RAEEECAL REGE’éTéfi‘W: AN EMFEWCAL STEE‘E’ “was for {T'Em Dagmar 05 DE. 9. MICHiGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Ira S. Robber 1967 . .. rung-.1 “Us 454 u. a $451.“:- __ ’_ ;wfi$ L r H hats . L I r, R A R Y M Ichigan State University This is to certify that the“ thesis entitled Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study presented by Ira S. Rohter has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Political Science h Bis/£24! Major professor Date May 1, 1967 0-169 A-WA"A *Afl44 ‘AFA ABSTRACT RADICAL RIGHTISTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY by Ira S. Rohter 1niroughout our history, political movements have sprung up in America, which have advocated practices which deny democratic processes and constitutional freedoms. Today, groups called variously "radical rightists,' right-wing extremists, the far-right," "super-patriots,' and similar names occupy the public spotlight. This study focuses on explaining why certain persons are attracted to this recent political movement. Three principal theses are offered, which are then tested empirically. Stated simply, people become radical rightists because: 1) through its ideology and activities tney come to believe they are influential and personally worthwhile individuals; 2) the movement provides a way of expressing hostilities generated by frustrations which have their primary source in social status and value conflicts; and :3) acceptance of the Communist conspiracy theory9 which the right advocateSQhelps to diSpel its believers' sense of confusion and anomic feelings. assured intervzr 5:: :.: "in-31m;- ;.41. Rightsts Z :zixec’ attitudzr. 11? ;; {masts have , s:-:4.s an: 'lxnver's‘l One tncszs _ I l I fies: :atpms mu, :fsnk"¢.l1. . - ‘ ~>ALU3AL’ p:- 31513 and Valle so (:5 :10 {ypes of A) The 51.1? \ other e. commu ticml ‘ Ce”? ar ' :5: out. rough: J t ':;: 7"t3 to Ira S. Rohter The data for investigating these hypotheses are drawn from structured interviews personally administered to 169 actual Rightists" and 167 Non-Rightists, the latter serving as a control-comparison group. Rightists are discriminated from legitimate conservatives and defined attitudinally by their belief that an overwhelming conspiracy of Communists have secretly taken over and controls the government, the schools and universities, the churches, the mass media, ad infinitum. One thesis advanced to explain the willingness of some to accept these notions states that radical rightism offers these persons a way of symbolically protesting difficulties they are experiencing over status and value conflicts. Emphasizing the source of their discontent- ment, two types of status-anxious rightists are proposed: 1) The Status Decliners, who are small businessmen, other entrepreneural types, old-timers in the community, and the less educated (at all occupa- tional levels). The amount of prestige they re- ceive and influence they have is decreasing from year to year. 2) The Newly Arrived, whose upward occupational and financial mobility are not matched by concurrent increases in their influence and acceptance by higher status social groups, and who resent this. Both types share a common sense of relative status deprivation because *Throughout the study the term "rightist," uncapitalized, refers to adherents to this movement in general; the term "Rightists," with a capital "R," means those persons in our sample who were empirically classified on an index. m. vaults ‘ arts of 1.121: 5*" _,....1'- Ijfllvl'lud.f Z I TILES LP. CJSU'] ‘ Z :2 1.50 arm to 5'- | a: at he same 11 teams, edicat: :3; aszllty) amZ . . | a: s::;ect1ve rm I ‘.A Z 1' V «anally slum: Sense 10. Z Z 4: 4w. rays to p' moaned '1‘“ [HI ;,,5:~. 1 5-3 This 13 I‘- N ...; :7 - .Def‘patrxw {3.5" . ”filial Dez- ‘ Mil; v v‘iu'entlon: r M 3’11 self“, . J Ira S. Rohter they experience discrepancies between their actual and expected status- rankings. The values which people hold and act on are also major deter- minants of their social rank, for they importantly affect style of living. Individuals who persist in maintaining older values and practices in contrast to more cosmopolitan ways of their contemporaries are also prone to status anxieties. Their social-rank discontentments may, at the same time, be compounded by their own anger over the fact that the traditional values which they cherish are being disestablished. Empirical data on the Rightists' objective social characteristics (occupation, education, age, length of residency, and intergenerational status mobility) and commitment to traditional values, as well as on their subjective reactions to the status they and their values receive, substantially support the status frustration hypotheses. Because low status threatens individuals' sense of self-esteem, they seek ways to restore their image of themselves as worthy. Persons dissatisfied with their status, it is hypothesized, are attracted to radical rightism because it allows them to feel more worthwhile and in- fluential. This is done in two ways: identification with "Americanism" ‘through hyper-patriotism enhances a man's sense of self-worth. Attack- ing influential people in the community and nation as "Communists" also allows the rightist to degrade these normally respected individuals so 'that they may elevate themselves in their place. The data again support ‘this contention: radical rightism enhances its adherents' sense of im- portance and self-esteem through an association with Americanism, [matriotism, and other worthwhile personal attributes, through special "educational" programs, and through attention gained by the public display of rightist beliefs. 'X'.-’:. are 1.5) 0- a \ . .. Hat.“ 5‘5"" -:;:...s:;c germ 2.15: camping fie; .2272 a gene rat , . I .. l .1") C. re )p‘e and ”130-“. 13133121 I | hits mutt 12319:: to expres: 5.3.213. against he evinc- Z “<12: wash-es of <. | :xa;t:e) are d:;§ :‘.‘.‘Q I Z ~_’ 3 ~ :- ‘ 'v-a “ 6‘ ‘AAO \1' lb Ii. “n ..... a: ghtists ..:.s‘.’.1vencss: t '--"“'€.y‘attri?, ‘ .n‘n xiii,” Ira S. Rohter Status anxieties and value frustrations alone do not explain why some persons are attracted to radical rightism; certain personality factors are also operative. One of these is the personality trait of "cognitive style.' Rightists are viewed as persons who see the world in simplistic terms (which accounts for their willingness to accept the Communist conspiracy theory of history) as well as being closed-minded. They have a general psychological need for simple, firm, stereotyped views of people and events, are dependent upon external authorities for guidance, and hold their beliefs so rigidly that compromise is impossible. Furthermore, rightists diaplay the trait of extrapunitiveness; they tend to express their frustrations as hostilities which they direct outwardly, against peOple whom they blame for their dissatisfied state. The empirical evidence supportsthese hypotheses. Three psycho- metric measures of cognitive style show that Rightists are closed- minded: they are disprOportionately intolerant of ambiguity, Opposed to compromise, and dogmatically reject people who do not share their own beliefs. Rightists also manifest the two defining characteristics of extrapunitiveness; they are generally prone to expressing hostility,and projectively-attribute their own personal hatreds into the symbol "Communism." Rightists are also thought to be anomic individuals whose re- action to contemporary society is one of alienation. It is found that they are extraordinarily concerned with their sense of powerlessness and inability to gain access to decision-makers. They feel that too much power resides in the hands of the federal government, labor unions, and liberal groups, while they have too little influence. Their political representatives are not responsive to them, they claim, but instead are c J. ~'. . ., ,..:. ‘3 L) ‘d. - . . - . ' . -',-",.3 v Q t l .-p ..i re "" Z- N I 0' O .on :.;.:;a. ..-;, ,m m _ Z s. .— -- .r-e.~..:t Ed‘s: J..[ 3‘ Z I a O« . ' .-T....’r) o: A'_‘_t"" veA . ." té-c'J-l . Ira S. hontcr dictated to by influentials. A sense of general personal powerlessness 315° Permeates their lives, which they try to alleviate through rightist activities . The rightists' political behavior thus serves as compensation for feelings of powerlessness, low status, and estrangement. Through rightism they gain a sense of purpose and identity; by combatting the "Communist conspiracy" they attempt to be recognized as the preper inheritors of America, deserving reSpect and esteem from their friends and net ion . in RADICAL RIGHTISTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY By ,,lllr’"'i Ira Sivfiohter A THESIS Submitted to lichigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1967 {y 1316;;9 .._.o l-. 12.3515 of the chi ‘ o . ~— u a fisfntl. Sar- ‘ use... 3:221: assist 1‘2: ‘3‘. -‘u. 35 31:11 a .5. H‘s? “ e“ A ‘ \azre'l 7 "5 ‘§ “6 Insve ‘ . -4 "1:53. and - 1t.» 3 Q" ”‘6‘?- e. ‘- Lc‘ ‘ a.) ‘p L‘ 't. .-., ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My intellectual debts to many scholars are only partially acknowledged in the text and bibliography of this study. A research grant from the Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administra- tion, University of Oregon, greatly facilitated the collection and analysis of the data, and I would like to express my appreciation to Philip Runkel, Harmon Zeigler, Marshall Goldstein, and Robert Agger, for their assistance and guidance while in Oregon. Roy Bardsley and his team of exceptional interviewers went considerably beyond the "call of duty" to collect these data from often extremely reluctant respondents. Ora Lind and Linda Powell supervised and spent long hours coding the interviews, and deserve credit for bearing with patience my perhaps overly strict procedures and standards. The Computing Center of the University of Oregon granted me many hours of computer time, and Thom Lane greatly aided the analysis through his expert skills as a programmer. Richard Schmuck and Mark Chesler kindly allowed me to use some items from an interview schedule they develOped to study rightists in Michigan, as well as providing considerable personal encouragement and advice in carrying out my own research. The Institute for Governmental Affairs, the University of Wisconsin, and its Associate Director, Clarke Hagensick, gave me time to complete this manuscript. Verna Hopper tried her best to provide some editorial assistance, and Mrs. Gordon Hanneman turned much ii . _".:'.‘ firr 5 " lost of J1 - “' ' . ' ‘L...““E:J ‘J ‘33. C‘. » v " Z 1..”an Jell- .. .‘. " .-: .3. 13-3 cone.“ T917113); of (at sea; tipartntt Z TT."r3.31‘, and co: 0 .132 £1.15 near; mstl). I ‘.;;:'.e {Ln-3 to .1“. ~- Z min pm) ’ 3:33- ‘ " u he) 1'1 "mus that the - MM cause scribbled over sheaves of paper into a neatly typed manuscript. Most of all I want to thank Frank Pinner, my advisor, for his willingness to endure reading through several drafts of this long study. His thoughtful comments and constant emphasis on conceptual clarity and correct use of the English language has immeasurably improved the dissertation. Throughout this long project, from its inception in Michigan, through the collection and analysis of the data in Oregon, and during the writing of the manuscript in Wisconsin, my wife Marcia has played several important roles, including those of research assistant, counselor, and companion. She alone knows how much her support during this time has meant to me. Lastly, I would like to express my debt to the 336 persons who took the time to answer our long series of questions, some of which were quite personal and probing. Some, I am sure, would be most dis- tressed if they happened to read this report. I am sorry if my con- clusions that their political ideas represent things other than what they claim cause them unhappiness; this was not my intention. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter , I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY. . . . . . . . . II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . III. RIGHTISTS AS PERSONS WITH STATUS PRUSTRATIONS. IV. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS FRUSTRATION THESIS V. THE STATUS ENHANCING FUNCTIONS OF RADICAL RIGHTISN . VI. PERSONALITY EACTORS: COGNITIVE STYLE AND EXTRA- PUNITIVENESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. PONERLESSNESS AND ALIENATION: THE ANOMY SYNDROME . . VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Letter Sent to Interviewees. . . . . . . Interview Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page ii 36 69 121 164 190 240 276 302 303 305 ‘ . I 0“ 9.311231 Rzgr’. . lineal Right. .‘reszdentm; a. “3:311; 331 ll‘ ilsntzsts 0n {nitrison Be 31 "Exists ‘ 1.. Lection :3lla:sed Ra“: Fungi} Act 1. ,. l ‘fggraphicifi ll "033 a r 9d “Iti' Z £6393 Stat Z 2-8 3-2 LIST OF TABLES Page Record of What Happened to the Original Sample. . . . . . . 43 Comparison Between Subsamples of Positive Voters and Known Radical Rightists on Radical Rightism Index . . . . . 50 Radical Rightism Index and Liberal-Conservative Attitudes . 55 Radical Rightism and Candidate Voted for in 1964 Presidential Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Radical Rightism Index vs. Original Sample Classification . 57 Comparison Between Publicly Active and Organizational Rightists on Liberal-Conservative Attitudes . . . . . . . . 58 Comparison Between Publicly Active and Organizational Rightists with Respect to their Vote in 1964 Presidential EleCtione s s e e e e e e e o o I 0 0 O 0 0 I e e e e s e . 59 Collapsed Radical Rightism Index vs. Original Sample, with Publicly Active and Organizational Rightists Combined . . . 59 Geographical Location of Birch Society Letter-Writers, Compared with the National Population . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Selected States with Most Birch Society Letter-Writers and “Fibers O O O 0 C O O O O O O O O 0 e O I O O O O O I O O I 106 Current Residence of Birch Society Members, by Regions-- Grupp Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Occupational Comparison Between Male Radical Rightists and Non-Rightists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Comparison Between Radical Rightists and Non-Rightists on Whether Self-Employed or not. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Age Distribution and Radical Rightism . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Objective Achieved Status (For Males) . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Intergenerational Occupational Status Differences for all Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 ‘1‘}. —.-— I 1‘; ... O . - til 0 3;) , _ L‘l o J- ‘ 1:223:69?“ in, Z Z (513185 0'11} ). Z | Iztergenerzt icxstional lccscatm: 11 (All Respond. | Occupational Z (tales Only) Pall Statis Z (Isles Only) Z ' OCCJDJtzomi ”or 3ill Res; Z OCCJPational Z Z Nil 3”th i Z ”or All n.3,; Z121“ 031i) 1. Status I! (Hales Only) :1gh-Statls C" .espondeat s) we . - 0| ca. “itctl V 5 him v“ 8 5t: Table 4-6 4-7 4-10 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-15 4-16 4-17 4-18 4-19 4-20 4-21 4-22 4-23 Intergenerational Occupational Status Differences (Males Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intergenerational Status Differences Using Combined Educational and Occupational Status Measure (Hales Only). Occupational Status Mobility in Highest Status Group (All Respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Status Mobility in Highest Status Group (Isles Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Full Status Measure of Mobility in Highest Status Group (Isles Only). . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Status Mobility in Middle-Status Groups (For All Respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Status Mobility in Middle-Status Groups (Males Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Full Status Measure of Mobility in Middle-Status Groups (Males Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Status Mobility in Lower-Status Groups (For All Respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational Status Mobility in Lower—Status Groups (Males Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Full Status Measure of Mobility in Lower-Status Groups (Males Only). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . High-Status Occupational Level vs. Education (For All Respondents). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-Status Occupational Level vs. Education (For All Respondents). . . . . . . . . . . . High-Status Occupational Level vs. Education (Males Only) Riddle-Status Occupational Level vs. Education (Males Only) Age, Length of Residency in Community, and Radical Rightism (Age ' Less than Fifty) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objective Status Mobility of Persons Residing for less than Ten Years in their Community and Radical Rightism . . . Age, Length of Residence in Community, and Radical Rightism . vi Page 128 128 129 129 129 131 131 131 132 132 133 134 135 135 135 136 137 138 " Qf'ettl'.'9 1! or me Year If; selxei in t“ 1 4-25 km: of RE. szztisn Int é-E? Religious M 223 Place in v51 2-25 Self-Emma: \ 1| +33 Reasons Give- .. 30: Future 0 '. 1 I . 3.0! Future (I '33 Peeing t at Jim-1h" ‘ '34 Believe Diff. Life and day s. Rat's 'ror; 2'3: ‘xteqt to w. ..I T‘)‘ klleve 1‘ r33 4. 3mm 31 a. scale ‘ ‘1' "1 L 51091“ of OZ)" HQ RQSJQESH . “tionalls '2 :. ‘1tily and p. ,1: Gain 8 3“ F32! Stan and P 51 “Ohm ‘ ;. 0‘ ".a . 'r 060'- 1 "Et- Fae Table 4-24 4-25 4-26 4-27 4-28 4-29 4-30 4-31 4-32 4-33 4-34 4-35 4-36 4-37 4-38 4-39 4-40 Objective Status Mobility of Persons Residing for Twenty or more Years in their Community and Radical Rightism. Belief in the Protestant Ethic vs. Radical Rightism Index. Index of Religious Fundamentalist Beliefs vs. Radical Rightism Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Religious Affiliation and Radical Rightism . . . . Place in which Respondent Grew Up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Evaluation of Social Class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reasons Given for Difficulties in Moving Upward Socially How Future of Job Looks (Males). . . . . . . . . . . . . How Future of Husband's Job Looks (Working Wives). . . . . . Peeling that Community Influentials are "Cliquish" or ..Friend1y” C . . O . . 0 . I C . . . O C . . C . . . O O O U Believe Difference Between What Should be American Way of Life and Way Things are Actually Done. . . . What's Wrong with Current American Way of Life . . . . . . . Extent to Which Believe Other People Share Your Values Why Believe Some People Don't Share Values . . . . . . Radical Rightism Index vs. Moral Breakdown Scale Radical Rightism Index vs. Traditional Values in Schools Scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of Open-Ended Questions on Which "Value and Morality" Type Responses are Given vs. Radical Rightism Index. Nationalism Scale vs. Radical Rightism . Family and Friends Reactions to Public Activities. Other Peeple (Not Known) Reactions to Public Activities. Family and Friends Reactions to Public Activities, and Status Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other People (Not Known) Reactions to Public Activities, Status Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and vii Page 138 141 143 144 144 147 147 148 148 149 152 152 153 153 155 155 157 168 182 182 182 183 Table Page 5-6 Encouraged to Continue Activities by Family and Friends. . . 183 5-7 Sensitivity to Reactions of Family and Friends (Upward Mobile Persons). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 5-8 Sensitivity to Reactions of Other People (Not Known) (Upwardly Mobile Persons). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 5-9 Believe People Now Pay More Attention Because of Public Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 5-10 Believe Peeple Now Pay More Attention Because of Public Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 5-11 Need for Greatness and Importance and Radical Rightism . . . 187 6-1 Radical Rightism vs. DOgmatic Views on Communism and Russia. 203 6-2 Inter-Correlations Between Separate Measures of Dogmatic COgnitive Style. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 6-3 Radical Rightism vs. Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. . . . . 207 6-4 Radical Rightism vs. Anti-Compromise Scale . . . . . . . . . 208 6-5 Radical Rightism vs. Closed-Mindedness Scale . . . . . . . . 208 6-6 Radical Rightism vs. Number of Extreme Responses (Opiniona- tion Index). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 6-7 Responses to Question "What Should be Done about Communists in our Country," Ranked by Degree of Sanction. . . . . . . . 225 6-8 Dominant Responses to Question "What Should be Done about Communists in our Country," Ranked by Degree of Sanction . . 225 6-9 Hostility Against Deviants Scale and Radical Rightism. . . . 227 6-10 Degree of Education of Communists, as Perceived by Non-Rightists and Rightists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 6-11 Number of Times Specific Religious Groups Mentioned as Sources of Communism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 7-1 'The Federal Government is Exercising too Much Power. . . . . 255 742 Are There Any Groups in America Who Have too Much Power and Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 7‘3 Groups Which Have too Much Power and Influence . . . . . . . 257 viii Table 7-5 7-10 7-11 7-11A 7-12 7-13 7-14 7-15 8-2 8-5 Are There Any Groups in America Who Have too Little Power and Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radical Rightism Index vs. Sense of Personal Powerlessness Scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radical Rightism Index vs. Political Alienation Scale. Elected Political Leaders Do What is Best for Country? . . How Would Public Officials React to your Problem?. . . . . Public Officials Do? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radical Rightism Index vs. Negative Voting Index . . . . . Radical Rightism Index vs. Lack of Trust of Other People scale C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I 0 O I Lack of Trust of Other People Scale (For High Content- Sensitives) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of Non-Political Organizational Memberships . Number of Non-Political and Non-Church Related Organiza- tional Memberships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of Organizational Memberships. . . . . . . . . Three-Item Political Efficacy Index vs. Radical Rightism Index 0 O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I Differences Between Radical Rightists and Non-Rightis on Scales, Controlling for Content-Sensitivity. . . . . . . . Comparison Between Publicly Active and Organizational Member Rightists on Self-Evaluation of Social Class . . . . . . . Occupational Comparison Between Publicly Active and Organiza- tional Member Rightists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educational Comparison Between Publicly Active and Organiza- tional Member Rightists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rotated Factor Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Page 257 259 261 262 262 264 265 265 267 267 267 270 278 283 283 284 295 .7421? 2-1 Index of Rap “2 Caspar '1 son E-Z Correlatio:; anneal 31...- LIST OF FIGURES Index of Radical Rightism Items and Weights. . Comparison Between Ideal-Types of Radical Rightists. Correlations Between Individual Scales and Index of Radical Rightism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 51 238 292 . ".1: 3} mm. u : Isl-nag C'Jntr 1 1‘4: the Ca J.’ tuugmt 171.; seteazae 71.1.: h: then 1- '3'». + M We ILL-3.1:. sf g:.verrment, ) “01231.33 pm: ' i1; entrenuxeii "same piblls :49 entertain 1‘ fans. 111e, CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 1, THE PROBLEM Some Frightening Facts Washin on has been taken over! By which we mean that Communist influences are now in full working control of our Federal Government... And we believe that the Communists and their dupes, allies, and agents, throughout this vast apparatus of government, now actually determine almost all policies, actions, and decisions. And then look all around you! For the Communist influence at the top reaches far outside of government. This influence, at times or in some areas amounting practically to control, is visibly well established and entrenched in the mass communications media, in books and magazine publishing, in education, in the labor movement, in the entertainment field, in many other divisions of our national life, and in a great many specific national organiza- tions. This influence is maintained and constantly strengthened through almost infinite pressures, icy ruthlessness, and diabolic cunning.... These are the words of Robert Welch, founder and leader of The (kmn Birch Society. This country, he believes, is run by agents of a Vast Communist conspiracy. Even our highest-level national leaders have fallen under the Conspiracy's control. Welch believes President Eisenhower is a "dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist con- 8P1racy.... writes, "I personally believe Dulles to be a Communist agent...'; "2 Of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, he 1 légalw ”W" M”... ___ _ W, ..—. . @ IRA SHERMAN ROHTER All Rights Reserved 1967 Allen Dulles, former Central Intelligence head, "is the most protected and untouchable supporter of Communism, next to Eisenhower, in Washington."3 Incredible as they may sound, these views are not confined to a few individuals. Welch, as leader of the John Birch Society, officially speaks for perhaps as many as 100,000 dues-paying members. He heads an organization with over 200 employees and more than 75 pro- fessional full-time field coordinators, with some 5,000 local chapters spread throughout the United States.4 The Society operates five regional offices, 300 bookstores, and at the end of 1965 was Spending more than $5 million a year. The Birch Society is only one of many organized groups sub- scribing to the "Welchian" kind of Communist conspiracy theory. In 1962, a catalog of such groups, far from complete and now outdated, listed 1,492 different organizations.5 Another source found 25 nation- wide rightist organizations in operation that year; their overall mem- berships exceeded 300,000 individuals and their budgets totaled more than $20 million.6 The number of activists-members is only a partial indication of the magnitude of rightist influence. Millions of Americans seem ready to go along with the various positions advocated by the right. A 1962 Gallup poll found a projected 6.5 million persons favorably disposed toward the John Birch Society, even though it was then re- ceiving a great deal of adverse publicity because of Welch's statement about Eisenhower.7 Four percent of those responding to a national poll conducted in 1964 reported they would be "more likely to Vote for" a presidential candidate approved by The John Birch Society. And .I’ § 5 :zer 34 "' & -_-. 52:163'5 5 mazer «21 ‘3‘: evaluation. T :32 of ammo urge seine 2t Radical :azziates 1.1". in :-..;5. [any rig :rtszsentia. can LEWIS 31 11151; affect. lane-'11.. ‘okitt‘t ErJusi ‘ .CI “3:553. a. erg d. f‘ ‘ A .5:- ~ waiéaz~~s a ".911. F v ‘J‘S t mafi“ ‘ 1' another 34 percent (of those who had heard of the organization) said the Society's support would not make any difference in their electoral decision.8 More recently, three percent of a national sample taken in December of 1965 gave the Birch Society a "highly favorable" evaluation.9 The right's support is thus wide-spread; it includes a core of dedicated activists who number in the hundreds of thousands and a large segment of sympathizers who number in the millions. Radical rightism has not died out, as some predicted, because candidates whom the rightists supported have been repudiated at the polls. Many rightists, for example, were very active in Goldwater's presidential campaign.10 Surprisingly, his overwhelming defeat, instead of disillusioning his rightist followers, had the opposite effect. Immediately after the election new members continued to join rightist groups, and their efforts to take over control of political groups, PTA's, civic organizations, school boards, and libraries in- creased.11 The right is also stepping up its recruiting efforts. Fred Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communist Crusade has appeared on local tele- vision in several cities and funds are now being solicited to sponsor nationwide broadcasts. The John Birch Society has inserted multi-paged color recruitment brochures in Sunday supplements of newspapers appear- ing in Los Angales, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and other major American cities. The effectiveness of these and other efforts to attract followers are difficult to evaluate, but it is clear that the right's public campaigns are on the increase. The Christian Anti-Communist Crusade runs many "Schools of Anti-Communism" throughout the United States each year, and speakers for the Birch Society's speakers bureau address hundreds of meetings each month. Billy James Hargis, "Christian Crusade" head, broadcasts his combination of anti-Communism and religious fundamentalism weekly on 400 radio stations, while Carl Iclntire beams his daily "20th Century Reformation Hour" over 618 radio stations. Clarence Manion, Dan Smoot, Howard Kershner, and other right-wing broadcasters air their views on more than 7,000 radio and television programs each week, covering all fifty states.12 Whatever its ultimate future, right-wing extremism seems likely to be with us for some time. Why this political movement attracts people is the guiding question of this study. To explain why people become rightists a theory is proposed and systematically tested against empirical data. 2. RADICAL RIGHTISM: AN ATTITUDINAL DEFINITION Political extremism in America is not a new phenomenon. Throughout our history, groups quite willing to discard democratic processes in favor of practices which deny constitutional freedoms have exerted considerable influence on the thinking and behavior of large numbers of Americans. Catholics, Jews, Negroes, and many others have found their rights of free speech, assembly, and movement severely restricted. The Native American Party was among the first antidemocratic groups to organize politically and have a significant impact on American politics. In the 1830's and '40s its antiimmigrant, anti- Irish, anti-Catholic views were supported by enough people to allow the party to dominate many local governments and send representatives 13 to both houses of Congress. Anti-Catholicism and hatred for n n-Prttestnnt religious groups such as Jews and Mormons were continued in the lJSO's by the Know-Nothings. So wide-spread were these atti- tudes that in the election of l854 the Know-Nothings, Working thrcugh a political wing called the American Party, were able to elect nine governors and fill state legislatures and even the v.5. Congress with adherents. Organized hostility toward Catholics continued through the l390's in the fern of the American Protective Association, which was able to control municipal elections in many midwestern and western states. Any recounting of the history of organized Ligotry in America must also include the various Populist movements. While the POpulists devoted most of their attention to economic issues, hostility toward Jews and alien groups was a significant undercurrent, often openly expressed.14 A few years later, in 1915, the resurrected Ku Klux Klan's overt antagonism toward Jews, Negroes, Catholics and all non- white Anglo-Saxon Protestants was expressed in campaigns of religious and racial hatred enforced by violence and terrorism. By the 1920's the Klan's political and social influence extended into every state of the union. As its actual membership reached nearly nine million people by 1925, with perhaps three times that many sympathizers, it dominated the politics of many states. Father Couglin's "National Union for Social Justice" and Gerald L. K. Smith's "Cross and Flag" carried into the 1930's and early 40's the tradition of organized racial and religious bigotry very much a part of America's political heritage. Today another breed of political extremists occupies the r.ublic spotlight, called variously "radical rightists," "right-wing ‘F‘ n 1: l0 . ., . H _ extremists, the far-right," "super—patriots, etc. For consistency, and because it is the descriptive label most frequently used I shall call these peOple "rightists,' and their beliefs and ’ doctrines "radical rightism." What is radical rightism is not always clear. A potpourri of organizations advocating many different programs have been called rightist. Some groups, for example, have been labelled rightist be— cause they favor conservative economic policies; others because they openly advocate racial hatred and violence. Academic and pOpular writings on radical rightism are equally confused over who may prOperly be called a rightist. Some observers use the term as an epithet for polemic purposes. The Marxist historian Herbert Aptheker, for example, considers McCarthyism (a synonym for rightism) as "the name of an ultra- reactionary, a fascist, political movement whose main stock in trade is anti-Communism...McCarthyism is American Fascism."l6 Many on the political left similarly hurl the charge of "rightism" as an invective against their political opponents, regardless of whether they are moderate Republicans, economic conservatives, or simply hold views differing from their own.17 Other commentators have characterized rightists in terms so vague and general that many segments of society fall within its mean- ing. Daniel Bell, for example, speaks of the right as a protest move- ment, based on "...new divisions [within society] created by the status "1 anxieties of new middle class groups.... Seymour Martin Lipset seems to share this view; he has defined rightism as an "irrational protest ideology [espoused by discontented and} declining 'liberal' classes living in declining areas."19 According to these definitions "white-blacklash" voters could be called rightists. Even antifluoridationists could be included! Many analysts believe, in fact, that opposition to fluoridation and many other community issues repre— . . . . . 20 sents a protest vote of dissatisfied Citizens. Defined so broadly, the term "rightists" is rendered analyti- cally meaningless. Such polemic and ambiguous definitions are clearly inadequate for any scientific study of radical rightism, which requires explicitly defined concepts and precise empirical referents. I propose that radical rightism be considered as a distinctive set of beliefs. Even when ideology is taken as the criterion of classification, there remains considerable disagreement among investigators of the right. Partially this is because the right is made up of many groups, each advocating somewhat different views and programs. The crucial problem, however, is to distinguish between legitimate political con- servatives and those groups who hide fundamentally different beliefs behind a conservative rhetoric. Schmuck and Chesler see radical rightism as conservative positions advanced on such issues, but accompanied by a fervent Americanism and the perception that people who do not accept these positions are Communists or Communist sympathizers. Hofstadter similarly believes that rightist ideology is a corruption of traditional conservatism; he views rightism as ...dissent... [uhich] can most accurately be called pseudo- conservatism...because its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservative and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of serious and restless dissatis— faction with American life, traditions, and institutions. This description fits the antidemocratic personality type identified by the authors of The Authoritarian Personality many years earlier. The pseudoconservative will, "in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against more or less ficti- tious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aim at their abolition."23 One attempt to distinguish operationally between legitimate conservative organizatiOns and rightist groups implicitly used this notion that radical rightists are really pseudoconservatives: The responsible [legitimate conservative] groups offer a policy alternative which they seek to advance through the existing political system. They are content to work through accepted political techniques. In contrast to the responsible right, the irresponsible Cpseudoconservatives] group not only opposed the policies of government, but denounces the political system itself. In their view the political system lends itself to domination by a conspiracy of left-wing collectivist- internationalists whicn is controlled directly or indirectly by Moscow. They are unwilling to accept the legitimacy of debate: truth in matters political is single and opposition to their view is synonymous with treason. While our observers concur in their belief that radical rightism is definitely not conservatism, they fail to agree upon exactly what it is. I suggest that there is a unique rightist theme which allows an empirical distinction to be made between the divergent groups and ideas all too often indiscriminately lumped together as rightist. This is their belief that a Communist conspiracy has secretly worked its way into positions of_great power and influence throughout the world, but particularly into the internal affairs of 152 United States. This, I believe, distinguishes radical rightism from other political movements. Radical rightists, like all other extremists, discern secret plotters whom they believe work behind the scenes trying to lead the nation to imminent disaster. To return to a historical context, most antidemocratic groups in the past accused some particular group--Jesuits, pOpes, Jews, international bankers, Masons, Free-Silverites--of attempting to take over America. The belief that America is being betrayed by a hidden conspiracy is a commonly shared characteristic of extremist organizations, and today's radical right is no exception.25 For the right, the hidden enemy is Communism and its many agents, who supposedly have permeated and now control government at the local, state and national levels, both political parties, schools and universities, the communication media, and even the churches. To the rightists the threat of Communism is greater domestically than externally. In the words of Robert Welch, "...our danger remains almost wholly internal, from Communist influence right in our midst and treason right in our government...."26 Proof for this claim seldom comes from the ability to name specific Communists who occupy specific positions of influence (although occasionally certain persons are accused of being Communists or dupes). The assertion's validity supposedly is apparent from the "effects" these conspirators have had on our nation's welfare. Following this legic, one need only look at the conduct of our foreign policy--the take over of China, Czechoslovakia, and most recently Cuba, by Communists-~and our domestic affairs--Medicare, urban renewal, federal interVention in civil rights, education, mental health, etc.--to comprehend fully the nature of this subversion. This method of reasoning leads Robert Welch and his followers to conclude that former President Eisenhower is a conscious Communist agent, since during his administration Commnusm made many advances throughout the world, or to Billy James Hamfis's statement: "How can you explain the mistake of our leaders 10 for the last 30 years if there aren't Communists giving them advice?"27 According to the radical right view of history this treason has been with us since the 1920's* but reached its climax in Roosevelt's administration, which through the New Deal undermined free capitalism and brought the economy under the control of the federal government as a prelude to socialism and an eventual Communist America. Under this program Communists, so the story goes, so infiltrated the government that most of its top positions are occupied by men who are shrewdly and consistently selling out America's interests. Rightists believe that conspiracy has been so successful that ...Communist influences are now almost in complete control of our Federal Government."28 Rightists see subversion extending into many areas of life, in addition to the national government. They see around them an invisible "establishment" which has infiltrated many of the major positions of power in America and is working for the ultimate victory of the world- wide Communist conspiracy. Rightists see our political system dom- inated by a "left-wing" conspiracy controlled directly or indirectly from Moscow. Liberalism thus is identified with Communism; it is seen as a domestic variety of Communist influence in Washington and other strategic places of influence, such as in the churches, the educational system, and the mass media. As one prominent rightist has put it: Our most dangerous enemies are the thousands and thousands of disguised vermin who crawl all around us and, in I"Recently Welch has traced the "great conspiracy" back to the eighteenth century, with the Illuminati, founded in Bavaria in 1776, as perhaps the most important early conspiratorial organization. See Ids essay "The Truth in Time" in the November (1966) issue of flygdcan Opinion. Most rightists, however, seem content to focus their altention on the workings of the Communist conspiracy in this century. obedience to orders from their superiors in the c0nspiracy, poison the minds of those about them with glib talk stout H . V! H H H . . . . ll social Justice, progressive educatioa, ClVll rights, "the social gospel," "one world," and "peaceful coexistence.' You will find them everywhere: in your c1383, in your schools, in your churches, in your courts.' The "educational" and "action" programs of the radical right supposedly are designed to awaken and inform Americans ahout this unseen but nevertheless very deadly peril. Much has already been written on the ideology and Leliefs of the radical right, and I refer the reader to these accounts for more detailed discussions about this aspect of rightism.30 3. RADICAL RIGHTISM A3 A FORM OF "STATUS POLITICS" Through political action men seek many goals, but high on the value scales of most societies are economic gain and material well- Jeing. As the authors of The American Voter, perhaps the major study of voting behavior, state, "economic interests have long been a primary . . . . . , g'31 _‘ . ,a fiOthC impelling political action. The works of oeymour Martin Lipset, V. 0. Key, Robert Alford, and other empiriCally oriented political analysts, stress the StrOIg relationships between socio- economic position, political behavior, sucn as party preference, . . .. 32 . voting, stand on issues, and activ1ty. Both Lipset and Alford have extended their analyses beyond the United States and 11nd similar relations ex1sting in many nations. Lipset Oiiers this conclusion: :1 _ .. , . .‘. , in modern democraCies conilict among ditlerent economic gr ups is expressed through political parties whicn basically represent a I . . . ‘ '1133 democratic translation 01 the class struggle. Political behavior is not motivated exclusively Ly economic concerns, however. In fact, some of the deepest struggles in imerican politics involve issues not directly related to economic interests. For example, while economic position is strongly associated with attitudes on economic issues, these attitudes bear little correlation to stands on race relations, civil liberties, or moral standards.34 While the list of goals which men actively seek in politics is extensive, a particular group of noneconomic goals is especially rele- vant to this study. Sometimes called "social" values, this set in- cludos the needs for deference, for recognition, and the need to feel important and wanted.35 Individuals, then, engage in political activities because they seek recognition, prestige, status, and feelings of importance. The analytical distinction between economic and noneconomic political motivations is important. As Richard Hotstadter has noted: political life is simply not an arena in which the conflicting interests of various social groups in concrete material gains are fought out; it is also an arena into which status aspirations and frustrations are...proJected. 36 Both Hofstadtor and Lipsot use the terms "status" and "class" politics to differentiate two types of political movements. "Class" politics 18 mainly oriented toward the advancement of material aims; its goals are mostly instrumental and tangible: increased wages, welfare measures, better working conditions, etc. In "status' politics, on the Other hand, issues of social position and claims to superiority are °mphasized. Disputes over status frequently underlie issues like fluorida- tion, resistance to new educational programs, prohibition, and the like. Joseph Gusfiold has elaborated the concept of status politics in his Btudy of the prohibition movement in the United States. His comments 0nthe goals contended in the dispute, illustrate its typically 15 5mm: 1: ‘ {Leif 5:551: ratzer tan ‘ 1:». not 5"." ;,.o " ' '- 3“ 1,, ”it 2353 Iurtter ‘ 1:5}. an €07.51." 1 A as or . Liftihthu 0I sun.x ro.e 1L 0 .a;;;:cal pos; ‘u‘e. I: "ammo; In” N . style of V. - 3.2!} . ‘ .g.rstatus f0: . 3 -.> ‘ H.011“, . :‘e 431‘ ~ 01 ‘ a it. VXU—‘t‘ . Ex‘ I 1. r 1,3? ‘J, W “l N's A 13 "symbolic" nature. He writes: as status groups vie with each other to change or defend their prestige allocations, they do so through symbolic rather than instrumental goals. The significant meanings are not given in the intrinsic properties of the action but in what it has come to signify for the participants...37 He adds further that issues particularly become tests of status when "they are construed as symbols of group morality and life style."38 A major hypothesis of this study is that radical rightism is a manifestation of "status politics, in which Communism plays a symbolic role in a struggle for prestige and social superiority.* The ’/ ideological positions which the rightists take basically represent a confrontation between themselves and others over moral, cultural, and general "style of life" positions. In this struggle victory means higher status for the winner, and degradation and lower status for the loser. . \ It is hypothesized that radical rightism serves as a tool for expressing dissatisfaction with status through political acts. Rightism represents an attempt by persons who feel inadequately es- teemed to affirm their sense of status. Rightists see themselves in- creasingly shut out of public affairs and find their way of life threatened. New elites, who subscribe to beliefs and values signifi- cantly different from the rightists' own, occupy positions of impor- tance and power in business, education, the mass media, and the govern- ment. In combatting these "new" peOple and the social forces which I"The rightists' choice of "Communism" as their symbol is not accidental. Certain historical and ideological factors affect the right's choice of Communism to represent what is in its eyes the cause of all of society's ills. Psychological predispositions to accept sim- plistic explanations and to express hostility on scapegoats also play a major role. See Chapter 6 for an extended discussion of these factors. 35 mere .025. .> 1;?- !§E.‘.St C0 l .. H .- ‘ n“ lieeCt :“C C. anew. l \ T1113. Vl‘" an: 155105, l 33.25 m deszr Is as; langt'sns.1 .zst'hentli, It" ;:e;:aa'e tel: ALE Iii ‘ ' 5 $137.59 1'51; ' I.. sociolr); 14 they represent, the right wears the guise of ”anti-Communism." It is really trying to achieve or regain respectability and importance for its adherences. Rightist activities are largely irrelevant to any real fight against Communism; they represent efforts cast in a symbolic form to affect the distribution of status and influence in modern American society. This view is held by Seymour Martin Lipset, who observes that status issues, "appeal to the uncommon resentments of individuals or groups who desire to maintain or improve their social status."39 The acts and language of status conflicts are usually more symbolic than instrumental, for when status groups compete with one another they try to degrade their Opponents and glorify themselves.* Joseph Gusfield calls this usage the "language of moral condemnation."40 Svend Ranulf, a Danish sociologist who has studied status-oriented movements in Europe, terms them expressions of "moral indignation."41 Hofstadter believes status politics tends "to be expressed more in vindictiveness, 1n.sour memories, in the search for scapegoats, than in realistic pro- "42 Dosals for positive action. The rightists' willingness to cry "Communist" at their enemies is such a symbolic mode of expression. N H 9 Their many labels (including "Collectivists, Leftists,' "Socialists," " n n n n n * * . 0he‘Worlders, Dupe, and Comsymp ) are applied in congunction w1th accusations of mass murder, treason, atheism, immorality, *See Murray Edelman's The Symbolic Use of Politics (Urbana: The UDiversity of Illinois Press, 1964), especially Chapters 6 and 7, for an extended discussion of the forms and meanings of "political language." .*Robert Welch's contraction for "Communist sympathizer.' . a...» 15 gangterism, narcotics, and pornOgrzxphy.* The purpose, of course, is to make their opponents appear to be the incarnation of all that is bad and themselves the personification of all that is good.“I In the struggle for prestige and social position, demands for deference are directed toward institutions which form and provide public recognition of cultural values. The educational system, churches, the communication media (radio, television, motion pictures, books and magazines) all become arenas for conflict between opposing status groups. Infilitration of PTA's and attempts to change school policies43, letterwriting campaigns to influence radio and television programs, are typical tactics which the rightists employ to establish their claim for recognition and status. Political institutions greatly influence the distribution of prestige in our society. Through legislation, policy-making, and re- lated acts, government determines whose values are to be authorita- tively recognized as being in "the public interest."44 In legitimizing one of many sets of competing values, the policy-makers bestow prestige 0m.the group holding these values. The losing group may experience a decline in prestige because of its defeat. // Groups which seek to enhance or maintain their status will demand that the government grant them deference. The right's Opposi- tion to Social Security, Medicare, civil rights, and most post-New Deal legislation can best be understood in terms of status politics, for *See Chapter 6 for a discussion of personality traits which account for this tendency for rightists to associate many negative attributes with their opponents. 1"""Chapter 5 discusses the techniques rightists use to enhance their feelings of status and self-esteem. 16 enactment of these pregrams implements Values which symbolically deprive rightists of prestige and influence. These defeats, even at a symbolically level, are very important to rightists. As Joseph Gusfield has noted in his study of the American Temperance movement, "the struggle to control the symoolic actions of government is often as bitter and as fateful as the struggle "45 to control its tangible effects. His analytical interpretation of the prohibitionists' motives provides a concise summing-up of the relationship between rightism and status politics. We consider Temperance as one form which the politics of status goals has taken in the United States today. Far from being a pointless interruption of the American political system, it has exemplified one of its characteristic processes. Since governmental actions symbolize the position of groups in the status structure, seemingly ceremonial or ritual acts of government are often of great importance to many social groups. Issues which seem foolish or impractical items are often important for what they symbolize about the style or culture which is being recognized or derogated. Being acts of defer- ence or degradation, the individual finds in governmental action that his own perceptions of his status in the society are confirmed or rejected. 4. RADICAL RIGHTISM as A FORM or "sxpasssxvs POLITICS" Politics frequently performs a cathartic function by allowing tensions, anxieties, and frustrations to he expressed. In these in- stances behavior is more symbolic than instrumental in reaching some specific goal. "Expressive politics" results when people act out their \ feelings through political acts which bear little relation to actually rOmedying their discontents.47 We may consider radical rightism as a manifestation of expressive politics. The rightists' beliefs ahout c0mmunism (and anticommunist acts) have little to do with the actual nature of communism in this country but instead primarily reflect their 17 mMipersonal and social needs. Through the psycnological mechanism of externalization, the political beliefs which the average rightist holds represent "a transformed version of his way of dealing with his inner difficulties."48 / This hypothesis derives from two premises: first, all «nunions serve expressive functions (in varying degrees, of course); secmnh amen beliefs or acts are very important to individuals, strong emotional needs are usually involved. The ways people View the world tell us a great deal stout them, fln'their beliefs and values are links between deep-lying patterns in their lives and the external world.* As Smith, Bruner, and White note hitheir study of the relationship between political attitudes and deeper personality traits, "opinions or attitudes-serve as mediators 49 tmtween the inner demands of the person and the outer environment."‘ The authors of the Authoritarian Personality, a major study of the L”YChological processes involved in forming and holding certain kinds ofzmliefs, share a similar orientation; they write: Since it will be granted that Opinions, attitudes, and Values depend upon human needs, and since personality is essentially an organization of needs, then personality r may be regarded as a determinant of ideological preferences.”2 Inner needs thus strongly color peOple's perceptions of the \— *The terms "attitude," "opinion," and ”belief" have no fixed “wanings in psychological literature, although all three terms make ” reference to an individual's evaluation of social (and other) objects.”0 9 Can say that attitudes, beliefs, and opinions involve affective or elnotional feelings connected with the object which gives it a positive ornegative quality, as well as a cagnitive element "which describes um obJect of the attitude [belief, opinion], its characteristics, and t3 relation to other objects." While there are, I believe, impor- tfimtitheoretical distinctions between each of these concepts, 1 shall ”mnow them interchangeably, unless otherwise noted. 18 external world. The stronger the emotional needs the more selective perception and organization which takes place, and the greater the tendency to treat external objects in terms of personal problems. Interpreted this way, an individual's political beliefs, although for- mulated in highly rational forms, may nevertheless be outgrowths of personal needs--clothed in ideological terms. Harold Lasswell spelled out this idea in his basic formulation that private motives displaced into the public sphere form the basis of political activity for many people.53 The investigation of the "authoritarian personalityH is concerned explicitly with the psychological roots which underlie the acceptance of Fascist, racist, and similar beliefs. Thus the rightists' perceptions of Communist infiltration and influence reflect the way their personal needs selectively distort reality. A con- spiracy theory of history has, for example, a strong appeal to persons who cognitively require simplistic explanations for complex events. Furthermore, this kind of "devil" theory makes it easier to express frustrations, usually as hostility directed against people who can be labelled Communists. Seeing oneself as a dedicated crusader against Communism allows an individual to identify himself with a noble cause, “1"“)? enhancing his self-regard. In these and many other ways (which Will be elaborated in the chapters which follow) the beliefs of r1Ehtism satisfy important psychological needs. Several kinds of studies indirectly support the thesis that rightist ideology represents externalizations of personal wants. Some 01 “‘0 research into the relationship between opinions and Personality h" “ready been mentioned. Smith, Bruner, and White's conclusions about one of their subjects illustrate how his attitudes directly ~——‘—_-— L A‘ relate to his general manner of coning with difficulties in his life. They write: Lanlin's opinions served both in his social adjustment by concretizing his allegiance to the society with which he identified and in making possible the externalization of some of his basic inner problems. For the condemnation of Russia as the unruly, demanding, aggressive, unreasoning nation that was an affirmation of his own early and con- tinuing renunciation of "making demands that didn't make sense." He lived by this formula, at a cost in tenségn, and whoever did not was a threat to his way of life. Studies of social movements also supply analogous findings. While a variety of theories has been offered to explain the rise of social movements, only since World War II has empirical research been employed to investigate the sociological and psychological determinants ofmembership.55 Gabriel Almond's study of French, Italian, English and American Communists gives us first-hand data about these adherents to a modern political movement. Among the findings particularly rele- vant to us is Almond's discovery that a high percentage of English and American Communists were attracted to the Party because it satisfied certain "neurotic" needs centering around feelings of alienation, hostility, resentment, isolation, and rejection. These feelings, writes Almond, drive peOple to "join the party in reaponse to the Pressures of internal needs and often in defiance of the modal patterns "56 Data which support and supplement these 0f {their} social group. c°n¢1usions can be found in Herbert Krugman's analysis of clinical case h13t0»ries of Communists who underwent psychotherapy.57 G. M. Gilbert's study of major Nazi leaders also illustrates howpersonal needs are manifested in political behavior. AS prison psychologist at the Nuremberg war trials Gilbert had the rare opportun- 1 ty’to observe and to administer psychological tests to such Nazi . u v 20 leaders as Goering, Hess, Hans Frank, Von Papen, Von Ribbentrop, and others.58 These case studies provide a picture of the several abnormal personality types attracted to and serving the Nazi movement, and show how the Nazi Party met the various psychic needs of these men. At a psychopatholical level these leaders displayed aggressive paranoia, sadomasochism, latent homosexuality, mystic sentimentalism, Narcissism, grandiose fantasy, and schizoid pathology.09 Herbert McClosky's studies of political conservatives also buttress our thesis about the association between personality and political beliefs. McClosky and other social scientists administered measures of political ideology and personality to large, representative samples of Minnesota citizens. Among the extreme political conserva- tives a rather consistent pattern of personality traits emerged. The extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for their imperfections or weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most easily moved to scorn and dis- appointment in others, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgments. Although aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others, they are usually defensive and armored in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike or fear in themselves. MCClosky interprets these findings by linking conservatism as a social and Political outlook with personality characteristics. Considering /’ seVeral alternatives which could account for the acceptance of con- Servative beliefs, he rejects them in favor of the notion that extreme (”niservatives selectively impose their own personality needs in Strllcturing reality. "In this way" he writes, "an individual creates a . . . . bet of perceptions that express, or are consonant with, his own T1 . . . eeclsand impulses.’ McClosky then demonstrates this thesis by .esstrtlo‘: of 1l :xsmtlves 3" :9 arms tilt t | \ “,conserl'lt‘ any 55:" CLO" griess. 55;: joctrines, t tenancies I :ozoreo 2471‘“- icsearcn '.'.c-;:ional can c, 1:. soul net-u. .-..;e;s,5“ the e. 1:556: ieehmzs .Z'thnt {met :0 21 relating many personality variables to specific political beliefs. His description of the role of hostility is typical. Noting that extreme conservatives are highly hostile and distrustful of people in general, he argues that this would explain why ...conservatives prefer to believe in man's wickedness, why they choose to see man as fallen, untrustworthy, lawless, selfish, and weak. Expressed as political doctrines, these projections of aggressive personality tendencies take on the respectability of an old and honored philosOphical position. Research into the determinants of racial prejudice provides additional data on the role that attitudes play in satisfying emotional and social needs. While many needs are met by holding prejudiced 62 tmliefs, the enhancement of self-regard63 and the expression of re- pressed feelings of hatred, jealousy, and snapicion are among the most 64 important functions fulfilled by these attitudes. Particularly per- tinent is the evidence which shows that prejudice frequently is used to justify aggressions induced by economic and political frustrations.65 The foregoing evidence clearly substantiates the hypothesis that an individual's susceptibility to radical rightism depends not only on his needs for status and esteem, but on the movement's ability t0 satisfy certain other personality-related needs. The assertion that personality factors play an important role in the etiolOgy of radical rightism should not be interpreted as sug- gesting that the study of rightism is the study of psychopathology. T00 many people are quick to label rightists "disturbed" individuals beefillse of their seemingly bizarre political beliefs. This is an in— a(":cul‘ate and misleading characterization. Most rightists are reas0n- akxly well-functioning individuals who raise families, hold jobs, and 5x11. 3.11 “er; a fill" 33': C \Iflf't' S:| 1 saute .sytih mum-.1 953'. 5.1.110- iormt. '.;::;sts usv tr. 3:50:11 ,ro LL" .331.)an ua. liner ism 111.; litrrszve stwy “5590' .15 inc ' .1 ‘. ilw 0" '“Luy-s . Ffsls. n53 .‘tn t Li,» 22 in many ways are not too different lrom their neighbors. To say that they have anxieties and frustrations which they resolve in certain ways, that they are attracted to rightism becauSe it satisfies important social and personal needs, or that they selectively perceive informa— tion and express their feelings in radical political forms, is not to associate psychological mechanisms and personality needs with the traditional psychoanalytical defense mechanisms of repression, denial, reaction formation, projection, and the like.66 In asserting that rightists use their political behavior as a means for resolving their personal problems is to take cognizance of the fact that everyone em~ ploys in his daily life certain "tactics" to release anxieties and other upsetting feelings. As Smith, Bruner, and White note in their intensive study of so-called "normal" individuals, they were most im- pressed by the "...constructive ways ...[}heir] subjects learned to make the most they could of their capacities and limitations." They added: "Indeed, opinions and values may themselves serve as construc- tive means of avoiding the critical vicissitudes that may require ex- treme defenses."67 In this sense, radical rightism may provide its adherents with the means for avoiding severe and disabling emotional difficulties. 5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY'S BASIC HYPOTHESES In Chapter 2 I describe the methods used to collect the empiri- cal data used to test a theory of why people become rightists. That radical rightism should be viewed as a political movement with symbolic 8°31! is a major thesis of this study. Through DartiCipatiOH in the m . ‘ 0"cheat persons who experience certain kinds of status and value .12; ‘K‘ts ell) fl,“ 1 y; :zezr .t-‘Si 9'- .c:... I I :1: result fro: imitation occ I many dec; “.r Ante-Codi: W: l 13:: the were as may. 43,“; mulal'n up; .; Lon-chum 1:. £23115 V‘Jufi. .," .4 *3 'u‘nl soc._- use :29: {MW 2.25102 and mor "gt-age) by new 2 5311;; institut “‘F tests the: Quite:- AS .‘I “#3er I .1“ S 23 conflicts express their dissatisfactions while at the same time enhanc- ing their personal feelings of social status, importance, and self- worth. Chapter 3 describes how feelings of relative status deprivation can result from two kinds of social experiences. One kind of status frustration occurs when an individual's initial level of status in the community declines. This is often the plight of small businessmen, of white-collar workers who lack college degrees, and of many persons who lack the increasing social and educational skills needed in our modern society. A second type of deprivational situation occurs when an in- dividual's upward occupational and financial mobility are not matched by concurrent increases in influence and acceptance into higher social status groups. In both instances discrepancies result between expected and actual social status and influence. Status frustrations can also arise when persons who strongly hold traditional values toward work, religion and morality perceive their way of life threatened and dis- IDaraged by new elites who occupy high positions in important value- Iforming institutions and hold more liberal views. Chapter 4 empiri- <=ally tests these assertions. Chapter 5 examines several ways that radical rightism enhances its adherents' sense of importance and self-esteem. This is done tluough an association with Americanism, patriotism, and other worth- Vvhile personal attributes, through special "educational" programs, and ‘through attention gained by the public display of rightist belieis. Status anxieties and value frustrations alone cannot explain ‘Nhy some persons choose radical rightism as a solution to their dif- ficulties. Certain personality factors operate in attracting J , Jaime», 3 x. n.2,? tutor: :- \ -a.'..‘ in 511.: gezmg 1;! it 7;!) :m I ,sv. :31: m own" P l 2:01; their .% Flirts-1‘ i 2:2; .Jstzlztu' w 11 wrangle . as WELL: mm ms ‘. ... , '0! ‘ lhl ‘1‘ 0 .7:- ‘ac.‘,. adlul Lo. , \ \eltfl ., 1 -~ .tr "1‘. t" 1e fc h! ‘ .‘ .J‘n , (‘3 i‘ . .'IP°?.. n ‘Je .(t a“ « TL». .1 e 24 frustrated, anxious persons to radical rightism. One of these person- ality factors is cognitive style. I hypothesize that rightists see the world in simple black and white terms (which they display by readily accepting the conspiracy theory of history) and are generally dogmatic. They have a psychological need for simple, firm, stereotypical views of people and events, are dependent upon external authorities for guidance, and hold their beliefs so rigidly that compromise is impossible. Furthermore, rightists seem extrapunitive; they tend to displace their hostilities onto people whom they projectively clothe with evil and undesirable qualities. They readily label people whom they do not like as Communists, and things they dislike as Communistic. The .rightists thus projectively attribute their own personal hatreds into ‘the symbol "Communism." Chapter 6 explores these two personality factors. In Chapter 7 I examine the assertion that rightists are anomic iridividuals, that their reaction to contemporary society is one of zalienation. It is argued they are extraordinarily concerned with their aiehse of powerlessness and limited access to decision-makers. They ifeci that political representatives are not responsive to them, but instead reflect the views of presently influential people. A sense of general personal powerlessness thus dominates their lives, which they try to alleviate through rightist activities. These are the major hypotheses which will be examined and teested in the following chapters of this study. They are presented he be, in one place, so that the reader will be able to place each set ()1? sub-hypotheses and data within the larger theoretical framework b Q1mg offered to interpret and explain why people become radical 25 rightists. 6. ma MULTIPLE APPEALS or RIGHTISM: ma MULTIFUNCTIONAL APPROACH Radical rightism, like most social movements, represents psychologically "an effort by a large number of people to solve collec- tively a problem they feel they have in common."68 Hans Toch, a student of social movements, sees such groups arising because they "satisfy needs neglected by society." He adds: When people feel themselves abandoned or frustrated by conventional society, they sometimes by-pass established institutions and create informal social organizations "on the side." Such grass-roots movements serve to provide otherwise unavailable services, to protest in— dignities, to escape suffering, to release tension, to explain confusing events, or in some other way to create a more tolerable way of life than is afforded by exist- ing formal organizations. Social movements attract members because they appeal to un- szrtisfied needs. What important functions does radical rightism perform f<>r'its adherents? Daniel Katz has provided a set of categories for itrterpreting the variety of needs met by attitudes which can be adopted t<> classify some of the particular appeals of radical rightism.70 A b12191 outline of some of the more important functions which rightism performs will alert the reader to this approach; a fuller elaboration Of th ~ * ese functions follows in Chapters 3-7. Subscribing to rightist beliefs and engaging in rightist activi- ties meet these basic personal needs: \ 53(:. *Functional analysis has, of course, a long usage in the social 15 1eInces. The classic statement by Robert Merton of manifest and latent 1P}‘ <’Ttions is an explicit and extended treatment of the concept. Social my and Social Structure, revised edition, (Glencoe, 111.: The Free e8s, 1957), Chapter 1. 3) JittftV] 3 $6715" 7:: "ego-iefens :zezr sense of 35:! $0113.: {3'01 3.15 ow 0f Lureatc-g; “it: 39 rt I .JQQ: ‘- ‘- x 933: 50. W 0| Ju.e‘° ‘ u . . I. ‘Q “§ :‘GS‘Tn «3’ 3:} ‘v._ .3...“ in I, ~. ”A. 6 Lb C0,} Cr! l) adherents are allowed to feel they are influential and worthwhile individuals; 2) hostility provides a cathartic release for frustration and anxiety; 3) acceptance of the conspiracy theory helps to dispel a sense of confusion and anomy. The "ego-defensive" function of rightism helps its adherents defend their sense of self-esteem. In Katz's words, these include the mechanisms by which the individual protects his ego from his own unacceptable impulses and from the knowledge of threatening forces from without, and the methods by which he reduces his anxiety created by such problems....71 Labeling people "Communists" illustrates one tactic rightists employ to protect their self-image. Finding their social status depricated and their values disestablished by peOple with higher status and different value-systems, they associate such peeple with a readily available "evil tag": Communism. These influentials are depicted as illegitimate sources of social evaluation, whose opinions can thus be disregarded. Intense patriotism and anti-Communism allows rightists to ex- press their central values in a socially acceptable way. Through the 'Walue-eXpressive" function of rightism the typical rightist displays '0 to others "72 ...the type of person he conceives himself to be. Fervent nationalism establishes an indentification with Americanism. Attacks on Communist atheism and immorality demonstrate the personal religiosity and morality of the assailant. Certain "utilitarian" or "adjustive" functions are also performed by rightist beliefs and acts. ExDressing common political ideas, people sharing similar feelings de- riVe support from, and form social relationships with, one another in r1ghtist groups. By seeing themselves as dedicated anti-Communists 'working to restore freedom to America, members reinforce each others' .513231 5‘5" l ‘ _ 9" ~ K‘vnti. 2:2: 12 3 “O‘r‘ l I n . .. e- - 'V ' " Lvisecbe ml. Wugfilxg ' mom 431' rezerc‘nk‘es ~ [0, memo; L .‘w " ‘ "‘ “Meet 3 ‘0”. names to T“ mt rig .:.“:;g: rigntJS‘ 2259: they are no; makers 0 ::r ~~ .Etlbe‘CnJ-lnce 27 sense of self-importance. Rightism appeals to some peOple because its beliefs provide order in a world which is, to them, bewildering and complex. The "knowledge" function of radical rightist ideOIOgy thus gives ...meaning to what would otherwise be an unorganized chaotic universe. PeOple need standards or frames of references for understanding their world, and attitudes [or ideology] help to supply such standards.73 The right's conSpiracy-view of events thus gives its adherents a simple framework for interpreting their difficulties and suggests simple techniques to remedy them. That rightism performs a variety of functions illustrates an important point, namely, that many diverse needs can be satisfied through rightism. For some persons, perhaps, the single most important reason they are rightists may be the social comradeship they find among fellow members of a rightist organization. For others, appeals to prestige-enhancement may alone be sufficient to attract them to rightism. The way rightism supplies simplistic explanations or rationales for expressing hostility may appeal to some. Or, more likely, a combination of factors interact to attract peOple to rightism. Recognition must always be given to the complex motivational sources of human behavior. All social acts are determined by multiple forces and '0 must guard against trying to explain radical rightism as rising ex— <flusively'from any single factor. Any one social movement will attract ‘nr8°ni “dth diverse needs, and each person's involvement in the move- "wnt gratifies a number of them. Nevertheless a set of common factors 2"“ hypothesized to be crucial in the etiology of rightism, and it is the se Common factors which we shall examine. .thtrate ,ar; I 1 «Lab, fmdcr ' H I mats 11‘! t1 1 i a I Its-cm b) t3? .._ .u , 5‘ it» ,, . ‘ “IV.“ ’3‘», ""1: 3‘. . "far ,3 ’ - b . Is‘. AI, ' ;. . z. 7. A NOTE ON QUOTATIONS FROM THE RIGHTIST LITERATURE In the analysis which follows'umebulk of the quotations used to illustrate particular points are taken from the writings of Robert Welch, founder and head of The John Birch Society. Most of these excerpts are taken from the society's monthly Bulletins, which are dis- tributed by the national headquarters to all Birch Society members. The monthly Bulletins are direct communications between the leaders and followers of the Society, and most members read each Bulletin faith- fully. As "official" statements of Society policy (each issue, although written personally by Welch, is approved by the "Executive Committee") the Bulletins keep members informed of latest programs, activities, publications and authoritative decisions. The Bulletins tfiuas provide one of the best sources of what Society members are doing and how they think about issues of relevance to the Society. It should be remembered, though, that we do not intend to single out the Birch Society for special treatment. Any other body of rightist literature could have been cited to demonstrate my case. It happens that Birch Society literature is most readily available for study. But, in some ways, Welch is an atypical Spokesman. He does 39: seem to be personally racist or anti-Semitic, traits which many r1Ehtists share.74 Welch, who could in this sense be called one of the more moderate of the extremists, is thus more than a fair repre— 3e“193th": of rightist leadership. But that Welch, a rightist less extreme than most, says the things that he does, tells us much about the nature of right-Wing thinking in America today. 7- NOTES FOR CHAPTER I Taken from a pamphlet titled HThe Time Has Come," copyrighted by Robert Welch (1964), printed and distributed by The John Birch Society, Belmont, Mass. The full quotation reads: "My firm belief that Dwight Eisenhower is a dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy is based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and palpable that it seems to me to put this conviction beyond any doubt." It appeared in the original version of Welch's long circulated letter called The Politician. (Christian Science Honitor, April 1, 1961). Subsequently, Welch released a revised version of The Politician in which this particular statement is deleted. (The Politician (Belmont, Mass.: Belmont Publishing Co., 1963)). On page 278, in a footnote, Welch admits deleting three paragraphs from the original version in the printed version, one of which contains the above statement (but which he does not cite). Welch, The Politician (1963 version), pp. 223-27. These figures are taken from Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein's Report on The John Birch Society - 1966 (New York: Random House, 1966). They are consistent with other published data on the Society, including its own statements. First National Directory of "Rightists" Groups,_Publications, and Some Individuals in the United States (and some foreign countries), fourth edition, (Seusalito, Calif.: The Noontide Press, 1962). .Alan Westin, "The Deadly Parallels: Radical Right and Radical Left," Harper's magazine, April 1962: 25-32. Dr. Arthur Larson, former chairman of The National Council for Civic Responsibility, said in a 1964 press conference that rightist organizations "now sPond upward of $20 million a year." (Reported in "Information Service," 33, No. 16 (Oct. 10, 1964) published by the National COUncil of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America.) Chicago Sun Times, March 6, 1962. Conducted by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N.J., remorted in New York Times, July 31, 1964. Gallup Poll, reported in The Milwaukee Journal, December 19, 1963. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 30 See Theodore H. White's The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965). The John Birch Society's monthly Bulletin for November 1964 (and subsequent issues) admits that many delegates to the Republican convention were Birchers, which con~ firms the observations made by many commentators at the time. The Birch Society says it doubled its membership in 1964 (see Month1y_Bulletins for October, November, and December, 1964) and observers tend to agree with this claim. See "Birch Society Boom" in The Wall Street Journal, Harch 26, 1965, and column by John Dreiske "New Signs of Birch Activity" in the Chica§g_§un Times, Sept. 25, 1965. Forster and Epstein, op. cit., also report on increased Birch activities following the election. The Society's growth during this period seems to be a fair barometer of how other rightist organizations fared during this period, although no reliable evidence is available to confirm this. These figures are listed in the report "'Anti-Communist' Nightmares: The John Birch Organisation" by "An American Corre- spondent," appearing in The Wiener Library Bulletin, 4, No. 4, new series no. 1 (London: The Wiener Library Limited, published in con- junction with the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, New York). Similar statistics are given in The New Republic,Nov. 6., 1965, p. 32. See Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, Danger on the Right (New York: Random House, 1964) and Harry OverstreEt and Bonaro Overstreet, The Strange Tactics of Extremism (New York: w. W. Norton, 1964) for discussions of these rightist broadcasters. This brief survey of major extremist organizations is drawn basically from Gustavus Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States, edited by Henry M. Christman, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), which should be consulted for full references and documenta- tion. Seymour Martin Lipset, in his article "The Sources of the Radical Right," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1963) also gives a brief historical survey of the groups discussed here. He furthermore provides additional references, some based on empirical studies, which are more recent than Myers. See pages 260-364 and footnotes especially. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, Inc., 1961); and particularly Victor C. Ferkiss, VPOpulist Influences on American Fascism," Western Political Quarterly, £2 (1957); 350-73, and references cited. :Fhadical right" is the term most commonly used to describe this Gflftremist" political movement-—F. J. Cook, "The Ultras: Aims, Affiliations and Finances of the Radical Right," The Nation, 32, (JUne 30, 1962), 68 pp.; J. Allen Broyles, The John Birch Society (BOSton: Beacon Press, 1964); Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, 233593; on the Right, op. cit.; J. Brant, "The Anti-Communist hoax,‘ $22.J!§w Republic, Ray 28: 15-19 and June 4: 17-20, 1962; Harold M. proShansky, and Richard 1. Evans, "The 'Radical Right': A Threat to ‘flle Behavioral Sciences," Journal of Social Issues, 19 (1963): 5037173.; or} A J‘”*‘ 71% En;- aauca. d. A: ‘n ,§ 1 I UU‘U‘... 0! f ‘1’ I “Werner ; V1.95 an ‘ n . "' ’1E1txst 3843 Le: bra-“'5 C1 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22, 23, 31 87-106; Donald Jansen, and Bernard Eismann, The Far Right (New York: McCraw-Hill Book Co., 1963); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right'" in Bell (ed.), 0p. cit.; A. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Threat of the Radical Right," New York Times Magazine, June 17, 1962; Allen Westin, "The Deadly Parallels: Radical Right and Radical Left, ' Harpers Magazine, April, 1962: 25-32. Other names include "FAR RIGHT, --R. Dudman, Men of the Far Right (New York: Pyramid Books, 1962); B. Holliday, "What I found inside the John Birch Society," Detroit Free Press, August 12-17, 1962; P. Horton, "Revivalism on the Far Right," Reporter Magazine, July 20,1961:25-29--RIGHT WING-~R. E. Ellsworth and S. M. Harris, The American Right Wing (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962)--EXTREHE RIGHT--G. B. Rush, "Toward a Definition of the Extreme Right," Pacific Sociological Review, 9 (1963): 64-73--RAMPAGEOUS RIGHT-~Barth, op. cit.--"RIGHTIST"-- Holliday, op. cit."EXTREMISTS"--0verstreet and Overstreet, op. cit.; Cook, op. cit., M. Sherwin, The Extremists (New York: St. Martin's Press, l963)--"ULTRAS"--Cook, op. cit.; Irving Saul, The American Ultras (New York: New America, 1962), and--"SUPER PATRIOTS"-- R. Schmuck and I. Chesler, "On Super-Patriotism: A Definition and Analysis," Journal of Social Issues, 12 (1963): 31-50. Herbert Aptheker, The Era of McCarthyism (New York: flarzain and lunsell, Inc., 1962), pp. 146, 152, quoted in Rush, op. cit.. Governor Pat Brown’s 1966 campaign for governor of California pro- vides an interesting use of the political uses of the epithet of "rightist" or "Bircher" to attack an Opponent. While Ronald Reagan certainly has many associations with rightists and rightism, Brown's campaign was strongly pitched toward running against the right-wing, with Reagan portrayed as its captive. Daniel Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics,’ in Bell (ed.) op. cit. p. 25. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Social Stratification and 'Right-Wing Extremism'," British Journal of Sociology, 12 (1959), p. 28. While the literature on the anti-fluoridation phenomenon is ex- tensive, a good sample is contained in the issue of The Journal of ‘§ggia1 Issues on fluoridation--11 (1961). See also Murray Levin's ,IEE Alienated Voter (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Co., 1960) and references cited in Chapter 7 in the section on "Political Alienation." Schmuck and Chesler, 0p. cit., p. 33. R1chard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt-1955" in Bell (ed.), op. cit., pp. 63-79. T W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper 8. Bros., 1950),p . 676. ‘2? a“- ‘#H-. ‘_. ‘t. ‘, , u ll 1;); fine :121 I: la .15 Cum: at ‘l Rm. (1361 ‘% tie Jar ‘ Also in; (fie. You, tented :1. history, (21111111.; , (Gleam, 1.1% m...- 0 -‘ _ let, gal... ”1“,". I ‘vucs‘er’ uenlefi° {sit “J"; . 53:9 J v fix. ‘ \ fl. LIP; $0.5 . Q 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 33, Barbara Green, et al., "Responsible and Irresponsible Right-Wing Groups: A Problem in Analysis," J. of Social Issues, $2 (1963): 3-17. The idea that what uniquely defines rightism is its image of world events and American politics as being under the control of a Communist conspiracy is more widely accepted today than when I proposed it three years ago. See Forster and Epstein, Report on the John Birch Society, op. cit. and Allen Broyles, op. cit. Also Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965), which in addition contains an ex- tended discussion of the use of the Conspiracy theory through history. Franz Neumann in his classic essay "Anxiety and Politics" (contained in Maurice Stein, et al. (eds.), Identity and Anxiety (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 269-290) also discusses the role of conspiracy theories in politics. Robert Welch, The Blue Book of The John Birch Society (Belmont, lass.: Author, 1961), p. 27. Cited by Bell, in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 34. The John Birch Society Bulletin for January, 1961. Revilo P. Oliver, "Communist Influence in the Federal Government," speech to the fifth annual convention of We, the People!, Chicago, September, 1959, cited in Joseph R. Gusfield, §ymbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), p. 181. The Ellsworth, Harris monograph, 0p. cit., is the most comprehen- sive exposition of the political beliefs of the radical right, with many direct source quotes. The article by Schmuck and Chesler, op. cit., is probably the best attempt at analyzing these beliefs, placing them within the context of traditional value controversies which have always existed in America. John Stormer's None Dare Call It Treason (Florissant, Missouri: Liberty Bell Press, 1964), a book actively distributed by the John Birch Society preceeding and during the 1964 presidential campaign, is an ex- cellent compilation of the radical right view of recent American history and society, written by a rightist. See also the articles and books cited in footnote No. 15. 46- Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960). Robert Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); V- C). Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: A1fred Knopf, 1961), particularly Chapter 6; Seymour M. Lipset, political Nan (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960), especially Chalrter 9, Class and Parties in American Politics." LiPSet, political Man, op. cit., p. 220. uter' 36! 1M. l , ‘J r. [.9 51‘ \ ~ ”blue m... c.1hll Q ‘... II “19;. c ”Jib ‘ 0 . ,5 . ‘5 } "”1 e \e, v “ lag t 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 44. 45. 46. 47. 33 Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), Chapter 9; Samuel Staffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955); Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., pp. 97- 130, 298-301. Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959); M. Brester Smith, Jerome Bruner and Robert White, Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956); Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 232. Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt--1955" in Bell (ed.), op. cit., pp. 63-80 at p. 70. Gusfield, op. cit., p. 21. lbid., p. 175. The "symbolic uses of politics" are develOped in considerable detail by Murray Edelman in his book of the same name. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). Lipset, in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 260. Gusfield, 0p. cit., p. 184. Svend Ranulf, Moral Indignation and Middle-Class Psychology (New York: Schocken Books, 1938). Hofstadter, in Bell (ed.), Op. cit., p. 71. See Mary Anne Raywid, The Ax-Grinders (New York: Macmillan, 1962) for a discussion of the attacks by the rightists on the schools. See William Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.). 223 Politics of Deve10pinngreas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 1; David Easton's A System Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) and (ed.) Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Gusfield, op. cit., p. 167. Ibid., p. 11. fyisfield, op. cit., explicitly employs this concept and calls it #5xpressive politics." He describes "expressive politics" as POlitical action taken more for the sake of expression than for the sake of influencing or controlling the distribution of valued °biects. The goal of the action...is not the 'solution' to the prTnllems which have generated the action. Politics, in this usage, is El means to express how the actors feel about the situation. (page 19). Richard Hofstadter, in "Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited: n. N Y.' -o- .1. Pool-1:: I F :rfi’ettz. \ i q ‘ 3e.t.o.. 0.] .. 9556,1131. 50¢ Diva; O! in.“ --—-— .' v .31! 1‘. L. l ‘1 . n Attituh‘? '\ max}, 4 u . ET... a!" V» n he 3:," 'v "9.1-. "o. l ’1‘ . p. ‘.‘ h .2 . r; -‘- 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57, 58. 59. 34 A Postscript--1962" in Bell (ed.), op. cit., calls this phenomenon "projective politics." This kind of politics "involves the pro- jection of interests and concerns, not only largely private but essentially pathological, into the public scene. (page 83). Smith, Bruner, and White, op. cit., p. 43. Ibid., p. 38. See David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948) or--with Egerton L. Ballachey, Individual in Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962); Smith, Bruner, and White, op. cit.; Daniel Katz (ed.), "Attitude Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 23 (1960); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes,‘ Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (1960): 163-204 at p. 168. Adorno, et al., p. 5; for critical appraisals of the research see Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1954). Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). Smith, Bruner, and White, 0p. cit., p. 152. Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Mass Movements (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1941) and also, The Politics of Despair (New York: Basic Books, 1958); Rudolph Herberle,Socia1 Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951); Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: lentor, 1951); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959); Harold Lasswell, op. cit. and, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Whittlesey House, 1935); Zevedei Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship (New York: Grove Press, 1956); Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954). Almond, op. cit. Herbert Ellis Krugman, "The Interplay of Social and psychological Factors in Political Deviance: An Inquiry into Some Factors Under- lying the Motivation of Intellectuals who became Communists," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1952). G. H. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dictatorship (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950). See Robert Lindner’s analysis of "Anton,' an American junior Hitler, in The Fifty Minute Hour (New York: Bantam Books, 1955), for a parallel case history. Mac," an American Communist also __.__-_.-.-._-‘Z* C ' ‘l 3“ . 60. 61. 62. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. psychoanalyzed by Lindner, is similar in his motivation for joining the CPA to the Communists analyzed by Krugman and Almond. Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review, 22 (1958): 2i-4o at 39. Ibid., p. 41. See Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954), especially Chapter 13 "Theories of Prejudice"; also Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, Anti-Semitism & Emotional Disorder (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950). Cantril, Psychology_of Social Movements, op. cit. Ackerman & Jahoda, op. cit., particularly Part III; Else Frenkel- Brunswik and R. N. Sanford, "Some personality factors in anti- Semitism," J. Psych., go (1945): 271-291. A. A. Campbell, "Factors associated with attitudes towards Jews," in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, 1947); Cantril, Psychology of Mass Movements, op. cit.: Carl Houvland and Robert Sears,‘fiMinor studies of aggression: VI. Correlations of Lynchings with Economic Indicies," J. Psychol., g (1940): 301-10; A. Mintz, "A re-examina- tion of correlations between lynchings & economic industries," J. Abnor & Soc. Psych., 41 (1946): 154-160; Bruno Bettleheim and Morris Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice (New York: Harpers, 1950); Joseph Greenblum and Leonard Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset (eds.),Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 480-91. Anna Freud,The Sgo_and the Mechanisms of Defense (New York: International University Press, 1946). Smith, Bruner, White, op. cit., pp. 283-4. Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (New York: The Hobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 5. 1212;, p. 3. Katz, "Functional Approach...," op. cit. 1219;, p. 172. 1312., p. 173. 1212;, p. 175. Forster and Epstein, Report on Birch Society, op. cit. The 93:? ”2.5 1111‘. 336 :zehcihc W age taken dun :tirti‘°°e page 3‘33 _ and clO: sisal bath?“ :1 values W‘- nm two nouz‘i CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES The empirical data for this study are taken from personal inter- views with 336 persons (half of whom are considered rightists) living in the Pacific Northwest. Conducted by professional interviewers, they were taken during the winter of 1965. The interview schedule was thirty-one pages long, and contained structured questions (with both open - and closed - ended answers) to elicit information about the social background, political and social activities, personality, and the values and attitudes of interviewees. The average interview lasted about two hours; a complete schedule is found in the Appendix. 1. THE SAMPLE A probability sample drawn from the total population of rightists would of course provide the best means for generalizing the findings from this study. Several practical reasons prevented this, however. First, in a simple probability sample, so few rightists would be picked up (less than 5%)1 that, without an impossibly large sample, statistical analysis would be virtually meaningless. Theoretically, a probability sample of this kind would be most valuable; for example, we 36 I an: it Elle {i J :ret15§051t1:3". I l :1: not allow a Astrz‘ :tsirlble alte 1 vb ... '. . . . :ti.1't.-‘.€:.'. l invent-3 defln \ \ if 13? OTSaUIZz 331515 Can 1 There“ ”Mame $3: 311.319 us 50% ”act-mm c ”‘3"- (l) q“ ”fibers O m and the “Shed In t fillers “31$, .5. Autno,E 3.“?! h. ‘ y. i h‘; ACtJ H . In c wrap {-35 . ~. '3. 5 . «9‘. it» "“5 3E}: 37 might be able to determine which significant variables transform certain predispositions into political activism.* Unfortunately, limited funds did not allow drawing this kind of sample. A stratified probability sampling of all rightists is a highly desirable alternative. This is, however, practically impossible to obtain. The secretiveness shrouding rightist organization membership lists prevents defining such a population, and furthermore, there are many persons who are ideolOgically and actively rightists while not members of any organization. Consequently no really complete population of rightists can be identified. Therefore the only feasible sampling plan entailed constructing a purposive sample of rightists. The criterion for inclusion in the sample was some form of public activity which seemed to indicate a radical-right orientation. Names were selected from the following sources: (1) a series of newspaper articles on "conservatism” which named members of the Liberty Amendment Committee (a rightist organiza- tion) and the John Birch Society in Portland, Oregon; (2) letters published in the Eugene, Oregon, Register Guard's "letters-to—the- editors mailbag" for the period from January 1, 1960, to January 1, 1965. Authors of letters with rightist themes (as determined by a * content-analysis) ‘were included in the sample. This column is the ' fActually, a stratified random sample would provide this infor- mation and not be as wasteful. ‘tln coding letters I classified letter writers into several categories, with the rightist sample divided into two groups. The first was easily classified as rightists--they voiced rightist views, cited rightist literature as sources for their views, or openly stated they were rightists. The second group, which showed less well-defined rightist tendencies, consisted of probable rightists. (Most of the persons in this second group did, in fact, turn out to be rightists when we interviewed them.) . .U' 0' 1351 310:5“. if a‘ x l I resueats, am; my ot‘aer coat I 1 a:;ro:rhte m 3 \ than are vol \ 53.319. in thA' Eithc omen ”“7 09131011: jun-‘1‘ “4* «i bros l ‘79“ 51mm 9111 1311. I 52129. “E" .. , “39531311, :+- . {‘3. High, lane, and 5.,- e'."a‘ A 1‘ . 3.- k» “f a. b; h 38 most popular feature of the paper, is regularly read by most Eugene residents, and prints over 2,500 letters each year. In Eugene, unlike many other communities, letterwriting is considered an effective and appropriate means of communication between responsible citizens and public officials, and operates as a public forum where issues of public concern are voiced. While this source unquestionably biases our sample, in that only individuals who are publicly willing to eXpress their opinions are picked up, the users of this column come from an unusually broad cross-section of the population. Ten names were drawn from a similar "letters-to—the-editor" column in the ledford, Oregon. Daily Mail. Another dozen or so names of rightists from this, the southern part of the state, were supplied by Congressman Duncan's office. They were individuals who had written him, as their Congressman, and stated what his staff considered to be right—wing views. Rightist names were thus drawn from communities in the northern, middle, and southern parts of Oregon. Two additional subsamples were constructed to provide a com- parison-control group to allow quantitative tests of the several hypotheses of this study. Like the rightists, these persons actively displayed some concern with public issues. One comparison group, which I call the "negative voters," consists of persons actively opposed to urban renewal, fluoridation of water, school bond issues, and other local government programs. The community of Springfield, Oregon, Just across the river from Eugene, has had a history of serious and pro- 2 Sample names were drawn from a list of tracted community conflict. circulators of four petitions in Springfield. Three of these petitions were carried around by opponents of a proposed urban renewal program. 39 One was an initiative petition to put the question of whether Springfield should have a housing code on the ballot; two others were circulated to recall the mayor and a councilman who were active proponents of urban renewal. The last petition was a nominating petition for mayor of Springfield which included among its signers some of Springfield's most well-known opponents of urban renewal. Other names were taken from lists of financial contributors to the campaigns to defeat the housing code in Springfield or the fluoridation of water in Eugene. Writers of letters to the Eggister Guard opposing these and other governmental policies were also included in the "negative voter" subsample. It should be noted that rightists frequently participate in local politics. This is particularly true in Springfield, where some of the most vocal proponents and activists in the intifurban renewal campaign were identifiable right-wingers. Some overlap between the lists of rightists and negative voters was discovered in constructing the original samples, and later on, while empirically classifying rightists, even more right-wingers active in local politics turned up. (See below, Table 2-5.) A second comparison-group consisted of individuals who publicly supported local governmental policies. This group, called the "positive voters” subsample, contains people who favor urban renewal and the fluoridation of Eugene's public water supply. Names were taken from letters written to the figgister Guard, from petitions circulated to put the fluoridation issue on the municipal ballot, and from a list of contributors to the ensuing campaigns. The bulk of these two groups (negative voters and positive voters) make up the non-rightist control-comparison sample. in iesired 1’ muse vzi 1d tzazreshts I; ' n1: .A“ ‘ *h yfishaaax t H3 _- 4L- ‘1; i h; 40 The Problem of Generalization The method used to collect the sample of rightists leaves much to be desired if, from the findings of this particular study, we wish to make valid generalizations about all rightists. One evident reserva- tion results from the fact that only Oregon rightists are studied; it seems plausible that regional differences (including social, economic, cultural, and historical factors) may produce different kinds of rightists.* I believe, however, that the social and psychological variables examined in this study are universal traits of rightists, and consequently regional differences, important as they are, should not markedly affect the validity of these findings. Unfortunately, any test of this assumption will have to wait until a national sample of rightists can be studied. One of the sample's most apparent biases is that persons who publicly eXpress their views are probably not truly representative of the rightist population as a whole. We know that political activists are generally different from nonactivists,3 and although many rightists are publicly active, there still are probably important differences be- tween them and rightists who do not write letters, circulate petitions, and participate in other forms of public rightist behavior. It is my belief, however, that all rightists share certain common traits, regardless of their degree of activity. This assumption was tested by comparing, on a number of variables, the publicly active Rightists with a group of Rightists associated with a radical right organization. 1.‘See Chapter 8, where a typ010gy of rightists is presented. The distribution of types of rightists is probably related to region, social class, age, and other variables. rs - ‘ the :9 31,.1' 1 19“. "in amt." \ .41 And ascribed to ’l | i new that the file 1.1: \ ”1‘ N ! , 1 "m"! Dir'liici am seaside-j ’3? Standarjc ‘1 £311,12th and ‘1‘: he later “re. ‘ .0“. HI '4‘” b 1003 «5‘1 .udgy inperao" 3., It 3') .93, u‘fOrt-n ' 9 Q~e.vir_‘h “q. 41 These 56 Rightists were randomly selected from a list of persons who contributed money or time to an organization in Portland, Oregon, and subscribed to its publications. The analysis, reported in Chapter 8, shows that the assumption is essentially correct. 2. THE INTERVIEWS The interviews were administered by the professional staff of Clark, Bardsley, and Haslacher, a commercial research firm in Portland with considerable experience in doing survey work which meets univer- sity standards. The interviewers were the best and most experienced available and were given detailed training sessions to familiarize them with the interview schedule. At no time did the interviewers know anything about the true nature of the study, or the kind of person being interviewed. They were told that they would be dealing with peeple of various shades of Opinion, and that some interviewees might hold extreme opinions. The interviewers' political views seemed fairly average, ranging from moderate liberalism to moderate conserva- tism. It appeared, however, that most were apolitical. This evalua- tion, unfortunately, must be made on the basis of impressionistic observations and from reading the interviewers' comment sheets; as an added control we should have empirically assessed their views. Never- theless, no systematic bias resulting from common political views among the interviewers was detected. About 10 percent of the interviews were verified, and all checks were confirmed by either telephone or letter. Interviewees received letters signed by the chairman of the department of political science of Michigan State University, informing . ‘ “-1 13mm r... | 3:12: in Ore. \ 1 11:94.1 some .1 1 W315 letter a‘ as before t1. 1 1)! human mph list pu | J - ‘ a 1 {11.1130 t udiviiuals bx: 716‘. hotter If a iiii: Contac‘ d? w, ‘ a. ”Mien ”t I‘M - a 1'. " try: 42 them they had been selected to be interviewed for a study being con- ducted in Oregon on the attitudes and opinions of people who had shown, through some activity, a concern with civic and community affairs. (This letter appears in the Appendix.) Letters were mailed out a few days before the respondent was contacted in person by the interviewer. The interviewers were instructed to contact each individual on their sample list personally not less than three times before notifying us of a failure to take the interview. We then tried to contact these individuals by telephone, and if we still failed to arrange an inter- view, another name from our reserve sample lists was substituted. If a person initially refused to be interviewed, he or she was again contacted personally by either myself or the research firm's most experienced interviewer. We did this for two reasons. First, we had a limited reserve of Radical Rightist names to substitute for refusals. Secondly, we thought that Rightists would be more resistant than most people to being interviewed, and we hoped that through a personal contact with the "Study Director" or his representative the interviewee could be reassured enough to cooperate with us. This pro- cedure worked about half the time. Still, although we rigorously followed this procedure, there is a statistically significant difference in refusal rates between the three subsamples. (See Table 2-1.) This differential refusal rate undoubtedly introduced some bias in the representative value of the sample, since those Rightists who refused to take the interviews were highly suspicious and, on occasion, were well-known activists. One Rightist refuser, for example, tape-recorded his original conversation with the interviewer, during which be accused her of being a disloyal “fl.o uncuqce .Au—r-CuW-LQ flew-:1: N3 ~.J£.:3Z\ 43 TABLE 2-1 RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ORIGINAL SAMPLE Original Classification 4,; H :3 o A m o f: U 5 o v m 0f: .1.) 34 O "“ o o O 44 G) > «4 m e 9- 0 on 13 3 a) 3 .G E P E H m ,9 m u a C 5 H I: r-i m -H >5 0 > O 0 cs H o 3.. «p :n e H 'c H (D 44 63 .C "1 0 N a 4.) Q) U) Q) "'4 U £2 ‘1'! C: no A H h A +3 0 #4 Q) «*4 (‘3 80 C H u) p O m in \ G) 3 :3 «a o H p :5 e o. a: «p e E u E a H .:~v 0-H O o "-1 o e +4 n a. > o o '1': u H H O 3 ‘4 m r-c Co a a : e 32 'H e ‘H 0 Q U, Q ”-4 4.) H V O +3 O s o m -H m n u1> : c: e m o m r-4 c: a u a a r: e. o a. o ‘H 'o .4 e A c» <0 e a. o > u . .o to .o H $<:Jr\ H ~034F~ -H a o 5 :.~. E‘A o o a: o >~. o e o tan-.4 a :3 "-4 a: :3 <1: ~\\ H +¢\. m C.: s \~ 3.. h e :2 H H a > c: :4 as a: + U o e +4 e as A e h e t: - H +1 H .o nan nsmnms .o-Hm a Q 1!“N S E o E‘u I E H 5.x m +344 a 3 none soc: ace? >01: 00110132 z 2 H v 2 as V .2 H V A +3 .12 B .C.‘ V E" V (A) (B) r (C) (n) (E) (F) (G) ' Radical 37 198 46 15 61 137 Rightist 235 (15%) *(23%) (8%) (31%) (58%) Negative 17 125 18 5 23 102 Voter 142 (12%) *(14%) (4%) (18%) (72%) SOSItive 14 118 8 13 21 97 Oter 132 (11%) *(7%) (11%) (18%) (73%) Cantl I"The rate of absolute refusals for the three groups is signifi- Chi-sy different at the .001 level. This was calculated by using the test quare approximation to binomial probabilities-~goodness of fit (New.y (See Morris Zelditcn, A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics Ork: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), chapter 10.) ‘. .\ - “11'. “it 0‘34. .u‘) . . I . 0.1- \n V\' " tab: Lu v: L .. W 4‘ .- wrsshon, 1.11.. 1 11315 amt t ‘ timer 1}. 3°C \ ‘I "shaman Ar; for, etc. 1 _, .A . - N 513213 gm irc ei~'.. - ‘ ”“1“: «Lo 11; L) I:‘ ‘." "“ku "1'18 1 .3110 31'1": ‘ 44 American, whom he was going to report to the FBI. When I contacted this man by telephone the next day, he similarly tape-recorded our con- versation, during which he constantly and most insistently asked ques- tions about the "real purpose of the study," who was paying for it, whether the government (specifically the FBI and the House Committee on Un-Alerican Activities) knew about the study, whom I was really working for, etc. I subsequently discovered that this man is the "Americanism Chairman" of a local veterans' organization, is a frequent "anti- Communist" speaker, and has attempted at other times to pose as an agent of the FBI. Prom comments made by the interviewers on their note sheets and from my own information about some of these peOple, there seems a consistent sample bias such that refusals came largely from rightists who were the most active and dedicated, or the most suspicious and afraid of taking the interview. An instance of the latter type of refusal was the individual who claimed she was told by the State Police not to give the interview, while refusing even to open the screen door. She then ran inside only to emerge a few seconds later with a camera ‘with.which she took photographs of the interviewer and her car's license plate number. Such bizarre events were not infrequent, and 001'.final sample probably under-estimates differences between rightists and Iron-rightists because the right-wingers with probably the most ex- treme traits could not be interviewed. Ced‘ ii In The interviews were coded, for punching onto IBM cards accord- lug to standard research procedures. Codes were designed to minimize c ode" (iiscretion by using very specific categories. All coding was ',.. -.—,»‘~ .13 .3 :16 3.31; 1.1 .‘1 .155 1131‘. . . y queshons, .7; ,,. . 11.: 1 £5er -v-« t. . $339393»: ac uh Hm £133 , . I~, 1 A ““‘a’. °T$ of 1‘: . e d .15;'.. v Jef lie. 9; 1 ‘ l 1}) data 9“ ‘ere def 45 done by specially trained coders. Accuracy was maintained by double coding all closed—alternative questions (average error was found to be less than .05% on the second coding) and triple coding all open-ended questions, by having two codings totally independent of each other, with a third check then comparing the two separate codings. When dis- agreements were discovered, two of the best coders, working together, made the final determination of which code was most appropriate. 3. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE INDEX OF RADICAL RIGHTISM Differentiating rightists from non-rightists is a crucial pro- blem in this study. One solution could be to consider organizational membership a sufficient empirical indicator. But this is not so simple, as it is not clear which organizations should properly be considered rightist.4 Nevertheless, consensus could probably be reached that membership in the John Birch Society, Billy James Hargis's Christian Crusade, and some other specific organizations are adequate operational indicators of rightism. But the right's careful guarding of its organizational membership lists prevents a papulation from being easily defined or sampled. This problem of great secretiveness showed up in my data also; while the sample included many individuals who we kne" were definitely associated with a rightist group, few admitted "e‘bership.* Membership in a rightist organization is in itself a theoretically inadequate measure of rightism anyway, because many \ *1 would estimate that at least 100 of the interviewees are 2::1‘8 of a radical right organization (56 of our sample came from a kind I‘Ship list alone), yet only 29 people admitted membership in any “ms of organization we classified as radical rightist or extreme erVative." (This was Question 71 in the interview.) 1338 73335 3. \ l 7‘ .5 .3- a.‘ 131m a...t I Using triterm of ' ‘ i I . ! filth :13: 3e 1 «M u -Q‘z_:t‘.ent ' ' 1...~ ~5C1-1331fle‘, :4 (53‘ NMing: . a: t'0 linens; 1e. “Her: 31 COMS .mttist COIL up. Lt COD". l ‘1‘ Q! "is ~> ‘ 34-», ' :, fl, . “;lt;. 31: .. “trim 46 nonmembers share identical beliefs with members, as well as being very active in anti-Communist causes. Using membership in a rightist organization as the sole criterion of rightism has the added disadvantage of being a simplistic twofold classification which overlooks variations in beliefs about the Communist conspiracy, intensity of feelings, and activities, all of which can be used to differentiate individuals on the basis of degrees of commitment. Instead of discrete categories I propose that rightists be classified empirically on the basis of variations in their beliefs and feelings about a Communist conspiracy. Individuals can be ranked on two dimensions: (1) their extent of belief in the existence of internal Communist subversion, and (2) their extent of involvement in activities which supposedly counter the influence of the alleged Communist conspiracy. Defining rightists in this manner emphasizes distinctions of degree. High scores on such a measure represent persons who both sub- scribe to conspiratorial beliefs and implement these beliefs through action. Persons who share similar beliefs but who do not act on then in Berna public way should have index scores lower than activists, but score somewhat higher than peeple who hold few conspiratorial beliefs and are completely inactive. An empirical Index of Radical Rightism following this model Was cOnstructed from 25 interview questions measuring rightist beliefs and act ivitiesf One dimension consists of items indicating whether the interviewee believes Communists have significant influence in, or \ 71 ‘These are questions 1, 4-8, 12-14, 24-28, 40, 46, 61, 67-69, ' 72-. 11):, 101, and 114. I we 3cm; 1 W l ‘i Q'sestzon, .o.‘ :01 1112;; 1.3. , ‘l I may; lh:\(,l I Y ‘ V r‘k “ ram; 115., -| ‘3? hits: 10:1 Tm: “31311411 33041 atte Carve rs 'i’ f: O‘ “- “043' 3:“; “5““ im 47 have actually infiltrated, governmental and other power positions. One question, for example, specifically asks the interviewee to evaluate how much influence he thinks Communists have in the American government today; answers of "a great deal" and "quite a bit" were scored as radical right responses. Responses of "Communism" or "Socialism" to the question "Are there any problems in America today which you are particularly concerned or worried about?" were similarly coded as radical rightist. Another question requested the interviewee to volun- tarily name any other places where he believed Communists might be found. These answers also reflect the saliency of Communism to the interviewee. Since many of the items in the index are not explicitly connected with Communists, volunteering such answers indicates the interviewee's concern with Communist infiltration. The activity part of the index is made up of items indicating participation in "anti-Communist" activities. A typical question asks about attendance at political rallies, dinners, study groups, etc.; answers which mentioned radical right or extreme conservative organiza- tions, and/or listed "Communism" or "Socialism" for the topic discussed, Discussing are considered as participation in radical right activities. issues involving rightist-concerns was another kind of activity. “'91 hting The purpose of any index is to order people in some meaningful 1a3t11J3n. The use of many items increases reliability by reducing the distorting effects which one or two inconsistent responses can have in o rderZlng people. But as is usually the case with methodolOgical racemes. J items raise: i x I me is us‘. II n he index. | | f \. 1.15 l 3.6!. setter mm.- 1 Lifizviaual WE, hols-am axon.k wins the re lenn zove :st only it. 1:15 would e internal re} 13% calcula‘ ”SPOLJiem . By What I'C film“ ‘11 “Wino ll 1; “no 48 procedures, disadvantages always accompany advantages, and using multiple items raises certain difficulties. If a simple cumulative scoring pro- cedure is used to arrive at a single summary score for placing people on the index, each item is considered equally as important as any other item. This assumption can be misleading, since some responses are far better indicators of radical rightism than others. For example, an individual who says he is a member of a radical right organization is probably more likely to be a strong rightist than an individual who thinks there might be a great deal of Communist influence in the American government,when asked the question point-blank. We could have used only items which seem equally powerful as rightist indicators, but this would entail discarding some items, thus decreasing the index's internal reliability. A solution to this dilemma is to weight items and calculate a weighted instead of a simple cumulative score for each respondent. By computing the total degree of intra-association between rightist responses on all items, we let the data themselves determine relative item weights. The statistic used to measure this degree of association was the Contingency Coefficient, since the scale measure- Ient is nominal (rightist response, non-rightist response) and this iii 13* dost ,fj;c.e:.ts 3° 3} 119515, 3 waited: and us calculate all otner ite coeffznent 5 :‘case V9163: lost 131:1“?st the itel tit. 31 2.33. It otzer people 1213 country Izzy relics; 49 was the most easily computed appropriate measure.* A matrix of co- efficients for all twenty-five questions (there are actually twenty- nine items, since some of the questions have more than one part) was computed, and the sum of each item's association with all other items was calculated by adding up all the coefficients between that item and all other items. Weights were assigned by dividing each item's total coefficient score by the lowest item's total score (to achieve unity as a base weight); this gave the item whose radical right responses were most infrequently associated with other items a weight of 1.00, while the item with the highest degree of association ended up with a weight of 2.93. It turned out, for example, that if a person talked with other people to warn them about the extent of Communist influence in this country (question 67-C), this was associated with about twice as lmny radical right responses as merely seriously talking about Communism (question 4). In this manner weights for all twenty-nine items which make up the index were determined by the degree of overall internal association between radical right responses, and scores for each person on the dimensions of beliefs and activities were computed. (See Figure 2-1 for items and weights.) *The Contingency Coefficient has some limitations as a Statuistic for measuring degree of association with nominal data. It h“ Slittle intuitive meaning, and its numeric values are sensitive to l"‘l‘g'll-nal values and the number of rows and columns in the bivariate tables. Goodman and Krusal's Tau-Beta is a better statistic for com- paring nominal associations, particularly since its value is based on ““3988 in predicting responses on one variable if you know the re- :3"“30 on another. Unfortunately, no computer program was available 400°‘1culate these coefficients, and the hand calculation of more than CalcValues was highly impracticable. A program was available to Wmlulate Contingency Coefficients, however, and since the coefficient numbd be used only for comparative intrasample purposes, with equal liniirs of rows and columns which allowed direct comparisons, the c sations of the Contingency Coefficient are not serious and it be- uSeful for our purpose. Lani Riga: :e; :1 at tea: 61' son sex. stoned ea :1 Wins". orgy: elapsed 1:1 Evans for 12: 18151 “Em; hm) quar M" . We. the in AB" Test of Index's Validity Before proceeding further we must establisn whether the Radical Right Index is a valid indicator of rightism. The first in- dependent test of the Index's validity is the examination of the scores of known members of a radical right organization.‘ This group was, as mentioned earlier, randomly drawn from a list of peOple associated with a rightist organization. As Table 2-2 shows, the index, with scores collapsed into quartiles, reflects this quite well. (For contrast scores for the "positive voter" sample, the group most likely to be least rightist, are shown.) With half of the known Rightists in the highest quartile, and only a fewIIin the lower (least rightist) quar- tile, the index discriminates as expected. TABLE 2-2 COMPARISON BETWEEN SUBSAMPLES OF POSITIVE VOTERS AND KNOWN RADICAL RIGHTISTS ON RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX Radical Rightism Index Scores (low) (high) I II III IV (N) Positive Voters 39% 44% 16% 1% (97) Known Radical Rightists 2 7 39 52 (56) ,"This type of validity is sometimes called "discriminant V81 id ity." *IThe range of scores for this known group of Rightists empiri- Cally demonstrates the usefulness of considering rightism as a variable mat‘iad of an "either-or" category. Beside the methodological advan- tage 0:: allowing ordinal statistical comparisons to be drawn, members who may have Joined an organization for nonideological reasons (this izcounts, I believe, for the few respondents whose scores are in the mole? quartiles) may be differentiated from those whose commitment is e intense. .. 50% cue. | 39:13; angu- .0 (IF m: IN THE C "m ta: yes, YES, 3' 803’ flue “Eric; :0- {'7 :J “C C) .V 3031’ m filer} volu: legr, A) FIGURE 2-1 INDEX OF RADICAL RIGHTISM ITEMS AND WEIGHTS Weight 1. How much approve of the John Birch Society; (Q. 61) 2.930 approve very much (2). approve , (1)"I 2. (IF INTERVIEWEE BELIEVES THERE IS COMMUNIST INFLUENCE 2.868 IN THE GOVERNMENT) Talked to other people, trying to warn them about communist influence; (Q. 67C) yes, very often (2) yes, often (1) 3. How much Communist influence think there is in 2.680 American government today: (Q. 67) a great deal or quite a bit (2) a little (1) 4. lany of the textbooks used in our schools promote 2.520 socialism: (Q. 100) agree very much (2) agree on the whole (1) 5. America is standing close to the brink of total 2.520 disaster from Communist subversion: (Q. 114) agree very much (2) agree on the whole (1) 6. How much communist influence think there is in 2.407 American schools and colleges: (Q. 68) a great deal or quite a bit (2) a little (1) 7- .Named other place(s) (churches, labor unions, etc.) 2.307 Voluntarily where Communists might be and their degree of influence is: (Q. 69) a great deal or quite a bit (2) a little or don't know (1) \ a. c lNMmbers in parenthesis are a priori unit weights of response neg-01.195 . - i Attenie. Coazunisi discu53nj very once Q“ . Attennt. or righ1 v e I.) OQCu .... c“ ”'00 l 0: center: Con ext 12' 30: W Curt 1‘31 and. I; U. t! “it P '0. . ;"A ”'JI‘;. \ 1a. Wu 9,. U FIGURE 2-1 (continued) Weight 8. Attended rallies, study groups, etc. where "anti- 2.302 Communist" or "extremely conservativem'".I matters were discussed: (Q. 5 and 5C) very often and often (2) once in awhile (I) 9. Attended rallies, study groups, etc. of radical right 2.292 or rightist-front organization: (Q. 5 and SB) very often and often (2) once in awhile (l) 10. Problem in America today particularly worried or 2.252 concerned about: (Q. l) Communism, Socialism (2)‘# extreme Conservative concerns (1) 11. Problem in America today most worried about: (1b) 2.237 Communism, Socialism (2)** extreme Conservative concerns (1) 12. How much danger is there that Communist influence can 2.227 hurt the country?: (Q. 673) a great deal or quite a bit (2) a little (1) 13. Member of: (Q. 71) 2.204 radical right organization (2) extremely conservative group (1) 14. ‘What causes differences between "American Way of Life" 2.093 and way things are done in this country nowadays: (Q. 408) Communism and radical right type (2) extreme conservative (l) **n .Extreme conservative concerns" are responses mentioning the concentration of power in the government, its tyranny and usurpation :fieihe Constitution, suppression of basic freedoms, and the like. Such anchorix: is often voiced by rightists, who then, of course, explain °Vents as caused by internal Communism subversion. j. iritten .1 | Coils-u:i extren E. A:t1v1ty socialis: very a lesser 3. 1n diSCu somlis very Gite: 3' OIfiCer raj; ext: Com Git L"? ' iritte GX‘ [a 5% affal 1:}: 53 FIGURE 2-1 (continued) Weight 15. Written letter(s) to public officials about: (Q. 12) 1.975 Communism and rightist concerns (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 16. Activity in school matters that involved communism or 1.917 socialism: (Q. 7C) very active (2) lesser activity (1) 17. In discussing school matters, discussed communism or 1.908 socialism: (Q. 7) very often (2) often (1) 18. Officer or in charge of activities of a: (Q. 72) 1.903 radical rightist group (2) extremely conservative group (1) 19. Written letter(s) to newspaper editors about: (Q. 8) 1.857 communism and rightist concerns (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) .20. Written letters to businessmen about: (Q. 13) 1.781 Communism and rightist concerns (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 21. In seriously talking about local government or community 1.667 affairs discussed very often or often: (Q. 4B) communism and rightist concerns (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 22. (Eroups in America having too much power: (Q. 46) 1.613 Communists and Socialists (2) Government (1) 23' Why against adding fluoridation to community's water 1.610 supply: (Q . 24) Communistic, Socialistic (2) BXtreme conservative concerns (1) 3L Shy age: \ Coat; extre' 3. In agar I Comma extrc \ I 5. lhy tnifi best (0:, I do a. j‘ 'hy agd C 0T1!!!“ extr '3tter fad: Ext: 54 FIGURE 2-1 (continued) Weight 24. Why against Urban Renewal: (Q. 26) 1.496 Communistic, Socialistic (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 25. Why against bond issues for schools: (Q. 28) 1.477 Communistic, Socialistic (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 26. Why think elected political leaders do not do what is 1.434 best for country: (Q. 148) do what is best for Communists, Socialists, Collectivists, etc. (2) disregard Constitutional forms, limitations, safeguards, etc. (1) 27. Why against property tax increase for schools: (Q. 27) 1.383 Communistic, Socialistic (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 28. Why against housing code: (Q. 25) 1.015 Communistic, Socialistic (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) 29. Taken an active part in local government or community 1.000 matter that involved: (Q. 60) radical right concerns (2) extreme conservative concerns (1) I"One confirmation of the assumption that high scores on this index represent strong beliefs about a Communist conspiracy and a high level of activities in advocating these beliefs, while low scores re- Dresent less intense beliefs and activity, is found in the extremely high (morrelation (r 3 .97) between the belief-components of the Index and the full belief-activity scores. The degree of covariance can be igterpreted as a measure of the goodness of fit of the regression lines r the two dimensions; the small amount of variance left unexplained $1) is thus one way of showing that the amount of error in the assump- on 13 Quite low. A 56 5:1; bet-ec: met of ra. cameras.7 I211 (Cam RAJIC 55 A second test of the index's validity is found in the relation- ship between index scores and conservative political beliefs. One facet of radical right ideology encompasses traditional conservative concerns.7 This association reveals itself in the empirical data as well (Gamma = +.6).* (Table 2-3.) TABLE 2-3 RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX AND LIBERAL - CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES Liberal -- Conservative Attitudes (liberal) (conservative) I .ll III I! (N) (low) I 47% 39% 8% 7% (75) Radical II 25 38 29 8 (92) Rightism Index III 15 21 35 29 (92) (high) 1v 1 9 31 58 (77) TABLE 2-4 RADICAL RIGHTISM AND CANDIDATE VOTED FOR IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Candidate voted for Goldwater Johnson Other** (N) (low) I 19% 76% 5% (75) Radical II 36 58 7 (92) Rightism Index III 74 21 6 (92) (high) IV 95 3 3 (77) *in l other" means "didn't vote,’ "won't say," or voted for another candidate." 1 . ‘The measure of association is the Goodman-Kruskal "Gamma" co- 8 fielent of ordinal association.8 The scale was constructed following :26 procedures detailed in a later section of this chapter, with the Sci")?!-3 gein‘ taken from the Survey Research Center's Liberal-Conservatism 0. troll ‘The scale's internal reliability, for this sample, is .83. Con- rehting for possible response-set did not significantly affect the . ionship. (See below.) [\J 56 SRC Liberal-Conservatism Scale 1. The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle. 2. If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government in Washington ought to give them the money they need. The government ought to see to it that big business corpora- tions don't have much to say about how the government is run. 0.) 4. The government ought to help peeple get doctors and hospital care at low cost. 5. If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing the government in Washington should see to it that they do. 6. The government ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. 7. The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white or colored children go to the same school. The Rightism Index's construct validity is further confirmed by examining another correlate of rightism, support of Goldwater for president in the 1964 presidential election.* In our sample there is a striking linear relationship between degree of rightism and voting for Goldwater . (Table 2-4 .) *It is interesting to note that Denison Kitchel, who directed Golchvater's 1964 Presidential campaign, was a member of the John Birch Society, if only for a few weeks (Portland Oregonian, July 19, 1965). While Kitchel resigned from the society a short time after joining, the fact ‘that he Joined indicates the ideological congruency between the Birchers and those around Senator Goldwater. Some Rightists did not “Pport him, however, because they felt that any politician would be unable: to effectively stop the Communist conspiracy. They believed that the best thing to do in the situation was to let Johnson win. Then, after 21 year or so of Great Society pragrams, the advances of Communism would lme so apparent that a real war against Communism could be waged. These pessimistic Rightists, who believe that activity is somewhat :Etiler ‘Would fall into category III of the Index. This group does, less:Ct1’ manifest the greatest degree of feelings of personal power- has ess-~see Table 7-5 in Chapter 7 and the discussion on powerless- s and alienation. . u", "1.1.. Inert t :6 r. - 1 112 emit? ‘ T35 G! the R15; countered eat-cent, 301.1 3m RS331»? l Cashier: PV.',, ”I A. t. .‘R o~ h, 57 The overwhelming association between index scores and three correlative attributes of rightism provides sufficient evidence to accept the index as a valid measure of radical rightism. The Sample and the Radical Rightism Index The sampling method resulted in groups with clear differences on the Rightism Index. (Table 2-5.) The distinction between persons considered originally as rightists and positive voters is particularly evident. The prediction that some people identified as negative voters would actually be rightists was born out--nearly 1/3 of the original negative voter sample turned out to be Rightists,* although they are considerably more moderate than persons originally identified as right-wingers. TABLE 2-5 RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX VS. ORIGINAL SAMPLE CLASSIFICATION Radical Rightism Index (low) (high) _I_ 1_[_I_ III _I_V_ (N) Original Positive 39% 44% 16% 1% (97) Sample Voters Cl assifi- cation Negative 32 36 28 3 (102) Voters Publicly Active 4 10 32 54 (81) Rightists Organizational 2 7 39 52 (56) Rightists 3am I *The convention will be adepted of calling persons from our thepnis who are empirically classified into the two upper quartiles of generightism Index Rightists. Lower-case rightists refers to the calledc aggregate of individuals associated withnthe politicalnmovement indivilhft"dical r1ghtism. Similarly, upper-case Non-Rightists refer to Wartilezls from our sample empirically classified into the two lower of the Rightism Index. f. o "I ,_. (I: aim and 0 me: correl . ,t. . Put": EU? 58 The assumption that findings from this sample can be generalized to all rightists is strengthened by the nearly equal degree of commit- ment to rightist beliefs and activities displayed by the publicly active and organizational Rightists. They are also matched on the two other correlates of rightism used to validate the index-~candidate preference and liberal-conservative attitudes. (Tables 2-6 and 2-7.) Table 2-8 shows the Rightism Index collapsed into two categories (high and low), with the two rightist subsamples combined into a single group. The problem of generalization will be returned to in Chapter 8, where additional comparisons made on a number of other variables employed in this study will allow us to answer with more accuracy the question of sample bias. TABLE 2-6 COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLICLY ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RICHTISTS ON LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES Liberal-Conservative Attitudes (liberal) (conservative) 1 $1. 111 g! (N) Publicly Active 8% 15% 34% 43% (118)* Rightists Organizational 12 16 31 41 (51)* Rightists Kruskal-Wallis H-Test = 0.274 P = n.s. l"Only individuals with scores in quartiles III or IV of the Rightism Index included. COLL}. w TABLE 2-7 COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLICLY ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTISTS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR VOTE IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Candidate Goldwater Johnson Other (N) Publicly Active 82% 14% 4% (118) Rightist Organizational 86 8 6 (51) Rightists 2 x I 1.72 P).30 TABLE 2-8 COLLAPSED RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX VERSUS ORIGINAL SAMPLE, WITH PUBLICLY ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTISTS COMBINED Radical Rightism Index (low) (high) (N) l;£L£L 3 & 4 Radical Rightists 12% 88% (137) Negative Voters 69 31 (102) Positive Voters 85 15 (97) 4. METHOD OF SCALE CONSTRUCTION In constructing scales and indexes the researcher is confronted Witli the serious methodological problem of deciding which one of many available techniques he will use. The problem is not simply a matter 01' Choosing the "one" correct technique but instead involves selecting from several possible techniques the procedure which best utilizes his data.10 Scales, indexes, and other such summary measures reduce larger quantities of data into forms more easily analyzed and manipulated. V v. .‘ N I 11:: H: on”, {file ir“0rl 4‘ no .! hi ease 1r» “' '3" in -,I”. n a. 53‘ 'I “' W‘- q. u ' :4-34‘“ tion of t; it “-13:13. 1 I W ‘ v- . .mitlmL m. _ "A fir-Dc .‘h“r- o ”E‘Qti { 60 They are usually constructed by following some systematic procedure for assembling evidence from multiple items of behavior into single com- posite scores or rank positions. Summarizing data, unfortunately, results in some loss of information and creates distortions as well. While information losses are probably outweighed by improved clarity and ease in interpreting the original data, distortions which arise from aggregating multiple items into a single score or index position can produce serious inaccuracies in the composite score's representa- tion of the original data. The extent to which this single score accurately summarizes the original data is called the scale's "functiona1 equivalence" to the original set of items comprising it.11 Many procedures have been developed to create functionally equivalent uneasures, with the most popular of these being techniques originally devised by Thurstone, Likert, and Guttman.12 While each technique has special advantages in aggregating cer- tziiaa kinds of data, theoretical and practical difficulties also serious- 1)’ filmmair each technique's usefulness and accuracy.13 After careful °°n81deration of the inherent limitations and likely distortions of most standard techniques, the following procedures were employed to conStruct the scales used in this study. The first step in constructing a scale is to select items wh‘i-<=li give valid indications of whatever attitude the scale is supposed tc’ n“reassure. In most cases the items used in this study were taken from scales previously tested and whose published results show their val1dity. The selection of items was based on intuition and experience, ‘vjstli criteria including "content" validity and discrimination power. Once items have been selected, a scale's internal consistency, lgqiyu€‘.‘1 (a .‘..-. . . # ..:..,.'... J ‘ ‘1 L i‘ls'~.e4- v. v: ascertgg . ll 110.1035 03 orzginzl 1;; I I“: Rf D‘tc “a a Gl unidimensionality, reliability, and meaningfulness must be determined empirically. This is done by measuring the scale's functional equivalence to the original items for the sample being studied. First, we ascertain which items can be considered as separate but related in- dicators of a single underlying factor, and therefore belong in the scale's final form. Second, we establish some quantitative measure of the degree to which a single scale score accurately represents the original multiple-items. Two basic procedures are usually followed in determining which items satisfy the criterion of internal consistency, thereby consti- tuting a valid scale: item-discrimination analysis, and Guttman's scalogram technique for ascertaining unidimensionality.14 While know- ing that a scale satisfying Guttman's criterion of unidimensionality has useful theoretical advantages, the technique also has its draw- backs .15 For example, the Guttman technique usually requires that responses to items be collapsed into dichotomies, which entails a great loss of information if the data were collected originally with multiple response categories. Also, Guttman's "Coefficient of Reproducibility," which is used as a quantitative measure of the degree to Which the overall summary score is functionally equivalent to the multiple items comprising it, is at best only a descriptive statistic. This means that its numeric value lacks any meaningful inferential statistical interpretation which would allow a statement to be made about probabilities of random errors affecting the scale's unidimension- ality or internal consistency. Lastly, several auxiliary criteria must be satiSfied by the data before they can be legitimately amenable to Seal Ogram analysis, and these assumptions are frequently most difficult ¢ ' ; l :5 tiere o:' l M a _, 1311‘. built- mm char, |\ mimic)“. if 3 perso: score: on t 2130 fall 1 ‘o‘ , kink-”J 1' $5.15 “:33 ,1 .‘ to meet.10 The unidimensional scales used in this study were constructed through a variation of item-discrimination technique. This ascertains if there is a consistent association between individual items and the total scale score. If we assume that a set of items measures some common characteristic, then all items should reflect this. For a given scale,each of its items is tested to see if it discriminates. That is, if a person's responses to several items classify him as a "high" scorer on the scale, then his responses on each individual item should also fall into the "high" category. The overall pattern of consistency determines whether an item should be included or rejected. In practice this was done by first calculating total cummuletive scores for each scale by summing responses to items making up the scale. The full range of responses for each item was used, with scores ranging from 1 (for "agree very much" with the statement) to 7 (for "disagree very much” with the statement).* Responses to each item were then compared to the total cumulative score to see if the item-responses were con- sistent with the cumulative score. This was determined by using fre— quency distribution tables, which allow actual patterns and distribu- tions of item-responses to be examined, things which cannot be seen “Sing Ordinary correlation measures. Next, we calculated the extent to which the total score accurately represented the original items. Ideally this should be a quantitative measure which allows an inferential statistical \ :0: Empirical evidence shows that this simple weighing system cor- re usiates better than .95 with more complex weighing procedures, such as ng converted sigma score for weights. See references cited in Coode and Hattie 3 0p. cit. (footnote No. 10), pp. 273-74. mm: 1 5.2110,: . wjificd 1 sh. resign: l RIFLES-“ts x. § .0 . g, H ‘ " d; g“. \ 1‘~ e ,r "C ".3" i”, \ 63 interpretation to be made. A measure of internal consistency originally developed by G. F. Kuder and M. W. Richardson supplies such a co- efficient, based on all variances between scores on the original multiple items and single cummulative score.17 Since the original equation was designed to consider only dichotomized item scores, I modified it slightly to take account of variances for a full range of six responses. The equation given below takes full account of all 'variances between cumulative scale scores and item responses, for all :items comprising the scale. The resulting coefficient can be inter- ;xreted statistically as a measure of the overall correlation between irrdividual items and scale score, with 1.0 indicating perfect associa- tixana 1 7- ‘w 3- 1 L 1’ P,“ -.-. Gffl + M + 62-265 ’LG‘,‘ \ 6; 2.6; G; = variance of the summary test score 6': L = variance of scores on item 1 '2? = correlation between score on item and total test score 5. CONTROLLING FOR RESPONSE-SET VVhenever measures are constructed which use fixed statements to Whicfll 'the individual responds, error due to response-set phenomena must be expected and controlled. Cronbach, in his classic article, d . . efined :rrasponse-set as 'any tendency causing a person conSistently to ma ke different responses to test items than he would have had the same _ _,...0 ,fl)‘ mum» ” "1"" - Al-{01‘J. t ‘V .I ‘ HR‘ 1‘ :E.l-1\-“‘:] o '9. hese are l same 1115 and to £0? other em 3:; set 0 aaszers a 255m 50;; I. sCQEtJre$ 64 content been presented in a different form."18 Since then, a Vast literature on response-set phenomena has developed; it has been shown empirically again and again that many persons answer items not in terms of their contents but on the basis of other factors.19 Included among these are tendencies to acquiesce to statements, to be negative, to choose answers which are socially desirable, to guess (or not guess), and to work for speed instead of accuracy. The discovery of these and other error-inducing response-patterns raises serious questions about any set of findings based on questionnaires and interviews. How many answers are valid replies which indicate how the respondent truly feels about something, and how many are artifacts based on noncontent features of the questionnaire or interview situation? No pat answer to this question can be given. When assessed empirically, response-set is sometimes insignificant, but at other times it has produced serious errors. The evidence is clear that response-set errors increase in significance with (a) the item's lack of clarity (ambigitz) for the respondent, and/or (b) when the item's saliency for the respondent is low. When items are both unambiguous and salient for a particular respondent, then response-set is not a Significant problem. Unfortunately, the clarity and saliency of items can only be determined empirically, and not on an _a_ priori basis, for both individual $5292 and respondents. Response-set measuring items for most of the scales used in the Study were included in the interview. These items were exact reversals of scale items. For example, one item in the "Intolerance of Amhighlilty" scale reads "There is usually only one right way to do an e ything' 3 its contradiction is worded "There are usually many right I l 6335 to a") I site sens ; j Fm resumes ‘1 Susttivm 1 lac-Comets ”“0 ‘I (an) _ c Ag: V8!- \g‘ :p >4- (1 4 I'I‘BM :7 t“ .4 r—C *J in [‘11: VEIKSED Di . ’- ways to do anything." Usually, more than 70 percent of the interviewees were sensitive to item-contents. Four categories of Content sensitivity were derived from the responses to the original item and its reversal, (1) High Content Sensitivity (HCS), (2) Ioderate Content Sensitivity (NOS), (3) Moderate Non-Content Sensitivity (INCS), and (4) High Non-Content Sensitivity (HNCS). Classification is based on the following response-patterns: ORIGINAL ITEI 52!. 5!. éé, 22 2!. 225 Agree (4) (4) (3) (2) (1) (1) Very Inch HNCS HNCS MNCS MCS HCS HCS Agree on (4) (4) (3) (2) (1) (1) the WhOIQ HNCS HNCS MNCS ”CS HCS HCS Agree a (3) (3) (3) (1) (2) (2) g} Little ms MNCS uNCS HCS ucs ucs 0—4 a Disagree a (2) (2) (1) (3) (3) (3) 33 Little “CS MCS HCS MNCS E1 Disagree on (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) the WhOlO HCS HCS MCS HNCS HNCS HNCS Disagree (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) \hery luch HCS HCS MCS MNCS HNCS HNCS Nine reversed items (each widely separated from its opposed scale item) were included in the interview schedule. An overall Content-Sensitivity score was computed for each interviewee by summing up his scores on eight of the nine tests. (One item was dropped during scale'refinement .) chfilpter 8 contains a detailed examination of the effects that res ._ Dense set error had on the outcome of the study. But the reader ‘I re 'V‘ .3. 3:3,, mm: might wish to know beforehand that in only one instance did controlling for response-set result in attenuating a significant difference between Rightists and Non-Rightists on a scalar measure. ’44 a1; ' ~39:- 10. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 This figure of 5% is taken from a nationwide Gallup Poll taken in February, 1962, as reported in Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right" in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Riga; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 349. Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), especially Chapter 13. Springfield is called "Oretown." See Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand IlcNally, 1965). Barbara Green, et al., "Responsible and Irresponsible Right-Wing Groups...", J. of Social Issues, lg (1963): 3-18. Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); S. Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, (New York: chraw-Hill, 1956). 1.. A. Goodman and W. H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classification," J. of Am. Statistical Assoc., 2.9. (1954): 732-764; Blalock, op. cit. R. Schmuck and I. Chesler, "On Super-Patriotism: A Definition and Analysis," J. of Social Issues, _I_g (1963): 31-50; G. B. Rush, "Toward a Definition of the Extreme Right," The Pacific Soc. Review, _6_ (1963): 64-73. Goodman and Kruskal, op. cit.; Linton Freeman, Elementary Applie Statistics (New York: John Wiley 8: Sons, 1965). ‘ A. Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson 8: Co., 1954). Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957); William J. Goode, and Paul K. Hatte, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw {1111 Book Company, Inc., 1952), chapters 15-17; Bert r. Green, Att 1tude Measurement," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of m Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. 1954), Vol. I, pp. 351-2; Helen Peak, "Problems of ObJBCtive Observations," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), W11 Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt- rt-Winston, 1953). 67 . . 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 1J7. 113. 1£3. 68 Peak, op. cit. Edwards, op. cit.; Geode and Hatte, op. cit.; Green, 0p. cit.; Peak, op. cit. Green, op. cit.; Peak, op. cit. Louis Guttman, chapters 2-6 on scalogram analysis in Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., "Measurement and Prediction," Vol. 4 in Studies in Social Psychology_in World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950); see also discussions in references cited in footnote 10. Green, 0p. cit.; Peak, op. cit; P. H. Kriedt and K. E. Clark, "Item Analysis versus Scale Analysis," J. Appl. Psychol., 33 (1949): 114-121. Green, op. cit.; Peak, op. cit. G. F. Knder and M. W. Richardson, "The Theory of Estimation of Test Reliability," Psychometrika, g (1937): 151-160. L. J. Cronbach, "Response Sets and Test Validity," Education Psychology Measurement, 6 (1946): 475-494. The literature on response-set is vast, with the following refer- ences being major reviews: L. J. Cronback, "Further Evidence on Response Sets and Test Design," Education Psychology Measurement, 10 (1950): 3-31; I. A. Berg, "The Unimportance of Test Item Content," in B. M. Bass & I. A. Berg (eds.), Objective Approaches to Personality Assessment (New York: Van Nostrand, 1959); D. N. Jackson and S. Messick, llContent and Style in Personality Assessment," Psychol. Bull. §§ (1958): 243-252; S. Messick, "Response Style and Content Measures from Personality Inventories," Educ. Psychol. Measmt. 3g (1962): 41-56; L. G. Rorer, The Great Response Style Myth, (Eugene, Oregon: Oregon Research Institute Monograph, 1963). £““"" ‘ I” CHAPTER 3 RIGHTISTS AS PERSONS WITH STATUS FRUSTRATIONS The idea that rightists eXperience serious anxieties from "status frustration" is one of the most prevalent themes in the litera- ture on rightism.1 Although in wide use, the concept of "status frustration" has been employed loosely in many instances. Notions involving status "characteristics," status "feelings," occupational status, and status "anxieties" have all been used interchangeably, without preper differ- entiation. Consequently a great deal of confusion surrounds the con- cept. Our first goal, then, is to provide a more explicit definition. 1. STATUS FRUSTRATION: A DEFINITION §tatus as a [ensure of Prestige While the rhetoric of American politics preaches egalitarianism, individuals are, in fact, ranked on some basis and stand in relation- ships of superiority-inferiority to one another. In a hierarchy of Prestige, persons are given unequal amounts of respect and deference: SCNIe are considered the "better peeple of the community," looked up to, ‘While others, considered the "lesser ones," are thought of as ordinary, ‘uLimportant, or even unworthy of respect. 69 \ 9 ”WE: c. 51)) . l 1 - A . him :5 0i "seen deference! \ 70 People are ranked by other members of their society, community, or group. A man's prestige thus depends on the attitude of respect his neighbors, friends, fellow employees, associates, and others have for him.* An individual's personal prestige, sometimes called his amount of "social honor," is synonymous with the approval, admiration, deference, and other forms of positive evaluation he receives from his fellowmen. The position a person occupies within his society's stratifica- 3 A tion system strongly affects the amount of prestige he receives. Ian's "status" is thus the socially defined measure of his prestige- rank. Sociologists usually make an analytical distinction between the "prestige" which is associated with a particular social role or posi- tion and the "esteem" accorded for performing in a specific capacity.4 Yet in the real world such fine distinctions are seldom made and peeple usually combine "prestige" and "esteem" into a single judgment when ranking others.5 Status and the Need for Self-Esteem Social status carries with it a psychological connotation.6 An individual's status indicates the amount of and kind of prestige he receives from others, and these social cues in turn significantly affect how he sees himself. The association between social status and the self-concept is universal; Berelson and Steiner conclude, on the basis of their review of "the present state of scientific knowledge a"Joseph Kahl, a sociologist, expresses this idea in a more ‘utlversal way: "prestige is a sentiment in the minds of men that is exDressed in interpersonal interaction."2 atmt yuan k influenced "f enlmt’lon c Ber «lemme ‘ heir stat a: self-e: ample, .. System (of It: 71 about human behavior," that "a person's self-evaluation is strongly influenced by the ranking of his class (that is, by the society's evaluation of the groups to which he belongs)."7* Because their sense of self-esteem is linked to the social deference they receive from others, people naturally seek to maximize their status. Hany personality theorists believe that the maintenance of self-esteem is one of man's essential social needs. McDougall, for example, considers the sentiment of self-regard the cornerstone of his "systematic psychology." Among Inrray's extensive list of human needs (of which 28 are social), several involve the need for self-esteem. Iaslow includes among his classification of basic needs "physiological safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and self-actualization."10 And in his popular introductory text in psychology, Ernest Hilgard says this about the major role played in human behavior by the need for self-esteem: If all the physiological drives were to be summarized accord- ing to a common principle, they might be said to serve the purposes of survival. If all the social motives were similar- ly summarized, they might be said to serve the purpose of maintaining security of status. When physiological needs are unsatisfied, the organism faces the dangers of depletion, illness, and death. When social motives are unsatisfied, the organism faces loneliness, anxiety, and self-depreciation. Gordon Aleort, in his codification of psychological literature on *That the way a person feels about himself is considerably de- termined by how other people judge him is not a new idea. Cooley re- ferrOd to this process as the "looking-glass self”;"the self that is m“ 1lililortant is a reflection, largely, from the minds of others.... “01°39 Herbert lead similarly emphasized the processes of social appraisal involved in the individual's development of his self-image: --.the self arise in conduct, when the individual becomes a social °b~j°ct in experience to himself." "8 imam), t ...tne 1n .w Mullah; respect, __ orier is immune: km“! ’ W35: 3“. '30 use: ”9? the I“ V; ‘V V' “11‘: in Se .8; ‘. ‘1 ‘1; l . ‘1 ’ vln—Wflwuv 1...... 72 personality, takes a similar position: ...the individual's desire for personal status is apparently insatiable. Whether we say that he longs for prestige, self- resgect, autonomy, or self-regard, a dynamic factor of this order is apparently the strongest of his drives.1 Status Frustrations We now have the theoretical ingredients to define "status trustration." Psychologically, the amount and kind of deference, {Jarestige, and respect a man receives is linked to his status. PeOple eukaose status evaluations are lower than they feel they deserve, and ‘vtao resent this situation, experience "anxieties" or "frustrations" <>trer their status. Status frustrations thus result from an individual's [Deerception of a discrepancy between his iglffdefined and socially- cieafined prestige-ranks. This discrepancy may occur because his per- iscbnal status is actually low or declining in social prestige, or such feelings may be produced by his subjective reaction to a situation ‘Vllich objectively may not be threatening him at all. In either case El sense of "relative deprivation" of status results which is psycho- 10gically real to, and resented by, the individual.13 But, because the maintenance of self-esteem is a strong human lll0tive, people who experience status frustrations are prompted to iriesist them. While people protect their sense of self-regard in many ‘Vays, we are particularly interested in showing how radical rightism restores the positive status feelings of people whose social status is low or deteriorating.‘ Let us now examine in detail the kinds of ‘"Psychological defense-mechanisms like rationalization, denial, and suppression can be used to block out feelings of relative inferior- ity. Or, the individual may endeavor to actually improve his social 3201162 attractc hiany c Varying mm L as superior 0 (“901mm, e “W, ems Emeline,“ and luxtul w... ‘ 3:) ‘T'x- . 1' L‘ol 1" 3"?1‘ T‘ " 3 J‘..‘ \ '“3'l3at'1 #931 “ tel. ‘( 31‘. ‘ 13¢ ‘ s ‘I. ‘r '.‘ .4‘ l a . I 9 , l at f.“ .‘. I" Ev. q !" h i 73 people attracted to rightism and the causes of their frustrations. 2. THE STATUS AND VALUE FRUSTRATIONS 0F RIGHTISTS: A SET OF HYPOTHESES Many criteria affect people's ranks in a prestige hierarchy. Varying with culture, nation, and even community, people are classified as superior or inferior on the basis of their family, authority, power (toolitical, economic, military), ownership of property, possessions, :iaacome, consumption patterns, style of life, occupation, skills, £1<3hievements, education, associational ties and connections, values Eirid attitudes, ethnic background, and race and religion.14 Personal IDJrestige-rank is thus the result of possessing or manifesting attri- laxates which are socially valued. itatus Decline: Occupation and Achievement A large group of rightists have been identified as coming from <><=cupations whose social prestige is declining. Why should these IDGaople be attracted to rightism? While many criteria affect an individual's social standing, A man's occupation is, among other things, the source of his income, \ twosition and resultant prestige-rank by working harder at his job, by :learning more socially valued skills, by improving his manners, or by any of the many ways people enhance their status. (See section immed- iately following for a list of attributes which significantly affect how an individual's status is judged.) Furthermore every person who is Status-frustrated is obviously not attracted to radical rightism; some of the psychological factors which affect this are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. But it is hypothesized that many persons who are status frustrated are attracted to rightism, and we are interested in how the activities and ideology of radical rightism Operate to make these people feel more comfortable about themselves. 11:13 occupation is one of the main measures of the deference he receives.l° 74 which importantly affects his style of living. It reflects his education. It also tells something about the type of associates he makes through his job, and the kind of power and authority he has over other people. A man's occupational situation is also a gauge of his achievements. Personal achievement is strongly emphasized in American culture, with individuals viewed as competing units in the quest for success, fame, and fortune, and each man is Judged by his record of achievements. The respect once accorded the "self-made" man was well represented by the pOpularity of the Horatio Alger myth of an earlier era. These beliefs still influence many today; Robin Williams observes in his study of American values that a ...striking feature of American culture is its tendency to identify standards of personal excellence with competitive occupational achievement. In short, the single personal attribute which correlates most hIlghly with the prestige granted a man and his family is his Occupation.” If a man's occupation decreases in social status, he Personally eXperiences a loss of respect and esteem. For in a society whalch greatly values achievement, which also believes that every man can, through a combination of hard work and self-improvement, enhance his social position, people are likely to feel that a low or declining occupational status signifies deficiency in abilities or ambition. The emergence of the radical right represents, according to this view, the response of some individuals to underlying and continu- ing tensions in current American society. Much of this tension has bteen generated by the vast social transformation which has taken place in modern America, particularly since World War II. But superimposed On these pressures are powerful stresses created by the international situatlov. and U uterznl charge agent at ins‘ forces. Pros; "am lite. lhilq 31215 have b Ruffled St 30ml flap 5:1”: am; 8'; situation and the cold war. The overall result has been enormous internal change, accompanied by severe strains. Large numbers of people zappear at first glance to have been treated kindly by these social iksrces. Prosperity has been general and most Americans are enjoying a better life. While society as a whole has prospered, some groups and indivi- citaals have been adversely affected by these same forces and have ex- perienced severe tensions. For these same changes have reworked the social map of the country, upset established status and power relation- asriips, and made new rules for playing status monopoly. Bureaucratization requires skills in group decision-making; technology requires special expertism. Education has increasingly be- <=<>nnrthe major highway to the technical skills necessary for adminis- trative and power-wielding jobs. Thus, the status of white-collar ‘V<>xkers who lack college degrees and training in social relations is 1 inited or declining.18 Also threatened by these social changes is the old professional and entrepreneural class: the independent physician, farm owner, small town lawyer, real estate man, home builder, automobile dealer, gas 8‘tiation owner, and small businessman. Status today is frequently de- I'Ilved from association with some collectivity; technical knowledge and ability to coordinate group efforts are highly valued, augmenting or allperseding sheer hard work and individual initiative. Politically, n“an who are their own bosses often find themselves stifled in a Society where they are in the shadow of large organized groups which compete with each other to advance their own interests and gain in- fluence over public policy. The small or middle-sized businessman and L .‘ ix... -..¢ :09 s:u':;eudtl«|i .n..~_.—z..—r———-——H «— Legislation an; gourment taxes, 3m; tend to ca 5313’s that -_.—+ __ 5 Increasingly me With 131 'v'anety at E 3715’. m: h \lil‘u‘g ‘Q‘K‘C $011111)“ “191‘; ilké 13110115, n. ; ‘ ”0.9351 the independent professional find themselves more constrained by social legislation and labor unions than the larger corporations: governmental measures such as social security, business taxes, and various regulatory laws are expensive and tend to complicate the Operation of small business in ways that little disturb the larger corporations.1 Inncreasingly the independent businessman finds himself unable to com- pete with large department stores and mail order outlets in price or variety of goods. At the same time labor unions tell him how much he must pay his employees, threatening him with strikes supported by massive groups able to hold out indefinitely unless he complies. £3<3cially, he used to be considered an important person in his community, Jresceiving deference and holding prestige positions in community organi- Zations. But recently his public status has declined as well-educated IDJrofessionals and executives increasingly occupy important leadership Ifcsles in community affairs.* In a society emphasizing concentration, <=eentralization, and bigness, independent businessmen and professionals illlcreasingly find themselves displaced by people possessing new skills Eind associated with large organizations.20 A similar adverse situation confronts blue- and white-collar wworkers who find their jobs threatened by automation. They, as well as their skills, become regarded as obsolete and therefore less valued. Another group finding its previous status declining consists of old and *This decline in status seems to be taking place at the level 0f national organizations also. The National Association of Manufac- turers, once the bastion of the smaller businessman (see Alfred S. Cleveland, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" Harvard Business Review, 32, No. 3, 1948) is now dominated by representatives of large corporations (Murray Kempton, "Laughter at the Waldorf," The New Republic, 153, No. 25 (Dec. 18, 1965). Pp. 19-20). r v ‘ ' m «We 7 ”l m at: longer him. ”has: with and V“ anal uselessncsg, While the 3", mm, they an“K hit helm n h \ I " \ :9: guns mum‘s. \ mama mm. \ \x m me have m ! mm M V3.13 *~“~‘\¥“&i ‘t' ion ENDS r1 \ arm l.—~4~.‘ .~ g __ __ A _- . w 77 retired people.21 Having left their former jobs and occupations they are no longer identified with productivity. And, in a society oriented toward youth and vitality, old age itself tends to be associated with social uselessness. While these groups suffer from actual losses of status and im- portance, they suffer "relative" deprivations of status as well.22 Their decline in prestige becomes even more noticeable to them as they see groups formerly disenfranchised achieve more and more social and inalitical power. An Irish Catholic president, an American Negro awarded ‘the Nbbel Peace Prize and named Time's "Man of the Year," are merely symbolic of this general social trend. Today, members of formerly low status immigrant, ethnic, religious, and racial groups are increasingly coccupying important positions in industry and government. Confronted by such changes, with their status threatened by new groups rising to positions of influence, declining groups can be a fertile source of sunporters for political movements such as radical Irightism which oppose these social changes and allow their adherents ‘to feel important and influential again. David Riesman has captured Well the sense of frustration associated with status decline and the resulting attractiveness of rightism in his essay on "discontented classes." The quotation below discusses older persons, but it is equally valid in portraying the resentment felt by all the groups men- tioned above: ...[Thé] growing minority of older people who feel rejected, disoriented, impoverished and resentful are ready to applaud an anti-political movement that promises to reorganize the world so that the old folks can understand it again.23 While many analysts argue that rightists are persons who are discontented with their status, little empirical data has, stadiums, by; 1 I m mum mi. i, ‘~:.s;m‘nlatel‘5 uh minimal st at: \l the 18% \ll small New En. stand, the mos many, the g the leaders Q Society, :93. 0‘. (In fiat 11m, {- with \‘L‘J fi‘.- --..-r-- -\ 78 tinfortunately, been presented to support what is actually a hypothesis. 'rhe published evidence which bears on the hypothesis that rightists are disportionately recruited from social groups experiencing a decline in occupational status is particularly sparse. In the 1950's, Martin Trow found that independent businessmen in a small New England city had, among all the occupational groups he studied, the most favorable attitudes toward the practices of Senator IcCarthy, the predecessor of today's radical rightism.24 Looking at the leaders of a contemporary rightist organization, the John Birch Society, Allen Westin reported in 1963 that of the twenty-five members of the National Council, sixteen were tOp executives or heads of "... family firms or companies headed by a single ‘I did it myself'" entrepreneur.25 Although there has been some turnover in Council members since then, sixteen are still entrepreneur types. Three others are independent professionals (two M.D.'s and a lawyer), two are re- tired military officers,It and the remaining members include a former university dean, a professor, and a priest. Two published accounts of first-hand observations of rightist groups also support the contention that rightists tend to come from occupational backgrounds of low or declining status. Chesler and Schmuck found the group they studied composed of ...real estate salesmen, insurance salesmen, housewives, low level administrators, a clerical worker, a female teacher, a male teacher...and our retired host.26 *Retired (and some active) military officers seem to have a propensity for rightism. This group would, of course, fall into our category of "status decliners." See Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," pp. 5-6, in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963), also Fred J. Cook, "The Ultras: Aims, Affilia- tions, and Finances of the Radical Right," The Nation, June 1962, 68 pp. inept for the tw; stool educat '10:. let t'lroughout t1; threatened. Re I m an respect‘l has three lamb. Ram in a sum The re. canistent wit W195 “0 ex' ntuudes’ We ileum an: 51:13“ 3mg: no“ 99130 ‘fiial Chat 5mm. Led. ’05. "rulers ““ng : 1335c: '1 l i ' :+ b‘ ‘e ' 'E V- . ; “~12 .‘. , 79 lixcept for the two teachers, none of the members had more than a high school education. Many of the Birch Society members whom.A11en Broyles met throughout the country also seemed to be persons whose status was threatened. He mentioned meeting, for example, three chapter leaders who are respectively, a retired naval officer, a small businessman who owns three hamburger stands, and a former concert pianist now teaching piano in a small community.27 The results of the January, 1962, California poll are also consistent with the "declining status" hypothesis. The occupational groups who expressed the greatest proportion of pro-Birch Society attitudes* were the retired, the unskilled and service workers, and clerical and sales people. Using different categories, support was highest among persons at a "medium" economic level and second highest among persons whose education had not gone beyond high school.28 The social characteristics of Birch supporters on a nation wide Gallup poll conducted in February of 1962 were essentially similar; rightist sym- pathizers were disprOportionately recruited from Social groups exper- iencing low or declining social prestige.29 Findings from studies of racial prejudice also support, in an indirect way, the tenability of the status-frustration thesis.30 Two studies of the relationship between social mobility and prejudice are particularly pertinent. Bettelheim and Janowitz found that World War II veterans who had experienced downward social mobility after the war (based on comparing their pre- and post-war occupational situations) a"Expressing approval of The John Birch Society is the single best item in the 29-item Index of Radical Rightism. See Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2. 80 ‘were more anti-Semitic and anti-Negro than returned veterans whose (occupational mobility remained stable or rose.31 Greenbaum and Pearlin replicated the Bettelheim and Janowitz study with a random sample of Elmira, New York, citizens. They found that persons wno were socially mobile in general (either upward or downward) and in- secure about their new status were more prejudiced toward Negroes and Jews than persons whose status was-stationary.32 The basic hypothesis which guided both studies was that social mobility results in status strains which produce anxieties. These, in turn, are expressed in racial and ethnic prejudice. Commenting on the fact that downwardly mobile people who identify with a higher class show the most prejudice, Greenblum and Pearlin's conclusions parallel closely our thesis linking radical rightism to status frustration: This group can readily be seen as being subjected to severe pressures. Many of them are striving to re-establish mem- bership in the higher status whence they originated while in the midst of a process that prevents them from realizing these aspirations. In addition to the tensions which might ordinarily be produced by mobility striving, this group is at the same time being declassed. 3 3. VALUES AND STATUS While an individual's occupational achievements are an impor- tant measure of his status, his other personal characteristics also significantly affect his total reputational prestige in the status hierarchy of his community.* If they are devalued, the person so affected will experience status decline in much the same way that a person whose occupational situation deteriorates finds his status 1"See above for a more complete listing of these criteria of status. 81 threatened. All too often we forget that an individual's social status is the result of a combination of many variables. The status that is gen- erally most emphasized by sociologists is social class, but an indivi- dual's "class" position in the stratification system is really a way of summarizing his type and quantity of possessions, interaction patterns, occupational activities, values, manners, and style of behavior in general.‘ While there is a very strong relationship between class and economic activities (relationship to the means of production, occupa- tion, income, ownership of land, etc.), social classes represent, ultimately, distinctions in styles of life.“' Status groups are based on more than economics; they essentially reflect shared ways of living, which means common values, attitudes, mores, manners, customs, and behavioral patterns. This expanded meaning of class, which connotes that prestige is derived from other than purely economic relationships, was early noted by Max Weber: ...status groups are communities. They are. however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation," we wish to designate as "status situations" every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social fA person's occupation, education, and income--commonly used measures of achieved status-~have been called "positional attributes" by Kingsley Davis. These variables are, of course, only a few of the many personal characteristics which combine to form what Goldhammer and Shils have called the individual's overall or "total status Judgment."35 1”Joseph A. Kahl argues that social classes are ideal-type-con- structs and that in America, at least, the distinctions between social strata are far from clear-cut. He admits that these ideal-type classes are useful abstractions which "...help us order our thinking about the complexity of social reality..."but he also warns us about falsely assuming that everything is so neatly ordered in the real world. The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1957). u—v—w 82 estimation of honor.... In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle.36 Class differences based on values, customs, and behavior proper to a particular group have been extensively studied by Erving Goffman.37 Vidich and Bensman used a similar approach to differentiate social classes in their study of a small community in upstate New York: By the word "class" the authors mean typical configurations of social and economic behavior which make it possible to distinguish groups of individuals from each other. That is, classes are identified in terms of productive activity, patterns of consumption and other forms of social and economic behavior.... In short, the word "class" is used to distinguish particular groups of individuals who exhibit specified social and economic life styles.38 Systematic research by Richard Centers and W. Lloyd Warner has also shown that prestige is accorded on the basis of style of life and beliefs. In his nation-wide study of social classes in America, Centers found that upper and middle class persons consider the way a "person believes and feels about things" the second most important criterion (after occupation) for determining whether a person belongs in their social class. Centers noted that "the primacy of beliefs and "39 Warner and attitudes as a criterion of class membership is general. his fellow researchers similarly found that social classes in Yankee City tended to have distinctive values and behavioral styles, and that successful entry into a higher class required matching the class's way Status and Declining Values How people think, feel, and behave toward one another is thus importantly related to the ways they live their lives. Among the pri- mary determinants of a person's style of living are the values to 83 which he subscribes. Values are often charged with emotions and define the ends of life and approved ways of approaching them.41 Since a person's status is connected to his values, any societal appraisal of these values correspondingly affects his claims to prestige and respect- ability. If society ceases to respect his values, his status suffers. This is the situation in which many rightists find themselves; they cling to values no longer respected, and so find themselves dis- respected as well. Many social observers have pointed out the major changes in American values which are taking place, and how this is making the accepted principles of an earlier period less certain and honored today. Our new order of technology and knowledge, along with the move- ment to metropolitan areas and the cultural ascendency of urban life over rural areas and small towns, have seriously threatened established 42 beliefs and customs. There has also been a transfer of political power to new groups as the major goal-setting institutions of society have become increasingly sensitive to the demands of former religious, ethnic, and economic minorities. A Catholic president, the civil rights movement's success in achieving greater racial equality, legis- lative reapportionment giving fairer representation to urban residents and decreasing the over-proportionate influences of rural and small- town interests, all indicate the transformation taking place in modern America. Those whose beliefs and behavioral styles were shaped by the displaced values find themselves and their way of life increasingly in disrepute. An example of how differing values produce individual status strains is found in Stone and Form's study of a small Michigan city 34 “here older middle-class residents and recently arrived managerial and professional people clashed. Employed by a national corporation and emphasizing different values, the "cosmopolites" challenged the domin- ant status of the old influentials by their behavior: they appeared publicly in casual sport clothes, exploited images of "bigness" in their conversations with local businessmen, retired late and slept late. They "took over" the clubs and associations.... The Country Club, for example, has undergone a complete alteration of character. Once the scene of relatively staid dinners, polite drinking and occasional dignified balls, the Country Club is now the setting for the "businessman's lunch," intimate drinking, and frequent parties where the former standards of moral propriety are often somewhat relaxed for the evening. Most "older families" have let their membership lapse.43 Peeple who maintain disestablishcd values may have their frustrations compounded by their subjective hostile reaction to the cultural dominance of different values and ways of life. Having grown up believing in traditional values, they see today's American society as a strange place where old virtues are condemned, where sinful practices are approved and even advocated. A strong sense of dis- enchantment thus arises in those whose values were shaped by an older morality. This too is characteristic of rightists.44 Morality, Individualism, and the Protestant Ethic The principles to which rightists subscribe reflect a strong commitment to morality, individualism, and the affirmation of work, savings, investment, and limited personal consumption. These tenets of what Max Weber calls the Protestant Ethic45 have been important guiding principles for many Americans. As Harold Lenski puts it in his classic study of American society: ...to work hard, to lead an orderly life, to nave a name for integrity and fair dealing, not to spend one's substance in reckless display, to have the resolution to carry out the purposes you undertake-~it is, roughly, to an ethic such as this that the religion of America has been shaped when the basic tradition was formed.46 PeOple who believe in these precepts stress self-sufficiency and individualism in the pursuit of long-term life goals; through hard work and thrift a man should be able to buy his own home, send his children to college, and plan and prepare self-support in his old age. They see governmental activities in relief, social security, public housing, urban renewal, and other welfare measures leading to a weaken- ing of individual initiative and self-reliance. Politically, these ideas are represented in demands that much of the social security pro- gram be abolished, the progressive income tax be eliminated, and govern- ment intervention in economic matters be ended. These, amidst others, are political proposals of radical rightism. People who are sympathetic to these ideas thus find in rightism a political means of expressing their deeply held moral principles. To see how their strong commitment to individualism colors theiri" views, let us examine in detail one current government program which frightists vehemently oppose, the progressive income tax. This tax has become a central symbol of evil to the rightists: the Opening wedge in the "communization" of America.* The John Birch Society and other rightist organizations lend their support to a program called the "liberty Amendment," which is designed to repeal the Sixteenth I"The progressive income tax is often historically linked to Communism by quoting Marx's Communist Manifesto, where such a tax is listed as part of the ten step path to Socialism. For other reasons see the publications of The Liberty Amendment Committee of the U.S.A. (6413 Franklin Avenue, Los Angeles 28, Calif.) £7 ikmendmcnt of the U.3. Constitution. Through the actions of 3 "Liberty LLobby" they hope to end the federal government's authority to levy a graduated tax. The progressive feature of the tax is particularly grating to individualists who believe that hard work, prudence, and resulting income bring only a higher rate of taxation, thus removing the incentive to increase one's income and get ahead. This tax is also objected to because it finances large government, which increasingly interferes with the individualists' daily activities, requiring them to keep detailed records, fill out complex long forms, and perform other burdensome tasks. Big government and its inevitable bureaucracy impinge on one of the rightists' major concerns, their desire for less government control over their lives.* They believe that to maximize freedom, simple and small government should be preserved, and the tax asserts the authority of the federal government. The remedy for all of these ills is thus simple: abolish the income tax. Ideologically, small businessmen and independent professionals have been strongly attached to the principles of the individualistic entrepreneur and opposed to anything contrary to a laissez faire economic role of government.47 It is thus no accident that small and middle sized businessmen, and independent professionals, disportionately support rightism. In addition to their occupational status problems it which predispose them to rightism, they share certain value frustra- tions which find expression in rightist ideology. Executives and *Chapter Seven's discussion of rightists' feelings of anomy and powerlessness focuses especially on this aspect of rightism. **See preceeding section on occupational status decline. 37 managers of large, publicly owned corporations seem to find little in rightism that is appealing; it has been the entrepreneural types who seem most prone to becoming radical rightists.48 Individualism may also be reflected in the geOgraphical loca- tions where most rightists live. While rightists are found everywnere, many are concentrated in the Southwest--Texas, Arizona, and particularly southern California.* A sort of raw "frontier" ideology of individual- ism seems to be the hallmark of many of these Western rightists. This Inay reflect the fact that these are areas where a kind of frontier «orientation exists, the place where peOple go to make a new and better l.ife for themselves and their children. Individualism and an emphasis cu) self help were basic traits of early frontier life, and still hold swvay in many places today.49 As Frederick Jackson Turner pointed out, t¥re experience of originally settling the West ...tended to the production of a society of which the most distinctive fact was the freedom of theAindividual to rise under conditions of social mobility....3U (Emphasis mine) 'Wiiile the West of today is very different from the West of the iliJieteenth century, it seems likely that peOple who subscribe to indi- "1ilualist values are still attracted to the newly growing cities of the SCNJthwest. Selective migration would thus account for larger than “S*1al concentrations of individualists in these sections of the country. ()t}h?r factors, of course, account for the disportionate number of rilihtists in these areas, but regionally emphasized (or reinforced) values act as a contributory condition. Convinced of the rightness of traditional values, most rightists * . . - See folIOWing section on tne "newly arrived" for docunentation. are deeply distressed by what they see as a decline in moral and religious principles in contemporary American society. Goldwater re- ceived the rightists' overwhelming support in his bid for the presi- dency because he articulated their troubled state of mind in his cam— paign speeches, particularly on the issue of morals. Again and again Goldwater dwelled on the theme: ”the moral fiber of the American peeple is beset by rot and decay." This explains, according to Goldwater and his followers, "wave after wave of crime in our streets and in our homes...riots and disorder in our cities...juvenile <1elinquency...obscene literature...corruption...."51 His slogan, 'Tstop the spread of socialism at home," is really only a statement of the problem as he sees it; its solution will come about solely by a reaffirmation of the religious, moral, and family values of the past. The right repeats the same charges in its own publications: we are a nation in great moral decay because we have abandoned old and Proven ways. Robert Welch, head of the John Birch Society, describes “tire goals of the organization he leads: ...the basic point here is that our concern is not with [religious] creed, but with morality, integrity, and purpose. We believe that the problems and tragedies which so engulf the world today are due primarily to the almost universal breakdown in the morality, and perversion of the purposes, which were so largely dependent on our various faiths.52 (Emphasis in original) Th9 right makes, of course, its usual contribution to this interpreta- 1:19,, of America's moral decline--the link with Communism. For it is the Communists who are responsible for "doing everything they can to break down the spiritual strength of our nation."53 This heightened concern with morality points to an important I“3Ot of many rightists' fervor--their strong religious commitment. we; in '1 right; not overhy re. mats loo-lg 1‘ market that hr the '3, vanous a slow ix Emmet imam ”belc‘a‘s rel. izatzoq-J‘] fieSree a 1' 13363; 0f : \ ”181mm x g;111{:‘ 89 Even in a rightist organization like the John Birch Society, which is not overtly religious, a considerable undercurrent of religious feelings exists among its members. In the JBS Bulletin for January, 1966, Welch reported that for the past few months we have been receiving letters from various members, urging that some phrase be added to our slagan to emphasize the dependence of the Society on Divine guidance in all our efforts to achieve a better world. (Emphasis mine) Welch's reaction was to emphasize the nonsectarian nature of the organ- ization--"The John Birch Society is not in the slightest sense or degree a religious organization," however, he added: "but it is com- gggsed of members who are deeply religious indeed." (Emphasis in original) The religious views of many rightists are strongly colored by fiandamentalism. Their writings bristle with indictments against '5liberal theology" and the "social gospel," and forcefully demand a 54 :rweturn to strict fundamentalist doctrine in the churches. Many anti- Communist rallies are like religious revivals in their emotionalism and Biblical rhetoric, with Communism and the forces of subversion at home 1dentified as works of the devil.55 Some of the more prominent organi- Zations combine fundamentalism and radical rightism: Billy James Hargis's "Christian Crusade," Carl Iclntire's "Twentieth Century 1 Reformation Hour," Fred Schwarz's "Christian Anti-Communist Crusade,' n56 an“: Edgar Bundy's "Church League of America. Several well—known I'1ghtist leaders are active fundamentalists or come from fundamentalist ba~<=kgrounds.m The rightists themselves frequently comment on this vein *Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, was raised as ‘1 fundamentalist Baptist, and he named the Society after an evangelical a hex STEAM. 15m Mars, ixrc‘rk Society he hoiestm 7mm mm 1.13 ‘ 3231:1153? t-een hum ”’9 990p]. 90 in their organizations. Welch, for example, speaks of "our Fundamental- istic members, who form such a solid core of the strength of the [John Birch] Society."57 A nation-wide 1952 ROper poll also showed that among the Protestant denominations Baptists were most prone to supporting Senator McCarthy . 58 Why this link between radical rightism and religious funda- mentalism? One answer lies, I believe, in the close congeniality be- tween fundamentalist doctrine and behavior,and rightist ideology. While religion represents only a weak social commitment for some people, for others it forms a basic value-orientation and behavior prescription. For such people religion involves not only membership in a church and attendance at services but a constant interweaving of religious values into their daily activities--use of the Bible in the home, as well as for study; religious rites during the Sabbath, holidays, at births, marriages, and deaths; the blessing of food during family meals; and prayers before retiring to bed. This active commit- ment to live according to religious tenets is strongly held among Lundamentalists, for such beliefs are accepted unquestioned and repre- 3€nt a deep involvement of the personality in given ultimate values \ Ba131:.ist who combined missionary preaching with his military work in china, where he was killed. Billy James Hargis, founder of the chIl'istian Crusade (of Tulsa, Okla. ), is an ordained fundamentalist '“1llister. Dr. Fred Schwarz, founder of the Christian Anti-Communism <31118ade (of Long Beach, Calif.) is the son of a pentecostal preacher ax“: did considerable "1ay" preacning himself before organizing his (trusade." Carl Molntire, of the 20th Century Reformation flour, is a1:30 an ordained minister, as is Edgar C. Bunday of the Church League °f America. Both men are fundamentalists. For detailed biographies (If these men see Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, The Strange Tactics of £E§E££Efififl (New York. w. w. Norton Company, 1964). and fril‘mlylté he '4 i Preteen“: it. me tilled. “ mews ‘d The Asa nation! a 0‘1 iTOQ if! ”03': their snort, W w; mm: 3113 c tea 1 91 and principles.*59 The values represented in rightist ideology--individualism, Protestant ethic, fundamentalist morality-~are part of what sociologists have called "Ascetic Protestantism." Benton Johnson credits its disciples with this psychological orientation toward life: The Ascetic Protestant idea of the calling emphasized methodical and consistent striving toward the accomplish- ment of long-range goals. It stresses output of effort from the individual toward the physical and social en- vironment and markedly de-emphasized the input of grati- fications from the environment to the individual. In short, the idea of the calling constrained the believer to adopt an instrumental, manipulative posture, to pro- duce and to achieve, and to curtail his interest in immediate consumption. At the same time it strengthened his determination to be self-reliant and to reap only rewards of his own making.60 People deeply committed to these values tend to judge all con- duct from this perspective; consequently, they are frequently embroiled 111 conflicts involving moral issues. An example of this occurred *Professor Frank Pinner has raised the interesting question, 'is there any evidence of deep religious commitment and practice among Ifiight-wing fundamentalists; to what extent is their rhetoric nothing "flare than a superficial adherence to traditional values?" There is, I believe, sufficient evidence of deep religious com- nlit-lent among fundamentalist rightists, although admittedly it is not c"Dnclusive. Scott G. McNall found in his study of members of a funda- nMaritalist-rightist organization that they were very active in church aiffairs, and practiced in their daily lives many religious Observances. p1Ctures of Christ, Bibles, and other devotional materials were con- sDicuous in their homes; they listened to religious radio programs and subscribed to fundamentalist publications; they attended religious ser- vices several times a week and revival-type meetings whenever they came t" town. (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, vniversity of Oregon, 1965.) And, to anticipate the reporting of find- lugs presented in the next chapter, more than 40 percent of the rightists n‘terviewed in this study reported they belong to fundamentalist churches. The point to all this is that it is exactly because the rightists areso intensely committed to fundamentalist morality that they eXper~ el‘lce so much frustration over its nonpractice today. issue molm‘. r shunts, sme o hing W31? gr Ennis discowc “ixgomsly 3p Catcher in 133. \— mlster said a ' N 31L}: yet 13 km: 0"; : 1331 h 7.1 .3 92 recently in Waterford, Connecticut, when members of a fundamentalist Baptist church organized their own "Christian" school. The Specific issue involved reading material assigned to Waterford's high school students, some of which fundamentalist parents considered "obscene.H Taking their grievances to a board of education meeting, the protesting parents discovered that most of the three hundred persons who attended "vigorously applauded the books" (which included Grapes of Wrath, Catcher in the Rye, Lord of the Flies, and Black Like Me). A Baptist minister said he was "dumbfounded" by this reaction, and commented sadly, "yet probably 80 percent of the people [in the community] are in favor of this sort of thing." The dissenting parents then organized their own school whose curriculum would not be in "conflict with fundamentalist Christian doctrines."61 Similar conflicts over values occur today in many communities. Another connection between the political programs of the right and conservative Christianity is their shared emphasis on individual- ism. We have already noted the significant role that individualism plays in rightist ideology. Individualism is also a dominant character- istic of religious fundamentalism, manifested in the way it views man's relation to God, the Church, interpretation of the Bible, and church creed. It is Up to each man personally to accept God into his life; no ritual or adherence to creed can replace the individual's autonomous d°¢ision, made of "free will," to follow the path of godliness. The church itself is conceived of not as an organic entity with its own exIlstence and history, but as a collection of believing peOple common- 13? dedicated to God's covenant. This results in the typical church Organization being congregational and nondenominational. According to he mob, iii a 51:02,, sale nthv n1: distance i helm in): chm Ct‘e‘: SiVEtgo‘q y} £31133 ,1 t L13: iflffr'x “Pirate; 351921;? 93 to one theologian, "there is fear here of wholeness and inclusiveness, and a strong inclination toward separateness and autonomy. It is this same individualism which is in part responsible for the Fundamentalist "62 The typical Fundamentalist’s resistance to ecumenical cooperation. freedom from a historical tradition and clergy makes him deprecate church creed and stress instead a private interpretation of the Bible. Salvation means "rescuing" individual souls and "there is in Fundamen— talism a tendency to speak not of sin but of 'sins,' not of a disease that infects all men, but of discrete acts individually performed and separately numbered."63 In classic fundamentalism there is conse— quently ...a want of concern for social problems and a disinclination to elaborate a social ethic. Morals tend to be individual- istically conceived. Emphasis is on personal purity and uprightness. There is little engagement with the structure of society, e.g., the structure of the state or of the economic order. It is supposed that all the ills of society can be cured if only the souls of individual men are "saved." Missions therefore become the preferred technique of social reform, to the virtual exclusion of legal enactments. 4 Both movements, the political and the religious, are thus underlaid with a rugged individualism, and this may explain, at least in part, tile natural affinity which Fundamentalists have for radical rightism. 3113_Conflict Over Values GeOgraphically, fundamentalism and it“ a‘sociatcd values are u“33tprevalent in rural areas and small towns. Their remoteness from 1aI‘ge metrOpolitan centers has allowed them to remain least changed (IVelatively) by the influences of urbanization, new ideas, and educa- tion. Speaking primarily of the South, Harold Laski has noted that 'l the ten states in whicn Fundamentalism has made the most headway have ‘3‘ u m .3. an illiteracy rate wnicn, with two exceptions, is from two to five times "65 Recent migration as great as that of the United States as a whole. has brought into urban places and occupations an increasing number of persons who were raised with traditional values. This is particularly true in the rapidly industrializing South and Southwest. But these rural and small-town born migrants, still clinging to traditional principles, find themselves in conflict with more cosmOpolitan values and ways of life. One way this conflict is eXpressed is in radical rightism and iconservative politics. In discussing the great strength that Goldwater showed in Los Angeles (southern California is also a rightist astronghold), Seymour Lipset felt it most significant that Los Angeles 'Wzontains a large concentration of fundamentalist Protestants from "66 Murray Havens similarly found that small towns and rural areas.... Runny Texas rightists came from rural or small-town backgrounds. He too ‘tlieorized that rightists ...only as adults encountered on a continuing basis a truly urbanized society... We may treat the radical right as a manifestation of a social cultural conflict between those raised in an essentially rural environment and the institu- tions of the urban and even metrOpolitan setting in which they now find themselves. This returns us to one of the study's major theses: that to a considerable extent the ideological positions taken by radical rightists represent a symbolic confrontation between opposing beliefs about mol‘ality and general style of life. This would explain one of the most Striking features of rightist ideology: its intense and often emotional 0PDosition to much of recent life. Many observers have noticed that while the avowed purpose of rightism is to combat Communism, in actuality this objective becomes a cover for Opposition against r‘v‘ t ...,. .‘, U‘ .. ‘{ u. .A‘ everything characteristic of a complex modern society.68 In this sense rightism is a response of traditional rural small town society against the assault of social change and threatening cultural influences. It is a protest against the fact that America has moved away from Ascetic Protestant values. Religion has been replaced by secular beliefs. Self-sufficiency, thrift, and self-control have lost much of their meaning in a society where many people are economically dependent upon public agencies, and social services like unemployment andaccident insurance, social security, and Medicare extend to nearly all. Indi- vidual industry and hard work count for less in large organizations which reward teamwork and good interpersonal relations. And, in an affluent society with easily available credit, delayed gratification and impulse control make little sense to many; as one sociologist observes, "the culture of mass society is increasingly a culture of compulsive consumption, of how to spend and enjoy, rather than a culture of compulsive production, of how to work and achieve."69 The right's adherents are drawn from those who strongly resent these cultural changes. For example, the four page folder titled £3.23}! STEP: A Bird's Eye View of the Communist Advance (part of the John Birch Society's most recent "recruitment packet" designed to attract new members) sa 3 this to persons troubled by the low status Y their older principles command in contemporary America: The one great final job left for the Communists is 8ubjugation of the peeple of the United States. Among the methods they are employing to achieve that result are: (a) The deliberate and insidious break-down of all morality and every sound sense of values; (b) the distortion and destruction of religious influences, §8Decially on the lives of the young; (0) the constant 1rlcloctrination of young and old alike, through our educa- t"ii-(anal system, and through our communications and enter- tainment media, in a preference for "welfare" and "security" against responsibility and opportunity.... Almost any piece of rightist literature contains similar ex- pressions of dissatisfaction with current values. Radical rightism, by linking these changes to Communist subversion, attracts alienated be]. 1evers in Protestant ethic-fundamentalist values by providing a mechanism which both protests these changes and reinforces their claims to cultural superiority}: The conflict between traditional and modern values has been described in many different ways. The Opposition between a 005110poli- tan ethic of mass society and traditional values which emphasize work and. achievement is only one characterization. Some writers see it as a contest between "urban" and "rural" virtues, others as the struggle of tradition versus modernity, of "cosrnOpolitans" against "localities." David Riesman sees these conflicts between groups as "characterological struggles," since they are based primarily on cultural and ideological differences rather than econOH-ic factors. In his popular book 325’. 92391)! Crowd he calls peeple representing different sides in the dis- pute the "inner-directed" and the "outer-directed."70 Regardless of under what name it is fought, the battle which the rightists are waging is yet another breakout of cultural warfare, with the outcome determin- ing Whose values shall be dominant. \ *Herbert Gold's characterization of Ronald Reagan supporters Captures the frustrations of the small-town born living in the midst of Spraw1 ing urbanism: There is the 20th century, this whole new thing, and then there are the peeple who hate it.... There is confusion that amid so mllch riches there is still poverty; amid so much intelligence t'here are still people who think peculiar [ideas] The new Reagan] regime represents the will of those who, above all, Want Order. They seek a return to a righteous running of things--the way they remember them in Arcadia, where they all grew up. (0! . . Degotes From the Land of Political Pop, ' The New York Times Mgazme, ember 11, 1966. 97 Still another important prize is at stake in this conflict: the social respect its victors will gain. Earlier we saw that peoples' personal status is closely linked to the values they pursue in their daily lives. If people persist in following socially outmoded norms and values, their behavior will seem similarly out of place, and others will evaluate it as such and fail to give them deference and respect. Thus the dispute over values becomes a dispute over prestige and social position as well, with victory meaning deference and higher status for the winners, and degradation and lower status for the losers. Greater social prestige is the second prize the rightists seek. This relationship between values and social status showed up clearly in the small upstate New York community which Vidich and Bensman studied. They found that attitudes toward production and con- sumption were good indicators of social status, since the groups dif- ferentiated on this basis differed significantly in their styles of living. The social values which they discovered defined distinctive life styles and basically involved attitudes toward investment, hoard- ing, consumption, and work, or what we earlier called the Protestant “”110. These tenets of the Protestant ethic form the core of many pe°Dles' claims (including the rightists') to status and respectability. They believe that through the Judicious manipulation and exercise of a combina- tion of hard work and self-improvement a man improves his sDeial position. Literally he mobilizes all his resources for a chance to move upward in the social estimation of cWhere.“ In Smalltown individuals who subscribed to these traditional beliefs (mainly farmers and the small businessmen) found their prestige slipping i n the community as new groups (professionals and skilled workers) ,,‘ I‘. f‘. v.4. 93 increasingly achieved political and social dominance. This was par- tially due to the older group's decreased economic influence. But an important element in their status decline was their continued adherence to out-of-fashion principles: The greatest shift in the dimension of class is an increased emphasis on stylized consumption and social activities as a substitute for economic mobility...the underlying secular trend indicates a shift from production to consumption values in the community.72 What happened in this small town has probably been replicated in many other communities in modern America. And those so disestablished pro- vide a reservoir of persons ready to eXpress their frustrations through radical rightism. 4. THE NEWLY ARRIVED l?ame did not bring the social advancement which the Babbitts cieserved. They were not asked to join the Tonawanda Country (:lub nor invited to the dances at the Union. Himself, liabbitt fretted, he "didn't care a fat hoot for all these highrollers, but the wife would kind of like to be among those present.73 In Babbitt Sinclair Lewis shows that discontentment over status is not limited to groups whose claims to social prestige are threatened becalISe their occupational achievements are devalued or because they Cling to out-of-fashion principles; similar anxieties can also follow rap1d upward social mobility. Ainong persons who have risen quickly in econOmic position or occupation, but find they are not accepted socia11y by those who already possess high status, status dissatis- f actions occur. Babbitt found himself in this plight, and so do many rightlists. Occupational mobility, both upward and downward, results in dis dtlsfactions when the prestige accorded to an indiVidual is less 99- than what he expects. When this happens his self-esteem is menaced. It is therefore not surprising to find "status anxieties" among the upwardly mobile—-people of humble origins, recent migrants to the cities, successful new small-businessmen and minor professionals, and those who have risen from the factory to the white-collar class. Many new members of the middle-class, emerging from city tenements and small towns with increasing national prosperity, have been under an intense strain that originates in part from the discrepancy between their power within a particular enterprise and their influence and social standing in their community} Murray Havens has written succinctly about peOple in this predicament: - ..advancing economically beyond anything they have exper- ienced before and beyond the present situations of most of their fellow townsmen, they are nevertheless excluded from at least some of the social and psychological rewards which they have eXpected to receive on the basis of their business and professional achievements. The denial of higher status-rank (and concurrent prestige) to an indi- Vidual who feels he deserves it can produce what we have been calling "fI‘UStrations over status ." Other anxieties confront the newly mobile. For those who are employees, their influence is transitory, without secure roots in propeFizy or established tradition. While they receive a salary and Other benefits from their jobs or corporate positions, their status is 76 I)r - a ‘ t - - g I‘ ' ecarlously lumcd only to their occupational achievements. noelal \ kind *Berelson and Steiner have pointed out the universality of this or status lag in most societies: as new groups come to positions of power and wealth in the SOciety...prestige in the system of stratification attaches to them, but only with some lag: power and wealth are attained Well before the commensurate prestige. change is consequently a threat to the new middle class. As Riesman and Cilazer point out, they are fearful that continued social mobility and economic redistributions will jeopardize their hard won positions. For , having precariously won respectability in paychecks and con- sumption style, they find this achievement menaced by a political and more broadly cultural outlook tending to lower barriers . . . . 77 This fear seems similar to that of the classic nouveau riche-types who, having themselves successfully gained their foothold in society, de- plore any changes which may displace them or allow other groups to rise to their social level. The civil rights movement's attaining better opportunities for Negroes, the War on Poverty helping the poor find jobs (and possibly acquire political power), and federal aid to schools making higher education available to increasing numbers, all threaten the social position of those who have just made it themselves. Just as radical rightism appeals to persons with anxieties abOUt their declining occupational prestige, so does it attract persons frustrated because of discrepancies between their economic achievements and tlheir acceptance into higher status groups. Havens reached a 81"ii-lair conclusion in his study of Texas rightists: The frustrations which can be produced by exclusion from the Positions of social and political influence to which one believes his economic advances entitle him do constitute a 8Il-gnificant aspect of the discontent which can lead to association with the radical right....78 Thus radical rightism can, among other things, be used as a weapon in the conflict between a rising economic group and those who currently occupy positions of leadership and influence. Under the guise 0f b61118: "anti‘Communist," rightists express their hostility toward the tradi- ti onal elite by calling them pro-Communists. By leveling such charges 101 they seek to tear down the prestige of those who occupy positions of high social status and power, positions to which rightists themselves aspire. At the same time rightists use their identification with Super- Americanism to reinforce their own claims for higher deference and status. Rightism also has an attraction to those newly middle-class persons (as well as others) who feel threatened by social changes: apposition to these changes constitutes a major item on the right's agenda. Countering civil rights is one of the radical right's principal concerns. The John Birch Society, for example, has discovered that its vigorous drive against the civil rights movement is becoming one of its most successful techniques for recruiting new members. Through local TACT (Truth About Civil Turmoil) committees Birchers "expose the civil rights fraud" and show that "the movement known as 'civil rights' is Communist-plotted, Communist-controlled, and in fact...serves only (knnnuanist purposes."‘ Antagonism to civil rights is also strongly stressed by other rightists groups, particularly in the South," The *JBS Bulletin for June, 1965. This program seems to be paying The Anti-Defamation League reports that the Society has grown smbs"Santially in Georgia and Alabama, and that membership is increasing in isiana and Mississippi as White Citizens Councils decline in 8t“math. FACTS, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb. 1966), p. 353. (See also foot- “°t°— for Table 3-2.) off. **Some of these groups are racists first and anti-communist only as a rationalizing after-thought; the Ku Klux Klan being an obvious ex- ;mple. But some of these groups are more subtle in their racism. thatllen Comp and Julian Foster argue, in a carefully documented article, it the Birch Society has a racist undercurrent. They conclude: But ri [the JBS] chooses instead to provide the thinnest of covers for out- Cu? 1: racism, to distort facts and to indulge in rhetoric in a way cal-u (Re:ted to appeal to the purveyors of racial hatred in its purest form. 21$: A Review of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March, 1966]“, p. 5.) In ture ion to the low-keyed segregationist appeal of Birch society litera- itself, the Society also has Jim Clark, Selma, Alabama 3 rac1st ‘\ - u r?- 1.02 War on Poverty is likewise coming under increasing attack by the right- ists. Their basic argument, a familiar one, is that it is designed and dominated by Communists. But comments by Robert Welch give us a clue to what may really be bothering them about the poverty program: in the JBS Bulletins for May and June, 1966, Welch states that it is Walter Reuther's intention (aided by his "Communist pals and agents") to ferment among "thirty million of the 'poor'" 8 "...proletarian revolution by the 'have-nots‘ against the 'haves'...." Several sets of empirical findings lend credence to the hypo- thesis that status-anxious, newly middle-class persons are attracted to radical rightism. Some evidence for this view comes from Murray Haven‘s research on rightists in the Southwest" These rightists, he sheriff, addressing Birch-sponsored anti-civil rights meetings as a Spe aker for its "American Opinion Speakers Bureau." The Milwaukee, Wisconsin,area's Birch Society Bookstore sells (from literally behind the counter) the literature of the National Putnam Letters Committee, Which advances a kind of "scientific" racism to justify segregation. This may explain some of the Society's growth in the South particular- ly and in northern cities where anti-Negro feelings run high. The right's true attitudes on race are also reflected in its ODDOS ition to school textbook changes which more accurately portray the role that Negroes have played in America's history. This campaign, called a "vicious vendetta by one author," is being led by the rightist or.ganization "Let Freedom Ring" and local ad hoc groups who call them- selves Land of the Free committees. (Chicago Sun Times, December 13, 1966 o a reprint from the Washington Post.) , *Havens' research methodology makes his findings questionable. gls Conclusions are based on information about rightists supplied by 91:2:‘j’ledgable observers" (newspaper editors and reporters, ministers, fromlc officials, and others) as well as some information obtained km)Wlactual I‘lghtlStS.‘ It is possible that the-views 0'1: tnese‘ . abo‘ltedgable persons might Simply reflect certain common speculations Haven rightists, rather tnan direct observations of benaVLor. since be (:08 does not make clear who said what, his'findings must properly rlsidered as more suggestive than conclu51ve. concludes, are generally persons who are dissatisfied because their social status had failed to rise along with their upward economic mobility. As he put it, they are peOple ...who have achieved in recent years quite substantial economic gains through business or a profession and are frustrated because of a failure of their social status"9 influence, and power to climb at a corresponding rate. Data which tend to support this proposition are contained in two public opinion surveys taken in 1962 (one a nation—wide Gallup Poll and the other a California Poll). In both samples Birch Society sympathizers were over-represented among persons whose social characteristics match the new middle-class. While there were a few differences between the results of the two polls, a cluster of white-collar employees and pro- fess ional peOple emerged in both which corresponds to our category of 80 newl y-arrived rightists. While sympathizers are hardly supporters, the attractiveness of a rightist organization like the Birch Society (whose leader was then being publicly denounced for his accusation that President Eisenhower was a dedicated Communist agent) to new m1ddle-c1ass persons, indicates the potency of its appeals to this group . Additional evidence for the status frustration hypothesis reSts on the assumption that expanding communities with relatively fl “1d social status structures should contain large concentrations of e p Ople with status anxieties, and therefore should be areas of zealous ra. dical right activity. This is the case, for we find strongholds of re dical rightism in the newly developing areas of Texas, Arizona, F10 . rlda, and California. Nineteen percent of the groups listed in the 196 o H 2 edition of the First National DirectorLof 'Rightist Groups are lo cated in California; New York has eight percent, Texas, six, Illinois 104 and Florida, five percent each.81 Similar geographical concentrations are found in four studies of John Birch Society members. A study done by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University ex- amined Birch-written letters protesting the United Nations. The resi- dency of these letterwriters showed a marked geographic imbalance with over-representation in the Far West. (Table 3-l) Very similar find- ings emerged in an analysis of Birch letters protesting a magazine article mistakenly thought to be pro-Communist, done at the University of Michigan. While about fifteen percent of the nation's population 1 1ves in the Far West, both the Columbia and Michigan studies found that more than forty percent of their Birch letterwriters live there. 83 (Table 3-1) My own analysis of yet another set of letters written by Birch Society members also protesting the United Nations likewise showed a disportionate number of Birchers living in the West.84 (Table 3-2) While the findings from each of these independent studies are I"allarkably similar, any conclusions which can be derived from them are 1‘ 981: ricted by the fact that they are based on only a portion of Society llenlbers; namely, those who are activists. Fortunately an unpublished Study by Fred W. Grupp overcomes this limitation by using a random sanple of all dues-paying Birch Society members. \ 1"85 la I"Grupp was able to enlist the aid of the Birch Society's aders in the study. agreed t Welch and the other Society leaders apparently 18a» 0 cmperate because they saw the study as an Opportunity to 31 t n more about their membership. er 13ader 101‘“ £01. lat Involved in a massive effort to the Society's image as a secret-conspiratorial organization, its 3 felt it was to their advantage to have some solid empirical in- ation to help them in their public relations campaign. In return 1- their cooperation Grupp furnished the society with copies of the 3121318 and a duplicate set of IBM cards. Grupp was able to get the Society to draw a random sample from 105 TABLE 3-1 GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF BIRCH SOCIETY LETTER-WRITERS, COMPARED WITH THE NATIONAL POPULATION Census National Columbia Michigan Re E1011 Popul at ion Study Study California 8.8% 33% 30% Other Far West 6.8% 9% 11% South 30.7% 29% 29% North Central 28.8% 18% 19% North East 24.9% 11% 10% Unknown - - 2% ‘— its total membership list, and to send questionnaires (which Society leaders had carefully scrutinized item by item) to 1866 members, along with a cover letter written by Robert Welch himself. Since the ques- :1°nnaires were mailed out by a Society member who also received the r91 eted responses, Grupp never saw any names. To further insure the thSYI-ity of members the completed questionnaires were removed from 1mg 1- return envelopes before being turned over to Grupp, thus shield- preveven postmarks from him. Iith all these precautions taken to p10 Ont him from learning any names, Grupp was unable himself to em- rat: the follow-up techniques normally used to increase the response- the of mail-questionnaires. And because he did not or could not get centsociety to do this, his response-rate was low--only about 35 per- ..‘b‘~and somewhat biased in that chapter leaders and West Coast dig 9133 were overrepresented in the final sample. (He was able to °°Ver this because the Society supplied him with the "true" leader- sh thin and region figures for the total Society membership--apparently th.y had this information.) Nevertheless Grupp's sample is certainly “Qst representative sample of authenticated Birch Society members ye t 0btained . 106 TABLE 3-2 SELECTED STATES WITH HOST BIRCH SOCIETY LETTER-WRITERS AND MEMBERS Rohter Ii ch igan Grupp St ate Analysis Analysis Analysis Ca]. ifornia 33 .91 29 .5% 25%" Texas 5 .0% 5 .5% 5% New York 8 .3% 4.2% 5% Washington 3 ~93 3 . 8% 3% Indiana 3 .5% 2 .9% 3% Ar izona 3 .2% l .l% 4% Illinois 2.6% 3.3% 4% 011 10 2 .5% 5 .5% * New Jersey 2 .5% .6% 5% nichigan 2.4% 2.4% * Pl orida 2 .3% 4.0% 4% Pennsylvania 2 .3% 2 . 4% * A1 1 others 27 .3% 34.8% 42% N : 2209 453 650 TABLE 3-3 CURRENT RESIDENCES or BIRCH SOCIETY uslssas, BY REGIONS - GRUPP SURVEY REG ION EAST MIDWEST SOUTH WEST 17% 19% 26% 38% to; ‘Professor Grupp did not find sizable blocs of Birch Society etaiN-Z-‘Dlmdents in these states. (Personal correspondence.) Two Southern 88, however, seem to have Joined the ranks of states having sizable tend Society membership: Alabama--4%, Georgia--3%. Grupp's findings has to confirm the Anti-Defamation League's report that the Society grown recently in these states (reported above). fOr "'Grupp was informed by his Birch Society source that the figure 8.9acalifornia is too high by 7%; according to him (and Grupp adds he 8110“ no reason to disbelieve him), the correct percentage for California 901:th be 18%. This overly high figure, and the even higher ones re- ”um 901 in the studies of Birch letter-writers, probably reflect what y Observers have claimed: the right is hyperactive in California. 107 Broyles also reports a similar concentration of Birchers in growing areas; while touring the national headquarters of The John Birch Society he noticed on an organizational map that Society chapters, bookstores, and coordinators seem to be most heavily concentrated in several cities in Texas and Southern California. But there were other significant concentrations in Phoenix, Wichita, and along the North Shore of Chicago.87 Hurray Havens found the same relationship between rightist activity and population change in the southwestern communities he studied: Virtually without exception, the cities in the Southwest in which the radical right has produced the most serious political consequence have been those in which the most rapid increases in population have taken place.88 This relationship holds true for California as well; the 1962 California Poll shows that support for the John Birch Society comes largely from the southern part of the state, which of course has also undergone the greatest increase in population.89 lost of the groups listed in ‘me First National Directory of Rightist Groups are in and around Los Angeles, and the Michigan study, found that 24% of the national Birch letter-writers (this would be 82% of the California ”titers) lived in southern California.90 Support for the radical right seems to be also related to t 9:13 ions arising from difficulties over community integration. In Ca 1 itcrnia the largest proportion of supporters of the Birch Society are 91 allong those who have migrated to the state since lorld War II. Ac cc)l‘ciing to Havens this holds true for the rest of the Southwest as Well - he reports that "a very large part of the identifiable members Wt the radical right consists of newcomers to the communities where th ey now reside."9:2 These data are consistent with our status- 108 frustration hypothesis, since the status 01 newcomers in the community is likely to be less firmly established than that of older residents. thile occupational prestige extends generally across community lines,93 many studies have shown that particular criteria for stratification vary from community to community.94 In such situations new residents would probably, as a group, be most prone to status anxieties since they have had less time to establish their "status credentials."* Evidence on the relationship between social mobility and psychological difficulties also supports our thesis. Hollingshead and Redlich found, in their study of one community, that persons who had recently risen into the upper-class, compared to older established upper-class persons, exhibited more "conspicuous consumption, family instability, and other symptoms of insecurity and anxiety."95 Upwardly mobile persons, insecure about their new positions, were also found to exhibit more racial prejudice than did persons of stationary status in the study by Greenbaum and Pearlin described earlier. The same scape- goating mechanism which, they felt, explained the prejudice of these per£30118 seems applicable to the rightists, who express their status anxieties not against Jews or Negroes but against the symbol .0 C""nlllunists ." 5. SOME CLOSING COMP‘ENTS In recruiting a following of persons from several social c1 asses and groups, radical rightism is unlike most social movements, \ ran *1 am thinking here of several types of "status credentials,’ etcging from the most obvious symbols of wealth (car, clothing, home, Par- ) to the more subtle symbols of beliefs and manners like political y and church affiliation, membership in civic and fraternal groups, an d the like. which tend to attract only certain social and economic groups.96 But rightism appeals to upper middle-class persons, lower middle-class persons, and lower-class persons; it is attractive to some old-time residents and some new ones, to some elderly persons and younger ones, to some independent professionals, small businessmen, and workers, to some college graduates and some with less than high school diplomas, to some religious conservatives, be they Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. Regardless of their diverse social characteristics, those attracted share a common psychOIOgical characteristic which makes them suscep- tible to rightism: they are anxious and frustrated about their status. At a personal level they are experiencing less deferential treatment than they expect, and they resent this. Since rightists strongly subscribe to principles of hard work and achievement, and link these to social status and personal worth, they are extremely sensitized to any discrepancies between the social status they feel they properly deserve and the deference they actually receive from other people. This sensitivity illustrates the subjective llattire of personal status. The psychological association between social p08i‘tzion and personal worth is not made by everyone, since people vary 111 their proneness to measure themselves in terms of their occupational acct>‘llplishments. Some people simply do not believe that hard work, Belt‘improvement, and a constant emphasis on achievement are important goals . Others, who may subscribe to such values, are also aware that ‘oclal inequalities produce unequal opportunities for social advance- Dent «- Neither of these groups is likely to link their worthiness as human bei ngs (their sense of self-esteem) directly to their social ac hifivements. But rightists, it is hypothesized, do make this we ‘” ; w?- 110 connection because they are strongly committed to the values of the Protestant ethic. Because they are important status indicators, the rightists' values play yet another important role in their frustrations. Differ- ences between their own values and those of others in their social groups can cause what sociologists call "status inconsistency," " "status discrepancy," or lack of "status crystal- "status mismatching, ization."97 The concept of "status consistency" follows from the idea that peoples' status is Judged on the basis of a multiplicity of criteria. Usually the attributes by which people are evaluated have approximately the same prestige-rank; i.e., ”upper-class" individuals usually have college degrees, make more than $15,000 per year, and are professionals or executives; "working-class" individuals usually have no more than high school educations, make less than $10,000 a year, and work in skilled or semiskilled occupations. "Inconsistencies" occur when several status attributes have prestige-ranks which are signifi- cantly discrepant. Everett Hughes, an early user of this concept, called attention to the dilemma of the Negro doctor whose ethnic and occupational attributes are extremely mismatched. The discrepancies create two kinds of problems; the first, in respect to how other peOple are to evaluate his status (should he be treated with the deference due a doctor, or as a Negro?); the second, regarding his 232 choice of a 98 In the same year an article by Emil Benoit-Smullyan proper role. noted three distinct types of "status"--econonic, political, and prestige, and that peeple occupy different positions in each of these three hierarchies.99 Leonard Bloom offers a good definition of status consistency: ' -_m —-——- .-—---. m a- r L In . n .4 3 ..0 air 111 As a positional variable, status consistency may be described by the scores of an individual on a number of ranked attri- butes. A study of the consistency of these scores can establish first, how well the attributes and the social roles imputed to their possessors "fit" together and, secondly, how the over-all social position of the individual compares with that of other individuals in the same society. Inconsistencies may produce "marginality," with deviant attitudinal and behavioral consequences. Some empirical substantiation for this 101 hypothesis has been found by sociologists. That radical rightism is one of these consequences is, of course, a major thesis of most of the academic literature on rightism.102 Unfortunately very little empirical evidence is available which explicitly tests this hypothesis. Lipset reports that a study done by Robert Sokol found that the more the "...conscious concern with status 1nconsistency...the greater the tendency to be a McCarthy supporter" 103 was predominant in the sample of men he interviewed. Note that it is the subjective perception of inconsistency which is related to support for McCarthyism; peOple must be aware of differences between how they are in fact treated and how they _t_l_i_i_n§_ they should be treated before their status discrepancies become personally meaningful. Lipset 3130 reports that respondents in a California poll whose education and occupa- t10:18.1 attainments were lot congruent were more likely to be favorably disposed toward the John Birch Society than those whose education and occupations were matched. The Cal ifornia Poll data do clearly suggest, however, that respondents whose educational and occupational attainments are not congruent--e.g., manual workers who went to college, 0r those in high-status positions with little education-- are more likely to be pro-Birch than others within their Strata whose statuses on these two stratification dimensions are roughly similar. Whi 1e these findings are based on too few cases to be statistically si mifiCGHt, they are in line with the hypothesis that status discrepancies produce anxieties which in some cases lead to the accept- ance of extremist politics.103 In focusing on attributes like education, occupation, and in- come, these studies used status indicators which primarily reflect achievements. Unfortunately, they did not examine values and style of living, which are also very important criteria of status. Havens found that the life-styles of the rightists he studied were in serious conflict with those of their cultural setting. Radical Rightists in the Southwest consist largely of urban residents, often recently arrived from rural areas, who have achieved in recent years quite substantial economic gains through business or a profession and who are frustrated because of the failure of their social status, influence, and power to climb at a corresponding rate. Their backgrounds, either working class or rural, or both, lead them also to very real conflicts with the cultural setting to which their economic gains have brought them. These conflicts are most evident in their religious fundamentalism and their un- sophisticated bewilderment and hostility toward many modern social and cultural innovations.10 Broyles' descriptions of the Birch Society members and leaders he interviewed also conveys this notion that rightists are persons socially "mismatched" in some way; as he states it, "most of the members I :interviewed were in the middle or upper middle class, but most of them were 'fringe' personalities in their comunities."107 10. 11, NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 See Richard Schmuck and Mark Chesler, "0n Super-Patriotism: A Definition and Analysis," J. of Social Issues, lg (1963): 31-50; and particularly the articles contained in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963). Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1957), p. 127. See Bernard Barber's Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure & Process (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1957); Kahl, op. cit.; Reinhard Bendix, Seymour M. Lipset,(eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953); Bernard Berelson, Gary Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p. 454; Hilton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1958) for detailed discussions of the stratification system. An excellent synthesis is provided by Robin Williams' American Society; A Sociolggical Interpretation, second edition, revised (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1963). Kinsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), Chapter 4. W. Lloyd Warner, et al., Social Class in America (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949); August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth (New York: Wiley, 1949). See Kahl, 0p. cit., (Chapter 2) for a critical evaluation of these studies. H. H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status," Arch. Psychol., 1942, no. 269. JBerelson & Steiner, op. cit., p. 489. (I. H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Scribner, 1902) . (3. H. Mead, Hind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) . W. McDougall, The Eneggies of Men (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933); A. H. Haslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper, 1954); H. A. Murray, et al., Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938)- EJr'nest R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology second ed., (New Y0rk: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), pp. 145-6. 113 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 24. 114 Gordon W. Allport, "The Psychology of Participation," Psychological Review, 52 (1945), p. 122. S. A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949); Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of the fiAmerican Soldier" (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950). Warner, op. cit.; Barber, op. cit.; Berelson & Steiner, op. cit.; Williams, op. cit. w. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (Yankee City Series, Vol. I), (New Haven: Yale Univer- sity Press, 1941), p. 261; Maryon K. Welch, "The Ranking of Occupations on the Basis of Social Status," Occupations, 27, 4 (January, 1949), pp. 237-41; Alex Inkeles and Peter R0881:— "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," Amer. J. Sociol., 61 (1956) 329-39; Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949); Barber, 0p. cit. Williams, op. cit., p. 418. See also Francis Sutton, et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); Thurman Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). See Kahl, Op. cit., Chapter 3, for an extended discussion of the relationship between occupation and socially evaluated prestige. See Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed--1962," in Bell (ed.), on. cit., p. 17; also Kahl, op. cit., Chapter 10. Seymour Lipset, "Backlash and Republican Prospects," mimeographed paper, 1964, p. 18. See Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (New York: Doubleday, 1960), for a vivid description of the plight of the small businessman in modern American society. See Frank A. Pinner, Paul Jacobs, and Philip Selznick, Old Age and Political Behavior: A Case Study (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1959), for a discussion of status anxieties among oldsters. Stouffer, op. cit.; Merton and Rossi, op. cit. David Riesman, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes-- 1962," in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 119. Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy," Amer. J. Sociology, Q2 (1958): 279-36. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 115 Alan Westin, "The John Birch Society," in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 225. M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Participant Observation in a Super- Patriot Discussion Group," J. of Social Issues, 12_(1963): 18—31 at p. 18. J. Allen Broyles, The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), Chapter 5. Cited in Seymour Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right: Doughlinites, McCarthyites, and Birchers - 1962," in Bell (ed.), op. cit., Table 24, p. 356. Ibid., Table 21, p. 352. These studies are cited in footnotes 62-65 of Chapter 1. B. Bettelheim and M. Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psycho~ logical and Sociological Study of Veterans (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950). Joseph Greenblum, and Leonard Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit. Ibid., p. 439. Kingsley Davis, "A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification," Amer. Sociological Review, Z (1942): 309-21. Herbert Goldhammer, Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status,' Amer. J. of Sociology, 25 (1939): 171-82. Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 186-93. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); flSymbols of Class Status,’ British Journal of Sociology, a (1951): 294-304. Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., p. 52 fn. Richard Centers, op. cit., p. 92, The PsycholOgy of Social Classes. Warner, et al., Social Class in America, op. cit. Williams, op. cit., Chapter 11. Vidich and Bensman, op. cit.; Amitar Etzioni, Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1964), particularly Part III, ("The Modern Society." 43. 44. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 116 George Stone, William Forn, "Instabilities in Status," American Soc. Rev., 18 (1953): 149-63 at p. 155. See particularly R. E. Ellsworth, S. M. Harris, The American Right Wing (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962); Schmuck and Chesler, op. cit.; G. B. Rush, "Toward a Definition of the Extreme Right," Pacific Soc. Rev., §_(1963): 64-73. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958). Harold Lenski, The American Democracy (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), p. 27. John Bunzel, The American Small Businessman (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962) . Westin, in Bell (ed.), op. cit. Henry Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); E. Z. Vogt, Modern Homesteaders (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955). Frederick Jackson Turner, "Contributions of the West to American Democracy," in his The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt, 1920). Speech of Senator Goldwater made at Prescott, Arizona, on Sept. 3, 1964. Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965), p. 116. The John Birch Society Bulletin for September,l963, (Belmont, Mass.), p. 2. J83 Bulletin for March, 1966. .Ralph Lord Ray, Apostles of Discord (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953); David Danzig, "The Radical Right and the Rise of the Fundamentalist Minority," elementary, April, 1962; "Special Supplement on the Far Right," The Reformed Journal, (Grand Rapids, Michigan), January, 1965; Hofstadter, Paranoid Style, op. cit., Chapter 3. Scott Grant McNall, "The Sect Movement," The Pacific Sociological Review, 6 (1963): 60-64. ' See Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, Danger on the Right (New ‘York: Random House, 1964) or Harry Overstreet, Bonaro Overstreet, The Strange Tactics of Extremism (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1964), for discussions of the organizations. .JBS Bulletin for September, 1963, p. 5. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 117 Reported by Lipset in "Three Decades of the Radical Right...," in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 334. See Williams, op. cit., for a more complete discussion of the role of values in affecting human behavior. Benton Johnson, "Ascetic Protestantism and political Preference," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1962): 35-46 at p. 37. Chicago Sun Times, November 15, 1965. Henry Stob, "Fundamentalism and Political Rightism," in The Reformed Journal (January, 1965): 4-6, at 5. This paragraph is drawn from Professor Stob's article. Ibid. Ibid., p. 6. Laski, op. cit., p. 287. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Backlash and Republican Prospects," o , cit. unpublished mimeographed paper, 1964. Murray Havens, "The Radical Right in the Southwest: Community Response to Shifting Socio-Economic Patterns," paper delivered at 1964 meeting, American Political Science Assoc., p. 4. I am frankly uncertain whether Havens made this conclusion based on interviews with actual rightists or on the basis of comments made by peOple who could be considered "knowledgeable observers" of radical rightism in their communities. Since Havens did not pre- sent any quantitative evidence I suspect the latter is true. Ellsworth and Harris, op. cit.; Schmuck and Chesler, 0p. cit. Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the Temperance Movement (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1963), p. 142; see also David Riesman, The Lone1y_Crowd, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), especially Chapter 6. David Riesman, The Lonely_Crowd, op. cit., pp. 31-36. See also James Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957); Vidich and Bensman, op. cit.; Etzioni and Etzioni, Op. cit.; Robert Merton, Chapter 10, HPatterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in Social Theory and Social Structure, (revised edition, Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1957). Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., p. 51. Ibid., p. 79. Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), p. 190. Murray Havens, Op. cit., p. 11. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 87. 88. 118 Berelson and Steiner, op. cit., p. 465. C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951). David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Dis- contented Classes-1955," in Bell (ed.), op. cit., p. 52. Havens, 0p. cit., p. 10. Ibid., p. 15. Reported in Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right...," op. cit., Tables 21 and 24, pp. 352 and 356. First National Directory of "Rightist" Groups, Publications and Some Individuals in the United States (and some foreign countries), fourth ed. (Sausalito, Calif.: The Noontide Press, 1962). Hannah Watenberg, Wagner Thielens, "Against the United Nations: A Letter-Writing Campaign in the Birch Movement," limited circula- tion, mimeographed, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1964, p. 5. James McEvoy, et a1., "Letters from the Right: Content-Analysis of a Letter writing Campaign," mimeographed, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1966, p. 17. This analysis is based on information supplied by Mrs. Norman Chandler, to whom I am indebted. As chairman of the Los Angeles Music Center's fund-raising committee, she received, in November and December of 1964, more than 2000 letters written by Birch Society members. These Birchers were responding to an article in the November, 1964 issue of the Society's Monthly Bulletin, which claimed that a United Nations flag was going to be flown over the JMusic Center when its construction was completed. Welch, who 'writes the Bulletin each month, exhorted Society members to write .Mrs. Chandler and others on various Center committees, to protest this. These are the letters to which my analysis refers. Mr. Grupp is currently writing up this study for his doctoral dissertation in political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Some of these findings were reported in his paper "Political .Activists: The John Birch Society and the A.D.A.," presented at the American Political Science Association meetings in New York, September 10, 1966. (irupp, 0p. cit.; these findings are taken from Chapter II, "The Geography of Membership," Table 2, of a dittoed draft, and from :figures supplied me by Mr. Grupp in personal correspondence. Broyles, op. cit., p. 3. Havens, op. cit., p. 3. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 97. 100. 101. 119 Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right...," op. cit., p. 355, Table 24. McEvoy, op. cit., p. 16. Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right...," op. cit., p. 363. Havens, op. cit., p. 3. Paul Hatt reported that in a nationwide study of prestige ratings associated with occupations "the findings...indicate an extra- ordinary amount of agreement on the prestige value of occupations, regardless of region or community." "Stratification in tne Mass Society," Amer. Sociological Review, 12 (1950): 216-22 at 222. Duncan and Artis found very close agreement” with the ratings used by North and Hatt and the positions given to peOple by judges in a rural Pennsylvania community. Otis Duncan and Jay Artis, "Some Problems of Stratification Research," Rural Sociology, 16 (1951): 17-29. See discussion and citations in Williams, op. cit., pp. 112-115; also Gordon, op. cit. A. B. Hollingshead, F. C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958). This description also seems to fit the "lower-upper class" people in Warner's Yankee City Study (Warner and others, op. cit.). See Hans Toch, The Social Psychologz;of Social Movements (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965); H. Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: John Wiley, 1941)? Rudolf Herberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1956); Gustavus Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States, edited by Henry M. Christman, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960). See N. J. Demerath's Social Class in American Protestantism (Chicago: Rand MCNally & Co., 1965), Chapters 3 and 4 for a detailed (and critical) discussion of this concept, which he calls "status discrepance." Everett C. Hughes, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status,‘ Am. J. Sociology, go (1944): 353-59. Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types, and Status Inter- relations," Am. Sociological Review, 2 (1944): 151-61. Leonard Bloom, ”Social Differentiation and Stratification," in Robert Merton, et al. (eds.), Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 429-41. Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, 12 (1954), 405—13; 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 120 William F. Kenkel, "The Relationship between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes," Amer. Sociol. Rev., 31 (1956): 365-68; Irwin w. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in power Distribution," Am. Soc. Review, 23 (1957): 275-81; Elton F. Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," Am. Soc. Review, 21 (1962): 469-80. Schmuck and Chesler, op. cit.: articles in Bell (ed.), 0p. cit. Robert Sokok, Rank Inconsistency and McCarthyism: An Empirical Test, unpublished paper, Dartmouth College, cited in Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right," op. cit., p. 334. Lipset, "Three Decades...," op. cit., p. 363. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co., 1960), especially Chapter 4; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959). Havens, op. cit., p. 12. Broyles, op. cit., p. 155. CHAPTER 4 AN EIPIRICAL.ASSESSKENT OF THE STATUS PRUSTRATION THESIS It is not often easy to determine whether or not an individual is frustrated because of status problems.. Few persons like to admit that they are not liked or respected.‘ Consequently, the most useful tests of status frustration are indirect questions and objective status indicators. The strategy of using multi-indicators was adapted for this study. This chapter primarily questions rightists' satisfaction with the status accorded them and their values. In Chapter 5, evidence is presented which shows that rightists use their activities and beliefs to enhance their sense of importance and self-respect; this would infer that they are suffering from status deprivations. Some other conse- quences of the rightists' low status feelings of personal powerlessness and political alienation, and other symptoms of anomy,appear in Chapter 7. The ultimate correctness of the status frustration thesis thus ultimately depends on how well a number of subhypotheses, empirically tested across several chapters, fare. I"A blatant question of this kind was in fact asked in the inter- view. Few persons said "No." See Section 6, this chapter. 122 Two distinct types of characteristics determine a man's status: (1) his education, occupation, and age; (2) his values and living style. Both sets of attributes are significant. Below, we examine objective indicators of these characteristics for both our Rightist and Non- Rightist samples. Then we look at their subjective reactions to the status of their current social position and values. In every instance we are looking for signs that the Rightists are more prone to status frustrations and anxieties than are the Hen-Rightists. 1. OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF ACHIEVED STATUS Occupation The status which a person enjoys depends upon many things. As mentioned earlier, however, the single personal factor which correlates most highly with the prestige accorded a man and his family is his occupation. It has been hypothesized that one group of rightists follows occupations of declining or low status. The occupations of all interviewees were classified according to Hollingshead's "Index of Social Position - Seven Socio-economic Scale Positions,"1 with separate categories established for farmers and retirees. Since women share the status of their husbands, their husbands' occupations were also coded. While the list of occupational classifications is detailed, the main categories are as follows: 1. Higher executives of larger concerns, prOprietors, and major professionals. 2. Business managers, proprietors of medium-sized businesses, and lesser professionals. 3. Administrative personnel, owners of certain small businesses, and minor professionals. 4. Clerical and sales workers, technicians, and owners of certain small businesses. 5. Skilled manual and service employees. 6. Machine operators and semiskilled employees. 7. Unskilled employees. 8. Retired people. 9. Farmers. Our Rightists‘ are drawn disproportionately from occupations of decreasing social prestige. Male Rightists are under-represented in the Jobs and professions having highest status (Table 4--l),Ml and nearly twice as many Rightists as Non-Rightists are retiremmmI There is also a tendency for more Rightists (or their husbands), to be self- employed businessmen and independent professionals. (Table 4-2.) *In the tables and discussions which follow, "Rightists" are considered to be persons whose scores on the Radical Rightism Index fall in the highest two quartiles. This empirical cutting point reflects the number of persons who seem to be Rightists in the data: wheri fzhe approximately 25 negative voters and 17 positive voters who turned out to have higher than median scores on the Radical Rightism Index are added to the original group of 137 rightists interviewed (see Chapter 2), this results in a group of 169 persons. This, coincidentially, is the number of persons who happen to be in the upper half of the Rightism Index. **The same relative relationship holds when women are included, basing their status on their husbands' occupation. ***Chi-scmare - 2.9 (corrected for “Mimitw- d'f' " 1' TABLE 4-1 OCCUPATIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN MALE RADICAL RIGHTISTS AND NON-RIGHTISTS Occupations I_ II III I! V 11 VII VIII (N) Non-Rightists* 24% 13% 19% 4% 18% 11% - 12% (95) Radical Rightists“ 10 12 17 15 14 9 2 21 (112) x2 = 14.52 P<.05 ‘Non-Rightists = Quartiles 1 a 11 on Radical Rightism Index *‘Rightists - Quartiles 111 & 1v TABLE 4-2 COMPARISON BETWEEN RADICAL RIGHTISTS AND NON-RIGHTISTS ON WHETHER SELF-EMPLOYED OR NOT Who Employed By Self-Employed Employee (N)* Non-Rightists 32% 68% 131 Radical Rightists 43 57 112 X2 i 2.56 (corrected for continuity) P(.15 I"The "N's" in this table are based on males' responses to Q.74--"Do you work for yourself or someone else?"--and for Questions 78-D and 79-B, asked of females about their husbands. l5 While Rightists are distributed over the entire age range, they tend to be older than Non-Rightists. (Table 4-3.) The over representa- tion of Rightists in their fifties and beyond is consistent with the status frustration thesis. The fifties probably correspond to that time in a man's life when he realizes that his social position and occupational career is pretty well established, and unlikely to improve significantly. If he has not "made it" by now, he probably accepts the fact that he is not going to make it at all. For those in their late sixties and older, old age itself tends to be associated with uselessness and decrepitude in a society increasingly oriented toward youth and vitality. Both groups, in addition, represent an older generation raised with traditional principles. They thus are susceptible to both occupational and value frustrations. TABLE 4-3 AGE DISTRIBUTION AND RADICAL RIGHTISM Age 35 or less 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+ (N) Median Age Non-Rightists 27% 29% 23% 13% 13% (166) 45 Rightists 14 17 22 20 27 (168) 54 Education and Occupation: a More Refined Measure of Status An individual's occupation alone is a relatively crude measure of his social standing. A somewhat better approximation is obtained by considering his degree of formal education. Following the practice of Hollingshead and Warner, a more refined gauge of status-rank was com- puted for each interviewee, with occupational standing assigned a weight of 4, and educational attainment a weight of 3.,“2 Scores for women (which I call "objective achieved status") are based on the prestige-rankof their husbands' occupation and their own education. A disprOportionate number of Rightists are found in the middle Astatus groups--they are minor professionals, owners of small businesses, clerical and sales workers, and technicians, with only medium educa- tional achievements (some college or post-high school training) at l"Educational attainments were classified as follows (based on Q. 86): l. graduate school 2. college graduate 3. some college 4. post- high school training 5. high school graduate 6. some high school 7. sixth- eighth grade 8. less than sixth grade best.’ (Table 4-4.) Status anxieties should be most prevalent among this lower middle-class group, since it contains persons whose occupa- tional situations and medium educations expose them to status threats. TABLE 4-4 OBJECTIVE ACHIEVED STATUS (FOR MALES) (COMBINED EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MEASURE) Status-Rank (high) (medium) (low) 1 & 2 3 & 4 5-7 (N) Non-Rightists 42% 30% 27% (99) Rightists 27 46 27 (111) x2 = 6.9 a(.05 The objective status attributes of rightists justify our infer- ence that they are uncommonly anxious about their status-positions. These findings are no more than suggestive, however, since they are at best only consistent with the status frustration thesis. 2. STATUS MOBILITY Stated most simply, the status frustration thesis argues that relative changes in social status produce anxieties which are often resolved through participation in the radical right. Rightists should therefore be persons experiencing status mobility, either upward or downward. One type of status change is produced by intergenerational occupational advancement or decline. For men, an objective measure of 1"The same relationship holds if females as well as males are included, although the difference between Rightists and Non-Rightists is at the statistical level of p<.15 (x2 - 3.4). 127 intergenerational change (called "occupational status difference") was computed from the difference (either positive or negative) between the prestige ranking of their own and their fathers' occupations.* Women's scores were based on prestige differences between the occupations of their husbands and their fathers. A more refined measure of status mobility was also computed for males, based on the difference between their own combined education-occupation status score and a similar score based on their fathers' occupation and education. (This is called "Pull Status Difference.") Examining overall status changes, we discover that rightists have experienced more objective occupational status mobility than non- rightists, particularly in a downward (losing status) direction. (Table 4-5.) This pattern persisted even when controlled for sex,and when the "full status difference" measure was used. (Tables 4-6, 7.) If anxiety is associated with declining status, then more of our rightists are eXperiencing these feelings. In the earlier discussion about the causes of status frustra- tions, a theoretical distinction was drawn between persons who are frustrated even though they are upwardly mobile, and those who are upset about their status losses. These two groups appear in the ob- jective data on status mobility. Within the highest occupational status classification (1), rightists have undergone more extreme upward mobility than non-rightists *Farmers were assigned the occupational rank of "4" which is consistent with Hollingshead's classification, as well as Hatt and North's Occupational Prestige Rating. See Paul K. Hatt and C. C. North, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," Opinion News, September, 1947, 3-13. TABLE 4-5 INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL STATUS DIFFERENCES FOR ALL RESPONDENTS Status Change 1058 no change gain (N) Non-Rightists 23% 26% 477. (160) R1 ghtists 34 2 17 49 (162) x = 4.2 .2O>p>.lo TABLE 4-6 INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL STATUS DIFFERENCES (mm-is ONLY) Status Change loss no change gain (N) Non-Rightists 247. 25% 51% (99) Right ists 35 17 48 (111) x2 - 3.8 .20)P>.10 TABLE 4-7 ImaRGENEMTIONAL STATUS DIFFERENCES USING C LBINsD EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MEASURE (MALES ONLY) Status Change loss no change gain (N) Right ists 29 5 66 (89) x2 = 3.8 .20)p>.1o 129 TABLE 4-3 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN HIGHEST STATUS GROUP (ALL RESPONDENTS) Degree of Status Rank Change 2:91 _+_§ +3 or more (N) Non-Rightists 6(23%) 8(311) 12(46%) (26) Bi ght ists 5(311.) -- 11(69‘7o) (16) x2 = 6.3 P<.05 TABLE 4-9 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN HIGHEST STATUS GROUP (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change 9:1 :3 +3 or more (N) Non-Rightists 5(22%) 7(30%) 11(48%) (23) Right ists 5(42%) -- 7(58%) (16) a: 2 x I' 4.8 P(.10 TABLE 4-10 FULL STATUS MEASURE OF MOBILITY IN HIGHEST STATUS GROUP (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change 9:; 1w +4 or more (N) Non‘Rightists 3(147.) New 90M) (22) Rightists 4(36%) 1(91.) 6(55%) (11) t x2 = 5.1 P(.lo \ 5,1an 1"These x2 values are provided for suggestive purposes only, of staseveral of the cells have values too small to allow a valid test tiistical significance. 130 of comparable status. This is true for the full sample (both males and females-~Table 4-8), when controlled for sex (Table 4-9), and when the combined educational and occupational status difference measure (Called "full status") is used. (Table 4-10.) It seems likely tnat such rapid occupational ascendency is accompanied by considerable status anxieties. At the same time, the number of rightists who have been at this highest status level for at least one generation is disproportionately large. Although they are too few to allow a meaningful analysis, they perhaps represent that segment of the traditional elite which finds itself threatened by newer groups achieving increased economic, political, and social power. Clusters corresponding to "newly arrived" and "decliner" type rightists also show up in the mobility data on middle status groups. Among those in these classifications (III, IV)--white collar employees, technicians, minor professionals, and small businessmen--the Rightists generally tend to have undergone more status changes, both upward and downWaz-d directions, than Non-Rightists. (Table 4-11.) Either rapid gains or losses in status-rank can produce anxieties, and persons who have risen from lower class occupations)or have fallen from upper- middle-class occupations,are particularly likely to be found at this Status level.‘ Among those in the lower-status categories--blue collar em- ploy‘Qs, manual and service workers, the unskilled (occupational status “"193 V, VI, VII)--the Rightists again experienced greater declines in \ (Tab l"This suggestive relationship holds when controlled for sex Wcule 4-12), but changes somewhat on the "full status" (education and pation) measure (Table 4-13), where status decliners are more Pro 11c"Minced among Rightists. 131 TABLE 4-11 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN MIDDLE-STATUS GROUPS (FOR ALL RESPONDENTS) Degree of Status Rank Change loss no change gain (N) Non—Rightists 16% 29% 55% (49) Right ists 22 14 64 (50) x2 = 3.2 P<.2o TABLE 4-12 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN MIDDLE-STATUS GROUPS (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change loss no change gain (N) Non-R1 ght ists 15% 27% 58% (25) Right ists 26 ll 63 (33) 2 TABLE 4-13 FULL STATUS MEASURE OF MOBILITY IN NIDDLE-STATUS GROUPS (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change loss no change gain (N) ""5511 ghtists 187. 18% 64% (22) R18htists 32 27 41 (34) x2 = 2.7 P(.30 132 tn1erjxr objective social status than comparable Non-Rightists. (Tables 4-14, 15, 16.) These Rightists have slid either from middle-class status into the working or lower class, or from the top level of this class to the very bottom. In either case, this process is likely to rurvee gsroduccd status frustrations. Attention should also be given to the suggestive cluster of Rightists in Table 4-16 who have made a major jump in their status-rank, yet retain their lower-class identification. This group may have made great efforts to climb out of the lower class, yet feels frustrated as it finds itself still accorded low status by others . TABLE 4- l 4 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN LOWER-STATUS GROUPS (FOR ALL RESPONDENTS) Degree of Status Change Loss of 2 or more other (N) Non-Rightists 23% 77% (66) {Rightist 33 67 (69) x2 (corrected for continuity): 1.4 P(.30 TABLE 4- l 5 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS MOBILITY IN LOWER-STATUS GROUPS (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change Loss of 2 or more ranks other (N) Non-Rightists 16% 847. (37) Rightists 33 62 (45) h x‘ (corrected for continuity) = 3.7 P(.05 133 TABLE 4- 1 6 FULL STATUS MEASURES: OF MOBILITY IN LOWER-STATUS GROUPS (MALES ONLY) Degree of Status Change 32s: 0 + 1 +2 or lore (N) Non-Rightists 39% 50% 11% (28) Right ists 45 32 23 (31) x2 = 2.4 p(.30 3. OTHER OBJECTIVE INDICATIONS OF STATUS ANXIETIES Today education is the major avenue to technical, administrative, and power-wielding Jobs; the acquisition of technical and social skills has become a primary occupational requirement for advancement in a SOCiety which increasingly emphasizes SOphisticated technology, bureau— crat 1c forms of organization, and collective decision-making. Education 13 also very important in upper and middle-class persons' evaluations of membership in their class, since it so importantly shapes friendship and consumption patterns and general style of life.3 Therefore, persons with less education than is typical of their class or occupational level tend to experience social strains; i.e., they feel anxious about their occupational future and social acceptance. Such mismatching of status attributes characterizes many Rightists; high- and middle-status Rightists have less education than a No - n\R'iggtists in the same stratum. (Tables 4-17, 18.) Such education- 31 differences can be seriously frustrating in a society where education \ intr I"The relationship remains unchanged when controls for sex are Jd‘-l'::ed. (Tables 4-19, 20.) 134: is a major criterion of social class and occupational advancement. Leggth of Residence in Community Rightists have been theoretically divided into two distinct ‘tygnes. Rightism serves, for those in the first group, to ward off amutieties caused by decline in status as newly emergent groups displace them in the status structure and introduce new values into the community. The newly arrived type rightists use their rightism to gain acceptance ir1t<> higher status groups. These two types could be observed in the empirical data on intergeneratioaal mobility. They appear again when we consider our respondents' length of residency in their community. TABLE 4-17 aIGH—STATUS OCCUPATIONAL LEVSL* vs. EDUCATION (FOR ALL RBSPONDENTS) Education Some College, Grad. College Post High High School School Grad. School or less (N) Non-Rightists 64% 13% 18% 4% (45) Right ists 33 26 29 12 (42) x2 = 8.6 p<,05 al- . Higher executives and proprietors of larger concerns, major professionals; business managers, proprietors of medium-sized businesses, and 1 e sser professionals . 135 TABLE 4-18 MIDDLE-STATUS OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL“ vs. EDUCATION (FOR ALL RESPONDENTS) Education College & Some College, High School Grad. School Post High School or less (N) Non-Rightists 27% 49% 24% (49) Rightists 12 34 54 (50) x2 - 9.8 P<.02 ‘IAdministrative personnel, owners small businesses, and minor professionals; clerical and sales workers, and technicians. TABLE 4-19 HIGH-STATUS OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL VS. EDUCATION (MALES ONLY) Education Some College Grad. School College Grad. or less (N) Non-Rightists 72% 11% 17% (36) Rizht ists 39 32 29 x3 = 7.4 P(.02 TABLE 4-20 MIDDLE-STATUS OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL VS. EDUCATION (MALES ONLY) Education Some College, College & Post High High School Grad. School School or less (N) "0‘1““. ghtists 35% 31% 35% (26) 318“ ists 16 29 55 (38) x2 = 3.7 P<.15 136 Since geographical mobility is related to age, with young people generally more on the move than older people, age was controlled. In looking at individuals under fifty, two clusters of Rightists tend to appear which match our "newly arrived" and "declining" typology. (Table 4-21.) One group consists of persons who have lived in their community less than five years. These "newer residents" may, because 01 their physical nobility, suffer frustrations resulting from their inability to integrate themselves into the community and be accepted by their neighbors."I Using a slightly different residency breakdown, we also find that among "newer residents" more Rightists than Non- Rightists have experienced downward status mobility (as measured by occupational status differences). (Table 4-22.) Possibly this sense of declining status further reinforces their sense of frustration. Thus status decline, combined with new resident status, may be directly related to rightism. TABLE 4-21 ACE, LENGTH or RESIDENCY IN COMMUNITY, AND RADICAL RIGHTISM (AGE = LESS THAN FIFTY) Length of Residence 5 Yrs. or 6-20 21 or Less Years more Yrs . (N) N°n~31ghtists 14% 63% 237. (97) Right late 21 49 30 (53) x2 = 2.8 P<.30 \ tha ‘As reported in a later section of this chapter, more Rightists 1!: 2 Non-Rightists do, in fact, mention that they do not feel accepted to the community. This lack of a sense of belonging may also be related a1 1 heir general tendency to distrust other people, and feelings of 1ng°nation, powerlessness, and anomy, which would impede then in form- close social relationships. (see Chapter 7.) 137 TABLE 4-22 OBJECTIVE STATUS MOBILITY OF PERSONS RESIDING FOR LESS THAN TEN YEARS IN THEIR COMMUNITY AND RADICAL RIGHTISM Status Nobility loss no change gain (N) Ron-Rightists 13% 20% 67% (30) Rightists 44 22 35 (23) x2 = 7.7 94.02 There is another disproportionately large cluster of Rightists who (see Table 4-21) have lived in their conunity for nest of their adult life (nore than twenty years). This group is likely to resent strongly the invasion of newer, influential persons into their community's status structure. The strong attraction which rightism has for "old tithe" residents is even more evident when we examine the relationship between rightism and period of residency for persons in their fifties and sixties: nearly half of the Rightists in this age group have lived in their communities for more than thirty years. (Table 4-23.) Furthermore, more old-time resident (having lived twenty or more years in their community) Rightists than Non-Rightists have suffered from °bJoct1vo1y downward social mobility. (Table 4-24.) Rightism thus app.8rs to attract some of its following from old-time residents whose frustrations have two sources: (1) they are growing old and are being replaced in the status structure by younger men and women; (2) they 11 ave OXperienced a lifetime of declining social status. 138 TABLE 4-23 AGE, LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN COMMUNITY, AND RADICAL RIGHTISM (AGE 3 50-69) Length of Residence Under 20 21-30 31 or lore Years Years Years (N) Non-Rightists 54% 21% 25% (48) Rightists 28 26 46 (72) 2 x ' 8.9 P(.02 TABLE 4-24 OBJECTIVE STATUS IOBILITY OF PERSONS RESIDING FOR TWENTY OR MORE YEARS IN THEIR COMIUNITY AND RADICAL RIGHTISN Status Mobility loss no change gain (N) Non-Right ists 26% 29% 45% (49) Rightists 45 15 40 (58) x2 = 4.8 P(.10 A brief note on statistical tests is in order here. Since our two groups are not probability samples, we cannot legitimately make ‘tatistical inferences from them to larger segments of the population. Nor Can we determine what proportion of the differences found between the two samples on some variable represent sampling errors and true differences. Nevertheless, we are confronted with the 91013103 0‘ evaluating the validity of a theory using empirical evidence. Statis- tic‘l tools can aid us in this process. Operating on th' pragmatic amaunption that a little information is better than no information (if on e is aware of the information's limitations, we use tests of 139 statistical significance in this study to help us assess the likelihood that differences found between the two samples do not reflect random variations. No technical validity is asserted or assumed. This pragmatic Justification also applies to confidence levels. While most of the relationships discussed represent differences between Rightists and Non-Rightists with statistical significance at the con- fidence level of .05, some relationships are reported (although given as ”tendencies") with significance levels of .10, or on some occasions, even .20 -.30. While a scrupulous researcher might reject the practice of reporting relationships whose levels of statistical significance fail. to satisfy the usual criterion of .05, we are Justified here, I beliove, because the acceptance or rejection of the status frustration thes1s does not depend on any single test. Indeed, quite the opposite is true, since a variety of different variables are used throughout tho study to test many subhypotheses operationally. It is the overall Pattern of our findings which ultimately determines the tenability of “1. basic thesis, and the reporting of an occasional significance level which is higher than convention usually dictates is hardly misleading in a complex analysis."' \ i I"Kenneth R. Hammond and James B. Householder offer this advice Y: their statistics text Introduction to the Statistical Method (New ‘1‘: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962): In view of the actual practices of research investigators, then, it seems to us that the conventional "accept-reject" rule 81lould be supplanted by an "accept-pursue-reject" rule. Three aDocific regions of the sampling distribution in question ought to be specified...the region of rejection of Ho, might be re- tained as the .05 region.... But the region from .05 to .15 m1ght well be associated with a decision to "pursue," while the re"laining region...might be associated with a decision to accept H0. (As a matter of fact, there are good grounds for suspecting 1"-hat in many cases the region actually associated with "pursuit" 140 4. OBJECTIVE VALUE DIFFERENCES Differences in values and behavior can also seriously affect peoples' status. This is particularly true when individuals persist in maintaining traditional values which are in sharp contrast to the more cosmopolitan values of their associates and many people in their com- munity. Because their beliefs and behavior are different they may find themselves rejected socially--consequently experiencing what we have been calling status frustrations. Persons holding and acting on tradi- tional values may, at the same time, be further resentful because they feel their values are no longer esteemed and given proper deference. The empirical data Clearly show that Rightists subscribe to values different from those of Non-Rightists, and strongly resent the non- Practice of these traditional values in modern society. Specifically, we hypothesize that rightists adhere to an ethos Which emphasizes hard work, the denial of immediate consumption desires in Order to satisfy long term goals, and individualism. Historically, these beliefs are associated with what Weber calls the Protestant Ethic. Rzl~ghi::l.sm is strongly related to belief in the Protestant Ethic, as measured empirically by a six item scale.* (Table 4-25.) Religious fundamentalism, it was argued, underlies many of the attltudes and values expressed in radical rightism. Our Rightists are, in fact, greatly influenced by Fundamentalism. Their commitment to \ Th now approximates .05 to .25.) (p. 379) e eRainination of alternative indicators of "status frustration" can ":1 us be considered a case of pursuit. 0th 1“See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of how this and the er Scalar measures used in this study were constructed. 141 Protestant Ethic Scale 1 . What this country needs most is a return to the simple virtues of individual initiative and self-reliance. .2.. Too many people today are spending their money for unnecessary things, instead of saving or investing it for the future. :3. A man can't be respected unless he's worked hard for some important goal. 44. Thrift and industriousness are the most important traits a man should develop. 5 . What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination and the will to work and fight for family and country. 6 . Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. Kuder-Richardson Coefficient of Internal Consistency - .87 TABLE 4-25 BELIEF IN THE PROTESTANT ETHIC VS. RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX Protestant Ethic (high) (low) _I_ E III _I_! (N) (low) I 12% 11% 33% 44% (75) Radical n 17 26 29 27 (92) ItlgflltfiLsm Index 111 30 28 28 13 (92) (high) IV 30 36 27 7 (77) Kruskal-Wallis H--Test = 41.5 p<.001 Gamma - .38 142 furudamentalist religious beliefs is clearly evident in their responses to a scalar measure.* (Table 4-26.) The Fundamentalism Index signifi- cantly correlates (product moment) +.39 with the Protestant Ethic Scale for our sample. The Rightist's beliefs are matched by their religious practices: nearly half of the Rightists attend churches of fundamentalist denom- inations. (Table 4-27.) A further breakdown of denominations shows that 32% (N = 54) of the Rightists are members of churches which can I“The Index of Religious Fundamentalist Beliefs was drawn from Gerhard Lensky's The Religious Factor (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 8; Co - , 1961). 1. Believe in God "Yes" - l oint "No" or uncertain" = 0 points 2. Believe in life after death "Yes' 3 1 point "No” or "uncertain" = 0 points 3. Believe that in next life (if "yes" to Q. 2) some peOple will be punished by God. '9 H - . Yes - I paint "No" or "uncertain" = 0 points 4. Views on Bible a. The Bible is God's word and all it says is true. 3 2 points b. The Bible was written by men inspired by God, and its moral and religious teachings are true, but because the writers were men, it contains some errors. ' 1 point Other responses 3 0 points 143 be considered as §g££§,* compared to only 7% (N = l2) of the Non- Rightists. The beliefs of sects represent the most antimodernistic fundamentalist positions.4 It was noted that Fundamentalism and traditional values are historically most common in rural areas and small towns, since they are environments which are farthest removed from and most hostile to cos- mopolitanism. As predicted, Rightists were more frequently brought up in rural areas and small towns of less than 5,000 people than Non- Rightists.** (Table 4-28.) TABLE 4-26 INDEX OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALIST BELIEFS VS. RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX Fundamentalist Beliefs 9 I, II III I! X, (N) Mean S.D. Radical I 19% 11% 12% 20% 20% 19% (75) 2.7 1.8 Rightism Index II 7 10 20 32 26 7 (92) 2.8 1.3 III 4 8 10 17 27 34 (92) 3.6 1. IV 4 5 10 13 27 4O (77) 3.8 1.4 Kruskal-Wallis H-Test = 33.4 P<.001 Gamma = .31 *Denominations considered as "sects" include Pentacostals, unaffiliated Baptists, and "Independent" Pundamentalists. ‘*While this difference may arise because the Rightists as a group are older and, at the time they were young, more people lived on farms, the relevant point is that the socialization experiences differ. This data is based on question 88 in the interview. 1 =14 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND RADICAL RIGHTISM Protestant Protestant Non-Fundamen— Fundamen- Catholic talist talist Other (N) Non-Rightist 19% 56% 17% 3% (167) Rightist 8 41 44 7 (169) Non-Fundamentalist Protestant - Presbyterian, Christian Scientist, Unitarian, Episcopalian, Methodist, Congregational, Quaker, Luthern, Protestant (no denomination given), and "other" liberal denominations. Fundamentalist Protestant - Church of Christ, Church of Nazarene, Disciples of Christ, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptist, Pentacostal, Assemblies of God, Church of God, Jehovah's Witnesses, Latter Day Saints, and "non-denominational-independent." These categories are derived from the codes used by Benton Johnson in his research published as:"Ascetic Protestanism and Political Preference in the Deep South," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (1964), No. 4; "other" includes atheist, agnostic, other philosophic positions, and Jewish. TABLE 4-28 PLACE IN WHICH RESPONDENT CREW UP Rural or town Town greater less than 5,000 than 5,000 pepulation pOpulation (N) Non-Rightists 53% 47% (165) Rightists 64 36 (163) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 4.0 P(.05 5. SUBJECTIVE REACTIONS T0 STATUS We have seen that Rightists differ from Non-Rightists on several objective indicators of status. Their greater intergenerational status mobility, educational discrepancies, and period of residency in the community all seem likely to expose the Rightists to serious status 145 anxieties. The Rightists' beliefs and behavior, reflecting a strong commitment to traditional values and religious Fundamentalism, differ significantly from the more cosmopolitan ways of their peers, a fact which tends further to compound their status anxieties. The overall pattern of these findings consistently supports the hypothesis that Rightists experience frustrations because of status difficulties. The Rightists' subjective reactions to their current status and values also reflect their sense of social dispossession and frustration. Sublgctive Reactions to Achieved Status Do the Rightists feel dissatisfied with their current social position? Their responses to several questions suggest the answer is "yes." Some Rightists tend to overrate themselves socially. 0n ob- Jective measures of social status, approximately twice as many Non- Rightists as Rightists are in the upper-status ranks. (See Tables 4-1, 4.) Yet when asked to evaluate their own social class: twice as many Rightists as Non-Rightists said they were "upper-class." (Table 4-29.) Although the number responding in this way is small, this ten- dency was exhibited equally by Rightist status gainers and decliners (as measured by intergenerational occupational mobility). It is safe to assume that these Rightists, who see themselves on a higher status plane than they objectively "deserve" according to society, are dis- turbed by the discrepancy. The Rightists' perceptions of how social acceptance and higher position are achieved also reflect their problems with status. In *This is Question 50 in the interview. 146 answering the question "How hard do you think it is for people today to move upward from one social class to another?"* both Rightists and Non- Rightists replied "Hard" about equally. But when asked the reason for their answer, Rightists and Non-Rightists differed sharply. The Rightist answers most often reflected a personalized perception that society is closed, that, for example, social advancement "depends on having money; ...It's hard for the poor man since money speaks and in- fluences other people." Other Rightists said: it depends on who you know, if in good with big shots; difficult to work for it by yourself; have to have both money and unusual capabilities, and not many people have both; not much opportunity; its getting harder; doors are closed as to who gets in. These responses seem to represent personal knowledge. The Non- Rightists, in contrast, gave abstract or sociologically descriptive answers. (Table 4-30.) Typically, they said that social mobility "depends on education"; "people must work hard and have abilities to get it"; "it requires social skills"; "it you have the desire and goal, then you can accomplish what you want." The disparity in perceptions of the two groups may result from dissimilar social experiences.** Disappointment over occupational advancement can be another source of frustration which predisposes peeple to become rightists. And, in fact, more Rightists than Non-Rightists tended to express *This is Question 51 in the interview. **The Rightists' extrapunitive tendency to blame others for their own social failures probably also plays an important role in their answers being more personalized than those given by the Non-Rightists. (See Chapter 6, section on extrapunitiveness, for a full discussion of this psychological mechanism.) 147 TABLE 4-29 SELF-EVALUATION OF SOCIAL CLASS Class Upper Upper-Iiddle Lower-Middle Lower (N) Non-Rightists ' 3% 67% 29% 1% (151) Rightists 7 58 35 o (155) x2 = 6.8 p<.1o TABLE 4-30 REASONS GIVEN FOR DIFFICULTIES IN MOVING UPNARD SOCIALLY Personalized- Impersonal- Closed Society Sociological View Perspective (N) Non-Rightists 40% 60% (42) Rightists 73 27 (48) x2 (corrected for continuity) 3 8.5 P<.Ol pessimistic views about their (or their husbands') job futures. Males were asked about their current jobs and their future in them; females were asked about their husbands' jobs.* While both groups gave satisfied-dissatisfied answers in about the same prOportion, male and working-wife Rightists were less optimistic about future job prospects than were the Non-Rightists. (Tables 4—31, 32. Since a man's Occupa- tion plays an important role in determining his associates, income, and general style of life, uncertainty or gloominess about his career causes anxiety. While women generally share their husbands' status, it seems likely that working wives, many of whom work to supplement their *These are Questions 75, 75(8), 78 (E & F), and 79 (c & D). 148 TABLE 4-31 HOW FUTURE OF JOB LOOKS (MALES) Excellent, Fair, Poor Good or Don't Know (N) Non~Rightists 87% 13% (84) Rightists 75 25 (87) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 3.03 .05(P(.10 TABLE 4-32 How FUTURE or HUSBAND'S JOB LOOKS (WORKING WIVES) Fair, Excellent Good Don't Know (N) Non-Rightists 54% 27% 18% (22) Rightists 22 67 11 (9) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 3.5 .10(P(.20 husbands' incomes so they may live at an higher economic level, are also highly sensitive about their husbands' occupational future and status position. The right believes that both nations and communities are con- trolled by a cabalist elite.‘ Welch, for example, talks of "insiders" ItThe belief that a cabalist group secretly controls things is historically endemic and rather widespread in the population. For his- torical examples see Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), especially Chapter 1; Gustavus Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States, edited by Henry M. Christman (New YorkIICapricorn Books, 1960). Hans Tech, in his The Social Psychology of Social Movements, discusses in some detail the social and psychological functions of this kind of belief (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- Merrill Co., 1965--see particularly Chapter 3, "The Benefit of Perceiving Conspiracies"). Robert Lane has probed the lives of four typical American 149 who deliberately pull ...within their conspiratorial circle the sons of the very powerful and the very rich."5 These "Insiders" "...now occupy most of the positions of great prestige and influence in Washington and London and Paris, as well as in the financial, educational, and pub- lishing circles of the whole world...."6 Some Rightists blame their low status on this kind of group, who, they allege, also run their community as well as the nation. We explored this source of resentment by asking, "Do you think that the people who are influential in this community are, in general, friendly peOple willing to help you out, or are they cliquish and keep to themselves?"* Overall, more Rightists than Non-Rightists said "cliquish,” with the response being most often voiced by Rightists whose intergenerational status had declined (32% to 20% for status gainers). (Table 4-33.) TABLE 4-33 FEELING THAT COMMUNITY INFLUENTIALS ARE ”CLIQUISH" on "FRIENDLY" Influential People Are: Friendly Cliquish (N) Non-Rightists 83% 17% (155) Rightists 76 24 (155) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 1.9 P(.20 citizens who, while not members of organized political movements, sub- scribe to cabalist beliefs. Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Chapter 7. *Question 49. 150, That some Rightists feel deliberately excluded from their com- munity's influence-structure is reflected in their replies to a follow- up question--why did they answer "cliquish." While there are too few responses to analyze statistically, the Rightists tended to give two types of reasons which give us some insight into their frustrations. Rightists who were experiencing a decline in their intergenerational occupational status tended to see their community "run by small cliques," believing that "old residents tend to look upon new people as outsiders." Others said that "certain families run things here," or that there existed "segregated groups who want their own way." A few mentioned that the cliquish influentials "all share common political views," a perception which probably reflects the different values and behavioral styles of each group. Among Rightists who had experienced upward social mobility (as measured by intergenerational occupational mobility), the most frequently given replies show a sensitivity to their differential social positions and reiterate their feelings that things are run by a small closed group out to advance its own interests at the expense of other groups. One Rightist said "they want to enhance their'status, for themselves." Another alleged "their own personal ambitions" make them cliquish, and one said "they want to be leaders." Although these data are only suggestive, they nevertheless illustrate the way some Rightists see their community run by a cabalist elite. In Chapter Seven, additional empirical evidence is presented which further describes the Rightists' sense of powerlessness and alienation. Subjective Reactions to Value Differences Rightists, we have seen, generally adhere to traditional Prot- estant Ethic and fundamentalist beliefs. Conflicts between their own 151 living styles and those practiced by more cosmopolitan persons are likely to produce status anxieties and resentments among the rightists. Our Rightists' replies to questions probing these feelings strongly support this hypothesis. That the Rightists are disturbed by newer values is evident throughout the interview. Nearly every Rightist, for example, answered "yes" to the question "Are there any differences between what you be- lieve should be the American way of life, and the way things are done n‘ in this country nowadays? (Table 4-34.) More significantly, when those who replied "Yes" were asked to specify what differences bothered them, it was the Rightists again who most often answered they were dissatisfied with current values and morality. (Table 4-35.) Some of the answers they gave included these comments: morality and standards are going bad; the American way of life is deteriorating because of a suppression of morality; we need a moral and spiritual revival among our leaders; we need to follow the Ten Commandments more; country now believes in material rather than spiritual ideals; too much credit given, and Spending; teachers teach pornography; we should return to belief in God. Whether Rightists see important differences between their own values and those practiced by the rest of society was probed directly in a question which immediately followed the items which ascertained their commitment to the Protestant Ethic. We asked: ’To what extent do you think other people today share your beliefs about the importance of individual initiative, taking care of oneself more, respect for authority, and the other ‘things we Just mentioned? Would you say that EVERYONE, MOST PEOPLE, SOME PEOPLE, or NO ONE share(s) your belief about the importance of these principles today? (No. 60) *Question 40. TABLE 4-3 4 BELIEVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT SHOULD BE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE AND WAY THINGS ARE ACTUALLY DONE No* Yes (N) Non-Rightists 29% 71% (167) Rightists 7 93 (169) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 26.1 P(.001 1"includes 6 "don't knows" for Non-Rightists, 2 "don't knows" for Rightists. TABLE 4-35 WHAT'S WRONG WITH CURRENT AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE Dissatisfied with current values and morals other (N) Non-Rightists 14% 86% (167) 31 69 (169) Rightists x2 (corrected for continuity) = 12.0 P<.001 Rightists were somewhat more disposed to answer "Some" or "No one" than were Non-Rightists (Table 4-36), and when asked why they said this, a disprOportionate number of Rightists specifically mentioned that the evident declining state of morality in this country showed them that many persons do not share their values. Their answers included: I am worried about the drift of the country; the amount of icrime and disrespect for authority shows things are going ‘the other way; we must instill more emphasis on respect, integrity, and individual responsibility; parents aren't ‘teaching their children the right things anymore; many people irresponsible and therefore wouldn't agree with these Irrinciples; many people don't look to future to take care of themselves; parents pamper children--don't control them any- more; individual initiative and other moral principles not being taught in the schools. Still other Rightists gave responses which clearly implied they were quite aware of, and troubled by, significant differences between their principles and those to which other peOple subscribe, even though the principles were not explicitly mentioned. (Table 4-37.) These replies had this form: Most people don't agree with me that something is wrong with the way things are going; election results show that only one-third of people think as I do; can see peOple disagreeing all the time; just look at the way the country is going. TABLE 4-36 EXTENT TO WHICH BELIEVE OTHER PEOPLE SHARE YOUR VALUES Everyone, most Some, No peOple do one (N)* Non-Rightists 56% 44% (166) Rightists 47 53 (167) x2 (corrected for continuity) 3 2.6 P(.15 ’Three "don't know" or "no answer" responses not included. TABLE 4-37 WHY BELIEVE SOME PEOPLE DON'T SHARE VALUES For reasons of value decline and other major differences Other reasons (N) Non-Rightists 28% 71% (167) Rightists 41 59 (169) x2 (corrected for continuity) = 6.0 P<.02 The clearest evidence which shows that Rightists are greatly crissatdsfied with the values practiced in modern America comes from 'theiJr responses to explicit requests for evaluations of 154 the state of current morality and the teaching of traditional principles in the schools. Two scales were constructed, made up of the following items: Traditional Values in Schools Scale 1. The schools should increase their emphasis on teaching Americanism. 2. We should increase the teaching of respect for authority in schools. 3. Modern education is resulting in the loss of American moral values. Kuder-Richardson Coefficient of Internal Consistency . .86 Moral Breakdown Scale 1. Modern education is resulting in the loss of American moral values- 2. There has not been a general breakdown of moral standards in our country. (Reversed in scoring) 3. What this country needs most is a return to love of country and old-fashioned patriotism. 4. If we would return to the religious, moral, and family values of the past, we could solve most of today's social problems. Knder-Richardson Coefficient of Internal Consistency = .87 The extraordinary monotonic association between radical rightism and these two scales (Tables 4-38, 39.) graphically illustrates the Rightists' intense feelings about the status of their traditional values in modern American life. Their strong commitment to such values, and their feelings that they are not being practiced today, must produce an acute sense of frustration and resentment. TABLE 4-38 RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX vs. "MORAL BREAKDOWN" SCALE Moral Breakdown (high) (low) ‘l 11 III I! (N) (low) I 2% 12% 29% 57% (75) Radical Rightism II 10 25 30 35 (92) Index 111 36 30 23 ll (92) (high) IV 53 35 9 3 (77) Kruskal-Wallis H-Test = 122.6 P<.001 Gamma = .66 TABLE 4-39 RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX vs. "TRADITIONAL VALUES IN SCHOOLS" SCALE Traditional Values (high) (low) 3. II 111 g! (N) (low) I 3% 16% 32% 49% (75) Radical Rightism II 3 as 31 33 (92) Index 111 30 35 22 13 (92) (high) IV 39 48 9 4 (77) Kruskal-Wallis II-Test = 96.5 P(.001 Gamma = .59 The Rightists' generalized and overriding concern with values snows up even in questions which have little direct connection to such issues. Regardless of what tOpic is raised--what problems they worry about, what community matters they discuss, what qualities they admire in "great people," what things Communists believe, etc.--many Rightists are prone to volunteer answers heavily colored by traditional values. The following replies, taken from a single interview, illustrate this 1: endency : (Q. 1) Are there any problems in America which you are par- ticularly concerned or worried about? A GREAT THE DETERIORATING CONDITION OF MORALS IN GENERAL. DESTROYING DEAL OF VANDALISM--WRECKING CHURCHES AND SCHOOLS. OF INITIATIVE AND INCENTIVE THROUGH HIGH TAXATION.... (Q. 4b) What local government or community matters have you seriously talked about during the past year? MOSTLY TAXATION AND MORALITY. CROSS ON THE BUTTE. WE WERE IN FAVOR OF THE BEAUTIFUL SYMBOL AND COULDN'T UNDERSTAND CHRISTIAN PEOPLE WANTING TO TAKE IT DOWN. (Q. 39) Would you tell me someone who in your opinion is a great American; and what is it about him that you admire most? JOHN GLENN--HE IS A REAL PATRIOTIC, STRAIGHT FORWARD MAN. A GOOD CHRISTIAN, BOY SCOUTS, GOOD MORAL INFLUENCE. BILLY GRAHAM--HIS LEADERSHIP IN CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE. A REALLY GREAT AMERICAN. (Q. 40) What difference do you see between what should be the American Way of Life and the way things are done in this country nowadays? I THINK THE PRESENT METHOD OP TAXATION IS STIFLING INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE. . . I AM ABSOLUTELY NAUSEATED WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LIBERAL BUT ARE UP INTO HIGH PLACES AND W'sm1MISTIC HINDED. THEY THINK THAT THE AVERAGE AMERICAN CAN '1‘ CONTROL HIS OWN MONEY. THEY THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HANDLE IT ALL. gQi 60) Why do you feel that only some people share your e iefs about the importance of individual initiative, taking care or oneself more, etc.? YOU CAN TALK TO PEOPLE AND MOST OF THEM START TO SAY THEY WANT TO BE THRIFTY, BUT WHEN YOU FIND OUT HOW THEY ACTUALLY LIVE THEY WANT EVERYTHING RIGHT NOW AND HAVE MORTGAGES AND EVERYTHING. THEY REALLY DEEP DOWN WISH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAND IT OUT TO THEM. I HAVE SOME FRIENDS WHO FEEL AS I DO, HOWEVER. (Q. 62) How would you describe the typical member of an anti-Communist group like the John Birch Society--what kind of a person would he or she be? HE IS A PERSON WHO KNOWS MONEY VALUES, IS PATRIOTIC. MORE INCLINED TO WANT TO DE-CENTRALIZE ALL BUT LOCAL GOVERNMENT. WELL READ, MORAL PERSON. The tendency to perceive issues in value-laden terms is gener- ally characteristic of Rightists. To the twelve open-ended questions in the interview which had elicited value responses,”I Rightists gave ‘many more such multiple responses than did Non-Rightists. (Table 4-40.) TABLE 4-40 NUMBER OP OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS ON WHICH "VALUE AND MORALITY" TYPE RESPONSES ARE GIVEN VS. RADICAL RIGHTISM INDEX Percent of People Giving This Many Such Responses 2 .1. a 2. 2. .5. 2 2. E (N) Non-Rightists 42% 29% 18% 8% 1% 1% 1% -- -- (167) Rightists 15 28 28 14 7 7 - l l (169) P<.001** *These were questions 1, 4b, 5c, 6b, 7b, 8b, 39, 40b, 60, 62, 64, and 66. :**The test of statistical significance is the KolmOgorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test, a non-parametric test which Compares the distribution on a set of values for two samples.7 A non-parametric test is required since the distribution of counts is severely skewed, and therefore a test which makes no assumptions for normality of distribution is nec- essary. This KolmOgOlov-Smirnov test has the added advantage of being very sensitive to variations in distribution. 6. TWO OTHER TESTS AND A CONCLUDING NOTE By means of two direct questions, we sought to find out whether respondents felt deprived of their contemporaries' respect and acceptance. One asked "In your own case, for example, do you think that everyone gives you as much respect as you feel you deserve?"* Significantly more Rightists than Non-Rightists answered "No,' even though relatively few persons admitted this, with the wording and response categories ** Interestingly, Rightists who have lost status (on being so blunt. the basis of their intergenerational occupational mobility) said "No" twice as often (22% vs. 11%) as did Rightists whose occupational mobility was upward.*** Again we see that persons experiencing declines in their status seem most responsive to rightism. Lack of social acceptance is another source of what we have been calling status frustrations. Everyone who was not born in the community where he then resided was asked: How have the people in this community accepted you? Do you feel you are accepted and part of the community, or still considered an outsider, or what? (Question 85b) People, generally, seem unwilling to admit they are having social dif- ficulties. Yet more Rightists than Non-Rightists said, relatively, I"Question 52. ** Sixteen percent of the Rightists replied "No," compared to only seven percent of the Non-Rightists. (P(.02) *‘*The figures for Non-Rightists saying "No" are correspondingly 9% vs. 3%. The levels of statistical differences between Non-Rightists and Rightists is (.20)P).10) for "status losers" and (.10>P>.05) for "status gainers." 159 that they felt unaccepted.* As before, the least degree of acceptance was voiced by the Rightists whose objective status had declined.** And, although the feeling of not being accepted is associated most frequently with relative newness to the community, among newcomers it is again *#* among the Rightists that feelings of nonacceptance are most pronounced. On the basis of this data, how has the status frustration thesis fared? The empirical evidence that Rightists are greatly distressed by value conflicts is clear and conclusive, I believe. That they are ex- periencing anxieties over their social status seems generally supported by the data on their objective status attributes and subjective re- actions to questions involving social position, respect, and acceptance. But these latter data are far from conclusive, and require further dis- cussion, since ultimately we must decide whether to accept or reject the theory laid out earlier. The weak relationships found may simply reflect the fact that the status frustration thesis is 223 correct. But rejecting the thesis seems overly harsh, particularly since many predictions did prove correct, though admittedly levels of statistical significance were some- times below strict statistical criteria. The problem arises, I believe, 1"16% vs. 10%, P(.25 (N-l4l & 148). Accepted included categories (If "Completely accepted" or "Accepted with no qualifications." Non- .Accepted included "Accepted with some qualifications" all the way to "Not accepted at all." * * This objective measure of status is based on intergenerational «occupational changes in status. 24% of the "status loser" Rightists fielt unaccepted, compared to 8% of the "status loser" Non-Rightists. ***Of the people who had lived in the community for 10 years or less, 31% of the Rightists expressed "nonacceptance" feelings, compared to 19% of the Non-Rightists. Given the few people in each group (29 Rightists, 37 Non-Rightists) the difference is not statistically signi- ficant; but the trend is interesting. 160 because there are many types of status deprivation, and many causes of it. Different situations can produce status anxieties, but the analysis looked at only one facet at a time. For example, some Rightists may experience status anxieties because they have lost economic power and social position. Others may be deeply upset because they see cherished traditional values not being practiced today. It would be unlikely that 21251 Rightist is disturbed by his values, his position, his age, his treatment by influential peOple, etc. But the strategy of analysis employed in this chapter follows this logic: all Rightists are run against all Non-Rightists. Consequently, since only a certain propor- tion of rightistscan be expected to manifest their particular kind of frustration.on any single measure, strong relationship never emerges. This problem is partially caused by the small size of our samples; establishing more than a few controls would render our study quantitatively meaningless. This problem is not insurmountable, however; some kind of combined measure of status deprivation would allow us to more adequately test the thesis, even with a sample this size. But, construction of this measure is no easy task. A theoretical model must first be developed (like the one used to construct the Radical Rightism Index) and then empirically defined. An attempt to use a simple cumulative cxnInt measure has proved futile. The development of a more sophisti- cated and hence considerably more complex measure is now in a planning stage, but both the theory and the data transformations upon which this index is predicated are beyond the scope of the current study. Some of the blame for the weakness of the findings must also fal].:on the research instrument. Some questions were poorly worded and thus failed to elicit feelings of frustration and resentment. For 161 example, we should not have asked our interviewees so bluntly about whether people respected them, and then forced them to answer simply H "Yes or "No." We should have led up to the point more carefully, em- phasized that few people get all_the respect that they wish and that such a response by them was very acceptable, and lastly, provided response categories which allowed subtle differentiations to be made. These changes are, of course, always easier to see in retrospect than when writing the instrument. The comparatively lower degrees of significance found in the objective achieved status data also reflect their imprecision as measures of status. Theoreticallyymany criteria affect an individual's status or level of prestige. While the attributes of occupation and education provide the best two single indicators of rank, they are not perfectly correlated with an individual's total prestige ranking. Thus a person's assigned score on the measures used is at best only an em- pirical approximation to what we consider the individual's "total I We therefore should have obtained additional indicators of status." status-rank. Exactly this kind of imprecision was reported by Lipset when he examined the hypothesis that status incongruities are related to support of McCarthyism. Using available survey data he reported a lack of success in finding empirical support for the hypothesis. But he I"See Joseph A. Kahl and James A. Davis, "A Comparison of Indexes of SociOchonomic Status," Amer. Sociological Review, 29 (1955): 317-25, where they analyzed 19 stratification measures and in a factor analysis found that two major factors emerged. One factor was basically composed of occupation and education. The second factor seemed related to cer- tain prestige measures, such as ecological indicators, status of parents and ethnic group. reports that one study found subjective perceptions of status discrepancy were related to McCarthyism.8 More adequate measures of a sense of frustration should have been employed in this study. A second theoretical problem with most objective measures of status (and the fault is shared here) is that they do not include the criteria of values and behavioral style which are important determinants of prestige-rank. As our society becomes more and more homogenized on certain criteria of status (clothing, possession of an automobile, taking long vacations, and other consumption indicators), other marks of prestige increasingly play a major role in social stratification, and future attempts to define status will have to take account of these variables as well. In sum, the overall pattern of the findings tends to support the thesis that Rightists are persons who are discontented with their degree of social acceptance, position, influence, and the lack of deference shown toward their strongly held traditional values. Other chapters, particularly Chapter 7, provide additional data which support the contention that Rightists are very frustrated persons. A more definitive assessment of the status frustration thesis's correctness will have to wait until further data is collected. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 August B. Hollingshead, Unpublished manuscript, (Department of Sociology, Yale University, n.d.). These weights were empirically determined. See W. Lloyd Warner, and others, Social Class in America (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949); August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlick, "Social Stratification and Psychiatric Disorders,' Am. Soc. Review, 29 (1953): 161-69. Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 92-98; see earlier dis- cussion in Chapter 3. See Martin E. Marty, "Sects and Cults," Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 332 (1960): 125-135; Willard L. Sperry, Religion in America (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946); Benton Johnson,_IAscetic Protestantism and Political preference in the Deep South," Am. J. Sociolggy, 22 (1964), No. 4. From a reprint of an article "The Truth in Time," which originally appeared in the November, 1966 issue of American Opinion, p. 7. Ibid., p. 27. S. Siegel, Non—Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956). Robert Sokol, "Rank Inconsistency and McCarthyism: An Empirical 'Test," (unpublished paper, Dartmouth College), cited in Seymour M. Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right-62," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963). 163 CHAPTER 5 THE STATUS ENHANCING FUNCTIONS OF RADICAL RIGHTISM The evidence is persuasive that Rightists are frustrated be- cause others fail to pay proper deference to them and their values. People in this position are not likely to accept this passively; they are hypothesized to use radical rightism as a device to enhance their feelings of importance, status, and self-respect. 1. THE GOODNESS AND GREATNESS OF BEING A RIGHTIST Radical rightism allows its adherents to raise their sense of self-worth in two ways. Through its emphasis on patriotism and anti- Communism, rightists can identify with "true Americanisn." This is an identification which should reward them with greater respect fro. their fellow citizens. Second, their fervent anti-Communism allows them to feel superior to persons with more education and higher social position. By attacking people they label Communists, and tearing down their reputations, the rightists elevate their own sense of status. [any rightists carry on their crusade against Communism with great sincerity, and believe they are saving their country from an in- sidious enemy. In their recruiting efforts, and to each other, right- ists frequently affirm that they are trying to "save your country, your 164 165 home, and your life itself...."1 Rightist organizations constantly re- inforce their members' feelings of self-importance by emphasizing the significance of the job they are doing. As a representative excerpt from a rightist communiqué’tells them: ...We can fortify our spirits with a realization of the historic and humanitarian importance of the job we have undertaken; of the staggering responsibility that now rests on our shoulders. That responsibility is not just for the future freedom of our own country, our children, and our- selves. To an increasing number of the best informed and most honorable citizens of other nations throughout the world, the John Birch Society now appears as the last hope of saving their country, their children, and themselves from Communist slavery.2 (emphasis in original) Statements like this, which invigorate the rightista' sense of mission and dedication, are found in almost all of their publications. Their function, whether consciously planned or not, is to instill feelings of importance and respectability among members who, as we have seen, need to have their sense of personal worth and public status asserted. A sense of greatness is deliberately fostered through associa- tion with rightism: an adherent who is militantly dedicated to conbatting Communism earns a special claim to honor, especially if he feels he is making a personal sacrifice. Exaggerated assertions of the greatness which all rightists share are constantly reiterated in their literature. Here are excerpts from three separate Birch Society Monthly Bulletins, illustrating Welch's continuous efforts to bolster his followers' self- image: November,fil964 Finally, by joining the John Birch Society you will become a part of the finest body of men and women in the whole world today. For any friend you might lose you will gain two new ones far more loyal and worthwhile. You will be amazed, perhaps, but certainly thrilled and encouraged, to find that there is so much honor, and loyalty, and 166 dedication to noble purposes, still extant among so many people. Rapidly learning how proud our members are of the Society and of each other, you will soon come to share that pride. And as you feel a tremendous satisfaction in doing your part to save for our children and their children the glorious country and humane civilization which we ourselves inherited. February, 1965 Ours is, beyond any question in my mind, the greatest, hardest working organization, most earnestly dedicated to noble purposes, that there is in the world today. And here is Welch's final sentence in the October, 1965 Bulletin, in which he states he wishes ...to thank all of our members once again for all of the devotion to our high ideals which makes of the John Birch Society the finest body of men and women in the world. no rightists assimilate this self-image as a result of their rightist activities? Our empirical data says "Yes." We explored this facet of rightism by the use of open-ended questions. Early in the interview we asked our respondents to name two individuals whom they consider "great persons" or "Americans," and then to describe what it is about these persons that they admire most.‘ Later, we asked every- one to describe "the typical member of an anti-Communist group like the John Birch Society.”" Ie assume that for Rightists the latter *Question (39)--"Tb change the subject now, we often hear people say about someone: 'He's a great person!’ Would you tell me someone who, in your opinion, is a great American. (8) What is it about (hill) (1101') that you ‘d‘ir. ”fit?" “Question (62)--"What kind of people do you think join anti- cdmnunist groups like the John Birch Society? How would you describe the typical member of an anti-Commist group like this--what kind of a person would he or she be?” 167 description is their idealized self-image, qua Rightists.* When we look at the qualities which Rightists use statistically more often than Non-Rightists to describe "great people," we discover they consistently use the same terms to characterize themselves. One quality of a "great person" particularly admired by many Rightists, and more frequently mentioned by them than by Non-Rightists, is concern with country and Americanism.*’ They gave such answers as "he is a true American patriot," ”wanted what was right for the N I. I! 0. country," "a patriotic man, has great love of his country, is dedicated to America and Americanism.” Seventy-five percent of the Rightists (compared to 22% of the Non-Rightists (P.80) and write letters to public officials (P).99). There is also little difference in how often they talk about community (P<.40) and school matters (P<.20). Both publicly active and organizational member Rightists are similar in their degree of concern with political "problems," participate equally in many rightist activities, and differ only in their public behavior. ’The measures were scores on the Radical Rightism Index (Table 2-5), Liberal-Conservative political attitudes (Table 2-6), and choice of candidate in the 1964 Presidential election (Table 2-7). See Chapter 2. *‘In order to concisely present these data I am simply reporting the degree of statistical difference between the two Rightist sub- samples on the variable being examined. The tests of statistical significance used were Chi-Square and Kruskal-Wallis H-tests, depend- ing on the nature of the data. 281 Values We have seen that Rightists are extremely concerned about current morality and the general declining status of traditional values in today's American society. Both groups share this concern with values and morals equally. They respond similarly to scales measuring the Protestant Ethic (P)~99), "traditional values in the schools" (P>.92), "nationalism" (P>.80), and "moral breakdown" (P).20). They also common- ly believe that 22225 people do not share their traditional values (P>.99) and see about the same degree of major differences between what they believe should be the American way of life and the way things are done at present (P).30). The Anomy Syndrome There are no significant differences between the two groups on several scalar measures of anomy: "trust of other people" (P).65), "political efficacy" (P)%85), "political alienation" (P)~50), "negative voting" (2)595), and "personal powerlessness" (P>515). Up to now we have seen there are only minor differences between the two groups of Rightists. Some important dissimilarities do emerge, however, in certain social characteristics and personality traits. Social Characteristics A majority of organizational Rightists consider themselves lower- middle class, in contrast to the bulk of publicly active Rightists, who evaluate themselves as upper-middle class. (Table 8-2.) This lower rating of their own social class membership is an accurate evaluation of their lower-objective occupational and educational status ranks. Occupationally,the organizational group is under-represented in white- 282 collar and small business categories, and gzgg-represented in semi-and unskilled categories. (Table 8-3.) A similar difference emerges be- tween the two groups on their amount of education, with the organiza- tional Rightists being underfrepresented in the "graduate education" category, and gzsrfrepresented in the "less than high school graduation" educational category. (Table 8-4.) There is no significant difference between the age distribution of the two groups (P).99), however. Sgglective Status Reactions The organizational Rightists also differ significantly from the publicly active Rightists in their reactions to how other people treat them. They more often say it is harder for people to move upward socially than do publicly active Rightists (P(.Ol), and more often feel that people give them $222 respect than they deserve (P(.10). They also feel much more excluded and snubbed by influential people in the com- munity than do publicly active Rightists, affirming more frequently that "connections and friends" are most important in becoming influential CP(.02) as well as mentioning less often that influential people are "friendly people willing to help you out" (P(.05). Personality Traits While both groups are similar in their responses to measures of anomy, some significant differences emerge on what could be called an TAutnomitarian Personality" factor. The organizational Rightists con- sistently score more extremely on several scales which are components of authoritarianism: "hostility" (K.Ol), "closed-mindedness" (P<.02), "intolerance of ambiguity" (P<.05), "dogmatic views on communism and 283 TABLE 8-2 COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLICLY ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBER RIGHTISTS ON SELF-EVALUATION OF SOCIAL CLASS a Class U.C. U.H.C. L.M.C. L.C. (N) Publicly Active Rightists 8% 64% 26% 2% (111) Organizational Member 4 41 54 - (46) Rightists x2 = 11.9 p<.05 *U.C. 3 Upper Class U.H.C. ' Upper-Middle Class L.I.C. ' Lower-Middle Class L.C. ' Lower Class TABLE 8-3 OCCUPATIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLICLY ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBER RIGHTISTS Occupation *Executives**White Collar Skilled and and Small Manual Semi and Professions Business Employees Unskilled Retired (N) Publicly Active 20% 34% 13% 8% 25% (102) Rightists Organizational 21 19 14 25 21 (43) lember Rightists x2 = 10.2 p<.05 ’Higher executives of larger concerns, proprietors, major professionals; business managers, proprietors of medium-sized businesses, and lesser professionals. I”Administrative personnel, owners small businesses, and minor pro- fessionals; clerical and sales workers, and technicians. TABLE 8-4 EDUCATIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLICLX ACTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBER RIGHTISTS Amount of Education Less than H.S. Grad., High School Post n.s. or College Graduate Graduation Some College Degree School (N) Publicly Active 22% 53% 12% 12% (117) Rightists Organizational Member 40 46 10 4 (50) Rightists x2 = 6.5 p<.1o f * I! ' Russia' (P(.lO), and anti-compromise' (P(.30).* Implication To summarize, the two groups of Rightists are similar in their degree of concern about community issues and matters involving tradi- tional values. They also take part equally in nonpublic political activities, and there are no differences in their responses to several indicators of anomy. But the sample of Rightists who are organizational members does differ significantly from that of the publicly active Rightists on three dimensions: they possess lower objective-achievement status (as measured by occupation and education), higher subjective sense of status frustration, and are more "authoritarian." 1"Although this difference does not satisfy the strict criterion of a .05 level of statistical significance, the pattern is worth noting. Furthermore, the difference would be P<.05 if the scale's four cate- gories are collapsed into three categories (high, medium, and low). The differences are consistent with other research which has found these same characteristics significantly associated with less political activity. While the literature on the relationship between "authoritarianism" and political behavior is highly inconsistent, some studies have found that high authoritarians participate less in politics than low scorers on measures of authoritarianism.2 The lower amount of participation in public activities by the organizational Rightists is also consistent with their lower occupational and educational status, since the literature overwhelmingly shows that lower-status persons are less likely to participate in politics than higher-status persons.3 It thus appears that the method of constructing the original sample--based on people who were publicly active--tended to under- represent certain social and personality characteristics in the original Rightist sample. This occurred because public activity is usually {associated with higher social status and low authoritarianism, thus attenuating two sets of personal attributes characterizing rightists. finiile this may account for some of the relatively weaker relationships found between Rightists and Non-Rightists on "achievement status" measures, the overwhelming differences which did emerge on the person- alaity measures becomes even more impressive. And the fact that all Rightists share common concerns with traditional values and display anomic feelings emphasizes the importance of these dimensions in the etiology of radical rightism. 3. A SUMMARY BY TYPOLOGY This has been an empirically based study of why people become radical rightists. In examining various social and personality factors and data have shown that Rightists, in comparison to Non-Rightists, have experienced more social mobility (particularly downward) and status anxieties, perceive significant differences between the traditional values they strongly believe in and those practiced by the rest of society, accept simplistic explanations and are generally closed-minded, displace their hostilities onto people to whom they attribute undesir- able qualities, and manifest feelings of personal alienation and power- I lessness. It has been further shown that by becoming Rightists they ‘ enhance their feelings of social status and self-worth, and use anti- Communism as a symbol to express their status and value frustrations by directing hostility against people who possess higher status and influ- ence and/or represent different values and ways of life. This study has tended to treat radical rightists as a monolithic group, sharing common ways of viewing society and expressing their common dissatisfactions and needs through the mechanism of rightism. While our Rightists share certain common characteristics, certain dif- ferences are also quite apparent. This implies that some differentia- tion should be made between types of rightists. Many variables have been examined in this study, and explanations have been offered to establish dynamic relations between social variables, personality traits, ideology, and behavior. Granting the multiple func- tions of rightism, and its multiple appeals which satisfy many distinc- tive needs, nevertheless certain attitudes, values, and personality traits seem to cluster together. Two distinctive patterns are apparent, and the following typology of rightists is suggested as a way of order- ing the variables examined in this study. Type I--The Status Seekers. This first group of rightists best fits the model that status frustrations and the desire for social esteem are motivational factors in the genesis of rightism. Among these rightists questions of social status, acceptance in the community, and the attainment of influence are most salient. Type II--The Culturally Alienated. This group of rightists conforms closest to the conceptualizations about value alienation, social isolation, and anomy. Unlike Type I rightists, who desire to be accepted [1 J into society and to achieve positions of social importance, the cultur- , ally alienated rightists do not want to be part of a society whose dom- V. 3mm. z _al- ‘- inant values and practices are incongruous with their own basic values and behavior. These rightists tend to be extremely religious, usually belong to Fundamentalist churches, view the world in terms of ascetic Protestant values, and equate Communism and Socialism with all they find wrong with today's world. There are many other variables on which the two types of Rightists would seem to differ; Figure 8-1 lists the major variables isolated in this study and contains estimates of how each type would be classified. Unfortunately these characterizations are based on estima- tions and have not yet been systematically tested. One statistical approach being explored uses modal or median responses to establish each group's typical characteristic on each variable. This typology offers at least two advantages in studying radical rightism. It first calls attention to the multiple appeals of rightism by emphasizing that persons may become rightists for a variety of reasons. Rightism performs many functions, and participation can be for one or a combination of them. While some of these factors may cluster naturally (as this typology suggests), there is nevertheless no pazeuettv fittelnutno aqi sustzufita II adfii high high high high high high high high mod. mod high high high high high high nKxi mod high high 288 m a m U m o 7? m m H n m m n» c m S1811q318 1 adxm Social Class J Status Frustration Acceptance in TVIOOS SSOTVA L117VNOSHHd KWONV mod low Community high high Desire for f—Protestant _ Ethic low mod Religious Fundamentalism 30d” mod Sense of Value -°1" -_M._e_en_ mod mod Acceptance of Sim- mm mod mod Closed-mindedness MOd mod Hostility mod mod Projection high high Concern with Power and Leadership ”0dr mod Personal 10* Powerlessness Alienation mod mod Lack of trust of other people Efficacy mod mod Group Attraction e===a===a==aaa§====================£_Jn SFWSVIUVA SLSILHDIH TVOIGVH JO FHdAl-TVSGI NSHMJQH NOSIHVHWOO I-8 FUHDIJ 289 simple, single explanation of "why people become rightists.' This typology can be usefully applied to a study of rightist organizations. Obviously some groups appeal more to one type of poten- tial rightist than others. "Culturally alienated" types would probably be attracted to religious-oriented rightists organizations, while "status seekers" might find the John Birch Society more appealing. There is a spectrum of rightist organizations whose membership composition would 1 'fl vary in important social and ideological ways. Some organizations E J appeal primarily to frustrated lower-class persons who ideologically : ”in accept anti-Semitic and racist views.4 Organizations attracting "status seekers" would play down any such socially disreputable views; this explains, I believe, the John Birch Society's official efforts to dis- avow anti-Semitism and overt racism. Again, these are only hypotheses which need to be explored and tested empirically. 4. AVERNUES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH An Empirical Causal lodel In answering the question "Why do people become radical rightists?" a middle-range theory has been proposed and tested. Signi- ficant associations have been found between rightism and status frus- trations (if one defines "status" in a broad, social-psychological sense), several basic personality traits, and certain attitudes and feeling-states. The theoretical connection between radical rightism and these social and personal variables is supplied by explanations which impute causality. But an important question has remained largely unanswered, namely, which factors are necessary, sufficient, contributory, or 290 intervening conditions for the genesis of radical rightism. A tentative conclusion is that some form of status frustration combines with certain personality traits to establish necessary conditions. Theoretically, an adequate model would posit a motivating force (status frustration) and some mechanism which determines how the feelings are directed or ex- pressed (cognitive style and extrapunitiveness). Anomy-feelings of powerlessness, alienation, and estrangement-might be considered some form of intermediate reaction to status and value frustrations. The concept of anomy is ambiguous, as already mentioned; it is used to con- vey feelings formed in reaction to social events, as an interrelated set of personality traits, or as a combination of both factors. It seems most plausible, in this instance at least, to argue that the Rightists' anomy has its roots both in the social pressures they are currently ex- periencing and their personality predispositions. A phenomenological description of our Rightists is reasonably clear--they are individuals with status anxieties, strong concerns with traditional values, simple cognitive style and extrapunitive personality traits.'They are, moreover, anomic. The underlying dynamics, the ques- tion of “new did they get this way?",are not so evident. Certain typical causal links due to early socialization should hold for this group as well as for the general population.5 For example, religious Fundamentalism would seem to proceed, in terms of time-sequence, Protestant Ethic and moral values. Personality traits, likewise, seem to be stable and consistent dispositions whose genesis is deve10pment- ally early.* But specifying general relationships is hardly satisfactory; *While psychoanalytically-oriented or learning theory-oriented psychologists would differ over the mechanisms involved, they would agree nevertheless that early experiences are extraordinarily important in forming personality traits or "behavioral predispositions." 291 more explicit associations must be posited and tested. An empirically verified model of causality must eventually be developed. Paul Lazarsfeld, in addressing the problem of the mathematical treatment of causal explanations, argues that "explanation consists of the formal aspect of elaboration and some substantive ordering of var- iables."6 We have already provided "elabbration," in that empirical variables have been defined and tested, as well as some "substantive ordering," which consists of statements saying x causes Y. But missing here is what Lazarsfeld calls the "formal" aspects of an elaboration. For this purpose he provides a model for inferring causal (non-spurious) association between 232 variables if the relationship is expressed as a correlation. This model, however, assumes interval levels of measure- ment, a requirement not always easily satisfied. Both Herbert Simon and Hubert Blalock have provided more generalized models, handling up to several variables, for distinguishing cases of spurious association from causal relationships.7 The theory of quantitative models is now beginning to be applied by pnelitical scientists, particularly in the area of comparative politics.8 But generating an empirical causal model for the etiology (xf radical rightism would require considerable data transformation and the application of multiple regression and correlation techniques.9 The complex multivariance analyses dictated by this type of model is beyond the scope of this present study. Two preliminary steps in this kind of analysis provide some indication of the importance 'of certain factors in the genesis of radical rightism. In reviewing the degree of association between factors examined in the study and radical rightism, this impressionistic ordering seems apparent: 292 concerns with morals and values . cognitive style extrapunitiveness . anomy . achievement status (fluwat-i This ranking is somewhat confirmed if we examine simple correlation co- efficients between individual scales and degree of radical rightism:* FIGURE 8-2 a CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL SCALES AND INDEX OF RADICAL RIGHTISM Group 1: Dogmatic views of Communism and Russia r = .6 Liberal-Conservatism ll 01 Group 2: Moral Breakdown r Anti-Compromise Traditional School Values ll .& Group 3: Negative Voting Index r Intolerance of Ambiguity Group 4: Political Alienation r = .3 Protestant Ethic Number of Extreme Responses II [0 Group 5: Hostility r Religious Fundamentalism Nationalism Need for Greatness I"Product-moment coefficient, rounded off to one decimal point. The strongest degree of association is between Rightism and dogmatic views on Communism and conservative political beliefs which are pretty much the ideological dimensions of radical rightism. Moral concerns and cognitive style are also found in ascending rank-order. Missing, of I"The items which make up these measures are listed in earlier chapters. Only those scales whose degree of association was statis- tically significant at the .05 level or better are listed. 293 course, from this tabulation are many indicators of factors explored in the study through nonscalar measures. But with the exception of achieve- ment status, most of the dimensions of the study are included, and their degree of association with radical rightism does give us some sense of their relevance in creating rightism. Several dimensions involving concerns with values, personality traits, and feelings of anomy were assumed, a priori, to be basic characteristics of rightists. An orthogonal principal-axis factor analysis using eighteen scalar measures empirically supports this assumption; as Table 8-5 shows, four basic factors emerged which corre- spond to the dimensions employed in the study." While the interpretation of a dimension is highly Judgmental, Factor III clearly constitutes an anomy syndrome. The items with the highest loadings are: Political Efficacy**(.7l)"** Political Alienation (.69) Personal Powerlessness (.64) Distrust of Other Peeple (.57) Negative Voting Index (.42) "This technique produces oblique factors which maximize high loadings with some indices and minimizes low loadings on the rest. With ‘these'data, four rotated factors efficiently accounted for our eighteen original variables (and explain 62% of the total variance). The fact that four factors emerged does not preclude other var- iables which might be importantly related to radical rightism. It only rmeans that of the variables sampled in this study, they represent four basic characteristics. **This measure was subsequently eliminated and replaced by the throe item index referred to in Chapter 7. This original scale was con- structed from these statements: 1. Voting is a way for peOple like me to have a say about how the government runs things. 2. I often wish that people would respect my opinion more. 3. Writing my Congressman and other public officials is a way peeple like me can influence the government's policies. 4. Public officials really care how people like me want things to be done. 15’. J 4 The portrait of rightists as culturally alienated, as individuals who are greatly disturbed by the nonpractice of traditional ways in modern society, is confirmed by Factor IV. This factor is basically dc- iined by an interrelated cluster of indices whicn measure Vfildc concerqs: Nationalism (.84) Traditional Values in Schools (.64) Protestant Ethic (.62) Religious Fundamentalism (.62) Moral Breakdown (.59) OfflIfi A third factor (II), apparently less "pure" than the preceeding‘ two, represents a "politics" dimension which is strongly colored by a ‘l r" II. V" 2‘ concern with traditional values. Liberal-Conservatism (.84) DOgmatic Views of Russia and Communism (.73) Anti-Compromise (.57) Negative Voting Index (.51) Moral Breakdown (.48) Traditional Values in Schools (.44) In Chapters 3 and 4,1 argued and demonstrated that rightists interpret and relate to political matters in highly moralistic, value- laden terms. That a factor appears which interweaves these elements lends further credence to this view. The fourth factor which appears (I) might best be labelled the "authoritarian personality" dimension. The indices with the highest loadings are: Although the original items were highly intercorrelated (the Kuder- Richardson Coefficient being .74), and two were retained in the index finally used, item 4 was dropped because it was also contained in the "political alienation" measure. Item 2 was discarded because it seemed more a measure of general rather than political inefficacy. The final index is thus a "purer," more unidimensional measure. ***Figures in parentheses are item-loadings on this factor. They may be interpreted as correlations, with 1.0 being a perfect association. .‘-V,.II.I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) TABLE 3-5 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX Index Intolerance of Ambiguity Traditional values in Schools Dogmatic Views of Communism and Russia Moral Breakdown Anti-Compromise Liberal-Conservatism -. Lack of Trust of Other People Hostility Political Alienation Protestant Ethic Need for Greatness Closed-mindedness Nationalism - Negative Voting Index Number of Extreme Responses Sense of Political Efficacy - Sense of Personal Powerlessness Religious Fundamentalism Index IH .679 .316 .239 .354 .541 112 .427 .476 .130 .422 .820 .626 O 013 .069 .157 .202 .300 .162 Factor Loadings g; 1 1 .287 -.251 .442 -.255 e776 -.074 .481 -.204 .572 -.192 .838 -.020 .039 -.570 .112 -.305 e295 _.689 e223 -e154 .092 .004 .061 -.054 .053 -.084 .511 -.415 .329 -.323 .138 -.714 .097 -.635 .263 .061 .640 .312 .590 .184 .032 .027 .148 .616 .049 .454 .842 .265 .213 .111 .319 .622 Need for Greatness and Importance (.82) Intolerance of Ambiguity (.68) Closed-mindedness (.63) Anti-Compromise (.54) Hostility (.47) Lack of Trust of Other PeOple (.43) Throughout the study I have maintained that both social and personality variables play major roles in the genesis of rightists. The clustering of personality traits found in the factor analysis also supports this contention."I This dimension, interestingly, would seem to constitute a [.1 basic authoritarian personality syndrome much like the one discovered E I by Adorno and his fellow researchers. Perhaps our group of ideological he extremists has given us a natural sample of authoritarians. In any case, this factor clearly shows that a distinct personality dimension is related to radical rightism. This factor analysis is offered not so much to prove anything conclusively as to illustrate the type of further analysis that must be done to build a viable theory explaining rightism, or any political be- havior for that matter. Many nulti-variate techniques are available, and some are now being pursued.*‘ * H 90 Because responses on the need for greatness scale are significantly affected by response-set, its theoretical relevance to this factor cannot be clearly assessed. t‘Efforts are underway toward constructing an adequate quantita- tive measure of "status frustration," based on a weighted combination of variables. we are also factor-analyzing the Radical Rightism Index, to test more systematically its bidimensionality. Partial correlational techniques (using both Pearson r's and Kendall tau's) will help us clarify the effects of age, occupation, education, and income (and other intervening variables) on social and personality attributes. And multiple regression and correlation procedures will provide us with a more exact picture (and causal model) of the relationship betwen our independent variables and rightism. 297 Future Research Goals While further analysis should greatly refine the results of this study, and perhaps even produce some new theoretical insights, these data constitute only a beginning effort in the construction and testing of a complete theory of the etiology of radical rightism. It is axiomatic that the findings of this study must be further tested and replicated. The areas of instrumentation and sample representativeness in particular warrant careful attention. Conceptually, and in terms of measurement, considerable atten- tion must be devoted to clarifying the "status frustration" thesis and better assessing its viability. Alternative research strategies should refine, and/or confirm, hypotheses dealing with personality factors and the anomy syndrome. For example, psychometric personality assessment devices are potentially useful techniques which can be utilized. Em- ployed in field settings, the personality data they supply about rightists can then be compared with norms and profiles established through known comparison groups. Nor should we rule out "door-step" prodective devices, such as sentence completion tests, "fill-in the adjective" questions, and even TAT pictures.‘ We would then be in a I"One psychometric measure which seems to yield highly valid .assessments of personality traits is the "Sixteen Personality Factor 'Dest" developed by Raymond Cattell and his associates at the Institute :fior Personality and Ability Testing (Champaign, Illinois). For a dis- cussion of the rationale behind these kinds of measures see Cattell's The Scientific Analeis of Personality (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, :1966). There are a great variety of such measures, many of them de- rived from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI); see Iiflwin G. Sarason, Personality: An Objective Approach (New York: John Wiley, 1966), H. J. Eysenck and Sybil B. Eysenck, Eysenck Personality Invento_ry (London: University of London Press, 1963), and P. E. Vernon's Personality Assessment: A Critical Survey (London: Methuen, 1964). For Effbrief overview of the many forms of projective tests see Boris better position to answer questions such as: Are rightists "neurotic" persons; are they more anxiety-ridden than most other people; do they have greater needs for power, etc.? The representativeness of samples also demand a great deal of consideration. Larger samples of rightists, perhaps taken nation-wide or at least from several regions, should reveal, for example, the vary- ing degree of racial prejudice among rightists. One could hypothesize that more Southern than Northern or Western rightists are anti-Negro. ”J Or perhaps not. In either case the results would be valuable. Another 1‘ difference between rightists which may be related to region is concern with moral values. Rightists in the South and West may, for example, be more concerned with these values than Eastern rightists, who may be more desirous (as a group) of achieving status through rightist activi- ties. These are only a few of the possible topics that could be ex- amined in a nation-wide sample. More representative comparison groups must also be interviewed; in addition to non-rightist activists a ran- dom sample of ordinary citizens would provide a second set of compara- tive data. A research design and grant preposal to carry out a project of this magnitude is now being planned. This study has primarily focused on the "now" characteristics and attitudes of rightists; we need to gather more data about the dynamics of radical rightism. Life histories and situational informa- tion should provide further illumination of many points up to now assumed; for example, exploration of early socialization experiences Semeonoff (ed.), Personality Assessment (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966); also Robert C. Birney and Richard C. Teevan (eds.), Measuring Human Motivation (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co., 1962); Bernard I. Murstein (ed.), Handbook of Projective Techniques (New York: Basic Books, 1965). 299 (family, religious, educational), and more probing of occupational careers, would allow us to describe more accurately the life-style of the "typical" rightist. We might also investigate what factors lead to initial recruitment into a right-wing organization, what kinds of individual changes occur once people become active rightists (the socialization effect), and what personal and situational variables affect dropping out. Here we could employ quasi-longitudional tech- niques and interview new recruits, old-timers, and drop-outs. Or panel techniques could be used, re-interviewing rightists over a several-year period. This is only a partial listing of the topics that should be explored in future systematic research into why peeple become Rightists. Other scholars, taking a somewhat different approach, need to examine the role of rightists in community-conflict situations--what initially attracts them to some issues and not to others, what kinds of effects they achieve (and why), and what finally happens. Here previous theories may be further tested and found adequate, or perhaps new ex- planations will have to be devised. Regardless of what particular facets are examined, the radical right offers a natural group of ide010gical extremists to study. Additional scientific investigations of rightism--whether directed to its causes, its activities, or its effects-~should contribute not only to our knowledge about the political behavior of these individuals, but about all politically active or concerned individuals as well. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8 See Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 83-6; also Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959),Chapter 9 for summaries of literature showing this. Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, 11 (1953)= 185-201; Filmore Sanford, Authoritarianism and Leadership (Philadelphia: Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1950); Lester Milbrath and Walter Klein, "Personality Correlates of Political Participation," Acta Sociologiga,‘§ (1962): 53-66. See Lester Milbrath, Political Participation, 0p. cit., pp. 115-28 for an extensive set of references to these studies. See Seymour M. Lipset's analysis of the "Coughlinites"--supporters of Father Coughlin in the late '30's. in "Three Decades of the Radical Right-..-.1962" in Daniel Bell (ed.). The Radical Right (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963). Several distinct approaches to socialization can be found in the literature-~for a somewhat out-of-date overview see Irving L. Child, "Socialization" in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, pp. 655-92; Eric H. Erikson's Childhood and Society (2nd ed., re- vised, W. W. Norton, 1963) represents a classic psychoanalytical view; see T. Sarbin's discussion of "role theory" (Lindzey, op. cit.) for a sociological interpretation and Ernest R. Hilgard's Theory of Learning (2nd edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1956) ‘3; a. R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, Conditionigg and Learning, revised by Gregory A. Kimble (2nd edition, New York: Appleton- Century-Croft, 1961) for a learning theory approach. Henry W. laier's Three Theories of Child Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) contains a detailed discussion and comparison of the views of Erickson, the cognitive approach of Jean Piagef, and the learning theory perspective of Robert Sears. See also Paul H. .Mussen, The Psychological Development of the Child (New York: Prentice—Hall, 1964). The classic survey of the political socialization literature is still provided by H. Hyman's Political Socialization (Glencoe, 111.:) Free Press, 1959); Robert Lane's Political Life (Glencoe, 111.: .Free Press, 1959) also gives somewhat of an overview. Fred Greenstein's Children and Politics (New Haven: .Yale University Press, 1965) is another and more recent source of citations and a discussion of relevant findings from psychology. 300 301 The study of "political socialization" has become a distinct area of study in political science: see the September, 1965 issue of The Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Roberta Sigel. The quotation is cited in Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1965), p. 112. Herbert A. Simon, spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," J. of Am. Statistical Assoc., 52 (1954): 467-79; Herbert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: - The University of North Carolina Press, 1964). For two recent applications of this technique to political science see Thad L. Boyle, "Contested Elections and Voter Turnout in a Local Community: A Problem in Spurious Correlation," Amer. Political Science Review, 52 (1965): 111-7; Charles Chudde and Donald McCrowe, T"The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, £2 (1966): 66-72; Arthur S. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," Amer. Political Science Review, §9_(1960): 913-922. Arthur 8. Banks and Robert Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963); H. R. Russett, H. R. Alker, Jr., K. W. Deutch, H. D. Lasswell, et al. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative Inter- national Politics (New York: Free Press, 1967): See William N. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariant Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: John Wiley, 1962), Andrew R. Baggaley, Intermediate Correlation Methods (New York: John Wiley, 1964), and Mordecai Ezekiel and K. A. Fox, Methods of Correlation and Reggession Analysis (3rd edition, New York: John Wiley, 1959) for techniques particularly appropriate to social science data. Cooley and Lohnes is especially useful because it also contains computer programs for calculating these measures. APPENDIX Letter Hailed to Interviewees Interview Schedule 302 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ans-runsme 6011.36! OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 0 DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Dear The Department of Political Science of Michigan State University has a deep and longstanding interest in citizen participation in public life. we encourage our faculty and students to be concerned with the problems of effective citizenship and to study these problems carefully. One such study is currently being conducted in your part of the coun- try. Mr. Ira Rohter, who is directing it, has been an instructor in our department and is currently completing his doctoral work. ‘We know Mr. Rohter as a reliable and conscientious person. As in all such projects, his study plans have been submitted to a committee of faculty members of this university, who have approved it as being a well conceived, unbiased study which will throw light on the life of American communities and of our nation . A large number of people from all walks of life are being interviewed in this survey. In this way, we hope to learn more about the formation and expression of public opinion in our country. You have been selected to be one of the many people to be interviewed. We obtained your name fran a lien; of people in your community who have participated in civic affairs by writing letters to the editor, by signing petitions, by making financial cxnrtributions to civic causes, etc. You have been carefully selected fran thijs list according to the best available methods of sampling, and it is therefore important that each person so selected cooperate in this study. Your record of civic responsibility indicates that you will want to help. The questions which are being asked in this study do not require any special knowledge. We would like to learn how you look upon your camnunity, how you feel about current affairs in the U.S.A., and how you make your views known. There are no right or wrong answers -- what counts are your page 2 own views and feelings about these things. Of course, your name will never be revealed to anyone; all of your answers will be strictly confidential. Mr. Rohter's report will be canpletely statistical, showing how many people answered each question in one way or another. The only reason we had to use your name to contact you was to make sure that we got a sample repre- senting accurately the different kinds of people in each community. Once the interview is cmnplete, the interview is identified by a code number only, thus insuring that your views remain completely confidential and anonymous . Thank you for reading this letter of introduction. We hope you will participate in this poll of how Americans feel about current affairs. We have made a great effort to insure that a variety of viewpoints will be in- cluded in the sample. We know that as a concerned citizen you will want your views fairly represented. One of our trained interviewers will call on you personally within the next day or so, and we hope you will cooperate with him or her. in our efforts to learn more about the opinions of people like yourself. The interview should take about an hour, and we know. from our past experience that you will enjoy talking about the questions asked. If you have any questions please do not hestitate to write to Mr. Rohter at P. 0. Box 1551, Eugene , Oregon . Sincerely, Wig/gas CHARLES R . ADRIAN Chairman CRA:sr V (‘1'. [It Schedule # -1- (1) Are there any problems in America today which you are particularly concerned or (2) (3) (A) worried ab out ? (B) IF MORE THAN ONE PROBLEM MENTIONED: Which one of these problems do you think is the most important? (C) AND: Why do you feel this is the most important problem? In general, do you consider yourself a Republican or Democrat? Republi can 1 Independent 2 Democrat 3 Which Presidential candidate did you vote for, Goldwater or Johnson? Goldwater 1 Johnson 2 Didn't vote 3 Won't say A How often, if ever, have you seriously talked about local government or community matters during the past year? very often 1 often 2 once in awhile 3 not at all L, (B) IF "OFTEN" OR "VERY OFTEN”: Briefly, what matters have you talked about? -2- (5) Phys you gone to any political rallies, dinners, study groups, coffee hours, or things like that during the past year? (IF YES): How often? XE—S M3.__4 veny often 1 often 2 once in awhile 3 (B) (IF YES): What group(s) was this? (C) Briefly, what matter was talked about? (6) Have you taken an active part on any local government or community issue during the last few years? This would mean doing such things as talking to public officials, participating in a political campaign, circulating petitions, and things like that. Yes 2 No l (B) (IF YES): Briefly, what was the issue or issues about? (0) Briefly, what part did you play in this? (7) Howrclften, if ever, have you seriously talked about public school matters during the past year? -very-<1ften I often 2 once in awhile 3 not at all h (B) IF DISCUSSED PUBLIC SCHOOL MATTERS: Briefly, what matters did you talk about? (CONTINUE QUESTION ON NEXT PAGE) -3- (CONTINUED FROM PRECEDING PAGE) (C) Did you take any actions about these matters, such as talked to people or school officials, participated in a campaign, circulating petitions, etc? No I Yes Briefly, what was it you did? (8) Have you ever written any "letters-to-the-Editor's Mailbag”? (Newspaper) Yes 2 No l (B) (IF "YES”): About how many have you written in the past year? (C) Briefly, what matter was it about? (Or if more than one —- briefly, what matters were they about?) I riINVOINED IN ANY COMMUNITY OR LETTER4WRITING ACTIVITY: GO TO NEXT PAGE > IF DRIP, SKIP NEXT PAGE AND GO TO QUESTION #12 IF INVOLVED IN ANY COMMUNITY OR LETTER-WRITING ACTIVITY: %? (9) How have the people you know well reacted to your (community)(letter—writing) % activity? How much of a reaction did you get from your family and friends * 5 about doing this? % (SHOW % , I \ >,< :TARD a great deal____ I quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all A as (B) IF "A GREAT DEAL" OR "QUITE A BIT" OF A REACTION: Did ALL, MOST, SOME, * or NONE of them approve of what you (said)(did)? % all I most 2 some 3 none h r : (C) , ALSO: How did you feel about this reaction from.your family and friendS;f how much encouragement did it give you in making you feel you wanted to f ;9 continue (writing letters)(community activity)? W ,SHOW * ,pAED a great deal_____l quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all 4% (D) Why? * R % k : (IO) HOW’mUCh of a reaction did you get from other people, people you don't know, through letters, phone calls, and things like that? :EHON ,CARD .a great deal____l quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all ;+% (B) IF "A GREAT DEAL” OR "QUITE A BIT” OF A REACTION: Did ALL, MOST, SOME, % or NONE of them approve of what you (said)(did)? 9 a all I most 2 some 3 none A * ‘33 (C) ALSO: How did you feel about this reaction from people you didn't know; * how much encouragement did it give you in making you feel you wanted to % g continue (writing letters)(community activity)? * ;SHOW' % ,CARD a great deal____l quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all A * W % *. CONTINUE QUESTION ON NEXT PAGE * -5- QUESTION CONTINUED FROM LAST PAGE Jr \" xY’ \I/ J; J; \‘a sh \‘1 \II \T’ \‘I \l ’l‘ \‘I a.\ “/ ’— \ *5!- (ll) Would you say that because of this activity of yours, peOple are now more likely)? if- to listen to you, pay more attention to what you have to say about public 9" *- affairs? ’33 * Yes, definitely l ‘X' 31‘ Yes, probably 2 * *SHOW No , probably 3 'X' *CARD No, definitely ll '3? -.‘<- DK 5 -><- /— «2. -.‘f- 4;.- —><~ —..<- 4;:— ~><— -x- —><- —x— -:<— -:<— e:- -x- -><- -x— ->:- -><— —x- -:<- -x- —x— -:<- -x- -x— -x- -x- -><- —x- -x- -><- ->:- —><— —><— -x- -x- -><- —)<- -x- e:- —x— -><—-><- ASK ALL INTERVIEWEES (12) Have you written any letters in the last year or so to public officials, such as your Congressman, or a local or state official? No I Yes 2 _fl Have you written any letters in the last year or so to business firms or radio and TV networks about their taking positions on political issues? r ‘ ‘_.J \ A) v No I Yes 2 -6— (1A) Some people feel that elected political leaders try to do what is best for the country. Other people disagree, and think that elected political leaders don't try to do what is best for the country. Do you think that elected political leaders ALWAYS, MOST OF THE TIME, SOMETIMES, or NEVER try to do what is best for the country? 1 always 2 most of the time SHOW’ 3 sometimes CARD A never 5 DK (B) IF "SOMETIMES," OR "NEVER”: Briefly, why do you say that elected political leaders don't try to do what is best for the country? (15) If you.were concerned about a local community problem and contacted city (county) officials, how do you think they would react? Do you think they would do "a," "b,” or "CH? (15) (16) City(County) School Officials Officials a) Understand your problem.and do what 1 they could about it? SHOW b) Listen to you but try to avoid doing 2 CARD anything? c) Ignore you or get rid of you as soon 3 as they could? (16) Howrefloout school officials? How do you think they would react if you contacted thenlefloout a problem about the schools? Would they do ”a,” "b,” or ”c"? (CHECK ABOVE) -7- U?) DO you think that city (county) officials do ”a,” ”b," or ”c”? (17) (la) City(County) School Officials Officials a) Do pretty much what the average citizen 1 wants? SHOW b) Do what some of the more influential CARD people want? 2 c) Do what they themselves think best? 3 (18) How about school officials? Do they do "a,” ”b,” or ”c”? (CHECK ABOVE) I am going to mention some issues which could come up in an election sometime this year, If the election were to be held today, would you vote for or against: 1 2 3 or have already. Not Sure For Against or DK (l9) Fluoridation of the community's water supply? (7O) A Housing Code to maintain community building standards? (21) An Urban Renewal Program for the community? (22) IProperty tax increase to pay for a larger school district budget? (23) .A bond issue to improve the schools paid for from public revenues? IF ALHVINST ANY ISSUE: Briefly, what would be the most important reason you would vote agairnat (issue)? (Record answer in proper space) (2A) IVluorldation: CONTINUE QUESTION ON NEXT PAGE (25) Housing Code: (26) Urban Renewal: (27) Property Tax Increase for Schools: (28) iBond Issue for Schools: -9- I'm.going to read out some statements now. These statements have been given to large numbers of people throughout the country. They are all matters of OPINION, there are NO right or wrong answers. We simply want to compare how people answer them in this community with replies from people elsewhere. When I read you a statement, please tell me how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with it. SHOW CARD As you can see from the card, you can express how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement. This is so we can get an accurate idea of exactly how you feel. YOU CAN ANSWER EACH STATEMENT RATHER QUICKLY BECAUSE IT IS YOUR YGEEIMMEDIATE "FEELING” ABOUT EACH STATEMENT THAT WE WANT. FIRST IMPRESSION, l 2 3 j 6 7 A’V’ A T A A D A D 0 SD V G E G H G I I N I R R R R E R L ;S L S S R E Y E W’ E I ‘A I A W’ A Y E M E H E T G T G H G M U 0 T R T R O R U c O L L E L E L E C H NLE E E E E E E H (29) PeOple like me should have more of a say about how things are run in this country. (30) Public officials really care how people like me want things to be done. (31) I wish public officials would listen more to people like me. (32) If it were possible, I'd throw most public officials out on their ears. (33) More and more I feel helpless in the face of what is happening in the world today. (3h) I often wish that people would respect my opinion more. (35) It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society at large. (36) WOrking in a group which takes stands on public issues is a way persons like me can influence the government. (37) Voting is a way for people like me to have a say about how the government runs things. (38) writing my Congressman and other public officials is a way people like me can influence the govern— ment's policies. -10- (39) To change the subject now, we often hear people say about someone: ”He's a great person!” Would you tell me someone who, in your Opinion, is a great American. Someone who is living, or recently lived, that is. Just tell me the first name that comes to you. (GET FIRST NAME) (B) What is it about (him)(her) that you admire most? (C) Could you tell me the name of someone else you think is a GREAT living, or recently living, American? (GET FIRST NAME) (D) What is it about (him)(her) that you admire most? (AO) To cfluange the subject a bit again, are there any differences between what you beljxave should be the American way of life, and the way things are done in this couniajy nowadays? Yes 2 No 1 DK 3 fl — — (B) LIF‘ "YES": In what ways are things different? \ I v. I... ...It ..III!\ . lll‘ll I -11- Now I'd like to read you some more statements again; this time they are about your feelings about being an American. Please tell me how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement, just like we did before. l 2 3 5 6 7 Av AT AA DA DO DV GE GHG I IN IE RRRERLSLS'SR EY Ew EI AI AW AY EM EH ET GT GH GM U 0 TRTRORU COL LELELEC jNE EEEEEEH (A1) America may not be perfect, but the American way has brought us as close to a perfect society as human beings can get. (AZ) I'm for my country, right or wrong. (43) I am willing to surrender my allegiance to the United States in order to give it to a world govern— ment. (AA) The worse danger to real Americanism.during the last 50 years has come from foreign ideas and agitators. M5) Some people feel they are citizens of the world, that they belong to mankind and not to any one nation. I, for my part, feel that I am first, last and always an American. (46) Are there any groups in America that you think have too much power or influence? No 1. Yes 2 DK 3 (IF YES): Who? Any others? -12- (A7) Any that have too little power? No 1 Yes 2 DK 3 (IF YES): Who? (A8) I'd like to talk a little about people in the community who are influential, who have some say in how things are done. Which do you think is most important in be- coming influential in this community: connections and friends, or hard work and ability? connections and friends 1 combination of all of these 3 hard work and ability 2 DK A (B) Why do you say this? (49) Do you think that the people who are influential in this community are, in GENERAL” friendly people willing to help you out, or are they cliquish and keep to themselves? friendly' 1 cliquish 2 DK :3 (B) IF "CLIQUISH": Why do you think this? -13- (50) When some peOple talk about different social groups, they think of them.as upper (51) (52) class groups, or middle class groups, or the like. Talking like this, would you say that you are UPPER CLASS, UPPER—MIDDLE CLASS, TOWER-MIDDLE CLASS, or LOWER CLASS? upper class 1 lower class A upper-middle class 2 DK 5 lower-middle class 3 How hard do you think it is for peOple today to move upward from one social class to another? very hard I not too hard 3 other 5(Explain quite hard 2 not hard at all A DK 6 below) 0 (B) IF "VERY" OR "QUITE HARD" ASK: Why? In your own case, for example, do you think that evegyone gives you as much respect as you feel you deserve? Yes 1 No 2 DK 3 (B) IF "NO”: Why do you think that? II II! It: -14- Here are some more statements again; this time they are about some principles people believe in. Would you again tell me hOW’mUCh you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of the statements? l 2 3 .5 6 Z A V A T A A D A D O D V G E G H G I I N I E R R R E R L S L S S R E Y E E I A I A W" A Y E E W E T G T G H G M H T R T R O R M U 0 O L E L E L E U C N L E E E E E E C H E H (53) What this country needs most is a return to the simple virtures of individual initiative and self- reliance. (SA) Too many people today are spending their money for unnecessary things, instead of saving or investing it for the future. K55) People should take care of themselves more instead I of always asking the government to help them out. (56) A man can't be respected unless he's worked hard for some important goal. (57) Thrift and industriousness are the most important traits a man should deveIOp. (58) hmat youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country. (59W) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtures children should learn. -15- (60) These last statements I just read are about things which some people feel are very important, and others don't. Your own answers will give us an idea of how you feel about these principles. To what extent do you think other people today share your beliefs about the impor- tance of individual initiative, taking care of oneself more, respect for authority, and the other things we just mentioned? Would you say that EVERYONE, MOST PEOPLE, SOME PEOPLE, or NQ_QNE share(s) your belief about the importance of these princi- ples today? l everyone 2 most people SHOW 3 some people CARD A no one 5 DK (B) Why do you say that? (61) Have you heard about the John Birch Society? No 1 Yes IF "YES": How much do you approve or disapprove of it? approve very much 2 disapprove very much 5 approve 3 DK -____P ____A disapprove -16- (62) What kind of people do you think join anti-communist groups like the John Birch Society? How would you describe the typical member of an anti—communist group like this —— what kind of person would he or she be? (PROBE WELL) Anything else? (B) hmy'do you think people join anti-communist groups like this? (63) hflurt kind of people do you think oppose the John Birch Society and other anti- conmumnist groups like it? -17- (6A) What kind of people 1p_America are most likely to become Communists? For example, how would you describe the typical American Communist —- what kind of person would he or she be? (Probe well) Anything else? (B) Why do you think they become Communists? (65) From what racial or religious groups are Communists most likely to come from? (66) hfluit things do Communists believe in? Anything els e ? -1g- (67) Some people feel that there is a great deal of communist influence in the American government today. Other people don't agree with this. How much communist influ— ence do you think there is in the American government today? a great deal 1 quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all A DK 5 IF INTERVIEWEE BELIEVES THERE IS ANY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT: (B) How much danger is there that communist influence within the government can hurt the country —— A GREAT DEAL of danger, QUITE A BIT of danger, A LITTLE danger, or NONE AT ALL? a great deal I quite a bit 2 a little 3 none at all A (C) Have you talked to other people, trying to warn them about this communist influence? No A IF "YES": How often? (READ ALTERNATIVES) very often 1 often 2 once in awhile 3 (68) Do you think there is any communist influence in American schools and colleges? (6?) SHOW CARD No A Yes (IF "YES”: How much influence do you think there is?) a great deal I quite a bit 2 a little DK 5 3 Do you know of any other places where there might be Communists? (B) ASK FOR EACH: How much influence do you think they have in (place named)? (B) Amount of Influence Great Quite A Deal A Bit Little D K I I—’ ‘10 u w. .\I_ .V. _v_ ..v_ _V. ..v- y. -\r- -v- _V. v- .v. _v_ -V. .V. .V. -v_ .3!- -v_ ..v- it. _v_ y. at. .v- _v_ -v_ -v_ .v_ .v. .31. ..v_ -V. .y. _v. -V. _v_ -V. .v- _V. -v. y. .A' -I\ I\ I\ /\ I\ l\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ '7\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ l\ l\ l\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ l\ v ..V. 'I\ I\ v ..V. vr 7 F IN ERVIEWEE BELIEVES THERE IS COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ANYWHERE IN E UNI n " ”Wh t d th nk ” - - O ,. STATES -- IN THE GOVERNMENT, SCHOOLS, OR ANYPLACE ELSE. a 0 you i n ’4 h 1d b d b t th C ' t ' try?” M n S ou e one a ou €58 ommunls S In OUI‘ COUIl . I‘ v ..V. 7: " _V_ -"- I\ I\ -"- .34. I\ I\ .V. -v. I\ I\ -"- .v. I\ I\ .V. y. I\ I‘ ..V. -v. I\ l\ .V. ..V. I\ I\ ..V. v n 7: .‘L I /\ .3? -V— -v_ I\ [\ .V. -"- I\ I\ .V. \I " w .V. y. -\I_ .v. y. :1. _v_ -v. _v_ V. y. _v_ -v_ -v_ .v. ..v. -v_ ..V. ..V. .v_ _v_ y. N. .y. .v_ _v- .v_ ..V. ..\I_ ..V. ..V. -v. _v_ -v_ _v_ V. -v. ..v_ -v. .V. ..v_ -V. -v_ y. l\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ l\ I\ 7\ l\ I\ I\ I\ l\ I\ l\ I\ I\ l\ I\ I\ l\ I\ I\ I\ I\ I\ l\ I\ I\ I\ I\ l\ I\ 7\ I\ I\ I\ l\ I\ I\ /\ I\ (71) Now let's talk about some other things you do. Do you belong to any organizationa such as PTA, church organizations, patriotic organizations, political groups or parties, veterans organization, unions, etc. a) IF "YES": What kind? b) How often do you attend meet- ings of this group? all most some none SHOW CARD 1 2 3 A (72) Ikrve you ever been an officer or in charge of activities in any of these groups? No 1 Yes (IF "YES”): Which group(s)? (73) ILSW‘I'd like to know about your occupation or job. What kind of work do you Ilsually do? (Please be specific, such as insurance salesman, machinist, housewife, etc.) -20- IF RETIRED GO TO QUESTION #76. IF UNEMPLOYED GO TO QUESTION #77. IF FEMALE—WORKING GO TO QUESTION #78. IF FEMALE—HOUSEWIFE GO TO QUESTION #79. IF NONE 93 THE ABOVE, CONTINUE ON WITH QUESTION #74. (74) DO you work for yourself, or someone else? self-employed l employee 2 (B) IF SELF—EMPLOYED: About how many people do you employ? (75) Taking into consideration everything about your job, how satisfied are you with it? very satisfied _ 1 not too satisfied 3 somewhat satisfied 2 not satisfied at all A (B) How about the future of your job? Is it: excellent 1 poor A good 2 DK 5 only fair 3 g9 19 QUESTION #80 -21- (76) FOR RETIRED PERSONS ONLY (A) (B) (C) (D) (IF NOT CLEAR) What kind of work did you do before you retired? (Occupation) Did you work for yourself, someone else? self—employed 1 employee 2 Why did you retire (if not clear -- have to retire or forced to do it)? reached retirement age I wanted to 3 health 2 other: (specify) In what way has retirement made a difference in your life? 99,19 QUESTION #80 -22- (77) FOR UNEMPLOYED ONLY SHOW CARD (A) (IF NOT CLEAR) What kind of work did you usually do when you were employed? (Occupation) (B) What happened to make you unemployed? (C) How long have you been unemployed? (D) In what way has being out of work made a difference in your life? (E) (IF UNEMPLOYMENT IS INVOLUNTARY) What are the future prospects of your getting work? Is it: excellent 1 poor A good 2 DK 5 only fair 3 (F) Would it be the same job, a better one, or a worse one? same job 1 worse job 3 better job 2 DK A g9 O QUESTION #80 -23- (78) FOR FEMALE4WORKING ONLY (A) Do you work for yourself or someone else? self—employed 1 employee 2 (B) Taking into consideration everything about your job, how satisfied are you with it? SHOW' very satisfied 1 not too satisfied 3 CARD somewhat satisfied 2 not satisfied at all A (C) What kind of work does your husband usually do? (Occupation) (D) Does he work for himself, or someone else? self-employed 1 employee 2 b) IF SELF-EMPLOYED: About how many people does he employ? (E) Taking into consideration everything about your husband's job, how satis- fied are you with it? (Read alternatives) SHOW’ very satisfied 1 not too satisfied 3 CARD somewhat satisfied 2 not satisfied at all A (F) How about the future of his 'ob? Is it: J excellent 1 poor A SHOW’ good 2 DK 5 CARD only fair :3 pg 19 QUESTION #80 -25- (80) I'm going to talk a little bit about religion now. Some people wonder whether there is a God. How do you feel —- do you believe there is a God or not? Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain or DK 3 GE) Do you believe in a life after death or not? Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain or DK 3 (B) IF "YES" OR "UNCERTAIN": Do you believe that in the next life some people will be punished by God, or not? Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain or DK 3 (82) Here are five statements which have been made about the Bible. I'd like you to tell me which one is closest to your own View. I The Bible is God's Word and all it says is true. 2 The Bible was written by men inspired by God, and its moral and religious teachings are true, but because the writers were men, it contains some human errors. 3 The Bible is a valuable book which teaches symbolically basic moral and religious truths. It The Bible is a valuable book because it was written by wise and good men, but God had nothing to do with it. 5 The Bible was written by men who lived so long ago that it is of little value today. (83) Do 3n3u have a religious preference? That is, are you Protestant, Catholic, Jehdjfli, or something else? IF ITUDTESTANT: What specific denomination is that, if any? (8A) Hrwv long have you lived in this city or general area? —26- “5) What type of community did you live in before this one? I lived here all my life 3 large city or suburb 2 rural or farm A small town (how large?) (B) IF BORN OR BROUGHT UP IN ANOTHER COMMUNITY: How have the people in this community accepted you? Do you feel you are accepted and part of the community, or still considered as an outsider, or what? (86) Would you mind telling me the last grade you completed in school? Grades: 1 2 3 A 5 o 7 8 9 10 ll 12 (Finished High School = 12) College: 1 2 3 A (College)Graduate work years IF ANY COLLEGE: What was your major area of study? Other schooling (specify) (87) 'WOuld you please pick the group which best represents the total family income I of all persons in this household during the past year. Just call your answer ) by number, please. less than $1999 per year I $6EOO-8A99 6 between $2000-3A99 2 $8SOO-lO,A99 7 between $3500-AA99 3 $10, SOO—lA, 999 8 between $ASOO-5A99 A greater than $15, 000 _9 'between $SSOO-6A99 5 _27- (88) 'Were you brought up mostly on a farm, in a small town, or in a large city? farm or rural area 1 small town 2 large city or suburb 3 (B) IF TOWN OR CITY: How large was its population? (89) What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up? (Occupation) (90) How many grades of school did your father complete? Grade: 1 2 3 A 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll 12 (Finished High School = 12) College: 1 2 3 A Graduate work years Other schooling (Specify) We are just about through now. Here are some more statements people have made through- out the country about many different things. Again, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement, and how strongly you feel. If you like, instead of me reading them to you, I can let you read them yourself and check off the answers. (Pause) Or if you prefer, I will read them like we have been doing with the others, and you can tell me how you feel about each statement. YOUR FIRST THOUGHT 1S WHAT WE'D LIKE, SQ YOU CAN ANSWER THEM AS QUICKLY A§_YQU WANT 29. l 2 3 5 6 7 AGREE AGREE On AGREE A DISAGREE DISAGREE On DISAGREE Very MUch The Whole Little A Little The Whole Very Much (91) we should increase the teaching of mathematics and science in elemen- tary school. (92) we should increase the teaching of respect for author- ity in schools. (93) The schools should increase their emphasis on teach- ing Americanism. K94) we should decrease the teaching of social studies or social living courses in our schools. -28- l 2 3 5 6 7 AGREE AGREE On AGREE A DISAGREE DISAGREE On DISAGREE Very Much The Whole Little A little The Whole Very Much (95) ‘We should increase psy- dwlogical services in the mhools for the treatment of 'uvenile1problems. (96) Our children are ppp tming as well educated in the basic fundamentals of reading, uniting, and arithmetic as they_used to. (97) It usually takes a long time to find out if you can trust someone. (98) If I had to choose be— tween happiness and greatness I'd choose happiness. (99) Modern education is re— sulting in the loss of Ameri- can moral values. (IOO) Many of the textbooks used in our schools promote socialism. (101) Colleges and universi— ties influence individuals to accept communist ideas. (102) I really respect a man MhO can get by doing as little work as possible. (103) The current fight be— tween the Russians and the Communist Chinese shows there are some great differences be- tween them. (lOA) As philosophies of gov- ernment, modern liberalism, socialism_and communism are all essential1y the same. (105) There has not been a general breakdown of moral standards in our countny. (TIMI) What this country needs host is a return to love of fxnnTtry'and old—fashioned triotism. (107) The main thing in life is fknr a person to do something important. (108) I think that one person can waally influence what hap— ans iJi society at large. (109) Of all the different philosophies which exist in this yaorld there is probably only (nae which is correct. -29- l 2 3 5 6 Y AGREE AGREE On AGREE A DISAGREE DISAGREE On DISAGREE Very MUch The Whole Little A Little The Whole Very Mach 110) The compromising of Ininciples leads to nothing mn.destruction. 111) There are other count- Iies which are much closer to being "perfect” societies than the United States. (112) Communism is a total evil. (113) The Soviet Union is ”mellowing” and the way is ppening for peaceful cooper- ation between the Russians and the United States. (11A) America is standing erilously close to the brink of total disaster from Commun— 'st subversion. (115) There is usually only one right way1to do anything. (116) If we would return to he religious, moral, and amily values of the past, we ould solve most of today's ocial problems. K117) It is a terrible thing for a person to attack public— ly the people who believe the same things he does. (118)? In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going on is to rely upon leaders or ex— erts who can be trusted. (119) Public officials really ‘don't care how people like me want things to be done. (I20) The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle. (121) Sex crimes, such as ape and attacks on children, deserve more than.mere impris- Inunent; such criminals ought to be pmblicly whipped or worse. 122) There is hardly any- thing lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his arents. (123) Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought. to Ema severly punished. -30- l 2 3 5 6 11 AGREE AGREE On AGREE A DISAGREE DISAGREE On DISAGREE Very MUch The Whole Little A Little The Whole VerngUc FE2A) Most people care what happens to you when you get Tight down to it. 125) To compromise with our Imlitical Opponents is danger- ous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. (126) People can be divided 'nto two distinct classes: the weak and the strong. I127) A man who does not be- lieve in some great cause has not really lived. (128) If Negroes are not get- housing, the government in wash) ington should see to it that they do. ting fair treatment in jobs and' (129) If cities and towns a— round the country need help to build more schools, the govern— ment in washington ought to ive them the money they need. (130) The government ought to see to it that big business corporations don't have much to say about how the govern- ent is run. (131) The government in wash— ington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. (132) I should like to belong to several clubs or lodges. (133) The Federal government is extending too much of its power into too many areas of everyday life. (13;) Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what is gging on. (135) In the long run,the best way to live is to pick . friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own. (136) There are usually many right ways to do anything. (137) Life is primarily a mat- ter of struggle for survival. (138) You can classify almost all people as either honest or crooked. -31- l 2 3 5 6 7 AGREE AGREE On AGREE A DISAGREE DISAGREE On DISAGREE Very Much The Whole Little A Little The Whole Vernguch 139) It doesn't take very long to find out if you can trust someone. (140) It is desirable to re— serve judgment about what's going on until one has a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. (1A1) If you don't watch yourA elf, most people will take advantage of you. (1A2) No one is going to care too much what happens to you when you get right down to it. (1A3) Human nature is funda- mentallyic00perative. (1AA) If I had to choose be- tween happiness and greatness, I'd choose greatness. (115) The United States and Communist Russia have nothing in common. (1A6) Our children are being better educated today in the basic fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic. (1A7) It is only when a per— son devotes himself to an ideal or a cause that life be— comes meaningful. (1A8) In this complicated world of ourseven leaders and experts we usually trust can- not help us know what is going on. (1&9) To compromise with our political Opponents is to be 'lty of appeasement. (150) A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long. (151) The government ought to help peOple get doctors and hospital care at low cost. (152) The government in wash— ington should stay out of the question of whether white or colored children go to the same school. wpgimmmm THANK YOU VERY MUCH SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, Else, Levinson, Daniel J., Sanford, R. Nevitt. The Authoritarian Personaligy. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Allport, Gordon. The Nature of PreQudice. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1954. Barber, Bernard. 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