SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE UNIFIED SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE: THE RESOURCE CONTROL MOVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY BY Kim Rodner AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology and Anthropology 1962 ABSTRACT SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE UNIFIED SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE: THE RESOURCE CONTROL MOVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY by Kim Rodner The dissertation comprises two distinct efforts. The first is strictly analytical and is concerned with clarifi- cation of a persistent theoretical issue. The second is empirical. It is concerned with the contemporary analysis of a social movement and a reconsideration of its historical presentation. The two ventures unite as the latter becomes didactic illustration of the former. Contemporary controversy attests to the fact that an adequate theory of social (or cultural) change does not exist. Functional theorists have been frequently accused by conflict theorists of abetting such a lack. Neither group has produced a convincing conception. The search for a theory of social change is fruitless because the problem itself is meaningless. It represents the revival, in the language of sociology, of the permanence versus change issue that perplexed the Pre-Socratic Greeks. A new approach is essayed. It is argued that the search for "laws of social change" or a "theory of social change" is initiated by virtue of the kind of language which the Kim Rodner sociologist employs in discussing his science. Functionalism represents one such language, conflict analysis another: neither, in and of themselves, are empirical theories. Instead they may be designated "meta-languages" in the sense that they may be used to discuss substantive theories. Because the former has stressed equilibriums, homeostases, boundary maintaining entities, and steady states it has introduced into the discussions of sociology a static over- tone; and because the latter has stressed constraints, con— flicts. and antagonisms it has introduced a changing or dynamic overtone. From such purely semantic errors arises the attempt to construct empirical theories. Yet no science of repute seeks theories of change versus statics (or as sociologists call it "control"). The confusion of our meta- languages in sociology entails us in a meaningless search. An alternative path is urged and illustrated. If we adopt the mature meta-language of the majority of the sciences we immediately achieve clarity. This language is generally called the Unified Science Language and is the product of the combined efforts of empirical philosophers and scientists alike. By adopting this clarified language the problem of change versus statics dissolves. To illustrate the analytical advance achieved by the Uhidfied Science Language an empirical problem is explored. Kim Rodner Sociologists have made much of the fact that social movements involve change. By studying a significant social movement and discussing it in the Language of Unified Science the futility of a special search for laws of change becomes obvious. Four types of propositions are amassed to explain the nature of the "resource control" or "conservation" movement in the United States, two of them empirical, two theoretical. First, original research was conducted to assess the impact of industrialization on the conservation movement. The forty-eight states were ranked in terms of resource relevant degrees of industrialization. They were next controlled for comparable amounts of "wild land" within their jurisdiction. From this a sample of comparable states with varying degrees of industrialization was selected. Questionnaires were administered to assess the "degree of rational resource control in public conservation agencies." A general correlation appeared between the level of industrialization and the rationality of resource control for states with comparable amounts of wild land. This evidence was supported by three additional kinds of propositions: historical studies of the national CCHIServation leadership; the theory of monopolistic capitalism; aruj organizational theory. These empirical materials plus Kim Rodner the general theoretical propositions were next cast against the traditional liberal-populist explanation of the conser- vation movement. Populist conceptions of the movement were challenged and liberal-populist ideology in the writing of conservation history argued. Such conceptions extend into political sociology on the one hand and the sociology of knowledge on the other. Returning to the over-all problem, a brief outline of the key elements of the Language of Unified Science is presented. Next an analysis, in terms of the USL, of the resource control movement is offered as a didactic illustration of its power in handling the generalizations of science-- without the introduction of pseudo—issues. The dissertation concludes with a brief consideration of similar problems elsewhere. SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE UNIFIED SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE: THE RESOURCE CONTROL MOVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY BY Kim Rodner A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology and Anthropology 1962 FThe rationale is that by getting positive answers to a series of small problems we will wake up some fine day with conclusive answers to the big problems. This hope can be a realistic one only so long as some connection between the little problems and the big ones is kept clearly in mind. When this connection disappears in the search for easy problems with conclusive answers, the result is merely the piling up of disconnected trivialities.9 Barrington Mbore,Jr., Political Power and Social Theory ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As Kenneth Burke once put it, I would like to thank a number of people Vwithout whom not.” In general I would like to thank the Department Chairman, Dr. John Useem and my dissertation committee, and to acknowledge the liberal intellectual possibilities within the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State University, possibilities which provided me with a relaxed situation and a flexible program in which to work. If I took a bit longer to come around than others, I hope the reading I did in between will repay the patience that the Department extended. In particular I would like to give top plaudits to my dissertation chairman, Dr. James B. MCKee. Our working relations have been virtually perfect, and with special reference to the analytical problem of this dissertation his observations and his interest in the sociology of confusion has been top rate. To Dr. Richard N. Adams must go my sincere thanks for his> example as an indefatigable scholar, and for his fixing me with the cold eye of reason on a couple of occasions when I had convinced myself that the world had stopped running. Dr. William A. Faunce prodded me correctly on the vagueness of Weber's notion of rationality and on the specific empirical iii design as well, I thank him for both. Dr. Jay Artis was kind enough to work in my behalf at milking the great Ford cow: if our efforts failed I am certain it was not his fault. Dr. William Form deserves credit for keeping me guilt ridden and for providing a model of what sociology should be: I thank him for both, even if my own efforts in no way compare. And to all other members, past and present, of the Department with whom I was fortunate enough to take courses or engage in conversation, my sincere thanks. Outside the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, I would first like to acknowledge a key intellectual debt-- however badly repayed--to the members of the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University. and especially to Doctors Rndner, Zerby, Walsh, and Leonard. Perhaps I over— estimate the contributions of analysis, but if so the meaning of a range of issues in the social sciences becomes extremely problematic. my thanks to the Philosophy Department for setting me right. Another group of ideologists that have had an important role in the formation of this dissertation are the following conservation leaders and their colleagues around the country. My close friend Russell NbKee gave me endless hours of conversation and quantities of information on the iv structure and extent of conservation in the United States and in Michigan. Dr. Justin W. Leonard, Research Director, State of Michigan Department of Conservation deserves thanks for his instructive criticism and especially for his cooper— ation in the construction of the conservation questionnaire and the cover letter that accompanied it. I should also like to thank Dr. Norman Smith, Chief of the Forestry Research Division, State of Michigan Department of Conservation, for his vast knowledge and aid in the construction of the "wild land? control variable. To Professor Stanley A. Cain, Head, Department of Conservation, School of Natural Resources, University of Michigan must go acknowledgement for reiterating the classic liberal conception of the history of conservation. Doubtless I would have discovered the contradiction in my thinking myself, but Dr. Cain's remarks considerably shortened the process. PREFACE Those that read a preface expect to gain some orientation. The best orientation which I can supply to this dissertation is to note that it is really two studies instead of one. Since this is the case it should serve the reader's purpose to understand what each of these pursuits involves and why they have been placed under one cover. The first concern is analytical. It is centered around issues that can be resolved only by clarifying the form of our discourse, the language we employ, and not, in fact apodictically not, in terms of empirical tests, studies, or examinations. Paradoxical though it may seem, I have long been convinced that much of the sterility of key aspects of modern sociology stems from a failure to conceive issues in any terms other than empirical. We have had too much of a good thing. We have stood, as though transfixed, before the alter of empirical evidence--never pausing to ask the crucial question: do our central questions have meaning, do they make simple semantic sense? With respect to the problem of social change, the search for a master theory of dynamics has gotten badly embroiled in verbal confusions. The work of sociologists (and anthropologists) in this area vi should stand as a vast collective embarrassment. Instead it is still a central consideration attracting the energies of top flight people in the lodestone search for ”the break— through.9 Specifically this study (its first and last parts) approaches the question of a "theory of social (cultural) change? from the point of view of meaning. It does not ask: that theory of change is correct??. It asks rather, what do we mean when we ask such a question, and what would such a theory purport to explain. And having asked that question it becomes pushy and disrespectful by arguing that we can give the idea of Fchange? no separate or distinct status, arguing that ultimately it is a pseudo-question. I come to this conclusion by showing that contained in the generalization (i.e., the correlations) of any science must necessarily (not probably) be contained a theory of change. And this is so, I argue, precisely because if we once have clearly in mind what science is, we also have clearly in mind that both permanence and change are simply ways in which we view the existing generalizations: change is the :function of a perspective we bring to our materials. And as wma Shall note, there is nothing wrong with perspectives so long, and only so long, as they do not generate unreal prOblems. vii With respect to a "theory of change” George C. Homans and S. F. Nadel long ago recognized these fundamental facts. They were ignored. I have tried, in the pages that follow, to set forth the arguments against a search for a theory or theories of social change as well as the apparent reasons that so many sociologists have been captured by an ingenuine issue. The second concern of this dissertation is empirical. It centers on an explanation of the social bases of the conservation movement in the United States. Conservation, or the control of resources, when viewed as a social movement can tell us something about the structure of industrial SOC: ieties within the framework of democratic-market political ecOnomies. In its own right an exploration of its causes and consequences seems justified. And this justification is mOre apparent as we realize the implications which new data and the analysis of old materials promise to confer. The conservation movement was, after all, one of the more significant domestic events of the era just preceding World War I, the era historians generally refer to as the f'age 0f refOrm," or more specifically as the ,“populist—progressive era- ," Since conservation is central to this important phase of American history it is not surprising that new find ings and the re-examination of old ideas connected with viii this period should have implications beyond conservation and resource matters alone. In particular political sociology and the sociology of knowledge both stand to gain from any review of the age of reform. Nor can it well be otherwise carnce we grant that American liberalism finds its roots :111 the populist revolt, and later in the New Deal, the latter vvliich, for all of its newness and in spite of massive and <>jft£n incredible contradictions in its own credo, viewed j_t:self as a fulfillment of the nineteenth century liberal creed. If today American liberalism seems hopelessly caught jar! the contradictions of its own past, and often incapable (>15 (extracting itself from the semantic confusions of its own apologists, perhaps what we are witnessing is the agony of 5311 :ideology becoming aware that in its past there is a lie. This lie may be particularly telling with respect to one of A“'Ierican liberalism's most important tenets, i.e., the liberal conception of domestic policy, particularly as it relates to reSources and conservation. Beyond exploring contemporary materials on the nature of the resource movement we shall have an opportunity to draw toSiether a variety of additional propositions (some empirical, some theoretical) that will bear on the nature of conservation his‘tory and on conservation's present status. As a group t . . . he Se propoSitions seem to me cruc1al for the assessment of ix the movement itself and the kinds of history that have been written about it. They are also crucial for the meaning of liberalism in its genesis: as well as its meaning today. Therefore, insofar as they pressure a review of the social sources of conservation history and urge further consider— ation of the political situation of early liberalism they constitute an essay in political sociology; and insofar as this intelligence calls into question the motives and the ideology of conservation historians it constitutes an essay in the sociology of knowledge. Both may be more fully explored at a latter time and by different methods, yet in this dissertation it is hoped a basis for such exploration will have been indicated. But beyond this strictly empirical concern is a laIIE‘ger significance. The study of social movements is closely linked, in the literature of sociology, with the genesis of social novelty, i.e., with social change. Surely, if there is anything to the claims of social change theorists this should be a rich area for investigation. By using the conservation movement as a concrete Jfllustration I will first attempt to explain it as an empirical phenomena. We will find that such an explanation 111 result in a sc1entific law, i.e., a generalization. I . . 1: Will then be my task to demonstrate that this Simple \(3 (Yr - I N‘ be :21 generalization (or correlation, as you wish) is more than sufficient to account for the ,"changes," that have taken place in society with regard to resource disposition and control. In other words, the empirical study will serve as an illustration of a formal or analytical problem. Ideally each investigation may be kept distinct, but illustration may bring the argument home with added force. Sometime it might be interesting to write a fnatural history of pseudo-problemsf'; one would have to cover much of human intellectual history. And while it might at first glance appear negative and testy, on closer examination it Should be doubly instructive but much more difficult to write and to read than the history of man's positive intellectual achievements. Certainly such a history is overdue in soC..‘.iology and the social sciences generally. It could serve as a handbook in the analysis of man's semantic delusions. one might even consider this dissertation as a small first eskaaay in a collection to come. xi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWIIEDGMNT S O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O i i i PMACE . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Vi (Zliapter I. THE POVERTY OF SOCIAL CHANGE THEORY . . . . . 1 II. THE EMPIRICAL PROBLEM: RESOURCE CONTROL mmm O O I C O O O O O O O O O O O O O 18 Chief Features 18 History and Hypotheses 25 Empirical Research Design 74 JIII. EMPIRICAL DATA AND INTERPRETATION . . . . . . 101 Data on State Park Systems 102 Data on Industrial Society 105 Data on Wild Land Variable 143 Data on Institutionalization of Rational Resource Control 152 Data on Taxation 189 Conclusions: The Nature of Resource Control 194 IV. UNIFIED SCIENCE, SOCIAL CI'RNGEJLND THE mVEmNT C C O O I C O O C O O O O O O O O 201 'V. CONCLUSIONS: PROBLEMS AND PSEUDO-PROBLEMS . . 224 BIBI.IOGRAPHY..................... 228 In“JPN-mum: LIST OF SURVEYED STATES AND STATE CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 24o xii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Rank order of number of acres in state parks, by states, together with annual visits and annual expenditures, 1959 . . . . . . 103 .2. Rank order of states Phighly industrialized,9 fmoderately industrialized,? and Fleast industrialized? as summarized for all industrial society indicators. States ranked by the total number sub-indicators falling into each third of the total rank order. Table excludes states exhibiting random variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 :3. Number of business establishments by employees size of 500 and over (1959) ranked by states, and ratio of establish- ments 8-19 employees to 500 and over employees. (Ratios computed by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 41. Gross assessed value, by states, of locally assessed taxable real property 1956: commercial and industrial property, in rank order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 5 - Ranked percent of total population inmn— agriculture workforce (annual average), for 1960. And percent of workforce in primary (extractive) and secondary (manufacturing) as opposed to teritary (service) industries (computations by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 65. Rank order, by states, of total number of cities of 50,000 population and over, together with breakdown, by states, of cities falling within each of the following ranges: 50,000-100,000: 100,000- 50,000; 250,000—500,000; 500,000-l,000,000; 1,000,000 and over (1960) O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O 118 xiii Table Jml. SLIB- JLIB. 2L41, 15 Rank order of number of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (1960), by states. And percent of total population residing inside SMSA (computed by author). (Overlapping SMSA counted for all states) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percent of total population classified as Frural? by 1960 census (computed by author), rank order by states . . . . . . “Water use by municipal systems per day (1954), by states (in 1,000,000 gallons), in rank order C O O O C C O O O C O O C C O O O 0 Municipal sewage loads (1954) in continental united States, by states [in terms of equivalent population], in rank order . . Total population,by states, 1960, in rank order 0 C I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Automobile registrations, by states, 1960 (in thousands), by rank order . . . . . . Rank order by states of absolute number of residents (15 years and older) buying fishing licenses. together with percent of resident population (15 years and older) buying fishing licenses and non- resident fishing licenses sold, as percent of resident . . . . . . . . . . . Rank order by states of absolute number of residents (15 years and older) buying hunting licenses, together with percent of resident population (15 years and older) buying hunting licenses and non- resident hunting licenses sold, as percent of resident . . . . . . . . . . . Per capita personal income, by states, 1960, in rank order . . . .‘. . . . . . . . . . Absolute acreage in Twild lands,? by states, circa 1954-59, as control factor . . . . . xiv Page 120 123 125 128 130 132 135 137 139 145 Table 17. £18. 3.9. 230. Page Continuum No. 1. Summary table of institutionalization of rational resource control sub-indicators of nine states ranked by degree of industrialization . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Continuum No. 2. Summary table of institutionalization of rational resource control sub-indicators of five states ranked by degree of industrialization . . 162 Continuum No. 3. Polar extreme summary table of institutionalization of rational resource control sub-indicators of six states, occurring as three pairs occupying extreme positions with respect to degrees of industrialization . . . . . 166 Rank order of states by relation of general revenue of state and local governments to personal income (1957)--general revenue per $1,000. of personal income.- Federal revenues of states per $1,000. of personal income (1957). And state per capita amounts of all general revenues (including federa1--1957) . . . . . . . . 192 XV LIST OF FIGURES AND APPENDICES Figure Page 1. Income, travel, and leisure factors affecting the use of outdoor recreation facilities for the period 1850-2000 . . . 142 APPENDIX: LIST OF SURVEYED STATES AND STATE CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 xvi CHAPTER I THE POVERTY OF SOCIAL CHANGE THEORY" Sociology's gadfly, Pitirm Sorokin, once remarked that there was as little justification for studying small groups in sociology as there was for studying small plants in botany. Whether or not he was right about small groups it is certain that a similar argument will stick for the study of social change. Change, as a distinct focus, a topic, or a field of investigation is as unwarranted a pursuit as its opposite number, order, cohesion, permanence, equilibrium, homeostasis, or the steady state. And the search for l_a_w_s_ Of Change or statics is therefore also unwarranted. Yet one need examine only a small portion of the periodical or hardcover literature in sociology to establish the fact that a large amount of time and energy is being spent precisely \ _ *The footnotes contain the majority of the works dlrectly relevant to this dissertation. I have attempted t° reStrict the citations to a reasonable number, yet at the E‘ame time it is important to flesh out the study with a variety of opinion and historical reference. In fact, he 1reader may expect to find in these notes a considerable amo‘fnt of material that points to wider and more stimulating orlZOns both in American historiography and in sociological thzory. In a sense the text itself is the bare outline of Con Personal and scientific interest in change and the Servation movement. on this task. So frequent are the references to this problem, and so filled with self-flaggelation the statements of failure, that one is tempted to speak of a ,"literature of frustration.,"1 The net result is a series of tours de force 1 The Vliterature of frustration” flowing from the functionalists is impressive . The following citations are not intended to be exhaustive, but they are representative. Beginning outside of sociology we find an economist with sociological interests at M.I.T. recently making this comment: 71f sociologists are to analyze change in a society a S a whole, rather than merely to describe it loosely, they must go beyond models in equilibrium and construct models involving dynamic processes," Everett E. Hagen, ,"Analytical I54£>dels in the Study of Social Systems,," American Journal of m, Vol. van (September, 1961), p. 150. From an eminent political scientist of the functional variety, this call to danger: " . ,. . . we need a set of abstractions which will help us find our way through the exciting multiplicity and complexity of change (p. 3). The analysis of change is a:'-"\Vays precarious and, for that reason, one of the most taking of man's urgent tasks (p. 5),," David E. Apter, _T_l'_1_e_ whical Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton University Press, 1961) . Don Martindale in Social Life and Cultural Cha_nge (D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962) spends some pages examining the functionalists (and others) inability to handle social change: - Talcott Parsons, who has grown restive under the frequent observation by contemporary critics that functionalism has t:E‘Q‘Jl‘loles with its theory of social change, undertook in his :ections of Theories of Society to develop the functionalistic heory of social change (pp. 26-27).," The result, Martindale argues, is last year's menu warmed over: ,"By way of a series of euphemisims Parson has taken this very step: he has re- M:r'bished social evolutionism (p. 27).," Unfortunately isrtindale does no better himself; in fact his entire book a a testimony to the superfluity of the concept. So far 1:: I can determine all Martindale adds is the word It a ,change" St I: otherwise fascinating and quite impressive series of Thud ies in the structure of several societies, mostly ancient. COESQ studies, centering around the role of intellectuals, 0f stitute a series of generalizations: as such the addition the word change to their exposition is most incredible. A rose is a rose by any name. So far as I can determine the source of much of the anguish over change dates from Talcott Parsons comment: ,"It is a necessary inference from the above considerations that a generil theory of thflrocesses QChange of social systems is not possible in the present The reason is very simply that such a state of knowledge. theory would imply complete knowledge of the laws of process 0f the social system and this knowledge we do not possess." Bernard __The Social System (The Free Press, 1951). P. 486. Barber arguing in the context of a specific sociological area Says in Social Stratification (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 19.57) . p. 479, ,"With the present limitations upon our social- BCJ-ence knowledge, it is easier to recognize the fact that one tYpe of stratificational structure or process has changed into another than to analyze precisely how the change occurred.' And a bit later on p. 480, ,"What we need, in addition to further understanding of the dynamic processes in each part of §°<=iety, is a theory of social change that will view society as a relatively unified system in which various parts are reeiprocally affecting one another." Walter Buckley in an article in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff's Modern i>mogical Theory (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1957), led ,"Structural-Functional Analysis in Modern Sociology, ," entit 25‘ 236-59, makes this comment on p. 245, ,". . . how can s he‘tT-ionalism account for the fact that specific social Sistems do not survive--that change seems as basic as ( a11>ility.," Marion J. Levy, Jr. in The Strucggre of Society Princeton University Press, 1952), changes the stress but 2:398 the same problem as Parsons had voiced: ,"There is, p3:~?3|’:efore, a sense in which some static analysis is logically £0101: to dynamic analysis, or is at least extremely helpful s r it. Structural-functional requisite analysis is one uagaiiematic way to develop static theories that may have such ofes,“ (p. 45). A. R. Radcliffe-Brown in A NaturaLl Science W (The Free Press, 1948), pp. 80-89, makes the same lht. Brown distinguishes among: kinds of societies, how On p. 89 he t ate? persist, and how they change their type. 9lies that: ,"The first major task of analysis I conceive 1:: be the synchronic study of society. Such an analysis is s 13% fundamental than a diachronic one.," Or again on the a?§ page: ,“We say: Let us take a society and consider it we though it were merely persistant, without change.‘ If to Go not do that, we cannot arrive at generalizations as 915 1“low societies change. It is logically of the very essence Q11 ~things that we Shall be able to make that discrimination," I‘les P. Loomis in Social Systems (D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960), attempts to build units into his conceptual scheme that will obviate the difficulty of handling change in an equilibrium model. In doing so he fails to realize that the difficulty is not substantive but formal (as we shall see). f'It is in an effort to break through some of the difficulties imposed by the static aspects of the equilibrium model in the analysis of social change that this model is presented [the PAS model]? (p. 10). Awareness of the impasse on change has become so great that Parsons has taken to answering his critics. In a re.‘iOinder to Gross' lead article in a recent issue of the Ms, 02. cit., p. 139, Parsons argues that some work is being done to rectify the hiatus in his system and others. He pOlntS to Neil J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial W (University of Chicago Press, 1959), as an example of Phis effort. There is no question that Smelser makes a valiant attempt to solve a problem of some importance to the funetionalists. As we shall see language can be used to acc-‘olnll'nodate any issue if only we have the patience to work :fid rework it to fit our needs. What is really amazing is Scit at least two important figures in contemporary social re .ence, both generally classified as functionalists, had tiJ ected the very meaningfulness of the problem at about the itme Parsons first published his The Social System. Whether 1110 was a fluke that they were ignored, or whether, as seems alte likely, Parsons' authority carried the day, is not 1111 Qgether clear. Their arguments are virtually identical to imne though much truncated and perhaps too brief to seem Portant. In The Human Group (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), pp- 449-52, George C. Homans put it this way: ."In studying social change, we discovered no new th What we did was watch how a change in value of Whe elements effects changes in the values of the others. gran we say that a decrease in the number of activities a inQ‘clp performs brings about a decrease in the frequency of not-Qraction between the members of the group, we are stating e1 hew hypothesis; we are studying changes in values of Stements entering a hypothesis we already know. We are 11dying dynamics," (p. 450). st) - ,"But when we say that in studying social control and 1: 0° :Lal change we have learned nothing new, we are not trying is turn our science into dust and ashes. What we have said SQ "that the phenomena of social statics, social control, and The :Lal change can be stated with more simplicity, elegance, insight when they are considered to be contained by designed at overcoming a problem that does not exist, and a voluminous body of research answering to no need but that of Mill's ,"higher ignorance,"2 implication in a single series of hypotheses," (p. 451). And S. F. Nadel in Foundations of Social Anthropology (TAG Free Press, 1951), pp. 100-106, makes the identical POlnt: VThe processes and connections so elucidated give us no ' laws of change': at least they give us only laws goverl'ling changes in determinate social phenomena. That is, they define the Finvariant relations' between such—and-such lnstitutions, groupings, and so forth; and this is what any Social law' does." (p. 102). Nadel was familiar with the alternative meta-language 11:11:!“ going to propose and thus he never fell into the trap of nat' functionalist vocabulary: Homans missed it by simple littve wit as far as I can see. Yet it is surprising how my 1e their contributions have been appreciated. I came to Whiown conclusions before re-reading either of these men, eveCh speaks well for simultaneous invention hypotheses n if the substantive meaning is ignored. 311 2C. Wright Mills, whether in bad taste, as Lipset toggests, or not, first employed the phrase ,"higher ignorance" .. characterize the work of functional theorists in his Tintroductionf' to The New American Library's edition of e orstein Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1953. He Ufi?%ded the argument in his Sociologicaljmagination (Oxford thlversity Press, 1959), but the early statement is still e most direct: Pa): ,"The Grand Theorists, on the other hand, Pl Fially organized attempt to withdraw from the.effort vealnly to describe, explain, and understand soc1ety: they herbalize in turgid prose the disordered contents of their thaa ing of eminent nineteenth-century sociologists, and in e process mistake their own beginnings for a finished res31111:. [th f'In the practice of both of these leading schools 0 § ,“Higher Statisticians." being the other school] contemporary thelal Science becomes simply an elaborate method of insuring byat no one learns too much about man and society, the first formal but empty ingenuity; the second, by formal but represent a Before supporting these statements it seems best to examine the general issues involved. The problem of change and statics in social phenomena is closely-—though not exclusively--related to fundamental ideas of the functionalists on the one hand and the conflict theorists on the other. While today the former is indeed the sociological orthodoxy there is afoot a growing revolt. Dahrendorf and Coser, to mention only two, have vehemently argued for an organized uprising against Utopia, and even some of the utopians have been struggling to activate their constructs.3 The fact \ c . loudy obscurantism. p ."The work of Thorstein Veblen stands out as a live . r(NT-est against these dominant tendencies of the higher lgnorance," (p. 5). 1e 3Ralf Dahrendorf has recently argued that the change- thss structural-functional perspective is utopian, not in Gee . Sense of being an unrealistic projection of certain desired social values, but in the sense that utopias are by . flnition un-changing societies. See his able presentation In ." Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological lgglysisfi' American Journal of Sociolo , Vol. LXIV (September, an 3), pp. 115-27. More recently see Ralf Dahrendorf, Class wlass Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford University fuess, 1959), for a full scale review of the battle of the anhqtional-conflict perspectives. Other enemies of utopia Q0 contemporary supporters of conflict include: Lewis A. StsQr, The Functionspf Social Conflict [this title is a .. Edy in paradox] (The Free Press, 1956); Morris Janowitz, ' gulitary Elites and the Study of War,," Conflict Resolution, 91:1 - I (March, 1957): also see the same writer's _T_h_e_ °\:EQIEessional Soldier (The Free Press, 1960); most of the work in Q. Wright Mills is generally--though not universally-- l Q:Luded in the conflict camp. There is, of course, a thhger body of ,"conflict-type," literature in modern sociology Q11 I could begin to explore in a footnote. For a review that men, living in the twentieth century, are still exercised over a Pre-Socratic problem of the fifth century, B. C., is a Striking comment on certain features of our science. Parmenides and Heraclitus are still with us in the language 0f Soc i ology . The Tchange problem" is the crux of the matter for b°th theoretical perspectives. For the functionalist it is the Problem to solve. For the conflict analyst it is (SUPPosedly) the problem he has solved-—though now the nemesis of conceptualizing permanence or stability arises. In their concern with change both functionalist and confl ict theorists—~though they appear not to realize it—— are in the thrall of a pseudo or semantic problem. The issue ls uIlreal, resulting from the ambiguity and kinds of Der s‘pectival biases into which their vocabularies lead them. This is not the first time in a science that men c . . . . . on-Qerned themselves with unreality. Yet this unreality is \ Q o pf the contest between the two camps Lipset has a few good rah agraphs--though I cannot buy his conclusions--in his éview of Moore's book (Political Power and Social Theory: PS\:3{ Studies, Barrington Moore, Jr., [Harvard University lsess, 1958] )_ in the American SOCiological ReView (April, lQSO), pp. 283—85. For still another approach focused at the QQVel of organizational theory (a level at which the same I'7'-:l51ict-functional battle rages) see: Eugene Litwak, ,"Models 0 f Bureaucracy Which Permit Conflict, ," American Journal of £3 w, Vol. va11 (September, 1961). Ea 4By Fun-reality? I refer not to false theories such as ‘the Ptolemy theory of the solar system or the Rutherford all the greater because in and of themselves neither functional nor conflict theory are really theories at all. In their pure form they make no assertions about the actual linkages or relations of the empirical world. In no way do they ."reStrict the framework of possibilities"-—the basic require- ment of any empirical theory. If one reflects on the issues carefully it is soon apparent that the two theories are languages about science rather than of science. To speak of SYStems of functional relations (or conflict, constraint, and antagonism) as the manner in which the world is ordered is not to talk about actual empirical interrelations. Rather. it is a language with which one may discuss what is discussed \ igzmic model, I mean, instead, problems in science that rest c°nn semantic and linguistic inadequacies such as the Newtonian andception of space and time (commented on below, pp. 224-25) Q0 G. E. Stahl's eighteenth century phlogiston theory of inmbustion and calcination of metals. This particular theory The chemistry depended ultimately upon what the investigator w by a ,"scientific proposition, ," for if they were willing th entertain ,"negative weights," and non-detectable substances ruin the empirical criteria of science vanished (i.e., the es of_the game were altered). The same question of meaning tfi?es us in the change issue: either we mean by change some— mell’lg frightfully common or the discourse we engage in is A al‘lingless. For discussion of the phlogiston theory see: I R. Hall, The Scientific Revolution 1500—1800 (Longmans, G r§Qn & Co., 1954), pp. 326-36: also, Herbert Butterfield, O _ %ins of Modern Science (The Macmillan Co., 1952). Pp. 152-63. The Bit ‘ 5Thus: Y'Any synthetic proposition [empirical propo- 153:. :Lonl—-affirmative or negative--is _a__£estriction of the 6% e of possibilities: as a determination it excludes other erminationsJ' Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social 8 . Q:Lences (Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 20. in actual empirical situations. Take the concept ”functional system.9 One may argue that the proper scientific perspective is to see the social World as a system of interconnected self-regulating units. me idea of such functionally interacting and self—regulating Systems is often used to discuss certain classes of events: organisms, groups, societies. To talk this way is common enough, but in all cases it is not a discussion of the world 'n out there," but of how we wish to View the world.6 The smile may be said for conflict analysis. For this reason many functionalists and conflict theorists choose, when talking a‘tkDCDIJIt their general theoretical perspectives, to append the Word analysis or model to the two pursuits. This gives \\ r1 6That functional-conflict vocabularies are not the necessity of a restriction of the frame of possibilities, not ist‘ubborn and irreducible facts," of nature, not "out there," in the world, but that they derive from our perspectives and anterests is nicely demonstrated by Ernest Nagel in, among Sther writings, ,"Teleological Explanation and Teleological F:§tems,,“ Readiryqs in the Philosophy of Science, Herbert 19191 and May Brodbeck (eds.) (Appleton—Century-Crofts, Inc., 93:53), pp. 537-58. There are several other excellent esentations which arrive at exactly the same conclusions. late. for instance: Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific W (Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 319-41; 1 3'51): a popular treatment many of the same issues are reviewed (I) Hans Richenbach's The Ripe of Scientifiic Philosophy - hiversity of California Press, 1951), pp. 191-214. Lihally, in a book with sociology as its chief concern, 1:, $\wellyn Gross, Symmsium on Sociological Theopy (Row terson and Co., 1959), see the functionalism-deflating E. bhicle by Carl Hempel, pp. 271-307. lO formal recognition of the ontological differences existing between actual empirical theories and certain kinds of languages ij1:11. xMhich we discuss empirical theories. Now, so as to make the issue perfectly clear, it 511<2>IJLUd be noted that when a functionalist or conflict theorist aIIJEifillyzes any specific empirical proposition in which he, (a) makes an empirical assertion in the vocabulary or language of, (b) functional or conflict analysis, he will in fact be H‘Eijk=:i_ng empirical claims as well as analytic ones. But here I am discussing 9n_ly the type of theory building and debate t:1:lial1:.is carried on when functionalism and conflict perspectives are considered in and of themselves. At this most general (and ontologically distinct) l‘EE‘Vreel, functional and conflict analysis are languages about El(:3't1‘laal theories in sociology. They provide us with a Er‘:>‘:=iabulary and something of a syntax by which we may discuss the venture in which we are engaged. And if we think of a. . . n ' " Q'tlslal empirical theories as the language of sc1ence, l ahguagesd' And since, in turn, these meta-languages contain 7See, for instance, Robert K. Merton,Social Theory t:;i;;§~_~_§ocial Structure (The Free Press, 1957), pp. 19- 33; JC’JLon J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society, op. cit., 1952, b1§> 27- 110, Ralf Dahrendorf, FOut of Utopia,? op. cit. 11 perspectives and residuals (such as the change and permanence bias) we may call them ."perspective theories-" Therefore, I shall use the phrase Fperspective theory" to designate any meta—languages in science; and I shall use the phrase ,"substantive theory," to designate any actual proposition expressed as a statement about empirical connections or correlations in the world. In sociology all statements about actual relations in the social world are substantive theories (if they are extremely specific the term ,"law," or ' generalization," may be preferred). And in sociology all Mements about statements of actual empirical connections are perspective theories and therefore meta-languages. They are languages about the actual propositions of scientific a 1 8course. Two facts about perspective theories or meta—languages S.1:a.:nd out. First, no science can exist without such 3‘ inguistic devices beyond the primitive formulations of its garliest folk discoveries. Scientists have to talk about hat they are doing as scientists, not just about what they fire studying in particular. Second, meta-languages or \ 11 8Llewellyn Gross, with whom I can agree on virtually rugthing, in a recent article does catch an aspect of the QBring I have in mind when I use the phrase ,"perspective 1; . SheorY-f' See: f'Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for ( QC iology,," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXVII eptember, 1961), p. 126. h __ 12 perspective theories are not only necessary but they must be jud ged as adequate or inadequate.9 As regards the first point, the history of empirical investigation bears ample evidence that when science gets bey<>nd its earliest collecting or natural history stage, SC: ientists themselves, as well as educated laymen, reflect not only on its particular laws or theories descriptive of connexity in the world, but they also discuss what this cc>2I:':|_nexity amounts to in general. Sociology is no exception: the debate on such issues fills the pages of much late nineteenth century and twentieth century social thought. Regarding the second point, the adequacy of perspective ~l:JTIeories or meta-languages, more needs to be said. The test of any symbol systems is its effectiveness for the purposes at hand. The test of scientific meta-languages is the degree t0 which they facilitate understanding and clarify the S'trbuctures of scientific knowledge. Since meta-languages are \ - 9There exists a large and fructifying literature which 3‘8 concerned with logical analysis of science. All general 1:31‘eatments of the subject make both points of this paragraph: <51 E2 necessity of contextual, perspective, or meta-linguistic Q\rices and the need to constantly examine their utility. In Sceiology see: Llewellyn Gross, Sympgsiuflmgon Sociological I3keory, op. cit.; in philosophy see, for instance. Richard B. baithwaite, Scientific Explanation, op. cit.; Ernest Nagel, Mctgre of Science (Harcourt, Brace 6: Co., 1961): and Q1: a non-technical treatment see Hans Richenbach, The Rise %c1entific Philoscmhy, op. c1t. 13 super—empirical they cannot be judged by empirical predictionist results. They can only be judged by how well they facilitate advance in empirical matters by clarifying, explicating, or aiding the understanding of scientific meanings. New what I am going to argue is that the perspectives OVe rvhelmingly current in sociology today—-functional °rthodoxy and conflict heterodoxy--are vague, ambiguous, and productive of pseudo-conceptualizations, such as the change and statics issue. What I shall propose, and this is clearly a S":rategic recommendation, is that we already have at hand a VOQ aublary or meta-language which has a long history of usage, has been carefully researched and explicated by men eminently c: apaible of meaning analysis, and is at present the perspective t: . . heory--or can eaSily translate the perspective theory——of e \very major science. It is therefore a meta-language with c: l a-I:‘ity, precedent. and consensus standingin its favor. It I 2L e. a tool purged of ambiguity and perspectival bias. vigilantly \ e t 10Strictly speaking this last paragraph is an over- ihatement. Meta-languages _a_r_e_ judged by their success; this ‘1). itself constitutes an inductive generalization (i.e., of 1 Se form ,"All A is 3,": ,"the U81. [see below] has clarified ~ S"Ines in these instances, therefore it will clarify issues other instances"). Some might argue that because the i hauCtion is drawn with regard to a symbol system that it is 7b weak form of induction. I see no difference in principle, t: in practice this criterion is often applied inconsistently linguistic formulations. l4 watched by its explicators for semantic fallings from grace, and admirably suited for scientific discussion. I shall not argue that conflict and functional Perspectives cannot be twisted and hammered into equal clarity and usefulness if we wish to spend the time and effort. Any language can be re-defined and organized to do nearly any job. But I shall argue that if this were done it would simply duplicate the effort already on hand, ignore a useful division of labor, and accomplish all this at coIlt'lsiderable cost. This last estimate seems justified j I-‘-l-<3. ging from the present confusions of current perspective theories in sociology. It also seems justified, when one views the long history of clarification which this dominant 3‘ anguage in use in empirical science today had to undergo to attain reasonable clarity. The meta-language I have in mind is generally referred to as the ygirfied Science Language (or vocabulary) hereafter afbbreviated as USL. Use and wont are the main considerations in recommending this language, and results in application Qah be the only criterion of success. The language that §~:LILOWSB'. one to talk about science with the least confusion, the language whose adoption results in the broadest inter- s - . .’ . . Q lence communication, the language that originates the SI bi; s “i A~r(II\ON p~ HU~F~I Pfi~T~T E~a t L.\ .6 L 73 Ink“. Do firs \rl. 15 smallest number of pseudo-problems (i.e., semantic problems)-- that is the language any reasonable person must recommend. 11The use of the Unified Science Language is extremely Widespread, being roughly coterminous with the present day Language of the philosophy of science in philosophy and the Work of several scientists concerned with issues of analysis anti semantics. See for instance: Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, op. cit.; Er rlest Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit.; the old stahdby, on which Nadel and several other social scientists were trained, Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction t1&éllmlqic and Scientific Method (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934)-- Still in print and still very useful; at least, so far as I can determine, it is the book that kept Foundations of Social \Anthropology off most, if by no means all, the semantic reefs; Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles W. Morris (ed 8.), International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (University of Chicago Press, 1955) (any and all of volume one—-both parts--and completed parts of volume two); Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics (The Free Press, 1956); He rbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy Mace, op. cit.; Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellers, %dings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton—Century-Crofts, Inc ., 1949). For simplified accounts see: Norman Campbell, \%t Is Science (Dover Publications Inc., 1952); Hans Richenbach, % Rise of Scientific Philosophy, op. cit.,- Stephen E. Roulmin, Philosophy of Science (Hutchinson, 1953); A. Pap, $ments of Analytic Philosophy (Macmillan and Co., 1949); and articles in several journals, especially the journal of the Philosophy of Science. The USL is not alone the effort of philosophers; quite the contrary, numerous scientists have contributed to its :anmtion and clarification. Among famous scientists that 3-\?e helped in the formation of this meta-language are: Elbert Einstein, Philipp Frank, Henri Poincare', Ernst Mach, EQrcy W. Bridgman, Pierre Duhem, Norman Campbell, Oscar Lange, Eugene P. Wigner, Theodore Abel, B. F. Skinner, Egon Brunswik, §lix Mainx, Joseph Woodger, Edgar Zilsel and however one Slshes to classify them Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Charles e~3t1ders Peirce, Rudolf Carnap, and Carl G. Hempel. I) - For a general introduction to the aims, methods, and iblef historical review of the USL see: Otto Neurath's essay 1‘ the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, Q _ M" pp. 1-270 .III-__. 16 Such a language is the USL. Such is not the language 0f functionalism or conflict analysis, as witnessed by the continuance of a two-thousand five-hundred year old problem that no other science or discipline finds worthy of a moment' 5 consideration. Pragmatic utility becomes the final arbiter; me3"E-a-languages are neither wrong nor right; they either aid or they inhibit communication. Now were clarification and meaning analysis my sole c<'->2Ir1<:ern, were the only interest that of establishing an analytic point, mainly, that some languages work and others do :not, or do so less effectively, then I might (a) develop Q0Injparative analyses of the respective languages, (b) point (31:11: the issues of confusion, and (c) end the matter with a recommendation, based upon degree of clarity and extent of usage, of some one meta—language. In other words I might engage in logical analysis as a pursuit in itself. There is however a pedagogical advantage in pursuing another strategy in making the point. If logic alone con- vinced, the task would soon be completed. But not only has lcgic often failed to dislodge entrenched ideas, it is Q:E‘ten frowned upon by American sociologists. Perhaps the GQ-‘lz‘man experience or the American idiom are to blame. At any rate another approach seems both more likely to instruct, In Q’3’:e interesting to read. ¥ 17 By selecting an empirical problem of some scope and complexity which is generally agreed to involve social change-- the chief artifact of confusion generated from sociology's competing meta-languages—-and subjecting it to interpretation in the USL, I may be able to demonstrate with added force the rue aningfulness of the argument. Thus about the analytic problem I can afford to be reasonably certain, for that analysis is completed and ready to present. About the empirical problem the reader may judge for himself. When put together the two approaches should have maximum expository effectiveness. Ideally either pur- 811 it is independent of the other (and may be so treated), but together they have the pedagogic advantage of going beyond the possibilities of either one alone. Science requires both pursuits: concept clarification or analysis and empirical lhvestigation. This thesis will involve both approaches. The next task is to select an empirical problem th at is significant and about which there is consensus regarding the problem of change. CHAPTER II THE EMPIRICAL PROBLEM: RESOURCE CONTROL MOVEMENT Chief Features By common consent the area of sociological investi— get ion pre—eminently concerned with social change is collective behavior. This is particularly true if we avoid the social PSYchological aspects of the field and concentrate on the inStitutional and organizational problems. And within the area of collective behavior social movements are generally c=<'>Ilc::eded to involve the apotheosis of social novelty. There- fore, the most likely area for the location of my empirical p“Tololem should be in the area of social movements. However, in terms of focus, I prefer to organize my 033k around the study of industrial soc1ety.l This has \ —‘— of There are, it seems to me, two mutually related ways 80 Viewing sociology. On the side of conceptual formations qu :Lology has been concerned with a limited but important set ()3: Social realities that other social sciences have ignored so given only slighting attention: collective behavior,. poqlalization, primary groups, assoc1ations, stratification, dipulation and ecology. In using these concepts a wide revérsity of special sociologies have emerged (military, of :Lgious, political, urban, etc.). On the other hand much a this work has been located in industrial society and to of esser extent historical societies. It depends on the kind Cluestions one asks as to which focus will prove most 18 19 c: :1. early been either the chief unit of analysis or the laboratOJ in which the sociologist has labored so assiduously. There- fore, my focus will be on _a_ social movement, but with no intention of studying social movements as such. The "social movement" is a useful concept for understanding or studying certain features of industrial orders. Thus, while drawing on the area of collective behavior and the sub-field of Social movements, I can hope to develop a fuller understanding of the social nature of the industrial process under selected <2 onditions. The social movement I wish to study may be called U. . u _ the resource control movement," and because the interest is in industrial society I shall call the venture The Resource c"’&1;l:rol Movement in Industrial Society. I believe that the one significant method of s‘t‘uxiying industrial society is by use of the comparative II“e‘thod, as Lipset, Bendix, Form, Miller, and others have a efl't'nonstrated . 2 But to construct a comparative research \ useful. Sociologists and social thinkers as much (if not - Ore) concerned with industrial society as with the concepts include: Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Max Weber, 1'1<>:rstein Veblen, Karl Mannheim, Robert Lynd, C. Wright Mills, IReinhard Bendix, Barrington Moore, Jr., Seymour M. Lipset, :?bert Bellah, William Kornheuser, Juan Linz, Clark Kerr, J~:Lll.ia.m Form, Daniel Bell, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Don Martindale Q Seymour Martin Lipset has conducted several studies Itr£>loying the comparative context of industrial society; see: 1‘ 20 EEeee:=es;j_gn for industrial societies requires that the variable 'kDGEE:ZjLJI19 correlated with industrialism be fairly well researched :ig::1. ssome specific societies, thus assuring the construction of jE>:]_.:Extasible hypotheses. This is especially the case regarding the ,"resource control movement," The exhortations and admon- iji:;:i_<>ns about resource control are many, but the scientific 2rT egain the greatest tactical advantage. Still believing that the comparative method offers 3=Vie<=11er'possibilities than a case study, the logical focus E§r1<>111d be a comparative analysis of the movement within 1:}1vvn no evidence of instincts (i.e., complex and specific gearleetic based reactions to complex and specific stimuli) ir1 1the human animal. Also it is clear that many men spend aJ.JL their lives in cities without apparent ill effects. Ehdtrrcope has been urban for a great period and New York, and TOkyo also have their urban types. Cal cutta, Damascus, If? :instictivists argue that this is precisely our trouble, 1. es: .., the cause of our wars, addiction, mental illness, well arlcfl good. But let them then specify under what conditions the ir theory might be proven false. Without a potential area of invalidation is superempirical. For clearly a theory The second mechanistic hypothesis is divided into two tYpe s, both of which may be dealt with here. The first is tilea Innechanistic theory proper, the second is essentially soc 1 a1. ?Religious callings? have been suggested as an If religious action e I I I I O p l anation of conservation actiVities. is: -:l‘ . . . . (acked upon as a supernatural instruction, then it is meqhanistic. But if conservation action is viewed as merely de=2:’ liesxying from religious values: then it is SOCial' Romain Gary has given an impassioned description of In the - JLndividual called by acts of preservation by God. the Iuovel, Roots of Heaven Gary portrays a Danish naturalist 46 all the species, who argues that all the plants and animals, the literal roots of heaven: kill the roots of heaven and are Destroy the profane order and you you. kill heaven itself. destroy the sacred order as well. While Gary himself is innocent of this belief it is clear that others have taken it :Literally.18 The argument need not detain us. Religion, as a is super-empirical. Super-empirical cognitive system of truth, Therefore, the religious matters are cognitively meaning-less. argument is cognitively meaning-less. However, as a belief (a social belief in a calling) I h ave no doubt that many converts to conservation have Come through the religious door. And while the history of conservation lends little support to the contention that thl S was the sole, or even a significant cause of the resource movement, it clearly did play a small part in particular In - . . o‘t3~\rations. Nonetheless, the organized and continuous be . . . havior of religious groups shows no eVidence of its Wide- SP3: . . Q ed impact upon conservation. Turning to social explanations, in the strict sense, We may review several. There is first the ?national interest? or - ' - security? argument. The idea seems to be that men perceiving 193 I ) l Romain Gary, The Roots of Heaven (Pocket Books, Inc., 47 our nationalistic needs rallied to support conservation I am sure this is a partial issues. At the national level, explanation of many significant developments, especially But the states have those of direct governmental action. .armies to equip, no conquests to mount, and no inter- nt> What liaiizgional treaties--with few exceptions—-to conclude. Ineafig' hold for a national movement is clearly inadequate to eJ:1ain the differential development of the movement at the st ates' level .19 There is next the diversity or ?variety hypothesis." argument is again simple. Men engage in conservation Tklese bee<:=£Eiuse of the desire to prevent the extinction of multipli— Every species that perishes is that much City and diversity. recreation groups as well as ideologues lost variety. Here, a17€3= (zommonly at work. It is safe to say that the vast maj <3:l:ity of naturalists held or hold a set of values similar Recreationists have had perhaps identical interests tc’ '1t113is. \ 19While the military get their due (along with the 1Ni1t; ~ . . . ;:l—<:nalists) in all general histories of conservation the (swing are of particular interest: H. J. Barnett, II 'qIEEL'EEE Changing Relations of National Resources to National ? Economic Geography, Vol. 34, No. 3 (July, 1958); S€=<:= ritYl. see Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of E1513 - ‘-“‘~5!E:§5igpgy_(Harvard University Press, 1959); Resources for F1?=t2 by itself. Expositors of diversity have been the most a1:*t::iculate group to fight for conservation of resources. .Btzrizi they are only a fragment of the mass support. Another form of the diversity argument, and another source of support for conservation, derived from the ec=<=>llxbgical thinkers. In the writings of this group the exhaustion of resources is seen as a threat to the ,"balance 01? iltleature,? with the implication that once out of balance \ 20 I I I I Preservationists, recreationists, :;:;::‘EE=Jrary naturalists are all included in this category. For Edw ‘ literary and the mystical appreciators see the sampler: a1_£E:‘:l~la Way Teale, Green Treasury (Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1956)—- Pa. Q note the bibliography of nature writing inside the title ‘5'"‘53.. For a popular survey of a few of the great naturalists Donald Culross Peattie, Green Laurals (Doubleday and Cc: " ‘P Inc., 1936). th surprisingly several naturalists Thoreau, Whitman, Krutch, haxr ‘53 come from literature itself: For a descriptive and able statistical and historical and mystic- et:<:= re‘; : ‘Btlzt:.':l“3w of the recreation arm see: Marion Clawson, R. Jrlsell He1d, Charles H. Stoddard, Landgfgr the Future ( c:-:::-‘:_Q John Hopkins Press, 1960), esp. pp. 124-93 (also iains excellent bibliography on recreation-preservation use hs) 49 the whole show goes under. Viewing these expositors of balance as a social source of conservation has only limited justification. Most of them appear late in the history of the movement. and most took intellectual positions that failed to win mass support, though no doubt their writing was influential among leaders. This leads me to a consideration of what is probably the most frequent lay reply to the question ,"why a conservation Advanced at the states level or resource control movement? ?' the most immediate reaction is to point out that some States need conservation control and others do not. Of course this ,"needing," of conservation is precisely the question: Why do some states pgerceive this need and others Apparently "need? is not- as for instance the Deep South? peI':‘Qeived differently by differently situated social groups. 16 such differential perceptions are what must be explained. The next most common responses, to the question of th . g movement's development, attributes it to an American no N for ,"rusticity," ."ruralnessfl' or the ,"lost agrarian \ 21For a sample of this school try: Henry Fairfield 031% ’ Q:I':n, Our Plundered Planet (Little, Brown & Co., 1948); Road to Survival (William Sloane Associates, W Ll l iam Vogt, Vi]? Q. ) 7 Harrison Brown, The Challenge of Man's Future (The (011%119 Press, 1954); Paul B. Sears, Deserts on the March a—\rersity of Oklahoma Press, 1935). 50 past," A similar explanationis generally given for sub— and selection of retirement urbanization, cabins on lakes, This explanation specifies no groups, no and burial sites . It appeals no sociological mechanisms. specific intere sts, These values only to the continuance of a set of values. float insubstantially above the subjected population and some- how influence social action. It reminds one strongly of ,"national character." studies current in certain quarters; studies which generally fail to specify the social formations. groups, and the interests of such groups which support the val ues in question. Values are not self-supporting. NOr are needs self- If there is one truth confirmed by social expl anatory . They are the result of perspectives S(r-j—ence, this is it: interests derived from social formations. Merely to point and The important qua Stion is to specify these formations. to Values or the needs of peoples is to call attention again t 0 What we wish explained: why do the values persist, why \ 013:155 co Q:red as explanations even from trained and involved hgervation leaders. In discussion I have had each of Se ideas put forward as supposedly adequate explanations 131% The general tendency to er 11a 1"! otherwise competent people. Q . without specifying, the sociological formations that s s: - port needs and values is apparently endemic, even in social anQ thists. The work of Gorer, Mead, Powdermaker, Brogan Sui others often lapses into similar tautologies--tautologies 11 in need of explanation. 22Both the notions of Fneed? and ?valueF have been 51 does one group see needs where another group does not? And this is true not only of the pure value or need explanation, but of all other explanations that suggest grounds for action without specifying the social organization integrating that action. In turning to my own hypothesis we will be examining a view deliberate]; designed for generality and inclusiveness. Wllile admitting the worth of some of the foregoing ideas on conservation, my aim will be to select an explanation that will encompass all such limited groups with their limited interests, as well as challenge the liberal historical hii'pc>thesis. My hypothesis has the advantage of generality Plus the not insignificant fact of subsequent empirical ex am ination. The hypothesis with which I am concerned may be stated in the following manner: as industrialization increases, only in the productive apparatus but also in terms of its not w‘ 16 er societal implications, the institutionalization of rat 9 o ' :Lonal resource control in the several states varies d c :L : Qctly. This formulation of my hypothesis contains implications tl'l it may not be altogether apparent. Clearly, it is a law— lik . . . Q statement describing the relation between two sets of 52 To this extent, as we events in the contemporary world. shall see below in the discussion of the explanation of this regularity, it attempts to explore, with present day materials, invariant relation. If confirmed, this relation will an constitute an explanation of these substantitive events. terms of one aspect of this regularity I posit a rather In that the larger the organization,the more ge neral theory: decision making; the more centralized the c e n tral ized the implications of the decision making the more obvious the the more obvious sc: attered needs of the organization; the needs, the more likely are decision-makers to perceive the natural resource base upon which their organization re Ste-«whether the organization be an urban political unit This kind of or a large scale industrial enterprise. exp; anation is clearly drawn from organizational theory and appears generally reasonable. But are there any other ‘1le ications of the hypothesis, implications that open u . p Wider considerations beyond contemporary events? I be II - :Leve there are. The history of conservation is a phenomena quite a :L % tinct from contemporary investigations into its social Yet it requires only a moment's reflection to realize if the contemporary materials are of the proper sort, the y may also shed light on the nature of the historical h 53 situation-—even if they cannot conclusively prove or disprove I am reminded of Weber's ,a strictly historical hypothesis. use of data on the relation between economic position (as measured by social class) and religious affiliation in the early chapters of the Protestant Ethic. As Weber noted: in itself such data cannot prove or disprove the larger regularity, but certainly it casts light on the situation and certainly it must be taken into account. The historical hypothesis with which this dissertation c: rosses swords is, of course, that offered by the populist— progressive historians (our first hypothesis in the present review) --the little man versus the trusts. Recently this C: onception has come under attack from a Harvard historian, It is this attack by a historian, coupled Samuel P. Hays. Wi 1:11 my contemporary data, plus the implications of a group of economists and critics, that will constitute the historical S ifle of my hypothesis. The issues are fairly involved and r amire a rather lengthy review. Conservation, as Samuel P. Hays in Conservation and T11 * \Q Gospel of Efficiency Qwed (in the context of ProgreSSive Era politics) as a battle points out, has generally been leg ‘tween the f'evil vested interests," (mainly, the corporations and \ 1-4, 261-76. 4: Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 54 communities) and the ”good un—vested public.9 In fact, it is so much of the liberal heritage to view the problem in this manner that virtually no one thinks to question the obvious. Hays points out that the few general histories as well as the more numerous specific studies of conservation invariably review the battle of the ,"interests versus the public." Now it may be good liberalism to do so, but, Hays argues, it just was not the case. Shifting through a mountain of evidence on the national scene Hays came to the same conclusion that I arrived at by deduction from general principles (especially those of economics and organizational theory) at the states' level. Mainly, that large scale organizations of no matter what kind (whether business or industrial structures or urban administrative units) imply planning and a large over-view, and therefore the greater probability of recognizing their resOUrce base (to be discussed below). Perception, in other w 0 I O Ords’ is a function of Size. Now what Hays has done at the national level and for the movement's leaders I am in effect testing at the s . . tate level. The notion that large scale industrial corpor- at ‘ long and large urban units should support and encourage con . . . Se:I:~vation measures is ProgreSSive History heresy. If 55 it is supported at the states' level then there will be at least two students of the movement that are in sharp dissent with the overwhelming opinion. Hays sums up his argument thus: Such examples, however, do not support the general View that corporations by their very nature promoted resource waste, and the larger the corporation and the greater its self-interest, the more destruction it caused. On the contrary, when the conservation movement arose in the early twentieth century, it became clear that larger corporations could more readily afford to undertake conservation practices, that they alone could provide the efficiency, stability of operations, and longerangepplanning inherent in the conservagion idea. Larger owners could best afford to undertake sustained-yield forest and range management, and understood more clearly than did small farmers the requirements for large-scale irrigation and water power development. [Italics mine] (Ibid., p. 263.) Also in an article in Perspectives on Conservation, Ekarlnry Jarrett (ed.),* entitled ?The Mythology of Conservation" Hays argues a similar point. Whether or not the present notion implies a conser- VEiizdixre political outlook is not so important as what was in fact the case. The historians, few though there are, are so lc>ii<3£ed in the direction of anti-monopoly and anti—trust ”traiIPGa of the resources? that little distinction was made ?bee . 1:‘W’Gaen the ownership of resources and the use of resources. 1633? ‘were not necessarily connected either in the past or Ii <>Vv,, and the misuse of one did not necessarily imply the \ * 56 more often it was the misues of the other. As Hays argues, small owner that fought conservation and misused the land. And while true that the Great Lakes Forest were raped and the Teapot Dome indeed scandalized, it does not follow that this was the general picture. Hays argues contrary on the basis of a massive sifting of the evidence at the national level. I am going to argue on sociological grounds that even today it is not the case by states. The political implications may fall where they will. I am privately as suspicious as the next of corporate interests, but it is worth examining the evidence to see. Finally, Hays argues that conservation as a movement Was the result of a small group of government scientists, tGChnologists, and engineers that wanted to see a maximum Utilization of resources along lines dictated by science. He argues that it was these men that influenced the first Roosevelt in his conservation programs: (p. 276) Social and economic problems, Roosevelt believed, Should be solved, not through power politics, but by eJ-{perts who would undertake scientific investigations and devise workable solutions. He had an almost unlimited faith in applied science. During his Presidency, he repeatedly sought advice of expert ccmmuissions, especially in the field of resource Policy, and he looked upon the conservation movement as an attempt to apply this knowledge. \ Mar: . 23For further support of these same ideas see: 1011 Clawson, R. Burnell Held, Charles H. Stoddard, Land fOr \‘t‘lne Future (The John Hopkins Press, 1960). PP. 275-360, h 57 But it should not be thought that Hays' work is the only act of protest against the dominant persuasion of populist- progressive history, nor that organizational theory alone and unaided is the only source I can cite to support my general argument and the implied historical implications regarding the conservation movement. Quite the contrary, while Hays codifies the major issues and is excellent at pinning down the evidence on the national scene and among economists, and critics leaders, there are other historians, that have developed aspects of the same contention. Richard Hofstadter's The Age of Reform, 24 is, to be sure, not about conservation, but it is about populism and Progressive politics. Hofstadter sees the movement as merely one aspect of a general shift of axis in the Structure of American society. In the period 1890-1917 industrial society made its greatest inroads on the agrarian °rganization of the United States. Until this period the rurals could still convince themselves that history making was in their hands. But by 1890 the evidence had begun to .\ ?40‘80; Erich W. Zimmermann, World Resources and Industries inlarper 8: Brothers, 1951); William L. Thomas Jr., Man's Role W9 the Face of the Earth, ed. (University of Chicago 6) esp. pp. 367—81, 851-92, 987-1134. 24Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (Vintage Bo 6&8. 1955), pp. 131-73. 58 pile up against them and doubt of their continued status ascendency had become widespread. Hofstadter argues that in response to this "status revolution,' in fact in the only response possible, the agrarians staged a revolt. That revolt was populism.25 Basically it was a moral and ethical protest, for the simple and sufficient condition that they had no other means of protest at their disposal. The large industries, the great trusts, the financial empires, the bankers, and the great cities overwhelmed and diminished them. But by the conservatism of history the rurals still had some control over the representational vote, even if they lacked the economic, industrial, and national power. They had only one course to take and they todk it--a moral revolution against the corruption, trusts, vested interests, monopolies, Catholic laxity, and the big cities. Honor had slipped from the rurals to the urbans, much as honor today continues 25John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (University of Minnesota Press, 1955), should be considered the classic statement on populism. However, Hofstadter gives a rather different interpretation to the events, and I have followed him in general. Basically Hicks' iterates the liberal position, and argues that the rurals had good reason for outrage against the East. He neglects, however, the question Hofstadter sees as central, i.e., why the movement todk the form it did and its meaning in terms of power shifts. 59 to slip or fails to be conferred--as witnessed in the ?status politics” of the radical right.26 Economic issues may be important, especially in depressions, but status may be more so. Besides, as few would dispute, in thelong run status follows class. The relationship between this conception of the age of reform and that of Hays' should be obvious. Put in terms of the sociology of knowledge, it means that historians, in championing the populist and progressive reformer,have in fact been sold the populist conception of history.27 They have simply repeated the charges against the urban east that the rural south and west formulated. Now one ought not to prejudge an issue. Were the industrial trusts and the vested interests really poor conservationists? Did they, as one aspect of the general triumph of the industrial sectors, rape the resources, dispoil the landscape,;iunder the oil fields, destroy the forests? In some specific instances clearly they did. But relative 26Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology,(Collier Bodks, 1961), pp. 103-23; and The New American Right, Daniel Bell, ed., (Criterion Books, 1955). 27Hofstadter, op. cit., pp. 13-14: ?The tradition of Progressive reform . . . is, indeed, the tradition of most intellectuals in America. Perhaps because in its politics the United States has been so reliably conservative a country during the greater part of its history, its main intellectual traditions have been, as a reaction, 'liberal,‘ as we say-- that is popular, democratic, progressive.§ 60 to small businesses, was this a general phenomena? Or have, in fact, the liberal historians simply looked for the supporting evidence for their case? Is, as Hays rightly asks, ownership of the land-—which no one can deny resided with the trusts-- the same thing as mis-use of the land? Did they, as trusts, relatively violate conservation rationality in the utilization of resources? These questions are considerably more open to controversy than might be expected. Remember, history for the populist was a conspiracy, a fraud, a vast plot against the small landowner and business— man. Yet, to reverse the question, what about their own history, the history of the small holders? were they the backbone of the conservation movement? Was it the small holder that practiced the patient, long range, rational planning inherent in the conservation ideology? Did their land use follow the dictates of scientific disposition? The evidence may not yet be conclusive on either side, but we may note a few additional points. In Bernard De Voto's fascinating history of the Rocky Mbuntain fur trade we find the following comment: As regards Astorls American Fur Company (a classic trust even then), ?The monopoly's policy was to conserve beaver and trap it scientifically with an eye to the future—- 61 but Oregon was jointly occupied and they might loose it,"28 The implication is that conservation would be practiced just so long as there was no competition, for with competition if your own outfit did not strip the beaver country someone else's would. Again with reference to that other great monopoly in fur, to the north: The Hudson's Bay Company had the wisest of all systems—-or what would have been the wisest if history had cooperated. It farmed the fur country practicing conservation, taking only a calculated percentage from a give1 field and then letting it lie fallow till the animal population had been restored. . . . That is, in places where the Company was a monopoly. It conserved the fur crop in its private fields but exhausted it as rapidly as anyone where there was competition.29 New, without pushing too hard, does not this dis- cussion about monopolies and long range planning, trusts and conservation have a familiar ring? Granted that the perception of resource needs are everywhere related to the concentration and centralization. Granted that perception of resource 28Bernard De Vbto, Across the Wide Missouri (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947). p. 87. 29Ibid., p. 213. Considering that these events reached their peak in the 1830's in the Rockies and the Oregon Territory it is instructive to see the uniformity of principles operating in the economy, principles such as we are just now Tdiscovering.? 62 needs is a reasonable postulate (beyond a certain size organization) of organizational theory. Do we not also find, in comments such as De Voto's, a supporting economic theorem for my hypothesis: that where there is monopoly there is security, where there is security there are profits, and where there are profits an organization can afford to lock ahead, plan rationally, employ science in the construction of the future? Clearly, in our time two eminent economists are connected with this view: Schumpeter, who argued that monopoly and concentration of capital—-induced by depressions-— were the central features of the system's incentives as well as its ability to rationally calculate. The ridding of economic marginals through the Fcold douche? of the economic crisis promoted growth in scale of economic organizations and conferred a breadth of scope and perception impossible in smaller concerns. At the same time it conferred a security of market and stability of price necessary to rational planning.30 And Galbraith, who has argued that monopolistic oligarchy is the stable form of capitalism. For with market 0Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democragy (3rd ed.; Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 87-106. 63 security, with monopoly and centralized control, industries for the first time can afford to be efficient in the long run as well as the short. Whereas in the case of the small holders. businessmen, and merchants the long view is economically (not to say intellectually) impossible. Thus in Professor Galbraith's concise formulation: The showPieces are with rare exceptions the industries which are dominated by a handful of large firms. The foreign visitor, brought to the United States, . . . visits the same firms as do the attorneys of the Department of Justice in their search for monopoly. To sum up: my hypothesis concerning the empirical investigation of this dissertation has two aspects. First, there is the issue of the social basis of present day conservation and resource control. This argues its point by means of a correlation between industrial society and resource control. The second aspect concerns a historical question. It uses the same findings as those in the first correlation but it does so with regard to their implications for the way history has been written. Thus as regards the first part, size and concentration of organization are related to perception and action. As regards the second 310uotation from Robert L. Heilbroner, The worldly Philosophers (Simon & Schuster, 1961). P. 270. For extended treatment any of Galbraith's recent works will do, but the most elaborate statement is found in John K. Galbraith, American CgpitalismL The Concept of Countervailing Power (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952). 64 part, monopoly and security are related to rationality and planning (both today and in the past). and in general both findings cast doubt on one aspect of American social thought. Finally, there is contained in this discussion an interesting and perplexing question. The implication of these arguments--quite aside from the question of conservative- liberal politics—-is that conservation movements represent the response of a pluralistic political and economic system to the necessities of planning. The resource control movement may, in other words, represent an opposite tendency of action from that of open markets and decentralized power. Political sociology has made much of the differing social bases of totalitarian and democratic systems. The most common feature cited is the monistic and monocratic versus the multi—group pluralism found in the social formations of the two opposing political—economic systems. From the point of view of the resource movement it is difficult to say which tendency it represents. Viewed as the work of a number of applied scientists and strong political leaders the planning appears to work outside the legitimate insti- tutions of democratic society. Viewed as a multiplicity of organizations and protest publics at the states levels it appears to be commensurate with democratic politics. Political sociologists and mass society theorists might 65 contemplate this dilemma, for both perspectives seem correct. My own initial hunch is that the analysis Hays has given fits well with the (monistic) totalitarian model. But viewing the same phenomena at the states level we have an apparent de- centralized reversal. It would seem that again in the United States we have a Tocquevillean pattern. Whether TVA, national parks, wilderness areas, national forests, and other federal lands represent a destruction of this pluralism is an open question. Federal control has grown, even to imposing its will on the non-industrialized states, i.e., Tennessee. Perhaps the democratic dilemmas of conservation are only an aspect of the dilemmas of national political-economic organization.32 It would seem that the new macro-pluralism of industrial society strains liberal thought to the breaking point, and in conservation it verges on the schizophrenic. Yet even where states receive massive federal aid their independence remains real (as we shall see). How this will appear a few decades hence is open to speculation. 32See: 'William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (The Free Press, 1959), esp. pp. 21-118, 227-38; S. M. Lipset, Politigalqup, op. cit., esp. pp. 357-96: also Lipset, ?Political Sociology,?l§ociology nggy (R. K. Merton, ed.; Basic Bodks, Inc., 1959), esp. pp. 81-91; and his Union Democracy (The Free Press, 1956), esp. pp. 3—16, 394-418 for more of the same; Philip Selznidk, fInstitutional VUlnerability in Mass Society,f American Journal of Sociology, Vbl. LVI (January, 1951), pp. 320-31; and Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegle, ?The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike,? op. cit., esp. p. 205 for related discussion; finally see Hays himself, in recognition of the same problem, pp. 275-76. 66 This industrialization hypothesis, taken by states in the United States, might be called a Vshotgun correlation? (as distinguished from ?shotgun empiricismf). The nearest approach to such a generalized and exploratory correlation is to be found in Professor Lipset's ?Economic Development and Democracy,"33 By shotgun correlation I refer to the fact that I shall not present a micro-analysis (i.e., a specific causal explanation) of the correlation at the state levels (such as: analysis of legislation, pressure groups, or similar causal devices) of the actual impact of societal groups on resource designation. The micro-analysis I shall present will be purely verbal: but the reasonableness of this purely verbal connection between the two sets of events will rest upon the initial plausibility of the industrial 33Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 45-76; also see: Clark Kerr and ;Abraham Siegel, ?The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike-- An International Comparison,? in Arthur Kornhauser, Industrial 'Conflict (MoGraw-Hill Bodk Co., Inc., 1954). The Kerr- Siegel article is actually not a correlation at all, since {only one systematic variation is recorded (propensity to .strike) but in the discussion that follows the authors suggest kinds of correlates that seem relevant. The end 7result is not quite the same as Lipset but close enough to 'be suggestive. The study is focused internationally, and therefore comparatively, and the Pshotgun empiricism? is contained in the hypotheses and theories that follow the presentation of the statistical prdblem. 67 indicators selected as resource relevant. It will also rest upon the empirical consistency of the over-all correlation. It need hardly be added that there is considerable agreement as to what aspects of societal industrialization are in fact resource relevant. Finally, the use of multiple operational indicators or indexes for the master variables must not be confused with the idea of ?multiple causation?--a notion resting upon poor semantics--for in the general sense industrialization is the ?cause.?34 And since no weights will be assigned to the indicators, multi-variant analysis is ruled out. In other words, I am seeking a broad, general correlation and that is all. Let us now consider whether the hypothesis that I have suggested can be placed in the framework of a still wider explanation. Will my theory, if proven correct, add additional confirmation to a master hypothesis of industrial organization? 4Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934), pp. 269-71. The multiple causality and the ?plurality of causes? contention is one social scientists might well get disabused of in a hurry. It is tempting in social theory to construct multiple causes but as Cohen and Nagel show it is also totally inadequate for explanation or prediction. It is another example of mistaking language for reality. 68 Beyond the correlation of industrial society with resource control there are a number of sociological hypotheses that appear relevant as a framework. HOwever, when one examines many theorists of industrial society's ?main drift? such as Marx, Veblen, Schumpeter, or Polanyi he finds that they are in one way or another caught up in specifics.35 In particular they are mesmerized by the capitalist market economy. And this is the case even when they are busy proclaiming its transitional and ephemeral character. None of these men had his eyes on the fundaments of social structure as they have increasingly become apparent. Others, perhaps lesser lights, such as Maine, Morgan, Spencer, Durkheim, Toennies, and lately Becker, Redfield, and Mannheim pointed to much more fundamental notions, and did so explicitly rather than by implication.36 But it remained for Max weber 35Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (Oxford University Press, 1942); Joseph A. Schumpeter, ?The Marxian Doctrine? (pp. 1-58) in Cgpitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd ed.; Harper & Brothers, 1950); Morton Mandell Bober, ggrl Marx's Interpretation of History (Harvard University Press, 1948); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, .§ogiglisp, and Democracy. 0p. cit.: Thorstein veblen, Tpp Portgple Veblen, Max Lerner (ed.) (The Viking Press, 1958); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transfopmation (Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1944). 36For a compact statement covering most of the, to use Bendix-Berger's concise phrase, ?paired but opposite tendencies of social action? contained in the various works of these men see: (by index) Don Martindale's unusually excellent 233. Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Houghton Mifflin Co., 69 to specifically crystallize the collective notions, and it continues to be Weber's work that today offers us the soundest understanding of the larger framework we are seeking. Weber argues that the master pattern of industrial drift was characterized by increasing rationality in the formations of social life. It was the ?contract? of Maine, the ?civitas? of Morgan, the ?industry? of Spencer, the ?organic solidarity? of Durkheim, the ?Gesellschaft? of Toennies, and lately the ?secular? of Becker, the ?urban? of Redfield, and more carefully, the ?functional rationality? of Mannheim—-it was these that Weber generalized in his master organizing concept of increasing rationality.37 1960); and for Morgan. discussed only in passing by Martindale, see: Leslie A. White, ?Lewis Henry Morgan: Pioneer in the Theory of Social Evolution,? in Harry Elmer Barnes, Ap Introduction to the History of Sociology (University of Chicago Press, 1948). pp. 138-54. In the same volume can be found discussions of Maine, Spencer, etc. 37Weber came to the full realization of the ?increasing rationality of modern society? very late in his life. There are in his works, however, several anticipations as well as overt expositions of the major notion. I realize that it is not customary to tie weber's notion to that of the societal opposites of the men I have listed above; I believe it is a fair tie-in nonetheless. See: Max weber, The Protespgpt Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 13—31, written just before death, this is the only concise statement. However, weber's entire comparative sociology involved the use of the notion, and it cropped up again and again in his discussion of everything from the ?rationality of the literati in China? to ?rational bourgeoisie enterprise.? Specifically see: Hans H. Gerth and C. wright Mills, From Max weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 293—94 70 All the others, with the exception of Mannheim, who rests his case on Weber, produced formulations that remained erroneously polarized. Their basic notions hardly received the conceptual analysis or careful examination in terms of a range of contemporary and past social structures. Economic models too often betrayed themselves when organizational indicators should have been employed. weber alone, it seems to me, had his fingers on the pulse of industrial reality. It becomes increasingly clear that the type of means- ends nexus Weber saw as characterizing modern industrial orders have more and more come to pass. Such nexus broke and elsewhere in the essay entitled ?The Social Psychology of WOrld Religions.? Also, in the same book see the authors discussion of Weber's intellectual background. A few major commentators interested in the same aspect of Weber's work include: Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (Harcourt. Brace & Co., 1951). P. 52, ?Max weber's whole work is in the last analysis directed toward the problem 'Which social factors have brought about the rationalistic characteristic of Western civilization'?; Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 382-449; Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (The Free Press, 1949), here and there pp. 500-578; edited and annotated: Max Rheinstein (trans. Edward Shils) Max Weber on Lay in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 224-55, 349-56; Hans Gerth and Don Martindale (trans.). Max weber's. Ancient Judism (The Free Press, 1952), pp. x—xi, ?Weber subsumed the develop- ment of modern capitalism under a more general Occidental process of rationalization?; H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness 3nd Society (Vintage Books, 1961), p. 289, ?On the one hand he [Weber] was convinced that the deepest tendency of the contemporary world was toward a bureaucratization of all phases of public activity: this was the tangible manifest— ation of that more general process of rationalization which had distinguished the West from all other known civilizations." 71 with tradition, increasingly utilized empirical science and organizational rationality as the final criteria for the survival of social formations in the modern world. It is within this framework that my correlation, if verified, will fit: as one more confirming instance of a master tendency in the structure of industrial organization. It will amount to a small increment of confirmation for the larger regularity.38 381n conversation with Professor Faunce, he has argued (if I follow him correctly) that (a) weber's notion of rationality can be given no separate meaning distinct from special aspects of industrialization taken individually, and (b) that if one attempts to do more than this the word becomes a metaphor with all of the logical and semantic difficulties of any metaphor. With this I completely concur. Nor do I wish to give the impression that I expect the concept to do more than that which ?a? (above) would rightfully restrict it. There— fore, a further word of clarification on the use of the notion is in order. It seems to me that what Maine, Spencer, Morgan, etc., and Weber were lodking for was some way of character— izing the major institutional alterations that have taken place in society since the industrial revolution (and events just prior to it). Unfortunately they lumped vast numbers of past situations, social forms, and institutions into inadequate residual categories when characterizing what came before the modern era. Terms such as ?preindustrial,? ?communal,? ?traditional,? and ?pre-modern? (when referring to types of societies) and the large number of similar labels that were offered simply confused, in summary fashion, the complexity of the past. Of course, the anthropologist found this quite disturbing, in fact ridiculous. But the sociologist was interested in industrial orders and not what came before. Thus we may forgive him at least this aspect of his dichotomy, remembering however that it is in need of 72 remedy if we are to employ it in any useful manner in the future. On the other hand this same group of sociologists did reach some clarity on the particular achievements of industrial institutions. weber's notion of increasing rationality was only one of several competing terms (i.e., ?contract,? ?cititas,? ?organic solidarity,? etc.). But I would argue that etymologically it was one of the best, for it characterized the secularism, decline of magic, and positive employment of science in larger and larger areas of social life--even to the point of studying man himself. The use of the logic of science in solving problems-—by no means all problems, of course,--is well caught in the traditional meaning of the term ?rationality.? A second feature, the growth of bureaucracy is, it might be argued, capable of similar analysis. Does the evidence of science support the contention that bureaucracy is the most efficient method we have for accomplishing complex and exacting taSks involving the coordination of large numbers of individual acts? If so, then this aspect of rationality is merely a special case of scientific rationality. Frankly I do not know that this is the case, though I do know that weber argued that it was. Even if, for the period 1850-1975 it were the most rational method of organization (i.e., the most efficient means supported by the scientific evidence) then at least for that period, if not forever, societies thus characterized were manifesting increasing rationality. If not, that is, if bureaucracy is not the most efficient type of organization for the tasks of an industrial system,then Weber was empirically wrong and all we have left of his notion is that science (at least science, that isl) extends more and more deeply into the social fabric in the construction of our choices. But even that would not be a bad characterization of the age, certainly as good as saying, as Maine would have it, that relations are increasingly contractual. But let us go a step further to the weakest sense of the meaning of rationality. ?Rationality? may be employed merely as a term or symbol that we use to stand for a number of separate but basically unrelated events which everyone would agree have taken place since 1750 (growth of science, growth of bureaucracy, more secondary controls, etc.). Actually this is about all that my formulation implies, for 73 In other words, ?institutionalization of rational resource control" is only another instance of the increasing rationality of industrial society. Specifically it is that instance of rationality wherein traditionalistic as well as market restraints on resources are deracinated, where the .ppgpp substituted are based upon empirical science and functional rationality of organization. That this type of means-ends fit is not yet perfect. relative to existing systems of rationality, is a fact. But if the general correlation holds then Weber's major pattern of drift will have been. by that much. vindicated.39 I have defined rationality to mean bureaucratic advance and the application of science. If more than that is justified, well and good, but this weak argument should offend no one. Finally, it must be freely admitted that Weber's use of the term itself is imprecise and open to some speculation. It seems to mean ?systematic? in some situations, ?governed by scientific logic? in others, and perhaps something more as well. something German. I do not pretend to know the full meaning. Certainly the formulation above. as far as it goes. can find no serious quarrel with weber's conception. 39 u u . . Of course, no ,theory is ever proven; it merely piles up confirming instances in its favor. we can disprove a theory. and do so conclusively. That is another problem altogether. It is perhaps worth noting that there are other theories of resource control aimed at explanation and pre— diction for purposes of application. Walter Firey's, ‘Manp Mind and Land (The Free Press. 1960) is such a work. With elaborate fanfare Firey gets out the idea that we must examine the interrelation of ecological. economic, and ethnographic features in order to adequately formulate resource policy. In spite of ponderous terminology and a 74 The Empirical Research Design My hypothesis states that the explanation of rational resource control differentials (by states) is to be under- stood as a direct function of the industrialization of society. How does one test such a correlation? The only possible approach is to construct operational indexes that will serve as definitions of the two major variables, and. at the same time, indicators of the appropriate data. As noted, to get the sorts of indicators needed, historical data are clearly inadequate. It is often vague and far too time consuming. Is there another method? Clearly, there is the ecological technique. Taking the forty- eight continentally contiguous states (Alaska and Hawaii being excluded because of their recent federal status)4O batch of Aristotlean syllogisms he only hatches a truism: i.e., we must take all factors into account. The actual job of predicting and explaining is carried on in four societies that Firey examines, and it shows, ever so clearly, that terminology or no you have to do the empirical ground work before you can predict; there is no simple ?social physics? from which reality can be deduced. 40Alaska and Hawaii have had a long and involved history of conservation warfare. They are. however, useless for our purposes, being, until recently, under federal juris- diction. Whatever conservation organizations exist can easily reflect this, rather than local facts and local industrialization. 75 an examination of the two variables will be undertaken state by state at a given dateline, falling within the five year period 1956-1961. By examining each state in terms of (a) industrialization of society, and (b) rationality of control, forty-eight comparative units will be amassed.41 If the correlations shows no major skews we may conclude that resource control differentials are a function of industrialism in (at least) one democratic, capitalistic system. But what indexes or indicators will serve as the operational definitions of the two key variables? Let us begin with the variable ?institutionalization of rational resource control.? The empirical indicators I am seeking must have the two following characteristics. First, they must indicate the empirical facts that are gptually relevant to rational resource control. Whether they slop over and do a bit more than this is less important. It would be more elegant to select indicators that direct attention to precisely what 41In point of fact there will ppp be forty-eight states, nor, for that matter twenty-eight. Four will be eliminated because they cannot be controlled; four more because they show random variation as regards degree of industrialization; and several more because they cannot be compared--either on a continuum or as extreme pairs--due to dissimilarities in quantities of wild land in the states to be matched. 76 is desired and no more, but a slight sloppiness of fit will not destroy their utility if it cannot be avoided. Second, the indicators must be pragmatically researchable. That is, it must be possible to get the required data they indicate without prodigious expenditures of time, effort, and money. To appreciate the type of indicators or indexes required it is important to define more specifically the meaning of ?institutionalization of rational resource control.? First, by ?institutionalization? is meant (a) regular and established ways of doing things, and (b) an association that serves public rather than merely private interests, and does so in an accepted, orderly, and enduring way. Both of these meanings of institutionalization are included in my definition and indicators must respond to both features. Second, by ?rational? is meant (a) the use of empirical science and general knowledge in the articulation of social means to ends (for whatever ends specified, and relative to whatever the corpus of scientific knowledge happens to be) and (b) the bureaucratization and/or professionalization of associations involved in the means—ends articulation (i.e., the construction of a rational administration of the means-ends nexus). Again, both characteristics of rationality must be included in the indicators. Third, by ?resource? is meant any culturally relevant material good or satisfaction--actual 77 or potential—-existing in the non-cultural world (natural world) that is characterized for some cultural purpose as not unlimited. Indicators of this factor I need not specifically include. They will be operationally included in the classification of associations of the cultural units (states) as concerned with resources and conservation. Since it must be such organizations that I study, no further indicator is necessary.4'2 Fourth, by ?control? is meant the probability of influencing or coercively designating the disposition of resources within the cultural units (states) investigated. If we now examine this set of definitions of the first variable we can readily see that there are five separate sorts of indicators that will be required: 1. Indicator of institutionalization in the sense of ?regular and established ways of doing things.? 2. Indicator of institutionalization in the sense of ?an association concerned with public rather than merely private interests.? 3. Indicator of ?use of empirical science and general knowledge in the articulation of the administration of the means-ends nexus.? 421n other words I am going to use the ?defined? conservation organizations as my resource units. The states classify them as such and I see no reason not to use that classification. As for private conservation organizations these can be obtained in a similar manner and will stand as defined by external agencies. 78 4. Indicator of ?bureaucratization and/or professional- ization of the administration of the means-ends nexus.? 5. Indicator of the "probability of influencing or coercively designating the disposition of resources." Taken as a group these indicators or indexes will, when they are empirically interpreted, constitute my operational definitions of ?institutionalization of rational resource control.? It now remains to specify the empirical inter— pretations of the five indicators. These interpretations must involve ?observable structures? concerned with resource control. Observable structures concerned with control fall into two types, public and private associations. The indicators listed above will be given empirical interpretations primarily in terms of public structures. 1. For the indicator ?regular and established ways of doing things? the empirical interpretation may be used of (a) organipgtiongl duration, and (b) permanence of tenure of staff relative to rank and file members of the organization. The duration of existence of an organization is certainly some evidence of its institutionalization. TWo years should be adequate for organizations established within the last five; five years for organizations established within the last ten. In both instances--and so as not to 79 penalize fledglings--the specified durations should generally eliminate short term pressure groups concerned with ephemeral issues. Salaried and permanent staff members, as opposed to voluntary personnel, appears to be a fair device for sorting out strictly ?newsletter? organizations from organized and effective professional structures. Both of these empirical interpretations of the first indicator apply especially to private associations concerned with conservation. The public sector is less likely to manifest the negative of either empirical interpretation. However, this in no way destroys the interpretation's effectiveness for the public sector and it should be included, obvious or not. 2. For the indicator of ?an association concerned with public rather than merely private interests? the empirical interpretation of public definition in legitimate codes and documents may be employed. Thus constitutions, legal declarations, state statutes, and other objective sources may be utilized. 3. For the indicator ?use of empirical science and general knowledge in the articulation of means to ends,? one empirical interpretation will be, numbers apd types of degrees in higher educgpion held by all renumerated staff members in public resource associations. This would exclude 80 from consideration voluntary fire fighters in state organizations, while it would include even the manual laborer in a govern- ment fish hatchery. Other things being equal, private organizations may be expected to have fewer degree holding employees since their chief interest is influence; while public organizations, such as the State of Michigan, Department of Conservation, would have more since they involve the administrative application of empirical science and knowledge to the rational attainment of ends. The ?certified degree or diploma? offers one fair and objective measure of the use of the expertise of empirical science and knowledge as contrasted with political appointment, nepotism. and patronage. Another ?sub-indicator? or ?interpretation? will be the averaged (three years) absolute size of research budgets. ?Absolute size? tells us how much research gets done, whereas taken as some percentage it would give a distorted picture. That is, given states with comparable forest lands to manage it would be folly to think that two deer—food research projects are better than one. They are no more likely to be better, as Keynes argued, than two railroads running side by side. Therefore it is absolute not relative amounts of research budget that are important. The issue of 81 federal monies and research will be resolved by keeping state and national funds separate on the questionnaire. Discussion of any bias such federal activity might give the state conservation picture must wait until the discussion of the wild land control variable. 4. For the indicator of ?bureaucratization and/Or professionalization of the administration of the means-ends nexus? the empirical interpretation may be confined mainly to ?bureaucratic rationality? (as opposed to ?professional rationality?) except as evidence suggests the need for the second sub-indicator. Professionalization, as a distinct mechanism for constructing rational administrative systems, is only indirectly encountered in administrative structures of public associations.43 For the major (i.e., bureaucratic) interpretation of rationality use may be made of the ratio of clerical to managers, officials, and professionals in the administrative 43Strictly speaking the above argument is arbitrary. Insofar as state bureaucracies employ, for instance, Ph.D.'s they are getting professionals and professional rationality (i.e., socialized competence in an area of task diversity-- the opposite of bureaucratic rationality). To this extent professionalism, as a third type of rationality (see below) must be included in my indicators. But the same indicator as scientific rationality can serve, in this case, a dual purpose (i.e., the number and type of degrees relative to total membership in the organization). This will be discussed below in the consideration of the conservation data. 82 staff of public associations.44 Stinchcombe has employed a similar index interpre- tation for the study of the construction industry, an industry exhibiting high manual professionalization but low bureau— cratic rationality.45 If the ratio is high it suggests an 44The relative weights given in this study to the public and the private sectors of conservation are admittedly uneven. The reasons for this are as follows. First, I am not trying to assess the relative importance of public versus private sectors. I am only interested in some objective measure of resource control that will be comparable by states. Second, the public sector will be my main source because it appears on all accounts to have the greatest impact, both through time and proportionately. Third, most private organizations that are billed as conservation organizations are really sportsmen's clubs and specialized preservationists groups. It would be most surprising, indeed, if they manifest the structure of rationality and control that public structures do, since their chief functions are influence and lobbying. Therefore, insofar as the private sector receives attention, gross membership and similar crude indicators will be utilized. 5Stinchcombe argues, as have several others recently (S. H. Udy, ?Bureaucracy and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study,? §§§. V61. 24 (December, 1959], pp. 791-95) that Weber's notion of rationality of administration (or administrative rationality) requires dissection: one element being bureaucratic with or without professionalization and the other professional- ization without bureaucratization. Files and records are employed as one of the best indexes of the split. The bureaucracy is a type of administration of many separate and distinct tasks, yet its rationality lies in the organi- zational structure. not so the matter of professionalism. Socialized competence in an area of task diversity is the professional rationality. The two are not necessarily linked. The use of files and file keepers is as good an indicator of the degree of bureaucratization as I need. See: Arthur L. Stinchcombe, ?Bureaucratic and Craft Administration 83 association organized around files, records, and communications and therefore centralized planning, decision making, influence, and coercion can be anticipated. If it is low one may safely assume that rational planning, centralized decision making, and centralized power are unlikely. This is precisely the difference one would expect to find between a government conservation bureaucracy and a private voluntary association of hunters united by an occasional party, the yearly hunt, and a monthly newsletter. It is also the difference one would expect to find between the California Fisheries and Wildlife Department and the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission. The administration of the ?means? in such diametric organi- zations varies accordingly. 5. For the indicator of ?probability of influencing or coercively designating the disposition of resources? the empirical interpretation of gposs membership in private and public associations and organizations and total state budget may be employed. While sheer members may not always be significant of control it is certain that even small organizations, no of Production: A Comparative Study,' in Administrative Science Quarterly, V01. 4 (September, 1959). Pp. 169-87. For discussion of the same general empirical indicator see: Reinhard Bendix, WOrk and Authority in Industry (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956). pp. 211-26. 84 matter how effectively structured, must gain some mass support in order to influence decisions. This is true especially for private groups. The sheer numbers, on the other hand. of employees in public structures are certain to influence events more significantly as they increase. Of course, it is true, as Selznick has shown, that a numerically insignificant association, if effectively structured and disciplined, may have disproportionate influence.46 This was especially true of the Bolsheviks in revolutionary Russia. But it todk a period of great social unrest to advance such an organization. Within the settled political structures of Western Europe the same organization had little effect without mass support. Temperance movements are often suggested, in the United States and Canada. as evidence of the effectiveness of organized minorities. But while they were well organized they also had mass rural support making them significant minorities. In itself mass support and (concomitantly) budgets may not be the entire story. but without them, except in times of social crisis, it is unlikely that much can be accomplished. Therefore, sheer size of voluntary private associations and total number 46Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (The Free Press, 1960; formerly published by MoGraw-Hill), pp. 1-72. 275-314. 85 of employees in public organizations along with budgets should give us a reasonable, if not unquestionable, measure of ?control.? In closing this discussion, of the empirical interpretation of the indicators of the first variable, the question of control factors again emerges. To begin with, it may appear that I will have to control the various states by population. Since there are enormous variations in population among the comparative units it would seem important to any conclusions to adjust these discrepancies. However, since population differentials are, as will be shown below, one of the indicators of ?industrial society? it would mean, in effect, that I was controlling an aspect of my variable. Besides, private and public resource control associations are not desigped to administer the population. Their concern is natural resources. But the control of another factor cannot be so easily disposed of as that of population differentials. I refer to the pgpgp, by states, of ?wild land? to land in agriculture and/or in urban areas.47 By wild land is meant forests, swamps, sheer mountain, desert, water's edge, etc. 47This facet really represents a third control factor: wild land, political, and economic. 86 Such land is carefully classified by states and can be ascertained en toto by detailed computations from relevant sources. Now the amount of wild land in a state must be controlled for this study to have worth. This is most easily seen in the case of Iowa. In that state the land falls into one of two predominant classifications: urban areas and agricultural farm. Except for soil and farm conservation there is quite literally little basis for a conservation program or resource control movement. There would be virtually nothing (conparatively speaking) for a state conservation department to administer. Therefore, we must eliminate those states that fall below a certain ratio of wild to non-wild land. At what ratio the cut off point, for complete elimination, should be established is not yet certain. Whatever the ratio proves to be it should be picked so as to appear ?reasonable? from the point of view of the known facts of that state's land and industrial- urban structure. However, for the remaining majority of states only those with roughly identical ratios of wild land to urban—agriculture will be compared. Another reason that the wild land control is imperative is that I am deliberately excluding agriculture conservation as well as soil control from this study. This is necessary because agriculture is, by definition, a form of resource 87 control outside of the industrial picture (unless industrial and mechanized farming are viewed——and this is too indirect-— as responses to growth of industrial population). To appreciate the effects of industrialism on resource control movements this factor must be excluded from this study, though, indeed, not from all studies of this problem. This is especially true from the point of view of a state analysis rather than a national analysis. Let us now turn to the other master variable ?industrial society.? Again one must define what is meant in order to facilitate the search for indicators. However, at this point a problem arises. Whereas, resource control was relatively limited, it is a truism that industrialism is a sweeping and highly diverse phenomenon. Therefore, what we must search out is neither a definition of those entities in the extension of the term as a whole, nor what logicians call a ?real definition? of the meaning of the idea in all respects. What we must have instead are only those aspects of industrial society that are particularly resource relevant.48 48The factors I select will stand in about the same relation to my study as Clark Kerr's-Siegle's ?explanations? and ?theories examined? stand to their discovery of the differentials in propensity to strike in various industries, see: ?The Interindustry Propensity to Strike--An International Comparison,? op. cit.; and the general discussion of the 88 Now clearly not all aspects of the impact of industrialism on society are resource relevant. Kinship, for instance, seems to have severely altered, in the course of industrialization, without registering a resource impact. It may be possible to argue that had extended families per- sisted the pattern of tract homes, for instance, would have created sharp differences in land use. And some would even argue that the nuclear family is by no means always an accompaniment of industrialization (i.e., Japan). Nonetheless there does seem to be a fairly general correlation, given enough time. But even if tract homes had been differently organized, farmland differently processed, there is general agreement that the alteration in kinship incident upon industrialization has not had a major role in the determin- . 49 ation of resources. meaning of the relation between economic development and democratic stability in S. M. Lipset's ?Economic Development and Democracy,? op. cit. There is considerable controversy over the relation of kinship to industrialization. That is enough to disqualify it for my use. See for instance: Eugene Litwak, ?Geography, Mobility and Family Cohesion,? American Sociological Review, Vbl. 25 (June, 1960), pp. 385-94; also by Litwak see: ?Occupational Mobility and Family Cohesion,? American Sociological Review, V61. 25 (February, 1960), pp. 9-21; and for a quite recent treatment of the entire problem, one, in fact, throwing doubt on the very correlation of nuclear families and industrialism see: Sidney M. Greenfield, ?Industrialization and the Family in Sociological Theory,? 89 The increase in the division of labor is another aspect of the process of industrialization that seems to have little resource relevance, unless one uses it as an indicator of industrialism--a very different thing.50 A shift to an associational type society is again of little direct meaning to resource use, unless, again, it is taken as an industrial indicator.51 And finally, a shift from sacred to secular orientations in daily decisions has had little resource relevance. Of course, if any of these changes are viewed as indicators of the industrialization of society then, by definition, that indicator is going to have an impact if the correlation holds at all.52But in themselves they are not vitally relevant. The American Journal of Sociology, vol. LXVII (Nbvember, 1961), pp. 312-22. Japan has been the source of much similar research with its persistence of dozoku and other forms of ?fictive kinship? in the process of industrialization. 50It is difficult to cite sources for the obvious. Only Marx argued that there could be an industrial order without division of labor. So grotesque is this formulation that it seems wiser to cite it than the mountain of comment on the necessity of a division of labor in industrial society. See: Karl Marx, The German Ideology (International Publishers, 1939), p. 22. And so uncertain was Marx of his own formu- lation that he never bothered to develop it. 1There is an embarrassment of riches regarding this issue: Cooley, Maine, Morgan, Redfield, Weber and a dozen others. This was one of Redfield's main contentions as well as many others. See: Robert Redfield, ?The Folk Society,? American Journal of Sociology (January, 1947); Becker argued 90 Having listed four common—-if not universal--features of industrialism that do not appear resource relevant, it remains to specify some features that in fact are. I have in mind four basic alterations that have occurred in the structures of societies under the impact of industrialization. Thus far I have not encountered critical opposition to viewing these features as ?caused? or constantly correlated with the industrialization of society. Further— more, they appear to me to be highly resource relevant. If they are, not my correlation would be meaningless. But inso- far as there is general agreement that these factors of industrialization are resource relevant, then, there is, by that much, reason for accepting them as the probable cause of the resource movement. There will also be the evidence of any serious study that has been concluded concerning their resource utilization--and there have been many--plus the inductive evidence of the general correlation I am attempting to establish in this dissertation. The ?deductive probability? of my chosen factors of resource relevant industrialization actually amount to the ?micro-analysis? of which I spoke while discussing the Chief that they could change back and forth (sacred and secular) but the same general point was involved. And the growing disenchantment has been the theme of many writers in sociology (and out) when viewing industrial societies. 91 Features of the empirical problem. It is this aspect that amounts to the "purely verbal?-—causal tie-in between industrial society and resource control. What I will end with in this study is a general correlation only. .Tpg specific causal analysis will rest on thepprobability of the industrial indicators being in fact resource relevant. These indicators must, again, be observable phenomena. They should, again, be actually relevant to resource use. And if a bit sloppy they should at least cover what is germaine to this study. Finally they should be pragmatically researchable. They are: 1. Indicator of growth in ?size and concentration of industrial organizations of economic production.? 2. Indicator of growth in ?size and concentration of urban political units.? 3. Indicator of growth in ?size and concentration of gross population." 4. Indicator of "increase in wealth per capita.? Taking these features of the impact of industriali- zation on society as resource relevant we can see that corresponding sub-indicators are required. These sub— indicators are simply the feature in question given an empirical interpretation.53 53Another possible variable that may appear important is the taxation differentials by states. This matter will be taken up (below) previous to the discussion of the conclusions to the empirical findings. 92 The empirical interpretations given these indicators are as follows: 1. For the indicator growth in ?size and concentration of industrial organizations of economic production? the following interpretations may be employed. First, the absolute number of economic enterprises employing 500 or more employees, by states, coupled with the ratio of small businesses (8—19 employees) to large, by states. Second, the assessed valuation of industrial and commercial properties. Third, percent of the states population in the non-agriculture workforce and the percent in primary and secondary versus tertiary industries. The reasons for employing the first indicator should be obvious in terms of my hypothesis. The last two are selected because the degree of industrialization of a society--or a state-—in every study I know is directly related to the size of and degree of concentration of economic organizations.5 2. For the indicator growth in ?size and concentration of urban political units? the following interpretations will 54See, for instance: Admantior Pepelasis, Leon Mears, and Irma Adelman, Economic Development (Harper & Brothers, 1961). pp. 3-17; also, Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1959), Parts 2 and 3; A. A. Berle. Jr., Power Without Property (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959), in which the old master of economic concentrations reiterates his views and adds further fuel. 93 be employed. First, total number, by states, of cities 50,000 population and over, together with breakdown, by states, of number of cities falling in specified size sub- classes. Second, total number of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, by states, plus percent of population residing within and without SMAS's. Third, percent of total population classified as rural, by states. Fourth, two additional sub-indicators concerned with water use in municipal areas and sewage disposal problems by municipal areas. 3. For the indicator growth in ?size and concentration of the gross population? the following interpretations will be employed. First, gross population figures by states. Second, automobile registrations by states. Third, fishing licenses sold (absolute and relative numbers as well as out- of—state), by states. Fourth, hunting licenses sold (absolute and relative as well as out-of-state). by states. The last three interpretations are utilized because of the sense (see below) in which the population (as a market and a recruitment source) is conceived in this study. 4. For the indicator.increase in ?wealth per capita? the empirical interpretation of per capita personal income, by state, will be employed, together with a general graph dealing with the relation among personal income, travel, and leisure 94 as they impinge on outdoor recreation. Since this latter aspect involves exactly what is important regarding personal income,it will serve as a useful summary device. Once I have established a continuum of states based upon these industrial sub-indicators of the four major indicators,I will be in a position to correlate them with the indicators of resource control. Before leaving this discussion of the empirical design.it is important to understand exactly why each of the industrial society indicators were chosen as having a high probability of resource relevance (i.e., a discussion of the causal connection between the two master variables at the ?micro-level?). The causal probability of my industrial correlates rests upon the likelihood of their involving the entire range of non-agricultural resource use. If they cover more than this range,no great harm is done; if they cover less, they are inadequate. A correlation in itself is a significant fact; but the desire in turn to explain the correlation is appealing. We noted that many features of industrialism were without resource relevance, but we went on to isolate four factors that were. The size and concentration of economic units of production was chosen for the following set of resource relevancies. Industries require basic raw materials 95 such as metals, chemicals, wood pulp, timber, concrete, and the entire range of fabrication materials. There are also the basic service needs of waste disposal, sufficient water for processing, water transport, and energy. Lately, the air pollution as well as stream pollution problems have complicated this picture. Thus in the entire spectrum of materials ranging from renewable to non-renewable resources. industry is directly concerned. The importance of size and concentration factors rests upon the question of perception of resources base and the likelihood of oligarchic monopoly. The chief point seems to be that the larger the enterprise, and the more concentrated the industry, the greater likeli- hood of perceiving the need to plan and the greater likeli- hood of the organization attaining economic security. Large size and concentration mean a broader overview, a greater probability of understanding the need for long range calculation, greater probability of monopoly, and thus greater appreciation of the limitations of any resource base. 0n the other hand the smaller the concern.the less likely is this sort of consideration to emerge. Problems of sufficient raw materials, water, waste removal, transport, and energy--each of these, and others, are crucial to rational planning. Rational planning is a necessary feature of all large scale operations. Therefore, 96 resource concern should be manifest by such organizations. Naturally some of this concern will be national and inter- national. Nonetheless.what is available at the states level will be of definite interest. The automobile industries have long shown concern for the metal and fuel resources in Michigan, and not a little of their interest in this state was centered around the Great Lakes coal, iron, copper, and water transport potentialities. This is not to say that industry will back conservation in general. But those aspects relevant to its particular industrial resource base will get attention. Turning to the indicator size and concentration of urban political units, the chief resource uses are those of water supply, waste disposal, air (and its pollution) and energy. By focusing on the growth of political entities we get into somewhat the same problem of planning and perception (and ?state? monopoly) that we discussed in industry. Beyond a certain size and concentration point, it is safe to say, water and waste disposal are seen as pp; urban problems. California is at present involved in a water project for the urban south that makes the Panama Canal pale by comparison. The Chicago waste disposal and water problem has plagued the Great Lakes states for years since it involves a basic 97 disposal—water use dilemma. Political communities, pp distinct from mereppopulation aggregates, are organized (like monopolies) to act on such issues. Modern history in urban places has demonstrated that this action is forth- coming as soon as the perception of the problem increases. This increase is a function of size and concentration of municipal polities.5 The huge recreation arm of conservation is covered mainly by the size and density of population indicator. Recreation is a multi-billion dollar national business and ranks third only to automobiles and agriculture in Michigan. As in the case of production industries it is necessary to indicate the groups concerned with its persistence and the resources upon which it relies. From the point of view of population these groups fall into two classes with respect to their interest in population: those concerned with markets and those concerned with recruits. In both instances the concentrated populations are the market targets and advertising targets as well as the source of recruitment. Groups concerned with mass markets and with mass 55Marion Clawson, R. Burnell Held, Charles H. Stoddard, Land fo; the Future (The John Hopkins Press, 1960), pp; 51-123 and bibliography. 98 advertizing include: hunting, fishing, and camping equipment companies; service industries related to these outdoor activities such as restaurants, taverns, hotels, motels, gasoline companies, and merchants; liquor, beer, and soft drinks and their advertisers; outdoor advertising and the (non-stalking) sporting goods manufacturers. Also in the category of mass markets are the local magazines and TV shows that find rich sources for feature articles in outdoor recreation and vacations, not to mention newspapers and ?outdoor? magazines concerned with hunting, fishing, and camping exclusively. In this list must be included tourist bureaus, tourist agencies, and the AAA; the market for skiing and a hundred similar recreations and their service industries; the automobile companies and tire companies that everywhere out-Michelin Michelin in thoroughness of travel instigation. On the other side of the use of population for market purposesis the use of population for recruitment for various programs: the CCC, three generations of Boy Scouts, summer camps and municipal boys camps, physical education organizations, organized nature groups, lodges and resorts, and the William 0. Douglas ideologists. What all these diverse groups--and many others not mentioned--have in common is that they are found mainly in the great population centers of the United States. Advertising, 99 sales, and recruitment drives are aimed at urban areas and it is suggestive that the mass support for private conservation organizations comes from the densely populated sectors of the United States. As to the resources such populations exploit, with their duly purchased objects of manufacture and their - certificates of membership, the following may be mentioned: campgrounds, state parks, roadside parks, ski lodges and slopes, resorts, beaches, wildlife, aquatic life, sheer mountains, streams, lakes.color tour routes, ?unspoiled? building sites, hiking trails, pack trails, ?wilderness areas,? game reserves, forests, historic sites, “recreation areas,? green belts, swamps, and ?scenic attractions.?56 Finally, the increase in wealth per capita isagain directly related to many of the political community resource uses (water, wastes, etc.) and also to recreation land use. Increases in income carry with them increased leisure and increased means of locomotion. With advances in leisure and transport the recreation features of otherwise remote areas 56;p;g., pp. 3-19, 124_93',412_39; also see: Marion Clawson, Statistics on Outdoor Recregtion (The John Hopkins Press, 1958), H. Martin and Esther S. Neumeyer, A Study of Leisure and Recreation in Their Sociological Aspects (A. S. Barnes & Co., 1949); Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn, Mass Leisure (The Free Press, 1958). lOO suddenly become real. Skiing is a striking example of a recreation industry directly related to wealth. Others such as surf fishing, skin diving, water skiing, boating, canoeing, sailing, fishing, hunting, even smelt dipping, and dozens of others are equally striking.57 Inthis discussion of the industrial society indicators it is clear that the major resource areas have been covered. Water, air, minerals, hiking trails, parks, forests, energy, lakes, scenery, streams, water transport, mountains, wildlife, fish, and a dozen other resources are contained in one form or another in the use bases of the four industrial indicators. If population is more than a giant target for bazaars, if industries are more than resource converters, if communities are more than drainpipes, and wealth more than idle hours and fast cars, it is also true that they are at least these things. 57See: Mass Leisure, pp. cit., esp. pp. 145-97, 281-304; Land for the Futurep op. cit., pp. 124-93, and bibliography in this latter bodk for all the key variables. CHAPTER III THE EMPIRICAL DATA AND INTERPRETATION We turn now to the empirical evidence which will give body to the research design. The quantitative data upon which this dissertation rests may, for convenience, be divided into three major and two minor categories. In review- ing and interpreting these materials I will follow a systematic pattern, beginning with a minor group of materials, followed by the three major categories of data, and ending with a consideration of the remaining minor category. The first minor category will review data on state parks. This is a fairly important piece of evidence for it demonstrates, in microcosm, several of the dissertation's chief points. The next task will be to consider the major categories of data, of which there are three. The first is concerned with establishing the rank order of the forty—eight states as regards their ?resource relevant degrees of industriali- zation.? Here I will first examine a general summary table, followed by a discussion of the thirteen sub-tables which went into its construction. These thirteen sub-tables constitute the empirical interpretations of the four chief 101 102 indicators of industrialization: economic organization, urbanization, population, per capita wealth. The second major area is concerned with establishing the absolute amounts of ?wild land? found within each state. This, as was noted, is necessary as a control factor in comparing the various conservation activities. The third major area is concerned with establishing the rank order of ?institutionalization of rational resource control,? by states. This will be approached by examining three summary tables and then by a verbal analysis of the individual public and private state findings. Finally, the second minor data table, concerned with taxation differentials by states, will be examined to assess the role of tax structures and tax capacity as it impinges upon conservation activities. Data on State Park Systems The United States Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census) keeps records of the number, size, annual visits, and total state expenditures on state parks by each of the fifty states. If we examine (see Table 1) this table (with the states ranked on the total acreage set aside in state parks) a number of important points leap into focus. In many ways this table constitutes a microcosm of the general 103 Table 1. Rank order of number of acres in state parks,by states, together with annual visits and annual expenditures, 1959. States Acreage Visits Expenditures (1,000) ($1,000) New York 2,701,199 34,990 18,646 California 677,007 22,196 21,757 Maine 204,361 616 303 Michigan 181,965 19,975 2,162 Pennsylvania 166,116 21,169 3,717 wyoming 152,005 463 31 Tennessee 131,325 3,789 1,981 Minnesota 99,533 2,935 822 Ohio 92,069 17,763 4,175 South Dakota 91,000 4,550 395 Kansas 90,491 2.785 1,105 .Missouri 73,775 4,962 1,113 Washington 73,195 7,065 1,855 Florida 72,737 3,260 1,091 Texas 62,301 6,269 614 Georgia 60.083 3,172 760 Oregon 59,490 10,836 1,981 Oklahoma 53,762 9,149 2,138 South Carolina 45,972 3,068 348 Indiana 43,723 3,011 1,245 New Hampshire 43,034 2,219 1,471 Illinois 42,772 8,447 3,467 .Alabama 42,691 2,846 390 ‘West Virginia 40.711 1,971 1,186 Nbrth Carolina 36.268 1,571 753 Iowa 29,715 7,359 1,359 Nebraska 28,213 3,662 381 ‘Virginia 24,364 1,171 301 New Jersey 22,801 4,772 1,996 Connecticut 21,297 4.828 1,089 Arkansas 19.114 2.023 468 Wisconsin 19,106 5,844 609 Kentucky 19,018 4,421 2,409 Idaho 17,465 687 117 Maryland 16,855 4.712 671 Mississippi 13,635 988 316 Massachusetts 13.516 7.226 2.695 Louisiana 12,218 1,611 514 104 Table 1. Continued. States Acreage Visits Expenditures (1,000) ($1,000) Nevada 9,895 70 65 Rhode Island 8.425 2,604 587 vermont 8,055 668 192 Utah 7,030 500 66 Colorado 6,964 314 136 Montana 6,490 320 99 New Mexico 5,387 1,003 185 North Dakota 4,393 437 109 Delaware 3,745 468 130 Arizona 4 3 43 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961, Table 254, p. 192. relation between industrialization and conservation. Since, however, state parks are concerned primarily with recreation and preservation the other major arm of resource control (raw materials) is hardly represented. Nevertheless, the table is instructive as far as it goes. It is clear from even a cursory examination of Table 1 that a close relationship exists between the industrial states (Table 2) and the number of visits and amount of :money spent on the park system of a given state. For while 'there are non-industrial states with large park systems (Maine, wyoming, South Dakota) the pressure on these systems Eas measured in annual visits is scant and the state 105 expenditures extremely low. Maine, for instance, with nearly forty million pppe acres in state parks than Pennsylvania, has less than one-thirty—fourth the visitors and expends less than one—twelfth the monies that Pennsylvania allocates. Both Maine and Pennsylvania are eastern states (thus obviating the effects--if any-—of large federal holdings) and they have virtually similar amounts of wild land (see Table 16, below). Mississippi and Massachusetts exhibit a similar pattern: though they maintain similar acreages in state parks the differences in visitors and expenditures is quite remarkable. Tennessee and Ohio show striking differentials. as do Iowa and Massachusetts-~even allowing that the latter pair have identical land areas and that the acreages in parks is biased against the hypothesis. Here then is a first approximation, concerned with recreation and preservation, that seems to bear out the hypothesis of this study. Summapy Table: Industrial Society In constructing the empirical design of this study (above), I selected, for special consideration, four aspects closely related to the general industrialization of society. And as was suggested in that general discussion, one or more 106 (generally the latter) ?sub—indicators? or ?empirical interpretations? would have to be assigned to these four master aspects of the first major variable. If one examines the discussion of these indicators he will find that a total of thirteen specific empiricalinterpretations have been assigned the four basic indicators, and that these thirteen interpretations constitute the operational definition of the industrial society variable. It follows, therefore, that if, for each of the thirteen empirical interpretations, the forty—eight states are (a) ranked in a series of thirteen continua ranging from highest to lowest, (b) if these continua are divided into thirds, and then (c) arranged according to the total number of empirical interpretations which each state exhibits falling (whether completely or largely) within the top, middle, or bottom thirds of the continua--if this operation is performed, a systematic summary of the resource relevant degrees of industrialization will have been established. This summary constitutes Table 2. Notice that if a state falling under say, the ?Highly Industrialized? third has a total of thirteen indicators (i.e., empirical interpretations or sub-indicators) it has (qua this definitional scheme) the maximum degree of industrialization possible, While if it has only eight 107 Table 2. Rank order of states ?highly industrialized,? ?moderately industrialized,? and ?least industrialized" as summarized for all industrial society indicators. States ranked by the total number sub—indicators falling into each third of the total rank order. Table excludes states exhibiting random variation. HIGHLY Highly Moderately Least INDUSTRIALIZED Industrial— Industrial- Industrial— STATES ized ized ized Indicators Indicators Indicators New York 13 0 0 Illinois 13 0 0 California 13 0 0 Ohio 13 0 0 Pennsylvania 13 0 0 Michigan 13 0 0 New Jersey 11 2 0 Texas 11 2 0 Indiana 11 2 0 Wisconsin 11 2 0 Massachusetts 11 1 1 Missouri 9 4 0 Florida 8 4 1 Connecticut 8 3 2 MODERATELY INDUSTRIALIZED H—I-I MrI-I L-I—I STATES Kansas 0 12 1 Louisiana 0 11 2 Colorado 2 10 1 Oregon 1 10 2 Oklahoma 0 10 3 Kentucky 1 9 3 Washington 4 9 0 Tennessee 3 8 2 Iowa 3 8 2 Alabama 2 8 3 Minnesota 4 8 1 Georgia 4 8 1 West Virginia 0 8 5 South Carolina 0 8 5 Table 2. Continued. 108 LEAST INDUSTRIALIZED H-I-I MrI-I L-I-I STATES NOrth Dakota 0 0 13 Idaho 0 O 13 South Dakota 0 l 12 vermont 0 l 12 New Mexico 0 l 12 Maine 0 3 10 Montana 0 3 10 wyoming 1 2 10 Delaware 2 1 10 Mississippi 0 4 9 New Hampshire 1 3 9 Arizona 1 3 9 Nevada 2 2 9 Arkansas 0 5 8 Utah 1 4 8 STATES EXHIBITING RANDOM H—I-I MrI—I L-I-I VARIATION Virginia 5 7 1 Maryland 5 4 4 North Carolina 6 5 2 Rhode Island 2 5 6 Nebraska 0 7 6 Source: Summaries of ?industrial society? sub-indicators. 109 (as, in this case, Florida which has four in the ?moderately industrialized"and one in the "least industrialized? thirds of the continua), then it has the minimum requirement for consideration as an industrial state. At any rate no fewer than eight interpretations must fall within pp; of the thirds to qualify for consideration in this study. If less than this number are concentrated in any one continuum-third the state is eliminated from all consideration. It will be noted that five states, exhibiting such random variation, are so eliminated. No attempt is made to weigh the importance of the various factors or interpretations. I know of no such criteria in the resource literature nor do I propose to attempt the formulation of a set of criteria. I have however, attempted to pick interpretations that are both sociologically reasonable and resource connected. And I have attempted, insofar as possible, to select, as my states to be investigated, the lpppp ambiguous states, that is, those having the greatest number of sub-indicators falling within each of the major continuum thirds. The reader is advised to consult this summary table frequently in appraising the legitimacy of any state's claim to being ?high,? ?low,? or ?middle? on the industrial 110 variable. It should also be kept in mind that five states have been, by virtue of this summary, eliminated from con- sideration. Other borderline situations (Florida) may be considered as virtually eliminated because of their ambiguous status. Indicator: Economic Organization Table 3. This is the first empirical interpretation concerned with the indicator ?size and concentration of economic organizations of production.? I will use a total of three interpretations in attempting to specify this aspect of the major variable. Table 3 is concerned with the total number of large business establishments (500 or more employees) in each state and the ratio of large to small businesses (8-19 employees). The importance of this table resides in the fact that it specifies an important aspect of my hypothesis: the relationship between size and concentration of an organization and the perception of that organization's resource base. In general the states which fall in the highly industrialized third of the summary table show, as well, the greatest number of big businesses and generally a strong tendency to reduce the ratio of large to small businesses. This is especially the case if we keep in mind the absolute amounts of land in the several states--a key 111 Table 3. Number of business establishments by employee size of 500 and over (1959) ranked by states. and ratio of establishments 8-19 employees to 500 and over employees. (Ratios computed by author.) States Estb. 500+ Ratio: 8-19 to 500+ New York 967 52:1 Pennsylvania 683 39:1 Illinois 636 42:1 Ohio 616 38:1 California 593 68:1 Michigan 407 41:1 Massachusetts 351 42:1 New Jersey 345 43:1 Texas 286 89:1 Indiana 246 45:1 Connecticut 202 33:1 Wisconsin 197 51:1 Missouri 185 64:1 North Carolina 180 59:1 Georgia 154 63:1 Tennessee 140 58:1 Maryland 136 53:1 Florida 126 117:1 Alabama 124 57:1 South Carolina 123 40:1 Virginia 123 79:1 Minnesota 119 74:1 Louisiana 98 81:1 West Virginia 80 53:1 Washington 77 93:1 Kentucky 75 86:1 Iowa 67 109:1 Rhode Island 52 46:1 Oregon 50 99:1 Oklahoma 49 134:1 Colorado 46 108:1 Kansas 42 141:1 Maine 39 61:1 Arizona 38 86:1 Arkansas 37 110:1 New Hampshire 33 50:1 112 Table 3. Continued. States Estab. 500+ Ratio: 8-19 to 500+ Delaware 30 42:1 Nebraska 30 125:1 Mississippi 30 142:1 Utah 24 99:1 Nevada 16 56:1 New Mexico 14 183:1 Idaho 12 161:1 Montana 12 165:1 vermont 10 112:1 wyoming 3 370:1 South Dakota 3 583:1 North Dakota 1 1,568:1 Source: CountyyBusiness Patterns, United States Department of Commerce, First Quarter, 1959, Part 1, p. 14 (see: "State Totals"). factor for our consideration in comparing the states. Thus we find North Dakota-—generally the lowest on all industrial indexes--with a ratio of one big business to every 1,568 small businesses, as contrasted with Connecticut's one big business to every 33 small businesses. If we remember also that the small businessman was pictured, by the populist historians, as the backbone of the conservation movement, the states which today exhibit such patterns cast severe doubt on this proposition. Table 4. Since there is generally agreed to be a close relationship between the degree of industrialization and corporate concentration, that is, between the centralization 113 by states, of locally assessed commercial and industrial Gross assessed value. taxable real property 1956: property. in rank order. Table 4. (units of $1,000,000) New York 12,860 Illinois 5,702 California 5,093 Ohio 3.633 Pennsylvania 3,495 Michigan 2,950 Massachusetts 2,490 New Jersey 2,056 Wisconsin 1,993 Texas 1,384 Connecticut 1,366 Florida 1,282 Missouri 1,224 North Carolina 1,184 Maryland 1,053 Indiana 832 Virginia 721 Tennessee 558 Minnesota 528 Colorado 520 Louisiana 486 Rhode Island 485 Kentucky 471 Iowa 444 Washington 437 Georgia 398 West Virginia 382 Alabama 369 New Hampshire 319 Oregon 312 Kansas 274 Maine 260 Nebraska 258 Delaware 250 Oklahoma 247 114 Table 4. Continued. (units of $1,000,000) Nevada 131 South Dakota 123 vermont 114 Mississippi 108 Arizona 106 Utah 99 Arkansas 86 Montana 72 Idaho 64 New Mexico 60 South Carolina 57 Wyoming 51 NOrth Dakota 38 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961, Table 545, p. 417. of corporate wealth and a nation's economic development, this table is useful in confirming the general pattern of con- centration adumbrated in Table 3 (above). The gross assessed value of locally assessed taxable real property in commercial and industrial use is a sub-indicator useful for defining degrees of industrialization, and indirectly therefore, economic concentration. If I had controlled these figures in Table 4 by constructing them in relation to total land area the concentration would have been even more apparent. Thus Delaware emerges in a strange position. Table 5. This table is concerned with yet another aspect of the concentration of economic units, by states. 115 Table 5. Ranked percent of total population in non-agricultural workforce (annual average). for 1960. And percent of workforce in primary (extractive) and secondary (manufacturing) as opposed to teritary (service) industries (computations by author). % workforce % primary States non-agriculture and secondary Massachusetts 37.1 47. New YOrk 36.8 42. Nevada 36.1 25. Connecticut 36.0 54. Delaware 34.5 42. Rhode Island 33.7 50. New Jersey 33.1 52. Pennsylvania 32.8 52. New Hampshire 32.2 54. Ohio 32.1 52. Missouri 31.2 43. California 31.2 40. Indiana 30.9 53. Illinois 30.8 49. Wisconsin 30.0 53. Michigan 29.8 50. Utah 29.6 36. Wyoming 29.3 41. Colorado 29.1 35. Maryland 28.9 43. Oregon 28.6 42. Washington 28.6 39. Maine 28.5 49. Minnesota 27.1 42. Nebraska 26.9 33. Vermont 26.8 47. Georgia 26.3 45. Florida 26.3 32. North Carolina 26.1 53. Texas 26.1 45. Tennessee 25.7 45. Virginia 25.5 43. Table 5. Continued. 116 % workforce % primary States non-agriculture and secondary Kansas 25.5 39. Arizona 25.3 46. Oklahoma 24.9 36. New Mexico 24.9 31. Montana 24.7 34. West Virginia 24.6 53. Iowa 24.6 39. South Carolina 24.3 53. Louisiana 24.1 40. Alabama 23.6 46. Idaho 23.3 37. Kentucky 21.4 45. Arkansas 20.6 41. South Dakota 20.4 26. Nbrth Dakota 19.6 25. Mississippi 18.2 43. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, 1961, Table 280, p. 211, Table 281, p. 212, respectively. By examining the relative percentage of the total state workforce (as compared with total population of the state) in non-agricultural pursuits, and then coupling this with the relative percentage of the workforce in the extractive (primary)--manufacturing (secondary) industries as opposed to the service (tertiary) industries, an even more sensitive indication of the industrialization-resource linkage can be demonstrated. Since it is generally the primary and secondary industries that utilize natural raw materials, and since the 117 tertiary industries are less directly involved and generally smaller, the figures again demonstrate, in their rank order consistency, the relations shown in Tables 3 and 4. Indicator: Urban Administrative Units Table 6. Turning now to the interpretations of "urban units of political administration? five tables supply these data. The first, Table 6, summarizes the findings of the 1960 United States Census. The states are ranked according to the total number of cities they contain with population of 50,000 or more. These in turn are brdken down into the various size units in which the cities, within a given state, fall. Once more. when viewing cities as political organizations capable of acting, the same argument. of perception as related to size and concentration is main- tained. Cities as energy, water, air, and waste disposal users are prime resource converters. Furthermore, unlike mere population aggregates, they are structured to act on these primacies. Again the close connection between the top. middle, and bottom groups of states in the several tables is quite apparent. Table 7. Pushing the relationship between urban units and resources one step further, an examination of the 118 Table 6. Rank order, by states, of total number of cities of 50,000 population and over, together with breakdown, by states, of cities falling within each of the following ranges: 50,000-100,000; 100,000-250,000; 250,000-500,000; 500,000-1,000,000; 1,000,000 and over (1960). Total Cities States 50,000 and 50,000—100,000—250,000— 500,000 over 100,000 250,000 500,000 1,000,000 1,000,000+ California 41 27 9 2 2 1 Texas 21 10 6 2 3 0 Pennsylvania 21 16 1 0 1 l Massa- chusetts 20 15 4 0 l 0 Ohio 18 10 2 4 2 0 Michigan 17 12 4 0 0 1 New Jersey 17 11 4 2 0 0 Illinois 15 12 2 0 0 1 New York 15 7 5 l l 1 Florida 10 6 2 2 0 0 Connecticut 10 6 4 0 0 0 Indiana 9 3 5 l 0 0 Virginia 9 4 4 1 0 0 Wisconsin 7 5 1 0 1 0 NOrth Carolina 7 4 3 0 0 0 Iowa 7 6 1 0 0 0 Missouri 6 4 0 1 1 0 Alabama 6 3 2 1 0 0 Georgia 6 3 2 l 0 0 Louisiana 5 2 2 0 1 0 Minnesota 4 l 1 2 0 0 Rhode Island 4 3 1 0 0 0 Tennessee 4 0 3 1 0 0 Washington 3 0 2 0 1 0 Oklahoma 3 l 0 2 0 0 Kansas 3 O 2 1 0 0 Kentucky 3 2 0 1 0 0 Colorado 3 2 0 1 0 0 119 Table 6. Continued. Total Cities States 50,000 and 50,000-100,000-250,000- 500,000 over 100,000 250,000 500,000 1,000,000 1,000,000+ South Carolina 3 3 0 0 0 0 West Virginia 3 3 0 0 Arizona 2 0 1 l 0 0 Nebraska 2 O 1 l 0 0 Oregon ~ 2 l 0 1 0 0 Utah 2 1 l 0 0 0 Nevada 2 2 0 0 0 0 Arkansas 2 2 0 0 0 0 Montana 2 2 0 0 0 0 Maryland 1 0 0 0 1 0 New Mexico 1 0 l 0 0 0 Mississippi 1 0 1 0 0 0 Delaware 1 1 0 0 0 0 New Hampshire 1 1 0 0 0 0 Maine 1 l 0 0 0 0 South Dakota 1 1 0 0 0 0 Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 NOrth Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 Source: The Municipal Year Bodk, Orin F. Nolting, et.a1. (eds.) (The International City Managers' Association, 1961), 120 Table 7. Rank order of number of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (1960), by states. And percent of total population residing inside SMSA (computed by author). (Overlapping SMSA counted for all states.) States # of SMSA % of total population residing inside SMSA Texas 20 63.3 Ohio 15 69.5 Pennsylvania 12 77.8 Massachusetts 11 85.2 California 10 86.4 Connecticut 10 77.5 Michigan 10 73.1 Illinois 8 76.9 Indiana 8 48.0 New York 7 85.5 Georgia 7 46.0 Alabama 7 45.5 Iowa 7 33.2 New Jersey 6 78.9 Florida 6 65.5 Wisconsin 6 46.2 North Carolina 6 24.5 Virginia 5 50.9 Louisana 5 49.9 Kentucky 5 34.1 Missouri 4 57.8 Tennessee 4 45.7 South Carolina 4 32.2 Colorado 3 67.9 Utah 3 67.4 Washington 3 63.1 Oklahoma 3 43.9 Kansas 3 37.3 west Virginia 3 30.9 Arkansas 3 19.0 Rhode Island 2 86.2 Nevada 2 74.3 121 Table 7. Continued. % of total population States # Of SMSA residing inside SMSA Arizona 2 71.3 Minnesota 2 51.3 Oregon 2 50.3 Nebraska 2 37.5 Montana 2 22.5 Maine 2 19.7 New Hampshire 2 17.7 Maryland 1 78.2 Delaware 1 68.8 New Mexico 1 27.5 South Dakota 1 10.6 North Dakota 1 10.6 Mississippi 1 8.5 Vermont 0 0.0 Idaho 0 0.0 wyoming 0 0.0 Source: The Municipal Year Book, Orin F. Nolting, et.a1. (eds.) (The International City Managers' Association, 1961), Table III, pp. 43-46, Table V, pp.89-90. And for data on percent of total population see: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, 1961, Table 11, p. 21. ?natural pattern? of cities is useful. This indicates the degree of concentration of urban units within a given area, not just their sheer number. To approach this problem Table 7 examines the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, by states, in terms of their total numbers and in terms of the total population which they contain. This gives some rough indication of the ?natural? concentration 122 of urban units unimpeded by ?artificial" city boundaries. The importance of this factor is that such units have, on occasion, acted in concert on a related problem (water, in the Los Angeles area). Both the percent of the total popu- lation residing inside the SMSA's plus the comparison with Table 6 (?total cities 50,000 and over?) help to convey some notion of this concentration, both in percentage figures and in the reduction of the number of cities 50,000 and over by inclusion in SMSA's (i.e., California's: 41 to 10). It should be noted in this present table that the numbers of SMSA's will not agree with the number given in the United States Census of 1960. The Census lists the total of SMSA's as 212 for the United States. My figure is somewhat above this number, since in the case of overlapping SMSA's the area in question was counted once in each state it overlapped. Table 8. This table pursues the urban indicator once more, but from the opposite point of view, asking: what percentage of each state is rural as defined in the 1960 Census? The table aids in the confirmation of the above urban tables by establishing rank order of ruralness, from least to most. Again the data throws up a series of states that conform quite closely to the growing expectation. 123 Table 8. Percent of total population classified as "rural" by 1960 census (computed by author), rank order by states. States Percent New Jersey 11.4 California 13.6 Rhode Island 13.6 New Yerk 14.5 Massachusetts 16.4 Illinois 19.2 Connecticut 21.6 Texas 24.9 Utah 25.1 Arizona 25.4 Florida 26.0 Colorado 26.2 Ohio 26.6 Maryland 27.3 Michigan 26.6 Pennsylvania 28.4 Nevada 29.4 Washington 31.8 Missouri 33.4 New Mexico 34.1 Delaware 34.4 Wisconsin 36.1 Louisiana 36.7 Oklahoma 37.0 Indiana 37.5 Oregon 37.8 Minnesota 37.8 Kansas 39.0 New Hampshire 41.6 Wyoming 43.1 Virginia 44.4 Georgia 44.7 Alabama 45.1 NebraSka 45.7 Iowa 46.1 Tennessee 47.7 Maine 48.7 Montana 49.7 124 Table 8. Continued. States Percent Idaho 52.4 Kentucky 55.4 Amkansas 57.1 North Carolina 60.4 South Carolina 58.8 South Dakota 60.7 Vermont 61.5 West Virginia 61.7 Mississippi 62.3 North Dakota 64.8 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961, Table 12, p. 22. Table 9. Attacking the urban concentration problem from a specific resource base, Table 9 contains a list of states ranked by the municipal use of water within the states per capita, per day. Water, perhaps the single most crucial ingredient of city living and industrial manufacture, here exhibits a pattern consistent with the foregoing expectations. Since water has become such a prime necessity of city life (and manufacture) it is worth noting a few general facts about its consumption. Studies indicate that. ?on a national basis municipal water use at the present time averages about 147 gallons per person, per day, but that this use varies, region by region, from 100 gallons per person, per day to as much as 250 gallons. An analysis of 125 Table 9. Water use by municipal systems per day (1954), by states (in 1,000,000 gallons), in rank order. States New Yerk 1,904 California 1,565 Illinois 1,248 Pennslyvania 1,150 Michigan 1,129 Ohio 949 Texas 702 New Jersey 526 Massachusetts 493 Indiana 413 Missouri 367 Wisconsin 348 Washington 332 Florida 296 Connecticut 243 Maryland 236 Georgia 224 Louisiana 204 Minnesota 193 Tennessee 188 Virginia 175 Colorado 174 NOrth Carolina 169 Alabama 158 Oklahoma 158 Kentucky 146 Iowa 144 Kansas 146 Oregon 126 Utah 121 Nebraska 119 Arizona 105 South Carolina 100 West Virginia 82 Rhode Island 70 Maine 69 Mississippi 69 New Mexico 64 126 Table 9. Continued. States Montana 54 Arkansas 53 Idaho 49 Nevada 38 New Hampshire 38 Delaware 35 wyoming 44 South Dakota 25 Nerth Dakota 18 vermont 10 Source: Water Resources Activities in the United States, ?Pollution Abatement,? Select Committee on National Water Resources, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Table 8, p. 8, in ?Future Water Require- ments for Municipal Use,? 1960. 580 community water supplies, which serve 83,704,000 persons, indicate that 41 percent of this average daily per capita requirement is attributable to domestic use, 18 per cent to (commercial, 24 percent to industrial, and 17 percent to . "1 public use.» Furthermore, if we compare the United States and .Auistralia, two countries of roughly similar land area, in txarms of a range of environments running from dry to wet, ““3 discover that (a) rainfall is the factor having most ____ 1Water Resources Activities in the United States, ”Fulture Water Requirements for Municipal Use,? Select Committee onNational Water Resources, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, January, 1960, p. 9. 127 influence on per capita water use in urban areas, and (b) that size of community ranks second as a key cause of differential water consumption. Thus, in six states of the United States having an annual rainfall of less than 15 inches the median per capita consumption was 210 gallons per day, but in 11 states having an annual rainfall exceeding 45 inches the per capita, per day use dropped to 119 gallons. And as between Australia and the United States the per capita consumption in communities 100,000 or less was 132 gallons per day as opposed to 150 gallons per capita, per day in communities of 100,000 and above.2 Certainly these general figures, as a delimitation of a specific resource problem, indicate the importance of the big urban and industrial states with regard to perception (of the resource base. The larger the city the more likely :is this problem to be accute: the more likely is it also tn: be perceived and acted on as a problem. Table 10. Another related table concerned with a reesource use is that of waste disposal in cities and urbanized areas. Table 10 exhibits a general rank order of relative ammounts of municipal waste in terms of equivalent population :b)’ states. The big industrial states again head the list, 2Ibid., p. 9. 128 Table 10. Municipal sewage loads (1954) in continental United States, by states [in terms of equivalent population], in rank order. States New York 9.5 California 7.3 Pennsylvania 5.4 Illinois 5.0 Ohio 4.4 Texas 4.1 Michigan 3.6 New Jersey 3.2 Massachusetts 2.8 Missouri 1.9 Indiana 1.8 Florida 1.7 Wisconsin 1.5 Virginia 1.2 Minnesota 1.2 Maryland 1.2 Louisiana 1.2 Georgia 1.2 Connecticut 1.2 Washington 1.2 Tennessee 1.1 North Carolina 1.1 Alabama 1.0 Iowa .9 Kansas .8 Kentucky .8 Oklahoma .8 Colorado .7 South Carolina .6 Oregon .6 Arkansas .5 west Virginia .5 Nebraska .5 Arizona .4 Mississippi .4 Rhode Island .4 Utah .4 Maine .3 129 Table 10. Continued. States New Mexico .3 Delaware .2 Idaho .2 Montana .2 New Hampshire .2 South Dakota .2 Nevada .1 North Dakota .1 vermont .1 Wyoming .1 Source: Water Resources Activities in the United States, ?Pollution Abatement,? Select Committee on National Water Resources, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Table 1, p. 2. and it illustrates once more the geometrically progressive problem as cities grow in size, not only with water but with waste disposal as well. The table gives this data in relative rank order (not absolute amounts). Indicator: Gross Population Table 11. Turning now to the third indicator (population) four kinds of sub-indicators or interpretations will be employed. The first, Table 11, simply presents gross population figures for the states. Since population is conceived, in this study, as an undifferentiated aggregate utilized as targets for both sellers of outdoor recreational goods and services and as recruitment sources 130 Table 11. Total population, by states, 1960, in rank order. States New York 16,782,304 California 15,717,204 Pennsylvania 11,319,366 Illinois 11,319,366 Ohio 9,706,397 Texas 9,579,677 Michigan 7,823,194 New Jersey 6,066,782 Massachusetts 5,148,578 Florida 4,951,560 Indiana 4,622,489 North Carolina 4,566,155 Missouri 4,319,813 Virginia 3,966,949 Wisconsin 3,951,777 Georgia 3.943.116 Tennessee 3,567,089 Minnesota 3,413,864 Alabama 3,266,740 Louisiana 3,257,022 Maryland 3,100,689 Kentucky 3,038,156 Washington 2,853,214 Iowa 2,757,537 Connecticut 2,535,234 South Carolina 2,382,594 Oklahoma 2,238,284 Kansas 2,178,611 Mississippi 2,178,141 West Virginia 1,860,421 Oregon 1,786,687 Arkansas 1,786,272 Colorado 1,753,947 Nebraska 1,411,300 Arizona 1,305,161 Maine 969,265 New Mexico 951,023 Utah 890,627 131 Table 11. Continued. States Rhode Island 859,488 South Dakota 680,514 Montana 674,767 Idaho 667,191 North Dakota 632,446 New Hampshire 606,921 Delaware 446,292 Vermont 398,881 Wyoming 330,066 Nevada 285,278 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, 1961, Table 9, p. 12. for resource clubs, organizations, and other assorted voluntary associations, it is clear why gross population figures are presented. Again, the general rank ordering seems to hold. Table 12. The concern in this table is with auto- mobile registrations ranked by states. It may, at first, appear remote from my study. Actually there is a good deal of evidence establishing a close correlation between the automobile and the recreation arm of conservation. Since most recreational (preservationist) aspects of resource use are tied to the means of transport this should come as no surprise. Trains, ships, planes, and even buses are 3Marion Clawson, et. al., ?Land For Recreation." Resources for the Futpge Annual Report (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1958). PP. 49-57. Table 12. 132 Automobile registrations, by States, (in thousands), by rank order. 1960 States California 6,625 New York 4,492 Pennsylvania 3,713 Ohio 3.652 Texas 3,524 Illinois 3,302 Michigan 2,883 New Jersey 2,115 Florida 2,041 Indiana 1,678 Massachusetts 1.559 Missouri 1,415 North Carolina 1,374 Wisconsin 1,329 Minnesota 1,302 Georgia 1,219 Virginia 1,190 Washington 1,102 Iowa 1,070 Tennessee 1,067 Alabama 1,039 Maryland 1,003 Connecticut 975 Kentucky 948 Louisiana 937 Oklahoma 878 Kansas 870 Oregon 737 South Carolina 718 Colorado 710 Nebraska 553 Mississippi 527 Amkansas 500 Arizona_ 485 west Virginia 475 New Mexico 355 Utah 330 Rhode Island 301 133 Table 12. Continued. States Maine 299 Montana 260 Idaho 255 North Dakota 231 New Hampshire 208 Delaware 142 wyoming 140 Nevada 133 Vermont 122 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961, Table 758, p. 559. generally incapable of providing the complex and specific transport required for even so simple an activity as visiting a state park. Furthermore, the American use of the auto- mobile, quite aside from resource use, is a factin its own right. Since it is a fact.the use of state automobile registrations as a source of data (at least for the United States--though in Europe the pattern would be some- what different) stresses the mobility potentials for masses of resource users within the various state settings. Populations, conceived as potential markets and recruits, exercise these potentials through transport in the form of camping, fishing, hunting, vacations, scenic drives, and dozens of other kinds of outdoor use. 134 Table 13. One good measure of the impact of gross population is the sale of fishing and hunting licenses by states. These recreation activities not only involve their own immediate objectives (and the well stocked sporting goods markets that cater to them) but they are closely related to camping (with the wide range of goods and services associated) and the use of numerous kinds of lands and waters. Table 13 presents the data on fishing, as ranked by the absolute number of fishing licenses sold to residents (15 years and older). Coupled with this is the (1950--on1y date available and therefore probably changed somewhat today) non-resident population of each state buying licenses (given as percent of resident). It is worth noting that in fishing this latter figure is often quite high (up to 86%.in Nevada), while with hunting this is not apt to be the case (see Table 14, below). When the absolute number of non-resident licenses is high it does have some effect on a particular state's conservation program (increased fish planting). The general opinion, however, of trained conservationists seems to be that this characteristic of the fishing picture is not an important independent variable, since it is generally associated with vacation trips of out-staters (i.e., the fisherman in question is generally passing through and does not expect phenomenal luck). Furthermore it is, in Table 13. Rank order by states of absolute number of residents 135 (15 years and older) buying fishing licenses, together with percent of resident population (15 years and older) buying fishing licenses and non-resident fishing licenses sold. as percent of resident. States Absolute # % of resident % non-resident (1956) (1950) to resident (1955) California 1,303,066 12.1 1.2 Minnesota 946,155 14.2 29.9 Michigan 877.008 16.3 35.5 Ohio 838.823 13.7 5.9 Indiana 805,165 18.5 6.8 Illionis 721,041 9.9 2.2 Pennsylvania 692,801 7.8 4.8 Wisconsin 681,955 27.1 43.0 New York 677,573 5.5 5.7 Tennessee 651,624 17.4 42.0 Missouri 509,394 18.2 9.6 Texas 467,107 5.8 1.8 Kentucky 436,207 13.4 23.8 Alabama 435,351 6.7 9.3 Washington 389.503 23.5 5.7 Virginia 369,969 11.4 3.4 Oklahoma 365,196 21.9 17.2 Iowa 364,765 17.4 3.8 Georgia 337.246 4.3 1.7 North Carolina 332,539 7.6 3.3 Oregon 300,012 21.7 9.3 Arkansas 274,654 14.2 50.6 South Carolina 251,052 10.8 4.1 Colorado 237,273 23.5 39.7 Florida 226,272 8.9 38.1 Kansas 217,150 17.1 2.7 Nebraska 206,140 20.6 4.8 Massachusetts 205,207 5.7 2.8 Montana 191,903 36.3 21.5 West Virginia 184,159 20.1 4.2 Louisiana 177,631 3.8 15.7 New Jersey 142,049 2.8 7.1 136 Table 13. Continued. States Absolute # % of resident % non-resident (1956) (1950) to resident (1955) Idaho 140,440 38.3 35.9 Mississippi 131,840 7.1 26.1 Maine 128,954 16.2 54.3 Utah 117,200 20.7 5.2 Wyoming 116,516 48.2 49.6 Maryland 107,949 3.3 23.5 Connecticut 100,243 4.8 4.2 South Dakota 99,028 23.5 38.9 Arizona 98,123 11.7 50.7 Vermont 81,713 26.3 45.7 New Hampshire 74,004 20.5 62.5 North Dakota 72,082 13.9 2.5 New Mexico 65,417 14.1 50.6 Nevada 28,444 17.3 86.8 Rhode Island 17,458 3.5 2.6 Delaware 7,015 2.1 16.3 Source: Statistics on Outdoor Recreation, Marion Clawson (Resources for the Future, Inc), pp. 99-101. total numbers (not percentages), a limited demand even at best. Table 14. This table pursues the same problem as the last but with respect to hunting. Note that the percentage of non-residents to residents drops off very swiftly except in isolated instances. Indicator: Per Capitgywealth Table 15. The table of per capita personal income approaches the increasing wealth of industrial society from the point of view of the impact of buying power on resource 137 Table 14. Rank order by states of absolute number of residents (15 years and older) buying hunting licenses, together with percent of resident population (15 years and older) buying hunting licenses and non- resident hunting licenses sold, as percent of resident. Absolute # % of resident % of non-resident States (1956) (1950) to resident (1955) Michigan 1,198,374 21.6 1.76 New York 949,626 6.4 2.64 Pennsylvania 899,545 10.1 3.55 Ohio 681,086 12.3 .41 Indiana 677,357 3.4 .47 California 630,847 6.1 .18 Wisconsin 601,480 17.9 .83 Illinois 523,809 3.4 1.09 Minnesota 523,069 21.7 .42 Tennessee 459,668 14.4 1.04 Texas 396.724 5.9 .68 Virginia 384,614 12.3 1.76 Iowa 370.035 17.3 .93 Missouri 359,483 11.0 .57 Nerth Carolina 340,019 10.0 1.57 Washington 305,321 23.5 .24 Oregon 274,572 17.8 .54 west Virginia 267,617 19.0 .28 Alabama 264,653 11.9 1.08 Kentucky 262,110 11.1 3.20 Colorado 261,954 34.0 6.24 Louisiana 244,025 12.5 1.15 Arkansas 225,644 21.6 3.47 Montana 192.443 36.4 .99 Kansas 189,858 13.4 1.18 Oklahoma 181,993 13.1 1.09 Georgia 181,059 4.8 .39 Mississippi 178,371 12.8 1.19 New Jersey 165,381 3.4 1.47 NebraSka 164,795 19.1 1.75 South Carolina 149,911 9.2 2.61 South Dakota 148,158 31.8 12.26 138 Table 14. Continued. Absolute # % of resident %.of non-resident States (1956) (1950) to resident (1955) Maine 146.155 20.2 17.67 Maryland 142,778 5.5 3.31 Idaho 137,463 39.0 2.77 Utah 130,350 25.7 8.30 Florida 125,764 4.6 1.73 Massachusetts 116,484 3.3 1.75 North Dakota 103,616 16.2 2.07 Wyoming 99,305 33.5 32.20 Arizona 98,607 11.3 3.48 New Mexico 78,836 12.3 3.65 vermont 73,618 23.7 15.20 New Hampshire 66,492 20.5 29.15 Connecticut 54,439 3.1 1.20 Nevada 31,670 17.6 14.85 Delaware 18,700 7.5 2.04 Rhode Island 12,820 1.8 1.46 Source: Statistics on Outdoor Recreation, Marion Clawson (Resourcesfor the Future, Inc),pp. 99-101. 139 Table 15. Per capita personal income, by states, 1960, in rank order. States Delaware $ 3.013. Connecticut 2,863. Nevada 2,844. New York 2,789. California 2,741. New Jersey 2,665. Illinois 2,613. Massachusetts 2,519. Maryland 2,394. Ohio 2,339. wyoming 2,334. Michigan 2,322 Colorado 2,320. Washington 2,317. Pennsylvania 2,266. Oregon 2,259. Rhode Island 2,228. Missouri 2,199. Indiana 2,179. Wisconsin 2,171. Nebraska 2,113. New Hampshire 2,074. Kansas 2,068. Minnesota 2,054. Montana 2,018. Arizona 2,011. Iowa 2,003. Florida 1,988. Texas 1,924. Utah 1,910. Maine 1,900. vermont 1,859. 140 Table 15. Continued. States Virginia $ 1,848. Oklahoma 1,848. South Dakota 1,842. New Mexico 1,806. Idaho 1,796. North Dakota 1,741. West Virginia 1,674. Georgia 1,608. Louisiana 1,604. NOrth Carolina 1,574. Tennessee 1,545. Kentucky 1,543. Alabama 1,462. South Carolina 1,397. Arkansas 1,341. Mississippi 1,173. Source: 1962 World Almanac, Harry Hansen (ed.), New York WOrld Telegram (compiled from United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 1962), p. 744. use. In general it may be pointed out that the United States, the most highly industrialized and the most wealthy nation on earth, produced (1950) an astounding 40% of the world's goods and services with only 7% of the world's land area, and but 6%.of the world's population. On the other hand ?in 1950, for every man, woman, and child of the population, we consumed an average of 7 tons of fuel and more than 11 tons of other materials exclusive of vast quantities of water and air, which are important raw materials in many industrial 141 processes."4 And of the wealth generated in such a system "about 3% of consumption expenditure went for recreational goods and services in 1909 and in 1914 while the 10.2 billion spent in 1950 represented 5.2 percent of the total."5 The rank order of per capita personal income is something of a measure of this potentiality today. Again the states assume what is, by now, a fairly characteristic pattern (with the exception of Wyoming and Nevada with their huge ranches, oil, and gambling). Figure 1. This figure explores, in graphic form, the interrelations of income, travel, and leisure as they have an impact on outdoor recreation in the past, present, and future. It draws together a variety of factors already discussed. Returning now to Table 2 it should be noted that this table simply summarizes the findings from the thirteen rank orders. That is, by dividing the thirteen rank orders into equal thirds the number of interpretations falling within each third (high, middle, or low) is established and the data summarized in convenient form. There could, of 4J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, America's Needs and Resources (The Twentieth Century Fund. Inc., 1955), p. 939. 5Ibid., p. 930. 142 Figure 1. Income, travel, and leisure factors affecting the use of outdoor recreation facilities for period 1850-2000. Units 100 g I 90 I . 80 1 v,; 0 70 ' o 60 l o ' 50 */;a 40 1 Total tr veL #Er capi V» ‘0 30 . , . O 20 ,"Wroductivity (n ti na ) ,//v er ca ita 10 ,0. r spbsa 1e 1... 'ome 9 C 8 h s___ 4 , 7 K11 o ke s) .- ‘ / . _ 6 F>k ..’ O . ‘7 5 ’Id’1 ~“ . 4 //J I, - , ,.. < 3 -/ ' . . ' ‘ __.., Per' nt 0f 341 O uggtionj: nstu es ‘. 2 1. is nt 0' r r at: nl j fl 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2000 Source: ‘Qgpd for the Future, Marion Clawson, Burnell Held, Charles H. Stoddard (The John°prkins Press, 1960), adapted after Figure 19, p. 130. 143 course, have been additional sub-indicators, perhaps there could also have been less. At any rate any state in which ten or more interpretations "cluster” seems to fall within a safe margin of error for comparative examination. Data on the Wild Land Variable The necessity of controlling the amount of wild land in each state rests on the fact that a state (no matter how industrialized) which has nothing but urban area, roads, and cropland is hardly in a comparable position with a state of similar industrialization but with great stretches of forest, wetlands, and open country. Furthermore, this factor impinges upon nearly every aspect of the industrialization of society (with reference to resource control), and it does so not generally, but specifically for all the inter- pretations I have presented. Therefore, the need to arrive at some reasonably accurate estimate of the wild land in each state, land which can call forth conservation efforts, is at once apparent. At the outset, however, I intend to exclude all forms of agricultural conservation as outlined in the empirical design. This leaves a very wide assortment of lands to locate in each of the several states. Table 16 summarizes these findings for each state and comprises the 144 central feature of control exercised in this study. Please note at the outset that California, Texas, Delaware, and Rhode Island have been excluded because they fell in no sequence sufficiently similar to other states to make comparison possible. The computing of the wild lands (Table 16) proceeds essentially by subtracting the non-wild lands of the state from the total figure of state acreage and then adjusting the remainder. Excluded from each state total are the following land uses: cropland, pasture, and grazing (except in forests), urban areas, rural highways, rural railroads, rural airports, farmsteads, farm roads and lanes, national defense holdings, A.E.C. lands, national guard camps, rural rifle ranges, rural golf courses, fairgrounds, rural radio stations, flood control areas, watershed protection areas, Indian reservations, and holdings of Bureaus of Land Management and Reclamation. In addition it excludes 1,520,000 acres of the Cabeza Prieta and Kofa game areas in Arizona and 2,728,711 acres of the Desert Game and Charles Seldon areas of Nevada, which are reported in government statistics as grazing areas. It also excludes 520,000 acres in Iowa listed as forest 145 Table 16. Absolute acreage in Vwild lands? by states, circa 1954-59, as control factor. State California 66,034,976 Texas 43,525,522 Oregon 31,236,385 Washington 28,134,076 Florida 25,154,487 Georgia 25,001,766 Arizona 24,770,026 Montana 24,708,066 Minnesota 24,392,591 New Mexico 23,891,947 Idaho 23,470,136 Michigan 23,093,353 Colorado 21,958,778 Nbrth Carolina 21,390,060 Arkansas 21,348,102 Alabama 21,267,654 Utah 20,967,200 New York 20,261,199 Nevada 20,071,602 Louisiana 19,625,218 Maine 18,013,634 Mississippi 17,822,836 Wisconsin 17,822,106 Missouri 17,700,775 Pennsylvania 17,679,116 Virginia 16,915,073 Tennessee 14,719,685 wyoming 13,911,701 South Carolina 12,676,972 Kentucky 12,152,051 Oklahoma 11,498,673 West Virginia 10,852,711 Ohio 7,764,069 Illinois 7,101,722 Indiana 6,425,723 New Hampshire 5,128,034 Vermont 3,989,055 Massachusetts 3,558,156 146 Table 16. Continued. States Iowa 3,338,919 Maryland 3,302,855 South Dakota 2,996,951 New Jersey 2,620,801 Kansas 2,609,491 North Dakota 2,165,767 Connecticut 2,144,217 Nebraska 2,041,664 Delaware 627,745 Rhode Island 466,426 Source: See text for detailed breakdown of computation. lands but not requiring fire protection and 379,000 acres in Ohio of the same class, both of which are marginal lands, and neither of which materially alter the figures for the states. The figures cited for each state include the following: state forests, state recreation areas, state parks, state wildlife refuges, roadside parks, state game areas, state fishing sites, together with national forests, national recreation areas, national parks, national wildlife refuges, national monuments_ (if wild» national memorial parks (if wild), national parkways, national seashore recreation areas, plus all commercial and non-commercial private forest holdings (whether grazing is allowed in such or not), and the following land forms: marshes, swamps 147 (if not in wildlife refuges), sand dunes, bare rock areas, sheer mountain, and deserts. In addition the inclusive figures contain acreage on the Adirondack and Catskill parks of New York and includes acreage for the 292 wildlife refuges of the nation. It does, however, exclude, in addition to that mentioned above, all bodies of water beyond 40 acres in extent, and it excludes unlisted minor miscellaneous holdings. It should be noted that because of the complexity of computing this table the figures are only approximate. This is partly the result of the number of classes of land use involved, but it is also a direct result of the following circumstances: differing definitions of land classes: the fact that the figures are drawn from sources whose dates of compilation vary: and the important factor that certain classes of land are transitional in type. NOnetheless the figures must be only approximate for our purpose and I do not believe that these matters greatly, if at all, affect the present consideration. Chief sources for the figures were the following: Timber Resources for America's Future, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Resource Report 14, January, 1958, Table 16, p. 534. Areas Administered by the National Park Service, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., January, 1961. 148 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, United States Department of Commerce, Table 254, p. 194 (1959). Maior Uses of Land in the United States, Summary 1954, H. H. Wooten and James R. Anderson, Information Bulletin 168, United States Department of Agriculture, January, 1957, Table 22, pp. 59-60, and Table 30, pp. 75—79. The fact that I have included, in this table of 9control,' wild lands that are in federal ownership may arouse some questions. It may, for instance, be argued that in a state in which there are large federal holdings (forests or parks, etc.) the need for conservation efforts on the part of the state-—efforts supposedly flowing out of the rationalization of industrial organization--is obviated. In other words, it may be argued that in such states there are already available sufficient parks, campgrounds, fishing sites, and general public lands to meet state needs. If this were true, control of state and federal lands would have to be undertaken individually. Another argument, along similar lines, might maintain that insofar as the federal government aids states in their conservation efforts, that by so doing theygalso stimulate conservation activity. Taking this last argument first, we may note that if it is true it will bias the study against the hypothesis in question. After discussing the matter with conservation officials I am ready to chance the bias as it stands. My 149 feeling is--in concert with others--that the funds involved will have very little if any major consequences. It may impart a certain skew to the middle ranges of the industrial ranks, but for the extremes it is clearly an inadequate factor. Nonetheless, for the middle ranges states shall be, insofar as possible, selected either exclusively from the eastern United States or the western United States or both, but not mixed. Since federal lands in the east are rudi- mentary the bias should be overcome. The second argument, concerning the role of federal funds and personnel, in satisfying conservation needs where federal state holdings are large, must be answered in more detail. First, the issue centers not around the quantity of land held in state or federal tracts--at least not exclu- sively--but around intensity of use and the pressure on the land. Much land in state holdings (as in the case of Wyoming, see Table l) with low use or pressure means little conser- vation activity, i.e., few personnel, low expenditures, little research, low bureaucratization, etc.--even where land holdings are extensive. On the other hand New Jersey (see Table l), with as much land as Wisconsin (ibig.) in state parks, spends nearly four times as much money on them (i.e., on personnel, equipment, etc.) as does a state seven 150 and one—half times as large but which among other factors, contains only a little more than half the population of the former. The same may be said of Massachusetts with only slightly less population and with more land area. Second, the entire question of the adequacy of federal conservation measures for industrial states, regardless of intensity of use, can itself be easily questioned. The federal government designs its programs for the nation and not the states alone. The result is that federal holdings are in connected blocks often situated at great distances from urban centers and population concentrations. This is especially true of wilderness areas, national parks, wildlife refuges, and even of national forests. Thus the needs of the state are placed below the needs of the nation, except where compatible. Furthermore, no matter how great the land holdings may be, there is still plenty left over for state use. And, except in certain reserved areas, the government has not fought the states on the matter of adequate land holdings for the resident population. One has only to observe a few figures to realize that regardless of federal holdings, the states needs must still be met under the impact of industrial factors. wyoming, as we have noted, has large state park holdings (apparently for reasons of sentiment) and is not industrialized (though per capita 151 income is high). 0n the other hand while wyoming's federal lands constitute 47.8 percent of total state land, California, with its great industrialization, has a nearly identical federal land holding program (47.0), yet its state park system is second only to New Ybrk. It spends more money on its parks than any other state, and registers the second highest visitor mark in the country (677,007 acres, $21,757,000 annually, and 22,196,000, respectively). Washington, also quite industrialized, shows no state diminuation of conservation activities in spite of large federal land holdings (29.9). In fact it ranks--on the state park indicator (Epig) well within the top third, being twelfth in the nation. Apparently, if a state is industrial- ized,the pressure on the land is great enough to override other factors, especially when the federal lands themselves are at far removes from the industrial society centers. Finally, as our first argument suggested, since there are cooperative efforts between federal and state structures, the possibility of finally distinguishing the federal and the state lands appears futile. NOt only in soil and farm conservation--which we are not considering in this study-- but in hunting (Pittman-Robinson Act), fishing (Dingel- Johnson), forest fire protection (Clark-McNary), and research (McNary-McSweeny) and other projects, both groups work in 152 concert. And while such stimulus to the various states—- with large federal holdings--may not eclipse the impact of high industrialization or its absence, it would bias the project just as much to separate state and federal wild lands, as to ignore them at all levels of industrialization when left in-—a factor we have taken into consideration above. Data on Institutionalization of Rational Resource Control I have presented the summary data on state parks, the data on degrees of industrialization within the several states, and the data concerned with amounts of wild land: it is now time to draw together the data constituting the other variable of the dissertation's correlation, mainly research concerned with degrees of institutionalization of rational resource control. In selecting the states to be surveyed by use of a conservation questionnaire, both the industrial rankings and the control factor had to be kept in mind. Alaska and Hawaii, as noted earlier, were eliminated because of the recency of their statehood. Five other states were eliminated because of random variation with respect to the sub-indicators of industrialization. Three additional states were eliminated by virtue of the fact that the quantities of wild land which 153 they contained bore no relation comparable to any of the other states in the wild land table. Thus at the outset ten states have been removed from consideration. These states are: Alaska, Hawaii, Virginia, Maryland, Rhode Island, North Carolina, Delaware, Nebraska, Texas, and California. Of the remaining forty states further elimination was necessary on grounds of the wild land control alone. It is clear that only those states possessing within their boundaries reasonably similar quantities of wild land can be scientifi- cally compared. Furthermore, it is clear that if the comparison is to assume something of the nature of a continuum, ranging from maximum to minimum industrialization, then states must be selected both for their exhibition of the range of industrialization and for the fact that they are relatively contiguous on the wild land table. Two such continua do in fact occur with the correct properties. If the reader will turn again to the wild land table (Table 16) he will note that continuum series number one commences with acreage 23,470,136 (the state of Idaho) and ends with acreage 17,679,116 (the state of Pennsylvania). Within this spread there occur some fifteen states several of which fall into each of the three divisions of the industrial society rankings. From these fifteen states, twelve were selected for questionnaire survey. 154 The second continuum commences with acreage 17,822,836 (the state of Mississippi--and thus is overlapping with the first continuum) and ends with acreage 11,498,673 (the state of Oklahoma). Within this spread there occur some ten states several of which again fall into each of the three divisions of the industrial society ranking (excepting the Fleast industrialized? third which contains only one state, mainly Mississippi. From these ten states seven were selected for questionnaire survey. One other technique of selection was utilized. Granting that a continuum of states is most desirable, extreme positions can also be instructive. Therefore, three pairs of states falling at extreme ends of the industrial rankings, but with comparable quantities of wild land, were surveyed in addition to the two continua above. These were respectively: New Jersey-North Dakota, Massachusetts-Vermont, Indiana-New Hampshire. The total of all states surveyed comprised twenty- two states. Seventy-one organizations involved with public conservation measures were contacted by means of a letter containing four items: a four-page questionnaire which included instructions and clarification in the form of notes attached. The questionnaire contained seven basic questions 155 with sub-totals and breakdowns. Second, a cover letter was included with the name of the organization, the individual responsible for information services, and a general description of the project. It also included assurances that the infor- mation would aid conservationists and that it could be kept confidential if necessary. Third, a second (smaller) cover letter was included, written by Dr. Justin W. Leonard, Research Director, Michigan State Department of Conservation, Lansing, Michigan. Fourth, a self-addressed stamped envelope was enclosed. 0f the seventy-one questionnaires, sixty—three (88%) were eventually returned. Of these, seventeen states of the original twenty-two were in sufficient condition to be utilized in the survey. One anticipated set of paired states (Michigan-Minnesota) had to be abandoned, due to incomplete data, and (in addition to Minnesota) Missouri, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arkansas also proved dumb or insufficient. Of the sixty-three questionnaires returned, fifty-five involved the seventeen surveyed states (71%) of the dissertation. A list of the original twenty-two states with their seventy-one public conservation organizations may be found in the Appendix (page 240). Since several of the states requested that the information be kept confidential 156 no breakdown of the specific organizational sub-totals is attempted.6 Three summary tables (Tables 17, 18, and 19) present the data as compiled from the several questionnaires of each state. Table 17 and Table 18 represent the data on the two continua (mentioned above), while Table 19 presents the data on the paired extreme states. Before reviewing the content of the conservation tables a note is necessary on the private features of conservation. The National Wildlife Federation in their FState Affiliate Fact Sheet Summary"7 notes that private conservation clubs and organizations exist in bewildering profusion and unevenness throughout the United States (one in Washington, D.C.; 1,300 in New York). It was, therefore, patently impossible to survey such a range of organizations to assess the features I have outlined for public conservation activities. Instead, at the end of each of the state 6Names of states and their respective organizations sub-totals will be supplied,upon proper request and identifi- cation,by the author. The necessity of this disguise results from the fact that a small number of surveyed states have either one or a very reduced number of public conservation organizations. The result is that the name of the organizations is sufficient to divulge the source of the information. ?The National Wildlife Federation, State Affiliate Fact Sheet (washington, D.C., 1962). 157 summaries, in the aforementioned tables, gross membership figures for each state's private conservation organizations is presented for what it is worth. Certainly it tells us something, especially something political since numbers count in politics. But undoubtedly organization of that membership counts even more heavily and can offset (easily) the inert membership of a group many times as large. Nonetheless, the figures are instructive and they are offered as some indication of the private sector within a surveyed state. In the first chapter of Science and the Modern World, Alfred North Whitehead noted that the peculiarity of modern science, in its origins and in its present state, is its confrontation of ?general ideas? with what he tellingly designated as ?irreducible and stubborn facts.? Certainly the Greeks had plenty of general ideas, and certainly the Egyptians had worked with irreducible and stubborn facts. But the singular flavor of modern thought, Whitehead con- tended, was the happy conjunction of the two orders of events. I am now prepared to subject a set of general ideas, in the form of the hypothesis and its correlates, to the irreducible and stubborn facts which have been gathered. Tables l7, l8, and 19, in the form of three continua, summarize these facts. As I noted earlier a total of 158 on. So; .2563 . «3.356 $mm.$~43 mm. gen Inn 2 S E a 4 1 so. mam; .8058 .0888; $3635: pufi «24383 WA b so. omo.m .omo.m~m .Hmm.~mm.ma Aooa.mmm.sav 232833 8. Km; 82.3; 5353.3 33.3033 m 568on n s m 1. . am. Sea .3658 68.3.0.3 $355.5: UM“. §mzzmm RM. 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Hem ooo.~m .nm0.m¢m.a Ammo.mmm.m0 azazma> 2. I U m. «m. was .mma.m .~50.wm0 Asos.m0H.m0 w_q 090x00 mamoz 1 a 1.2 N# e s T.2 Tn“. am. ms .oom.mm .mm¢.nmm Awmo.m~H.mv m. mmHmmmssm smz H# 168 A.b.z mo mmmoxmv ZZOZMZD mmw v.0 0.0 m mw Hma 05H .0002 m# 1,005.00 009 1.5.0 1.0.0 .10 .4 mm 1.00.” smma 0.2 N# 000.ma mmw 0.ma H.0 0H mg mma 00H .QZH H# mCOHmeficmmno .Qmumm menoz mama Amocwflomv .m.z .m.m camm cOHpm>Hmmcoo huflammmq HMUAHmHU mwummn umm .n.£m I.4.z_ I.¢.m mmmumwn mpm>flum cH UHHQDm mco Hmm mmmmoamam Hmuoa mflsmnmflfimz Hmwao Ho mmmhoamfim mo Hmnfidz GBOwamHm wamm momummn Hmuoe mumww OH NO “03852 mGOHumw Iflcmmuo Had .mmscflucoo .mH magma 169 .muflmcsofiumosv muwameoocfi adamauumm mo mame :0 omumfiflumms 000.0 000.0 ooo.¢H mmw mm? w.mm 0H 0H gm 0H 0H .B> m# 0% .Q.Z ~# ma .3 .Z .3" 170 seventeen different states are involved, with three of them (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Mississippi) serving on two different continua. Thus, in the three tables a total of twenty units are compared. The data are broken down into twelve columns in each table, and are tabulated such that the highly industrialized states appear at the top of the table, the moderately industrial- ized states (except in Table 19) in the middle, and the least industrialized states at the bottom. The titles given to each of the twelve columns are meant to reflect the sub- indicators of the major variable as developed above in the conceptual discussion of resource control. In some few instances an asterisk (*) accompanies a particular bit of data. This indicates that a questionnaire was incomplete and an estimate had to be made. All estimates are based upon evidence and are (when necessary) biased against the expectation. Thus in the case of Mississippi it is not clear from the questionnaire what the word Fseasonal' means (three months or six) in the context of a question on employee status and size. The larger figure was employed-- a fact which, because Mississippi falls in the Fleast industrialized? segment of the states, biases the data against the hypothesis. 171 Proceeding from the affirmative sub-indicators of the hypothesis to the questionable and perhaps disconfirming, we may begin with Table 17 and the first column designated "total state budget.9 In this table nine states are being compared with one another with respect, in this instance, to the summary total expenditures of all state conservation activities (excluding of course soil and agricultural conser— vation as noted above). Four of these states fall into the highly industrialized bracket, two into the moderately industrialized bracket, and three into the least industrialized bracket. In terms of wild land control the extremes vary by 5,548,030 acres, while individual members differ by as little as 726 acres. There results a fairly compact continuum which makes comparison meaningful. The total state budgets for the nine states run from $29,029,922 to $2,191,315 for New Yerk and Maine respectively. Without question the figures of this sub-indicator of control affirm a general correlation between industrialization and expenditures on resource matters. Of the nine states Mississippi represents the only deviation from the general pattern, and as a deviation it is not great. It must be added that when other data on Mississippi are reviewed (same table) the general correlation holds. 172 One might speculate as to why this deviation should occur at all in Mississippi. A possible explanation lies in extreme poverty and rural situation coupled with its vast reserve of hardwood forests. These hardwoods constitute the chief, perhaps the only, important source of state gain. Unlike Idaho, with its huge conifer concentrations, hardwoods are in real demand, and the state that has them has something like a monopoly. Being to some extent a one industry state it is not surprising to find a liberal forestry budget (amounting to nearly $2,000,000), which over-shadows the other conservation activities such as fish and game. Idaho on the other hand could spend a similar amount but with little return to the state's economy. Especially is this so in recent times with the influx of Canadian softwoods, the ten percent devaluation of the Canadian dollar, and the great access and transportation advantages conferred on Pacific Ocean ports. An additional factor enters into a consideration of the state budget figures of Mississippi. When we compare it to Maine we note that there is well over a million dollar differential. The northern states have always prided themselves on their conservation mindedness while the south has left it to the federal government to enforce conservation (TVA). But with nearly the same quantities of wild land Maine and Mississippi refute this 173 contention. Again I believe the difference reflects the market importance of hardwoods (Maine being a pine state). Also, the reason for Idaho's relatively low placing (Idaho has over 5,000,000 more acres), when compared to Maine, undoubtedly reflects the impact of federal programs which relieve state pressure--the eastern states being less favored in this respect. But even granting the impact of such outside influences as lumber markets and federal agencies on a state's conservation picture, the discrepancy is not great. More remarkable by far is the massive consistency with which the correlation I have posited occurs. Given nine states with closely similar amounts of wild land the impact of industrialization is obvious. If we turn next to the respective research budgets the same conclusions appear. Taking an average (over the three most recent years) of sums spent on research by all state conservation organizations, the industrial states have a clear lead over the non-industrial states. A differential of $448,086 separates the top from the bottom, with a range from $523,068 to $80,000. The unusually large research expenditures of Wisconsin and Michigan undoubtedly reflect basic differences in professionalization of the structures as compared with Pennsylvania and New York, a fact which is acknowledged in conservation circles but 174 which does not alter the overall pattern. Just as size of total budget is a sub-indicator of degree of control, so size of research expenditures is a sub-indicator of rationality--in the form of the application of empirical science in the means-ends nexus. Turning next (column three) to total number of employees involved in state resource organizations, we again note the same correlation by industrial states. Since number of people involved in conservation is some (admittedly crude) measure of control these figures serve (together with total budgets) as our third sub—indicator. The range of personnel size extends from 6,416 in New York to 459 in Idaho, with a differential between the two of 5,957. Michigan and Idaho break the drift of the correlation to a slight extent, enough to raise questions. Michigan formerly had a considerably larger body of personnel involved in conservation. Recent cuts due to fiscal incapacity and failure to respond on the part of government have called for severe cut—backs. Much of this has meant a cut in field staffs and in the police arm where large numbers were supported on modest budgets. The cut-back (in the form of refusal to replace retired or otherwise resigning personnel) has meant a large drop in numbers relative to costs. Idaho, on the other hand, is a sparsely populated state surrounded 175 by sparsely populated regions and its deviation from the norm reflects this fact. Both Maine and Mississippi either are close to large population areas or themselves have-- relative to Idaho--dense populations. Much recreation conservation involves large personnel outlays and this is highly associated with population concentrations (see Table 1). There is also the fact of large federal holdings in national forests in Idaho, which reduces the figure some- what relative to the east. Nonetheless none of the deviations are striking and the general correlation is upheld. It should also be noted that the situation of Louisiana, which is high on most indicators, results from the fact that it is at the very top of the middle ranges of industrialization: its data nicely reflect this fact. If we next examine columns four and eleven entitled ?employee tenure (%lsa1aried)? and ?all organizations 10 years or older; public legality established? respectively, we can summarize the results of these sub-indicators of institutionalization. The concept of institutionalization is implied in both the sense of ?a regular and established way of doing things? and in the sense of ?an association which serves public rather than merely private interests, and does so in an accepted, orderly, and enduring way.? 176 Columns four and eleven again support our contention with regard to both instances. Needless to say it would have been most surprising, in the United States, not to find such a correlation in a survey of public resource institutions, but it needed confirming nonetheless. All the states in Table 17 have a sufficiently tenured staff to justify them as involving institutionalization in the first sense given above. It is true that Pennsylvania is remiss in this matter because of the peculiar nature of its decentralization of conservation activities, but even a one—third salaried staff is impressive from the point of being ?regular and established.? And in Louisiana after the neopotism of the Long governments it is not surprising to find the populist reform producing a sweeping salaried civil service accounting for a .94 salaried personnel. Butnot only are all the staffs of sufficient permanence in all states to amount to institutionalization, the duration of all the organizations in all the states extends to at least ten years, and more generally to several decades. Finally, institutionalization in the sense of ?serving public rather than merely private interests? is verified for all organizations in all states by virtue of its legality in public codes, statutes, and laws. No exception exists. Turning next to column twelve, in Table 17, and the 177 scant but informative data on ?total membership in private ' we learn again that the cor- conservation organizations,' relation with industrialization is nearly perfect. These figures, which range from 300,000 in New York State to 3,700 in Maine, are the total membership in all known private conservation organizations for the states. Since we are dealing with similar amounts of wild land in the several states such figures amount to real evidence for our hypo- thesis. Alabama's total was not given by the National Wildlife Federation, but the other eight states fit the general picture nicely. As in most instances in this dissertation the data on conservation is given in absolute terms. Impact and control are what we are interested in—- or indicators of them--and not some relative figure. Given a fixed quantity of wild land absolute figures alone can tell the story. We may now review orders of data that are ambiguous or questionable and others that, if not disconfirming, are then either mistaken or irrelevant. The first deals with the number, type, and ratio of degrees held in higher education by personnel involved in the totality of state public conservation organizations. The second deals with the ratio of clerical employees to non-clerical employees in the sum total of all state public conservation organizations. 178 Both of these pieces of data are concerned with the ration- ality of organization. The first is concerned with ration- ality in the sense of application of science--we have seen part of the data on this in our review of research funds. The second is concerned with rationality in the sense of bureaucratic rationality as outlined in the empirical design. Examining the fifth through the eighth columns of Table 17, it can readily be seen that in terms of sheer numbers of degrees, the industrial correlation with conser- vation still holds. The range is from 915 in New York to 93 in Idaho. It is not as neat a correlation as the former, with the chief ambiguity appearing toward the least industrial end of the continuum, but it is apparent that a correlation exists. Idaho again probably suffers from its large federal holdings which tends to skew its representation. If we think of higher degrees in the sense of indi- cating expertise, (felt to be common features of bureaucracy) then there is no question that the industrial states surpass the non-industrial states. Everyone since weber has argued for certification and similar objective criteria as one mechanism for establishing the presence of bureaucratic forms. It is also evidence of the operation of ?universalistic? selection criteria, another indicator of bureaucracy. In this sense we have two separate but related sub—indicators 179 such as we are seeking: evidence of rationality as expertise in use of science, and evidence of rationality in certification and universalistic selection techniques. The only question is, do we want this to be stated relatively or absolutely. Before offering the arguments on both sides let us examine columns six, seven, and eight to see what the compo- sition of these degrees amounts to. As might be expected the largest concentration of degrees beyond undergraduate school are found in the heavy research states (Wisconsin, Michigan, etc.), yet while there can be no question that industrialization produces an impact, a considerable representation is found in the middle ranges (Louisiana: 27.M.A.-M.S., 6 Ph.D.'s in science). The number and sophistication of the degrees tapers off as the least industrial states are approached. The real question is: which is most important, the absolute number of degrees or the relative? I believe this question is ambiguous. If we are interested in degree of expertise, that is in the extent to which empirical science is applied and general learning available, then clearly only the absolute figures are important. This is so precisely because we are working with a fixed amount of wild land, and any increase in the knowledgeability of the personnel involved must-~if we accept the sub—indicator--reflect an 180 increase in rationality. Of course we could deny that degrees are any measure of this, but that seems extreme except to poets and romantics. Thus the size of the organi- zation, relative to its number of degree holders, is of no importance. This argument is reinforced as we realize that the more degrees a conservation worker has, the higher will be his position within the organization. There may, of course, be exceptions but they must be very few indeed. This means in effect that direction and policy are frequently established (or at least administered) by such an educated elite. Thus absolute size alone is important when we consider rationality in the sense of use of science and general knowledge for the neatest fit of means to ends. But whenxne turn to rationality in the sense of ?certification? and the application of ?universalistic standards? the argument will not hold. In this sense of rationality, i.e., as criterion of bureaucratization, only the relative number of degrees is important. And since the absolute data of columns five, six, seven, and eight cannot help us in this matter, we must turn to column nine where ratios have been worked out. Column nine entitled ?number of employees per degree held? shows quite clearly that there is gg correlation between conservationist's degrees and the industrialization of society. Therefore, there is no 181 correlation-—by this criterion--between bureaucratic rationality and industrialization. Louisiana turns out to have lowest ratio while Alabama falls close to Wisconsin. Furthermore, Idaho and Maine both outdistance New York. Before attempting to account for this phenomena-—which incidently is an about face of some proportions--it is worth- while considering the data in column ten. Column ten entitled ?number of employees per gag clerical worker? appears to have little to do with what we have been discussing. It does, however, bear on the same point. We are considering indicators of rationality in the sense of bureaucratic rationality. Certification and uni- versal selection criterion are indicators of such rationality, but-—as was outlined in the discussion of the empirical design (above)--so is the ratio of clericals to non-clericals. Bureaucracy has as one important feature: the fact that task specialization exists without professionalization. The job of bureaucracy is to coordinate the great task diversity and specialization of the individuals involved for a concerted end. Bureaucracy is therefore an administrative structure. The argument is (see Stinchcombe, op. cit.) that files and records are more necessary where such task coordination must occur from above, rather than below as in a professionalized workforce (construction trades). What 182 then do the findings show? Is there a general relation between degree of industrialization of a state and the worker-clerical ratio of its conservation organization? The answer, on the basis of my data, is no. New York and Wisconsin turn out to rank below Idaho and Alabama, while only Michigan looks like what the hypothesis contends. Reinhard Bendix in Work and Authority in Industry, has argued that the best single index of degree of bureau- cratization is the ratio of salaried to non-salaried in the occupational structure of a country (op. cit., p. 211). If we were to apply this criterion to conservation organizations, even that index would fail, as can be easily seen from review— ing the data in column four (collected for other purposes), which compares the salaried to the non—salaried in all state conservation organizations as given in percentages. We have then three columns of data (four, nine, and ten) all bearing on the same point and all coming to the same conclusion: that rationality by bureaucratization, whether measured by percent salaried to non-salaried, ratio of degrees, or ratio of clericals-~that all such indicators deny there is a correlation between bureaucratic rationality and industrialization in public conservation organizations. 183 Contrary to all of the other findings of Table 17 this evidence bears against the hypothesis. What does it mean? It could mean, I believe, one of five possible things. First, it could be pure chance, a fantastic long shot. This, it seems to me, is not worth consideration, especially when Tables 18 and 19 are considered. Second, it could mean that offices have been automated in a number of the key deviants. The instructions given for this item on the questionnaire do not exclude that possibility.8 Again this does not have much appeal since it also rests on a long shot. Besides it is difficult to imagine a poor state getting the automation leap on a rich state in such a matter. It should be the other way around. Third, the question may have been ambiguous or the data very poor. Both are possibilities. Ambiguity seems somewhat unlikely not only because of the instructions but because of the reception it got in agencies where it was first worked out (Water Resources and Department of Conservation, 8They read as follows: ?By 'clericals' is meant any state employee whose primary job (1/2 or more of total work time) is spent in keeping, creating, or ordering records, communications, and information. Thus, secretaries, steno— graphers, typists, filers, accountants, classifiers, record keepers, etc. qualify. Excluded should be scientists, technologists, researchers, managers, administrators, directors, supervisors, proprietors, commissioners, writers, and generally all professionals, even if they do occasionally keep records and do clerical work, but if that work does not average 1/2 or more of their total work time.? 184 in Michigan). The possibility of bad data is not out of the question. Of all the items on the questionnaire this one required the most effort. In some situations that effort was greater than in others, since some personnel departments were well organized while others were not. At any rate the possibility is there; it took a lot of counting. Fourth, with respect to the data on percentages of the work force salaried and non-salaried in state organizations, the indi- cator of bureaucratic rationality may be meaningless. Bendix urged his single ?best? index with respect to economic organizations. State government agencies, such as conservation, are not economic. The fact that they often manifest (Louisiana) a high percentage of salaried employees follows from the fact of government. Even when one grants the weak— ness of the civil service movement in the United States (Pennsylvania, for instance) the inroads have been sufficient to create large salaried blocks in all governmental agencies. Thus the index of salaries versus their 1adk is worthless in any study of the present type. Fifth, the anomoly which columns nine and ten present still persists even if that of column four has vanished. The problem, I believe, resides in the inadequacy of the original conception around which the indicators of educational degrees and clerical personnel were 185 designed. The fact that this conceptualization was inadequate does not mitigate the value that the original conception had, nor does it mean that all is lost. It helps to clarify conceptual thinking to make partial mistakes and I believe this is true in this case as well as in others. We have noted that rationality exists (in an absolute sense).confirmed by the data on the several states in Table 17. This type of rationality has been referred to as expertise or professionalism and it relates to the use of empirical science and general knowledge in the solution of problems. The other kind of rationality (organizational rationality in the form of bureaucracy, pure and simple) we have not demonstrated. The reason for this, I would argue, is that it does not exist. The public state organizations which I have surveyed are not rational bureaucracies, nor on the other hand are they professional bureaucracies—-they are a combination of both types. Unfortunately I know of no reasonable index (such as salaried, clericals, etc.) for ascertaining this phenomena. But, in part this has already been demonstrated by virtue of the increase (absolute) in professionalism (measured by degrees) in states having similar amounts of wild land. The manner and the structure of such organizations beyond this is not known. The range and types which such organizations may take must be enormous 186 and a major achievement would commence with a typology. Clearly in a structure in which researchers are frequent,9 and in which tasks are frequently regulative rather than instrumental the likelihood of files and records showing a relative increase diminishes. Furthermore when many of the personnel involved with regulative functions are themselves professionalized (game biologists, foresters, geologists), the problem of sorting out the two is doubly difficult. At any rate my data clearly do not respond to it, and in this sense the rationality of conservation organizations that I demonstrate must rest on scientific rationality coupled with a definite but oblique body of evidence on the role of professionalism--the latter evidence being data on degrees. Needless to say more research is advised, not so much on conservation, but on ?mixed? types of bureaucratic rationality. The evidence therefore does not bear against my hypothesis so much as it is irrelevant. More subtle techniques of analysis, once developed, could uncover it. That, however, necessitates a study in the conceptual or general areas of sociology (organizational) and a turning away from a substantive area. In any event the general 9It should be remembered that an M.S. in biology may qualify an individual as Chief of Forestry or some similar post. Research is much more common in such instances than might be so with a comparable degree in sociology. 187 pattern of my evidence in Table 17 substantiates the hypo- thesis, while the qualifications do not so much qualify: as introduce a new problem. Turning to Table 18,exactly the same analysis holds with respect to the data it contains,as was presented in Table 17. Hewever, Table 18 contains only five states in its continuum: two in the highly industrialized bracket, two in the moderately industrialized bracket, and one in the least industrialized bracket. Only Kentucky and Tennessee are new additions to our data, but arranged with states already reviewed in Table 17 they give some further insight. Everything which applied to the previous table also applies to this one, and the reader is invited to inspect it without further exposition. Table 19 compares six new states with reference to each of the sub-indicators discussed in the previous tables. Hewever, unlike the former two tables, Table 19 involves paired polar opposite states with no mid-points on the continuum. Furthermore it involves states exhibiting very different amounts of wild land from those exhibited in the former table, the range being from 6,425,723 acres of Indiana to the 2,165,767 of Nerth Dakota. Yet given even these small quantities of wild land the evidence could not be more strikingly in support of my hypothesis. Again the 188 data columns remain unchanged and the same analysis which applied to the former conservation tables applies to the latter. Only a few comments on the peculiarities of a handful of entries require discussion. First of all it is evident that sheer size of state is of no importance in the matter of conservation rationality and control. The small eastern states respond to industriali- zation just as readily as the large midwestern lands. This can be doubly confirmed by referring again to the data on state parks (reviewed earlier in Table l) in the cases of Massachusetts and New Jersey. Second, vermont holds some- thing like the position that Mississippi did in the former tables. That is, with respect to Massachusetts-—with which it alone is being compared in this table—-it has an impressive budget for a non-industrial state, but it shows little consistency with this in any of the other data columns. By the same tdken Nerth Dakota—-which is to be primarily compared with New Jersey, but which may be also compared with vermont—- is low on budget and research but high on degree ratio, clerical ratio, and high on absolute degrees. The reasons for this lie, in part, in the fact that in North Dakota the State School of Forestry is considered a conservation organi- zation and has been included in the totals. Third, New Hampshire has a large private conservation participation-- 189 larger in fact than the industrial state with which it is being compared, mainly Indiana. Possibly this reflects sheer eastern tradition, which like California has had fanatical bird watchers and preservationists; partly it may reflect double residency patterns by Which New Yorkers owning property in New Hampshire for summer homes can claim residency or at least membership in local organizations. It might be added that there is a slight tendency for the degree and clerical ratios to fall more nearly in line with the original hypothesis in Table 19 than was the case in the previous reviews. But the tendency is so slight as to offer no real hope. Data on Taxation In concluding the presentation of the data one last minor category must be reviewed. Certainly the industrial states we have examined have more money to spend on conservation than do the non-industrials. Certainly, too, they spend more money on such activities. Could one argue that this is so simply because they are rich and therefore able to conserve while the non-industrials are poor and unable to afford such luxuries? That is in fact my hypothesis, or at least an aspect of it. But to put the question in another light: do the industrial states 190 have Egg structures that make resource control, on a scienti- fic basis, possible, while the non-industrial states are saddled with tax structures inimicable to such activities? Is tax structure the cause of conservation rationality and not industrialization? Or can tax structures act-—to put the matter more weakly--as an intervening variable between conservation and industrialization of society? I have no data on tax structure as such, but I do have the actual budget figures for the several states and that is as good. Thus the problem is essentially irrelevant for this study, since the industrial states have in fact high budgets and the non-industrial states have low budgets. Taxation structures appear to follow industrial structures, at least as regards conservation and resource control. Nevertheless a few additional features are of interest in regard to tax matters. First, the entire point of this dissertation is that certain sets of conditions are invariantly associated with resource control. Either this is or is not the case and tax or other matters are of no importance unless they have an impact on this general correlation. Second, it is difficult, on general grounds, to imagine where the poor states are to get the monies (as well as why the rich states would not have the monies) to take an effective role in conservation. Industrialization 191 not only calls forth conservation, but it supplies the means to achieve it as well. Third, a review of state revenues and relative fiscal capacities (see Table 20) reveals that when state taxation is considered in terms of relative loads and relative possibilities the general point made (number two above) becomes specifically demonstrable. Nerth Dakota-- on all counts the least industrialized state--has pushed its fiscal capacity to the limit ($158.57 annual state and local revenue per $1,000.00 of personal income)10 while New Jersey, with a similar amount of wild land, has extended its taxation to less than half that of Nerth Dakota and at the same time gets virtually no federal aid. Yet New Jersey is a state with a high degree of rational resource control. Certainly the taxes in Nerth Dakota are heavy, yet they are not allocated to conservation. There is also the example of California, which I have not studied in this survey but which is generally conceded to have a crack conservation program. In that 0?A.significant measure of state and local govern- ment financing is found in the relationship between the amount of general revenue collected and the personal income of the state's residents. These personal income figures are widely recognized as a valuable measure of the approximate ?fiscal capacity? of the states, and their relation to general revenue constitutes a significant indication of the proportion of II available financial resources. . . .,, Council of State Governments, The Bodk of States, CSG, 1960, pp. 190-91. 192 Table 20. Rank order of states by relation of general revenue of state and local governments to personal income (l957)—-genera1 revenue per $1,000. of personal income. Federal revenues of states per $1,000. of personal income (1957). And state per capita amounts of all general revenues (including federal--l957). State and local Federal rev- State per capita general revenue enues per amounts of all per $1,000. p.i. $1,000. p.i. general revenues States Nerth Dakota $158.57 $22.31 $259.12 Louisiana 141.05 24.43 259.28 Mississippi 137.26 28.17 159.85 New Mexico 133.51 38.76 296.44 South Dakota 129.37 25.67 240.51 wyoming 126.18 41.78 341.22 Oregon 122.96 19.92 277.48 Montana 120.59 25.95 275.82 Nevada 120.04 25.27 358.82 Minnesota 119.11 12.90 244.50 Idaho 118.59 22.36 227.92 Oklahoma 117.67 24.94 232.97 vermont 116.23 17.56 226.36 Arizona 115.30 16.94 243.88 Colorado 115.27 19.93 271.45 Kansas 114.28 15.18 235.32 Utah 113.86 19.39 228.74 Iowa 113.12 12.27 227.80 California 111.18 13.28 315.05 washington 110.99 13.99 265.66 Florida 110.50 12.26 219.39 ‘Wisconsin 110.34 8.46 228.18 South Carolina 109.41 16.74 148.95 Georgia 107.92 17.95 180.48 Arkansas 107.08 24.82 150.80 New York 105.56 6.20 283.44 NOrth Carolina 102.40 19.84 162.00 Maine 102.36 14.04 194.36 Tennessee 100.89 16.89 163.89 Michigan 99.74 8.56 234.81 Massachusetts 99.52 7.73 252.45 Alabama 98.18 24.40 161.70 Texas 97.61 14.37 199.72 New Hampshire 95.65 9.81 196.02 193 Table 20. Continued. State and local Federal rev— State per capita States general revenue enues per amounts of all per $1,000. p.i. $1,000. p.i. general revenues Virginia $ 95.55 $ 9.84 $226.36 Kentucky 94.00 15.96 150.76 Nebraska 93.27 12.79 194.86 Maryland 88.28 8.12 207.85 Pennsylvania 87.07 6.00 197.16 Indiana 84.64 6.19 183.58 Rhode Island 84.34 11.73 192.25 West Virginia 84.17 12.25 150.85 Illinois 83.08 6.20 217.05 Connecticut 82.81 4.77 245.18 New Jersey 82.10 3.99 215.93 Ohio 81.97 7.11 200.77 Missouri 77.71 15.36 181.31 Delaware 67.96 6.79 206.68 Source: The BoOk of the States--l960-61, Council of State Governments, 1960, V01. XIII, Table 4, p. 196, Table 4, p. 196, and Table 3, p. 195 respectively. state services are plentiful and state costs in taxes quite high, yet unlike North Dakota, there is no laCk of conservation. Either taxation structures are dependent variables or they vary randomly, but they appear to have no very direct effect on resource control. At any rate the matter is unimportant for this study since the budget data settles the question. 194 Conclusions: The Nature of Resource Control The review of the empirical data is now complete. There remains to be drawn the conclusions to which these data conduces, and the implications of the additional propositions that were presented in review of the empirical problem. So far as the contemporary scene is concerned the relation between industrialization of society and rational-- in its new and weaker sense—-resource control is proven. Of course this applies only to the states of the United States and technically only to those that were surveyed, yet the probability remains that what is true for the sample is true for the whole. At least on the data presented, increases in conservation activity--both publically and (it would seem) privately as well—-are closely related to increases in relevant industrialization. Thus for the contemporary United States one of the key determinants of a social movement has been established. There remains to be considered the implications which this has for the historical conservation movement. Clearly, contemporary data on a social movement cannot be passed off as historical fact. What it can do is call attention to certain present relations which may make us more sensitive to past events. 195 The conservation movement is generally pictured by its historians and expositors as a fight of the old rural middle class against the overwheening concentrations of wealth and monopolistic power on the eastern seaboard. Liberal ideology has consistently maintained this image, and until 1959 no single historian had broken this faith. The fact remains that what had been considered obvious evidence for the pictured battle of farmers and small businessmen against the east is anything but conclusive. Most frequently, historians, as Hays pointed out, took the illicit ownership of 1and——a fact which no one could deny-—as immediate evidence for poor conservation policy. Yet what shrewd dealing, in the acquisition of land, has to do with its use is never stated. Roy Robins in Our Landed.Heritggg, perhaps the single most impressive review of land policy and land history in the United States, simply assumes (Part III, ?The Corporation Triumphs?)ll that such a connection exists, and like most liberal expositors champions the populist sanity and yeOman virtues of the smallholders. Today liberalism holds, as a key article of its faith, this conservation story. Hardly any month went by during the Eisenhower administration in which the liberal 11Princeton University Press, 1942, pp. 203-300. 196 press did not print dark thoughts on the rapes and give-aways of our "landed heritage." Examining the controversy——as on Dinosaur National Monument--the battle was not between yeoman and monopolists but between competing conservationists. And frequently it was not over conservation at all but owner- ship. Where the chips will finally fall on this controversy is open to question. What I propose is simply this: First, if today we ask which states have the largest industries and the greatest concentrations of wealth and capital power, we find that it is those same states that have the highest level of rational resource control. They spend more money, do more research, employ more people, use more science, have more private conservation activity, and possess more professionalized staffs than do any of the states that predominate in small farmers, small businessmen, and small industrialists. Perhaps this is not history as it Egg, and perhaps the big states have learned from the past, but then, on the other hand, perhaps things were never quite as they have been pictured. Second, Samuel P. Hays' (op. cit.) study of conservation leadership arrives at a similar conclusion with respect to the history of the movement. The leadership was not, he argues in Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, ever of the west, the south, or the populists. It stemmed instead 197 from scientists and technicians centered in Washington, D.C. who had the ear of the first Roosevelt and who, like Roosevelt, wished to see the rational adjustment of resource claims. The supposed connection between these men at the national level and the populists in the field has, Hays points out, never been demonstrated. Third, both Schumpeter and Gailbraith—-and others-- have argued that monopoly is the stable situation of large scale capitalism. And that not only is it stable-—in terms of concentration——but it is also more efficient. What this means for the conservation movement is simply this: without monopoly--on theoretical grounds alone--there is strong presumptive evidence against the rationality potential of small competitors. Yet small competitors have been pictured as the backbone of the movement. Something has to give or the contradiction remains. Fourth, monopoly not only suggests security of market but concentration. Even the most elementary principle of organizational theory supports this contention: the greater the concentration, the greater the perception. Every study ever done of participation in organizations shows a correlation between knowledge of the situation and the position of an individual. Surely the same type of idea is acceptable with respect to economic enterprises, urban 198 administrations and other large collectives. Thus the greater the size and concentration of the units involved, the greater the likelihood of planning for the future. And one way of planning is through conservation of the necessities of your organization (whether water, minerals, or game). In other words, four kinds of propositions--two empirical and two theoretical--give us grounds to question the entire philosophy and ideology of the conservation move— ment. What conservationists wanted may be good, true, and beautiful, but their presuppositions are certainly open to question. My marshalling of four arguments against the popular picture of the movement cannot be called conclusive, but they ought at least be taken into account in future considerations. Finally, before turning badk to the analysis of social change theory a word on the strictly contemporary implications of the research are in order. ‘We noted at the conclusion of the empirical design, that if the cor— relation or lawful regularity connecting industrial society and rational resource control were confirmed, then this confirmation would fit into a larger regularity. Weber's conception of the increasing rationality of western social organization was that larger regularity, and the success of this research would give further support to Weber's. It was 199 also noted that ?rationality? was only the empirical name given to increases in the use of science and bureaucratization of organization, and perhaps--though this was only implied, not explicitly stated--in concentration of control (i.e., power). What finally then does the evidence on this question support? If we take the concept we wish explained, mainly ?institutionalization of rational resource control,' we can now specifically rally the findings. First, as regards institutionalization in both senses (regular and public), all of the conservation organizations--high and low-- possessed both characteristics. This is to be expected in public structures and thus gives us no new understanding one way or the other. Second, as regards rationality, it was noted that support for its close tie to the industrialization of society existed in three separate and important respects: (a) in the form of research budgets as indicative of scientific rationality, (b) in the form of absolute numbers of degrees in higher education as indicative of scientific rationality and the application of general knowledge, and (c) in the form of professionalization as an organizational alternative to bureaucracy--all of these factors applying to states xdith nearly identical amounts of wild land. Third, as regards control two separate and important aspects confirm the correlation: (a) absolute size of budget relative to a 200 fixed quantity of land, and (b) absolute size of staff in public, and membership in private, conservation organizations. Thus with respect to weber's conception, the evidence is affirmative in all respects except that of strictly bureau- cratic rationality-—and that because, in all likelihood, a ?mixed? or alternative professionalized structure predominates in public conservation organizations. CHAPTER IV UNIFIED SCIENCE, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE MOVEMENT We may now return to the larger concern of this dissertation: how to handle the problem of change in sociology. We had noted at the conclusion of the first section that an endemic interest of present-day sociology is the dispute between the functionalist and the conflict theorist. This altercation centers around the solution to Parmenides two—thousand five-hundred year old dilemma: ?what is, is? (statics); ?what is not, is not? (literally, ?is nothing?); ?how then, can something change into that which it is not? (flux)?l Dressed up for moderns this dilemma reappears in the lament for the ?laws of change.? The functionalists insists on homeostases, self-regulating systems, steady states, boundary maintaining entities, cohesions, and equilibriums; the conflict theorists insist on a Heraclitian 1This early problem in Greek philosophy is not offered in jest. I quite seriously mean that it is the identical problem that puzzled the Greeks. It is not puzzling to philosophers or to most scientists today, but it is still with us in sociology: John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (The Meridian Library, 1957; first published St. Andrew, 1930), pp. 169—96. 201 202 world of flux in which one never steps into the same social structure twice (permanence being an illusion of conservatives, reactionaries, and utopians). But functional and conflict theorists are not the only thinkers caught in the dilemma of change and permanence. Chapters dealing with the supposedly distinct and separate area of social change are to be found in an endless number of textbooks and monographs written by persons not formally identified with either theoretical position. And it does not end there. Numerous volumes in anthropology as well as course titles in both fields proclaim ?social change? (or ?cultural change?) to be a distinct and separate focus of investigation. 2Ibid., pp. 130—68; also see: Bertrand Russell, A History of western Philosophy (Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 38-52. 3At random one may find an embarrassment of riches in this pseudo—field: Raymond Firth, Elements of Social .quanization (Watts & Co., 1951), pp. 80-121; Paul H. Landis, Ingroductory Sociology (The Ronald Press Co., 1958), pp. 44-83; Alfred Lewis Kroeber, Anthropology (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948), pp. 386-444; E. Adamson Hoebel, Man in the Primitive WOrld (MCGraw—Hill Bodk Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 559—622; Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer,‘Angntroduction to Anthropology (The Macmillan Co., 1959), pp. 660-89; George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, Otto N. Larson, Sociology (Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 693-748; Ronald Freedman, et. al., Principles of Sociology (Henry Holt & Co., 1956), pp. 261-81; Kimball Young and Raymond W. Madk, Sociology and Social Life (American Bodk Co., 1959), pp. 87—107. Netably, Leonard Broom and Philip Selznidk, Sociology (Row, Peterson & Co., 203 I have presented an investigation of a problem in ?social change.? In it I have not once alluded to social change in the conceptual apparatus of the proposed investi— gation. Instead I have written about concomitant variation of two phenomena. And indeed, I shall never have to do more than this to handle a problem commonly agreed to be concerned with social change. This is possible because in the back- ground of my formulation, and execution to come, I have utilized a language of scientific discussion which has eliminated the Pre—Socratic dilemma. This elimination has come about by the simple but elegant expedient of using a vocabulary that is neither ambiguous nor suffused with a perspectival bias. My pride in this vocabulary lies only in the fact that it is a proven instrument. As a background for scientific investigation it is the most mundane of all the languages of science, yet it alone offers a vocabulary of science that allows us to argue about science without semantic confusion. To make this pOint clear, let us now introduce five 1958) make no mention of change whatsoever. It is no wonder, for after formulating their book around the presen- tation of a series of generalizations in the several areas of sociology, to add a chapter on change would require a second text printed exactly as before but with the word ?change? in the chapter headings. Needless to say, my list is only partial, but it is typical. 204 concepts from the Unified Science Language. In this intro- duction there will be no profound neo-logisms, no semantic esoterics. Yet with them we can adequately handle everything that I have been proposing and many other issues, problems, theories, and methods in the sciences. The five concepts of the language I am about to dis- cuss achieved their present status from the work of scientist and philosopher alike. Both groups were concerned with developing a language which could be used to discuss science as a cognitive pursuit. Both perceived the inadequacies of alternative languages. Both were strong adherents of the belief that science had a common method and a common aim. The problem of understanding what the scientist was doing when he went about his business was their chief motivation. They sought in common and after some faulty starts achieved an instrument in which to express this common pursuit. What was this common method and aim? Two general concepts express the aim of science. Three othersexpress the means by which this aim is achieved. NOne of the five should be strange or difficult. First, the aim: explanation and prediction. Scientists, indeed men of knowledge generally, aim at explaining events 4Review footnote ll. 205 and regularities and predicting the same. Second, the method or means. Events and regularities are explained or predicted by (a) observing the fgppg, (b) organizing and abstracting from these facts in the formation of concepts, and (c) linking concepts into patterns of regularity called lgyg. Some sciences do more than this, they construct theories by means of appropriate deductive tools, but that is beyond anything that has occurred in the social sciences (Parsons and the functionalists not excluded). By briefly examining these five concepts--and refer- ring the reader to the more exacting analyses of the literature-— we will have at our disposal the essential concepts of the USL that we need to comprehend the problem of change. With it any problem of a formal or analytic nature in sociology or anthropology can be greatly clarified. Being a language about the substance of empirical investigation it cannot, of course, solve empirical problems. Only empirical research can do that. But it can accommodate any of the abounding semantic problems of sociology, of which social (or cultural) change is one. If one forces himself to think in this language, there need never arise again the ?eternal recurrence? of the semantic pseudo-issues which are so common a feature of the landscape. And one can only hope that because the philosophers have had their hand in this venture--they are 206 after all the present day masters of the analysis of meaning-- immediate judgment will not be passed down. They have cleaned their boots of their past mistakes; they have some- thing to teach us. But we can be taught only if we will pause long enough to listen. Fagpg are first. They consist of immediately given sense data. They are, in themselves, unique and non- reproducible. They are the stuff of experience: e.g., The Michigan Conservation Department has 21 Ph.D. degree holders: there are no departments of conservation in some states; California has 121 clericals working in its Department of Fisheries and Wildlife. Concepts are quite different.5 They do not involve the unique and non-reproducible; they are class terms. Class terms may be described as involving a ?constant conjunction of characteristics.?6 ?Gold? is, for instance, a concept. It is a constant conjunction of characteristics—-characteristics being facts from which abstractions have been made--such as a certain ductility, 5For concept formation any of the major works cited in footnote 11 have sections on the logic of concepts. How- ever, see: Carl G. Hempel, ?Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science,? International Encyglopedia of Unified Science, Vbl. II, No. 7 (University of Chicago Press, 1952). 6Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934), pp. 245-49. 207 tensile strength, color, specific gravity, and so forth. In these terms ?institutionalization of rational resource control? is one concept and ?industrial society? is another. The constantly conjoined characteristics are those listed as the indicators. I defined the two concepts so as to include these characteristics-—based, of course, upon some reasonably well ascertained facts--and I am interested in seeing if there is some sort of conjunction between them. This con- junction between concepts is, if verified, a lgw: and if not, or until it is, it is called a hypothesis. Laws then, link concepts into patterns variously referred to as invariant relations, regularities, correlations, causal connections, generalizations, linkages, relations; but for the present purpose merely ?laws.?7 Sometimes these laws, when they are very general, that is, when they cover a wide range of phenomena, are referred to as theories. This is quite incorrect usage from the point of view of strict Unified Science, but it is done and I have done it in this proposal. Technically, theories are another sort of animal altogether.8 7For discussion of laws see any of the discussions in volumes footnote 11. Also: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, op. cit., C. G. Hempel, et. al., pp. 319-52. 8The best discussion of theory of which I am aware is contained in Braithwaite, op. cit., footnote 10, pp. 22-114. Also for both theory and concepts as well as fact 208 The social sciences have virtually no true theories, certainly none in sociology and anthropology. Another error is often made with regard to the use of the word ?generalization.? Generalizations are related to laws in a special way. They are not really different from them except in a specific formal sense. It is this: a generalization has only instances which stand to verify it (?I have seen 500 crows that were black, therefore all crows are black?-—the last clause is the generalization for which 500 instances stand as verification); a law on the other hand is deduced from a generalization by the rules of logic. It, therefore, has not only the instances standing for it but the deduction as well (?Black birds survive best in environments with little light; I have seen 500 instances of this; crows are black birds; therefore, crows survive best in environments with little light--and this precisely because they are black birds?).9 At this point we have three very briefly explicated USL concepts, and a few very closely related secondary terms statements see: Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson & Co., 1959), for facts: pp. 93-111; for concepts: pp. 59-76; for laws: same discussion as concepts; for explanation and prediction: also same dis- cussion; and for the nature of the USL in general see Chapter II, pp. 49-58. 9This particular explication is borrowed from 209 that were discussed in the context of the primary three. These are the tools with which we will examine how the ends of science are to be achieved. That is, it is by means of facts, concepts, and laws that we explicate the meaning of explanation and prediction. To begin with, explanation and prediction have the same logical structure. All that divides them is a temporal factor. If one wishes to understand scientifically an event-—an ?event? being a fact or set of facts—-a£pg£ it occurs, we call this an explanation. On the other hand, if one wishes this understanding before an event occurs we call it a prediction. But the logical or formal apparatus is identical. Before examining this apparatus, another notion is necessary. We have already discussed it in examining the concept, fact. Facts, as dealt with before, were unique events from which we abstracted in developing concepts. Now we must use the concept of fact for a different purpose. This purpose is called by a variety of names: ?facts of the case,? ?initial conditions,? ?antecedent conditions,? ?starting conditions,? and so forth. Another way to put the matter is to designate the problem to be explained or predicted, i.e., the facts of the case. New we are ready 210 to move. To explain or predict three things are necessary: 1. A general law. 2. The problem, facts of the case, initial conditions, etc. 3. Deductive consequences of #1 and #2 above. If #2 was acquired before the events of concern took place, the result is a prediction; if afterward, the result is an explanation. In both cases, problems or events to be explained or predicted are subsumed under general laws, and such acts of subsumption are all that is meant by the mep of science. Let us now apply this. My facts of the case, initial conditions, or problemis: how do I explain the resource control differentials by states? The answer is: by first collecting the data or facts on the states (initial conditions) and then subsuming them under a general law. The law, in loFor formulations of explanation and prediction see any of the following: J. W. N. Watkins, ?Ideal Types and Historical Explanations,? in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, op, cit., p. 723; in the same work see: Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ?The Logic of Explanation,? pp. 319-324; and again Braithwaite, Op. cit., pp. 342-68. 11113151., pp. 347-50. 211 this case, is none other than my correlated concepts of resource and industry. Let us grant that this correlation is true (actually it makes not one jot of difference if it is true or not, the logic of explanation and prediction being a formal concern in either case). My problem is, how to explain the resource movement by states (each state being a separate problem or set of initial conditions). I do this by simply deducing from the general law and the initial conditions of the particular states the consequences. Example: Michigan is a highly industrialized state; it also has a high development of rational resource control; this is to be explained by sub— suming this particular set of facts or problems under a law. The law states: in all cases--under control conditions—— 'where there is a high degree of industrialization of society there is also a high degree of institutionalization of rational resource control. Michigan is an instance of the former (the initial conditions); therefore, Nfichigan must necessarily be an instance of the latter (deduction). The event is explained. It has been subsumed under a law, i.e., deduced from a law. But laws not only explain initial conditions, problems, <1r sets of facts. They explain laws themselves, and by an identical process. Suppose now we want to explain the (let 212 us call it by this name) ?law of resource control.? We proceed as before. Only now the law itself is the problem to be explained. Therefore, we need a more general law to explain it, one from which it can be deduced. Fortunately we have it: weber's law--for that is what his argument is—- of the increasing rationality of the industrial order. Our law is deduced as a specific instance of this larger regu- larity in society. And weber's regularity in turn might also be subjected to the same treatment if we had a still more general law. Incidently, relative to Weber's correlation, mine is formally a law and his a generalization as explained above. In the matter of prediction one proceeds exactly as before, only the facts of the case or initial conditions have not yet transpired. Thus, you merely word the question differently. If there yppg a state that were little industrialized, or there is a state but I know only that it is non-industrial, therefore, it should have a low develop- ment of institutionalization of rational resource control. One may go out and ?test? the consequences of this prediction. But, except for the temporal factor, the logic is identical to that of explanation. Incidently, it is possible to have laws of any degree of generality (or specificity) so long as all the actual or 213 potential cases to which they might apply have not yet been observed. Therefore, a law which applies to only one society is still a law, and it will have been such even if that society goes out of existence or if the law is expanded to cover yet other societies. A law, to be a law, need only apply so long as the entities to which it refers exist. Temporality is not a feature of laws.12 If the reader has followed these formal yet elementary propositions this far, a fact may have been noted. We have discussed the resource control movement in terms of what science is about without once reverting to any conceptual category such as ?social dynamics,? ?cultural change.? or ?social change.? We have done this by pointing out that particular cases of high (as well as low) development of resource movements are related to the general law of resource control. How can this be? Social movements are the essence of social change! Has all the reality of the world dropped through the sieve of a formal essay in logic chopping? Not at all. None of the real stuff of the world has vanished, but some of the unreal has. At least nothing as unreal as 12See: Edgar Zilsel, ?Physics and the Problem of Historico-sociological Laws,? in Feigl and Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 720 (footnote). 214 looking for distinct, separate, unique, and special laws of social change has occupied us. The implication must be clear. It is not that change is unrea1--after all we do talk this way and apparently with some meaning——but rather that if you know the laws of society then you also know the laws of change (or statics) as well. YOu know this because you know how to explain and predict events and regularities-— in this case social ones--and that is all any science does or can doi Is this a trick, a slight of hand by which I have made speciously simple the complex truths of change and statics? Well, it is a slight of hand in the sense of any semantic clarification (which may be far from ?slight?). It is all still there: change, statics, equilibrium, alterations, conflicts, and functional balances. But it is not any different from any of the generalizations of science. The world is just as rich as ever but it is not cluttered with issues about which mis-guided theorists write endless essays. The problem of social change in sociology or anthropology is like the problem of negative weights: there is no problem. How, then, did it arise? It derived from the use of an obfuscating meta-language in the discussion of the nature of science. Functionalism and conflict theory are not 215 empirical theories. In themselves they make no specific claims about the empirical world. They are perspective theories. We cannot aSk of them, are they true or false. That is like aSking: are the rules of football true or false? It is meaningless. What we can aSk is, do the rules facilitate the game we wish to see played? And the game pg wish to see played is science. Do functionalism and conflict analysis facilitate this game? No, not if we judge by the problem of change. Do we have a set of rules that do? Yes, the same one as the other sciences, the USL. But not to be dogmatic, let us look a little closer at the problem of change. Let us subject it specifically to analysis by means of the USL and try to see why the .guestion has cropped up and continues to crop up. One suggestion as to the social sources of this idea comes from meta-linguistics. Bertrand Russell has argued--only to be castigated by Lewis Feuer for jumping beyond his limited and correct idea to a general and incorrect one--that the subject- predicate structure of the Indo—European languages of the west have led us astray.l3 We have in such languages nouns l3See: Lewis S. Feuer, ?Sociological Aspects of the Relation Between Language and Philosophy,? Philosophy of Science, vol. 20 (April, 1953), pp. 85-100. This remarkable essay constitutes very damaging evidence against the empirical claims of meta-linguistic extremists. It does not, however, 216 or subjects to which predicates or adjectives are affixed. The noun somehow remains the same and yet it suffers alter- ations by predicates. This characteristic of our language may have led to the concept of substance in philosophy—- an underlying substrate without properties or predicates, the changeless stuff of ultimate reality. At any rate it is now embedded in our words ?change? versus ?permanence,? ?becoming? versus ?being.? And if we can use such words, then why should there not be a reality behind them? Heraclitus and Parmenides fell into this trap two thousand, five-hundred years ago, and so have others: was the world a flux or was it an unchanging reality. If one chose the former, then permanence became an illusion, if the latter, change the shadow. Later thinkers argued that the problem was real but that one or the other side was repeatedly wrong. The positions often took on political implications: conservatives, reactionaries, and utopians opted for permanence, while revolutionaries and anarchists plugged for change. This is where we are today, two-thousand five-hundred years later. The eternal recurrence is complete. And a small version of explore as deeply as one might wish the logical problems. See also: H. Hoijer (ed.), Lppgugge in Culture (University of Chicago Press, 1954). 217 the rebirth of old issues is to be found in the history of poor, brief sociology itself: the early organicists and the conflict advocates gave way to their earnest contemporaries, the functionalist and the neo-conflict theorists.l4 The solution to the change-permanence dilemma is this. First of all we must agree that men have something in mind when they talk about ?change and permanence.? we must preserve this real ?something? in our analysis and yet not get trapped in our own verbage. Let us take a familiar problem and analyze it in our newly introduced vocabulary. We buy an automobile. It is shiny, clean, runs well and we say it is new, as yet unchanged. Five years later it is a rusted, clanking, dented in hulk and we say it has changed. What precisely do we mean by this statement? We mean, I believe, that a number of events (facts) have occurred with respect to this car such that it is not what it used to be. Our job is to explain those events. New events are merely initial conditions, facts of the case, or problems to be explained. The laws by which we explain them are l4?With sociological functionalism, it is difficult to excape the impression that the circle is complete and sociology has returned to the point of View of its founders.? Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 537. The cynic might argue that the return is not only to the founders but to the founder's confusion. 218 well known. They include many of the concepts of our physical world linked into patterns of regularity: laws of mechanics, chemistry and others. We examine the history of the car, history being merely the duly listed chronicle of events (to be explained) placed in order of occurrence. For each event in the car's history we apply or try to apply the appropriate law (assuming we have such), and by means of a simple deduction or subsumption we have explained the events. The sum total of the events when explained constitute the ?change? about which we may be proud or chagrined. The question now is: are these laws that did this explaining separate, distinct, unique, or fresh conceptions of the world? Must we study them as such, write chapters about them, teach courses organized around them? NOnsense! They are the same laws that have been around all the time. They are the laws of physics and chemistry, not laws of change, not laws of statics or equilibrium! just laws. And so the same may be said for permanence. We buy the car, put it in the garage, leave it there covered and sealed. Five years later we uncover it and see that it has not changed. The car is a static entity, an unchanged unit of our experience. Why? Because it has no histopy of events to reveal, nothing to explain, no laws to apply. We catch this sense when we talk (however incorrectly) of a people 219 without a history, a people that remained nearly the same-- of course, search hard enough and some ?events? will be brought to light, because it depends very much on what we want to call an event in the history of aypeople or a car. Change and statics are strictly relative to our interests in ?keeping the record? of events as they relate to some object upon which we choose to concentrate. Does the same analysis apply to societies? western society changed, we say, from feudal to industrial; by the use of our words we catch two permanences with some events in between. wa to explain this shift? ‘We follow the same procedure as before, though it is a more difficult problem than the case of an automobile. It is hard to get all the facts or events as they developed. And we do not know the laws of society so well. But if we did-—and we do know some—-the process would be identical to that of a physical object's change. The laws we might suggest involve linkages between concepts from various orders: economic and religious, religious and legal, strata and technology, and so forth. They are the sociological generalizations and hypotheses that we employ, or attempt to employ, everyday. History is simplyyarlot of prdblems to be explained. And this brings us to the crux of the matter. Change and statics result merely from our interest and our point of 220 View.15 If we are ?pure scientists? we are interested in explaining particular events and developing laws in and of themselves. No change and no statics to worry about in such a pursuit, just as there was none to worry about in the study of the resource movement. But many of us choose to focus on time slices of particular events in and of themselves: feudalism and industrialism. It is this focus alone that results in our semantic confusions. By aSking for laws which explain how seemingly solid and stable nouns (?feudalism, industrialism?) change into something else, we are concentrat- ing on end events. By focusing on the two end events of a time slice we seem to have two stable units, two functional wholes, two steady states. But science does not ask what is steady and what is changing; it is concerned pply with explanation and prediction, and this applies to every event we wish to select. Whether all is change and flux, or whether all is stability and permanence is really a meaningless question. And if we fool ourselves into thinking that there is some- thing different about explaining events as steady states, 15Anumber of analysts have recently made the point that functionalism—-or conflict perspectives--are the result of our interests, and therefore of the questions we pose. This, they are, but nothing more. In this sense they are to be condemned as offering unique or special focuses of attention. Nagel and Hempel (cited) stand out, see: footnotes 6 and 10, Nagel, 1956. 221 if we believe that different laws are required than are required for explaining the period in between such steady states, then we are the dupes of language. For to explain events in the steady state or in the period in between is one and the same thing. Events are events; they are explained in only one way in this world-—though we may talk about the process in diverse language--that is by subsuming them under regularities, and those regularities themselves under still wider ones. And what applies to permanence applies to change. Both concepts are artifacts of the language we use. If they gave us no trouble, and some thinkers slide easily over them, all would be well. Unfortunately we find courses, bodks, and chapters devoted to a special area of social change. I for one have been long puzzled as to why the authors of these documents were not troubled by the unlimited nature of their field, why they were not disturbed by using so many of the same generalizations in this area as in the other divisions of sociology or anthropology.l6 And to compound the confusion we have entire meta- languages that are devoted to the discussion of these 16See Don Martindale, Social Life apd Cultural Change (D. van Nestrand Co., Inc., 1962). This recent work is one long series of generalizations about intellectuals in ancient society, with the word ?change? attached. 222 problems. Functionalism handles permanence; conflict takes on change. Since these are not substantive theories, all one can wonder is why? For if the functional and conflict protagonists under- stand science at all, they will understand that change and steady—states are artifacts of the kinds of questions we ask, the type of vocabulary that we use. In a perfectly legiti- mate sense they are the result of a bias that focuses on what are supposed to be ?wholes? or ?homeostatic systems? as though they were some unique and peculiar event of the universe. And conflict analysis, in responding to this bias, simply answers error with error. But this is not the place to explore the general problem of the poverty of functional analysis (and conflict theory's response). Besides, it has been very well done for me by a number of analysts. All their efforts bear out the contention that functional analysis and functional systems are the myths of our provincialism: in fact, I have elsewhere already argued this position.17 But if one uses the USL--the commonest meta-language of empirical science--this problem never emerges. Change and permanence alike are consigned to the semantic dustbin. l7Kim Rodner, A.Critigue of Motivational Theories in Social Psychology (unpublished M.A. thesis, Michigan State University, 1959), pp. 73-115. 223 For the consistent use of the USL must always lead a scientist to search for explanation and prediction, and there is no mystery how they are achieved. The question of how something changes is merely a question of applying a series of laws to a history of events concerned with some entity that we choose to pursue. And the problem of statics is equally meaningless: how something remains static or unchanging is not to be sought in some esoteric ?equilibrium? concept, but in the way yg_write the histories of the situations that concern us. As in the case of the automobile in the garage, all the ?changes? that had taken place with respect to it (perhaps a layer of dust) are ignored, left out of the history. They appear unimportant, and we feel that they are unimportant precisely because from our point of view (how a car becomes a wreck) they most assuredly are. Thus change and statics are products of our interests, even of our provincialism. And by utilizing the USL we employ an instrument that eliminates such provincialism by eliminating ambiguity and perspectival bias. CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS: PROBLEMS AND PSEUDO-PROBLEMS The history of science since the Renaissance has alternated between periods of theory building and factual mopping-up actions. It is not often realized that much of this advance resulted for the pure analysis of meaning, and not from empirical tests or patient fact grubbing. Bertrand Russell has several times pointed out--as have others--that the most recent revolution in physics was the result, not of new empirical finds (that came later), but of the examin- ation of a meta-language, a pure exercise in analysis. The architect of this revolution was, of course, Einstein. For in his Special Theory of Relativity he spent his major effort analyzing the meaning of space and time, and since he was an empiricist,Newton's notions and metaphysics had to go. Percy Bridgman picked up the idea and coined a term to characterize the method by which Einstein had achieved his his results, he called it ?operationalism.?1 See: Ernst Mach, ?Newton's Views of Time, Space, and Motion,? in Feigl and Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 165—70; Hans Richenbach, ?The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity,? (same volume), pp. 195-211, in particular: 224 225 Bridgman's operationalism was destined to become one of the contributing elements to the new loOk in modern philosophy and science. But more than that, it became apparent that empirical concerns in science are only as good as the questions aSked. It became obvious that meaning- less questions could never be tested, no matter how cunning the experimenter. It is unfortunate that so little of this interest has seeped down to the social sciences, especially to the theoretical orientations of today; unfortunate too that the use of the USL--the combined result of these philosophers and scientists efforts at developing a clear context for scientific debate--has not become sociological second nature to many thinkers. If it were, if all scientists forced themselves to think in terms of this wider context of science, many of the problems that plague us would have vanished with the eternal recurrence of old ones. I have presented a proposal for the investigation of an empirical relation, a law. Net yet a general law until ?The logical basis of the theory of relativity is the dis- covery that many statements, which were regarded as capable of demonstratable truth or falsity, are mere definitions.?; also Bertrand Russell, The ABC of Relativity (The New American Library, 1958), pp. 114-22, 138—44. And for a general treatment see: E. A. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations of Modegn Science (Doubleday Anchor & Co., 1954). 226 further instances are examined, but having the structure of a law nonetheless. Men interested in the preservation of the natural world, for whatever reasons, have been many. Few of them appeared to have hypothesized that their actions were deeply influenced by the process of industriali- zation within their society. Yet the evidence bears this hypothesis out. Thus, an explanation has been established for some past events, and a predictive base worked out for some future ones. This is all we do in science, though we do it at various levels of generality. Change and permanence cease to be mysteries when we view the world in this manner. In fact, once our semantics are in order, such pseudo- problems simply dissolve. There are other reasons besides permanence and change for being displeased with using functional and conflict analysis as the meta-languages of our science. Such reasons call into question every supposed advantage that either perspective is said to confer.2 For all they are really 2In this proposal my attack has been directed against only one aspect of functional or conflict perspectives. Yet one cannot escape the conclusion that the change is not the only problem of these meta-languages. The sweeping condem- nation of both perspectives is long overdue. All the evidence is on hand, all the work has been done--for these, as we have seen, are not empirical but analytic problems. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the failure 227 asserting (the only residual meaning that can possibly be given) is that they both urge us to seek connections between events in the world, i.e., laws. But what a welsh Rabbitt this is, for what is any science doing? Yet even aside from the sweeping condemnation which many feel these per- spective theories richly deserve, they have led us badly astray on the problem of permanence and change. That is enough to make any reasonable person suspicious of their utility. to eschew these intellectual systems is due mainly to certain sociologist's inordinate failure to read anything but sociology. The change problem is one instance; there are many others. To break the provincial boundaries of our conceptualization five titles would suffice: for general background, Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge University Press, 1953), or Ernest Nagel, The sgpucture of Science (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1961); then, for careful understanding of the nature of the specific problem, Ernest Nagel, ?Telological Explanation and Teleological Systems,? Readings in the Philopophy of Science, by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp. 537-58--a1so an excellent background volume. Following this two other aspects of the same specific problem should be explored, ?Causal and Teleological Explanations,? pp. 319-40 in the Braithwaite volume just cited, and Ernest Nagel,'A.Formali- zation of Functionalism,? in Logic Without Metaphysics (The Free Press, 1956), pp. 247-86. These essays should then be followed by Carl G. 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Alabama Arlen—sag Mag-19 Indiana Kentucky Logisiana APPENDIX LIST OF SURVEYED STATES AND STATE PUBLIC CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS Department of Conservation water Improvement Commission Alabama Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Arkansas Forestry Commission Arkansas Game and Fish Commission ‘Water Pollution Control Commission Colorado Cooperative Fishery Research Unit Colorado State Forest Service Colorado Game and Fish Department State Park and Recreation Board Colorado Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Idaho Department of Fish and Game Idaho State Forestry Department Idaho Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Department of Conservation Stream Pollution Control Board Indiana Flood ControlAWater Resources Commission Department of Conservation Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Kentudky‘Water Pollution Control Commission Louisiana Forestry Commission State Parks and Recreation Commission Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission 240 Maine Massachusetts Nfichigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri W New Jepsey 241 Department of Inland Fisheries and Game Maine Forest Service State Park Commission Baxter State Park Authority Water Improvement Commission Water Resources Division Maine Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Department of Natural Resources Division of Waterways (Department of Public works) Massachusetts Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Department of Conservation Michigan water Resources Commission Department of Conservation Water Pollution Control Commission Mississippi Forestry Commission Mississippi Game and Fish Commission State Park Commission State Conservation Commission Division of Geological Survey and water Resources Missouri State Park Board Missouri Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Fish and Game Department New Hampshire Division of Resources Development ‘Water Pollution Commission water Resources Board New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development New York North Dakota Oklahoma Pennsylvania Tennessee vermont W 242 Conservation Department New YOrk State Fish and Wildlife Management Board New YOrk State water Pollution Control Board North Dakota School of Forestry North Dakota Game and Fish Department Department of Wildlife Conservation Oklahoma‘Water Resources Board Pennsylvania Game Commission Pennsylvania Fish Commission Pennsylvania Department of Forests and Waters Sanitary water Board, Department of Health Pennsylvania Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit Department of Conservation Tennessee Game and Fish Commission Tennessee Stream Pollution Control Board Tennessee Division of Water Resources Vermont Fish and Game Commission vermont Department of Forests and Parks ‘Water Conservation Board ‘Wisconsin Conservation Department Committee on‘Water Pollution Wisconsin‘Water Regulatory Board