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NEOCONSERVATISM AND ITS VIEW
TOWARD EDUCATION

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NEOCONSERVATISM AND ITS VIEW TOWARD EDUCATION

By

Mary M. Merillat-Miller

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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1982

ABSTRACT

NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM

Mary M. Merrillat-Miller

This thesis attempts to determine the socio-political position of the neoconservative movement and attempts to explicate neoconservative opinions regarding public education. The writing which appears in Conservative Interest from 1978-1980 serves as the basis for the paper. Ancillary readings are also included.

The historical background of neoconservative liberalism is first discussed. The author then seeks to identify the neoconservative movement and subsequently describes neoconservatism as a neoconservative socio-political position by identifying the assumptions upon which neoconservatism rests.

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This thesis is concerned with the views on public education expressed in Conservative Interest, and other neoconservative works. Conservative action, desegregation and busing, school authority and discipline, and the specialized programs of bilingual education, moral education, and career education are all addressed.

A brief summary and critique conclude the thesis.

ABSTRACT

NEOCONSERVATISM AND ITS VIEW TOWARD EDUCATION

By

Mary M. Merillat-Miller

This thesis attempts to provide a description of the socio-political position known as neoconservatism, and attempts to explicate neoconservative discourse and opinions regarding public education in the United States. The writing which appeared in Commentary and Public Interest from 1976-1980 serves as the basis for this paper. Ancillary readings are also utilized.

The historical background of conservatism and liberalism is first discussed. The thesis then seeks to identify the neoconservatives as a distinct group and subsequently describes neoconservatism as a discernible socio-political position by delineating the basic assumptions upon which neoconservatism rests.

The bulk of this thesis is concerned with the views on public education expressed in Commentary, Public Interest, and other neoconservative works. Affirmative action, desegregation and busing, school authority and discipline, and the specialized programs of bilingual education, moral education, and career education are all addressed.

A brief summary and critique conclude the thesis.

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Special appreciation is given to Dr. R. B. Smith, Switch, who initiated the author into the business world from 1977-1979 and continued to be a mentor and encouragement after leaving the State College of Financial Management in Washington, D.C.

DEDICATION

To Stephen,
whose love, encouragement, support, and never-ending patience has made this possible

Sincere gratitude is given to Norma Anderson who served as a mentor and support from 1979 to the present. Her advice and support have been invaluable. For the time spent with me, the knowledge and insights given, and the valuable perceptions offered, I will be forever indebted.

Finally, heartfelt thanks are given to my parents, C. E. and Mary Jane Merrill, for allowing me to completely disrupt their lives by imposing on them throughout the year while traveling between Louisville and East Lansing to complete this thesis.

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years, the term "neoconservatism" has undoubtedly become a part of the working vocabulary of the journalists writing for Newsweek, Time, Newsday, Fortune, Washington Post, and a host of other magazines, newspapers, books, and scholarly journals. Neoconservatism has gained prominence as a discernible and powerful force within the American political milieu. Emerging in the wake of the negative reaction against many of the "new left" strains of radicalism which prevailed in the 1960s, neoconservatism has been fashioned into a coherent ideological outlook which assails the dominant ethos of the liberal left community. It is the ideological synthesis of liberal and conservative themes which makes this viewpoint both "new" and "conservative." Unlike much of the current liberal left community, neoconservatives assert that to preserve the ethos of liberalism, society must seek to preserve the tradition and heritage of liberalism. To do so requires continued investment in the traditional values and institutions within America, ranging from full endorsement of bourgeois capitalism to elevation of the

CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF INTENT

During the last decade, particularly the last six years, the term "neoconservative" has increasingly become a part of the working vocabulary of the journalists writing for Newsweek, Time, New York Times, Washington Post, and a host of other magazines, newspapers, books, and scholarly journals. Neoconservatism has gained prominence as a discernible and powerful position within the American political milieu. Emerging out of a vociferous negative reaction against many of the non-rational brands of radicalism which prevailed in the 1960s, neoconservatism has been fashioned into a distinct political outlook which assails the dominant assumptions of today's liberal left community. It is the combination and intertwining of liberal and conservative themes which makes this viewpoint both "new" and "conservative." Unlike much of the current liberal left community, neoconservatives assert that to preserve the ethos of liberalism, society must seek to preserve the tradition and heritage of liberalism. To do so requires continued investment in the traditional values and institutions within America, ranging from full endorsement of bourgeois capitalism to elevation of the

virtues of marriage and family. In short, although our political and economic systems may not be perfect, they serve us well, are the best possible alternatives, and demand preservation rather than dismantlement.

It is the opinion of this author that one cannot intelligently discuss any given position unless one is cognizant in some comprehensive manner of the particular tenets of that position. Therefore, this paper attempts to present and delineate the basic suppositions of the neoconservative position and includes a necessary amount of attention to historical background. As with most critical commentary, both positive and negative factors are addressed. The critique advanced here will focus on a general scrutiny of the basic underlying assumptions of the neoconservative position rather than an exhaustive review of other logical and empirical expositions characteristic of contrary positions.

This thesis seeks to explore generally the position known as neoconservatism--its spokespersons as an identifiable group, their expressed underlying assumptions, and specifically their views toward American public education. In doing so, it focuses on the literature from 1976-1980 appearing in Commentary and Public Interest, two key journals which emphasize and have an editorial policy supportive of neoconservative thought. Commentary, a long-standing respected intellectual journal, named Norman Podhoretz as editor in 1960. Elliot Cohen, a

previous editor, had been a major voice in the effort to convince readers that Western Civilization was not in total disarray as the Marxists and Rightists had claimed.³ But when Podhoretz assumed the editorship, his first task was to question many of Cohen's leanings, asking why in light of America's success story there were rising rates of divorce, crime, drug abuse, nervous breakdowns, and juvenile violence. To Podhoretz, the answer at that time could be found in Paul Goodman's Growing Up Absurd, which Commentary serialized in three parts prior to its publication in book form. To Goodman, the current American social order had inherited "incomplete revolutions" where traditional mores and codes of behavior had been ruffled, yet nothing had emerged to replace them.¹

The "new" Commentary took a direction many were leary about. Nonetheless, Podhoretz helped spur an intellectual hunger not only among readers but also among writers who would later be called "neoconservatives." To Podhoretz, a key contribution of the journal was that it provided intellectuals the yearned-for forum in which they could once again function in the familiar and comfortable role of critic.² During the first two years

¹Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks (New York: Harper and Row, Colophon Books, 1979), pp. 78-79.

²Ibid., p. 86.

of his editorship at Commentary Podhoretz, by his own admission, published articles which took an anti-liberal stance and he himself acknowledged support for that same position.³

Gradually the anti-liberal bent began to increase in intensity and manifested itself most clearly in a Commentary piece by Podhoretz entitled "My Negro Problem-- And Ours," a collection of personal experience stories regarding Podhoretz's early days in an integrated neighborhood in Brooklyn. He revealed his feelings that white children like himself had been persecuted, oppressed, beaten, robbed, and humiliated by black children rather than vice versa. His intent was to express doubt about the liberal notion which maintained that if whites and blacks could only live together, they would develop "mutual understanding and sympathy;" to Podhoretz, it only "exacerbated the hatred that existed."⁴

At about the same time, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan published Beyond the Melting Pot, a book which challenged the liberal assertion that ethnic differences were destined to disappear as immigrant groups became more assimilated into American culture.⁵ Elsewhere too, various criticisms of 1960s liberalism surfaced, much

³Ibid., p. 111.

⁴Ibid., pp. 124-125.

⁵Ibid., p. 136.

of it written by neoconservatives. By 1964, when Podhoretz's Commentary split further away from the editorial policy once shared with Jason Epstein's New York Review of Books over a matter involving the publication of an article by Nathan Glazer--an article mildly critical of Berkeley radicals that New York Review had commissioned, and then failed to publish, that was subsequently snatched up by Commentary--it had become apparent that Commentary, and many who contributed regularly to it, had serious reservations about various expressions of the radicalism of the 1960s and wrote feverishly to let their fears be known.⁶

The anti-liberal and anti-radical attitude surfaced in another manner in 1965 when the Public Interest was founded by Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer and was backed by a group of other social scientists, among them Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, James Q. Wilson, and Daniel Moynihan. All of these individuals delineated the need to analyze public policy and discern its limits. In the first issue of Public Interest Bell and Kristol described the new journal's intent:

[F]or public opinion genuinely to exist, it must be (a) opinion, not fancy or prejudice, and (b) public--i.e., directed toward the common good rather than to

⁶ Ibid., pp. 203-209.

⁷ Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, "Year of the Public Interest" Public Interest 1 (Fall 1965): 3.

⁸ Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 127-128.

private benefits. It is such a public opinion that the Public Interest seeks to serve.⁷

Five years after the start of Public Interest writers were united, in addition to their concern with the limits of social policy, by their shared views on the alienated groups, or what they called the "new class." To the neoconservatives, the new class was not really new except in its immense size and influence. Basically, they represented those hostile to bourgeois civilization. The new class was important to battle also because they were not, as was popularly believed, a culture of youth. Rather, they represented a political conflict that representatively crossed all ages, ethnic groups, and social classes. Finally, the neoconservative writing for Public Interest rejected the new class as being what Michael Harrington had called "a constituency of conscience." They viewed instead a group of educated, professionally and technically proficient, and prosperous individuals attempting to dislodge the business and commercial community in America. Kristol characterized them as a group pretending to be concerned with the general good of others, particularly blacks and poor, while concurrently seeking to enhance their own power.⁸

⁷Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, "What Is the Public Interest?" Public Interest 1 (Fall 1965): 5.

⁸Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 287-288.

Throughout the writings in Commentary and Public Interest the strands of neoconservative thought are woven together; much of the neoconservative position can be gleaned from a reading of both journals. In addition to the 1976-1980 issues of Commentary and Public Interest, other readings have been incorporated into this thesis. Ancillary works are employed when necessary, primarily for purposes of historical and contextual background. Several pieces from earlier editions of Commentary and Public Interest are consulted and various other books and essays written by neoconservatives are utilized.

Chapter Two seeks to clarify the interpretive background of the labels "liberal" and "conservative" by viewing them in an historical context. Conservative, and thus neoconservative, means little unless understood in accordance with its relation to the overall background of the times. In short, we can ask "Conservative with respect to what?" By briefly examining the social-philosophical roots of liberalism and conservatism, the position taken by neoconservatives can be better illuminated and more fully understood.

Chapter Three deals first with the personalities behind the position of neoconservatism and second with the basic assumptions which support their writing. The group of individuals who comprise the core of neoconservatism represent a tightly knit group whose personal and political odysseys must be taken into account when

discussing their position. Just as one must know who stands behind neoconservatism, one must also specifically address precisely what neoconservatism is and what it is not. Several key themes are identified and elucidated. The central concern of this chapter is to identify and clarify the underlying social, political, and cultural assumptions upon which neoconservatism rests.

Chapter Four represents the bulk of this thesis and deals with a description of neoconservative opinion on public education. Four key areas are addressed: affirmative action, desegregation and busing, authority, and specialized programs, the latter of which includes bilingual education, moral education, and career education. Public education mirrors the culture at large and is the recipient of a wide array of policy decisions; for this reason it has become a key focus of neoconservative discourse. The issues addressed and the positions taken on each are detailed in this chapter.

Finally, Chapter Five summarizes the overall content of this paper. Additionally discussed are this author's views and criticisms regarding the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the general neoconservative position.

Several limitations must be mentioned with regard to this study. First, any inquiry of this sort must necessarily make use of broad-based generalizations for purposes of simplicity and ease of discussion. Max Weber described usage of this kind in accordance with

his theory of ideal-types. In the process of thinking, he explained, we tend to view reality in terms of it being conceptually perfect or ideal. Although we can acknowledge that reality is skewed from the ideal image, we nonetheless dichotomize our thoughts in relation to that ideal. His cautionary advice is that we at least recognize this fact and wittingly strive to grapple with the realistic areas of grey that lie on a continuum between the distinct poles of black and white. With regard to neoconservative personalities, differences do indeed exist among spokespersons of this position and it is vital to note the fact.

The British analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has greatly contributed to the understanding of problems inherent in discussions concerned with differences and similarities. Wittgenstein speaks in terms of "family resemblances," pointing out that many terms, in this case the label "neoconservative," may share essential features yet concurrently reflect differences. In illustration of this point, we can designate five individuals and assign them the respective characteristics as delineated below in Figure 1, where "x" denotes possession of the particular feature. Upon examination we see that only one characteristic, e, is common to all. We can additionally note that other characteristics overlap in varying degrees ranging from four overlapping characteristics near the middle of the continuum to only one overlapping

characteristic at the end of the continuum.

Second, studies which rely on description and interpretation rather than the Person of empirical data face the inevitable problem of bias from the author's perspective.

Characteristic	1	2	3	4	5
A. Objectivity and detachment have been sought through this work, yet it is foolhardy to assume objectivity is ever neutral and unbiased by the	x				
D. The work is x	x		x	x	
E. The work is x and x	x	x	x	x	x
F. The general task of x is to display the x	x		x	x	x
G. What of neoconservatism, x			x	x	x
H. The guiding principle throughout this work is x				x	x
I. Third, the level of work attempted here is x					x

Figure 1. Variances of Shared Characteristics at a particular point in time. This thesis is not a comprehensive political analysis of neoconservatism nor With regard to the neoconservative spokespersons, the shared characteristics appear more prevalent than the differences; their individual political careers reflect descriptive groundwork has been done. It is hoped that at the very least, the additional analyses and critiques might be helpful in the emergence of neoconservatism.

Likewise, the discussion surrounding the historical background of conservatism and liberalism, the delineation of neoconservatism's basic assumptions, and the descriptive nature of the thesis, however, the description of the neoconservative position on educational issues is similarly tainted by utilizing ideal-types. It is important to keep this consideration in mind clear where certain ideas and statements were derived

throughout.

Second, studies which rely on description and interpretation rather than a set of empirical data face the inevitable problem of bias from the author's perspective. Objectivity and detachment have been sought throughout this paper, yet it is foolhardy to assume this study is value neutral and unblemished by the author's own views. The topic itself and the readings selected and cited are of course inherently biased. However, the general task of attempting to discern the who-and-what of neoconservatism has been the intended guiding principle throughout this work.

Third, the level of work attempted was thought suitable for one particular person's academic endeavors at a particular point in time. This thesis is not a comprehensive political expose on neoconservatism nor is it an exhaustive review of neoconservative writing. It is hoped that at the very least, a measure of descriptive groundwork has been laid from which additional analyses and critiques might be derived.

Fourth, there is the stylistic concern of this paper regarding the use of innumerable footnotes which no doubt may be cumbersome to the reader. Given the descriptive nature of the thesis, however, this author regards the amount of footnoting as unavoidable; it was a chief concern in the writing of this piece to make it clear where certain ideas and statements were derived,

lest they be taken to be biased personal interpretations from the author's viewpoint.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Terms such as "liberal" and "conservative" denote of immense interpretive diffuseness and must therefore be addressed first with regard to their historical development. It is fruitless for anyone to attempt a discussion of neoconservatives, neo-liberals, neo-right liberals, or other similar ideal type labels unless one is cognizant of the basic positions from which these conceptions have developed. In short, a phrase such as "liberal" is devoid of meaning unless the attached "and" word is clearly understood. Although an extended historical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the following section is directed toward clarifying some of the political terms, "conservative" and "liberalism" as they exist in a traditional, historical context. What follows in subsequent pages draws primarily from the writing of Cranston, Minogue, and Russell, whose works provided much of the descriptive background needed.¹ The intent here

¹ Maurice Cranston, "Edmund Burke," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* vol. 1, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967): 429-31; Maurice Cranston, "Liberalism," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* vol. 1, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free

is not a comprehensive investigation of conservatism and liberalism, but rather a straightforward delineation of the historical trends for each in a manner that emphasizes the consensus of historians and philosophers regarding

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Terms such as "liberal" and "conservative" admit of immense interpretive difficulties and must therefore be addressed first with regard to their historical development. It is fruitless for anyone to attempt a discussion of neoconservatives, neoliberals, centrist liberals, or other similar ideal type labels unless one is cognizant of the basic positions from which divergencies have developed. In short, a prefix such as "neo-" is devoid of meaning unless the attached root word is clearly understood. Although an exhaustive review and analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the following section is directed toward clarification of the socio-political terms, "conservatism" and "liberalism," as they exist in a traditional, historical context. What follows in subsequent pages draws primarily from the writing of Cranston, Minogue, and Russell, whose works provided much of the descriptive background needed.¹ The intent here

¹ Maurice Cranston, "Edmund Burke," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* vol. 1, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967): 429-31; Maurice Cranston, "Liberalism," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* vol. 4, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free

is not a comprehensive investigation of conservatism and liberalism, but rather a straightforward delineation of the historical trends for each in a manner that emphasizes the consensus opinions of historians and philosophers regarding common and unifying themes of the term. Conservatism is a term which has been adopted by members of the Conservatism movement. In the most general usage, conservatism refers to the dual attachment by men to the traditional institutions which surround them and to the doctrines which purport to defend those institutions. Preferring the familiar over new contrivances, conservatism thus generally eschews change, or at best, regards it with a measure of cautious deliberation.²

Prior to the time of the Reformation, distinguishing conservatism from other political philosophies was virtually impossible, for there existed no other coherent body of politics. It was to this fact that Mannheim referred when he wrote, "Goaded on by opposing theories, conservative mentality discovers its idea only ex post."

Press: London: Collier Publishers, 1967): 458-461; Kenneth Minogue, "Conservatism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967): 195-198; Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, Touchstone Books, 1945).

²Minogue, "Conservatism," p. 195.

facto."³ From that time henceforth, however, one can discern distinct political party lines in which one group proposes change and another opposes it. The term itself is thought to have developed in Paris and London in the early nineteenth century, and by the middle of that century, "conservatism" was increasingly endorsed and adopted by members of the Tory party. The intellectual background of conservatism extends to writers such as Hume, Swift, Aquinas, Plato, and Aristotle, all of whom had their writings cited and arguments advanced in varying degrees according to the specific political demand of the time. Historically, conservatives have defended monarchical and aristocratic institutions from new egalitarian reforms, yet it is important to note that what is conserved remains independent of the major philosophical arguments of conservative thought.⁴

Conservatism's hostility to new radical social change, particularly that justified by utopian vision or an abstract set of rights, stems from the tenet that government functions best when it limits itself to maintaining order; extension beyond these limits will lead only to social disruption. Those who govern are believed to possess special virtues not shared equally with all

³Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 207.

⁴Minogue, "Conservatism," p. 195.

men, skills learned through practice. Thus, those who have been members of traditional ruling classes are often best fitted for the task. Time and experience become necessary and important prerequisites to develop the habits demanded by sound political decision making.⁵

The place of reason in conservative thought often varies. Ethically, conservatism asserts that moral training is more beneficial than reasoned calculations. Politically, it is the abuse of reason by men who propose policies directed toward the elimination of social ills that bears the brunt of conservative criticism and not reason itself. Viewed not as a science but rather as an art, politics employs principles only as a guide to elucidate complex and difficult situations; the principles are not to be viewed as dogma. When they are mistakenly taken to be doctrine, political principles lead to unrealizable utopian hopes that have no chance of fruition.⁶

The view of human nature espoused by conservatism sees man as either inherently sinful and evil in the Hobbesian sense or as unstable and unpredictable. The first of these views stems from the doctrine of original sin; from this came the Augustinian notion that government could and should remedy man's defective character. Both views of human nature agree that moral and political

habits, especially those relevant to ruler conduct

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

stability and civilization itself rely on the perpetuation of traditional institutions--church, state, and family,--and on the acceptance of a sense of duty and moral obligation. Whatever divergencies do exist among conservatives, their view of man's less-than-perfect nature is a common thread and unifying theme; the root cause of social and political ills reverts back to man himself and not his environment. Thus, measures to upgrade the social environment in the guise of ultimately improving man are tenuous. Change in the morals of men is seen as the best vehicle for possible social improvement.⁷

The stress on moral responsibility is often closely associated with religion. The writings of Edmund Burke, (typically credited as the founder of conservative philosophy), elucidate this point further, particularly those writings found in Reflections on the Revolution in France. To Burke, a highly religious man who thought the fruits of happiness and peace were available only in heaven, it was believed that history developed and unfolded through the direct guidance of God. The institutions created throughout history were not overnight creations of men employing the highest faculties of reason but gradual progressions of behavioral dispositions and habits, especially those relevant to ruler command and

⁸Cranston, "Burke," p. 430.

⁷Ibid.

citizen subordination. These change according to the mandates of shifting social circumstances, yet only slowly, by gradual degrees; this allows for the conservation of large segments of an institution's past history and it is in this respect that maintenance, not improvement, is the real business of government.⁸

As noted earlier, the idea of tradition weighs heavily in the political position of conservatism and thus needs further examination. The basis for decisions in the present relies on the heritage of currently existing institutions, any of which can be modified. Tradition encompasses the conscious reasoning of any activity as well as the habits and dispositions which can lead to the further development of activities. The principles upon which activity is based do represent in part, conscious deliberations, yet conservatism warns that this in itself is incomplete and must not be allowed to assume a dominating position; tradition allows for, and nurtures, the development of rational thought. The role of authority relates directly to tradition, for authority is the custodian or gate keeper of tradition. Authorities are admittedly fallible, yet are defined for their compensating effects against human ill-intent, mistakes, and blindness. Duty and discipline are thus key safeguards against fallible

⁸Cranston, "Burke," p. 430.

¹⁰Ibid.

man and freedom becomes that which men ought to do.⁹

The role of religion in conservatism, as noted above, is often a key factor in justifying political decisions. Yet another brand of conservatism, realistic skepticism, legitimates decision making in a manner qualitatively different. Here, gross universal generalizations about the nature of man are avoided, and concentration is focused instead upon man in his current state; the conscious choices he makes represent his nature in modern society. Since it is believed that man will make political decisions that interfere least with his own interests, government thereby becomes the medium which supervises the multitude of individuals as they engage in the process of satisfying their wants and needs. In this respect, government participates only so far as to regulate the rules of society, and therefore does not engage in the prescription of actual activities for society. As conditions gradually change, so too do the rules, but alterations are made in continuance with the social order from which they stem. They are not created anew nor are they made with a great degree of frequency; too much change occurring too rapidly can give rise to false hopes and grandiose visions concerning the possibilities for a given society.¹⁰

⁹Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (New York: 1962), pp. 196-197.

¹⁰Ibid.

A key feature which distinguishes skeptical conservatism from classical conservatism is that skeptical conservatism limits itself to the political realm, thus maintaining that a person could be politically conservative yet radical or liberal in other areas such as moral preferences or cultural tastes. Although the similarities between skeptical conservatism and classical liberalism may appear many, an important difference separates the two. Skeptical conservatism eschews the value of human choice, private property, and diversity in personal belief systems as absolute entities in and of themselves, preferring instead the notion of limitations in any and all institutions.¹¹

Michael Oakeshott, a political scientist at the London School of Economics, is considered the best contemporary spokesman of conservatism and further elucidates the conservative position. Although his writings are numerous, Rationalism in Politics contains the best and most comprehensive collection of works illustrating his position.¹² Secondary critiques of his work by Greenleaf, Crick, Wood, and most notably, by Pitkin, offer considerable insight, analysis, and clarity to an

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962).

understanding of Oakeshott's writings.¹³ Pitkin's analyses are addressed in part below, selected largely as principal material because of the relation drawn between Oakeshott and contemporary conservative spokespersons.

Oakeshott views society in a manner that has been characterized as "ecological." While all men are products of history, they perceive only a small part of it and often remain unaware of this association despite the contributory effect of their daily private choices to ongoing historical development.¹⁴ The structure of society is large, complex, and in a continual state of flux, yet it remains stable enough to absorb the varied and slight changes brought about by men.¹⁵ It is the balance between change and the capability-to-absorb-change that distinguishes Oakeshott's scheme as ecological, a balance which must ultimately be kept on an even keel lest the system as a whole be upset. His wariness of radical new

¹³W. H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1966); Bernard Crick, "The World of Michael Oakeshott," Encounter 20, no. 6 (June 1963): 65-74; Neal Wood, "A Guide to the Classics: the Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott," Journal of Politics 21, no. 4 (November 1959): 647-662; Hanna F. Pitkin, "The Roots of Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of Politics," in The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left, rev. ed., ed. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York: New American Library, 1976), pp. 243-288.

¹⁴Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 244.

¹⁵Oakeshott, Rationalism, p. 183; Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 244.

social change reflects this fear of upsetting the natural balance which exists in society. Because Oakeshott contends that no social contract exists between man and society, man cannot impose alterations at his own convenience; change must stem primarily from that which already exists.¹⁶ And if it does not proceed with cautious gradations? It is then, asserts Oakeshott, that real damage occurs. With the loss of tradition comes a loss of stability and sense of purpose, and men become what Burke described as "little better than flies of a summer," victims of the faulty promises issued by an instantaneous society in which life becomes little more than a series of disjointed and disconnected experiences.¹⁷ Oakeshott envisions society as a community where individuals live according to norms that enhance their freedom to live, rather than restrain them from living.¹⁸ Most of Oakeshott's writing serves as a defense of conservatism and an attack on "Rationalism" which is depicted as the position antithetical to conservatism. It is vitally important to note that Rationalism is not used synonymously with rationality. Rationalism is a political position which seeks the logical, the orderly, tics, states Oakeshott, is the process in which we

¹⁶Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 244.

¹⁷Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Thomas D. Mahoney (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 108.

¹⁸Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 245.

the abstract, while concurrently rejecting traditional and customary norms of behavior. Those considered devotees of Rationalism define rationality as deliberate behavior directed toward a predetermined goal, behavior that is justified in ideological terms.¹⁹ Above all, Oakeshott detests the Rationalist pursuit of perfection for the social order. He states:

It involves the penalties of impiety . . . , and its reward is not that of achievement but that of having made the attempt. It is an activity therefore, suitable for individuals, but not for societies.²⁰

Instead, Oakeshott sets forth the view that things should be valued as they currently exist and thus prefers slow, gradual change over rapid. His concept of community is favored over Rationalism's focus on organizations. Most important, Oakeshott's view of rationality denotes activity conducted in such a manner "that the coherence of the idiom of activity to which the conduct belongs is preserved and possibly enhanced."²¹

A key underlying assumption of Oakeshott's work deserves mention for it helps further clarify his position. This concerns his definition of political activity. Politics, states Oakeshott, is the process in which men

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 245-247.

²⁰Oakeshott, Rationalism, p. 59.

²¹Ibid., p. 102.

"attend to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together."²² His use of "attend" is noteworthy for it implies surveying something already present rather than actually creating something anew; Oakeshott always shows preference to the familiar.²³

In any generation, even the most revolutionary, the arrangements which are enjoyed far exceed those which are recognized to stand in need of attention, and those which are being prepared for enjoyment are few in comparison with those which receive amendment: the new is an insignificant portion of the whole.²⁴

Thus, our world as it is, is the best possible world. All in it, asserts Oakeshott, is a "necessary evil."²⁵

Tradition is viewed as the only means to furnish the continuity necessary to resolve dispute over individual short term goals and the public's long term goals.

Due to its high degree of complexity, tradition is impossible to create.²⁶ Attempts to do so invariably create chaos, destruction of social cohesion, and the loss of an historical perspective between past and present. In short, there occurs a loss of ecological balance.

²²Ibid., p. 112.

²³Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 250.

²⁴Oakeshott, Rationalism, p. 112.

²⁵Ibid., p. 133.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 22-23; 121.

Oakeshott is careful to recognize and admit the presence of inconsistencies within society, yet maintains that politics can adjudicate and reduce conflict by seeking stability.²⁷ Valued both for itself and as a mechanism by which freedom is guarded, stability remains an indispensable element in Oakeshott's scheme. He even goes so far as to say that it may be the only meaningful political goal.²⁸ If this is the case, we may quite properly ask, What of other goals? In particular, what of freedom? Oakeshott's answer remains in line with the historical tradition of classical conservatism. Freedom simply is by the very presence of its availability.²⁹ It is not something procedural, something sought; freedom is solely the absence of constraints. Therefore, any and all political efforts to harness or legislate its powers are futile. Those entrusted with the business of government, the politicians, will thus be constrained in their control of power, for a system based on habit and tradition restrains their actions to the occasional repair work needed.³⁰

Oakeshott issues one caveat regarding the possibility of seeking certitude through a political system.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 124-125.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 127.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 121-123.

³⁰ Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," pp. 255-257.

Although tradition is to serve as the guide for decision making, it is in no way assured that tradition will provide a cohesive set of final answers to problems.³¹ Theoretical principles can only be applied to concrete sets of circumstances; they alone cannot provide solutions. Therefore, there are guidelines for the use of theoretical principles.³² Politicians must refrain first from conceiving of principles that are completely alien to established tradition. Failing to do this would be to create ideas out of context, specifically out of historical context. They must also take all measures to enhance the already existing consistencies within the social structure and actively reduce the degree of incoherence when it becomes apparent. Politicians must finally avoid the temptation to seek certitude by appeal to abstract answers derived from theoretical principles; always they must appeal to the concrete knowledge which already exists.³³ Failure to do so would designate a disregard for prevailing tradition, a fatal mistake in Oakeshott's view. Tradition may very well weaken or appear in utter disarray but never, according to Oakeshott, will it fail completely.³⁴

³¹Oakeshott, Rationalism, p. 136.

³²Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," pp. 258-259.

³³Ibid., p. 259.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 259-260.

There are two additional considerations with regard to tradition and its role in society. One involves crisis, the greatest and most dangerous threat to tradition.³⁵ States Oakeshott, tradition in the face of a major crisis "has little power of recovery" for by its historical nature and very definition, it is geared only to slow, gradual, and adaptive change.³⁶ Prevention of social crises, Oakeshott warns us, is of key importance; this parallels earlier remarks indicating his assertion that stability may be the sole political goal which carries meaning.³⁷ The second consideration regards the possibility that tradition will become devoid of meaning. He offers no solution, but does suggest that social arrangements must be consciously examined (a preventive measure) in order to avoid becoming static and alien to the people which they serve.³⁸

Liberalism

A different conception of what it means to consciously examine the existing social order can be found in the political position of liberalism. When investigating the term "liberal," it is helpful to trace the word's

³⁵ Ibid., p. 261.

³⁶ Oakeshott, Rationalism, p. 70.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁸ Pitkin, "Roots of Conservatism," p. 260.

definition back to its etymological roots. The orthography as it currently exists was present in both Middle English (1100-1400 A.D.) and Middle French (1300-1500 A.D.) and is most probably derived from the Latin word "liber," which literally denotes "free." Earlier relationships to "liberal" can be found in the Old English term "leodan" which means "to grow" and itself is traceable to the Greek word "eleutheros," also meaning "free."³⁹ Today we tend to loosely define a liberal as one who believes in freedom or liberty, yet encounter ambiguity when the attempt is launched to define either liberty or freedom. Further examination of the connotation of "liberal" yields greater understanding, and it can be stated with a large measure of certainty that "liberal" in its earliest meanings was a term mixed and ambiguous in nature. St. Gregory, in using "libertas," meant "free" or "freedom." On the other hand, Shakespeare used "liberal" to denote a person who was licentious or gross, thus a term pejorative in nature.⁴⁰

The political usage of the word can be traced to late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century England when liberal was the label attached to members of the Whig Party by opposing Tories. It is interesting to note

³⁹Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 18th ed., s.v. "liberal."

⁴⁰Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458.

that the Spanish spelling of the word, "liberales," was used by the Tories rather than the standard English spelling in an attempt to convey the sense that the Whigs were somehow un-English and unpatriotic in their political persuasions. Gradually, however, the term has come to be enjoyed in a more positive sense, examples of which are apparent throughout the works of Hobbes in his writings on both ethics and political philosophy.⁴¹

Whether one views liberal or liberalism positively or negatively depends on an individual's perceptions of freedom and government and the relationship between the two. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the term, it is possible to delineate a vague distinction between those who view freedom as something which belongs to an individual and those who view it as something which belongs to the collection of individuals known as society. Likewise, an additional distinction can be made between those who view government as something largely passive, an institution from which individuals are to be protected, and those who view government as an institution which belongs to the collectivity of individuals, and can therefore defensibly be expected to function actively for the betterment of all individuals in society. Within both distinctions, the former position thus thinks of "liberty" as "freedom from" something, e.g., government, oppression,

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid. 1. History of Western Philosophy, p. 117

servitude, etc., and the latter group views "liberty" as "freedom to" something, e.g., to have certain individual rights, social rights, or a lifestyle of one's choosing.

There are limits to how far one can reasonably be expected to go with a discussion of conceptual terms and all their related and implied meanings before it becomes indispensable to view the usage of such terms within the historical context in which they appear. It is to these various historical contexts that we now turn.

Traditional English liberalism for example, or classical liberalism, rests in general on the notions of freedom from the constraints of the state and is based on the policies and practices of laissez faire economics.⁴² Thomas Hobbes writes in his chapter on the liberty of subjects in Leviathan that, "Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion."⁴³ The bias against government must be understood within the setting that nearly all governments were at that time either monarchical or aristocratic. Early liberalism was typically opposed to everything politically and philosophically medieval and thus rejected absolute powers of Church and state in favor of the rising middle class. Although primarily Protestant, it advocated toleration of religious

⁴² Ibid. pp. 596-598.

⁴³ Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 553.

differences yet remained firmly opposed to any sort of religious fanaticism, specifically that exemplified by the Calvinists and Anabaptists.⁴⁴

John Locke is generally credited as the political philosopher who provided the first comprehensive statement concerning classical liberalism. An exhaustive review of his theoretical work is beyond the scope of this paper, but several characteristics warrant consideration. First is Locke's elevation of reason over the dictates of the Church. In using the powers of reason, we investigate what we know with certitude and what we believe to know probabilistically; both are indispensable for the attainment of truth and knowledge.⁴⁵ This was a significant development in political philosophy for it signified the diminishing authority of the Church as elements of science and reason assumed a position of greater prominence and influence. Locke himself was a devout Christian, religiously educated, and according to all accounts, a man who lived according to his faith in the existence of a God. He accepted the possibility of direct revelation from God to man as a means to attain knowledge, yet tempered any inclination toward dogmatism with his ultimate trust in men's capabilities for reasonableness. In Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 596-598.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 606-610.

qualifies his religious faith by stating that even "revelation must be judged by reason."⁴⁶ His argument is quite simply that reason is a disposition or an inclination bestowed by God himself and not something wholly derived syllogistically. Chiding medieval thought, Locke writes:

God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational.⁴⁷

A second feature of Locke, and one which is all too frequently treated lightly in the literature, is his insistence on the virtue he described as prudence. By this Locke implies that men ought to be concerned with long term interests as much as possible in order to appropriately and judiciously balance the struggle between the public and the private interests. Bertrand Russell provides the following commentary on, and explanation of, Locke's position.

Prudence is the one virtue which remains to be preached, for every lapse from virtue is a failure of prudence. Emphasis on prudence is characteristic of liberalism. It is connected with the rise of capitalism, for the prudent became rich while the imprudent became or remained poor. It is connected also with certain forms of Protestant piety: virtue with a view to heaven is psychologically very analogous to saving with a view to investment.⁴⁸

The reliance on prudence is particularly important

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 607.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 614.

when one entertains notions of social change. The classical liberal position, by no means hostile to change, is cautious with regard to the extremes it is willing to extend itself. Generally, traditional English liberals refrained from extreme measures, eschewing anything close to anarchy. Nonetheless, it is true that Locke condoned civil disobedience and rebellion but his acceptance of such measures was issued with the caveat that rebellion should occur only after all other feasible attempts at reform had been exhausted; he assumed men would tolerate a great deal before rebelling. Locke's acknowledgement of rebellion as a last resort reflects his deeper commitment to the fact that rulers may well indeed wield their power unfairly. If rulers do so, they cease to be agents of the government of the people and function rather as tyrants. Thus, citizens may rightfully rebel, disobey, and topple the existing government. In doing so, people are appropriately exercising their abilities and rights to reason and are ultimately acting in accord with their long term interests.⁴⁹

A third feature of Locke that symbolizes classical liberalism is the necessity of the state for life, liberty, and property. As mentioned earlier, Locke and the traditional English liberals rejected the principle of heredity as the basis for political power, arguing instead

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 615-633.

that government is the result of a contract between people and government.⁵⁰ It is a social contract consciously made rather than one dictated by divine authority. Locke asserts that men will behave reasonably; this is based on his assumption that man in the state of nature is a virtuous and happy man who will always obey reason. Because the existence of a God is accepted by Locke, moral rules based on the teachings of the Bible are what determine the legal and behavioral codes which are to be upheld. Other classical liberals who do not espouse Biblical teachings, most notably the deist Founding Fathers, appeal to man's reasoning ability in order to devise an appropriate code of behavior. What is important here is not the Christian-deist differences of opinion, but rather their acceptance of government in the role of an institution through which law and order would be maintained. Traditional English liberalism envisioned government as the agency through which men's rights and freedoms would be protected, a mode of remedy for disputes in society, but always one whose power and operation were designed for and limited to the common good. With the emphasis on common good, defense against the intrusion of tyrannical foreign powers is additionally assumed.⁵¹ Writes Locke of political power:

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 630.

⁵⁰ Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458.

⁵¹ Russell, History of Western Philosophy, pp. 629-640.

Political power I take to be the right of making laws, with penalty of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the common wealth from foreign injury and all this only for the public good.⁵²

The limits of men's powers are also addressed by Locke in a familiar quotation regarding liberty.

The state of nature is a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state has an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.⁵³

A fourth and final characteristic feature of traditional liberalism is the system of checks and balances, a concept which in practice kept separate the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.⁵⁴ The formulation of the first two is generally credited directly to Locke. It bears mentioning that in its inception the executive branch originally referred to the king and was thereby evil in Locke's mind, while the

corpus for example, extend the liberties of citizens.

⁵² Ibid., p. 630.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 625.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 637-640.

legislative branch referred to Parliament and was generally considered good and upright. By keeping the two separate, abuses of power would be best prevented. Locke did not place the judicial branch as the mediator and resolver of executive-legislative conflicts but relied instead on his faith in men's reasoning and compromising abilities to adjudicate disputes as they arose. Prior to the time of the Revolution, judges were appointed--and dismissed--by the King and thus served more in the capacity of puppets rather than law makers and enforcers. This is thought to have influenced Locke's downplay of the judicial branch. Following the Revolution however, removal was possible only through the joint decision of both Houses of Parliament. From that time on, the role of the judicial system became more pronounced, its most visible manifestation currently evidenced by the operation of the Supreme Court in the United States.⁵⁵ With the changed nature of the legal branch, certain new characteristics typical of classical liberalism were evident. Law became a mode of extending individual rights but only insofar as the measures taken functioned to limit the operation of the executive branch. Legal doctrines guiding search and seizure, bail, arrest, and habeas corpus for example, extend the liberties of citizens, yet they do so by constraining executive power, not by

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 638-640.

liberties outrightly.⁵⁶

Juxtaposed to Locke is the position of Hobbes who held that the natural state of man was a selfish one guided by personal interest. Richard Hofstadter has frequently noted that the United States Constitution reflected the beliefs of Hobbes and Calvin concerning human evil and self interest. The Founding Fathers, notes Hofstadter, failed to express faith in man's goodness and believed "in the power of a good political constitution to control him."⁵⁷ Those present at the Constitutional Convention revealed through their discussions exactly how much they distrusted common man and the potential hazards of democratic rule. The masses were thought incapable of determining what was right according to the men at the Philadelphia Convention; with few exceptions they themselves were all representative of high position and wealth. Notions of democracy were simply unappealing and unattractive to men who based their views of reality on a Hobbesian premise that men were unruly and in need of control. Yet they concurrently expressed fear of rightist extremes of dictatorship and monarchy and felt the masses ought to have a voice in the government which ruled them. Thus, legitimate

⁵⁶ Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458.

⁵⁷ Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1948), p. 3.

government had to derive from the people.⁵⁸

Given the sordid and unchangeable nature of man, change would have to be introduced into the system of government itself. Hofstadter describes the search for a balanced government in line with the natural state of mankind as a quest for "constitutional devices that would force various interests to check and control one another."⁵⁹ Three such "devices" were established: federated government rule, representative government, and the creation of a system of checks and balances through the interrelationships of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The Founding Fathers, in seeking to establish a government that would ensure the liberty of its citizens, tied liberty not to democracy as is popularly believed, but rather to property. Property was thought to be the basis of government; without it, men lacked the essential stake in society which made them good citizens.⁶⁰ In describing this essential belief of the framers of the Constitution, Hofstadter writes:

Because men have different faculties and abilities, the Fathers believed, they acquire different amounts of property. To protect property is only to protect men in the exercise of their natural faculties. Among the

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 4-7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 10-13.

engage many liberties, therefore, freedom to
 cally hold and dispose property is paramount.
 aid the Democracy, unchecked rule by the masses,
 slight is sure to bring arbitrary redistribution
 of property, destroying the very essence
 of liberty.⁶¹

The Founding Fathers wanted men to be free to obtain property and use it to gain more. They believed that by devising guidelines to temper men's self-interest struggles maximum freedom for all would be possible. Their intentions and efforts were of course those of the eighteenth century, prior to the expansion of industrialism which radically changed the distribution of property and its resultant effect on political power. There is small doubt that when John Jay stated, "The people who own the country ought to govern it," he had little vision of a society in which multimillion dollar corporations would become a dominant feature in contemporary life.⁶²

In England's politics, change in the classical conception of liberalism became increasingly visible near the end of the nineteenth century. Certain English liberal theorists, most notable among them the Oxford-trained philosopher Thomas Green, wrote of freedom and liberty in a manner more expansive in scope. Such thought was radical when compared to its classical heritage, for now appeared the demand for government to actively

⁶¹Ibid., p. 12.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 15-17.

engage in efforts directed toward social reform. Specifically intended were those sorts of actions which would aid the multitudes of poor and oppressed. The seemingly slight alterations were in reality quantitatively radical. Where politics was formerly passive except in cases where individual liberties were extended as a result of restraints placed on the executive elements of government, it was now called upon to actively plan and execute social change. Additionally, the concept of economic laissez faire was cast from its classical status as unshakeable gospel.⁶³ Green's essay which appeared in 1881, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," circled widely throughout England and was immediately regarded as a radical piece, for it not only attacked laissez faire practices, but also set forth principles which justified the creation of welfare state economics.⁶⁴ The radical elements continued to expand on the eve of the twentieth century and eventually manifested their far reaching effects with the crumbling of the British Labor Party. Following that, classical laissez faire devotees allied themselves with conservative right wing forces against

~~classify the French political arena in order of the~~

⁶³ Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458.

⁶⁴ W. H. Walsh, "Thomas Hill Green," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 3, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967), p. 357.

⁶⁵ Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458

the new faction of radical liberals.⁶⁵ Thus, we see that those who were once considered liberal by means of the tradition of classical liberalism were now termed conservative. They had become so not because of an inherent change in their position, but rather because of a change in the public perception of that position. As mentioned earlier, the terms liberal and conservative are relative according to their relationship upon one another and it is always in order to ask, Conservative or liberal with respect to whom or what? Classical liberalism was liberal when compared to the church-state brand of conservatism. But with the rise of the "new" liberals, or "radical" liberals in the late-nineteenth century, the old liberalism seemed conservative by comparison, even though it was not conservative to the same degree as the traditional brand of conservatism.

The issue of how the connotations of political terms such as liberal and conservative became altered throughout the course of history can be further examined. Historians concerned with the political events in France since the early part of the eighteenth century generally classify the French political arena in one of two ways. The first describes political events in terms of two discernible positions, the second in terms of three. Those who view France in the former manner distinguish

⁶⁵Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 458.

the left wing as conservateurs. This faction loosely encompasses those individuals who are supportive of the Catholic Church and traditional modes of social organization. In contrast are the right wing liberals who generally oppose Church authority in favor of parliamentary government, social progress, and the independent individual rights of men to live outside the influence of traditional religious structures. The politics of France viewed from the latter perspective employs three rather than two distinctions. On the left are the socialists, anarchists, and communists. On the right are those conservatives with royalist persuasions. Poised amidst these two factions are the liberals. What is significant in the issue of viewing French political thought as either bipartite or tripartite is that if the first description is accepted, "liberal" encompasses the radical left; if the second description is utilized, "liberal" opposes the radical left. Again, the terms admit of ambiguity and can easily be misunderstood unless closely scrutinized.⁶⁶

Surrounding the French Revolution were two opposing camps of liberals. On one side the classical liberalism in the tradition of Locke was espoused by Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Benjamin Constant. On the other side were the radical liberals, Rosseaulike, democratic, and more

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 459.

rebellious in their efforts to execute the Revolution.⁶⁷ Some historians today characterize this latter group as antithetical to true liberalism, criticizing them foremost for the extremes to which anarchist measures in the name of nationalism and liberty were taken, commentary not unlike that expressed by Voltaire, Constant, and other classical liberals in nineteenth century France.⁶⁸

After the fall of Napoleon, Constant and his friends sought to restore a more classical type of liberalism in France and believed they had succeeded in 1830 when Louis Philippe took the throne and traditional liberals assumed positions of leadership within the country.⁶⁹ What followed thereafter was all but promising. Toppling the old regime proved only to create a new bourgeois leadership, intent on maintaining their newly acquired powers, and promises to aid the poor never materialized. The left wing rebelled again in 1848, but from the right came the rule of Napoleon III in 1852. After that, there was no formal liberal party in France and the connotation of liberalism, termed as such, failed to survive as a cohesive idea in the minds of the French people.⁷⁰

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 600.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 639.

⁷⁰Cranston, "Liberalism," p. 459.

In 1912 there occurred a resurgence in the debate between old, right wing liberalism, and new, left wing liberalism. Le Liberalisme, written by Emile Faguet, appeared, was widely circulated, and argued again for a return to Lockean politics. Faguet asserted foremost that although the state at times may well indeed be evil, it is always less of an evil than anarchy. He argued for the principles of maintenance and order in government, claiming that any further actions would interfere with individual rights to be free of the constraints of the state in personal and business matters. The work was met with profuse criticism from French theorist Jean deGrandvilliers who called Faguet's conception of liberalism "perverted." He claimed that true liberalism can only denote actively pursuing the extension of citizens' rights and liberties, the state being not only a means to achieve this, but an indispensable one at that. Thus Grandvilliers represents the radical, or etatiste, liberals who argue that if government is sincerely one "of the people" then it rightfully can and should be used for the benefit of the people.⁷¹

The dispute as it existed between Faguet and Grandvilliers serves as one further illustration of the degree of ambiguity involved in the concepts of "liberty" and "liberalism." Viewing their debate in isolation could

⁷¹Ibid.

quite reasonably lead one to label Faguet a conservative and Grandvilliers a liberal. And in doing so, one would most assuredly be correct. Viewed in terms of their relationship to one another's position, Faguet is less liberal, or more conservative, than Grandvilliers, and Grandvilliers more liberal, or less conservative, than Faguet. But when taken within its historical context and compared to traditional conservatism, both are liberal, although liberal in varying degrees.

Nineteenth century Germany provides another example of the changing nature of liberalism, but the progression of the new or radical liberal movement took a course qualitatively different from that of England or France. The new brand of liberalism which arose in Germany was nationalistic, calling first for unification so that all of Germany might be strengthened. Where England and France sought greater freedom for individuals, factions in Germany sought greater freedom for the state. These efforts bear significance not only because of the quest for the state, but additionally because of the novel concept of freedom utilized. Rather than resisting constraints from without, radical liberals in Germany appealed to Kant's idea of conformity to the moral freedoms offered by a perfect state. In short, if citizens banded together in support of a unified state they would be obeying moral law and could thus enjoy the essence of true freedom. Although Germany was

eventually unified, it was not due to the efforts of the new liberals but rather to the efforts of the imperialists. Additionally, the theoretical political impetus came not from Kant, but from Bismarck. The classical-type liberalism apparent in Germany prior to the nineteenth century did show some sign of resurgence following the 1945 defeat of the Nazi regime.⁷²

It will perhaps be easier to comprehend the political climate of the United States having examined the general historical antecedents in England, France, and Germany. The political philosophy of emerging America as shaped by the Founding Fathers was fashioned after the position of classical liberalism, although additionally concerned with democracy in a manner unlike Locke. With the shifts in the United States toward more egalitarian notions of democracy, liberal has tended to be increasingly disassociated with the tradition of classical liberalism; indeed, by current standards, the classical liberal position would be termed conservative. This is an important point to bear in mind when one begins examining the government programs and policies which prevail today in the United States.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 459-460.

CHAPTER III

THE NEOCONSERVATIVES AND THEIR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Posing the question, "Who are the neoconservatives and what do they believe?" is a query inherently difficult to answer. Proposed answers are no more exact than to label a particular individual a "liberal" or a "conservative." The following caveat is therefore in order. Labels of this sort, and statements made in the same vein, are broad-based and general. The use of such terms and statements complies with the earlier description of ideal-type usage described in Chapter I.

The Professing Group

In general, the neoconservatives most often represent the New York Jewish intellectual community, but they are not limited to this group. Daniel Bell has provided an extensive geneology of who-has-been and who-is within this community, complete with a listing of those individuals considered "Gentile cousins" and those who were geographically outside New York, but similar enough to warrant inclusion into the New York community of

intellectuals as "status holding" members.¹

The list is a long one; for our purposes, the most recognizable names on the roster include Elliot Cohen, Sidney Hook, Lionel and Diana Trilling, Hannah Arendt, Edmund Wilson, Richard Hofstadter, Clement Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Melvin Lasky, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, and Norman Podhoretz.²

Outside this immediate circle but having stature as members of the New York Jewish intellectual community are Daniel Boorstin, Edward Banfield, Aaron Wildavsky, and Daniel P. Moynihan. Most prominent in the literature are the writings of Lipset, Moynihan, Bell, Kristol, Glazer, and Podhoretz. Some individuals are hesitant about being labeled neoconservative. Podhoretz, for example, prefers his views accepted as "centrist" or "centrist liberal;" Lipset, like many others, advocates being called a socialist; Bell flatly rejects the term; Kristol in contrast, openly endorses the term.³

¹Daniel Bell, The Winding Passage (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 127-129.

²Ibid.

³Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks (New York: Harper and Row, Colophon Books, 1979), p. 16; Bell, Winding Passage, p. 286; Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Harper and Row, Colophon Books, 1978), p. xi; Nathan Glazer, Remembering the Answers (New York: Harper and Row Torchbook, 1972), p. ix.

Most of the core spokespersons of neoconservatism possess prestigious professional credentials. Educated at universities such as Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and New York's City College, they are bright, articulate, and well-rounded intellectually. They have direct access to the people on Capitol Hill, Wall Street, and the labor unions. Their influence and power extends into the American Enterprise, Hudson, and Rand Institutes and the Carnegie, Ford, and Sage Foundations. Overall, their networks can be depicted as having both depth and breadth.

Judged by technical and stylistic standards, the neoconservatives write well and they write prolifically. Daniel Bell, for one, had written 426 articles in the twenty year period from 1940-1960.⁴ Two of the most important vehicles of neoconservative thought, Commentary and Public Interest, regularly and consistently feature neoconservative writers. Commentary, founded by the American Jewish Committee, is currently edited by Norman Podhoretz who has held that position since 1960. Public Interest first appeared in 1965, the result primarily of efforts by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell; today Kristol shares the editorship with Nathan Glazer. But the scope of neoconservative discourse traverses far beyond these two journals and can also be found in Atlantic Monthly, Business Week, Esquire, Fortune, Harper's, New Republic,

⁴Bell, The Winding Passage, p. xii.

Newsweek, New York Times, Science, Time, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Monthly. Their appearance in such a wide spectrum of periodicals further attests to the prominence held by the neoconservatives.

Most of the neoconservatives began as outspoken socialists, Kristol and Bell being notable graduates of the "Alcove 1" crowd, denoting a cafeteria section at City College in the 1930s and 1940s that had been designated for non-Communist socialists.⁵ During the time of the Second World War, Kristol, Bell, and other liberals and socialists found themselves reexamining and rethinking their basic premises and beliefs. With the onset of the Cold War, the intellectuals who were shunned only a decade earlier now came into their own, valued for their political expertise in socialist thought.⁶ It was at this time that a position of hard anti-communism established its roots in the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, a counterpart to the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom.⁷ Several neoconservatives were active in the execution of its goals, chief among them

⁵Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing American Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, Touchstone Books, 1979), pp. 81, 161.

⁶Ibid., pp. 25-32.

⁷Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 289-290.

being prevention of the spread of Soviet influence.⁸ This was a vital factor in the intellectual development of many neoconservatives, for the threat of Soviet expansion and oppression was seen as the ultimate evil--all other issues were of secondary and subordinant stature.

Nonetheless, it was the perceived radicalism in its various expressions in the 1960s that alienated many of these former socialists and liberals.⁹ That racial and social inequities existed, they never doubted. Yet neoconservatives believed the liberal community falsely extended such inequalities into an overgeneralized frontal assault on capitalism, American middle class society, and all cultural norms of the time. They watched fellow members of the liberal community either succumb to radicalism or flounder helplessly, unable to defend the institutions and cultural and social mores that were the focus of radical attack. Those who are currently neoconservatives rejected outrightly the notion that the American social order was corrupt to such an extent that any salvaging efforts were doomed to fail, and only a radical moral, social, cultural, and political reconstruction could successfully remedy American maladies. Additionally, however, the neoconservatives began reexamining their own liberal premises and eventually realigned their

⁸Podhoretz. Breaking Ranks, pp. 161-358, passim.

⁹Ibid.

thinking closer to conservative notions regarding the limits of social policy and political practice. Focusing on the results of many liberal social programs, the neoconservatives concluded that liberal policies had failed to produce the intended results.¹⁰

If there is one single feature that characterizes the group of individuals known as the neoconservatives, it is the sense of community which permeates their very existence. They represent a tightly knit group with close connections that extend beyond agreement on a particular issue. Friendships are key. Elliot Cohen, editor of Commentary prior to Podhoretz, had been Lionel Trilling's mentor and his first publisher. Podhoretz, whose own mentor had been Trilling, succeeded Cohen shortly after his death in 1959. In Breaking Ranks Podhoretz describes vividly the cocktail party arguments which regularly erupted concerning some of the articles he published in Commentary in 1961, dealing in general with the uncomfortableness of hard anti-Communism that was espoused by Richard Lowenthal, Theodore Draper, Sidney Hook, and Lionel and Diana Trilling. By printing articles critical of U.S. involvement in the Cold War conflict and proposals that it might be better to be "Red Than Dead," Podhoretz's friends felt personally and intellectually betrayed. Twenty years later Podhoretz admitted that

¹⁰Ibid.

they had had a right to feel worried and betrayed; it was not much longer, shortly after Vietnam erupted, that Podhoretz realigned his views on foreign affairs with those on domestic issues and consequently rejoined the intellectual stance of his associates.¹¹

Irving Kristol has also served in the editorship of Commentary and now serves as co-editor of Public Interest with Nathan Glazer. Daniel Bell and Kristol were the first two editors when the journal was founded and wrote the introductory essay, "What Is The Public Interest?" Also on the editorial board of Commentary are Milton Himmelfarb and Walter Laqueur, who are frequent contributors as well; Public Interest's editorial board includes a roster of regular neoconservative contributors--Robert Nisbet, Paul Weaver, Daniel Moynihan, Roger Starr, and James Q. Wilson. Neoconservatives were overwhelming contributors to three key Commentary symposia: "What Is A Liberal--Who Is A Conservative;" "Liberalism and the Jews;" and "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy."¹²

Spouses are sometimes included in the action.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 173-174.

¹²"What Is a Liberal--Who Is a Conservative: A Symposium," Commentary 62, no. 3 (September 1976): 31-113; "Liberalism and the Jews: A Symposium," Commentary 69, no. 1 (January 1980): 15-83; "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy: A Symposium," Commentary 65, no. 4 (April 1978): 29-71.

Himmelfarb's wife Gertrude writes frequently as does Podhoretz's wife, Midge Decter. Sociologists Peter and Brigitte Berger likewise appear periodically. The network extends further. Daniel Bell's collection of essays, The Winding Passage, is dedicated to Nathan and Lochi Glazer; portions of Seymour Martin Lipset's glowing review appear on the book's jacket. The Radical Right, edited by Daniel Bell in 1963, includes essays written by Lipset, Glazer, Hofstadter, and longtime friend David Riesman. In Commentary, Peter Berger reviewed Bell's Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Nisbet reviewed economist Thomas Sowell's Knowledge and Decisions, and Michael Novak reviewed Kristol's Two Cheers for Capitalism.¹³ All books written by neoconservative spokespersons are promptly cited and reviewed. The examples of mutual support are numerous, and one statement can be made with certainty regarding the neoconservative support system. They all write regularly, they contribute to each other's works, they review each other's books, and they publish each other's reviews. The degrees of networking present further indicate the seriousness of

¹³Peter Berger, "Disjunctions," a review of Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism by Daniel Bell, Commentary 61, no. 4 (April 1976): 82-83; Robert Nisbet, "Political Economist," a review of Knowledge and Decisions by Thomas Sowell, Commentary 70, no. 1 (July 1980): 68-72; Michael Novak, "A Liberal Critique," a review of Two Cheers for Capitalism by Irving Kristol, Commentary 66, no. 1 (July 1978): 68-70.

neoconservatism as a powerful and influential voice in American society.

One last example also serves to illustrate this point. The American Enterprise Institute, mentioned earlier, has increasingly moved from being a right-wing think tank to a neoconservative one. James Q. Wilson has served in an academic advisory capacity. Resident Scholars have included Michael Novak and Irving Kristol. Project coordinators have been Peter Berger, Seymour Martin Lipset, Nathan Glazer, Ben Wattenberg, and Edward Banfield. The 1976 Bicentennial Distinguished Lecture Series featured among others, Kristol, Martin Diamond, Nisbet, Peter Berger, Daniel Boorstin, Banfield, and Lipset. On the American Enterprise Institute's advisory staff for the Center for the Study of Government Regulation have been Kristol, James Q. Wilson, Paul Weaver, and Aaron Wildavsky. An Institute publication, Public Opinion, is edited by Lipset and Wattenberg.¹⁴

The Basic Assumptions

The concept of equality plays an important role in neoconservative discussions. In the nineteenth century, debate over the notions of equality and liberty dominated intellectual discourse. Was the promise of liberty for

¹⁴Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives, p. 11.

all citizens best left in the hands of aristocratic leaders, or did liberty entail equality of participation for all citizens? Did liberty denote freedom to live as one desired, according to one's abilities, plans, and wishes with equal access to participation in government? Or did liberty depict a freedom for citizens from the ends of government intervention and imposition? The interrelationships between liberty and freedom have occupied political and philosophical thought throughout history, and continue to provide contemporary scholars a focal point for further debate. Neoconservatives, like most serious thinkers, view these issues according to their interrelatedness with one another rather than in dichotomous either/or fashion. They have not issued a cohesive and comprehensive statement specifically addressing these ideas yet they nonetheless have much to say regarding them.

The prime concern of neoconservatives has been what they perceive to be an abusive assault on equality in our current social order. The basis for their position is the presence of what they believe to be an ill-founded and tenacious form of egalitarianism. Daniel Moynihan writes of equality as a never ending topic in political discourse. Nathan Glazer fearfully discusses the revolutionary tone of deliberations regarding equality. The writing of the late Martin Diamond reflects trepidation with inflated ideas about equality. Irving Kristol

warns against the elevation of equality over principles of liberty. Daniel Bell condemns contemporary leanings toward "wholesale egalitarianism." Aaron Wildavsky fears society will be unable to survive the damage inflicted by egalitarian demands. And Robert Nisbet regards the recent revolution in equality as the greatest assault on authority, tradition, and liberty today.¹⁵

The neoconservatives are by no means hostile to notions of equality. What they do condemn is the redefinition of equality that is obtained by measures of equality of outcome rather than measures of equality of opportunity. Neoconservatives do not assert that if inequities exist in outcome measures, whether they be in levels of housing, education, income, status, etc., that inequities in opportunity are absent. Quite the contrary, unequal outcomes may very well be, and often are, directly caused by unequal opportunities. But to assume that unequal outcomes are in fact caused by breaches

¹⁵Daniel P. Moynihan, "Presenting the American Case," American Scholar 44 (Fall 1975): 572-578; Nathan Glazer, "The Limits of Social Policy," Commentary 52, no. 3 (September 1971): 52; Martin Diamond, "The Declaration and the Constitution: Liberty, Democracy, and the Founders," in Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol, eds., The American Commonwealth: 1976 (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 55; Irving Kristol, "What is 'Social Justice'?" Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, Mentor Books, 1978), p. 179; Daniel Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," Public Interest 29 (Fall 1972): 65; Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the People," Commentary 56, no. 2 (August 1973): 32; Robert Nisbet, "The New Despotism," Commentary 59, no. 6 (June 1975): 32.

in opportunity is, in the neoconservatives view, blatantly false. Criticism is leveled against those perceived to be desirous of equality of conditions, for neoconservatives see this desire as a crucial assault on individual freedom and an affront to a truly democratic and liberal society. Rejecting the emphasis often placed on equality of result rather than opportunity, Daniel Bell writes:

In the shorthand of game theory, equality of opportunity is a non-zero-sum game in which individuals can win in differential ways. But equality of result, or redistributive policies, essentially is a zero-sum game, in which there are distinct losers and winners.¹⁶

This conviction on equality characterizes the first key assumption of neoconservatism addressed here, that being a rejection of egalitarianism if egalitarianism denotes everyone having equal shares of all things.¹⁷ Equal opportunity for everyone to participate in all areas of living is a morally and politically sound objective worth protecting. Yet regardless of equal access, all individuals possess varying degrees of talent, skill, knowledge, aptitude, ability, motivation, effort, and drive. In addition, individuals possess the crucial

¹⁶Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys 1960-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 188-189.

¹⁷Irving Kristol, "What Is a Neoconservative?" Newsweek, 19 January 1976: 17.

element of choice with which they can exercise taste, preferences, likes, and dislikes. When taking all these factors into account, equal opportunity can in no way ensure outcomes between individuals or between groups of individuals.

The neoconservatives, in rejecting this notion of egalitarianism, thus uphold the idea of a meritocracy, whereby the possession of rewards and distinctions held by individuals is entirely just. This, a second assumption of neoconservatism, is also considered to be a naturally occurring phenomenon given the variances in ability and effort mentioned above. Implied here as well is a belief in the capabilities inherent in individuals to exercise personal responsibility and choice to better their conditions regardless of what circumstances one happens to be in. Yet this seemingly ultra-conservative stance is tempered by discussion of a "just meritocracy" addressed specifically by Daniel Bell.¹⁸ The meritocracy refers to those positions and rewards within a society that are beyond the essentials of life, e.g., food, shelter, and clothing. As the term itself denotes, individual merit should be the criterion for reward, advancement, and distinction. Thus, other predetermined criteria are rejected as inimical to a just meritocracy, affirmative

¹⁸Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," p. 66.

action quota systems chief among them.¹⁹

The concept of a just meritocracy extends to a further qualifying factor, for Bell asserts meritocratic principles must prevail above all in universities but also in business and government, if societal rewards are to be employed for the benefit of all members of society. In essence then, society as a whole can benefit through the maintenance of a meritocracy.²⁰

A third neoconservative assumption stemming from the aforementioned two regards the notion of a welfare state. Irving Kristol notes that neoconservatism is generally supportive of the idea of a welfare state but vehemently opposed to interpretations of "welfare state" which resemble the Great Society programs of the 1960s. Stated in different terms, this assumption also means that neoconservatives overall are apprehensive about and opposed to extending the role of government into certain areas of social life, for the net result is typically "government overload," and the intended objectives remain unfulfilled.²¹

¹⁹Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. xiv.

²⁰Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.

²¹Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: A Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 8, 65-75; Kristol, "Social Reform: Gains and Losses," Two Cheers, pp. 217-222.

Specifically addressing the issue of "welfare state," Kristol characterizes it as the implementation of social programs which provide individuals the necessary levels of security and comfort to survive in contemporary urbanized society with the least possible amount of government interference; this interpretation is accepted as a valid endeavor by the neoconservatives.²²

Kristol notes that the original idea of a welfare state had at its core the principle of insurance for individuals. The government was to aid people in providing a basic floor beneath which they could not sink. The "insurance" was to provide protection for people against three major obstacles found in an industrialized society: unemployment, serious illness, and dependency in old age.²³ Daniel Bell, writing in Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, also describes the need for social policy to establish minimums permitting people to have security against the above three hazards found in society, echoing the thought of other neoconservatives.²⁴ Yet Bell departs from most neoconservatives in that he advocates extending the role of government even further. In The Coming of Post-industrial Society he stresses the

²²Kristol, "What Is a Neoconservative?", p. 17.

²³Kristol, "Reforming the Welfare State," Two Cheers, p. 231.

²⁴Bell, Cultural Contradictions, pp. xii-xiii.

necessity of including all disadvantaged groups in society and asserts that if doing so requires the remainder of society bearing the burden, then so be it.²⁵

Despite his more lenient position, Bell nonetheless is quick to realign himself with other neoconservatives in the respect that society in general needs to lower its expectations and recognize its limits in the attainment of wants, the exploration of experience, the questioning of mores, the alleviation of social problems, and the quest for change.²⁶ Samuel Huntington, in the report to the Trilateral Commission entitled Crisis of Democracy, argued that only if the surge for democracy in all areas of life is curbed can government realistically achieve a balanced existence for democracy; this sentiment is overwhelmingly endorsed by neoconservative spokespersons.²⁷ The desire for balance and limitations extends to all facets of international and national influence, yet roosts most comfortably for the neoconservatives in the area of welfare policies. Beyond the provision of social minimums the government then erringly creates a paternalistic state, opening itself up to addressing every type of problem and committing itself

²⁵Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 366-367.

²⁶Bell, Cultural Contradictions, pp. 281-282.

²⁷Huntington, The Crisis of Democracy, p. 113.

to solving all of them.²⁸

To neoconservatives, paternalistic policies were the fatal flaw in the Great Society programs. Nathan Glazer concludes there was some success with certain programs, Community Action being one example, yet expresses rejection of most social service efforts of that decade.²⁹ Aaron Wildavsky expresses the same attitude concerning the futility of "throwing funds at social problems" and attributes the efforts in large part to misdirected egalitarian forces which yielded demands that no government could possibly meet.³⁰ Irving Kristol extends the argument further in Two Cheers for Capitalism by stating that the Great Society version of the welfare state actually made matters worse by trapping people in poverty with programs that made it disadvantageous to

²⁸Kristol, "Reforming the Welfare State," Two Cheers, p. 231; Frederick Doolittle, Frank Levy, and Michael Wiseman, "The Mirage of Welfare Reform," Public Interest 47 (Spring 1977): 62-87; Leslie Lenkowsky, "Welfare Reform and the Liberals," Commentary 67, no. 3 (March 1979): 56-61; on government regulation generally, see Derek Bok, "The Federal Government and the University," Public Interest 58 (Winter 1980): 80-101; Peter Skerry, "Christian Schools versus the I.R.S.," Public Interest 61 (Fall 1980): 18-41; Robert D. Behn and Kim Sperduto, "Medical Schools and the 'Entitlement Ethic'," Public Interest 57 (Fall 1979): 48-68; Donald L. Horowitz, "Are the Courts Going Too Far?" Commentary 63, no. 1 (January 1977): 37-44.

²⁹Nathan Glazer, "Nixon, the Great Society, and the Future of Social Policy: A Symposium," Commentary 55, no. 5 (May 1973): 34-35.

³⁰Wildavsky, "Government and the People," p. 28.

work, and above all by creating an illusion that complex problems and subsequent reform efforts could be instituted quickly and accomplish their objectives over a short span of time.³¹ Kristol speaks often of the need to "rid ourselves of these 'Great Society' barnacles on the original ideas of the welfare state," and asserts that until government does so, those dependent on welfare will continue to live in the demoralizing "depths of social pathology."³²

A fourth neoconservative assumption regards the demise of authority in social and cultural institutions and the resultant loss of social cohesion. Daniel Bell delineates four major authority structures which have been eroded. First challenged are the status systems of society. The "old family" and "native descent" establishments, e.g., the DAR, Harvard, and the major foundations, seem to display defensiveness about their standing, and a readiness to abdicate the idea that they form an elite. Second, in organizational life, the change has been the replacement of "the boss" by bureaucratic chains of command. Third, in professional life, various professions such as medicine and teaching have abandoned

³¹Kristol, "Social Reform: Gains and Losses," Two Cheers, pp. 217-222.

³²Kristol, "Social Reform: Gains and Losses," Two Cheers, pp. 217-222; Kristol, "The Poverty of Redistribution," Two Cheers, p. 225.

necessary distance from their clients and accepted an "equality of roles based on a commonality of purpose." And fourth, erosion has occurred in cultural life. In the arts the denial of standards is commonplace, and in values the denial of the usefulness of age and experience is widespread.³³ Samuel Huntington has additionally expressed the same themes and focused on the loss of trust in governmental leadership; Aaron Wildavsky expresses concern why as a society we are "doing better and feeling worse" referring to drug use and increasing crime rates; and James Q. Wilson writes regularly about crime, drug abuse, and youth unrest as indicative of a loss of authority.³⁴

In On the Democratic Idea in America Irving Kristol speaks directly to the crises in authority found in American social, political, and cultural realms. There is a crisis in government for people no longer trust its leadership and will sometimes utilize illegal means, e.g., rioting, to protest government policy. There is a crisis in the youth culture for they have irresponsibly

³³Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," Winding Passage, pp. 189-190; also see, Nathan Glazer, "The Attack on the Professions," Commentary 66, no. 5 (November 1978): 34-41; James Nuechterlein, "Radical Historians," Commentary 70, no. 4 (October 1980): 56-64.

³⁴Huntington, Crisis of Democracy, pp. 161-162; Wildavsky, "Government and the People," p. 25; James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

withdrawn and created their own world, far removed from intrusion by adult moral authority. There is also a crisis of culture in that multitudes of anti-establishment figures have rejected traditional notions of virtue evidenced by terrorism, drug use, homosexuality, and promiscuity.³⁵ Like other neoconservatives lamenting the loss of authority throughout society, Kristol frequently comments on the skewed definition of liberty which has been interpreted by some as license to do anything. In Two Cheers for Capitalism he writes:

The success which this "liberal" redefinition--a combination of moralistic egalitarianism and optimistic "permissiveness"--has achieved means that, in the United States today, the law insists that an 18-year-old girl has the right to public fornication in a pornographic movie--but only if she is paid the minimum wage.³⁶

Neoconservatives attribute the loss of authority largely to the rise of an "adversary culture," a phrase first coined by Lionel Trilling in Beyond Culture. Trilling depicted the adversary culture as primarily middle class, and worthy of concern because they were capable of attracting large numbers from within their ranks, and were powerful enough to perpetuate their ideas with conformity. The adversary culture characterized those who

³⁵Irving Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America (New York: Harper & Row Torchbook, 1972), pp. 21-24.

³⁶Kristol, "On Conservatism and Capitalism," Two Cheers, p. 128.

Trilling felt had subversive intentions, evidenced in their rejection of bourgeois capitalist society, their dismissal of traditional values in family, home, work, and religion, and their elevation of exploration-through-experience over more conventional modes of behavior.³⁷

The thrust and power of an adversary culture is held by neoconservatives to have become so powerful and identifiable that it has given rise to an entire "new class."

Throughout all the neoconservative writing, the new class is the target of vitriolic criticism. Identifying the members of the new class is difficult, but generally they refer to those holding the dispositions described by Trilling who are often represented by intellectuals, professors, media spokespersons, knowledge industry workers, or government personnel. Members are typically related in some way or another to higher education, cosmopolitanism, the media, or the science-based industrial complex.³⁸ Daniel Bell regards the notion of a "new class" as a somewhat "muddled concept," and departs from other neoconservatives in that he regards it more as a mentality than an actual class. Whether class or mentality, this is the group classified pejoratively as today's "liberals," those who reject

³⁷Lionel Trilling, Beyond Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965).

³⁸Bell, "The New Class: A Muddled Concept," Winding Passage, pp. 144-164.

fundamental principles of liberalism and free enterprise and prefer instead the prioritizing of issues such as equality, racism, imperialism, and entitlements. They are characterized further as erroneously seeking moral judgment through individuals rather than institutions, and esteeming experience rather than tradition as the source for understanding life.³⁹

Kristol describes the new class as a group who prefers "fantasy over reality," a stubborn group that insists on entertaining "absurd ideas."⁴⁰ Many are irresponsible intellectuals; most are not true intellectuals, but merely think they are so, in his view. As a whole, the new class is engaged in a struggle for status and power with the business community often under the banner of equality.⁴¹ In addition to the criticism of the new class voiced by Bell and Kristol, the latter being one of the most vociferous, indictments are leveled by Norman Podhoretz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Peter Berger, Seymour Martin Lipset, Michael Novak, Nathan Glazer, James Q. Wilson, and Aaron Wildavsky.⁴² In short, the new class

³⁹Ibid., pp. 144-149.

⁴⁰Kristol, "Business and the 'New Class'," Two Cheers, pp. 25-26.

⁴¹Kristol, "About Equality," Two Cheers, p. 165.

⁴²Norman Podhoretz, "The Adversary Culture and the New Class," pp. 19-32; Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Politics and the New Class," pp. 33-48; Peter Berger, "The Worldview of the New Class: Secularity and Its

represents that body of individuals whose ideas and actions are the prime target of neoconservative critique.

A fifth assumption stems directly from the above discussion on the loss of authority, and concerns criticism by the neoconservatives against popular counter-culture movements. Neoconservatism esteems the hallmarks of traditional values--religion, family, and the "high culture"--music, art, prose, poetry, etc.--of Western civilization.⁴³ Although neoconservatives divided over the issue of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s, they united in their criticism of the modes of protest, campus demonstrations, rioting, and the like. They condemn homosexuality and drug use completely, and similarly reject a great deal of the manifestations of the sexual revolution pertaining to heterosexual

Discontents," pp. 49-56; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The New Class and the Professoriate," pp. 67-88; Nathan Glazer, "Lawyers and the New Class," pp. 89-100; Aaron Wildavsky, "Using Public Funds to Serve Private Interests: The Politics of the New Class," pp. 147-154, all in B. Bruce-Briggs, ed., The New Class? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Michael Novak, "Race and Truth," Commentary 62, no. 6 (December 1976): 54-58; James Q. Wilson, "American Politics, Then and Now," Commentary 67, no. 2 (February 1979): 39-46.

⁴³Kristol, "What Is a Neoconservative?" p. 17; Kristol, "'When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness'--Some Reflections on Capitalism and the 'Free Society'," Two Cheers, pp. 239-246; Nathan Glazer, "The Rediscovery of the Family," Commentary 65, no. 3 (March 1978): 49-56; Chester E. Finn, "The Family Under Fire," Public Interest 50 (Winter 1978): 146-157.

matters.⁴⁴ Certain expressions of the women's movement are rejected.⁴⁵ Irving Kristol issues criticism against much of the environmentalist movement.⁴⁶

Religion is of key importance to most neoconservatives, and the loss of esteem in traditional religions in recent years is interpreted as having produced a crisis within our culture. Kristol notes that one result of the decline of religion has been that individuals and society as a whole began answering key questions regarding behavior with a flippant attitude of "Why not?"⁴⁷ And Daniel Bell, perhaps the thinker who has dealt with the topic of religion and its relation to culture at greatest length, writes:

If science is the search for unity of nature, religion is the search for unity of culture. Culture is a different realm from nature. . . . Culture seeks meaning on the basis of purpose. It cannot be indifferent

⁴⁴Bell, "Charles Fourier: Prophet of Eupsychia," Winding Passage, pp. 91-104; Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1979), pp. 361-365.

⁴⁵Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, p. 363; Brigitte Berger, "What Women Want," Commentary 67, no. 3 (March 1979): 62-66; Michael Levin, "The Feminist Mystique," Commentary 70, no. 6 (December 1980): 25-30.

⁴⁶Kristol, "The Hidden Costs of Regulation," Two Cheers, pp. 46-50; Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism," Two Cheers, pp. 51-65; see also, David A. Stockman, "The Wrong War? The Case Against a National Energy Policy," Public Interest 53 (Fall 1978): 3-44.

⁴⁷Kristol, "The Shaking of the Foundations," On the Democratic Idea, pp. 25-30.

to the imperatives of nature, for it is the conscious response of men to the existential predicaments that arise out of the interaction of men with nature, and with one another. The very search for meanings that transcend one's own life drives a culture to find common meanings regarding the human condition in other cultures, and to seek some unity, not in any ecumenical or theological sense, but in the oneness of the human predicament. The road of culture always leads one to a beyond, a beyond that modern culture has trivialized.⁴⁸

A sixth premise of neoconservatism regards their viewing as a threat to democracy those elements of foreign policy which appear to be against American values. Nathan Glazer specifically notes that to speak of American values means to speak of those exhibited in the founding documents of the United States--the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers--whether or not they are values that have been successfully actualized into practice.⁴⁹ Generally, neoconservatives strongly support Israel and regard the Arab countries with cautious deliberation, particularly concerning prospects for a negotiated settlement. They optimistically view ideas of progress throughout the world, especially in Third World nations, with the West serving as a key model; concurrently they reject notions that "quality

⁴⁸Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" Winding Passage, p. 352.

⁴⁹Nathan Glazer, "American Values and American Foreign Policy," Commentary 62, no. 1 (July 1976): 32.

of life" and "progress" are antithetical to one another.⁵⁰ They are highly critical of those who indict the United States for intervention in the Third World. The basic neoconservative contention is that Western guilt about Third World poverty is wholly unfounded; the Third World is better as a result of Western presence.⁵¹

Neoconservatives support a global drive for human rights yet have much to say regarding the scope and extent of such actions. Daniel Moynihan stresses the need to treat human rights as one component of U.S. foreign policy rather than as an isolated humanitarian impulse. Walter Laqueur, Stephen Miller, and Peter Berger, all writing in Commentary, argue that "human rights" and "human rights violations" have different interpretations for different countries. Thus, standards of morality must be cautiously delineated and the context and grade of development of countries in which alleged violations occur need to be carefully scrutinized.⁵² Similar dispositions

⁵⁰Gertrude Himmelfarb, "In Defense of Progress," Commentary 69, no. 6 (June 1980): 53-60; Daniel P. Moynihan, "Was Woodrow Wilson Right?" Commentary 57, no. 5 (May 1974): 25-31.

⁵¹P. T. Bauer, "Western Guilt and Third World Poverty," Commentary 61, no. 1 (January 1976): 31-38; Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," Commentary 59, no. 3 (March 1975).

⁵²Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Politics of Human Rights," Commentary 64, no. 2 (August 1977): 19-26; Walter Laqueur, "The Issue of Human Rights," Commentary 63, no. 5 (May 1977): 29-35; Stephen Miller, "Politics

can be found in the writing of other neoconservative spokespersons, eighteen in all, who contributed to a special symposium on human rights and American policy abroad in a 1981 issue of Commentary.⁵³

The neoconservatives, in remaining steadfast in their anti-Communism stance, support agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and likewise advocate a strong military defense to thwart the Communist threat. They argue, too, against isolationist moves in the United States out of fear that failure by the U.S. to actively defend the free world will inevitably create conditions conducive to the threat of Communist aggression.⁵⁴

Finally, a seventh major assumption of neoconservatism concerns faith in the capitalistic free enterprise system as one of America's strongest values. A free economic system is viewed as a necessary condition for

and Amnesty International," Commentary 65, no. 3 (March 1978): 57-60; Peter L. Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal?" Commentary 64, no. 3 (September 1977): 60-63.

⁵³Commentary. "Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium," Commentary 72, no. 5 (November 1981): 25-63.

⁵⁴James Q. Wilson, "American Politics," pp. 39-46; Norman Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," Commentary 61, no. 4 (April 1976): 31-41; Peter Berger, "The Greening of American Foreign Policy," Commentary 61, no. 3 (March 1976): 23-27; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy: A Symposium," Commentary 65, no. 4 (April 1978): 58-59.

political liberty by some,⁵⁵ and more moderately viewed as an "inevitable connection" to democracy by others.⁵⁶ Overwhelmingly, neoconservatives prefer the workings of the free enterprise market over direct governmental controls. Irving Kristol has addressed both the topic of capitalism and the claims of its critics more than other neoconservatives. The themes regarding capitalism found in On The Democratic Idea were expanded in the collection of Wall Street Journal essays that later appeared in Two Cheers for Capitalism. In Kristol's view, inequalities do indeed exist in American capitalistic society; yet he insists that on a global scale those inequalities are trivial.⁵⁷ He stresses repeatedly the need for individuals to accept capitalism as a system which recognizes that in a nation of individuals who will operate according to their own best interests, and the best possible outcome will be "a society of civil concord, not a community of mutual love."⁵⁸ Though rewards are not always judiciously shared, history shows that

⁵⁵Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Michael Novak, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy: A Symposium," Commentary 65, no. 4 (April 1978): 53-54; 62-63; 63-64.

⁵⁶Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, David Riesman, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy: A Symposium," Commentary 65, no. 4 (April 1978): 45-46; 48-50; 66-67.

⁵⁷Kristol, "'When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness'," Two Cheers, p. 246.

⁵⁸Kristol, Two Cheers, p. x.

the system works: people accepting the capitalistic system and the bourgeois virtues of prudence, diligence, trustworthiness, ambition, etc., do better their conditions over the long term.⁵⁹

Kristol notes that the economic system delineated by Adam Smith was intended to be capitalist, although in a manner unlike we find today. Its growth and expansion have given rise to innumerable individual and institutional problems--lack of fulfillment for personal human needs and growing numbers of large, bureaucratic, quasi-monopolistic firms--yet remains a system worth preserving for two reasons. It tends to uphold and strengthen the democratic order, and the range of possible alternatives offers nothing better.⁶⁰

The above assumptions, particularly those relating to capitalism and minimal government interference, tie directly into the neoconservative definition of liberalism. To them, it is ironic that persons such as themselves who in their own view defend the traditions and workings of liberal institutions should be dubbed "conservative" or "neoconservative." Conversely, the neoconservative opposition who criticizes liberal institutions which

⁵⁹Kristol, Two Cheers, p. x; George Gilder, "In Defense of Capitalists," Commentary 70, no. 6 (December 1980): 42-45.

⁶⁰Kristol, Two Cheers, p. xiii; Stephen Miller, "The Poverty of Socialist Thought," Commentary 62, no. 2 (August 1976): 31-37.

maximize personal liberty and wish to further expand the scope of government intervention in areas such as economics, the environment, business, educational administration, etc., are classified as "liberal." Neoconservatives do not view themselves as legitimators of the status quo nor apologists for their own positions and privileges. Rather, they embrace the bourgeois idea of liberty, described below by Irving Kristol:

It asserted that liberty implied the right to do bad as well as the right to do good, that liberty could be abused as well as used --in short, that a distinction had to be made between liberty and "license." The making of this distinction was the task of our cultural and religious institutions, especially the latter. It was these institutions which infused the idea of liberty with positive substance, with "values," with an ethos. The basic belief was that a life led according to these values would maximize personal liberty in a context of social and political stability, would ensure--insofar as this is humanly possible--that the exercise of everyone's personal liberty would add up to a decent and good society. The practical virtues implied by the "bourgeois" values were not very exciting: thrift, industry, self-reliance, self-discipline, a moderate degree of public-spiritedness, and so forth. On the other hand, they had the immense advantage of being rather easily attainable by everyone. You didn't have to be a saint or a hero to be a good bourgeois citizen.⁶¹

Daniel Bell has described the problems which have arisen throughout history that have undermined the legitimacy of both capitalism and liberal democracy. In

⁶¹Kristol, "On Conservatism and Capitalism," Two Cheers, pp. 128-129.

Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Bell characterizes how disjunction has occurred between the three realms of politics, culture, and the techno-economic structure, and the result has been increased tensions between each of the three. Particularly with the subsequent rise in affluence in the success of techno-economic ventures, a crisis has taken place in culture. The very system which allowed expansion of personal liberty has eventually turned around to undermine itself, through the rise of modernity and an increasing reliance on principles of self-fulfillment and self-realization, the rejection of the bourgeois ethic regarding work attitudes and habits, and a radical rejection of anything considered a restraint." The downfall of religion and the rise of mass higher education have not further contributed to adversity toward the very basic underlying principles of liberal democracy.⁶³ In the neoconservative view, the absence of religion and the rejection of the bourgeois ethos have left the traditional forms of capitalism and liberal democracy with no underlying moral principles. Until this situation reverses, the "new liberalism" propounded by those the neoconservatives criticize will be allowed

⁶²Bell, Cultural Contradictions, passim.

⁶³Bell, Cultural Contradictions, passim; Kristol, "On Conservatism and Capitalism," Two Cheers, pp. 129-130.

to perpetuate without hindrance.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

NEOCONSERVATISM AND EDUCATION

The neoconservatives address education in terms of the effects brought to it by government policies. Generally, representatives of the neoconservative position assert that such federal interference has produced more harm than good. They contend further that if allowed to continue at its current rate, the degree of interference may in fact produce irreparable long term damaging effects. Because education is the recipient of numerous policy efforts, it has become a major focal point of neoconservative analysis and critique.

Stemming from the pervasive debates over equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes, several related issues emerge in neoconservative discourse. I have selected the four areas addressed most frequently as the central concern of this thesis. These are affirmative action, desegregation and busing, authority, and special programs. Each will be addressed in turn.

Affirmative Action

The issue of ethnicity

Before entering a discussion concerned with discrimination, affirmative action, or quotas, it is quite appropriate to initially address precisely what is meant when one refers to "minorities." In America, most persons questioned about minorities and their position within the larger socio-cultural setting would undoubtedly provide a finite description. A probable statement might be to assert that the United States is comprised of a majority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and surrounding them are various minority groups. This is basically untrue, asserts economist Thomas Sowell.¹ The myth about minorities in America that he dispels consists of several things we "know" to be true, "facts" from which many attitudes, beliefs, and political positions are derived. Sowell describes these supposed truths. We "know" minorities have lower incomes, lower IQs, lower occupational status, higher fertility, higher illegitimate birth rates, higher incidence of one-parent homes, and higher crime rates. We also "know" blacks are the worst off in all-around economic terms. Sowell claims that none of these alleged truths is literally accurate, and

¹Thomas Sowell, "Myths About Minorities," Commentary 68, no. 2 (August 1979): 33-37.

most miss the mark completely. His arguments, advanced in Commentary, evaluate these myths in an effort to eradicate prevailing notions about minorities in America.²

At the outset, the idea of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority is faulty. Census figures show that half the population cannot even identify their ethnicity. While Anglo-Saxons are the largest single group, they represent only fourteen percent of the population; Sowell notes that this is not much more than the thirteen percent figure for German-Americans or the eleven percent figure for blacks. Rather than a distinct majority/minority phenomenon, there is a mosaic of many different groups. The increasing number of intergroup marriages further serves to blur the distinct racial and ethnic labels. While the author notes the United States is hardly a representation of one indistinguishable assemblage, he cautions that discussions regarding racial and ethnic labels should not be taken as literally as they are currently.³

Another myth concerns Anglo-Saxons being situated at the top of the scale in terms of income, occupation, or education. Earning higher incomes are Jews, Japanese, Poles, Chinese, and Italians. For every "old money" family there are thousands more in near or absolute poverty; thus, the overall averages are skewed. The

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 33.

notion of a figure that represents the national average income is often misleading. Hidden in these statistics are even larger variations between cities or age groups than between ethnic groups. Color is not the economic determining factor as persons often believe. When discussing national averages, Sowell states:

The idea that it is a norm or a standard--that any statistical deviation from it is both unusual and suspicious, and that we would all be the same except for the sins of "society"--is arbitrary political rhetoric.⁴

With regard to occupational status, about fourteen percent of employed Americans are in the professions or similar technical fields. In spite of myths about race discrimination in professions, black West Indians, Japanese, Filipinos, and Chinese have above average representation in these jobs. Eventually, contends Sowell, people will have to accept the evidence that race alone is not as deterministic a factor as is often perceived.⁵

In an attempt to explain the persistence of these erroneous myths, Sowell stands very much in the neoconservative tradition. In his perception, one reason for the faulty beliefs lies in the concept of social pathology, an assumption into which many civil rights leaders and

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 34.

liberal social scientists and politicians are thought to have a vested interest. The key principle of social pathology is preoccupation with certain life conditions--poor educational performance, broken homes, or high crime rates--termed pathological and believed to have been caused by society. Absorption by such facts has at the same time ignored another picture, also very real. Sowell describes how those who have written about black economic advancements and black schools where high achievement is the norm rather than the exception have been subjected to harsh and sometimes scathing treatment. Although there is a necessity to recognize the sins of others against particular groups, that in itself is insufficient. The issue defined by Sowell is whether the economic and social problems encountered by ethnic groups vary with the frequency or severity of injustices targeted against them.⁶

As an illustration of this topic, he notes that although large numbers of Japanese-Americans and Mexican-Americans arrived in the United States at roughly the same time, the early years of the twentieth century, settled in the same area, the Southwestern states, and similarly faced educational and occupational discrimination, vast differences now separate the two groups. The

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 35.

incomes of Japanese-Americans are nearly double those of Mexican-Americans, and the former group's crime rates are only a fraction of the latter group's.⁷

In the view of Thomas Sowell, more attention must be given to cultural--not racial--factors. If discrimination and prejudice are accepted as primal explanations for economic disadvantage, how, he asks, can one explain the fact that Jews and Japanese have attained such high status at the top of the income ladder? Few persons would even attempt to argue against the fact that both groups have suffered through the effects of prejudice and discrimination. Family pattern, i.e., number of children, is one factor separating high and low income groups, with those families having the least number of children faring better on income scales. However, additional research is needed to further explain the discrepancies that exist between groups.⁸

There are several other elements which characterize social pathology explanations. One of these refers to the "slavery legacy" of blacks, gleaned from scrutiny of broken homes and female-headed families. But historically, most black children grew up in two-parent, male-headed households, both during periods of freedom and periods of slavery. Sowell contends:

⁷Ibid., p. 35.

⁸Ibid., pp. 34-35.

The current large and rising numbers of female-headed families among blacks is a modern phenomenon stemming from the era of the welfare state--when the government began to subsidize desertion and teenage pregnancy.⁹

A second issue is IQ differences between races. At fault is the idea of uniqueness, specifically concerning blacks, whether it be uniqueness in genetic make-up or uniqueness in environment. A danger exists when statistics from one group are compared with national averages. Data cited by Sowell illustrates further the fluctuation of ethnic group averages from one decade to the next.¹⁰

A third element often given in social pathology explanations is the attribution of causality for high black crime rates to prejudice and discrimination. Historically, black crime is nothing unique. In 1863, New York City Irishmen killed more people in one riot than blacks killed in all the riots of the 1960s. The nineteenth century race riots were bloodier and more violent than those today, and the "races" involved were typically white ethnics.¹¹

The fourth and final characteristic debunked by Sowell is "white racism" as the cause of black crime.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

To assume such is overly simplistic, he asserts. White racism has been likewise directed at other groups, West Indians and Japanese-Americans for example, and both have crime rates lower than blacks. Further, their crime rates have consistently been lower than whites.¹²

Perhaps even more harmful, in the view of neo-conservatives, than construing faulty assumptions without evidence is the tendency to ignore other variables in the haste to reach quick, cure-all political decisions. Often overlooked is the simple factor that incomes between groups vary because some groups work more than others. Comparing Chinese-Americans to Puerto Ricans, one-fifth of the former have three or more family members working and the latter have less than one-half that; in families where no one works, the former rank last among ethnic groups, the latter rank first.¹³

Age, as it relates to acquired work experience, is another variable often disregarded. Age differences are vast between groups. The four groups with the highest age average--Jews (46), Poles (40), Irish (37), and Germans (36)--are at least ten years older than the four lowest age-average groups--Blacks (22), American Indians (20), Mexicans (18), and Puerto Ricans (18). Comparing Mexicans and Puerto Ricans to Jews, an age difference

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 36.

average of twenty-eight years is present. An enormous amount of work experience is gained in that amount of time.¹⁴

Compounding age differences are variances in educational levels. Jews for example, average seventy percent more formal education than Puerto Ricans. Adding that factor to their twenty-eight year age advantage, and the resulting work experience gained, the income differences produced are vast, and easier to understand when all variables are considered. Sowell criticizes the government affirmative action policies regarding this matter, for he contends the job and population percentages routinely broadcasted ignore the fact that the population statistics incorporate the body of inexperienced and poorly educated persons, as well as children and infants.¹⁵

Additionally mentioned are other variables such as geographic location, the cultural transmission of work values and skills, and attitudes and beliefs concerning the value of formal education. The presence of all these variables taken together indicates that presumptions of discrimination as the root cause of racial tensions are premature. Ultimately, only by seeking further empirical evidence concerning all the possible

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

contributing factors to ethnic differences, can more objective and sound decision bases be formed. In the process, neoconservative spokesman Thomas Sowell contends that explanations more credible than those which place the blame and responsibility on society can hopefully be found.¹⁶

The issue of race relations

In addition to discussing myths about minorities, neoconservatives have much to say concerning a larger, more encompassing group of myths, those regarding current black/white race issues. Following the tumultuous race riots of the 1960s, the Kerner Commission declared that the United States had become a dual society of blacks versus whites. Identified as the chief causal factor for the strife was white racism. The recommended solution was to initiate government programs directed at the elimination of discrimination and poverty found in employment, housing, and education.¹⁷

With regard to this issue, the neoconservative spokespersons direct their criticisms and discourse toward the liberal ideology of social pathology which has dominated the media and public policy decision making. Specifically targeted is the alleged lack of objectivity and

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 36-37.

¹⁷Murray Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," Commentary 69, no. 6 (June 1980): 46-52.

skepticism.¹⁸ Neoconservative adversaries are charged with first establishing ideological predispositions and then pursuing evidence to support those social and political dispositions. Most discussions concerning race issues are carried out, claim neoconservatives, in "outrageous innocence," where opinions flow profusely without careful examination.¹⁹ The perception that blacks and whites are today split racially regarding issues of race is in reality a fantasy that persists because of consistent reinforcement by media spokespersons, liberal intellectuals, vociferous members of the black activist community, and many social scientists.²⁰ The divisions which do exist between blacks and whites are viewed by neoconservatives as no more severe than those which exist within a race. In effect, something has been made out of nothing.²¹

The distinguished scholar Daniel Boorstin has had much to say throughout his career concerning the tenacity of opinions which tend to persist without being subjected to a substantial amount of scrutiny. In 1961 Boorstin

¹⁸Michael Novak, "Race and Truth," Commentary 62, no. 6 (December 1976): 54-58.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁰Louis Henri Bolce III and Susan H. Gray, "Blacks, Whites, and 'Race Politics'," Public Interest 54 (Winter 1979): 70-75.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 75.

published The Image: A Guide to Psuedo-events in America.²² In this book the author confesses that although he has no idea what "reality really is," he is quite certain he knows an illusion when he sees one.²³ And in his view, illusions abound in America. Eventually they take root and become pseudo-events, those "events" which occur because someone has consciously created them. The media are viewed by Boorstin as among the chief culprits in image-creation, a task which they began undertaking in the twentieth century when the emphasis of their work was transferred from news gathering to news making.²⁴ A decade later another of Boorstin's books, Democracy and Its Discontents, refined several of the intricacies involved in the creation of images.²⁵ One of these is a rise in the importance of "Big Opinions," and is described in the context of being contrasted with knowledge.²⁶ Boorstin delineates several of the characteristics of the "Big Opinion."

²²Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Psuedo-events in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).

²³Ibid., p. iii.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 7-44.

²⁵Daniel J. Boorstin, Democracy and Its Discontents: Reflections on Everyday America (New York: Random House, 1971).

²⁶Ibid., pp. 12-21.

- 1.) Opinions are miscellaneous, discrete, and unsystematic. While elements of knowledge are somehow coherent and have a necessary relationship to one another, opinions are discrete and may be contradictory. . .
- 2.) Opinions tend to be normative: approve or disapprove, yes or no, good or bad. Knowledge tends to start from a question, . . . opinions tend to start from an answer . . .
- 3.) Opinions, therefore, tend to be fluctuating and fluid, not cumulative. Knowledge builds on knowledge. But one opinion may or may not add on to another. While knowledge grows, opinions oscillate.
- 4.) Opinions can be about the future, while knowledge can only be about the past. (Or the present, a name for the immediate past.) Therefore,
- 5.) Opinions are limitless in subject, infinite in number. They may be about anything that exists--or about people, things, and subjects which do not exist.
- 6.) Opinions are validated by other opinions. Of course, no amount of agreement can create a fact of life or transform assertion into fact. While majority vote cannot create knowledge, it can create opinion: one person's opinion can become stronger and be reinforced because it is also held by others.
- 7.) Finally, and perhaps more important, Opinions tend to be epiphenomenal. While knowledge tends to be phenomenal, concerning facts that are directly perceptible to the senses, opinions tend to be derivative and secondary. While knowledge is of this or that, opinions are about this or that.²⁷

(Emphases in original)

This contrast between knowledge and opinion illustrates much of the fervent criticism behind neoconservative

²⁷Ibid., pp. 19-20.

discourse on race relations. Writes Michael Novak:

Certain opinions pass without inspection; others--on plainly ideological grounds--are rejected without inspection. It is as though no one dares to think, no one dares to question.²⁸

(Emphases in original)

In support of the claim that the current socio-political requirement is to "march in rank" to the day's ideological tune, neoconservative spokespersons expand the argument voiced earlier by Thomas Sowell, that those who question dominant assumptions are subjected to unfair harsh treatment.²⁹ Novak contends that those who do express doubts about prevailing assumptions are immediately jumped by "intellectual muggers" ready to discipline anyone who ventures into forbidden territory.³⁰

Neoconservatives criticize this passionate devotion to ideological positions and offer several instances as examples of these unsystematic and contradictory postures. First, in 1954 the Supreme Court ruled against racial discrimination in educational placement; two decades later, race became a guiding principle. Second, James Coleman was highly praised in the 1960s because his work was viewed as support for racial integration; since the 1970s when he began publicly doubting the long

²⁸Novak, "Race and Truth," p. 54.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

term worth of busing efforts, he has become the target of widespread attack. Third, some of the recent moves in historical scholarship have advanced in accordance with a particular author's ideological bias; evidence is sought and reported according to whether or not it fits a particular mold. Fourth, a recent trend among certain writers, e.g., Genovese, Fogel, and Gutman, has produced a considerable literature which purports to prove that blacks fared better under slavery than they do now under freedom and twentieth century "white oppression." Fifth, upon publication of Daniel Moynihan's government paper in 1965, "The Negro Family," the author was labeled a racist and is still branded such today by some. Psychologist Kenneth Clark defended Moynihan in 1965 stating that if Moynihan was a racist than Clark himself was racist. Clark added, "Is a doctor responsible for a disease simply because he diagnoses it?" But in 1976 Clark denounced Moynihan in the Sunday New York Times Book Review. Ironically, much of the research from which Moynihan drew his work was from Clark's own study of Harlem and his own book, Dark Ghetto.³¹

The double standards cited above present a troubling paradox to neoconservative writers. If one refrains from granting responsibility to blacks for their own social, educational, and occupational advancement

³¹Ibid., pp. 54-57.

and instead characterizes them as victims of societal injustices, he is regarded a friend. If on the other hand one assumes equality between blacks and whites in all matters and asserts blacks have responsibility for their future, denying that they are powerless victims, he is labeled a racist. In short, contends Michael Novak, "[T]here is no equality in our social discourse" concerning racial relations.³²

Neoconservative spokespersons attempt to systematically dispel the idea that black/white polarity exists on major social, economic, and political issues. Furthermore, they wish to eradicate the notion that both groups view issues and solutions according to the presumed consequences for certain groups, assuming that benefits to one group will be at the expense of the other. And as a part of both of these, they wish to prove faulty the implication of homogeneity of opinion within races; without homogeneity within a race, the claim cannot be made that one opinion or another represents a particular racial group's perspective.³³

The research cited in support of these neoconservative assertions was conducted in New York City during 1977. While a complete report of this survey cannot be presented here, a brief summary of the findings is given.

³²Ibid., p. 58.

³³Bolce and Gray, "Race Politics," pp. 61-62.

On the first issue, preferential treatment for blacks over whites in college admissions and job hiring, twelve percent of the whites agreed with such treatment and eighty-five percent disagreed; forty percent of the blacks agreed with preferential treatment policies and fifty-three percent disagreed. A Gallup poll taken the same year revealed similar results. The second issue concerned preferential treatment of less-qualified blacks over whites in college admissions and job hiring. Both blacks and whites split evenly over this and blacks favored it only slightly more than whites. This too was confirmed in a 1977 New York Times/CBS poll. A third inquiry concerned busing across district lines and whether it would improve race relations. For this, seventy-five percent of the whites and fifty-two percent of the blacks were opposed to busing and thought it made race relations worse. In a 1976 Harris poll, eighty-one percent of the whites and fifty-one percent of the blacks opposed it and expressed the feeling that it had negative social results. A fourth issue was whether or not a young black can get ahead in America if he works hard. Eighty-three percent of whites and fifty-six percent of blacks agreed that a young person can succeed given motivation and effort. On a fifth issue, fifty-six percent of whites and forty-four percent of blacks feel that whites are not responsible for the

conditions of blacks.³⁴

Other concerns exhibited higher degrees of polarization between blacks and whites on issues concerning requirements on businesses to hire a certain number of minority workers, with whites generally opposing it and blacks generally favoring it. Compensatory programs, however, if designed to specifically upgrade the skills of poor people with limited training are generally supported by whites.³⁵

Within the group of blacks surveyed, further splits were found. Blacks split evenly on the issue of whether high crime should be handled by tighter police controls or by the elimination of root causes, e.g., poverty. Concerning affirmative action policies related to quotas and preferential treatment, the researchers found significant trends. Younger blacks tended to favor them more than older blacks, and lower income blacks favored them more than higher income blacks. The one exception was that higher income blacks tend to support certain types of job hiring preferential programs almost as much as the lower income blacks.³⁶

One conclusion from this is that self interest seems to play a key role in black opinion as it often

³⁴Ibid., pp. 64-67.

³⁵Ibid., p. 67.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 67-69.

does in white opinion.³⁷ Overall, what has been shown is that opinion differences between races cannot be automatically assumed. On some matters, whites tend to come closer to a majority opinion on race-related issues. However, for blacks, no single opinion from "the black community" can be gleaned.

The issue of affirmative action

It was noted earlier in this paper that neoconservatives tend to be generally opposed to government intervention in the adjudication of social problems. Perhaps nowhere is this attitude more vividly presented than in the body of writing devoted to the topic of affirmative action. Overwhelmingly, the opinions expressed in Commentary and Public Interest are against the general affirmative action and quota policies currently in operation. Of the journals surveyed in the five year period from 1976 through 1980, the issue of affirmative action stands out above all others as being the topic over which the most solidarity of opinion can be found. In short, the policies are viewed as inherently wrong, misdirected in intent, and counterproductive to the entire essence of a democratic society.

Much of the writing concerns the area of higher education employment. Thomas Sowell, whose writing is

³⁷Ibid., p. 69.

focused upon here, contends that facts have been increasingly skewed by the images and misconceptions in the controversy surrounding affirmative action. He notes that there has been "pathetically little analysis" in academia regarding the before and after situation of affirmative action policies and programs.³⁸ His first intent is to distinguish the conceptual rationale of affirmative action from the specific practices which have resulted.

The basic underlying principle behind affirmative action is that court orders to "cease and desist" from some discriminatory practice are insufficient means to alleviate harm already done, or even to prevent future abuses which may result from previous illegal actions. The various and often conflicting definitions and interpretations of affirmative action make it impossible to specify a precise denotation. In Sowell's view, all one can currently do is survey and elucidate the particular elements involved. Part of the difficulty is the equally elusive notion of equality of opportunity, specifically because past discrimination is often imbedded in the present capabilities of individuals. Thus one must be concerned with questions regarding the legal basis for compensatory treatment, the costs involved,

³⁸Thomas Sowell, "'Affirmative Action' Reconsidered," Public Interest 42 (Winter 1976): 47-65.

and their long term effects.³⁹

These precise issues were in fact addressed by Congress during the Civil Rights legislation of 1964. Senator Humphrey noted that the Act was not a requirement for employers to achieve racial balance through preferential treatment. Senator Clark asserted that the burden of proof was to be on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to prove that racial discrimination had taken place. Regarding the use of tests which found individuals in a disadvantageous position compared to the general population because of past cultural or educational deprivation, some Senators feared that ability testing would be outlawed and wished to attach an amendment that would prevent such action. Humphrey rejected the proposal, asserting that such tests were in fact legal, and believed no claims of the sort feared would ever be allowed to take root in any substantial way.⁴⁰

The intentions of Congress, however, were eventually lost when the actual administration of the law began. The burden of proof fell on employers to prove non-discrimination, numerical representations of ethnic members employed were utilized, and employers were forced to prove the fairness of any tests used. Compounding these problems was the confusion over who had authority

³⁹Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 49-50.

to enforce affirmative action programs. Agencies have overlapping jurisdictions, and more than once, one federal agency has sued another for affirmative action violations.⁴¹

Significant to higher education, the later inclusion of an Executive Order required affirmative action programs from all federal contractors. Then in 1971, "Revised Order Number Four" specifically mandated that institutions of higher education must analyze deficient areas with regard to the employment of women and minorities, including the establishment of goals and timetables to remedy the deficiencies. Sowell notes that affirmative action programs were being employed for three full years before anyone had a substantial grasp on what the actual problems really were, having been forced to bypass the problem-statement phase of policy adoption. Utilizing data on academic employment from the National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Council on Education, Sowell attempted to determine a valid description of the situation before and after Revised Order No. 4 was issued.⁴²

Prior to 1971, blacks earned less than whites, women earned less than men, and blacks and women represented a smaller percentage of academia than they did of

⁴¹Ibid., p. 51.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 52-53.

the general population. However, the academic careers of the two groups are vastly different from the rest of the profession in three important respects: they possess a Ph.D. less than half as often as other academics, publish less than half as many articles per person, and are concentrated in the lowest paying fields. Sowell also suggests that the issue of "underrepresentation" of blacks and women in academia cannot be said to be caused by employer discrimination. Of all those with the Ph.D. degree, twenty percent of academics are women, and more than two percent are blacks; women only hold ten percent of the total number of Ph.D.s, and blacks hold less than one percent of the total number held.⁴³

Women's careers vary even more from the patterns of blacks, and cannot therefore be lumped together under the umbrella term, "minority." Sowell identifies marriage as the critical variable in the academic careers of women. Single female Ph.D.s achieve full professor status more often than other academics of similar experience, while their married counterparts achieve the rank far less frequently. In 1968-69, single female academics earned slightly more than single males. Sowell notes it is difficult to fairly compare women's careers with men's because married women, and particularly those with children, detract from the overall female academic

⁴³Ibid., p. 55.

averages.⁴⁴

Sowell goes on to investigate more thoroughly the reasons behind why married academic women fare so much worse than single academic women and academic men. Three key characteristics emerge. First, married women put more time into home and family than do married men; second, career location is typically determined by the husband's career with little regard to the wife's career; third, women interrupt their careers more often than men, usually for having children, but additionally in other ways related to someone else's needs, e.g., an ailing family member. Both surveys and statistics reveal that marriage helps men's careers and hinders women's careers. While single women academics fare slightly better than single men academics, married men academics "have a huge advantage" over married female academics. On the whole, concludes Sowell, men in academia do better than women, and he notes three additional related trends: independent people fare about equally regardless of sex; those who receive help, married men, do much better than anyone; those who give help, married women, do the worst of all. Although the author concedes that the situation may be an unjust one, he nonetheless asserts that the above employment description is not the result of

⁴⁴Ibid.

employer discrimination.⁴⁵

The situation after the adoption of affirmative action programs would be expected by many to have improved the position of women and blacks. But the statistical information utilized by Sowell revealed that virtually no change has occurred with respect to the income, promotion, or employment of blacks and women in higher education.⁴⁶

Generally, neoconservative spokespersons contend first that few if any noteworthy benefits have been gained from affirmative action programs. They contend, second, that actual harm has been done. One focal point for criticism is that an unintended effect of affirmative action programs has been the creation of a costly bureaucratic nightmare with respect to hiring procedures. In higher education, search committees are expected to abide by federal formulas for determining available and qualified applicants. It is asserted that many of these formulas defy economics, logic, and statistical theory. Additionally, they also prove to be an assault on academic freedom, for hiring is increasingly being taken out of the jurisdiction of academic departments and placed into the hands of administrators who may, but most likely do not, know anything about the requirements of a specific

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 53-57.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 57.

academic field. According to the research cited, this legalistic manner of hiring academicians usually does not result in the employment of a woman or minority member, but the paperwork amassed is necessary to prove that good faith efforts are being made to meet the necessary goals and timetables. One of the University of Michigan affirmative action reports submitted to the federal government carried a price tag of \$350,000 for the statistical work alone.⁴⁷

A second point of criticism is that affirmative action programs which require evidence to prove that discrimination is not occurring (because women and minorities are underrepresented) totally excludes the possibility of individual choice. Because the demands for continuous research and publication production is an obvious strain on anyone, many academics, particularly women who are married with children, consciously choose positions where their main task is teaching. A survey conducted by Professor Kent Mommsen found further that black academics, most of whom were employed in black colleges, were unwilling to leave their current positions for less than a \$6000 per annum raise.⁴⁸ In short, not everyone wants to play climb-the-success-ladder, particularly if doing so requires leaving family, friends, a

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 63.

comfortable position, a geographic location one particularly enjoys, or an employment situation in which both spouses of a professional couple are gainfully employed and run the risk of losing one income by moving.

A third point at which neoconservatives criticize affirmative action programs concerns quotas and the whole notion of quality and standards in higher education. Preferential admissions programs have often turned into a charade of logistics. Joseph Adelson, a University of Michigan psychologist, describes the problems encountered by their medical school since the implementation of preferential quota systems.⁴⁹ Administrators are depicted as fragmented souls, torn between the federal government's fetish for minority numbers, and the faculty's demand for good students. The dean lamented about the fact that many unqualified white students had been admitted in the 1950s when enrollment figures were down, and were pushed through school despite doubts about their quality as students. The dean was convinced that these types of students were in part the reason the medical profession had obtained such a bad name due to incompetence, insurance fraud, and malpractice suits.⁵⁰ In a conversation with the dean and other medical faculty, Adelson discovered

⁴⁹Joseph Adelson, "Living with Quotas," Commentary 65, no. 5 (May 1978): 23-29.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 24.

that they felt the affirmative action programs were futile efforts and would not enable them to find highly qualified students any more efficiently than what they had been doing earlier, prior to the federal mandates. In short, the search for talent had been going on continuously without bureaucratic monitoring, and they resented having to accept students for the sole purpose of making the numbers look good.⁵¹

Thomas Sowell notes that with government intervention and affirmative action programs, a new and crude definition of "qualified" has emerged to include those qualified-to-be-trained.⁵² The problem is that most universities, and certainly most professional schools, do not wish to invest time, money, and human resources into remedial work. Neoconservatives note that many liberals cite affirmative action success stories like Harvard and Stanford as proof that preferential treatment can produce positive results.⁵³ However, states Adelson, "Elite schools . . . can command

⁵¹Ibid., p. 25.

⁵²Sowell, "Affirmative Action Reconsidered," pp. 58-59.

⁵³Adelson, "Living with Quotas," p. 27; Thomas Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" Commentary 65, no. 6 (June 1978): 41, Nathan Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination:2," Commentary 66, no. 3 (September 1978): 39; William J. Bennett and Terry Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination:1," Commentary 66, no. 3 (September 1978): 32-34.

the best of everything, and their successes in minority training tell us nothing at all about what is happening elsewhere."⁵⁴ Selective schools are often unique also in that most minority students are far removed from being truly disadvantaged. Concerning the minority students in the psychology graduate program at University of Michigan, Adelson notes that by judging by speech and dress they appear comfortably middle class, are likable and interesting young people, work hard, and will have no trouble obtaining their degrees. But to assume that they are disadvantaged and attending the university only as a result of affirmative action programs is sheer nonsense. In essence, many of those recruited at top institutions are typically middle class, well schooled, and not the poor and deprived that affirmative action is supposed to help.⁵⁵ When an admissions committee at the University of Michigan decided to consider socioeconomic status in addition to race for minority applicants, of the last five finalists for admission into a graduate program, three were in elite private colleges and two at selective state universities. Three of the five came from very affluent families and one of these

⁵⁴Adelson, "Living with Quotas," p. 27.

⁵⁵Adelson, "Living with Quotas," p. 27; Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" pp. 42-43; Novak, "Race and Truth," p. 58; Bolce and Gray, "Race Politics," p. 75.

from an extremely wealthy background. The average family income of these minority candidates was considerably higher than that of the screening committee faculty.⁵⁶ Thus, neoconservative writers call into question the idea that affirmative action aids those who need it most.

Also related to the claim that affirmative action can succeed because it works in elite schools is to ignore, in the opinion of neoconservatives, differences of degree. Few academics raise eyebrows when the scales are tipped in favor of admitting a black student from South Chicago who has a Graduate Record Examination score of 1200 and a B+ college grade point average, rather than admitting a white student from Shaker Heights who has a Graduate Record Examination score of 1250, and an A- college grade point average. But the reality of the situation does not present such choices similar to these in the average institution; differences are typically vast, and not a matter of a few points here or there.⁵⁷

In the furor which surrounded the Bakke case, statistics regarding Medical College Admissions Test scores

⁵⁶Adelson, "Living with Quotas," p. 27.

⁵⁷Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 33; Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" p. 41, 43; Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 37; Adelson, "Living with Quotas," pp. 26-27.

were obtained from the University of California Medical School at Davis. In 1973, Alan Bakke's percentile scores were 96 verbal, 94 quantitative, 97 science, and 72 general information. The scores of students regularly admitted were 81 verbal, 76 quantitative, 83 science, and 69 general information. The average scores of students admitted into the special minority program were 46 verbal, 24 quantitative, 35 science, and 33 general information.⁵⁸ Nathan Glazer asserts that there is sufficient reason to doubt whether the special admittees could even make it through medical school, and if so, he wonders what type of career they would have in the future.⁵⁹ An additional sobering fact reiterated throughout much of the neoconservative discourse is that when limited positions are available, someone else's opportunity is sacrificed for the sake of preferential admissions. As Sowell notes, "It is not a Rockefeller or a Kennedy who will be dropped to make room for quotas; it is a DeFunis or a Bakke."⁶⁰

Not all institutions have the opportunity to select minority students of the caliber Adelson describes. Thomas Sowell expends a great deal of energy discussing

⁵⁸Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 37.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" p. 42.

those who are not like the students in Adelson's writing. Those described by Sowell are the students he feels represent the vast majority of minority students, most of whom are black. It is at this point that neoconservative spokespersons express a fourth criticism of affirmative action, that being the damage inflicted on those who are supposedly the recipients of benefits.

Sowell is quick to illustrate that ideological justification for minority preferential treatment is only a part of the picture. For colleges and universities, keeping up the minority numbers is a wise investment. Lowering a few standards here or there in order to keep millions of dollars in funds flowing in from the government and various foundations seems a small price to pay. But nonetheless someone does pay in the end--the students--and the cost is greater than in dollars.⁶¹

The argument here is that leading institutions have the money and the status to attract enough minority students to pass inspection in the numerical scheme. Quite often it entails lowering entrance standards. The injustice done is that many minority students are mismatched with institutions and unfairly become failures when they could have done very well elsewhere. For example, during one year at Cornell, half the black students were on academic probation even though their average

⁶¹Ibid., p. 41.

college admissions scores put them in the top twenty-five percent of all American students. Yet the remainder of Cornell's student body were in the top one percent of all American students. This process continues through the line of colleges and universities with each institution reaching below their usual standards to accept minority students who are often unqualified to compete at that institution.⁶²

Proponents of special admissions standards argue that without them, minority members would be unable to attend college. The neoconservatives disagree, asserting that historically, low income people have pursued education whenever financial assistance has been available to them, as was the case in the post World War II years with the GI Bill. Many people were enabled to attend college who otherwise could not have afforded it. Admissions standards were not lowered, and GI Bill students enrolled in institutions best suited to their interests and abilities.⁶³

A fifth basis of attack from neoconservatives is directly related to the previous one, but focuses on the damage inflicted as a result of all affirmative action programs--preferential hiring, preferential admissions, occupational quotas, educational quotas, etc.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 41-42.

This concerns an assault on notions of equality among persons.⁶⁴ The result has been the creation of a dual system of standards, one for whites, another for minorities. The underlying assumption is manifested in the transmission of the message that "minorities are losers who will never have anything unless someone gives it to them."⁶⁵ This claim is an erroneous one that is turned on its head when considering the educational and economic achievements of minorities during the time of equal rights legislation; the achievements were attained well before the imposition of goals and timetables, quotas and preferential treatment.⁶⁶ Neoconservative writers hasten to point out that other ethnic groups as well have escaped positions of social and cultural disadvantage, particularly Jews, Poles, Italians, and Japanese, in the post World War II era without the aid of government intervention and preferential treatment.⁶⁷

The unifying thread which ties neoconservatives together in their condemnation of affirmative action

⁶⁴ See for example, Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Carl Cohen, "Why Racial Preference is Illegal and Immoral," Commentary 67, no. 6 (June 1979): 40-52; Carl Cohen, "Justice Debased: The Weber Decision," Commentary 68, no. 3 (September 1979): 43-53.

⁶⁵ Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?" p. 43.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Andrew M. Greeley, "The Ethnic Miracle," Public Interest 45 (Fall 1976): 20-36.

programs appears to be the use of race as the single most important variable. Nathan Glazer speaks often to the necessity of distinguishing between non-discrimination and the imposition of numerical quotas. To Glazer, quota systems are simply examples of racial discrimination in reverse.⁶⁸ In the most general sense, neoconservatives see affirmative action as symptomatic of an overall liberal/radical/left assault on democracy. Specifically targeted is what they perceive to be a skewed interpretation of equality, where equal opportunity is expected to yield equal results. If equal results do not appear evident, assert neoconservatives, that does not necessarily indicate that individual or group opportunities have been intentionally thwarted, and to assume such is an assault on the canons of logic. As noted above, attention to race alone misses the mark completely in their view. In addition to violating notions of equality among individuals, where race (or sex or religion) is not supposed to be considered a factor, the utilization of race as the key variable in affirmative action programs automatically excludes the use, or even the consideration, of other variables.

One article published in Commentary, "The New Black Intellectuals," illustrates that neoconservatives are

⁶⁸Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

not alone in questioning the scope and effectiveness of government social programs for minorities which began in the 1960s.⁶⁹ Criticized by liberals and black activists for betrayal of their race and serving as apologists for the status quo, these scholars have turned to structural and economic variables for an explanation of the plight of minorities. In doing so, they reject the type of social pathology explanations described earlier in this paper and eschew the use of race as the focal point for explaining and alleviating the problems faced by minorities. They do not share the same social and political philosophies at all times, and often vary importantly on certain issues. Yet they do share an approach to minority problems that views society as an intricate and interrelated complex of variables, all of which must be taken into account.⁷⁰

As we have seen, economist Thomas Sowell, who contributes frequently to Commentary and Public Interest, often steps out of his discipline and writes on a broad range of topics. In one of his most celebrated works, Race and Economics, Sowell states:

[T]he greatest dilemma in attempts to raise ethnic minority income is that those methods which have historically proved successful--self-reliance, work skills, education,

⁶⁹Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," pp. 46-52.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 47.

business experience--are all slow developing, while those methods which are direct and immediate--job quotas, charity, subsidies, preferential treatment--tend to undermine self-reliance and pride of achievement in the long run.⁷¹

Thus, all good intentions notwithstanding, liberal policies and programs are inflicting damage on those they are intended to help.

William Wilson, sociologist and department chairman at the University of Chicago, believes attention must be diverted from the assumption that a homogeneous black community currently exists in America. In The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, Wilson focuses his analysis on the class structure which prevails within the black community. He describes an underclass of unskilled and domestic labor and welfare recipients, a working class of semi-skilled blue collar workers, and a middle class of skilled labor and white collar workers; Wilson asserts that the black population is roughly distributed among these three groups, thirty-five percent, thirty percent, and thirty-five percent respectively. Failure to attend to this structure is, in Wilson's view, to ignore perhaps the most meaningful focal point of analysis currently available to social

⁷¹Thomas Sowell, Race and Economics (New York: D. McKay Co., 1975), cited in Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," p. 49.

scientists.⁷²

Walter Williams, an economist at Temple University, has focused extensively on the effects of government and organized labor efforts on the black poor, arguing that many of these market-interfering efforts have caused problems for the black poor. Among other things, Williams advocates exempting young people from minimum wage laws, asserting that younger workers, who typically do not need the money for support, are usually less skilled, less productive, and more costly to employers than are adult workers. Exempting them from minimum wage requirements is seen as one method of alleviating escalating levels of youth, especially black youth, unemployment.⁷³

Derrick Bell, law professor at Harvard, evoked the criticism of liberals for his stand against forced busing particularly in large urban areas where students may be transferred to schools educationally inferior to those they were enrolled in originally. Bell asserts that the evidence concerning school integration fails to prove that integration yields better race relations and improved black achievement. He joins with the opinion of Ronald Edmonds, former director of Harvard's Urban

⁷²William Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), cited in Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," pp. 47-48.

⁷³Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," p. 48.

Studies Center and currently at Michigan State University, in the belief that the goal of racial balance in schools should not be allowed to take precedence over the improvement of the educational settings which serve the needs of students. Thus the position is not strictly one of anti-integration, but rather one which requires greater flexibility of approaches and alternative solutions.⁷⁴

One Supreme Court decision regarding affirmative action receives the close attention of neoconservative writers and needs to be addressed. This regards the case of Alan Bakke and the University of California Medical School at Davis. This case is briefly addressed from the perspective presented by neoconservatives.

In the most general description, Alan Bakke, a white male, went to court because he had been denied admission to medical school in 1973 and 1974. Despite high grades and high entrance exam scores (given on page 109 of this paper), Bakke was not even placed on an alternate list for either year. The problem arose when it was discovered that out of one hundred admissions vacancies, sixteen had been reserved specifically for minority members, special slots designated for "special admittees."⁷⁵ Bakke's contention was that he had been unfairly

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁷⁵Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 31.

discriminated against because he was white.

The United States Supreme Court ruled in two 5-4 decisions. The first of these held that the special admissions program at Davis which designated sixteen minority slots was unlawful, and ordered Alan Bakke admitted. The second decision reversed a previous California Supreme Court ruling which had held that any consideration of race in the admissions program at Davis was unconstitutional. Justice Powell held the most interesting position in this case, being the only Justice to be in both 5-4 majorities.⁷⁶ In essence then, the decision reflected the making of policy by a single Justice.⁷⁷

Powell and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Burger declared the Davis program unlawful, with Powell relying on the Fourteenth Amendment and the other four invoking Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. In the second ruling, which proclaimed lawful the use of race in admissions programs, Justice Powell was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White.⁷⁸ Because of Powell's influential stance, it is his opinion which

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Charles Abernathy and Frank Askin, "How One Justice Set the Policy in the Bakke Case," Chronicle of Higher Education 16, no. 18 (10 July 1978), p. 9.

⁷⁸ Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 31.

neoconservatives scrutinize.

The interesting point in Powell's opinion is that he maintains the law does not mean one thing to persons of one color and another thing to persons of another color. Then he asserts that race may be considered as a factor in an admissions program. It appears that Powell is being contradictory, but he gets around the presumed inconsistency by appealing to the notion of diversity in higher education.⁷⁹

As a model to justify this stance, Powell referred to Harvard's Admission Plan as an example of affirmative action appropriately applied in higher education.⁸⁰ In addition to test scores, grades, and recommendations, Harvard considers other factors such as geographic location, family background, artistic talents, economic status, or race. Race is thus only one of many variables taken into account for the purpose of achieving a student population that is diverse and well-rounded.⁸¹ Justice Powell maintained that such a goal is well within the limits of academic freedom, itself an entity that is constitutionally protected.⁸² The crucial distinction

⁷⁹Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," pp. 37-38.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 39.

⁸¹Abernathy and Askin, "How One Judge Set the Policy," p. 9.

⁸²Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 31.

between the procedures used by Harvard and those used by the University of California Medical School at Davis is that Harvard uses race as a factor out of many possible others; Davis used race as the factor.

Powell is criticized in Commentary for initially drawing the comparison between the models used by Harvard and Davis. The former employs the admissions procedure in a four-year college program, the latter in a professional school program.⁸³ The two are qualitatively different. Medical schools need not worry about who will play soccer, or who will play in the orchestra, or who will be on the debate team; in short, diversity is not the issue in professional schools that it is in an undergraduate program.

Additionally, there has been criticism on the very nature of fairness of the Harvard Model.⁸⁴ It may appear to seek diversity yet still defines individuals "in an aggregate as defined by race and ethnicity."⁸⁵ Statements from Harvard that the neoconservative spokespersons scrutinize indicate acknowledgment that only admitting ten or twenty black students would fail to achieve rich

⁸³ Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 33; Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 39.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 32.

diversity and would also isolate the black students because of the smallness of their numbers; thus they aim for a larger number of students. In other words, numbers matter, and even though Harvard's program is not called a "special admissions program" it is one in reality.⁸⁶

Nathan Glazer states that despite the ambiguities and criticisms, he nonetheless accepts Justice Powell's decision as a fair one. Yet he also expresses deep concern that using race as a factor will continue to mean the factor, disguised in rhetoric, a method he vehemently opposes. Glazer recognizes the difficulty in avoiding ethnic considerations when factors beyond objective criteria are used in admissions programs: race and ethnicity are dominant social forces not easily brushed aside in this country.⁸⁷

On the whole, neoconservatives believe that they read the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act differently than do many liberals. To them, any consideration of race and ethnic origin ought to be excluded, with no exceptions made regardless of intent. Glazer and other neoconservatives cite the failure of Congress to explicitly address the areas of ambivalence which have arisen

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 39.

concerning racial and sexual preference in employment and education admissions programs. It is only in the Congress, they assert, that a definitive and clear statement can be made, one so distinct that administrators and courts will have no possible choice but to follow it.⁸⁸

Desegregation and Busing

On 17 May 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered a unanimous opinion from the Supreme Court which ruled "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."⁸⁹ One year later, Warren delivered an additional opinion of the Court ruling that local school officials and district courts must act "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed" to eliminate racial discrimination present in public schools.⁹⁰

The meaning of the Brown decision

The first part of Brown left little ambiguity in anyone's mind concerning the precise interpretation of

⁸⁸Glazer, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 39; Bennett and Eastland, "Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination," p. 35.

⁸⁹Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483(1954).

⁹⁰Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294(1966).

the new law. It laid to rest the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision allowing separate but equal public school facilities and outrightly declared the racial segregation of public school students unconstitutional. However, the interpretation of the "all deliberate speed" clause in which the Court called for desegregation, has been the cause for major battles for nearly thirty years.

During the ten year period following Brown, the Court did not once rule on a case that might render a hint as to the exact meaning of "desegregation." Many thought the Court would in 1955, when in Briggs v. Elliott, a South Carolina District Court ruled that a ban on segregation did not mandate integration.⁹¹ However, the Supreme Court failed to react. Thirteen years later in Green v. New Kent County the Court ruled on 27 May 1968 that school districts must eliminate discrimination "root and branch."⁹² And more notably in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Burger Court ruled that "all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems." Busing, they stated, was a "normal and accepted tool of educational policy" and was an

⁹¹Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).

⁹²Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 450(1968).

appropriate means to use in desegregating the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools.⁹³

Racial assignment, therefore, when linked to segregation was illegal, and when linked to integration was considered legal. The rationale for this was that segregation is unconstitutional, whereas integration is constitutional. Racial assignment directed toward achieving integration was viewed as an acceptable means to achieve the objective.⁹⁴

Of crucial importance when discussing the legal background of desegregation is the recognition and treatment of the distinctions between "violation" and "remedy." This distinction is delineated and explained by Owen M. Fiss, a Yale University Professor of Law. One of his many articles on this subject, "School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law," elucidates the issues regarding the role of the courts in matters of educational policy.⁹⁵ A frequently cited piece by both pro-busing and anti-busing advocates, Fiss's work is employed and relied upon in the following pages with respect to the interpretation of legal decisions. The author notes that

⁹³Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1(1971).

⁹⁴Owen M. Fiss, "School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law," Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 3-39.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 3-39.

segregation denies equality and is seen as a violation of law; integration is seen as the remedy. The key question addressed is one of violation; in short, Is segregation forbidden by the Constitution?⁹⁶

Brown contained two primary elements. One, racial assignment, was not forbidden by the Court per se. The other, segregation, needs to be addressed as to whether or not it alone is unlawful. The reason for this is because segregation can occur by racial assignment alone, or by reason of some other means such as geographical location. The argument against segregation in Brown was a dual one. The first aspect was that school segregation had led to unequal educational opportunity for blacks. The second aspect was that school boards were responsible for the segregation; they had assigned students to schools according to geographic location and the result of this was segregation. This latter phenomenon was true, however, only if two supporting assumptions were also true: that geographical segregation was truly not by choice, and that such segregation was avoidable if appropriate steps were taken.⁹⁷ Fiss has also argued elsewhere that government may also bear responsibility for segregation if involved in some way in the area of housing development. If such is the case, then in effect one government

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 15-18.

agency (school boards) are being called upon to remedy ills created by another government agency.⁹⁸

Both facets of the argument behind Brown are forceful, yet Fiss maintains the courts have been reluctant to completely accept the argument against segregation patterns, largely because the empirical state of the first part, concerning segregation yielding unequal educational opportunity, is in such a state of constant debate among opposing camps of social scientists. Additionally, regardless of the fact that a distinction exists between "violation" and "remedy," judges view both factors simultaneously, examining violations according to what remedies, and the costs involved, are available or possible if a presumed violation is in fact deemed as such.⁹⁹

For example, if racial assignment is determined to be a violation, the remedy is relatively cost free--cessation of the practice. On the other hand, if contributory segregated patterns are the violations, the range of remedies available are costly in terms of time, money, resources, community dissatisfaction, etc.¹⁰⁰

In Brown, the Court did not make racial assignment the key flaw, nor did it contend that segregation is

⁹⁸Owen M. Fiss, "Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts," Harvard Law Review 78, pp. 564, 578 n. 14 (1965).

⁹⁹Fiss, "School Desegregation," pp. 16-17.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 17.

prohibited when produced in a direct and current sense by racial assignment. Rather, states Fiss,

it seems committed to a result-oriented approach to school cases--one that minimizes, but does not eliminate, the link with racial assignment and that tends to emphasize the segregated pattern.¹⁰¹

But in Green v. New Kent County, the Warren Court declared that a violation may indeed exist even when segregation is not caused currently and directly by racial assignment. Yet still, it did not specifically make segregation the key flaw. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the Court reaffirmed the position of Green and further extended the argument to state that past racial assignment could be seen as a means to declare segregation unconstitutional.¹⁰² In Swann, as in another similar case, Keyes v. District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, the past discrimination issue was geographic location, which had effectively segregated students into distinct homogeneous schools.¹⁰³ The distinction between these latter two cases, Swann and Keyes, is worth examining further, for much can be gleaned by scrutinizing the causal connections made by the Court.

In Swann, a case of segregation plus overt past

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 18-19.

¹⁰³Keyes v. District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189(1973).

racial discrimination was determined. The past discrimination was called a "nonimmediate cause," and held by the Court to be sufficient enough reason to classify the segregation as "state imposed." Two kinds of causal connections were made. First, past discrimination on the part of the school board might have been a key factor in the creation and maintenance of segregated residences; combined with the practice of assigning students to schools close to their homes, attendance patterns of racial homogeneity were produced. Second, past school board decisions regarding the location and size of schools might explain why geographic assignment would produce segregated schools. Both connections were in fact no more than hypothetical possibilities, but the Court presumed them to be true based on the sheer existence of segregatory patterns. This is not to deny the possibility of rebuttal for both conjectures. However, the burden of proof in doing so remained on the school board. They would have to prove after-the-fact that past discrimination, in forms such as school size and location determination and racial designation of schools, was not a key in causing school segregation. In Swann they could not do so, but the possibility exists that this could be overcome at some point in time.¹⁰⁴

Keyes was a much more complex case involving a

¹⁰⁴Fiss, "School Desegregation," pp. 19-21.

pattern of segregation plus covert past racial assignment in parts of the school district. Swann and Green had been clear cut: both involved conspicuous dual systems--blacks in certain schools, whites in others. But Keyes involved only some schools which reflected segregatory patterns in the Denver district. In dealing with these differences, the Court first held that past discrimination could be assumed even if it was covert. The overt/covert distinction is primarily one of proof. Unlike Swann in which the board assumed the burden of proof, Keyes required proof on the part of the plaintiff. The Court also had to deal with the facts of partial segregation. The discrimination found in Denver existed in a section of the city known as Park Hill, a ghetto area bordering a predominantly white neighborhood. To prove their case, the plaintiffs first brought suit against the Park Hill area, won, and then attempted to broaden the suit to include the remaining part of the system. In an effort to expand this finding of past discrimination to bring the segregation of the entire system under the jurisdiction of the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court constructed two major theories.¹⁰⁵

First is the Spread Theory, suggesting a ripple effect among schools with respect to discrimination.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 21-22.

The Court first explained how discrimination in Park Hill schools could spread to nearby schools and then expanded the argument to explain how it could spread further to other schools in the system.¹⁰⁶ Following that, the Court presumed that discrimination had in fact spread, as is shown in the following passage from the text of Keyes.

Denver is not a district which might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated districts. . . .The District Court stated, . . . that there was "a high degree of interrelationship among these schools, so that any action by the Board affecting the racial composition of one would almost certainly have an effect on the others." . . . This suggests that the official segregation in Park Hill affected the racial composition of schools throughout the district.¹⁰⁷

To disclaim this, the Board would have had to establish that discrimination had not spread; they tried but could not. Thus, it was assumed on the part of the Court that discrimination had spread from certain schools to all schools, and that over time, discrimination had contributed to the existing segregatory patterns found in the district.¹⁰⁸

Second is the Repetition Theory, in which the Court

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 22-24.

¹⁰⁷ Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189(1973).

¹⁰⁸ Fiss, "School Desegregation," pp. 23-24.

maintained that if the board practices were discriminatory in one section of the system, then most likely they were discriminatory in others. This stemmed from the previous case won by the plaintiffs in which they proved there had in fact been discrimination in the Park Hill area where the Board had made racially based school assignments. The Court then assumed other assignments might have occurred similarly, even though they may have been couched in different terms such as "location by geographical proximity." The burden of proof was again on the board to prove conclusively that existing segregation was not the result of past segregatory measures.¹⁰⁹

Thus it is evident that in Swann and Keyes the Court was determined to bring segregation within the jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The creation of several sets of presumptions and the imposition of conditions on the school officials to dispel the assumptions further buttress this contention.¹¹⁰

By viewing segregation itself as the violation and past discrimination as the prime causal factor, the scope of possible remedies is expanded, a factor which will be elaborated upon below. In Keyes, the entire district was brought under the Equal Protection Clause

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹¹⁰Ibid., pp. 25-26.

by linking past discrimination in one part of the system to the whole system. And in Swann, the district was brought within the reach of the Clause when the Court moved from blatant past discrimination, to linking past discrimination as a causal factor in some segregatory patterns, to a dictum mandating the elimination of segregation throughout an entire system.¹¹¹

Here enters the matter of remedy, the second part of the question of obligation discussed earlier in this section. Having determined that segregatory patterns were unconstitutional, the Court faced remedial efforts. Since the segregation was the ill, forbidding racial assignment alone was insufficient. Assignment based on criteria other than race was likewise insufficient because the segregatory patterns may still have remained. Choice alone, given the level of prejudice, was considered to be beyond the realm of possibility. And employing geographic proximity criteria was useless because of existing segregatory residential patterns. Thus, the remedy must be integration.¹¹²

The word "integration," with its emotive and political connotations, has been successfully avoided by the Courts. In its place have been various substitutes: "racial identification of the system's schools" in Green;

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 32.

"actual desegregation" in Swann; "all-out desegregation" in Keyes. The Court made vivid the notion that if conflicts arose between integration and other values, integration had to prevail. Yet they failed to outrightly endorse the term "integration."¹¹³

We turn now to consideration of what stands today as one of the most controversial court cases involving desegregation, the Detroit schools case of Milliken v. Bradley.¹¹⁴ Prior to this point, we have been concerned with racial segregation that occurred within a single district. The Detroit case focused on the relationship between within-district segregation, and an additional pattern, cross-district segregation.

Detroit is a predominantly black system surrounded by white suburbs. In 1970 the black/white student ratio was 64/36 in the city, 13/87 in the suburbs.¹¹⁵ The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a lawsuit with a federal district court in 1971 charging de jure segregation within Detroit schools. The federal district court, and later the Michigan 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled in favor

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Milliken v. Bradley, 338 Federal Supplement Eastern District, Michigan, (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 484 F 2d (6th Circuit, 1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. (1974).

¹¹⁵Fiss, "School Desegregation," p. 27.

of the NAACP.¹¹⁶ Both found that unlawful segregation was present within the district of Detroit, for the central core schools were all black.¹¹⁷ This finding alone has not been challenged, nor is it an issue of much debate.

Additionally, the trial judge declared in the manner of Keyes, that the cross-district segregation had been caused by past discrimination on the part of Detroit school boards. Having determined this as the violation, he set forth a remedy involving cross district busing.¹¹⁸ But in 1974, the Supreme Court reversed the inter-district busing remedy in a 5-4 decision.¹¹⁹ The Court upheld the unlawfulness of the within-district segregation, but rejected the busing measure because it did not remedy the actual violation and instead extended beyond the violation unnecessarily.¹²⁰

The Court did not, as it might initially appear, place an outright ban on inter-district busing. In Keyes and Swann the remedy had extended beyond the immediate area of segregation capable of being proved the result of past discrimination; there, it appeared

¹¹⁶Eleanor P. Wolf, "Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case," Public Interest 42 (Winter 1976): 102.

¹¹⁷Fiss, "School Desegregation," p. 27.

¹¹⁸Ibid., pp. 27-28.

¹¹⁹Wolf, "Social Science and the Courts," p. 102.

¹²⁰Fiss, "School Desegregation," p. 28.

segregation, not past discrimination, was the chief ill. There also exists the matter of the Court knowing without doubt that by ruling in such a manner, the city district would remain segregated from the surrounding suburbs. In addition, there is the fact that inter-district busing would not have been determined unjust if the inter-district segregation had been proven unlawful. The Court had ruled that inter-district segregation is unlawful only if first, government is responsible for it, and second, government responsibility is proved on the basis of an accusatory theory, based on discrimination by the state, past or present, that can be shown to be a causal factor to the inter-district segregation. The plaintiffs attempted to prove past discrimination on the part of the white suburbs and racial gerrymandering of the district on the part of the state; they failed to prove either.¹²¹

Thus in Milliken v. Bradley, the move toward a result-oriented approach to school desegregation, emphasizing discriminatory demography and eliminating its link with the activity of racial assignment, came to a dead end halt. Having held through Green, Swann, and Keyes the result-oriented approach was in effect buried in the Detroit case.¹²²

¹²¹Ibid., pp. 29-31.

¹²²Ibid., p. 31.

In summary of school segregation law since Brown, four elements describe the current legal state. First, racial assignment to produce segregation is illegal. Second, racial assignment to eliminate segregation is legal. Third, within-district segregation resulting from nonracial assignment is illegal, if the school board has made racial assignments in the past. And fourth, inter-district segregation is legal unless it is proven that racial assignments, past or present, were the chief contributing cause.¹²³

The courts and the social scientists

In this context, evaluating the impact of segregation is of crucial importance. And it is at this juncture that the influence of empirical evidence weighs most heavily. Is segregation harmful? Is it harmful to whites? Is it harmful to blacks? In general, what are the effects, intended or otherwise, on children of both races? An enormous amount of involvement has been present on the part of social scientists from the early days of Brown and into the present. And much of the controversy over busing which currently exists stems from ongoing vitriolic debates within the academic community. The average citizen is left with little more than feelings of ambivalence and confusion, e.g., "If the experts cannot

¹²³Ibid., p. 36.

agree, then what are we supposed to think?" Worse yet, what are people supposed to do? It is a concern realistic and justifiable, for the social costs involved have been, and still remain, enormous in breadth and depth.

In 1973, James Q. Wilson of Harvard University described in Public Interest his feelings on how scholars can disagree so sharply about the interpretation of the same set of "facts."¹²⁴ In regard to the acrimonious debates between Thomas Pettigrew and David Armor concerning the effects of desegregation, Wilson wrote:

[H]aving looked at the results of countless social science evaluations of public policy programs, I have formulated two general laws which cover all cases with which I am familiar: First Law: All policy interventions in social problems produce the intended effect--if the research is carried out by those implementing the policy or their friends. Second Law: No policy in social problems produces the intended effect--if the research is carried out by independent third parties, especially those skeptical of the policy.

These laws may strike the reader as a bit cynical, but they are not meant to be. Rarely does anyone deliberately fudge the results of a study to conform to pre-existing opinions. What is frequently done is to apply very different standards of evidence and method.¹²⁵

The statement by Wilson is an important piece of advice to bear in mind when considering the controversy

¹²⁴James Q. Wilson, "On Pettigrew and Armor: An Afterword," Public Interest 30 (Winter 1973): 132-134.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 133.

that pertains to desegregation. Further elucidating the problems between social science and social policy is an article from Public Interest which represents neoconservative leanings, "Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case," by Eleanor P. Wolf. The author undertook a study of all testimony presented in the Detroit case in order to determine what types of social science materials were used and to evaluate the quality and comprehensiveness of those materials. Also of concern to Wolf was discovering how the courts dealt with the mass of demographic evidence, much of which was conflicting, and discerning the extent to which decision making was influenced by the social science evidence.¹²⁶

The material used for the research was the verbatim transcript from the 1971 forty-one day trial, the exhibits offered as evidence, and the transcripts for the hearings conducted in 1972 on alternative plans for desegregation. The key categories concerned with social science were first, housing patterns in urban neighborhoods; second, the social, economic, and psychological factors thought to be associated with learning; third, the allegations and refutations of segregation practices within the school system; and fourth, the

¹²⁶ Wolf, "Social Science and the Courts," pp. 102-120.

testimony and controversy about methodology.¹²⁷ A brief look at her major findings illustrates why there exists such a high level of concern among neoconservatives regarding the role of social science in the courtroom.

During the testimony revolving around housing practices, omissions of relevant research created a biased presentation in Wolf's view. No testimony reflected scholarly studies which attribute greater emphasis on black economic abilities or emphasis on social class distribution of blacks in accounting for the residential patterns of whites. No testimony attempted to explain the residential patterns of blacks as similar to other ethnic groups, nor was there any testimony referring to the increasing strength of social ties among blacks and other ethnic groups that persisted despite cultural assimilation. In short, much was left unstated that could have been introduced into the proceedings.¹²⁸

Compounding this were perceived problems with the presenters, most of whom came from civil rights groups or social service agencies. Only one scholar, demographer Karl Taeuber, represented the academic community. Additional testimony came from black real estate brokers who spoke of the rebuffs encountered when trying to obtain property listings in white areas. The truth of their

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 103.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 104.

statements is one issue; the affective appeal on the listeners as objective experts is quite another.¹²⁹

The testimony concerned with education, both in-school factors and out-of-school factors, was extensive. Again much was left unsaid. There was no testimony concerning differences in educational achievement between ethnic groups at similar income levels, no challenge to assertions concerning the harm done by homogeneous ability grouping, and no challenge to assertions concerning the research on the effects of teacher attitudes on student achievement. No testimony revealed the doubts of some researchers regarding the conflicting goals of local control of schooling and large scale integration programs. And worst of all in the author's view, there was no challenge to the assumption that racial and social mixture of students would enhance the achievement levels of low achievers.¹³⁰

Problems with methodology stemmed largely from the failure of experts to instruct the judge in basic principles of scientific inquiry. At the close of the trial the judge admitted thinking all along that socioeconomic status was part of input measures. Additionally, testimony concerning implied cause/effect with regard to certain items was accepted as such rather than as

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 105-106.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 107.

correlational data, which it was in fact. Data were handled with ambiguous language, e.g., statements such as one score being "higher" or "lower" than another, income levels being "lower class" or "middle class" without any interpretation given as to what the terms meant, how they were used, and whether or not differences were significant in statistical terms. In addition the terms employed were used inconsistently throughout the testimony. In Wolf's view, hypotheses were presented as facts, sources were cited incorrectly, facts were inaccurately reported, and accounts of research data were distorted.¹³¹

Wolf accepts the notion that social scientists can be valuable additions in courtrooms if they stay within their boundaries and serve only in a role that scrutinizes evidence, methodology, and data interpretation. Other than a role such as this, the author calls into question whether such experts are all that expert. Many social scientists refuse to testify in court proceedings, particularly psychologists and psychiatrists, who abhor the idea of being placed in an adversarial position with other colleagues in trials concerned with the alleged sanity/insanity of a defendant. Yet an adversarial system is an inherent part of our legal structure; rarely is a courtroom a place where truth is sought.

Other neoconservatives echo concern with the role

¹³¹Ibid., pp. 111-113.

played by social scientists in the nation's courts. Nathan Glazer questions the appropriateness of whether issues relevant to educational policy even belong in a courtroom.¹³² David Kirp specifically scrutinizes the role of judicial authorities in desegregation issues.¹³³ Criticism is leveled on various points, but typically focuses upon the efforts of judges to decide policy questions which are believed to extend beyond both their competence and their jurisdiction. The neoconservative discussions are consistent with regard to their general attitudes toward the appropriate role of government in public life. In short they feel that government functions best if it is not continually called upon to devise or resolve matters of policy. Providing funds, establishing standards, and encouraging state and local governments to devise methods to rectify the problems of race and schooling are given as reasonable functions of federal authorities.¹³⁴

¹³²Nathan Glazer, "Towards an Imperial Judiciary," Public Interest 41 (Fall 1975): 104-124.

¹³³David L. Kirp, "School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism," Public Interest 47 (Spring 1977): 101-128.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 126.

Busing as a remedy for
educational woes

Another focal point for critical commentary from neoconservatives is the matter of using integration as a remedy for racial balance in public education. At issue is its use as a remedy for poor academic performance among minorities. Neoconservatives question the long standing prevailing assumption that racially mixed classrooms are more conducive to high achievement than are segregated classrooms. And it is this assumption which has produced at times the most acrimonious debates. Busing, the neo-conservatives have claimed, has proved to be largely a political and symbolic gesture which unfortunately has deemphasized the need to appraise and evaluate the causes of poor school performance among minorities. They are highly critical of liberal acceptance of the integration-yields-higher-performance hypothesis, and call instead for additional research and reevaluation of dominant assumptions.

Accompanying the Brown decision in 1954 was the belief among American educators that in addition to all the other ills which exist in a segregated society, the psychological and academic damage was especially great to black children. Yet there was little evidence to support this claim. Despite the lack of data, many social scientists assumed integration would raise black self-concept and ultimately their academic performance. David

Armor, a frequent critic of busing, noted in Public Interest in 1972 that once the integration hypothesis took root, a multitude of political, legal, and educational decisions soon followed that reflected blanket acceptance of the hypothesis as fact. He notes that from that point forward, social science sought not objective evidence, but rather evidence that would support those claims and ideological predispositions.¹³⁵ Only a few months before the article by Armor appeared, Nathan Glazer issued a plea in Commentary that social scientists ought to begin seriously challenging the underlying assumptions of the integration hypothesis. He expressed doubts not only about the possibilities of busing being an effective remedy for educational problems, but also about the alleged effects of integration yielding better understanding among people of different races.¹³⁶

With the appearance of Armor's article in 1972 criticizing busing, there erupted in Public Interest a debate between anti-and pro-busing supporters. Armor had claimed that forced integration failed to raise black pupil achievement and argued further that it

¹³⁵David Armor, "The Evidence on Busing," Public Interest 28 (Summer 1972): 90-126.

¹³⁶Nathan Glazer, "Is Busing Necessary?" Commentary 53, no. 3 (March 1972): 51.

additionally increased tension between blacks and whites.¹³⁷ In a subsequent issue, Armor's former professor and colleague at Harvard, Thomas Pettigrew, denounced his claims and cited evidence to the contrary.¹³⁸ Following this appeared another article by Armor in which he again advanced his original opinion and critiqued pro busing advocates.¹³⁹

It was this debate that spurred James Q. Wilson to formulate his "two laws" of data interpretation referred to earlier in this paper. The debate spilled over from Public Interest into Harvard Educational Review in 1976; it continues today with all the elements of vigorous dispute exemplified earlier and additional points of controversy as well. Many social scientists have aligned themselves on one side or the other of the busing/integration/achievement issue. Some, however, most notably Harvard's Nancy St. John, have remained in a fairly unbiased position. St. John is perhaps the most exemplary of spokespersons highly respected by those on both sides of the controversy. Her summary of available research findings is perhaps the most objective report

¹³⁷Armor, "The Evidence on Busing," pp. 90-126.

¹³⁸Thomas Pettigrew et al., "Busing: A Review of 'The Evidence'," Public Interest 30 (Winter 1973): 88-118.

¹³⁹David Armor, "The Double Double Standard: A Reply," Public Interest 30 (Winter 1973): 119-134.

in text form on the academic and social effects of integration to date.¹⁴⁰

No discussion of desegregation can proceed without drawing attention to the research conducted under the guidance of sociologist James Coleman. Following the massive amount of research undertaken in the mid 1960s that emerged in Equality of Educational Opportunity,¹⁴¹ or the "Coleman Report" as it came to be known, and the equally ambitious reanalysis conducted by Mosteller and Moynihan, On Equality of Educational Opportunity,¹⁴² the work of Coleman and his associates was the research cited most often in support of school desegregation efforts. As mentioned earlier, this was also the time of the debates between Armor and Pettigrew which erupted in Public Interest. Elsewhere, in publications such as Commentary, New York Magazine, Integrated Education, and New Republic, one can find evidence that the controversy surrounding the integration/school achievement hypothesis continued to expand with ever

¹⁴⁰Nancy St. John, School Desegregation: Outcomes for Children (New York: Wiley, 1975).

¹⁴¹James Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

¹⁴²Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., On Equality of Educational Opportunity (New York: Vintage Press, 1972).

increasing furor.¹⁴³

Then, on 2 April 1975 at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Coleman and two co-authors, Sara D. Kelly and John A. Moore, presented a paper which argued the point that busing and similar desegregation efforts actually increased segregatory patterns by bringing about "white flight"--the movement of whites out of central city areas.¹⁴⁴

The bomb had dropped. On 18 May 1975, the Boston Globe reported Coleman's findings in an article entitled, "Desegregation's Architect Unhappy With Overall Results," and shortly thereafter the Los Angeles Times printed a similar story. On 7 June 1975 the story of Coleman's new thesis was again picked up by the wire services and reported that day in the New York Times and the National Observer. Two weeks later, Newsweek also discussed Coleman's work under the heading, "Second Thoughts." The New York Times immediately began scrutinizing Coleman's work and two more stories were printed. On 14 June

¹⁴³Glazer, "Is Busing Necessary?" 39-52; Michael Kramer, "Bus Stop," New York Magazine, 21 August 1972, pp. 6, 7; Nancy St. John, "Desegregation: Voluntary or Mandatory?" Integrated Education 10, no. 1 (January-February 1972): 9-10; Martin Mayer, "The Sham of Instant Equality," New Republic 166, no. 16 (1 April 1972): pp. 14-15.

¹⁴⁴James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John A. Moore, "Recent Trends in School Integration," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C., 2 April 1975.

1975, a piece by Barbara Campbell entitled "Five-Year Study on Busing Scored: Finding That It Causes White Exodus Disputed" appeared and was soon followed by another in similar fashion by Iver Peterson, "Clark Group Assails New Coleman Study." ("Clark" referring to psychologist Kenneth Clark). On 11 July 1975, Robert Reinhold printed yet another story regarding the controversy, "Coleman Concedes Views Exceeded New Racial Data." For followers of the busing debates, it proved to be a busy summer.¹⁴⁵

The scholarly community was not quite as swift as the media in reacting to the new Coleman position. In October 1975 Coleman published a brief summary of the findings earlier presented at the American Educational Research Association meeting in Phi Delta Kappan under the title, "Racial Segregation in the Schools:

¹⁴⁵"Desegregation's Architect Unhappy with Overall Results," Boston Globe, 18 May 1975, pp. 8, 9; "Courts Scored as Going Too Far in School Integration," Los Angeles Times, 29 May 1975, pp. 10, 11; "Long-Time Desegregation Proponent Attacks Busing as Harmful," New York Times, 7 June 1975, p. 25; Mark R. Arnold, "A Scholar Who Inspired It Says Busing Backfired," National Observer, 7 June 1975, pp. 1, 18; Merril Sheils and Diane Camper, "Second Thoughts," Newsweek, 23 June 1975, p. 56; Barbara Campbell, "Five Year Study on Busing Scored: Finding That It Causes White Exodus Disputed," New York Times, 14 June 1975, p. 12; Iver Peterson, "Clark Group Assails New Coleman Study," New York Times, 25 June 1975, p. 49; Robert Reinhold, "Coleman Concedes Views Exceed New Racial Data," New York Times, 11 July 1975, pp. 1, 7.

New Research with New Policy Implications."¹⁴⁶ In February 1976 the first lengthy challenge to his white flight thesis appeared in Harvard Educational Review.¹⁴⁷

Thomas Pettigrew of Harvard, and Robert Green of Michigan State University, reconsidered Coleman's data and concluded that the research failed to support the claim that desegregation efforts, particularly busing, led to white flight. In addition to rejecting Coleman's thesis on methodological grounds, Pettigrew and Green were highly critical of Coleman's "unprecedented campaign" by a sociologist "to influence public policy."¹⁴⁸ In the first table presented in the text of their article, the authors provided a chronological guide spanning nine months time which illustrated the extent to which Coleman granted press interviews, appeared on television question and answer shows, and spoke at conferences on topics regarding alternatives to busing.¹⁴⁹ Concerning Coleman's media blitz, the authors discuss the implications of social scientists blending empirical research with political

¹⁴⁶James S. Coleman, "Racial Segregation in the Schools: New Research with New Policy Implications," Phi Delta Kappan 57, no. 2 (October 1975): 75-78.

¹⁴⁷Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green, "School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman 'White Flight' Thesis," Harvard Educational Review 46, no. 1: 1-53.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

biases. In the concluding pages of their Harvard Educational Review article, Pettigrew and Green write with regard to all the attention and remarks surrounding Coleman's research.

They make good copy for the mass media, perhaps, but they cheapen the debate, lower the public's respect for social science, and divert public attention from real issues. Indeed, the whole episode goes beyond racial issues or attacks on personalities, to raise painful ethical questions about the relationship between social science and public policy.¹⁵⁰

In the next issue of Harvard Educational Review, Coleman offered a response to Pettigrew and Green.¹⁵¹ He defended his white flight research entirely, criticized the Pettigrew and Green reanalysis on methodological grounds, and leveled an attack on the claim that he stood alone as the sole social scientist "bad guy" who had freely expressed his opinions. Coleman specifically addressed the same issues that neoconservative spokespersons such as Glazer, Sowell, and Armor had discussed in Public Interest three years earlier concerning the acceptance by the liberal community of integration hypotheses as facts without substantial evidence.

Because social-science research in this area has been largely in the service of the advocates of compulsory racial balance and their

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁵¹James Coleman, "Response to Professors Pettigrew and Green," Harvard Educational Review 46, no. 2 (May 1976): 217-224.

policies, the advocates have enjoyed a comfortable monopoly of legitimacy. Opponents could be labeled segregationists or racists, and guilt by association was a convenient and often-used tool. And now when the remedy can be legitimately questioned on the basis of its consequences, the advocates protest. What is serious and shocking to me is not that the questioning of compulsory racial balance in schools has now become legitimate, but that it has only now become legitimate--that social-science research has only recently broken the monopoly of legitimacy so that the policy can be examined on its merits.¹⁵²

Pettigrew and Green, of course, issued a rejoinder to Coleman's statement in the same issue, upholding their original contentions and focusing further on Coleman's role in research and public policy formulation.¹⁵³

Although a barrage of writing appeared in various journals, newspapers, and magazines following Coleman's 1975 research report, the net result in simplest form was that the prevailing liberal ideology of the integration hypotheses had come under fire. Commentary and Public Interest continued printing articles in the same vein as those which appeared in the early 1970s and expanded their arguments further. For example, Diane Ravitch's piece, "The 'White Flight' Controversy" which

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁵³Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green, "A Reply to Professor Coleman," Harvard Educational Review 46, no. 2 (May 1976): 225-233.

appeared in 1978, exemplified a shift in focus from concern over a lack of empirical evidence regarding busing to concern that new alternatives for school improvement be devised in light of the new resegregation data.¹⁵⁴

To neoconservative representatives, the phenomenon of white flight showed precisely what they had feared and anticipated would occur, that being the residential exodus away from the most troubled urban schools in protest of legal and political policies which dictated forced school integration.

In short, neoconservatives reject busing as a key remedy for problems regarding poor academic performance by blacks. Forced integration, they contend, was erroneously conceived by liberals who operated on faulty and untested assumptions, although those assumptions may have been well-intentioned initially. Neoconservative writing is more harsh in tone than a decade ago. Perhaps this is because spokespersons feel the liberal community continues pro-busing efforts on ideological grounds despite what they perceive to be convincing evidence in the other direction, e.g., that of Coleman, Armor, Sowell, and Ravitch. As of this time, there is no hint that neoconservative journals will cease printing criticisms of forced integration or citing evidence in support of

¹⁵⁴Diane Ravitch, "The 'White Flight' Controversy," Public Interest 51 (Spring 1978): 135-149.

their contentions. It is this author's opinion that as long as busing is utilized as a tool of educational policy with respect to racial balance in public schools, the neoconservatives will continue full force in their criticisms

Authority

Robert Nisbet, a frequent contributor to Commentary and Public Interest, writes in Twilight of Authority of the decline of Western Civilization.¹⁵⁵ Nisbet resounds the theme of social degeneration increasingly found in various writings today, yet goes further than many by proclaiming that we currently exist in an age of primitive degradation.

Historically, asserts Nisbet, twilight eras of creativity, development, and expansion have plummeted into periods of decline. The result is described as a vacuum of morality, in which the roles of man and community are radically altered. Man lives through a series of disjointed and disconnected life experiences, wandering furtively in search of a place within society. Bonds of trust, loyalty, and commitment, considered integral elements for community attachment, are lost and subsequently the complete notion of a community perishes.

¹⁵⁵Robert Nisbet, Twilight of Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

Lacking communal moral goals based on shared values and tradition, individualism is transformed into egoism--the emphasis on the isolated self apart from its relation to a larger body. Values are perceived as relative to any given individual's personal preference and consequently, the fabric of culture erodes.

Much of what Nisbet states is similarly expressed by another neoconservative, Daniel Bell, in his book of essays, The Winding Passage.¹⁵⁶ Nisbet echoes the Burkean-Oakeshott tradition whereby individuals seeking liberty necessarily esteem virtue, authority, obedience, social cohesiveness, and communal spirit. The pervasive egoism of our day which destroys these likewise destroys the possibility of freedom. By failing to live in accordance with the prerequisites that maintain a community, man jeopardizes both the existence and the future of collective equality and liberty.

For Nisbet, as for many of the neoconservative writers, the goal of rectifying the ills of the twilight era is an attainable one. Optimism is of a tainted sort, however, and the present social and cultural milieu is by no means viewed as one easily remedied. The place of authority within a truly liberal society is of paramount concern to the contributing writers in Public

¹⁵⁶ Daniel Bell, The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys 1960-1980 (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1980).

Interest and Commentary. Specifically they discuss the lack of assertiveness permeating the culture at large and focus frequently on the absence of authority in education. Problems with student discipline and violence are viewed as reflections of general societal tendencies yet are nonetheless treated as being manageable within schooling institutions themselves. The educational climate perceived by neoconservatives with respect to diminishing authority is thus discussed as a product of larger social trends.

Time and space do not permit a lengthy examination of the role of authority within and throughout all social institutions as perceived by the neoconservatives. Because education is viewed as a large complex institution with a life of its own, neoconservatives maintain that many prevailing ills are controllable and correctable without interference from sources outside of education. Therefore, only those elements bearing directly on schooling will be addressed in the following pages.

A not so innocent youth

Well over a decade ago, the concept of student discipline took on new meaning. When discussing typical misbehavior, pranks, and general disruptiveness that have characterized schools from their inception, one used to envision shoving and pushing, tardiness, occasional truancy, improper dress, and from those brazen enough,

actions directed at teachers such as deliberately misplaced grade books or seat-switching and name-changing on substitute days. Actions such as these are usually viewed with humor by those uninvolved and typically also in retrospect by those unfortunate enough to have been caught in the act. The common element in all things of this sort is that for most cases, the acts are harmless and victimless. While they may momentarily disrupt a class, frazzle a few parents, and unnerve a teacher or two, no real damage is ever done; such is the substance of which many school day memories are often made.

While foolishness indeed prevails today, the scene is no longer amusing. Compounding commonplace misbehavior is an assortment of actions which do have victims, very real victims, whether student or teacher or community. Vandalism, to buses, buildings, and materials is often "built-in" to annual school budgets; students are robbed, beaten, shot, and stabbed; teachers are likewise robbed, attacked, harrassed outside of school, and subjected to vandalism of their personal property. We know factually that such acts of violence occur within schools in America, but we must properly ask whether violence of this magnitude is the norm or the exception. Are these regular occurrences, or are they remote incidents cited repeatedly to buttress arguments from extreme example? In 1970 the Senate Subcommittee on

Juvenile Delinquency heard a series of horror stories about student violence and discipline, and subsequently acted to ascertain the precise scope of such deeds. Congress passed an amendment in 1974 to an education bill requiring the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to research the extent of crime in American schools. The study culminated in 1978 when the National Institute of Education (NIE), the agency which conducted the research, submitted an extensive 350 page report to Congress entitled Violent Schools--Safe Schools. The content of this report is described in Public Interest, and will be discussed here in similar fashion.¹⁵⁷

In general, junior high schools exhibited more crime than senior high schools, and urban schools tended to have more violence than suburban or rural schools.¹⁵⁸ The Public Interest delineates six specific questions with regard to the findings in the above Congressional report; each of these is briefly described below.

First, concerning whether or not real crime occurs in schools, the study showed that indeed it did. Mischief and foul language were mentioned as pervasive but were not classified as "real crime." Eleven percent of high school students reported having something stolen from

¹⁵⁷Jackson Toby, "Crime in American Public Schools," Public Interest 58 (Winter 1980): 18-42.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 19-21.

them; one-fifth of these reported the worth was greater than \$10. One-half of one percent reported having been robbed in a four week period with the use of force or weapons. Of these, one-ninth resulted in physical injury. One and one-third percent reported personal physical attacks, two-fifths of whom were injured; few required medical attention. These figures were obtained in personal interviews; anonymous questionnaires revealed figures at least double. The methodologists participating in the study thought the interviews more valid, and thus rejected the questionnaire findings in their report. In urban junior high schools, eight percent of the students reported staying home from school during the previous month out of fear for their personal safety; five percent reported the same in suburban areas, and four percent in rural schools.

Teachers reported thefts but relatively few robberies and assaults. In urban schools, robberies were three times greater and assaults nine times greater than in rural areas. Twenty-eight percent of the teachers in urban areas expressed fear in confronting students who misbehaved while only eleven percent suburban and seven percent rural teachers voiced similar concern for personal safety.

With regard to vandalism, the study estimated a cost of \$200 million per year for the replacement of

damaged or stolen property.¹⁵⁹

Second, researchers sought to determine whether outside intruders were responsible for school crime, or if students themselves were the main offenders. The study found that the "school intruder hypothesis" was a myth. Most violent activity was committed by students themselves. Also dispelled was the myth that older students overwhelmingly prey on younger students. In an attempt to discover who the perpetrators were, intense field studies were conducted. The field project director, A. J. Ianni of Columbia's Teachers College, reported his impressions:

- 1.) About ten percent of a school's students are responsible for the crime and violence in schools.
- 2.) This group was not identifiable in terms of racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic background.
- 3.) The disruptive students were regarded by school staff as academically poor, frequently in trouble in the community, and generally from troubled homes.
- 4.) The students were well known among staff and other students as "troublemakers."
- 5.) These students had no trouble making friends among the other students when specific problems or issues arose. They therefore represented a relatively small group among themselves, yet were able to effectively set-off a ripple-effect among other students.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 22-24.

Third, the Violent Schools--Safe Schools research determined that school crime occurs outside of classes and in areas where adult supervision is lowest, e.g., bathrooms, locker rooms, and cafeterias.¹⁶¹

Fourth, in an attempt to discover who were the victims of school crime, the study found that younger students and the least experienced teachers were most often attacked or robbed. Male students were victims twice as much as female students. Male teachers were more likely than their female counterparts to be attacked, but less likely to be robbed. The research concluded that overall, schools were more dangerous for males, who were both the main victims and the main victimizers. Minority students and teachers were more likely to be robbed and attacked than whites; the researchers concluded this was because they tended to be in urban schools where the crime rate was highest.¹⁶²

Fifth, the researchers tried to determine the causes of school crime, but none were given. The study spoke only of possible contributory factors. The tendency was for high crime schools to be those with higher than average proportions of children from low socioeconomic backgrounds and those located in high crime

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁶²Ibid.

neighborhoods.¹⁶³

Jackson Toby, writing in Public Interest, went back and looked at the original data in order to discover further trends that were not brought out in the Congressional report. He found urban areas to be the worst in all-around terms. There also tended to be a positive correlation between rate of crime and student/teacher perceptions of laxness in school rule enforcement in all three types of schools (urban, suburban, rural). Laxity of rule enforcement was perceived to be highest in urban areas.¹⁶⁴

Finally, the sixth element was concerned with whether or not the study suggested anything that the federal government could do to reduce school crime. The suggestions given did not come from the research team nor were they intended for Congressional action. Rather, they came from within the ranks of schools themselves--students, teachers, and principals. The recommendations were grouped into eight categories: security devices, security personnel, discipline and supervision, curriculum and counseling, training and organizational change, physical plant improvement, parental involvement and community relations, and improvement of school climate. Noted most often by all three groups, students, teachers, and

¹⁶³Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

principals, was "discipline and supervision." Subsumed under that category were classifications such as rule enforcement, suspension, expulsion, special classes, monitoring, controlling student movement, etc. It was also noted that regarding efforts already utilized, urban areas expended the most effort in controlling school crime and violence with the exception of one method, paddling.¹⁶⁵

The emergence of
school disorder

The National Institute of Education accomplished what it proposed to do--describe the state of affairs as it existed with regard to school violence and discipline. The neoconservative writing goes a step further and explores the very emergence of disorderly schools.

The historical development of American schools gradually removed schooling from the province of family and often from the immediate community. Consolidated school districts found in non-metropolitan areas and the large schools of the inner city stand as current examples of this separation. The intended purposes of these moves proved to be successful endeavors in decreasing cost and increasing efficiency. Larger schools meant lower per pupil expenditures, greater flexibility in hiring specialty teachers, and greater degrees of

¹⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 25-26.

professional autonomy from local social and political biases.¹⁶⁶

Along with the advantages of autonomy came the disadvantages which are linked by neoconservatives to problems of school crime in that they contributed to overall school disorderliness. First, as explicated in the 1950s by James Coleman's The Adolescent Society and illustrated in the 1970s in Philip Cusick's Inside High School, students spend a great deal of time "hanging out."¹⁶⁷ Subcultures developed by students typically have more to do with who's doing what to whom rather than who's studying what. Writes Jackson Toby, "Students were 'doing their own thing,' and their thing was not what teachers and principals were mainly concerned about."¹⁶⁸ Students unmotivated toward academic study typically have no trouble diverting their energies elsewhere.

Related to this is the problem posed by sheer numbers alone. When hundreds of teenagers assemble together, maintaining order can be as large a problem as trying to educate them. Numerous corridors, hallways,

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁶⁷James Coleman, The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education (New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1961); Philip Cusick, Inside High School: The Student World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

¹⁶⁸Toby, "Crime in Schools," p. 28.

and rooms used for purposes other than class, e.g., lunch-rooms, leave large numbers of young people unattended; teachers and principals cannot feasibly be everywhere at all times. The assumption expressed in Public Interest is clear with regard to the desirability of local effect:

[I]solation from the local community always means that if a large enough proportion of students misbehave, teachers and principals cannot maintain order.¹⁶⁹

A second and more obvious pressure on maintaining school order is compulsory attendance. The intended stated purpose is to raise educational levels. The unstated purpose may be to keep students off the streets and out of the job market. Either way, one result is that students are forced to remain in school; for many, school is the last place they want to be. Public schools have little freedom to expel, unlike private schools, and the presence of unruly and often violent youth poses additional and burdensome discipline problems.

A third trend is increasing sensitivity to student rights. Until this latest development less than a generation ago, school personnel clearly had the upper hand in discipline matters. Students were expelled, suspended, paddled, and punished with sentence-writing, extra homework, after school detention, or a host of other measures with little overt regard to due process. Perceived abuses

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

of the above and arbitrary standards of application gave birth to the push for student rights. Along with greater democratization of schools came a host of procedures for disciplinary action. Hearings are called, witnesses are often necessary, appeal procedures are outlined, and paper shuffling between teachers and principals regarding the details of discipline code infractions are common. The intent was originally for fair and consistent treatment of all students, as an assurance to parents and students that unprofessional biases against youngsters for whatever reason, race, religion, personality differences, etc., would be prevented. An unintended consequence has been that school officials and well behaved children are frequently on the defensive; unruly students have the legal protection against school personnel.¹⁷⁰

Related to this is the factor of the juvenile courts. The general trend is for juvenile authorities to leave schools alone to solve their own problems. In certain states, for example, truancy is illegal but not punishable by certain means, incarceration being one of them. Since they are considered the type of "crime" that would not be a crime if committed by an adult, certain methods of punishment are not allowed. The problem faced by schools in matters like truancy is that they have little authority to really enforce

¹⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 29-30.

truancy laws; many school officials believe little can be done if those rules already established are in effect ignored by virtue of not being enforced. Yet it is all too easy to pass the problem to the juvenile court system, where innumerable problems are also present, often far beyond those found in schools. Overloaded caseworkers, backlogged hearings, and overcrowded juvenile correctional facilities--many of which breed delinquency to more sophisticated levels rather than rehabilitate it--are increasingly becoming the norm of the juvenile justice system.¹⁷¹

A fifth trend addressed by the neoconservatives that was not mentioned by the NIE researchers is the continually eroding authority of teachers. There are still those, as there have been in the past, capable of controlling classrooms filled with unruly students merely because of personality or sheer physical presence. Yet overwhelmingly the role of the teacher as a quasi-sacred person has diminished almost completely. One reason cited is the general anti-establishment assault on authority figures throughout the culture at large, i.e., government officials, policemen, parents. A second reason suggested is the specialized attack on teachers which began in the 1960s. Books written by

¹⁷¹Toby, "Crime in Schools," p. 30; Edward A. Wynne, "What Are the Courts Doing to Our Children?" Public Interest 64 (Summer 1981): 3-18.

John Holt, Jonathon Kozol, and others depicted teachers as narrow-minded, "horribly" middle class, repressive, insensitive, racist, and inept. The key effect of this was the creation of a new assumption: if children were doing poorly in school, the blame belonged most of all on the teachers. Sharing the blame were society or parents or the church or friends or television or anyone except the students--but above all, teachers were the villains.¹⁷²

Thus the neoconservatives view school crime according to its relation to the larger social context. Various trends and forces from without--the separation of schools from family and community influence, compulsory attendance, students rights movements, and the erosion of teacher authority--have all contributed to the increase in the scope of school crime and violence.

The real effect of
school crime

A key reason for concern about school crime is the detrimental effect it bears on the educational process. Particularly in many of the large urban areas, both teachers and students approach schooling with low morale and poor incentives to perform well. Aside from being able to transfer their children to private schools,

¹⁷²Toby, "Crime in Schools," pp. 30-32; Midge Decter, "Looting and Liberal Racism," Commentary 64, no. 3 (September 1977): 48-54.

the majority of parents are virtually powerless to impact the schools.

As we have seen, the problem of school crime is most pronounced in urban areas. Neoconservatives suggest that controlling it is of additional importance because the mission of propelling youth from disadvantaged families toward successful learning and occupational skills is severely blighted by school crime. Opponents to the neoconservative position argue that the causal arrows run in reverse direction: that school crime is a result of school abuses of due process. The Children's Defense Fund maintained in the mid-1970s that unfair treatment of students, particularly blacks, created the rage and frustration of urban youth. A 1975 Senate Subcommittee Report, "Our Nation's Schools--A Report Card: 'A' in School Violence and Vandalism" echoed this same sentiment, speaking to the issue of how school failings incite student violence.¹⁷³ Without rejecting the above arguments, a neoconservative spokesperson states:

[I]t seems more plausible that school violence lowers the effectiveness of the educational process through the fears that it arouses than that arbitrary school rules so enrage students that they rob and steal from each other and teachers, and perpetrate assaults and vandalism.¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, it is argued that the Defense Fund/Senate

¹⁷³Toby, "Crime in Schools," pp. 32-35.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 35.

hypothesis fails to stand up under empirical scrutiny: "The tendency for 'less fair' schools to have higher violence rates virtually disappeared when other co-varying causal factors were statistically removed."¹⁷⁵

Reducing school crime

The neoconservative position stresses strongly the need for long range views toward school crime with accompanying experimentation in various methods of disciplinary action. Additionally stressed is the need for patience and consistency when attempting experimental reform efforts. Several suggestions call for the use of informal controls incorporated into the school routine such as parent involvement and increased peer influence. Another suggestion is the rearrangement of priorities. Rather than attempting to control all crimes, e.g., alcohol, marijuana use, or weekend vandalism, it is asserted that crime in schools during school hours should be given foremost attention.¹⁷⁶

A third set of propositions assaults the assumptions of those labeled "youth advocates" who call for more invigorating teachers and curricula as the solution to school crime. Neoconservatives are quick to point out that nothing can be interesting at all times, nor

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 37.

can any one person be exciting on all occasions. Schools like other aspects of living, are inevitably going to be boring, routine, and mundane at times. Psychologists may quite appropriately prefer positive reinforcement over negative, yet not everyone can be hooked on school-related rewards. Another part of neoconservative suggestions extends beyond the point others rarely choose to go--perhaps society should be allowed to abandon responsibility for educating certain youngsters. When last resort measures such as suspensions and expulsions have been exhausted, schools ought to be able to permanently remove students from public schools. Children's rights are necessary and important, but sometimes take unintentional twists when implemented, often at the expense of other students--well-behaved students who also have rights.¹⁷⁷

One case study in Violent Schools--Safe Schools reveals the story of a district which maintained a policy of transferring troublemakers from one school to another so that a child might be given a chance to start anew. The school board required that no reports concerning the reasons for transfer were to follow the student for fear of biasing faculty in the receiving school. Stated one junior high school dean in the district:

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-41.

We had a kid last year who slashed another kid's throat with a razor blade and we finally had to transfer him. . . , but we couldn't tell them what he had done or even that they should keep an eye on him because he was potentially violent.¹⁷⁸

A frequent debate

Neoconservatives are quick to attack the excesses and abuses of children's rights devotees. They criticize the members of today's liberal left for condoning or excusing behavior which unfairly or radically questions authority. For them, the scrambling which has resulted from the due process crisis referred to earlier has only tended to make matters more difficult. The reasoning is not that students rights are wrong, but that the burden of proof and responsibility rests on those in control, teachers and principals, whose own rights, as well as those of children who behave, appear secondary in importance to the rights of offenders.

In a fiery attack on the liberal left, Midge Decter examines the youth crime which followed the New York City blackout in 1977.¹⁷⁹ She forthrightly condemns the looting and burning that took place, but additionally focuses on and launches a lengthy critique of liberal opinion concerning the "youth rage" which was cited as

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Decter, "Looting and Liberal Racism," pp. 48-54.

reason for the uproar. Writes Decter in Commentary,

So many who are habitually quick and sure and virtuous in all their analyses of social problems often find it worthwhile to remain oblivious to any of the consequences of their view in the real world.¹⁸⁰

Decter voices many of the key criticisms against current liberal attitudes toward urban youth that are echoed throughout the bulk of neoconservative writings.

The first of the liberal claims attacked is that urban youth have been ignored because the urban poor generally have been ignored. For nearly two decades hundreds of programs have been developed and millions of dollars poured into inner cities; massive efforts, she asserts, have been made to alleviate the conditions of the poor. Successful or not--many would claim intervention harmed more than helped--neoconservatives outrightly reject claims that the urban poor have been ignored.¹⁸¹

Second, assumptions concerning youth unemployment in urban areas are taken to task. Assuming that youth mind being unemployed is not as obvious to Decter as the liberal community claims it to be. The notion that "unemployed" refers to those who have sought and failed to find a job is a "laughable proposition."¹⁸² For many

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 51.

youth, particularly males, it does not pay-off financially to acquire a job. Dangerous money, easily accessible money, provides a sizeable income for those who engage in a host of not-very-acceptable-types of occupations. Citing Manchild in the Promised Land by Claude Brown as an illumination of such work, a list of street jobs accesible to youth is given: rolling drunks, selling drugs, mugging, stealing, and prostitution.¹⁸³ Street crime simply has greater financial incentives than does flipping hamburgers in a corner restaurant.¹⁸⁴

A third rejected tenet is the assertion that urban youth are victims of racial oppression, the result of white apathy. Directed primarily at immigrant youth who comprised a sizable portion of looters following the New York City blackout, Decter states:

They flock here and go to any lengths not to be sent home--hardly the behavior . . . of victims. They are poor, to be sure, like all immigrant groups they are here because they were even poorer before.¹⁸⁵

Decter further condemns liberal claims that, also due to white apathy, the looters behaved like animals; on the contrary, she asserts, they behaved in all too human

¹⁸³Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: Macmillan, 1965), cited in Decter, "Looting and Liberal Racism," p. 52.

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Decter, "Looting and Liberal Racism," p. 52.

a manner.¹⁸⁶

Criticized most severely of all is the assumption that youth crime is an outgrowth of rage, a painful message expressing their torment. In the case of the looters, they were not making a statement about society in the view of neoconservatives, but were having a grand time of it all. One youngster being interviewed while looting a clothing store told a reporter, "Hey, man, . . . It's the name of the game." Greed and excitement, not frustration, were the forces behind the madness.¹⁸⁷

If liberal explanations concerning the crime and violence of the young are in error, we may appropriately inquire as to a neoconservative version to explain it. They have one and voice it often: the liberal community has given youth, particularly poor urban youth, permission to act violently, break laws, and commit crimes. Liberal excuses, tolerance, and apologies have bred a crisis in the authority structures of society. Youth have been allowed to get away with all of it,

. . . by all the papers and magazines, movies and documentaries--all the outlets for the purveying of enlightened liberal attitude and progressive liberal policy--which had for years and years been proclaiming that race and poverty were sufficient excuses for lawlessness. . . . by all the politicians and government officials who had for years

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., p. 53.

and years through their policies been expressing their belief that there was no other way to "tame" ghetto youth . . . and no other way to move them ahead in life except by special arrangement. . . . by all the self-appointed foundation--or government-funded militant spokesmen for the interests of the black and Hispanic communities whose threats of "long hot summers" had been the key to their exercise of power with the political establishment.¹⁸⁸

The crux of the issue according to neoconservatives is an attitude which to them is as inherently racist as any found in the deep South of decades ago--that society cannot expect urban youth behavior to be any better than it is because we must not apply the same standards and expectations to the urban poor as we do to everyone else. The liberal left is condemned in the end for conveying the message that being poor or being black are grounds for special moral consideration, as though these persons were not quite human or equal enough to be held accountable for their own behavior.¹⁸⁹

Special Programs

Another issue addressed in neoconservative journals involves the adoption and presence of special programs in public schools. Generally, spokespersons are not opposed to vocational or career education, family life classes, or any similar program. They do object, however,

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 52-54.

when curricular offerings similar to these are used as replacements for more traditional forms of study. Also addressed is the topic of whether many of these instructional programs are as worthwhile as their proponents assert.

Three special programs are treated in this paper: bilingual education, moral education, and career education. Each is addressed in turn.

Bilingual education

"Bilingual education" is a term often misunderstood and misinterpreted by individuals from within and without the professional education community. A brief sketch of the term's evolution into full scale programs within American public schools can facilitate a better understanding of precisely what is entailed in bilingual education. Specifically of concern are elements such as who is served by such programs, who finances them, what underlying intents were in the original push for bilingual education, what degree of consistency exists within and between schools and communities in the administration of bilingual education, and what conclusions, if any, can be gleaned concerning the success/failure of these programs. In Public Interest, Abigail Thernstrom addresses questions similar to these in "E Pluribus

Plura--Congress and Bilingual Education."¹⁹⁰ Her article reflects neoconservative concern about education curriculum specifically and the role of government in educational policy generally.

Contrary to popular belief, bilingual education was not originally a product of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1840, non-English speaking parents of German origin persuaded the Cincinnati public schools to provide coursework for their children in the native language. Elsewhere across the United States from the mid-to late-nineteenth century, immigrants fought and won the battles which secured specialized instruction for non-English speaking students in their native tongue. By the outbreak of the Second World War, however, few if any such programs remained.¹⁹¹

The current movement in favor of bilingual education emerged in the 1960s and centered around children of Mexican-American background living in Texas. In 1967 Senator Yarborough introduced the bilingual education bill; subsequent hearings focused on the high drop out rates, poor academic performance, and low median number of years of formal schooling completed of Hispanic children in general. Echoing Yarborough's sentiments,

¹⁹⁰ Abigail M. Thernstrom, "E Pluribus Plura: Congress and Bilingual Education," Public Interest 60 (Summer 1980): 3-22.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Senator Kuchel of California summarized the hearings by claiming, "The fault lies with our educational system." The pro-bilingual education arguments were rather straightforward and easily understood. It was unfair and unrealistic to expect children of Mexican descent, raised solely with the Spanish language, to enter American schools and be able to compete at grade level with their English-speaking peers. It is not difficult to imagine that a ten year old Spanish speaking child placed into a fifth grade social studies class in an American school is almost surely guaranteed failure in that particular class; likewise with any child, or adult for that matter, suddenly immersed in a different culture dominated by a different language. Therefore, bilingual education was viewed as a panacea to the problem of assimilating students of Limited English-speaking Ability (LESA) in the respect that it was hoped specialized programs would remedy the problem of unequal educational opportunity by providing aid to students. Thus, students would be enabled to "catch-up" in basic skills.¹⁹²

Having identified the intent of bilingual education, the manner in which it was to be achieved was through the native language, Spanish. Since Spanish was easier to learn than English, teaching LESA children the basic skills would first be done in Spanish and then

¹⁹²Ibid.

later transferred to English. Yarborough asserted that the intended goals would never be fully actualized unless a special bill was passed appropriating funds specifically for the purposes of bilingual education.¹⁹³ In January 1968 the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was amended with Title VII, the Bilingual Education Act. The Act itself does not specifically define "bilingual education," but refers instead to special needs of LESA children and calls for the creation of imaginative and innovative programs to meet those needs.¹⁹⁴ Programs could be special classes such as cultural awareness, history of the native culture, or programs geared to better home and school communication with regard to the LESA students. Thus with the funding provided from the federal level, local school authorities were given virtual free reign to design and implement bilingual programs. Only two criteria were established for receiving federal funds. Schools having a high percentage of LESA children from families with incomes below \$3000 per year or children from families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments. In fiscal year 1969 Congress appropriated \$7.5 million for bilingual education;

¹⁹³Thernstrom, "E Pluribus Plura," pp. 5-6; Jack K. Campbell, "Senator Yarborough and the Texan 'RWY' Brand on Bilingual Education and Federal Aid," Educational Studies 12, no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 403-415.

¹⁹⁴Thernstrom, "E Pluribus Plura," p. 6.

the funds aided seventy-six projects and 26,521 children. In fiscal year 1974, the sum was \$58.3 million for 383 projects and 339,595 children. Eighty percent of those children were Hispanic, and the remaining twenty percent were a mixture of twenty-three other ethnic groups.¹⁹⁵

Thernstrom questions the efficiency of bilingual education from several directions. First is the initial assumption that bilingual programs were pressing educational needs. At the time the program was adopted, no statistics concerning the number of LESA children in the United States had been compiled. Second, even if convincing data were available, one must draw a distinction between certain LESA children; some are more assimilated than others and in need of less help. Of those perhaps most needy of bilingual instruction would be those children who belong to an enduring ethnic subculture, e.g., Puerto Ricans in New York City or Mexican-Americans living close to the border. Yet the very maintenance of linguistic and cultural independence is questioned as perhaps a temporary phenomenon; the suggestion is given that assimilation is more important than maintenance of the native culture.

A third criticism is that while Hispanic children do perform poorly in school, language may not be the problem. Still unproven is the assumption of value for

¹⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 12-13.

needing instruction in two languages. A fourth criticism is that the arguments advanced during the Congressional hearings on bilingual education were masks to a hidden agenda: the creation of a society more responsive to the need for ethnic diversity. At the heart of this hidden agenda was the black power movement, centering on an assertion psychological in nature which maintained that mainstream American culture had damaged black self esteem to such an extent that reinstilling a sense of self-worth and pride ought to be of key concern. Voiced not only by militants, the same claim was echoed by moderates and liberals such as Jesse Jackson, Martin Luther King Jr., and Kenneth Clark, who advocated strong positive identification with one's black roots, and reaffirmation of one's black experience. To do so was often interpreted as concurrent rejection of dominant white values, particularly in schools, and the creation of black institutions in which black values could break free from white assimilation.¹⁹⁶

The neoconservative position is not antithetical to the basic positions espoused by Jackson, King, and others similar to them; what is questioned is the assumption that other ethnic groups have suffered the same or similar degree of racism as have blacks. By transferring the arguments of blacks to other ethnic groups without

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 6-9.

examining the belief itself was, in the view of neo-conservatives, a premature and faulty assumption. They contend further that by eschewing the principle of assimilation, the Supreme Court's argument in Brown is in effect reversed. In 1954 Chief Justice Earl Warren stated:

To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race, generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.¹⁹⁷

What some black militants and their white liberal supporters were doing was now contending that the assimilation of students into cultures different from their own created feelings of inferiority.¹⁹⁸

Those who served as witnesses at the Congressional hearings on bilingual education unanimously rejected assimilation, or the "melting pot" ideal, suggesting instead the United States ought to embrace and protect different cultures. Neoconservative spokespersons assert that the assimilation of blacks throughout history had not been the problem, for other groups had successfully dealt with assimilation pressures. Thernstrom asserts that the real problem had been the massive segregation and ostracism experienced by blacks which proved to be

¹⁹⁷Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

so damaging; both of these elements were experienced by blacks to an extent far beyond other ethnic groups. She further contends that the highly organized, special interest bilingual education movement that advantageously hid in the shadows of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s encouraged a negative addition to transitional classwork for LESA children--the establishment of protective enclaves of ethnicity.¹⁹⁹

Three significant historical events which occurred in the development process of bilingual education are given considerable weight. The first of these transpired in 1974 when the Title VII Act was renewed in such a manner that previous emphasis on transitional programs was undermined by an emphasis on maintenance programs. Seven key changes in bilingual legislation were adopted:

- (1) The poverty clause mentioned earlier was eliminated.
- (2) The program was no longer deemed experimental but now assumed to be a success.
- (3) The wording of the Act was changed in such a way that a child's native culture and language were recognized as "a primary means by which a child learns."
- (4) "Bilingual education" was redefined to include "bicultural education."
- (5) Provisions were made to include students whose primary language was English for purposes of cross-cultural appreciation.
- (6) Instructions specified that bilingual students be mainstreamed into music,

¹⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 8-11.

- art, and physical education.
- (7) An Office of Bilingual Education was created within the U. S. Office of Education.

Primarily led by Senators Cranston and Kennedy, the net effect of the 1974 expansion was to alter the original legislation to make bilingual-bicultural education programs the means by which to teach LESA children. Furthermore, it firmly established the role of the federal government as caretaker behind the bilingual education movement.²⁰⁰

A second event notable in the progression of bilingual education was the Supreme Court's decision in 1974 in Lau v. Nichols. In short, the case involved a class action suit by 1800 non-English speaking Chinese students denied specialized English courses in San Francisco; 1000 other non-English speaking Chinese students were receiving special English instruction. The district and appeals courts decided against the plaintiffs on the grounds that:

Every student brings to the starting line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic, and cultural backgrounds, created and continued completely apart from any contribution by the school.²⁰¹

But the Supreme Court reversed the decision, resting its case partly on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act which banned discrimination on grounds of race, color, or

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 13-18.

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

national origin in any activity that was the recipient of federal funds, and additionally on a Health, Education, and Welfare Department guideline which stated that schools must rectify language deficiencies if those deficiencies exclude children from active school participation. In turn, the Department of HEW interpreted the Court's decision as a requirement to provide bilingual and bicultural educational programs. The Chinese-Americans wanted English instruction to aid educational access and had obtained it. Neoconservative opinion stresses that additionally, the Hispanics indirectly scored a victory, although with a different argument blankly accepted by HEW: that equal access and participation required equal motivation to succeed academically and that motivation, in turn, depended on a positive self image. To foster a positive self image required formal classroom acknowledgment and instruction geared toward a child's ethnic identity, i.e., bicultural instruction.²⁰²

Trickle-down effects of Lau were shortly thereafter apparent, all of the arguments in each case ultimately resting on the Lau decision. In Texas and New Mexico, school authorities have been forced into providing massive bilingual/bicultural programs, and in Ann Arbor, Michigan, schools were ordered to devise plans which would prepare teachers to recognize and accept

²⁰²Ibid., pp. 18-21.

Black English. In these areas and elsewhere in the United States, measures were ordered to be taken to provide programs directed at language and cultural maintenance. Materials and texts were limited to those which avoided negative ethnic stereotypes and focused instead on the positive features of the children's ethnic background.²⁰³

The third noteworthy event occurred in 1978 when Congress began seriously questioning the efficacy of bilingual education. A four year study of 11,500 Hispanic children conducted by the American Institute for Research under contract from the USOE brought forth several illuminating pieces of information. The six most pertinent results are listed below.

- (1) Most children did not need to learn English-- (they already had a good grasp of it).
- (2) Those needing to learn English were not doing so.
- (3) Most programs sought linguistic and cultural maintenance rather than transition to English.
- (4) Most programs were not designed to increase English competency.
- (5) Only sixteen percent of the students enrolled in bilingual instruction were Spanish monolingual.
- (6) No evidence indicated that the students were happier.

The director of the project summarized to the House Subcommittee on Education that there was no evidence that Title VII bilingual education as it was currently being implemented proved to be the most appropriate approach

²⁰³Ibid.

for students of limited English-speaking ability.²⁰⁴

The debate which followed in Congress exemplified the divergent views of two different perspectives on bilingual education: those who saw it as a philosophical issue whereby differences between groups ought to be protected, and those who saw it as an educational issue, the effects of which were apparently not successful. In the final analysis, the bilingual act was again amended in 1978 to include four changes. First, a limit of forty percent was established as the number of students in a district who could receive bilingual instruction and those students had to be clearly of limited English speaking ability; programs could no longer be maintained solely for enhancing ethnic solidarity. Second, increased parent involvement was called for in the form of advisory committees; this was done in an effort to give more voice to a constituency which typically demanded its children learn English and less voice to those referred to as politically active ethnics. Third, local districts were instructed to hire teachers who had proficiency in English as well as the ethnic language of LESA children who were served. Fourth, the terminology delineating participants was changed from "limited English speaking" to "limited English proficiency" to include students capable of speaking, but not reading

²⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 15-16.

or writing, English.²⁰⁵

These above amendments attached to the original Title VII Bilingual Education Act represent policy status; its future will become more certain in 1983, the year the act expires. To the neoconservatives it will be too late to dispose of bilingual education; it has spread throughout the nation, and most of all, it is rooted in Supreme Court decisions. Perhaps the most negative consequence of bilingual education in their view is that it has robbed the public school system of its function to transcend ethnicity and integrate students into values they think suitable for all American children.

Moral education

The topic of moral education also finds a place in neoconservative writings. After they trace the historical writings emphasizing the need for instruction of moral values in the schools, e.g., Thomas Jefferson's Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, McGuffey's Readers, and John Dewey's Democracy and Education, all of which voiced an interest in teaching moral reasoning to children during their school years, attention is drawn to the contemporary literature which maintains that schools should not "teach values" per se, but instead teach skills related to values. Although they

²⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 15-18.

do not term it as such, what the neoconservatives refer to is commonly known as "values clarification." The work of Sidney Simon and Lawrence Kohlberg dominates their discussion.

At the outset it is important to note that values instruction is not new in American education, as the historical writings above illustrate. But to many American educators, values teaching became one of a series of "never before discovered innovations" of the 1960s. Neoconservatives are quick to point out that major differences separate the writings of Simon from those of Kohlberg. The differences exist not only in their respective positions, but also in their professional followings within the education community. To the neoconservatives, the similarity which exists between the two is a rejection of the traditional method of moral education defined by Simon as "indoctrination," and described as the imposition of values on the young. This similarity is the focus of the neoconservative critique.

A detailed analysis of Simon and Kohlberg's position is beyond the scope of this thesis.²⁰⁶ However, a brief description of each is given in turn for purposes of clarity and cohesiveness.

²⁰⁶For discussion and analysis of values clarification and its relation to moral education, see G. Curtis Smitch, "A Historical and Logical Analysis of the Values Clarification Movement" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1977).

Sidney Simon's work represents the initial approach to moral education known as values clarification. Theoretically, Simon denies all traditional notions of rightness and wrongness; thus in practice, no one can instruct another into a "right" set of values. However, Simon states that the "process of valuing" is a practical concern which can be taught and is most appropriately done through "simulation games." Through values clarification a person can consciously discover his own values and learn how to effectively negotiate himself through life. Simulation games are presented through a series of "strategy" exercises in which typically, a question is asked and a student selects one of three or four possible answers which most typifies himself. In doing so, claims Simon, students move toward greater self-understanding and self-knowledge.²⁰⁷

The strategy approach is criticized on the grounds that the questions themselves and the respective foils are inherently biased and are therefore not "value free." If for example, a child were asked to answer the question, "When I grow up, I'd most like to become a _____," and the selection of possible answers were "(A) doctor, (B) teacher, (c) lawyer, (D) plumber." The choices alone are limited and simplistic, the student is asked to

²⁰⁷William J. Bennett and Edwin J. Delattre, "Moral Education in the Schools," Public Interest 50 (Winter 1978): 82-83.

consider options that he likes or dislikes at a particular point in time, and he is asked to respond based on his knowledge of four professions about which he may or may not know anything substantive.

After reviewing the specific content of many of the values clarification exercises, several other conclusions are drawn in the literature by neoconservative spokespersons. First, criticism is leveled at Simon's underlying assumption that knowing what one wants is sufficient to live well. Second, Simon disregards the role of factual knowledge in the decision-making process. Third, most of the questions center only on the student and his own desires and demands. This is viewed negatively, as an example of misplaced emphasis on egocentric concerns. Fourth, and related directly to the above, other persons are seen only as a means to achieve one's own needs, and the deeper aspects of personal relationships are ignored in simulations. Fifth, notions such as fidelity in marriage, concern for others, mutual personal respect, self restraint, deferred gratification, etc., are absent in strategy games. In short, such "value free" strategies themselves approach indoctrination by encouraging "narcissistic self-gratification," glorifying "the doctrine of the primacy of wants," promoting "hasty, ill-informed, ignorant, and precipitous judgment," and ignoring the possible place of "goodness, decency, or the capacity for a positive exercise of will" in one's

life.²⁰⁸

The work of Lawrence Kohlberg on cognitive moral development exemplifies a higher degree of theoretical cohesiveness and scholarly acceptance than that of Sidney Simon. Kohlberg specifically rejects notions of philosophical relativism and finds only limited worth in values clarification exercises. Based on several cultural and anthropological studies, as well as many of his own conducted at Harvard, Kohlberg asserts that there are six universal developmental stages of moral development. Each of these stages can only be reached by passing through the preceding one, and each subsequent stage is morally superior to its antecedent.²⁰⁹ While any person can "stop" in the process of moral development anywhere along the six stage route, everyone can be stimulated to progress to additional levels. The only way to achieve this, asserts Kohlberg, is through exercises which directly involve discussion of moral dilemmas.²¹⁰

In a classroom setting, teachers are expected to be value-neutral, present moral dilemmas to the students, and guide them through the developmental process from

²⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 83-86.

²⁰⁹Bennett and Delattre, "Moral Education," pp. 87-89; Lawrence Kohlberg, "Understanding the Hidden Curriculum," Learning 1, no. 2 (December 1972): 10-14.

²¹⁰Ibid.

one stage to the next in a relaxed, nonjudgmental, and democratic setting. The desired end is to facilitate each child's moral development through the discussion of moral conflicts.

Criticism is directed toward Kohlberg for his libertarian emphasis. His basic position reveals a dislike for what he believes to be the imposition of authority (parents, teachers, rules, traditional mores of behavior); students are encouraged to evaluate moral claims from the perspective of how they relate to a given individual's rights. For example, in illustration of the reasoning process between parents and children, Kohlberg discusses children's rights but never accepts the existence of parent rights as such; children are assumed to be in a disadvantaged position. Another example concerns a woman's unhappiness with marriage and family life. Options such as divorce and extramarital affairs are discussed without reference to the rights or concerns of the woman's husband and children. Both examples short shrift reciprocity of equal rights of all persons involved.²¹¹

In general, claims of authority and rules are almost always eschewed in favor of individuals who are assumed to be in a disadvantaged position. Kohlberg is criticized

²¹¹Bennett and Delattre, "Moral Education," pp. 89-94.

for ignoring impartial justice and notions of rational good by treating those subject to rules and authority as victims. Further questions are posed regarding whether what Kohlberg describes as morality is really morality at all. On the topic of morality, neoconservative spokespersons espouse their position in contrast to Kohlberg's:

Morality takes place among human beings and not among disembodied bearers of "rights," who are incessantly engaged in squabbling about them. Morality is concerned with doing good, with sacrifice, altruism, love, courage, honor, and compassion, and with fidelity and large-mindedness regarding one's station, commitments, family, friends, colleagues, and society in general. Morality among men is not merely legalistic and formalistic, it does not consist merely of so many non-negotiable demands.²¹²

In sum, Simon and Kohlberg are criticized for their failure to avoid the type of indoctrination they profess to abhor. Neoconservatives assert that the move toward value neutral education suggests instead values detrimental to a rational, free society--the primacy of wants, desires, and self gratification, and an ideology exalting rights and special justice. To them, the authority imposed by Simon and Kohlberg is more tyrannical and damaging than most of that exhibited in contemporary society. The ultimate tragedy to children is viewed as the creation of a world in which no place is found for the transmission of knowledge and experience, and any attempt to impart

²¹²Ibid., pp. 94-97.

either is depicted as a travesty and imposition.²¹³

Career education

The move toward career education in the United States manifested itself in the 1960s and reflects more than merely another innovative and panaceic push in the education community. From the mid-1800s until the late-1950s, the popular and most common attitude toward public schools was positive in nature. Schooling was viewed as the means by which society could remedy its problems and prepare its youth to successfully carry on American culture. Particularly because of rapid and expansive industrialization, schools were called upon to replace the learning that could no longer be provided informally outside of the school. While public education still bears the brunt of being regarded as societal-problem-solver for a wide array of ills, career education is in part a deviation from this norm.

When reformers of the 1960s began attacking schools as being destructive to personal growth, "little red prisons" in John Holt's memorable phrase, irrelevant to the real world, and general obstacles to true learning, it became evident that the level of trust in schooling had diminished. By the early-1970s claims typical of the above were accepted outrightly by many government and

²¹³Ibid.

professional commissions. They believed further, that one remedy to the "youth problem" as they called it, was to remove students from school and expose them to the more realistic, invigorating setting of the workplace. Gone was the notion of schools as refuges from the pressures of daily living; in its place was an idea that schools isolated the young, imposed irrelevant attendance and behavior codes, and unwisely elevated the value of book learning. Additionally absent was the view that schools could prepare youth for jobs and careers; it was now believed that the workplace could better facilitate learning.²¹⁴

Career education as a movement is difficult to define conceptually. The United States Office of Education (USOE) describes it as "the totality of experiences through which one learns about and prepares to engage in work as part of her or his way of living." The processes in which schools are to be engaged are designed to facilitate "more informed" career choices when the time to do so arrives. These processes begin in grade school (career awareness), progress throughout junior high (career exploration) and high school (advanced career exploration or specific job training), and are justified

²¹⁴Eleanor Farrar McGowan and David K. Cohen, "'Career Education': Reforming School Through Work," Public Interest 46 (Winter 1977): 28-34.

on the grounds that they make students more aware of life by realistically involving them in the workplace and giving them actual hands-on experience. Theoretically, career education is not intended to supplant the typical public school curriculum, but merely supplement it.²¹⁵

It is proposed that this lack of cohesiveness may have actually facilitated the rapidity with which the movement spread. In 1979, 9200 of the country's 162,000 districts offered career education programs. Most states have separate career education offices within their departments of education. Many states require career education programs and more propose to follow suit. In 1971 the USOE spent \$9 million on various projects, and by 1978, expenditures had reached \$110 million. The National Institute of Education, USOE's research affiliate, annually budgets \$2.4 million per year for projects related to career education research and development.²¹⁶

Further impetus for the expansion of career education came from dismal reports in the course of daily social events. On a fairly regular basis media have reported the decline in the salability and income value of college degrees as well as regular updates on the increased cost of higher education. Studies which showed high school graduates did as well as college graduates

²¹⁵Ibid., pp. 31-32.

²¹⁶Ibid., p. 32.

income-wise in the job market were published amidst the flurry of controversy over Coleman's 1966 and Jencks' 1972 research which contended that schools had little if any effect on later life success.²¹⁷ All this occurred in the same time context as rising school crime, drug use, vandalism, and student hostility toward schooling in general. Combined, these factors became a looming nightmare of concern.²¹⁸

The faulty assumption underlying career education is characterized by neoconservative spokespersons as "the romance of work."

The reports and programs suggest that work is lively, while school is boring. Work is a preparation for adult life, while school simply reinforces an irresponsible youth culture. Work will stimulate curiosity and provoke learning, whereas school stultifies them. Work will provide meaningful contact with adults and help integrate youth into society, while school prevents socialization. The common thread in career education is the notion that work is authentic, real, and healthy, that it can solve problems created or unmanaged by the dull world of compulsory classrooms.²¹⁹

The belief in such a set of assumptions by career education

²¹⁷James Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); Christopher Jencks, et al., Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

²¹⁸McGowan and Cohen, "Reforming School," pp. 32-34.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 34.

advocates backfires when squared with the reality of the working world. Attempts to implement career education ideas have resulted in programs which make the world of work a course for study rather than the originally intended program in which students would study the workplace. Unnoticed by career education proponents, work is often not what they perceive it to be; like schools, work is not immune from the pervasive problems of the larger society.²²⁰

Apart from misperceptions of the workplace, several important barriers to full implementation of career education are evident. One lies with the business community. Employers are typically willing to serve as information sources and gladly accommodate the usual field trip/plant tour for classes of students. This is apparently as far as they wish to go. While career education originally desired a partnership with business, employers were quick to respond that they wanted no part of such a liaison; the development and instruction of programs belonged in its rightful place with its rightful owners--schools. The only Fortune 500 firm to publicly endorse and plan for career education was General Motors. In addition to feeling that career education was within school jurisdiction, another obvious contention of the large corporations was that involvement with career

²²⁰Ibid., pp. 33-34.

education would be cost ineffective. Several other professionals within the education community, chief among them the National Association of Secondary School Principals (NASSP), vociferously agreed with the opinions of business. Utilizing business resources is acceptable, but sharing instructional responsibility with them is not. Eventually the notion of partnership quietly subsided and disappeared from the career education agenda.²²¹

Organized labor represents the second forceful barrier to full program implementation. Arguing for the traditional notion that schools can help adjudicate problems found in the workplace rather than the other way around, labor takes a negative view of incorporating youth into the workplace. Apart from the fear of rate-busting and an unequal advantage to big business, labor rejects career education for the unemployment effect, i.e., putting adults out of work, and questions the realism of exposures students would actually be able to receive. AFL-CIO spokespersons stated that placing young people in various jobs for two or three weeks at a time, as many career education advocates would like, "is an insidious idea," and outrightly contradicts the stated intent of career education, to allow students to experience a deep involvement with work and workers: "It's one thing to work on an assembly line for three

²²¹Ibid., pp. 34-37.

weeks, or even three months. And it's another to work on that job for thirty years or more."²²²

A great deal of criticism regarding career education has come from the professional community of educators. In the face of teacher oversupply and declining student enrollments, any program reducing the number of students in school for any period of time is perceived as a threat to public school personnel. Furthermore, much of the advance work for career education was done by non-education reformers, and the imposition on teacher and administrator territory has not been enthusiastically received. There has also been a vocal outcry by many teachers against the inclusion of career education programs into the curricula at the cost of other subjects. One USOE official suggested high school English teachers might incorporate a study of work values along with a literature unit on Charles Dickens, but the likelihood of a suggestion such as this being warmly received seems dubious at best.

Cost, always a major consideration to school personnel, is quickly becoming another obstacle. The transportation expense of taking students on various work site field trips can be staggering, particularly in a time where extra transportation costs are budgeted so strictly that few, if any, excursions of this sort are economically

²²²Ibid., pp. 37-39.

feasible. Additionally, as work becomes more infused in the curricula, material costs eventually take their toll on school budgets. Films, books, self-instructional packages, and career kits can tax school funds considerably, often beyond the point at which they can realistically extend without curtailing expenditures in other subject areas.²²³

Neoconservative spokespersons are quick to address as an underlying ill a more serious defect in the way people perceive the relationship between work and school. Reformers supporting career education perceive schools as useless and boring, while work experiences are redeeming and stimulating. But as the criticisms arising from labor, business, and educational professionals elucidated, such a perspective is rejected by large segments of society who still envision schools as a preparatory step for work and life, and dismiss the notion that work is or has to be the most fulfilling part of one's life.

Ultimately claim neoconservatives, the roots of the debate lie in perceptions concerning knowledge and its role in an individual's life. As society has become more industrialized and technological, schools have been viewed chiefly as the best means of preparation for living in a modernized era. But additionally schools served a necessary function of socialization because traditional

²²³Ibid., pp. 39-43.

institutions--family, community, religion--had been weakened as well. However, with the increased criticism of schools in the 1960s and 1970s came a challenge to the old assumption, and a new premise, that life preparation is best achieved informally rather than formally, took its place. Both views are criticized for presenting "fantasies about modernity," and the types of education necessary. In short, both sides have had extravagant expectations concerning modern living and the capabilities of either formal institutions or daily experience in solving the problems of living in an increasingly formal and specialized culture.²²⁴

²²⁴Ibid., pp. 44-47.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

This chapter will attempt first to present a terse and cohesive overview of the topics addressed in the preceding four chapters. It will attempt second to critique and evaluate the various general tenets of the neoconservative position.

Summary of the Thesis

In Chapter I, a brief description was provided regarding the rising prominence of neoconservatism as a powerful and discernible position in the current political and intellectual arena. The author asserted that to critically discuss the position it was necessary to initially describe it with attention to historical background and to the position's underlying assumptions. In addition to a wide array of historical and neoconservative readings, the paper as a whole focused on the literature from 1976-1980 that appeared in Commentary and Public Interest, two leading vehicles of neoconservative thought.

It was additionally noted that neoconservatism as a distinct outlook evolved from a negative reaction

to various expressions of 1960s liberalism and radicalism, specifically those expressions that neoconservatives believed were devoid of a rational base. The Public Interest itself was founded in 1965 to specifically address issues of public policy that purported to serve the interests of all. Of key importance to the spokespersons in that journal were the limits to effective social policy and the need to temper expectations. By 1970, key neoconservative spokespersons were united in their opposition to the "new class," a group of professionals, technical workers, policy makers, and professors who were described as being against the premises of bourgeois civilization and in contempt of the business and commercial communities in America.

Chapter I also delineated several limitations to this study which focused primarily on the use of ideal-type generalizations, and the need to note that neoconservatives at times share several common features yet at other times share few characteristics. Thus the study focused not on individuals, but rather on social, political, and intellectual phenomena. References to the work of sociologist Max Weber and analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein further elucidated this point. Other limiting features included the use of ideal-type generalizations in the historical section, the inherent problems present when attempting a descriptive and interpretive study rather than one based on sets of empirical data,

the limits of this study as a Master's Degree thesis, with respect to the fact that at this level the intent was not to present a comprehensive political expose on neo-conservatism nor an exhaustive review of neoconservative literature, and finally, the somewhat cumbersome matter of excessive referencing which was chiefly unavoidable due to the descriptive and straightforward nature of this paper.

Chapter II delineated the historical trends that characterize conservatism and liberalism. Prior to the Reformation era, conservatism stood alone as a cohesive political position. Karl Mannheim noted that until then no other political doctrine challenged traditional conservatism. Conservatism's hostility to new and radical social change stems from its assertion that a well functioning government works best if it is limited to social and political maintenance procedures rather than social reform. It stresses the need to maintain traditional institutions such as church, state, and family, and asserts that citizens owe the state moral and political allegiance. Underlying the tenets of conservatism was the belief that social and political ills revert back to man himself and not his environment.

Traditional conservative writings, particularly those of Edmund Burke, reflected a belief in God as the guiding hand in history. Because of the importance of divine intervention, tradition was of vital significance.

Tradition was to serve as the guiding principle behind future activity and allowed for the development of rational thought. In the context of tradition, authority enters into its prime position according to conservatism, for in its various forms it serves as the guardian of tradition and ensures that men will act in accordance with what they ought to do.

An outgrowth of, and alternative to, traditional conservatism was realistic skeptical conservatism which focused on the state of man in his current condition and the choices made by him at that time. An assumption beneath all of this is that men, in the course of their conscious decisions, will act in their own self interest. Government, then, will not deliberately plan activities for citizens but merely regulate the rules of society under which the citizens lived. As social conditions change, rules are amended accordingly. This brand of conservatism differed from traditional conservatism in that it limited itself solely to the political realm.

Also discussed in some depth was the work of Michael Oakeshott, perhaps the most notable of contemporary spokespersons of conservatism. Oakeshott is known for his "ecological" view of society which characterizes the natural balance present in the system. Change in the social system must stem from what already exists and must proceed in line with what the system can easily and readily absorb. To upset the natural ecological balance is to

simultaneously lose tradition, stability, and purpose with the result being a life of disjointed experiences for men. Oakeshott, in stressing the need for stability and change that stems from tradition, rejects those who strive for societal perfection, a goal suitable for individuals, not societies.

Additionally stressed in this section was Oakeshott's conception of politics as a process in which men actively deal with the set of arrangements already present in society by virtue of fortuity. Always stressed is that which exists--good or bad--and the need to work within the given situation. By limiting attention according to this stipulation, politicians are automatically limited in their actions to "repair work" on the system. They are thereby warned to refrain from devising grandiose reforms that lie outside established tradition and challenged to ensure that society change gradually, but very gradually, to avoid the possibility that tradition may become meaningless to the citizens of society. Finally addressed was Oakeshott's view of social crises which in his opinion are the ultimate threat to tradition and stability, a threat so severe that recovery may be impossible.

In the second section of Chapter II, the historical background of liberalism is surveyed, including attention to the etymological use of the term. Discussion concerning one's perceptions of freedom and government and

the interrelationship between the two helped elucidate the distinction between those who view government as a passive institution and those who view it as an active institution.

Several historical contexts were explored in an attempt to convey to the reader exactly how shifting circumstances simultaneously brought about a shift in the connotation of "liberal" and "liberalism." Explored at greatest length was traditional English, or classical, liberalism which was based on freedom from government constraints and supportive of laissez faire economic policies and practices. Emphasis was given to segments of the political philosophy of John Locke who is credited as the first person to provide an exhaustive expose on the classical liberal position. Specifically noted were first, Locke's reliance on reason for political guidance over religious dictates, a radical departure from those who had previously placed all authority within the realm of the Church. Second noted was Locke's insistence on the virtue of prudence as a guide for attending to and acting on those things believed to be in man's long term interest. This feature was particularly vital in Locke's philosophy for it helped delineate the limits of social reform measures that may be attempted, yet additionally made provisions for and acceptance of men's rights to civil disobedience if and when rulers failed to act according to the long term interests of their citizens.

Addressed third was Locke's insistence that the existence of the state and its government is a prerequisite for individual life, liberty, and property. Locke asserted, unlike Thomas Hobbes, that man's state of nature was a virtuous and happy one; in this state he believed men would act reasonably and follow the moral teachings and codes of the Bible. The fourth and final feature addressed was Locke's system of government checks and balances, designed to keep the legislative, executive, and judicial branches separate and in check of one another to prevent abuses of power.

In contrast to Locke's assumption that man's state of nature is a good and happy one, Hobbes's premise that man is inherently sinful and evil was noted. Parallels were drawn between the position of Hobbes and that of the Founding Fathers who also stressed the selfish state of man and incorporated that assumption into the Constitution. Additionally noted was the level of distrust in democracy voiced by the framers of the Constitution and their efforts to devise methods by which the collection of self-interest-motivated individuals could live together peaceably and harmoniously. Property, the attainment of it and the possession of it, was of utmost importance to the Founding Fathers and the role of property and its relation to freedom and liberty was briefly examined.

The classical liberalism referred to here began to gradually change near the end of the nineteenth century

and the nature and scope of those changes was delineated. In short, they involved the expansion of government activity in social reform efforts specifically to aid those citizens regarded as poor and/or oppressed and the downplay of the importance of laissez faire policies and practices. Those who defended traditional notions of classical liberalism eventually allied themselves with conservative factions to combat the new radical outlook toward government activity. Thus the "old" liberals became more conservative when compared to the new faction of liberals.

Similarly in France and Germany various new and radical forms of liberalism sprang forth and further altered the connotation of "liberal" and "conservative," as early traditional liberal ideas were questioned and assailed by groups expressing greater degrees of liberalism. Events regarding this occurrence during the French Revolution and Germany's movement toward unification were addressed in order to convey the shifts which took place in the political positions of conservatism and liberalism.

Chapter III investigated two key components of the discussion concerning neoconservatism: the professing group of spokespersons known as the neoconservatives and the basic underlying assumptions of the neoconservative position. The first part stressed the roster of individuals who comprise the core of the professing group,

discussed their academic credentials, professional and political careers, relations to economic and political centers of power, and attended closely to the sense of community and closeness which characterizes this group. Additionally stressed was the move in the mid-1960s by neoconservatives against what they perceived to be unfounded and unreasonable outbursts of radicalism.

The second part of Chapter III briefly delineated and explained the basic suppositions of the position. Included in this discussion was concern with the differences between equality of opportunity and equality of result, neoconservative thoughts on current definitions of egalitarianism and meritocracy, and their assumptions regarding the welfare state and perceived abuses of its role during the Great Society years. Also attended to were their beliefs relevant to the role of authority structures in various social and cultural institutions, specifically the demise of those structures, and the hand played by the "new class" in undermining tradition, authority, and equality. The final pages of commentary regarding neoconservative premises dealt with their negative reactions toward popular counterculture movements in all areas of modern life, their insistence on the importance of religious life as a guide to moral behavior, their views regarding the elevation of traditional American values in domestic and foreign policy matters, and their expressed faith in the economic system of

capitalistic free enterprise. Also noted in this section was the neoconservative definition of liberalism and what they perceive to be abuses of the American liberal tradition.

Chapter IV represented the bulk of this thesis and examined the views that neoconservatism takes toward American public education. The chapter focused on four key areas which best revealed the neoconservative position.

The first of these areas concerned the topic of affirmative action and specifically addressed neoconservative views regarding ethnicity, social pathology, race relations, and the policies and practices which led to the formulation of laws related to affirmative action and quota systems. Tying together the neoconservative thoughts which reject affirmative action procedures is their condemnation of using race as a single, key variable by which employment and school admissions decisions are made.

Their arguments proceeded along several different lines, dealt with a variety of specific cases, and encompassed the writing of several neoconservative spokespersons. Backed with an array of data from various sources, the neoconservatives argued that affirmative action programs, although not named as such, were well in place and functioning efficiently prior to formal federal mandates. Two key disadvantages, among others, resulting from affirmative action programs were discussed

by neoconservative writers. One involved the extent and amount of bureaucratic charading which has occurred as a result of agencies and institutions being forced to exhibit that good faith efforts have been made in the recruitment of women and minorities. Second and more serious was the impression that they felt had been created concerning the achievement of women and minorities, that being the notion that many persons feel distinctions and achievements have been conferred on, rather than earned by, those in the group that affirmative action purports to help.

Overall, viewing affirmative action according to how it is perceived by neoconservatives, attention was given to the theoretical principles of such policies, the problems encountered in educational policy and practice resulting from the implementation of affirmative action programs, and the normative implications of affirmative action in society.

The second part of Chapter IV dealt with neoconservative views on desegregation and busing. For purposes of what the author perceived to be necessary background, the legal history and the implications of several court cases were examined at considerable length. Also addressed was the neoconservative view on the appropriate role of social scientists in the courts, and the problems which they feel have resulted from the heavy use of social science "expertise" in the formulation of public policy.

Neoconservative views on the use of busing to alleviate educational achievement woes were examined at length. Questioned by neoconservatives among other things is the assumption that integrated classrooms are more conducive to learning than segregated ones. The criticism leveled was that busing, largely a political and symbolic gesture, has deemphasized the need to evaluate the causes of poor academic performance among minorities. Surveyed too was the evidence cited by neoconservative spokespersons which criticizes busing as an ineffective means to aid achievement. The debates which transpired in the pages of Public Interest and Harvard Educational Review between David Armor and Thomas Pettigrew were detailed. Also treated was the 1975 "white flight" report by James Coleman and his associates, the furor which surrounded it, and the Harvard Educational Review discourse which ensued between Coleman and two of his opponents, Pettigrew and Robert Green.

The third topic discussed was the issue of authority and particularly the lack of it in public schools. Specifically dealt with by neoconservatives were student, parent, and community rights in relation to their effect on student discipline. By removing the authority of teachers and school administrators in the name of civil liberties, neoconservatives contend that society has locked into position a host of obstacles which have made it nearly impossible to create the orderly prerequisite

conditions for learning. To them, the collective body of school personnel have wrongly been put on the defensive rather than unruly students. The lack of assertive authority was held to be indicative of a lack of authority in the larger social order and neoconservative commentary relevant to this premise was reviewed. In general, neoconservatives were quick to attack the contemporary liberal community for giving youth, especially poor urban youth, permission to act violently, break laws, and bear no responsibility, through rhetorical excuses, tolerance, and apologies.

The final section of Chapter IV addressed three public education special programs: bilingual education, moral education, and career education. The primary objection expressed concerning all of these programs was their unworthwhileness as replacements for traditional curricular study. The history of the bilingual education bill and all its revised forms was traced from its introduction to Congress in 1967 through its enactment in 1968 and its various renewals up to 1978. Also addressed was the overall socio-political context of the civil rights movement in which bilingual education assumed a top priority position. Neoconservative spokespersons criticized bilingual education foremost for the abuses in its implementation, i.e., programs tend to perpetuate themselves rather than effectively aid students in making the transition to becoming more proficient in English.

They additionally criticized it on the grounds that, in their view, public schools have been robbed of their vital function to transcend ethnicity and integrate all students into values thought suitable for everyone in America.

The discussion surrounding moral education revolved around neoconservative critique of the values-instruction work of Lawrence Kohlberg and Sidney Simon; both were systematically criticized for their assertions that classroom instructional activities can be value neutral or value free. The neoconservative spokespersons asserted that those purporting unbiased approaches to moral education have instead pushed a value system detrimental to a rational and free society, i.e., one that esteems primacy of wants, desires, and self-gratification. Simultaneously, Simon and Kohlberg, and others like them, were viewed as erroneously rejecting the importance of the transmission of knowledge and experience.

Last addressed was the career education movement. The historical precedents relevant to the changing nature of the work/school relationship were noted, and the assumptions underlying contemporary career education programs were attended to, for they were negatively critiqued by neoconservative spokespersons. The neoconservative writers surveyed the role of knowledge in the career education proponents' view and criticized it as another "fantasy" concerning modernity, just one more example

of the extravagant expectations regarding modern life. As with other educational issues, neoconservative spokespersons were quick to address the matter of quality and standards, the arguments about which were also dealt with in this section.

A Selective Critique of the Position

As we have seen, neoconservatives derive a great deal of impetus for their arguments by claiming that although they accept the notion of a welfare state, they reject Great Society-type versions of a welfare state. Part of this tenet stems from neoconservatism's unwillingness to continually expand the province of government activity and part of it comes from an oft-made neoconservative claim that throwing money at social problems seems futile and typically solves little. Their rejection of the Great Society programs assumes of course that intensive government intervention did in fact take place.

Did the government deluge poverty programs with funds? Moynihan himself noted in the 1960s when writing about his ill-fated Family Assistance Plan that, "The social reforms of mid-decade had been oversold, and, . . . underfinanced to the degree that seeming failure could be ascribed almost to intent."¹ Looking at the

¹Daniel P. Moynihan, cited in Michael Harrington, "The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics," in Lewis Coser and Irving Howe, eds., The New Conservatives:

figures confirms Moynihan's observation. In the ten year period from 1960-70 funding increases for Social Security and Medicare were \$33.9 billion and \$10.4 billion respectively, three times the amount increased for five other public aid programs--Medicaid, welfare payments, food stamps, housing subsidies, and student aid.² The U.S. Government Budget revealed that from 1955-75, the human resources portion of funding increased from \$14.5 billion to \$134.9 billion.³ Yet, unmentioned by neo-conservatives is where this money went. Over \$93 billion, more than seventy percent, went to Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, VA benefits, and aid to the handicapped, blind, and aged.⁴

Those programs which received the bulk of the funding, Medicare and Social Security, are in this author's view, the precise type of programs which can be classified as "insurance" in the neoconservative definition of the term. The public assistance programs which received less than thirty percent of the 1955-75 Government Budget seem to exemplify those criticized most by neoconservatives, yet comparatively speaking, their case concerning

A Critique from the Left rev. ed. (New York: New American Library, 1973), p. 32.

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

throwing money at problems during the Great Society years seems, at the very least, overgeneralized. What was planned for the Great Society programs and what was actually operationalized are two different things, given the nature of political compromise between advocates and opponents; when the bartering ends, a modified version of the intended program usually emerges. There is considerable merit to neoconservative warnings that funding alone cannot always be expected to alleviate or improve problematic conditions, and even more important, that progress cannot be attained overnight as many persons erroneously believe. However, this author finds it inadequate and misleading to make a blanket statement such as Kristol does when he claims the Great Society programs failed.

Daniel Bell seems more reasonable than Kristol, Glazer, and others when he contends that perhaps government has not gone far enough with regard to incorporating all persons from all groups into the mainstream of society when it comes to insuring individuals from illness, starvation, old age dependency, unemployment, and homelessness. Certainly Bell is more humane, and humane to a degree with which I am more comfortable. It is one thing to rally against government waste, call for spending cuts, damn the welfare and food stamp cheats, and quite another to carry out those threats across the board. Certainly there are, as Kristol asserts, those

who fraudulently collect welfare, food stamps, rent subsidies, Medicaid, and unemployment checks, but to demolish entire programs on the basis of the fact that abuse exists is an irrational move based on illogical conclusions.

Just as moving forward with social reform measures ought to proceed gradually, so too should program cut-backs and dismantlements. If government intervention in social policy is to be curbed one must somehow realistically deal with the affected portions of the population in the interim--unless one finds, homeless, ill-fed people wandering the streets a tolerable phenomenon. Along with the hard-line approach by many neoconservatives, one finds a startling lack of compassion, except perhaps in the writings of Daniel Bell. It might be relatively easy to cut funds for social human resource programs with a deft sweep of a pen. Papers, pens, pencils, and figures are the tools of statistical manipulation and budget balancing. Numbers have no faces. But faces do exist and to ignore the fact seems inexcusable. Seeking a reasonable level of balance for government in the hope of avoiding a paternalistic state is prudent and sensible unless the government is to be found handling every imaginable type of social ill. Certain things, however, seem quite appropriately within the province of government intervention and to the author these include adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, and employment

for whoever truly needs them.

The impression often given by neoconservatives is that the United States spends enormous amounts of money on social welfare programs. Compared to the other advanced nations of the world, both Communist and capitalist, the United States spends the least percentage of its GNP than any other nation.⁵ Michael Harrington has noted that the U.S. welfare state is from the start a contradictory phenomenon, which partly explains the inherent problems we have. On one side, the welfare state represents the triumph of the liberal left. It places nonmarket considerations on a market-centered economy, in a manner which places people's priorities upon it, particularly during periods of crisis. On the other side, the welfare system does exist in a capitalist economy. During periods of normalcy and stability, society tends to accept an "all's well" attitude and often attempts to undo the progress previously made.⁶ In addition to the U.S. welfare state being characterized by less GNP spending on human resource programs than any other economically advanced nation, Harrington notes that the American system has not been influenced as much by socialist thinking and action as have other advanced welfare states; thus welfare state undertakings tend to

⁵Ibid., p. 57.

⁶Ibid., pp. 57-58.

be considered as "inefficient." Furthermore, states' rights vetoes make it possible to penalize many federal-based programs such as welfare, unemployment insurance, and Medicaid.⁷

There are additional considerations regarding not so much what neoconservatives say, but rather what they neglect to say. There is no mention, for instance, of middle class welfare subsidies which exist under the guise of tax deductions. Nor is there any mention of the problem that there are simply not enough jobs in existence for everyone in the United States. Our advanced, technically proficient, highly industrialized, capitalist society has produced a system so productive, so automated, and so technically efficient that not everyone is needed to produce the goods that we consume. There is of course Japan, a model of efficiency and superb workmanship, a capitalist economy that is the envy of all others. To Americans today, their low unemployment rates are particularly enviable. Yet one cannot view a modern marvel like Japan in an isolated context. Japan, like all other advanced capitalist economies, is part of an interdependent world market. They are at the top of the heap efficiency-wise, and are thus able to succeed in a manner that other countries cannot. Given the international market and the very definition of "capitalism,"

⁷Ibid.

not all capitalist economies can do what Japan does; only the best will boast the success that they currently enjoy.

A final feature not mentioned by neoconservatives is the fine line which separates the poverty class from the working poor. Neoconservatives often criticize the current welfare programs because they provide disincentives to work and promote laziness. However, one needs to look at the overall occupational structure when addressing this issue, for if an individual can make more in terms of dollars and free medical assistance than if he worked forty hours per week at or below the minimum wage level, there is little wonder why individuals opt, often for the sake of sheer survival, to not work and go on welfare. There appear to be two possible ways out of this predicament. Either lower the amount of welfare payments so that the working poor would be better off working and thus be induced to do so; the result of this would of course be to create a level of poverty at which even the most conservative of conservatives would probably cringe. Or one could provide income supplements to the working poor; this in reality would create a negative income tax which, as we learned from McGovern's 1972 defeat, is radically opposed by the majority of the population, and also serves to subsidize industries and workplaces which pay low wages, a prospect antithetical

to free market enterprise. The neoconservatives seem unlikely to accept either of these alternatives, yet unfortunately have proposed no other.

If the neoconservatives have accurately described what they believe to be an assault on equality, they have brought to the forefront an issue of grave importance. As noted earlier, the neoconservatives have concerned themselves with the idea that "equality," whether we have it or whether we lack it, rests solely on outcome measures. This worries them and rightly so. We can question whether unequal opportunity has caused unequal outcomes and investigate from that point forth. But we cannot assume matter-of-factly that unequal results were caused by breaches in opportunity. Past this point of generality it seems impossible and unwise to discuss a concept so intricate as represented by "equality" without pinpointing the precise conditions or outcomes one is speaking of.

The intent here is not to outline the various meanings of a social-political-philosophical term such as equality, but rather to take note of the fact that problems are inherent when discussing it. For example, does equality between persons mean that everyone is capable of doing the same things equally well? Does equality toward persons mean that I will treat everyone equally, or that I will love strangers to a degree equal to that of loving my family? Does equality among persons

in schools or the workplace mean that everyone has an equally powerful voice in the operation of that organization? Does equality in a marriage mean that each partner consistently gives and takes in an equal amount? Does equality mean that a doctor earns an amount of money equal to that of a waitress for similar working hours and employment experience? Does equality mean that two persons with a college degree in the same field earn equal salaries? Rhetorically at least we claim to be each other's equal, yet in one avenue or another we attempt and manage to pass by one another, be it through money, status, power, education, experience, or popularity.

One key strength of the neoconservative arguments is in their careful discussions regarding other plausible explanations for the existence of unequal outcomes in earnings and employment positions. They write frequently of factors such as talent, skill, aptitude, ability, knowledge, motivation, effort, drive, and choice; in short, the range of factors they cite when defending meritocratic principles. The application of any of these personal features will probabilistically ensure that even given equal opportunities, equal outcomes will not result. In Thomas Sowell's work on ethnic groups for example, he was able to discover, by looking at certain population-structural features, why some groups fared better economically than others--they worked more hours

in a week.

Yet even if one accepts the basic premises of this neoconservative argument, there is still room to question whether the extremes of outcome measures can be explained solely by factors such as those referred to as characteristic of a meritocracy. In 1976 the wealthiest ten percent of Americans received twenty-nine percent of all personal income and owned fifty-six percent of all national wealth. In contrast, the poorest ten percent of Americans received one percent of all personal income and was in debt.⁸ Does a discrepancy such as this derive explanation from qualities like skill, ability, or motivation? Or do those who have it to begin with manage not only to keep it, but pass it along to their children as well? Take for example a corporation president who earns \$800,000 per year in salary, excluding benefits and perks, and compare that individual with a teacher of similar age, education, and work experience who earns \$25,000 per year. Assuming some argument can be made to justify that the corporate president "deserves" more money than the teacher is one thing, but does he or she "deserve" a salary thirty-two times greater? It is the vast disparities of outcome with regard to income

⁸Lewis A. Coser, "Introduction," to Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe eds., The New Conservatives: A Critique From the Left (New York: New American Library, 1973), p. 6.

that must be better understood. Unlike the neoconservatives, I am not convinced that such disparities can be explained by differences in individual abilities. Daniel Moynihan sits in the U.S. Senate having trekked a not-so-easy life from caddying on Indiana golf courses and bartending in his mother's New York City pub. Thomas Sowell made it from being a Harlem drop out to being a Harvard professor. I do not argue whether such things are possible. They most assuredly are. But the question to be asked is whether such achievements are probable.

Another factor which deserves brief mention here is money. When one examines differences in outcome as exemplified by differences in income levels there is more at issue than the single factor of money. With the possession of money, a wide array of goods and services are made available and opportunities are greatly enhanced. Nearly everything is up for sale in the international marketplace. One can buy tutors or private schooling for his children, education from travel, association with other elites, the best in medical and legal services, celebrity, entertainment, and sex. It is perhaps the singlemost important variable in society today with regard to opportunity, yet the benefits that can be reaped by its possession are often underestimated.

In education, the neoconservative position on specialized programs raises important issues on the appropriate purpose and function of public schooling.

Originally, bilingual education was intended to equalize opportunities for children with limited proficiency in the English language, specifically Mexican-American children whose dominant language was Spanish. Throughout the progression of the enactment and revisions of the Bilingual Education Act, the interpretation of "bilingual education" was expanded from language transition to cultural maintenance and bicultural education. Available data strongly demonstrate that there is good reason to question whether current bilingual programs are effective in helping children's English ability. If the data are accurate, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not the financial and human resources expended are worthwhile. Cultural maintenance or bicultural education could as easily, and perhaps more efficiently, be handled by church, civic, or neighborhood groups. There is no doubt that students with poor English language skills will be at a disadvantage in American schools, employment markets, and general social institutions. In the future, the question to be asked might concern what schools and society can do to enhance effective instruction for those with poor English efficiency, and thereby equalize opportunities for those bilingual education programs were initially designed to help.

The neoconservative discourse on moral education exemplifies one of several innovations that swept public schools with little attention to what was actually being

done. As they have shown, the "value free" instruction characterized by Kohlberg and Simon is far from neutral. The emphases in simulation games which are used to help students make moral decisions eschew traditional values esteemed by neoconservatives and focus largely on individual egocentric concerns with little regard for the importance of factual knowledge or established norms of justice.

Similarly, career education has made a sweep through public schools with little examination of the basic premises upon which the movement rests. There seems to be little if any data regarding whether or not students exposed to career awareness or career education programs make more informed choices when they enter the work force. Furthermore, many educators and policy makers seem to blankly accept the idea that the experiential knowledge gained in such programs is realistic, a notion vociferously challenged by the neoconservative spokespersons, as well as many other professional educators, corporate spokesmen, and labor leaders.

The central concern to this author regarding all three special programs in public schools, is whether or not they warrant the expenditures of time, energy, human resources, and financing, and whether or not schools even ought to concern themselves with endeavors such as these. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a lengthy discussion regarding the purposes of public

education in American society. However, imparting knowledge and minimum levels of skill competency is one objective toward which I am biased. That is not to say skills and knowledge cannot be obtained elsewhere nor is it to say that other concerns are not important. But on a massive scale, schools are the best medium currently available to us to impart knowledge. And, like it or not, schools simply cannot accomplish everything currently requested of them. In short, regard for student academic achievement, stressed by neoconservative writers, is also the key priority in the view of this author.

Throughout the course of the discussions by neoconservatives surrounding desegregation, busing, and affirmative action, several important issues were raised and many more questions emerged. The overriding concern among neoconservative spokespersons is utilizing race, and sometimes sex, as the singlemost important variable when making policy decisions, the act of which violates democratic principles. Despite costly affirmative action programs, neoconservatives contend that little progress has been made with regard to the employment of women or minorities. If this is correct, we must necessarily ask the further question of why. Is it a matter of expecting results in too short a time span? Or is it that discrimination is so embedded in institutions that further efforts need to be employed? Is the

pool of available employment candidates not qualified? Or have those who are qualified already been hired? Are quota systems to be viewed in isolation as inherently undemocratic? Or are they to be accepted, despite their flaws, because the end objective justifies the means? Questions such as these, particularly the latter, are also applicable to special admissions programs in colleges and universities whether or not they admit to utilizing a statistical quota system. Are schools really admitting less qualified candidates, or are there other measures of qualifiability apart from test scores which need to be examined? Do the current policies and practices surrounding special admissions programs need to be changed so that despite lowered or preferential entrance standards, similar exit standards can be enforced? None of these admit of easy solution; the strength of the neoconservative discourse is that they have raised questions such as these, yet further analyses are in order.

The issue of busing also poses innumerable questions with regard to whether the end justifies the means. To many contemporary liberals busing is seen as the only way to eliminate segregated schooling and inequities in educational opportunity. The neoconservatives, as we have seen, disagree and appear willing to dispense with forced busing completely. We must ask whether as a society we are willing to tolerate racially separated

schools and if not, ask what other alternatives might be workable if forced busing is eliminated. Should the racial integration of public schools be our prime consideration, or should such efforts take a back seat to the improvement of student academic achievement?

Two distinct issues are actually present here, one dealing with the best suitable climate for academic achievement in schools and the other dealing with racial integration in a dominant American institution. They are of course closely interrelated and intertwined yet often, possibly because of the emotional charge inherent in the issue, they are misleadingly discussed together under the single label "busing." Posing questions and discerning issues may not initially lead to a prescriptive formulae for societal woes, but it may be one of the best means to attain knowledge about a specific problem or issue. Asking questions and raising first-principle issues have been the chief strengths of the neoconservative writers, for the questions and issues raised are often those they believe their adversaries have overlooked.

Throughout this thesis it was consistently noted that neoconservatism arose as a reaction against 1960s radicalism. Herein lies one of its greatest flaws as a socio-political position. Largely negative in all areas of discourse, neoconservatism overwhelmingly relies on playing the role of critic with little attention to proposing solutions. And all too often, the rational

and logical criticism voiced by neoconservatives is transformed into sheer polemical outburst. In this author's view, Irving Kristol reigns supreme as the chief polemicist. While his writing makes good copy, it sounds at times as if it were written by a member of a threatened corporate-capitalist aristocracy.

Another key flaw of the neoconservative position is its lack of internal critique. Rarely does one find an antithetical position expressed in Commentary or Public Interest. When one can be found, it is either in the form of a rebuttal to various charges leveled against neoconservative spokespersons, and a rejoinder always has the last word, or it is in the form of a brief statement issued on a prescribed symposium topic in Commentary.

The principal flaw, in this author's perception, throughout all the neoconservative discourse lies in their strict idealist interpretations of socio-political life. Occasionally, especially in the work of economist Thomas Sowell, attention is given to structural aspects, but Sowell's work is more the exception than the norm. The neoconservative's work is thus often ahistorical, lacking the necessary amount of regard for the overall context in which people live, and the effects of material and economic factors on the choices they make, the types of lives they lead, and the beliefs or values they possess. The neoconservatives as a group, as one will

undoubtedly have noticed by this point in time, defend those institutions in which they have done very well. The corporate-capitalist structure of America has been good to these individuals. It is unlikely that they will ever turn against a system which has made them both comfortable and prosperous.

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