ABSTRACT CITY COUNCILLORS' LATER POLITICAL CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS By Nancy Oppenlander Using Joseph Schlesinger's ambition theory, this study explores the effects of social background and structural characteristics of municipal political systems upon the later office seeking behavior of city councillors. The 228 council members examined entered office from l946 to 1966 in six cities of Michigan: Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek. Hypotheses are presented predicting that occupational status, education, age, sex and race affect the likelihood that councillors will run for and win a further elective office. The data failed to show consistent support for the hypothesis that councillors of higher occupational status are more likely to do so. Executives and middle level corporate workers showed a less than predicted rate of office seeking, while small businessmen displayed a greater than expected rate. However, professionals, primarily lawyers, showed a high frequency of office seeking and winning. This greater tendency among lawyers is largely due to their advantaged position in the state's opportunity structure. Most judicial and prosecutorial posts in Michigan are legally restricted to licensed lawyers. These positions, which Nancy Oppenlander frequently become office goals for lawyer-councillors, are especially attractive in that they may be used as a political stepping—stone to higher (progressive) offices in the state. The educational level of councillors was positively associated with later office attempts and victories. As age increases among councillors, the tendency to seek and win further office declines. Councillors over the age of fifty were more likely to have static or discrete careers, while younger councillors tend to seek lateral and progressive offices and to be successful. Small sub-sample size prohibited systematic tests for the effects of race and sex upon subsequent careers. However, blacks and women in the sample appeared to have restricted opportunities to advance from the council level. Two approaches to structural characteristics of municipal poli- tical systems were analyzed. First, Gordon Black's investment model was tested. It posits that the cost of a council election is an indi- cator of an individual's commitment to a political career. The cost measures of municipal population, the closeness of council elections and the act of defeating an incumbent were predicted to be associated with further office attempts and victories. In regard to the first two variables, weak associations were found in the data. The incumbency measure was strongly associated with later office attempts, but was a very weak predictor of victories. Second, a measure of Schlesinger's political opportunity structure was constructed for each of the sample cities. This measure is based upon the number of other elective offices available to councillors and the turnover rate in occupants of these offices over a twelve year Nancy Oppenlander span. The data show a strong association between the size of the opportunity structure and the likelihood that councillors will pursue and attain a further elective office. The composition of a councillor's current office district, that is, the extent to which it encompasses, coincides and overlaps with the districts of other elective offices, was predicted to be associated with later career behavior. An index of electoral advantage was con- structed, based upon the size of the voting population and the ward or at-large nature of council districts. As predicted, the rate of office seeking and winning increased with electoral advantage. Councillors from populous at-large districts were more likely to run for and win further office, while those from small wards were least likely to do 50. Overall these findings on structural variables suggest that an opportunity approach to political careers has greater predictive ability than a cost model. CITY COUNCILLORS' LATER POLITICAL CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS By Nancy Oppenlander A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1976 © Copyright by NANCY OPPENLANDER 1976 To my mother and father ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study, as is true of all of its kind, was made possible through the generous cooperation of many people. I first wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance given by the members of my disser- tation committee, Kenneth VerBurg, Joseph Schlesinger and Paul Conn. I am especially grateful to Charles Press, the committee chairman, who patiently and thoroughly guided me through the dissertation and all phases of my graduate study. My father and my brother, Russell, have given me consistent encouragement during this project. I am greatly indebted to Julie Miterko for numerous improvements in my writing style. Special thanks go to Richard Child for his counsel and especially for his encourage- ment to pursue further research endeavors. Finally I wish to pay tribute to my friend, Shamus, who offered me unflagging support during all stages of this study. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................ iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................ v LIST OF TABLES ......................... ix CHAPTER 1. MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS ..... l I. Introduction ................... l The exodus to the suburbs ............ 2 Incentives and municipal recruitment ...... 4 The lack of political opportunities ....... 6 Recruitment and leadership performance ..... 7 II. Review of the Literature ............. lO Interpreting the findings ............ l2 Political ambitions and careers ......... l3 The structure of political opportunities . . . . l6 Factors affecting office movement ........ l7 Classifying upward career moves ......... 18 The career pathway classification ........ 20 Stymied career types .............. 22 III. The Hypotheses to be Tested ............ 24 Background characteristics and political career advancement .................. 26 Councillors' occupation and political career advancement .................. 27 Councillors' educational background and career advancement .................. 29 Age as a factor affecting later office seeking behavior ................... 29 Race and sex as factors affecting advancement. . 30 Structural factors affecting advancement . . . . 33 The structure of political opportunities . . . . 36 The logic of electorates ............ 37 The data base .................. 38 IV. Development of the Examination .......... 4O vi CHAPTER II. THE LATER POLITICAL CAREERS OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS . . . I. Municipal Officials: Their Prior Experiences in Government Political Party and Voluntary Organizations ........ , .......... Membership in voluntary organizations ...... Entering municipal office ............ II. Municipal Officials: Their Later Political Careers ..................... Later office attempts and victories by municipal officials ................... Movement from municipal office to statewide and congressional office ............. Political party organization and career movement ................... Movement to appointive office .......... III. Later Office Seeking and the Tenure of Municipal Officials .................... IV. Later Office Behavior of Mayors and City Councillors ................... V. The Career Pathway Typology ............ The structure of political opportunities . . . . Summary ..................... III. THE BACKGROUND OF COUNCILLORS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS ........................ I. Review of the Literature ............. Political recruitment and the backgrounds of councillors .................. Office seeking behavior ............. The backgrounds of councillors and office seeking behavior ............... Later office elections and the backgrounds of councillors ................ II. Occupations of City Councillors and Later Political Career Behavior ............ The measurement of occupational status ..... Office seeking and office winning among councillors of varied occupational status. . . Professionals: the special case of lawyers. . . Executives and middle level corporate workers. . 45 46 48 52 54 55 56 59 63 64 67 71 75 78 9l 93 93 96 99 l04 106 107 110 ll2 ll7 CHAPTER III. IV. VI. vii Small businessmen ................ Manual laborers ................. Interpreting the findings ............ The Educational Backgrounds of City Councillors. . Educational achievement and office seeking . . . Education and elective office winning ...... Interpreting the findings ............ Age and Later Political Careers .......... Age and elective office attempts ........ Office winning and age ............. Later political careers of councillors over fifty ..................... Age and councillors' later political careers . . Race and Sex as Determinants of Later Political Careers ..................... Backgrounds ................... Later political careers ............. Council membership in transition ........ Summary and Conclusion .............. IV. THE STRUCTURAL SETTING OF CITY COUNCILLORS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREER BEHAVIOR ............... I. II. III. IV. Municipal Population and the Later Political Careers of Councillors ............. Council campaigns in the sample cities ..... Electoral Competition and the Later Political Careers of City Councillors ........... Closeness of council vote ............ Defeating an incumbent in a council election . . Interpreting the findings ............ The Political Opportunities of Councillors . . . . The political opportunity rate ......... Electorally Manifest Offices ........... Measuring for the electorally manifest condition ................... Index of electoral advantage and the level of later office attempts by councillors ..... Summary and Conclusion .............. 120 123 125 128 128 129 130 131 132 134 135 136 137 139 140 142 143 162 165 170 174 175 177 179 180 184 189 191 194 196 CHAPTER viii V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ................. BIBLIOGRAPHY OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO LIST OF TABLES Number of group memberships ................ 83 Predominant group memberships ............... 83 Level of later office attempts and victories ........ 84 Level of office seeking behavior of city officials by mean years served in city office and % defeated in city incumbency races .................. 84 Population of Michigan cities to raw figures and as a percentage of the state population, l940-l970 ...... 85 Level of appointive offices assumed by municipal officials ........................ 86 Number of terms in municipal office ............ 86 Incumbency elections and mean years served ......... 86 Outcome of city incumbency elections and % seeking later office ....................... 87 Municipal officials by outcome of municipal incumbency elections and outcome of later elective office attempts ......................... 87 11. 12. l3. 14. 15. 16. 17. Selected characteristics of mayors and city councillors . . % of mayors and city councillors defeated in incumbency races .......................... Councillors classified by the Career Pathway Typology . . . Later elective office attempts, success and success rate of councillors ...................... Occupation and later career behavior ............ City councillors who are professionals by elective office attempts, outcome of elective office attempts and % taking appointive posts ................. Office goals of councillors who are lawyers and outcome of subsequent election .................. ix 88 88 89 90 151 152 153 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. % of councillors who were corporate executives entering office from 1946 to 1965 ................. Small businessmen by elective office attempts, outcome of election, and % taking appointive posts ......... Councillors who were small businessmen by elective office attempts and outcome ................... Highest educational level and % seeking later office. . . . % making elective office attempts by education and occupation ........................ % winning elective office by highest educational level. . . % winning elective office by education and occupation . . . Age and % seeking elective office ............. Age and mean years served on the city council ....... Age and office goals sought ................ Age and outcome of further office attempts ......... Elective office winners by age and level of office goal . . Age of councillors by career pathways pursued ....... Career pathways taken by black and female councillors (by raw numbers) ..................... Selected characteristics of councillors who won lateral office .......................... Population of city and percentage of councillors seeking later elective office .................. Population of city and percentage of aspiring councillors winning later elective office .............. The effects of electoral competition in initial council race upon later office attempts and victories of councillors ....................... Percentage of councillors making later office attempts by electoral competition and city size .......... Percentage of councillors winning later elective office by electoral competition and city size .......... Incumbent as an opponent and closeness of council vote. . . 153 154 155 155 156 156 157 157 158 158 159 159 160 160 161 202 202 203 204 204 205 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. xi The effects of defeating an incumbent upon the likelihood that a councillor will seek later office and win later office .......................... Percentage of councillors making later office attempts by incumbency defeats and city size ............. Percentage of councillors winning further elective office by incumbency defeats and city size ........... Percentage differences produced by the variables of city population, closeness of vote and incumbency defeat upon office seeking and winning by councillors ...... Political opportunity rates for elective offices in sample cities, January l957 to December 1968 .......... Size of the opportunity structure and percentage of councillors making further office attempts and percentage of council victories in further office attempts ..... Size of the opportunity structure and the average number of later elective offices held by successful councillors across cities ...................... Percentage of ambitious councillors in wards and at-large districts seeking city wide and other elective offices. . Percentage of ambitious councillors from districts with large and small voting populations seeking city wide and other elective office ................ Index of electoral advantage and the percentage of councillors seeking and attaining further elective office .......................... Index of electoral advantage and level of later office attempts and victories by councillors .......... 205 206 206 207 207 208 208 209 209 210 211 CHAPTER I MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS I. Introduction There is no denying that the government of the cities is the one most conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the National government tell but little for evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of State governments are insignificant compared with the extrava- gance, corruption, and mismanagement which mark the admini- strations of most of the great cities. Since James Bryce's indictment of city governments in 1893, elected municipal officials have been steadily under attack for the failure to provide long term guidance for city affairs. Corruption and inefficiency was so widespread at the turn of the century, that most municipal governments were reorganized. Reformist measures, such as nonpartisan ballots, at-large districts, staggered terms and off year elections, were written into city charters in an effort to upgrade the quality of the candidates recruited to municipal office. Despite these structural changes, municipal leadership continues to face criticism. Many contemporary scholars have characterized mayors and city "2 ll 3 and councillors in critical terms: "indecisive, uncertain," "patently inferior."4 Much of recent literature has created an image of a leadership vacuum in American cities that is largely immune to control by the electorate. Since municipal offices most consistently attract amateur contenders with limited knowledge of political affairs, it is maintained that the electorate has few chances to elect competent candidates. Commonly found in the literature are three explanations of how this state of affairs affects recruitment and limits the leadership ability of municipal officials. One school of thought maintains that weak leadership is an indirect outcome of out-migration trends in urban areas. A second explanation focuses upon the lack of financial and social rewards for holding municipal office. A third school of thought views the limited opportunities for political advancement from the municipal level as a condition that sets limits upon the quality of candidates that are initially recruited for mayoral and council elec- tions. Let us review these explanations. The exodus to the suburbs Scholars have noted that a decline in municipal leadership is coincidental with urban migration trends since the middle 1940's. Among the most significant changes in American urban settlement in the years since World War II is the mass migration to the suburbs.5 Reports of the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that migration and new population growth is occurring primarily outside central city bound- aries.6 Between 1950 and 1956, only 19% of metropolitan growth was within municipal boundaries, while 33% occurred in incorporated suburbs, and 49% occurred in townships around cities.7 The population movement to areas outside the city's boundaries has affected central city leaders in two ways. First, as the most affluent residents and businesses migrate to the suburbs, city treasuries suffer a loss in tax revenue. Charles Press states, "these urban centers have been losing upper and middle class residents as well as their indus- trial and commercial tax base to the suburbs..."8 Part of the explana- tion of New York City's recent problems argues this condition. Although city leaders face growing needs to initiate new projects and upgrade existing services, they have relatively less revenue with which to finance them. Restrained by the diminishing tax base, mayors and city councillors often find it impossible to implement innovative policies. Financial limitations may even restrain the city's administration from increasing budget allocations to maintain existing services. Under these financial restraints, mayors and city councillors have been reluctant to devise new policy approaches for the city's problems. Even mayors in large cities with access to many federal funding pro- grams find it difficult to take the role of policy innovator under these conditions. Second, migration has brought about the flight of middle class community leaders to areas outside the city's boundaries. The central city mayor now finds himself surrounded by competing township, suburban and county officials, many of whom are migrants from the central city. Robert Schulze maintains that the flight of middle class leaders from the central city and the growth of other local government units in the suburbs has weakened the leadership of central city officials. They are separated from suburban leaders "by ever widening social, psy- chological and physical distances," resulting in an increasingly "frus- trated local civic and political leadership."9 As a result of these difficulties, it is maintained that the increasing burdens of holding municipal office in central cities have affected recruitment patterns. Candidates regarded as qualfied by local community standards have become reluctant to run for local office. In some cases recruiting groups are forced to select candi- dates out of expediency, rather than out of a consideration of their capabilities. In a study of councillors in Minnesota cities, Robert Weber and George Van Cleve conclude, “in an age where the number of problems which each community must face through governmental action has grown tremendously, there is a pressing need for intelligent and forceful 10 leadership." Given the increasing frustrations of office holding, "there is little evidence that the recruitment and use of this type of leadership in community government will continue." 1] Incentives and municipal recruitment A second school of thought ascribes the leadership vacuum to the failure of cities to provide potential candidates attractive induce- ments to run for office. It is widely recognized that holding mayoral or council office brings moderate rewards. As Arthur Bromage, a poli- tical scientist and ex-councillor puts it, pay, power and patronage are unlikely incentives: "running for election, risking loss of face, devoting hours at city hall, -- these must offer their own reward to the councilman."12 An overall look at salaries allotted to mayors and councillors suggests that compensation is a weak inducement to run for municipal office. In 1965 the mean salary for a mayor in a city of 50,000 to 13 100,000 inhabitants was $8,415 per annum. Since the office is frequently full-time, many mayors abandon their private careers while serving. City councillors, who usually work on a part-time basis, receive considerably less compensation than mayors. In 1965 the average salary for councillors of cities in the previously mentioned population range was $1,500 in mayor-council systems and $1,200 in council-manager systems.14 In some cities councillors receive no compensation. Councillors frequently find that their salary is minimal relative to the time commitment demanded by the office. Weber and Van Cleve state: For spending an average of ten to fifteen hours a week on city business, the typical councilman in these cities can expect compensgtion which is substantially below the federal minimum wage. It is maintained that minimal salaries make it difficult to recruit the most sought after candidates for municipal office. In a study of California cities, Eugene Lee reports that citizen groups often find that their top priority choices for candidates are reluctant to run for office. One respondent made the observation that "it is very difficult to get a good businessman to run for city office...As there is no compensation for the hours and hours of work, there is 16 After several failures to enlist candi- naturally no attraction." dates who were regarded as qualified, recruiters lowered their stan- dards as the closing date for nominations drew near. The moderate prestige associated with holding municipal office has also been cited as a barrier to the recruitment of viable leaders. This argument maintains that municipal office holding simply lacks the status that is associated with participation in other community groups. Citizens interested in community involvement find greater rewards of public recognition by participating in voluntary groups, such as civic and charitable organizations. The overall effect is that individuals who might otherwise have run for municipal office channel their talents into other endeavors. In a comparison of city politics in New Haven, Nashville and Chicago, Mayer Zald and Thomas Anderson found evidence supporting this position: The relatively moderate prestige of local politics makes a career in [it] unattractive for the social and economic elite. This factor may lead the social and economic elite 7 to not make serious and con51stent moves into local p01lthS. The lack of political opportunities A third argument maintains that municipal office is lacking in prestige as a viable base from which to launch a political career. For the politically ambitious individual, municipal office holding is an unattractive career option. Studies of the career patterns of mayors lend support to this argument. Of all the mayors who have served in New York City from 1898 to 1972, Theodore Lowi finds that none have been successful in attempts to win higher office.18 A similar pattern has been discovered in a random sample of mayors from large cities. Of ninety-six mayors elected in twenty-four American cities, Marilyn Gittell reports that ten percent were later elected to a higher office.19 The lack of future political opportunities may discourage some political aspirants from seeking municipal office. According to Gittell, politically ambitious individuals who might otherwise have sought mayoral office guide their careers into other elective positions at the county and state levels that might better serve as a political stepping—stone. For political newcomers interested in a long term career in politics, the advantage of seeking "higher” level office may be too compelling to deny. In the absence of ambitious candidates, those who are left to contend for local office are, according to Gittell, the least motivated, the least qualified and the least compe- tent individuals: The more astute politician will guide his career around, not into, the mayor's office...Men of inferior caliber are, and must be attracted to the office...This explains, at least in part, the obvious deficiencies in city admini- stration angoportend little hope for the future of city government. Recruitment and leadership performance The explanations for the leadership vacuum cited in the preceding sections emphasize factors that influence the kinds of individuals who are recruited to municipal office. Although these arguments have merit, they do not clearly demonstrate how changes in incentives will bring about improvements in the recruitment and leadership performance of municipal officials. For example, increasing the salaries of city officials might attract more pe0ple as candidates. It is not clear, however, that among the larger number of contenders, there will be a greater propor- 2] Nor is it clear that increasing tion of competent individuals. salaries will insure that recruiters and voters are in a better posi- tion to decide who would be the most able leaders. A similar argument holds in evaluating the effects of social prestige of city office upon leadership recruitment. If the public recognition for municipal office holding were higher, a greater number of individuals would probably seek candidacy. Yet those additional candidates may have no greater leadership potential than those who sought city office under lower prestige conditions. The increasing responsibilities attached to city office holding have also been cited as an important influence upon leadership recruit- ment. Undoubtedly the burdens of municipal office tend to make some individuals reluctant to seek candidacy. It is not clear that quali- fied individuals are any more likely than the less qualified to be dis- couraged from office seeking. The opposite effect might just as well occur with the increased challenges of the office inspiring the more talented individuals to run, while the less capable people withdraw from the competition. Gittell's argument that the career status of an office influences the type of individuals who are recruited to that office holds the greatest promise of linking an incentive factor with leadership perfor- mance. Gittell suggests that city office has been a dead end position for those interested in a political career. Since municipal posts rarely serve as a stepping-stone to higher office, few candidates who are strongly committed to a political career are attracted to municipal competition. Those who are most often recruited are amateurs who lack a long standing interest in or desire for a political life. Based upon the theory of electoral accountability, this argument implies that political contenders who hope to make a career out of pol- itics treat the office holding experience differently than those with a more temporal commitment to politics. In Ambition and Politics, Joseph Schlesinger contends that careerists provide political leader- ship that is more responsive to the electorate. Since political careerists must depend upon elections in order to remain in office or to run for higher office, they are under a compulsion to take into account the preference of the electorate. Individuals who desire to remain in city office for more than one term find it expedient to strive for a set of policies that are satis— fying to at least a majority of their constituents. Office holders who hope to advance to a higher position are under a compulsion not only to satisfy their present constituents, but also to consider the preferences of the electorate of the higher office to which they aspire. On the other hand, public officials who are less concerned or indifferent to whether they continue serving in political office are under no obligation to consider public opinion. This argument does not imply that amateurs have no interest in responding to the preferences of their constituents. Many may even feel that their role as a public servant requires them to respond to constituent interests. Yet offi- cials who are most consistently responstive to the electorate are those who do so not out of deference to the public, but out of a regard for the public's ability to influence their future political life. Unlike any of the other incentives related to recruitment, the career status of an office is crucial to whether leadership will regu- larly be accountable to public opinion. If the ambitions of elected officials play a prominent role in ensuring leadership responsiveness, it is worth investigating the extent to which careerists are found in municipal office and the conditions that tend to foster ambitions in municipal office holders. A review of the literature pertaining to the 10 future ambitions of municipal officials will be helpful in undertaking this investigation. II. Review of the Literature Only a few research studies have been concerned with the extent to which municipal officials aspire to further elective office. In a study of San Francisco Bay area councillors elected on a nonpartisan ballot, Kenneth Prewitt asked if they intended to stand for reelection and if they had any interest in another office.22 Of 433 respondents 29% intended seeking another office, 53% expected to seek another term and 18% planned to retire. Over one-fourth of the sample indicated an interest in pursuing a political career by moving to another office position. When partisan elected councillors from the Buffalo area were asked similar questions, a higher percentage of politically ambitious individuals were discovered. William Dutton found that 61% desired political advancement to a local, state or federal position while one- third wished to continue in council office. Only six percent of the Buffalo area councillors stated intentions to retire from political life.23 Two other interview studies of municipally elected officials report a much lower incidence of intentions to seek further office. Among Minnesota councillors from cities of 10,000 to 50,000 population, Weber and Van Cleve found that four out of sixty-five, around six per- cent, indicated an interest in running for a state or national office. In an interview study of Houston councillors, Richard Feld and Donald Lutz asked each respondent to rank order his reasons for running 11 by listing “as many or as few as were relevant."25 Of fifty respon- dents, two ranked using the council office as a stepping-stone as a motive for initially seeking the council office. Gittell's study of mayors from the nation's largest cities is the only research to date of actual career movement. Ninety-six mayors were classified according to whether they moved to a "higher political office," defined as an elective post with a larger district at the state or national level. As previously mentioned, about one-tenth of the mayors did so. Controlling for region, Gittell found that no southern mayors had moved to a higher office. In other regions, the percentage who ascended to higher office was approximately seven percent in the far west, ten percent in the midwest and twenty percent in the northeast. The largest single group who advanced in politics were mayors from the smaller cities in the sample who took statewide posts, usually the governorship. The literature reports considerable variance across cities with two to sixty-one percent of municipal officials stating intentions to run for a further office. While Weber and Van Cleve indicate that the desire for another office is less prevalent in small cities, Gittell's study suggests that the chances for actual advancement to statewide office are better for mayors from cities approaching medium population size. Variations in careers appear to be related to regional areas of the country with the northeast, and, to a lesser extent, the midwest offering the greatest opportunities for mayors. 12 Interpreting the findings For several reasons one should be cautious in drawing inferences from the above studies about municipal officials' later career behav- ior. The first and most obvious problem concerns the use of survey questions as an indicator of future office seeking. An office holder may be less than candid in making statements about his future career plans. He may be reluctant to state his desire to seek another office, given the tendency in American politics for aspirants to withhold such infbrmation until they officially open a campaign. Furthermore, poli- tical opportunities fluctuate over time. A municipal official may not plan to seek advancement, but an attractive office may become available or vice versa. A second problem concerns what types of further office experience of municipal officials are important to analyze. In studying the later careers of mayors, Gittell measured the frequency with which they ascend to "higher" elective office. Operationally, a mayor who advances is one who moves to an elective post with a greater consti- tuency. However, constituency size is not a universal indicator of higher office movement. For example, a mayor of Detroit would probably consider becoming a congressman a step upward, though his congressional district would include only a fraction of his mayoral constituency. The same example would apply to the nine city council members who are elected on an at-large basis. Furthermore, Gittell's definition of "higher" office excludes numerous posts, both elective and appointive, that may become office goals for ambitious municipal officials. In studying the later office ambitions of councillors, Prewitt and Dutton measured the frequency 13 with which they desire to attain "any other political or governmental positions" at the local, state or federal level.26 A major concern of this dissertation is to determine whether muni- cipal officials go on to other political positions in their later career, since no such study of actual behavior has been conducted. All the later office moves of mayors and councillors, both to elective and appointive positions, will be described in this study. However, we are also concerned with the opportunities that muni- cipal officials have to ascend to the highest positions in state and national politics. Therefore, we shall focus upon the frequency with which municipal officials seek and attain progressive political office. Since the actual movement of municipal officials to other poli- tical office has not previously been researched, virtually nothing is known about what conditions tend to foster political advancement. Another objective of this dissertation is to explore the character- istics of city councillors and their political surroundings which may influence their opportunities to attain another political office. In order to conduct such a study, one needs a theoretical founda- tion that can effectively interpret and predict the role of ambitions in career behavior. Schlesinger's seminal study of political careers in Ambition and Politics provides a framework that can be fruitfully applied in examining municipal career patterns. Political ambitions and careers Like all politicians, city councillors are motivated by certain hopes and expectations for a political career. Schlesinger assumes that the primary force that spurs people to seek office is ambition: 14 Ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrive on the hope of preferment and the drive for office...In politics the relation between motive and drive is more obvious than in any other social endeavor. The paradox is that the simplicity of this relationship is so often slighted in political analysis. Of all those who per- form for their fellow men, the politician leaveszthe clear- est tracks between hlS purpose and his behav1or. A researcher cannot empirically measure the presence of political ambitions in the minds of individuals. As previously noted, what a person says about his future goals and what he does may not always coincide, especially for public figures. These careers are enterprises that require a kind of flexibility if the person is to achieve his ambitions. As Everett Hughes puts it, "these ambitions themselves seem fluid, rather than fixed upon solid and neatly defined objectives."28 That intentions themselves cannot be empirically isolated should not be a reason to assume that ambitions do not exist. The subsequent behavior of politicians, whether they seek office, is an indicator of such ambitions. The researcher can infer from behavior whether poli- ticians hold the desire to pursue a political career. Whether ambitions are put into action depends on a number of fac- tors. Background characteristics of office holders, i.e., occupation, education, age, race and sex, probably have an impact on who advances in politics. Schlesinger points out that situational factors in the politician's immediate environment have much to do with the fostering of ambitions. When another office is available and an individual has a reasonable chance of winning it, conditions are ripe for advancement.29 Ordinarily we would not expect a city councillor to seek a nomi- nation for the office of governor or United States senator. The consti- tuency he is serving is only a small segment of the district held by 15 statewide elected officials. Since his core of support is highly con- centrated in the city or one area or it, the likelihood that he could win the nomination or election is low. Those who would argue that few municipal officials move directly to national offices are probably correct. City councillors are not in a political situation that is advantageous to winning such offices. On the basis of this fact it should not be concluded that city councillors hold no further ambitions. Their ambitions are developed on the basis of their immediate political situation. Am ambitious city councillor is likely to seek another office within his own political milieu, the urban area, or attempt an office with a district that is primarily composed of his urban constituency. If it can be found that many individuals do indeed move to other elective positions, it is evidence that some city politicians do have aspirations, just as poli- ticians at other levels do. Schlesinger distinguishes three directions that ambitions may take: discrete, static and progressive. An office holder with dis- crete ambitions holds his present post for a single term and "then 30 Since the discrete poli- chooses to withdraw from public office." tician does not seek any further elective offices, he may choose to ignore political pressures exerted by his constituency. When an office holder has static ambitions, he "makes a long run "3] Since the static politician career out of a particular office. seeks reelection, he is more likely to pay attention to the preference of the electorate. Finally an office holder may have progressive ambitions and there- fore aspires "to attain an office more important than the one he now 16 32 seeks or is holding." A progressive politician "is under tension not only from his current constituency, but also from that of the office to which he aspires."33 To the extent that progressive and static ambitions are present, municipal office holders will tend to be more consistently accountable to the electorate. When many officials hold progressive ambitions and are able to satisfy those ambitions, a structure of political opportunities is discernible. The structure of political opportunities Schlesinger's extensive development of the structure of political opportunities for governors and congressmen provides a conceptual framework that can be applied to the career patterns of city council- lors. This structure is defined by the entire pattern of movement from one office to other offices. It is the sum of the chances for other offices that are available to ambitious politicians in a given position of government. The opportunity structure lying before city councillors may be very limited as Gittell suggests, or it may encompass a wide variety of office options. As Schlesinger notes, The structure may be clearly defined, as in a heredi- tary monarchy which limits chances and ambitions to the family tree. Or it may be difficult toBQiscern structure: potential candidates emerge everywhere. The municipal structure of political opportunities is probably the most diffuse structure of all levels of American government. When an individual begins at the lowest rungs of politics, his career may move in many different directions. Nevertheless it would be imprudent to assume that no orderly movement occurs from council office. Even at 17 the lowest rungs of American government, some order may be discernible in career movement. Factors affecting office movement As city councillors move through their careers, a number of fac- tors impinge upon their decisions to pursue another office. Those of a sociological orientation point to general social characteristics held in common by successful office holders. Higher occupational, educa- tional and social levels are found among successful politicians.35 These factors in addition to race and sex may serve as a screening device in the recruitment and advancement of city councillors. Also related to the way individuals move from one office to another are the circumstances surrounding the office holder at the moment he makes a career decision. As Gordon Black suggests, the office holder may respond "primarily to the immediate forces in his political environment rather than to factors that occurred in the more distant past."36 Political careers are based on decisions that must take into consideration what offices are available, electoral support and chances for winning that office. This is not to imply that all politicians are calculating the best winning strategy at all points in their careers. Many office holders Inay give no thought to their future political careers. Nevertheless, some people are more successful than others in pursuing long political (Sareers. By analyzing the circumstances surrounding the successful and Lnnsuccessful, the long term and short term office holders, we can iso- Tiate situational factors that are relevant to consistent career move- I"lent. 18 This dissertation examines the careers of city councillors who served in office over a twenty year time period in six Michigan cities. Every individual who enters office brings with him different exper- iences and hopes for pursuing a political career. If we were to inter- view these councillors, we might find several variations in their expressed ambitions to pursue further office. This study will examine how these ambitions are translated into actual career behavior. Classifying upward career moves One of the perennial problems in classifying how politicians advance is determining what offices, if attained, constitute an upward career move. One criterion of upward movement is whether the subse- quent office gives the politician relatively greater decision making authority than did his prior office. Prewitt and Nowlin's study of ambitious councillors indicates that they desire that their future office will give them greater responsibilities and prerogatives. This tendency is so strong that the majority of the ambitious favor expand- ing the authority of the desired office beyond its present scope.37 Offices with greater authority and responsibility than the council post also tend to confer greater prestige to their occupants. While many positions may constitute upward career moves for councillors, Schlesinger has identified the most obvious progressive offices lying before councillors and other aspiring officials within a state. They are U.S. senator, U.S. representative, governor and statewide elected officials. Most of the time, these offices are not immediately attainable targets for councillors. Schlesinger's analysis indicates that few 19 councillors ascend directly to the governor's office. Of all governors in the United States who were elected from 1914 to 1958, only four per- cent had served in local elective office, municipal and county office, immediately prior to becoming governor.38 However, councillors may move to stepping-stone offices that give them a more feasible chance to run for governor. Of the same sample of governors, seven percent first held local office, then moved to another office position from which they were directly elected governor. The offices that most often served as stepping-stones to governor in their order of importance were statewide elective offices, law enforcement positions mainly at the county level, state legislator and admini- strators at all government levels. These stepping-stone offices may be likely office targets for ambitious councillors who cannot expect to immediately run for the governor's office. Councillors may have ultimate ambitions to serve as a U.S. repre- sentative since it is one of the most important offices elected within the state. At present, the career pathway to the House of Representa- tives remains unexplored. Given that the office of representative has career status similar to that of governor, it is reasonable to assume that roughly the same types of stepping-stone offices are used to win either position. Councillors may have ultimate ambitions to ascend to the U.S. Senate. While Schlesinger's analysis indicates that the aforementioned stepping-stone posts, with the office of governor added to the state- wide category, are common routes to the Senate, the most often used Penultimate office is that of U.S. representative. 20 For councillors the pathway to the Senate would most likely involve a complex sequence of offices from the stepping-stone post to representative and from representative to senator. Since this route includes a longer sequence of electoral risks of defeat than other important offices, it is logical to expect very few councillors to be successful in winning the senate office. From 1912 to 1958, only six percent of all senators began their careers in local office and held a subsequent stepping-stone position from which they were elected to the Senate.39 For the purposes of this study, councillors who advanced to step- ping-stone offices or the highest elective offices in the state are considered to have made a progressive career move. Advancement to a more important office is only one of several career lines that council- lors may pursue. In order to systematically examine the directions of all council careers, a classification scheme is introduced in the fol- lowing section. The career pathwayiclassification Schlesinger suggests that "when ambitious men are drawn into local 40 Some councillors' ambi- offices, their expectations are diffuse." tions may lead them to attempt higher office, while others may decide to remain in local office or drop out of politics altogether. The career pathway classification is designed to account for all the pos- sible routes that councillors may take later in their career. Several decisions had to be made concerning rules for classifying careers. The primary question is "what matters?" Should one consider Only offices later held or both those held and those unsuccessfully 21 sought? Since our concern is with ambitions and the ability to suc- ceed, it was decided to classify separately those who won and those vvru) failed in attempts at later office. Only councillors who had pub- l'icly stated intentions and/or officially filed for candidacy were (:lassified as actually having sought a post. The following categories make up the career pathway classifica- ‘tion. A councillor may decide to end his career in politics with only one term of council service. If a councillor stayed in office for only one term and neither sought reelection nor sought an alternative public office for at least eight years following his entry to the council, he was classified as having a discrete career. The discrete has the least involvement in a political career of all the categories. At the opposite extreme is the progressive councillor who decides to ascend to a "more important" political office. A councillor who takes a higher elective office at sometime during the eight years fol- lowing his entry to the council is classified as having a progressive career. The offices that are defined as progressive moves for councillors are U.S. senator, U.S. representative, governor and other statewide elective offices. In addition, the stepping-stone posts to be identi- fied in Chapter II that bring councillors to these offices are also considered progressive moves for councillors. Councillors who once qualified as having a progressive career retained that classification regardless of later electoral defeats or dismissals. Given his relatively low position in the opportunity structure, a councillor may seek another office at the local level. A move by a councillor to the elective office of mayor, city treasure, city clerk, 22 lcocal school board, county commissioner or another county position will t>e classified as lateral office behavior, though in some cases condi- ‘tions of office security or salary may in fact be greater than for someone holding a council seat. Investigating such features is beyond the scope of this study, though their presence seems a rational infer- ence. We will, however, classify the move as lateral because the poli- tical power exercised is not dissimilar to that of the council. A councillor who later assumed an appointive post at any government level is also considered here to have made a lateral move. As will be shown in Chapter II, the common characteristic of these lateral positions is that they are non-progressive and, as such, do not serve as a stepping-stone for attainment of one of the highest posi- tions in the state. Rather, a lateral career move places an (ex-)coun- cillor in an office that confers no greater future political opportuni- ties than did his council seat. Following Schlesinger's terminology, we regard a councillor who chooses to remain in his current office by running in one or more incumbency races as a statjg, If either a lateral or a static sought a progressive office later in his career he is reclassified accordingly. Stymied career types This dissertation is concerned with discovering not only how often councillors are reelected or win another office, but also the occur- rence of later defeats. Any given councillor is stymied in his ambi- tions whenever he runs for an office one or more times without success. With the exception of discretes who seek no further political offices, 23 cxouncillors in the above categories who make further attempts may be t>locked from achieving their goal. A stymied static is defined as one who loses an incumbency elec- tion after one or more terms of council service. Should a stymied statjp_seek another office at a later date, he is reclassified accord- ingly. A lateral may find his career stymied if he loses an election for a county or another municipal office. Unless he is successful in a separate county or municipal office attempt at a later time, he is classified as a stymied lateral. If a stymied lateral went on to run for a higher office, he is reclassified as a progressive or stymied progressive according to the outcome of the election. A councillor who seeks to win a higher office may also be stymied. If a councillor ran for a higher office, but was defeated, he is clas- sified as a stymied pppgressive. If he later won an election for a higher office, he is reclassified as a progressive. These decision rules are intended to rank councillors according to the highest career pathway they seek in their later career. That is, a progressive attempt takes precedence over other (lateral or static) office attempts and victories. Likewise, a lateral attempt takes pre- cedence over any static career behavior by councillors. Contemporary political careers are difficult to classify. Unless a person has died, it is impossible to know if he will change his career plans in the future. The obvious means of avoiding this problem is to examine only careers that ended decades ago. If one wishes to study the recent career behavior of politicians, some decision rules that maximize validity must be established. It was 24 ciecided that councillors who served in council office from 1946 to 1966 vvould be classified by the career pathway typology. Since the poli- ‘tical behavior of councillors was traced up to 1974, there is a mini- Inum of an eight year time span for which later office is recorded. The 1966 entrants to the city council pose the most serious problem for classification. Some still may have been serving in the council in 1974. In Lansing and Detroit, where the term of office is four years, entrants may have been completing only their second term in 1974. For this reason, it was decided to classify councillors who entered office in these cities only through 1962. III. The Hypotheses to be Tested The initial task of this study is to discover what types of office goals councillors actually pursue and attain. Our guiding assumption will be that few councillors will be successful in advancing to markedly higher offices. In Chapter II the sample of councillors will be classified by the career pathway typology. If a significant number of office seekers are uncovered, there exists a structure of political opportunity. The shape of this structure is defined by the types of later offices that councillors attain. Ambition theory provides clues as to what kinds of offices coun- cillors might take. Schlesinger states that the politician tends to seek offices that are reasonably attainable given his present political career position. Since council is one of the few nonpartisan elective offices in Michigan and since it has poor linkages with political party organization, it is a relatively weak position from which to jump to the highest offices in the state, i.e., governor, U.S. representative 25 61nd U.S. senator. This in no way implies that progressive careers are riot possible from council office. It does suggest that the immediate (:areer goals and achievements of progressive councillors will most often be offices at the moderate levels of the career ladder, rather than the highest posts. Prewitt found evidence for this position in the statements of San Francisco Bay area councillors. While over half of the councillors having political ambitions intended seeking local, county or judicial offices, only 18% hoped to run for state legislative office and only 11% expected to run for congressional office.41 The most obvious career step for councillors is to another office within their municipality. As Schlesinger states, Pwhen two offices have the same or similar electorates, it is logical to expect movement from one to the other."42 Office seeking councillors are expected to most frequently take this career route. A number of other offices in the structure of political oppor- tunities lie somewhere between municipal positions and the highest state offices. The network of county offices and state legislative posts probably compose the middle range of the opportunity structure. The scope of their responsibilities is for the most part broader than that of municipal posts, yet narrower than that of a governor or a congressman. Since many of these "middle" offices are partisan posts, they are more likely stepping-stones than is council to the highest offices in the state. Next to other municipal posts, county and legis- lative offices are probably the most often sought positions by ambi- tious councillors. 26 It is expected that the status of an office has much to do with the frequency of attempts made by councillors to attain that office. The success councillors have in winning these offices is also likely to depend upon the office's relative status in the opportunity structure. From this argument can be stated the following hypotheses: Hypothesis I: The higher an office is in the structure of political opportuni- ties, the less likely that councillors will make attempts to attain that office. Hypothesis II: The higher an office is in the structure of political opportuni- ties, the less likely that ambitious councillors will be success- ful in attempts to attain that office. Background characteristics and political career advancement The remainder of this dissertation will examine factors that may influence the ambitions and subsequent careers of councillors. The social and individual backgrounds of politicians have been the most widely acknowledged determinants of who is recruited to political office. Donald Matthews states, "regardless of democratic institutions and values, political decision-makers tend to be chosen from those ranking high in America's system of stratification."43 In studying council recruitment, Prewitt describes what he calls a "social bias in leadership selection" that brings to office those with 44 Since status characteristics higher than the population as a whole. background characteristics are known to affect recruitment to city councils, it is reasonable to expect that they have a bearing on coun- cillors' expectations and chances to attain a later office. 27 This influence operates in internal and external ways. First a councillor who ranks high in status characteristics may make a self (internal) judgement that his chances for another office are better than contenders of lesser status. Likewise a councillor ranking lower in status probably lowers his estimate of the chances of winning another office. If this process occurs, a councillor's status will have an effect upon whether he decides to seek a further office. External influences come into play when a councillor decides to run for another office, regardless of his status ranking. The elec- torate then has the opportunity to discount or weight the importance of any given status characteristic in making a voting decision.45 If any given status characteristic has an external influence, a candidate ranking higher will be more likely to meet with success at the polls. In order to test for the effects of both the internal and external influences of individual characteristics upon councillors, two types of hypotheses will be introduced in the following sessions: those which predict that higher status councillors will more often seek another office and those which predict that, among the ambitious, higher status councillors are more likely to be successful when they make a later office attempt. Councillors' occppation and political career advancement Of all the criteria by which individuals are ranked in American society, the occupation of an individual is probably the most widely recognized.46 Prewitt found that those from upper status occupational groups were the most likely to be recruited to council office. A similar pattern is found in the higher office levels of American 28 politics. This suggests that occupational background affects council- lors' ambitions and actual career movement. The following hypotheses will be tested: Hypothesis III: The higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis IV: The higher the occupational status of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. Of all occupational types, lawyers have been found to be espec- ially prevalent in public life. Heinz Eulau and John Sprague state, "lawyers are clearly a distinct occupational group that is more vis- ible, more ubiquitous, more prominent and even more dominant in American political life than any other.“47 The advantaged position of lawyers in entering politics has been attributed to their social status, the skills that they cultivate by the nature of their profes- sion and their continual interaction with public officials.48 One might expect that with these advantages, councillors who are lawyers will have a greater propensity to seek and win later elective office than will other occupational types. The following hypotheses will be tested: Hypothesis V: Councillors who are lawyers will be more likely than other occu- pational types to make further office attempts. Hypothesis VI: Ambitious councillors who are lawyers are more likely than office seekers of other occupational types to be successful in further office attempts. 29 Councillors' educational background and career advancement It has become increasingly evident in the United States that a second criterion by which individuals are ranked in status is educa- tion. Virtually all studies of council, legislative, congressional and presidential office holders indicate that those recruited to office have completed higher levels of education than the total population. We expect that educational background is associated with the ambitions and career advancement of councillors. Hypothesis VII: The higher the educational level of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis VIII: The higher the educational level of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. Age as a factor affecting later office seeking behavior Although age is not widely recognized as a status norm of society, it may influence the career attitudes of councillors and the public in making voting choices. Schlesinger has pointed out that the aging politician probably adjusts his ambitions toward more modest office goals than does his younger counterpart. In a study of legislators from four states, John Wahlke et al. found that age is related to expressed political ambitions.49 Younger legislators more frequently have the desire to seek a further elective office than do older legislators. In a follow-up analysis of the same sample, Paul Hain found that younger legislators are more likely to attain another office. The following relationships between age and later career behavior are expected to be found among city councillors: 3O Hypothesis IX: The greater the age of councillors, the less likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis X: The greater the age of ambitious councillors, the less likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. Race and sex as factors affecting advancement The factors of race and sex have had such a profound influence upon the chances for entry into politics that few blacks or women have served in council office. Of the San Francisco Bay area councillors studied by Prewitt, none were black and only five percent were women.50 Feld and Lutz report that only five percent of Houston councillors were black, all entering office after 1970.51 Both groupings have had severely limited access to offices in the higher levels of politics. E. E. Werner found that between 1917 and 1964 only seventy women had served in the U.S. Congress. Of those, about one-half had relatives in Congress and over one-half were either elected or appointed to fill a vacancy, often one caused by the death of a husband.52 State legislatures have shown similar, though less marked patterns of recruitment. In 1963-64, for example, only 4.5% of the state legislators in the country were women, compared to two per- cent of the members of Congress. The literature indicates that blacks have also had limited access to higher office. From 1869 to 1950 only fifty-four blacks had served in Congress. In recent years, the representation of blacks in Congress has increased only slightly. While in 1950 only two blacks served in Congress, their numbers had increased to twelve, roughly three percent, 31 by 1972. State legislative office has been a less often realized career goal for blacks than it has been for women. In 1957 only one percent of the legislators from California, Ohio, and New Jersey were black. In Tennessee, where the black population was 16% in 1957, there were no black legislators.53 Since other office levels have been largely inaccessible to blacks and women, the following hypotheses are suggested: Hypothesis XI: Black councillors will be less likely than others to make further office attempts Hypothesis XII: Ambitious black councillors will be less likely than other office seekers to be successful in further office attempts. Hypothesis XIII: Councilwomen will be less likely than councilmen to make further office attempts. Hypothesis XIV: Ambitious councilwomen will be less likely than ambitious council- men to be successful in further office attempts. Apart from the overall tendency for both groups to be excluded from political careers, it is expected that blacks and women differ in the frequency with which they seek further office. The literature sug- gests that in recent years blacks tend to have had a relatively greater advantage than women in running for elective office. Ernest Patterson points out that an increasing number of congressional, legislative and municipal districts are composed of black majorities or near majori- 54 ties. In 1971 all ten of the districts that were over 50% black elected black congressmen. 32 While black candidates can increasingly count on the votes of the black community, women find little unified support along sex lines. Women are elected to office, not as representatives of a common inter- est grouping, but from support across a number of groupings in their district. Since these groupings are united on an ad hoc basis, women lack the "natural" constituency that is usually found supporting black candidates. The greater difficulties women face in organizing a winning coali- tion probably lowers their expectations for attaining an elective office, even when they already hold a political post. In a study of female party leaders, Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik conclude that women leaders' ambition is constrained by their limited opportunities to attain public office. Female party officials tend “to discount pub- lic office as a career objective...and to channel their efforts into other, non-political areas of endeavor."55 The literature suggests that women continue to have lowered expec- tations in regard to a political career, while blacks are finding more and more support among black constituencies. If this is the case, we should find that councilwomen in Michigan cities are less likely than black councillors to seek and attain another elective office. Research on political recruitment especially at the local level generally emphasizes the importance of background characteristics. Yet almost all studies indicate that some lower status individuals enter council office although at a lower rate than upper status people. These unpredicted cases suggest that factors other than background exert an influence upon political ambitions and career behavior. 33 Gordon Black has pointed out that office holders tend to set their ambitions according to the immediate circumstances of their political environment, rather than according to factors that occurred in the more distant past: Background factors are obviously important, but it remains to be seen whether their cumulative effect on a politician is very great. Such factors are probably out— weighed by more immediate concerns, particularly those concerns that are related to the choices that are available at the time a potential candidate must make hlS dec1Sion. Structural factors affecting advancement The specific circumstances surrounding a council election require some candidates to make greater expenditure in campaign efforts than others. Those candidates who spend more resources, i.e., time, effort and capital, can be viewed as incurring greater costs in order to attain a given office. A number of considerations affect the costli- ness of a campaign, such as the reputation and demeanor of the candi- dates. While the effects of individual attributes are probably randomly distributed across the universe of councillors, structural factors of the political system have a systematic impact upon campaign costs. Black demonstrates that the costs are markedly higher for council candidates campaigning in large cities and/or in competitive districts. Highly contested races require a substantial allocation of resources on the part of the winner, as do races in larger cities where greater absolute numbers of the voting populus must be reached. Another factor affecting the costs of an election for a given candidate is whether his opponent is an incumbent. Particularly in nonpartisan cities, as are found in this dissertation sample, it is 34 difficult for a political newcomer, as are most council candidates, to defeat an incumbent. As Charles Adrian points out, the familiarity of the incumbent's name in the absence of party labels gives him an advan- tage in securing votes.57 In order to be successful, a challenger to an incumbent would have to make several earlier attempts at office, as Adrian suggests, or wage a highly animated campaign against the incum- bent. Regardless of electioneering tactics, it is obvious that oppo- nents of incumbents must incur greater costs in order to be elected to office. Black argues that campaigns that tend to be more costly are clearly recognizable by candidates either prior to or during the elec- tion: [Since these costs] represent resource allocations that could be spent in other ways,...the choice to spend them in office seeking is a choice not to spend resources on other alternatives. For this reason they are an impor- tant component of the utility calculus of a potential office holder when he faces the chggce of whether he should seek some political office. Black then presents a strong argument that under conditions requiring greater costs for election, individuals who decide to become candidates do so under increased risks that they will be defeated. When costs and risks are higher, Black argues that the individuals less committed to office holding decide not to run. Those who do run and win office under costly conditions will tend to be those who most highly value holding the council office. Black found that the council- lors' level of desire for his office is positively related to city size and the degree of competition in his election. The relationship between a candidate's commitment to winning the office and cost factors is circular in that those most desirous of an 35 office may be more often found running in competitive races, since the less committed have already withdrawn, or competitive races themselves may foster greater desires. Regardless of which process operates, those candidates who win costly races are assumed to have a heightened commitment to the office holding experience. Black found that their commitment to politics extended beyond their desire to hold the council office. Councillors elected in large cities and/or in highly contested races more often reported a desire to run for another office in the future than did their opposites. Black's central thesis is that structural characteristics of a polity determine, in part, the level of commitment of office holders to a political career. Under certain conditions structural character- istics serve as a screening device to selectively recruit and advance the most politically committed individuals. Black's enquiry relied upon the stated intentions of councillors to seek another office. Since this dissertation study measures the actual career movement of councillors under varying conditions, we shall test the following hypo- theses: Hypothesis XV: Councillors from large cities will be more likely to make further office attempts than those from smaller cities. Hypothesis XVI: Councillors from large cities will be more likely to win further office than those from smaller cities. Hypothesis XVII: Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who were elected by wide margins. 36 Hypothesis XVIII: Those who were initially elected to council office in closely con- tested races will be more likely to win further office than those who were elected by wide margins. Another indicator of the earlier investment of councillors is whe- ther, at anytime in their career, they entered and won a council elec- tion against an incumbent. Since those who outran an incumbent prob- ably had to invest a substantial amount of resources in campaigning, they may be more likely than others to have a long range commitment to a political career. If incumbency elections are indicative of the investment level of political commitment of councillors, we shall find support in the data for the following hypotheses: Hypothesis XIX: Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who did not. Hypothesis XX: Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to win further office than those who did not. The structure of political ppportunities While Black emphasizes the importance of the earlier investments of public leaders, Schlesinger focuses upon the objective chances for advancement lying before elected officials: In developing an ambition theory of politics we can bring order to the office ambitions of politicians only if we can find order in their chances or opportunities for office. It is therefore necessagy to discover...the struc- ture of political opportunities. This structure is defined by the turnover of elected officials at various office levels. The opportunities for councillors to seek and attain further office are maximized when other municipal, county, 37 legislative and state officials frequently vacate their offices. In this situation councillors face a sizeable opportunity structure. When the turnover of office holders at other (presumably higher) office levels is lower, councillors have fewer chances to advance. We shall construct an empirical measure of the opportunity struc- ture lying before councillors of different cities in order to test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis XXI: The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to council- lors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis XXII: The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to council— lors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further office. The logic of electorates In discussing the "logic of electorate" Schlesinger focuses upon the way in which elected officials will be advantaged or disadvantaged in their later careers by the nature of their current electorate.60 Here we are concerned with how structural characteristics of the coun- cil district act upon councillors' political ambitions. Council districts that are congruent with, totally surround and greatly overlap with the districts for many other elective offices offer substantial opportunities for advancement to their occupants. 0n the other hand, councillors representing districts that are electorally linked with a lesser number of other office districts face fewer chances for political promotion. 38 By constructing an index of electoral advantage that is indica- tive of the overlay between council and other office districts, we can test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis XXIII: The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis XXIV: The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further office. Many of the relationships that we have predicted in the above hypotheses may be interrelated. For example, looking back to the individual variables that we shall test, the educational achievement and occupational levels of councillors may be strongly associated. Among the structural measures described in the preceding sections, city size may be correlated with the closeness of council elections and other structural variables. Whenever it is appropriate, control vari- ables will be introduced into the data. The data base This study examines 234 mayors and city councillors who served in the six largest cities of Michigan from 1946 to 1966. The career data collected include the group memberships and political party and public offices held by these individuals before and after council service. Municipal election statistics were retrieved from city clerk's records in each of the sample cities, while most of the office holding and individual information was taken from the files of local newspapers. In all of the sample cities the newspapers maintained individual files that include newspaper clippings regarding the later office 39 holding activities of mayors and city councillors. In many cases the newspaper library had available a backlog of questionnaires answered by municipal officials themselves. For a few members of the sample, addi- tional biographical information was drawn from the Michigan Manual or personal interviews. The municipal officials included in the sample served in the fol- lowing cities: Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek. These cities were selected because they have undergone changes common to many American central cities since the mid 1940's. Each city has experienced urban sprawl, population growth in the sur- rounding fringe areas and relative losses of population in the center. For example, Grand Rapids, like the other sample cities, "has had an explosion of residential developments and shopping centers, some located far outside the central city boundaries."6] Each of the sample cities has attempted to retain its center as the commercial and business hub of the area. Municipal officials from all six cities have attempted local and federally funded projects to upgrade the downtown area. Except for Battle Creek, all cities were Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, with a population of over 50,000 for at least part of the time during the period of analysis and each city conformed to the definition of an SMSA by maintaining a work force of which at least 15% commute to the city. Central cities were selected for two reasons. First, ambitious municipal officials, if they exist, are more likely to be found in cen- tral cities. Second, it was expected that councillors in central cities would be more likely to have variations across background 4o characteristics that are hypothesized to be related political ambitions and advancement. IV. Development of the Examination Chapter II will be concerned with describing the later political careers of mayors and city councillors. In an effort to uncover the shape of the municipal structure of political opportunites, we will describe the specific types of offices later attained by councillors. Hypotheses I and II predicting patterns of attempted and actual career movement will be tested. Chapter III is concerned with testing for the effects of various background characteristics upon the office attempts and victories of councillors. Hypotheses III through XIV regarding occupation, educa- tion, age, race and sex will be tested. The objective of Chapter IV is to explore the impact of struc- tural characteristics upon the later career behavior of councillors. Measures of both the political investments of councillors and their career opportunities will be introduced. Chapter V is concerned with a general evaluation of the extent to which mayors and councillors in the sample cities seek and attain later elective office. The implications of these findings pertaining to accountable municipal leadership will be discussed. In addition, this chapter will summarize the factors found to be associated with office advancement. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. FOOTNOTES James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1897), 1:637. Marilyn Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End," Public Admini- stration Review 24 (March 1963):20. Robert L. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Community Political Systems, ed. by Morris Janowitz (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 71. Theodore Lowi, "Why Mayors Go Nowhere," Washington Monthly 3 (January l972):56. Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Politics 27 (August 1965):647. Charles Press, When One-Third of a City Moves to the Suburbs (East Lansing: The Institute for Community Development, 1959), pp. 1-2. Ibid. Charles Press, "The Cities Within a Great City: A Decentralist Approach to Centralization," The Centennial Review 7 (Winter 1963 :115. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power," p. 23. Robert Weber and George Van Cleve, "What Makes a City Councilman Tick," Nation's Cities 8 (June 1970):35. Ibid. Arthur Bromage, On the City Council (Ann Arbor: George P. Pub- lishing Company, 1950), p. 21. The Municipal Yearbook (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1965). Ibid. Weber and Van Cleve, "What Makes a City Councilman," p. 35. Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanshjp (Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press, 1960):'pp. 73-74. 41 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 42 Mayer N. Zald and Thomas A. Anderson, "Secular Trends and Histori- cal Contingencies in the Recruitment of Mayors," Urban Affairs Quarterly 3 (June 1968):67. Lowi, "Why Mayors Go Nowhere," p. 56. Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor," p. 220. Ibid.. pp. 22 and 23. Interview with former city hall reporter Lloyd Moles in Lansing, August 21, 1975. Mr. Moles maintains that the quality of council candidates in Lansing has declined with increases in council sal- aries. Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970). p. 176. William H. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators: A Comparative Perspective," olity 7 (Summer 1975):507. Weber and Van Cleve, "What Makes a City Councilman," p. 35. Richard Feld and Donald S. Lutz, "Recruitment of City Council Mem- bers in Houston" (paper delivered to the Southern Political Science Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, November 5-7, 1970), p. 15. See also Richard Feld and Donald Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," Journal of Politics 34 (August l972):924-42. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators," p. 507. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. l. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe: Free Press, 1968), p. 67. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 38-39. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Bryan T. Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the Characteristics of Local Political Leaders," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (November 1968):519-31. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 43 Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, California, September 8—12, 1970), p. 3. See also Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives," American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972): 144-59. Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly 22 (June 1969):306. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 91 Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 199. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 184. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 99. Donald Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision- Makers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 23. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, Chapter 2. Matthews, The Social Background, p. 56. Hughes, Men and Their Work, pp. 11-12. Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers and Politics (Indiana- polis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), p. 3. Matthews, The Social Background, pp. 30-31. John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System, Exploration in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), Chapter 6. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 29. Feld and Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," pp. 927- 28. E. E. Werner, "Women in Congress: 1917-1962," Western Political Quarterly 21 (January 1968):40-50. Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, p. 488. Ernest Patterson, Black City Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1974), pp. 244-50. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 44 Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik, "Women as Politicians: The Social Background, Personality, and Political Careers of Female Party Leaders," Journal of Social Issues 28 (l972):230. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition" (unpublished paper), p. 44, footnote 6. Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952):77. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition" (unpublished paper), p. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. Ibid., p. 99. Press, When One-Third of a City, p. 1. 11. 9. CHAPTER II THE LATER POLITICAL CAREERS OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS This chapter traces the earlier and later political careers of the individuals who held city council and mayoral office in Michigan from 1946 to 1966.1 In Section I we will explore the extent to which these officials had experience in government, political parties and voluntary organizations prior to their entry into municipal office. This section is retrospective in the sense that it describes the setting in which these individuals made the decision to enter municipal office. It is intended to give the reader an overall perspective for viewing their later political careers. Our perspective on the later careers of councillors and mayors is twofold in that we are concerned with both the willingness of municipal officials to seek other office and their ability to get elected to a subsequent post. As Everett Hughes states, A career is, in fact, a sort of running adjustment between a man and the various facts of life and his pro- fessional world. It involves the running of risks...It contains a set of predictions about the course of events [in his profeSSional world.] An investigation of political careers should take into account, not only the choices of politicians to seek another office, but also the judgement of recruiters, i.e., partisan officials and the elec- torate. The frequency with which office seekers are found is a measure of the extent to which political ambitions are actualized among 45 46 municipal leaders. The percentage of municipal officials who actually attain another office is indicative of their objective opportunities to “advance" their political career. Section II will describe the frequency of later office attempts and victories among the total sample of municipal officials. Section III is concerned with how the later political aspirations of municipal officials are related to the length of their tenure in city office. In Section IV we will explore the differences in the tenure and political career advancement of mayors and city councillors. In Section V, the types of offices pursued and attained by the ambitious will be examined in an effort to describe the Opportunity structure open to city councillors. Consistent lines of office move- ment found in the data are indicators of the career horizons that these officials typically attain. Hypotheses I and II concerned with the trend of career movement to higher office levels by councillors will be tested in this section. 1. Municipal Officials: Their Prior Experiences in Government Political Party and Voluntary Organizations For the most part the individuals who enter mayoral and council office in the Michigan cities have had no previous experience in government. Over 80% of the total sample had rendered no service in government prior to their election to city office. Two patterns emerged in the data among those 18% who had pre- viosly held government posts. A minority of these, thirteen, had held full time posts at the municipal, county or state level. An ex- governor of Michigan, William Comstock, entered the Detroit Common Council at the age of sixty-eight. The remainder of those who had 47 previously held full time posts had served at the local level, i.e., as school board superintendent, assistant county prosecutor, sheriff and city and county department heads. However, the majority of those with prior government experience had served on part time local boards, such as hospital, park, welfare and health boards, and commissions, such as charter and city beautifi- cation commissions. In some ways, these boards and commissions are outside the mainstream of politics in the city. With few exceptions, they are appointive posts and are therefore not a training ground for future campaign efforts.3 The individuals who had served in these posts worked almost totally out of the view of the public. The local newspapers published few or no accounts of the workings of these boards and commissions. To an even greater extent, city officials lacked any overt involvement with a political party prior to entering office. Only eight, approximately three percent of the 234 city officials had offi- cially worked in a party organization or served as a delegate to a party convention. Prior to their entry into municipal office, none had a record of service at national party levels. The partisan affiliation of those in the sample appears to be a factor that is seldom mentioned during campaigns for city office. Con- spicuously absent from newspaper biographies of municipal candidates is information about their partisan preferences. This may be partly because nonpartisan ballots are used. At least for the cities of Detroit, Jackson and Battle Creek there is evidence that political parties do not normally play an active role in city elections.4 If 48 Michigan city officials shared common experiences prior to entering office, it was outside political party circles. Membership in voluntary organizations Most of these individuals entered municipal office with a record of service in voluntary organizations of the city. While virtually every official for which information was available had a membership in at least one organization, roughly three-fourths belonged to three or more groups. See Table l. The data on group memberships were drawn primarily from newspaper accounts published just prior to the city election. For the most part, the candidates volunteered this information to the newspapers. Given these circumstances, one would expect that some marginal memberships would have been listed by the candidates. For this reason, these data are probably not a valid indicator of the actual extent of group participation by these individuals. It is worth noting, however, that 31% of those belonging to voluntary organi- zations were founders, officers or committee chairmen at sometime prior to their election to municipal office. This suggests that at least some of the people who become municipal leaders had more than a token involvement in groups of the city. The kinds of groups to which municipal officials belonged encom- passed a broad range of interests. In order to present the data in a systematic way, a classification of predominant group membership was constructed. Individuals in the sample are classified according to the major kind of group affiliations they had prior to entering municipal office. 49 The categories are civic, business, veteran, labor union, professional, government improvement, religious, ethnic and political party groups.5 These categories were devised on the basis of the kinds of group mem- berships found in the sample and are not intended to be exhaustive, except for the sample under study. City officials with one group membership were easily classified. The bulk of city officials with two or more memberships were classified according to the following rules: 1. If a majority or plurality of group memberships fell into one category, the official was classified accordingly. 2. If the official had an equal number of group memberships in two or more categories, he was classified in the appropriate category on the basis of leadership position(s) he had held. 3. If he had an equal number of group memberships in two or more categories and held no leadership position(s), he was excluded from the classification. These rules are not intended to reflect the frequency of group membership in the data which has already been analyzed. Rather they are intended to give the reader an overall view of the predominant kinds of group affiliations that officials had prior to their entry into municipal office. Well over one-half of the 193 officials who were classifiable, 58%, were primarily involved in civic and charity organizations, such as the Lions Club, Scout clubs, Red Cross, Community Chest and Old Newsboys clubs.6 Almost 14% were mainly affiliated with business groups that included the Chamber of Commerce, construction councils, real estate associations and various other specialized business 50 organizations. Between six and eight percent were found in the sample who belonged to veterans clubs, labor unions or professional clubs. Only a few individuals, four percent or less, fell into each of the other categories. See Table 2. If the group membership of these individuals reflects their inter- ests, it is apparent that the majority are involved in civic affairs and, to a lesser extent, in activities related to their occupations. The extent to which these organizations take part in municipal cam- paigns varies. Although no direct evidence is available, it appears that civic groups found in the data are for the most part apolitical. Their mem- bers do not appear to recruit individuals to run for municipal office and are usually inert during political campaigns. While they may intervene into politics for a specific policy end, civic group members are primarily concerned with activities that are outside the political arena. Those affiliated with labor unions and business groups make some efforts to influence the recruitment and election of municipal candi- dates. Union members in Flint occasionally endorse and campaign for city candidates, although they almost never intervened in Jackson pri- maries and elections.7 In Detroit union members are more active in recruiting and working for candidates. In all three cities, the unions often suffer defeats in attempts to get their candidates elected.8 This is evident in the small proportion, less than one-tenth, of muni- cipal officials with union membership or with a distinct pro—labor stance found in the sample. 51 In all six cities, members of business groups make attempts to recruit municipal candidates although not usually on a regular basis. Occasionally they attempt to recruit businessmen as municipal candi- dates in Jackson and to a lesser extent in Battle Creek, but often find it difficult to convince businessmen to run for office.9 The Citizens' League of Detroit composed of businessmen and professionals screens candidates and makes public endorsements on a fairly regular basis. However, its influence on the electorate is limited to well-to-do neighborhoods.10 In the other cities, business groups endorse candi- dates from time to time but do not actively campaign in their behalf. While information in the literature is scarce about the political role of other organizations, this writer found little evidence of muni- cipal campaign efforts by veteran, religious, ethnic and professional associations.H While municipal candidates make speaking appearances before these groups, these organizations do not publicly endorse candi- dates. For the most part, voluntary organizations in the sample cities do not appear to serve as institutions of municipal recruitment on a regu- lar basis. Of all the cities, Detroit has the most structured channels of recruitment with labor unions and the Citizens' League sometimes seeking and usually endorsing candidates for mayoral and council office. However, the efforts of these groups in no way amount to a monopoly over recruitment. In the other cities, voluntary organi- zations solicit candidates from time to time, but are often unsuccess- ful in winning elections. In the long run these defeats have probably served to stifle the attempts of such groups to recruit municipal candidates. 52 It should be noted that most successful candidates for municipal office, even in Detroit, have a background in civic groups that rarely intervene in the municipal electoral process. It appears that a sub- stantial number of individuals who decide to run for municipal office do so on the basis of their own initiative. If anything, their organi- zational involvement may be indicative of a general interest in civic and community affairs. It is not surprising that many self starters are found among Michigan city officials, since a similar pattern has been found in other cities and at other levels of elective office.12 Entering municipal office Most of those who enter mayoral and council office do so via the election process. Of the entire sample, less than ten, five percent, were appointed to fill vacancies. In most of the municipalities during the time period under study, the city charter specified that openings for an office be filled by a special or regular election. This per- centage of appointments to municipal office is substantially lower than that discovered by Prewitt. In the San Francisco Bay area, 24% of the councillors initially entered office by having been appointed.13 At least in the Michigan cities under study, the citizens almost always have the option to take part in the recruitment process through elec- tions. Overall a substantial majority of municipal officials enter office lacking the kind of political experience that is normally associated with professional office holders. Most appear to be what Prewitt calls "citizen-politicians," people with an interest in politics, but with little expertise in practical matters.14 53 Upon entering office, many may have discovered that they had much to learn about the ordinary tasks of governing. As in other fields, the newcomers to mayoral and council office probably learn from those around them with greater experience. Such was the case for Councillor Fred Kircher, a novice to politics who relied upon the long tenured city attorney for advice on council affairs. After several terms of council service, Mr. Kircher stated, "Joe Lavery [city attorney] is a unique man who was the balance wheel of the city council. I learned more from him about practical city government than any other person."15 On the other hand, there is a developmental aspect to these data. Somehow these individuals decided to make the leap from private life to public office holding. The fact that they did so meant that they were willing to take on a whole new set of experiences and responsibilities. The act of municipal office holding may have altered their atti- tudes about their abilities and opportunities to further serve in pub- lic office. While some may have found the experience frustrating, others may have found enough personal satisfaction in office holding to merit future endeavors in politics. Perhaps the statement of Willard Bowerman whose political career began in the Lansing city council is revealing: "once you get into politics, it sort of gets into your blood. Who knows, I may be back someday running for something else."16 A year later Mr. Bowerman ran successfully for the office of mayor. As will be seen in Section II, many other municipal officials went on to seek another elective office at the city and other levels. 54 Municipal Officials: Their Later Political Careers "When ambitious men are drawn into local office," Schlesinger states, "their expectations are diffuse." ‘7 Such is the case with city officials included in the sample of this study as career options included elective and appointive office at local, county, state and congressional levels. In order to define, for purposes of this study, that behavior constitutes an attempt at a later office, several deci- sion rules have been specified. 1. Mayors and councillors who sought an office, whether elective or appointive, are designated as having made a later office attempt. (In terms of seeking an appointive position, the data are limited primarily to those who were successful in that the seeking of an appointive post is frequently not pub- lic information. In contrast, seeking an elective position is a matter of public record.) Whenever officials sought an elective and held an appointive office in their later career, the elective post takes prece- dence, regardless of the outcome of the election. This rule is based on the assumption that seeking elective office requires greater effort and opportunity costs than is the case when seeking an appointive post. Posts that are held concurrently with the council and mayoral office are disqualified as later office attempts. Until 1967, city councils were empowered by law to designate one or more of their members to serve on the County Board of Supervisors, now called Commissioners. Chosen by a majority vote, some councillor-commissioners retained the county office for the 55 duration of their council term. Since this office was not sought independently by the councillor and did not constitute a separate office holding experience, it is disregarded as a later office attempt. 4. Councillors, who after their council term expired, sought pub- lic election to the county board are classified as having made a later office attempt. Let us first examine the frequency with which municipal officials seek another elective office. Later office attempts and victories by municipal officials Of the total sample of 234 mayors and city councillors, 38% later sought another elective post, usually immediately after city service. The data indicate a higher frequency of office attempts than one would expect given most of the published literature on city officials. Gittell and Lowi emphasize the lack of ambition of municipal leaders to seek "higher" office, meaning state of national elective office. Since the data presented here include attempts by city officials at municipal, county and higher levels, the percentage of office seekers in the sample is substantial. The broader definition used in this study is based on the assumption that any independent attempt at another office, however modest its stature, is an indicator of the pre- sence of political ambitions. One need not become a governor, congressman or president in order 18 In fact the majority of elec- to achieve a career in political life. tive attempts by municipal officials, 63%, are for offices at the local level. See Table 3. 56 Thirty percent of all the aspirants ran for municipal posts. These individuals were primarily councillors who later sought the mayoral office. Around one-third of the office seekers made attempts at county elective posts, i.e., county commissioner, treasurer and drain commissioner. The remaining 37% sought legislative, and to a lesser extent, congressional and statewide elective posts. When municipal officials do become political aspirants, it is apparent that they are most likely to pursue office goals at the local levels of elective government. This suggests that they themselves tend to view their political opportunities as confined to offices in the lower reaches of politics. Of the total sample 24% actually went on to another elective office. As might be expected, municipal officials are most likely to fan out into the network of local elective offices. Seventy-nine per- cent of those who won a later office assumed a municipal or county post, while 21% attained a legislative or higher position. As will be seen in the following section, very few municipal officials ascended to the highest offices in the state. Movement from municipal office to statewide and congressional office Of the entire sample of office seekers, thirteen went on to run for a statewide or congressional office later in their careers. Only three were successful. One of three municipal officials who ran in the general election for lieutenant governor was elected, as was one of six councillors who contended for congressional office. Only one municipal official, a councillor from Detroit, ran for, and was elected to the state Supreme 57 Court. Of the four councillors who contended for the posts of gover- nor, appeals judge and attorney general, none were successful. Of the thirteen highest office seekers, most had served a number of years in municipal office before making an attempt at a later office. See Table 4. During their tenure in municipal office, none had been defeated in an incumbency election. Six of the thirteen highest office seekers sought or held at least one later office before attempting a state or congressional office. Four of the six held county elective office, as prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, judge or commissioner immediately prior to running for a higher office. Almost one-half of the highest office seekers were from Detroit. All three of those who actually won the progressive offices of con- gressman, Supreme Court judge and lieutenant governor had previously served as common councillors in Detroit.19 Needless to say, conclusions cannot be drawn from a sub-sample of this size. Nevertheless, the predominance of Detroit officials among the office seekers and winners suggests that political conditions in Detroit are somehow more conducive to upward career movement. Although the following explanation is somewhat speculative, the sheer population size of Detroit, relative to the other sample cities, may have altered the everyday conduct of political affairs there in ways that open career opportunities. First, the presence of a large population in Detroit has expanded the functions of city government and indirectly enhanced the stature of city office. Since city councillors are elected at-large, their constituency is even greater than that of a congressman. Unlike councillors and some mayors in the other sample 58 cities, those in Detroit have their own offices, a secretarial staff and are paid on a full time basis. Common councillors are expected to and generally do spend substantial time in fulfilling their office obligations. According to Ernest Patterson: Detroit Common Councillors serve full time and come to learn enough about the city's business to be taken seri- ously. They must be viewed as having more weight than the counCilmen of most other American Cities. During the time period under study, Detroit was from 17% to 31% of the state population. See Table 5. Detroit residents make up a larger proportion of the voting population in state elections than is found in any other city in Michigan. From time to time, local party organi- zation in Detroit has dominated the candidate selection process at the state level.21 Even when local party machinery is not powerful at the state level, politicians who are well known in Detroit have an advan- tage in state campaigns. With the backing of the Detroit electorate, they begin a campaign with relatively greater chances for success than other local leaders. In addition, Detroit officials have a greater exposure to the pub- lic in the news media. Since Detroit is the newspaper and broadcast capital of the state, city officials encounter more frequent and exten- sive coverage than do most other local leaders. The greater visibility and credibility attained by Detroit officials may be assets when seek- ing support from the public to run for higher office. Party officials, as well, may tend to view them as more favorable candidates for higher office than most other city officials. It should be noted that ambitious Detroit officials, while they may be advantaged over other city leaders, compete for party 59 endorsement with a myriad of aspirants in other government levels and circumstances. The argument being made here is not that Detroit leaders have an absolute advantage in statewide competition, but that they have relatively greater chances for advancement than do their col- leagues at the same office levels in other Michigan cities. As will be seen in the following section, the structure and function of party organization in the six cities under study creates conditions that fur- ther enhance the political opportunities of Detroit leaders. Political party organization and career advancement Detroit and the other sample cities conduct city elections via the nonpartisan ballot. The effects of this ballot form upon political party activity have been a perennial research topic for political 22 scientists. A general conclusion found in the current literature is "non-partisanship serves to weaken the political parties in those areas where it is in effect."23 The available research indicates that political parties in the sample cities participate only marginally in city election campaigns. Based on observations of elections in Detroit over a period of years, Adrian states: Slates of candidates are supported by various interest groups but political party organizations have little 054 no part in campaigns, or are active only sporadically. When they do participate, parties encounter competition with ad hoc and community groups that more regularly intervene in campaigns. A similar pattern was found for elections in the city of Flint.25 While the campaign function is rarely performed by local parties, it should not be assumed that parties have no ties with city elected 60 officials. Nor should it be assumed that parties disregard all city leaders as potential candidates for higher office. The pattern of party organization in the state suggests that, while most city offi- cials tend to be isolated from recruitment by local party leaders, this is not always the case in Detroit. Before detailing this argument, some explanation of the candidate recruitment process of the parties is necessary. In Michigan, local party units are organized to participate in state conventions for the selection of some candidates for statewide office. In addition, leaders of local units may attempt to mobilize support within the party in behalf of primary candidates for other statewide offices. It is in the interest of local party leaders to recruit and sup- port a statewide candidate from their own district. As specified by law, the size of the local unit's delegation at the state convention depends upon the total vote cast by the district's electorate for the party's candidate for Secretary of State.26 This mechanism is designed to reward districts where there is great party strength among the voters. Since the district vote would tend to increase when a local name appears on the ballot for statewide office, there is an incentive for local party leaders to recruit and support home based candidates. While this factor works in favor of Detroit city officials, it probably works against aspiring mayors and councillors from smaller cities. The reason for this tendency is the method of organizing local districts in and around urban areas. 61 According to Kenneth VerBurg, local party districts and conven- tions are organized either along congressional district boundaries or along county lines: As a general rule, [conventions] are held on a county basis when a congressional district encompasses several counties and on a congressional district basis when these are smaller than a county. For example, in Wayne County, which consists of several congressional districts, party organization is structured almost enéirely on the basis of districts rather than by the county. This method of party organization places Detroit officials in close physical proximity to local party leaders. As the largest city in Michigan, the boundaries of Detroit totally encompass two congres- sional districts. Detroit residents compose the majority of voters in two additional congressional districts. Local party headquarters are located within the city's boundaries and, more importantly, party leaders serve a totally urban clientele. Given the urban nature of their constituency, party leaders in the Detroit area are probably more likely to maintain a dialogue with city officials. There is evidence that party leaders have made attempts to recruit Detroit officials to run for statewide office. Edward Jeffries, who served as mayor and councillor of Detroit for ten years, "was woed by 28 Adrian further reports both parties as a gubernatorial candidate." that several other Detroit mayors have had "loose party connections." Sarasohn and Sarasohn found a close alliance between Common Councillor George Edwards and democratic congressional district leaders.29 After serving five terms on the council, Edwards became the democratic dis- trict chairman in 1950. He was ultimately elected to the state supreme court bench. 62 All three of the Detroit councillors in this sample who won high office had established partisan ties either before or during their tenure in city office. The Detroit News gives accounts of attendance at republican fund raising events by Councillor James Brickley who later won the posts of county prosecutor and lieutenant governor. The pattern of party organization described by VerBurg is much less conducive to interaction between party and city leaders in the five other sample cities. Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek are enclaves of congressional districts that encompass two or more counties. By the nature of their districts, local party leaders serve a mixed clientele of urban, suburban and rural constituents. When they function as recruiters, local party leaders may be hesitant to give backing to city based aspirants who may be repugnant to the suburban and rural segments of their district. Gittell recognizes this burden to municipal leaders in stating that few mayors become power figures in 30 While this bar- state party organization due to anti-city sentiment. rier may hinder Detroit officials at higher party levels, the support of local leaders and the stature of city office may be factors that override this problem from time to time. The last two passages have focussed upon the limited movement of municipal officials to the peak of the state opportunity structure. Our analysis of municipal officials would not be complete without a description of the frequency with which mayors and city councillors later take appointive posts. 63 Movement to appointive office Of the entire sample approximately 18% assumed an appointive posi- tion, usually immediately after their elective term expired. Most fre- quently these individuals took a full time post in a city department or agency, although many municipal officials went on to a full time post at the county or even state level. See Table 6. Usually these positions serve as a replacement for a private occu- pation. Most of those who take appointive positions remain there for a number of years. If they do move to another government post, it is almost always another appointive office at the same level of govern- ment. Among the sample under study, municipal officials less frequently take appointive positions than they seek and win later elective office. The appointive pathway is clearly not a main career course taken by municipal officials. There is evidence suggesting that at least some of those who take appointive posts are municipal officials who have limited opportunities to attain another elective office. Approximately 31% of those who went on to an appointive position had previously been defeated in a muni- cipal incumbency election compared to only 18% of those who later won an elective office. It is possible that their earlier defeat at the municipal level tends to discourage these individuals from seeking another office. Rather they opt for an appointive position. In this section we have described the extent to which municipal officials later seek and attain an elective office or move to an appointive post. Before further describing their later political careers, let us examine the length of time municipal officials remain 64 in their current offices. As will be seen in the following section, ambition theory posits a relationship between current office behavior and the future career moves of elected officials. III. Later Office Seeking and the Tenure of Municipal Officials A central assumption of ambition theory is that "a politician's 3] An official who holds behavior is a response to his office goals." aspirations for future office alters his present behavior in ways that he perceives as helpful to attaining his office goal. As Prewitt and Nowlin put it, "an incumbent's expectations of, and/or aspirations for the future" constrain his current behavior.32 If this hypothesis of ambition theory is valid, one would expect office seeking municipal officials to behave differently in their current post than non-seekers. Among the municipal officials under study here, tenure appears to be associated with later career behavior. Despite their further ambitions, those destined for another elec- tive office remain longer in their current position than do others. This finding is surprising in light of the fact that most municipal officials serve a substantial period in office. Of the entire sample, 69% remained in their current office for three of more terms or an average of 5.61 years. See Table 7. Those who later win an elective office serve 6.72 mean years in their current post compared to 6.17 years for those losing a later office attempt and those taking an appointive post. Mayors and coun- cillors who seek no further political office, either elective or appointive, remain in their present post the shortest period, 4.59 years. See Table 8. 65 It is not possible with these data to impute motives to the beha- vior of municipal officials. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the ambitious consistently find advantages in remaining for several terms in city office. One explanation is that the longer tenure may be due to the need to await opportunities for advancement to another elective office. Municipal officials who intend to seek another office may delay an attempt until the desired office is vacated by the incumbent or until the electoral support for an incumbent has dropped. Because running for office is, to some degree, a risky enterprise, it follows that ambitious municipal officials would plan career moves in a way that maximizes their chances for success. Another factor that may act to keep some aspiring officials in their current post is their need to establish ties with partisan recruiters. Most enter municipal campaigns with no previous partisan experience. Since municipal elections are nonpartisan both in a legal and practical sense, those who are elected do not make inroads into the local party structure. For the most part, municipal officials with career plans must make independent efforts to initiate dialogue with local partisan leaders. The longer tenure of the ambitious may be due to the need for time to build a backlog of party contacts that may become an advantage for later winning a party nomination. The success or failure that muni- cipal officials experience in building partisan credentials may partly determine whether they carry out plans to seek a later office. Black recognizes this continuing appraisal process in stating that city 66 councillors "tend to develop ambitions slowly as a result of their changing circumstances."38 The desire to remain in municipal office for several terms may be related to ambitions for a further office in another, more obvious way. According to ambition theory, officials who aspire to a later elective office are under constraints to cultivate support from their future electorate. For municipal officials, city voters will probably compose at least part of their future electorate, and occasionally the major- ity. Reelection races may be regarded by the ambitious as a means for building and measuring future voter support. Schlesinger recognizes the relation between electoral outcomes and career behavior in stating that "success spurs ambition and failure dampens it."34 Prewitt found evidence that councillors who aspire to future office are more likely to actively campaign for incumbency elections than are non-aspirants. Councillors stating intentions to run for another office reported more often than others that they "campaigned 35 hard in the last election" and "had a strong desire to win." On the basis of these and other responses, Prewitt states, Personal energy, funds and time are probably more likely to be committed to a campaign by the ambitious than by the councilman ready to retire...In addition, the ambi- tious councilman will probably receive more psychological gratification from campaign activity than will his less politically ambitious colleagues. The man hopeful of mov- ing to a higher post has found in politics suffisgent reward to merit making even greater investments. If the ambitious have a heightened commitment to winning incum- bency elections, as Prewitt found, it is possible that those who win such elections are more likely to have or develop further political 67 ambitions. Using the sample of Michigan municipal officials, the following hypothesis is tested: Municipal officials who win reelection races are more likely than others to make further office attempts. A tendency in support of this hypothesis appeared in the data with almost 62% of those who won incumbency races seeking later office as compared to 48% who lost reelection bids and 53% of those who did not run for reelection. See Table 9. Apparently the act of winning incumbency elections tends to raise municipal officials' expectations and foster the desire for another office. The fact that those who lost an incumbency election tend to be the least likely to seek later office suggests that early failures tend to stifle ambitions. The ability of municipal officials to win reelections is also associated with future success in an attempt for a further office. Over two-thirds of the ambitious who won an earlier incumbency race went on to win another elective post. Only one-half of those aspir- ants who had previously 1ost or did not enter an incumbency election advanced to another elective office later in their career. As will be seen in the following section, this relationship between incumbency and later office victories serves to explain differ- ences in the later careers of mayors and city councillors. IV. Later Office Behavior of Mayors and City Councillors Initially it was expected that mayors would be more likely than councillors to seek and attain a later political office. As chief executives, mayors have greater visibility to the electorate and 68 37 The greater opportunities to make party contacts at higher levels. data indicate that, despite the dynamic nature of their office, mayors are less likely than councillors to seek a later office goal. Only 38% of the thirty-seven mayors in the sample sought another political posi- tion, either elective or appointive, compared to 58% of the council- lors. The depressed rate for mayors may be partly explained by their immediate past experience in municipal office. Overall mayors have a substantially shorter service in office, 3.92 mean years, than do coun- cillors. See Table 11. Their shortened tenure is largely due to defeats in incumbency elections. Fifteen of the mayors, 43%, lost reelection bids, while only 25% of the councillors did so. For both groups, defeat in an incumbency election was associated with no later office attempts. While systematic data are not available, it appears that these defeats sometimes occur after a mayor has tried to implement a new pro- gram in the city. Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian found that mayors in Jackson who attempted to focus public attention on city problems were “repaid for their troubles by losing their offices": One mayor became identified with the proposal for a new city hall. Following failure on this issue, he retired from office and there were indications his action was not voluntary. A second mayor worked for two terms toward a solution of the metropolitan problems of the area. He received constant criticism from inside and out- side the city council. On his third try for office he ran a poor third and the office fell to a man who had earned a reputation for voting against evegy tax increase and almost every city capital improvement. However, the rapid turnover of mayors is not confined to cities where mayors take the policy initiative. In Grand Rapids, where mayors 69 are traditionally weak leaders, the percentage of mayors defeated in incumbency elections is higher than in Jackson. See Table 12. At least in Michigan, it appears that when there is dissatis- faction with city government, regardless of its source, voters tend to hold the chief executive accountable, rather than councillors. In all six cities, the level of incumbency defeat was higher for mayors than for councillors. See Table 12. The relatively large number of mayors who experience incumbency failures are probably led, in turn, to stifle their future political aspirations. One of the most striking features of these data is the poor rate of success mayors experience when they do attempt another elective office. Only three of the eight mayors who ran for elective office were victorious compared to 57% of the aspiring councillors. None of the five mayors who contended for the office of governor, lieutenant governor or congressman were successful. The remaining three who actually won later office sought the more modest posts of county regis- ter, state representative and university regent. Although the numbers in the data are too small to warrant conclu- sions, they suggest that mayors have inflated ambitions in regard to the offices that they can reasonably hope to win. Had mayors sought more modest targets, their rate of success might have been greater. Initially councillors tend to seek offices with city, county or legislative districts. When they run for statewide or congressional office, it is usually after holding an intermediate office at the city, county or legislative level. As was previously stated in another con- text, three of the eight councillors who ran for congressman, state supreme court judge and lieutenant governor were successful. __3 70 It is interesting to note that mayors show a slightly more fre- quent tendency than councillors to take appointive posts. Of the four- teen office seeking mayors, six (43%) took an appointive office com- pared to 31% of the same grouping of councillors. Given their limited chances for winning elective office, mayors who hope to continue in government may simply opt for an appointive post. At least since 1946, mayors in these cities have only occasionally sought another elective office and rarely won it. The stymied career posture of mayors over the years probably has had long range effects on the later behavior of mayors. According to Schlesinger, offices take on reputations of their own that are based on the achievements or fail- ures of past occupants. Given the past record of Michigan mayors, it any be that the office itself appears unattractive to the ambitious contender in politics. Small sample size and the low rate of success of mayors precludes making pat generalizations about their career horizons. However, it is increasingly clear in this analysis that, relative to councillors, mayors encounter greater problems in winning later office. Whether the mayoral stalemate is due to poor judgement on the part of mayors or factors in the political system is a debatable question. The fact that the few mayors who sought moderate level offices were successful sug- gests that the judgement factor is the crucial variable. It appears that when mayors chose office targets that are about the same level as councillors, their rate of success greatly increases. This would suggest that, at least potentially, the elective opportunity structure open to mayors is similar to that of city councillors. In 71 the following section, the types of offices within the municipal opportunity structure for councillors will be examined. V. The Career Pathway Typology In Chapter I, the discrete, static, lateral and progressive cate- gories of the career pathway typology were introduced. The data pre- sented in the previous sections indicate that seven percent of the councillors, not having made any attempts at later office, have dis- crete careers. An additional 22%, since they won at least one incum- bency election, have static careers. Councillors may also have progressive or lateral careers although only the most conspicuous offices in Michigan that constitute progres- sive moves have been identified. (See Chapter I.) The most obvious progressive goals for councillors and most other politicians have already been determined by research in ambition theory. Councillors have progressive careers when they seek and win the highest offices in the state: congressman, governor, and other statewide elective posi- tions. The highest offices are clearly upward moves and become ends in themselves for most ambitious politicians. For councillors who begin with low career status, the highest offices are not usually within their grasp immediately after council service. Initially most ambitious councillors seek an intermediate office that can be used as a stepping-stone to one of the highest offices in the state in the future. Offices that have been used as stepping-stones by councillors in the past are likely to be used in the same way by later councillors. 72 Of course, many later offices held by councillors have stepping- stone potential about the same as the city council and are usually treated by councillors as a final point in a lateral political career. Only the data can inform us as to which offices are progressive and which are lateral. Given councillors' low position in the total opportunity struc- ture, they have many options in regard to what later offices they might pursue. Councillors in this sample moved to over thirty different local, county and state offices in Michigan. Most of those offices were not treated as stepping-stones during the time period under study. These offices apparently do not kindle upward ambitions in ex-council- lors. Any later office held by ex-councillors that did not produce a contender for the highest offices in the state during the time period under study is classified as a lateral office. Councillors who move to these offices are regarded as having lateral careers. By this definition, lateral offices found in the data include at the municipal level, mayor, judge, clerk, treasurer, city manager, city attorney and all other appointive offices. At the county level, they are commissioner, sheriff, register of deeds, drain commissioner and the appointive posts of assessor, auditor, treasurer, department direc- tors and court employee positions. At the regional and state levels, they include university regent, legislator and departmental and pro- gram directors. It should be noted that the office of state legislator, while it attracted several councillors, was never used as a kick-off point to run for higher office. While in other states its stepping-stone poten- tial is apparent, it simply was not treated as a conduit to higher 73 office by Michigan councillors. Legislative office was used by a few subjects in this sample as an entry point to other lateral offices at the municipal and county level. Of the total sample of councillors, 37% went on to a lateral office after leaving council service. Some second offices are used by councillors as a conduit to candi- dacy for the highest state offices. When one or more ex-councillors assumed another political post from which they ran and attained one of the highest offices in Michigan, this second office is regarded as p39; gressive, and is classified accordingly. Councillors who move to such stepping-stone offices are considered to have a progressive career. Two office types appeared in the data as stepping-stones to higher office, county judge and county prosecutor. The two councillors who successfully used these offices as stepping-stones had long and com- plex careers in politics. George Edwards, who later won the post of state supreme court judge, began his career in public office by serving on the Detroit Common Council for ten years. After becoming a local leader in the Democratic party, Edwards contended for the office of probate judge which he held for four years. After serving on the circuit bench for two years, he successfully ran for the office of supreme court judge in 1955. Two other councillors who became county judges sought high offices in the state, though unsuccessfully. After serving as district judge, an ex-councillor from Battle Creek lost the Republican nomina- tion for attorney general. A circuit judge who had served as a coun- cillor in Flint lost the general election for U.S. Congress in 1956. The county prosecutor's office has also been a stepping—stone to higher office for ex-councillors. Two years after leaving the Federal 74 Bureau of Investigation, James Brickley began his political career by serving on the common council for two terms. After an unsuccessful race for judgeship in the Court of Appeals, Brickley was appointed as assistant prosecutor in Wayne County. Two years later, he took the post of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. A year later Brickley was nominated lieutenant governor at the Republican state convention. Running on an indivisible ticket with gubernatorial candidate William Milliken, Brickley was elected in 1970. Only one councillor in the sample ascended directly from the coun- cil post to one of the highest offices in the state. After serving four terms in the common council, Charles Oakman successfully ran as the Republican candidate in the seventeenth district for U.S. Repre- sentative in 1952. Oakman had a history of involvement in state party politics which probably helped him move directly from city to congres- sional office. 0f the total sample, four percent held a progressive office after leaving council service. The career pathway typology includes stymied categories at all but discrete levels of ambition. A static may be stymied in his attempt to win an incumbency race, just as a progressive may lose an election for higher office. Of the total sample of councillors, 29% were stymied at some level of ambition. The highest percentage of stymied occurred within the progressive grouping. Of the twenty councillors who attempted higher office, only 45% were successful as compared to 79% of the laterals. It should be noted that the success has a built-in bias. Since the lateral category includes twenty-five councillors who later took appointive office, the success rate for laterals is inflated. When appointees are eliminated, the success rate decreases to 72%. 75 Roughly 60% of the councillors who entered a reelection campaign were victorious. These findings suggest that, on the average, councillors' chances for victory are greater when they seek another (lateral) office instead of continuous reelection. Of course, progressive offices, when sought, are the most difficult to attain. To this point, the offices that generally become goals for aspir- ing councillors have been identified. The central focus of the follow- ing section will be upon the total number of attempts made by council- lors to win different offices. These attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, define the options open to councillors in the structure of political opportunities. The structure oprolitical opportunities A recurring problem in defining the opportunity structure for office holders is determining the order of importance of separate elective offices. Two broad categories of office types have already been identified, lateral and progressive offices. Lateral offices have small districts, confer moderate political status and lack the quality of inspiring ambitions in occupants. Due to their inherent qualities, these offices are lower in the opportunity structure than progressive offices. Progressive offices are widely recognized as status positions and tend to have relatively larger districts. They either satisfy high level ambitions or are used as a means to achieve them. A central problem in ordering offices in the data is the rela- tively small number of attempts by councillors to win individual offices. For example, only a single attempt was found in the data to win the office of attorney general. Nevertheless, there appears 76 to be a trend in office attempts as is expressed in the following hypo- thesis: Hypothesis 1: The higher an office is in the structure of political opportuni- ties, the less likely that councillors will make attempts to attain that office. In order to avoid the problem of small sample size, the total num- ber of attempts made by councillors for the entire grouping of lateral offices is compared with the total number of attempts for progressive offices. As Table 14 indicates, the vast majority of attempts by coun- cillors are at the lateral level. The most frequent sought lateral office was the mayoral post. Since both council and mayoral office have urban constituencies, it is reasonable to expect interaction to occur between the two offices.4O Furthermore, the frequent contact between mayors and councillors in every day political affairs serves to create a recruitment linkage between the two offices. A second clustering of lateral attempts were focussed at legis- lative office. Of all lateral offices, the legislature is structurally the "closest" to the grouping of progressive offices. While the legis- lature was never used as a stepping-stone to higher office, two ex-councillors who sought legislative posts later sought the office of circuit judge. One was successful. While the data are limited, they suggest that legislative office may be regarded as a means to climb to the lower rungs of the progressive career ladder. As might be expected, the greatest percentage of progressive attempts were aimed at the "stepping-stone" offices of county 77 prosecutor and county judge. For the aspiring councillors, these offices probably appear more accessible than the highest progressive offices. 0f the total number of later office attempts, only 13% were aimed at the highest offices of governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, congressman and supreme and appeals judge. Overall, the data indicate, as Hypothesis I predicts, a decreasing rate of office seeking as the level in the opportunity structure increases. The rate of success that councillors are expected to achieve in later office attempts is stated in the following hypothesis: Hypothesis II: The higher an office is in the structure of political opportuni- ties, the less likely that ambitious councillors will be success- ful in attempts to attain that office. Table 14 indicates support for this hypothesis. While the rate of success for lateral attempts was 68%, it decreased to 46% for progres- sive attempts. The lateral rate of success is depressed by the large number of stymied attempts at legislative office, while the progressive rate is increased by the large proportion of winners for stepping-stone offices. The "borderline" offices in both groupings tend to diminish the predicted relationship. It is apparent, however, that at the high- est levels the rate of success is low. The fact that few attempt statewide and congressional office, and even fewer attain it, is an indicator of the barriers councillors experience to reaching the top of the state opportunity structure. Overall it appears that a filtering process tends to operate in which fewer and fewer attempts and succes- ses are achieved as one looks higher in the opportunity structure. 78 Summary Most of the municipal officials under study display a commitment to politics that extends beyond a single office holding experience. Despite the nonpartisan nature of city office, over one-third of these officials sought a further elective office. Almost one-fourth of the entire sample went on to assume another elective post, primarily at the lateral level. The majority of municipal officials, 69%, remained in their cur- rent position for at least two terms. These findings suggest that those who serve in municipal office frequently have further political ambitions. If ambition or the desire for reelection imposes a restraint upon elected officials, then voters in the sample cities often have the option to exercise electoral control over municipal officials. City councillors experience varying degrees of success in seeking later offices. As stated in Hypotheses I and II, a regressive oppor- tunity structure exists in which the highest offices are less often sought and attained by ambitious councillors. Before attempting the highest offices, councillors usually make inroads into local party organization. For structural reasons, only Detroit officials have had much success in establishing partisan alli- ances. Due to this barrier and others, the ambitious most often direct their careers into lateral office. This chapter has been concerned with examining the primary depen- dent variable of this study, the later office behavior of municipal officials. In the following chapter, the background characteristics of 79 city councillors that may be related to later office behavior will be examined. 10. 11. 12. FOOTNOTES The term of office for Lansing councillors and the mayor in Detroit is four years. Since 1955 the term of office for coun- cillors and the mayor has been four years. In order to maintain the validity of the tests of later career behavior, only those who served in office in Detroit and Lansing from 1946 to 1962 are included in the sample. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe: Free Press, 1968), p. 67. Six individuals served on the County Board of Commissioners who until 1968 were selected by a majority vote of the city council. One individual served on the school board which is an elective position. Stephen B. and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), p. 58; Maurice Ramsey, "Some Aspects of Non-partisan Government in Detroit" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1944). The category of political party groups includes Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Women's Republican Club, and Businessmen's Republican Club. Excluded from this category are cadres or posi- tions in formal political party organization. Old Newsboys clubs collect funds for charitable causes. Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadel- phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 73. Ibid., p. 78; Edward Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 60-61; C. O. Smith and S. B. Sarasohn, "Hate Propaganda in Detroit," Public Opinion Qparterly 10 (1946- 47 :24-52. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 69-70; David A. Booth and Charles R. Adrian, "Power Structure and Community Change" (unpub- lished paper, 1963), p. 12. Banfield, Big City Politics, p. 59. Ibid.. PP. 55-63. Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 80 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 81 1970, pp. 84-86; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System, Exploration in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 95. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 131. Ibid., Chapter 7. Lansing State Journal, April, 1960. Lansing State Journal, March 11, 1960. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 199. Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), Chapters 6 and 9. James Brickley who won the office of lieutenant governor ran on an indivisible ticket with the governor. Ernest Patterson, Black Citnyolitics (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1974), p. 58; Banfield, Big City Politics, p. 54. Sarasohn and Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns, pp. 7-8, 56-68. Charles Beard, "Political and City Government," National Municipal Review 6 (March l9l7):201-206; Charles Merriam, "Nominating Systems," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 106 (March l923):1-10; T. R. Holling, "Nonpartisan, Non- political Municipal Government," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 121 (September 1938):43-49. Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952): 767. Charles Adrian, "A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959):455. C. H. Clark, "Some Aspects of Voting Behavior in Flint, Michigan -- A City with Nonpartisan Municipal Elections" (Ph.D. disserta- tion, University of Michigan, 1952). Kenneth VerBurg, Guide to Michigan County Government (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, 1972), IX-B. Ibid. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics," p. 22. Sarasohn and Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns, p. 58. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 82 Marilyn Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End,‘I Public Admini- stration Review 24 (March 1963):22. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 6. Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly 22 (June l969):299. Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Astructural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970), p. 3. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 9. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 198. Ibid. Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Claque, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," Journal of Politics 24 (l962):340. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 296. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics," pp. 774-775. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 99. 83 TABLE 1 Number of group memberships No. of group memberships ’ No. of officials % O 4 1.98 1 22 10.89 2 25 12.38 3 40 19.80 4 31 15.35 5 35 17.33 6 22 10.89 7 9 4.46 8 or more 14 6.93 total 202 100.01 TABLE 2 Predominant group memberships Type of group No. of officials % civic 111 57.51 business 27 13.99 veterans 14 7.25 labor union 12 6.22 professional 11 5.72 government improvement 7 3.63 ethnic 4 2.07 religious 4 2.07 political party 3 1.55 total 193 100.01 84 TABLE 3 Level of later office attempts and victories Level Number % Attempts: city 27 30.00 county 30 33.33 legislative, regional and state 33 36.67 total 132 100.00 Victories: city 23 40.35 county 22 38.60 legislative, regional and state 12 21.05 total 57 100.00 TABLE 4 Level of office seeking behavior of city officials by mean years served in city office and % defeated in city incumbency races Highest office Other office Non- seekers Seekers seekers mean years served 8.00 6.23 4.91 % defeated in incumbency races 0.00% 27.73% 33.33% total N 13 119 102 85 TABLE 5 Population of Michigan cities to raw figures and as a percentage of the state population, 1940-1970 1940 1950 No. % No. % Detroit 1,623,542 30.89 1,849,568 29.03 Grand Rapids 164,292 3.13 176,515 2.77 Flint 151,543 2.88 163,143 2.56 Lansing 78,753 1.50 92,129 1.45 Jackson 49,656 .94 51,088 .80 Battle Creek 43,453 .83 48,666 .76 Michigan 5,256,106 6,371,766 1960 1970 No. % No. % Detroit 1,670,144 21.35 1,511,482 17.03 Grand Rapids 177,313 2.27 197,649 2.23 Flint 196,940 2.52 193,317 2.18 Lansing 107,807 1.38 131,546 1.48 Jackson 50,720 .65 45,484 .51 Battle Creek 44,169 .56 38,931 .44 Michigan 7,823,194 8,875,083 86 TABLE 6 Level of appointive offices assumed by municipal officials Level 1 Number % city 17 40.48 county 16 38.10 state 9 21.43 total 42 100.01 TABLE 7 Number of terms in municipal office Terms Number % l 49 20.94 2 24 10.26 3 or more 161 68.80 total 234 100.00 TABLE 8 Incumbency elections and mean years served % of each group Mean Municipal defeated in years officials incumbency elections served N winners 18.18 6.72 55 losers 28.57 6.17 35 appointees 30.95 6.17 42 non-seekers 33.33 4.59 102 total 28.63 5.61 234 87 TABLE 9 Outcome of city incumbency elections and % seeking later office_ . City IncumbenCy Elections. Total Sought later office won lost did not run yes 61.53 48.48 52.63 56.41 no 38.47 51.52 47.37 43.59 total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 total N 130 66 38 234 TABLE 10 Municipal officials by outcome of municipal incumbency elections and outcome of later elective office attempts Incumbency election Outcome of later attempts won lost didn't enter won 67.86 50.00 50.00 lost 32.14 50.00 50.00 total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 total N 56 20 14 88 TABLE 11 Selected characteristics of mayors and city councillors Mayors ‘ Councillors % of total seeking elec— tive or appointive office 37.83 50.25 % of total seeking elective office 21.62 29.44 % of elective office seekers successful 37.50 60.34 mean years served 3.92 5.93 % of total losing city incumbency races 43.42 25.38 total number 37 197 TABLE 12 % of mayors and city councillors defeated in incumbency races % mayors defeated % councillors defeated City of within each sample city within each sample city origin % g N % N Detroit 25 (4) 22 (27) Lansing 100 (3) 39 (46) Grand Rapids 60 (5) 28 (25) Flint 40 (10) 29 (38) Jackson 30 (10) 29 (35) Battle Creek 20 (5) 15 (26) total 43 (37) 29 (197) N-total number of mayors or councillors elected within each respective city. 89 TABLE 13 Councillors classified by theCareer Pathway Typology Rate of success1 Number % Progressive: successful 9 3.95 45.00 stymied 11 4.82 total 20 8.77 Lateral: successful 85 37.28 78.70 stymied 23 10.09 total 108 47.37 Static: successful 50 21.93 60.24 stymied 33 14.47 total 83 36.40 Discrete: 17 7.46 total 228 100.00 70.61 1 Number of Successful X 100%. Rate 0f Success = Total Number of Attempts 90 TABLE 14 Later elective office attempts, success and success rate of councillors No. of % of No. of % of Rate of Attempts Attempts Successes Successes Success Lateral office: mayor 38 32 31 42 81.58 municipal judge 3 3 3 4 100.00 city clerk 3 100.00 city treasurer 3 3 2 3 66.67 county commissioner 7 6 6 8 85.71 other county elective 13 11 8 11 61.54 legislator 24 20 9 12 37.50 total 90 77 61 82 67.78 Progressive office: county prosecutor 4 3 5 100.00 county judge 10 8 6 8 60.00 attorney general 1 1 0 0 supreme & appeals judge 2 2 l 1 50.00 lieutenant gov. 3 3 1 1 33.33 governor 2 2 0 O O congressman 6 5 1 l 16.67 total 28 24 13 16 46.43 total 118 101 74 98 62.72 CHAPTER III THE BACKGROUND OF COUNCILLORS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS The unrepresentative character of city councils from the angle of recruitment is documented in virtually every study of American cities since World War II.1 On the average, entrants to the council emerge from groupings at the upper end of the status hierarchy. Along the lines of occupation, income and education, they cluster at higher levels than do their constituents.2 Additional criteria by which they are unrepresentative of the urban population include race, sex, and age.3 As is found at other office levels, the vast majority of coun- cillors are white males. In terms of age, they are most often in their forties when they enter council office. Although it is widely acknowledged that background traits influ- ence people's chances of entering the council, little is known about how these traits continue to shape councillors' political careers. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the backgrounds of councillors consistently affect their opportunities of attaining further public office. In effect this study investigates determinants of political promo- tion rather than of initial recruitment. As James Barber suggests, once individuals hold office, their knowledge about political life and their role in it expands.4 Councillors are probably more attuned than 91 92 most people to their political opportunities. If they are interested in winning further office, they are likely to be sensitive to the for- mal and informal qualifications for advancement. As councillors make decisions to seek or not to seek another public office, they probably consider, among other factors, their own backgrounds. Section I of this chapter reviews the current studies regarding how traits of individuals intervene in the political recruitment pro- cess. Theoretical approaches found in the literature will be applied to explain the relationship between the backgrounds of councillors and their later political career behavior. In Section II, the effects of councillors' private occupations upon later office attempts and victories will be examined. The third section is concerned with the educational achievements of councillors and the frequency of further office attempts. Age as a determinant of later political career behavior will be explored in Section IV. The differences in the seeking of office by women and black council members will be discussed in the fifth section. The final section will include a composite description of councillors who advanced to the highest levels of state politics. Some background traits, since they are interrelated, may have a combined effect upon the later career behavior of councillors. Such is the case for some levels of education and occupation found in the sample of councillors. Whenever it is appropriate, control variables will be introduced into the data. 93 I. Review of the Literature As was demonstrated in Chapter II, successful office seeking coun- cillors in Michigan fan out into a diverse number of elective offices in the state ranging from mayor to supreme court justice. Although their experiences in seeking further office are diverse, ambitious councillors more or less share two objectives: first, to become a candidate and second, to win the subsequent election. The literature on political recruitment provides some insights as to how political aspirants in general attain their objectives. Political recruitment and the backgrounds of councillors Rufus Browning points to the need to conceptualize recruitment as a complex system that involves several stages where actors make selec- tion decisions.5 While Browning's model takes into account structural factors of the political system, it identifies the electorate, recruit- ers and the individual being considered as making inputs into the recruitment process. Although Browning's focus was upon the power and achievement motivations of political aspirants, he points out that [Dersonality traits vary systematically with social status. The purpose ()f this chapter is not to impute motives to the behavior of office holders, but to cast light on how traits of councillors consistently influence their chances to attain further political office. Background traits of councillors have the potential to influence a selection decision at each stage of recruitment where human judgement 1'rITIZervenes. These stages are the point at which the individual makes the decision to seek office, the time at which recruiters make 94 selection decisions, and the day of the election when voters choose the winning candidate. Admittedly these stages are artificial in the sense that recruit- ment is a continuing process. As Donald Matthews puts it, "leadership selection is going on throughout America everyday and is not just con- fined to primaries and elections."6 Specific events, such as an individual's declaration of candidacy and general election outcomes, offer the researcher a point in time to test for what types of criteria have been applied in the recruitment process. In the data sections of this chapter, two stages of recruitment relevant to aspiring councillors of varied backgrounds will be tested by the following general hypotheses: Councillors differentiated by background, i.e., occupation, educa- tion, race, sex and age, will vary in the frequency of further office attempts. Office seeking councillors differentiated by background will vary in the frequency of successful later office attempts. The first hypothesis is concerned with how councillors of differ- ing backgrounds systematically select themselves as candidates or opt c>ut of future office endeavors. Only those who filed or made a public (ieclaration of candidacy are considered to have made a further office attempt. The second hypothesis is concerned with how the electorate, or some portion of it, judges candidates according to their back- grounds. Some councillors were unsuccessful in primaries or in party convention balloting. Others became candidates in the general elec- ticni, but were defeated. In either case, these councillors are classi- fieci as having made an unsuccessful later office attempt. A review of 95 the literature pertaining to these two hypotheses will be found in the following two passages. This study makes no claim to include all phases of recruitment. One aspect of recruitment, which is beyond the purview of this analy- sis, is how recruiters make candidate selection decisions. Kenneth Prewitt recognizes that recruiters pay attention to the backgrounds of candidates in stating that recruiters are: ...sensitive to demonstrated accomplishment. Nominating or search committees understandably are impressed with past performance of potential recruits. Nothing more effectively demonstrates performance than advanced educa- tion or high soc1a1 status or a prestige occupation. In the sample of councillors under study here, the quality and frequency of contact between office seekers and recruiters varied. In part, this variation depended upon the institutional setting in which candidates were selected. Most councillors sought offices that required filing nominating petitions or entry fees in order to be placed on the primary ballot. These offices include municipal and most county posts, legislative and congressional seats, and most statewide elective positions. In the above cases, partisan or self designated recruiters may decide to withhold or give support to "select" candi- dates at the time of the primary.8 For several offices in the state, candidates are nominated by con- ventions of the political parties. Such is the case for councillors who sought the offices of lieutenant governor, supreme court justice and attorney general. On the average, partisan recruiters exert greater continuous control over the choice of candidates by the conven- tion system than by the primary system. 96 In Michigan the interest that recruiters have in selecting candi- dates also varies according to the status of the office. Primary contenders for the nomination of county commissioner generally receive little or no support from partisan recruiters. As Kenneth VerBurg points out, the party nomination is won "largely through efforts of the candidate himself with the help of a small group of supporters rather than the support of the party."9 At higher office levels, partisan recruiters probably take a more commanding role in selecting the party's nominee. As a general rule, the higher the office, the greater the role of partisan recruiters in selecting candidates. Given the limitations of the data, this study is unable to describe the decision rules applied by recruiters. However, the impact of recruiters is implicitly taken into account in testing hypotheses about councillors' backgrounds and office winning. Let us turn to the general literature of political recruitment. Office seeking behavior The psychological point at which present office holders decide to seek further political office is one of the least understood aspects of recruitment. Most of the literature applies to individuals of varied political backgrounds, all of whom are seeking the same poli- tical office. This section seeks to apply the general recruitment literature to the specific case of councillors considering diverse later office attempts. One of the most recent efforts to describe the way in which individuals deliberate over the question of seeking political office is 97 found in James Barber's study of state legislators.10 He outlines three interrelated questions that a potential candidate would ask him- self in deciding whether to run for political office. 1. Do I want it? (motivation) 2. Can I do it? (resources) 3. Do they want me? (opportunity) The first question concerns the tradeoffs individuals would be willing to make in order to run for further political office. This question has a special relevance for councillors who, with the excep- tion of Detroit Common Councillors, are under an obligation to give only part time service. Most other elective offices in the state, if attained, would require a greater commitment of time and energy.11 Consequently the motivation to seek office is partly dependent upon the councillor's present nonpolitical situation. As will be seen in Section II of this chapter, his private job in terms of its nature, flexibility and time demands may affect his political aspirations. Second, the fostering of political ambitions depends in part upon the councillor's place in the opportunity structure. Like other public officials, councillors in Michigan have a limited set of career options. In this context, the question of "do I want it?" usually means, "do I want to become mayor, county commissioner, county judge, other county official or legislator?“ Some may have no interest in holding these offices, and therefore decide to remain in the council or drop out of politics entirely. Others may set or adjust their aspirations to "fit" their options. Those who seek the stepping-stone offices of county judge and county prosecutor may have longer range career plans in mind. Although it is 98 incorrect to think of councillors taking orderly steps up the career ladder, there is a rough sequence to full blown political careers begun at the council level. Such a career ordinarily runs from the council, to a county office, and then on to a higher elective office. Those having aspirations to become a congressman or statewide elective official have little chance to ascend directly to their office goal. Those who attempt to do so almost always fail. County posts, notably judgeships and the prosecutor's office, are better kick off points for seeking the highest offices in the state. For the most ambitious councillor the question, "do I want it?" may mean, ”do I want a stepping-stone post that may open greater political opportunities for me in the future?" The second question, "can I do it?" has to do with the qualifica- tions needed for the office goal under consideration. The councillor's answer depends in part upon the confidence he has in his newly attained political skills. It also depends upon the qualifications prescribed by law for the office. Legal qualifications for most offices are limited to age, residency and citizenship requirements. However, most judgeships and all prosecutor's posts, the stepping-stone offices, are legally restricted to individuals practicing law. For this reason and others, councillors who are lawyers have more career options, espec- ially in the upward direction, than do most of their colleagues. The third question, "do they want me?" has to do with political opportunities. Timing is an important factor in every political career. The councillor who intends to seek a specific office may have to delay his plans until the office becomes available. In some cases, the office may be occupied by a political ally. In other cases, the 99 incumbent may be so well entrenched with the electorate that any chal- lenger would almost certainly face defeat. In addition, the councillor needs to consider recruiters' choices and his own electoral strength in the district of the desired office. John Kingdon reports that candidates for elective office, especially winners, perceive that their own personal characteristics influence voters' choices.12 This finding suggests that individuals considering further office attempts make estimates of their attractiveness to voters. As Barber points out, it is impossible to separate the effects of motivation, resources and opportunity upon an individual's calculus. Each variable has a circular relationship with the other two. For example, whether a councillor wants the prosecutor's office depends upon whether he has the formal and informal qualifications, whether county partisan recruiters support him and whether the voters, in his estimate, would elect him. In the data sections of this chapter, moti- vations, resources and opportunities will not be treated separately. Rather, combinations of these variables will be examined in light of the backgrounds of councillors. The backgrounds of councillors and office seeking behavior At least two approaches to background factors and office seeking behavior can be drawn from the literature on recruitment. The most prevalent approach is to treat background traits as dimensions of social status.13 Among all ascribed and achieved traits of individ- uals, occupation is the most universal criterion used for ranking 14 individuals in the United States. Since educational achievement has 100 become a prerequisite for entry into the jobs most valued by people in general, education is also a widely applied measure for evaluating individuals. In describing American society, sociologists are treating the ascribed traits of race, sex and age more and more as determinants of status.15 However, there is less general agreement among the popula- tion as to the ranking order implied by ascribed traits. This is especially evident in comparisons of attitudes between individuals of less favored groupings (by society's standards) and the population as a whole. In regard to race, Melvin Tumin states, I'though Negroes may be fully aware of the White man's low evaluation of 'Negroes' as against 'Whiteness,' they do not publicly agree with such a low evalu- ation."16 The basic assumption of this approach is that people who exper- ience the rewards of higher status on the basis of one or more of these individual traits will be more predisposed to seek political office. As Donald Matthews states, "the individual who enjoys relatively high social status has attained success according to society's defini- tion."17 He is more likely to consider himself a better person for political office holding than others. Furthermore, he is more likely to have the resources and opportunities that are advantageous for run- ning for political office. This approach does not assume that all individuals of higher sta- tus will seek political office. In fact, most of them do not. Nor do pe0ple of lower status always remain on the sidelines of political competition. 101 However, an immense body of multi-disciplinary literature suggests that higher status individuals have more chances to develop the motives, resources and opportunities that are requisites to office seeking. This writer makes no claim to have reviewed all of the writings on the status of individuals. Some of the conclusions of this literature have been classified along Barber's model of office seekers as follows. In regard to motives, higher status individuals are more likely to: be self confident, by socioeconomic status,18 by sex;19 . . . . 20 be aggreSSive and assertive, by soc10economic status; 21 22 feel politically competent, by occupation, 23 by education, by sex; feel a duty to participate in politics, by education,24 by sex,25 by occupation;26 In regard to resources, higher status individuals are more likely to: be politically informed, by education,27 by sex;28 have skills of verbal communication, by socioeconomic status;29 be conceptually sophisticated about politics, by sex;30 participate in voluntary organizations, by socioeconomic status,31 by race;32 be leaders in voluntary organizations, by income;33 be organized in their daily lives, by socioeconomic status;34 be capable of organizing a political campaign, by socioeconomic status.35 102 In regard to opportunities, higher status individuals are more likely to: know others who are politically active, by socioeconomic status;36 have family members who are politically active, by socioeconomic status;37 know others who encourage political involvement, by socioecono- mic status;38 be viewed by others as influential members of the community, by socioeconomic status.39 These conclusions do not patently confirm that there exists a causal relationship between background traits and political careers. However, they do suggest that background traits work in multiple ways to influence people's ambitions and political behavior. At the present state of research, the relative "weight" of individual traits in affecting people's office seeking behavior is unknown. In fact, sociologists have been unable to arrive at any specific conclusions as to how separate traits contribute to the overall social status of individuals. Tumin states, ...Sociological researchers have struggled for many years without much notable success to develop a satisfactory model of evaluation of over-all social standing. We persist in this effort, however, because we realize that in our social relationships we judge and evaluate each other and determine our respective acceptabilities, not in terms of occupation, income or educational achievement alone, but rather in terms of a mixture of these and many other elements: sex, age, skin color, religion, naxaonal origin, marital status, family background, and so on. The researcher of political recruitment, therefore, is guided by the general hypothesis that status is related to office seeking, but 103 depends upon the data to reveal specific traits or combinations of them that are associated with office attempts. A second problem has to do with the representation of background traits as dimensions of status. Although it is widely confirmed that people of certain backgrounds are more likely to seek political office, it is not clear that this relationship is entirely a function of status. This brings us to the second approach to background. It claims that people's circumstances in their private life are equally or more important determinants of office seeking behavior than is their overall status. The circumstantial approach begins with the assumption that "public officials in the U. S. emerge from all levels of the social structure" and points to the occupation of the individual as one cru- cial determinant of office seeking behavior.4] Herbert Jacob claims that individuals with private occupations that place them in a broker- age role are more prepared than others to enter contention for poli- tical office. Such occupations have several distinguishing features: ...They allow their occupant time to seek office; they teach him many of the skills a politician needs —- the skill of bargaining, the ability to convince, the art of inspiring trust and confidence. A brokerage role also facilitates the development of numerous contacts which aid the individual in his business but which prove invalu- able upon entry into politics. Such contacts also may lead to financial backing when planning a campaign. Finally brokerage roles are often at the fringe of poli- tics and promote close contact with governmental officials ranging from city inspectors to the court house gang. They thus allow the individual to learn of the opportuni- ties in4political life and to observe how others have suc- ceeded. According to Jacob, these occupations include general practi- tioners, lawyers, newspapermen, hotel and restaurant proprietors, auto 104 and fuel dealers, independent merchants, real estate brokers, insur- ance salesmen, bartenders, local union officials and undertakers. This approach emphasizes the importance of circumstances which are created as a result of the individual's life situation. From this per- spective it is not strictly denied that status plays a role in foster- ing ambitions. However, status is regarded as a secondary determinant. The circumstantial approach has been applied in the analysis of background factors other than occupation. For example, Angus Campbell et a1. attributes the lower rate of political participation among women to their continuing obligation to care for the family and home.43 Presumably this explanation could be applied to explain the lower rates of office seeking among women. As will be seen in this chapter, the circumstantial and status approaches may dovetail in explaining specific background traits. For example, the status approach also has been applied in explaining the lower levels of political participation among women. Clyde Franklin, Jr. and Laurel R. Walum maintain that the role model that society pre- scribes for women discourages their entry into political competition. As a result of this socialization, women "have internalized norms which limit their educational, career and political aspirations."44 In the following sections of this chapter, both approaches will be considered in explaining the variations in office seeking among differ- ent types of councillors. Later office elections and the backgrounds of councillors A second aspect of political recruitment to be examined in this chapter is the role the electorate plays in advancing or retarding the 105 political careers of city councillors. It is predicted that aspiring councillors with preferred background traits will be more likely than others to win elections for further office. How voters perceive political candidates in general is a continu- ing subject of inquiry. Public opinion surveys have documented that aside from partisan and issue preferences, voters pay attention to the "personal attributes of candidates."45 However, the relevance that a candidate's occupation, education, race, sex and age holds for people making voting judgements is not clear. Angus Campbell et a1. discov- ered that voters perceive candidates more along the dimensions of their personalities and overall images, rather than according to their speci- fic traits.46 Campbell's study of voter opinion was directed at people's atti- tudes toward presidential candidates. In less conspicuous state and local elections, where ambitious councillors are more likely to con- tend, background factors may have a greater relevance to voters. In the first place, the electorate is relatively uninformed about the issues in state and local campaigns. Second, many of the elections in which aspiring councillors con- tend (almost half) are conducted on a nonpartisan ballot. In the fre- quent absence of issue and partisan cues, voters probably pay more attention to the backgrounds of candidates. The relative weight that voters place upon individual traits as opposed to personality traits is a matter of speculation. However, it should be noted that the television and radio coverage given to state and local candidates is fairly limited. Consequently, most voters do not have the audio or visual opportunity to form a "personality image" 106 of the candidates. This is probably true even when the candidates have previously held council office. However, biographical information about the candidates is readily available in newspaper accounts. When voters have any information about state and local candidates, it is probably in regard to their backgrounds. Assuming that voters have biographical information about the candidates, how do they interpret it? The status approach has been most widely applied to explain how candidates' backgrounds influence voter choices. Of all sets of recruiters, the electorate is the larg- est and probably the most "representative" grouping of society. Since the standards of who should hold public office are derived from society-at-large, it follows that the electorate applies those norms in making voting decisions. As Kenneth Prewitt puts it, The political aspirant's success in business, military, civic or academic endeavors is relevant to his political image, since the voter uses the candidate's past accom— plishments as an indicator of his future performance. Since, by definition, the well-educated, the better-off, or the holder of a prestige occupation is someone who "achieved," who has accomplishments, his abances of gain- ing respect from the voter are increased. In the following data sections, the relationship between separate background traits of councilmen and their electoral success in further office attempts will be tested. II. Occupations of City Councillors and Later Political Career Behavior This section begins by ranking city councillors along an ordinal scale of occupational status. This scale will be used to measure the effects of occupational status upon later political career behavior 107 according to the following hypotheses, originally introduced in Chapter I. Hypothesis III: The higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis IV: The higher the occupational status of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. Finally the circumstances surrounding councillors of various occupa- tions will be discussed. The measurement of occupational status One problem in classifying councillors by their private jobs is that there is no methodologically "correct" way of ordering occupations by prestige. Although it is generally agreed that professionals and executives belong at the upper end of the status continuum, scholars differ as to which of the two groupings ranks highest.48 In 1947 Cecil North and Paul Hatt found that a national sample of respondents ranked physicians as higher in status than corporate 49 Professors, dentists and lawyers were about equal in executives. prestige to executives, while civil engineers and teachers ranked lower. Since the 1940's the increased growth and visibility of large corporations has probably served to raise the status of executives in the eyes of the public. More current interpretations of occupational data, such as that of Alex Inkles in 1960, find evidence that large business executives rank higher in status than professionals.50 108 For purposes of classifying councillors, those nine percent of the total sample who were executives in business and industry were ranked as the highest occupational grouping, followed by professionals. See Table 15. Among councillors the professional grouping included a large num- ber of lawyers, but few doctors, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, architects, professors and teachers. In order to "balance" this cate- gory to make possible further breakdowns, councillors were also included who held semi-professional jobs as newspapermen, photographers and morticians.5] This classifying strategy probably diminishes the overall status accorded to the category. Semi-professionals ranked somewhat below teachers in the North-Hatt scale. The third category of councillors is composed of middle level corporate workers, 14% of the total sample. They include individuals who had specialized jobs as accountants, office managers, research consultants, purchasing agents, data analysts and public relations specialists. In the past, middle level corporate workers have not received much attention in occupational studies. Some of these jobs came into existence and became visible to the public only in the last twenty-five years. For example, the conversion of corporations to computer systems beginning in the 1950's ultimately brought into existence a number of specialty positions. The North-Hatt classification included only one middle level position, "accountant for a large business," which ranked between most traditional professionals and various independent busi- nessmen. For the purposes of this study, the assumption is made that 109 councillors with other middle level positions roughly correspond in status to that of corporate accountant. The fourth and largest occupational category of councillors is small businessmen, proprietors and managers of small concerns usually located within the city. Typical businesses found in the sample included neighborhood groceries, hardware stores, dry cleaners, shoe stores, auto repair shops, printers, lumber companies and wholesale houses. Owners and salesmen of real estate and insurance companies were also included in this grouping which made up almost 40% of the total sample. The ranking of small businessmen below middle level corporate workers is roughly in line with the North-Hatt occupational scale. The highest ranking for a small businessman, "owner-operator of a small printing shop," was well below that of corporate accountant. Other small businessmen, "manager of a small store" and "barber," ranked lower on the North-Hatt scale and overlapped in status with some skilled laborers. No information was available concerning the prestige of jobs in real estate although insurance agents ranked close to store managers. The final category of councillors is manual laborers who made up less than ten percent of the total sample. Over one-half of the individuals falling in this grouping worked in auto production or a related industry. Most of the remainder worked in service oriented trades as electricians, television repairmen, carpenters, commercial drivers or railroad workers. No councillors were found in the sample who could strictly be considered unskilled laborers. 110 It is recognized that this classification is not in any way a per- fect measure of occupational status. Some of the decision rules for classifying councillors were made arbitrarily. In addition, small sample size restricted a more refined breakdown of occupations. Never- theless, this classification serves as a roughly ordinal measure of occupational status that can be applied to test hypotheses in the next section. Office seeking and office winning among councillors of varied occupational status The data do not confirm the hypothesis that the higher the occupa- tional status of councillors, the more likely that they will seek fur- ther elective office. Although the professionals showed an expected high rate of office seeking, other occupational groups did not rank as predicted by the hypothesis. The highest status grouping, councillors who were executives, showed the lowest rate of office seeking. Only five percent made later office attempts. See Table 15. Middle level corporate workers who ranked third in status showed a less than average tendency to seek further office. Small businessmen ranked second in later office attempts, another finding running counter to the hypothesis. Manual laborers who were predicted to show the lowest office seeking rate actually ranked above both groupings of corporate officials. Furthermore, the status variable does not display the expected relationship with office winning. Executives cannot be analyzed here since only one ran for later office. Although relatively few middle level corporate workers sought further office, which makes the reli- ability of the data questionable, they showed the highest rate of 111 success in later office attempts. Professionals ranked second fol- lowed by manual laborers. The latter grouping included only eight individuals which makes the data difficult to interpret. Small busi— nessmen displayed the lowest success rate with less than one half win- ning elections for further office. However, the irregularities in the data could be due to small sub-sample size. If one looks only at the two occupational groupings with N's over twenty-five, professionals and small businessmen, the predicted relationship holds. Almost 69% of the professionals who sought further office were successful compared to 49% of the small businessmen. The pattern of later moves to appointive posts found among differ- ent occupational groupings showed no consistent relationship with status. It is worth noting that executives and small businessmen, who for different reasons are the least likely to end up in elective office, are the most likely to take appointive posts. This suggests a kind of balancing tendency in which groupings with relatively fewer chances to take elective office opt for appointive posts. The posts taken by executives were for the most part commissions and boards requiring a limited time commitment. Small businessmen, on the other hand, tend to take full time posts at the municipal and county level. Overall relatively few people from any of the occupational groupings took appointive posts. These findings along with the job breakdown of councillors suggest some specific ways in which occupational status is related to political recruitment and subsequent careers. It is clear that occupational status has a rough impact upon whom is recruited to council office. While professionals, corporate workers and small businessmen composed 112 a relatively small proportion of the total work force, they made up 86% of the councillors. Manual laborers who were a majority of the work force composed a very small percentage of the councillors. Although occupational status affects who is initially recruited to council office, it has less power in explaining which councillors are likely to seek or win further political office. While professionals behaved roughly as predicted, some other occupational groupings did not. Corporate officials at the executive and middle level produced some disparities in the data at both the office seeking and office win- ning levels. Manual laborers showed a higher rate of office attempts and victories than was predicted, although the latter finding may be due to small sample size. It appears that factors other than occupational status were at work producing differential rates of office seeking and winning. Per- haps the circumstances surrounding councillors of differential occupa- tions can further explain their political career behavior. In the fol- lowing sections, specific occupational groupings will be discussed adopting the circumstantial approach to explain variations in office seeking and winning. Professionals: the special case of lawyers The high rate of office seeking among professionals can be attri- buted almost entirely to lawyers. While 85% of the councillors who were lawyers sought further elective office, the rate is considerably lower for those in other professions. See Table 16. Doctors, den- tists and pharmacists made no later attempts at elective office. 113 Why do lawyers predominate over other professionals as office seekers? The argument that lawyers have flexible occupations has little merit in explaining why they seek office more than some other professionals.52 Doctors, dentists and professors have many options to arrange their time schedules or defer their work load to colleagues, but few of them in the sample did so in order to seek political office. It is also maintained that lawyers are more able than other pro- fessionals to keep astride of current developments in their field while taking a sojourn into political life.53 Yet many public offices held by lawyers do not bring them into meaningful contact with the law. Even when lawyers become judges, their function on the bench may not strengthen their knowledge of the law in areas relevant to their pri- vate practice. Keeping abreast of the legal profession or some aspect of it largely comes through the preparation for and the litigation of specific cases. One could argue that a physician in politics can more easily fol- low new developments in his field since they are reported to him through medical journals and field representatives. Other profes- sionals who need not learn of new developments in their field through actual practice include dentists, pharmacists, most professors and many teachers. A third argument maintains that lawyers enjoy unique side benefits through public service. As a "form of ethical advertising," office holding enhances the lawyer's reputation and thereby increases his clientele.54 This rationale may have merit in explaining why some lawyers become city councillors. Notoriety in the community goes along with 114 the office. Its part time nature allows the lawyer time to benefit [In-flbvmfljfluh‘ from his enhanced reputation by enlarging or upgrading his clientele. The advertising argument has less validity in explaining why the lawyer-councillor seeks further elective office. Since the time com- mitment is likely to be greater for any elective office beyond the council, the lawyer would have to sacrifice valuable time in order to seek further office. At least temporarily, he might have to give up part of his newly cultivated clientele. It seems unlikely that a law- yer who entered the council for public relations purposes would then cast aside the benefits gained in order to hold further office. A fourth argument maintains that lawyers are more likely to seek and attain further office because the "political" nature of their work 55 More than other gives them advantages in public office competition. professionals, they have close and frequent contact with government and party officials. In addition lawyers are experienced in the skills of communication which are valuable for campaigning. However, these advantages do not necessarily mean that lawyers have greater chances to win public office. In this study, aspiring councillors who were lawyers fared well in later elections, but not much better than did their counterparts from the other professions. See Table 16. The main difference between lawyers and other profes- sionals is that the former more often sought office. Schlesinger maintains that the prominence of lawyers as office seekers largely has to do with their relatively advantaged position in the political opportunity structure.56 Unlike any other occupational grouping of councillors, lawyers have a virtual monopoly over recruit- ment to the complex of over 435 judicial and prosecutorial offices in 115 Michigan. As required by law, these offices are restricted to prac- ticing lawyers. Consequently lawyers have more office holding options open to them than any other occupational grouping of councillors. The data give striking evidence that lawyer-councillors take advantage of their unique opportunities. Over 70% of their office seeking attempts were aimed at judicial and prosecutor's posts. In fact, lawyers have a somewhat higher rate of success in seeking these in comparison to other offices. While three-fourths of the lawyers seeking judgeships and prosecutor's offices were successful, only two- thirds of the lawyers running for other elective posts were victorious. (Table 17) This finding indicates that the slightly greater office seeking success that lawyers have over other professionals is largely due to their victories when seeking the "monopoly" offices. When they enter competition for other elective positions, this advantage almost dis- appears. The fact that lawyers have the maximum chances for electoral suc- cess when running for the monopoly offices partly explains why they seek these offices in the first place. Political aspirants tend to direct their ambitions toward office goals that are reasonably attain- able. Yet lawyer-councillors may find these offices attractive for additional reasons. First, almost all judicial offices and some prosecutor's posts at the city level are nonpartisan. It is probably easier for the lawyer- councillor to move to a second nonpartisan post than to compete in the partisan races for the other offices open to him. ll6 Second, judges and prosecutors are well paid relative to most other elective offices available to councillors in the state. Although salaries varied across districts and across time, many were in the five figure range for the time period under study. Also the incumbency return rates for these offices are high in Michigan. Therefore, these offices may hold inherent satisfactions for their occupants. The third reason applies exclusively to the 48% of all lawyer- councillors who sought county judgeships and county prosecutor's posts. It was demonstrated in Chapter II that councillors who hold these posts have the maximum opportunity to win higher elective office in the future. This does not mean that councillors who ascend to a stepping- stone office have strong chances to become a statewide elected official or congressman. Relative to other public officials, councillors have rather moderate opportunities. It does mean that councillors who become county judges or prosecutors have better chances than any other grouping of councillors to attain the highest offices. The small number of all councillors who sought state elective or congressional office restricts us from refuting or confiming this argu- ment. However, two of the five councillors who held stepping-stone offices and who later sought the highest offices were successful. Only one out of nine, ll%, of the remaining councillors who sought statewide or congressional office were victorious. This finding suggests that progressive political opportunities primarily belong to councillors who are lawyers and who attain the stepping-stone offices. Of course, these individuals who enter stepping-stone posts face a risky and time consuming pathway of ascent to the highest offices in the state. They usually start their political careers at a relatively ll7 early age, which allows them sufficient time to climb the rungs of the political career ladder. These individuals were an average of thirty- five years when they entered the council compared to forty-five mean years for the total sample. Those two who actually ascended to high offices were twenty-seven and thirty-one when they entered the council and both were forty-two when they entered statewide progressive office. In summary lawyers probably seek further political office more often than other professionals (and other occupational groupings) partly because they have a broader range of office opportunities. Second, the special options open to them are probably more attractive than the office goals available to other occupational groupings of councillors. Judgeships and prosecutor's posts are full time jobs with relatively higher salaries than most other elective offices available to councillors. Third, lawyers relative to other occupational group- ings of councillors have a monopoly over the stepping-stone offices of county prosecutor and county judge. By holding these offices, a few can realistically hope to ascend to the highest offices in the future. The unique place of lawyer-councillor in the opportunity structure is a primary reason why they are more often found than others seeking elec- tive office. Executives and middle level corporate workers During the time period under study, l946 to l972, corporations have undergone a period of expansion and diversification. Large enter- prises have increasingly built new facilities and relocated divisions outside the central city's boundaries. ll8 This trend along with the growing desire among higher status groups to escape city life has probably caused an increasing number of corporate workers to live outside the central city. The result has been smaller numbers of corporate workers entering city council office in the last twenty-five years. See Table l8. Of those who do become councillors, relatively few seek further elective office. For councillors who are corporate executives, the demanding nature of their work may prohibit them from future endeavors into politics. A major function performed by executives involves making the "right" judgement in situations with a limited amount of information. The decisions they make or approve often "significantly affect profits and the future plans" of the corporation.57 Richard Hall maintains that executives work long hours in perform- ing these tasks.58 Furthermore, they operate in a "results oriented" environment in which their mistakes may become conspicuous and even result in demotion. In this context, it is understandable that few councillors who are executives show an interest in seeking further elective office. Cam- paigning is time consuming and most office goals available to them, if attained, would require a greater time commitment than the council. For the executive, time is a scarce commodity. Futhermore, executives have strong incentives for remaining in their private occupations. As Hall points out, executives are well paid, "with some salaries reaching the startling and seemingly exorbi- tant two to three hundred thousand dollar level or higher."59 Accord- ing to Robert Presthus, they expect and enjoy the rewards of status 60 both within the organization and within the community. In comparison 119 the office goals reasonably available to councillors who are execu- tives would, if attained, accord relatively moderate status and income. Councillors who are middle level corporate officials may also see few advantages to seeking further political office. They are the pool from which high level executives are drawn. Furthermore they display a rather strong commitment to the organization. According to Cyril Sofer, middle level corporate workers identify with their employer, ...not in the sense of total acceptance, but in the sense that the company is their work and their work is central to their life. The organization thus serves as a major point of refegence...a focus for life and a means of pro- v1d1ng order. If middle level corporate workers typically define their occupa- tional role in this way, it is doubtful that many would channel their interests and energies into further political endeavors. Those who are ambitious probably direct their efforts toward advancement inside the corporation rather than outside it. The status and income advan- tages that they would gain by becoming executives probably outweigh the benefits that they could expect to attain by seeking any of the office goals available to them. Although the overriding tendency is for councillors who are middle corporate workers to refrain from further elective attempts, a few of them did make such attempts and successfully so. Let us examine their office goals. Three sought and attained the full time posts of city treasurer, recorder's judge and sheriff. The remaining three sought part time posts at the county and municipal level. All but one were in their forties when they entered the council. Most of them were near fifty when they sought further elective office. 120 Their age and moderate office goals suggest that these individ- uals were not motivated by the desire to pursue an upward political career. Perhaps the three who took part time offices simply desired to have an involvement in politics that was not demanding enough to require them to give up their private occupation. On the other hand, the three who took full time office appeared to have used politics as a means to begin a second career in middle age. It is possible that these individuals perceived that their opportunities for advancement within the corporation were limited and therefore opted for a substitute livelihood in government. This rationale may also explain why five of the councillors who were middle level corporate workers moved to appointive posts. All were in their late forties and moved to full time positions at the municipal level. Small businessmen Small businessmen showed not only a high rate of entry into the city council, but also an above average tendency to seek further elec- tive office. One explanation for their prominence as office seekers is that most are engaged in occupations that involve brokerage roles. According to Jacob, these jobs include independent merchants, restau- rant proprietors, auto dealers, fuel dealers, real estate brokers and insurance salesmen. Their common denominator is that they bring the individual into continual interaction with the public. Presumably these jobs foster the "skills of bargaining" and "inspiring trust" which are valuable in campaigning. Furthermore, they bring the individual into contact with lZl government officials from time to time which allows him to gain an inside view of political life. This argument maintains that all other factors being equal, individuals from these occupations will be more likely to pursue a political career. If this explanation is valid, one would expect that councillors with brokerage occupations would be more likely than other small busi- nessmen on the council to pursue further political office. In order to test this hypothesis, office seeking frequencies for the brokerage councillors were compared with that of councillors from other small business concerns. The latter group included owners and salesmen of wholesale enterprises, owners of trucking companies and contractors. The data do not show evidence for the hypothesis. Businessmen from wholesale and service companies showed a rate of elective office seeking that was not substantially lower than that found for brokerage businessmen. See Table l9. Since the brokerage role does not appear to explain further office seeking, it was decided to compare office attempt rates of owners with those of managers and salesmen. Owners might feel that political participation through office seeking would enhance their reputation in the corrmunity and indirectly increase their clientele. Furthermore, owners may have a greater stake in giving public service since govern- ment's plans for the development of the community may indirectly effect the well being of their business. As Table 20 indicates, the difference in office seeking rates between owners and salesmen and managers is small. Apparently those working in small businesses, regardless of their specific role in it, often find reason to seek political office beyond the council. 122 One explanation is that the private opportunity structure open to all types of small businessmen often leads them to seek an extended role in political life. In the last seventy years, the number of small businesses in the nation has increased. The small merchant and whole- saler has faced increasing competition from larger enterprises. Many independent agents in real estate and insurance have been gradually losing clientele to larger firms. In general, the prospects of pros- perity for the small businessmen have been in decline. The alternative occupational outlets for small businessmen are few. Many in the sample had a high school education or less. During the time period under study, they lacked the credentials that might have enabled them to make an easy transition into another occupational field. Furthermore, small businessmen tend to be generalists. As Walter Slocum states, proprietors perform multiple occupational roles, such as bookkeeping, cleaning, inventorying, buying and selling.62 This is especially true of the downtown merchants in the sample, many of whom inherited the family business. The national trend, however, is toward increasing training and specialization in occupations. Whereas the small businessmen of a cen- tury ago might have been able to enter the middle ranks of a larger concern, his chances of doing so in the last thirty years are minimal. Given the limited horizons that small businessmen faced during the time period under study, it is not surprising that many attempted to extend their political involvement beyond service on the council. Although some sought part time posts, most aspiring businessmen on the 123 council attempted full time posts that would, if attained, serve as an alternative to their private job. Most of their elective attempts were aimed at lateral offices at the municipal and county level. Despite their relatively moderate office goals, they experienced somewhat low rates of success in general elections. This fact and the fact that their risk of defeat was high in bids for elective office may explain why small businessmen show a high rate of movement to appointive posts. Small businessmen typically take appointive posts that are full time at the municipal or county level, such as parks commissioner, health inspector and county court employee. These data suggest that many small businessmen are motivated to extend their careers beyond the council primarily to attain a second occupation. This pattern is observable across time and across cities. Manual laborers Councillors who were manual laborers ranked only three percent below small businessmen in terms of later office attempts. This find- ing is not surprising when one considers the limited private oppor- tunity structure open to manual laborers. Like small businessmen, they tend to have few options to move into alternative occupations. On the other hand, laborers may have less reason than small businessmen to seek a full blown career in politics. The laborers found in the sample (enjoyed a substantial amount of job security. Those who worked in large industry, almost one-half, were members of powerful unions which Protected them from arbitrary dismissals. They could expect to receive regular increases in wages and substantial fringe benefits. Most of l24 the remainder in this grouping were service oriented craftsmen, some of which were union organized. Although no data are available, it is likely that some of the laborers in the sample had higher annual incomes than did the small businessmen. Furthermore, industrial workers and craftsmen have remained a relatively stable proportion of the work force in the last twenty-five years.63 Relative to small businessmen, they faced fewer uncertainties about their private occupa- tional future. Laborers' advantage in job security may explain the differences found in the later office attempts of the two occupational groupings. Laborers showed a less frequent tendency than small businessmen to seek full time elective office. Only one worker, at the Buick plant in Flint, sought a full time post -- as county register of deeds. Six of the seven who made elective office attempts aimed at the county commis- sioner's post and the mayor's office in Battle Creek and Jackson. None of these lateral offices, once attained, did or would have required them to give up their private jobs. One can only speculate as to why laborers did seek further office. It seems plausible that they were motivated to do so for two reasons. First they would receive supplemental income. Depending on the office, the amount ranged from several hundred to several thousand dollars. Second, the act of seeking and attaining further political office pro- bably heightened laborers' status in the community. The prestige that they gained through political activity probably counterbalanced their relatively moderate occupational status. For laborers, lateral office seeking may have been regarded as a means to enhance their standing in 125 the community without jeopardizing their relatively stable occupational position. Interpreting the findings Let us review the overall findings concerning the relationship between the occupations of councillors and their later political career behavior. Hypothesis III predicting that council members with high job status will more often seek political office was not confirmed by the data. Although professionals showed a high rate of office seeking, those of other high status positions did not. Councillors who were executives and middle corporate workers made less frequent attempts at further office than did those who were small businessmen. The predicted relationship was not entirely born out by the data, but differences in office seeking were found across occupational groups, enough to warrant exploring the circumstances created by coun- cillors' jobs. In regard to corporate officials, the literature sug- gests that executive and middle level workers are tightly linked into a private opportunity structure. The rewards of being or becoming an executive are probably more attractive than a political career begun at the council level. Ordinarily such a career ends after a second office holding experience at the municipal level or county level. This would explain why councillors who are corporate officials stalemate their careers at the council level. As explained earlier, small businessmen tend to have restricted private job opportunities and are therefore more likely to channel their ambitions into politics. While laborers also have limited job options, they differ from small businessmen in that they have a 126 substantial amount of occupational security. While their occupational status is low, laborers may have less reason than small businessmen to attempt an alternative career in politics. Consequently, they do not seek political office as often as small businessmen. Unlike the other occupational types, lawyers enjoy a special posi- tion in the political opportunity structure. More political office goals are available to them than to any other job type. In Michigan over 400 judicial and prosecutorial posts are legally restricted to practicing lawyers. Thus, councillors who are lawyers enjoy a virtual monopoly (relative to others) over the stepping-stone offices of county prosecutor and county judge. The greater number of office options available to them, especially those that are progressive probably explain their higher rate of office seeking. Several findings were uncovered in regard to the occupations of councillors and their frequency of victory in later office attempts. Hypothesis IV predicting that the higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will win_public office was only partially born out by the data. Professionals showed a high rate of success in later office attempts, almost 69%, which may have been partly due to their occupational prestige. A breakdown of profes- sionals showed that lawyers were the most likely to win further office, but that this tendency was largely due to their victories in races for judicial and prosecutorial office. Both the "monopoly" enjoyed by lawyers and the heightened occupational prestige of all professionals appears to bring about their higher frequency of electoral victories. Middle level corporate workers also enjoyed a high rate of success when they sought further office. Unfortunately, their small numbers 127 make it impossible to have much confidence in this finding. The prob- lem of small sample size also restricts us from drawing conclusions about executives and laborers. Of the small businessmen who sought an office on the council, only 49% were successful. This low rate of success may be due to their moderate occupational status. The economist, Peter Marks suggests that 64 While small businessmen lack a "class constituency" in the city. working class people will vote for working class candidates, the middle and upper classes give their support to candidates of high occupational prestige. Signey Verba touches on this notion in stating that middle class Americans place a high value on "getting ahead" and therefore estimate the political aspirant's right to rule in terms of his social status.65 If this explanation is valid, small businessmen tend to lack the kind of class oriented support that people at other social and occupational levels enjoy. This explanation leaves one wondering how small businessmen were able to get elected to the council in the first place, especially in much large numbers. Almost 40% of all councillors were small business- men. However, the data indicate that small businessmen encountered difficulties in getting elected to council office, just as they did when they sought further elective office. They were more often defeated in first council races than were any other occupational group. Indeed we must marvel at their tenacity. These findings suggest that occupational status is a factor which limits small businessmen's suc- cess in further office endeavors. Overall it appears that the occupations of councillors had an impact upon their later political career behavior. Both occupational 128 status and the circumstances created by jobs affected councillors' chances to seek and win further political office. In the following section, we shall examine the educational backgrounds of councillors and their later political career behavior. III. The Educational Backgrounds of City Councillors Overall those who entered the city council showed a high level of educational attainment. While almost 41% had entered college, an addi- tional 23% had completed graduate or professional programs. Although the proportion of college educated councillors was higher in the l960's than in earlier years, a majority with an education beyond high school were found in every time period under study. The objective of this section is to determine whether educational backgrounds of councillors are associated with later political career behavior. The following hypotheses, previously stated in Chapter I, will be tested. Hypothesis VII: The higher the educational level of councillors the more likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis VIII: The higher the educational level of councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. The control variable of occupation will be introduced in order to test for the independent effects of education. Educational achievement and office seeking, The data show that councillors vary in elective office attempts according to their education. While over 59% of those who attended undergraduate school and almost 66% of the councillors with graduate 129 training sought elective offices, only one-third of those with a high school education or less made the same attempt. See Table 2l. Perhaps the tendency for the more educated to seek office is due to their advantage in personal resources. A college level education tends to raise people's consciousness about politics and to develop their innate abilities to communicate. It is also possible that a high education is related to office seeking, not because it in any way develops people's resources, but because it is a requisite for many of the jobs that typically produce aspiring politicians. The data demon- strate that the occupational level of councillors is positively related to their educational achievement. In Table 22, occupation is introduced as a control variable. Within the executive grouping, only one individual sought further office which made it impossible to test for the effects of education. With this exception, the predicted relationship between education and office seeking holds within every occupational grouping. Education and elective office winning In the grouping of councillors who ran for further office, 48% of those with only high school educations or less won office. Those with a college education were more successful -- 61% were elected -- while the highest percentage of winning (70%) occurred among councillors with graduate training. The data show support for the predicted relation- ship between education and office winning. When the control variable of occupation is introduced, the expected pattern persists, except in the executive and laborer groupings where small N's may be producing irregularities. See Table 24. 130 One interesting aspect of the data pertains to the office goals of councillors. Surprisingly those with high school educations are almost as likely as graduate trained councillors to seek progressive office. However, their chances for success are restricted. They are less likely to win either the lateral or progressive posts than those with college or graduate training. Interpreting the findings The overall findings suggest that the educational background of councillors consistently influences their later political career beha- vior. Somehow high educational attainment motivates those councillors who have it to seek further office. Perhaps higher education culti- vates greater feelings of political competence as Almond and Verba suggest.66 Education probably works in many different ways to produce this effect. First, it gives people objective skills that are useful resources in political competition. Second, the norm of political participation is learned directly or indirectly at the college level. Furthermore, education places the individual in occupational situations where "he meets others of like educational attainment, and this tends to reinforce the effect of his own education."67 Regardless of which processes are at work, this writer concludes that educational level is an important determinant of councillors' later political career behavior. In the following section we will examine the influences of age upon the likelihood that councillors will seek further political office. 131 IV. Age and Later Political Careers This section is concerned with the effect a councillor's age has on his seeking and attaining further office. Joseph Schlesinger maintains that a politician's age places restrictions upon his future political chances: ...A politician may fail to advance in politics as much because he is the wrong agg8at the wrong time as because he 15 in the wrong office. In some cases an ambitious politician may be denied political pro- motion because of his youth. For example, in Michigan the ambitious who are under the age of thirty are legally prohibited from becoming governor. However, councillors' chances for the governorship are limited more because they are in the wrong office than because they are at the wrong age. As has already been demonstrated, council office is not a pathway of ascent to the governor's post. Rather, we are concerned here with whether a councillor's general opportunities for further office decrease with his increasing age. The function of age upon a council- lor's later political behavior will be tested by the following hypo- theses: Hypothesis IX: The greater the age of councillors, the less likely that they will make further office attempts. Hypothesis X: The greater the age of ambitious councillors, the less likely that they will be successful in further office attempts. 132 Age and elective office attempts The data demonstrates that those who entered the council at a younger age are consistently more likely to seek further elective office. Over 7l% of the council entrants between the ages of twenty- one and thirty made further office attempts compared to 47% of those in the thirty-one to forty age grouping. The rate declines to approxi- mately 39% for those in their forties and fifties. A sharp drop in the office seeking activity occurs in the plus sixty age grouping. See Table 25. These data were not based upon the actual age of councillors when they tried to advance to other office. In some cases, this information was not available, especially when a councillor's political history was taken from his obituary; the actual dates at which he sought further office were unknown. Rather these dates are based upon the age at which individuals initially entered the council. On the average, ambitious councillors spent over six years in office before making a further political attempt. Council entrants over fifty tend to have a slightly shorter length of service before a new office attempt is made. See Table 26. Still the pattern of office seeking found in the data suggests that the age at which individuals entered council office was an important determinant of their later aspirations in politics. As Schlesinger explains, the younger face a wider range of poli- tical opportunities over time. In addition, further office seeking is a less costly commitment for those who begin their political careers in their twenties and early thirties.69 Having not yet made a long term investment in their private occupations, they can treat an office 133 seeking endeavor as a "trial run.” If they are successful and if they find sufficient rewards in office holding, they can consider a long range career in politics. Should they be defeated in political conten- tion, they can more easily than their older colleagues redirect their ambitions into their private occupations. On the other hand, a further office attempt for the person who entered the council over the age of forty usually involves greater opportunity costs. As stated earlier, the councillor in his forties usually spends an average of more than six years on the council. By the time he makes an elective office attempt, he is likely to be near or over fifty. At this age, he has already invested a number of years in his private job and may not be willing to divert his personal resources from it in order to seek political office. The older council- lor may also recognize that should he leave his job in order to hold further office, he may not be able to return to it at a later date. These findings are in agreement with the literature concerning the sociology of aging which suggests that the "middle age crisis" begins in the late forties and early fifties. At that point the individual realizes that he is in fact not likely to rise in life much further than he already has. According to J. S. Slotkin, the individual in middle age faces an adjustment period in which he may lower his level of aspirations until they are in line with what he can reasonably hope to achieve before retirement.70 When this reasoning is applied to the analysis of political careers, it suggests that the older councillor will be less likely to seek further political office. More importantly, it suggests that when 134 he does seek further office, he is less likely to attempt office goals that would raise his position on the political career ladder. Let us turn from the frequency data on office seeking to an exami- nation of the types of office goals sought by councillors of varying ages. As Table 27 indicates, those who entered the council at a younger age were more likely than older councillors to seek progressive office goals. While 40% of the council entrants in their twenties and 33% of those in their thirties sought county law enforcement or state- wide elective offices, the rate drops considerably for those over forty. Conversely, the rate of lateral office seeking increased with age. Older councillors were more likely to seek elective office at the municipal and county level that do not "fit" into the opportunity structure of politics. That is, lateral offices are political dead ends in the sense that they open no higher career opportunities for their occupants. From these data it can be inferred that age affects not only the frequency of later office attempts, but also the level of office goals that councillors pursue. In the following section, we shall examine how councillors of differing ages actually fared in later office attempts. Office winning and age The data indicate that those who entered the council at a younger age are more likely to wjn_attempts at further elective office. While 90% of the council entrants under thirty were successful in later office attempts, the rate declines to around 6l% for those in their 135 thirties and forties. Beyond the age of fifty, the rate drops to 50%. See Table 28. Furthermore, age appears to limit councillors' opportunities regardless of the elective office goals that they seek. Although cell N's were small, Table 29 shows that younger councillors were consis- tently more likely than their older colleagues to win elections at both the lateral and progressive levels. Thus, the elective advantage that younger councillors enjoy appears to crosscut levels of the opportunity structure. Later political careers of councillors over fifty The "middle age crisis" described by Slotkin appears to have an objective reality for older councillors. That is, they actually were less likely than those younger to obtain their elective office objec- tives. This fact alone may explain why fewer older councillors seek fur- ther elective office. It is possible that they recognize that their chances for victory are limited. To draw from Barber, older council- lors who had ambitions in elective politics might have estimated that their opportunities for success were limited. Rather than face the somewhat high risks of defeat, some may have simply refrained from further elective office attempts. Given their relatively limited opportunities to attain elective office goals, what other career options do councillors over fifty take? One alternative is that older councillors simply drop out of politics altogether. In fact l4% of the councillors over fifty had discrete 136 careers on the council. This percentage is the highest found among all age groupings. See Table 30. A second alternative is that councillors over fifty take appoint- ive posts. However, the frequency with which older councillors take appointive posts is less than in younger age groups. Only 16% of the councillors who entered office over the age of fifty took appointive posts, compared to 22% of the rest of the sample. A third option is that older councillors simply remain on the council term after term. This alternative is in line with Slotkin's argument that people in middle age usually remain on their present course in life regardless of what aspirations they previously held. About 38% of the councillors over fifty had static careers. The static rate is higher for these councillors than for any other age grouping. The career pathways taken by older councillors are diverse. Some seek and/or move to other political positions, although at a lower rate than other age groupings. More frequently older councillors chose career options that do not take them beyond the council office holding experience. Since over one-half of them either dropped out of the council after a single term or pursued static careers, they appear to have more restricted political careers than their younger counterparts. In the following section, we shall review the overall findings in regard to age and office seeking. Age and councillors' later political careers The age of city councillors consistently affects the likelihood that they will seek and win further elective office. Younger 137 councillors more often run for later office and are more likely to be successful. Most of the office goals sought and won by councillors were lateral. That is, they were municipal and county posts that did not constitute an upward move on the political career ladder. Although younger councillors were less likely to run for lateral offices, they were more likely to win them. About nine percent of the entire sample of councillors ran for progressive posts at the county and state level. However, younger councillors, especially those under the age of thirty, were the most likely to seek and win progressive office. Beyond the age of thirty, the rate of progressive office attempts, both successful and unsuc- cessful, declines consistently. The fact that both lateral and progressive office goals are diffi- cult to attain for councillors over fifty has probably served to dis- courage many of them from seeking elective office. It appears that they opt instead for static careers or drop out of politics altogether. The variable of age has been shown to affect the office seeking behavior of councillors as predicted by Hypotheses IX and X. In the following section, the role of race and sex as determinants of council- lors' later political career behavior will be examined. V. Race and Sex as Determinants of Later Political Careers During the time period under study, few blacks or women entered council office in the six cities. From l946 to 1966, only four blacks were found serving in council office, l.75% of the total sample. Even in Detroit, where the percentage of the total population that was black 138 ranged upwards of 25%, the first black was not elected to the common council until 1957. In Jackson, Lansing and Grand Rapids, no blacks had entered the council by l966. Women fared only slightly better than blacks in terms of their numbers on the council. From l946 to I966, six women, 2.63% of the total sample, had been elected to council office in the cities of Lansing, Grand Rapids, Detroit and Jackson. The small number of blacks and women serving in council office was a reflection of their overall limited opportunities in municipal elec- tive politics. During the sample period, no blacks had served in mayoral office or in the complex of other elective offices, i.e., treasurer, clerk or assessor in the respective cities. Nor were women generally found serving in municipal elective offices other than in the council. A conspicuous exception was Mary Bennet, a newspaper reporter, who was elected as mayor of Jackson in I965. Her liberal viewpoint on issues such as housing and race rela- tions became apparent during her first term and was probably instru- mental to her defeat two years later. Mrs. Bennet was later appointed as director of Jackson's Office of Economic Opportunity but became dis- illusioned with local programs and resigned in 1969. A second exception is found in Lansing where one municipal elec- tive office, the clerkship, has traditionally been held by women. Although this office is elective, it has essentially served as a long term career post for its female occupants. Since l923, a female city clerk has never been defeated in an incumbency race. Often they ran unopposed. The last three women who became city clerks served until 139 their retirement. With these two exceptions, women have only been able to enter municipal elective office via the council. Due to small sample size, it will not be possible to system- atically test hypotheses concerning race, sex and further office attempts. Since the women and blacks found in the sample were overall quite different from other councillors in their backgrounds and poli- tical behavior, we shall proceed with a descriptive analysis of them. The initial task of this section is to describe the past achieve- ments of black and women councillors in terms of their educations, occupations and organizational affiliations in the city. Second, their political careers after leaving council office will be described. Finally, we shall examine the changing political opportunities for blacks and women since the time period under study. Backgrounds Blacks and women who entered the council showed a tendency to have substantial experience in voluntary and party organizations, and/or jobs oriented to politics. Of the three blacks for which information was available, Wayne Patrick, a Detroit lawyer, was most directly involved in government, having worked in the county prosecutor's office for several years prior to entering the council. Floyd McCree, a pro- duction worker in the Buick plant in Flint, was a local official in the United Auto Workers. Incidentally, Mr. McCree twice ran unsuccessfully for the council and had been active in a political party before being elected in I958. Clark Valentine had retired from the army just prior to running for the council in l963. However, he had previously served as the president of a neighborhood improvement organization for several 140 years. All three had been affiliated with moderate black groups in the city such as the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League. Among the women who ascended to the council, two distinct patterns emerged in their pasts. Two were housewives who had a long record of involvement in civic affairs in the city. One, who was the wife of a neuro-surgeon, additionally had been active in urban renewal and pro- annexation groups in Grand Rapids. She also had served as a delegate to the state democratic convention two years prior to running for the council. Of the remaining four women, all had full time occupations that are usually regarded as "breeding grounds" for politicians. One was a real estate salesman while two were owners of small businesses. Lucille Belen, the owner of a florist shop in Lansing, had previously held a democratic party office at the state level. One other women held a law degree and had worked as an investigator for the probate court prior to running for the council. All had a record of service in civic groups in the city. Judging from their backgrounds, both blacks and women appear to have had more extensive community and political experience than did their white male colleagues on the council. Later political careers The elective political opportunities that women and blacks had, or took as councillors, were few. None made attempts to run for progres- sive offices at the county or state level. Only one black councillor and one councilwoman sought a lateral elective office. In l969 Mary Beck had sufficient primary votes to be included on the general 141 election ballot for mayor in Detroit. However, she was soundly defeated in the election and dropped out of politics altogether. After becoming the county democratic chairman in 1968, Floyd McCree unsuccessfully ran for the legislature. Two years later, he was elected county register of deeds and remains in that post to the present time. Probably as a result of their limited opportunities to advance to other elective offices, most women and black councillors sought to remain in the council term after term, and thereby pursued static careers. The average length of service for both groups was higher than that of the total sample of councillors. The women served 8.33 mean years, while the three black councillors averaged 14.33 years. Even a static career became hazardous for women after serving several years on the council. Three of the four female statics were defeated in incumbency elections and all subsequently stayed out of politics. The case that most strongly emphasizes the obstacles they faced was that of a woman from Detroit who ran in three consecutive races for the common council before being elected. After serving two terms, she was defeated in an incumbency race. She contended unsuc- cessfully in two more elections before dropping out of council and political contention altogether. Overall the political career opportunities of women appear to have been severely restricted in all directions, except out of politics. While the black councillors had no setbacks in pursuing static careers, they too appear to have been blocked from lateral and progressive office goals. 142 Whether this state of affairs will continue for these individ- uals remains to be seen. One woman and one black who were elected to the council prior to l966 are still serving and have been classified as statics. This classification may be premature. In addition, the only elected lateral, Floyd McCree, may decide to run for further office, although he is not in the most opportune position from which to do so. These or any of the other individuals described here may make other office attempts in the future. Nevertheless it is fair to conclude that blacks and women had severely limited political career options compared to their white male colleagues on the council during the time period under study. Council membership in transition This section would not be complete without some mention of the recent influx of blacks and women into council office. From l967 to l974, the number of blacks serving on the council has quadrupled. The single greatest increment of blacks occurred in the Detroit election of l973 which increased their numbers on the council from one to four. Coleman Young, a popular state senator with a history of black acti- vism, was elected mayor over John Nichols, a white ex-police commis- sioner. This change in municipal leadership has been attributed to the fact that over one-half of the Detroit population was black and was mobilized to constitute a winning majority. Iimg_reports that "the election was decided chiefly along racial lines" with "92% of the blacks voting for Young and 9l% of the whites voting for Nichols."7] However, black newcomers have also been successful in winning at-large elections to the council in Lansing and Battle Creek where 143 they constitute less than 20% of the total population. Furthermore, a black councillor from Grand Rapids won the city wide election for mayor in 1972. Of course, some black newcomers to the council (in Flint) were elected from ward districts that had large black populations. However, it appears that substantial portions of white voters have been willing to cast their ballots in favor of black candidates. Slight increases in the number of women serving on the council have occurred in recent years. Their numbers expanded from six to nine in the l967 to l974 period with one councilwoman being an incumbent "carryover" from earlier years. All but one of the six female new- comers entered office in the early 1970's. Unfortunately it is too early to observe whether these women and blacks will seek further political office. If past history can serve as a guide, we can expect these individuals to remain in the council an average of around six years before seeking a further office goal. With their increasing numbers, however, it seems inevitable that some will make such attempts in the future. Whether the electorate will respond negatively, as it has often done in the past, remains to be seen. The defeats women have experienced in comparison to blacks suggest that they will encounter more failures than blacks when running for council and other elective offices in the future. VI. Summary and Conclusion This chapter gives evidence that background traits affect the later political careers of councillors. Those with preferred traits by society's definition run more frequently for elective office beyond 144 the council. When councillors were stratified by education, age, race and sex, the expected relationships between these status traits and office seeking were found. Some unpredicted patterns emerged among councillors when they were ranked by occupational status. While pro- fessionals in the high echelons of occupational rank (primarily law- yers) often sought further office, corporate officials did not. One moderate level grouping, small businessmen, had a high rate of office attempts, a finding running counter to the status hypothesis. In order to explain these disparities, the circumstances surround- ing the private jobs of councillors were examined. Depending on their vocation, their private ambitions may have influenced councillors' political aspirations. Although the data did show some irregularities, those of high occupational status more often succeeded in later elections. Educa- tional achievement and age appear to also affect a councillor's chances, while the factors of race and sex have such a pronounced influence upon political careers that few blacks or female council- members run for later elective office. In summation, it is evident that the electorate, in some fashion, considers a councillor's back- ground when making voting decisions. From these data, a composite profile of the successful council- lor can be constructed. This individual is most likely to attain lateral office at the municipal and county level. As Table 32 indi- cates, he is most likely to be a white male who entered the council in his thirties. His accomplishments in private life are substantial. He has a college education which may have extended beyond the 145 undergraduate level. His occupation is "white collar," and he is most likely to be a professional. The composite picture for the few councillors who attain progres- sive office varies only slightly. He is a white male, usually a law- yer, who entered the council in his garly_thirties. After a tenure of over six years on the council, he advanced to a stepping-stone post. From his new vantage point at the county level, he seeks and wins a high level office. This chapter has described who runs for political office from the council. In Chapter IV we will see how factors of the urban political system affect councillors' chances for further elective office. 10. ll. FOOTNOTES See Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship_(Berkeley: University of California Press, l960); Kenneth Prewitt, Ihg_ Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., l970); Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, l963); Richard Feld and Donald S. Lutz, "Recruitment of City Council Members in Houston" (paper delivered to the Southern Political Science Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, November 5-7, I970); Edward Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965). Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 225-26; 7 Richard Feld and Donald S. Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," Journal of Politics 34 (August l972):928-29; Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 56-58. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 26 and 226; Feld and Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," p. 927. James David Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, l965), p. 17. Rufus Browning, "Hypotheses about Political Recruitment: A Par- tially Data Based Computer Simulation," in Simulation in the Study of Politics, ed. by William Coplin (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, l968), p. 304. Donald Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision- Makers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 6l. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 28. See Chapter II, Section 11. Kenneth VerBurg, Guide to Michigan County Government (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, l972), IX-26. Barber, The Lawmakers, pp. ll-lS. One conspicuous exception is the County Board of Commissioners which meets approximately once a month. 146 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 147 John Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 22-23. Matthews, The Social Background. Melvin Tumin, Social Stratification (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., I967), p. 13. Ibid., p. 26. Ibid., p. 27. Matthews, The Social Background, p. 56. Ibid.; Eva Rosenburg found evidence that higher status adults in kibbutzes are more poised and self confident. See Eva Rosenburg, "Social Stratification in a Classless Society," American Socio- logical Review 16 (l95l):766-74; Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 57-62. Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik, "Women as Politicians: The Social Background, Personality, and Political Careers of Female Party Leaders," Journal of Social Issues 28 (l972):225-26. J. Bieri and R. Lobeck, "Self Concept Differences in Relation to Identity, Religion and Social Class," Journal of Abnormal Psycho- logy 62 (l96l):94-98. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l965), Chapters 7-9. Ibid. Ibid.; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley Publishers, I960), p. 490. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Chapter 6. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., Chapter 3. Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 492. Kimball Young, Social Psychology (New York: Crofts and Company, I930), pp. 262—63; A Gesell and E. E. Lord, "A Psychological Com- parison of Nursery School Children from Homes of Low and High Economic Status," Pedagogjcal Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology 34 (l927):554-57. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 148 Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 492. Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," American Sociological Review 11 (l946):688-90. M. E. Olson, "Social and Political Participation of Blacks,“ American Sociological Review 35 (August l970):682-97. William G. Mather, "Income and Social Participation," American Sociological Review 6 (l94I):381-82. Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50 (July I943):370-96; Lester Milbrath, Political Partici- pation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 30. The lack of resources of the lower strata is described by Judith Shuval in “Class and Ethnic Correlates of Casual Neighboring," American Sociological Review 21 (August l956):453-58. James Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 11. Ibid., pp. 225-26. Davies points out that the upper middle class probably produced more rulers than the upper class. See also Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vin- tage Books, 1960); Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 287-91; Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Political Decision Makers, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 193-217. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 66. Prewitt estimates that influence by politically active parents is a major factor inducing political participation among 30% to 40% of those who are active in municipal politics. Ibid., PP. 60-61. R. W. Hodge and D. J. Treiman, "Social Participation and Social Status," American Sociological Review 33 (October I968):722-40. Tumin, Social Stratification, p. 26. Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U. S. -- A Model," Journal of Politics 24 (November 1962):703-16. Ibid., p. 710. Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 488. C. W. Franklin and L. R. Wallum, "Towards a Paradigm of Substruc- tural Relations: An Application to Sex and Race in the United States," hylon (Fall l972):248. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. Science 1 (January 1957):27. 149 Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller, The Voter Decides (New York: Harper and Row, 1954); Campbell, et al., The American Voter; Angus Campbell and Donald Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes and the Presidential Vote," in American Voting Behavior, ed. by Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (New York: Free Press, 1959). Campbell, et al., The American Voter. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 31. Less recent studies rank professionals as the highest status occu- pational grouping. See Eleanor H. Bernert, "The Chicago Labor Force, 1910 to 1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1949); Bradford Kimball, "Changes in the Occupational Pattern of New York State," Educational Research Studies 2 (I937):15. Cecil North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupation: A Popular Evaluation," gpinion News 9 (September 1, l947):3-13. Alex Inkles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Exper- ience, Perception and Value," American Journal of Sociology 66 (July 1960):5-6. Kimball, "Changes in the Occupational Pattern." Reinhart Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 436. Ibid. V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 540; Joseph Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of Political Matthews, The Social Background, pp. 30—31. Schlesinger, "Lawyers," pp. 28-39. "The Executive Life," Fortune, 1956, pp. l7-18. Richard H. Hall, Occupations and the Social Structure (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 140. Ibid. Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 164-204. Cyril Sofer, Men in Mid-Career: A Study of British Managers and Technical Specialists(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 338. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 150 Walter L. Slocum, Occupational Careers (Chicago: Aldine Publish- ing Company, 1966), p. 58. Hall, Occupations, p. 188. Discussion with Peter Marks in Providence, Rhode Island, June 29, I975. Verba's point appears in an unpublished paper reviewed in Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Socialization and Leadership Selection," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 361 (September 1965):99. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 204-209, and 379-87. Ibid., p. 379. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 174. Ibid., p. 176. J. S. Slotkin, "Life Course in Middle Age," in Problems of the Middle Age, ed. by C. B. Vedder (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas Publisher, 1965), pp. 47-48. "New Men for Detroit and Atlanta," Time, January 14, 1974, p. 13. 151 .mUmeo m>wpumpm unmaom 0;: mcwnsogm chowpmaauuo sumo cw Longs: Pepe» co ummmmk mmm .. Pm om mm um _N 2 Page» oo.oo_ .. oo.oo_ oo.oop oo.oop oo.oop oo.oop N page» ow._m .. pm.mw no.0“ mm._m o¢.mm m¢._n o: ap.m_ .. mm.¢_ mm.mm mo.mp mm.o_ Km.mm mm» "women m>wpcwoaam xoo» mm o m mm 5 mm P z Puuop oo.oop oo.oo_ oo.oo_ oo.oo_ oo.oop oo.oo_ oo.oop & Fmpou mm.m¢ oo.o om.~m mm._m mm.ep ¢O.Fm oo.oo~ umo_ no.0m oo.o mo.Nm mo.m¢ _~.mm mm.mo oo.o :03 anmpqsmppm muwwwo m>vuompm mo meoupso mum m Fm om mm um Pm 2 Fame» oo.oo~ oo.oop oo.ooF oo.oo~ oo.oop oo.oo_ oo.oo_ & Page“ mm.mo oo.o¢ om.Po am.mm mp.mm mp.m¢ ¢~.mm o: _m.mm oo.oo op.wm P_._¢ mm.PN Rm.om o~.¢ mm» “muwweo m>wpompm ugmsom fimm.mm &_N.N xm~.m Nmm.mm &m_.¢_, &Nm.m~ xm~.m _muop mcogpo mgmgoamb cosmmchmzn mpmgoacoo mecowmmwwogm mm>wpsowxm pfimsm Fm>wp mpuuwz Low>ozmn gmmgmo Lupe, was cowpmaaooo, mp MAm