A CASE STUDY OF THE NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS TEACHERS' STRIKE Thesis for the Degree of Ed .. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY WILLIAM JOHN ROGERS ‘1 96 8 0-169 Al’hcb‘ét I. ’\ 4" This is to certify that the thesis entitled . A CASE STUDY OF THE *NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS TEACHER'S STRIKE ‘1. presented by WILLIAM JOHN ROGERS has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for ‘ Ed .' D". degree in Educ at ion lfl/Ij/i Date September 30, 1968 .3. LIBRARY Michigan State University 7- {I "'.I u- '13,..th 3-21. ABSTRACT A CASE STUDY OF THE NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS TEACHERS' STRIKE by William John Rogers Statement of the problem. In this study it was attempted to analyze the events of the 1967 North Dearborn Heights teachers' strike. An effort was made to determine the critical factors that led to teacher-board of education confrontation, the dissolution of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers, and the loss of approximately fifty- six teachers to the North Dearborn Heights school district. An effort was also made to identify alternative bargaining procedures that would be helpful to boards of education and teachers in avoiding difficulties similar to those experi- enced in North Dearborn Heights. Methods, teghnigges and data used. In conducting a case study of the North Dearborn Heights teachers' strike literature in the general areas of the historical background of collective bargaining for teachers, the role of conflict and the teacher strike in collective bargaining, and collec- tive bargaining in the private and public sectors was first reviewed. A structured interview schedule was then prepared and structured interviews were held with all members of the William John Rogers North Dearborn Heights Board of Education and with three members of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers bargaining team. Data pertaining to the strike was also taken from newspaper articles, board minutes, bargaining team notes, and public documents. Major findings of the study. An analysis of data resulted in the following findings which were reported in the study: I l. A teacher strike does not serve the same function as does a strike in private industry. A teacher strike is not an economic weapon against the employing board of educa- tion. Rather, it is an exertion of power against an entire community. Because teacher strikes are assumed to be con- trary to the public interest they are generally prohibited by law. 2. If legal prohibitions against teacher strikes are to be continued, an alternate measure such as binding arbitration must be substituted as a means of protecting the interests of teachers. 3. Mediation and fact finding can be effective in avoiding impasses in collective bargaining. They cannot, however, be relied upon to settle all differences between teachers and boards of education. A. Public opinion can be a powerful influence in negotiations but it cannot be depended upon to be supportive of a fact finder's recommendations. William John Rogers 5. The court injunction in a teacher-school board dispute is only as powerful as it is allowed to be by parties to the dispute. "Resignations" in the face of an injunction can render it almost useless. 6. A school board's bargaining team should have authority to make decisions and binding agreements in nego- tiating sessions. A board not wanting to delegate that kind of authority to its bargaining team might have to assume a bargaining role or set up guidelines within which its bar- gaining team would be free to function. 7. A board and its bargaining team should never allow a situation to develOp in which a tentative agreement reached by the bargaining team might be rejected by the board. 8. The use of power in collective bargaining by either side is a tactical error that can easily cause the other side to increase its Opposition to any agreement. 9. A major recommendation resulting from the case study was that a procedure be deve10ped for the resolution of impasses in collective bargaining through mediation, fact finding, and finally, binding arbitration of differences in contract negotiations. A CASE STUDY OF THE NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS TEACHERS' STRIKE By William John Rogers A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION College of Education 1968 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer wishes to express his sincere apprecia- tion to the many persons who assisted in the develOpment of this study. He is greatly indebted to Dr. David Smith, chairman of his doctoral committee who so generously offered guidance, counsel, and encouragement during the course of the study. The writer is also indebted to Dr. Clyde Campbell, (0 Dr. Georg Myers, and Dr. John Useem, members of his com- mittee, for their time and counsel. To my wife, Mary, and children, Julie, William Jr., and Karol who were patient and understanding, and without whose encouragement this study would not have been possible, the writer is deeply grateful. A ii ACKNOWLEDGME LIST OF TABIIES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 LIST OF APPE Chapter I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE STUDY CONTENTS NTS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O NDI CES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ThePrOblellIQoooooooooooooo TheStUdyoooooooooooooooo II. A REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE . . . . The Historical Background of Collective Collective Bargaining in the Private and PUbliCSGCtorSOooooooooooo III. THE NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS TEACHER STRIKE IV. ANAL Bargaining for TeaCherS o o o o o o o o o The Role of Conflict and the Teacher Strike in calleCtive Bargaining o o o o o o o o YSIS OF DATA 0 O O O O O O O O O O O V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES iii Page ii iv 14 1A 33 h? 66 11h 13h 1A7 155 Table l. 2. 3. A. 5. 6. 7. LIST OF TABLES North Dearborn Heights salary schedule-- 1966- 7 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers preposed teacher salary schedule--l967-68 . Board of education preposed teacher salary SCthUle'“1967'68 o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers proposed teacher salary schedule--l967-68 . Tentatively approved 1967-68 salary schedule Board of education preposed teacher salary 30h9d“16"1967-68 o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers preposed teacher salary schedule--l967-68 . School District of North Dearborn Heights 1967-68 teachers salary schedule . . . . . iv Page 73 7h 75 76 80 88 89 108 LIST OF APPENDICES I Al :pendix Page "'1 A. Structured Interview Schedule . . . . . . . . 156 B. Interview with Rita McGowan, Teacher Bar- gaining Team Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . 160 C. Interview with Marilyn Tykocki, Teachers' Bargaining Team Member . . . . . . . . . . 178 D. Interview with Peggy White, Teachers' Bar~ gaining Team Member . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 - CHAPTER I A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE STUDY Introductory statement. The introduction of collec- tive bargaining to the educational scene in recent years has had a powerful impact on school policy making and administra- tion. It has added a vast new dimension to the entire educa- tional profession and has raised many questions concerning methods and procedures to be adopted by teachers, administra- tors and boards of education in dealing with each other under the terms of collective bargaining laws. Following the adaption of Act 379 of the Public Acts of 1965 by the Michigan legislature, collective bargaining for teachers in that state became more vigorous and wide- spread. Teachers, administrators, and board members seemed generally unprepared for collective bargaining under the terms of the act. There was evidence of the lack of nego- tiating experience on all sides. One of the immediate results of collective bargaining was the formal confrontation of boards of education and teachers across the bargaining table. In many cases con- frontation led to conflict and eventually to strikes. The problem of teacher strikes reached a climax in September, 1967, when about one—fourth of Michigan's public 1 2 school children, over 400,000 of them, did not go to school because of teacher strikes. These children lost 5,000,000 stu-. dent days as the result of the strikes, according to a letter written by State Board of Education member Leroy Augenstein to State Board of Education president Edwin Novak.1 This major disruption of educational services for chil- dren was the product of an unhappy bargaining relationship be- tween boards of education and teachers. It was evident that efforts must be made to improve bargaining procedures for both boards of education and teachers as a means of avoiding a con- tinuation of labor-management difficulties in the schools. I. The Problem Background of the problem. There was no doubt that collective bargaining has brought many advantages to the teachers of the State of Michigan. It was also evident that problems have developed as the result of collective bargain- ing under Act 379. Nowhere has this become more evident than in the School District of North Dearborn Heights where on September 5, 1967, a teachers' strike began. It was the second such strike to take place in that district during the first two years of collective bargaining under Public Act 379. The North Dearborn Heights Teachers' strike was only 1Letter from Leroy Augenstein, member, State Board of Education, October 4, 1967. one of a large number of strikes that began in Michigan on the same day, but it was destined to assume major signifi- cance in the field of collective bargaining in education. It was especially significant because it ended in the disso- lution of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers as an organization and in serious disruption of educational services for boys and girls in the district. In addition it created conditions that nearly led to the actual dissolu— tion of the school district. ' The strike followed a long series of collective bar- gaining sessions between the North Dearborn Heights Feder- ation of Teachers and the board bargaining team. These sessions amounted to over three hundred hours of across the table negotiations. A tentative agreement had been reached between the federation and the board bargaining team in June, 1967, but this agreement was subsequently rejected by the board at its ratification meeting. Following a summer in which teachers would not meet at the bargaining table because of vacation commitments, negotiations began late in August. Union and board bargain- ing teams could not reach agreement by September n, so on the 5th of September, when schools were scheduled to Open, the strike began. During the course of the strike the board went to court seeking an injunction to send the teachers back to the classroom. On September 18, a temporary restraining A. order was issued by the Circuit Court sending the teachers back to work. At that point, seventy-nine teachers of a total staff of one hundred fifteen decided to resign rather than to obey the court order. The teachers' resignations were apparently submitted as a means of avoiding the court order. The teachers appeared to have every expectation of returning to work when the strike was settled, but the North Dearborn Heights Board of Education chose to accept the resignations and to operate the schools with the remaining teachers and with newly recruited staff members. This unexpected action by the board was in response to the tactical move of submitting mass resignations by the union and was at first probably just a counter move in the collective bargaining process. The events that followed, however, served to intensify the critical situation. The resignations became final in the minds of all parties con- cerned, and.a.majority of the teachers who had resigned found positions in other school districts, while the North Dear- born Heights district found replacements for its former teachers. I ‘ This strike which began as only one of many in the fall of 1967 became unique when it ended with the dissolu- tion of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers. Because of this unique quality, and because the strike also contained elements that were common to strikes in other districts, it has become a most interesting and important subject for study. This strike had all of the features common to such work stoppages. It had issues, slogans, per- sonality conflicts, power struggles, picketing, crossing of picket lines, violence, threats of violence, property damage, misunderstandings, continuing negotiations, mediation, fact finding, a court injunction, and a lawsuit to close the schools. In fact, it became an ideal laboratory for the purpose of studying conflict as it interfered with effective collective bargaining for teachers. Stappment of the problem. In this study it was at- tempted to analyze the events of the 1967 North Dearborn Heights teachers' strike through the case study technique. It was attempted to determine the critical factors that led to the teacher-board of education confrontation, the dissolution of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers, and the loss of approximately fifty-six teachers to the district. It was also attempted to identify alternative bargaining pro— cedures that would be helpful to boards of education and teachers in avoiding difficulties similar to those experi- enced in North Dearborn Heights. Significance of the problem. Confrontation and con- flict between boards of education and teachers under collec- tive bargaining procedures in the State of Michigan have become a source of major concern to board members, admin- istrators and other educators throughout the state. Conflict between boards of education and teachers can lead to mutual 6 distrust, low staff morale, and reduced effectiveness in the classroom, even when there is no actual work stappage. When conditions lead to an actual teachers' strike, there can be little doubt that children become disadvantaged as their edu- cational programs are disrupted. Collective bargaining was a very new experience for the vast majority of educators and there was evidence that the practice would become more widespread. Most of those who have engaged in collective bargainingin the schools have had little or no actual training for that responsibility and few have had much experience. Collective bargaining procedures failed to be effective in reaching contract agreements in many Michigan school districts before school was scheduled to open in September, 1967. The strikes that took place in Michigan schools in the fall of 1967 seriously interfered with the educational processes that should have been going on in the affected school districts. Predictions have been made that collective bargaining conditions may become even more critical in future years. We have little assurance that similar unfortunate situations will not be repeated in the same or other school 'districts. It appeared that no matter what advantages collective bargaining held for teachers, there was always a possibility that bargaining would lead to conflict between teachers and their boards of education when they find themselves on Opposite sides of the bargaining table. Miller commented: It is most unlikely that teachers and admin- istrators can work as a team to identify and solve problems together and at the same time be creating a labor-management bargaining climate which puts them poles apart.2 In his article on "Group Conflict and School Organi- zation," Wildman pointed out how conflict can so easily be- come a part of the collective bargaining situation. He wrote: It is now quite clear that the theory and prac- tice of collective bargaining are based, first, on the assumption of significant and continuing con- flict between the manager and managed, in any enter- prise, and, second on the corollary assumption that there will be a strong identifiable community of interest and consensus within the employee group with regard to large numbers of items and areas of judgment on which there will be conflict with the managing authority. Collective bargaining as it is practiced in industry, and at least in some school systems, is essentially a power gelationship and a process of power accommodation. During the past two years we have seen increasing evidence that Wildman's warning concerning the element of conflict in collective bargaining was well founded. Conflict resulting from collective bargaining disputes led to a few 2William.C. Miller, "Curricular Im lications of Ne- gotiation " Educ tion 1 Leadershi , XXIII April, 1966), pp. 233—3 . . 3Wesley A. Wildman, Charles R. Perry, "Group Con- flict and School Organization," Phi Delta Ka an, XLVII (January, 1966), pp. 2hh-51. isolated strikes in Michigan schools in 1966. One of these occurred in North Dearborn Heights. Then in September, 1967, strikes broke out in more than forty school districts throughout the state. Most of the labor disputes that led to teachers' strikes in 1967 were settled after a few days or weeks. In the School District of North Dearborn Heights, however, agree- ment between the board of education and the striking teachers was never reached. In that district conflict that material- ized during collective bargaining became so great that im- passes could not be resolved. The school lost the services of many of its teachers and classes were disrupted even after school was reOpened. The district faced the possi- bility of being dissolved as the result of the labor dispute. Of all the school districts in Michigan that ex- perienced teachers' strikes in 1967, North Dearborn Heights was among those most seriously affected. It became a de- sirable location for a case study to be conducted in order to study the conditions which resulted in intensive conflict. Such a study could be helpful to both teachers and boards of education in deve10ping more sOphisticated bargaining pro- cedures for future negotiations. II. The Study Importance of the study. Collective bargaining in education provides a relatively new means of conflict 9 resolution in the schools, and a relatively new approach to the process of securing cooperative action within school systems for the achievement of educational goals. Since collective bargaining may be a permanent feature on the educational scene, it is most important that it not be used as the basis for a power struggle that could result in dis- aster for both a teaching staff and a community as was the case in North Dearborn Heights. In 1961 Charles and Mary Weber pointed out some of the hazards created by collective bargaining in education. They described collective bargaining in terms of a power struggle and pointed out that should an event take place that would upset the equilibrium of power, the bargaining situation would disintegrate into that of compulsion. They advocated mutuality as a democratic method of securing cooperative effort. This could be achieved, they wrote, by means of intelligent and uncoerced consensus.“ Stinnett wmote that negotiations constitute another evolutionary step in the democratizing of school admin- istration.5 hCharles A. Weber, Mary E. Weber, Fundamentals of Educational Leadership (New York: Exposition Press, I951), pp. 23-29. 5T. M. Stinnett, Jack H. Kleinmann, Martha L. Ware, Prof ssion 1 Ne otiation in Public Education (New York: The Macmillan gompany, I966), p. I. 10 If bargaining or compromise can be approached through democratic processes, it can become a powerful influence for the improvement of education and the teaching profession. If it becomes little more than a power struggle, as it did in North Dearborn Heights, much of its effectiveness will be lost and it could lead to highly unsatisfactory results for teachers, school boards and communities. This study is important because analyzing the North Dearborn Heights strike and identifying the critical factors that led to confrontation and conflict in that distribt will help to avoid a repetition of those unfortunate events in that district and others as teachers and school boards pre- pare for a new round of collective bargaining. Limitations of the study. There were six limitations of this study that should be noted. First, the study was limited to a case study and analysis of the 1967 collective bargaining and teachers' strike crisis in the School District of North Dearborn Heights and to the factors that led directly to the labor crisis in that district. Second, while it was possible that seeds of discontent and clashes of personality could have their roots far in the past, there was no attempt to trace possible causative factors of the labor crisis back beyond the beginning of collective bargaining for teachers under Act 379 in the school dis- trict in 1966. 11 Third, the study did not become involved with the possible influence of outside factors such as the existence of strikes in other school districts. It was recognized, however, that some outside influences such as advice from parent, teacher or board organizations may have been im- portant to the events in the district. Only when outside sources exerted a clear and identifiable influence on the collective bargaining process were those influences con— sidered in this study. Fourth, no attempt was made to assess blame for the breakdown of collective bargaining against any individual or group. A clear understanding of the goals and activities of the parties as they related to the course of events in the labor crisis was sought. Fifth, there was no attempt to compare the North Dearborn Heights labor dispute and strike with those that took place in other school districts. The scope of this study would not allow true comparisons because of the great differences in both type and volume of information available concerning the North Dearborn Heights dispute and those of other school districts. Finally, it was not the purpose of this study to evaluate Michigan's Public Employees' Relations Act (Act 379 of the Public Acts of 1965). Th9 structured interview. Since great importance was given in this study to information obtained through a 12 structured interview, that procedure should be reviewed. The structured interview was chosen as the means for obtaining information from the parties involved in the labor dispute for the following reasons. First, it could be used as an exploratory device to help identify many di- mensions of the dispute, thus revealing important phases of the study. Second, the structured interview could be used to record the perceptions of certain known events by the different parties to the labor dispute. Third, only by interviewing the parties to the dispute would it be possible to examine unanticipated consequences and to probe the moti- vations of individuals and groups as they made critical decisions during the collective bargaining crisis. The structured interview schedule can be found in appendix A at the end of this study. Overyigw of the study. In chapter one the study was introduced. The background of the problem was reviewed and some of the events and consequences of the North Dearborn Heights teachers' strike were described. The significance of those events and of the problem and the importance of the study were pointed out. In chapter two of this study, literature related to collective bargaining for teachers was reviewed. Literature of primary importance to the study was involved with the historical development of collective bargaining in education, the process of collective bargaining between 13 teachers and boards of education, and conflict between teachers and boards of education in the collective bargain- ing process. The third chapter will contain data relating to the strike in North Dearborn Heights. The data was drawn from notes of bargaining team members, newspaper accounts of the strike, minutes of the board of education, administrative memoranda, correspondence between individuals and organiza- tions involved in the dispute, special reports relating to the dispute, and structured interviews with representatives of the parties to the collective bargaining dispute. In chapter four the data cited in the previous two chapters was analyzed in an attempt to point out concepts in collective bargaining that will be useful to both teachers and school boards as the means of helping them to avoid future labor-management confrontations similar to the one experi— .enced by North Dearborn Heights. Chapter five of this study will include a summary of findings and in that chapter an attempt was made to identify areas for future study. CHAPTER II A REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE Three pertinent areas of literature were related to this study. The first was related to the historical back- ground of collective bargaining for teachers. This area of literature was reviewed in order to establish a frame of reference from which the North Dearborn Heights teachers' strike could be better analyzed in a case study. A second area of literature that was reviewed was involved with the teacher strike and conflict in collective bargaining. A review of this literature was undertaken in an attempt to identify concepts that would be helpful in understanding the events surrounding the strike in North Dearborn Heights. The third area of literature that was pertinent to this study related to the special problems of collective bargaining in the public sector, particularly in education. Similarities and differences in collective bargaining in the public sector as compared with the private sector of employee-employer relationships were explored. , I. The Historical Background of Collective Bargaining for Teachers Tegcher orggnization . Two main teacher organizations 14 15 are active in collective bargaining. They are the National Education Association and its affiliates, and the American Federation of Teachers. The National Education Association is the older and larger of the two. It had a membership of over 9A0,000 and had some 8,275 local affiliates, while the American Federation had over 110,000 members and about #50 locals.1 The NEA Handbook states that: The NBA is an independent, voluntary, nongovern- mental organization available to all professional teachers. It believes that all educators, regardless of position, rank, or authority are workers in a common cause. It c00perates with all groups in Amer— ican life who seek to improve education. It works for better schools, and to further that end, for the im- provement of the professional status of teachers. Under such policies the National EduCation Association has become the largest professional organization in the world and the only over-all professional associ- ation for teachers in the United States.2 Membership in the National Education Association is not limited to teachers, although teachers do account for a majority of memberShips in the organization.3 The National Education Association is a huge and diverse organization. The diversity of its functions has a LMyron Lieberman and Michael H. MoSkow, Collective N 0 at one for Teachers (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 19 ' pp. 2 '34. 2National Education Association, NEA Handbook (Wash- ington, D. 0.: National Education Association, I965), p. 15. 31bid., p. 13. 16 significant influence on its role in collective bargaining. Representing teachers in negotiations with boards of educa- tion has not been its sole or even primary function, although interest in negotiations has increased recently. Most of the NEA's resources are devoted to matters of curriculum and instruction. Also, various departments of NBA are virtually autonomous and may adopt policies on collective bargaining (or professional negotiations) that are in conflict with those of other departments or the association itself.’+ The American Federation of Teachers holds a differ- ent viewpoint of the teaching profession and collective bargaining from that of the NEA. Its stated objectives are: 1. To bring associations of teachers into rela- tions of mutual assistance and c00peration. 2. To obtain for them all the rights to which they are entitled. 3. To raise the standards of the teaching pro- fession by securing the conditions essential to the best professional service. A. To promote such a demonstration of the schools as will enable them to better equip their pupils to take their places in the industrial, social and political life of the community. 5. To promote the welfare of the childhood of the nation by providing progressively better educational Opportunity for all. The AFT claims to be the only organization specifically “Lieberman, Collgcpive Negotiations, p. 32. 5anstitution of the American Federation of Teachers (Chicago: American Federation of Teachers, October, I95h), p. 3. 17 6 devoted to the interests of classroom teachers. The emergencg of collective bargaining for teacherp. There is some confusion as to where and when collective bar- gaining between teachers and school boards actually began. According to Stinnett, the first known negotiation agreement between teachers and a board of education was the Norwalk, Connecticut group contract between the board of education and the Norwalk Teachers' Association in 19A6. That agree- ment followed a teachers' strike. In 1951 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruled that teachers were entitled to organize and that boards of education could negotiate with them. The court denied the right of teachers to strike, however.7 Lieberman claimed that, "For most practical purposes, 1960 marks the beginning of the collective negotiations movement in public education."8 He referred to the events surrounding the strike of the United Federation of Teachers in New York City on November 7, 1960. That strike was noted in the American School Board Journal with the comment that 6Lieberman, Collective Negotiapions, p. 34. 7T. M. Stinnett, Jack H. Kleinman, and Martha L. Ware, Profs sional Ne otiation in Public Education (New Ybrk: The MacmilIan Company, I966), p. 7. 8Lieberman, Collective Ne otiations, p. 35. 18 "The New York Strike . . . indicates that we are entering a new phase in the relations of boards of education and their organized teaching staffs."9 Charles Cogen wrote that collective bargaining was achieved in New York City not through legislation or vol- untary agreement with the board of education but by the ultimate weapon, the strike. The strike of 1960 did not lead immediately to an agreement with the board of education. Before that was achieved, New York teachers voted in a refer- endum in favor of collective bargaining in June, 1961. A new school board then arranged a collective bargaining election and the United Federation of Teachers was elected bargaining agent for the teachers in December, 1961. A second strike took place in April, 1962 before a final con- tract agreement was reached in August, 1962.10 Between the years of 19A6 and 1962, many agreements which were in reality what are now called collective bargain- ing agreements were reached between boards of education and teacher organizations. Most of these were informal in nature, but were formally adopted by the boards of education.11 9"Teachers Strikes," American School Board Journal, CXLI (December, 1960), p. 34. 10Charles Cogen, "Departure from the Old Ways," Am- epicgp Teacher Magazine, XLVIII (October, 1963), pp. 5-6:- 11Stinnett, Professional Ne otiation, pp. 7-8. 19 The success of the United Federation of Teachers in New York had a far-reaching effect on teachers and their organizations throughout the country. The prestige of the American Federation of Teachers (joined by the United Feder- ation of Teachers shortly after its victory in New York) rose dramatically. The National AFT organization was pressed into action by the demands of the locals for representation elections and collective bargaining assistance as other teachers sought to follow the example of the New York teachers.12 With success in New York, the AFT was encouraged to continue to advocate collective bargaining for teachers and it did not preclude the use of the strike, as evidenced by the writings of Harrison.13 stkes added that, "The sooner all of those who have contributed to the submissive obedi- ence, compliance, and meekness of teachers realize that they must deal with a new breed of teachers, the better."14 Reuther encouraged the AFT by saying that the teachers of America are on the march and that, "They have made up their 12Lieberman, Collective Negotiations, pp. Al-AZ 13George M. Harrison, "Procedures in Collective Bargaining," American Teacher Ma azine, XLII (October, 1957), p02. 1l'bJohn M. Fawkes, "The Dawn of a New Era for Teachers," American Teacher Ma azine, XLVIII (October, 1963), p. 13. 20 minds that they have been second class citizens long enough."15 ' Changes within the NEA as a result of the New York strike and collective bargaining agreement have been much more dramatic than those that took place in the AFT. It had been apparent for years that collective bargaining in education would provide the AFT with major organizational Opportunities if the NEA did not change its policies on teacher-school board relationships. The victory of the United Federation of Teachers in New York in 1960-1962 con- vinced NEA leaders that new policies were needed. As a re- sult the NEA has undergone a change of position from Oppo- sition to collective bargaining to support for collective bargaining since 1962.16 Stinnett agrees that 1962 marked the official entry of the NEA into professional negotia- tions.17 Gibson wrote that during this century collective action has become more formalized and that it is stressing more and more the welfare of the membership of teacher or- ganizations. He cited the development and growth of the lSWalter P. Reuther, "The Road to a Brighter Tomorrow {32 Teachers," American Teacher Magazine, XLVIII (April, 69913050 16Lieberman, Collective Ne otiations, p. A2. 17Stinnett, Professional Ne otiations, p. 12. 21 American Federation of Teachers andothe growing emphasis of the National Education Association upon "professional nego- tiations" to illustrate his point.18 Legal aspects of collective bargaining for teachers. For over thirty years, the United States Congress has, as a matter of national policy, granted employees in private in- dustry the right to bargain collectively with their employers. Following passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the states quickly responded by enacting "labor" laws which established procedures for the settling of labor dis- putes between employees and employers. The National Labor Relations Act specifically excluded public employees from its provisions, however.19 Early statutes in America were hostile to unions among public employees, and membership in unions was gen- srally denied to such employees. Teachers could and did lose their jobs because of union membership. In 1917 the Chicago Board of Education passed a resolution prohibiting teachers from membership in the Chicago Federation of Teachers. Several teachers were dismissed for union membership and the 18R. Oliver Gibson and Herold C. Hunt, The School Personnel Administrator (Boston: Houghton MiffIin Company, 5 g P0 375- lgM. Chester Nolte, "Teachers Face Boards Of Educa- tion Across the Table--Lega11y " American School Board Jour- nal, CL (June, 1965), pp. 10-1 . 22 board was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court which held that union membership "is inimical to proper discipline, prejudicial to the efficiency of the teaching force, and detrimental to the welfare of the public school system."20 As late as 1955, Thomas wrote that there was no legal Opinion which would indicate that a school board must recognize any labor union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its teachers. In his article he pointed out the fact that Michigan's labor legislation "expressly excludes" the state or any of its political subdivisions from provisions of its labor law. Further, Act 336 of the Public Acts of 19A7 prohibited strikes by public employees and it also contained no provisions which would require a board to recognize any union as a bargaining agent. Thomas also concluded that since a board of education would be unjustified in refusing to discuss a grievance with an individual employee, it should not enter into an exclusive arrangement with a union.21 In 1960, Seitz wrote that Supreme Court rulings favor public employees' right to organize and that legisla- tion toward mandatory collective bargaining might be forth- coming. He wrote: 20 Ibide , p. 110 21 wssley E. Thomas, "The Must and Ma on Bargainin Agents," Michi an Education Journal, XXXIII (October, 1955 , p. 8h. 23 q The greatest obstacle to acceptance of the right of school boards to engage voluntarily in col- lective bargaining culminating in contract agreements is the position of many public officials that the public employer is under a sovereign disability to emulate the practice in the private employment rela- tionship. The outlook of the public bodies which follow such a philosophy is based upon the doctrine that the determination of employment conditions in the public service is an inherent legislative func- tion, and that neither the executive nor legisla- ture may delegate to any outside group, such as a labor organization, the functions entrusted to it under the basic scheme of government. Seitz said that in spite of such prevailing attitudes many governmental units have gone a long way to fashion their labor relations policies similar to those in private indus— try. He said that no discussion of the right of teachers to engage in collective bargaining would be complete without mention of the strike. "All courts and authorities agree that the right does not exist," he added. He also thought that a state could halt strikes and picketing through police power and that that should be done because continued Opera- tion of schools is certainly vital to general welfare.23 The first state to enact a statute granting collec— tive bargaining rights to teachers was Wisconsin. A declara- tion Of rights for municipal employees was passed in 1959, and in 1962 a comprehensive labor relations statute for all 22Reynolds C. Seitz, "School Boards and Teacher Unions," American School Board Journal, CXLI (August, 1960), p. 1 . . 23Ibid., pp. 12-13. 24 municipal employees was adopted.24 The 1962 legislation provided the right to join labor organizations, to be repre- sented by them in collective bargaining, and the right to refrain from such activities. Strikes are prohibited but mediation and fact finding with public recommendations are provided for in impasse situations.25 In 1965 six more states adOpted laws requiring boards of education to negotiate with teachers. Those states were California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and washington. Similar legislation was enacted in Rhode Island in 1966 and in Minnesota and New York in 1967.26 Lieberman goes on to say that legislation is not all-important in the effect it has on negotiations. For example, the California, Oregon and Washington statutes have not yet resulted in a significant number of contract agreements. This is in contrast with the states of Con- necticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. 2AArvid Anderson, "State Regulation of Employment Relations in Education," Readings on Collective Negotiations in Public Education, ed. by Stanley A. Elam, Myron is erman, and Michael H. Moskow (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), p. 104. 25Michael H. Moskow, "Recent Legislation Affecting Collective Negotiations for Teachers," Phifipelta Kappan, XLVII (November, 1965), p. 139. 26Myron Lieberman, "Collective Negotiations: Status and Trends," American School Board Journal, CLV (October, 1967), p. 80 25 Some states, however, such as New Jersey have school boards that are deeply involved in collective bargaining even though there is no statute specifically authorizing or regu- lating collective bargaining for teachers in those states.27 Anderson relates that Of the above states having legislation which grants collective bargaining rights to teachers, California, Connecticut, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington have separate statutes regulating teacher-board relationships, as Opposed to general legislation covering all municipal employees.28 He states that these statutes generally protect the right to organize and the right of em— ployees to be represented in collective bargaining by repre- sentatives of their own choosing. They establish the duty to bargain and define certain unfair labor praCtices. They do not grant the right to strike but provide mediation and fact finding services usually with public recommendations as the result of fact finding. He believes that in Wisconsin, after five years of experience, the system is working ade- quately.29 Anderson's Optimism is not entirely shared by Parker, who wrote that after one year under the Michigan Employment 27Ibid. 28Anderson, "State Regulation of Employment Rela- tions," p. 103. 291bid., p. 104. 26 Relations Act, 1966 was characterized as "The Teachers' Revo- lution" and "The year the teachers went to war for higher wages, better working conditions and a voice in educational policy."30 He said that despite the fact that strikes are prohibited by the act, nine school districts were struck during the year. Collective bargaining was impeded by a lack Of experience on both sides, reluctance of school boards to yield traditional management rights, the demand by teacher organizations to correct all inequities in the first contract, and the financial inability of school districts to meet collective bargaining demands. In spite of the problems, however, Parker believed that the parties will eventually learn to live with one anOther in a collective bargaining relationship.31 It is clear that the trend in legislation in the area of teacher-board of education relationships is to make available to the teachers many of the key elements of col- lective bargaining. While a few states still prohibit the right to organize, Opposition has decreased. Legislation, court decisions and executive orders have given a majority 30Hyman Parker, "The New Michigan Labor Relations Law and Public School Teachers," Readin s on Collective Ne o- tiations in Public Education ed. 5y StanIey M; Elam, Myron Lieberman and MichaeI H. Mbskow (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), pp. 125-26. 31Ibid., pp. 126-27. 27 of teachers the right to join organizations of their own choosing.32 As many as twenty more states have introduced or will soon introduce collective bargaining legislation for teachers, in addition to the ten states that presently have enacted such laws.33 Changing gttitudes toward collective bargaining for tegchers. According to Stieber: The 1960's have already earned the right to go down in labor relations history as the decade of the public employee. At the federal, state and local levels of government, employees are organiz- ing, engaging in negotiations, and giving voice to grievances against their employers; in short, they are beginning to act like all other employees. Leg- islatures are passing laws according public em- ployees most of the rights won by workers in private industry thirty years ago.3# The dramatic emergence of collective bargaining for teachers was accompanied not only by changing legislation but by changing attitudes of educators and board members toward collective bargaining itself. Much of the current approach to the problems of teacher-school board relationships 32Wesley A. Wildman, "Legal Aspects of Teacher Col- lective Action," Readin s on Collective Ne otiations in Public Education, ed. 5y StanIey ML EIam, Myron Lieberman, and Michael H. MOskow (Chiago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), p. 89. T d "33Ligberman, "Collective Negotiations: Status and ren s, p. . 34Jack Stieber, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector " Challen es to Collective Bar ainin , ed. by Lloyd Ulman (EngIewood CIiffs, N. 3.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 65. 28 reflects the philosOphy of the American Federation of Teachers regarding collective bargaining. The AFT has long advocated bargaining rights for teachers and has claimed that collective bargaining is in- evitable.35 Charles Cogen, president of the AFT said that two centuries of labor relations history had paved the way for the opportunity to raise the level of the educational system and to improve working conditiOns of teachers.36 Janssen wrote that the major change in the AFT is not phil- OSOphical, but amounts to "almost frantic growth."37 In contrast to the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association has undergone tremendous changes of a philosOphical nature during the 1960's. In 1955 Thomas explained why boards of education were not re- quired to bargain with teachers' representatives, and also why they should not. He quoted Franklin D. Roosevelt as writing in 1937 that the process of collective bargaining could not be transplanted into public service.38 The NEA opposed collective bargaining (or professional negotiations) 35Fewkes, "Dawn of a New Era," p. 13. 36Cogen, "Departure," p. 5. 37Peter Janssen, "The Union Response to Academic Mass Production,” Saturda Review, October 21, 1967, p. 6A. 38Thomas, "Bargaining Agents," p. 8A. 29 until 1962 when it changed its position. At its 1961 con- vention the NEA passed a resolution which carefully avoided the words "collective negotiations" and which called for the right of professional education associations to partic- ipate in the determination of policies of common concern, including salaries and other conditions of professional service. Arbitrary use of authority by boards of education and the use of the strike by teachers was precluded by the resolution.39 In 1962 the corresponding resolution was changed to include the words "professional negotiation" and a statement that procedures should be established which pro- vide an orderly method for professional education associ- ations and boards of education to reach mutually satisfac- tory agreements. The statement against arbitrary use of board authority and the teacher strike was retained. In the same convention a resolution advocated professional sanctions as a means of preventing "unethical or arbitrary policies or practices that have a deleterious effect on the welfare of the schools."‘*0 In subsequent conventions the position of the NEA has become stronger in its demands for 39National Education Association, Addresses and Pro- ceedin s, 1961 (Washin on, D. C.: NationEI Education Asso- ciation, 1961), pp. 21 -17. “ONational Education Association, Addresses and Pro- ceedin s, 1962 (Washington, D. C.: NationaI:Education Asso- ciation, 1962), pp. 17 -81. 30 professional negotiations. In the 1965 convention, for ex- ample, the resolution that Opposed the teacher strike was changed to delete reference to the use of the strike.’+1 By 1968 the NEA had adopted most of the philOSOphy of the AFT. Even the strike was recognized by resolution. Hazard wrote that: The distinctions between strikes and sanctions: between professional negotiations and collective bargaining; between the goals for public education as held by the NEA and the AFT are more illusory than real. By semantic transfiguration, the AFT’s collective bargaining becomes the NEA's professional negotiations.“ While teacher organizations have been pressing for- ward in collective bargaining, boards of education have not presented a unified position relative to the merits of bar- gaining with teachers. Some have been Opposed to collective bargaining because to enter into bargaining would be to delegate traditional board prerogatives to the teachers, while others, prompted by sentiments of fair dealing or a public relations sense, have bargained voluntarily with representatives of the teachers.h3 As evidence of a.growing acceptance of collective bargaining for teachers, Southworth thought it to be reasonable hlLieberman, "Collective Negotiations," p. A6. “ZWilliam R. Hazard, "Semantic G astics?" American School Bo rd Journal, CLV (October, 1967 , p. 19. hBSeitz, "School Boards and Unions," p. 11. 31 for teachers to want to participate more fully in terms of their employment, but that in some areas, such as teacher recruitment, it would be more efficient to continue to leave decision making in the hands of administrators who are trained to do that kind of work.44 Another advocate of collective bargaining between teachers and boards of education was Nolte, who thought in 1965 that it was imperative that boards of education cut through red tape and seek to set up orderly procedures for meeting with teachers across the bargaining table.45 A most interesting comparison of the writings of one of the leading figures in the area of collective bargaining for teachers can be made in the case of Lieberman who in 1960 wrote: The foremost fact about teachers' organizations in the United States is their irrelevance in the national scene. Their futility in protecting the public interest and the legitimate vocational aspir- ations of teachers is a national tragedy, much more dangerous to our democratic institutions than the excessive power wielded by such familiar bogeys as "Madison Avenue," "labor bosses," "captains of in- dustry," "military high brass," and the like. Be- cause their organizations are weak, teachers are without power; because they are without power, power is exercised upon ghem to weaken and to corrupt public education.4 thilliam D. Southworth, "Teamwork is the Answer," Ameripan School Board Journal, CLIII (September, 1966), p. 65. A5 A6Myron Lieberman, The Future of Public Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, I965), p. I79. Nolte, "Teachers Face Board," p. 12. 32 In 1967 Lieberman wrote that teacher organizations were spending several times more for negotiations than the total National School Board Association budget. He added: In brief, the teacher organizations are rapidly escalating the local, state and national resources being devoted to negotiations. Unless there is a comparable effort by school management, at local, state and national levels, the outcome will be dis- asterous for it. Indeed, an across-the-board effort by school management to organize for collective ne- gotiations is absolutely essential at the present time.47 Summapy. The first section of this chapter was de- voted to a review of literature related to the historical background of collective bargaining for teachers. Two teacher organizations were described. The NEA is larger and more diversified. Historically it has been more intent on matters of curriculum and instruction than on negotiations. In contrast, the smaller but rapidly grow- ing AFT has concentrated more on gaining benefits for its members. Success of teachers in early strikes and bargaining agreements in Norwalk and New York led to increased interest of teachers elsewhere in collective bargaining and teacher organizations have responded to that interest. Great changes have taken place in legal thought and practice as they relate to collective bargaining for teachers. h7Lieberman, "Collective Negotiations: Status and Trends," p. 10. 33 Early statutes were hostile to unions among public employees and as late as the 1950's it was generally assumed that teachers did not have the right to bargain collectively with boards of education. By 1968, however, at least ten states have adOpted legislation granting public employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their employers, and as many as twenty more states are considering similar legislation. II. The Role of Conflict and the.Teacher Strike in Collective Bargaining Evidences of conflict in collectivebargaining for teachers. While there are many ways in which conflict in collective bargaining can be expressed other than through the strike, the expression that is best understood and that is the ultimate expression of conflict is that of the strike. Traditionally, teachers have been reluctant to use the strike, but with its success first at Norwalk and then at New York, it has become increasingly pOpular with teachers. In Michigan, for example, there were nine teacher strikes by June, 1966, the first year in which the state's new Public Employment Relations Act was in effect.h8 In September, 1967, at least thirty-six school districts in heParker, "Michigan Labor Relations Law," pp. 125-26. 3A {Michigan were struck by teachers. Included among those thirty-six districts was the state's largest, Detroit. Over AO0,000 children were affected by the strikes.49 According to Janssen, teacher militancy reached a new high in 1967, when teacher strikes also broke out in other states such as Illinois, Kentucky, Florida, and New York. He said the strikes were caused by teachers trying "to reverse the dismal spiral of low salaries, crowded classes, and assembly-line working conditions."50 The news section of the American School Board Journal commented on the New York and Detroit strikes in 1967. It stated that in New York the settlement cost $135.A million and raised the salaries of New York teachers to a range of from $6,750 to $13,750, one of the highest scales in the nation. In Detroit it was projected that the settlement would cost $18.7 million in added teachers' pay over two years. The Detroit board, which faced an $8 million deficit in the first year of the con- tract alone, may have been hOping for assistance from the state legislature. In New York, as e result of the strike that netted $135.A million, the United Federation of Teachers was fined $150,000 (about 83.00 per member) and its president, A1 49Peter Janssen, "Teacher Strikes: Who Won?" Satur- da Review, October 21, 1967, p. 66. SOIbid. 35 Shanker, was sentenced to jail for fifteen days.51 The importance of conflict situations in education was pointed out by Brodinsky, who in listing the ten major educational events of 1967, gave first place to the New York City teachers' strike. Second place on his list went to the situation in Florida, where about 32,000 teachers of the 55,000-membsr Florida Education Association submitted resignations forcing the governor to call a special session of the legislature to provide additional funds for edu- cation.52 Evidence of continued unrest among teachers and conflict between teachers, and school authorities continues to appear. The March 11, 1968 issue of U. S. News and World Rppppp indicated that strikes~are continuing to occur across the country. According to that article, teacher strikes took place in Florida, Albuquerque, New Mexico, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and in Wellston, a suburb of St. Louis.53 Causes of teacher militancy and strike . There are no simple explanations that can be given for the increasing 51"News," American Schooeroard Jougnal, CLV (Nov- ember, 1967), p. 2. 52Ben Brodinsky, "The Ten Major Educational Events of 1967," Education Summa , January 15, 1968, p. 5. 53"Teacher Strikes Across the Nation-~Who Wants What," U. S. Newsfland World Re ort, March 11, 1968, p. 10. 36 evidence of teacher militancy and strike activity. The lit- erature in the field of collective bargaining for teachers yields observations but no answers to the question, "Why?" Steiber comments, in explaining reasons for organi- zation of teachers, that labor unions have devoted more energy and resources to the task of organizing teachers. He wrote: They [teacher organizations] became more mili— tant, they organized demonstrations, picketed, talked tough to public officials and on occasion called strikes to back up their demands, even though they knew such action was prohibited. A few dram- atic breakthrough agreements, such as the 1961 contract covering AA,OOO New York City teachers helped union organization in other cities and states.5h Corwin found that professionalization is a militant process. According to him, professionalization is a drive for status. It represents efforts of members of a vocational group to control their work. In attempting to gain that control, the vocational group will seek to wrest power from those groups which have traditionally possessed it. He stated that this process is beginning to take place among teachers.55 In 1961 Bahou wrote that, "American teachers are ShStieber, "Collective Bargaining," p. 68. 55Ronald G. Corwin, "Militant Professionalism, In- itiative and Compliance in Public Education," Sociology of Education, XXXVIII (Summer, 1965), p. 313. 37 atomized and hence powerless in a pluralistic society. Con- sequently they have occupied a position of subservience, and inferiority in the community power structure."56 His state- ment agrees with Corwin's position that a vocational group that lacks power will have to take it from those who hold power as the group aspires to professional status. Cass does not view the problem in terms as simple as those of Corwin and Bahou. He cited a many faceted com- plex of factors leading to increased teacher militancy. He reported that the growing militancy of teachers could be explained primarily in terms of competition for members and power between the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, but that other factors also contributed. The question of take-home pay was important, but equally crucial was the issue of job satisfaction. He stated that a large number of men entered teach- ing after World War II. Salaries became more important then, but so did the demand of teachers to have a stronger hand in determining their professional destiny. Once a reasonable salary level is reached many teachers will accept lower salaries if other job satisfactions are high. Cass added that Other forces have converged on the schools to reduce teacher job satisfaction. The National 56 Victor Bahou, "Must Teachers Remain in the Shadows?" Educational Forum, XXV (May, 1961), p. A73. 38 Defense Education Act and the Elementary and Secondary Edu- cation Act promised great improvements for education. Added local funding seemed to offer better conditions in the near future, but expectations of teachers were not realized. He related that many occupational groups have learned that justice of demands does not win increased salaries, but that power does. Also, the wide acceptance of civil dis- obedience as an apprOpriate means for protesting social wrongs has not been lost to the thinking of teachers and their organization leaders. According to Cass another major factor in the rela- tionship between teachers and their employers is the grow— ing impersonality of the schools as they have become larger while at the same time a new breed of teachers, better edu- cated, less dedicated, and more pragmatic is taking over in the classrooms.57 ‘ Wildman also holds that teacher militancy must be attributed to many interrelated causes. He points to argu- ments that even a dramatic improvement in teacher salaries will not put an end to teacher discontent, and that demands for money are "more symptomatic than causative." According to this line of reasoning, teachers are seeking a significant voice in school policy determination. . 57James Case and Max Birnbaum, "What Makes Teachers Militant," Saturda Review, January 20, 1968, pp. 5A-56. 39 Another view that Wildman discusses is one that col- lective bargaining for teachers is not really very revolu— tionary and that when the teacher organizations have reached their goals relative to wages and improved working conditions they will assume the traditional role of the labor unions in this nation and will be mainly interested in protecting positions won in collective bargaining agreements. After reviewing these points, Wildman attributes strikes in Michigan schools to inexperience in bargaining, rivalry between the NEA and AFT organizations, a political climate highly tolerant of overt and dramatic action by employee organizations even when in violation of the law, reluctance of school boards to be the first to agree to precedent-setting demands and failure of the Michigan statute to make fact finding a specific and terminal procedure to be invoked by either party.58 General observations were that collective bargaining is a power relationship in which conflict is involved, and that in collective bargaining the teacher organization feels obligated to "deliver something" to its membership. Often attempts are made to do too much in the first contract. Competition between teacher organizations tends also to . 58Wesley A. Wildman, "What Prompts Greater Teacher Militanc ?" American School Board Jourpgl, CLIV (March, 1967) pp. 27-3 0 A0 increase overt conflict between the teachers and the admin- istration or board.59 The ineyipability of conflict. The inevitability of conflict between teachers and boards of education seems, for a time at least, to be established through collective bargaining relationships. In addition to the tensions created by competition between NEA and AFT60 and the rising aspirations of teachers seeking better salaries and greater professional identity61 there is the possibility that con- flict can be created by the collective bargaining process itself. Campbell described a situation in which conflict seems likely when he indicated that with teachers demanding bargaining rights, it is clear that they are going to have a greater voice than ever before in determining school policy and that boards can no longer expect to get by with a policy of paternalism, no matter how beneficent it might be.62 Sglgig'a PP- 31’32- 6OArnold M. Bloom, "A More Militant Profession," American School & Universit , XXXVII (October, 196A), p. 17. 6llbm. 62Roald F. Campbell, "Is the School Su erintsndent Obsolete?" Phi Delta ngpan, XLVIII (October, 966), p. 53. #1 Heisel wrote that the process of collective bargain- ing is "essentially a conflict between management and the union." He stated that it is futile to seek harmony be- cause management has what the union wants, and union gains are management's losses. "Conflict is inevitable" is his way Of describing the situation. He added that the process does not have to be acrimonious. The bargaining process was likened to a basketball game before which the Opponents shake hands and then do their best to defeat each other in the contest.63 Wildman raised the question of the development of a form of group conflict as the result of collective bargain- ing. He described group conflict as: Those situations in which large numbers of per- sons in an organization may share perceived depriva- tions, frustrations, or dissatisfactions and develOp consensus on issues in Oppositign to consensus on another level in the hierarchy. A Wildman stated that it is widely accepted that col- lective bargaining can allow legitimate power to be acquired by an employee organization. However, in assessing the apprOpriateness of bargaining to education, “the disutilities that can accompany the introduction of adversary procedure must be considered.“ 63w. D. Heisel and J. D. Hallihan, Questions and hicago: ic Answer on Public Em lo ees Ne otiation (C PersonneI Association, 1967), p. 68. 6“Wildman, "Group Conflict," p. 2AA. A2 He cautioned that the establishment of a "formal collective employee-employer relationship" sets in motion processes which may cause assumptions of conflict to become self-confirming hypotheses. The employee organization, for example, might develop a vested interest in seeking out and mabntaining conflict situations. Also, the superintendent might have to appear to be Opposed to teacher demands in order to give the union a bargaining function.65 Wilson agreed with the idea that teacher organiza— tions, both "union" and "professional," are forced to create a climate of conflict in order to justify their existence. He also stated that NEA organizations are widening the division between teachers and administrators in order to "present a facade of classroom teacher orientation to the unions, the public, and.its own members in its struggle to represent teachers in negotiations with boards of educa- tion."66 Hall's writing adds concern over the possibility that conflict can be generated in collective bargaining even though participants might not really want it to occur. He wrote: 65Ibid., p. 245. 66Charles F. Wilson "Whose Man is the Superintend- ent?" Phi Delta Ka an, XLVIII (December, 1966), pp. 156-57. A3 Open conflict can turn out to be irresistibly attractive to the participants. They may enjoy it wholeheartedly even while they feel guilty over their enjoyment. On occasion, it is almost impos- sible to extricate oneself, or one's group, from a conflict situation, as seems to be the case after thirteen years of entrapment in Vietnam. And when conflict does terminate, it leaves cars that last long and seem not to heal properly. 7 Hall also wrote that a mood of conflict can so settle over an organization that it could be "as little sub- ject to control as an equinoctial storm." He said that there are times when the atmosphere of an organization seems charged with conflict. At these times it seems that par- ticipants "are mutually oriented to get into a scrap without delay and with a minimum of provocation."68 Results of conflict and teacher strikes. Some of the results of teacher strikes have already been referred to earlier in this chapter. It seems apparent that by mak- ing use of the strike, teachers have been able to force boards of education to grant dramatic salary increases. The strong probability that salary improvement will be beneficial to education in general as well as the teaching profession is Obvious and need not be studied deeply at this point. Some of the less obvious results should be considered, 67Oswald Hall, "The Social Context of Conflict," Grievances and Their Resolution, ed. by Frank W. Lutz, Lou KIeinman, and Sy Evans (DanviIle, Illinois: Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 1. 68Ibid., p. 10. AA however, because they could be of equal or greater impor- tance in the future. There is the probability that collective bargaining victories won by the strike have brought to many individual teachers a sense of accomplishment and a voice in determin— ing their own professional status.69 The days of paternal- ism are gone, according to Braun in his review of the strike in Woodbridge, New Jersey.70 It seems likely that additional teacher involvement in curriculum matters and in determina— tion of class size will hold promise of better schools in the future as envisaged by Jackson.71 On the other hand, there appear to be negative effects of collective bargaining including conflict and the strike that should also be considered. One involves the personal relationship between teachers and school adminis- trators. Lillrose described changes that had taken place in a school where the entire staff had worked together happily in the past, but where conflict in bargaining had torn teachers and principal apart. According to her, the 69Reuther, "Road to a Brighter Tomorrow," pp. 5-6. 70Robert J. Braun, "What Happened in Woodbridge," School Management, XI (May, 1967), p. 122. 71Cornelia P. Jackson, "Professional Negotiation and a New Image," Michigan Elementary Princi al, XLI (March, 1967). Po 1A. A5 principal and the staff are now in separate camps because of the union's need to maintain strength by "salient or assumed conflict."72 Rice maintained in 1965, before the recent rush of teacher strikes took place, that teacher unrest was damag- ing to school public relations programs. He said that spokesmen for teacher organizations argue that coercive schemes have brought results and that "the end would justify the means." He expressed concern over "long-range ill effects and the resentment of the public."73 Another negative effect of collective bargaining is that in the face of conflict between teachers and adminis- trators, who find themselves designated to be in the manage- ment group, it appears that educational leadership by ad- ministrators, at least in some instances, might be in jeopardy. That was Miller's contention,74 and it is a posi- tion in harmony with that of Neagley who wrote that, "The establishment and maintenance of satisfactory human 72Bernice Lillrose "The Squeeze on Principal-Teacher Relationships," Michigan Elementary Principal, XLII (Febru- ary, 1968), p. 9. 73Arthur H. Rice, "Teacher Unrest has Damaged School Public Relations," Natiopg:8chools, LXXV (March, 1965), p. A6. 7“William C. Miller, "Curricular Implications of Negotiation," Educational Leadership, XXIII April, 1966), P0 533- A6 relationships among all staff members is primary,"75 in a school supervisory program. Summapy. In section II of this chapter literature related to the role of conflict and the teacher strike in collective bargaining was reviewed. It was found that teacher strikes have occurred with increasing frequency, especially in Michigan during 1966- 67 and 1967-68. In general, teacher strikes have been fol- lowed by significant salary increases for teachers. Teacher unrest that seems to lead to strikes is attributed to many causes including a desire on the part of teachers to participate in making decisions affecting their professional work, the growing impersonality of schools and rivalry between teacher organizations as well as increased salary expectations. There is evidence that conflict results from the collective bargaining situation because of the adversary roles that are played by parties to the negotiations. In 'this reference conflict tends to become a self-confirming .hypothesis. There is concern that conflict and teacher strikes ‘will.be damaging to school public relations programs and 7 Ross L. Neagley and Dean N. Evans, Handbook for Effective sion of Instruction (Englewood Cliffs, New 5 Su ervi Jersey: Prentice-Ha 1, Inc., A , p. 5. A7 that it will interfere with educational leadership activi— ties of school administrators. III. Collective Bargaining in the Private and Public Sectors Similarities between collective bargaining in the private and public sectors. In order to understand the dif- ferences between collective bargaining in the private and public sectors it is helpful to first look at the similar- ities between bargaining in the two areas. Most arguments to the effect that there is or should be little difference between bargaining collectively in the private and public sectors revolve around the relationships between the employee and his job and do not give important consideration to the interest of the public or the acquisi- tion of funds. ’These arguments can be compelling, however, because the interest of the public employee in his own conditions of employment are great, just as are those of the employee in private business or industry. Steiber wrote that developing trends in collective lxargaining for public employees generally follow existing 1£NMS governing labor-management relations in private industry, exxcept that strikes are prohibited and alternative settle- ment procedures are provided. Most unions see little dif- ference between employment in the private and public sectors. Time‘unions focus their attention on "the individual employee, A8 his economic needs, his job and his fundamental rights as a citizen in a democratic society." The unions believe that public employees do not differ from those in private indus- try "in terms of economic requirements and the desire to have a voice in determining their conditions of employment." The more militant unions assert the right to strike.76 In discussing "Procedures in Collective Bargaining," Harrison emphasized similarities between bargaining in the private and public sectors of employment when he wrote: It was the need for democracy on the economic side of man's life that brought into being the idea of collective bargaining. In practice, collective bargaining has proved so successful in democratiz- ing the employer-employee relationship that it has become an established institution in every free democratic nation in the world. It is the instrument successfully utilized by wage earners, salaried groups and professional peOple to humanize the employer-employee relation- ship. Collective bargaining is equally successful in this role with people employed by governmental units as with private employers.77 Reuther told teachers that their right to organize and.participate in collective bargaining was the same as “that of millions and millions of other workers in both pri- 'vate industry and government.78 76Stieber, "Collective Bargaining," p. 77. 7Harrison, "Procedures in Collective Bargaining," p- 5- 78Reuther, "Road to a Brighter Tomorrow," p. 5. A9 Cogen agreed with both Harrison and Reuther that bargaining rights for teachers were the same as those for workers in private industry when he wrote that collective bargaining--the process of economic democracy that had been developed in centuries of labor relations history-—enab1ed teachers to participate in the determination of their own working conditions.79 Most discussions of collective bargaining in the ‘ private and public sectors of employment become involved at sometime or another with the use of the strike as a bargaining tool. Lieberman conceded that strikes should not be allowed in certain areas of government service such as the armed forces or the police. He stated that in other areas of public employment workers should have the same right to strike as private employees. He wrote: The public welfare or safety is hardly threat- ened by strikes of gardeners in public parks. In- consistently, employees of a privately owned utility can strike, whereas employees of a publicly owned utility, providing the same service cannot strike. And there is not much logic in permitting teamsters to close a school by not delivering coal to it but not permitting teachers to close it by refusing to teaChe 79Cogen, "Departure," p. 5. 8QMyron Lieberman, "Teacher Strikes: Acceptable Strategy?" Phi Delta Ka an, XLVI (January, 1965), p. 238. 50 Continuing, Lieberman said that no teacher strike recorded has ever lasted long enough to result in irrepar- able educational harm to children. Schools are closed for vacations, football games, harvesting, teachers' conventions, inclement weather and for many other reasons and no one gets very excited about it. But people become very excited if school is closed for one day because of a strike. There is no evidence that teacher strikes have had any lasting impact on children because of the illegality factor either. He argued further that since strikes cannot be pre- vented in the private sector even when they clearly threaten national welfare or safety, it is hypocritical to say that teacher strikes cannot be permitted because they would en— danger public safety or welfare. He holds that the "public- private dichotomy" is not a logical basis for deciding what group can or cannot strike. Some strikes in the private sector are more threatening to the public than some in the public sector. "Teacher strikes may be inconvenient but they do not endanger the public welfare or safety."81 Lieberman noted elsewhere that in some Canadian provinces teachers have the right to strike by statute. He emphasized that he does not advocate strikes in violation of’law or an appropriate court order.82 81Ibid. 82Lieberman, Collective Negotiations, p. 301. 51 Differences in collective bargaining in the_private and putlic sectors. There is a great deal of evidence that the conditions under which collective bargaining functions in private industry are not entirely the same in public employment. There has been some reluctance on the part of public employers to grant bargaining rights to employees. Spero summed up one argument against granting bargaining rights as follows: Government asserts that its relation to those who earn their livelihood in its service is dif- ferent from the relation of private employers to their employees. To private employees government guarantees the freedom to organize, to bargain col- 1ectively with their employers and to strike. It claims, however, that the means used by workers in private employ to bring pressure upon their employers to improve their conditions have no place in the public service and that their use would represent a derogation of sovereignty and an attack on the authority of the state. Government insists that, in order to preserve the integrity of public author- ity, it must possess the right of final determina- tion in all its employment relations.83 Spero pointed out, however, that in spite of their reluctance to grant legal authority to bargain to their em- ;ployees, agencies of the government have been dealing with enmfloyees and coming to understandings with them for many jyears, without thinking of this action as being related to collective bargaining.84 83Stirling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New ‘York: Remsen Press, 19A8), p. I. 8hlbid., p. 341. 52 There has been a great deal of reluctance on the part of legislative bodies in this country to give up their rule-making jurisdiction. Because of this there is a tend- endy to treat the legislative process that governs the em- ployment relationship in the public service as reserved territory, to be excluded from collective bargaining.85 The United States Government took a step toward bar- gaining collectively with its employees by means of Presi- dent Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 in 1962. That order granted some bargaining rights to federal employees, but it limited matters that could be bargained and denied employees the right to membership in organizations "which assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof." Executive Order 10988 actually main- tained the right of government to final determination of policies while granting to employees the right to participate in the determination of certain working conditions. It did not break down the major differences between bargaining in public and private employment.86 85George H. Hildebrand, "The Public Sector," Frontiers mn ho>hom cw museum umao Hm on» Ham we soon mm moms on omam coo monoEOmSnoa .moowppmwo weapanOo tempo Hm mo mammomoe mo :OHpmmovmm mpzwwom chonnmma nonoz Ho mo>nsm hhmamm mom on moasoonow newsman Eomm ¢\H some nosoa wcfixomm Ha .noma .H espouse an osmEOmSnoa .m .musos nmpmmsmm hetero mo pasfla s on a: omnwoo o omoaon possum moo: nopmmEmm some now omsoaam ma madoogom humane one so peoomo .H «mmpoz omo.ma omm.ma omo.ma oma.ma omo.ma omo.aa omm.aa omo.oa omm.oa oom.oa oa ooa.ma oos.ma oom.ma ooo.aa oom.aa ooa.aa ooe.oa oom.oa ooo.oa omen a omm.ma oka.aa one.aa omm.aa omo.oa omm.oa oma.oa ones omeo ooma m ooo.ma ooo.aa oom.aa ooo.oa ooe.oa ooo.oa oooo . ooNa ooam ones a omm.aa oma.aa oms.oa cam.oa omao ommo omao omeo omao oomm o ooa.aa ooe.oa oom.oa oooo ooma ooao ooeo oomo ooom .omse a omo.oa omm.oa omoo ones omoo omoo ommm omen ones oome a oom.oa ooao oomo ooaa ooso oomm oooe oome ooms omoo m omoo ommo omao ones ommo omen omen ones omoo oooo m oooo ooma oomo ooeo oooo oops oome oomo oomo ommo a ones omoo ones onow ones omme ommo omao omao ooom o .o.ca om. oa+ om.as om+a2 oa+aa as om+ao oa+am am metro I. .mem .meo no .m .3. I monsooauueasoonom sesame monsoon comedona mongoose mo coaomamoom mommaom sponsoom :ph02-u.e magma 77 a point where they did not feel able to make a further con- cession without some assurance that the other side would make a corresponding offer. In an attempt to move toward an agreement, the mediator called the union president and the school super- intendent to a private and unofficial meeting with him on June 8. At, that time the union president and school super- intendent were instructed that an attempt should be made by each side to bring out its best possible offer with the knowledge that if an agreement could not be reached in this manner, the offers would never be made official and neither side would lose its bargaining position. During discussions that then took place it soon be- came apparent that an agreement might be possible. The dif- ference between the salary positions of the two sides had been reduced sharply. One serious problem remained to be solved before the negotiating parties could reach an agree- ment, and that problem could not be entirely resolved without reference to teacher salaries in other school districts. Each bargaining team represented another group-- teachers and the board. Neither bargaining team appeared willing to reach a salary agreement that would appear to be disadvantageous to its group when compared with salary schedules yet to be determined in other school districts in the metropolitan area. In order to cope with that prob- lem, a basic salary schedule that the superintendent could 78 agree to as being financially feasible and safely in line with what other districts might be expected to pay was worked out. To protect the interests of the teachers, a clause was added that would raise teacher salaries in the event that salaries in other districts in the area would prove to be higher than those in North Dearborn Heights. According to the clause, North Dearborn Heights would rank no lower in salary than 13th in a group of 32 selected com- parable school districts.8 When the above salary schedule arrangements had been worked out by the union president and the school super- intendent with the assistance of the mediator, the mediator reminded the others that the salary prOposal was still un— official and that it would remain so until approved by the two bargaining teams. The union president was instructed to meet with members of her bargaining team to determine whether or not they would accept the salary proposal as it existed. The superintendent was instructed to contact bargaining team members and board members for the same pur- pose. A meeting of the two bargaining teams was scheduled for the afternoon of MOnday, June 12, for the purpose of officially offering and approving the salary prOposal, but only if there were no objections from the parties on either side. 8School District of North Dearborn Heights, bargain- ing team notes, 1967. ' asunder—HI ... ,. -v.’ .JH‘DIIIlldIIH 1‘. .H II: A..I|1\ 79 For a summary of the tentative salary schedule agree- ment, see table 5. Rejection of the tentative contract agreement. Fol- lowing their unofficial meeting with the mediator, the union president and the superintendent contacted their apprOpriate parties to inform them concerning the unofficial agreement that had been reached. The union bargaining team accepted the arrangement and gave every indication of being satisfied with it. On the morning following the unofficial meeting which had resulted in a tentative agreement, the superin- tendent called six of the seven board members. The seventh member was out of town and could not be contacted. The pro- posed salary schedule and the ranking clause were reviewed in each of the telephone conversations. In each case it was pointed out by the superintendent that a c0py of the salary schedule, ranking clause and other pertinent informa- tion would be delivered to the board member's home that afternoon along with the regular packet of information sent to each board member every Friday. It was also pointed out that the salary proposal was not yet officially on the bar- gaining table and that it would not be placed there if there were any objections to it on the part of board members. Board members were urged to report any objections to the salary proposal to the superintendent before noon the follow- ing Monday. A note included in the materials sent to the 8O .mpopupmpo Hoonom mapmnmaaoo mm mo dsopm oopooaom m moose ppma mo moapwmoo mama m upmpmwme Op hummmoooo up oommonoop on Op mopmmamm «opoz ooe.Na oop.Np ooo.aa ooN.aa ooo.oa ooa.oa ooa.oa emmo op ooo.aa oom.aa oop.pa ooe.oa oom.oa oooo ooeo ommo o ooa.ap ooo.pa ooo.oa ooN.oa oooo ooeo ooao omow m ooo.op oom.oa ooa.op ooeo oomo oooo oooo ommo a oom.oa ooa.oa ooso oomo oooo oomm ooNo omoe o ooa.op ooeo oomo ooom comm ooam oome ones m ooeo oomo oooo oOmm oops ooee ooas oops a oomo ooem oomo oopm ooee oome oooe omeo m oooo ooow oONm oowe ooee ooos ooeo omae N ooem oomo oooe come ooae ooeo ooao capo a ooao oooo oooe ooNe oomo ooao ooao Oman o oa+o.eo om.az oN.az op+aa as oN+am oa+am am .oxo .m.om Omwwmnihr ;, when» (H oasoonon humane monnoma oo>ondas bao>ppmpcosuu.m manna 81 board members' homes Friday afternoon repeated the request that objections to the salary schedule, if any, be reported to the superintendent by noon on Monday, June 12, in which case the salary prOposal would not be officially offered at the bargaining table. On the morning of June 12, one board member called to express concern over the recognition in the schedule of credits earned beyond the Specialist in Education degree level, but he indicated that his objection was not strong and that he would support the prOposed salary schedule. No other board member expressed any concern, so the board bar- gaining team (at this time not including attorney Targan who was out of town) proceeded to place the salary proposal on the bargaining table that afternoon. The completion of details relative to the total con- tract took a short time, and by the end of the afternoon of June 12 a tentative contract agreement had been finalized. The tentative contract agreement was to cover a two year period except for economic items which were to be renegotiated after a one year period. Both bargaining teams expressed happiness that the agreement had been reached at an early date. That evening at a scheduled board meeting, however, opposition to the contract began to develop. One board mem- ber expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed salary schedule in very strong terms and some of the others indicated 82 concern over the ranking clause. They indicated that it would probably result in higher salary costs that could not be determined until other districts reached their salary agreements. Other board members felt that the district would pay competitive salaries and that salaries would be about the same under the ranking clause as they would be if the district would wait until a clearer picture of salary conditions in the area would be available before bargaining a salary schedule. The board decided not to act on the prOposed con- tract that night because the members wanted to have complete OOpies of the entire contract available to study and these were still being prepared. A week later, on Monday, June 19, the board met again in a special meeting to consider the prOposed contract on an item by item basis. After studying most of the non- economic items the meeting was adjourned until the following evening. The adjourned meeting was reconvened on the even- ing of June 20 and study on the contract was continued. Finally, after midnight, a resolution to reject the contract was approved unanimously by the board, primarily because of the structure of the salary schedule.9 9 School District of North Dearborn Heights, Minutes of the Board of Education, June 20, 1967. ‘flo IMM).114II.III. n . Pin. ._ 83 An unofficial poll of board members taken at that time indicated that four were Opposed to the ranking clauses and three were not. Five board members indicated that they wanted to reject the proposed contract while two indicated that they did not want to do so even though they had voted publicly with the majority in order to make the action unani- mous. The board's action in rejecting the proposed con- tract caused a reaction of shock and anger on the part of the teachers' bargaining team members. Bargaining was broken off for the summer in accordance with the union's previous position and letter to that effect. There was an attempt on the part of one board member to bring about a reconsideration of the board's action, but that board.member was not able to attend the next meeting and no resolution for reconsideration was prOposed. The unfair labor practice charge. On June 30, 1967, the federation filed charges that the board's bargaining team was not given adequate authority to bargain and that the board had withdrawn and revoked agreements reached in collective bargaining which it had approved in conversations with its bargaining team.10 At the commencement of the hearing on August 15, 1967, 10State of Michigan, Labor Mediation Board, Labor Relations Division, Trial Sxaminzr McCormick's Decision and Recommended Order, August 23, 19 7- 84 the schOol district filed an answer to the charges. The dis- trict's statement indicated that the board had appointed a negotiating team to seek solutions to the union's demands subject to ratification by the board of education convening in a manner prOperly prescribed by law, and that the feder- ation's bargaining team had been advised at the beginning of negotiations and at several times later that the solu— tions negotiated to the demands of the union wOuld be sub- mitted to the board for its sole and exclusive evaluation. The board had, according to the statement, convened in a manner prescribed by law and had exercised its right to evaluate the entire proposed contract as it had been nego- tiated and had voted not to ratify the proposed contract as submitted.11 On August 23, 1967 the trial examiner issued his decision and recommended order in the above case. In his findings of fact, he reconstructed the facts of the bargain- ing procedures up to and including the board's rejection of the prOposed contract. He concluded that the federation had urged two seemingly inconsistent theories at first. They were: (a) that the board's team was not given adequate authority to conduct bargaining, and (b) that the board reneged on a binding salary agreement made by its team acting 11 Ibid. 85 with full authority from the board. The federation had with- drawn its first charge during the course of the hearing. The trial examiner found that the board can not be bound by informal statements made outside a formal session and that the board members had not given any meaningful approval to the complex contents of a salary schedule through telephone conversations with the superintendent. According to the trial examiner, efforts of the superintendent to bring about an agreement might have misled the federation team concerning the views of board members, but not to the point of violating the school district's obligation to bargain in good faith. The trial examiner recommended that the Labor Medi— ation Board issue an order dismissing the charges and com- plaint in their entirety.12 That order was issued on October 17, 1967.13 Final negptiations before the strike. During the summer of 1967 no negotiations were scheduled to take place until August 28. As already indicated, a letter from the union bargaining team to that effect had been received by the board bargaining team and the mediator. Attempts on —_ lzIbid. lBState of Michigan, Labor Mediation Board, Labor Relations Division, Decision and Order, October 17, 1967. 86 the part of the board team to schedule bargaining sessions were unsuccessful. On August 25 a call from the mediator was received by the superintendent, informing him that the trial examiner's decision and recommended order had been favorable to the board and that the president of the North Dearborn Heights Federation of Teachers was now refusing to begin negotiations again on August 28 unless the full board of education would be present. The reason given for the demand that the board be present was that by rejecting the prOposed contract in June, the board had proved that its negotiating team was without authority to reach an agreement with the teachers. The teachers, therefore, would bargain only while the board was present in order to avoid a possible second rejection of a tentative agreement. At its regular meeting on the evening of August 28 the board indicated to its team that it would be impossible for all members to be present for negotiations because of their own employment responsibilities. They agreed, however, that one or two members would be able to be present if that would help get negotiations under way again. A letter was sent to the local federation president the next morning advising her that every effort would be made to have the board represented by some of its members at bargaining meetings and that the board would meet as soon 87 as it possibly could to ratify a contract agreement.15 A salary proposal was included with the letter to the union president (see table 6). On August 31 negotiations began again, but not until the superintendent gave a signed statement to the teachers' bargaining team that one or preferably two board members would be present for negotiations, and that the board presi- dent had already called for a special meeting on September 3 to consider a contract agreement if one should be ready for board action. The teachers' new salary proposal was then presented (see table 7). It represented significantly increased salary demands and retained the ranking clause which had been the basic cause of the board's earlier contract rejection. With the presentation of these new demands an impasse again materialized. A meeting was called by the State Labor Mediation Board in its Detroit offices for Monday, September A, 1967 (Labor Day). That meeting ended at about 6:00 P.M. with an offer on the part of the teachers to return to the salary schedule that had been negotiated by the teams and rejected by the board in June (table 5) and to change the ranking clause from thirteenth position among the thirty-two .u.“ -‘n-~-~. -.-—-- ---- lL’Letter from William Rogers, Superintendent, School District of North Dearborn Heights, August 29, 1967. .nmcwmwpmn mm osmm one camsmn HHHB meowmfi>oue oHEoeoom no muwmmcmn oweahm pmnpo .m>onw UmumOchw mm mxooan :a need on on manon nopmmsmm pom pemsmmnspeflmm “muoz oommma . ma Mm ooe.NH ooo.ma . . 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