ABSTRACT

CITY COUNCILLORS' LATER POLITICAL CAREERS:
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND
AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

By

Nancy Oppenlander

Using Joseph Schlesinger's ambition theory, this study explores the effects of social background and structural characteristics of municipal political systems upon the later office seeking behavior of city councillors. The 228 council members examined entered office from 1946 to 1966 in six cities of Michigan: Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek.

Hypotheses are presented predicting that occupational status, education, age, sex and race affect the likelihood that councillors will run for and win a further elective office. The data failed to show consistent support for the hypothesis that councillors of higher occupational status are more likely to do so. Executives and middle level corporate workers showed a less than predicted rate of office seeking, while small businessmen displayed a greater than expected rate.

However, professionals, primarily lawyers, showed a high frequency of office seeking and winning. This greater tendency among lawyers is largely due to their advantaged position in the state's opportunity structure. Most judicial and prosecutorial posts in Michigan are legally restricted to licensed lawyers. These positions, which

frequently become office goals for lawyer-councillors, are especially attractive in that they may be used as a political stepping-stone to higher (progressive) offices in the state.

The educational level of councillors was positively associated with later office attempts and victories.

As age increases among councillors, the tendency to seek and win further office declines. Councillors over the age of fifty were more likely to have static or discrete careers, while younger councillors tend to seek lateral and progressive offices and to be successful.

Small sub-sample size prohibited systematic tests for the effects of race and sex upon subsequent careers. However, blacks and women in the sample appeared to have restricted opportunities to advance from the council level.

Two approaches to structural characteristics of municipal political systems were analyzed. First, Gordon Black's investment model was tested. It posits that the cost of a council election is an indicator of an individual's commitment to a political career. The cost measures of municipal population, the closeness of council elections and the act of defeating an incumbent were predicted to be associated with further office attempts and victories.

In regard to the first two variables, weak associations were found in the data. The incumbency measure was strongly associated with later office attempts, but was a very weak predictor of victories.

Second, a measure of Schlesinger's political opportunity structure was constructed for each of the sample cities. This measure is based upon the number of other elective offices available to councillors and the turnover rate in occupants of these offices over a twelve year

span. The data show a strong association between the size of the opportunity structure and the likelihood that councillors will pursue and attain a further elective office.

The composition of a councillor's current office district, that is, the extent to which it encompasses, coincides and overlaps with the districts of other elective offices, was predicted to be associated with later career behavior. An index of electoral advantage was constructed, based upon the size of the voting population and the ward or at-large nature of council districts. As predicted, the rate of office seeking and winning increased with electoral advantage. Councillors from populous at-large districts were more likely to run for and win further office, while those from small wards were least likely to do so.

Overall these findings on structural variables suggest that an opportunity approach to political careers has greater predictive ability than a cost model.

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To my mother and father

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CHAPTER I

MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS

I. Introduction

> There is no denying that the government of the cities is the one most conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the National government tell but little for evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of State governments are insignificant compared with the extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement which mark the administrations of most of the great cities.[1]

Since James Bryce's indictment of city governments in 1893, elected municipal officials have been steadily under attack for the failure to provide long term guidance for city affairs. Corruption and inefficiency was so widespread at the turn of the century, that most municipal governments were reorganized. Reformist measures, such as nonpartisan ballots, at-large districts, staggered terms and off year elections, were written into city charters in an effort to upgrade the quality of the candidates recruited to municipal office. Despite these structural changes, municipal leadership continues to face criticism.

Many contemporary scholars have characterized mayors and city councillors in critical terms: "indecisive,"[2] "uncertain,"[3] and "patently inferior."[4] Much of recent literature has created an image of a leadership vacuum in American cities that is largely immune to control by the electorate. Since municipal offices most consistently attract amateur contenders with limited knowledge of political affairs,

it is maintained that the electorate has few chances to elect competent candidates.

Commonly found in the literature are three explanations of how this state of affairs affects recruitment and limits the leadership ability of municipal officials. One school of thought maintains that weak leadership is an indirect outcome of out-migration trends in urban areas. A second explanation focuses upon the lack of financial and social rewards for holding municipal office. A third school of thought views the limited opportunities for political advancement from the municipal level as a condition that sets limits upon the quality of candidates that are initially recruited for mayoral and council elections. Let us review these explanations.

The exodus to the suburbs

Scholars have noted that a decline in municipal leadership is coincidental with urban migration trends since the middle 1940's. Among the most significant changes in American urban settlement in the years since World War II is the mass migration to the suburbs.[5]

Reports of the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that migration and new population growth is occurring primarily outside central city boundaries.[6] Between 1950 and 1956, only 19% of metropolitan growth was within municipal boundaries, while 33% occurred in incorporated suburbs, and 49% occurred in townships around cities.[7]

The population movement to areas outside the city's boundaries has affected central city leaders in two ways. First, as the most affluent residents and businesses migrate to the suburbs, city treasuries suffer a loss in tax revenue. Charles Press states, "these urban centers have

been losing upper and middle class residents as well as their industrial and commercial tax base to the suburbs..."[8] Part of the explanation of New York City's recent problems argues this condition.

Although city leaders face growing needs to initiate new projects and upgrade existing services, they have relatively less revenue with which to finance them. Restrained by the diminishing tax base, mayors and city councillors often find it impossible to implement innovative policies.

Financial limitations may even restrain the city's administration from increasing budget allocations to maintain existing services. Under these financial restraints, mayors and city councillors have been reluctant to devise new policy approaches for the city's problems. Even mayors in large cities with access to many federal funding programs find it difficult to take the role of policy innovator under these conditions.

Second, migration has brought about the flight of middle class community leaders to areas outside the city's boundaries. The central city mayor now finds himself surrounded by competing township, suburban and county officials, many of whom are migrants from the central city.

Robert Schulze maintains that the flight of middle class leaders from the central city and the growth of other local government units in the suburbs has weakened the leadership of central city officials. They are separated from suburban leaders "by ever widening social, psychological and physical distances," resulting in an increasingly "frustrated local civic and political leadership."[9]

As a result of these difficulties, it is maintained that the increasing burdens of holding municipal office in central cities have

affected recruitment patterns. Candidates regarded as qualfied by local community standards have become reluctant to run for local office. In some cases recruiting groups are forced to select candidates out of expediency, rather than out of a consideration of their capabilities.

In a study of councillors in Minnesota cities, Robert Weber and George Van Cleve conclude, "in an age where the number of problems which each community must face through governmental action has grown tremendously, there is a pressing need for intelligent and forceful leadership."[10] Given the increasing frustrations of office holding, "there is little evidence that the recruitment and use of this type of leadership in community government will continue." [11]

Incentives and municipal recruitment

A second school of thought ascribes the leadership vacuum to the failure of cities to provide potential candidates attractive inducements to run for office. It is widely recognized that holding mayoral or council office brings moderate rewards. As Arthur Bromage, a political scientist and ex-councillor puts it, pay, power and patronage are unlikely incentives: "running for election, risking loss of face, devoting hours at city hall, -- these must offer their own reward to the councilman."[12]

An overall look at salaries allotted to mayors and councillors suggests that compensation is a weak inducement to run for municipal office. In 1965 the mean salary for a mayor in a city of 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants was $8,415 per annum.[13] Since the office is

frequently full-time, many mayors abandon their private careers while serving.

City councillors, who usually work on a part-time basis, receive considerably less compensation than mayors. In 1965 the average salary for councillors of cities in the previously mentioned population range was $1,500 in mayor-council systems and $1,200 in council-manager systems.[14] In some cities councillors receive no compensation.

Councillors frequently find that their salary is minimal relative to the time commitment demanded by the office. Weber and Van Cleve state:

> For spending an average of ten to fifteen hours a week on city business, the typical councilman in these cities can expect compensation which is substantially below the federal minimum wage.[15]

It is maintained that minimal salaries make it difficult to recruit the most sought after candidates for municipal office. In a study of California cities, Eugene Lee reports that citizen groups often find that their top priority choices for candidates are reluctant to run for office. One respondent made the observation that "it is very difficult to get a good businessman to run for city office...As there is no compensation for the hours and hours of work, there is naturally no attraction."[16] After several failures to enlist candidates who were regarded as qualified, recruiters lowered their standards as the closing date for nominations drew near.

The moderate prestige associated with holding municipal office has also been cited as a barrier to the recruitment of viable leaders. This argument maintains that municipal office holding simply lacks the status that is associated with participation in other community groups.

Citizens interested in community involvement find greater rewards of public recognition by participating in voluntary groups, such as civic and charitable organizations. The overall effect is that individuals who might otherwise have run for municipal office channel their talents into other endeavors.

In a comparison of city politics in New Haven, Nashville and Chicago, Mayer Zald and Thomas Anderson found evidence supporting this position:

> The relatively moderate prestige of local politics makes a career in [it] unattractive for the social and economic elite. This factor may lead the social and economic elite to not make serious and consistent moves into local politics.[17]

The lack of political opportunities

A third argument maintains that municipal office is lacking in prestige as a viable base from which to launch a political career. For the politically ambitious individual, municipal office holding is an unattractive career option.

Studies of the career patterns of mayors lend support to this argument. Of all the mayors who have served in New York City from 1898 to 1972, Theodore Lowi finds that none have been successful in attempts to win higher office.[18] A similar pattern has been discovered in a random sample of mayors from large cities. Of ninety-six mayors elected in twenty-four American cities, Marilyn Gittell reports that ten percent were later elected to a higher office.[19]

The lack of future political opportunities may discourage some political aspirants from seeking municipal office. According to Gittell, politically ambitious individuals who might otherwise have sought mayoral office guide their careers into other elective positions

at the county and state levels that might better serve as a political stepping-stone. For political newcomers interested in a long term career in politics, the advantage of seeking "higher" level office may be too compelling to deny. In the absence of ambitious candidates, those who are left to contend for local office are, according to Gittell, the least motivated, the least qualified and the least competent individuals:

> The more astute politician will guide his career around, not into, the mayor's office...Men of inferior caliber are, and must be attracted to the office...This explains, at least in part, the obvious deficiencies in city administration and portend little hope for the future of city government.[20]

Recruitment and leadership performance

The explanations for the leadership vacuum cited in the preceding sections emphasize factors that influence the kinds of individuals who are recruited to municipal office. Although these arguments have merit, they do not clearly demonstrate how changes in incentives will bring about improvements in the recruitment and leadership performance of municipal officials.

For example, increasing the salaries of city officials might attract more people as candidates. It is not clear, however, that among the larger number of contenders, there will be a greater proportion of competent individuals.[21] Nor is it clear that increasing salaries will insure that recruiters and voters are in a better position to decide who would be the most able leaders.

A similar argument holds in evaluating the effects of social prestige of city office upon leadership recruitment. If the public recognition for municipal office holding were higher, a greater number

of individuals would probably seek candidacy. Yet those additional candidates may have no greater leadership potential than those who sought city office under lower prestige conditions.

The increasing responsibilities attached to city office holding have also been cited as an important influence upon leadership recruitment. Undoubtedly the burdens of municipal office tend to make some individuals reluctant to seek candidacy. It is not clear that qualified individuals are any more likely than the less qualified to be discouraged from office seeking. The opposite effect might just as well occur with the increased challenges of the office inspiring the more talented individuals to run, while the less capable people withdraw from the competition.

Gittell's argument that the career status of an office influences the type of individuals who are recruited to that office holds the greatest promise of linking an incentive factor with leadership performance. Gittell suggests that city office has been a dead end position for those interested in a political career. Since municipal posts rarely serve as a stepping-stone to higher office, few candidates who are strongly committed to a political career are attracted to municipal competition. Those who are most often recruited are amateurs who lack a long standing interest in or desire for a political life.

Based upon the theory of electoral accountability, this argument implies that political contenders who hope to make a career out of politics treat the office holding experience differently than those with a more temporal commitment to politics. In Ambition and Politics, Joseph Schlesinger contends that careerists provide political leadership that is more responsive to the electorate. Since political

careerists must depend upon elections in order to remain in office or to run for higher office, they are under a compulsion to take into account the preference of the electorate.

Individuals who desire to remain in city office for more than one term find it expedient to strive for a set of policies that are satisfying to at least a majority of their constituents. Office holders who hope to advance to a higher position are under a compulsion not only to satisfy their present constituents, but also to consider the preferences of the electorate of the higher office to which they aspire.

On the other hand, public officials who are less concerned or indifferent to whether they continue serving in political office are under no obligation to consider public opinion. This argument does not imply that amateurs have no interest in responding to the preferences of their constituents. Many may even feel that their role as a public servant requires them to respond to constituent interests. Yet officials who are most consistently responstive to the electorate are those who do so not out of deference to the public, but out of a regard for the public's ability to influence their future political life.

Unlike any of the other incentives related to recruitment, the career status of an office is crucial to whether leadership will regularly be accountable to public opinion. If the ambitions of elected officials play a prominent role in ensuring leadership responsiveness, it is worth investigating the extent to which careerists are found in municipal office and the conditions that tend to foster ambitions in municipal office holders. A review of the literature pertaining to the

future ambitions of municipal officials will be helpful in undertaking this investigation.

II. Review of the Literature

Only a few research studies have been concerned with the extent to which municipal officials aspire to further elective office. In a study of San Francisco Bay area councillors elected on a nonpartisan ballot, Kenneth Prewitt asked if they intended to stand for reelection and if they had any interest in another office.[22] Of 433 respondents 29% intended seeking another office, 53% expected to seek another term and 18% planned to retire. Over one-fourth of the sample indicated an interest in pursuing a political career by moving to another office position.

When partisan elected councillors from the Buffalo area were asked similar questions, a higher percentage of politically ambitious individuals were discovered. William Dutton found that 61% desired political advancement to a local, state or federal position while one-third wished to continue in council office. Only six percent of the Buffalo area councillors stated intentions to retire from political life.[23]

Two other interview studies of municipally elected officials report a much lower incidence of intentions to seek further office. Among Minnesota councillors from cities of 10,000 to 50,000 population, Weber and Van Cleve found that four out of sixty-five, around six percent, indicated an interest in running for a state or national office.

In an interview study of Houston councillors, Richard Feld and Donald Lutz asked each respondent to rank order his reasons for running

by listing "as many or as few as were relevant."[25] Of fifty respondents, two ranked using the council office as a stepping-stone as a motive for initially seeking the council office.

Gittell's study of mayors from the nation's largest cities is the only research to date of actual career movement. Ninety-six mayors were classified according to whether they moved to a "higher political office," defined as an elective post with a larger district at the state or national level. As previously mentioned, about one-tenth of the mayors did so.

Controlling for region, Gittell found that no southern mayors had moved to a higher office. In other regions, the percentage who ascended to higher office was approximately seven percent in the far west, ten percent in the midwest and twenty percent in the northeast. The largest single group who advanced in politics were mayors from the smaller cities in the sample who took statewide posts, usually the governorship.

The literature reports considerable variance across cities with two to sixty-one percent of municipal officials stating intentions to run for a further office. While Weber and Van Cleve indicate that the desire for another office is less prevalent in small cities, Gittell's study suggests that the chances for actual advancement to statewide office are better for mayors from cities approaching medium population size. Variations in careers appear to be related to regional areas of the country with the northeast, and, to a lesser extent, the midwest offering the greatest opportunities for mayors.

Interpreting the findings

For several reasons one should be cautious in drawing inferences from the above studies about municipal officials' later career behavior. The first and most obvious problem concerns the use of survey questions as an indicator of future office seeking. An office holder may be less than candid in making statements about his future career plans. He may be reluctant to state his desire to seek another office, given the tendency in American politics for aspirants to withhold such information until they officially open a campaign. Furthermore, political opportunities fluctuate over time. A municipal official may not plan to seek advancement, but an attractive office may become available or vice versa.

A second problem concerns what types of further office experience of municipal officials are important to analyze. In studying the later careers of mayors, Gittell measured the frequency with which they ascend to "higher" elective office. Operationally, a mayor who advances is one who moves to an elective post with a greater constituency. However, constituency size is not a universal indicator of higher office movement. For example, a mayor of Detroit would probably consider becoming a congressman a step upward, though his congressional district would include only a fraction of his mayoral constituency. The same example would apply to the nine city council members who are elected on an at-large basis.

Furthermore, Gittell's definition of "higher" office excludes numerous posts, both elective and appointive, that may become office goals for ambitious municipal officials. In studying the later office ambitions of councillors, Prewitt and Dutton measured the frequency

with which they desire to attain "any other political or governmental positions" at the local, state or federal level.[26]

A major concern of this dissertation is to determine whether municipal officials go on to other political positions in their later career, since no such study of actual behavior has been conducted. All the later office moves of mayors and councillors, both to elective and appointive positions, will be described in this study.

However, we are also concerned with the opportunities that municipal officials have to ascend to the highest positions in state and national politics. Therefore, we shall focus upon the frequency with which municipal officials seek and attain progressive political office.

Since the actual movement of municipal officials to other political office has not previously been researched, virtually nothing is known about what conditions tend to foster political advancement. Another objective of this dissertation is to explore the characteristics of city councillors and their political surroundings which may influence their opportunities to attain another political office.

In order to conduct such a study, one needs a theoretical foundation that can effectively interpret and predict the role of ambitions in career behavior. Schlesinger's seminal study of political careers in Ambition and Politics provides a framework that can be fruitfully applied in examining municipal career patterns.

Political ambitions and careers

Like all politicians, city councillors are motivated by certain hopes and expectations for a political career. Schlesinger assumes that the primary force that spurs people to seek office is ambition:

> Ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrive on the hope of preferment and the drive for office...In politics the relation between motive and drive is more obvious than in any other social endeavor. The paradox is that the simplicity of this relationship is so often slighted in political analysis. Of all those who perform for their fellow men, the politician leaves the clearest tracks between his purpose and his behavior.[27]

A researcher cannot empirically measure the presence of political ambitions in the minds of individuals. As previously noted, what a person says about his future goals and what he does may not always coincide, especially for public figures. These careers are enterprises that require a kind of flexibility if the person is to achieve his ambitions. As Everett Hughes puts it, "these ambitions themselves seem fluid, rather than fixed upon solid and neatly defined objectives."[28]

That intentions themselves cannot be empirically isolated should not be a reason to assume that ambitions do not exist. The subsequent behavior of politicians, whether they seek office, is an indicator of such ambitions. The researcher can infer from behavior whether politicians hold the desire to pursue a political career.

Whether ambitions are put into action depends on a number of factors. Background characteristics of office holders, i.e., occupation, education, age, race and sex, probably have an impact on who advances in politics. Schlesinger points out that situational factors in the politician's immediate environment have much to do with the fostering of ambitions. When another office is available and an individual has a reasonable chance of winning it, conditions are ripe for advancement.[29]

Ordinarily we would not expect a city councillor to seek a nomination for the office of governor or United States senator. The constituency he is serving is only a small segment of the district held by

statewide elected officials. Since his core of support is highly concentrated in the city or one area or it, the likelihood that he could win the nomination or election is low. Those who would argue that few municipal officials move directly to national offices are probably correct. City councillors are not in a political situation that is advantageous to winning such offices.

On the basis of this fact it should not be concluded that city councillors hold no further ambitions. Their ambitions are developed on the basis of their immediate political situation. Am ambitious city councillor is likely to seek another office within his own political milieu, the urban area, or attempt an office with a district that is primarily composed of his urban constituency. If it can be found that many individuals do indeed move to other elective positions, it is evidence that some city politicians do have aspirations, just as politicians at other levels do.

Schlesinger distinguishes three directions that ambitions may take: discrete, static and progressive. An office holder with discrete ambitions holds his present post for a single term and "then chooses to withdraw from public office."[30] Since the discrete politician does not seek any further elective offices, he may choose to ignore political pressures exerted by his constituency.

When an office holder has static ambitions, he "makes a long run career out of a particular office."[31] Since the static politician seeks reelection, he is more likely to pay attention to the preference of the electorate.

Finally an office holder may have progressive ambitions and therefore aspires "to attain an office more important than the one he now

seeks or is holding."[32] A progressive politician "is under tension not only from his current constituency, but also from that of the office to which he aspires."[33] To the extent that progressive and static ambitions are present, municipal office holders will tend to be more consistently accountable to the electorate. When many officials hold progressive ambitions and are able to satisfy those ambitions, a structure of political opportunities is discernible.

The structure of political opportunities

Schlesinger's extensive development of the structure of political opportunities for governors and congressmen provides a conceptual framework that can be applied to the career patterns of city councillors. This structure is defined by the entire pattern of movement from one office to other offices. It is the sum of the chances for other offices that are available to ambitious politicians in a given position of government.

The opportunity structure lying before city councillors may be very limited as Gittell suggests, or it may encompass a wide variety of office options. As Schlesinger notes,

> The structure may be clearly defined, as in a hereditary monarchy which limits chances and ambitions to the family tree. Or it may be difficult to discern structure: potential candidates emerge everywhere.[34]

The municipal structure of political opportunities is probably the most diffuse structure of all levels of American government. When an individual begins at the lowest rungs of politics, his career may move in many different directions. Nevertheless it would be imprudent to assume that no orderly movement occurs from council office. Even at

the lowest rungs of American government, some order may be discernible in career movement.

Factors affecting office movement

As city councillors move through their careers, a number of factors impinge upon their decisions to pursue another office. Those of a sociological orientation point to general social characteristics held in common by successful office holders. Higher occupational, educational and social levels are found among successful politicians.[35] These factors in addition to race and sex may serve as a screening device in the recruitment and advancement of city councillors.

Also related to the way individuals move from one office to another are the circumstances surrounding the office holder at the moment he makes a career decision. As Gordon Black suggests, the office holder may respond "primarily to the immediate forces in his political environment rather than to factors that occurred in the more distant past."[36] Political careers are based on decisions that must take into consideration what offices are available, electoral support and chances for winning that office.

This is not to imply that all politicians are calculating the best winning strategy at all points in their careers. Many office holders may give no thought to their future political careers. Nevertheless, some people are more successful than others in pursuing long political careers. By analyzing the circumstances surrounding the successful and unsuccessful, the long term and short term office holders, we can isolate situational factors that are relevant to consistent career movement.

This dissertation examines the careers of city councillors who served in office over a twenty year time period in six Michigan cities. Every individual who enters office brings with him different experiences and hopes for pursuing a political career. If we were to interview these councillors, we might find several variations in their expressed ambitions to pursue further office. This study will examine how these ambitions are translated into actual career behavior.

Classifying upward career moves

One of the perennial problems in classifying how politicians advance is determining what offices, if attained, constitute an upward career move. One criterion of upward movement is whether the subsequent office gives the politician relatively greater decision making authority than did his prior office. Prewitt and Nowlin's study of ambitious councillors indicates that they desire that their future office will give them greater responsibilities and prerogatives. This tendency is so strong that the majority of the ambitious favor expanding the authority of the desired office beyond its present scope.[37]

Offices with greater authority and responsibility than the council post also tend to confer greater prestige to their occupants. While many positions may constitute upward career moves for councillors, Schlesinger has identified the most obvious progressive offices lying before councillors and other aspiring officials within a state. They are U.S. senator, U.S. representative, governor and statewide elected officials.

Most of the time, these offices are not immediately attainable targets for councillors. Schlesinger's analysis indicates that few

councillors ascend directly to the governor's office. Of all governors in the United States who were elected from 1914 to 1958, only four percent had served in local elective office, municipal and county office, immediately prior to becoming governor.[38]

However, councillors may move to stepping-stone offices that give them a more feasible chance to run for governor. Of the same sample of governors, seven percent first held local office, then moved to another office position from which they were directly elected governor. The offices that most often served as stepping-stones to governor in their order of importance were statewide elective offices, law enforcement positions mainly at the county level, state legislator and administrators at all government levels. These stepping-stone offices may be likely office targets for ambitious councillors who cannot expect to immediately run for the governor's office.

Councillors may have ultimate ambitions to serve as a U.S. representative since it is one of the most important offices elected within the state. At present, the career pathway to the House of Representatives remains unexplored. Given that the office of representative has career status similar to that of governor, it is reasonable to assume that roughly the same types of stepping-stone offices are used to win either position.

Councillors may have ultimate ambitions to ascend to the U.S. Senate. While Schlesinger's analysis indicates that the aforementioned stepping-stone posts, with the office of governor added to the statewide category, are common routes to the Senate, the most often used penultimate office is that of U.S. representative.

For councillors the pathway to the Senate would most likely involve a complex sequence of offices from the stepping-stone post to representative and from representative to senator. Since this route includes a longer sequence of electoral risks of defeat than other important offices, it is logical to expect very few councillors to be successful in winning the senate office. From 1912 to 1958, only six percent of all senators began their careers in local office and held a subsequent stepping-stone position from which they were elected to the Senate.[39]

For the purposes of this study, councillors who advanced to stepping-stone offices or the highest elective offices in the state are considered to have made a progressive career move. Advancement to a more important office is only one of several career lines that councillors may pursue. In order to systematically examine the directions of all council careers, a classification scheme is introduced in the following section.

The career pathway classification

Schlesinger suggests that "when ambitious men are drawn into local offices, their expectations are diffuse."[40] Some councillors' ambitions may lead them to attempt higher office, while others may decide to remain in local office or drop out of politics altogether. The career pathway classification is designed to account for all the possible routes that councillors may take later in their career.

Several decisions had to be made concerning rules for classifying careers. The primary question is "what matters?" Should one consider only offices later held or both those held and those unsuccessfully

sought? Since our concern is with ambitions and the ability to succeed, it was decided to classify separately those who won and those who failed in attempts at later office. Only councillors who had publicly stated intentions and/or officially filed for candidacy were classified as actually having sought a post.

The following categories make up the career pathway classification. A councillor may decide to end his career in politics with only one term of council service. If a councillor stayed in office for only one term and neither sought reelection nor sought an alternative public office for at least eight years following his entry to the council, he was classified as having a discrete career. The discrete has the least involvement in a political career of all the categories.

At the opposite extreme is the progressive councillor who decides to ascend to a "more important" political office. A councillor who takes a higher elective office at sometime during the eight years following his entry to the council is classified as having a progressive career.

The offices that are defined as progressive moves for councillors are U.S. senator, U.S. representative, governor and other statewide elective offices. In addition, the stepping-stone posts to be identified in Chapter II that bring councillors to these offices are also considered progressive moves for councillors. Councillors who once qualified as having a progressive career retained that classification regardless of later electoral defeats or dismissals.

Given his relatively low position in the opportunity structure, a councillor may seek another office at the local level. A move by a councillor to the elective office of mayor, city treasure, city clerk,

local school board, county commissioner or another county position will be classified as lateral office behavior, though in some cases conditions of office security or salary may in fact be greater than for someone holding a council seat. Investigating such features is beyond the scope of this study, though their presence seems a rational inference. We will, however, classify the move as lateral because the political power exercised is not dissimilar to that of the council. A councillor who later assumed an appointive post at any government level is also considered here to have made a lateral move.

As will be shown in Chapter II, the common characteristic of these lateral positions is that they are non-progressive and, as such, do not serve as a stepping-stone for attainment of one of the highest positions in the state. Rather, a lateral career move places an (ex-)councillor in an office that confers no greater future political opportunities than did his council seat.

Following Schlesinger's terminology, we regard a councillor who chooses to remain in his current office by running in one or more incumbency races as a static. If either a lateral or a static sought a progressive office later in his career he is reclassified accordingly.

Stymied career types

This dissertation is concerned with discovering not only how often councillors are reelected or win another office, but also the occurrence of later defeats. Any given councillor is stymied in his ambitions whenever he runs for an office one or more times without success. With the exception of discretes who seek no further political offices,

councillors in the above categories who make further attempts may be blocked from achieving their goal.

A stymied static is defined as one who loses an incumbency election after one or more terms of council service. Should a stymied static seek another office at a later date, he is reclassified accordingly.

A lateral may find his career stymied if he loses an election for a county or another municipal office. Unless he is successful in a separate county or municipal office attempt at a later time, he is classified as a stymied lateral. If a stymied lateral went on to run for a higher office, he is reclassified as a progressive or stymied progressive according to the outcome of the election.

A councillor who seeks to win a higher office may also be stymied. If a councillor ran for a higher office, but was defeated, he is classified as a stymied progressive. If he later won an election for a higher office, he is reclassified as a progressive.

These decision rules are intended to rank councillors according to the highest career pathway they seek in their later career. That is, a progressive attempt takes precedence over other (lateral or static) office attempts and victories. Likewise, a lateral attempt takes precedence over any static career behavior by councillors.

Contemporary political careers are difficult to classify. Unless a person has died, it is impossible to know if he will change his career plans in the future. The obvious means of avoiding this problem is to examine only careers that ended decades ago.

If one wishes to study the recent career behavior of politicians, some decision rules that maximize validity must be established. It was

decided that councillors who served in council office from 1946 to 1966 would be classified by the career pathway typology. Since the political behavior of councillors was traced up to 1974, there is a minimum of an eight year time span for which later office is recorded. The 1966 entrants to the city council pose the most serious problem for classification. Some still may have been serving in the council in 1974. In Lansing and Detroit, where the term of office is four years, entrants may have been completing only their second term in 1974. For this reason, it was decided to classify councillors who entered office in these cities only through 1962.

III. The Hypotheses to be Tested

The initial task of this study is to discover what types of office goals councillors actually pursue and attain. Our guiding assumption will be that few councillors will be successful in advancing to markedly higher offices. In Chapter II the sample of councillors will be classified by the career pathway typology. If a significant number of office seekers are uncovered, there exists a structure of political opportunity. The shape of this structure is defined by the types of later offices that councillors attain.

Ambition theory provides clues as to what kinds of offices councillors might take. Schlesinger states that the politician tends to seek offices that are reasonably attainable given his present political career position. Since council is one of the few nonpartisan elective offices in Michigan and since it has poor linkages with political party organization, it is a relatively weak position from which to jump to the highest offices in the state, i.e., governor, U.S. representative

and U.S. senator. This in no way implies that progressive careers are not possible from council office. It does suggest that the immediate career goals and achievements of progressive councillors will most often be offices at the moderate levels of the career ladder, rather than the highest posts.

Prewitt found evidence for this position in the statements of San Francisco Bay area councillors. While over half of the councillors having political ambitions intended seeking local, county or judicial offices, only 18% hoped to run for state legislative office and only 11% expected to run for congressional office.[41]

The most obvious career step for councillors is to another office within their municipality. As Schlesinger states, "when two offices have the same or similar electorates, it is logical to expect movement from one to the other."[42] Office seeking councillors are expected to most frequently take this career route.

A number of other offices in the structure of political opportunities lie somewhere between municipal positions and the highest state offices. The network of county offices and state legislative posts probably compose the middle range of the opportunity structure.

The scope of their responsibilities is for the most part broader than that of municipal posts, yet narrower than that of a governor or a congressman. Since many of these "middle" offices are partisan posts, they are more likely stepping-stones than is council to the highest offices in the state. Next to other municipal posts, county and legislative offices are probably the most often sought positions by ambitious councillors.

It is expected that the status of an office has much to do with the frequency of attempts made by councillors to attain that office. The success councillors have in winning these offices is also likely to depend upon the office's relative status in the opportunity structure. From this argument can be stated the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis I:

The higher an office is in the structure of political opportunities, the less likely that councillors will make attempts to attain that office.

Hypothesis II:

The higher an office is in the structure of political opportunities, the less likely that ambitious councillors will be successful in attempts to attain that office.

Background characteristics and political career advancement

The remainder of this dissertation will examine factors that may influence the ambitions and subsequent careers of councillors. The social and individual backgrounds of politicians have been the most widely acknowledged determinants of who is recruited to political office. Donald Matthews states, "regardless of democratic institutions and values, political decision-makers tend to be chosen from those ranking high in America's system of stratification."[43]

In studying council recruitment, Prewitt describes what he calls a "social bias in leadership selection" that brings to office those with status characteristics higher than the population as a whole.[44] Since background characteristics are known to affect recruitment to city councils, it is reasonable to expect that they have a bearing on councillors' expectations and chances to attain a later office.

This influence operates in internal and external ways. First a councillor who ranks high in status characteristics may make a self (internal) judgement that his chances for another office are better than contenders of lesser status. Likewise a councillor ranking lower in status probably lowers his estimate of the chances of winning another office. If this process occurs, a councillor's status will have an effect upon whether he decides to seek a further office.

External influences come into play when a councillor decides to run for another office, regardless of his status ranking. The electorate then has the opportunity to discount or weight the importance of any given status characteristic in making a voting decision.[45] If any given status characteristic has an external influence, a candidate ranking higher will be more likely to meet with success at the polls.

In order to test for the effects of both the internal and external influences of individual characteristics upon councillors, two types of hypotheses will be introduced in the following sessions: those which predict that higher status councillors will more often seek another office and those which predict that, among the ambitious, higher status councillors are more likely to be successful when they make a later office attempt.

Councillors' occupation and political career advancement

Of all the criteria by which individuals are ranked in American society, the occupation of an individual is probably the most widely recognized.[46] Prewitt found that those from upper status occupational groups were the most likely to be recruited to council office. A similar pattern is found in the higher office levels of American

politics. This suggests that occupational background affects councillors' ambitions and actual career movement. The following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis III:

The higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis IV:

The higher the occupational status of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

Of all occupational types, lawyers have been found to be especially prevalent in public life. Heinz Eulau and John Sprague state, "lawyers are clearly a distinct occupational group that is more visible, more ubiquitous, more prominent and even more dominant in American political life than any other."[47] The advantaged position of lawyers in entering politics has been attributed to their social status, the skills that they cultivate by the nature of their profession and their continual interaction with public officials.[48]

One might expect that with these advantages, councillors who are lawyers will have a greater propensity to seek and win later elective office than will other occupational types. The following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis V:

Councillors who are lawyers will be more likely than other occupational types to make further office attempts.

Hypothesis VI:

Ambitious councillors who are lawyers are more likely than office seekers of other occupational types to be successful in further office attempts.

Councillors' educational background and career advancement

It has become increasingly evident in the United States that a second criterion by which individuals are ranked in status is education. Virtually all studies of council, legislative, congressional and presidential office holders indicate that those recruited to office have completed higher levels of education than the total population. We expect that educational background is associated with the ambitions and career advancement of councillors.

Hypothesis VII:

The higher the educational level of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis VIII:

The higher the educational level of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

Age as a factor affecting later office seeking behavior

Although age is not widely recognized as a status norm of society, it may influence the career attitudes of councillors and the public in making voting choices. Schlesinger has pointed out that the aging politician probably adjusts his ambitions toward more modest office goals than does his younger counterpart.

In a study of legislators from four states, John Wahlke et al. found that age is related to expressed political ambitions.[49] Younger legislators more frequently have the desire to seek a further elective office than do older legislators. In a follow-up analysis of the same sample, Paul Hain found that younger legislators are more likely to attain another office. The following relationships between age and later career behavior are expected to be found among city councillors:

Hypothesis IX:

The greater the age of councillors, the less likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis X:

The greater the age of ambitious councillors, the less likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

Race and sex as factors affecting advancement

The factors of race and sex have had such a profound influence upon the chances for entry into politics that few blacks or women have served in council office. Of the San Francisco Bay area councillors studied by Prewitt, none were black and only five percent were women.[50] Feld and Lutz report that only five percent of Houston councillors were black, all entering office after 1970.[51]

Both groupings have had severely limited access to offices in the higher levels of politics. E. E. Werner found that between 1917 and 1964 only seventy women had served in the U.S. Congress. Of those, about one-half had relatives in Congress and over one-half were either elected or appointed to fill a vacancy, often one caused by the death of a husband.[52] State legislatures have shown similar, though less marked patterns of recruitment. In 1963-64, for example, only 4.5% of the state legislators in the country were women, compared to two percent of the members of Congress.

The literature indicates that blacks have also had limited access to higher office. From 1869 to 1950 only fifty-four blacks had served in Congress. In recent years, the representation of blacks in Congress has increased only slightly. While in 1950 only two blacks served in Congress, their numbers had increased to twelve, roughly three percent,

by 1972. State legislative office has been a less often realized career goal for blacks than it has been for women. In 1957 only one percent of the legislators from California, Ohio, and New Jersey were black. In Tennessee, where the black population was 16% in 1957, there were no black legislators.[53]

Since other office levels have been largely inaccessible to blacks and women, the following hypotheses are suggested:

Hypothesis XI:

Black councillors will be less likely than others to make further office attempts

Hypothesis XII:

Ambitious black councillors will be less likely than other office seekers to be successful in further office attempts.

Hypothesis XIII:

Councilwomen will be less likely than councilmen to make further office attempts.

Hypothesis XIV:

Ambitious councilwomen will be less likely than ambitious councilmen to be successful in further office attempts.

Apart from the overall tendency for both groups to be excluded from political careers, it is expected that blacks and women differ in the frequency with which they seek further office. The literature suggests that in recent years blacks tend to have had a relatively greater advantage than women in running for elective office. Ernest Patterson points out that an increasing number of congressional, legislative and municipal districts are composed of black majorities or near majorities.[54] In 1971 all ten of the districts that were over 50% black elected black congressmen.

While black candidates can increasingly count on the votes of the black community, women find little unified support along sex lines. Women are elected to office, not as representatives of a common interest grouping, but from support across a number of groupings in their district. Since these groupings are united on an ad hoc basis, women lack the "natural" constituency that is usually found supporting black candidates.

The greater difficulties women face in organizing a winning coalition probably lowers their expectations for attaining an elective office, even when they already hold a political post. In a study of female party leaders, Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik conclude that women leaders' ambition is constrained by their limited opportunities to attain public office. Female party officials tend "to discount public office as a career objective...and to channel their efforts into other, non-political areas of endeavor."[55]

The literature suggests that women continue to have lowered expectations in regard to a political career, while blacks are finding more and more support among black constituencies. If this is the case, we should find that councilwomen in Michigan cities are less likely than black councillors to seek and attain another elective office.

Research on political recruitment especially at the local level generally emphasizes the importance of background characteristics. Yet almost all studies indicate that some lower status individuals enter council office although at a lower rate than upper status people. These unpredicted cases suggest that factors other than background exert an influence upon political ambitions and career behavior.

Gordon Black has pointed out that office holders tend to set their ambitions according to the immediate circumstances of their political environment, rather than according to factors that occurred in the more distant past:

> Background factors are obviously important, but it remains to be seen whether their cumulative effect on a politician is very great. Such factors are probably outweighed by more immediate concerns, particularly those concerns that are related to the choices that are available at the time a potential candidate must make his decision.[56]

Structural factors affecting advancement

The specific circumstances surrounding a council election require some candidates to make greater expenditure in campaign efforts than others. Those candidates who spend more resources, i.e., time, effort and capital, can be viewed as incurring greater costs in order to attain a given office. A number of considerations affect the costliness of a campaign, such as the reputation and demeanor of the candidates.

While the effects of individual attributes are probably randomly distributed across the universe of councillors, structural factors of the political system have a systematic impact upon campaign costs. Black demonstrates that the costs are markedly higher for council candidates campaigning in large cities and/or in competitive districts. Highly contested races require a substantial allocation of resources on the part of the winner, as do races in larger cities where greater absolute numbers of the voting populus must be reached.

Another factor affecting the costs of an election for a given candidate is whether his opponent is an incumbent. Particularly in nonpartisan cities, as are found in this dissertation sample, it is

difficult for a political newcomer, as are most council candidates, to defeat an incumbent. As Charles Adrian points out, the familiarity of the incumbent's name in the absence of party labels gives him an advantage in securing votes.[57] In order to be successful, a challenger to an incumbent would have to make several earlier attempts at office, as Adrian suggests, or wage a highly animated campaign against the incumbent. Regardless of electioneering tactics, it is obvious that opponents of incumbents must incur greater costs in order to be elected to office.

Black argues that campaigns that tend to be more costly are clearly recognizable by candidates either prior to or during the election:

> [Since these costs] represent resource allocations that could be spent in other ways,...the choice to spend them in office seeking is a choice not to spend resources on other alternatives. For this reason they are an important component of the utility calculus of a potential office holder when he faces the choice of whether he should seek some political office.[58]

Black then presents a strong argument that under conditions requiring greater costs for election, individuals who decide to become candidates do so under increased risks that they will be defeated. When costs and risks are higher, Black argues that the individuals less committed to office holding decide not to run. Those who do run and win office under costly conditions will tend to be those who most highly value holding the council office. Black found that the councillors' level of desire for his office is positively related to city size and the degree of competition in his election.

The relationship between a candidate's commitment to winning the office and cost factors is circular in that those most desirous of an

office may be more often found running in competitive races, since the less committed have already withdrawn, or competitive races themselves may foster greater desires. Regardless of which process operates, those candidates who win costly races are assumed to have a heightened commitment to the office holding experience.

Black found that their commitment to politics extended beyond their desire to hold the council office. Councillors elected in large cities and/or in highly contested races more often reported a desire to run for another office in the future than did their opposites.

Black's central thesis is that structural characteristics of a polity determine, in part, the level of commitment of office holders to a political career. Under certain conditions structural characteristics serve as a screening device to selectively recruit and advance the most politically committed individuals. Black's enquiry relied upon the stated intentions of councillors to seek another office. Since this dissertation study measures the actual career movement of councillors under varying conditions, we shall test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XV:

Councillors from large cities will be more likely to make further office attempts than those from smaller cities.

Hypothesis XVI:

Councillors from large cities will be more likely to win further office than those from smaller cities.

Hypothesis XVII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who were elected by wide margins.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to win further office than those who were elected by wide margins.

Another indicator of the earlier investment of councillors is whether, at anytime in their career, they entered and won a council election against an incumbent. Since those who outran an incumbent probably had to invest a substantial amount of resources in campaigning, they may be more likely than others to have a long range commitment to a political career. If incumbency elections are indicative of the investment level of political commitment of councillors, we shall find support in the data for the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XIX:

Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who did not.

Hypothesis XX:

Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to win further office than those who did not.

The structure of political opportunities

While Black emphasizes the importance of the earlier investments of public leaders, Schlesinger focuses upon the objective chances for advancement lying before elected officials:

> In developing an ambition theory of politics we can bring order to the office ambitions of politicians only if we can find order in their chances or opportunities for office. It is therefore necessary to discover...the structure of political opportunities.[59]

This structure is defined by the turnover of elected officials at various office levels. The opportunities for councillors to seek and attain further office are maximized when other municipal, county,

legislative and state officials frequently vacate their offices. In this situation councillors face a sizeable opportunity structure. When the turnover of office holders at other (presumably higher) office levels is lower, councillors have fewer chances to advance.

We shall construct an empirical measure of the opportunity structure lying before councillors of different cities in order to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XXI:

> The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis XXII:

> The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further office.

The logic of electorates

In discussing the "logic of electorate" Schlesinger focuses upon the way in which elected officials will be advantaged or disadvantaged in their later careers by the nature of their current electorate.[60] Here we are concerned with how structural characteristics of the council district act upon councillors' political ambitions.

Council districts that are congruent with, totally surround and greatly overlap with the districts for many other elective offices offer substantial opportunities for advancement to their occupants. On the other hand, councillors representing districts that are electorally linked with a lesser number of other office districts face fewer chances for political promotion.

By constructing an index of electoral advantage that is indicative of the overlay between council and other office districts, we can test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XXIII:

The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis XXIV:

The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further office.

Many of the relationships that we have predicted in the above hypotheses may be interrelated. For example, looking back to the individual variables that we shall test, the educational achievement and occupational levels of councillors may be strongly associated. Among the structural measures described in the preceding sections, city size may be correlated with the closeness of council elections and other structural variables. Whenever it is appropriate, control variables will be introduced into the data.

The data base

This study examines 234 mayors and city councillors who served in the six largest cities of Michigan from 1946 to 1966. The career data collected include the group memberships and political party and public offices held by these individuals before and after council service. Municipal election statistics were retrieved from city clerk's records in each of the sample cities, while most of the office holding and individual information was taken from the files of local newspapers.

In all of the sample cities the newspapers maintained individual files that include newspaper clippings regarding the later office

holding activities of mayors and city councillors. In many cases the newspaper library had available a backlog of questionnaires answered by municipal officials themselves. For a few members of the sample, additional biographical information was drawn from the Michigan Manual or personal interviews.

The municipal officials included in the sample served in the following cities: Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek. These cities were selected because they have undergone changes common to many American central cities since the mid 1940's. Each city has experienced urban sprawl, population growth in the surrounding fringe areas and relative losses of population in the center.

For example, Grand Rapids, like the other sample cities, "has had an explosion of residential developments and shopping centers, some located far outside the central city boundaries."[61]

Each of the sample cities has attempted to retain its center as the commercial and business hub of the area. Municipal officials from all six cities have attempted local and federally funded projects to upgrade the downtown area.

Except for Battle Creek, all cities were Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, with a population of over 50,000 for at least part of the time during the period of analysis and each city conformed to the definition of an SMSA by maintaining a work force of which at least 15% commute to the city.

Central cities were selected for two reasons. First, ambitious municipal officials, if they exist, are more likely to be found in central cities. Second, it was expected that councillors in central cities would be more likely to have variations across background

characteristics that are hypothesized to be related political ambitions and advancement.

IV. Development of the Examination

Chapter II will be concerned with describing the later political careers of mayors and city councillors. In an effort to uncover the shape of the municipal structure of political opportunites, we will describe the specific types of offices later attained by councillors. Hypotheses I and II predicting patterns of attempted and actual career movement will be tested.

Chapter III is concerned with testing for the effects of various background characteristics upon the office attempts and victories of councillors. Hypotheses III through XIV regarding occupation, education, age, race and sex will be tested.

The objective of Chapter IV is to explore the impact of structural characteristics upon the later career behavior of councillors. Measures of both the political investments of councillors and their career opportunities will be introduced.

Chapter V is concerned with a general evaluation of the extent to which mayors and councillors in the sample cities seek and attain later elective office. The implications of these findings pertaining to accountable municipal leadership will be discussed. In addition, this chapter will summarize the factors found to be associated with office advancement.

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CHAPTER II

THE LATER POLITICAL CAREERS OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

This chapter traces the earlier and later political careers of the individuals who held city council and mayoral office in Michigan from 1946 to 1966.[1] In Section I we will explore the extent to which these officials had experience in government, political parties and voluntary organizations prior to their entry into municipal office. This section is retrospective in the sense that it describes the setting in which these individuals made the decision to enter municipal office. It is intended to give the reader an overall perspective for viewing their later political careers.

Our perspective on the later careers of councillors and mayors is twofold in that we are concerned with both the willingness of municipal officials to seek other office and their ability to get elected to a subsequent post. As Everett Hughes states,

> A career is, in fact, a sort of running adjustment between a man and the various facts of life and his professional world. It involves the running of risks...It contains a set of predictions about the course of events [in his professional world.][2]

An investigation of political careers should take into account, not only the choices of politicians to seek another office, but also the judgement of recruiters, i.e., partisan officials and the electorate. The frequency with which office seekers are found is a measure of the extent to which political ambitions are actualized among

municipal leaders. The percentage of municipal officials who actually attain another office is indicative of their objective opportunities to "advance" their political career.

Section II will describe the frequency of later office attempts and victories among the total sample of municipal officials. Section III is concerned with how the later political aspirations of municipal officials are related to the length of their tenure in city office. In Section IV we will explore the differences in the tenure and political career advancement of mayors and city councillors.

In Section V, the types of offices pursued and attained by the ambitious will be examined in an effort to describe the opportunity structure open to city councillors. Consistent lines of office movement found in the data are indicators of the career horizons that these officials typically attain. Hypotheses I and II concerned with the trend of career movement to higher office levels by councillors will be tested in this section.

I. Municipal Officials: Their Prior Experiences in Government Political Party and Voluntary Organizations

For the most part the individuals who enter mayoral and council office in the Michigan cities have had no previous experience in government. Over 80% of the total sample had rendered no service in government prior to their election to city office.

Two patterns emerged in the data among those 18% who had previosly held government posts. A minority of these, thirteen, had held full time posts at the municipal, county or state level. An ex-governor of Michigan, William Comstock, entered the Detroit Common Council at the age of sixty-eight. The remainder of those who had

previously held full time posts had served at the local level, i.e., as school board superintendent, assistant county prosecutor, sheriff and city and county department heads.

However, the majority of those with prior government experience had served on part time local boards, such as hospital, park, welfare and health boards, and commissions, such as charter and city beautification commissions. In some ways, these boards and commissions are outside the mainstream of politics in the city. With few exceptions, they are appointive posts and are therefore not a training ground for future campaign efforts.[3] The individuals who had served in these posts worked almost totally out of the view of the public. The local newspapers published few or no accounts of the workings of these boards and commissions.

To an even greater extent, city officials lacked any overt involvement with a political party prior to entering office. Only eight, approximately three percent of the 234 city officials had officially worked in a party organization or served as a delegate to a party convention. Prior to their entry into municipal office, none had a record of service at national party levels.

The partisan affiliation of those in the sample appears to be a factor that is seldom mentioned during campaigns for city office. Conspicuously absent from newspaper biographies of municipal candidates is information about their partisan preferences. This may be partly because nonpartisan ballots are used. At least for the cities of Detroit, Jackson and Battle Creek there is evidence that political parties do not normally play an active role in city elections.[4] If

Michigan city officials shared common experiences prior to entering office, it was outside political party circles.

Membership in voluntary organizations

Most of these individuals entered municipal office with a record of service in voluntary organizations of the city. While virtually every official for which information was available had a membership in at least one organization, roughly three-fourths belonged to three or more groups. See Table 1.

The data on group memberships were drawn primarily from newspaper accounts published just prior to the city election. For the most part, the candidates volunteered this information to the newspapers. Given these circumstances, one would expect that some marginal memberships would have been listed by the candidates.

For this reason, these data are probably not a valid indicator of the actual extent of group participation by these individuals. It is worth noting, however, that 31% of those belonging to voluntary organizations were founders, officers or committee chairmen at sometime prior to their election to municipal office. This suggests that at least some of the people who become municipal leaders had more than a token involvement in groups of the city.

The kinds of groups to which municipal officials belonged encompassed a broad range of interests. In order to present the data in a systematic way, a classification of predominant group membership was constructed.

Individuals in the sample are classified according to the major kind of group affiliations they had prior to entering municipal office.

The categories are civic, business, veteran, labor union, professional, government improvement, religious, ethnic and political party groups.[5] These categories were devised on the basis of the kinds of group memberships found in the sample and are not intended to be exhaustive, except for the sample under study.

City officials with one group membership were easily classified. The bulk of city officials with two or more memberships were classified according to the following rules:

1. If a majority or plurality of group memberships fell into one category, the official was classified accordingly.
2. If the official had an equal number of group memberships in two or more categories, he was classified in the appropriate category on the basis of leadership position(s) he had held.
3. If he had an equal number of group memberships in two or more categories and held no leadership position(s), he was excluded from the classification.

These rules are not intended to reflect the frequency of group membership in the data which has already been analyzed. Rather they are intended to give the reader an overall view of the predominant kinds of group affiliations that officials had prior to their entry into municipal office.

Well over one-half of the 193 officials who were classifiable, 58%, were primarily involved in civic and charity organizations, such as the Lions Club, Scout clubs, Red Cross, Community Chest and Old Newsboys clubs.[6] Almost 14% were mainly affiliated with business groups that included the Chamber of Commerce, construction councils, real estate associations and various other specialized business

organizations. Between six and eight percent were found in the sample who belonged to veterans clubs, labor unions or professional clubs. Only a few individuals, four percent or less, fell into each of the other categories. See Table 2.

If the group membership of these individuals reflects their interests, it is apparent that the majority are involved in civic affairs and, to a lesser extent, in activities related to their occupations. The extent to which these organizations take part in municipal campaigns varies.

Although no direct evidence is available, it appears that civic groups found in the data are for the most part apolitical. Their members do not appear to recruit individuals to run for municipal office and are usually inert during political campaigns. While they may intervene into politics for a specific policy end, civic group members are primarily concerned with activities that are outside the political arena.

Those affiliated with labor unions and business groups make some efforts to influence the recruitment and election of municipal candidates. Union members in Flint occasionally endorse and campaign for city candidates, although they almost never intervened in Jackson primaries and elections.[7] In Detroit union members are more active in recruiting and working for candidates. In all three cities, the unions often suffer defeats in attempts to get their candidates elected.[8] This is evident in the small proportion, less than one-tenth, of municipal officials with union membership or with a distinct pro-labor stance found in the sample.

In all six cities, members of business groups make attempts to recruit municipal candidates although not usually on a regular basis. Occasionally they attempt to recruit businessmen as municipal candidates in Jackson and to a lesser extent in Battle Creek, but often find it difficult to convince businessmen to run for office.[9] The Citizens' League of Detroit composed of businessmen and professionals screens candidates and makes public endorsements on a fairly regular basis. However, its influence on the electorate is limited to well-to-do neighborhoods.[10] In the other cities, business groups endorse candidates from time to time but do not actively campaign in their behalf.

While information in the literature is scarce about the political role of other organizations, this writer found little evidence of municipal campaign efforts by veteran, religious, ethnic and professional associations.[11] While municipal candidates make speaking appearances before these groups, these organizations do not publicly endorse candidates.

For the most part, voluntary organizations in the sample cities do not appear to serve as institutions of municipal recruitment on a regular basis. Of all the cities, Detroit has the most structured channels of recruitment with labor unions and the Citizens' League sometimes seeking and usually endorsing candidates for mayoral and council office. However, the efforts of these groups in no way amount to a monopoly over recruitment. In the other cities, voluntary organizations solicit candidates from time to time, but are often unsuccessful in winning elections. In the long run these defeats have probably served to stifle the attempts of such groups to recruit municipal candidates.

It should be noted that most successful candidates for municipal office, even in Detroit, have a background in civic groups that rarely intervene in the municipal electoral process. It appears that a substantial number of individuals who decide to run for municipal office do so on the basis of their own initiative. If anything, their organizational involvement may be indicative of a general interest in civic and community affairs. It is not surprising that many self starters are found among Michigan city officials, since a similar pattern has been found in other cities and at other levels of elective office.[12]

Entering municipal office

Most of those who enter mayoral and council office do so via the election process. Of the entire sample, less than ten, five percent, were appointed to fill vacancies. In most of the municipalities during the time period under study, the city charter specified that openings for an office be filled by a special or regular election. This percentage of appointments to municipal office is substantially lower than that discovered by Prewitt. In the San Francisco Bay area, 24% of the councillors initially entered office by having been appointed.[13] At least in the Michigan cities under study, the citizens almost always have the option to take part in the recruitment process through elections.

Overall a substantial majority of municipal officials enter office lacking the kind of political experience that is normally associated with professional office holders. Most appear to be what Prewitt calls "citizen-politicians," people with an interest in politics, but with little expertise in practical matters.[14]

Upon entering office, many may have discovered that they had much to learn about the ordinary tasks of governing. As in other fields, the newcomers to mayoral and council office probably learn from those around them with greater experience. Such was the case for Councillor Fred Kircher, a novice to politics who relied upon the long tenured city attorney for advice on council affairs. After several terms of council service, Mr. Kircher stated, "Joe Lavery [city attorney] is a unique man who was the balance wheel of the city council. I learned more from him about practical city government than any other person."[15]

On the other hand, there is a developmental aspect to these data. Somehow these individuals decided to make the leap from private life to public office holding. The fact that they did so meant that they were willing to take on a whole new set of experiences and responsibilities.

The act of municipal office holding may have altered their attitudes about their abilities and opportunities to further serve in public office. While some may have found the experience frustrating, others may have found enough personal satisfaction in office holding to merit future endeavors in politics.

Perhaps the statement of Willard Bowerman whose political career began in the Lansing city council is revealing: "once you get into politics, it sort of gets into your blood. Who knows, I may be back someday running for something else."[16] A year later Mr. Bowerman ran successfully for the office of mayor. As will be seen in Section II, many other municipal officials went on to seek another elective office at the city and other levels.

II. Municipal Officials: Their Later Political Careers

"When ambitious men are drawn into local office," Schlesinger states, "their expectations are diffuse."[17] Such is the case with city officials included in the sample of this study as career options included elective and appointive office at local, county, state and congressional levels. In order to define, for purposes of this study, that behavior constitutes an attempt at a later office, several decision rules have been specified.

1. Mayors and councillors who sought an office, whether elective or appointive, are designated as having made a later office attempt. (In terms of seeking an appointive position, the data are limited primarily to those who were successful in that the seeking of an appointive post is frequently not public information. In contrast, seeking an elective position is a matter of public record.)
2. Whenever officials sought an elective and held an appointive office in their later career, the elective post takes precedence, regardless of the outcome of the election. This rule is based on the assumption that seeking elective office requires greater effort and opportunity costs than is the case when seeking an appointive post.
3. Posts that are held concurrently with the council and mayoral office are disqualified as later office attempts. Until 1967, city councils were empowered by law to designate one or more of their members to serve on the County Board of Supervisors, now called Commissioners. Chosen by a majority vote, some councillor-commissioners retained the county office for the

duration of their council term. Since this office was not sought independently by the councillor and did not constitute a separate office holding experience, it is disregarded as a later office attempt.

4. Councillors, who after their council term expired, sought public election to the county board are classified as having made a later office attempt.

Let us first examine the frequency with which municipal officials seek another elective office.

Later office attempts and victories by municipal officials

Of the total sample of 234 mayors and city councillors, 38% later sought another elective post, usually immediately after city service. The data indicate a higher frequency of office attempts than one would expect given most of the published literature on city officials. Gittell and Lowi emphasize the lack of ambition of municipal leaders to seek "higher" office, meaning state of national elective office.

Since the data presented here include attempts by city officials at municipal, county and higher levels, the percentage of office seekers in the sample is substantial. The broader definition used in this study is based on the assumption that any independent attempt at another office, however modest its stature, is an indicator of the presence of political ambitions.

One need not become a governor, congressman or president in order to achieve a career in political life.[18] In fact the majority of elective attempts by municipal officials, 63%, are for offices at the local level. See Table 3.

Thirty percent of all the aspirants ran for municipal posts. These individuals were primarily councillors who later sought the mayoral office. Around one-third of the office seekers made attempts at county elective posts, i.e., county commissioner, treasurer and drain commissioner. The remaining 37% sought legislative, and to a lesser extent, congressional and statewide elective posts.

When municipal officials do become political aspirants, it is apparent that they are most likely to pursue office goals at the local levels of elective government. This suggests that they themselves tend to view their political opportunities as confined to offices in the lower reaches of politics.

Of the total sample 24% actually went on to another elective office. As might be expected, municipal officials are most likely to fan out into the network of local elective offices. Seventy-nine percent of those who won a later office assumed a municipal or county post, while 21% attained a legislative or higher position. As will be seen in the following section, very few municipal officials ascended to the highest offices in the state.

Movement from municipal office to statewide and congressional office

Of the entire sample of office seekers, thirteen went on to run for a statewide or congressional office later in their careers. Only three were successful.

One of three municipal officials who ran in the general election for lieutenant governor was elected, as was one of six councillors who contended for congressional office. Only one municipal official, a councillor from Detroit, ran for, and was elected to the state Supreme

Court. Of the four councillors who contended for the posts of governor, appeals judge and attorney general, none were successful.

Of the thirteen highest office seekers, most had served a number of years in municipal office before making an attempt at a later office. See Table 4. During their tenure in municipal office, none had been defeated in an incumbency election.

Six of the thirteen highest office seekers sought or held at least one later office before attempting a state or congressional office. Four of the six held county elective office, as prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, judge or commissioner immediately prior to running for a higher office.

Almost one-half of the highest office seekers were from Detroit. All three of those who actually won the progressive offices of congressman, Supreme Court judge and lieutenant governor had previously served as common councillors in Detroit.[19]

Needless to say, conclusions cannot be drawn from a sub-sample of this size. Nevertheless, the predominance of Detroit officials among the office seekers and winners suggests that political conditions in Detroit are somehow more conducive to upward career movement.

Although the following explanation is somewhat speculative, the sheer population size of Detroit, relative to the other sample cities, may have altered the everyday conduct of political affairs there in ways that open career opportunities. First, the presence of a large population in Detroit has expanded the functions of city government and indirectly enhanced the stature of city office. Since city councillors are elected at-large, their constituency is even greater than that of a congressman. Unlike councillors and some mayors in the other sample

cities, those in Detroit have their own offices, a secretarial staff and are paid on a full time basis. Common councillors are expected to and generally do spend substantial time in fulfilling their office obligations. According to Ernest Patterson:

> Detroit Common Councillors serve full time and come to learn enough about the city's business to be taken seriously. They must be viewed as having more weight than the councilmen of most other American cities.[20]

During the time period under study, Detroit was from 17% to 31% of the state population. See Table 5. Detroit residents make up a larger proportion of the voting population in state elections than is found in any other city in Michigan. From time to time, local party organization in Detroit has dominated the candidate selection process at the state level.[21] Even when local party machinery is not powerful at the state level, politicians who are well known in Detroit have an advantage in state campaigns. With the backing of the Detroit electorate, they begin a campaign with relatively greater chances for success than other local leaders.

In addition, Detroit officials have a greater exposure to the public in the news media. Since Detroit is the newspaper and broadcast capital of the state, city officials encounter more frequent and extensive coverage than do most other local leaders. The greater visibility and credibility attained by Detroit officials may be assets when seeking support from the public to run for higher office. Party officials, as well, may tend to view them as more favorable candidates for higher office than most other city officials.

It should be noted that ambitious Detroit officials, while they may be advantaged over other city leaders, compete for party

endorsement with a myriad of aspirants in other government levels and circumstances. The argument being made here is not that Detroit leaders have an absolute advantage in statewide competition, but that they have relatively greater chances for advancement than do their colleagues at the same office levels in other Michigan cities. As will be seen in the following section, the structure and function of party organization in the six cities under study creates conditions that further enhance the political opportunities of Detroit leaders.

Political party organization and career advancement

Detroit and the other sample cities conduct city elections via the nonpartisan ballot. The effects of this ballot form upon political party activity have been a perennial research topic for political scientists.[22] A general conclusion found in the current literature is "non-partisanship serves to weaken the political parties in those areas where it is in effect."[23]

The available research indicates that political parties in the sample cities participate only marginally in city election campaigns. Based on observations of elections in Detroit over a period of years, Adrian states:

> Slates of candidates are supported by various interest groups but political party organizations have little or no part in campaigns, or are active only sporadically.[24]

When they do participate, parties encounter competition with ad hoc and community groups that more regularly intervene in campaigns. A similar pattern was found for elections in the city of Flint.[25]

While the campaign function is rarely performed by local parties, it should not be assumed that parties have no ties with city elected

officials. Nor should it be assumed that parties disregard all city leaders as potential candidates for higher office. The pattern of party organization in the state suggests that, while most city officials tend to be isolated from recruitment by local party leaders, this is not always the case in Detroit. Before detailing this argument, some explanation of the candidate recruitment process of the parties is necessary.

In Michigan, local party units are organized to participate in state conventions for the selection of some candidates for statewide office. In addition, leaders of local units may attempt to mobilize support within the party in behalf of primary candidates for other statewide offices.

It is in the interest of local party leaders to recruit and support a statewide candidate from their own district. As specified by law, the size of the local unit's delegation at the state convention depends upon the total vote cast by the district's electorate for the party's candidate for Secretary of State.[26] This mechanism is designed to reward districts where there is great party strength among the voters. Since the district vote would tend to increase when a local name appears on the ballot for statewide office, there is an incentive for local party leaders to recruit and support home based candidates.

While this factor works in favor of Detroit city officials, it probably works against aspiring mayors and councillors from smaller cities. The reason for this tendency is the method of organizing local districts in and around urban areas.

According to Kenneth VerBurg, local party districts and conventions are organized either along congressional district boundaries or along county lines:

> As a general rule, [conventions] are held on a county basis when a congressional district encompasses several counties and on a congressional district basis when these are smaller than a county. For example, in Wayne County, which consists of several congressional districts, party organization is structured almost entirely on the basis of districts rather than by the county.[27]

This method of party organization places Detroit officials in close physical proximity to local party leaders. As the largest city in Michigan, the boundaries of Detroit totally encompass two congressional districts. Detroit residents compose the majority of voters in two additional congressional districts. Local party headquarters are located within the city's boundaries and, more importantly, party leaders serve a totally urban clientele. Given the urban nature of their constituency, party leaders in the Detroit area are probably more likely to maintain a dialogue with city officials.

There is evidence that party leaders have made attempts to recruit Detroit officials to run for statewide office. Edward Jeffries, who served as mayor and councillor of Detroit for ten years, "was woed by both parties as a gubernatorial candidate."[28] Adrian further reports that several other Detroit mayors have had "loose party connections." Sarasohn and Sarasohn found a close alliance between Common Councillor George Edwards and democratic congressional district leaders.[29] After serving five terms on the council, Edwards became the democratic district chairman in 1950. He was ultimately elected to the state supreme court bench.

All three of the Detroit councillors in this sample who won high office had established partisan ties either before or during their tenure in city office. The Detroit News gives accounts of attendance at republican fund raising events by Councillor James Brickley who later won the posts of county prosecutor and lieutenant governor.

The pattern of party organization described by VerBurg is much less conducive to interaction between party and city leaders in the five other sample cities. Lansing, Flint, Jackson and Battle Creek are enclaves of congressional districts that encompass two or more counties. By the nature of their districts, local party leaders serve a mixed clientele of urban, suburban and rural constituents. When they function as recruiters, local party leaders may be hesitant to give backing to city based aspirants who may be repugnant to the suburban and rural segments of their district. Gittell recognizes this burden to municipal leaders in stating that few mayors become power figures in state party organization due to anti-city sentiment.[30] While this barrier may hinder Detroit officials at higher party levels, the support of local leaders and the stature of city office may be factors that override this problem from time to time.

The last two passages have focussed upon the limited movement of municipal officials to the peak of the state opportunity structure. Our analysis of municipal officials would not be complete without a description of the frequency with which mayors and city councillors later take appointive posts.

Movement to appointive office

Of the entire sample approximately 18% assumed an appointive position, usually immediately after their elective term expired. Most frequently these individuals took a full time post in a city department or agency, although many municipal officials went on to a full time post at the county or even state level. See Table 6.

Usually these positions serve as a replacement for a private occupation. Most of those who take appointive positions remain there for a number of years. If they do move to another government post, it is almost always another appointive office at the same level of government.

Among the sample under study, municipal officials less frequently take appointive positions than they seek and win later elective office. The appointive pathway is clearly not a main career course taken by municipal officials.

There is evidence suggesting that at least some of those who take appointive posts are municipal officials who have limited opportunities to attain another elective office. Approximately 31% of those who went on to an appointive position had previously been defeated in a municipal incumbency election compared to only 18% of those who later won an elective office. It is possible that their earlier defeat at the municipal level tends to discourage these individuals from seeking another office. Rather they opt for an appointive position.

In this section we have described the extent to which municipal officials later seek and attain an elective office or move to an appointive post. Before further describing their later political careers, let us examine the length of time municipal officials remain

in their current offices. As will be seen in the following section, ambition theory posits a relationship between current office behavior and the future career moves of elected officials.

III. Later Office Seeking and the Tenure of Municipal Officials

A central assumption of ambition theory is that "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals."[31] An official who holds aspirations for future office alters his present behavior in ways that he perceives as helpful to attaining his office goal. As Prewitt and Nowlin put it, "an incumbent's expectations of, and/or aspirations for the future" constrain his current behavior.[32] If this hypothesis of ambition theory is valid, one would expect office seeking municipal officials to behave differently in their current post than non-seekers. Among the municipal officials under study here, tenure appears to be associated with later career behavior.

Despite their further ambitions, those destined for another elective office remain longer in their current position than do others. This finding is surprising in light of the fact that most municipal officials serve a substantial period in office. Of the entire sample, 69% remained in their current office for three of more terms or an average of 5.61 years. See Table 7.

Those who later win an elective office serve 6.72 mean years in their current post compared to 6.17 years for those losing a later office attempt and those taking an appointive post. Mayors and councillors who seek no further political office, either elective or appointive, remain in their present post the shortest period, 4.59 years. See Table 8.

It is not possible with these data to impute motives to the behavior of municipal officials. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the ambitious consistently find advantages in remaining for several terms in city office.

One explanation is that the longer tenure may be due to the need to await opportunities for advancement to another elective office. Municipal officials who intend to seek another office may delay an attempt until the desired office is vacated by the incumbent or until the electoral support for an incumbent has dropped. Because running for office is, to some degree, a risky enterprise, it follows that ambitious municipal officials would plan career moves in a way that maximizes their chances for success.

Another factor that may act to keep some aspiring officials in their current post is their need to establish ties with partisan recruiters. Most enter municipal campaigns with no previous partisan experience. Since municipal elections are nonpartisan both in a legal and practical sense, those who are elected do not make inroads into the local party structure.

For the most part, municipal officials with career plans must make independent efforts to initiate dialogue with local partisan leaders. The longer tenure of the ambitious may be due to the need for time to build a backlog of party contacts that may become an advantage for later winning a party nomination. The success or failure that municipal officials experience in building partisan credentials may partly determine whether they carry out plans to seek a later office. Black recognizes this continuing appraisal process in stating that city

councillors "tend to develop ambitions slowly as a result of their changing circumstances."[38]

The desire to remain in municipal office for several terms may be related to ambitions for a further office in another, more obvious way. According to ambition theory, officials who aspire to a later elective office are under constraints to cultivate support from their future electorate. For municipal officials, city voters will probably compose at least part of their future electorate, and occasionally the majority. Reelection races may be regarded by the ambitious as a means for building and measuring future voter support. Schlesinger recognizes the relation between electoral outcomes and career behavior in stating that "success spurs ambition and failure dampens it."[34]

Prewitt found evidence that councillors who aspire to future office are more likely to actively campaign for incumbency elections than are non-aspirants. Councillors stating intentions to run for another office reported more often than others that they "campaigned hard in the last election" and "had a strong desire to win."[35] On the basis of these and other responses, Prewitt states,

> Personal energy, funds and time are probably more likely to be committed to a campaign by the ambitious than by the councilman ready to retire...In addition, the ambitious councilman will probably receive more psychological gratification from campaign activity than will his less politically ambitious colleagues. The man hopeful of moving to a higher post has found in politics sufficient reward to merit making even greater investments.[36]

If the ambitious have a heightened commitment to winning incumbency elections, as Prewitt found, it is possible that those who win such elections are more likely to have or develop further political

ambitions. Using the sample of Michigan municipal officials, the following hypothesis is tested:

> Municipal officials who win reelection races are more likely than others to make further office attempts.

A tendency in support of this hypothesis appeared in the data with almost 62% of those who won incumbency races seeking later office as compared to 48% who lost reelection bids and 53% of those who did not run for reelection. See Table 9.

Apparently the act of winning incumbency elections tends to raise municipal officials' expectations and foster the desire for another office. The fact that those who lost an incumbency election tend to be the least likely to seek later office suggests that early failures tend to stifle ambitions.

The ability of municipal officials to win reelections is also associated with future success in an attempt for a further office. Over two-thirds of the ambitious who won an earlier incumbency race went on to win another elective post. Only one-half of those aspirants who had previously lost or did not enter an incumbency election advanced to another elective office later in their career.

As will be seen in the following section, this relationship between incumbency and later office victories serves to explain differences in the later careers of mayors and city councillors.

IV. Later Office Behavior of Mayors and City Councillors

Initially it was expected that mayors would be more likely than councillors to seek and attain a later political office. As chief executives, mayors have greater visibility to the electorate and

greater opportunities to make party contacts at higher levels.[37] The data indicate that, despite the dynamic nature of their office, mayors are less likely than councillors to seek a later office goal. Only 38% of the thirty-seven mayors in the sample sought another political position, either elective or appointive, compared to 58% of the councillors.

The depressed rate for mayors may be partly explained by their immediate past experience in municipal office. Overall mayors have a substantially shorter service in office, 3.92 mean years, than do councillors. See Table 11. Their shortened tenure is largely due to defeats in incumbency elections. Fifteen of the mayors, 43%, lost reelection bids, while only 25% of the councillors did so. For both groups, defeat in an incumbency election was associated with no later office attempts.

While systematic data are not available, it appears that these defeats sometimes occur after a mayor has tried to implement a new program in the city. Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian found that mayors in Jackson who attempted to focus public attention on city problems were "repaid for their troubles by losing their offices":

> One mayor became identified with the proposal for a new city hall. Following failure on this issue, he retired from office and there were indications his action was not voluntary. A second mayor worked for two terms toward a solution of the metropolitan problems of the area. He received constant criticism from inside and outside the city council. On his third try for office he ran a poor third and the office fell to a man who had earned a reputation for voting against every tax increase and almost every city capital improvement.[38]

However, the rapid turnover of mayors is not confined to cities where mayors take the policy initiative. In Grand Rapids, where mayors

are traditionally weak leaders, the percentage of mayors defeated in incumbency elections is higher than in Jackson. See Table 12.

At least in Michigan, it appears that when there is dissatisfaction with city government, regardless of its source, voters tend to hold the chief executive accountable, rather than councillors. In all six cities, the level of incumbency defeat was higher for mayors than for councillors. See Table 12. The relatively large number of mayors who experience incumbency failures are probably led, in turn, to stifle their future political aspirations.

One of the most striking features of these data is the poor rate of success mayors experience when they do attempt another elective office. Only three of the eight mayors who ran for elective office were victorious compared to 57% of the aspiring councillors. None of the five mayors who contended for the office of governor, lieutenant governor or congressman were successful. The remaining three who actually won later office sought the more modest posts of county register, state representative and university regent.

Although the numbers in the data are too small to warrant conclusions, they suggest that mayors have inflated ambitions in regard to the offices that they can reasonably hope to win. Had mayors sought more modest targets, their rate of success might have been greater.

Initially councillors tend to seek offices with city, county or legislative districts. When they run for statewide or congressional office, it is usually after holding an intermediate office at the city, county or legislative level. As was previously stated in another context, three of the eight councillors who ran for congressman, state supreme court judge and lieutenant governor were successful.

It is interesting to note that mayors show a slightly more frequent tendency than councillors to take appointive posts. Of the fourteen office seeking mayors, six (43%) took an appointive office compared to 31% of the same grouping of councillors. Given their limited chances for winning elective office, mayors who hope to continue in government may simply opt for an appointive post.

At least since 1946, mayors in these cities have only occasionally sought another elective office and rarely won it. The stymied career posture of mayors over the years probably has had long range effects on the later behavior of mayors. According to Schlesinger, offices take on reputations of their own that are based on the achievements or failures of past occupants. Given the past record of Michigan mayors, it may be that the office itself appears unattractive to the ambitious contender in politics.

Small sample size and the low rate of success of mayors precludes making pat generalizations about their career horizons. However, it is increasingly clear in this analysis that, relative to councillors, mayors encounter greater problems in winning later office. Whether the mayoral stalemate is due to poor judgement on the part of mayors or factors in the political system is a debatable question. The fact that the few mayors who sought moderate level offices were successful suggests that the judgement factor is the crucial variable.

It appears that when mayors chose office targets that are about the same level as councillors, their rate of success greatly increases. This would suggest that, at least potentially, the elective opportunity structure open to mayors is similar to that of city councillors. In

the following section, the types of offices within the municipal opportunity structure for councillors will be examined.

V. The Career Pathway Typology

In Chapter I, the discrete, static, lateral and progressive categories of the career pathway typology were introduced. The data presented in the previous sections indicate that seven percent of the councillors, not having made any attempts at later office, have discrete careers. An additional 22%, since they won at least one incumbency election, have static careers.

Councillors may also have progressive or lateral careers although only the most conspicuous offices in Michigan that constitute progressive moves have been identified. (See Chapter I.) The most obvious progressive goals for councillors and most other politicians have already been determined by research in ambition theory. Councillors have progressive careers when they seek and win the highest offices in the state: congressman, governor, and other statewide elective positions. The highest offices are clearly upward moves and become ends in themselves for most ambitious politicians.

For councillors who begin with low career status, the highest offices are not usually within their grasp immediately after council service. Initially most ambitious councillors seek an intermediate office that can be used as a stepping-stone to one of the highest offices in the state in the future. Offices that have been used as stepping-stones by councillors in the past are likely to be used in the same way by later councillors.

Of course, many later offices held by councillors have stepping-stone potential about the same as the city council and are usually treated by councillors as a final point in a lateral political career. Only the data can inform us as to which offices are progressive and which are lateral.

Given councillors' low position in the total opportunity structure, they have many options in regard to what later offices they might pursue. Councillors in this sample moved to over thirty different local, county and state offices in Michigan. Most of those offices were not treated as stepping-stones during the time period under study. These offices apparently do not kindle upward ambitions in ex-councillors. Any later office held by ex-councillors that did not produce a contender for the highest offices in the state during the time period under study is classified as a lateral office. Councillors who move to these offices are regarded as having lateral careers.

By this definition, lateral offices found in the data include at the municipal level, mayor, judge, clerk, treasurer, city manager, city attorney and all other appointive offices. At the county level, they are commissioner, sheriff, register of deeds, drain commissioner and the appointive posts of assessor, auditor, treasurer, department directors and court employee positions. At the regional and state levels, they include university regent, legislator and departmental and program directors.

It should be noted that the office of state legislator, while it attracted several councillors, was never used as a kick-off point to run for higher office. While in other states its stepping-stone potential is apparent, it simply was not treated as a conduit to higher

office by Michigan councillors. Legislative office was used by a few subjects in this sample as an entry point to other lateral offices at the municipal and county level. Of the total sample of councillors, 37% went on to a lateral office after leaving council service.

Some second offices are used by councillors as a conduit to candidacy for the highest state offices. When one or more ex-councillors assumed another political post from which they ran and attained one of the highest offices in Michigan, this second office is regarded as progressive, and is classified accordingly. Councillors who move to such stepping-stone offices are considered to have a progressive career.

Two office types appeared in the data as stepping-stones to higher office, county judge and county prosecutor. The two councillors who successfully used these offices as stepping-stones had long and complex careers in politics.

George Edwards, who later won the post of state supreme court judge, began his career in public office by serving on the Detroit Common Council for ten years. After becoming a local leader in the Democratic party, Edwards contended for the office of probate judge which he held for four years. After serving on the circuit bench for two years, he successfully ran for the office of supreme court judge in 1955. Two other councillors who became county judges sought high offices in the state, though unsuccessfully. After serving as district judge, an ex-councillor from Battle Creek lost the Republican nomination for attorney general. A circuit judge who had served as a councillor in Flint lost the general election for U.S. Congress in 1956.

The county prosecutor's office has also been a stepping-stone to higher office for ex-councillors. Two years after leaving the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, James Brickley began his political career by serving on the common council for two terms. After an unsuccessful race for judgeship in the Court of Appeals, Brickley was appointed as assistant prosecutor in Wayne County. Two years later, he took the post of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. A year later Brickley was nominated lieutenant governor at the Republican state convention. Running on an indivisible ticket with gubernatorial candidate William Milliken, Brickley was elected in 1970.

Only one councillor in the sample ascended directly from the council post to one of the highest offices in the state. After serving four terms in the common council, Charles Oakman successfully ran as the Republican candidate in the seventeenth district for U.S. Representative in 1952. Oakman had a history of involvement in state party politics which probably helped him move directly from city to congressional office. Of the total sample, four percent held a progressive office after leaving council service.

The career pathway typology includes stymied categories at all but discrete levels of ambition. A static may be stymied in his attempt to win an incumbency race, just as a progressive may lose an election for higher office. Of the total sample of councillors, 29% were stymied at some level of ambition. The highest percentage of stymied occurred within the progressive grouping. Of the twenty councillors who attempted higher office, only 45% were successful as compared to 79% of the laterals. It should be noted that the success has a built-in bias. Since the lateral category includes twenty-five councillors who later took appointive office, the success rate for laterals is inflated. When appointees are eliminated, the success rate decreases to 72%.

Roughly 60% of the councillors who entered a reelection campaign were victorious. These findings suggest that, on the average, councillors' chances for victory are greater when they seek another (lateral) office instead of continuous reelection. Of course, progressive offices, when sought, are the most difficult to attain.

To this point, the offices that generally become goals for aspiring councillors have been identified. The central focus of the following section will be upon the total number of attempts made by councillors to win different offices. These attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, define the options open to councillors in the structure of political opportunities.

The structure of political opportunities

A recurring problem in defining the opportunity structure for office holders is determining the order of importance of separate elective offices. Two broad categories of office types have already been identified, lateral and progressive offices. Lateral offices have small districts, confer moderate political status and lack the quality of inspiring ambitions in occupants. Due to their inherent qualities, these offices are lower in the opportunity structure than progressive offices. Progressive offices are widely recognized as status positions and tend to have relatively larger districts. They either satisfy high level ambitions or are used as a means to achieve them.

A central problem in ordering offices in the data is the relatively small number of attempts by councillors to win individual offices. For example, only a single attempt was found in the data to win the office of attorney general. Nevertheless, there appears

to be a trend in office attempts as is expressed in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis I:

> The higher an office is in the structure of political opportunities, the less likely that councillors will make attempts to attain that office.

In order to avoid the problem of small sample size, the total number of attempts made by councillors for the entire grouping of lateral offices is compared with the total number of attempts for progressive offices. As Table 14 indicates, the vast majority of attempts by councillors are at the lateral level.

The most frequent sought lateral office was the mayoral post. Since both council and mayoral office have urban constituencies, it is reasonable to expect interaction to occur between the two offices.[40] Furthermore, the frequent contact between mayors and councillors in every day political affairs serves to create a recruitment linkage between the two offices.

A second clustering of lateral attempts were focussed at legislative office. Of all lateral offices, the legislature is structurally the "closest" to the grouping of progressive offices. While the legislature was never used as a stepping-stone to higher office, two ex-councillors who sought legislative posts later sought the office of circuit judge. One was successful. While the data are limited, they suggest that legislative office may be regarded as a means to climb to the lower rungs of the progressive career ladder.

As might be expected, the greatest percentage of progressive attempts were aimed at the "stepping-stone" offices of county

prosecutor and county judge. For the aspiring councillors, these offices probably appear more accessible than the highest progressive offices.

Of the total number of later office attempts, only 13% were aimed at the highest offices of governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, congressman and supreme and appeals judge. Overall, the data indicate, as Hypothesis I predicts, a decreasing rate of office seeking as the level in the opportunity structure increases.

The rate of success that councillors are expected to achieve in later office attempts is stated in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis II:

> The higher an office is in the structure of political opportunities, the less likely that ambitious councillors will be successful in attempts to attain that office.

Table 14 indicates support for this hypothesis. While the rate of success for lateral attempts was 68%, it decreased to 46% for progressive attempts. The lateral rate of success is depressed by the large number of stymied attempts at legislative office, while the progressive rate is increased by the large proportion of winners for stepping-stone offices. The "borderline" offices in both groupings tend to diminish the predicted relationship. It is apparent, however, that at the highest levels the rate of success is low. The fact that few attempt statewide and congressional office, and even fewer attain it, is an indicator of the barriers councillors experience to reaching the top of the state opportunity structure. Overall it appears that a filtering process tends to operate in which fewer and fewer attempts and successes are achieved as one looks higher in the opportunity structure.

Summary

Most of the municipal officials under study display a commitment to politics that extends beyond a single office holding experience. Despite the nonpartisan nature of city office, over one-third of these officials sought a further elective office. Almost one-fourth of the entire sample went on to assume another elective post, primarily at the lateral level.

The majority of municipal officials, 69%, remained in their current position for at least two terms. These findings suggest that those who serve in municipal office frequently have further political ambitions. If ambition or the desire for reelection imposes a restraint upon elected officials, then voters in the sample cities often have the option to exercise electoral control over municipal officials.

City councillors experience varying degrees of success in seeking later offices. As stated in Hypotheses I and II, a regressive opportunity structure exists in which the highest offices are less often sought and attained by ambitious councillors.

Before attempting the highest offices, councillors usually make inroads into local party organization. For structural reasons, only Detroit officials have had much success in establishing partisan alliances. Due to this barrier and others, the ambitious most often direct their careers into lateral office.

This chapter has been concerned with examining the primary dependent variable of this study, the later office behavior of municipal officials. In the following chapter, the background characteristics of

city councillors that may be related to later office behavior will be examined.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term of office for Lansing councillors and the mayor in Detroit is four years. Since 1955 the term of office for councillors and the mayor has been four years. In order to maintain the validity of the tests of later career behavior, only those who served in office in Detroit and Lansing from 1946 to 1962 are included in the sample.

2. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe: Free Press, 1968), p. 67.

3. Six individuals served on the County Board of Commissioners who until 1968 were selected by a majority vote of the city council. One individual served on the school board which is an elective position.

4. Stephen B. and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), p. 58; Maurice Ramsey, "Some Aspects of Non-partisan Government in Detroit" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1944).

5. The category of political party groups includes Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Women's Republican Club, and Businessmen's Republican Club. Excluded from this category are cadres or positions in formal political party organization.

6. Old Newsboys clubs collect funds for charitable causes.

7. Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 73.

8. Ibid., p. 78; Edward Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 60-61; C. O. Smith and S. B. Sarasohn, "Hate Propaganda in Detroit," Public Opinion Quarterly 10 (1946-47):24-52.

9. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 69-70; David A. Booth and Charles R. Adrian, "Power Structure and Community Change" (unpublished paper, 1963), p. 12.

10. Banfield, Big City Politics, p. 59.

11. Ibid., pp. 55-63.

12. Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,

1970, pp. 84-86; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System, Exploration in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 95.

13. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 131.

14. Ibid., Chapter 7.

15. Lansing State Journal, April, 1960.

16. Lansing State Journal, March 11, 1960.

17. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 199.

18. Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), Chapters 6 and 9.

19. James Brickley who won the office of lieutenant governor ran on an indivisible ticket with the governor.

20. Ernest Patterson, Black City Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1974), p. 58; Banfield, Big City Politics, p. 54.

21. Sarasohn and Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns, pp. 7-8, 56-68.

22. Charles Beard, "Political and City Government," National Municipal Review 6 (March 1917):201-206; Charles Merriam, "Nominating Systems," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 106 (March 1923):1-10; T. R. Holling, "Nonpartisan, Non-political Municipal Government," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 121 (September 1938):43-49.

23. Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952): 767.

24. Charles Adrian, "A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959):455.

25. C. H. Clark, "Some Aspects of Voting Behavior in Flint, Michigan -- A City with Nonpartisan Municipal Elections" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1952).

26. Kenneth VerBurg, Guide to Michigan County Government (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, 1972), IX-8.

27. Ibid.

28. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics," p. 22.

29. Sarasohn and Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns, p. 58.

30. Marilyn Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End," Public Administration Review 24 (March 1963):22.

31. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 6.

32. Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly 22 (June 1969):299.

33. Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Astructural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970), p. 3.

34. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 9.

35. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 198.

36. Ibid.

37. Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Claque, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," Journal of Politics 24 (1962):340.

38. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 296.

39. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics," pp. 774-775.

40. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 99.

TABLE 1

Number of group memberships

No. of group memberships	No. of officials	%
0	4	1.98
1	22	10.89
2	25	12.38
3	40	19.80
4	31	15.35
5	35	17.33
6	22	10.89
7	9	4.46
8 or more	14	6.93
total	202	100.01

TABLE 2

Predominant group memberships

Type of group	No. of officials	%
civic	111	57.51
business	27	13.99
veterans	14	7.25
labor union	12	6.22
professional	11	5.72
government improvement	7	3.63
ethnic	4	2.07
religious	4	2.07
political party	3	1.55
total	193	100.01

TABLE 3

Level of later office attempts and victories

Level	Number	%
Attempts:		
city	27	30.00
county	30	33.33
legislative, regional and state	33	36.67
total	132	100.00
Victories:		
city	23	40.35
county	22	38.60
legislative, regional and state	12	21.05
total	57	100.00

TABLE 4

Level of office seeking behavior of city officials by mean years served in city office and % defeated in city incumbency races

	Highest office seekers	Other office Seekers	Non-seekers
mean years served	8.00	6.23	4.91
% defeated in incumbency races	0.00%	27.73%	33.33%
total N	13	119	102

TABLE 5

Population of Michigan cities to raw figures and as a percentage of the state population, 1940-1970

	1940		1950	
	No.	%	No.	%
Detroit	1,623,542	30.89	1,849,568	29.03
Grand Rapids	164,292	3.13	176,515	2.77
Flint	151,543	2.88	163,143	2.56
Lansing	78,753	1.50	92,129	1.45
Jackson	49,656	.94	51,088	.80
Battle Creek	43,453	.83	48,666	.76
Michigan	5,256,106		6,371,766	
	1960		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%
Detroit	1,670,144	21.35	1,511,482	17.03
Grand Rapids	177,313	2.27	197,649	2.23
Flint	196,940	2.52	193,317	2.18
Lansing	107,807	1.38	131,546	1.48
Jackson	50,720	.65	45,484	.51
Battle Creek	44,169	.56	38,931	.44
Michigan	7,823,194		8,875,083	

TABLE 6

Level of appointive offices assumed by municipal officials

Level	Number	%
city	17	40.48
county	16	38.10
state	9	21.43
total	42	100.01

TABLE 7

Number of terms in municipal office

Terms	Number	%
1	49	20.94
2	24	10.26
3 or more	161	68.80
total	234	100.00

TABLE 8

Incumbency elections and mean years served

Municipal officials	% of each group defeated in incumbency elections	Mean years served	N
winners	18.18	6.72	55
losers	28.57	6.17	35
appointees	30.95	6.17	42
non-seekers	33.33	4.59	102
total	28.63	5.61	234

TABLE 9

Outcome of city incumbency elections and % seeking later office

Sought later office	City Incumbency Elections			Total
	won	lost	did not run	
yes	61.53	48.48	52.63	56.41
no	38.47	51.52	47.37	43.59
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	130	66	38	234

TABLE 10

Municipal officials by outcome of municipal incumbency elections and outcome of later elective office attempts

Outcome of later attempts	Incumbency election		
	won	lost	didn't enter
won	67.86	50.00	50.00
lost	32.14	50.00	50.00
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	56	20	14

TABLE 11

Selected characteristics of mayors and city councillors

	Mayors	Councillors
% of total seeking elective or appointive office	37.83	50.25
% of total seeking elective office	21.62	29.44
% of elective office seekers successful	37.50	60.34
mean years served	3.92	5.93
% of total losing city incumbency races	43.42	25.38
total number	37	197

TABLE 12

% of mayors and city councillors defeated in incumbency races

City of origin	% mayors defeated within each sample city		% councillors defeated within each sample city	
	%	N	%	N
Detroit	25	(4)	22	(27)
Lansing	100	(3)	39	(46)
Grand Rapids	60	(5)	28	(25)
Flint	40	(10)	29	(38)
Jackson	30	(10)	29	(35)
Battle Creek	20	(5)	15	(26)
total	43	(37)	29	(197)

N-total number of mayors or councillors elected within each respective city.

TABLE 13

Councillors classified by the Career Pathway Typology

	Number	%	Rate of success[1]
Progressive:			
successful	9	3.95	45.00
stymied	11	4.82	
total	20	8.77	
Lateral:			
successful	85	37.28	78.70
stymied	23	10.09	
total	108	47.37	
Static:			
successful	50	21.93	60.24
stymied	33	14.47	
total	83	36.40	
Discrete:	17	7.46	
total	228	100.00	70.61

[1] Rate of Success = $\frac{\text{Number of Successful}}{\text{Total Number of Attempts}}$ X 100%.

TABLE 14

Later elective office attempts, success and success rate of councillors

	No. of Attempts	% of Attempts	No. of Successes	% of Successes	Rate of Success
Lateral office:					
mayor	38	32	31	42	81.58
municipal judge	3	3	3	4	100.00
city clerk	2	2	2	3	100.00
city treasurer	3	3	2	3	66.67
county commissioner	7	6	6	8	85.71
other county elective	13	11	8	11	61.54
legislator	24	20	9	12	37.50
total	90	77	61	82	67.78
Progressive office:					
county prosecutor	4	3	4	5	100.00
county judge	10	8	6	8	60.00
attorney general	1	1	0	0	0
supreme & appeals judge	2	2	1	1	50.00
lieutenant gov.	3	3	1	1	33.33
governor	2	2	0	0	0
congressman	6	5	1	1	16.67
total	28	24	13	16	46.43
total	118	101	74	98	62.72

CHAPTER III

THE BACKGROUND OF COUNCILLORS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREERS

The unrepresentative character of city councils from the angle of recruitment is documented in virtually every study of American cities since World War II.[1] On the average, entrants to the council emerge from groupings at the upper end of the status hierarchy. Along the lines of occupation, income and education, they cluster at higher levels than do their constituents.[2] Additional criteria by which they are unrepresentative of the urban population include race, sex, and age.[3] As is found at other office levels, the vast majority of councillors are white males. In terms of age, they are most often in their forties when they enter council office.

Although it is widely acknowledged that background traits influence people's chances of entering the council, little is known about how these traits continue to shape councillors' political careers. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the backgrounds of councillors consistently affect their opportunities of attaining further public office.

In effect this study investigates determinants of political promotion rather than of initial recruitment. As James Barber suggests, once individuals hold office, their knowledge about political life and their role in it expands.[4] Councillors are probably more attuned than

most people to their political opportunities. If they are interested in winning further office, they are likely to be sensitive to the formal and informal qualifications for advancement. As councillors make decisions to seek or not to seek another public office, they probably consider, among other factors, their own backgrounds.

Section I of this chapter reviews the current studies regarding how traits of individuals intervene in the political recruitment process. Theoretical approaches found in the literature will be applied to explain the relationship between the backgrounds of councillors and their later political career behavior.

In Section II, the effects of councillors' private occupations upon later office attempts and victories will be examined. The third section is concerned with the educational achievements of councillors and the frequency of further office attempts. Age as a determinant of later political career behavior will be explored in Section IV. The differences in the seeking of office by women and black council members will be discussed in the fifth section. The final section will include a composite description of councillors who advanced to the highest levels of state politics.

Some background traits, since they are interrelated, may have a combined effect upon the later career behavior of councillors. Such is the case for some levels of education and occupation found in the sample of councillors. Whenever it is appropriate, control variables will be introduced into the data.

I. Review of the Literature

As was demonstrated in Chapter II, successful office seeking councillors in Michigan fan out into a diverse number of elective offices in the state ranging from mayor to supreme court justice. Although their experiences in seeking further office are diverse, ambitious councillors more or less share two objectives: first, to become a candidate and second, to win the subsequent election. The literature on political recruitment provides some insights as to how political aspirants in general attain their objectives.

Political recruitment and the backgrounds of councillors

Rufus Browning points to the need to conceptualize recruitment as a complex system that involves several stages where actors make selection decisions.[5] While Browning's model takes into account structural factors of the political system, it identifies the electorate, recruiters and the individual being considered as making inputs into the recruitment process. Although Browning's focus was upon the power and achievement motivations of political aspirants, he points out that personality traits vary systematically with social status. The purpose of this chapter is not to impute motives to the behavior of office holders, but to cast light on how traits of councillors consistently influence their chances to attain further political office.

Background traits of councillors have the potential to influence a selection decision at each stage of recruitment where human judgement intervenes. These stages are the point at which the individual makes the decision to seek office, the time at which recruiters make

selection decisions, and the day of the election when voters choose the winning candidate.

Admittedly these stages are artificial in the sense that recruitment is a continuing process. As Donald Matthews puts it, "leadership selection is going on throughout America everyday and is not just confined to primaries and elections."[6] Specific events, such as an individual's declaration of candidacy and general election outcomes, offer the researcher a point in time to test for what types of criteria have been applied in the recruitment process.

In the data sections of this chapter, two stages of recruitment relevant to aspiring councillors of varied backgrounds will be tested by the following general hypotheses:

> Councillors differentiated by background, i.e., occupation, education, race, sex and age, will vary in the frequency of <u>further office attempts</u>.
>
> Office seeking councillors differentiated by background will vary in the frequency of <u>successful later office attempts</u>.

The first hypothesis is concerned with how councillors of differing backgrounds systematically select themselves as candidates or opt out of future office endeavors. Only those who filed or made a public declaration of candidacy are considered to have made a further office attempt. The second hypothesis is concerned with how the electorate, or some portion of it, judges candidates according to their backgrounds. Some councillors were unsuccessful in primaries or in party convention balloting. Others became candidates in the general election, but were defeated. In either case, these councillors are classified as having made an unsuccessful later office attempt. A review of

the literature pertaining to these two hypotheses will be found in the following two passages.

This study makes no claim to include all phases of recruitment. One aspect of recruitment, which is beyond the purview of this analysis, is how recruiters make candidate selection decisions. Kenneth Prewitt recognizes that recruiters pay attention to the backgrounds of candidates in stating that recruiters are:

> ...sensitive to demonstrated accomplishment. Nominating or search committees understandably are impressed with past performance of potential recruits. Nothing more effectively demonstrates performance than advanced education or high social status or a prestige occupation.[7]

In the sample of councillors under study here, the quality and frequency of contact between office seekers and recruiters varied. In part, this variation depended upon the institutional setting in which candidates were selected. Most councillors sought offices that required filing nominating petitions or entry fees in order to be placed on the primary ballot. These offices include municipal and most county posts, legislative and congressional seats, and most statewide elective positions. In the above cases, partisan or self designated recruiters may decide to withhold or give support to "select" candidates at the time of the primary.[8]

For several offices in the state, candidates are nominated by conventions of the political parties. Such is the case for councillors who sought the offices of lieutenant governor, supreme court justice and attorney general. On the average, partisan recruiters exert greater continuous control over the choice of candidates by the convention system than by the primary system.

In Michigan the interest that recruiters have in selecting candidates also varies according to the status of the office. Primary contenders for the nomination of county commissioner generally receive little or no support from partisan recruiters. As Kenneth VerBurg points out, the party nomination is won "largely through efforts of the candidate himself with the help of a small group of supporters rather than the support of the party."[9]

At higher office levels, partisan recruiters probably take a more commanding role in selecting the party's nominee. As a general rule, the higher the office, the greater the role of partisan recruiters in selecting candidates.

Given the limitations of the data, this study is unable to describe the decision rules applied by recruiters. However, the impact of recruiters is implicitly taken into account in testing hypotheses about councillors' backgrounds and office winning. Let us turn to the general literature of political recruitment.

Office seeking behavior

The psychological point at which present office holders decide to seek further political office is one of the least understood aspects of recruitment. Most of the literature applies to individuals of varied political backgrounds, all of whom are seeking the same political office. This section seeks to apply the general recruitment literature to the specific case of councillors considering diverse later office attempts.

One of the most recent efforts to describe the way in which individuals deliberate over the question of seeking political office is

found in James Barber's study of state legislators.[10] He outlines three interrelated questions that a potential candidate would ask himself in deciding whether to run for political office.

1. Do I want it? (motivation)
2. Can I do it? (resources)
3. Do they want me? (opportunity)

The first question concerns the tradeoffs individuals would be willing to make in order to run for further political office. This question has a special relevance for councillors who, with the exception of Detroit Common Councillors, are under an obligation to give only part time service. Most other elective offices in the state, if attained, would require a greater commitment of time and energy.[11]

Consequently the motivation to seek office is partly dependent upon the councillor's present nonpolitical situation. As will be seen in Section II of this chapter, his private job in terms of its nature, flexibility and time demands may affect his political aspirations.

Second, the fostering of political ambitions depends in part upon the councillor's place in the opportunity structure. Like other public officials, councillors in Michigan have a limited set of career options. In this context, the question of "do I want it?" usually means, "do I want to become mayor, county commissioner, county judge, other county official or legislator?"

Some may have no interest in holding these offices, and therefore decide to remain in the council or drop out of politics entirely. Others may set or adjust their aspirations to "fit" their options. Those who seek the stepping-stone offices of county judge and county prosecutor may have longer range career plans in mind. Although it is

incorrect to think of councillors taking orderly steps up the career ladder, there is a rough sequence to full blown political careers begun at the council level. Such a career ordinarily runs from the council, to a county office, and then on to a higher elective office.

Those having aspirations to become a congressman or statewide elective official have little chance to ascend directly to their office goal. Those who attempt to do so almost always fail. County posts, notably judgeships and the prosecutor's office, are better kick off points for seeking the highest offices in the state. For the most ambitious councillor the question, "do I want it?" may mean, "do I want a stepping-stone post that may open greater political opportunities for me in the future?"

The second question, "can I do it?" has to do with the qualifications needed for the office goal under consideration. The councillor's answer depends in part upon the confidence he has in his newly attained political skills. It also depends upon the qualifications prescribed by law for the office. Legal qualifications for most offices are limited to age, residency and citizenship requirements. However, most judgeships and all prosecutor's posts, the stepping-stone offices, are legally restricted to individuals practicing law. For this reason and others, councillors who are lawyers have more career options, especially in the upward direction, than do most of their colleagues.

The third question, "do they want me?" has to do with political opportunities. Timing is an important factor in every political career. The councillor who intends to seek a specific office may have to delay his plans until the office becomes available. In some cases, the office may be occupied by a political ally. In other cases, the

incumbent may be so well entrenched with the electorate that any challenger would almost certainly face defeat.

In addition, the councillor needs to consider recruiters' choices and his own electoral strength in the district of the desired office. John Kingdon reports that candidates for elective office, especially winners, perceive that their own personal characteristics influence voters' choices.[12] This finding suggests that individuals considering further office attempts make estimates of their attractiveness to voters.

As Barber points out, it is impossible to separate the effects of motivation, resources and opportunity upon an individual's calculus. Each variable has a circular relationship with the other two. For example, whether a councillor wants the prosecutor's office depends upon whether he has the formal and informal qualifications, whether county partisan recruiters support him and whether the voters, in his estimate, would elect him. In the data sections of this chapter, motivations, resources and opportunities will not be treated separately. Rather, combinations of these variables will be examined in light of the backgrounds of councillors.

The backgrounds of councillors and office seeking behavior

At least two approaches to background factors and office seeking behavior can be drawn from the literature on recruitment. The most prevalent approach is to treat background traits as dimensions of social status.[13] Among all ascribed and achieved traits of individuals, occupation is the most universal criterion used for ranking individuals in the United States.[14] Since educational achievement has

become a prerequisite for entry into the jobs most valued by people in general, education is also a widely applied measure for evaluating individuals.

In describing American society, sociologists are treating the ascribed traits of race, sex and age more and more as determinants of status.[15] However, there is less general agreement among the population as to the ranking order implied by ascribed traits. This is especially evident in comparisons of attitudes between individuals of less favored groupings (by society's standards) and the population as a whole. In regard to race, Melvin Tumin states, "though Negroes may be fully aware of the White man's low evaluation of 'Negroes' as against 'Whiteness,' they do not publicly agree with such a low evaluation."[16]

The basic assumption of this approach is that people who experience the rewards of higher status on the basis of one or more of these individual traits will be more predisposed to seek political office. As Donald Matthews states, "the individual who enjoys relatively high social status has attained success according to society's definition."[17] He is more likely to consider himself a better person for political office holding than others. Furthermore, he is more likely to have the resources and opportunities that are advantageous for running for political office.

This approach does not assume that all individuals of higher status will seek political office. In fact, most of them do not. Nor do people of lower status always remain on the sidelines of political competition.

However, an immense body of multi-disciplinary literature suggests that higher status individuals have more chances to develop the motives, resources and opportunities that are requisites to office seeking. This writer makes no claim to have reviewed all of the writings on the status of individuals. Some of the conclusions of this literature have been classified along Barber's model of office seekers as follows.

In regard to motives, higher status individuals are more likely to:

be self confident, by socioeconomic status,[18] by sex;[19]

be aggressive and assertive, by socioeconomic status;[20]

feel politically competent, by occupation,[21] by education,[22] by sex;[23]

feel a duty to participate in politics, by education,[24] by sex,[25] by occupation;[26]

In regard to resources, higher status individuals are more likely to:

be politically informed, by education,[27] by sex;[28]

have skills of verbal communication, by socioeconomic status;[29]

be conceptually sophisticated about politics, by sex;[30]

participate in voluntary organizations, by socioeconomic status,[31] by race;[32]

be leaders in voluntary organizations, by income;[33]

be organized in their daily lives, by socioeconomic status;[34]

be capable of organizing a political campaign, by socioeconomic status.[35]

In regard to opportunities, higher status individuals are more likely to:

know others who are politically active, by socioeconomic status;[36]

have family members who are politically active, by socioeconomic status;[37]

know others who encourage political involvement, by socioeconomic status;[38]

be viewed by others as influential members of the community, by socioeconomic status.[39]

These conclusions do not patently confirm that there exists a causal relationship between background traits and political careers. However, they do suggest that background traits work in multiple ways to influence people's ambitions and political behavior. At the present state of research, the relative "weight" of individual traits in affecting people's office seeking behavior is unknown.

In fact, sociologists have been unable to arrive at any specific conclusions as to how separate traits contribute to the overall social status of individuals. Tumin states,

> ...Sociological researchers have struggled for many years without much notable success to develop a satisfactory model of evaluation of over-all social standing. We persist in this effort, however, because we realize that in our social relationships we judge and evaluate each other and determine our respective acceptabilities, not in terms of occupation, income or educational achievement alone, but rather in terms of a mixture of these and many other elements: sex, age, skin color, religion, national origin, marital status, family background, and so on.[40]

The researcher of political recruitment, therefore, is guided by the general hypothesis that status is related to office seeking, but

depends upon the data to reveal specific traits or combinations of them that are associated with office attempts.

A second problem has to do with the representation of background traits as dimensions of status. Although it is widely confirmed that people of certain backgrounds are more likely to seek political office, it is not clear that this relationship is entirely a function of status.

This brings us to the second approach to background. It claims that people's circumstances in their private life are equally or more important determinants of office seeking behavior than is their overall status. The circumstantial approach begins with the assumption that "public officials in the U. S. emerge from all levels of the social structure" and points to the occupation of the individual as one crucial determinant of office seeking behavior.[41] Herbert Jacob claims that individuals with private occupations that place them in a brokerage role are more prepared than others to enter contention for political office. Such occupations have several distinguishing features:

> ...They allow their occupant time to seek office; they teach him many of the skills a politician needs -- the skill of bargaining, the ability to convince, the art of inspiring trust and confidence. A brokerage role also facilitates the development of numerous contacts which aid the individual in his business but which prove invaluable upon entry into politics. Such contacts also may lead to financial backing when planning a campaign. Finally brokerage roles are often at the fringe of politics and promote close contact with governmental officials ranging from city inspectors to the court house gang. They thus allow the individual to learn of the opportunities in political life and to observe how others have succeeded.[42]

According to Jacob, these occupations include general practitioners, lawyers, newspapermen, hotel and restaurant proprietors, auto

and fuel dealers, independent merchants, real estate brokers, insurance salesmen, bartenders, local union officials and undertakers.

This approach emphasizes the importance of circumstances which are created as a result of the individual's life situation. From this perspective it is not strictly denied that status plays a role in fostering ambitions. However, status is regarded as a secondary determinant.

The circumstantial approach has been applied in the analysis of background factors other than occupation. For example, Angus Campbell et al. attributes the lower rate of political participation among women to their continuing obligation to care for the family and home.[43] Presumably this explanation could be applied to explain the lower rates of office seeking among women.

As will be seen in this chapter, the circumstantial and status approaches may dovetail in explaining specific background traits. For example, the status approach also has been applied in explaining the lower levels of political participation among women. Clyde Franklin, Jr. and Laurel R. Walum maintain that the role model that society prescribes for women discourages their entry into political competition. As a result of this socialization, women "have internalized norms which limit their educational, career and political aspirations."[44]

In the following sections of this chapter, both approaches will be considered in explaining the variations in office seeking among different types of councillors.

Later office elections and the backgrounds of councillors

A second aspect of political recruitment to be examined in this chapter is the role the electorate plays in advancing or retarding the

political careers of city councillors. It is predicted that aspiring councillors with preferred background traits will be more likely than others to win elections for further office.

How voters perceive political candidates in general is a continuing subject of inquiry. Public opinion surveys have documented that aside from partisan and issue preferences, voters pay attention to the "personal attributes of candidates."[45] However, the relevance that a candidate's occupation, education, race, sex and age holds for people making voting judgements is not clear. Angus Campbell et al. discovered that voters perceive candidates more along the dimensions of their personalities and overall images, rather than according to their specific traits.[46]

Campbell's study of voter opinion was directed at people's attitudes toward presidential candidates. In less conspicuous state and local elections, where ambitious councillors are more likely to contend, background factors may have a greater relevance to voters. In the first place, the electorate is relatively uninformed about the issues in state and local campaigns.

Second, many of the elections in which aspiring councillors contend (almost half) are conducted on a nonpartisan ballot. In the frequent absence of issue and partisan cues, voters probably pay more attention to the backgrounds of candidates.

The relative weight that voters place upon individual traits as opposed to personality traits is a matter of speculation. However, it should be noted that the television and radio coverage given to state and local candidates is fairly limited. Consequently, most voters do not have the audio or visual opportunity to form a "personality image"

of the candidates. This is probably true even when the candidates have previously held council office. However, biographical information about the candidates is readily available in newspaper accounts. When voters have any information about state and local candidates, it is probably in regard to their backgrounds.

Assuming that voters have biographical information about the candidates, how do they interpret it? The status approach has been most widely applied to explain how candidates' backgrounds influence voter choices. Of all sets of recruiters, the electorate is the largest and probably the most "representative" grouping of society. Since the standards of who should hold public office are derived from society-at-large, it follows that the electorate applies those norms in making voting decisions. As Kenneth Prewitt puts it,

> The political aspirant's success in business, military, civic or academic endeavors is relevant to his political image, since the voter uses the candidate's past accomplishments as an indicator of his future performance. Since, by definition, the well-educated, the better-off, or the holder of a prestige occupation is someone who "achieved," who has accomplishments, his chances of gaining respect from the voter are increased.[47]

In the following data sections, the relationship between separate background traits of councilmen and their electoral success in further office attempts will be tested.

II. Occupations of City Councillors and Later Political Career Behavior

This section begins by ranking city councillors along an ordinal scale of occupational status. This scale will be used to measure the effects of occupational status upon later political career behavior

according to the following hypotheses, originally introduced in Chapter I.

Hypothesis III:

The higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis IV:

The higher the occupational status of ambitious councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

Finally the circumstances surrounding councillors of various occupations will be discussed.

The measurement of occupational status

One problem in classifying councillors by their private jobs is that there is no methodologically "correct" way of ordering occupations by prestige. Although it is generally agreed that professionals and executives belong at the upper end of the status continuum, scholars differ as to which of the two groupings ranks highest.[48]

In 1947 Cecil North and Paul Hatt found that a national sample of respondents ranked physicians as higher in status than corporate executives.[49] Professors, dentists and lawyers were about equal in prestige to executives, while civil engineers and teachers ranked lower.

Since the 1940's the increased growth and visibility of large corporations has probably served to raise the status of executives in the eyes of the public. More current interpretations of occupational data, such as that of Alex Inkles in 1960, find evidence that large business executives rank higher in status than professionals.[50]

For purposes of classifying councillors, those nine percent of the total sample who were executives in business and industry were ranked as the highest occupational grouping, followed by professionals. See Table 15.

Among councillors the professional grouping included a large number of lawyers, but few doctors, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, architects, professors and teachers. In order to "balance" this category to make possible further breakdowns, councillors were also included who held semi-professional jobs as newspapermen, photographers and morticians.[51] This classifying strategy probably diminishes the overall status accorded to the category. Semi-professionals ranked somewhat below teachers in the North-Hatt scale.

The third category of councillors is composed of middle level corporate workers, 14% of the total sample. They include individuals who had specialized jobs as accountants, office managers, research consultants, purchasing agents, data analysts and public relations specialists.

In the past, middle level corporate workers have not received much attention in occupational studies. Some of these jobs came into existence and became visible to the public only in the last twenty-five years. For example, the conversion of corporations to computer systems beginning in the 1950's ultimately brought into existence a number of specialty positions. The North-Hatt classification included only one middle level position, "accountant for a large business," which ranked between most traditional professionals and various independent businessmen. For the purposes of this study, the assumption is made that

councillors with other middle level positions roughly correspond in status to that of corporate accountant.

The fourth and largest occupational category of councillors is small businessmen, proprietors and managers of small concerns usually located within the city. Typical businesses found in the sample included neighborhood groceries, hardware stores, dry cleaners, shoe stores, auto repair shops, printers, lumber companies and wholesale houses. Owners and salesmen of real estate and insurance companies were also included in this grouping which made up almost 40% of the total sample.

The ranking of small businessmen below middle level corporate workers is roughly in line with the North-Hatt occupational scale. The highest ranking for a small businessman, "owner-operator of a small printing shop," was well below that of corporate accountant. Other small businessmen, "manager of a small store" and "barber," ranked lower on the North-Hatt scale and overlapped in status with some skilled laborers. No information was available concerning the prestige of jobs in real estate although insurance agents ranked close to store managers.

The final category of councillors is manual laborers who made up less than ten percent of the total sample. Over one-half of the individuals falling in this grouping worked in auto production or a related industry. Most of the remainder worked in service oriented trades as electricians, television repairmen, carpenters, commercial drivers or railroad workers. No councillors were found in the sample who could strictly be considered unskilled laborers.

It is recognized that this classification is not in any way a perfect measure of occupational status. Some of the decision rules for classifying councillors were made arbitrarily. In addition, small sample size restricted a more refined breakdown of occupations. Nevertheless, this classification serves as a roughly ordinal measure of occupational status that can be applied to test hypotheses in the next section.

Office seeking and office winning among councillors of varied occupational status

The data do not confirm the hypothesis that the higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will seek further elective office. Although the professionals showed an expected high rate of office seeking, other occupational groups did not rank as predicted by the hypothesis. The highest status grouping, councillors who were executives, showed the lowest rate of office seeking. Only five percent made later office attempts. See Table 15.

Middle level corporate workers who ranked third in status showed a less than average tendency to seek further office. Small businessmen ranked second in later office attempts, another finding running counter to the hypothesis. Manual laborers who were predicted to show the lowest office seeking rate actually ranked above both groupings of corporate officials.

Furthermore, the status variable does not display the expected relationship with office winning. Executives cannot be analyzed here since only one ran for later office. Although relatively few middle level corporate workers sought further office, which makes the reliability of the data questionable, they showed the highest rate of

success in later office attempts. Professionals ranked second followed by manual laborers. The latter grouping included only eight individuals which makes the data difficult to interpret. Small businessmen displayed the lowest success rate with less than one half winning elections for further office. However, the irregularities in the data could be due to small sub-sample size. If one looks only at the two occupational groupings with N's over twenty-five, professionals and small businessmen, the predicted relationship holds. Almost 69% of the professionals who sought further office were successful compared to 49% of the small businessmen.

The pattern of later moves to appointive posts found among different occupational groupings showed no consistent relationship with status. It is worth noting that executives and small businessmen, who for different reasons are the least likely to end up in elective office, are the most likely to take appointive posts. This suggests a kind of balancing tendency in which groupings with relatively fewer chances to take elective office opt for appointive posts. The posts taken by executives were for the most part commissions and boards requiring a limited time commitment. Small businessmen, on the other hand, tend to take full time posts at the municipal and county level. Overall relatively few people from any of the occupational groupings took appointive posts.

These findings along with the job breakdown of councillors suggest some specific ways in which occupational status is related to political recruitment and subsequent careers. It is clear that occupational status has a rough impact upon whom is recruited to council office. While professionals, corporate workers and small businessmen composed

a relatively small proportion of the total work force, they made up 86% of the councillors. Manual laborers who were a majority of the work force composed a very small percentage of the councillors.

Although occupational status affects who is initially recruited to council office, it has less power in explaining which councillors are likely to seek or win further political office. While professionals behaved roughly as predicted, some other occupational groupings did not. Corporate officials at the executive and middle level produced some disparities in the data at both the office seeking and office winning levels. Manual laborers showed a higher rate of office attempts and victories than was predicted, although the latter finding may be due to small sample size.

It appears that factors other than occupational status were at work producing differential rates of office seeking and winning. Perhaps the circumstances surrounding councillors of differential occupations can further explain their political career behavior. In the following sections, specific occupational groupings will be discussed adopting the circumstantial approach to explain variations in office seeking and winning.

Professionals: the special case of lawyers

The high rate of office seeking among professionals can be attributed almost entirely to lawyers. While 85% of the councillors who were lawyers sought further elective office, the rate is considerably lower for those in other professions. See Table 16. Doctors, dentists and pharmacists made no later attempts at elective office.

Why do lawyers predominate over other professionals as office seekers? The argument that lawyers have flexible occupations has little merit in explaining why they seek office more than some other professionals.[52] Doctors, dentists and professors have many options to arrange their time schedules or defer their work load to colleagues, but few of them in the sample did so in order to seek political office.

It is also maintained that lawyers are more able than other professionals to keep astride of current developments in their field while taking a sojourn into political life.[53] Yet many public offices held by lawyers do not bring them into meaningful contact with the law. Even when lawyers become judges, their function on the bench may not strengthen their knowledge of the law in areas relevant to their private practice. Keeping abreast of the legal profession or some aspect of it largely comes through the preparation for and the litigation of specific cases.

One could argue that a physician in politics can more easily follow new developments in his field since they are reported to him through medical journals and field representatives. Other professionals who need not learn of new developments in their field through actual practice include dentists, pharmacists, most professors and many teachers.

A third argument maintains that lawyers enjoy unique side benefits through public service. As a "form of ethical advertising," office holding enhances the lawyer's reputation and thereby increases his clientele.[54]

This rationale may have merit in explaining why some lawyers become city councillors. Notoriety in the community goes along with

the office. Its part time nature allows the lawyer time to benefit from his enhanced reputation by enlarging or upgrading his clientele.

The advertising argument has less validity in explaining why the lawyer-councillor seeks further elective office. Since the time commitment is likely to be greater for any elective office beyond the council, the lawyer would have to sacrifice valuable time in order to seek further office. At least temporarily, he might have to give up part of his newly cultivated clientele. It seems unlikely that a lawyer who entered the council for public relations purposes would then cast aside the benefits gained in order to hold further office.

A fourth argument maintains that lawyers are more likely to seek and attain further office because the "political" nature of their work gives them advantages in public office competition.[55] More than other professionals, they have close and frequent contact with government and party officials. In addition lawyers are experienced in the skills of communication which are valuable for campaigning.

However, these advantages do not necessarily mean that lawyers have greater chances to win public office. In this study, aspiring councillors who were lawyers fared well in later elections, but not much better than did their counterparts from the other professions. See Table 16. The main difference between lawyers and other professionals is that the former more often sought office.

Schlesinger maintains that the prominence of lawyers as office seekers largely has to do with their relatively advantaged position in the political opportunity structure.[56] Unlike any other occupational grouping of councillors, lawyers have a virtual monopoly over recruitment to the complex of over 435 judicial and prosecutorial offices in

Michigan. As required by law, these offices are restricted to practicing lawyers. Consequently lawyers have more office holding options open to them than any other occupational grouping of councillors.

The data give striking evidence that lawyer-councillors take advantage of their unique opportunities. Over 70% of their office seeking attempts were aimed at judicial and prosecutor's posts. In fact, lawyers have a somewhat higher rate of success in seeking these in comparison to other offices. While three-fourths of the lawyers seeking judgeships and prosecutor's offices were successful, only two-thirds of the lawyers running for other elective posts were victorious. (Table 17)

This finding indicates that the slightly greater office seeking success that lawyers have over other professionals is largely due to their victories when seeking the "monopoly" offices. When they enter competition for other elective positions, this advantage almost disappears.

The fact that lawyers have the maximum chances for electoral success when running for the monopoly offices partly explains why they seek these offices in the first place. Political aspirants tend to direct their ambitions toward office goals that are reasonably attainable. Yet lawyer-councillors may find these offices attractive for additional reasons.

First, almost all judicial offices and some prosecutor's posts at the city level are nonpartisan. It is probably easier for the lawyer-councillor to move to a second nonpartisan post than to compete in the partisan races for the other offices open to him.

Second, judges and prosecutors are well paid relative to most other elective offices available to councillors in the state. Although salaries varied across districts and across time, many were in the five figure range for the time period under study. Also the incumbency return rates for these offices are high in Michigan. Therefore, these offices may hold inherent satisfactions for their occupants.

The third reason applies exclusively to the 48% of all lawyer-councillors who sought county judgeships and county prosecutor's posts. It was demonstrated in Chapter II that councillors who hold these posts have the maximum opportunity to win higher elective office in the future. This does not mean that councillors who ascend to a stepping-stone office have strong chances to become a statewide elected official or congressman. Relative to other public officials, councillors have rather moderate opportunities. It does mean that councillors who become county judges or prosecutors have better chances than any other grouping of councillors to attain the highest offices.

The small number of all councillors who sought state elective or congressional office restricts us from refuting or confiming this argument. However, two of the five councillors who held stepping-stone offices and who later sought the highest offices were successful. Only one out of nine, 11%, of the remaining councillors who sought statewide or congressional office were victorious. This finding suggests that progressive political opportunities primarily belong to councillors who are lawyers and who attain the stepping-stone offices.

Of course, these individuals who enter stepping-stone posts face a risky and time consuming pathway of ascent to the highest offices in the state. They usually start their political careers at a relatively

early age, which allows them sufficient time to climb the rungs of the political career ladder. These individuals were an average of thirty-five years when they entered the council compared to forty-five mean years for the total sample. Those two who actually ascended to high offices were twenty-seven and thirty-one when they entered the council and both were forty-two when they entered statewide progressive office.

In summary lawyers probably seek further political office more often than other professionals (and other occupational groupings) partly because they have a broader range of office opportunities. Second, the special options open to them are probably more attractive than the office goals available to other occupational groupings of councillors. Judgeships and prosecutor's posts are full time jobs with relatively higher salaries than most other elective offices available to councillors. Third, lawyers relative to other occupational groupings of councillors have a monopoly over the stepping-stone offices of county prosecutor and county judge. By holding these offices, a few can realistically hope to ascend to the highest offices in the future. The unique place of lawyer-councillor in the opportunity structure is a primary reason why they are more often found than others seeking elective office.

Executives and middle level corporate workers

During the time period under study, 1946 to 1972, corporations have undergone a period of expansion and diversification. Large enterprises have increasingly built new facilities and relocated divisions outside the central city's boundaries.

This trend along with the growing desire among higher status groups to escape city life has probably caused an increasing number of corporate workers to live outside the central city. The result has been smaller numbers of corporate workers entering city council office in the last twenty-five years. See Table 18. Of those who do become councillors, relatively few seek further elective office.

For councillors who are corporate executives, the demanding nature of their work may prohibit them from future endeavors into politics. A major function performed by executives involves making the "right" judgement in situations with a limited amount of information. The decisions they make or approve often "significantly affect profits and the future plans" of the corporation.[57]

Richard Hall maintains that executives work long hours in performing these tasks.[58] Furthermore, they operate in a "results oriented" environment in which their mistakes may become conspicuous and even result in demotion.

In this context, it is understandable that few councillors who are executives show an interest in seeking further elective office. Campaigning is time consuming and most office goals available to them, if attained, would require a greater time commitment than the council. For the executive, time is a scarce commodity.

Futhermore, executives have strong incentives for remaining in their private occupations. As Hall points out, executives are well paid, "with some salaries reaching the startling and seemingly exorbitant two to three hundred thousand dollar level or higher."[59] According to Robert Presthus, they expect and enjoy the rewards of status both within the organization and within the community.[60] In comparison

the office goals reasonably available to councillors who are executives would, if attained, accord relatively moderate status and income.

Councillors who are middle level corporate officials may also see few advantages to seeking further political office. They are the pool from which high level executives are drawn. Furthermore they display a rather strong commitment to the organization. According to Cyril Sofer, middle level corporate workers identify with their employer,

> ...not in the sense of total acceptance, but in the sense that the company is their work and their work is central to their life. The organization thus serves as a major point of reference...a focus for life and a means of providing order.[61]

If middle level corporate workers typically define their occupational role in this way, it is doubtful that many would channel their interests and energies into further political endeavors. Those who are ambitious probably direct their efforts toward advancement inside the corporation rather than outside it. The status and income advantages that they would gain by becoming executives probably outweigh the benefits that they could expect to attain by seeking any of the office goals available to them.

Although the overriding tendency is for councillors who are middle corporate workers to refrain from further elective attempts, a few of them did make such attempts and successfully so. Let us examine their office goals. Three sought and attained the full time posts of city treasurer, recorder's judge and sheriff. The remaining three sought part time posts at the county and municipal level. All but one were in their forties when they entered the council. Most of them were near fifty when they sought further elective office.

Their age and moderate office goals suggest that these individuals were not motivated by the desire to pursue an upward political career. Perhaps the three who took part time offices simply desired to have an involvement in politics that was not demanding enough to require them to give up their private occupation.

On the other hand, the three who took full time office appeared to have used politics as a means to begin a second career in middle age. It is possible that these individuals perceived that their opportunities for advancement within the corporation were limited and therefore opted for a substitute livelihood in government.

This rationale may also explain why five of the councillors who were middle level corporate workers moved to appointive posts. All were in their late forties and moved to full time positions at the municipal level.

Small businessmen

Small businessmen showed not only a high rate of entry into the city council, but also an above average tendency to seek further elective office. One explanation for their prominence as office seekers is that most are engaged in occupations that involve brokerage roles. According to Jacob, these jobs include independent merchants, restaurant proprietors, auto dealers, fuel dealers, real estate brokers and insurance salesmen.

Their common denominator is that they bring the individual into continual interaction with the public. Presumably these jobs foster the "skills of bargaining" and "inspiring trust" which are valuable in campaigning. Furthermore, they bring the individual into contact with

government officials from time to time which allows him to gain an inside view of political life. This argument maintains that all other factors being equal, individuals from these occupations will be more likely to pursue a political career.

If this explanation is valid, one would expect that councillors with brokerage occupations would be more likely than other small businessmen on the council to pursue further political office. In order to test this hypothesis, office seeking frequencies for the brokerage councillors were compared with that of councillors from other small business concerns. The latter group included owners and salesmen of wholesale enterprises, owners of trucking companies and contractors.

The data do not show evidence for the hypothesis. Businessmen from wholesale and service companies showed a rate of elective office seeking that was not substantially lower than that found for brokerage businessmen. See Table 19.

Since the brokerage role does not appear to explain further office seeking, it was decided to compare office attempt rates of owners with those of managers and salesmen. Owners might feel that political participation through office seeking would enhance their reputation in the community and indirectly increase their clientele. Furthermore, owners may have a greater stake in giving public service since government's plans for the development of the community may indirectly effect the well being of their business.

As Table 20 indicates, the difference in office seeking rates between owners and salesmen and managers is small. Apparently those working in small businesses, regardless of their specific role in it, often find reason to seek political office beyond the council.

One explanation is that the private opportunity structure open to all types of small businessmen often leads them to seek an extended role in political life. In the last seventy years, the number of small businesses in the nation has increased. The small merchant and wholesaler has faced increasing competition from larger enterprises. Many independent agents in real estate and insurance have been gradually losing clientele to larger firms. In general, the prospects of prosperity for the small businessmen have been in decline.

The alternative occupational outlets for small businessmen are few. Many in the sample had a high school education or less. During the time period under study, they lacked the credentials that might have enabled them to make an easy transition into another occupational field.

Furthermore, small businessmen tend to be generalists. As Walter Slocum states, proprietors perform multiple occupational roles, such as bookkeeping, cleaning, inventorying, buying and selling.[62] This is especially true of the downtown merchants in the sample, many of whom inherited the family business.

The national trend, however, is toward increasing training and specialization in occupations. Whereas the small businessmen of a century ago might have been able to enter the middle ranks of a larger concern, his chances of doing so in the last thirty years are minimal.

Given the limited horizons that small businessmen faced during the time period under study, it is not surprising that many attempted to extend their political involvement beyond service on the council. Although some sought part time posts, most aspiring businessmen on the

council attempted full time posts that would, if attained, serve as an alternative to their private job.

Most of their elective attempts were aimed at lateral offices at the municipal and county level. Despite their relatively moderate office goals, they experienced somewhat low rates of success in general elections. This fact and the fact that their risk of defeat was high in bids for elective office may explain why small businessmen show a high rate of movement to appointive posts.

Small businessmen typically take appointive posts that are full time at the municipal or county level, such as parks commissioner, health inspector and county court employee. These data suggest that many small businessmen are motivated to extend their careers beyond the council primarily to attain a second occupation. This pattern is observable across time and across cities.

Manual laborers

Councillors who were manual laborers ranked only three percent below small businessmen in terms of later office attempts. This finding is not surprising when one considers the limited private opportunity structure open to manual laborers. Like small businessmen, they tend to have few options to move into alternative occupations. On the other hand, laborers may have less reason than small businessmen to seek a full blown career in politics. The laborers found in the sample enjoyed a substantial amount of job security. Those who worked in large industry, almost one-half, were members of powerful unions which protected them from arbitrary dismissals. They could expect to receive regular increases in wages and substantial fringe benefits. Most of

the remainder in this grouping were service oriented craftsmen, some of which were union organized. Although no data are available, it is likely that some of the laborers in the sample had higher annual incomes than did the small businessmen. Furthermore, industrial workers and craftsmen have remained a relatively stable proportion of the work force in the last twenty-five years.[63] Relative to small businessmen, they faced fewer uncertainties about their private occupational future.

Laborers' advantage in job security may explain the differences found in the later office attempts of the two occupational groupings. Laborers showed a less frequent tendency than small businessmen to seek full time elective office. Only one worker, at the Buick plant in Flint, sought a full time post -- as county register of deeds. Six of the seven who made elective office attempts aimed at the county commissioner's post and the mayor's office in Battle Creek and Jackson. None of these lateral offices, once attained, did or would have required them to give up their private jobs.

One can only speculate as to why laborers did seek further office. It seems plausible that they were motivated to do so for two reasons. First they would receive supplemental income. Depending on the office, the amount ranged from several hundred to several thousand dollars. Second, the act of seeking and attaining further political office probably heightened laborers' status in the community. The prestige that they gained through political activity probably counterbalanced their relatively moderate occupational status. For laborers, lateral office seeking may have been regarded as a means to enhance their standing in

the community without jeopardizing their relatively stable occupational position.

Interpreting the findings

Let us review the overall findings concerning the relationship between the occupations of councillors and their later political career behavior. Hypothesis III predicting that council members with high job status will more often seek political office was not confirmed by the data. Although professionals showed a high rate of office seeking, those of other high status positions did not. Councillors who were executives and middle corporate workers made less frequent attempts at further office than did those who were small businessmen.

The predicted relationship was not entirely born out by the data, but differences in office seeking were found across occupational groups, enough to warrant exploring the circumstances created by councillors' jobs. In regard to corporate officials, the literature suggests that executive and middle level workers are tightly linked into a private opportunity structure. The rewards of being or becoming an executive are probably more attractive than a political career begun at the council level. Ordinarily such a career ends after a second office holding experience at the municipal level or county level. This would explain why councillors who are corporate officials stalemate their careers at the council level.

As explained earlier, small businessmen tend to have restricted private job opportunities and are therefore more likely to channel their ambitions into politics. While laborers also have limited job options, they differ from small businessmen in that they have a

substantial amount of occupational security. While their occupational status is low, laborers may have less reason than small businessmen to attempt an alternative career in politics. Consequently, they do not seek political office as often as small businessmen.

Unlike the other occupational types, lawyers enjoy a special position in the political opportunity structure. More political office goals are available to them than to any other job type. In Michigan over 400 judicial and prosecutorial posts are legally restricted to practicing lawyers. Thus, councillors who are lawyers enjoy a virtual monopoly (relative to others) over the stepping-stone offices of county prosecutor and county judge. The greater number of office options available to them, especially those that are progressive probably explain their higher rate of office seeking.

Several findings were uncovered in regard to the occupations of councillors and their frequency of victory in later office attempts. Hypothesis IV predicting that the higher the occupational status of councillors, the more likely that they will win public office was only partially born out by the data. Professionals showed a high rate of success in later office attempts, almost 69%, which may have been partly due to their occupational prestige. A breakdown of professionals showed that lawyers were the most likely to win further office, but that this tendency was largely due to their victories in races for judicial and prosecutorial office. Both the "monopoly" enjoyed by lawyers and the heightened occupational prestige of all professionals appears to bring about their higher frequency of electoral victories.

Middle level corporate workers also enjoyed a high rate of success when they sought further office. Unfortunately, their small numbers

make it impossible to have much confidence in this finding. The problem of small sample size also restricts us from drawing conclusions about executives and laborers.

Of the small businessmen who sought an office on the council, only 49% were successful. This low rate of success may be due to their moderate occupational status. The economist, Peter Marks suggests that small businessmen lack a "class constituency" in the city.[64] While working class people will vote for working class candidates, the middle and upper classes give their support to candidates of high occupational prestige. Signey Verba touches on this notion in stating that middle class Americans place a high value on "getting ahead" and therefore estimate the political aspirant's right to rule in terms of his social status.[65] If this explanation is valid, small businessmen tend to lack the kind of class oriented support that people at other social and occupational levels enjoy.

This explanation leaves one wondering how small businessmen were able to get elected to the council in the first place, especially in much large numbers. Almost 40% of all councillors were small businessmen. However, the data indicate that small businessmen encountered difficulties in getting elected to council office, just as they did when they sought further elective office. They were more often defeated in first council races than were any other occupational group. Indeed we must marvel at their tenacity. These findings suggest that occupational status is a factor which limits small businessmen's success in further office endeavors.

Overall it appears that the occupations of councillors had an impact upon their later political career behavior. Both occupational

status and the circumstances created by jobs affected councillors' chances to seek and win further political office. In the following section, we shall examine the educational backgrounds of councillors and their later political career behavior.

III. The Educational Backgrounds of City Councillors

Overall those who entered the city council showed a high level of educational attainment. While almost 41% had entered college, an additional 23% had completed graduate or professional programs. Although the proportion of college educated councillors was higher in the 1960's than in earlier years, a majority with an education beyond high school were found in every time period under study.

The objective of this section is to determine whether educational backgrounds of councillors are associated with later political career behavior. The following hypotheses, previously stated in Chapter I, will be tested.

Hypothesis VII:

The higher the educational level of councillors the more likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis VIII:

The higher the educational level of councillors, the more likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

The control variable of occupation will be introduced in order to test for the independent effects of education.

Educational achievement and office seeking

The data show that councillors vary in elective office attempts according to their education. While over 59% of those who attended undergraduate school and almost 66% of the councillors with graduate

training sought elective offices, only one-third of those with a high school education or less made the same attempt. See Table 21.

Perhaps the tendency for the more educated to seek office is due to their advantage in personal resources. A college level education tends to raise people's consciousness about politics and to develop their innate abilities to communicate. It is also possible that a high education is related to office seeking, not because it in any way develops people's resources, but because it is a requisite for many of the jobs that typically produce aspiring politicians. The data demonstrate that the occupational level of councillors is positively related to their educational achievement.

In Table 22, occupation is introduced as a control variable. Within the executive grouping, only one individual sought further office which made it impossible to test for the effects of education. With this exception, the predicted relationship between education and office seeking holds within every occupational grouping.

Education and elective office winning

In the grouping of councillors who ran for further office, 48% of those with only high school educations or less won office. Those with a college education were more successful -- 61% were elected -- while the highest percentage of winning (70%) occurred among councillors with graduate training. The data show support for the predicted relationship between education and office winning. When the control variable of occupation is introduced, the expected pattern persists, except in the executive and laborer groupings where small N's may be producing irregularities. See Table 24.

One interesting aspect of the data pertains to the office goals of councillors. Surprisingly those with high school educations are almost as likely as graduate trained councillors to seek progressive office. However, their chances for success are restricted. They are less likely to win either the lateral or progressive posts than those with college or graduate training.

Interpreting the findings

The overall findings suggest that the educational background of councillors consistently influences their later political career behavior. Somehow high educational attainment motivates those councillors who have it to seek further office. Perhaps higher education cultivates greater feelings of political competence as Almond and Verba suggest.[66]

Education probably works in many different ways to produce this effect. First, it gives people objective skills that are useful resources in political competition. Second, the norm of political participation is learned directly or indirectly at the college level. Furthermore, education places the individual in occupational situations where "he meets others of like educational attainment, and this tends to reinforce the effect of his own education."[67]

Regardless of which processes are at work, this writer concludes that educational level is an important determinant of councillors' later political career behavior. In the following section we will examine the influences of age upon the likelihood that councillors will seek further political office.

IV. Age and Later Political Careers

This section is concerned with the effect a councillor's age has on his seeking and attaining further office. Joseph Schlesinger maintains that a politician's age places restrictions upon his future political chances:

> ...A politician may fail to advance in politics as much because he is the wrong age at the wrong time as because he is in the wrong office.[68]

In some cases an ambitious politician may be denied political promotion because of his youth. For example, in Michigan the ambitious who are under the age of thirty are legally prohibited from becoming governor. However, councillors' chances for the governorship are limited more because they are in the wrong office than because they are at the wrong age.

As has already been demonstrated, council office is not a pathway of ascent to the governor's post. Rather, we are concerned here with whether a councillor's general opportunities for further office decrease with his increasing age. The function of age upon a councillor's later political behavior will be tested by the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis IX:

The greater the age of councillors, the less likely that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis X:

The greater the age of ambitious councillors, the less likely that they will be successful in further office attempts.

Age and elective office attempts

The data demonstrates that those who entered the council at a younger age are consistently more likely to seek further elective office. Over 71% of the council entrants between the ages of twenty-one and thirty made further office attempts compared to 47% of those in the thirty-one to forty age grouping. The rate declines to approximately 39% for those in their forties and fifties. A sharp drop in the office seeking activity occurs in the plus sixty age grouping. See Table 25.

These data were not based upon the actual age of councillors when they tried to advance to other office. In some cases, this information was not available, especially when a councillor's political history was taken from his obituary; the actual dates at which he sought further office were unknown. Rather these dates are based upon the age at which individuals initially entered the council.

On the average, ambitious councillors spent over six years in office before making a further political attempt. Council entrants over fifty tend to have a slightly shorter length of service before a new office attempt is made. See Table 26. Still the pattern of office seeking found in the data suggests that the age at which individuals entered council office was an important determinant of their later aspirations in politics.

As Schlesinger explains, the younger face a wider range of political opportunities over time. In addition, further office seeking is a less costly commitment for those who begin their political careers in their twenties and early thirties.[69] Having not yet made a long term investment in their private occupations, they can treat an office

seeking endeavor as a "trial run." If they are successful and if they find sufficient rewards in office holding, they can consider a long range career in politics. Should they be defeated in political contention, they can more easily than their older colleagues redirect their ambitions into their private occupations.

On the other hand, a further office attempt for the person who entered the council over the age of forty usually involves greater opportunity costs. As stated earlier, the councillor in his forties usually spends an average of more than six years on the council. By the time he makes an elective office attempt, he is likely to be near or over fifty. At this age, he has already invested a number of years in his private job and may not be willing to divert his personal resources from it in order to seek political office. The older councillor may also recognize that should he leave his job in order to hold further office, he may not be able to return to it at a later date.

These findings are in agreement with the literature concerning the sociology of aging which suggests that the "middle age crisis" begins in the late forties and early fifties. At that point the individual realizes that he is in fact not likely to rise in life much further than he already has. According to J. S. Slotkin, the individual in middle age faces an adjustment period in which he may lower his level of aspirations until they are in line with what he can reasonably hope to achieve before retirement.[70]

When this reasoning is applied to the analysis of political careers, it suggests that the older councillor will be less likely to seek further political office. More importantly, it suggests that when

he does seek further office, he is less likely to attempt office goals that would raise his position on the political career ladder.

Let us turn from the frequency data on office seeking to an examination of the types of office goals sought by councillors of varying ages. As Table 27 indicates, those who entered the council at a younger age were more likely than older councillors to seek progressive office goals. While 40% of the council entrants in their twenties and 33% of those in their thirties sought county law enforcement or statewide elective offices, the rate drops considerably for those over forty.

Conversely, the rate of lateral office seeking increased with age. Older councillors were more likely to seek elective office at the municipal and county level that do not "fit" into the opportunity structure of politics. That is, lateral offices are political dead ends in the sense that they open no higher career opportunities for their occupants.

From these data it can be inferred that age affects not only the frequency of later office attempts, but also the level of office goals that councillors pursue. In the following section, we shall examine how councillors of differing ages actually fared in later office attempts.

Office winning and age

The data indicate that those who entered the council at a younger age are more likely to win attempts at further elective office. While 90% of the council entrants under thirty were successful in later office attempts, the rate declines to around 61% for those in their

thirties and forties. Beyond the age of fifty, the rate drops to 50%. See Table 28.

Furthermore, age appears to limit councillors' opportunities regardless of the elective office goals that they seek. Although cell N's were small, Table 29 shows that younger councillors were consistently more likely than their older colleagues to win elections at both the lateral and progressive levels. Thus, the elective advantage that younger councillors enjoy appears to crosscut levels of the opportunity structure.

Later political careers of councillors over fifty

The "middle age crisis" described by Slotkin appears to have an objective reality for older councillors. That is, they actually were less likely than those younger to obtain their elective office objectives.

This fact alone may explain why fewer older councillors seek further elective office. It is possible that they recognize that their chances for victory are limited. To draw from Barber, older councillors who had ambitions in elective politics might have estimated that their opportunities for success were limited. Rather than face the somewhat high risks of defeat, some may have simply refrained from further elective office attempts.

Given their relatively limited opportunities to attain elective office goals, what other career options do councillors over fifty take? One alternative is that older councillors simply drop out of politics altogether. In fact 14% of the councillors over fifty had discrete

careers on the council. This percentage is the highest found among all age groupings. See Table 30.

A second alternative is that councillors over fifty take appointive posts. However, the frequency with which older councillors take appointive posts is less than in younger age groups. Only 16% of the councillors who entered office over the age of fifty took appointive posts, compared to 22% of the rest of the sample.

A third option is that older councillors simply remain on the council term after term. This alternative is in line with Slotkin's argument that people in middle age usually remain on their present course in life regardless of what aspirations they previously held. About 38% of the councillors over fifty had static careers. The static rate is higher for these councillors than for any other age grouping.

The career pathways taken by older councillors are diverse. Some seek and/or move to other political positions, although at a lower rate than other age groupings. More frequently older councillors chose career options that do not take them beyond the council office holding experience. Since over one-half of them either dropped out of the council after a single term or pursued static careers, they appear to have more restricted political careers than their younger counterparts. In the following section, we shall review the overall findings in regard to age and office seeking.

Age and councillors' later political careers

The age of city councillors consistently affects the likelihood that they will seek and win further elective office. Younger

councillors more often run for later office and are more likely to be successful.

Most of the office goals sought and won by councillors were lateral. That is, they were municipal and county posts that did not constitute an upward move on the political career ladder. Although younger councillors were less likely to run for lateral offices, they were more likely to win them.

About nine percent of the entire sample of councillors ran for progressive posts at the county and state level. However, younger councillors, especially those under the age of thirty, were the most likely to seek and win progressive office. Beyond the age of thirty, the rate of progressive office attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, declines consistently.

The fact that both lateral and progressive office goals are difficult to attain for councillors over fifty has probably served to discourage many of them from seeking elective office. It appears that they opt instead for static careers or drop out of politics altogether.

The variable of age has been shown to affect the office seeking behavior of councillors as predicted by Hypotheses IX and X. In the following section, the role of race and sex as determinants of councillors' later political career behavior will be examined.

V. Race and Sex as Determinants of Later Political Careers

During the time period under study, few blacks or women entered council office in the six cities. From 1946 to 1966, only four blacks were found serving in council office, 1.75% of the total sample. Even in Detroit, where the percentage of the total population that was black

ranged upwards of 25%, the first black was not elected to the common council until 1957. In Jackson, Lansing and Grand Rapids, no blacks had entered the council by 1966.

Women fared only slightly better than blacks in terms of their numbers on the council. From 1946 to 1966, six women, 2.63% of the total sample, had been elected to council office in the cities of Lansing, Grand Rapids, Detroit and Jackson.

The small number of blacks and women serving in council office was a reflection of their overall limited opportunities in municipal elective politics. During the sample period, no blacks had served in mayoral office or in the complex of other elective offices, i.e., treasurer, clerk or assessor in the respective cities.

Nor were women generally found serving in municipal elective offices other than in the council. A conspicuous exception was Mary Bennet, a newspaper reporter, who was elected as mayor of Jackson in 1965. Her liberal viewpoint on issues such as housing and race relations became apparent during her first term and was probably instrumental to her defeat two years later. Mrs. Bennet was later appointed as director of Jackson's Office of Economic Opportunity but became disillusioned with local programs and resigned in 1969.

A second exception is found in Lansing where one municipal elective office, the clerkship, has traditionally been held by women. Although this office is elective, it has essentially served as a long term career post for its female occupants. Since 1923, a female city clerk has never been defeated in an incumbency race. Often they ran unopposed. The last three women who became city clerks served until

their retirement. With these two exceptions, women have only been able to enter municipal elective office via the council.

Due to small sample size, it will not be possible to systematically test hypotheses concerning race, sex and further office attempts. Since the women and blacks found in the sample were overall quite different from other councillors in their backgrounds and political behavior, we shall proceed with a descriptive analysis of them.

The initial task of this section is to describe the past achievements of black and women councillors in terms of their educations, occupations and organizational affiliations in the city. Second, their political careers after leaving council office will be described. Finally, we shall examine the changing political opportunities for blacks and women since the time period under study.

Backgrounds

Blacks and women who entered the council showed a tendency to have substantial experience in voluntary and party organizations, and/or jobs oriented to politics. Of the three blacks for which information was available, Wayne Patrick, a Detroit lawyer, was most directly involved in government, having worked in the county prosecutor's office for several years prior to entering the council. Floyd McCree, a production worker in the Buick plant in Flint, was a local official in the United Auto Workers. Incidentally, Mr. McCree twice ran unsuccessfully for the council and had been active in a political party before being elected in 1958. Clark Valentine had retired from the army just prior to running for the council in 1963. However, he had previously served as the president of a neighborhood improvement organization for several

years. All three had been affiliated with moderate black groups in the city such as the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League.

Among the women who ascended to the council, two distinct patterns emerged in their pasts. Two were housewives who had a long record of involvement in civic affairs in the city. One, who was the wife of a neuro-surgeon, additionally had been active in urban renewal and pro-annexation groups in Grand Rapids. She also had served as a delegate to the state democratic convention two years prior to running for the council.

Of the remaining four women, all had full time occupations that are usually regarded as "breeding grounds" for politicians. One was a real estate salesman while two were owners of small businesses. Lucille Belen, the owner of a florist shop in Lansing, had previously held a democratic party office at the state level. One other women held a law degree and had worked as an investigator for the probate court prior to running for the council. All had a record of service in civic groups in the city.

Judging from their backgrounds, both blacks and women appear to have had more extensive community and political experience than did their white male colleagues on the council.

Later political careers

The elective political opportunities that women and blacks had, or took as councillors, were few. None made attempts to run for progressive offices at the county or state level. Only one black councillor and one councilwoman sought a lateral elective office. In 1969 Mary Beck had sufficient primary votes to be included on the general

election ballot for mayor in Detroit. However, she was soundly defeated in the election and dropped out of politics altogether.

After becoming the county democratic chairman in 1968, Floyd McCree unsuccessfully ran for the legislature. Two years later, he was elected county register of deeds and remains in that post to the present time.

Probably as a result of their limited opportunities to advance to other elective offices, most women and black councillors sought to remain in the council term after term, and thereby pursued static careers. The average length of service for both groups was higher than that of the total sample of councillors. The women served 8.33 mean years, while the three black councillors averaged 14.33 years.

Even a static career became hazardous for women after serving several years on the council. Three of the four female statics were defeated in incumbency elections and all subsequently stayed out of politics. The case that most strongly emphasizes the obstacles they faced was that of a woman from Detroit who ran in three consecutive races for the common council before being elected. After serving two terms, she was defeated in an incumbency race. She contended unsuccessfully in two more elections before dropping out of council and political contention altogether.

Overall the political career opportunities of women appear to have been severely restricted in all directions, except out of politics. While the black councillors had no setbacks in pursuing static careers, they too appear to have been blocked from lateral and progressive office goals.

Whether this state of affairs will continue for these individuals remains to be seen. One woman and one black who were elected to the council prior to 1966 are still serving and have been classified as statics. This classification may be premature. In addition, the only elected lateral, Floyd McCree, may decide to run for further office, although he is not in the most opportune position from which to do so. These or any of the other individuals described here may make other office attempts in the future. Nevertheless it is fair to conclude that blacks and women had severely limited political career options compared to their white male colleagues on the council during the time period under study.

Council membership in transition

This section would not be complete without some mention of the recent influx of blacks and women into council office. From 1967 to 1974, the number of blacks serving on the council has quadrupled. The single greatest increment of blacks occurred in the Detroit election of 1973 which increased their numbers on the council from one to four. Coleman Young, a popular state senator with a history of black activism, was elected mayor over John Nichols, a white ex-police commissioner. This change in municipal leadership has been attributed to the fact that over one-half of the Detroit population was black and was mobilized to constitute a winning majority. Time reports that "the election was decided chiefly along racial lines" with "92% of the blacks voting for Young and 91% of the whites voting for Nichols."[71]

However, black newcomers have also been successful in winning at-large elections to the council in Lansing and Battle Creek where

they constitute less than 20% of the total population. Furthermore, a black councillor from Grand Rapids won the city wide election for mayor in 1972.

Of course, some black newcomers to the council (in Flint) were elected from ward districts that had large black populations. However, it appears that substantial portions of white voters have been willing to cast their ballots in favor of black candidates.

Slight increases in the number of women serving on the council have occurred in recent years. Their numbers expanded from six to nine in the 1967 to 1974 period with one councilwoman being an incumbent "carryover" from earlier years. All but one of the six female newcomers entered office in the early 1970's.

Unfortunately it is too early to observe whether these women and blacks will seek further political office. If past history can serve as a guide, we can expect these individuals to remain in the council an average of around six years before seeking a further office goal. With their increasing numbers, however, it seems inevitable that some will make such attempts in the future. Whether the electorate will respond negatively, as it has often done in the past, remains to be seen. The defeats women have experienced in comparison to blacks suggest that they will encounter more failures than blacks when running for council and other elective offices in the future.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter gives evidence that background traits affect the later political careers of councillors. Those with preferred traits by society's definition run more frequently for elective office beyond

the council. When councillors were stratified by education, age, race and sex, the expected relationships between these status traits and office seeking were found. Some unpredicted patterns emerged among councillors when they were ranked by occupational status. While professionals in the high echelons of occupational rank (primarily lawyers) often sought further office, corporate officials did not. One moderate level grouping, small businessmen, had a high rate of office attempts, a finding running counter to the status hypothesis.

In order to explain these disparities, the circumstances surrounding the private jobs of councillors were examined. Depending on their vocation, their private ambitions may have influenced councillors' political aspirations.

Although the data did show some irregularities, those of high occupational status more often succeeded in later elections. Educational achievement and age appear to also affect a councillor's chances, while the factors of race and sex have such a pronounced influence upon political careers that few blacks or female councilmembers run for later elective office. In summation, it is evident that the electorate, in some fashion, considers a councillor's background when making voting decisions.

From these data, a composite profile of the successful councillor can be constructed. This individual is most likely to attain lateral office at the municipal and county level. As Table 32 indicates, he is most likely to be a white male who entered the council in his thirties. His accomplishments in private life are substantial. He has a college education which may have extended beyond the

undergraduate level. His occupation is "white collar," and he is most likely to be a professional.

The composite picture for the few councillors who attain progressive office varies only slightly. He is a white male, usually a lawyer, who entered the council in his early thirties. After a tenure of over six years on the council, he advanced to a stepping-stone post. From his new vantage point at the county level, he seeks and wins a high level office.

This chapter has described who runs for political office from the council. In Chapter IV we will see how factors of the urban political system affect councillors' chances for further elective office.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970); Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); Richard Feld and Donald S. Lutz, "Recruitment of City Council Members in Houston" (paper delivered to the Southern Political Science Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, November 5-7, 1970); Edward Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965).

2. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 225-26; Richard Feld and Donald S. Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," Journal of Politics 34 (August 1972):928-29; Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 56-58.

3. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 26 and 226; Feld and Lutz, "Recruitment to the Houston City Council," p. 927.

4. James David Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 17.

5. Rufus Browning, "Hypotheses about Political Recruitment: A Partially Data Based Computer Simulation," in Simulation in the Study of Politics, ed. by William Coplin (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 304.

6. Donald Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 61.

7. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 28.

8. See Chapter II, Section II.

9. Kenneth VerBurg, Guide to Michigan County Government (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, 1972), IX-26.

10. Barber, The Lawmakers, pp. 11-15.

11. One conspicuous exception is the County Board of Commissioners which meets approximately once a month.

12. John Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 22-23.

13. Matthews, The Social Background.

14. Melvin Tumin, Social Stratification (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 13.

15. Ibid., p. 26.

16. Ibid., p. 27.

17. Matthews, The Social Background, p. 56.

18. Ibid.; Eva Rosenburg found evidence that higher status adults in kibbutzes are more poised and self confident. See Eva Rosenburg, "Social Stratification in a Classless Society," American Sociological Review 16 (1951):766-74; Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 57-62.

19. Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik, "Women as Politicians: The Social Background, Personality, and Political Careers of Female Party Leaders," Journal of Social Issues 28 (1972):225-26.

20. J. Bieri and R. Lobeck, "Self Concept Differences in Relation to Identity, Religion and Social Class," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 62 (1961):94-98.

21. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Chapters 7-9.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley Publishers, 1960), p. 490.

24. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Chapter 6.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., Chapter 3.

28. Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 492.

29. Kimball Young, Social Psychology (New York: Crofts and Company, 1930), pp. 262-63; A Gesell and E. E. Lord, "A Psychological Comparison of Nursery School Children from Homes of Low and High Economic Status," Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology 34 (1927):554-57.

30. Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 492.

31. Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," American Sociological Review 11 (1946):688-90.

32. M. E. Olson, "Social and Political Participation of Blacks," American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970):682-97.

33. William G. Mather, "Income and Social Participation," American Sociological Review 6 (1941):381-82.

34. Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50 (July 1943):370-96; Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 30. The lack of resources of the lower strata is described by Judith Shuval in "Class and Ethnic Correlates of Casual Neighboring," American Sociological Review 21 (August 1956):453-58.

35. James Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 11.

36. Ibid., pp. 225-26. Davies points out that the upper middle class probably produced more rulers than the upper class. See also Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 287-91; Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Political Decision Makers, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 193-217.

37. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 66. Prewitt estimates that influence by politically active parents is a major factor inducing political participation among 30% to 40% of those who are active in municipal politics.

38. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

39. R. W. Hodge and D. J. Treiman, "Social Participation and Social Status," American Sociological Review 33 (October 1968):722-40.

40. Tumin, Social Stratification, p. 26.

41. Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U. S. -- A Model," Journal of Politics 24 (November 1962):703-16.

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44. C. W. Franklin and L. R. Wallum, "Towards a Paradigm of Substructural Relations: An Application to Sex and Race in the United States," Phylon (Fall 1972):248.

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47. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 31.

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TABLE 15

Occupation and later career behavior

	Executives 9.29%	Professionals 25.22%	Middle level corporate 14.16%	Small businessmen 39.82%	Laborers 9.29%	Others 2.21%	Total 99.99%
Sought elective office:							
yes	4.76	50.87	21.88	41.11	38.10	60.00	37.61
no	95.24	49.13	78.13	58.84	61.90	40.00	62.39
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	21	57	32	90	21	5	226
Outcome of elective office attempts:*							
won	0.00	68.96	85.71	48.65	62.05	0.00	56.67
lost	100.00	31.04	14.29	51.35	37.50	0.00	43.33
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	1	29	7	37	8	0	85
Took appointive posts:							
yes	28.57	10.52	15.63	23.33	14.29	--	18.14
no	71.43	88.46	81.25	76.67	85.71	--	81.86
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	--	100.00
total N	21	57	32	90	21	--	226

*Based on total number in each occupational grouping who sought elective office.

TABLE 16

City councillors who are professionals by elective office attempts, outcome of elective office attempts and % taking appointive posts

	Lawyers	Doctors & pharmacists	Professor & teachers	Engineers, architects, newspapermen & morticians
Sought elective office:				
yes	85.19	0.00	33.33	30.77
no	14.81	100.00	66.67	69.23
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	27	5	12	13

	Lawyers	All other professionals combined
Outcome of elective office attempts:		
won	71.43	62.50
lost	28.57	37.50
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	21	8

	Lawyers	All other professionals combined
Took appointive office:		
yes	7.41	13.33
no	92.59	86.67
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	27	30

TABLE 17

Office goals of councillors who are lawyers and outcome of subsequent election*

Outcome of election	Office goal	
	Judgeship & prosecutor's office	Other elective offices
won	75.00	66.67
lost	25.00	33.33
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	12	9

*Table based on total number of office seeking lawyer-councillors.

TABLE 18

% of councillors who were corporate executives entering office from 1946 to 1965

Time period	Executives
1946-55	57.14
1956-65	42.86
total %	100.00
total N	21

TABLE 19

Small businessmen by elective office attempts, outcome of election, and % taking appointive posts

	Brokerage businessmen			Other small businessmen
	Independent merchant	Real estate & insurance brokers	Fuel & auto dealers	
Sought elective office:				
yes	43.90	36.84	42.86	39.13
no	56.09	63.15	63.14	60.87
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	41	19	7	23
Outcome of elective office attempts:				
won	55.56	57.14	33.33	33.33
lost	44.44	42.86	66.67	66.67
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	18	7	3	9
Took appointive posts:				
yes	17.07	26.32	28.57	30.43
no	82.93	73.68	71.43	69.57
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	41	19	7	23

TABLE 20

Councillors who were small businessmen by elective office attempts and outcome

	Small businesses	
	Owners	Salesmen & managers
Sought elective office:		
won	38.89	44.44
lost	61.11	55.56
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	54	36
Outcome of elective office attempts:		
won	47.62	50.00
lost	52.38	50.00
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	21	16

TABLE 21

Highest educational level and % seeking later office

% seeking later office	Education		
	High school or less	College	Graduate school
yes	33.33	59.04	65.96
no	66.67	40.96	34.04
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	75	83	47

TABLE 22

% making elective office attempts
by education and occupation

Occupation	High school or less	College or higher
Executives	20.00 (5)	0.00 (13)
Professionals	40.00 (5)	56.52 (46)
Middle level corporate	21.43 (14)	33.33 (12)
Small businessmen	40.54 (37)	51.22 (41)
Laborers	37.50 (16)	50.00 (4)

TABLE 23

% winning elective office by highest educational level

% winning elective office	Education		
	High school or less	College	Graduate school
won	48.00	61.22	70.37
lost	52.00	38.78	29.63
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	25	49	27

TABLE 24

% winning elective office by education and occupation

Occupation	High school or less	College or higher
Executives	0.00 (1)	--
Professionals	50.00 (2)	52.77 (36)
Middle level corporate	66.67 (3)	100.00 (4)
Small businessmen	46.67 (15)	52.38 (21)
Laborers	66.67 (6)	50.00 (2)

TABLE 25

Age and % seeking elective office

Later elective office attempts	Age					
	21-30 6.80%	31-40 36.89%	41-50 25.73%	51-60 18.45%	+60 12.14%	total 100.01%
yes	71.42	47.37	39.62	39.47	20.00	40.93
no	28.58	52.63	60.38	60.53	80.00	59.07
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	14	76	53	38	25	206

TABLE 26

Age and mean years served on the city council

Mean years served before:	Age				
	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	+60
first office attempt	6.89 (9)	6.34 (35)	6.86 (21)	6.27 (15)	4.00 (5)
first successful office attempt	7.25 (8)	7.05 (21)	7.15 (13)	5.57 (7)	4.40 (3)
move to appointive post	5.33 (3)	7.69 (16)	5.82 (11)	5.85 (7)	3.67 (3)

TABLE 27

Age and office goals sought

Office goal	Age			
	21-30	31-40	41-50	+50
progressive	40.00	33.33	19.04	10.00
lateral	60.00	66.67	80.96	90.00
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	10	36	21	20

TABLE 28

Age and outcome of further office attempts

Outcome	Age			
	21-30	31-40	41-50	+50
won	90.00	61.11	61.90	50.00
lost	10.00	38.89	38.10	50.00
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	10	36	21	20

TABLE 29

Elective office winners by age
and level of office goal

Office goal	Age			
	21-30	31-40	41-50	+50
progressive	75.00 (4)	58.33 (12)	50.00 (4)	0.00 (2)
lateral	100.00 (6)	66.67 (24)	64.71 (17)	55.56 (18)

TABLE 30

Age of councillors by career pathways pursued

Career pathway	Age				
	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	+60
discretes	0.00	5.19	7.69	10.52	20.00
statics	14.28	24.68	36.53	34.21	44.00
lateral	57.14	54.54	50.00	52.63	36.00
progressive	28.57	15.58	5.78	2.63	0.00
total %	99.99	99.99	100.00	99.99	100.00
total N	14	77	52	38	25

TABLE 31

Career pathways taken by black and female councillors (by raw numbers)

Pathway	Blacks	Women
progressive	0	0
stymied	0	0
lateral	1	1*
stymied	0	1
static	3	1
stymied	0	3
discrete	0	0

*appointive office taken

TABLE 32

Selected characteristics of councillors who won lateral office

Age	
21-30	16.36
31-40	41.82
41-50	23.64
+50	18.18
total %	100.00
total N	55

Occupation	
executive	0.00
professional	40.00
middle corporate	12.00
small businessmen	36.00
laborer	10.00
other	2.00
total %	100.00
total N	51

Education	
high school or less	19.67
college	49.18
graduate school	31.15
total %	100.00
total N	61

Race	
white	98.36
non-white	1.64
total %	100.00
total N	61

Sex	
male	100.00
female	0.00
total %	100.00
total N	61

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL SETTING OF CITY COUNCILLORS AND LATER POLITICAL CAREER BEHAVIOR

A recurring theme in the literature on political ambition is that elected officials, in assessing their future career opportunities, pay close attention to the structural conditions of their current environment.[1] Like other politicians, city councillors are enmeshed in a setting of demographic and political givens that partly determine their opportunities to advance in politics.

Black makes a strong argument for the importance of structural variables in shaping the later career ambitions of councillors. Although his concern is with the effects of municipal population and electoral competition, Black contends that structural factors in general are the most crucial determinants of political advancement:

> A man's political motives and desires are molded by the availability of political 'opportunities,' and...such opportunities are structurally determined. The critical element here is the idea that a political structure acts on the choices of individuals so as to systematically affect all political office seekers.[2]

This chapter explores the impact of several aspects of the municipal environment that may be influential in shaping councillors' later office seeking behavior. In Section I the effects of city population upon the frequency with which councillors seek and attain later elective office will be examined. According to Black, those who won council office in a big city probably had to invest more resources of

time, energy and capital in campaigning than did their counterparts from a smaller municipality. If their larger investment is indicative of a greater commitment to a political career, the following hypotheses will be confirmed with the data on councillors from Michigan:

Hypothesis XV:

Councillors from large cities will be more likely to make further office attempts than those from smaller cities.

Hypothesis XVI:

Councillors from large cities will be more likely to win further office than those from smaller cities.

A second indicator of the costliness of council elections is the degree to which they are competitive. Since they probably spent more resources in campaigning, individuals who were successful in closely contested council races may be more likely than those who were easy victors in such elections to have futher ambitions. In Section II, the following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis XVII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who were elected by wide margins.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to win further office than those who were elected by wide margins.

A third indicator of the earlier investment of individuals is whether at anytime in their career, they entered and won a race against a council incumbent. Those who did probably spent substantial resources in campaigning. If this greater expenditure is reflective of a commitment to a further political career, victors over council incumbents are expected to behave as follows:

Hypothesis XIX:

Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who did not.

Hypothesis XX:

Those who defeated an incumbent in a council election will be more likely to win further office than those who did not.

The third section is concerned with the way the objective opportunities of councillors to attain further office act upon their political ambitions and subsequent careers. Schlesinger asserts that whether elected officials advance from one office to another depends upon the openness of the opportunity structure lying before them. When the turnover in the occupants of elective posts at other, presumably higher levels is greater, the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors is larger. It is expected that:

Hypothesis XXI:

The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis XXII:

The larger the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors across municipalities, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further elective office.

In the fourth section, the way in which councillors are advantaged or disadvantaged by the composition of their current electorate will be explored. The extent to which council constituencies are congruent and overlap with the electorates for other political offices may affect councillors' ambitions and later political careers. As will be explained in Section IV, the form of councillors' district on a ward or at-large basis and the size of its voting population are indicative of the electoral opportunities councillors have to attain another office.

An index combining the variables of district form and size will be constructed in order to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XXIII:

The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will make further office attempts.

Hypothesis XXIV:

The greater is the electoral advantage of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will win further office.

The findings of this chapter are summarized in Section V.

I. Municipal Population and the Later Political Careers of Councillors

Black maintains that those elected to the council from cities of a large population tend to share a stronger commitment to council office holding and to further political endeavors than their colleagues from small cities. This relationship is partly due to the campaign conditions that contenders for council office face across cities of different size. In large cities, the costs attached to seeking council office are relatively greater in terms of time, effort and capital. According to Black,

> ...the larger...the electorate to which the candidate must appeal...the more costly in general will be his campaign. [For this reason,] an individual's investment in politics would appear to be associated with the size of the political unit which the individual serves.[3]

Among San Francisco Bay area councillors, those from larger cities consistently reported that they spent more funds in campaign efforts. Almost 80% of the successful contenders from cities of 30,000 or more residents spent at least $1000 in council elections compared to only six percent of those from smaller cities. In addition, councillors from large communities more frequently reported spending "considerable"

time in campaigning.[4] Black acknowledges that other costs are borne by council contenders, i.e., the opportunity costs of foregoing other alternatives outside of politics, but he maintains that the bulk of their expenditures are in capital and in effort, and those who campaigned in larger cities consistently spent more of these resources.

Once elected those from larger cities also incur greater costs in holding council office. Black maintains that the responsibilities and demands placed on council officials are relatively greater in large cities. Therefore, big city councillors probably spend more time and effort in conducting the tasks of their office than do their colleagues in smaller cities.

Black infers that since they are willing to allocate more resources, those from larger cities essentially place a higher value on holding council office than do councillors from smaller municipalities. Support for this contention is found in the responses of Bay area councillors to the following question: "Which of the following statements most closely approximates your desire and efforts to be elected to the council in your last campaign? considerable; some; little." Those from cities of large populations consistently reported a higher level of desire to be elected.[5]

A corollary of this argument is that since the demands of politics are greater in large cities, those potential candidates who are less committed to holding office will tend to refrain from entering the competition, thereby leaving only those who are the most committed as council candidates.

Black then seeks to demonstrate that the big city councillor is also more likely to harbor a desire to continue his political career by seeking a further office.

Let us examine the three alternatives available to the individual once elected to the council: "Option A. to drop out of politics; Option B. to seek re-election; Option C. to pursue another political office."[6] The councillor makes an estimate of his utility (U), for each of the three options. As stated in the model, (U) is equal to his appraisal of the probability (P) that he could attain his goal times the benefit (B) he expected to enjoy from it, minus his assessment of the costs (C) he would incur by seeking the objective, $U(o) = PB - C$. Black makes the assumption that the individual will choose the alternative that he expects to yield the highest utility value.[7]

Option A involves the councillor's estimate of how he could otherwise spend his given resources outside the political arena, for example, in order to advance his private occupation. The remaining two alternatives describe courses of action that the councillor may take in order to continue his political career, either by running in an incumbency election -- Option B, or by seeking another political office -- Option C.

Obviously a number of judgements enter into a councillor's calculus of these three utility values. The components of the utility equation tell us little about the considerations "behind" a councillor's estimate of P, B and C for each alternative. Black acknowledges that we know "next to nothing about the general process through which such factors are aggregated by the individual."[8]

At issue here, however, is the systematic effect that structural variables have upon a councillor's calculus of utility for the three alternatives. The size of the city in which an individual was elected indirectly affects his estimate of the costs that he would incur by seeking a further office objective. As has already been demonstrated, city size is positively related to the magnitude of the initial investment made by the individual to win and hold council office. Black maintains that the greater is a councillor's earlier expenditure, the smaller is his estimate of the additional costs he would incur in seeking a future office. Therefore, the individual who allocated more resources is more likely than one who spent a lesser amount to choose Option C.

Let us look at Black's description of this earlier investment and its impact upon a councillor's later career choices. First, a portion of that which an individual invested in order to attain council office can return benefits in both his public and his private life.[9] For example, a candidate who meets his constituents on a face-to-face basis is likely to gain votes which aid him in winning the election. Direct contact with the voters probably also yields private benefits to the council contender. If he has a gregarious nature, campaigning may bring him the personal satisfaction of making new acquaintances.

Perhaps more important to the average candidate, electioneering may be of benefit to his private occupation. If the council candidate is a businessman, he may find new customers or future contacts among his constituents. Williams and Adrian suggest that the council candidate who is a neighborhood merchant probably expects political activity to help his business.[10] If the candidate is a lawyer, campaigning may

serve as an "ethical form of political advertising" which may aid him in enlarging his clientele.[11] Regardless of the outcome of the election, virtually every council candidate probably expects and enjoys some form of private reward from his campaign efforts.

However, a large portion of an individual's expenditure involved exchanging scarce resources for "uniquely political knowledge."[12] During the campaign, he more or less learned "how to operate as a political candidate. He discovered who in his constituency will offer him political support." As a councillor, he "became familiar with the laws of his system, the rules of procedure in his political arena, and the informal norms that regulate the interpersonal relations among politicians."[13]

While this specialized knowledge is beneficial to the individual in his political role, it confers few or no benefits to him should he terminate his public career. If he drops out of politics (Option A), the councillor will lose that part of his investment which cannot be transferred to non-political alternatives.

A substantial part of this investment, however, can be "reapplied" toward other political endeavors. According to Black, each allocation that the individual made "in the political process in his political unit" was an investment not only toward the office that he won, but also "toward the other offices or positions potentially open to him."[14] The greater was the earlier expenditure made by the individual to seek and hold council office, the larger is the absolute amount that he can reapply in seeking a further office objective. All other factors being equal, the net costs of a later political campaign are relatively smaller for one who made a larger earlier investment than for the

person who previously spent fewer resources. The former is therefore more likely to seek another political office.

Since councillors from large cities had, by and large, made greater investments in obtaining their positions, they are predicted in Hypothesis I to be more likely to run for another political office. Let us apply Black's investment model to the sample under study.

Council campaigns in the sample cities

Although no systematic data are available, the costliness of campaigns for Michigan councillors appears to decline with city size. In Detroit, the largest city, council candidates make frequent public speaking appearances. James Brickley who began his political career in the common council claims that successful contestants "make as many as two or three speeches a day in the two weeks prior to the general election."[15]

According to Edward Banfield, face-to-face campaigning is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to attain victory in a Detroit council election.[16] A contender also needs to win the "active support, including financial backing, from one or two, or even two or three city wide interests."[17] These regularly include the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education, building trades unions, organized city workers, business and professional organizations, ethnic clubs, homeowners associations, good government groups and the newspapers. The need for group support in Detroit means that those candidates who are elected had devoted at least some time to seeking out and organizing others for campaign work.

Since the 1940's, council and other local candidates have increasingly supplemented their campaigns with messages in the mass media.[18] Near election day radio and television spots are commonplace as are printed endorsements in the city's newspapers. The widespread use of these techniques suggests that council competitors make financial sacrifices and/or devote some time to fund raising efforts.

In Grand Rapids, Flint and Lansing, the middle sized cities in the sample, successful candidates appear to make lesser investments in council campaigns. While they make some public speaking appearances, the pace is not as great as their counterparts in Detroit.

For the most part, council contenders are unable or unwilling to attain the active backing of any organized interests in the middle sized cities. From time to time candidates in Grand Rapids have received public endorsements from business and neighborhood groups, but little assistance in direct campaigning. While union workers have regularly stumped for pro-labor candidates in Flint, those from other groupings in the city have done so only sporadically.[19]

According to Lloyd Moles, former city hall reporter for the Lansing State Journal, council candidates from Lansing "worked with little or no organizational backing in the council elections of the 40's and 50's."[20] Since the 1960's, members of several groupings, such as the West Side Association, union locals and state workers have become visibly active in council campaigns.[21] It is interesting to note that the increase in citizen and group involvement occurred in a period of rapid population growth. From 1960 to 1970, the number of Lansing residents increased by 20%, from almost 108,000 to over 131,000.

In the smallest sample cities, Battle Creek and Jackson, council campaigns are traditionally low keyed. Contenders in both cities make few public speaking appearances. In a study of Jackson, Williams and Adrian report, "few councilmen made speeches or did much beyond printing a few cards and placing an election eve ad. When a service club invited the candidates to speak before it on one occasion, only one to eighteen appeared at the meeting."[22]

In Battle Creek, council candidates deliver few campaign speeches. Nor do they normally spend more than a few hundred dollars in electioneering.[23] Several contenders have gone so far as to announce and carry out their intentions to spend no money in the council campaign. Because it is considered prestigious for candidates to minimize expenses, the usual pre-election paraphenalia -- placards, banners and bumper stickers -- are often absent from Battle Creek campaigns.[24]

While these observations are impressionistic, they suggest that city size is positively associated with the amount of resources in time, effort and capital that successful candidates allocate in council campaigns. This variation in expenditures may reflect, as Black suggests, differences in the degree of commitment candidates have to council service and to a political career in general. In the small cities those who run for council office may view their political involvement more as a civic service, while those in big cities may tend to see it as a first step in a political career. If this is the case, we should find, as Hypothesis XV states, that councillors elected in cities with a large population are more likely to make later office attempts than those in smaller ones.

In Table 33, the data show a weak, but positive association between municipal size and the percentage of councillors making later office bids. Forty-eight percent of those elected from a city population of over a million (Detroit), seek further office compared to 45% of the councillors in middle size cities and one-third of those in small cities.

While it is not formally stated, Black's explanation implies that city size is related to the likelihood that councillors will be victorious in later office bids. Those individuals who spent more resources should have actually learned more about the effective techniques of campaigning. On the average, their greater investment in "uniquely political knowledge" should make big city councillors more likely to win later elective office.

The data show weak support for this contention. One-third of the councillors from big cities win a later office while around 28% and 21% of those in medium and small cities do so. See Table 34.

Given the weak associations found in the data, one hesitates to blanketly accept the investment argument presented by Black. In light of the extreme differences in the population of the sample cities, from over one million to less than 50,000, one would expect more marked variation in the rates of office attempts and victories by councillors.

It is possible that those from larger cities view their earlier expenditures as an investment in their political future, as Black asserts. On the other hand, big city councillors may more often seek and attain later office not because they are motivated by their investment, but because they, as office holders, find themselves in a climate fertile for the growth of ambitions. As William Dutton states,

those who enter council office in big cities tend "to become better known, get more news coverage and thus have a public image" all of which add up to "a somewhat better opportunity for advancement."[25]

The data on city size are not sufficient to tell us which process is at work here. However, we can test for the effects of additional cost factors. If other variables reflecting campaign investments are associated with the later career behavior of councillors, we will have found additional support for Black's argument.

II. Electoral Competition and the Later Political Careers of City Councillors

Like city size, the competitiveness of the election which brought an individual into council office is a rough indicator of his earlier investment. Black maintains that the aspirant who entered a closely contested race tends "to have campaigned more vigorously" for his office and thereby spent greater resources in time, energy and capital.[26]

As has already been discussed, the larger the earlier expenditure made by the individual to attain council office, the greater is the absolute amount that he can reapply in a further office endeavor. In a competitive campaign, the successful contender probably works harder and learns more practical skills of electioneering. Compared to his less seasoned colleague, he may expect a further political venture to be less costly and therefore be more likely to seek further office.

Second politically competitive races may act as a screening device which filters out potential candidates who are less committed to office holding. Conversely those who entered close races and won, since they

spent substantial resources to do so, may have a greater commitment to pursuing a further political career.

Black's argument suggests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis XVII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to make further office attempts than those who were elected by wide margins.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Those who were initially elected to council office in closely contested races will be more likely to win further office than those who were elected by wide margins.

Two measures of electoral competition are applied to the data on Michigan councillors, the closeness of the vote in an individual's first successful race for the council and the defeat of an incumbent in a council election.

Closeness of council vote

In order to test for the effects of the closeness of the vote, councillors were classified according to the percentage of the total vote that they received in their first successful council race. In Detroit and Battle Creek top vote getters are elected from a list of candidates. Four of the eight councillors in Lansing are elected by this procedure. The following formula was used to arrive at a percentage figure that reflects the closeness of the vote for at-large, list elected candidates:

$$\%\ \text{of vote for candidate} = \frac{\text{total number of votes for a given candidate}}{\text{total number of votes for a given candidate} + \text{total number of votes for highest losing candidate}}$$

The data in Table 35 show a weak relationship between the closeness of vote and the frequency of office seeking by councillors. Those

elected by 50% to 59% of the vote and those elected by 60% to 69% of the vote showed a similar frequency of later office attempts, around 40%. The rate of office seeking drops to about 31% among councillors elected by 70% or more of the vote.

A similar pattern emerges in the data on the closeness of vote and later office victories among councillors. Those in the 50's and 60's percentage range of electoral competition are about equal in the frequency with which they reach further office and are about ten percent more likely than councillors in the lowest competition category to do so.

Both the office seeking and winning data suggest a threshold point in electoral competition, at around 70%, beyond which the frequency of office seeking and winning declines. While this variation may be due to the impact of electoral competition upon the later career behavior of councillors, the "hidden" variable of city size may be producing the observed pattern in the data. Among the cities under study, electoral competition roughly increases with population. It is possible that electoral competition simply mirrors the association between city size and the frequency of later office attempts by councillors.

In Table 36, the relationship between competition and office seeking is tested with the control variable of population introduced. Due to the threshold level found in the competition data, councillors are divided into two groupings, those who attained less than 70% of the vote in their first council race and those who received 70% or more of the vote.

As Table 36 indicates, the relationship between competition and office seeking holds at all levels of the control variable. In fact

competition and city size have roughly equivalent effects upon the rate of councillors' later office attempts. About nine percent and six percent more of those in closely contested races than those in non-competitive ones seek further office. Within these categories, the differences produced by city size are about ten percent and six percent.

However, the two factors are less equal in their impact upon the likelihood that councillors will win a later office. Table 37 indicates that city size has somewhat more impact upon the likelihood that councillors will attain a further office than does competition. The original relationship between competition and later victories is weakened with the control variable present.

Defeating an incumbent in a council election

Another factor reflecting the costs of council campaigns is whether an individual defeated a current office holder in a council election. It is well documented in the literature that incumbent councillors enjoy an advantage over their opponents in reelection races, especially in nonpartisan cities such as those under study here.[27] Individuals who outran an incumbent in a council race probably had to invest a substantial amount of resources in order to do so.

In the sample under study, all but one of the thirty people who defeated a current council member won by a close electoral margin. See Table 38. If their greater investment fosters or is fostered by a long range commitment to a political career, we should find a higher rate of later office attempts among those who previously defeated an incumbent in a council election.

The incumbency variable operates in the expected manner. Roughly 63% of those who outran an incumbent later sought another elective office compared to 35% of those who had not previously defeated an incumbent. Furthermore, this relationship holds when the control variable of population is introduced into the data. See Table 40. These findings suggest that those who successfully pit themselves against a current council official are or become ambitious for further office.

A startling feature appears in the data when one examines the percentage of actual later office victories among those who previously defeated an incumbent compared to that of others. The former is only seven percent more likely than those who had never outrun a council incumbent to win a later elective office. Despite its strong effect upon the office seeking behavior of councillors, the act of defeating an incumbent has less impact than the other cost variables upon the likelihood that councillors will be victorious in a later office bid.

When the control variable of city size is introduced, we find that most of those who earlier defeated an incumbent and went on to win a further office are located in a big city (Detroit). In medium and small cities, the relationship between defeating an incumbent and attaining a further office almost disappears.

The act of defeating an incumbent appears to arouse ambitions among those who did so. However, this variable has little capability to predict which councillors are likely to be successful in a later office attempt.

Interpreting the findings

These findings suggest some specific conclusions about the applicability of the investment argument to the behavior of councillors from Michigan. First, it appears that the "surrogate" measures of cost, city size, the closeness of the vote and incumbency victory, have some impact upon the later office ambitions of councillors. Still the overall weak relationships found in the data suggest that these cost factors are only a few of many determinants of councillors' office seeking behavior. As Black acknowledges, the investment argument "is partial in that it ignores [other] variables that undoubtedly affect the development of political ambitions in individuals."[28]

For purposes of comparison, the percentage differences in office seeking brought about by the three variables are summarized in Table 42. These figures are compiled from the variation in the frequency of later office attempts reported in Tables 33 to 35 and 39.

The incumbency measure shows the strongest association, while city size and the closeness of vote have substantially less impact upon the office seeking behavior of councillors. This suggests that when a council candidate faces and overcomes special obstacles not normally present in council campaigns, such as an incumbent as an opponent, his victory is more likely to spark within him further political ambitions. Defeating an incumbent is a costly and conspicuous achievement to the councillor. Being elected in a big city or winning by a close margin, while they involve substantial expenditures, may be regarded by the councillor as less notable symbols of his own political ability.

Apparently certain types of earlier expenditures are more likely than others to actualize further political ambitions among councillors.

This conclusion does not necessarily run counter to Black's model. It is possible that defeating an incumbent, since those who did so won closely contested races, is a more costly venture than simply winning a close election or one in a big city.

The investment argument has less applicability in explaining the likelihood that councillors will win another elective office. As Table 42 indicates, the percentage differences created by the size and incumbency variables are less for office winning than for office seeking. The closeness of vote in a council election has about the same (weak) impact upon the frequency of office attempts and victories.

Overall high expenditures and the investment they represent do not substantially heighten councillors' objective chances for victory in a later office attempt. Factors outside the investment model probably have a stronger impact upon councillors' later career movement. In the following section, we shall explore the office options available to councillors and how they affect their later office seeking behavior.

III. The Political Opportunities of Councillors

A second explanation for differences in the frequency of office attempts and victories among councillors is drawn from the theory of political ambitions. While acknowledging that many considerations, including personal ones, enter into a politician's career calculus, Schlesinger emphasizes that the decision to seek candidacy hinges upon the availability of opportunities:

> ...Ambition for office develops within a specific situation...It is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician.[29]

Within a municipality, the number of political offices open for competition is limited at any given time. In the midst of a scarcity of political outlets, the ambitious councillor probably considers which offices are desirable to him and, among those, which he has a reasonable chance of winning.

According to Schlesinger, the official who considers seeking a further office does so within a structure of political opportunities. This structure describes the chances he has to attain further elective office, given his current position in politics.

In a legal sense every official is eligible to run for a diverse number of elective positions ranging from those in the lower reaches of government to the highest positions. In reality, each politician faces a more limited set of office options, the sum of which compose "his" opportunity structure.

For example, a typical councillor is unlikely to run for the presidency or even the governor's post. As Schlesinger states, "a politician's sense of the probable outlets for his ambitions are aroused by [past] external events...[by] the accumulated experience of men in positions similar to his own..."[30] In the history of the nation, no councillor has ascended to the presidency and few have reached the governor's office. Most often councillors direct their careers toward offices at lower rungs of the political career ladder.

At least two factors affect the size of the opportunity structure lying before councillors of different cities, the quantity of available elective offices and the frequency with which they are vacated by their occupants. The number of elective offices having districts overlapping with minicipal boundaries sets legal limits on the frequency with which

councillors have opportunities to advance. According to Schlesinger, the greater the quantity of offices available to officials within a political unit, the larger is the size of the opportunity structure.[31]

In comparing the distribution of offices across municipalities, three types of political outlets for city based aspirants are found. For every municipality is a set of offices which are fixed in number regardless of the size or other structural characteristics of a city. For example, a single mayoral post is found in every city. Within a given state, the number of certain county-wide offices for which councillors are eligible remains constant across cities, if municipal boundaries do not cross-cut county lines. Among the sample cities, these include the county-wide offices of prosecutor, sheriff, clerk, treasurer, drain commissioner and register of deeds. Since their districts encompass the entire state, the number of statewide elective offices, i.e., governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state and attorney general, legally available to councillors across cities is fixed in number.

Second, a small quantity of elective offices exist which are more or less unique to certain cities. In Michigan one or a combination of the municipal offices of treasurer, auditor, clerk and attorney may be designated by charter as elective posts and thereby increase the number of office outlets available to councillors. In the sample cities, the number of unique offices created by municipal charters is small, three or less. A few unique offices are also found at the county level, i.e., the Board of Auditors in Wayne County.

A substantially greater quantity of elective offices vary in number according to population and are therefore unevenly distributed

across municipalities. This process operates not only at the city level, but at other levels of the federal structure. For example, large states encompass more congressional districts than smaller ones. In comparison to those of lesser population, large counties overlap with a greater number of legislative districts. In the same vein, the boundaries of big cities encompass and/or overlap with more legislative, congressional and judicial districts than do those of smaller cities. In Michigan, the number of county commission seats increases with municipal population, although before 1968 smaller cities were somewhat overrepresented on a per capita basis.[32] These offices which vary in number according to population create more potential outlets for councillors in large cities.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that big city councillors have more actual opportunities to advance in politics. This brings us to the second factor influencing the size of the opportunity structure, the frequency with which new people are elected to these offices.[33] When the turnover in the occupants of these offices is high, the size of the opportunity structure is larger. The opportunities for councillors and other aspirants to advance are more restricted when these offices are held by incumbents term after term. As Lester Seligman asserts, the chances of an ambitious politician are dependent upon the career movement of those officials at other (higher) levels of politics.[34]

For our purposes, it makes little difference whether incumbents are defeated in reelection bids or whether they vacate their offices voluntarily. Either event leads to the same outcome -- the more

frequent arrival of newcomers in office which increases the size of the opportunity structure.

The political opportunity rate

In this section we shall construct a measure of the size of the opportunity structure open to councillors of different cities taking into account both the number of legally available offices and their turnover rates. Hypotheses XXI and XXII stating that the larger the size of the opportunity structure, the more likely that councillors will seek and attain another elective office will be tested.

A general problem in measuring the opportunity structure is that the offices which compose it may alter over time. New provisions of the law may change the electoral characteristics of an office. One conspicuous example in Michigan is the County Board of Supervisors which until 1968 included a few elected, but primarily appointed members from the sample cities. Many of these appointees were councillors selected by their colleagues to hold the county post concurrently. After 1968 municipal members of the county board were chosen by elections. Due to its primarily non-elective nature for most of the time period under study, the county board offices will not be included in the measure of the opportunity structure.

A second problem in assessing the size of the opportunity structure is the immense number of offices that are potential targets for councillors. An all-inclusive measure of opportunities would include every elective office in the city, county, state and nation. Ambition theory suggests that the set of potential office goals open to councillors is much more limited. In this study, only the major offices at

the municipal, county, regional and statewide levels that were most frequently attained by councillors in the last thirty years are included in our measure. Offices that are unique to certain municipalities and their surrounding counties are excluded.

Despite these restrictions, the offices that are incorporated into the empirical measure of the opportunity structure account for almost three-fourths of the later career moves of councillors. They are lieutenant governor, state senator, state representative, county prosecutor, county sheriff, county clerk, county register of deeds, county treasurer, county drain commissioner, circuit judge, probate judge and mayor.

Following Schlesinger's suggestion that a political generation is twelve years, we calculated the total number of personnel changes in these offices from January, 1957, to December 1968. It is assumed that this time span, since it falls at the middle years of our analysis, is a representative indicator of the total political opportunities available to councillors during the entire period under study.

For each sample city, the sum of personnel changes in the target offices from 1957 to 1968 was calculated. For example, the total number of new legislators who were elected from districts lying totally or partly within a given city were recorded. This procedure was repeated for each of the above offices.

In Table 43 the sum of the personnel changes which occurred in each of the municipalities are reported. These figures are the equivalent of the "political opportunity rate" described by Schlesinger.[35] As Table 43 demonstrates, these rates do not consistently increase with city size. Although Detroit shows the highest rate, the second largest

city, Grand Rapids, ranks third in the turnover of officials, while the opportunity structure of Lansing is the smallest of any of the sample cities.

In order to test for differences in the career behavior of councillors, the percentage of those who sought a later elective office across the sample cities is introducted as the dependent variable in Table 44. The data display support for Hypothesis XXI. Detroit with the largest opportunity structure, fifty-three personnel changes in the twelve year time span, produced the largest percentage of councillors who seek further elective office, 48%. Flint and Grand Rapids rank second and third among the sample cities in the frequency of political opportunities, although both have total personnel turnover rates which are considerably smaller than Detroit, twenty-nine in Flint and twenty-six in Grand Rapids. The former city produces nearly as large a percentage of office seeking councillors as Detroit while Grand Rapids equals Detroit in aspirants.

A reversal in the expected ranking of cities by office seekers occurs here -- Grand Rapids ranks second while Flint is third. The similarity in the size of the opportunity structures of the two cities, twenty-six and twenty-nine respectively, and the relatively minor differences in the percentage of office seekers, 48% and 47%, suggest that this disparity would probably disappear over a longer time span. The startling feature in the upper range of the opportunity structure is the failure of Detroit to produce a substantially larger percentage of office seekers than Grand Rapids and Flint.

As the opportunity rate declines to twenty-four in Jackson and Battle Creek, the percentage of office seeking councillors

correspondingly drops. As expected, Lansing with the smallest opportunity structure has the lowest percentage of ambitious councillors, 29%.

The data show a consistent relationship between the opportunity rate and the percentage of councillors victorious in later office bids. As the size of the opportunity structure enlarges across the sample cities, the percentage of councillors who attained a further office regularly increases. Detroit stands somewhat apart from Flint and Grand Rapids in the proportion of office winners. One-third of the common councillors reached a later office while less than 30% of those in Flint and Grand Rapids did so. As the opportunity rate declines to twenty-one in Jackson and Battle Creek, the percentage of office winners drops to 22% and 24% respectively. Lansing with the smallest opportunity structure has the lowest percentage of winners, less than 17%.

These data suggest that the opportunities lying before councillors have an aggregate impact upon their later career behavior. Although it does not run counter to the hypothesis, one unexpected finding which appears in both the office seeking and winning data is the lack of substantial difference in the later career behavior of Detroit councillors compared to those in Flint and Grand Rapids. Given its sizeable opportunity structure relative to the other two cities, Detroit was expected to produce councillors with a markedly higher rate of later career activity.

One possibility is that the opportunity structure affects not only the frequency with which councillors move to further office, but also the total number of offices that they hold in their later political

careers. A sizeable opportunity structure, such as that found in Detroit, may allow councillors to reach two or even three offices beyond their current one. Those situated in a more restricted framework may tend to have only a single later office holding experience.

Up to this point, we have tested simply for the percentage of councillors across cities who attained later office. Here our concern is with the average number of offices held by those councillors having later political careers.

In Table 45, the mean number of offices held by ambitious councillors across the sample cities is reported. As expected, the average number of office holding experiences increases regularly as the opportunity structure grows in size across the sample cities. Interpolating the data, we find that one-third of the nine successful councillors in Detroit hold two or more offices beyond their current one. Of those three common councillors, two held a sequence of three later offices. In the remainder of the sample cities, the longest series of later offices held by councillors was two. Among the councillors in Lansing, none are found who held more than a single later elective office. These findings suggest that a great increment in the size of the opportunity structure, such as that found in Detroit, leads to a longer sequence of later office holding experiences.

Furthermore, there is a tendency for those who hold a greater number of other offices in their political career to reach the higher levels of the opportunity structure. Councillors who held two or more later offices were more likely to reach a progressive position at the county, congressional or statewide level than were those who later held only a single post.

To this point, we have explored the objective opportunities councillors have to seek and attain further elective office. We have found that those located in larger opportunity structures are more likely to pursue later elective office and more likely to be successful in such attempts. Furthermore, their later careers tend to include a long series of office holding experiences and to be more likely to reach progressive levels.

According to ambition theory, the size of the opportunity structure is only one of several structural factors that channel politicians' careers. In the following section, we shall examine how the distribution of voters across districts affects the later office seeking behavior of councillors.

IV. Electorally Manifest Offices

Among the manifest conditions that influence the future career choices of elected officials is "the logic of electorates." According to Schlesinger, "when two offices have the same or similar electorates, it is logical to expect movement between them."[36] All other factors being equal, an officeholder will be most likely to seek a position having an electoral district that is congruent with his current one. Under these conditions, the ambitious official encounters the least amount of electoral tension. By advocating policies that ingratiate him to his current constituency, he maximizes the support he can expect to gain in a future bid for office.

When an official's future political target has a district that is enclaved within his current constituency, he is under greater electoral stress. To ensure that he can remain in office until an opportunity

for advancement appears, he is under tension to take policy positions that will sustain his appeal among a majority of his present electorate. If he is to maximize his chances for advancement, however, he should avoid policy stands which would alienate that division of his current constituents who will eventually evaluate him for promotion. When he takes actions that appeal to members of the enclave, his chances for advancement are probably the greatest. In this situation, the councillor faces the problem of winning favor among both his current and future electorate while avoiding courses of action that would alienate either.

Under most circumstances the ambitious councillor can probably devise a workable solution although he faces a greater risk of failure than his counterpart seeking a congruent office. Schlesinger suggests that the normal strategy is to refrain from policy stands on controversial issues, thereby ensuring continued support among his current electorate. At the same time, the ambitious councillor probably seeks to invoke measures that have appeal in the target constituency. Such measures need not pertain to the "burning issues of the day." In fact, his strategy may involve a more personal and less visible type of politics -- extending special courtesies such as frequent public speaking appearances and efficiently responding to grass root requests for street repairs, improvement of city services, etc. Over time, such a strategy may be useful in building a winning coalition for a future office bid in the enclaved district.

When an official intends to seek an office with a district that partly overlaps with his current electorate, he is under the greatest electoral tension. Not only must he strive to win favor among his

present constituents, but he must avoid policy stands repugnant to that part of his future electorate which lies outside his current district.

This problem is especially pronounced for ambitious councillors seeking offices with districts that include suburban and rural voters. According to Marilyn Gittell, a substantial amount of bias against urban based politicians exists in areas outside the city which has frequently led to the defeat of aspiring mayors and presumably other municipal politicians.

Of course the extent of the overlap is the crucial factor. When most of the target electorate lies outside their current district, councillors face the greatest risk of defeat and are therefore likely to refrain from seeking that office.

Measuring for the electorally manifest condition

The above classification suggests that councillors representing districts that are congruent with or that totally encompass the districts of a large number of other offices are more likely to seek those offices. Conversely councillors from districts that include within their boundaries few congruent or enclaved constituencies are less likely to make such attempts.

Second, the frequency with which councillors seek overlapping offices largely depends upon the amount of overlap between their current electorate and their future one. When their present constituents compose a large proportion of the voters for a target office, councillors will be more likely to seek that office.

No single parameter is sufficient to describe the distribution of congruent, enclaved and overlapping constituencies across council

districts. However, two factors are indicative of the way in which councillors from Michigan are advantaged or disadvantaged by the composition of their current electorate, the form of their district and its size.

Among the sample cities at-large council districts are more likely to be congruent with the boundaries of other office districts than are council wards. The former have "the same or similar electorate" as those for city wide elective offices, i.e., mayor, treasurer, clerk, etc. On the other hand, council wards lack congruency with the districts of these elective posts. Because of their advantage in congruency, at-large councillors show a greater tendency to seek city wide offices than do their ward based counterparts. Around 49% of the at-large councillors with political ambitions sought a city wide elective office compared to 36% of those elected from wards. See Table 46.

Indicative of councillors' position in regard to enclaved and overlapping districts is the size of their current electorate. Those council districts with a large voting population are more likely than small ones to include enclaved constituencies within their boundaries. For the sample under study, some congressional and legislative seats composed the majority of enclaved districts.

Furthermore large council districts tend to compose a larger proportion of the voters for offices with overlapping districts at the county, legislative, congressional, regional and state levels. As Table 47 indicates, ambitious councillors from large districts, those with over 8000 voters, are more likely than those from smaller ones to seek the above offices.

The factors of district form and size may have an additive effect upon the likelihood that councillors will seek later political office. While at-large districts are more likely to produce councillors who run for congruent offices, populous council districts tend to be associated with their occupants seeking posts with enclaved and overlapping constituencies.

When the two measures are combined, they are indicative of the overall electoral advantage councillors have. By constructing an index of electoral advantage based on council district form and size, the total impact of the electorally manifest condition upon councillors' office seeking behavior can be ascertained. Those most advantaged, at-large councillors from populous districts, tend to have more options to seek offices with congruent and enclaved districts. Furthermore, their current electorate composes a greater percentage of the voters for offices with overlapping districts. Their office seeking rate is expected to be higher than for any other grouping of councillors.

Those representing small wards, the least advantaged, have fewer opportunities to run for posts with congruent and enclaved districts. In addition, their present constituency makes up a smaller proportion of the voters for posts with overlapping districts than for any other category in the index. They are predicted in Hypothesis XXIII to be the least likely to seek a later elective office. The intermediate groupings of councillors, those from small sized at-large districts and those from large wards, are expected to rank at the middle levels of office seeking.

The data show the expected pattern. Almost 49% of the at-large councillors from large districts seek further office while 36% of those

from small wards to so. Councillors from small at-large districts and large wards are about equal in the frequency of later office attempts, 37% and 39% respectively. See Table 48.

Since the index is designed to show the objective opportunities councillors face in later office attempts, we should find that councillors who are electorally advantaged are also more likely to win a later elective office (Hypothesis XXIV). As Table 49 indicates, one-third of the councillors from highly populated at-large districts attain a later office compared to 18% of those from small wards. Councillors from the middle categories are about equal in their rate of ascent to other elective offices, 26% and 28%.

Index of electoral advantage and the level of later office attempts by councillors

Found in the data is evidence that the characteristics of councillors' district also affect the types of offices they are likely to seek and attain. The greater the electoral advantage of councillors, the more likely it is that they will run for a progressive office at the statewide, congressional or county level. See Table 49.

Around 42% of the ambitious councillors from sizeable at-large districts in Detroit, Lansing and Battle Creek sought the above offices compared to 17% of those in large wards in Grand Rapids and Flint, 12% of those in small at-large districts in Jackson and Battle Creek and 3% of those in small wards in Grand Rapids, Lansing and Flint.

Councillors in populous at-large districts are also more likely to attain a progressive office. Over 38% did so while the percentage declines consistently across categories. None of the councillors from small wards ascended to a progressive post.

Apparently the combination of a sizeable at-large district offers a distinct advantage for councillors to attain a progressive office. This is not entirely a function of district size, since only 17% of those in large wards sought a progressive post. At-large districts appear to give an advantage to their occupants.

It is possible that when they include a sizeable number of voters, at-large districts allow their occupants a wider scope of visibility to the public and to political recruiters. With the entire city as their constituency, at-large councillors in big cities are likely to enjoy a greater amount of news coverage in the central city and surrounding areas than do councillors from large wards. With this greater amount of visibility, at-large big city councillors may have more progressive opportunities to advance than their ward elected counterparts.

Conversely, the percentage of lateral office attempts and victories by ambitious councillors decreases with electoral advantage. Those in more populous at-large districts are the least likely to seek and attain a lateral office while the percentage increases consistently across categories. When those from sizeable at-large districts do run for and win lateral office, it is most likely to be a city wide post. This is probably due to their congruency advantage.

Large ward councillors are the most likely to seek lateral offices at the county level. This may be a result of their lack of progressive opportunities and the fact that their current district composes a sizeable portion of the electorate for county office. Due to the size of their current districts, councillors with small at-large constituencies lack opportunities to attain county elective office. However,

their districts are congruent with city wide elective posts which leads a majority of them to seek and attain such offices.

Councillors from small wards, since they lack an electoral advantage at any office level show no distinct pattern of lateral office seeking. They attempt posts at all lateral levels. However, they are most likely to win city wide elective offices -- 47% do so -- and less likely to attain county elective or legislative office.

In this section we have found that the electorally manifest condition affects the later political careers of councillors. Those advantaged by the composition of their current electorate are more likely to seek and to attain a later political office. In addition the likelihood that councillors will contend for and attain a progressive office depends upon their electoral position. In the following section we shall summarize the findings of this chapter.

V. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, two structural approaches were applied to explain the later career behavior of councillors. First, Black's model predicting that councillors treat their earlier campaign and other expenditures as an investment in a political career was tested. The surrogates measures of cost, city size, closeness of the council vote and incumbents as opponents, showed evidence that those who had been successful in races requiring great expenditures of resources were more likely than other council victors to seek a further office. The incumbency measure produced the greatest variation in the frequency of later office attempts by councillors.

The cost variables were less closely associated with the likelihood that councillors would win a further elective office. Black's model is best applied to explain the development of political ambitions among councillors, rather than to predict their subsequent political careers. For the councillors under study, large earlier investments did not substantially improve their actual opportunities to attain another elective position.

Second explanations drawn from Schlesinger's theory of political ambition were tested. The data indicate that the size of the opportunity structure available to councillors across cities affects the likelihood that they will seek and attain a later political office. In addition, those councillors enmeshed in a sizeable opportunity structure tend to have later careers with a longer sequence of office holding experiences.

The electoral advantage of councillors based upon the form of their council district and its size sets bounds upon their objective chances to attain a further office. Those most advantaged are more likely to seek and attain another elective position at a later date. They also tend to reach higher levels of the opportunity structure. Those less advantaged are more likely to attempt and attain lateral offices.

The findings of this chapter indicate that structural variables are influential in shaping the later political careers of councillors. The opportunity measures applied in this chapter show more consistent and in some cases stronger influences than the cost variables upon the frequency of office seeking and winning by councillors. This suggests that a theoretical approach to political ambition that focusses upon

opportunities is more powerful than a cost approach in explaining councillors' later career behavior.

In Chapter V we shall review our findings in regard to the determinants of political ambitions among councillors.

FOOTNOTES

1. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966); Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review 64 (September 1970):865-78; Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives," American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972); Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970); Richard L. Enstrom, "Political Ambitions and the Prosecutorial Office," Journal of Politics 33 (February 1971):190-94; Paul Lynn Hain, "American State Legislators' Ambitions and Careers: The Effects of Age and District Characteristics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971); William H. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators: A Comparative Perspective," Polity 7 (Summer 1973).

2. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," pp. 144-45.

3. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization," p. 867.

4. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," p. 148.

5. Ibid., p. 152.

6. Ibid., p. 146.

7. Ibid.

8. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," (unpublished paper), p. 47, footnote 25.

9. Ibid., p. 12 and 46, footnote 20. Black states, "some candidates undoubtedly do run for office not because they expect to win, but because it will benefit them in other ways. Local lawyers, for example, sometimes use this as a way of advertising since advertising is normally forbidden under state law. The logic for such individuals is that they should attempt to minimize their total expenditures because they will benefit from all of the free publicity they derive from the election."

10. Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 85.

11. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of Political Science 1 (January 1957):27.

12. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," pp. 155-56.

13. Ibid., p. 155.

14. Ibid.

15. Interview with James Brickley at Michigan State University, East Lansing, July 10, 1973.

16. Edward Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 56-57.

17. Ibid., p. 56.

18. Ibid., pp. 56-57; John L. Perentesis, "Effectiveness of a Motion Picture Trailor as Election Propaganda," Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (1948):465-69; "Los Angeles Again?," The Economist, September 6, 1969, p. 42.

19. "Unions Eye City Commission With Support Thrown to Five Candidates," The Flint Journal, November 2, 1952, p. 47.

20. Interview with Lloyd Moles in Lansing, August 21, 1975.

21. Interview with Doug Underwood in Lansing, August 21, 1975.

22. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 71.

23. Interview with Nancy Crawley, city hall reporter, in Battle Creek, August 20, 1975.

24. Ibid.

25. William H. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators: A Comparative Perspective," Polity 7 (Summer 1975):516.

26. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization," p. 868.

27. Charles Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952): 774.

28. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," p. 145.

29. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 8.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 42.

32. Doris M. S. Brimmer, ed., The County Board of Supervisors (East Lansing: Bureau of Social and Political Research, 1959), p. 6.

33. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 37.

34. Lester Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics," Political Research: Organization and Design 1 (March 1958):15.

35. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp. 40-41.

36. Ibid., p. 99.

TABLE 33

Population of city and percentage of councillors seeking later elective office

Later office attempts	City population		
	1,000,000 or more	100,000-999,999	30,000-99,999
yes	48.15	44.68	33.33
no	51.85	54.32	66.67
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	27	81	120

TABLE 34

Population of city and percentage of aspiring councillors winning later elective office

Outcome of later office attempts	City population		
	1,000,000 or more	100,000-999,999	30,000-99,999
won	33.33	28.40	20.83
lost	66.67	71.60	79.17
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	27	81	120

TABLE 35

The effects of electoral competition in initial council race upon later office attempts and victories of councillors

	Electoral competition			
	50-59%	60-69%	+69%	total
Later office attempts:				
yes	40.00	41.07	30.77	38.67
no	60.00	58.93	69.23	61.33
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	130	56	39	225
Later office victories:				
yes	25.38	26.79	15.38	24.00
no	74.62	73.21	84.62	76.00
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	130	56	39	225

TABLE 36

Percentage of councillors making later office attempts by electoral competition and city size

City size	Electoral competition*	
	close	not close
large	50.00	--
N	(26)	
medium	44.44	35.29
N	(63)	(17)
small	34.69	28.57
N	(98)	(21)

*Close category of electoral competition includes those councilmen initially elected to council office by less than 70% of the total vote. Not close category include those councilmen elected by 70% or more of the total vote.

TABLE 37

Percentage of councillors winning later elective office by electoral competition and city size

City size	Electoral competition	
	close	not close
large	34.62	--
N	(26)	
medium	25.40	23.53
N	(63)	(17)
small	21.43	14.29
N	(98)	(21)

TABLE 38

Incumbent as an opponent and closeness of council vote

Vote	Defeated an incumbent	
	yes	no
close	96.67	23.59
not close	3.33	76.41
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	30	195

TABLE 39

The effects of defeating an incumbent upon the likelihood that a councillor will seek later office and win later office

	Defeated an incumbent	
	yes	no
Sought office:		
yes	63.33	34.87
no	36.67	65.13
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	30	195
Won office:		
yes	30.00	23.08
no	70.00	76.92
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	30	195

TABLE 40

Percentage of councillors making later office attempts by incumbency defeats and city size

City size	Defeated an incumbent	
	yes	no
large	66.67 (12)	35.71 (14)
medium	77.77 (9)	38.57 (70)
small	44.44 (9)	32.73 (110)

TABLE 41

Percentage of councillors winning further elective office by incumbency defeats and city size

City size	Defeated an incumbent	
	yes	no
large	41.67 (12)	28.57 (14)
medium	22.22 (9)	25.71 (70)
small	22.22 (9)	21.82 (110)

TABLE 42

Percentage differences produced by the variables of city population, closeness of vote and incumbency defeat upon office seeking and winning by councillors

	population	closeness of vote	incumbency defeat
office seeking	14.82	9.23	28.46
office winning	12.50	10.00	6.92

TABLE 43

Political opportunity rates for elective offices in sample cities, January 1957 to December 1968

Rate	Detroit	Flint	Grand Rapids	Jackson	Battle Creek	Lansing
lt. governor	3	3	3	3	3	3
state senator	8	0	2	1	2	3
state rep.	20	5	6	2	2	3
co. attorney & sheriff	2	3	3	3	2	3
co. clerk, register, & drain comm.	2	2	4	3	5	1
circuit judge	13	7	4	3	3	1
probate judge	3	3	2	4	2	2
mayor	2	6	2	5	5	2
total	53	29	26	24	24	18

TABLE 44

Size of the opportunity structure and percentage of councillors making further office attempts and percentage of council victories in further office attempts

	Size of opportunity structure					
	Detroit 53	Flint 29	Grand Rapids 26	Jackson 24	Battle Creek 24	Lansing 18
later office attempts:						
yes	48.15	46.81	48.15	37.78	32.35	29.17
no	51.85	53.19	51.85	62.22	67.65	70.83
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	27	47	27	45	34	48
later office victories						
yes	33.33	29.79	29.63	22.22	23.53	16.67
no	66.67	70.21	70.37	77.77	76.47	83.33
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	99.99	100.00	100.00
total N	27	47	27	45	34	48

TABLE 45

Size of the opportunity structure and the average number of later elective offices held by successful councillors across cities

Councilmen	Size of opportunity structure						
	Detroit 53	Flint 29	Grand Rapids 26	Jackson 24	Battle Creek 24	Lansing 18	Total
A total moves	13	18	10	12	10	8	71
B total winners	9	14	8	10	8	8	57
A/B average no. moves	1.44	1.28	1.25	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.25

TABLE 46

Percentage of ambitious councillors in wards and at-large districts seeking city wide and other elective offices

Level of office attempt	Form of district	
	ward	at-large
city wide	35.56	48.89
other	64.44	51.11
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	45	45

TABLE 47

Percentage of ambitious councillors from districts with large and small voting populations seeking city wide and other elective office

Level of office attempt	Size of district	
	+8000	-8000
city wide	25.81	47.37
other	74.19	52.63
total %	100.00	100.00
total N	31	57

TABLE 48

Index of electoral advantage and the percentage of councillors seeking and attaining further elective office

	Index of electoral advantage			
District: / Population:	at-large large	at-large small	ward large	ward small
Office attempts:				
yes	48.72	36.62	38.71	35.63
no	51.28	63.38	61.29	64.37
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	39	71	31	87
Office victories:				
yes	33.33	28.17	25.81	18.39
no	66.67	71.83	74.19	81.61
total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	39	71	31	87

TABLE 49

Index of electoral advantage and level of later office attempts and victories by councillors

	Index of electoral advantage			
	large at-large	large ward	small at-large	small ward
Level of office attempt:				
progressive				
statewide elective	15.79	8.33	0.00	0.00
congressional	10.53	0.00	0.00	3.23
co. pros. & judge	15.79	8.33	11.54	0.00
lateral				
legislature	21.05	25.00	15.38	35.48
other co. elective	0.00	33.33	15.38	25.81
city wide elective	36.84	25.00	57.69	35.48
total %	100.00	99.99	99.99	100.00
total N	19	12	26	31
Level of office victory:				
progressive				
statewide elective	15.38	0.00	0.00	0.00
congressional	7.69	0.00	0.00	0.00
co. pros. & judge	15.38	14.29	10.00	0.00
lateral				
legislature	15.38	14.29	10.00	17.65
other co. elective	0.00	42.85	15.00	35.29
city wide elective	46.15	28.57	65.00	47.06
total %	99.98	100.00	100.00	100.00
total N	13	7	20	17

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The theory of electoral accountability maintains that elections serve as a means for the public to control elected officials. Because voters through periodic elections confer or deny the "privilege of governing," those who want to hold office advocate policies that are in accord with voters' preferences. A basic assumption of accountability theory is that elected officials hold political ambitions and act upon them by seeking reelection or advancement to another elective office.

Several studies of municipal recruitment have reported the extent to which city councillors state the desire to continue in their present post or seek another elective position. Little is known about the frequency with which municipal officials actually seek further office. The later career behavior of leaders is a key element in accountability theory. After all, voters have the opportunity to restrain public officials only when the latter seek reelection or advancement.

This dissertation has investigated the extent to which individuals elected to municipal office subsequently enter incumbency elections and/or make other office attempts. In Michigan central cities, most mayors and councillors, 79%, run for reelection at least once. Approximately 69% remain in office for three terms or longer. Of the entire sample, 38% went on to run for another elective office later in their career.

It appears that further political ambition to continue in their present position and/or to seek another elective post is the rule, rather than the exception among those who enter municipal office. If further political aspirations or the desire for reelection is the crucial factor restraining public leaders, then voters in the sample cities frequently have the means for controlling municipal officials.

A primary task of this dissertation was to investigate the frequency and nature of the later political careers attained by municipal officials. Almost one-quarter of the entire sample later assumed another elective office, usually at the municipal or county level. Most of the later career behavior of councillors is lateral in that the offices they seek and attain are generally not much higher in the opportunity structure and do not have the potential to serve as a political stepping-stone. Typical lateral offices won by councillors were mayor, city treasurer and clerk, county commissioner, county drain commissioner and county clerk.

At least in Michigan central cities, councillors are largely outside the mainstream of advancement to the highest offices in the state. Only three of the entire sample went on to a statewide or congressional office and only thirteen reached the stepping-stone posts of county judge or prosecutor. For those who begin or direct their political career into the council, the opportunities for progressive advancement are limited.

In terms of their career horizons, however, councillors are probably no less advantaged than the thousands of other locally elected officials in Michigan. Most public figures in legislative, county, township and (other) municipal offices have few opportunities to ascend

to the highest positions in the state. Furthermore council office is no way a political "dead end" for those hoping to pursue a political career. Councillors' opportunities simply lie somewhere below the highest elective positions in Michigan.

A major objective of this study was to discover what types of councillors are likely to seek and attain further elective office. It is well documented in the literature on recruitment that those who enter council office are most frequently white middle class businessmen usually in their late thirties or in their forties. However, little is known about how individual characteristics are associated with political promotion from one elective office to another.

Drawing from social stratification theory, we predicted that councillors of higher occupational status would be more likely to seek and attain another elective office. The data failed to support this hypothesis.

Councillors with the higher status occupations of executive and middle level corporate worker showed a low frequency of office seeking, while those who were small businessmen ranked higher than predicted in office attempts. From these findings we inferred that the nature of one's occupation, in terms of the time commitment it requires and in terms of the opportunities for private advancement it offers, affect whether councillors pursue further elective office.

Small sub-sample size prevented us from drawing any pat conclusions about councillors' occupational status and their success in later office attempts. If one ignores occupational categories with small N's, it appears that aspirants of higher status are more likely to be victorious in later elective endeavors.

The data show consistent support for the hypothesis that those of greater educational achievement are more likely to pursue a political career. The higher is the educational level of councillors, the greater is the likelihood that they will seek and attain another elective office. This relationship holds when the control variable of occupation is introduced.

As was predicted, increasing age among councillors acts to limit their career horizons. Those who entered council office over the age of fifty were the most likely to have a discrete or static career. When they did seek further elective office, they showed the highest rate of defeats both at lateral and at progressive levels. Conversely younger councillors are more likely to seek a later elective office and to be successful. These data conform to the general findings of other ambition studies that increasing age is strongly associated with decreasing expectations and ability to advance in politics.

Because few blacks and women were found serving in council office, a systematic analysis of how race and sex are associated with later careers was not possible. Since both groupings are rarely discussed in the literature on municipal recruitment, a rudimentary analysis seemed appropriate.

In terms of their later political careers, none of the four blacks and the six female councillors in the sample sought a progressive office. Although one black and one woman ran for a lateral post, only the former was successful.

Blacks and women who entered council office differed from their white male colleagues in several respects. Their organizational and

occupational backgrounds suggest that blacks and women had more previous political and community experience than did other councillors.

Nevertheless these individuals generally faced greater obstacles in initially getting elected to council office. Often they were elected to the council by close margins. Several of the women ran for the council two or three times before finally winning the office. Once elected, both blacks and women have a substantially longer tenure in council than others.

While we cannot offer proof, it seems reasonable that their longer tenure in the council is a result of their limited opportunities to attain other elective office. If ambitious black and female councillors generally lack chances for electoral advancement, it follows that the only feasible political option open to them is to pursue a static career.

These findings regarding background traits suggest that the predisposition and ability of councillors to attain further political office are unevenly distributed. The characteristics that other researchers have found to be associated with the initial recruitment of individuals to council office appear to have a continued bearing upon which councillors are likely to seek and attain further elective office.

Certain occupational types are known to be less likely to enter council office, i.e., executives, middle level corporate workers and laborers. The few who do enter council office in Michigan central cities are less likely than other occupational types to seek a further elective position. On the other hand, small businessmen who enter council office in large numbers tend to be more likely than other

councillors to make later office attempts. Here status appears to be a less important factor affecting councillors' ambitions than practical considerations in regard to their occupational careers.

While those who are less educated, older, black and female enter the council at a lower frequency than others, they are also less likely than their opposites to seek and win another elective position. Along these characteristics, councillors having traits less preferred by society's standards appear to have more limited opportunities to advance.

This dissertation has sought to determine whether certain structural characteristics of the political system are associated with office seeking and winning by councillors. We begin with the investment approach presented by Gordon Black which posits that the cost of council elections is an indicator of the commitment individuals have to pursuing a political career. The "surrogate" measures of cost, municipal population, the closeness of council elections and the act of defeating an incumbent, were predicted to be associated with further office attempts and victories by councillors.

Weak positive associations were found in the data between city size and the likelihood that councillors will seek or attain further elective office. The hypothesis that close council elections are more likely to foster further office attempts and victories among councillors was tested. Very weak support was found in the data.

The act of defeating an incumbent in a council election showed a strong association with later office seeking. Those who outran incumbents were more likely than contenders defeated by an incumbent and those who had not opposed an incumbent to make a later office attempt.

Apparently the incumbency variable is a "closer" measure of the political ambitions held by councillors than the other cost factors tested. Those who are willing to oppose an incumbent probably have a stronger commitment than others to pursuing a further political career. However, the incumbency variable is a very weak indicator of councillors' success in later office attempts.

Overall the cost variables are poor indicators of the likelihood that councillors will win a further elective office. The objective chances councillors have to direct their political career into another elective office have little to do with their prior political investment.

Guided by Joseph Schlesinger's ambition theory, we tested hypotheses concerning the opportunity structure and the later career behavior of councillors. Although several researchers to date have tested factors related to political opportunities, no attempts have previously been made to directly measure the number of political opportunities lying before a given group of elected officials.

The size of the opportunity structure open to councillors of different cities varies according to the number of other elective offices available at local and higher levels and the frequency with which they are vacated by incumbents. We calculated the total number of personnel changes in these offices over a twelve year time span.

The data show evidence that the larger the size of the opportunity structure, the more likely that councillors in a given city will seek and win a further elective office. In addition the size of the opportunity structure is positively associated with the likelihood that

councillors will have two or more later office experiences and that they will attain a progressive post during their career.

Drawing from Schlesinger's description of the logic of electorates, we tested hypotheses concerning the electoral advantage of councillors and their later career behavior. An index of electoral advantage was constructed based upon the size of the voting population and the at-large or ward nature of council districts. This index reflects the overall chances a council district offers to its representative to attain further elective office.

Those representing at-large council districts with a sizeable voting population, the most advantaged, were expected to be more likely to seek and attain another elective office. The least advantaged, councillors from wards with a small voting population, were predicted to be the least likely to make an attempt and win a further office.

The data showed the expected pattern. As the electoral advantage increases across councillors, the rate of office seeking and winning tends to increase. The electorally advantaged are also more likely to reach higher (progressive) levels of the opportunity structure, while the less advantaged are more likely to attain lateral offices.

Our findings regarding structural variables indicate that political opportunities are an important determinant of the later career behavior of elected officials. When openings in other offices frequently occur, councillors are more likely to seek and attain electoral advancement. On the other hand, when elected officials at other levels remain in office term after term, councillors' opportunities are restricted. The career movement at other (presumably higher) levels of

the opportunity structure sets bounds on the chances for advancement of those at lower levels.

The nature of council districts in terms of voting population and overlap with other office constituencies affects councillors' chances for promotion. At-large council districts with a sizeable voting population are more likely to foster ambitions among councillors than other types of council districts.

Overall our findings suggest that Schlesinger's opportunity approach provides a useful perspective for interpreting and predicting the later career behavior of elected officials.

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