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
Longitudinal Analysis of Senate Behavior:
A Methodological Inquiry

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ABSTRACT

LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BEHAVIOR: A METHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

By

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In this dissertation the longitudinal (non-cross-sectional) perspective has been defined (within the context of studies of Congressional behavior) to include not only dynamic studies such as before-and-after designs or panel designs, but also "static" studies which make systematic use of data from more than one Congress.

The first three Chapters discuss problems associated with the predominant cross-sectional approach and the nature and hypothetical advantages of longitudinal analysis. The longitudinal analyses in Chapters IV-VI were designed to broadly check explicit methodological hunches about the utility of longitudinal analysis and to further examine substantive assumptions about consistency and change in Congressional behavior.

It was found that the sharp limits of the cross-sectional perspective reduce opportunities for measurement, explanation, and prediction. The longitudinal perspective, on the other hand, increases the opportunities to reliably and validly measure otherwise elusive behavior such as the practice of, support for, or opposition to McCarthyism (Chapter IV). The longitudinal perspective helps us to identify predictors of recurring behavior, identify pivotal or

marginal decision-makers and thus helps clarify the strategic alternatives open to political leaders (Chapter V). And the longitudinal perspective helps to explain subtle behavior (for example, voting on foreign policy) that is likely to be misinterpreted in a cross-sectional perspective.

Probably the clearest advantage of longitudinal over cross-sectional analysis is in the study of change in individual behavior. If we accept consistency-change in rank order and consistency-change in magnitude as two basic dimensions for developing a typology of longitudinal analyses of consistency-change in legislative behavior -- each of the three types exemplified in Chapters IV, V, and VI fits in a different one of the three cells representing logically possible analyses. Chapter IV, a static study, fits in the cell representing consistency in both rank order and magnitude. Chapter V fits in the cell representing change in magnitude but consistency in rank order. And Chapter VI, a dynamic study, clearly fits in the cell representing change in both magnitude and rank order.

In addition to the methodological insights regarding the analysis of consistency-change there are substantive hypotheses about consistency change in Congressional behavior. The subsequent research (reported in IV, V, and VI) did not negate these assumptions.

Most Senators have rather well formulated policy tendencies by their first term in the Senate. These policy tendencies are supported by numerous interrelated and relative enduring values,

sympathies, identifications, beliefs, and attitudes, which guide cognitive processes such as perception, thinking, and memory.

Given the excessive cost of frequent and systematic surveys, many politicians hesitate to change much from "winning positions" taken in previous elections. Knowing that they won when they took positions x, y, and z hardly constitutes precise scientific evidence of why they won, but it may often be salient information for those who lack precise information. Furthermore, the rank order of constituencies is not likely to change dramatically in the short run on many of the constituency variables relevant to the overall policy positions of Senators.

There is an ideological bias in the social exposure and communication patterns of Senators that results in social reinforcement of their policy tendencies. That is Senators, once in office, establish working relations with like-minded people and tend to "hear" disproportionately from those who agree. This differential contact is due both to the predispositions of representatives and those of lobbyists, constituents and others who disproportionately contact politicians who lean their way.

These and the other informed hunches about consistency-change especially receive support from the research reported in Chapters IV and V, which like the "library research" cited in Chapter II, reveals impressive consistency over time.

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I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM

Introduction

Measurement lies at the juncture of theory and experience--the first contact of reason and nature.¹

Political scientists have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of the discipline. Often these expressions have been stated in terms of conflict between two alternative approaches or methodologies, for example, hyperfactualism versus general theory. Such explanations of the state of the discipline in terms of conflict between a fruitless and a fruitful approach may provide interesting, at times even dramatic reading, but such single-cause explanations provide insufficient clarification and guidance. One response to the plaint that we have "too much description and not enough theory" is the truism that "descriptive research and theory must develop together." But both the initial plaint that "we have too much description and not enough theory" and the response that "description and theory must develop together" suffer from oversimplification. It may be that we have had too much of some kinds of description--but what kinds of description have we had too much of? And it also may be that theory and description must develop together--but what kinds of description contribute to theory? Clearly there is need to differentiate between types of description that "we have too much of" and the types of description essential to theory-building.

¹Henry Margenau, "Philosophical Problems Concerning the Meaning of Measurement in Physics," in Measurement: Definitions and Theories (New York: John Wiley, 1959).

Before attempting to identify a few aspects of description that contribute to theory, it is well to ask: What is the role of description in science? And how does the interplay of empirical evidence and theory in political science compare with that in the scientific ideal?

The Theoretical Structure of a
Highly-Developed Science

In the scientific ideal there are tight formal connections among the concepts and epistemic connections (empirical indices) to link some of these concepts directly to the data. In Carl Hempel's terms the formal connections endow concepts with theoretical import, and the epistemic connections endow concepts with empirical import.² If the formal links are sufficiently tight it may be possible to get by with few empirical indices. All concepts not directly linked to data may nevertheless gain empirical import through the indirect connections provided by the formal net. In such a theoretical structure it is legitimate to include statements about unobservable entities.³

Margenau's description of the nature of a well-developed science may be diagrammed as follows:⁴

²Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II. No. 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 39-50.

³H. Feigl, "Philosophical Embarrassments of Psychology," The American Psychologist, XIV (1959), 127.

⁴Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), chap. 5.




Figure 1. Circles represent constructs.
 Single lines represent formal connections.
 Double lines represent epistemic connections
 (rules of correspondence).

A Typical Structure in Political Science

Political scientists have innumerable theoretical notions and innumerable observables but a poverty of scientific theory. A major reason for this lack of theory is the weakness of the connections between the theoretical notions (on the left, below) and the observables (on the far right, below).




Figure 2.
 Broken single lines represent weak formal connections.
 Double lines represent epistemic connections.
 Absence of lines represents insular concept (no connection).

Weak epistemic connections also account in part for the weak formal links (represented by the broken lines between the concepts in Figure 2). Little descriptive differentiation and flexibility (as with dichotomization) often means insufficient flexibility to formulate laws: That is, a low level of measurement or failure to measure not only may mean a weak epistemic connection but also may seriously hinder the expression of formal relations among concepts. Thus, partly because of the failure of much of the discipline to move beyond classification to ordinal and higher levels of measurement, we usually must resort to loose verbal connections between concepts.

Furthermore, because such loose verbal connections predominate in contemporary political "theory" and because most of the empirical indices

are also deficient, it is advisable for political scientists to develop many more indices than would otherwise be necessary. As Royce puts it:

Lack of a sufficient number of convincing formal multiple connections, . . . combined with weakness of epistemic correlation . . . suggests that less well-developed sciences . . . need to stay closer to the perceptual plane until they can provide tight formal nets in the conceptual plane.⁵

Exclusive attention to either side of the above figure is scientifically fruitless. Concepts must have both theoretical and empirical import. Because political scientists have mountains of low-level descriptions with little theoretic import but few effective epistemic connections, it is only prudent to devote more attention to the final stage of description--measurement. If this claim errs, it is in the direction of understatement. Perhaps Torgerson comes closer to correctly stating the importance of focusing more on the connections between data and theoretic concepts. After demonstrating how the low investment in measurement has made many theories immune to adverse results (by allowing the theorist to attribute negative results to weak measures), Torgerson states that:

The concepts of theoretical interest tend to lack empirical meaning, whereas the corresponding concepts with precise empirical meaning often lack theoretical import. One of the great problems in the development of science is the discovery or invention of constructs that have . . . both. (Italics mine.)⁶

It is therefore crucial that the reaction to hyperfactualism (excessive attention to the far right of the diagram) not be the equally

⁵J. R. Royce, "Factors as Theoretical Constructs," American Psychologist, XVIII (1963), 524. If staying "closer to the perceptual plane" were interpreted as meaning indiscriminate gathering of poorly connected facts, the consequence would be continued hyperfactualism. It is interpreted here as meaning multiple epistemic connections.

⁶Warren S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 8.

sterile error of confusing speculation for scientific theory. We cannot develop theoretical science first and then worry about mundane matters of measurement. "The development of a theoretical science . . . would seem to be virtually impossible unless its variables can be measured adequately."⁷

Recognizing the sterility of the twin excesses of hyperfactualism and speculation devoid of empirical import is one step toward scientific progress. Deciding to respond to the shortage of concepts having both theoretical and empirical import by devoting more attention to the connections between observables and theoretical concepts is a second step. Identifying specific difficulties that impede the attainment of the final stage of description--measurement--is a third. But scientific payoff is attained only after a fourth step: the identification, development, and utilization of tactics and strategies to cope with these obstacles to measurement. The preceding pages have dealt with steps one and two. The next few pages will briefly sketch some of the difficulties that impede measurement, offer examples of research tactics that can overcome some of these difficulties when the data are available, and suggest that the lack of data (to meet the criteria of scientific measurement) is frequently a function of the researcher's limited time perspective rather than of natural impossibilities or excessive cost. This will be followed by an exploration of longitudinal analysis.

A general requisite of measurement is isomorphism. There must be correspondence between some formal aspect of the numbers assigned (for example, the rank of ordinal numbers) and some aspect of reality (for example, the order of the subjects on a dimension). Alternatively, a

⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

major difficulty with measurement has been the frequent lack of isomorphism or of any evidence of isomorphism. Numbers are easily assigned. But assigning them so that at least one formal aspect of the number system (for example, rank) will probably correspond to some aspect of the order or relations among the subjects is another matter. It is safest to assume that scores never solely reflect actual behavior. To some extent they reflect:

1. the peculiarities of the particular imperfect data selected for analysis (type of data or time-span of data);
2. the nature and limits of the general measurement model selected (summated index, Guttman scale, Lingoes' multiple scalogram analysis, factor analysis, Kruskal's multidimensional scaling, Guttman's smallest Euclidean space analysis, and so forth);
3. the nature and limits of the specific theoretical version (for example, principal-factor or centroid solution) of the more general model;
4. the nature and limits of the computer program (for example, SHARE or BMD) used to apply the previous model to data;
5. the specific options selected from the computer program (for example, choice of criterion of rotation, choice of criterion for determining the number of factors to rotate, or choice of R or Q technique);
6. the interpretation given to the scores (that is, what property of the subjects is said to correspond in what way to what formal aspect[s] of the numbers assigned);
7. other considerations that will be touched on in other chapters.

If at each point the researcher repeatedly selects the same options he is not likely to discover how or to what extent the scores that he assigns are products of his particular methods. He is likely, at best, to have a very narrow perspective.

When we restate the general difficulty of attaining isomorphism in terms of many specific difficulties that are partly consequences of specific decisions, tactics for coping with the problem begin to suggest themselves, and the problem becomes more manageable.

If, for example, we consider the question, "Can indices formed from voting data possibly tap the same variable reflected in the content of speeches?" or "Does the rank of the subjects on the hypothesized dimension vary greatly with the type of data used?"--the tactic of complementary use of different types of data or the tactic of using a criterion of validity is suggested.⁸

For another example imagine that a researcher studying policy behavior on labor-management issues finds that the initial scores he obtains divide senators into two opposed groups, one that steadfastly sides with management and another that steadfastly sides with labor. He may question whether this lowest degree of differentiation (dichotomization) corresponds to reality: i.e., is isomorphic. Although labor-management conflict is clearly one of the most bipolarized dimensions of Congressional behavior, the researcher may suspect that the senators' over-all positions on labor-management issues may be more complex and differentiated than is indicated by his measure (based on a small subset of responses to labor-management issues). When the question of isomorphism is directed to the specific problem of how the degree of differentiation

⁸These will be discussed below.

in numbers assigned corresponds to the actual degree of differentiation in policy positions, one thinks of the tactic of using longitudinal data to obtain a more comprehensive view of the degree of differentiation.

It is vital that we reformulate the general question of isomorphism in terms of many problems specifically enough stated to suggest tactics for making these problems more manageable. The frequent and effective use of these tactics seem unlikely, however, if we habitually conceive of research in cross-sectional terms. No single session or Congress is likely, for example, to offer data for a measure of "right-wing indiscriminate hostility" or "support for McCarthyism" that offers realistic differentiation, a test of relations among indicants, an independent test of validity, and evidence that the behavior is not ephemeral. To even ask for such is to risk being labeled "impractical" or "naive," (i.e., unacquainted with the difference between measurement in psychology and education based on intimate studies of students, patients, and other compliant persons; and measurement of characteristics of extremely busy politicians playing roles that deter revealing exposure to panel interviews, experiments, narcosis, polygraphs, projective tests, and so forth). And to ask those who claim to understand the dimensionality of legislative behavior to occasionally predict or to show how they have at times controlled relevant variables might bring an equally strong reaction.

While it is unfair to expect those who study important elective officials to fully meet all conceivable criteria of measurement, it is fair to insist that they not fail to meet standards because a narrow time perspective leads to the false conclusion that "we just don't have the data."

Because many of the research tactics essential to improved measurement--and thus essential to improved "junction of theory and experience"--depend on a longitudinal perspective, it seems appropriate to:

1. define longitudinal analysis;
2. list properties or attributes that may be used to generate types of longitudinal analysis;
3. illustrate how types of longitudinal analysis may be generated;
4. briefly discuss four general types of longitudinal analysis;
5. offer reasons for expecting sufficient consistency to make longitudinal analysis fruitful;
6. hypothesize methodological advantages of longitudinal analysis.

II. THE NATURE OF LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

Definition of Longitudinal Analysis

The term longitudinal analysis is used below in its broadest form that encompasses many specific types of analyses extending over time. It is used as the counter-term for cross-sectional analysis, thus avoiding the more cumbersome term "non-cross-sectional analysis."

The term cross-sectional analysis of congressional behavior will be used below to label static studies using data from a single Congress. Longitudinal analysis of congressional behavior will be used to refer to: (1) static studies using data from two or more Congresses, and (2) dynamic studies (for example, before-and-after designs).

Although the examples of longitudinal tactics appearing in Chapters IV, V, and VI are based on the measurement of recurring behavior, I do not wish to continue the sterile argument between behavioralists and traditionalists as to whether humans and events are unique and immeasurable. I wish to concede at the outset that all real events and individuals are unique, non-recurring, and immeasurable. But I hasten to add that scientists can abstract, measure, and relate properties of

events, and individuals.¹ That scientists do so imperfectly does not damn the scientific enterprise if these studies are incrementally valid or lead to studies which are.

Longitudinal analysis is not used here to refer to retrospective studies that attempt detailed historical reconstruction of unique events, or studies using data generated at one point in time (for example, through a survey) but assumed to reproduce observations from widely separated periods of time. The latter type of study might share the advantages of longitudinal analysis if there were some way of determining which responses represented honest reports of accurately remembered behavior and which responses reflected either: (1) faulty memory due to time lapse and rationalization, or (2) inaccurate reporting due to conscious desire of some to appear consistent and of others to appear to have been "right all along." The last tendency may be particularly prevalent among those playing political roles and suggests the advantage of having longitudinal data (data generated over a period of time as with records of Senate voting and verbal behavior.)²

¹Hayward Alker, Jr. argues that "if events are unique, repetitive observation is impossible. . . ." But operations in his Mathematics and Politics reveal that science merely claims to abstract, measure, and relate properties of events or individuals (New York: Macmillan, 1965). Torgerson states ". . . it is always the properties that are measured and not the systems themselves. Measurement is always measurement of a property and never measurement of a system. . . . individuals, cultures, and chromosomes are immeasurable by their very nature. Each, however, possesses properties that perhaps can be measured." Events are not measured but their properties, thus the fact that no two events are identical in all their detail does not prevent the measurement of those properties which they do have in common. Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 9.

²A further advantage of data generated over time (Senate roll calls, data through content analysis of the Congressional Record) is the availability of many more indicants than one could gather through interview.

Finally, two independently designed cross-sectional studies typically do not constitute a longitudinal analysis. But many cross-sectional studies contain aspects that may be extended longitudinally (in either direction) if the second researcher consciously designs his research to take advantage of the potential of the first study. Such longitudinal extensions are not to be confused with those secondary analyses or replications that may involve longitudinal extensions of the researchers' activity but not of the measures of the subjects' behavior.

Attributes, Facets, or Properties that May Be
Used for Construction and Distinguishing
Types of Longitudinal Analysis

1. Choice of respondents: repeat same respondents; or use different respondents.
2. Location of time periods: past-(more recent) past; or past-future.
3. Division of attention or research effort among time periods: evenly divided among periods; or unevenly divided (for example, one period is emphasized while another is drawn upon primarily for a criterion for a measure developed in the period emphasized).
4. Number of variables traced through time: small; or large.
5. Aspects of behavior abstracts: rank order; magnitude, shape of distribution; communality; percentage of

variance accounted for by various factors; and so forth.³

6. Whether change is measured: dynamic; or static (for example, a longitudinal search for enough data to establish a measure of relatively enduring though infrequently expressed behavior).
7. Amenability of variables to control: controllable; not controllable.⁴
8. Whose behavior is (described, explained, predicted) made more subject to control by whom: the elected leader's behavior by the electorate, or vice versa.

³The communality of a variable is given by the sum of the squares of the common-factor coefficients. In Q-analysis (analysis of a correlation matrix of men, not items) of data meeting the assumptions of the factor-analytic model, measures of communality aid in identifying deviants or "mavericks." Moreover, this precise statistical concept contributes to substantive political theory by promoting a distinction between types of deviants. For example, after extracting three or four Q-factors from United States Senate roll call data, it becomes clear that we need to distinguish those such as Goldwater who dissent a great deal but whose voting behavior can be statistically accounted for by his loadings on a few common factors, from those who do not have substantial loadings on any of the common factors and who will have high loadings reported for them only if we instruct the computer to continue the rotational analyses until unique factors are reported. In unidimensional analyses the first type has extreme rank but very few nonscale responses; the second type has an unusually large number of nonscale responses, or an unusual combination of positions on separate unidimensional scales.

⁴An example of research which focuses on variables not amenable to control is that of Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII (March, 1964). Professor Flinn concludes: "Assuming the theories advanced in this study are nearly correct, then it seems that there is very little chance of getting or increasing party responsibility by deliberate action . . . whether it is desired or not." Perhaps man is sometimes seen as a pawn in a fatalistic chess game, because of the concepts chosen to guide perception rather than because this is the inevitable nature of reality. If Dahl, Lindblom, Brecht, Van Dyne, Myrdal, and others are correct in conceiving of science as an aid to rational decision, facets 7 and 8 assume considerable importance.

Four General Types of Longitudinal Analysis
(As Developed by Dichotomies 1 and 2)⁵

Location of Time Periods

		Past-(More Recent) Past	Past-Future
R e s p o n d e n t s	Use Different ⁶	TREND	PREDICTION OF AGGREGATE BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA
	Use Same	PANEL	PREDICTION OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM INDIVIDUAL SCORES ⁷

Trend.--An example of a trend study would be a study of how the content of floor statements, perhaps as reported in the Congressional Record, relates to severe economic changes or to important changes in our national security. Hamilton, in his content analysis of sermons given during the period 1929 to 1940 demonstrated how opinions can be related to economic fluctuations.⁸ Another example of a trend study is that of Cantwell in which he related congressional behavior to a series of public opinion polls.⁹

⁵For a related presentation of attributes and types, see Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 201-83.

⁶Different samples from the same population.

⁷From such predictions one can, of course, also predict the behavior of a legislative body.

⁸Thomas Hamilton, "Social Optimism and Pessimism in American Protestantism," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. VI, pp. 280-83.

⁹Frank V. Cantwell, "Public Opinion and the Legislative Process," The American Political Science Review, LV (1946), pp. 924-35.

Panel.--Panel studies may be illustrated by the cross-tabulation of two or more scales taken from different sessions or Congresses which contain a number of members in common. Such panel studies may identify those who change rank and those who do not, while also indicating the direction and the conditions of change. Foreign aid, civil rights, urban affairs, and economic issues are certainly open to exploration by panel study. Panel studies have the virtue of giving information on individuals as well as information on groups.

Prediction.--The two types of prediction studies shown above are distinguished by whether they give information on individuals. The use of individual scores has advantages over aggregate data for both scientific explanation and practical application but does not exclude the study of groups. Thus the type of prediction that appears in the fourth quadrant is often preferable to that shown in the quadrant above it. While some speak of prediction as not requiring any understanding of, or interest in, the relation between the basis of the prediction and the behavior predicted, it is assumed here that reliable predictions of the policy behavior of legislators both require and contribute to the understanding of the conditions under which consistent policy behavior is to be expected and the conditions under which change is likely. Panel studies should help illuminate these conditions and provide a sounder basis for prediction.

Some of the advantages of prediction will be suggested below. But the interesting questions of the relationship between prediction and control, and how the choice of whose behavior is predicted for whose benefit relates to who controls whom, will have to wait until a later work. It may be noted at this point, however, that the earlier development of

techniques and financial support for the study of the electorate than of techniques and support for the study of elective elites, combined with the greater incentive and ability of the elective elites to bear information costs, may make popular control less effective. The examples of prediction that will be developed at any length below will focus more on the behavior of elective elites than of the electorate. It is especially important that rational democratic opinion makers (and through them opinion leaders) receive information that will enable them to predict the behavior of elective leaders with sufficient precision to maintain faith in the effectiveness of popular control. Although the following work will not accomplish this, some methodological and substantive aspects are relevant.

It is obvious from a quick look at the number of facts (or attributes) listed above that scores of specific types of longitudinal analyses could be constructed. For this reason it is clearly more economical to list facets that may be used to generate types than to attempt to comprehensively list and illustrate the much more numerous types. Although only a few common types were discussed here, additional more specific and less frequently discussed longitudinal tactics will be covered below.

Reasons for Expecting Sufficient Consistency
in Legislative Behavior to Make
Longitudinal Analysis Fruitful

While enduring or recurring behavior by Supreme Court justices has been clearly demonstrated, we have relatively few published studies of Congressional decision-making over time. Nevertheless, these do suggest considerable consistency, although they do not clearly define its nature.¹⁰

¹⁰D. R. Brimhall and A. S. Otis, "A Study of Consistency in Congressional Voting," Journal of Applied Psychology, XXXII (1948), 1-7, 14. Reprinted in Wahlke and Eulau, Legislative Behavior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). Also Donald R. Matthews, cited below.

Matthews and others have noted that by the time men reach the United States Senate they have usually developed rather stable opinions on many policy matters. Matthews also argues that taking a public position, especially at the time one first gains election to the Senate, tends to encourage consistency. His argument is largely contained in the following quotes:

The importance of the senator's initial "mandate"--partially self-defined, partially reflecting popular sentiment--is hard to overestimate. Senators, once in office, establish working relationships with like-minded senators and understandings and friendships with sympathetic lobbyists, administrators, and reporters that are difficult to change. They quickly make a public record, and it is often unwise to alter it drastically.

.
There were sizeable shifts in the ideological make-up of the Senate during this ten-year period [1947-1956], but this was not the result, for the most part, of incumbent senators shifting their positions. Note that "the class of 1947" maintains very much the same ideological complexion during the entire ten-year period. The "class of 1949" has its ideological center of gravity well to the left during the entire period. Nor apparently has there been much change in the overall stance on issues of those elected in 1950. A senator's initial "mandate," therefore, may be a major influence on his voting many years after it was received.¹¹

A senator may consciously consider his initial public policy position a promise which should be kept for moral or prudential reasons. He may also have unconsciously associated his initial policy position with the rewarding experience of winning, and thus conditioning as well as conscious strategy fosters recurring policy behavior. It is also the case that once a representative has taken a public position, he finds it necessary to defend it by repeatedly offering some rationale. Both the unconscious effects of repeating the rationale and the consciousness

¹¹Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960).

of having done so encourage recurring policy behavior.¹²

But there are other reasons to expect a large degree of consistency in decision behavior. Senators must spend a large amount of time and energy in public relations and other nondecision-making roles. Yet they must also take a position on roughly 200-250 roll calls each session and more than 1,000 per term of office. Usually these are not narrow routine questions such as are handled at the lower levels of a bureaucracy. Typically these are policy questions with important though perhaps uncertain consequences. Therefore, senators must consciously or unconsciously adopt strategies to make decision-making problems more manageable. Increased consistency in rank is a latent function of all of the following hypothesized strategies or tactics for making decision-making more manageable:

1. A subset of members get their initial impressions of a stimulus or check their initial impressions of its direction and magnitude by checking the perceptions of those who "crystallized" earlier.

¹²One danger of elaborately defending what is felt to be a politically expedient but otherwise undesirable policy position is that the representative gets trapped. If he isn't affected by the above-mentioned unconscious processes, he may, nevertheless, feel it necessary to long continue a socially harmful policy stance because: (1) he wishes to appear consistent; (2) his position has gained the status of a promise; or (3) he, and possibly others like him, have so reinforced his electorate's prejudices rather than slowly and indirectly whittle away at them that he now has no choice but to either continue reinforcing these prejudices or face greater risks at the polls than he would have initially encountered had he adopted a less expedient strategy. (The specious argument that it is undemocratic for the representative to decide what is a prejudice or to place his judgment against that of the majority of the moment will have to be dealt with elsewhere. There is, however, increasing evidence that the norms of democracy are often part of our living, or behavioral, constitution precisely because many officials, opinion-makers, and opinion leaders do adhere to these norms when the man-in-the-street is indifferent or hostile.)

- a) By checking both extremes on the dimension that the senator assumes the new stimulus belongs to he may:
 - i) confirm his hunch about what issue is raised, or find evidence that some other issue is raised by the stimulus;
 - ii) confirm his hunch about the direction of a Yea (or Nay) response on the new stimulus.
 - b) By estimating roughly where on the continuum the early crystallizers have divided, he obtains information with which to estimate the magnitude (or valence) of the stimulus.¹³
2. Few if any members fully re-examine their positions on a dimension each time another stimulus belonging to that dimension is presented for decision.
- a) Members rarely spend much time examining items with estimated cutting points far from their own positions on the dimension.¹⁴
 - b) Many members also save time by not closely examining items with estimated cutting points closer to their own

¹³ Those who decide last have the most social cues to take a position on the continuum but the least influence on how others perceive the stimulus.

¹⁴ Making decision-making more manageable by reducing in some way the number of problems that one attends to is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of rationality. But not all tactics that reduce the number of decisions to ruminate on promote rationality. Furthermore, a tactic such as this (2a) may promote the rationality (or "education") of those at one part of the dimension but promote irrationality on the part of others at another part of the scale. Thus the consequences of some tactics depend on other variables such as the position of the decision maker.

positions but with manifest content and magnitude perceived to be almost identical to that of a previously decided question.

3. Incrementalism is another strategy or tactic (for making decision more manageable) that promotes recurring behavior and thus the fruitfulness of longitudinal analysis.¹⁵

Because the complexity of many problems is not matched or offset by sophistication of empirical theory, adequacy of measures of relevant variables, and a comprehensive prescriptive theory to relate normative and empirical elements; Congressmen often have a modest understanding of the consequences of various alternatives. Small incremental policy moves are made because of this modest understanding of the complex problems and low faith in the relevance or efficacy or revolutionary or utopian proposals requiring large change.

Types of Decision-Making¹⁶

	High Understanding		
	SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL DECISION-MAKING	REVOLUTIONARY AND UTOPIAN DECISION- MAKING	
Small Change	INCREMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (often practiced by Congressmen, judges, party leaders, executives, and administrators)	WARS, REVOLUTIONS, CRISES AND GRAND OPPORTUNITIES	Large Change
	Low Understanding		

¹⁵David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963).

¹⁶Ibid., p. 78.

Thus we have a paradox. The predictability of Congressional behavior stems in part from the fact that Congressmen, being unable to predict the long-run consequences of large policy changes, resort to a series of incremental changes. These do not resolve issues in a short span of time, as utopians or revolutionaries would like; thus we find recurring issues and recurring behavior, open to longitudinal analysis.

If the reader differs with these claims about the predictable nature of much decision-making in Congress, the differences can be resolved by careful longitudinal analysis. Certainly one clear advantage of longitudinal analysis is its potential for clarifying what types of decision-making occur, on what issues, and under what conditions.¹⁷

Another reason to expect considerable consistency in the relative policy positions of most representatives over a six-to ten-year period, is that a representative's socio-economic background and status, and his career-goals, values, and group memberships and identifications usually do not change much in such a period of time.

An argument against the hypothesized fruitfulness of longitudinal

¹⁷It is probable that congressional decision-making is more complex than the excellent work of Braybrooke and Lindblom suggests. They list a series of incremental changes in congressional policy as evidence that congressmen pursue incremental strategy. But careful longitudinal analysis using individual scores and not just aggregate data may reveal that many (and on some dimensions most) congressmen were not reaching their decisions by incremental strategy. The corporate decision pattern may change incrementally if some of the congressmen on one side of the median member change their individual positions incrementally. If the distribution is more "U-shaped" than "bell-shaped," and this is frequently the case in the Senate, it does not require incremental changes by many individual members to bring about incremental changes in the corporate decision pattern. Furthermore, incremental changes in representatives' positions may sometimes be due less to their own pursuit of an incremental strategy of decision than to their response to the incremental strategy of others (interest groups, the executive, and so forth).

The great potential of Lindblom's work may be more fully realized if it is linked to longitudinal analyses of decision behavior.

analysis might be based on the assumption that consistency has its source in doctrinal rather than pragmatic decision. If we have seen or are seeing "the end of ideology," and if pragmatic decision-making results in inconsistency, why expect to discover recurring or enduring behavior through longitudinal analysis?

Two points should be made in response. First, doctrines are not constructed with sufficient regard for the multiplicity of values, the influence of changing conditions upon the efficacy and cost of means, and the effects of changes in the latter on the ranking or weighting of ends.¹⁸ Thus those who originally committed themselves to consistently follow a doctrine often find it too costly to be consistent in terms of that doctrine.

Second, two of the reasons for saying that pragmatic decision makers are generally inconsistent do not hold up under closer examination. Pragmatic congressmen are frequently said to be inconsistent because they sometimes support labor and at other times support management, or often go along with certain civil rights groups but at other times do not. Such behavior may in fact be quite consistent. There is nothing inconsistent about denying the relatively extreme demands of an interest group while granting a number of its more moderate claims. The simplistic

¹⁸The notion of a hierarchy of values is too simple. The ranking or weighting of values must be related to changing conditions. Changing conditions not only alter the efficacy and cost of instrumental values, but may even reverse the direction of impact; much as "effectiveness" or "fluency" in one politician may be socially beneficial, but "effectiveness" or "fluency" in another politician may be unfortunate or even disastrous: Or much as the direction of the effect of a budget deficit (or surplus) on net goal attainment depends on variables such as the amount of slack in the economy, price trends, and so forth. The inadequacy of any comprehensive and detailed "hierarchy of values" does not mean however that value decisions must be arbitrary, ad hoc, or atheoretical.

view of consistency as steadfast support of the demands of one interest group or class and the equally steadfast rejection of those of other interest groups or classes is the very antithesis of a key function of legislatures--interest aggregation.

The sort of "consistency" that is eschewed by many congressmen--steadfast or exclusive support of a single interest or value--is not the consistency that behavioral scientists assume when they apply Guttman scaling, multiple scalogram analysis, factor analysis, Kruskal's multidimensional scaling, or smallest Euclidean space analysis in the study of voting bodies. The application of these methods typically requires that many decision makers not be "consistent" in the sense of steadfast or exclusive support of a single particularistic interest. These methods would bear little fruit if there were but two "ranks" or if all members were represented by but two or three points in a multidimensional space.

Another reason why it is sometimes assumed that congressional decision-making is inconsistent and thus defies the discovery of regularities may be called the "editor's fallacy." Editors and columnists frequently take a statement made by a congressman in one context and contrast it with a statement or vote cast in another context and conclude that his decision-making is so inconsistent as to frustrate the discovery of regularities. Because of the congressman's need to communicate effectively with many people who are not interested in an elaborate statement of assumptions, conditions, or qualifications; because the complexity, multiplicity, and subtlety of the components of decision and their relations usually defy easy explicit formulation; and because it is often impolitic to comprehensively state one's criteria; congressmen only partially state the rationale of specific decisions. Because he has not

made it clear that under different conditions he would act differently (yet consistently), but instead has appeared to unqualifiedly support some policy position, it is easy for the unsympathetic journalist to criticize him for "inconsistency" when he (consistently) changes position on some measure because of change in one or more relevant but unexplicated variables. It is reasonable to hypothesize that congressmen adhere more consistently to their relatively comprehensive and complex though largely unexplicated cognitive and evaluative structures than to the brief simplistic ad hoc rationales offered to the public.¹⁹ Thus it is also reasonable to expect to find patterned decision behavior through longitudinal analysis.

It will be demonstrated in another chapter that great changes in rank on a dimension of policy behavior should not be arbitrarily equated with "inconsistency" or "error" or absence of relatively enduring attitudes. Such changes in rank can be associated with consistent attitudes open to longitudinal exploration.

¹⁹ It is necessary that we do not equate a change in position on a policy dimension, or an apparent contradiction between a brief simplistic ad hoc policy statement and a subsequent decision under changed circumstances with inconsistent or unpatterned behavior. It is tempting to attribute unexplained "errors" to the respondent rather than to the researcher's theoretical framework. But it is safest for the researcher to initially assume that the "inconsistency" may be due to the limits of his own perspective. It is partly by such an heuristic assumption that his theoretical framework will be developed.

III. THE ADVANTAGES OF LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

A General Summation of the Advantages

One may speak of the advantages of longitudinal analysis in either general or specific terms. When speaking in general terms and thus summing up the many specific advantages of longitudinal analysis, it may be hypothesized that longitudinal analysis promotes:

1. the discovery of recurring behavior and relatively enduring attitudes so necessary to behavioral science;
2. cumulative science (now so conspicuously lacking);
3. the specification of concepts;
4. isomorphism;
5. the study of change and the conditions of change, and thus helps identify multivariate relations that are less likely to be identified in cross-sectional studies, if they can be identified at all in cross-sectional studies;
6. the development of concepts with both empirical and theoretical import.

Obviously the points are interrelated. Several of them are little more than different perspectives on the same matter. But perhaps the emphasis and variety of expression serve to communicate more fully the nature of the general advantages of longitudinal analysis.

Longitudinal Analysis Promotes the
Specification of Concepts

The first step in concept formation is typically the formation of a vague image generated by intuitive combination of informal observations. But concept formation must not stop with such a vague image. Fruitful scientific concepts usually must be developed by repeated reference to data. If the concept concerns phenomena assumed to endure or recur, it is vital that reference be made to data from different points in time. Failure to refer to data at different points in time may result in serious misconceptions.

During this process of developing concepts by repeated reference to data, longitudinal analysis often helps clarify:

1. the dimensionality of the behavior;
2. the level of the analysis (for example, manifest behavior or underlying attitudes);
3. the aspects of behavior referred to (for example, valence or rank order);
4. the degree of differentiation.

Whether a political scientist conceives of the opposition to Supreme Court decisions (expressed in congressional voting 1957-59) as opposition by Congress, a party (Republican), a wing of a party (Southern Democrats), an inter-party coalition, or as a varied series of often overlapping vote groupings the exact nature of which varied considerably with the specific issue (appointment of a judge, reversal of a decision, limitation of a decision or of the jurisdiction of the Court) depends on whether he relies on a few votes at one point which suggest opposition by a party, or a few votes at another point which suggest opposition by a wing of a party, or a few at another point which suggest opposition by

a coalition, or careful longitudinal analysis which cautions the researcher against any of the preceding and reveals a need to view the opposition in multidimensional terms with the makeup of opposition varying with the variation in specific issues. Thus, too narrow a time perspective often reinforces a tendency toward oversimple conceptualization.

A cross-sectional approach permits the researcher to unconsciously select a point in time which seems to substantiate his initial conceptualization of the phenomena under study. But, longitudinal analysis often brings data to view that does not fit well with a priori notions. Thus longitudinal analysis is more likely to force one to refine his initial conceptualization. This may be frustrating in the short run but rewarding in the long run.

If a researcher conceives of the attacks on the Court in the late fifties as just another expression of "know-nothingism" and is content to merely list a few other examples of "know-nothingism," such as McCarthyism, to suggest how he conceives the phenomenon, he fails to learn what a simple longitudinal analysis could have shown--that much of the anti-Court behavior in and out of Congress was not highly related to support for McCarthy and that some of this behavior was even inversely related to support for McCarthy. Such a longitudinal finding forces the careful theorist to re-examine his initial concepts (or vague images). In this case longitudinal analysis reveals that the proffered examples of "know-nothingism" do not constitute a single behavioral dimension. Learning this forces the scientific theorist to either abandon the vague concept or to specify more clearly its meaning. Thus, longitudinal analysis, by revealing empirical relations that contradict the vague notion of recurring "know-nothing" behavior, encourages the theorist to

distinguish between levels of analysis: (1) manifest decision behavior, and (2) attitudes that come together to generate that behavior. If the theorist wishes to persist in using the term "know-nothingism," he must recognize that any clear-cut continuity is not in the diverse patterns of behavior. At most he can claim that each of the different examples of "know-nothingism" are behavioral products of many factors, some common and some unique. And, one of the common factors is an attitude labelled "know-nothingism" that supposedly played a part in the generation of each pattern of behavior (Each behavioral event [attack on the Court, McCarthy support] is different either because of different loadings on the common factors or because of the presence of unique factors or both.)¹

In addition to promoting the specification of concepts by enabling the researcher to learn more of the dimensionality of the manifest behavior, and by encouraging him to clarify the level of analysis, longitudinal analysis promotes specification by forcing the researcher to state more clearly what aspect of behavior he assumes recurs or changes (at a given level of analysis). After an event like Pearl Harbor the valence or magnitude of most congressmen may change greatly on the selective service policy dimension but the rank order may change little. It is essential that a researcher specify which aspect he assumes will recur (or change).

As has been noted above (p. 8) longitudinal analysis also cautions the theorist against conceiving policy behavior in dichotomous terms if longitudinal evidence reveals that policy positions are more differentiated

¹Longitudinal analysis is not the only unsung tactic for aiding the process of conceptualization. The study of measurement models and the (miniature) theories of behavior that underlie them can greatly clarify problems of conceptualization. This is so even if calculations are never made.

than this in the real world. Imagine that a student of legislative behavior concludes from an analysis of data in the second session of the 79th Congress that there were "two viewpoints," "two sides," "two groups divided sharply on their attitudes toward organized labor." If other political scientists assume that this minimum level of differentiation is representative of congressional behavior, there will be serious consequences for theory. If it is not noted that a number of congressmen who sided with labor on OPA or other questions on which labor's demands seemed moderate and timely, voted against organized labor on a pro-labor substitute for the Taft-Hartley Act and on overriding the veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may be falsely concluded that congressmen are either the agents of labor or of management and that none are in any sense arbiters. An interesting conclusion in light of the function of legislatures as agencies for interest aggregation.

On each separate vote representatives must either support or not support the claims of labor. In some sessions or Congresses one can obtain "hard empirical evidence" that nearly all representatives side with one or the other of two polar interest groups. And, representatives have values, advocate and determine policies, and thus are not apart from the group struggle. But if we take off our cross-sectional blinders we can see that the position of many representatives on a recurring dimension is not that of any particularistic interest group. Some representatives do not serve as agents of particularistic interests (on all dimensions) but play the crucial legislative role of aggregator of interests (if only on some dimensions). But, this is not seen clearly in cross-sectional analyses. To find evidence of interest aggregation often requires a longitudinal effort to obtain a more realistic degree of differentiation.

The Advantage of Longitudinal Analysis for Replacing
Plausible but Scientifically Deficient Ex Post
Facto "Explanations" with Scientific
Explanations

A fairly typical and apparently accepted pattern of explanation in cross-sectional studies of legislative behavior involves the calculation of a large number of correlations in a single session or Congress and the selection of a limited number of these--the significant correlations--for use in "explanations." This method of "explanation" consists of two parts. First, the researcher points to the statistical significance of the selected correlation. Second, he notes the plausibility of such a relation in light of an ex post facto selection of largely favorable quotes from a contradictory literature or an ex post facto selection of those elements in the behavioral situation which seem intuitively or self-evidently compatible with the statistical relationship.

The weakness of such ex post facto explanations revolves, in part, around the selection of a fraction of the correlations. If one hundred correlations are calculated (but not necessarily reported) and five are said to be significant at the five per cent level of confidence (would occur by chance not more than 1/20 times), any of the correlations reported as significant could very well have occurred by chance, although one would not realize this if he were not told of the many correlations winnowed out.

If we calculate one hundred correlations and find that ten are significant at the five per cent level, what can we conclude? Perhaps one half of these relations should be attributed to chance. Combining such statistical evidence with ex post facto rationales does not provide us with scientific explanations. However, two strategies of scientific

explanation often enable us to use the above sort of correlations and yet have a firmer basis for deciding whether the relations occurred by chance or represent behavioral regularities. First, if before he computes the correlations for time Y, the researcher records predictions of behavior at time Y based on analyses at time X and records them in such a manner as to make them more subject to disproof than to rationalization; the researcher has less reason to fear that he has unconsciously selected one of several possible rationales, interpretations, or explanations because it is the one that fits his particular findings. Second, unpredicted significant correlations which one does not know whether or not to attribute to chance, but for which there is some substantive support, may be treated as promising hypotheses--that is, predictions of relations to be found in another Congress. Whether the researcher selects the first or the second strategy, longitudinal analysis is essential.

With the advent of high-speed computers, the increased availability of data checks containing over 100,000 responses for a single Congress, and the use of computer programs such as MIT's Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique, the chances have increased astronomically that researchers will have the computer calculate hundreds or thousands of correlation coefficients and then select for further analysis that small fraction which are deemed statistically significant. If students of congressional behavior are not to confuse the combination of correlations which meet a statistical test of significance (yet may easily be due to chance) and ex post facto selection of rationales with scientific explanation, there must be more recognition of the need for longitudinal analysis.

Guttman and others have, of course, previously warned against the practice of inferring some "causal" connection from items from the same cross-section of time. In 1950 Guttman noted that:

Theoretically one can never infer "cause" from the cross tabulation of two attitudes or opinions gathered at the same time. However, opinion analysts make this inference quite often.²

The Advantage of Longitudinal Analysis for
Testing the Validity of Measures

If one is asked how he knows that some measure is valid (actually measures what it purports to measure), he faces a question that often is not explicitly raised and that seldom is answered in studies of legislative behavior.

One obvious reason why little or no evidence of the validity of a measure is offered is that there may not be any other (relevant concurrent) behavior, in the time period of the study, which can act as a criterion (i.e., which can allow a pragmatic test of concurrent validity). Usually studies of legislative behavior cover a period of only one or two years. Thus, no adequate test of concurrent validity may be possible (given limited research funds, reluctance of congressmen to submit to many kinds of tests, and limited roll call or interview data for a short time period).

An alternative test of pragmatic validity and one that has two advantages over a test of concurrent validity is predictive validity. By predictive validity we mean the adequacy of a measure (such as Rosenau's measure of indiscriminate hostility) to distinguish individuals (senators)

² Measurement and Prediction, Vol. IV of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 155.

who will differ in their subsequent behavior (1953 or later).³

For example, the predictive validity of Rosenau's measure of indiscriminate hostility may be tested by seeing if it usefully distinguishes senators who will differ in their subsequent support of, or opposition to, McCarthyism or those who practice it. If Rosenau's measure is valid, a disproportionate number of those he classified as "Indiscriminates" should show up among the most extreme supporters of McCarthy during the censure efforts. We would expect, for example, that nearly all of the "Indiscriminates," who were still in the Senate in 1954, to be among those in the most extreme pro-McCarthy ranks (on a scale of support for McCarthy).⁴

Predictive validity, I have said above, has two advantages over concurrent validity. First, it makes a test of validity possible even if the period from which the original measure is derived does not offer a relevant criterion. Because it frequently is the case that one cannot find an adequate criterion in the same time period as that from which the measure to be tested is derived, it is a longitudinal search for a criterion that offers hope for a test of validity.

The second advantage of predictive validity (i.e., the use of a criterion derived from a different time period) is that whether our immediate interests are primarily scientific or practical, we need to identify behavior that endures for more than one or two years. While a longitudinal search for a criterion may offer evidence of enduring or recurring behavior, a concurrent criterion does not.

³James N. Rosenau, "Senate Attitudes Toward a Secretary of State," in Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, edited by J. C. Wahlke and H. Eulau (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 332-47.

⁴Chapter IV will offer evidence of the feasibility of such predictions.

The Advantage of Longitudinal Analysis for
Suggesting the Relative Importance
of Variables

Students of legislative behavior who argue the importance of (nominal) party affiliation often offer as evidence the predictive power of party affiliation. Frequently the claim is stated as James A. Robinson does in his Congress and Foreign Policy-Making. There he says that ". . . certain roll call studies have indicated that party is the best single predictor of a legislator's vote."⁵ Thomas and Lamb claim that:

Probably the single most important clue to the attitudes of a legislator is his party membership. David B. Truman's study of party influence in the Eighty-first Congress found that "the party label evidently is the single most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior. . . ."⁶

The predictive value of a variable may be viewed as one measure of the variable's importance. But, there is less justification for assuming that the predictive value or power can be gauged by a cross-sectional study. There is even less justification for assuming that party is the best predictor of roll call behavior, when one has not even attempted to test the predictive power of such constructs as bloc membership or scale type. When one does what Turner, Truman, Thomas and Lamb, and others did not do--look at the dimensions of congressional behavior and compare the predictive power of the ready-made formal aggregates (nominal party affiliation, region, etc.) with the predictive power of behavioral types or groupings--one finds that their oft repeated

⁵ (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 100.

⁶ Congress: Politics and Practice (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 36-37.

professional lore does not hold up. There is no convincing evidence that party affiliation is the best predictor of roll call behavior on any recurring substantive dimension or combination of dimensions. Although prediction from party is generally superior to prediction from socio-economic background, socio-economic status, and constituency variables; it is inferior to prediction from scale-type and from multidimensional types derived from recurring behavior patterns.⁷

If one wishes to preserve the good name of party as a predictor, he may, of course, claim that party, behaviorally defined, is generally a better predictor than socio-economic background, socio-economic status, constituency variables, or nominal party affiliation.⁸

Longitudinal analysis of congressional behavior, however, reveals that nominal party affiliation is less important as a predictive variable than the above mentioned authorities claim, but more important than Miller and Stokes assume to be the case in the making of foreign policy.⁹

The Advantages of Longitudinal Analysis for the Study of Change

The theoretical advantages of longitudinal analysis, particularly of the panel study, for the analysis of change require little comment. Most readers will readily agree that unless we measure individual behavior over time we have to rely on a comparison of marginals to estimate

⁷ See Chapters IV-VII below.

⁸ Both nominal party affiliation and behavioral party membership may often be useful for practical prediction and perhaps aid in the development of hypotheses. But, those who are interested in "party" as an independent variable would do well to distinguish between nominal party affiliation and party identification. One type of evidence for such a distinction will be offered in Chapter VI.

⁹ See The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII (March, 1963) pp. 45-56 and Chapters IV-VII below.

change. But the marginals can only tell us of the net shifts, not the actual turnover. The net shift in the marginals may be negligible and suggest little or no change, but the unrevealed turnover may be so large that the user of marginals has been seriously misled.¹⁰

The skeptic has reason, however, to ask what specific research problem related to an important area of theory requires longitudinal analysis of change. One vital area of theory which has recently become much more open to exploration through longitudinal analysis of legislative behavior is the process of conflict. One might hypothesize, for example, that in the period preceding the Civil War there was an increasing simplification of the dimensions of congressional decision. Substantive issues that were not initially perceived and determined primarily in terms of the developing conflict between North and South became increasingly tied to the sectional conflict as the latter became more salient. Even if the original purpose of a legislative proposal were unrelated to the North-South conflict and if the effect of the proposal on that contest were slight, that contest was so close and the stakes so large that such policy objectives were increasingly subordinated. Logically consistent with this is the hypothesis that increasing bipolarization was associated with the above simplification of the issues.

An anti-behavioralist would be right in arguing that no single measurement model even if used longitudinally could offer a complete view

¹⁰For example:

First Time	Second Time		Total
	Pro	Anti	
Pro	30	17	47
Anti	18	29	47
Total	48	46	94

of the above conflict. No model can fully portray reality. As scientists, however, we do not seek to recreate historical reality in all of its detail but to identify regularities which map (not reconstruct) reality. A map that contains much less than one per cent of the details of the area to be traversed is much more useful than one that contains so much detail that the path to one's goal is obscured. The following measurement models if used longitudinally to study the process of developing conflict in the pre-Civil War period offer the following different but complementary perspectives:

1. At a point in the anti-bellum period in which content analysis of verbal behavior suggests that the conflict was not yet explicit and intense, Guttman or MSA scales of roll-call behavior should reveal many scale dimensions which are not highly correlated with other scale dimensions.¹¹ As content analysis of verbal behavior reveals more explicit and intense conflict, the scales of roll call behavior should reveal fewer scale dimensions that are uncorrelated with the over-all conflict. Fewer scales should be unimodal and a larger percentage should be increasingly bipolar. As the researcher approaches 1861 he may find fewer middle ranks containing more than two members, and the opposite or extreme ranks should be separated by differences on more items or on items that involve larger stakes.
2. The factor analysis of congressional roll call items should

¹¹MSA = Multiple Scalogram Analysis. See Appendix B.

reveal that fewer orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors are required to account for most of the variance, as the nation moved closer to Civil War. Alternatively, the R-factor whose content best represents the North-South conflict will account for an increasingly larger percentage of the variance.

3. The factor analysis of senators or representatives should reveal that the bipolar Q-factor that best reflects North-South conflict should account for an increasing percentage of the variance.
4. If the researcher applies Kruskal's multidimensional scaling or smallest Euclidean space analysis to a longitudinal series of matrices of correlation or agreement among congressmen, he should find that a decade or so before the Civil War there were many diverse clusters and isolates, but that as 1861 approached the points (representing legislators) become more closely clustered into two widely separated groups. Furthermore, he will find fewer distinct clusters in spite of the fact of increasing membership.

The above loose hypotheses may seem obvious to those readers whose common sense or social psychology corresponds. But the plausibility of hypotheses and their merit are not identical.¹²

¹²George Galloway in his History of the House of Representatives states that "party discipline and the power of the caucus were weakened by sectional disputes over the slavery question as the irrepressible conflict approached" (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961), p. 131. Others have been more emphatic in discussing "the sharp split" or "the breaking into fragments" of the Democratic party. But we must await longitudinal measurement before we can answer questions about how much, how fast, and in what manner congressional party unity was weakened, and how much, how fast, and in what manner the North-South congressional bipolarization took place.

The following generalizations by V. O. Key suggest something of the content of one type of cleavage that preceded the North-South contest and may be interpreted by some as implying that the simplifications of the dimensions and bipolarization during the period of East-West conflict was comparable to that during the North-South conflict:

As the slavery issue grew in intensity and salience, the old cleavage between East and West was replaced by a new sectionalism. The pattern of sectional politics became one of conflict between North and South. As the "solid West" disintegrated, "rival societies, free and slave, were marching side by side into the unoccupied lands of the West, each attempting to dominate the back country."¹³

Thus, Key's remarks suggest that we moved from two-sided conflict between East and West to two-sided conflict between North and South. The previous set of generalizations, however, assumed less simplification of the dimensions and less bipolarization during the period of East-West conflict than during the period of North-South conflict.

The purpose of these few pages on the advantages of longitudinal measurement for the study of change has not been to endorse a set of hypotheses about the process of conflict but to suggest the difficulty of scientifically choosing among or refining hypotheses without engaging in longitudinal analysis.

It should also be noted that while the more accurate measurement of change may greatly aid science, scientists are not interested in change per se. Instead, scientists are interested in the increased opportunity (afforded by the study of change) for inference about the regularities that underlie change.¹⁴

¹³V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958), p. 254.

¹⁴An example of how the study of changes in a condition (party control of the administration) can reveal underlying regularities will be offered in Chapter VI.

The Subject Matter of Chapters IV, V, and VI

Thus far I have (I) discussed the general problem, (II) described the nature of longitudinal analysis, and (III) hypothesized advantages of longitudinal analysis. Chapters IV, V, and VI offer original examples of longitudinal analysis intended to serve as evidence of advantages hypothesized in Chapter III.

In each of these examples successive events are hypothesized to involve stimuli which are similar enough in some respect to elicit patterns of response that are also similar (in some hypothesized respect such as rank order, or a significant difference between members of different parties). That is, in each chapter I hypothesize that recurring aspects of stimulus situations elicit (measurable) recurring aspects of response behavior. The three examples are also similar in that each (1) has United States senators as its population, (2) uses roll call data, (3) seeks differentiation through ordinal measurement, (4) compares measures at different points in time, and (5) is relevant to the study of decision making, party, and political strategy.

These examples differ, however, in that each is designed to offer a different application of longitudinal analysis and to emphasize a different type of advantage. Thus it is hoped that Chapters IV, V, and VI, taken together, will evidence the broad utility of longitudinal analysis for measurement, prediction and explanation.

The first example (Measurement of Right-Wing Indiscriminate Hostility) will abstract recurring aspects of behavior (rank order) common to

such events as the 1949-52 attacks on Secretary of State Acheson and the December, 1954 censure vote support for McCarthy. It will emphasize the utility of longitudinal analysis for measurement.

The second example (An Exploration of Urban Affairs Decision Making) will abstract recurring aspects of behavior related to both the 1962 vote on the Department of Urban Affairs and the 1965 vote on the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It will emphasize the utility of longitudinal analysis for prediction.

The third example (Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy Position) will abstract recurring aspects of behavior common to the 1952-53 Truman-Eisenhower transition and the 1960-61 Eisenhower-Kennedy transition. It will emphasize the utility of longitudinal analysis as an aid in explanation.

The stimulus situation in all of its detail is not perfectly repeated in any of these examples: and it is because of this that such analyses are relevant to the study of politics in the real world. Until political scientists can identify recurring patterns of behavior elicited by recurring types of real-world stimuli, there can be no science of politics.

IV THE MEASUREMENT OF McCARTHYISM: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

The general, long-term purpose of this chapter is not "history for history's sake" but the development of intellectual tools to better measure future expressions of indiscriminate hostility.

The specific purposes of this paper are to reveal how longitudinal analysis can offer:

1. Increased differentiation so important to conceptualization and the expression of relations.
2. A test of the relations among four different types of indicants (and thus offer evidence of the validity of scale analysis of roll call votes and content analysis of speeches).
3. Evidence that the analyzed behavior is neither random nor ephemeral but patterned and recurring and thus open to fruitful scientific analysis.
4. Evidence of the feasibility of scientific prediction of "representatives" voting behavior from their verbal behavior (a type of prediction that is important in a complex representative democracy).

The four types of data which will be used are:

1. 1954 Senate roll calls on the censure of Senator McCarthy.
2. James N. Rosenau's dichotomization of senators as either

indiscriminately hostile or not indiscriminately hostile toward Truman's Secretary of State (based on the content analysis of their statements in the Congressional Record 1949-52).¹

3. Margaret Chase Smith's 1950 (anti-McCarthy) "petition" data.
4. Richard Rovere's rating of Welker, Jenner, and McCarthy as the three most extreme indiscriminate right-wingers or McCarthyites (based on his intensive qualitative analysis of many observations not included under 1, 2, and 3).²

The subjects are Republican senators common to the period of the Rosenau study and to the period of the McCarthy censure votes (1954).

The scale hypothesis and test of relations among indicants are as follows:

The three Republican senators that Rovere identifies as most extreme will be among the thirteen that Rosenau identifies as indiscriminately hostile;³ these Indiscriminates will be among the fifteen-to-twenty most extreme Republican supporters of McCarthy identified by the roll call analysis of the McCarthy censure votes, and these

¹Op. cit., p. 346.

²Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1959).

³Subsequent study revealed that only ten of the thirteen identified by Rosenau as "Indiscriminates" were still in the Senate at the time of the censure votes.

in turn will be included among those who did not endorse Margaret Chase Smith's "Declaration of Conscience." In other words there should be a cumulative pattern of behavior on the four types of indicants (Rovere's dichotomy, Rosenau's dichotomy, the scalable censure roll calls, and Smith's petition data). Figure 3 portrays the hypothesized relations.

The coefficient of reproducibility (CR) will exceed .90.

Specification of the Concept

McCarthyism is related to a broad set of style concepts. These include Parsons' distinction between affectivity and affective-neutrality (one of the pattern variables borrowed by Almond),⁴ Eric Hoffer's "true believer,"⁵ Rokeach's "opinionated rejection,"⁶ Shils' frustrated and hostile legislator,⁷ Pritchett's Know-Nothingism,⁸ aspects Adorno's authoritarianism,⁹ and Lowenthal & Guterman's distinction

⁴Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).

⁵Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper, 1951).

⁶Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

⁷Edward A. Shils, "The Legislator and His Environment," The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18 (1950-1951), pp. 571-584.

⁸C. Herman Pritchett, Congress Versus the Supreme Court 1957-1960 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961).

⁹T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).

b These are the 1958-McCarthy's Indiscriminates of Rosenau's study. rather than all
children of Rosenau's Indiscriminates.

Hypothesized Relations Among Indicators and Senators

		Four Types of Indicators			
		Intense, direct general support for and practice of McCarthyism	Indiscriminate hostility to- ward Acheson	Supported McCarthy on censure ^a	Did not endorse anti-McCarthy declaration
Types of Senators	I McCarthyites	+	+	+	+
	II Indiscriminates ^b	-	+	+	+
	III More Discriminate McCarthy Supporters	-	-	+	+
	IV Late (including "fair weather") opponents	-	-	-	+
	V Early opponents	-	-	-	-

^aBecause there are multiple censure toll calls with differing marginals we can obtain greater differentiation than the five major types in this simple figure.

^bThese are the less-McCarthyite Indiscriminates of Rosenau's study, rather than all thirteen of Rosenau's Indiscriminates.

Figure 3

between the anti-democratic agitator & the reformer."¹⁰ McCarthyism is closest, however, to Rosenau's concept of indiscriminate hostility. Indiscriminate hostility does not merely mean opposition or criticism, but refers to the quality (or style) of opposition. Rosenau's important distinction between discriminate hostility and indiscriminate hostility is based on the percentage of hostile references that are in the personal qualities and symbol-collectivity categories.¹¹ He states that not all of the critics of Secretary Acheson "evidenced an inclination to treat him as a scapegoat for the insecurities of a troubled world."¹²

A significant distinction can be made between those who tended to confine their criticism to Acheson's performances and those whose hostility tended to be more indiscriminate and embraced him in all his capacities. These tendencies have been operationalized by attributing a discriminately hostile attitude to those Senators who recorded less than 10.3 per cent of their hostility potential in the personal qualities and symbol-collectivity categories, and by ascribing an indiscriminately hostile attitude to those who registered more than 10.3 per cent of their unfavorable references in these two categories.¹³

¹⁰"Portrait of the American Agitator," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948, 12, pp. 417-429.

¹¹"The symbol-collectivity category was established to account for references in which Acheson was identified neither as an individual possessing certain qualities nor as an official performing certain acts, but as a symbol of an ambiguous phenomenon ('the Truman-Acheson policy') or as a member of an indeterminate collectivity ('the Acheson crowd')."

¹²Ibid., p. 337.

¹³Ibid., p. 337.

Rosenau offers the following examples of indiscriminate hostility:

[The Indiscriminates] perceived that "the Secretary of State is managing our Armed Forces, our political life, our private press [Jenner]," that "Mr. Acheson today is not only writing our foreign policy but he more than any other man in the United States is dictating our domestic economy to a process which put "Mr. Acheson in full charge of the throttle [Malone]," so much so that it was "turning . . . the Government of ours into a military dictatorship, run by the Communist-appeasing, Communist-protecting betrayer of America, Secretary of State Dean Acheson [Jenner]."

.
I have studied Acheson's public utterances sidewise, slantwise, hindwise, and frontwise; I have watched the demeanor of this glib, supercilious, and guilty man on the witness stand; I have reflected upon his career, and I came to only one conclusion: his primary loyalty in international affairs runs to the British labor government, his secondary allegiance is to the Kremlin, with none left over for the country of his birth. The only trouble Acheson ever encounters is when Socialist-British and Russian-Communist policy diverge. . . . Then he reluctantly follows the lead from Socialist-London [McCarthy].¹⁴

Rosenau also categorizes McCarthy's descriptions of Acheson as "the great Red Dean of fashion" and "the elegant and alien Acheson-Russian as to heart, British as to manner," as examples of indiscriminate hostility.¹⁵

An example of indiscriminate hostility that refers less to personal qualities than to some vague collectivity is McCarthy's reference to "the Acheson-Hiss-Yalta crowd."¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 340-341.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 341.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 341.

"In addition to positing the operation of hyphenated collectivities as explanatory of all that was undesirable, the Indiscriminates perceived that hidden groups and mysterious forces were causing untold damage."¹⁷

. . . Acheson was viewed as "the very heart of the octopus [McCarthy]," as the expression of "a sinister, ruthless undertow [Malone]," as the product of "the inner circle . . . with its hidden rooms and hidden corridors [Jenner]." For the Indiscriminates, in short, the course of events was determined by "a rather sinister monster of many heads and many tentacles, a monster conceived in the Kremlin, and then given birth by Acheson, with Attlee and Morrison as the midwives, and then nurtured into Frankenstein proportions by the Hiss crowd, who still run the State Department [McCarthy]."¹⁸

The scale variable hypothesized to be common to the four kinds of data is conceived as a behavioral product of multiple attitudes; not as an attitude. Although there appears to have been widely shared perception of what underlying issue was common to the (above-mentioned) petition, speeches and votes, it is assumed that the behavioral responses to that issue were generated by more than a single attitude.

We are not concerned here with all expressions of right-wing indiscriminate hostility. Any cumulative ordering obtained below will not adequately measure right-wing indiscriminate hostility toward Blacks, Union leaders or Jews. The concern is with indiscriminate hostility directed at "leftist" management of national security questions.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 341.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 341.

The Theoretical Import of the Concept

It is hypothesized that the conceptualization of indiscriminate behavior at this level of generalization offers a more nearly optimal juncture of theoretical import and empirical import. Clearly this level of conceptualization offers more theoretical scope than a specific measure of senatorial behavior toward Acheson or McCarthy. And if the four different types of indicants scale together, the increase in theoretical scope is not at the expense of empirical import. To seek even greater theoretical scope by treating race, religion, national security, and labor questions as one issue-dimension, would sacrifice empirical import. Congressmen simply are not arrayed along but one dimension on these issues.¹⁹ And neither are their constituents.²⁰

The theoretical importance of the concept can better be seen by noting the scope of the relations that it has been hypothesized to enter into as both a dependent and an independent variable. The following inventories of hypotheses are not meant to be exhaustive,

¹⁹Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 212ff. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 45-56. Charles Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1958), pp. 308-338.

²⁰Miller and Stokes, ibid. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June, 1963), pp. 368-377. Michael Rogin, "Wallace and the Middle Class: The White Backlash," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Spring, 1966), pp. 98-108.

but only suggestive of the scope of relations involving indiscriminate hostility.

When concerned with the explanation of senators' indiscriminate hostility--that is with IH as a dependent variable--we may relate IH to:

I. The Situation as Immediate Antecedent of Action (including opportunities, limits and prudential considerations)

A. The Position of

1. Constituents on

a) Indiscriminate hostility

(1) Direction of opinion

(2) Saliency of opinion

b) Other factors that influence electoral outcome
(probably net effect of constituents' party images, issue and candidate orientations on electoral outcome--victory or defeat--if candidate does not engage in indiscriminate hostility)

2. Party leaders (for example, Taft's calculated tolerance or encouragement of McCarthyism)²¹

²¹"Once McCarthyism took hold, Taft . . . encouraged its author to keep on with his accusations on the ground that the law of probabilities could not in the long run fail him. 'If one case doesn't work, try another,' he told McCarthy." Rovere, op. cit., p. 136. McCarthy ". . . was a pure delight now to the campaign committees, and the Republican organizations were in hot competition to have him come in with a load of documents on anyone who was giving them trouble. Approval came from high places. Robert Taft gave it out that in his opinion 'the pro-Communist policies of the State Department fully justified Joe McCarthy in his demand for an investigation.'" Rovere, p. 179.

3. Opinion-makers (for example, the ". . . group of reporters . . . who worked closely with [McCarthy] and his staff," and " . . . the reporters, especially those from the wire services, [who tried] to stimulate conflict [subversive to the Senate folkways])"²²

B. The relation of the Senator's party membership to that of the target of indiscriminate hostility (for example, Acheson) and to that of those expressing indiscriminate hostility (McCarthy, Jenner, and so forth)²³

c. The clarity, vagueness or ambiguity of situational norms

II. The Senator's Personality Processes and Dispositions

A. Motivational Bases of Attitudes

1. Object appraisal (reality testing)
2. Mediation of self-other relationships (social adjustment)
3. Externalization and ego defense

B. Attitudes Toward

1. Communists and those accused of being communists
2. The norms of democracy, fair play, etc.
3. The importance of party victory

²²Matthews, op. cit., pp. 202, 217.

²³Rosenau, op. cit.

- III. The Senator's Social Environment as Context for the Acquisition, Maintenance, and Change of Attitudes
- A. The Information that His Environment Provides about Relevant Social Objects (e.g., targets and exponents of McCarthyism).
 - B. The Information that His Environment Provides about the Prevailing Social Norms (of positive and negative reference groups) Concerning Relevant Social Objects (e.g., targets and exponents of McCarthyism).
 - C. Life Situations Conducive to Formation of "Authoritarian Personality," Deflating Self-esteem, Provoking Displaced Aggression
 - 1. Personal life situations (for example, the senator's position, accomplishment, prestige do not match that of other senators, or meet the standard set by a starving ego)
 - 2. Defeats or decline for his (subnational) group (party, ideological group, socio-economic grouping)²⁴
 - 3. National reversals (defeats, retreat, stalemate, other evidence of declining national power) that frustrate and humiliate those whose self-esteem strongly depends on national power and respect

²⁴Rovere, op. cit., p. 21.

(examples--loss of China, American retreat in Korea)²⁵

IV. Remote Facts of History, Politics, Economics, etc., that Contribute to the Distinctive Features of the Senator's Environment and of the Immediate Situations that He Encounters.²⁶

Any of these classes of determinants could be more thoroughly developed. For example, Table 1 hypothesizes types of pressures (on senatorial choice of style) generated by the permutations of I, A, 1, a), and I, A, 1, b). Many of McCarthy's supporters in the Senate perceived the position of constituents on indiscriminate hostility as favorable, and the probably electoral outcome (without indiscriminate hostility) as unfavorable (see lower left cell in Table 1) . As Rovere puts it:

Into [the world of the daft and the frenzied] came large numbers of regular Republicans who had coolly decided that there was no longer any respectable way of unhorsing the Democrats and that only McCarthy's wild and conscienceless politics could do the job.²⁷

III, C, 2, points to an additional less conscious, less direct

²⁵Rosenau, op. cit., p. 342.

²⁶Adapted from M. Brewster Smith, Determinants of Anti-Semitism: A Social-Psychological Map (New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1965,) and Rosenau, op. cit.

²⁷Rovere, op. cit., p. 21.

TABLE 1

TYPES OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE ON SENATOR'S CHOICE OF STYLE

		Position of Constituents on Indiscriminate Hostility	
		Favorable	Unfavorable
P W i			
r i n	Favorable	IH <u>un-</u>	Electoral
o t a	(victory)	necessary	situation <u>dis-</u>
b h t			couraging IH
a o e			
b u			
l t H			
e o			
I s	Unfavorable	Electoral	<u>No advantage</u>
O n t	(defeat)	situation	in IH
u d i		encouraging	
t i l		IH	
c s i			
o c t			
m r y			
e i			
m			
-			

sort of constituency influence on senatorial style. Those senators who strongly identified with the Republican party, whose self-esteem was deflated by the defeats from 1932-1948, and who felt subjected to the arbitrary authority of a misguided electorate and a liberal opposition party, were more likely to engage in indiscriminate hostility. The greater the policy differences between the "losers" and the "winners" and the more salient the issues on which they differ, the greater the frustration of the "losers" and the greater the probability that they will seek emotional satisfaction through indiscriminate attacks. The extent to which frustration leads to indiscriminate hostility rather than socially useful "reality testing" and coping with national problems, depends in part on (1) how well-equipped, intellectually, the senator is for "reality testing," and (2) how well he has internalized the vital norms that help keep competition on substantive issues from being severely compounded by personal conflict.²⁸

The purpose here is not, however, to thoroughly develop each point in the above outline, but simply to suggest the scope of the relations into which the concept enters.

As an independent variable indiscriminate hostility has been hypothesized to have effects on all three branches of government, the

²⁸V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion & American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961).

electorate and foreign publics. Beer et al.,²⁹ Shils,³⁰ Matthews,³¹ and Almond³² are among those who have discussed the relation between style of expression and the functioning of legislative bodies. Almond, for example, argues that both the function of interest articulation and the function of aggregation are performed in part by legislative bodies and that the style of articulation has important effects on aggregation.³³ He states that

With regard to the style of interest articulation, the more latent, diffuse, particularistic, and affective the pattern of interest articulation, the more difficult it is to aggregate interests and translate them into public policy. Hence a political system characterized by these patterns of interest articulation will have poor circulation between the rest of the society and the political system, unless the society is quite small and has good cue-reading authorities. On the other hand, the more manifest, specific, general, and instrumental the style of interest articulation, the easier it is to maintain the boundary between the polity and society, and the better the circulation of needs, claims, and demands from the society in aggregable form into the political system. A political system with an interest articulation structure and style of this kind can be large and complex and still efficiently process raw

²⁹Samuel Beers, et al., Patterns of Government (1st ed.; New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 22-25.

³⁰Shils, op. cit.

³¹Op. cit., pp. 97-99, 217.

³²Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

³³Ibid., pp. 33, 36, and 40.

demand inputs from the society into outputs responsive to the claims and demands of that society.³⁴

Key,³⁵ Kris and Leites,³⁶ Lipset,³⁷ Shils,³⁸ Stouffer,³⁹ and others help us relate style of leadership to the electorate's:

I. Personality Processes and Dispositions⁴⁰

A. Motivational Bases of Attitudes (for example style of leadership can foster reality testing or ego defense)⁴¹

B. Attitudes, beliefs, expectations, images

1. Feelings about the effectiveness of democracy⁴²

³⁴Ibid., p. 36.

³⁵V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy op. cit.

³⁶Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," reprinted in Berelson and Janowitz (eds.), Public Opinion and Communication (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 278-288.

³⁷Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1960).

³⁸Shils, op. cit.

³⁹Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955).

⁴⁰Important leaders affect the attitudes of this and the next generation of voters through relatively direct effects on their social environment as the context for acquisition, maintenance, and change of attitudes. Such leaders have quite indirect effects on the voters of the (remote) future. That is, present-day leadership behavior will be among the remote antecedents of electoral behavior in the distant future.

⁴¹Kris and Leites, op. cit., especially pp. 286-288.

⁴²Lipset, op. cit.

2. Feelings about the legitimacy of democracy⁴³
3. Feelings about the legitimacy of specific office-holders⁴⁴
4. Faith in people⁴⁵
5. Images of the U.S.S.R., Socialist Britain, etc.⁴⁶

II. Behavior⁴⁷

- A. Voting Behavior
- B. Mass Action

Perhaps the theoretical import of indiscriminate hostility (as an independent variable) is best seen in the work of Key and that of Shils. The latter, after discussing the sources, objects, and consequences of indiscriminate hostility, concludes that:

⁴³David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 278-310. Also, Lipset, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴Easton, *ibid.*, speaks of the objects of legitimacy as authorities and regimes. Lipset has also spoken broadly of participants in the political process as objects of legitimacy. Specifically, Lipset has viewed Birchers and other extremists as denying the legitimacy of those in the democratic game who differ with them; paper on extremism delivered at the State University of New York at Binghamton, October 6, 1966.

⁴⁵For measures of faith in people see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 212-214. For the relation between faith in people and political cooperation see pp. 227-231.

⁴⁶For a distinction between image and attitude see Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (published for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 25-26. For images as dependent variables see "Part One" of Kelman.

⁴⁷In addition to affecting the voters' behavior through effects on their attitudes toward objects, leaders influence behavior through their effects on the voters' situation.

. . .each accusingly worded question or hostilely intended general statement sets the stage for more bitter accusations and more violent denunciation. The pattern of discourse already too prevalent in American political life--that a point cannot be made unless it is overstressed and reiterated in the strongest possible terms--has been . . . made into the standard currency of American legislative and political argument. Legislators who feel relatively little animosity against their opponents use this language because it has become a convention of their profession or because to be heard in the clamor of sensational words, they too must speak sensationally.

.
The deeper damage consists in what it is doing to the tone and etiquette of American political life. The tolerance and calm which are necessary for rational discussion of the extremely complicated and difficult alternatives confronting us are greatly diminished by low standards of political discourse This is a time when it is most desirable and necessary that the older crudities of mind and sentiment should be replaced by dispassionate reflection and carefully measured statement. The tact and self restraint which are essential to the political life of a democracy are stunted in this atmosphere.

By their disrespect for the proprieties, without which an efficient democratic government cannot function, the reputation of the political profession is further besmirched and the quality of its performance is reduced.

.
The nature of the tasks facing politicians today however is so taxing to every moral and intellectual resource that the questionable luxury of political savagery can no longer be afforded.

.
In a situation which seems very much like a vicious circle at least part of the remedy must be sought in greater tactfulness and restraint. It is not too much to hope that if legislators, politicians, and citizens can be made more aware of the delicate balance on which the free society rests, some of them will change their behavior and others will no longer support or tolerate practices which are harmful to the democratic system.⁴⁸

The Ten Indicators Used in the Test of the Scale Hypothesis

The first indicator in the following scale is a dichotomy that separates McCarthy and . . . his two great supporters in the Senate,

⁴⁸Op. cit., pp. 583-584.

William Jenner, of Indiana, and Herman Welker, of Idaho. . .⁴⁹ from the other senators (see Column 1 of Figure 4). These three were rated as having given more intense, direct, and general support for McCarthyism than the other senators.

The second indicator is a dichotomy that distinguishes thirteen senators who were indiscriminately hostile toward Secretary of State Acheson (1949-52) from senators who were not indiscriminately hostile. The number and proportion of "indiscriminate" references by those who were hostile to Acheson are reported in the last two columns of Table 2.⁵⁰ The thirteen hostile senators who had more than 10.3 percent of their unfavorable references in the personal qualities and symbol-collectivity categories were labeled "Indiscriminates" by Rosenau. The hostile senators with less than 10.3 per cent in this category are labeled "Discriminates."

⁴⁹Rovere, op. cit., pp. 56-57. Although Rovere's classification of Jenner and Welker as McCarthy's "two great supporters" is accepted here, there were some "near greats" in the Senate. Bridges, for example, supported McCarthy and McCarthyism in many ways including motions on Senate floor. The most extreme roll call stimulus in the following scale was shaped by Bridges.

⁵⁰Table 2 is based on Table VII of Rosenau's "The Senate and Dean Acheson: A Case Study in Legislative Attitudes," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University (Princeton, 1957), (This is the only reference that will be made to Rosenau's thesis.) All other citations are to Rosenau's "Senate Attitudes Toward a Secretary of State," op. cit.

Table 2 A Breakdown of the Hostile Minorities

Senator	Party	Registration	Years of Tenure to 1953	Number and Proportion of References Recorded as				Number and Proportion of References Recorded as				Total	Personal Qualities and as a Symbol-Collectively	
				Favorable	Unfavorable (Hostility Potential)	Neutral		Favorable	Unfavorable (Hostility Potential)	Neutral				
				No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	No.	%
I N D I S C R I M I N A T O R Y														
Welker	R	Mt.	2	-	-	16	100.0	-	-	-	-	16	7	43.7
Jenner	R	Mv.	6	-	-	202	96.2	8	3.8			210	41	20.3
McCarthy	R	Mv.	6	-	-	309	95.4	15	4.6			324	120	38.9
Malone	R	Mt.	6	-	-	314	90.8	32	9.2			346	39	12.4
Dirksen	R	Mv.	2	-	-	22	84.6	4	15.4			26	5	22.7
Taft	R	Mv.	14	-	-	69	84.1	13	15.9			82	10	14.5
Bridges	R	Ne.	16	-	-	66	83.5	13	16.5			79	23	34.9
Wherry	R	Mv.	9	1	0.4	209	79.1	54	20.5			264	34	16.3
Kem	R	Mv.	6	-	-	117	78.5	32	21.5			149	27	23.1
Capehart	R	Mv.	8	-	-	45	77.6	13	22.4			58	9	20.0
Bricker	R	Mv.	6	-	-	21	75.0	7	25.0			28	5	23.8
Mundt	R	Mv.	6	1	1.7	40	69.0	17	29.3			58	7	17.5
S Langer	R	Mv.	12	6	11.8	31	60.8	14	27.4			51	4	12.9
Brewster	R	Ne.	12	8	9.1	61	69.3	19	21.6			88	5	8.2
Cain	R	P.	6	7	5.5	74	58.3	46	36.2			127	6	8.1
I Knowland	R	P.	8	10	7.7	71	54.6	49	37.7			130	3	4.2
N Ferguson	R	Mv.	10	-	-	32	47.1	36	52.9			68	1	3.1
A Morse	R	P.	8	10	10.1	45	45.5	44	44.4			99	1	2.2
T Watkins	R	Mt.	6	1	1.3	35	43.7	44	55.0			80	1	2.9
E McCarran	D	Mt.	20	1	2.9	13	37.1	21	60.0			35	1	7.7
S Donnell	R	Mv.	5	-	-	16	34.0	31	66.0			47	-	-

The third through the ninth indicators (Columns 3-9 of Figure 5) are McCarthy censure (Senate Resolution 301) roll call votes taken in December, 1954.

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>CQ</u>	<u>Number</u> ⁵¹	<u>Description</u>
3	6	(p. 472)	McCarthy Censure. BRIDGES (R.N.H.) substitute for Committee amendment, resolving that McCarthy violated no rule or precedent in failing to appear before the Privileges and Elections Subcommittee. Rejected (12/1/54), 20-68
4	1	(p. 473)	McCarthy Censure. Committee amendment rewording first count of resolution condemning McCarthy for failure to cooperate with the Privileges and Elections Subcommittee investigating his finances in 1952 and for abusing the Subcommittee. Agreed to (12/1/54), 67-20
5	4	(p. 472)	McCarthy Censure. DIRKSEN (R Ill.) substitute (for the above committee amendment) resolving that McCarthy's conduct did not warrant formal censure or condemnation. Rejected 12/1/54) 21-66.
6	5	(p. 473)	McCarthy Censure. Adoption of resolution as amended. Adopted (12/1/54), 67-22
7	3	(p. 473)	McCarthy Censure. BENNETT (R Utah) amendment to committee amendment, to delete second count, concerning Zwicker, and to substitute a count condemning McCarthy for his charges against members of the Committee which recommended censure and for calling the Senate censure session a "lynch bee." Agreed to (12/2/54) 64-23.

⁵¹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1954, pp. 472-473.

- | | | |
|---|------------|---|
| 8 | 4 (p. 473) | McCarthy Censure. Committee amendment as amended to eliminate reference to Zwicker and substitute condemnation for abuse of the censure Committee. Agreed to (12/2/54), 62-24. |
| 9 | 2 (p. 473) | McCarthy Censure. Committee amendment rewording second count of resolution, condemning McCarthy for abusing and denouncing Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker for his testimony before McCarthy on security at Ft. Monmouth, N.J. BRIDGES (R N.H.) motion to table Committee amendment. Rejected (12/2/54), 33-55. (Second count of censure resolution thus was kept alive.) |

The tenth indicator (column 10) distinguishes those who endorsed Margaret Chase Smith's 1950 statement of principles from those who did not. The signers of this anti-McCarthy declaration, which became known as "A Declaration of Conscience," were Charles W. Tobey (R N.H.), George D. Aiken (R Vt.), Wayne Morse (R Ore.), Irving Ives (R N.Y.), Edward J. Thye (R Minn.), and Robert C. Hendrickson (R N.J.), and (the author) Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine).⁵²

The statement said in part that

Certain elements of the Republican Party have [promoted] confusion in the hopes of riding the Republican Party to victory through the selfish, political exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance and intolerance.

It is high time that we stopped thinking politically as Republicans and Democrats about elections and started thinking patriotically as Americans about national security based on individual freedom.⁵³

⁵² Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1950), p. 452. Also see footnote "a" of Figure (below).

⁵³ Ibid., p. 452

To the extent that the ten indicators discussed here form a cumulative pattern the resulting measure demonstrates that longitudinal analysis can promote the scientific measurement of significant behavior.

The Test of the Scale Hypothesis

Figure 5 orders the items according to their extremeness (magnitude, or "difficulty"). The resulting scalogram has a Coefficient of Reproducibility of .99. Although further refinement is possible (e.g., through content analysis specifically designed to break ties), Figure 5 does reveal that those rated as most supportive of McCarthyism by Rovere are included among those who were indiscriminately hostile toward Acheson, the latter are included among those who were most supportive of McCarthy on the censure vote and these are included among the nonsupporters of Margaret Chase Smith's anti-McCarthy Declaration of Conscience. (See Figure 5.)

Implications

It was noted above that often the data are not available in a single session of Congress for constructing a scientific measure. It was assumed, however, that finding sufficient data for a measure that offers differentiation, reliability, and validity, becomes more likely if we (1) take off our cross-sectional blinders, and (2) simultaneously opt for the complementary use of different types of data, rather than restrict ourselves to but one type of indicant.

The scale hypothesis (based on qualitative content analysis) that the ten indicators drawn from a six-year period actually tap

Rank Order of Republican Senators
on McCarthyism

Items

Scale Type	Senator	State	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
McCarthyites	McCarthy	Wisconsin	+	+	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	+
	Welker	Idaho	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	N
	Jenner	Indiana	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Bridges	N. H.	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Malone	Nevada	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Dirksen	Illinois	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	N
	Bricker	Ohio	-	+	+	+	+	+	?	+	+	+
	Capehart	Indiana	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Mundt	S. Dakota	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Langer	N. Dakota	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
More Discriminate McCarthy Supporters	Butler	Maryland	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	N
	Hickenlooper	Iowa	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Schoeppel	Kansas	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Gordon	Oregon	-	-	+	?	?	+	?	+	?	+
	Knowland	California	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Martin	Penn.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Young	N. Dakota	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Dworshak	Idaho	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	mild supporters	Colorado	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
	mild opponents	Delaware	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Marginal Senators	mild opponents	S. Dakota	-	-	-	-	-	-	?	?	?	N
	mild opponents Case		-	-	-	-	-	-				

Figure 5

Items

Scale Type	Senator	State	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Late Opponents	Frear	Delaware	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
	Saltonstall	Mass.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
	Ferguson	Michigan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
	Watkins	Utah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
	Carlson	Kansas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N
Early Opponents	Bennett	Utah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N
	Flanders	Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
	Aiken	Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
	Smith	New Jersey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-a
	Morse	Oregon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-b
	Ives	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Hendrickson	New Jersey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Thye	Minnesota	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Smith	Maine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Duff	Penn.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N
N = Not a member of Congress at this time.			C. R. = .99									

? = Absent, general pair, "present," did not announce or answer CQ poll.

^aBecause he took as clearcut a public stand as did the signers, Smith of New Jersey is assigned a minus. For evidence of Mr. Smith's endorsement or "wholehearted agreement with everything" Mrs. Smith of Maine said, see p. 7895 Congressional Record, 1950.

^bMorse was an Independent during the 83rd Congress.

Figure 5 - Continued

"McCarthyism" ("right-wing indiscriminate hostility directed at 'leftist' management of national security issues"), is well supported by the empirical analysis. Not only is the reliability impressive but the fact that the ten indicators were generated in four different ways clearly demonstrates that the rank order is not an artifact peculiar to one type of data. Also the fact that the roll call items fit so well among three other types of data argues against the assumption that roll call data are necessarily artifactual or invalid.

When the interpretation of roll calls or other data is in dispute, a longitudinal search for a criterion of validity can often resolve the dispute. For example, when the editors of the New Republic and William S. White offer conflicting interpretations of the McCarthy censure votes, we need not conclude that the process of interpreting such phenomena is so complex that it is necessarily arbitrary. The fact that three other types of data support the New Republic rather than the Citadel interpretation is intersubjectively transmissible evidence; not subjective opinion.

The complementary use of data (made possible by longitudinal analysis) also fosters and pinpoints reexamination of measures and the assumptions underlying the use of data and measuring techniques.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ According to Rovere, Bridges was not among the three most extreme senators, but Bridges was judged third most extreme by Rosenau's method of estimation (percentage of unfavorable references in the personal qualities and symbol-collectivity categories). This directs one's attention to a comparison of Bridges' remarks with those of Jenner to see if Rosenau's raw data is inconsistent with Rovere's rating, or if Rosenau's failure to distinguish between extremely indiscriminate and mildly indiscriminate references accounts for his relatively low rating of Jenner.

For example, conflict between Rosenau and Rovere on the ordering of Jenner and Bridges is found to be a consequence of Rosenau's decisions to (1) estimate indiscriminate hostility from the percentage rather than the number of unfavorable references recorded in the "personal qualities and symbol-collectivity categories," and (2) treat all references in these categories as equal. The consequences of the latter decision, to give no more weight to Jenner's extremely indiscriminate references than to Bridges relatively mild ones, are made explicit by the systematic comparison of the different types of data. When one uses Rosenau's new data on Jenner and Bridges and gives more weight to relatively extreme references than to mild ones, the results are quite consistent with Rovere's rating.⁵⁵

The above measure also demonstrates that longitudinal analysis can increase the differentiation among respondents. If the 1949-1952 data were not linked to the 1954 roll-call data, we could not differentiate among the twenty who were most supportive of McCarthy. The importance of increased differentiation to the development of political theory has not, however, been sufficiently recognized; perhaps because the vital role of differentiation in the interplay of theory and research has not been made explicit. If one were not aware of the range of behavior revealed by the above scale, it might seem quite reasonable to dichotomize the senators on the roll call on adoption of the Senate censure resolution (indicant 6);

⁵⁵ Rosenau's data on Jenner and Bridges are also consistent with Rovere's rating if some weight is assigned to the number of indiscriminate references as well as to the percentage.

labeling those who voted "Nay" McCarthy supporters, and those who voted "Yea" McCarthy opponents. Such a dichotomy has the appeal of both simplicity and convention. Unfortunately this common practice treats men who differ importantly as though they were the same type. For example, such a dichotomization would lump together those who had different positions on indicants 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 as "McCarthy supporters." And it would categorize as one type ("McCarthy opponents") senators who greatly differed on items 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Examples such as this must have inspired Hempel to write that

. . . comparative or quantitative concepts will often prove so considerably superior for the purposes of scientific description and systematization that they will seem to reflect the very nature of the subject matter under study, whereas the use of classificatory [either . . . or] categories will seem an artificial imposition. (Emphasis added)⁵⁶

When behavioralists use dichotomies to represent behavior that can be shown to have a broad range, it gives some substance to the criticisms that behavioralists do not measure important though subtle differences--do not respect the uniqueness or complexity of political behavior. On the other hand, the above scale (which is open to even greater differentiation) is part of the evidence that suggests that the more extreme anti-behavioralists have prematurely concluded that science cannot sufficiently differentiate among the politically important and that subjective intuition is preferable to "futile counting."

⁵⁶Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 56.

V URBAN AFFAIRS DECISION MAKING IN THE SENATE: A PREDICTIVE STUDY

Congress is making an increasing number of decisions directly affecting urban governments and is increasingly worthy of attention from those concerned with all arenas of decision affecting urban affairs. Congress, however, because of its size and complexity can not be as fruitfully studied by a traditional approach as the smaller arenas for urban affairs decisions. A researcher may gain considerable insight from intimate acquaintance with all members of a city council. He may be able to retain a large percentage of their responses in his mind and imaginatively order these into patterns of behavior. This is not as true, however, when our researcher turns his attention to urban affairs decisions flowing from Congress, and this may explain the relative poverty of generalizations in this area. Statements such as "Congressmen tend to think small about city housing,"¹ may suggest something of the value orientation of the author but do not provide descriptions that may serve as a basis for explanation, prediction, and control.

One requisite of the scientific study of Congressional decision-making on urban affairs issues is the clarification of the dimensions of such behavior. The a priori lumping together of all measures such as urban renewal, housing, community facilities, airports, District

¹Daniel Seligman, The Exploding Metropolis, The Editors of Fortune (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1958), p. 102.

of Columbia affairs, and mass transit as urban affairs policy may allow only the roughest description of policy behavior. A more precise identification of the correlated but multiple dimensions will promote explanation, prediction, and control.

A related requisite of the scientific study of policy behavior is the identification of enduring or recurring dimensions. This search for regularities that hold up over time requires that time-bound case studies of single sessions be supplemented with longitudinal analyses which can distinguish the ephemeral from that which is more enduring and thus of scientific interest.

But what are the assumptions about the nature of decision-making in the area of urban affairs that lead us to expect the recurring behavior necessary to scientific study? If it is typical that a problem appears, a decision is made, and the problem is solved; there may be no recurring or enduring dimension and limited prospects for scientific study. If, however, urban problems are complex and our economic and intellectual resources are limited, the problems are likely to require a lengthy series of related attacks --constituting an enduring dimension amenable to scientific study through longitudinal analysis. This Chapter assumes that corporate decision-making by Congress on urban affairs is overtly serial and incremental. It also suggests a method for clarifying this assumption.

If most of the decisions on urban affairs can be placed on a few recurring dimensions, the Kennedy administration should have been able to avoid its embarrassingly inaccurate prediction of

Senate behavior on the Department of Urban Affairs proposal.²

Furthermore, if this decision which was described by journalists as a unique result of many factors is found to be part of an enduring pattern of decisions, so should most of the more routine urban decisions.

The Department of Urban Affairs Decision

In February, 1962, proponents of the Department of Urban Affairs received a setback in the United States. The unexpected 42-58 defeat not only signified the weakness of urban forces or strategy but also proved to be one of the key events giving President Kennedy his image as weak in managing Congress.³ An appropriate test of the hypothesis that this decision was not idiosyncratic but a predictable part of a larger pattern of behavior on urban measures

²"Administration leaders ... wanted it voted on first in the Senate where they thought it would be approved." 1962 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 380.

³That the Kennedy image did suffer from his Congressional defeats is suggested by the following comparison:

Public Approval for Johnson and Kennedy in Key Areas of Action

	Per cent approval for:		Net
	Kennedy	Johnson	K-J
Keeping government clean	55	51	+4
Handling Khrushchev	66	74	-8
Handling race problems	49	60	-11
Handling Vietnam	56	72	-16
Keeping economy healthy	59	77	-18
Getting Congress to act	44	77	-33

(Kennedy figures based on early November, 1963, results, Johnson figures based on August, 1964, results?
Newsweek, August 31, 1964, p. 27.

is found by relating the 1962 decision to the previous relevant set of decisions--those on the 1961 Housing scale. If there is considerable regularity (order, structure, patterning) in urban affairs decision-making, the 1962 proposal of a department centering around the FHA should either scale with the 1961 housing items or be highly correlated with the 1961 housing scale. Furthermore, if the hypothesized regularity is confirmed, we will have a basis for understanding the options open to urban statagists in each period.

The following scale (Figure 6) reveals not only that the 1961 housing decision (items 1, 3-9) form a unidimensional pattern but also that the 1962 decision (item 2) fits rather well on the same dimension.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Clark	Pa.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kefauver	Tenn.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bartlett	Alaska	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Carroll	Colo.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Douglas	Ill.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hart	Mich.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
McNamara	Mich.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Humphrey	Minn.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Long	Mo.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith	Mass.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Williams	N. J.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morse	Ore.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Neuberger	Ore.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pastore	R. I.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pell	R. I.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Jackson	Wash.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Magnuson	Wash.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Byrd	W. Va.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Randolph	W. Va.	+	*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Case	N. J.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Javits	N. Y.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Yarborough	Texas	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Proxmire	Wisc.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Figure 6

Symington	Mo.	+ + + - + + + + +	Best prospects for winning <u>new</u> votes in the 87th and 88th Congresses (if issue not posed as race issue)
McCarthy	Minn.	+ + - + + + + + +	
Engle	Calif.	- + + + + + + + +	
Mansfield	Mont.	- + + + + + + + +	
Metcalf	Mont.	- + + + + + + + +	
Moss	Utah	- + + + + + + + +	
Hickey	Wyo.	- + + + + + + + +	
McGee	Wyo.	- + + + + + + + +	
Burdick	N. D.	- + + + + + + + +	
Long	Hawaii	- + + + + + + + +	
Young	Ohio	- + + + + + + + +	
Muskie	Maine	- + + + + + + + +	
Gruening	Alaska	- + + + + + + + +	
Church	Idaho	- + + - + - + + +	
Hartke	Indiana	- + - + + + + + +	
<u>ANDERSON</u>	N. Mex.	- - + + + + + + +	
<u>CHAVEZ</u>	N. Mex.	- - + + + + + + +	
<u>DODD</u>	Conn.	- - + + + + + + +	
<u>BIBLE</u>	Nev.	- - + + + + + + +	
<u>CANNON</u>	Nev.	- - + + - + + + +	
<u>SPARKMAN</u>	Ala.	- - - + + + + + +	
<u>HAYDEN</u>	Ariz.	- - - + + + + + +	
<u>HILL</u>	Ala.	- - - + + + + + +	
<u>JOHNSTON</u>	S. C.	- - - + + + + + +	
<u>BOGGS</u>	Del.	- - - + - + + + +	
<u>LONG</u>	La.	+ - - - + + + + +	
<u>FONG</u>	Hawaii	+ - - - + + + + +	
Keating	N. Y.	+ + + - - - - - +	
<u>FULBRIGHT</u>	Ark.	- - - + - - + + +	
Gore	Tenn.	+ + - - - - - - +	
Kerr	Okla.	- + - - + - - - +	
Cooper	Ky.	+ - + - - - - - -	
Ellender	La.	- - - - + - - - +	
Kuchel	Calif.	- - - - - + - - -	
Wiley	Wisc.	- - + - - - - - +	
Jordan	N. C.	- - - - - - - - +	
Ervin	N. C.	- - - - - - - - +	
Talmadge	Ga.	- - - - - - - - +	
Monroney	Okla.	- + - - - - - - -	
Scott	Pa.	- + - - - - - - -	
Morton	Ky.	+ - - - - - - - -	
McClellan	Ark.	- - - - - - - - -	
Allott	Colo.	- - - - - - - - -	
Bush	Conn.	- - - - - - - - -	
Goldwater	Ariz.	- - - - - - - - -	
Williams	Del.	- - - - - - - - -	

Figure 6 - Continued

+ = Pro-urban vote

- = Anti-urban vote

* = Senate rules required that Senator Randolph, the only Senator with perfect support for the dimension in 1961 not to vote for the Department of Urban Affairs, vote nay after acceding to Majority Leader Mansfield's request that he move for discharge of

Figure 6 - Continued

the resolution of disapproval (1962 CQ Almanac, p. 383).

Identification of Scale Items:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1961 CQ Roll Call	68		185	62	71	72	70	74	85
1962 CQ Roll Call		14							

It should be noted that support for urban measures dropped precipitously after the middle of the distribution. Thus it was necessary (in the 87th and 88th Congresses) that the proponents garner five to eight of the votes of the moderate Southerners or their sympathizers from Nevada, New Mexico, and border states. Considerable support (five to eight votes) from that range of the distribution that extended from Anderson (N. Mex.) to Fulbright would not have been an unrealistic hope (barring the premature announcement of a Negro to head the department). To have expected to offset losses among these crucial marginal senators by searching for the support of Northerners further down in the distribution appears unrealistic. Advocates of a cabinet level Department of Housing and Community Affairs in the early sixties did not have a promising alternative to recruiting support from these identifiable marginal Senators.

While the above scale provides a very useful basis for identifying the best prospects in 1962-64 for votes 43-50 for a Department of Housing and Urban Development, there are alternative perspectives for explanation or prediction of such a decision. The relationships between constituency variables, nominal party affiliation, the Senators' personal characteristics, and policy

position on the 1962 measure are as follows:

Constituency Variables and Policy Position

As one should expect there is a positive correlation between "% urban" and position on the 1962 measure. The more interesting finding, however, is that neither "% urban" nor "% rural farm" is as strongly related to policy position on this issue as are eight other variables.

Table 3

CORRELATION OF THE 1962 VOTE WITH
CONSTITUENCY VARIABLES*

% urban2887
% rural farm	-.2226
% nonwhite	-.2525
% foreign born3265
% native of foreign or mixed parentage3480
Median income3933
% of families with incomes under \$3,000 . .	-.3909
% of families with incomes \$10,000 and over2958
% completed less than 5 years of school . .	-.3440
% unemployed3253
% white collar3476
% using public transportation to work2848

* Calculated from Table 2, 1962 County City Data Book

While none of the constituency variables provides a basis for prediction or political strategy that compares with the above scale, the relationships suggest hypotheses for further testing. (For example, two of the correlations suggest that persons who have

received their political socialization in foreign countries or from parents raised in foreign countries are more accepting of central government efforts in urban affairs.

Party Affiliation and Policy Position

Nominal party affiliation correlated .45 with position on the Department of Urban Affairs. The 38-26 split among the Democrats would have made any attempt to predict policy position from nominal party affiliation somewhat disappointing.

If, however, we define party behaviorally by using Louis McQuitty's "HiClass" to dichotomize the Senate on the basis of its 1961 roll call behavior, we find that 93% (38/41) of one behavioral party supported the Department of Urban Affairs while 93% (53/57) of the other behaviorally defined party opposed the 1962 measure.

The Senators' Characteristics and Policy Position

Table 4

SUPPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT BY ORDERED
SUBCLASSES OF SENATORS

	Pro	Con	
Age 62-71	3	26	(most anti)
Agriculture	2	14	
Business/Banking	11	18	
(Senators	42	58)	
Teachers	8	6	
Age 37-50	17	5	(most pro)

While much of the association between age and policy position is incidental to or stems from the association of age with more fundamental variables, not all of it is incidental to differences in constituency. When we examine the fourteen states in which "same-state senators" split on this measure we find that in these fourteen comparisons where legal constituency is held constant the probability is nine to five that the younger of the "same-state senators" will support the Department while the older will oppose. Thus while age is not a major factor it may be necessary to a comprehensive explanation.⁴

None of the top 22 Republicans on seniority and only one of the top 16 Democrats favored the bill.⁵ This was in small part, a consequence of how the administration defined the issue and not simply a consequence of implacable opposition of all of these men toward the basic urban dimension.

In the case of the 1962 Department of Urban Affairs vote it appears that for purposes of prediction, assessment of the political prospects of urban interests, and development of political strategy, the ordering obtained by longitudinal scale analysis is more

⁴Subsequent examination of the 1965 data revealed that in 12 of 16 states that split on HUD the younger Senators were pro-HUD.

⁵This reinforces doubts about the capacity of the seniority system to anticipate and cope with urban problems.

instructive than the alternative perspectives. But is this a unique case--a fluke? It has been suggested above that--because journalists considered this vote as more complex or more nearly unique than most votes on urban affairs--evidence that it fits on a dimension may be considered evidence that most of the more routine urban affairs decisions are predictable parts of highly patterned behavior.

As an additional check on the hypothesis that urban affairs decisions are predictably patterned, two predictions were attempted from the 1963 Urban Mass Transit scale (Figure 7 , items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-12). The first was a prediction of position on the 1964 Urban Mass Transit Act (Figure 7, item 3).

The first of these predictions (that the 1964 Urban Mass Transit Act vote would fit on the same dimension with the 1963 Mass Transit items) was made with the most confidence because of the apparent homogeneity of content. Whether using correlation or error criteria the items from these different sessions were found to constitute one recurring or enduring dimension.

The second of these predictions (the higher the scale position of a group of senators on Urban Mass Transit the higher the probability that they will support reapportionment) assumes that most senators, especially Northerners, will respond to both Urban Mass Transit and the reapportionment rider largely in terms of a more general attitude of support for or hostility to the claims of urban areas. Some attenuation of the relationship between the two issues may result from Southerners and perhaps some of their sympathizers

Figure 7

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Clark	Pa.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ribicoff	Conn.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kennedy	Mass.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dodd	Conn.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kefauver	Tenn.	+	+	D	+	+	D	+	+	+	+	+	+
McCarthy	Minn.	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Case	N. J.	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Inouye	Hail.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Douglas	Ill.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brewster	Md.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Beall	Md.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hart	Mich.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
McNamara	Mich.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Humphrey	Minn.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Long	Mo.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Symington	Mo.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Metcalf	Mont.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Williams	N. J.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Javits	N. Y.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Keating	N. Y.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burdick	N. D.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morse	Ore.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pastore	R. I.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
McGovern	S. D.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Randolph	W. Va.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nelson	Wisc.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Engle	Calif.	-	-	D	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gore	Tenn.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	?
Pell	R. I.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Scott	Pa.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Neuberger	Ore.	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Jackson	Wash.	-	-	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Magnuson	Wash.	-	-	+	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hartke	Ind.	-	-	+	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Anderson	N. Mex.	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bible	Nev.	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gruening	Alaska	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cannon	Nev.	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mansfield	Mont.	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Monroney	Okla.	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Young	Ohio	-	-	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Bartlett	Alaska	-	-	?	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Johnson	N. C.	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+

Figure 7 -- Continued

[illegible]

reacting in terms of displeasure with the Court.

By dividing the senators into five groups on the basis of their degree of support for Urban Mass Transit we find the following divisions on the reapportionment issue:

	No.	Pro- Reappor	?	Anti- Reappor
Group 1 <u>Most Pro</u> Urban Mass Transit	(4)	4	0	0
Group 2	(2)	2	0	0
Group 3	(41)	29	5	7
Group 4	(9)	4	2	3
Group 5 <u>Most Anti</u>	(41)	1	0	40
	—	—	—	—
	97*	40	7	50

*Engle, Kefauver, and Moss not included in this analysis.

Thus there is little reason to believe that the relatedness of the 1961 and 1962 items was simply a fluke. Relations among 1963 and 1964 items are quite clear. But perhaps the most convincing evidence of a predictable patterning of urban affairs decision comes from the test of a prediction of 1965 behavior. Copies of such a prediction were submitted to Professors Spaeth and Adrian in July, 1965 (before the HUD vote). The basis of this identification of the Senators most likely to provide a majority for HUD was a scale derived from the 1965 housing items and the 1962 vote on the Department of Urban Affairs (Figure 8). The 1965 housing items had been chosen as the basis for updating the perspective on potential

support for HUD before the 1965 housing votes took place.⁶ The 1961-64 analyses had given considerable reason to expect that the 1965 housing items would clarify the options open to HUD proponents in the 89th Congress. Just how sound a basis the longitudinal view (of housing and "Department of Urban Affairs," 1961-65) provided for practical political analysis and for academic understanding of the options open to urban strategists is evidenced by the fact that not one of the fifty Senators predicted to favor HUD subsequently voted against it.⁷

Some Additional Implications and Extensions

Urban affairs decision-making in Congress is quite open to longitudinal analysis scientific study.

1. Urban affairs decision behavior is measurable at the level of ordinal (not just nominal) measurement. The finer distinctions made possible by ordinal measurement are not sought for the sake of descriptive subtlety in itself but because greater descriptive flexibility or differentiation increases the opportunity to conceive, state, and test generalizations.

⁶ And before the designation HUD had replaced the tentative label "Department of Housing and Community Affairs." Appendix B of "An Exploration of Urban Affairs Decision-Making in Congress (paper submitted to Charles Adrian in completion of Political Science 805).

⁷ At the request of one professor probably opponents were also identified on the above prediction. The correlation between the predicted and the actual results is .9 (Yules Q).

Senator	State	Main Bases of Prediction				Pred.	Actual
		(7/65) 161	(1962) 14	(7/65) 159	(7/65) 160	(7/65) Pred.	(8/65) 179
Hart	Mich.	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morse	Ore.	+	+	+	+	+	+
Clark	Pa.	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pastore	R. I.	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ribicoff	Conn.	+	N	+	+	+	+
Kennedy	N. Y.	+	N	+	+	+	+
Bartlett	Alaska	-	+	+	+	+	+
Gruening	Alaska	-	+	+	+	+	+
Church	Idaho	-	+	+	+	+	+
Douglas	Ill.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Hartke	Ind.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Muskie	Maine	-	+	+	+	+	+
McNamara	Mich.	-	+	+	+	+	+
McCarthy	Minn.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Long	Mo.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Mansfield	Mont.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Metcalf	Mont.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Williams	N. J.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Case	N. J.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Javits	N. Y.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Burdick	N. D.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Young	Ohio	-	+	+	+	+	+
Monroney	Okla.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Neuberger	Ore.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Pell	R. I.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Yarborough	Texas	-	+	+	+	+	+
Moss	Utah	-	+	+	+	+	+
Jackson	Wash.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Magnuson	Wash.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Proxmire	Wisc.	-	+	+	+	+	+
McGee	Wyo.	-	+	+	+	+	+
Scott	Pa.	-	+	+	-	+	+
Symington	Mo.	-	+	-	+	+	+
Kennedy	Mass.	-	N	+	+	+	+
McIntyre	N. H.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Montoya	N. M.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Harris	Okla.	-	N	+	+	+	+
McGovern	S. D.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Bass	Tenn.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Nelson	Wisc.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Bayh	Ind.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Brewster	Md.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Tydings	Md.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Inouye	Hawaii	-	N	+	+	+	+
Mondale	Minn.	-	N	+	+	+	+
Gore	Tenn.	-	+	-	-	+	+
Byrd	W. Va.	-	+	-	-	+	+
Randolph	W. Va.	-	-	+	+	+	+
Hayden	Ariz.	-	-	+	+	+	+
Long	La.	-	-	+	+	+	+
HHH Pres. of Senate		N	+	N	N	N	N

N=Not eligible to vote.

Figure 8

Most of the hypotheses given below about change, the distribution of power, the relation between individual and corporate decision, and political strategy could not be based on classificatory concepts that merely indicate the presence or absence of a property but not the order or degree.

2. The dimensions of urban affairs behavior can be clarified --divided into related but not identical variables--thus allowing more precise description, explanation, and prediction.
3. Urban affairs decision behavior is sufficiently enduring to be the subject of generalizations that hold over more than one session of Congress and thus allows the generality of inference over time associated with science.

Recognition of the kind of distribution (whether it approaches a normal or a U-shape) existing for urban affairs dimensions is a prerequisite for understanding: (1) the relation between individual and corporate decision; (2) the potential for change in corporate decision; (3) the relative power of marginal individuals near the midpoint of the distribution; and (4) the relevance or superficiality of concepts of "average" or "typical" behavior of senators.

1. The relation between individual and corporate decision varies greatly with the kind of distribution. With a normal distribution there is a high relationship between the corporate decision pattern and that of many individuals. With a U-shaped

distribution, however, a large percentage of the individual members may be extreme yet the corporate decisions be moderate. On the Housing and Department of Urban Affairs dimension each of 79 senators cast all or all but one of his nine votes in either a consistently pro-urban or consistently anti-urban direction, but the decision pattern for the Senate as a corporate body was - - - - + + + + +: quite different from that of 79% of the senators. More impressive evidence for the meaningfulness of the distinction between individual and corporate decision is the fact that not a single senator on this urban dimension had the same decision pattern as did the Senate as a corporate body.

2. The potential for change in the corporate position of a decision-making body such as the Senate also depends on the nature of the distribution of its members. With a normal distribution many individuals must change to bring about significant change in the corporate position. With a U-shaped distribution, however, such as is found on urban affairs, a change in a few individuals near the midpoint of a distribution may bring considerable change in corporate decisions.
3. The relative importance or "power" of the individuals near the midpoint of a distribution to contribute to change in corporate decision also depends on the shape of the distribution. While with either type of distribution it is the pivotal individuals who would be considered by the Shapley-Shubik school as the most powerful, another consideration is the percentage who are

near the midpoint. On the 1961-62 Housing dimension the potentially pivotal members were fewer and thus more "powerful" than the potentially pivotal members of a normal distribution. (An individual's power stemming from his pivotal position in a U-shaped distribution is not a general personality trait or personal possession capable of equal expression in all policy areas, but rather is a consequence of a relation with others and greater freedom to act that may be unique to the dimension under consideration. It is a source or kind of power that is highly specific.)

4. Statements such as "Congressmen . . . think small about city housing,"⁸ suggesting that congressmen think alike about housing are less plausible if we note that on the relevant dimension the distribution of congressmen simply does not conform to the above assumption. For example the 1961 housing distribution is nearly the reverse--a bimodal distribution with a large percentage of the subjects at or near the extremes. Given such a distribution descriptions of "average congressmen" invite serious misunderstanding. They serve neither as a descriptive base for science nor as a practical base for political strategy.

Viewing urban affairs decision-making in Congress from the perspective of Braybrooke and Lindblom's classification of types of

⁸ Seligman, op. cit.

decision-making (page 21), we can conclude that it does not involve the large sudden change associated with revolutionary or utopian decision-making, nor the high understanding associated with some administrative or technical decision-making. It is less rational-deductive problem solving, than a lengthy series of limited decisions (or attacks or steps) of an incremental nature--that is decisions whose consequences differ only incrementally or marginally from the status quo.

If Braybrooke, Lindblom, and Simon are correct in suggesting that experience enlightens us more about proposals that differ only marginally from those with which we have had experience than about more grandiose proposals, we may conclude that although incremental decision-makers do not have as much understanding as is required for utopian or revolutionary decision-making, they have more understanding of the probably consequences of their policy moves than the typical utopian or revolutionary actually has of his. The relative modesty of the incremental decision-maker is based on a realistic respect for the complexity of problems and the limits of our resources including our intellectual resources.

(Incremental decision-making need not have a conservative coloring. It would, for example, be entirely compatible with this type of decision-making for Congress to repeatedly expand the urban mass transit program if previous investments are judged worthwhile. In fact the initial mass transit program was clearly intended not as a solution but as an experiment which if promising

could lead to a series of more extensive attacks on urban congestion.)

Advice to the (urban) Prince(s)

Some of the implications of the above that are relevant to the practical political strategy are:

1. Clarify the dimensions of the behavior. See how the issues are related in the minds of the decision-makers--what general evaluative dimensions are employed.
2. Identify dimensions which recur or endure and thus allow prediction.
3. Use ordinal measurement to obtain finer differentiation among decision-makers than obtained by dichotomies such as pro and con or rural and urban. Increased descriptive power not only reduces the tendency toward stereotypy but increases the potential for empirical generalizations.
4. Identify the type of distribution and the related consequences (four of which are discussed above).
5. Identify the decision-makers near the midpoint of the distribution who are the best prospects for providing the winning votes for a coalition.
6. Identify how far these marginal voters were willing to go (on the previous relevant dimension) and using this and perhaps some interview data estimate how far they may be willing to go in the foreseeable future.
7. Careful identification of the marginal members not only

suggests which representatives to concentrate on and how far they may be willing to go but what tactics of persuasion are the most appropriate. It appears from an examination of the 1961-64 distribution on housing and the Department of Urban Affairs that the tactics supported by innumerable political scientists who believe that the President as representative of urban interests must get Congress to act by taking issues to the people, raising the level of popular awareness, thus increasing popular pressures upon congressmen, can be grossly inappropriate. The senators who were the best prospects for providing the winning votes on this dimension before 1965 came from states where the wishes of John F. Kennedy were more likely to stimulate a negative than a positive response. The bulk of these constituencies were certainly not inclined to follow the presidential lead. To have made their senators' actions more visible on issues seeming to involve more federal power in local affairs, race, more taxes, expenditures, and deficits would have invited negative pressures.

Realistic strategies must be based on realistic analyses. The latter often require a longitudinal perspective.

VI. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY POSITION: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS AS AN AID TO CAUSAL INFERENCE

Critics of the scientific approach to political behavior have argued that an intractable problem in the scientific study of politics is that of finding recurring patterns in the changing behavior of politicians, particularly of sophisticated politicians faced with complex and changing conditions (for example, U. S. senators). No doubt changing behavior can complicate the tasks of description, explanation, and prediction. But do changes in the behavior of the politically important defy scientific generalization?

The degree of difficulty in identifying regularities underlying change depends on what kind of change is being analyzed and what intellectual tools (for example, research design) are brought to bear on the problem. For this reason it is useful to explicitly distinguish several types of change and then to consider what type of analysis is appropriate to each.

Among the kinds of change that may at first frustrate the observer of legislative behavior are:

- 1) Changes in the direction of response (from "-" on extreme proposals to "+" on more moderate propositions) that are simply a function of the different valences (magnitudes) of the items stimulating a cumulative pattern of response. Such a cumulative pattern of roll call behavior may have been generated by either:
 - a) a single univocal attitude (which is measured at

the ordinal level by the roll call scale).

- b) the systematic interaction of multiple attitudinal components (none of which is measured by the rank order on the cumulative pattern of behavior).
- 2) Change over time in rank order on an issue because of:
 - a) change in relevant condition(s).
 - b) change in underlying attitude(s).
 - 3) Changes in the valences of congressmen on a dimension of policy behavior with little or no change in rank order (for example, shift of the congressional distribution in a pro-selective service direction after Pearl Harbor).
 - 4) Change in the empirical relation between variables (for example, clear change from one Congress to another in the correlation between policy behavior on an issue and a constituency variable because of a shift in rank order on policy produced by a change in a relevant condition).

The last three kinds of change obviously call for dynamic analyses (panel or before-and-after). But the first kind of change may seem to be open to cross-sectional analysis. A major difficulty, however, is that the researcher often cannot tell from a cross-sectional analysis how to interpret a cumulative pattern of voting. No matter how high the coefficient of reproducibility, the cumulative pattern may have been generated by either a single univocal or a systematic interaction among multiple attitudinal components. If we perceive the problem in terms of an individual compensatory composition model in which an excess in one attitudinal component

can compensate for a deficit in another, it is obvious that a number of congressmen can have the same rank on voting behavior without having the same rank on any of the attitudes that contributed to that behavior. Thus the researcher using the cross-sectional approach does not know whether to consider the rank order on the cumulative pattern of behavior as the rank order on an underlying attitude (as the measure of an attitude), or merely as the behavioral product of the systematic interaction of several underlying attitudes.

This chapter's example of longitudinal analysis, a simple before-and-after design, focuses on "type 2a" change, but some aspects of the problem treated here are also relevant to "type 1" and "type 4" changes. The following methodological hunches are explored:

- 1) Dynamic longitudinal analyses (panel or before-and-after designs) aid in the identification of patterns of change in behavior associated with changes in conditions.
- 2) Thus such longitudinal analyses provide a basis for empirically disciplined inference about regularities underlying change in behavior.
- 3) Among the specific problems requiring inference that are made more amenable to scientific analysis are:
 - a) the problem of whether single or multiple attitudes underlie a cumulative pattern of voting behavior (foreign policy position).
 - b) what the content of one or more of the underlying

attitudes is:

- c) whether the condition hypothesized as relevant is indeed an important condition affecting behavior.
- d) the identification of the subset of politicians who vary their behavior with the change in condition (party control of the administration).

This chapter's substantive problem is the appraisal of alternative models of congressional delegation to the executive on foreign policy roll call decisions. It is concerned with the identification of an external condition and an attitude, or attitudes, that underlie congressional foreign policy making.

Miller and Stokes have argued that decision making in the domain of foreign policy conforms to Burke's conception of representation in the sense that the Congressman looks elsewhere than to his district (they report a correlation of -0.09 between the policy position of representatives and those of districts).¹ They add that congressional foreign policy-making deviates from the Burkean model in that the representative relies on the executive branch which is deemed to have superior information with which to calculate the public interest. Their concluding paragraph warrants close attention.

It would be too pat to say that the domain of foreign involvement conforms to the third model of representation, the conception promoted by Edmund Burke. Clearly it does in the sense that the Congressman looks elsewhere than to his district in making up his mind on foreign issues. However, the reliance he puts on the President

¹Op. cit., p. 56.

and the Administration suggests that the calculation of where the public interest lies is often passed to the Executive on matters of foreign policy. Ironically, legislative initiative in foreign affairs has fallen victim to the very difficulties of gathering and appraising information that led Burke to argue that Parliament rather than the public ought to hold the power of decision. The background information and the predictive skills that Burke thought the people lacked are held primarily by the modern Executive. As a result, the present role of the legislature in foreign affairs bears some resemblance to the role that Burke had in mind for the elitist, highly restricted electorate of his own day.²

This assumption, that congressmen rely on the executive because of an essentially bipartisan consideration, belongs to the first of the following three models of congressional delegation to the executive.

Bipartisan Delegation Model

Given:

the condition that a transition in party control of the administration is attended by no abrupt change in executive foreign policy (for example, 1952-53, 1960-61)

If:

- I. Constituencies are not likely to produce important short run changes in the rank order of congressional roll call support for executive foreign policy positions

(Because:

- A. Constituencies have less effect on foreign policy than on other major issues such as race and welfare
- B. The rank order of the constituencies as perceived

²Ibid., p. 56. The executive branch does not take a position on all of the foreign affairs roll calls. But it does often enough to make possible the degree of reliance upon the executive branch that Miller and Stokes hypothesize.

by the congressmen is not likely to change importantly in the short run

1. The rank order of the constituencies is not likely to change importantly in the short run
2. Although congressional perceptions of constituency position are relatively accurate, evidence of clearcut change in constituency position is usually required to alter perceptions held by men busily attending many other phenomena)

II. Congressmen's (private) substantive attitudes on foreign policy are not likely to produce important short run change in the rank order of congressional support for executive foreign policy (See "Reasons for Expecting . . . Consistency," p. 17)

(Because:

- A. The private attitudes of the congressmen are not likely to change importantly in the short run
- B. The few congressmen whose private policy attitudes change importantly are likely to restrain [moderate] the expression of this change, rather than abruptly and obviously flipflop)

III. Congressmen rely on the executive because of its enduring institutional superiority in background information and predictive skills

Then Expect:

- I. Little or no change in rank order of congressional support

for executive foreign policy positions after a transition in party control of the administration

- II. Whatever changes that do take place in rank order of congressional support of the executive to be bipartisan (that is, expect no significant difference between the proportion of Democrats and Republicans included among those who increase their support of the executive and the proportion of the Democrats and Republicans included among those who decrease their support).

The following are examples of tables that involve small numbers of changers and no significant differences between parties in direction of change. Both tables are consistent with the above model.

	Party of Changers				Party of Changers		
	D	R			S	R	
Direction of Change in the Support of the Executive across Administrations	1	1	2	increase	2	1	3
	1	1	2	decrease	2	1	3
	2	2	4		4	2	6

The above model is designed to explain congressional delegation to the executive in terms of the dependence of the congressmen upon the executive branch's superior information and predictive skills. Numerous statements by academicians and journalists about the information advantages of the executive and of bipartisanship in foreign affairs seem to support the above model.

Some writers, however, have hypothesized that congressional delegation to the executive depends on partisan considerations. Professor Kesselman, for example, suggests that ". . . the President's party label plays a significant part in explaining congressional voting on foreign affairs."³ At no point does he argue that congressmen delegate because of the informational advantages of the executive. This explicit assumption, that congressmen rely on the executive because of the relation between his party label and theirs, belongs to the second model: the "nominal party affiliation model." Although the only assumption in the model that is different (from the assumptions of the bipartisan model) is the assumption about the reason for delegation, note the effect of change in this assumption (III) on the predictions.

Nominal Party Affiliation

("Party Label") Model

Given: the condition that a transition in party control of the administration is attended by no abrupt change in executive foreign policy (for example, 1952-53, 1960-61)

If: I. Constituencies are not likely to produce important short run changes in the rank order of congressional roll call support for executive foreign policy positions

³Mark Kesselman, "A Note: Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V, No. 3 (August, 1961), 284.

(Because:

- A. Constituencies have less effect on foreign policy than on other major issues such as race and welfare
- B. The rank order of the constituencies as perceived by the congressmen is not likely to change importantly in the short run
 - 1. The rank order of the constituencies is not likely to change importantly in the short run
 - 2. Although congressional perceptions of constituency position are relatively accurate, evidence of clearcut change in constituency position is usually required to alter perceptions held by men busily attending many other phenomena)

- II. Congressmen's (private) substantive attitudes on foreign policy are not likely to produce important short run change in the rank order of congressional support for executive foreign policy ("Reasons for Expecting . . . Consistency," p. 17)

(Because:

- A. The private attitudes of the congressmen are not likely to change importantly in the short run
- B. The few congressmen whose private policy attitudes change importantly are likely to restrain [moderate] the expression of this change, rather than abruptly and obviously flipflop)

III. Congressmen rely on the executive because his party label coincides with their own

Then Expect:

- I. Considerable change in the rank order of congressional support for executive foreign policy positions after a transition in party control of the administration⁴
- II. Changes in rank order of congressional support of the executive to be partisan (that is, expect a significant difference between the proportion of nominal Democrats and Republicans included among those who increase their support of the executive and the proportion of Democrats and Republicans included among those who decrease their support).

Kesselman reports the following pattern of change and consistency for representatives common to the 81st and 86th Congresses:⁵

	Demo- crats	Repub- licans
Number <u>shifting</u> toward isolationism	25	2
Number consistently isolationist	21	13
Number <u>shifting</u> toward internationalism	7	16
Number consistently internationalist	60	15
Total in both Congresses	113	46

⁴Kesselman classified 50 of 159 House members (31%) as shifters, pp. 286-87.

⁵Ibid., p. 287.

The table for the changers (shiffters) reveals a significant difference between the parties:

	D	R
Toward isolationism	25	2
Toward internationalism	7	16

One difficulty, however, in Kesselman's "before-and-after" design is that the time lapse between the first ("before") measure (81st Congress) and the change in condition (January, 1953), and the time lapse between the change in condition (January, 1953) and the second ("after") measure (86th Congress), are so large that the Congressmen's private attitudes and the constituencies' attitudes may have changed importantly. Thus Democrats shifting away from internationalism and toward isolationism may have been responding to factors other than the change in party control of the administration of foreign policy. In fact, Rieselbach's work gives critics reason to suspect that a good part of the change reported by Kesselman did not take place across administrations (from the 82nd to the 83rd Congress), but within the Eisenhower administration.⁶ Rieselbach reports that the percentage of Democrats who were isolationists more than doubled (from 13.4% in the 83rd to 29.8% in the 85th) and that the percentage who were internationalists declined from 72% in

⁶ Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (September, 1964).

the 83rd to 47% in the 85th Congress.⁷ These figures add weight to Kesselman's comment that:

It might have been more desirable, for the purpose of controlling changes other than that of presidential succession, to have compared the Eighty-second Congress with the Eighty-third.⁸

Another difficulty raised by Kesselman's analysis is less readily remedied. In fact, it involves a problem in conceptualization and measurement which in itself constitutes a challenging subject for a dissertation. Attempting to explain delegation to the executive in terms of party label may seem inadequate to those who hypothesize that the 1954 desegregation decision and subsequent events, such as the conflicts over the 1957 and 1960 civil rights proposals, substantially weakened the party identification of those Southern Democrats who were wholehearted segregationists. Not only can it be assumed that the party identification of segregationist congressmen was weakened, but in at least a few cases, a discrepancy between party label and party identification developed by the end of the fifties. The Southern Democrats who most fervently attacked "federal encroachment," "the welfare state," "federal regulation," "bureaucrats," and "creeping socialism," while fervently supporting "balanced budgets," and "economy," probably came to feel as close or somewhat closer to the Republican party. This is particularly

⁷ Ibid., p. 578. Unfortunately, because Rieselbach's study is not a panel study and we do not know whether these figures represent individual change, these figures may cast doubt on Kesselman's inference but not settle the question raised.

⁸ Op. cit., p. 285.

plausible if the Democratic congressmen who repeatedly made comparisons (of the parties) in a manner unfavorable to the Democrats, who supported Republican candidates, or who switched parties, were a subset of the preceding group (which can be identified by content analysis).⁹

If we assume that party identification and nominal party affiliation at times diverge and if we assume that congressmen delegate to the executive because of their party identification rather than their party label, we must derive predictions that differ from those of the preceding model. The following "Party Identification Model" does this.

Party Identification Model

Given: the condition that a transition in party control of the administration is attended by no abrupt change in executive foreign policy (for example, 1952-53, 1960-61)

⁹ The direct effect of the race issue has been to weaken the party identification of segregationist Democrats, but this alone would not cause them to identify with the Republicans. An indirect effect of the race issue on segregationist Democrats is the reinforcement of images of "federal encroachment," "spiraling bureaucracy," "centralization," and so forth, that clearly support the model Republican position on many economic issues.

Southern Democrats who have the least (private) resentment of increased opportunity for Negroes, and who are relatively liberal on economic matters, may have a strong (private) identification with their party in spite of a hundred public differences with the majority of their party on civil rights roll calls.

If:

- I. Constituencies are not likely to produce important short run changes in the rank order of congressional roll call support for executive foreign policy positions

(Because:

- A. Constituencies have less effect on foreign policy than on other major issues such as race and welfare
- B. The rank order of the constituencies as perceived by the congressmen is not likely to change importantly in the short run
 1. The rank order of the constituencies is not likely to change importantly in the short run
 2. Although congressional perceptions of constituency position are relatively accurate, evidence of clearcut change in constituency position is usually required to alter perceptions held by men busily attending many other phenomena)

- II. Congressmen's (private) substantive attitudes on foreign policy are not likely to produce important short run change in the rank order of congressional support for executive foreign policy (See "Reasons for Expecting . . . Consistency," p. 17)

(Because:

- A. The private attitudes of the congressmen are not likely to change importantly in the short run
- B. The few congressmen whose private policy attitudes

change importantly are likely to restrain [moderate] the expression of this change, rather than abruptly and obviously flipflop)

- III. Congressmen rely on the executive because their party identification coincides with the executive's

Then Expect:

- I. Considerable change in the rank order of congressional support for executive foreign policy positions after a transition in party control of the administration
- II. Changes in the rank order of congressional support of the executive to be partisan (that is, expect a significant difference between those who identify with the Democratic party and those who identify with the Republican party).

Should the slight divergence between nominal party affiliation and party identification in the Senate during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition become considerably greater by the time of some future transition in party control of the administration, we would not expect significant differences between those who wear different labels and we would have to seek measures of party identification.¹⁰ But in the Senate at the time of the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition it appears that only a few senators (including Thurmond, Byrd, and

¹⁰ Presumably if a greater discrepancy took place and a score or two of men were less supportive of the party whose label they bore than of the opposition party, the discrepancy between label and identification would become more of an issue and more indicators of party identification would be available.

Lausche) identified with a party opposed to their nominal party. Thus for the 1960-61 transition models II and III should lead to similar although not identical results. (With model III Thurmond et. al. would not be counted as deviant cases if they are found to have decreased their support in 1961; with model II they would be deviant cases.)

The Before-and-After Analysis: Purpose, Span, Indices and Results

We often hear of the difficulty or impossibility of measuring all or even most of the variables that contribute importantly to complex behavior. But it is not necessary to measure all or even most variables if by research design we minimize the opportunity of certain variables to contribute to the behavior being explained. In order to minimize the effect of changes in the constituencies' attitudes and the senators' private (substantive) attitudes on foreign policy, we must compare measures of the senators' behavior as shortly before and after the January 1961 transition as possible. Because we do not want the classification of many congressmen as changers to be determined by one or a few foreign policy roll calls, it is more appropriate to compare net support scores in the Congress preceding transition with the net support scores in the subsequent Congress than to compare "sessions" offering half as much data. This is often important when analyzing the House because of the paucity of foreign policy roll calls (on which the President took a position).¹¹

¹¹For example there were only eleven "Eisenhower-issue roll calls in the field of foreign policy in 1960." 1960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 110.

Because the substantive hypotheses relating senators' and representatives' foreign policy positions to various independent variables are concerned with change and consistency in foreign policy position (broadly defined), and not just foreign aid, it would seem that the substantive concept (foreign policy position) is better tapped by a general measure than by a narrow quasi-scale.¹² The above considerations and a concern for interpretability led to the Index of Partisan (foreign policy) Change.¹³ The Index of Partisan Change utilizes more information than a cross-tabulation of Congressional Quarterly Support Scores or a cross-tabulation of CQ Opposition Scores. The Index of Partisan Change = net (foreign policy) support for the new President - net support for the preceding President. Change as measured by the Index can most appropriately be labeled partisan when two conditions are met: (1) there is a significant difference between the direction of change on Republicans and the direction of change of Democrats, (2) "changers" are defined as those who score +40 or more points on the index. The stronger the relationship between direction of change and party membership, the

¹²In previous tests of the hypotheses my narrow quasi-scales revealed, when crosstabulated, that the changers were partisan but the ~~small~~ number of items in such scales offered insufficient reliability. It is probable that Kesselman would have found most of the changers to be partisan changers even if he had chosen a different subset of foreign policy roll calls. But many details of a cross-tabulation of quasi-scales composed of few items depend greatly on the items selected.

¹³It was hoped that the index would be more easily interpreted than the somewhat esoteric general (first unrotated) factor.

stronger the probability that the change was partisan. For any transition a positive score indicates change favorable to the incoming President. For the January, 1961 transition changers with positive scores switched in a direction favorable to the Democratic President; those with negative scores switched in a direction un-favorable to John Kennedy.

If we apply the Index of Partisan Change for the 86th-87th Congress (using ± 40 or more points as the definition of changer) we find that more than a third of the Senators common to the two Congresses changed. Much more important is the finding that all but one of the thirty-two changers changed in an overtly partisan direction. The one deviant (from the standpoint of the Nominal Party Affiliation Model), Lausche of Ohio, was less clearly deviant in terms of the Party Identification Model.¹⁴

	D	R
Senators Who Scored +40 or More	14	0
Senators Who Scored -40 or More	1	17

¹⁴Chaples has reported that Lausche was the only nominal Democrat in the 87th Congress who was, in terms of policy behavior, one of thirteen "Dirksen-Type Republicans" on foreign Policy. Chaples also found that Lausche was a "Bush-Type Republican" on twenty-eight agriculture votes. Peterson previously had found that (in a factor analysis of the roll call positions of 99 senators and President Kennedy) Lausche's prime loading was the conservative Republicans. In the 87th Congress Lausche's CQ Party Opposition score (64) was more than two-and-a-half times his Party Support score (25). Earnest A. Chaples Jr., "The Use of a Modified Form of Elementary Factor Analysis for Studying the Public Attitudes of United States Senators...", Twenty-third Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists. D. J. Peterson, Michigan Academy of Arts, Sciences, & Letters, 1964.

Several thoughts occur to those of us who are not used to seeing such nearly perfect results. Would very many "deviant cases" have been added if the marginal changers (Senators with scores in the upper thirties) had been added? Or what if the before-and-after analysis had been based on the 1960 and 1961 Sessions rather than the 86th and 87th Congresses (and the lower reliability of the measures offset by more demanding definition of change)? What if the Index of Partisan Change had been applied to the House of Representatives?

Adding the nine marginal changers has the unusual effect of increasing the significance of the findings. Only one of the 41 (clearcut and marginal) changers changed in a direction inconsistent with nominal party affiliation and he appears to have changed direction in a manner consistent with his (psychological) or latent party identification.¹⁵

	D	R
Senators Who Exceeded +35	22	0
Senators Who Exceeded -35	1	18

If we use the Index of Partisan Change for 1960-61 and a more demanding definition of change (+50) because of the lower reliability when using Sessions rather than Congresses, we find that 29 of 30 changers changed in an overtly partisan direction.

¹⁵ See previous footnote. If the nature of Lausche's "same-state Senator (Young)" and the 1968 rejection by the Ohio Democrats are considered along with the material in the previous footnote it seems quite likely that Lausche was acting in a manner consistent with a Republican identification.

Relation Between Party & Direction of Change 1960-61

	D	R
Senators Who Scored +50 or More	8	0
Senators Who Scored -50 or More	1	21

The Index of Partisan Change for 1960-61 also reveals that eleven Democrats, but no Republicans, increased their support in such a manner as to yield scores of +40 to +76. Twenty-four Republicans and three nominal Democrats decreased their support sufficiently to earn a score of -40 to -119.

	D	R
Senators Who Scored +40 or More	11	0
Senators Who Scored -40 or More	3	24

It is interesting to note that the three deviants (from the standpoint of the Nominal Party Affiliation Model) are the only Senators identified in the Prospectus (p. 70) and a previous paper as nominal Democrats who probably "identified with a party opposed to their nominal party."¹⁶ This suggests that nominal party affiliation is a very strong correlate of direction of change (in support of Presidents on foreign policy) only as long as it is an indicator of party identification, that party identification is the basic "causal agent," and that when nominal party affiliation does not reflect (psychological) party identification the Party Identification

¹⁶ Thurmond, Byrd, and Lausche; Peterson, Michigan Academy, Op. cit.

Model will be seen to explain and predict change better than the Nominal Party Affiliation Model.

When we apply the Index of Partisan Change for the 86th-87th Congress to the House of Representatives as a check on the generality of the above findings, we discover impressive evidence about the importance of party to the explanation of change in support of Presidents on foreign policy. Of the 86 House members who changed +40 or more points only one changed in a manner inconsistent with his nominal affiliation.¹⁷ One of the most extreme partisans among the Congress-

Party & Direction of Change For House Members 86th-87th Congress

	R	D
Congressmen Who Scored +40 or More	1	57
Congressmen Who Scored -40 or More	28	0

sional Republicans, Melvin Laird of Wisconsin (-75), was recently

¹⁷The deviant (from the standpoint of Nominal Affiliation Model) was Weaver of Nebraska. His increase in foreign policy support can largely be attributed to his 1962 Foreign Policy Support score of 78 (and Opposition score of only 17). The other Nebraska Republicans had Support scores of 11, 22, 22, and Opposition scores of 89, 78, 78. Weaver's 1962 Foreign Policy Support score was associated with an extraordinarily low Party Unity score of 46 and relatively high Party Opposition (46). The other Nebraska Republicans had Party Unity Scores of 98, 81, 86, and Party Opposition scores of 0, 14, 4. While Weaver had a net of zero Party Support the average of the other Nebraska Republicans was a net of 82. Again it appears that the nominal deviant is less clearly deviant in terms of party identification.

elevated to a position with great impact on foreign affairs. Because of the almost perfect relationship between direction of change and party, and because of the extreme magnitude (-75) of Laird's change there is a very high probability that the new Secretary of Defense is one of the men who was least concerned with the content of merits of executive foreign policy proposals during the 86th-87th Congresses.¹⁸

Longitudinal analysis of both houses during the Truman-Eisenhower and Eisenhower-Kennedy transitions has revealed that only a minority of the men in Congress are clearcut changers and that this rather significant minority is highly partisan. Party label was so highly related to direction of change in support that it is hard to believe that American parties are as "meaningless" as many of their critics claim. Deviant case analysis suggests, however, that if party label and party identification become less highly correlated the Party Identification Model will offer better explanation of change than the Party Label Model.¹⁹

The preceding analysis also has serious implications for the numerous cross-sectional analyses of "party" and "nonparty" votes.

¹⁸ Another Republican who probably had less than average concern with the content or merits of executive foreign policy proposals, but enjoyed a position of considerable influence was Senator Dirksen of Illinois.

¹⁹ The cases of the two Democrats least identified with their nominal party, Lausche and Thurmond, suggest that there are forces at work (party organization and personal factors such as the desire to reduce cognitive dissonance) that inhibit widespread and enduring discrepancy between party label and party identification.

A roll call on which the parties do not overtly differ has been assumed to be a roll call on which party had no influence. We now have a theoretical and empirical base for denying that an Index of Likeness of 100 means that party was unimportant. It is now apparent that many of the Senate foreign policy roll calls of the Eisenhower era, that have previously been classified as not being party votes, had high indices of party likeness precisely because 17-20 Senate Republicans assigned important weight to party when voting on Eisenhower proposals (thus causing them to vote much like the rather internationalist Democrats). If "bipartisan cooperation" assumes that Senators of both parties vote alike because of shared substantive assumptions and/or common delegation to the President (because "the background information and the predictive skills ... are held primarily by the modern Executive...");²⁰ the scope of "bipartisan cooperation" during the Eisenhower era is seriously exaggerated by including the seventeen clearcut partisan Republicans among those supposedly engaged in "bipartisan cooperation."

Once again we have found that cross-sectional analyses can be seriously misleading unless associated with longitudinal analyses. Perhaps the most appropriate conclusion is that of Heinz Eulau:

Most political behavior research is cross-sectional.. ... As a result, most political behavior research has been ahistorical..... It is, of course, possible to compare the behavior of cross sections ... through time and venture inferences about change from such comparison. But the method

²⁰Miller and Stokes, op. cit.

is unsatisfactory because changes may be in opposite directions and compensatory, making only for marginal results that indicate little or no change..... The dilemma of studying change through time must ultimately be solved by longitudinal studies. Longitudinal research on political behavior, using the individual as the unit of analysis, is probably the most dependable technique of studying the process of cause and effect, for it permits description of the direction, degree, rate, and character of political change.²¹

²¹"Political Behavior," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan, 1968.

VII CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation the longitudinal (non-cross-sectional) perspective has been defined (within the context of studies of Congressional behavior) to include not only dynamic studies such as before-and-after designs or panel designs, but also "static" studies which make systematic use of data from more than one Congress.

The first three chapters discussed problems associated with the predominant cross-sectional approach and the nature and advantages of longitudinal analysis. The longitudinal analyses in Chapter IV-VI were designed to broadly check the methodological hunches about the utility of longitudinal analysis and to further examine substantive assumptions about consistency in Congressional behavior.

It was found that the sharp limits of the cross-sectional perspective reduce opportunities for measurement, explanation, and prediction. The longitudinal perspective, on the other hand, increases the opportunities to reliably and validly measure otherwise elusive behavior such as the practice of, support for, or opposition to McCarthyism (IV). The longitudinal perspective helps us to identify predictors of recurring behavior, identify pivotal or marginal decision-makers and thus helps clarify the strategic alternatives open to political leaders (V). And the longitudinal perspective helps to explain subtle behavior that is likely to be misinterpreted in a cross-sectional perspective. For example, the partisan change in roll call voting between the 82nd and 83rd Congresses

(associated with the transition in party control of the administration) contributed to the appearance of "bipartisan" foreign aid voting in the "Eisenhower Congresses." It was easy, from a cross-sectional perspective, to assume that bipartisan reasons for delegating to the executive ("the constitutional and informational superiority of the executive branch") explained the apparent "bipartisan behavior." The longitudinal analyses reported in Chapter VI revealed, however, that the surface pattern of bipartisan voting was in great part a product of partisanship. Bipartisan motives are not likely to explain the behavior of partisan changers who like Bennett of Utah varied their support depending on which party controlled the administration of foreign policy. But the such partisan behavior was not evident to cross-sectional students of an "Eisenhower Congress."

Probably the clearest advantage of longitudinal over cross-sectional analysis is in the study of change in individual behavior. If we accept consistency-change in rank order and consistency-change in magnitude as two basic dimensions for developing a typology of longitudinal analyses of consistency-change in legislative behavior -- each of the three types exemplified in Chapters IV, V, VI fits in a different one of the three cells representing logically possible analyses. Chapter IV, a static study, fits in the cell representing consistency in both rank order and magnitude. Chapter V fits in the cell representing change in magnitude but consistency in rank order. And Chapter VI, a dynamic study, clearly fits in the cell representing change in both magnitude and rank order. It is felt that the findings reported in these diverse but complementary analyses better

evidence the broad utility of the longitudinal perspective than examples that are redundant in the sense that they illustrate but one type or but one advantage of longitudinal analysis.

Some Substantive Conclusions Regarding Consistency-Change

In addition to the methodological insights regarding the analysis of consistency-change offered in the above chapters there were substantive hypotheses about consistency and change in Congressional behavior. With one possible exception, the subsequent research (reported in IV, V, and VI) did not negate these assumptions.

Most Senators have rather well formulated policy tendencies by their first term in the Senate. These policy tendencies are supported by numerous interrelated and relative enduring values, sympathies, identifications, beliefs, and attitudes, which guide cognitive processes such as perception, thinking, and memory. In sum the belief system is rather thoroughly developed and not likely to change greatly in the short run.

Given the excessive cost of genuinely scientific polling (in depth) and multivariate computer analysis of the responses, many politicians (like the Senators studied by Matthews and those studied by Brimhall and Otis) hesitate to change much from "winning positions" taken in previous elections. Knowing that they won when they stressed x, y, and z hardly constitutes precise scientific evidence of why they won, but it may often be salient information for those who lack precise information. Furthermore, the rank order of constituencies is not likely to change dramatically in the short run on

the constituency variables most relevant to the overall policy positions of Senators (for example, percentage of the labor-force that is organized in labor unions, region, population per square mile, percentage foreign stock, or urban rural). And change in one constituency variable often is sufficiently outweighed by consistency in others to inhibit dramatic overall change. Thus constituency does not frequently cause grand reorderings of conservatives and liberals.

There is an ideological bias in the social exposure and communication patterns of Senators that results in social reinforcement of their policy tendencies. That is "Senators, once in office, establish working relations with like-minded [people]" and tend to "hear" disproportionately from those who agree. This bias in exposure or differential contact is due both to the predispositions of representatives and the predispositions of lobbyists, constituents and others who disproportionately contact (and reinforce views of) politicians who lean their way.

These and the other informed hunches about consistency-change that appeared originally in the prospectus (and more recently in Chapter II) receive additional support from the research reported in Chapters IV and V, which like the research cited in Chapter II, reveal impressive consistency over time. At first glance studies such as those by Kesselman might seem to directly contradict the above assumptions about Senatorial consistency. After all, Kesselman concluded that the change in rank he observed for scores of House members represented change in attitude. And Price also suggested that when Senators such as Bennett changed from one of the most

anti-foreign aid positions in 1952 to the very top pre-aid class in 1953 they were changing attitudes. Given the intellectual tools employed by scholars such as Coombs and Rokeach, especially the individual compensatory composition model, we can now see that there is no basis for the inference (by Kesselman and others) that change in rank on foreign aid voting (associated with transition in party control) represents change in attitude. The evidence suggests that Senators such as Bennett change in rank on foreign aid in order to remain consistent partisans.

Such consistency (as was reported in Chapters II, IV, and V) has enormous significance for both the theorist and practitioner of democratic politics. This consistency over time no doubt makes the job of the electorate more manageable and probably helps explain the extremely significant correlations between Conservative Coalition Support Scores of House members and electoral support for Goldwater in their Congressional districts (1964) and between Conservative Coalition Opposition Scores of Senators and electoral support for Humphrey in their states (1968). It would appear that electoral politics need not be as random or devoid of policy relevance as cynics have suggested.

Although these general conclusions cannot substitute for the more detailed ones in the above chapters, it is hoped that they suggest something more of the broad advantages of longitudinal analysis -- a method that Eulau rightly views as underutilized.

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