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N'IHIJO . f: ‘I‘P‘to o In. A v . u- - 1 D ‘Ilil ‘- ....-—w-w“v- 7"" This is to certify that the dissertation entitled THE ACADIAN RESPONSE TO THE CONSCRIPTION CRISIS OF WORLD WAR II presented by Helen Jean McClelland Nugent has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degree inArts and Letters Inter- disciplinary ; M Major professor Date %? girl/6?; MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 marrow! Michigan matc- L; University w :— v—v *‘F_" w—r f w MSU LIBRARIES M RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. THESIS‘ THE ACADIAN RESPONSE TO THE CONSCRIPTION CRISIS OF WORLD WAR II BY Helen Jean McClelland Nugent A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Arts and Letters Interdisciplinary 1983 ABSTRACT THE ACADIAN RESPONSE TO THE CONSCRIPTION CRISIS OF WORLD WAR II By Helen Jean McClelland Nugent Canadian unity was threatened during both World Wars by the question of whether conscripted men should be required to serve outside of the territorial boundaries of Canada. Generally historians have re- garded the issue as one which divided the nation along English versus French, or at least English versus non-English lines. The strong oppo- sition to conscription that was evident in Quebec has been regarded as typical of French Canadian attitude, ignoring the possibility that French descended minorities outside of Quebec may have reacted differ- ently. For this study, data was gathered from several sources. News- paper and magazine articles from the 19403 were used to determine nu- merical data concerning the plebiscite vote, to gauge views of the Maritime population of those years, and to ascertain what events were influential in the thinking of Maritimers. Electoral records were utilized to show comparisons between the general elections of 1940 and 1945 and between those elections and the 1942 plebiscite vote. House of Commons debates were scrutinized to ascertain how Members of Parlia- ment representing the Acadian provinces reacted to the issues. Inter- views were conducted during the summer of 1982 with persons of Acadian and non-Acadian background throughout the Maritime provinces to judge how vividly the "crisis" remains in memory after forty years. Numerical data was analyzed by statistical methods applicable to social science fields in order to prove the significance of the find- ings, to substantiate the indications of the raw data, and to confirm that the results were not due to the chance selection of the sample. The findings of the study confirm greater opposition to con- scription among the French-descended Maritimers than among non-French, but found Acadian opposition significantly less than that in Quebec. A significant difference was also found among the Acadians resident in different Maritime ridings, with the New Brunswick ridings registering the greatest opposition. Although some accounts have described limited Acadian resistance to conscription, the personal interviews revealed no memories of any "conscription crisis" in the Maritime provinces, but strong pride among the Acadians toward those who served in the military during World War II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The members of my guidance committee, Dr. Georges Joyaux and Dr. Victor Howard, have far surpassed the normal role of committee members in guiding and directing a co-ordinated interdisciplinary program. Dr. Russel Nye and Dr. Robert Anderson were of immense help in planning and carrying through all stages of the program. As disser- tation director, Dr. Gordon Stewart has been the rare mentor who corrected my errors, re-directed my thinking, and kept the effort alive when I was ready to quit. Financial assistance for travel expenses from the Indiana State organization of Delta Kappa Gamma Society International is much appreciated, along with the co-operation of many residents of the Maritime provinces who willingly shared the memory of their World War II experiences. Of course, my work would have been impossible without encour- agement of friends and family. The statistical advice of my husband, the art ability of my son, and the patience and understanding of each daughter were invaluable. The multitude of other friends and relatives who have contributed in so many ways to the completion of this work are most gratefully acknowledged. ii . . . r r u u , ; » r , _\ , List of Tables List of Figures Introduction Chapter I 11 III IV V VI Appendix Bibliography TABLE OF CONTENTS The Problem Conscription as an issue in Canada Formative influences on the Acadians The Acadian Response: The Acadian Response: The Acadian Response: Assessment iii Papers and Politicians Voting Patterns Novels and Memories Page iv 10 32 47 74 88 98 117 122 10 11 12 LIST OF TABLES Grandes Familles Acadian ridings "no" vote in plebiscite compared with each other and with Quebec Maximum percentage of French descended population voting ”no" Percentage of voters eligible for 1940 general election participating in the 1940 general election and in the 1942 plebiscite Percentage of eligible voters voting in the 1940 general election and in the 1942 plebiscite in the Maritime provinces The 1940 and 1945 general elections compared in six sample Maritime ridings of highest Acadian population concentration Pearson r test using Angers' statistics indicating cor- relation between French descended population of more than 10% and higher "no" vote, if only votes cast are counted Results of z-tests for significant difference between the percentage of "no" votes in Quebec and in the Acadian ridings as shown in Table 3 Pearson r test for correlation between percentage of Acadian population and percentage of decline in the plebiscite vote of 1942 from the general election of 1940 in six sample ridings Chi square test verifying that the maximum percentage of total French descended population voting "no" differs between the six sample Maritime ridings and Quebec Chi square test verifying that the maximum percentage of total French descended population voting "no" differs among the six sample Maritime tidings Z-test for significant difference between percentage of Quebec FrancOphones and percentage of total Acadians voting "no" in plebiscite in six sample Maritime ridings iv 40 77 79 81 81 84 117 118 118 119 120 121 LIST OF FIGURES Map: Ridings in Maritime Provinces with Acadian representatives in Ottawa during the period of World War II Map: Percentage of "yes" votes in plebiscite by province Map: Phase I recolonization by Acadians Map: Phase II recolonization by Acadians Map: Phase III recolonization by Acadians 44 75 109 110 111 INTRODUCTION The Problem Although the response of Quebec to the conscription issue in Canada during World War II has been well covered through monographs, articles, and textbooks, there has been a tendency to assume that the attitudes of Quebecois were the standard responses of all French de- scended Canadians. Older textbooks by such respected authors as Ed- ward McInnis, through even Mason Wade's comprehensive account, have concentrated solely on Quebec.1 In this approach the response of the French descended minorities outside of Quebec is neglected. The same lack of reference to non-Quebecois French Canadians has led to confusion on the significance of the results of the plebi- scite held in April of 1942. Donald Creighton, J. L. Granatstein, John Saywell and John Ricker have all concentrated on the vote in Que- bec to the exclusion of other French descended voters in emphasizing the "split" between French- and English-Canadians.2 A recent writing by an Acadian nationalist who desired to emphasize the Francophone unity between Quebec and the Acadian people, has criticized the New Brunswick Acadian members of parliament during the World War II years for following the leadership of the King government on the conscription issue rather than obeying the wishes of the voters.3 This approach to the conscription issue has neglected the Acadian population as a sepa- rate group of French Canadians, and especially those who live outside of l 4 v , 2 New Brunswick, even though a riding in Nova Scotia was represented in Ottawa by an Acadian member at that very time.4 A common source for all of these writers is an early analysis of the voting results compiled by F. A. Angers and published the month following the plebiscite. In this article, Angers analyzed the vote by section, and did consider Francophone populations outside of Quebec. The intention of his article was to show that the voting results had an English vs. non-English split, and that the French voted "no" as a part of the non-English coalition.S The article contended that all areas of more than 10% French descended population voted in a manner "remarquable avec the pourcentage de la population d'origne francaise."6 Since the field of statistical analysis has matured rapidly over the past forty years, more recent methods applied to voting statistics could provide a basis for a different approach by historians dealing with this era. Among Prince Edward Island Acadians, two of their own historians have noted that Acadians served willingly in the military forces during the war years. J. Henri Blanchard refers to the large numbers of Aca- dians enrolled during both wars.7 Georges Arsenault agreed with Blanchard's assessment.8 A popular reminiscence of her wartime adventures as a lighthouse keeper in Nova Scotia by Evelyn Richardson criticized the Quebecois ob- jectors to conscription by contrasting them to the behavior of the lo- cal French.9 Mrs. Richardson's lighthouse was located offshore from the Nova Scotia riding represented by V.-J. Pottier, so her view of Nova Scotia Acadians was a familiar one. Antonine Maillet, the noted Acadian author and creator of_La Sagouine, considered World War II of sufficient importance to the 3 Acadians to allot a chapter for her character to comment on the war. Although fictional, Sagouine's descriptions were not dramatically dif- ferent from personal interviews that were utilized to obtain the present day Acadian thinking about the events of forty years ago. Even though the intervening time may have blurred memories, reminiscences of the participants included at least a clue to the way things were then. Sev- eral weeks were spent in the Acadian regions during the summer of 1982, talking with Acadians and non-Acadians, visiting Acadian museums and cultural centers, and becoming familiar with the area and the popula- tion. For purposes of this study, six Maritime ridings were chosen as sample ridings because they contained a high concentration of Acadians among the population. Four of the ridings are in New Brunswick, one is in Nova Scotia, and one in Prince Edward Island. The three ridings in New Brunswick which elected Acadians to Parliament in the 1940 general election are all traditionally French, of both Acadian and Quebec background. The combined counties of Resti- gouche-Madawaska, which was represented by J.-Enoil Michaud, is an in- teresting mixture of ideas. The Madawaska area is famous as a politi- cal maverick that clings happily to the legendary designation of "The Republic of Madawaska." Positioned nearly as an appendage of New Bruns- wick, between Quebec and the State of Maine, the area is influenced po- litically at least as much by those two areas as by the New Brunswick legislature which gaverns from Frederiction. The riding had an esti- mated 76% French population in 1931 that had grown only slightly by 1971, to 77%. The area is composed mostly of lumbering and logging areas with some marginal agricultural enterprise. The major city is 4 Edmunston. This region is atypical of Acadian areas because of the lack of coastline and fishing interests. Gloucester, east of Restigouche, borders on the Baie des Cha- leurs. The major cities are Bathurst and Caraquet, both of which are fishing centers. Interest in the Acadian culture has resulted in the establishment of a museum in Caraquet and a pioneer Acadian village south of the city. The French population was 77% when Clarence-J. Veniot sat in Ottawa during World War II, and remained at that level in 1971. Kent County is south of Northumberland County, and borders the Northumberland Straits. The Acadian communities are along the shore while inland regions are primarily farmed by Canadians of English de- scent. An Indian reserve is also contained inland. The Acadians had 77% of the population in 1931 and 81% by 1971. Aurele-D. Leger sat in Ottawa for this riding during the war years. Westmoreland County, bordering on Northumberland Straits and the Bay of Fundy as well as onto Nova Scotia, is more Acadian by historical designation than by population. The 40% French p0pulation remained un- changed from 1931 to 1971. Mermamcook, which was an early re-settlement area for Acadians, is the setting of St. Joseph Institute, the oldest Francophone educational institution in the Maritimes, later absorbed into the Universite de Moncton and the Acadian Centre there. Fort Beau- sejour, site of the battle in 1754 which resulted in the demand for. Acadian expulsion, is also located in this riding. During the period of this study Anglophone Harry Read Emmerson was the MP in Ottawa. Northumberland County, Located between Gloucester and Kent coun- ties, contains several Acadian settlements along the Bay of Miramachi, S but the population percentage of French was only 25% in 1931 and 26% in 1971. Many French families of both Acadian and Quebec background are engaged in lumbering and logging activities. This county was not re- garded as Acadian by L§_Voix d'Evangeline during the time of this study and has not been included among the sample ridings. In Nova Scotia, the township known as Clare, in Digby County, along Baie Sainte-Marie, has contained a majority of Acadian population, although other areas scattered along the coast south of Yarmouth, through Argyle township to the Pubnico region, are also Acadian.11 The organization of this riding has varied from time to time, but from 1935 to 1945 the riding was known as Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare, and sent Vin- cent-Joseph Pottier to Ottawa. The 26% French descended population in 1931 had grown to 32% by 1971. There are also Acadian settlements on Cape Breton in Richmond County at Arichat, and on the north shore of Inverness County at Cheticamp. The Cape Breton Acadians have exerted very little political influence although the population proportion of Acadians there has historically been higher than in other areas of Nova Scotia. Prince Edward Island is divided roughly into thirds for politi- cal administration. There are a few scattered Acadian settlements in King's and Queen's counties, but the largest concentrations are in Prince County, the furthest county East. The 1931 French population level of 17% had fallen to 14.3% by 1971. Although there are strong Acadian parishes in the Egmont Bay-Miscouche-Summerside region, and also in Tignish, the political impact has been too insignificant to elect an Acadian to Parliament. During the 19403 this riding was rep- resented by J. L. Ralston.who, as the Minister of Defence, was at the r 7 7. 7 » H . 7 . 7 7 7 a - . / . - A i . a ,7 7 A v 7 a 7 7 ,. , 7 - , '\ ., .. - 7. r n — ‘ , A 1 7‘ A ‘ , , , ‘. ' . 7 7 . \ 7 , 7 7 . A v. - 7. . A ~ - , c ‘— ‘- .r 4 - ‘ - ' “ r ‘ - , A , 7 A ,, ‘ n , . , . . \ > 7 7 -, 7 7 » .7 u .r , , 7 ‘ r ,7 .. f ,— .1 .. _ _ ,7 1 '\ A .7 7 7 a 7 . 1 ,a . , A , - .7 ,A s, ‘n . 7 A , . r- Iv , \ , 7 , n 7 . .7 p . - ' 7 ~ 7 - - - ' a 7 ‘ rx - 7 ~ ' , ‘ n . 7 . r A ‘ ' "x 7 ~ - r‘ 7 - fl . - V — ' {- ’ - v ' ' z . 1 , — - - . ,, ‘ - p , , 7 7 r. ‘ a - ,_ a a R h I, \ ‘ V ’ r' w , ‘7 A 7 w 7 - ' , ’~ rx . 7 ' r h .v , " a r‘ ~ ' ‘ -~ '\ r‘ 7 . , ‘ , f7 , . . , A f _ ‘ _‘ , , ‘ , A 7 , r» . -3 - A , . . ‘ ‘ . 7 ‘ r a , , - ,- , ‘ 7 ’ ' v‘» ‘ A. ' 7 1* r ' r .' t ~ , . x , g v . ., . 7. , , . . . .\ - .. —~ - h _ ,. , ._ r -7 7 > r - I , 7 , V 7 ' A ~ — 7 7 - 6 very center of the 1944 conscription crisis. In late March, 1940, just before Hitler's blitzkrieg struck in Scandanavia in early April, Prime Minister Mackenzie King scheduled a general election for Canada. All political parties stressed their total opposition to conscription. After the experience of World War I, how- ever, there was doubt in many minds that this policy would be viable in an extended war. The Liberals were able to gather a sizable majority of 117 members over the combined totals of Tory and CCF opposition. In the Maritimes, Liberals carried all but seven seats. The Acadian rid- ings were among the Liberal majority. New Brunswick's sample ridings had no test of French-English voting strength in the 1940 election: three ridings had all French candidates and the other had two Anglophones opposing each other.12 In Restigouche-Madawaska, Michaud defeated Oscar Levasseur by a comfort- able margin of nearly 7,000 votes to retain his seat and the cabinet position of Minister of Fisheries. In this position he was one of only eight Acadian ministers since Confederation.13 Born and partially edu- cated in Quebec, Michaud was of Acadian lineage and had spent his adult life in New Brunswick. He was strongly Francophone and, upon at least one occasion, was mistaken by a prairie journalist for a Quebec repre- sentative.14 The riding of Gloucester rejected Conservative Albany M. Robichaud for the third consecutive time, electing instead C.-J. Veniot, a physician, by a healthy 5,004 vote margin.15 In Kent, where Louis R. P. Robichaud did not stand for reelection, Aurele-D. Leger defeated Telesphore Arsenault who had represented the riding during the Bennett government from 1930-1935. The margin of victory was 2,550 votes. Westmoreland had an all English-Canadian contest in which Harry Read 7 Emmerson defeated his Conservative opponent, Emmet McMonagle, with a majority of 6,172 votes. The Nova Scotia riding of Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare witnessed a contest between and Acadian from Argyle township and a respected Conser- vative businessman from Yarmmuth, James Marvin Walker. Vincent-Joseph Pottier took the election by a margin of 4,282 votes. Acadians in Prince Edward Island had no candidate in the tun- ning, but the Liberal candidate in Prince County was to become a cen- tral figure in the conscription question. The Conservative candidate, John Adolphus MacPhee, lost the seat by 1,978 votes to James Layton Ralston, who would become Mackenzie King's Minister of Defence. Ral- ston's belief in late 1944 that conscription had become a necessity led to the controversy which brought about his resignation. The eventual implementation of conscription by his successor, Brigadier General A. G. L. McNaughton, caused Mackenzie King to call for a confidence vote in November of that year. The problem to be addressed by this study is to look at the problem of conscription during World War II, not from the view of the Quebecois or their English-Canadian protagonists, but from the view of the heretofore ignored Acadian French in the Maritime provinces. By examining their newspapers, the action of their political representa- tives in Ottawa, analyzing certain voting patterns in general elec- tions and the 1942 plebiscite, and comparing the results to the present- day writings and reminiscences of Acadians, it will be possible to mea- sure their role in the conscription crisis which occurred in Canada during the second world war, and to assess whether or not it is legiti- mate to assume that their reaponse was identical to that of Quebec. . o - 7 7 7. 7 . - 7 . . 7 7 7 7 7 r‘ A 7 , 7 , . 7. . s 7 . , , , . A - , -A , 7 .1 .7 . . A. j _ . 7 . 7 , ‘ . . n P p 7 7 . 7 7 - . 7 ‘— ‘ 7 7 , 7 r 7 7 ,a _. 7 ,a h 7 7 7 7 — _. 7 . . . l y 7 7 .— . , .7 m ’ —. A '7 , 7 r 7 7 , A . - 7 . A 7 7 1 1 , , . 7 7 , a 7 . 7 7 7 . 7 , H , 7 7 7 7 v . ' ‘ ‘ A < ~ ~ 7 ‘ . 8 NOTES 1Edward McInnis, Canada: Political and Social History, third ed. (Toronto, 1969), pp. 575 ff. and Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760- -1967, rev. ed. in two volumes (Toronto, 1975), especially Chapter XV, w"French Canada and World War II (1939-1944)," are only two widely used books where this usage is common. 2Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939- 1957 (Toronto, 1976), p. 71; J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939- 1945 (Toronto, 1975), p. 225; John Saywell and John Ricker, Ramsay Cook, ed., Canada: A'Modern Study, rev. ed., (Toronto, 1977), pp. 256 ff. 3Philippe Doucet, "La Politique et les Acadians," in Les Acadi- ens des Maritimes: Etudes Thematiques, ed. Jean Daigle, (Moncton, 1980), especially "Les Acadiens et la Deuxieme Guerre,” pp. 279-282. 4J. K. Johnson, The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867- 1967 (Ottawa, 1968) lists V. J. Pottier sitting for the Nova Scotia riding of ShelburneeYarmouth- Clare from 1935 to 1945. 5F. A. Angers, "Un vote de race: Analyse mathématique et sta- tisque du vote au DIEbiscite dans les cinq provinces de l'Est," L'Ac tion Nationale XIX, 4 (May, 1942): 299-312. 61bid., pp. 301-302. 7J. Henri Blanchard, The Acadians of Prince Edward Island 1720- 1964 (Charlottetown, 1964), p. 141. 8Georges Arsenault, Histoire de l' emigration chez les Acadiens de l' Ile-du- Prince Edouard (Summerside, 1980), p. 33. 9Evelyn Richardson, B . . . was for Butter and Enemy Craft (Halifax, 1976), p. 113. 10Arsenault, Samuel P.; Daigle, Jean; and Schroeder, Jacques, Atlas de l 'Acadie: Petit Atlas des Francophones des Maritimes (Moncton, 1976), planche 3. Succeeding references to 1971 population from same source. 1931 estimates of percentages from Angers, "Un vote de race." 11Digby County was formed in 1836 and Yarmouth County separated from Shelburne County in 1837. Seasoned Timbers: A_Sampling of Histor- ig_Buildings Unigue 52 Western Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1972), I: 121. .- , o ~ . . M ‘ , a y u 7 , , ‘ , . - s 1 , - r -\ n , . r l A - ,.' _ a .. . - , , , I», 7 . - 7 a . .\ 7 a . - _ —. v. .— o , , h r ,1 7, ‘1 q > ., a , . , , . 4 ,. . _ _. . A. _ - ,. 7 r _ - \ a ., . ‘ - . - ,— 7 , 7 i 2Personal data on candidates from J. K. Johnson, The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1967. Electoral figures from Dominion of Canada, Report of the Chief Election Officer: 19th General Election (1940). 3 L§_Voix d'Evangeline, July 21, 1938. 14 During the November, 1944, cabinet crisis, the Winnipeg Free Press included Michaud among front-page pictures captioned "Cabinet ministers from Quebec who are said to be resigning." Winnipeg Free Press, November 23, 1944. 15 Robichaud ran unsuccessfully in 1930, 1935, 1940, and 1945. Finally successful in 1952, he was defeated again in 1953. CHAPTER I Conscription as an issue in Canada ‘ In the United States the term "conscription crisis" is commonly equated with the widespread draft resistance experienced during the Vietnam conflict. In Canada, however, the idea of conscription refers only to the requirement that draftees serve outside of Canada, and has been an historic point of contention between French Canadians and Eng- lish Canadians. During both World Wars the differences grew to the proportion of a "crisis" situation. Self government and national identity are concepts which have developed slowly in Canada over the course of two centuries. Canada has no heritage of revolutionary uprisings against British "Redcoats." The regular British army has been viewed, rather, as a reSpected and appreciated institution which furnished valuable protection during the slow Canadian evolution into independent status. Because they were a part of the British Empire, most English Canadians regarded military service as an honorable career. After British regular forces were withdrawn from the new Dominion in 1871, defense responsibility was assumed by the militia and voluntary enlistments were sufficient to maintain the necessary level of manpower until World War 1, although the South African crisis of 1899-1902 created a question of Canadian involvement. This conflict over the nature of military service first 10 , A a _ , , - 7 7.~ ’ 7 a a. ,-. .7 w , , w ‘- 7 w , . , A . . . 7 , , A , \ , A , _ .‘ - 7‘ .. H 1‘ . , r, , . ¢ 1 11 occurred during the Boer War when Wilfrid Laurier, the first French- Canadian Prime Minister, denied that Canada had any obligation to pro- vide tr00ps requested by England to serve in South Africa. There was no question on any side of the basic loyalty of Laurier or French Cana- dians to the Empire. The feeling existed in Quebec then, as it did later, that Canada's role in the Empire's defense could best be served by providing for Canadian defense. The Canadian population was too small, it was argued, to provide adequate tr00ps for home regiments while sending participants to battlefields far-flung throughout the Em- pire. Henri Bourassa, who emerged during the Boer War crisis as a Spokesman for the French-Canadian nationaliste position, insisted that a distinction be made between British imperial ambitions and Canadian national interests. In response to demands from English Canada, 7,000 Canadians were recruited and equipped then sent to serve as part of the British army. Only volunteers were sent, and Laurier insisted that no precedent had been set concerning Canadian participation in future English wars. During World War I, Canada's participation began when England entered the war in 1914. As always, overseas duty was restricted to volunteers. Those conscripted for mandatory service were used only in Canada until losses became too heavy to reinforce by voluntary enlist- ments. The imposition of regulations requiring conscripted men to be sent overseas brought serious division to the country in 1917. The most notable disagreement on the subject was along racial lines, between French-descended and English-descended Canadians. The frightening vio- lence which accompanied the political conflict resulted in street riots and civil disobedience which re-emphasized the dangers to national unity 12 inherent in racial division. These spectres haunted the political scene from the earliest days of World War II. All parties concerned desired to avoid such disunity during World War II, and the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 con- tained limitations in section three which explicitly precluded mandatory military service outside Canada or her territorial waters. Efforts to change this limitation nearly brought down Mackenzie King's wartime government, and the debate over definitions and terms was heated among and between Francophones and Anglophones. During the entire period of World War II a cloud of suspicion hung over all considerations of mandatory service. Conflicting opin- ions developed over the precise limits or exact definitions of phrases such as "overseas service." Geographical terms like "Western Hemis- phere," and "territorial boundaries and waters" were debated and chal- lenged throughout the country's media and in provincial legislatures as well as among the leaders in Ottawa. Definition of the word "conscrip- tion" remained constant: sending men called upon for mandatory mili- tary service to assignment outside of Canada. The long-standing divi- sion of opinion between French Canadian and English Canadian over the wisdom and legality of such action stood ready to again occupy center stage in the Canadian political theatre. The French-Canadian reluctance to send conscripted men overseas was rooted in long-standing differences concerning what was and what was not a Canadian war. Although the necessity of serving under arms had been established in New France, there is evidence to indicate that even then the average French Canadian was intent on avoiding military service unless his homeland was directly threatened.1 The French were ' 7. r . 7 7 , - x . , , , 7 . . n ‘ ' * n 7 . ~ . _ _ . 7 c 7 ,- _ . . . c _ - 7 r7 :\ 7 , 7 7 7 , . A I 77 . \ 7. ,_ a . ,7 _‘ 7 . ,7 A v , 7, - 7 ‘ 7 .- 7 7 .7. c —. r \ 7 7 7 _ i 1 7 , , 7 ‘7 7 a 7‘ - n , 7 - 7 . 7 .7‘ ,7 . . _ 7 - A - , , , ,7 — . ,\ . r 7 . 7 , 7 _ ,, A .. , ,_v A , ,_ , . 7 , .1 , 7 77 . a 7 7 — 7 7 7 ‘ . — 7 ,. 7, 7 _ 7 fl , 7 , t 7 . ,. ,7 7 7 ‘ . 7, , ‘ ‘1 ,— 7 7 ,7 _‘ 7 — ‘ , , . , I , , - 7 7 v 7 i ‘ > . v . 7 7 . a , -. r ,7 ,_ A , - 7 . . u 1 ,. 7 ,7 7 7. , c 7 7 7 i , ,, _ ,7 . 7. I' - 7 . A 7 7 V . 7 7, , 7 , 7 - . 7. fl 1 . '1 , 13 also responsible for dividing the military forces into "active" mili- tia--single young men in good health, and the "reserve"-- older, married men whose reSponsibilities limited their time available for training and drill. Following the Conquest in 1760, the British were able to exercise their authority without the use of conscription among the French Canadians, and the majority of the capitaines d5 milice were retained in civil functions only. As a part of British North America, most French Canadians were content to avoid military service unless the homeland was directly threatened. Regular army officers of English background found it difficult to deal with the militia members' inabil- ity or refusal to conform to rigid rules and discipline. Gradually a system evolved which had similarities to the old French military: active and reserve troops. Single young men in good health would be the first accepted in "active" militia. If required, battalions of these men could serve full time, attaining a high degree of military skill through training and service. Married and older men who had more demanding responsibilities at home would be enrolled into more seden- tary positions as "reserves." Only in case of real or imminent threat were these reserves called into active service.2 The first permanent military units in Canada were established under the Military Act of 1855. Despite the French roots of the Cana- dian militia, British military traditions were established which en- dured through World War II. Gradually these traditions came to be regarded as Canadian, rather than British, ignoring some of the actual origins. In the Militia Act of 1868, volunteers were emphasized as the core of national defense, although the principle of conscription, or levee en masse, was retained.3 v 14 The withdrawal of British troops from Canadian soil after the signing of the Treaty of Washington left Canadians responsible for their own tr00ps, but retained Imperial traditions and training proce- dures. Senior positions went to British officers or to Canadians trained in the British army. Establishment of officers' training fa- cilities on Canadian soil brought British supervision and training staff which did nothing to attract Francophone Canadians into the Army. The special historical circumstances of the Acadian population in the Maritime region gave them a unique response to war and military service. An Acadian tradition of neutrality was established after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 made them political subjects of the British crown while still culturally and religiously tied to the French regime. Their attempt to walk the narrow line of non-involvement resulted in the infamous expulsion during the final French-English struggle for co- lonial supremacy in North America. In Nova Scotia, Acadians were docu- mented as a part of the British forces from shortly after the Treaty of Utrecht: After the British conquest the Acadian militia ceased to exist as such, but those who were willing to cooperate with the British regime were admitted to the local forces, regular and militia. An Acadian officer, Major John Doucett, eventually commanded a company of the 40th Regiment, a British regular unit raised at Annapolis in 1717, a d rose to be an Administra- tor in the province of Nova Scotia. During the Napoleonic Wars, Governor Wentworth went to great lengths to keep the Acadians loyal, and the tradition of the Nova Scotia militia having Acadian units with Acadian officers dates from that era.5 By 1859, however, when military units began to organize along national- ity lines, many Acadians melted in with other ethnic groups. In Hali- fax there were recorded Scottish, English, and Irish companies, but no 15 French.6 This pattern was evident during World War II when such groups as the Prince Edward Highlanders and the Cape Breton Highlanders con- tained muster rolls with good proportions of Acadian names.7 Army life was even less attractive to Acadians than to Quebec- ois. Besides the language barrier, as residents of coastal areas of the Maritime provinces, their lives were traditionally sea-oriented.8 The Royal Navy remained the coastal protector even after the passage of the Navy Bill in 1910, and the fledgeling Royal Canadian Navy retained English methods and traditions. Francophone participation was neither expected nor encouraged. French opposition to conscription in Canada during World War I has been extensively studied. The split along racial lines is docu- mented in every Canadian history text. However, none of these studies consider any regional disparity or resistance outside of Quebec. In order to place the World War II situation in proper perspective, it will be helpful to review the Canadian political changes which occurred between the two wars, and their effect on the position of the Canadian government in procuring troop replacements in 1944. During World War I there was little question of Canada's colo- nial status. The degree of autonomy which might be claimed was subject to debate, but no one seriously challenged the view that Great Britain's declaration of war against the Central Powers also involved the Domin- ions of the Empire. In Canada the main point of contention between Anglo-Canadian and French-Canadian was not whether obligation without representation existed, but to what extent.9 Anglo-Canadians, whether born in Britain or Canada, generally accepted the idea that full effort 16 on the part of the colonial members of the Empire meant sending as many men as necessary to fill British army ranks. If it became necessary, conscripted soldiers should be sent to overseas duty. The French Canadian constitutional view was that colonial military obligation was fulfilled by self defense, and sending Canadian men to battle areas outside of Canada was not required. Therefore, duty in Europe should be completely voluntary and certainly not supported by conscription. When it became evident that the high level of Canadian partici- pation could not be maintained without mandatory overseas service, pas- sage of the Military Service Bill threatened national unity as never before. A general election scheduled for December of 1917 forced Prime Minister Robert Borden to form a Union cabinet without Laurier, the Liberal leader, and to pass the Wartime Election Act which would en- courage the election of a pro-conscription parliament to implement the dread measure. Under the Election Act, Canadians who were former citi- zens of an enemy country were disenfranchised while women who were next-of—kin to soldiers serving overseas were given the vote. Quebec Opposition to conscription was left in a shattered Liberal minority, and the feelings of frustration contributed to the outbreak of violent resistance which led to bloody riots in Quebec City during the Easter Week end of 1918. Twenty-two years later both major political parties were still reacting to the memory of this violence when, in the 1940 general election campaign, Mackenzie King and the Conservative leader, R. J. Manion, pledged both of their parties to a policy of non-conscrip- tion. Quebec voters had heeded the advice of King's Francophone cabi- net ministers to resist the Union Nationale's Opposition to participation \ q-n - 7‘.“ \- , .7- 17 in the war, and Maurice Duplessis had been defeated in the provincial election of 1939. King's strategy of delaying the Canadian declaration of war against Germany until September 10, 1939, had also been popular in Quebec, although unappreciated by Anglophiles.10 The politics of Prime Minister King were clearly a reaction to the Crisis of 1917, and designed to prevent any recurrence of the French Canadian question of how far colonial obligations extended. During the twenty-two year recess in EurOpean battles, changes had occurred in Ca- nada's status which helped to re-define her responsibilities. The in- sistence of Prime Minister Borden of Canada and South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts in obtaining the adoption of the Borden-Smuts reso- lution at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 had laid the groundwork for recognition of autonomy in foreign policy in the Statute of West- minster in 1931. French Canadians applauded this vindication of Laurier's contention that Canada had no obligation to send troops to the Boer War. In retrospect, the now departed leader's action of send- ing men to South Africa seemed less reprehensible than Henri Bourassa had claimed at the time. King spared no effort in the 1940 campaign in lauding Laurier for his wisdom in acting in a conciliatory manner to- ward London in the earlier dispute rather than creating an unnecessary confrontation. Because of the differences between the conscription difficulties in World War I and World War II, it is necessary to consider other pos- sible motivations for anti-conscription sentiment. The presence of in- ternational ideologies was far more evident during World War II. Fas- cism, Communism and anti-Semitism all entered the scene and made the en- tire war picture much more complicated than the largely nationalist 18 controversies of earlier years. The Jewish persecutions which accompanied the rise of Nazism have been the subject of considerable research. Much has been said and written about the attitude of the Roman Catholic church toward anti- Semitism. The strength of the church among French Canadians makes the question of anti-Semitism worth consideration to assess if it had any bearing on the conscription issue, although definitive answers are elusive. Increasing numbers of Jewish refugees searched for new homes after the German pogroms of 1936 and again after the Austrian Anschluss of 1938. Canada's large territorial expanse had attracted immigrants searching for economic or political improvement for years. A number of Jews were already present in various parts of the country. Before the actual hostilities of World War II began, tales of Nazi atrocities were largely discounted. Even anti-appeasement Englishmen found the descrip- tions of German behavior unbelievable.11 North Americans, 108t in their own depression-era problems, gave little notice to Jewish difficulties. Until Poland was attacked, Canadians generally favored all attempts to prevent open conflict. Even Mackenzie King felt that Hitler could be approached with reason.12 Never the less, Jewish immigration was in- creasing and there were attempts being made to allow even larger num- bers to enter. The Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, working feverishly to save as many as possible from the growing danger in Europe, believed that Mackenzie King's cabinet contained Quebec members who threatened their goal. After the Liberal party had been defeated in Quebec by Maurice Duplessis' Union Nationale party in 1936, the president of the Montreal-based Society reported to his board that "he had it on good . h v 7 ‘ ' ‘ fl 7 ' .7 1 r .. 7 7 7 . 7 . 7 7 . 7 7 l. 7 7 77 ' ' 7. 1' . 7 it . 7 7 7 ,7, - ,7 7 — 7 ,. A — 7 ‘ - - p ' ‘- A 77 7 . _ - , 7 ,- : - _‘ . 7 y - ‘ .— 7 , 77 7 I , A, . . '7 ’ 7 19 authority that the French Canadian element in the Federal Cabinet is strongly opposed to the admission of Jews to Canada."13 Certainly anti-Semitism existed in Quebec. The Fascist organi- zer, Adrien Arcand, had built his movement increasingly upon the fear of large-scale Jewish immigration. Henri Bourassa wrote a series in Le Devoir during his journey through Europe in the summer of 1938 which portrayed Hitler very favorably. Early in 1939 a petition circulated by the St. Jean Baptist Society in Quebec City "protesting vigorously against immigration of any kind whatever and especially against Jewish immigration" was presented to the House of Commons bearing 127,364 signatures.14 But the harsh reality of the Fascist movement, based largely on anti-Semitism, existed and grew in other parts of Canada as well. Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as Ontario, had flourishing organizations. Arcand was less successful in the Maritime provinces. In 1937 attempts were made to build a Fascist organization in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, but failed for lack of numbers.15 Anti- 16 However, there is not semitism has been noted among Acadians. enough evidence available to make any valid comparison with Quebec. The lack of any sizable Jewish population among Acadian regions, combined with the historical prejudice toward Black neighbors, suggests the pos- sibility that in racial animosities, any scapegoat will suffice.17 The outbreak of war in Europe lessened the acceptibility of open anti-Semitism, but the fall of France in June of 1940 brought another problem for French Canadian leaders: the separation of the" French nation into "occupied" and "unoccupied" sectors, the former ad- ministered by the Nazi military authorities and the latter supposedly a free state. 20 Among Anglo-Canadians, as among the English themselves, Petain's government in Vichy was viewed as merely a puppet organization set up to carry out Nazi dictates in the unoccupied section of France. Marshal Petain announced a plan for restauration, designed to re-establish a tra- ditional authority in French society and to re-organize the state on professional and corporate structures in accordance with the Papal Encyclicals of Pius XI, which had great appeal for the religious leaders in Quebec.18 The appearance of General Charles de Gaulle's Free French as anti-Nazi allies created a confusing situation as both de Gaulle and Petain sought to picture themselves as "true France," and the other as a "traitor." The actual potential for pro-Nazi influence upon French Canadians was less than feared by the Canadian government, but the unexpected affinity of Quebec leadership for Vichy caused difficulty for Mackenzie King throughout 1940 and 1941.19 Vichy and the Germans in occupied France both tried to use the short-wave radio to woo French Canadian thinking. From Paris, in Nazi- occupied France, a regular broadcast beamed to French Canada used "A1- ouette" as a signature theme. There were a number of objectives for these transmissions, but the most frequently emphasized was keeping alive the memory of French rule in Canada by making constant allusions to the historic ties. Attempts were made to influence the French Canadian attitude toward the rest of the Dominion through fostering separatism and setting French Canadians against conscription. Efforts were made to establish a direct link in thinking between "Fascist" France and. Canada and to justify collaboration between unoccupied France (Vichy) and Germany and to show how futile any other course would be. Any le- gitimate or desirable cultural differences within Canada were magnified 1 , . t 7 ‘ 7 w 7 7 — 7 7 7 , i 7 ’77 , 7 , , ’- ’ ,- A 7 77 - ‘ 7 7 ~ - A- 7 . ,7 7 A 7 77 7 A , _ 7 7 7 , - - - :7. , 7 .- / " 7 ‘ ‘ l A A -~ A ~ 7 7 7 .7 7 7 7 7 , 7 7 ,_ 7 7 7 7 ‘ , 7 7 ‘ 7 - 77 -. - 7 - 7 7 , i A b ,, ‘ 7 > ‘ , , D V r < 7 A . 7 p, . 7 a , 7 ‘ , ‘ , ‘ P‘ . ’ ' 7 n A F ' ~ ' r ‘ ~ ‘ n 7 P. ’ 7 ‘ 7 ' ' " -7 A - 7 - h '7 -\ I 7* '- - _ .7 7 7 . ~ , 7 . 7 a A 7 7 n 7 7 r ‘ r‘ I ~ ‘ — — - ‘ - ‘ - - r . ‘ ~ ». ' 7 ' ' m ,- - a - 7' - , 7- 7 ‘ 7 - - . I 7. .7 7 r ‘7 . ‘ 7 7 ,7 A 7 - 7' 7 , 7 7 , 7, A u - . T V - 7 ,— ,7 u .7 l ‘ 7 _ - 7 ‘ . 7, 7 7 ' 7 - 7 . \ fl . ,7. 7 .7, N 7 . —. . - 7 7 - ~ -. 7 ,- 7 77 ‘ ' , ' . . - 77 ,7 ‘ A . 7 A ~ ' < , ,e 7 7 - *' 7 — c7. — - ~ . .. . - . . 7 V , 7 - - r—_ 21 into such proportions as would incite disunity.20 In addition to the German transmissions, there were also regu- lar broadcasts to French Canada from "unoccupied France" under the aus- pices of the collaborationist Vichy government. The objectives of those broadcasts were also quite clear. There was an Open promotion of hostility to Great Britain and a minimizing of American strength and potential aimed at undermining Canadian morale. The virtues of the New Order and values of collaboration were stressed. General de Gaulle and his followers were castigated as enemies of the New Order and, there- fore, traitors to France. The totalitarian trends of the Vichy regime in social, economic, cultural and political matters were defined and defended. These broadcasts from Vichy had several often-repeated themes which stressed the close ties between France and Canada. The most dominant was that France had always considered French Canadians as Frenchmen because of the profound cultural identity which existed be- tween the two, and that French Canadians considered France as their fatherland. An extension of this theme was the idea that French Cana- dian power in Canada had steadily grown since 1763, and continued to strengthen despite their persecutions for their French attitudes and actions. Heavy emphasis was put upon the theme that the French-Cana- dian attachment to France could in no way be considered disloyalty to Canada. The final culmination of these themes was that the France of Petain was moving toward greater similarity with the France left behind 21 The by the French-Canadian settlers, and also with their ideals. French-Canadian response to these themes was obviously intended to sat- isfy the objectives by lessening the French-Canadian acceptance of English and English-Canadian pleas for additional war effort. 7 7 7 7 ‘ 7 - 7 7 7 .7 -\ . 7 7 1 ,7 7 7 7 .- 7 A 7 7 r7» . 7 7 7 ,. j - 7 7 7_ 7 _ . . 7 A, 7 ,‘ _ . 7 7 - A , , , p 7-7 7 7 ,_ 7 7 -_ 7 7 _ ‘ .— , ¢ 7 . . A , l , I , - 7 A 7 . 7 _\ A 7 u < . ,- 7 —7 .7 7 m . _ 7 A 7 22 Unlike the plans for these transmissions, the success was vague and undefined. No exact targets were pinpointed among specific poten- tial listeners. Therefore it is difficult to assess any precise measure of how well the attempts succeeded among either Quebecois or Acadians. Among Maritime newspapers, La‘Voix d'Evangeline gave approximately equal space to items originating with Vichy sources and those from the Free French. The only mention of Radio Paris broadcast attempts to sway voters toward a "non" vote in the plebiscite was in the English language press. A small article datelined Ottawa reported the incident on an inside page, while on the editorial page of the same paper, the suggestion was made, in an editorial entitled "If Hitler Voted," that not only Hitler, but Mussolini, Hirohito, Laval and all their support- ers would vote "no." The editorial concluded that "So will a consider- able number tarred with Nazism, who unfortunately do have the right to vote on April 27."22 In their Maritime location, it is possible that some Acadians heard the pro-Nazi broadcasts. However, they certainly were subjected to more pro-British, pro-conscription influences than were the Quebec- ois, simply by reason of their more pervasive bilingual setting. The French language weekly newspapers were supplemented by daily news in English as there were no full-time French radio facilities. Even those who read the French weeklies had their news supplemented by English language sources. Exposure to pro-British media was much stronger among the Acadians, which gave them a different view of the world af- fairs during the years since 1917 than the view of Quebec. After the United States entered the war the extent of Canada's war effort became a political issue of the first magnitude. During the 23 late summer of 1940, less than a month after the Ogdensburg meeting with Mackenzie King, President Roosevelt had mobilized the National Guard and gained passage of the first peacetime conscription in United States history.23 By the end of October, United States men had been registered and the first draft numbers selected, with no restrictions or guarantees concerning home defense or overseas duty assignments. By August of 1940, Canada had managed to create the National Resources Mo- bilization Act and had registered over 800,000 men and childless widow- ers. In early October the first conscripts began training for home de- fense. The Canadian system actually created two armies: "reserves" to remain within Canada for home defense, and "active" for duty overseas. In early 1942, the comparisons between the two Western hemis- phere nations in the Pacific theatre of war seemed to many Conservatives to indicate a lack of dedication on the part of the Liberal government. The unfortunate surrender of the British garrison at Hong Kong only weeks after the arrival of Canadian reinforcements compared unfavorably with the stand of American and Filipino tr00ps who, with little chance of reinforcements and additional equipment, seemed to be staving off defeat through strategic withdrawals and retreats. The introduction of a two-front war necessitated additional manpower according to pro-con- scriptionists. The threat of invasion from Asia mandated keeping a sizable force for home defense, countered the anti-conscriptionists. On the floor of the House of Commons the argument raged. On January 22, 1942, the Speech from the throne carried the idea of a national plebiscite to let the people answer in a referendum vote on the question "Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods 7 7 .7 7 7 7. _. 7 7 K . o . 7 - . 7‘ 7 . A _ i . 77 ‘ . 7 . 7 _ ‘ 7 7 , _‘ v ox _ 7 . _‘ . ~ .. - 7 7 , A 7 . 7. . m 7‘ 7 7 77 , .. m A , 7 ‘ ., i .7 7 r~ ~ - . ‘ v 7 2 7 — 7t . , v i .- a. . . ‘7 7 - .. . . . . - r . . , , , _ __ _\ . - — - r 7. . . ~ 7 . — 7 _ 7 , 7 ' _ . v _ . .\ ‘ v . , ' ‘ 7 77 7 ,. 7 7‘ , 24 of raising men for military service?"24 Much opposition to the plebiscite came from Conservatives of a similar mind to George Drew, party leader in Ontario, who had been agi- tating for the introduction of overseas conscription since early in the war. The feeling of this group was that the government already pos— sessed the power to conscript and should do so without wasting time and money on a national vote. This attitude seemed especially dangerous in Quebec because R. B. Hanson had been replaced as federal Tory leader in November by Arthur Meighan who was well remembered as the chief archi- tect of the Military Service Act of 1917. If Dr. Manion's campaign vow of 1940 that the Conservatives opposed the use of conscription retained any credence under Hanson, choosing Meighan as partly leader destroyed it entirely. In Quebec, nationalistes challenged the King government's goal of "Conscription if necessary but not necessarily conscription." The death of the leading Quebec Liberal in King's cabinet, Ernest Lapointe, in late November of 1941 had removed the most influential voice. Much debate about the issue of conscription centered on what position La- pointe would have taken. The most widely used argument of those in Quebec Who supported the government was that a "yes" vote would keep the power of conscription in the hands of an administration which was on record as opposing the use of that power, while a confidence vote might very well result from a "no” vote. An election might possibly hand over power to a Meighan-led government, and thereby cause automatic conscription. The hardest task was to convince the voters that the vote was not "yes" or "no" on conscription, but rather on whether or not the government should remain bound to the campaign pledge of 1940. 7 77 ' 7 Q 7. V 7 , 7 7 ,7 7 a ) , _ .7 7 ‘ A 7 7 _\ ‘ \' 7 L 7 7 , 7 7 77 \ 7 h ‘ 7. , A . 7 ‘7 7 - '—x - , 7 7 7- ‘ ‘ I. 7 7 7 » 7 7 - 7 7 7» 7‘ 7 7 7 7 . 7 ‘ - ‘ 7 7 ‘ 7 7 v “ ‘7 ‘ < ‘ 7 7 - I 7 A ‘ 7 7 ,. 7 ' 77 ~ 7 - 7 . ~ ‘ 7 . . _ ; _ - ‘- - ‘ ‘ - ‘ ,- ’ 'x ' -. ‘ — 7 25 The actual plebiscite vote, on April 27, 1942, settled nothing for Canada. Those who had favored conscription for overseas duty viewed the vote as a mandate from eight of nine provinces for immediate action. Those opposed to conscription reiterated that they had been assured by the Prime Minister that the plebiscite was not a vote for or against conscription, but for or against allowing the government to pass conscription legislation if it should ever be needed. The Quebec oppo- nents stressed that Quebec had voted overwhelmingly "non" and must not be coerced if Canadian unity were to survive. Pro-British elements in- sisted that Quebec was the only "holdout" and in the interests of unity must submit to majority role. The CCF party insisted that conscription of manpower must not be implemented without conscription of wealth. Interpretations of the "will of the people" were as numerous as politi- cians could make them. Mackenzie King's government, needing the support of both Quebec and Ontario Liberals, finally succeeded in getting the restrictive Section three of the N. R. M. A. removed, but was absolutely committed to showing dire need before using conscripted men for overseas duty. As usual, the military struggle did not wait for political con- troversy to subside, therefore the war continued. In Europe, the raid on Dieppe in August of 1942 created controversy in Canada over the large percentage of Canadians killed, wounded, or captured. Contingents of Canadian troops participating in the Italian campaign also raised the spectre of necessary reinforcements. A touchy problem emerged with the need to defend the Western hemisphere. The Japanese juggernaut in the Pacific was halted at the Battle of Midway in June of 1942, but that was not evident at the time. Instead, Japanese troops, landed in the 26 Aleutian Islands as part of a feint strategy accompanying the Midway attack, appeared to pose a real threat to hemisphere security. New- foundland, Labrador, and Alaska had already been included in areas to which conscripted troops might be sent. An order-in-council was issued on June 18, 1943, which authorized the use of Canadian troops in the Aleutians, and Ralston immediately made this order applicable to the 25 The Thirteenth had been train- Thirteenth Canadian Infantry Brigade. ing with American men and methods as part of joint American-Canadian preparations for hemiSphere defense, and was composed largely of N.R.M.A. men. In August of 1943, landings of these troops on Kiska Island re- vealed that the Japanese troops had departed. Nevertheless, contro- versy swirled about Ralston's policy of sending conscripted troops into a potential combat situation outside of Canadian territory. In the cabinet, Ralston and Macdonald remained the leading pro- ponents of expanding the overseas service to include all N.R.M.A. men. King grew testy about the issue, but he yearned for some way to estab- lish Canada's position as a real power in the war and to reaffirm him- self as a respected leader of his people. He was especially unnerved when English language newspapers reported stories which fueled doubts to the contrary. The Toronto Telegram, for example, allowed a Washing- ton correspondent to report that It was a favourite jest among American politicians that Canada was on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays a partner member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, on Thursdays Fridays and Saturdays a satellite ally of the United States, and on Sundays an independent sovereign State, untrammelled by any ties or obligations. DrDay landings in Normandy in June, 1944, further divided the parliamentary opinions on the question of using N.R.M.A. men abroad. ‘I 27 Ralston knew that as the push across France through the Low Countries into Germany progressed the casualty rate would increase. The further the armies progressed, however, the stronger the home front belief grew that the war was approaching the end. News accounts about the surrender of scores of German troops, Nazi use of young boys as reinforcements, dwindling Luftwaffe strength, and accompanying Russian successes on the Eastern front seemed to indicate that the end was imminent for Hitler. The United States Navy's superiority in aircraft carriers had definite- ly turned the Pacific tide and recaptured island bases allowed heavy bombers to raid the Japanese homeland. Few, if any, Canadian troops would be required in the Pacific theatre. With the end of hostilities seemingly in sight after five long years of struggle, volunteers for overseas duty declined, and the opponents of conscription were certain that the war would end before the measure became necesSary. Regrettably, Adolf Hitler doggedly held on, long past the time of his evident defeat. Autumn of 1944 brought the Canadian government to a decision crisis on the issue of conscription. Ralston visited the European front and returned with a firm resolve to implement conscrip- tion. There was cabinet support for his position: Macdonald, Ilsley, William Mulock and Colin Gibson among others. In a cabinet so designed to include French representation, there was also opposition which inclu- ded the French ministers: Power, Fournier, LaFleche, St. Laurent, and Michaud. King accepted Ralston's resignation in rather brutal fashion on November 1, 1944. As a replacement he appointed the controversial Gener- al A. G. L. McNaughton who expressed the overly optimistic opinion that reinforcements could be adequately supplied by additional appeals for 28 volunteers. Continued shortfall of overseas volunteers led McNaughton to also call for overseas conscription within a fortnight. In late No- vember the cabinet approved an order-in-council which would result in 16,000 conscripted men being assigned for duty overseas. Parliamentary furor was intense due to feelings both conscriptionists and anti- conscriptionists that they were being maneuvered for political purposes. Ralston's resignation appeared to conscriptionists to be a sacrifice of a truthful cabinet member made in order to pacify Quebec. McNaughton's reversal of attitude appeared to anti-conscriptionists to be a contrived pre-arrangement with the Prime Minister to retain political favor among Quebec Liberals. Dismay on both sides ran so high that Mackenzie King was forced to ask for a vote of confidence in early December. In late December the last gasp of Nazi Germany's military power was expended in the Battle of the Bulge. The realization that fanati- cism among the Axis could impede Allied progress and inflict senseless, but actual, casualties made the government policy seem more sensible to Canadians. Fortunately, spring of 1945 brought the final victory in Europe. Although the refusal of voters in Ontario Gray-North riding to provide McNaughton with a Commons seat in a February 5 election had confused the situation, the conscription issue faded rapidly on the po- litical scene. The King government's time had run out, but just as the events in Europe had aided his efforts in March of 1940, the end of the struggle was to his advantage in the June, 1945 election. Acadian citizens and their representatives in Ottawa partici- pated in these tumultous events, both as Maritimers and as Canadians of French extraction. The question to be answered is which influence was most meaningtul--did the Acadian role most nearly resemble that of ‘\ r 7 7 7 _ 7 , . 7. . I - 7 _ a .. 7 q 7 p 7 7 A /- - , ' 7‘ ~ 7 — 77 - - ,7 a 7 .- ,. A ,7 29 other Francophones in Quebec, or that of their AnglOphone neighbors in the Maritime provinces? 30 NOTES 1R. H. Roy, "The Canadian Military Tradition" in The Canadian Military: A_Profile, ed. Hector J. Massey (Toronto, 1972), pp. 6-48. 21bid., pp. 7-9. 31bid. 4Thomas H. Raddall, West Novas: A History 2f the West Nova Scotia Regiment (Halifax, 1947), p. 15. 5Interview with Brian Cuthbertson, Public Archives, Halifax, Nova Scotia, on June 28, 1982. 6Ernest J. Chambers, The Canadian Militia: A History Origin and Development g£_the Force (Montreal, 1907), p. 80. f the 7War Diary of the Cape Breton Highlanders, Beaton Institute, mf, Cape Breton University, Sydney, Nova Scotia. 8Charles C. Hughes, Marc-Adelard Tremblay, Robert N. Rapoport, and Alexander H. Leighton, People gf Cove and Woodlot: Communities from the Viewpoint 9; Social Psychiatry (New York, 1960), p. 33. Also Jean-Claude Dupont, "L'influence de la mer sur la vie domestique des Acadiens," Revue Economique dg l'Universite Moncton (Octobre, 1966): 32-36. 9Grant Dexter covers the constitutional aspects of both con- scription eras in a series of editorial articles, Winnipgg, Free Press, December 19-22, 1944. 10This followed the British declaration by one week and was voted by a special session of the Canadian parliament. 11An example is found in Harold Nicholson, Diaries and Letters 1930-1939 (New York, 1966), I: 347-348. 12C. P. Stacey, "The Divine Mission: Mackenzie King and Hitler," Canadian Historical Review LXI, 4 (December, 1980): 502-512. 13Irving Arbella and Harold Troper, "'The Line Must be Drawn Somewhere'": Canada and Jewish Refugees, 1933-39," Canadian HistoriCal Review LX,2 (June, 1979): 189 n. 14Lita Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada 13 the Thirties (Toronto, 1975), p. 132. 31 151bid., pp. 141-142. 16Hughes et a1., People of Cove and Woodlot, p. 153. 17G. A. Rawlyk, "The Guysborough Negroes: A Study in Isolation," Dalhousie Review XLVIII,1 (Sprint, 1968): 27. 18Paul Couture, "The Vichy-Free French Propaganda War in Quebec 1940 to 1942," Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers,,l979: 203. 19J. F. Hilliker, "The Canadian Government and the Free French: Perceptions and Constraints 1940-1944," International Historngeview II,1 (January, 1980): 87-108. 20Albert A. Shea and Erik Estorick, Canada and the Short Wave War (Toronto, 1942), p. 14. 21Ibid., p. 16. 22"If Hitler Voted," Halifax Herald, April 23, 1942. 23The Ogdensburg meetings were held April 18, 1940. On August 27, Congress authorized induction of the National Guard into Federal service and on September 16 the Selective Training and Serfice Act (Burke-Wadsworth Bill) was approved. Richard B. Morris, ed. Encyclope- di§_9£_American History (New York, 1961), rev. ed., p. 365. 24Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House gf Commons, February 10, 1942, I: 453. Hereafter referred to as House of Commons, Debates. 25Desmond Morton, Canada and War (Toronto, 1981), p. 111 and Stanley W. Dzuiban, United States Army ig_World WE: ll, vol. 8. Military Relations between the United States and Canada 1939-1945 (Washington, 1959), VIII, 4: 257. 26As included in "Government and Post-War Policy," The Round Table, XXXIII: 277. CHAPTER II Formative influences on Acadians A comprehensive assessment of the Acadian response to conscrip- tion must of necessity consider the unique cultural formation of the French descended population in the Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. These people have a distinct and different cultural background from the population of Quebec. Dif- ferences which were present in the colonial foundations of Acadie and Quebec have continued to influence the divergent developments of the two pOpulations. Historian George Stanley chronicled the different begin- nings: ". . . in reality Acadia was an entity separate from Canada and the Acadian psychology distinct from the Quebecois. The accessibility of Acadia by water and its inacessibility from Canada by land, were very real factors in Acadian life and history."1 Anglophone historian Mason Wade and Acadian historian Emery Le- Blanc see the political situation as a cause of the differences between the two groups, while R. P. Rene Baudry views political differences as a result of cultural development. Writing of the Quiet Revolution per- iod in Quebec, Wade said: Once again Quebec seems to be showing the selfish pre- occupation with her own concerns and interests which in the past has cost Acadia dear and strengthened the Acadian sense of separateness. . . . the Acadians have been able to make common cause with the Franco-Ontarians, the Franco-Manitobans and the other minority groups which have similar problems which are not those of the French majority in Quebec. 32 33 LeBlanc simply stated that "Le Canadien-frangais est maitre chez lui. L'Acadien ne 1 'a jamai étE. 11 a donc aquis une mentalité différente."3 LeBlanc's three short sentences include volumes of unspoken reference, however, when one considers the emphasis given by Quebecois to becoming "Masters of our own house." Surely it is correct that the Acadians would have indeed acquired a different mentality, simply from never hav- ing endured the struggle of trying to become master of his own house. The obvious difference of never having been master of his own house re- mains as another factor contributing to the different mentality. Baudry cites similarities between the two groups as including origin, language, and religion, but emphasizes the differences in par- ticulars of language, customs and mentality. In concluding that the Acadians have a "caractiére distinctif" because of these differences, Baudry affirms the contention that the Acadian minority is a Francophone population which, due to regional distinctions, should be regarded as having potentially different responses to national situations than do the Quebecois.4 A psychological study along Nova Scotia's St. Mary's Bay-~the French Shore of that province--describes the Acadian position there: They feel themselves to be a separate ethnic group, bound together by common language, religion and cultural tradition, all of these having been intensified by the common disaster of the expulsion. They are separate not only from the nearby English but almost equally from the Quebec French. Reactions to these feelings range from an effort to acculturate to the English group on one hand, all the way to vworking for a revival of former Acadian patterns of living and a desire to exclude outside influences on the other. Some results have been a change from Irish to Acadian priests in most of the parish churches and the introduction of instruction in French into the public schools.5 During the heady early days of the Parti Quebecois administra- tion in Quebec, a great deal of emphasis was put upon the idea of 34 Quebec as the "motherland" of all French Canadians. Many attempts were made to stimulate pan-Francophone organization and co-operation which would stress the basic similarity of all French-descended Canadians. The possible values to be gained by a separate French province were widely discussed by Acadian nationalists, especially in New Brunswick, and Quebec separatists.6 A conference was convened in 1977 to strength- en ties between Quebec and neighboring Acadians. One of the speakers was Acadian writer Antonine Maillet. Despite the obvious emphasis on similarity and unity of purpose, Ms. Maillet strongly cautioned the Que- becois that the Acadians must be allowed the right of their difference,7 Although Quebec nationalism has brought linguistic and cultural gains to all Canadian Franc0phones, recent moves toward Quebec indepen- dence have caused Acadians to review their own distinctions. While some Acadians have argued for a Quebecois-Acadien alliance to plan the Fran- cophone future, either as a part of Canada or independent from it, most Acadians prefer to see Acadian culture preserved as a separate entity. Some Acadian nationalists would like to create an Acadian province in northern New Brunswick, but most of them would then prefer that such a province make her own decision concerning separatism when and if Quebec achieves her own independence. The same cultural differences which caused Acadians in the late twentieth century to fear assimilation by Quebec nearly as much as as- similation by English Canada would have also contributed to the thinking of the population during the 19403. These cultural differences caused attitudinal differences between the two groups in their thinking about World War II conscription. There are several specific points of cul- tural difference between being Acadian and being Quebecois. 35 Some differences were evident as early as the French colonial period, due to the differences of origin in France. After the founding of Port Royal in 1605 and Quebec in 1608, colonization from France went slowly into both areas. The area within present day Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and the state of Maine was desig- nated as "Acadie" and developed separately from the settlements along the St. Lawrence River. The two French populations can be traced to colonization from different French provinces at different times. Most Quebec population had origins in Normandy and Brittany, while Acadians came primarily from central France in and around the region of Poitu.8 French immigration to Acadia had nearly ceased by 1660, while Colbert's plans for increased colonization in New France were just getting start- ed. The majority of differences between Acadians and Quebecois, how- ever, have North American origins. One factor is geographical location. Being situated in the Mar- itime area gave the Acadians a far more sea-oriented lifestyle than that of the Quebec dwellers. The seigneurial system of land allotment and the agricultural life of "habitants" were never widespread in Acadia. Even those who did not live in coastal fishing villages were tied to the sea by economic necessity as well as by geographic reality. They became aware of, and subject to, the seasons of the cod or of the her- ring; of net, seine, or dropped line fishing; of the varieties of boat necessary for coastal or off-shore fishing. What to catch, when and how to catch it, more than what to grow became life's determinants for Acadians. Those who didn't fish depended for livelihood upon those who did. Nets had to be made, traps repaired, boats built and equipped, and the jobs were available when fishing was good, but unavailable in 7 7\ , a . 7 ‘ _ ~ , ' _ , - 7.. ,_ _» ~. . . _ - 7 7., 7 ' 7 7 7 7 . . 7 7 7 . . 7 7 7 . 7 ‘w A -\ 7 fl 7 _. _ .7 L, 7 . 7 . ,— , 7 7 7 . ‘ j _ . _. 7 7 _ 7 _ I . _ . 7, 7 . I 7 , . . , _ , 7 ,7 7 ‘A 7 . - 7 7 a 7 7 ,7 , 7 7 7 - 7 _ 7 , — 7 i ' ‘ 7 7 - . 7“ 7 . A. 7. 1 i 7 7 ‘ . 7 7 . r _ ‘77 . 7 , 7 . 7 7 -.. . 7 7 7 7 7 A 7 7 . , . i . , , . . _ . i A, , , ‘ . . - . . _ 7 ,. 7 . . , , 7 N 7 _ . .‘ fl 7 7 - . ._ 7. .. , . __ .. . . . 7.. ~ 36 off years. Agricultural development among the Acadians differed from that in Quebec during the pre-expulsion period, but even more after their return. The Acadian farmers are often called "les défricheurs d'eau-- settlers, or clearers, of the water"--due to their utilization of low- lands and swampy marsh areas through the use of dykes which incorporated an ”aboiteau" to fertilize and irrigate the soils.9 The engineering of these dykes produced constructions still visible around Grand Pré in the Minas Basin area. Upon their return from the expulsion, Maritime Aca- dians found the choice agricultural areas pre-empted by English language arrivals and the lands granted to the returnees were mostly rocky and unsuitable for cultivation.10 They turned increasingly to sea-oriented activities. Thus the devotion and attachment of the Quebecois to the land, as depicted in Ringuet's Trente Arpents and Louis Hemon's Maria Chapdelain was not a part of Acadian culture. Instead, as Jean-Claude Dupont has documented, a knowledge and respect, as well as fear, of the sea has formed the background for Acadian literature and legend.11 The primary difference between Quebecois and Acadian, even in current times, is the Acadian historical experience of the dispersal. Their proximity to the sea left them in a perilous position during the Great War for Empire between France and England. Actually a series of four separate struggles, the battles pitted English settlers and Indian allies against French colonists and Indian friends. Following the second round of the struggle, Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), the Treaty of Utrecht transferred the area of Acadia from French control to English. No open clashes occurred between French settlers and English conquerors because the Acadians assumed arneutral position through the period of 37 King George's War (1740-1748). Suspicions that the Acadians were aid- ing the French against the English were fed by widespread anti-English activities of nationalist priests, such as LeLoutre from Quebec, who had been sent to provide religious leadership for the Acadians and converts among the Micmac Indians. In an early battle of the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the Acadian presence at Fort Beausejour on the Nova Scotia isthmus seemed conclusive evidence to English military leaders. As a result, La Grand Derangement was authorized to remove all Acadians from the crucial Maritime regions and resettle them in other areas of the Empire or in France. This relocation was responsible for experiences which Acadians feel set them apart frrntother Canadians as surely as the Holocaust of World War II distinguishes the Jewish population. While any identifica- tion between the eighteenth century British crown and Hitler's Nazi Germany would be nonsensical, the impact of the expulsion on the Acadian population impressed upon their descendants the necessity of remembering the dreadful tragedy in the same way that modern day Jewish people are dedicated to assuring the the Holocaust will never be forgotten. Through two hundred years of re-telling the story of those Francophones who were uprooted then made the long journey back to the Maritime provinces, there has been created a sense of identity among Acadians which they feel makes them distinct among Canadians. Bona Arsenault's description of the Acadian experience might well apply to Jews: They were "victims of a military strategy that upset the course of history. . . . Down through the centuries and across the frontiers, the descendants, so closely tied one to another by the same family names, same blood and the same tragic history have in fact always remained truly faithful to the memory of 7 77 - 7 ,7 A . 7 7 7 . . _ I 7 ' 1 . 7 7 7 7 , . 7 _ r . 7 .7 7 . 7 , i _ ‘ . , . 7 7 _. v ' I 38 their unfortunate ancestors."12 Not only the horrors of the forced removal, loss of their homes, lands, boats and equipment, and the separation of family members have been told and re-told by generations of Acadians, but also the struggle to reunite and return to the Maritime region. Although a few remained in France, and many populated the bayou country of southern Louisiana, about 8,000 Acadians had returned to the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island by 1800. This chapter in Acadian history is the most important in marking them as unique, and provides a basis for further differences from Francophones in Quebec. Because of the deportation experience, Acadians formed links with post-Revolutionary France through "separated others" who were transported there. In the southern United States were whole communities of kinsmen who shared Acadian culture even to architectural and economic similari- ties, but had "x" added to the family name through registration difficul- ties with the English authorities.13 The Acadian view of the rest of North America and, to some extent, the world, broadened instead of being narrowed as was that of post-Conquest Quebec. Due to the wide dispersal and re-location of the residents of the original Acadia, even today it is not possible to always make a logically defensible decision as to who is and who is not an Acadian. The Acadian Centre in Moncton, New Brunswick, generally considers as Acadian anyone who regards himself as Acadian.14 In Nova Scotia, cer- tain names are identifiable as being "Cape Breton Acadians," differenti- ated from a small post-Revolution French migration which came into Cape Breton with the returning Acadians.15 On Prince Edward Island, certain names are identifiable with particular Acadian communities, indicating - - - - , l _ _ 7 7 4 _ _‘ . ‘ . , _ N H N -. .7 r , 7 . 7 , 7 - p r ~ r 7 ~ : 7 >\ 7- 7 \ 7 7 ‘ 7 .— 7 7 7 ‘v ' I .. r‘~ ' - > 7 ' < j. 7 I I A ' 0‘ A O 7 ‘ 'V r7 A A > ~ A ‘< v ‘ ‘ ' . u . . n - - 7 . - .- - 7 . — - ~ ,- ~ A A , 7 7 < - § 7 , - 77 .- - ' - 7 , N n 7 ' ' A ' * , ‘ . A . .. . _ '- . , A _\ __ —\ 7 h . 7 - 7- 7 - n 7 7 * 7 7 7 7 - ,7 ‘ m h r. 7‘ A 7 7 7 7 7 7 - - 7 - - ~ a - . — _ 7 ‘ 7 k, r _ — - 7 '— 7 - 7 — p. -. ' . . i , 7 n 7 n, .- ,- 7 — - - - P. A 39 high degree of locale stability.16 There are also spelling variances, such as Chiasson-Chaisson, and some name changes as exemplified by Haché-Gallant. Some Huguenot and Quebecois population has also been in- troduced into the Maritime provinces, so it is not safe to assume that all French names in those provinces indicate Acadian descent. There are some names, though, which denote an Acadian descendant in nearly every case. (See Table 1). Generally speaking, these are the seventy-six names (or recognizable variants) which appear on the list of "Grandes Familles." These are families which number more than one hun- dred families of that name.17 No attempt has been made for this study to weigh the degree of "Acadianess" by any formula device such as counting Acadian grandparents. Those who consider themselves Acadian, living in areas of Acadian concentration, and having Acadian names were consid- ered to be genuine. After the deportation began in 1755, many New Englanders moved into the Maritime areas vacated by the Acadians. This was in response to urging by the English authorities who desired to build a loyal popu- lation in the region. After the American Revolution another influx came as Loyalists sought refuge under the English crown. Although the Acadi- an population had been permitted to return after 1768, many were still arriving with the Loyalists. Returning Acadians were not often able to resettle in their former locations. Instead, it was necessary to accept and adjust to the presence of a number of strangers in the area. A "garrison mentality" such as that sometimes attributed to Quebec could not isolate the Acadians from the Scots, Germans, English, former Amer- icans and Blacks who came into the Maritimes. Apparently the Acadians showed the same racial prejudices toward Blacks as did other white ,. i 7. . - 7 a 7 l 7. r 7 ‘ a - . . . .7 A 7 7 . . r 7 ~ 7 ,_ 7 . 7 7 - i . 7 7 7 7 7 - - r 7‘ A , -. 7‘ 7 .‘ 7‘ 7 7 A _ . 7‘ 7 7 .7 7 7 7 i , . 7 .7 q . 7‘ ‘7 . . - 7, 7, 7 _ . 7 . _ a 7 ,- 7 ~ , . _ .. , , , 7 . . , p7 — — — - - ~ . .7 ~ I - w ’ A - - -\ _ _ ,> . a , _ .‘ .. - _ .— . 7 , . .7 N 7 \ .7 v - 7 ,. - 7 7 r « 5 - 7 , 7 , , r - 7 7 _ i . 7- i . 7 ,i ,. , . 7i , 7 - 7 . - x A 7 TABLE l--"Grandes Familles" of the Acadians O \OCDme-l-‘UJNH LeBlanc Arsenault Gallant Cormier Boudreau Richard Doucet Landry Pourier Robichaud Comeau Leger Roy Gaudet Chiasson Melanson Savoie Theriault Bourque Cyr Hebert Duguay Daigle Thibadeau Doiron Hache Belliveau Deveau Allain Maillet Saulnier Bourgeois Gagnon Brault Caissie Godin Bernard Blanchard Goguen D'Entremont 40 2,759 families 1,543 1,167 1,079 1,054 1,021 955 910 760 759 702 640 604 576 539 535 510 509 481 450 422 397 383 377 371 369 353 306 295 293 285 279 268 259 259 248 247 246 238 236 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. Babineau Aucoin Dupuis Benoit Babin Michaud Martin Oullet Allard Lanteigne Surrette Vantour Dugas Albert Brideau Bugeaud (Bujold) Lavoie Pitre Amirault (Mirault) Mazerolle Vienneau Boucher Gauvin Pellerin Fougere Lozier Bourdages Bastarache Forest Pothier Gautreau Fournier Henri Paulin Girouard Thibault 231 212 205 194 193 192 188 182 180 180 179 167 166 162 160 155 152 147 147 142 142 140 139 138 132 130 130 129 128 128 125 123 115 112 111 104 41 residents.18 By setting themselves above the Blacks among the set- tlers, Acadians avoided the lowest rung on the socio-economic ladder. The status of "White Niggers” claimed for Quebecois by revolutionary Pierre Valliere during the 19603 was never equally viable to describe the Acadians. The language of Acadians, already different from Quebec due to the nautical phrases which were commonly used, took on new inflections, phrases and words from non-French contacts during the exodus and upon return. These differences were increased through the mid-19003, even among families where the spoken language remained French. Another point of distinction between Quebecois and Acadian was the role of the church. The Roman Catholic population of Highland Scots and Irish in the Maritime areas had complete control of churches in those provinces when the Acadians returned from their forced exodus. The combined Roman Catholic population received the right to vote and to hold elective office in the early nineteenth century, but the Anglophone priests were seldom able to hold services in French or to counsel the Acadians in a helpful manner. Attitudes toward Irish clergy differed between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Acadians. In New Brunswick, the Irish priests did not seem to relate well to the French parishoners. In Nova Scotia the anti-French sentiments of the Irish priests seemed to be directed toward the church in Quebec, which they felt was trying to control the Maritime church.19 The political and social influence of the clergy was never as intense as in Quebec. The short supply of reli- gious leaders among the Acadians following the deportation had placed a great deal of responsibility upon the laity. This lay responsibility continued while parishes were served by Anglophone priests and even when . . A N . , . , i l ,2 r 7 ,- A, 7 .. r ‘ P 7 - 7‘ _ - A .A a - 7 ... , 7 - A 7 ,— . A A 7 z r .. a 7 -‘ A ,n , .2 ~ . 7 r A L , v a . n pl - A 4‘ . A , a 7 , ’ — ,v I 42 Francophone priests from France or Quebec were present. When true Acadian priests, raised in this tradition, were available by the mid- l9th century, their role in parish life differed from the priest‘s role in Quebec. Recognizing this different religious heritage, the Acadian National Congress of 1884 rejected Quebec's St. John Baptist Day and The Marseillaise as a national anthem. Instead the Feast of the Assump- 20 tion on August 15 and Ave Maris Stella were chosen. Later the fleur- des-lys of Quebec, representing the pre-Revolutionary Bourbon France, was also rejected. An Acadian flag was created by adopting the modern French tricolor and, continuing the dedication to the Blessed Virgin Mary, placing a gold star upon the blue section. The political position of Quebecois within a separate province where the majority of the population was French descended was never possible for the Acadians. Because the Acadians had to return gradually to areas unclaimed by those who had arrived in their absence, the dis- persal of these people into three separate provinces may be considered a direct result of the deportation experience. When the deportation oc- curred, the Acadian homeland was politically undivided. While most of the Acadians were away Prince Edward Island was separated from Nova Scotia in 1769, and New Brunswick became a separate province after the Loyalist immigration in 1784. Had the Acadian population been in place during the thirty years 1755-1785, these migrations might possibly have had different results. "Islands" of Acadian influence exist in all three Maritime prov- inces, but the idea of a separate Acadian province is a recent result of Quebec militancy and discussions of Maritime union. At the time of World War II political power in the Maritime provinces was firmly in . 7 -, . .- -7 - . l . 7 7 7 7 77 -' 7 m - m . -. —. - '7 - 7 ‘ 7 V - 7 . 7 I - r . ~ 7 n 7 , 7 ‘ q . A 5 77 ‘ < . . r, ,1 a N 7 _ A 7 m 7 7 , ,_ , A (A - L - . 7 A _ r i , , ,_‘ 7 ‘ 7 , l 7 . g , i r 7 7 r 7‘ — ~ — . __ ‘- 7 7 7 A 7, 7 ,7, 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ‘ 2 ,_\ r i 7 7 n , 7 . . 7 7 7 — - 7 A —. _ . 4 7 . A _ _ A _ 7 - _ - A - \ 7 -7 7 - n 77 ,7 - ‘ r _ . ' x n A - r 7 ». ~ . A - m ‘ ' r ' ‘ ,.. ’ ' . v ' 7 ‘ n - p - p . ~ 7~ -. ' - 7 ' ’r ' '\ ‘ " -\ ’ P‘ ’ ' 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 — i r q . 7 A r - 7 — 7 — 7 r V ~ ~ _ —7 71‘ ,- A ‘ - 7 , x 77. ‘ ,— 7. — ,7 - a «7 2 ‘ 77 - 7 7 a ‘ 7 7 7 - n 1 ~ A 7, 7 ‘ . . 7 7 -. ‘ n V... ' .- 1 - e ,7 7 ,- 7 a — A . r 7 . (x . .- ~ . - .-. 7‘ 7 A ‘7 N " n _ ‘ - a. u- r, ._ .7. r A z A '7 77 I, ~ 7 ‘ 7 ‘ ’- 5 1 ‘ 7 a V —, 7 7 r . ~ 5 4 . ‘N 77 - 7 a I ~ 7 - ~ T - ‘7‘ ‘ . ‘ ' ' : . 7 7 7 A — v- 7 A a 7 . - - A -- .- . . r .2 7 - k 7 - - 7 z-x 7 w b i , __ . ,. - _ 7 L A, , 7 ,. .. i . , , _ .. 7 - ~ 7 a - 7- < 7 43 Anglophone hands. There had been Acadian representation in each of the three provincial legislatures, infrequent Acadian ministers at the prov- incial level, some representation from the heavily Acadian New Bruns- wick ridings in Ottawa, and seven cabinet ministers at the federal level since 1867. But the strength of political leadership was reserved for English language Canadians. In the 19403 there were, as there are today, areas in each of the Maritime provinces where the Acadian population was concentrated. The renewed interest in Acadian culture over the past decade has re- sulted in well-publicized museums, heritage centers of cultural festi- vals in nearly every such area. These regions contain persons who re- member or had participated in World War II. On the basis of where Acadians were clustered in sufficient strength to elect one of their own to Parliament in Ottawa and/or to publish a French language newspaper, three New Brunswick ridings and one in Nova Scotia have been isolated for study. In Prince Edward Island and on Cape Breton there were neither representatives in Ottawa nor French newspapers. Centers of Acadian population during the 19403 are verified by demographic studies published in A£l§§_dg 1'Acadie from material gathered by the Acadian Centre at Universite de Moncton. Figure 1 indicates the ridings used for this study: those which had Acadian MPs as well as two other ridings where Acadian popu- lation was located in measurable concentration. 44 sound; 56% comuoEEm .m.m§ uofiuuom .7u>§ .3wa .on.<‘% pod»; .TdEEHE 2.23: TQM HH umB vHuos wcausv 5.6qu :H mm: Guava“; :33 mmcagm oEUHnwzunH 55on c... . “ ell! 6 O0 ; a. . agape ¢ 9. 0 . o 0‘ G 0’ 7690‘? .9 09s.. O;.~¢\'F‘\‘\.“ 4, c O O 0“ I" «wont . ‘ o .oo 06 as \‘ \ ta? HES . $6 m. 8. vac» mu m. 0 VI’ 45 NOTES 1George Stanley, "Regionalism in Canadian History," in Teaching History 13 Canada, ed. Geoffrey Milburn (Toronto, 1972), p. 100. 2Mason Wade, "Quebecois and Acadien," Journal gf Canadian Studies IX, 2(May, 1974): 51. 3Emery LeBlanc, Les Acadiens: Lg Tentative d3 Genocide d'un Peuple (Montreal, 1963), p. 123. Translation: "The French Canadian is master in his own house. The Acadian has never been. He now has acquired a different mentality." (Translations throughout this study are my own unless noted differently.) 4R. P. Rene Baudry, "Les rapports ethniques dans les provinces maritimes," in The Canadian Duality, ed. Mason Wade (Montreal, 1960), p. 375. The original French: "11 se rapprochent de leurs fréres du Quebec par les affinités profondes, d'origine, de langue et de religion, mais ils en différent par plusieurs particularités de langue de coutumes et de mentalité, qui leur donnent un caractiére distinctif." SDorothea C. Leghton, John S. Harding, David B. Macklin, Allister M. Macmillan, and Alexander H. Leighton, The Character 2f Danger: Psychiatric Symptoms in Selected Communities (New York and London, 1963), p. 402. 6A great deal of writing on this subject is found in periodicals of the time. See L'Action Nationale LXVII (1977-78) and Royal Society gf Canada Proceedings, ser. 4, 15 (1977) which devoted entire issues to the topic. 7Antonine Maillet, "Littérature Acadienne," Royal Society 2: Canada Proceedings ser. 4, 15 (1977): 214. The original French: "Donnez- nous ce droit 5 notre couleur, a notre difference; donnex-nous 1e droit de ne pas Etre Québécois tout a fait, ni Franpais seulement, ni Canadians entirément, ni Américains encore moins!" 8Bona Arsenault, History of the Acadians (Ottawa, 1978), p. 25- 38, passim. Also, an introductory film shown at the Village Historique Acadien near Caraquet, New Brunswick, contrasts the time and origin of the French settlements in Acadia and New France. 9Cec11e Chevrier, Les Défricheurs D'eau (Caraquet, N. B., Village Historique Acadie, 1978), especially pp. 24-25 1OJ. Alphonse Deveau, Two Beginnings: A Brief Acadian Histogy (Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1980), pp. 67-69. 7 ‘ k . F 7 77 Y, .. -7 ~ " i 7 > K V 7 . y. ' ‘ F > k P , ) _ .. - ’ , . 7 7 7 tr “ N 7 h ‘ r I“ '5 7 , . \ N 7 h F r n - - , a 46 11Jean-Claude Dupont, "L'influence de la mer sur la vie domes- tique des Acadiens," Revue Economique d3 l'Université Moncton (Octobre, 1966): 32-36. Also by the same author, Histoire populaire des Acadie (Montreal, 1979), and Heritage d'Acadie (Montreal, 1977) contain additional information. 12Arsenault, History 2f the Acadians, p. 242. 13William Faulkner Rushton, The Cajuns from Acadia £3 Louisiana (New York, 1979), passim. 14Interview with Raymond LeBlanc, Director of Acadian Centre, Universite de Moncton, June 21, 1982. 15Interview with Marshal Bourinot, curator, Le Noir Forge Muse- um, Arichat, Nova Scotia, Richmond County, Cape Breton, July 7, 1982. 16In conversation on July 3, 1982, Lilly Gallant of Summerside, Prince Edward Island, expressed surprise to learn of a family name in another town. She stated: "I never knew any Theriaults lived in Tignish." 17This list is mentioned in many writings, but is cited as found in Antoine Bernard, L'Acadie vivante: Histoire g3 peuple acadien dg ses origines g nos jours (Montreal, 1945), p. 172, Appendix A. 18G. A. Rawlyk, "The Guysborough Negroes: A Study in Isolation," Dalhousie Review XLVIII, 1 (Spring, 1968) 24-36. 19Neil Boucher, The Development of §2_Acadian Village: Surette's Island 1859-1970 (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 40-41. 20Leon Theriault, "Cheminement Inverse des Acadiens et des Anglophones des Maritimes 1763-1955,: R. S. C. Proceedings ser. 4, 15 (1977): 156. CHAPTER III The Acadian Response: Papers and Politians This chapter will review the written and printed records of the Acadian politians and their constituents which relate to the World War II conscription situation. From such evidence it will be possible to establish the structure of the contemporary public debate. In some cases the agreement between Acadian and non-Acadian Maritimers is evi- dent while in other cases the differences are striking. Unfortunately there are no extant collections of papers of any of the representatives of the six ridings which contain correspondences from constituents regarding the plebiscite or the conscription issue. The newspapers, however, are sources from which reactions may be ob- served. Complete collections of wartime issues are available for two Maritime French-language newspapers. La Voix d'Evangeline was published in Moncton, New Brunswick, and circulated among Acadians throughout that province. Lg Petit Courrier d3 sud—ouest Nouvelle Ecosse, published in West Pubnico, Nova Scotia, was widely read throughout the riding of Shelburne‘Yarmouth-Clare. No French language publication existed in Prince Edward Island. Wartime issues of L2 Madawaska, published at Edmunston, New Brunswick, are not available in sufficient numbers to be reliably consulted. Early in 1942, La Voix d'Evangeline explained that Acadians did not yet view conscription as necessary. This continued to be an 47 48 Accurate appraisal of the situation for a long while. In addition, Acadians felt there was reason to trust their parliamentary representa- tives: all belonged to the majority party, one held a cabinet post. The people had confidence that measures would be enacted as best suited to win the war. In the meantime, there were other things to be consid- ered besides the conscription issue. In the early years both French language newspapers were con- cerned more with local social and religious events than with the world situation. Many of those events gradually became war related: donations were sought for war relief in many parishes. Volunteer families were needed to entertain men from nearby training camps, military men were the subject of homecoming, marital, or burial reunions.1 Both papers carried government announcements admonishing civilians to donate to the Red Cross, support the several Victory Loan drives, be aware of which ration stamps were current, and not to hoard commodities nor engage in loose talk which might help the enemy in some way. In an end-of-year resume of "Les principales dates de l'anée," L§_Voix d'Evangeline did 2 not list the plebiscite. All Maritime newspapers gave prominent space to reports of the high level of enlistment among Maritimers, especially those serving over- seas. Often pictures were used. L3_Voix d'Evangeline cited instances of Acadian families with several sons serving together. In February, 1943, an editorial lamented that all the publicity surrounding the var- ious French-speaking "Quebec" units was well and good, but by contraSt Acadians were much less credited.3 Quoting a recent count of St. Joseph's Parish in Shediac, New Brunswick, the paper cited figures of families who had five or more soldiers and concluded that "At that rate 7 A a. 7 7 7 7, ,~ . 7 . 7 7 _ 7 a a , . . 7 - , , - . ,7 7 » - _7 7 ‘- 7 ,, a. A ‘ b 7 a r 7 *. ,7. . 7 . 7 7 - 7 : .2 ,. . 7 i , 7 , 7 . . _ . 7 7 .7 . a 7 77 7 a 7. a V,- 77 _ , _ , , , W . .4 _ , 7 , 7. 7 , ._ . _ , ., o 49 the parish of Shediac could furnish nearly two artillery batteries, and close to half of a tank batallion."4 I As the war progressed, L§_Voix d'Evangeline grew in size and in- cluded in the inner pages more official releases concerning the war and Canada's role in it. Eventually a page of official photographs was part of every issue: new weapons in use, troops on parade in England, Canadi- an built plans or ships in action, or Allied troops training in Canada were frequent topics. The scope of Acadian knowledge was increased concerning the war and those who represented Canada in it--whether they were Maritimers or Prairie residents, Anglophone or Francophone. By 1944 a column called "Coup d'oeil a Ottawa" had appeared. It kept the readers informed first-hand about the activities of the govern- ment. Until the actual cabinet controversies and resignations created the "confidence crisis" in late November, however, there was little men- tion of the specific activities of the Acadian members. The four Acadian members sitting in Ottawa during the war years represented a number equal to the all-time high for Acadian members at that time. New Brunswick's three Acadian MP8 were the most ever elected from that province.5 Prince Edward Island had not sent an Acadian to Ottawa during the twentieth century, and Nova Scotia never more than one. In all three provinces, however, Acadians had gained political experience through provincial affairs. Prince Edward Island had an Aca- dian in the provincial parliament as early as 1854 when Stanislas- Francois Poirer was elected. He became Speaker of the House in 1873 and signed the request to the Queen to allow the province into Confederation. The next year Poirer became the first Acadian to sit in the federal ~ . . . . . 7 a r‘ .. 7 ‘ 7 ,7 ’ . - ‘ . .. . a ‘ . . — r ‘ '7 A . . A A ' 7 - .. ’7 . A ,— 7 7 .7 . r\ — -~~ . ,7 , 7 7 7 7. ’- A .9 - ..n ~ 7 ,7 A 7 7 7 - r ’ ' f - 7 7 < 7 ’7 ‘ -~ A. , . __ . 50 parliament. Nova Scotia had the first Acadian named to a provincial cabinet position when Isidore LeBlanc was named in 1883. New Brunswick has had several Acadian members of the provincial cabinet since 1870, but only in 1960 was an Acadian elected as provincial premier. Pierre Veniot had succeeded to the office without election in 1923. In 1926 Veniot became the first Acadian to serve on the federal cabinet when he was appointed Postmaster-General. Despite the active political involve- ment, however, even in New Brunswick where the population percentage of Acadians was highest, the Acadian voting impact was never sufficient to elect representation proportional to their percentage of the population.6 The outbreak of World War II had surprised neither the world nor the Canadian public in the manner that World War I had. Hitler's ac- tions in Europe were obvious, and once Great Britain had declared war, on September 3, 1939, the question was not if Canada would be involved, but when--or indeed, whether she already was. The Imperialists among Canada's population were appalled that Mackenzie King's government felt obligated to declare war separately and unilaterally.7 Declaring war was an action of the Special War Session of the Eighteenth Canadian Parliament. In that session, Michaud, Veniot and Pottier were already sitting, but took no part in the debates. Kent was represented by Louis P. A. Robichaud who did not stand for re-election, but was the only Acadian to participate in the discussions. After the declaration of war, a debate ensued over creation and administration of a Canadian Patriotic Fund. Robichaud indicated the Acadian preference for voluntary participation by suggesting that use of "funds collected and contributed" in section four of the bill indicated the possibility of mandatory participation. Robichaud insisted, against the assertions 7 7 x l . _ _. .. . \ ( ‘ . A 7 7 . ,— 7 - a A 77 a o ‘7 7 7 y » 7- ,- 7 D 1‘ 7 w v 7 7 . 7 - -‘ 7 7 A i . c 7 ‘ A 7 A . 7 7 7 - 7 P . 51 of other Liberal members, that mandatory collection of funds had been the case during World War I, and that the people had resented that ac- tion.8 The section was agreed to without amendment, but Robichaud had set the tone for Acadian attitude toward the war: voluntarism. Conservatives in general agitated over the week delay before the final declaration of war on September 10, 1939. Mackenzie King's action was applauded by most Liberals, both English and French Speaking. The first wartime editorial of L§_Voix d'Evangeline lauded the Prime Minis- ter's action of choosing "moderate" involvement in the war, and stressed that Canadian participation was strictly voluntary. By emphasizing that King had said that Canada was involved "of our own free will" the paper asserted that Canada also had the power to use the same liberty not to be involved. The contrast to the World War I situation was applauded because it seemed to indicate that Mackenzie King would honor his cam- paign promise of conscription opposition. The high compliments given to Liberal policy were tempered by a warning that the seeming high degree of national unity might exist only temporarily. It was stressed that first priority must be given to keeping peace between French and English language Canadians "que la guerre dure six mois on six ans." In a very objective manner, almost in the view of an outside observer, the paper counselled both Francophones and Anglophones that extreme caution must be exercised by both to avoid wounding the other.9 In this calm approach to a volatile issue, the editorial was a preview of the years to come. Lg Voix d'Evangeline did not conceal the opinion that Parliament had accepted the situation only "for the moment." Although there was no measurable opposition to entry into the war, the shaky alliance of English—French Conservative-Liberal agreement was too A . 7 7 a i 7 7 a . A‘ 7‘ a, - 7 ‘. . ,_‘ h - 7 ‘ 7 f. 7 . 7 7 . fl 7 ‘ l 7 7 ~ 77. , —7 7 . a v '7 ,. _ - /- 7 . 7. 7 — — 7 . - - r 7 A . 7 . . - - . 52 tenuous to last. Within a fortnight, the province of Quebec demon- strated opposition to conscription, but support for King's government, by ousting the Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis in a pro- vincial election engineered by members of King's cabinet to be decided almost totally by the conscription issue.10 As the phony war continued in EurOpe, King surprised Parliament and the country by calling for a general election in the speech from the throne on January 25, 1940. This election resulted in a Liberal majority of which the representa- tives of the Maritime ridings selected for study were a part. Early in the war Vincent-Joseph Pottier, the Nova Scotia Acadi- an sitting in Ottawa, was very active in calling attention to the poten- tial of maritime shipbuilding as a contribution to the war effort. In a speech following the reply to the throne speech in late 1940, Pottier was obvious for his positive outlook. Sandwiched between strongly neg- ative anti-conscription warnings from Bourget and Gauthiers of Quebec, Pottier never mentioned the issue. Instead he emphasized the contribu- tion that could be made to the war effort by instituting a program of wooden ship construction. After rebuttals to all the arguments that could be made against the use of wooden ships, he concluded that "every creek or cove, on the Atlantic coast particularly, is a potential ship- yard."11 The following spring, 1941, he took the floor again to emphasize the need for more financing designed to enable "family shipyards" to 12 Pottier's sugges- participate in the construction of minesweepers. tions would benefit all Maritimers, of course, not just Acadians, al- though many of the smaller shipyards were located in the Clare region along Baie-Ste.-Marie. The minesweeper construction at Methegan, for 7 7 _‘ 7 7 A . - ~ § a - . 7 7 i l 7.. 7 _ ,7, . .‘ . A 7 7 7 7 7 . . 7 ‘ i f , 7 - 7 . . 7 77 r~ - 0 —~ A .\ . , 53 example, was a major economic factor in that Acadian village during the war years. The success of Pottier's ideas is evident from an editorial which appeared in L3_Tribune, Sherbrooke, Quebec, lauding Maritime ship- builders. The editorial, written in French, cited impressive statistics demonstrating the growth of shipbuilding in the Maritime shipyards and stated proudly that the facilities were still growing.13 By November of 1941, Canada had been at war for over two years, but the United States remained nominally neutral. The initial surge of enlistment recruitment was expended and the Japanese threat represented by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the fall of Hong Kong was not yet ap- parent. Parliament was discussing measures which might effectively be used to encourage young men to respond voluntarily to military service. When the suggestion was made that more men from Central Canada should be sent to the Royal Navy College, Pottier spoke for his constituents: I have always thought there should be more facilities for taking advantage of the experience of young men who have lived all their lives on the seashore. There are some things they do not have to learn. . . . We are not making the best use of the valuable material available on our coasts. I do not want to discourage enlistments in the Army, but we have men in the Army who have lived all their lives by the sea, and it is a pity some system is not worked out to make the best use of their experience.1 Within six months the Minister for Naval Affairs, Angus L. Macdonald, affirmed Mr. Pottier's position by verifying that Maritimers did seem to have a preference for navy service. Nova Scotia has given us about 3,900 naval recruits. That is a very large proportion, larger, I believe than any other province with the exception of Prince Edward Island, where the preportion is slightly higher. That is a much higher proportion than has been given by any other place. A good many of these men have been bred to the sea and have found their way to the navy. During the lengthy Commons debates over the plebiscite question, 54 the deputies from the sample ridings all supported Mr. King's position. The three New Brunswick Acadians in parliament Spoke from the vantage point of being Francophone. Speaking as Minister of National Defense on February 10, 1942, Prince County, P. E. 1., member J. L. Ralston presented government's answers to the major points of criticism. Despite interruptions by R. B. Hanson, who was opposition leader when Meighan had no seat, the minister gave enlistment statistics to support his claim that the volun- tary system had not failed. He added that "if the voluntary system does not meet the needs of the fateful days before us, then I shall feel it my duty as part of my responsibility to advocate the adoption of the other method."16 The plebiscite, he emphasized, was not asking the pe0p1e to decide for or against conscription, but rather to allow the government to develop "Canada's programme for total war, not as en- forced by the brutal methods of the Gestapo, but through the wholeheart- ed cooperation of a free people under the direction of a democratic government."17 On the following day, the first Acadian member spoke in the de- bate on the address in reply to the throne speech. C.-J. Veniot of Gloucester stated that he was "one of the representatives of 225,000 Acadians who form about one-fifth of the population of the maritime provinces."18 In a strongly worded statement he predictably aroused Conservative temper by stating: . . .conscription now is, and always will be a racial issue in Canada. It was forced into such a place in our thoughts by the unforgivable and unforgettable circumstances with which the Conservative party surrounded the birth of conscrip- tion and the way in which it was carried out in the last war, and proposed again in the present war.19 55 In addition to blaming Conservatives of British descent for every unfor- tunate aspect of the issue, Veniot made an impassioned plea for more Francophone military units to stimulate voluntary enlistments among the French. In the end, however, Veniot was not willing to break with his party leadership because of the only apparent alternative: Personally, I am prepared to support the proposed plebiscite, and to ask my people to back it up one hundred per cent; not that I favour conscription, but because I feel that a middle course can be worked out which will be just and equitable and less disruptive. . . because I have the utmost confidence in my chief and in his government; . . . If conscription ever did become a supreme necessity. . . I would rather see its enforce- ment in the hands of the Prime Minister, noted for his moderation and his broadness of views, and the men surrounding him, than in the hands of the men who have made conscription such a flop by the odious way it was enforced in Quebec during the last war.2 Another Acadian from New Brunswick, A.-D. Léger of Kent, empha- sized the theme of the preference for the King government over the Con- servatives while challenging the idea that the war efforts of Canada were insufficient. "In order to compare with us, the United States should have over five million men under arms. . . . I say that our war effort compares favourably with that of any allied nation of the world."21 Defending the anti-conscriptionist views of Francophones, Leger stressed the theme of voluntary involvement: It is not because they do not want to share the responsibility; no it is because they know it is more honourable to do their part freely. . . . I am proud to say that the French in New Brunswick have thus far contributed more than their quote. They represent about a third of the DOpulation in that province, and have con- tributed forty to forty-five per cent of total enlistments. Leger interrupted his comments in English to speak in French. In his native tongue he appealed for support for the plebiscite. He stressed to his colleagues that the question was not one of conscription, but of releasing the government from its earlier pledge. He stressed that his 56 constituency did not want conscription, and that all those who did not want conscription should support Mr. King. The alternative would be that the opposition would bring in conscription as they had in 1914- 1918.23 Returning to English, Léger issued a call for unity in the war effort which he viewed as a struggle of Christianity against paganism. He once more stressed that "every fair-minded hon. member should vote in favour of the speech from the thorone. In reference to the plebi- scite, let me point out that hon. members on both government and oppo- sition sides of the house have pledged themselves against conscription for overseas service."24 In between the two Acadian members, H. R. Emmerson, the member from Westmoreland, New Brunswick, spoke in favor of the plebiscite af- ter having first identified his constituents and documented their loyalty: We are a truly Canadian section of the dominion, with a mixture of English, Irish, Scotch and French. Approximately two-thirds of the citizens are English speaking and the remaining third are French speaking. . . . If we may judge loyalty by enlistments, then Moncton, Westmoreland County and all the maritimes will certainly not take second place to any other part of Canada. Although he supported the plebiscite "in order to relieve the government of their past commitments," Emmerson voiced his opposition to conscrip- tion, and his preference for voluntarism: Personally, I do not believe in conscripting men for fighting units unless it is absolutely impossible to get men by any other means. . . . I do not wish to belittle those who will not volunteer to fight over- seas, but I do not consider that it is to the best in- terests of the Canadian army to dilute it with men so constituted that they have not the heart and spirit to fight, and who must be driven on by compulsion. 6 Appealing for support for the plebiscite as a way of ensuring a united war effort, Emmerson declared, "There is actually just one point on 57 which the opposition differs from the government, and that is as to the method of securing men for the army overseas. Surely there is only one way to decide what Canada wants. Let us ask the people whose servant we are."27 By the end of February, Veniot was back on the floor, denying allegations that he was a "French fanatic" by cataloguing his father's dedication "to fostering and promoting bonne entente, harmony, and union between the two races," and attesting to his own like ambitions by cit- ing his children's education in English and Protestant universities.28 Hidden in a great deal of political oratory, including extensive quota- tions from Elizabeth Armstrong's book, The Crisis in_0uebec 1914-1918, Veniot did indicate that he did not expect conscription to result from a "yes" vote in the plebiscite: Others--and to this group I belong--see in the plebiscite an indication of the desire of the government, in case the nation is confronted with a supreme danger, to be free by the will of the peOple to take whatever measures it deems necessary in order to protect the nation and the allied cause, even if we must have rigourse to a certain measure of conscription for overseas. During the plebiscite debates, representatives of four of the six Maritime ridings designated as "Acadian" spoke for the record. In addition, J.-E. Michaud answered queries about paying for a full-page neWSpaper advertisement he had used to solicit a "yes" vote in his riding.30 V-J. Pottier is not on record. An interesting point in these opinions is the agreement on two points: (1) All MP8 expressed aversion to conscription on the grounds that voluntary enlistment created a superior military force; and (2) All agreed that the plebiscite was not a vote on conscription itself, and, therefore, the Acadians declared themselves in favor of a "yes" 58 vote to keep the King government in control of the system should the need to use it arise. Only Mr. Veniot's charges that conscription was a ra- cial issue failed to find support with other Maritime representatives. In a discussion with Minister for Air Defense C. G. Power, the opposition leader, R. B. Hanson, member for the New Brunswick riding of York-Sunbury, called attention to the high enlistment rate among the Acadian people: There is one other point I would like to make for my own province. I should like to pay a tribute to the Acadians of New Brunswick. They did their duty by enlisting, once they got the opportunity to do so. But the Military authorities gave these young men no opportunity to recruit fgf at least the first nine months of the war. . . After extensive political comment by Hanson, designed to berate the Minister of National Defense, the member from the riding of Royal, composed of King and Queens counties in New Brunswick, Conservative Alfred J. Brooks, raised a question to which Mr. Power had no answer: "A great many young men from northern New Brunswick did go over to One- bec to enlist. I was wondering if they were recorded as enlisting in New Brunswick, or was a certain district in Quebec receiving credit for those enlistments? The answer was provided by the member from Restigouche-Madawaska, J.-E. Michaud who gave a breakdown of recruits from northern New Bruns- wick who had enlisted in the first division, primarily into the York and Carleton Regiment, and in the second division: At that time, however, a number of boys who lived adjacent to the province of Quebec had enlisted in the Gaspe and Matapedia valley regiment which had been mobilized for the first division. Credit for those enlistments was not given to New Brunswick. Those boys were French spegking and they joined up with the Quebec regiments. 3 M 7 4 7 - - i 77 — A 7 r 7 .7 7 7 , - . 7 _ , /— - 7 ’- 7 7 A. a 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 _ a i‘ a v, a» z . . A 7 59 It is probable that the early enlistment figures for New Brunswick, particularly for the Acadian regions, were slightly lower than the actual figures while those of Quebec were slightly exaggerated. V.-J. Pottier was also quick to defend the enlistment record of Maritimers during the parliamentary debates over Bill 80, the Mobiliza- tion Act, which followed the plebiscite. When an Ontario member had claimed that province led all others in enlistments, Pottier replied: I have here the best figures I have been able to obtain. They first appeared in a Toronto paper, and I am sure they would have been at least fair with Ontario. In these figures Ontario appears to be the sixth province down the line. I will give the number by provinces up to that point. These are per 10,000 of population. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, taken together, give 495 persons as having joined the army, airforce and navy--and I am talking about the active service. Manitoba is next with 490 persons; British Columbia third with 483; New Brunswick fourth with 448; Alberta fifth with 444, and Ontario not first, but sixth, with 426 for every 10,000 of population. After the Ontario member replied that this information was correct, and that his reference had been to actual numbers rather than to percentage of population, another member asked Pottier to complete the list. He added, "Saskatchewan, 326; and Quebec, 204."34 Each week La Voix d'Evangeline reported the happenings in parlia- ment and in the provincial assembly of New Brunswick. Usually more space was allotted for the provincial assembly. Following the controver- sy between Veniot and Hanson, though, the newspaper printed both Léger's and Veniot's speeches in the March 5 issue.35 No comment accompanied the speeches, but an editorial defended Veniot against Hanson's charge that the Acadian had delivered one of the most dangerous speeches ever heard in the House of Commons.36 The paper asked why Hanson should cri- ticize Acadian "leaders" for not preparing for conscription when all par- ty leaders, including Mr. Manion, had pronounced against it in the 1940 60 election. Veniot's reference to a question of race was defended by a quotation from a 1939 speech by Manion on the floor of Commons in which he claimed that conscription had caused "violent racial antagonisms" and had been "of no real military value as far as the empire was concerned." The new5paper charged that Manion had repeated the declaration during the 1940 campaign in the province of Quebec and affirmed it "une ving- taine de fois au cours of cette campaigne." The editorial closed with the assertion that Manion's speech, not Veniot's was the best example of a dangerous speech.37 Some evidence exists that there was a measure of church approval for Veniot's position. In a letter on his House of Commons letterhead, Veniot wrote to Abbe Albert Brideau of Grand Digue, New Brunswick, a letter of thanks for the Abbe's message of congratulations on the speech in the House of Commons. Veniot claimed to be only doing his duty as he saw it, but was grateful that his efforts were appreciated by those who had at heart the true interest of French Canadians in general and in particular the Acadians.38 By contrast to the scarcity of papers for the Acadian deputies, Angus L. Macdonald, the former premier of Nova Scotia who had become King's Minister of National Defense for Naval Services, received and preserved dozens of letters on the topic of conscription. He represented the Ontario riding of Kingston, but many of the letters which he recei- ved were from Nova Scotians. None, however, were from Acadians.39 His Scottish heritage was best known, but Macdonald was grandson of Stan- islas Poirer, the noted Prince Edward Island Acadian politician.4O Less than a year after the plebiscite, L£_Voix d'Evangeline extended sympa- thies to Macdonald upon the death of his mother who they claimed "a 7 7 7 . 7‘ 7‘ n 7 7 7 , 7 7. 7 7 , 7 7 . 7 7 L a . \ . 7 7 ,7 7. ' ' < 7 a ,‘ . - 7 .. . . q , 7 , 7 7 _ 7 K 7 7 7 . ,7 7 7 , . 7 v r . 7 7 7 ,7, 7 7 , 7 . 7 7 A) 7 7 7 7 7 A 7‘ 61 "41 Macdonald was fourni elle aussi une belle, un magnifique carriére. firmly in the pro-conscriptionist camp, and as a Roman Catholic, he re- ceived congratulations from English-speaking clergy for his position. Mackenzie King was concerned about both Macdonald and Ralston being too pro-conscriptionist. Shortly after the American entry into the war he had entered in his diary: "I feel a bit worried about the determined attitude of Ralston, who is backed by Macdonald, and the danger of the two of them being too arbitrary in their stand in support of conscrip- tion."42 In Restigouche-Madawaska, the Acadian representative, Michaud, had come down firmly on the side of a "yes" vote. He stressed the fact that the war was no longer a European dispute but a world conflict in which Canada was engaged, and emphasized the German submarines on the East coast and the threat of Japanese invasion on the West coast. Ca- nada must act, he claimed, to defeat the enemy before the battle was on Canadian soil. To do this, it was necessary for the government, which had the responsibility for defense, to have full liberty of action on the best means of raising troops to align against the enemy was his concluding argument.43 During the month immediately preceding the April 27, 1942, ple- biscite, there were organized committees in the Maritime provinces, as across Canada, to encourage a "yes" vote from the citizens. Throughout Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, communities were encouraged to vote "yes." An occasional Acadian name appeared among the organizers or sponsors of the meetings, but very few. 0n the other hand, there were no published announcements or reports of meetings held by Acadians to encourage a "no" vote.“+ . 7 7 7 ‘ 1 . 7 7 7 -\ 7. 7 - 7. r . 7 7 7‘ 7 7 m 7 ‘ 7 '- 7 A 7‘ , . t 7 7 ,_ . 7. 7 ‘ 7 7 . 7 . 7 7 7 . p. / . 7 4.. . -. — , , . 7 77 7 7 . a m 7 .7_ "\ a a ,7 7 ' -. . - 7 7 — ‘ 7‘ , . 7 . 7 7 . ,. 62 Advice to Acadians concerning how to vote on the question was vague. The representatives in Ottawa stressed their approval of a "yes" vote. Various provincial and civic office holders and service clubs sponsored paid advertisements in both English and French language papers. The Federal government, in addition to the public notices of the election, also ran bilingual appeals to the public to vote, without preference for either response. In late January, the English language Catholic Register had been urging Catholics to vote for the best interests of the state, without any further direction: Whatever be the nature and form of the question that is to be submitted by the Federal Government to the voters of Canada there is one Catholic principle of which every citizen may be reminded: that a vote is an act of government, it is a public function for a public purpose and not a private act for a private interest. . . . The ordinary citizen who is deciding a great question of State policy when he casts a vote is not doing his duty unless he votes foraghat he thinks is the good of the State rather than of himself. L2_Voix d'Evangeline also issued a vague reminder in the issue just before the vote that the newspaper had run paid announcements both pro and con, and was not responsible for any expressed opinions. In 46 French, the paper counselled the people only to vote conscientiously. An editorial written by Eugene 1'Heureux, in Catholic Action, was re- printed which summarized the arguments for a "yes" and "no" vote, then ended with the advice that more importance should be attached to assuring that the feelings which resulted from the 27th of April vote were aimed toward winning the war and preventing the defeat of Canada.47 Nova Scotia's Acadian paper was equally indefinite toward advis- ing readers about the plebiscite voting. The main point of difference between the two papers seemed to be that Le Petit Courrier equated the , - r ,. 63 vote with a vote on conscription. A front page article in the issue be- fore the vote said definitely that voting "yes" or "no" in the plebiscite was voting in favor of or against conscription, especially conscription for overseas.48 The paper cited King as having been anticonscriptionist up until December 7, 1941, and maintained that the Japanese menace added to the German threat in the East had placed the nation in great danger, necessitating total mobilization of men and industry as Australia had in- voked. The paper concluded by emphasizing that King already had the legal right to enforce conscription and was now seeking the moral right.49 The only editorial comment of L3 Petit Courrier was an English language Reprint of "As We See It" column written by an Acadian emigre in an Ev- erett, Massachusetts, newspaper. The column paid tribute to the Canadian government for asking permission of the electorate to change its mind, and gave high compliments to the Canadian war effort.50 After the plebiscite, the Nova Scotia paper included only a fif- teen line front-page story stating that the "oui" response was in the proportion of nearly two to one.51 La Voix d'Evangeline offered an edi- torial which attempted to explain the apparent French-English split in Maritime voting. The seeming incongruity of a population in New Bruns- wick which voted in the majority "non" while furnishing an imposing number of volunteers for military service was explained by the fact that the Acadians were not yet convinced that conscription was necessary.52 During the months before the plebiscite, Maritime newspapers did not devote the editorial attention to conscription that major newspapers in the Central region did. The same held true after the plebiscite un- til the conscription crisis actually erupted. Except for the fortnight preceding the plebiscite and the weeks of late November and December of .7. -~.————-.—.-.- a v ,\ . , 5 rs 7 7‘ ~ ' - r . _ A ,7 _ f .‘ 4, 7 64 1944, conscription was seldom mentioned editorially in either French or English Maritime papers. By contrast, in the September 1939-June 1945 period, La Presse of Montreal dedicated 46.3% of their editorials to conscription and the Toronto Globe and Mail used 57.5% of their editorials for that topic.53 The six identifiable Acadian ridings had four Acadians and two English-Canadian representatives in Ottawa during the war years. Their speeches on the floor of Commons indicated that they were all prepared to reluctantly accept the idea of a plebiscite although all were opposed to conscription. The Acadian voters received very little strong advice from editorial sources concerning how to vote on April 27, and did not express opinions in letters to the editor as did their Anglophone neigh- bors. English language papers counselled a strong "yes" vote, and urged all citizens to vote, since a light turnout would be a defeat for the democratic system. French language papers stressed the duty of the cit- izen to vote, whether "oui" or "non." But the Maritime vote was not hea- vy. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the voting percentages lagged be- hind those of the 1940 general election. Only in Quebec was the vote "substantially higher" than in the last election.54 The record of Aca- dian voting was neither drastically lower nor substantially higher than in 1940, but deserves analysis from several considerations to determine exactly how the Acadians did vote concerning the plebiscite. All New Brunswick Acadians had spoken during the pre-plebiscite debates against the idea of sending conscripted men overseas. They all solicited a "yes" vote from their constituents on the grounds that con- scription would only be imposed when necessary, and a Liberal government under Mackenzie King was far less likely to ever find it necessary than ‘ . 7. x r ' ‘ ~ * ‘ 7 . 7 c _ 7 7 x —, 7 , 7 7. .7 , u A ~. , ‘ ,7. . . r . ,. ,. 7 7 , 7' 7 ‘ 7' ' 7 7 . 7 . . ,7 - 7 . 7 7 ,.. . 7 < . A 7. ‘ . . 7 . .7 7 . . V V Y a 7 - 7, 77 7 . ,7 — 7 7 '- r. 7 7 > . 7 ,_ 7 .— 7 . . - 65 a Conservative administration. In the cabinet, Michaud backed King through the flap over Bill 80, and even took the floor during the de- bates over removal of section three from the N. R. M. A. He spoke at length about understanding the French attitude by realizing that they were far less convinced that the war was a Canadian struggle. He concluded: So far as I am concerned. . .conscription. . .is neither a fetish, a symbol, nor an article of faith; it is merely a method of levying men and goods required to support the war needs of Canada. . . . We have raised an army which is a credit to our country without having recourse to compulsion, and it is my hope and wish that we shall never have to resort to compulsory measures to fill the ranks of our army. . . . In time of crisis, I feel the government must have full and unlimited authority to work for the security of the nation, and the security of the nation should be the ultimate law. That is why I support the measure which the government has presented to the house, in order to give the government, the Prime Minister, whoever may be at the head of affairs, full and complete authority to do the best under the circumstances when they arise. When the actual conscription situation arose in late 1944, Mi- chaud proved his loyalty to King. La Voix d'Evangeline reported after the resignation of Power that Michaud and LaFleche, of Quebec, had let 56 In the same issue, the it be known that they were supporting King. editorial explained the reversal of McNaughton and King on the conscrip- tion issue as an unfortunate and political move, but a law which must be obeyed.57 Michaud caucused with the French speaking ministers and after St. Laurent's explanation of why the government had to enforce conscrip- tion, he told the British United Press, "The French speaking Liberal min- isters are united," but refused further explanation.58 Michaud, Veniot and Pottier voted with King on every question during the entire crisis. Ralston and Emmerson did the same. Aurele-B. 66 Leger registered the only opposing vote among the Acadian ridings during the conscription debates in Commons. On November 27, 1944, King put his government on the line by in- troducing a motion of confidence "That this house will aid the government in its policy of maintaining a vigorous war effort."59 There was no question that a vote of confidence was to accept conscription for over- seas duty. But the alternative was a wartime election which would, at best, distract attention from the war effort and could potentially do irrevocable harm to national unity. The Graydon amendment was proposed to change the motion to read: "That this house is of the Opinion that the government has not made cer- tain of adequate and continuous trained reinforcements by requiring all N. R. M. A. personnel whether now or hereafter enrolled to serve in any theatre of war and has failed to assure equality of service and sacri- fice."6O In answer to this obvious move by conscriptionists to avoid a wartime election without giving approval to King's policy, Quebec MP Joseph Jean proposed an amendment to the amendment which would have al- tered the motion to: "That this house is of the opinion that the gov- ernment has not made certain of adequate and continuous trained rein- forcements by using to the best advantage the general personnel in Cana- da and the volunteers overseas without resorting to conscription for ser- vice overseas.”61 All other attempts to amend were ruled out of order. King wanted his party to reject both amendments and to pass the original motion. L3_Voix d'Evangeline disputed the idea that voting for the Jean amendment then for the original motion had any credence. In an editorial, the paper stated that it was impossible to vote against o .. 7‘. . .7 7 . 7 -7 ‘ 67 conscription in a sub-amendment then vote for it in the principal mo- 62 Nevertheless, several members, including Léger, expressed them- tion. selves in that manner. The government remained in power, however. The Jean amendment was defeated, 168-43, and the Graydon amendment also fell by 170-44. All Acadians voted with the majority on the Graydon defeat and on the passage of the King motion, 143-70. Several years later Léger wrote on Commons letterhead to Father Albert Brideau, who had earlier congratulated Veniot on his 1942 speech, to ask for the priest's support in securing an appointment to the New Brunswick Senate. Concerning his own years of service in Ottawa, he commented that the priest was aware that he had given his all, even damaging his health in 1944.63 Except for Léger's one vote, the Acadian and non-Acadian depu- ties in the six selected ridings voted solidly behind King's government in the so-called "Conscription Crisis." In order to determine whether or not this was in keeping with the wishes of their constituents, some further analysis of the voting patterns in the six ridings is necessary. 68 NOTES 1For example, near the time of the plebiscite, in the Moncton, N. B., cathedral, an organization was formed "assurer par la 1 'entiere collaboration de la paroisse l'Assomption a tout projet relatif a l'effort de guerre du Dominion ou aux intéréts des hommes eanlés dans les armées du Canada." Translation: "to assure co-operation by the entire Assumption Parish in all projects related to the war effort of the Dominion or to the interests of men enrolled in the Canadian armies." The group took as its first project, in collaboration with the Kinsmen Clubs, a collection to furnish milk to children in Great Britain. La Voix d'Evangeline, April 30, 1942. 2L3_Voix d'Evangeline, January 7, 1943. 3Ibid., February 11, 1943. Original French: "trés beau et tres bien. Mais tout cela nous rappelle, par contraste, que nous qui formons l'élément acadien des provinces maritimes, nous sommes beaucoup moins bien partagés." 4Ibid., Original French: "A ce compte, 1a pariosse de Shediac pourrait fournir deux batteries d'artillerie, environ, et prés de la moitie d'un batallion de chars d'assaut!" 5Emery LeBlanc, Les Acadiens: La tentative d5 genocide d'un peuple (Montreal, 1963), p. 87. 6Anselme Chiasson, Petit Manuel d'Histoire d'Acadie des Debuts a 1976: Quatrieme Fascicule d3 1867 a 1976 (Moncton, 1976), IV: 10-13. 7The term Imperialist is used to denote those Canadians and British in Canada who felt that Canada's proper place in world affairs was as a colony of England. This included many, but not all, Conserva- tives, a few Liberals, and practically no Canadians of French descent. 8House of Commons, Debates, September 11, 1939, V: 126. 9"Le Canada est en guerre avec l'Allemagne," La Voix d'Evangeline September 14, 1939. Original French: "Nous sommes en guerre parce que nous l'avons voulu, parce que nos gouvernements, croyant sincérement interpreter la volonté du peuple canadien, 1'ont voula. Cette guerre nous en sommes librement--of our own free will, a dit le premier minis- tre, M. King. Nous pourrions, usant de cette méme liberté, ne pas etre. . . . Enfin, autre indication que nous sommes en guerre 'modérément,' c'est que nous n'aurons pas de conscription, c'est-a-dire pas de service obligatorie outre-mer. M. King nous en a fait la promesse et M. Lapointe en a fait une des conditions de sa collaboration. Monsieur Manion, de 69 son coté, a fait une promesse analogue. Et la deputation a accepté, pour le moment du moins, cet état de chose. Nous voulons voir 15 chez la majorité anglaise un désir trés louable de ne pas heurter la popula- tion de langue frangaise dont l'opposition 5 toute mesure de coercition est bien connue. Et c'est une bonne chose que nos parlementaires aient compris qu'il faut avant tout, préserver l'unité nationale du Canada. Oue la guerre dure six mois ou six ans, il faudra continuer, Canadiens de langue frangaise et Canadiens de langue anglaise, 5 vivre ensemble, 5 travailler ensemble. Il est donc de la plus haute importance pour la paix extérieur que les deux éléments ethniques qui constituent la masse de la population canadienne ne s'infligent pas des blessures qu'il serair difficile de guérir par la suite." 10Probably the best survey of the provincial election is con- tained in J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1975), pp. 28-35. The cabinet mem- bers campaigned against Duplessis by threatening to resign from the Fed- eral Cabinet if Duplessis' government was re-elected in Quebec. This would have removed the French influence from King's advisors and, they said, have left the Ottawa government open to conscription advocates. 11House of Commons, Debates, December 2, 1940, I: 597. 121bid., April 1, 1941, II: 1085. 13as reprinted in L3 Petit Courrier, February 4, 1942. Original French: "En 1939 le rendement des chantiers maritimes canadiens se re- sumait a 4,500 tonneaux. En 1942, la production de navires marchands seulement a été de 960,000 tonneaux. . . . Au cours du premier trimes- tre de 1940, quatorze chantiers outillés pournla fabrication despetites embarcations travaillaient a la construction de navires de guerre. . . . Aujourd'hui, 1e nombre de chantiers de ces deux categories est respec- tivement de 19 et de 58, et l'on travaille encore a les agrandir." 14House of Commons, Debates, November 11, 1941, IV: 4265. 151b1d., May 7, 1942, 111: 2253. 161bid., February 10, 1942, 1: 453 17Ibid., I: 452. 18Ibid., February 11, 1942, I: 512. 19Ibid., I: 513. An exchange over the issue took place later in the plebiscite debate between Hanson and Veniot (Debates, 1942, I: 688), which resulted eventually in Veniot quoting lengthy passages from Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis gf Quebec 1914-1918. House of Com- mons, Debates, February 26, 1942, I: 853-854. 7 7 7 7 . ,7 7 7 , 7 . 7 .7 .- 7. 7 7 .7 — . ,— , 7 - 7. - a . 7 7 7 . 7 ,7 7 7 . 7 7 7 ,7 . \ 7 7 .. 7 . 7 , 7 .7 7 . fl . 7 ,7 7 7 , 7 7 7 , A 7 . 7 7 7‘ 7 7 « 7 7 .- - v . A x r 77 7 1 7 . A - . .7 g 7 . 7' 7 7 . ,- 1 «a -‘ 7 n . 1 p 7 7 7 7 7 r - r\ r < - 7 . . . 7 7 f ,7 7 .— 7 7 1 ,7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 7 . \ 7 7 7 7 7O 201bid., February 11, 1942, 1: 517-518. 21Ibid., February 13, 1942, I: 589. 221bid., I: 589-590. 23Ibid., I: 590. Translation as printed. 2Z‘Ibid. 251bid., February 12, 1942, 1: 543. 26Ibid., I: 544. 27Ibid., I: 546. 28Ibid., February 26, 1942, I: 855. 291bid., I: 854. 30Ibid., April 21, 1942, II: 1792. Michaud answered a question from Hanson about financial responsibility for a full page ad in the Campbellton Graphic of April 16, 1942. 311b1d., November 12, 1941, IV: 4327. 321bid., IV: 4329. 33Ibid. 341b1d., June 1, 1942, 111: 2964. 35Lg'Voix d'fivangeline, March 5, 1942. Headlines to the speeches did not mention any controversial aspect. "Veniot approuve 1e plébiscite et demandera 5 ses électeurs de 'l'appuyer sans réserve'" and over Leger's speech: "Acadiens du Nouveau Brunswick ont fourni leur part du volon- taires a l'armée déclare le deputé de Kent." Translation: "Veniot approves the plebiscite and asks his electors for 'unreserved support'" and "Acadians of New Brunswick have durnished their part of the army volunteers declares the deputy from Kent." 361bid. Original French: "un des discours les plus dangereux qu'il m'ait Eté donné d'entendre en cette enceinte depuis que je suis membre de la Chambre des Communes. . ." 37Ibid., Original French: "Et cela fait, on l'admettra, une belle cargaison de 'discours dangereux.'" 71 380.-J. Veniot to Abbe A. Brideau, February 18, 1942. File 15.1-21, Acadian Centre, University of Moncton, New Brunswick. Original French: "Je viens to remercier sincérement de ton gracieux message de félicitations 5 1'occasion du discours que j'ai prononcé la semaine derniere a la Chambre des Communes dur 1a question de la conscription. Je n'ai fait que mon devoir tel que je 1e concois. Tout de meme, je suis heureux de savoir que mes faibles efforts sont appréciés par ceux qui out 5 coeur les véritables intéréts du Canada frangais en géneral, et de l'Acadien en particlier. Dans le courant de la semaine je t'enverrai quelques copies de ce discours." 39Ha11fax, Nova Scotia, Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Angus L. Macdonald papers, file 36. 40Emery LeBlanc, Les Acadiens, p. 87. 4ILE'Voix d'fiyangeline, February 11, 1943. Translation: "has also completed a glorious, a splendid career." 42Diary, December 31, 1941, as recorded in J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record (Toronto, 1960), I: 331. 43Le Madawaska, April 16, 1942, as quoted in Eloi de Grace, Georgette Desjardins, and Rose-Alma Mallet, Histoire d'Acadie par les textes, fasciscule D, 1930-1974 (Fredericton, 1976), p. 21. Original French: ". . . la guerre n'est plus une dispute européene mais un conflit mondial dans lequel 1e Canada est engagé. . . . Pour cela, i1 faut que ceux qui ont 1a responsabilite de vous defendre aient la plus entiére liberté d'action sur la facon de lever des troupes et de les aligner contre l'ennemi. . ." 44The Halifax Chronicle, Halifax Herald, and Charlottetown Patriot all reported such meetings and rallies in various parts of the provinces. Only in Digby, Nova Scotia, was an Acadian mayor, E. J. Theriault included as having any part in activities. Digby Courier, April 23, 1942. 45"Duty in a Plebiscite," The Catholic Register, January 19, 1942. 46ie plebiscite de lundi prochain," La‘Voix d'fivangeline, April 22, 1942. Original French: "Ouant 5 notre journal, il n'a qu'un con- seil a donner. C'est de voter, de voter tous et de voter conscienceuse- ment." 47Ibid., Original French: "Encore une fois, nous attachons plus d'importance 5 l'état des esprits qu'au résultat du 27 avril pour gagner 1a guerre et préventir la défaite de notre pays." 72 48L; Petit Courrier dg_§ud-Quest d3 Nouvelle-Ecosse, April 23, 1942. Original French: "En définitif, voter 'oui' ou 'non' au plebi- scite, veut dire voter en faveur on contre la conscription, surtout la conscription pour service outre-mer." 49Ibid., Original French: "Ces mesures, le premier ministre a déja 1e droit légal de les mettre en force. Ce qu'il demande par le plebiscite c'est 1e droit moral." SOCleveland d'Entremont, "Confidence in Canada," Everett, Massachusetts, as quoted in Lg Petit Courrier, April 16, 1942. 51;: Petit Courrier, Abr11 30, 1942. S2L§_Voix d'Evangeline, April 30, 1942. Original French: "Les Acadiens du Nouveau Brunswick, par example, qui ont en majorité répondu "Non,' n'en ont pas moins fourni a l'armée de terre un nombre imposant de volontaires. . . . Pourquoi donc ont-ils refuse de donner au gouvern- ement 1e blanc-seign qu'il leur demandait? Parce qu'on n'a pas réussi 5 les convaincre que la chose ffit nécessaire. . . . Mais nos gens n'en restent pas moins de bons Canadiens et qui continueront 5 faire leur devoir." 53Martin Lubin, "Conscription: The National Identity Enigma and the Politics of Ethno-Culture in Canada during World War II” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1973), p. 620 54Halifax Herald, April 28, 1942. 55House of Commons, Debates, July 6, 1942, IV: 3946. 56La Voix d'Evangeline, November 30, 1944. Original French: "M. Michaud, ministre du Transport, at M. LaFleche, ministre du Ser- vices nationaux de guerre, ont lait savoir qu'ils appurent M. King." 57Ibid., Original French: "11 faut se soumettre 5 la loi du pays, mais nous ne pouvons féliciter M. King qui a capitulé pour tenter de rester au pouvoir, pour faire plaisir aux impérialistes qui travail- lent contre l'unité nationale." 58Winnipeg Free Press, November 24, 1944. 59House of Commons, Debates, November 27, 1944, VI: 6595. 6OIbid., IV: 6622. 61Ibid., November 28, 1944, IV: 6734. r r 7. 7 i \ . 7 7 ,7 7 ,7 , 7 A 7 . r ,7 .7 7 7 7 7. 7 7‘ 7 7. . 7 v 7 . 7 ,7 7 7 l ‘ o x ‘ ~ \ . I 7 ,- 7 7‘ - 7 7 ~. 7 A 7. ,— .7 . 7 7 -- - 7 .— 7 7 - 7 7 . A 73 62"Coup d'oeil a Ottawa," La_Voix d'Evangeline, December 7, 1944. Original French: "113 ne peuvent dire, dans un sous-amendment: 'Nous n'approuvons pas le conscription pour outre-mer' et, dans la motion principale, "Nous approuvons la conscription pour outre-mer.' Voter pour le motion de confiance, c'est approuver 1a conscription pour outre-mer." 63Auréle-Dominique Léger to Albert Brideau, April 28, 1950. Acadian Centre, University of Moncton, File 15. 1-26. Original French: "Vous savez aussi bien que moi, depuis que je suis 1e représentant comté j'ai donné tout ce qu'il y avait en moi.jusqu'§ endommager ma santé en 1944." CHAPTER IV The Acadian Response: Voting Patterns Another way of examining the Acadian attitude toward conscrip- tion is through some statistical analysis of voting patterns among the Acadian p0pulation. Such analysis would help to clarify whether or not there was a difference between Acadian and Quebecois at the ballot box over the conscription question and to gauge any dissatisfaction among Acadian voters about the actions of their representatives in Ottawa. The most widely circulated figures from the plebiscite vote were the "yes" percentages of votes cast. Figure 2 shows that figure for each province. Only in Quebec was the "yes" percentage less than a majority. The provincial figures do not allow for any indication of areas of concentrated "no" votes within a province. However, Francois- Albert Angers made a closer study of the vote in Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime provinces, examining the numbers in each county or riding. The field of statistical analysis was in its infancy during the 19403, but he did some analysis in his article "Un vote de race: Analyse mathématique et statistique du vote au plébiscite dans les cinq provin- ces de l'Est," published in May, 1942, following the April 27 vote. The work is widely quoted and has generally been considered an accurate analysis since the broad claim made by the author was substantiated by his data.1 With the advent of computers and calculators, statistical analysis of electoral data has advanced rapidly, and tests have been developed which eliminate the possibility of distortion or bias due to 74 . 7 7 . » 7 a 7 l 7 77 7 7 - _ _ __ 777 _ 1 H 7 , 7 - . . . ..77 ,— 7 7 7 7 . 7 ,. ,7 . ,— 7 . . ,7 _ . . 7 , 7 7 A. ‘ ._ 7 7 A 7 a 7 7 7 . 7 7 A x - » A 7 7 .7 7‘ . 7 .. - x II I '1' .i’lil I0 .N¢¢H .NH %«.2 .vdmumm meHHmm a“ umuuoaou mafiumfiumum "momsom .7 . . . . 7m: .7 ‘ 4 . \ II‘ III; JIWIIIII‘ . ~7 ' , ... . 7 , .7 7 .. . 7 sm~ x. fig» w ” Nah . 7. sun ” ummmso onoua hp wuo> :moh: mo uwuucmuummuum mmDon n'. IIII'III.II-‘IIII||‘|II" 1‘ 76 the sample of the population used. More incisive questions may be asked and more sophisticated results obtained. Some of Angers' conclu- sions may be open to reinterpretation by considering alternative empha- ses. For purposes of this study, the 1931 census data used by Angers has been replaced by 1941 census data where possible, since the 1941 figures would be more applicable to the 1942 plebiscite vote. Angers' article stated that in Quebec the "no" vote was cast in a percentage similar to the percentage of French origin, and that the same phenomenon was obvious in the Maritimes and in Ontario wherever the French population was more than 10% of the population total.2 The voting statistics verify that a distinct relationship exists between the Acadian population and the number of "no" votes among those votes cast in the plebiscite. By use of the Pearson E test it is possible to test for correlation between the percentage of "no" vote and the percentage of French-descended pOpulation. This is the usual test for correlation where there is not a strong case against a normal (bell- shaped) distribution. When the Pearson E test is applied to Angers' statistics and the areas as outlined in his study, a significant corre- lation is indicated between the "no" vote in the areas of more than 10% French descended population and the French descended population in the area. (Statistical data for the Pearson $.18 shown in Appendix,.table 8.) Therefore, Angers' claim is verified, if only the votes cast in the plebiscite are considered. Angers made no attempt, however, to analyze the vote from any perspective beyond measuring the votes cast by English and non-English portions of the p0pulation in the eastern five provinces. There is a difference evident between Quebec and the Acadian ridings in the I ‘ . 7 7 7 . P 7 _ 7 . 7 . I 7 . 7 7 ,- _‘ 7 7 . v _ .7 7 ,_ 7 7 , 7 7 .7 77 percentages of "no" votes among those cast. Table 2 shows that the three New Brunswick ridings with Acadian representatives in Parliament had a combined French descended population percentage nearly approaching that of Quebec, yet the percentage of "no" votes among those cast, while a majority, was significantly less than in Quebec. TABLE 2--Acadian ridings "no" vote in plebiscite compared with each other and with Quebec. Quebec 1 *1 *2 *3 *4 approximate French 79% 65.9% 66.3% 55.1% 78.7% population "no" votes cast 975,220 25,639 30,020 35,268 22,606 total votes cast 1,351,419 47,297 60,680 81,118 36,916 percentage of 72% 54% 49.5% 43.5% 61% "no" votes cast *1=Maritime ridings with Acadian Members of Parliament (Restigouche-Madawaska, Gloucester, Kent, Shelburne-Yarmouth, Clare) *2=New Brunswick ridings with the largest concentration of Acadian population (Restigouche-Madawaska, Gloucester, Kent, Westmore- land) *3=Maritime ridings with the largest concentrations of Acadian population in each province (*1 + Westmoreland and Prince) *4=New Brunswick tidings with "no" majorities (Restigouche- Madawaska, Gloucester, Kent) SOURCEz, Quebec data from Angers, "Un vote de race”; Acadian data from La Voix d'Evangeline, Digby Courier, Charlottetown Patriot, immedi- ate post-plebiscite issues. Z-tests may be used to validate the significance of the differ- ence between the percentage of "no" votes in Quebec and the percentage in the Acadian ridings as grouped in Table 2. The z-test is preferable in this instance because it takes advantage of the normal approximation to . _ 7 7 7 7, . . f 7 . . . _ , ,- 7 . 7. ‘ 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ,7 77 . 7 , 7 7 7 -- ,7 7 7 7 7.7 7 7r 7 7 7 7 7 7' r‘ - r . . ~ . A A 7 4 . A 7 ’7 7 7- ’ . _.. ~ < 1‘ 7 ‘ 1 . . - ,7 7» _ , .7 7 7 7 7 - A . 7 7 - A . 7 7 7 7‘ , 7 ,7 7 , _ , 1 7 ) , - 7 - 7 7 77 7 ,7 7 .— _ _ » h7 - ’ 7 7‘ 7 ' 7 — -\ 7 7 ,1- ~ - 7 .- 7 1 7 7 7, .7 , 7 7 _ 7 7 r‘ , .7 7 7 , 7. 77 7 ,7 . . 7 7 7 7 7 7 . , . 1 _ 7 7 7 7 7 7 .7 7‘ 77 7 7 7 , 7 .7 . , l ' . . 7 7 7 77 7 7 . - .7 77 7 7 .— 7 7 .7 7 - 7 7 7 . , 7 7, 7 - - ' ' "\ * - 7 m l a 7 7 .7. ,7 - ~- 7 . 7 7 ,— . 7 7 7 7 7 7. 7‘ 7 7 . - . 7, 7. , . , ,, _77 7 7 7 78 the binomial distribution. When the z-tests are run on each set of data displayed in table 2, the results indicate that the difference is signi- ficant. (Results of these z-tests are in Appendix, table 8). Consideration should also be given to residents beyond just those who turned out to cast a vote. Many issues have been decided by the portion of the population who chose not to participate in the elec- toral process. Overall in Canada, 6,500,000 peOple were eligible to vote in the plebiscite and slightly more than 4,500,000 people did so, for approximately a 70% national turnout. Of eligible voters, there- fore, neither "yes" nor "no" received a majority vote. 2,945,514 voted ”yes" or 45.3% of all eligible voters. The "no" vote was 1,643,006, or 25.6% of all eligible voters.3 The newspapers reported that New Bruns- wick and Nova Scotia turned out fewer voters than in the 1940 election, while Quebec had a heavier vote.4 The record of the Acadian ridings should indicate whether they voted as Maritimers or as Franc0phones. A Pearson E test indicates a significant negative correlation between the percentage of Acadian population in the sample ridings and the percentage of decline in the total vote from the 1940 general elec- tion to the 1942 plebiscite. (See Appendix, table '9). While the vote was generally less in the plebiscite than in the 1940 election, the per- centage of decline was less in the ridings of higher Acadian.popu1ation concentration. Since this correlation is significant, it may be conclud- ed that Acadians tended to turn out to vote in the plebiscite in heavier numbers than non-Acadians. During the post-plebiscite debate in Parliament over the revi- sion of the National Resources Mobilization Act, a member from Quebec observed: 7 _ ,n , - ‘ 7 7 - . ‘ 7 , a - , 7 ‘ 7 7 7 ,5 _ ,7 . , 7 7 " Y' - _ 7 7 _ ,7 7 ,7 ,. 7 . . 7 p 7 - , 7 7 7 ‘ 7 a 7 7 - 77 77 7 7 . 7 7 7. 7 7 . v , A - 7 A .7. 7 7 , I ~ 7 7 7 r 7< 7 7 a , 7 -7 7 . - , ‘, ‘ 7 7 7 77 7 ,. . 7 7 7 7 r 7 ‘ 7 ,7 7 7 . 7 ,7 ‘ 7 7 7 7 7 , . .. 7 . ,7 7 7 ‘7 . r ._ - - .. - , . . 7. 7 _ 7 ' 7 ‘fi .. 7 ,7 . 7.. 7 7 7 7 7 7\ .77 7 , _ 7 , 7 ,_ -7 7 . A _ , 7 ‘ . x 7 ‘ 7 7 7 7 7. 7 k 7 7 7 7 . 7 7 7 _ 7 7 7' p 7 7 _ 7 7 7 7 .7‘ 7 7 7» 7 7 79 . that with the exception of Quebec, the other provinces were more or less indifferent. . . . outside of the province of Quebec the voters remained more or less aloof from the question. . To prove his point, he quoted figures of the plebiscite vote in each province which included the following: New Brunswick, 62.9%; Nova Sco- tia, 45.5%; Prince Edward Island, 57.2%; Quebec, 75.8%. Since the ser- vice vote was counted separately, it is necessary to remember that ser- vice men who voted would still appear on the elector list in their home provinces, although their plebiscite votes would not be recorded there. The conclusion may be reached, however, that the turnout of Acadian voters was heavier than non-Acadian, but not nearly as heavy as voting in Quebec. Since Quebec was the recognized stronghold of French language anti-conscription sentiment, some comparisons between Acadian ridings and Quebec are pertinent. Table 3 offers one such comparison in the maximum possible percentage of French~decended voters who voted "no." TABLE 3--Maximum percentage of French descended population voting "no” 1941 1941 Fr. - max 7. Area population Fr. % population "no" Fr. no Quebec 3,332,000 79% 2,632,000 975,220 37% Rest.-Mad. 61,251 76% 46,550 10,420 22% Gloucester 49,913 83% 41,428 6,866 17% Kent 25,817 77% 19,879 5,320 27% Westmoreland 64,486 40% 25,794 7,414 29% . Shel.-Yar.-Cl. 44,146 26% 11,478 3,033 26% Prince 34,490 27% 9,312 2,215 24% SOURCES: Angers, "Un vote de race,"; Report of Chief Election Officer (1940); Local newSpaper plebiscite results. A 7 - 7 7 7 ,2 .7 7 _ 7 , ,, , 7 . _ 7 \ 7 7. 7 7 A 7‘ 7 . 7 r 7. ’ ' ' ’ r 7 ' r“ -7. A ‘ 7 7 7 ‘ . 7 7 I 7 7 77 r\ 7 7 7 ‘7— ,7 f 7 7‘ 7 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 f\ , 7 v \ 7 - 7 _ ‘ 7 1 H 80 This maximum percentage would be reached only if all "no" votes were cast by French descended voters. None of the Acadian ratios come near to the Quebec figure. Probably the most unexpected ratio is the Glou- cester result which indicates that an 83% French descended pOpulation-- a larger percentage than Quebec--returned only a maximum 17% "no" vote. Since this table is based on total French descended population rather than eligible voters, the answer may lie in a larger population which is below voting age, unwilling, or unable to vote. . The Chi-square test, the only common test to measure a ques- tion of several proportions, was used to verify that the true propor- tion of "no" votes in the six sample Maritime ridings is not the same as .37, which was the prOportion of "no" votes in Quebec to the total French descended population of Quebec. (See Appendix, table 10). The maximum percentage of French descended population voting "no" in Quebec differs significantly, therefore, from the maximum percentage of Acadi- ans voting "no" in the six sample Maritime ridings. In table 4 comparitive figures are shown for just the six Mari- times sample ridings dealing with the percentages of the population who voted in the general election of 1940 and in the plebiscite election of 1942. The figures for both elections are based on those who were eli- gible to vote in each riding, not the total population. A decline in the percentage of eligible voters who cast votes is evident from 1940 to 1942 in every one of the six ridings. This decline was general, however, in all the Maritime provinces, as shown in table 5. The per- centage decline from the general election of 1940 to the plebiscite of 1942 was especially sizable in both Nova Scotia and Prince Edward 13- land. . ‘ \ . 7 7 , . . ‘ V, , , 7 , Y 7 7 7 7 ' . 7 , 7 7.» 4 r 7 -‘ ‘ s - r Ir 7 : v - V 7. 7 . ‘ . ‘ A 7 - . ‘, 7 ,‘ , 77 .7 A 7 V — 7 7 7, , 7 7. — 77 .- ,7. ‘ 7 A _ , ,‘ v 7 7 . g 7 ' 7 , 7 7 7 7 7 7. 7 7 7 7 . _ _ _ 7. 7 A 7 , — .7 . . 7 7 7 V 7 7 , . H - r . — A A A r v ' — 7 , 7 77 r 7 N 7 7 ' , 7 7 7 7 , ,1 ‘ 7 . ~ 7 . . , 7 . 7‘ 7 ,. 1 ,— 7 ,7 7 , 7 -‘ . 7 n 7 . 7 7 , . ,7 A 7 7 . 7 7 7 . . 7 7 . . \ 7 7 7 7 . 7 7 . 7 . 7 - 7 ‘ 7 7 a . - v - . ‘ ,7, 7 _ ,. , 7 _ , _ . ,_ , . 77 7 7 . 7 77 7 ‘ .7 7 7 ,. 7 7. _ 7 7 7 , . 7, . - - 7 .7 , (7 A 7 7 77 - r 7 r . 7 . . 7 _ ,. ~ 7 7 , '— , 7 7 7 . . 7 . a 7 7 7 7 7 77 7. 7. r 7 7 7 7 7. 7 H 7 7 7 _ 7 7 , 7 ,. — . 7 7 - . , . 7 7 A ' 81 TABLE 4--Percentage of voters eligible for 1940 general election par- ticipating in the 1940 general election and in the 1942 plebiscite Riding eligible 1940 voting 1940 (%) voting 1942 (%) Rest.-Mad. 28,730 17,623 (61.3%) 17,500 (60.9%) Gloucester 23,052 16,081 (69.8%) 11,701 (50.8%) Kent ’ 13,594 8,707 (64.1%) 7,715 (56.8%) Westmoreland 36,631 16,916 (73.5%) 23,764 (64.9%) Shel.-Yar.-Cl. 25,833 17,550 (67.9%) 10,381 (40.2%) Prince 19,481 14,618 (75%) ~ 10,057 (51.6%) SOURCES: Plebiscite data from local papers; 1940 voting data from Report of General Election Officer (1940). TABLE 5--Percentage of eligible voters voting in the 1940 general elec- tion and in the 1942 plebiscite in the Maritime provinces Province , . 1940 1942 New Brunswick 68% ‘ 62.9% Nova Scotia 70% 45.5% Prince Edward Island 78% 57.2% SOURCES: Plebiscite data from local papers; 1940 voting data from Report of General Election Officer (1940). The 1940 general election percentages shown in table 5 are lower than a comparison of votes polled to electors listed for the 1930, 1935, 1940, and 1945 elections included in Report of Chief Election Officer: 20th General Election (1945), p. xi. The data in table 5 is taken from the body of the 1940 report, as given with the provincial returns, and there- fore makes allowance for invalid or spoiled ballots. Using the total French descended population of the sample rid- ings, 154,441, and the total number of "no" votes cast in those ridings, , v 7 ‘ 7 . . n v 7 7 ‘ _ l ‘ u ' ( ~ I A 7 7 ‘ 7' I ’ 7 ,7 . -7 7 . 7 7 - . 7 ,- 7 7 7 - , 7 W 7 7 7. u 7 ) 7 - r. . 7. 7 . ‘ \ , . 7 n A 7. 7 , 7 ,_ ,, 7 7. 7‘ 7 7 f , A 7. 7 7 , - 7 ,7 ,. 7. _ 7 , . 7 I" - 7 . . 7 ,- 7 ,7 ,7 7 A 7 - 7 7 . N 7 7 7 ,7 ,- , r 7. , 7 ,7 - ._\ ,_ . 7. 7 7 A ,7, 7 - A 7 r ,. 7 . . .. 7 - ., ,7 7 _ , 7 7 7 , 7 A A 7 7- > 82 35,268, an overall ratio of .228359 is computed to express this rela- tionship. This relationship was then used in a Chi-square test to ver- ify that there is a difference in the way the Acadians in the sample ridings cast their vote, and that the result was not due to the change of the sample. (See Appendix, table 11). In addition to differing from the vote of the Quebecois, therefore, the maximum percentage of French-descended population voting "no" differs significantly among the six sample Maritime tidings. In addition, a z-test shows a significant difference between the proportion of "no" votes in Quebec to the total Francophone popula- tion and the proportion of "no" votes among Acadians to the Acadian population in the six sample Maritime ridings. (See Appendix, table 12). By use of statistical tests, Angers' basic claim for his anal- ysis, using his data, has been verified. The statement is valid that the phenomenon of a "no" vote percentage related to the French descend- ed population of an area is present where the French descended popula- tion is 10% or greater. However, the percentage of "no" vote is far less among the Acadians in the Maritimes than among the French Canadians in Quebec. Some further conclusions may be justified by comparing the data of the sample ridings with that of Quebec, and by considering the entire French descended population rather than just those who went to the polls on April 27, 1942. At least three definite observations may be made concerning the Acadian plebiscite vote: (1) Acadians tended to vote in larger numbers than did English descended Maritimers; (2) The "no" vote among Acadians is significantly lower than the "no" vote in Quebec; (3) The "no" vote among the sample Maritime ridings of highest Acadian V . . . 7 .7 V-_ . 7 F. 7 - 7 7 ‘ v , , . A n 7 . 7‘ 7 . 7 7\ 7 , . , , . ,. ,1 7 - . 7 A ‘ ‘ . c A. , - . v , 7 , 7 7 7 . 7 7‘ 7 . 7 v A 7 7 a 7‘ _ . A 7 7 , r ,. . .. K .7 , . 7‘ , _ 7 . 7 7 i _ - , 7 V 7. v 7. , . V - i ‘ 7 7‘ . 7 7 i . . ‘ I 7 . a u m . 7 7 . 7 7 a 7 7 7 7 - 7 . 7" 7 7 '\ 7 . - n ~ - 7 ’7 ‘ 7. 7 — — 83 concentration in each province differs significantly. The first observation is not unexpected due to the higher pro- portion of Francophone voters in general participating in the plebiscite. The latter two observations, based on differences within the Franc0phone vote are deserving of'further examination. Voting patterns in the 1945 general election are also of inter- est because of the suggestion by Philippe Doucet that the Acadian depu- ties did not respect the wishes of their constituents in the matter of conscription.6 Throughout the entire conscription controversy, the me- dia had continually warned King, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, and all members of Parliament that a judgement day on their ac- tions was not far off. They must soon stand for re-election. King called a general election for June 11, 1945. The fate of the Acadian members varied. Of the four Acadian Members of Parliament, only Aurele Leger stood for re-election. J.-E. Michaud accepted appointment as Chief Justice of the New Brunswick Supreme Court as soon as Parliament was dissolved in April of 1945. C.-J. Veniot went to the Senate at the same time, and only a short while later V.-J. Pottier went to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.7 All three had served in Ottawa since at least 1935, while Leger had been elected for the first time in 1940. In the 1945 election, the Liberal Party remained in power in the nation and in the Acadian ridings. In the Maritimes, Acadian candi- dates remained prominent in the New Brunswick ridings, but redistricting in Nova Scotia precluded another Acadian Member of Parliament until Felton Fenwick Legere was elected on the Progressive Conservative ticket to represent Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare from 1958 to 1962. Ralston did 7 7 , 7 , ‘ ‘ 7 7 7 . I. . 7 - 7 - . . ‘ V‘ . 7< < 7. 7 . -7 7 , 7 ‘ 77‘ . 7 -7 7 7 A r . ‘ ‘ .7 ' 7 7. 7 ‘ 7 ’ § 7 ‘ 7 7 ' 7 . r 7 , 7 , V .7 7 . 7 7 7 - 7 ' V ‘ , h. .7 7 7 7 _ 77 7 . .7 l , 7 7 ‘ 7 7 7. . 7 7 . . - ‘ , 77 7 7 — _ ‘ ~ A . N '77, ‘l l ‘ f‘ .'7 7 . V - 7 ' 7 7 .7 7 .7. 7 7 _ 7- ' - .— 7 . ' . 7‘ 7, 7 ) 7 . 7 Q 7 — 7 — 7 7— ‘ ~ - ~ 2 w r — 7 a r ‘ . 7 _ ' _. "‘ r .' ‘ 1 , v" rs ’ ‘ ' ‘ J ‘ N 7 ~ I . . ... - -. — - r . , - - f , 7. u 7 ,— ~ 7 7 .A , - - e r ' h n . ~ « 1‘ 7 7 7 7 -7 ' ,7 — 7 r 7 - A - . 7 7 f 77 V . 7 ‘ 7. 7 7 7 7- 7 ’ 7 . 7., 7. 7 7 . 7 7 7 - , . 7 ‘ ~ 7 ’- , 7 . 7‘ '7 '7' 7A 7 V 7 _ . 7 7 . ‘- _ ‘ ' _ . 7 7 7 A, K - . 7 84 not stand again in Prince, but Emmerson was victorious in Westmoreland. The conscription issue never surfaced in the election campaigns. As is often the case with voters, there was more concern With current problems than with the past. When the war ended in Europe, the problem of getting men into uniform faded when compared to the difficulties of getting them out. Establishing a peacetime domestic economy without inflation or de- pression, while pursuing a truly visible Canadian position in foreign affairs would be the concerns of the next Parliament, and it was those questions, rather than conscription, which were addressed. Voter participation showed a marked increase in 1945 in each of the Maritime provinces, especially in the Acadian ridings. TABLE 6--The 1940 and 1945 general elections compared in the six sample Maritime ridings of highest Acadian population concentration r ‘ i win. Acad. cand. riding province Riding win. Z party party voting Z voting Z Rest.-Mad. 1940 42Z L* L & C 61Z 68Z 1945 42Z L L & 3rd 76Z 78Z Gloucester 1940 45% L* L & C 70Z 68Z 1945 SOZ L L, C, & 3rd 81Z 78Z Kent 1940 41Z L L & C 64Z 68Z 1945 53Z L* L, C, & 3rd 82Z 78Z Westmoreland 1940 45Z L* none 76% 68% 1945 43Z ' L* none 82Z 78Z She1.-Yar.eC1» " or 1940 42Z L* L 68Z 70Z’ 1945 ‘ 34Z L none 70Z 72Z Prince 1940 45Z L none 75Z 78Z 1945 47Z L 3rd 83Z 81Z SOURCE: Report of Chief Election Officer, 19th & 20th Gen. Elec. 7 V7“ - 7 .— 7 .. 7 7 . .. f ,. . N 7 . 7 A 7777 , 7. r- r s -\ 7 A 7 7. ‘ 7 7 H r 7 , 7‘ 7 . P A 7 L ‘ 7 - ,- 7‘ . l ‘ l 85 The 1945 presence of third party candidates suggests that there was a rising strength of new political ideas in the Maritimes which extended among the Acadians. In Prince County, Acadian Cyrus F. Gallant stood for a third party and collected 5.8Z of the vote. In that very close election, where the Liberal candidate had only 46.9% and the Progressive Conservative only 46.4%, the third party vote was an important factor.9 There is no evidence in any riding to indicate that the Acadian repre- sentatives in Ottawa during World War II were either rejected or re- warded for their position on the conscription issue. There is suffi- cient evidence to conclude that the post-war years brought increased political participation among Maritimers in general, and Acadians in particular. The Acadian voting patterns in the plebiscite indicated that there were some similarities between the Acadian vote and that of Que- bec, but there were also significant differences. The percentage of "no" votes cast in the Acadian ridings was much lower than that of Quebec. The maximum possible percentage of Acadians voting "no" was much lower than Francophones in Quebec, surprisingly so in the riding of Gloucester, New Brunswick, where the highest concentration of Acadi- an population was found. There were significant differences among the Acadian votes re- corded in the six sample Maritime ridings. Although all ridings regis- tered a larger voter turnout for the plebiscite than the rest of the Maritime ridings, the maximum possible "no" vote among the Acadian rid- ings varied from 17Z to 29Z. The highest maximum "no" vote was not found in the highest concentration of Acadian population. Despite the media warnings at the time of the 1944 conscription 86 crisis, analysis shows that the Acadian voters did not indicate in the 1945 general election any widespread dissatisfaction with the policies of the Liberal party under William Lyon Mackenzie King. The Acadian ridings remained solidly Liberal in the 1945 general election with higher percentages of voters turning out than in the 1940 election. In four of the sample Acadian ridings the 1945 voting percentage was higher than the provincial percentage. In 1940 only two of the six had higher percentages than the provincial level. 87 1F. A. Angers, "Un vote de race." Among others using this study to substantiate their conclusions concerning the plebiscite are J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War, and Philippe Doucet, "La Politique et les Acadiens," in Les Acadiens des Maritimes, ed. Jean Daigle. 2Angers, "Un vote de race," 301-302. Original French: "Dans toute 1a province de Québec, 1e pourcentage du vote Egg evolue d'une facon remarquable avec le pourcentage de la pooulation d'origine francaise; dans les Maritimes et dans l'Ontario, 1e meme phénoméne est sensible partout ou la population d'origine frangaise represents plus de lOZ de la p0pulation totale". 3Raw figures from Desmond Morton, Canada and War (Toronto, 1981), p. 118. 4Halifax Herald, April 28, 1942. 5House of Commons, Debates, July 6, 1942, IV: 3967. 6Doucet, "La Politique des Acadiens," in Les Acadiens des Mari- times, ed. Jean Daigle, p. 281. 7J. K. Johnson, The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967, pp. 332, 365, 470, and 585. 8Johnson, Directory of Parliament, appendix. 9based on election data in Report of General Election Officer, 20th General Election (1945). CHAPTER V The Acadian Response: Novels and Memories In this chapter more individual and personal responses to the cataclysmic events of World War II will be considered. Since the empha- sis on Acadian cultural revival is a phenomenon of the late twentieth century, chronicles of everyday Acadian life available to the reading public have only recently become available. These, like the reminis- cences related by interview respondents, are personal and usually color- ed by the immediate locale, suggesting that as regional differences may separate Quebecois from Acadian viewpoint, provincial borders may cause differences among Acadians even while emphasizing the similarities of the Acadian cultural heritage. Personal reminiscences are not totally reliable in obtaining his- torical validity. Intervening time, especially a period as long as for- ty years tends to blur memory. However, personal or literary reminis- cences of an event as monumental as World War II often contain at least a clue to the way things were at that time. For this reason, considera- tion has been given to the writings of Acadian authors concerning the war and to personal memories of Acadians who were living, as they them- selves frequently phrased it, "in those times." Acadian writers themselves have included references to World War II and the Acadian role in it in their writings. Most Acadian authors are aware of a somewhat limited audience for their writings, and address themselves very personally to it. Historians J. Henri Blanchard and 88 89 Georges Arsenault, for example, have written in great detail about the Acadians of Prince Edward Island. Their works are about and for the families and parishes on the Island and are remarkable for the intimate and personal tone. Among Nova Scotia Acadians, J. Alphonse Deveau and Neil Boucher have written extensively about the early Acadian settle- ments, the expulsion and the return of Acadians to that province. The best known Acadian fiction writer, Antonine Maillet, has produced a number of stories and books about "typical" Acadian characters. The greatest meaning and largest audience for her writing are among Acadian readers. Unlike the historians, she has created characters who live for Acadians because they embody the unique features formed by the Acadian cultural development. Her stories are built upon the lifestyle and values which every Acadian can recognize as belonging to his cousin, or great-grandfather, or neighbor's ancestor if not to himself. Her tongue- in-cheek comments on everyday Acadian life are generally accepted among Acadians as being valid, even if exaggerated for the sake of humor. Miss Maillet's best-known literary creation is La Sagouine, now known and acclaimed beyond the Acadian community. Using the Acadian reference to themselves as people connected with water, Miss Maillet described her charwoman heroine as "a scrubwoman, a woman of the sea, who was born with the century, with her feet in the water. . . .who ends up on all fours, with her bucket in front and her hands in the water." Although Miss Maillet has created other characters who also reflect Acadian qualities, La Sagouine is by far the best known due to a stage adaptation which starred Viola Leger in the title role. Trans- lation into English and filming for C.B.C. gave the character nation- wide exposure and contributed greatly to Miss Maillet's international 7 ‘ 7 7 ., 7 . 7 7 ,7 . . . 7 . 7 7 7 7 . 7 7 7 7, 7 . , 7 . 7 7 x _‘ , . .7 7 7 . 7 . 7 7 ~ . . v r . 7 7. -7 7 <7 7 7 r7. 7 .7 . 7 7 r. 7 7 7 777 _ \ 7 , 7. , .7 7 _ 7 ,7. ‘ 7 7 ‘ - v . s 7 7 7 .7. 7 7 7 e .7 r 7 7 V r L - . 7. ' ~ 7‘ . . , Y 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 7 7 7 ,7 . 7.. V. 7- . A 77 . 77 7 _ ,7 . 7 (7 7 7 77 7 . 7 - 7 7 7 7 7 . , _ 7 7 7 7 7 . 7 . 7 - 7 . , 7 . 77 7 A 7 , . 7 v . 7 .— 7 7 _ - .5 7 ‘ 7 . _. . _ . 7 . 7 Y . - .K 7 7 7‘ 7 . 7 . ' ' O 7 7 7 7 7 7 ‘ A 7 7 7. 7 7 . . 7 * - 7 v ~ " -. ‘ a - ' 7 7 7 ‘ 7. 7 - 7 ‘ r- 7. - - A 7 _ 7 7 7‘ 7- . .7 ,7 . -7 7‘ , —7 7 , 7 7 7 . . p 7 ,. I, , 7 , . . , . . 7 - - . 7 7 ,7 7 7 7 7 ,7 .— - - . .7 .7. . , 7 _ . 7 ,A ,-7 a 7 7 , 7 7 .— 7— ‘7 ‘7 7 ,7, 77 7 7 7 7 7 - 7 c . ‘ . _ 7 V 7. g A 7 - f‘ 7 r v r _ r ~ A ,- . 7 . .. 7, ~ A ~ r A ‘ I 7 - - ~ ,77 7 A ' m ‘ 7 ‘ ‘ ' — fl \ ' ’ ‘ 7 7 .7 A , 7 - . 7 7 7. .7 , 7 7 9O reputation. Bouctouche, New Brunswick, Miss Maillet's birthplace, claims to be "the birthplace of La Sagouine." In the book, Miss Maillet has devoted a chapter entitled "The War" to Sagouine's views of World War II and the effect that it had on her Acadian cronies. Her description of the welcome reception which the poverty-stricken Acadians gave to the regular income from soldiers' pay and allotment checks is verified by those who lived through the war years. In the chronically depressed Maritimes the "Great Depression" had played few favorites, so non-Acadians often described the same re- action. In the classic work, Sagouine calls the war "a good thing," because it arrived "just in the nick of time to.save us from poverty."1 Georges Arsenault provides several reasons why Acadians from Prince Edward Island were willing to serve, either as volunteers or as conscripts. He acknowledges the evidence of a patriotic spirit, but not as the only motive for enlisting. Some saw the opportunity for a regular paycheck, some joined the army to save the country, others to accompany friends who had already joined. Arsenault further suggests that family men who had acquired debts during the depression period volunteered in order to gain the opportunity to pay their debts.2 J. Henri Blanchard credited Prince Edward Island Acadians with enlisting in both wars: "In the two great World Wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945), the large number of Acadians of Prince Edward Island who enlisted for service has frequently been the cause of favorable comment."3 An informal memoir of the Nova Scotia region which deals with the period of World War II is B. . . was for Butter and Enemy Craft by Evelyn M. Richardson. Mrs. Richardson had earlier written a first-person account of the trials and tribulations, as well as the pleasures, of . 7 7 7. 7 ‘ . 7 . 7 7 7 - 7 7 T' ,7 ,77 - - 7 . 5 7 > A ' ‘ ' " "- ' ‘ r I ' 5 —\ ‘ ‘ ' . 7 7 ,- 7 7 7 7 7 7 r 7 t“ - 7 77 7 7 7 7‘ 7 t . 7 n . 7 7 ,7 7 7 7 — 7 A A 7 , V . . 7 7 7‘ 7 . ' r - - . 7 A ,7 - 77 .. - , 7 -~ - -\ 7 7 - 77 91 being a lighthouse keeper off the Nova Scotia coast in E3 Keep a_§igh£. In her second book Mrs. Richardson deals with the added duties and dan- gers which the light keepers endured during the war years. She makes reference to the Acadian response to the war by stating: "In contrast to the Quebec attitude one had only to read the Honour Roll in our 10- cal newspapers to know that the number of Acadian French enlisting and giving their lives was at least commensurate to their proportion of the population."4 One clear example of radical Opposition to conscription is found in a brief memoir by Aldea Duguay in the journal of a historical society named for the Acadian hero, Nicholas Denys. Duguay tells of efforts to escape overseas duty among residents of the tiny village of Duguayville, New Brunswick. The author cites by name and age seven informants who provided information for the article, but does ndt credit any particu- lar event to any named informant. No names are given for any of the adventures described. Several methods of avoiding conscription were described: going to sea, emigrating to the United States, self-mutila- tion, feigning mental illness, and hiding in the woods. Four cases were individually recounted, but again without naming the evader. One man supposedly hid in the woods, eating only the rabbits he could trap. Another who could stand isolation no longer came out of hiding only to be immediately conscripted. A third man was married only a week before he was conscripted and never returned. The most radical story was the encounter of a man whose wife cut off his fingers to prevent his con- scription.5 The seven informants for the unnoted article would have been aged, at the time of the plebiscite, 10, 17, 35, 38, 43, and 49 years. Personal interviews which were conducted during June and July 7 7. 7 7 7 7 7 ‘ 7 . 7 77. 7 7 . ,7 . 77 ‘ 7 ~ _ . -7 7 7 . - . .7 7 7 . 77 7 77 « 7 7 . 7 , 7 7. 7 7 7 7 . 7 7 7 77‘ 7 7 7 m 7 7 h ‘ . 7 7 7 - 77 7 - 7 7 7 7 -- 77 . 7 7 - r\ - 7' 7 . r 7 ‘ ‘ 7 a - ,. - 7, a 7 I - m — 7 7 - h A f . . H - ‘ .- 7 7 ‘7 . _ 7 7 - , .7 7 ,- 7 7 7. 7 ,- 7 7 . . _ 7 A ' . 1‘ - - r» ' ' rs I“ 7 7 7 a .7 — A ' ‘ . ' > ~ : 7 V. 7 '—\ “ ' A 2' ~ ' " A . - ’ ’ ' ‘ ‘ ’\ 77 7 77 7 - r7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 .7 7 - 7 7 a 7 7 - ~.-— , 77 7. 7 7. . . 7 77 7 77 . 7, 7 .7 7 77 7 7 7. 7 '7 _ ,7. 7— A ‘ V , 7 7 7 7 7 . ‘ _ ‘_ 7 . 7 7 ' 7 , ’ , . 7. ‘1 ' .7 - 7 ‘ . . - 7 7 77 , a 7 7 ' 7 .' ‘ 7 7 7 77. - . 7 7 .- 7 7 7 .. 7 . 7 7— . 7 7 7 ‘ A 7 77 V 7 7 V 7 7 7 .7 . . 7 7 7: 7 _ - - - 7 7‘ 77 7 r 7 m 7 .7 r 7 ‘ —— 7 7 . 7 r — 7 ‘ ‘ r . a 7 - 7 ~ 7 a 7. 7 : 7 « 7 ' 7 ,— 7 . 7.7 , 7 . . 7 A 7 . .7 7 ,. 7 - A 7 ,7‘ 7 . . ‘ 7 7 . . ' 7 7 r . p. 7 - 7 . 7 7 _, . 7 7 7 77 * 7 V . - 7. r7 v - r- - . r- V - 7 r ‘ 7- 7 7 7 7 7 ~ . 7 r. 7 7. A - 7 '- ~'~ m 7 . - - V ‘ 7 - A - , V - 7 — - -' p , < 7 7‘ '7. V .7 — ' * - I - . r - 7 r - 7 m P‘ - - , -- . 7 z- ‘ - I 7 .. a 777 - 7 — fix 7 A 7 7 7‘ 7 7 . ,- 7 7 7 A I ~ , 7 .- 7 ,7 .7 77 . . 7 7 7 — 7 . 7 7 . .7 7 ’7 7- 7 7 - 7. 7 - ,7 . - p 7 . a ‘ 7 7 7 f 7 ‘ .r' 7 V . 7 7- . 7 ' . _ I 7 A r , 7 7 p , ~ r - - 7 - ~ » - . . 7. 7 92 of 1982 among a chance selection of Acadian and non-Acadian residents of the Maritime provinces tended to discount the Duguayville episode as highly unusual. In general, informants among English and French descend- ed Canadians were more able to discuss the war years in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island than in New Brunswick. Most New Brunswick respon- dents remembered little about the war years, while in the other two pro- vinces specific instances and personal experiences were related quite willingly. Whatever the underlying reasons, the personal interviews contained far more information relating to the Acadian populations of Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. Of English-descended and French- descended respondents who had recollections of the war years, none cited any memory of conscription as a major issue. When asked to describe the war years as they remembered them, respondents told of the rationing of various commodities, the difficulties of transportation, the crowded housing conditions when industries assumed wartime production schedules, community activities to entertain servicemen, friends and relatives who served in the military, and the threat of enemy activities in the vicin- ity. Some mentioned the trauma of losing loved ones and several dis- played medals or letters of commendation which had been received by the surviving family. Acadian and non-Acadian informants were equally dim when questioned specifically about the conscription issue. None remem- bered the exact question of the 1942 plebiscite, but recalled it as a vote on whether to have conscription. Replies to the question of con- scription resistance were very universal in affirming that they did not remember any opposition to conscription in the Maritime provinces. "None here," was often the answer, "you need to talk to people in Que- bec." When confronted with the plebiscite voting percentages which 7 r. ~I - . ~ ’ " . ‘ ‘ ’ ” ' ' " .7, 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 -‘ . A _ 7 7 . 77 7 ‘ . 7‘ f' 7 ,. I . 7 V V 7 7 7 A . 7 _ 7‘ . 7 . - . 7’ , I 7 7 ‘ 77 7— - 7 7 7 7 ,7 7 ‘ A r 7 _ . . 7 7 . - 7- 7 7 V 7 7‘ , n 7 7 7 7 7 7 7. I ‘ 77 I 7 — 77 7 7‘ I 7 . ,. 7 , 77‘ I 7 7 — 7 .7 . .7 7. 7 7 7 7 . 7 77‘ 7 .— 7, 77 7 I7 7 7 7 7 7 r ,- . p. 7 - .7- 7 7 ,7 _ »-\ - . _ f‘ 7 7 7 7 7. 7 .- 77 ‘ r _ 7 , 7 7 7‘ ,7_ 7 ' 7 . A . 7 . - . 7 . A — 7 . 7 7 - ,- p. 7 7 7 7 7 7 I 7 A - 7. ., 7’ 7. 7 7 I ‘ \ a 7 7 7 ‘ 7 - ~ . ,— 7 . 7 , A . - - 7. ,7‘ 7 ,7 F , - - 7 . ,. ,. ‘ 77 . ,7 A ’7 . . , 7 -7 7 f .. 7 7 7 .. I I 7 .7 ‘ - -. 7’- r - rs 7' 7 - ‘ 1 "" \ 7 7 -- 77‘ .7 .7 7 - ,7 7 . 7.. . 77 — I 77 7 7 .— 7- ,7 .— . 7 , 7' ,7 7 77 7 7 a 7 7‘ -V 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 v 7 - ~ .7. . - . I — I . | I . 7 7. 7 . 7 7 7 7 7‘ 7 7 7 7 7 . I . 7 7 - I n m 7 n. 7 ‘ 7 7 - . ’x .‘ - m r - Y - 7 7 7. 7 . 7 , r . - , .— 7 _ 7 7 7 77 ‘ - 7 7 I 7 r\ 7 - . - A 77 7 7 93 indicated more Acadian opposition than non-Acadian, the usual reaction was skepticism among both groups. It was often tactfully suggested that (l) the figures were not accurate, or (2) this was some kind of prOpa- ganda disseminated by Quebec militants to discredit Acadians and dis- rupt the rapport among Maritime people. One English-Canadian lady of- fered the suggestion that "in this area [Rent County, New Brunswick] the Indians are the problem, not the French. The French have never caused us a minute's worry."6 Several veterans responded that there was no thought among Aca- dians of trying to escape the service, but a high instance of Voluntary enlistment. One former officer, a non-Acadian from Prince Edward Island, was of the opinion that a few men tried to avoid service by turning to agriculture or to other protected fields, but he strongly emphasized that those persons were more likely to be of English background than of French.7 A younger Acadian, very active in the current drive for re- vival of Acadian culture, stated that he had observed among the Acadians a great pride toward those who had served in the armed forces. He de- scribed this pride as being close to the reverential attitude exhibited toward those who chose a religious vocation.8 Other active Acadian leaders credited the Acadian willingness to participate in World War II military to a "British mentality" caused by the assimilation into an English-dominated society. There was little indication that anyone in 1982 would have expected the Acadians to have acted differently during the war years than they did. The attitude was prevalent in 1982 that Acadians, as Maritimers, had a very different view of World War II than did persons in Quebec. An Acadian college 94 student, whose father and uncle had both enlisted in the Prince Edward Island Highlanders, observed: "We're a lot different from the fellows in Quebec."9 A veteran in Nova Scotia, who had trained in a Quebec unit be- cause he was Francophone, told of being "embarassed" by the attitude of Quebec civilians toward British and English-Canadian soldiers.10 Others, both Acadian and non-Acadian, expressed the opinion that there was some basis for anti-British feeling because of the superior attitude which British soldiers, training in Canada, displayed towards Canadians. This would have been especially evident, and especially distasteful, in Quebec. War memorials bear out the high instance of Acadian military service. In some instances, the actual memorials are parish memorials erected in the Roman Catholic churchyard. In other instances, the com- munity memorials bear names of Acadian origin in a ratio roughly equi- valent to the Acadian percentage of the community's population. In Acadian museums, which are to be found in all three Maritime provinces, there are indications of an existing pride in having served in World War II. Men have donated items carried home as souvenirs¢-~ captured battle flags, enemy weapons, and uniform items. Families of deceased servicemen or veterans have given medals, citations, and uni- form issue to be placed on public display. Many Maritimers, being oriented to the sea, preferred to serve in the naval forces. Since there were no Francophone units, this option was available only to bilingual or Anglophone Acadians, and many took this opportunity. No informants were located who remembered the New Brunswick 7 4 7 O 7, 7 7 ,7 7 7 \ 7 7 , .7 7 7 7 ,7 . 77 77\ .7 77 77 . 7 7‘ .7 A ‘ . ,_ , .7 _ . 95 Acadians who had served as deputies in Ottawa during the war. In the Nova Scotia riding of ShelburneeYarmouth-Clare, however, Vincent-Joseph Pottier was remembered. If his lack of outspoken opposition to the con- scription issue was not popular with his constituents, there is no evi- dence of dissatisfaction remaining. Many of those who remember him cited evidence of his provincial activities rather than his service in Ottawa. Frequently he was called "Judge Pottier," apparently due to ~his service on the provincial supreme court. Several respondents com- mented on his part in the reform of provincial school administration and consolidation. His brother, Philip Pottier, still resides in Belle- ville, Nova Scotia, and in a personal conversation he stated that he had no knowledge of any controversy over his brother's support for the King government's position. In reply to a direct question about the amount of negative reaction caused by his brother's votes, Philip Pottier stated with emphasis: "I don't remember hearing anything at all about it--not anything at all!"11 Another informant who remembered Pottier's years in Ottawa con- fessed to being a Progressive Conservative with a high regard for James Marvin Walker, Pottier's opponent in 1940. Concerning Pottier, she had respect for his actions and said: "Vince Pottier was a good man and an honest one and I believe he always acted in the best interest of the people he represented--and I mean all of them, French, English, Black, or anything else."12 The overall impression gained from personal interviews in all three Maritime provinces was that, in general, the Acadian attitude toward conscription differed little from non-Acadians. Conscription never became a major issue, in the minds of present day residents, - ' 7 > > . 7- 7 . x . N 7 o 7 u ' “ 7 . 7 . 7. ‘ 7 7 A .7 . . 7 . 7 7. 7 .\ 7 77 , , 7 7 7 . 7 .7 ,7 7 7 7 7 - v 7 I ' ‘ v 7 7 . r 77 r .— . 7 77‘ . - 7 H , , n . g 7 7 7‘ 7 77 . ,- 7 7 7 _. 7 . 7 7 A 7 7 ‘ fl 7 7 . 7 7 7 7 ‘ 7 .7 7 7 7 7 7 ,7 7 7 7 . \ 7 7 r 7 7 7 7 r 7. , . 7 _ c . 7 7 ‘ 7 . A 7 7 7 .. . . , - - - 7 7 7 7 _ 7‘ . 7 7 7 7 7 5 ‘ r, - — 7 - .— 7 A - ~ ' - a .7 - r 7 f r , - r. .— 7 .7 . _ :- A 7 ._ A fl 7 7 , (7— 7 7 ~ ,— 7 — f 7 77 . , 7 . 77 ,7 o a 7 , , 7 ~ 7 . r r- w r » .7 7 7 96 because by 1944 when the necessity of conscription for overseas service finally became a reality, there was virtually no able man left in the Maritimes to be conscripted. Those who could enlist had already done so. Those who hadn't enlisted were unfit to serve in any case. The possibility that such personal recollections are not com- pletely valid cannot be ignored. However, the widespread uniformity of opinion across language lines and provincial borders does indicate that in 1982 there were certainly no residual animosities from 1942. More than thirty interviews conducted among Acadians and non-Acadians in all three provinces corroborated the impression given by the quotations in this chapter: World War II was a nasty affair which required the co-operative efforts of the population and we did our part. 97 NOTES 1Antonine Maillet, La Sagouine (trans. Luis de Cespedes) (Toronto, 1979), p. 101. 2Georges Arsenault, Histoire gs l'émigration chez les Acadiens .dg L'Ile-dg-Prince-Edouard (Summerside, P.E.I., 1980), pp. 33-34. Original French: "L'esprit de patriotisme et la conscription ne furent pas les seuls motifs qui ont incite toutes ces personnes 5 s'enr81er. Pour certains la guerre symbolisait un emploi, un chéque de solde; pour d'autres c'était l'occasion de 'découvrir du pays,‘ ou encore pour suivre les amis qui partaient en grand nombre. Meme des péres de famille, endettés pendant la crise économique, se sont inscrits dans les forces armées y voyant la chance de payer leurs dettes." 3J. Henri Blanchard, The Acadians gprrince Edward Island, 1720- 1964 (Charlottetown, P.E.I., 1964), p. 141. 4Evelyn M. Richardson, B. . . was for Butter and Enemy Craft (Halifax, 1976), p. 113. SAldea Duguay, "La Conscription," Lg Revue d'Histoire d__l_ Societe Historique Nicolas Denys II, 2 (1974): 11-13. 6Interview with Gladys Warman, farm wife in Kent County, New Brunswick, June 20, 1982. 7Interview with James Hogan, Canadian Legion Officer in Summerside, Prince Edward Island, July 5, 1982. 8Interview with Donaldo Arsenault, office of Secretary of State of Canada, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, July 2, 1982. 9Interview with Peter Richard, Summerside, Prince Edward Island, July 2, 1982. 10Interview with Alfred B. d'Entremont, West Pubnico, Nova Scotia, June 26, 1982. 11Interview with Philip Pottier, at his daughter's home in Tusket, Nova Scotia, June 17, 1982. ' 12Interview with Olive Mackenzie, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, June 26, 1982. \7 \ 7 7 . ‘ . \ 7 A 7 7 7 - 7 V 7 7 7 - ~ 0 A . . . 7 ‘ n 7 L, ’ t f > . . , . . . 7 7 . - 7 . - 7 - . 7. q - 7 .— . . '7 ‘ . H _ .— . , ' u H 7 7 7 . .7 , —‘ A 7 . n. q .7 . r . v . / 7 .. 7 CHAPTER VI Assessment Differences of attitude toward conscription certainly existed in Canada during World War II. The obvious difference between Canadians of English descent and Canadians of French descent is well documented and has been widely studied. Angers suggested, and presented statistical data to validate, that the cleavage was not just between English and French, but between English and non—English. The information and data gathered for this study indicates that in addition to these previously discussed differences, there were differences of opinion between Cana- dians of French descent. These differences were largely regional in origin, and at least partially due to geographical location and socio- logical variances among the French pepulations. The difference in at- titude between Maritime Acadians and Quebecois toward the conscription issue may be no greater than their differences on other topics. Al- though both are of French descent, different sociological forces have caused each to develop a very distinct cultural viewpoint. One reason suggested for the Acadian compliance during World War II was "our British mentality, caused by living in a British me- "1 lange. This description of the Acadian position is very accurate and an excellent example of the way in which Lg Grand Dérangement created their unique vieWpoint. Returning from the expulsion, the Acadians had no Opportunity to develop in the tightly-bound, self-contained isolation of Quebec. Rather, they became a part of, instead of apart from, 98 7 . 7» 7 7 7 . . — . 7 . 7 . - ‘ . > r ,_ 7 7 7 7 77 7 7 . 7 , 7 — 7 . 7 7 7 7 , .7 .7 . 7 r- .p, .7 . 777 . 7 . o o . , 7 . 7 , . 7 7 7 . ,— 7 . 7 7 7 . T 4 ' 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 , u 7 A - 7 7 . . 77 7 7 7‘ 7 7 7 7 7 7, 7 ‘ 7 7 - . . 7 7 - 7 7 7 . 7 A 7 ' . . i 7 - 7 . 7 7 . . ,7 .. .7. ,_ 7‘ ,7 7 . ‘ I - . . 7- 77 7. 7 7 7 ,7 a 7 . . 7 7» . 7 1 I 7 7 7 , 7 7 . 7 . 7 ,7 7 s . . . . ‘ 7 7 7. 7 7 . 7 7 7 7 , ,7 .7 7 7 . .7 ’ ' - .7 7 7 7 A. - , 7 7 . , .7 7 7 . 7 1 7 . . _ .7 l ,7 ,7 ,. > . ,7 _ . .7 ,_\ . 7 ,7 7 . ' 7 y ‘ . . . 7 . , . .. , ,7 7 _..7 . 7 7 7 77 7 .. 77 ,. 7 7- 7 N , 7 7 7 7 7. 7 ,7. 7 7 _ - . 7 . 7 ' 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ‘ . . 7 7 ,T7 7 7 . 7 7 ‘ \ ‘ ‘ . ' 7 7 7 7 . 7 ‘ 7 ‘. r 7 ,7 7 7 . ‘ 99 neighboring societies. For communication bilingualism was a necessity. As a result, the French language declined in use until the decade of the 19708. Instruction in schools in the Maritime provinces was often only in English, although in some places some teaching was in French. The necessity of co-operation is a part of Maritime life accor- ding to those who live there. The success of such co-operative ventures as the fisheries in Prince Edward Island or the grocery co-operatives throughout the Maritime provinces should be no surprise. One informant spoke of the "inborn feeling for coooeration" among Acadians, and noted that cooperatives and credit unions which originate and flourish in Acadian areas are not limited to Acadian membership.2 Such willingness to cooperate stems in part from economic depri- vation, and the Maritimes have been a chronically depressed area since Confederation. In such areas of chronic depression emigration is al- ways observed and Acadians were no exception. During the unusually dif- ficult period of the Great Depression, many Acadians left to go West in Canada and South to the United States. Bilingualism gave them a greater choice of destination than departing Quebecois. As a result, contacts with a variety of outside sources lessened the parochialism of the Aca- dians' view. The hard times of the depression years made enlistment into the service more attractive than it otherwise might have been. A veteran of five years overseas service explained: I went just like everybody else. Nobody had any money-- maybe the French had less, I don't know--there wasn't any money around. The war came along and it army service was a paycheck for a job that somebody had to do. gut here [Prince Edward Island] we didn't figure it was an English war or a Frengh war or an Amer- ican war. Hitler had to be stopped, so we went. In addition, there had grown up a pride among many Acadian fami- lies concerning military service. A veteran's widow displayed that 100 pride in exhibiting her husband's medals, citations, pictures, and uni- form regimental badges. She related that he had enlisted in both wars, but being a family man and past combat age served only in the Home De- fence during the second war. She recalled that while he was training in Quebec she had visited him there, and verified that a different atti- tude towards the military existed in that province. "I could feel their antagonism toward that uniform," she stated. Community pride in those who had served in the first World War was also an incentive to the men of 1940. In addition to the youthful enthusiasm often felt for military ventures, the appeal of the uniform, and the excitement as compared to the drabness of Depression Era life, the long lists displayed in every community on "honour roll" memorials motivated the younger generation to again honor the family name. Throughout the Maritimes such memorials are found with two separate tab- lets, often the 1939-45 list having been attached to the earlier erected 1914-18 monument. In Acadian areas, recognizable Acadian surnames are evident in good proportion to the number of families in the community.5 Regional pride in the enlistment records of the Maritime pro- vinces was displayed by both Anglophone and Francophone residents during the war years. English language and French language newspapers consis- tently gave prominent space to stories of statistics which showed en- listments in Maritime areas to be higher than other regions. As noted, in Parliament both Acadian and non-Acadian representatives of Maritime ridings, from both Liberal and Progressive Conservative benches, com- mented on the high enlistment percentages from those provinces and at- tested to the Acadian willingness to serve. Another aspect of Acadian life which played an important part in 101 their acceptance of the necessity of conscription was their nearly total familiarity with English and the historic lack of contact with Quebec and the culture of "New France." A former school teacher in Nova Sco- tia related that during the war years "due to poor radio and no televi- sion, of course, we had little contact with Quebec. But we knew every day what was going on in Halifax!"6 Things going on in Halifax at that point were indeed frighten- ing. The entire coast of Nova Scotia, in fact, was greatly affected by the proximity to the fighting. The media carried reports Of the submarine activity, vessels torpedoed, wreckage found, and victims rescued from life boats. The sinking of the ferry "Caribou" linking Nova Scotia with Newfoundland on October 14, 1942, particularly shocked and frightened Maritime residents. Inhabitants of coastal areas south of Yarmouth were sometimes able to hear gunfire from invisible off- shore encounters between Nazi submarines and Allied coastal defense vessels.7 In addition, rumors of enemy activities spread rapidly between and among Acadians and other Maritime residents. The landing of spies and saboteurs was a widespread fear. According to an informant near Caraquet, New Brunswick, it was common knowledge that German submarines were active in Baie des Chaleurs, and at least once agents were landed in that area.8 In Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, two Germans who aroused the suspicions of a theatre ticket clerk were allegedly apprehended and ad- mitted having been put ashore from a submarine.9 An officer of the Re- serve batallion of the West Nova Scotia Regiment has recorded that: "Its greatest utility came in the year 1942 when German submarines in- fested the coast and (on the American side of the line) landed parties , ~ A, , ,. , x ,_ , ,. . - , - r‘ I m V , - . , A . . , - o . , , - A . -‘ . , t - ‘ , . s r . _. — . , 7 - u s * - ‘ N ’ ' ‘ ' . . i 7 . a . ,- r A ,, .c . u . . r . , . ,. . .. . __ a 7 . ,— h > - ‘7 ,., . _ h 7 7 r- . A . - . _ - A n , - r. - .— - A ,—. , A r n - . H . , , _ Y . . r. - r —. e .- n r .- , - - - . ~' _. ~ a . 102 of saboteurs."10 Although documented landings have not been discovered, recent disclosures of evidence that Nazi submarines had erected weather stations in the fjords of Newfoundland make the fears of 1942 more understandable.11 The schools were also utilized to disseminate information con- cerning war aims and citizens' duties to children and adults alike. An example of this kind of activity was included in the report of the school inspector from an Acadian region of Nova Scotia in 1943: The National Film Board co-operating with the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship established a circuit in the district of Argyle, comprising Wedgeport, Tusket, the Argyles and Pubnicos with the object of dissemination infor- mation about the war effort and democracy. In addition, films on health and social problems were shown. Two shows with sound pictures were shown once a month in each centre, one in the afternoon for children and the other in the evening for adults. From an educational standpoint, these programs were of great value to the public, especially to the people from remote areas. The potential of damage to fishing grounds or equipment due to the naval activities was never far from Acadian minds, either. "Being people of the sea," an informant claimed, "We had more to lose than the farmers--our boats, our wharves, the fish themselves!"13 Historically at least two other contributing factors must be considered in assessing the lack of Acadian opposition to conscription. The traditional attitude of Acadians has been that of a neutral, rather passive, non-controversial member of society. A newspaperman described the Acadians as "much more docile" than Quebecois.14 A government offi- cial stated that the Acadian "likes to blend into the crowd, not be dif- ferent."15 A librarian was of the Opinion that Acadians "always look for a neutral corner to avoid any controversy."16 Very difficult to assess is another historical aspect which 103 differs greatly between Quebecois and Acadian: the role of the church and religious leaders. The greater leadership exercised by the laity during the period of expulsion plus the number of Acadian parishes ser- ved by Irish or Scottish priests tended to diminish the influence of the priest as community leader. The Acadians were never counselled to take upon themselves the "mission" of preserving their language and culture as were the Quebecois. Although Irish and Scottish Anglophone priests did not become dominant in every aspect of life as in Quebec, they may have been partially responsible for the cohesiveness among Acadian Roman Catholics. In some instances, at least, an Irish or Scottish parish priest could serve the peoples' spiritual needs by celebrating Mass in Latin and attending to the obvious affairs of the parish in English, but the laity could keep the priest "in the dark" concerning financial 17 There or social affairs by conversing in French about those things. are also parish histories which describe warm regard between Irish or Scottish priests and Acadian parishoners.18 Some parish histories docu- ment aid given to Acadian parishes by Irish Bishops and even, in some cases, by clergy of the Church of England.19 The preference for the Liberal party by Acadian voters, as by Quebecois, was encouraged by priests who told the people during the 19203 and 19303 "that a vote for the 'Tories' was a vote for Protestan- "20 There is, however, little available evidence to indicate anti- tism. conscription direction from any Roman Catholic leaders in the Maritimes, whether Acadian, Scottish, Irish, or English. 0n the contrary, news- paper articles describe parish activities in Acadian parishes which con- tributed greatly to the war effort as well as to war relief efforts for England and France. The only activity directly related to the issue of . 7 . 7 7 ‘ . 7 7 7 7 7 t 7‘ . ,.7 ‘ , 7 7 _ , . , 7 . , 7 ,7 7 A 77 7 7 - 7 ,7 .. . V. ,7 . 7. . . ‘ ~ . V 7 . 7‘ 77 7 —. 7 7 7 7 7‘ . .7 7 V. 7 7 — » 7 , A 7 ,7 7 - *- ) 7 * - , ' x A . r 7 ' ‘ u r — . o, - — . r. — — - , ~. — 7‘ -r~ — ' I 7 _ < i i 7 7 . ,7. ‘7 r 7. 7 A ‘7 ,7 7 n 7 7 7 7 . . 7 . . 7‘ —, 7 7 - \ _ . _ _ .. _ . 7 7. . 7 7_ 7- 7 . . 7 7 7 _ 7 ‘ ,. 7 7 7 . _ 7 7 7 ‘ . . ,7 , . _ . 7-. . 7 . 7‘ 7 7 7 - 7 . , , A 7 I . . 7- A 7, 7, . 7 ,7 7 7 7 7 r - - n . , . — , - — - - , 7g . — .. . . 7 7‘ « .. . _ . - 77 7 7 , h _ 7‘ . . . . ,_ . 7 7 . ‘7 ‘ 7 7 7, 7. 7 7 ,7 7 7 . . . - 7 7 r 7 . . . __ .. — v _ - 7. —. 7 _., . 7 ., 7 . . . 7 7 . . . . .7 . , 7. 7 7 7 . _ ,_ _ m ‘ . ,. 7 7 7 . . _ 7 7 A 7 , ‘_ . 7 -7 7 7 7 , 7 7 . _ . 7' . A 7 , . ‘ 7 h 7 7‘ . ,7 7 . .‘ , 7 7 _ . . ,_ 77 . - 7 7 l 7 l 104 conscription was a debate held at St. Joseph University, at Mermamcook, New Brunswick, on March 19, 1942. An evening program, attended by a large number of students and adults, witnessed the debate over the quesa tion: "Le Canada, doit-il adOpter la conscription pour service militaire outre-mer?" The affirmative team was declared to be the winner.21 Archbishop Robichaud of Moncton, himself of Acadian extraction, made frequent appeals to the people to participate in loan drives and other civilian efforts, to avoid drunkenness and carousing which would cause missed work days, and to attend to daily prayers for those engaged in battle. In a radio address in 1943, the ArchbishOp declared that the causes of the war were inhumane capitalism, atheistic communism, and neo-paganism. He further stated that the war was a scourge from God intended to cause conversion of the people and would have, in God's providential design, the result of rendering a more humane and Christian order of things in this sinful world.22 Two military veterans credited the Acadians with a traditionally higher level of Canadian identity than most Quebecois. An English de- scended officer of the Canadian Legion of Prince Edward Island volun- ' perhaps, teered the opinion that "Acadians were more 'Canada-conscious, than some of the English speaking soldiers, and certainly more than the guys--even the volunteers--from Quebec."23 An Acadian veteran in Nova Scotia proudly claimed that Acadians had felt differently about the war because "we are true Canadians." His reasoning was that the Acadians had struggled to return to the Maritimes "from the States, from Europe, from Quebec, from all over." In his Opinion, the Quebecois would have never made the effort had they been expelled after the Conquest. 105 Because of this difference, he declared, "Acadians will never be separatists because Canada is our country."24 Opinions why the Acadians expressed less hostility to serving in the war are many and varied. The differences in attitude among the Acadians themselves must also be considered. The voting records on the plebiscite issue indicate opposition to mandatory overseas service in Acadian areas, but at different levels. In New Brunswick, the ridings of Restigouche-Madawaska, Gloucester, and Kent all registered a "no" majority vote, and the other Acadian ridings had a larger "no" vote than was recorded in the province generally. And the stories of radical resistance in Duguayville cannot be overlooked. While this indicates less resistance than in Quebec, two additional questions, perhaps rela- ted, are raised for investigation: (1) In view of all the evidence and testimony pointing to Acadian loyalty and devotion to Canada, why was there any objection to mandatory conscription, and (2) Why was there a higher level of objection in the New Brunswick ridings than in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island? Superficially the questions can both be answered simply with attributing the opposition to the influence of Quebec, and there is cer- tainly some validity to such a view. However, closer study provides additional reasons. The Opposition to conscription among both Acadians and Quebecois was partially a fact of being Francophone. While Acadians were largely bilingual, many felt more comfortable dealing with French. Military ser- vice for some of these men meant either the discomfort and potential danger of serving in an Anglophone unit commanded by Anglophone officers, or the discomfort of serving in a Quebec unit with those whose language _ 7‘ . 7 a 7 7 1% ~ 7 — .. .. .7. ~ A . fi _ 7 f' 106 and culture, although French, was quite different. Late in 1940, bi- lingual training facilities were established for men from Restigouche- Madawaska, Gloucester, and Northumberland counties in New Brunswick. However, La_Voix d'Evangeline noted quite quickly that this left Acadians in Kent, Victoria, and Westmoreland counties to be trained at Fredericton, and did nothing for those in Nova Scotia or Prince Edward Island.25 All during the war years the newspaper evidenced a pride in pointing to Acadian backgrounds of officers who assumed command of An- glophone units, but still continually questioned why no all-Acadian units were ever created in any branch of service.26 The lack of bi- lingual training facilities and active units was certainly a deterrent to approval of mandatory overseas service. Another point against mandatory service, in the attitude of many Acadians, was the pride in military service which was mentioned earlier. With the Maritime provinces, especially Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island leading all other regions in voluntary recruits, many Acadians saw no reason why reluctant conscripts should be sent to over- seas duty. While firmly desiring that ample reserves be ready to re- lieve those units already engaged in combat, Acadians generally believed that encouraging enlistments produced better quality soldiers than mandatory conscription ever would. There was, throughout the Maritimes as a whole, the belief that all the men who could be had been or would be enlisted. Conscripted men would be physically or mentally deficient in some way.27 So many potential volunteers among the Acadians were rejected due to poor nutrition and lack of physical conditioning that discussions of this fact were brought to the floor of Commons before the 28 Americans had entered the war. Conscription would force this 107 embarassment upon many who, aware of their deficiencies, avoided the recruitment office. These reasonings, as well as the traditional anti-English war arguments, were naturally more widespread and evident in the regions geographically closer to the Quebec border. The highest percentage of "no" votes are in the closest proximity to Quebec. But, in addition to the frequently mentioned media influences, the lifestyle similarities must be considered. Madawaska and Restigouche counties, along with parts of Kent and Gloucester, are nOt Sea-oriented, but lumbering or farming areas as in Quebec. Duguayville, seat of the resistance de- scribed by Andre Duguay, is located thirty miles from the coast, and sawmills and logging operations are very evident with no boats or fish- ing apparatus apparent.29 Bathurst is about 60 miles northeast and Caraquet 40 miles north. Influxes of emigrants from Quebec have taken place periodically, especially during times of economic hard- ship.30 The Acadian Centre at University of Moncton acknowledges great difficulty in differentiating between Francophones Of Acadian and Quebec heritage in those counties.31 In addition, there are in the region families of Acadian heritage who lived for several decades in Quebed before re-emigrating to the Maritime region. For these reasons, the opposition element in Quebec would have more effect through family ties and laboring association in these adjacent regions. Figures 3-5 indicate the time frame for the re—settlement of the Acadian areas.32 The fact that persons in the coastal areas had returned up to a century before those in the inland settlements could significant- ly affect their views toward neighboring groups. This return was a gra- dual affair. Three identifiable phases of resettlement are: 1769-1815; . 7 7 7 \ - 7. ' _. - , — ’ . o. - n - - . , 77 ‘ 7 7 . 7 - 7 7 r 7 - 7 , . ‘ ‘ ‘7 . _ 77 7. 7 7 7 7 7 7 . .7 7 7 7 . r 7 7 77 7 . 7 _ 7 77 7 \ 7 - 7 7. . 7 . , 7 ‘ 7 7 7 7 r 7 7 7 7 7‘ 7 , A - 7. 7‘ 7, 7 7 77x . - «7 7. . . - . 7 . . — - 7 . . ,7 7 7. 7 . 7 7 7 7‘ .7. - 7. 7: c ,7. 7 7 , 7. 7 7 ' . _ 7 7 7. - 7 7. 7. 7. . . 7 fl _ . -_ , , ‘. 7 , 7 . 7 . ,7, 7. 7 . 7 7 I V , > . 7 n 7 7 7 7 7 — - 7 , 7. - 7 7 .7. _ .7 7. -7 77 . . ‘ ' - , . 7 .7 - ,— 7 7 r, 7 77 7 . 7. 7 7. 77 7 . . . . . 7 7 , 7. . 7 7 . 7 77 ,7, 7. 7 7 7 .. 7 7 I 7 7 -. . , 7 1 ‘ ‘ . 7 ‘ 7- . 7. ‘7 ,7 7 . . , 7 . a . . A .. ' ' a . . . 7. 7 7. _ 7 7 - 7. 7 7 ‘7 7. 7, 7‘ 7 7, . 7 7 7 , . 7 7 . ‘ - - - — 7 .. 7. 71 ~' . 108 1815-1867; and post-1867. The first phase was largely the return of those Acadians who had escaped expulsion by hiding out in the woods, then those who returned from the States prior to the end of the Napole- onic Wars. The second phase is mainly from the States and from Europe. Phase three is made up mostly of those moving out from the originally resettled areas and forming new parishes. All three provinces had most immigration during phase one. Nearly all of the Acadian areas of Prince Edward Island were es- tablished during the early phase and, significantly, most were in Prince County. In Nova Scotia the Clare and Yarmouth areas were the site of the earliest settlements as well as the expanding ones. In New Bruns- wick it is interesting to note that the Phase I settlements were the coastal settlements while those which were located inland were mostly established since Confederation. The geographical location in New Brunswick tended to remove large segments of the Acadians from the influence and fear of wartime activity which was especially strong in Nova Scotia. Although enemy agents were suspected along the coast of Baie des Chaleurs, the fish- ermen there had few fears of their equipment and grounds being damaged by battle. Similarly, floating wreckage, sounds of battle, and rescue vessels were far removed from the New Brunswick Acadians. Differences of attitude among Acadians, then, seem to be attri- butable to the chance of geographic location. Certainly no Acadian wanted conscripted men to be sent overseas. No Acadian member of Par- liament wanted to vote for such a measure. No Acadian newspaper urged such action. Yet they obeyed the law without significant objection. Perhaps they had a greater respect for authority than did the Quebecois, 7 — - r . 109 0H ~527me . maven; AmeH-oonc Manama"; mamoa \VWRSW. m‘ .973“ Wk. e 2:3. 78$ See 7858 / ha cowuwNfiGOHounwu H wmusmunm $5on 210877.77. 57g: . Q . u \QQQ E8523 3‘: 7.. mam? \m\ .3ch 110 0H onocwao .wwwmo<.u mmHu¢ Eoum sump “momsow .0 @777. “.maow Anowaumawav mcmfivmo< An coaunnacoHoouwu HH omwsmuue MMbOHm nu $301.75 EQJUOQt<7U .\ .0." msocmHa 70:23.3“... wwHuw Eon—w Numb "mogOm kob‘k Vx Musswgfiotm, Wvflxg‘btfi 1 ‘ \ u AV m 6 NW 0 / inx vb? WQoWfi: v.73: 3‘me 3.6 1‘“ NW‘UM :2: .783 232.3. // .3 7633.77.38-..“ H: gunnim $5on 112 as some claim.33 Perhaps, as others insist, the fact of their numerical inferiority to other groups made them too docile to object. In Prince Edward Island, although Acadian population had increased by 1.37 times from 1871 to 1941, they still represented only 15.6% of the population. Nova Scotia Acadians had increased 2.02 times, but were only 11.5% of all Nova Scotians. Even in New Brunswick, with an increase of 3.65 times in 60 years, the percentage of pOpulation was only 357..34 Bilingualism had an immeasurable impact on Acadian attitudes through the war years, as it had throughout the past decades. The abil- ity to understand the English version as well as French removed the sus- picion that often existed when communications were done through trans- lators. Listening to addresses delivered in English, or reading Eng- lish newspaper accounts was more informative when the subtleties or inuendoes which could accompany translation was removed from considera- tion. For this reason, the Acadian enjoyed a more comfortable position vis-a-vis his Anglophone neighbors than did the Quebecois. In addition, the Acadians enjoyed the advantage of being able to communicate among themselves, in French, without Anglophone interruption. The response of the Acadians to the conscription crisis during World War II was neither dramatic or outstanding. Certainly they regis- tered reluctance to the imposition of conscription. The heavier turn- out for the plebiscite vote in Acadian regions, the "no" majority in some New Brunswick ridings, the speeches of the New Brunswick members in Ottawa, the anti-government vote of AurEIe-D. LEger are all indications of opposition to the government policy. On the other hand, high enlistment percentages, the pro-govern- ment position of the Ottawa representatives, and the complete lack of , . r. ’ , ~ ' r—~ ,‘ , , q / 113 any documented organized anti-conscription activities all point to the acceptance, however reluctant, of the necessity of following Mackenzie King's policies. This entire period in Acadian history represents no critical juncture which would create a closer Francophone identification within the Acadian community as it may have done in Quebec. Instead, as the reminiscences of present-day residents show, it served to mark the Acadians as Maritimers. Although they might differ from their neigh- bors in language and culture, they shared the economic deprivation and exposed position which were the results of geographic location. This was more evident in the coastal regions than further inland. Forty years later a similarity of attitude is evident. Acadians and non-Acadians tend to contrast the rapport of Anglophones and Franco- phones in the Maritime provinces to the discord in Quebec. The World War II period, in their memories, was no more and no less harmonious, but merely additional evidence that good relations have historically existed between the two groups. Any present-day unhappiness over Acadian desires to expand their cultural profile through increased French language use is largely blamed on outside agitators or fear of them. Both groups gave high marks to the good relations within the Maritime provinces. The Acadian response to the conscription crisis during World War II is best described as acquiescence to the majority view of the community--but the overall Maritime community rather than only the. Acadian community. 114 NOTES 1Interview with Jeremie Pineau, Summerside, Prince Edward Island, July 3, 1982. 2Interview with Wilmer Blanchard, Summerside, Prince Edward Island, July 5, 1982. He credited the "inborn cooperation" idea to his father, historian J. Henri Blanchard. 3Interview with Edouard Arsenault, Mont Carmel, Prince Edward Island, July 3, 1982. He has been active in veterans' activities since World War II, and is past president of the local Canadian Legion. 4Interview with Mrs. Levi [Mary Helen] Gallant, Summerside, Prince Edward Island, July 2, 1982. 5Examples are found at Caraquet, New Brunswick; Cheticamp, Nova Scotia; Mont Carmel, Miscouche, and Tignish, Prince Edward Island. 6Interview with Marie Dugas, Church Point, Nova Scotia, June 26, 1982. 7Among persons recalling this experience were Olive Mackenzie, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, June 17, 1982, and Lorna Watts, near Shelburne, Nova Scotia, June 28, 1982. 8Interview'with Donat Savoie, Grand Anse, New Brunswick, June 18, 1982. Richardson, B...was for Butter, describes similar fears in Nova Scotia. 9Interview with Joyce Weaver, Windsor, Nova Scotia, June 22, 1982. 10Raddall, West Novas, p. 11. 11§_§_. John's [Newfoundlanfl Telegram, July 9, 1982, 12L. A. d'Entremont, M. A., inspector in Division number 14, Clare and Argyle, in Annual Report of the Superintendent of Education for Nova Scotia for the year ended July 31, 1982 (Halifax, 1943), p. 77. 13Interview with Alfred B. d'Entremont, West Pubnico, Nova Scotia, June 26, 1982. - 14Interview with Wilmer Blanchard, Summerside, P. E. 1., July 5, 1982. 115 15Interview with Donaldo Arsenault, Charlottetown, P.E.I., July 2, 1982. 16Interview with Georges Comeau, Edmunston, New Brunswick, June 17, 1982. 17This situation was described as having existed during the early and mid-19th century in St. Simon-St. Jude parish in Tignish, Prince Edward Island, by Henri Gaudet, who is currently writing a parish history. Since Tignish is 98% Roman Catholic, this is also a community history. Interview with Gaudet, Tignish, P.E.I., July 3, 1982. 18Neil Boucher, The Development of an Acadian Village: Surette's Island 1859-1970 (Ottawa, 1980), p. 39. Blanchard, Histoire des Acadiens documents the work of MacEachern, Macdonald, Walker, and other non- Acadian priests in Prince Edward Island. 19Boucher, The Development of ag_Acadian Village, pp. 20-23. L'Eglise Ste.-Marie (Pointe-de-l'Eglise, Nouvelle-Ecosse, 1980), pp. 27-29. 20Boucher, The Development g£_§n Acadian Village, p. 48. 21LgVoix d'Evangeline, March 19, 1942. 22LEIVoix d'Evangeline, May 13, 1943. Original French: "La guerre, qui est la fléau de Dieu pour la conversion des peuples, doit- elle avoir pour résultit dans les desseins provindentiels de Dieu de rendre 5 la terre pécheresse un ordre de choses nouveau, plus humain et chrétien." 23Interview with James Hogan, Summerside, P.E.I., July 5, 1982. 24Interview with Alfred B. d'Entremont, West Pubnico, N. 5., June 26, 1982. ZSLQ Voix d'Evangeline, October 10, 1940. 26For examples see above and La_Voix d'Evangeline, July 8, 1943. 27Several informants cited this reasoning as having been a fac- tor for enlisting among Acadians: "He didn't want anyone to think he had something wrong with him." ' 28House of Commons, Debates, November 12, 1941, IV: 4328-4329. 116 29Duguayville is a very small hamlet in central Gloucester, County, New Brunswick, with many architectural and name similarities to Quebec, although Duguay is an established Acadian name. 30A recent Quebec emigrant noted that "Whenever times get really hard, Quebeckers pour into New Brunswick." Interview with Armand Boulet, Connors, New Brunswick, June 21, 1982. 31Ronald LeBlanc, director of the Acadian Centre, commented that many with Quebec names claim to be Acadian by marriage or through maternal lines while some of the best known Acadian names "don't even want to hear the word." His solution is to "take them as what they say they are." Interview with LeBlanc, Moncton, New Brunswick, June 21, 1982. 32Atlas dg_l'Acadie, planche 16. 33Charles G. Hughes, et. a1, People of Cove and Woodlot, p. 300. "In the Acadian community, respect for authority is strongly engendered in the child and is consistently supported throughout his adult years. The church hierarchy provides a classic model. . ." Several informants in June and July of 1982 commented that Acadians prefer to obey the rules, then work to change them rather than to participate in civil disobedience. 34Percentages based upon data from Atlas d3 l'Acadie, planche 3. APPENDIX 117 APPENDIX TABLE 7--Pearson E test using Angers' statistics indicating correlation between French descended population of more than 10% and higher "no" vote, if only votes cast are counted. X=French percentage of 1931 population Y="no" percentage of votes in 1942 plebiscitee HIDING x Y x2 Y2 XY Gloucester 83 59 6889 3481 4897 Kent 77 69 5929 4761 5313 Restigouche- Madawaska 76 60 5776 3600 4560 Westmoreland 40 31 1600 961 1240 Inverness- Richmond 35 44 1225 1936 1540 Prince 27 22 719 484 594 Shelburne- Yarmouth-Clare 26 29 676 841 754 Northumberland 25 29 625 841 725 Digby-Annapolis 17 10 289 100 170 Antigonish- Guysborough 15 29 225 841 435 Victoria- Carleton 13 12 169 144 156 g x=434 Y=394 x2=24132 Y2=17990 XY=2 0386 N=11; $39.5; §=35.8 Sd. x=25.17; Sd.Y=18.8 Pearson r=.93; DF=9; significant .05=.602; .01=.735 118 APPENDIX TABLE 8--Results of z-tests for significant difference between the percentage of "no" votes in Quebec and in the sample Acadian ridings as shown in table 3 *1 *2 : *3 8 *4 2 86.3 86.8 173.5 46.5 significance level: .05=l.96; .01=2.S76; .001=3.292 TABLE 9--Pearson 3 test for correlation between percentage of Acadian population and percentage of decline in the plebiscite vote of 1942 from the general election of 1940 in six sample ridings X=percentage of population that is Acadian Y=percentage of decline in votes from 1940 to 1942 RIDING x Y x2 Y2 XY Rest.-Mad. 76 .4 5776 .16 30.4 Gloucester 83 19.0 6889 361.0 1577.0 Kent 77 7.3 5929 53.29 562.1 Westmoreland 40 8.6 1600 73.96 344.0 Shel.4Yar.-Cl. 26 27.7 676 767.29 720.2 Prince 27 23.4 729 547.56 631.8 25 X=329 Y=85.4 Xé=21599 Y2=1803.26 XY=3865.5 N=6; i=54.8; §=14.r; Sd. x=24.24; Sd. Y=9.65 Pearson r=-.6143244; DF=4; significant .05=.812; .01=917; 1.=.584 119 APPENDIX TABLE 10--Chi-square test verifying that the maximum percentage of total French descended population voting "no" differs between the six sample Maritime ridings and Quebec O=percentage of Quebec Francophones voting "no"=.3704849 RIDING No vote (0) rAcad. pop. *Q (e) o-e (g;g)2 e _Rest.-Mad. 10,420 17,224 -6804 2687.79 Gloucester 6,866 15,328 -8462 4671.55 Kent 5,320 7,355 -2o35 .563.05 Westmoreland 7,414 9,544 -2130 475.37 She1.4Yar.-Cl. 3,033 4,246 -1213 346.53 Prince 8 2,215 3,445 -1230 439.16 2’ =9l83.45 RIDING Acad.pop.-o (O) Acad. pop.-e (E) O-E Lglgl? E Rest.-Mad. 36,130 29,326 6804 1578.61 Gloucester 34,562 26,100 8462 2743.5 Kent 14,449 12,524 2035. 330.66 Westmoreland 18,380 16,524 2130 279.19 Shel.-Yar.-C1. 8,445 7,232 1213 203.45 Prince 7,097 5,867 1230‘ 257.87 £=5393.73 Chi square=l4,476.73 N=6; DF=6; significant .05=12.59; .01=16.81; .001=22.46 TABLE 11--Chi-square test verifying that the maximum percentage of 120 APPENDIX total French descended population voting "no" differs among the six sample Maritime ridings A=percentage of Acadian population voting "no" in sample Maritime ridings=.228359 RIDING No vote (0) Acad. pop.*A (e) U-e o-e 2 e Rest.-Mad. 10,420 10,630 -210 4.15 Gloucester 6,866 9,460 -2594 711.29 Kent 5,320 4,539 781 134.38 Westmoreland 7,414 5,890 1524 394.33 Shel.-Yar.-Cl. 3,033 2,621 412 64.76 Prince 2,215' 2,126 89 3.73 224312.64 RIDING Acad.pop.-o (0) Acad. pop.-e (E) O-E O-E 2 E Rest.-Mad. 36,130 35,920 210 1.23 Gloucester 34,562 31,968 2594 210.49 Kent 14,559 15,340 -781 39.76 Westmoreland 13,380 19,904 -1524 116.69 Shel.-Yar.-C1. 8,445 8,857 -412 19.17 Prince 7,097 7,186 -89 1.10 Z=388.44 Chi square=1,701.03 N=6; DF=6; significant .05=12.59; .01=16.81; .001=22.46 121 APPENDIX TABLE 12--Z-test for significant difference between percentage of Quebec Francophones voting "no" in plebiscite and the percentage of total Acadians voting "no" in the six sample Maritime ridings (O factor=.37; A factor=.23). Z=115.7 significant .05=1.960; .01=2.576; .001=3.292 122 APPENDIX INTERVIEW METHODS Interviews conducted during June and July, 1982, were with a chance selection of Maritime residents who had resided in the area or served in the military during World War II. The usual method of finding reSpondents was to inquire at an Acadian museum or cultural center about potential respondents living in the area. Usually one successful inter- view led to others. Acadians often sent me to Anglophones and vice versa. There was no effort by either group to prejudice my selection. The method of interview was to utilize a tape recorder if there was no objection and to engage in an informal discussion of World War II and how it affected Maritimers. A few people preferred not to have the recorder used and written notes were made. Rather than using a selected set of questions and a standard question-answer format, the conversation was allowed to proceed naturally between and among the participants. I introduced several topics for discussion and comment, usually in the following order. (1) Outstanding memories of World War II (2)' Effect of conscription issue on Maritime population (3) Memory of any "crisis" surrounding conscription (4) Recollections of the plebiscite vote (5) Differences between French-descended and English-descended Maritimers on conscription issue (6) Difference on amount of effort put forth for war effort (7) Comment on the higher "no" vote cast in Acadian ridings. Most of the interviews were about 20-25 minutes in length. Some ran over an hour and two lasted an entire evening. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Newspapers Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Patriot, 1941-42. 23521 (Nova Scotia) Courier, Jan. 1940-Sept. 1945. Halifax (Nova Scotia) Chronicle, 1942-44. Halifax (Nova Scotia) Herald, 1942-44. Moncton, New Brunswick, Lg Voix d'Evangeline, Sept. 1938-June 1945. West Pubnico, Nova Scotia, Lg Petit Courrier d2 Sud Ouest d5 La Nouvelle Ecosse, 1941-43. Winnipeg (Manitoba) Free Press, 1944-45. Manuscript Collections Church Point, Nova Scotia. Université Ste.-Anne. Acadian Centre. Halifax, Nova Scotia. Public Archives. Angus L. Macdonald Papers. Moncton, New Brunswick. University of Moncton. Champlain Library. Center for Acadian Studies. Sydney, Nova Scotia. University of Cape Breton. Beale Institute. Cape Breton Highlanders War Diary. Published Primary Sources Dominion of Canada. Parliament. Journals of the House of Commons, 18th parliament, 5th session + 19th parliament, sessions 1-5. Dominion of Canada. Parliament. Official Report pf Debates House pf Commons, 18th parliament, 5th session + 19th parliament, sessions 1-5. Dominion of Canada. Parliament. Report pf the Chief Election Officer: 19th General Election (1940) + 20th General Election (1945). 122 ‘ \ . , , , i i , , . .7 Q ~ , 7 7. . ’ a u - , r. 7* 'r < . . o e , . y A . . . vi. ‘7 .7 ‘ — n. . . a. . , - > -_ v - A , . _ , . , . e . . , —_ _ . ,7 _ A e, , , ,. _. ,. . . . , e - — — m - . _ , .. v , . , - ' . _ e . - ‘ . V , i , . —‘ . , ‘ ’ ' ' , e _ m , ,1 r _ . . . H P . _ , , , ,e i , ,7 , . r, .A . . , v , . . r - a 124 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, Canada and the Fight for Freedom. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1944. Pickersgill, J. W. and Forster, Donald, eds. The Mackenzie King Record. 4 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961-70. Interviews Arsenault, Donaldo. Office of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. Interview 2 July 1982. Arsenault, Edouardo. Canadian Legion. Cap Egmont, Prince Edward Island, Interview 3 July 1982. Blanchard, Wilmer. Lg‘Voix Acadien. Summerside, Prince Edward Island. Interview 5 July 1982. Boucher, Neil. Acadian Centre, Universite Ste.-Anne. Church Point, Nova Scotia. Interview 28 June 1982. Boulet, Armand. Connors, New Brunswick. Interview 17 June 1982. Bourinot, Marshal. Curator, Le Noir Forge Museum. Arachat, Nova Scotia. Interview 7 July 1982. Brown, Christopher. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia. Interview 29 June 1982. Brown, Mary. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia. Interview 29 June 1982. Comeau, Georges. University of New Brunswick--Edmunston. Edmunston, New Brunswick. Interview 17 June 1982. Cuthbertson, Brian. Public Archives. Halifax, Nova Scotia. Interviews 22 June, 30 June, and 19 July 1982. D'entremont, Alfred E. Acadian Museum. West Pubnico, Nova Scotia. Interview 26 June 1982. D'entremont, Margaret Pottier. Tusket, Nova Scotia. Interview 27 June 1982. Deveau, Alphonse. Acadian Centre, Universite Ste.-Anne. Church Point, Nova Scotia. Interview 28 June 1982. Dugas, Marie. Curator, l'Eglise Ste.-Marie. Church Point, Nova Scotia. Interview 26 June 1982. Gallant, Anne. Mont Carmel, Prince Edward Island. Interview 4 July 1982. 125 Gallant, Mary Helen. Summerside, Prince Edward Island. Interview 2 July 1982. Gallant, Wilfrid. Mont Carmel, Prince Edward Island. Interview 4 July 1982. Gaudet, Henri. Tignish, Prince Edward Island. Interview 3 July 1982. Hogan, James. Canadian Legion, Summerside, Prince Edward Island. Interview 5 July 1982. LeBlanc, Raymond. Acadian Centre, Champlain Library, University of Moncton. Moncton, New Brunswick. Interview 21 June 1982. Macfarlane, Angus. Office of Veteran's Affairs. Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. Interview 2 July 1982. Mackenzie, Olive. Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. Interview 26 June 1982. Matheson, Donald. East Earltown, Nova Scotia. Interview 30 June 1982. Matheson, Joyce. East Earltown, Nova Scotia. Interview 30 June 1982. Pineau, Jéremié. Lg Voix Acadien. Summerside, Prince Edward Island. Interview 3 July 1982. Pottier, Philip. Tusket, Nova Scotia. Interview 27 June 1982. Powell, Christine. Granville Ferry, Nova Scotia. Interview 24 June 1982. Powell, Robert. Granville Ferry, Nova Scotia. Interview 24 June 1982. Richard, Peter. Summerside, Prince Edward Island. Interview 2 July 1982. Salter, Robert. Parrsboro, Nova Scotia. Interview 21 June 1982. Savoie, Donat. Grand Anse, New Brunswick. Interview 18 June 1982. Specht, Ruth. Barton, Nova Scotia. Interview 25 June 1982. Theriault, Donald. Tignish, Prince Edward Island. Interview 3 July 1982. Warman, Gladys. Bass River, New Brunswick. Interview 19 June 1982. Watts, Calvin. Shelburne, Nova Scotia. Interview 28 June 1982. Watts, Lorna. Shelburne, Nova Scotia. Interview 28 June 1982. Weaver, Joyce. Windsor, Nova Scotia. Interview 23 June 1982. i , . _ . , , _ V _ ‘ ~ a , . , \ . m .5 , . r , a p i , , . . ., . . . a a ’ . . x A q _ . n a r . . U . . . . , v _ n . < i , ~ .. . . 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