MSU LIBRARIES m RETURNING MATERIALS: PIace in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES wiII be charged if book is returned after the date stamped beIow. ENERGY PRICE SHOCKS, AND SHORT-RUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY: THE EVIDENCE FROM FIVE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES By Alireza Nasseh A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Economics 1982 ABSTRACT ENERGY PRICE SHOCKS, AND SHORTvRUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY: THE EVIDENCE FROM FIVE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES By Alireza Nasseh The dramatic increases in energy prices that occurred when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the world price of oil in 1973—197”, and again more than doubled it between the end of 1978 and early 1980, have had profound implications for the economies of all the industrialized countries. These energy price shocks played a dominant role, by most accounts, in bringing about the.deep recession and high inflation of thefimidv19703. The main purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of large increases in the price of energy since 1973 on the economies of the main industrialized countries. To this end,,a model of short-run aggregate supply with explicit treatment of energy prices was developed. We have concentra— ted on the supply side of the economy since the important effects of energy prices on macroeconomic activity occur largely through aggregate supply. The model has been estimated and simulated for five industrial countries; the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Large increases in the price of energy were found to have had substantial disruptive effects on the economies of most of the countries we have examined. In particular, the energy price shocks generated a sizable inflationary pressure in the U.S., Canada, U.K., and Germany. Furthermore, the adverse effects of higher energy prices on labor productivity, real wages, the capital utilization rate, and energy consumption were found to be significant and similar across countries, except for France. In the German economy, the effects of higher energy prices appear to be relatively larger than elsewhere, while the effects in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. are similar but smaller than those in Germany. In France, energy price shocks do not appear to have had a significant effect on the economy. TO MY PARENTS, AND TO MY WIFE, SHAHRZAD ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS One cannot complete a program of graduate study with- out the assistance and encouragement of a great many people who deserve recognition for their efforts. I must first express my sincere gratitude to Professor Robert H. Rasche, Chairman of my dissertation committee, for his invaluable advice and guidance throughout this study. He was a rich source of inspiration and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor James M. Johannes for many hours spent reading the various drafts of this disser- tation, and for his countless insightful suggestions. In addition, my thanks go to other members of my committee, Professors Edmund Sheehey and Christine E. Amsler, who also read the entire manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. Finally, I shall always be grateful to my parents, whom I owe an immense debt of gratitude for their unending support and encouragement through the years, and to my wife, Shahrzad, whom I owe my deepest thanks for her love and her patience in awaiting the completion of this dissertation. Terie Snyder typed the dissertation, and I would like to thank her for her efforts. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Tables. . . . . . . . . , , , vi List of Figures . . . . . . , . , , . , , , , , , , , , viii CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ..‘ , . , , . ‘ , , , , , , , , , 1 TWO - A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RECENT ENERGY PRICE BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “ 2.1 - Introduction , , , , , , , , , , , , H 2. 2 - Crude Oil Prices . . . 5 2. 3 - A Review of Empirical Studies of Energy Price Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 THREE - A THEORETICAL MODEL OF SHORToRUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY o o o o o o o o 0 Q o 0 Q o o o o 22 3.1 - Introduction . , , , , , , , , 22 3. 2 - The Model , , , , , , , , , , , , 22 3. 2.1 — Price Equation . . 27 3.2.2 - Wage Rate Equation or Short— Run Phillips Curve . , . . . . 33 3.2.3 - Short Run Demand for Labor . . , #3 3.2.u - Relationship Between Manhours and Employment . , . , HS 3.2.5 - Supply of Labor (Labor Force Participation) Equation , , , , #7 3.2.6 - Demand for Energy. . . , , . , , 50 3.2.7 - Supply of Energy . . , . . , , , 52 3.2.8 - Capital Utilization Rate . . . . 52 FOUR - EMPIRICAL RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . 56 u.1 - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 u. 2 - The Basic Estimation Technique . . . . . 56 u. 3 - Model Estimation . . . . . . . . . . 62 A. — United States of America. . . . . . 62 B. - Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 C. - United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . 73 D. — Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 E. — France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8“ F. — Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 iv CHAPTER PAGE FIVE - THE EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICE SHOCKS. . . . . . 93 5.1 - Introduction. . . . . . . . . . 93 5.2 - The Effects of Energy Price Shocks. . . 93 A. - United States of America . . . . . 93 B. - Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 C. - United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . 10“ D. - Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 E. - France . . . . 115 5.3 - The Relative Impact of. Energy Price Shocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 5.” - The Effect of Higher Energy Prices on the Shape of Aggregate Supply. . . . 126 SIX — SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 128 APPENDIX - DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES . . . . . . . . 131 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1M3 TABLES ”.1 Results of Results of Results of Results of Results of LIST OF TABLES Historical Historical Historical Historical Historical Actual Performance of 1973*19790 o o o 0 Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation the U.S. Economy Historical Simulation - U.S.A Absence of Abrupt Increases in Price of Energy - U.S.A. for For for for for U.S.A. Canada U.K. Germany. France Deviation from Base Case Forecasts - U.S.A. Actual Performance of the Canadian Economy 1973-19.79. . o o o 0 Historical Simulation — Canada. Absence of Abrupt Increases in Price of Energy — Canada - . . Deviation from Base Case Forecasts - Canada Actual Performance of U.K. Economy - 1973-1979. Historical Simulation - U.K. Absence of Abrupt Increases in Price of Energy — U.K. Deviation from Base Case Forecasts - U.K.. Actual Performance of Germany's Economy vi PAGE 9a 95 97 98 100 101 102 103 105 106 107 108 110 TABLES PAGE 5.1u - Historical Simulation - Germany- - - - - . - . 111 5.15 - Absence of Abrupt Increases in Price of Energy - Germany 0 o o o o o I 0 0 0 . ' ° ' ° ' ' ll 3 5.16 - Deviation from Base Case Forecasts - Germany - 11a 5.17 - Actual Performance of France's Economy 1973-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 5.18 - Historical Simulation - France - - - . . - - ~ 117 5.19 - Absence of Abrupt Increases in Price of Energy - France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 5.20 - Deviation from Base Case Forecasts - France- - 119 5.21 - The Marginal Impact of a 1% Increase in the Price Of Energy " U.S.A- o o o o o o o o o o 121 5.22 - The Marginal Impact of a 1% Increase in the Price of Energy — Canada. . . . . . . . . . 122 5.23 — The Marginal Impact of a 1% Increase in the Price of Energy — U.K. .. . . . . . . . . . 123 5.2” - The Marginal Impact of a 1% Increase in the Price of Energy - Germany . . . . . ... . . 12” 5.25 - The Marginal Impact of a 1% Increase in the Price of Energy « France. . . . . . . . . . 125 5.26 - The Estimates of Own Price Elasticity of Aggregate Supply in Five Countries. . . . . 127 vii LIST OF FIGURES PAGE Chart 2.1 — Saudi Arabian Crude Oil. . . . . . . . . . 8 Chart 2.2 - Output Growth in Six Countries . . . . . . 10 Annual Percentage Rate Chart 2.3 - The Rate of Increase in Prices in Six Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Annual Percentage Rate Figure 3.1 - A Model of Short-Run Aggregate Supply . . 2H viii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The economies of the world were so dominated in the 19708 by the effects of two oil crisis that the period has been aptly named "the OPEC decade".1 The dramatic increases in energy prices that occurred when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the world price of oil in 1973-1970, and again more than doubled it between the end of 1978 and early 1980, have had profound implications for the economies of all the industrialized countries. Other commodities have experienced rapid and substantial increases in price. The prices of grain and other agricultural products, for example, have experienced price fluctuations on the order of 300 or ”00 percent over years. Few people, however, would be as concerned about these events, or expect them to have anywhere near the impact on our standard of living that increases in the price of energy are likely to have. Higher energy prices have contributed to reduced economic growth in many countries, and in the longer-run may result in basic changes in lifestyles. V‘— IThis was the title of a special review of the world economy in the 19703 which was published in the Economist, 29th December 1979. How fast energy prices rise in the future will depend in part on the rate at which conventional energy resources become scarcer and more difficult to find, in part on the rate of technological change that lowers the cost of nonconventional energy sources, in part on the behavior of the OPEC cartel, and in part on the domestic energy policies of various countries. Although the dramatic increases of 1973-197N are not likely to continue, we should probably expect to see energy prices continue to rise in real terms, at least slowly, for the next few decades. This study develops a model of shortwrun aggregate supply for major oil consuming nations with explicit treatment of energy prices, and explores the effects of a change in the price of energy (oil) on the aggregate supply. The emphasis is on the supply side of the economy since important effects of energy on macroeconomic activity occur largely through aggregate supply. An increase in energy prices represents an increase in the cost of a major factor of production. Consequently, an increase in energy prices relative to other prices should result in a decline in the amount of goods and services supplied by the economy at any given level of prices, that is the aggregate supply curve should shift to the left. An attempt is made to measure the extent to which the aggregate supply curve shifts to the left, at any level of output, due to higher energy prices. An overview of the pattern of the crude oil price increases during the last decade, and a review of the empirical studies of the effects of energy price changes on the U.S. and other industrialized countries' economies are included in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, a model of short-run aggregate supply with explicit treatment of energy prices for major oil consuming nations is developed. Chapters Four and Five present empirical results. Specifically, in Chapter Four, the results of the statistical estimation of the model for five industrial countries; the United States, Canada, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are given. In Chapter Five, the empirical results of the effects of energy price shock are presented, in turn, for each country, and also a comparison of the relative effects of energy price shock is made among the countries included in this study. Finally, Chapter Six presents-some overall conclusions. CHAPTER TWO A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RECENT ENERGY PRICE BEHAVIOR 2.1 - Introduction The behavior of crude oil prices in the 19705 presents a record of apparent chaos. The roughly fourfold increase in the price of crude oil from 1971 through 1979 was partly responsible, by most accounts, for bringing about one of the longest and deepest post—war declines in economic activity in most industrial nations and causing a nearly world wide inflationary epidemic. The oil consuming nations experienced a second sharp rise in the price of crude oil in 1979-1980, in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Although the increase was not as great in percentage terms as that of 1s7a-197u, it came on top of a very sluggishrecovery in Western Europe and Japan, and a high underlying rate of inflation in the United States. In this chapter we first look in detail at the pattern of the crude oil price increases during the last decade. Next, we survey the results of several attempts to analyze and quantify the macroeconomic effects of the 1973-197H oil price increase on the U.S. economy, as well as other industrial countries‘ economies. 2.2 - Crude Oil Prices During the 19708 the average producer price of crude oil rose from about $2 a barrel to about $31 a barrel (May 1980). The increases in the price were largely concentrated in two periods, 1973-1979 and 1979-1980. The price of Saudi Arabian oil, which until recently was the standard by which most other crude oil prices were set, was $1.30 a barrel at the beginning of the 19708, much lower than it had been throughout the 19508, and much of the 1960s. With moderate inflation in the industrial countries, this would mean imported oil prices fell somewhat more in real terms. The steady decline in the dollar price of oil was brought to a halt in 1970, partly owning to action by the Organization of Petroleum Exportinngountries (OPEC). Throughout the postwwar period, the oil companies has generally controlled production and pricing, despite the fact that by the early 19708 the OPEC countries were the source of about 85 percent of world exports of oil. The OPEC countries pushed increasingly for participation in ownership and changes to existing contracts, securing new agreements in 1970 and 1971 which paved the way for further substantial changes in both price and participation. The posted price of Saudi Arabian oil, which had been $1.80 a barrel throughout the 19608 (even though actual discounted prices had fallen as low as $1.28), was raised between 1971 and early 1973 in three steps to $2.59 a barrel, and was at $3 a barrel before the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. The war and subsequent production cutbacks initiated a series of large price rises. In October the posted price of Arabian light crude increased to $5.11 a barrel, and in December 1973 the price was more than doubled to $11.65, a 350 percent increase on the price a year before. The immediate impact on the industrialized countries did not come from the price rise alone, but also from production cutbacks during the winter of 19739197“ and embargoes until March 1978 on the United States and the Netherlands. After this enormous surge, prices remained largely unchanged for almost the next five years - while declining in real terms. The period of relative oil price stability was brought to an end at the close of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, sparked off by the Revolution in Iran. The new series of price increases raised posted prices to $13.3u a barrel and then to $lh.55 a barrel in early 1979. The 28th June meeting of OPEC in Geneva raised the Saudi benchmark price from $1u.55 to $18.00, with a price ceiling of $23.50 which was itself soon broken by the more militant OPEC members. The Saudi price was later raised to $2“ and then to $26 (in January 1980) and to $28 (in May 1980). The average official OPEC export price of oil, which stood at $12.87 at the end of 1978, had moved to around $31 a barrel by May 1980, an increase of 1M0 percent. The average of $31 a barrel covers a wide spread which for light oils ranges from Saudi oil selling at $28 a barrel and Iranian oil selling at around $35 a barrel. Using the posted price of Saudi Arabian crude oil as a rough indicator of world oil prices, and export unit values of industrial countries as a rough index of the price of their product8,Chart2L].8hows the movement of the nominal price and the relative price of oil (that is, the nominal price of oil relative to export unit values of industrial countries) from 1955 to 1980. The nominal price of oil which had been roughly steady throughout the 19508 and 19608, increased almost 300 percent in 197981980. By contrast, the relative price of oil which has been declining through most of the 19508 and 19608, after rising sharply in 1973-197u, fell steadily from 197” to 1978, due both to inflation in the industrial countries and to depreciation of the dollar; In 1979 the deterioration of the relative price of oil ended and it jumped sharply upward. Moreover, the relative price has increased less in percentage terms in 1979-1980 than it did in 1973-197”. A casual review of the record for the United States and the five industrial countries is supportive of the view that all countries have shared a similar adverse impact due to energy price developments in the seventies. Charts 2.2 and2. 3 show the realvoutput growth rates and the rate—of‘price increases, respectively, for each of the six countries from 1960 to 1980. For France and the United Kingdom, the growth rates are for real GDP and the implicit price deflator. For the other countries, GNP data are used to 30 25 20 x>f-f-OU p 01 10 . “"NOHINRL PRICE """ RERL PRICE (1972 PRICES) 7 I I I I 1955 1960 1985 1970 1975 1980 Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF CHART 2.1 SAUDI ARABIAN CRUDE OIL to measure output and prices. As can be seen in Chart 2-2 in 1979-1975, and then again in 1979-1980 the growth rate of real output fell sharply in each of the six countries. In 1979-1975, the rate of increase in prices rose sharply in each of the six countries (Chart2.3). Subsequently the inflation rates declined in all six countries. In 1979 the decline in the inflation pace ended and it jumped upward again in 1979-1980. 2.3 - A Review of Empirical Studies of Energy Price Shocks During the last several years considerable theoretical and econometric effort has been made to understand and to model the effects of oil or-—more generally-—energy price increases. Furthermore, some analysts have attempted to measure the extent to which these higher energy prices have adversely affected the level of prices, or rate of inflation, output, productivity, investment and capital utilization, and other macroeconomic developments. There have been, however, considerable differences in the theoretical approaches taken ' by different analysts and also, the angle from which they have looked at the issue of energy price shocks and their effects on the economy. The most successful approach has been to consider energy as a primary input in production and concentrate on the effects of a rise in the price of energy relative to the price of output from the goods and services sector. This has implications for the income of non-energy factors of the production and for aggregate demand, but many 0, b2 < 0) (3.12) or O = O O ‘ m blq + b2 qt—l (3.12) where q is the ratio of industrial production to its 33' exponential trend. With this modification, the equation of aggregate price index can be written as follow: P = (I-n)Pt_li' nbléi'nbzqt_14-nawi-n8r . (3.13) + nApB - nA(ut) For estimation purposes, our price equation will be as: P : ao+alw+a2r+ “BEBE... unfit-1+ (1561+ (165115.11 (3.1a) + a7t 3.2.2 - Wage Rate Equation or ShortuRun Phillips Curve The Phillips curve began as the result of an empirical investigation of U.K. wage behavior by Phillips (1958), was extended and put into a theoretical disequilibrium context by Lipsey (1960), and was applied to the U.S. and set in a policy context by Samuelson and Solow (1960). The basic hypothesis of the Phillips curve is an application to the labor market of the familiar idea that price increases in response to excess demand and decreases in response to excess supply. For the sake of convenience, the rate of unemployment is used as a proxy for excess demand (or excess supply) in the labor market. The relation— ship between the rate of change of money wages and unemp10y« ment rate is generally thought to be non«linear; when the unemployment is near the frictional level, small variations in the unemployment rate might be expected to have a big 3N impact on the resulting wage change, on the other hand, if the rate of unemployment is already large, a small variation in this rate might be expected to have little impact on the rate of change of money wages. However, recent empirical studies (Cagan, 1977) and Papademos (1977) have demonstrated that non-linear and linear specifications seem to do about as well over the sample period through the mid 1970's; In addition, Phillips argued that the change in the unemployment rate and the percentage change in consumer prices would also influence the percentage change in money wages. Phillips' justification for including the change in the unemployment rate in the wage equation was that the change in unemployment rate is a plausible indicator of future labor market conditions. When the rate of unemployo ment is decreasing, employers would be expected to offer higher wages for the service of labor than when the rate of unemployment is constant. Conversely, when the rate of unemployment is increasing, employers will be less willing to grant wage increases to workers. Thus, the relationship between the‘rate of change of money wages and the change in the unemployment rate will be inverse. The effect of the rate of price increase on wages is clear. Phillips, and Lipsey (1960) pr0posed that workers would, at least partially, protect the real value of their earnings by bargaining for compensation for increases in the general level of prices. curve, i importa employe union 1 c) Iabc accordi but do trade-T (1966, that tj trade- Pested result labor that b 0n the momina PPoduC. aVePage iDCpeaE the act actual : highEF E ‘I’Ol‘keps ) that ‘ 35 In the subsequent extensions of the basic Phillips curve, new explanatory variables were included, the more important of which were: a) profits as an indicator of employers' ability to concede to higher wage demands; b) trade union membership as a proxy for worker's aggressiveness; c) labor productivity as a basic influence on wage rates according to neo-classical economic theory. These modifications to the Phillips curve qualify, but do not challenge, the conclusion that there is a longvrun trade—off between inflation and unemployment. Friedman (1966, 1968) and Phelps (1968) were the first who argued that there was a temporary, but not a longvterm stable trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Their argument rested on the idea that the short—run tradeaoff was the result of expectational error by economic agents. Friedman's labor market analysis (1968) made the explicit assumption that both the demand for labor and supply of labor depend on the real wage rather than on the nominal wage. Since the nominal wage was evaluated in terms of the current actual product price by employers and in terms of the expected average consumer price level by workers, employment could increase as long as the expected price level lagged behind the actual level (thus, simultaneously allowing a lower actual real wage to induce increased hiring by firms, and a higher expected real wage to induce a higher labor supply by workers). However, the expectational error can not persist so that employment returns to its equilibrium level. In 36 equilibrium the expected and actual price level are equal, and so in equilibrium only one level of unemployment and output is possible. Friedman named the associated unemployment rate (given population, technology, and labor participation) as the Natural Rate of Unemployment, NRU. The natural rate hypothesis also implies that attempts to hold the unemploy- ment rate below (above) the natural rate will cause an upward (downward) acceleration of prices indefinitely. The initial reaction of U.S. economists to the NRH was that the policy implications of the NRH could be safely ignored, on the empirical grounds that U.S. prices and unemployment were inconsistent with it. In its simplest form, the expectation hypothesis as applied to wage equation can be written as: wt = f(x) + apte (f' > 0) where w is the percentage change of money wage, pte is t the expected rate of inflation at time t, and X represents a measure of excess demand for labor (in turn related to the unemployment rate). Empirical confirmation of the NRH requires that the estimated coefficient on Ste be unity, - assuming the conditions that characterize the long run; a) be = p, that is expected price changes equal actual price changes; b) p = w, that is wage changes are fully reflected in the final prices. Initial empirical evidence on the NRH suggested that th fo th Pe to th. thT ex; stu the i.e, (196 the In 5917, 37 the hypotheses can be rejected for the U.S. and U.K. but not for Canada. More specifically, empirical wage studies for the U.S. by Turnovsky and Wachter (1972), Gordon (1971), Perry (1970), among others have found that the wage response to expected price change is significant but is less than one; that is, the coefficient a is approximately 0.3 to 0.5. On the other hand, studies for Canada by Turnovsky (1972) and J. Vanderkamp (1972) have found that the wage response to expected price change is not significantly different from one. However, more recent empirical evidence such as the studies by Gordon (1972) and McCallum (1976), suggest that the coefficient a is equal to one, implying the absence of a long-run tradeuoff between inflation and unemployment, i.e.; a long-run vertical Phillips curve. Ever since the publication of studies by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), it has been customary to include the expected rate of inflation as an important factor in the explanation of shortorun wage and price changes. Even if there is no longsrun tradevoff between inflation and unemployment, as implied by the NRH, the short-run tradeooff may be highly important. The nature of this short‘run trade-off is strongly influenced by what determines inflation expectation. A usual assumption about this expectation formation is that the expected rate of inflation is determined by historical rate of inflation. In particular, "adaptive expectation", as introduced by Cagen (1956), have been used in several theoretical and empirical studies of inflation 38 by Nordhaus (1975) and Tobin (1975), among others. Indeed the widespread use of adaptive expectations suggested that an ever-accelerating rate of inflation could maintain an unemployment rate below the natural rate of unemployment. More recently, this type of assumption about expectations has been challenged by the notion of "rational expectations", first introduced by Muth (1961) and incorpor- ated in the complete model of inflation by Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975). Expectations are defined as rational when the expectation error is unrelated to all the information available when expectations are formed, i.e., expectation of inflation is an unbiased prediction of actual inflation, given all the information available just before the period begins. Sargent and Wallace demonstrate that macro economic stabilization policy, even in the short run, cannot influence unemployment if expectations are formed "rationally", unless the policy makers act in an unpredictable way. The use of rational expectations in the theory of inflation and unemployment has been criticized by FiScher (1977), Gordon (1976 and 1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977), Taylor (1979) among others. It is not so much.the assumption of rational expectations in itself as_the implicit assumption about complete shorteterm flexible prices and wages that these economists criticize. Longsterm profit considerations and transaction costs involved in frequent price setting on the part of firms and multiperiod wage contracts have AL “1 A$k 39 often been mentioned as the underlying reason for sluggish short-run wage and price adjustment. These short-run price and/or wage rigidities can result in a short-run Phillips curve, so that the policy implications of the usual rational expectations model mentioned above are incorrect. Fischer (1977) constructed a rational expectations model with long— term labor contracts. He demonstrated that short-run wage rigidities due to the long-term contracts enables stabilize- tion policies to affect the behavior of real output in the short-run. According to Gordon (1977): "In light of wide« Spread evidence that prices adjust sluggishly to demand and supply shocks, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that for short-run analysis the application of rational expectations to economic policy should be regulated to the same scrap heap of discarded ideas where lie the earlier classical models of perfect market clearing laid to rest by Keynes forty years ago". "It is important to recognize that sluggish shorteterm price adjustment is not "irrational" and does not in any way contradict the idea that expectations should be formed rationally;'Gordon (1976). The specification of the wage adjustment relationship - the short-run Phillips curve e includes the conventional variables which have been found to be significant in previous researchJ The rate of unemployment, which serves as a proxy for the excess demand in the labor market, will appear in three differnt functional forms, namely linearly and inverted NO to the first and second power. Though theoretical consiv derations suggest a nonlinear form due to the downward rigidity of money wages and to the presence of bottlenecks at low levels of unemployment, some empirical research has discovered that the linear form is more suitable. Rather than make an arbitrary choice at the outset, we will experiment with all three forms in order to determine the one which is appr0priate for each individual nation. The change in the rate of unemployment is also included as a measure of expectations of the future of labor market conditions. In addition, the expected rate of inflation has been found to be an important factor in the explanation of short—run wage changes. Finally, the percentage change in labor productivity is also included. According to neoclassical economic theory, _this variable should exert a significant influence on the rate of wage changes. The theory postulates that labor services will be purchased until the marginal value product of labor just equals the money wage. Holding product prices constant, a rise in the marginal physical productivity of labor will shift the demand for labor curve outwards and, as equilibrium is reestablished, nominal wages will increase. In sum the wage equation can be written as; o - 0e 0 w — bo + blU + 1320 + b3 p + bu Lp (3.15) where w is the rate of change of money wages, U is the rate of unemployment which will take on one of the three forms NI outlined above, 0 is the (absolute) change in the rate of unemployment, be is the expected rate of inflation (unobservable) and LP is the rate of change in average labor productivity. The wage adjustment relationship given by (3.15) represents the equilibrium or desired wage changes, 3*. The sluggish short-term adjustment of wages to prices, (and other factors) can be incorporated into the wage equation by adopting the following simple adjustment mechanism: . = .* - . Aw 1(w wt_1) (3.16) or w = Aw* + (1-1) wt”1 (3.16') where A is the adjustment coefficient, (0 s A s 1). Combining equation (3.15) and (3.16)‘, we obtain the basic wage adjustment equation as: 1.+ AblU + 1b2 {a U + Ab3pe + 1b,, LP (3.17) The wage adjustment equation given by (3.17) can not Ibo + (.1--).) wt_ be directly estimated because data on pe do not exist. Thus, an expectation generating function has to be postulated. I The use of rational expectations appears to have become quite conventional in recent years, and, hence it will be adOpted for present purposes. The idea of rational expectations approach isto base expectations on the model itself. In particular, 1:2 expectations of pte are based on the information available at time t. 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The values of endogenous variables of the model for France, obtained in the historical simulation of the model are given in Table 5.18. Table 5.19 shows the model's projections for a base case describing the evolution of the French economy in the absence of abrupt increases in the price of energy. Finally, table 5.20 shows the deviation of the historical simulation of the model from the base case forecasts. Energy price shocks do not appear to have had a significant effect on the French economy. There is a rather small increase in the rate of inflation in 1970 and 1975, that could be attributed to the effect of energy price shocks. However, the increases in the price of energy have not had significant effect on the level of employment, or on labor productivity in France. Also, higher energy prices have not reduced the energy consumption in this country, however, they have led to a reduction in the capital utilization rate. 5.3 - The Relative Impact of Energy Price Shocks It may well be the case that the extent by which various countries have been adversely affected by higher energy prices differs across them. 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