. 1 "y ABSTRACT DONALD RICHBERG AND REXFORD TUGWELL: CAPITALIST PLANNING IN THE NEW DEAL BY Michael Vincent Namorato IIn the late 19205 and early 19305, planning meant different things to different people. Conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike interpreted it according to their iJudividual ideological predilections. As the Rooseveltian New Deal was implemented, moreover, the con- cept of planning inherited a political dimension as well. Planners, whether of the left or the right, modified their thinking to coincide with their evaluation of Franklin Roosevelt. In many reSpects, these planners, despite their earlier pronouncements, began to characterize the New Deal, and New Dealers, according to their personal, political preferences rather than according to their conceptual beliefs. And in so doing, they confused the concept of planning even more. From a personal, individual perspective, this was particularly unfortunate because New Dealers like Donald Richberg and Rexford Tugwell were misunderstood in what they themselves were saying about planning. More Michael Vincent Namorato importantly, as time went on, the stereotypes created during the New Deal years lingered on, affecting not only what their contemporaries said of them, but also what later historians would, and did, write. Today, Richberg and Tug- well, and especially their planning programs, have been lost in the maze of political labelling and historical disagree- ments. In analyzing both men's planning conceptions, however, there is little doubt that they evolved in their thinking. Prior to and during the New Deal, both were remarkably similar in the way they defined planning. Con- sistently reluctant to Specify planning theoretically, both tended to identify certain characteristics which, they believed, a planned economy possessed. Specifically, when- ever they wrote about and/or spoke of planning, they meant c00peration between business, labor, and government; coordination between industry and agriculture; expertise in formulating policy; the service ideal; balance and/or equilibrium within industry, among industries, and between industry and agriculture; and, experimentation in approach and method. This latter characteristic was particularly important because both men felt that planning could only be effected in the long-run and that the eXperience gained in implementing it would be vital to determining whether or not ‘the United States could transform from a laissez-faire economic system to a planned one. They also repeatedly enmflmsized that planning would assure the survival of the Michael Vincent Namorato United States in the twentieth-century and that it was in and of itself a democratic process. In effect, both men, by utilizing the concept more as a general philosophical approach to the American economic system, ignored the theoretical implications of the principle itself. They were in many ways pioneers in the theory of planning, but not much else. All of this, of course, is not to deny the differ— ences which existed between them. From a conceptual and practical vieWpoint, Tugwell was consistently more inclined to define planning in terms of the governmental—industrial relationship, to favor governmental coercion, and to offer, however vaguely, suggestions for the implementation of planning. In a similar vein, although both men agreed on the causes and cures for the Depression, Tugwell was relatively more precise in suggesting programs to achieve recovery. And, finally, while both utilized their personal and political experiences in the 19203 as guidelines for develOping their economic philosophy, Tugwell was more familiar with the intellectual currents of the times, such as Taylorism, pragmatism, and institutionalism. Still, by March, 1933, neither he nor Richberg was capable of offering Franklin D. Roosevelt a feasible alternative to the Depression in any form of planning. During their tenure in the New Deal, however, both men tried to correct this by develOping their concepts all the more. Whereas Richberg eventually refined his thinking Michael Vincent Namorato on planning so that balance became a prerequisite to imple— mentation, Tugwell concentrated on the practical problems involved in implementing agricultural and industrial planning. As New Deal administrators, moreover, both men consistently tried to conform their individual agencies to their own understanding of planning. In many ways, this explains Richberg's approval of price-fixing in some of the major NRA codes, his interpretation of section 7(a), and his approval of the automobile code's extension. As for Tugwell, his commitment to planning goes a long way in explaining his actions in the Pure Food and Drug controversy and his handling of the Resettlement Administration. By 1936, both men believed that a start had been made toward the planned economy and that more would follow, given the time and the Opportunities necessary. While Richberg and Tugwell had already begun drifting apart during the New Deal in their understanding and commitment to planning, it was in the post-1936 period where this was explicitly demonstrated. Where Richberg con- tinued to define planning in terms of balance, esPecially between business, labor, and the government, Tugwell devel- oped his conception of planning along the lines of "The Fourth Power" Not only did he utilize a different terminol- ogy in discussing planning, but he even conceptualized it in a nmre sophisticated way. More importantly, he consciously .attempted to implement it while he was Chairman of the New York City Planning Commission and later Governor of Puerto Michael Vincent Namorato Rico. And in doing so, he learned so much more about planning theoretically and practically that, in the post- 1946 period, he has continued to refine his programs, emphasizing in recent years the United States' need to re- write the Constitution. DONALD RICHBERG AND REXFORD TUGWELL: CAPITALIST PLANNING IN THE NEW DEAL BY Michael Vincent Namorato A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1975 © Copyright by MICHAEL VINCENT NAMORATO 1975 l1 Dedicated To Mom, Dad, and Karen ii M b I vi. u- . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In completing the dissertation, I naturally incurred quite a few debts along the way. Among the most important was the help I received from my major professor, Dr. Madison Kuhn. Through his knowledge of American history, his understanding of peOple and his patience with impatient graduate students, I have learned what history really is as well as what a commitment a historian must make if he is to be successful. For that and much more, I will be eternally grateful to him. In a similar vein, I am indebted to the other members of my thesis committee, including Dr. James Soltow, Dr. Paul Sweet, and Dr. Barbara Steidle. Each in their own way contributed to my graduate education and the completion of my doctoral program. HOpefully, in the long- run, the time and effort they expended on me will prove fruitful. While researching, I came into contact with a number of peOple who helped me in my work. I would like to express my thanks to them now, especially Mr. Archie Motley at the Chicago Historical Society, Mr. Stewart and his staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the staff and iii personnel at the Library of Congress and the National Archives, Ms. Elizsabeth Mason at the Columbia Oral History Project, and the staff and personnel of the libraries at the University of Chicago, Michigan State University, and the University of Mississippi. Finally, no listing of acknowledgments would be complete without expressing my sincere appreciation for the three peOple to whom this dissertation is dedicated. With- out the love and encouragement of my mother, my father, and eSpecially my wife, Karen, what was a rewarding and positive experience for me would definitely have become a tedious, frustrating task. In many ways, the thesis that follows is as much theirs as it is mine. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. CAPITALIST PLANNING IN THE NEW DEAL: AN INDIVIDUAL APPROACH . . . . . II. THE PREPARATION OF A PLANNER. . . III. TWO PLANNERS IN THE NEW ERA . . . IV. THE GRAND EXPERIMENT, 1932-1936. . V. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF AN ACADEMIC, 1932-1936 . . . . . . . . VI. ADMINISTRATORS: THEORY IN PRACTICE. VII. CRUSADING FOR A PRINCIPLE. . . . VIII. A FINAL ANALYSIS. . . . . . . APPENDIX: A SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY. . . . BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . Page 38 78 148 195 282 333 422 432 434 CHAPTER I "CAPITALIST PLANNING IN THE NEW DEAL: AN INDIVIDUAL APPROACH" Economic planning is the systematic appraisal, management, and utilization of societal resources, both human and natural, for future alternatives. It may be private or governmental in its approach, voluntary or coercive in its program, general or specific in its purpose. It may be utilized in any type of political environment, whether totalitarian, socialistic, or democratic. And, depending on that political environment, it may result in a regimented society, a socialized economy, or a democratic entity. In the United States, for example, economic planning has today become a highly sophisticated approach to the problems of a highly industrialized economy. Private enterprise as well as government on all levels have adopted this approach as a means to securing their objectives.1 1See John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Signet Books, 1967), chapters l-7 for an excellent discussion of the use of planning in the tech— Iumtructure; for planning on the federal level, see Seymour Dkflman, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War Ohm York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 19707] chapters 1-27'__— The planned obsolescence of the products we buy, the urban renewal projects which our taxes pay for, the federal natural resources conservation programs all demonstrate the extent to which our economy has come to reply on planning. This was not always the case, however. Neither was planning as s0phisticated in Its essentials as it is today. The principle developed and evolved as America became more and more industrialized. In the 1920s, when America's economy of abundance was reaching its artificially high levels of productivity, a small group of disheartened liberals were erecting the intellectual framework for planning. John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, Simon Patten, Herbert Croly, and Charles Beard all recognized the changing character of American capitalism with its advances in technology and business consolidation. Using the Soviet example, they argued that man had the capacity to plan, that planning was technically feasible, and that history itself had demonstrated the beneficent consequences of preparing for the future.2 Few peOple at first paid much attention to them until the Depression of 1929 validated their arguments. As fear, unemployment, and tmman suffering increased, "business executives, prominent churchmen, and noted educators, no less than labor leaders, 2Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: 1km Crisis of the Old Order, 1919—1933—TBoston: Houghton bhiflin Co.,—1957), pp. 130— 144; Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Ideologies and UtOEaS: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought (Chicago. Quadrangle, 1969f, pp. 36- 72. progressive economists, and popular journalists became the proponents of planning for a new social order."3 By late 1929, even a political party, headed by such liberals as Dewey, Villard, and Paul Douglas, was formed to advance the principles of a planned economy. Although the League for Independent Political Action would never attract a large following in subsequent years, its mere creation at this time illustrated the pOpular attraction which the planning principle began to receive after the Depression started. From 1929 to 1932, numerous programs to institute planning in the American economy were introduced, ranging from the liberal ideas of a George Soule to the conservative view- point of a Gerard Sw0pe.4 In the 1932 campaign, planning had even become a political issue. Although both candidates spoke of planning, Roosevelt, on the advice of peOple like Donald Richberg and Rexford Tugwell, tried to be more Specific about it. In view of the Depression and the novelty of planning, however, he could only say so much, despite the disapproval of his 3Ekirch, Ideologies and Utopias, p. 49. 4See, for example, George Soule, A_Planned Society (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 184-285; Stmart Chase, A New Deal (New York: The Macmillan Company, 11932), pp. 194-253; Charles Beard, "A 'Five Year Plan' for .Anmmica," Forum LXXXVI (July, 1931), 5-6; Howard Scott and ()thers, Introduction 59 Technocragy (New York: John Day Company, 1933), pp. 39ff.; J. G. Frederick, ed. The SwOpe Efilan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: Business Bourse, 1931) , chapter 2. Although other programs were proposed, these give a fairly good cross—section of planning at this time. .‘v p.- - v. .1. 4,. c... advisors. Once the election was over, though, he believed that he had the mandate he needed for the "bold, persistent experimentation" which his Oglethorpe speech had eXpressed. What he did not realize was that planning would soon become a catch-word, a label which his Opponents particularly would use for political identification purposes. By 1935, when the NRA-AAA program had reached its climax, planning meant many things to many peOple. Confusion over the substance of planning resulted. Conservative newspapers, such as The New York Times and The New York Herald Tribune, considered planning alien to the American tradition and typical of the Rooseveltian approach. Liberal journals, such as The New Republic, reacted to this type of stereo- typing by defending the principle Of planning as well as by emphasizing the conservative character of Rooseveltian planning. And individuals, within and outside of the political realm, characterized planning and the New Deal in an unique way. Herbert Hoover, for example, believed the phrase “planned economy" had its origins in Mussolini's corporatism and was Often prOposed as a program by "the Communists and the Socialists." The New Deal had used it as a disguise to .institute "governmental execution and dictation" in its .atmempt to "cross-breed Socialism, Fascism, and Free Enterprise." New Deal planners were merely ”totalitarian ZLitmrals" who were bent upon destroying the very foundations of American capitalism.5 Hoover, however, did not categorically condemn all planning, only New Deal planning. In his philOSOphy, planning was acceptable as long as it sought to preserve the initiative of individuals.6 Former New Dealers seemed to agree with Hoover's analysis. Raymond Moley, a disenchanted New Dealer by 1935, admitted that, much to his dismay, Roosevelt had utilized planning in the National Recovery Administration, the Agri- cultural Adjustment Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. There was nothing worse than this because planning was then and now "a modern version of socialism" which had its origins in Walter Rathenau's discussion of Germany in the First World War. Not only was planning alien to the American political tradition, but it also represented everything the New Deal and Roosevelt should not have done.7 Like Hoover, though, Moley too felt that planning was permissible. His conditions, however, 5Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs 9£_Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), pp. 354-355. 6Herbert Hoover to Wesley C. Mitchell, October 26, 1934; Herbert Hoover to Wesley C. Mitchell, December 17, 1934, Herbert Hoover papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Presidential Individual File, "Folder- Mitchell," West Branch, Iowa. 7Raymond Moley, The Republican Opportunity in 1964 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964), pp. 23-24; Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, LBrace and World, Inc., 1966I, p. 291. emphasized the need for business to carry on the planning function, not the federal government. This disillusionment with New Deal planning and the consequent confusion which it entailed was not confined to conservatives like Hoover and Moley alone. Even Walter Lippmann was infected with it by 1937. This one-time national planner rejected his earlier fascination with the planning principle once his fascination with Roosevelt's New Deal began to fade. Lippmann believed that planning was not a feasible alternative because it was simply "devoid of meaning, and there is, speaking literally, nothing in it." 'Planning for production implied planning for con- sumption and, in an economy of abundance, no such planning was possible unless a dictatorial oligarchy which would "tolerate no effective challenge to their authority" existed.8 If it did, it would be outside of the American political tradition. All in all, what peOple like Hoover, Moley, and Lippmann were saying was that New Deal planning was not acceptable, but that planning, in some self-defined form, was. They failed, moreover, to recognize what R. H. Montgomery saw as the crux of the planning problem in the early 19308--the difference between the technical, engineering aspects of planning and the institutional planning which most planners were calling for. 8Walter Lippmann, "Planning in an Economy of Abundance," The Atlantic Monthly CLIX (1937) , 39-46. .a‘v-b ¢ n tn. A; C N I . . | . .‘M a h According to Montgomery, planning had become a highly confused term. Most Opponents, and even proponents, of planning failed to recognize that planning was at once ". . . a matter of facts and figures and blueprints" as well as an institutional matter, dealing with the "under- lying set Of rules by which we live." The term itself seemed to possess magic: "By some process of rubbing this Aladdin's lamp we are suddenly to make an end of our aim- less wanderings." But planning was not so simple. It implied redefining American economic values, accepting the "Huey Longs, and Coughlins, and Sinclairs, and LaFollettes . . .” as well as trying to answer the who, how, and why of planning.9 It meant in reality a process of experimentation and trial-and—error which would take a long time. Time would make planning a feasible alternative although, in reality, Montgomery failed to recognize that time was the enemy of planning. From 1935 on, planning would no longer be popular either among the peOple or with Roosevelt him- self, certainly not to the extent that it had been in March, 1933. Roosevelt had shifted his ground and was assuming a new approach to the depression, one characterized by welfarism and counter-organization. New Deal planning, in 9R. H. Montgomery, "Planning the New Deal," Plan Age I (November 1935), 6-11. This journal was the Official organ Of ESPA (National Economic and Social Planning Association) which began its Operations in 1934 for the specific purpose Of advocating, analyzing and pursuing planning in the United States. other words, had died, despite the desperate medicinal efforts of Mordecai Ezekiel and others in the Department of Agriculture in the post-NRA period. Historians, looking back, have recognized this and have attempted to resolve the initial confusion which existed in the early New Deal concerning planning. Their method is distinctive since, instead of concentrating on individual New Deal planners, they have emphasized and identified "groups" Of planners who were within the New Deal administration. Two historians are particularly important in this regard: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Ellis Hawley. Schlesinger divided the New Deal into a First and 10 The First, dominated by the heirs of Second New Deal. the New Nationalism, emphasized the inevitability of bigness in business as well as the need for planning in the economy. Agreeing on the goals of planning, these New Dealers could not agree on the means to achieve them. "The co—ordination boys--Moley, Berle, Tugwell, Johnson, Richberg, Frank, Charles Beard--were . . . brilliant but anarchic," lacking the teamwork necessary to foster and institute their central planning ideas. Although their programs were designed for both reform and recovery, it was this lack of 10Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 322.512 ef Roosevelt: The Politics 9: U heaval, 1935-1936 (Boston: Houghton EIfflin Company, 1960), ppT“2I4—ff7 Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York: CaprIEOrn jBooks, 1944) was perhaps the first major historian to divide the New Deal into two distinct programs. . co-ordination which eventually resulted in their losing to the Brandesians in the Second New Deal. In the post-NRA era, their planning programs were still alive in Ezekiel's Industrial Expansion Plan, but dead in terms of Roosevelt's utilizing them.11 What Schlesinger did was to define planning in the First New Deal in terms of what the New Dealers agreed on and not in terms of what the individual planners thought. By concentrating on the First New Deal as a whole, he inadvertently minimized the differences among the early New Deal planners and confused the problem of New Deal planning even more. Finally, instead of analyzing why there was such a lack of co-ordination among the First New Dealers in their planning prOposals, he concentrated on comparing them to the Brandesian Second New Dealers. All this is not to deny the value of Schlesinger's study, but rather to point out the problems which it causes. Analyzing the New Deal as an entity, it is understandable why these problems exist in Schlesinger. The same, however, cannot be said of Ellis Hawley who distinctly concentrated on the New Deal and the problem of monOpOly. According to Hawley, the New Deal's depression program consisted of three distinct, contradictory approaches: a government-sponsored business commonwealth llSchlesinger, The Politics 9: Upheaval, p. 235. 10 exemplified by the NRA, a democratic collectivistic philOSOphy exemplified by economic planning in the immediate post-Schecter period, and a reversion to anti-trustism exemplified by the Thurmond Arnold movement. Each approach was tried until it proved itself incapable of alleviating the depression and capable of stimulating political Opposition.12 The planning approach, moreover, was utilized hIthe First New Deal to a degree and was still alive in the Second, particularly in the Department of Agriculture. The National Recovery Administration, symbol of the business commonwealth for Hawley, was the first formal attempt by the New Deal to use planning in its program to SOlve the Depression. More the product of conservative tnasiness planners like Raymond Moley, Hugh Johnson, and I3.‘nald Richberg with some participation by the more iJltellectual planners like Rexford Tugwell and Jerome Frank, id: proved to be ineffective because of internal conflicts E11nd its inability to define a consistent line of policy. IDeSpite its failure to effect expansion or recovery, which Vwas inevitable anyway, the NRA did recognize the "desir- Eikfllity of planning," did accept the "underconsumptionist 1:l'leory" emphasizing the need for economic balance, and did Eilightly encourage the growth of strong labor and consumer 12Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem ef flonOpoly: A Stud i_r_1_ Economic Ambivalence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. viii. I.- “or. a- -.. o ..l . ‘\ 5‘ — ~- 5‘ I‘ I S. I. - . . . ~ 0 .' ‘ _ n . ‘- ll 13 In this, it achieved something, although organizations. planners like Tugwell were disappointed. This diasspoint- ment, however, did not result in despair among the intellectual planners. In the post-NRA period, peOple like George Galloway, Arthur Dahlberg, Lewis Lorwin, Harold Loeb, walter Polakov, John Dewey, Stuart Chase, and others cmntinued to emphasize the need for planning. What is more important is that in the Department of Agriculture and the bhtural Resources Committee, peOple like Mordecai Ezekiel, Rexford Tugwell, Jerome Frank, and Gardiner Means were continually develOping new planning schemes and programs. These post-NRA New Deal planners agreed that com- Petdtion within the economy was fast disappearing, that INJsiness price-fixing had caused America's problems, and tfllat anti-trustism was the wrong approach to solve the depression. Although disappointed with the New Deal generally, they still believed that planning was a feasible Eilternative for American democracy.14 Their planning Elroposals usually called for a central board or council to t:hink about national economic problems, to formulate c>k>jectives, and to establish central policy guidelines; Sllmmp or functional representation on policy-making aAgencies; and a neutral fact-finding secretariat.15 In l3 14 Ibid., pp. 133-134. Ibid., pp. 169-186. 15Ibid., pp. 174-177. .uv .J u. 12 Ezekiel's Plan for Industrial Expansion, their prOposals were given concrete reality in vain because by that time {flanning was no longer a realistic alternative within the BMW Deal for political, economic, and ideological reasons. lawley, in fact, argued that for the same reasons planning had never been a realistic alternative after 1933. Only partial, piecemeal, haphazard planning was possible and only in certain situations and under certain circumstances as.i11ustrated by agriculture, labor, and industries like Imituminous coal, Oil, and transportation.16 Hawley's analysis, unlike Schlesinger's, examined bkew Deal planning thoroughly. Like Schlesinger, though, Ehawley's approach to planning was group—conscious and arbministratively-oriented. In his discussion of the First New Deal, for example, he consistently distinguished IDetween the business planners like Hugh Johnson and Donald Iiichberg and the intellectual planners like Rexford Tugwell Eind George Soule. Where the business planners were more <2onservative in their goals and mechanisms to effect IPlanning, the intellectuals were more liberal. Business Iplanners trusted businessmen and were less inclined to latilize governmental coercion; the intellectuals distrusted knminessmen and were more inclined to use the government. A_conflict resulted and a spectrum of planners developed l6Ibid., pp. 272ff. 13 with those on the right favoring business, those in the Huddle hOping businessmen would become more socially cmnscious, and those on the left emphasizing the need for governmental coercion.17 The inherent weakness in this form of reasoning was Hawley's failure to define those planners within the New Deal and those with no political or administrative con- nection with it. This is particularly serious in his (iiscussion of the intellectual planners in the First New Ikeal. Hawley grouped the planning ideas of the Soule's, cnlase's, Dewey's, and Beard's, with the Tugwell's, Frank's 611d Ezekiel's despite their academic, not administrative, tLies to the New Deal. In analyzing the Second New Deal, Iiawley also implied that people like Ezekiel were in Exolitically significant positions to influence Roosevelt ‘Nhen, in reality, they were not. Finally, Hawley's cate- t:a.p1anned, Marxist system.22 Even such liberal journals 15153 The New Republic seemed to accept this characterization, ElZLbeit with some disappointment in Richberg's change of Ilkeart. An "amicable woodchuck" in appearance, Richberg was ];urai5ed for his tenaciousness and industry. He was a ];>1anning crusader, but one "who cannot permit himself to -1=‘evolt. "23 He wanted change and fought for it. For ‘tZJmt,'he was a plus in the Rooseveltian administration. 20 "Commissar Richberg," New York Herald Tribune t{gJuly 8, 1933); "Comrade Richbergski Issues Another hreatski," Crow's Coast Lumber Digest (April 5, 1935), news <:=1ippings, Richberg papers, LC, Box 48. 21Richberg papers, LC, miscellany, Box 58. 22 "Suave Richberg Follows Johnson Who Came in Like a JEsion," The Washington Post (September 30, 1934), news <:=1ippings, Raymond Clapper papers, LC, Box 183; Frank L. IFtluckholn, "Balance, Not Planning, I5 Richberg's Aim," New ‘Xfcuk.Times, magazine section (September 9, 1934), p. 3. . 23Jonathan Mitchell, "Grand Vizier: Donald R. Richberg,” New Republic LXXXII (April 24, 1935) , 301—304. u. s . l 'l 20 Rexford Tugwell, on the other hand, received a more llndibrm press reception. Where ambivalence characterized ISixxmerg's press reception, Tugwell's was characterized by (Dzeposition from left and right. From Mark Sullivan's c=<>lumns in The New York Herald Tribune to the Saturdey .Efijfiening Post, Tugwell was painted as the New Deal subversive .Ifeevolutionary who secretly planned to destroy American czéagflxalism.24 He was the Columbia professor who frightened 25 <:<:xnservatives and liberals alike. His critics, moreover, lIl<>tivated by their patriotism, tried desperately to convince ‘tllle public that "Rex the Red," "Tugwell, Rex," "Rex, the ESVveetheart Of the Regimenters" was dangerous. With an g 24Bernard Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and The New IDeal (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 337- ;? 56. Sternsher's discussion is excellent, especially in :Ludentifying Tugwell's critics and the fallacies in their Ea‘-‘ttacks on him. See also T. W. Koch, Telegram, to ranklin D. Roosevelt, February 21, 1935; H. T. Collord to IF‘Ianklin D. Roosevelt, December 17, 1935; Frederick Sullen 0 Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 10, 1933 all in I3"‘r'anklin D. Roosevelt papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library '( FDR Library), Official File l--Misc. for examples of <0pular and business reactions to Tugwell. 25"We Shall Make America Over," SaturdayEvening Eghwost (October 29, 1938) in Raymond Clapper papers, LC, Box 3L107; Alva Johnston, "Tugwell, The President's Idea Man," SEEJaturday Evening Post (August 1, 1936), 9. In another ‘Eigrticle, Tugwell and Richberg are closely identified with Q:ne another--Edward Angly, "By Their Words," Saturday i§§tyening Post (February 1, 1936), 36ff. in Clapper papers, , Box 107. 26Blair Bolles, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters: DI. Tugwell Makes America Over," The American Mercury 39 (September 1936) , 77-86 is an excellent example of Tugwell's hostile reception by the press. 21 EirIOgant personality which caused him more harm than good, Tugwell tried to placate the press in vain. Even after he announced his resignation, his critics refused to call a . 27 . <3<2ase-fire. There were of course some Tugwellian £3upporters. Ernest K. Lindley, for example, considered him I. . the philOSOpher, the sociologist, and the prOphet of tille Roosevelt Revolution, as well as one of its boldest I;>I:actitioners." Despite Tugwell's trip to Russia and his 'lemguarded talk, Lindley argued that Tugwell-phobia was Eissinine because Tugwell was not a dangerous radical, but Irreather a practical liberal who was trying to reform .Zaxnerica.28 Drew Pearson and Robert Allen agreed, arguing ‘tihat Tugwell's ". . . radicalism ends with his belief that ‘eevery man should have a home and a garden."29 Unfortu- lrlately, no one seemed to listen. When Tugwell submitted his ~1=esignation in 1936, The New Republic editorialized that 3IRoosevelt had thrown him to the wolves, thus ending the . . 30 ‘ZzontroverSIal governmental career of a controver51a1 man. \ 27 Paul W. Ward, "The End of Tugwell," Nation 143 (November 28, 1936), 617-618. 28 . . Ernest K. Lindley, "War on the Brains Trust," S§§cribner's Magazine XCIV (November, 1933); The Roosevelt EEgevolution: First Phase (New York: Viking Press, 1933), I;qn 304-314; Half Way With Roosevelt (New York: Viking 3E>ress, 1936), p. 42. 29"The Daily Washington Merry Go-Round," n.d., in IEIenry A. Wallace papers, LC, scrapbooks, reel 41. 30"Tugwell to the Wolves," New Republic LXXXV (December 25, 1935), 186-187. 22 Actually, it did not. By 1941, Tugwell returned to govern- Inentservice as governor of Puerto Rico. More importantly, when he returned, the radical stereotype cast on him in the 63early 19305 still remained to affect what his contemporaries EiI‘ldlater historians would think of him. Richberg also was Eiiffected, but with the image of a liberal-turned conservative who betrayed his former friends. Contemporary Opinions of both men were influenced by (:rtzher factors as well, e5pecia11y the individual's Opinion C>:EF the New Deal and his personal relationship with the two Irlean. J. Franklin Carter, the anonymous New Deal sympathizer, ‘CDIQGDIY confessed his biases in the preface to The New Dealers. An associate and friend of most of his subjects, 3r1e:still believed hi5 Opinions were trustworthy and ‘U'aluable.31 For him, Donald Richberg was an enigma in the 1xIew Deal. A logical choice for general counsel of NRA, he iElt first frightened conservatives and terrified the Old (ESuard by declaring the New Deal the "long-awaited revo- :1iution." Eventually, though, this Richbergian radicalism ‘dlnconsciously petered out by 1934 to such a degree that SEeven businessmen told Richberg he was "not an uncouth, lblairy agitator." This transformation, in Carter's view, lelustrated ". . . the almost inevitable tendency of the \— 31J. Franklin Carter, The New Dealers (New York: ESimon and Schuster, Inc., 1934), preface. Carter published t:he study as being written by an "Unofficial Observer." . s 1 23 a951.11g radical, when entrusted with responsibility and power, tOgoconservative." Richberg, however, had earned his "‘Iacation from progressivism" since he had done as much u . . . as any one man, not entrusted with political power, c=<>u1d do to advance the principles of liberalism. " ‘C31:hers, like Rexford Tugwell, could and would carry on the C rusade . 32 If any New Dealer was misunderstood, Carter 3k>€elieved it was Tugwell. Labelled a Bolshevik, radical, and czllemer revolutionary, he was genuinely a conservative "who ‘vv<>uld save the profit system and private ownership of igparoperty by adapting them to the technical conditions of ‘tzhe power age." Tugwell was not a utOpian of the socialis- ‘tlic stripe nor a dogmatic laissez-fairist. He was as much Eicollectivist as "J. P. Morgan is a collectivist. . . ." 713he reason he is seen as such is because he is "too honest" iEind incapable of keeping his ideas to himself.33 In short, lble was politically naive and, as a result, paid the price ‘be being stereotyped as a radical. Writing years later, one of the original Brains ’JDrusters took a somewhat different view than Carter. ZERaymond Moley, disenchanted New Dealer in 1935 who con- iIEessedly had turned conservative, saw Richberg and Tugwell fiLn.terms of his own political philosophy and view of the ‘erw Deal. To him, Richberg was a "sponsor of free 3ZIbid., pp. 38-41. 33Ibid., pp. 85-91. 24 Eenterprise" who, by 1936, shared his own doubts about Roosevelt's anti-business turn, while Tugwell was a statist éiruia.planner who always supported Roosevelt.34 In the IFiust New Deal, Moley believed Tugwell's economic thinking "czlosely resembled that Of the British socialists who as t::Lme went on submerged their socialism under the guise of -rléitional planning.“35 Tugwell, moreover, was impractical Eilld "ignorant of politics." Although he stimulated peOple "ZLike a cocktail," his ideas were consistently dangerous Ellld alien to the American way.36 For Moley, Richberg the c:c>nservative was preferable to Tugwell the radical. Other New Dealers were not as politically motivated j.n their preferences for Richberg or Tugwell as Moley was. ESamuel I. Rosenman, for example, believed both men were IFHanners and capable individuals within the Rooseveltian \ 34Raymond Moley, correspondence with author, July 21, ~3L972. Moley also indicated that he was not sure of any il;flanning ideas that Richberg may have had, although he (Richberg) probably develOped some type of philosophy of IEDlanning while serving in the NRA. Moley and Richberg ecame "good" friends according to Mrs. John H. Small, the iiformer Mrs. Richberg (Mrs. John H. Small, correspondence ‘Vvith author, July 26, 1972). This probably affected lbdoley's opinion of Richberg. 35Moley, The First New Deal, p. 356. 36Ibid., pp. 356-358; Raymond Moley, After Seven ‘Sfears (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 15. -CTames A. Farley, Jim Farleyfs Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: McGraw-Hill CO. , Inc. , 1948?, indirectIy Indi- czated his agreement with Moley by his actions in the 1936 campaign. He was instrumental in having Tugwell kept ssilent and out of the campaign. Farley believed that Tugwell usually said too much and frightened people by the way he said it. 25 'adnunistration, although he conceded that Richberg had undergone a change of heart in the mid-19305.37 Felix I?rankfurter, on the other hand, thought neither one was éic:c:eptable. 'Whereas Richberg was "incredibly short— Esikflmed" at times and terribly ambitious, Tugwell was out- £3Ipoken and "a pain" in the neck.38 Frankfurter preferred a (Icohen, Corcoran or Lilienthal within the New Deal since tllaey were his protegés and links with Roosevelt, especially .j_I) the Second New Deal. One of his protegés, David E. JLuilienthal, ironically had links with these two men. Lilienthal, Richberg's one-time law assistant in (Idiicago, had felt a strong affection for his employer of the J_9205. To him, Richberg was a brilliant lawyer with a ssocial philOSOphy permeating his every action.39 By the \— 37Samuel 1. Rosenman, correspondence with author, ESeptember 28, 1972; Samuel I. Rosenman, Workigg With Roose- ‘\Jelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 145-146. :Ironically, Rosenman doubted Moley's influence in the First INew Deal--see Samuel I. Rosenman to Rexford Tugwell, (January 16, 1969, Samuel I. Rosenman papers, FDR Library, 130x 31. A COpy of this letter is in Workinngith Roosevelt, 119. 81. ‘ 38For Frankfurter's Opinions of Richberg, see Louis IBrandeis to Felix Frankfurter, March 25, 1935; Felix IFrankfurter to Louis Brandeis, March 15, 1935; Frankfurter 1to Brandeis, April 27, n.d.; Frankfurter to Brandeis, Ifiovember 27, n.d. all in Felix Frankfurter papers, LC, .Isoxes 28 and 29. For his views of Tugwell, see Frankfurter 1to Brandeis, February 9, 1934; Philip Kurland to Felix IFrankfurter, November 11, 1953; Frankfurter to Kurland, IQovember 13, 1953 all in Frankfurter papers, LC, Boxes 29 Eind 72. .. 39David E. Lilienthal, The Journals ef David E. Lilienthal: The TVA Years, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 14-16. 26 late 19305, this was no longer true. Richberg the pro- gressive crusading for labor had transformed into Richberg the business lawyer Opposed to labor.40 For Lilienthal, he Was an ironic disappointment. The same was true of Tugwell. Lilienthal, as TVA director, was a practitioner of planning in the piecemeal, regional sense. It was only natural for him tO seek Tugwell's support for his TVA programs. Support, however, was not the reception he received. Tugwell Opposed TVA piecemeal planning because, Lilienthal believed, he ". . . never quite understood it; was temperamentally unable to really sympathize with it."41 Tugwell the national planner could not understand Lilienthal the regional Planner nor the entire Brandeisian program of the Second New IDeal. The Lilienthals and Brandeisians, in turn, could not understand nor accept Tugwell. There were, however, other New Dealers who could understand Tugwell and accept him, such as Harold Ickes iand Jerome Frank. Honest Harold, outspoken and irascible, f5 the above-mentioned contemporaries of Richberg and UTCIgwell had one aspect in common-~they all were influenced k3)? what the news media had said of these two men. Their c>‘Wrngeneral positions on the New Deal and their personal IS€e=1ationships with both men also affected them but in such 51 way that they still either defended and/or attacked the It“<32n in the stereotypes which had been already established. 1y1<::re importantly, these contemporary opinions affected what :l‘isiter historians would say about planning, the New Deal, Ea“lead these two individual planners. Generally, historians have treated Richberg and t1:m‘etlgwell in a characteristic fashion. Discussing them 5‘Siiigoaringly, they have continued to utilize the stereotypes :L‘JFI either offensive or defensive manners. Donald Richberg, “-~_1 45Jerome Frank, "The Memoir of Jerome Frank," Oral I‘3l:i_story Research Office, Columbia University, pp. 29-34. .. Rogers also agreed with Ickes and Frank, see Lindsey 1E"<.<:>gers, "The Memoir Of Lindsey Rogers," Oral History Re search Office, Columbia University, p. 90. 46Frank, "The Memoir of Jerome Frank," pp. 25 and 143. 29 net as pOpular as Tugwell, is usually seen as the conser- vative, Bull Mooser who betrayed his earlier liberal inclinations. Sometimes he is recognized as a planner, some- times he is not. Tugwell, however, is consistently seen as a planner, although some historians believe him to be radical, while others feel he was not so radical. Tugwell's Popularity has even increased almost in proportion to the decline of Roosevelt's, particularly with the New Left historians of the 19605. This was not always the case, 11<3wever. According to Barton Bernstein, the liberal historians of the 19505 and early 19605, Arthur Schlesinger, I‘77-):ank Freidel, William Leuchtenburg, and James M. Burns ( political scientist) "wrote from a liberal democratic con- S‘Qnsus vieWpoint."4 Generally favorable to the New Deal, they argued that Roosevelt had replenished democracy, bescued the federal government "from the clutches of big IQ \15iness," and redistributed political power within the “erican system.48 Their disagreements centered on the Q~egree of the New Deal's success as well as Roosevelt's t‘ esponsibility for that success. They also disagreed \‘ 47Barton J. Bernstein, "The New Deal: The Conser- vative Achievements of Liberal Reform," in Barton J. ernstein, ed. Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in erican History (New YOrk: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 2—64. \ 481bid. 30 somewhat in their characterizations of Richberg and Tugwell . Freidel, Burns, and Leuchtenburg believe that Tugwell was a radical planner who advocated the "drastic Overhauling of the economic system," while Richberg, only in Leuchtenburg's case, was a conservative Bull Mooser who never had any intention of instituting extensive planning Within the American economy.49 To them, the dichotomy was Clear and definite. Arthur Schlesinger, on the other hand, VVEiS not so certain. He argued that Richberg was a planner who could be militant and radical if he were in the mood.50 E3(‘3hlesinger wondered, though, how much of Richberg's JTedical militancy was rhetoric and how much reality, Q Specially during the early New Deal days.51 His ambiguous Q~Ctions while counsel of NRA are difficult to explain. It §eemed that Richberg, susceptible to flattery, by late 1934 \ 49Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph ( :Boston: Little, Brown and_Co., 1956), pp. 263, 265, 351, 3 53; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox ( blew York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1956), pp. 177, l :58, 193, 153-154, 372; William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. goosevelt and The New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) , hp. 35, 68-69, 84, 85, 197—108, 248, 75-76. Quote is from kStreidel, p. 263. Neither Freidel nor Burns analyzed Rich— berg as a planner. 50Schlesinger, The Cricis ef the Old Order, pp. 147, 2- '78, 458; The Coming e_f_ the New Deal, pp. 92-93. 51Schlesinger, The Coming e: the New Deal, pp. 106- 107. Schlesinger felt that as Richberg rose in power, he became more insecure (p. 164) . 31 mklearly 1935, began to listen more to his business friends tjmn the liberals with the result that there was a notice- aflfle change in him to a conservative stance by the end of NRAJ .He had changed and was inconsistent, while Tugwell remained staunch in his progressivism. Always a consistent planner with well-defined programs, Tugwell demonstrated the fundamental conflict between "the theorist and the activist," one being radical and the other realistic. He ‘was audacious and shocking, but not so radical.52 He was essentially a practical planner whose "occasional cockiness cu:condescension of manner" got him into trouble and ewehtually caused his own decline.53 In short, Tugwellian Eflanning offered an alternative to Roosevelt, but an lanmXEptable alternative as long as Tugwell prOposed it. Siflflesinger thereby placed the responsibility on Tugwell, hot Roosevelt. New Left historians, especially Howard Zinn EamiPaul Conkin, have reversed this. Unlike the liberal historians of the late 19505 and eeanur19605, New Left historians are quite critical of Roosevelt and the New Deal. They generally agree that Roosevelt was too conservative to institute the radical memnues necessary to have made America more democratic, unn:the New Deal failed to help the underprivileged groups e d 4 52Schlesinger, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. l96ff. an 00. ’— 53 3&3361 Schlesinger, Qggigg of the New Deal, pp. 351, fii 32 in American society, and that Roosevelt simply restored the undemocratic capitalistic structure which had existed before 1929. More importantly, they also agree that Tugwell knew what had to be done since he was the only true radical in the New Deal. He was a "bold advocate of national planning" which was designed to help the lower-income groups.54 An embittered reformer, he also pointed the way to recovery and a new America. But, Roosevelt was too con- servative in his philOSOphy and experimentalism to heed his advice. In Tugwell's thinking, ". . . there were faint echoes of technocracy, a hint of a corporate state, and a near arrogant contempt for such traditional values as Competition, small economic units, and fee simply property - .." which caused Roosevelt to ignore Tugwell's designs for America. It was Roosevelt's fault, not Tugwell's, for net employing planning on a grand scale. Roosevelt, not Tugwell, therefore, failed to achieve a better American 55 The alternative was there, but Roosevelt refused society. to accept it. What the New Left historians like Zinn and Conkin are saying is that they prefer the radical Tugwell to the conservative Roosevelt. They have exaggerated Tugwell's g 54Howard Zinn, ed., New Deal Thought (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966) , p. xxii. For the most part, the New Left completely ignores Donald Richberg. C SSPaU1 Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Thomas Y. rowell Co., 1967), pp. 32' 39. 33 role in the New Deal as well as the pervasiveness of his planning programs. Without verifying their hypotheses, they seem simply to have reacted to the favorable analyses of the liberal historians. And, they have accomplished this without analyzing Tugwellian planning in any detail. In this last respect, Ellis Hawley is accountable too. Obsessed with categories and labels, Hawley described Richberg and Tugwell in terms of the "typical" business planner and the "typical" intellectual planner. He did not analyze either man's planning conceptions individually or in any detail. Instead, he simply characterized them. Whereas Richberg was a conservative business planner who "stood essentially for a policy of business-government COOperation, under which the government would aid business- men in planning and coordinating their future activities," Tugwell was an intellectual planner who favored strong governmental supervision of the planning function out of 56 Did both men consistently distrust for businessmen. Support these programs? Did their planning ideas evolve \efore, during, or after the New Deal? Were their programs substantively Operational in March, 1933 or thereafter? Hawley does not answer since his categorization prevents him. And, by refusing to do so, he not only failed to resolve the confusion over New Deal planning, but he also 56Hawley, pp. 45-46, 401-402. The latter pages are the location of the quote. 34 fiflled to step beyond the stereotypic labels which these U«>New Deal planners had been shackled with. Fortunately, at.1east two historians have not failed to step beyond this labelling process: Bernard Sternsher and Thomas Vadney. Biographers of Tugwell and Richberg respectively, they specifically directed their analyses to dispelling the myths ‘which surrounded these men. According to Sternsher, Tugwell was neither a socialist nor a communist, but rather a democrate who ". . . criticized the capitalistic system not because he vnuued to destroy it, . . ., but because he wished to immmove it." His proposals were in the pragmatic-idealistic 57 His critics, however, people like American tradition. Alva Johnston, Frank Kent, David Lawrence, Mark Sullivan, Eum.Blair Bolles deliberately created a distorted image of 13hm58 They believed Tugwell was the clever revolutionary ' lead monotonous lives, surrender their freedom, suffer "e< 46; Tugwell, Address to Adult Education Association (Otztober 29, 1933), USDA Press Release, Tugwell papers, 30)::46; Tugwell, "The President's Monetary Policy," Novrember 5, 1936, p. 3, Tugwell papers, Box 47; Tugwell, Managing Money," November 14, 1933, pp. 1-7, Tugwell papers, Box 46; Tugwell, Diary (Expanded Form), April 24, 19344, p. 3, Tugwell papers, Box 19; Tugwell, Diary (Expanded 227 by themselves, he did not believe that they could restore recovery, although they could contribute to it. Essentially, what Tugwell was saying was that the Depression was a complex phenomenon and one which could not be resolved with simple, utOpian formulas. Public works programs, direct federal relief, deficit spending, pro- gressive taxation, governmental operation of depressed industries, reflation, and currency management--all of these suggestions, if implemented simultaneously, could alleviate the symptoms of the economic crisis. In doing so, moreover, they would not only prevent a revolutionary ferment from develOping any further, but they would also help in creating a more viable economic framework in which the causes of the Depression could be dealt with. In Tugwell's thinking, only planning could eliminate those causes by correcting the basic disparities within the American economic system and by restoring the fundamental balance between industry and agriculture. A long-range program, he was convinced, had to be adopted because it represented America's only alternative for surviving in the twentieth-century. With this sense of urgency, it was not surprising, therefore, ifllat he persisted in his efforts to convince Roosevelt of —¥ F01:m), 1932-1934, pp. 20-21, Tugwell papers, Box 19; Tugrwell, "Prices and Dollars," and "Our Weight in Gold," botzh in Rexford Tugwell, The Battle For Democragy, pp. 48— 51, 25-28; Sternsher, pp. 59-61, 62, 71, 314-315. 228 the need for planning, especially after the President-elect took Office on March 4, 1933. After Roosevelt's inauguration, Tugwell's role as an advisor changed again. Instead of merely offering proposals for dealing with the agricultural and industrial crisis, he now became actively involved in formulating and administering policies adopted by the President for over- coming the Depression. This was particularly true in the case of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery Administration. In both instances, Tugwell aided in drafting the legislation, worked to make the programs effective, and advised the President on alter- natives after the Supreme Court declared them unconstitu- tional. More importantly, in both instances, he publicly defended the principles on which they were based, while, in private, he criticized their administrators. For Tugwell, the AAA and the NRA represented America's first steps towards the planned economy and, being so, he felt a per— sonal reSponsibility for their survival in the American system. In many respects, Tugwell was one of the men most responsible for the creation of the AAA in 1933. As a professional economist in the 1920s, he had written pro- liqfically on the farmer's problems stemming from World War I and the basic inelasticity of agriculture. As an advisor in the 1928 presidential campaign, he had unsuccessfully suggested his Advance Ratio Plan to Governor Smith. And, 229 as a Brains Truster, he had persistently advised Governor Roosevelt on the importance of re-establishing an equilibrium between industry and agriculture in confronting the crisis of the Depression. In all these activities, however, Tugwell had not been able to offer a politically acceptable and an economically feasible farm program because he believed that the resolution of the farm problem depended on long-term, land-use policies involving planning and not short-term, "fly-by-night" panaceas, such as McNary- Haugenism and other dumping schemes. Based on political considerations and "negative" policies, he felt these proposals sought to deal with the symptoms of farm distress, not its causes.44 Tugwell did not believe, thought, that this was true of all the farm prOposals Offered in the early 19305, especially the voluntary domestic allotment plan. Although he had heard of the plan in late 1931, Tugwell did not seriously acquaint himself with its principles until the spring of 1932. At first, he met with three of the sponsors of the prOposal, Beardsley Ruml, M. L. Wilson, and Henry Wallace, in April-May, and then, at Roosevelt's request, he attended an agricultural conference iJI June where the domestic allotment idea was explained 44Tugwell, Diary, December 31, 1932, p. 35 and Jazauary 6, 1933, p. 46, Tugwell papers, FDR Library. 230 to him in detail.45 From that point on, Tugwell became the chief exponent of the plan among the Governor's advisors as well as the primary medium through which the sponsors of the idea could meet with Roosevelt. In retrospect, it is not surprising that he acted in this way because the domestic allotment plan coincided with many of the sug- gestions he was making throughout the 19205 and early 19305. Like Tugwell's own Advance Ratio Plan, the purpose of domestic allotment was to equalize farm supply with consumer demand through a system of voluntary agreements among farmers. However, unlike the ARP, the domestic allotment prOposal was more detailed and specific. According to this prOposal, agricultural experts, "using historical amounts of production as base figures," would calculate "the total prOSpective sale of export crops in the domestic market" and then allocate Specific amounts of production for each COOperative farmer. In return for his agreeing not to plant more than his specific allotment, the farmer would receive "payments which, when added to the selling price," would give him a parity return "on the domestically 45Tugwell, The Brains Trust, pp. 453, 457, 459; Sternsher, pp. 46 and 174. The actual originators of the ,plan were John Black, William J. Spillman, M. L. Wilson, Beardsley Ruml, Mordecai Ezekiel, and Henry Wallace-—all Vflarking cooperatively for the most part. See Edward L. arud Frederick Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace gf Iowa: 2M3 [aggrarian Years (Iowa: Iowa State UniverSity Press, 1968), PP«- I25ff.; Sternsher, pp. 183ff. Also, see Mordecai Ezeakiel, "Facts On the Domestic Allotment Act," January 15, 19333, p. l, Tugwell papers, FDR Library, Box 3. 231 consumed portion of his product." If, however, the same farmer produced more than he agreed to, his excess pro- duction would receive only the prevailing world prices and nothing else.46 Completely dependent on his COOperation, the domestic allotment idea was designed to convince the farmer that the less he produced, the more money he would make. It also attempted to demonstrate to the farmer that the problem of the surplus could only be resolved by him- self.47 In view of EurOpe's inability to buy American goods in the midst of the world depression and the saturation of the American market itself, the advocates of domestic allotment hOped to convince the farmer that his only hope lay in COOperation and restricted production, at least in the immediate future. COOperation, planning, and expertise --these were the keys to farm prosperity as far as they, and Tugwell, were concerned. In Tugwell's thinking, domestic allotment was impressive because it was Specific in its implementation procedures and politically feasible in its voluntarism. By making the farmer socially conscious, he felt that it would relieve the immediate burden of farm distress, aid in laying the foundation for a long-range land-use prOgram, and facilitate the establishment of a "regulated and Imalanced" economy. At the same time, however, he also ¥ 46Sternsher, p. 173. 47 pp- 7-100 Ezekiel, "Facts On the Domestic Allotment Act," 232 believed that it would encounter quite a bit of Opposition. A new approach to the farm question, it ignored the traditional remedies of tariffs and McNary-Haugenism and in doing so, it could incur the wrath of the more conser— vative farm leaders.48 To prevent that, Tugwell, there- fore, began a vigorous campaign to sell the domestic allotment idea to the American peOple. Between November, 1932 and March, 1933, he collaborated closely with M. L. Wilson, Mordecai Ezekiel, and Frederick Lee, a Washington attorney, in writing propaganda supporting domestic allotment, in drafting legislation incorporating its principles, and in encouraging the lame-duck Congress to act quickly. In view of the deteriorating farm situation, Tugwell was particularly adamant in demanding that the Congress implement domestic allotment.49 With farm prices declining, foreclosures increasing, and farm discontent intensifying, he feared that violence might erupt and Spread quickly throughout the country. Unfortunately, political considerations were more important to the Congress than actual conditions and, as a result, nothing was done. After Roosevelt's inauguration on March 4, however, the status of domestic allotment changed drastically. 48Tugwell, Diary, January 6, 1933, pp. 46-52, frugwell papers, FDR Library. 49Schapsmeier, pp. l69ff.; Lord, pp. 326ff.; Sternsher, pp. 185ff. 233 Under the supervision of Henry Wallace, the new Secretary of Agriculture, the supporters of the prOposal held con- ferences and produced a compromise draft bill for con- gressional consideration. Introduced on March 16 in the House of Representatives, the bill immediately ran into the opposition of inflationists and conservative farm leaders. Objecting to the restrictive production features of the bill as well as its taxing provisions, they sought to kill it in committee. By early April, this strategy seemed to be working so well that President Roosevelt intervened. Having committed himself to domestic allotment, he sought to salvage as much of it as it could. To placate the inflationists, he accepted the Thomas amendment to the AAA which allowed him, as President, to expand the currency. To placate the Opponents of controlled production, moreover, he ordered Wallace, Tugwell, Jerome Frank and Frederick Lee to meet with George Peek, the prominent McNary-Haugenite, to work out their differences. Although several confer- ences were held in April and May, Peek refused to compromise on production control, arguing instead for marketing agree- ments. On May 3, though, he agreed to accept those pro- visions of the bill for restrictive production as a last resort only, while simultaneously agreeing to be the chief administrator of the program. Within ten days of his 234 decision, opposition to the bill subsided and the Agri- cultural Adjustment Act was enacted into law.50 In its final form, the AAA was a hodgepodge of ideas and methods designed to satisfy everyone. Purporting to bring about a balance between the production and con- r sumption of farm goods so that farm income would have the i same relative purchasing power that existed from 1909-1914, i: it empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to do any of several things. For the basic farm products, such as wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, tobacco, milk, and rice, the AAA could enter into agreements with individual farmers by which the AAA would pay the farmer to limit his production. The AAA could also buy up agricultural surplus and/or lend money to farmers, accepting their cr0ps as collateral until prices rose. In this instance, the Commodity Credit Corporation, created in the fall of 1933, was to act as the lending agency. Finally, the AAA, through the Secretary of Agriculture, could subsidize agricultural exports if it so desired. The entire program was to be financed from revenues acquired from a special tax on food and fiber processors, who, in turn, could pass the tax on to the 51 consumer. ‘ 50For a detailed discussion of the Peek-Wallace et.al. conferences, see Schapsmeier, pp. 170-173 and fiternsher, pp. 188-190. Tugwell never denied that he was Cuae of the authors of AAA. See Tugwell, "The Reminiscences 0f Rexford Tugwell," pp. 42-43. 51Schapsmeier, pp. 173-174; Sternsher, p. 190. TClgwell later stated that he and Jerome Frank conceived 235 Although the AAA was legally supposed to be administered by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace and AAA Administrator George Peek, this did not happen once the AAA was in Operation. As Assistant Secretary of Agri- culture, and later as Under-Secretary, Tugwell played a prominent role in the overall and daily Operation of the program. The reason for this was quite Simple. Tugwell .f— 41" 1 fl.‘ _ 4 an '11.- _" a was appointed to Agriculture because he had helped Roosevelt in the campaign; he had consistently championed domestic allotment before its passage; and, he got along rather well with Wallace. More importantly, Wallace himself had requested that Roosevelt appoint him his Assistant because he needed help in dealing with the administrative details of running his Department. Recognizing his own limitations in this area, Wallace simply believed Tugwell would be a valuable asset to him. For his part, Roosevelt agreed and he offered Tugwell the position. In accepting the appoint- ment, Tugwell naturally defined his responsibilities very broadly, believing that he would assist the Secretary in all activities within the Department, including the AAA. Although this interpretation of his authority would eventually lead to serious problems within Agriculture, Tugwell, in May, 1933, was justified in thinking the way .he did. For all practical purposes, the AAA was within his \ tile Commodity Credit Corporation. Tugwell, "The Reminis- CGEnces of Rexford Tugwell," pp. 50-51. 236 jurisdiction and, as such, subject to his influence and direction.52 In all his speeches and writings as Assistant, and later Under-Secretary of Agriculture, Tugwell consistently defended the AAA. Emphasizing its voluntary, experimental nature, be continuously characterized it as a temporary prOgram seeking to achieve a dual purpose. In the short- run, it was attempting to assist the farmer by reducing the "spread between Operating costs and retail prices" as well as the "Spread between the prices which farmers receive and those which consumers pay." In the long-run, moreover, it was laying the foundation for the permanent land-use planning necessary to sustain agriculture's survival in the twentieth-century.53 Although the short-run objective conflicted in some instances with the longer-range goal, Tugwell did not believe that the clash seriously endangered 52Tugwell, Diary, January 7, 1933, p. 48, January 24, 1933, p. 77, February 17, 1933, p. 97, February 18, 1933, p. 99, Tugwell papers, FDR Library; H. A. Wallace to ‘ Rexford Tugwell, January 28, 1933 and H. A. Wallace to - Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum, May 14, 1934, both in ‘ Tugwell papers, FDR Library, Box 3 and FDR papers, FDR Library, OF-l respectively; Sternsher, pp. 86-89, l90-l9l, 251-261. Tugwell, of course, supported Wallace's appoint- mentzas Secretary of Agriculture in February, 1933. 53Rexford Tugwell, "Our Lands in Order," USDA grass Release (August 4, 1933), pp. 1-3 and Tugwell, flxrversified Attack," column (October 15, 1933), p. 3 both J{|€Pugwell papers, FDR Library, Boxes 46 and 47 respec- trVelyu Also, Tugwell, "Taking the Initiative," column (9Ct0ber 28, 1933), pp. 2-3, both in Tugwell papers, FDR leramyy Boxes 47 and 46 respectively. .. 237 the effectiveness of the overall program. Many of the shorter-term devices being employed, such as crOp reduction, would eventually be abandoned once the more permanent land policies were adOpted and implemented. In many respects, Tugwell believed that the explanation for it lay in past governmental land policies. Between the founding of the republic and the onset of the Depression, Tugwell felt that the government, especially on the federal level, had pursued reckless, wasteful, and irrational prOgramS in distributing the public domain. Without any concern for the future, the government gave the land away to anyone who would settle it, whether individual farmers or, in the late nineteenth-century, industrial concerns. By 1900, land exploitation by private interests had reached such alarming proportions that a conservation movement was started to salvage what was left. Demanding that the government assume its reSponsibility in protecting the nation's most abundant resource, the conservationists successfully coerced the government on all levels to adOpt a more scientific and efficient approach to land utilization. But, Tugwell also felt that their success was temporary because, with World War I and the return to normalcy in the: 19205, private interests again took control of the Putilic domain and exploited it for their own benefit. Enccnxraged by the federal government particularly, these Private interests speculated in wild—eyed enterprises, ruthlessly stripped the land of its wealth, and ignored the 238 basic principles of land-use to such an extent that they contributed to the outbreak of the Depression. More importantly, Tugwell believed that this private exploitation forced the American peOple generally to re-examine their attitudes towards the land and to demand that the federal government devise new programs for develOping it in the general interest. With the Hoover administration refusing to do this, Tugwell concluded that the New Deal had to, and, it was in this context that it implemented the AAA.54 For Tugwell, the basic principles underlying the AAA, and the New Deal farm program generally, were the simple assumptions that land is a commodity affecting the entire economic system, that the federal and state govern- ments can "go a long way in planning the use of the public domain," and that an agriculture-industrial balance had to be established before the Depression could be resolved. In attempting to reduce acreage so that "probable pro- duction" would be brought more closely in line "with probable consumption," the AAA, moreover, was trying to persuade the American farmers to work together so as to cultivate the soil of the United States as though it were one single farm, to keep out of certain kinds of production fifty million acres of land, to assure the production of food and fibres we need, with ample 54Rexford Tugwell, "The Place of Government in a National Land Program," Address to a joint Meeting of the ‘erican Economic Association, American Statistical Association, and the Farm Economic Association (Philadelphia, December 29, 1933) , USDA Press Release, Department of Agri- (“thure, NA, Box 293. Also in Tugwell, The Battle For My, pp. 143-164. 239 reserves both for export and carryover, to protect drainage and water supplies through a great prOgram of reforestation, and through special credit and financial institutions to keep the farmer on his farm and the farm family in the farm home during a period of terrible economic insecurity throughout the world.55 In this sense, the New Deal and the AAA were trying to save American capitalism, not destroy it. More importantly, f Tugwell argued that the methods employed by the government 1 to achieve this objective were in the American democratic tradition. Without coercing the farmer to do anything, the government was simply asking him to COOperate in its grand planning effort to restore the economic system.56 If it succeeded, everyone would Share in the results, but, if it failed, then, the farmer would have to assume some of the responsibility for that failure. In a similar vein, Tugwell also felt that the processing tax used in the AAA was constitutional and within the American framework. Although representing "a Shift in purchasing power from one group [the consumer] to the other [the farmer]" it still did not imply class 55Rexford Tugwell, Remarks as Assistant Secretary Of Agriculture in the NBC Farm and Home Hour (February 2, 1934), p. 4, Tugwell papers, FDR Library, Box 46; Rexford Tugvmfldq "Address over CBS" (July 31, 1934), USDA Press Release, Department of Agriculture, NA, Box 302. . 56Rexford Tugwell, "Renewed Frontiers," Mg!_York 3155§§ (January 14, 1934), pp. 1, 3, 7, Tugwell papers, FDR Iqlxrary, Box 46; Rexford Tugwell, "Address Before the NlagaraCounty Pioneer Association" (New York, August 8, 1934), pp. 2-3, 11 and Rexford Tugwell, "Address at Slemson College" (South Carolina, August 15, 1934) , pp. 3ff., SDA Press Release, Department of Agriculture, NA, Box 302. 240 legislation. In Tugwell's Opinion, there were two reasons why this was so: First, no recovery can occur until farmers are able to buy industrial products on an ample scale, so that the temporary disadvantage to the consumer will be overcome just as fast as an increased farm buying power gets to work. Second, an increase in farm income means a direct expansion of purchasing power--much of it, as in the case of farm machinery, of special importance to the capital-goods industries. In practical terms, Tugwell argued this meant that there was a direct correlation between mass production and mass consumption. Each depended on the other, and, considering the effect the Depression had on the farmer, it was of the utmost importance to make certain that farm income were increased prOportionately. The AAA, through the processing tax, was doing that and, therefore, it was justified in attempting to Shift purchasing power from one group to another. In defending the AAA in this way, Tugwell was saying that the devices employed by the program were temporary expedients which, in the Short-run, would facilitate the restoration of the farmer to a more equitable position within the economic system while, in the long-run, they Vflnild have little or nothing to do with eliminating the basic causes of farm distress. To accomplish that, more Permanent policies would have to be implemented and those Pelicies would have to deal with the basic problem of the ‘ 57Rexford Tugwell, "The Price Also Rises," Fortune IX (January 1934), 108. '_"" 241 land itself, especially in terms of retiring sub-marginal land, re-orienting the family farm, and revising the American value system. Despite arguments to the contrary, Tugwell emphasized that the American individualistic philosophy contributed to the outbreak of the Depression generally and the agricultural crisis particularly. By promoting the individual's rights, this philOSOphy encouraged the govern- ment to pursue lax land policies which, in turn, encouraged private interests to abuse the land. Individual farmers especially were reSponsible for this land misuse because they planted more land than they had to. In doing so, moreover, they not only created a surplus problem, but they also contributed to soil erosion. By 1933, Tugwell felt that so much of the land had been damaged that a Significant portion of the farm pOpulation migrated to the cities in order to escape the poverty-ridden existence they were leading--all to no avail. Ill—prepared for industrial occupations, they could not adjust to urban life and, as a result, their situation got even worse. More importantly, those who stayed on the farm were also suffering because the land could no longer produce a livelihood. Desolate and barren, the land, in short, had lost much of its Preductive power and, in Tugwell's opinion, until that power was restored, the farm depression would continue 242 indefinitely--regardless of any Short-term artificial means employed to sustain the farmer.5 In light of this, Tugwell recommended that the federal government act quickly to initiate a permanent land-use program. Specifically, he suggested that the government withdraw approximately one-seventh of the public domain from use, including the submarginal lands of the Appalachian highland, the Piedmont.Plateau, the Great Lakes, and the Great Plains. Here, the government would restore the soil through massive reforestation projects. In addition, the government would have to move people from the submarginal lands to better, more productive lands. By relocating these farmers, the government would be providing a "real alternative to poverty living" while simultaneously making them more productive in the economic system generally. And, finally, the government would have to consider seriously whether or not consolidated farms should replace the more inefficient individual ones. In Tugwell's thinking, If individual agricultural workers are to operate at a high level of productivity, if at the same time agri- cultural production is to be limited to the effective demand for agricultural products, there must be a very appreciable reduction in the proportion of American workers engaged in commercial agriculture--preferably by the gradual transference of some farm laborers and tenants who are now Operating at a low level of 58Rexford Tugwell, "National Significance of Recent intends in Farm Population," Sggial Forces 14 (October 1935), Pp. 1-7, in Tugwell papers, FDR Library, Box 70. 243 productivity, with low incomes, and some farm operators who are working on submarginal lands, into at least part-time production of goods and services for which there is a more elastic demand. Part of these goods and services may be directed toward retaining the pOpu- lation remaining in agriculture, resulting in better housing for rural families, better schools for rural children, more nurses, doctors, telephones, books, and clothes, and more adequate diets both for farm families and for city families.59 More importantly, fewer commercial farmers might be the only way to sustain an equitable, lasting balance between industry and agriculture. With technological efficiency daily enhancing industrial productivity, Tugwell emphasized that it was essential for agriculture to follow suit and, considering the SOphistication of the American economic system, farm consolidation might be the only way to do it. Although land withdrawal, resettlement, and farm consolidation were the initial steps in a land-use program, Tugwell did not believe they were the only ones. Much more would be necessary, although he was not certain what Specifically would have to be done. In this respect, 59Tugwell, "The Place of Government in a National Land Program," pp. 158ff.; Tugwell, "The Planned Use of the Land," Today I (January 20, 1394), 7, 23-24, Tugwell papers, FDR Library, Box 69; Tugwell, "The Farmers Control of Industry" (June, 1934), p. 5 and "Nature and Agricultural Adjustment," Address to Annual Farm and Home Picnic (South Dakota, June 29, 1934), pp. 4ff., both in Tugwell papers, Boxes 47 and 46 respectively; Tugwell, "National Signifi- cance of Recent Trends," p. 6. Quote is from the latter. Tugwell's ideas on resettlement will be develOped further in the next chapter in the discussion of the Resettlement Administration. As early as March, 1934, Tugwell had -intimations of such an agency. See Tugwell to the President, Iflarch 3, 1934, FDR papers, FDR Library, OF 1, Box 2. See iilso Tugwell, Diary (Expanded Form), "From An Administra- txor's Notebook: The Outlines of a Permanent Agriculture," p19. 53-63, Tugwell papers, Box 21. 244 Tugwell argued that experience would fill in the details and that farmer-government cooperation would determine how successful the program was progressing. Like any long-term planning program, land-use needed time and Tugwell was hOping that it would get it. In spite of Tugwell's public Optimism that the New Deal through the AAA was striving to help the farmer in the short-and long-run, he privately expressed serious reser- vations about the way in which the program was being administered by the Washington bureaucrats, especially George Peek. Here, the irony of Tugwell's concern was that he had initially supported the appointment of Peek as Administrator of the AAA, only to find that, within a very short time, he would become his chief Opponent. Before the passage of the AAA, Tugwell believed that Peek was the most logical choice for Administrator. Although disagreeing with him on several critical issues, he considered Peek to be a forceful, intelligent per- sonality who had the "best graSp of anyone" of the AAA potential, even though he did tend to be too conservative in philosophy and too international-minded in temperament. .More importantly, Tugwell and Wallace both felt that Peek, a veteran of McNary-Haugenism and a close friend of Bernard JBaruch, was the only one who could quash congressional -. -,7 r —- - 6 .fiw] - v D I I I I O 1 ‘ ‘ | O o u 6 A I O I 3 I u ‘ u . 0 u 1 b . 4 I I _ I ‘ § « a f—"‘ 440 insights into how Richberg was operating in the NRA and into how Tugwell directed the RA. More importantly, they demonstrated that both men were trying to implement planning in their respective spheres of authority to the best of their abilities. In the long-run, though, one has . to wonder if.the time and effort expended in discovering this is worthwhile. In this dissertation, it was to a degree. Oral Memoirs A somewhat more interesting source of information for this dissertation was the oral history collection at the Columbia Oral History Project. In all, 15 memoirs were examined, including the memoirs of Harry Mitchell, Oscar Stine, Arthur Krock, William Cumberland, Louis Bean, Rudolph Evans, Chester Davis, Will Alexander, Samuel Bledsoe, Charles Fahy, Jerome Frank, John Frey, Lindsey Rogers, Cleveland Rogers, and Rexford Tugwell. Of these, only the Chester Davis, Will Alexander, Jerome Frank, and Rexford Tugwell accounts were significant and useful. The Davis and Alexander memoirs were important for the information they contained on Tugwell's activities in the USDA and the RA, while the Frank and Tugwell memoirs were important for their commentaries on Richberg's performance in the NRA. .. 441 Published Memoirs In addition to the oral accounts at the Columbia Project, several published memoirs of prominent New Dealers were also examined. These included, Harold I Ickes. The Autobiography pf a Curmudgeon. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943. . The Secret Diary of Harold I. Ickes. Volume I: The First Thousand Days, 1933-i936. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953. Hugh S. Johnson. The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and 55., 1935. David E. Lilienthal. The Journals Of David E. Liliethal. Volume I: The TVA Years, 1939-1945, including a Selection pf Journal Entries from the 1917-1939 Period. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Raymond Moley. After Seven Years. New York: Harper, 1939. . The First New Deal. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966. Frances Perkins. The Roosevelt l Knew. New York: Viking Press, 1946. Samuel I. Rosenman. Working With Roosevelt. New York: Harper, 1952. Secondary Material While primary source materials served as the basis for the dissertation, some secondary works were consulted as well. For a detailed account of the secondary materials directly related to Richberg and Tugwell, the reader should review chapter 1. For information on all the secondary sources cited, he should review the footnotes. Without unduly repeating what has already been said and for the purpose of quick reference, the reader should be aware that the following materials were helpful. H D I O I I 0 I 0 ~ O 1 n I . O . t ’ 5 442 Among the political biographies of Donald Richberg and Rexford Tugwell, the two most important are Bernard Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964) and Thomas Vadney, The Wayward Liberal: A Political Biographypi Donald Richberg (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1970). A more specialized, published biography Of Tugwell is Charles T. Goodsell, Administration pf a Revolution: Executive Reform ifl Puerto Rico under Governor Tugwell, 1941-1946 (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965). A specialized, unpublished study of Donald Richberg which is quite good is ChristOpher Lasch, "Donald Richberg and the Idea of the National Interest," M.A., Columbia University, 1955. Among the general New Deal studies, the ones which were the most helpful for this thesis were Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age 9: Roosevelt, Volume I: The Crisis g£ the Old Order, 1919-1933, Volume II: The Coming pf the New Deal, and Volume III: The Politics 9: Upheaval, 1935- 1936 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956-1960); James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956); Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967); and William Leuchtenburg, Franklin 2. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). Among the more Specialized New Deal studies, the following were helpful: Irving Bernstein, The New Deal .0 443 Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950); Sidney Fine, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle: Labor, Management, and the Automobile Manufacturing Code (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem pf MonOpoly: A Study 32 Economic Ambivalence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Joseph L. Arnold, The New Deal $2 the Suburbs: A History pf the Greenbelt Town Program, 1935-1954 (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1971); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., IdeOlOgies and UtOpias: The Impact g£ the New Deal 92 American Thought (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969); Paul Conkin, Tomorrow A New World: The New Deal Community Program (New York: Cornell University Press, 1959); and Barton J. Bernstein, "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards A New Past; Dissenting Essays 3E American History (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 263— 288. Finally, among studies On economic theory and planning, the following were useful: Allan G. Gruchy, Modern Economic Thought: The American Contribution (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967); John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Signet Books, 1967); George Soule, A Planned Society (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932); Stuart Chase, A New Deal (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932); and, Howard Scott 444 others, Introduction pg Technocracy (New York: The John Day Company, 1933). 03174-4117 WI)! Am B“ I‘ll " H m3 "9 “"49“ N” l "HI”!