




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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS IN A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY: THE CASE OF COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-1964

By

Richard Gerald Mendes

The task of this thesis is twofold: first, to utilize the available literature in the field of political authoritarianism for the purpose of synthesizing a model of totalitarian regime behavior; second, to apply a limited portion of this model to an analysis of Communist China during the 1949-1964 period.

The first task must be approached with extreme care, for the field of political authoritarianism is one in which conceptual clarity is often lacking. Fascist, monarchical, communist, militaristic, traditional-despotic, totalitarian, and still other forms of authoritarian government have tended to be lumped together in a fashion which often lacks any attempt to construct inter-authoritarian delineations. Thus, the first major goal of this thesis is to present a model totalitarian regime which possesses both internal consistency and external differentiation. The model actually presented is one based upon the axiom that the distinguishing characteristic of a totalitarian regime is the drive of the ruling elite for total centralization of all societal power in its own hands.

From this basic axiom, via the process of deductive logic, a series of propositions is derived. These propositions represent one functional aspect of the totalitarian regime, specifically, the relationships between the totalitarian elite and intermediate groups (i.e., any group existing in the organizational space between the individual and the elite itself) of the society. Thus, the major thrust of the bulk of the thesis is to examine the possible congruence between these postulated propositions and actual behavior in Communist China during the 1949-1964 period.

Three types of intermediate groups in China were chosen for examination: (1) minor parties, (2) mass organizations, and (3) mass campaigns. These particular groups were chosen because they were nominally independent or quasi-independent of the leadership elite. Therefore the elite-intermediate group relationships postulated at the outset would logically be more visible in their cases than in those of groups more closely tied to the elite itself (e.g., the Army or the Party).

The data utilized in this examination are reflective of the difficulty in obtaining information concerning "closed" political systems. The Chinese regime has guarded the secrecy of its decision-making procedures and has attempted to structure the flow of information regarding the announcement and implementation of policy in the nation

at large. Therefore, analysis of the Chinese situation calls for the use of a certain sleuth-like approach strongly reminiscent of pre-1956 studies of the Stalinist regime. However, no nation as large as China can function without leaving tell-tale traces of its activities. Two major sources of information are available, and both are utilized in this thesis. The first source of information is the reportage of scholars and journalists who have been allowed to visit China. The second is the group of American governmental agencies in the Far East that constantly monitors internal Chinese communications. These agencies painstakingly collect and translate Chinese newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts. By judicious use of both of these sources one can reasonably hope to derive a fairly accurate picture of events in China.

The conclusion of this thesis is that the totalitarian model and the actual behavior of the Chinese regime are similar enough to encourage further use of the totalitarian model in attempting to understand other functional aspects of the Chinese system. Furthermore, since a model operates on the basis of analogy, it is a valuable tool for prediction. Therefore, the totalitarian model also holds promise as a framework for anticipating coming events in China. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution can be viewed as a logical extension of the elite-intermediate group relationships postulated at the outset of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research is to examine possible relationships between the Chinese Communist Government and a model totalitarian state. The first task, therefore, is to explicate the procedures to be used in constructing the model totalitarian state. This task must be considered in terms of both the materials to be used for the process of conceptualization and the structural requisites of model building.

Turning first to the unstructured gathering of materials (observations) which are the basics of the process of conceptualization, one must choose between reliance upon primary experiences and what might be termed "pre-inducted" materials. It is far beyond the scope of this research to construct the model from scratch. That is a project which can fill, and has filled, numerous volumes. Rather, the strategy of this paper is to synthesize available theory in order to provide a model. The intention is to "boil down" the vast quantity of literature on the subject until only the bare bones, the most basic characteristics of the totalitarian model remain. The goal is

to reject totalitarian characteristics unique to a single, or a small, group of authors; but rather to search for characteristics which seem to be consensual across the whole range of investigation into this field. In attempting such a project one must be wary of the subjectivity of many authors, the tendency of various disciplines to use different jargon to describe the same activity, and the sheer bulk of commentary on totalitarianism. A surprising fact is that in the great quantity of totalitarian writings, there is a reasonably high degree of agreement upon basics. Presented below are various scholars' characterizations of the totalitarian model which, in the opinion of the author, are fairly representative of both the diversity and uniformity of opinion on this topic.

Perhaps the most widely known description of a totalitarian model is that presented by Friedrich and Brzezinski in Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. They conceptualize a totalitarian regime as possessing the following six characteristics:

- (1) an official ideology which relates to all areas of man's activity;
- (2) a single mass party which is elitist and usually led by a single individual;
- (3) a terroristic police system;
- (4) a "technologically conditioned" almost complete control of mass communications media by the elite;
- (5) a "technologically conditioned" almost complete

elite control of all means of armed combat;
 (6) a centrally controlled economy.¹

Actually, the use of the term "totalitarian" itself seems to have stemmed from an article on Fascist doctrine which Mussolini wrote for the Enciclopedia Italiana in 1932.² He wrote:

The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values may exist, much less have any value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarianism, and the Fascist State, as a synthesis and a unit which includes all values, interprets, develops, and lends additional power to the whole life of a people.³

Karl Schmitt was the leading Nazi political theorist. Edmund Walsh in his work Total Power presents Schmitt's interpretation of the essence of totalitarianism:

The development of government proceeds "in three dialectic stages: from the absolute state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the neutral state of the liberal nineteenth century to the totalitarian state in which state and society are identical." (Der Huter der Varfassung, 1931, page 79.) The final stage in this evolution was the monopoly of all power, all authority, all will in the Fuhrer, conceived and accepted as a Messiah endowed with unlimited legal prerogatives in a state under perpetual martial law.⁴

Here are two descriptions of totalitarianism provided by committed proponents of the system and it is interesting to note they lack the thoroughness of modern, Western descriptions rather than differing in content. The lack of completeness is to be expected on the part of Schmitt, since he was working in a society which frowned upon Western scientific rationalism and urged its citizens to "think with their blood."

In any case, modern analyses of the totalitarian model are strongly reminiscent of these earlier statements. Sydney Hook wrote in 1959:

A totalitarian society is one in which there is an absolute and interlocking monopoly of power--economic, juridical, military, educational, and political--in the hands of a minority party which countenances no legal opposition and is not removable by the processes of freely given consent.⁵

This type of description more closely parallels that of Mussolini and Schmitt than does that of Friedrich and Brzezinski.

In point of fact, most contemporary analysts of totalitarianism prefer to follow the example of Friedrich and Brzezinski, and describe totalitarianism in terms of a determining set of characteristics. A. James Gregor very closely parallels Friedrich and Brzezinski in his list of totalitarian features:

- (1) an official ideology that extends to all areas of human activity;
- (2) a unitary party which is elitist;
- (3) a governmental monopoly of police, weapons, and communications;
- (4) a centralized economy.⁶

Similarly, Boris Meissner, writing in Brzezinski's collection Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, characterizes a totalitarian regime as one possessing the following:

- (1) unrestricted autocracy of the party (the lack of any restrictions constitutes the difference between totalitarian and autocratic regimes);

- (2) total control from above (terror serves as a reminder of this control) which extends to all areas of life and all groups and organizations;
- (3) total planning in the economic, social, political, and cultural spheres.⁷

N. S. Timasheff also presents a set of characteristics:

- (1) concentration of power in the hands of a few;
- (2) lack of individual rights vis à vis the collectivity;
- (3) expansion of the state until it becomes almost synonymous with the society.⁸

Karl Deutsch characterizes the totalitarian regime in much the same fashion as above; however, his language varies somewhat. He perceives three crucial characteristics of a totalitarian regime:

- (1) mobilization of effort (i.e., an active support by the citizenry);
- (2) unity of command (once again, centralization of power);
- (3) effective power of enforcement (which implies governmental control of weapons, police, and communications).⁹

Barrington Moore provides a more condensed version of many of the above characterizations when he describes a centralized totalitarian system as:

. . . a society all of whose activities, from the rearing of children to the production and distribution of economic goods, are controlled and directed from a single center. Presumably coercion plays a large part in this centralized control.¹⁰

Finally, Hannah Arendt distinguishes two central factors of a totalitarian system. First, the atomization

of the individual. That is, the citizen of the ideal totalitarian state has no allegiance, no frame of reference, and no empathy for any form of group whatsoever aside from the monolithic state itself. Second, the totalitarian state is an imperialistic state.¹¹ Bronislaw Malinowski concurs, and indeed emphasizes this second feature when he states, "Totalitarianism can be defined as the supreme mobilization of natural resources for war efficiency."¹²

The above descriptions of totalitarianism are but a sample of the voluminous descriptions of totalitarianism. Actually, most of the remaining descriptions differ from those above not generally in meaning, but rather in completeness. How the preceding authors, among others, perceive totalitarianism will be presented in greater depth below, as a model of totalitarianism is synthesized point by point.

The second task mentioned at the outset was to comment upon the process of model building as it relates to this research. Until now the term "model" has been used in the lexical sense, primarily because many writers quoted above made use of this term and it is inadvisable for the author of this paper to account for their usage(s). For the purposes of the research to follow, however, it is necessary to present a stipulative definition of "model" in the interests of clarity and rigor.

The term "model" seems to have a multiplicity of usages in the social sciences. Items labeled as models may be more or less rigorous, physical, formal, or pre-scriptive. Scott Greer comments:

The term model is used, however, in various senses. In the policy sciences it is sometimes used to refer to ideal conditions--model behavior by model people. It is sometimes just a way of referring to fairly abstract theory. And it sometimes refers to the process of quantifying laws.¹³

Van Dyke also notes this problem in stating " . . . that imitation, explanation, and prescription are all associated with the notion of a model and that some confusion results."¹⁴ The ambiguity inherent in the term "model" seems to be partitionable into three distinct areas: (1) the idea of "formal" and "informal" models; (2) the relationship between "model" and "theory"; and (3) the distinction between "model" and "ideal type."

The idea of a formal model seems to hinge upon the degree to which the model is symbolic and divorced from empirical referents.¹⁵ Meehan contends:

What is a formal model? In the simplest terms possible, it consists of a set of carefully defined elements and the rules for manipulating them; the whole system is usually reduced to symbolic form--Euclidean geometry is a classic example. From a slightly different point of view, a formal model comprises a set of axioms and all of the postulates of theorems that can be derived from those axioms according to the canons of formal logic.¹⁶

"Formality" in a model can also entail the ability to quantify parallel elements. Greer reflects this line of reasoning in his conception of a "formal" model:

It seems most sensible to use the term "model" to refer to a developed theory that is isomorphic to an undeveloped one. A mathematical model would then be a developed theory for which quantitative values can be stated, values for the description of both variables and relations among them. In this sense, mathematical models are of little value for social science except in those areas where variables conform to the demands of true number; otherwise isomorphism is not determinable . . . , such areas are rare.¹⁷

The formal model is therefore: (1) a symbolic system whose symbols, as elements, are divorced from empirical referents; and (2) often, a system whose relational aspects can be examined vis-à-vis another system only through quantification.

If the scope of the usage of the term "model" were restricted to only formal models, it would hold little promise for the purposes of this research. However, there are non-formal models which are more immediately useful. Greer states:

Although models, if rigorously defined, have presently a very limited use in social science, the term "model" is ubiquitous. One could dismiss this popularity as merely a fad, a new cargo cult, if there did not seem to be a common meaning underlying all the usages noted. This use of "model" would seem to indicate a configurative concept that can be used in widely varying circumstances. It is a formal abstraction, like any complex concept, and its utility varies with the empirical nature of its referent.¹⁸

Greer, in fact, allows great flexibility in the usage of the concept:

In common usage, then, we are not talking about formal models most of the time. We are really talking about something that precedes formalization, precedes axiomatic and formal theory. We are in fact using a controlling conceptual scheme, one that is purely formal and without content, one that may lead to the construction of empirical theory. Let us be clear:

model, as we use it in social science, simply refers to a guiding metaphor.¹⁹

Therefore, "models" in political science may assume a variety of forms. That is, to utilize Kaplan, a family of conceptions of model (including a subset of "formal models") is inherent in the concept of model.

A second concern in the consideration of model building is the relationship, and possible overlap, between "model" and "theory." Kaplan contends that the use of the term "model" is often of little methodological value when one is simply operating upon "theory."²⁰ Kaplan states:

We can now understand why the term "model" is sometimes used as a synonym for "theory," especially one which is couched in the postulational style. The model is conceived as a structure of symbols interpreted in certain ways, and what it is a model of is the subject-matter specified by the interpretation. Relations among the symbols are presumed to exhibit corresponding relations among the elements of the subject-matter. The theory is more or less abstract--that is, it neglects certain variables--and what it describes are certain more or less "ideal" entities, having an existence only in the context of the theory itself. What is hoped is that the system of such entities will be isomorphic, in appropriate respects, to the real system which provides the subject-matter for the theory.²¹

What Kaplan has outlined above he suggests be termed "theory in postulational form,"²² rather than "model." Kaplan is, in essence, stating that in order for a theory to be a model, only the relational aspects of the elements may be evaluated for isomorphism and there is no need for the elements themselves to be isomorphic to any degree whatsoever. This point is especially important to this

research because the "model" used here would lose its validity in light of Kaplan's categorization. The fault in Kaplan's treatment is that he dichotomizes theories into sets of either totally relational or other. That is, he leaves no room for degree. It might be reasonably stated that a "model" emphasizes the relational aspects and thus "model" and "non-model" theory are end points on a continuum. In this context, the use of the term "model" in the present research is valid, since the primary function of the structure is to permit extrapolation and prediction based upon congruity of form, and the empirical referents function merely as indicators of relevance, rather than as explanatory hypotheses. It might be added, and will be illustrated, that Kaplan's severe restrictions upon the usage of the term "model" are not generally reflected in the literature on structure of theory.

A final consideration of model building is the possible distinction between "model" and "ideal type." Ideal types come in two forms: prescriptive, and descriptive. The use of the term "model" to represent a prescriptive ideal type is common. Van Dyke comments:

. . . we should note that models sometimes represent a conception of the desirable, constituting patterns or ideal types, and so take on a normative or prescriptive quality. Thus one of the characters in the Pirates of Penzance claimed, "I am the very model of a modern Major-General." In this sense, there are also model professors, model wives, and model students. And there are models who display dresses in fashion shops and models who pose for artists. To name them as models is to prescribe. Imitation is recommended. Those who want to excel as Major-Generals, professors,

wives, or students, and those who want to achieve the beauty of the fashion model or the artist's model should seek an isomorphic correspondence of a one-to-one sort with the model.²³

Although the use of the term "model" in the above sense is quite common in everyday life, in this paper the term is in no way prescriptive.

A second form of "ideal-type," the Weberian form, is descriptive. It simply describes the "pure" form or what might be described as the modern equivalent of a Platonic Form. Kaplan states:

An ideal type may be a construct like the limiting concepts. . . . It specifies something "with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components." (135:93) [Weber, M.: The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Glencoe, Ill., 1949.] As such, it is a particularly useful device for dealing with internal vagueness. No state in history has been wholly, fully, "truly" a democracy, just as no male has exhibited all the traits of masculinity in superlative degree--Athens did not extend suffrage to slaves, and even Achilles was given to tears. But we can conceptualize perfect specimens of any species.²⁴

It is therefore obvious that one need not choose between utilizing a model or an ideal type, since the two are separate entities and not mutually exclusive. One can construct a model of an ideal type. "Model" refers to the manner or style of conceptualization while "ideal-type" refers to a type of concept. Thus a model of an ideal type would be a construct primarily concerned with the elemental relations within some "pure" entity. One might also have theories about ideal types as well as models.

Having considered the various uses of the term "model" (as well as "ideal type") and the ambiguities of the term, it is now necessary to stipulate the use of the term in this paper. First, a model is an abstraction. As Van Dyke writes, ". . . , a model is an abstract image --a simplified and composite version--of a class of phenomena."²⁵ Second, a model functions via the process of analogy. Lastrucci writes:

A model, as employed in scientific discussions, refers to a parallel form, simpler than the complex subject it represents, but having a similar structure or organization.²⁶

And Nagel adds:

In analogies of the first kind [substantive analogies], a system of elements possessing certain already familiar properties, assumed to be related in known ways as stated in a set of laws for the system, is taken as a model for the construction of a theory for some second system. This second system may differ from the initial one only in containing a more inclusive set of elements, all of which have properties entirely similar to those in the model; or the second system may differ from the initial one in a more radical manner, in that the elements constituting it have properties not found in the model (or at any rate not mentioned in the stated laws for the model).²⁷

Third, a model, because it is an analogous structure, is used for prediction and extrapolation rather than explanation. Meehan writes, ". . . , formal models can often be used as predictors, even though no explanation of the phenomena being examined is available."²⁸ Van Dyke similarly contends, "A correspondence is specified between attributes of the model and what is modeled. Neither explanation nor prescription enters in."²⁹ Finally, a

model can encompass an "ideal-type" and, in effect,
represent the pure form of a phenomenon. Lastrucci sums
 up this position:

Science is fundamentally a particular method of achieving reliable knowledge. In pursuit of that achievement, all its knowledge is theoretical--i.e., it is an interpretation of reality, not the reality itself. This theoretical interpretation is often arranged in terms of ideal or perfect forms or conditions--e.g., an absolute condition designated as a "solution," a specific and discrete entity as a "cell," or an absolutely round figure designated as a "circle." Such conceived ideal forms are termed models, whether referring to simple concepts such as "solutions" or to highly abstract concepts such as "the law of gravity." But such models are only approximations, and hence tentative interpretations of reality. The function of science, therefore, is to endeavor constantly to refine and improve such models so that they may continually approximate more closely the assumed reality of form and matter in terms of increasing and more refined empirical evidence.³⁰

Table 1 presents the model of the "pure" or "ideal" totalitarian state which will be utilized in this work. The basic axiom of the entire model is that totalitarian regimes seek the totalization of power. A definition of power and the derivation of the lower-level propositions will be presented in later sections. But first it is necessary that the nature of the testing be made clear. Specifically, the propositions in Table 1 are not hypotheses, whose validity in relation to totalitarianism in general will be tested in the course of this work. Rather, because they are components of a model, they are the "givens" of an equation and are axiomatically true. If one wishes to question their validity he must do so by criticizing either the basic (general) assumptions

TABLE 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Level of Theory	Characteristics of Totalitarian Model		
General	Totalization of power		
Mid-Range	1) Quantitative and qualitative extensions of power	2) Limited and informal elite	3) Subordination of all goals to power-seeking
Specific	1) Destroy autonomy of intermediate groups	2) Destroy autonomy of individual	3) Constant surveillance
	1) Destroy or control all pre-takeover groups 2) Keep groups in a constant state of flux 3) Confuse lines of authority and spheres of duty 4) "Fabricate" interests for groups 5) Regulate individuals' interactions with groups		

of the model presented earlier or the logic of the deductive process employed. Should the Chinese situation in no way whatsoever parallel the propositions, this does not bring into question the validity of these propositions.

The above argument may lead the reader into something of a cul-de-sac. That is, if the propositions are axiomatically true, regardless of their resemblance to Chinese behavior, and since the behavior of the Chinese groups is true by nature of its very existence (i.e., the behavior is what it is, it is empirically and sensually true, and its existence does not cease simply because it fails to conform to a theory), then the question becomes, what is being tested?

What this research is testing is the relationship between the model and reality. Both the model and reality are accepted as true, only their relevance to each other can be falsified (assuming the testing procedure itself is correct). Perhaps a simplistic version of this question can bring the entire situation into sharper focus. One may state that human beings need water in order to live, as a logically derived true proposition of human behavior, deduced from the model of a "human being." One may also observe the activities of creature Q. If creature Q uses no water, assuming the method of observation itself is valid, one can conclude that the model of "human being" has some amount X_{water} less relevance to the understanding of creature Q (where the sum of X_1^n represents the total

sum of human characteristics), than would be the case if creature Q had used water. For creature Q to be human, $Q = X_{\text{water}} + X_{\text{hair}} + X_{\text{reproduction}} + \dots + X_n$. Therefore, what is being tested is not the model of humanity, which is a given, or the reality of Q, which is a fact of existence, but the validity of the equation.

This research operates on the same principle as that outlined above. But the research is not testing a simple equation, which is often an either/or proposition. The task is more complex. Relationships become a matter of degree. In short, this work is testing, in a very non-quantitative fashion, the relevance of the totalitarian model to Chinese behavior, based upon a limited number of propositions within the model.

The Chinese regime cannot conform completely to the totalitarian model, or even completely to the limited set of propositions presented within this work. Every earthly regime is sui generis in totality and no model can parallel all interaction. The question then becomes, how closely does China parallel the totalitarian model? That is, how useful are the characteristics of totalitarianism, as presented in this model, for predicting events in China. The Chinese regime may be thought of as a point in N dimensional space. Each dimension represents a form of governmental organization and the research hopes to help determine how closely the Chinese regime lies to the axis of totalitarianism.

The reason for this research is thus evident. If it can be demonstrated, on the basis of an examination of a portion of the model, that it is analogous to Chinese behavior, then there is some support for: (1) extending the analogy to other portions of the Chinese system, and (2) using the model to predict behavior within all sections of the Chinese system. Therefore, the research is not intended to explain why the Chinese behave in a fashion similar or dissimilar to that postulated in the model; rather, it is intended to help ascertain the usefulness of the model for anticipating a wide spectrum of behavior. Furthermore, as many theorists indicate, if the model is analogous to the empirical system, then one can examine empirical interactions by studying model interactions.

As Table 1 indicates, the basic axiomatic principle of a totalitarian regime is its drive to be the sole repository of power in the society. Therefore, before proceeding further, it is necessary to consider the meaning and implications of "power."

The process of conceptualizing "power" is a most difficult task, as many political scientists can attest to. R. H. Tawney insightfully remarked, ". . . power is the most obvious characteristic of organized society, but it is also the most ambiguous."³¹ Furthermore, there seems to be a proliferation of ambiguities rather than a reduction, perhaps due to the necessity of each discipline to conceptualize power in a fashion relevant to its needs.

It is possible, however, to examine various considerations of power in terms of general categories and, hopefully, discover a conceptually meaningful and useful usage of the term.

Definitions of power can be arranged in terms of two considerations: (1) whether the definition examines power in terms of its components (power bases or attributes) or its relational aspects, and (2) whether power is a motivated process or simply a situational condition. The two conditions are complementary rather than mutually exclusive:

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Motivation</u>		
	Conscious	Unconscious	Situational
Power Bases			
Interactions			

The "bases-interaction" dimension is of primary concern in this research. That is, because a model is being utilized, the motivation of power usage is peripheral to its actual operation. The "bases-interaction" dimension is also, in general, dichotomous. That is, most theorists define power in terms of either its attributes or as a relationship between elements. Of those who stress the bases of power Simon is prominent. He uses the term "authority" but it seems to be, in effect, a substitute for "power." Simon writes:

Because the person who accepts proposals may do so for a variety of motives, there will be seen in any organization a number of different types of authority relationships, corresponding to these different motives for acceptance.³²

Simon goes on to discuss the various types of authority (i.e., the bases of power). Briefly, he divides the bases of power in the following fashion:

- A. Authority of Confidence (obedience stems from the belief in another's ability)
 - 1. Functional Status (expertise)
 - 2. Hierarchical Status (position)
 - 3. Charismatic Leadership
- B. Authority of Identification (obedience stems from the need to identify with a group)
- C. Authority of Sanctions
 - 1. Non-hierarchical Sanctions
 - 2. Hierarchical Sanctions (authority stems from deprivations caused by a higher position in the structure of organization)
 - 3. Rule of Anticipated Reactions (obedience stems from threat of sanctions)
- D. Authority of Legitimacy (obedience stems from one's belief that he should obey)³³

Nieburg, in his discussion of political violence, also mentions bases of power. He writes:

Domestic, politically socialized power is transmuted into indirect forms manifested by prestige, influence, property-holding, skill, class or caste, physical beauty, and the like. The constituted authority

structure holds a legitimate monopoly of the means of physical power in order to enforce the norms of social relationships, rights and responsibilities, procedures for political change, conduct and mediation of private and public bargaining, and exchange of values among individuals and groups by means of attenuated and socialized forms of indirect and decentralized power.³⁴

Schermerhorn, in his work Society and Power, refers to Bierstedt's discussion of the sources of power:

Bierstedt is more persuasive when he declares that the source of power in human society is threefold: "(1) numbers of people, (2) social organizations, and (3) resources," particularly where intergroup relations are concerned.³⁵

Schermerhorn also presents his own set of power sources.

He contends that there are five major bases of power:

- (1) military, police, or criminal power with its control over violence;
- (2) economic power with control over land, labor wealth, or corporate production;
- (3) political power with control over legitimate and ultimate decision-making within a specified territory;
- (4) traditional or ideological power involving control over belief and value systems, religion, education, specialized knowledge, and propaganda;
- (5) diversionary power with control over hedonic interests, recreation, and enjoyments.³⁶

Although all of the above definitions are generally useful, there are, on the whole, inappropriate for the present research for two reasons. First, they exhibit a tendency to define power in terms of other abstract

concepts and are thus partially exposed to the criticism of circularity. Second, since it is a model with which the author of this paper is working, the interactional characteristics of "power" are of primary concern. To discuss power as an entity is irrelevant, to discuss it as a relationship is crucial.

Therefore it is necessary to examine some definitions of power put forth by theorists who emphasize the interactional aspects of the concept. These definitions can be divided into four general categories: (1) those that emphasize the role of power in structuring or motivating a society; (2) those that view power in terms of a clash of systems; (3) those that discuss power as it relates to conflict and/or sanctions; and (4) those that view power as an actor upon the probabilities of events.

The first group mentioned above consists of those definitions of power which define power as some cohesive or motivational force acting vis-à-vis the society, generally, as a whole. Nieburg expresses this position:

Much of philosophy and the social sciences deals with "power," "violence," "force," and the nature and function of the state and its police power. Power is the most overworked and ill-defined word in political discourse. It can be defined most concretely in physical terms: Power is the application of energy to do work. It is the man or machine moving a mass from here to there. At a higher level of abstraction, power is the ability to direct energy to modify or control the environment, to express values (designs, goals, etc.) through intervention in the configuration of things. In terms of the social environment, power may be viewed as the ability to direct human energy (i.e., attitudes and behavior) to express or realize

certain values by the organization and use, modification and control of both physical and human (i.e., behavior itself) materials. . . .³⁷

Huntington contends that Talcott Parsons also reflects this view:

Parsons says power is ". . . the ability to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the action of persons and groups, which is binding on them by virtue of their position in the society."³⁸

Finally, Lynd also exhibits this society-oriented conceptualization of power:

Organized power may accordingly be conceived as the process by which whatever is the version of order and disorder in a given society is continually defined, redefined, and maintained. Order in this sense is the way the major routines of a population's daily actions are channeled toward selected goals in the use of available institutional means.³⁹

The consensus on this position, then, seems to be that Power is a force which motivates one set of elements in a Society to accomplish some task. In a sense, power is the ability of a society to utilize its various resources in order to accomplish goals or establish or preserve patterns of behavior.

The second conceptualization of power mentioned above is somewhat similar to the first. That is, it also conceptualizes power as a system-wide relationship; however, it stresses the conflict or disruption between systems. Karl Deutsch puts forth this definition:

We might say, then, that power consists in the probability of preserving the inner structure of one of the systems in a clash, with little or no relevant

modification, at the price of bringing about relatively large modification in the structure of the systems which clash with it. In other words, power consists in accepting the least amount of non-autonomous change in one system while producing the largest amount of non-autonomous change in another.⁴⁰

Thus Deutsch views power as a proportional relationship, involving both change in the object of the power relationship and change in the wielder of power. The problem with this definition lies in its inability to conceive of power in absolute amounts. That is, one system which produces no change in another system and suffers no change itself, is equivalent in power to a system which produces total change in another system yet undergoes total transformation in the process. However, it would, by this point, seem conceptually necessary to admit that the simple ability to produce change is somehow related to power. Thus to equate the absence of activity with the ability to produce vast change is a fruitless line of argument. In terms of a simple application, it would be stating that the Nazi regime had no more, or perhaps even less, power than a rock. Therefore, the effect of power upon the wielder of power, while perhaps useful for an understanding of power, cannot be allowed to become a determining factor.

A third view of power relates the concept to sanctions (deprivations) and, in some cases, to conflict. Harold Lasswell presents the classical definition of this type:

At this point we narrow our conception of power, using the term to designate relations in which severe

deprivations are expected to follow the breach of a pattern of conduct. . . . This eliminates an enormous range of relationships in which a breach is assumed to be of trivial importance.

This mode of conceiving power emphasizes the crucial role of expectation. One conductor may expect to deal strictly with his men, and to impose penalties for minor as well as major deviation from the faithful following of his cues. And an orchestra may expect to deal strictly with conductors if the players are dissatisfied. Indeed, by deliberate non-cooperation or hostile agitation, they may get him fired.⁴¹

Bachrach and Baratz also utilize the notion of sanctions, and they also add the idea of conflict. They conceptualize power in the following manner:

We can now draw together the several elements of our conception of power. A power relationship exists when (a) there is a conflict over values or course of action between A and B; (b) B complies with A's wishes; and (c) he does so because he is fearful that A will deprive him of a value or values which he, B, regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by noncompliance.⁴²

In fact, they insist upon conflict as a condition of a power relationship:

. . . , in speaking of power relations, one must take care not to overstate the case by saying that A has power over B merely because B, anxious to avoid sanctions, complies with a given policy proclaimed by A.⁴³

Of course, one must also consider the question of what constitutes a sanction. Lasswell tackles the problem by enlarging the range of application:

Manifestly, expectations may differ about what constitutes a deprivation, and what is mild or severe. When we are examining not one human association but a whole community, or all the communities of which there is knowledge, we define severity or mildness in the light of the entire panorama of relationships which are taken into account.⁴⁴

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George Orwell presents a rather extreme, though hardly viable, view of the proper role of sanctions:

How does one man assert his power over another? . . . By making him suffer. Obedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering how can you be sure that he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation. Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing.⁴⁵

Finally, Schermerhorn combines the notion of sanctions with that of decision-making capabilities:

. . . , we may define power as the processual relation between two parties modally characterized by (1) asymmetrical influence, in which a perceptible probability of decision rests in one of the two parties, even over the resistance of the other party; and (2) the predominance of negative sanctions (threatened or actual) as a feature of behavior in the dominant party. . . . In summary: whatever the deviation from either of the modal characteristics, power relations are still present as long as one of the two variables, asymmetry, or negative sanctions, still remains.⁴⁶

The thrust of these arguments is fairly clear; A has power over B if, and sometimes only if, A can impose some deprivation upon B in order to force compliance. One fault of this type of conceptualization stems from nonintercomparability of sanctions. One man's sanction is another man's reward, and not even Lasswell's attempt to "average out" the idea of sanctions can suffice to solve the problem. A second, and more serious, fault lies in the inability of these theories to account for changed behavior due to such "non-sanctions" as idealization and imitation, love, charisma, etc. To claim a proper definition of power by banishing the above types of behavior to other categories (e.g., influence) is merely to make a semantic victory

out of a conceptual defeat. The behavior of men and groups is controlled and influenced by the carrot as well as the stick, and to ignore either is unsatisfactory.

The fourth view of the nature of power seems to hold the most promise. It conceives of power as the ability to change the probability of occurrences. Deutsch states:

. . . , power is the ability to make things happen that would not have happened otherwise. In this sense it is akin to causality, that is, to the production of a change in the probability distribution of events in the world. And since the world is changing already, power deals with the change of change--or second-order change. Thus power involves our ability to change the changes that are already under way and would continue without our intervention.⁴⁷

Thus, the probabilistic approach avoids the major pitfalls of the earlier approaches by avoiding the almost hopeless complexities and ambiguities of what power is and focusing upon what power does. The concept is defined by its measurement. That is, all the earlier approaches defined power in terms of its identifying characteristics, either its bases or the features of interaction associated with it. This led to either reification of the concept of power, or the unenviable task of trying to understand a very abstract concept through a limited set of empirical characteristics. The probabilistic approach eases the situation, and also especially lends itself to use with model building, by looking only at the effects of power rather than power itself. Thus, in a very real sense, power is as power does.

The concept of power which will be used in this research is the probabilistic concept put forward by Dahl. Briefly stated, Dahl measures power (he never truly "defines" it) as the difference in probabilities of an entity committing or not committing some act, dependent upon either action or non-action by a second entity. That is, A's power over B with respect to B committing act x, dependent upon A's committing act w can be symbolically represented as:

$$M \left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x \right) = P(a, x/A, w) - P(a, x/A, \bar{w}) = p_1 - p_2$$

where M is power, a and A are actors, x and w are their respective acts, and p is probability.⁴⁸ The description presented above is the crux of Dahl's treatment. It is not necessary here to recreate his entire work, it appears in numerous places.⁴⁹ Suffice it to say that for the purposes of this research "power" is defined as the ability of one actor to change the probability of a second actor's performance of some deed, by committing a second deed. This definition, although it may prove to contain certain operational difficulties, is especially suited, because of its relational nature, to work with models.

As stated earlier, the primary goal of a totalitarian regime is the ultimate concentration of power in the hands of the totalitarian elite. Logically this implies both a quantitative and a qualitative extension of power. Quantitative extension of power entails an expansion of the amount of power held in relation to each

unit of the society. Qualitative extension of power refers to the expansion of power beyond the political sphere and into every area of human activity. Hook states, ". . . , the historic tendency of all major totalitarian states, particularly when they find themselves in a world of non-totalitarian states, is towards total control."⁵⁰ Arthur Schlesinger writes, "Totalitarianism, . . . , means that all social energy--all loyalty, emotion and faith--is focused upon a single objective; . . ."⁵¹ Also, Malinowski contends that "Totalitarianism consists . . . in the placing of one institution, the state, above all others, at the expense of their very existence."⁵² The state, which is the totalitarian elite, is thus the center of all decision making, and its decisions are unquestionable. Kohn very correctly contends that ". . . , modern totalitarianism has reasserted the same claim to absoluteness as medieval faith."⁵³

But it is not simply the finality or absoluteness of decision making which uniquely characterizes the totalitarian regime. Many early despotisms and autocracies were also in possession of absolute authority. What distinguishes the totalitarian state is the enormous range of its power. It endeavors to extend its power into every area of human existence. This feature distinguishes it from mere autocracies. Neumann writes:

The design of modern dictatorship is essentially different from that of its nominal antecedents. Present-day autocracies are not just departures from the democratic norm. They claim to present a system

of government outliving their dictatorial creator and extending their sway into a totalitarian rule over practically every sphere of human interest and activity. It is their quasi-institutional and totalitarian character, this virtually limitless extension in time and space, that holds out the challenge to democracy.⁵⁴

Schlesinger echoes this belief when he writes:

The totalitarian state, which has risen in specific response to this fear of freedom, is an invention of the twentieth century. It differs essentially from old-style dictatorship, which may be bloody and tyrannical but yet leaves intact most of the structure of society. Totalitarianism, on the contrary, pulverizes the social structure, grinding all independent groups and diverse loyalties into a single amorphous mass. The sway of the totalitarian state is unlimited. This very fact is a source of its profound psychological appeal.⁵⁵

In fact, the idea of the all pervasiveness of the totalitarian regime is probably the most widely held belief on the part of totalitarian analysts. This characteristic certainly predates Mussolini's popularization of the term "totalitarian." The imposition of the state upon the whole of society was a feature of Plato's ideal political system. Furthermore, the French Utopian Socialist St.-Simon was espousing the same idea in the early nineteenth century: "Like the modern totalitarian state, the Saint-Simonian doctrine demanded the total control of all phases of society and culture, including the realm of personal life, family, religion, and education."⁵⁶ These early calls for a total state control were limited to small communities. It was only the technological revolution in communications which permitted total control to be extended to a mass society.

Thus the modern totalitarian state transcends the simple autocratic state by its extension into all spheres of human activity, and at the same time transcends the old-style "total" state by its utilization of the communications revolution to extend its control to mass societies. Hans Buchheim supports this contention in his description of a modern totalitarian state:

. . . the totalitarian claim to power is not kept within the bounds of possible governmental competence but--as the name makes clear--is intended to dispose unreservedly over the totality of human life. The claim is not confined to the area for which the state is responsible but is allowed to encompass all areas, and to have an exclusive voice even where the political regime can at best play an ancillary role--as, for instance, in family life, in scientific research, and in art. Totalitarian rule attempts to encompass the whole person, the substance and spontaneity of his existence, including his conscience. It does not acknowledge the primacy of society over the state as an area of freedom which, in principle, lies beyond governmental control, but rather interferes in it deliberately, to change it from the ground up according to its own plan; for the regime wishes to create--in accordance with its own ideological scheme and with social engineering techniques--a wholly new society. . . . It undertakes the production of an artificial, synthetic society.⁵⁷

George Sabine also professes this belief:

[In a totalitarian society] Government may, indeed must, control every act and every interest of every individual or group in order to use it for enhancing national strength; government is not only absolute in its exercise but unlimited in its application. Nothing lies outside its province. Every interest and value--economic, moral, and cultural--being part of the national resources were to be controlled and utilized by government.⁵⁸

Kornhauser also emphasizes the totalitarian state's absorption of society:

Thus, while it is a dictatorship based on mass support, and while it is also based on elite-domination of centralized organization, its distinctive character lies in the fact that it is a permanently mobilized mass movement which seeks to control all aspects of life. Totalitarian dictatorships involve total domination, limited neither by received laws or codes (as in traditional authoritarianism) nor even by the boundaries of governmental functions (as in classical tyranny), since they obliterate the distinctions between state and society. Totalitarianism is limited only by the need to keep large numbers of people in a state of constant activity controlled by the elite.⁵⁹

Finally, Ernest Barker states the situation very clearly when he writes, ". . . the system of single-party government is led to engulf--to absorb, or at any rate regulate-- churches, trade unions, institutions of education, charitable organizations, and every form and phase of the activity of the community's life."⁶⁰

The totalitarian regime is therefore characterized by an absolute and all-pervasive centralization of power. The ideal totalitarian state not only decides for its citizens such matters as who will govern, what major domestic policy will entail, etc., it also controls the most mundane and non-political questions of a person's life. Marriage, leisure activities, proper foods, etc., all come under the purview of the totalitarian state. Huxley's Brave New World presents a view of uniformity in even such minor things as proper dress. Those who doubt that a totalitarian regime's arm could ever reach that far should contemplate the stress put upon the wearing of uniforms in many actual totalitarian regimes.

The extent of the totalitarian state's desire for centralization of power can be seen in the fact that it even surpasses human activity. That is, the totalitarian regime would seek to impose its control upon nature itself, or at least conceive of nature in such a fashion that it conforms to the regime. Robert Tucker discusses the Stalinist regime's projection of totalitarianism upon nature. Tucker contends the Soviets could not accept non-deterministic and non-ordered theories of science (e.g., Heisenberg indeterminacy principle, Mendelian genetics, quantum theories which hold that electrons "choose their own path"). In effect, Tucker concludes, the totalitarian cannot accept an uncontrollable nature any more than he can accept an uncontrollable social system.⁶¹

In conclusion, the first (and probably most basic) characteristic of the ideal totalitarian state is the drive of the ruling elite to centralize power both qualitatively (over all aspects of life) and quantitatively (absolute obedience).⁶² The next logical question, then, is what is the nature of this totalitarian elite that strives so forcefully for total power?

NOTES

CHAPTER I

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²⁷Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), p. 110.

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³⁰Lastrucci, pp. 61-62.

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³⁷Nieburg, p. 10.

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³⁹Robert Lynd, "Power in American Society as Resource and Problem," in Calvin Larson and Philo Washburn (eds.), Power, Participation, and Ideology (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 58.

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⁴⁶Schermerhorn, p. 12.

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⁴⁸Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in Behavioral Science, II, No. 3 (July 1957), 205.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 201-215.

⁵⁰Hook, p. 183.

⁵¹Arthur Schlesinger, The Vital Center (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 77.

⁵²Malinowski, pp. 305-306.

⁵³Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 65.

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⁵⁷Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics, trans. Ruth Hein (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 14.

⁵⁸George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1937), p. 916.

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CHAPTER II

A TOTALITARIAN MODEL

A second characteristic of a totalitarian regime, based upon its drive for power, is the unique nature of the political elite. It is generally the case, at least at the level of actual historical regimes, that the totalitarian society has been dominated by a single individual. Daniels' statement is typical of the conclusion of many totalitarian scholars, "They [totalitarian regimes] have all been dominated by individual dictators. In every case, one man was the creator and director of the country after the party took power."¹ Similarly, Friedrich and Brzezinski state that Goering once remarked to the then British ambassador, Neville Henderson, "When a decision has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Fuhrer alone who decides."² Friedrich and Brzezinski conclude that the individual totalitarian dictator:

. . . possesses more nearly absolute power than any previous type of political leader, that he is completely identified with his actual following, both by himself and by them, in a kind of mystical union, that he is able to operate on both these levels as he does because he is backed by mass propaganda and terror--coercive cohesion--and that therefore his

leadership is not to be confused either with tyranny, or despotism, or absolutism in their historical forms.³

It is obvious, then, that the ideal totalitarian state can be ruled by a single individual. It is also possible, however, that there may be a totalitarian elite composed of a limited number of individuals who share this power, so long as this elite acts only as a unit. Some form of oligarchy is possible, but only so long as this elite is small enough to operate entirely on the basis of inter-personal and entirely non-formal interaction. The reason for this restriction is plain; should the elite become too large or too formalized it will begin to adopt some meaningful bureaucratic administrative procedures. Thus, once power is institutionalized it must necessarily become fragmentized. Any group, even if it is a segment of the totalitarian elite, will tend to accumulate power and loyalties once it is allowed to become a legitimate institutional organization. Bureaucratization entails specialization of function (Weber) which in turn encourages fragmentation of power. Hannah Arendt writes:

A hierarchically organized chain of command means that the commander's power is dependent on the whole hierarchic system in which he operates. Every hierarchy, no matter how authoritarian in its direction, and every chain of command, no matter how arbitrary or dictatorial the content of orders, tends to stabilize and would have restricted the total power of the leader of a totalitarian movement.⁴

Sabine contends that ". . . bureaucratic qualities, which far more than political liberalism had been principles of

German constitutionalism, were in fact destroyed by the rise of national socialism to power."⁵

What Sabine and Arendt point up is that bureaucratization, institutionalization, in effect the establishment of any lines of authority and/or the granting of legitimacy to any group is a challenge to the total control of the ruling elite. Why, therefore, should a totalitarian elite court such a threat by establishing rules, lines of authority, differentiated groups, within itself? It can thus be seen that the totalitarian elite (when it is more than a single individual) must be a group small enough to function on the basis of non-formal and totally inter-personal relations. Neumann characterizes this operation as "oligarchic democracy." That is, democracy only within the elite; and he adds, "Brutal and merciless as the lieutenants usually are toward their enemies, strutting like the gods of vengeance, they had better not play the boss within the circle of their associates."⁶

In conclusion, the totalitarian model is dominated by either a single individual in whom all power resides, or an elite small enough to operate without the necessity of formalized rules.

The final characteristic of totalitarian regimes, stemming from its power-seeking, is the tendency to subordinate any and all societal goals to the desire for the total concentration of power in the hands of the elite.

This characteristic is crucial in differentiating the ideal totalitarian state from other forms of political organization, some of which may possess totalitarian characteristics to one degree or another. A true Communist state, for example, will always strive for the attainment of the final Marxist utopia whereas a totalitarian state which makes use of Marxist ideology will abandon Marxist goals when they become a threat to the power of the ruling elite. Similarly, other societal goals can fall by the wayside when they conflict with the drive for power. In this sense, the totalitarian is strangely like the democratic state, that is, they both place the method of governing (absolute power in one case and self-determination in the other) above any specific end-point for the society. They are both more concerned with the means than the end, even though their respective means are polar opposites.

Thus, the totalitarian regime will not let any goals interfere in its drive for power. Obviously, the elite will not sacrifice power in order to attain goals to which the elite itself is not committed. For example, one finds it hard to imagine the Nazi regime striving for the goal of meaningful mass suffrage at the expense of its own power. There is, however, a more difficult problem. What happens when a totalitarian regime must choose between surrendering power and the attainment of goals to which it is publicly committed? This is a point in dispute

among totalitarian analysts. They do agree that the totalitarian state possesses an ideology. The question then becomes: does power seeking take precedence over ideological goals or not?

Many theorists contend that the heart of a totalitarian regime is its commitment to an all inclusive ideology. Kohn, for example, writes that "The totalitarian certainty of victory is based on an eschatological confidence free from all moral contexts."⁷ Ernst Nolte contends that, "Every totalitarian dictatorship must be founded on some necessary, incontestable factor which it perhaps merely annexes, perhaps exceeds to a dangerous degree, but which for the time being disarms the objections of its opponents and elicits the approval of the masses."⁸ Waldemar Gurian presents the classic example of this position. He writes:

Montesquieu remarks that religion works a check in despotic regimes which do not have any institutional or traditional checks against the arbitrary actions of the despot. An essential feature of totalitarianism consists in the disappearance of this factual, though neither legal nor institutional, limiting power of religious habits and customs. On the contrary, energies and forces which formerly had their outlet and expression in religion, limiting the old despotic ruler, are now driving forces behind and in the new despotic regimes of the 20th century. The totalitarian ideologies replace and supersede religion.⁹

What Gurian is saying is that ideology replaces religion as the check upon the otherwise unchecked regime. Thus, for Gurian, ideology (i.e., ideological goals) takes precedence over the total centralization of power. He goes on to contend that:

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In the pure forms of totalitarianism--which are not only an expression of methods by which the "new prince" of Machiavelli must operate in the world of the twentieth century--the ideology is the driving force (and not primarily oratory) determining the reality of the movement.

The formal structure of the ideology can be filled with various contents and permits great flexibility. But it would be a decisive error to conclude that therefore the ideology--Marxism and Leninism on the one hand, the racial Weltanschauung of the Fuehrer on the other hand--is unimportant, only a cover-up of a drive for power and control without sense of limits and moderation, as required by existing conditions and power relations.¹⁰

Many theorists tend to replace Marxism or Racism with Modernization and Industrialization as the ideological goals of the contemporary totalitarian state. The content of the ideologies varies; what remains throughout is the idea that there is some set of ideological goals which is of greater importance to the regime than the simple drive for total power.

This paper is diametrically opposed to the contentions of Gurian. It asserts that in the ideal totalitarian state ideology is a sham, a control device. Furthermore, the totalitarian elite will in every instance abandon an ideological goal if such a goal becomes a threat to the drive for total power. Of course, since no real regime absolutely conforms to the totalitarian model, this will not always be the case in the real world. However, there are numerous historical events supporting this assertion. Joseph Nyomarky, in his discussion of the Nazi state points out the following instances: "Those people who wanted to attach some programmatic content to National

Socialism were called by Hans Frank the 'objectivists' as opposed to the 'totalitarians' for whom National Socialism remained an 'infinitely interpretable Weltanschauung,' or an 'empty faith' . . ."¹¹ Nyomarky continues:

. . . in that year [1934] rose the "Order State," which was more concerned with the solution of existing problems ("the principle of the execution of orders at any price") than with the utopian future. In the years after 1934 it became clear to all willing to see and listen that the Nazi state was not to be a socialist state, nor a state based on traditional ideas of authority, but a state based on the concept of order! Order became sacred regardless of its substance, and loyalty became equated with obedience.¹²

Nyomarky also discusses the roles of the Sturmabteilung (S.A.--Storm Troopers) and Schutzstaffel (S.S.--Elite Guard) in the Nazi state. The S.A. made demands upon Hitler in return for its support, and was thus a block to his total control. The S.S., however, was an entirely different type of organization:

The S.S. was based on the sanctity of orders regardless of substance; its code was unconditional obedience. . . . In their oath, S.S. men swore unqualified loyalty to the person of Adolf Hitler. . . . The S.S. was an organization of men who broke with all traditions and who followed their superiors blindly without questions or reservations . . . ; it was the ideal political expression of the Nazi state. The motto of its members, "My honor is my loyalty," revealed the emptiness of their fanaticism and made them ideal mercenaries of the totalitarian leader.¹³

The same assertion has been made about the Chinese regime by Lucian Pye. He writes, "Now, however, it seems relevant to ask in simple accounting terms whether the Chinese have not been paying an excessively high price simply for maintaining their political, that is, their control system, and whether control has not increasingly become an end in

itself and not a means."¹⁴ Barrington Moore states the general case:

Today the insistent demand for a commitment--commitment for its own sake--is part of a pervasive totalitarian atmosphere. In my city the trolley cars carry placards urging parents, "Give your child a faith to live by." Apparently any respectable faith will do. Its content does not matter.¹⁵

Basically, for the totalitarian regime, ideology is a "tool" of control much like a police system or an educational network. The content of the avowed ideology has little relevance to the primary goal of the leadership elite, the centralization of power. It may well be the case, some may suggest, that the ideology represents a set of secondary goals, which may be pursued only when they do not challenge the regime's power. But even this is anathema to the totalitarian elite; for if the elite allows some set of goals (even secondary ones) to exist legitimately they could potentially supply a framework for reasoning, a yardstick against which to measure the actions of the regime. Therefore the ideology must be kept ever meaningless, ever shifting and changing so that it becomes an instrument for total obedience rather than a set of positive goals. This is the essence of Orwell's "double-think." The world of 1984 is characterized by the lack of a real ideology; in that world "War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength."¹⁶ In The Trial, Kafka's hero obeys seemingly irrational orders, and he obeys them not because of a reasoned commitment to an ideology, but

because of a compulsion to obedience that not even he can rationally comprehend.

As has been stated earlier, no actual regime can fully satisfy the requirements of the totalitarian model and therefore no real regime has ever totally subjugated every pragmatic and utopian goal to the drive for total power. Perhaps this is why the works of Orwell, Kafka, Huxley, and others touch more closely upon the soul of totalitarianism than do the works of social scientists. In any case, the third basic characteristic of the ideal-type totalitarian regime is its subordination of all goals to the goal of centralization of power. Therefore, the degree to which any actual regime follows this course is an indication of the degree to which it approximates the totalitarian model.

This section has been concerned with general characteristics of the totalitarian regime (centralization of power, informal nature of the elite, and subordination of all ideological goals). In the next section, a set of lower-level propositions about the totalitarian model will be presented and discussed.

The discussion thus far has concerned three basic characteristics of the totalitarian model. Based upon these generalizations, several more specific characteristics of the totalitarian model can be deduced:

- (1) in order to insure total control, the totalitarian regime will attempt to keep a close and constant

surveillance of all activities of each of its citizens;

- (2) the totalitarian regimes will strive to destroy the autonomy of the individual;
- (3) the totalitarian regimes will strive to destroy the autonomy of all intermediate groups in the society.

The totalitarian regime can never feel absolutely secure in its desire to attain and retain total power. The mere possibility that somewhere, someone may be escaping the control of the regime is almost neurotically abhorrent to the regime. What is more, the fear of opposition grows rather than diminishes as the regime gains greater power. Most analysts of the totalitarian phenomenon have noted the tendency of such regimes to reach a state of near-paranoia as its real opposition is destroyed and it is faced with the task of finding new enemies. Because the fear of opposition is not terminal with the attainment of stability, the need for a surveillance network lasts for the life of the regime.

Of course, the regime desires to observe more than simple opposition. Since the regime seeks to control every aspect of life, it must observe everyone in all activities, in order to be sure that its control does not erode. Thus the need for an elaborate surveillance network, penetrating all areas of society. Rather than a single network, in fact, the totalitarian regime must maintain a set of surveillance networks, each separate from the others. These networks spy not only upon the masses,

but on each other. The reason for this is plain: a unitary observation network can easily acquire a will of its own and become a rival power center in the society. The networks must be strong enough to perform their functions vis-à-vis the masses, yet weak enough to pose a minimal threat to the totalitarian elite. Since an observation or police organization is itself an intermediate organization, the means used by the elite to both utilize and control it are the same as the means for utilizing and controlling all intermediate organizations. These procedures will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

The point to be made here is that the regime does maintain such a set of networks, and does strive to be informed about all activities. Ignazio Silone's Bread and Wine portrays this system:

It is well known (says Minorca) that the police have their informers in every section of every big factory, in every bank, in every big office. In every block of flats the porter is, by law, a stool pigeon for the police. In every profession, in every club, in every syndicate, the police have their ramifications. Their informers are legion, whether they work for a miserable pittance or whether their only incentive is the hope of advancement in their careers. This state of affairs spreads suspicion and distrust throughout all classes of the population. On this degradation of man into a frightened animal, who quivers with fear and hates his neighbor in his fear of discovery, the dictatorship is based. The real organization on which the system in this country is based is the secret manipulation of fear.¹⁷

Thus, even in Fascist Italy, generally considered quite far removed from the ideal totalitarian state, the

pervasiveness of the watchful eye of the regime was a major factor of the system.

Silone's passage also bears upon the second characteristic mentioned above, the totalitarian regime's desire to destroy the autonomy of the individual. As will be seen later, the totalitarian elite seeks to destroy the possibility of an individual relating to a societal group and thus acquiring a different set of perspectives than those supplied by the elite. Therefore, there are only two sources of direction for the individual left, his own self-reliance and the regime. What the regime desires is the destruction of the individual's self-reliance. Thus stripped of both inner dependency and the support of non-regime controlled social group relationships, the individual becomes totally dependent upon the elite for all direction and purpose in his life. The ideal totalitarian citizen lacks any critical capacities, any self-reliance, any ability to function away from the regime's control.

Else Frenkel-Brunswick discusses this psychological attack upon self-reliance:

For those who have fallen within the grasp of totalitarianism, rational argument is overshadowed by the image of an all-powerful, superhuman leader whose aura of strength, superiority, and glory afford surcease from feelings of isolation, frustration, and helplessness and whose doctrines provide an absolute and all-embracing answer to the conflicts and confusions of life and relief from the burdens of self-determination. These solutions, presented in a dogmatic, apodictic, and often inarticulate and unintelligible way, are formulated for the explicit purpose of bypassing the process of reasonable consideration and of finding their mark in those emotional and instinctual

processes which prompt to precipitant action. Reason, deliberation, and a manysided orientation toward objects, situations, or toward life itself then appear as irrelevant and thus as morbid.¹⁸

Thus the totalitarian man is as dependent upon the regime for his mental sustenance as a baby is upon its mother for physical sustenance. The first goal of a regime is therefore to break the individual loose from his old ties and frameworks for analysis. Moore states, "A totalitarian movement tries to acquire a considerable mass clientele, especially from individuals turned loose upon the world by the destruction of prior social bonds."¹⁹ Furthermore, as Hoffer,²⁰ Ortega y Gasset,²¹ and Fromm²² point out, the masses may not be committed to preserving their individual autonomies. Dostoievsky writes in The Brothers Karamazov, "Man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find some one quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born."²³ And Arthur Schlesinger adds, "Man longs to escape the pressures beating down on his frail individuality; and more and more, the surest means of escape seems to be to surrender that individuality to some massive, external authority."²⁴ Furthermore, Schlesinger realizes how totalitarianism feeds upon this need of some in society to relinquish their autonomy: ". . . the essential dynamism of totalitarianism is toward the unlimited domination and degradation and essential obliteration of the individual; . . ."²⁵ Hans Buchheim agrees that ". . . the totalitarian claim to power, . . . , is said to insist on treating people like objects,

never establishing a relationship with them but eager to rob them of their independence."²⁶

Thus, for those who seek to surrender their individuality, the totalitarian regime fills a need; but the regime itself must seek to destroy the autonomy of all its citizens, not merely those who are in agreement. In a democratic society, persons who seek this type of direction often find it in religion or in some other form of group which does not encompass the entire society. Therefore, those who prize individual autonomy are allowed to, in effect, live their lives outside the system. But the totalitarian state, in its drive for total power, cannot afford such a luxury. William Kornhauser states:

The non-elite also needs to form and maintain hyper-attachments to the elite in totalitarian society, for since people are given no other choice as to objects of attachment, they must find psychological sustenance in this manner or do without it.²⁷

John Kautsky adds, "The goal [of a totalitarian regime] is, again, to turn the population from a potential threat to the regime into its pliant tool. The insecure, powerless individual is to be satisfied by having himself and his interests associated with, and indeed submerged in, a large and powerful community."²⁸

What then is this human end product which the totalitarian regime works to produce? What is the "totalitarian man" in his ideal state? Schlesinger states:

The totalitarian man denies the testimony of his private nerves and conscience until they wither away before the authority of the Party and of history. He is the man persuaded of the absolute infallibility of

the Party's will and judgment, the agent who knows no misgivings and no scruples, the activist who has no hesitation in sacrificing life to history.²⁹

And Adorno presents a classical psychological profile of the totalitarian citizen:

Totalitarian society produces a psychological type that is self-alienated, like the mass man, but group-centered, like the tradition-directed person. Totalitarian society engenders this combination by denying any respect to the individual and by attaching all meaning to the group (especially the party in conjunction with the state). Possessing no legitimate privacy and few personalized models of conduct, the individual in totalitarian society sheds an unwanted sense of individuality and submits psychologically as well as behaviorally to the group. He does not regard himself as distinct from the group. Since the group is dominated by an elite possessed of a monopoly of power, submersion in the group entails submission to the elite. Extreme submission to the elite and extreme hostility toward outsiders are characteristics of the Totalitarian man.³⁰

Finally, Szamuely casts light upon the totalitarian man in his commentary upon the Soviet Union (whether or not his comments are actually true in the case of the Soviet Union, they are relevant to the totalitarian model):

Indeed, Lewis Carroll is an invaluable guide on a Sovietological expedition: a journey to a land where, for instance, a memory that only works backward is regarded as a pretty poor memory, and where most people have acquired the practice necessary to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast.³¹

Thus the totalitarian man is self-alienated, insecure, lacks self-confidence; in short, his only source of mental strength is the regime. Of course, the goal of the regime is to spread this state of dependency to all its citizens, no one must even consider opposing the directions of the elite. Furthermore, simple obedience is not enough.

Acquiescence is a characteristic of the authoritarian and not the totalitarian regime. The regime demands wholehearted and enthusiastic support from its citizens because grudging obedience indicates that the individual has sufficient internal resources to arrive at a conclusion not identical with the regime's. If an individual can reach independent conclusions, even though he does not act upon them, it indicates that the control and power of the regime is not total. John Weiss states, "Totalitarian dictatorships must manufacture approval, not merely outlaw disapproval."³² Szamuely illustrates the difference between autocratic obedience and totalitarian support in his description of one aspect of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union:

In other words, the striking difference between the present-day USSR and Stalin's Russia is that today if one keeps one's nose clean and one's mouth shut and does nothing then one is guaranteed (barring a genuine misunderstanding) not to go to gaol--whereas under Stalin millions of people were sent to slave labour camps literally for "doing nothing."³³

Finally, Deutsch quips that "In a democracy, . . . , everything that is not forbidden is permitted; under an authoritarian regime, everything that is not permitted is forbidden; under totalitarianism, everything that is not forbidden is compulsory."³⁴

The totalitarian regime is not willing to accept the grudging obedience of its citizens. It strives for the active enthusiasm of each individual in every venture. Simply accepting the dictates of the state may indicate

that the individual believes that he himself "knows better" but can do nothing about it. This potential willingness to rely upon one's own judgment is a threat to the total authority of the elite. Thus, the ideal totalitarian citizen is an individual who makes no decisions for himself, but supports every elite decision as if it were his own fondest wish.

The third and final characteristic to be discussed is the desire of the totalitarian regime to destroy the autonomy of all intermediate groups in the society. Kornhauser supplies an excellent description of what constitutes an intermediate group. He states:

We can conceive of all but the simplest societies as comprising three levels of social relations. The first level consists of highly personal or primary relations, notably the family. The third level contains relations inclusive of the whole population, notably the state. The second level comprises all intermediate relations, notably the local community, voluntary association, and occupational group. These intermediate relations function as links between the individual and his primary relations, on the one hand, and the state and other national relations, on the other hand. It must be emphasized that voluntary associations are not the only kind of intermediate relation; all organized relations that mediate between the family and the nation, such as local government and the local press, are classified as intermediate structures in the present study.³⁵

For the purposes of this paper, Kornhauser's conception of intermediate structures will be extended. Specifically, an intermediate structure or group is any structure or group that stands between the isolated individual and the totalitarian elite. Governmental units (even the state structure), voluntary associations, family units, and even

the totalitarian party itself are intermediate structures. In fact, any association of humans, except for the totalitarian elite, is an intermediate group.

The reader may be taken aback by such an inclusive definition, and may well wonder how a model totalitarian system can operate without these organizations. First, one must consider the totalitarian leader(s) (one may assume that a single dictator presides over the system, but the case holds just as well for an elite such as was described earlier). The citizen would receive all inputs from the leader and direct all outputs to the leader. Physical isolation of the individual would be unnecessary; he would simply not be cognizant of other humans around him. The leader would experience no difficulty in issuing directives to all the citizens; modern mass media can cope with that task. The problem is one of surveillance and decision making. How can the leader monitor the activities of all the citizens, learn of the objective needs of the system, or be sure that his orders are followed? What this system calls for is some sort of gigantic input-communications net. A super-computerized system which can collect and collate all incoming information and process it in accordance with the wishes of the leader without either burdening him with masses of details or adding any judgmental factor of its own. This is the ideal totalitarian state, each individual tied completely and exclusively to the leader.

Of course, the whole idea is a bit farfetched given the present level of technology, and some may suggest it is more political science-fiction than political science. Perhaps it is, but imagine a person attempting to explain the modern state and its reliance upon mass communications to an eighteenth-century audience. Pictures that float invisibly through the air would seem a bit speculative to a citizen of that era. Technology has a habit of overtaking speculation.

But if one leaves the world of speculation and returns to the present technological age, a different situation awaits him. Given the present level of technology, no leader or elite can possibly keep tabs on an entire society. Thus, unfortunately for the totalitarians, intermediate groups are necessary evils. They are necessary for surveillance, passing information up to the elite, and handling countless decision-making tasks too menial to warrant the attention of the elite. But they are evil because each one is a potential rival for power in the totalitarian system. This is the dilemma of the modern totalitarian state. To meet this dilemma the totalitarian state has devised a set of means to aid in utilizing these intermediate groups while minimizing their threat to the system.

The desire of the totalitarian regime to destroy the autonomy of intermediate organizations is a common feature of almost all conceptualizations of the totalitarian model. Friedrich and Brzezinski discuss the various

"islands of separateness (family, church, university, and military)" with which totalitarian regimes must cope.³⁶

They then conclude that "the dictatorship seeks to divide and rule in the most radical and extreme way: each human being should, for best effects, have to face the monolith that is the totalitarian rule as an isolated 'atom'."³⁷

In specific reference to Germany, Walsh states:

"The Church [in Nazi Germany] was an obstacle in the way of totalitarianism; hence it had to go. Total power cannot tolerate divided allegiance."³⁸ Sabine also discusses the totalitarian need to subjugate or destroy intermediate groups in Germany:

Except by permission of government there could be neither political parties, labor unions, industrial or trade associations. Except under its direction there could be neither publication nor public meeting. Education became its tool and in principle religion was also, . . . Leisure and recreation became agencies of propaganda and regimentation. No area of privacy remained that an individual could call his own and no association of individuals which was not subject to political control. . . .³⁹

Sabine then continues:

Totalitarianism undertook to organize and direct every phase of economic and social life to the exclusion of any area of permitted privacy or voluntary choice. But it is important to observe what this type of organization concretely meant. First and foremost it meant the destruction of great numbers of organizations that had long existed and that had provided agencies for economic and social activities. Labor unions, trade and commercial and industrial associations, fraternal organizations for social purposes or for adult education or mutual aid, which had existed on a voluntary basis and were self-governing, were either wiped out or were taken over and restaffed. Membership became virtually or actually compulsory, officers were selected according to the "leadership principle," and their procedures were decided not by the membership but by the outside power that the leader represented.⁴⁰

Thus the totalitarians begin their rule by destroying or capturing old forms of intermediate organization. This attitude of totalitarianism does not end with the seizure of power, however; the regime is constantly obsessed with these groups. Weber states: "If the community is an organic whole, deviations are corrupting and cannot be tolerated. All must act as one, shunning dissensions as intrinsically harmful, seeking a unity which alone can save in the providential person of one man."⁴¹ Intermediate groups are potential spawning grounds for just such dissensions. Alex Inkeles goes so far as to suggest that the preeminent goal of the totalitarian regime is not to subordinate the individual per se, but to subordinate the human associations of a society.⁴² He states:

. . . totalitarianism, in contrast to liberalism and pluralism, leaps over the individual to give full recognition and weight to the role of social institutions in the structure and functioning of society. It recognizes that one of the important aspects of social organization in the large-scale society is that the individual is related to the total social system primarily through the institutional networks in which he is enmeshed and it has therefore given special and primary emphasis to the subordination of the traditional human associations, the organizations and institutions, of which the individual is a member. This becomes the chief tool for its ultimate subordination of the individual to the state. Totalitarianism recognizes that so long as certain of its crucial membership units are not themselves subordinated to the demands of the central authority, the individual himself may to that degree be immune to full subordination.⁴³

John Kautsky also recognizes the vital need to control intermediate organizations. He states that "The new organizations, all run by the regime, thus become organs of supervision."⁴⁴ The regime in fact encourages the

individual to participate in these controlled organizations in order to keep him "out of trouble." This, of course, relates to a point made earlier; the totalitarian regime cannot accept grudging obedience; the citizen must actively demonstrate his support. These organizations become the channels through which such activity is directed. Barker similarly recognizes this use of organizations. He writes:

The absolute on which it [a totalitarian government] is based must be carried into every domain of life--the social no less than the political: religion, education, economics, the methods of sport and the uses of leisure, as well as politics proper. Any form of group for any activity is a potential rival; it is a possible magnet of loyalty, which, however insignificant it may seem in comparison with the great loadstone, may none the less succeed in deflecting the quivering point of allegiance. From early life, the individual must be taught to point true: he will be enlisted early in the Octobrists or the Balilla or the Hitler Youth: his games, his holidays, the very life of his family, will be drawn into the field of the party, the party-State, the leader, the ultimate absolute.⁴⁵

Several societies have attempted to construct the type of organizational system outlined above. John Weiss discusses the Italian experience:

The Italian Fascists created a vast network of ideological and paramilitary leisure-time organizations, including the famous Dopolavoro (after-work) paralleling the Nazi Strength Through Joy. Only so could they frustrate the development of spontaneous cultural and leisure activities. Such activities would, if allowed to arise freely, express the independent and hence dangerous varieties of individual, group, or class experience. Normally, each group or sub-group in society can draw upon its own social or work experience as a model from which to judge and accept or reject what it is told or taught by outsiders.⁴⁶

The same holds true for the Nazi regime. Neumann describes the situation of non-central governments:

The totalitarian theory was also the instrument for co-ordinating all public activities. Absolute control from the top--the famous Gleichschaltung (synchronization) of federal, state, provincial, and municipal activities--was justified in the doctrine of the state's total right and total power. In contrast to the pluralistic and federalistic Weimar Republic, the new state could not and would not brook the existence of autonomous public bodies within it;
 . . .⁴⁷

Kornhauser writes, in relation to the Soviet Union, that:

The intermediate structure of a totalitarian society, on the other hand, helps to prevent access to the elite by virtue of its domination by the elite. By means of intermediate groups instituted and controlled from above, the totalitarian regime is able to keep the population in a state of mobilization. Such organizations as Soviet trade unions have the primary function of activating and channelizing the energies of workers in directions determined by the regime. If there were no controlled intermediate organizations in all spheres of society, people would be free to regroup along lines independent of the regime. That is why it is of the utmost importance to totalitarian regimes to keep the population active in these controlled groups. Totalitarian regimes search out all independent forms of organizations in order to transform them or destroy them. In certain other societies, the natural decline of independent forms of association prepares the way for the rise of totalitarian movements.⁴⁸

The preceding discussion has attempted to highlight the role of the intermediate organization in a totalitarian state. That is, it is necessary as a tool for the control of society but it is dangerous as a potential opponent of the totalitarian elite. Ionescu puts it directly:

In an ideal Apparat, or for that matter totalitarian state, the function of all these bodies [intermediate groups] is that of "transmission belts" and of agencies of state-control. But then it can be said that the

history of any "ideal" Apparatus or totalitarian state is precisely the history of the failure of the central "monolithic" power to prevent institutional checks from being reformed.⁴⁹

This is the basic dilemma of totalitarian states: how to use intermediate groups but yet retain complete control over them.

It is the contention of this paper that the totalitarian state has an arsenal of weapons to use in order to try and alleviate this dilemma, since by its very nature it cannot be completely solved. These procedures or weapons for both utilization and control are the tests by comparison to which this paper hopes to gain some insight into the usefulness of the totalitarian model for studying Communist China. They are, furthermore, the least general of the propositions thus far presented and are therefore the most useful measures against which the behavior of a regime can be empirically tested (although the reader must keep in mind that they are but a single set of totalitarian characteristics and there are many other sets which deal with different relations and activities of the totalitarian regime). These procedures of the totalitarian regime for dealing with intermediate structures are presented below.

A. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will:

1. Destroy the old-style intermediate organizations which cannot be utilized by the regime;
2. Infiltrate and control the old-style intermediate organizations which are of some use to the regime;

3. Create a new set of organizations which are totally the creatures of the totalitarian elite.

B. The totalitarian elite will attempt to prevent organizations from becoming identified with specific interests in the society and thus being a potential focus for individuals who share that interest. The elite will do this by:

1. Attempting to prevent institutionalization.

Huntington defines institutionalization as, ". . . the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."⁵⁰ He goes on to state that the level of institutionalization is defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of an organization.⁵¹ The totalitarian regime attempts to minimize the level of all four of the above measures by constantly keeping organizations in a state of flux; that is, organizations will be created and destroyed rapidly because the longer an organization exists the more likely it becomes that members of the organization will develop a vested interest in it; therefore, the life expectancy of an organization will be very brief as compared to that of another society;

2. Attempting to separate leadership from expertise in intermediate organizations--leadership will be vested in persons politically loyal to the regime

rather than persons who possess the necessary expertise to run the organization or who represent an area of knowledge which that organization was created to speak for (in China, of course, this is subsumed under the "red-expert" controversy).

C. The totalitarian regime will seek to keep organizations weak and insecure by maintaining confused lines of authority:

1. Various organizations will all be charged with the same area of operation and thus the organizations will act as a check upon each other (this is, in effect, a totalitarian twist to the Madisonian argument of Federalist #10. That is, since groups cannot be abolished, they should be diverse enough to check one another);
2. The regime will periodically and arbitrarily shift the locus of activity and/or authority from one organization to another in order to prevent any one organization from acquiring a sense of legitimacy born of past performance, in the eyes of the citizens; also, it helps perpetuate the totalitarian atmosphere by denying to citizens sure knowledge of where authority lies, thus helping to keep the citizen in a perpetual state of flux and insecurity as well as adding to his general feeling of helplessness;

3. The regime will constantly set up a gallery of figureheads--this will serve many of the same purposes as (2) above, but also the figureheads are available as scapegoats for the failures of the regime, thus preserving the "infallibility" of the elite; these figureheads are usually placed in positions of prominence in intermediate organizations, often as a direct prelude to their disgrace.
- D. The regime will try to base organizations on a fictional shared interest rather than a real one. Thus, sports and leisure clubs are fabricated to replace real organizations. Mass groups based on characteristics such as "motherhood" are encouraged as replacements for organizations which are centered about an actual and immediate felt need of its members. This lessens the attachment which the member will build for the group.

This section has attempted to analyze the dilemma of totalitarian regimes in their relations with intermediate groups (i.e., utilization vs. control). It has further presented a set of propositions outlining the procedures which the totalitarian regime uses in order to ease this dilemma. Now the research will focus upon a set of intermediate groups in Communist China vis-à-vis their adherence to these procedures and by doing so hopefully will help determine the usefulness of the totalitarian model for understanding Chinese activities.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III

MINOR PARTIES

In Chapter II it was stated that an intermediate group was one which existed in the area between the isolated individual and the ruling elite. In China this includes the state apparatus, the army, voluntary associations, family, the party itself, etc. It is obviously beyond the scope of this research to investigate all of the above forms of intermediate-organization. Therefore, this work will focus upon only a specific subset of these intermediate organizations, consisting of three separate types. The first two of these three types of organizations are what Townsend refers to as "secondary associations." They constitute ". . . the secondary association which is organized, at least theoretically, on the basis of the common interests, occupations, or class viewpoints of its members. With no significant exceptions, these organizations are national associations with branches at various local levels and operate again theoretically, on the principle of voluntary membership."¹ The types of secondary associations to be examined are the democratic (or minor) parties and the mass organizations. The third type of group to be

examined in this work is the mass campaign, which is an extremely ephemeral form of mass organization.

There are several reasons for choosing these three types of groups. First, most of these organizations are outside what is commonly considered, in Western governmental systems, the political or governmental sphere of activity. The minor parties, which would play a political role in a democratic state, play a non-political role in China. These groups are referred to as minor parties or democratic parties. They are, in fact, neither parties, in the Western sense, nor democratic. However, they theoretically represent the continuation of pre-Communist political parties and are also theoretically part of a United Front Government with the Communist Party. The Communist regime itself invariably refers to them as minor or democratic parties and the author feels it unwise to create new terminology for these groups since such terminology would only confuse the reader as to the object of references. Furthermore, this chapter will make amply clear the "true" nature of these groups. Therefore, the regime's behavior towards these groups illustrates the spread of elite activity, in a totalitarian state, beyond the limits of normal political or governmental roles. It illustrates the extension of the elite's desire for control over all areas of human activity. Because these groups are, in this sense, far removed from the regime, an analysis

of them should demonstrate most clearly the operation of those characteristics presented at the end of Chapter II.

These three types of groups can, in effect, be arranged along a continuum of totalitarianism. That is, the groups can be rank ordered so that each group more closely conforms to the totalitarian demands than the preceding group.

The analysis begins with the democratic, or minor, parties which existed in China from the inception of the regime (or earlier) until the onset of the Cultural Revolution. There were eight democratic parties which, along with the Communist Party itself, formed the United Front which was the "official" governmental ruling coalition from 1949 until the Cultural Revolution. The majority of these parties pre-dated the Communist takeover and thus had an existence independent of the ruling elite.² Many of the parties represented entrenched and vested interests. Because these parties represented interests which were independent of the regime, it was necessary for the regime to remold the organizations so that they would no longer be representative of special groups, but rather would be channels for control of these groups. That is, they would be a tool for the elite's domination of that segment of society which they supposedly represented.

It is primarily because the parties represented "real" interests and had power bases which pre-dated the regime (thus they could be viewed by some as legitimate

sources of authority, independent of the ruling elite) that they, of all the groups being considered here, were furthest removed from the ideal totalitarian intermediate organization. Chapter IV will discuss how the minor parties were successively co-opted, dominated, totally controlled, and finally discarded by the ruling elite of China.

The second type of organization which will be discussed in this work is the mass organization. These organizations are closer than the minor parties to the type of intermediate organization preferred by a totalitarian regime because they are creatures of the ruling elite. Specifically, they were constructed by the regime to serve its ends and thus have a lesser claim to legitimacy as an actual representative group than do the minor parties. Furthermore, the mass organizations themselves can be broken down into two major types:

- (1) those organizations which ostensibly represent some real and immediate interest of a group of persons in the society (e.g., one of the trade unions);
- (2) those organizations which represent a sham interest because the bases upon which they are organized are either (a) too broad to include immediate interests (e.g., the Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China), or (b) the bases are totally fictional and created by the regime (e.g., the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

These organizations all served the regime as channels of communication, information, and control. Furthermore, as Chapter IV will indicate, they were more "totalitarian" in their nature than the minor parties because they were more diffuse in their interests, more the creatures of the regime, and more transient.

At the time of the initiation of the cultural revolution there were 120 mass organizations and minor parties in Communist China.³ Table 2 divides these organizations along the lines outlined above.

TABLE 2

MINOR PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Minor Parties

China Assn. for Promoting Democracy
 China Democratic National Construction Assn.
 Chinese Peasant's and Worker's Democratic Party
 Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang
 Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League
 China Democratic League
 China Chih Kung Tang
 Chiu San Society

Mass Organizations

"Real" Basis

All-China Federation of Handicraft Cooperatives
 All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles,
 includes:
 Union of Chinese Artists
 Union of Chinese Cinema Workers
 Union of Chinese Drama Workers
 Union of Chinese Musicians
 Union of Chinese Photographers
 Union of Chinese Writers
 Union of Chinese Chuyi Artists
 China Dancing Research Assn.

TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, includes:
China Agricultural and Forestry Workers' Trade Union
China Coal Miners' Trade Union
China Construction Workers' Trade Union
China Education Workers' Trade Union
China Engineering Workers' Trade Union
China Financial and Commercial Workers' Trade Union
China Geology Workers' Trade Union
China Heavy Industry Workers' Trade Union
China Light Industry Workers' Trade Union
China Petroleum Workers' Trade Union
China Postal and Telecommunications Workers' Trade Union
China Railway Workers' Trade Union
China Seamen's Trade Union
China Textile Industry Workers' Trade Union
China Water Conservation and Electric Power Workers' Trade Union
All-China Journalists Assn.
China Scientific and Technical Assn., includes:
China Aeronautical Engineering Society
China Agricultural Mechanization Society
China Agronomy Society
China Anatomy Society
China Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Society
China Anti-Tuberculosis Society
China Architectural Society
China Astronomy Society
China Automation Society
China Bacteriology Society
China Botany Society
China Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Society
China Civil Engineering Society
China Crop Research Society
China Dynamics Society
China Electronics Society
China Entomology Society
China Forestry Society
China Geodesy and Cartography Society
China Geography Society
China Geology Society
China Geophysics Society
China Horticulture Society
China Hydraulic Engineering Society
China Mathematics Society
China Mechanical Engineering Society

TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

China Medical Society
 China Metallurgy Society
 China Meteorology Society
 China Nursing Society
 China Oceanography Society
 China Paleontology Society
 China Pedology Society
 China Pharmacy Society
 China Physics Society
 China Physiology Society
 China Plant Pathology Society
 China Shipbuilding Engineering Society
 China Silicate Society
 China Textile Engineering Society
 China Water Conservation Society
 China Zoology Society
 China Welfare Institute for the Blind and Deaf Mute
 National Red Cross Society of China
 Political Science and Law Assn. of China
 Religious Organizations, includes:
 Chinese Buddhist Assn.
 Chinese Catholic Patriotic Assn.
 Chinese Islamic Assn.
 Chinese Taoist Assn.
 National Committee of Protestant Churches in
 China for Realization of Self-Administration

"Broad" Based

All-China Athletic Federation
 All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce
 All-China Returned Overseas Chinese Assn.
 All-China Students' Federation
 All-China Youth Federation
 China Philosophy Society
 China Welfare Institute
 Chinese People's National Committee in Defense
 of Children
 Chinese People's Relief Assn.
 Women's Federation of the People's Republic
 of China

"Sham" Basis

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of China
 China Asia-Africa Society
 China Committee for the Promotion of Inter-
 national Trade
 China Welfare Institute
 Chinese People's Assn. for Cultural Relations
 with Foreign Countries

TABLE 2 (cont'd.)

Chinese People's Committee for World Peace
 Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
 Friendship Assns., includes:

China-Albania
 China-Africa
 China-Bulgaria
 China-Burma
 China-Cambodia
 China-Ceylon
 China-Cuba
 China-Czechoslovakia
 China-Germany
 China-Hungary
 China-India
 China-Indonesia
 China-Iraq
 China-Japan
 China-Korea
 China-Latin America
 China-Mongolia
 China-Nepal
 China-Pakistan
 China-Rumania
 China-United Arab Republic
 China-Vietnam
 Sino-Soviet

For complete, but undifferentiated, listing, see Vincent King, "Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China," M.I.T. Center for International Studies Monograph, January 1966, Appendix.

The third type of intermediate organization which will be discussed is the mass campaign. These campaigns have been a feature of Chinese politics throughout the Communist period. They have, however, become more refined as time passed. Similarly, as the techniques of utilizing the mass campaign developed, the regime began to rely more heavily upon them, generally as a replacement for other forms of intermediate organization.

The mass campaigns have several features which make them singularly desirable for a totalitarian regime. First, they lack a strict and formalized hierarchy, thus discouraging the entrenchment of power. Second, they are extremely transitory. Therefore, they do not have the ability to acquire a sense of legitimacy, in perhaps a Burkian manner, in the eyes of the public. Furthermore, the campaigning flits from topic to topic at a moment's notice, thus decreasing the citizen's sense of security and his ability to build a stable set of priorities, upon which he can make rational decisions outside the framework of regime control. In effect, the use of the mass campaign in China comes the closest to any actual regime's utilization of an intermediate group in an advanced totalitarian fashion. Chapter V will focus upon the role of the mass campaign in China.

The minor parties, the mass organizations, and the mass campaigns all are vital (or were vital) in the Chinese governmental framework. Each represents a type of organization which is distinct in its relation to a totalitarian regime. The following three chapters will be devoted to studying these three types of groups and evaluating their positions vis-à-vis the Chinese ruling elite. Not only will each be evaluated in terms of its own relationship to the totalitarian principles outlined earlier, but arguments will be put forward to support the contention that they may be rank ordered in terms of their approximation to the

ideal totalitarian intermediate organization (culminating, theoretically, in the elimination of all such groups whatsoever). Also, evidence will be presented to indicate that the Chinese regime has been moving, over time, to replace "less totalitarian" groups with "more totalitarian" groups. The Cultural Revolution is a watershed event in this movement and will be examined as such.

Of course, the intermediate groups mentioned above were not the only ones subjected to elite controls during the 1949-1965 period. The governmental bureaucratic system underwent drastic revision after 1949. In the Party's control of the bureaucracy one can see the use of many control devices applied in other areas. Barnett discusses several of the control devices used for the purpose of guiding the bureaucracy:

- (1) The Party hierarchy itself has functional units parallel to the government, almost a "shadow government." These units exert leadership over their counterparts in the bureaucracy;
- (2) Party members almost monopolize key leadership posts at all levels of bureaucracy. Furthermore, they are subject to Party orders as well as governmental directions;
- (3) All major central governmental bodies have "Party Fractions." That is, the high ranking Party members-bureaucrats comprise a clique which is responsible for assuring that Party directives are implemented;

- (4) Party branches and committees exist within all levels of the bureaucracy;
- (5) Party directed intermediate mass organizations (Young Communist League, Labor Union, and Women's Association) serve as "transmission belts" and monitoring agencies for non-Party workers at all levels of the bureaucracy;
- (6) The use of political study sessions which all workers attend. These meetings present the Party line to non-members and also provide group criticism and self-criticism for non-Party workers who are not performing adequately.⁴

Many of the above techniques will appear again as they operate vis-à-vis the other intermediate organizations. The Army was also subjected to reorganizations, and control devices were installed in it. Alexander George⁵ and Samuel Griffith⁶ discuss these devices and the subsequent conflicts which arose in the army between the forces of professionalism and those of control. Similarly, the Cultural Revolution was, at least in part, directed against entrenched interests in the Party itself, and was an attempt by the totalitarian elite to reimpose controls over some organization (the Party) which had become a viable separate power-base.

The Bureaucracy, the Army, and the Party were traditionally the three major control organizations in Communist China and they were all subject to intermediate group controls. However, it is far beyond the scope of

this research to discuss at length the development of each. Therefore, although all of these organizations are related to the research, this paper will focus upon the three types of intermediate organizations mentioned at the outset: minor parties, mass organizations, and mass campaigns. By studying these groups one can discover relationships to the elite which will be of benefit in studying the Party, Army, and Bureaucracy.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the types of evidence to be utilized in this investigation. As noted earlier, reliable quantitative data about the functions of the Chinese system are all but impossible to obtain. There are two basic types of evidence that will be used in this research. First, the pronouncements of the Chinese government itself may be examined for clues to activities within the regime. The American Consulate General in Hong Kong publishes a Survey of the China Mainland Press five times weekly, as well as Extracts from China Mainland Magazines at irregular intervals. Various other governmental agencies also publish translations of Chinese documents.⁷ Also, the Chinese regime itself puts out foreign language material, such as the Peking Review. Analyses of these types of materials must be somewhat cautious. The regime (and sometimes the American translators) have their own axes to grind. Furthermore, the regime writes in a jargon all its own and one cannot always take things at face value. Also, the Chinese system is so

large and often diverse that sometimes the provincial organs lag behind the central regime in their pronouncements. This is an especially important consideration since much of the information passed to the West comes through Hong Kong and is overly influenced by the nature of the southern provinces. Whenever such material is used, the circumstances surrounding its release will be kept in mind by the author.

Another source of evidence, especially important to this type of study, is secondary sources. This paper is not an attempt to conduct an overall investigation of the Chinese system. It is concerned with relating the operations of a small part of that system to a theoretical model. Thus the opinions and evaluations of individuals who are primarily committed to studying the Chinese system are to be weighed heavily. Also, the preponderance of useful material on China is in the form of reportage. Outsiders' eyewitness accounts of the system in operation can be extremely valuable.

In conclusion it is necessary to emphasize three points. First, it is the relevance of the model and not the model itself that is being examined. Second, only a specific subset of intermediate organizations in China will be discussed. Third, the evidence to be used is often fragmentary because of the nature of the Chinese regime. With these points in mind, one can proceed with the actual investigation.

The first section of the research will deal with the role of the minor parties, as intermediate organizations, in Communist China. As indicated in the preceding section, the Chinese elite has progressed from the utilization of "less" totalitarian organizations to the reliance upon organizations which more closely conform to the dictates of a totalitarian regime. The minor parties, in this context, represent a starting point from which to begin the analysis. That is, they represented, at the time of the Communist takeover, the greatest acceptable locus of power outside of the regime itself. As stated earlier, they were founded and initially organized by persons outside the elite. It will be demonstrated that the objective skills and talents which these persons possessed were necessary for the operation of the regime and thus they had to be utilized while at the same time these persons could not be allowed to build a separate power base. As stated in Chapter II, the intermediate organization in a totalitarian state is a necessary evil. It is necessary for the operation of the state at this stage of technology, and yet it inherently possesses the potentiality for the proliferation of power, the greatest threat to the regime itself. The Chinese regime, in order to cope with this problem, utilized some of the control devices outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II. Specifically, they infiltrated the leadership of these organizations, they attempted to keep the parties insecure by shifting and confusing their respective roles

in the society, they severely regulated the membership policies of the parties, and they generally maintained an atmosphere of unease within the minor parties. In short, rather than serving as representatives of the societal groups which they ostensibly represented, the minor parties served, as is necessary in a totalitarian regime, as control devices through which the ruling elite could monitor and direct the activities of certain elements of the society while at the same time preventing these elements from collecting the means to function as a legitimate power base.

The analysis will be broken into time periods which correspond to qualitatively different historical epochs. The first period (1949-1955) was the period during which the Communist regime most critically felt the need for the services of the members of these minor parties and thus encouraged their existence and relative stability. The second period (1956) was that of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, during which the restrictions were eased and the active and unencumbered support of the members sought. The third period (1957) witnessed the severe rectification campaign which, as theoretically postulated in this paper, demonstrated the inability of a totalitarian regime to tolerate a proliferation of power. The fourth period (1958-1965) was one in which the role of the parties was "normalized." That is, the controls placed upon them were tightened while utilization of their members was increased.

In this period they moved in the direction of becoming more the creatures of the totalitarian state. The final period commenced with the Cultural Revolution and will be discussed in a separate section. This period can be distinguished not by the role that the parties played, but rather by the fact that they passed silently from scene, with hardly a bit of debris. Significantly, this period marks the replacement of the minor parties with other forms of intermediate organization more suitable to a totalitarian regime.

The Early Period: 1949-1955

Between 1949 and 1964 China was theoretically governed by a coalition of parties consisting of the Communist Party and eight democratic parties. These democratic parties were by no means "mass" organizations, as the membership figures presented in this chapter will indicate, but were, in effect, representative groups for certain non-revolutionary elements in Chinese society. Even the most naive of political observers could not mistake the utterly subservient role which these parties played. Thomas states, "In contrast [to the CPC] . . . , the other parties associated with the Peking regime are none of them mass parties, nor do they control any of the real sources of power in China today."⁸

Before embarking upon a discussion of the development of these organizations, it is perhaps advisable briefly to acquaint the reader with each of the eight

democratic parties. The most important of the parties was the China Democratic League. This party represented mainly cultural and educational elements, primarily the bourgeoisie intellectuals. The Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee was composed largely of disaffected KMT Party members and was a vehicle of the Communist Party in attempts at converting Nationalist Chinese both on the mainland and on Taiwan. The China Democratic National Construction Association was representative of the "national bourgeoisie" and was an instrument of the CPC in the socialization of industry and commerce. The China Association for the Promotion of Democracy was the organization of teachers, editors, publishers, and cultural workers in general. The China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party was not at all representative of peasants and workers. Rather, it was composed largely of persons in the medical and public health fields. The China Chih Kung Party was organized specifically to enlist the aid of overseas Chinese in the development, primarily economic, of the mainland. The Chiu San Society was composed of scientists and scientific workers. Finally, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League was a group which was dedicated to convincing the native Taiwanese to support the CPC and oppose the Nationalists.⁹

Although there were a few other minor democratic parties during the very earliest years of the Communist regime, they were soon disbanded or amalgamated into one

of the above eight parties. It is the nature of these democratic parties and their changing roles in the "United Front" government which will be discussed in this section.

Origins of the Democratic Parties

Most of the democratic parties were initially organized during, or immediately following, the conflict with Japan in the 1930-40's. For example, the China Democratic League (CDL) was founded after the New Fourth Incident of 1941.¹⁰ It was originally named the League of Democratic Political Groups (or Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties, depending upon translation) and was, in fact, an amalgamation of several separate political organizations, including: (1) Comrades Association for National Unification and Construction (founded in January 1940), (2) National Salvation Association, (3) Third Party, (4) All-China Professional Educational Society, (5) Rural Construction Group, (6) Northeast Revolutionary Comrades Association, (7) National Socialist Party (organized by Chang Chun-mai in 1931),¹¹ and the Youth Party.¹² Its leader and organizer was Chang Lan, President of Chengtu University.¹³ In 1944, it was more tightly organized and renamed the China Democratic League. Of its early role, Thomas states, "Representative chiefly of liberal and leftist intellectuals and other middle-class elements, it had attempted to function as a 'third force' between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and had

called for a coalition government and for political and economic reforms."¹⁴

With the outbreak of civil war in 1946, the CDL moved further to the left. The more right-wing elements of the party separated themselves, the Youth Party breaking away in October 1945, and the National Socialist Party leaving in early 1947. Finally, in October-November 1947, the CDL was officially outlawed by the Kuomintang for allegedly being an accessory to "bandits." The official Nationalist history states, "The China Democratic League . . . composed mostly of petty-bourgeoise intelligensia who, dissatisfied with the Nationalist rule and instigated by the Communists, secretly collaborated with the Communist Party and did whatever possible to weaken the prestige of the National government."¹⁵ The CDL, now led by Chang Lan, Lo Lung-chi, and Shen Chun-ju was reorganized in Hong Kong and became publicly avowed supporters of the Communist Party. With the victory of the Communists on the mainland, the CDL was invited to participate in a new "United Front" government.

The Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee was organized in January of 1948 in Hong Kong by Marshal Li Chi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. Closely allied to this party were the Kuomintang Association for Promoting Democracy and San Min Chu I Comrades Association.¹⁶ This group consisted of critics of the KMT leadership who had been expelled from the party. The KRC was later to serve as an organizing

"magnet" for remnants of the KMT who chose not to flee the mainland following the Communist victory. The other democratic parties had either also been organized during the anti-Japanese period (except for the Chih Kung Party, which dates back to the nineteenth century), or were quickly "discovered" by the CPC upon its assumption of power.

When the Communists took over the government they were already somewhat committed to a United Front Policy. This had been their slogan for over a decade "in the course of their criticism of the one-party government of the Kuomintang, and it had a powerful emotional appeal in Chinese politics."¹⁷ This is not to suggest, however, that the CPC did not wish to construct a united front government for such was definitely not the case. The CPC had many valid reasons for desiring the assistance, voluntary or otherwise, of the democratic parties, and these reasons can be uncovered by examining the roles and duties of the democratic parties during this early era.

The Roles of the Democratic Parties: 1949-1955

During the period from 1949 to 1955, the democratic parties in China were used by the CPC for three major purposes: (1) to obtain support for the CPC from elements of society which would not usually be considered sympathetic to communist goals, (2) to "control" certain elements of society which might be dangerous to the regime, and (3) to

utilize bourgeois and white-collar, bureaucratic elements without contaminating the Communist Party by offering them membership, especially in the case of government employment. Of course, the third CPC desire was probably the origin of the "red and expert" controversies which were to trouble the regime for many years. However, this problem lies beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that the possibility of such a conflict either did not occur to the Chinese, or the costs of the conflict were insufficient to outweigh the advantages to be gained by the Party from making use of the democratic parties in this manner.

As stated above, the CPC used the democratic parties as a means of obtaining support from nonrevolutionary elements of the society. Thomas states:

. . . in the early stages of political and economic stabilization, calling as it did for the broadest possible collaboration of the former Nationalist governmental bureaucracy, and the co-operation of business and intellectual elements generally, a government containing these middle parties could more readily attract and reassure, as well as give a sense of participation in the government, to such groups, than could a purely Communist regime.¹⁸

Barnett comments upon this Communist ability to enlist the support of these parties, and consequently of the social elements which supported the parties, "The members of these groups are given an opportunity to participate in political affairs, and although they have little authority or power, the mere fact that they are put on

committees and called upon for consultation makes many of them feel they are playing an important political role."¹⁹ Clubb also notes this role of the democratic parties and he asserts that "the democratic parties are to assist the CCP line, educating and guiding the people the way the CCP wants them to go, mobilizing their enthusiasms and energies for the work of 'socialist construction.'"²⁰

Of course, in order to use these parties as bases for support, the CPC had to be sure of its control over the parties. Aside from the obvious and heavy-handed physical controls available, the CPC depended mainly upon control by means of introducing its own members into the democratic parties' organizations. The China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, in demonstrating its loyalty to the Communist leadership of the United Front, requested, "An appropriate number of Chinese Communist Party members and New China Youth League members . . . should be won over to our party in order to strengthen the leadership of our party."²¹

During the 1949-1955 period, the CPC encouraged the democratic parties to expand (although the CPC specified from which elements of society each party could draw its new members) while it increased its control over the parties. In doing so, the CPC built "organized support and share responsibility for implementing its current program on a broadened basis, at the same time reserving to itself a decisive policy-making role--a combination

which cannot help but be a source of great strength to the regime."²²

The second function which the democratic parties performed for the CPC during the early period of Communist rule was that of utilizing the services of the bourgeoisie and the ex-Kuomintang bureaucrats, without allowing them to join and somehow "contaminate" the CPC itself. In 1950 the Party was attempting to purify its membership and "proletarianize" itself. However, it still needed the cooperation of the bourgeoisie if it desired to retain any "new democratic" features, such as limited private enterprise. Therefore, instead of incorporating these persons into the Party, the CPC preferred to work through the democratic parties. In 1951 The Economist reported that the Communists "need to retain and consolidate the support they had during the civil war from these classes, who were inspired by disgust at Kuomintang corruption and fiscal incompetence and also by nationalist motives--but they do not want them in large numbers inside the Communist party."²³

The third duty of the middle parties during this period was to serve as a controlling device for elements of society which had the possibility of becoming troublesome to the regime. Once again, the Communists were unwilling to incorporate them into the Party itself and they therefore made use of the middle parties as supervising agents. Clubb states that the minor parties were

"something in the nature of isolation wards for leading members of different social groups who, deemed unsuitable for CCP membership because they might infect that pure organization, nevertheless could not safely be left to go their own way since they might provide focuses for troublesome dissent."²⁴

The "Hundred Flowers" Period: 1956

In 1956 the CPC launched a campaign to permit, and even encourage, all elements of Chinese society to submit constructive criticism of the regime. Boorman writes: "An interlude of liberalisation in ideological controls came during the 'hundred flowers' campaign launched in mid-1956 with the explicit aim of giving intellectuals and 'cultural workers' a greater sense of participation in the tasks of 'Socialist construction' and of leavening the literary scene with the fresh forms of expression."²⁵

In the realm of political affairs, the democratic parties became a rallying point for anti-administration commentary. Lo Lung-chi, vice chairman of the China Democratic League, came forth very early in the movement and questioned the good faith of the CPC. Lo proposed the formation of a United Front organization to "inspect excesses during . . . past [anti-rightist] movements; this was to provide a guarantee that people who dared to 'bloom' and 'contend' would not be subjected to attack and retaliation."²⁶ It will later be evident that Lo's questioning of the government's intentions was extremely insightful.

However, Lo continued to criticize the CPC during the period, in spite of any doubts he might have entertained. Lo questioned the role of the democratic parties in the CPC dominated governmental framework. He acknowledged that these parties had participated in government work, but he stated: "How to make their positions real, and not merely nominal, is a question. What embarrasses the democratic parties and groups most is the lack of information required for the study of policies." He continues:

At the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the democratic parties and groups cannot voice any effective opinion on matters under discussion because they are not informed in advance of the matters to be discussed, and at the moment of discussion they have no time to study them. This is a problem of making the democratic parties and groups really, and not only nominally, consultant.²⁷

Another middle party figure, Yen Hsin-min, also criticized the CPC and complained that "the democratic parties today still do not possess the material basis for equality (with the CPC); all they have is political and legal equality, which is not genuine and actual equality."²⁸ Franklin Houn, in an analysis of this period, states that much of the minor party criticism was directed at the aloofness of the Communist bureaucracy; and the criticism seemed to "reflect a sense of frustration, on the part of the former leadership group, over their exclusion from the conduct of public affairs."²⁹

Of course, the minor parties were not the only centers of governmental criticism; student groups,

scientific, literary, and academic elements also voiced their often extreme displeasure with certain aspects of the CPC. The Party was taken aback by the volume and vehemence of the criticism, and the CPC leadership decided to "clamp the lid down" on the non-revolutionary elements and therefore launched a major rectification campaign. An important factor of the "hundred flowers" period is that during this time, the democratic parties, and especially the CDL, attempted to act as true intermediate organizations by articulating the demands of the societal groups which they represented. Their failure to perform this function for an extended period illustrates the inability of a totalitarian regime to allow multiple centers of power, no matter how weak, to arise.

The Rectification Campaign: 1957

In 1957 the CPC launched a major rectification campaign aimed at suppressing the critics who had come forth during the "hundred flowers" period. A great portion of this campaign was directed at the democratic parties, who were viewed as a major source of support for the anti-regime critics. In 1957 Teng Hsiao-p'ing delivered a "Report on the Rectification Campaign" to a session of the eighth Central Committee in which he stated:

The rightists in the various democratic parties and groups functioned as the core of the rightist attacks, because the people have granted them a certain political status and they could make use of their legal positions to issue orders and enlist followers. The democratic parties are the product of the period of

democratic revolution and although a number of their members have moved to the left during the socialist revolution, most of them have not yet changed their bourgeoisie standpoint for that of the proletariat. Therefore, the rightists at one time got the upper hand in many organizations of the democratic parties.³⁰

A pro-Nationalist publication, discussing the attack of the CPC upon the parties and rightists, states: "Wild animals can become dangerous as they did in 1957; the bulk of those who were then branded rightists came from the ranks of the minor parties. They were buffeted, kicked at, and beaten down, and when tamed put back again in the show to give better performances than ever."³¹ Even putting the colorful rhetoric aside, it is fairly obvious that the CPC was committed to new measures designed to provide further control, and to provide retribution, over the democratic parties. The CPC moved in three areas to achieve these goals. First, they moved against individuals in the middle parties who had voiced criticism of the regime. Second, they took measures concerning the organization of the parties designed to prevent any increase of political power on the part of the parties. Third, they instituted a "self-rectification" campaign which was designed to force the parties to purge themselves of rightist elements.

The CPC first attacked individual members of the democratic parties who had been outspoken in their criticisms of the regime. A number of minor party leaders were accused of being rightists and were subjected to psychological pressure which served to produce "confessions" of

guilt. Three of the leading figures who were singled out for retribution were Lo Lung-chi, vice-chairman of the CDL and Minister of the Timber Industry; Chang Po-chun, vice-chairman of the CDL (of which there were five), and Minister of Communications; and Chang Nai-chi. These men were deprived of their party offices and, by a cabinet re-organization approved by the People's Congress in 1958, they were removed from their government positions. Hsieh Hsueh-hung, who was chairman of the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, was deprived of her post and expelled from the Communist Party. In 1958 twenty democratic party "rightists" were suspended from the Chinese People's Consultative Conference and fifty were suspended from the National People's Congress itself.³² In removing these leaders, the CPC felt that "these men, who were all leaders in their respective parties, had evidently permitted or even encouraged their members to raise heretical questions concerning such matters as the need for the Communist Party dictatorship, the amount of compensation to industrialists whose property had been expropriated, and the position of the democratic parties."³³

Lo Lung-chi, who ironically had earlier been concerned with the prevention of retribution on the part of the CPC, and Chang Po-chun were especially made into targets by the CPC. The "Chang-Lo" conspiracy became the major CPC excuse for the avalanche of political criticism in 1956. Lo was shown the error of his ways and he subsequently

confessed to almost every crime but the great train robbery which, fortunately for him, had not yet occurred. He confessed to having attempted to separate the intellectuals from the CPC and lure them into the CDL. "There was, he said, within the League an 'invisible organization' of people who had undergone American or British education, an organization which had been crushed in 1952 and revived in 1957."³⁴ In a public confession by Lo, he stated:

. . . as a vice-Chairman of the China Democratic League, I had for over a year endeavored, in collaboration with Chang Po-chun, to divert the League to the rightist course, depriving it of its role as assistant to the Party and throwing into confusion backward members of the League in the face of rampant attacks by rightist elements. This was unfavorable to the Party's leadership and the socialist cause.³⁵

Lo and Chang presented a number of these public confessions, as did almost all the accused rightists. It is entirely possible that these men felt that they had indeed been rightists and had led the mass of the membership astray. Whether the confessions were genuine, or were dictated by expediency, the CPC succeeded in discrediting the leadership of the democratic parties and, having done so, were in a position to move against the organizations themselves.

Rectification of the Democratic Party Organizations

The middle parties had been encouraged to expand during the 1949-1955 era, and by 1957 the eight parties had a combined membership of 110,000,³⁶ of whom 30,000 belonged to the China Democratic League.³⁷ The CPC took several steps to weaken the parties and prevent any

possible future increase in political strength. First, the parties were reorganized at all levels. Second, all rightists or suspected rightists were replaced with leftists. Third, previously abandoned restrictions on the parties were restored, and the parties were forced to expel all members who had joined during the period when these restrictions had not been enforced. Fourth, all membership expansion was specifically prohibited.³⁸ The CPC was now in firm control of the democratic parties and they made use of this control to launch a major effort to reform the membership of the parties. The parties were required to abandon their bourgeois attitudes and move with new determination in acquiring a socialistic outlook. The CPC desired that this change in attitude be a result of efforts on the part of the parties themselves, and so the "self-rectification" campaign was launched.

Self-Rectification in the Democratic Parties

The Chinese Democratic League launched this campaign with a statement recognizing the need for reform within the party. Part of the statement announced:

After the rectification campaign of the Chinese Communist Party began, a group of anti-socialist rightists, under the pretext of airing views, spoke various sorts of things against the Communist Party and socialism in an attempt to sabotage the socialist enterprises and destroy the people's democratic dictatorship and the unity between the party and the people, hoping to drag the wheel of history backward. What is even more striking and astonishing is that, among our democratic parties, and particularly among the leading personnel and members of our own League, there have been discovered some rightist anti-Communist and anti-socialist erroneous speeches.³⁹

The CPC was quick to emphasize the importance of self rectification as a cure to the self-diagnosed illness indicated above. On September 17, 1957, Li Wei-han, Director of the Department of the United Front Work of the Chinese Communist Party, delivered a speech at a gathering of representatives of the minor parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. He said that the "minor parties and groups in China were still bourgeoisie in character, in spite of the elimination of their original economic base that resulted from the socialist transformation of industry, commerce, and agriculture in 1955 and 1956. They must therefore effect a self-transformation in order to become a political force truly dedicated to socialism."⁴⁰ An official self-reform campaign was initiated by the middle parties in February of 1958. "The China Democratic National Construction Association, composed mostly of industrialists and businessmen, even specified a time-limit of three years."⁴¹ A joint rally of over 10,000 prominent minor party members and independents was held on March 16, 1958, at T'ien-an Square and was presided over by Shen Chun-ju, the 85-year-old Chairman of the CDL. At this rally a "Charter for the Socialist Re-Education of Democratic Parties and Non-Party Democrats" was adopted.⁴² This charter proclaimed the goals of the democratic parties to be: (1) to reform their political standpoint in order to more devotedly strive for socialism under the leadership of the CPC; (2) to be loyal to

the socialist system, "faithfully carrying out the state's policies and laws and wholeheartedly contributing our knowledge and strength to the nation's construction.

. . .";⁴³ (3) to learn from the workers and peasants, "through practical work, establishing a proper attitude toward physical labor and actively developing the doctrine and sentiments of the working people; . . .";⁴⁴ (4) to study Marxism-Leninism and the examples of the Soviet Union; (5) "to carry through the policy of letting one hundred flowers bloom, one hundred schools of thought contend; . . .";⁴⁵ (6) to provide re-education so that long-term coexistence and mutual supervision are possible; and (7) to "firmly . . . carry out the United Front policy in the service of socialism."⁴⁶ The minor parties held another rally on April 10th which, as Tang states, demonstrated "the public capitulation of the minor parties and groups to the Communist demand for thorough self-transformation. . . .";⁴⁷ This rally launched a "dedication of hearts to the Party" movement. Wu Han (who was in the center of the Cultural Revolution and was purged due to it), Director of the Peking Municipal Committee of the CDL, stated that the major goal of the bourgeoisie was "to faithfully surrender their hearts to the Communist party and the people."⁴⁸ This "dedication of hearts" was pursued throughout the country and was the cause of a great many self-enlightenment meetings, at which the bourgeois elements attempted to criticize each other and develop a

socialist outlook. These meetings became known as "meetings of immortals" and were still being held as late as 1961.⁴⁹

By means of these three measures, the CPC succeeded in disciplining the democratic parties and cutting off the flow of criticism. Tang speculates that the CPC may have used this campaign,

. . . more as an object-lesson than as a real drive to enforce conformity, even though the conversion of such groups is one of their avowed goals. They may not have had too much faith in the new pledges of loyalty, but they accepted the outward submission as a suitable compromise for the time being. Presumably, after the letting off of steam in the "contending and blooming" period, the lid was now firmly back on.⁵⁰

The attempt of the democratic parties to act as non-totalitarian organizations was firmly suppressed by the CPC. After this initial outburst of CPC control and retribution, a gradual return to "normalized" roles for the democratic parties took place. The return of the democratic parties to their normal role in the government during the 1958-1964 period, which included their role in the "Great Leap Forward," is the topic of the following section.

Normalization of the Democratic Parties:

1958-1965

In late 1957 the CPC began to ease the pressure on the middle parties. The Party had successfully squelched the outright criticism on the part of these groups and was now satisfied to allow these parties to resume their earlier

roles. The China News Analysis, although it is hardly an unbiased observer and must be considered with this in mind, stated: "In 1957-58 one would have thought that the recalcitrant satellite parties would have been wiped out of existence. On the contrary, Peking, in its typical dialectical way, promotes and expands them. The CPPCC serves for a close checking on the middle class."⁵¹ One suspects that the regime was more motivated by a desire to return the middle parties to their proven useful roles than by a desire to be dialectical. But for the CPC, power-seeking had replaced avowed ideology. The important factor, however, is that the CPC chose to attempt to stabilize its relationship with the democratic parties rather than obliterate them. Evidence of the CPC's lessening of pressure was contained in a "Report on Government Work" given by Chou En-lai in 1959 to the National People's Congress. He stated at that time:

Through study, work and participation in manual labor, many of them [the minor parties] have made varying degrees of progress. Except for a handful of rightists, most of those democratic party members and other democrats who take part in state work have fulfilled their duties at their posts. During the rectification campaign, the democratic parties tidied up their organizations. They still play a positive role in rallying the various social forces to serve socialism. In the future, it is still necessary in our country to continue to consolidate and develop the people's democratic united front on the basis of serving socialism. Under the premise of accepting the leading position of the Communist Party, long-term co-existence and mutual supervision between the Communist Party and the various democratic parties and groups is still beneficial to the people's cause.⁵²

The willingness of the CPC to reinstate the minor parties into its favor can be seen in the membership figures. In 1961 there were 100,000 members of the minor parties,⁵³ or only 10,000 fewer members than immediately before the rectification campaign, when the parties were at the peak of their importance. Thus, by 1959, the minor parties had resumed a role in Chinese government and the "anti-rightist" campaigns were toned down. This is not to say, however, that all CPC rectification activity ceased. As late as 1963 Chang Nai-chi, who was at that time (1) Minister of Food in the State Council, (2) Vice-Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association, (3) Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, (4) a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and (5) a member of the National People's Congress, was purged and had to undergo rectification for alleged rightist inclinations.⁵⁴ Chang, however, was more an isolated example than evidence of a general trend. From 1959 to 1964 the CPC was willing, and almost eager, to use democratic party members in governmental roles.

Democratic Party Members in Governmental Positions

During this period, members of the minor parties held some significant governmental positions. Direction of the entire United Front operation was supplied by the United Front Department, headed by Li Wei-han. This department was a section under the Central Committee of

the Communist Party. Below this department was the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, chaired by Chou En-lai. This organization included members from all the middle parties and "from all those in the middle-class who count."⁵⁵

In the area of government operations, the minor parties were also represented. In 1959, 14 of 49 ministries of the central government were headed by members of the minor parties.⁵⁶ These ministries were often the more specialized ministries, usually subsidiary to the planning industries; and they included such ministries as the timber industry, posts and telegraphs, justice, food industry, light industry, textiles, forestry, communications, marine products, and city services.⁵⁷ Members of the democratic parties also held numerous lesser posts throughout the government.

These government officials were usually chosen for their technical skills and not for any policy-making abilities. "They hold these posts at the pleasure of the Party, for whose policies they act as administrators."⁵⁸ Thus, the CPC utilized the skills of the middle party members while preventing any rightist tendencies from entering the government. Of course, no administrator is absolutely objective, and the biases of the administrators must have at least implicitly slipped into their work; however, this was kept at an absolute minimum by the Party cadres, who permeated the government.

The Role of the Democratic Parties

During the 1959-1964 period the democratic parties revived their duties of the pre-"hundred flowers" era and even expanded their sphere of operations, under proper CPC supervision of course. In 1963 the role of the democratic parties was described:

To insure national survival, the co-operation of the educated middle class, particularly of the leading scientists, is sought today. At the same time the Party endeavors to keep them safely under its thumb, hammering into their ears incessantly the Marxist truth. This ambivalence, a very important feature today when something must be done to revive the half-paralysed national economy, is seen in this issue under a different aspect, the middle-class tempered in organizations adapted to this double purpose.⁵⁹

In order to perform their duties, the democratic parties operated under the direction of the CPPCC, described above. The CPPCC during this period had 1,086 local branches and conducted 430 political schools which presented political courses to over 140,000 persons.⁶⁰ The most outstanding of the schools constructed to educate the bourgeoisie was the Central College of Socialism. For example, of the 285 students enrolled there in 1961, there was one president of an institution of higher learning, 33 professors, 16 members of the Academy of Science, 36 engineers, 5 doctors, 11 literary figures, 18 members of national minorities, 3 religious leaders, 5 overseas Chinese, and a number of teachers.⁶¹ Actually, the CPPCC performed two major tasks. First, it "controlled" the parties. Che'n Shu-t'ing stated in 1963 that the purpose

of the CPPCC was "to unite the democratic parties and all other people under the leadership of the communist party and Chairman Mao, and to see that these people in the CPPCC undertake political study and self-reform."⁶²

Second, the CPPCC provided propaganda for communist activity abroad. "The international friend, often a sympathizer but not a communist, is impressed by the broad spirit of tolerance he imagines he finds in Peking when it honours non-communists."⁶³

Under the direction of the CPPCC, the democratic parties have been called upon to define their goals and duties. From December 1962 to January 1963, all eight parties held national conventions to settle upon their proper tasks. As a result of these meetings, they decided upon the following goals:

- (1) "To continue to uphold the three red banners of the socialist general line, great leap forward, and people's communes; to contribute more to socialist reconstruction, to the campaign for austerity and increased production, and to the development of science, culture and education; and to work for a bumper harvest in agriculture and new triumphs of socialism."⁶⁴
- (2) "To support wholeheartedly the general line of foreign policy and to participate without reserve in the struggle against imperialists, reactionaries, modern revisionists and for world peace."⁶⁵
- (3) "To study diligently Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's

works; to undergo ideological education in patriotism, internationalism and socialism; and to push ideological reform of party members and the masses."⁶⁶

Aside from these general goals, each of the democratic parties was assigned specific tasks. The China Democratic National Construction Association, in conjunction with the Federation of Industry and Commerce, was given the task of helping to improve "the managerial system and supply to the market, and in general in the readjustment of the national economy."⁶⁷ The party of the intellectuals, the China Democratic League, the Association for Promoting Democracy, and the Chui San Society, along with the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, were given the task of adjusting scientific techniques for the aid of agriculture. Several of the parties were asked to work on industrial and technical questions. In Taiwan, members of the CPPCC were instructed to contact 210 "upper-class" people in order "to explain to them the policy of the Party and of the government and to solicit their cooperation and help in economic construction."⁶⁸ The Chih Kung Tang, which is concerned with overseas Chinese and actually dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, was also called on to help in the national economy.

The Democratic Parties and the "Great Leap"

The democratic parties did not occupy a major role in the great leap; however, the party members were called

upon to aid the program. The primary emphasis was upon physical labor, and the middle-class, white collar workers were expected to engage in heavy labor, as were almost all elements of Chinese society at that time. Perhaps the greatest impact of the Great Leap upon the CPC was its failure. The subsequent rightist tone of the Party line was indeed more favorable to the democratic parties than it had been for many years. Following the failure of the great leap, the democratic party members began to feel more secure in their bourgeois roles. This is not to say, however, that the minor parties gained a position of strength in the society.

Merle Goldman discusses the period of criticism of Maoist goals which occurred in 1961-62.⁶⁹ In the course of this criticism some minor party figures were prominent in the ranks of the anti-Maoist commentators. However, the 1961-62 period was unlike the earlier attempted assertions of the minor parties' influence in several critical respects:

- (1) the criticisms were very weak: "Unlike the Hundred Flowers, the few intellectuals who did speak out in 1961-62 limited their statements to a parroting of the official line";⁷⁰
- (2) the criticisms of the 1961-62 period came not from intellectuals but from members of the upper echelons of the CCP and the government (especially the Propaganda Department), and were most likely supported by

anti-Maoists highly placed in the Party itself rather than outside (e.g., minor party) persons;⁷¹

- (3) there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the minor parties as organizations participated in this activity.

In conclusion then it can be seen that all the goals and duties of the democratic parties were duties to the CPC and to the peasant and proletarian classes. The middle parties were in existence to benefit these groups and not the bourgeoisie, which they supposedly represented. In this sense, the parties during the 1959-1965 period, the 1961-62 experience to the contrary notwithstanding, just as in the 1949-1955 period, were almost totally the servants of the CPC and were not centers of political power.

Conclusion

Several points have been made in this chapter relating to the role of the minor parties in China (the letters and numbers in parentheses are "keyed" to the conclusions presented at the end of Chapter II):

- (1) It has been demonstrated that the minor parties were infiltrated by members of the ruling elite or their agents in order to insure the elite's domination of these parties (A,2);
- (2) It has been demonstrated that when the parties gave some indication of attempting to function as sources

of authority (the Hundred Flowers period) they were severely repressed by the regime because they were viewed as a viable threat to the regime (A,2);

- (3) The "Chang-Lo" conspiracy, as well as the rest of the rectification campaign, demonstrates the ability of a totalitarian regime to effectively enforce psychological standards upon even the most diverse elements of a society, or at least to attempt, should the admissions of the accused have been mere lip service, such an enforcement (C,3);
- (4) The regime's control of membership policies demonstrates, as mentioned in Chapter II, the desire of a totalitarian regime to control the relationship between the intermediate organization and its own membership (B,2);
- (5) The twists and turns of the regime's policies toward the minor parties illustrate the regime's desire to keep the parties in an almost constant state of flux, an atmosphere of frightened anticipation and indecision (C,2);
- (6) The developing relationship between the elite and the minor parties (culminating in their disappearance during the Cultural Revolution, which will be discussed in a separate section) illustrates the general desire of a totalitarian regime to utilize intermediate organizations with a minimum of threat, and to constantly

replace older organizations with ones which more clearly represent and adhere to the guidelines presented in Chapter II (B,1). The next chapter will deal with the mass organizations in China, which, in effect, did serve as substitutes for the minor parties.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

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⁶Samuel Griffith, II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).

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¹⁰O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 309.

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- 30Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Rectification Campaign," in Robert Bowie and John Fairbank, Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 347.
- 31"The Middle Class," China News Analysis, No. 461, March 22, 1963, p. 1.
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- 33Ibid., p. 69.
- 34Bowie and Fairbank, p. 14.

³⁵Lo Lung-chi, "My Preliminary Examination," in Bowie and Fairbank, p. 332.

³⁶Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1962-63 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1964), p. 714.

³⁷Lo, p. 332.

³⁸Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1960-61 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1962), p. 656.

³⁹U.R.I., "Rectification Campaign," p. 116.

⁴⁰Houn, p. 66.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 66.

⁴²Ibid., p. 67.

⁴³Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁹For accounts of such "meetings of immortals" sponsored by the Chu San, Association for Promoting Democracy, and the Peasants' and Workers' Party, see the Review of the Mainland Press, U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, Vols. 2451 (Feb. 10, 1961, p. 7), 2454 (Feb. 7, 1961, p. 1), 2455 (Jan. 31, 1961, p. 1).

⁵⁰Houn, p. 69.

⁵¹"The Middle Class," China News Analysis, p. 5.

⁵²Chou En-lai, "Report on Government Work," in Bowie and Fairbank, pp. 520-521.

⁵³Chow (ed.), China Yearbook: 1960-61, p. 655.

⁵⁴Chow Senying (ed.), China Yearbook: 1963-64 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1965), p. 651.

⁵⁵"The Middle Class," p. 69.

⁵⁶U.R.I., Communism in China, p. 69.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 69.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 69.

⁵⁹"The Middle Class," p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 2.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 4.

⁶²Ibid., p. 2.

⁶³Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁴Chow, China Yearbook: 1963-64, p. 652.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 652.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 652.

⁶⁷"The Middle Class," p. 6.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁹Merle Goldman, "The Unique 'Blooming and Contending' of 1961-62," in The China Quarterly, No. 37 (Jan.-March, 1961), pp. 54-83.

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CHAPTER IV

MASS ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter will delve into the role of mass organizations in China, and the various means by which the regime has controlled these organizations. Mass organizations during the 1949-1964 period were an important feature of the political and social scene and were used extensively by Mao and the ruling elite. Mao himself realized the potential which the mass organization possessed as early as 1928, when he wrote "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan."¹ In this report he wrote in praise of the peasant associations:

If ten thousand schools of law and political science had been opened, could they have achieved in such a short time so much political education among men and women, young and old, all the way into the remote corners of the country as the peasant associations have now done? I think not.²

The mass organizations are means by which the totalitarian regime can extend its control into areas of the society generally considered beyond the scope of legitimate political activity:

The mass "people's organizations" are the most significant device employed by the CPC to carry its mass-line policy into practical operation. Through them the Party

can mobilize and exercise direct leadership over every key group in society and over all areas of activity.³

Chou states:

One of the major causes of the success of the Chinese communist party is its effective organization and indoctrination of the masses at the grass roots, primarily through a myriad of mass organizations.⁴

Fairbank adds: "These mass organizations, . . . , reach the individual in his professional or social role, among his peers, in ways that the government cannot."⁵

And Tang concludes:

To avoid isolation as a minority group and to heighten the effectiveness of its rule, the CPC also attempts . . . , to gain control of every major organized group and movement in the society.⁶

Although there were a wide variety of mass organizations, they all had a great deal in common. Townsend points out four crucial features of all organizations.⁷ First, "they are firmly controlled and supervised by the CCP through the placement of Party members in leading positions."⁸ This regime policy was one which is characteristic of the totalitarian system as outlined at the outset of this research. In this chapter, the regime infiltration and domination of the organizations will be documented for a wide variety of groups. Also, in China all mass organizations were under official government "charter" and the charter could be revoked at the regime's discretion.⁹ This power, in itself, was not vital but was rather an indication of the regime's control of the mass organizations. It was simply a legal mask for actual

control. In short, "any reactionary organization harming the 'interests of the state or people' or any organization violating the regulations could be disbanded."¹⁰ Houn concludes:

Key positions in the various mass organizations are held by Communists or their sympathizers, and the mass organizations themselves depend upon the government for financial support [a] situation which amounts to virtual government control of the organizations.¹¹

A second common feature of these groups is that they were all organized around the principle of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism is a major theory of political organization at all levels of activity in China. It stems from the dialectic fashion in which the masses of people must be led through the revolutionary period and grows to serve as a model for all leadership styles in the nation. As the title indicates, democratic centralism combines, theoretically, the seemingly opposite elements of democracy and centralized control. The major "centralist" features are:

- (1) a hierarchical organizational structure for all societal groups so that directions can be easily passed down to lower levels;
- (2) the proper development of leaders appropriate to each level of the hierarchy;
- (3) strict obedience of all "lower" level units to their hierarchical superiors.

The major "democratic" features of the theory are:

- (1) the passing of information upward along the hierarchical chain so that the leadership will be aware of lower level demands and not fall into the habit of "commandism";
- (2) the encouragement of creative applications of high-level directives to local situations in a relevant fashion;
- (3) a free and thorough discussion of issues before a decision is reached, but no further commentary by dissatisfied elements once a decision has been made, as this encourages factionalism within supposedly unitary groups.

In theory the idea of democratic centralism might seem to possess the potential for being a dynamic method of leadership (all problems of operationalization aside). However, the Chinese regime, in conformity to its totalitarian propensities, eviscerated democratic centralism and made it into another hollow ideology useful only for masking naked control:

As is the case in state and Party structure, "centralism" (minority submission to majority, and lower levels obeying higher levels) is much more conspicuous than "democracy" (regular convening of congresses at all levels and free discussion before decisions are reached). All major decisions are made at the top, and higher levels can review and revoke the decisions of lower levels. In effect, the centralized structures of the mass organizations supplement and reinforce the state structure as channels for transmitting central policy to the basic level.¹²

This chapter will demonstrate the universality of democratic centralism as an organizing principle of mass organizations,

and the manner in which this doctrine aided regime domination of the groups.¹³

A third common feature of mass organizations is their:

. . . well-developed basic-level organization to encourage maximum participation and obedience to higher directives by individual members, to develop as many activists as possible, and to expand the amount of contact between members and nonmembers.¹⁴

Thus the mass organizations developed activists and cadres who could serve as agents of the regime. By doing this they also tapped the talents of the most ambitious and energetic members of the society and used them for regime purposes, not to mention the fact that this practice helped to keep these people from having time to engage in activities not supervised by, and perhaps not beneficial to, the regime.

Finally, all these organizations served as "transmission belts." That is, they linked the regime to the masses (the Mass-Line Philosophy itself will be discussed in Chapter V).¹⁵ As stated earlier, a totalitarian regime is not satisfied with the sullen or passive obedience of its citizens, it demands mass enthusiasm, and the mass organizations were means for stirring up such enthusiasm and activity. Houn feels that mass organizations have three advantages in conducting propaganda and indoctrination on behalf of regime policies:

- (1) "to supplement the propaganda and indoctrination personnel and facilities of the regime";

- (2) "to tailor propaganda and indoctrination for use in special groups"; and
- (3) "to conduct propaganda and indoctrination unofficially when desired."¹⁶

Mass organizations in China may be divided into three types:

- (1) "elite" or specialized groups, composed of a relatively small number of professionals;
- (2) "paper" organizations, that exist almost solely for propaganda purposes and lack an active membership;
- (3) "true" mass organizations, which are built upon common interests, of a greater or lesser degree, and possess large memberships.¹⁷

In conclusion, then, this chapter will demonstrate the regime's use of, and control over, all three types of mass organizations.

"Paper" Organizations

The first type of mass organization to be considered functioned in China during the 1949-1964 period and might be termed the "paper" organization. Organizations of this type represented no common interests of groups within Chinese society, but rather they were solely created by the regime to further certain official goals, especially foreign policy goals. Townsend describes these as:

. . . organizations that are frankly political and propagandistic but which have relatively little contact with the Chinese people. Most of these are

designed to advance the Party line in international relations; examples are the various "friendship" associations with foreign countries, the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, the China Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the China Peace Committee. In some cases, these organizations may claim mass membership (the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association once had about seventy million members) but they offer few genuine opportunities for mass participation. Their work consists mainly of high-level exchange visits and propaganda releases.¹⁸

Of all the types of mass organizations considered in this chapter, this type represented the least threat to the regime. There are several reasons for this. First, there was really no true common interest which could bind the members together. Decreased wages may cause trade unions to be restive, but a diplomatic setback in Africa would hardly turn the Chinese-African Friendship Association against the regime. On the contrary, it would turn the members against their "friends" rather than their leaders.

Second, most of these organizations admitted members only as part of a unit. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association is a case in point. It was founded in Peking on October 5, 1949, only four days after the founding of the CPR.¹⁹ Its purpose was to "further and consolidate the fraternal friendship and co-operation between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, and to strengthen the ties between the two nations in cultural, economic, and other affairs."²⁰ By January of 1953, only three and one-half years later, the SSFA claimed a membership of over

68 million (1,830 branches and 213,150 sub-branches).²¹

"The vast membership of the SSFA is made possible through the policy of admitting organizations en bloc. For example, the entire People's Liberation Army joined as one unit."²² Of course, this membership practice serves to isolate members from a sense of identity with the organization. In effect, they are members "once removed" and their allegiance to the organization, always a potential threat to the regime, is thus diminished. In fact, one may question whether any allegiance is formed at all since these friendship associations appear in such an abrupt manner and disappear with no residue.

A third indication of the regime's control of these organizations is the manner in which they almost instantaneously appear when the international situation calls for just such an organization. The China-Africa Association is a good example:

In 1960 the virtual dissolution of the French Community, the approach of independence for the British Sub-Saharan dependencies, and the granting of independence to the Belgian Congo startled the CPC into the realization that a revolutionary situation in Africa might be more imminent than it had supposed. A China-African People's Friendship Association was formed in April.²³

The China-Latin America Association was formed in March of 1960 to counteract Russian influence in Cuba.²⁴ The CPR (the government itself officially "forms" these organizations) created the China-Laos Friendship Association on March 4, 1963, in order to coincide with a state visit by

Souvanna Phouna.²⁵ The Japanese Association is another case:

Probably to counteract the unfavorable impression produced on all sections of Japanese public opinion except the extreme left by Chinese assertiveness, and in particular Chinese opposition to the test ban treaty, the CPR established a China-Japan Friendship Association on October 4, 1963, with the mission of expanding informal relations between the two countries and promoting an early "normalization" of official relations. Although it might seem surprising that the CPR waited so long to take such an obvious step with respect to the country that was probably the most important single object of its "people's diplomacy," it should be realized that Japan became in this way the first country for which the CPR has established a Friendship Association without having also established diplomatic relations.²⁶

One can see, therefore, that the regime's control of these organizations was tight indeed. But like mass organizations in totalitarian settings, these groups had a certain utility for the regime (otherwise they simply could not exist at all), especially in the field of foreign policy. Here the groups served two purposes:

- (1) they transmit, or "cue," the people of China as to the correct foreign policy line (in other words, they are a sort of scorecard of who is friend and who is foe at the moment);
- (2) they often act as quasi-official arms of the regime in the conduct of foreign relations, sometimes making diplomatic moves which the regime itself cannot "officially" make.

As for the first duty mentioned above, the SSFA provides a clear example. One of the official functions

of the SSFA was to help the Chinese people gain "a knowledge of the social and government system of the Soviet Union, and its achievements in socialist reconstruction as well as in advanced production."²⁷ In order to accomplish this goal the SSFA took several steps: (1) it instituted radio language courses in Russian; (2) in 1954 it organized a total of 196,000 lectures attended by 43 million people; (3) it translated Russian books into Chinese; (4) it published a journal, Sino-Soviet Friendship, with a circulation of 300,000 copies; and (5) beginning in May 1955 it published a Russian language daily in Peking.²⁸ "During the first five years of its existence, the SSFA claims to have published more than 1,000 pamphlets and books, totaling over 20 million copies."²⁹ To emphasize the importance of the organization, and this good relationship, Liu himself was the first Chairman of the group. Although, of course, the SSFA no longer plies its wares, and in reality no other friendship organization had or has such a large apparatus, the above example illustrates the general internal uses of such organizations. It would not surprise this author, given diplomatic desirability, to see, after more than twenty years of studied and concentrated hatred, a Sino-American Friendship Association spring up overnight with a membership in the tens of millions. Such is the power of the regime.

Also, as mentioned above, these organizations sometimes served as quasi-official arms of the regime's

foreign policy. Thus:

The Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association reached an agreement in Peking on 16 August that China would invite "delegations from Japanese academic circles and of Japanese writers, scientists, cartoonists, artists, calligraphers, photographers and young people active in Japan's cultural life."³⁰

Also:

Peking . . . sent towards the end of February 1961 a goodwill delegation headed by Liu Chang-sheng--President of the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association--to Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.³¹

These organizations were also used to voice regime displeasure, as well as being goodwill ambassadors:

To demonstrate further Peking's concern and angry reaction, a mass rally was held in Peking on 26 January [1961] presided over by the writer-politician Kou Mo-jo, President of the China Peace Council. . . . Kou Mo-jo delivered a blistering attack on the United States whose "criminal character" had been revealed by the conclusion of the U.S.-Japanese military treaty. . . .³²

In conclusion, then, these "paper" organizations must be regarded in respect to two features. First, they performed a function for the regime by aiding in "cueing" foreign policy both internally and externally. Second, these groups were the least threatening, as potential power bases, to the regime for the following reasons:

- (1) a lack of a true shared common interest;
- (2) unit membership policies;
- (3) a rapid series of creations and destructions, keeping these groups in a constant state of flux.

"Elite" Organizations

The type of mass organization mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and dealing with specialized groups was the "elite" organization. These groups were usually tied together by bonds of common interest, as opposed to "paper" organizations, but lacked the large membership of the true "mass" organization. Townsend writes:

. . . [This] type of mass organization is the professional or technical association that has a relatively small and exclusive membership and that engages in some "private" activities of a professional or scholarly nature. These associations may put out scholarly publications, engage in national and international exchange of information, and so forth. They are not as constantly involved in political mobilization and propaganda as the other types [of mass organizations] and they do not have a significant range of contact with the masses. Nevertheless, they are in no sense isolated from politics. All recognize the political leadership of the CCP and all exhort their members to implement the Party line in areas pertaining to their special interests. Although some of their activities may be non-political, they must participate in national political movements and subordinate their professional activities and opinions to political considerations whenever the Party so demands.³³

Although these groups lacked large memberships, they were crucial to the regime for several reasons. First, they represented persons with relatively rare skills, skills that could not be replaced from the general population. Therefore, in order to utilize these skills the regime had to control the organization. Second, the members of these groups were more likely to balk at regime control than were other sectors of the population because they were less naive than the general population, because they were

"experts" and thus expected to receive more from the system than the "ordinary" people, or because they often were intellectuals who, in general, are usually seeking to impose their own ideas on societies as a matter of ego.

In order to better understand the nature of these groups, this section will examine the two leading organizations of this type, the All-China Federation of Natural Science Societies and the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. The science organization was certainly the less volatile of the two groups, perhaps because the work of its members did not really touch upon matters of societal control and behavior. The organization was deemed necessary, however, to prevent unorthodox or "bourgeois" science from entering China:

The Communist Party, of course, already had made preparations to bring scientists within its network of mass organizations. Plans for this were laid at a meeting convened in Peking during July, 1949 where it projected an All-China Conference of Scientific Workers. This conference, with about 470 participants meeting in Peking on August 18-24, 1950, formally established two key organizations. One was an All-China Federation of Natural Science Societies with "the aim of rallying all the scientific workers so as to carry out scientific research work for the improvement of production technique, and thus to promote New Democratic economic and cultural construction." The other was the All-China Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Knowledge designed to assist the government popularise science.³⁴

The two organizations mentioned above worked in close relationship with the official Academy of Sciences. Just because the work of these organizations was somewhat peripheral to political activity did not excuse them from

regime control, because in totalitarian society no activity is outside the sphere of regime interest. This was true of the scientific groups. Lindbeck states: "The presence and supervisory intervention of the Communist Party is evident throughout the entire range of scientific organizations."³⁵

The artists and writers in China have presented a thornier problem to the regime. The organization to monitor them was formed early and became a vital instrument for control of writers during the post-Hundred Flowers period. The key organization was the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles:

The All-China Federation of Literary Art Circles had been founded in Peking on July 10, 1949, with Kuo Mo-jo presiding. The Communists made sure that they held the key posts although they were plainly a minority within the membership. Later it was decided to form an association of writers presided over by Mao Tun, another veteran of the Communist struggle and a former companion of Lu Hsun.³⁶

As indicated above, Kuo Mo-jo was a key figure in the group and also, as indicated above, the regime was in firm control of this organization from the outset. Goldman states:

[Kuo Mo-jo] became a vice-premier of the government from 1949 to 1954, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and president of the Academy of Sciences. Nominally, he was in charge of research and creativity in Communist China, but in fact, he has been a front man for the party. He has carried out its bidding without any deviation.³⁷

The ACFLAC was really similar to the ACFTU in that it presided over a group of more specialized organizations, all

of which were likewise under firm regime control:

The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles is essentially a holding company responsible for coordinating the activities of nine national organizations representing major branches of the arts: literature, drama, painting, music, dance, folklore, vocal music, films and photography. The literary subdivision of the Federation is the Chinese Writers' Union. Like its Russian counterpart, the Union of Soviet Writers, this organization is intended to be the principal professional body in the contemporary Chinese life, responsible to and supervised by the Central Committee of the Party. The Writers' Union is designed to provide a forum for the interchange of ideas, an organization through which professional writers may aid and stimulate each other, and a direct channel through which the Communist Party, aided by the Party fraction in the Union, can transmit its mandates and elucidate its view of the tasks confronting contemporary Chinese literature. Mao Tun, in addition to his post as Minister of Culture in the government, has also served as chairman of the Chinese Writers' Union since 1949. The Union now has four vice-chairmen: Chou Yang, Pa Chin, Shao Ch'uan-lin and Lao She. As a national association, the Writers' Union also supervises branches in the provinces and autonomous regions, and at the sub-provincial level as well. In organization and operations, these branches are similar to the national Union, though their apparatus is naturally simpler.³⁸

A watershed event of this organization was its third national congress in 1960. This was the first congress since 1953 and thus was responsible for squaring the duties of the organization with the new role writers were expected to play in Chinese society. The artists and writers had been most vociferous during the "Blooming and Contending" period and had therefore been treated harshly in the 1957 rectification campaigns. Then in the Great Leap period they had been compelled to demonstrate their "redness." The 1960 congress set the tune for the integration of the artists and writers into the totalitarian society. Boorman

writes of this:

Outside the Party and government structure, the key apparatus facilitating Party direction of literature is the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. The Federation, established in the summer of 1949 slightly before the establishment of the Central People's Government, is one of the . . . most influential of the "people's organisations" which Peking has created to channel political controls throughout the country. Reorganized at its second congress in 1953, the Federation held its third national congress of writers and artists at Peking in July-August 1960. That meeting elected a national committee of 224 persons, from among whom were elected the chairman and fifteen vice-chairmen of the Federation. Kuo Mo-jo was re-elected chairman, with Mao Tun and Chou Yang as the top vice-chairmen. Other vice-chairmen elected in 1960 included Pa Chin, Lao She, Hsu Kuang-p'ing (widow of Lu hsun), T'ien Han, Ou-yang Yu-ch'ien (died 1962) and Hsia Yen, as well as Mei Lan-fang (died 1961) and other senior figures in the arts.³⁹

At this congress, official goals were laid out for the organization. Ch'en reports:

The third speaker on the opening day . . . [was] Chou Yang, Vice-President of the Federation and a Deputy Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, who . . . laid down six tasks for the Congress.

The first task, according to Chou Yang, was that China's art and literature must be placed under the political guidance of the Communist Party, so that they can play their full part in building a socialist society and in serving the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Secondly, they must be regarded as a weapon in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and as bonds of friendship between all the progressive peoples of the world. Thirdly, further encouragement must be given to the workers and peasants who used their spare time in literary and artistic activities. Fourthly, writers and artists should make strenuous efforts to raise both the ideological and artistic standards of their work. Fifthly, art and literary criticism should be developed a step further along Marxist-Leninist lines in order to foster a healthy and refined discernment. Finally, writers and artists must strengthen their unity, so as to organize themselves into a fighting unit for the interests of the working class.⁴⁰

Except for the first, most of the above goals were mere rhetoric. In fact, the only other aim with a realistic aspect was the encouragement of peasant and worker literature. There was great emphasis on the literary work of amateurs during this period. A prize winning poem of 1960 was written by a peasant:

I am just sixty, but I can still work
 And I find it as easy as when I was young
 It's not that I am boasting of my strength
 But here in my heart I have Mao Tse-Tung.⁴¹

This was another aspect of the red-expert controversy and an attempt by the regime to lessen the influence of the writers and artists by downplaying the role of their expertise in society. By demeaning the expert, the regime sought to keep the writers in an uncertain frame of mind and full of self-doubt, excellent conditions for a totalitarian citizen.

The ACFLAC also has performed more mundane, although important, tasks:

It [the ACFLAC] was a device for combining all factions and all the intellectuals in the creative arts into one body over which the party could exercise direct supervision. Further, the ACFLAC was one of the most influential organs for communicating party policies to the reading public.⁴²

The ACFLAC also conducted self-criticism campaigns similar to those of the minor parties:

Before 1949, about one-third of China's writers had already been re-educated. Many more participated in criticism and self-criticism sessions organized by the ACFLAC as early as August 1949.⁴³

Finally, the ACFLAC served as a foreman of sorts, seeing that the writers and artists were "productive" members of society:

An additional function of the mass organizations is to encourage propaganda and indoctrination specialists among their ranks to prepare appropriate material for the party.

For example, one of the principal tasks of the All-China Association of Literary Writers (the Chinese Writers' Union) is to see that its members produce a sufficient number of literary works in accordance with party policy and doctrine.⁴⁴

It can readily be seen then that the "elite" organizations were extremely useful to the regime and were also very closely controlled by the regime. The firmness of the control is evident in the permeation of the groups by regime agents and the great attempts of the regime to strip the specialists of their professional self-esteem. The regime had no intention of allowing rambunctious intellectuals to threaten its power over the society, as the following incident indicates:

[A battle arose] over the role of culture in the new society and the relations between the intellectuals and the Party leaders. These debates were held on various pretexts: once it was a question of the significance of a film, The Life of Wu Hsun, another time the attitude to a literary classic, The Dream of the Red Chamber, but in fact the leitmotiv was always the same: What degree of autonomy Communist intellectuals can have, and how they can best contribute to the building of socialism. It followed that those who did not share the same concepts as the Communist leaders were denounced as "evil minds."⁴⁵

True "Mass" Organizations

The third, and by far the most important, of the mass organizations in China during the 1949-1964 period

were the true "mass" organizations. These organizations possessed large memberships and were organized around common interests. Sometimes these interests were immediate and keenly felt, as was the case of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and sometimes the interests were more of a "catch-all" category, as in the case of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women.

There were several organizations of this type: the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the Young Communist League, the Peasants' Associations, etc. This section will deal with three organizations representative of the spectrum of behavior found among groups of this type:

- (1) the All-China Federation of Democratic Women;
- (2) the various Chinese youth organizations (the Young Communist League, the Young Pioneers, the Student's Federation, and the Federation of Democratic Youth);
- (3) the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (and its member unions).

The All-China Federation of Democratic Women

The ACFDW was founded in 1949 as an outgrowth of the First All-China Women's Congress.⁴⁶ Its official aims were "safeguarding women's rights and children's welfare, enhancing the political consciousness and ability of women, securing the equality between men and women, and striving for the complete emancipation of women."⁴⁷ The

more immediate tasks of the ACFDW were to:

- (1) mobilize women workers in the cities in order to increase production;
- (2) encourage peasant women to participate in mutual-aid societies and cooperative organizations, and help increase agricultural production;
- (3) liberate women from feudal concepts and social customs.⁴⁸

The report of Teng Ying-ch'ao in 1953 stated: "The era of construction has begun. Production should be the top priority in all programs and the central task of the women's movement is the mobilization of women to participate actively in industrial and agricultural production."⁴⁹

The organization of the ACFDW was based on democratic centralism and was similar to most other mass organizations. Theoretically, the organization's power was vested in the National Congress. The Congress elected an Executive Committee of 125 regular and 28 alternate members, all elected for two-year terms. The true effective group was the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee.⁵⁰ "It should be noted, however, that the permanent Secretariat, the administrative and managerial arm of the ACFDW under the Standing Committee, is viewed by some observers as the rising power in this as in other such organizations."⁵¹

At the regional level, the organization worked via six working committees, with branches in all provinces and municipalities.⁵² Sometimes the ACFDW worked as an adjunct of the government:

At the same time, mass organizations do assume some administrative responsibilities. . . . The Women's Federation, through its participation in legal proceedings and its own investigations and mediation, has assumed a major share of responsibility for administering the Marriage Law.⁵³

The ACFDW also had an international branch, which it attempted to use in order to influence women in other, especially developing, nations. "Thus, through the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the ACFDW allies itself with all the peace-loving women throughout the world to struggle for world peace."⁵⁴

The organization's membership in 1950 was 30 million,⁵⁵ but by 1953 it had increased to a reported 76 million.⁵⁶ Membership in the organization was open only to those who were members of a local association and not to individuals as such;⁵⁷ here, once again, the use of indirect membership as a control device is seen. Party members dominated the organization. Ts'ai Ch'ang, elected chairman in 1949 and 1953, was until 1956 the only woman on the Party Central Committee. Teng Ying-ch'ae, vice-chairman, was an alternate member of the Central Committee.⁵⁸ There were also non-Party figures used by the organization. Soong Ching-Ling, wife of Sun Yat-sen, and He Hsiang-ning, wife of another prominent early Kuomintang leader, were both officers of the ACFDW.⁵⁹ "Thus, by utilizing pliable non-Party personnel in the ACFDW, the CPC endeavors to create the appearance of a united front. At the same time, its efforts to mobilize women all over the nation,

irrespective of their background and affiliations, for the promotion of Communist programs, reflect the mass-line policy in action."⁶⁰

Barnett describes the actual operation of the ACFDW units at various levels. In a central ministry, M:

The third Party-directed mass organization, the Women's Association (fu nu lien ho hui), was . . . loosely organized. In some respects, actually, it was little more than a paper organization in Ministry M. Like the Labor Union it was led by Party members employed in the ministry. Its special responsibility was to implement programs specifically relating to women, but like all mass organizations it was also expected to give general support to the Party in carrying out all policies. In this particular ministry, however, its activities were not extensive and it was relatively unimportant.⁶¹

In County X:

The Women's Association, as would be expected, concerned itself primarily with activities of special interest to women throughout the county. The headquarters of the association was staffed by nine cadres, seven Party members and two non-Party cadres. . . . At the local level, there was both a women's work cadre and a branch of the association in most communes.

Concerned with political as well as welfare work, the association had a variety of responsibilities. During every major campaign, its specific task was to organize special propaganda directed at women, and to mobilize them to support the campaign. It also had primary responsibility for organizing, or at least helping to organize, women to participate in all programs that were aimed specifically at them, such as implementation of the marriage law or the fostering of family planning. The association provided an important outlet for the energies of many activist women, both Party and non-Party members, and it assisted the Party considerably in many different ways. However, its organization was fairly loose, and could not really be compared, in terms of usefulness to the Party, with a more disciplined organization such as the YCL.⁶²

And in a work brigade, B:

The local Women's Association, whose chairwoman was the only woman on the brigade's Party Branch Committee, was a very loosely organized body in Brigade B. It met only infrequently, and was not impressively active. It did, however, promote certain programs, such as home sanitation and birth control, which were especially relevant to women and home management.⁶³

Barnett's descriptions point up several features relevant to the operation of the ACFDW as a mass organization in a, perhaps, totalitarian system:

- (1) the regime controls the organization by means of infiltration of leadership posts;
- (2) the regime can use the organization to perform service functions which are too menial for elite attention;
- (3) the regime can use the organization to "whip up support" for various regime activities;
- (4) the very fact that the ACFDW represents "all women" whether peasants or workers, of one nationality or another, etc., almost insures that no real common ground can be found upon which to build a power-seeking organization (the same cannot be said, for example, of the ACFTU).

For the above reasons, one can conclude that the Chinese regime exercises "totalitarian-type" control over the ACFDW.

Chinese Youth Organizations

The Chinese regime has a long history of utilizing youth groups as control devices for young people. In fact, the founding of the first Communist youth organization

predates by a year the founding of the CCP itself. This early group was named the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, but in 1925 the name was changed to the Chinese Communist Youth Corps.⁶⁴ Jen Pi-shih, a member of the Chinese Communist Politbureau said that the above group "played a preparatory role in the establishment of the Communist Party ideologically and organizationally."⁶⁵ In 1936 when the CCP joined the United Front, the Youth Corps was abandoned and from 1936-1949 the Party sponsored several youth organizations: the Vanguard of Chinese National Liberation, the National Salvation Association of Youth, the Vanguard of Anti-Japanese Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.⁶⁶

As the Chinese Communists expanded their control throughout 1948, they began to amalgamate the various youth groups into one.⁶⁷ "The New Democratic Youth League was established in that year, on an experimental basis, in north China."⁶⁸ This group was to be a "nucleus for mobilizing China's youth, serving as both assistant and reserve strength of the Communist Party."⁶⁹ In the spring of 1949 a series of national conferences set up three youth organizations:

- (1) the All-China Democratic Youth Federation;
- (2) the All-China Democratic Students' Federation;
- (3) the New Democratic Youth League (or Corps).⁷⁰

In October of 1949 the Party organized a fourth group, the Chinese Adolescent and Children Corps, which was the

descendant of such earlier groups as the Labouring Children's League, the Anti-Japanese Young Pioneers.⁷¹ In August of 1953 the name of the Chinese Adolescent and Children's Corps was changed to the Young Pioneers.⁷² "In line with the transition from a society of 'New Democracy' to that of socialism, the New Democratic Youth Corps changed its name to the Chinese Communist Youth Corps [Young Communist League (YCL)] in 1957."⁷³ In this work, the names Young Communist League and Young Pioneers will be used to refer generally to each continuing organization during the 1949-1964 period.

In effect, then, there were four youth groups operating in China from 1949 to 1964:

- (1) Young Communist League
- (2) Young Pioneers
- (3) Student's Federation
- (4) Democratic Youth Federation.

The Democratic Youth Federation was the largest and most loosely knit of the organizations.⁷⁴ Membership in the Federation was composed of organizational units rather than individuals.⁷⁵ The organization's constitution stated that "any nationwide organization established by Chinese youth, including overseas Chinese youth, or youth organizations in various provinces and cities" can join.⁷⁶ The constitution also spelled out the goals of the organization:

The aims of the Federation are to unite youth bodies throughout the country, to promote the welfare of youth, to strive with the people to win a complete

victory for the New Democratic revolution, to accomplish the tasks of constructing a New Democratic country, and to struggle in cooperation with democratic youth all over the world for lasting peace and People's Democracy.⁷⁷

Of course, the Federation was organized on the basis of democratic centralism with important positions being staffed by YCL members and vital leadership positions being filled by CCP members. The original head of the Federation was Liao Ch'eng-chih, who was 43 years old and an alternate member of the Party Central Committee.⁷⁸

A second youth organization was the Student's Federation. The Federation was headed by a national Congress and was naturally based upon democratic centralism. The Congress met biennially and elected an Executive Committee, consisting of at least one delegate from each provincial or municipal organization. The Executive Committee implemented the decisions of the Congress (which was in reality a rubber-stamp group) and also elected a Presidium, which functioned when the Executive Committee was not in session. Through this presidium and the nature of democratic centralism, the Federation was controlled by the regime. The organization was funded by its local affiliates, who were supposed to send 20 percent of their dues to the national organization.⁷⁹ The activities of the organization were divided into five parts (departments):

- (1) Organization
- (2) International liaison
- (3) Welfare

(4) Propaganda

(5) Recreation.⁸⁰

The Federation also has played an active role in the international communist student movement: "At the Second Congress of World Students in Prague in 1950, China was re-elected to a vice chairmanship in the International Union of Students."⁸¹ Article II of the Federation Constitution presented a general outline of the avowed tasks of the group:

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to unite the students throughout the country, in enthusiastic response to Chairman Mao's call "to have good health, to study well, and to work properly"; to thoroughly implement the party's policy of "letting education serve the political interests of the proletariat, and combining education with productive labor"; to make efforts to cultivate ourselves to be both red and expert intellectuals of the working class, so as to struggle to build China into a great and strong Socialist country with highly developed modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture; to strengthen the unity with the students of Socialist countries; to develop friendship and cooperation with the students of various countries; to support the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, so as to exert efforts for the cause of bringing about a lasting peace and the progress of mankind.⁸²

As stated earlier, the Federation was controlled by the regime. The following is an example of this type of control:

A qualified non-Communist foreign observer who left Peking early in 1951 estimated that in one of the leading universities in Peking, which then had a total enrollment of 1,100, there were approximately 200 to 300 members of the Youth League and perhaps 20 members of the Communist Party. According to this observer, the activities of the 1,100 in the student association were determined by the 200-300 League members, who were controlled by the 20 Party members.⁸³

In general, then, the two organizations discussed above were broadly based youth groups with a wide variety of announced ends. Houn states:

Serving as front organizations for the Communist party and enlisting adherents on a less discriminating basis are the All-China Federation of Youth and the All-China Federation of Students. According to the official statement, these two organizations are employed to consolidate and expand the "socialist united front" among the youth organizations, to educate young people from various walks of life, to exhort them to work heroically and to study diligently, to contribute to the construction of a socialist society, and to struggle, in cooperation with young people all over the world, for the preservation of world peace and the abolition of colonialism.⁸⁴

The next organization to be considered, the YCL, had a much greater role in the regime's system of controls.

The YCL was the youth organization most closely tied to the regime and the Party:

Formally defined as the party's "assistant" and charged with the responsibility of imbuing all its members with communist spirit and educating them in Marxist-Leninist theory, the [Chinese Communist Youth] corps is most closely tied to the party itself.⁸⁵

The organization of the YCL was similar to the organizations mentioned above. The official supreme leadership organ was the Congress. When it was not in session the Central Committee of the League acted in its name. "Judging from the nature of its work, the Central Committee is actually the organ which determines the course of youth movement work in China."⁸⁶ The national membership of the organization was not as large as the other youth organizations. Houn reports 23 million members in 920,000 local branches in 1957.⁸⁷

Lewis states that there were 25 million members of the YCL

in 1959.⁸⁸ And Townsend presents the same 25 million figure for 1964.⁸⁹ Thus, the size of the organization was kept in check by the regime. One reason for the elitist nature of the YCL was that it supplied fresh membership material to the CCP. "The YCL is probably the most important source of new party members because of the requirement that applicants for Communist Party membership under 25 years of age be league members. As a general average between 1949 and 1959, approximately 4 out of 10 new members came from the league."⁹⁰ Membership in the YCL itself is for youth of 14 to 25 years, although many of its leaders far exceed the age limit.

The general goals of the YCL were usually described in a very vague sense. The task of the YCL has been described thus:

To act as a bridge between the Party and the young people and as a center from which to unite the youths, to conduct the politico-ideological work among the youths and the children, to publicize the Party's guidelines and policies of different periods, to raise the class consciousness of the youths, and to bring forth their activism and creativity of the building of socialism and communism. (China Youth, #17, Sept. 17, 1962)⁹¹

The meeting of the YCL Central Committee on December 20, 1962, outlined five major tasks for the YCL:

- (1) Implementation of the general line set forth by the Party for the development of the national economy;
- (2) Ideological and educational and organizational work to strengthen the YCL in rural areas, "and with the League members' exemplary action, the broad masses of the

youths are to be rallied together, set in motion and led to fulfill and over-fulfill the various production tasks";

- (3) Education of youth to observe the system, concern themselves with the collective, love and protect public property, and strengthen the communes;
- (4) Exemplary work in performing duties in the communes and carrying out Party policies toward the communes;
- (5) Conducting communist education among the youth in order to strengthen the proletariat and wipe out the bourgeoisie.⁹²

At times, however, the national YCL has undertaken more specific projects. In 1958 they organized 90 million youth to collect manure. In the same year they also organized 60 million to work in water conservation projects and 30 million to work in 1,780,000 youth shock brigades.⁹³

Still, most of the YCL activity took place at the local level:

The local organizations of the Young Communist League are set up according to the administrative divisions at present in force in mainland China. These organizations have the right to decide on the concrete work of the youth movement in their respective locality, but they generally take orders from the upper hierarchy for transmittal below.

However, the most essential link of the YCL is its primary-level organizations which are set up with local organizations, companies, enterprises, and production units as their units, League branches or sub-branches are then set up according to the number of League members in the respective unit.

These organizations at the primary level are charged with the responsibility of directly mobilizing the League members and other youth for participation in various kinds of work and of organizing them for studies

of politico-ideological education, as well as of recruiting new members for the League. In addition to being charged with this, the units constitute the fundamental organizations through which the Chinese Communists push their youth movement work.⁹⁴

Barnett provides some insights into the day-to-day functioning of the YCL at the local level. He discusses the operation of the YCL unit in a central ministry, a county, and a production brigade. In Ministry M the YCL was an important instrument for aiding the Party supervision of non-Party cadres. As noted earlier, most of the YCL leadership positions were held by "overage" but politically dependable persons in order to facilitate Party control of the organization. The YCL in Ministry M served three functions. First, and most importantly, it was an arm of the Party in supervising ministry work. Second, it was a screening apparatus for potential Party members. Third, it sponsored some social and cultural events.⁹⁵

The YCL played a larger role in County X, where it often served as a replacement for a Party organization much more thin in resources than the Party organization of Ministry M. Like the YCL in Ministry M, most of the leadership was overage (an estimated 16 percent of the total membership of County X's YCL was overage). Unlike Ministry M, however, the YCL in the county provided a larger proportion of the leadership cadres in the county than the parallel YCL organization did for the ministry. This enabled the Party to supervise the county: "Since YCL members functioned under direct Party leadership and were

subject, in effect, to Party discipline, one might say that the top elite in County X, including both Party and YCL members, consisted of more than fourteen thousand persons, or over 3 percent of the population--rather than 1 to 2 percent, the figure if only Party members were counted."⁹⁶

Finally, in a production brigade:

The YCL operated here as elsewhere as a Party-controlled subsidiary for youth, and as already stated, was headed by a member of the Party Branch Committee. It had over thirty members scattered throughout the brigade, organized into one YCL Branch. Its meetings were quite frequent, but were more irregular than those of the Party. The YCL, in turn, led the Young Pioneers organization, which had close to one hundred members, who were pupils in brigade primary schools. A YCL member who taught in one of the three primary schools in the brigade directed the Pioneers.⁹⁷

Thus the role of the YCL was that of a typical organization under totalitarian control. The members were used as agents to exercise mass control, and at the same time the organization itself was kept under the constant control of the regime.

This dual role can be seen in the relationship between the YCL and the Young Pioneers. The Young Pioneers was an organization for children aged 9 to 15. The membership of this organization steadily increased during the 1949-1964 period (especially in contrast to the YCL membership policy) as can be seen in Table 3.⁹⁸ The Young Pioneers was strongly attached to the YCL organization. The official tasks of the Young Pioneers were:

Under the leadership of the Communist Youth League, in its study and various collective activities, the Young Pioneers should unite with and educate adolescents and children in possession of rich cultural and scientific knowledge, a perfect physique and the virtues of the "five loves." [love the fatherland, love the people, love labor, love science, love public property]⁹⁹

TABLE 3
YOUNG PIONEERS' MEMBERSHIP 1949-1960

Time	Membership (1,000's)	Source
Oct. 1949	478	<u>People's Daily</u>
Dec. 1950	1,900	<u>Hsin-hua Monthly</u>
Dec. 1951	3,000	<u>Hsin-hua Monthly</u>
Dec. 1952	5,200	<u>People's Daily</u>
June 1953	7,000	<u>Hsin-hua Daily</u>
June 1954	8,000	<u>People's Daily</u>
May 1955	10,000	<u>People's Daily</u>
May 1956	25,000	<u>China Youth Daily</u>
Feb. 1957	30,000	<u>People's Daily</u>
June 1958	35,000	<u>People's Daily</u>
June 1959	44,000	<u>People's Daily</u>
May 1960	50,000	<u>People's Daily</u>

Barnett illustrates the closeness of these ties in his description of Young Pioneer activity in County X:

Itself responsible to the Party, the YCL in turn was in charge of organizing and running a subsidiary organization for children, called the Young Pioneers (shao nien hsien feng tui, or shao hsien tui, for short) made up of youngsters aged nine to fifteen. The YCL's

School Work Department directed the Pioneers' activities, which consisted for the most part of recreation and indoctrination designed to inculcate basic Party-approved values and attitudes into children. The Pioneers were organized mainly in the schools. Perhaps 35 to 40 percent of primary school children--including many, if not most, of the brightest and most energetic ones--took part in its programs. Understandably, the YCL drew a significant number of its members from those who had come to its attention because of their activities in the Pioneers. The YCL and the Pioneers constituted, therefore, a pipeline for recruitment to the Party elite that enabled the leaders to select, train, and test potential Party members from a very young age.¹⁰⁰

Thus the Young Pioneers formed a lower echelon mass organization under the direction of the YCL, which was itself controlled by the regime.

This discussion of the regime's relations with youth organizations has demonstrated the totalitarian need for constant monitoring of activities as well as the totalitarian desire for "proper" socialization of the young. Furthermore, the relationships of the regime to the YCL, and the YCL to the other youth organizations has demonstrated the totalitarian need to operate at several levels of surveillance and control. Here, as in other mass organizations, democratic centralism has served as a useful device for totalitarian control of mass organizations.

The All-China Trade Union Federation

Trade unions in China have operated under the controlling conditions of the regime since their formation in 1949. They have been subject to all the delicate balancing which is an integral part of the totalitarian control. They have always been conceived of as "transmission

belts" based upon the ideas of democratic centralism. The preamble of the Trade Union Constitution stated that "the trade unions of China are the mass organizations of the working class led by the Party and are the transmission belt between Party and the masses."¹⁰¹ This section will attempt to demonstrate that the Chinese regime had successfully (prior to the Cultural Revolution) managed to utilize the unions while at the same time preventing them from becoming competing centers of power. As Barnett writes:

The Federation [of Labor] has little resemblance to trade unions in non-communist countries. It is really a mass political organization through which the regime controls labor, and this is most clearly symbolized by the fact that unions have no right to strike. Stress is laid upon members' obligations, not their rights, so that the primary mission of the unions is to see that Party and government policies are implemented, and to strive for higher production.¹⁰²

Although the activities of the trade unions varied widely from 1949 to 1964, the structure of the Federation remained stable. The national organization of the trade unions was subdivided in two vertical fashions, according to occupation and also according to geographical administrative units. There was a federation of trade unions in each county and province, and these were all united under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).¹⁰³ In 1954 there were 23 nationwide industrial unions, while the geographical subdivisions ended in 180,000 basic branches.¹⁰⁴ This dual system of division is a classic example of the totalitarian regime's desire to keep every organization from developing the potential to become a unified power base.

At the apex of the ACFTU was the All-China Congress of Trade Unions, which met every four years. It theoretically acted upon reports from the Executive Committee, but it was, of course, a rubber-stamp. The Congress elected an Executive Committee and an Auditing Commission. "In the interim between congresses, the 98 member Executive Committee is responsible for implementing the decisions of the Congress and giving leadership to the trade union work of the nation (article 16)."¹⁰⁵ Another major task of the Executive Committee has been to attempt to instigate trade union agitation outside of mainland China.¹⁰⁶ The Executive Committee elected a 24-member Presidium and an eight-member Secretariat. The Secretariat conducted the routine work of the organization while the Presidium was "the interim body for implementing the decisions of both the Congress and the Executive Committee."¹⁰⁷ Peter Tang then concludes, "In this as in so many other organizations, then, the principle of democratic centralism makes it possible to concentrate the fate of the entire trade union movement in a very few hands."¹⁰⁸

At the other end of the trade unions are the some 180,000 local branches mentioned above. Townsend states:

In the case of the trade unions, a primary organization may be established in any enterprise or establishment with ten or more trade union members. In larger enterprises, the primary committee may set up subordinate committees at the workshop level and trade union groups on the basis of production or office units. Trade union groups elect their own leaders, while the primary committees are elected by general meetings of members or by congresses of members' representatives. The

creation of such small branches facilitates frequent meetings, direct personal contact between leaders and ordinary members, and the existence of a trade union organization in even the smallest production unit. It also requires the services of large numbers of activists who are regular workers, rather than full-time union cadres, but who engage in official union work in their off-duty hours. In 1957, there were almost four million such activists, about 30 percent of the national trade union membership.¹⁰⁹

Membership in these branches had grown considerably in the period under discussion. In 1948 there were an estimated 2,830,000 union members,¹¹⁰ but by 1953 the number had grown to 10,200,000¹¹¹ and by 1957 it had pushed past 11,000,000.¹¹² This represented over 90 percent of the industrial workers in the country and a majority of all urban workers in the country.¹¹³ This does not mean, however, that all the trade union members were industrial workers, the 1950 Trade Union Law stated that membership was open to all wage earners whose livelihood was based mainly upon wages. The China News Analysis states:

Trade Unions in China embrace not only industrial workers but, . . . , all manual and non-manual workers whose wages constitute their sole or main source of livelihood. There are Unions not only in the industries, but also in government offices, schools, cultural organizations, etc.¹¹⁴

Thus one can see the totalitarian regime at work again. Specifically, the regime feared that a union movement based entirely upon industrial workers would have too great a potential for a real shared interest. Thus the regime sought to weaken the common interests of the organization by including all sorts of extraneous groups.

The entire Federation apparatus was supported by the dues and employer contributions paid to it. The management contributed the equivalent of two percent of its payroll while members' dues amounted to about one percent of their wages.¹¹⁵ The members paid a membership fee after applying for admission and if they fell more than six months behind in their dues they could be expelled. This action was taken by the lowest unit and confirmed by its immediate superior.¹¹⁶ "A membership card must be kept carefully because a person who loses one is subjected to public criticism and re-education and special sanctions may be applied according to the gravity of his negligence. Then a new card may be issued."¹¹⁷ However, it will be shown later, in Barnett's discussion of unions in government branches, that upper echelon members, especially Party members, considered union dues and meetings of little importance.

The link between the union leadership and the members mentioned above was democratic centralism. However, before discussing the relation of democratic-centralism to the unions, it is necessary to add that the unions did perform some other functions. These functions were quasi-governmental and were of more a service than a control nature. The Federation:

1. in co-operation with the Ministry of Labor arranged contracts between labor and state-owned or joint public-private enterprises;
2. is involved in the administration of factories and welfare services such as social insurance, health plans, maternity benefits, and vacations;

3. is involved in a broad program of cultural and educational activities;
 - A. it runs the Workers' Publishing House and promotes the sale of its publications,
 - B. in co-operation with the Ministry of Education it has started spare-time schools for workers in fields of:
 - (1) general education in order to reduce illiteracy,
 - (2) technical training;
4. most importantly, activates and mobilizes the workers and attempts to improve labor productivity.¹¹⁸

For the purposes of the regime, however, the most important function of the trade unions was their service as transmission belts to the workers, and the key to this role is democratic centralism. The Constitution of the ACFTU exemplified democratic centralism in mass organizations:

- (1) the leadership organs of trade unions at all levels shall be produced by democratic election from below and make periodic reports to members on the work performed;
- (2) trade union organizations at all levels must carry out their work in accordance with the Constitution and resolutions of trade unions;
- (3) all decisions of trade unions organizations must be passed by majority vote of members present; and
- (4) trade union organizations at the lower level shall obey those of the higher level.¹¹⁹

In spite of the rhetoric, democratic centralism has seemed to operate in only one direction--from the top down. Harper writes:

For the Chinese Communists, with their commitment to mobilizing the masses in order to effect industrial progress as well as political action, both of these elements--democracy and centralism--are essential. Thus, the Chairman of the ACFTU could declare that, if the factory operates only on the basis of centralized rule, then the leadership cannot help but become alienated from the workers; if the factory were run wholly by the workers in a purist sort of syndicalism, anarchy would be the result and, though the workers in that factory might be satisfied, the interests of the whole country would not be served. But each attempt by the unions to implement the democratic aspect of democratic centralism in China's enterprises has

ultimately succumbed to an imposition of control by the enterprise leadership, centralist in fact and democratic only in name.¹²⁰

This lack of a two-way flow was most heavily felt by the union cadre, mentioned above. He could not blindly follow Party orders or he would be accused of remaining aloof and attacked for "commandism." On the other hand, if he stood up for the interests of the workers against the Party, he was accused of "tailism" or "economism." Here the regime managed to play the Party off against the union, and thus confuse the loyalties of the cadre. Harper contends:

The conscientious union cadre will at some point continue to press against Party decisions on behalf of the workers. But when this occurs, whenever the transmission belt begins to function in a truly two-way manner, the Party perceives a threat to its rule and accuses the trade union of seeking independence from the Party and succumbing to "economism," that is, considering only the interests of the industrial workers.¹²¹

The cadres were also aware of their own elevated position, vis-à-vis the rest of the workers:

The mistrust between trade union cadres and the workers is reciprocal. The majority of the workers, those who are not ambitious activists, belong to the category called "masses." Party-members and cadres are afraid that they will be contaminated by contact with the impure and they will be blamed, if not now then at some future mental purge, for having fraternized with the masses.¹²²

In the above two commentaries one can find two manners in which the regime controlled the unions: (1) the cadres, who were the union leadership at lower levels, were always kept off guard, so to speak, and were thus deprived of the

stability needed to establish a power base; and (2) a feeling of mistrust was encouraged between the union cadres and the workers, thus preventing a coalition of masses and leadership from forming around common causes.

Finally, the regime had one powerful weapon it used to control the unions, monopolization of leadership positions. With only one exception, all Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen, and Secretaries of the ACFTU have been Party members. Six of the 19 members of the ACFTU Secretariat since 1953 were also members or alternates of the CCP Central Committee. The ACFTU Executive Committee was almost totally composed of CCP members. Ninety-one percent of the almost 1,000 delegates to the Eighth Trade Union Congress in December of 1957 were Party members.¹²³ "We may assume, then, that 95 percent or more of the ACFTU Executive Committee members are also CCP members, who in Lenin's words, 'carry out the directives of the Party'."¹²⁴ Therefore, the Party had another lever for the control of the ACFTU.

Thus far several methods the regime had used to control the trade unions have been discussed. One can find these methods at work by examining the development of the trade unions from 1949 to 1964. The strategies for regime control of the ACFTU had all been actively applied vis-à-vis the unions during the 1949-1964 period. The entire period was an example of the regime's balancing act; that is, the attempt to utilize the unions to achieve certain ends but at the same time the fear of the unions becoming a separate

power base. Thus the period saw a series of union attempts to represent the workers, immediately followed by regime oppression of the unions. Yet the oppression was never strong enough to completely crush the unions and thus end their utility to the regime.

The development of the ACFTU may be broken into three periods:¹²⁵ (1) the period when Li Li-san was the dominating force in the ACFTU (1948-1952); (2) the period when Lai Jo-yu was chairman (1952-1948); and (3) a period of "normalization" of union utility preceding the Cultural Revolution (1958-1964). The ACFTU (which is synonymous with the All-China Federation of Labor) was initially founded in 1925 by the Second All-China Congress of Labor. It was reconstituted in 1948 by the Sixth Congress of Labor.¹²⁶ Li Li-san was made First Vice-Chairman of the ACFTU in August of 1948, a position which he held until May of 1953.¹²⁷ Li had previously been in the USSR for a lengthy period and it is possible that he resented the Maoist cast of the Party, a Party which Li himself had once sought to shape. Perhaps this is the reason for Li's attempt to use the ACFTU to expand his power, and thus the power of the unions themselves.

Immediately following the Communist victory, the unions, perhaps intoxicated by the "proletarian" victory, engaged in a series of strikes which virtually crippled the industrial capacity of the country. The Party was

understandably concerned with this situation, and was also faced with a severe economic crisis in March-June of 1950.¹²⁸ "Acting firmly, the Party instructed the unions to exert discipline and restore production, which they did, speaking strictly on behalf of management in the state enterprises and siding with the owners in private enterprises."¹²⁹ Then in late 1950, Li began to make his influence felt. A rectification campaign in late 1950 saw ". . . the unions being accused of having separated themselves from the worker masses."¹³⁰ The vertical basis of union direction was emphasized over the horizontal controls of Party mechanisms. In this fashion Li, operating at the apex of the structure of national unions, could increase his own authority.¹³¹ Li also made other moves to fortify his position:

Li also moved to strengthen his influence over the ACFTU propaganda and communications organs. In December, 1950, a new editor was appointed for the ACFTU newspaper, Kung-jen jih-pao; this man was purged in 1957 as a "revisionist," with some cause. At the same time a new editorial committee was set up for the monthly ACFTU organ, Chung-kou Kung-jen, with Li as committee head. The editorial trend of Chung-kou kung-jen during 1951 may aptly be described as leaning towards economism.¹³²

By 1951 the union movement was reaching a peak:

Rather than serving merely as a pipeline for Party and management, the unions began to identify with and advocate the interests of the workers. The unions had been siding with the authority in both public and private enterprises; their increased attention in 1951 to workers' interests placed them at odds with the Party, which, after all, must identify itself with national, as opposed to only workers', interests. The consequent tendency of the unions was towards autonomy in relations with the Party, as well as the rise of economism.¹³³

By early 1952 the unions, and Li Li-san, had accumulated enough power to worry the regime. Barnett describes some of the various roles of the unions during this period:

In some cities in China, all contracts between state agencies and private enterprises must now be signed by union representatives who together with representatives of the enterprises' senior staff members sit in on the contract negotiations, review contracts, and help to determine "legitimate profits." Because of the detailed knowledge of operations that union members now possess, they are called upon particularly to review cost estimates made by the managers of private enterprises.

Unions have also been given a share of responsibility for internal plant management in private factories, which they exercise through Labor-Management Consultative Committees. The line separating management and union responsibilities in this respect is sometimes rather vague, and there have been cases in which the Communists have reprimanded unions for going too far in encroaching upon management functions, reminding them that their job is merely to supervise and that the managers of private enterprises do still have basic responsibility for managerial functions.¹³⁴

He then adds:

Labor unions have also developed into an increasingly important instrument of government control over private enterprises. During the Five-Anti campaign, they were used, in accordance with the basic principles of class warfare, as one of the principal means of applying pressure on businessmen and extracting information and confessions from them. They were not only strengthened organizationally during the campaign, but their economic-control functions were also substantially increased.¹³⁵

Thus by early 1952 the ACFTU had taken several steps in the direction of increasing control over the affairs of its members. It was attempting to establish authority of its own. "Li was seeking to make the unions a power base operationally independent of the Party; the unions were later accused of pursuing autonomy and of a distinct trend

towards economism, a more or less correct evaluation by the CCP of the situation."¹³⁶ Li's attempts to use the unions as a power base were abruptly halted in early 1952 by the regime's decision to crush the potential threat and his replacement by Lai Jo-yu. "Li Li-san was purged from his ACFTU leadership in early 1952 and from then until at least 1955 the unions neglected workers' interests and concentrated on the interests of the state, notably in working with management to increase production."¹³⁷ Lai was appointed ACFTU Secretary-General in 1952 and elected Chairman in 1953.¹³⁸ Lai had had no previous experience in union activities, thus the regime was once again attempting to prevent the rise of a real interest group by attacking the communality of the group's interest. Harper summarizes the Li Li-san era:

And thus ended the first period in China under Communist rule when the trade unions sought to function ideally in their transmission belt role. In order to function properly, a mass organization requires a modicum of operational independence from absolute Party control, at least enough so that it will not be viewed solely as another arm of authority by the masses it is supposed to represent. Only thus can it transmit back up to the Party the actual mood and desires of the masses, so that the Party may follow the mass line in a meaningful manner. But in 1951 the CCP chose to interpret the unions' efforts to represent the interests of the workers as a threat to Party control; the result was a return to absolute dominance by the Party, subservience by the unions.¹³⁹

Lai was head of the ACFTU from 1952 until his death in 1958. The 1952-1956 period was one of quiet and strict control of the unions by the regime. A statement of the

Seventh Congress reflects this attitude:

In May, 1953, at a time when the regime was shifting its emphasis to the industrialization program and the transition to socialism, the seventh congress of the organization reaffirmed its broad aims in the following terms: ". . . to unite and educate the workers and raise their political consciousness; to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance, and unite with the people of all other strata to actively fulfill the national construction plan; and on the basis of developing production, to improve the workers' material and cultural life step by step; and to strive for the early industrialization of the country and its transition to Socialism."¹⁴⁰

In 1954, the ACFTU reiterated its position on its proper role in the regime's scheme of things:

The Workers Daily, organ of the All-China Federation of Labor in Peking, defined the responsibilities of the unions as follows, in an article published on May Day this year [1954]: "Under the leadership of the Economy Checkup Committee, trade unionists should organize the working masses to supervise the capitalists so that they may be restrained from repeating acts of the 'five poisons.' This is the main task confronting employees and workers in private enterprises." Their main responsibility, in short, is to help the government control private enterprises rather than to concern themselves with problems of more direct concern to workers.¹⁴¹

However, by 1956 Lai was beginning to be co-opted by the very organization he was originally assigned to control. This phenomenon is not unusual, as any student of American independent regulatory agencies and commissions can verify. Also, the "Blooming" of 1957 gave added impetus to workers' desires to make their interests known, although it must be stated that the unions themselves were not directly involved in the criticisms of the regime. What did happen was that the unions once again, under the

guidance of Lai, returned to the road of economism. "Lai Jo-yu, the Party leader assigned to bring the unions back under the thumb of the Party in 1952, led the union battle behind the scenes against the new Party line in 1957."¹⁴² Lai made several statements indicating his desire to see the unions strengthened in their position in society:

Lai Jo-yu, then Chairman of the ACFTU, spoke to the [Eighth] Party Congress on the work of the unions. Reviewing the state of industrial democracy in industrial management, he too stressed the need for a return to the worker masses. Although the unions might need the guidance and help of the Party in the plant, he pointed out that it was the union's responsibility not only to "educate the workers and employees to take a correct attitude toward the interests of the state" but also to "organize them to safeguard their personal interests."¹⁴³

At the same time Lai stated that "the particular role of the unions was 'to protect the welfare and democratic rights of the mass of workers and employees'."¹⁴⁴ Harper concludes that during this period:

The trade union leadership--an integral part of that Party leadership--was more interested in fostering worker participation in all areas of management, including the material interests of the workers, through the councils. This was a harbinger at the highest levels of the coming clash between the unions and the CCP, for the unions were at this point once more embarked on the path of economism and were seeking ways to achieve operational autonomy from the Party. They found strong support for economism and independence even at the highest levels in the Party; revelations of the Cultural Revolution make it clear that Liu Shao-ch'i, Honorary Chairman of the ACFTU and long identified with the labor movement, backed the unions in 1956-57.¹⁴⁵

At this point there was an internal Party debate over the proper role of the trade unions, a debate which ended in a victory for those committed to the centralization

of power and a defeat for those who worked to encourage trade union autonomy.¹⁴⁶ "When the 8th Trade Union Congress was held in December 1957, Lai Jo-yu himself led the series of speeches proclaiming the submission of the unions to Party control."¹⁴⁷ Townsend states:

In a speech at the Eighth Trade Union Congress in December, 1957, only fifteen months after he had spoken out for the workers' interests at the Eighth Party Congress, Lai Jo-yu stated that worker wages and welfare benefits had to be considered in the light of overall national interests and the development of production. Lai added that two questions had been common to all great debates on trade union policy since 1949: Should the trade unions accept Party leadership? Should the trade unions regard production as their central task? Needless to say, he answered both affirmatively and said mistakes had arisen when either had been denied.¹⁴⁸

The Party continued to closely monitor the ACFTU activities but no purge of the union leadership occurred until after Lai's death in May of 1958.¹⁴⁹ Liu Ning-yi became ACFTU Chairman in August of 1958, at which time most of Lai's economism-oriented colleagues were purged from the top leadership positions and transferred downward.¹⁵⁰ "In Liu Ning-yi's first speech as ACFTU Chairman, he declared that trade unions must work under the unified leadership and unified arrangements of the Central Committee of the CCP and its local committees at various levels'."¹⁵¹ Harper characterizes the weakness of the unions during the 1958-1964 period:

The theme of strong Party committee leadership over the unions was stressed in the workers' press during the remainder of 1958. With the Great Leap Forward and its radically altered industrial policies, and with economism and opportunism within the trade unions repressed,

the unions in China entered an era of quiescence. From 1960 until the Cultural Revolution, one may legitimately characterize the trade union treatment in the press as dull and boring. The unions had submitted to the Party completely, were referred to as a "pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat," and had become to all outward appearances nothing more than a subdued mouthpiece of the Party and an arm for worker control.¹⁵²

The trade union movement was in the firm control of the regime. The China News Analysis contends that during the food shortages of the Great Leap period the trade unions were used to suppress complaints of workers.¹⁵³ The general blandness of that era is typified in an announcement put out by the fourth meeting of the Executive Committee of the ACFTU in 1962 (November 19 to December 13, 1962). The main objectives of trade union activity inside China were stated as:

- (1) an economy campaign that should reach down to each worker and group of workers;
- (2) the promotion of the old formula of labor emulation;
- (3) assistance to collective economies of the communes;
- (4) promotion of activists;
- (5) more activity in commerce, State farms, cities and countries;
- (6) care for the livelihood of clerks and workers and help them to solve their problems.¹⁵⁴

Finally, Barnett provides an insight into the day-to-day functioning of the unions during this period of relative inactivity. He discusses union activity in Ministry M:

The Labor Union (kung hui) in Ministry M was also a Party-created and directed organization, but it was more loosely organized and less important [than the Y.C.L.]. It was headed by a chairman (chu hsi), a deputy chairman (fu chu hsi), and several committee-men responsible for special fields such as welfare (fu li) and culture and sports (wen t'i). These were part-time positions held by persons with regular ministry jobs. All the union's leadership and functionary posts were held by Party members. The union was not particularly active in Ministry M, however (or reputedly, in some other ministries either). Membership which was open to both Party and non-Party members, was voluntary. Most employees of the ministry joined, even though this involved payment of dues (1 percent of salary), because the union administered certain important welfare programs, including labor insurance, and provided some recreational facilities and educational programs. It organized biweekly film showings, for example, as well as special annual outings. Every Wednesday evening, normally from 7:00 to 9:00 P.M., there was a union "life and self-criticism meeting" (sheng huo chien t'ao hui), but attendance was fairly irregular; many Party members, in particular, missed a great many of these meetings. In short, the labor union was not a center of power or influence in any way comparable to the Party, although it did perform some useful functions under Party direction.¹⁵⁵

And of County X he states:

Theoretically, the General Labor Union was an organization established for "workers" throughout the county, including state cadres as well as industrial and commercial workers. In practice, however, not many Party members participated actively in its programs, and its activities were designed for non-Party state cadres even more than for ordinary workers.

The county headquarters of the union had a staff of eight state cadres. Only one, the chairman (chu hsi), was a Party member, although some of the others belonged to the YCL. Under the chairman, there were a clerical secretary (wen shu); four welfare cadres (fu li kan pu), who also acted as cultural workers (wen hua yuan); one statistician (t'ung chi yuan) who collected the monthly dues; and a management cadre (kuan li yuan).

Each government organization and economic enterprise in the county had a branch of the union, but the organization of the branches was minimal, generally with just a single cadre designated as head (fu tze jen). In government organs, the personnel cadre or cadres were normally responsible for union work.

Altogether, there were perhaps four to five hundred members in the union in County X. They paid 1 percent of their salary monthly as dues, but collection of these dues was much more lax than in Party organizations. Every Saturday, during the period when the Party branches met, the union convened meetings of its own, attended by non-Party cadres.

The union maintained one sizable headquarters building and also had space in several other locations for "cultural palaces" (wen hua kung) and recreation clubs (chu lo pu). Its main activities were in the fields of welfare, recreation, and propaganda. In addition to operating the cultural and recreational centers, it maintained a library and ran a night school which provided literacy training.

In political terms the union was not a very important organization in County X, partly because the number of workers in "factories" and other economic enterprises was relatively small. It did, however, provide some useful services to the non-Party working force, especially those persons employed in the county seat.¹⁵⁶

One can therefore easily see that the general history of the ACFTU in China has been one of subjugation to the regime--a regime which performed a delicate balancing act of control and exploitation, an act which required the use of a wide variety of totalitarian control devices.

At the outset of this section, seven methods of regime control over the ACFTU were presented (the symbols following each statement are "keys" to the initial propositions presented at the end of Chapter II):

- (1) a system of dual vertical rule, instituted in order to confuse lines of authority within the organization (C);
- (2) the use of a gallery of figureheads as a rubber-stamp device, in this case the Congress of the ACFTU (C,3);
- (3) the desire to keep membership not restricted to industrial workers, thus helping to prevent the formation

of a "real" common felt need or interest in the organization (D);

- (4) the playing of Party directives against worker needs, commandism vs. tailism, to keep union cadres in a state of uncertainty and insecurity (C,1);
- (5) the promotion of mutual distrust between union cadres and workers, once again to prevent communality of interests (C);
- (6) Party monopolization of union leadership positions (A,2);
- (7) the separation of expertise from leadership, in this case the imposition of Lai, who had had no previous union experience, as head of the ACFTU in order to prevent a pocket of specialty from forming (B,2).

By means of the above measures, the regime managed to control the unions in the 1949-1964 period. The unions were not allowed to function as representative groups or to become centers of power. Tang states:

In theoretical terms, the Communists reject the notion that a trade union can concern itself primarily with the economic aims of wages, hours, job security, and the like; instead they insist upon the identity of interests between the union and the state.

In practical terms, the Communists, in China as elsewhere, insist that the freedom of workers to organize and bargain collectively be restricted, and that only those unions approved by the regime (and dominated by the Party) be allowed to exist.¹⁵⁷

Townsend substantially agrees:

The trade union debate over workers' interests has been . . . complex. On the one hand, there have been consistent complaints from the workers and even from high-ranking union officials that the trade unions have sacrificed workers' interests in their efforts to maintain industrial harmony and increase production. These

complaints have undoubtedly been encouraged by high expectations about labor's position in a socialist society and by the Party's reluctance to stifle mass initiative in the proletarian ranks. On the other hand, the Party has insisted that workers' interests cannot take precedence over national interests. It has acknowledged that some trade union cadres and organizations have failed to represent the workers and that the unions must improve in this respect, but it has also branded as "economism" or "trade unionism" all attempts to use the unions as political weapons in the defense of workers' interests. . . . we can say that the trade unions have shown tendencies toward greater representation of their members' interests but that all of these tendencies have been checked and heavily criticized.¹⁵⁸

And the Union Research Service sums up the case quite strongly by stating:

Two conclusions emerge. . . . Firstly [sic], that the unions, dominated by cadres, have no power in themselves to seek redress for the ills of its [sic] members. Thus it can do only so far as the party permits [sic]. Secondly, that the Communist Party is the self-declared representative of the proletariat [sic]. Its' [sic] policies, dictated by persons largely not of proletarian background, are ipso facto declared to represent the interests of the proletariat. Those who disagree are classed as bourgeois.¹⁵⁹

Therefore, like the other organizations, the ACFTU and its trade unions during the 1949-1964 period, were exploited and controlled by the Chinese regime.

This chapter has analyzed the roles of the various types of mass organizations in China during the 1949-1964 period. In each discussion of each group the role of the regime, as it relates to the propositions outlined at the end of Chapter II, has been pointed out. Based upon these discussions, one can only conclude that the Chinese regime used a wide variety of totalitarian devices to manipulate

the organizations and preserve that delicate balance between utilization and suppression which is necessary to the totalitarian regime. The major problem encountered by the regime was the longevity of the organizations. The case of Lai and the ACFTU is a fine example. Merely because of a prolonged association a sense of loyalty was built, and thus a potential power base was created. In the next chapter, the discussion will center around mass movements, which were sporadic and extremely transitory and were therefore more useful and less threatening to the regime.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

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¹⁹Tang, p. 333.

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⁴⁵Karol, pp. 264-265.

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⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Townsend, p. 155.

⁵⁴Tang, p. 332.

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⁵⁶Townsend, p. 151n.

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⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

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⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

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- 125 This breakdown roughly corresponds to that of Harper's. For a complete and detailed account of the ACFTU from 1949 through the Cultural Revolution, see Harper, "The Party and the Unions . . . "
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CHAPTER V

MASS CAMPAIGNS

The Mass-Line Philosophy

One vital key to understanding the role of mass campaigns in Chinese society is an awareness of the mass-line philosophy, or perhaps psuedo-philosophy, of the regime. The regime itself publically announced the crucial role of this policy in its operation. A Jen Min Jih Pao editorial stated, "The fundamental policy of the Party, is the policy of mass line."¹

The general meaning of mass-line policy had developed with the initial period of Mao's leadership of the Party. But by the early 1940's the concept had assumed the form it would keep, virtually unchanged, until 1964.² A Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, stated this position:

In all practical work of our Party, correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses." This means summing up (i.e., coordinating and systematising after careful study) the views of the masses (i.e., views scattered and unsystematic), then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularising them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own, stand up for them and translate them into action by way of testing their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to sum up the views of the masses, and once again take the resulting ideas back to the masses so that the

masses give them their wholehearted support. . . . And so on, over and over again, so that each time these ideas emerge with greater correctness and become more vital and meaningful.³

At the same time, Mao himself wrote:

We should go into the midst of the masses, learn from them, sum up their experiences so that these experiences will become well-defined principles and methods, and then explain them to the masses (through agitation work), and call upon the masses to put them into practice in order to solve their problems and lead them to liberation and happiness.⁴

Townsend views the mass-line as containing two separate, but closely related, aspects of the Party's role in society.⁵

The first aspect of the mass-line is that it is a general statement concerning the Party's need to stay in constant and intimate contact with the masses.⁶ This aspect assigns great powers and wisdom to the people as a whole: "Every cause led by the Party, be it revolution or construction, is the people's own and must be achieved by the people themselves. Party policies must rely on the people for realization."⁷ Liu Shao-chi also pointed out the need for this contact with the masses, but his attention was more oriented toward the "backward" masses in the society:

In accordance with the mass line, the majority, that is the intermediate and the backward elements, must be taken care of, otherwise the advanced sections will become isolated and nothing can be done satisfactorily. The slogans of action and the forms of struggle and of organization we put forward before the masses must be acceptable to the intermediate and backward elements. The development of the self-consciousness and self-activity of the masses concerns chiefly these people. A mass movement is possible only when these people are awakened and inspired to action. . . .

Our sole intention is to attract and to set in motion the intermediate and the backward elements through the active elements. In other words, it is

for rallying the broadest possible masses that the active elements are to be organized. If the intermediate and backward masses are not yet awakened, we must know how to enlighten them as well as how to wait for them.⁸

Thus the first aspect of the mass-line philosophy, in its theoretical form, is a concern for the utilization of the energy and genius of the masses.

The second aspect of the formal mass-line concept refers to proper leadership styles for cadres and for the Party in general. This aspect of the mass-line concerns the synthesis of mass activity and Party leadership which should be used to implement policy:⁹

The procedure is summed up as "coming from the masses and going to the masses." This means that the scattered and unsystematic views of the masses are to be collected by Party organizations, carefully studied and coordinated, and then turned into statements of Party policy. Because of this process, the CCP claims that it "learns from the masses" and that all its policies originate with the masses.¹⁰

A resolution adopted by the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in December, 1958, illustrates the use of mass-line philosophy as a leadership principle (it is the "golden mean" between commandism and tailism):

Following the 1957-1958 rectification campaign, the party's mass line achieved a new, great victory. The great leap forward in socialist construction and the setting up of people's communes throughout the rural areas are two signal marks of this victory. The mass-line working method of the party is the lifeblood of the people's communes. The setting up and consolidation of the people's communes is impossible without the mass line, without the full faith of the people in the party and in the People's Government, and without an upsurge in the revolutionary zeal of the masses. Therefore, leading functionaries of all levels in the commune must put the mass line thoroughly into practice in every type of work tackled. They must look upon

themselves as ordinary working people, and treat the commune members in a comradely way. Kuomintang and bourgeois styles of work which coerce the masses are strictly prohibited. Because of the big leap forward in production and the victory in setting up communes, some cadres are beginning to get dizzy with success; and, unwilling to do patient work of educating the masses by persuasion, they are exhibiting certain rude attitudes.¹¹

Formally, then, the mass-line would seem to be a philosophy of adhering strictly to the wishes of the people. The regime is, in effect, nothing more than the articulator of the people's desires and the cadres are the collectors of information. In China, however, the mass-line in practice is not at all the same as the mass-line in theory.

It was stated earlier in this work that ideology is a tool in the totalitarian regime's quest for power, and not the other way around. In China, the mass-line can be seen to be a philosophy intended to gain mass enthusiasm while preserving regime control. Four points can be made which will support and illuminate the above contention.

First, the mass-line is a hollow shell of a philosophy. It has been used to cover such a variety of behavior that it cannot be said to possess intrinsic meaning. Yu states:

Like class consciousness, this mass line has become something of a political myth of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a policy to which almost every Communist Party member refers in almost every speech or writing for almost every occasion. They talk forever about the "harmonious unity with the masses," "the viewpoint of the masses," "wisdom of the masses," "sanction of the masses," etc. Almost every program or policy of the Party is "demanded," "desired," and "initiated" by the masses. It is the "creative initiative" and "highly elevated political

consciousness" of the masses that result in their "volunteering" to go to the Korean front, "demanding" the suppression of "reactionaries, counter-revolutionaries and rightists," "insisting" on various mass movements, or "petitioning" for the realization of the commune program. It even appears that the Party rarely does anything without the "sanction of the masses." Nothing in Communist China, one can be sure, is or can be divorced from this seemingly sacred doctrine of mass line.¹²

Second, the constant insistence that regime directions are really the desires of the people (here one can see the re-emergence of Rousseau's "General Will" and his notion that people can fail to perceive their own true desires) serves to weaken the self-reliance and the objective judgment of the people and make them more receptive to any regime policy.¹³ Thus, the regime is building the type of citizen desirable in a totalitarian state, a citizen who identifies solely with the regime and has no set of standards other than regime approval or disapproval.

Third, the mass-line philosophy lessens the potential influence of the official state structure, thus reducing its ability to become a competing center of power:

. . . , the mass line blurs the distinction between governmental and nongovernmental activity by using state organs, propaganda media, mass organizations, and direct contacts between cadres and masses for the same purpose of securing popular acceptance and execution of Party objectives. Since the Party demands "conscious and voluntary action," rather than simple obedience, it must reach down to establish direct contact with the masses. In the process, the state structure is sometimes bypassed or reduced to only one of several agencies for transmitting political information and directives to the people.¹⁴

Finally, the mass-line arouses mass enthusiasm for regime policy (a totalitarian regime needs enthusiastic

citizens, not passive ones) while allowing the regime to retain actual control over policy formulation.¹⁵ The Party itself is the real decision-maker in policy matters:

. . . the CCP claims that it "learns from the masses" and that its policies originate with the masses. At the same time, however, the Party insists that its leading role requires it to make the actual decision on the basis of its superior knowledge and experience; it cannot accept "incorrect" mass views that would lead the Party itself into error. The Party is guided in its decisions by the conviction that it alone clearly understands the long-run collective interests of the people.¹⁶

The reasons for ignoring the populace while still theoretically following the mass-line are numerous:

The masses can have "wrong," even "backward," ideas when their "class consciousness is not adequately elevated." Moreover, the Communists add, the masses do not always see their way clearly because they are the targets of "evil propaganda" or "counterrevolutionary ideologies" of the bourgeois and capitalist classes. The Jen Min Jih Pao puts it rather bluntly: "Unquestionably, our mass line does not mean that we should do whatever the masses want. . . . Our slogan is: 'We do what must be done.'"¹⁷

As Yu concludes:

. . . the Communist formula [is] that "the policy and methods of work of the Party must originate from the masses and go back to the masses." A cynical interpreter of this statement would argue that the Communists try to make the ideas of the Party sound as if they were ideas of the people. It is closer to the mark to say that they attempt to transform the feeling or sentiments of the masses into an idea or notion that, on the one hand, seemingly represents what the masses want, but on the other, expresses what the Party really intends.¹⁸

Thus, the mass-line is a useful totalitarian tool for maximizing mass support while minimizing mass influence on policy.

It is because the mass-line technique has been used to stir up mass enthusiasm that it is of great interest at this point in the analysis. The major weapon of the mass-line is the mass campaign. Liu wrote in reference to emulation campaigns:

In our work we should break through at one point to give an example to the masses and let them see and understand things by themselves. Only by giving demonstrative examples to the masses can we encourage them, particularly the intermediate and backward elements, by affording them the opportunities and facilities to understand the problems, thereby instilling in them confidence and courage to act under our Party's slogans and to culminate in an upsurge of mass enthusiasm.

The reason that recently army heroes, labour heroes and model workers in different places have been playing an outstanding role and have become the best propagandists and organizers of the masses is due to the very fact that through such living personalities, examples, and experiences familiar to the people the masses are enabled to understand the issues, thus heightening their consciousness and self-confidence. This also explains why revolutionary reconstruction in China's revolutionary bases is playing an educational and enlightening role for people of the whole nation and is developing the entire nation's consciousness and self-confidence.¹⁹

Townsend concludes:

[After 1949] The CCP discovered that mass execution of policies designed to produce major changes throughout China was a very complex matter and that higher-level cadres no longer maintained the popular contacts that were to ensure a "democratic" style in the absence of popular controls. The Party's response was to retain the theory of the mass line while trying to recapture its original spirit through indoctrination of the people and rectification of cadres. The mass movements have been the most tangible sign of this effort to force the political situation into conformity with the theory. But the mass movement, for all of its demands on masses and cadres alike, has been only a temporary solution. It creates mass "enthusiasm" and renews direct cadre leadership of the people, but only by an enormous expenditure of time and effort. Moreover, enthusiasm drops rapidly when

the movement subsides and the movements seem to lose more of their impact with each campaign. The problem of the mass line is, therefore, a recurring conflict between theory and reality.²⁰

In conclusion, then, the mass campaign and the mass-line policy are inseparably linked together. The mass campaign is a sophisticated weapon in the arsenal of a totalitarian regime and will be considered as such.

The Mass Campaign

As stated in Chapter II, the mass campaign is an extremely useful device for utilizing the energy of the masses, arousing their enthusiasm, while at the same time preventing these forces from becoming competing centers of allegiance. Barnett writes:

One of the most striking and distinctive aspects of the operation of the regime in China today is its continued reliance, seventeen years after coming to power, upon mass campaigns, rather than on more routinized administrative methods, to carry out its major policies and programs. This revolutionary mode of operation was clearly a product of the techniques for mass mobilization developed by the Chinese Communists during their struggle for power and during the early years of class struggle when they consolidated their power. In essence, the campaign approach to policy implementation, which grows out of their commitment to what is called the "mass line," involves the setting of a few clearly defined immediate aims [although these aims have often had a tendency to grow into broad, sweeping goals], the concentration of efforts and attention on these aims above all others, the mobilization and training of large numbers of cadres drawn from many segments of the political system to carry out a campaign, and finally the mass mobilization of the population as a whole to take action to achieve the defined goals. Such campaigns rest on the premise that the masses, if they are properly organized and infused with ideological fervor, can be activated to achieve most of the society's fundamental goals,²¹

Barnett's analysis is valid except for one point: the regime's desire to initiate campaigns is not due primarily to a belief in the superior "achievement" powers of the masses in a campaign setting, but rather to the regime's desire to prevent institutionalization. It is a totalitarian control device that is self-liquidating.

Townsend states:

On nearly all major national issues, the Chinese political culminates in a mass movement that coordinates in one general campaign all the organizational and educational efforts that prepare the citizen for political action. Mass movements are the most characteristic expression of the Chinese style of political participation. Like general election campaigns in Western democracies, they are the most significant events in mass political life and the symbol of the basic objectives of political participation. As "the most concentrated and salient form of expression of the mass line" and "the climax of the revolutionary action of the masses," the mass movement relies on direct action by an enthusiastic and totally mobilized population to bring Party policies to fruition. The essence of the movement is its ability to stimulate mass activism, thus avoiding reliance on specialists and state organs, while retaining Party leadership to prevent spontaneous or undisciplined action.²²

In considering the 1949-1964 period, one cannot escape the impact of the numerous campaigns. The popularity of the campaign technique has varied somewhat. In general, during the periods when the "economic rationalists" or "revisionists" or "bureaucrats" exerted influence in Party circles, the campaigns were used less vigorously and often in conjunction with more conventional organizational apparatus.²³ Such periods were the 1953-1956 period, the period following the Great Leap, and the early 1960's. On the other hand, when the Maoist leadership was in firm

control the regime exhibited more totalitarian behavior and made more extensive use of the mass campaign technique. The "Hundred Flowers," 1957-58 rectification, Great Leap, and Cultural Revolution campaigns are the best examples of these periods. Many other periods were a mixture of the two, such as the "5-Anti" or socialist education campaigns.²⁴ In any case, two points are very clear: (1) the more "totalitarian" leadership has pressed for increased use of campaigns as opposed to conventional institutional devices,²⁵ and (2) campaigns were used at all times during the 1949-1964 period, although their importance in respect to the entire control apparatus fluctuated somewhat. Yu, writing in 1959, stated:

Anyone who takes even a casual look at the Communist record since the establishment of the Peking regime in 1949 will immediately realize that for ten years the entire nation has always been engaged in one major mass movement or another, simultaneously with large-scale campaigns for different sections of the population at particular times. To name chronologically only the few that are generally known, there have been the Land Reform movements, hsueh hsi (study), Resist-America Aid-Korea, propaganda networks, ideological remolding, "three-anti five-anti," suppression of counterrevolutionaries, mutual cooperatives of production, the Five-Year plans, the agricultural cooperatives, "Hundred Flowers," national reconstruction through austerity and diligence, reform through work, "great leap forward," "general line of socialist development," production of steel and iron, and the people's communes.²⁶

Since 1959, many more campaigns have been added to the list. There were too many campaigns to discuss each one individually; however, some general observations about campaigns can be made. First, there are various types of campaigns,

just as there are various types of mass organizations. Second, all campaigns share the same general modus operandi. Third, the mass campaign in operation conforms to many of the propositions outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II. Each of the above observations will constitute a major topic of this chapter.

Types of Campaigns

There are two manners, or dimensions, by which campaigns can be typed. First, one may consider the campaign's clientele. That is, who actively participates in, and to whom are the goals of the campaign directed. The participants and the targets of campaigns are not always the same people, and this situation could lead to confusion in typing campaigns. However, this problem can be solved by the introduction of the second method of categorizing campaigns, the consideration of the goals of the campaign. By introducing this aspect, the question of whom the campaign is directed against (if anyone at all) becomes one of goals and not of clients. Therefore, the first dimension of campaign categorization concerns the scope of the participation in the campaign and the second dimension concerns the goals of the campaign. The first dimension has, really, only two categories. Campaigns are generally conducted or designed to be conducted either by specialized, relatively elite groups, or by the society as a whole. Thus the early "three-anti" campaign was concerned with,

and conducted by, education-related individuals while the great leap was designed to include the whole of Chinese society in its activities. The first type of campaign may be called a "specific" campaign and the second type a "diffuse" (referring to the scope of participation) campaign.

The goals of campaigns can be divided into three general categories. First, there are campaigns designed to "rectify" or correct behavior in the society, and these campaigns are usually directed at specific groups. The first 5-Anti campaign was an example of this. A second type of campaign is designed to implement a general policy or attitude throughout the entire society. The "Hundred Flowers" and great leap campaigns were examples of this type. Finally, and most recently, there are emulation campaigns in which exemplary individuals are held up by the regime for imitation by the populace. These campaigns are in the old Stakhanovite tradition and the Lei Feng campaign is probably the most typical of these campaigns. These emulation movements can be used to influence either select groups or the entire population, but the campaigns of this type known in the West are those given the broadest possible exposure in China, and are thus diffuse campaigns. Table 4 illustrates the categorization of campaigns and presents some examples. Each of these methods of categorization will be discussed in greater detail below.

TABLE 4

CAMPAIGN TYPOLOGY

Participants	Goal		
Specific	Rectification	General	Emulation
	Three-anti	Construction of communes	
Diffuse	Post-"Hundred Flowers"	Great Leap	Lei Feng

Specific vs. Diffuse Campaigns

Most of the Chinese campaigns familiar to Western writers are of the diffuse type. The "Hundred Flowers," Great Leap, and, of course, the Cultural Revolution are the most prominent. These campaigns are well known because they affected all of the society and thus they were publicized to an extraordinary degree by the regime itself. This type of campaign will be examined more closely in the following section on campaign goals. At this time the focus will be upon the specific campaigns. Because of the limited participation in these campaigns they are not as visible on the Chinese scene.

One example of this type of campaign was the Ideological Reform Campaign of 1951. Barnett writes:

Since achieving power, the Chinese Communists have advanced their revolution through a continuing series of intensive mass campaigns and movements. Each of these has severely shaken the structure of old Chinese society and has pushed the revolution a step further. During the past year [1951], China's intellectuals--

and the Chinese educational system--have been the prime targets of an important one of these movements, the Ideological Reform campaign.²⁷

This campaign was a specific campaign not because it was aimed at intellectuals, but rather because it was conducted, under Party direction, by the teachers and students who comprised the intellectual community and not by the society as a whole. One can observe this phenomenon by studying the events at Yenching University, which was abolished in the course of the campaign. The chief target at Yenching was the President, Lu Chih-wei, and his antagonists were the members of the academic community itself, not outsiders brought in by the Party to "clean up" the situation. In fact, the climax of the campaign was an attack on Lu by his own daughter, a student at the university (and also a candidate for membership in the New Democratic Youth League).²⁸ She denounced him: "You are a one hundred per cent claw of imperialism and a tool faithful to American imperialism in its cultural aggression." "You have been a hypocrite and I have been cheated by you." "You are no longer my respectable father." "No Chinese will ever pardon you."²⁹ Barnett adds:

She excused herself for not having denounced him earlier by blaming her weakness on the "love between a father and a daughter [it is believed that prior to the campaign she had been strongly and genuinely fond of her father]," but she went on to say: "Even if this love is true, it is definitely insignificant compared with the love among the broad masses, not to mention the fact that your love is not love but deceit. Why must I be deceived by you and revolt against the people? I want to be with the broad masses and struggle hard for the sake of communism."³⁰

Lu himself followed later with a stream of confessions of his own crimes.

One important feature of this campaign, as Barnett notes, and of "specific" campaigns in general is their reliance on the techniques of group criticism and self-criticism. Other sections of this research have pointed out the usefulness of "criticism," "self-criticism," and "struggle" sessions as totalitarian control devices; for example, the "meetings of immortals" conducted by the minor parties. Criticism and self-criticism are especially useful in specific campaigns because the campaign itself is being waged by one's peers. It is evident that pressure for attitude change and conformity is much greater when applied by one's peers than when applied by strangers.³¹ Therefore, the specific campaign has an advantage over its diffuse counterpart: it can bring pressure from a target's associates, and even relatives (the implications of the use of close relatives by the regime to attack a target are extremely important when one considers the totalitarian regime's desire to destroy the family unit; however, such a discussion lies beyond the scope of the present research). The Ideological Reform Campaign adhered to this philosophy of utilizing criticism and self-criticism:

Like so many of the "campaigns" that have taken place in Communist China one after another, in rapid succession, during the past three years, the Ideological Reform campaign started with relatively little fanfare and then, over a period of months, built up into a frantic, violent, and almost hysterical "struggle." (A recent refugee from the mainland has

described some of the meetings held during the course of the campaign in Peking, and they sound very much like "holy roller" orgies.) The stated aim of the campaign when it started was to carry out general "ideological reform" through a "study movement" and "criticism and self-criticism." . . .

The campaign really started rolling on September 29, 1951 when Premier Chou En-lai addressed a mass meeting of more than 3,000 professors, assistants, and instructors in Peking, to define a correct "standpoint" and "attitude" for them.³²

Throughout 1951 the campaign rolled on, but it then ended abruptly in early 1952, when it was merged with the three-anti campaign.³³ It is the ability to quickly and effectively end campaigns that makes them extremely valuable to the Chinese regime. There is no lingering organizational framework, seeking self-perpetuation and therefore hungering for power. The campaigns are quick and potent. As Barnett states:

A standard technique employed by the Chinese Communists in their "campaigns" is to apply extreme pressure for a short period of time and then to relax the pressure, boasting of their magnanimity, while they consolidate gains made--which are always short of the extreme goals and maximum aims defined in the campaigns.³⁴

Campaign Goals

A second way to categorize campaigns is to examine their goals. As mentioned earlier, there are three general types of goals set for campaigns: (1) rectification, (2) general or sweeping societal change, or (3) emulation. Rectification campaigns have occurred frequently in the course of the Chinese regime's tenure. Most of these campaigns were designed to "rectify" or reform certain

rightist elements or traits in the society. Two of the best known campaigns of this type were the 5-Anti campaign of 1952 (which was directed at bourgeois elements, especially businessmen) and the post-"Hundred Flowers" campaign of 1957-58 (which was aimed at persons, especially intellectuals, who had criticized the Party during the "blooming and contending" period). The 5-Anti campaign grew out of the three-anti campaign which was mentioned above in reference to the Ideological Reform movement:

In January, 1952, a direct attack on the bourgeoisie was initiated in speeches made in Peking by Premier Chou En-lai and Po Yi-p'o. At first, these attacks were based on the Three-Anti slogans, but they later were expanded and developed into the new Five-Anti campaign. The bourgeois class was severely chastised for having cheated and stolen huge sums of money "from the government and from the people," and the guilty were ordered to confess and make restitution.³⁵

From January through May the campaign was promoted in all the major cities of China.³⁶ "The Communists went to great lengths to arouse the masses against the bourgeoisie, and during the course of the campaign class warfare between employees and employers was at times bitter and intense as a result of the general mobilization of workers and shop assistants in the struggle against the business class."³⁷ As the pace of the campaign mounted, more use was made of self-criticism and criticism as tools for the proper "remolding" of the target individuals:

Great emphasis was placed during the campaign on the need for public denunciation and confession. The government guaranteed full protection to anyone making a denunciation, and the treatment accorded to businessmen

depended to some degree upon their willingness to confess. Frank confession could lead to a one-grade reduction of criminal status, while refusal to confess automatically resulted in raising the classification of the case by one or more grades. Special consideration was given to persons who performed the "meritorious service" of denouncing others.³⁸

The campaign finally wound down by June, when it was displaced in the public eye by a new campaign to increase national production through more construction. As a result of this 5-Anti campaign, the regime increased its control over the economic sector and all but eliminated the last vestiges of private business.³⁹ Several important features of this campaign should be noted:

- (1) it made use of the criticism and self-criticism techniques;
- (2) it increased the power of the regime, especially over the economic sector;
- (3) it was swiftly and completely displaced by a new campaign and thus left no lingering apparatus. Those organizational bodies that were specifically designed for the campaign, such as ad hoc public tribunals, disappeared along with the campaign itself.

A second major rectification campaign was the anti-rightist campaign of 1957-1958, which grew out of the Hundred Flowers movement. The Hundred Flowers movement was originally initiated in order to let the people speak up about the working style of the party and the government officials. It was, in effect, a campaign to weed out unnecessary bureaucracy. But the response to this campaign

was so vehement and voluminous in its criticism that the regime felt compelled to "rectify" those whose criticisms were directed at the regime. "By June 1957, the rectification of the party turned into the rectification of the critics of the party."⁴⁰ The campaign was mounted quickly (leading some observers to the somewhat dubious conclusion that the whole affair was a regime "trap" to ensnare its hidden enemies in the society):

. . . with the appearance of . . . JMJP editorials in the second week of June, a campaign against leading intellectuals was set in motion with an unexpected speed and intensity, . . . The intellectuals who had criticized were labeled rightists and the drive was called the antirightist campaign. It served the dual purpose of damaging the prestige of the intellectuals and providing a mechanism for the reaffirmation of the party's position. As the movement progressed, the emphasis shifted from the first to the second purpose.⁴¹

Just as the regime moved rapidly in 1952 to attack the business community and strengthen its control over the economy, it moved quickly in 1957 to attack the intellectual community and strengthen its control over the cultural community. Both cases demonstrate the totalitarian desire to expand power and both cases also demonstrate the usefulness of the mass campaign in accomplishing this task. The 1957 campaign ended abruptly after a series of confessions by leading intellectuals, and was swallowed up in the great new modernization campaign, just as the earlier 1952 rectification campaign had been swiftly ended by a new movement. Thus, in 1957, the regime again proved its ability to turn campaigns on and off like running water.

A second type of campaign is that which is oriented toward accomplishing large societal goals. The Hundred Flowers movement, described above, began as a campaign of this type. Undoubtedly the greatest of these movements in the 1949-1964 period was the Great Leap Forward. The great leap actually began with the ending of the Hundred Flowers philosophy in June of 1957, but it did not really burst onto the scene until 1958. It lasted until 1960. Schurmann states:

As the Great Leap Forward grew in intensity, it began to spread to the entire society. What had started as a movement aimed at "overtaking" England in fifteen years in industrial production" quickly became a gigantic nation-wide mass movement which affected city and country alike. The mounting hsiafang campaign saw millions of city people pour into the villages to engage in agricultural work.⁴²

In effect, the great leap was a "super-campaign" and contained within itself many smaller and more specific campaigns, such as hsiafang or the construction of flood controls. This is not entirely unusual. Mass campaigns in China have overlapped one another, they have grown out of one another, and they have often been integrated in some sort of temporary hierarchical framework. One should not have the impression that only one campaign was active at any given time and that one ended neatly when another began. The use of campaigns in China has been like the direction of an orchestra, with the regime as the conductor, and the campaigns and their themes as instruments. The conductor "uses" his instruments harmoniously, sometimes

highlighting one and sometimes another, and often silencing one section only to revive it later in the piece.

Much has been written detailing the activities of the great leap, and it would seem impossible to recap all the events here. Townsend best captures the spirit of the movement:

The period of the Great Leap is perhaps best known for the formation of people's communes in the countryside in 1958 and for the attempt to score sensational advances in all areas of production by the extravagant expenditure of human resources. This was a period in which China proclaimed its ability to catch up with the industrially advanced nations by virtue of human effort and enthusiasm. Hundreds of millions of Chinese were to be organized for a "war against nature." Planning and statistics were forgotten, obstacles were ignored, and everyone, regardless of position, was expected to make some contribution to productive labor.⁴³

Townsend also notes one crucial feature of the Great Leap:

. . . , the Great Leap involved an unprecedented effort to indoctrinate the entire population with "correct" ideology. This effort reinforced the tendency noted above to move away from regular procedures within the state structure, as it depended essentially on direct mobilization of the masses by cadres at the lowest level. In fact, as Chou En-lai said, it was simply a matter of making the methods of the rectification campaign become a "permanent feature of our political life"; mass meetings, constant discussion and debate and writing of tatzubao, which formerly had been used as techniques for mass movements, were to become the very heart of regular political activities.⁴⁴

Thus, the great leap marked a period of increased use of mass campaigns and campaign techniques, as well as demonstrating the utility of general-goal campaigns to the regime.

A third type of campaign is the "emulation" campaign, in which people are exhorted to follow the

shining example of some exemplary citizen, usually deceased. The hero almost always leaves a diary or set of notes behind, telling of his good deeds, and then an emulation campaign is built around the virtues demonstrated in the hero's writings. Seven individuals--Lei Feng, Ouyang Hai, Wang Chieh, Mai Hsien-teh, Wang Chin-hsi, Chiao Yu-lu, and Lui Yung-chun--were centers of emulation campaigns between 1963 and 1966.⁴⁵ It should be noted that five of the seven were members of the PLA. Only Wang Chin-hsi, an oilfield worker, and Chiao Yu-lu, a party cadre who performed agricultural miracles, were not PLA members but were heroes of the old, Stakhanovite fashion.⁴⁶ This reliance on the PLA to supply heroes is evidence of the role of the Army in assisting Mao in the late 1960's to expand his power base. Also, the emulation campaigns fit into a larger, more general campaign that advised the population to "Learn from the People's Liberation Army." What better endorsement of the virtues of the PLA as a body, than a constant discovery of "heroes" produced within its own ranks?

The most well known and the most typical of these campaigns was the Lei Feng campaign of 1963. Lei Feng was a hero because of the type of life he led and his ability to heighten his own ideological awareness. His diary states that he was born to a very poor peasant family, which was badly mistreated by the local landlords, and of which Lei was the only survivor. But then the CCP was

victorious and Lei had the opportunity to go to school and learn to be a truck driver and a mechanic. He then joined the motorized force of the PLA and wrote in his diary:⁴⁷

I have been saved at the cost of the blood and life of my revolutionary elders. The great Communist Party and Chairman Mao saved me! I have decided to dedicate my life to the communist cause.⁴⁸

Lei rushed to volunteer to go fight off an alleged Nationalist invasion of the mainland, but the political commissar of his unit tells him he is not needed to fight any invasion, but his duties lie elsewhere. The cadre gives Lei a set of the collected works of Mao. Lei reads them over and over and realizes that heroism is in socialist construction and not only in fighting the Nationalists. His diary sings the praises of the Party and Mao:

July 1, 1961

I felt particularly happy this morning when I got up, because last night I had dreamt of our great leader Chairman Mao. And it so happens that today is the Party's 40th anniversary. Today I have so much to tell the Party, so much gratitude to the Party, so much determination to fight for the Party. . . . I am like a toddler and the Party is like my mother who helps me, and teaches me to walk. . . . my beloved Party, my loving mother, I am always your loyal son. . . .⁴⁹

Lei then proceeds to do an amazing number of anonymous good deeds. He could never pass people at work without helping, and he never identifies himself in order to win praise. His diary states typically:

October 15, 1961

Sunday today. I didn't go out; instead I washed 5 mattresses for the comrades in my squad, repaired Kao K'uei-yun's bedcover, assisted the cooks to wash more than 600 cabbages of cabbage, swept inside and outside

the room and other things . . . In all, I've done what I should have done. I'm tired but happy. . . . It's glorious to be a nameless hero.⁵⁰

Lei sets such a good example that he even reforms a shiftless comrade. Lei performs countless good deeds. Then, in August of 1962, at the age of 22, he is killed in an accident.⁵¹ His diary was "discovered" and the regime was so impressed that Mao himself launched the "Learn from Lei Feng" campaign in 1963.⁵²

The obvious goal of the campaign was to inspire people to live and work like Lei. For those who feel the entire story is so trite that the Chinese could only scoff at the campaign, K. S. Karol, who traveled through China while the campaign was being conducted, reports of attending a film depicting the life of Lei:

The audience leaves wet-eyed. Gino Nebiolo even told me that in a movie theater in the suburbs of Si'an he saw the audience rising in unison at the end of the film and chanting for a full five minutes, "All honor to Lei Feng."⁵³

The life of Lei Feng was the life of the almost ideal totalitarian citizen. All of his energy, all of his devotion, all of his love went to the state; it was his "mother." His friendships with others are based on their shared participation in the state and not on personal grounds. In short, Lei Feng is pretty much entirely a creature of the state; he has no other frame of reference. The Lei Feng campaign was typical of a large group of emulation campaigns designed to mold the totalitarian citizen.

This section has focused upon ways to differentiate among campaigns. The next section will examine the communalities in the method of operation of campaigns in general.

The General Modus Operandi of Mass Campaigns

Although the mass campaigns vary in their goals and constituencies, they do tend to share a common general method of operation. The first aspect of this communality is that campaigns are initiated by the highest echelons of the regime. In a democratic-centralist fashion the word is passed down to whatever group is involved that a certain type of campaign should be initiated. Often key figures in the regime make the pronouncement, as Mao himself has sometimes done, and often the "official" newspaper Jen Min Jih Pao is used to pass along the instruction in its editorial (and sometimes its news) section. Whatever the method of initiation, the central regime keeps tight control over activities. "The Five-Anti campaign was carefully organized on a national scale, and detailed rules and regulations were promulgated by the Central Government."⁵⁴ Townsend states:

Movements are launched by central directives, either government or Party, that state the basic scope and objectives. Local governments at municipal, provincial, and hsien level follow with their own statements that echo the central directives and specify the timing and operation of the movements within their area of jurisdiction.⁵⁵

Townsend also points out another common feature of campaigns: campaigns are "pre-tested" in restricted areas

before they are used in the country at large. "'Experimental work' in 'key points' always precedes a more general unfolding of a campaign in any given area. Experimental work not only tests popular response and the effectiveness of techniques but also serves as a training ground for a select group of cadres who will provide leadership when the movement is expanded."⁵⁶ The first three-anti campaign, for example, was tested in Manchuria before it became a nationwide movement.⁵⁷

A third common feature of the mass campaign is the frenzy with which they are carried out. The campaigns move at a fearsome pace, and build up momentum as they move along. Barnett describes the early days of the 5-Anti campaign in Shanghai:

By late January, an extensive propaganda drive was under way. Teams of propagandists toured the city and mobilized workers and shop assistants to help them. They plastered the city with posters, written slogans, banners, and "wall newspapers." Some of the teams in local districts consisted of up to 200 members; they went into factories and stores and demanded confessions from the owners and managers. Loudspeakers set up outside shops and at important street corners blared questions and accusations at businessmen: "Hey, boss, have you confessed yet?" Workers, and even casual passersby, were encouraged to shout at businessmen through these public loudspeakers.⁵⁸

Barnett also discusses the effect of campaigns on the normal procedures and bureaucratic operation of Ministry M in the late 1960's:

Every major campaign has involved enormous organizational activity, and has introduced a period of apprehension, anxiety, and tension within the bureaucracy as well as throughout society as a whole. Generally, within the bureaucracy, political study has

been dramatically increased until, at the peak of such a campaign, normal work has come virtually to a halt while everyone has devoted almost full time for weeks--and sometimes months--to endless group discussions, usually culminating in tense, emotional "struggle meetings" (tou cheng hui).⁵⁹

He adds:

. . . , special campaign indoctrination meetings slowly increased until they occupied about half time, and finally full time for perhaps a month or two. As a campaign progressed, emphasis shifted from fairly generalized propaganda and indoctrination to increasingly emotional discussions in which everyone had to engage in criticism and self-criticism. Finally, a climax was reached when a number of specific cadres were singled out and made the targets of mass public denunciation within the ministry in huge "struggle meetings." In major political campaigns there had to be specific human targets to "struggle" against; errors and evils, as well as virtues, had to be personified.⁶⁰

He then concludes:

. . . [campaigns] occurred at fairly frequent intervals, and the most important of them involved periods of almost frenetic activity and extreme tension. These campaigns played an extraordinary role in the operational dynamics of the bureaucracy in China. At the height of a campaign, cadres devoted virtually full time to meetings and other activities related to it and had virtually no time for "private" individual affairs. Every campaign was exhausting--and unnerving, too, for many cadres--and a significant amount of time and energy went into getting over the last campaign or preparing for the next one.⁶¹

The goal of the regime is to involve the cadres in campaigns and restrict as far as possible any "private life"; this makes for a good totalitarian citizen. As Schurmann so aptly points out, in China "mass movements became a substitute for private enjoyment."⁶² One is strongly reminded of Huxley's "brave new world" where individual activity is undesirable and only group activity possesses meaning or joy for the citizen.

In short, three basic common aspects of mass campaigns have been presented above:

- (1) centralized control by the regime;
- (2) the use of small-scale "pre-test" areas;
- (3) the frenzied nature of the campaign itself, with emphasis placed upon "mass" pleasure and activity as opposed to individualism.

The Mass Campaign as a Totalitarian Device

This chapter has discussed the role of the mass campaign in China during the 1949-1964 period. Based upon this evaluation, one can clearly see the relationships between campaign behavior in China and the model behavior outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II (the letters and numbers at the end of each statement are "keyed" to the propositions at the end of Chapter II):

- (1) the campaigns were centrally controlled by the regime, as Townsend points up and Barnett describes in his comments on the 5-Anti campaign (A,3);
- (2) the campaigns were extremely transitory, thus having no organizational or bureaucratic framework to compete with the regime for power; Barnett's description of the campaign methods in Shanghai illustrates this point (B,1);
- (3) the campaigns overlapped and interlocked with one another, as the Ideological Reform-3-Anti-5-Anti progression or the great leap expansion indicate, and

therefore lines of authority and responsibility were constantly confused (C,1);

- (4) the campaigns were abruptly begun and halted, thus preventing any sense of allegiance from arising to a specific movement, which could lead to an institutionalized loyalty, the rapid shift from the "Hundred Flowers" philosophy to the 1957-58 rectification campaign is an illustration of this technique (C,2);
- (5) the campaigns made use of "figureheads" or scapegoats to either personify evils, or accept the blame for failures actually attributable to the regime itself, as the attacks on Yenching University and President Lu demonstrate (C,3).

In addition, other features of mass campaigns, such as the use of criticism and self-criticism to break down self-esteem and self-reliance, and the substitution of group activity for individual activity, conform to general totalitarian policies but do not specifically relate to intermediate group behavior as outlined at the conclusion of Chapter II.

Having considered the arguments, one can only conclude that mass campaigns were indeed extremely compatible with totalitarian needs and were used in such a manner by the Chinese regime between 1949 and 1964.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

¹Frederick Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 15.

²James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 57.

³Ibid.

⁴Yu, p. 16.

⁵Townsend, p. 72.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., pp. 72-73.

⁸Yu, p. 17.

⁹Townsend, p. 73.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Dan Jacobs and Hans Baerwald (eds.), Chinese Communism: Selected Documents (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 130.

¹²Yu, p. 15.

¹³Townsend, p. 74.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷Yu, p. 17.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 18.

²⁰Townsend, p. 199.

²¹A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 437.

²²Townsend, p. 185.

²³The "more totalitarian" group in this sense is that group which more closely adheres to the basic goal of a totalitarian regime--the accumulation of power. Thus, in the case of China, the "more totalitarian" group would consist of Mao and his followers, who are indeed overwhelmingly concerned with power. The "less totalitarian" group(s) then would consist of individuals such as Liu and others of his ilk (e.g., P'eng Teh-huai), who tend to allow other goals, such as economic development or military efficiency, to interfere with the drive for centralized power. The contention then becomes that mass campaigns have been more useful in the acquisition and maintenance of power, while other goals are more readily obtained through more institutionalized methods.

²⁴Alan Liu, in his recent work, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) also makes this same point. However, he refers to the Maoist group as "left-ists" (as opposed to revisionists). Thus, in spite of the semantic difference, the conclusion is the same (p. 113).

²⁵Liu presents a similar chronology of campaign utilization, although he proceeds from a different analytical framework (see Chapter Five and especially pp. 92-93). Also, Hiniker and Farace present a substantiating graph of mass mobilization activity for the 1949-1958 period although, once again, they are operating on the basis of a different analytical framework: in this case, competing methods of political development. See Paul Hiniker and Vincent Farace, "Approaches to National Development in China: 1949-1958," in Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVIII, No. 1 (Oct. 1969), 51-72, and esp. p. 70.

²⁶Yu, pp. 26-27.

²⁷A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955 (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 125.

²⁸Ibid., p. 127.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹For example, see Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), or Arthur Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

³²Barnett, Communist China . . ., pp. 128-129.

³³Ibid., p. 131.

³⁴Ibid., p. 134.

³⁵Ibid., p. 139.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 142.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 204.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 204-205.

⁴²Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 465.

⁴³Townsend, p. 96.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁵Mary Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes," China Quarterly, No. 33 (Jan.-March 1968), p. 51.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷For a more detailed description of his life, see K. S. Karol, China: The Other Communism (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), pp. 245-249.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 246.

⁴⁹Sheridan, p. 52.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 53.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 51.

- ⁵²Karol, p. 249.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 248.
- ⁵⁴Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 140.
- ⁵⁵Townsend, p. 186.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 187.
- ⁵⁷Barnett, Communist China . . ., p. 137.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 145.
- ⁵⁹Barnett, Cadres . . ., p. 33.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 33-34.
- ⁶¹Ibid., pp. 69-70.
- ⁶²Schurmann, p. 393.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This work has attempted to demonstrate the relative congruence of the postulated relationships between a totalitarian regime and intermediate organizations within society, and the actual relationships between the Chinese regime and a variety of secondary intermediate associations in China during the 1949-1964 period. The purpose of the Conclusion is twofold. First, it will attempt to judge the degree of congruence referred to above. Second, it will evaluate the Cultural Revolution in light of the predictive process of the totalitarian model.

The first task is an extremely difficult one due to the nonquantitative nature of the material. No hard and fast acceptance or rejection is possible; however, by evaluating each of the propositions at the conclusion of Chapter II in the light of the massive evidence presented in the body of the research, one will be able to clearly grasp the essential isomorphism of the model and the reality.

Before launching into this evaluation, however, it would seem prudent to discuss two potential problems which

may occur to the reader, and which deserve explanation. First, there is the question of alternative explanations. That is, even though the model and the reality are congruent, the reader may question whether the behavior of the Chinese regime towards its intermediate groups was due to some reason or set of reasons other than the totalitarian nature of the regime. The answer to this potential objection lies in the basic irrelevancy of it. This work is concerned with a totalitarian model and not a totalitarian theory and, as was discussed at some length in Chapter I, models are analogous and predictive but are not primarily explanatory. Therefore, so long as the model and the reality behave similarly the model retains its validity. If the model of totalitarianism presented in this paper parallels the behavior of the Chinese regime, it makes little difference if the regime's behavior is due to a totalitarian perspective, or the process of modernization, or the rotation of the earth. Quite simply, this research need not consider alternative explanations as determinative because it does not deal greatly with theory, and therefore, as noted on page 12, is concerned with prediction and extrapolation rather than explanation.¹

A second potential objection concerns the manner(s) in which the validity of the model may be disproven. The reader may question whether there is, in fact, any method by which to demonstrate that the model is not significantly related to the reality. In this case the proof of the

pudding is in the eating. Disproval cannot be accomplished by alternative methods, but only by alternative models. The evidence presented herein must be sufficiently convincing to demonstrate the essential similarity between model and behavior. Beyond a failure to accomplish this minimal goal, the only valid method for disproving the usefulness of the model is to produce a more useful one--one which is more closely analogous to, and predicts more accurately, the behavior of the Chinese regime. In such a case, this second model would be more useful for studying Chinese behavior. In essence then, this section will attempt to demonstrate that the totalitarian model presented at the outset of this research possesses a high degree of utility for studying Chinese behavior. Anyone wishing to attack the model must do so not by proving that it is "false" but by producing another model closer to actual Chinese behavior.

One other point must be considered at this time, the generalizability of the totalitarian model. Of course, this does not specifically bear upon the validity of the model's application to the Chinese regime. Rather, it bears upon a potential wider application of the model and the possibility that it (the model) is simply an ad hoc structure paralleling the Chinese regime. It is impossible, of course, in this work, to thoroughly examine the relevance of the model to other systems. However, presented below are some data to suggest that the model indeed may be

applicable to other systems with some hope of fruitful results. These data simply bring out prominent features of some other systems (e.g., centralization of power, attempted prevention of institutionalization and bureaucratization, treatment of intermediary groups) which suggest the feasibility of an extension of the totalitarian model as a framework for evaluating other regimes.

Several features of the Nazi regime suggest the potential utility of the model. The centralization of power was just such a feature. Hitler himself wrote in Mein Kampf:

From the smallest community cell to the highest leadership of the entire Reich, the state must have the personality principle anchored in its organization.

There must be no majority decisions, but only responsible persons, and the word "council" must be restored to its original meaning. Surely every man will have advisers by his side, but the decision will be made by one man.

The principle which made the Prussian army in its time into the most wonderful instrument of the German people must some day, in a transferred sense, become the principle of the construction of our whole state conception: authority of every leader downward and responsibility upward.²

A. J. Nicholls also notes this feature, while relating it to the lack of a determinative ideology:

Dictatorial organization--and deliberate worship of the Fuhrerprinzip--became a feature of the Nazi movement. Originally this was not true of the party, some of whose members, such as Rosenberg, spoke of traditional German democracy--by which they referred to tribal elections in a mythical past and not to the type of electoral activity represented by modern liberalism. But within the framework of German nationalist movements as a whole there had always been a tendency to equate obedience to a leader and discipline with German--and therefore desirable--attitudes of mind.

This dictatorial power was exercised in a personal way and did not necessarily involve ideological uniformity. . . .³

The Nazis also struggled against the problem of institutionalization and bureaucracy. The official German civil service handbook of 1938 illustrates this point:

As a movement born from life itself, and life-creating in turn, National Socialism demands the rejection of formalistic rigidity in thought and action and expects from its officeholders and trustees a living and dynamic attitude. This dynamic must be rooted in the newly awakened soul of the people. It was only a natural consequence of the seizure of power that, by virtue of the Civil Service Law of April 1933, racially and ideologically alien elements were eliminated from the civil service. Beyond and above that, when the unity of party and state had become law, the need arose for a broader and deeper anchoring of the German professional civil service in the service of the Fuhrer and in the totality of the nation.

Thus, even here National Socialism fought its battle in a war against bureaucracy and regulations. . . . [from Kalender far Reichsjusbizbeamte (Berlin: R v. Decker's Verlay and G. Schenck, 1938), pp. 17-18, by Roland Freisler.]⁴

Finally, the Nazi regime exhibited a tendency to treat secondary groups in a fashion very similar to that presented in the discussion of Chinese groups. Trade unions, for example, were strictly controlled:

Deprived of his trade unions, collective bargaining and the right to strike, the German worker in the Third Reich became an industrial serf, bound to his master, the employer, much as medieval peasants had been bound to the lord of the manor. The so-called Labor Front, which in theory replaced the old trade unions, did not represent the worker. . . . It took in not only wage and salary earners but also the employers and members of the professions [similar to the "watering down" of the Chinese trade unions under the ACFTU]. It was in reality a vast propaganda organization and, as some workers said, a gigantic fraud. Its aim, as stated in the law, was not to protect the worker but "to create a true social and productive community of all Germans. Its task is to see that every single individual should be able . . . to perform the maximum of work."⁵

The USSR under Stalin was another system which promises rewards for the attempted application of the model. Fainsod notes the desire of Stalin to subordinate all groups, even the Party, to his own control. He (Fainsod) concludes that one of the major features of the Khrushchev era was the return of the Party to a position of power and autonomy.⁶ Fainsod also discusses Stalin's problem with the tendency toward institutionalization (a tendency which Stalin successfully prevented from growing) and in doing so he (Fainsod) almost totally parallels this author's discussion (Chapter II) of the "necessary evil" aspect of intermediate groups:

One of the striking characteristics of modern totalitarian dictatorship is its dependence on bureaucratic organization to make its control effective. The bureaucratization of the dictator's power is an inevitable outgrowth of the magnitude of his responsibilities. Trusted lieutenants and a party machine are indispensable concomitants of his domination. In the process of utilizing them, his authority may be both intensified and diluted. It is intensified to the degree that he succeeds in fashioning an administrative mechanism which is a reflection of his will. It is diluted to the extent that he is compelled to cede power to his subordinates and the party machine acquires a momentum and direction of its own. Every dictatorship faces the problem of institutionalizing its own authority. The power of the Leader depends on his ability to keep the essence of control in his own hands or in the hands of reliable subordinates while transforming the party machine into an obedient instrument ready to execute his slightest command.

The development of the Communist Party apparatus as an extension of the long arm of the dictator constitutes one of the most impressive and formidable organizational achievements of modern totalitarianism.⁷

Finally, Fainsod encapsulates the totalitarian aspects of Stalin's regime, and brings out a host of features identical to various aspects of the model:

The organization of the economy and society to maximize industrial and military strength involved a strengthening of the totalitarian features of the regime. . . .

The formula of totalitarian rule as it took shape under Stalin's ministrations was a complex one. It represented, in one aspect, a drive to safeguard his own security by obliterating all actual or potential competing centers of power. Positively, it tried to saturate and paralyze the minds of the Soviet populace with a monolithic stream of agitation and propaganda stressing the superiority of the Soviet system and the virtues of its leaders. Negatively, it sought to deny the people access to any alternative by cutting them off from the outside world and from each other. Through the secret police, it attempted to create a milieu of pervasive insecurity founded on ever-present fear of the informer and the labor camp. The Party and the secret police guarded the loyalty of army and administration and, in turn, watched each other. In this system of institutionalized mutual suspicion, the competing hierarchies of Party, police, army, and administration were kept in purposeful conflict and provided with no point of final resolution short of Stalin and his trusted henchmen in the Politbureau. The concentration of power in Stalin's hands rested on the dispersal of power among his subordinates.⁸

Even Fascist Italy, generally considered to be rather far removed from the totalitarian mold, demonstrated some attributes of the model. Finer, writing in 1935, describes the centralization of power imposed by Mussolini:

This leads us to the term State, the heart of the whole discussion is What does Mussolini mean by the State? He means Himself. A pattern of philosophic hocus-pocus is the medium for the transformation of the State into Benito Mussolini. It is not very elaborate, because he does not beat about the bush. Indeed, he cannot beat about the bush: that has been his peculiar strength in post-war Italian politics. He wills, and his will is the truth.⁹

In conclusion, this discussion has not substantiated the generalizability of the model. It has, however, presented some heuristically valuable statements and data suggestive of other possible applications of the model.

Having disposed of these points at the outset, the analysis can proceed to an examination of the propositions presented at the conclusion of Chapter II, in light of the evidence presented in the body of the text. In the case of each proposition, examples from the text will be presented, but these are examples and are used to direct the reader's attention to sections where more detailed proof is presented; they are not intended as proofs in themselves. The first group of propositions is concerned with the behavior of the regime toward intermediate groups at the time of the regime's first coming to power.

A,1. Upon gaining control the totalitarian elite will destroy the old-style intermediate organizations which cannot be utilized by the regime. Since the bulk of this work has dealt with the regime's activities after it had "broken in" its new form of government, little has been directed to this point. However, there were numerous examples of the behavior mentioned above upon the seizure of control by the regime. The most noticeable of these actions was the destruction of the "secret societies" by the Communist regime. The secret societies were powerful, fraternal, mutual-aid groups which had existed in China through a long succession of dynasties and governments. These brotherhoods were organized to provide their members with a source of power to be used to check the activities of the government. It was the sad lot of these societies, however, that they possessed no economic or social utility,

and thus no justification for existence in the new society. Unlike the minor parties or the trade unions, they really had no manipulative potential for the regime; therefore they were doomed. Furthermore, the strong emotional ties of the members represented a potential allegiance totally anathema to the regime. Thus the Communist regime did what no previous government of China had done, or could do (and in doing so the regime demonstrated the totalitarian desire to expand its power over heretofore "private" areas of society); it destroyed the secret societies:

The secret societies, . . . , were regarded as the source of resistance to and conspiracy against the existing administration. Against these organizations the Manchu government proceeded with the greatest possible severity, without achieving much success. However, under the Communist regime members of the secret societies, composed mainly of the peasantry and local tradesmen, have been liquidated as "reactionary elements."¹⁰

A,2. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will infiltrate and dominate the old-style intermediate organizations which are of some use to the regime. The clearest example of this behavior can be seen in the regime's behavior towards the minor parties (which, of all the groups under consideration, were the ones functioning most actively outside party control before 1949). The regime did have use for these organizations. As described in Chapter III, there were three reasons for the continued existence of the minor parties: (1) to obtain support for the CCP from elements of society which would not usually be considered sympathetic to communist goals; (2) to control

certain elements of society which might be dangerous to the regime; and (3) to utilize bourgeois and white-collar bureaucratic elements without contaminating the Communist Party itself by offering them membership. Thus the minor parties, unlike the secret societies, served the needs of the regime and therefore were allowed to exist.

However, the minor parties were infiltrated, dominated, and simply controlled by the regime. Party members assumed leadership positions in the organizations. The China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party's "request" for a contingent of CCP members to be brought into its ranks is an illustration of this type of behavior, which was characteristic of all the minor parties. The real indication of the regime's control over the parties was the 1957 rectification campaign, in which the leaders of the minor parties behaved in strict obedience with CCP wishes.

Finally, another example of the regime's conformity to proposition A,2 is evident in the discussion of the trade unions, in which it was pointed out that the Party monopolized leadership positions in the union movement, including those individual unions which had existed before 1949.

A,3. Upon gaining control, the totalitarian elite will create a new set of organizations which are totally the creatures of the totalitarian regime. The examples of this technique are numerous. The ACFTU, ACFDW, YCL, Young Pioneers, ACFLAC, all the various "friendship" associations,

and all the mass campaigns were concocted by the regime, at the time of its coming to power, in order to facilitate its control over the society. As for the degree of control exercised by the regime over these groups, this has varied somewhat from time to time and place to place, but the regime has been, in general, in control of each group or campaign at all times. This fact was demonstrated again and again in the course of the research. The Party dominance of all important positions in these groups, the rubber-stamp nature of the national congresses, the regime's centralized direction and "stage-managing" of the mass campaigns, and the regime stranglehold on funding are all representative of the extraordinary control which the regime exercised over these groups and movements which it had created upon its arrival in power.

The second group of propositions in Chapter II is concerned with the totalitarian elite's attempt to prevent organizations from becoming identified with specific interests in society and thus becoming a potential focus for persons sharing that common interest and a separate power base.

B,1. The regime attempts to prevent institutionalization by creating and destroying groups relatively quickly, thus denying them the life necessary to become "institutionalized."

The most clear cut example of this policy can be seen in the regime's use of mass campaigns. As Barnett points out in

his description of the 5-Anti Campaign in Shanghai, the nature of the mass campaigns is extremely transient. The campaign begins abruptly and ends quickly, and in doing so it develops no organizational framework or apparatus which would, inevitably, seek to preserve itself and thus become a competing center for power. Another, more long-range, illustration of proposition B,1 has been the regime's increased reliance on less institutionalized forms of mass control, such as mass campaigns, and decreased usage of more formalized structures, such as the minor parties, over the 1949-1964 period. After 1957, the minor parties rapidly declined in importance and similarly, after 1963 the mass organizations began such a decline. By the very end of the period under consideration the mass campaign was rapidly replacing the other two forms of intermediate organization as the regime's arm for mass control. The Cultural Revolution was the culmination of this trend.

B,2. The regime will seek to separate leadership from expertise in intermediate organizations--leadership will be vested in persons politically loyal to the regime rather than persons who possess the necessary expertise to run the organization, or who represent an area of knowledge for which that organization was created to speak. The prime example of this type of behavior was demonstrated in the replacement of Li Li-san by Lai Jo-yu in the ACFTU. Lai was an outsider with no previous connections with the labor movement or labor in general; thus, the regime expected

him to represent their interests rather than the interests of the workers. The same was true of other organizations, such as youth groups or literary organizations, where either totally untrained Party loyalists were elevated and installed in high-ranking positions, or less qualified persons were promoted to leadership positions on the basis of Party loyalty rather than technical merit (e.g., Kuo Mo-jo). This entire policy, in fact, is the heart of the red-expert dispute which has raged in China since the beginning of the Communist rule. At the moment, it would seem that "redness" has won out over expertise (the PLA, for example, decided the issue as early as 1959) and therefore the totalitarian policy which emphasizes regime-loyalty has triumphed over the economically-rational (perhaps modernizing) philosophy. In any case, on the whole, the regime has succeeded in separating leadership and expertise.

Another example, falling into perhaps a more general category, was the regime's strict control of membership policy of the minor parties. By controlling membership the regime was able to exclude persons who possessed a strong rational reason for joining a minor party but were of questionable loyalty. This further demonstrates the operation of proposition B,2. A further example of this attempt to separate leadership from the rank and file was illustrated by the attempts of the Party to promote mutual distrust between union cadres and the masses of workers. Finally, the extensive use of overage

leaders in the various youth organizations clearly illustrates that the organizations were designed to facilitate regime control rather than to express the interests of youth.

The third set of propositions concerns the totalitarian regime's desire to keep organizations weak and insecure by maintaining a constant state of flux within the society.

C,1. Various organizations will all be charged with the same area of operation and thus the organizations will act as checks upon one another. This practice was clearly evident in the case of the mass campaigns. The campaigns overlapped and interlocked with one another, as the Ideological Reform-3 Anti-5 Anti progression or the Great Leap expansion indicate, and therefore lines of authority and responsibility were constantly confused. In the case of the unions, the regime played Party directives off against union worker needs (commandism vs. tailism) in order to keep union cadres in a state of uncertainty and insecurity. Similarly, the ACFDW has often been charged with carrying out campaigns at the same time that other organizations, for example the YCL, have received similar charges. Thus neither organization could claim true credit for the task accomplished and sometimes conflict between the two arose over the best methods for carrying out regime directives.

Another illustration of the above contention is the very number of groups and campaigns used by the regime. The staggering number of such organizations alone is almost a guarantee that no one will emerge as a serious threat to the power of the regime. A final illustration of this technique was the system of dual vertical rule instituted for the ACFTU by the regime in order to confuse lines of authority within the organization.

C,2. The regime will periodically and arbitrarily shift the locus of activity and/or authority from one organization to another in order to prevent any one organization from acquiring a sense of legitimacy, born of past performance, in the eyes of the citizens. One can find evidence of this policy in the total shift from the "open" ideology of the Hundred Flowers to the severity of the 1957-58 rectification campaign. This sudden and totally unexpected shift from an invitation to voice criticism to a policy of strict repression exemplifies the totalitarian regime's effort to keep the citizens puzzled as to which groups or campaigns are really in control. The answer, of course, is that only the regime is ever really in control.

The same situation can be seen to hold true in the case of the various friendship associations. They would rise and fall with the vicissitudes of foreign policy; and an organization with 70 million members, such as the SSFA, could literally be here today and gone tomorrow.

C,3. The regime will constantly set up a gallery of figureheads, who can serve as rubber-stamps for regime policies or as scapegoats for regime failures. In the case of the minor parties, this was evident during the 1957-1958 rectification campaigns. The entire "Chaing-Lo" conspiracy was constructed by the regime to help explain the vehemence of the Hundred Flowers criticism, criticism which stemmed from displeasure with the regime and not with the minor parties. Similarly, the attacks on Yenching University and President Lu demonstrated the use of scapegoatism.

Finally, the establishment of rubber-stamp figure-head individuals or bodies is an elemental part of democratic-centralism. In effect, every mass organization and minor party had some powerless leadership group that possessed no duty other than to approve of regime policy. The reader can find examples of this in the sections concerning the minor parties, the ACFTU, the ACFDW, etc.

The final proposition about model totalitarian behavior is that,

D. the regime will try to base organizations on a fictional interest rather than a real shared interest. This lessens the attachment which the member will build for the group.

This can best be seen in the discussion of mass organizations. For example, the regime created organizations whose reasons for existence were based on the most tenuous of

common interests. All the friendship organizations and the ACFDW typify this sort of group. Furthermore, the regime sought to "water down" the real felt interests of those groups which were actually organized around common interests. Thus the ACFTU was made to open its doors to all wage earners, therefore preventing the interests of the industrial workers from unifying the membership and perhaps jolting it into action of a prolonged nature.

In conclusion, then, the relationships between the propositions and the actual behavior of the Chinese regime are both numerous and isomorphic. Although the preceding section only supplied some examples of the uniformity of the two sets of behavior, these examples represent the vast congruence which is evident throughout the whole of the research.

The second goal of this concluding section is to evaluate the Cultural Revolution in light of the totalitarian model presented above. As already noted, the goal of a model is to predict behavior, and thus one may at least partially evaluate the utility of the model of Chinese behavior on the basis of its ability to reasonably forecast the events of the Cultural Revolution (from its vantage point of 1964). It is the contention of this section that the application of the totalitarian model to Chinese behavior in the 1949-1964 period could logically

lead one to expect, in 1964, many of the salient features of the Cultural Revolution.

Perhaps the most crucial feature of the Cultural Revolution was its basic drive against bureaucracy and institutionalization. It sought to "open" the society in the sense of freeing individuals from the control and influence of various intermediary organizations. The most powerful of those organizations were the state apparatus and the Party itself. Both these organizations became targets of the Cultural Revolution because of the degree of institutionalization which had arisen in their operation. Although the state and the Party were not treated in the body of this research, it is logical to extend the regime's desire to prevent institutionalization, because of its potential for creating separate power bases, to such organizations. Thus, the drive of the regime against institutionalization in the government and in the Party, during the Cultural Revolution, was a natural outgrowth of the overriding desire of the regime to centralize power, as outlined in the opening discussion.

A second feature of the Cultural Revolution which could be predicted from the model was the universal use of mass campaigns and mass movements. The Cultural Revolution was composed of a series of massive, often disjointed, frenetic campaigns. The participants in the Cultural Revolution, and this includes almost all of the citizenry

in one degree or another, were literally swept along with the movements and were caught up in the excitement of the revolutionary milieu. The entire Cultural Revolution, in fact, may be considered as a "super-campaign" similar to the Great Leap (of which, theoretically, the Cultural Revolution was simply a continuation). As the model indicates, the use of mass campaigns instead of organizations was an event to be expected, and this trend became plainly visible in China during the Cultural Revolution.

A final basis for predicting the nature of the Cultural Revolution is implied in the very point made above. As the use of mass campaigns increases, the use of mass organizations decreases. This is exactly what happened in China after 1965. The mass organizations and minor parties suffered grievous, perhaps mortal, blows as a result of the Cultural Revolution. The minor parties simply disappeared from the sight of Western observers. Many of the leading figures in these parties were members of the government and were thus criticized in the anti-bureaucratic campaigns. However, the organizations themselves seem to have simply been cast into limbo, ignored, and whether they will be reconstituted is questionable. It is quite possible that the minor parties and the united front have served their purpose and therefore, like the secret societies, they no longer exist. However, the possibility of some sort of settlement with Formosa might tempt one to believe

that the proper minor parties (the remnants of the mainland KMT) could be revitalized, should the international scene so dictate, and serve as an intermediary between Formosa and the mainland.

The mass organizations suffered primarily the same fate in the Cultural Revolution. Klein and Hager, in their discussion of the composition of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP illustrate the decline of the mass organizations.¹¹ The Ninth Congress, which convened in 1969, "is the story of the victors and victims of the Cultural Revolution."¹² The mass organizations can be listed among the victims. The fall of the organizations can be seen in their representation on the Ninth C.C. On the Eighth C.C. there were eight men who had been high YCL officials between 1949 and 1964, including Hsiao Hua, Liao Ch'eng-chih, and Hu Yao-ping. None of these eight men served on the Ninth C.C.¹³ There were twelve individuals who sat on the Eighth C.C. and were also All-China Youth Federation officials between 1949 and 1964. "Only two survived to the Ninth C.C., but both of them--Su Yu and Hsieh Fu-chih--are obviously more closely linked to the PLA than to youth work."¹⁴ There were also twelve ACFTU officials of the 1949-1964 period on the Eighth C.C. and eight of these men were not on the Ninth C.C., "including two of the most important in the everyday federation activities, Liu Ning-i and Li Chieh-po."¹⁵ Furthermore, "None of the four elected

to the Ninth C.C. (e.g., Ch'en Yun) has been active in the labour federation since the 1950's."¹⁶ Thus the mass organizations simply gave way to the mass campaigns as means for totalitarian control. Harper writes:

For the present, the mass line of Mao Tse-tung rides triumphant in decision-making. . . . Ironically, the unions, which fought in 1957 for workers congresses with some real powers and then lost the battle just as they attained that goal, are now defunct. . . . There is no evidence that the union structures are functioning or even exist at any level other than the national; like most mass organizations, they appear to have been simply displaced in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution.¹⁷

The rise of the utilization of mass campaigns and the relegation of the minor parties and mass organizations to mere shadow organizations, or worse, along with the drive against bureaucracy, was clearly evident from the nature of the operation of the model presented at the outset of this research.

In conclusion, by demonstrating the isomorphism between a section of the model and actual Chinese behavior, and by demonstrating the use of the model as a valid predictor of events in China, this research has accomplished two tasks. First, by demonstrating that one section of the model "fit" actual behavior, the research indicates that one may proceed, cautiously, to attempt to apply other sections of the model to China. In short, the failure to invalidate one part of the totalitarian model holds out hope for the validity of the entire model.

Second, this research has demonstrated that in the case of intermediate organizations, the totalitarian model devised herein seems a relatively accurate predictor of events in China. Thus, the model may be said to possess utility for the anticipation of trends in the behavior of the leadership elite of Communist China.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

¹For a re-examination of the theoretical implications of models the reader should refer to the discussion of Kaplan's contentions on pp. 9-10.

²Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1925), pp. 449-450.

³A. J. Nicholls, "Germany," in S. J. Woolf (ed.), European Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 73.

⁴George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966), pp. 338-339.

⁵William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959), pp. 362-363.

⁶Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 127.

⁷Ibid., p. 176.

⁸Ibid., p. 109.

⁹Herman Finer, Mussolini's Italy (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1935), p. 203.

¹⁰Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China (New York: Mentor Books, 1962), p. 73.

¹¹Donald Klein and Lois Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," in The China Quarterly, No. 45 (Jan.-March, 1971), p. 37.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Paul Harper, "Workers' Participation in Management in Communist China." Paper prepared for presentation at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970, p. 22.

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