' THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS
IN A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY: THE CASE
OF COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-1964
By

Richard Gerald Mendes

The task of this thesis is twofold: first, to
utilize the available literature in the field of politica1
authoritarianism for the purpose of synthesizing a model of
totalitarian regime behavior; second, to apply a limited
portion of this model to an analysis of Communist China
during the 1949-1964 period.

The first task must be approached with extreme
care, for the field of political authoritarianism is one
in which conceptual clarity is often lacking. Fascist,
monarchical, communist, militaristic, traditional-deSpotic,
totalitarian, and still other forms of authoritarian
government have tended to be lumped together in a fashion
which often lacks any attempt to construct inter-authori-
tarian delineations. Thus, the first major goal of this
thesis is to present a model totalitarian regime which
Possesses both internal consistency and external differ-
entiation- The model actually presented is one based upon
the axiom that the distinguishing characteristic of a
totalitarian regime is the drive of the ruling elite for

total centralization of all societal power in its own hands.

Richard Gerald Mendes

From this basic axiom, via the process of deductive

logic, a series of propositions is derived. These propo-

sitions represent one functional aSpect of the totalitarian
regime, specifically, the relationships between the total—

itarian elite and intermediate groups (i.e., any group

existing in the organizational Space between the individual

and the elite itself) of the society. Thus, the major

thrust of the bulk of the thesis is to examine the possible
congruence between these postulated propositions and actual

behavior in Communist China during the 1949-1964 period.

Three types of intermediate groups in China were
chosen for examination: (1) minor parties, (2) mass orga—
nizations, and (3) mass campaigns. These particular groups

were chosen because they were nominally independent or

quasi-independent of the leadership elite. Therefore the

elite-intermediate group relationships postulated at the
outset would logically be more visible in their cases than
in those of groups more closely tied to the elite itself

(e.g. , the Army or the Party).

The data utilized in this examination are reflective

of the difficulty in obtaining information concerning

"closed" political systems. The Chinese regime has guarded

the secrecy of its decision-making procedures and has
attempted to structure the flow of information regarding

the announcement and implementation of policy in the nation

Richard Gerald Mendes

at large. Therefore, analysis of the Chinese situation

calls for the use of a certain sleuth-like approach

strongly reminiscent of pre—l956 studies of the Stalinist

regime. However, no nation as large as China can function

without leaving tell—tale traces of its activities. Two

major sources of information are available, and both are

utilized in this thesis. The first source of information

is the reportage of scholars and journalists who have been

allowed to visit China. The second is the group of Ameri-

can governmental agencies in the Far East that constantly

monitors internal Chinese communications. These agencies

painstakingly collect and translate Chinese newspapers,

magazines, and radio broadcasts. By judicious use of both

of these sources one can reasonably hope to derive a fairly

accurate picture of events in China.

The conclusion of this thesis is that the totali—
tarian model and the actual behavior of the Chinese regime
are similar enough to encourage further use of the totali-

tarian model in attempting to understand other functional

aSpects of the Chinese system. Furthermore, since a model

operates on the basis of analogy, it is a valuable tool

for prediction. Therefore, the totalitarian model also
holds promise as a framework for anticipating coming events
in China. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution can be viewed as
a logical extension of the elite-intermediate group rela—

tionships postulated at the outset of this thesis.

THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS
IN A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY: THE CASE

OF COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-1964

By

Richard Gerald Mendes

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

JDepartment of Political Science

 

© Copyright by
RICHARD GERALD MENDES

1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several persons have made the.preparation of this
thesis a possibility. I wish to thank Dr. Thomas Greene
for his aid in the early stages of my research. Dr. David
Bell and Dr. Alan Spitz, my dissertation committee readers,
contributed greatly to the completion of my work. Dr.
Bell's analysis and contributions colored the entire
theoretical and philOSOphical orientation, while Dr. Spitz
provided a wealth of information on the functioning of the
Chinese regime as well as insightful methodological com-
ments. I wish to especially note my gratitude to Dr. Paul
Hiniker, the chairman of my thesis committee. He helped
me formulate the basic concepts of this research and sub-
sequently provided intellectual and moral support at every
stage of my work.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my debt to my
parents, who never doubted that I would finish this thesis
(which is more than I can say for myself) and were a con-

stant source of encouragement.

ii

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

LIST OF TABLES .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. A TOTALITARIAN MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
III. MINOR PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
IV. MASS ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
V. MASS CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

iii

Table

LIST OF TABLES

Theoretical Framework
Minor Parties and Mass Organizations

Young Pioneers' Membership 1949-1960

Campaign Typology . . . . .

iv

Page
14
71

146

187

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research is to examine possible
relationships between the Chinese Communist Government and
a model totalitarian state. The first task, therefore, is
to explicate the procedures to be used in constructing the
model totalitarian state. This task must be considered in
terms of both the materials to be used for the process of
conceptualization and the structural requisites of model
building.

Turning first to the unstructured gathering of
materials (observations) which are the basics of the proc-
ess of conceptualization, one must choose between reliance
upon primary experiences and what might be termed "pre—
inducted" materials. It is far beyond the scope of this
research to construct the model from scratch. That is a
project which can fill, and has filled, numerous volumes.
Rather, the strategy of this paper is to synthesize avail-
able theory in order to provide a model. The intention
is to "boil down" the vast quantity of literature on the
subject until only the bare bones, the most basic charac-

teristics of the totalitarian model remain. The goal is

1

2

to reject totalitarian characteristics unique to a single,
or a small, group of authors; but rather to search for
characteristics which seem to be consensual across the
whole range of investigation into this field. In attempt-
ing such a project one must be wary of the subjectivity
of many authors, the tendency of various disciplines to
use different jargon to describe the same activity, and
the sheer bulk of commentary on totalitarianism. A sur-
prising fact is that in the great quantity of totalitarian
writings, there is a reasonably high degree of agreement
upon basics. Presented below are various scholars' char-
acterizations of the totalitarian model which, in the
opinion of the author, are fairly representative of both
the diversity and uniformity of opinion on this topic.

Perhaps the most widely known description of a
totalitarian model is that presented by Friedrich and

Brzezinski in Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.

 

They conceptualize a totalitarian regime as possessing

the following six characteristics:

(1) an official ideology which relates to all areas of
man's activity;

(2) a single mass party which is elitist and usually led
by a single individual;

(3) a terroristic police system;

(4) a "technologically conditioned" almost complete
control of mass communications media by the elite;

(5) a "technologically conditioned" almost complete

3
elite control of all means of armed combat;
(6) a centrally controlled economy.1
Actually, the use of the term "totalitarian"

itself seems to have stemmed from an article on Fascist

doctrine which Mussolini wrote for the Enciclopedia

 

Italiana in 1932.2 He wrote:

The Fascist conception of the State is all—embracing;
outside of it no human or spiritual values may exist,
much less have any value. Thus understood, Fascism
is totalitarianism, and the Fascist State, as a syn-
thesis and a unit which includes all values, inter-
prets, develops, and lends additional power to the
whole life of a people.3

Karl Schmitt was the leading Nazi political theorist.

Edmund Walsh in his work Total Power presents Schmitt's

 

interpretation of the essence of totalitarianism:

The development of government proceeds "in three
dialectic stages: from the absolute state of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the
neutral state of the liberal nineteenth century to
the totalitarian state in which state and society
are identical." (Der Huter der Varfassung, 1931,
page 79.) The final stage in this evolution was the
monopoly of all power, all authority, all will in the
Fuhrer, conceived and accepted as a Messiah endowed
with unlimited legal prerogatives in a state under
perpetual martial law.

 

Here are two descriptions of totalitarianism provided by
committed proponents of the system and it is interesting
to note they lack the thoroughness of modern, Western

descriptions rather than differing in content. The lack
of completeness is to be expected on the part of Schmitt,
since he was working in a society which frowned upon

Western scientific rationalism and urged its citizens to

"think with their blood."

4
In any case, modern analyses of the totalitarian
model are strongly reminiscent of these earlier state-
ments. Sydney Hook wrote in 1959:
A totalitarian society is one in which there is an
absolute and interlocking monopoly of power--economic,
juridical, military, educational, and political--in
the hands of a minority party which countenances no
legal opposition and is not removable by the processes
of freely given consent.5

This type of description more closely parallels that of

Mussolini and Schmitt than does that of Friedrich and

Brzezinski.

In point of fact, most contemporary analysts of
totalitarianism prefer to follow the example of Friedrich
and Brzezinski, and describe totalitarianism in terms of
a determining set of characteristics. A. James Gregor
very closely parallels Friedrich and Brzezinski in his
list of totalitarian features:

(1) an official ideology that extends to all areas of
human activity;

(2) a unitary party which is elitist;

(3) a governmental monopoly of police, weapons, and com-
munications;

(4) a centralized economy.6

Similarly, Boris Meissner, writing in Brzezinski's col—

lection Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, character-

 

izes a totalitarian regime as one possessing the following:
(1) unrestricted autocracy of the party (the lack of any
restrictions constitutes the difference between total-

itarian and autocratic regimes);

5
(2) total control from above (terror serves as a reminder
of this control) which extends to all areas of life
and all groups and organizations;
(3) total planning in the economic, social, political,
and cultural Spheres.7
N. S. Timasheff also presents a set of characteristics:
(1) concentration of power in the hands of a few;
(2) lack of individual rights vis a vis the collectivity;
(3) expansion of the state until it becomes almost synon-
ymous with the society.8
Karl Deutsch characterizes the totalitarian regime in much
the same fashion as above; however, his language varies
somewhat. He perceives three crucial characteristics of
a totalitarian regime:
(l) mobilization of effort (i.e., an active support by the
citizenry);
(2) unity of command (once again, centralization of power);
(3) effective power of enforcement (which implies govern-
mental control of weapons, police, and communications).9
Barrington Moore provides a more condensed version of many
of the above characterizations when he describes a central—

ized totalitarian system as:

. . . a society all of whose activities, from the
rearing of children to the production and distri-
bution of economic goods, are controlled and directed
from a single center. Presumably coercion plays a
large part in this centralized control.

Finally, Hannah Arendt distinguishes two central

factors of a totalitarian system. First, the atomization

6
of the individual. That is, the citizen of the ideal
totalitarian state has no allegiance, no frame of refer-
ence, and no empathy for any form of group whatsoever
aside from the monolithic state itself. Second, the

11 Bronislaw

totalitarian state is an imperialistic state.
Malinowski concurs, and indeed emphasizes this second

feature when he states, "Totalitarianism can be defined
as the supreme mobilization of natural resources for war
efficiency."12

The above descriptions of totalitarianism are but
a sample of the voluminous descriptions of totalitarianism.
Actually, most of the remaining descriptions differ from
those above not generally in meaning, but rather in com—
pleteness. How the preceding authors, among others, per-
ceive totalitarianism will be presented in greater depth
below, as a model of totalitarianism is synthesized point
by point.

The second task mentioned at the outset was to
comment upon the process of model building as it relates
to this research. Until now the term "model" has been
used in the lexical sense, primarily because many writers
quoted above made use of this term and it is inadvisable
for the author of this paper to account for EEEEE usage(s).
For the purposes of the research to follow, however, it is

necessary to present a stipulative definition of "model"

in the interests of clarity and rigor.

7

The term "model" seems to have a multiplicity of
usages in the social sciences. Items labeled as models
may be more or less rigorous, physical, formal, or pre-
scriptive. Scott Greer comments:

The term model is used, however, in various senses.
In the policy sciences it is sometimes used to refer
to ideal conditions--model behavior by model peOple.
It is sometimes just a way of referring to fairly
abstract theory. And it sometimes refers to the
process of quantifying laws.13
Van Dyke also notes this problem in stating " . . . that
imitation, explanation, and prescription are all associa-
ted with the notion of a model and that some confusion
results."14 The ambiguity inherent in the term "model"
seems to be partitionable into three distinct areas: (1)
the idea of "formal" and "informal" models; (2) the rela—
tionship between "model" and "theory"; and (3) the
distinction between "model" and "ideal type."

The idea of a formal model seems to hinge upon the
degree to which the model is symbolic and divorced from
empirical referents.15 Meehan contends:

What is a formal model? In the simplest terms
possible, it consists of a set of carefully defined
elements and the rules for manipulating them; the
whole system is usually reduced to symbolic form--
Euclidean geometry is a classic example. From a
slightly different point of view, a formal model
comprises a set of axioms and all of the postulates
of theorems that can be derived from those axioms
according to the canons of formal logic.

"Formality" in a model can also entail the ability

to quantify parallel elements. Greer reflects this line

of reasoning in his conception of a "formal" model:

8

It seems most sensible to use the term "model"
to refer to a developed theory that is isomorphic to
an undeveloped one. A mathematical model would then
be a developed theory for which quantitative values
can be stated, values for the description of both
variables and relations among them. In this sense,
mathematical models are of little value for social
science except in those areas where variables conform
to the demands of true number; otherwise isomorphism
is not determinable . . . , such areas are rare.

The formal model is therefore: (1) a symbolic system
whose symbols, as elements, are divorced from empirical
referents; and (2) often, a system whose relational
aspects can be examined vis—a-vis another system only
through quantification.

If the scope of the usage of the term "model"
were restricted to only formal models, it would hold
little promise for the purposes of this research. However,
there are non-formal models which are more immediately
useful. Greer states:

Although models, if rigorously defined, have presently
a very limited use in social science, the term "model"
is ubiquitous. One could dismiss this popularity as
merely a fad, a new cargo cult, if there did not seem
to be a common meaning underlying all the usages noted.
This use of "model" would seem to indicate a config-
urative concept that can be used in widely varying
circumstances. It is a formal abstraction, like any
complex concept, and its utility varies with the
empirical nature of its referent.18

Greer, in fact, allows great flexibility in the usage of
the concept:

In common usage, then, we are not talking about

formal models most of the time. We are really talking
about something that precedes formalization, precedes
axiomatic and formal theory. We are in fact using a
controlling conceptual scheme, one that is purely
formal and without content, one that may lead to the
construction of empirical theory. Let us be clear:

 

9

model, as we use it in social science, simply refers
to a guiding metaphor.19

 

Therefore, "models" in political science may assume a
variety of forms. That is, to utilize Kaplan, a family
of conceptions of model (including a subset of "formal
models") is inherent in the concept of model.

A second concern in the consideration of model
building is the relationship, and possible overlap,
between "model" and "theory." Kaplan contends that the
use of the term "model" is often of little methodological
value when one is simply Operating upon "theory."20 Kaplan
states:

We can now understand why the term "model" is
sometimes used as a synonym for "theory," especially
one which is «couched in the postulational style.

The model is conceived as a structure of symbols
interpreted in certain ways, and what it is a model
of is the subject-matter Specified by the interpre-
tation. Relations among the symbols are presumed

to exhibit corresponding relations among the elements
of the subject-matter. The theory is more or less
abstract-—that is, it neglects certain variables--
and what it describes are certain more or less "ideal"
entities, having an existence only in the context of
the theory itself. What is hoped is that the system
of such entities will be isomorphic, in appropriate
reSpects, to the real system which provides the
subject-matter for the theory.21

What Kaplan has outlined above he suggests be termed

22 rather than "model."

"theory in postulational form,"
Kaplan is, in essence, stating that in order for a theory
to be a model, only the relational aspects of the elements
may be evaluated for isomorphism and there is no need for

the elements themselves to be isomorphic to any degree

whatsoever. This point is especially important to this

10
research because the "model" used here would lose its
validity in light of Kaplan's categorization. The fault
in Kaplan's treatment is that he dichotomizes theories
into sets of either totally relational or other. That is,
he leaves no room for degree. It might be reasonably

stated that a "model" emphasizes the relational aSpects

 

and thus "model" and "non-model" theory are end points on
a continuum. In this context, the use of the term "model"
in the present research is valid, since the primary func—
tion of the structure is to permit extrapolation and pre—
diction based upon congruity of form, and the empirical
referents function merely as indicators of relevance,
rather than as explanatory hypotheses. It might be added,
and will be illustrated, that Kaplan's severe restrictions
upon the usage of the term "model" are not generally
reflected in the literature on structure of theory.

A final consideration of model building is the
Possible distinction between "model" and "ideal type."
Ideal types come in two forms: prescriptive, and
descriptive. The use of the term "model" to represent a
Prescriptive ideal type is common. Van Dyke comments:

. . . we should note that models sometimes represent

a conception of the desirable, constituting patterns

or ideal types, and so take on a normative or prescrip-
tive quality. Thus one of the characters in the
Pirates of Penzance claimed, "I am the very model of

a modern Major-General." In this sense, there are

also model professors, model wives, and model students.
And there are models who diSplay dresses in fashion
shops and models who pose for artists. To name them

as models is to prescribe. Imitation is recommended.
Those who want to excel as Major-Generals, professors,

 

11

wives, or students, and those who want to achieve the
beauty of the fashion model or the artist's model
should seek an isomorphic correSpondence of a one—to-
one sort with the model.23

Although the use of the term "model" in the above sense is
quite common in everyday life, in this paper the term is
in no way prescriptive.

A second form of "ideal-type," the Weberian form,
is descriptive. It simply describes the "pure" form or
what might be described as the modern equivalent of a
Platonic Form. Kaplan states:

An ideal type may be a construct like the limiting
concepts. . . . It Specifies something "with which
the real situation or action is compared and surveyed
for the explication of certain of its significant com-
ponents." (135:93) [Weber, M.: The Methodology of the
Social Sciences, Glencoe, Ill., 1949f] As such, it is
a particularly useful device for dealing with internal
vagueness. No state in history has been wholly, fully,
"truly" a democracy, just as no male has exhibited all
the traits of masculinity in superlative degree--
Athens did not extend suffrage to slaves, and even
Achilles was given to tears. But we can conceptualize
perfect specimens of any species.24

 

It is therefore obvious that one need not choose between
utilizing a model or an ideal type, since the two are
separate entities and not mutually exclusive. One can
construct a model gf_an ideal type. "Model" refers to
the manner or style of conceptualization while "ideal—
type" refers to a type of concept. Thus a model of an
ideal type would be a construct primarily concerned with
the elemental relations within some "pure" entity. One
might also have theories about ideal types as well as

models.

12
Having considered the various uses of the term
"model" (as well as "ideal type") and the ambiguities of
the term, it is now necessary to stipulate the use of the

term in this paper. First, a model is an abstraction.

 

As Van Dyke writes, ". . . , a model is an abstract image

--a simplified and composite version-~of a class of

a."25

;ptienomen Second, a model functions via the process

 

of analogy. Lastrucci writes:

A model, as employed in scientific discussions, refers
to a parallel form, simpler than the complex subject
it represents but having a similar structure or
organization.é

And Nagel adds:

In analogies of the first kind [substantive analogies],
a system of elements possessing certain already
familiar properties, assumed to be related in known
ways as stated in a set of laws for the system, is
taken as a model for the construction of a theory for
some second system. This second system may differ
from the initial one only in containing a more in-
clusive set of elements, all of which have properties
entirely similar to those in the model; or the second
system may differ from the initial one in a more
radical manner, in that the elements constituting it
have properties not found in the model (or at any rate
not mentioned in the stated laws for the model). 7

Ellird, a model, because it is an analogous structure, is

 

\nsed for prediction and extrapolation rather than explana-

 

Eigg. Meehan writes, ". . . , formal models can often be
Used as predictors, even though no explanation of the
phenomena being examined is available."28 van Dyke sim—
ilarly contends, "A correSpondence is specified between
attributes of the model and what is modeled. Neither

explanation nor prescription enters in."29 Finally, a

 

 

13
model can encompass an "ideal-type" and, in effect,

represent the pure form of a phenomenon. Lastrucci sums

 

up this position:

Science is fundamentally a particular method of
achieving reliable knowledge. In pursuit of that
achievement, all its knowledge is theoretical--i.e.,

it is an interpretation of reality, not the reality
itself. This theoretical interpretation is often
arranged in terms of ideal or perfect forms or con-
ditions--e.g., an absolute condition designated as a
"solution," a Specific and discrete entity as a "cell,"
or an absolutely round figure designated as a "circle."
Such conceived ideal forms are termed models, whether
referring to Simple concepts such as "solutions" or

to highly abstract concepts such as "the law of
gravity." But such models are only approximations,

and hence tentative interpretations of reality. The
function of science, therefore, is to endeavor con—
stantly to refine and improve such models so that

they may continually approximate more closely the
assumed reality of form and matter in terms of
increasing and more refined empirical evidence.30

 

Table 1 presents the model of the "pure" or
"ideal" totalitarian state which will be utilized in this
VVc>rk. The basic axiom of the entire model is that total-
211tarian regimes seek the totalization of power. A defini-
tion of power and the derivation of the lower-level
191?opositions will be presented in later sections. But
fifr‘st it is necessary that the nature of the testing be
Ina-(‘le clear. Specifically, the propositions in Table 1
are 223 hypotheses, whose validity in relation to total-
itarianism in general will be tested in the course of
tiliis work. Rather, because they are components of a model,
trlGBy are the "givens" of an equation and are axiomatically
t‘?l1e. If one wishes to question their validity he must do

SC) by criticizing either the basic (general) assumptions

14

 

Manchu 29H? moofiuomhmpsfi
masosw no“ munchovnfi :OHmownnmm: Av

.mHnsoa>aosa oeanmom an

 

 

mast mo mononum can mpflnonpsm mo mocfia omsmsoo Am oflmfloomm
xDHm mo mumpm pampmsoo m SH museum sows AN
mQSOMw so>ooxm910hm Ham Honesoo no soupmon AH
OOSmHHHo>hsm Hmsofi>flocfi mo masonw OpmfioosHOch
pampmnoo Am hsoooasm honpmom an no SSOSOHSN hospmon AH
oncoming:
wcfixOOMIuosoo SOBOQ mo mcofim
ow mamow Ham mpwao Icouxo o>HumufiHmno
mo cofipmcaouonsm Am Hmsnowsfi cam UOQHqu AN tam o>fipmpflucmsa AH
sosoo mo sofipmufiampoe Hmhococ

 

Hooos smfinmpfiamaoe mo mofiumahOpomhmno

snooze mo Ho>oq

 

um03m2<mh A<UHBWQOHEB

H 3mg

15

of the model presented earlier or the logic of the

deductive process employed. Should the Chinese situation

in.no way whatsoever parallel the propositions, this does

INDt bring into question the validity of these propositions.

The above argument may lead the reader into some-

tliing of a cul-de-sac. That is, if the propositions are

£1)(iomatically true, regardless of their resemblance to

(Ellinese behavior, and since the behavior of the Chinese
Eglroups is true by nature of its very existence (i.e., the
laeehavior is what it is, it is empirically and sensually
true, and its existence does not cease simply because it

Ifziils to conform to a theory), then the question becomes,

vvliat is being tested?
What this research is testing is the relationship

13<etween the model and reality. Both the model and reality

EIITe accepted as true, only their relevance to each other

(lain be falsified (assuming the testing procedure itself is

Perhaps a simplistic version of this question
One

c3<>rrect).

‘3Eln bring the entire Situation into Sharper focus.
may state that human beings need water in order to live,

as a logically derived true prOposition of human behavior,

deduced from the model of a "human being." One may also

'3t353erve the activities of creature Q. If creature Q uses

11¢) 'water, assuming the method Of observation itself is

v‘lilid, one can conclude that the model of "human being"

Ahalfis some amount Xwater less relevance to the understanding

cxf' creature Q (where the sum of X? represents the total

16

sum of human characteristics), than would be the case if

creature Q had used water. For creature Q to be human,

Q = xwater I Xhair I Xreproduction I + Xn'

Therefore, what iS being tested is not the model of

humanity, which is a given, or the reality of Q, which is

a. fact of existence, but the validity of the equation.
This research operates on the same principle as

that outlined above. But the research is not testing a

Simple equation, which is often an either/or proposition.

The task is more complex. Relationships become a matter

of degree. In short, this work is testing, in a very non-

<llzlantitative fashion, the relevance of the totalitarian

model to Chinese behavior, based upon a limited number of

prOpositionS within the model.

The Chinese regime cannot conform completely to

1file totalitarian model, or even completely to the limited

Set of propositions presented within this work. Every

earthly regime is sui generis in totality and no model can

parallel all interaction. The question then becomes, how

closely does China parallel the totalitarian model? That

is how useful are the characteristics of totalitarianism,

3

as presented in this model, for predicting events in China.

The Chinese regime may be thought of as a point in N

dimensional Space. Each dimension represents a form of

gtD‘Iernmental organization and the research hOpes to help

fie‘termine how closely the Chinese regime lies to the axis

°f totalitarianism.

17

The reason for this research is thus evident. If

it can be demonstrated, on the basis of an examination of

a portion of the model, that it is analogous to Chinese

behavior, then there is some support for: (1) extending

the analogy to other portions of the Chinese System, and

(2) using the model to predict behavior within all sec—

tions of the Chinese system. Therefore, the research iS

not intended to explain why the Chinese behave in a fashion

Similar or dissimilar to that postulated in the model;

rather, it is intended to help ascertain the usefulness of

the model for anticipating a wide Spectrum of behavior.

Furthermore, as many theorists indicate, if the model is

Ellaalogous to the empirical system, then one can examine

empirical interactions by studying model interactions.

As Table 1 indicates, the basic axiomatic principle-

Of a totalitarian regime is its drive to be the sole repos-

itory of power in the society. Therefore, before proceeding

further, it is necessary to consider the meaning and impli—

cnations of "power."

The process of conceptualizing "power" is a most

difficult task, as many political scientists can attest to.

R- H. Tawney insightfully remarked, ". . . power is the

most obvious characteristic of organized society, but it

is also the most ambiguous." Furthermore, there seems

to be a proliferation of ambiguities rather than a reduc-
tion, perhaps due to the necessity of each discipline to

conceptualize power in a fashion relevant to its needs.

18

It is possible, however, to examine various considerations

of power in terms of general categories and, hopefully,
discover a conceptually meaningful and useful usage of the

term.
Definitions of power can be arranged in terms of

tnwo considerations: (1) whether the definition examines

power in terms of its components (power bases or attri-
lolites) or its relational aspects, and (2) whether power
:155 a motivated process or simply a Situational condition.

UPlie two conditions are complementary rather than mutually

exclusive:

Motivation

(Illaracteristics

Conscious Unconscious Situational

 

 

Power Bases

 

 

 

Interactions

The "bases-interaction" dimension is of primary

<3<3ncern in this research. That is, because a model is

being utilized, the motivation of power usage iS peripheral

't<> its actual operation. The "bases-interaction" dimen-

sion is also, in general, dichotomous. That is, most

'tllteorists define power in terms of either its attributes

5332, as a relationship between elements. Of those who
£3131?ess the bases of power Simon is prominent. He uses the

'tGSer "authority" but it seems to be, in effect, a substi—

tute for "power." Simon writes:

19
Because the person who accepts proposals may do
so for a variety of motives, there will be seen in
any organization a number of different types of
authority relationships, corresgonding to these dif-
ferent motives for acceptance.3
:Simon goes on to discuss the various types of authority
(hi.e., the bases of power). Briefly, he divides the bases
cxf power in the following fashion:

A . Authority of Confidence (obedience stems from the

 

belief in another's ability)

1. Functional Status (expertise)
2. Hierarchical Status (position)
3. Charismatic Leadership

13.. Authority of Identification (obedience stems from the

 

need to identify with a group)

C3- Authority of Sanctions

 

l. Non-hierarchical Sanctions
2. Hierarchical Sanctions (authority stems from
deprivations caused by a higher position in the
structure of organization)
3. Rule of Anticipated Reactions (obedience stems
from threat of sanctions)
- Authority of Legitimacy (obedience stems from one'S

belief that he should obey)33

Nieburg, in his discussion of political violence, also
ln‘atitions bases of power. He writes:

Domestic, politically socialized power is transmuted
into indirect forms manifested by prestige, influ-
ence, property-holding, skill, class or caste, phy-
sical beauty, and the like. The constituted authority

20

structure holds a legitimate monopoly of the means

of physical power in order to enforce the norms of

social relationships, rights and reSponsibilities,

procedures for political change, conduct and media—
tion of private and public bargaining, and exchange
of values among individuals and groups by means of

attenuated and socialized forms of indirect and de—
centralized power.34

Schermerhorn, in his work Society and Power, refers to

 

Bierstedt's discussion of the sources of power:

Bierstedt is more persuasive when he declares that
the source of power in human society is threefold:
"(1) numbers of people, (2) social organizations,

and (3) resources," particularly where intergroup

relations are concerned.35

€3<2hermerhorn also presents his own set of power sources.

lies contends that there are five major bases of power:

(21) military, police, or criminal power with its control

(:2)

(:3)

(‘1)

(5)

over violence;

economic power with control over land, labor wealth,
or corporate production;

political power with control over legitimate and
ultimate decision-making within a Specified territory;
traditional or ideological power involving control
over belief and value systems, religion, education,
Specialized knowledge, and propaganda;

diversionary power with control over hedonic inter-

ests, recreation, and enjoyments.36

A-::l-‘l:hough all of the above definitions are generally use-

:E‘JII, there are, on the whole, inappropriate for the

I33'E‘esent research for two reasons. First, they exhibit a

tendency to define power in terms of other abstract

21

concepts and are thus partially exposed to the criticism

of circularity. Second, since it is a model with which

the author of this paper is working, the interactional

characteristics of "power" are of primary concern. To

discuss power as an entity is irrelevant, to discuss it

as a relationship is crucial.

Therefore it is necessary to examine some defini-

‘tions of power put forth by theorists who emphasize the

linteractional aSpects of the concept. These definitions

Cain.be divided into four general categories: (1) those

truat emphasize the role of power in structuring or moti—

Vating a society; (2) those that view power in terms of a

C3111sh of systems; (3) those that discuss power as it

relates to conflict and/or sanctions; and (4) those that

Vilew power as an actor upon the probabilities of events.

The first group mentioned above consists of those
definitions of power which define power as some cohesive

‘31? :motivational force acting vis-a—vis the society,

geanerally, as a whole. Nieburg expresses this position:
Much of philosophy and the social sciences deals

with "power," "violence," "force," and the nature and
function of the state and its police power. Power
iS the most overworked and ill—defined word in
political discourse. It can be defined most concretely
in physical terms: Power is the application of energy
to do work. It is the man or machine moving a mass
from here to there. At a higher level of abstraction,
power is the ability to direct energy to modify or
control the environment, to express values (designs,
goals, etc.) through intervention in the configuration
of things. In terms of the social environment, power
may be viewed as the ability to direct human energy
(i.e., attitudes and behavior) to express or realize

22

certain values by the organization and use,
modification and control of both physical and human
(i.e., behavior itself) materials. . . 37

Huntington contends that Talcott Parsons also reflects
this view:

Parsons says power is ". . . the ability to
mobilize the resources of the society for the attain-
ment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment
has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization,
above all, of the action of persons and groups, which
is binding on them by virtue of their position in the
society." 8

Ifiinally, Lynd also exhibits this society—oriented con-
ceptualization of power:

Organized power may accordingly be conceived as the
process by which whatever is the version of order and
disorder in a given society is continually defined,
redefined, and maintained. Order in this sense is
the way the major routines of a population's daily
actions are channeled toward selected goals in the
use of available institutional means.39

 

The consensus on this position, then, seems to be that
pOwer is a force which motivates one set of elements in a
ES<><3iety to accomplish some task. In a sense, power is the
ability of a society to utilize its various resources in
‘51?<der to accomplish goals or establish or preserve patterns
02'? behavior.

The second conceptualization of power mentioned
at><>ve is somewhat similar to the first. That is, it also
c3<>riceptualizes power as a system-wide relationship; how—
e\'er, it stresses the conflict or disruption between
S‘ystems. Karl Deutsch puts forth this definition:

We might say, then, that power consists in the prob-

ability of preserving the inner structure of one of
the systems in a clash, with little or no relevant

23

modification, at the price of bringing about rela-

tively large modification in the structure of the

systems which clash with it. In other words, power

consists in accepting the least amount of non-

autonomous change in one system while producing the

largest amount of non-autonomous change in another.40
Thus Deutsch views power as a prOportional relationship,
involving both change in the object of the power relation-
ship and change in the wielder of power. The problem with
this definition lies in its inability to conceive of power
in absolute amounts. That is, one system which produces
no change in another system and suffers no change itself,
is equivalent in power to a system which produces total
change in another system yet undergoes total transformation
in the process. However, it would, by this point, seem
conceptually necessary to admit that the Simple ability to
produce change is somehow related to power. Thus to equate
the absence of activity with the ability to produce vast
change is a fruitless line of argument. In terms of a
simple application, it would be stating that the Nazi
regime had no more, or perhaps even less, power than a
rock. Therefore, the effect of power upon the wielder of
power, while perhaps useful for an understanding of power,
cannot be allowed to become a determining factor.

A third view of power relates the concept to sanc-
tions (deprivations) and, in some cases, to conflict.
Harold Lasswell presents the classical definition of this
type:

At this point we narrow our conception of power,
using the term to designate relations in which severe

24

deprivations are expected to follow the breach of a
pattern of conduct. . . . This eliminates an enormous
range of relationships in which a breach is assumed to
be of trivial importance.

This mode of conceiving power emphasizes the
crucial role of expectation. One conductor may expect
to deal strictly with his men, and to impose penalties
for minor as well as major deviation from the faithful
following of his cues. And an orchestra may expect to
deal strictly with conductors if the players are dis—
satisfied. Indeed, by deliberate non-cOOperation or
hostile agitation, they may get him fired.41

Bachrach and Baratz also utilize the notion of sanctions,
and they also add the idea of conflict. They conceptualize
power in the following manner:

We can now draw together the several elements of our
conception of power. A power relationship exists
when (a) there is a conflict over values or course of
action between A and B; (b) B complies with A's
wishes; and (c) he does so because he iS fearful that
A will deprive him of a value or values which he, B,
regards more highly than those which would have been
achieved by noncompliance.42

In fact, they insist upon conflict as a condition of a
power relationship:

. . . , in Speaking of power relations, one must take
care not to overstate the case by saying that A has

power over B merely because B, anxious to avoid sanc-
tions, complies with a given policy proclaimed by A.43

Of course, one must also consider the question of what
constitutes a sanction. Lasswell tackles the problem by
enlarging the range of application:

Manifestly, expectations may differ about what
constitutes a deprivation, and what is mild or
severe. When we are examining not one human asso—
ciation but a whole community, or all the communities
of which there is knowledge, we define severity or
mildness in the light of the entire panorama of rela-
tionships which are taken into account.44

.

.‘IIF
A

Ono‘“

P‘0. ‘

A.“

3'" Lf

o—O- (Y) tn

I),

25
George Orwell presents a rather extreme, though hardly
viable, View of the proper role of sanctions:
How does one man assert his power over another? . . .
By making him suffer. Obedience is not enough.
Unless he is suffering how can you be sure that he is
obeying your will and not his own? Power is in
inflicting pain and humiliation. Power is in tearing
human minds to pieces and putting them together again
in new shapes of your own choosing.45
Finally, Schermerhorn combines the notion of sanctions
with that of decision-making capabilities:

. . , we may define power as the processual relation
between two parties modally characterized by (l)
asymmetrical influence, in which a perceptible prob-
ability of decision rests in one of the two parties,
even over the resistance of the other party; and (2)
the predominance of negative sanctions (threatened or
actual) as a feature of behavior in the dominant
party. . . . In summary: whatever the deviation from
either of the modal characteristics, power relations
are still present as long as one of the two variables,
asymmetry, or negative sanctions, still remains. 45

The thrust of these arguments is fairly clear; A has power
over B if, and sometimes only if, A can impose some depri-
vation upon B in order to force compliance. One fault of
this type of conceptualization stems from nonintercompara-
bility of sanctions. One man's sanction is another man's
reward, and not even Lasswell's attempt to "average out"
the idea of sanctions can suffice to solve the problem.

A second, and more serious, fault lies in the inability

of these theories to account for changed behavior due to
such "non-sanctions" as idealization and imitation, love,
charisma, etc. To claim a proper definition of power by
banishing the above types of behavior to other categories

(e.g., influence) is merely to make a semantic victory

26
out of a conceptual defeat. The behavior of men and
groups is controlled and influenced by the carrot as well
as the stick, and to ignore either is unsatisfactory.

The fourth View of the nature of power seems to
hold the most promise. It conceives of power as the
ability to change the probability of occurrences. Deutsch
states:

. . . , power is the ability to make things happen
that would not have happened otherwise. In this
sense it is akin to causality, that is, to the pro-
duction of a change in the probability distribution
of events in the world. And since the world is
changing already, power deals with the change of
change--or second-order change. Thus power involves

our ability to change the changes that are already
under way and would continue without our intervention.

47
Thus, the probabilistic approach avoids the major pitfalls
of the earlier approaches by avoiding the almost hopeless
complexities and ambiguities of what power is and focusing
upon what power does. The concept is defined by its mea-
surement. That is, all the earlier approaches defined
power in terms of its identifying characteristics, either
its bases or the features of interaction associated with
it. This led to either reification of the concept of
power, or the unenviable task of trying to understand a
very abstract concept through a limited set of empirical
characteristics. The probabilistic approach eases the
Situation, and also eSpecially lends itself to use with
model building, by looking only at the effects of power

rather than power itself. Thus, in a very real sense,

power is as power does.

27

The concept of power which will be used in this
research is the probabilistic concept put forward by Dahl.
Briefly stated, Dahl measures power (he never truly
"defines" it) as the difference in probabilities of an
entity committing or not committing some act, dependent
upon either action or non-action by a second entity. That
is, A's power over B with respect to B committing act x,
dependent upon A's committing act w can be symbolically
represented as:

M (£ : w,x) = P (a, x/A, w) - P (a, x/A, W) = p1 - p2
where M is power, a and A are actors, x and w are their
reSpective acts, and p is probability.48 The description
presented above is the crux of Dahl's treatment. It is
not necessary here to recreate his entire work, it appears
in numerous places.49 Suffice it to say that for the pur-
poses of this research "power" is defined as the ability
of one actor to change the probability of a second actor's
performance of some deed, by committing a second deed.
This definition, although it may prove to contain certain
Operational difficulties, is especially suited, because

of its relational nature, to work with models.

As stated earlier, the primary goal of a total-
itarian regime is the ultimate concentration of power in
the hands of the totalitarian elite. Logically this
implies both a quantitative and a qualitative extension
of power. Quantitative extension of power entails an

GXpanSion of the amount of power held in relation to each

28
unit of the society. Qualitative extension of power
refers to the expansion of power beyond the political
Sphere and into every area of human activity. Hook states,
". . . , the historic tendency of all major totalitarian
states, particularly when they find themselves in a world
of non—totalitarian states, is towards total control."50
Arthur Schlesinger writes, "Totalitarianism, . . . , means
that all social energy—-all loyalty, emotion and faith—-
is focused upon a Single objective; . . ."51 Also,
Malinowski contends that "Totalitarianism consists
in the placing of one institution, the state, above all

52 The

others, at the expense of their very existence."
state, which i§_the totalitarian elite, is thus the center
Of all decision making, and its decisiOns are unquestion-
able. Kohn very correctly contends that ". . . , modern
totalitarianism has reasserted the same claim to absolute-
ness as medieval faith."53
But it is not simply the finality or absoluteness

of decision making which uniquely characterizes the total-
itarian regime. Many early deSpotisms and autocracies
were also in possession of absolute authority. What dis-
tinguishes the totalitarian state is the enormous range of
its power. It endeavors to extend its power into every
area of human existence. This feature distinguishes it
from mere autocracies. Neumann writes:

The design of modern dictatorship is essentially

different from that of its nominal antecedents.

Present-day autocracies are not just departures from
the democratic norm. They claim to present a system

29

of government outliving their dictatorial creator
and extending their sway into a totalitarian rule
over practically every Sphere of human interest and
activity. It is their quasi-institutional and total—
itarian character, this virtually limitless extension
in time and Space, that holds out the challenge to
democracy.

 

Schlesinger echoes this belief when he writes:

The totalitarian state, which has risen in specific
response to this fear of freedom, is an invention of
the twentieth century. It differs essentially from
old-style dictatorship, which may be bloody and

tyrannical but yet leaves intact most of the structure

of society. Totalitarianism, on the contrary, pul-

verizes the social structure, grinding all independent

groups and diverse loyalties into a Single amorphous

mass. The sway of the totalitarian state is unlimited.

This very fact is a source of its profound psycholog-
ical appeal.55

In fact, the idea of the all pervasiveness of the
totalitarian regime is probably the most widely held
belief on the part of totalitarian analysts. This char-
acteristic certainly predates Mussolini's popularization
of the term "totalitarian." The imposition of the state
upon the whole of society was a feature of Plato's ideal
political system. Furthermore, the French Utopian
Socialist St.-Simon was eSpousing the same idea in the
early nineteenth century: "Like the modern totalitarian
State, the Saint-Simonian doctrine demanded the total
Control of all phases of society and culture, including
the realm of personal life, family, religion, and
education."56 These early calls for a total state control
Were limited to small communities. It was only the tech—
nological revolution in communications which permitted

total control to be extended to a mass society.

30

Thus the modern totalitarian state transcends the
simple autocratic state by its extension into all Spheres
of human activity, and at the same time transcends the
old-style "total" state by its utilization of the communi-
cations revolution to extend its control to mass societies.
Hans Bucheim supports this contention in his description
of a modern totalitarian state:

. . . the totalitarian claim to power is not kept
within the bounds of possible governmental competence
but--as the name makes clear-—is intended to dispose
unreservedly over the totality of human life. The
claim is not confined to the area for which the state
is responsible but is allowed to encompass all areas,
and to have an exclusive voice even where the political
regime can at best play an ancillary role--as, for
instance, in family life, in scientific research, and
in art. Totalitarian rule attempts to encompass the
whole person, the substance and Spontaneity of his
existence, including his conscience. It does not
acknowledge the primacy of society over the state as
an area of freedom which, in principle, lies beyond
governmental control, but rather interferes in it
deliberately, to change it from the ground up according
to its own plan; for the regime wishes to create--in
accordance with its own ideological scheme and with
social engineering techniques--a wholly new society.

. . It undertakes the production of an artificial,
synthetic society.57

 

George Sabine also professes this belief:

[In a totalitarian society] Government may, indeed
must, control every act and every interest of every
individual or group in order to use it for enhancing
national strength; government is not only absolute
in its exercise but unlimited in its application.
Nothing lies outside its province. Every interest
and value—-economic, moral, and cultural--being part
of the national resources were to be controlled and
utilized by government.58

Kornhauser also emphasizes the totalitarian state's

absorption of society:

 

 

31

Thus, while it is a dictatorship based on mass support,
and while it is also based on elite-domination of
centralized organization, its distinctive character
lies in the fact that it is a permanently mobilized
mass movement which seeks to control all aSpectS of
life. Totalitarian dictatorships involve total
domination, limited neither by received laws or codes
(as in traditional authoritarianism) nor even by the
boundaries of governmental functions (as in classical
tyranny), since they obliterate the distinctions
between state and society. Totalitarianism is limited
only by the need to keep large numbers of people in a
state of constant activity controlled by the elite.59

 

Finally, Ernest Barker states the situation very clearly
when he writes, ". . . the system of single—party govern—
ment is led to engulf--to absorb, or at any rate regulate--
churches, trade unions, institutions of education, chari-
table organizations, and every form and phase of the
activity of the community's life."60
The totalitarian regime is therefore characterized
by an absolute and all-pervasive centralization of power.
The ideal totalitarian state not only decides for its
citizens such matters as who will govern, what major
domestic policy will entail, etc., it also controls the
most mundane and non—political questions of a person's
life. Marriage, leisure activities, proper foods, etc.,

all come under the purview of the totalitarian state.

Huxley's Brave New World presents a view of uniformity in

 

even such minor things as proper dress. Those who doubt
that a totalitarian regime's arm could ever reach that
far Should contemplate the stress put upon the wearing of

uniforms in many actual totalitarian regimes.

32

The extent of the totalitarian state's desire for
centralization of power can be seen in the fact that it
even surpasses human activity. That is, the totalitarian
regime would seek to impose its control upon nature itself,
(n'at least conceive of nature in such a fashion that it
conforms to the regime. Robert Tucker discusses the
Stalinist regime's projection of totalitarianism upon
nature. Tucker contends the Soviets could not accept non-
deterministic and non—ordered theories of science (e.g.,
Heisenberg indeterminancy principle, Mendelian genetics,
quantum theories which hold that electrons "choose their
own path"). In effect, Tucker concludes, the totalitarian
cannot accept an uncontrollable nature any more than he
can accept an uncontrollable social System.

In conclusion, the first (and probably most basic)
characteristic of the ideal totalitarian state is the
drive of the ruling elite to centralize power both quali-
tatively (over all aSpectS of life) and quantitatively
(absolute obedience).62 The next logical question, then,
is what is the nature of this totalitarian elite that

strives so forcefully for total power?

 

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Total-
itarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger,
1956), pp. 9-10.

2Robert Tucker, The Soviet political Mind (New
York: Praeger, 1963), p. 4.

 

31bid., p. 4.

4Edmund Walsh, Total Power (New York: Doubleday,
1948), p. 242.

 

5Sydney Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom
(New York: Collier Books, 1959), P. 182.

6A. James Gregor, Contemporary Radical Ideologies
(New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 20—21.

7Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social
Change," in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Dilemmas of Change
in Soviet Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969), PP. 71-75. .

 

8N. S. Timasheff, "Totalitarianism, Despotism,
Dictatorship," in Carl Friedrich (ed.), Totalitarianism
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1954), p. 39.

 

9Karl Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibil-
ities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian
Systems," in Friedrich, Totalitarianism, p. 309.

 

10Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social
Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 31.

11Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
(New York: Meridian Books, 1958).

12Bronislaw Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1944), p. 305.

13Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 19697. P. 140.

14Vernon van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical
Analysis (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1960), p. 104.

 

33

 

34

15Kaplan would not be in agreement with this
distinction; see Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964),
p. 264.

 

16Eugene Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought
(Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 292.

 

17Greer, p. 140.

1312;g,, p. 141.

19£pgg., pp. 141-142.

20Kaplan, p. 264.

21;p;g., p. 264.

2219;g., p. 264.

23Van Dyke, p. 107.

24Kaplan, p. 83.

25Van Dyke, p. 106.

26Carlo Lastrucci, The Scientific Approach

(Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc.,
1963), p. 130.

 

27Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), p. 110.

 

28Meehan, p. 294.
29V’an Dyke, p. 106.
3OLastrucci, pp. 61-62.

31R. H. Tawney, Equality (London: Allen & Unwin,
1931), p. 228.

 

32Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor
Thompson, "Why Men Obey," in John Kessel, George Cole, and
Robert Seddig (edS.), Micropolitics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 580.

 

33Ibid., p. 580.

34H. L. Nieburg, political Violence (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 11.

 

35

35Richard Schermerhorn, Society and Power (New
YOrk: Random House, 1961), p. 16.

 

36Ibid., p. 17.
37Nieburg, p. 10.

38Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
p. 143.

 

 

39Robert Lynd, "Power in American Society as Re-
source and Problem," in Calvin Larson and Philo Washburn
(edS.) , Power, Participation, and Ideology (New York:
David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 58.

40Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica-
tion (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1953), p. 73.

 

41Harold Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York:
The Viking Press, 1948), p. 12.

 

42Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and
Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework," in Roderick Bell,
David Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner, Political Power
(New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 102}

43Ibid., p. 102.

44Lasswell, p. 13.

45George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
& World, 1949), p. 270.

46Schermerhorn, p. 12.

47Karl DeutSch, Politics and Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 24.

48Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in
Behavioral Science, II, No. 3 (July 1957), 205.

 

49Ibid., pp. 201-215.
50Hook, p. 183.

51Arthur Schlesinger, The Vital Center (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 77.

 

52Ma1inowski, pp. 305-306.

53Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth
Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 65.

 

36

54Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (New York:
Praeger, 1965), p. 3.

 

55Schlesinger, p. 53.

56Georg Iggers, The Cult of Authority (The Hague:
Nbrtinus Nijhoff, 1958), p. 103.

 

57Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature
and Characteristics, trans. Ruth Hein (Middletown, Conn.:
Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 14.

 

 

53George Sabine, A History of Political Theory,
3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, E Winston, 1937),
p. 916.

 

59William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 122-123.

60Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (London:
Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 289.

 

61Tucker, p. 98.

62For an interesting counter-example to the total-
itarian concept of unlimited power, the reader might con-
sult Schlesinger's discussion of the extremely circumscribed
nature of political power-seeking in the United States; in
Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Co., 1966).

CHAPTER II

A TOTALITARIAN MODEL

A second characteristic of a totalitarian regime,
based upon its drive for power, is the unique nature of
the political elite. It is generally the case, at least
at the level of actual historical regimes, that the total—
itarian society has been dominated by a single individual.
Daniels' statement is typical of the conclusion of many
totalitarian scholars, "They [totalitarian regimes] have
all been dominated by individual dictators. In every case,
one man was the creator and director of the country after
the party took power."1 Similarly, Friedrich and
Brzezinski state that Goering once remarked to the then
British ambassador, Neville Henderson, "When a decision
has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on
which we are standing. It is the Fuhrer alone who
decides."2 Friedrich and Brzezinski conclude that the
individual totalitarian dictator:

. . . possesses more nearly absolute power than any
previous type of political leader, that he is com-
pletely identified with his actual following, both by
himself and by them, in a kind of mystical union,
that he is able to operate on both these levels as he

does because he is backed by mass propaganda and
terror--coercive cohesion-—and that therefore his

37

,-1._-_ 11-

 

38
leadership is not to be confused either with tyranny,
or des otism, or absolutism in their historical
forms.

It is obvious, then, that the ideal totalitarian
state can be ruled by a single individual. It is also
possible, however, that there may be a totalitarian elite
composed of a limited number of individuals who Share
this power, so long as this elite acts only as a unit.
Some form of oligarchy is possible, but only so long as
this elite is small enough to operate entirely on the basis
of inter—personal and entirely non-formal interaction.
The reason for this restriction is plain; should the elite
become too large or too formalized it will begin to adopt
some meaningful bureaucratic administrative procedures.
Thus, once power is institutionalized it must necessarily
become fragmentized. Any group, even if it is a segment
of the totalitarian elite, will tend to accumulate power
and loyalties once it is allowed to become a legitimate
institutional organization. Bureaucratization entails
Specialization of function (Weber) which in turn encour—
ages fragmentation of power. Hannah Arendt writes:

A hierarchically organized chain of command means
that the commander's power is dependent on the whole
hierarchic system in which he operates. Every hier-
archy, no matter how authoritarian in its direction,
and every chain of command, no matter how arbitrary
or dictatorial the content of orders, tends to sta—
bilize and would have restricted the total power of
the leader of a totalitarian movement.

Sabine contends that ". . . bureaucratic qualities, which

far more than political liberalism had been principles of

\

 

 

39

Cbrman constitutionalism, were in fact destroyed by the
rise of national socialism to power."5

What Sabine and Arendt point up is that bureau-
cratization, institutionalization, in effect the estab—
lishment of any lines of authority and/or the granting
of legitimacy to any group is a challenge to the total
control of the ruling elite. Why, therefore, should a
totalitarian elite court such a threat by establishing
rules, lines of authority, differentiated groups, within
itself? It can thus be seen that the totalitarian elite
(when it is more than a single individual) must be a group
small enough to function on the basis of non-formal and
totally inter-personal relations. Neumann characterizes
this operation as "oligarchic democracy." That is,
democracy only within the elite; and he adds, "Brutal and
merciless as the lieutenants usually are toward their
enemies, strutting like the gods of vengeance, they had
better not play the boss within the circle of their

0 6
associates."

In conclusion, the totalitarian model is dominated
by either a single individual in whom all power resides,
or an elite small enough to operate without the necessity
of formalized rules.

The final characteristic of totalitarian regimes,
stemming from its power-seeking, is the tendency to sub—
ordinate any and all societal goals to the desire for the

total concentration of power in the hands of the elite.

‘ " r-‘r-rmcmi '
I

__-Jx=:....-.

 

40
This characteristic is crucial in differentiating the
ideal totalitarian state from other forms of political
organization, some of which may possess totalitarian
characteristics to one degree or another. A true Communist
state, for example, will always strive for the attainment
of the final Marxist utopia whereas a totalitarian state
which makes use of Marxist ideology will abandon Marxist
goals when they become a threat to the power of the ruling
elite. Similarly, other societal goals can fall by the
wayside when they conflict with the drive for power. In
this sense, the totalitarian is strangely like the demo-
cratic state, that is, they both place the method of
governing (absolute power in one case and self-determina-
tion in the other) above any Specific end-point for the
society. They are both more concerned with the means than
the end, even though their respective means are polar
opposites.

Thus, the totalitarian regime will not let any
goals interfere in its drive for power. Obviously, the
elite will not sacrifice power in order to attain goals
to which the elite itself is not committed. For example,
one finds it hard to imagine the Nazi regime striving for
the goal of meaningful mass suffrage at the expense of its
own power. There is, however, a more difficult problem.
What happens when a totalitarian regime must choose
between surrendering power and the attainment of goals to

which it is publicly committed? This is a point in dispute

 

41
among totalitarian analysts. They do agree that the
totalitarian state possesses an ideology. The question
then becomes: does power seeking take precedence over
ideological goals or not?

Many theorists contend that the heart of a total-
itarian regime is its commitment to an all inclusive
ideology. Kohn, for example, writes that "The totalitarian
certainty of victory is based on an eschatological cOnfi-
dence free from all moral contexts."7 Ernst Nolte contends
that, "Every totalitarian dictatorship must be founded on
some necessary, incontestable factor which it perhaps
merely annexes, perhaps exceeds to a dangerous degree, but
which for the time being disarms the objections of its
opponents and elicits the approval of the masses."

Waldemar Gurian presents the classic example of this posi-
tion. He writes:
Montesquieu remarks that religion works a check in
despotic regimes which do not have any institutional
or traditional checks against the arbitrary actions
of the despot. An essential feature of totalitarianism
consists in the disappearance of this factual, though
neither legal nor institutional, limiting power of
religious habits and customs. On the contrary,
energies and forces which formerly had their outlet
and expression in religion, limiting the old despotic
ruler, are now driving forces behind and in the new
deSpotic regimes of the 20th century. The totalitarian
ideologies replace and supersede religion.9
What Gurian is saying is that ideology replaces religion
as the check upon the otherwise unchecked regime. Thus,
for Gurian, ideology (i.e., ideological goals) takes

precedence over the total centralization of power. He

goes on to contend that:

 

cm

 

 

42

In the pure forms of totalitarianism-—which are not
only an expression of methods by which the "new
prince" of Machiavelli must operate in the world of
the twentieth century--the ideology is the driving
force (and not primarily oratory) determining the
reality of the movement.

The formal structure of the ideology can be filled
with various contents and permits great flexibility.
But it would be a decisive error to conclude that
therefore the ideology—-Marxism and Leninism on the
one hand, the racial Weltanschauung of the Fuehrer on
the other hand--is unimportant, only a cover—up of a
drive for power and control without sense of limits
and moderation, as required by existing conditions and
power relations.10

 

Many theorists tend to replace Marxism or Racism with
Modernization and Industrialization as the ideological
goals of the contemporary totalitarian state. The content
of the ideologies varies; what remains throughout is the
idea that there is some set of ideological goals which is
of greater importance to the regime than the Simple drive
for total power.

This paper is diametrically Opposed to the
contentions of Gurian. It asserts that in the ideal
totalitarian state ideology is a Sham, a control device.
Furthermore, the totalitarian elite will in every instance
abandon an ideological goal if such a goal becomes a
threat to the drive for total power. Of course, since no
real regime absolutely conforms to the totalitarian model,
this will not always be the case in the real world. How-
ever, there are numerous historical events supporting this
assertion. Joseph Nyomarky, in his discussion of the Nazi
state points out the following instances: "Those people

who wanted to attach some programmatic content to National

._--_._._..__,_ if!

43
Socialism were called by Hans Frank the 'objectivists' as
Opposed to the 'totalitarians' for whom National Socialism'

remained an 'infinitely interpretable Weltanschauung,‘ or
"11

 

an 'empty faith' Nyomarky continues:
. . . in that year [1934] rose the "Order State,"
which was more concerned with the solution of existing
problems ("the principle of the execution of orders
at any price") than with the utopian future. In the
years after 1934 it became clear to all willing to
see and listen that the Nazi state was not to be a
socialist state, nor a state based on traditional
ideas of authority, but a state based on the concept
of order! Order became sacred regardless of its sub-
stance, and loyalty became equated with obedience.12

Nyomarky also discusses the roles of the Sturmabteilung

 

(S.A.--Storm Troopers) and Schutzstaffel (S.S.—-Elite

 

Guard) in the Nazi state. The S.A. made demands upon
Hitler in return for its support, and was thus a block to
his total control. The S.S., however, was an entirely
different type of organization:
The S.S. was based on the sanctity Of orders regardless
of substance; its code was unconditional obedience.
. . . In their oath, S.S. men swore unqualified loyalty
to the person of Adolf Hitler. . . . The S.S. was an
organization of men who broke with all traditions and
who followed their superiors blindly without questions
or reservations . . . ; it was the ideal political
expression of the Nazi state. The motto of its members,
"My honor is my loyalty," revealed the emptiness of
their fanaticism and made them ideal mercenaries of
the totalitarian leader.13
The same assertion has been made about the Chinese regime
by Lucian Pye. He writes, "Now, however, it seems relevant
to ask in simple accounting terms whether the Chinese have
not been paying an excessively high price Simply for main-
taining their political, that is, their control system,

and whether control has not increasingly become an end in

h.—

J.

 

44

itself and not a means."14 Barrington Moore states the
general case:

Today the insistent demand for a commitment--

commitment for its own sake--is part of a pervasive

totalitarian atmosphere. In my city the trolley

cars carry placards urging parents, "Give your child

a faith to live by." Apparently any reSpectable faith

will do. Its content does not matter.15

Basically, for the totalitarian regime, ideology

is a "tool" of control much like a police System or an
educational network. The content of the avowed ideology
has little relevance to the primary goal of the leadership
elite, the centralization of power. It may well be the
case, some may suggest, that the ideology represents a
set of secondary goals, which may be pursued only when they
do not challenge the regime's power. But even this is
anathema to the totalitarian elite; for if the elite allows
some set Of goals (even secondary ones) to exist legiti-
mately they could potentially supply a framework for rea-
soning, a yardstick against which to measure the actions
of the regime. Therefore the ideology must be kept ever
meaningless, ever shifting and changing so that it becomes
an instrument for total obedience rather than a set of
3 positive goals. This is the essence of Orwell's "double;
think." The world of 1284 is characterized by the lack of
a real ideology; in that world "War is Peace, Freedom is
Slavery, Ignorance is Strength."16 In The Trial, Kafka's

hero obeys seemingly irrational orders, and he obeys them

not because of a reasoned commitment to an ideology, but

 

45
because of a compulsion to obedience that not even he can
rationally comprehend.

As has been stated earlier, no actual regime can
fully satisfy the requirements of the totalitarian model
and therefore no real regime has ever totally subjugated
every pragmatic and utopian goal to the drive for total
power. Perhaps this is why the works of Orwell, Kafka,
Huxley, and others touch more closely upon the soul of
totalitarianism than do the works of social scientists.

In any case, the third basic characteristic of the ideal—
type totalitarian regime is its subordination of all goals
to the goal of centralization of power. Therefore, the
degree to which any actual regime follows this course is
an indication of the degree to which it approximates the
totalitarian model.

This section has been concerned with general
characteristics of the totalitarian regime (centralization
of power, informal nature of the elite, and subordination
of all ideological goals). In the next section, a set of
lower-level propositions about the totalitarian model will
be presented and discussed. I

The discussion thus far has concerned three basic
characteristics of the totalitarian model. Based upon
these generalizations, several more Specific characteristics
of the totalitarian model can be deduced:

(l) in order to insure total control, the totalitarian

regime will attempt to keep a close and constant

 

46
surveillance of all activities of each of its citizens;
(2) the totalitarian regimes will strive to destroy the
autonomy of the individual;
(3) the totalitarian regimes will strive to destroy the
autOnomy of all intermediate groups in the society.

The totalitarian regime can never feel absolutely
secure in its desire to attain and retain total power.

The mere possibility that somewhere, someone may be escaping
the control of the regime is almost neurotically abhorent
to the regime. What iS more, the fear of opposition grows
rather than diminishes as the regime gains greater power.
Most analysts of the totalitarian phenomenon have noted
the tendency of such regimes to reach a state of near-
paranoia as its real opposition is destroyed and it is
faced with the task of finding new enemies. Because the
fear of opposition is not terminal with the attainment of
stability, the need for a surveillance network lasts for
the life of the regime.

Of course, the regime desires to observe more than
simple opposition. Since the regime seeks to control
every aspect of life, it must observe everyone in all
activities, in order to be sure that its control does not
erode. Thus the need for an elaborate surveillance net—
work, penetrating all areas of society. Rather than a
Single network, in fact, the totalitarian regime must
maintain a set of surveillance networks, each separate from

the others. These networks spy not only upon the masses,

~_ra~ now—"ml! .

 

47

but on each other. The reason for this is plain: a
unitary observation network can easily acquire a will of
its own and become a rival power center in the society.
The networks must be strong enough to perform their func-
tions vis-a-vis the masses, yet weak enough to pose a
minimal threat to the totalitarian elite. Since an
observation or police organization is itself an inter—
mediate organization, the means used by the elite to both
utilize and control it are the same as the means for uti-
lizing and controlling all intermediate organizations.
These procedures will be discussed in detail later in this
chapter.

The point to be made here is that the regime §2§§
maintain such a set of networks, and does strive to be
informed about all activities. Ignazio Silone's Bread and

Wine portrays this system:

It is well known (says Minorca) that the police have
their informers in every section of every big factory,
in every bank, in every big office. In every block

of flats the porter is, by law, a stool pigeon for the
police. In every profession, in every club, in every
syndicate, the police have their ramifications. Their
informers are legion, whether they work for a miserable
pittance or whether their only incentive is the hope

of advancement in their careers. This state of affairs
Spreads suSpicion and distrust throughout all classes
of the population. On this degradation of man into a
frightened animal, who quivers with fear and hates his
neighbor in his fear of discovery, the dictatorship is
based. The real organization on which the system in
this fountry is based is the secret manipulation of
fear.

Thus, even in Fascist Italy, generally considered quite

far removed from the ideal totalitarian state, the

 

 

48
pervasiveness of the watchful eye of the regime was a
major factor of the system.

Silone's passage also bears upon the second
characteristic mentioned above, the totalitarian regime's
desire to destroy the autonomy of the individual. As will
be seen later, the totalitarian elite seeks to destroy the
possibility of an individual relating to a societal group
and thus acquiring a different set of perSpectives than
those supplied by the elite. Therefore, there are only
two sources of direction for the individual left, his own
self-reliance and the regime. What the regime desires is
the destruction of the individual's self-reliance. Thus
stripped of both inner dependency and the support of non-
regime controlled social group relationships, the individ—
ual becomes totally dependent upon the elite for all
direction and purpose in his life. The ideal totalitarian
citizen lacks any critical capacities, any self-reliance,
any ability to function away from the regime's control.

Else Frenkel—Brunswick discusses this psychological
attack upon self-reliance:

For those who have fallen within the grasp of total-
itarianism, rational argument is overshadowed by the
image of an all-powerful, superhuman leader whose

aura of strength, superiority, and glory afford sur-
cease from feelings of isolation, frustration, and
helplessness and whose doctrines provide an absolute
and all-embracing answer to the conflicts and confusions
of life and relief from the burdens of self-determina-
tion. These solutions, presented in a dogmatic,
apodictic, and Often inarticulate and unintelligible
way, are formulated for the explicit purpose of by-

passing the process of reasonable consideration and
of finding their mark in those emotional and instinctual

49

processes which prompt to precipitant action. Reason,
deliberation, and a manysided orientation toward
objects, situations, or toward life itself then appear
as irrelevant and thus as morbid.18

Thus the totalitarian man is as dependent upon the regime
for his mental sustenance as a baby is upon its mother for
physical sustenance. The first goal of a regime is there-
fore to break the individual loose from his old ties and

frameworks for analysis. Moore states, "A totalitarian

‘

movement tries to acquire a considerable mass clientele,

eSpecially from individuals turned loose upon the world by

19

the destruction of prior social bonds." Furthermore, as

20 21 22

Hoffer, Ortega y Gasset, and Fromm point out, the

masses may not be committed to preserving their individual

autonomies. Dostoievsky writes in The Brothers Karamazov,

 

"Man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find some
one quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom
with which the ill-fated creature is born."23 And Arthur
Schlesinger adds, "Man longs to escape the pressures beat-
ing down on his frail individuality; and more and more,
the surest means of escape seems to be to surrender that
individuality to some massive, external authority."24
Furthermore, Schlesinger realizes how totalitarianism feeds
upon this need of some in society to relinquish their
autonomy: ". . . the essential dynamism of totalitarianism
is toward the unlimited domination and degradation and
essential obliteration of the individual; . . ."25 Hans

Bucheim agrees that ". . . the totalitarian claim to power,

. . , is said to insist on treating peOple like objects,

 

50
never establishing a relationship with them but eager to
rob them of their independence."26
Thus, for those who seek to surrender their indi—

viduality, the totalitarian regime fills a need; but the
regime itself must seek to destroy the autonomy of all its
citizens, not merely those who are in agreement. In a
democratic society, persons who seek this type of direction
often find it in religion or in some other form of group
which does not encompass the entire society. Therefore,
those who prize individual autonomy are allowed to, in
effect, live their lives outside the system. But the
totalitarian state, in its drive for total power, cannot
afford such a luxury. William Kornhauser states:

The non-elite also needs to form and maintain hyper—

attachments to the elite in totalitarian society, for

Since people are given no other choice as to objects

of attachment, they must find psgghological sustenance

in this manner or do without it.
John Kautsky adds, "The goal [of a totalitarian regime] is,
again, to turn the population from a potential threat to
the regime into its pliant tool. The insecure, powerless
individual is to be satisfied by having himself and his
interests associated with, and indeed submerged in, a
large and powerful community."28

What then is this human end product which the

totalitarian regime works to produce? What is the "total-
itarian man" in his ideal state? Schlesinger states:

The totalitarian man denies the testimony of his

private nerves and conscience until they wither away

before the authority of the Party and of history. He
is the man persuaded of the absolute infallibility of

 

 

 

 

51

the Party's will and judgment, the agent who knows
no misgivings and no scruples, the activist who has
no hesitation in sacrificing life to history.2

And Adorno presents a classical psychological profile of
the totalitarian citizen:

Totalitarian society produces a psychological type
that is self-alienated, like the mass man, but group-
centered, like the tradition—directed person. Total-
itarian society engenders this combination by denying
any reSpect to the individual and by attaching all
meaning to the group (eSpecially the party in conjunc-
tion with the state). Possessing no legitimate privacy
and few personalized models of conduct, the individual
in totalitarian society sheds an unwanted sense of
individuality and submits psychologically as well as
behaviorally to the group. He does not regard himself
as distinct from the group. Since the group is dom—
inated by an elite possessed of a monopoly of power,
submersion in the group entails submission to the
elite. Extreme submission to the elite and extreme
hostility toward outsiders are characteristics of the
Totalitarian man.30

 

Finally, Szamuely casts light upon the totalitarian man in
his commentary upon the Soviet Union (whether or not his
comments are actually true in the case of the Soviet Union,
they are relevant to the totalitarian model):

Indeed, Lewis Carroll is an invaluable guide on a

Sovietological expedition: a journey to a land

where, for instance, a memory that only works back—

ward is regarded as a pretty poor memory, and where

most people have acquired the practice necessary to

believe as many as Six impossible things before

breakfast.31

Thus the totalitarian man is self-alienated,

insecure, lacks self-confidence; in short, his only source
of mental strength is the regime. Of course, the goal of
the regime is to Spread this state of dependency to all its

citizens, no one must even consider opposing the directions

of the elite. Furthermore, simple obedience is not enough.

52

Acquiesence is a characteristic of the authoritarian and
not the totalitarian regime. The regime demands whole-
hearted and enthusiastic support from its citizens because
grudging obedience indicates that the individual has suf—
ficient internal resources to arrive at a conclusion not
identical with the regime's. If an individual can reach
independent conclusions, even though he does not act upon
them, it indicates that the control and power of the regime
is not total. John Weiss states, "Totalitarian dictator-
ships must manufacture approval, not merely outlaw dis-
approval."32 Szamuely illustrates the difference between
autocratic obedience and totalitarian support in his
description of one aSpect of de—Stalinization in the Soviet
Union:

In other words, the striking difference between the

present-day USSR and Stalin's Russia is that today if

one keeps one's nose clean and one's mouth shut and

does nothing then one is guaranteed (barring a genuine

misunderstanding) not to go to gaol--whereas under

Stalin millions of people were sent to slave labour

camps literally for "doing nothing."33
Finally, Deutsch quips that "In a democracy, . . . ,
everything that is not forbidden is permitted; under an
authoritarian regime, everything that is not permitted is
forbidden; under totalitarianism, everything that is not
forbidden is compulsory."34

The totalitarian regime is not willing to accept

the grudging obedience of its citizens. It strives for

the active enthusiasm of each individual in every venture.

Simply accepting the dictates of the state may indicate

 

 

53
that the individual believes that he himself "knows
better" but can do nothing about it. This potential
willingness to rely upon one's own judgment is a threat to
the total authority of the elite. Thus, the ideal total-
itarian citizen is an individual who makes no decisions
for himself, but supports every elite decision as if it
were his own fondest wish.

The third and final characteristic to be discussed
is the desire of the totalitarian regime to destroy the
autonomy of all intermediate groups in the society. Korn-
hauser supplies an excellent description of what consti-
tutes an intermediate group. He states:

We can conceive of all but the simplest societies
as comprising three levels of social relations. The
first level consists of highly personal or primary
relations, notably the family. The third level con—
tains relations inclusive of the whole population,
notably the state. The second level comprises all
intermediate relations, notably the local community,
voluntary association, and occupational group. These
intermediate relations function as links between the
individual and his primary relations, on the one hand,
and the state and othernational relations, on the
other hand. It muSt be emphasized that voluntary
associations are not the only kind of intermediate
relation; all organized relations that mediate between
the family and the nation, such as local government
and the local press, are classified as intermediate
structures in the present study.35
For the purposes of this paper, Kornhauser's conception of
intermediate structures will be extended. Specifically,
an intermediate structure or group is any structure or
group that stands between the isolated individual and the
totalitarian elite. Governmental units (even the state

structure), voluntary associations, family units, and even

54
the totalitarian party itself are intermediate structures.
In fact, any association of humans, except for the total—
itarian elite, is an intermediate group.

The reader may be taken aback by such an inclusive
definition, and may well wonder how a model totalitarian
system can operate without these organizations. First,
one must consider the totalitarian leader(s) (one may
assume that a Single dictator presides over the system,
but the case holds just as well for an elite such as was
described earlier). The citizen would receive all inputs
from the leader and direct all outputs to the leader.
Physical isolation of the individual would be unnecessary;
he would simply not be cognizant of other humans around
him. The leader would experience no difficulty in issuing
directives to all the citizens; modern mass media can cope
with that task. The problem is one of surveillance and
decision making. How can the leader monitor the activities
of all the citizens, learn of the objective needs of the
system, or be sure that his orders are followed? What this
system calls for is some sort of gigantic input-communica-
tions net. A super-computerized system which can collect
and collate all incoming information and process it in
accordance with the wishes of the leader without either
burdening him with masses of details or adding any judg-
mental factor of its own. This is the ideal totalitarian
state, each individual tied completely and exclusively to

the leader.

55

Of course, the whole idea is a bit farfetched
given the present level of technology, and some may suggest
it is more political science—fiction than political science.
Perhaps it is, but imagine a person attempting to explain
the modern state and its reliance upon mass communications
to an eighteenth-century audience. Pictures that float
invisibly through the air would seem a bit Speculative to
a citizen of that era. Technology has a habit of over-
taking speculation.

But if one leaves the world of speculation and
returns to the present technological age, a different situa-
tion awaits him. Given the present level of technology, no
leader or elite can possibly keep tabs on an entire society.
Thus, unfortunately for the totalitarians, intermediate
groups are necessary evils. They are necessary for surveil-
lance, passing information up to the elite, and handling
countless decision-making tasks too menial to warrant the
attention of the elite. But they are evil because each one
is a potential rival for power in the totalitarian system.
This is the dilemma of the modern totalitarian state. To
meet this dilemma the totalitarian state has devised a set
of means to aid in utilizing these intermediate groups
while minimizing their threat to the system.

The desire of the totalitarian regime to destroy
the autonomy of intermediate organizations is a common fea—
ture of almost all conceptualizations of the totalitarian

model. Friedrich and Brzezinski discuss the various

56

"islands of separateness (family, church, university, and

military)" with which totalitarian regimes must cope.36

They then conclude that "the dictatorship seeks to divide
and rule in the most radical and extreme way: each human

being Should, for best effects, have to face the monolith

that is the totalitarian rule as an isolated 'atom'."37

In Specific reference to Germany, Walsh states:
"The Church [in Nazi Germany] was an obstacle in the way of
totalitarianism; hence it had to go. Total power cannot
tolerate divided allegiance."38 Sabine also discusses the
totalitarian need to subjugate or destroy intermediate
groups in Germany:

Except by permission of government there could be
neither political parties, labor unions, industrial

or trade associations. Except under its direction
there could be neither publication nor public meeting.
Education became its tool and in principle religion
was also, . . . Leisure and recreation became agen-
cies of propaganda and regimentation. No area of
privacy remained that an individual could call his own
and no association of individuals which was not subject
to political control. . . .39

Sabine then continues:

Totalitarianism undertook to organize and direct every
phase of economic and social life to the exclusion of
any area of permitted privacy or voluntary choice.

But it is important to observe What this type of orga-
nization concretely meant. First and foremost it meant
the destruction of great numbers of organizations that
had long existed and that had provided agencies for
economic and social activities. Labor unions, trade
and commercial and industrial associations, fraternal
organizations for social purposes or for adult educa-
tion or mutual aid, which had existed on a voluntary
basis and were self-governing, were either wiped out

or were taken over and restaffed. Membership became
virtually or actually compulsory, officers were
selected according to the "leadership principle," and
their procedures were decided not by the membership 40
but by the outside power that the leader represented.

57
Thus the totalitarians begin their rule by destroying or
capturing old forms of intermediate organization. This
attitude of totalitarianism does not end with the seizure
of power, however; the regime is constantly obsessed with
these groups. Weber states: "If the community is an
organic whole, deviations are corrupting and cannot be
tolerated. All must act as one, shunning dissensions as
intrinsically harmful, seeking a unity which alone can

"41 Intermediate

save in the providential person of one man.
groups are potential Spawning grounds for just such dis-
sensions. Alex Inkeles goes so far as to suggest that the
preeminent goal of the totalitarian regime is not to sub—

ordinate the individual per se, but to subordinate the

 

human associations of a society.42 He states:

 

. . . totalitarianism, in contrast to liberalism and
pluralism, leaps over the individual to give full
recognition and weight to the role of social institu-
tions in the structure and functioning of society.

It recognizes that one of the important aspects of
social organization in the large-scale society is that
the individual is related to the total social system
primarily through the institutional networks in which
he is enmeshed and it has therefore given Special and
primary emphasis to the subordination of the traditional
human associations, the organizations and institutions,
of which the individual is a member. This becomes the
chief tool for its ultimate subordination of the indi-
vidual to the state. Totalitarianism recognizes that
so long as certain of its crucial membership units are
not themselves subordinated to the demands of the
central authority, the individual himself may to that
degree be immune to full subordination.43

John Kautsky also recognizes the vital need to control
intermediate organizations. He states that "The new
organizations, all run by the regime, thus become organs

of supervision."44 The regime in fact encourages the

58

individual to participate in these controlled organiza—
tions in order to keep him "out of trouble." This, of
course, relates to a point made earlier; the totalitarian
regime cannot accept grudging obedience; the citizen must
actively demonstrate his support. These organizations
become the channels through which such activity is directed.
Barker similarly recognizes this use of organizations. He
writes:

The absolute on which it [a totalitarian government]
is based must be carried into every domain of life--
the social no less than the political: religion,
education, economics, the methods of sport and the
uses of leisure, as well as politics proper. Any
form of group for any activity is a potential rival;
it is a possible magnet of loyalty, which, however
insignificant it may seem in comparison with the great
loadstone, may none the less succeed in deflecting
the quivering point of allegiance. From early life,
the individual must be taught to point true: he will
be enlisted early in the Octobrists or the Balilla or
the Hitler Youth: his games, his holidays, the very
life of his family, will be drawn into the field of
the party the party-State, the leader, the ultimate
absolute.45

Several societies have attempted to construct the type of
organizational system outlined above. John Weiss discusses
the Italian experience:

The Italian Fascists created a vast network of
ideological and paramilitary leisure-time organiza-
tions, including the famous Depolavaro (after-work)
paralleling the Nazi Strength Through Joy. Only so
could they frustrate the development of spontaneous
cultural and leisure activities. Such activities
would, if allowed to arise freely, express the inde—
pendent and hence dangerous varieties of individual,
group, or class experience. Normally, each group or
sub-group in society can draw upon its own social or
work experience as a model from which to judge and
accept or reject what it is told or taught by
outsiders.46

 

 

59
The same holds true for the Nazi regime. Neumann describes
the Situation of non-central governments:

The totalitarian theory was also the instrument for
cO-ordinating all public activities. Absolute con-
trol from the top--the famous Gleichschaltung (syn—
chronization) of federal, state, provincial, and
municipal activities--was justified in the doctrine
of the state's total right and total power. In con-
trast to the pluralistic and federalistic Weimar
Republic, the new state could not and would not brook
the efi%stence of autonomous public bodies within it;

 

Kornhauser writes, in relation to the Soviet Union, that:

The intermediate structure of a totalitarian society,
on the other hand, helps to prevent access to the
elite by virtue of its domination by the elite. By
means of intermediate groups instituted and controlled
from above, the totalitarian regime is able to keep
the population in a state of mobilization. Such orga-
nizations as Soviet trade unions have the primary
function of activiating and channelizing the energies
of workers in directions determined by the regime. If
there were no controlled intermediate organizations in
all Spheres of society, people would be free to re—
group along lines independent of the regime. That is
why it is of the utmost importance to totalitarian
regimes to keep the population active in these con-
trolled groups. Totalitarian regimes search out all
independent forms of organizations in order to trans-
form them or destroy them. In certain other societies,
the natural decline of independent forms of associa-
tion prepares the way for the rise of totalitarian
movements.

 

The preceding discussion has attempted to high-

light the role of the intermediate organization in a
totalitarian state. That is, it is necessary as a tool
for the control of society but it is dangerous as a
potential opponent of the totalitarian elite. Ionescu
puts it directly:

In an ideal Apparat, or for that matter_totalitarian

state, the function of all these bodies {intermediate

groups] is that of "transmission belts" and of agencies
of state-control. But then it can be said that the

 

60
history of any "ideal" Apparat or totalitarian state
is precisely the history of the failure of the central
"monolithic" power to prevent institutional checks
from being reformed.49
This is the basic dilemma of totalitarian states: how to
use intermediate groups but yet retain complete control
over them.

It is the contention of this paper that the total—
itarian state has an arsenal of weapons to use in order to
try and alleviate this dilemma, Since by its very nature
it cannot be completely solved. These procedures or
weapons for both utilization and control are the tests by
comparison to which this paper hopes to gain some insight
into the usefulness of the totalitarian model for studying
Communist China. They are, furthermore, the least general
of the propositions thus far presented and are therefore
the most useful measures against which the behavior of a
regime can be empirically tested (although the reader must
keep in mind that they are but a Single set of totalitarian
characteristics and there are many other sets which deal
with different relations.and activities of the totalitarian
regime). These procedures of the totalitarian regime for
dealing with intermediate structures are presented below.
A. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will:

1. Destroy the old-style intermediate organizations
which cannot be utilized by the regime;
2. Infiltrate and control the old-style intermediate

organizations which are of some use to the regime;

61
3. Create a new set of organizations which are totally
thecmeatures of the totalitarian elite.
The totalitarian elite will attempt to prevent orga-
nizations from becoming identified with specific
interests in the society and thus being a potential
focus for individuals who share that interest. The
elite will do this by:
1. Attempting to prevent institutionalization.
Huntington defines institutionalization as,
". . . the process by which organizations and
procedures acquire value and stability."50 He
goes on to state that the level of institution-
alization is defined by the adaptability, com-
plexity, autonomy, and coherence of an organiza-

tion.51

The totalitarian regime attempts to
minimize the level of all four of the above mea—
sures by constantly keeping organizations in a
state of flux; that is, organizations will be
created and destroyed rapidly because the longer
an organization exists the more likely it becomes
that members of the organization will develop a
vested interest in it; therefore, the life expec—
tancy of an organization will be very brief as
compared to that of another society;

2. Attempting to separate leadership from expertise

in intermediate organizations--1eadership will be

vested in persons politically loyal to the regime

62
rather than persons who possess the necessary
expertise to run the organization or who represent
an area of knowledge which that organization was
created to Speak for (in China, of course, this

is subsumed under the "red-expert" controversy).

The totalitarian regime will seek to keep organizations

weak and insecure by maintaining confused lines of

authority:

1.

Various organizations will all be charged with the
same area of operation and thus the organizations
will act as a check upon each other (this is, in
effect, a totalitarian twist to the Madisonian

argument of Federalist #10. That is, since groups

 

cannot be abolished, they should be diverse enough
to check one another);

The regime will periodically and arbitrarily Shift
the locus of activity and/or authority from one
organization to another in order to prevent any one
organization from acquiring a sense of legitimacy
born of past performance, in the eyes of the
citizens; also, it helps perpetuate the totali-
tarian atmosphere by denying to citizens sure
knowledge of where authority lies, thus helping
to keep the citizen in a perpetual state of flux
and insecurity as well as adding to his general

feeling of helplessness;

63

3. The regime will constantly set up a gallery of
figureheads--this will serve many of the same
purposes as (2) above, but also the figureheads
are available as scapegoatsfor the failures of
the regime, thus preserving the "infallibility"
of the elite; these figureheads are usually placed
in positions of prominence in intermediate orga-
nizations, often as a direct prelude to their
disgrace.

D. The regime will try to base organizations on a fictional
Shared interest rather than a real one. Thus, Sports
and leisure clubs are fabricated to replace real orga-
nizations. Mass groups based on characteristics such
as "motherhood" are encouraged as replacements for
organizations which are centered about an actual and
immediate felt need of its members. This lessens the

attachment which the member will build for the group.

This section has attempted to analyze the dilemma
of totalitarian regimes in their relations with interme—
diate groups (i.e., utilization vs. control). It has
further presented a set of propositions outlining the pro—
cedures which the totalitarian regime uses in order to
ease this dilemma. Now the research will focus upon a set
of intermediate groups in Communist China vis—a-vis their
adherence to these procedures and by doing so hopefully
will help determine the usefulness of the totalitarian

model for understanding Chinese activities.

NOTES
CHAPTER II

1Robert Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York:
Vintage Books, 1962), p. 305.

 

2Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Total-
itarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger,
1956)} p. 23.

31bid., p. 26.

4Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
(New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 364-365.

5George Sabine, A History of Political Theory,
3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1937),
p. 917.

6Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 20.

7Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth
Century (New York: Harper TOrchbookS, 1966), p. 57.

8Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, trans.
R. Piper & CO. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston,
1963), p. 222.

 

9Waldemar Gurian, "Totalitarianism as political
Religion," in Carl Friedrich, Totalitarianism (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap, 1954), p. 122.

 

101bid., p. 125.

11Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in
the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1967), p. 38n.

 

121bid., p. 52.
13Ibid., p. 140.

14Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 237.

 

15Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social
Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 195.

16George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
& World, 1949), p. 17.

64

65
17Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 147.

18Else Frenkel-Brunswick, "Psychological Aspects of
Totalitarianism," in Friedrich, Totalitarianism, p. 172.

 

19Moore, p. 26.

20Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper
& Row, 1951).

 

21Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1932).

 

22Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston, 1941).

 

23F. Dostoievsky, The Brothers Karamazov, Book V,
Chapter 5.

 

24Arthur Schlesinger, The Vital Center (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 53.

 

25Ibid., p. 87.

26Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature
and Characteristics, trans. Ruth Hein (Middletown, Conn.:
Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 16.

 

 

27William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 62.

 

28John Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped
Countries (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 95.

 

 

29Sch1esinger, p. 56.
30Kornhauser, p. 111.

31Tibor Szamuely, "Five Years After Khrushchev,"
in Survey, No. 72 (Summer 1969), p. 59.

32John Weiss, The Fascist Tradition (New York:
Harper & Row, 1967), p. 96.

 

33Szamuely, pp. 57—58.

34Karl Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possi—
bilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian
Systems," in Friedrich, Totalitarianism, p. 309.

 

35Kornhauser, p. 74.

36Friedrich and Brzezinski, pp. 239-280.

66

37121g., p. 281.

38Edmund Walsh, Total Power (New York: Doubleday,
1948), p. 100.

39Sabine, p. 916.

49121g., pp. 918-919.

41Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism (New York:
van Nostrand, 1964), p. 36.

42Alex Inkeles, "The Totalitarian Mystique: Some
Impressions of the Dynamics of Totalitarian Society," in
LFriedrich, Totalitarianism, p. 90.

43Ibid., p. 90.

44Kautsky, p. 94.
45Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (London:
Oxford University Press, 1942), p. T66.

46Weiss, p. 98.

47Franz Neumann, Behemoth (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966), p. 51.
48Kornhauser, pp. 82-83.

49Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European
EEEEEEBJnist States (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 166.

S SOSamuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing
_£!E£E13313§ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12.

51See Huntington, p. 12., for a complete discussion.

CHAPTER III

MINOR PARTIES

In Chapter II it was stated that an intermediate

group was one which existed in the area between the isolated

individual and the ruling elite. In China this includes

the state apparatus, the army, voluntary associations,

family, the party itself, etc. It is obviously beyond the

Scope of this research to investigate all of the above

forms of intermediate-organization. Therefore, this work

Will focus upon only a Specific subset of these intermedi-
ate organizations, consisting of three separate types.

The first two of these three types of organizations are

"ha-1: Townsend refers to as "secondary associations." They

constitute ". . . the secondary association which is orga-

Iii-Zed, at least theoretically, on the basis of the common
interests, occupations, or class viewpoints of its members.
with no significant exceptions, these organizations are

national associations with branches at various local levels

and operate again theoretically, on the principle of

VOIUntary membership."1 The types of secondary associa—

tions to be examined are the democratic (or minor) parties

and the mass organizations. The third type of group to be

67

68
examined in this work is the mass campaign, which is an
extremely ephemeral form of mass organization.

There are several reasons for choosing these three
types of groups. First, most of these organizations are
outside what is commonly considered, in Western govern—
mental systems, the political or governmental Sphere of
activity. The minor parties, which would play a political
role in a democratic state, play a non-political role in
China. These groups are referred to as minor parties or
democratic parties. They are, in fact, neither parties,
in the Western sense, nor democratic. However, they
theoretically represent the continuation of pre-Communist
political parties and are also theoretically part of a
United Front Government with the Communist Party. The
Communist regime itself invariably refers to them as minor
or democratic parties and the author feels it unwise to
create new terminology for these groups since such ter—
minology would only confuse the reader as to the object
of references. Furthermore, this chapter will make amply
clear the "true" nature of these groups. Therefore, the
regime's behavior towards these groups illustrates the
Spread of elite activity, in a totalitarian state, beyond
the limits of normal political or governmental roles. It
illustrates the extension of the elite's desire for control
over all areas of human activity. Because these groups

are, in this sense, far removed from the regime, an analysis

69
of them should demonstrate most clearly the operation of
those characteristics presented at the end of Chapter II.

These three types of groups can, in effect, be
arranged along a continuum of totalitarianism. That is,
the groups can be rank ordered so that each group more
closely conforms to the totalitarian demands than the
preceding group.

The analysis begins with the democratic, or minor,
parties which existed in China from the inception of the
regime (or earlier) until the onset of the Cultural Revo-
lution. There were eight democratic parties which, along
with the Communist Party itself, formed the United Front
which was the "official" governmental ruling coalition
from 1949 until the Cultural Revolution. The majority of
these parties pre—dated the Communist takeover and thus
had an existence independent of the ruling elite.2 Many
of the parties represented entrenched and vested interests.
Because these parties represented interests which were
independent of the regime, it was necessary for the regime
to remold the organizations so that they would no longer
be representative of special groups, but rather would be
channels for control of these groups. That is, they would
be a tool for the elite's domination of that segment of
society which they supposedly represented.

It is primarily because the parties represented
"real" interests and had power bases which pre-dated the

regime (thus they could be viewed by some as legitimate

70

sources of authority, independent of the ruling elite)

that they, of all the groups being considered here, were

furthest removed from the ideal totalitarian intermediate
organization. Chapter IV will discuss how the minor
parties were successively co-opted, dominated, totally
controlled, and finally discarded by the ruling elite of

China.

The second type of organization which will be
discussed in this work is the mass organization. These
organizations are closer than the minor parties to the
type of intermediate organization preferred by a total-
itarian regime because they are creatures of the ruling
elite. Specifically, they were constructed by the regime
to serve its ends and thus have a lesser claim to legiti-
macy as an actual representative group than do the minor
parties. Furthermore, the mass organizations themselves
can be broken down into two major types:

(1) those organizations which ostensibly represent some
real and immediate interest of a group of persons in
the society (e.g., one of the trade unions);

(2) those organizations which represent a Sham interest
because the bases upon which they are organized are
either (a) too broad to include immediate interests
(e.g., the Women's Federation of the People's Republic
of China), or (b) the bases are totally fictional and
created by the regime (e.g., the Chinese People's

Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign

Countries)-

71

These organizations all served the regime as
channels of communication, information, and control.
FUrthermore, as Chapter IV will indicate, they were more
"totalitarian" in their nature than the minor parties
because they were more diffuse in their interests, more
the creatures of the regime, and more transient.

At the time ofthe initiation of the cultural
revolution there were 120 mass organizations and minor
parties in Communist China.3 Table 2 divides these orga—

nizations along the lines outlined above.

TABLE 2
MINOR PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

 

Minor Parties

 

China Assn. for Promoting Democracy

China Democratic National Construction Assn.
Chinese Peasant's and Worker's Democratic Party
Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League

China Democratic League

China Chih Kung Tang

Chiu San Society

Mass Organizations

 

"Real" Basis
All-China Federation of Handicraft Cooperatives
All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles,
includes:
Union of Chinese Artists
Union of Chinese Cinema Workers
Union of Chinese Drama Workers
Union of Chinese Musicians
Union of Chinese Photographers
Union of Chinese Writers
Union of Chinese Chuyi Artists
China Dancing Research Assn.

 

72
TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

 

All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing

COOperativeS

All-China

Federation of Trade Unions, includes:

China Agricultural and Forestry Workers' Trade
Union

China
China
China
China
China

Coal Miners' Trade Union

Construction Workers' Trade Union
Education Workers' Trade Union
Engineering Workers' Trade Union
Financial and Commercial Workers' Trade

Union

China
China
China
China
China

Geology Workers' Trade Union

Heavy Industry Workers' Trade Union
Light Industry Workers' Trade Union
Petroleum Workers' Trade Union

Postal and Telecommunications Workers'

Trade Union

China
China
China
China

Workers'
All-China
China Scientific and Technical Assn.,

China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China

Railway Workers' Trade Union

Seamen's Trade Union

Textile Industry Workers' Trade Union
Water Conservation and Electric Power
Trade Union

Journalists Assn.

includes:
Aeronautical Engineering Society
Agricultural Mechanization Society
Agronomy Society

Anatomy Society

Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Society
Anti-Tuberculosis Society
Architectural Society

Astronomy Society

Automation Society

Bacteriology Society

Botany Society

Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Society
Civil Engineering Society

Crop Research Society

Dynamics Society

Electronics Society

Entomology Society

Forestry Society

Geodesy and Cartography Society
Geography Society

Geology Society

Geophysics Society

Horticulture Society

Hydraulic Engineering Society
Mathematics Society

Mechanical Engineering Society

73

TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

 

China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China

Medical Society

Metallurgy Society
Meteorology Society
Nursing Society
Oceanography Society
Paleontology Society
Pedology Society

Pharmacy Society

Physics Society

Physiology Society

Plant Pathology Society
Shipbuilding Engineering Society
Silicate Society

Textile Engineering Society
Water Conservation Society
Zoology Society

China Welfare Institute for the Blind and Deaf Mute
National Red Cross Society of China

Political Science and Law Assn.
Religious Organizations,

"Broad"

of China
includes:

Chinese Buddhist Assn.

Chinese Catholic Patriotic Assn.

Chinese Islamic Assn.

Chinese Taoist Assn.

National Committee of Protestant Churches in
China for Realization of Self-Administration

Based

 

All-China
All-China
All-China
All-China
All-China
China Philosophy Society

China Welfare Institute

Chinese People's National Committee in Defense
of Children

Chinese People's Relief Assn.

Women's Federation of the People's Republic
of China

"Sham"

Basis

 

Athletic Federation

Federation of Industry and Commerce
Returned Overseas Chinese Assn.
Students' Federation

Youth Federation

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of China
China Asia-Africa Society

China Committee for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade

China Welfare Institute

Chinese People's Assn.

for Cultural Relations

with Foreign Countries

74

TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

 

Chinese People's Committee for World Peace
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
Friendship Assns., includes:
China-Albania
China-Africa
China—Bulgaria
China-Burma
China-Cambodia
China-Ceylon
China-Cuba
China-Czechoslovakia
China-Germany
China—Hungary
China-India
China—Indonesia
China-Iraq
China-Japan
China—Korea
China-Latin America
China-Mongolia
China-Nepal
China-Pakistan
China-Rumania
China-United Arab Republic
China-Vietnam
Sino—Soviet

 

For complete, but undifferentiated, listing, see
Vincent King, "Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China,"
M.I.T. Center for International Studies Monograph, January
1966, Appendix.

The third type of intermediate organization which
will be discussed is the mass campaign. These campaigns
have been a feature of Chinese politics throughout the
Communist period. They have, however, become more refined
as time passed. Similarly, as the techniques of utilizing
the mass campaign developed, the regime began to rely more
heavily upon them, generally as a replacement for other

forms of intermediate organization.

75

The mass campaigns have several features which
make them singularly desirable for a totalitarian regime.
First, they lack a strict and formalized hierarchy, thus
discouraging the entrenchment of power. Second, they are
extremely transitory. Therefore, they do not have the
ability to acquire a sense of legitimacy, in perhaps a
Burkian manner, in the eyes of the public. Furthermore,
the campaigning flits from topic to topic at a moment's
notice, thus decreasing the citizen's sense of security
and his ability to build a stable set of priorities, upon
which he can make rational decisions outside the framework
of regime control. In effect, the use of the mass campaign
in China comes the closest to any actual regime's utiliza-
tion of an intermediate group in an advanced totalitarian
fashion. Chapter V will focus upon the role of the mass
campaign in China.

The minor parties, the mass organizations, and the
mass campaigns all are vital (or were vital) in the Chinese
governmental framework. Each represents a type of orga-
nization which is distinct in its relation to a totalitarian
regime. The following three chapters will be devoted to
studying these three types of groups and evaluating their
positions vis-a-vis the Chinese ruling elite. Not only
will each be evaluated in terms of its own relationship to
the totalitarian principles outlined earlier, but arguments
will be put forward to support the contention that they may

be rank ordered in terms of their approximation to the

76

ideal totalitarian intermediate organization (culminating,

theoretically, in the elimination of all such groups what-

soever). Also, evidence will be presented to indicate

that the Chinese regime has been moving, over time, to

replace "less totalitarian" groups with "more totalitarian"
groups. The Cultural Revolution is a watershed event in
this movement and will be examined as such.

Of course, the intermediate groups mentioned above
were not the only ones subjected to elite controls during
the 1949-1965 period. The governmental bureaucratic system
underwent drastic revision after 1949. In the Party's
control of the bureaucracy one can see the use of many
control devices applied in other areas. Barnett discusses
several of the control devices used for the purpose of
guiding the bureaucracy:

(l) The Party hierarchy itself has functional units
parallel to the government, almost a "shadow govern-
ment." These units exert leadership over their coun-
terparts in the bureaucracy;

(2) Party members almost monopolize key leadership posts
at all levels of bureaucracy. Furthermore, they are
subject to Party orders as well as governmental
directions;

(3) All major central governmental bodies have "Party
Fractions." That is, the high ranking Party members-
bureaucrats comprise a clique which is responsible for

assuring that Party directives are implemented;

77

(4) Party branches and committees exist within all levels
of the bureaucracy;

(5) Party directed intermediate mass organizations (Young
Communist League, Labor Union, and Women's Association)
serve as "transmission belts" and monitoring agencies
for non-Party workers at all levels of the bureaucracy;

(6) The use of political study sessions which all workers
attend. These meetings present the Party line to non-
members and also provide group criticism and self-
criticism for non-Party workers who are not performing

adequately.4

Many of the above techniques will appear again as
they operate vis-a-vis the other intermediate organizations.
The Army was also subjected to reorganizations, and control

5 and

devices were installed in it. Alexander George
Samuel Griffith6 discuss these devices and the subsequent
conflicts which arose in the army between the forces of
professionalism and those of control. Similarly, the Cul-
tural Revolution was, at least in part, directed against
entrenched interests in the Party itself, and was an
attempt by the totalitarian elite to reimpose controls
over some organization (the Party) which had become a
viable separate power-base.

The Bureaucracy, the Army, and the Party were
traditionally the three major control organizations in

Communist China and they were all subject to intermediate

group controls. However, it is far beyond the scope of

78
this research to discuss at length the development of
each. Therefore, although all of these organizations are
related to the research, this paper will focus upon the
three types of intermediate organizations mentioned at the
outset: minor parties, mass organizations, and mass cam-
paigns. By studying these groups one can discover rela-
tionships to the elite which will be of benefit in studying
the Party, Army, and Bureaucracy.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the types of
evidence to be utilized in this investigation. AS noted
earlier, reliable quantitative data about the functions
of the Chinese system are all but impossible to obtain.
There are two basic types of evidence that will be used
in this research. First, the pronouncements of the Chinese
government itself may be examined for clues to activities
within the regime. The American Consulate General in Hong

Kong publishes a Survey of the China Mainland Press five

 

times weekly, as well as Extracts from China Mainland

 

Magazines at irregular intervals. Various other govern-

 

mental agencies also publish translations of Chinese
documents.7 Also, the Chinese regime itself puts out

foreign language material, such as the Peking Review.

 

Analyses of these types of materials must be somewhat
cautious. The regime (and sometimes the American trans-
lators) have their own axes to grind. Furthermore, the
regime writes in a jargon all its own and one cannot always

take things at face value. Also, the Chinese system is so

79
large and often diverse that sometimes the provincial
organs lag behind the central regime in their pronounce-
ments. This is an especially important consideration
since much of the information passed to the West comes
through Hong Kong and is overly influenced by the nature
of the southern provinces. Whenever such material is used,
the circumstances surrounding its release will be kept in
mind by the author.

Another source of evidence, especially important
to this type of study, is secondary sources. This paper
is not an attempt to conduct an overall investigation of
the Chinese system. It is concerned with relating the
operations of a small part of that system to a theoretical
model. Thus the opinions and evaluations of individuals
who are primarily committed to studying the Chinese system
are to be weighed heavily. Also, the preponderance of
useful material on China is in the form of reportage. Out-
siders' eyewitness accounts of the system in operation can
be extremely valuable.

In conclusion it is necessary to emphasize three
points. First, it is the relevance of the model and not
the model itself that is being examined. Second, only a
Specific subset of intermediate organizations in China will
be discussed. Third, the evidence to be used is often
fragmentary because of the nature of the Chinese regime.
With these points in mind, one can proceed with the actual

investigation.

80

The first section of the research will deal with
the role of the minor parties, as intermediate organizations,
in Communist China. As indicated in the preceding section,
the Chinese elite has progressed from the utilization of
"less" totalitarian organizations to the reliance upon
organizations which more closely conform to the dictates
of a totalitarian regime. The minor parties, in this con-
text, represent a starting point from which to begin the
analysis. That is, they represented, at the time of the
Communist takeover, the greatest acceptable locus of power
outside of the regime itself. AS stated earlier, they
were founded and initially organized by persons outside the
elite. It will be demonstrated that the objective skills
and talents which these persons possessed were necessary
for the operation of the regime and thus they had to be
utilized while at the same time these persons could not be
allowed to build a separate power base. As stated in
Chapter II, the intermediate organization in a totalitarian
state is a necessary evil. It is necessary for the opera-
tion of the state at this stage of technology, and yet it
inherently possesses the potentiality for the proliferation
of power, the greatest threat to the regime itself. The
Chinese regime, in order to cope with this problem, utilized
some of the control devices outlined at the conclusion of
Chapter II. Specifically, they infiltrated the leadership
of these organizations, they attempted to keep the parties

insecure by Shifting and confusing their respective roles

 

81
in the society, they severely regulated the membership
policies of the parties, and they generally maintained an
atmOSphere of unease within the minor parties. In Short,
rather than serving as representatives of the societal
groups which they ostensibly represented, the minor parties
served, as is necessary in a totalitarian regime, as con-
trol devices through which the ruling elite could monitor
and direct the activities of certain elements of the
society while at the same time preventing these elements
from collecting the means to function as a legitimate power
base.

The analysis will be broken into time periods which
correspond to qualitatively different historical epochs.
The first period (1949—1955) was the period during which
the Communist regime most critically felt the need for the
services of the members of these minor parties and thus
encouraged their existence and relative stability. The
second period (1956) was that of the "Hundred Flowers"
campaign, during which the restrictions were eased and the
active and unencumbered support of the members sought.

The third period (1957) witnessed the severe rectification
campaign which, as theoretically postulated in this paper,
demonstrated the inability of a totalitarian regime to
tolerate a proliferation of power. The fourth period
(1958-1965) was one in which the role of the parties was
"normalized." That is, the controls placed upon them were

tightened while utilization of their members was increased.

82
In this period they moved in the direction of becoming
more the creatures of the totalitarian state. The final
period commenced with the Cultural Revolution and will be
discussed in a separate section. This period can be dis—
tinguished not by the role that the parties played, but
rather by the fact that they passed Silently from scene,
with hardly a bit of debris. Significantly, this period
marks the replacement of the minor parties with other forms
of intermediate organization more suitable to a totalitar—

ian regime.

The Early Period: 1949-1955

 

Between 1949 and 1964 China was theoretically
governed by a coalition of parties consisting of the Com-
munist Party and eight democratic parties. These demo-
cratic parties were by no means "mass" organizations, as
the membership figureslmesented in this chapter will indi-
cate, but were, in effect, representative groups for cer-
tain non-revolutionary elements in Chinese society. Even
the most naive of political observers could not mistake
the utterly subservient role which these parties played.
Thomas states, "In contrast [to the CPC] . . . , the other
parties associated with the Peking regime are none of them
mass parties, nor do they control any of the real sources
of power in China today."8

Before embarking upon a discussion of the develop-
ment of these organizations, it is perhaps advisable

briefly to acquaint the reader with each of the eight

83

democratic parties. The most important of the parties
was the China Democratic League. This party represented
mainly cultural and educational elements, primarily the
bourgeoise intellectuals. The Kuomintang Revolutionary
Committee was composed largely of disaffected KMT Party
members and was a vehicle of the Communist Party in attempts
at converting Nationalist Chinese both on the mainland and
on Taiwan. The China Democratic National Construction
Association was representative of the "national bourgeoisie"
and was an instrument of the CPC in the socialization of
industry and commerce. The China Association for the Pro—
motion of Democracy was the organization of teachers,
editors, publishers, and cultural workers in general. The
China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party was not at
all representative of peasants and workers. Rather, it
was composed largely of persons in the medical and public
health fields. The China Chih Kung Party was organized
Specifically to enlist the aid of overseas Chinese in the
development, primarily economic, of the mainland. The
Chiu San Society was composed of scientists and scientific
workers. Finally, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government
League was a group which was dedicated to convincing the
native Taiwanese to support the CPC and oppose the
Nationalists.9

Although there were a few other minor democratic
parties during the very earliest years of the Communist

regime, they were soon disbanded or amalgamated into one

84
of the above eight parties. It is the nature of these
democratic parties and their changing roles in the "United

Front" government which will be discussed in this section.

Origins of the Democratic Parties

 

Most of the democratic parties were initially
organized during, or immediately following, the conflict
with Japan in the 1930—40's. For example, the China Demo-
cratic League (CDL) was founded after the New Fourth Inci—
dent of 1941.10 It was originally named the League of
Democratic Political Groups (or Federation of Chinese
Democratic Parties, depending upon translation) and was,
in fact, an amalgamation of several separate political
organizations, including: (1) Comrades Association for
National Unification and Construction (founded in January
1940), (2) National Salvation Association, (3) Third
Party, (4) All-China Professional Educational Society,

(5) Rural Construction Group, (6) Northeast Revolutionary
Comrades Association, (7) National Socialist Party (orga-
nized by Chang Chun-mai in 1931),11 and the Youth Party.12
Its leader and organizer was Chang Lan, President of
Chengtu University.13 In 1944, it was more tightly orga—
nized and renamed the China Democratic League. Of its
early role, Thomas states, "Representative chiefly of
liberal and leftist intellectuals and other middle-class
elements, it had attempted to function as a 'third force'

between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and had

85
called for a coalition government and for political and
economic reforms."14

With the outbreak of civil war in 1946, the CDL
moved further to the left. The more right-wing elements
of the party separated themselves, the Youth Party break—
ing away in October 1945, and the National Socialist Party
leaving in early 1947. Finally, in October-November 1947,
the CDL was officially outlawed by the Kuomintang for
allegedly being an accessory to "bandits." The official
Nationalist history states, "The China Democratic League
. . . composed mostly of petty—bourgeoise intelligensia
who, dissatisfied with the Nationalist rule and instigated
by the Communists, secretly collaborated with the Communist
Party and did whatever possible to weaken the prestige of
the National government."15 The CDL, now led by Chang Lan,
Lo Lung—chi, and Shen Chun—ju was reorganized in Hong Kong
and became publicly avowed supporters of the Communist
Party. With the victory of the Communists on the mainland,
the CDL was invited to participate in a new "United Front"
government.

The Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee was organized
in January of 1948 in Hong Kong by Marshal Li Chi—Shan and
Feng Yu-hsiang. Closely allied to this party were the
Kuomintang Association for Promoting Democracy and San Min

16 This group consisted of

Chu I Comrades Association.
critics of the KMT leadership who had been expelled from

the party. The KRC was later to serve as an organizing

86
"magnet" for remnants of the KMT who chose not to flee
the mainland following the Communist victory. The other
democratic parties had either also been organized during
the anti-Japanese period (except for the Chih Kung Party,
which dates back to the nineteenth century), or were
quickly "discovered" by the CPC upon its assumption of
power.

When the Communists took over the government they
were already somewhat committed to a United Front Policy.
This had been their slogan for over a decade "in the course
of their criticism of the one-party government of the
Kuomintang, and it had a powerful emotional appeal in
Chinese politics."17 This is not to suggest, however, that
the CPC did not wish to construct a united front government
for such was definitely not the case. The CPC had many
valid reasons for desiring the assistance, voluntary or
otherwise, of the democratic parties, and these reasons
can be uncovered by examining the roles and duties of the

democratic parties during this early era.

The Roles of the Democratic Parties: 1949-1955

 

During the period from 1949 to 1955, the democratic
parties in China were used by the CPC for three major pur-
poses: (l) to obtain support for the CPC from elements of
society which would not usually be considered sympathetic
to communist goals, (2) to "control" certain elements of

society which might be dangerous to the regime, and (3) to

87
utilize bourgeois and white-collar, bureaucratic elements
without contaminating the Communist Party by offering them
membership, especially in the caSe of government employ-
ment. Of course, the third CPC desire was probably the
origin of the "red and expert" controversies which were to
trouble the regime for many years. However, this problem
lies beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say
that the possibility of such a conflict either did not
occur to the Chinese, or the costs of the conflict were
insufficient to outweigh the advantages to be gained by the
Party from making use of the democratic parties in this
manner.

As stated above, the CPC used the democratic parties
as a means of obtaining support from nonrevolutionary ele-
ments of the society. Thomas states:

. . in the early stages of political and economic
stabilization, calling as it did for the broadest
possible collaboration of the former Nationalist
governmental bureaucracy, and the co-operation of
business and intellectual elements generally, a
government containing these middle parties could more
readily attract and reassure, as well as give a sense
of participation in the government, to such groups,
than could a purely Communist regime.18
Barnett comments upon this Communist ability to enliSt
the support of these parties, and consequently of the
social elements which supported the parties, "The members
of these groups are given an Opportunity to participate

in political affairs, and although they have little

authority or power, the mere fact that they are put on

88

committees and called upon for consultation makes many of
them feel they are playing an important political role."19
Clubb also notes this role of the democratic parties and
he asserts that "the democratic parties are to assist the
CCP line, educating and guiding the people the way the CCP
wants them to go, mobilizing their enthusiasms and energies
for the work of 'socialist construction.'"20

Of course, in order to use these parties as bases
for support, the CPC had to be sure of its control over
the parties. Aside from the obvious and heavy-handed
physical controls available, the CPC depended mainly upon
control by means of introducing its own members into the
democratic parties' organizations. The China Peasants'
and Workers' Democratic Party, in demonstrating its loyalty
to the Communist leadership of the United Front, requested,
"An appropriate number of Chinese Communist Party members
and New China Youth League members . . . should be won
over to our party in order to strengthen the leadership of
our party."21

During the 1949-1955 period, the CPC encouraged
the democratic parties to expand (although the CPC Speci-
fied from which elements of society each party could draw
its new members) while it increased its control over the
parties. In doing so, the CPC built "organized support
and Share reSponsibility for implementing its current
program on a broadened basis, at the same time reserving

to itself a decisive policy-making role-—a combination

89

which cannot help but be a source of great strength to
the regime."22

The second function which the democratic parties
performed for the CPC during the early period of Communist
rule was that of utilizing the services of the bourgeoisie
and the ex-Kuomintang bureaucrats, without allowing them
to join and somehow "contaminate" the CPC itself. In 1950
the Party was attempting to purify its membership and
"proletarianize" itself. However, it still needed the
c00peration of the bourgeoisie if it desired to retain any
"new democratic" features, such as limited private enter-
prise. Therefore, instead of incorporating these persons

into the Party, the CPC preferred to work through the

democratic parties. In 1951 The Economist reported that

 

the Communists "need to retain and consolidate the support
they had during the civil war from these classes, who were
inSpired by disgust at Kuomintang corruption and fiscal
incompetence and also by nationalist motiveS-—but they do
not want them in large numbers inside the Communist
party."23

The third duty of the middle parties during this
period was to serve as a controlling device for elements
of society which had the ppssibility of becoming trouble-
some to the regime. Once again, the Communists were
unwilling to incorporate them into the Party itself and
they therefore made use of the middle parties as super-

vising agents. Clubb states that the minor parties were

90
"something in the nature of isolation wards for leading
members of different social groups who, deemed unsuitable
for CCP membership because they might infect that pure
organization, nevertheless could not safely be left to go
their own way Since they might provide focuses for trouble—

some dissent."24

The "Hundred Flowers" Period: 1956

 

In 1956 the CPC launched a campaign to permit, and
even encourage, all elements of Chinese society to submit
constructive criticism of the regime. Boorman writes:

"An interlude of liberalisation in ideological controls
came during the 'hundred flowers' campaign launched in
mid-1956 with the explicit aim of giving intellectuals and
'cultural workers' a greater sense of participation in the
tasks of 'Socialist construction' and of leavening the
literary scene with the fresh forms of expression."25

In the realm of political affairs, the democratic
parties became a rallying point for anti-administration
commentary. Lo Lung-chi, vice chairman of the China Demo-
cratic League, came forth very early in the movement and
questioned the good faith of the CPC. Lo proposed the
formation of a United Front organization to "inSpect
excesses during . . . past [anti-rightist] movements; this
was to provide a guarantee that people who dared to 'bloom'
and 'contend' would not be subjected to attack and retali-

"26

ation. It will later be evident that Lo's questioning

of the government's intentions was extremely insightful.

91
However, Lo continued to criticize the CPC during the
period, in Spite of any doubts he might have entertained.
Lo questioned the role of the democratic parties in the
CPC dominated governmental framework. He acknowledged
that these parties had participated in government work,
but he stated: "How to make their positions real, and
not merely nominal, is a question. What embarrasses the
democratic parties and groups most is the lack of informa—
tion required for the study of policies." He continues:
At the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consulta—
tive Conference, the democratic parties and groups
cannot voice any effective Opinion on matters under
discussion because they are not informed in advance
of the matters to be discussed, and at the moment of
discussion they have no time to study them. This is
a problem of making the democratic parties and groups
really, and not only nominally, consultant.27
Another middle party figure, Yen HSin—min, also criticized
the CPC and complained that "the democratic parties today
still do not possess the material basis for equality (with
the CPC); all they have is political and legal equality,

28 Franklin

which is not genuine and actual equality."
Houn, in an analysis of this period, states that much of
the minor party criticism was directed at the aloofness of
the Communist bureaucracy; and the criticism seemed to
"reflect a sense of frustration, on the part of the former
leadership group, over their exclusion from the conduct of
public affairs."29

Of course, the minor parties were not the only

centers of governmental criticism; student groups,

92
scientific, literary, and academic elements also voiced
their often extreme displeasure with certain aspects of
the CPC. The Party was taken aback by the volume and
vehemence of the criticism, and the CPC leadership decided
to "clamp the lid down" on the non—revolutionary elements
and therefore launched a major rectification campaign. An
important factor of the "hundred flowers" period is that
during this time, the democratic parties, and eSpecially
the CDL, attempted to act as true intermediate organizations
by articulating the demands of the societal groups which
they represented. Their failure to perform this function
for an extended period illustrates the inability of a
totalitarian regime to allow multiple centers of power, no

matter how weak, to arise.

The Rectification Campaign: 1957

 

In 1957 the CPC launched a major rectification
campaign aimed at suppressing the critics who had come
forth during the "hundred flowers" period. A great portion
of this campaign was directed at the democratic parties,
who were viewed as a major source of support for the anti—
regime critics. In 1957 Teng Hsiao-p'ing delivered a
"Report on the Rectification Campaign" to a session of the
eighth Central Committee in which he stated:

The rightists in the various democratic parties and
groups functioned as the core of the rightist attacks,
because the people have granted them a certain polit-
ical status and they could make use of their legal

positions to issue orders and enlist followers. The
democratic parties are the product of the period of

93

democratic revolution and although a number of their

members have moved to the left during the socialist

revolution, most of them have not yet changed their

bourgeoise standpoint for that of the proletariat.

Therefore, the rightists at one time got the upper

hand in many organizations of the democratic parties.30
A pro-Nationalist publication, discussing the attack of
the CPC upon the parties and rightists, states: "Wild
animals can become dangerous as they did in 1957; the bulk
of those who were then branded rightists came from the
ranks of the minor parties. They were buffeted, kicked at,
and beaten down, and when tamed put back again in the show
to give better performances than ever."31 Even putting
the colorful rhetoric aside, it is fairly obvious that the
CPC was committed to new measures designed to provide
further control, and to provide retribution, over the
democratic parties. The CPC moved in three areas to
achieve these goals. First, they moved against individuals
in the middle parties who had voiced criticism of the
regime. Second, they took measures concerning the organi-
zation of the parties designed to prevent any increase of
political power on the part of the parties. Third, they
instituted a "self-rectification" campaign which was
designed to force the parties to purge themselves of right-
ist elements.

The CPC first attacked individual members of the

democratic parties who had been outspoken in their criti-
cisms of the regime. A number of minor party leaders were

accused of being rightists and were subjected to psycho-

logical pressure which served to produce "confessions" of

94
guilt. Three of the leading figures who were singled out
for retribution were Lo Lung-chi, vice-chairman of the
CDL and Minister of the Timber Industry; Chang Po-chun,
vice-chairman of the CDL (of which there were five), and
Minister of Communications; and Chang Nai-chi. These men
were deprived of their party offices and, by a cabinet
re-organization approved by the People's Congress in 1958,
they were removed from their government positions. Hsieh
Hsueh-hung, who was chairman of the Taiwan Democratic
Self-Government League,was deprived of her post and
expelled from the Communist Party. In 1958 twenty demo-
cratic party "rightists" were suspended from the Chinese
PeOple's Consultative Conference and fifty were suspended

f.32 In removing

from the National People's Congress itsel
these leaders, the CPC felt that "these men, who were all
leaders in their reSpective parties, had evidently permitted
or even encouraged their members to raise heretical ques-
tions concerning such matters as the need for the Communist
Party dictatorship, the amount of compensation to industri-
alists whose property had been expropriated, and the posi-
tion of the democratic parties."33

Lo Lung-chi, who ironically had earlier been con-
cerned with the prevention of retribution on the part of
the CPC, and Chang Po-chun were eSpecially made into targets
by the CPC. The "Chang—Lo" conSpiracy became the major CPC

excuse for the avalanche of political criticism in 1956.

Lo was shown the error of his ways and he subsequently

95

confessed to almost every crime but the great train robbery
which, fortunately for him, had not yet occurred. He con-
fessed to having attempted to separate the intellectuals
from the CPC and lure them into the CDL. "There was, he
said, within the League an 'invisible organization' of
people who had undergone American or British education, an
organization which had been crushed in 1952 and revived in
1957."34 In a public confession by Lo, he stated:

. . . as a vice-Chairman of the China Democratic

League, I had for over a year endeavored, in collab-

oration with Chang Po-chun, to divert the League to

the rightist course, depriving it of its role as

assistant to the Party and throwing into confusion

backward members of the League in the face of rampant

attacks by rightist elements. This was unfavorable

to the Party's leadership and the socialist cause.
Lo and Chang presented a number of these public confessions,
as did almost all the accused rightists. It is entirely
possible that these men felt that they had indeed been
rightists and had led the mass of the membership astray.
Whether the confessions were genuine, or were dictated by
expediency, the CPC succeeded in discrediting the leader—

ship of the democratic parties and, having done so, were

in a position to move against the organizations themselves.

Rectification of the Democratic Party Organizations

 

The middle parties had been encouraged to expand

during the 1949—1955 era, and by 1957 the eight parties

36

had a combined membership of 110,000, of whom 30,000

37

belonged to the China Democratic League. The CPC took

several steps to weaken the parties and prevent any

96
possible future increase in political strength. First,
the parties were reorganized at all levels. Second, all
rightists or suSpected rightists were replaced with left—
ists. Third, previously abandoned restrictions on the
parties were restored, and the parties were forced to expel
all members who had joined during the period when these
restrictions had not been enforced. Fourth, all membership
expansion was specifically prohibited.38 The CPC was now
in firm control of the democratic parties and they made
use of this control to launch a major effort to reform the
membership of the parties. The parties were required to
abandon their bourgeois attitudes and move with new deter-
mination in acquiring a socialistic outlook. The CPC
desired that this change in attitude be a result of efforts
on the part of the parties themselves, and so the "self-

rectification" campaign was launched.

Self-Rectification in the Democratic Parties

 

The Chinese Democratic League launched this cam-
paign with a statement recognizing the need for reform
within the party. Part of the statement announced:

After the rectification campaign of the Chinese Com-
munist Party began, a group of anti-socialist right-
ists, under the pretext of airing views, spoke various
sorts of things against the Communist Party and
socialism in an attempt to sabotage the socialist
enterprises and destroy the people's democratic
dictatorship and the unity between the party and the
people, hoping to drag the wheel of history backward.
What is even more striking and astonishing is that,
among our democratic parties, and particularly among
the leading personnel and members of our own League,
there have been discovered some rightist anti—Communist
and anti-socialist erroneous speeches.39

97
The CPC was quick to emphasize the importance of self
rectification as a cure to the self—diagnosed illness
indicated above. On September 17, 1957, Li Wei-han,
Director of the Department of the United Front Work of the
Chinese Communist Party, delivered a Speech at a gathering
of representatives of the minor parties and the All-China
Federation of Industry and Commerce. He said that the
"minor parties and groups in China were still bourgeoisie
in character, in spite of the elimination of their orig-
inal economic base that resulted from the socialist trans—
formation of industry, commerce, and agriculture in 1955
and 1956. They must therefore effect a self-transforma-
tion in order to become a political force truly dedicated
to socialism."40 An official self-reform campaign was
initiated by the middle parties in February of 1958. "The
China Democratic National Construction Association, com-
posed mostly of industrialists and businessmen, even
Specified a time-limit of three years."41 A joint rally
of over 10,000 prominent minor party members and indepen-
dents was held on March 16, 1958, at T'ien-an Square and
was presided over by Shen Chun—ju, the 85-year-old Chairman
of the CDL. At this rally a "Charter for the Socialist
Re-Education of Democratic Parties and Non-Party Democrats"
was adopted.42 This charter proclaimed the goals of the
democratic parties to be: (1) to reform their political
standpoint in order to more devotedly strive for socialism

under the leadership of the CPC; (2) to be loyal to

98
the socialist system, "faithfully carrying out the state's
policies and laws and wholeheartedly contributing our
knowledge and strength to the nation's construction.

.";43 (3) to learn from the workers and peasants,
"through practical work, establishing a proper attitude
toward physical labor and actively developing the doctrine
and sentiments of the working people; . . .";44 (4) to
study Marxism-Leninism and the examples of the Soviet
Union; (5) "to carry through the policy of letting one
hundred flowers bloom, one hundred schools of thought con-

tend; . . ."45

(6) to provide re—education so that long-
term coexistence and mutual supervision are possible; and
(7) to "firmly . . . carry out the United Front policy in
the service of socialism."46 The minor parties held
another rally on April 10th which, as Tang states, demon-
strated "the public capitulation of the minor parties and
groups to the Communist demand for thorough self-transfor-
mation. . . ."47 This rally launched a "dedication of
hearts to the Party" movement. Wu Han (who was in the
center of the Cultural Revolution and was purged due to
it), Director of the Peking Municipal Committee of the CDL,
stated that the major goal of the bourgeoisie was "to
faithfully surrender their hearts to the Communist party
and the people."48 This "dedication of hearts" was pursued
throughout the country and was the cause of a great many

self-enlightenment meetings, at which the bourgeois ele-

ments attempted to criticize each other and develop a

99
socialist outlook. These meetings became known as
"meetings of immortals" and were still being held as late
as 1961.49
By means of these three measures, the CPC succeeded
in disciplining the democratic parties and cutting off the
flow of criticism. Tang speculates that the CPC may have
used this campaign,
. . more as an object-lesson than as a real drive
to enforce conformity, even though the conversion of
such groups is one of their avowed goals. They may
not have had too much faith in the new pledges of
loyalty, but they accepted the outward submission as
a suitable compromise for the time being. Presumably,
after the letting off of steam in the "contending and
blooming" period, the lid was now firmly back on.50
The attempt of the democratic parties to act as non—
totalitarian organizations was firmly suppressed by the
CPC. After this initial outburst of CPC control and retri—
bution, a gradual return to "normalized" roles for the
democratic parties took place. The return of the demo—
cratic parties to their normal role in the government
during the 1958-1964 period, which included their role in
the "Great Leap Forward," is the topic of the following

section.

Normalization of the Democratic Parties:

 

1958-1965

 

In late 1957 the CPC began to ease the pressure
on the middle parties. The Party had successfully squelched
the outright criticism on the part of these groups and was

now satisfied to allow these parties to resume their earlier

100

roles. The China News Analysis, although it is hardly an

 

unbiased observer and must be considered with this in mind,
stated: "In 1957-58 one would have thought that the recal—
citrant satellite parties would have been wiped out of
existence. On the contrary, Peking, in its typical dia-
lectical way, promotes and expands them. The CPPCC serves
for a close checking on the middle class."51 One suspects
that the regime was more motivated by a desire to return
the middle parties to their proven useful roles than by a
desire to be dialectical. But for the CPC, power-seeking
had replaced avowed ideology. The important factor, how-
ever, is that the CPC chose to attempt to stabilize its
relationship with the democratic parties rather than
obliterate them. Evidence of the CPC'S lessening of pres-
sure was contained in a "Report on Government Work" given
by Chou En—lai in 1959 to the National People's Congress.
He stated at that time:

Through study work and partici ation in manual labor,
many of them [the minor parties have made varying
degrees of progress. Except for a handful of right-
ists, most of those democratic party members and other
democrats who take part in state work have fulfilled
their duties at their posts. During the rectification
campaign, the democratic parties tidied up their orga-
nizations. They still play a positive role in rally-
ing the various social forces to serve socialism. In
the future, it is still necessary in our country to
continue to consolidate and develop the people's
democratic united front on the basis of serving
socialism. Under the premise of accepting the leading
position of the Communist Party, long—term co—existence
and mutual supervision between the Communist Party and
the various democratic parties and groups is still
beneficial to the people's cause.52

101
The willingness of the CPC to reinstate the minor parties
into its favor can be seen in the membership figures. In

53 or

1961 there were 100,000 members of the minor parties,
only 10,000 fewer members than immediately before the
rectification campaign, when the parties were at the peak
of their importance. Thus, by 1959, the minor parties had
resumed a role in Chinese government and the "anti-rightist"
campaigns were toned down. This is not to say, however,
that all CPC rectification activity ceased. As late as

1963 Chang Nai-chi, who was at that time (1) Minister of
Food in the State Council, (2) Vice-Chairman Of the China
Democratic National Construction Association, (3) Vice-
Chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Com-
merce, (4) a member of the Standing Committee of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and

(5) a member of the National People's Congress, was purged
and had to undergo rectification for alleged rightist
inclinations.54 Chang, however, was more an isolated
example than evidence of a general trend. From 1959 to

1964 the CPC was willing, and almost eager, to use demo-

cratic party members in governmental roles.

Democratic Party Members in Governmental Positions
During this period, members of the minor parties
held some Significant governmental positions. Direction
of the entire United Front Operation was supplied by the
United Front Department, headed by Li Wei-han. This

department was a section under the Central Committee of

102
the Communist Party. Below this department was the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, chaired by Chou
En-lai. This organization included members from all the
middle parties and "from all those in the middle-class who
count."55

In the area of government operations, the minor
parties were also represented. In 1959, 14 of 49 ministries
of the central government were headed by members of the
minor parties.56 These ministries were often the more
Specialized ministries, usually subsidiary to the planning
industries; and they included such ministries as the timber
industry, posts and telegraphs, justice, food industry,
light industry, textiles, forestry, communications, marine
products, and city services.57 Members of the democratic
parties also held numerous lesser posts throughout the
government.

These government Officials were usually chosen for
their technical Skills and not for any policy-making
abilities. "They hold these posts at the pleasure of the
Party, for whose policies they act as administrators."58
Thus, the CPC utilized the Skills of the middle party
members while preventing any rightist tendencies from
entering the government. Of course, no administrator is
absolutely objective, and the biases of the administrators
must have at least implicitly slipped into their work;

however, this was kept at an absolute minimum by the Party

cadres, who permeated the government.

 

 

103

The Role of the Democratic Parties

 

During the 1959-1964 period the democratic parties
revived their duties of the pre-"hundred flowers" era and
even expanded their sphere of operations, under proper CPC
supervision of course. In 1963 the role of the democratic
parties was described:

To insure national survival, the co—operation of the
educated middle class, particularly of the leading
scientists, is sought today. At the same time the
Party endeavors to keep them safely under its thumb,
hammering into their ears incessantly the Marxist
truth. This ambivalence, a very important feature
today when something must be done to revive the half-
paralysed national economy, is seen in this issue
under a different aSpect, the middle—class tempered
in organizations adapted to this double purpose.59

In order to perform their duties, the democratic
parties operated under the direction of the CPPCC, described
above. The CPPCC during this period had 1,086 local
branches and conducted 430 political schools which pre—
sented political courses to over 140,000 persons.60 The
most outstanding of the schools constructed to educate
the bourgeoisie was the Central College of Socialism. For
example, of the 285 students enrolled there in 1961, there
was one president of an institution of higher learning,

33 professors, 16 members of the Academy Of Science, 36
engineers, 5 doctors, 11 literary figures, 18 members of
national minorities, 3 religious leaders, 5 overseas
Chinese, and a number of teachers.61 Actually, the CPPCC

performed two major tasks. First, it "controlled" the

parties. Che'n Shu-t'ing stated in 1963 that the purpose

 

 

 

104

of the CPPCC was "to unite the democratic parties and all

other people under the leadership of the communist party

and Chairman Mao, and to see that these people in the

CPPCC undertake political study and self-reform."62

Second, the CPPCC provided propaganda for communist

activity abroad. "The international friend, often a sym-

pathizer but not a communist, is impressed by the broad
spirit of tolerance he imagines he finds in Peking when

it honours non-communists."63

Under the direction of the CPPCC, the democratic
parties have been called upon to define their goals and
duties. From December 1962 to January 1963, all eight
parties held national conventions to settle upon their
proper tasks. As a result of these meetings, they decided
upon the following goals:

(1) "To continue to uphold the three red banners of the
socialist general line, great leap forward, and
people's communes; to contribute more to socialist
reconstruction, to the campaign for austerity and
increased production, and to the development of science,
culture and education; and to work for a bumper harvest

in agriculture and new triumphs of socialism."64

(2) "To support wholeheartedly the general line of foreign
policy and to participate without reserve in the
struggle against imperialists, reactionaries, modern

revisionists and for world peace."65

(3) "To study diligently Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse—tung's

105

works; to undergo ideological education in patriotism,

internationalism and socialism; and to push ideological

reform of party members and the masses."66

Aside from these general goals, each of the demo-

cratic parties was assigned Specific tasks. The China
Democratic National Construction Association, in conjunc—
tion with the Federation of Industry and Commerce, was
given the task of helping to improve "the managerial system
and supply to the market, and in general in the readjust-
ment of the national economy."67 The party of the intel-
lectuals, the China Democratic League, the Association for
Promoting Democracy, and the Chui San Society, along with
the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, were
given the task of adjusting scientific techniques for the
aid of agriculture. Several of the parties were asked to
‘work on industrial and technical questions. In Taiwan,
Inembers of the CPPCC were instructed to contact 210 "upper-
<31ass" people in order "to explain to them the policy of
‘the Party and of the government and to solicit their co-
<Operation and help in economic construction."68 The Chih
IKung Tang, which is concerned with overseas Chinese and

zactually dates back to the mid—nineteenth century, was

zalso called on to help in the national economy.

:Ihe Democratic Parties and the "Great Leap"
The democratic parties did not occupy a major role

Sin the great leap; however, the party members were called

106
upon to aid the program. The primary emphasis was upon
physical labor, and the middle-class, white collar workers
were expected to engage in heavy labor, as were almost all
elements of Chinese society at that time. ‘Perhaps the
greatest impact of the Great Leap upon the CPC was its
failure. The subsequent rightist tone of the Party line
was indeed more favorable to the democratic parties than
it had been for many years. Following the failure of the
great leap, the democratic party members began to feel
more secure in their bourgeois roles. This is not to say,
however, that the minor parties gained a position of
strength in the society.
Merle Goldman discusses the period of criticism of
Maoist goals which occurred in 1961-62.69 In the course
of this criticism some minor party figures were prominent
in the ranks of the anti-Maoist commentators. However, the
1961-62 period was unlike the earlier attempted assertions
of the minor parties' influence in several critical reSpects:
(1) the criticisms were very weak: "Unlike the Hundred
Flowers, the few intellectuals who did Speak out in
1961-62 limited their statements to a parroting of the
official line";70
(2) the criticisms of the 1961-62 period came not from
intellectuals but from members of the upper echelons

of the CCP and the government (especially the Propa-

ganda Department), and were most likely supported by

107
anti-Maoists highly placed in the Party itself rather
than outside (e.g., minor party) persons;

(3) there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the
minor parties as organizations participated in this
activity.

In conclusion then it can be seen that all the
goals and duties of the democratic parties were duties to
the CPC and to the peasant and proletarian classes. The
middle parties were in existence to benefit these groups
and not the bourgeoisie, which they supposedly represented.
In this sense, the parties during the 1959-1965 period,
the 1961-62 experience to the contrary notwithstanding,
just as in the 1949-1955 period, were almost totally the
servants of the CPC and were not centers of political

power.

Conclusion

 

Several points have been made in this chapter
relating to the role of the minor parties in China (the
letters and numbers in parentheses are "keyed" to the con-
clusions presented at the end of Chapter II):

(1) It has been demonstrated that the minor parties were
infiltrated by members of the ruling elite or their
agents in order to insure the elite's domination of
these parties (A,2);

(2) It has been demonstrated that when the parties gave

some indication of attempting to function as sources

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

108
of authority (the Hundred Flowers period) they were
severely repressed by the regime because they were
viewed as a viable threat to the regime (A,2);
The "Chang—Lo" conspiracy, as well as the rest of the
rectification campaign,demonstrates the ability of a
totalitarian regime to effectively enforce psycholog-
ical standards upon even the most diverse elements of
a society, or at least to attempt, should the admis-
sions of the accused have been mere lip service, such
an enforcement (C,3);
The regime's control of membership policies demon-
strates, as mentioned in Chapter II, the desire of a
totalitarian regime to control the relationship between
the intermediate organization and its own membership
(B,2);
The twists and turns of the regime's policies toward
the minor parties illustrate the regime's desire to
keep the parties in an almost constant state of flux,
an atmosphere of frightened anticipation and indecision
(0,2);
The developing relationship between the elite and the
minor parties (culminating in their disappearance
during the Cultural Revolution, which will be discussed
in a separate section) illustrates the general desire
of a totalitarian regime to utilize intermediate orga—

nizations with a minimum of threat, and to constantly

109
replace older organizations with ones which more
clearly represent and adhere to the guidelines presented
in Chapter II (B,1). The next chapter will deal with
the mass organizations in China, which, in effect, did

serve as substitutes for the minor parties.

CHAPTER III
NOTES
1James Townsend, Political Participation in

Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
I969): p. 151.

 

 

2For a complete pre-l949 discussion of the origins
of these parties, see James Seymour, "Communist China's
Bourgeois—Democratic Parties (unpublished Master's thesis,
Columbia University, n.d.).

3Vincent King, "Propaganda Campaigns in Communist
China" (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Center for International
Studies Monograph, Jan. 1966), p. 8.

4A. Doak Barnett, "Mechanisms for Party Control in
the Government Bureaucracy in China," Asian Survey, VI,
No. 12 (Dec. 1966), 659-661.

 

5Alexander George, The Chinese Communist Army in
Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

 

6Samuel Griffith, II, The Chinese People's Libera-
tion Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).

 

 

7For example, the Central Intelligence Agency and
the United States Information Agency, as well as military
organizations.

8S. B. Thomas, Government and Administration in
Communist China (New York: Institute of Pacific RElations,
1955), p. 45.

 

 

9Union Research Institute, Communism in China (Hong
Kong: Union Research Institute, 1959), P. 67.

 

10O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 309.

 

111bid., p. 309.

12Union Research Institute, "Rectification Campaign
of the 'China Democratic League'," in Union Research Ser-
vice, VIII, No. 7 (July 23, 1957) (Hong—Kong: Hui Shun
Chi, 1957), p. 114.

 

13c1ubb, p. 309.

14Thomas, p. 46.

110

lll
15U.R.I., "Rectification Campaign," p. 114.
16Thomas, p. 46.
ljlbig., p. 46.
181213., p. 46.
19A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early

Years, 1949-1955 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966),
p. 14.

 

 

20Clubb, p. 1.
21Thomas, p. 48.
22Ibid., p. 49.

23The Economist, London, Feb. 10, 1951, p. 309.

 

24C1ubb, p. 311.

25Howard Boorman, "The Literary World of Mao Tse-
tung," in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), China Under Mao:
Politics Takes Command (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966),
pp. 384-385.

 

 

26Rene Goldman, "The Rectification Campaign at
Peking University: May—June 1957," in MacFarquhar (ed.),
p. 260.

27U.R.I., Communism in China, p. 68.

 

28Ibid., p. 68.

29Franklin Houn, TO Change a Nation (New York:
Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 64.

 

30Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Rectification
Campaign," in Robert Bowie and John Fairbank, Communist
China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis (cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 347.

 

 

31"The Middle Class," China News Analysis, NO. 461,
March 22, 1963, p. 1.

 

 

32U.R.I., Communism in China, p. 68.
33Ibid., p. 69. A

34Bowie and Fairbank, p. 14.

112

35L0 Lung—chi, "My Preliminary Examination," in
Bowie and Fairbank, p. 332.

36Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1962-63
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1964), p. 714.

 

37Lo, p. 332.

38Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1960—61
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1962), p. 656.

 

39U.R.I., "Rectification Campaign," p. 116.

40Houn, p. 66.

4¥Ibig., p. 66.

4?;pig., p. 67.

43;21g., p. 67.

441919., p. 67.

45Ibi§., p. 68.

461213., p. 68.

47:219., p. 68.

4§Igig., p. 68.

49For accounts of such "meetings of immortals"
sponsored by the Chu San, Association for Promoting
Democracy, and the Peasants' and Workers' Party, see the
Review of the Mainland Press, U.S. Consul in Hong Kong,

Vols. 2451 (Feb. 10, 1961, p. 7), 2454 (Feb. 7, 1961, p. 1),
2455 (Jan. 31, 1961, p. l).

 

50Houn, p. 69.

51"The Middle Class," China News Analysis, p. 5.

 

52Chou En-lai, "Report on Government Work," in
Bowie and Fairbank, pp. 520-521.

53Chow (ed.), China Yearbook: 1960-61, p. 655.

 

54Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1963-64
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1965), p. 651.

55"The Middle Class," p. 69.

56U.R.I., Communism in China, p. 69.

 

113
5jlbig., p. 69.
5§gpid., p. 69.
59"The Middle Class," p. 1.
691§1g., p. 2.
Gilbig., p. 4.
62191g., p. 2.
63gpgg., p. 2.
64Chow, China Yearbook: 1963-64, p. 652.

 

6?;gig., p. 652.

6§Ibig., p. 652.

67"The Middle Class," p. 6.
68121g., p. 6.

69Merle Goldman, "The Unique 'Blooming and Con-
tending' of 1961-62," in The China Quarterly, NO. 37 (Jan.-
March, 1961), pp. 54-83.

 

701bid., p. 64.

711bid., p. 68.

CHAPTER IV

MASS ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter will delve into the role of mass
organizations in China, and the various means by which the
regime has controlled these organizations. Mass organiza—
tions during the 1949-1964 period were an important fea-
ture of the political and social scene and were used
extensively by Mao and the ruling elite. Mao himself
realized the potential which the mass organization pos-
sessed as early as 1928, when he wrote "Report of an In—
vestigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan."1 In this
report he wrote in praise of the peasant associations:

If ten thousand schools of law and political Science
had been Opened, could they have achieved in such a
short time so much political education among men and
women, young and old, all the way into the remote
corners of the country as the peasant associations
have now done? I think not.2
The mass organizations are means by which the totalitarian
regime can extend its control into areas of the society
generally considered beyond the scope of legitimate polit-
ical activity:
The mass "people's organizations" are the most signif-

icant device employed by the CPC to carry its mass—line
policy into practical Operation. Through them the Party

114

115

can mobilize and exercise direct leadership over every
key group in society and over all areas of activity.3

Chou states:
One of the major causes of the success of the Chinese
communist party is its effective organization and
indoctrination of the masses at the grass roots, pri-
marily through a myriad of mass organizations.

Fairbank adds: "These mass organizations, . . . ,
reach the individual in his professional or social role,
among his peers, in ways that the government cannot."5
And Tang concludes:

TO avoid isolation as a minority group and to heighten
the effectiveness of its rule, the CPC also attempts

. . . , to gain control of every major organized group
and movement in the society.

Although there were a wide variety of mass organi-
zations, they all had a great deal in common, Townsend
points out four crucial features of all organizations.7
First, "they are firmly controlled and supervised by the
CCP through the placement of Party members in leading
positions."8 This regime policy was one which is charac-
teristic of the totalitarian system as outlined at the
outset of this research. In this chapter, the regime
infiltration and domination of the organizations will be
documented for a wide variety of groups. Also, in China
all mass organizations were under official government
"charter" and the charter could be revoked at the regime's
discretion.9 This power, in itself, was not vital but was

rather an indication of the regime's control of the mass

organizations. It was Simply a legal mask for actual

116
control. In short, "any reactionary organization harming
the 'interests of the state or people' or any organization
violating the regulations could be disbanded."10 Houn
concludes:
Key positions in the various mass organizations are
held by Communists or their sympathizers, and the
mass organizations themselves depend upon the govern-
ment for financial support [a] situation which amounts
to virtual government control of the organizations.

A second common feature of these groups is that
they were all organized around the principle of democratic
centralism. Democratic centralism is a major theory of
political organization at all levels of activity in China.
It stems from the dialectic fashion in which the masses of
people must be led through the revolutionary period and
grows to serve as a model for all leadership styles in the
nation. As the title indicates, democratic centralism
combines, theoretically, the seemingly opposite elements
of democracy and centralized control. The major "central-
ist" features are:

(l) a hierarchical organizational structure for all
societal groups so that directions can be easily
passed down to lower levels;

(2) the proper development of leaders appropriate to each
level of the hierarchy;

(3) strict obedience of all "lower" level units to their

hierarchical superiors.

The major "democratic" features of the theory are:

117

(l) the passing of information upward along the hierarch-
ical chain so that the leadership will be aware of
lower level demands and not fall into the habit of
"commandism";‘

(2) the encouragement of creative applications of high-
level directives to local Situations in a relevant
fashion;

(3) a free and thorough discussion of issues before a
decision is reached, but no further commentary by
dissatisfied elements once a decision has been made,
as this encourages factionalism within supposedly
unitary groups.

In theory the idea of democratic centralism might
seem to possess the potential for being a dynamic method
of leadership (all problems of operationalization aside).
However, the Chinese regime, in conformity to its total—
itarian propensities, eviscerated democratic centralism
and made it into another hollow ideology useful only for
masking naked control:

As is the case in state and Party structure, "central-
ism" (minority submission to majority, and lower levels
obeying higher levels) is much more conspicuous than
"democracy" (regular convening of congresses at all
levels and free discussion before decisions are
reached). All major decisions are made at the top,

and higher levels can review and revoke the decisions
of lower levels. In effect, the centralized structures
of the mass organizations supplement and reinforce the
state structure as channels for transmitting central
policy to the basic level.12

This chapter will demonstrate the universality of democratic

centralism as an organizing principle of mass organizations,

118
and the manner in which this doctrine aided regime
domination Of the groups.13

A third common feature of mass organizations is
their:

. . . well-developed basic-level organization to

encourage maximum participation and obedience to

higher directives by individual members, to develop

as many activists as possible, and to expand the 14

amount of contact between members and nonmembers.
Thus the mass organizations developed activists and cadres
who could serve as agents of the regime. By doing this
they also tapped the talents of the most ambitious and
energetic members of the society and used them for regime
purposes, not to mention the fact that this practice
helped to keep these people from having time to engage in
activities not supervised by, and perhaps not beneficial
to, the regime.

Finally, all these organizations served as "trans—
mission belts." That is, they linked the regime to the
masses (the Mass-Line Philosophy itself will be discussed
in Chapter V).15 As stated earlier, a totalitarian regime
is not satisfied with the sullen or passive obedience of
its citizens, it demands mass enthusiasm, and the mass
organizations were means for stirring up such enthusiasm
and activity. Houn feels that mass organizations have
three advantages in conducting propaganda and indoctrina—
tion on behalf of regime policies:

(1) "to supplement the propaganda and indoctrination

personnel and facilities of the regime";

119

(2) "to tailor propaganda and indoctrination for use in
Special groups"; and

(3) "to conduct propaganda and indoctrination unofficially
when desired."16

Mass organizations in China may be divided into

three types:

(1) "elite" or Specialized groups, composed of a relatively
small number of professionals;

(2) "paper" organizations, that exist almost solely for
propaganda purposes and lack an active membership;

(3) "true" mass organizations, which are built upon common
interests, of a greater or lesser degree, and possess

large memberships.17
In conclusion, then, this chapter will demonstrate

the regime's use of, and control over, all three types of

mass organizations.

"Paper" Organizations

 

The first type of mass organization to be consid-
ered functioned in China during the 1949-1964 period and
might be termed the "paper" organization. Organizations
of this type represented no common interests of groups
within Chinese society, but rather they were solely created
by the regime to further certain official goals, eSpecially
foreign policy goals. Townsend describes these as:

. . . organizations that are frankly political and

propagandistic but which have relatively little con-
tact with the Chinese people. Most of these are

120
designed to advance the Party line in international
relations; examples are the various "friendship"
associations with foreign countries, the Chinese
People's Association for Cultural Relations with
Foreign Countries, the Chinese People's Institute of
Foreign Affairs, the China Afro-Asian Solidarity Com-
mittee, and the China Peace Committee. In some
cases, these organizations may claim mass membership
(the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association once had about
seventy million members) but they offer few genuine
Opportunities for mass participation. Their work con—
sists mainly of high-level exchange visits and propa-
ganda releases.18

Of all the types of mass organizations considered
in this chapter, this type represented the least threat to
the regime. There are several reasons for this. First,
there was really no true common interest which could bind
the members together. Decreased wages may cause trade
unions to be restive, but a diplomatic setback in Africa
would hardly turn the Chinese-African Friendship Associa-
tion against the regime. On the contrary, it would turn
the members against their "friends" rather than their
leaders.

Second, most of these organizations admitted mem-
bers only as part of a unit. The Sino-Soviet Friendship
Association is a case in point. It was founded in Peking
on October 5, 1949, only four days after the founding of
the CPR.19 Its purpose was to "further and consolidate
the fraternal friendship and co—operation between the
Chinese and Soviet peoples, and to strengthen the ties
between the two nations in cultural, economic, and other

affairs."20 By January of 1953, only three and one-half

years later, the SSFA claimed a membership of over

F . 1.7.771: ‘~f§"".m'-.-=’"

121
68 million (1,830 branches and 213,150 sub-branches).21
"The vast membership of the SSFA is made possible through
the policy of admitting organizations en bloc. For example,
the entire People's Liberation Army joined as one unit."22
Of course, this membership practice serves to isolate mem-
bers from a sense of identity with the organization. In
effect, they are members "once removed" and their alleg-
iance to the organization, always a potential threat to
the regime, is thus diminished. In fact, one may question
whether any allegiance is formed at all since these friend-
ship associations appear in such an abrupt manner and dis—
appear with no residue.
A third indication of the regime's control of these
organizations is the manner in which they almost instantan-
eously appear when the international situation calls for
just such an organization. The China-Africa Association
is a good example:
In 1960 the virtual dissolution of the French Community,
the approach of independence for the British Sub-Saharan
dependencies, and the granting of independence to the
Belgian Congo startled the CPC into the realization that
a revolutionary Situation in Africa might be more immi—
nent than it had supposed. A China—African People's
Friendship Association was formed in April.

The China-Latin America Association was formed in March of

1960 to counteract Russian influence in Cuba.24 The CPR

(the government itself officially "forms" these organiza-

tions) created the China-Laos Friendship Association on

March 4, 1963, in order to coincide with a state visit by

122

Souvanna Phouna.25 The Japanese Association is another

case:

Probably to counteract the unfavorable impression
produced on all sections of Japanese public opinion
except the extreme left by Chinese assertiveness,

and in particular Chinese opposition to the test ban
treaty, the CPR established a China-Japan Friendship
Association on October 4, 1963, with the mission of
expanding informal relations between the two countries
and promoting an early "normalization" of official
relations. Although it might seem surprising that the
CPR waited so long to take such an Obvious step with
reSpect to the country that was probably the most
important Single object of its "people's diplomacy,"
it should be realized that Japan became in this way
the first country for which the CPR has established

a Friendship Association without having also estab-
lished diplomatic relations.26

One can see, therefore, that the regime's control

of these organizations was tight indeed. But like mass

organizations in totalitarian settings, these groups had

a certain utility for the regime (otherwise they simply

could not exist at all), eSpecially in the field of foreign

policy. Here the groups served two purposes:

(1)

(2)

they transmit, or "cue," the people of China as to the
correct foreign policy line (in other words, they are
a sort of scorecard of who is friend and who is foe at
the moment);

they Often act as quasi-official arms of the regime in
the conduct of foreign relations, sometimes making
diplomatic moves which the regime itself cannot "offi-
cially" make.

As for the first duty mentioned above, the SSFA

provides a clear example. One of the official functions

123
of the SSFA was to help the Chinese people gain "a knowledge
of the social and government system of the Soviet Union,
and its achievements in socialist reconstruction as well

n."27 In order to accomplish this

as in advanced productio
goal the SSFA took several steps: (1) it instituted radio
language courses in Russian; (2) in 1954 it organized a
total of 196,000 lectures attended by 43 million people;

(3) it translated Russian books into Chinese; (4) it pub-

lished a journal, Sino-Soviet Friendship, with a circulation

 

of 300,000 copies; and (5) beginning in May 1955 it pub-

28 "During the

lished a Russian language daily in Peking.
first five years of its existence, the SSFA claims to have
published more than 1,000 pamphlets and books, totaling
over 20 million COpieS."29 To emphasize the importance of
the organization, and this good relationship, Liu himself
was the first Chairman of the group. Although, of course,
the SSFA no longer plies its wares, and in reality no other
friendship organization had or has such a large apparatus,
the above example illustrates the general internal uses of
such organizations. It would not surprise this author,
given diplomatic desirability, to see, after more than
twenty years of studied and concentrated hatred, a Sino-
American Friendship Association Spring up overnight with a
membership in the tens of millions. Such is the power of
the regime.

Also, as mentioned above, these organizations

sometimes served as quasi-official arms of the regime's

124
foreign policy. Thus:
The Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries and the Japan-China Cultural
Exchange Association reached an agreement in Peking on
16 August that China would invite "delegations from
Japanese academic circles and of Japanese writers,
scientists, cartoonists, artists, calligraphers,
photographers and young people active in Japan's cul-
tural life.30
Also:
Peking . . . sent towards the end of February 1961 a
goodwill delegation headed by Liu Chang—sheng--Presi-
dent of the Chinese—African People's Friendship ASSO-
ciation--to Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.
These organizations were also used to voice regime dis-
pleasure, as well as being goodwill ambassadors:
TO demonstrate further Peking's concern and angry
reaction, a mass rally was held in Peking on 26 Jan-
uary [1961] presided over by the writer-politician
Kou Mo-jo, President of the China Peace Council. . . .
Kou Mo—jo delivered a blistering attack on the United
States whose "criminal character" had been revealed by
the cggclusion of the U.S.-Japanese military treaty.
In conclusion, then, these "paper" organizations
must be regarded in reSpect to two features. First, they
performed a function for the regime by aiding in "cueing"
foreign policy both internally and externally. Second,
these groups were the least threatening, as potential power
bases, to the regime for the following reasons:
(1) a lack of a true Shared common interest;
(2) unit membership policies;

(3) a rapid series of creations and destructions, keeping

these groups in a constant state of flux.

125

"Elite" Organizations

 

The type of mass organization mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter and dealing with Specialized
groups was the "elite" organization. These groups were
usually tied together by bonds of common interest, as
opposed to "paper" organizations, but lacked the large
membership of the true "mass" organization. Townsend
writes:

. . . [This] type of mass organization is the profes-
sional or technical association that has a relatively
small and exclusive membership and that engages.in

some "private" activites of a professional or scholarly
nature. These associations may put out scholarly pub-
lications, engage in national and international exchange
of information, and so forth. They are not as con-
stantly involved in political mobilization and ropa-
ganda as the other types [of mass organizations? and
they do not have a significant range of contact with
the masses. Nevertheless, they are in no sense iso-
lated from politics. All recognize the political
leadership of the CCP and all exhort their members to
implement the Party line in areas pertaining to their
Special interests. Although some of their activities
may be non—political, they must participate in national
political movements and subordinate their professional
activities and opinions to political considerations
whenever the Party so demands.33

Although these groups lacked large memberships, they were
crucial to the regime for several reasons. First, they
represented persons with relatively rare skills, skills
that could not be replaced from the general population.
Therefore, in order to utilize these skills the regime had
to control the organization. Second, the members of these
groups were more likely to balk at regime control than were
other sectors of the population because they were less

naive than the general population, because they were

126
"experts" and thus expected to receive more from the system
than the "ordinary" people, or because they often were
intellectuals who, in general, are usually seeking to
impose their own ideas on societies as a matter of ego.
In order to better understand the nature of these
groups, this section will examine the two leading organiza-
tions of this type, the All-China Federation of Natural
Science Societies and the All-China Federation of Literary
and Art Circles. The science organization was certainly
the less volatile of the two groups, perhaps because the
work Of its members did not really touch upon matters of
societal control and behavior. The organization was deemed
necessary, however, to prevent unorthodox or "bourgeois"
science from entering China:
The Communist Party, of course, already had made
preparations to bring scientists within its network
of mass organizations. Plans for this were laid at a
meeting convened in Peking during July, 1949 where it
projected an All-China Conference of Scientific
Workers. This conference, with about 470 participants
meeting in Peking on August 18-24, 1950, formally
established two key organizations. One was an All-
China Federation of Natural Science Societies with "the
aim of rallying all the scientific workers so as to
carry out scientific research work for the improvement
of production technique, and thus to promote New Demo-
cratic economic and cultural construction." The other
was the All-China Association for the Dissemination of
Scientific and Technical Knowledge designed to assist
the government popularise science.34

The two organizations mentioned above worked in close

relationship with the official Academy of Sciences. Just

because the work of these organizations was somewhat

peripheral to political activity did not excuse them from

127
regime control, because in totalitarian society no activity
is outside the sphere of regime interest. This was true
of the scientific groups. Lindbeck states: "The presence
and supervisory intervention of the Communist Party is
evident throughout the entire range of scientific organi-
zations."35
The artists and writers in China have presented a
thornier problem to the regime. The organization to moni-
tor them was formed early and became a vital instrument
for control of writers during the post-Hundred Flowers
period. The key Organization was the All-China Federation
of Literary and Art Circles:
The All-China Federation of Literary Art Circles had
been founded in Peking on July 10, 1949, with Kuo Mo—jo
presiding. The Communists made sure that they held the
key posts although they were plainly a minority within
the membership. Later it was decided to form an asso-
ciation of writers presided over by Mao Tun, another
veteran of the Communist struggle and a former com—
panion of Lu Hsun.36
As indicated above, Kuo Mo-jo was a key figure in the group
and also, as indicated above, the regime was in firm control
of this organization from the outset. Goldman states:
[Kuo Mo-jo] became a vice-premier of the government
afrom 1949 to 1954, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, chairman of the All-
China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and
president of the Academy Of Sciences. Nominally, he
was in charge of research and creativity in Communist
China, but in fact, he has been a front man for the

party. He has carried out its bidding without any
deviation.37

The ACFLAC was really similar to the ACFTU in that it pre-

sided over a group of more Specialized organizations, all

128
of which were likewise under firm regime control:

The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
is essentially a holding company responsible for co-
ordinating the activities of nine national organiza-
tions representing major branches of the arts:
literature, drama, painting, music, dance, folklore,
vocal music, films and photography. The literary
subdivision of the Federation is the Chinese Writers'
Union. Like its Russian counterpart, the Union Of
Soviet Writers, this organization is intended to be
the principal professional body in the contemporary
Chinese life, responsible to and supervised by the
Central Committee of the Party. The Writers' Union

is designed to provide a forum for the interchange of
ideas, an organization through which professional
writers may aid and stimulate each other, and a direct
channel through which the Communist Party, aided by
the Party fraction in the Union, can transmit its man-
dates and elucidate its view of the tasks confronting
contemporary Chinese literature. Mao Tun, in addition
to his post as Minister of Culture in the government,
has also served as chairman of the Chinese Writers'
Union since 1949. The Union now has four vice-chair-
men: Chou Yang, Pa Chin, Shao Ch'uan—lin and Lao She.
As a national association, the Writers' Union also
supervises branches in the provinces and autonomous
regions, and at the sub—provincial level as well. In
organization and operations, these branches are similar
to the national Union, though their apparatus is
naturally simpler.38

A watershed event of this organization was its third
national congress in 1960. This was the first congress
Since 1953 and thus was reSponsible for squaring the duties
of the organization with the new role writers were expected
to play in Chinese society. The artists and writers had
been most vociferous during the "Blooming and Contending"
period and had therefore been treated harshly in the 1957
rectification campaigns. Then in the Great Leap period
they had been compelled to demonstrate their "redness."

The 1960 congress set the tune for the integration of the

artists and writers into the totalitarian society. Boorman

129
writes of this:

Outside the Party and government structure, the key
apparatus facilitating Party direction of literature
is the All-China Federation of Literary and Art
Circles. The Federation, established in the summer

of 1949 slightly before the establishment of the
Central People's Government, is one of the . . . most
influential of the "people's organisations" which
Peking has created to Channel political controls
throughout the country. Reorganized at its second
congress in 1953, the Federation held its third
national congress of writers and artists at Peking in
July-August 1960. That meeting elected a national
committee of 224 persons, from among whom were elected
the chairman and fifteen vice-chairmen of the Federa-
tion. Kuo Mo-jo was re-elected chairman, with Mao Tun
and Chou Yang as the top vice-chairmen. Other vice-
chairmen elected in 1960 included Pa Chin, Lao She,
Hsu Kuang-p'ing (widow of Lu hsun), T'ien Han, Ou-yang
Yu-ch'ien (died 1962) and Hsia Yen, as well as Mei
Lan—fang (died 1961) and other senior figures in the
arts.39

At this congress, official goals were laid out for the
organization. Ch'en reports:

The third Speaker on the opening day . . . [was] Chou
Yang, Vice-President of the Federation and a Deputy
Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, who

. . . laid down Six tasks for the Congress.

The first task, according to Chou Yang, was that
China's art and literature must be placed under the
political guidance of the Communist Party, so that
they can play their full part in building a socialist
society and in serving the workers, peasants, and
soldiers. Secondly, they must be regarded as a weapon
in the struggle against imperialism and modern revi-
sionism and as bonds of friendship between all the
progressive peoples of the world. Thirdly, further
encouragement must be given to the workers and peasants
who used their Spare time in literary and artistic
activities. Fourthly, writers and artists should make
strenuous efforts to raise both the ideological and
artistic standards of their work. Fifthly, art and
literary criticism should be developed a step further
along Marxist-Leninist lines in order to foster a
healthy and refined discernment. Finally, writers and
artists must strengthen their unity, so as to organize
themselves into a fighting unit for the interests of
the working class.40

130

Except for the first, most of the above goals were mere
rhetoric. In fact, the only other aim with a realistic
aSpect was the encouragement of peasant and worker litera—
ture. There was great emphasis on the literary work of
amateurs during this period. A prize winning poem of 1960
was written by a peasant:

I am just sixty, but I can still work

And I find it as easy as when I was young

It's not that I am boasting of my strength

But here in my heart I have Mao Tse-Tung.41
This was another aspect of the red-expert controversy and
an attempt by the regime to lessen the influence of the
writers and artists by downplaying the role of their ex-
pertise in society. By demeaning the expert, the regime
sought to keep the writers in an uncertain frame of mind
and full of self-doubt, excellent conditions for a total-
itarian citizen.

The ACFLAC also has performed more mundane, although

important, tasks:

It [the ACFLAC] was a device for combining all factions

and all the intellectuals in the creative arts into one

body over which the party could exercise direct super-

vision. Further, the ACFLAC was one of the most influ-

ential organs for communicating party policies to the

reading public.42
The ACFLAC also conducted self-criticism campaigns similar
to those of the minor parties:

Before 1949, about one-third of China's writers had

already been re-educated. Many more participated in

criticism and self-criticism sessions organized by
the ACFLAC as early as August 1949.43

131
Finally, the ACFLAC served as a foreman of sorts, seeing
that the writers and artists were "productive" members of
society:

An additional function of the mass organizations
is to encourage propaganda and indoctrination Special-
ists among their ranks to prepare appropriate material
for the party.

For example, one of the principal tasks of the
All-China Association of Literary Writers (the Chinese
Writers' Union) is to see that its members produce a
sufficient number of literary works in accordance with
party policy and doctrine.

It can readily be seen then that the "elite" orga-
nizations were extremely useful to the regime and were
also very closely controlled by the regime. The firmness
of the control is evident in the permeation of the groups
by regime agents and the great attempts of the regime to
strip the Specialists of their professional self-esteem.
The regime had no intention of allowing rambunctious intel-
lectuals to threaten its power over the society, as the
following incident indicates:

[A battle arose] over the role of culture in the new
society and the relations between the intellectuals
and the Party leaders. These debates were held on
various pretexts: once it was a question of the sig-
nificance Of a film, The Life of Wu Hsun, another time
the attitude to a literary classic, The Dream of the
Red Chamber, but in fact the leitmotiv was always the
same: *What degree of autonomy Communist intellectuals
can have, and how they can best contribute to the
building of socialism. It followed that those who did
not share the same concepts as the Communist leaders
were denounced as "evil minds."45

 

 

 

True "Mass" Organizations

 

The third, and by far the most important, of the

mass organizations in China during the 1949—1964 period

132

were the true "mass" organizations. These organizations

possessed large memberships and were organized around

common interests. Sometimes these interests were immediate

and keenly felt, as was the case of the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions, and sometimes the interests were more of

a "catch-all" category, as in the case of the All-China

Federation of Democratic Women.

There were several organizations of this type: the
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Federa-
tion of Democratic Women, the Young Communist League, the
Peasants' Associations, etc. This section will deal with
three organizations representative of the Spectrum of
behavior found among groups of this type:

(1) the All-China Federation of Democratic Women;

(2) the various Chinese youth organizations (the Young
Communist League, the Young Pioneers, the Student's
Federation, and the Federation of Democratic Youth);

(3) the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (and its

member unions).

The All—China Federation of Democratic Women

 

The ACFDW was founded in 1949 as an outgrowth of

46 Its official aims

the First All-China Women's Congress.
were "safeguarding women's rights and children's welfare,
enhancing the political consciousness and ability of

women, securing the equality between men and women, and

47
striving for the complete emancipation of women." The

133

more immediate tasks of the ACFDW were to:

(l) mobilize women workers in the cities in order to
increase production;

(2) encourage peasant women to participate in mutual—aid
societies and cooperative organizations, and help
increase agricultural production;

(3) liberate women from feudal concepts and social customs.48

The report of Teng Ying-ch'ao in 1953 stated: "The era of

construction has begun. Production should be the top

priority in all programs and the central task of the
women's movement is the mobilization of women to participate
actively in industrial and agricultural production."49
The organization of the ACFDW was based on demo—
cratic centralism and was Similar to most other mass orga-
nizations. Theoretically, the organization's power was
vested in the National Congress. The Congress elected an

Executive Committee of 125 regular and 28 alternate members,

all elected for two-year terms. The true effective group

was the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee.50

"It should be noted, however, that the permanent Secre-

tariat, the administrative and managerial arm of the ACFDW

under the Standing Committee, is viewed by some Observers

as the rising power in this as in other such organizations."51

At the regional level, the organization worked via
six working committees, with branches in all provinces and

municipalities.52 Sometimes the ACFDW worked as an adjunct

of the government:

134

At the same time, mass organizations do assume some
administrative responsibilities. . . . The Women's
Federation, through its participation in legal pro-
ceedings and its own investigations and mediation,
has assumed a major share of responsibility for ad-
ministering the Marriage Law.53

The ACFDW also had an international branch, which
Lit attempted to use in order to influence women in other,
especially developing, nations. "Thus, through the Women's
International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the ACFDW allies
itself with all the peace-loving women throughout the world
to struggle for world peace."54

The organization's membership in 1950 was 30 mil-

55 but by 1953 it had increased to a reported 76 mil-

lion,
lion.56 Membership in the organization was open only to
those who were members of a local association and not to

57 here, once again, the use of indirect

individuals as such;
membership as a control device is seen. Party members
dominated the organization. Ts'ai Ch'ang, elected chairman
in 1949 and 1953, was until 1956 the only woman on the
Party Central Committee. Teng Ying-ch'ae, vice-chairman,
was an alternate member of the Central Committee.58 There
were also non-Party figures used by the organization.

Soong Ching-Ling, wife of Sun Yat-sen, and He Hsiang-ning,
wife of another prominent early Kuomintang leader, were

both officers of the ACFDW.59

"Thus, by utilizing pliable
non-Party personnel in the ACFDW, the CPC endeavors to
create the appearance of a united front. At the same time,

its efforts to mobilize women all over the nation,

135
irrespective of their background and affiliations, for the

promotion of Communist programs, reflect the mass-line

policy in action."60

Barnett describes the actual operation of the ACFDW
units at various levels. In a central ministry, M:

The third Party-directed mass organization, the
Women's Association (fu nu lien ho hui), was . . .
loosely organized. In some respects, actually, it
was little more than a paper organization in Ministry
M. Like the Labor Union it was led by Party members
employed in the ministry. Its special reSponsibility
was to implement programs specifically relating to
women, but like all mass organizations it was also
expected to give general support to the Party in
carrying out all policies. In this particular ministry,
however, its activities were not extensive and it was
relatively unimportant.61

 

In County X:

The Women's Association, as would be expected, con-
cerned itself primarily with activities of special
interest to women throughout the county. The head-
quarters of the association was staffed by nine cadres,
seven Party members and two non-Party cadres. . . .
At the local level, there was both a women's work
cadre and a branch of the association in most communes.
Concerned with political as well as welfare work,
the association had a variety of responsibilities.
During every major campaign, its specific task was to
organize Special propaganda directed at women, and to
mobilize them to support the campaign. It also had
primary responsibility for organizing, or at least
helping to organize, women to participate in all pro-
grams that were aimed specifically at them, such as
implementation of the marriage law or the fostering
of family planning. The association provided an impor—
tant outlet for the energies of many activist women,
both Party and non-Party members, and it assisted the
Party considerably in many different ways. However,
its organization was fairly loose, and could not really
be compared, in terms of usefulness to the Party with
a more disciplined organization such as the YCL.62

136
And in a work brigade, B:
The local Women's Association, whose chairwoman was
the only woman on the brigade's Party Branch Committee,
was a very loosely organized body in Brigade B. It
met only infrequently, and was not impressively active.
It did, however, promote certain programs, such as
home sanitation and birth control, which were eSpecially
relevant to women and home management.

Barnett's descriptions point up several features relevant

to the Operation of the ACFDW as a mass organization in a,

perhaps, totalitarian system:

(1) the regime controls the organization by means of infil-
tration of leadership posts;

(2) the regime can use the organization to perform service
functions which are too menial for elite attention;

(3) the regime can use the organization to "whip up support"
for various regime activities;

(4) the very fact that the ACFDW represents "all women"
whether peasants or workers, of one nationality or
another, etc., almost insures that no real common
ground can be found upon which to build a power—seeking
organization (the same cannot be said, for example, of
the ACFTU).

For the above reasons, one can conclude that the Chinese

regime exercises "totalitarian—type" control over the ACFDW.

Chinese Youth Organizations
The Chinese regime has a long history of utilizing
youth groups as control devices for young people. In fact,

the founding of the first Communist youth organization

137

predates by a year the founding of the CCP itself. This
early group was named the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps,
but in 1925 the name was changed to the Chinese Communist
Youth Corps.64 Jen Pi-shih, a member of the Chinese Com-
munist Politbureau said that the above group "played a
preparatory role in the establishment of the Communist
Party ideologically and organizationally."65 In 1936 when
the CCP joined the United Front, the Youth Corps was aban—
doned and from 1936-1949 the Party sponsored several youth
organizations: the Vanguard of Chinese National Libera—
tion, the National Salvation Association of Youth, the
Vanguard of Anti-Japanese Youth, and the New Democratic
Youth Corps.66

AS the Chinese Communists expanded their control
throughout 1948, they began to amalgamate the various youth
groups into one.67 "The New Democratic Youth League was
established in that year, on an experimental basis, in
north China."68 This group was to be a "nucleus for mobil-
izing China's youth, serving as both assistant and reserve
strength of the Communist Party."69 In the Spring of 1949
a series of national conferences set up three youth
organizations:
(1) the All-China Democratic Youth Federation;
(2) the All-China Democratic Students' Federation;
(3) the New Democratic Youth League (or Corps).7O
In October of 1949 the Party organized a fourth group, the

Chinese Adolescent and Children Corps, which was the

138
descendant of such earlier groups as the Labouring

71 In

Children's League, the Anti—Japanese Young Pioneers.
August of 1953 the name of the Chinese Adolescent and
Children's Corps was changed to the Young Pioneers.72 "In
line with the transition from a society of 'New Democracy'
to that of socialism, the New Democratic Youth Corps
changed its name to the Chinese Communist Youth Corps
[Young Communist League (YCL)] in 1957."73 In this work,
the names Young Communist League and Young Pioneers will
be used to refer generally to each continuing organization
during the 1949—1964 period.
In effect, then, there were four youth groups

operating in China from 1949 to 1964:
(1) Young Communist League
(2) Young Pioneers
(3) Student's Federation
(4) Democratic Youth Federation.
The Democratic Youth Federation was the largest and most
loosely knit of the organizations.74 Membership in the
Federation was composed of organizational units rather
than individuals.75 The organization's constitution stated
that "any nationwide organization established by Chinese
youth, including overseas Chinese youth, or youth organiza-
tions in various provinces and cities" can join.7 The
constitution also spelled out the goals of the organization:

The aims of the Federation are to unite youth bodies

throughout the country, to promote the welfare of
youth, to strive with the people to win a complete

139

victory for the New Democratic revolution, to

accomplish the tasks of constructing a New Democratic

country, and to struggle in cooperation with demo-

cratic youth all over the world for lasting peace and

People's Democracy.
Of course, the Federation was organized on the basis of
democratic centralism with important positions being
staffed by YCL members and vital leadership positions
being filled by CCP members. The original head of the
Federation was Liao Ch'eng-chih, who was 43 years old and
an alternate member of the Party Central Committee.78

A second youth organization was the Student's

Federation. The Federation was headed by a national Con-
gress and was naturally based upon democratic centralism.
The Congress met biennially and elected an Executive Com-
mittee, consisting of at least one delegate from each
provincial or municipal organization. The Executive Com-
mittee implemented the decisions of the Congress (which
was in reality a rubber-stamp group) and also elected a
Presidium, which functioned when the Executive Committee
was not in session. Through this presidium and the nature
of democratic centralism, the Federation was controlled by
the regime. The organization was funded by its local
affiliates, who were supposed to send 20 percent of their
dues to the national organization.79 The activities of the
organization were divided into five parts (departments):
(1) Organization

(2) International liaison

(3) Welfare

140

(4) Propaganda

(5) Recreation.80

The Federation also has played an active role in the inter-
national communist student movement: "At the Second Con-
gress of World Students in Prague in 1950, China was re-

elected to a vice chairmanship in the International Union

of Students."81 Article II of the Federation Constitution

presented a general outline of the avowed tasks of the
group:

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,

to unite the students throughout the country, in
enthusiastic reSponse to Chairman Mao's call "to have
good health, to study well, and to work properly"; to
thoroughly implement the party's policy of "letting
education serve the political interests of the prole-
tariat, and combining education with productive labor";
to make efforts to cultivate ourselves to be both red
and expert intellectuals of the working class, so as

to struggle to build China into a great and strong
Socialist country with highly developed modern indus-
try, modern agriculture, and modern science and cul-
ture; to strengthen the unity with thesstudents of
Socialist countries; to develop friendship and coopera-
tion with the students of various countries; to support
the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, so
as to exert efforts for the cause of bringing about a
lasting peace and the progress of mankind.

As stated earlier, the Federation was controlled by the
regime. The following is an example of this type of

control:

A qualified non—Communist foreign observer who left
Peking early in 1951 estimated that in one of the
leading universities in Peking, which then had a total
enrollment of 1,100, there were approximately 200 to
300 members of the Youth League and perhaps 20 members
of the Communist Party. According to this observer,
the activities of the 1,100 in the student association
were determined by the 200-300 League members, who were
controlled by the 20 Party members.83

141
In general, then, the two organizations discussed above
were broadly based youth groups with a wide variety of
announced ends. Houn states:

Serving as front organizations for the Communist
party and enlisting adherents on a less discriminating
basis are the All-China Federation of Youth and the
All-China Federation of Students. According to the
official statement, these two organizations are
employed to consolidate and expand the "socialist
united front" among the youth organizations, to educate
young people from various walks of life, to exhort them
to work heroically and to study diligently, to contrib—
ute to the construction of a socialist society, and to
struggle, in cooperation with young people all over
the world, for the preservation of world peace and the
abolition of colonialism.

The next organization to be considered, the YCL, had a
much greater role in the regime's system Of controls.

The YCL was the youth Organization most closely

tied to the regime and the Party:
Formally defined as the party's "assistant" and charged
with the reSponsibility of imbuing all its members with
communist spirit and educating them in Marxist-Leninist
theory, the [Chinese Communist Youth] corps is most
closely tied to the party itself.
The organization of the YCL was similar to the organizations
mentioned above. The Official supreme leadership organ was
the Congress. When it was not in session the Central Com-
mittee of the League acted in its name. "Judging from the
nature of its work, the Central Committee is actually the
organ which determines the course of youth movement work in
China."86 The national membership of the organization was
not as large as the other youth organizations. Houn reperts

23 million members in 920,000 local branches in 1957.87

Lewis states that there were 25 million members of the YCL

142

in 1959.88 And Townsend presents the same 25 million

figure for 1964.89

Thus, the size Of the organization was
kept in check by the regime. One reason for the elitist
nature of the YCL was that it supplied fresh membership
material to the CCP. "The YCL is probably the most impor-
tant source of new party members because of the requirement
that applicants for Communist Party membership under 25
years of age be league members. As a general average
between 1949 and 1959, approximately 4 out of 10 new members
came from the league."90 Membership in the YCL itself is
for youth of 14 to 25 years, although many of its leaders
far exceed the age limit.

The general goals of the YCL were usually described
in a very vague sense. The task of the YCL has been
described thus:

To act as a bridge between the Party and the young
people and as a center from which to unite the youths,
to conduct the politico—ideological work among the
youths and the children, to publicize the Party's
guidelines and policies of different periods, to raise
the class consciousness of the youths, and to bring
forth their activism and creativity of the building of

socialism and communism. (China Youth, #17, Sept. 17,
1962)91

 

The meeting of the YCL Central Committee on December 20,

1962, outlined five major tasks for the YCL:

(1) Implementation of the general line set forth by the
Party for the development of the national economy;

(2) Ideological and educational and organizational work to
strengthen the YCL in rural areas, "and with the League

members' exemplary action, the broad masses of the

143
youths are to be rallied together, set in motion and
led to fulfill and over-fulfill the various production
tasks";

(3) Education of youth to observe the system, concern them—
selves with the collective, love and protect public
property, and strengthen the communes;

(4) Exemplary work in performing duties in the communes
and carrying out Party policies toward the communes;

(5) Conducting communist education among the youth in order
to strengthen the proletariat and wipe out the bour-
geoise.92

At times, however, the national YCL has undertaken more

Specific projects. In 1958 they organized 90 million youth

to collect manure. In the same year they also organized

60 million to work in water conservation projects and 30

million to work in 1,780,000 youth shock brigades.93

Still, most of the YCL activity took place at the

local level:

The local organizations of the Young Communist League
are set up according to the administrative divisions

at present in force in mainland China. These organi-
zations have the right to decide on the concrete work
of the youth movement in their respective locality,

but they generally take orders from the upper hierarchy
for transmittal below.

However, the most essential link of the YCL is its
primary-level organizations which are set up with local
organizations, companies, enterprises, and production
units as their units, League branches or sub-branches
are then set up according to the number of League mem-
bers in the reSpective unit.

These organizations at the primary level are charged
with the reSponsibility of directly mobilizing the

League members and other youth for participation in
various kinds of work and of organizing them for studies

144

of politico—ideological education, as well as of

recruiting new members for the League. In addition

to being charged with this, the units constitute the

fundamental organizations through which the Chinese

Communists push their youth movement work.94
Barnett provides some insights into the day-to-day func-
tioning of the YCL at the local level. He discusses the
operation of the YCL unit in a central ministry, a county,
and a production brigade. In Ministry M the YCL was an
important instrument for aiding the Party supervision of
non-Party cadres. As noted earlier, most of the YCL
leadership positions were held by "overage" but politically
dependable persons in order to facilitate Party control
of the organization. The YCL in Ministry M served three
functions. First, and most importantly, it was an arm of
the Party in supervising ministry work. Second, it was a
screening apparatus for potential Party members. Third,
it sponsored some social and cultural events.95

The YCL played a larger role in County X, where it

often served as a replacement for a Party organization much
more thin in resources than the Party organization of
Ministry M. Like the YCL in Ministry M, most of the leader-
ship was overage (an estimated 16 percent of the total
membership of County X's YCL was overage). Unlike Ministry
M, however, the YCL in the county provided a larger pro-
portion of the leadership cadres in the county than the
parallel YCL organization did for the ministry. This
enabled the Party to supervise the county: "Since YCL

members functioned under direct Party leadership and were

145
subject, in effect, to Party discipline, one might say
that the top elite in County X, including both Party and
YCL members, consisted of more than fourteen thousand per-
sons, or over 3 percent of the population--rather than 1
to 2 percent, the figure if only Party members were
counted."96

Finally, in a production brigade:

The YCL operated here as elsewhere as a Party-controlled
subsidiary for youth, and as already stated, was headed
by a member Of the Party Branch Committee. It had over
thirty members scattered throughout the brigade, orga-
nized into one YCL Branch. Its meetings were quite
frequent, but were more irregular than those of the
Party. The YCL, in turn, led the Young Pioneers orga-
nization, which had close to one hundred members, who
were pupils in brigade primary schools. A YCL member
who taught in one of the three primary schools in the
brigade directed the Pioneers.9
Thus the role of the YCL was that of a typical organization
under totalitarian control. The members were used as agents
to exercise mass control, and at the same time the organiza-
tion itself was kept under the constant control of the
regime.

This dual role can be seen in the relationship
between the YCL and the Young Pioneers. The Young Pioneers
was an organization for children aged 9 to 15. The member-
ship of this organization steadily increased during the
1949-1964 period (especially in contrast to the YCL member-
ship policy) as can be seen in Table 3.98 The Young

Pioneers was strongly attached to the YCL organization.

The official tasks of the Young Pioneers were:

146

Under the leadership of the Communist Youth League,
in its study and various collective activities, the
Young Pioneers Should unite with and educate adoles-
cents and children in possession of rich cultural and
scientific knowledge, a perfect physique and the vir-
tues of the "five loves." [love the fatherland, love
the people love labor, love science, love public
prOpertyl9é

TfiBLE 3
YOUNG PIONEERS' MEMBERSHIP 1949-1960

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time Membership (1,000's) Source
Oct. 1949 478 People's Daily
Dec. 1950 1,900 Hsin—hua Monthly
Dec° 1951 3,000 Hsin-hua Monthly
Dec. 1952 5,200 People's Daily
June 1953 7,000 Hsin—hua Daily
June 1954 8,000 People's Daily
May 1955 10,000 People's Daily
May 1956 25,000 China Youth Daily
Feb. 1957 30,000 People's Daily
June 1958 35,000 People's Daily
June 1959 44,000 People's Daily'
May 1960 50,000 People's Daily
Barnett illustrates the closeness of these ties in his

desc

ription of Young Pioneer activity in County X:

Itself responsible to the Party, the YCL in turn was
in charge of organizing and running a subsidiary orga-
nization for children, called the Young Pioneers (shao
nien hsien feng tui, or shao hsien tui, for short)
made up of youngsters aged nine to fifteen. The YCL's

 

 

147

School Work Department directed the Pioneers'
activities, which consisted for the most part of
recreation and indoctrination designed to inculcate
basic Party-approved values and attitudes into chil-
dren. The Pioneers were organized mainly in the
schools. Perhaps 35 to 40 percent of primary school
children--including many, if not most, of the bright-
est and most energetic ones--took part in its programs.
Understandably, the YCL drew a significant number of
its members from those who had come to its attention
because of their activities in the Pioneers. The YCL
and the Pioneers constituted, therefore, a pipeline
for recruitment to the Party elite that enabled the
leaders to select, train, and iest potential Party
members from a very young age. 00

Thus the Young Pioneers formed a lower echelon mass orga-

nization under the direction of the YCL, which was itself

controlled by the regime.

This discussion of the regime's relations with
youth organizations has demonstrated the totalitarian need
for constant monitoring of activities as well as the total-
itarian desire for "proper" socialization of the young.
Furthermore, the relationships of the regime to the YCL,
and the YCL to the other youth organizations has demon-
strated the totalitarian need to operate at several levels
of surveillance and control. Here, as in other mass orga—
nizations, democratic centralism has served as a useful

device for totalitarian control of mass organizations.

The All-China Trade Union Federation

Trade unions in China have operated under the
controlling conditions of the regime Since their formation
in 1949. They have been subject to all the delicate
balancing which is an integral part of the totalitarian

control. They have always been conceived of as "transmission

148

belts" based upon the ideas of democratic centralism. The
preamble of the Trade Union Constitution stated that "the
trade unions of China are the mass organizations of the
working class led by the Party and are the transmission
belt between Party and the masses."101 This section will
attempt to demonstrate that the Chinese regime had success-
fully (prior to the Cultural Revolution) managed to utilize
the unions while at the same time preventing them from
becoming competing centers of power. As Barnett writes:

The Federation [of Labor] has little resemblance to

trade unions in non-communist countries. It is really

a mass political organization through which the regime

controls labor, and this is most clearly symbolized by

the fact that unions have no right to strike. Stress

is laid upon members' obligations, not their rights,

so that the primary mission of the unions is to see

that Party and government policies are implemented, and

to strive for higher production.102

Although the activities of the trade unions varied

widely from 1949 to 1964, the structure of the Federation
remained stable. The national organization of the trade
unions was subdivided in two vertical fashions, according
to occupation and also according to geographical adminis-
trative units. There was a federation of trade unions in
each county and province, and these were all united under

).103

the All—China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU In

1954 there were 23 nationwide industrial unions, while the
geographical subdivisions ended in 180,000 basic branches.104
This dual system of division is a classic example of the

totalitarian regime's desire to keep every organization from

developing the potential to become a unified power base.

149

At the apex of the ACFTU was the All-China Congress
of Trade Unions, which met every four years. It theoret-
ically acted upon reports from the Executive Committee,
but it was, of course, a rubber-stamp. The Congress
elected an Executive Committee and an Auditing Commission.
"In the interim between congresses, the 98 member Executive
Committee is reSponsible for implementing the decisions of
the Congress and giving leadership to the trade union work
of the nation (article 16)."105 Another major task of the-
Executive Committee has been to attempt to instigate trade
union agitation outside of mainland China.106 The Executive
Committee elected a 24-member Presidium and an eight-member
Secretariat. The Secretariat conducted the routine work
Of the organization while the Presidium was "the interim
body for implementing the decisions of both the Congress

107

and the Executive Committee." Peter Tang then concludes,

"In this as in so many other organizations, then, the prin-
ciple Of democratic centralism makes it possible to concen—
trate the fate of the entire trade union movement in a very
few hands."108

At the other end of the trade unions are the some
180,000 local branches mentioned above. Townsend states:

In the case of the trade unions, a primary organization
may be established in any enterprise or establishment
with ten or more trade union members. In larger enter-
prises, the primary committee may set up subordinate
committees at the workshop level and trade union groups
on the basis of production or office units. Trade
union groups elect their own leaders, while the primary
committees are elected by general meetings of members
or by congresses of members' representatives. The

150

creation of such small branches facilitates frequent
meetings, direct personal contact between leaders and
ordinary members, and the existence of a trade union
organization in even the smallest production unit. It
also requires the services of large numbers of acti-
vists who are regular workers, rather than full-time
union cadres, but who engage in official union work in
their off-duty hours. In 1957, there were almost four
million such activists, about 30 percent of the national
trade union membership.109

Membership in these branches had grown considerably in the
period under discussion. In 1948 there were an estimated

110

2,830,000 union members, but by 1953 the number had

grown to 10,200,000111 and by 1957 it had pushed past
11,000,000.112 This represented over 90 percent of the
industrial workers in the country and a majority of all

113 This does not mean, how-

urban workers in the country.
ever, that all the trade union members were industrial

workers, the 1950 Trade Union Law stated that membership
was open to all wage earners whose livelihood was based

mainly upon wages. The China News Analysis states:

 

Trade Unions in China embrace not only industrial
workers but, . . . , all manual and non-manual workers
whose wages constitute their sole or main source of
livelihood. There are Unions not only in the indus-
tries, but also in government offices, schools, cul-
tural organizations, etc.
Thus one can see the totalitarian regime at work again.
Specifically, the regime feared that a union movement based
entirely upon industrial workers would have too great a
potential for a real shared interest. Thus the regime
sought to weaken the common interests of the organization

by including all sorts of extraneous groups.

151
The entire Federation apparatus was supported by
the dues and employer contributions paid to it. The manage-
ment contributed the equivalent of two percent of its pay-
roll while members' dues amounted to about one percent of

their wages.115

The members paid a membership fee after
applying for admission and if they fell more than six
months behind in their dues they could be expelled. This
action was taken by the lowest unit and confirmed by its

116 "A membership card must be kept

immediate superior.
carefully because a person who loses one is subjected to
public criticism and re-education and special sanctions
may be applied according to the gravity of his negligence.
Then a new card may be issued."117 However, it will be
Shown later, in Barnett's discussion of unions in govern-
ment branches, that upper echelon members, eSpecially Party
members, considered union dues and meetings of little
importance.

The link between the union leadership and the
members mentioned above was democratic centralism. How-
ever, before discussing the relation of democratic-centralism
to the unions, it is necessary to add that the unions did
perform some other functions. These functions were quasi-
governmental and were of more a service than a control
nature. The Federation:

1. in co—operation with the Ministry of Labor arranged
contracts between labor and state-owned or joint
public-private enterprises;

2. is involved in the administration of factories and

welfare services such as social insurance, health
plans, maternity benefits, and vacations;

152

3. is involved in a broad program of cultural and
educational activities;

A. it runs the Workers' Publishing House and
promotes the sale of its publications,

B. in co-Operation with the Ministry of Education
it has started spare-time schools for workers
in fields of:

(1) general education in order to reduce
illiteracy,
(2) technical training;
4. most importantly, activates and mobilizes the
workers and attempts to improve labor productivity.118

For the purposes of the regime, however, the most
Iinmportant function of the trade unions was their service as
‘tiaansmiSsion belts to the workers, and the key to this role
ties democratic centralism. The Constitution of the ACFTU
exemplified democratic centralism in mass organizations:

(1) the leadership organs of trade unions at all levels
shall be produced by democratic election from below and
make periodic reports to members on the work performed;
(2) trade union organizations at all levels must carry
out their work in accordance with the Constitution and
resolutions of trade unions; (3) all decisions of trade
unions organizations must be passed by majority vote of
members present; and (4) trade union organizations at
the lower level shall obey those of the higher level.119

In Spite of the rhetoric, democratic centralism
lJas seemed to operate in only one direction—-from the top
down. Harper writes:

For the Chinese Communists, with their commitment to
mobilizing the masses in order to effect industrial
progress as well as political action, both of these
elementS-—democracy and centralism--are essential.
Thus, the Chairman of the ACFTU could declare that,

if the factory operates only on the basis of central—
ized rule, then the leadership cannot help but become
alienated from the workers; if the factory were run
wholly by the workers in a purist sort of syndicalism,
anarchy would be the result and, though the workers in
that factory might be satisfied, the interests of the
whole country would not be served. But each attempt
by the unions to implement the democratic aspect of
democratic centralism in China's enterprises has

153
ultimately succumbed to an imposition of control by
the enterprise leadership centralist in fact and
democratic only in name. 20
This lack of a two-way flow was most heavily felt
1337 the union cadre, mentioned above. He could not blindly
:f<)llow Party orders or he would be accused of remaining
aloof and attacked for "commandism." On the other hand,
iuf he stood up for the interests of the workers against
'tlle Party, he was accused of "tailism" or "economism."
Here the regime managed to play the Party Off against the
\Jtiion, and thus confuse the loyalties of the cadre. Harper
Contends:
The conscientious union cadre will at some point con-
tinue to press against Party decisions on behalf of
the workers. But when this occurs, whenever the
transmission belt begins to function in a truly two—
way manner, the Party perceives a threat to its rule
and accuses the trade union of seeking independence
from the Party and succumbing to "economism," that is,
considering only the interests of the industrial
workers.12
TPhe cadres were also aware of their own elevated position,
‘Vis-a-vis the rest of the workers:
The mistrust between trade union cadres and the workers
is reciprocal. The majority of the workers, those who
are not ambitious activists, belong to the category
called "masses." Party-members and cadres are afraid
that they will be contaminated by contact with the
impure and they will be blamed, if not now then at some
future mental purge, for having fraternized with the
masses.122
In the above two commentaries one can find two manners in
which the regime controlled the unions: (1) the cadres,
who were the union leadership at lower levels, were always

kept off guard, so to speak, and were thus deprived of the

154

stability needed to establish a power base; and (2) a
feeling of mistrust was encouraged between the union cadres
and the workers, thus preventing a coalition of masses
and leadership from forming around common causes.

Finally, the regime had one powerful weapon it
used to control the unions, monopolization of leadership
positions. With only one exception, all Chairmen, Vice—
Chairmen, and Secretaries of the ACFTU have been Party
members. Six of the 19 members of the ACFTU Secretariat
since 1953 were also members or alternates of the CCP Cen—
tral Committee. The ACFTU Executive Committee was almost
totally composed of CCP members. Ninety-one percent of the
almost 1,000 delegates to the Eighth Trade Union Congress

123 "We may assume,

in December of 1957 were Party members.
then, that 95 percent or more of the ACFTU Executive Com-
mittee members are also CCP members, who in Lenin's words,
'carry out the directives of the Party'."124 Therefore,
the Party had another lever for the control of the ACFTU.
Thus far several methods the regime had used to
control the trade unions have been discussed. One can find
these methods at work by examining the development of the
trade unions from 1949 to 1964. The strategies for regime
control of the ACFTU had all been actively applied vis-a-vis
the unions during the 1949-1964 period. The entire period
was an example of the regime's balancing act; that is, the

attempt to utilize the unions to achieve certain ends but

at the same time the fear of the unions becoming a separate

155
power base. Thus the period saw a series of union attempts
to represent the workers, immediately followed by regime
Oppression of the unions. Yet the oppression was never
strong enough to completely crush the unions and thus end
their utility to the regime.

The development of the ACFTU may be broken into
three periods:125 (1) the period when Li Li-san was the
dominating force in the ACFTU (1948-1952); (2) the period
when Lai Jo-yu was chairman (1952-1948); and (3) a period
of "normalization" of union utility preceding the Cultural
Revolution (1958-1964). The ACFTU (which is synonymous
with the All-China Federation of Labor) was initially
founded in 1925 by the Second All-China Congress of Labor.
It was reconstituted in 1948 by the Sixth Congress of
Labor.126 Li Li-san was made First Vice-Chairman of the
ACFTU in August of 1948, a position which he held until

May of 1953.127

Li had previously been in the USSR for a
lengthy period and it is possible that he resented the
Maoist cast of the Party, a Party which Li himself had
once sought to Shape. Perhaps this is the reason for Li's
attempt to use the ACFTU to expand his power, and thus the
power of the unions themselves.

Immediately following the Communist victory, the
unions, perhaps intoxicated by the "proletarian" victory,

engaged in a series of strikes which virtually crippled

the industrial capacity of the country. The Party was

156
understandably concerned with this situation, and was also
faced with a severe economic crisis in March-June of 1950.12.8
"Acting firmly, the Party instructed the unions to exert
discipline and restore production, which they did, Speaking
strictly on behalf of management in the state enterprises
and siding with the owners in private enterprises."129 Then
in late 1950, Li began to make his influence felt. A rec-
tification campaign in late 1950 saw ". . . the unions being
accused of having separated themselves from the worker
masses."130 The vertical basis of union direction was
emphasized over the horizontal controls of Party mechanisms.
In this fashion Li, Operating at the apex of the structure
of national unions, could increase his own authority.131
Li also made other moves to fortify his position:
Li also moved to strengthen his influence over the
ACFTU propaganda and communications organs. In
December, 1950, a new editor was appointed for the
ACFTU newspaper, Kung—jen jih—pao; this man was purged
in 1957 as a "revisionist," with some cause. At the
same time a new editorial committee was set up for the
monthly ACFTU organ, Chung-kou Kung-jen, with Li as
committee head. The editorial trend of Chung-kou

kung—jen during 1951 may aptly be described as leaning
towards economism.132

 

 

 

By 1951 the union movement was reaching a peak:

Rather than serving merely as a pipeline for Party and
management, the unions began to identify with and
advocate the interests of the workers. The unions had
been siding with the authority in both public and pri—
vate enterprises; their increased attention in 1951

to workers' interests placed them at odds with the
Party, which, after all, must identify itself with
national, as opposed to only workers', interests. The
consequent tendency of the unions was towards autonomy
in relations with the Party, as well as the rise of
economism.133

157
By early 1952 the unions, and Li Li-san, had accumulated
enough power to worry the regime. Barnett describes some
of the various roles of the unions during this period:

In some cities in China, all contracts between state
agencies and private enterprises must now be Signed

by union representatives who together with represen-
tatives of the enterprises' senior staff members sit

in on the contract negotiations, review contracts, and
help to determine "legitimate profits." Because of

the detailed knowledge of operations that union members
now possess, they are called upon particularly to
review cost estimates made by the managers of private
enterprises.

Unions have also been given a Share of responsi-
bility for internal plant management in private fac—
tories, which they exercise through Labor-Management
Consultative Committees. The line separating manage-
ment and union responsibilities in this respect is
sometimes rather vague, and there have been cases in
which the Communists have reprimanded unions for going
tOO far in encroaching upon management functions, re-
minding them that their job is merely to supervise and
that the managers of private enterprises do still have
basic responsibility for managerial functions.134

He then adds:

Labor unions have also developed into an increasingly
important instrument of government control over private
enterprises. During the Five-Anti campaign, they were
used, in accordance with the basic principles of class
warfare, as one of the principal means of applying
pressure on businessmen and extracting information and
confessions from them. They were not only strengthened
organizationally during the campaign, but their eco-
nomic-control functions were also substantially
increased.135

Thus by early 1952 the ACFTU had taken several steps in
the direction of increasing control over the affairs of
its members. It was attempting to establish authority of
its own. "Li was seeking to make the unions a power base
Operationally independent of the Party; the unions were

later accused of pursuing autonomy and of a distinct trend

158

towards economism, a more or less correct evaluation by

136

the CCP of the situation." Li's attempts to use the

unions as a power base were abruptly halted in early 1952

by the regime's decision to crush the potential threat and
his replacement by Lai Jo—yu. "Li Li—san was purged from

his ACFTU leadership in early 1952 and from then until at

least 1955 the unions neglected workers' interests and

concentrated on the interests of the state, notably in

137

working with management to increase production." Lai

was appointed ACFTU Secretary-General in 1952 and elected
Chairman in 1953.138 Lai had had no previous experience

in union activities, thus the regime was once again attempt-
ing to prevent the rise of a real interest group by attack?
ing the communality of the group's interest. Harper sum-
marizes the Li Li-san era:

And thus ended the first period in China under Communist
rule when the trade unions sought to function ideally

in their transmission belt role. In order to function
properly, a mass organization requires a modicum of
operational independence from absolute Party control,

at least enough so that it will not be viewed solely

as another arm of authority by the masses it is

supposed to represent. Only thus can it transmit back
up to the Party the actual mood and desires of the
masses, so that the Party may follow the mass line in

a meaningful manner. But in 1951 the CCP chose to
interpret the unions' efforts to represent the interests
of the workers as a threat to Party control; the result
was a return to absolute dominance by the Party, sub-
servience by the unions.139

Lai was head of the ACFTU from 1952 until his death
in 1958. The 1952-1956 period was one of quiet and strict

control of the unions by the regime. A statement of the

159
Seventh Congress reflects this attitude:

In May, 1953, at a time when the regime was shifting
its emphasis to the industrialization program and the
transition to socialism, the seventh congress of the
organization reaffirmed its broad aims in the following
terms: ". . . to unite and educate the workers and
raise their political consciousness; to consolidate
the worker-peasant alliance, and unite with the people
of all other strata to actively fulfill the national
construction plan; and on the basis of developing pro-
duction, to improve the workers' material and cultural
life step by step; and to strive for the early indus-
trialization of the country and its transition to
Socialism."14O

In 1954, the ACFTU reiterated its position on its proper
role in the regime's scheme of things:

The Workers Daily, organ of the All—China Federation

of Labor in Peking, defined the responsibilities of the
unions as follows, in an article published on May Day
this year [1954]: "Under the leadership of the Economy
Checkup Committee, trade unionists should organize the
working masses to supervise the capitalists so that
they may be restrained from repeating acts of the 'five
poisons.‘ This is the main task confronting employees
and workers in private enterprises." Their main
reSponsibility, in short, is to help the government
control private enterprises rather than to concern
themselves with problems of more direct concern to
workers.141

 

However, by 1956 Lai was beginning to be co-opted
by the very organization he was originally assigned to
control. This phenomenon is not unusual, as any student
of American independent regulatory agencies and commissions
can verify. Also, the "Blooming" of 1957 gave added
impetus to workers' desires to make their interests known,
although it must be stated that the unions themselves were
not directly involved in the criticisms of the regime.

What did happen was that the unions once again, under the

160
guidance of Lai, returned to the road of economism. "Lai
Jo—yu, the Party leader assigned to bring the unions back

under the thumb of the Party in 1952, led the union battle

behind the scenes against the new Party line in 1957."142

Lai made several statements indicating his desire to see
the unions strengthened in their position in society:

Lai Jo— u, then Chairman of the ACFTU, Spoke to the
[Eighth Party Congress on the work of the unions.
Reviewing the state of industrial democracy in indus-
trial management, he too stressed the need for a
return to the worker masses. Although the unions
might need the guidance and help of the Party in the
plant, he pointed out that it was the union's respon-
sibility not only to "educate the workers and employees
to take a correct attitude toward the interests of the
state" but also to "organize them to safeguard their
personal interests."14

At the same time Lai stated that "the particular role of
the unions was 'to protect the welfare and democratic
rights of the mass of workers and employees'."144 Harper
concludes that during this period:

The trade union leadership—-an integral part of that
Party leadership--was more interested in fostering
worker participation in all areas of management,
including the material interests of the workers,
through the councils. This was a harbinger at the
highest levels of the coming clash between the unions
and the CCP, for the unions were at this point once
more embarked on the path of economism and were seek-
ing ways to achieve Operational autonomy from the
Party. They found strong support for economism and
independence even at the highest levels in the Party;
revelations of the Cultural Revolution make it clear
that Liu Shao—ch'i, Honorary Chairman of the ACFTU
and long identified with the labor movement, backed
the unions in 1956-57.145

At this point there was an internal Party debate
over the proper role of the trade unions, a debate which

ended in a victory for those committed to the centralization

161

of power and a defeat for those who worked to encourage

146

trade union autonomy. "When the 8th Trade Union Congress

'was held in December 1957, Lai Jo-yu himself led the series
of Speeches proclaiming the submission of the unions to
‘Party control."147 Townsend states:

In a Speech at the Eighth Trade Union Congress in
December, 1957, only fifteen months after he had
Spoken out for the workers' interests at the Eighth
Party Congress, Lai Jo-yu stated that worker wages

and welfare benefits had to be considered in the

light of overall national interests and the develop-
ment of production. Lai added that two questions had
been common to all great debates on trade union policy
since 1949: Should the trade unions accept Party
leadership? Should the trade unions regard production
as their central task? Needless to say, he answered
both affirmatively and said mistakes had arisen when
either had been denied.148

The Party continued to closely monitor the ACFTU activities
but no purge of the union leadership occurred until after
Lai's death in May of 1958.149 Liu Ning-yi became ACFTU
Chairman in August Of 1958, at which time most of Lai's
economism—oriented colleagues were purged from the top
leadership positions and transferred downward.150 "In Liu
Ning-yi's first Speech as ACFTU Chairman, he declared that
trade unions must work under the unified leadership and
unified arrangements of the Central Committee of the CCP
and its local committees at various levels'."151 Harper
characterizes the weakness of the unions during the 1958—
1964 period:

The theme Of strong Party committee leadership over the

unions was stressed in the workers' press during the

remainder of 1958. With the Great Leap Forward and its

radically altered industrial policies, and with econo-
mism and opportunism within the trade unions repressed,

162

the unions in China entered an era of quiescence. From
1960 until the Cultural Revolution, one may legitimately
characterize the trade union treatment in the press as
dull and boring. The unions had submitted to the Party
completely, were referred to as a "pillar of the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat," and had become to all
outward appearances nothing more than a subdued mouth—
piece of the Party and an arm for worker control.152

The trade union movement was in the firm control of the

 

regime. The China News Analysis contends that during the
food shortages of the Great Leap period the trade unions

were used to suppress complaints of workers.153

The general

blandness of that era is typified in an announcement put

out by the fourth meeting of the Executive Committee of the

ACFTU in 1962 (November 19 to December 13, 1962). The main

objectives of trade union activity inside China were stated

as:

(1) an economy campaign that Should reach down to each
worker and group of workers;

(2) the promotion of the old formula of labor emulation;

(3) assistance to collective economies of the communes;

(4) promotion of activists;

(5) more activity in commerce, State farms, cities and
countries;

(6) care for the livelihood of clerks and workers and help
them to solve their problems.154

Finally, Barnett provides an insight into the
day-to-day functioning of the unions during this period of

relative inactivity. He discusses union activity in

Ministry M:

163

The Labor Union (kung hui) in Ministry M was also a
Party-created and directed organization, but it was
more loosely organized and less important [than the
Y.C.L.]. It was headed by a chairman (chu hsi), a

a deputy chairman (fu chu hsi), and several committee—
men reSponsible for special fields such as welfare

(fu 1i) and culture and Sports (wen t'i). These were
part-time positions held by persons with regular
ministry jobs. All the union's leadership and func-
tionary posts were held by Party members. The union
was not particularly active in Ministry M, however

(or reputedly, in some other ministries either).
Membership which was open to both Party and non-Party
members, was voluntary. Most employees of the ministry
joined, even though this involved payment of dues (1
percent of salary), because the union administered
certain important welfare programs, including labor
insurance, and provided some recreational facilities
and educational programs. It organized biweekly film
showings, for example, as well as Special annual out-
ings. Every Wednesday evening, normally from 7:00 to
9:00 P.M., there was a union "life and self—criticism
meeting" (sheng huo chien t'ao hui), but attendance
was fairly irregular; many Party members, in particular,
missed a great many of these meetings. In short, the
labor union was not a center of power or influence in
any way comparable to the Party, although it did per-
form some useful functions under Party direction.155

 

 

 

And of County X he states:

Theoretically, the General Labor Union was an organiza-
tion established for "workers" throughout the county,
including state cadres as well as industrial and com—
mercial workers. In practice, however, not many Party
members participated actively in its programs, and its
activities were designed for non-Party state cadres
even more than for ordinary workers.

The county headquarters of the union had a staff
of eight state cadres. Only one, the chairman (ghg
hsi), was a Party member, although some of the others
balonged to the YCL. Under thechairman, there were a
clerical secretary (wen shu); four welfare cadres (£3
1i kan pu), who also acted as cultural workers (E22
hua yuan); one statistician (t'ung chi yuan) who col—
lected the monthly dues; and a management cadre (kuan
1i yuan).

Each government organization and economic enter—
prise in the county had a branch of the union, but the
organization of the branches was minimal, generally
with just a single cadre designated as head (fu tze jen).
In government organs, the personnel cadre or cadres were
normally responsible for union work.

 

 

 

164

Altogether, there were perhaps four to five hundred
members in the union in County X. They paid 1 percent
of their salary monthly as dues, but collection of
these dues was much more lax than in Party organiza-
tions. Every Saturday, during the period when the
Party branches met, the union convened meetings of its
own, attended by non-Party cadres.

The union maintained one sizable headquarters
building and also had space in several other locations
for "cultural palaces" (wen hua kung) and recreation
clubs (chu lo pu). Its main activities were in the
fields of welfare, recreation, and propaganda. In
addition to operating the cultural and recreational
centers, it maintained a library and ran a night school
which provided literacy training.

In political terms the union was not a very impor-
tant organization in County X, partly because the
number of workers in "factories" and other economic
enterprises was relatively small. It did, however,
provide some useful services to the non—Party working
force eSpecially those persons employed in the county
seat.156 -

 

One can therefore easily see that the general history of
the ACFTU in China has been one of subjugation to the
regimeé-a regime which performed a delicate balancing act
of control and exploitation, an act which required the use
of a wide variety of totalitarian control devices.

At the outset of this section, seven methods of
regime control over the ACFTU were presented (the symbols
following each statement are "keys" to the initial propo-
sitions presented at the end of Chapter II):

(1) a system of dual vertical rule, instituted in order to
confuse lines of authority within the organization (C);

(2) the use of a gallery of figureheads as a rubber-stamp
device, in this case the Congress of the ACFTU (C,3);

(3) the desire to keep membership not restricted to indus-

trial workers, thus helping to prevent the formation

165
of a "real" common felt need or interest in the
organization (D);

(4) the playing of Party directives against worker needs,
commandism vs. tailism, to keep union cadres in a state
Of uncertainty and insecurity (C,1);

(5) the promotion of mutual distrust between union cadres
and workers, once again to prevent communality of
interests (C);

(6) Party monopolization of union leadership positions (A,2);

(7) the separation of expertise from leadership, in this
case the imposition of Lai, who had had no previous
union experience, as head of the ACFTU in order to
prevent a pocket of Specialty from forming (B,2).

By means of the above measures, the regime managed
to control the unions in the 1949-1964 period. The unions
were not allowed to function as representative groups or
to become centers of power. Tang states:

In theoretical terms, the Communists reject the notion
that a trade union can concern itself primarily with
the economic aims of wages, hours, job security, and
the like; instead they insist upon the identity of
interests between the union and the state.

In practical terms, the Communists, in China as
elsewhere, insist that the freedom of workers to orga—
nize and bargain collectively be restricted, and that
only those unions approved by the regime (and dominated

by the Party) be allowed to exist.157

Townsend substantially agrees:

The trade union debate over workers' interests has

been . . . complex. On the one hand, there have been
consistent complaints from the workers and even from
high-ranking union officials that the trade unions have
sacrificed workers' interests in their efforts to main-
tain industrial harmony and increase production. These

166

complaints have undoubtedly been encouraged by high
expectations about labor's position in a socialist
society and by the Party's reluctance to stifle mass
initiative in the proletarian ranks. On the other
hand, the Party has insisted that workers' interests
cannot take precedence over national interests. It
has acknowledged that some trade union cadres and
organizations have failed to represent the workers and
that the unions must improve in this reSpect, but it
has also branded as "economism" or "trade unionism"
all attempts to use the unions as political weapons in
the defense of workers' interests. . . . we can say
that the trade unions have shown tendencies toward
greater representation of their members' interests but
that all of these tendencies have been checked and
heavily criticized.158

And the Union Research Service sums up the case quite
strongly by stating:

TWO conclusions emerge. . . . Firstly [Sic], that the
unions, dominated by cadres, have no power in them-
selves to seek redress for the ills of its [sic] members.
Thus it can do only so far as the party permits [sic].
Secondly, that the Communist Party is the self-declared
representative of the proletariat [sic]. Its' [sic]
policies, dictated by persons largely not of proletarian
background, are ipso facto declared to represent the
interests of the proletariat. Those who disagree are
classed as bourgeois.

 

Therefore, like the other organizations, the ACFTU
and its trade unions during the 1949-1964 period, were
exploited and controlled by the Chinese regime.

This chapter has analyzed the roles of the various
types of mass organizations in China during the 1949-1964
period. In each discussion of each group the role of the
regime, as it relates to the propositions outlined at the
end of Chapter II , has been pointed out. Based upon these
discussions, one can only conclude that the Chinese regime

used a wide variety Of totalitarian devices to manipulate

167
the organizations and preserve that delicate balance
between utilization and suppression which is necessary to
the totalitarian regime. The major problem encountered
by the regime was the longevity of the organizations. The
case of Lai and the ACFTU is a fine example. Merely
because of a prolonged association a sense of loyalty was
built, and thus a potential power base was created. In
the next chapter, the discussion will center around mass
movements, which were Sporadic and extremely transitory and
were therefore more useful and less threatening to the

regime.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

1Franklin Houn, TO Change a Nation (New York:
Free Press of Glencoe, 1961): p. 53.

 

2Ibid.

3Peter Tang, Communist China Today (New York:
Federick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 325.

 

4K. C. Chao, "Mass Organizations in Communist
China," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (Sept.
1954), 752.

 

5John Fairbank, The United States and China (New
York: Viking Press, 1962), p. 282.

 

6Tang, p. 324.

7James Townsend, Political Participation in Commu-
nist China (Berkeley: University of California—Press,
1969), pp. 152-154.

 

 

8Ibid., p. 152.
91bid.
101bid.

 

11Houn, p. 54.
12Townsend, p. 152.

13For a more complete discussion of democratic
centralism see Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1966), pp. 54, 85-89.

 

 

14Townsend, p. 153.
lélbid., pp. 53-54.
16Houn, p. 53.

17Townsend, p. 151.

181bid.

 

19Tang, p. 333.

168

169
201bid.

21Ibid.

 

22Ibid.

23Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 192.

 

241232,, p, 200.
2?;219-2 p. 352.
26y21g,, pp. 382-383.
27Tang, p. 333.
281219.

291bid.

 

30Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 249.

 

3llbid., p. 289.

32;p;g., p. 49.

33Townsend, p. 152.

34John Lindbeck, "The Organization and Development
of Science," in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), China Under

Mao: Politics Takes Command (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T.
Press, 1966), p. 339.

 

 

35Ibid., p. 366.

36K. S. Karol, China: The Other Communism (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 264.

 

37Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist
China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967),
pp. xvi-xvii.

 

38Howard Boorman, "The Literary World of Mao-Tse-
tung," in MacFarquhar, p. 381.

39Ibid., pp. 380-381.

40Jerome Ch' en, "Writers and Artists Confer," The
China Quarterly, No. 4 (October—December, 1960), p. 76.

 

170
416o1dman, p. 246.
4?;21g., p. 90.
43lbig., p. 96.
44Houn, p. 54.
45Karol, pp. 264-265.
46Tang, p. 331.

4712l9-

481bid.

 

49Ibid.

 

501bid.

511bid.

 

521bid.

 

53Townsend, p. 155.
54Tang, p. 332.
552212.

56Townsend, p. 15ln.
57Tang, p. 332.
531219-

591212,

60lbid.

61A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Polit-
ical Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1967), p. 30.

 

 

621213., p. 186.

631bid., pp. 369-370.

64Houn, p. 11.

65A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early

Years, 1949—55 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
p.'381

 

 

171
66Houn, p. 11.

67Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 38.

 

681212.
69ygig,
701219.
71Union Research Institute, "Young Pioneers in Com-

nnIJnist China," in Union Research Service, XXXVII, No. 11
(Nov. 6, 1964), 156.

 

721bid.
73Houn, p. 11.

74Barnett, Communist China . . . , p. 39.

 

75Ibid.
761bid.

77Ibid.

 

781bid., pp. 38-39.

 

79Tang, p. 333.
801bid.

81Ibid.

 

82Townsend, p. 154.

83Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 42.

 

84Houn, p. 12.
851bid., p. 11.
86Union Research Institute, "The Youth Movement of

COlmmunist China in 1962," Union Research Service: Commu-
£13£§t China 1962, I, 110.

 

 

87Houn, p. 11.

88John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China
(fitthaca, N.Y.: Cornell University press, 196377 p. 143.

 

89Townsend, p. 151n.

172
90Lewis, p. 144.

91Union Research Institute, "Youth Movement . .
1962," p. 110.

921bid., pp. 110-111.
93Lewis, p. 143.

94Union Research Institute, "Youth Movement . . .
1962," p. 111.

95Barnett, Cadres . . ., p. 29.

 

96Ibid., pp. 183-184.

97Ibid., p. 369.

98Union Research Institute, "Young Pioneers . . .,"
I). 1157.
99Ibid., p. 156.
100Barnett, Cadres . . ., pp. 184-185.

 

101Paul Harper, "The Party and the Unions in Commu-
rtist China," The China Quarterly, No. 37 (Jan.-March, 1969),
p . 84.

 

102Barnett, Communist China . . ., pp. 263-264-

 

103China News Analysis, "Trade Unions and Industrial
VVkJrkers," NO. 482 (August 23, 1963), p. 1.

 

104Barnett, Communist China . . ., pp. 263-264.

 

105Tang, p. 328.

106China News Analysis, "Trade Unions . . .," p. 2-

 

107Tang, p. 328.
1081222}
109Townsend, p. 153.
110Tang, p. 328.
1111219'

112Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 264.

 

173

 

 

 

 

113Ibid.

114China News Analysis, "Trade Unions . . .," p. 1.
115Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 264.

116China News Analysis, "Trade Unions . . .," p. 2.
1171bid.

 

118Tang, p. 327.
119Chou, p. 753.

120Paul Harper, "Worker's Participation in Manage-
nneant in Communist China," Paper prepared for 66th meeting
of American Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel,
Iq<3s Angeles, Calif., September 8-12, 1970, p. 3.

 

121Harper, "The Party and the Unions . . .," p. 88.
122China News Analysis, "Trade Unions . . .," p. 6.
123Harper, "The Party and the Unions . . .," pp. 86-87.

124Ibid., p. 87.

125This breakdown roughly corresponds to that of
Ilarper' s. For a complete and detailed account of the ACFTU
iirom 1949 through the Cultural Revolution, see Harper, "The
IParty and the Unions . .

126Tang, p. 326.

 

 

127Harper, "The Party and the Unions . . .," p. 89.
128Harper, "Worker's Participation . . .," p. 5.
129Ibid.

1301bid.

131Harper, "The Party and the Unions . . .," p. 91.
1321bid.

 

133Ibid., pp. 92-93.

134Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 168.

 

1351bid., pp. 167-168.

and the

174

 

 

135Harper, "Worker's Participation . P 5.
1371hid., p. 6.

138Harper, "The Party and the Unions ," p. 97.
139121g., p. 99.

140Tang, p. 326.

1413arnett, Communist China . . ., p. 168.
142Harper, "The Party and the Unions .," p. 104.
143Harper, "Worker's Participation . . .," p. 12.
144Ibid.

149;p;g., p. 13.

146For a detailed discussion, see Harper, "The Party
Unions .," pp. 104-107.

147;p;g., p. 107.

148Townsend, p. 97.

149Harper, "The Party and the Unions ," p. 112.
150£Elg_

151121g., p. 113.

15?;31g., pp. 113-114.

153China News Analysis, "Trade Unions .," p. 4.

 

154Ibid., p. 2.

155Barnett, Cadres . - -, PP- 29'30-

 

156Ibid., pp. 185—186.
157Tang, pp. 326—327.
158Townsend, p. 157.

159Union Research Institute,

"Trade Unions Incom-

petent in Safeguarding the Interests of Workers," Union

Research Service, VIII, No. 12 (Aug.

 

9, 1957), p. 219.

CHAPTER V

MASS CAMPAIGNS

The Mass-Line Philosophy

 

One vital key to understanding the role of mass
campaigns in Chinese society is an awareness of the mass-
line philosophy, or perhaps psuedo—philosophy, of the
regime. The regime itself publically announced the crucial

role of this policy in its operation. A Jen Min Jih Pao

 

editorial stated, "The fundamental policy of the Party, is

the policy of mass line."1

The general meaning of mass-line policy had devel-
oped with the initial period of Mao's leadership of the

Party. But by the early 1940's the concept had assumed

the form it would keep, virtually unchanged, until 1964.2

A Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, stated
this position:

In all practical work of our Party, correct leadership
can only be developed on the principle of "from the
masses, to the masses." This means summing up (i.e.,
coordinating and systematising after careful study)
the views of the masses (i.e., views scattered and un-
systematic), then taking the resulting ideas back to
the masses, explaining and popularising them until the
masses embrace the ideas as their own, stand up for
them and translate them into action by way of testing
their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to
sum up the views of the masses, and once again take
the resulting ideas back to the masses so that the

175

176

masses give them their wholehearted support. . . . And
so on, over and over again, SO that each time these
ideas emerge with greater correctness and become more
vital and meaningful.

At the same time, Mao himself wrote:

We should go into the midst of the masses, learn
from them, sum up their experiences so that these
experiences will become well-defined principles and
methods, and then explain them to the masses (through
agitation work), and call upon the masses to put them
into practice in order to solve their problems and
lead them to liberation and happiness.

Townsend views the mass-line as containing two separate,

but closely related, aspects of the Party's role in society.5

The first aspect of the mass-line is that it is a general
statement concerning the Party's need to stay in constant
and intimate contact with the masses.6 This aspect assigns
great powers and wisdom to the people as a whole: "Every
cause led by the Party, be it revolution or construction,
is the people's own and must be achieved by the people

themselves. Party policies must rely on the people for

7

realization." Liu Shao—chi also pointed out the need for

this contact with the masses, but his attention was more
oriented toward the "backward" masses in the society:

In accordance with the mass line, the majority, that
is the intermediate and the backward elements, must
be taken care of, otherwise the advanced sections will
become isolated and nothing can be done satisfactorily.
The slogans of action and the forms of struggle and of
organization we put forward before the masses must be
acceptable to the intermediate and backward elements.
The development of the self—consciousness and self-
activity of the masses concerns chiefly these people.
A mass movement is possible only when these people are
awakened and inspired to action. . .

Our sole intention is to attract and to set in
motion the intermediate and the backward elements
through the active elements. In other words, it is

177

for rallying the broadest possible masses that the
active elements are to be organized. If the inter—
mediate and backward masses are not yet awakened, we
must know how to enlighten them as well as how to wait
for them.8

'Thus the first aSpect of the mass-line philosophy, in its
‘theoretical form, is a concern for the utilization of the
energy and genius of the masses.

The second aSpect of the formal mass-line concept
refers to proper leadership styles for cadres and for the
Party in general. This aSpect of the mass-line concerns
the synthesis of mass activity and Party leadership which
should be used to implement policy:9

The procedure is summed up as "coming from the
masses and going to the masses." This means that the
scattered and unsystematic views of the masses are to
be collected by Party organizations, carefully studied
and coordinated, and then turned into statements of
Party policy. Because of this process, the CCP claims
that it "learns from the masses" and that all its
policies originate with the masses.10

A resolution adopted by the Eighth Central Committee of the
CCP in December, 1958, illustrates the use of mass-line
philosophy as a leadership principle (it is the "golden
mean" between commandism and tailism):

Following the 1957-1958 rectification campaign, the
party's mass line achieved a new, great victory. The
great leap forward in socialist construction and the
setting up of people's communes throughout the rural
areas are two signal marks of this victory. The mass-
line working method of the party is the lifeblood of
the people's communes. The setting up and consolida-
tion of the people's communes is impossible without
the mass line, without the full faith of the people in
the party and in the PeOple's Government, and without
an upsurge in the revolutionary zeal of the masses.
Therefore, leading functionaries of all levels in the
commune must put the mass line thoroughly into practice
in every type of work tackled. They must look upon

178
themselves as ordinary working people, and treat the
commune members in a comradely way. Kuomintang and
bourgeoise styles of work which coerce the masses are
strictly prohibited. Because of the big leap forward
in production and the victory in setting up communes,
some cadres are beginning to get dizzy with success;
and, unwilling to do patient work of educating the
masses by persuasion, they are exhibiting certain rude
attitudes.11
Formally, then, the mass-line would seem to be a
philosophy of adhering strictly to the wishes of the people.
The regime is, in effect, nothing more than the articulator
of the people's desires and the cadres are the collectors
of information. In China, however, the mass-line in prac-
tice is not at all the same as the mass-line in theory.
It was stated earlier in this work that ideology is
a tool in the totalitarian regime's quest for power, and
not the other way around. In China, the mass-line can be
seen to be a philosophy intended to gain mass enthusiasm
while preserving regime control. Four points can be made
which will support and illuminate the above contention.
First, the mass-line is a hollow shell of a philos-
Ophy. It has been used to cover such a variety of behavior
that it cannot be said to possess intrinsic meaning. Yu
states:
Like class consciousness, this mass line has
become something of a political myth of the Chinese
Communist Party. It is a policy to which almost
every Communist Party member refers in almost every
Speech or writing for almost every occasion. They
talk forever about the "harmonious unity with the
masses," "the viewpoint of the masses," "wisdom of
the masses," "sanction of the masses," etc. Almost
every program or policy of the Party is "demanded,"

"desired," and "initiated" by the masses. It is the
"creative initiative" and "highly elevated political

179

consciousness" of the masses that result in their
"volunteering" to go to the Korean front, "demanding"
the suppression of "reactionaries, counter-revolution-
aries and rightists," "insisting" on various mass
movements, or "petitioning" for the realization of

the commune program. It even appears that the Party
rarely does anything without the "sanction of the
masses." Nothing in Communist China, one can be sure,
is or can be divorced from this seemingly sacred doc-
trine of mass line.12

Second, the constant insistence that regime directions are
really the desires of the people (here one can see the
re-emergence of Rosseau's "General Will" and his notion
that people can fail to perceive their own true desires)
serves to weaken the self—reliance and the objective judg-
ment of the people and make them more receptive to any
regime policy.13 Thus, the regime is building the type of
citizen desirable in a totalitarian state, a citizen who
identifies solely with the regime and has no set of stan-
dards other than regime approval or disapproval.

Third, the mass-line philosophy lessens the
potential influence of the official state structure, thus
reducing its ability to become a competing center of power:

. . . , the mass line blurs the distinction between
governmental and nongovernmental activity by using
state organs, propaganda media, mass organizations,

and direct contacts between cadres and masses for the
same purpose of securing popular acceptance and exe-
cution of Party objectives. Since the Party demands
"conscious and voluntary action," rather than simple
obedience, it must reach down to establish direct con-
tact with the masses. In the process, the state struc—
ture is sometimes bypassed or reduced to only one of
several agencies for transmitting political information
and directives to the people.14

Finally, the mass-line arouses mass enthusiasm for

regime policy (a totalitarian regime needs enthusiastic

180

citizens, not passive ones) while allowing the regime to

retain actual control over policy formulation.15 The Party

itself is the real decision—maker in policy matters:

. . . the CCP claims that it "learns from the masses"
and that its policies originate with the masses. At
the same time, however, the Party insists that its
leading role requires it to make the actual decision
on the basis of its superior knowledge and experience;
it cannot accept "incorrect" mass views that would
lead the Party itself into error. The Party is guided
in its decisions by the conviction that it alone
clearly understands the long-run collective interests
of the people.16

The reasons for ignoring the populace while still theoret—
ically following the mass-line are numerous:

The masses can have "wrong," even "backward," ideas
when their "class consciousness is not adequately ele-
vated." Moreover, the Communists add, the masses do
not always see their way clearly because they are the
targets of "evil propaganda" or "counterrevolutionary
ideologies" of the bourgeois and capitalist classes.
The Jen Min Jih Pao puts it rather bluntly: "Unques-
tionably, our mass line does not mean that we should
do whatever the masses want. . . . Our slogan is: 'We
do what must be done.'"17

 

As Yu concludes:

. . . the Communist formula [is] that "the policy and
methods of work of the Party must originate from the
masses and go back to the masses." A cynical inter-
preter of this statement would argue that the Communists
try to make the ideas of the Party sound as if they
were ideas of the peOple. It is closer to the mark to
say that they attempt to transform the feeling or sen-
timents of the masses into an idea or notion that, on
the one hand, seemingly represents What the masses
want, but on the other, expresses what the Party really
intends.18

Thus, the mass-line is a useful totalitarian tool for maxi-
mizing mass support while minimizing mass influence on

policy.

181
It is because the mass-line technique has been
used to stir up mass enthusiasm that it is of great
interest at this point in the analysis. The major weapon
of the mass-line is the mass campaign. [Liu wrote in
reference to emulation campaigns:

In our work we should break through at one point to
give an example to the masses and let them see and
understand things by themselves. Only by giving
demonstrative examples to the masses can we encourage
them, particularly the intermediate and backward ele-
ments, by affording them the opportunities and
facilities to understand the problems, thereby instill-
ing in them confidence and courage to act under our
Party's slogans and to culminate in an upsurge of mass
enthusiasm.

The reason that recently army heroes, labour
heroes and model workers in different places have been
playing an outstanding role and have become the best
propagandists and.organizers of the masses is due to
the very fact that through such living personalities,
examples, and experiences familiar to the people the
masses are enabled to understand the issues, thus
heightening their consciousness and self-confidence.
This also explains why revolutionary reconstruction
in China's revolutionary bases is playing an educa-
tional and enlightening role for people of the whole
nation and is developing the entire nation's conscious-
ness and self—confidence.19

Townsend concludes:

[After 1949] The CCP discovered that mass execution

of policies designed to produce major changes through-
out China was a very complex matter and that higher-
level cadres no longer maintained the popular contacts
that were to ensure a "democratic" style in the
absence of popular controls. The Party's response

was to retain the theory of the mass line while trying
to recapture its original spirit through indoctrina-
tion of the people and rectification of cadres. The
mass movements have been the most tangible Sign of
this effort to force the political situation into con—
formity with the theory. But the mass movement, for
all of its demands on masses and cadres alike, has
been only a temporary solution. It creates mass
"enthusiasm" and renews direct cadre leadership of the
people, but only by an enormous expenditure Of time
and effort. Moreover, enthusiasm drops rapidly when

182
the movement subsides and the movements seem to lose
more of their impact with each campaign. The problem
of the mass line is, therefore, a recurring conflict
between theory and reality.20
In conclusion, then, the mass campaign and the
mass-line policy are inseparably linked together. The mass

campaign is a sophisticated weapon in the arsenal of a

totalitarian regime and will be considered as such.

The Mass Campaign

 

AS stated in Chapter II, the mass campaign is an
extremely useful device for utilizing the energy of the
masses, arousing their enthusiasm, while at the same time
preventing these forces from becoming competing centers of
allegiance. Barnett writes:

One of the most striking and distinctive aSpects
of the operation of the regime in China today is its
continued reliance, seventeen years after coming to
power, upon mass campaigns, rather than on more rou—
tinized administrative methods, to carry out its major
policies and programs. This revolutionary mode of
operation was clearly a product of the techniques for
mass mobilization developed by the Chinese Communists
during their struggle for power and during the early
years of class struggle when they consolidated their
power. In essence, the campaign approach to policy
implementation, which grows out of their commitment
to what is called the "mass line," involves the setting
of a few clearly defined immediate aims [although these
aims have often had a tendency to grow into broad,
sweeping goals], the concentration of efforts and
attention on these aims above all others, the mobili-
zation and training of large numbers of cadres drawn
from many segments of the political system to carry
out a campaign, and finally the mass mobilization of
the population as a whole to take action to achieve
the defined goals. Such campaigns rest on the premise
that the masses, if they are properly organized and
infused with ideological fervor, can be activated to

achieve most of the society's fundamental goals, . ...21

183

Barnett's analysis is valid except for one point:
the regime's desire to initiate campaigns is not due pri-
marily to a belief in the superior "achievement"powers of
the masses in a campaign setting, but rather to the
regime's desire to prevent institutionalization. It is a
totalitarian control device that is self—liquidating.
Townsend states:

On nearly all major national issues, the Chinese
political culminates in a mass movement that coordi-
nates in one general campaign all the organizational
and educational efforts that prepare the citizen for
political action. Mass movements are the most charac-
teristic expression of the Chinese style of political
participation. Like general election campaigns in
Western democracies, they are the most significant
events in mass political life and the symbol of the
basic objectives of political participation. As "the
most concentrated and salient form of expression of
the mass line" and "the climax of the revolutionary
action of the masses," the mass movement relies on
direct action by an enthusiastic and totally mobilized
population to bring Party policies to fruition. The
essence of the movement is its ability to stimulate
mass activism, thus avoiding reliance on Specialists
and state organs, while retaining Party leadership to
prevent Spontaneous or undisciplined action.2

In considering the 1949-1964 period, one cannot

escape the impact of the numerous campaigns. The popularity
of the campaign technique has varied somewhat. In general,
during the periOdS when the "economic rationalists" or
"revisionists" or "bureaucrats" exerted influence in Party
circles, the campaigns were used less vigorously and often
in conjunction with more conventional organizational
apparatus.23 Such periods were the 1953-1956 period, the
period following the Great Leap, and the early 1960's.

On the other hand, when the Maoist leadership was in firm

184
control the regime exhibited more totalitarian behavior
and made more extensive use of the mass campaign technique.
The "Hundred Flowers," 1957—58 rectification, Great Leap,
and Cultural Revolution campaigns are the best examples of

these periods. Many other periods were a mixture of the

two, such as the "5-Anti" or socialist education campaigns.24

In any case, two points are very clear: (1) the more

"totalitarian" leadership has pressed for increased use of'

campaigns as opposed to conventional institutional devices,25

and (2) campaigns were used at all times during the 1949-
1964 period, although their importance in respect to the
entire control apparatus fluctuated somewhat. Yu, writing
in 1959, stated:

Anyone who takes even a casual look at the Commu-
nist record since the establishment of the Peking
regime in 1949 will immediately realize that for ten
years the entire nation has always been engaged in
one major mass movement or another, simultaneously
with large-scale campaigns for different sections of
the population at particular times. To name chrono-
logically only the few that are generally known, there
have been the Land Reform movements, hsueh hsi (study),
Resist-America Aid-Korea, propaganda networks, ideo-
logical remolding, "three-anti five-anti," suppression
of counterrevoltionaries, mutual cooperatives of pro-
duction, the Five-Year plans, the agricultural c00per-
atives, "Hundred Flowers," national reconstruction
through austerity and diligence, reform through work,
"great leap forward," "general line of socialist
development," production of steel and iron, and the
people's communes.

 

Since 1959,many more campaigns have been added to the list.
There were too many campaigns to discuss each one indi—
vidually; however, some general observations about campaigns

can be made. First, there are various types of campaigns,

185
just as there are various types of mass organizations.

Second, all campaigns share the same general modus operandi.

 

Third, the mass campaign in operation conforms to many of
the propositions outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II.
Each of the above observations will constitute a major

topic of this chapter.

Types of Campaigns

 

There are two manners, or dimensions, by which
campaigns can be typed. First, one may consider the cam-
paign's clientele. That is, who actively participates in,
and to whom are the goals of the campaign directed. The
participants and the targets of campaigns are not always
the same people, and this situation could lead to confusion
in typing campaigns. However, this problem can be solved
by the introduction of the second method of categorizing
campaigns, the consideration of the goals of the campaign.
By introducing this aspect, the question of whom the cam-
paign is directed against (if anyone at all) becomes one
of goals and not of clients. Therefore, the first dimen-
sion of campaign categorization concerns the scope of the
participation in the campaign and the second dimension
concerns the goals of the campaign. The first dimension
has, really, only two categories. Campaigns are generally
conducted or designed to be conducted either by Specialized,
relatively elite groups, or by the society as a whole.

Thus the early "three-anti" campaign was concerned with,

186

and conducted by, education-related individuals while the
great leap was designed to include the whole of Chinese
society in its activities. The first type of campaign may
be called a "Specific" campaign and the second type a
"diffuse" (referring to the scope of participation) campaign.

The goals of campaigns can be divided into three
general categories. First, there are campaigns designed
to "rectify" or correct behavior in the society, and these
campaigns are usually directed at Specific groups. The
first 5-Anti campaign was an example of this. A second
type of campaign is designed to implement a general policy
or attitude throughout the entire society. The "Hundred
Flowers" and great leap campaigns were examples of this
type. Finally, and most recently, there are emulation
campaigns in which exemplary individuals are held up by
the regime for imitation by the populace. These campaigns
are in the old Stakhanovite tradition and the Lei Feng
campaign is probably the most typical of these campaigns.
These emulation movements can be used to influence either
select groups or the entire population, but the campaigns
of this type known in the West are those given the broadest
possible exposure in China, and are thus diffuse campaigns.
Table 4 illustrates the categorization of campaigns and
presents some examples. Each of these methods of categori—

zation will be discussed in greater detail below.

187
TABLE 4

CAMPAIGN TYPOLOGY

 

 

 

Participants Goal
Rectification General Emulation
, , Construction
Spec1f1c Three-anti of communes

 

. Post—"Hundred
Diffuse Flowers" Great Leap Lei Feng

 

 

 

 

Specific vs. Diffuse Campaigns
Most of the Chinese campaigns familiar to Western
writers are of the diffuse type. The "Hundred Flowers,"
Great Leap, and, of course, the Cultural Revolution are
the most prominent. These campaigns are well known because
they affected all of the society and thus they were pub-
licized to an extraordinary degree by the regime itself.
This type of campaign will be examined more closely in the
following section on campaign goals. At this time the
focus will be upon the specific campaigns. Because of the
limited participation in these campaigns they are not as
visible on the Chinese scene.
One example of this type of campaign was the
Ideological Reform Campaign of 1951. Barnett writes:
Since achieVing power, the Chinese Communists have
advanced their revolution through a continuing series
of intensive mass campaigns and movements. Each of
these has severely shaken the structure of old Chinese

society and has pushed the revolution a step further.
During the past year [1951], China's intellectuals—-

188

and the Chinese educational system—-have been the

prime targets of an important one of these movements,

the Ideological Reform campaign.27
This campaign was a Specific campaign not because it was
aimed at intellectuals, but rather because it was conducted,
under Party direction, by the teachers and students who
comprised the intellectual community and not by the society
aS a whole. One can observe this phenomenon by studying
the events at Yenching University, which was abolished in
the course of the campaign. The chief target at Yenching
was the President, Lu Chih-wei, and his antagonists were
the members of the academic community itself, not outsiders
brought in by the Party to "clean up" the situation. In
fact, the climax of the campaign wmsan attack on Lu by his
own daughter, a student at the university (and also a
candidate for membership in the New Democratic Youth

28

League). She denounced him: "You are a one hundred

per cent claw of imperialism and a tool faithful to Amer-

ican imperialism in its cultural aggression." "You have
been a hypocrite and I have been cheated by you." "You are
no longer my respectable father." "No Chinese will ever

pardon you."29 Barnett adds:

She excused herself for not having denounced him
earlier by blaming her weakness on the "love between

a father and a daughter [it is believed that prior to
the campaign She had been strongly and genuinely fond
of her father]," but she went on to say: "Even if
this love is true, it is definitely insignificant
compared with the love among the broad masses, not to
mention the fact that your love is not love but deceit.
Why must I be deceived by you and revolt against the
people? I want to be with the broad masses and strug-
gle hard for the sake of communism."30

189
Lu himself followed later with a stream of confessions of
his own crimes.

One important feature of this campaign, as Barnett
notes, and of "specific" campaigns in general is their
reliance on the techniques of group criticism and self-
criticism. Other sections of this research have pointed
out the usefulness of "criticism," "self-criticism," and
"struggle" sessions as totalitarian control devices; for
example, the "meetings of immortals" conducted by the minor
parties. Criticism and self-criticism are especially
useful in Specific campaigns because the campaign itself
is being waged by one's peers. It is evident that pres—
sure for attitude change and conformity is much greater
when applied by one's peers than when applied by strangers.31
Therefore, the Specific campaign has an advantage over its
diffuse counterpart: it can bring pressure from a target's
associates, and even relatives (the implications of the
use of close relatives by the regime to attack a target
are extremely important when one considers the totalitarian
regime's desire to destroy the family unit; however, such
a discussion lies beyond the scope of the present research).
The Ideological Reform Campaign adhered to this philosophy
of utilizing criticism and self-criticism:

Like so many of the "campaigns" that have taken
place in Communist China one after another, in rapid
succession, during the past three years, the Ideolog-
ical Reform campaign started with relatively little
fanfare and then, over a period of months, built up

into a frantic, violent, and almost hysterical
"struggle." (A recent refugee from the mainland has

190

described some of the meetings held during the course
of the campaign in Peking, and they sound very much
like "holy roller" orgies.) The stated aim of the
campaign when it started was to carry out general
"ideological reform" through a "study movement" and
"criticism and self-criticism."

The campaign really started rolling on September 29,
1951 when Premier Chou En-lai addressed a mass meeting
of more than 3,000 professors, assistants, and instruc-
tors in Peking, to define a correct "standpoint" and
"attitude" for them.32
Throughout 1951 the campaign rolled on, but it then ended
abruptly in early 1952, when it was merged with the three—

anti campaign.33

It is the ability to quickly and effec—
tively end campaigns that makes them extremely valuable to
the Chinese regime. There is no lingering organizational
framework, seeking self-perpetuation and therefore hungering
for power. The campaigns are quick and potent. As Barnett
states:

A standard technique employed by the Chinese Com-
munists in their "campaigns" is to apply extreme pres-
sure for a short period of time and then to relax the
pressure, boasting of their magniminity, while they
consolidate gains made--which are always Short of the
extreme goals and maximum aims defined in the
campaigns.34

Campaign Goals

A second way to categorize campaigns is to examine
their goals. AS mentioned earlier, there are three general
types of goals set for campaigns: (1) rectification, (2)
general or sweeping societal change, or (3) emulation.
Rectification campaigns have occurred frequently in the

course of the Chinese regime's tenure. Most of these

campaigns were designed to "rectify" or reform certain

191
rightist elements or traits in the society. Two of the
best known campaigns of this type were the 5-Anti campaign
of 1952 (which was directed at bourgeois elements, eSpe-
cially businessmen) and the post—"Hundred Flowers" campaign
of 1957—58 (which was aimed at persons, especially intel-
lectuals, who had criticized the Party during the "blooming
and contending" period). The 5-Anti campaign grew out of
the three-anti campaign which was mentioned above in ref—
erence to the Ideological Reform movement:

In January, 1952, a direct attack on the bour-
geoisie was initiated in Speeches made in Peking by
Premier Chou En-lai and Po Yi-p'o. At first, these
attacks were based on the Three-Anti slogans, but
they later were expanded and developed into the new
Five-Anti campaign. The bourgeois class was severely
chastised for having cheated and stolen huge sums of
money "from the government and from the people," and
the guilty were ordered to confess and make restitu-
tion.

From January through May the campaign was promoted in all

36 "The Communists went to

the major cities of China.
great lengths to arouse the masses against the bourgeoisie,
and during the course of the campaign class warfare between
employees and employers was at times bitter and intense as
a result of the general mobilization of workers and Shop
assistants in the struggle against the business class."37
AS the pace of the campaign mounted, more use was made of
self-criticism and criticism as tools for the proper
"remolding" of the target individuals:
Great emphasis was placed during the campaign on
the need for public denunciation and confession. The

government guaranteed full protection to anyone making
a denunciation, and the treatment accorded to businessmen

192
depended to some degree upon their willingness to
confess. Frank confession could lead to a one-grade
reduction of criminal status, while refusal to con-
fess automatically resulted in raising the classifi-
cation of the case by one or more grades. Special
consideration was given to persons who performed the
"meritorious service" of denouncing others.

The campaign finally wound down by June, when it was

displaced in the public eye by a new campaign to increase

national production through more construction. AS a

result of this 5-Anti campaign, the regime increased its

control over the economic sector and all but eliminated

the last vestiges of private business.39 Several important

features of this campaign should be noted:

(1) it made use of the criticism and self-criticism tech—
niques;

(2) it increased the power of the regime, especially over
the economic sector;

(3) it was swiftly and completely diSplaced by a new cam-
paign and thus left no lingering apparatus. Those
organizational bodies that were Specifically designed
for the campaign, such as ad hoc public tribunals,
disappeared along with the campaign itself.

A second major rectification campaign was the
anti-rightist campaign of 1957-1958, which grew out of the
Hundred Flowers movement. The Hundred-Flowers movement
was originally initiated in order to let the people Speak
up about the working style of the party and the government

officials. It was, in effect, a campaign to weed out

unnecessary bureaucracy. But the response to this campaign

193
was so vehement and voluminous in its criticism that the
regime felt compelled to "rectify" those whose criticisms
were directed at the regime. "By June 1957, the rectifi-
cation of the party turned into the rectification of the

critics of the party."40

The campaign was mounted quickly
(leading some observers to the somewhat dubious conclusion
that the whole affair was a regime "trap" to ensnare its
hidden enemies in the society):
. . . with the appearance of . . . JMJP editorials in
the second week of June, a campaign against leading
intellectuals was set in motion with an unexpected
Speed and intensity, . . . The intellectuals who had
criticized were labeled rightists and the drive was
called the antirightist campaign. It served the dual
purpose of damaging the prestige of the intellectuals
and providing a mechanism for the reaffirmation of
the party's position. AS the movement progressed,
the emphasis Shifted from the first to the second
purpose.41
Just as the regime moved rapidly in 1952 to attack the
business community and strengthen its control over the
economy, it moved quickly in 1957 to attack the intellectual
community and strengthen its control over the cultural
community. Both cases demonstrate the totalitarian desire
to expand power and both cases also demonstrate the use-
fulness of the mass campaign in accomplishing this task.
The 1957 campaign ended abruptly after a series of con-
fessions by leading intellectuals, and was swallowed up in
the great new modernization campaign, just as the earlier
1952 rectification campaign had been swiftly ended by a new

movement. Thus, in 1957, the regime again proved its ability

to turn campaigns on and off like running water.

194

A second type of campaign is that which is oriented
toward accomplishing large societal goals. The Hundred
Flowers movement, described above, began as a campaign of
this type. Undoubtedly the greatest of these movements in
the 1949—1964 period was the Great Leap Forward. The great
leap actually began with the ending of the Hundred Flowers
philosophy in June of 1957, but it did not really burst
onto the scene until 1958. It lasted until 1960. Schurmann
states:

As the Great Leap Forward grew in intensity, it
began to Spread to the entire society. What had
started as a movement aimed at "overtaking" England
in fifteen years in industrial production" quickly
became a gigantic nation—wide mass movement which
affected city and country alike. The mounting hsiafang
campaign saw millions of city people pour into tfie__—_—
villages to engage in agricultural work. 2

In effect, the great leap was a "super—campaign" and con-
tained within itself many smaller and more Specific cam-
paigns, such as hsiafang or the construction of flood
controls. This is not entirely unusual. Mass campaigns
in China have overlapped one another, they have grown out
of one another, and they have often been integrated in
some sort of temporary hierarchical framework. One Should
not have the impression that only one campaign was active
at any given time and that one ended neatly when another
began. The use of campaigns in China has been like the
direction of an orchestra, with the regime as the conductor,

and the campaigns and their themes as instruments. The

conductor "uses" his instruments harmoniously, sometimes

195
highlighting one and sometimes another, and often Silencing
one section only to revive it later in the piece.

Much has been written detailing the activities of
the great leap, and it would seem impossible to recap all
the events here. Townsend best captures the Spirit of the
movement:

The period of the Great Leap is perhaps best known
for the formation of people's communes in the country—
side in 1958 and for the attempt to score sensational
advances in all areas of production by the extravagant
expenditure of human resources. This was a period in
which China proclaimed its ability to catch up with
the industrially advanced nations by virtue of human
effort and enthusiasm. Hundreds of millions of Chinese
were to be organized for a "war against nature." Plan—
ning and statistics were forgotten, obstacles were
ignored, and everyone, regardless of position, was
expected to make some contribution to productive
labor.

Townsend also notes one crucial feature of the Great Leap:

. . ., the Great Leap involved an unprecedented effort
to indoctrinate the entire population with "correct"
ideology. This effort reinforced the tendency noted
above to move away from regular procedures within the
state structure, as it depended essentially on direct
mobilization of the masses by cadres at the lowest
level. In fact, as Chou En-lai said, it was Simply

a matter of making the methods of the rectification
campaign become a "permanent feature of our political
life"; mass meetings, constant discussion and debate
and writing of tatzubao, which formerly had been used
as techniques for mass movements, were to become the
very heart of regular political activities.44

Thus, the great leap marked a period of increased use of
mass campaigns and campaign techniques, as well as demon-
strating the utility of general-goal campaigns to the
regime.

A third type of campaign is the "emulation"

campaign, in which peOple are exhorted to follow the

196
Shining example of some exemplary citizen, usually deceased.
The hero almost always leaves a diary or set of notes
behind, telling of his good deeds, and then an emulation
campaign is built around the virtues demonstrated in the
hero's writings. Seven individuals--Lei Feng, Ouyang Hai,
Wang Chieh, Mai Hsien—teh, Wang Chin-hsi, Chiao Yu-lu, and
Lui Yung-chun-—were centers of emulation campaigns between
1963 and 1966.45 It should be noted that five of the
seven were members of the PLA. Only Wang Chin-hsi, an
oilfield worker, and Chiao Yu-lu, a party cadre who per—
formed agricultural miracles, were not PLA members but were
heroes of the old, Stakhanovite fashion.46 This reliance
on the PLA to supply heroes is evidence of the role of the
Army in assisting Mao in the late 1960's to expand his
power base. Also, the emulation campaigns fit into a
larger, more general campaign that advised the population
to "Learn from the People's Liberation Army." What better
endorsement of the virtues of the PLA as a body, than a
constant discovery of "heroes" produced within its own
ranks?

The most well known and the most typical of these
campaigns was the Lei Feng campaign of 1963. Lei Feng was
a hero because of the type of life he led and his ability
to heighten his own ideological awareness. His diary
states that he was born to a very poor peasant family,
which was badly mistreated by the local landlords, and of

which Lei was the only survivor. But then the CCP was

197
'victorious and Lei had the opportunity to go to School and
learn to be a truck driver and a mechanic. He then joined
the motorized force of the PLA and wrote in his diary:47

I have been saved at the cost of the blood and
life of my revolutionary elders. The great Communist
Party and Chairman Mao saved me! I have decided to
dedicate my life to the communist cause.

Lei rushed to volunteer to go fight off an alleged Nation—
alist invasion of the mainland, but the political commissar
of his unit tells him he is not needed to fight any
invasion, but his duties lie elsewhere. The cadre gives
Lei a set of the collected works of Mao. Lei reads them
over and over and realizes that heroism is in socialist
construction and not only in fighting the Nationalists.

His diary Sings the praises of the Party and Mao:

July 1, 1961

I felt particularly happy this morning when I got up,
because last night I had dreamt of our great leader
Chairman Mao. And it so happens that today is the
Party's 40th anniversary. Today I have so much to
tell the Party, so much gratitude to the Party, so
much determination to fight for the Party. . . . I am
like a toddler and the Party is like my mother who
helps me, and teaches me to walk. . . . my beloved
Party49my loving mother, I am always your loyal son.

ILei then proceeds to do an amazing number of anonymous
good deeds. He could never pass people at work without
helping, and he never identifies himself in order to win
praise. His diary states typically:

October 15, 1961

Sunday today. I didn't go out; instead I washed 5
mattresses for the comrades in my squad, repaired Kao
K'uei-yun's bedcover, assisted the cooks to wash more
than 600 catties of cabbage, swept inside and outside

198
the room and other things . . . In all, I've done
what I should have done. I'm tired but happy. . . .
It's glorious to be a nameless hero.
Lei sets such a good example that he even reforms a shift—
less comrade. Lei performs countless good deeds. Then,
in August of 1962, at the age of 22, he is killed in an

accident.51

His diary was "discovered" and the regime was
so impressed that Mao himself launched the "Learn from Lei
Feng" campaign in 1963.52

The obvious goal of the campaign was to inSpire

people to live and work like Lei. For those who feel the
entire story is so trite that the Chinese could only scoff
at the campaign, K. S. Karol, who traveled through China
while the campaign was being conducted, reports of attend-
ing a film depicting the life of Lei:

The audience leaves wet-eyed. Gino Nebiolo even
told me that in a movie theater in the suburbs of Si'an
he saw the audience rising in unison at the end of the
film and chanting for a full five minutes, "All honor
to Lei Feng."53

The life of Lei Feng was the life of the almost

ideal totalitarian citizen. All of his energy, all of his
devotion, all of his love went to the state; it was his
"mother." His friendships with others are based on their
Shared participation in the state and not on personal
grounds. In short, Lei Feng is pretty much entirely a
creature of the state; he has no other frame of reference.

The Lei Feng campaign was typical of a large group of emu—

lation campaigns designed to mold the totalitarian citizen.

199
This section has focused upon ways to differentiate
among campaigns. The next section will examine the commu-

nalities in the method of operation of campaigns in general.

The General Modus Operandi of Mass Campaigns

 

Although the mass campaigns vary in their goals
and constitutuencies, they do tend to share a common
general method of operation. The first aspect of this
communality is that campaigns are initiated by the highest
echelons of the regime. In a democratic-centralist fashion
the word is passed down to whatever group is involved that
a certain type of campaign should be initiated. Often key
figures in the regime make the pronouncement, as Mao him-
self has sometimes done, and often the "official" newspaper

Jen Min Jih Pao iS used to pass along the instruction in

 

its editorial (and sometimes its news) section. Whatever
the method of initiation, the central regime keeps tight
control over activities. "The Five—Anti campaign was
carefully organized on a national scale, and detailed rules
and regulations were promulgated by the Central Govern-
ment."54 Townsend states:
Movements are launched by central directives, either
government or Party, that state the basic scope and
objectives. Local governments at municipal, provin—
cial, and hsien level follow with their own statements
that echo the central directives and Specify the timing
and operation of the movements within their area of
jurisdiction.55

Townsend also points out another common feature of

campaigns: campaigns are "pre-tested" in restricted areas

200

before they are used in the country at large. "'Experi-
mental work' in 'key points' always precedes a more general
unfolding of a campaign in any given area. Experimental
work not only tests popular reSponse and the effectiveness
of techniques but also serves as a training ground for a
select group of cadres who will provide leadership when the
movement is expanded."56 The first three—anti campaign,
for example, was tested in Manchuria before it became a
nationwide movement.57

A third common feature of the mass campaign is the

frenzy with which they are carried out. The campaigns move
at a fearsome pace, and build up momentum as they move
along. Barnett describes the early days of the 5—Anti
campaign in Shanghai:

By late January, an extensive propaganda drive was
under way. Teams of propagandists toured the city and
mobilized workers and Shop assistants to help them.
They plastered the city with posters, written slogans,
banners, and "wall newspapers." Some of the teams in
local districts consisted of up to 200 members; they
went into factories and stores and demanded confessions
from the owners and managers. Loudspeakers set up
outside shops and at important street corners blared
questions and accusations at businessmen: "Hey, boss,
have you confessed yet?" Workers, and even casual
passersby, were encouraged to Shout at businessmen
through these public loudSpeakerS.58

Barnett also discusses the effect of campaigns on the
normal procedures and bureaucratic operation of Ministry M

in the late 1960's:

Every major campaign has involved enormous organi-
zational activity, and has introduced a period of
apprehension, anxiety, and tension within the bureau-
cracy as well as throughout society as a whole.
Generally, within the bureaucracy, political study has

201

been dramatically increased until, at the peak of

such a campaign, normal work has come virtually to a
halt while everyone has devoted almost full time for
weeks—-and sometimes months--to endless group discus-
sions, usually culminating in tense, emotional "strug-
gle meetings" (tou cheng hui).59

 

lie adds:

. . ., special campaign indoctrination meetings Slowly
increased until they occupied about half time, and
finally full time for perhaps a month or two. As a
campaign progressed, emphasis shifted from fairly
generalized propaganda and indoctrination to increa-
singly emotional discussions in which everyone had to
engage in criticism and self-criticism. Finally, a
climax was reached when a number of Specific cadres
were singled out and made the targets of mass public
denunciation within the ministry in huge "struggle
meetings." In major political campaigns there had to
be Specific human targets to "struggle" against; errors
and evils, aS well as virtues, had to be personified.60

He then concludes:

. . . [campaigns] occurred at fairly frequent intervals,
and the most important of them involved periods of
almost frenetic activity and extreme tension. These
campaigns played an extraordinary role in the Opera-
tional dynamics of the bureaucracy in China. At the
height of a campaign, cadres devoted virtually full
time to meetings and other activities related to it
and had virtually no time for "private" individual
affairs. Every campaign was exhausting--and unnerving,
too, for many cadreS--and a significant amount of time
and energy went into getting over the last campaign or
preparing for the next one. 1

The goal of the regime is to involve the cadres in campaigns
and restrict as far as possible any "private life"; this
makes for a good totalitarian citizen. AS Schurmann so
aptly points out, in China "mass movements became a substi-
tute for private enjoyment."62 One is strongly reminded

of Huxley's "brave new world" where individual activity is
undesirable and only group activity possesses meaning or

joy for the citizen.

202
In short, three basic common aspects of mass
campaigns have been presented above:
(1) centralized control by the regime;
(2) the use of small-scale "pre—test" areas;
(3) the frenzied nature of the campaign itself, with
emphasis placed upon "mass" pleasure and activity as

opposed to individualism.

The Mass Campaign as a Totalitarian Device

 

This chapter has discussed the role of the mass
campaign in China during the 1949—1964 period. Based upon
this evaluation, one can clearly see the relationships
between campaign behavior in China and the model behavior
outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II (the letters and
numbers at the end of each statement are "keyed" to the
propositions at the end of Chapter II):

(1) the campaigns were centrally controlled by the regime,
as Townsend points up and Barnett describes in his
comments on the 5—Anti campaign (A,3);

(2) the campaigns were extremely transitory, thus having
no organizational or bureaucratic framework to compete
with the regime for power; Barnett's description of
the campaign methods in Shanghai illustrates this
point (3,1);

(3) the campaigns overlapped and interlocked with one
another, as the Ideological Reform-3-Anti-5-Anti

progression or the great leap expansion indicate, and

203
therefore lines of authority and responsibility were
constantly confused (C,1);

(4) the campaigns were abruptly begun and halted, thus
preventing any sense of allegiance from arising to a
specific movement, which could lead to an institution-
alized loyalty, the rapid Shift from the "Hundred
Flowers" philosophy to the 1957-58 rectification cam-
paign is an illustration of this technique (C,2);

(5) the campaigns made use of "figureheads" or scapegoats
to either personify evils, or accept the blame for
failures actually attributable to the regime itself,
as the attacks on Yenching University and President Lu
demonstrate (C,3).

In addition, other features of mass campaigns, such as the

use of criticism and self-criticism to break down self-

esteem and self-reliance, and the substitution of group
activity for individual activity, conform to general
totalitarian policies but do not Specifically relate to
intermediate group behavior as outlined at the conclusion

of Chapter 11.

Having considered the arguments, one can only
conclude that mass campaigns were indeed extremely com-

patible with totalitarian needs and were used in such a

manner by the Chinese regime between 1949 and 1964.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

1Frederick Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China
(New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 15.

 

2James Townsend, Political Participation in Commu-
nist China (Berkeley: University of california Press,
1969), p. 57.

 

 

3Ibid.

 

4Yu, p. 16.
5Townsend, p. 72.

6Ibid.

 

7Ibid., pp. 72—73.
8Yu, p. 17.
9Townsend, p. 73.

loIbid.

 

11Dan Jacobs and Hans Baerwald (eds.), Chinese Com-
munism: Selected Documents (New York: Harper & Row,
1963), p. 130.

 

 

12Yu, p. 15.
13Townsend, p. 74.
14Ibid.

151bid.

 

16Ibid., p. 73.
17Yu, p. 17.

181bid., p. 15.

 

19Ibid., p. 18.

20Townsend, p. 199.

204

205

21A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and
Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), p. 437.

 

 

22Townsend, p. 185.

23The "more totalitarian" group in this sense is
that group which more closely adheres to the basic goal of
a totalitarian regime--the accumulation of power. Thus,
in the case of China, the "more totalitarian" group would
consist of Mao and his followers, who are indeed over-
whelmingly concerned with power. The "less totalitarian"
group(s) then would consist of individuals such as Liu and
others of his ilk (e.g., P'eng Teh—huai), who tend to
allow other goals, such as economic development or military
efficiency, to interfere with the drive for centralized
power. The contention then becomes that mass campaigns
have been more useful in the acquisition and maintenance
of power, while other goals are more readily obtained
through more institutionalized methods.

24Alan Liu, in his recent work, Communications and
National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1971) also makes this same
point. However, he refers to the Maoist group as "left-
ists" (as opposed to revisionists). Thus, in spite of the
semantic difference, the conclusion is the same (p. 113).

 

 

25Liu presents a similar chronology of campaign
utilization, although he proceeds from a different ana-
lytical framework (see Chapter Five and especially pp. 92-
93). Also, Hiniker and Farace present a substantiating
graph of mass mobilization activity for the 1949-1958
period although, once again, they are operating on the
basis of a different analytical framework: in this case,
competing methods of political development. See Paul
Hiniker and Vincent Farace, "Approaches to National Devel-
opment in China: 1949—1958," in Economic Development and
Cultural Change, XVIII, No. 1 (Oct. 1969), 51-72, and eSp.
p. 70.

 

 

26Yu, pp. 26-27.

27A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early
Years, 1949—1955 (New York: Frederick Praeger,—I964),
p. 125.

 

 

281bid., p. 127.

 

29Ibid.

301bid.

206

31For example, see Leon FeStinger, A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1957), or Arthur Cohen, Attitude Change and Social
Influence (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

 

 

 

 

32Barnett, Communist China . . ., pp. 128-129.

 

33Ibid., p. 131.
34Ibid., p. 134.
35Ihid., p. 139.

361bid.

 

371bid.
331hid., p. 142.

39Ibid.

 

4OMerle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist
China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967),
p. 204.

 

 

411bid., pp. 204—205.

42Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1966), p. 465.

 

 

43Townsend, p. 96.
44Ibid., p. 98.

45Mary Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes," China
Quarterly, No. 33 (Jan.-March 1968), p. 51.

 

461bid.

47For a more detailed description of his life, see
K. S. Karol, China: The Other Communism (New York: Hill
& Wang, 1967), pp. 245-249.

 

481bid., p. 246.
49Sheridan, p. 52.
501bid., p. 53.

511bid., p. 51.

207
52Karol, p. 249.
53Ibid., p. 248.

54Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 140.

 

55Townsend, p. 186.
56Ibid., p. 187.

57Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 137.

 

581bid., p. 145.

59Barnett, Cadres . . ., p. 33.

 

6OIbid., pp. 33-34.
5llbid., pp. 69-70.

62Schurmann, p. 393.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This work has attempted to demonstrate the relative
congruence of the postulated relationships between a total-
itarian regime and intermediate organizations within
society, and the actual relationships between the Chinese
regime and a variety of secondary intermediate associations
in China during the 1949-1964 period. The purpose of the
Conclusion is twofold. First, it will attempt to judge
the degree of congruence referred to above. Second, it
will evaluate the Cultural Revolution in light of the pre—
dictive process of the totalitarian model.

The first task is an extremely difficult one due
to the nonquantitative nature of the material. No hard and
fast acceptance or rejection is possible; however, by
evaluating each of the propositions at the conclusion of
Chapter II in the light of the massive evidence presented
in the body of the research, one will be able to clearly
grasp the essential isomorphism of the model and the
reality.

Before launching into this evaluation, however, it
would seem prudent to discuss two potential problems which

208

209

may occur to the reader, and which deserve explanation.
First, there is the question of alternative explanations.
That is, even though the model and the reality are con-
gruent, the reader may question whether the behavior of the
Chinese regime towards its intermediate groups was due to
some reason or set of reasons other than the totalitarian
nature of the regime. The answer to this potential objec-
tion lies in the basic irrelevancy of it. This work is
concerned with a totalitarian model and not a totalitarian
theory and, as was discussed at some length in Chapter I,
models are analogous and predictive but are not primarily
explanatory. Therefore, so long as the model and the
reality behave similarly the model retains its validity.
If the model of totalitarianism presented in this paper
parallels the behavior of the Chinese regime, it makes
little difference if the regime's behavior is due to a
totalitarian perspective, or the process of modernization,
or the rotation of the earth. Quite Simply, this research
need not consider alternative explanations as determinative
because it does not deal greatly with theory, and there-
fore, as noted on page 12, is concerned with prediction
and extrapolation rather than explanation.1

A second potential objection concerns the manner(s)
in which the validity of the model may be diSproven. The
reader may question whether there is, in fact, any method
by which to demonstrate that the model is not Significantly

related to the reality. In this case the proof of the

210
pudding is in the eating. Disproval cannot be accomplished
by alternative methods, but only by alternative models.
The evidence presented herein must be sufficiently con—
vincing to demonstrate the essential Similarity between
model and behavior. Beyond a failure to accomplish this
minimal goal, the only valid method for diSproving the
usefulness of the model is to produce a more useful one--
one which is more closely analogous to, and predicts more
accurately, the behavior of the Chinese regime. In such a
case, this second model would be more useful for studying
Chinese behavior. In essence then, this section will
attempt to demonstrate that the totalitarian model pre—
sented at the outset of this research possesses a high
degree of utility for studying Chinese behavior. Anyone
wishing to attack the model must do so not by proving that
it is "false" but by producing another model closer to
actual Chinese behavior.

One other point must be considered at this time,
the generalizability of the totalitarian model. Of course,
this does not Specifically bear upon the validity of the
model's application to the Chinese regime. Rather, it
bears upon a potential wider application of the model and
the possibility that it (the model) is Simply an ad hoc
structure paralleling the Chinese regime. It is impossible,
of course, in this work, to thoroughly examine the rele-
vance of the model to other Systems. However, presented

below are some data to suggest that the model indeed may be

211

applicable to other systems with some hope of fruitful

 

results. These data simply bring out prominent features
of some other systems (e.g., centralization of power,
attempted prevention of institutionalization and bureaucrat—
ization, treatment of intermediary groups) which suggest the
feasibility of an extension of the totalitarian model as a
framework for evaluating other regimes.

Several features of the Nazi regime suggest the
potential utility of the model. The centralization of
power was just such a feature. Hitler himself wrote in

Mein Kampf:

 

From the smallest community cell to the highest
leadership of the entire Reich, the state must have
the personality principle anchored in its organization.

There must be no majority decisions, but only
responsible persons, and the word "council" must be
restored to its original meaning. Surely every man
will have advisers by his side, but the decision will
be made by one man. 7

The principle which made the Prussian army in its
time into the most wonderful instrument of the German
people must some day, in a transferred sense, become
the principle of the construction of our whole state
conception: authoritynof every leader downward and
reSponsibility upward.z—i

 

 

 

 

A. J. Nicholls also notes this feature, while relating it
to the lack of a determinative ideology:

Dictatorial organization--and deliberate worship
of the Fuhrerprinzip--became a feature of the Nazi
movement. Originally this was not true of the party,
some of whose members, such as Rosenberg, Spoke of
traditional German democracy--by which they referred
to tribal elections in a mythical past and not to the
type of electoral activity represented by modern
liberalism. But within the framework of German
nationalist movements as a whole there had always been
a tendency to equate obedience to a leader and disci-
pline with German--and therefore desirable-—attitudes
of mind.

 

212

This dictatorial power was exercised in a personal
way and did not necessarily involve ideological
uniformity. . .

The Nazis also struggled against the problem of institution-
alization and bureaucracy. The official German civil ser-
vice handbook of 1938 illustrates this point:

AS a movement born from life itself, and life-
creating in turn, National Socialism demands the
rejection of formalistic rigidity in thought and action
and expects from its officeholders and trustees a
living and dynamic attitude. This dynamic must be
rooted in the newly awakened soul of the people. It
was only a natural consequence of the seizure of power
that, by virtue of the Civil Service Law of April 1933,
racially and ideologically alien elements were elim-
inated from the civil service. Beyond and above that,
when the unity of party and state had become law, the
need arose for a broader and deeper anchoring of the
German professional civil service in the service of
the Fuhrer and in the totality of the nation.

Thus, even here National Socialism fought its
battle in a war against bureaucracy and regulations.

. . . [from Kalender far Reichsjusbizbeamte (Berlin:
R v. Decker's Verla and G. Schenck, 1938), pp. 17-18,
by Roland Freislerj4

 

Finally, the Nazi regime exhibited a tendency to treat
secondary groups in a fashion very Similar to that pre-
sented in the discussion of Chinese groups. Trade unions,
for example, were strictly controlled:

Deprived of his trade unions, collective bargaining
and the right to strike, the German worker in the Third
Reich became an industrial serf, bound to his master,
the employer, much as medieval peasants had been bound
to the lord of the manor. The so—called Labor Front,
which in theory replaced the old trade unions, did not
represent the worker. . . . It took in not only wage
and salary earners but also the employers and members
of the professions [similar to the "watering down" of
the Chinese trade unions under the ACFTU]. It was in
reality a vast propaganda organization and, as some
workers said, a gigantic fraud. Its aim, as stated in
the law, was not to protect the worker but "to create
a true social and productive community of all Germans.
ItS task is to see that every Single individual Should
be able . . . to perform the maximum of work."5

.DMu-J.

213

The USSR under Stalin was another system which
promises rewards for the attempted application of the
model. Fainsod notes the desire of Stalin to subordinate
all groups, even the Party, to his own control. He
(Fainsod) concludes that one of the major features of the
Khrushchev era was the return of the Party to a position
of power and autonomy.6 Fainsod also discusses Stalin's
problem with the tendency toward institutionalization (a
tendency which Stalin successfully prevented from growing)
and in doing so he (Fainsod) almost totally parallels this
author's discussion (Chapter II) of the "necessary evil"
aSpect of intermediate groups:

One of the striking characteristics of modern
totalitarian dictatorship is its dependence on bureau-
cratic organization to make its control effective.

The bureaucratization of the dictator's power is an
inevitable outgrowth of the magnitude of his responsi-
bilities. Trusted lieutenants and a party machine are
indiSpensable concomitants of his domination. In the
process of utilizing them, his authority may be both
intensified and diluted. It is intensified to the
degree that he succeeds in fashioning an administrative
mechanism which is a reflection of his will. It is
diluted to the extent that he is compelled to cede

power to his subordinates and the party machine acquires
a momentum and direction of its own. Every dictatorship
faces the problem of institutionalizating its own
authority. The power of the Leader depends on his
ability to keep the essence of control in his own hands
or in the hands of reliable subordinates while trans-
forming the party machine into an obedient instrument
ready to execute his slightest command.

The development of the Communist Party apparatus
as an extension of the long arm of the dictator con-
stitutes one of the most impressive and formidable 7
organizational achievements of modern totalitarianism.

Finally, Fainsod encapsulates the totalitarian aspects of
Stalin's regime, and brings out a host of features identical

to various aspects of the model:

214

The organization of the economy and society to
maximize industrial and military strength involved a
strengthening of the totalitarian features of the
regime. . . .

The formula of totalitarian rule as it took shape
under Stalin's ministrations was a complex one. It
represented, in one aSpect, a drive to safeguard his
own security by obliterating all actual or potential
competing centers of power. Positively, it tried to
saturate and paralyze the minds of the Soviet populace
with a monolithic stream of agitation and propaganda
stressing the superiority of the Soviet system and the
virtues of its leaders. Negatively, it sought to deny
the people access to any alternative by cutting them
off from the outside world and from each other.
Through the secret police, it attempted to create a
milieu of pervasive insecurity founded on ever—present
fear of the informer and the labor camp. The Party
and the secret police guarded the loyalty of army and
administration and, in turn, watched each other. In
this system of institutionalized mutual suSpicion, the
competing hierarchies of Party, police, army, and
administration were kept in purposeful conflict and
provided with no point of final resolution Short of
Stalin and his trusted henchmen in the Politbureau.
The concentration of power in Stalin's hands rested on
the dispersal of power among his subordinates.

Even Fascist Italy, generally considered to be
rather far removed from the totalitarian mold, demonstrated

some attributes of the model. Finer, writing in 1935,
describes the centralization of power imposed by Mussolini:

This leads us to the term State, the heart of the
whole discussion is What does Mussolini mean by the
State? He means Himself. A pattern of philosophic
hocuS-pocus is the medium for the transformation of the
State into Benito Mussolini. It is not very elaborate,
because he does not beat about the bush. Indeed, he
cannot heat about the bush: that has been his peculiar
strength in post-war Italian politics. He wills, and
his will is the truth.9

In conclusion, this discussion has not substantiated

 

the generalizability of the model. It has, however, pre-
sented some heuristically valuable statements and data sug-

gestive of other possible applications of the model.

 

215

Having disposed of these points at the outset, the
analysis can proceed to an examination of the propositions
presented at the conclusion of Chapter II, in light of the
evidence presented in the body of the text. In the case of
each proposition, examples from the text will be presented,
but these are examples and are used to direct the reader's
attention to sections where more detailed proof is pre-
sented; they are not intended as proofs in themselves. The
first group of propositions is concerned with the behavior
of the regime toward intermediate groups at the time of the
regime's first coming to power.

A,1. Upon gaining control the totalitarian elite will

 

destroy the old-style intermediate organizations which

 

cannot be utilized by the regime. Since the bulk of this

 

work has dealt with the regime's activities after it had
"broken in" its new form of government, little has been
directed to this point. However, there were numerous
examples of the behavior mentioned above upon the seizure
of control by the regime. The most noticeable of these
actions was the destruction of the "secret societies" by
the Communist regime. The secret societies were powerful,
fraternal, mutual-aid groups which had existed in China
through a long succession of dynasties and governments.
These brotherhoods were organized to provide their members
with a source of power to be used to check the activities
of the government. It was the sad lot of these societies,

however, that they possessed no economic or social utility,

216
and thus no justification for existence in the new society.
Unlike the minor parties or the trade unions, they really
had no manipulative potential for the regime; therefore
they were doomed. Furthermore, the strong emotional ties
of the members represented a potential allegiance totally
anathema to the regime. Thus the Communist regime did what
no previous government of China had done, or could do (and
in doing so the regime demonstrated the totalitarian desire
to expand its power over heretofore "private" areas of
society); it destroyed the secret societies:

The secret societies, . . . , were regarded as the
source of resistance to and conSpiracy against the
existing administration. Against these organizations
the Manchu government proceeded with the greatest pos-
sible severity, without achieving much success. How-
ever, under the Communist regime members of the secret
societies, composed mainly of the peasantry and local
tradesmen, have been liquidated as "reactionary ele-
ments."10

A,2. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will
infiltrate and dominate the old-style intermediate organiza-
tions which are of some use to the regime. The clearest
example of this behavior can be seen in the regime's
behavior towards the minor parties (which, of all the

groups under consideration, were the ones functioning most
actively outside party control before 1949). The regime

did have use for these organizations. As described in
Chapter III, there were three reasons for the continued
existence of the minor parties: (1) to obtain support for

the CCP from elements of society which would not usually

be considered sympathetic to communist goals; (2) to control

217

certain elements of society which might be dangerous to
the regime; and (3) to utilize bourgeois and white-collar
bureaucratic elements without contaminating the Communist
Party itself by offering them membership. Thus the minor
parties, unlike the secret societies, served the needs of
the regime and therefore were allowed to exist.

However, the minor parties were infiltrated,
dominated, and Simply controlled by the regime. Party

members assumed leadership positions in the organizations.

‘ ‘i’fm'lfltgv w

I!"

The China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party's
"request" for a contingent of CCP members to be brought
into its ranks is an illustration of this type of behavior,
which was characteristic of all the minor parties. The
real indication of the regime's control over the parties
was the 1957 rectification campaign, in which the leaders
of the minor parties behaved in strict obedience with CCP
wishes.

Finally, another example of the regime's conformity
to proposition A,2 is evident in the discussion of the trade
unions, in which it was pointed out that the Party monop-
olized leadership positions in the union movement, including
those individual unions which had existed before 1949.

A,3. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will
create a new set of organizations which are totally the
creatures of the totalitarian regime. The examples of thfis
technique are numerous. The ACFTU, ACFDW, YCL, Young

Pioneers, ACFLAC, all the various "friendship" associations,

218
and all the mass campaigns were concocted by the regime,
at the time of its coming to power, in order to facilitate
its control over the society. AS for the degree of control
exercised by the regime over these groups, this has varied
somewhat from time to time and place to place, but the
regime has been, in general, in control of each group or
campaign at all times. This fact was demonstrated again
and again in the course of the research. The Party domi-
nance of all important positions in these groups, the
rubber-stamp nature of the national congresses, the regime's
centralized direction and "stage-managing" of the mass cam-
paigns, and the regime stranglehold on funding are all
representative of the extraordinary control which the
regime exercised over these groups and movements which it

had created upon its arrival in power.

The second group of propositions in Chapter II is
concerned with the totalitarian elite's attempt to prevent
organizations from becoming identified with specific
interests in society and thus becoming a potential focus
for persons sharing that common interest and a separate
power base.

B,l. The regime attempts to prevent institutionalization

by creating and destroying groups relatively quickly, thus
denying them the life necessary to become "institutionalized."
The most clear cut example of this policy can be seen in the

regime's use of mass campaigns. AS Barnett points out in

 

219
his description of the 5-Anti Campaign in Shanghai, the
nature of the mass campaigns is extremely transient. The
campaign begins abruptly and ends quickly, and in doing so
it develops no organizational framework or apparatus which
would, inevitably, seek to preserve itself and thus become
a competing center for power. Another, more long-range,
illustration of proposition B,l has been the regime's ’
increased reliance on less institutionalized forms of mass
control, such as mass campaigns, and decreased usage of more :
formalized structures, such as the minor parties, over the 1
1949-1964 period. After 1957, the minor parties rapidly
declined in importance and Similarly, after 1963 the mass
organizations began such a decline. By the very end of
the period under consideration the mass campaign was
rapidly replacing the other two forms of intermediate orga-
nization as the regime's arm for mass control. The Cultural
Revolution was the culmination of this trend.
B,2. The regime will seek to separate leadership from
expertise in intermediate organizations-—1eadership will
be vested in persons politically loyal to the regime rather
than persons who possess the necessary expertise to run

the organization, or who represent an area of knowledge

 

for which that organization was created to Speak. The

 

prime example of this type of behavior was demonstrated in
the replacement of Li Li—San by Lai Jo-yu in the ACFTU.
Lai was an outsider with no previous connections with the

labor movement or labor in general; thus, the regime expected

220

him to represent their interests rather than the interests
of the workers. The same was true of other organizations,
such as youth groups or literary organizations, where
either totally untrained Party loyalists were elevated and
installed in high-ranking positions, or less qualified
persons were promoted to leadership positions on the basis
of Party loyalty rather than technical merit (e.g., Kuo L
Mo—jo). This entire policy, in fact, iS the heart of the fr
red—expert diSpute which has raged in China Since the E
beginning of the Communist rule. At the moment, it would h
seem that "redness" has won out over expertise (the PLA,
for example, decided the issue as early as 1959) and there—
fore the totalitarian policy which emphasizes regime—loyalty
has triumphed over the economically-rational (perhaps
modernizing) philosophy. In any case, on the whole, the
regime has succeeded in separating leadership and expertise.

Another example, falling into perhaps a more
general category, was the regime's strict control of mem-
bership policy of the minor parties. By controlling
membership the regime was able to exclude persons who
possessed a strong rational reason for joining a minor
party but were of questionable loyalty. This further
demonstrates the operation of proposition B,2. A further
example of this attempt to separate leadership from the
rank and file was illustrated by the attempts of the Party
to promote mutual distrust between union cadres and the

masses of workers. Finally, the extensive use of overage

221
leaders in the various youth organizations clearly
illustrates that the organizations were designed to
facilitate regime control rather than to express the

interests of youth.

The third set of propositions concerns the total—
itarian regime's desire to keep organizations weak and
insecure by maintaining a constant state of flux within 1

the society.

h} "'—.("“— _ v

C,l. Various organizations will all be charged with the

E

same area of operation and thus the organizations will act

as checks upon one another. This practice was clearly

 

evident in the case of the mass campaigns. The campaigns
overlapped and interlocked with one another, as the Ideo-
logical Reform-3 Anti—5 Anti progression or the Great Leap
expansion indicate, and therefore lines of authority and
responsibility were constantly confused. In the case of
the unions, the regime played Party directives off against
union worker needs (commandism vs. tailism) in order to
keep union cadres in a state of uncertainty and insecurity.
Similarly, the ACFDW has often been charged with carrying
out campaigns at the same time that other organizations,
for example the YCL, have received similar charges. Thus
neither organization could claim true credit for the task
accomplished and sometimes conflict between the two arose

over the best methods for carrying out regime directives.

222

Another illustration of the above contention is the
very number of groups and campaigns used by the regime.
The staggering number of such organizations alone is almost
a guarantee that “0.223 will emerge as a serious threat to
the power of the regime. A final illustration of this
technique was the System of dual vertical rule instituted
for the ACFTU by the regime in order to confuse lines of
authority within the organization.

C,2. The regime will periodically and arbitrarily shift

 

the locus of activity and/or authority from one organization

 

to another in order to prevent any one organization from

 

acquiring a sense of legitimacy, born of past performance,

 

in the eyes of the citizens. One can find evidence of

 

this policy in the total Shift from the "Open" ideology of
the Hundred Flowers to the severity of the 1957-58 rectifi—
cation campaign. This sudden and totally unexpected shift
from an invitation to voice criticism to a policy of strict
repression exemplifies the totalitarian regime's effort to
keep the citizens puzzled as to which groups or campaigns
are really in control. The answer, of course, is that only
the regime is ever really in control.

The same Situation can be seen to hold true in the
case of the various friendship associations. They would
rise and fall with the vicissitudes of foreign policy; and
an organization with 70 million members, such as the SSFA,

could literally be here today and gone tomorrow.

223

C,3. The regime will constantly set up a gallery of

 

 

figureheads, who can serve as rubber-stamps for regime

policies or as scapegoats for regime failures. In the

 

case of the minor parties, this was evident during the
1957-1958 rectification campaigns. The entire "Chaing—Lo"
conspiracy was constructed by the regime to help explain
the vehemence of the Hundred Flowers criticism, criticism
which stemmed from diSpleasure with the regime and not

with the minor parties. Similarly, the attacks on Yenching

 

University and President Lu demonstrated the use of scape-
goatism.

Finally, the establishment of rubber-stamp figure-
head individuals or bodies is an elemental part of demo-
cratic—centralism. In effect, every mass organization and
minor party had some powerless leadership group that pos-
sessed no duty other than to approve of regime policy.

The reader can find examples of this in the sections con-

cerning the minor parties, the ACFTU, the ACFDW, etc.

The final proposition about model totalitarian
behavior is that,
D. the regime will try to base organizations on a fictional
interest rather than a real shared interest. This lessens
the attachment which the member will build for the group.
This can best be seen in the discussion of mass organiza-
tions. For example, the regime created organizations whose

reasons for existence were based on the most tenuous of

224

common interests. All the friendship organizations and

the ACFDW typify this sort of group. Furthermore, the
regime sought to "water down" the real felt interests of
those groups which were actually organized around common
interests. Thus the ACFTU was made to open its doors to
all wage earners, therefore preventing the interests of the
industrial workers from unifying the membership and perhaps

jolting it into action of a prolonged nature.

In conclusion, then, the relationships between the
propositions and the actual behavior of the Chinese regime
are both numerous and isomorphic. Although the preceding
section only supplied some examples of the uniformity of
the two sets of behavior, these examples represent the vast
congruence which is evident throughout the whole of the

research.

The second goal of this concluding section is to
evaluate the Cultural Revolution in light of the totali-
tarian model presented above. As already noted, the goal
of a model is to predict behavior, and thus one may at
least partially evaluate the utility of the model of
Chinese behavior on the basis of its ability to reasonably
forecast the events of the Cultural Revolution (from its
vantage point of 1964). It is the contention of this sec—
tion that the application of the totalitarian model to

Chinese behavior in the 1949—1964 period could logically

225
lead one to expect, in 1964, many of the salient features
of the Cultural Revolution.

Perhaps the most crucial feature of the Cultural
Revolution was its basic drive against bureaucracy and
institutionalization. It sought to "open" the society in
the sense of freeing individuals from the control and in-
fluence of various intermediary organizations. The most
powerful of those organizations were the state apparatus
and the Party itself. Both these organizations became
targets of the Cultural Revolution because of the degree
of institutionalization which had arisen in their operation.
Although the state and the Party were not treated in the
body of this research, it is logical to extend the regime's
desire to prevent institutionalization, because of its
potential for creating separate power bases, to such orga-
nizations. Thus, the drive of the regime against institu-
tionalization in the government and in the Party, during
the Cultural Revolution, was a natural outgrowth of the
overriding desire of the regime to centralize power, as
outlined in the opening discussion.

A second feature of the Cultural Revolution which
could be predicted from the model was the universal use of
mass campaigns and mass movements. The Cultural Revolution
was composed of a series of massive, often disjointed,
frenetic campaigns. The participants in the Cultural

Revolution, and this includes almost all of the citizenry

226

in one degree or another, were literally swept along with
the movements and were caught up in the excitement of the
revolutionary milieu. The entire Cultural Revolution,
in fact, may be considered as a "super-campaign" similar
to the Great Leap (of which, theoretically, the Cultural
Revolution was simply a continuation). As the model indi-
cates, the use of mass campaigns instead of organizations
was an event to be expected, and this trend became plainly
visible in China during the Cultural Revolution.

A final basis for predicting the nature of the
Cultural Revolution is implied in the very point made
above. AS the use of mass campaigns increases, the use of
mass organizations decreases. This is exactly what hap-
pened in China after 1965. The mass organizations and minor
parties suffered grievous, perhaps mortal, blows as a result
of the Cultural Revolution. The minor parties simply dis-
appeared from the Sight of Western observers. Many of the
leading figures in these parties were members of the
government and were thus criticized in the anti-bureaucratic
campaigns. However, the organizations themselves seem to
have Simply been cast into limbo, ignored, and whether they
will be reconstituted is questionable. It is quite possi-
ble that the minor parties and the united front have served
their purpose and therefore, like the secret societies,
they no longer exist. However, the possibility of some

sort of settlement with Formosa might tempt one to believe

227

that the proper minor parties (the remnants of the mainland
KMT) could be revitalized, should the international scene
so dictate, and serve as an intermediary between Formosa
and the mainland.

The mass organizations suffered primarily the same
fate in the Cultural Revolution. Klein and Hager, in their
discussion of the composition of the Ninth Central Commit—

tee of the CCP illustrate the decline of the mass organiza- {f

I-‘l 'h'. -

tions.11 The Ninth Congress, which convened in 1969, "is a
the story of the victors and victims of the Cultural

Revolution."12

The mass organizations can be listed among
the victims. The fall of the organizations can be seen in
their representation on the Ninth C.C. On the Eighth C.C.
there were eight men who had been high YCL officials
between 1949 and 1964, including Hsiao Hua, Liao Ch'eng—l
chih, and Hu Yao—ping. None of these eight men served on
the Ninth C.C.13 There were twelve individuals who sat on
the Eighth C.C. and were also All-China Youth Federation
officials between 1949 and 1964. "Only two survived to
the Ninth C.C., but both of them-—Su Yu and Hsieh Fu-chih--
are obviously more closely linked to the PLA than to youth

14 There were also twelve ACFTU officials of the

work."
1949—1964 period on the Eighth C.C. and eight of these men
were not on the Ninth C.C., "including two of the most

important in the everyday federation activities, Liu Ning-i

and Li Chieh-po."15 Furthermore, "None of the four elected

228
to the Ninth C.C. (e.g., Ch'en Yun) has been active in the
labour federation Since the 1950's."16 Thus the mass
organizations Simply gave way to the mass campaigns as
means for totalitarian control. Harper writes:

For the present, the mass line of Mao Tse—tung
rides triumphant in decision-making. . . . Ironically,
the unions, which fought in 1957 for workers congresses
with some real powers and then lost the battle just as
they attained that goal, are now defunct. . . . There
is no evidence that the union structures are function-
ing or even exist at any level other than the national;
like most mass organizations, they appear to have been
simply displaced in the struggles of the Cultural
Revolution.

The rise of the utilization of mass campaigns and the rele-
gation of the minor parties and mass organizations to mere
Shadow organizations, or worse, along with the drive against
bureaucracy, was clearly evident from the nature of the
operation of the model presented at the outset of this
research.

In conclusion, by demonstrating the isomorphism
between a section of the model and actual Chinese behavior,
and by demonstrating the use of the model as a vatni pre-
dictor of events in China, this research has accomplished
two tasks. First, by demonstrating that one section of
the model "fit" actual behavior, the research indicates
that one may proceed, cautiously, to attempt to apply other
sections of the model to China. In short, the failure to

invalidate one part of the totalitarian model holds out

hope for the validity of the entire model.

229
Second, this research has demonstrated that in the
case of intermediate organizations, the totalitarian model
devised herein seems a relatively accurate predictor of
events in China. Thus, the model may be said to possess
utility for the anticipation of trends in the behavior of

the leadership elite of Communist China.

*-' '**-r-
..

‘ -.n.-C'—'. ‘

NOTES
CHAPTER VI
1For a re-examination of the theoretical implications
of models the reader should refer to the discussion of

Kaplan's contentions on pp. 9-10.

2Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1925), pp. 449-450.

 

3A. J. Nicholls, "Germany," in s. J. Woolf (ed.),
European Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 73.

 

4George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1966), pp. 338-339.

 

5William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959),

pp. 362-363.

 

6Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 127.

 

7Ibid., p. 176.
8Ibid., p. 109.

9Herman Finer, Mussolini's Italy (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1935), p. 203.

 

10Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society
of China (New York: Mentor Books, 1962), p. 73.

 

 

11Donald Klein and Lois Hager, "The Ninth Central
Committee," in The China Quarterly, No. 45 (Jan.-March,
1971), p. 37.

 

121bid.

 

13Ibid., p. 54.

14lbid.

 

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

 

17Paul Harper, "Workers' Participation in Management
in Communist China." Paper prepared for presentation at
the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970, p. 22.

230

 

B IBL IOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York:
Meridian Books, 1958.

 

 

Barker, Ernest. Reflections on Government. London: .
Oxford University Press, 1942. g

 

Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China: The Early Years,
1949-1955. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

 

 

. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in
Communist China. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1967:

 

 

Bell, Roderick, Edwards, David, and Wagner, R. Harrison
(eds.). Political Power. New York: The Free
Press, 1969.

 

Bowie, Robert, and Fairbank, John. Communist China 1955-
1959: Policy Documents with Analysis. Cambridge,
Mass.: ‘Harvard University Press, 1965.

 

 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (ed.). Dilemmas of Change in Soviet
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press,
1969.

 

 

Buchheim, Hans. Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and
Characteristics. Translated by Ruth Hein. Middle-
town, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968.

 

 

Chow Senying (ed.). China Yearbook: 1960-61. Taipei:
China Publishing Co., 1962.

 

. China Yearbook: 1962-63. Taipei: China
PubliSHing Co., 1964.

 

. China Yearbook: 1963—64. Taipei: China
Publishing Co., 1965.

 

 

C'hu Chai and Winberg Chai. The Changing Society of China.
New York: Mentor BoOks, 1962.

 

231

232

Clubb, O. Edmund. Twentieth Century China. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964.

 

Cohen, Arthur. Attitude Change and Social Influence.
New York: Basic Books, 1964.

 

Daniels, Robert. The Nature of Communism. New York:
Vintage Books, 1962.

 

Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and Social Communication.
Cambridge: The M.I.TT Press, 1953.

 

. Politics and Government. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1970.

 

 

Dostoievsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. Translated
by David Magarshack. Hammondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, 1958.

 

Dutt, Vidya Prakash. China and the World. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

 

Fainsod, Merle. How Russia IS Ruled. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965.

 

Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957.

 

Finer, Herman. Mussolini's Italy. New York: Grosset &
Dunlap, 1965 (1st ed., 1935).

 

Friedrich, Carl, and Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Autocragy. New York: Praeger,
1956.

 

 

Friedrich, Carl (ed.). Totalitarianism. New York:
Grosset & Dunlap, 1954.

 

Fromm, Eric. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston, 1941.

 

George, Alexander. The Chinese Communist Army in Action.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

 

Goldman, Merle. Literary Dissent in Communist China.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniverSity Press, 1967.

 

Greer, Scott. The Logic of Social Inquiry. Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.

 

Gregor, A. James. Contemporary Radical Ideologies. New
York: Random House, 1968.

 

233

Griffith, Samuel, II. The Chinese People's Liberation
Army. New York: MCGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967.

 

Hinton, Harold. Communist China in World Politics.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966.

 

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim.
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1925.

 

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Harper &
Row, 1951.

 

Hook, Sydney. Political Power and Personal Freedom. New
York: Collier Books, 1959. f

 

“Ina". 1r

Houn, Franklin. To Change a Nation. New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961.

 

Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968T'

 

Iggers, Georg. The Cult of Authority. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.

 

Ionescu, Ghita. The Politics of the European Communist
States. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Jacobs, Dan, and Baerwald, Hans (eds.). Chinese Communism:
Selected Documents. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

 

Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1964.

 

Karol, K. S. China: The Other Communism, 2nd ed. Trans-
lated by Tom Baistow. New York: Hill & Wang,
1968 (1st ed., 1966).

 

Kautsky, John (ed.). Political Change in Underdeveloped
Countries. New York: John Wiley 8 Sons, 1962.

 

Kessel, John, Cole, George, and Seddig, Robert (eds.).
“Micropplitics. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1970.

 

Kohn, Hans. Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century,
3rd ed. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966.

Kornhauser, William. vThe Politics of Mass Sociepy. New
York: Free Press, 1959.

Larson, Calvin, and Washburn, Philo (eds.). Power,
Participation, and Ideology. New York: David
McKay Co., Inc., 1969.

 

234

Lasswell, Harold. Power and Personality. New York: The
Viking PreSS, 1948.

 

Lastrucci, Carlo. The Scientific Approach. Cambridge,
Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1963.

 

Lewis, John. Leadership in Communist China. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1963.

 

Liu, Alan. Communications and National Integration in
Communist China. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1971.

 

 

MacFarquhar, Roderick (ed.). China Under Mao: Politics l
Takes Command. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. 5

 

 

Malinowski, Bronislaw. Freedom and Civilization. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1944.

 

Meehan, Eugene. Contemporary Political Thought. Homewood,
111.: The Dorsey Press, 1967.

 

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Political Power and Social Theopy.
New York: Harper & Row, 1958.

 

Mosse, George (ed.). Nazi Culture. New York: Grosset &
Dunlap, 1966.

 

Nagel, Ernest. The Structuye of Science. New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & WOfld, Inc., 1961.

 

Neumann, Franz. Behemoth. New York: Harper & Row, 1966
(1st printed 1942).

 

Neumann, Sigmund. Permanent Revolution, 2nd ed. New York:
Praeger, 1965.

 

Nieburg, H. L. Political Violence. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1969.

 

Nolte, Ernst. Three Faces of Fascism. Translated by
R. Piper & Co. New York: Holt, Rinehart, &
Winston, 1963.

 

Nyomarkay, Joseph. Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi
Party. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1967.

 

Ortega y Gasset, José. The Revolt of the Masses. New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1932.

 

Orwell, George. 1984. New York: Harcourt, Brace, &
World, 1949.

235

Pye, Lucian. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1968.

 

Sabine, George. A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed.
New YCrk: Holt, Rinehart, EiWinston, 1937.

 

Schermerhorn, Richard. Society and Power. New York:
Random House, 1961.

 

Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Vital Center. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1949.

 

 

Schlesinger, Joseph. Ambition and Politics. Chicago: L
Rand McNally & Co., 1966.

Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist
China. Berkeley: University of California Press,

 

 

 

1966. L4
Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.

Greenwich, C6nn.: Fawcett PubliCatian, Inc.,

1959.

Tang, Peter. Communist China Today. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1957.

 

Tawney, R. H. Equality. London: Allen & Unwin, 1931.

Thomas, S. B. Government and Administration in Communist
China. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,

 

 

Townsend, James. Political Participation in Communist
China. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967.

 

Tucker, Robert. The Soviet Political Mind. New York:
Frederick Praeger, 1963.

 

Union Research Institute. Communism in China. Hong Kong:
Union Research Institute, 1959.

 

United States Consul. Review of the Mainland Press.
Hong Kong. Vols. 2451 (Feb. 10, 1961, p. 7),
2454 (Feb. 7, 1961, p. 1), and 2455 (Jan. 31,
1961, p. l).

 

van Dyke, Vernon. Political Science: A Philosophical
Analysis. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1960.

 

Walsh, Edmund. Total Power. New York: Doubleday, 1948.

 

236

Weber, Eugen. varieties of Fascism. New York: Van
Nostrand, 1964.

 

Weiss, John. The Fascist Tradition. New York: Harper
& Row, 1967.

 

Woolf, S. J. (ed.). European Fascism. New York: Vintage
Books, 1968.

 

Yu, Frederick. Mass Persuasion in Communist China. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

 

Articles and Periodicals

Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton. "Decisions and Non— t
Decisions: An Analytical Framework," in Roderick ?
Bell et al., Political Power (New York: The Free
press7‘1969), pp. 100-109.

 

Barnett, A. Doak. "Mechanisms for Party Control in the
Government Bureaucracy in China," Asian Survey,
VI, No. 12 (Dec. 1966), 659-674.

 

Boorman, Howard. "The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung,"
in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), China Under Mao:
Politics Takes Command (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
1966), pp.i368-391.

 

 

Chao, K. C. "Mass Organizations in Communist China,"
American Political Science Review, XLVIII (Sept.
1954), 752-765.

 

Ch'en, Jerome. "Writers and Artists Confer," The China
Quarterly, No. 4 (Oct.—Dec., 1960), pp.Y76-81.

 

 

China News Analysis. "The Middle Class," China News
Analysis, No. 461 (March 22, 1963), p. l.

 

 

. "Trade Unions and Industrial Workers," China
News Analysis, No. 482 (Aug. 23, 1963), p. 1.

 

 

Dahl, Robert. "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science,
II, No. 3 (July 1957), 201-215.

 

Deutsch, Karl. "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities
and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian
Systems," in Carl Friedrich (ed.), Tptalitarianism
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1954), pp. 308-341.

 

Frenkel-Brunswik, Else. "Psychological Aspects of Total-
itarianism," in Friedrich, Totalitarianism, pp.
171-202.

 

237

Goldman, Merle. "The Unique 'Blooming and Contending' of
1961—62," The China Quarterly, No. 37 (Jan.—March,
1969), pp. 54-83.

 

Goldman, Rene. "The Rectification Campaign at Peking
University: May-June 1957," in MacFarquhar, China
Under Mao, pp. 255-270.

 

Gurian, Waldemar. "Totalitarianism as Political Religion,"
in Frederich, Totalitarianism, pp. 119-141.

 

Harper, Paul. "The Party and the Unions in Communist
China," The China Quarterly, No. 37 (Jan.-March,
1969), pp. 84-119.

 

“pr

. "Workers' Participation in Management in Com-
munist China." Paper prepared for 66th meeting of {j
American Political Science Association, Biltmore
Hotel, Los Angeles, Calif., Sept. 8-12, 1970.

* .T mm; 1

Hiniker, Paul, and Farace, Vincent. "Approaches to
National Development: 1949-1958," Economic Devel-
opment and Cultural Change, XVIII, No. 1 (Oct.
1969), 51472.

 

 

Inkeles, Alex. "The Totalitarian Mystique: Some Impres-
sions of the Dynamics of Totalitarian Seciety,"
in Frederich, Totalitarianism, pp. 88-107.

 

King, Vincent. "Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China"
(Monograph). Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Inter-
national Studies, M.I.T., Jan. 1966.

Klein, Donald, and Hager, Lois. "The Ninth Central Com—
mittee," The China Quarterly, No. 45 (Jan.-March,
1971), pp. 37-56.

 

Lindbeck, John. "The Organization and Development of
Science," in MacFarquhar, China Under Mao, pp.
333—367.

 

The (London) Economist, Feb. 10, 1951.

 

Lynd, Robert. "Power in American Society as Resource and
Problem," in Calvin Larson and Philo Washburn
(eds.), Power, Participation, and Ideology (New
York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1969), PP. 40-64.

 

Meissner, Boris. "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change,"
in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Dilemmas of Change
in Soviet Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), pp. 73-88.

 

 

238

Nicholls, A. J. "Germany," in S. J. Woolf (ed.), European

Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 61-87.
Seymour, James. "Communist China's Bourgeois-Democratic

Parties." Unpublished Master's thesis, Columbia
University, n.d.

Sheridan, Mary. "The Emulation of Heroes," The China

 

Quarterly, No. 33 (Jan.-March, 1968), pp. 47172.

 

Simon, Herbert, Smithburg, Donald, and Thompson, Victor.

"Why Men Obey," in John Keller et al. (eds.),
Micropolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1970), pp. 580—589.

 

Szamuely, Tibor. "Five Years After Khrushchev," Survey,

1
No. 72 (Summer 1969), pp. 51-73. ———’_—' t

Timasheff, N. S. "Totalitarianism, DeSpotism, Dictator-

ship," in Friedrich, Totalitarianism, pp. 39-46.

 

Union Research Institute. "Rectification Campaign of the

'China Democratic League,'" Union Research Service,
VIII, No. 7 (July 23, 1957).

 

. "Trade Unions Incompetent in Safeguarding the
Interests of Workers," Union Research Service,
VIII, No. 12 (Aug. 9, 1957).

 

. "Young Pioneers in Communist China," Union
Research Service, XXXVII, No. 11 (Nov. 6, 1964).

 

"The Youth Movement of Communist China in 1962,"
Union Research Service: Communist China 1962, I.

 

 

       
   

HIG N

”Tnuulmrifi

312

E V

Hjfluflfllflm(@flfllflflflfljfltfilfl'ES

031