ABSTRACT

THE LIBERAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA IN NEW SOUTH WALES:
A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL PARTY AS

AN OFFICE-SEEKING ORGANIZATION
BY Charles John Orlebeke

This study of the Liberal Party of Australia in the
state of New South Wales has two basic objectives: (1) to
enlarge the body of knowledge about a particular party
organization by presenting information on its structure
and behavior; and (2) to analyze that organization in terms
of theoretical assumptions which may be applied to party
organizations generally.

r The first chapter reviews some of the important
economic, social, and political forces which have helped
to shape the development and character of the Australian
party system. Among these forces are Australia's vigorous
and strife-torn Labor movement, its economic dependence on
primary production, the antipathy between city and country,
and the unique amalgam of British and American-derived
political institutions.

In approaching the study of party organization, our
central assumption is that party organization is dominated
by the drive to gain control of government through the
election of party candidates. Within the organization,
those who win elections and exercise governmental power

tend to dominate the party; and shape its structure, policies,

Orlebeke

and strategy to meet the conditions of officeeseeking. Thus,
the party organization serves mainly as the instrument of
those who hold public office or have the ambition to do so;
and the distribution of power within the party is determined
less by formal organizational structure than by the party's
position with respect to control of government. Questions
of party policy are usually resolved by the behavior of
office-holders controlling government: when the party is
in opposition, policies are selected according to their
perceived impact on capturing votes in the next election.

The Liberal Party of New South Wales has shared in
the consistent success of the party in national politics
since 1949, but has failed--sometimes narrowly--to gain
control of state governfment. Because of the federal system,
the party has therefore achieved its obJective at one level
and been frustrated at the other. Chapter III discusses
the patterns of behavior likely to prevail in the organiza-
tion, given our assumptions about office ambitions, and given
1?; structural character of the Australlin political system.
Since office-seekers and supporting organizational resources
cluster around each public office, we identify the electorate
organization as a basic unit of party organization. A second
basic unit is the central organization, which cuts across
electorate boundaries, and seeks to coordinate and direct

the drive for power.

Orlebeke

Chapters IV, V, and VI present a descriptive and
analytical review of the New South wales Party organiza-
tion from.mid-l959 to larch, 1962. The introductory section
of each chapter sp‘é‘l’l‘d‘flut the implications of our assump-
tions for-three phases ofggrganizaticnal activity: (1)
the mobilizing of parity. resources between elections 3
(e) the nomination process} and (3) the campaign phase‘.
d'he. main body of each chapter presenter evidence supporting
the contention that party organizations can best be under? ~;
stood in terms of the office-Qs'eekingepproach.

The branch development program, an: intensive effort
begun in 1959 to buildup party resources, is analyzed in
Chapter III. The program was conceived by the central
organization in response to repeated electoral failure at
the state level. It met with only limited success because
it threatened to upset the conditions of nomination-seeking
in electorate organisations, and was resisted by both parlia-
mentary and non-parliamentary office-holders in electorate
organisations.

Chapter IV analyzes the nomination process prior to '
the'51961 national election and} the 1962 state election.
the virtually uneventful nomination series prior to the
national campaign, contrasted with intensive competition
for state level nominations, suggested clearly that officeu .
holders controlling government are significantly less vulner—

able to nomination challenges than office-holders in 0PP081’61611.

Orlebeke

Party behavior during the 1961 national campaign and
the 1962 state campaign is discussed in Chapter VI. Office-
seekers, regardless of party label, tended to relate their
appeals and strategy to what had taken place in government,
and defined policy positions according to their perceived
electoral consequences. Thus, the campaign style and
appeals employed by the national Liberal Party in 1961
and the state Labor Party in 1962 were strikingly similar,
and characteristic of parties in power. Similarly, the
national Labor Party in 1961, and the New South Wales Liberal
Party in 1962, adopted campaign strategy typical of parties

in opposition.

THE LIBERAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA IN NEW SOUTH WALES:
A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL PARTY AS AN
OFFICEZSEEKING ORGANIZATION

By
Charles John Orlebeke

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
*for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

1965

Copyright by
CHARLES JOHN ORLEBEKE

'1966

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my major professor, Mr. Joseph A.
Schlesinger, for his patient and constructive counsel during
the preparation of this study. I am also indebted to Mr.
Leroy Ferguson and Mr. Charles Press, who reviewed the
preliminary draft and provided numerous helpful suggestions.

During my sixteen-month stay in Australia, I enjoyed
the assistance, advice, and kind hospitality of many
Australians. Mr. Henry Mayer, Associate Professor of
Government at the University of Sydney, arranged for my
initial contacts with Liberal Party leaders, and continued
to serve as a helpful and stimulating mentor throughout
my stay. I also wish to thank Professor Richard Spann
and his colleagues in the Department of Government, who
assisted in countless ways with the gathering of material
for this study.

Many members and officials of the New South Wales
Liberal Party made invaluable contributions to my research.
I am especially grateful to Mr. John L° Garrick, General
Secretary of the party, who somehow managed to carve time
out of an impossibly heavy schedule to help me explore the
workings of the party organization. This study would not
have been possible without Mr. Garrick's willingness to
give me access to party meetings and records on a no—strings-

attached basis. Many other Liberals—-too many to mention

iii

by name--provided assistance and friendly counsel: Mr. A.
T. Lenehan and members of the party field staff; Mr. Charles
Meeking, editor of Theégugtralian Liberal; and Mr. John C°

 

Maddison and his colleagues on the Branch Development

Committee were particularly cooperative.
CHARLES ORLEBEKE

Michigan.State University
May, 1965

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 iii
LISTOFTABLESeeeeeeeeoeeeeoeeooVii

Chapter ' ' ' '
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introductory Comment

The Party as an Organized Effort to Win
Elections and Control Government

Parties and Politics in Australia

Summary

II. THE NEW SOUTH WALES LIBERAL PARTY: STRUCTURE,
ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL . . . . . 4. 49

Introduction "

The Branch Organization
Annual Convention
Electorate Conferences
Regions

State Council

State ExecutiVe
Administration and Personnel
SUmmary

III. THE NEW SOUTH WALES LIBERAL PARTY AS AN
OFFICE-SEEKING ORGANIZATION . . . . o . . 78

Introduction

The Electorate organization
The Central Organization
Summary

IV. THE BRANCH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: MOBILIZING
HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES . . . . . . 108

Introduction

Assessment of the Organization

Objectives of the Branch Development Program

Implementation of the Branch Development
Program

Summary

Chapter
V. THE CONTEST FOR NOMINATIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH
WALES LIBERAL PARTY . Q . g g o o o . g 0 o 176

Introduction

The Nomination Process: Formal Procedure

The Nomination Process: Federal Election
of December 9, 1961

The Nomination Process: State Election
of March 3, 1962

Summary

VI. THE CAMPAIGN PHASE 0F PARTY ORGANIZATION . . . 230
Introduction
The 1961 Federal Election Campaign
The 1962 State Election Campaign
Summary
APPENDIX C O O O O O C C O O O O O O O O O O O C O 0 271+

BIBLIOGRAPHY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 280

vi

Table

l.
2.

3.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

LIST OF TABLES

Summary of Liberal Party Branch Membership . . .

Summary of Liberal Party Branch Membership

the Sydney Metropolitan Area .........-..

Liberal Party Membership in'Safe Liberal
Electorates: May, 1959 . . . . . . . .

Liberal Party Membership in'"Swing"
Electorates: May, 1959 . . . . . . . .

Liberal Party Membership in Safe Labor
Electorates: May, 1959 . . . . . . . .

Summary of Branch Membership: January, 1960:

and Membership Targets Of'Branch '
Development Drive e e e e e e e e e e e

Branch Membership: January, 1960; and
Membership Targets in Safe Liberal
Electorates e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Branch Membership: January, 1960: and

Membership Targets in "Swing" Electorates .,.

Branch Membership: January, 1960; and
Membership Targets in Safe Labor
Electorates e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Summary of Branch Membership before and
after Branch Development Drive . . . . .

Branch Membership in Safe'Liberal Electorates

before and after Branch Development Drive_,-....i

Branch Membership in "Swing" Electorates
and after Branch Development Drive . . .

Age Distribution of 55 Liberal Office-
Seekers e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Occupations of 55 Liberal Office-Seekers

vii

before

Page
117

120
121
123

126
138

140

141

142
164
16;
167

215
215

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introductogytcomment

The student of political parties is being confronted
with a growing volume of material on what parties are doing
and what they ought to be doing in relation to modern gov-
ernment throughout the world. An expanding literature now
provides an impressive body of information on political
parties both in the United States and abroad. As data on
parties accumulates, the need for a comprehensive theory
of party organization becomes more pressing; yet political
scientists have not in general concerned themselves with
developing such a theory.

. The failure to develop a theory of party organization
is at least partly due to the fact that students of parties
have been preoccupied first with defending and later with
advancing the idea of party as an instrument of democratic
political action. This preoccupation necessarily implied
a concern for party reform, including prescriptions for

making parties more "effective" and "responsible."1 It

 

1Committee on Political Parties, American Political
Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party

System (New York: Rinehart, 1951).

rarely included a concern for developing a series of
theoretical assumptions about party organization which
could be tested in various political contexts.

But perhaps the main reason why a theory of party
organization has not been developed is that the idea of
party is so difficult to apply to all organizations which
claim to be parties. Only a few students have taken on
the assignment of analyzing and comparing systematically
parties in various political and cultural settings. These
students readily testify to the intractable nature of their
task; and their work is characterized more by hedging,
qualifications, and exceptions than by general propositions
about party organization. Duverger, for example, states in
his preface to Political Parties:

The reader is therefore asked never to forget the

highly conjectural nature of most of the con-

clusions formulated in this book--a point of which

he will constantly be reminded. In fifty years'

time perhaps it will be possible to describe the
real working of political parties.

Similarly, Newmann finds the task of theorizing about
parties "overwhelming":

The question of a proper approach to a meaningful
theory of political party structure poses a dilemma
because the overwhelming data of our material world
fall into a conceivable pattern only if seen through
the controlled order Of a conceptual framework,
which in turn can be conceived only in a full
appreciation of the rich texture of reality. The
task of attempting to systematize our knowledge,

 

1M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen
a Co., Ltd., 1954), p. n.

therefore, is confronted by almost overwhelming
difficulties.1

Given the present development--or lack of it--of party
theory, the student who looks at a particular party
organization in a particular setting is hard pressed to
find theoretical tools with which to work. This presents
two basic alternatives. The first alternative is to analyze
a given party organization within the limits set by its
location in“a particular political system. Such
an analysis might find a place in a volume using the
country-by-country approach of Modern Political Parties.
The formidable task of relating such a study to other
studies would presumably be left to an editor or to some
future theorist.

The second alternative is to gather and use whatever
rudimentary theoretical tools may be available, and try to
learn more about the opportunities and limitations of
engaging in theory-oriented research.

The two alternatives are not, of course, mutually
exclusive. ‘One cannot work with theoretical assumptions
in a vacuum. The question, however, is whether or not--
given certain minimal political and cultural conditions--
a set of theoretical assumptions can be employed to
illuminate the behavior patterns of a given party organiza-

tion. Research efforts pursued on that basis could well

13. Neumann ice.) Modern Political Pa ties
(Chicago: Univers ty of W A.

 

result in new and promising ideas about what is fundamental
and what is incidental to the dynamics of party organize;
tion. In any case, it is my view that party research
should be directed toward enriching the body of knowledge
about parties, and toward the development of theoretical
assumptions on how and why parties behave as they do in a
variety of political environments.

The particular focus of this study is the organiza-
tion of the Liberal Party of Australia, with emphasis on
the division of the Liberal Party located in the state of
New South Wales, which is.Australia's most populous state.
Most of the data for this study was gathered during sixteen
months of residence in the state capital of Sydney--from
August, 1960 to December, 1961.

Fortunately for research purposes, these months
spanned a period of intensive party activity including a
branch development drive--an ambitious attempt to at least
double the size of the party membership; a referendum
campaign on the question of abolishing the upper house of
the New South Wales parliament; a national election in
December, 1961; and the selection of candidates for the
state election of March, 1962.

Because the literature on Australian parties, and
especially the Liberal Party, is rather thin; a detailed
description of Liberal Party structure, together with a
similarly detailed narrative of party activities would

5

contribute Something new to present data on the party.
The value of such a contribution would be considerably
enhanced, however, by analyzing the data in terms of
theoretical assumptions which could be applied to other
parties in other countries.

The party as an organized.
e;_or 0 win elections and
control government

 

The study of political parties has so far produced
a confused Jumble of concepts and Classifications, many of
them value-laden. MacDonald, for example, distinguishes
between "doctrinal" and"nondoctrina1" parties.1 Neumann
distinguishes between parties of "individual representa-
tion", "democratic integration", and "total integration."2
Duverger classifies parties according to their basic
Structural unit and the relationship of these units to
higher levels of the organization.3

In a penetrating discussion of party organization
theory, Joseph A; Schlesinger argues that there may be a
way out of the confusion:

Cutting through all these distinctions, there is the

issue of whether a party belongs to its members and
therefore out to be responsive to their interests, or

 

1N. McDonald, The Stud of Political Parties (Garden
City: Doubleday a 00., 5), p. 31.

2N8umann, OB. Cite, ppe non-05.
3Duverger, op. cit., pp. A-60.

whether it is an organization aimed at winning elections
and which, therefore, ought to be responsive to the
electorate.
In other words, Schlesinger poses the question of whether
a party organization is an instrument for party members to
impose their views on government policy; or whether it is
an instrument of those who hold, or are driven by the
ambition of holding public office and wielding governmental
power.

Schlesinger points out that the student's response to
this question influences fundamentally the character Of his
analysis. Writers such as Michels and Duverger, who work
from Marxian assumptions, tend to view parties as instruments
of their members, and thus are preoccupied with structural
arrangements for insuring responsibility of leaders to rank-
and-file members. Lamenting the fact that socialist leaders
use rather than serve the mass membership, Michels developed
"the iron law of oligarchy."2 Duverger's assumptions led
him to conclude that universal suffrage creates the necessity
for parties to represent a mass electorate, and thus

concludes that mass membership parties with complex structures

of the socialist type will eventually replaCe the

anachronistic "cadre" parties of the "middle class."

 

1J. A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization,"
in J. G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965). The quotation, and subsequent references,
are drawn from a draft manuscript of Schlesinger's chapter.

8) 2R. Michels, Political Parties (Glencoe: Free Press.
195 .

For those analysts such as Schumpeter and Downs who
perceive party-and-electorate as the critical theoretical
Juncture, the concern for party organization as such fades
into the background.1 In the forefront are party elites
or "teams" whiCh compete for votes and for the privilege of
holding the reins of government until the next election.
Such questions as how the team was formed or how the team
relates to a party organization are assumed to be,
theoretically at least, irrelevant.

According to Schlesinger, the search for some kind
of bridge between the member-oriented and electorate-
oriented approaches to parties leads to McKenzie's careful

2 McKenzie describes Conservative

study of British parties.
and Labor party structure in detail, but with particular
emphasis on the distribution of power between the parlia-
mentary parties and non-parliamentary party organizations.
McKenzie concludes that party structures, ideologies, and
pronouncements notwithstanding, the crucial factor in the
distribution of power is the party's position with respect
to government. Thus parties tend to be dominated by their
public office-holders, particularly when these officials

are in power or close to power. McKenzie's meticulous

 

1A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1957); J} SChumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism,
and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

 

2R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London:
William Heinemann, Ltd., 1958).

analysis is particularly significant since it Sheers away
much of the theoretical lumber of Duverger's structural
approach, and helps to open the way toward a more elemental
theory of party organization.

‘ All party organizations have in common the objective
to influence government in some way. The most obvious and
effective way to influence government is to have party
members holding public office and controlling the instruments
of governmental power. In a democracy, the voters choose
public officials from among candidates, most of whom bear a
party label. We are only concerned in this study with
parties which operate in the contest of democratic political
systems--systems in which voters periodically have a choice
among candidates for public office. Further, we are only
concerned with parties which have a reasonable chance of
winning elections.

We shall assume that party organization in a democracy
can best be defined as an organized effort to gain control
of government through the election of party candidates. The
drive for office is the party organization's reason for
existence, and electoral victory is the measure of its
success. It flows from this assumption that men who win
elections, who expect to win elections, or who know how to
mobilize resources for winning elections stand high in the
organization's hierarchy of values. Because they embody

the organization's success, office-holders occupy important

positions in the party leadership, and tend to shape the
organization to meet the conditions of office-seeking.
Thus party organization becomes the means by which a man
with political ambition may gain public office and stay in
office if he so desires. If the office holder for some
reason does not wish to stay in office, the importance of
organization fades.

A There are many motivations which drive a party
organization into political action. But since the satis-
faction of these motivations depends on the primary objective
of winning office, the quest for office forces other conside
erations into the background. The office-seeking motivation
tends to dominate when the party is close to government. The
candidate who can win gets the party nomination and support;
party policies and principles assume a quality of amazing
elasticity as they are shaped by party leaders to meet the
presumed conditions of electoral success.

Party organization provides the resources for conduc-
ting the electoral campaigns of office-seekers. The resources
necessary to win may be minimal or very substantial. In a
safe constituency for his party, the only "organization"
necessary for an officeeseeker may be the party designation
on the ballot. However, a candidate for the United States
presidency needs an organization which can furnish millions
of dollars and millions of hours of volunteer labor. In

general, the amount of organizational resources needed

10

increases in proportion to the competitiveness of the
office and the size of the constituency served by the
office. _

There are many kinds of contributions an organiza-
tion.may provide, and the value of each depends on the
political conditions of the contest. ’Money is an especially
useful resource in almost any contest, sinceit is fluid and
can be channeled into the purchase of goods and personal
services needed for the campaign. Money buys organization.

Party organizations also need volunteer manpower to
supplement the work of paid party officials. Parties need
people willing to do the routine chores of party organizae
tion--clerica1 work, door-to-door canvassing, for example.
Also needed are people with special skills such as leadership
and manipulative skills.

How do office-seekers get people to contribute to
party organization? Participation in a party organization
offers a variety of incentives. Not all participants are
interested in seeking public office, but some are. Others
may have a personal loyalty to the office-seeker. Support
for a particular ideological position motivates some party
workers, while others may wish to support more specific
policy objectives. Party organization provides a social
outlet for some contributors; for many women, party work
provides a respite from household tedium. Many contributors

have no.ambition for public office, but do value party

ll

organization offices which involve the privilege of .
associating with, and being associated with, public officee
holders. People join or are attracted into party organizes
tion for many reasons, but the drive which gives their
collective efforts shape, direction, and purpose is the
drive for public office.

We may conclude, then, that a party organization
reduced to its most simple unit is that collection of
cooperative efforts directed toward the winning and holding
of a single public office. The important questions about
who shall run on what platform and what campaign techniques
shall be used--these questions are resolved in terms of their
bearing on the office-Seeking ambition. But they are not
resolved without conflict.

The most common conflict within the party organiza-
tional unit is between competing office-seekers. When the
clash is between a public office holder and a challenger,
the contest is generally weighted in favor of the incumbent
who has already demonstrated his ability to win.

But the potential for conflict is greatly multiplied
by the fact that units of the same party rarely function
completely independently of each other. A more inclusive
unit such as a state gubernatorial candidate's organization
defines "victory" in different terms than the constituent
unit of a state legislator. Victory for the constituent

unit may consist only in the election of a local legislator,

l2

whilevictory for the gubernatorial organization consists

in a statewide victory. Tension and conflict exist between
the inclusive unit and its constituent units to the extent
that one officeeseeker perceives his chances of nomination
and election to be reduced by the ambition of another
officeeseeker. Obviously, the criss-crossing of tension
and conflict in a complex federal system such as the United
States or Australia presents a formidable task for the
analyst of party organizations.

Drawing mainly from.Schlesinger's discussion of party
organization, we have sketched in a very general way our
approach to the study of party organization. A theory of
party organization based on the office-seeking ambition
should be applicable to any party in a democracy which has
a prospect of gaining control of government. But conflicts
between office-seekers occur within the contest of very
different political systems. The political and cultural
environment which produces alternative governing parties
also imparts to these parties distinctive characters and
traditions. The challenge posed by this thesis is to
illuminate the process by which the drive for office works
through and shapes the Liberal Party organization of Australia.

In the next section of this chapter we shall describe
some of the broad historical, cultural, and political forces
which have helped to mold Australian parties. We shall
complete the chapter with a general review of Australian

Party organizations.

13

Politics and parties in Australia
Introduction.--The political history of Australia

 

began with the establishment in 1788 of a British convict
colony at Sydney, New South Wales. Although remnants of
the convict system lingered until the mid-nineteenth century,
the number of free settlers equalled convicts already by
1828, and outnumbered them four-to-one by 1841.1

Settlers from the original colony of New South Wales
pressed southward to establish the colony of Victoria, and
northward to establish Queensland. Free men arriving from -
Great Britain formed colonies in Western Australia and South
Australia. The island colony of Tasmania, located some 100
miles off the southeastern tip of the continent, developed
like New South Wales from a convict settlement.

The early Australian colonies were administered by
the British Colonial Office through military Governors

2 AlmoSt from the beginning,

vested with absolute authority.
however, the Governors with their unruly militia were unable
to impose orderly administration. As Marjorie Barnard
points out, "The convict system, fortunately, never got

into smooth working order."3 Convicts arriving in Sydney

 

-1J. D. B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics
(London: Gerald Duckworth'& 00., Ltd., 1959), p.50.

2Marjorie Barnard has written a fascinating account of
Governor Lachlan Macquarie's tenure as Governor of New South
Wales, 1810—1821. See Macquarie's World (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1961).

3Barnard, op. cit., p. 103.

14

were confronted by varying degrees and kinds of servitude.
Skilled tradesmen were quickly put to work by the colonial
government on such projects as public buildings, roads,
bridges and docks. Other convicts were employed as clerks
and secretaries in government offices. Unskilled convicts
often were assigned as servants to free settlers, who paid
them a small wage for their work. In general, most convicts
who did not get into trouble could look forward to a gradual
relaxing of penal restraints until the expiration of their
sentences.1 Incorrigibles were consigned to hard labor on
chain gangs, or worse, were exiled to Newcastle to work in
coal mines under overseers known for brutality.2 Adminis-
tration of the convict system was a hopelessly cumbersome
task for the colonial government, and the net result was
that convicts were more speedily assimilated into the free
community.

In short a system as complex, as muddled, as much at

the mercy of external circumstances as that in force

in New South Wales afforded many loopholes for hope.

It was a troubled water lg which, if many sank, many
also fished with success.

Venturesome settlers, both free men and emancipated
convicts, left the coastal towns to tap the potential of
Australia's vast interior. The unique suitability of the

 

1A convict was eligible for a "ticket-of-leave" after
serving at least three years of his sentence. A ticket-of-
leave holder was practically a free man unless he committed
a crime. Conditional pardon gave a convict his freedom, but
did not permit return to England. Absolute pardon could also
be granted by the Governor in exceptional cases. Barnard,

OE. Cite, PP. 119-20.
21bid., p. 117.
31bid., pp. 101-2.

15

country for raising sheep soon resulted in a lucrative wool
trade with Great Britain. The best pastoral land was
appropriated by squatters, who eventually gained title to
huge land holdings and formed what Australians call the
”squattocracy." In addition to sheep-raising, wheat farming
was an important element in the early Australian economy.
Near the cities, settlers raised food crops and established
dairy farms to serve the population centers.

Governmental institutions developed rapidly in the
colonies. In 1855 and 1856, the British Parliament approved
self-governing status for New South Wales, Victoria, south
Australia, and Tasmania. Queensland, which was formerly a
part of New South Wales, became self-governing in 1859; and
Western Australia in 1890.1 The model for each colonial
constitution was, and still is, the British constitution:

a constitutional monarchy with an appointive Governor repre-
senting the Crown; a representative parliament as the legis-
lative body; and an executive directly responsible to
parliament. Colonial parliaments were bicameral, the Lower
House elected on a popular franchise, and the Upper House
either nominated by the Governor or elected on a property

franchise.2

 

1H. R. Anderson, "The Constitutional Framework," The
Government of the Australian States, ed. S. R. Davis (London:
Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd” 1960), p. 4.

2The Lower House is called the Legislative Assembly
in New South Wales, Western Australia, Victoria, and
Queensland; and called the House of Assembly in Tasmania and
South Australia. The Upper House is called the Legislative
Council)in all states (Queensland abolished its Upper House
in 1922 .

16

The establishment of colonial governments coincided
with the discovery of gold in New South Wales and Victoria,
and later in Western Australia. The lure of quick fortunes
brought thousands of new immigrants to Australia, and mining
communities quickly sprang up. As the gold deposits were
depleted, the settlers attracted to the mining districts had
to seek other means of livelihood. Some bought land from
squatters and took up farming, although these ventures often
failed because of erratic and inadequate rainfall, and
because transportation facilities were often lacking. Small
industries were established in some country towns, but
development was inhibited because finished products could
be more cheaply imported from Great Britain in exchange for
wool and wheat.1

It was in the period of 1860 to 1890 that many of the
main currents of Australian economic, social, and political
life were formed. The economy of the colonies came to be
dependent upon the production and export of primary products,
especially wobl and wheat. Primary producers were deeply
committed to a policy of free trade. But struggling manu-
facturing interests demanded a protective tariff wall until
they could compete with foreign manufactured imports. The
protectionists found an early champion in David Syme, a
Victorian publisher, who believed that severe unemployment

among ”diggers" (miners) could be solved by the development

 

1F. w. Eggleston, Reflections or an-Australian Liberal
(Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire Pty. Ltd.,fil953), p. 27.

17

of tariff-protected industries.1 The issue of free trade
versus protection, more than any other single issue, tended
to dominate Australian politics until 1910; moreover, it
remains as a significant issue at the present time.

The second half of the nineteenth century also saw
the emergence of the "White Australia" immigration policy.
The discovery of gold attracted large numbers of Chinese
immigrants until the colonies passed restrictive legisla-
tion in the 1870's. In Queensland, however, the importation
of cheap labor from the South Sea islands to work on sugar
plantations continued until the formation of the Commonwealth
in 1901.2 Since federation, the "White Australia” policy
has been embraced by all parties, and supported by a vast
popular consensus-~challenged by few besides a bearded
student fringe.3

Another characteristic social current of this period
was the rising antipathy between the "country" and the
capital cities. New immigrants clustered in capital cities,
which served not only as a state's vital land and sea
transportation nexus, but also as the center of manufac-
turing, business, and finance, as well as the seat of state

government. Country interests soon came to fear city

 

lLouise Overacker, The Australian Party System (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1952}, pp. 34-36;‘MIIler,

op. cit., pp. 45-46.
2Overacker, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

3See for example: Sydney Morning Herald, November
16-17, 1961.

18

domination of government policies on roads, railroads,
irrigation schemes, tariffs, and credit--all issues which
have a crucial impact on rural development. But rural
hostility toward the capital cities was--and is--only partly
the result of clashing economic interests: the "man on the
land" and the country townsman possess a nebulous but deep-
seated feeling that life "outback" is somehow more authen-
tically and uniquely Australian than the more ordered,
comfortable life of the city dweller. The peculiar kinship
shared by rural Australians, together with the press of
economic issues, helped to nourish political action with a
distinctively rural stamp. Eventually, the Country Party
which organized in 1919 "gave form to the old division
between the city and the bush."1

The vigorous Australian labor movement also took shape
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first
labor organizations were unions of skilled tradesmen which
by 1874 had won the eight-hour day in every colony except
Western Australia.2 Meanwhile, the labor movement also
gathered strength in the country. The Amalgamated Miners'
Association organized in 1874 in Victoria, and under the
driving leadership of William Spence, the miners' union

movement extended into other states. Spence also worked to

 

1Marjorie Barnard, A History of Australia (Sydney:
Angus & Robertson Ltd., 1962), p. 5267’

21bid., p. 416; Overacker, op. cit., p.40.

19

organize the shearers, who in 1886formed the Amalgamated

Shearers' Union.1

The burgeoning union movement in Australia
encountered little real resistance from employers during the
economic boom of the 1870's and early 1880's. But in 1885,
the world market prices on wool and metals began to fall,
and the economy skidded toward Depression. Economic crisis
brought labor unrest: in 1890 a strike by maritime workers
touched off walkouts by miners' and shearers' unions, who
had grievances of their own. Business came to a standstill,
but the general strike proved to be a failure as far as the
unions were concerned. Employers readily found non-union
workers to break the strikes, and the unions had insufficient
funds to finance a prolonged strike. After three months the
unions caved in, and went back to work under terms dictated
by employers.2
The bitter labor strife of the early 1890's brought
to a head a class division which probably had its roots in
the old master-convict relationship. Prior to 1890, the

labor movement grew easily, nourished by the fruits of

prosperity and inspired by the heady visions of Henry George
and Edward Bellamy.3 But economic decline brought the unions

 

1Barnard, op. cit., 420-21.

2Ibid., pp. 422-24. See also 0. H. Grattan, (ed.),
Australia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947),
PD 0 62"on

3George's Progress and Poverty and Bellamy's Looki
Backward were widely read in Australia. George visited
Australia in 1890 and received ”a tumultuous weliome." 4
Barnard o . cit. . l7. Cf. Overacker, 02. c t., p. 9;
and A. A. CalweIl: RThe Australian Labour Party, The AustraUan
Political Part S stem, S. R. Davis et a1. (Sydney: Angus &
Robertson, 1954), pp. 54-56. -.

 

 

 

2O

face to face with the superior financial resources and
political power of organized employer groups. When the_
1890 strike was crushed with the help of anti-labor colonial
governments, labor turned to direct political action as the
means for realizing its social and economic goals. “A
”Political Labor League" was hastily organized in New South
Wales to contest the general election of 1891. The labor
movement's first large-scale venture into politics was an
astonishing success: the League captured 36 out of 45 seats
contested in the l20-member Legislative Assembly.1 In
Victoria, a ”Political Labor Council" elected 16 out of a
90-member Assembly in 1894, and political Labor organizations
in the other four colonies also secured some parliamentary

representation in the 1890's.?

Politics in the Australian colonies between 1850 and
1900 was characterized by turbulence and instability. In
the 45 years preceding federation in 1901, Barnard reports
that New South Wales had 30 changes in government, Victoria

had 29, South Australia had 42, Tasmania had 20, and Queenshuui

3 "4

had 22. “The party system barely existed. In the early

colonial governments, political groups formed around the

 

lCalwell, loc. cit., p.57.

2Ibid. In South Australia the labor party organization
was known as the ”United Labour Party” ; in Western Australia,
the :Australian Labour Federation“ ; in Queensland and Tasmanflm
the 'Workers' Political Organization." After federation in
1901, the state labor parties retained their individual names
until 1918, when a federal conference of the party adopted
the name it bears today-~Australian Labor Party.

312. 431. “_I_b_i_g_.

21

issue of Free Trade versus Protection; however:

By the 1880's the old slogans ”free trade" "and

"protection" had lost their significance, "great
names" were more important than issues, election
manifestoes were tailor-made to suit the exigencies
of the moment and what passed for "parties" were
really "rival syndicates” more concerned with the
perquisites of office than the implementation of
policy. Although the labels "Liberal," "National, "
cConservative,” and "Radical" were used, in election

wpaigns the two sides were more often referred to

as ministerialist" and' 'opposition.”

In spite of the appearance of political chaos, colonial
governments were able to resolve issues and face the
peculiar problems involved in developing a new continent.
Australian settlers could not "unlock the land" without land
reform laws, irrigation systems, roads, railroads, and
harbors; the people turned to government because there was
nowhere else to turn. Moreover, the challenge of development
was too great to be met by local governments; there was
therefore a fundamental thrust toward centralized planning
and administration.
Irrigation was a typical case where the State had not
only to supply advice but to build works and establish
huge administrations, and, as the railways and roads and
harbours were also managed by public authorities, a
constructive State policy of what is called a socialistic
character became an incident of Australian politics.
This involved not only State planning of a technical
order but also dealing with settlers and financing them,
and thus the control of vast servicesawith multitudes
of officials and complicated finance.
Colonial government programs were undertaken during times
of political instability, and were necessarily characterized

by experimentation and improvisation. But they learned from

 

1Overacker, op. cit., p. 37.
2Eggleston, op. cit., p. 24.

22

their mistakes, and managed to build a tradition of active,
pragmatic government, manned by a sprawling bureaucracy and
committed to a policy of "development."1
The movement toward federation of the six colonies
slowly gathered impetus as Australia approached the turn
of the century. In 1891, a convention of colonial politi-
cians drew up a draft constitution which would transfer to
a central government such minimal functions as tariff
control, immigration, foreign affairs, currency, and
national defense. During the 1890's the draft constitution
was debated and amended in a series of conventions, as well
as in the colonial parliaments. Finally, in 1899, the
colonies voted in separate referendums to adopt the consti-
tution which united them into a single Australian nation.2
The British parliament acted favorably on the new constitu-
tion in 1900, and the first Australian parliament convened
in 1901.

The Australian federal system.--The Australian consti-

 

tution reflects "an amalgam of concepts derived from the

Constitution of the United States and of the British concept

W'—

1Miller calls “development" a ”native concept"--not
to be confused with’ 'socialism.” "The Australian style in
politics may be characterized as...a habit of neglecting
theoretical arguments on policy, in favor of discussions on
concrete proposals, summed up in the word 'development'"
(pp. 224- 25).

2For an excellent review of events leading up to
federation, see L. F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government
of the Commonwealth of Australia (London: Longmans, Green
E Co., 1954), pp. 1-37. Also see Riker's discussion of the
military and defense considerations involved in the decision
to federate, in Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1964), pp. 27 28. .

 

 

 

23
of responsible government."1 It providesfor a central
government with specified powers; the state (formerly
colonial) constitutions and powers were left intact, except
those powers superceded by the federal constitution.

Executive authority is vested in a Governor-General,
who is appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the
Australian government.2 The Governor-General exercises
formal powers similar to those of the British monarch: he
designates the Prime Minister, formally opens and dissolves
parliament, and gives the royal assent to acts of parliament.
Actual executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister
and his fellow ministers of state who form the Cabinet. The
Cabinet may be drawn from either house of parliament, but
it is responsible only to the lower house--the House of
Representatives.

Legislative authority is vested in a bicameral parlia-
ment composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
In 1948 the membership of both bodies was increased in size:
the House from75 to 122 members,3 and the Senate from 36

 

1H. Ra Anderson, loc. cit., p. 31.

2The Governor-General is usually a titled Englishman.
Two exceptions occurred (in 1931 and 1946) when Labor gov-
ernments requested the appointment of Australian-born
Governors-General.

3In addition, the Northern Territory and the
Australian Capital Territory each elects one representative
with restricted voting privileges.

24

to 60 members.1

The members of the House of Representatives are
elected from single member districts for 3-year terms.
Districts are apportioned on a population basis, and each
state is represented on the basis of its population. Cur-
rently, New South Wales elects the largest number of repre-
sentatives--46; Victoria elects 33; Queensland elects 18;
South Australia elects 11; Western Australia elects 9; and
Tasmania elects 5. Representatives are elected under a
"preferential system" of voting, by which the voter numbers
each candidate on the ballot in the order of his preference.
If no candidate receives an absolute majority of first pref-
erence votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is elimi-
nated, and his second preference votes are distributed among
the remaining candidates. The process continues until one
of the candidates receives a majority.2

Members of the Senate are elected for 6-year terms,
and under normal circumstances, half of the membership
stands for election every 3 years. The Senate is composed

of 10 members from each state, and is elected under a

 

1The Australian constitution provides that the House
of Representatives should be approximately twice the size
of the Senate.

2D. W. Rawson, Australia Votes Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1961), p. 2.

 

25

complicated system of proportional representation.1

The Senate may originate legislation with the exception

of money bills, which it may reject but not amend. All
other bills are subject to Senate amendment or rejection,
and none may become law without Senate approval. In the
event of a deadlock between the two chambers, the government

may call for a "double dissolution" followed by a general

election of both chambers.2

.._L
'7

1The'system for electing the Senate is described in
Rawson, op. cit., pp. 62-63:

"Within each state a quota for election is determined
by dividing the number of formal valid votes by one more
than the number of senators to be elected and adding
one. The first candidates listed by the two major
parties will normally have polled a higher number of
first preference votes than the quota, and are therefore
elected. In each case a 'transfer fraction' is calcula-
ted by dividing the surplus of votes above the quota by
the total number of votes received by the candidate.

All his second preferences are then examined to see how
the second preferences of his supporters were distributed,
and in each case the number of second preferences is
multiplied by the 'transfer fraction'...When the

surplus of all elected candidates, including those
brought above the quota by the distribution of these
preferences, have been distributed, the candidate with
fewest first preference votes is eliminated and his
preferences distributed as for the House of Representa-
t ves.

The process continues until all vacancies are filled.

2The Prime Minister may ask the Governor-General to
dissolve both chambers if the Senate rejects a House-passed

bill twice in a three-month period. If new elections do not
result in breaking the deadlock, the bill is put to a vote
in a joint session. Double dissolutions have occurred
twice: in 1914 and 1951.

26

The ultimate judicial authority in Australia is
exercised by the High Court, which consists of a Chief
Justice and six associate justices appointed by the govern-
ment. A justice holds office for life unless he wishes to
retire. The High Court acts as a court of appeal from state
Supreme Courts, and has original jurisdiction in actions
against the federal government or actions involving more
than one state. The most important function of the High
Court is to interpret the constitution, and in so doing to
hand down decisions which have helped to determine the
balance of power between federal and state governments.1

The framers of the Australian constitution spelled
out certain powers held exclusively by the federal govern-
ment. These include the exclusive power to levy customs
duties; the determination of legal tender; the administra-
tion of the postal service; and the maintenance of the armed
forces. The constitution also provides that most other powers
are held concurrently by the state and federal governments,
either or both of which may legislate in such areas as taxa-
tion, banking, naturalization and immigration, marriage and

2

divorce, education, and social services. At the time of

federation, according to Davies:

The states meant to go on governing largely as before,
looking after development, land policy and agriculture,
labour relations, education, health and social welfare,
having merely shed to a convenient joint subsidiary
certain dullish chores. A picture of federal-state
relations, of course, which was to become completely

 

lcr. Crisp, op. cit., pp. 262-280.

2Anderson, 10c. cit., pp. 33-34.

 

27

browned over within twenty years.1

Since federation, the federal government has gradually
expanded its activities in many of the concurrent fields
at the expense of state power. In addition, the defense
powers of the federal government have been broadly construed
by the High Court "to justify Commonwealth control over
almost every aspect of economic, industrial, and social
life during time of war."2
The most significant shift in the balance of federal
power has occurred in the area of intergovernmental finan-
cial relations.3 In the first ten years after federation
in 1901, the federal government was required by constitu-
tional provision (Section 87) to return to the states three-
quarters of all customs and excise revenue. This system was
replaced in 1911 by federal grants of 25 shillings Egg
capita to each state. Between 1911 and 1927, the states
sank deeply into debt while the federal government, which
needed funds to pursue World War I, began to encroach upon
such important sources of state revenue as the income and
inheritance taxes. In 1927 the federal government ended

the per capita grants, and agreed to assume existing and

 

future state indebtedness. However, all future borrowing

by both federal and state governments was to be regulated

 

 

l
A. F. Davi s Australian Democrac (London: Longmans
Green & Co., 1958 M) ’ 41 ’

2Anderson, 10c. cit., p. 34.

3For discussions of federal-state financial relations,
see L. F. Giblin, "Financial Aspects of the Constitution,”

Federalism in Australia (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire Pty. Ltd.,
'1919), pp. 89- -108,*Davies, op. cit., pp. 81-96; Anderson,
1°C. Cite, Pp. 40-52.

 

 

28

by a new agency, the Loan Council, consisting of the
Premier of each state and the Prime Minister. In 1934 the
federal government also established the Commonwealth Grants.
Commission, a three-member body responsible for recommending
outright federal grants to the so-called "claimant states":
Western Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania.1
The heavy financial pressures occasioned by the second‘
World War caused a further extension of federal fiscal power.
In 1942 the federal government passed legislation estab-
lishing itself as the sole taxing authority in the income
tax field, and providing that the states would be compen-
sated by grants equal to the average of their income tax
collections in the two previous years. Four states chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the uniform income tax,
but the High Court upheld the system. The principle of
federal "reimbursement" was abandoned after the war in favor
of a formula based on "need." ”It is significant that a
substantial sum over the formula has nevertheless been pro-
duced every year since 1946 to mollify premiers at the last

moment."2

The proportion of state revenue received from federal

grants has steadily increased. In 1962-63 the federal budget

 

1"Claimant states" receive special assistance because
of their dependence upon primary production, and because of
the claimed adverse effect of high tariffs on their economy.
The recommendations of the Grants Commission have invariably
been adopted without change.

2Davies, op. cit., p. 94. The amounts of federal rants
are negotiated eac year at the Premiers' Conference, wh ch
is a meeting of the six state Premiers with the federal
government.

29

called for a total of L477.2 million (approximately $1
billion) in grants to the states. Although it is difficult
to measure the precise federal-state proportion, the federal
Treasurer estimated that in the previous fiscal year (1961-
62) states received 56.7 percent of their revenue from the
federal government. The bulk of the funds granted by the
federal government is not earmarked for specific purposes
and does not require matching state funds. For example,
about two-thirds (L353 million) of the 1962-63 grants were
made without any strings attached, while less than one-
third (£113 million) was for specific public works projects.
The balance (Lll.2 million) was granted to the ”claimant

states."1

It is clear that although the collection of public
revenue has devolved mainly upon the federal government, the
state governments continue to make most policy decisions on
how the money is to be £2223. ‘Within the general boundaries
of public borrowing and spending established by the federal
government, the states are relatively free to determine
spending priorities, and in addition, are chiefly responsible
for the administration of public services. Thus,

”the growth of Federal power has not meant a decline in
State power, if we measure State power by the number of
people employed by state government, the amount of money

spent by them, and the extent to which their activities
impinge on the average citizen."

 

1Budget figures are quoted from "Australia: Financial
Powers of the Commonwealth,” Round Table, No. 210 (March,

1963). pp. 191-197.
2Miller, op. cit., p. 159.

30

Australian Political Parties

Four major parties contest Australian elections: the
Labor Party, the Country Party, the Liberal Party, and the
Democratic Labor Party. In this section we shall give a
brief background statement on each party. This will be
followed by a historical sketch of the party struggle since
federation. Finally, we shall present a review of party
structure at the federal level and in the individual states,
with particular attention to New South Wales.

The Labor Party has been in existence continuously
since federation (1901), and is generally regarded by
students of Australian politics as the lodestar of the
party system. Louise Overacker's view is typical:

The character of the party system and the functioning
of parliamentary democracy have been profoundly affected
by the A.L.P. Whether for better or worse, its doctrine,
machinery, and traditions have penetrated the institu-
tions of its present-day rivals.
The Labor Party has, however, been subject to a series of
organizational convulsions arising from bitter disputes

between militant socialists and those who seek piecemeal

social reformm.within a private enterprise system.2 These

 

1p. 312. See also W. K. Hancock, Australia (Sydney:
Australasian Publishing Company Pty. Ltd., I945), pp. 185-
198. Hancock's influential study of Australian history,
politics, and culture was first published in 1930. Hancock
labelled the National Party and Country Party as ”parties of
resistance" --a term Overacker accepts as Hapt. The
"initiative-resistance" concept as a dominant theme in
Australian political analysis is critically examined by
Henry Mayer, ”Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System,”
Historical Studies, VII (November, 1956), 235-270.

2Crisp, op. cit.,pp. 74-115.

31

disputes have been complicated--and aggravated--by sectarian
strife which led to the formation of the Democratic Labor
Party; as well as by interstate party conflicts resulting

in part from the divisive forces inherent in federal struc-
ture.1 Internal disruptions have severely limited Labor's
ability to gain and retain control of the federal government.
Yet the party has also demonstrated a long-term resilience,
and its status as a potential governing party has never been
seriously threatened.

The Country Party was first organized in 1919 and
currently maintains organizations in all states except
Tasmania and South Australia. As we have seen, the Country
Party became the political expression of rural economic
interests as well as rural distrust of city-based politi-
cians--both Labor and non-Labor.

Mayer has said of the Country Party that "its disap-
pearance has been prophesied since its inception, yet it

:12

has shown very great persistence. Rawson calls the

Country Party

a standing affront to the tidy-minded. Its support

is spread over the country districts...in a manner
which refutes all simple explanations, including those
from within the party itself. It has been described

at various times as a party of country people generally,
or as a party of primary producers, or as a party of
certain kinds of primary producers, and each description
is almost equally easy to confirm and to refute. Most
country people in Australia, including most of the

 

IA. Wildavsky, "Party Discipline under Federalism:
Implications of the Australian Experience," Social Research,

XXVIII (Winter, 1961), 437-458.
2Mayer, 10c. cit., p. 266.

32

farmers, vote for the parties other than the Country
Party. It is a party held together by regional,'
industrial, and personal interests and loyalties, in
all kinds of combinations, but with the regional factors
usually predominating.

Although the Country Party is a completely distinct politi-
cal organization, it generally enters into mutual agreements
not to contest parliamentary seats held by incumbents from
the major non-Labor party--presently the Liberal Party. At
the parliamentary level, Country Party members jealously
guard their separate identity, but they nearly always ally
themselves, either in government or in opposition, with the
Liberal Party.

The Liberal Party was formed in 1944 and is active in
all six Australian states. As the major non-Labor party,
the Liberal Party occupies the place in the party system
formerly held by the “Fusion” or "Liberal Party" (1909-
1916), the National Party (1917-1930), and the United
Australia Party (1931-1944). Yet the Liberal Party has
been largely successful in fighting off "the constant jibes
that we have merely changed our name, that we are an old
party in a new guise."2

The Liberal Party has been able to shuck the “resistance"
image of its antecedents by developing a distinctive body of
policy since coming to power in 1949, and also by developing

a party organization which consciously seeks to avoid the

pitfalls of the old non-Labor parties. In the area of

 

lRawson, op. cit., p. 49.
23. L. Garrick, ”The Liberal Way of Progress,” a
Liberal Party pamphlet, 1948?, p. 5.

33

public policy, the Liberal Party has clung to its claim as
a ”private enterprise” party, but has nevertheless placed
”a very great reliance upon fiscal controls, especially

over imports, banking policy and taxation, as a means of
assisting rapid economic growth with only moderate inflation."1
At the same time, the Liberal government has established new
social service benefits and liberalized others, and pursued
an active policy of "national development."2 Organiza-
tionally, the Liberal Party has built a much larger rank-
and-file membership than its predecessors; it has broadened
its base of financial support by accepting money only from
individuals or single business concerns, but not associations
or fund-raising committees operating outside the party
structure.3 Ideologically, the Liberal Party has tried to
turn the tables on Labor by espousing a "positive Liberal

philosophy" as opposed to the ”reactionary" socialism of
the Labor Party.4
1

 

Rawson, op. cit., p. 34.

21h Australia the term "national development" covers
a broad range of programs including highway construction,
irrigation, hydroelectric power projects, and the discovery
and development of natural resources.

3B. D. Graham, ”The Placg of Finance Committees in
Non-Labor Politics, 1910-1930, Australian Journal of

Politics and Histor§_ VI (May, 1960), pp.4l-52; Overacker,
op. cit., pp. 217-2 8, 255-257; Crisp, op. cit., 132-136.

4The idea of Liberal ideological ascendency has been
developed by W. K. Anderson in a series of presidential
addresses to the Federal Conference of the Liberal Party.
See especially ”Liberals Lead a Revolution" (1953) and
“Liberal Lead to an Expanding Nation" (1956), which have
been published in pamphlet form by the Federal Secretariat
of the Liberal Party.

34

In order to help place today's Australian parties
in historical perspective, we now turn to a brief sketch
of the party struggle since federation.

In the first decade after federation, there were three
political parties which contended for control of the
Commonwealth government: the Protectionist party, the Free
Trade party, and the Labor Party. The three parliamentary
groupings were roughly equal in size, and each jockeyed for
leadership in a series of shifting coalition governments.

The Protectionists led by Alfred Deakin governed with Labor
support until 1904 when a Labor Prime Minister, J. C. Watson,
headed a government lasting less than four months. Watson
was succeeded by G. H. Reid, a Free Trader who governed
almost a year with Protectionist support. In 1905, Deakin
again became Prime Minister with Labor support and held
office for over three years. Labor returned to power briefly
in 1908 under A. Fisher; Deakin was back in 1909 for his
final year as Prime Minister--this time supported by a
"fusion“ of Protectionists and Free Traders, which took the
name "Liberal.“ In the election of 1910, the Labor Party

led by Fisher decisively defeated the Liberals.1

The Labor Party, opposed by the Liberal Party, domina-
ted the federal government until 1917 when the conscription
issue brought about a split in Labor's parliamentary ranks.
The Labor Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes, who favored
conscription in the face of strong opposition from within

 

1Overacker, op. cit., DP. 197-203.

35

his party, bolted the Labor Party.1 Hughes formed a new
Cabinet composed of six Liberals and five former members

of the Labor Party. In the national election of 1917, the
Hughes government was returned under a new party banner--
the Nationalist Party. The Country Party made its debut
in 1919, electing eleven members to federal parliament and
thereby holding the balance of power. Country Party members
gave the Hughes government grudging support; but in 1922,
with its parliamentary strength increased to fourteen, the
Country Party withdrew support from Hughes. The federal
Treasurer, S. M. Bruce, succeeded Hughes as Prime Minister,
and the Leader of the Country Party, Earle Page, became
Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer. The Country Party
insisted on four additional Cabinet posts in return for
its support.2 The Bruce-Page "composite" government3
remained in office until 1929 when Labor was swept into
power.

Labor's triumph was short-lived. Battered by the
depression crisis, J. M. Scullin's government floundered
its way toward certain defeat. Once again, internal Labor
dissension produced a split which provided the opposition

with new leadership: the Treasurer, J. A. Lyons, and

 

1Overacker, op. cit., pp. 115-128.

2Ulrich Ellis, A Historyof the Australian Countgy
Party (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1963), pp.

3Country Party spokesmen prefer to speak of "composite
.governments rather han coalit on governments, since the

Country Party tends.to be jealous of its status as an
"independent Partyt

36
several of his followers joined the opposition. Under
Lyons' leadership, the United Australia Party was formed,

and the new party won an overwhelming victory in 1931.1

Lyons led a United Australia-Country Party government until
his death in 1939.

When Robert G. Menzies succeeded Lyons as Prime
Minister, relations between the coalition partners steadily
deteriorated. Interparty differences on policy, as well as
bitter personal conflicts between Menzies and Country Party
leaders, led to the downfall of the government.2 Three
weeks before Pearl Harbor, a Labor government under the
leadership of John Curtin took office. The opposition
parties continued in disarray during the war years, and the
1943 election reduced the United Australia Party to a mere
fourteen members and the Country Party to nine members.

In October, 1944, Menzies as Leader of the Opposition
called a conferenoeeof eighteen political andssemi-p01itical
organizations active in the various states. Menzies urged
the organizations to disband and form a "new movement."3
Two months later a second conference was held, and the par-
ticipating organizations agreed on a constitution for a party

to be named the Liberal Party of Australia.

 

1Overacker, op. cit., 213-14.
2Ellis, op. cit., pp. 233-257; Overacker, o . cit.,
pp. 214-215.

3Excgrpts of Menzies' address to the conferepce are
quoted in Forming the Liberal Party of Australia,

Liberal Party pamphlet (undated).

37

The newly organized Liberal Party contested its
first election in 1946, and captured eighteen seats while
improving the popular vote received by the United Australia
Party in 1943 by 13.6 percent.1 Following its re-election,
the Labor government became embroiled in a series of contro-
versies involving bank nationalization, the lifting of
wartime controls, and labor unrest caused by Communist-
dominated unions.2 In the 1949 election, an anti-Labor
landslide put a Liberal-Country coalition securely into
power under Menzies' leadership.

The Menzies government has remained in power since
1949 by winning elections in 1951, 1954, 1955, 1958, 1961,
and 1963. In 1961, the Menzies government suffered heavy
losses in Queensland and New South Wales, but retained a
tenuous one-seat parliamentary majority.3 Two years later
the government called another election and received a
thumping endorsement from the voters: party strength fol-
lowing the election of December, 1963 stood at 52 seats for
the Liberals, 20 for the Country Party, and 50 for the Labor
Party.

Since 1955 the Labor Party's efforts to unseat the

 

1
Overacker o . cit. . 297. In 1946 the Liberal
Party received 33'pgrcent 3fpthe popular vote; the Country

Party, 10.9 percent; the Labor Party, 49.9 Percent; other,
6.2 percent.

2Overacker, op. cit., pp. 292-296.
3The 1961 federal election is analyzed in Chapter VI.

38

Menzies government have been impeded by a damaging split

in its own ranks, which led to the formation of the
Democratic Labor Party. The upheaval occurred after
Catholic-led ”Industrial Groups" wrested control of several
key industrial unions from Communist officers. The
'Groupers", as they were called, were strongest in the
state of Victoria where their control of Labor Party-
affiliated unions led to control of the party state executive.
Militantly anti-Communist, the "Groupers" also turned their
fire on non-Communist union members who would Join with
Communists in forming a so-called ”unity ticket"--a slate
of candidates in a union election. Finally, the growing
power of the Industrial Groups, together with mounting
criticism of the federal parliamentary Leader, H. V. Evatt,
by leading Victorian Catholics, culminated in the Labor
split.

In October, 1954, Dr. Evatt issued a statement attack-
ing "a small group of Labor members...disloyal to the Labor
movement and to Labor 1eadership...deflecting the Labor
movement from the pursuit of established Labor objectives
and ideals.

”It seems certain,” Evatt went on, "that the activi-
ties of this small group are largely directed from outside

the Labor Movement."1

 

1B. A. Santamaria, "'The Movement': 194l-1960--An
Outline,“ Catholics and the Free Society, ed. Henry Mayer
(Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1961), p.88.

39

Evatt's denunciation of the Industrial Groups was
followed in 1955 by action of the Labor Party Federal
Executive to dissolve the Victorian State Executive and
confirm the appointment of a new Executive purged of
”Groupers'. The Labor split in Victoria reverberated
throughout the Labor movement in Australia, but generally
with less serious consequences for existing Labor Party

1 Dissident factions in

organizations in other states.
western Australia, Tasmania, and South Australia formed
political organizations known as the Australian Labor
Party (Anti-Communist) and made token appearances in the
1955 federal elections. In Victoria, the A.L.P. (A-C)
polled 15 percentg of the vote in 1955, but all of its
candidates for the House of Representatives (including
seven incumbents) were defeated by official Labor Party
candidates.2
The Labor Party State Executive of New South Wales
was also reshuffled in 1956 as a result of action taken by
the Federal Executive of the Labor Party. This reduced the
strength of 'Groupers” in New South Hales, but did not bring
about a deep split in the party organization, partly because
the Roman Catholic hierarchy in New South Wales did not

support the D.L.P. movement. A nucleus of a few party

officials did leave the regular party organization, however;

 

1The development of the D.L.P. in each state is
summarized by D. U. Rawson, op. cit., pp. 37-49.

2One D.L.P. candidate for the Senate, F. J. McManus,
was elected because of the system of proportional representa-
tion by which Australian Senators are elected.

40

and formed the Democratic Labor Party--the name which was
eventually adopted in all states except Queensland.1

In the last three elections of the federal House of
Representatives in 1958, 1961, and 1963, the D.L.P. has
fielded a slate of candidates in each state; however, its
share of the total vote has gradually waned from 9.4 percent
in 1958, to 8.5 percent in 1961, and 7.3 in 1963. The D.L.P.
has polled as high as 14.8 percent of the vote in Victoria
(1958 and 1961), and as low as 4.3 percent in New South
Wales (1963).

It is difficult to assess either the electoral impact
of the D.L.P., or the place the D.L.P. has occupied and will
occupy in the Australian party stem. Rawson's analysis of
the 1958 election concludes that "had there been only one
Labor Party the government would very probably still have

been returned:2

And Labor's strong showing in 1961 seemed
to disprove the notion that the existence of the D.L.P.
necessarily relegates Labor to permanent opposition. Never-
theless, the D.L.P. has unquestionably been a troublesome,
even if not insurmountable, roadblock in the path of the
Labor Party.

We shall complete our discussion of Australian parties

with a brief review of party structure in the individual

 

lThe A.L.P. split in Queensland occurred in 1957 as a
result of conflict between the incumbent Labor government
and the party's State Executive. The Labor Premier, V. C.
Gair, was expelled, and he and his followers formed the
Queensland Labor Party. See A. A. Morrison, "The Government
of Queensland," in Davis, op. cit., pp. 288-292.

2Rawson, op. cit., p. 223.

41
states and at the federal level.

According to Davis:

The foundation of the Australian political parties is

deeply rooted in the States. This is a fact of first

importance...Each major party...has created a federal

organization, but in each case it is a tight or loose

coalescence of State parties in a superstructure which

limitatigfifisfii.tflfiozfiie’éfitzlifidi‘tfim ”‘3‘
Party organizations within each state virtually monopolize
the functions of candidate selection, fund raising, and
campaign organization for both federal and state elections.
Although the structure of a given party is generally similar
from.state to state, there are numerous variations growing
out of a particular state's political traditions.

Typically, the Liberal and Country parties are organ-
ized in local branches which elect delegates to a constit-
uency or electorate organization. The electorate organiza-
tion sends delegates to a central council, which exercises
the formal responsibility for party policy and management.
In most states, the central council elects a smaller central
executive which is responsible for the day-to-day management
of the organization. All parties hold an annual conference
or convention composed of delegates from.party branches;
the annual conference hears speeches by party leaders,

debates policy resolutions, and usually elects part of the

central council. State and federal parliamentary parties

‘—

1
Davis. op. cit., p. 578. Variations among state
party organizations areoutlined in pp. 578 - 603.

b.-

42

have substantial representation on all central bodies,
but members of parliament are specifically prohibited from
acting as state president.

Each state Liberal Party organization sends seven
delegates to the federal council, which usually meets annu-
ally and elects a smaller federal executive including a
federal president, one delegate from each state, and a
women's chairman. The federal organs of the Liberal Party
provide state organizations with some access to and influ-
ence on the federal policy-making process; however, the
primary responsibility for shaping policy--both in theory
and practice--rests with the parliamentary leadership.

In addition, the federal organization does not exercise
supervisory or disciplinary authority over state parties.

The Country Party, as Overacker has pointed out-

is hardly more than a loose alliance of inde endent
state chieftains...0utside of parliament [it is little
more than a loose confederation of very independent
state groups linked together by a federal council, a
federal'pfesident, and a headquarters office in
Sydney 0 o 0
Thus, the federal organization of the Country Party con-
sists mainly of its parliamentary party, which under a
series of strong parliamentary leaders, has demonstrated
remarkable cohesion.

Labor Party organizations at the state level also
form branches as the basic structural unit. Branches elect
delegates to state and federal electorate committees, and
these committees in turn elect delegates to the annual

1Overacker, op. cit., pp. 222, 231.

43

conference. Unions affiliated with the Labor Party also
have direct representation at the annual conference in pro-
portion to the size of their membership, the result being
that union delegates far exceed the number of non-union
delegates. As the collective voice of the party, the
annual conference is vested with ”supreme ruling authority?
and may instruct members of parliament on policy questions.
The annual conference also elects the central executive
which has broad supervision over the party organization
including the power to expel members, dissolve branches,
and refuse party endorsement to candidates.

At the federal level a conference is held biennially
consisting of six delegates from each state. The federal
conference elects federal party officers and an executive
with two delegates from each state. These federal bodies
also have broad powers which include the right to determine
party policy and to restructure state organizations.l

Within the borders of each state, party organizations
expend a major share of their energies and resources in
order to capture control of state governments. In spite of
the fact that in four states one party has been in power

for extended periods, most election campaigns are genuine

 

lThe recurring crises in Labor Party organization,

both at state and federal levels, have received much atten-
tion from students of Australian politics. In addition to
Overacker's excellent study, see L. F. Crisp, The Australian
Federal Labour Party 1901-1951 (London: Longmans, Green &
Co., 1955). Also see J. D. B. Miller, "Party Discipline in
Australia,” Political Science, V (March and September, 1953),
3-15, 21—36.

1+4

contests which offer a reasonable prospect of victory to

both parties.1

In South Australia, the Liberal and Country League2
has maintained an unbroken hold on the state government since
1933, thanks largely to a gerrymandered system of represen-
tation which gives twice as many seats to the country as

to the capital city of Adelaide. Even so, the L.C.L.
narrowly missed defeat in 1962. The second longest period

of one-party contrtl has occurred in Tasmania, where a

Labor government has been in power since 1935. The Labor
Party controlled the Queensland government from 1932 to

1957, but lost control to a Country-Liberal coalition after
the Labor split. Changes in party control have been most
frequent in Western Australia and Victoria; both currently
have Liberal-Country governments since 1958 and 1955
respectively.

New South Wales has a population of about four
million people, which is well over a third of Australia's
total population. The state is bounded on the east by some
700 miles of Pacific coastline, and extends approximately
the same distance into the interior of the continent. In
general, the state is characterized by a pattern of decreas-
ing population density and economic development from east

to west. The mid-coastal region, which comprises three

 

lDavis, op. cit., pp.579-583.

2In 1932 the two non-Labor parties in South Australia,
the Liberal Federation and the Country Party, merged to form
the Liberal and Country League--the name it has used ever
since.

45
percent of the area, "holds seventy per cent of its
population and ninety per cent of its industrial strength."1
In the center of the region lies the state capital of Sydney,
a metropolis of more than two million people; to the north
is Newcastle, with a population of 150,000, and to the soufll
is Wollongong-Port Kembla with a population of 130,000.

Over 95 percent of the people outside the three
largest cities live within 250 miles of the coast. Dairy-
ing is the main industry in the north and south coastal
areas. Parallel with most of the coastline is a sharply-
raised tableland, which contains important sheep and cattle
grazing districts as well as closely settled mixed farming
areas. Wheat farming is a major rural industry along the
western slopes of the tablelands, while the vast, dry plains
in western New South Wales are suitable only for sheep
grazing. According to Parker, "less than 15,000 people live
in the unincorporated portions of the Western Division,1
covering over fourty per cent of the State."2

New South Wales has a bicameral parliament consisting
of a 94-member Legislative Assembly elected from single-

member districts, and a 60-member Legislative Council.3

 

1R. S. Parker, "The Government of New South Wales,”
Government of the Australian States, p. 59.

21bid.

3Legislative Councillors are elected for life; vacan-
cies are filled by a joint vote of the Legislative Assembly
and Legislative Council. The Council may amend or reject
all bills except the annual appropriation bill, which can
be delayed for one month. The Labor Party has long been
comitted totboliiition of the Council, but a bloc of Labor
Councillors has refused to vote themselves out of existence
by approving an abolition bill. In 1961, a referendum on
the question of abolition was soundly defeated.

46

Since 1949, the Legislative Assembly has been elected under
an apportionment system which gives 48 seats to the Sydney
metropolitan area, and 46 seats to the remainder of the
state. Within these two major divisions, electorate
boundaries are determined on a population basis by an
Electoral Districts Commission.1
The Labor Party has controlled the Legislative
Assembly since 1941. Its principal strength lies in the
major industrial complexes of Sydney, Newcastle, and
Wollongong; however, its strength has also penetrated sig-
nificantly into the more densely populated country areas.
In addition, the Labor Party commands the allegiance of the
sparsely-settled, far-western electorates. The Liberal
Party is based mainly in the middle and upper-middle class
suburbs in the Sydney metropolitan area. Other Liberal
strongholds include prosperous, semi-rural electorates
adjacent to the Sydney area, as well as the south coast
dairying area. The Country Party does not contest metro-
politan electorates, but it controls most of the electorates
forming a broad belt from the wealthy northeastern New
England area to the southern agricultural districts.2
In spite of Labor's extended grip on the New South

Wales government, the contest for power has been by no means

one-sided. The 1950 election resulted in a 46-46 split

 

1This Commission is a three-member body composed of
the Electoral Commissioner ex officio, a judge and a
surveyor appointed by the government.

2Parker, op. cit., pp. 83-94.

47
between Labor and its non-Labor opponents, but the support
of two "Independent Labor” members kept the government in
power. In the elections of 1956 and 1959, the ”adjusted”
Liberal and Country Party vote combined very nearly equalled
the vote for the Labor Party; yet the Labor government
received a 52-42 parliamentary majority in 1956, and a
50-44 majority in 1959.1 In each election, a handful of
additional Liberal and Country votes in ”swing" seats could
have tipped the election in their favor. As a result,
Liberal leaders have consistently maintained that the
apportionment system is weighted in Labor's favor, and also
that electorate boundaries are deliberately drawn to give
Labor the edge in critical swing seats. While this claim
is difficult to document conclusively, it does reflect the
frustration of a party organization which has always been
within reach of power, but has fallen just short of grasping
it.

Summary
In the opening chapter of this study, we have outlined

our theoretical approach to the analysis of party organiza-
tion. Our central assumption is that party organization is

an organized effort to gain control of government through

 

lIt is difficult to arrive at an accurate breakdown
of the party vote because of several uncontested electorates

and the presence of independent and splinter party candidates
on the ballot. Joan Rydon attempts to take these factors
into consideration in computing party strength in elections.
See her chapter ”The Results," State Ballot, Ian Campbell
(Sydney: Australian Political Studies Association Monograph

No. 7. 1963). pp. 46-51.

48

the election of party candidates. The drive for public
office is the party organization's reason for existence,
and electoral victory is the measure of success. Thus,
those who win elections and hold governmental power tend

to dominate the party organization, and tend to shape party
structure and policies to meet the conditions of office-
seeking.

The contest among parties for control of government
occurs within the framework of differing traditions, cultures,
and political institutions. This particular study of party
organization is devoted to an analysis of the,Liberal Party
of New South Wales, Australia. We have reviewed some of
the important economic, social, and political forces which
have had a bearing on the development and character of the
party system in Australia. Among these are its vigorous
and stormy labor movement, the antipathy between city and
country, the economic dependence on primary production, and
the unique mixture of British and American-derived political
institutions.

Within the state of New South Wales, we have seen thd:
the Liberal Party has shared in the consistent success of
the party in national politics since 1949, but has failed--
sometimes narrowly--to gain control of state government.
The objective of this study is to examine the response of
the party to this position, and to analyze that response in
terms of our concept of party as an office-seeking

organization.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW SOUTH WALES LIBERAL PARTY:

STRUCTURE, ADMINISTRATION
AND PERSONNEL

Introduction

Political parties operate within an established
organizational structure, which provides for units and
levels of organization, and also provides for procedures
by which the party chooses leaders, evolves policy, conducts
campaigns, and makes decisions about the internal operation
of the organization. In this chapter, we are concerned
with the formal structure of the New South Wales Liberal
Party, and the procedural mechanisms by which the party

operates and makes decisions.

 

Liberal Party branches are the smallest units of
organization, and form the foundation of the party structure.
The next level of organization is the electorate conference,
which is composed of delegates from branches located within
a given electorate. The governing body cf the organization
is State Council, which is composed mainly of delegates
elected by ppppg electorate conferences. A much smaller
body, the State Executive, is elected by State Council, and
is responsible for party operation between meetings of State

Council. Among the members of the Executive elected by the

49

50

Council are the State_President and four vice-presidents,
who may not be members of parliament, and the State
Treasurer.

Liberal members of state parliament form the state
parliamentary party, elect their own Leader, and have direct
representation on the central bodies of the party organiza-
tion. The state Leader has the final responsibility for
spelling out party policy. Liberal members of federal
parliament from New South Wales also select a Leader and
have direct representation on State Council and the State
Executive. The federal Leader is the chief spokesman for
Liberal Party policy at the federal level.

These are the main outlines of the party structure;
we turn now to a more detailed examination of the component

units, and their relationship to each other.1

The branch organization

A Liberal Party branch consists of at least ten
members who, with the consent of the state electorate
conference, pass a resolution that a branch be formed.
Membership is open to any person who indicates his desire
to join by signing a prescribed application form, and paying
the annual membership fee of L1 (approximately $2.25).

 

1Party structure and procedures are spelled out in
the party constitution, a document containing 236 articles
when it was issued in printed form in 1957. The constitu-
tion has since been amended frequently, and an updated
version is currently being prepared. The discussion in
this chapter reflects the latest information available;
however, specific references and quotations are drawn from
the 1957 version unless otherwise indicated.

51

Upon the formation of a branch, the members elect a branch
committee consisting of a president, two vice-presidents,
secretary, treasurer, and at least two other members. The_
branch also elects from three to eight delegates (depending
on the size of its membership) to the state and federal
electorate conferences in which the branch is located. In
addition, the five branch officers are ex officio delegates
to electorate conferences. Finally, the branch elects,
three to five delegates to the party annual conference.

Branch officers are responsible for the leadership
and administration of branch affairs. The branch president
acts as chairman of all branch meetings, and provides
over-all leadership of branch activities. The branch
secretary takes charge of all correspondence, records,
documents, and keeps the minutes of all branch meetings.
The branch treasurer receives membership fees and other
monies, keeps the branch bank account, and presents an
annual financial statement to the branch. Delegates to
electorate conferences and the annual convention transmit
to these bodies the resolutions and ideas of the branch,
and are responsible for reporting back to the branch the
proceedings of such meetings. All of these office-
bearers, sitting as the branch committee, are responsible
for meeting separately between general branch meetings in
order to plan a program of branch activities, prepare reports
for the general branch, and dispose of routine branch

administration.

52
The functions of a Liberal Party branch as outlined

in Clause 45 of the party constitution are as follows:

(a) To promote the objects, policy and platform of the
Organisation.

(b) To work for the election to Parliament of the
selected and endorsed candidates of the Organisa-
tion, and for that purpose to co-operate with all
the other Branches and the State Electorate
Conference within the Electorate and with the
Executive and committees in organising the
electorate to that end.

(c) To enlist supporters of the Organisation as members
of the Branch.

(d) To raise funds for the purpose of the Organisation
and for the furtherance of its objects.

(e) To secure the enrolment of every person eligible as
an elector and the removal from the Electoral Roll
of the names of all unqualified persons.

(f) To keep an Electoral Roll for the Electorate in
which shall be marked the known supporters of the
Organisation.

(g) To encourage within the Branch and the Organisation
all educational work of a political, social, and
economic character.' 4 ‘4‘ pf »

(h) To adopt resolutions for submission to the State‘“
Council, to Convention, or the Electorate Conference
or Regional Conference concerned.

A review of these eight functions indicates that the princi-
pal object of the branch organization is electoral: six of
the eight functions are directly or indirectly concerned
with the mobilization of maximum Liberal electoral support
in the branch area.

Functions other than electoral responsibilities are

notably less prominent in the list: one such function is

the ”educational work of a political, social, and economic

53
character" which the branch should encourage. This catch-
all statement includes branch activities ranging from the
staging of debates to the annual Christmas social. The
ether non-electoral function is the discussion of policy
resolutions, and the submission of such resolutions to the
higher levels of the party organization. _

In order to remain in good standing with the party, a
branch is required by the constitution to hold an annual
general meeting sometime before August 31. The quorum for
sucha meeting is eight members. At the annual meeting,
branch members elect or re-elect office-bearers, hear
reports from the treasurer and the branch committee, and
discuss general business. The branch is also required by
the constitution to keep its membership records and finan-
cial affairs in good order. If a branch ceases to function
satisfactorily, or ceases to function at all, it may be
investigated by the State Executive, which has the power
to disband a branch and confiscate its records and funds
(if any).

The discussion so far has focused Liberal Party
branches in general;it is necessary, however, to differen-
tiate among four types of branches, some of which have
somewhat different functions and privileges. The most
common type is the general branch, which draws its member-
ship from both sexes. The functions and privileges of

general branches are those which have already been outlined.

54
In addition to the general branches, there are Special.
Branches, Young Liberal Branches, and Womenfs Branches.

Clause 28 of the party constitution provides that
Special Branches, ”based not upon geographical areas, but
upon community of cultural, occupational, or other interests"
maybe formed with the consent of the State Executive.
Special Branches are governed by the same provisions as
general branches, except that Special Branches are entitled
to send one delegate to State Council. They are the only
branches with such direct representation on the governing
body of the party organization. At this writing, there are
only three Special Branches: the City of Sydney Special
Branch, the Northern Suburbs Club (Sydney), and the Sydney
University Liberal Club. Members of Special Branches may
also be members with full voting privileges in general
branches, but persons holding dual membership must pay the
membership fee to both branches.

Membership in Young Liberal Branches is open to anyone
in the 16-26 age group. Young Liberal Branches elect their
own officers and conduct their own affairs--mainly social
functions; they do not have the electoral responsibilities
of general branches, although they often co-operate with
general branches in the performance of such functions.

Each Young Liberal Branch elects three delegates to Youth
Council, the function of which is "to co-ordinate the work
of Young Liberal Branches, and generally to promote and

stimulate the progress of the Organisation and of the Young

55
Liberal Movement."l Youth Council also elects five _
delegates to State Council and one delegate to the State
Executive. The chairman of Youth Council is a member of
the State Executive appointed by the State Executive.

I‘.An annual Young Liberal Convention has been held since
1954. The convention spans two successive evenings: one
evening is devoted to thedebating of resolutions submitted
by Young Liberal Branches; the second evening is devoted to
the annual Young Liberal Ball. All Young Liberals are
eligible to attend both functions.

The fourth type of Liberal Party branch is the Women's
Branch. Like Young Liberal Branches, Women's Branches do
not elect delegates to electorate conferences; each Women's
Branch sends one delegate to a co-ordinating body called
the iWomen's Group”.2 The Women's Group meets monthly to
hear guest speakers--usually members of parliament, discuss
policy proposals, and plan social activities designed to
raise money for the party. Women's Group elects three
delegates to represent it in State Council. Liberal Party
women held their first Women's Convention in 1960, and it
has since become an annual event. The convention debates
branch resolutions covering a wide range of subjects--as

one report puts it--'from children to beer, from education

 

lConstitution, Clause 37.

2The ”Women's Committee" of a general branch may also
send one delegate to the WOmen's Group.

56

to pensions, and from census papers to flogging."1

Annual Convention .

The Liberal Party annual convention is an assembly of
delegates elected directly by party branches. All branch
presidents and secretaries are ex officio delegates, and
additional delegates (three to five) are elected by branches
of varying size.

Any branch or state electorate conference may submit
motions to be included on the convention agenda. Convention
delegates discuss and vote on each motion; however, there
is no provision in the constitution for the incorporation
of convention decisions into party policy. Lacking any
formal power, the role of the convention is to "bring to
our policy-making bodies the topical thinking of the
community an a wide variety of subjects" and to "provide a
fund of ideas for future discussion in the course of our
everyday life."2 . ' _ ’

The annual convention is normally held on a weekend,
with the first session on Friday evening and the closing
session on Saturday evening. The State President occupies
the chair. Motions submitted to the convention total at
least 100--the 1960 convention, for example, considered a
record 241 motions--and cover a wide range of topics:

immigration policy, decimal currency, social services,

 

lSydney Mornipg Herald Editorial, August 1, 1961.

2R. C. Cotton (then State President , "A Message to
Convention Delegates in the 1960 Convent on Agenda.

57

aboriginal welfare, Sydney HarborBridge toll, and mouth-
toamouthtresuscitation--to mention a few examples from the
1960 convention. Because of the large number of motions,
the relative brevity of the convention, and the attendance
of several hundred delegates, it is impossible to debate
motions with any thoroughness. According to the convention
standing orders, the mover of a motion is limited to five
minutes to present his case, and all other speakers are
limited to three minutes. The time limit for debate on any
single motion is thirty minutes. The convention agenda
groups motions according to subject matter, and includes a
time-table giving the amount of time to be devoted to each
group of motions. In the 1960 agenda, for example, the
time:tab1e allowed thirty minutes for seven motions dealing
with immigration.1 With the help of these procedural rules
together with an alert and sometimes ruthless chairman, the
annual convention is able to gallop through most of its
agenda with remarkable agility, if questionable profit.
Nevertheless, convention debates, such as they are, are
carried on with a notable earnestness. And in contrast to
similar political gatherings in the United States, convention
delegates are normally orderly and attentive while convention
business is being conducted.

In addition to the consideration of motions, the
annual convention is usually addressed by the State

President, the State Leader of the State Parliamentary Party,

 

1"1960 Convention Agenda," pp. 12-13.

58

and the Prime Minister (if available) or a Cabinet Minister
from New South Wales.
In the past few years, the functions of the annual
convention have been critically examined, and its value to
the party organization has been openly questioned. After
the_l962 convention, the State Executive noted in its annual
report to State Council:
Debating standards and subject matter generally, were
not of a high order...Throughout the years, we have
adopted the policy of refraining from guiding the
Convention debate in any way.- In that spirit,
Parliamentary members generally, have not participated
to any extent in the debates. Inevitably, the effect'
is to have very uninformed discussions on many topics,
often led by a handful of delegates and represented in
the press as the collective viewpoint of the Party.
As a result, Convention frequently fails to serve either
broad democratic participation or sound public relations
taCtics o

The State Executive called for "a thorough appraisal of

all aspects of the Annual General Convention, including its

nature and functions."2
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the annual

convention was scuttled in 1963 ”due to the intervention

of the Federal Election campaign”;3 and in 1964, the

convention--usually held in October or November, was

"deferred" until after state elections scheduled for May 1,

1965.3 It seems reasonable to conclude that the convention

faces an uncertain future.

 

lReport of the State Executive to the Annual General
Meeting of State Council," December 3, 1962, pp. 9-10.

2Ibid., p. 9.

3Ibid., December 13, 1963, p. 13.
ulbid., December 14, 1964, p. 3.

59
Electorate Conferences
4‘ An electorate conference is composed of delegates
elected by each general branch within a state or federal
electorate. The same group of delegates from a given
branch are members of both the state and federal electorate
conferences.

The state electorate conference is the main link
between local branches and the higher levels of the organi-
zation. The state electorate conference reviews all reso-
lutions forwarded to it by branches within the electorate,
and forwards approved resolutions to the governing body of
the organization--State Council. Each conference elects
four delegates to State Council, one of whom must be a
woman. In addition, the state electorate conference is
responsible for supervising control and co-ordinating the
work_of all branches within the electorate, assisting in
the formation of new branches, and defining organizing
areas within the electorate. These duties and prerogatives.
apply only to state conferences and not federal conferences.

The following activities and functions are carried
out by both state and federal conferences. All electorate
conferences elect a committee consisting of a president, two
vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer, at least one
additional member from each branch, and an auditor. State
conference committees also include the four delegates to

State Council and four alternate delegates. Conference

60

officers exercise much the same functions as do the corres-
ponding branch officers: they perform the administrative
tasks of the conference, plan activities, and provide
general leadership.

Electorate conferences play a key role in election

campaigns, both in the selection of Liberal candidates and

 

in the management of campaigns. An electorate conference

 

elects thirty of its members, who together with twenty .
members of State Council appointed by the State Executive,
comprise a candidate selection committee. Aspiring candi-
dates for parliament appear before the committee and are
subjected to questioning. The committee then proceeds to
nominate by exhaustive ballot the most desirable candidate.1
When a candidate for a given electorate is endorsed,
the electorate conference is in charge of organizing and
conducting the campaign, subject to the general supervision
of State Council and the State Executive. The conference
appoints a campaign committee, usually from among its own
members, which consists of a chairman, secretary, treasurer,
finance sub-committee, and publicity sub-committee. The
campaign committee organizes meetings, fund-raising,

distribution of leaflets, and polling day activities.2

 

1The procedure and politics of pre-selection will be
discussed in detail in Chapter V. It should be noted here,

however, that conferences elect the entire selection com-
mittee in all electorates outside the Sydney metropolitan
area.

2S. R. Tyler describes Liberal campaign organization
in his article "Campaigning at the Grassroots", Australian
Political Studies Association News, VI (February, 1961),
pp. 6-12.

 

61

Regions
In 1957, State Council approved the formation of

nine regional (five metropolitan and four country) con-
ferences composed of an average of ten state electorates
each. Regional conferences were established as an inter-
mediate organizational stratum between electorate confer-
ences and the central bodies of the party. They were
composed of all officers of state and federal electorate
conferences within the region, together with one representa-
tive of Young Liberal Branches and one representative of
Women's Branches within the region, and El; members of the
State and Federal Liberal parliamentary parties from the
region. Each region elected its own office-bearers, who
comprised the regional committee. The presidents of the

nine regional conferences were ex officio members of both

 

State Council and the State Executive.

It was hoped that the regional conferences would
develop into organizational clearing-houses, relieving
State Council and the State Executive from the burden of
dealing with strictly local and regional matters. These
hopes were not realized: instead of streamlining the party
organization, regional conferences complicated it by adding
another layer to already complex structure.

Because of "the failure of regions to function in

the full scope of their responsibility",1 the State Executive

finally recommended to State Council in 1962 that the idea

 

1"State Executive Report to State Council," June 29,
1962, p. 2.

62

of active regional conferences be abandoned. The State
Executive presented three straightforward reasons for its
recommendation:

(a) the huge distances involved in country areas, which
make the region unworkable in terms of simple
travel.

(b) the Party Constitution is built upon the exploitation
of the self-interest of individual electorates.
Regions have no uniform self-interest and therefore,
there is often little incentive for a common meeting
ground.

(c) branch and Conference office-bearers already have a

heavy enough calendar of meetings without adding
another stratum of meetings.

The State Executive also recommended, however, that postal
ballots be conducted in each region to elect a regional
president, who would be an ex officio member of State Council
and the State Executive. These recommendations were adopted

by State Council.

State Council
State Council is the governing body of the party.
It is vested by the party constitution with the power "to
exercise all or any of the powers of the Organisation...
within the boundaries of the State of New South Wales."2
State Council is a body of about 300 party members.

The composition of its membership is as follows:3

E1; four delegates from each state electorate conference,
2 five delegates from the Youth Council,

 

1Ibid.

2Constitution, Clause 135.
31bid., Clause 136.

 

63

three delegates from the Women's Group,

one delegate from each special branch,

the president of each regional conference,
fifteen delegates (including at least five women)
elected by the annual state convention, ’

Egg all members of the State Finance Committee,

ONU'I 4:1»

the leader and seven other members of the state
parliamentary party, and

(9) the leader and two Other members of the federal
parliamentary party.

State Council is constitutionally required to meet at
least six times a year. Fifty membersconstitute a meeting
quorum. In practice, State Council usually met an average
of nine times a year until 1957. Upon the establishment of
regional conferences, meetings of State Council were reduced
to six each year. When it became apparent that the regional
conferences were not playing their expected role in reducing

the size of State Council agenda, it was decided in 1961
that State Council should meet monthly.1 Attendance at

meetings varies considerably: an exceptional meeting will
attract 125 members, but an attendance of around 100 members
is the usual turnout.

State Council is re-constituted each year at its
annual general meeting in November. At this meeting, State
Council hears addresses by the State President and a member
of federal Parliament. It also receives a report from the
State Executive which reviews the activities, accomplish-
ments, and problems of the party organization during the
preceding year. But the main function of the meeting is
the submission of nominations for the party's State Execu-

tive. State Council chooses eighteen peeple from its own

 

1State Council Minutes, April 17, 1961.

64

membership to serve on the State Executive: the State
President, the State Treasurer, four Vice-Presidents,1 six
members from the Sydney metropolitan area, and six country
members. Nominations must be submitted in writing within
one week after the annual general meeting, and election to
these positions is by secret postal ballot. At the mnual
meeting, State Council members are provided with a list of
retiring State Executive members, together with the attend-
ance record of each retiring member at Executive meetings.
These records are intended to guide State Council members
in their nominations and subsequent voting.

In addition to electing eighteen members of the State
Executive, State Council also nominates and elects by the
same procedure seven representatives to the Liberal Party
Federal Council, a Constitution Standing Committee, six
members of the Joint Standing Committee on State Policy, and
a three-member Liberal Philosophy Committee.

State Council considers resolutions from every level
of the party organization, although branches are encouraged.
to channel resolutions through their electorate conferences.
Individual members of State Council may also raise matters
for discussion, but must state why they have not used normal
channels. State Council resolutions embrace a large number
of topics including policy recommendations, "Liberal

principles", and internal organizational problems.

 

1There are two Vice-Presidents (one man and one woman)
from.metropolitan electorates, and two from country
electorates.

65

State Council has final authority on all matters
relating to the party organization and constitution. Since
1959, State Council may amend the constitution at any meet-
ing,.but amendments must be approved by 60 percent of the
members presentj'.At each meeting of State Council, the
State Executive submits a report which includes a summary
of its activities between Council meetings, and also in-
cludes any proposals which the Executive may wish to submit.
Council reviews each item of the Executive report, and has
the power to reject any Executive proposal.

On matters of party policy, State Council has only
deliberative ”power". State policy recommendations are
submitted to the Joint Standing Committee on State Policy;
federal policy resolutions are referred to the N.S.W.
federal parliamentary party, or to the appropriate federal
minister (if the Liberal Party is in power). If State
Council so decides, it may appoint special committees to
study any aspect of party policy or party organization, and
may be guided by the findings of such committees.

State Executive

 

According to the party constitution, the State
Executive acts as a committee of State Council: ”It shall
exercise the functions of the State Council between meetings

and shall submit a report to the State Council of its

 

1Prior to 1959, amendments to the party constitution
could only be considered at an annual constitutional session
of State Council. The quorum for this special session was

100 members.

66

activities at each meetingof the State CouncilJ'1

The State Executive is a body of thirty-seven party
members, of which eighteen are elected from State Council
as already described. The balance of the Executive is made
up as follows:2
(1; the presidents of each regional conference,
2 the two Leaders of the parliamentary parties, pluS'

two additional members of each parliamentary party,
3 one representative of Youth Council,
4 the immediate past State President,
5 a vice-president elected by the State Finance
Committee, and
(6) the president of Federal Council.

The constitution does not spell out the number of
times the Executive must meet, nor does it establish a
quorum for Executive meetings. In practice, the Executive
meets at least once a month. The function of the Executive
is to "exercise all administrative functions, including
control of Staff, publicity, and raising and expenditure
of monies."3 These functions are exercised subject to
review and approval by State Council. However, "no decision
of the Executive upon administrative matters shall be
reversed by State Council unless a resolution to that effect
is carried by two-thirds of the members attending the State
Council meeting."4

The State Executive plays an important role in the
nomination of candidates. Each candidate selection in the

metropolitan area is made by a fifty-member selection

 

1Constitution, Clause 159. 21bid., Clause 160.
3Ibid, Clause 162. aIbid.

67
committee, of which twenty are State Council members nomi-
nated by the State Executive. The State Council panel for
each committee is chosen on a rotating basis from the
approximately 200 Council members who live in the metro-
politan area. The practice is to choose Council members
from as many different electorates as possible. The
participation of the Council panel inevitably raises charges
of central ”interference" in the nominating process. This
will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter V.

To assist in the exercise of its powers, the State
Executive may appoint such committees as it sees fit.

These committees may be composed of any members of the
party. The most important committee appointed by the
Executive is the Finance Committee, which deals specifically
with the raising and spending of money for the party organi-
zation in cooperation with the State Treasurer.

The State Executive also has the power to engage a
General Secretary to be in charge of day-to-day administra-
tion of the party organization, and "such other officers as
it considers necessary for the adequate forwarding of the

interests of the Organisation."1

Administration and personnel
The Liberal Party has its headquarters in downtown

Sydney.2 Party offices occupy two floors of a privately-

 

1Ibid, Clause 167.

2Party headquarters is located in Ash Street, Sydney.
Official party publications generally refer to headquarters
as “central office", but newspapers and many party members
more commonly refer to it as Ash Street."

68

owned office building; in addition, the party uses the ,
basement of the building as a meeting hall for State Council,
pro-selection committees, and other gatherings which cannot
be accommodated in the smaller ”Executive Room.” The
central administrative functions of the party organization
are performed at party headquarters by a paid staff of
approximately twenty-five persons under the supervision of
the General Secretary. The staff includes the General
Secretary and his private secretary, the State Supervisor

of the party Field staff and his secretary, an accountant,

a public relations officer, a press officer, a research
officer, the editor of The Australian Liberal, a switch-
board operator, and about a dozen.women engaged in routine
office chores.

The staff at party headquarters attends to an immense
amount of administrative detail. A large proportion of time
is spent on duties connected with the meetings and work of
the party's central bodies, and their many committees and
sub-committees. A single meeting of any such group may
involve assembling of a meeting agenda, notification.e£
each member regarding time and place of meeting, recording
the minutes of each meeting, and assembling the minutes for
presentation to the next meeting. Long committee and sub-
committee reports often place an additional burden on the
staff, which may have to dig up information for these reports
in addition to typing, duplicating, and circulating them to

69
committee members.1

The tempo of headquarters activity naturally increases
during election campaigns. Several months before an
election, the staff is absorbed by the mechanics of prepar-
ing for candidate selection meetings (often called "pre-
selections”). For each pro-selection, office personnel
must contact by telephone the twenty pro-selection delegates
named by the State Executive, and ask them.to attend. If
some of the twenty cannot attend, alternate delegates must
then be contacted. In addition, the staff prepares and
mails to each pro-selection delegate: a leaflet prepared
by the General Secretary on the duties of a selector; an
agenda of the pre-selection.meeting; and a dossier on each
candidate providing personal background, qualifications, and
reference letters. hAfter candidates are selected, the staff
at party headquarters becomes immersed in the details of
campaign organization: the preparation and distribution
of campaign propaganda, campaign committee meetings, coordi-
nation of the campaign in the various electOrates, raising
of funds, and the organization of polling day activities.

The present General Secretary of the party is Mr. J.
L. Garrick, who has held the position since 1948. Carriok's

personal background includes a Bachelor of Economics degree

 

 

T374“81This strict adherence to orderly bureaucratic pro-
cedure, while burdening the staff with a severe load of
,paper work, does provide the student with a wealth of re-
search.material. Unfortunately, however, the proceedings

of party meetings are usually recorded in the minutes with
studious vagueness. Sharp conflicts are noted obliquely,

.if at all, and controversial or ”touchy" topics often go
Imnrecorded. According to the General Secretary, minutes

are 'emasculated" to protect the confidences of the party,
should the minutes by some mischance fall into hostile hands.

70

from Sydney university in 1939. Then World War II inter-
vened, and Garrick served in the Australian army through-
out the war. As a prisoner of war for over three years,
Garrick managed to survive the rigors of prison camp and
pick-and-shovel work on the Burma-Thailand "Railway of
Death.” Garrick returned to Australia with intentions to
begin Sydney University's program in medicine, but the
University discouraged him because of his age. He was
twenty-six.

In 1946, Hr. K. McGaw--an |'old friend of the
family" and member of the New South Wales parliament--
suggested to Garrick that he help set up the research
operation of the recently-organized Liberal Party. Al-
though Garrick had no particular interest in politics or
party administration, the position appeared to suit his
qualifications and talens. Garrick took up his duties
with characteristic aggressiveness; he brought to his
position as research officer a quick mind, an engaging
personality, and an apparently boundless capacity for
work.

. Garrick's talents soon attracted the attention of
Sen. U. H. Spooner, then State President of the party.
A close personal bond developed between the two men, a
bond which Garrick himself states has overtones of a
”father-son" relationship. In late 19%? the Liberal Party

began to organize for the 19H9 federal elections, and

71

Spooner asked Garrick to take over as General Secretary.
Garrick refused, and the position remained vacant for
several months while the State Supervisor served as acting
General Secretary. Garrick finally accepted the position
on the condition that he would resign immediately follow-
ing the federal elections of l9#9. His foreshadowed
resignation did not occur: Garrick directed the party
organisation in the triumphant campaign which swept the
Liberal Party into power in 1949, and he has retained his
position until the present time. Garrick's resignation
was widely rumored following the 1961 federal election,
when the Menzies Government held on by a tenuous majority
of one. But Garrick continues as General Secretary with
no immediate intention of resigning.

Garrick has been described as a "lean-faced, grey-
flannel man...with granite chin, a smile that flashes on
and off like a neon sign, and a.vague resemblance to Kirk

1 More to the point: he is thought of as

Douglas.“
”Australia's most efficient party secretary.'2 Garrick

has no personal assistant other than his stenographer,

 

ln s
A Gre Eminence e ig s The Bulletin LXXXIII
No. 4275 (Jangary 20, 19523, £,5."Tfi§‘£fitfid¥‘6f the ’
article--identified only as ”An Ash Street Correspondent"

--was Henry Mayer.

2Ibid. See also Peter Coleman, "The men Behind the
Party MEEEInes,
8’ 1962), 140

The Bulletin, LXXXIII, No. 4308 (September

72

and his associates sometimes observe that he appears
unwilling to delegate responsibility to subordinates.
Theresult is, as The Bulletin's correspondent points
out, that
Garrick has been secretary, organiser, P.R. man,
fund-raiser, chief clerk, policy-maker, propagandist.
He has been Dorothy Dix to disappointed wives whose
husbands have once more failed to gain pre-selection
and to hundreds of other callers who want something
from the party or whose corns have been trodden on.
Over the years, Garrick has developed a reputation for
fairness and integrity. His keenly-honed political
instinct is combined with some of the detachment of the
academic—~Carrick communicates easily with political
scientists and encourages their interest in the party.
Unquestionably, Garrick holds a deep and personal loyalty
to the Liberal Party; however, he is hard-headed in
measuring both the assets and the weaknesses of the party.
The General Secretary, in addition to directing the
professional staff of the organization, also serves as
secretary to the State Executive. This position involves
such responsibilities as preparing the Central Office
budget, and making recommendations to the Executive re-
lating to staff, publicity, finance, party structure, and
campaign organization. The General Secretary also prepares
the State Executive report to monthly meetings of State

Council. In November of each year the State Executive

presents a complete annual report to State Council. This

 

1"A Grey Eminence Resigns," 10c. cit.

73

report is prepared by the General Secretary, and is a
reasonably searching and candid statement of 10,000 words
or more which evaluates the party's activities in the pre-
ceding year and holds up challenges to the party in the
year ahead.

The State Supervisor of the field staff, Mr. A. T.
Lenehan, began his career in party politics after the
Depression of the early 1930's forced him out of business.
Lenehan Joined the United Australia Party as an organizer
in 1933. In 1945, Lenehan accepted a position with the
Liberal Party organization of Western Australia, but re-
turned to New South Wales in 1958 and took over as State
Supervisor. Working under the direction of the General
Secretary, the State Supervisor has immediate supervision
over the activities of the field staff. His duties in-
clude recommending field staff appointees to the General
Secretary; carefully reviewing the weekly reports which
all organizers must submit; and generally keeping the
General Secretary informed on developments, progress, and
trouble spots in the party's electorate organizations.

In addition to the party central office in Ash Street,
the Liberal Party maintains ten offices distributed through-
out the Sydney metropolitan area, and nine offices located
in the larger ”country” centers of Dubbo, Goulborn,
Newcastle (2), Gosford, Hamilton, Orange, Wauchope, Uagga
‘Wagga, and Wollongong. Each of these offices is normally

T4
manned by a member of the party's full-time professional
field staff.1 A member of the field staff is responsible
for assisting the branch and electorate organizations which
function in his assigned territory. He is expected to help
organize meetings, to advise branch officers on constitu- .
tional matters and assist them with routine administration,
to work with the party member of parliament and/or the
party candidate, and to do much of the organizing and
"leg-work" of election campaigns. He is the main link
between the local organization and party headquarters:
he seeks to implement in the local area the decisions
which emanate from the governing agencies of the party,
and on the other hand, he keeps the central organization

informed on conditions in his territory.2

 

1Field staff members are sometimes given the less
decorous title of ”organisers". They may also be re-
ferred to as "field officers" or "field representatives".

2Field officers are considered to be "The equivalent
of the [Conservative Party] 'agents' of British elector-
ates.” See The Australian Liberal, July, 1961, p. 6. The
duties of Liberal Party field officers and Conservative
Party agents are in fact very similar. G.P. agents, how-
ever, are hired and paid by the voluntary organization in
each electorate, while Liberal organizers are engaged by
the State Supervisor (with the ap roval of the General
Secretary and the State Executive , and their salaries are
paid from central funds. Moreover, G.P. agents function
as secretaries for the electorate organizations, while
in the Liberal Party, this function is performed by a
‘member of the voluntary organization. 0n the G.P. agent,
see McKenzie, o . cit.,pp. 246-283 and G. 0. Comfort,
Professional PoEIEIcians: A Study of British Party Agents
‘(Vashingtonx ’Public Affairs Press), 1958, pp. 5-59. Also
see A. T. Lenehan (State Supervisor, N.S.W. Liberal Party),
”Report on the Conservative Party Organisation", unpub-
lished report to the Branch Development Committee, Febru-
ary l, 1961. A sub-committee of the Branch Development
Committee submitted a report to the BBC on July 3, 1961,
recommending that Liberal field staff should continue to
be hired by headquarters, but supported financially by
electorate conferences.

75

Because of fairly rapid turnover, the strength of
the field staff varies from year to year. There has been,
however, a gradual decline in the number of organizers
since the high point of l9h9 when there were about thirty.
In the 1958-61 period, the field staff numbered from
twelve to fifteen men, with a few added during election
campaign periods.

To get a general picture of the field staff member-
ship, I asked the eighteen organizers who worked in the
federal election campaign of December, 1961, to fill out
a brief questionnaire. 0n the question of length of
service with the Liberal organization, it was found that
nine of the eighteen had worked for the party one year or
less; two had worked for the party two years; one for four
years; one for six years; and five were veterans of ten
years or more with the organization.

Although half of the field staff were recent em-
ployees of the organization, it does not follow that the
group was characterized by youthfulness. None of the
eighteen was under thirty years of age; four were in their
thirtie's; eight in their fourtie's; three in their
fiftie's; and three in their sixtie's.

Information on occupational background indicated a
heavy concentration of salesmen and small businessmen;
two farmers; two public servants; a former military officer;
and a lifelong political organizer, who had served the

Liberal Party and its non-Labor antecedents for over

76

fourty years. Regarding educational background: thirteen
were high school graduates; four had some kind of post-
high school technical education; and only one had
attended college.

Party organizer's receive little, if any, formal
training; but before receiving a permanent assignment, an
organizer must pass a written examination on the party
constitution and on campaign organization. In general,
the party has found it difficult to attract and retain
bright young talent, or develop the spirit of pro-
fessionalism characteristic of Conservative Party agents.l
Chiefly responsible for these conditions is the fact that
organizers must work long hours under considerable
pressure for low salaries. In 1961 field staff members
were paid a salary of about $45 per week before taxes,
plus a car allowance and a small expense allowance. Al-
though such wages are not unusual in Australia, they are
not sufficient inducement for most career-minded young ‘
men, especially those with a college education.

In the last two or three years, State Executive
reports indicate that the size of the field staff has been
gradually increasing, and that a ”consistent programme of
staff training...is now a key feature of our working year
and is finding its expression in the high calibre and

experience of our staff members."2

 

lSee McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 246-248.

2“The State Executive Report to the annual General
Meeting of State Council, November l4, 19 u p 8 Of. the
"Report" of December 13, 1963, pp.l2-l3; and December 3,

1962, p. 15.

77

.§E!Eé£ls
We have in this chapter outlined the formal

structure of the New South Liberal Party, and reviewed
the procedures by which the organization operates. We
have seen that the party organization is designed to
fulfill two basic objectives. The first objective is

to equip the party with the means to conduct election
campaigns. The branch organization draws in manpower,
money, and other resources necessary to win elections.
The electorate conference collects and manages these
resources in an effort to capture an individual parlia-
mentary seat for the party. The central bodies of the
party direct and coordinate the statewide effort to gain
control of government. The second basic objective is to
provide procedures by which competition and conflict
within the party can be managed. These procedures
enable the party to make the hard decisions about
candidates and policy; they provide the means for am-
bitious men to gain political power, and they offer hope
to the losers.

Significantly, two elements in the party structure
--regiona1 conferences and the annual convention-~have
been allowed to atrophy, probably because neither had
important decisions to make, and neither contributed

much to the major objectives of the organization.

CHAPTER II;

THE NEW SOUTH WALES LIBERAL PARTY
AS AN OFFICE-SEEKING
ORGANIZATION

Introduction

It is assumed that party organization can best be
approached as an organized effort to gain control of
government through the election of party candidates
motivated by the ambition to win and hold public office.
In this chapter we shall be looking at the New South Wales
Liberal Party from the point of view of this assumption.
There will be little attempt to marshall supporting V
evidence; in fact, the main purpose of the discussion
is to see how far our theoretical assumptions alone can
carry us in describing probable patterns of party behavior.
The remaining chapters of this study will undertake to
demonstrate that party behavior can best be explained and
understood in terms of the office-seeking view of party.

The types of organizational patterns which flow from
our assumptions are shaped by certain basic structural
features of the Australian political system. Two such
features are particularly important to this discussion.
First: Australia is a federal system.with both national

and state governments; therefore, the New South Wales

78

79

Liberal Party directs its efforts toward control of
government at two levels. The goal of the party is to
participate in the election of a Liberal government at

the national level, and also to elect a Liberal state
government. Federal structure makes it possible for

the aims of the organization to be realized and frustrated
at the same time.

Second: Australia has a parliamentary sytem of
government. This means that the success of a party in
controlling government at either the state or federal
level depends on the party's ability to win a sufficient
number of separate contests in individual electorates to
form a parliamentary majority. A unit of party organiza-
tion is thus formed around the public office at stake in
each state and federal electorate. We shall designate
such a unit as an electorate organization} Within the
framework of an electorate organization, office-seekers
compete for the party nomination and the successful
nominee engages opposing candidates in a contest for the
parliamentary seat. An electorate organization may be
defined, then, as a collection of efforts directed toward
the capture of a single parliamentary office. For an
electorate organization, winning an interparty contest in
a single electorate is its primary objective.

A second basic unit of party organization forms

a 1To avoid semantic confusion, the terms "electorate"
and electorate organization will be used in this study

only in reference to the districts or constituencies in
which candidates for parliament compete. It will not be
used in the broader sense of ”the voters in general."

 

80

around the party's quest for control of government. We
shall designate this unit as the central organization,
which is defined as a collection of efforts directed toward
retaining or capturing control of government. Although
parliamentary structure imposes a decentralized pattern
of office-seeking efforts on the party organization, the
central aim of controlling government remains as the
cohesive element of the party. Thus, for the central
organization, victories in single electorates are not
important in themselves, except as these victories add

up to control of government or the frustration of opposi-
tion.

Electorate organizations and the central organi-

 

zation are the principal structural units of the New South
Wales Liberal Party organization. In the discussion which
follows, we shall apply the propositions of ambition theory
to each type of unit, and attempt to determine the patterns
of organizational behavior likely to prevail. In addition,

we shall analyze patterns of interaction among the various

 

units as determined by the party's position with respect

to government.

The electorate organization

Electorate organizations provide the framework for
office ambitions, and the principal question bearing on
the shape and character of a given organization is whether

or not the Liberal Party controls the seat.

81

In electorates held by the Liberal Party, office-
holders tend to dominate the electorate organization.
Members of parliament have the prestige of public office;
they wield formal governmental power even though power is
diminished when the party is in opposition. Within the
framework of the electorate organization, the office-holder
has demonstrated that he can survive intraparty competition
for the nomination, and interparty competition for the
office. Other Liberals with office ambitions thus find
it difficult to challenge a sitting member, and so they
often seek other outlets for party activity and wait for
an opportunity to present itself.

The office-holder seeks to build and maintain an
electorate organization which will insure his reenomina-
tion and re-election. The nature of his goal is such
that there is no need for an active electorate organiza-
tion between elections. Office-holders have an investment

in the organizational status duo, ecpfibinlly until the

 

nomination has been again secured.

Office-holders are put on their guard by elec-
torate organization activities in which they are not
involved. They tend to regard organization as an instru-
:ment of ambition, and "superfluous" organizational
activities between elections may signal the rise of
challengers.

When the office-holder has been re-nominated, he

‘must_then assess the electorate organization in terms of

82

the resources needed to win re-election. In "blue
ribbon" Liberal seats, the office-holder may usually
assume re-election, although he may wish to mount more
than a,token campaign in order to.enhance furtherwhis
status in the party and the electorate, and discourage
potential challengers to his re-nomination. Other office-
holders, however, may view re-election as less certain
and may attempt to build a substantial campaign organi-
zation.\ The office-holder who won by a narrow margin

in the previous election is likely to seek new sources
of support. Similar efforts will be made by members who
fear a loss of popularity in the electorate, or who fear
that population changes in the electorate threaten his
re-election. The office-holder who wins re-election
tightens his grip on the electorate organization.

We have tended to assume so far that the sole
objective of the office-holder is to retain his office.
It is also his objective, of course, to participate in
a parliamentary majority which controls government. But
this remains as his secondary objective, since it neces-
sarily depends on the attainment of his primary objective
--winning office in the electorate.

The objective of controlling government is more
important to some office-holders than to others. For
example, the Leader of the parliamentary party, Cabinet
members, and potential Cabinet members presumably have

more at stake in a general election than back-benchers.

83

Any members, however, may be inclined to help mobilize
resources for strengthening the government-seeking activi-
ties of the party. Although all office-holders contribute
to control of government simply by being elected, those who
actively work for the party's success outside of their own
electorates are participating in the arena of the central
organization. This point will be developed in greater
detail in our discussion of the central organization.

The fact that some office-holders do more than
the minimum organizationally to insure their personal re-
election does not alter our basic assumptions about office-
holders and their electorate organizations. We shall continue
to assume that the office-holder who contributes to the
government-seeking efforts of the party will do so only to
the extent that his own office is not threatened. Perception
of ”threat" varies with individual office-holders, and the
threat may be real or illusory.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that
Liberal-held electorates may have organizations which differ
considerably if only superficial measurements are applied.
One Liberal electorate may contain several branches with
hundreds of party members; there may be a bustle of social
and political activities, even between elections. Another
Liberal electorate may contain a small clique of party
officers which does nothing until an election approaches.

If our assumptions are correct, such differences among

84

electorate organizations can nearly always be traced to the
differing motivations and inclinations of officeeholders.

We turn now to an examination of party organization
in electorates not held by the Liberal Party. In such
electorates, organizations tend to vary according to the
party's chances for winning the seat. Intra-party competi-
tion for the party nomination is likely to be most intense
in those electorates which appear certain to go Liberal.
Competition tends to decrease as the chances for Liberal
victory decrease.

Vacancies in safe Liberal seats may occur because of
the retirement, resignation, or death of an office-holder.
Safe seats may also be created by changes in electorate
boundaries. Prior to the 1962 state election, for example,
a redistribution (or reapportionment) created three new safe
Liberal electorates: The Hills and Wakehurst, which each
attracted fourteen Liberal office-seekers; and Kirribilli,
which attracted eighteen competitors for the nomination.

When a safe Liberal electorate is vacant for any
reason, there is usually a rush of competitors for the
party's endorsement. Each competitor attempts to build a
'base of support for the nomination, and the resulting com-
'petition is likely to have an observable impact on the
character of party activities in the electorate. As the
.1ines of competition begin to emerge, office-seekers try to

inabilize support through the branch structure. Often this

I
A:

85

means arousing a somnolent branch which has not functioned;
since the last election. Or it may mean insuring that enough
supporters are present at a branch meeting to control the _
election of sympathetic officers. Another possible technique
is the organization of new branches to provide additional
bases of support. Thus, when competition for a nomination

is intense, the electorate organization involved tends to
divide into factions supporting the various aspirants.

A nomination contest in a safe Liberal seat is likely
to attract also a number of office-seekers who are not resi-
dents of the electorate concerned. Such interest is encour-
aged by the fact that the fifty-member selection committee
choosing the candidate will include twenty selectors from
State Council who are also nonresidents, and who are presuma-
lily not directly involved in local factions. The composition
of the selection committee thus implies a measure of objec-
tivity which would increase a nonresident candidate's chances
of success. In addition, the unstable and factional character
of the electorate organization contributes further to the un-
certainty regarding the eventual winner of the nomination, thus
encouraging office-seekers who feel they have nothing to lose

by entering the contest.1

When the selection committee for a vacant safe Liberal
seat has finally met and chosen a candidate, his election

'will in most cases be assured, depending on party and public

 

1Chapter V will discuss competition for nominations in
21 number of specific electorates. The discussion will include
tan.analysis of voting patterns of selection committees.

86

reaction to theflchOice. .If;£@Qtionsfinqthe+slestorate
organization fail to unite behind the nominee, the danger ~
exists that an "independent Liberal? may emerge to challenge
the candidate endorsed by the party. The challenge may be
more serious if the Labor Party decides not to nominate a
candidate, which gives its supporters in the electorate the
opportunity to embarrass the Liberal Party by voting for the
"independent."

Upon the election of a new Liberal officeéholder in a
safe seat, the electorate organization tends to return to the
typical pattern of other Liberal-held seats. The new office-
holder fashions an organization which will support his re?
nondnation and re-election. He uses the power and prestige
of'his office to consolidate his position, and discourage
the ambition of rivals. ‘

Some electorates are narrowly held by the Labor Party,
and the possibility of a Liberal victory may appear promising.
Other electorates may be created by reapportionment which
appear to have an approximately equal number of Liberal and
Labor voters. In such electorates, competition for the
nomination is likely to be active, but less intense than in
vacant safe Liberal seats. Seeking public office in a mar-
ginal or "swing" seat offers the prospect of a highly demand-
ing campaign and an uncertain outcome. This tends to discour-
age interest on the part of office-seekers from outside the

electorate.

87

Within the electorate, the party organization will
reflect the degree of competition for the nomination. ‘Officee
seekers use the same techniques to build support through the
branch structure as those used in safe Liberal seats. Face
tionalism may be even sharper, however, in "swing” seats than
in vacant safe seats. "Swing" seats often have a history of
hard-fought campaigns followed by the disappointment of
narrow defeats. The pool of office-seekers is thus likely
to include previously defeated candidates or an ex-member of
parliament, each of whom has a clique of supporters in the
electorate organization. The presence of these aspirants,
in addition to some new faces, may result in a confused
Jumble of conflicting ambition and loyalty which can only
berresolved for the time being by the decision of the selec-
tion committee. Following the decision, the need for
organizational unity is more compelling than it is after a
factional struggle in a safe Liberal seat. In a "swing“
seat, the electorate organization needs to marshall every
possible resource to defeat Labor; in the "blue ribbon"
Liberal electorate, the absence of a viable Labor threat
may encourage rival factions in the electorate organization
to fight out their differences at the polls.

There are a number of electorates in which a Liberal
candidate has virtually no chance of winning. Such an elec-
torate may contain several thousand Liberal voters, but no

office-seekers, and hence, no electorate organization. Where

88

there is no contest for the nomination, the Liberal Party
constitution provides that the State Executive may select

the candidate.1 Often a volunteer will step forward to con?
test the electorate, hoping thereby to impress party leaders
with his loyalty and gameness. Some of the compensations for
certain defeat include a certain amount of campaign experi-
ence, a picture in The Australian Liberal, a pat on the back
at party headquarters, and a possible advantage in future
nomination contests.

If no one volunteers to run in a ”hopeless" electorate,
the State Executive attempts to recruit a candidate.

From the point of view of the central organization,
there are a number of reasons for having a candidate in safe
Ikabor electorates. First, it is a matter of party pride that
a Liberal candidate should challenge the Labor Party in every
electorate. Second, it is important that some organizational
activity be stimulated if possible in order to bring out the
maximum Liberal vote. This is particularly true in federal
elections in which Senate seats are at stake. Third, popula-
tion changes and regular reapportionments can produce radical
alterations in electorate boundaries which may improve Liberal
;prospects of victory. In that event, a rudimentary organiza;
tion could help support future office-seeking efforts. Fourth,
campaigns in safe Labor electorates provide training and

experience for those with office ambitions. The central

 

1Constitution, Article 212.

89

organization values these campaigns to the extent that a
small allocation of central funds is provided to help
purchase modest advertisements in the local paper, a few
posters, and other minimum supplies. In addition, the can?
didate may expect a contingent of Liberal supporters from
safe electorates on election day to help hand out “how-to?
vote" leaflets at polling places.

So far in this discussion we have not distinguished
between state and federal electorate organizations, since we
assume that the general patterns described apply with equal
validity to both. However, the possible implications of
overlapping electorates should be noted.

We assume that both federal and state office-holders
dominate their electorate organizations. Therefore, given
an area embracing safe Liberal seats with overlapping

1 we conclude there is likely to be a stable

boundaries,
pattern of electorate organizations unless other factors

intervene. Other factors would include the occurrencendf a
vacancy; or radical boundary changes involving the creation
of new electorates, the abolition of other electorates, and
the alteration of surviving electorates. When such factors
do intervene in a safe Liberal area, the possibility exists

that incumbent office-holders will use their prestige either

 

1The most extensive such area includes the north and
:north-western section of the Sydney metropolitan area, which
embraces seven Liberal federal electorates, eleven Liberal
state electorates, and two Labor state electorates. Three
state electorates were held by Labor prior to the 1961
reapportionment.

90

for personal advancement or for exerting influence on behalf
of someone else. For example, if a federal seat becomes
available, a state member may decide to contest the nomina;
tion, and attempt to make the advance to federal parliament.
Such a member might be able to draw the complete support of
his state electorate organization, but not necessarily, since
an active nomination contest tends to produce realignments in
the electorate organization.

If a state seat becomes available within a Liberal
federal electorate, we assume that the federal member of
parliament has no interest in descending to the state level.
He may, however, use his party contacts in the electorate to
exert influence on behalf of a particular candidate. The
extent and effectiveness of these efforts would be difficult
to measure, since they are likely to be informal and unpubli—
cized.

In the campaign phase of party organization, office-
holders and office-seekers in safe Liberal areas tend to
draw from the same pool of party workers for both state and
federal campaigns. Supporters of party candidates generally
come to occupy official positions in party branches, and
become identified as willing workers for the party. In most
cases, willingness to work in campaigns will extend to both
the state and federal electorates in which the branch is
located.. The role of a given branch in its two electorate
organizations may, however, differ considerably, especially

if a vacancy occurs in one of them.

91

In areas where Liberal and non-Liberal state and
federal electorates overlap each other, organizational
resources may be located in unlikely places if the federal
system were not a factor. For example, a Liberal federal
electorate may contain party branches which lie within the
boundaries of one or more Labor state electorates; or a
Liberal state electorate may contain branches which are
located within one or more federal electorates held by Labor.
Such an anomalous distribution of party resources is sig-
nificant to the extent that it involves non-Liberal elec-
torates in the ”swing" category. When party resources are
fortuitously located in_p9tential Liberal electorates, an
organizational base exists upon which office-seekers can draw
in attempting to capture the seat.

Liberal branches located in strong Labor electorates
because of electoral geography orient their activities almost

completely toward the Liberal-held electorate.

The Central Organization

The central organization has been defined as the
"collection of efforts directed toward retaining or capturing
control of government." Political victory consists of an
aggregate of separate electorate victories which produce a
parliamentary majority. There is no single statewide office,
strictly speaking, which forms the nucleus for the central
organization; however, the Leaders of the parliamentary

;parties~ though elected in theirown electorates —- are a major

92
focus of central organization efforts, since the attrac-

tiveness of a Leader evidently has a general impact on voting

behavior throughout the state.

The objective of an electorate organization, as we have
seen, is limited primarily to winning within the electorate.
Thus, the party needs to develop organizational mechanisms

which cut across electorate boundaries, and which direct and

coordinate the party's drive for power. Those who control

and support these mechanisms make up the central organization.
It: is the central organization which views the existing and
potential resources of the party throughout the state in
relation to the goal of controlling government.

The necessity for over-all direction and coordination

0f the party organization is reflected in the formal structure

as spelled out in the party constitution. Formal provision

is made for a governing body of the party--State Council,

Which is composed of delegates from state electorate con-

feI'ences. State Council in turn elects from its own member-

Bhip the State Executive, which includes the State President,

VicemPresidents, and Treasurer. The State Executive hires a

f‘-I.Zl.2l.--time party official, the General Secretary, who super-
Vises Central Office, the field staff, and manages the daily

affairs of the organization. The constitution also provides

that the parliamentary parties shall designate delegates to
State Council and the State Executive, but no parliamentary

member may serve as State President.
The central bodies of the formal party structure are

93

not the same as the central organization. There is,
however, an extensive overlapping of personnel. The most
active, loyal, and ambitious members of the party at large
tend to cluster in the formal central bodies, and it is the
same people which help to form the core of the central
organization. However, State Council with its membership
of some 300 has many nominal members who do not contribute
overtly to central organization goals. Members of the State
Executive generally do contribute, but there is much varia-
tion in the character and amount of their contributions.
rho central organization also draws personnel from outside
of the central bodies of the party. Such personnel may
serve on committees created to strengthen the government-
seeking program of the party, or serve as a pool of workers
which can be assigned to organizationally weak electorates
1' or campaign work. The central organization also includes
those who desire or feel constrained to contribute money to
the central funds of the party, but who do not participate
in party activities in any other way.

The central organization is composed of two kinds of
Personnel: leaders and supporters. Central organization
1eaders initiate, develop, and direct the over-all strategy
which is believed necessary to bring the party to power and
keep it there. In most cases, these leaders occupy official

Positions in the formal structure, and work within the formal

Structure whenever possible. Central organization supporters

94

provide the manpower, money, and other resources necessary
to carry out the leaders' strategy.

Who leads the central organization? The identification
of central organization leaders cannot always be made with
certainty and confidence, but the task is simplified when
the party controls government. Leadership identification is
far more hazardous when the party is in opposition.

When the party is in power, the central organization
tends to be dominated by the party's public office-holders.
The Leader of the parliamentary party is then Prime Minister,
and his power and prestige overshadow all other forces in the
party. Cabinet members also rank particularly high in the
hierarchy of party affairs. In fact, the entire parliamen-
tary party shares in the rewards which accompany the realiza-
tion of the party objective. Public office-holders may
eJCPect and generally receive deference and loyalty both
fI‘czam electorate organizations and the central organization.

The success of public office-holders tends to relegate
0ther central organization personnel to an essentially
8uipportive role. Between elections the central organization
Promotes and defends the government and its policies. It
c"a-I‘ries on a continuing assessment of the organizational
resources of the party with a view to maintaining them at

3- 1evel necessary to retain control of government. In addi-
tion, the central organization attempts to gauge public

reaction to the government's performance in office so that

95

reV-eelection is not Jeopardized by unpopular policies.

The fact that non-parliamentary personnel of the central
organization are involved daily in assessing organizational
strength and public opinion helps to insure that office-
holders do not ignore their supporters. It is axiomatic
izinat past success at the polls does not assure future success:
although office-holders dominate, supporters can and do have
independent ideas about the strategy and policy which will

bring re-election. Complete harmony is therefore unlikely,
since decisions on strategy must necessarily be made in a
state of uncertainty about their electoral consequences.
If sharp conflicts occur, office-holders tend to temper
their position rather than risk a weakening of support. On
balance, however, it must be concluded that office-holders
have a clear and consistent strategic advantage on almost
any intraparty issue. .

The central organization has a further function when
the party is in power, and that is to strengthen the party's
control by capturing more parliamentary seats. The central
organization naturally turns its attention to those elec-
torates in which Liberal candidates lost by the narrowest
InBat-gins. when the central organization examines such an
electorate, it attempts to assess whether the party candidate

‘as the best possible vote-getter; whether financial support
was inadequate; whether enough party workers were available

before and during the campaign; and what needs to be done to

96

win next time. These questions necessarily imply a direct

intrusion of the central organization into the internal

affairs of an electorate organization. Such an intrusion

may be welcome, but it is likely to be unwelcome since it
ulassets the conditions of office-seeking within the electorate
organization, particularly during the nomination phase.
Tensions are unavoidable when the central organization
becomes involved directly in a nomination contest. Suspi-
cious of manipulation or dictation may be fostered, more-
over, by the fact that twenty members of State Council
chosen by the State Executive have a vote in the formal
candidate selection meeting.

Tensions may also arise between the central organiza-

tion and an electorate organization when a vacancy occurs

in a safe Liberal seat. Office-seekers who have toiled for

the party will see an opportunity to fulfill ambition;

hOWever, the parliamentary leadership may see an opportunity
to bring in a new colleague who adds talent and distinction
to the government team, but lacks a background of dedicated

Party service. The result is a nomination contest which may

leave a residue of ill feeling on all sides.

Another possible--though improbable--source of tension
between central and electorate organizations could be a
reVolt in an electorate organization against its own sitting
member of parliament. The office-holder's neglect of his

°rganization, combined with the resourcefulness of an ambitious

‘97

challenger, could produce such a situation. The central

organization is characteristically predisposed to support
office-holders, and in any case, wishes to avoid the public
embarrassment associated with "dumping" a member in good
standing of the government team. Thus, the central organi-
zation will attempt to avert an internal head-in conflict
in an electorate organization.

Although tensions between units of organization are
possible when the party controls government, we may conclude
that the "normal” relationship prevailing is one of funda-
mental compatibility. In both the central organization and
the electorate organizations, office-holders are inextri-
cably linked with the satisfaction of party victory and the
fruits of governmental power.

The fact that the party controls government has criti-
cal implications for the campaign phase of party activity.
The central organization develops campaign strategy against
the background of what has taken place in government. Party
Policy for campaign purposes tends to be equated with govern-
ment policy. The central organization publicizes the accom-
Pliahments of the government, and ignores or plays down
faallures and embarrassments. Since the party bases its
caItlpaign on its record in government, office-holders
neCessarily dominate the process of developing policy

POBitions for the campaign. Controversial issues within

1She party organization are nearly always settled when office-

98

holders in control of government establish a position on
'the issue. At the same time, new programs and policies emana-
ting from the organization are stifled if they are not accept-
able to office-holders. Thus, campaign strategy tends to be
directed toward the same combination of vote‘fi‘l which put the
party in power.

we turn now to an examination of the central organiza-
tion when the party is out of power. We have already indi-
cated that when the party is' in opposition, the central
organization attempts to coordinate and direct efforts which
will bring the party's office-holders control of government.
A party defeat at the polls stimulates the central organiza-
tion to assess the reasons for failure, and to take whatever
action is perceived asnecessary in order to win the next
election. Unanimity on these points is unlikely in the face
01‘ defeat, for defeat bears its own seeds of frustration,
confusion, and conflict. There is frustration caused by
unfulfilled ambition; there is confusion about who or what
13 to blame; and there is conflict about who is to speak for
the party and lead it to victory. All of these factors serve
to complicate the identification of leaders and supporters in
the central organization when the party is in opposition.
Following a losing election campaign, the central
°r8anization undertakes an assessment of what went wrong.
speculative ingenuity yields many possible rationalizations

t'<3~r defeatm-an unprincipled and deceptive opposition campaign,

 

99

a hostile press, lack of funds, and so forth. In addition,

a federal system offers many other opportunities for explana-

tion: the New South Wales Liberal Party, for example, is able
to explain its defeats in state elections by referring either
to the popularity or unpopularity of the national Liberal
government. When the national government is perceived as
popular, the New South Wales Labor government is said to reap
the benefits of prosperity resulting from national policy;
when the national Liberal government is perceived to be
unpopular, the state Liberal Party is said to share the
st dgma.

Although many reasons and combinations of reasons for
defeat can be alleged, the party turns a critical eye on its
office-holders and candidates who cannot escape being tarred
by the defeat. Defeat damages the power and prestige of
Office-holders in such a way that we can not assume their
domination of the central organization.

The position of the parliamentary Leader is particu-
la~1"ly ambiguous following party defeat because of the nature
°f parliamentary structure. The Leader runs in a single
electorate, but his appeal as Prime Minister or. as a potential
PPiIne Minister presumably has a bearing on his party's
an-<'.=cess in otherelectorates. The defeat of the party is
therefore an implicit rejection of the parliamentary Leader.
Defeat, however, does not dispose of the Leader and make way

for another since the Leader is likely to be successful in

100

rhis own electorate. He can not be shelved as "titular
Jxeader" with honor but without office, for he retains his
«Diffice and his position as Leader until he resigns or the
zaearliamentary party removes him.

The decision regarding the future of a defeated
Leader may or may not be an easy one. If the party sub-
stantially improved its strength in the election as compared
to previous elections--if, in other words, the party drew
closer to power-S-then it is likely that the Leader will be
re -endorsed. But if the party failed to move closer to power,
the Leader's position may be in Jeopardy. Members of the
parliamentary group may think that their earlier support of
‘ttaee Leader was a mistake; other members who have leadership
amnlaitions may try to gather support in order to unseat the
desjfeated Leader. In addition, there tends to be strong
PIPeessures from noneparliamentary leaders both for and against
retention of theLeader.

If the Leader survives party defeat, the party has a
Parliamentary Leader between elections whose power and prestige
Ila-Va been almost inevitably dimmed; if the Leader is replaced,
the dominance of the new Leader will be limited by the fact
tilert his popular appeal is still untested. In either case,
the Leader of the opposition does not have the pre-eminent

B‘batus within the party which is enjoyed by a national Prime
I“ii-hister or State Premier.

It is not only the Leader who suffers a diminution of

101

status when the party loses an election. Defeat casts its
shadow over the entire parliamentary team which has been
relegated to opposition by the voters. Those in the party
who are most concerned with winning government begin to probe
for weak spots in the parliamentary delegation. Questions
are raised regarding the performance of office-holders prior
to the party's defeat; speculation is possible regarding ways
to improve the vote-getting ability of party candidates by
presenting new faces to the electorates. The introspective
process following defeat must involve an evaluation of the
party's office-holders, and unavoidably introduces an element
of uncertainty about the standing of office-holders in the
central organization.

When the party is in opposition, there is thus a
greater opportunity for non-parliamentary personnel in the
central organization to wield power and influence. The neat
pattern of leaders (office-holders) and supporters which
prevails when the party is in power is less likely to prevail
when in opposition. Non-parliamentary personnel who occupy
conspicuous places of leadership in the central bodies of the
Party are not preoccupied merely with supporting office-
hOlders, but more particularly with planning strategy for the
next election. Such strategy could include the energetic
recruitment of more party volunteer workers, the hiring of
Professional staff, raising more money, finding attractive

candidates, and so on. All considerations focus on the central

102

goal of changgf-from opposition to control of government.
Moreover, to the extent that central organization strategy
involves electorate organizations, there is a disturbance of

the status qua which may have an impact on office-seeking

 

conditions in electorate organizations.

We have assumed, however, that the office-holder has
an investment in the status quo in his electorate organiza-
tion; he tends to resist, therefore, changes or intrusions_
which would endanger his re-nomination. The office-holder
perceives central organization strategy in terms of its
impact on his electorate organization. When some office-
holders feel threatened by central organization strategy,
tension develops between these office-holders and other
central organization personnel who believe electorate organi-
zation involvement is necessary to win the next election.
For example, if the central organization determines that new
party members and branches are desirable in a Liberal elec-
torate, the office-holder may decide not to cooperate in a
membership drive which could result in complicating his
re-nomination. Those in the central organization promoting
the drive would perceive the office-holder's resistance as
as: obstacle to victory at the next election. On the other
hand, the office-holder who Joins in the development of party
I‘eaources (such as new members) is more likely to be influen-
tial in the central organization.

In addition to conflict on organizational strategy,

103

the party in opposition is characteristically troubled by
conflict on party policy. Defeat implies a rejection of

party policies as well as rejection of party candidates.

The party thus encounters the need to examine its policies

and to determine what changes may be necessary to win wider
public support. This is a difficult process for the party

in opposition. The party unity which was constrained by

an election campaign breaks down; past policy disagreements
must be thrashed out again and new policy alternatives debated.
This process is complicated by the fact that the party is tied
to its past positions, and cannot change radically and
abruptly, if only not to appear merely opportunistic.

The development of policy is further complicated by the
federal system, particularly when a state party such as the
New South Wales Liberal Party is out of power, and the national
party controls government. The state party is limited in
choosing policy alternatives not only by its past positions,
but also by the prevailing policies of the national party.

During the period between elections, the policy de-
velopment process cannot be monopolized by office-holders
because of the inherent weakness of their position. Non-
Parfldamentary personnel thus have the opportunity to parti-
cipate actively in this process by evaluating past policy and
Presenting new alternatives. Again, the differences of opinion
Which emerge may not neatly divide office-holders from those

not holding office, and it may be difficult to identify with

104

precision leaders and supporters in the central organiza-
tion.

During the campaign phase, the central organization
of the out-party also tends to focus on the record of the
government. Since office-seekers of the out-party monopolize
the alternative to the governing party, campaign strategy is
usually directed toward discrediting government policy and
leadership. In addition to mounting an attack on the exist-
ing government, the central organization also seeks to develop
new policies and programs which will attract a winning combi-
nation of voters. The shaping of such policies is subject to
the difficulties and complications already indicated, and
also involves the risk of alienating past supporters as well

as appealing to new supporters.

Summary

In this chapter we have discussed the patterns of
behavior likely to prevail in the New South Wales Liberal
Party organization, given our assumptions about office am-
bition, and given the structural character of the Australian
political system. Since office-seekers and supporting organi-

zational resources cluster around each public office, we

 

identified the electorate organization as a basic unit of
party organization. A second basic unit is the central
organization, which is a collection of efforts directed
toward capturing or holding control of government. Because
of Australia's federal system, control of both national and

state government is at stake, and thus it is possible for

105
the aims of the central organization to be realized at one
level and frustrated at the other.

In the electorate organization, the principal question
bearing on the shape and character of the organization is
whether or not the party controls the parliamentary office.
Members of parliament, who have the prestige and power of
public office, tend to dominate the electorate organizations.
In electorates held by an opposing party, organizations tend
to vary in size and activism according to the degree of
competitiveness among office-seekers for the party nomination.
Competition among office-seekers usually decreases as the
prospects for Liberal victory decrease.

The party's public office holders take control of
government when an aggregate of electorate victories produces

a parliamentary majority. The central organization cuts

 

across electorate boundaries to direct and coordinate the
drive for power. It is composed of two types of personnel:

leaders and supporters. Leaders initiate, develop, and direct

 

the strategy believed necessary to bring the party to power
and keep it there; supporters provide manpower, money, and
other resources necessary to carry out leaders' strategy.
Although the identification of central organization
leaders cannot always be made with confidence and certainty,
we assume that public office holders dominate the central
organization when the party controls government. Non-

parliamentary personnel in the central organization are then

106

relegated to an essentially supportive role. Between
elections the central organization promotes and defends
the government and its policies. It also carries on a con-
tinuing assessment of organizational resources in order to
maintain them at a level necessary to retain control of
government.

When the party is in opposition, the identification
of central organization leaders is more hazardous. After
electoral defeat, the objective of the central organization
is to determine what went wrong and to devise strategy to
win the next election. But electoral defeat tends to dim
both the power and prestige of public office holders, and
also stimulates confusion and conflict about leadership,
strategy, and policies. Thus, the non-parliamentary personnel
have greater opportunity to influence organizational strategy
between elections. Such strategy could include the develop-
ment of resources in electorate organizations which would
tend to disturb the conditions of nomination-seeking. The
threat of such disturbance encourages resistance by incum-
bent office-holders who have a vested interest in maintaining
the Status quo in their electorate organizations. But office
holders who stand in the way of mobilizing additional resources
also risk discrediting themselves, and rivals with office
ambitions may feel encouraged to challenge incumbents.

As the next election approaches, the need to present

a semblance of unity to the voters constrains party unity.

107

Interéelection conflicts about leadership and policies are
submerged until the voters make their choice. Victory for
the party settles most arguments in favor of the winning
office-holders who assume control of government.

The remaining chapters of this study will focus on the
New South Wales Liberal Party during the period from mid-1959
to March, 1962. This period begins shortly after the party
had fought the successful federal campaign of November, 1958,
and the unsuccessful state campaign of March, 1959. It
extends through the successful federal campaign of December,

1961, and the unsuccessful state campaign of March, 1962.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRANCH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM:
MOBILIZING HUMAN AND
FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Introduction

In NoVember, 1958: the Liberal-Country government of
Prime Minister Menzies won its fifthéstraight electoral test,
and was returned to office with a comfortable-77-h5 parlia- '
mentary majority.. Within the state of New South Wales, a
small swing against the Menzies government had occurred, and
the suburban Sydney seat of St. George slipped into Labor's
hands by 59 votes.1 The Liberals held on to their other 15
seats, however, and successfully supported the election of 3
Senators. The 1958 victory was solid, if not resounding.

In March, 1959, the Labor government of Premier J. J.
Cahill was re-endorsed by the vOters of New South Wales. The

Liberal Party and Country Party each made a net gain of one

‘ AL

1The Liberal candidate Mr. B. w. Graham, fell just
short of retaining the seat in spite of the fact that he

received 75 percent of the second preference votes of the
D.L.P. candidate.

108

109

seat, but the Labor Party retained a workable 49-44
majority.l Labor's unbroken hold on the government
since 1941 was not seriously threatened.
Following the state elections of 1959, the Liberal
Party faced the unusual prospect of an inter-election period
extending until late 1961 when, barring unforeseen events,2
the Menzies government would again seekers-election. .For
the first time since its organization as a party, the Liberal
Party in 1959 had an opportunity to conduct a systematic
examination of its organizational resources. As the General
Secretary indicated in a memorandum to the Branch Develop-
ment Committee (BDC):
With an average of one general election per year since
1949, no opportunity has presented itself, until now,:
for long range branch reform. Inevitably, the constant
appeals to branches for special efforts in the intensive
campaign periods, have produced a general weariness with.
politics and a reluctgnce to engage in routine functions
in the 'off' periods.
In another memorandum, the General Secretary, put the case

more bluntly:

 

1The Liberal Party won the seats of Blacktown, Dubbo, and
Wagga Wagga, but lost Parramatta and Sutherland. The Country
Party gained the seat of Young.

2As it happened, the Liberal Party had to fight another
statewide campaign in April, 1961, when the Labor government
tried to abolish the upper house (Legislative Council) of the
New South Wales parliament by referendum. The abolition
proposal was overwhelmingly defeated.

3”Branch Development Programme,“ a confidential memor-
andum prepared by the Genera Secretary for the April 30,
1960 meeting of the Branch Development Committee.

110

Branches have alternated between intensive elece

tioneering and complete stagnation. There has

been little thought given to branch development

or to defining the purpose of branches between

elections. V
In 1959, the time had come for the Liberal Party to assess
its organizational resources, define organizational goals,
and implement plans for achieving the goals of the organi-
zation.

The organizational component of the party which
addressed itself to these problems was the central organi-
zation. As the quotations above from the General Secretary
indicate, the electorate organization is characteristically
an election-centered mechanism: when the contest for office
is fought and settled, the electorate organization lapses
into inactivity or "stagnation" until the next campaign
period, regardless of the victory or defeat of the4party
slate as a government-seeking team. On the other hand, the
central organization as typified by the General Secretary ’
views the party in terms of its total electoral performance,
andthe mobilization of a winning organization becomes a
full-time enterprise.

In the chapter which follows, we shall examine the
assessment of the party made by the central organization,
and point up the areas of weakness in the party as seen by

the central organization. In the second place, we shall

examine the goals of the Branch Development Drive, which was

 

l"Branch Development," a confidential memorandum pre-
pared by the General Secretary for the July 28, 1959 meeting
of the BDC. ‘

111

designedto correct the weaknesses of the organization.
Third: we shall examine the implementation of the Branch
Development Drive, and the resulting collision between
central and electorate organizations. Finally, we shall
attempt to arrive at conclusions on the success, or lack

of success, of the inter-election branch development program
pursued by the central organization.

In this chapter, we shall draw heavily from confi-
dential memoranda, which circulated only among central
organization personnel and not among party members at large;
as well as party publications, minutes of party meetings,
committee reports, newspaper stories, and personal observa-

tion.

Assessment of the Organization

 

Introduction.--From the point of view of the central

 

organization, the only relevant basis for assessing the party
organization is its success in winning elections. The dis-
tinction between central organization attitudes and elector-
ate organization attitudes is made in the following statement
by Mr. J. C. Maddison, chairman of both the Electorate
Assistance Committee and the Branch Development Committee,
and then State Treasurer:

'My view is that we must have unity throughout the

whole of the Organisation. Unless we all pull together

we shall never get very far...

'One of the things I've been telling meetings,’ he

says, 'is that unless the Party in New South Wales
works as a whole, and unless we win more than 50

112

percent of the seats, there is not much point in

the members [of parliament! in the "safe seats only
being returned. The members and all Liberals in the
"safe" seats...must realize that when planning for
an election we have to be mindful of the whole scene
and not just one or two seats.‘

The obligation, he Ear. Maddison] points out, is for
the party members in the secure electorates to do more
than merely return the sitting member. They must
provide men and money for the major task of winning
more seats.

Mr. Maddison's statement thus dismisses electorate
organization work as having "not much point" unless their
efforts result in the election of a parliamentary majority.

Once the basic inadequacy of the party organization
had been established, the central organization began to focus
on the specific indices of organizational strength and vital-
ity. The party constitution spells out what electorate
organizations and their component branches must do if the

party is to win elections:

(1) to enlist supporters of the Organisation as members
of the branch,

(2) to raise funds for the purpose of the Organisation
and for the furtherance of its objects,

(3) to secure the enrollment of every person eligible
as an elector and the removal from the electoral
roll of the names of all unqualified persons,

(4) to keep an Electoral Roll for the electorate in
which shall be marked the known supporters of the
Organisation,

(5) to encourage within the Branch and Organisation
all education work of a political, social and
economic character,

1"Mr. John Maddison Prods Consciences, Pockets,”
.Agstralian Liberal, July, 1960, p. 4. Hereafter, references
to the Australian Liberal will be abbreviated AL.

113
(6) to adopt resolutions for submission to the State
Council, to Convention, or the Electorate Conference
or Regional Conference concerned.

These activities relate mainly to the establishment
and maintenance of a fully-organized campaign-fighting
machine working systematically both during and between
election periods to elect party candidates. In reviewing
these functions, the General Secretary stated:

It is fair comment that very few people in the Liberal
Party would be aware of them and they are certainly

not in the direct focus of branches.

It may well be that we are not looking to define new
functions, but to resurrect and enforce the old ones.

2
The State Supervisor also reported that branch conditions were
”far from satisfactory."3 In addition to resisting an in-
creased membership fee, the State Supervisor reported that
branch officers lacked "inspiration and enthusiasm”,4 that
the majority of branch committees were not functioning, and
that many branch meetings were 'dry as dust."5 "It is a
fact,” the State Supervisor said, .
that within the branch structure of the Liberal Party,
branch committees are elected at annual meetings and
there the matter rests. No attempt is made to call the

committee together to organise meetings, and go assist
in the development of Party work in the area.

 

1Constitution, Clause 45.

 

2"Branch Development," p. 2.
3"Branch Membership and Organisation,” p. 1.
4Ibid. 51bid, p. 3.

6Ibid, p. 2.

114

In the assessment which follows, we shall see that the
central organization gave attention to questions as these:

(1) How many members does the Liberal Party have, and
what are the trends in branch membership?

(2) Are the electorate organizations and their component
branches performing their duties and functions in a
manner which achieves maximum electoral results?

(3) What is the level of activism, dedication, and
loyalty in the branch and electorate structure?

(4) Are the electorate organizations in a healthy
condition financially? ‘

(5) Are the electorate organizations attracting members
of such a calibre that could form a pool of
potential candidates?

(6) Are incumbent members of parliament doing everything
possible to build up the party at the electorate
organization level?

When the central organization assessed the party in terms of
these questions, its findings did not hold out much hope for
improving the electoral performance of the party in the future.
The central organization was confronted by a shrinking mem-
bership, uncertain financial resources, a low level of acti-
vism and enthusiasm, and parliamentary members eager to pre-
serve the status quo. The central organization resolved to

search out the reasons for these conditions, and also to carry

out a program to correct these conditions.

Branch membership.--Immediately following the state

 

election of 1959, the central organization set out to deter-
mine the actual number of party members in the organization.

This determination should have presented no problem, since

115
clause 62 of the party constitution required each branch
to submit annually to the General Secretary "a report.
showing the work done during the year, the financial position
of the Branch...and a certified copy of the Members' Roll.”
In practice, however, this clause of the constitution was not
honored by branch officers or enforced by the State Executive.
The obvious result was that the central organization had only
a fuzzy picture of the membership strength of the party.
As the General Secretary pointed out in a memorandum to

the State Executive:

It has never been possible to measure accurately the

branch membership of the Liberal Party in this State.

Our practice...of leaving all branch membership records

in the hands of the secretaries of branches has produced

many defects, including badly kept records, failure to

secure membership renewals or new membership and loose

estimates of branch strengths.
The General Secretary's report went on to describe the hap-
hazardness of existing methods for assessing membership:

Each year an estimate of total membership has been

compiled by the process of obtaining from branches

their statement of branch strengths. In consequence,

there has been a general estimate (probably grossly

exa gerated) of Party strength ranging from 35,000

to 0,000 members.
The estimates were indeed "grossly exaggerated" as the General
Secretary's report subsequently pointed out:

The actual financial membership, as far as can be

ascertained, is probably not more than 14,000 and

there are quite a number of the 345 branches which

are constigutionally not entitled to continue their
existence.

 

1"Branch Membership Drive," p. 1.

2Ibid. 31bid.

116

The 14,000 branch membership figure was obtained from a

report prepared for the General Secretary by the State
Supervisor of field staff, Mr. A. T. Lenehan.l Lenehan

had directed the field staff to obtain as reliable informae
tion as possible on branch membership in each state elec-
torate. Although the State Supervisor's memorandum included
the reservation that ”it has always been difficult to obtain
from branches an authentic statement as to branch membership”,2
his membership survey was the first serious attempt to pin down

the actual number of people in the party organization, particu-

larly in the Sydney metropolitan area.

 

1"Branch Membership and Organisation ' a memorandum
prepared for the_General Secretary by the State Supervisor,

May 15, 1959. Cf. Gwendolen Carter's statement in Neumann,
op. cit.,rp. 97. that the New South Wales Liberal Party had
some our hundred and sixty branches dotted throughout the
state, and, in addition, numerous youth clubs." Carter does
not indicate the number of party members in these branches,
nor disclose the source of her information. However, if her
figure of 460 branches was correct at the time of her writing
(1956), it appears that the number of party branches dropped
sharply between 1956 and 1959. More likely, she was given
exaggerated figures. In any case, since records do not exist
which confirm or refute her statement, perhaps all that is
confirmed is the characteristic imprecision of information
on‘party membership. Cf. also Duverger, op. cit., pp. 62-
90.

2Ibid.

117

Thefollowing table summarizes the distribution of
Liberal Party branch membership between metropolitan and
"country" state electorates, as reported by the State Super-

visor in May, 1959.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF LIBERAL PARTY BRANCH MEMBERSHIP

 

 

Electorates Members Branches

 

Metropolitan area:

 

44 electorates 10,569 191
”Country" area:

21 electorates 3,363 154
TOTAL [1 electorates 13,932, 345

 

It should be noted initially that figures on branch member-
ship in "country“ electorates are in most cases very unreliable,
since the central office of the party is generally unable to
get accurate information from these areas. Central organiza-
tion involvement in "country" electorates tends to decline in
relation to a given electorate's distance from Sydney. The
most reliable information is thus obtained from the Liberal-
held electorates of Nepean, Hawkesbury, Gosford, and
Wollondilly, which are more or less contiguous to the Sydney
metropolitan area. Fourty-four Liberal Party branches are
located in these electorates.

In the 5 Liberal-held electorates1 outside the Sydney

 

1The five electorates: Maitland, South Coast, Albury,
Wagga Wagga, and Dubbo.

118

orbit, the prevailing organizational pattern is that the
office-holder has an active personal following which expands
during campaign periods, and then lapses into inactivity
between elections. The State Supervisor's survey reports
that 39 branches are organized in these 5 electorates.
The remaining 62 branches in "country" areas are
distributed among the 18 electorates not held by the Liberal
Party, but which have some kind of Liberal organization.
Rawson and Holtzinger's description of Liberal branches in
southeastern New South Wales is typical of Liberal organiza-
tion in the ”country":
At the branch level, it is almost a misnomer to speak
of Liberal Party branch activity. Even large and
important branches often hold only the annual meeting
that is required if they are to have a voice in the
selection of candidates. Some branches are called
into being during an election campaign and are then
allowed t3 lapse until the approach of the next
election.

Under such circumstances, little attention is given to

routine administration of branches, and it is impossible to

get accurate information on branch membership figures.

In concluding these summary comments on Liberal organi-
zation in the "country", we should note that there are in fact
#6 electorates outside of the Sydney metropolitan area. Since
membership figures are indicated for only 27 electorates,

there were evidently 19 electorates without any Liberal

organization at all at the time of the survey.

 

1D. W. Rawson and S. M. Holtzinger, Politics in Eden-
Monaro (London: Heinemann), 1958, p. 51.

119

For the balance of the discussion of party member-
ship, we shall focus on the party organization in the Sydney
metropolitan area. The New South Wales Liberal Party, despite
its ambitions to extend itself throughout the state, is
primarily a Sydney-based party. Sydney is the headquarters
for the central organization; Sydney contains the bulk of
Liberal Party membership and financial resources; and Sydney
embraces the crucial swing electorates which are the key to
victory for the Liberal Party.

In presenting membership figures for state electorates
in the metropolitan area, it must be kept in mind that regu-
lar reapportionment has resulted in considerable alteration
of electorate boundaries.1 Reapportionments are supposed to
preserve existing boundarggs whenever possible; however,
rapid population increases in the suburbs have made extensive
alterations inevitable. The membership figures obtained by
the central organization in 1959 were based of course on the
existing arrangement of electorate boundaries. Branch

development targets were also based on existing conditions.

 

lIn 19‘9, the Labor Government increased the size of
the New South Wales Legislative Assembly from 90 to 9# seats.
The Sydney area was given #8 seats; Newcastle received 6; and
the I‘country" area received #0. Subsequent reapportionments
were completed in 1952, 1957, and 1961. 'Under present elec-
tion statutes, there must be a reapportionment at least every
5 years. Boundaries are determined by an Electoral Commission
of 3 members: a judge or ex-judge and a surveyor appointed by
the Government, and the state Electoral Commissioner (a public
servant). Australians generally use the term “redistribution”
instead of "reapportionment.” See R. S. Parker, op. cit.,

pp. 69-76.

120

Although boundaries were again altered in 1961, membership
ffigures will be presented from the 1959 perspective.1

The following table summarizes Liberal Party branch
membership in the Sydney metropolitan area. State elector-
ates are classified into "safe Liberal", ”swing" electorates,
and "safe Labor” according to Liberal performance in the

election of March, 1959.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF LIBERAL PARTY BRANCH MEMBERSHIP
IN THE SYDNEY METROPOLITAN AREA

 

 

 

 

Electorates Members Branches
Safe Liberal (15) 7,153 96
"Swing" (10) 1,948 48
Safe Labor (23) 1,468 47
TOTAL (#8) 10,569 191

 

Keeping in mind previous qualifications regarding the
accuracy of the figures above, we may still conclude that
party membership is concentrated in those electorates where
electoral support of the party is greatest. Half of the
branches, and well over two-thirds of the membership is
located within electorates which return Liberal office-

seekers as a matter of course. The branch organization is

fl
s-C'

1The shifting of electoral boundaries obviously has
important implications for office-seeking patterns in the
party organization. These implications are discussed in
Chapter V.

121

weak by comparison in those electorates where elections are
won or loste-the 10 "swing“ electorates, and still weaker in
the 23 electorates where the party has almost no chance of
winning. Thus, in 1959 the central organization faced the
necessity of either strengthening the party in "swing” area
or finding some means of re-allocating the resources exist-
ing in strong Liberal areas.

With these preliminary comments as background, we may
proceed with a breakdown and examination of each of the 3

groups of electorates.

TABLE 3

LIBERAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN SAFE LIBERAL
ELECTORATES: MAY, 1959

 

_r
E

State Electorate Branches Members 3%Liberal Vbte (1959)

Gordon 10 732 Uncontested
Neutral Bay 5 496 Uncontested
vaucluse 4 830 Uncontested
Willoughby 8 517 Uncontested
Woollhara 4 1,016 Uncontested
Mosman 6 167 78.73
Eastwood 6 155 72.69
Collaroy 7 222 71.09
Lane Cove 6 300 69.55
Hornsby 10 1,018 66.75
Ashfield-Croydon 7 393‘ 64.31
Manly 5 115 63.13
Burwood 7 732 .61.56
Cronulla 5 '287 60.62
Earlwood 6 173 58.25

 

TOTAL 96 7,153. --- a

 

122

Table 3 lists the 15 electorates which have been
classified as safe Liberalhfarty seats. Nine of these
electorates are located in the middle and upper middle-
class suburbs which extend some 20 miles north of Sydney
harbor. The 9 electorates are Gordon, Mosman, Neutral Bay,
Manly, Lane Cove, Hornsby, Willoughby, Collaroy, and
Eastwood. This is Liberal heartland, a wide belt of Liberal
support which will deliver 60-75 percent majorities for the
party regardless of any manipulation of the electorate
boundaries.

A second strong Liberal area is a narrow suburban
strip extending east of the central business district of
Sydney and along the southern shores of the harbor. This
area includes the electorates of vaucluse and Woollhara.
Within these electorates are Sydney's most prestigious
suburbs; they are settled by business executives and pro-
fessional men who have achieved financial success, and
whose wives regularly adorn the society pages of the Sydney
Morningifierald.

The safe Liberal seats of Burwood, Ashfield-Croydon,
and Earlwood are primarily residential areas located south-
west of the central business district of Sydney. They are
sandwiched between strong Labor areasé-thesolder densely
populated suburbs immediately bordering the central district;
and the highly industrialized, closely settled suburbs
stretching farther south and west of the city. Consequently,

123

a redrawing of electorate boundaries could throw the seats
of Burwood, Ashfield-Croydon, and Earlwood into the "swing"
category.

The safe Liberal seat of Cronulla was created by the
1957 reapportionment. Cronulla is a rapidly growing resi-
dential area bordering the southern shores of Botany Bay;
it is about 15 miles from downtown Sydney.

Table 4 contains a breakdown of Liberal Party member-

ship in the 10 electorates classified as "swing" seats.

TABLE 4

LIBERAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN “SWING"
ELECTORATES: MAY, 1959

 

 

 

635 5a.68*

 

6

George's River 5 170 52.27.
Drummoyne 8 204 52.19

Blacktown 7 168 51.16*
Rockdale 4 111 £8.57E
Hurstville 2 7o 46.18s
Sutherland A 82 #5.67‘
Bondi 3 1&6 45.45

Concord A 227 45.40

fiyde 5 115, 45.00

TOTAL #8 1,928 ---

 

*Includes distribution of D.L.P. or independent
candidates' second preferences in cases where
neither major party candidate received a majority
of first preference votes., "

12AV

Included in the ”swing“ category are the 10 electorates
which would change hands as a result of 2.5 percent or less
of the vote in each electorate. The characteristics of these
"swing" electorates vary considerably. For example, the
adjacent electorates of Bondi and Coogee are older residen-
tial areas containing uniformly modest dwellings. In each
of the electoral :subdivisions and polling places (precincts)
in these electorates, the parties compete on very nearly
even terms.

In contrast, the electorate of Hyde on the northern
shore of Sydney Harbor is held by Labor because of heavy
Labor majorities in 3 polling places (Gladesville, Gladesville
North, and Hyde), while the other parts of the electorate are
fairly evenly matched. The Liberal seat of George's River
has one strong pro-Liberal subdivision (Oatley) which gives
the Liberal candidate a margin of victory. In Blacktown
electorate, strong Liberal and strong Labor subdivisions
balanced each other off, with the edge going to the Liberal
candidate in 1959.1 Located south of inner Sydney Harbor
are the adjacent electorates of Concord and Drummoyne, which
were once mainly residential areas, but are giving way in-

. O
creasingly to industrial development.2 Hurstville and

Sutherland electorates embrace rapidly growing suburbs in

 

Inlacktown was radically altered by the 1961 reappor-
tionment, and became a safe seat. The strong Liberal areas
..in Blacktown now form part of the new safe Liberal seat--
The Hills.

2Drummoyne was altered somewhat by the 1961 reapportion-
ment and was carried by the Labor Party in 1962.

125
the southern part Of the metropolitan area.

' Table 4 indicates that, in general, Liberal branch
organization is weak in the 10 crucial borderline elector-
ates. Coogee, with 635 members, appears to be an exception;
however, another survey of branch membership completed
immediately before the 1960 Branch Development Drive credited
Coogee with only 160 members. The February, 1960 membership
survey also reduced estimates for other "swing" electorates,
with the result that the total estimate for the 10 electorates
was reduced from 1928 members to 1280 members, and from #8
branches to 42 branches.

Table 5 lists the 23 electorates where the Liberal
Party has little or no prospect of victory. The relatively
high level of party membership in North Sydney is the result
of door-to-door canvassing by a retired insurance salesman
who worked on a commission basis. His efforts added a few
hundred names to party membership records, but according to
party officials, few of these people ever attended a party
meeting. Membership figuresfor Kogarah and Randwick later
proved to be exaggeratgd.' In the hardecdre Labor electorates
where the Liberal Party pollb less than 40 percent of the
vote, the Liberal branch organization is limited to a handful
of loyal party members, and 4 electorates have no Liberal

organization at all.

126
TABLE 5

LIBERAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN SAFE LABOR
ELECTORATES: HAY, 1959

State Electorate Branches Members %Libera1 Vote:1959

 

 

North Sydney 8 543 44.28
Merrylands 2 38 44.05
Kogarah 6 265 43.32
Parramatta 6 105 42.81
Dulwich Hill 3 53 42.78
Canterbury 2 38 41.35
Liverpool 2 60 41.09
Randwick 5 91 41.06
Leichhardt 3 30 38.44
Lakemba 1 14 36.03
Auburn l 20 35.40
Haroubra l 20 35.27
Bankstown 1 26 33.49
Harrickville l 20 31.02
Paddington-Waverley 1 25 30.73
Fairfield 1 21 30.43
King 1 17 27.52
Granville 0 0 27.02
Fast Hills 0 0 26.42
Phillip O 0 24.83
Cook's River 1 18 24.24
Balmain 1 64 23.44
.Redfern 0 0 19.86
TOTAL 47 1,468 ---

 

127

Party finance.--In the view of the central organisation,

 

the decline in party branch membership was accompanied by a
precarious financial standing. Unfortunately, it was impos-
sible to secure details on the raising and spending of party
funds, so we must proceed on the basis of indirect evidence
which is available.

The principal burden for raising money falls on the
Finance Committee. This committee is appointed by the State
Executive and consists of about 15 people with good connec-
tions in the business community. The State President,
Metropolitan Vice-President, State Treasurer, and the Leader
of the New South Wales federal parliamentary party also serve
on the Committee. The General Secretary is secretary of the
Finance Committee, and serves as its chief administrative
officer.1 The chairman of the Finance Committee is ex officio
one of the five vice-presidents of the party.2

The Finance Committee is primarily responsible for
raising money to support the operations of the party Central
Office. This includes office rentals, salaries of professional
staff, and during campaign periods the cost of statewide
advertising, centrally issued propaganda, and other election-
eering materials not associated with individual electorate
campaigns.

Finance Committee members use the "personal approach"

 

lThese party officers serve on the Finance Committee as
a matter of custom, and not according to constitutional pro-
vision. ‘

28ee Constitution, Clause 160. Also note that the chairman
of the Finance Committee may not be'a member of parliament.

 

128

in soliciting funds--mainly from.individuals in business,'
industry, and commercial institutions. The Liberal Party,

in contrast to its non-Labor antecedents (National Party

and United Australia Party), does not accept donations from
trade associations, professional organizations, or any other
organization which represents a particular economic grouping.

A second principal component of Liberal Party fund-
raising efforts is the Electorate Assistance Committee (EAC).
The objective of the EAC is to stimulate safe Liberal elector-
ate organizations to raise money which can be redistributed
among less wealthy electorate organizations.1 The chairman
of the EAC is designated by the State Executive, and the
committee consists of 20 to 30 party members from."donor"
electorate organizations.

The EAC has been functioning since 1953. Until 1958,
the committee was a loosely organized.body which arranged and
approved direct transfers of funds from ”donor" to'honee'
electorates. However, since 1958 the EAC has established a
central account which receives and disburses all electorate
assistance funds.

In order to determine the allocation of funds, the EAC
analyzes past election results, and gives top priority for

assistance to those electorates narrowly held by either party..

1Although the EAC is mainly concerned with raising and
distributing funds, it also attempts to arrange for the
transfer of volunteer party workers from safe electorates
to needy electorates.

129

In general, electorates which deliver the largest Liberal
majorities are expected to assume the major share of the
obligation for electorate assistance funds.

The machinery of electorate assistance is complex and
cumbersome, and there are many points at which breakdowns
can occur. In the first place, the success of electorate
assistance obviously depends on the voluntary cooperation of
the electorates involved, particularly the potential donor
electorates. Not all electorates, however, are equally
enthusiastic about electorate assistance: some electorate
organizations must be prodded into sending a delegate to the
electorate assistance committee; some make financial commit-
ments which are fulfilled only in part or not at all. In the
1958 federal election campaign, for example, 10 electorates
were pledged to contribute to the assistance fund. Only 3
electorates (Bradfield, Parramatta, Uentworth) met their
obligations; 3 (Hackellar, Iarringah, Lowe) contributed about
half of their pledge; and 4 (Bennelong, North Sydney, Evans,
Hitchell) failed to contribute at all. _

The work of the electorate assistance committee is also
complicated by the immense amount of detailed information which
must be gathered and analyzed. Such information includes elec-
tion statistics, the strength or weakness of branch organiza-
tions, the number of polling places in each donee electorate
and the number of volunteers required to man each polling

place, the campaign budgets of dense electorates, and the

130

amount of money likely to be available from donor elector-
ates. This information does not come to hand in orderly and
systematic fashion, but rather bitéby-bit or not at all.

In addition, electorate assistance arrangements are continually
being revised: a crucial campaign in a swing electorate may
exceed its budget by hundreds of pounds, or a donor elector-
ate may be unable to raise the money which it pledged. Under
such circumstances, effective long-range planning is difficult,
if not impossible.

The main burden of dealing with electorate assistance
problems falls on the committee chairman (Mr. Maddison), who
works closely with the General Secretary. In order to get
desired results, the chairman relies chiefly on the steady
application of personal pressure. If a committee member is
absent from a number of the committee's lunch-hour sessions,
he may expect to be contacted by the chairman. If the deliné
quent member continues to show lack of interest, he is re-
placed. When a particular electorate is lagging in its organi-
zation of electorate assistance, the delegate from.that
electorate receives from the chairman a good-humored remon-
strance, or sometimes a sarcastic tongue-lashing. In.spite
of such pressure, breakdowns in electorate assistance machin-
ery cannot be completely eliminated.

Although the problems involved in carrying out the
electorate assistance scheme are formidable, the achieYeants

of the scheme should not be minimized. Available data on the

131

1950-56 phase of the electorate assistance committee's
activities are very sketchy, but it seems clear that the
committee has expanded its activities considerably since

1957 when Haddison became chairman. In the federal elections
of 1958, 23 of the 27 electorates in the Sydney metropolitan
area participated in the electorate assistance scheme: 6 as
donor electorates and 19 as donee electorates. These elec-
torates received varying amounts from an electorate assist-
ance fund of 43675s1 over two-thirds of which was contribu-
ted by two electorates: Wentworth (£1350) and Bradfield
(L1275). The state election campaign of 1959 occasioned a
still more ambitious electorate assistance effort which
embraced 45 of the 48 state electorates in the Sydney metro-
politan area. In this campaign, 12 donor electorates con-
tributed a total of 36037 which was distributed to 33 donee
electorates. Well over half of the fund was contributed by
four electorates: Gordon (£1400), Vaucluse (£1200), Hoollahra
(leoo), and Hornsby (L700). (These electorates coincide
approximately with the federal electorates of Hentworth and
Bradfield.)

The principal recipients of electorate assistance funds
were those state and federal electorates in which Liberal and
Labor strength appeared to be most evenly balanced. In the
1958 federal campaign, the largest beneficiaries of electorate
assistance were Phillip (L500), Parkes (L425), and Kingsford-

 

1One Australian pound equals about $2.25.

132

Smith (L365); in the state campaign of 1959, Hyde received

the largest outlay of assistance funds (L824), followed by
Bondi (L500), Coogee (L474), and Blacktown (L470). The
proportion of such contributions to the total campaign

budget varies a great deal from electorate to electorate,
depending mainly on the size and vitality of the branch
membership in each electorate, and the fund-raising potential
of the branch membership. In any case, the available evidence
suggests that the contribution from electorate assistance

funds rarely exceeds one-third of the total campaign budget

in any given electorate.l

In summary, a general assessment of the EAC indicates
that over the years the committee has been troubled by
persistent tensions characteristic of relations between
central and electorate organizations. For example, a sub-
committee of the EAC reported in 1956 regarding-

the unwillingness or inability of some strong Liberal
electorates to accept responsibilities under the

scheme and their consequent meagrezprovision of money
and manpower to Other electorates.

An EAC report of five years later speaks of similar
difficulties :

_

1According to members of the electorate assistance
committee, an intensive campaign in a swing electorate usually
113-3 a budget of approximate y 1500. This is also the figure
Cited by S. R. Tyler, who has participated actively in several
E'iberal campaigns (once as a candidate). See his article:
0mm: aigni "at the Grass Roots,“ APSA News, VI (February,
19633, "3

PP. “120

2"Future Development of Electoral Assistance,”
unpublished mimeographed report, July 13, 1956.

133

Because the Committee's task is purely a persuasive

one, it follows that a high level of effectiveness

can be achieved only if its functions are understood
and appreciated by the Party as a whole. At the present
time, many members of the Party...1ack any detailed
understanding of its true purpose or the difficulties

it has to overcome. In some areas where there should

be considerable potential to help the Committee's work,
the attitude ranges from apathy to mild hostility.

The third major component of party fund-raising efforts
is the electorate organization as such. Electorate organiza-
tions are the least stable and most erratic sources of party
funds. The only regular means of raising money is the annual
membership fee paid by each branch member to the branch
treasurer. Until 1958, the fee amounted to the equivalent
of 28 cents, which was not even sufficient to pay postage
used by the branch secretary. As we shall see, the central
organization decided to pursue a conscious policy of
strengthening party finance at the electorate organization
level. One of the pivotal elements of this policy was the
decision to increase the annual membership fee eightfold to
L1 ($2.25).

The fee increase encountered immediate and bitter
resistance in many electorate organizations. The State
Supervisor reported to the General Secretary in May, 1959,
that the increase-—

has had repercussions within the organisation. A
number of areas have accepted the position, others
have not...A firm stand will be necessary if the
will of [State] Council is to be implemented...
Certain branches threaten to go out of existence

and it is known that certain office-bearers will
do nothing to implement Council's decision.

 

1"Horking Paper on Electoral Assistance,” un-
published mimeographed report, February 27, 1961.

l34~

The existing membership comprises a large number of
persons who have subscribed 2/6d. only. It will be
necessary, if the L1 subscription is to prevail, to
notify branches-of their constitutional position if
the full subscription is not paid. The view is
expressed that on account of the increased fee we
will lose certain branches.

The General Secretary also took note of the situation in a

memorandum to the State Executive:
Several electorates are showing an unwillingness to
pursue the new membership fees...Clear1y, this cannot
be allowed to continue as it must have a demoralizing
effect upon the whole branch structure.

Pointing out that State Council had already rejected two
motions for rescinding the new fee, and that more motions
were forthcoming, the General Secretary recommended that
"a resolution might be secured ensuring that no further amend-
ments to membership fees shall be debated by Council for

3 This resolution was submitted as a

another twelve months."
recommendation of the State Executive to State Council at its
meeting of June 29, 1959, and the resolution was adopted.

The same meeting of State Council debated four motions
from branches and electorates that the increased fee be re-
scinded. In the debate, the State President said that ”to a
great extent [the Party's] future independence was bound up

with the membership fee."n

Other speakers said that the higher
fee "was linked with a strong branch structure" and that

branches pursuing the fee were encountering no major

 

l"Branch Membership and Organisation," p. 2.
2"Branch Membership Drive,' p. 1. 3Ibid.

159, July, 1959, p. l. The State President at the time
was Mr. R. C. Cotton.

135

1 Speakers opposing the higher fee claimed

difficulties.
that it would "split the party“; that many branches would :.
refuse to collect it; and that many branch officers and mem-
bers would resign if forced to pay the fee. After a lengthy
and spirited debate, the motions to rescind the fee were de-
feated by a 54-41 vote, indicating a high degree of negative
feeling toward the fee even at the State Council level of the
party organization.

There are a number of indications that funds collected
by the Finance Committee are slowly declining in relation to
the total fund-raising effort of the party. This relative
decline is due partly to the apparent caprice of the sources
tapped by the Finance Committee, and partly to the philosophy
of the General Secretary, Mr. Carrick, who believes the party
can raise more money and better retain its integrity by a
broader base of financial support. As the General Secretary
stated in the "Report of the State Executive to the Annual
General Meeting of State Council,” November 6, 1961:

When the Liberal Party was formed in this State, it was
regarded as essential that its finance-raising methods
should be so broadly based, as to enable it to surv1ve
the inevitable periods of electoral unpopularity and to
be impervious to any pressure-groups.

This principle is fundamental to the whole character and

integrity of the Liberal Pagty. It has been underlined
by events of recent months.

 

1Ibid, p. 4.

2"Report," p. 3. In November, 1960, the Menzies govern-
ment imposed credit restrictions on banks and other lending
institutions, and passed a measure requiring life insurance
companies to invest at least 30 percent of their investments
in government securities. These actions inspired cries of
”socialism“, and reportedly had an unfavorable impact on
Liberal fund raising efforts.

136

The decline in funds raised by the Finance Committee appears
to have seriously undermined the development of the Central
Office staff.

Over the years as costs have risen and as political
organisation has become more complex and exacting,
donations have not followedthe same trend. It has
been necessary therefore, for us to be spartan in
our methods, in some cases to the point where our
capacity to achieve results has been limited.1

 

We have already noted that the field staff has gradually
declined to about half of its strength in the peak year of
1949. And in 1961, the General Secretary felt forced to
conclude that ”the Einanciafl position has rarely been other
than precarious and it has not been impossible to look with
confidence to the long-range development of the organisation."2
Complaints about lack of funds are perhaps characteristic
of parties everywhere, and such complaints are usually viewed
with skepticism by outside observers. In contrast, the finan-

cial plight of the New South Wales Liberal Party is generally

recognized as a reality. The Bulletin's ”Ash Street

 

Correspondent" notes the "shoe-string budget” of the party
and comments: "People who waffle about the rich coffers of

the Liberal Party have never looked at it."3 Nation's

 

correspondent, Don Uhitington, states:

 

1"Report of the State Executive to the Annual General
Meeting of State Council," November 26, 1960. Emphasis
supplied.

2”Heport of the State Executive to the Annual General
Meeting of State Council," November 6, 1961, p. 3.

3"A Grey Eminence Resigns," loc. cit.

 

137

The State where Liberal Party [financiafl .affairs are
probably at their lowest ebb is New South Wales. There,
it was short of funds even be ore the last campaign

the federal elections of 1961 began. Many business

ouses in Sydney which had contributed for years to the
party funds either refused to do so, or reduced their
contributions substantially. Two big business organi-
sations known to me ma e their most substantial con-
tributions to D.L.P. emocratic Labor Parti) funds on
the grounds that that was the best way to keep Labor
from winning. A third rejected Liberal Party overtures
for the first time in the memory of any one of the firm's
senior partners.

The correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald makes the

 

following observations along the same lines:
As for funds, the party is living from hand to mouth...
The party is so impoverished that it is struggling to
maintain a skeleton administrative staff. Its few paid
officers are loaded with a burden of work out of all
proportion to the wages they receive. As a result,
there has been great difficulty in holding staff.2
The party's uncertain financial resources, combined
with an apparently deteriorating branch organization, impelled
the central organization to create an organizational mechanism
which could help to correct these deficiencies. Thus, in 1959,
the Branch Development Committee (BDC) was established by the
State Executive upon the recommendation of the General
Secretary. BDC was charged with the general responsibility
for improving the vitality of the party branch structure,
and more specifically, for planning and implementing branch
membership drives. The most ambitious membership drive

launched by the BDC took place in the period from mid-1960 to
mid-1961. After reviewing the objectives of this branch

 

1Don whiti ton, "Liberals in Disarray," Nation, No. 86
(January 27, 1962 , p. 4. "“"'

earn, May 12, 1962, p. 2.

v

138
development program, we will discuss the implementation of

the program.

.ijectives of the Branch Development Program

Increased branch membership.-§The General Secretary,
in reviewing the membership data presented earlier, commented
that ”the present situation is therefore, very unsatisfactory
and cannot be allowed to continue."1 The objectives of the
branch development program were many, as we shall see; but
viewed at its most superficial level, the program was designed
to bring a large number of new members into the party.

In late 1959, a survey of branch membership was again
made. This compilation was presented to the BDC on January
27, 1960, along with recommended target figures for each elec-
torate. The target figures were adopted by the committee.2

Table 6 summarizes membership targets in the 3 groups

of electorates.

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF BRANCH MEMBERSHIP: JANUARY, 1960;

AND MEMBERSHIP TARGETS OF BRANCH
DEVELOPMENT DRIVE

 

 

 

 

January, 1960 Target "
Electorates Members Branches Members Branches
Safe Liberal (15) 8,861 96 18,165 144
"Swing” (10) 1,280 42 4,405 89
Safe Labor (2;); 1,289 99 6,058 96
TOTAL (48) 11,430 177 28,618 329

 

1"Branch Membership Drive,” p. l.
2BDC Minutes, January 27, 1960, p. 2.

139

The BDC thus envisioned a membership expansion program which
would increase the number of branch members by approximately
250 percent. The program was to be carried out over a two-
year period, but the main thrust of the program was planned
to be a highly organized branch development drive from May
through August, 1960.

Under the projected program, Liberal members would
still be concentrated in "blue ribbon” Liberal electorates
which would more than double the existing branch membership.
The program was relatively more ambitious, however, in ”swing”
and safe Labor electorates. In "swing" electorates, the BDC
planned to double the number of branches, and nearly quad-
ruple membership. In Labor electorates, branches would be
more than doubled, and membership expanded fivefold.

Table 7 is a breakdown of branch membership targets
in the 15 safe Liberal electorates. There is considerable
variation both in the number of members enrolled in January,
1960; and in the membership targets, which tend to be related
to existing branch strength. In general, targets in most
safe Liberal electorates call for doubling, or nearly doubling
the number of branch members. However, in electorates where
membership has fallen below 200, relatively greater efforts

were planned.

140

TABLE 7

BRANCH MEMBERSHIP: JANUARY, 1960; AND MEMBERSHIP
TARGETS IN SAFE LIBERAL SEATS

 

 

January, 1960 Target

Electorates Members Branches Members Branches
Gordon 2,067 8 3,950 13
Neutral Bay 540 5 1,040 9
vaucluse 851 4 1,850
Nilloughby 511 8 1,175 10
woollhara 1,366 4 2,200 7
Mosman 754 6 1,425 12
Eastwood 155 6 615 11
Collaroy 374 9 780 13
Lane Cove 199 5 550 9
Hornsby 660 9 1,580 12
Ashfield-Croydon 177 7 450 9
Manly 66 3 550

Burwood 560 11 940 ll
Cronulla 153 5 645 8
Earlwood 228 . 6 315 6
TOTAL 8,861 96 18,165 144

 

Table 8 provides data on the branch membership target
in the 10 ”swing" seats. In contrast to the fairly regular

pattern of targets set for safe Liberal seats, targets for

"swing" seats differ considerably from electorate to electorate

141

TABLE 8

BRANCH MEMBERSHIP: JANUARY, 1960; AND
MEMBERSHIP TARGETS IN “SWING” ELECTORATES

 

 

January, 1960 Target
Electorates Branches Members Branches Members
Coogee 6 160 6 650
George's River 5 107 9 360
Drummoyne 4 145 6 355
Blacktown 5 155 28 550
Rockdale 3 67 8 490
Hurstville 2 8O 5 350
Sutherland 4 78 9 330
Bondi 3 147 4 550
Concord 4 229 7 550
Hyde 5 112 7 220
TOTAL 42 1,280 89 4,405

 

in relation to January, 1960 levels. Regardless of existing
membership, the BDC planned--except in Ryde--to build up
membership in ”swing" seats to a strength of from 330 members
(Sutherland) to 650 members (Coogee).

Table 9 is a breakdown of membership targets in the 23
safe Labor electorates. The gigantic North Sydney target is
at least partly explained by the fact that North Sydney lay

within the safe Liberal federal electorate of the same name.
In the other 7 electorates in which the Liberal Party polled

more than 40 percent of the vote, targets call for membership

142

TABLE 9

BRANCH MEMBERSHIP: JANUARY, 1960; AND MEMBERSHIP
TARGETS IN SAFE LABOR ELECTORATES

 

 

 

 

January, 1960 Target
Electorates Branches Members Branches Members
North Sydney 8 543 9 2,776
Merrylands 0 O 4 105
Hogarah 6 192 7 (395
Parramatta 5 115 8 295
Dulwich Hill 3 62 7 285
Canterbury 2 51 8 250
Liverpool 2 20 4 130
RandWiCK 4 64 5 525
Leichhardt 2 6O 3 225
Lakemba 1 25 4 120
Auburn 1 12, 4 7O
Maroubra 1 l2 3 90
Bankstown 0 O 4 140
Marrickville 1 20 0 O
Paddington-Waverley l 32 4 140
Fairfield l 20 4 62
King 1 20 O O
Granville O O 4 75
East Hills 0 0 6 120
Phillip O O O O
Cook's River 1 l7 3 95
Balmain ' 1 24 3 100
Redfern O 0 3 70
TOTAL 39 1,289 96 6,058

 

143

increases up to a total of 2254550 members in each electorate.
In 12 of the remaining 15 hard-core Labor electorates, the BDC
planned to establish in each electorate 3 or 4 small branches
with a total membership of 70-140 members. In 3 electorates;-
Marrickville, Phillip, and King--the BDC planned no branch
development efforts.

This completes the brief review of branch development
targets as adopted by the BDC in January, 1960. As planning
for the drive continued, however, these targets were scaled
down considerably. The General Secretary indicated in an
April 30, 1960 memorandum to the BDC that the drive would
be limited to 30 of the 48 metropolitan state electorates:
”The remaining eighteen are of the strong, Labor industrial

ul

type and our progress there will be much slower. The same

memorandum stated that "the programme visualizes the forma-
tion of one hundred and eight new branches with an increased

membership of approximately nine thousand persons."2 The

 

July, 1960 Australian Liberal stated that the drive ”aims

in its first phase at securing ten thousand more members of

 

the Party and at establishing 108 new branches in the metro-

3 In September, the General Secretary

politan area alone.”
presented the same figures at a party meeting as a two-year

Objective.4

 

l'Branch Development Programme,” p. 2.
2Ibid., p. 4.
35;, July, 1960, p. 2 (Supplement). Emphasis supplied.

55;, September, 1960, p. 7.

144

These statements represent a substantial reduction in
the objective of the branch development program as originally
conceived and adopted. Even with the exclusion of 18 safe
Labor electorates, there was a reduction in the membership 4
target from more than 15,000 new members to 10,000, and in the
branch target from 207 new branches to 108. The BDC did not
compile a detailed breakdown of electorate target figures
reflecting the more modest goal, and it is apparent that the
original targets were set aside as visionary. Even so, the
aim of doubling the party memberShip remained as a formidable
objective.

Improving branch performance.--In the discussion of the
central organization's assessment of party resources, we have
already noted that central organization leaders were critical
of "stagnation” at the electorate organization level. It is
clear that the central organization related branch inactivity
between elections to weakened organizational performance in
the campaign period:

New members and branch reforms must go hand-in-hand...
If we are to meet the real and growing threat of our
opponents, our branches must be geared to undertake
continuous programmes of work. It is no longer
sufficient for them to spring into effective life in
the last few weeks of an election campaign and to
hibernate (or at the best, meet desultorily) between
times as all too many of them.now do.1

The branch development program had as a major objec-
tive the transformation of branches into continuously active

organizational units working to achieve the party's objectives.

 

1"3tate President's Message,” 9;, July, 1960, p. 1
(Supplement). . ,

145

The BDC recognized at the outset-

that any scheme must fail which seeks merely to add a
number of new members to existing branches. For

people to be attracted permanently to this Organisation,
branch membership must be given a more tangible purpose
and the proceedings made more attractive.

The BDC, therefore, gave considerable attention to the stimu-
lation of "purposeful branches," branches which would prepare
interesting and attractive programs; which would reach out
into the surrounding community and seek the support of in-

fluential community leaders; which would, above all, mobilize

every possible resource in the service of the Liberal cause.2

According to the General Secretary:

The Branch Development Committee is seized with the
anecessity of a virtual re-education of Branch members
and office-bearers in their future tasks. As a first
step, the Committee finds it necessary to emphasise
that the branch has major and continuing responsi-
bilities which are beyond the capacity of any other
media to discharge. It ought to be the front-line
public relations of the party.

The Branch Development Drive, therefore is not simply
a means of taking in more branch members and building
more branches, although these objectives are worthy
in themselves. As a first step, it will seek out
probably Liberals and endeavour to enrol them. It
will then attempt to locate the doubtful or swing
voters and, by skilful personal contact, endeavour

to persuade them towards the Liberal cause.

No mass media can do these things.3

 

1"Branch Development Programme, p. l.

2or. "State President's lessage,” AL, July, 1960, p. 1
(Supplement). Also the General SecretaryTs comment that ”our
greatest resource of potential man-power [strong Liberal area
has been virtually untapped,’l ”Branch Development Programme,“

p. 1.
3Ibid, p. 1-2, Emphasis supplied.

lfl6

In calling upon branches to become the public relations
arm of the party, and in rejecting the possibility that the
mass media could perform this function adequately, the central
organization envisioned the branch as an integral part of
community organizational life. As the General Secretary
indicated in a memorandum to the BBC:

The Liberal Party is often accused, with some measure
of truth, of remoteness from public contact...It is
necessary to bring our branch structure into direct
contact with community life.
The State President expressed a similar view in the
Australian Liberal:
We cannot be remote and survive. We must make the
Liberal Party organization a functional and acceptable
part of community life. Our branches mugt be in
intimate contact with their local areas.

To achieve these objectives, the BDC undertook to pre-
pare a recommended program for branches, which would make
their activities both enjoyable and "purposeful." In addition,
the BDC planned selective recruitment efforts which would seek
to attract leaders in community organizations, salesmen and
public relations men, professional men, and ”junior executivesf'

These efforts will be analyzed in the discussion of the

implementation of the branch development drive.

PartZFinance.--The branch development program was con-

 

ceived a short time after the party State Council, on the

recommendation of the General Secretary, increased the annual

 

ylfiThe Branch Programme-~Some Suggested Reforms,” mimeo-

graphed memorandum from the General Secretary to the BDC,
March 30, 1960, p. 1.

2"State President's nessage,' op. cit.

147

membership fee. As we have seen, this decision caused great
turmoil, and allegedly threatened to cost the party heavily
in membership renewals.

Consolidating branch members under the Ll fee was of
great importance to the central organization. Under the
old fee, a party member did not contribute enough to pay for
the minimal housekeeping expenses of the branch secretary.

The branch treasury lay empty unless some special fund-raising
project was sponsored. In electorates with low party
membership, there was a tendency to depend on the Electorate
Assistance Committee for help in financing campaigns. Under
the higher fee, however, a branch is provided automatically
with a substantial sum of money in the treasury, especially

if the branch has a large membership. Self-supporting and
financially strong branches and electorate organizations tend
to relieve pressure on the central funds of the party, the
sources of which are narrow-based and uncertain.

Insofar as the new fee increased the financial resources
of the electorate organization, it contributed to the objec-
tive of the central organization, which is to provide the
party with a stable source of money for fighting elections.

To accomplish this objective, the central organization planned
to strengthen and broaden the financial base at the electorate
level, and eventually draw upon electorate resources to help

finance the central machinery of the party.1

1 n

Cf..Miche1s op. cit. p. 198: The modern part like
the modern state, 8n e vor to give to its own organizazion
the widest possible base, and to attach to itself in financial
bonds the largest possible number of individuals."

 

148

This objective was clearly spelled out by the General
Secretary in the State Executive annual report to State
Council in 1961:

Finance is our greatest single problem. We must resolve
it if we are to recruit and maintain an adequate pro-
fessional staff of the calibre which a modern-day
political party demands...

The work of central finance-raising should be regarded
as supplementary to the local effort. In the final
analysis, the party will grow in strength only if it
continues to widen its field of individual donors at
the 'grass roots'...

Inevitably, in the coming years, it will be necessary
for electorates to assume a growing responsibility for
the maintenance of the organisation.1

The higher fee was itself a step toward assuming this growing
responsibility" in that the fee included a built-in subscrip-
tion to the monthly party magazine, The Australian Liberal.
Branch treasurers are required to forward 5 shillings (about
$.55) of each fee to central office to pay for a party member's
subscription. The Australian Liberal, a 32-page magazine of
party news, features, and some general interest articles,
depends for its existence on the support of the membership
fee. The magazine is important to the central organization,
since it‘ensures-—A

automatic distribution to all branch members of a

significant document which contains essential informa-
tion on,a wide range of political matters.

The periodical is being used as an essential part of

the Branch Development Programme. It ensures that
information is distributed regularly, direct to branch
members and is not subje set to the hazardsof¥channelling
through branch office-bearers.2

#k

1"Report of the State Executive to the Annual General
Meeting of State Council, November 6, 1961, p. 4.

2Ibid., November 25, 1960, p. 8.

149

Thais, The Australian Liberal is a direct link between the

 

curatral organization and the rank-and-file branch member.
When a new member joins the party, he automatically subscribes
to the central publication;1 and the branch treasurer who
collects the fee not only enriches the branch treasury but
acts as a subscription collection agent for the central
organization.

For a number of reasons, therefore, the central organi-
zation had a large stake in the higher fee. The fee elevated
existing members to the status of party contributors, and lent
impetus and purpose to a drive to add many thousands of new
members to the party. As the General Secretary pointed out:

The organisation confronts a two-fold task, namely--

the re-enrolment of pre-existing branch members with

the renewal of branch fees for the coming year, and

secondly, a comprehensive branch membership drive.2
Confronted by widespread resistance to the fee at the
electorate level, the central organization launched the
Branch Development Drive as an instrument for both broadening
the financial base of the party, and increasing the amount of
financial resources available to the party.

In this chapter we have presented a general assessment V
of the organizational resources available to the New South

Hales Liberal Party in its struggle to win control of govern-

ment. It was an assessment which stimulated the formation of

 

1Under the old fee, subscription to the party
periodical Liberal Opinion was optional. Liberal Opinion's
format was less elaborate and of lesser quality than its
successor, The Australian Liberal.

 

2"Branch Membership Drive," p. 1.

150

a program of action: the branch development program. This
program to develop the organizational resources of the party
was advanced by the central organization in the hope that the
party's government-seeking objectives would be realized. As
the General Secretary summed up shortly before the 1960
membership drive was launched:
If the plan succeeds, it will provide an enormously
strengthened organisation to meet the needs of the
Federal and State elections at the end of next year...
If the scheme is fully implemented, we should be able,
for the first time, to isolate the swing voters and to
work on them...the branch should be adequately equipped
with funds and a solid core of finance should be available
to meet campaign needs.
With the Federal Government approaching its twelfth year of
office and the State Party confronting the difficulties-
attendant upon a lengthy pefiod in opposition, the tasks
ahead of us are very large.
Implementation of the Branch Development Drive
The Branch Development Committee was created by the
State Executive in May, 1959, upon the recommendation of the
General Secretary.2 As we discussed in the preceding section,
the BDC was charged with the responsibility of revitalizing
the party branch structure by bringing in thousands of new
party members, and improving existing branch activities. In
this section, we shall examine and evaluate the efforts of

the BDC over a two year period--June, 1959-June, 1961. This
period may be divided into four phases: the membership drive

 

1"Branch Development Programme,“ p. 4.

2'Branch Development Drive,” a memorandum from the General
Secretary to the State Executive, May 25, 1959, p. 3.

151

planning phase from June, 1959-April, 1960; the intensive
drive itself from May-September, 1960; a period of BDC
inactivity from September, 1960-February, 1961; and a phase
involving further member recruitment efforts before arriving
at new membership totals in June, 1961.

The BDC was chaired by Mr. J. C. Maddison, then State
Treasurer and also chairman of the Electorate Assistance
Committee. Maddison was authorized by the State Executive to
co-opt additional members of the BDC as he saw fit. At the
first meeting of the BDC on June 5, 1959, Maddison was joined
by three other members of the State Executive: Mr. Ralph
Bonner, an attorney and a Roman Catholic who was later to be
elected State President of the party:1 Mr. Claude Tuckwell,
an insurance broker and veteran party worker; and Mr. Eric :
Willis, the young Deputy Leader of the state parliamentary par’w.
Mr. A. T. Lenehan, State Supervisor of party field staff, also
attended the meeting and acted as the committee's secretary.2

The first meeting of the committee was devoted to a
general discussion of its duties. The committee arrived at
the tentative conclusions that an all-out membership drive was
indeed necessary--'the sooner the better”; that special atten-
tion should be given to "swing" electorates and areas of rapid
population growth; and that a special effort should be made to

attract "'key' people with a well-chosen personal approach aimed

 

1hr. Bonner served as State President in 1961 and 1962.
2Minutes of BDC, June 5, 1959.

152

at securing their joining the party."1

By the end of July, 1959, the BDC had expanded to eight
members. The committee began to give attention to the
mechanics of implementing the membership drive. Decisions
needed to be made on whether the BDC would work through the
state electorate conference or through individual branches:
whether special literature should be prepared for new members:
whether volunteer party canvassers should receive special
training. The committee also considered "the devising of ways
of securing the co-operation of the Parliamentary Parties with
the aims and objects of the Committee.”2

The BDC set for itself a heavy meeting schedule. The
full committee generally met at bi—weekly intervals, but often
much more frequently. In addition, as decisions were made,
particular work assignments were given to small sub— ~—
committees which held separate meetings. Membership on these
subcommittees was often overlapping, which meant that some
committee members were involved in several meetings per week
during some periods of membership drive planning.

By the end of January, 1960, the BDC had completed most
of its preparatory work. The membership drive was scheduled
to begin on May 2 with a kick-off rally featuring the Leader
of the State parliamentary party, Nr. Askin: and the federal
Attorney General, Sir Garfield Barwick. But before the drive

 

lIbid.

2Hinutes of BDC, July 28, 1959. The role of parliamentary
members in the branch development program will be discussed
separately at the end of this chapter.

153
could be launched, the BDC faced the task of communicating
the objectives of the drive to the party organization at large,
and securing the active cooperation of office-holders and other
party personnel who had not been involved in the planning
process.

On April 5, 1960, the chairman of the BDC dispatched a
lengthy and detailed memorandum to all presidents and secre-
taries of state electorate conferences, as well as to members
of state and federal parliaments. The memorandum began as
follows:

For the past eight months the Branch Development Com.

mittee (appointed by State Executive, together with

co-opted members of the Branch Organisation) has been

meeting continuously and preparing plans for the

conduct of a Membership Drive within the metropolitan

area and also examining ways and means of developing

the Branch Organisation, generally.

The Committee has now reached the stage in completing

its plans when State Electorate Conferences must be

made aware of the essential details.1
Following this portentous opening were eight legal-size pages
(single spaced) of instructions on how the membership drive
should be conducted. Four days after the memorandum was sent
to state electorate conference officers, a second memorandum
from the BDC chairman was sent to the presidents and secre-
taries of all Liberal Party branches. This memorandum was of

similar length and covered much the same ground as the earlier

one .

 

1"Nelllbership Drive: Branch Development,” a memorandum
from the chairman of the BDC to all state electorate con-
ference presidents and secretaries, February 5, 1960, p. l.

154

Implementation of the branch development drive, as indi-
cated in the two memoranda, was to be carried out according to
the following plan. All state electorate conferences were ~
asked to call a meeting within the period of February l5eMarch
14. At this meeting the target figures for new branches and
new members established by the BDC should be endorsed, and a
Branch Development Sub-Committee be appointed consisting of
one member from each branch in the electorate. The Sub-
Committee was expected to establish geographical areas for
which each branch in the electorate would be responsible. In
areas requiring new branches, committees of three members were
to form the nucleus of the planned branch, and secure enough
additional new members to form a new branch. The State
Electorate Conference Branch Development Sub-Committee was
placed in charge of co-ordinating the drive throughout the
electorate. Members of the party field staff were expected
to assist as much as possible, and to act as liaison between
the electorate and the central BDC.

At the branch level, the drive was to be co-ordinated
by the branch representative on the electorate Branch Develop-
ment Sub-Committee. This person, known as the "Branch Drive
Captain," was expected to appoint a ”Team Captain” and a group
of canvassers for each area into which the branch had been
subdivided.

Each branch was also called upon to prepare a complete

list of "main electors" (heads of households) residing in the

155
branch area. The list was then to be organized by street
addresses, and would indicate the occupation of each elector.
Basic information for compiling the index could be obtained
from the I'Original Roll of Electors and Ratepayers” maintained
by municipal councils, but organizing the material by streets
represented a formidable task requiring many hours of tedious,
volunteer labor. The Branch Drive Captain was also expected
to compile a special list of officers of all voluntary
organizations such as service clubs, veterans groups, business
organizations, and sporting clubs.
Assuming the completion of the necessary groundwork,
the BDC memoranda called for the scheduling of training
sessions for canvassers during the month of April, 1960?-
immediately preceding the drive kick-off on May 2. Training
sessions would be scheduled on a regional basis, and would
feature members of the BDC and the field staff. A special
manual would also be available as a guide to canvassers.1
The BDC communications went on to spell who should be

canvassed as prospective members, and how they should be
approached:

The drive is to be a "discriminate” canvass. It should

be confined to those people, who, because of their

occupations or professions, appear to be likely Liberal

sympathizers. As well, the ke members of all the local

voluntary organizations are to e canvassed duri the

'Flrst stage of the drive. :The wives Of all loca 1y
prominent men should be canvassed...

 

1Visitors' Manual, a Liberal Party publication prepared
for party workers in the branch development program. In an
interesting semantic move, the BDC decided to use the term
"visitor“ instead of “canvasser', and the term ”briefing”
instead of “training" when referring to the preparation of
party workers for the drive. See Minutes of BDC “Visitors”
Sub-Committee, March 14, 1960.

 

156

In principle, canvassers are to be assigned to the
section within which they reside or are best known...

"Cold" canvassing should be avoided where possible.
Knowing a prospect personally or being able to arrange
an introduction to him can mean the difference between
the canvasser being successful or unsuccessful. The
value of personal relationship between the canvasser
and the prospect must be stressed time and time again...

Special emphasis must be placed on the soliciting of

the key personnel of local voluntary organizations as

they are in effect the local leaders and are in a

position to influence the members of their organisations...

The canvasser should be prepared to spend a reasonable '
amount of time with a prospect, but he must be aware
that he does not spend an abnormal amount of time dis-
cussing some very interesting, but totally time-
wasting subject. .

After the commencement of the drive itself, canvassers
were expected to attend a progress report session called by
the Branch Drive Captain. A second reporting session was
called for within one week after the end of the two-month
intensive drive. Canvassers' reports were to indicate-

any objection raised by those who refused to join...

the objections raised [fiere] to be forwarded by the
Branch Drive Captains to the State Electorate Conference
Branch Development Sub-Committee which is to forward
them to the Branch Development Committee which will

analyse them and try to devise ways and means of
overcoming them.2

In cases where the prospective member was undecided, the Branch
Drive Captain was "to consider transferring the contacting of
the prospect to another canvasser. If this is done, the second

canvasser should not call for at least one week."3

 

1"Membership Drive: Branch Develo ment," a memorandum
from the BDC chairman to all party branc presidents and

secretaries, February 9, 1960, p. 2-3.
2Ibid., p. 4. 31bid.

157
Within one month after the completion of the drive,

the state electorate conference was expected to hold an
“induction meeting" for new members which would feature mem-
bers of parliament and other party officials. The conference
president was advised to station himself at the door to
welcome new and old party members and guests.

Informality [phould be the keynote of the evening. As

much time as possib e should be given over to allowing

the new members to mix and meet the others present. This

is particularly important where the official guests are

concerned. The Electorate Conference President shpuld
ensure that they are not monopolised by one group.

All members were also to receive the new brochure ”The Trust
You.Accept" prepared by the BDC. In addition, members should
be issued a party membership card which "will have no practi-
cal use as far as the organisation is concerned, but it may
help some members to gain that feeling of 'belonging' that
they lack.”2 Following the induction meeting, a branch vice-
president was to be assigned the task of following up on new
members who did not attend, or who did attend the induction
but failed to come to subsequent branch meetings.

’ The BDC ended its memoranda with a note of optimism,
and a straightforward statement on the reason for the whole
effort: ‘

We look forward with anticipation to the attainment
of the membership target in your branch area.

The building up of the organisation in the year, 1960,
will help considerably when we meet the challenge of
the ngegal Elections in 1961 and the State Elections
in 19 2.

Having spelled out the objectives and implementation

\

machinery of the drive to local party officers, the BDC threw
itself into prodding the electorate and branch organizations

 

1 2

Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. ' 31bid., p. 5~6.

158

into action. It was agreed that the BDC, which by this time
had expanded to eighteen members, would attend as many elec-
torate conference meetings as possible. In addition, of
course, the party field staff would concentrate its efforts
on organizing for the drive. 4
.Minutes‘of committee meetings provide an indicative,

if not complete, account of the response by electorate
organizations. The BDC minutes of Narch 24, 1960, reported
"full cooperation” from the Burwood electorate, ”no enthusiasm
for the proposals" from Manly, ”not complete cooperation3,from
Collaroy, an energetic house-to-house canvass already underway
in Rockdale, and ”progress" or "cooperation? (with qualifi-
cations) from.Gordon, vaucluse, and North Sydney.1 On March
30, it was reported that the Mosman electorate had "accepted
the proposals of Branch Development in principle."2 At the
same meeting:

Verbal reports were made by each Field Representative

in regard to the action,taken in connection with Branch

Development within their respective areas. It was

gleaned from the reports that there was 50 to 69 per

cent co-operation by the electorates concerned.

In April, 1960, the BDC moved ahead with briefing
sessions for canvassers who had agreed to work in the drive.
Again, the BDC minutes indicate that success in this phase
was spotty. The BDC "Briefing Sub-Committee" minutes of

April 6 take note of "well attended” meetings in the northern

 

1Minutes of BDC, march 24, 1960, p. 2.

2Minutes of BDC, March 30, 1960, p. l.
31bid.

159

and central regions of the metropolitan area. The April 11
minutes comment on a "successful meeting" in the southern,
region, but an “unsatisfactory” meeting in the eastern region.
A "fair meeting” in the western region was reported in the
"Briefing Sub-Committee" minutes of April 27. In a meeting
of the full BDC on April 13, a field staff report statedthat
a total of 292 "Visitors" had been enrolled as volunteers,
and that contacts were being made with 166 others. ”In
commenting on the report the Chairman expressed disappoint-'
ment with the number of 'Visitors' enrolled...and stated
that the Committee should aim at securing the services of
at least 1,000 'Visitors'".1

The branch development drive was launched on May 4,
1960. According to The Australian Liberal, "almost 700 key
members of the Liberal Party" gathered to hear addresses by
the federal Attorney General (Sir Garfield Barwick), the state
parliamentary Leader (Mr. Askin), the state President (Mr.
Cotton), and the Leader of the New South Wales federal
parliamentary party (Senator Spooner).2 Near the close of
the meeting, the chairman of the BDC, Hr. Maddison, "said it
had been an inspiring and exciting evening. Its inspiration
and excitement should now be translated into activityaV3
Maddison termed the program'"realistic, and the work involved

for Branch members...far easier than-it looked on paper. 53%:

 

lMinutes of BDC, April 13, 1960.
85;, May, 1960, p. l.
31bid., p. 7.

160

'It is in your hands,‘ he said, 'to go and do the job.”1
Within a month after the launching of the drive, the.
BDC met with members of the field staff to review progress.
Individual members of the Field Staff reported gradual‘
progress...Difficulties were being met in certain areas
in each of the Regions. Each member of the Staff implied
that every effort was being made to overcome these
difficulties. A statement was presented...showing a
Membership Increase of 730...Mr. Maddison stated he was
not distressed over results to date and that he was very
satisfied with the reports...He expressed the opinion
that within two or three months real Membership Increase
would be shown.2
The field staff was instructed to keep weekly records of
membership increases, and be ready in three weeks to present
another report to the BDC. When the BDC again convened,
members of the field staff "reported gradual progress...and
steady increase in membership. A statement was presented
showing an increase on basic figures of 1,318 at 13 June,
1960.'3
At the drive progressed, party publications continued
to claim a significant build-up in branch membership. An
item in the July, 1960 Australian Liberal said that 1,500
new members had been enrolled by mid-June.# In August, The
Australian Liberal pointed to an increase of more than 2,500

6

new members;5 the September issue reported 3,000 new members.

 

1.1.21.2.

2Ninutes of BDC, May 30, 1960, p. 2.
3Minutes of BDC, June 20, 1960, p. 2.
5gp, July, 1960, p. 2 (supplement).
55;, August, 1960, p. 2.

égp, September, 1960, p. l.-

161

The State Executive report to State Council in September
indicated that “the membership increase is now approximately
3,500."1

The figure of 3,500 was taken from data gathered by the
BDC. At the same time, however, the committee betrayed un-
certainty about its figures by deciding to ask eaohsbranchw-
to submit a statement of its membership as of September 30,
1960.2 In the event, the implementation of this decision was
deferred,~since the BDC disbanded until February 1, 1961.3

In November, 1960, the State Executive reported to State
Council that "it seems clear that almost 4,000 new members

4

have been enrolled as a result of the Drive up to date."

 

1
Report of the State Executive to State Council,
September 26, 1960, p. 1.

2Minutes of BDC, September 19, 1960.

3The activities of the BDC, and the membership drive
itself, were effectively interrupted by the intervention of a
by-election campaign in the federal electorate of Calare, a
country electorate about 200 miles west of Sydney. Calare had
been held by the same Liberal member, John Howse, since 1946.
When Howse resigned, the Country Party decided to field a
candidate-~much to the Liberals' irritation, since the Labor
Party had little chance of victory. The Liberal electorate
organization in Calare had deteriorated badly during Howse's
long incumbency, while the Country Party coulddraw on strong
state electorate organizations within Calare. In an effort to
Hold Calare, the Liberal Party assigned most of its Sydney
field staff to Calare during September and October. The
campaign also absorbed much of the General Secretary's attention
during this period. With the field staff out of Sydney, it was
impossible to keep the membership drive moving. The by-election,
held on November 5, was won by the Country Party. See C.
Orlebeke, "Any Lesson in Calare?", The Observer, October 29,
1960, p. 8; and ”The Calare By-Electiofi', Australian Political
Studies Association Negp, February, 1961, pp. 13-15.

The BDC'S lack of activity between November and February
can be attributed to the holiday season and summer doldrums.

“Report of the State Executive to the Annual General
Meeting of State Council, November 25th, 1960, p. l.

162

However, this claim is made only after considerable hedging:
At the outset it was very difficult to establish an
accurate record of existing branch members. The only
records available had been kept by branch secretaries
and in many cases, very little attempt had been made
over the years to renew subscriptions.

The increased branch membership fee did not take full

effect until the financial year 1960/61. It was there-

fore not possible at the beginning to detect what

wastage might occur as the result of the new fee.

The Branch Membership Drive which was launched in May,

1960, therefore overlapped our initial attempts to

restore pur existing membership and to establish the

new fee. A

The BDC reconvened in February, 1961, and began by

following up on its efforts in 1960. The committee again sent
out a barrage of letters (1) to all branch presidents request-
ing a statement of membership and of branch program plans for
the year;2 (2) to 6'state'electorates‘whichcwerePreported-l

to have new branches in the process of formation; (3) to 23

newly established branches asking if they were having any

problems needing BDC help; (4) to 4 blue-ribbon state elec-
torates requesting that they plan membership drives.3 Subse-
quent meetings of the BDC were largely devoted to discussing
problems in specific areas, and attempting to revive a general
membership drive was not seriously considered.

At the same time, committee meetings were clearly marked
with a pervasive sense of disappointment over the results of
the 1960 drive, and with a sense of frustration about the

outlook of the branch development program. It was decided,

 

1Ibid. 2Minutes of BDC, February 1, 1961.
3Minutes of BDC, February 20, 1961.

163

therefore, to form a 5-man subcommittee from among its members
in order to review in detail the problems existing in the
organization.1 The subcommittee in its first meeting discussed
its assignment at length; its conclusions reflected clearly
the lack of success of the BDC in the 1960 drive:
Arising from the discussions it was resolved that the
sub-committee would visit key areas in turn to meet

local representatives in order to:

(a) Explain the work of the Branch Development Committee
and the sub-committee.

(b) To seek local views on Branch programmes and Branch
Development.

(c) To establish sound public relations begween each
area and the Branch Development Committee.

The subcommittee did carry out its plan to meet with a number
of electorate organizations, and held many meetings with
individual members of the field staff. An "Interim Reportfi
of the subcommittee was completed on June 27, 1961, and we.
shall discuss some of its contents later in this chapter.

In May, 1961, the BDC again undertook to determine the
number of branch members in the Sydney area, and the field
staff was asked to submit a report.3 The results of the
survey confirmed that apparently very little net membership

increase had occurred after two years of effort by the BDC.

 

1Ibid.
2Minutes of BDC Subcommittee, February 22, 1961.

3Minutes of BDC, May 19, 1961.

164

The following table provides membership figures broken down
according to "safe Liberal", "swing", and "safe Labor" state

electorates.

TABLE 10

SUMMARY OF BRANCH MEMBERSHIP BEFORE AND
AFTER BRANCH DEVELOPMENT DRIVE

 

 

 

Electorates Before Drive After Drive Net Gain/Loss
Safe Liberal (15) 8,861 8,727 -134
"Swing" (10) 1,280 1,600 320
Safe Labor (23) 1,289 1,375 86
TOTAL (48) 11,430 11,702 272

 

The table above indicates a net membership gain of only 272
new members. The party showed a net loss of membership strength
in its "blue-ribbon" areas, and relatively small gains in
"swing" and safe Labor electorates.

Within the three types of electorates, the survey re-
vealed an apparently erratic pattern of gains and losses.
Table 11 provides data on the 10 safe Liberal electorates.
The poor performance of the Gordon electorate is primarily
responsible for the over-all decline in safe Liberal seats.
It is obvious that a membership drive was not mounted in
Gordon, and in addition, as the BDC sub-committee report

;points out, "the Gordon debacle is undoubtedly due to the

165

TABLE 11

BRANCH MEMBERSHIP IN SAFE LIBERAL ELECTORATES
BEFORE AND AFTER BRANCH DEVELOPMENT DRIVE

 

 

 

 

Electorates Before After Net Gain/Loss
Gordon 2,067 728 -1,339
Neutral Bay 540 907 367
vaucluse 851 1,108 257
Willoughby 511 495 -16
Woollhara 1,366 1,149 ~217
Mosman 754 1,210 456
Eastwood 155 376 221
Collaroy 374 364 -10
Lane Cove 199 162 -37
Hornsby 660 557 -103
Ashfield-Croydon 177 207 30
Manly 66 458 392
Burwood 560 560 O
Cronulla 153 186 33
Earlwood 228 260 32
TOTAL 8,861 8,727, -134

 

lack of continuity and supervision in collecting subscrip-

l

tions." The ”debacle" in Gordon is balanced off by substan-

tial increases totaling 1,225 in Mosman, Manly, and Neutral Bay

 

lInterimReport, BDC Subcommittee, June 27, 1961, p. 8.

166

electorates. Without discounting whatever efforts may have
been made by volunteers in Mosman and Neutral Bay, it should
be noted that a retired insurance salesman had been active“
in this area signing up new party members for a commission.1
The BDC subcommittee suggests that he may have been responsi-

ble for almost 1,000 new members.2 In the case of Manly, we
noted earlier that there was "no enthusiasm" for branch
development plans.3 The increase in Manly, however, cannot
be attributed to a change of heart; rather, the increase re-
sulted from intensive canvassing by members of the field staff
who were assigned temporarily to Manly by the central office.4
The electorates of Eastwood and vaucluse show moderate meme
bership gains; Woollhara slipped {17 members; and the remain-
ing eight electorates had little change in net membership.
Turning now to a survey of the "swing" electorates, we
again note a wide variation in branch development efforts.
Table 12 indicates that Hurstville, Coogee, and Bondi show the
greatest net gains in new members among the "swing" seats. The
increase in Hurstville can be attributed to the energetic drive

conducted by the Bexley branch, which increased its membership

from 49 to 161 members.5 A canvassing team from Bexley branch

 

1Ibid. See also SMH, May 12, 1962, p. 2. The insurance
agent was permitted to keep half of the first annual fee
collected from each new member.

2Interim Report, p. 8.
3See p. 158n21811~

4Minutes of BDC, August 23, 1960, p. 2. A second field
staff canvass in Manly was made in May, 1961. Seventy-six
members were enrolled to form a new branch, but the first
meeting of the branch did not attract a quorum (8).

5R. W. Rathbone, “How Could It Be Donel',.§L, July,
1960, p. 10.

167

TABLE 12

BRANCH MEMBERSHIP IN "SWING" ELECTORATES BEFORE
AND AFTER BRANCH DEVELOPMENT DRIVE

W

 

 

Electorates Before After Net Gain/Loss
Coogee 160 312 152
George's River 107 127 20
Drummoyne 145 176 31
Blacktown 155 189 45
Rockdale 67 58 -9
Hurstville 80 227 147
Sutherland 78 144 66
Bondi 147 236 89
Concord 229 148 -81
Ryde 112 41 ~71
TOTAL 1,280 1,600 320

 

also established a new branch of 22 members-~Car1ton West-
Kogarah.

The increases in Coogee and Bondi, however, were not the
result of local efforts. Seven members of the field staff were
assigned to Coogee and Bondi for three weeks in order to build

1 In the remaining “swing" electorates,

up membership strength.
there were no dramatic increases and some indications of

serious slippage.

 

1Minutes of BDC, February 1, 1961; State Executive Report
to6the Annual General Meeting of State Council, November 6,
19 1: Po 2-

168

In the 23 safe Labor electorates, as we have already
noted, there was no serious push for new members. Membership
totals for the 23 electorates indicate a net increase of 86
members: 12 electorates had membership gains, 5 electorates
lost membership, and 6 remained unchanged.

In attempting to assess the branch development effort as
a whole, one is least comfortable on the shifting sands of
branch membership figures. How did it happen that almost
4,000 new members were claimed when, in fact, only 200-300
were added to the total membership? The obvious answer is
that thousands of members were probably counted twice. There
is little question that the branch development drive of 1960
produced a more or less organized flurry of activity in many
electorates with the result that thousands of membership fees
were collected. The fact that the drive coincided with the
normal period of membership renewal no doubt added to the
general confusion. The field staff was under heavy pressure
from the BDC to report membership increases, and it is
probable most membership renewals were counted as "new members”.

These observations are not intended to demean the branch
development drive. Party membership was, according to the
General Secretary, in gradual decline since l949--a decline
which was dangerously accelerated by the controversy over the
membership fee increase in 1959. The drive did succeed in
consolidating the higher fee, and probably brought back as
dues-paying members many who had resisted or avoided paying

the new fee. In so doing, the drive may have averted a serious

169

.lppg in party membership, and at the same time it realized
one of the drive's main financial objectives.

It is impossible to say how many people brought into the
party were really new members, who had no previous connection
with the organization. Since there was certainly some attrie
tion in the membership existing before the drive, we may cone
clude that there were more new members than indicated by the
net increase of 272. A clue to genuine new membership may be
the number of newly established branches formed during the
drive: as of June, 1961, some 20 new branches had been estab-
1ished, and 15-20 others were being pushed by the BDC. The
20 new branches alone claimed 800-900 members. Some of these
may have been transferred members from.existing branches, but
the great majority were probably new members. Taking into
account additional new members which were undoubtedly added
to existing branches, a rough but reasonable estimate of
actual new membership would be 1,000-1,500 new members. There
is no way of knowing, of course, how many new members went
beyond the simple payment of the membership fee and made
their way into the stream of party activities.

Although the branch development program can not be
written off as a failure, it was a profound disappointment
to its organizers when viewed against the grand objectives of
the program. The BDC's careful planning and elaborate machin-
ery failed to work when tested by implementation. With few
. exceptions, electorate organizations were not activated to

seek the goals set by the BDC.-

170

The branch development program thus brought to the
surface fundamental tensionsbetween the central organization
and electorate organizations. As an arm of the central organi-
zation, the Branch Development Committee was concerned primarily
with mobilizing the maximum organizational resources in the
quest for a Liberal victory. Electorate organizations, on
the other hand, were primarily concerned with maintaining‘
control of the office-holding and office-seeking conditions
within each electorate.

The failure of electorate organizations to perform in
the interests of the party as a whole was censured by the
BDC subcommittee assigned to survey the branch structure.

The subcommittee's “Interim Report" contains a dreary cata-
logue of branch shortcomings such as the following:

Leading citizens are not as a generality attracted to.

the party...Uninteresting or non-existing branch programmes,
of a diverse nature...Unsuitab1e meeting centres...Lack of
a stimulating crusading spirit throughout the party...
Disinterest and lack of assistance by Parliamentary Members
in organisational affairs...Last1y there appears, except
for the "red-line" enthusiast, complete absence of the
"will to win”. This negation of zest and fighting spirit

is having a paralysing effect on our organisation. .
Later in the report, the subcommittee gives its version of
the conflict between central and electorate organizations:

The Sub-Committee is unanimous in taking the view that

in the main the control of Branches and Conferences has
passed from the organisational structure of the Party as
set out in the Constitution and administered by the State
Executive, to individuals or groups of individuals whether
they be parliamentary members or private members who
incorrectly believe they have some vested interest in the
local organisation.

 

1Interim Report, p. 2. -2Ibid., p. 5.

171

In this statement, the subcommittee acknowledges unhappily
that electorate organizations are not run by the central
organization, but rather by members of parliament and branch
officers with "some vested interest."

The success of a branch development program posed a
real threat to entrenched branch and electorate officers.

If membership targets had been realized, the members of many
existing branches would be far outnumbered by new members.
Such an influx would be at least a potential threat to incump
bent branch officers. Moreover, the formation of new branches
would mean in influx of new delegates to the electorate con-
ference, which often plays a decisive role in the selection
of candidates.1 Most branch officers were therefore unable

to generate much enthusiasm for a program which could
undermine the control of their bailiwicks.

Liberal members of parliament also contributed to the
disappointing result of branch development by failing to lend
their active support to the effort. The General Secretary
anticipated this problem even before the membership drive
when he stated:

The pre-selection method in metropolitan areas creates

a vested interest by the sitting member in inertia.

There is a strong tendency in Liberal areas to dis-
courage new members or new branches, presumably

because they may create new challenges in pre-selection.2

Efforts were made, however, by the BDC to secure the involve-

ment of parliamentary members in the membership drive. Shortly

 

1This point will be further developed in Chapter V.

2"Branch Development," p. l.

172

before the drive was launched, the BDC chairman and the
General Secretary met on succeeding days with the state and

federal parliamentary groups.1 Both groups expressed support
of the aims of the drive. In addition, as we noted earlier, 4
the federal Attorney General, Sir Garfield Barwick, agreed to
deliver the main address at the rally opening the drive.2
The rally was also addressed by state parliamentary Leader,
Mr. Askin, and the New South Wales federal parliamentary
Leader, Senator Spooner.3

In spite of public commitments by parliamentary members
to support branch development, the BDC came to regard their
expressions as "lip service." It was clearly not in the
interests of incumbent office-holders to promote actively a
program which could complicate the nomination process. The
problem of re-nomination is most manageable in electorates
which contain relatively inactive branches with stable
leadership cliques supporting the incumbent. The branch
development program offered the unwelcome prospect of shaking
up the existing electorate organization by an influx of new
people. This would confront the incumbent with a group of
new faces from his own electorate at the nomination meeting,
in addition to the unknown group of 20 selectors representing
State Council. If faced with nomination challenges, the

incumbent would be forced to appear before a nominating

 

1 Minutes of BDC February 8, February 17 Februarg 26,
1960. The meetings with the parliamentary par 1es were eld

on February 26 and 27, 1960.

231r Garfield himself was not a party member until
shortly before his nomination as the Liberal candidate in the
Parramatta by-election of 1958.

3gp, May, 1960, pp. 1, 7, and 4-page»$pecial Supplement.

173

committee with undetermined loyalties, and compete under
considerable pressure with his challengers. Generally speaking,
the incumbent would rather not submit himself to this kind of
scrutiny if he can avoid it.

The promoters of branch development were aware of the
reasons for lack of support by members of parliament, but found
these reasons unacceptable. The BDC believed that the party's
office-holders have the responsibility to use the power and :
prestige of their position to help build a winning party
organization. The member of parliament should work for a
large, growing, and active branch structure in his electorate;
the risks associated with an active organization are minimal
if the sitting member serves the electorate well, according
to the BDC. Thus, the conflict between the central organize;
tion and office-holders was sharpened by the fact that office-
holders readily promised support for branch development and
even made inspiring speeches at rallies and conventions, but
failed to take concrete steps in their own electorates to
invigorate the branch organization.

A personal memorandum written in February, 1961, from
the General Secretary to the BDC chairman communicates some
of the hostility toward members of parliament, and also
illustrates the kind of pressure put upon members to assist
the membership program. The memorandum was as follows:

(1) Cooperation with the Parliamentary Party
I suggest you write a carefully written letter to me

from the Branch Development Committee, and suggest that
I bring the matter to the Central Committee of the State

174

Executive at its next meeting. In writing the letter,
you might keep in mind its future use by the State
Leader in being read out to the Parliamentary Party.

I think that this is essential because I do not think
that any casual report of a Committee discussion would
be good enough and I am not disposed to suggest that
we should make a further attempt to address the
Parliamentary Party.

I think that we want to express ourselves calmly but
with force on paper. Furthermore, I think that the
correct plan is for the memorandum to come to the
attention of the State Leader through the Central
Committee, so that it goes with the knowledge and
blessing of the Executive.

(2) Development of Branches

I think that it is also important that we should busy
ourselves with restoring stagnating branches in City
Members' electorates. I have in mind Hornsby as a
start and I think we should work out a thorough
programme so that everyone knows we mean what we say.

It is no use seeking help from the Parliamentary Party
if they believe we are talking platitudes.l

The second part of the memorandum clearly sounded the warning
that the central organization intended to proceed with building
branch strength in Liberal electorates with or without the

approval and support of the sitting member.2

Summary
After fighting the successful federal campaign of 1958,

and the losing state campaign of 1959, the Liberal Party made

a searching assessment of its organizational resources.

 

lMemorandumfrom J. L. Garrick to J. C. Maddison,
February 21, 1961. This memo gives a rare and illuminating

example of how various agencies of the central organization
can be manipulated to apply maximum pressure on office-holders.

2The nomination for the electorate of Hornsby--mentioned
in the memorandump—was contested by the BDC chairman, Mr.
Maddison, who won both the nomination and the election.

175

Spearheading the assessment of the organization were the
General Secretary and the State Supervisor of field staff.
Evaluation of branch membership strength, branch activism and
effectiveness, and party finance led to the conclusion that

a major effort to build the party's resources was imperative

if the party was to maintain control of the national govern-
ment, and gain control of state government. The Branch
Development Committee was appointed to implement such an effort.

The BDC completed an analysis of organizational strength
on the basis of available information, and established ambitious
targets for building a larger and stronger organization. Then
the BDC devised elaborate plans for reaching these goals, and
communicated their plans to electorate organizations. In
implementing the branch development program, the BDC encoun-
tered complete cooperation in very few electorates, partial
cooperation in most electorates, and a total lack of response
in others. The impact of the program was difficult to evaluate
because of unreliable data on membership strength, but the
over-all result was disappointing. In general, electorate
organizations were unwilling to accept direction from the BDC,
and unwilling to undertake a vigorous membership drive. Members
of parliament offered vocal support for the effort, but failed
to within their own electorates to achieve the targets which’
were set.

Thus, the branch development program, which was conceived
by the central organization to mobilize party resources for
victory, collided with resisting office-holders who did not want
to disturb the conditions of office-seeking in the electorate

organizations.

CHAPTER V

THE CONTEST FOR NOMINATIONS IN THE
NEW SOUTH WALES LIBERAL PARTY

Introduction

Control of individual offices and control of government
are at stake in each election. In the months before an ele0«
tion, the party decides which candidates will carry the party‘s
designation into the electoral contest. These decisions
constitute the nomination process by which office-seekers
compete with each other for the opportunity to contest an
electorate with the support of the party's name and resources.
The strategy of office-seeking tends to be controlled by two
main considerations: (1) What are the chances of being
nominated in a particular electorate; and (2) If nominated,
what are the chances of winning the office? Thus, office
ambitions are discouraged in hard-core Labor electorates where
the party nomination can be readily secured, but there is no
hope for being elected. On the other hand, office ambitions
are also discouraged in a safe Liberal seat held by a Cabinet

minister, since the prospect of being nominated is remote.

176

177

The central organization is concerned with the nomination
process insofar as the selection of candidates relates to the
party's prospects for winning control of government. If the
party is already in power, the central organization has
realized its objective and seeks to maintain the status quo.

It does not attempt to make organizational changes or encour-
age attitudes which stimulate challenges to incumbent members
of parliament. Rather, the central organization tries to
bolster the prestige of the Liberal government, and encourages
loyalty to its members.

Thus, the Liberal Party State President (then Mr. Honner),
at a time when the Menzies government was receiving severe
criticism of its economic policies from newspapers and business
interests, warned a meeting of party officers as follows:

'It is not a time to aid the enemy by swallowing and
regurgitating the enemy propaganda of ill-informed
or malicious criticism,‘ he said.
Unless w preferred socialism, unless we preferred
Calwell Tieader of the oppositioé] to Menzies, then
we had a duty to build up, not to destroy, the prestige
of our parliamentary members, who were the best men the
Party could find among those willing to serve in
Government.
This statement by a central organization leader includes no
attempt to refute "ill-informed or malicious criticism", but
rather calls for loyalty in the face of the spectre of defeat.
When the party is not in control of government, the

central organization attempts to correct whatever conditions

are perceived as the reasons for defeat. If the party has

 

15;, April, 1961, p. 1.

178

appeared to lack sufficient money or other resources to conduct
a winning campaign, the central organization attempts to
mobilize additional resources through such techniques as the
branch development program.
In addition, the central organization is likely to turn
a critical eye on the office-holders of the party, who must
demonstrate from a posture of opposition that they constitute
an acceptable and desirable alternative to the governing party.
Repeated electoral failure tends to reflect unfavorably on the
parliamentary delegation, from.which executive leadership would
usually be drawn in the event of victory.1
As we have already indicated, the Liberal Party has been

experiencing the frustration of prolonged opposition at the
state level. The result is that the central organization has
been receptive to, and at times actively fostered, the ambition
of office-seekers who offer the prospect of improving party
performance in state elections. Thus, the State President,
after calling on party officers "to search out the ablest
citizens we can persuade to place their talents at the service
of the people of this State,"2 abruptly shifted his ground
later in the same address:

The man who could be of most value in Parliament loses

such value if he cannot win the seat. The man who can
win the seat is, in the circumstances, the man to choose.3

 

1In a governmental system with a segaratel elected
executive, the party may readily reach on side 0 the legis-

lative delegation for a presidential or gubernatorial candi-
date. Such a candidate may choose to disassociate himself
from his party's legislative record.

251;, April, 1961, p. 2.
3Ibid.

179

The State President then went on to point out that the

central organization value of winning government should

prevail over all other considerations:
Sometimes the selection of the horse for the course
may go against the grain. It may mean the rejection
of a better man. It may mean the acceptance of a
candidate who might seem, in some sense, unacceptable
except that he 'has what it takes' to win the seat.
It may mean the overriding of strong personal prefer-
ences, of close, life-long associations, of deep and
abiding loyalties; but if that sacrifice is necessary
to turn the socialists out of office, and if turning
the socialists out of office is what we want, then it
is a sacrifice we must be prepared to make...

Let us not, as Liberals, have on our consciences some 1
action that would keep the Labor Government in office.

The statements of Mr. Honner which we have quoted illus-
trate some of the tensions and conflicts which complicate the
nomination process in the Liberal Party. In this chapter,
we shall examine the nomination process in terms of the inter-
action of office ambitions in electorate organizations, and
government ambitions in the central organization. Since the
chracter of this interaction is determined mainly by the
party's position with respect to control of government; and
since the party controls government at the federal level, but
not at the state level, we shall discuss separately the nomi-O
nation process for both a federal and a state election: the
federal election of December 9, 1961; and the state election
of March 3, 1962.

First, however, we shall outline the formal procedures

governing the selection of candidates.

 

11bid., p. 2, 11.

180

The nomination process: formal procedure
The nomination or candidate selection process in the
Liberal Party is governed by rules of procedure laid down in

l The process of candidate selection’.

the party constitution.
usually begins from 6 to 9 months before a state or federal
election is anticipated. Upon the decision of the State
Executive to open nominations, the General Secretary is di-
rected to place a public advertisement in metropolitan news-
papers inviting candidates to come forward and compete for
nominations. '

Any member of the Liberal Party is eligible to compete
for the party's endorsement in any state or federal electorate
in New South Wales. If a candidate is not a party member at
the time nominations are called for, he may simply apply for
membership to a local branch, pay his membership fee, and
proceed to compete for the nomination.2

The General Secretary supplies each candidate with a
lengthy form to complete. The;candidate is required to provide
the following background information about himself: age,
marital status, educational background, current and previous

occupation, professional and business experience, war service

and patriotic activities, Liberal Party activities, previous

 

lConstitution, Clauses 199-227.

2See the State President's (then Mr. Honner) letter to
the SMH, October 10, 1961, p. 2: "Our doors are wide open to
anyone of Liberal faith. A person may Join at the moment of
nomination for selection.” In contrast, the New South Wales
Labor Party requires at least 3 years of party membership for
candidates. See R. S. Parker, op. cit., p. 100.

181

political experience, and special associations in the elector-
ate. The candidate may also submit, if he wishes, not more
than 3 letters of reference supporting his candidacy. In
addition, the candidate must pay a nomination fee of L5 (11.75)
which is not refundable. All background material on candidates
is compiled and duplicated at party headquarters, and distribu-
ted to members of selection committees at least one week prior
to the selection meeting.

The Liberal Party of New South Wales, like the Liberal

organization in all states except South Australia,1

employs
an ad hoc selection committee for each electorate. The
composition of the selection committee differs according to
the location of the electorate. In electorates outside of the
Sydney metropolitan area, a Liberal candidate is nominated by
a selection committee composed entirely of delegates from
party branches within the electorate. Each branch in a "countnfi
electorate designates from 3 to 6 delegates (depending on the
size of the branch) for federal nominations, and 5 to 12 dele-
gates for state nominations. The chairman of ”country"
selection meetings is a member of the State Executive designated
by the State Executive.

For electorates in the Sydney metropolitan area, the
selection committee for each electorate is composed of 30

members of the electorate conference, and 20 members of State

s

1In South Australia, Liberal candidates are chosen by a
postal ballot of all branch members in an electorate. In
Victoria and Tasmania, selection committees are composed exclu-
sively of branch delegates without participation of the State
Council. Queensland and Western Australia, like New South Wales,
use a combination of electorate and central participation.

182

Council designated by the State Executive. In selecting State
Council panels of 20, the State Executive uses the following
guidelines:

(1) A complete participation of all available metro-
politan councillors over a series to? selections

(2) A representation of as many different electorates
as possible in any one panel of 20.

(3) Within the scope of the above principles, as random
as possible an election system.

It is also customary that 5 members of the State Council panel
be members of the State Executive. .When the State Executive
has compiled a list of 20 State Council members and 10 alternate
members, the list is turned over to the senior clerk on thefit
party staff who telephones the designees until 20 agree to be
present at the selection meeting concerned. The senior clerk
then gives the list to the General Secretary who keeps it
locked up until the time of the selection meeting. Thus, only
the senior clerk and the General Secretary know the exact
composition of the State Council panel. Theoretically, no one
member of the panel knows who are the other 19 members. This
procedure is of course intended to prevent prior consultation

among the panel regarding the candidates offering themselves

for nomination.2

 

1Quoted from the "Report of the State Executive to the An-
nual General Meeting of State Council," November 6, 1961, p. 9.

2See the State President's (Mr. Honner) rejoinder in SMH,
October 10, 1961, p. 2, to R. A. Benson's letter in SMH, ocEEBer
9, 1961, p. 2. Benson alleged that certain party "oTTIcials"
might be "able to count on 20 votes out of 50 at every preselec-
tion meeting." Mr. Honner retorted that since the State Council
panel "is a random cross-section of some 200 eligible State
councillors, and since practically all councillors participate
over a whole series of selections, there is no bloc vote." See
also Malcolm Mackerras's analysis of the composition of State
Council panels in "Pre-selections in the New South Wales Libera.
Party," unpublished B.A. honors thesis submitted to the Depart-
ment of Government, University of Sydney, 1960.

183

Selection meetings for electorates in the Sydney area
are nearly always held in the dingy basement meeting room of
party headquarters in downtown Sydney.1 The chairman, who is
a member of the State Executive designated by the State
Executive, introduces himself and asks for a formal motion
declaring him chairman of the meeting. Then the chairman asks
the General Secretary (or other senior party official present)
to call the roll of delegates. The formalities continue as
the chairman asks whether any delegate is related to a candi-v
date, is less than 21 years old, or has been a party member
for less than 6 months. An affirmative response of course
disqualifies a delegate from participation.

When the preliminary formalities are completed, the
candidates are called into the meeting room and introduced to
the selection committee. The chairman explains to the group
of candidates that each shall be allowed to address the selec-
tors for 8 minutes on any subject of his choice, after which
he must respond to questions from the selectors for 7 minutes.2
After the groundrules have been explained, the candidates are
ushered out of the room. They then appear--one by one--before
the committee in alphabetical order. Under no circumstances

are the candidates allowed to observe each other's performance

before the selectors.

1The press is never admitted to selection meetings. In
1961, for the first time, political scientists were permitted
to attend as observers.

2Time limits are rigorously enforced by the use of a
stop-watch and bell.

184

There are many possible approaches a candidate can use
to convince the selection committee that he is the most suitabka
candidate for the electorate. Some candidates emphasize
personal qualifications~-education, military service, profess—
ional experience, connections in the electorate, party acti~
vities, and so forth. Other candidates focus their attention
on a particular issue or issues such as the public transporta-
tion problem or the tax structure; these candidates usually
promise--if nominated and elected-—to devote their energies
to the problems outlined. A few candidates present airy
discourses on "Liberalism" or the "challenge of the future"
or a similar topic; the candidate who takes this oblique
approach makes no direct reference to his own candidacy.
Most candidates, of course, try to use a combination of
approaches in their 8-minute presentations.

When a candidate has finished speaking, the chairman
calls for questions from the selection committee. There is
no set procedure for question-time: if anyone wants to ask a
question, he raises his hand and proceeds when recognized by
the chairman. Most candidates dread this question period,
for one bobbled question can negate the effect of a carefully
prepared speech. Some questions are routine requests for
information. For example: Will you devote your full time
to parliamentary duties? Would you maintain an office in
the electorate and be available at specified times to deal
with constituents' problems and requests? Other questions
recur so often in pre-selections that the candidate can

anticipate them and be primed with an answer. For example:

185
What can you do for the people of your electorate? How can
we defeat the Labor Party in the next elections? Such questions
do not usually give the candidate any difficulty.

There are other questions which the candidate fears.
Naturally, a candidate fears a question on a topic which he
knows little or nothing about. A complicated question on
taxation, federal-state relations, or foreign policy may take
a candidate off guard if he is not equipped to answer it, or
clever enough to disguise his ignorance. It is hazardous for
a candidate to appear uninformed or inarticulate. Another
type of question-time pitfall for a candidate is the facetious
question. For example: "In view of the current controversy
concerning expulsions from our beaches because of immodest
bathing attire, what do you think the Liberal policy should
be regarding the proper dimensions of bathing suits?l" Such
a question is designed to embarrass the candidate, and usually
succeeds. 8

Perhaps the question dreaded most of all by candidates
is the controversial question--in other words, the question
dealing with a problem on which there is a sharp difference
of opinion within the party. Such controversial problem-areas
include the "White Australia” immigration policy, the problem
of state aid to private and parochial schools, and the problem

of gambling laws. If the candidate expressed a strong opinion

 

1This question was actually put to Mr. E. D. Darby in a
re-selection for the Manly State Electorate held on October
,‘1961, Mr. Darby, the sitting member for Manly, lost his

attempt for re-endorsement. In the election of March 3, 1962;
however, he ran as an independent and defeated the endorsed
Liberal candidate, Mr. H. O. Boyle.

186
when such topics were debated on the various levels of the
party organization, that opinion may be dredged up by a
questioner, especially if the candidate's opinion was contrary
to the position eventually adopted by the party as "policy.”
But even if the interrogator does not know the position of
the candidate on a controversial issue, he does know that the
candidate's response could alienate a number of members of
the selection committee. Thus, the controversial question
can and often does become a weapon used by a selector against
a candidate whom he opposes. The selector who favors a
particular candidate is unlikely to put his favorite on the
spot with a thorny question. More likely, he would ask a
"Dorothy Dix-er",l which if not actually pre-arranged, would
at least be designed to bring out the strong points of "his"
candidate.

While there is little doubt that question—time is used
for strategic purposes by blocs of supporters for particular
candidates, it is also clear that some selectors who are
completely uncommitted look upon question-time as a fairly
reliable indicator of a candidate's poise under pressure,
ability to express himself effectively, and his general compe-
tence in discussing political problems. In order to provide a
fair basis of comparison for evaluating the candidates, these
selectors often ask each candidate an identical question. Such
a question usually demands that each candidate address himself

to some broad problem area, and present his ideas for improving,

_i.

l ‘-
"Dorothy Dix-er" is a slang term applied to a question
which is pre-arranged by the questioner and the respondent.
Such questions are common features of parliamentary question-

time.

187
for example, the tax structure or the public transportation
system. The candidate who rates highest in such a test certain-
ly improves his stock with uncommitted selectors.

When the last candidate has completed his appearance
before the selection committee, the chairman calls on the
General Secretary (or, in his absence, another paid party
official) to explain the voting procedure. The system used--
called the ”exhaustive system”--provides that each selector
vote for the gng_man whom he thinks will make the best Liberal
candidate.1 The vote is cast by secret ballot. The candidate
who receives a majority of votes cast becomes the party's
nominee. If there are more than 2 candidates competing for
the nomination, and if no candidate receives a majority, then
the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated.
However, more than one candidate may be eliminated if the
combined vote of the least popular candidates is less than
the vote polled by the next most popular candidate. To
illustrate, let us examine the first ballot of a hypothetical

 

pre-selection:
Candidate A..... 3 votes
' B00... 14 u
” c..... 10 '
I Deeeee 5 I
n. - , fl
. Eeeeee 18
TOTAL 50 "

 

1

Until 1958 the Liberal Party used in its pre-selections
the preferential system of balloting which is typical of regula?
Australian elections. Under this system, the selector votes
for all contestants, ranking them in the order of his prefer-
ence. If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences,
the candidate with the least votes is eliminated and his second
preferences are distributed among the remaining candidates.
The process is repeated until a candidate receives a majority.
The preferential system was abandoned because it was felt that
selectors should only be permitted to vote for a candidate and
not against another candidate by putting hiETEt the bottom of

188
In this hypothetical case involving 5 contestants for the
nomination, candidates "A" and ”D" would be eliminated since
their combined total of 8 votes is less than the 10 votes
polled by candidate "C”. The selectors then proceed to ballot
again, their choice being limited to "B", "C", or "E". If
none of the remaining candidates polls a majority, the candidate
with the least votes is eliminated, and the stage is set for
a showdown between the 2 candidates who survive the second
ballot.

When the General Secretary has finished his outline of
voting procedure, the chairman calls for nominations for
scrutineers of the vote counting. As it happens, the first
4 or 5 names called out by selectors are "elected" to admin-
ister the balloting operation under the supervision of the -
General Secretary or other party official present. Scrutineers
distribute blank ballots to the other members of the selection
committee, and collect the completed ballots after each vote.
The scrutineers deposit the ballots in the slot of a locked
wooden box prominently placed on the chairman's table.. Then
the General Secretary carries the box into an adjoining room,
and he and the scrutineers proceed with the vote counting. If
the nomination is not decided on the first ballot, the General
Secretary announces the names of the candidates which have been
eliminated. He does not divulge, however, the number of votes
that the candidates received: only he and the scrutineers
know the course which the ballot is taking, and the scrutineers
are not permitted to discuss the vote with their fellow selec-

tors until the winner has been determined.

189

When one of the candidates receives a majority of votes
cast, all the candidates are summoned to the meeting room and
the General Secretary announces the winner. The chairman, the
president of the electorate conference, and usually one of the
unsuccessful candidates address congratulatory remarks to the
winner, and assure him of wholehearted support. Finally, the
victorious candidate himself thanks the committee for its
endorsement, and pledges an energetic campaign. When a sitting
member has been defeated in a selection contest, these post-
selection pleasantries can take a cruel twist. Some selector
is bound to "move a vote of thanks" to the defeated sitting
member for his service to the party and his electorate, wherea‘
upon the selection committee lustily applauds the man it has
just repudiated. The defeated member manages a tortured
response to this gesture, while in his mind he weighs the
possibility of running as an independent. The chairman makes
a few closing remarks and declares the meeting closed.

The nominationgprocess:
'Tederal election gf‘fiegemberég, 1961.

We have assumed in this study that the objective of a
party organization is to control government by electing party
candidates to public office. Candidates who win elections and
participate in control of government tend to dominate the party
organization. The perpetuation in power of the party's office-
holders tends to be the single-minded aim of party supporters:
to challenge or repudiate party office-holders would constitute
rejection of the very people who signify and embody realization

of the party objective.

190

The Liberal-Country government of Prime Minister Menzies
was enjoying its twelfth year of uninterrupted power as the
New South Wales Liberal Party looked forward to the federal
election of 1961. In this section, we shall discuss the contests
for House of Representative nominations for the election of
December 9, 1961. First, we shall examine the nomination
process in those electorates controlled by the Liberal Party;
and second, contests in electorates not held by the party.

If our assumptions are valid, we would expect that the
15 incumbent Liberal members of the House of Representatives
would be re-nominated without challenge. In the event, one
office-holder, W. C. Wentworth, had token opposition to his
re-nomination; and another office-holder, F. A. Bland, was
defeated in a nomination by a rival office-seeker, John S.
Cockle. (The Bland case is discussed below.) All other
office-holders were re-endorsed by the party without challenge.

In Chapter III, it was suggested that in spite of central
organization support of office-holders when the party is in
power, an office-holder's neglect of his electorate organization
combinedeith the resourcefulness of an ambitious challenger
could result in the defeat of an office-holder for re-nomination.
The case of Professor Bland is an interesting example of such
an improbable occurence.

Professor F. A. Bland was elected in 1951 to represent
the federal electorate of Warringah, a safe Liberal seat. Bland
entered federal Parliament at the age of 68 after retiring from
his position as Professor of Public Administration at Sydney
University. In spite of his age, Bland proved to be an able,

191
vigorous member of Parliament. He became chairman of the Public
Accounts Committee, and gained national recognition as a voci-
ferous foe of bureaucratic waste and inefficiency. Indeed,
l‘the Liberal branches of Warringah were very proud of his
achievements."1 Bland was re-endorsed without opposition, and
re-elected in 1955 and 1958.

In 1960, Bland resigned as chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee. He began to complain of failing health, and indi-
cated with some equivocation that perhaps he should not offer
himself as a candidate for the election of December, 1961.
While Bland hedged, Mr. J. S. Cockle, secretary of the
Warringah electorate conference since 1953, quietly began
gathering support from key branch members in the electorate.
Politically ambitious, Cockle had long been active in local
politics, had served on the Sydney City Council, had competed
for selection as a candidate in another federal electorate in
1956, and was a member of the Liberal Party State Executive.2
Since Bland did not reside in the Warringah electorate (a sore
point with some local Liberals) and did not maintain close
contact with party branches, he was unaware of Cockle's activi-
ties. Then in late 1960, Bland--who had outlived 3 previous

wives--married his secretary, who was less than half his age

 

1Quoted from a letter to the SMH, November 21, 1961.
The correspondent was Edith Pulsford, a Liberal branch member
in Warringah electorate.

See AL, February, 1961‘ pp. 4, 9, for the feature article
"Jack Cockle Is Hard Fighter. Cockle, 52, was secretary of the
Aflflfirfliapian Steamship Owners' Federation.

192
and a Roman Catholic. There were mutterings that the old
professor had gone too far. A short time after his marriage,
Bland announced that he would again seek re-election after
all--at the urging of the Prime Minister himself.

But Cockle continued his unobtrusive compaign among the
branch officers in the electorate. His aim was to control the
electorate conference, the body of branch delegates-~main1y
office beareres--which elects from its own number the 30
people who form the selection committee along with 20 delegates
from State Council. When the Warringah conference met to choose
its 30 selectors, only 36 out of a possible 95 delegates from
the electorate's 11 branches appeared at the meeting.1 Clearly,
the meeting was dominated by Cockle's supporters and chose a
selection panel favorable to him. The selection was eventually
held on May 30, 1961, and Cockle won a narrow victory.

On the night of his defeat, Bland was quoted as saying:

Everybody, from the P.M. [Prime Minister] down,
was perfectly satisfied there would not be the
slightest chance of my being defeated.
Members of the [Liberal Party state-fl executive
to whom I Spoke afterwards were appalled at
what happened.-

Bland was correct, although the newspapers did not put much

3

stock in the second part of his statement. The press claimed

 

1This information was supplied to the writer by Mr. R.
Tarrant, Liberal Party field officer in the Warringah electorate.

3Seefor example, SMH Editorial, "The Defeat of Prof.
Bland,” June 2, 1961, and—The Bulletin, June 3, 1961.

193
that "the party machine" which allegedly controlled the 20

State Council delegates had given Bland the axe: after all,
Cockle was a member of the State Executive, it was pointed
out .

The weight of the evidence, however, clearly points to
the electorate organization as the main contribution to Bland's
defeat. Following the nomination contest, the General
Secretary, J. L. Garrick, indicated to me in an interview
that the result had taken him completely by surprise. He
was certain that the bulk of the State Council delegates
participating in the selection had in fact voted for Bland.

The General Secretary's views were shared by J. C. Maddison,
the member of the State Executive who chaired the selection
meeting.

The General Secretary was particularly disturbed by the
fact that no one had informed him that Cockle had taken control
of the electorate organization delegates. If he had been aware
of Cockle's activities Carrick said he would have tried to
persuade Bland to step down rather than risk ending his career
with a humiliating rebuff. In addition, Carrick said that
Cockle's actions had prevented what should have been a wide-
open nomination contest among many candidates.1 As it happened,
the contest provided ammunition for the press to fire at the
"Ash Street machine." Ironically, the State Executive, which
was allegedly behind Ccckle's nomination, reprimanded him at

first meeting following the contest.

1E. C. B. MacLaurin, a member of the State Executive,
expressed a similar view in a letter to AL, July, 1961, p. 8.

19L:
The fact that Bland had been rejected by delegates from
his own electorate was confirmed by an exchange of letters in

the Sydney Morning Herald several months after the selection.
In response to a Herald news story which mentioned that Bland

"was not seeking re-election", Bland retorted somewhat

petulantly:

This statement is being sedulously circulated
in the electorate but it is not true.

I am not seeking re-election because I was not
chosen by the few notorious preselection committee
for Warringah.

Bland's letter drew an angry response from a Warringah member
of the selection committee, who "bitterly resented" Bland's
reference to the "notorious" committee. Noting that Bland
had resigned the previous year from the Public Accounts

Committee, the correspondent continued:

It came as a surprise, therefore, to a number
of active Warringah Liberals when he offered
EEEEEIftagaln fdr preseIeCEIon, particularly
as he had indicated on several occasions that
for health reasons he would not stand again.

As he had surrendered such an important role,
I, and I feel sure a majority of the selection
committee, felt that as he is now 79 years of
age, with practically inaudible voice, he
wouldgncjlon or be capable of representing
thefwarringan'électorate.

 

To me it is incredible that he should publicly
sneer at people who have given him unwavering
support for the past nine years...

 

1Letter to the SMH, November 18, 1961.
2Letter to the SMH, November 21, 1961 (emphasis supplied).

195
This letter leaves little doubt that Bland was not "dumped"
by some amorphous "party machine", but was defeated by his
previous supporters (including Cockle) in Warringah electorate
who refused to endorse him for another term.

Apart from the Bland case, all other Liberal incumbents
were renominated without real challenge. We now shift our
attention to electorates not held by Liberals, but which
appeared to have potential as Liberal seats. Two electorates
in particular fell into this category: St. George, which was
captured by the Labor Party in 1958 by 59 votes; and Barton,

2 These

which was retained by Labor in 1958 by 264 votes.

are adjacent electorates with similar characteristics located

in the southeastern suburbs of the Sydney metropolitan area.
Each of the two nomination contests attracted a candle

dates, 4 of whom entered Egyh contests. Neither of the 2

defeated candidates in 1958 decided to become involved in

the 1961 selections.3 Each contest included both residents

and non-residents of the electorate involved.

 

er. Cockle was subsequently elected by a wide margin
over two independent's--not members of the Liberal party.

2The indicated margin of victory for Labor in Barton
and St. George is after the distribution of D.L.P. second
preferences.

3Mr. Bruce Graham, who was defeated in St. George
in 1958, lid contest for the nominat‘ " in 3 state elec-
torates, l Felerh; ,5- “ rite, .. ’1' "e 2‘2, ”r =38
unsuccessful in all 5 attempts.

196
The St. George selection meeting was held on May 24,
1961, and the Barton meeting was held on the following evening.
The 6.candidates for the St. Georgaflnomination were as follows:

JOHN AMOS. Amos, 50, was a theatre manager active

in the Bexley branch of the party in St. George.
Amos claimed to be well known and respected in the
electorate. He expressed confidence in the strength
of the local party organization. He also pointed
out that his surname began with the letter "A"

which would give him the advantage of having his
name at the top of the ballot.1

 

WINIFRED CHRISTISON. Miss Christison, 36, was a
private secretarygfor a Liberal member of federal
parliament (Mr. Aston). Miss Christison was also

a member of the Bexley branch. She also claimed
many local associations, plus specialized knowledge
of a parliamentary member' s duties. She promised
a hard-working campaign including a door-to-door
canvass, if nominated.

THOMAS DALTON. Dalton, 44, was a realtor who lived
JuSt inside the Barton electorate, although his
office was in St. George. A member of the party
since 1944, Dalton was affiliated with the
Mortdale-Oatley Branch (Barton) and had worked

in all federal and state campaigns. Dalton claimed
broad support in the community because of his active
involvement in numerous voluntary associations such
as boys' clubs, sporting clubs, charities, etc.

RICHARD HAWKINS. Hawkins, 39, was a retailer of
electrical and electronic materials. He was
president of the Hurstville branch, a member of
the Hurstville state electorate conference, and
a member of the St. George federal electorate
conference. In addition to his party activities,
Hawkins claimed to be actively involved in 27
different community organizations and projects.

JACK MANNING. Like Hawkins, Manning, 54, was
aTTIIiaEeH with the Hurstville branch. Manning

was the manager of a sheet metal facotry. He

was active in the Lions Club and other businessmen's
clubs, but had not been active in the party apart
from branch activities.

......

—w—

lSee Henry Ma ayer (ed.), "The'Donkey Vote' for the House
of Representatives, Australian Political Studies Association
monograph No. 6 (mimeographed), Sydney, 1963. The monograph
suggests that 2-4 percent of the voters vote their preference
straight down the ballot in alphabetical order.

197

KEITH WOODWARD. Woodward, 40, had returned from
a foreign service post in Geneva only two weeks
before the selection meeting. Prior to that,
Woodward had been a government lawyer and
Journalist. He argued that his professional
qualifications were more important than being

a "local boy." He candidly told the selection
committee he was trying for the St. George

nomination because it seemed the most likely
seat to go Liberal in the next election.

The St. George selection committee consisted of 30
delegates from the electorate conference and 20 delegates
from State Council. The committee was confronted by two
candidates (Amos and Miss Christison) from the Bexley
branch, two candidates (Hawkins and Manning) from the
Hurstville branch, and two candidates (Dalton and Woodward)
from outside of the electorate organization. The winning
candidate, Amos, was nominated on the fourth ballot. The
voting resulted in a pattern of elimination as follows;

The first ballot eliminated Manning, who was running
against the president of his own branch; and Dalton, who had
no firm organizational base in the electorate.1 The second
ballot eliminated Miss Christison, who also was competing
against a leading member of her branch. In the third ballot,
the selection committee was confronted by Amos, Hawkins,
and Woodward. Hawkins was eliminated. The final ballot
pitted the local candidate Amos against Woodward, who
although a political unknown from outside the electorate,
had impressive credentials as a potential candidate. The

committee picked Amos.

 

1Dalton, an ex-seaman, may also have been handicapped
by his accent. He lacked the so-called 'cultivated'
Australian accent characteristic of people in business
and the professions--and most Liberals. Dalton had the

198

The elimination pattern suggests strongly that the
committee was divided between two major groups; one supporting
Woodward with sufficient strength to keep him in the running
until the final ballot; and another group composed of blocs
of followers of the various local candidates. When the
field of local candidates was narrowed to Amos and Hawkins,
delegates from the large (161 members) and vigorous Bexley
branch probably rallied to Amos against the forces from the
smaller (44 members) Hurstville branch, of which Hawkins
was president.

It is likely that Woodward drew the bulk of his
support from the 20-member State Council delegation
participating in the selection. These delegates were
uninvolved in the manouvering which occurred prior to the
nomination in the St. George electorate organization. The
State Council delegation was thus more likely to Judge the
candidates by their qualifications and their performance
in the selection meeting. On the basis of these criteria,
Woodward clearly had the edge over the local candidates,
and was able to survive elimination until the final ballot
even though he lacked a local base of support. ,Woodward
had to put his ”organization" together on the spot—win
a lS-minute appearance before the selection committee. He
could appeal to those delegates who, like himself, had no
personal stake in the St. George electorate organization.
For Woodward-~an office-seeker in search of an electorate--

there would be other contests; for State Council delegates,

199

there was nothing to do but cast their votes for the best
candidate and let the St. George organization take over
from that point on.

The St. George selectors had a difference perspective.
Although they were sharply divided, they eventually had to
choose between a man they knew with deep roots in the elece
torate, and an articulate stranger who wanted to use St.
George as an instrument of political ambition. Confronted
with this alternative, the St. George delegation closed '
ranks behind Amos. V

The nomination contestfor Barton federal electorate_.
washeld on the evening following the St. George nomination.
Hawkins, Manning, Dalton, andonodward again entered the
field. In addition, Alexander Alexander, 64, a slipper
manufacturer from outside the electorate; and Colin Sullivan,

7,who was vice;president of the Bartonfederal electorate
conference, entered the race. Sullivan was a pharmacist
and a member of the Blakehurst branch in Barton.

The Barton selection committee thus had to choose _
from among 4 candidates from outside the electorate (Alexander,
Manning, Hawkins, and Woodward); and 2 from the electorate
organization (Dalton and Sullivan). Manning andeawkins lived
in the immediate area, but were deprived of an organizational
base becuase of the accidental boundary division between

Barton and St. George.1

L—
—-—¢
“‘0‘ 0.— ,___. v... _. .. vane- r--w-ihw*-."-wfil mi“ Tr

1Most of the candidates seeking the St. George or Barton ’
nomination continued efforts to be nominated. Woodward defeated
Manning for the nomination in Hughes, a safe Labor seat.
Manning subsequently accepted the nomination for Banks, a hard-
core Labor seat. Hawkins defeated Dalton for the nomination
in Hurstville state electorate, a Labor-held swing seat.

’-‘.-—. -.n‘—

—'v v e? fl

200

As the balloting for the Barton nomination proceeded,
early eliminations again resulted in a showdown between a
local candidate--Sullivan, and an attractive candidate from
outside the electorate--Woodward. Once again, the electorate
organization candidate won. As we shall see later in this
chapter, this pattern of voting by nominating committees
appears to re-occur in a number of nominations for state
electorates. This phenomenon will be discuSsed further at
that time.

Since we assume that party organization is aninstrument
of office-seekers, we anticipate an absence of office-seekers
in those electorates which appear beyond hope of Liberal
capture. This assumption receives support from a review of
Liberal party nominations in safe Labor electorates.

With less than 4 months to go before the federal
election, no Liberal candidate had come forward to contest
any of the 10 electorates in the Sydney metropolitan area
receiving less than 37 percent of the Liberal vote in the
previous federal election of 1958.1 This fact was cited
by the State Supervisor in an urgent memorandum to all members
of the field staff asking them.”to make all out efforts to
secure candidates--preferably from.within the respective

areas. The matter is urgent and must receive attention."2

 

1The ten electorates and their Liberal votes: Kingsford-
Smith (36.7); Lane (35.0): Banks (33.5); Dalley (29.0):
Blaxland (27.5); Grayndler (26.6); Reid (26.4); Watson (25.1);
East Sydney (22.7)} West Sydney (19.0). -

2“Field Staff Notes", a mimeographed memorandum from the
State Supervisor to the field staff, August 17, 1961.

201

Less than two months before the election, 5 of the hard-core
Labor electorates still remained uncontested by a Liberal
candidate. Field staff members were again told that it was
of the “utmost urgency" that candidates be found for these
electorates--"All staff must give matter serious attention."
Eventually, a candidate was secured for each of the electorates.

The evidence concerning nominations in safe Labor seats
suggests that competition for nominations tends to be replaced

by recruitment of candidates by the central organization. The

 

value of running candidates in all electorates is stated in

The Australian Liberal:

In the "hard luck” seats, it is desirable that the
Liberal flag should be shown, to encourage the
hard-working branches in those districts, to
demonstrate that the Party is not prepared to give
socialists a walk-over, to consolidate existing
Liberal strength there so that it may grow in
importance for future Federal and State campaigns.

For the candidate who undertakes a doomed campaign, the party
offers its gratitude and a veiled promise of better prospects

in the future:

It is not easy for a candidate to tackle a campaign
with the almost certain knowledge of defeat ahead.
The Liberal Party greatly appreciates the spirit
and loyalty which animate those candidates who
stand as Liberals in such electorates. It believes
in the value of their efforts; it considers that
they demonstrate and improve their own abilities
for future contests elsewhere.

‘w y r,— :—v— fl

1"Federal Campaign 1961. “Field Staff Notes," a mimeo-
graphed memorandum from the State Supervisor to the field staffi

October 13, 1961.
2

31bid.

AL, February, 1962, p. 18.

202

Our review of nominations for the federal election of
December, 1961 may be summarized by stating that Liberal
office-holders were able to maintain control of their offices
without significant challenge from rival office-seekers. If
our assumptions are valid, the nomination process was rela-
tively uneventful because the Liberal Party was in control
of government, and therefore, office-holders enjoyed the
power and prestige necessary to retain the support of both
electorate and central organizations.

It would be misleading to conclude, however, that
relations between the Liberal government and their party
supporters were entirely placid and harmonious. In the
year preceding the 1961 election, there was in fact consid-
erable dissension and turmoil within the party organization.

The principal cause of controversy within the party
was a series of economic measures instituted by the Liberal
government in November, 1960. These measures included a
10 percent increase (to 40 percent) in the tax on automobile
sales; a number of credit restrictions tailored to slow down
installment buying, imports, and speculative building
ventures; and a requirement that life insurance companies
invest at least 30 percent of their assets in government
securities.

The economic measures of November, 1960 triggered a
barrage of negative criticism from those groups most directly
affected. Leaders of industry and commerce denounced the
actions as a fresh attack on the free enterprise system;

banking interests said that the government had taken another

2..
step toward complete control of the private banking system.
The requirement governing the investment of insurance company
assets into government bonds was also challenged as a move
toward socialism. Running through all of the criticism was
the common theme that the Liberal Party had abandoned "Liberal
principles" and was leading the nation toward socialism Just
as surely as the Labor Party would, if it were in power.

As the effects of the government's measures began to be
felt in the economy, criticism intensified and soon pene-
trated the ranks of the Liberal Party organization. ‘Thg
Australian Liberal began to carry lengthy articles explaining
and defending the actions of the government,1 and the General
Secretary prepared a statement ”for key Liberal Party people...
designed to assist them in informing electors unfamiliar with
the language of the economist or the complexities of the
subJect."2 Motions critical of the government began toappear
regularly on the agenda of the State Council.3

I Liberal parliamentary solidarity was also shaken by
the economic measures. ‘Mr. H. B. Turner, New South Wales
backbencher from the Bradfield electorate, attacked the
regulation of insurance company investments as "pernicious",
"repugnant", and the ”first step to perdition."4 Mr. Turner's
views were echoed by another New South Wales Liberal, Mr. B. C.

‘Wheeler from Mitchell electorate.5

 

1See for examples, AL, December, 1960, pp. 15-16; April,
1961’ pp. 6, l6. .

2"Notes on Economic Policy," mimeographed, undated, 4 pages.
3See Minutes of State Council, January-April, 1961.
4SMH, April 28, 1961. 58MB, May 3, 1961.

204
In June, 1961, the Sydnethorning Herald reported that
"a routine discussion of party affairs” at a meeting of the
State Executive "developed suddenly into a sharply critical

1 A special

examination of Commonwealth economic policy."
meeting of the Executive was held the following week for .
further discussion of the problem. According to the Herald
report, ”one member <§f the Executive) with a prominent
business background said he suspected Mr. Menzies was unaware
of the deep misgivings in industry and commerce about
Commonwealth actions."2 The proceedings and decisions

(if any) of the special meeting were not disclosed, but
second-hand reports indicate that the Executive urged the
government to ease credit restrictions as soon as possible.

. Liberal parliamentary dissension again erupted in
October, 1961, when Mr. Wheeler returned to his attack,
claiming that ”private enterprise in recent months had
reason to doubt whether the Government still upheld its
3

free enterprise policies." Mr. Wheeler was commended by

the president of his electorate conference, Mr. Irwin, who
said the government ”rode roughshod over the wishes and

4

desires of the party and flouted party policy." Irwin

went on to say: J._

 

.7 i —, i

1 v \

SMH, June 22, 1961.
21bid.'

3Ibid., October 11, 1961.

4Ibid., October 13, 1961. See also the editorial:
"Mr. Wheeler Speaks for Liberal Principles," October 12, 1961.

205

Judging by the great number of resolutions passed

by State Council imploring the Government to implement

its 1949 banking policy it would appear that 90 per

cent of Liberals back Mr. Wheeler's stand.

It would appear that the only way we can bring the

government back to reality is for outstanding

businessmen to oppose the Ministers at the forth-

coming election ind make banking and free enter-

prise the issue.
In spite of Mr. Irwin's suggestion, no "outstanding businessmen?
came forward, and none of the 4 government Ministers from New
South Wales was challenged by a dissident Liberal for re-
nomination or re-election.2 Liberal backbenchers fared Just
as well, except for Professor Bland, whose defeat was unrelated
to the economic issue.

Thus, we may conclude that a major disruption within the
party involving a central policy issue had virtually no impact
on the politics of nominations. Electorate organizations
remained loyal to incumbents; contests for nominations occured
only in electorates where there was no incumbent Liberal and
some chance of a Liberal victory. Similarly, there is no
evidence that the central organization did anything other than
foster loyalty to Liberal office-holders, and in doing so,

discouraged the ambition of rivals. Moreover, there is no

indication that the central organization made any moves to

 

lIbid.

2In the State of Victoria, however, a retired insurance
executive, Mr. G. E. Knox, announced in July, 1961, that he
would oppose the federal Treasurer, Mr. Holt, who was the
Cabinet member most closely identified with Liberal economic
policy. Mr. Knox quietly withdrew from the contest a month
before the election for what he described as "purely family
reasons." 39°.§!§; July 28, Ngvember 4, 1961.

206

threaten the reeendorsement of Liberal officeuholders who
publicly denounced government policy;L

In the next section of this study, we shall examine the
nomination politics in the state election of March, 1962.
We hope to demonstrate that the contrast between this series
of nominations and the series Just analyzed can be explained
chiefly on the basis of the party's position in relation to
control cf gOVerimwut.

The candidate selection system used by the New South
Wales Liberal Party is generally accepted by party rank-and-
file as the best method. There has been some dissent,
however. For example, two motions were introduced in the
1961 annual convention which favored the selection of candi-
dates by local branch delegates only.2 Speakers supporting
these motions did not complain about "Junta" controlled
selections; rather, they contended that the Liberals in a
given electorate were the best qualified to Judge which
candidate could serve the electorate most effectively. Other
speakers~emembers oi State Council-~opposed the motions,
claiming that good local candidates had nothing to fear from
the State Council panel. These speakers also asserted that
the welfare of the party as a whole is at stake in candidate

selections, as well as the welfare of the local electorate.

Q

It is reasonable to assume, however, that Messrs.
Turner and Wheeler hurt whatever chances they may have had
for promotion within the parliamentary delegation to a
ministerial post.

2
See 1961 Convention Agenda, Motions l2? and 131, P' 29.

207
The State Council panel's participation in selections, they
argued, helps provide candidates which strengthen the parlia-
mentary party with "Cabinet material." After the debate,
both motions were overwhelmingly defeated by voice vote.

The nomination process:
state election of March 3, 1962.

 

The nomination process for the state election of March
3, 1962, began with the aftermath of the 1959 election. In
that election, the Liberal and Country parties gained one
seat each, but the Labor Party retained an adequate 49-45
working majority in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly.
This was the sixth straight election loss for the Liberals,
who have never controlled the government of New South Wales

since the organization of the party.

lSee_A__I_J_, November, 1961, p. 12. The annual convention,
as we have noted,' has no ower to amend the party constitution;
its debates and “decisions, however, are indicators of pre-
vailing sentiment among the party rank-and- file. Cf. Parker's
comments on the Liberal Party's candidate selection method:

“While not as"democratic' as a rank-and-file selection
ballot, this system is probably less open to abuse than
most alternative methods of pre-selection, and it has
been retained with minor adjustments since the inception
of the Liberal Party. Its administration is surrounded
with elaborate safeguards against undue influence and
oligarchical manipulation, and...it does not seem to
have deserved the querulous complaints of some disappointed
Liberals about the 'dictation' of 'swollen—headed party
bosses' and the 'foisting of" a hand-picked candidate'

by 'the Ash Street machine.’

Parker, 32, cit., p. 98.

208

Following the 1959 election, the parliamentary Leader,
Mr. P. H. Morton, offered his resignation to his colleagues.
Morton had been Leader since 1955, and had also led the party
to defeat in 1956. Morton was active in private business
interests--a fact used against him by Labor, and a basis for
criticism from Liberals as well.1 The parliamentary group
accepted Morton's resignation and elected the then Deputy
Leader, Mr. R. W. Askin, to succeed Morton as Leader. Askin
was a former bank officer, who had represented the electorate
of Collaroy since 1950.

The 1959 election also produced reactions from non-
parliamentary personnel in the party organization, and much
of the reaction tended to focus on the office-holders of the
party. Soon after the defeat, State Council activated a
special committee to study the 1959 campaign and make recom-
mendations for future campaigns. The committee's report was
the main topic of discussion in the August and September,
1959, meetings of State Council.

The State Council committee report stated the "Liberal
leadership had not been established as a fully acceptable
alternative to the entrenched leadership of Mr. Cahill [Labor
Premieél." The report was particularly critical of Liberal
absenteeism from parliamentary divisions. Attendance records

covering the preceding 3 years were circulated among State

 

lMorton was managing director of a motor accessories
distributing firm, and chairman of directors of Coventry
Gauge and Tool Company, an Australian subsidiary of a
British firm. See AL, October, 1959, p. 4 for Morton's
response to criticism of his private business involvements.

209

Council; the records indicated that the Liberal Party had by

far the poorest average attendance of any of the parties.1

The committee report made a direct connection between absen-
teeism and Liberal electoral failures:

Liberal members absences...had made it impossible
for them to discharge fully their Parliamentary
duties, and they had failed to function as an
effective Opposition. If elected to Parliament,
a member's first duty was to be present at each
sitting, except for very serious reasons...

We need 100 per cent there if we are to win
Government...Since the inception of the Liberal
Party 14 years ago, we have never won a State
election here. We have had too many part-time
politicians with outside private interests.2

The committee report made a number of recommendations
which clearly implied dissatisfaction with the performance
of Liberal office-holders. These recommendations included:

TV training for Party leaders; circulation of
parliamentary division lists to State Council
and State Electorate Conferences; possible
establishment of a sub-committee to assert
[sic] in ways of attracting candidates of high
calibre; and provision for all sitting members,
whether opposed or not, to face selection
committees.

It was also recommended that where a selection
committee considered there was no satisfactory
candidate before it, then it should refuse to
endorse any candidate.3

 

1Out of 222 parliamentary dividions, the average Labor
member was present at 200; the average Country Party member--
181; the average Liberal member--l65. AL. October, 1959, p. 4.

2

lhiao

;AL, September, 1959, p. 11.

210

In addition to censuring office-holders in its report
and discussions, State Council passed a highly significant
constitutional amendment which seriously undermined the status
of office-holders. Prior to the amendment, Clause 21 of the
party constitution specifically excluded sitting members from
a provision that any party member who ran against an endorsed
Liberal candidate should be automatically expelled from the
party for 3 years. Under this provision, a Liberal member of
parliament could be rejected by a selection committee, and
still run for re-election as an "unendorsed Liberal candidate"
without Jeopardizing his party membership. The theory behind
this privileged status was that a member of parliament should
have the right to appeal to the electorate for re-election
even if rejected by a party selection committee.1 The
practical effect of the clause was that it served to dis-
courage the emergence of rival office-seekers, since a rival
could be confronted with a Liberal incumbent even if success-
fully nominated.

State Council simply amended Clause 21 by deleting
the exclusion of sitting members from the penalty for opposing
an endorsed Liberal candidate.2 This meant that a Liberal
member could not appeal beyond the decision of a selection

committee to his electorate without losing his party standing

 

10f. R. T. McKenzie, op cit., p. 588: "A fundamental
feature of the British parliamentary system” is that ”members
must holdfthemsélVes responsible solely to the electorate and
not to the mass organizations of their supporters outside
Parliament.”

%§L,'September, 1959, p. l.

211
and membership. The amendment of Clause 21, coupled with
State Council's analysis of the 1959 election defeat, served
notice on office-holders that many members of the central
organization were dissatisfied with their performance. These
actions also alerted ambitious office-seekers to the fact that
a climate of opportunity was being officially encouraged.

We have seen that party attitudes and events following
the Liberal defeat in 1959 pointed toward a period of insecurity
for office-holders on the state level. Liberal office-holders
not only suffered from the inherent weakness of prolonged
opposition, but also found themselves under attack because
of lacklustre and irresponsible performance in office. More-
over, office-holders were held largely responsible for the
debility of the organization, a fact which has been discussed
in connection with the branch development drive. Thus,
office-holders were caught between the party organization
and its chief objective-~winning control of government.

In October, 1960, midway between the 1959 and 1962
elections, the State President, Mr. Cotton, told the party
annual state convention that-

It was a matter of supreme importance...that
Liberals should cast a very critical eye over
every member of Parliament representing them

in the various Houses.

”If we are not satisfied with what they are

doing, and the quality of work they are performing,

we should not hesitate to find somebody to replace
them.

212

"These are harsh words, and I do not apply them

in any sense to any particular person...We expect

from ourselves the very highest activity politi-

cally and the very highest endeavor. Similarly,

we should look for it in our parliamentary repre-

sentatives. If we do not do so, our Party will

not flourish.l

Party dissatisfaction with Liberal office-holders was

echoed and amplified in Journalistic comment. Following
the 1959 election, The Sydney Morning Herald ran an editor-
ial entitled "who Would Want to Lead the Liberal Rabble?".2
In late 1960, after the election of a new State President
of the Liberal Party, the "Herald" commented on the need
for more qualified Liberal candidates, and then noted:
"There has been little incentive to link one's political
fortunes to a band of parliamentarians who behaved like
a rabble of 'no-hopers'."3 As the time for nomination
contests approached, newspapers commented with increasing
frequency on the likelihood of challenges to sitting
members. The Sydney Daily Telegraph's political corres—
pondent summarized probable contests in an article:
"Opposition out for Blood (New)."zl Another article, "Lib
Shakedown", discussed Liberal office-holders who allegedly

were "marked down for the axe in the Liberal Party's 'new

blood' campaign."5

 

AL, November, 1960, p. l.

spa, July 15, 1959. p. 2.

syn, becember 19, 1960. p. 2.

Daily Telegraph (Sydney), August 25, 1961, p. 2.

U14='U)l\)l—’

Ibid., OCtObeI‘ 3, 1961’ po 30

213
We have been reviewing a number of factors which
pointed toward the probability of a lively series of nomin-

ation contests. In addition to these political factors, an

 

institutional factor had an important bearing on the nomin-
ation process: this was the reapportionment of state elec-
torates which was announced approximately 5 months before
the beginning of candidate selectionmeetings.1 Population
shifts had occurred mainly in the Sydney metropolitan area,
and it was there that electorate boundaries were most radi- '
cally altered. From the perspective of the Liberal Party,
the reapportionment had the following impact: 2 safe seats
(Neutral Bay and Woolhara) were abolished outright; 2
borderline Liberal seats (Blacktown and Drummoyne) were
altered to favor Labor; 3 new safe Liberal seats (Kirribilli,
Uakehurst, and The Hills) were created in the rapidly
growing northern suburbs of Sydney. Only # Liberal elec—
torates (Earlwood, George's River, Lane Cove, Cronulla)
survivedthe reapportionment with boundaries intact: all
others retained their identity, but were subjected to
baundary changes of varying extent and importance.

The 1961 reapportionment necessarily had a profound
impact on the structure of state electorate organizations.
Overnight, many office-holders found themselves either
with an entirely new electorate, or with a significantly
altered electorate. Branches loyal to a particular office-

holder suddenly were thrust into another electorate with

 

lSee SMH, May 6, 1961, PD. 1, 5; July 12, 1961, p. 3;
Parker, op. It., pp. 69-76.

214
a different political complexion. Some branches landed in
newly-created electorates which presented unexpected oppor-
tunities for ambitious office-seekers. Thus, reapportion-
ment added another element of instability into a party
organization already troubled by the corrosive irritation
of prolonged opposition.

When the Liberal Party organization prepared to“
select candidates for the 1962 state election, there were
16 electorates in the Sydney metropolitan area which could
be considered safe Liberal seats. The following diagram
indicates the pattern of nomination contests in these 16

safe Beats e

yr-2 new electorates-
open contests

 

L_ *“ 7 unopposed
14 Liberal xx? ..;;x
incumbents* 3 re-nominated

7 challenged

4 defeated
*Note: Includes Mr. Dennis, who contested the new
seat of The Hills after his own seat, Blacktown, was
made a sure Labor seat by reapportionment. Dennis
did, however, reside in that part of the old
Blacktown electorate which formed part of The Hills,
and thus is counted here as an incumbent.

We note from the diagram above that 7 of the 14
Liberal incumbents seeking renomination.were challenged
by rival office-seekers. Three of the incumbents were
able to beat down challengers, but 4 failed to receive

party re-endorsement.

215

Before examining nomination contests in individual
electorates, we shall present an overview of the character-
istics of office-seekers in the 9 safe Liberal electorates
where competition occurred. The 9 contests attracted a
total of 62 candidates, 7'of whom were incumbent members
of parliament. Of the 55 remaining office-seekers, a
heavy majority were active in the party organization: #
out of 5 were branch officers; over half (54_percent)
were members of State Council: 5 were members of the State
EXecutive; and 3 were former members of parliament defeated
in previous elections.

The following table indicates the age distribution
of the 55 officeeseekers.

 

 

Age* Percent,,- Age Percent
21.29.....l.8 50-59.....21.6
30-39.....25.2 60--......3.6
40-49.....45.0 NA ......l.8

A survey of the occupational backgrounds of Liberals
with office ambitions indicates a virtually complete domin-
ation by the white-collar occupations.

Qgggpation Percent
Professional....39.6
Managers........12.6
Officials.......l2.6
Proprietors.....l#.4
Salesmen........14.4
Clerical.........1.8

HouseW1vefle s es 0 003.6

 

216

We note from the table above that professional people com-
prised almpst 40 percent of the office-seekers. Within the
professional_category, about half (10) of the office-seekers
were lawyers; the group also included accountants, teachers,
engineers, and a librarian. If the three categories ”managers,
officials, and proprietors,” are lumped together, they comp
prise a group similiar in size to the professional group.
"Proprietors" included operators of some kind of retail busi-
ness; ”officials” included a civil servant, an animal inspec-
tor, and a tourist officer: ”managers” included upper level
business executives and plant managers. Among the salesman,
half (4) were realtors.

-The educational background of the 55 office-seekers
can be summed up as follows:' 37.8 percent had no formal
education beyond high school: 23.4 percent held an advanced
professional degree (mainly lawyers); 21.6 percent had a
general liberal arts university education; and 16.2 percent
had earned a technical diploma in such fields as accountancy
and pharmacy.

We turn now to an examination of 6 nomination contests
in specific electorates. First, we shall analyze the 4
contests in which Liberal members of parliament were defeated
by challengers. These contests occurred in the electorates
of Hornsby, Manly, The Hills and Gordon. Second, we shall
examine the contest in Burwood electorate, in whichthe
Liberal incumbent won re-nomination by a narrow margin.
Third, we shall examine the contest in Kirribilli, a new,

safe Liberal electorate created by reapportionment.

217

In the introduction to this section, we pointed out
that the party‘s prolonged opposition status created tension
and conflict between electorate organizations and the central
organization. It was also pointed out that reapportionment
disrupted many electorate organizations, and further compli-
cated the nomination process. The result of this combination
of circumstances was that people with office ambitions were
encouraged to contest nominations, even to the point of
challenging office-holders. The discussion of contests in
6 specific electorates will attempt to analyze the impact
of these circumstances on theWpattern of competition among
office-seekers, and also the impact on the values and
behavior of selection committees.

Since voting in selection committees is by secret
ballot, it is difficult to determine with complete accuracy
the voting behavior of selection committee delegates. How-
ever, the sequence of candidate eliminations if often illum-
inating, particularly since a given pattern appears to recur
again and again. In addition, much information was gleaned
as a result of personal conversations and interviews with
party officials, candidates, State Council members, and
(numerous selection committee delegates.

Mr. S. A. Storey was elected as an independent in
1941, from the Hornsby state electorate. Hr. Storey joined
the Liberal Party when it was organized in 19#5, and he
continued to represent the electorate as a Liberal. When

the date (October 3, 1961) for the Hornsby pre-selection

218

was set, Storey tried unsuccessfully to have the pre-
selection postponed; he then announced that he would not
attend the meeting.1 Storey changed his mind at the last
minute and did appear before selection committee. He was
defeated on the first ballot.

Storey was beaten by a combination of bad luck, a
superior opponent, and his own neglect of the branches
in his electorate. It was bad luck for Storey that
reapportionment had cut off a section of his electorate
containing 3 branches, from which he could have expected
some support. In addition, the reapportionment added to
Hornsby electorate a section which contained 2 branches
sympathetic to his opponent-«Mr. J. c. Haddison. A like-
able, articulate, and ambitious lawyer, Maddison had been
active in Liberal Party affairs since 1949. He was a
perennial branch officer, electorate conference officer,
and campaign director. In addition, he was an energetic
leader of fund-raising efforts, the establishment of new
branches, and campaigns for new party members. Maddison's

ability and activism soon brought him a seat in State

Council, and in 1957 he became a member of the State Execu-

tive. In 1958 he was elected State Treasurer; and, as we
have seen, he became chairman of two of the hardest working

committees in the party organization--the Electorate

 

1Storey made his appeal to a meeting of State Council

held September 29, 1961. He claimed that the pre-selection

meetinggsonflicted with.his duties tqtattendvsessions of
parliament. He also claimed that selectors had not been
given proper advance notice of the time of the selection.
Storey's objections were overruled unanimously by State
Council.

219

Assistance Committee and the Branch Development Committee.1
Because of his many positions in the party organization,
Haddison figured prominently in almost all meetings of State
Council; he was well known and respected. Thus, when Maddison
announced that he would contest the pre-selection for Hornsby
electorate, he held an unbeatable hand—strong support from
the branches in the electorate, and almost certain strong
support from a State Council panel--regardless of the parti-
cular individuals chosen to make up the panel. Haddison's
selection was secured by a large majority on the first
ballot.2
Another Liberal member of state parliament to lose pre-
selection was Hr. E. D. Darby, who had represented the safe
Liberal seat of Manly since 1945. There is no doubt that
Darby was more thoroughly disliked by leaders of the central
organization than any other Liberal parliamentarian. The
main grievance against Darby was that he was openly anta-
gonistic to all efforts to strengthen the party organiza-
tion--either in Manly, or the party as a whole. Darby repre-
sented a prosperous suburban area which regularly voted
60-65 percent Liberal; yet party records in 1959 showed that
Manly electorate had 5 Liberal branches with a total of only

 

W W

lSee 'Tropicus', ”Mr. John Maddison Prods Consciences,
Pockets," AL, July, 1960, p. 4.

2There was a third contestant for the Hornsby nomina-
tion-~Mr. J. H. Sim, a stockbroker. Sim was one of those
unusual people who turn up in pre-selections occasionally;
he addressed the meeting in the name of the Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost." He had no support.

220

115 members. These branches were so inactive that the Manly
electorate conference had not met, and therefore the elec-
torate for some time was not_represented on State Council.1
In the past, when pre-selections were held, the branches'
revived briefly and Darby successfully staved off opponents
to his re-endorsement.

Because of the weakness of the branch structure, the
Manly electorate did not participate in the electorate
assistance scheme. When the party membership fee was
increased in 1959, Darby encouraged his supporters not to
pay the increased fee. Darby also opposed the branch develop-
ment program approved by State Council in 1959. These actions-
made Darby unpopular with the central organization, espec-
ially since the Manly electorate was potentially a source
of considerable organizational strength for the Liberal
Party. -

In spite of Darby's opposition to branch development,
the General Secretary had ordered members of the paid field
staff to canvass for new members in the Manly electorate.
This intensive drive resulted in the revival of 3 "dead"
branches, the establishment of 3 new branches, and a total
of 450 new members were added to the rolls. Clearly, the
central organization hoped that this infusion of new people
would produce challenges to Darby's grip on the Manly

 

,__v

1 ,
See the "Report of the State Executive to State
Council," November 6, 1961, p. 2.

221
organization. Ironically, the success of this strategy was
never tested, for the 6 new branches established by field
staff efforts were all in the northern section of the elec-
torate; reapportionment clipped off this section and added
it to the new Wakehurst electorate. In addition, another
section was 22223 to Manly which contained 2 Liberal branches.
It was from one of these branches that Darby's main opponent
emerged--Mr. H. 0. Boyle, a 39-year-old school teacher.

When the Manly pre-selection was held on October 6,
1961, there were 4 branches in the electorate--2 were generally
pro-Darby and 2 were_proeBoyle. There was also some scattered
support for Mr. J. W. Paton, who was mayor of the suburb of
Manly, but had not been active in the Liberal Party. In
addition, there were 3 candidates (2 who lived outside the
electorate), who had no base of support. These 3 candidates
were eliminated in the first ballot; Mayor Paton was elim-
inated in the second ballot. 'The final vote was between
Darby and Boyle; Boyle wane-27-23.

After the contest, Boyle stated in an interview that his
supporters had canvassed the 30 delegates from Manly elec-
torate conference, and that 17 indicated they would vote for
him. Boyle was certain, therefore, that (l) he had enough
votes to survive the early eliminations, and (2) he would
need about half the votes of the State Council panel in order
to win. Boyle was confident that anti-Darby sentiment in
the State Council panel would be sufficiently strong to give
him the 9 or 10 votes he needed. As it happened, his calcula-

tions were perfect.

222

An interesting aspect of the Manly case is the method
which the central organization used in an attempt to unseat
Darby: members of the paid field staff were withdrawn from
their usual assignments in other electorates, and were
directed to sign up new members and establish new branches
in the Manly electorate. The field staff canvassed door-
to-door, and the results of its efforts have already been
noted: 450 new members and 6 new branches. This costly and
time-consuming program.was ordered on the assumption that
from a revitalized branch structure would emerge challenges
to Darby's suitability as a member of parliament. In addi-
tion, it was hoped that a vigorous branch structure would
lead to the effective participation of Manly's Liberal voters
in (1) continued branch development, and (2) the electorate
assistance program for weaker Liberal area. In other words,
the membership drive conducted by the field staff in Manly
electorate was undertaken in order to help realize Manly's
potential contribution to the vitality of the party organi-
zation as a whole, as well as to secure the removal of Mr.

Darby e 1

r. j—v—v‘v '— w ‘1‘. f ‘.fi" v w-rvv' ‘wv—vv- w

lDarby appeared to agree with this statement, according
(to a report in SMH, November 3, 1961: "Mr. Darby said his loss
of preeaelggtion was symptomatic of a postwar pOTTtical crisis
over whether a group or the constituents chose a member of
Parliament. He said less than two per cent of people who vote
Liberal in the Manly electorate in the last State election
were financial members of the Liberal Party Correct percentage
according to party records was .7 6%. He said that when the
current Liberal Party search for new members--or fpurgel--
started, there was a decay in party membership and a change
in the party constitution which prevented a Liberal who was
not selected from standing as an 'unendorsed Liberal.'" Note
Darby's equation of the "search for new members" and the
"purge.

223

Another Liberal member of state parliament to lose re-
nomination was Mr. A. H. Dennis, who had been representing the
Blacktown electorate. "A few months before the nomination
contest, reapportionment changed Blacktown from a 'swing'
seat to a safe Labor seat.1 About twoefifths of the old
Blacktown electorate was transferred to a newly created elec-
torate called The Hills, which was located in Sydney's north-
west suburban fringe and was a certain safe Liberal seat.
Dennis decided to contest The Hills pro-selection. “There
were 9 Liberal Party branches in the new electorate, only 2 ‘
of which were originally in Dennis's old Blacktown electorate.
Even these 2 branches were not solidly supporting Dennis.2
Thus, Dennis entered The Hills pre-selection in such a weak
position that he can hardly be classified with the other 3
parlimentarians who were 'dumped.‘ Dennis lost his seat in
parliament because of the caprice of the change in his elec-
torate boundaries.

The Hills pre-selection attracted 14 candidates, half of
whom lived outside the electorate. A few of the local candi-
dates had small blocs of supporters; the other local mandi-
dates and-7 candidates from other electorates hoped for

scattered votes from the local delegates and enough votes

 

me e n-.- t he- . - w. _- e l “he", jaw _ we.
, ‘

lDennis receiVed 49.9% Of the vote in the 1959 state
elections; he received a majority of 51.16% after the distri-
bution of an independent candidate's second preferences.

2Two branch members from the old Blacktown electorate
were themselves candidates in The Hills pre-selection. One
of them had been Dennis's campaign manager in 1959.

224

from the State Council panel to survive the successive elimin-
1‘;:i:hs. The local candidate with the largest bloc was Mr.
M. S. Ruddock, who had been active in Liberal Party politics
and local government in The Hills area for 12 years. Ruddcck
won.The Hills nominationin the final ballot, defeating David
Griffin from nearby Gordon electorate by 2 votes.
We turn now to the contest in the blueeribbon Liberal
seat of Gordon, which had been represented since 1953 by f
Mr. Stewart Fraser. Two strong candidates challenged Fraser,
both of whom were_active in Liberal Party affairs and in local
politicc in the Gordon electorate. Mr. A. H. Jago, a bank‘
manager, was president_ofthe Killers branch, a delegate to
State Council, and mayor of Kuringegaie-a municipality
embracing a large section of the electorate. Mr. David
Griffin, an attorney, was viceepresident of the Killara
branch, and had previously been a member of State Council,
president of Gordon electorate conference, and secretary _
of the Pymble_branch;;the largest branch in the electorate.
There was no office:seekers from outside the electorate.

’ On the first ballot, Fraser, the incumbent, was elimin-'
ated. Jago defeated Griffin on the second ballot by one vote.
Reports after the contest indicated that Jago had used his
position in local government as a means to gather support,
while Fraser tended to neglect local branch affairs.1
Griffin, a skilled and articulate speaker, had less local

support than Jago, but probably received the votes of most

State Council delegates.

.....

 

.-—.—v ray.“ '7'— y-fi fifi

181m, September 2931961; nail rel. ra h (Sydney),
September 29, 1961; Sun( Sydney , Gogober g, E961

225

. Burwood is a safe Liberal seat represented by Mr. Ben
Doig. -Friction had developed between Doig and some of the
leading branch officers in Burwood electorate, 2 of whom.were
opposing him for preeselection. One of these opponents, Mr.
W. Sheppard, was president of the Burwood electorate confer-
ence, and had directed Doig's campaign in 1959; the other at
opponent, Mr._J.'Jackett, was viceEpresident of the elecé .
torate conference. A third opponent was Mr. P. Wilson, who
had until a few months before been the Liberal Party field
officer assigned to Burwood. Since Doig was apparently
going to be hardepressed to retain his seat, 3 candidates
from.other electorates entered the contest, hoping that a
strong State Council vote and scattered votes from the
splintered Burwood delegation.would give an ”outsider" a
chance for the nomination. At the last minute, a fourth
candidate decided to enter the Burwood contest: he was
David Griffin, who a few days beTUIe had failed by one Vote
to get the nomination for his home electorate of Gordon.
Griffin again made an excellent impression on the selection
committee, and after 3 ballots he and Doig--the sitting
member-ewere the Only candidates still in the running. Doig
won the final ballot by one vote.

The preeselection for Kirribilli electorate was held
the evening following the Burwood selection. Kirribilli was
a new seat created by the reappcrtionment, and it was an
almost certain Liberal seat. Eighteen candidates paraded
before the preeselection committee; 9 were active Liberals
who resided in Kirribilli, and 9 lived outside of the elec-
torate--including the unlucky Mr. Griffin. Once again, after

"-
Q

226

many ballots a local candidateeeMr. J. L. Waddyeefaced Griffin
in the last ballot; and onceagain, Griffin lost by one vote.
Two days later, Griffin entered The Hills preeselection,

which we have already discussed, and lost to a local candi-

date in the final ballot by 2 votes.

‘Each of the 6 nomination contests which we have reviewed
was governed by a particular set of circumstances. It is
clear, however, that the main battleground of aspiring-
Liberal candidates is the electorate organization.“ Offices
seekers begin to manouver for support months, or even years,
before the formal selection meeting takes place. Groups of
supporters in party branches cluster around each office-
seeker, and each branch or group of branches may have its
favorite candidate. ‘These factions tend to be projected
into the electorate conference, which elects 30 delegates
to the selection meeting. ‘ .

The relative detachment of the 20-member State Council
panel stands in sharp contrast to the intense involvement
of the electorate organization. This attitude of detachment
and objectivity is encouraged by the central organization.
”A Message to Members of Selection Committees", contains
the following exhortation: . 7
Your decision--by secret ballot--will profoundly
alfect the fortunes of this Party, not only in
.w-,one particular electorate but throughout the State.
Good candidates are Vital to our success. A candi-
date with strong personal appeal can succeed in an
electorate which may be otherwise unwinnable. Out-
standing personalities will enormouély enhance our
goodwill in every part of the State... _
Your decision should reSt ENTIRELY upon your personal'
assessment of the respective merIEs cf the candidates.

Yours is a secret vote according to your conscience.
You are NOT called uponlto represent the viewpoint

227

There is every indication that State Council members
who participate in pro-selections do in fact take their task
seriously. State Council panels, as we have seen, are
composed of party members drawn at random from all parts of
the Sydney metropolitan area. Some will come to the meeting
with their minds already made up, but most of them appear to
come with the honest intention of evaluating the candidates,
and voting ”according to their conscience? for the best
candidate. Since State Council selectors will not usually
be directly involved in factional fights within the elec-
torate concerned, they are more inclined to vote for "a
candidate with strong personal appeal” without regard to
the candidate's residence.

The difference in perspective betweenlocal selectors
and State Council selectors is reflected most clearlyin
nomination contests involving both local candidates and non-
resident candidatesahnFor example, we have seen that in the
electorates ovairribilli, Burwood, and The Hills, the final
ballot pitted a local candidate against an attractive non-
residenteein each case, Mr. David Griffin. The balloting
pattern in these contests indicates that candidates with
the smallest blocs of local supporters, together with the
least attractive ”outside? candidates, are eliminated first?-
‘often in the first ballot. The State Council panel tends
to give substantial support toaa strong outside candidate
such as Griffin, and thus prevents his elimination. ‘But as

the weaker local candidates are eliminated, the selectors

228

supporting these candidates must decide whether to switch to
the outside candidate, or switch to another local candidate
who has survived elimination. Confronted with this alterna-
tive, the local selectors tend to close ranks behind the
local candidate, rather than face the prospect of being
forced to campaign for an outsider. Although there is
certain to be some cross-over between local selectors and
State Council selectors, the overall advantage in a final

ballot lies with the local candidate.

émierix

The contest for nominations in the New South Wales
Liberal Party tends to be shaped by conditions within each
electorate organization, and by the party status as governing
or opposition party.

Within the electorate organization, competition is
unusual if an incumbent Liberal member of parliament seeks _
reenomination. Competition tends to be most sharp, however,
in safe Liberal electorates which for some reason are not
held by an incumbent. The degree of competition decreases
in relation to the apparent chances of a Liberal victory in
an electorate.

When the party is in power, the position of office-
holders is especially commanding. Since office-holders in
control of governmentembody the realization of the party
objective, they receive the loyalty and support of both the
central organization and electorate organizations. Testing

our assumption on the nomination process for the 1961 federal

229'

election, we found that there was virtually no challenge to
incumbent office-holders, in spite of the fact that there was.
a major intraparty conflict on the Liberal government's
economic policies. An exception to the generally uneventful
nomination process was the failure of one incumbent, Professor
Bland, to win re-nomination. In reviewing this case, we

found that Bland was unseated by forces within his electorate
organization in spite of general support by the central
organization.

At the state level, the New South Wales Liberal Party
had never since its formation in 1945 gained control of
government. This tended to reflect unfavorably upon party
office-holders, who had consistently failed to attract
sufficient support from the voters. As the party faced the
1962 state election, the central organization openly
encouraged an attitude of criticism and challenge toward
incumbent members of parliament. In addition, reapportion-
ment altered electorate boundaries and disrupted office-
seeking conditions in many electorate organizations. This
combination of circumstances produced a sequence of spirited
nomination contests. Although 7 incumbents were re-nominated
without challenge, 9 other contests attracted a total of 62

office-seekers, and 4 incumbents were defeated by challengers.

The votingpattern of selection committees indicated
that the strongest local candidate clearly has the overall
advantage, in spite of the tendency of State Council delegates

to vote for an attractive non-resident candidate.

CHAPTER VI
THE CAMPAIGN PHASE 0F
”PARTY ORGANIZATION

Introdsqres.._,-_. _ _ . e e
' The nomination phase of party organization in Australia
is a distinctly intramural matter. _Men with office ambitions
use the machinery established by party organization to compete
for tho party label and resources in trying to gain public
office. The voters at large have,no formal voice in the
nomination process, although the voteegetting ability of an
officeeseeker as perceived by the nominating committee may
have a bearing on the nomination decision. However, when all
decisions on nominations have been made, the party organiza-
tion at all levels turns its attention to the task of electing
its endorsed candidates and winning control of government.
With the onset of the campaign phase, the importance of conscienl
flicts among office-seekers within the party tends to shrink
in comparison.with the more crucial contest with competing
parties.

An election campaign confronts a party with the question
of its own survival. Party candidates tend to dominate the

230

231

party organization because their success or failure is thc
standard measure of the party's success or failure. Thus,
intraparty competition is overshadowed by the compelling
drive to defeat the opposition. Those disappointed office-
seekers who do carry intraparty conflict into the campaign.
phase tend to abdicats future claims to party endorsement.
Most men with office ambitions are therefore prepared to
accept the nominating decisionfipgpd wait for a more opportune
occasion. .Meanwhile, the demands of party loyalty and the
threat of victory by the opposition party are sufficient to
bring about a closing of ranks behind the party nominees.
Tensions between the central and electorate organizaf
tions also tend to be suppressed during the campaign phase.
Once nomination contests are settled, the objective of both
the Qipctorate and central organization becomes the election
of the party candidate. Leaders of the central organization
may not have preferred a particular candidate; they may have
tried to prevent his nomination. This conflict becomes
irrelevant during the campaign since the success of even
“undesirable" candidates is bound up with the success of the
party. The office-seeker who is able to obtain the credentials
of'a party candidate tends to attract general support from the
existing organization, both within his electorate and in the
central organization. § Thus, the real challenge confronting
both the candidate and the organization is the attraction
of sufficient support from the voters at large in order to

achieve public office.

232

In this chapter we shall examine the strategy employed
by party candidates to win elections. But before analyzing
specific federal and state campaigns, we shall discuss in
general terms the range of appeals used by party organiza-
tions. _

As we discussed in Chapter III, campaign strategy is
developed mainly in response to what takes place in government.
Public offichHolderswho are in control of government present
themselves for reeelection on the basis of their record.

They amass evidence of accomplishments and progress; they
ignore or underplay negative aspects of the record. If an
embarrassment orfailure by the government is conspicuous,
there arc efforts to give assurance that corrective measures
are being taken.

Leaders of the party in power tend not to offer the
voters a wide range of new premises. Campaign promises are
used to lure votes from particular groups, but promises may
also repel votes from other groups. Venturesome policy
proposals involve a degree of risk: the party in power prefers
to maintain control by appealing as much as possible to the
same body of voters which elected its office-holders pre-
viously. There is a second reason why parties in control of
government avoid new policy proposals during campaigns. Such
proposals raise the awkward question: if a given new program
has merit, why did the government fail before to proceed with
its implementation? The party in power, therefore, promises
to ”build on its record" rather than venture into new program

areas 0

233

The candidates of the party in power address themselves
not only to the record of their party in government, but
also attack the candidates of the opposition party. Attack
on the opposition may take many forms, and may be unleashed
with varying intensity. A typical attack is to label the
opposition as irresponsible or obstructive--prone to distor-
tion and misrepresentation in its criticism of the govern-
ment. The campaign promises of the opposition are usually
labeled as extravagant, impracticable, or even dangerous.
Another line of attack is to question the capability of
the opposition to govern: opposition leaders may be des-
cribed as weak, confused, and inept; or as aggressive and
power-hungry. In general, the intensity of attacks on the
opposition will relate to the governing party's perception
of its own vulnerability in the campaign. If the governing
party is confident that either its own record or the weak-
ness of the opposition assures its reelection, then there
is little point to a pulverizing attack on the opposition.
Public office-holders prefer to talk about themselves and
are content to do so until an opponent is perceived as a
threat.

Candidates of the opposition party also focus on what
has taken place in government. They probe the governing
party's record in search of issues which will arouse suffi-
cient voters to vote against the government. They attack
government leaders as demonstrably incapable of governing

effectively, and predict disaster if the governing party

23.4

is returned to office. The very condition of being in opposi-
tion tends to encourage campaign techniques which emphasize
negative criticism and forceful assaults. Since the opposi-
tion party in a two-party system constitutes the only alter-
native to the party in power, it is automatically brought to
power if the governing party is discredited enough to repel
a sufficient number of voters.

Although opposition candidates do monopolize the alter-
native to the governing party, it is necessary to do more
than conduct a merely negative campaign. The opposition party
is called upon to spell out the policies it would pursue if
entrusted with control of government. These policies generally
are of two types: the office-seekers of the opposition begin
by adopting those policies of the governing party which are
perceived as strong vote-getters. This demonstrates to the
voters that they have nothing to lose by switching party
allegiance. The second type of policy offered by the opposi-
tion is a group of campaign promises--new programs the
opposition intends to enact, but which are not offered by
the governing party. Campaign promises carry the same risk
for the opposition as for the party in power: there is the
two-edged danger that promises may not attract the desired
additional votes and may also repel past supporters of the
party. In spite of the risks involved, however, the opposi-
tion tends to propose a group of new programs to the voters
in the hope that it has hit upon a winning combination of

campaign appeals.

235

The central figures of an Australian election campaign
are the parliamentary Leaders of the competing parties. The
Leader of each party begins the campaign with a lengthy policy
speech, which spells out the partyprogram, attacks the opposing
party, and generally sets the tone of the campaign. The
policy speech forms the backbone of most party propaganda, and
is the principa1.resource for local candidates. The Leader
is also important because he usually symbolizes the party.

He is the object of wide publicity throughout the year, and
the focus of party loyalty. In the eyes of many voters, the
combination of qualities which make up the Leader determines
their reaction to his party. Thus, the Leader's “image” as
well as his policies is an important component of campaign
strategy.

The foregoing generalizations have not included any
attempt to distinguish types of strategy according to specific
political parties. We assume that office-seekers, regardless
of their party identification, determine campaign strategy
first of all by relating their appeals to what has taken place
in government, and secondly in response to their status as
governing party or opposition party candidates. Traditional
“party principles" play an uncertain role in the development
of strategy, as we shall see later in this’chapter.

We turn now to an examination of the federal election
campaign of December, 1961; and the state election campaign

of March, 1962.

236

The 1961 Federal Election Campaign
Mr. Arthur A. Calwell, the Leader of the opposition,

delivered the Labor Party's policy speech three weeks before
election day.

Mr. Calwell described the Liberal-Country Government

as inept, and tired, and said it was "mounting the

guillotine of it's own creation to it‘s own self-

desiruction...It is time for a change,” he said,

"it is time to clean up the stableI It is time to

clean out the Menzies Government."
If elected, Mr. Calwell promised to wipe out unemployment
within one year; he promised a wide range of new or expanded
social service benefits in the fields of education, health
services, pensions, child endowments, and housing--all with-
out increased taxation, but financed by a revitalized,
expanding economy. Mr. Calwell also promised to provide
greater assistance to state and local governments. On the
touchy issue of communism, Mr. Calwell said:

We areecompletely and inrevocably opposed to
Communism on ideological and philosophical grounds.

Communism to us is an alien creed based on tyranny
and sustained by terror. We have always declared,
and say it again, that between the Labourwflarty and
the Co unist Party there exists an unbridgeable
Sulfese

Mr. Calwell was equally forthright on the subject of socialism
and nationalization of industries:

Mr. Calwell said Labour had no plans to nationalise

the banks or to socialise medicine...“We promise not

to raise the question of nationalization during the
lifetime of the 24th Parliament.”

 

131411, November 17, 1961.

2Ibid.

31bid.

237

In defense and foreign affairs, Mr. Calwell said a Labor
government would maintain defense spending at the status
quo, ”but we will have something to show for it. We will
have a stronger Navy, Army and Air Force"; he also supported
continued Australian support of the British Commonwealth, the
UN, SEATO, and self-determination for New Guinea.1

The Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, began the Liberal-
Country joint policy speech as follows:

I do not'propose to put before you a ong list of
promises. After 12 years the A.L.P. ustralian
Labor Party] can easily make a series of brand new
offers without saying where the new hundreds of
millions are to come from; though they will, of
course, come from you...

For us to come along now with a string of new
promises would excite your ridicule. You could
well say: "You have had years to do these things.
Why didn't you think of them before?"

We offer you good government. The essential quality
r... offiod governmehfirissthatsimwomld have sound and
-l,,‘ n e ligible principles, that it should pursue great
"national and social objectives with resoluteness,
that it should be able to meet the storms which arise
"i from time to time with a proper sense of navigation...

Tonight I will lay before you a statement of principles
and ideas which have been followed and, in our belief,
ought to continue to be followed for the good of
Australia s

I could speak to you for hours on the national and
social achievements of the last decade. The over-
whelming majority of Australians have benefited
from them, and will remember them.2

 

Ibid.

2"Federal Election, 1961, Joint Policy Speech,“ November
15, 1961, quoted from the printed pamphlet issued by the Federal
Secretariat of the Liberal Party of Australia, p. 3-4. Cf. the
comment in Creightoanurns, Parties and Peo 1e Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, I951), p. 52: '55 is part of the
logic of a governing party's situation that it should run a
quiet campaign. It can do little but face the electorate on
the strength of its record. To raise new issues...would be
*0 admit that its stewardship had been deficient.”

1

238

The Prime Minister went on to promise a continuing program of
national development, and gave examples of recent Common-
wealth financing of railway and port improvements, road
building, and hydro-electric irrigation projects.

Mr. Menzies defended the economic policy of the Liberal
government, which Mr. Calwell had condemned as a “piece of
high-handed economic bungling which only a reckless, power-
drunk Government could conceive and carry out.'1 Menzies
stated that:

M Government was not prepared to permit a

inflationari] boom to roar on to the inevitable

burst...Ne knew that this would be unpleasant

for some, but we believed that our actions

would protect many more people against a collapse...2
Menzies cited evidence that rising prices, labor shortages,
speculative investing, and depleted overseas reserves made
necessary the controvfrsial ”credit sqeeze‘ economic measures

of November, 1960.3 Menzies said that "our measures, un-

pleasant in themselves, have succeeded,H and noted that the

Ibid.

2"Policy Speech," p. 9.

l

3The economic measures included a 10 percent increase
(to 40 percent) in the tax on automobile sales: and the
imposition of banking controls designed to discourage land
and stock speculation, large-scale importing, and consumer
credit. Interest rates on deposits were increased to
encourage saving, and preferential credits rates were
extended to export producers in the agricultural and mining
industries. See "The Australian Economy" (Canberra: Common-
wealth Government Printer, 1961), pp. 12-13.

4"Policy Speech," p. 9.

239

emergency measures had been gradually lifted and finally ended.

Menzies admitted that "the most discussed by-product of
our policies has been some temporary unemployment,” and
expressed "profound sympathy” for the unemployed. He charged,
however, that: O

Our opponents magnify the employment problem for

election purposes...They do not want you to remember

that the socialist policy, in action, would bring

about such confusion in private industry, and such

distruflbmin the minds of investors, both overseas

and at home, that unemployment would increase
heavily and the national progress would be halted.

1
After listing further accomplishments in foreign relations,

foreign trade, and national development, the Prime Minister
asked: "Can similar things be achieved by our divided and
disorganized opponents, lacking experience, judgment, and
standing?"2 Menzies ended his policy speech with the familiar
charge that the Labor Leader and his parliamentary colleagues
would not be their own masters, but would be subject to the
direction and discipline of non-parliamentary Labor hierarchy:

You are not in truth being asked by Labor to vote

[for] Mr. Calwell...You are being asked to hand

over the international and national policies of

Australia to the obscure but powerful gentlemen

of the Federal Conference of the A.L.P.l This

is a complete denial of Parliamentary Democracy.

It provides the final reason why we ask you to renew

our mandate...3

Following the policy speeches by the two parliamentary
Leaders, the campaign quickly focussed on economic issues,

and it became clear that Mr. Calwell had chosen the health

A;
—'—J v fi

libidgg pp. 10-119
21bid, p. 20.
31bid., p. 21.

240

of the Australian economy in general, and unemployment in
particular, as the basis for Labor's challenge to the Menzies
Government. Calwell promised that his Government would
immediately begin to spur the economy by introducing a
supplementary budget of £100 million for financing of public
works, Northern Territory development, increased grants to
states, and social service improvements. He said he would
re-impcse import restrictions which had been lifted by the
Menzies government, and raise tariffs to protect "established
industries."1

The Prime Minister attacked Labor's proposals as
inflationary and a "wild experiment."2 He scoffed at the
claim that Calwell's program could be implemented without
increasing taxes, and quoted a former Labor Prime Minister,
Ben Chiffley, as saying that ”it is just no use attempting
to tell the people that [social service improvements] can be
done except by the imposition of additional taxes."3 0n
the same evening, Calwell reminded his audience in Perth
that the 1958 Menzies government had budgeted a deficit
of £110 million when unemployment at a far lower rate than
in 1961. Calwell quoted Menzies statement at that time:
"Deficit spending is the right risk to take if Australia
is to have faith in the continued growth of her national

a4

economy.

_>¢

2 T ' 71*f\ .‘ v

lan November 17, 1961.

2
SMH November 21, 1961.

3SMH, November 25, 1961. J. B. Chifley was Labor Prime
Minister from 1945 to  1949 when Labor was swept out of office.
, 4 ‘ _ p .
Zhig

‘ .

24‘

As the campaign went into its second week, Mr. Calwell
placed declining emphasis on expounding his policy proposals,
and increasing emphasis on.Menzies' failure to spell out what
his government proposed to do about the economy. Calwell
repeated his challenge again and again throughout the balance
of the campaign:

I speak for the Australian people when I ask the
Prime Minister one simple question, and I challenge
him to answer it with a plain "Yes or HNo. ...

”Is the Prime Minister satisfied with the economic
situation now prevailing7f ‘_

If the Prime Minister answers "Yes“ it means that
he is satisfied with an economic situation in which
the level of unemployment is higher than it has
ever been since all parties accepted the policy

of full employment.

If the Prime Minister answers ”No" then he is
bound to tell the public what he plans to do to
improve the situation.1

Menzies ignored Calwell's challenge, but neither Calwell nor

the Sydney-Morning herald wouldlet him forget it.2 The Prime

Minister meanwhile shifted his campaign to foreign affairs,
making two national television speeches dealing with Nest New
Guinea, Berlin, nuclear disarmament, and Southeast Asia.3
Calwell rarely discussed foreign affairs in his speeches, a
fact which Menzies commented on scornfully: "He said the Labour

Party's only policy on foreign affairs was the 'rather vague

_A_

I ’v‘fi'TJwv-TV r ...—l ‘r‘

iggggl November 28,1961.

28cc the SMH editorial, ”Mr. Menzies Evades the Calwell

’- can.

Challenge,” December 1, 1961.

38MB, November 30, 1961.

2h

new“ .

idea of taking it to the United Nations and then washing your
hands of it."1 Referring to the impending British negotiations
with theEuropean Common Market, Menzies belittled Calwell's
capacity to defend Australian interests:

It is not a job to be handed over to novices...

What has anyone said to you which would indicate

that he [Calwell] understands the nature, the

gravity and the complexities of this problem?

Are you going to hear a Labour Prime Minister

speaking for you in the councils of the world-—

a Labour Prime Minister struggling to get to

know all the people in the United States and

the other great contries with whom we are utterly

familiar?2

The final days of the campaign were taken up mainly with
a repetition of issues already well defined. A new note was
sounded, however, when the Prime Minister abruptly injected
the issue of communism into the campaign, claiming that the
Labor Party's attitude toward communism was "ambiguous" and
"feeble."3 Calwell angrily retorted that Menzies had stopped
to "McCarthyism”, "muck-raking" and "demagoguery"; Calwell
called the charges "a measure of his [Menziesfl growing
anxiety about the election result."4
If Menzies was in fact growing more anxiOus, events

proved that he had good reason. When the votes were counted

after the election of December 9, the 77-45 Liberal-Country

 

1Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3SMH, December 1, 1961.
ASMH, December 2, 1961.

24.3

majority was reduced to 62-60--or 61—60 after the naming of
a non-voting Speaker. There was a general swing against the
Menzies Government throughout the Commonwealth: Labor
captured 2 seats in Western Australia, 5 seats in New South
Wales, and 8 in Queensland. The Government was able to hold
its own in Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania, in spite
of generally reduced majorities.
The Queensland debacle resulted from an average swing

of almost 7 percent against the Government. In 1958,
Queensland had shown its loyalty to the Menzies Government
by returning members in 15 out of 18 electorates; the 1961
election gave Labor a 11-7 advantage. Political observers
had predicted some losses for the Government, but did not
anticipate the extent.1 Two months before the election, one
correspondent commented:

Reliable reports from Queensland indicate that the

Menzies Government is remarkably unpopular in that

State, far more so than the residents of the other

States could imagine possible.

The resentment against the Government is based on

a general belief that Mr. Menzies has taken things

too much for granted in recent years...There is

the feeling that Queensland's overwhelming support

has led the Prime Minister to treat the State almost

with contempt.2
Queensland, with its vast undeveloped territory, depends

heavily upon federal government grants for the development of

transportation networks and industrial expansion. Labor Party

 

lSMH, October 2, 1961; November 23, 1961.

28MH, October 2, 1961.

2#4

candidates campaigned vigorously for greater support of
Queensland development, and their appeal was evidently
successful. In addition, the relatively high unemployment
rate of 3.5 percent in Queensland probably contributed to
the Government's defeat.l

In New South Wales, the average swing against the Govern-

2 The Liberal Partyglost 3 seats in

ment was 5.21 percent.
the Sydney metropolitan area: Phillip, Evans, and Mitchell.
Phillip, a closely contested inner city electorate, was won
by the Liberal candidate (W. J. Aston) in 1958 with 51.87
percent of the vote after distribution of Democratic Labor
Party second preferences. In 1961, the Labor candidate

(S. D. Einfeld) defeated Aston by a 50.33 clear majority.

The D.L.P. polled 5.54 percent in Phillip. The Liberal
candidate for Evans out-polled his Labor opponent in primary
votes by 318, and held on by 287 votes after the distribution
of 702 votes cast for an independent candidate. However,
when the decisiVe 2,865 (7.5 percent of vote) D.L.P. second
preferences were ditributed, the Labor candidate received
over 56 percent and was elected by only 72 votes. The third
electorate lost by the Liberal Party was Mitchell, which

had radically altered in character since 1958 because of an
influx of 21,500 new voters.» In Bennelong electorate, a

Liberal defeat was staved off when the D.L.P. delivered over

 

1In April, 1961,Queensland's unemployment rate of 3.5
percent compared with Western Australiao2.l, South Australia—-
2.0, New South Walesfel.8, Tasmania—1.7, Victoria-1.5. SEE,
April 18, 1961.

2The 5.21 percent figure was cited in the State Executive
Annual Report, December 3, 1962, p. 2.

245

three-quarters of its second preferences to the Liberal
candidate, enabling him to overcome an 1,849 vote deficit
and win by 832 votes.

The Country Party lost 2 of its 9 seats in New South
Wales. In Cowper, the aged Country Party member, Sir Earle
Page, was-on his deathbed at the time of the election, a fact
which probably contributed to the sharp swing to Labor in
Cowper. The Country Party also lost the electorate of Hume,
which had been narrowly carried in 1958 after distribution
of D.L.P. preferences. The Labor candidate in 1961 polled
an outright majority of 50.91 percent.

We shall not undertake in this study a detailed
analysis of voting behavior in the 1961 election. We assume
that office—seekers select campaign appeals, which in their
best judgment, will produce a favorable reaction from the
voters. Office—seekers form and use party organization to
achieve their objective of public office. Local candidates,
organizations, and issues may be important and even decisive
in individual electorates; however, most contests tend to be
overshadowed by the better-publicized confrontation by the
parliamentary Leaders. This appeared to be true in 1961,
when a decline in support for the Government--accentuated
in Queensland--prevailed throughout the Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister'assumed that the voters would remain,
faithful because of 12 years of demonstrated competence, and
because of unattractive alternative leadership offered by

the opposition party. The Leader of the opposition selected

246

economic issues as the basis of his challenge, and kept up
his attack at the point he perceived the government to be
most vulnerable. Given the state of electoral uncertainty,
Mr. Calwell made the better judgment.1

A significant aspect of the 1961 campaign was that the
appeals made the two Leaders presented a rather ironic juxta-
position of traditional party "principles." Mr. Menzies,
Leader of the party of private enterprise, defended his
government's use of controls to prevent the ruin of the
economy. In doing so, he was savagely attacked by the
major manufacturing and banking interests for laying the
heavy hand of government intervention on the economy. Mr.
Calwell, Leader of the party of public enterprise, readily
discarded his party's socialist objective for the campaign,
and seemed comfortable singing in the same chorus with the
Chamber of Manufacturers and the Australian Bankers Associa-
tion. The Sydney Morning Herald added its touch to the
incongruity of party postures when it declared editorially
that it "stands today as it has throughout its history for
liberal principles."2 However, the Herald continued, the

Menzies Government has "turned more and more to bureaucratic

planning and socialistic methods [and] the country has been

 

r- ‘r w

lAfterithe election, The Australian Liberal stated that
"the Prime Minister has accepted the result as indicating

disapproval or'misunfllrstandins by.a large sector of voters
of the Government‘s economic policies. ‘AL, January, 1962,

p. l.
2
SMH, December 7, 1961.

247

brought to a parlous position.”1 The Herald then called for

the election of a Labor government.2

Although victory evaded Mr. Calwell, he was able to
mobilize the Labor Party organization effectively. He ree
tained electoral support previously loyal to Labor, and he was
able to cut deeply into past Liberal support. Thus, Calwell's
campaign demonstrated the extent to which a parliamentary
Leader--sensitized to vote-getting issues-~is able to place his
own stamp on his party when making a bid for control of governe
ment.‘ The Prime Minister, his prestige shaken, but still in
power, reacted quickly to the electoral rebuff he had received.
Soon after the election, the Menzies government instituted a

series of special economic measures "to increase employment

n3

and business confidence. These measures provided for:
more funds for State Governments; increased
unemployment benefits; reduced income tax and

sales tax on vehicles; more money for home building;
investment allowances; additional funds for the
Development Bank; and...in particular cases,
protection of Australian industries...

The government also took steps toimpose additional limits on
imports of goods which were in competition with Australian-made

goods.‘ Thus, the Liberal-Country government took overtlarge
A . {

sections of Labor policy in response to its electoral

__‘_i

‘7

1Ibid.

2Menzies later called the Herald's endorsement "an
exercise in logic that will engage the study of people in" the
philosophy schools of the universities for years to come."
SMH, February 3, 1962. . .
3AL, March, 1962, p. 15. 4Ibid.

248
setback. Australian voters had apparently expressed a pre-
ference for Labor's 1961 campaign policy, and Liberal public
office-holders showed no lack of willingness to comply with the
voters' wishes. ‘
The 1962 state election campaign.

The New South Wales state election of March 3, 1962 was
held less than 3 months after a federal election which
resulted in a severe setback to the Liberal-Country govern-
ment of Prime Minister Menzies. The Leader of the state
parliamentary party, Mr. R. w. Askin, feared that the un-
popularity of the national Liberals would transfer to the
state level, and gave an early indication that "we intend

l

to fight on state issues." At the same time, Askin suggested

that the federal election may have reflected a general desire
for a change by the voters. If so:
Practically every argument used by Labor against the
Menzies government applies with greater force to the
Heffron government... if ever ther was a case of a
government grown complacent and arrogant from an

over-long stay in»office, the N.S.W. government fits
the bill.2

In spite of this hopeful note sounded by Mr. Askin, there was
little question that the national_Liberal reversal put the
state Liberal Party in an awkward defensive position, and
complicated the effort to assume a position of aggressive

challenge.

 

lSMH, January 22, 1962, cited by Ian Campbell, "State
Ballot: The N.S.W. General Election of March 1962," Australian
Political Studies AssociatiOn Monograph No. 7, 1963, p. 10.

2SMH, January 20, 1962, cited by Campbell, op. cit., p.10.

249

Liberal Party office-seekers were confronted with other
problems as they prepared for the campaign. In our previous
chapter on the nomination process, we discussed the internal
disruption which occurred as a result of electorate boundary
alterations complicated by the frustrations of prolonged
opposition. Four incumbent office-holders failed to win re-
nomination: they did not, however, accept the decision of
the party nominating committees, and decided to run as
independent's in their respective electorates against the
endorsed Liberal candidates.1 The four dissident Liberal
officeeseekers, and their supporters under Clause 21 of the
party constitution, faced a penalty of expulsion from the
party for at least three years. However, they saw a loop-
hole in Clause 21 which they intended to slip through: they
would resign (not wait for expulsion) shortly before filing
their nominations with state elections officials, and simply
rejoin the party after the election. One of the candidates,
Mr. Fraser, stated that his "price" for rejoining the parlia-
mentary party would be the portfolio of housing and develop-
ment.2 Fraser made it clear that he perceived his duty to
be service to his constituents, and not the party organization.
Therefore:

The State Secretary of the Liberal Party, Mr.
Garrick [bid], and his associates at Ash Street,
must be taught that the elected representatives
of the people...are not prepared to hand over

their guties and responsibilities to an outside
junta.

 

l
The four incumbents and their electorates were: S.A.
Storey (Hornsby), E. D. Darby (Manly), A. H. Dennis (The HillsL
D. S. Fraser, (Gordon).

2
The Sun, October 3, 1961.
2 -

25.

Another candidate rejected for re-nomination, Mr. Darby, said
"the people of Manly will decide whether they want their
present member to continue serving them or a new member"
[the endorsed Liberal candidate] .1 Darby also insisted
that "he was still a Liberal and it would be unthinkable
for him to vote against the Party in Parliament."2

The actions taken by the unendorsed candidates
threatened to subvert the disciplinary force of Clause 21,
which had been passed by State Council in 1959 and was
receiving its first test. The State Executive therefore
requested State Council to strengthen Clause 21 by pro-

hibiting an unendorsed candidate from joining or re-joining

 

the party for at least three years. The amendment to Clause
21 was finally approved, but only after more than two hours

of spirited debate. According to The Australian Liberal

 

report:

Parliamentary members argued during the animated
debate that members who had given good service in
Parliament should not be penalissd if the they
were elected after standing against selected
[endorsed] candidates; and that if the balance
between opposing parties were narrow it might

be possible to gain State Government by enlisting
any independents in the Party ranks.3

Non-parliamentary members of State Council took the position
that the party's public office—holders were obliged to accept

the party's verdict on their capability to continue in office.

 

lSMH, November 8, 1961.

2The Sun, October 17, 1961.
3AL, December, 1961, p. 10.

251

Mr. C. Tuckwell, a member of the State Executive and the Branch
Development Committee, summed up this view late in the debate.

Mr. C. Tuckwell said that an man going in as a

Liberal member [of parliamen%j submitted himself

to pro-selection and agreed to abide by the Party's

constitution. When a sitting man was defeated at

a pre-selection it could be assumed there were

good reasons for the defeat. If he [then] villified

the organisation he assisted its opponents.1
In a final speech before the vote on the amendment, Mr. J.
Cameron, who had moved the amendment, declared that "Liberals
have to decide whether to be a real political party or a
group of policical picnickers."2 Passage of the strengthen-
ing amendment to Clause 21 demonstrated that the non-parlia-
mentary members of the central organization would impose
discipline on office-holders who were rejected by selection
committees and contested elections without party endorsement.
The Clause did not, however, have any effect on the inten-
tions of the four dissidents to run as independents. They did
not, with the exception of Darby in Manly, pose any real
threat to the endorsed candidates. They did, however, siphon
off some of the party's potential resources; moreover, their
protests against the party "machine" contributed to the
prevailing image of the state Liberal Party as a disorganized
and somewhat quarrelsome political organization.

Another problem confronting Liberal office-holders in

the campaign was the development of policy. Following the

party's defeat in 1959, a committee appointed by State Council

 

Ibid., P. 14.

 

2This quotation is drawn from personal notes taken at
State Council meeting, November 6, 1961.

253
reported that the 1959 policy speech——

had made a favorable impression, but such a com-
prehensive document delivered a few weeks before
the poll, without prior continued advocacy and
explanation, could not be fully accepted, and

in the circumstances gave the impression that

it promised too much and was incapable of ful-
filment. "It dodged certain controversial "1
issues and made unhappy compromises on others."

The defeated Leader, Mr. Morton, defended the 1959 policy:

Policy was being considered for 15 months before

the election. .and for months I visited every

metropolitan seat.

It has been stated that we cannot make up our

minds on some issues. But'we were trying to

accomplish what had net been offered in N.S.W.

for many years--a joint policy with the Country

Party. We conferred for months--and immediately

after an understanding had been reached with

Mr. Hughes [then Country Party LeadeE] he

became ill, and I had to start again with the

new Leader.2
The Liberal and Country Party Leaders were finally able to
agree on a joint policy in 1959. In 1961, however, the Country
Party parliamentary members broke precedent, and became the
first party in New South Wales to adopt a policy of direct
state aid to private schools.3 The Country Party move
impelled Liberal Party office-holders to take a direct stand
on the sensitive issue of aid to private schools. The
Liberal position, however, remained a matter of speculation

until the Leader's policy speech when it was announced that

 

¥AL, September, 1959, p. 11.

2AL, October, 1959, p. 4.

3SMH, August 24,1961. The new Country Party policy
toward private schools called for the state to pay the interest
on loans used for private school construction.

253
the Liberal Party would not support direct aid of any kind
to private schools. The Labor Premier, Mr. Heffron, ignored
the question of direct aid in his policy speech, so it was
assumed that there would be no immediate change in the govern-
ment's policy. Thus, the Liberal Party found itself in
fundamental disagreement on a major policy issue with its
potential coalition partner--the Country Party, and in
agreement with its chief adversary.

On other major policy questions, the Labor Premier
stood firmly on the record of his government. As Heffron
noted shortly after the election: "Labor had not made
extravagant promises to woo votes.. Most of Labor's promises
consisted of a continuation of our present activities."1
In his policy speech, Heffron relied heavily on the pre—
sumed unpopularity of the national Liberal government. He
accused Askin of failing to speak out against, and even
defending, the "disastrous measures" of the Menzies govern-
ment. At the same time, Heffron claimed that a Canberra-
dominated Liberal government in New South Wales would subject
the state to the same "destructive jolts and jars to the
economy...which have so recently been a feature of Liberal-

"2 Addressing

Country administration in the federal sphere.
himself to_the existing high level of unemployment in New

South Wales, Heffron said:

 

l
4 Daily Mirror, March 7, 1962, cited by Campbell, op.cit.
P- 5

2Ibid., p. 10.

254

Unfortunately, the Commonwealth not the state had

the constitutional powers necessary to deal with

unemployment. Banking, credit, income, company

taxation and import controls were all fields where

the Commonwealth was virtually exclusive.l
Heffron promised to maintain "unremitting pressure" on the
Commonwealth Government for increased grants to New South
Wales, which would be administered in a "constructive and
practical" manner to raise the level of employment.2

The Labor Premier skirted two other controversial issues

in his policy speech: rent controls, and legalizing of off-
course betting on horse races. In New South Wales, rent
controls imposed during World War II on existing dwellings
"w%Tm‘memer-lifted. The result was that tenants who occupied
rental premises continuously since World War 11 continued to
pay as little as $15—20 perwmonth rent, while tenants living
in comparable dwellings built since the war paid at least
triple the controlled rate. Controlled premises comprised
about 20 percent of all rented premises, most of which were
located in the older sections of cities embracing strong
Labor-voting areas and some "swing" electorates. A Royal
Commission appointed by the government to study the Landlord

and Tenant Act recommended, in substance, that the anachron-

istic controls be lifted, provided that safeguards against

 

1Daily Telegraph, February 13, 1962.

2Campbell, 02.01t., p. 11.

255

exorbitant rents and summary eviction be retained.1 In his
policy speech, Heffron said that there would be no substan-
tial changes in the Landlord and Tenant Act, but that his
government would "consider" the recommendations of the
Royal Commission.2

The Premier also gave no indication in his policy
speech that his government planned any moves toward licensing
off-course betting establishments, although there was reported
to be strong pressure to do so from sections of the Labor
Party organization.3 Other forms of gambling--slot machines,
state lotteries, and race course betting--flourished legally
in New South Wales, and were major sources of revenue.4 Off-
course betting, although illegal, went on more or less openly.
This disturbed many religious leaders, who at the same time
spoke out against any proposal to place a legal stamp of
approval on yet another form of the gambling vice. As far
as the campaign was concerned, Mr. Heffron decided that
this was an issue to let slide.

The Liberal leader, Mr. Askin, delivered his policy
speech two nights after the Premier's. Characterizing
Labor's policy as "dreary, stalh, and completely lacking in

l . _

Cf. SMH editorial "Selfishness, Politics and Rent
Control,” November 3, 1961: "The Premier has behaved almost
as if somebody had invited him to grasp a red-hot poker."

2
Campbell, op. cit. p. 22. _
3SMH, June 6, 1961.

nIn 1960-61, the various forms of legal gambling pro-
duced a total of about $30 million in revenue. See SMH,
October 4, 1961.

256
imagination", as well as sounding "like a political death
rattle”,l Askin spelled out a vigorous program for ending
unemployment, and a long list of promises for improving
social services. Askin accused Labor of being "defeatist"
about unemployment, and of—a*
’*inexcusably losing many large industries to the

Southern States. We State Liberals have centred

our whole policy on making N.S.W. the most secure

of all States from an employment point of view...

We will take a leaf out of the Vitorian Liberal

Government's book, and give the 'red carpet'

treatment to industrialists wishing to establish

factories.2
To stimulate employment Askin promised that his government
would immediately introduce a supplementary budget of L2
million ($4.5) "to be allocated at once to stimulate building
and developmental works in the City and country." In addition:
"We will begin at once to implement a dynamic roads and State
public works programme."3

» In the area of social services, Askin promised to raise‘

pension benefits for all retired public servants; provide
free bus transportation for school children; accellerate
hospital construction and establish a new medical school;
improve mental health services; provide public transport
concessions to all widows; and provide 95 percent govern-

ment-guaranteed loans for home buyers. All of this, and

more, would be accomplished in concert with a program of

 

tax reduction on property and gasoline}l

e l , , 2 -
.flé: March, 1962. p. 15. Ibid., p. 16.
3

Ibid. 4Ibid., pp. 16-19.

257
Askin met head-on the issues of rent controls and
licensing of off-course betting. He promised to implement
the recommendations of the Royal Commissions on the Landlord
and Tenant Act by permitting controlled rents under L5
($11.25) per week to be raised by a maximum of 40 percent.
A "Rent Relief Fund" would also be established to assist
"on a confidential basis” pensioners or unemployed workers
who suffered hardship because of increased rents.l
In a surprise gambit, Askin proposed to legalize off-
course betting. "The State Liberals are against encouraging
gambling,“ Askin reasoned-
but we do not oppose gambling in moderation. Where
gambling cannot be curbed effectively by prohibition
and law enforcement it is preferable to license and
tax it for public purposes...
We respect the views of those who oppose legalising
off-course betting, but they have not advanced any
practicable alternative to the present disgraceful

position.

An overwhelming majority of our fellow citizeng
approve licensing S.P. starting price betting.

With the revenue produced by an expanding economy and by the
proposed betting tax, Askin predicted: "We will be able to
implement the most dynamic policy ever presented in this State
for substantial tax reductions, social benefits and encourage-

ment of employment."3

LL
——

vj— f- -

lIbido’ pp. 17-18.

2Ibid. p. 16.

3Ibid.

258

Premier Heffron's reaction to Askin's aggressive policy
speech echoed Prime Minister Menzies' response to his opponent
three months before.- Heffron calledAskinFs policy‘reckless and
irresponsible... quite impossible of realisation."l In later
statements, Heffron said: "He Askin is in opposition--he
can promise anything"2 and "MrrAskifiwis making all sorts of
promises but the first thing will be to find something to use

3 Heffron labelled Askin's proposal for retire-

for money."
ment benefit increases as "airy-fairy";4 his reaction to
Askin's proposal to legalize off-course betting was "this
government does not consider this a matter for urgent or
anxious thought."5
At the same time that the Premier was'attacking Liberal
campaign promises, his government was busy implementing some .
of the very measures Askin had proposed. During the campaign,
the Heffron g6vernment moved to increase retirement benefits
for public servants by 10 percent; and to provide 95 percent
guaranteed home purchasing loans. Heffron also announced

that a committee of judges would be appointed to study the
question of additional gambling legislation.6

w-..— ¢ 4 o 4 - - —_ w

H

SMH, February 15, 1962, cited by Campbell, op.cit., p.17.

R)

SMH, February 22, 1962, cited byCCampbell,{gquit., p.18.
SMH, February 23, 1962, cited by Campbell, 0 .cit., p.12.

42w

SMH, February 22, 1962, cited by Campbell, gp.cit., p.18.

Ul

Daily Mirror, February 16, 1962, cited by Campbell, 22.
cit., p. l .

6
'AL, March, 1962, p. 25; SMH, February 24, 1962.

259
Askin responded angrily to the Labor government's
actions. The following statement by Askin communicates both
his frustration and his remarkable perception:
That is the Labor policy-~to lift our proposals.
What is worrying the Government is that the things
we stand for are the things the Labor Party is

meant to stand for.

They know our program has caught the imagination
of the public so they are stealing it.1

Thus, Askin described well the irony of the situation: the
Liberal Party had a better Labor policy than the Labor Party
itself; the Labor Party, sensing an apparent danger to its
control 6f.government, quickly neutralized the appeal of
Liberal policy by adopting it as its own.

The Labor Party did not, however, attempt to take over
Liberal policy on rent controls. In fact, "the announced
Liberal policy of increasing controlled rents up to 40%...
was used by Labor as the major campaign issue whenever rental
premises were in significant numbers."2 The Labor Party
organization flooded such areas with pamphlets entitled
"Warning: Liberals Will Raise Your Rent.”3 "A leaflet
distributed in Bligh [a "swing" electorate newly created
by reapportionment] on election eve, urging rent payers not
to trust the Liberal Party, said: 'Rent L5 and over--unlimited

increase proposed.“+ Although the Liberal Party tried to

 

4.____‘ _.._-_.__—__ -- a- n y W .....

lSMH, February 24, 1962.

2"Appreciation", an analysis of the election prepared by
thg State Executive and submitted to State Council, April 27,
“19 2, po 2o

4 ‘ .
3Campbell, pp. 22-23. 15L, March, 1962, p. 25.

260

allay fears by sponsoring large advertisements saying "The
Liberal Party guarantees that no one will suffer hardship",l
one Liberal candidate complained that "attempts to explain
the Liberal Party‘s policy on rents in Bligh was like going
over Niagra in a barrel."2

The voters of New South Wales went to the polls on
March 3, 1962, and returned the Heffron Labor government
with a substantially increased majority. The Liberal Party
lost four seats to Labor candidates: Bligh, Coogee,
Drummoyne, and Nepeaneeall in the Sydney metropolitan area.
In addition, the endorsed Liberal candidate in Manly was
defeated by the incumbent Liberal-turned—independent, Mr.
Darby, who had failed to win party re~nomination. The Labor
Party picked up an additional member of parliament when its
endorsed candidate defeated Mr. Purdue, who had sat in.parlia~
ment as an independent member from the Waratah electorate.
There was no change in party control in the electorates
held by the Country Party. Thus, when the new parliament
convened, the Labor government was firmly in control with
a 54—40 majority.

In response to the Liberal Party defeat, the State
Executive attempted to analyze the factors contributing to
the defeat. The State Executive's "Appreciation", which was
undoubtedly drafted by the General Secretary, claimed that
the 1961 reapportionment tended to weaken Liberal—held "swing"
3

seats and strengthen Labor control in its borderline seats.

’-' —. _ ‘ _ __ 1‘ . _,_‘—_ ,_ -

lsyy, March 1, 1962, cited by Campbell, p. 23.
2" 3"

Appreciation", p. 3. Appreciation," p. 2.

Ix)
O‘x

,Based on 1959 voting patterns, it appears that boundary changes
worked against Liberal incumbents in Bligh, Drummoyne, and
Nepean, and against Liberal challengers to Labor incumbents
in the "swing" Rockdale, Concord, and Mudgee electorates.
An objective analyst, Miss Joan Rydon, agreed with the
Liberal contention; she suggests that--

There can be little doubt that the redistribution

of 1961 strengthened the position of the A. L. P.

To what extent movements and growth of population
H;;a . e- neit‘e and to what exte nt there were a

elements of 'gerrymandering“ ... are queSLions to
which there are unlikely to be final answers.1

The Liberal Party "Appreciation" also discussed certain
policy positions which may have contributed to the defeat.
Foremost among these was the policy on rent control. In the
”swing" electorate of Coogee, a sampling of polling places
(precincts) indicated that in predominantly homeowner areas
the Liberal candidate polled as well as inl9593 however, in
apartmentedwelling areas, there was a 5-6 percent swing to
the Labor candidate. It was believed that rent control was
"the deciding issuewin Coogee [and] played a supporting role

th gerrymandered boundaries in determining the fact of
Bligh, Drummoyne and'Nepean." Unfortunately for the Liberals,
the rent control issue had its greatest impact in those elec-
torates which the party needed to hold.2

The ”Appreciation? comments on the issues of legalized
betting and state aid to private schools are critical of the

timing and manner in which party positions were presented to

the public.

_ A_ LA__ A‘ A k #_‘

I I J

1Joan Rydon, "The Results” , in Campbell, op. cit., p. 51.

2" "Appreciation,“ pp. 2-3.

On legalized betting:

The main criticism by Liberals is directed against
the suddenness of the announcement and the consequent
inadequacy of explanation...

Over the years, the Liberal Party has branded the

State Labor Government as the "gambling government" ...

By contrast, an image had been established of a

Liberal Party which opposed the promotion of gambling

and sought to establish the virtues of thrift and

providence. The Party' s election policy (by its

suddeness [aid] of impact seemed to shatter these

concepts. any people felt that the Liberals were

outbidding Labor in the gambling field and that or

principles had_been put aside in order to find

extra revenue.i

Regarding aid to private schools, the "Appreciation’I

noted that "the Liberal policy remained a matter of intense
speculation" until a few weeks before the election.2 In
addition, many signs pointed toward the adoption of a
favorable position on aid to private schools: the Liberal
Menzies government had been assisting private schools in the
Australian Capital Territory since 1957; the New South wales
Liberal Party annual general convention had recommended
support; and the Country Party had also adopted a policy of
state aid. It was also generally known that the State
President, Mr. Bonner-=a Roman Catholic--favored aid to
private schools.

The policy speech, on this point therefore, must
have created an anti-climax.

whatever its form of resolution} ‘

' " —suited to an elec ion camps gn. ,
Clear y,' t s ould be studied and resolved on ;
merits in a period of calm, and conveyed to the

electors at a time free of election pLssion, so
that the full impli ations can be understood 3

  
 
 

 

 

iIbid.’ pp. 3-“. 21bido; p. 70
31b1do, pg 8.

263'

_ In general complaints about the timing of policy _
decisions, the "Appreciation? notedthat it was impossible
to preparedefinitive campaignliterature and advertising,
since "details of the policy were not available...until the
day of the Policy Speech,2% weeks before polling day.'1
Moreover, "controversial policies cannot be launched and
sold at short notice. They arouse suspicion and tend to
repel support."2 "

Although the State Executive could readily criticize
on the basis of hindsight, it had little to offer toward a
solution either of intra;party policy conflicts, or toward
the larger question of a winning campaign strategy. Such
issues as gambling and aid to private schools were debated
and studied between elections within the councils of the
party, but never resolved. _It fell to the Leader and his
fellow officeéseekers_to decide whether to equivocate or
take a concrete stand. VMr. Askin's predecessor had been
attacked for dodging certain issues and making unhappy.
compromises on others;3 Mr. Askin evidentlydecided to be.
unequivocaland gamble that electoral success would vindicate
his choice of strategy. If Askin hadled the party to,
victory after so many years or_frustration, thereseems
little doubt that his government's positions on issues
would be accepted and even embraced, though not always

Qisia.

32232.. p. 9 . _, .4
3&3, September, 1959, p. 11.

265‘

happily, throughout the party organization. Asit happened,
the party's defeat settled nothing, but only tended to

l
deepen intraparty policy differences.

.....aaThe im at“ 9:991)“er 235131191”. _ e \

In Chapter IV we discussed in detail the role which
central and electorate organizations are expected to play
in providing the resources necessary to conduct an effective
election campaign. 'The responsibilities of the central
organization, once candidates have been nominated and policies
defined, are to develop and manage campaign_propaganda3 to
secure adequate resources of money and manpower (both
volunteers and paid staff); and to allocate these resources
throughout the party organization in such a manner thatfmfl‘
maximum electoral advantage is realized. The electorate
organization serves the local party candidate; its functions
include the management of localpropaganda, fundlraising,
and the mobilizing of party workers to perform various
electioneering tasks. We noted in Chapter IV_that thecentral‘
organization regarded the resources of the party as inadequate,
and undertook through the branchdevelopment_program to
strengthen the organization in preparation forthe federal .
election of December,_1961, and the state election of March,
1962. In this section we shall discuss in general terms the
two related_questions: .How_wel1 did the partyorganization
in fact perform in the two campaigns_under review, and
secondly, did the organisation's performance have any
-demonstrable bearing on the_outcone?

##4

I V '1

'cf. Peter Coleman, 1..;¢.1e., p. 16.

 

26%

The impact of party organization on the outcome of an
election is not readily measured._ It is generally assumed,
however, that the amount of resources available, and the
skill with which they are used, have some influence on a
candidatefs success. Since voting is compulsory in
Australia,organization is not necessary to ”get out the vote."
But compulsory voting also means that a large number of
uninformed and apathetic people go to the polls. Since the
Australian ballot does not include the party designation of
candidates, many voters are confronted with a slate of
unfamiliar names.1 In addition, the voter is required to
number in the order of his preference the square opposite
each candidate. If the voter fails to mark each candidate,-
his ballot is ruled "informal" (invalid) and thrown out.

In a multieparty contest, a voter's secondpreferences can
determine the winner if no candidate receives a majority of
first preference votes. These procedures in Australian
elections suggest the importance of lastfminute communication
between.party organization andthe voter.

Candidates and their supporters try to make such contact
by distributing "howetoevote cards" to voters asthey approach

the entrance of the polling place. A "how-to-vote card” is a

_‘_‘ . _n__4__

w h V ‘7 “if 'fr‘I v v F" v V ""

‘lA survey taken in the Parkes (N.S.W.) federal electorate
in 1958 indicated that less than half of the respondents ‘
“tould name the Labor candidate, in spite of the fact that he
had served the electorate for 15 years, "was a leading member
of his party, received frequent notice in the press, and was
regarded as having a considerable personal following in the
electorate." Less than a quarter of the respOndents could'
identify the Liberal candidate, and the D.L.P. candidate was
virtually unknown.’ SeéP. Nesterway,"The‘Parkes Sample
Survey,” in Rawson, op. cit;, 164-196.

{1‘63

slip of paper with the names of the candidates appropriately
marked. Each candidate arranges to have as many volunteers
available as possible to cover the approaches to each polling
plant. In the Lylney metropolitan area alone, a thorough
election day organization would require perhaps 5,000 volunteer
workers.; This presents a formidable organizational challenge,
particularly since the party membership is not distributed
equally throughout the area.2 As we noted in Chapter IV,
the Electorate Assistance Committee of the State Executive
attempts to work out arrangements by which electorates with
an excess_o’ ranpower donate volunteers to electorate;
"“oeci

According to evaluations by party officials, as well
as outside observers, the Liberal Party‘s election day
organization was not adequate in either the federal or state

election. The Australian Liberal reported after the federal

 

——- —. -. *-~—‘ . -_..._.. - -.—.~.—-——“

 

1The figure of 5,000 workers assumes that 4 volunteers
working in 6—hour shifts are required at each pelling place.
The polls are open for 12 hours (8 a.m.-—-8 p.m.). All
elections are held on Satu:day. For a description of election
day activities, see Overacker, op; cit., pp. 278~282.

 

S. R. Tyler, a veteran of many Liberal campaigns,
writes that "the enlistment and organising of polling booth
workers always presents the campaign committee with a major
headache. At no time are there sufficient volunteers
available to fill all the vacant positions and to do all the
multitude of small but important tasks " See Tyler,
"Campaigning at the Grass Roots,” _Aust§alian_fioliticai-Stadies
Assgciation.§ews, February, 1961, p. 12.

267

election:
The Federal poll and the poor manning of many booths...

disclosed how members and the Party can suffer when
organisation at the branch level is below possible strength.

Some sitting Liberal members of both Federal and State
Parliaments have done far too little to encourage and
foster the growth of branches. On this Federal occasion
they have received eloquent demonstration at the booths
and elsewhere that organisation in the electorates 13"
an essential factor in bringing out the maximum vote...

It was noticeable in many strong Labor areas that

Liberal workers were either badly out-numbered or

missing entirely.

Another observer commented:

Some sitting Liberals were appalled at the ex ent to

which they found, too late, that their branch membership

had declined...As a result, some sitting members who

had considered themselves reasonably safe found on polling

day that half their tables weren't manned, and one minister

found that his name had not even been displayed at several

polling booths in his electorate.2

Reports like those just quoted indicate that the Liberal

organization on election day was generally disappointing.
Although the Liberals appeared to lose face, it is not clear
whether or not they lost votes, and if so, how many. Most
electorates, of course, are "safe" for one party or the other,
and it is unlikely that any number of workers could alter the
outcome. But as we noted earlier in this chapter, there were
two electorates, Phillip and Evans, in which Liberal incumbents
were defeated by very narrow margins. It is possible that a

more adequate organization on election day could have had an

 

——1' -—"i fi

lAL, January, 1962, p. 1.

v--.

2 ... ._
' D. Whitington, "Liberals in Disarray,” Nation 4, January
27’ 1962; p. 40

268

impact,mbut it is more likely that the vote was a reflection
of the swing against the government. In the absence of
comparable data on both Liberal and Labor organizational
strength in the various electorates, it is impossible to
draw definitive conclusions.

‘In the state election, there is no evidence to suggest

that the Liberal organization performed better than in the

federal election three months before.‘ The General Secretary

commentedthat "our polling-day organisation was no better
and no worse than usual in recent campaigns."1 The General

Secretary also stated shortly after the state election:

-.....-

VNo_amountflof_extra work in the electorates, whether in

polling day work or canvassing, could, in my judgment and

that ofmany, have altered the result at all."?

~WThe General Secretary's conclusion appears to be
supported by the results in two electorates, Hurstville
and Kogarah, which differed significantly in organizational
resources. Hurstville was one of the few electorates in

which the branch development program had realized substantial

increases in party membership-~from 70 to over 300 members.
According to a branch president in Hurstville:

The Liberal organisation in the Hurstville
electorate is at least twice as large as that

of its opponents, and far more united, enthu-
siastic and effective. Yet in the recent State
election--with an excellent local candidate,

a splendid organisation and more money than

we have ever had-~we only managed to reduce

the overall Labour majority from 1,878 to 1,168.3

H .—.—
. . , _.r._ - «- '

lPersonal letter to me from J. L. Carrick, July 2, 1963.

 

2Personal letter to me from J. L. Carrick, May 28, 1962.

3R.Rathbone, quoted from letter to SMH, May 16, 1962.

269

W_In_the southern suburban electorate of Kogarah, the

-...

Liberal candidate--a nonresident of the electorate--

foundthat "branch membership was pitifully small.f1

The
candidate, Mr. J? R. Partridge, enlisted "the support of
40 of my personal friends from the Northern suburbs (not
active Liberals) to help in leaflet distribution and on
polling day§f2_ According to Partridge, the electorate
assistance program was little helpin . ,,

Electoral [sic] Assistance was very ineffective

and‘quite horrifying to me...0ur entire Outside

help on polling day was only Six persons. There

was no outside assistance at all for our three

leaflet distributions, despite promises. Cash

aid wae meagre. _ . .

”In_spite ofthe fact that Partridgewas a stranger to
the-electerate, was nominated only four weeks before the
elections, and had very limited resources with which to
work,he was able to increase slightly the Liberal percentage ‘
of the vote (44.0) as compared to the previous election (43.3).
Again, on the basis of available data, it is difficult

to draw conclusions on the impact of organization. Analysis
of the state election is complicated further by changes in
all but 8 electorate boundaries, thus precluding in most
casescomparisons with previous elections. However, evidence
from 2 electorates (Hurstville and Kogarah) with unchanged

boundaries suggests that factors other than organizational.

resources have at least as much impact on election results.

 

lJ‘ 3° Partridge: "winning the Next State Election,” AL,
June, 1962’ P0 120 Party membership records listed 233 members

in Kogarah as of June, 1961. Most of these were evidently
inactive. ' .

2Ib1d. ’ 3gpgg.

270

In this chapter we have examined the 1961 federal
election campaign and the 1962 state election campaign in ,
New South wales. We have assumed that public office-holders,
particularly the parliamentary leadership, dominate the
development of campaign policy and strategy. We also assumed
that office-holders determine strategyfirst ofall by .
relating their appeals to what takes place in government,
and secondly in response to their status as governing party
or opposition party candidates. Thus, office-holders in
control of government--as the Liberals were in l96l--tend
to present themselves for re-election on the basis of their
record, and avoid a wide rangeof new campaign promises
which may repel more votes than are attracted. On the other
hand, office-holders in oppositioneeas the New South Wales
Liberals were in 1962-- search for issues to discredit the
government, and also tend to present a list of campaign,
promises. to thevoters inanattempt to hit upon a winning
combination of campaign appeals.'

In the 1961 federal campaign, the Labor Party was in '
the role of the challenger. The Labor parliamentary Leader,
Mr. Calwell, focussed his attack on the alleged inability
of the henzies government to cope with economic problems in
general, and unemployment in particular. If elected, Calwell
pledged to wipe out unemployment within one year, and also
promised a wide range of new or expanded social services--

all without increased taxes. Calwell promised further to

shelve any Labor plans for nationalizing of major industries.

271

Prime Minister Menzies based the Liberal appeal for
reeelection Ton_the national and.socialachievements of the
last decade", and refused to come forward "with a string
of new promises."n Menzies charged that Labor's programs
were wildly irresponsible, and that Labor leaders lacked
the experience or capability to manage Australian domestic
and foreign policy. Menzies also claimed that unemployment
was only temporary, and accused Calwell of manifying the
problem. . .

, ~Inwselecting campaign appeals for theLiberal Party,
the Prime Minister assumed that the voters would remain‘
faithful because of demonstrated competence in the past, and
because 9f unattractive alternative leadership offered by
the opposition party. The Leader of the Labor Party selected
economic issues as the basis of Labor's challenge, and he
kept uphis attack at the point he perceived the government
to be most vulnerable. Given the election outcome, it
appeared that Calwell had made the better assessment. YWhen
the votes were counted, the government's 77;#5 majority was
reduced to a single seat. .. . f_

The 1961 campaign involved an ironic juxtaposition of
party ”principles" and campaign appeals. The Liberal Party»-
athe party of private enterprises-was forced to defend its
use of economic controls against attacks by both the Labor
Party and commercial interests. The Labor Party, on the
other hand, casually discarded its traditional socialist
objective for the campaign, and offered programs designed

to advance private enterprise.

272

_In the 1962 state election, theLiberal Party found:
itself in the role of challenger. The Liberal Leader, Mr. ,
Askin, chargedthat Labor's policies were "dreary, stale,
lacking in imagination, and defeatist about unemployment."
Taking a leaf out of Calwell's book, Askin then promised to” ,
introduce a supplemental budget, expand public works programs,
and provide a broad range of improved health and welfare
services. Askin also took forthright positions on the controe

aversial issues of rent controls, state aid to private schools,
and off-course betting on horse races.

The Labor Premier, Mr. Heffron, stoodfirmly on the
record of his government, and attempted to play on the pre;
sumed unpopularity of the national Liberal government.
Heffron labelled the Liberals' ambitious programs as
”reckless, irresponsible", and impossible to implement;
however, the Labor governmnet then proceeded to enact during
the campaign parts of Liberalpolicy. With respect to .
sensitive questions on which Labor had temporized in the past,
Heffron avoided the risk of taking definitive positions
during the campaign.

The voters' response to the party appeals was_to return.
the Labor government with an increasedparliamentary majority.

We have seen in this chapter that_officeeseekers, regard;
less of party label, tend to define campaign positions in;
relation to their perceived electoral consequences. Thus,
the campaign style and appeal used by the federal Liberal

Party and the state Labor Party were characteristic of

273
parties in power. Similarly, the federal Labor Party and
the state Liberal Party adopted a campaign strategy typical
of parties in opposition.

APPENDIX

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

SYDNEY METROPOLITAN AREA
STATE mmTORATLs

Blacktown (Liberal)
Hornsby (Liberal)
Collaroy (Liberal)
Manly (Liberal)
Mosman (Liberal)
Neutral Bay (Liberal)
North Sydney (Labor)
Willoughby'(Liberal)
Lane Cove (Liberal)
Gordon (Liberal)
Ryde (Labor)
Eastwood (Liberal)
Parramatta (Labor)
Merrylands (Labor)
Granville (Labor)
Fairfield (Labor)
Liverpool (Labor)
Sutherland (Labor)
Cronulla (Liberal)
Georges River (Liberal)
East Hills (Labor)
Hurstville (Labor)
Kogarah (Labor)
Rockdale (Labor)

MAY: 1959

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
3o.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Earlwood (Liberal)
Lakanba (Labor)
Bankstown (Labor)
Auburn,(Labor)
Concord (Labor)
Burwood (Liberal)
Canterbury (Labor)
Ashfield-Croydon (Liberal)
Drummoyne;(Liboral)
Balmain (Labor)
King (Labor)
Leichhardt (Labor)
Dulwich Hill (Labor)
Marriokvillo (Labor)
Phillip (Labor)
Bedfern (Labor)
Cook's River (Labor)
Maroubra (Labor)
Bandwick (Labor)
Coogee (Liberal)
Paddington—Waverly (Labor)
Bondi (Labor)
Wollahra (Liberal)
Vaucluse (Liberal)

 

 

 

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
l8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

SYDNEY Lamorouw AREA
STATE macromrss
APRIL, 1962

Blacktown (Labor)
The Hills (Liberal)
Hornsby (Liberal)
Collaroy'(Liberal)
Wakehurst (Liberal)
Manly (Independent)
Mosman (Liberal)
Kirribilli (Liberal)
Willoughby (Liberal)
Gordon (Liberal)
Lane Cove (Liberal)
Ryde (Labor)
Eastwood (Liberal)
Parramatta (Labor)
Wentworthville (Labor)
Granville (Labor)
Fairfield (Labor)
Liverpool (Labor)
Bass Hill (Labor)
Auburn (Labor)
Concord (Labor)
Burwood (Liberal)
Drummoyne (Labor)
Balmain,(Labor)

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
3o.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

King (Labor)

Phillip (Labor)
Bligh (Labor)
Vaucluse (Liberal)
Bondi (Labor)

Coogee (Labor)
Randwick (Labor)
Redfern (Labor)
Marrickville (Labor)
Dulwich.Hill (Labor)
AShfield-Croyden (Labor)
Canterbury (Labor)
Bankstown (Labor)
East Hills (Labor)
Lakemba (Labor)
Georges River (Liberal)
Sutherland (Labor)
Cronulla (Liberal)
Kogarah (Labor)
Hurstville (Labor)
Earlwood (Liberal)
Rockdale (Labor)
Cook's River (Labor)

Maroubra (Labor)

”— ————-——-_— 1 -——

’ _“AA—_*_—

 

mm .# r.“ —'

l:
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10..

ll.
12.
l3.
14.
15.
l6.
l7.
l8.
19.
20.
21.
22.

13.. some 22.11.23
STATE mmmaarss
APRIL, 1962

Start (Labor)

Cobar (Labor)
Castlereagh (Labor)
Dubbo (Liberal)
Temora (Country)
Murrumbidgee (Labor)
Murray (Country)
Young (Country)
Wagga Wagga (Liberal)
Albury'(Liberal)
Barwon (Country)
Upper Hunter (Labor)
Mudgee (Labor)

Orange (Country)
Batburst.(Labor)
Burrinjuck (Labor)
Goulburn (Labor)
Australian Capital Territory
Monaro (Labor)
Tenterfield (Country)
Tamworth (Country)

Casino (Country)

23. Byron (Country)

24. Lismore (Country)
25. Clarence (Country)
26. Armidalo (Country)
27. Raleigh (Country)
28. Oxley (Liberal)

29. Gloucester (Country)
30. Maitland (Liberal)
31. Cessnock (Labor)

32-37. Newcastle area: Kurri Kurri,
Waratah, Newcastle, Kahibah,
Lake Macquarie, Hamilton (Labor)

38. Wyong (Labor)

39. Hartley (Labor)

40. Hawkesbury (Liberal)
41. Gosford (Liberal)

42—89. Sydney area: Liberal (15),
Labor (32), Independent (1)

9o. Nepean (Labor)
91. Wollondilly (Liberal)
92. Bulli (Labor)

93—94. WollongonghKembla, Illawarra
(Labor)

95. South Coast (Liberal)

 

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.
l3.
l4.

SYDNEY METROPOLITAN AREA
memmlnammmmn
JAKUARY, 1962

Mitchell (Labor)
Werriwa (Labor)
Robertson (Liberal)
Parramatta (Liberal)
Reid (Labor

Banks (Labor)
Bradfield (Liberal)
Bennelong (Liberal)
Blaxland (Labor)
Lowe (Liberal)

Lang (Labor)
mackellar (Liberal)
North Sydney (Liberal)
Evans (Labor)

15.
l6.
l7.
l8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Dalley (Labor)
Parkes (Labor)
Grayndler (Labor)
St. George (Labor)
Barton (Labor)
Hughes (Labor)
Warringah (Liberal)
West Sydney (Labor)
Watson (Labor)
Wentworth (Liberal)
East Sydney (Labor)
East Sydney (Labor)
Kingsford-Smith (labor)

 

 

 

SYDMEY METROPOLITAN AREA
FEDERAL ELECTORATES

TANUA RY) (79;.

I9.

    

x
«a
as"

A0

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

NEW SOUTH RALES
FEDERAL ELECTORATES
JANUARY, 1962

Darling (Labor)
Riverina (Country)
Gwydir (Country)
Lawson (Country)
Calare (Country)
Farrer (Liberal)
Hume (Country)
Australian Capital Territory (Labor)
New England (Country)
Paterson (Country)
Robertson (Liberal)
Macquarie (Labor)
EdenéMonaro (Country)
Richmond (Country)
Cowper (Labor)

Lyne (Country)

Hunter (Labor)
Newcastle (Labor)
Shortland (Labor)
Mitchell (Labor)

21.—45..Sydney‘Areathiberal,(8),.Labor,(l7)

46.

Cunningham (Labor)

47. macarthur (Liberal)

 

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nuns; atom 3m? b
s. a
1mm}? .

 

 

280

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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

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