


THE CONSTRUCT VALIDATION OF AN INSTRUMENT
TO IDENTIFY DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL
JUDGMENT OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN:
A PILOT STUDY

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
SANDRA JEAN STYER
1974




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
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has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Elementary Education


Major professor

Date Dec. 5, 1973



ABSTRACT

THE CONSTRUCT VALIDATION OF AN INSTRUMENT TO IDENTIFY DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN: A PILOT STUDY

By

Sandra Jean Styer

This study was conducted to determine whether an instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflict situations and accompanying probing questions related to typical elementary classroom situations could be constructed which would identify developmental stages of moral judgment in accordance with Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment development.

The major question this study attempted to answer was: Is it possible to construct an instrument composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development? In order to ascertain the construct validity of the instrument, it was necessary to determine significant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven year old groups in the percent usage of each of the developmental stages of moral judgment.


Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment development is sequential and that a child must progress through each stage sequentially. This sequential progression, further evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment, was investigated in this study. Was the attainment of each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the simulated situations contained in the instrument for the total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral judgment responses are limited to one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

The instrument was developed to be used with elementary school children. In this study, the interview was conducted with forty-eight predominantly middle-class children. There were sixteen subjects from each of age groups seven, nine, and eleven years. Each individual subject was presented ten hypothetical moral conflict situations with accompanying probing questions. The responses for each subject were copied verbatim by the investigator who then qualitatively analyzed the responses. On a situation-by-situation basis, the responses for



individual subjects were assigned ratings according to the stage(s) which was indicated by the response to one situation. The stages were identified by reference to Kohlberg's definitions of each developmental stage. From these ratings for each subject, percent usage scores were derived for each situation and for the total instrument. The percent usage scores were used to calculate weighted percent usage scores which were summed to derive moral maturity scores.

The moral maturity scores for each of the individual situations and for the total instrument were used in analyses of variance to determine whether there were significant differences in moral maturity related to age. The differences among the three age groups were found to be significant at the .05 level in the total instrument and in eight of the ten individual situations.

The developmental sequence of moral judgment stages was determined through an investigation of the correlation between the use of two given stages by one individual. In general, it was found that the correlations diminished as the stages became more widely separated.

An analysis of the percent usage of each stage at each age level revealed that there was a general tendency for the use of stages 1 and 2 to decrease with age and for stages 3 and 4 to increase with age, although this trend was not perfectly consistent.

The degree to which individual situations correlated with the total instrument ranged from $-.08$ to $+.90$ with nine of the ten situations correlating significantly with the total instrument at the $.05$ level.

It was found that 52% of the subjects had a modal percent usage of one stage of development in at least 45% of their responses. Thirty-five percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses.

The individual responses which had been analyzed in the qualitative analysis provided the basis for the construction of the scoring manual. The typical responses of each of the four represented stages of moral judgment development were summarized in the manual for each hypothetical conflict situation. Directions were included for the derivation of a weighted percent usage or moral maturity score for the total instrument. The scoring manual was designed to be used by elementary teachers.

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By

Sandra Jean Styer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

As an objective of the elementary school curriculum in the United States, moral education has received varying degrees of emphasis throughout the past century. There has been a lack of consensus among people in our society as to what institution is responsible for promoting specific moral and social values in children. Some variation in amount of emphasis has been a reflection of rapidly changing moral and social values; while other variation has been attributable to problems arising from differential conceptions of moral education. Conceptions of moral education have ranged from the authoritative inculcating of arbitrarily chosen rules and regulations to the critical examination of social problems.

Dewey emphasized the need for schools to provide an approach to moral education through opportunities for social living. He listed the three resources of the school for moral education as:

1. the life of the school as a social institution in itself
2. methods of learning and of doing work
3. the school studies or curriculum¹

¹John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), p. 44.

Dewey elaborated upon these three aspects as follows:

In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order etc., are the expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis.²

Dewey's concern with the development of individuals who could participate effectively in a democracy has continued to be shared by many educators. Citizenship education as an objective of contemporary elementary social studies curricula emphasizes character development. This development

. . . is accomplished slowly and gradually over the years through a program which places increasing responsibility on children for their own actions in the classroom. As they grow in maturity, they are placed in situations where they may make decisions and choices relative to their own and group welfare and progress. The extent to which the right decisions and choices are made will indicate a growing sense of responsibility and consciousness of group welfare on the part of individual children.³

Miel and Brogan's concern with the development of democratic citizens has led them to emphasize that cooperation is not necessarily democratic.

²Ibid., p. 44.

³John Jarolimek and Huber M. Walsh, eds., Readings for Social Studies (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 80.



For a person to be cooperative in such a way that he submerges his individuality for the 'good of the group' is not democratic even though the individual sacrifices his difference willingly. Cooperation is democratic only if it nurtures individuality for the mutual benefit of the person and his society. Democratic cooperation implies that the individual is integrating his desire to be with others, to fit into the group and thus to belong, with his desire to be himself, to be unique, to have self-respect, to be competent, to achieve.⁴

In continuing, they suggested the school's role:

The school, then, has the task of helping children learn the skills and experience the satisfaction of cooperating with a high degree of good feeling, maintenance of individual integrity, and the use of intelligence to create results beyond the capacity of any one individual. At the same time, the school must help children learn to deal with competition realistically.⁵

In learning to cope effectively with both cooperation and competition, children must receive some guidance in their decision making. This requires classroom teachers who are sensitive to the behavior and judgment of children. If the teacher is to guide the child, the stage of development at which the child presently functions must be recognized. It is assumed that "cooperation" and "competition" require moral judgments on the part of the individual. Thus, knowing the developmental stage of children's moral judgments will provide the basis for planning guided instructional experiences to enhance this judgment.

⁴Alice Miel and Peggy Brogan, More Than Social Studies, A View of Social Learning in the Elementary School (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 20.

⁵Ibid., p. 21.

Kohlberg has constructed an instrument which identified developmental stages of moral judgment through the analysis of responses to an interview composed of ten hypothetical moral conflict situations, each followed by probing questions designed to analyze and sometimes challenge the child's choice of alternative responses to the conflict situation. Kohlberg's instrument was originally developed to collect data from subjects aged ten to sixteen years. His hypothetical moral conflict situations were designed to be intellectually challenging to educated adults. It was assumed that these complex and unfamiliar situations and questions would be more intriguing to the subjects than would the presentation of familiar conflict situations. It was expected that they would facilitate the qualitative analysis of each case.⁶

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to construct (and determine the construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's theory) an instrument designed to identify, through responses to simulated elementary classroom situations, the developmental stages of moral judgment (as defined by Kohlberg)⁷ of children aged seven to eleven years.

⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958), p. 76.

⁷Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization,"



Questions

The major question which this study attempted to answer was:

1. Is it possible to construct an instrument composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development?

Related questions which this study attempted to answer were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the simulated situations contained in the instrument for the total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral judgment responses are limited to one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

Background of Theory

Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral judgment was consistent with his cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. As one component of socialization, moral judgment development was found to be characterized by changes in cognitive-structural form which were universal and related to age. Kohlberg was able to identify

six developmental stages of moral judgment which met the criteria of cognitive stages proposed by Piaget.⁸

The stages were defined on the basis of ten, thirteen, and sixteen year old children's responses to ten hypothetical moral dilemmas which required the child to choose between two culturally acceptable or two culturally unacceptable alternative solutions to each dilemma. Dependent upon their choice of alternative, each subject was presented questions probing the reasoning underlying his choices. The moral judgments were classified into levels and stages of development which were found to form an invariant sequence. These levels and stages were explicitly defined by Kohlberg:

Level 1

Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.

Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2. Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally other's. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

Level II

Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectations of others.

⁸Ibid., p. 375.

Stage 3. Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment of intentions.

Stage 4. Authority and social-order-maintaining orientation. Orientation to 'doing duty' and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.

Level III

Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties.

Stage 5. Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Stage 6. Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.⁹

Kohlberg identified twenty-five aspects of moral judgment (see Table 1) each of which was defined specifically in terms of the above stages. Kohlberg explained:

These aspects represent basic moral concepts believed to be present in any society. . . . Each of these concepts is differently defined and used at each of the six stages.¹⁰

. . . At each stage, the same basic moral concept or aspect is defined, but at each higher stage this definition is more differentiated, more integrated and more general or universal.¹¹

⁹Ibid., p. 376.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 376.

¹¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), p. 30.



TABLE 1.--Coded Aspects of Developing Moral Judgment.^a

Code	Description	Aspects
I. Value	Locus of value--modes of attributing (moral) value to acts, persons, or events. Modes of assessing value consequences in a situation.	1. Considering motives in judging action. 2. Considering consequences in judging action. 3. Subjectivity vs. objectivity of values assessed. 4. Relation of obligation to wish. 5. Identification with actor or victims in judging the action. 6. Status of actor and victim as changing the moral worth of actions.
II. Choice	Mechanisms of resolving or denying awareness of conflicts.	7. Limiting actor's responsibility for consequences by shifting responsibility onto others. 8. Reliance on discussion and compromise, mainly unrealistically. 9. Distorting situation so that conforming behavior is seen as always maximizing the interests of the actor or of others involved.
III. Sanctions and Motives	The dominant motives and sanctions for moral or deviant action.	10. Punishment or negative reactions. 11. Disruption of an interpersonal relationship. 12. A concern by actor for welfare, for positive state of the other. 13. Self-condemnation.

TABLE 1.--Continued.

Code	Description	Aspects
IV. Rules	The ways in which rules are conceptualized, applied, and generalized. The basis of the validity of a rule.	14. Definition of an act as deviant. (Definition of moral rules and norms.) 15. Generality and consistency of rules. 16. Waiving rules for personal relations (particularism).
V. Rights and Authority	Basis and limits of Control over persons and property.	17. Non-motivational attributes ascribed to authority (knowledge, etc.). (Motivational attributes considered under III above.) 18. Extent or scope of authority's rights. Rights of liberty. 19. Rights of possession or property.
VI. Positive Justice	Reciprocity and equality.	20. Exchange and reciprocity as a motive for role conformity. 21. Reciprocity as a motive to deviate (e.g., revenge). 22. Distributive justice. Equality and impartiality. 23. Concepts of maintaining partner's expectations as a motive for conformity. Contract and trust.
VII. Punitive Justice	Standards and functions of punishment.	24. Punitive tendencies or expectations. (a) Notions of equating punishment and crime. 25. Functions or purpose of punishment.

^aLawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education and the Public Schools: A Developmental View," Religion and Public Education, ed. by Theodore R.Sizer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 170.



In addition to this logical consistency, these stages had empirical consistency both across aspects and verbal situations. There were three indications of empirical consistency.

. . . First, by the fact that an average of 50 per cent of a subject's moral judgments fit a single stage. Second, such consistency is indicated by fairly high correlations in moral levels from one story to another. Third, it is indicated by the fact that these correlations between situations are not specific, i.e., there is a general moral level factor.¹²

While Kohlberg demonstrated that moral judgment development is an area of cognitive development, he suggested that the rate and extent of development is partially dependent upon role-taking experiences and general social participation. Thus, Kohlberg's theory could provide the impetus for modifications in elementary curriculum.

Assumptions

Basic to this study are the following assumptions:

1. Moral judgment is an area of structural development. There are distinct changes in the form or structure of the child's moral judgments related to age changes.
2. Kohlberg's definition of the six stages of moral judgment development is a valid description of this cognitive development.
3. Kohlberg's six stages of development of moral judgment form an invariant sequence.

¹²Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 388.

4. A child's developmental stage of moral judgment may be identified through an analysis of his stated reason(s) for taking a specific action related to a given incident depicted in a hypothetical conflict situation.

5. The situations presented in the moral conflict stories have no general influence upon the developmental stage of the response which is elicited.

6. The alternatives chosen by the child in the hypothetical conflict situations are not determined by his knowledge of the "right" answers.

7. The child's moral behavior in the classroom is a reflection of his developmental stage of moral judgment.

Method

Subjects

The study included forty-eight children aged seven, nine, and eleven years from a school serving primarily middle-class suburban and rural children. At each of grade levels one, three, and five, sixteen children of the appropriate age were selected randomly from those with parental permission to participate in the study.

Procedure

The instrument was constructed according to Kohlberg's prototypes for designing stories and accompanying questions to elicit moral judgment.

The instrument consisted of hypothetical moral dilemmas similar to those which the subject might conceivably encounter in the elementary classroom. The rationale for the use of hypothetical moral dilemmas to elicit moral judgments has been given by Turiel.

By designing stories that do not have a culturally correct answer it is possible to partially circumvent the normative problem and elicit moral reasoning rather than moral knowledge or opinion. The reasoning used in judging right and wrong in these situations reflects a child's internally organized mode of structuring the social and moral world.¹³

The instrument was pretested to avoid the inclusion of stories in which one alternative response was far more frequently chosen.

The instrument was presented to the total sample. A total of ten hypothetical conflict situations and accompanying questions were orally presented to individual subjects.

The subject's responses to the questions designed to elicit the reason for the child's moral judgment provided the data to be analyzed in terms of Kohlberg's six developmental stages of moral judgment. All responses were copied verbatim.

Initially, rapport was established through a standard explanation to the subject relative to the

¹³Elliot Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking," Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology, ed. by Paul H. Mussen, Jonas Langer, and Martin Covington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 96.

interviewer's interest in learning more about children. The need to copy responses in order to facilitate memory was explained to the subject. There was assurance of the confidential nature of this material. Finally, the subjects were requested to refrain from discussing the study with other children.

Analysis of the Data

Each subject's responses to the proposed instrument were analyzed and coded using Kohlberg's method. A score was derived which identified each subject's developmental stage of moral judgment on each story as well as on the total instrument.

For each hypothetical moral conflict situation the typical responses at each stage of moral judgment development were summarized. These summaries composed the scoring manual which provides a method of scoring future responses to the instrument.

The data was analyzed to determine the individual subject's consistency of responses. The percentage of subjects indicating one stage of moral judgment development in at least 50% of their responses was determined.

Another factor analyzed in relation to the proposed instrument was the degree of intercorrelation among the ten hypothetical conflict situations.

Since the major purpose of this study was to determine the construct validity of the proposed instrument,



the scores were analyzed to determine whether the responses formed a cognitive-developmental hierarchy of stages conforming to Kohlberg's three levels and six stages of moral judgment development.

Limitations

The subjects of this study were limited to individuals from one suburban, middle-class, traditionally graded, elementary school.

The instrument, composed of one set of stories presented to children of elementary grade levels one, three, and five, may have been less intrinsically interesting than one designed for a narrower age range.

Flavell suggested that a general limitation of Piaget-type studies is that the subject's language may not accurately reflect his thought structure, ". . . that what the child says will lead you either to an overestimation or an underestimation of his operant intellectual level."¹⁴

Definition of Terms

The following terms are related to Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment development and to the writer's instrument.

Moral judgment.--The term "moral judgment," as used in this study, refers to Kohlberg's definition which he has clearly stated:

¹⁴John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), p. 437.

1. Moral action is oriented to or preceded by a value judgment.
2. Moral judgments are viewed by the judge as taking priority over other value judgments.
3. Moral actions and judgments are associated with judgments of the self as good or bad.
4. Moral judgments tend to be justified or based on reasons which are not limited to consequences of that particular act in that situation.
5. Moral judgments tend toward a high degree of generality, universality, consistency and inclusiveness.
6. Moral judgments tend to be considered as objective by their makers, i.e., to be agreed to independently of differences of personality and interest.¹⁵

Aspects.--Twenty-five aspects of developing moral judgment have been identified by Kohlberg.¹⁶ Classification of children's responses into the six stages ". . . was made in terms of placement of each moral idea or judgment of the child in a given stage with regard to one of twenty-five aspects of morality."¹⁷ These twenty-five aspects are listed in Table 1.

Classroom situations.--In this study, the term "classroom situations" refers to the types of situations depicted in the hypothetical moral conflict situations in the writer's instrument.

¹⁵Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958), pp. 8-12.

¹⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education and the Public Schools: A Developmental View," Religion and Public Education, ed. by Theodore R.Sizer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 170-173.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 170.

Construct validity.--In this study, the term "construct validity" refers to the degree to which the subjects' responses to the interview situations reflect developmental stages of moral judgment consistent with Kohlberg's theory.

Hypothetical moral dilemma.--This term refers to a moral conflict situation which ". . . poses a conflict between two culturally unacceptable (or acceptable) alternatives."¹⁸


Invariant developmental sequence.--This term refers to the idea that the order of the developmental stages of moral judgment is invariant. Kohlberg described this:

All movement is forward in sequence, and does not skip steps. Children may move through these stages at varying speeds, of course, and may be found half in and half out of a particular stage. An individual may stop at any given stage and at any age, but if he continues to move, he must move in accord with these steps.¹⁹

Percent usage.--In this study, the term percent usage refers to that quantity which indicates an individual subject's relative use of a given developmental stage for an individual hypothetical conflict situation or for the total instrument. For example, a percent usage of 35 for stage 2 for an individual subject for the total instrument indicates that 35% of the responses (points assigned on

¹⁸Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking," p. 96.

¹⁹Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral," p. 28.



the basis of the qualitative analysis) of the individual subject for the total instrument were identified as stage 2 responses.

Moral education.--For this study, Kohlberg's comprehensive definition of "moral education" will be used. It is the ". . . transmission of the values of justice on which our society is founded."²⁰

Moral principle.--The term "moral principle" was defined by Kohlberg in his early research. He stated:

Essentially, a moral principle is a rule of choice and a principled choice is one which fulfills the criteria of regularity, universality and ideality.²¹

Stages.--Furth defined the term "stages" in reference to Piaget's research. However, the definition is equally applicable to Kohlberg's research. It is:

Successive developmental periods, each one characterized by a relatively stable general structure that incorporates developmentally earlier structures in a higher synthesis.²²

Structure.--Furth has also provided a concise definition of the term "structure" as:

The general form, the interrelatedness of parts within an organized totality. Structure can often be used

²⁰Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," Moral Education, ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R.Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 68.

²¹Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes," p. 286.

²²Hans G. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, Theoretical Foundations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 265.

interchangeably with organization, system, form, coordination.²³

Educational Implications

The establishment of the construct validity of an instrument to identify developmental stages of moral judgment through responses to simulated classroom situations would provide an instrument possibly more relevant to elementary school children's interests and problems. Teachers may perceive the instrument as more relevant to measuring citizenship and related social studies objectives.

To the extent that this instrument identified children at relatively immature stages of moral judgment, it would suggest a need for teachers to periodically evaluate the developmental stage of the child's moral judgment. Such a longitudinal approach would be accompanied by instruction designed to stimulate higher levels of moral judgment.

Dependent upon the teacher's philosophy, this instruction would be direct or indirect. Scriven advocates the former.

Our goal should be the straightforward development of cognitive skills for handling value disputes--not persuasion or indoctrination in the usual sense. Moral reasoning and the moral behavior it indicates should be taught and taught about, if for no other reason than it is immoral to keep students ignorant of the empirical and logical bases behind the morality which is behind the law and the institutions which

²³Ibid., p. 265.

incorporate this country's virtues and permit its vices. But in addition to this intellectual payoff is the practical benefit to a society of possessing members who are skilled in making value judgments. Such a society becomes a moral community, offering important benefits to all of its members.²⁴

The recent trend toward including psychology, sociology, social psychology, and anthropology in elementary social studies programs indicates the increased valuation of the development of human relations skills through direct instruction. This instrument would be a possible evaluative measure of the effectiveness of new programs.

As an example, Lippett's Social Science Laboratory Units,²⁵ use inquiry techniques to help children understand human behavior in a scientific manner. An examination of the objectives for this program suggests that the attainment of selected objectives would be related to children's developmental stages of moral judgment.

Organization of the Remainder of the Dissertation

The related literature will be reviewed in Chapter II. In Chapter III, the method of the study will be presented. The results of the study will be given in Chapter IV. Conclusions and recommendations for further study will

²⁴Michael Scriven, "Values in the Curriculum," Readings for Social Studies in Elementary Education, ed. by John Jarolimek and Huber M. Walsh (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 83.

²⁵Ronald Lippett, et al., The Teacher's Role in Social Science Investigation (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1969), pp. 144-146.

comprise Chapter V. The instrument and scoring manual will be included in the appendices.

In the chapter which follows, that literature will be reviewed which is related to the major cognitive-developmental theories of moral judgment.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The review of the literature will be limited to a survey of the major studies related to the cognitive-developmental approach to the study of the development of moral judgment. The reader who is interested in the two other major theories of the development of moral judgment, the associationistic and psychoanalytic theories, may refer to the comprehensive selections by Kohlberg¹ and Hoffman.²

Initially, there will be a description of the cognitive-developmental approach. This will provide a background for the comprehension of the cognitive-developmental approach to the study of moral judgment development. The rationale for the cognitive-developmental approach in moral judgment research will be presented. There will be a summary of the research of Piaget, whose findings were an impetus for much of the recent research

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification," Child Psychology, The Sixty-second Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).

²Martin L. Hoffman, "Moral Development," Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology, ed. by Paul H. Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970).

in moral judgment. Some of the studies related to selected attributes of Piaget's theory will be reviewed. Critiques of Piaget's theory and research by Kohlberg and others will be examined. Kohlberg's theory and research related to the development of moral judgment will be presented in some detail and studies related to his theory will be reviewed. Finally, there will be a discussion of several related conceptions of moral education in the public school curriculum held by Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg.

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach

The cognitive-developmental approach to research in general cognitive development will be examined inasmuch as it is basic to the more specific cognitive-developmental approach to research in the development of moral judgment.

Fundamental to the comprehension of the cognitive-developmental approach is a recognition of the assumptions upon which cognitive-developmental theory is based.

Kohlberg has listed those assumptions for the cognitive-developmental approach in general as well as those for the cognitive-developmental approach to social-emotional development of which moral judgment development is a component.

Some assumptions of cognitive-developmental theory in general are:

1. Basic development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure which must be explained

by parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.

2. Development of cognitive structure is the result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment, . . .
3. Cognitive structures are always structures (schemata) of action. While cognitive activities move the sensorimotor to the symbolic to verbal-propositional modes, the organization of these modes is always an organization of actions upon objects.
4. The direction of development of cognitive structure is toward greater equilibrium in this organism-environment interaction, i.e., of greater balance or reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism. This balance in interaction, rather than a static correspondence of a concept to an object, represents 'truth,' 'logic,' 'knowledge,' or 'adaptation' in their general forms. This balance is reflected in the underlying stability (conservation) of a cognitive act under apparent transformation, with development representing a widened system of transformations maintaining such conservation.³

The following related assumptions are specific to social-emotional development:

1. Affective development and functioning, and cognitive development and functioning are not distinct realms. 'Affective' and 'cognitive' development are parallel; they represent different perspectives and contexts in defining structural change.
2. There is a fundamental unity of personality organization and development termed the ego, or the self. While there are various strands of social development (psychosexual development, moral development, etc.), these strands are united by their common reference to a single concept of self in a single social world. Social development is, in essence, the restructuring of the (1) concept of self, (2) in its relationship to concepts of

³Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 348.



other people, (3) conceived as being in a common social world with social standards. In addition to the unity of level of social development due to general cognitive development (the g factor in mental maturity tests), there is a further unity of development due to a common factor of ego maturity.

3. All the basic processes involved in 'physical' cognitions, and in stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic to social development. In addition, however, social cognition always involves role-taking, i.e., awareness that the other is in some way like the self, and that the other knows or is responsive to the self in a system of complementary expectations. Accordingly developmental changes in the social self reflect parallel changes in conceptions of the social world.
4. The direction of social or ego development is also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's actions and those of others toward the self. In its generalized form this equilibrium is the end point or definer of morality, conceived as principles of justice, i.e., or reciprocity or equality.⁴

An additional assumption of cognitive-developmental theory is that ". . . basic mental structure is the result of an interaction between certain organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world, rather than reflecting either one directly." As described by Kohlberg:

This interaction leads to cognitive stages which represent the transformations of simple early cognitive structures as these are applied to (or assimilate) the external world, and as they are accommodated to or restructured by the external world in the course of being applied to it.⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 349.

⁵Ibid., p. 352.

These cognitive stages as characterized by Piaget were reviewed by Kohlberg:

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving the same problem at different ages.
2. These different modes of thought form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a 'structured whole.' A given stage-response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it. Rather it represents an underlying thought-organization, . . .
4. Cognitive stages are heirarchical integrations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function. The general adaptational functions of cognitive structures are always the same (for Piaget the maintenance of an equilibrium between the organism and the environment, defined as a balance of assimilation and accommodation). Accordingly higher stages displace (or rather reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages.⁶

This interactional conception of stages assumes that the specific formation of stages is dependent upon experience and that passage through the stage may be accelerated by more frequent or more intensely stimulating experiences.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 352-353.



The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to the
Study of Moral Judgment Development

The validity of the cognitive-developmental approach to the study of moral judgment development is supported by the findings of the early and monumental research in moral development conducted by Hartshorne and May. Although the purpose of this research was to determine the degree of consistency in an individual's moral behavior and correlates of moral behavior rather than to identify cognitive stages in moral judgment development, the implications of the findings are pertinent to the cognitive-developmental approach.

The Hartshorne and May studies in deceit evaluated three types of deceptive conduct (cheating, lying, and stealing) in specific situations. The results of these studies demonstrated that deceit is not a unitary character trait, but rather a function of specific situations. These concomitants of deceit in the order of their importance were: (1) classroom association, (2) general personal handicaps, such as relatively low IQ, poor resistance to suggestion, and emotional instability, (3) cultural and social limitations in the home background, and (4) such other miscellaneous facts as are loosely correlated with deception.⁷

⁷Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in Deceit (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), p. 412.



Similarly, the Hartshorne and May studies in self-control as measured by two series of tests (five persistence and four inhibition tests) found conduct to be determined by the nature of the specific situation. Relatively low correlations were found among their measures of honesty, service, and self-control.⁸

Piaget related his theory of moral judgment development to his theory of general cognitive development. He explained:

Everyone is aware of the kinship between logical and ethical norms. Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action. Nearly all contemporary theories agree in recognizing the existence of this parallelism--from the a priori view which regards pure reason as the arbiter both of theoretical reflection and daily practice, to the sociological theories of knowledge and of ethical values. It is therefore in no way surprising that the analysis of child thought should bring to the fore certain particular aspects of this general phenomenon.⁹

This parallelism was reflected in Piaget's concept of egocentrism. Piaget wrote:

Just as the ideas which enter his mind appear from the first in the form of beliefs and not of hypotheses requiring verification, so do the feelings that arise in the child's consciousness appear to him from the first as having value and not as having to be submitted to some ulterior evaluation. It is only through contact with the judgments and evaluations of others that this intellectual and affective anomie will.

⁸Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in Service and Self-Control (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 445.

⁹Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1948), p. 398.



gradually yield to the pressure of collective logical and moral laws.¹⁰

Piaget applied his theories of cognitive structure and stages to moral judgment development. Kohlberg asserted that this structural component of moral judgment development is related to the development of motives and affects inasmuch as these are primarily mediated by changes in thought patterns. This implies that:

1. There should be an empirical correlation between moral judgment maturity and non-moral aspects of cognitive development.
2. Moral judgment stages or sequences are to be described in cognitive-structural terms even in regard to 'affective' aspects of moral judgment, like guilt, empathy, etc.
3. There should be an empirical correlation between maturity on 'affective' and cognitive aspects of morality, even if affective maturity is assessed by projective test or interview methods not explicitly focused on moral judgment.
4. The way in which moral judgment influences action should also be characterizable in cognitive-structural terms.
5. The socioenvironmental influences favorable to moral judgment development should be influences characterizable in cognitive-structural terms, for example, in terms of role-taking opportunities.¹¹

The major proponent of this cognitive-developmental approach to research in moral judgment development has been Jean Piaget.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 401.

¹¹Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," pp. 390-391.



Piaget's Theory of the Development
of Moral Judgment

Piaget proposed his developmental theory of moral judgment in his classic volume, The Moral Judgment of the Child. He investigated Swiss children's respect for rules and their sense of justice through the presentation of hypothetical situations followed by questions to which subjects responded by choosing from predetermined alternatives designed to reflect stages of moral judgment.

An analysis of the responses related to children's respect for rules found that:

. . . these answers present us with two distinct moral attitudes--one, that judges actions according to their material consequences, and one that only takes intentions into account. These two attitudes may co-exist at the same age and even in the same child, but broadly speaking, they do not synchronize. Objective responsibility diminishes on the average as the child grows older, and subjective responsibility gains correlatively in importance. We have therefore two processes partially overlapping, but of which the second gradually succeeds in dominating the first.¹²

Objective responsibility as an aspect of moral realism is one of several observable aspects of young children's concepts of rules identified by Piaget. Kohlberg listed these:

1. Objective responsibility (as opposed to intentionalism). Objective responsibility is seen by Piaget as a kind of literalistic evaluation of an act in terms of its exact conformity to the rule rather than in terms of its intent. It is indicated by a judgment of the act in terms of

¹²Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 133.

physical consequences rather than in terms of intentions.

2. Unchangeability of the rules (as opposed to flexibility). This is interpreted as fixity of rules regardless of changed requirements of the situation to which the rule is to be applied.
3. Absolutism of value (as opposed to relativism). According to Piaget, the judgment of an act as either right or wrong is believed by the child to be shared by everyone, since only one perspective is taken toward the act. In cases of clear conflict in judgments of the same act, the adult's view is believed always to be right.
4. Moral wrongness defined by sanctions (as opposed to moral judgments made independently of sanctions). According to Piaget, the young child's definition of an act as wrong is based on the fact that the child is punished.
5. Duty defined as obedience to authority (as opposed to duty being defined in terms of conformity expectations of peers or equals). 'Any act showing obedience to a rule or even to an adult is right.'¹³

Piaget identified three stages in the development of children's sense of justice. They were:

One period, lasting up to the age of 7-8, during which justice is subordinated to adult authority; a period contained approximately between 8-11, and which is that of progressive equalitarianism; and finally a period which sets in towards 11-12, and during which purely equalitarian justice is tempered by considerations of equity.¹⁴

The first stage of the sense of justice has the five attributes of the first stage of the respect for rules with the following additional characteristics:

¹³Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification," p. 314.

¹⁴Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 315.

6. Ignorance of reciprocity in defining obligations (as opposed to defining obligations in terms of the rights of contract and exchange).
7. Expiative justice (as opposed to restitutive justice). Belief in severe, painful punishment rather than in restoration to the victim.
8. Immanent justice (as opposed to naturalistic causality). Belief that deviance will lead nature or physical things to injure the culprit.
9. Belief in collective responsibility (as opposed to individual responsibility).
10. Punishment by authority (rather than retaliative reciprocity by victim).
11. Favoritism by authority in distributing goods rather than impartiality, equality, distributive justice).¹⁵

These attributes of the heteronomous stage of moral judgment development are fostered by adult constraint which results in a "morality of constraint" described by Flavell as:

. . . formed in the context of the unilateral relations between child as inferior and adult as superior. The child adapts to the prohibitions and sanctions handed down from on high by reifying them into moral absolutes--sample 'givens' which are unquestioned and sacred, in theory if not in practice.

With development, this morality of constraint is at least partially replaced by a 'morality of cooperation,' formed out of the reciprocal relationships among status peers and based on mutual, rather than unilateral respect.¹⁶

¹⁵Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification," p. 315.

¹⁶John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 295-296.

Children pass from this morality of constraint as a consequence of moral experiences related to reciprocal relationships among peers, and relationships with adults.

Piaget explained:

. . . we may assume that it is the discovery of the imperfection of adult justice. When, as is almost bound to happen, a child is submitted to unjust treatment by his parents or his teachers, he will be less inclined to believe in a universal and automatic justice.¹⁷

This rationale as well as other Piagetian concepts have elicited negative reactions from Piaget's critics.

Critical Reactions to Piaget's Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to
Moral Judgment

Flavell has provided an evaluation specific to Piaget's theory and research in moral judgment development as well as valid general criticisms which may be extended to Piaget's study of moral judgment. Kohlberg has critically discussed those aspects of Piaget's theory and research which influenced the development of his theory and research.

Two common, but inappropriate, types of criticism of Piaget were identified by Flavell. One type was related to the fact that Piaget designed his research to investigate only those developmental questions which intrigued him, with little interest in antecedent-consequent factors

¹⁷Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 262.

such as general intelligence, socioeconomic background, etc. The second criticism was that Piaget failed to pursue one specific interest in great breadth and depth.¹⁸

Flavell reviewed those characteristics of Piaget's research and reporting which could be validly criticized. One such characteristic was that Piaget seldom precisely described his experiments.¹⁹

In regard to sampling procedure, Flavell contended that age and ready availability were probably the only factors determining Piaget's selection of subjects.²⁰

While Flavell approved of Piaget's use of the clinical method in interviewing children, he suggested that a semistandardization of procedure would have improved Piaget's research designs. Related to this was the problem of Piaget's unspecified sample sizes and the uncontrolled variation within his samples.²¹

Another problem was related to Piaget's organization and analysis of data. He has presented numerous verbatim protocols which effectively illustrate developmental stages, however, he has failed to provide even

¹⁸Flavell, Developmental Psychology, p. 430.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 430.

²⁰Ibid., p. 431.

²¹Ibid., p. 431.



rudimentary quantitative information which might have made his findings more convincing.²²

Flavell maintained that ". . . the child's linguistic comprehension and usage is not independent of underlying intellectual structure and orientation." However, he advised that one cannot expect the child's language usage to provide for an accurate assessment of his intellectual structure. In Piaget-type studies, evaluation of the child's verbalization may lead to either an overestimate or an underestimate of his intellectual level.²³ Furthermore, the developmental level of the child's response may be dependent upon the child's comprehension of particular concept-relevant words used by the experimenter.²⁴

Kohlberg was influenced by, but highly critical of, Piaget's theory and research. He contended that several of Piaget's moral judgment dimensions are representations of thought content rather than cognitive structure. For example:

. . . the dimension of responsiveness to peer as opposed to adult expectations. While Piaget hypothesizes this dimension as part of his autonomous stage, his rationale for deriving this from a consideration of cognitive form is vague and unconvincing. There is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring a peer than an adult.²⁵

²²Ibid., p. 432.

²³Ibid., p. 437.

²⁴Ibid., p. 436.

²⁵Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 325.

Kohlberg's extensive empirical study and logical analysis have suggested that Piaget's criteria for stage development have not been met by Piaget's two stages of moral judgment.²⁶

Kohlberg referred to the results of Turiel's research to demonstrate that while Piaget's concepts and methods do not adequately measure cognitive structure, the area of moral judgment is one of structural development.²⁷

Kohlberg contended that Piaget's stories ". . . do not reveal awareness or unawareness of intentions in moral judgment, but simply how much these are weighted against consequences."²⁸ He critically compared his assessment method with that of Piaget. Kohlberg classified open-ended responses into one of six stage categories. Piaget asked his subjects to choose between two given alternatives. Piaget's "right answer" might have reflected social learning of the content rather than understanding of the basic structure of the right answer.²⁹

²⁶Ibid., p. 375.

²⁷Elliot Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgments" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965).

²⁸Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 407.

²⁹Ibid., p. 407.

Such weaknesses and limitations of Piaget's theory and research have led to numerous critical reactions by other researchers as evidenced by the quantity of Piaget-related studies in moral judgment development, several of which will be reviewed in the next section.

Research Related to Piaget's Theory of the Development of Moral Judgment

Most of the major studies related to Piaget's theory of moral judgment development have focused upon one or more of the fundamental aspects of this theory, and have tended to be of the antecedent-consequent type.

Piaget contended that objective responsibility was an attribute of the heteronomous stage, characterized by the child's judging behavior in terms of physical consequences rather than intentions.

Boehm and Nass, who presented Piaget-type stories to children aged six to twelve years and of average intelligence, found that at nine years of age, the majority of American children reflected subjective more than objective responsibility in their moral judgments. Only half of Piaget's nine year olds gave subjective answers. The time span between these studies was suggested as an important factor. The only significant result related to social class was in the response to one situation in which the upper-middle class boys were significantly more concerned with the motivation behind the material damage than the

working-class boys who were more concerned with the actual damage.³⁰

Whiteman and Kosier interviewed children aged seven to twelve years using pairs of Piaget-type stories in which the first story of each pair involved an undesirable outcome despite good intentions, while the second story involved an undesirable outcome (with lesser consequence than that in the first story), but without good intentions. Decisions based upon intent were scored as mature, while decisions based upon consequences were scored as immature responses. It was found that the ability to make mature judgments is a function of advances in age and increases in IQ at each age. Maturity of moral judgment was not significantly related to personality characteristics as rated by teachers, sex of subject, Sunday School attendance, or membership in scouting organizations. Maturity of moral judgment was found to be related to children's attendance in ungraded classrooms.³¹

The young child's absolutism of perspective as opposed to the more mature individual's relativism of perspective was an aspect of Piaget's theory of moral realism which has been the focus of some research.

³⁰ Leonore Boehm and Martin L. Nass, "Social Class Differences in Conscience Development," Child Development, XXXIII (1962), p. 571.

³¹ Paul H. Whiteman and Kenneth P. Kosier, "Development of Children's Moralistic Judgments: Age, Sex, IQ, and Certain Personal-Experiential Variables," Child Development, XXXV (1964), p. 843.



Lerner studied perspective in the moral reasoning of six to twelve year old boys of Geneva, Switzerland. He studied three aspects of perspective, ". . . empathic capacity, the ability to resist various prestige suggestions, and the ability to resist various sociocentric suggestions.³² Lerner found that until age eight or nine, children's judgments were absolute. They judged the exterior aspects of social behavior and assumed everyone had the same opinion of others. After age eight or nine, the child's judgments were more relativistic. His ability to resist the prestige of majority opinion and seniority was found to increase slightly with age. Even adults retain some residue of moral heteronomy.³³

Absolutism of perspective in relation to members of in-groups and out-groups decreased differentially with increased age. The finding of a correlation among Lerner's three aspects of perspective in some individual children indicated the possibility of the existence of social personality types in young children related to cultural factors.³⁴

MacRae tested two hypotheses related to the research findings of both Piaget and Lerner. MacRae

³²Eugene Lerner, "The Problem of Perspective in Moral Reasoning," The American Journal of Sociology, XLIII (September, 1937), p. 249.

³³Ibid., p. 260.

³⁴Ibid., p. 249.

hypothesized that the questions of Piaget and Lerner involved an underlying dimension of moral judgment other than age and that this dimension was associated with the type of authority relations experienced by the child.³⁵

MacRae's study of the moral judgment of five to fourteen year old boys indicated that the moral judgment questions elicited three relatively independent clusters rather than a single factor. These three clusters were not found to be related to parental authority as measured in this study.³⁶

Piaget's distinction between his two moral judgment stages in terms of the definition of duty, first as obedience to authority and later as conformity to peer expectations, has been studied by Boehm. Boehm used Piaget's clinical method with Piaget-type stories accompanied by probing questions and found distinct differences between the responses of Swiss and American children. Compared to American children's responses, Swiss children reflected less confidence in their peers and a longer duration of the belief in the omniscience of adult authorities. Boehm proposed that the American culture, which promotes cooperation among children rather than dependence upon adults, stimulates the more rapid

³⁵Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Test of Piaget's Theories of Moral Development," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIX (1954), p. 14.

³⁶Ibid., p. 18.

development of social conscience as a result of pressure to learn group social skills. The cultural differences between an inner-directed and an other-directed society may have accounted for the apparent differences in the content of conscience. The American child's conscience was oriented to social adjustment while the Swiss child's conscience was oriented to character improvement.³⁷

In a related study, Boehm investigated the effect of mental and socioeconomic levels upon the development of conscience and challenged Piaget's conclusion that the child cannot reach the stage of mature moral judgment until he is independent of adults and has achieved peer reciprocity. Her subjects were six to nine years old, of gifted and average intelligence from upper-middle-class and working class socioeconomic levels. The interviews related to peer reciprocity versus dependence on authority elicited judgmental responses from the working-class child at both intelligence levels which were of a higher level than those of the upper-middle-class child. At both socioeconomic levels the gifted children gave mature responses at least one year earlier than the children of average intelligence.³⁸

³⁷Leonore Boehm, "The Development of Independence: A Comparative Study," Child Development, XXVIII (March, 1957), p. 92.

³⁸Leonore Boehm, "The Development of Conscience: A Comparison of American Children of Different Mental and Socio-economic Levels," Child Development, XXXIII (1963), p. 575.

A major attribute of Piaget's sense of justice in the heteronomous stage was the young child's belief in expiative justice (the preference for severe punishment of the offender rather than restitution to the victim).

MacRae's investigation of the association of moral judgment development with the type of authority relations experienced by the child found that greater maturity of moral judgment on MacRae's "punishment" index was significantly related to the father's higher occupational status.³⁹

Johnson found that higher IQ, increasing chronological age, and higher status parental occupation were positively correlated with more mature moral judgment in regard to the dimension of expiation vs. restitution.⁴⁰

Piaget's concept of immanent justice (the belief that misbehavior will result in punishment by physical calamities) has been the subject of some research.

Johnson found that age, IQ, and parent attitudes were positively correlated with responses to immanent justice items. He also found a high correlation between responses to immanent justice items but a relatively low correlation between responses to immanent justice items and other attributes of moral judgment.⁴¹

³⁹MacRae, "Piaget's Theories," p. 18.

⁴⁰Ronald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral Judgments," Child Development, XXXIII (1962), p. 352.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 352.

Another body of research is a consequence of the challenge to Piaget's thesis that the development of moral judgment is primarily dependent upon age. Social learning theorists have proposed that moral judgment development may be accelerated by direct social learning instruction.

Bandura and McDonald attempted to demonstrate ". . . that children's moral orientations can be altered and even reversed by the manipulation of response-reinforcement contingencies and by the provision of appropriate social models."⁴² Their subjects whose moral judgment had been classified as either predominantly objective or subjective were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups. In one group children were positively reinforced for the adoption of the observed adults model's evaluative responses which were contrary to the group's orientation. The second group of children were not reinforced for the imitation of the observed adult model's evaluative responses. Children in the third group were not exposed to models but were reinforced for moral judgments that were counter to their dominant moral orientation. It was found that subjectivity was positively related to age but unrelated to sex differences. Objective and subjective judgments occurred simultaneously rather than as developmental stages. Subjective children exposed

⁴²Albert Bandura and Frederick J. McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVII (1963), p. 275.

to objective models, and those positively reinforced for imitating models' objective moral judgments became more objective in their moral judgments and retained this orientation in their post-experimental behavior. Modification of children's moral judgments was as effective with exposure to models alone as with the combination of models and social reinforcement. Operant conditioning alone resulted in a slight but not statistically significant increase in objective responses. Modeling combined with reinforcement was more effective with girls, while boys were more responsive to modeling without reinforcement.⁴³

Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich, and Nathanson replicated Bandura and McDonald's study with the addition of several controls and extended analyses.⁴⁴ The subjects, who were five to twelve years old, were assigned to four groups on the basis of pretest scores. These groups represented tentative and definite high (subjective) and tentative and definite low (objective) judgmental responses. The low subjects were exposed to a model's low moral judgments. The posttest consisted of six repeated items, six new items, and six rather unusual items presented either immediately or two weeks after the modeling phase. Bandura and McDonald's results were replicated. Numerous

⁴³Ibid., pp. 279-280.

⁴⁴Philip A. Cowan, et al., "Social Learning and Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Moral Development," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, II (1969), p. 266.

variables were identified which influenced the modeling effects. These variable included the subjects' pretest scores, the particular measure, time between conditioning and posttest, type of item, and direction of conditioning.⁴⁵

The researchers suggested that Kohlberg's moral judgment stages be used for future analyses replicating the format of the Bandura and McDonald study to focus upon stage changes.⁴⁶ They concluded that social learning theorists need to investigate developmental levels of moral judgment as a possible variable related to the influence of adult models on children's responses.⁴⁷

Piaget's critics have generally failed to propose more adequate and comprehensive theories with additional or alternative aspects and stages of development of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment has been unique in its definition of aspects and stages which are genuinely developmental. A brief review of Kohlberg's criticisms of Piaget's theory and research will provide a basis for understanding the rationale of Kohlberg's approach.

Kohlberg has offered an explanation for the lack of individual consistency to be found across Piaget's

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 261.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 272.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 273.

items eliciting the judgments of the intentions versus the consequences of acts.

Failure to find individual consistency beyond that due to age suggests that development with regard to such items merely reflects a process of moving from ignorance to knowledge of cultural cliches, rather than a process of moving from one level of thinking to another.⁴⁸

Piaget's interview items investigating intentions versus consequences reflected typologically consistent orientations but involved modes of thought more complex than those inferred by Piaget's decision to score the items dichotomously.⁴⁹

Kohlberg contended that some of Piaget's moral judgment dimensions were related to culture rather than cognitive form. For example:

There is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring a peer than an adult. It is not surprising to find, then, that this dimension does not vary regularly with chronological and mental age, that what age trends exist are absent in some national groups (e.g., the Swiss), and that in general this dimension is sensitive to a wide variety of cultural and subcultural influences which cannot be analyzed in rate of development terms.⁵⁰

Piaget's method of interviewing required children to choose between two prepackaged alternatives. Kohlberg criticized this technique:

This facilitates children's social learning of the content of the 'right answer' without necessarily implying development of awareness of the structure

⁴⁸Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking," p. 186.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 186.

⁵⁰Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 375.

underlying the right answer. Furthermore the Piaget stories do not reveal awareness or unawareness of intentions in moral judgment, but simply how much these are weighted against consequences.⁵¹

Kohlberg discussed the Cowan, Langer, Nathanson, and Heavenrich replication of the Bandura and McDonald research. Their finding of a reversability of moral judgment responses has been explained by Kohlberg within the framework of cognitive-developmental theory. Kohlberg proposed:

. . . that morality is an area of structural development but that Piaget's concepts and methods for defining structure are not as adequate in the moral field as are his concepts and methods in the area of logical operations.⁵²

Kohlberg, influenced by J. M. Baldwin's theory of moral judgment development, has developed more adequate concepts and methods for defining structure.

J. M. Baldwin's Theory of the Development
of Moral Judgment

J. M. Baldwin's theory influenced the development of the theories of both Piaget and Kohlberg. Kohlberg explained:

We accepted the more general characterizations of Baldwin while rejecting some of Piaget's more specific elaboration and causal explanations. Our justification is based on identifying our first two types with the first two theoretical types of Baldwin and Piaget. We felt we found enough similarity to Piaget's types to justify this equation, together

⁵¹Ibid., p. 407.

⁵²Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 407.

with enough differences to necessitate our reinterpretations.⁵³

The similarity of Kohlberg's definitions of levels and stages of development of moral judgment to Baldwin's stages was apparent in Kohlberg's summary of Baldwin's stages.⁵⁴

Kohlberg's Theory and Research in the
Development of Moral Judgment

Kohlberg's theory and research was based upon the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization which stresses:

. . . that directed sequences of changes in behavior organization or shape always have a strong cognitive component. On the logical side, our approach claims that social development is cognitively based because any description of shape or pattern of a structure of social responses necessarily entails some cognitive dimensions. Description of the organization of the child's social responses entails a description of the way in which he perceives, or conceives, the social world and the way in which he conceives himself.⁵⁵

Kohlberg continued:

On the empirical side the cognitive-developmental approach derives from the fact that the most marked and clear changes in the psychological development of the child are cognitive, in the mental-age or IQ sense. The influence of intelligence on children's social attitudes and behavior is such that it has a greater number of social-behavior correlates than any other observed aspect of personality.⁵⁶

⁵³Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 346.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 344-345.

⁵⁵Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 372.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 373.

With this approach, Kohlberg has pursued the following goals:

1. The empirical isolation of sequential stages in the development of moral thought.
2. The study of the relation of the development of moral thought to moral conduct and emotion.
3. The application of a stage analysis of moral judgment to subcultural differences as well as pathological deviance in moral orientations.
4. The isolation of the social forces and experiences required for the sequential development of moral orientations.⁵⁷

The empirical isolation of sequential stages in the development of moral judgment was the object of Kohlberg's early research.⁵⁸ The data for this developmental analysis was provided by responses to interviews of boys aged ten, thirteen, and sixteen from upper-middle and lower to lower-middle-class suburban areas of Chicago. Half of each age group had been classified as popular and half as socially isolated on the basis of classroom sociometric tests. IQ was evenly distributed among all groups.⁵⁹ The subjects were interviewed for approximately two hours. Piaget's work inspired both the content and method of Kohlberg's interview composed of ten hypothetical moral dilemmas which were:

⁵⁷Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought," Vita Humana, VI (1963), pp. 11-12.

⁵⁸Kohlberg, "Development of Modes,"

⁵⁹Kohlberg, "Development of Children's," p. 12.

. . . ones in which acts of obedience to legal-social rules or to the commands of authority conflicted with the human needs or welfare of other individuals. The child was asked to choose whether one should perform the obedience-serving act or the need-serving act and was then asked a series of questions probing the thinking underlying his choice.⁶⁰

When Kohlberg analyzed the specific alternatives chosen by the children, age trends which would have been expected on the basis of Piaget's theory were not evident. Rather, it was found that the child's stated reason for his alternative and his definition of the conflict situations were related to developmental levels.⁶¹

An extensive analysis of individual cases led to Kohlberg's definition of six developmental types of value-orientation represented in three levels (see pp. 6-7).

This typology was based upon twenty-five aspects of morality evident in children's thinking (see Table 1, pp. 8-9).

An example of the six "types" for one aspect, "Motive Given for Rule Obedience or Moral Action," follows:

1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on.
3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 12.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 12.

5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.⁶²

The term "typology" referred to the form of his six stages inasmuch as about fifty percent of most individual's moral judgments are at one stage.

Kohlberg contended that his stages (types) represented an invariant developmental sequence. Though movement through the stages must be forward, speed of progression varies among children and an individual may be in two stages at any one time. Development may terminate at any age or stage. Kohlberg acknowledged uncertainty as to whether Stage 6 always succeeds Stage 5 or whether Stages 5 and 6 are two alternate mature orientations.

Kohlberg found the following evidence for the invariant developmental sequence of his stages.

1. The correlations between these types when so arranged form a quasi-simplex.
2. This arrangement of the types provides a dimension sharply differentiating are groups.
3. The arrangement provides a dimension significantly differentiating groups expected to be environmentally favored for social development. These were groups higher in sociometric and socio-economic status.
4. The arrangement provides a dimension correlating to a moderate degree with intelligence, a variable favorable to social development.

⁶²Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), p. 28.

5. The arrangement provides a dimension correlating to a moderate degree with teacher's ratings of internalized conformity and fairmindedness.
6. The arrangement provides a dimension differentiating delinquent from non-delinquent boys similar in age, socioeconomic status and intelligence.⁶³

Evidence that morality, as a dimension of social development accounted for Kohlberg's findings, was provided by the finding that the content of his developmental schema:

. . . contains such varied elements of orientation as roles, rules, self-image, punishment, approval, sympathy, exchange, authority, indicates that we have not been able to isolate any of these elements as central in our account of the vague unity to which they all seem related.⁶⁴

The correlations between the six types of moral judgment formed a quasi-simplex. There was a:

. . . trend toward negative correlations between the higher and lower types of thought. Such negative relations suggest that higher modes of thought replace or inhibit lower modes of thought rather than being added to them. This in turn suggests that higher types of thought are reorganizations or preceding types of thought.⁶⁵

Kohlberg's definition of levels of moral judgment development was supported by the higher correlations of types within the three levels than between levels.⁶⁶

Kohlberg has demonstrated the universality of his developmental sequence of moral judgment stages through

⁶³Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 338.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 339.

⁶⁵Kohlberg, "Development of Children's," p. 31.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 17.

his research in other cultures. He has conducted studies in Great Britain, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey which have included preliterate and semiliterate villagers. Moral judgment development in Mexico and Taiwan was found to be a little slower but followed the same sequence of stages. Stages five and six were absent from the groups in the two isolated villages in Yucatan and Turkey.⁶⁷ Kohlberg has interpreted the comparable findings across cultures.


The social worlds of all men seem to contain the same basic structures. All the societies we have studied have the same basic institutions--family, economy, law, government. In addition, however, all societies are alike because they are societies--systems of defined complementary roles. In order to play a social role in the family, school or society, the child must implicitly take the role of others toward himself and toward others in the group. These role taking tendencies form the basis of all social institutions. They represent various patternings of shared or complementary expectations.⁶⁸

This interpretation is congruent with the assumption that ". . . moral development is dependent on role-taking ability and on general social participation rather than on the learning of specific habits or values."⁶⁹ This assumption has important educational implications. It suggests the need for investigations of the effects of role-taking experiences and general social participation in the classroom.

⁶⁷Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," pp. 382-383.

⁶⁸Kohlberg, "Moral Philosopher," p. 30.

⁶⁹Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 140.



Studies Related to Kohlberg's
Theory and Research

Several studies have been conducted relevant to Kohlberg's theory and research.

Turiel experimentally tested Kohlberg's theory of the sequentiality of stages in the developmental of moral judgment. Kohlberg's research had provided two types of evidence that the six stages defined a developmental sequence.

1. . . . each of the six stages show significant age differences in the expected directions.
2. . . . evidence based on a 'Guttman quasi-simplex' correlation matrix indicated that these stages do form a developmental order.⁷⁰

Turiel demonstrated experimentally that Kohlberg's six stages represented a developmental continuum. Turiel's research tested:

. . . the developmental proposition that Kohlberg's stages form an invariant sequence by establishing whether the stage attained by the child would determine the type and amount of learning of new moral concepts.⁷¹

The subjects were pretested with part of Kohlberg's instrument. Forty-four subjects in stages two, three, and four were equally distributed among three experimental groups and one control group. The experimental treatment consisted of exposure to an adult experimenter's moral reasoning in individual role-playing situations derived from Kohlberg's

⁷⁰Turiel, "Experimental Test," p. 17.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 18-19.

hypothetical moral conflicts which were not used in the pretest. Each of the three treatment groups varied in the stage of moral reasoning presented to the subjects with presentations of moral reasoning one stage below, one stage above, and two stages above the initial dominant stage. The control group received no treatment. The posttest was the complete Kohlberg interview.⁷²

Direct and indirect scores were derived. The direct scores were "Stage scores . . . obtained from the posttest responses to the three situations used in the treatments but not in the pretest." Turiel defined the indirect scores:

Posttest stage scores for the six situations used in the pretest represent the amount of indirect influence, or the tendency to generalize the treatment influence to situations differing from those on which subjects were directly influenced.⁷³

Turiel's hypotheses were confirmed by both the direct and indirect scores.

Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg conducted a follow-up study. Using a different experimental method, they replicated Turiel's findings and isolated some of the related developmental factors.⁷⁴

⁷²Elliot Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, III (1966), p. 613.

⁷³Ibid., p. 614.

⁷⁴James Rest, Elliot Turiel, and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgments Made by Others," Journal of Personality, XXXVII (June, 1969), p. 227.

The subjects were twenty-two fifth graders and twenty-three eighth graders. Each subject was pretested using five situations from Kohlberg's interview. In the exposure conditions, the subjects were given two booklets each containing four parts. The first part contained one of Kohlberg's conflict situations which had not been used in the pretest. The second part contained six sets of "advice" offering possible solutions to the conflict--two sets of advice for one stage below the S's predominant stage, two for one stage above, and two for two stages above. Two opposing courses of action were advocated in each set. The third section contained questions designed to elicit the subject's preference for and comprehension of the given advice. The final section elicited the subject's personal advice.⁷⁵

The results indicated that:

1. Children prefer concepts that are above their predominant stage (whether one or two stages up) to concepts that are below,
2. Children find thinking two stages above their own more difficult to comprehend than thinking one stage above, and thinking one stage above more difficult than thinking one stage below,
3. Children assimilate thinking that is directly above their own stage more readily than thinking that is either one stage below or two stages above their own.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 228-230.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 237.

Another aspect of Kohlberg's research which has stimulated additional study is the universality of stage mixture in individuals. All of Kohlberg's subjects had scores other than those in their predominant stage. Usually, a subject indicated a dominant stage with fewer judgments indicative of an adjacent stage and even fewer at more distant stages. Probably, imprecision in the interviewing techniques and scoring methods accounted for some of the stage mixture.⁷⁷

Turiel proposed that stage mixture was primarily a function of the developmental process, being directly related to the structuring process. He hypothesized ". . . that amount of stage mixture is an important measure which, when considered with modal stage, reflects the nature of the developmental process."⁷⁸

While systematic and extensive longitudinal study would be required to test Turiel's hypotheses, there has been an analysis of the stage mixture of subjects representing a variety of backgrounds who have already been interviewed. The results indicated that stage mixture was an aspect of the developmental process and the interpretation

⁷⁷Elliot Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking," Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology, ed. by Paul H. Mussen, Jonas Langer and Martin Covington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 114.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 116-117.

of the differences in degree of stage mixture must vary throughout the developmental process.⁷⁹

This stage mixture in individual children may complicate attempts by the teacher to determine an individual's developmental stage of moral judgment for the purpose of providing stimulation to promote development, yet teachers can become more aware of children's stages of moral judgment development and provide for appropriate levels of moral education in the elementary curriculum.

Moral Education in the Elementary Curriculum

Proposals for programs of moral education in the elementary curriculum represent a broad spectrum of philosophies. The decisions made with regard to planning moral education are dependent upon the school of psychology with which the planner is identified as well as upon his definition of the role of the school in moral education.

Kohlberg's conception of moral education was derived from his cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment. Piaget did not present a systematically developed conception of moral education, however, his random suggestions were insightful. It was Dewey's philosophy of moral education with which Kohlberg has most strongly identified.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 125.

In Moral Principles in Education, Dewey proposed the notion (later supported by cognitive-developmental research findings) that teaching about morals is ineffective.⁸⁰ He stressed the need for realistic experiences in moral education.⁸¹

Dewey further contended that the separation of instruction and character and of learning and doing characterized by ". . . formality, arbitrariness, and an undue emphasis upon failure to conform was ineffective. Effective moral education must be a consequence of the provision of ". . . opportunity for reciprocity, cooperation, and positive personal achievement.⁸²

In Dewey's discussion of standards by which to evaluate moral education, he stressed the need for the provision for the development of judgment.⁸³ Dewey described this development:

The child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised in forming and testing judgments. He must have an opportunity to select for himself, and to attempt to put his selections into execution; that he may submit them to the final test, that of action. Only thus can he learn to discriminate that which promises success from that which promises failure; only thus can he form the habit of relating his purposes and notions to the conditions that determine their value. Does the school as a system, afford

⁸⁰John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1959), p. 41.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 17.

⁸²Ibid., p. 27.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 54-55.

to present sufficient opportunity for this sort of experimentation? Except so far as the emphasis is upon intelligent doing, upon active investigation, it does not furnish the conditions necessary for that exercise of judgment which is an integral factor in good character.⁸⁴

The relationship between moral judgment and behavior suggested by Dewey and supported by subsequent psychological research implied an educational need which Dewey described as ". . . a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application." Dewey stated these moral principles in social and psychological terms which closely resembled Kohlberg's definition of moral principles. Dewey believed:

. . . that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not 'transcendental'; that the term 'moral' does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the conditions and forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits of the individual.⁸⁵

Dewey's volume on moral education (1909) was published prior to Piaget's published report (1932) of his research in moral judgment development. Piaget made numerous proposals for moral education in the schools on the basis of his philosophy and his research findings. Distinct similarities between the views of Dewey and Piaget are apparent.

Piaget recognized his bias as a psychologist in his discussion of priorities in moral education and

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 55-56.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 57-58.



emphasized that: "Educational facts are facts of social psychology, . . ."86

Piaget related his theory of the development of the child's concept of justice to teacher behavior. He noted that it has been demonstrated that teachers who value cooperation as opposed to constraint accomplish their objective through the use of punishment by reciprocity rather than expiatory punishment.⁸⁷

Piaget condemned the adult constraint which promotes moral realism in the child. This adult constraint exists in the school to the extent that the ". . . prestige of the spoken word triumphs over any amount of active experiment and free discussion."⁸⁸

Piaget concluded that a curriculum similar to that proposed by Dewey would facilitate moral judgment development. He felt that an educational system promoting "group work" and "self-government" was ideal.⁸⁹

Piaget's final comments in The Moral Judgment of the Child stressed the need for educational experiment to supplement his purely psychological knowledge. He urged

⁸⁶Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 328.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 218.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 194.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 405.

that educational research be conducted by teachers or by teachers with educational psychologists.⁹⁰

Kohlberg discussed the implications of his research in moral judgment development for the modification of some objectives of the curriculum. As he studied the stages of moral development and attempted to design a moral education program, he ". . . realized more and more that its implication was the reassertion of the Platonic faith in the power of the rational good." Any discussion of moral education must necessarily be accompanied by a definition of the nature of virtue. Relevant elements of the Platonic view were summarized:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Fifth, the good can be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.

Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all along dimly or at a low level and its teaching is more a calling out than an instruction.

Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because the same good is known differently at different levels and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.

Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 400.

giving upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before.⁹¹

Kohlberg suggested that this point of view is incompatible with that which defines moral education as a "bag of virtues" (honesty, self-control, responsibility, loyalty, etc.) to be adopted by children who are admonished to "Be a good citizen," "Be generous," etc. The weakness of the assumption that anyone can be a moral educator was suggested by Kohlberg.

If we think of moral education as something carried on at the adult level, we recognize that the effective moral educator is something of a revolutionary rather than an instiller of virtues.⁹²

Kohlberg argued that the teaching of justice in the schools was the only constitutionally legitimate form of moral education.⁹³

This position implied no support for the value-clarification approach to decision making which is based upon the premise of ethical relativity. It is assumed that there are no "right" answers and students need to clarify their values. It teaches students:

1. to be more aware of their own values and how they relate to their decisions,

⁹¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," Moral Education, ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R.Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 57-58.

⁹²Ibid., p. 65.

⁹³Ibid., p. 67.

2. to make their values consistent and order them in hierarchies for decisions,
3. to be more aware of the divergencies between their value hierarchies and those of others,
4. to learn to tolerate these divergencies,⁹⁴

Kohlberg and Turiel criticized the value-clarification approach:

Indeed, acceptance of the idea that all values are relative does, logically, lead to the conclusion that the teacher should not attempt to teach any particular moral values. Such a position can present problems for the teacher. The students of a teacher who has been successful in communicating moral relativism will believe, like the teacher, that 'everyone has their own bag and that 'everyone should do their own thing.'⁹⁵

With Kohlberg's Platonic view, ". . . we inspire cognitive conflict in the student and point the way to the next step up the divided line." The effectiveness of this approach in the stimulation of development to advanced stages of moral judgment has been demonstrated.

This we do experimentally by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose him to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers.⁹⁶

To further support their approach, Kohlberg and Turiel offered these propositions which are basic to the

⁹⁴Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, "Moral Development and Moral Education," Psychology and Educational Practice, ed. by G. Lesser (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1971), p. 419.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 419-420.

⁹⁶Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 82.

cognitive-developmental approach and contrary to the value-clarification approach:

1. We often make different decisions and yet have the same basic moral values.
2. Our values tend to originate inside ourselves as we process our social experience.
3. In every culture and subculture of the world the same basic moral values are found. While social environments directly produce different specific beliefs (e.g., smoking is wrong, eating pork is wrong) they do not engender different basic moral principles (e.g., 'consider the welfare of others,' 'treat other people equally,' etc.).
4. Insofar as basic values are different, then it is largely because we are at different levels of maturity in thinking about basic moral and social issues and concepts. Exposure to others more mature than ourselves helps stimulate maturity in our own value processes. We are, however, selective in our responses to others and do not automatically incorporate the values of elders or authorities important to us.⁹⁷

While the exposure of students to moral conflict situations accompanied by argument with their peers may be effective in promoting moral judgment development, Kohlberg and Turiel hold that it is not a sufficient condition for moral education.⁹⁸

The need for specified objectives in moral education is obvious when one recognizes the typical moralizing of elementary teachers. Kohlberg recommended that since this moralizing about school rules and values is unavoidable,

⁹⁷ Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 430.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 111.



it should be conducted with reference to "consciously formulated goals of moral development." Without explicit goals, it is inevitable that teachers have primarily focused upon the immediate and trivial aspects of classroom management. Those teacher moral attitudes which might stimulate children's moral development have been less evident in the classroom.⁹⁹ Instead, teachers have frequently provided children with reasons for behavior which were neither moral nor mature. Kohlberg found that:

Sixth-grade children tell us their teachers tell them not to cheat because they will get punished (stage 1) 'or because the person you copied from might have it wrong and so it won't do you any good' (stage 2, expediency).¹⁰⁰

Kohlberg and Turiel described the danger inherent in this lower level reasoning:

Moral reasoning below the child's level is, therefore, not very likely to be educative (in the sense of stimulating the development of his judgmental processes), nor is it very likely to influence behavior. It is frequently necessary to show children the wrongness of particular actions. However, by coupling an admonition with lower-level reasoning, the child may be reinforced in his behavior because he can reject the reasoning on which the judgment is based.¹⁰¹

Since teachers necessarily engage in moral education, it is the formulation of aims and content which

⁹⁹Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education and the Public Schools," p. 167.

¹⁰⁰Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View," The School Review, LXXIV (Spring, 1966), p. 12.

¹⁰¹Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 453.

present the real value problems. Kohlberg reviewed the Russian system of "character education" described by Urie Bronfenbrenner as one approach to moral education. Such an approach consists of ". . . the imposition of a state-determined set of values first by the bureaucrats upon the teachers, and then by the teachers upon the children.¹⁰²

In addition to moralizing by individual teachers and systems of state moral-indoctrination, a third alternative is proposed by Kohlberg. This alternative involves the definition of the goal of moral education as the stimulation of moral judgment and character development. It means assisting the child in his natural development rather than imposing an unnatural pattern upon him.¹⁰³

To stimulate this type of development of moral judgment ". . . a teacher's moralizings must be cognitively novel and challenging to the child, and they must be related to matters of obvious, real importance and seriousness."¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the teacher's primary responsibility is guiding the child to:

1. focus on genuine moral conflicts,
2. think about the reasoning he uses in solving such conflicts,

¹⁰²Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools," pp. 18-19.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 22-23.



3. see inconsistencies and inadequacies in his way of thinking,
4. find means of resolving such inconsistencies and inadequacies.¹⁰⁵

Kohlberg recognized that his hypothetical conflict situations were only a supplement to the discussions of immediate and real issues in the classroom. He expressed concern that moral judgment development as an objective of moral education must be accompanied by the application of this ability to the guidance and criticism of behavior.¹⁰⁶

Correspondence between the development of the child's moral judgment and his behavior is a function of several complex factors. One aspect of this correspondence concerns the development of ego abilities related to the cognitive tasks of the classroom. The development of these attentional ego capacities may be stimulated by the general programming of classroom learning situations.¹⁰⁷ The correspondence between the child's moral judgment and behavior is further influenced by the nature of the demands made upon the child's behavior. These demands must match his existing moral values. Kohlberg found two major types of mismatch. One type was a consequence of the moralizing about petty classroom routines. This kind of mismatch can be minimized by the teacher in two ways.

¹⁰⁵Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 454.

¹⁰⁶Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools," p. 25.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 25.



The first is to insure that he does communicate some of his values with regard to broader and more genuinely moral issues. The second is to treat administrative demands as such and to distinguish them from basic moral demands involving moral judgment of the child's worth and moral sanctions.¹⁰⁸

The second type of mismatch is a result of expectations of behavior reflecting moral values not yet developed. For example, since the five to seven year old child's moral values do not determine his resistance to cheating on tests, it is ineffective to treat his cheating as a moral issue.¹⁰⁹

If classroom teachers are to successfully use a developmental conception of moral education as a basis for stimulating children's moral development, they need to clarify their comprehension of the nature of moral development. Knowledge of those aspects of moral development which should be encouraged at a particular developmental level is required.

According to Kohlberg, the most important educational implication of his theory is the need to listen sensitively to the child's moral communications. The teacher must be ". . . concerned about the child's moral judgments (and the relation of the child's behavior to these judgments) rather than about the conformity of the child's behavior or judgments to the teacher's own."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 26.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 27.

Summary

The review of the literature presented in Chapter II provided a basis for understanding the cognitive-developmental approach, in general, as well as the more specific cognitive-developmental approach to moral judgment. Kohlberg's theory and related research were presented. Finally, there was a presentation of the conceptions of moral education of Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg.

The discussion of conceptions of moral education implied a need for greater understanding by the classroom teacher of the child's moral judgment development. This need could be met to some degree through further research which was directly related to the moral judgments made by children in the classroom. In Chapter III, there will be a description of the construct validation of an instrument similar to Kohlberg's instrument designed to identify developmental stages of moral judgment. However, the content of the instrument to be validated is directly related to moral issues in the classroom.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

A description of the population and sample, design, instrumentation, scoring manual construction, interview procedure, and qualitative and quantitative analysis of data will be presented in this chapter.

Population and Sample

The subjects of this study were students in an elementary school located in a small suburban village adjacent to a medium-sized midwestern city. The students were predominantly from lower-middle-class or working class families, with many of the fathers employed in a nearby automobile factory. The majority of the mothers were employed, many by a large local shopping mall. A small percentage of families were on welfare while a few students were of upper-middle-class origin. In general, the population of this sparsely populated area represented a cross-section of socio-economic classes.

The elementary school in which the subjects were students had two types of classroom organization. Kindergarten through fifth grade was located in the building. Children were assigned to each grade level



according to age and with continuous promotion being the policy. In kindergarten through second grade, the classrooms were heterogeneously grouped and self-contained. In third through fifth grade the classrooms were heterogeneously grouped with each grade level housed in a large open pod with four teachers teaming to instruct a group of approximately one hundred children.

The subjects for this study were selected from the first, third, and fifth grade levels. At each of these respective grade levels those children were identified who were seven, nine, and eleven years old. These age levels were selected inasmuch as it was assumed that such an arrangement would facilitate an analysis of the moral judgment development stages related to age levels. It was assumed that by including the chronologically more mature first graders, there might be greater comprehension by the subjects of the simulated situations, thus facilitating the qualitative analysis of the data.

From the permanent cumulative records of the first, third, and fifth graders, those students of the appropriate age levels were identified. A letter was sent to the parents or guardians of each of these children providing a general description of the proposed study including the role of the subjects. Their signature and return of the letter in an enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope signified their permission for their

child to participate in the study. A copy of this letter is provided in Appendix A. Approximately one half of the parents responded positively at each of the three age levels. Of the population of 29 seven year olds, there were 16 responses. Of the 48 nine year olds, 26 responded, and of the 57 eleven year olds, 32 responded. At the seven year old level the entire population of 16 composed the sample. At each of the nine and eleven year old levels, 16 subjects were randomly selected from the total population of those with parental permission.

There was a preponderance of male subjects in the seven year old group, with 4 females and 12 males. There was more balance in the nine and eleven year old groups with 8 male and 8 female nine year olds and 7 male and 9 female eleven year olds.

Design and Procedure

Several analytical procedures were used in this study. The basic scores for individual subjects, derived from the assessment of percent usages of each developmental stage of moral judgment, were used in comparing the performance among the three age levels and between the two sexes.

The percent usages were also utilized in determining the percent of subjects whose moral judgment reflected one developmental stage in at least 50% of their responses.

Correlation coefficients were computed from the percent usages to determine the inter-story consistency of the instrument and the sequentiality of the developmental stages reflected in the responses.

Instrumentation

The present instrument (see Appendix C) was constructed with reference to the instrument designed by Kohlberg. The prototypes in Kohlberg's instrument were carefully analyzed and the format and structure were approximated for the instrument used in this study.¹

The content of the hypothetical conflict situations and accompanying probing questions in the instrument of this study differed significantly from those of Kohlberg's instrument. His hypothetical conflict situations, moral dilemmas encountered by adults, were intentionally unfamiliar situations which he assumed would be challenging and eliciting of conceptually rich responses from the ten, thirteen and sixteen year old subjects for which they were designed. An example of Kohlberg's situations is presented in Appendix B.

Kohlberg presented four requisites for a test of moral development which have been accepted in this study. These were:

¹Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes," pp. 361-375.

1. That it be developmental in nature or developmentally differentiating.
2. That various tests or situations for its assessment intercorrelate substantially and fairly uniformly so that it cannot be broken down into other factors.
3. That the test have some face relationship to the concept at issue, e.g., morality.
4. That it show some correlation with whatever external criteria be available, though no such criteria can be definitive either for morality or intelligence since these concepts are not defined by an external criterion.²

In the construction of the instrument for the present study, it was assumed that younger, more egocentric subjects would respond with more spontaneity and elaboration to simulated school situations which were at least partially familiar. It had been the investigator's experience as a classroom teacher that young children are eager to discuss moral issues which arise frequently and naturally in the classroom. They will discuss these issues in some depth given an adult who provides them with the time and the guidance to explore these issues when they are pertinent.

Some of the representative moral issues typically confronting the child in the elementary school situation provided the general content for designing the ten hypothetical moral dilemmas in the instrument used in this study. These dilemmas were designed to ". . . pose a conflict between two culturally unacceptable (or

²Ibid., p. 98.

acceptable) alternatives."³ Turiel presented the rationale for the development of such stories.

By designing stories that do not have a culturally correct answer it is possible to partially circumvent the normative problem and elicit moral reasoning rather than moral knowledge or opinion. The reasoning used in judging right and wrong in these situations reflects a child's internally organized mode of structuring the social and moral world.⁴

To determine whether or not these situations truly posed a conflict to children, the hypothetical conflict situations with their alternatives were pretested. They were presented orally to groups of children aged seven to eleven who indicated their choice of alternatives through their written responses of "yes" or "no," "John" or "David," and so forth. The appropriate alternative responses were written on the chalkboard following the oral presentation of each situation and question. The children were required to write only one word as their response to each situation. A situation with two alternatives to which an approximately equal number of children responded was considered sufficiently conflictive. A situation in which one alternative was more frequently chosen was redesigned and again pretested until it conformed to the above criterion.

When the pretesting of the dilemmas was completed, questions related to each dilemma were designed to probe the child's moral reasoning. Some of the questions were

³Turiel, "Development Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking," p. 96.

⁴Ibid., p. 96.

constructed for all of the subjects. Other questions were specified for those subjects who chose one or the other alternative. Multiple questions were designed for each situation for increased reliability and validity in the measurement of the responses to these complex situations. Many of the questions were open-ended, requiring the child to make moral decisions and to give reasons for his decisions. The questions were indirect to the extent that they always were related to children in the stories, never to the subject himself.

Each of the ten hypothetical moral situations and accompanying probing questions were entities. It was believed that a young child's attention could be more effectively maintained through the presentation of different unrelated stories than through a series of related, continuing situations which might also have increased problems of recall.

The investigator recognized the fact that moral education is a sometimes controversial issue. When this instrument was designed for use with children in the elementary school, and as a possible basis for discussion and other learning activities, issues were selected which were assumed to be less controversial and more acceptable to elementary teachers and the community as a whole.

The reliability of the scoring was determined through correlating the scores assigned to a random sample

of the subjects by the investigator with scores assigned by a psychology instructor with a Ph.D. in social psychology and a special interest in child development. There were eighteen subjects in this random sample, six from each of the three age levels. The resulting product-moment correlation was $+.77$. This was significant at the $.001$ level. This does indicate that there was a high degree of agreement between the two raters.

Scoring Manual Construction

A scoring manual was constructed to accompany the instrument. It was designed to be used by classroom teachers in their assessment of their children's developmental stages of moral judgment as reflected in the complete interview or in portions of the interview (selected situations). The manual was constructed not only as a guide in evaluating a formal interview with an individual, but also as a guide in evaluating individual and small group contributions to discussions of selected dilemmas.

The scoring manual presents stage descriptions in concrete and practical terms. It is also intended to serve as a means of further acquainting the elementary teacher with the nature of each developmental stage of moral judgment, and to assist the teacher in distinguishing between moral judgment and other types of social judgments. The purpose of the manual is to promote the teacher's ordering of priorities so that the focus is upon the

stimulation of a child's moral development rather than upon less serious kinds of classroom behavior.

The qualitative analysis of the data provided the essential material for the construction of the scoring manual. During the qualitative analysis those responses reflecting each of the four represented developmental stages for each conflict situation had been identified. From these identified responses, the investigator selected stereotypical responses which then comprised the content of the scoring manual.

The directions for the assignment of scores to subjects for individual situations as well as for the entire instrument were presented and accompanied by an example. Also included were several references to articles by Kohlberg published in popular professional journals. These were included in order to contribute to the scorer's understanding of Kohlberg's theory and its educational implications.

In the construction of the scoring manual, each situation was carefully analyzed. As part of the qualitative analysis, an individual score sheet was prepared for each situation for each individual. Upon each sheet was indicated the choice of alternative by the individual as well as those selected responses to the probing questions which were expected to be of possible value in the construction of the scoring manual.

All of the individual sheets were examined on a situation-by-situation basis. The responses indicative of a specific stage were analyzed to identify some stereotypical responses which could be included in the description of that stage for that situation. Frequently, less stereotypical and more creative responses were included when these were particularly illustrative of the given stage of moral judgment. Quotations were sometimes included for illustrative purposes. There was a similar descriptive summary of stereotypical responses for each of the developmental stages identified in this study for each situation.

Inasmuch as this manual was constructed on the basis of the responses of this sample, it would be expected that with additional use of this instrument, there would be additions to and modifications of the descriptions of each stage for each situation.

Interview Procedure

Each subject was interviewed individually by the researcher. Each interview was approximately seventy-five minutes in length. The data was collected during a period of four weeks.

In the implementation of the interview procedures, there were three sources of concern--the physical situation, the interviewer's behavior, and the respondent's behavior.



Each child was introduced to the interviewer by his teacher who explained that the interviewer, who was a teacher at Ohio State, wanted to talk with him.

The interview was conducted in a private conference room free of distractions. The interviewer and the respondent were seated facing each other at one side of a table, facilitating the interviewer's recording of the responses.

At the beginning of each interview, the interviewer presented the following standard instructions to the subject:

I'd like you to listen to some short stories which I'm going to read to you. These are stories about things which sometimes happen to children in school. After I read each story, I'll ask you some questions. There aren't any right or wrong answers to these questions. I just want you to tell me what you think. I'll need to write down your answers in order to help me remember. No one will see your answers except me. I will be studying all of the children's answers to learn more about how children think. I'm asking that you not talk to any of the other children about these stories and questions. Alright? Listen very carefully.

The interviewer, with experience as an elementary teacher in the primary grades, was permissive and non-judgmental throughout the interview.

Each interview was presented in its entirety in one session. The responses of each subject were copied verbatim by the interviewer during the interview. This did not appear to influence the spontaneity of the responses.

Children of this age range tend not to be inhibited by this notetaking.⁵

Throughout the interviews, there was nondirective probing when this was judged appropriate and necessary to elicit responses which were clearer and more fully elaborated. Frequently, this probing consisted of repeated requests for the subjects to give reasons for their responses. When responses were unclear, the interviewer requested clarification. These clarifications were always presented in such a way as not to cue a response. Likewise, subjects who required repetition or clarification of a hypothetical conflict situation or question were accommodated.

Occasionally, when a child expressed a sincere inability to think of a response to one of the probing questions, the interviewer proceeded with the interview without comment or censure. More frequently, children made such comments as: "That's a hard question," or "That's all I can think of."

Although the content of the hypothetical conflict situations was related to rather sensitive issues, the subjects were generally very open in their reactions and seldom required probing due to reticence.

At the conclusion of each interview, the subject was thanked for his cooperation and commended for his effort.

⁵Leon J. Yarrow, "Interviewing Children," Handbook of Research Methods in Child Development, ed. by Paul H. Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 594.

Questions

The major question this study attempted to answer was: Is it possible to construct an instrument composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development? In order to ascertain the construct validity of the instrument, it was necessary to determine significant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven year old groups in the percent usage of each of the developmental stages of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment development is sequential. A child must progress through each stage sequentially. This sequential progression, further evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment, was investigated in this study. Was the attainment of each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the simulated situations contained in the instrument for the total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral judgment responses are limited to one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

In addition, this study explored possible differences related to sex. Inasmuch as the number of females in the seven year old group was limited (four) and the sample of each sex at each of the other age levels was relatively small (seven and eight), the question was stated as follows: Do males and females differ in stage of moral judgment development at the nine and eleven year old levels?

Qualitative Analysis of the Data

A qualitative analysis preceded the quantitative analysis of the data. The qualitative analysis provided the basis for the assignment of scores utilized in the quantitative analysis. In addition, the qualitative analysis identified those responses to each hypothetical moral conflict situation which were typical of each developmental stage of moral judgment found in these age groups. These typical responses were summarized as the content of the scoring manual.

A score was assigned to each individual for each of the ten hypothetical moral conflict situations. The scoring was conducted by the investigator on a situation-by-situation basis. The responses of the entire sample to a given situation were analyzed and scored before proceeding to the next situation.

In the scoring of each situation, the entire protocol for an individual analyzed. Kohlberg explained this procedure:

. . . we never score each sentence or paragraph that a subject utters, but only the moral position that he takes on the issues raised by the situation. As we shall see, this moral position may be made over the course of the subject's responses repeated, qualified, or elaborated.⁶

The initial question in each situation required the subject to choose between two alternatives to a hypothetical moral dilemma. Occasionally, a subject would refuse to choose one alternative, giving instead the response "both right" or "both wrong." The response to this question as well as to those questions probing the reasoning behind the chosen alternative was scored to provide the major score for that situation. In those cases in which a subject reflected a second stage of moral judgment development either in his responses to the primary dilemma, succeeding related probing questions, or secondary dilemmas, he was assigned a second stage for that orientation.

For example, a subject might have had a score of 3(2) for his responses to one situation indicating that his given reasons for his choice of alternatives and his major orientation was stage 3 while he evidenced some stage 2 responses during the probing.

⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "Basic Outline," Directions for Scoring, p. 11 (mimeographed).

Those subjects whose responses clearly and consistently were representative of one stage of moral judgment development were assigned only one score for a given situation. In those infrequent cases in which an individual evidenced a third stage of moral judgment development within one situation, his score was based upon the two dominant stages.

To determine the appropriate score(s) to be assigned to an individual for a given hypothetical conflict situation, Kohlberg's description of the characteristics of the six development stages of moral judgment was used. He defines each stage by reference to eight different modes of judgment.⁷ These modes are defined in Table 2.

Kohlberg's detailed scoring manual was also used. While incomplete, it was sufficient for scoring the issues represented in protocols from Kohlberg's instrument. This manual contained a section devoted to the definition of each aspect of moral judgment development at each of the six stages. While the manual was designed to guide the scoring of moral judgments made within any context, there was a definite orientation to the responses to Kohlberg's instrument. For example, illustrative examples of typical stage responses included selected responses to his instrument.

⁷Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," pp. 376-383 and 326-327.

TABLE 2.--Summary of Characteristics of Six Moral Types.^a

-
1. Value.--Modes of attributing moral value to acts and persons. Differentiating and relating means and ends, intentions and consequences, one person's evaluation and others, etc. Modes of assessing value-consequences in the situation.
 2. Choice.--The kind of identification with the actor in conflict and methods of resolving the conflict. The social process of moral argumentation and the capacity for making and maintaining an independent choice. The outcome chosen in the particular situation.
 3. Sanction.--The dominant rewards, punishments or goals to which conformity is oriented.
 4. Negative Standard or Rules.--The type of concept against which an act is assessed, on which guides conformity, e.g., taboo, rule, law. The concept of duty or moral compulsion.
 5. Self-image and Role.--Modes of defining concepts of good person and good role.
 6. Authority.--The kind of respect accorded to authority and status and the reasons for which such respect is accorded.
 7. Content.--The particular rules or virtues stressed by the type.
 8. Justice.--Concern for and concepts of rights and the legitimate relation of one act, as deserved, to another. Standards of exchange, reciprocity, contract, punishment and reward.
-

^aLawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958), p. 376.

Frequently, the stage of the response was obvious without reference to a guide. For example, this was particularly true in regard to those immature responses (stage 1) which reflected an orientation to fear of punishment and avoidance of trouble as a rationale for a moral decision.

Quantitative Analysis of the Data

The quantitative analysis was performed upon the data resulting from the qualitative analysis. The stage score(s) assigned to each subject for each situation were analyzed for each individual subject. The procedure utilized was one which Kohlberg described:

The child may be assigned more than one level of response. If the child's response is of a single type, one score is assigned, and is weighed 3 units. If the child's score is mixed, two type scores are assigned, e.g., 3(2). The major type 3 receives a weight of 2, the minor type (2), a score of 1. As a result, children receive a weighted score on each level across situations.⁸

The percent of usage of each stage for each individual subject was determined to find the number of individuals the majority (50% and greater) of whose responses were at one stage of moral judgment development. This indicated the extent of individual consistency in stage of moral judgment. Another indicator was the correlation in moral levels from one story situation to another.⁹

⁸Lawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations," (mimeographed).

⁹Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 388.

An example of this scoring is presented in Table 3. To complete the individual score sheets, the scorer records the points assigned to an individual child for each situation. Each situation receives three points. If a child uses only one stage in responding to a situation, three points are assigned to that stage. If a child uses a primary and a secondary stage, two points are assigned to the primary stage and one point is assigned to the secondary stage. When points have been assigned to each of the ten situations, the points are summed across each stage. When the sum for each stage has been determined, the percent usage of each stage may be ascertained. The weighted percent usages may be derived through multiplying the percent usage by the number of the stage. For example, the percent usage of stage three is multiplied by three. The weighted percent usages for each stage represented is summed to determine the total moral maturity score.¹⁰

To determine whether there were significant differences between mean scores of males and females in stage of moral judgment development at a given age, the t test was used. Since there were only four females in the seven year old sample, this analysis was limited to the nine and eleven year old samples.

¹⁰Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide," (mimeographed).

TABLE 3.--An Example of Scoring.^a

Stage Score	Situation										Sum	Percent Usage	Weighted Per- cent Usage
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X			
1	1	1	1	2	1(2)	2(1)	1	1	1	1(2)			
2	3	3	3	2	1	1	3	3	3	2	23	76.6	76.6
3				3	1	2				1	7	23.3	46.6
4													
5													
6													

Note: The child's total moral maturity or moral age score is the sum of the weighted percent usage of each level, i.e., 123.

^aLawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations," (mimeographed).

To determine whether there were significant differences among the three age groups in the usage of each stage of moral judgment, analyses of variance were performed.

Evidence was sought regarding the sequentiality of developmental stages of moral judgment. This was necessary to support the developmental theory of moral judgment inasmuch as the attainment of each stage of moral judgment is prerequisite to the attainment of the next higher stage in the sequence.

Kohlberg described his analysis of the sequentiality of these stages:

The 'simplex' pattern of intercorrelations derives from the expectation that the more two types of thought are separated from one another in a developmental sequence, the lower should be the correlations between them. This expectation can be compared with the actual intercorrelations obtained among the six types of thought.¹¹

The individual subject's profiles indicating the percent of responses within each of the stages of moral judgment were used in constructing a product-moment correlation matrix in which each correlation reflected the extent to which individual subjects who used one stage of judgment also used other stages of judgment. Kohlberg explained:

The expectation applied to the matrix is that the correlations between two types of thought should

¹¹Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," p. 16.

decrease as these two types are increasingly separated in the developmental hierarchy.¹²

Summary

In this chapter, the population and sample were described including their age levels, socio-economic status, and school organizational plan.

The design of the study was reviewed. There was an account of the rationale and construction of the hypothetical moral conflict situations and probing questions. The construction of the scoring manual was explained. The standard procedure for interviewing the subjects was presented.

The questions which this study investigated were restated accompanied by a description of the method of data analysis. Both the method of the qualitative analysis of the data which provided individual's scores and the method of the quantitative analysis which utilized the individual's scores to determine the results were reported.

In the following chapter, the results of the study will be presented.

¹²Ibid., p. 17.



CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The analysis of the data will be presented in this chapter. The data was both qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed. The qualitative analysis provided the scores which were used in the quantitative analysis. In addition, the qualitative analysis identified the responses to each of the hypothetical moral conflict situations typical of each of the stages of moral judgment development. The qualitative findings are summarized in the scoring manual (Appendix D) and will not be reviewed in this chapter.

The findings reported in this chapter are those derived from the quantitative analysis of the stage scores assigned to each subject for each individual situation and for the total instrument. These stage scores provided the data to determine the percent usage by each subject for each stage of moral judgment for each situation and for the total instrument. Moral maturity scores were determined from the percent usages for each situation and for the total instrument. The total moral maturity scores provided the data used in determining the correlations between

percent usage scores for the four stages of moral judgment development for individual subjects.

In order to determine inter-story consistency, the moral maturity scores for each individual situation were correlated with the moral maturity scores for the total instrument. To further investigate the responses to each individual situation, analyses of variance were performed to determine the relationship of chronological age to moral maturity scores. Similarly, an analysis of variance was performed on the total moral maturity scores. A "t" test was used to determine whether there were significant mean differences related to sex in the total moral maturity scores at the nine and eleven year old age levels. Finally, there will be a discussion of the findings.

Questions

The major questions which this study attempted to answer were:

1. Is it possible to construct an instrument composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development? In order to ascertain the construct validity of the instrument, it was necessary to determine significant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven year old groups in the percent usage of each of the developmental stages of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment development is sequential. A child must progress through each stage sequentially. This sequential progression, further evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment, was investigated in this study. Was the attainment of each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions which this study attempted to answer were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the simulated situations contained in the instrument for the total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven years?
2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral judgment responses are limited to one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

Construct Validity

The construct validity of the present instrument was ascertained by two different types of analyses. The relationship of age and moral maturity was investigated to determine whether increases in age were associated with advances in moral maturity as evidenced by higher total moral maturity scores. The second type of analysis was an investigation of the sequentiality of the moral judgment



stages to determine whether there was evidence of a developmental sequence from stage 1 through stage 4.

Relationship of Age and Moral Maturity

The major question which this study sought to answer was related to the extent of the relationship between chronological age and maturity of moral judgment as evidenced in moral maturity scores derived from an analysis of the subject's responses to the hypothetical conflict situations.

These moral maturity scores were derived from the percent usage of stages calculated for each subject. The percent usage of each stage was weighted according to the relative maturity of the stage. The percent usage of stage one was multiplied by one, stage two was multiplied by two, and so forth. These weighted percent usages totaled for each subject were the moral maturity scores. These scores were calculated for each individual hypothetical moral conflict situation as well as for the total instrument. This provided data with which to determine whether there were differences in the moral maturity scores which were related to age. Analyses of variance of the moral maturity scores of the seven, nine, and eleven year old groups were performed. The differences among the three age groups were found to be significant beyond the .05 level in the total instrument and in each of the individual situations



with the exception of Situations I and VI. The percentage point of the F distribution for 2 and 40 degrees of freedom at the .05 level was 3.23. Summaries of these analyses of variance are presented in Tables 4 through 14. The finding of an insignificant relationship between age and moral maturity for Situations I and VI will be discussed in a later section (pp. 113, 114, 115).

Information concerning individual hypothetical moral conflict situations was essential for two reasons. First, if the total instrument were to be revised and modified prior to its further use as a research instrument, it would be necessary to identify those situations which were more and less discriminating according to age. Second, if selected situations were to be used for discussion and/or instructional purposes in the elementary classroom, the identification of the more discriminating situations would facilitate a more stimulating learning situation.

Developmental Sequence of Moral Stages

In order to determine the construct validity of the present instrument, it was necessary to demonstrate the developmental sequentiality of the moral judgment stages identified by the instrument.

Kohlberg has demonstrated ". . . that attainment of each mode of thought is prerequisite to the attainment

TABLE 4.--Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Moral Maturity Scores.

Score	Source	MS	F
Total	Treatment Error	29,830.271 1,942.208	15.358
Situation I	Treatment Error	6,993.187 5,452.054	1.283 (N.S.)
Situation II	Treatment Error	50,703.25 7,519.061	6.743
Situation III	Treatment Error	37,164.562 5,388.136	6.897
Situation IV	Treatment Error	30,092.896 6,512.037	4,621
Situation V	Treatment Error	42,670.146 5,860.704	7.280
Situation VI	Treatment Error	7,124.104 5,029.243	1.416 (N.S.)
Situation VII	Treatment Error	128,107.895 5,109.113	27.031
Situation VIII	Treatment Error	39,725.145 4,701.0528	8.450
Situation IX	Treatment Error	35,472.395 4,475.330	7.926
Situation X	Treatment Error	45,193.583 9,262.629	4.879

The percentage point of the F distribution for 2 and 40 degrees of freedom at the .05 level was 3.23.

of the next higher in a hypothetical sequence."¹ He obtained evidence of the sequential nature of the development of his stages through constructing a Guttman quasi-simplex correlation matrix. "The 'simplex' pattern of intercorrelations derives from the expectation that the more two types of thought are separated from one another in a developmental sequence, the lower should be the correlations between them."² Kohlberg compared his intercorrelations with this expectation and reported that his findings were in general agreement. ". . . the correlations between two types of thought should decrease as these two types are increasingly separated in the developmental hierarchy."³

A matrix of product-moment intercorrelations was constructed for this study. The product-moment correlations presented in the matrix in Table 15 indicate the extent to which individuals who use one stage of judgment also use a second stage of judgment.

An examination of Table 15 indicates that the intercorrelations do tend to decrease as two stages of

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, I Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought," Vita Humana, VI (1963), pp. 15-17.

²Ibid., p. 16.

³Ibid., p. 17.

TABLE 5.--Matrix of Intercorrelations between Four Stages of Moral Judgment.

Stage	1	2	3	4
1	X	.09	-.62	-.53
2	-.09	X	-.16	-.53
3	-.62	-.16	X	+.10
4	-.53	-.53	+.10	X

judgment are more widely separated. However, this pattern is not as definite as in Kohlberg's data.

In addition to this analysis which found the intercorrelations between the four stages of moral judgment present in this data, another analysis identified the percent of usage of each stage of moral judgment by each age group. These trends are illustrated in Figure 1.

The usage of stage 1 decreased with increased age. Stage 2 decreased slightly from age seven to age nine years, then essentially remained the same at the eleven year level. Stage 3 increased from age seven to age nine years, then showed some decrease from the nine year to the eleven year level. The usage of stage 4 steadily increased from age seven to age nine years and from age nine to age eleven years.

These findings differ from those of Kohlberg to the extent that his data reflected a decrease with age in




Figure 1.--Percent Usage of Four Stages of Moral Judgment at Three Age Levels.

the usage of both stages 1 and 2 and an increase with age in the usage of stages 3 and 4 until age thirteen at which there was stabilization. Kohlberg noted that his findings for age seven were based upon data from a limited number of responses from twelve boys.⁴

Inter-Story Consistency

This study proposed to determine the inter-story consistency of the simulated situations contained in the instrument for the total sample of children.

If, for some instructional or research purpose, it were necessary to give a shortened form of this interview, it would be necessary to know which of the individual situations correlated most highly with the total instrument.

To determine these intercorrelations, a moral maturity score was derived for each of the hypothetical moral conflict situations. A product-moment correlation of the score from each individual situation with the score from the total instrument was calculated. The correlations are presented in Table 16. They ranged from $-.08$ to $+.90$. There were significant correlations between each of individual situations I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X and the total instrument at the $.05$ level. The value of r at the $.05$ level with 45 degrees of freedom was $.2875$. The finding of an insignificant $-.08$ correlation between situation IX and the total instrument will be discussed in a later section (see page 115).

TABLE 6.--Inter-Story Consistency.

N=48	Situation	Correlation
	I	+.64
	II	+.61
	III	+.68
	IV	+.56
	V	+.90
	VI	+.61
	VII	+.76
	VIII	+.67
	IX	-.08
	X	+.67

Modal Percentages of Stage Usage

This study investigated the percentage of subjects whose moral judgment responses were limited to one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses to the present instrument.

The percent usage of stages was calculated following the assignment of points to each subject for each situation. For each situation, three points were assigned to a stage which was used exclusively in that situation. For a situation in which there was both a major and minor orientation, the major stage received two points and the minor stage received one point. The total number of points across the ten situations for each developmental stage for an individual subject were compiled to determine the percent usage of each stage by an individual.

When the percent usage of each stage had been determined for each subject, the stage with the modal percent usage was identified. Those subjects whose modal percent usage was 50 percent or above were tallied. This dominance of one stage is evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment. In one reference, Kohlberg reported that more than 50 percent of his subjects reflected one major stage of development in at least 50 percent of their responses.⁴ In another reference, Kohlberg suggested a 45 percent response as the criterion.⁵ In the present study, both the 50 percent and the 45 percent criteria were used. The findings are summarized in Table 17.

Twenty-five, or 52%, of the 48 subjects evidenced one stage of development in at least 45% of their responses. Seventeen, or 35%, of the 48 subjects reflected one stage of development in at least 50% of their responses.

The modal stage is the best estimate of a child's current stage of moral judgment development. Knowledge of the modal percent usages of one stage by individual subjects is important if educational experiences designed to stimulate moral judgment development are to be planned.

⁴Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), p. 28.

⁵Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," p. 15.

TABLE 7.--Modal Percent Usages of One Stage.

	N=16 7 year olds	N=16 9 year olds	N=16 11 year olds	N=48 Total Group
45%+	10	8	7	25
50%+	7	5	5	17

Relationship of Sex and
Stage Usage

The relationship of sex to stage usage could be investigated at the nine and eleven year old levels only inasmuch as there were only four females at the seven year old level. The small number of subjects at the nine year old (8 males, 8 females) and the eleven year old level (7 males, 9 females) made the data less than conclusive, but may at least suggest a direction for future investigation.

The "t" tests applied to the mean scores for boys and girls for the nine and the eleven year old groups showed no significant differences at the .05 level in stage usage between the males and females for either the nine or the eleven year old groups. The t score for the nine year old group was 1.658. The t score for the eleven year old group was .049. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 18.

TABLE 8.--Differences in Moral Maturity Scores Related to Sex.

Age	Sex	Mean	SD
9 years N=16	Males	219.50	20.27
	Females	253.11	
11 years N=16	Males	271.11	20.78
	Females	272.14	

Discussion of Findings

A critical review of some of the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the data may provide the opportunity for various observations and insights.

In discussing the results of this study, the limitations of the sample must be recognized. The sample was randomly selected from the population of seven, nine, and eleven year olds whose parents had returned to the investigator a signed letter signifying their approval of their child's participation in the study. Thus the data cannot be assumed to be normative, inasmuch as there may have been an ongoing selective process. These parents who granted

permission for their child's participation in the study may have had some common personal-social characteristic(s) which might modify their children's moral judgments in some systematic way. For example, the subjects may have systematically responded at a higher or a lower stage than the "norm" of the population of 7, 9, and 11 year olds in general. This possible bias would not necessarily interfere with the sensitivity of the instrument. This sensitivity has been demonstrated by the finding that eight of the ten moral conflict situations discriminated significantly according to differences in age levels. Furthermore, this sensitivity was reflected in the finding that the scores on nine of the ten situations correlated significantly with the scores on the total instrument.

Prior to the discussion of the more objective analyses, a few brief comments pertinent to some subjective observations may be of interest.

The first informal observation was made by several of the investigator's student teachers who pretested the situations through presenting the situations orally to their groups of children and requiring them to choose (written responses) from two alternative solutions to the dilemma. The student teachers had been instructed to permit no discussion until the written responses had been submitted. They reported that both primary and intermediate

grade children were eager and enthusiastic to discuss the situations at some length when given the opportunity.

A second kind of informal observation was made by the investigator during the interviewing process. Without exception, the children apparently considered each dilemma and accompanying questions with considerable seriousness. Occasionally, there were comments such as "That's a hard one," or "I can't think of anything else." Frequently, a child would relate a similar incident which they had experienced or witnessed. In general, the children seemed not to perceive the investigator as a teacher (authority) figure. This was indicated by their openness in responding. Some offered solutions to the dilemmas which would not have conformed to school rules. Others "confessed" some of their unacceptable school behaviors. These responses were volunteered despite the fact that the investigator asked no questions probing the child's experiences. This egocentric orientation was observed at all age levels.

An interesting observation of behavior which was apparently related to age was that the seven year olds were the most spontaneous. Generally, they responded quickly and without hesitation. This seemed to be a function both of the younger child's greater openness and lack of inhibition and their relatively simpler approach to the problems. The younger children more frequently seemed to be immediately sure of their response.



One seven year old even inquired as to whether or not the fifth graders considered the questions too simple.

In discussing the quantitative analysis, it is important to recognize that both the interviewing and the scoring procedures were subjective to some degree. Of necessity, the interviews were limited in time (1½ hours) and conducted in one continuous session. A fairly rapid pace was maintained throughout the interview. Limited probing was possible.

The scoring procedures were rather global. Furthermore, with this type of scoring procedure, there was some subjectivity, some uncertainty at times as to the dominant and/or secondary stage of moral judgment development which has been expressed.

The finding that fewer than 50 percent of the subjects had a modal response of more than 50 percent at one stage of moral judgment may be a reflection of the greater stage mixture at younger age and lower stage levels (as compared to the 10 to 16 year old subjects of Kohlberg's basic research). The finding that more seven year olds than nine or eleven year olds had modal percent usages of one stage of 45 percent and 50 percent indicated that as they progress through the third and fourth stages at ages nine and eleven, there continued to be some usage of the first and second stages.



This stage mixture is quite apparent in the findings of the intercorrelations between the four stages of moral judgment. There is the unexpected finding of a $-.09$ correlation between the usage of stage 1 and stage 2. In examining the quantitative data, it was obvious that subjects who used stage one frequently used it almost exclusively. There was a very dominant tendency to respond in terms of taking a specific action in order to avoid punishment. This finding may lead one to question the source of this type of judgment. Is it a function of the child's stage of moral judgment development or is it a reflection (at least to some minimal degree) of the expectations of teachers, parents and other adults who require the child to behave in specified ways for the expressed purpose of avoiding punishment? One might also question the extent to which learning and cultural expectation determined the finding that stage 2 usage decreased only slightly from age seven to age nine with a slight increase from age nine to age eleven.

The finding that the responses to Situation I did not discriminate significantly according to differences in age levels may be explained by the nature of the content of the moral conflict situation and the accompanying probing questions. In Situation I, the subject must decide whether Carol should be in the science fair in which she might win a prize or help Maria (who speaks

mostly Spanish) learn her English. In reviewing the data, it was observed that the seven year old sample received a higher total score for Situation I than for any other Situation with the exception of Situation VI which also failed to significantly discriminate according to differences in age level. It was further observed that the eleven year old subjects received a lower mean score for Situation I than for any other situation.

The seven year old subjects' comparatively more mature and the eleven year old subjects' comparatively less mature responses may be explained by the fact that the seven year olds reflected a greater desire to help Maria (a more mature response) because they had little or no familiarity with science fairs or other such competitive activities. Furthermore, seven year olds place less value upon such individual competition and winning. By contrast, eleven year olds place more value upon such individual competition and would be less likely to choose to sacrifice this opportunity in order to help someone. Generally, the eleven year olds are more concerned about their grades and academic status than are the seven year olds. This may have stimulated their choosing participation in the science fair and working for their personal benefit before helping another.

The responses to Situation VI did not discriminate significantly according to age level. An examination of

the data revealed that, on the average, seven year olds responded at a more mature stage to this situation than to any of the other situations. Both the nine and eleven year old subjects' average stage of response to this situation was slightly more mature than to the total instrument.

The relatively more mature average stage of response by the seven year olds to Situation VI may be a function of the content of the dilemma and accompanying probing questions. In Situation VI, the subject must decide whether Maria who has found a quarter on the playground, should keep the quarter or give it to Jill who has insisted that it is her quarter. The younger children, in making the choice that Maria should give the quarter to Jill rather than use it herself, may be responding to Jill's statement: "Hey! That's my quarter. Give it to me!" Their responses apparently reflecting helpfulness and generosity may indicate, in fact, an immature submission to an aggressive demand.

The finding that Situation IX did not correlate significantly with the total instrument was interesting inasmuch as it was found that Situation IX was significantly discriminating according to differences in age levels. An examination of the data revealed that the average stage of response for the eleven year old sample for Situation IX was the lowest of the ten situations. For the seven year old sample, only one situation had a



lower average stage of response (Situation VII). The generally immature responses to this situation may be a reflection of school learning. In Situation IX, the subject must decide whether or not Barbara should spell her words wrong on a spelling test so that Carl, who copies from her, will get an F. Elementary school children are typically instructed not to cheat. Frequently, they are given immature reasons supporting this required behavior. For example, they are not to cheat because they will be punished if the cheating is discovered. Another aspect of this situation which may have stimulated immature responses is the possibility that Barbara's copying the words wrong may result in her receiving a lower grade. This concern with grades above other responsibilities may reflect the excessive preoccupation of the school (as an institution) with grades.

Nine of the ten hypothetical moral conflict situations had a significant product-moment correlation with the total instrument. With the exception of Situation IX which correlated only $-.08$ with the total instrument, the instrument could be divided for instructional or research purposes. Different selected situations could be used as a pretest and a posttest. Further information which could be used in the selection of situations could be derived from the findings of the analyses of variance performed upon the moral maturity scores of each of the situations

to determine differences between age groups. Those situations which were found to be more discriminating according to age might be assumed to be more challenging and intriguing for discussion and other instructional purposes. These would include specifically situations II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, and X. These seven items might comprise an instrument. Just one of these situations might be chosen for a fairly extensive instructional experience including role-playing as well as discussion.

Summary

In this chapter, the results of the study were presented. It was found that 35 percent of the subjects had a modal stage response of 50 percent or above. An assessment of the relationship between usage of stages indicated a trend toward lower intercorrelations between stages as they became more distant from each other. An examination of the percent of moral judgments reflecting each stage at each age level showed in general a decrease in stage 1 and 2 usage with increased age and an increase in stage 3 and 4 usage with increased age. Intercorrelations of each individual situation with the total instrument found correlations ranging from $-.08$ to $+.90$ with nine of the ten correlations statistically significant. Analyses of variance performed to determine differences in scores related to age level indicated significant differences



in the total instrument and eight of the ten individual situations. No significant differences related to sex were found.

From these findings, some important educational implications may be suggested. The conclusions and educational implications will provide the bases for making recommendations for needed research which will be discussed in the final chapter.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

This study was conducted to determine whether an instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflict situations and accompanying probing questions related to typical classroom situations could be constructed which would identify developmental stages of moral judgment in accordance with Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment development.

The instrument was developed to be used with elementary school children. In this study, the interview was conducted with forty-eight predominantly middle-class children. There were sixteen subjects from each of age groups seven, nine, and eleven years. Each individual subject was presented ten hypothetical moral conflicts with accompanying probing questions. The responses for each subject were copied verbatim by the investigator who then qualitatively analyzed the responses. On a situation-by-situation basis, the responses for individual subjects were assigned ratings according to the stage(s) which was indicated by the response to one situation. The stages

were identified by reference to Kohlberg's definitions of each developmental stage. From these ratings for each subject, percent usage scores were derived for each situation and for the total instrument. The percent usage scores were used to calculate weighted percent usage scores which were summed to derive moral maturity scores. The percent usages and the moral maturity scores were used in the quantitative analyses.

The moral maturity scores for each of the individual situations and for the total instrument were used in analyses of variance to determine whether there were significant differences in moral maturity related to age. The differences among the three age groups were found to be significant at the .05 level in the total instrument and in eight of the ten individual situations.

The developmental sequence of moral judgment stages was determined through an investigation of the relationships between usage of stages by individuals. This was determined through an investigation of the correlation between the use of two given stages by one individual. In general, it was found that the correlations diminished as the stages became more widely separated.

An analysis of the percent usage of each stage at each age level found that there was a general tendency for the use of stages 1 and 2 to decrease with age and



for stages 3 and 4 to increase with age, although this trend was not perfectly consistent.

The degree to which individual situations correlated with the total instrument was determined. These intercorrelations ranged from $-.08$ to $+.90$ with nine of the ten situations correlating significantly with the total instrument at the $.05$ level.

The stage with the modal percent usage was identified for each subject. It was found that 52 percent of the subjects had a modal percent usage of one stage of development in at least 45 percent of their responses. Thirty-five percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of development in at least 50 percent of their responses.

The relationship between sex and stage usage was investigated at the nine and the eleven year age levels. No significant differences related to sex were found.

Finally, the individual responses which had been analyzed in the qualitative analysis provided the basis for the construction of the scoring manual. The responses indicative of each of the four represented stages of moral judgment development were studied for each hypothetical conflict situation. A summary of the typical responses at each stage for each situation was written. Included were directions for the derivation of a weighted percent usage or moral maturity score for the total instrument. The scoring manual was designed to be used by elementary teachers.

Conclusions

The conclusions of this study have been organized in relation to the questions which this study was designed to investigate.

1. It is possible to construct an instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflict situations typically confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct validity relative to Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development. The construct validity of this instrument is demonstrated by two related findings.

a. There is a significant relationship of age to moral maturity scores for the total instrument. Increases in age level are associated with advances in moral judgment stage attainment. There is a similar significant relationship for eight of the ten individual hypothetical moral conflict situations.

b. The intercorrelations between the four represented stages of moral judgment reflect the sequentiality of the stages indicating the developmental nature of this cognitive process. However, this trend is not perfectly consistent. The percent usage of each of the four stages of moral judgment at the three age levels reflects a distinct developmental trend, however, this likewise, is not perfectly consistent.

2. There is a significant relationship between the moral maturity scores for the total instrument and



for nine of the ten individual hypothetical moral conflict situations. These nine situations could be used individually to determine children's moral maturity scores. They could also be used in groups as pretest and posttest research instruments.

3. Less than fifty percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of moral judgment development in at least 50 percent of their responses, however, slightly more than fifty percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of moral judgment development in at least 45 percent of their responses. This instrument does not identify substantial modal stages for individual subjects. This conclusion must be tentative inasmuch as the stage mixture may be partially a reflection of the ages of the subjects.

Educational Implications

Possibly the most important finding related to elementary curriculum was that young children aged seven, nine, and eleven years are truly challenged and find real satisfaction in responding to questions and discussing issues related to typical moral judgment problems which they face in the classroom.

The present instrument should serve not only as a diagnostic tool but also as a means of educating the teacher in regard to the stages of moral judgment development used by children. Through the teacher's use of the



scoring manual, such familiarity would necessarily develop. This familiarity should facilitate the teacher's ability to stimulate moral judgment development through the use of moral reasoning one stage above the child's present stage.

The dilemmas which have been developed for this instrument could provide valuable bases for the types of classroom meetings for discussion and problem-solving which have been advocated by William Glasser in his Schools Without Failure program. The dilemmas contained in the present instrument would provide some genuine social problems for discussion in classroom meetings. The importance of this type of challenge has been stressed by Glasser:

The kind of thinking that leads to the solution of social problems is more difficult, but unfortunately, less taught than the kind of thinking that leads to the solution of technical problems. Students who are taught social responsibility in school, who learn in a living situation to think of ways to help each other solve their problems both as individuals and as groups, are better able to help solve, or at least to cope with, the larger problems of society. We must get more students involved with each other in an educational system that seems important enough to them so that they will work to learn to think, to solve problems, and to become socially responsible.¹

During the interviewing and the qualitative analysis, several informal observations were made which have important educational implications. Children tended to reflect the

¹William Glasser, Schools Without Failure (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 76.



values of teachers and other adults. This was particularly evident in regard to questions related to punishment and to evaluation. The use of punishment as a deterrent would seem to retard moral judgment development to the extent that the child fears punishment. The emphasis upon grades would seem to encourage the child to value grades (things) above people and principles.

Finally, the interest which children showed would indicate that the moral conflict situations would provide suitable material for role-playing. In addition to the kinds of factors focused upon in the probing questions, children themselves could identify various conditions which might alter their moral judgments. Children might be less inhibited in their role-playing of these types of situations which are very familiar and about which they care deeply. Not only would the children benefit from the cognitive stimulation of the role-playing process but the teacher could observe firsthand the moral judgment of the students.

After children had been presented this interview or portions of it, they might begin to develop such dilemmas for discussion and role-playing on the basis of their experiences in school. This could easily become a component not only of the social studies curriculum, but of the language arts curriculum as well. Ideally,

this approach to moral education would pervade the elementary curriculum.

Recommendations

The recommendations for needed research are related to the study of both moral judgment development and moral education.

In regard to the study of moral judgment development, it would seem advisable to further examine the qualitative data (the responses) in order to develop some hypotheses related to reasons for the differences among situations in the degree to which they discriminated among age levels. It would also be worthwhile to collect data with more extensive probing using those situations which both correlated significantly with the total instrument and significantly discriminated according to age.

It would also be worthwhile to collect data from a larger number of children in the middle elementary grades, and even junior high school, inasmuch as the data in the current study provided a limited number of stage 4 responses and no stage 5 responses. This could result in both a refinement of the instrument and the further elaboration of the scoring manual. The attainment of typical stage 5 responses would provide the teacher of stage 4 children with material which could be used in presenting challenging arguments to them to stimulate their moral development.



Inasmuch as this study involved children of mixed, although predominantly middle-class, socio-economic status, it would be informative to collect data using this interview with lower-class and upper-middle-class groups in order to determine the possible effect of social class upon their stage of moral judgment as identified by this instrument.

This interview needs to be conducted with larger groups of both sexes at all age levels to determine possible influences of sex upon moral judgment development. It would be particularly interesting to investigate responses to Situation VIII dealing with sex discrimination to determine possible differences between males and females at various age levels.

Finally, there needs to be some investigation of the impact of the teacher's behavior (expectations, attitudes, level of moral judgment) upon the student's stage of moral judgment expressed in this interview composed of classroom situations.

In regard to the development of moral education in the curriculum, it is first of all obvious that teachers must be educated through inservice courses, workshops, and the examination and use of newly developed materials, to systematically include moral education in the curriculum through discussion of community events as well as personal experiences, role-playing and through experiences in



literature. In addition, teachers need to become sensitized to their own impact upon children's moral development through their decisions, judgments, and behavior in the classroom.

Kohlberg has expressed this need most effectively.

He stated:

The creation of a moral atmosphere is not a matter of one educational technique or ideology or means or another, but springs from the moral energy of the educator, of his communicated belief that his school or classroom has a purpose. In short, promoting moral development requires moral conviction on the part of the teacher. And it implies that the teacher must listen carefully to the child's moral judgments rather than seek conformity between the child and the teacher.²

Since the survival of moral education in the curriculum is dependent upon its acceptance by teachers, administrators, and community members; and since moral education has been such a typically sensitive and controversial topic; it is important to demonstrate to these groups that moral education is of extreme value and that it need not be biased or threatening. This could be accomplished by increasing these persons' awareness of the prevalence of moral education in the existing curriculum even though it may not be labeled "moral education." Furthermore, it must be accomplished through the introduction of materials such as those contained in the instrument presented in this study; not as a frill, but as a regular component of the total curriculum.

²Lawrence Kohlberg, "Understanding the Hidden Curriculum," Learning, I (December, 1972), p. 14.



APPENDIX A

LETTER TO PARENTS

APPENDIX A

LETTER TO PARENTS

March 30, 1973

Dear Parents:

I am an instructor in Early and Middle Childhood Education at the Mansfield Campus of The Ohio State University. Concurrently, I am a doctoral candidate in elementary education at Michigan State University.

I am particularly interested in child development as it is related to the elementary curriculum. For my doctoral dissertation I have constructed an interview for elementary school children. This interview is composed of ten brief stories about boys and girls in the elementary classroom. Each of these stories poses a dilemma and is followed by a series of related questions. These questions require the child to make judgments. The responses to the questions will be analyzed according to developmental stages of judgment.

My interest is in how children's judgments differ according to age level. I plan to interview 20 children selected randomly from each of age levels seven, nine, and eleven years.

Each child will be interviewed individually for approximately one hour at a time which is convenient to the classroom teacher. In this study the child will be identified only by age and sex.

Your signature below will indicate your permission for your child to participate in this study. The return of this form at your earliest convenience will be most appreciated.

The results of this study will be made available to the principal, the teachers, and anyone else who might be interested. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Sandra Styer, Instructor,
Early and Middle Childhood Educ.

Parent's signature

APPENDIX B

SELECTED SITUATION FROM KOHLBERG
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

APPENDIX B

SELECTED SITUATION FROM KOHLBERG INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

Situation I

Joe was a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the \$40 it cost to go, and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind about letting him go. His father's friends had decided to go on a special fishing trip and Joe's father was short the money it would cost him to go with them. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

- Q. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money or should he give it to him? Why?

Probing Questions

A. If should give

1. Would a loyal son have to loan his father the money or is it up to Joe? (Does Joe have a right to refuse?)
2. Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money? (a) Would a good father have asked for the money like that?
3. What would be the best reason for Joe to refuse?

B. If should refuse

1. Would a loyal son loan his father the money?
2. Does his father have a right to ask Joe for the money? (Would a good father?)

*Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958), pp. 361-362.



3. What would be the best reason for Joe to give his father the money?
4. Joe wanted to go to camp but he was afraid to outright refuse to give his father the money. So he gave his father \$10 and told him that was all he had made. He took the other \$40 he had made and paid for the camp with it. He told his father that the head of the camp said he could go then and pay for it later. So he went off to camp, but his father didn't have enough money to go on the fishing trip with only the \$10.

Did Joe do wrong in doing that or was he justified in doing that under the circumstances?

C. Both

5. Joe's father broke his promise about letting Joe go to camp. Was that wrong or was it all right under the circumstances?
6. Which is worse: a son breaking a promise to his father or a father breaking a promise to his son? Why?
(a) Why shouldn't someone break a promise anyhow?
7. Later Joe's father found out that Joe had lied to him about the money. What should his father do when Joe gets back from camp? (If not mentioned) Should he punish Joe for lying?
(If merely predicts) What would you do if you were Joe's father?
8. Would the punishment do Joe good when his father had broken his promise in the first place?

APPENDIX C

HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS



APPENDIX C

HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Situation I

Maria speaks mostly Spanish. She must work hard to learn English. Carol helps her with English for an hour every day. Carol speaks both Spanish and English well.

The sixth grade is planning a science fair. Several prizes will be given for the best science projects. The children will work on science projects during their free time when Carol usually helps Maria. Carol has a very good idea for a science project on plants. All of the sixth graders could learn a lot from her project. Also, she might win a prize. The teacher told Carol that she could either be in the science fair or help Maria.

Q. Should Carol be in the science fair? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

1. What would be the best reason for Carol to choose to help Maria with her English rather than to be in the science fair?
2. Suppose Maria couldn't go to junior high school the next year if she didn't know English well enough. Then would you say that Carol should help Maria with her English rather than be in the science fair?
3. If you knew Carol could not possibly win a prize in the science fair, would you still say that Carol should be in the science fair rather than helping Maria with her English?
4. Suppose that instead of giving Carol a choice, the teacher had said that Carol must go on helping Maria with her English and could not be in the science fair. Would that have been right?

Subjects responding "no":

1. What would be the best reason for Carol to choose to be in the science fair rather than to help Maria with her English?



2. Suppose you knew that Carol would win the first prize (five dollars) in the science fair. Then would you say that she should enter the science fair?
3. Suppose that instead of giving Carol a choice, the teacher had said that Carol must be in the science fair and stop helping Maria with her English. Would that have been right?
4. If Carol chose to be in the science fair, the whole sixth grade could learn a lot from her science project. Would it be better for the whole class to learn a lot from Carol rather than only Maria learning from Carol?

All subjects:

1. Suppose a child spent so much time helping another child that he got lower grades himself. Would it have been better not to help another child and get higher grades?
2. When children help each other in school, should they only help their friends? Should they ever help those who have caused them trouble? What would be a good reason to help someone who had been mean to you?
3. Suppose a teacher only gave five A's to the whole class in arithmetic. The five children who got A's helped children who were getting B's. Then, some of the B students did so much better that the teacher gave them A's and some of the A students who had helped the B students got B's. Would it be better to help another child even if you then got a lower grade because the teacher would only give five A's?

Situation II

Mrs. Jones, fourth graders were working on a social studies unit about Indians. Mrs. Jones had told them that at the end of the unit each child could tell her what grade he thought he deserved for his work on the unit.

Peter had to decide what grade to give himself. He thought of the two ways that teachers usually grade children. Peter would have to choose one of these two ways to grade himself. If he graded himself one way, he'd have to give himself an A because he had done his best work. If he



compared his work with the other children's work, he'd have to give himself a C because almost all of the children had done much better work than he had done.

- Q. Should Peter give himself an A because this was the best work he could do or should he compare his work with the other children's work and give himself a C? Why?

Subjects responding "A":

1. What would be the best reason for Peter to give himself a C?
2. Suppose every child in the whole class had worked very hard and had done their best. Would it be right to give the whole class A's? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "C":

1. What would be the best reason for Peter to give himself an A?
2. Some people say that it isn't fair for a child to do his best work and get a C while another child who does not do his best work gets an A. Would you agree? Why or why not?

All subjects:

1. Who could best decide what would be the fairest grade for a child--the child himself or his teacher?
2. When do you think it would be best to let a child/his teacher (choose the one opposing above response) decide what grade he should have?
3. When a teacher lets a student give himself a grade, would it be all right for the student to give himself an A even though he hadn't done his best work and he had done worse than many other students?
4. What would be the best reason for a child to get an F and fail?
5. Would it be fairer if children did not get any grades such as A, B, C, D, and F?

Situation III

Mrs. Reed gave her fifth graders two pages of review arithmetic homework every Friday. They were supposed to do it all by themselves.

John and David almost always had trouble with their arithmetic homework. They usually handed it in unfinished on Monday. This Friday, Mrs. Reed said that unless everyone had their arithmetic homework finished Monday morning, the whole class would miss their noon recesses during the coming week.

John's mother told John that she'd help him. Then he'd be sure to have it finished by Monday morning. Sometimes Mrs. Reed asked Sam to help David with his work in the classroom. This time Sam told David that he'd help him with his homework. Then he'd have it finished by Monday.

Q. Who would be doing the worse thing--John for letting his mother help him or David for letting Sam help him? Why?

Subjects responding "John for letting his mother help him":

1. What would be the best reason for John to let his mother help him?
2. If John let his mother help him, who would be doing the worse thing--John for letting his mother help him or his mother for telling John that she'd help him when they both knew that John's teacher wanted him to do it alone?
3. Would a good son refuse to let his mother help him?

Subjects responding "David for letting Sam help him":

1. What would be the vest reason for David to let Sam help him?
2. If David let Sam help him, who would be doing the worse thing--David for letting Sam help him or Sam for telling David that he'd help him when they both knew that the teacher wanted him to do it alone?
3. Would a good child refuse to let his friend help him?

All subjects:

1. If the whole class had to stay in for noon recesses for a week because one or two children didn't finish their homework, would that be fair? Why or why not?
2. Suppose there were thirty children in the class and twenty didn't finish their homework, then would it be fair to keep the whole class in for noon recesses for a week?
3. Would it ever be fair to punish the whole class for something only part of the class did? If yes, when?
4. Do you think the children who didn't finish their homework should have been punished? If yes--What would be the best punishment for them?
5. What would be the best reason for doing homework without any help from anyone?

Situation IV

When the fifth grade boys had outdoor gym, they liked to play a ball game. Only four boys could play at once. One afternoon, the teacher asked Danny to be a leader. He chose his three friends--Bob, Jim, and Paul to play with him. After they had played for a few minutes, Jerry came up to Danny and told him that he wanted to play. Danny didn't want to make Bob, Jim, or Paul quit the game, but Jerry said, "Danny, if you don't let me play, I'll fight you!" When the teacher found children fighting, they always had to go inside.

- Q. Should Danny let Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the game? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

1. What would be the best reason for Danny to not let Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the game?
2. Suppose Jerry cheated a lot in games. Would you still say that Danny should let Jerry take the place of one of his friends?
3. Would it ever be right to fight for your friends?



4. Suppose Jerry wanted to take Danny's place. Should Danny let him? Would it be right to fight for yourself but not for your friends?

Subjects responding "no":

1. What would be the best reason for Danny to let Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the game?
2. Suppose Jerry could play the game better than anyone else in his classroom. Then should Danny let Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the game?
3. Why might fighting be the wrong way to settle this problem?
4. Suppose Jerry wanted to take Danny's place. Should Danny let him?

All subjects:

1. If a leader in a game had to choose between two children, which should he choose--a child who played very well and sometimes cheated or a child who played very badly and never cheated? Why?
2. Which is worse--a child who fights with other children on the playground or a child who says mean and nasty things to other children on the playground? Why?

Situation V

Mrs. McDonald was giving her second graders a very important arithmetic test. She gave directions very carefully for each part of the test. She gave the children a certain length of time to work on each part of the test. When the time was up, she'd say, "Stop!" The children were supposed to stop right away so everyone would have the very same length of time to work on the test questions and problems.

After each part of the test, when Mrs. McDonald said, "Stop!" Mark would keep on writing for a little while. This gave Mark extra time to finish questions and problems.

- Q. Would what Mark did be worse than copying answers from your neighbor's paper? Why or why not?



Subjects responding "yes":

1. If a child kept on doing his own problems, he'd be showing that he was able to do the problems even though it did take him longer. Why would it be wrong to take longer?
2. Why would it be wrong to take more time on this arithmetic test when teachers often want children to take all the time they need to finish their arithmetic papers correctly?
3. What would be the best reason to take longer on a test?

Subjects responding "no":

1. Would it be more honest to take longer on a test than copying from your neighbor's paper?
2. What would be the best reason to copy answers from a neighbor's paper?
3. Do you think that children would copy from their neighbor's papers if they knew for sure that they'd get a good grade? Do you think children sometimes cheat because they're afraid of getting poor grades? Would children cheat if they didn't get any grades at all?

All subjects:

1. Should a child who kept working on the arithmetic test after the teacher said "Stop!" be punished? If yes--How should he be punished?
2. Do you think a test that is timed is a fair test?
3. What would be the best reason for not cheating on a test?

Situation VI

One afternoon Central School was going to have a special Walt Disney movie. Each child who wanted to see the movie had to bring a quarter from home. Marcia's mother couldn't give her a quarter so Marcia would have to go to the library while the others were seeing the movie.

While Marcia was outside on the playground after lunch, she found a quarter near the swings. Marcia picked



up the quarter. Along came Jill. Jill almost never brought money for anything. Jill saw that Marcia had found a quarter. Jill said, "Hey." That's my quarter. Give it to me!"

Q. Should Marcia use the quarter she found for the movie or should she give it to Jill? Why?

Subjects responding "She should use the quarter":

1. What would be the best reason to give the quarter to Jill rather than use it?
2. Suppose Marcia had brought a quarter from home for the movie. Then do you think she should have kept the quarter?
3. Suppose that when the children were back in the classroom, a girl told the teacher that she had left a quarter by the swings but couldn't find it when she went back to look. What should Marcia do? Why?

Subjects responding "She should give it to Jill":

1. What would be the best reason for Marcia to use the quarter rather than give it to Jill?
2. Do you think Jill was telling the truth when she said that it was her quarter? Should you always believe what a classmate tells you? Why or why not?
3. Suppose that Marcia found a dollar rather than a quarter. Should she have given that to Jill? If not--Why would that be different?

All subjects:

1. Is it right for a school to make students pay money to see a movie when some students can't bring the money?
2. Which would be worse--taking a quarter from beside the swings on the playground or taking a quarter from the top of someone's desk in the classroom? Why?

Situation VII

Miss Brown's third grade class was going to have a Mother's Day program. The children were writing their very own Spring poems to recite at the program. Sally was trying to write a poem about Spring flowers. All of the poems she wrote sounded terrible. Finally, Sally decided that she just could not write her own Spring poem.

On her next trip to the library, Sally looked through some books of poetry. One book had many poems about Spring flowers. Sally found a poem she was sure the teacher wouldn't know and copied it. When the class had their Mother's Day program, Sally recited the poem she had copied from the book.

- Q. Should Sally have asked her friend Janet who wrote good poetry to write a poem for her rather than copying a poem out of a poetry book?

Subjects responding "yes":

1. What would be the best reason for Sally to use one of the poems from the book?
2. Which would be worse--reciting a poem which was written for you by your friend but which should have been written by you or copying answers from your close neighbor's paper?

Subjects responding "no":

1. What would be the best reason for Sally to use one of the poems Janet wrote?
2. Suppose that the teacher was very interested in poetry for children and knew many poems. Then should Sally use a poem from the book rather than one of Janet's poems?

All subjects:

1. Why would it be wrong to copy a poem from a book or a friend when the teacher had asked children to write their own poems?
2. What would have been the best reason for Sally to have written and recited her own poem even if it did sound terrible?



3. Suppose a child had to write a book report. For his whole report he copied what was written on the front flap of the book jacket. Would that be right? Why or why not?

Situation VIII

The sixth grade social studies class was studying different jobs. Many different people visited the classroom to talk to the children about their jobs. Some of these visitors talked to the whole class. Some talked to only the girls and some talked to only the boys. Some of the children were interested in being doctors or nurses. They invited a doctor and a nurse to speak. They asked the doctor to speak to the boys and the nurse to speak to the girls.

- Q. Was it wrong to have the doctor talk to the boys and the nurse talk to the girls? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

1. A person who wants to be a doctor has to study a lot of science. Do you think that girls could do as well as boys in science? Why or why not?
2. Would it be best for a boy or a girl to want to be a very great and famous heart surgeon? Why?

Subjects responding "no":

1. Should a girl have a chance to become a doctor if she's interested in medicine? Why or why not?
2. Suppose one of the boys wanted to be a kindergarten teacher. Should a boy want to be a kindergarten teacher? Why or why not?

All subjects:

1. Most of the doctors in books, movies, and television shows are men, not women. Is this wrong?
2. What would be a good reason for having more women doctors in books, movies, and television shows?
3. Most of the kindergarten teachers in books, movies, and television shows are women, not men. Is this wrong?



4. What would be a good reason for having more men kindergarten teachers in books, movies, and television shows?
5. Do you think it would be a good idea for schools to encourage girls to be interested in becoming doctors, lawyers, and scientists?
6. Do you think it would be a good idea for schools to encourage boys to be interested in becoming kindergarten teachers, nurses, and secretaries?
7. (If inconsistency in above two responses)--Why would you say (repeat response)?

Situation IX

Barbara was the best speller in Mrs. Johnson's third grade. During spelling tests, Carl, who sat next to Barbara often copied Barbara's spelling words. Barbara had told Carl to stop copying. Finally, Barbara's friend Jenny told Barbara that she should spell a lot of her words wrong on the next test and then correct them after Carl had copied the wrong ones. Then Carl would get an F.

Q. Should Barbara do this? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

1. Suppose that Carl copied the wrong words. He could become confused and be an even worse speller. If Barbara's copying the words wrong confused Carl, should she do that?
2. Suppose that instead of Carl, it was Barbara's best friend who was copying, then would you say Barbara should spell the words wrong? If not--Why would this be different?

Subjects responding "no":

1. Should Barbara tattlet to the teacher about Carl's copying the words?
2. Which would be worse--Jenny having the idea of spelling words wrong and telling Barbara to do it or Barbara actually spelling the words wrong? Why?



3. Suppose Barbara let Carl copy and tried to help him by writing very large and clear. Who would be doing the worse thing--Barbara or Carl? Why?

Situation X

Ann and Diana liked the clay which the children could use when their work was finished. One afternoon when they were alone in the classroom after school, they went to the cupboard, took out the bag of clay, divided it between them, and took it home with them.

The next day the teacher, Mrs. Fox, found that the clay was missing. "Who took the clay?" she asked. "If whoever took the clay admits it, I won't punish them." Diana said, "I did not take the clay." All during this time Ann did not say a word.

Q. Who did the worse thing--Diana or Ann? Why?

Subjects responding "Diana":

1. If Diana wanted to do the fairest thing for her friend Ann, what would she have done?
2. Why would some people say that it was worse for Ann to not say a word?
3. What would have been the best reason for Ann to not say a word?
4. Do you think Ann was more honest?
5. Suppose that it had been Ann's idea to take the clay. Diana just followed her. Would you still say Diana did the worse thing?

Subjects responding "Ann":

1. If Ann wanted to do the fairest thing for her friend Diana, what would she have done?
2. Could you say that Ann was not honest? She didn't tell a lie.
3. When a teacher asks the class for someone to admit something, must the person who did the wrong thing admit it? Why might they sometimes not admit it?
4. Why would some people say that it was worse for Diana to say that she did not take the clay?



5. Suppose that it had been Diana's idea to take the clay. Ann just followed her. Would you still say that Ann did the worse thing?

All subjects:

1. Sometimes when a person admits doing something wrong, they may get others in trouble. Should they still admit what they did even if it gets others in trouble.
2. Suppose Mrs. Fox had said that she would punish whoever took the clay. Would you still say (Diana or Ann) did the worse thing? If changed--Why did you change your mind?
3. If Joan say Diana walking home with the clay, should she have told Mrs. Fox? If no--When would it be right to tatttle? If yes--When would it be wrong to tatttle?



APPENDIX D

SCORING MANUAL



APPENDIX D

SCORING MANUAL

This scoring manual has been developed to accompany the instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflicts related to elementary classroom situations. The manual was designed to guide the elementary teacher in determining the developmental stages of moral judgment of children who are seven to eleven years old.

The manual consists of summaries of exemplary responses of children aged seven to eleven years to each of the ten hypothetical moral conflict situations of this instrument. Whenever possible, these typical responses (or portions of) have been recorded verbatim to enhance their reality. Some sample protocols are presented in Appendix E. For each conflict situation, these responses have been organized into four sections reflecting each of the first four stages (of a total of six stages) of moral judgment development. While these summaries of typical responses are specific to the instrument, however, they are consistent with Kohlberg's general definitions of the first four stages of moral judgment development.

These are:

Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation. Ego-centric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and

occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions.

Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to 'doing duty' and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.¹

The scorer should be very familiar with these general definitions prior to scoring children's responses to the instrument. Recall of these definitions should increase the scorer's comprehension of the relationship between the summaries of the stereotypical responses in the scoring manual and the specific responses which the scorer is evaluating. The scorer should also have a general understanding of Kohlberg's theory as it is related to educational objectives. The scorer would be well advised to read at least one of the articles listed in "Suggested References" (see p. 148). A detailed description of the construction and validation of this instrument is to be found in Styer's dissertation.²

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 376.

²Sandra Styer, "The Construct Validation of an Instrument to Identify Developmental Stages of Moral Judgment of Elementary School Children" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973).

Directions for Scoring

In scoring the responses of an individual child to a specific situation, the scorer should first read through the entire response. Then, the scorer should review the summary of the stereotypical responses for each developmental stage as listed in the scoring manual for that specific situation. The summary which is most congruent with the child's responses should be identified. In some cases, a second summary reflecting a child's secondary orientation may be identified. The stage(s) identified for an individual child for an individual situation should be recorded on an individual score sheet (see page 149) which was developed by Kohlberg.³

In completing the individual score sheets, the scorer should record the points assigned to each individual child for each situation. Each situation receives three points (see sample scoring sheet). If a child uses only one stage in responding to a situation, three points are assigned to that one stage. If a child uses a primary and a secondary stage, two points are assigned to the primary stage and one point is assigned to the secondary stage. When points have been assigned to each of the ten situations, the points should be summed across each stage. When the sum for each stage has been found, the percent

³Lawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations" (mimeographed).

usage of each stage may be determined. The percent usage is determined by dividing the sum for each stage by the total possible, which is 30. From the percent usage, the modal percent usage may be identified. A modal percent usage of 50 percent or greater indicates one dominant stage usage.

From the percent usages, the weighted percent usages may be derived. The percent usage should be multiplied by the stage number to determine the weighted percent usage, e.g., the percent usage of stage three should be multiplied by three. The weighted percent usages should be summed to ascertain the total moral maturity score. These total moral maturity scores range from 100 to 400 for this instrument. The following ranges indicate the child's moral judgment development stage in terms of total moral maturity scores:

Stage 1: 100-150

Stage 2: 151-250

Stage 3: 251-350

Stage 4: 351-400

The range of possible scores for stage 1 is only fifty points inasmuch as a child whose performance was consistently stage 1 could not score below 100. The range of possible scores for stage 4 is only fifty points inasmuch as no subjects in this sample responded at stage 5.

It is important to recognize that elementary teachers will identify responses which are indicative of

a specific developmental stage for a given situation, but are not included in the scoring manual. This is to be expected since the questions are open-ended and the scoring manual was constructed on the basis of a limited number of responses. The elementary teacher who has become familiar with Kohlberg's general definitions, the summaries in the scoring manual, and children's responses to this instrument should be able to reliably determine the stage level of these varied responses.

Suggested References

- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Child as a Moral Philosopher." Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), 25-30.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Development and the New Social Studies." Social Education, XXXVII (May, 1973), 369-375.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Understanding the Hidden Curriculum." Learning, I (December, 1972), 10-14.
- Styer, Sandra. "The Construct Validation of an Instrument to Identify Developmental Stages of Moral Judgment of Elementary School Children." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973.

Situation I

Stage 1:

Carol should be in the science fair because if she won a prize, she would get five dollars which she could spend. She could buy toys with the money. Winning the money is better than helping somebody. Carol would have more money and she would learn more about science than the other children.

If Carol's teacher had told her that she must be in the science fair and stop helping Maria, Carol should listen, so she doesn't get a whipping.

Child's name _____
Modal Stage 1
Moral Maturity Score 123.2

INDIVIDUAL SCORE SHEET (SAMPLE)^a

Hypothetical Moral Conflict Situations													
Moral Judgment Development Stages	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	Sum	Percent Usage	Weighted Percent Usage
	1	3	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	23	76.6	76.6
	2			3	1	2				1	7	23.3	46.6
	3												
	4												
Total Moral Maturity Score													123.2

NOTE: The moral maturity score is the sum of the weighted percent usages.

^aLawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations," (mimeographed).

A good reason to help someone (in school) who had been mean to you would be to keep out of arguments and fights.

Stage 2:

Carol should be in the science fair because maybe she likes science better than what Maria is studying. Carol made the science project. She could help Maria later. It might help Carol get a better grade in science. She could have a lot of fun. Working with Maria wouldn't be much fun.

Carol should not be in the science fair because she does not want to be in the science fair. It's more important to help people, then they can help you later.

A child should not worry about another child's grades. If he keeps helping the other child, he might fail.

You should help people who have been mean to you because next time they will be nice to you.

Stage 3:

Carol should be in the science fair because she'll help other children learn from her science project.

Carol should help Maria in order to make friends with her. Then, Maria could speak better English. She wants to make Maria Happy. You're supposed to help people, not make them feel bad.

You shouldn't help someone else if you then get a lower grade, because your parents might be disappointed in you. They'd wonder why you were not getting high grades. The teacher would wonder what you were doing all the time.

Stage 4:

Carol should help Maria because Maria must learn how to speak English. She might not learn it Carol entered the science fair. Carol could be in the science fair the next year after Maria had learned English. The science fair is just something she could do but helping Maria is something she should do because Maria probably wouldn't have any other chance to learn English.

When children help each other in school, they shouldn't only help their friends because other children might need a lot of help and nobody else might want to help them.

Situation II

Stage 1:

Peter should give himself an A, because an A is a higher grade. A "C" is bad. If he got a C, his mother would be mad.

Peter should give himself a C because if he gave himself an A, he would be "acting big."

A child should never be allowed to give himself a grade. If he did badly, he'd probably give himself a good grade, and that's bad.

The teacher can always better decide what grade to give a child because the teacher is older than the child. She's bigger than the children. The teacher has already been through the children's grade. The teacher has the grade book and the child doesn't.

Stage 2:

Peter should give himself an A because he tried very hard and he wanted to get an A. It would make him feel better. If he gave himself a C, he wouldn't feel good. If he gave himself a C, he might not go into a higher grade. He did his work without copying.

Peter should give himself a C because other children did better jobs than Peter did. Peter wasn't very smart and other children were smart. Peter should try to do better. Maybe if he tried harder, then he could get an A.

When the teacher allows a child to grade himself, he shouldn't give himself an A, because then he won't try harder.

A child could give himself a grade when he's in the fifth or sixth grade and knows more about grades.

Stage 3:

Peter should give himself an A. The teachers grade that way. Then his parents would know that he'd done his best work. He only can do his best work, he can't do better.

Peter should give himself a C. If he gave himself an A, it wouldn't be too fair to other people because their work was better than his work. The teacher would think that he was giving himself an A just because he wanted it.

The teacher can better decide what grade a child should have because they know what grade the child should get and why they should get them. The child might give himself a better grade than he should have. That would be cheating.

The child could best give himself a grade when there was a substitute teacher who did not know much about grading.

Stage 4:

Peter should give himself an A because he worked hard on it and if he compared his work with that of other children and gave himself a C, it wouldn't be fair to him.

A child who's allowed to grade himself should not give himself an A when he doesn't deserve it because he'd be cheating himself. He would not learn the material.

A child should receive an F when he's cheated, because cheating wouldn't be fair to the other children.

Situation III

Stage 1:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him because the teacher might see them and David would be sent to the corner.

It would be worse for John to let his mother help him because she might make a mistake. The teacher would get mad and spank John because he did a bad thing.

The best reason for John to let his mother help him would be that the teacher wouldn't know about it.

The best reason for David to let Sam help him would be to get his school work done so that he could get an A.

Children who didn't finish their homework should be punished. Whip them. Sit them in the corner. Send them to the principal's office.

Stage 2:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him because David might not know all of the answers or how to do it.

The best reason for John to let his mother help him would be that he wanted to go out for recess.

The best reason for David to let Sam help him would be that if Sam got good grades, you could get good grades yourself.

If twenty out of thirty children in the class didn't finish their homework, it would be fair to keep the whole class in for noon recesses for a week. More than one half is a lot. The others should stay in.

The children who didn't finish their homework should have been punished. They should do the whole paper and if they missed any, they should do two problems for each one which they missed.

Stage 3:

It would be worse for John to let his mother help him. His mother should know better. She has probably had homework herself. The mother should know that the teacher wanted John to do it by himself. John should have asked the teacher if he could have help from his mother. David

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was in the classroom. The teacher probably knew what was going on with David.

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him. John would probably tell his mother not to give answers, just explain. Sam would just give the answers.

A good son would refuse to let his mother help him because he would listen to his teacher.

Only the children who didn't finish their homework should be punished. If other children were punished, it wouldn't be fair.

A good child would not refuse to let his friend help him, because he wouldn't want to break up a good friendship.

Stage 4:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him. If Sam weren't trustworthy, he might tell David some answers. John's mother would probably know better how to help him fairly.

It would be worse for John to let his mother help him because his mother would probably know all the answers and tell him the answers. Sam would just help David.

It would not be fair to keep thirty children in for recess because twenty didn't finish their homework. It would never be right to punish the ten for what they didn't do. It was not their fault.

The best punishment for children who didn't finish their homework would be to keep them in for recess. Children like to go out to play. Paddling wouldn't help.

Situation IV

Stage 1:

Danny should let Jerry play so that he could have a better team and win. You could get in trouble for fighting or get hurt. The school year where they're playing doesn't belong to Danny.

Fighting is the wrong way to settle this problem because somebody might get hurt. Children are too little to fight.

A child who fights is worse than a child who says mean and nasty things because fighting could hurt someone very badly. Saying mean and nasty things wouldn't hurt anyone.

Stage 2:

Danny should let Jerry play because then they wouldn't have to go inside.

Danny should not let Jerry play, because Danny didn't want Jerry to play.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played very well and sometimes cheated because he was good and didn't cheat all of the time. The one who played badly would make your team lose the game.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played very badly and never cheated because the other team (without the cheater) could win.

Stage 3:

Danny should let Jerry play because it would be nicer than not letting him play. He shouldn't have picked only his friends in the first place. It would make other children feel left out.

Danny should not let Jerry play because the child who had to quit might be Danny's best buddy and might be sad.

It would be better for a leader in a game to choose a child who played very badly and never cheated rather than one who played well and sometimes cheated because if the team with the cheater won, everyone would say that his team cheated.

The child who says mean and nasty things is worse than the child who fights with other children because it's not nice to call people nasty names.

Stage 4:

Danny should not let Jerry play because he started the game with his friends and shouldn't make one quit. That way, he'd probably lose all of his friends, not just one.

Danny should let Jerry play so everybody could have a turn. It wouldn't be fair for the three boyfriends to play all of the time and not let anyone else play.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played very badly and never cheated because at least they would have a fair game, even if they didn't win.

Situation V

Stage 1:

It would be worse to take longer on a test because the teacher might see you and you'd get in trouble. You might get an F.

It would be worse to copy answers from your neighbor's paper. The teacher has told you not to copy lots of times. You'd be whipped.

A child who took longer on a test should be punished. Put him in the corner and don't let him out for a minute. Take his pencil away. Break the end of his pencil off to make him stop.

The best reason for not cheating on a test would be to avoid getting a spanking. If you were caught, it would make your grade lower.

Stage 2:

It would be worse to take longer on a test. When he works longer, he may not hear what the teacher is saying about the next part of the test.

It would be worse to copy answers from your neighbor's paper. You wouldn't learn anything.

The best reason to copy answers from a neighbor's test would be if the child were real smart and you knew that he wouldn't get a wrong answer.

To punish a child who worked longer on a test, the teacher should make him stand in the hall to miss some time on the next test.

The best reason for not cheating on a test would be that you'd probably get an A if you didn't cheat. You'd more likely get it right without cheating.

Stage 3:

It would be worse to take longer on a test. If you copied from another person, their answers would be wrong. If you both got the same answers wrong, the teacher would know what was going on.

It would be worse to copy from a neighbor's paper because you would not learn what you should if you didn't do it on your own. Copying is bad. If you work longer, it would mean that you knew the answers.

Stage 4:

It would be worse to take longer on a test because he may get an A. It wouldn't be fair to those who stopped right away.

It would be worse to copy answers from a neighbor's paper. In taking longer, at least they would be your answers. The teacher would see what you could do. If you were copying, you wouldn't learn how to do the problems. If you worked longer on a test, you'd learn more, although you shouldn't continue working.

It is wrong to take longer on a test because the other children didn't have that length of time. You'd be cheating the whole class. It would be fair if all of the children had that much time.



The best reason for not cheating on a test would be to avoid feeling guilty.

Situation VI

Stage 1:

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill because Jill said that it was her quarter. If she didn't, Jill would cry.

If Marcia found a dollar rather than a quarter, she should not have given it to Marcia because a dollar is more than a quarter.

It would be worse to take a quarter from the top of someone's desk because the teacher or someone else might see you take it. You would get in trouble for stealing.

Stage 2:

Marcia should use the quarter because she found it. She wanted to see the movie and her mother hadn't given her money. Then she wouldn't have to stay in the library.

The best reason for Marcia to give the quarter to Jill would be so that she could sit beside her in the movie, if she wished.

Marcia should use the quarter rather than give it to Jill, if Jill were nasty about the quarter.

Stage 3:

Marcia should use the quarter because Jill just came walking along. She wasn't near the swings. She was probably lying so that she could go to the movie.

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill because Jill doesn't have extra money. Jill might be kind of poor.

The best reason to give the quarter to Jill would be that Jill might have been her best friend. A lot of people would just give it to her (Jill) to make a friend or just to keep a friend.

It would be worse to take a quarter from someone's desk than from the playground because you might not know whether it belonged to someone on the playground. To take it from someone's desk would be stealing. It wouldn't be fair. The person would come in and find the quarter gone.

Stage 4:

Marcia should use the quarter because she doesn't know whether or not Jill is telling the truth. Jill might just want the quarter. It might not be hers at all.

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill, because it could have been Jill's quarter. If Jill's lying, she's only hurting herself.

It would be worse to take a quarter from someone's desk because you'd know whose quarter it was and it would stay on your conscience.

If Marcia learned that a girl had left a quarter by the swings, Marcia should give it to the teacher. Otherwise, she'd be stealing.

Situation VII

Stage 1:

Sally should copy the poem out of the book if nobody saw her copying it.

Sally should ask Janet to write a poem for her. The teacher might recognize the poem which would be copied from a book.

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or a friend because it would be disobeying and that's real bad.

If Sally used Janet's poem, she'd get a worse whipping.

Stage 2:

Sally should use one of the poems Janet wrote. It isn't fair to copy from a book because the poems in the book are good.

Sally should use one of the poems from the book because it would probably make more sense. A book would have better poems.

The best reason for Sally to use one of the poems from the book would be that it would be better to have a poem from a book than to not have a poem.

The best reason for Sally to use one of the poems from the book would be that her friend might not have given her a poem.

The best reason for Sally to use one of the poems from the book would be that her friend might not have given her a poem.

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or a friend because you would want to have a poem which was different.

Stage 3:

Sally should use one of the poems from the book because the teacher knows how the work is that Janet does

and she'd probably have known that Sally asked Janet to write a poem for her.

Sally should use one of Janet's poems because the poems in the book are good. She wouldn't deserve to have the best poem.

The best reason to copy a poem from a book would be that Sally would not be embarrassed in front of all those people by having no poem.

The best reason for Sally to have written and recited her own poem would be that the poem would be original and new. The poem would probably sound pretty to mother.

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or a friend because it would not be fair to the rest of the class. They wrote their poems by themselves. They did what the teacher asked them to do.

Stage 4:

Sally should copy a poem from a book because then she wouldn't be getting anyone else involved. Then, Janet wouldn't get in trouble.

Sally should use one of Janet's poems. If she took it out of a poetry book, it would be like stealing. If Janet gave it to her, it wouldn't be like stealing. Somebody wrote it for her.

It would be better for Sally to ask Janet just for ideas, not for the whole poem.

It would be just as bad for Sally to copy from a book as to have another child write a poem for her. Someone wrote the book. She should ask the teacher for help.

Situation VIII

Stage 1:

It was not wrong because girls are girls and boys are boys. A doctor is usually a boy and a nurse is usually a girl. The man tells you what the man's doing and the woman tells you what the woman's doing.

A boy should not be encouraged to be a kindergarten teacher, nurse, or secretary. Girls are kindergarten teachers. Men teach upper grades. Little children wouldn't understand the big men. Men like to have harder jobs, where they make more money. Men wouldn't look so well in nurse's clothes.

A girl should not be encouraged to be a doctor, lawyer, or scientist. A girl couldn't become a doctor because she's a girl and a doctor is a man. Girls couldn't become doctors because they can't grow up to be men. When you're a girl, you grow up to be a woman.



Stage 2:

It was not wrong because boys would rather have men than ladies talk to them. Maybe the nurse wanted to talk to the girls and the doctor wanted to talk to the boys.

It was wrong because some of the girls might want to be doctors rather than nurses.

If a boy really wants to be a kindergarten teacher, if he thinks it would be fun, he should be one.

Stage 3:

It was not wrong because mostly girls want to be nurses. Usually, men are doctors. No boy wants to be a nurse.

It was wrong. The doctor and nurse should talk to the whole class so the boys and girls would know what doctors and nurses do.

A girl should be encouraged to be a doctor if she's smart like a man and interested in being a doctor.

Boys, not girls, should be encouraged to be doctors because boys have steadier hands and can stand the sight of blood. Girls might faint. Boys can handle tools better.

Men shouldn't be encouraged to be kindergarten teachers, nurses, and secretaries because men like to work hard and being a secretary is easy.

Stage 4:

It was wrong because there are women doctors. Chances are that some girls would want to be doctors instead of nurses. There are boy nurses. The doctor and nurse should talk to the whole group.

Girls should be encouraged to be doctors, lawyers, and scientists because women have the same ability as men to do things.

There should be women doctors on television because there is women's lib. If some women saw women on television being doctors, they'd want to be doctors.

Situation IXStage 1:

Barbara should not do this. If the teacher picked up her paper, she might get in trouble. The teacher might get real mad.

Barbara should do this because she doesn't want Carl to get an A. It would be a punishment for Carl. She



could trick Carl because that would be the only way to make him stop copying.

Barbara shouldn't tattle to the teacher about Carl's copying because she'd get in trouble, too, if they weren't allowed to tattle.

Stage 2:

Barbara should not do this because she might not be able to correct them. She might just forget some of them. She'd probably get more wrong than she did before. She could fail. Carl might tell the teacher that she had copied them wrong.

Barbara should do this because it would teach Carl not to copy. Carl would get a poor grade, then Barbara would correct hers and she wouldn't get a poor grade.

Stage 3:

She should not do this. She should just tell the teacher so she could be moved. It wouldn't be helping anybody if she did this.

She should do this because it's not right to copy on a spelling test.

If Barbara's best friend copied, Barbara should not spell the words wrong. She wouldn't want her best friend to get a poor grade.

If her best friend got them wrong, she would blame Barbara, be mad, and not like her.

Barbara should not tattle to the teacher because it's not nice to tattle. You should talk to the person who's copying to try to make him stop.

Stage 4:

Barbara should do this because then Carl will never copy again. Barbara wouldn't want Carl to cheat.

Barbara should not do this. You shouldn't do anything which would make another person get a bad grade. Barbara could tell the teacher that Carl was copying so that the teacher could move him away so he couldn't copy. Barbara would still get it right.

If Jenny had the idea of spelling words wrong and told Barbara to do it, Barbara would be doing the worse things, because she would know that it wasn't right to take her friend's advice.

Barbara should spell the words wrong if her best friend copied, because it's basically the same thing. It would teach her a lesson--to quit copying.

Barbara should tattle about Carl's cheating because it isn't fair to the class if they must spell without cheating.

Situation XStage 1:

Ann did the worse thing. She could get in trouble. If the teacher said something to her and she didn't answer, the teacher might think that she took the clay.

Diana did the worse thing. She could get in trouble for lying.

An example of a time when it would be wrong to tattle would be when somebody hits you real softly. Another example would be when you did one little thing--like playing football wrong.

Stage 2:

Ann did the worse thing. She should have said something because teachers know from the look on the child's face whether or not they did it.

Diana did the worse thing. She should have told the teacher that she took the clay because the teacher wouldn't punish her.

It's wrong to tattle when the person to whom you tattle might not believe you.

It's wrong to tattle when someone does something to someone else. They should tattle, not you.

Stage 3:

Ann did the worse thing. The teacher asked them a question. She wouldn't say anything. That's like not telling the truth.

Diana did the worse thing because Diana said that she didn't take it. She would tell the truth, if she wanted to be nice.

Diana should have told the teacher that Ann didn't do it either, so her best friend wouldn't get in trouble.

Jean should tattle when she was alone with the teacher. She wouldn't want the other children to know.

Jean should tattle because the class might have needed the clay.

Stage 4:

Diana did the worse thing. She told a lie. You shouldn't lie. You should tell the truth even if you get punished. Since Ann didn't say anything, she wouldn't be lying, but in a way she would be.

Diana should have told the teacher that she had taken the clay, then maybe Ann would have confessed, too.

You should admit what you've done wrong. If you lie, you just feel guilty.



APPENDIX E

SAMPLE PROTOCOLS



APPENDIX E

SAMPLE PROTOCOLS

For illustrative purposes, sample protocols have been selected from the qualitative data. These are representative of stage 1, 2, 3, and 4 responses to the hypothetical moral dilemma presented in Situation V (see p. 140).

Stage 1:

"No. When I was in kindergarten, I did that once and I had to go over and sit in the corner."

"No. If he copied, that would be badder. Because the teacher told you not to copy lots of times. If you copy, you get whipped by the principal. If you keep going on, you just get whipped by the teacher."

"No. Because if you copy off of someone else's paper, you might get in trouble."

"No. Because the teacher would probably be looking and she'd say, "Quit copying off that person," and maybe they'd have to change places with another person."

Stage 2:

"No. Because if you copied an answer from a paper and the other person was wrong, you'd get the same answer wrong."

"No. Because if you copied, maybe one of them would be wrong, and I think it would be better to think of your own things."

"Yes. Cause your neighbor's paper could be wrong and you'd get what they got. If they get a bad grade, you'd get it."

"No. Not if Mark was pretty smart because Mark would get them right."

Stage 3:

"Yes. If he copied, the other children would tell him to stop. It wouldn't be fair to those who stopped right away."

"Yes. That's disobeying. If I was him, I wouldn't disobey. If the teacher told me to do something, I wouldn't say "no" even if it wasn't good."

"Yes. Because it isn't fair to the others, because he could get an A."

"No. Because copying is bad. Going on means that you know the answers. You won't learn if you don't do it on your own."

Stage 4:

"Yes. Because you're cheating the whole class. Because if you're going to get extra time, everybody ought to, if they needed extra time."

"Yes. Because it wouldn't be fair to the other children. Mark would have more time to work on it. You should have the same amount of time as the other children."

"No. Because if you were copying, you wouldn't know how to do it. If you worked more, you'd learn more, but you shouldn't work over."

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