


THE THEORY OF INTUITION
IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Alan M. Phillips
1969

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
The Theory of Intuition
in Plato's Republic

presented by
Alan M. Phillips

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for
Ph.D **Philosophy**
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ABSTRACT

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

by John M. Thompson

The main argument of this dissertation is that the theory of knowledge in the Republic is a theory of intuition. In its most basic form, this theory is intuitionist in its epistemology. I investigate Plato's Republic in order to arrive at a new interpretation of his theory of knowledge. In the first place, third, I show how that theory is a theory of intuition, or a theory of intuition.

The major part of the work, however, is the investigation of Plato's theory of knowledge in the Republic. The theory of knowledge, for Plato, is a relation between the Form and the Form. I first examine Plato's theory of the Form and theory of the mind. Then I examine his account of the knowledge relation between them.

The method of this investigation of Plato's theory of knowledge is a line by line analysis of the relevant passages in the Republic. I translate and interpret, with arguments on behalf of my translations and interpretations, the following sections of the Republic, passim: 475a-480a, 505a-507d, 508a-509a, 560d-567c, 598b-599c, 608c-611d, 504a-509a, 508d-511a, and 511a-540c.

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ABSTRACT

THE THEORY OF INTUITION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

by Alan M. Phillips

The main argument is that Plato's theory of knowledge in the Republic is a theory of intuition. First, I argue that a theory is intuitional if it satisfies three criteria. Second, I investigate Plato's Republic, in order to arrive at an adequate interpretation of his theory of knowledge in that dialogue. And third, I show how that theory of knowledge satisfies the three criteria for a theory of intuition.

The major part of the work, however, is the investigation of Plato's theory of knowledge in the Republic. Since knowledge, for Plato, is a relation between the mind and the forms, I first examine Plato's theory of the forms and theory of the mind. Then I examine his account of the knowledge relation between them.

The method of this investigation of Plato's theory of knowledge is a line by line analysis of the relevant passages in the Republic. I translate and interpret, with arguments on behalf of my translations and interpretations, the following sections of the Republic, passim: 475a-480a, 596a-597d, 435a-444e, 580d-587c, 484b-495c, 608c-611d, 504a-509a, 509d-517e, and 518b-540c.

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I argue that, for Plato, the mind is triadic: there are three things in it--a rational (or philosophic) portion, a spirited (or honor-loving) portion, and an appetitive (or wealth-loving) portion. I argue that the mind "in its truest nature" is this immortal rational portion of it, and that it is this element which has the power of knowing the forms. If the mind is properly educated, this rational element can become what its nature is: knower of the forms.

I argue that, according to Plato, knowledge can either be indirect understanding (*dianoía*) or direct understanding (*noésis*). In the former, the forms are understood only through their images (i.e., for Plato, their instances), and the mind can only reason "hypothetically," from "hypotheses" (forms assumed without proof) to conclusions (forms implied by those hypotheses). In the latter the forms are understood directly: the rational element in the

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mind has no need for images in order to understand them. It reasons with forms themselves rather than with images (instances) of them, and it can reason inductively (from the hypotheses to the forms which imply those hypotheses) as well as deductively.

I argue that, for Plato, all of the forms are implied by the form of the good. These relations of implication are participation relations, and the form of the good is the ancestor (by participation relations) of all of the forms. It is the universal and original of everything and the image and instance of nothing (except possibly itself). Everything is dependent, for its nature and substance, and its existence, upon the good. In noësis, the mind can ascend inductively all the way to the form of the good, and then it can deduce (by participation-implication relations) all of the forms from this first premise (arché). But although all the other forms can not only be directly understood, but proved by the good, the good is evident by direct understanding alone.

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By

Alan M. Phillips

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I. INTRODUCTION: THEORIES OF INTUITION

I intend to show that the theory of knowledge in Plato's Republic is a theory of intuition, and that it is an intuitional theory of a certain sort: one which claims that (1) none of the data of intuition are data of sense-perception, (2) the data of intuition are themselves the knowledge-items, (3) the knowledge-items are universals, and (4) whereas some of the knowledge-items are describable (in definitions), others are known but not describable: the form of the good, for instance. Chiefly, however, I am interested in showing that it is appropriate to call Plato's theory of knowledge a theory of intuition.

My strategy is this: first, in this introductory chapter I intend to arrive at a definition of what a theory of intuition is. I shall argue that according to theories of intuition, intuitional experience is mystical experience: direct acquaintance with transcendent, non-sense-perceptual data; that such intuitional experience provides us with knowledge; and that having such experiences in some way justifies its being called knowledge. Second, in the eighth and concluding chapter I shall argue that the theory of knowledge which Plato develops in his Republic satisfies these criteria for a theory of intuition, and in the process of doing so I shall indicate what sort of intuitional theory it is. And third, since knowledge, for Plato in the Republic, consists of a relation

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between the mind and the forms, I will investigate each of the termini of this relation, and then investigate the relation itself. Accordingly, in the second chapter I will inquire into Plato's theory of the forms, in the third and fourth his theory of the mind, and in the fifth, sixth, and seventh his theory of the knowledge-relation which holds between the mind and the forms.

In order to show that Plato holds an intuitional theory in the Republic, it is necessary to decide what makes a theory of knowledge intuitional. It will not do to simply lay down a definition and then show that Plato's theory satisfies it, for the definition itself can be challenged. Therefore it will be necessary to examine some theories of intuition (theories which use the word "intuition" or make positive claims in behalf of intuition or of intuitive knowledge), in order to arrive at a definition of what makes such theories intuitional. Then I can go on to argue that Plato's theory of knowledge in the Republic fits this pattern. And in the beginning, at least, my only clue is that certain theories claim certain things for intuition or for intuitive knowledge. The word "intuition" comes from the Latin word "intuitus," which originally meant a visual perception. The dictionary definition of the term, in Latin, is "looking at closely" or "viewing intently."¹ And throughout the word's history, long after it became employed to indicate a special way of knowing or type of knowledge, it has retained its visual associations: intuition, as either a

¹D. P. Simpson, Cassell's New Latin Dictionary (New York: Funk & Wagnals Co., 1960), p. 324.

ground or kind of knowledge, is regarded as in some way like vision. As we will see, a frequent characteristic of theories of intuition is their use of a visual analogy: just as we observe (visually) what is visible, so we intuit what is knowable. Our power, or exercise, of seeing is vision, whereas our power, or exercise, of "seeing" is intuition. This "seeing" is a certain kind of experience, that of intuiting or having intuitions, and this "power of seeing," like our power of vision, is an ability which under certain conditions is exercised. Under those conditions, we have "vision" of what can be known.¹

It was in medieval philosophy that the term "intuitus" came to mean a way of knowing. Duns Scotus, for instance, held that we can have knowledge of "singular existents" by means of "intellectual intuition."² As Copleston describes it, Duns Scotus maintained that we can not only have immediate intellectual understanding of universals, but we can likewise have immediate intellectual intuition of particulars. Although this intellectual intuition is confused during our human lives, it is not confused after the soul has left the body and is no longer hindered from clear immediate knowledge of particulars. In themselves, particulars are just as intelligible as are universals. God is not confused, and can know particulars clearly and immediately. And we are not confused after the death of the body, when we can also have unconfused immediate understanding of

¹Sir William Hamilton notes six different philosophical uses of the word "intuition" (or "intuitus") in his edition of Thomas Reid's *Philosophical Works* (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), II, 759.

²Duns Scotus *Quodlibet* 13. 8-10.

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Hence McKeon identifies the meaning of "intuitus" as a kind of knowledge, namely "immediate" knowledge:

INTUITUS, intuition, intuitive knowledge, that by which something is known immediately, without ratiocination; thus, first principles known through themselves are known intuitively, as that the whole is greater than its part, and so too the existence or non-existence of things is known. More generally, even ratiocination is reduced to intuitive knowledge, as Thomas (following Augustine) points out (In Lib. I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol.) "To understand means nothing other than the presence of the intelligible to the understanding in some way."²

According to this formulation of McKeon's, intuition is some power of knowing things "immediately, without ratiocination." It is "that by which" items of knowledge are "present to the understanding in some way." (Hereafter I use the term "knowledge-item" to mean anything which a given theory claims that we know: truths, facts, principles, propositions, judgments, particulars, universals, or whatever is held to be known according to that theory.) Intuition provides knowledge, which is called "intuitive knowledge": for instance, the intuitive knowledge of "first principles" and of "the existence or non-existence of things."

But the phrases in McKeon's explanation provoke a number of questions. First, what is intuition, this power "by which" the knowledge-items are known "immediately, without ratiocination" in intuitional experience? Second, what is meant by "the presence of

¹Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Pt. II, 210-216. Immanuel Kant likewise attributes intellectual intuition to God, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans., p. 90.

²Richard McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, Vol. II: Roger Bacon to William of Occam (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), Glossary, p. 466.

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the intelligible to the understanding"? Third, how does immediate knowledge differ from "mediate" knowledge (knowledge "by ratiocination")? And fourth, how is ratiocination "reduced to intuitive knowledge"? The first pair of questions seems to involve, respectively, the "power" of intuiting and the exercise of that power when one is having intuitional experience, and the second pair of questions seems to involve the relation between intuitive knowledge and the non-intuitive knowledge that is somehow based on it.

A more recent intuitional position is that held by Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy. Russell maintains that the relation between intuitive knowledge and the knowledge that is derived from it is implication. Mediate knowledge is knowledge which is inferred from intuitive knowledge in accordance with intuitively known principles of valid deduction:

Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called self-evident truths. Among such truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our derivative knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction.¹

In Russell's theory of intuition, mediate knowledge consists of truths (and principles) which are deduced from self-evident truths (and principles). Intuitive knowledge (knowledge which consists of self-evident truths and principles) is immediate rather than derivative, in that it consists of what is not known mediately--i.e. which is not known only by deduction from other evident truths and principles. Intuitive knowledge is self-evident in that it is evident by

¹Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 109.

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itself rather than evident by deduction from something else that is evident. And ratiocination "reduces to intuition" in that derivative knowledge is deduced by self-evident principles of deduction: what makes derivative knowledge evident is that it is deduced from intuitively known truths by intuitively known principles of deduction. Were there no self-evident truths, there would be no evident ones: "if the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends on our intuitive knowledge."¹

Among the varieties of self-evident truths and principles which Russell recognizes are some ethical propositions, certain logical and mathematical principles, and truths "which merely state what is given in sense." In each case, to say that these truths and principles are "intuitive" is to say that they are self-evident. But what is there about them which makes them self-evident? What is it which is "given in sense"? What is there about these logical and mathematical principles which makes them "luminously evident"?² In short, what is it in our experience which is "that by which" we are provided with intuitive knowledge? Russell writes:

We may say that a truth is self-evident, in the first and most absolute sense, when we have acquaintance with the fact which corresponds to the truth In all cases where we know by acquaintance a complex fact consisting of certain terms in a certain relation, we say that the truth that these terms are so related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these cases the judgment that the terms are so related must be true. Thus this sort of self-evidence is an absolute

¹Ibid. See also: (1) Aristotle Posterior Analytics 72b 18-24. (2) John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), Vol. II, Bk. IV, chap. ii, p. 177.

²Ibid, p. 111.

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Russell elsewhere identifies acquaintance as direct awareness:

. . . we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.²

A truth is self-evident if there is direct awareness (or consciousness) of the "fact" which "corresponds to" the truth. Russell says that those self-evident truths which state what is given in sense-perception correspond to facts consisting of a sense-datum having a certain sense-quality, or consisting of sense-data related to one another in a certain relation.³ Sense-qualities and relations are universals, and Russell claims that we can be acquainted with universals as well as with sense-data particulars.⁴ And the self-evident logical and mathematical principles correspond to facts consisting of relations between universals. We know immediately that two and two are four, for instance, when we are acquainted with this complex fact consisting of those universals (two and four) in that relation to one another.⁵ Like two and four, the relation between them is a universal.

Thus, according to Russell's theory, when we have direct awareness of a "complex fact" consisting of "certain terms in a certain relation," the truth that these termini are in that relation to one another is absolutely self-evident. What we are aware of is the complex fact; it is this "fact" which is given in our experience. And it is the acquaintance with this fact which provides us with intuitive knowledge of the truth. Hence we can call

¹Ibid, pp. 136-37. ²Ibid, p. 46, pp. 128-29.

³Ibid, p. 101. ⁴Ibid, pp. 95-96. ⁵Ibid, p. 103.

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such facts data of intuition: things given to us, from which we can get intuitive knowledge. (There may be some difficulty with the term "given." In one epistemological sense, to call anything "given" is to imply that it comes into consciousness unconditioned by any prior mental factors or operations, or "uncooked": for instance, that (in Peirce's words) it is not "determined by a previous cognition of the same object."¹ That is not the sense in which I employ the term here. In calling something the datum of an intuition, I am only saying that it is an object which one is aware of when he is having acquaintance which can qualify as institutional. It is an "immediate object of consciousness" or an "object of direct awareness": that which, according to theories of intuition, we are acquainted with.)

Russell's theory claims that there is a correspondence between the data of intuition (the "complex facts") and the self-evident truths and principles which we know if we are acquainted with the "facts." The intuitively known knowledge-items, in this theory, are these truths and principles, and Russell is claiming that the data of intuition provide us with knowledge of the corresponding knowledge-items. In turn, the judgments which express these truths and principles, which judge that those termini are in that relation, "must be true." There is likewise, then, a correspondence between the knowledge-items and the propositional cognitions (the judgments) which express those knowledge-items. I am

¹Charles Saunders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), V, 135. Indeed, for Peirce, an intuition is a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object.

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presuming that, for Russell, these judgments are propositional cognitions (stated or stateable knowledge-claims). If so, then the sort of intuitional theory Russell is developing is this: the propositional cognitions (stated or stateable knowledge-claims) are twice removed from intuitional experience (experience in which we are acquainted with data of intuition). Acquaintance with the data of intuition furnishes us with knowledge of the knowledge-items. The knowledge-items are not themselves data of intuition, but correspond to data of intuition. And since we have knowledge of the knowledge-items, our knowledge-claims must be true: our intuitional experience, therefore, warrants or justifies these twice removed knowledge-claims. (By a propositional cognition--stated or stateable knowledge-claim--I mean whatever we think or say, when we think what we think we know or state what we assert that we know. That is, they are the linguistic, publicly stateable expressions or descriptions of ostensible knowledge-items: they express the knowledge-items if the knowledge-items are themselves propositional, and they describe the knowledge-items if the knowledge-items are not propositional.)

Thus, in Russell's theory, our acquaintance with the data of intuition provides knowledge-items (although the data of intuition are not themselves the knowledge-items), and justifies knowledge-claims (although the knowledge-claims are not themselves the knowledge-items). The data of intuition provide (corresponding) knowledge-items, and justify (corresponding, via the knowledge-items "between") knowledge-claims.

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Russell's, in that the data of intuition are themselves the knowledge-items. That is, the knowledge-items are immediately given by acquaintance, and therefore directly provided by intuitional experience. Descartes' theory of intuition appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind:

By intuition [intuitus] I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler, though deduction, as we have noted above, cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and so on. Facts of such a kind are far more numerous than many people think, disdaining as they do to direct their attention upon such simple matters.¹

Intuition is a conception which "an unclouded and attentive mind" has when "that which we understand" (the "facts") are conceived "so readily and distinctly" that we have no doubt whatsoever about them. As in Russell's theory, these things (which the unclouded and attentive mind readily and distinctly understands) are "facts"--for instance, the fact that I exist, that a triangle is bounded by three lines, etc. Intuition is distinct from other kinds of conception (such as imagination) by the ready and distinct manner in which the mind, when unclouded and attentive, is acquainted with its data (the facts). Consequently, the mind is "wholly freed from doubt" about the truth of the knowledge-items. Unlike in Russell's theory,

¹René Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. and trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, I, 7.

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the facts which are known are truths: the data of intuition are themselves the knowledge-items. And Descartes at least implies that this complete freedom from doubt is justified in the case of knowledge provided by intuition, since one can also have no doubts whatsoever about beliefs acquired in other ways, beliefs which may not even be true, let alone certain. And, that which distinguishes intuition from other conceptions is, as Descartes puts it, (1) the unclouded and attentive state of the mind, and (2) the ready and distinct way in which the mind conceives "that which it understands."

Descartes, like Russell, handles the problem of derivative knowledge in terms of intuitive knowledge. Derivative knowledge consists of whatever can be deduced from what is intuitively known, if each inference from premise to conclusion is accompanied by a "clear vision" (i.e. intuition?) of each step in the deductive process:

. . . we have, besides intuition, given this supplementary method of knowing, viz. knowing by deduction, by which we understand all necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty. . . . many things are known with certainty, though not by themselves evident, but only deduced from true and known principles by the continuous and uninterrupted action of a mind that has a clear vision of each step in the process.¹

For Descartes, all knowledge is infallible, and all such knowledge is either intuitive or derivative: it is intuitive if it is self-evident, and it is derivative if it can be deduced from intuitive knowledge by "necessary" inferences (i.e. valid deduction). Moreover, the knowledge-items themselves are certain. What is deduced

¹Ibid, p. 8. This process of deductive inference certainly resembles intuition, relative to the clear vision of each step. But Descartes says that it isn't: "the certitude [of deduction] is rather conferred upon it in some way by memory."

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Not all theories claim certainty and infallibility for the knowledge which intuitional experience provides. Russell, for instance, thinks that ethical propositions have "some degree of self-evidence, but not much."¹ Likewise, A. C. Ewing defends intuition as a reliable source of knowledge, but does not claim certainty or infallibility for all of the ostensible knowledge-items which are given in intuitional experience:

Most philosophical defenders of intuition have preferred not to use the word except in cases where they claimed certain knowledge. But at any rate we must admit that people sometimes seem to themselves to know something intuitively when they do not really have the knowledge, and it does not seem to me to matter very much whether we express this by saying that they seemed to have intuitions but did not really, or by saying that they had intuitions but the intuitions were wrong. I have a preference, however, for the latter mode of expression because the former suggests that there is some specific recognizable psychological state, that of having intuitions, which has the proud privilege of infallibility, and this does not seem to be the case.²

Whether or not there is some "specific recognizable psychological state" of having intuitions, there is apparently a specific recognizable state of seeming to have intuitions, or of having seeming intuitions:

It is a well-known fact that propositions, particularly in ethics, but also in other fields of thought, sometimes present themselves in such a way to a person that without having even in his own opinion established them by empirical observation or by argument he seems to himself to see them directly and clearly to be true. This is often expressed by saying that he has

¹Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 117.

²A. C. Ewing, Ethics, p. 122.

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Although, according to Ewing, there is nothing about intuitional experience which renders it transparently intuitional, he does claim that there is such a unique sort of experience (that of "having intuitions"), whether or not in any given case we can be sure that we are having one. And he does assert that when a person is having ostensibly intuitional experiences it at least seems to him that he is acquainted with ("sees") certain propositions that are directly and clearly true--i.e. self-evident and obviously true--even if they aren't necessary or infallible. It is a "well-known fact," he claims, that propositions present themselves in that way, and therefore we can call them known (if they are true), or at least rationally believed, by intuition. For Ewing, as for Descartes, the data of intuition are the same as the knowledge-items known: they are certain propositions which we are acquainted with in experience, that are self-evident and obviously true. But Ewing denies Descartes' claim that there are certain marks that clearly differentiate intuition from other kinds of conceptions, and he likewise denies that these intuitive knowledge-items are certain and infallible.

However, in claiming that there are ostensibly intuitional experiences, Ewing is at least supposing that one knows what it means to say that someone is having an intuition--i.e. that one

¹Ibid, p. 119.

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¹ A. C.
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knows what the word "intuition" means. And he also claims that among these ostensibly intuitional experiences (whether or not we can differentiate them from other similar psychological states when we have them) are genuine intuitions. When they are genuine intuitions rather than only seeming intuitions, they provide us some evidence for the propositions we are aware of in those cases, even if we are not certain or the propositions are not infallible. When the intuitions are not other psychological states in disguise they are, like those other states of seeming intuition, at least self-evident in their way of presenting themselves to the mind. And they are at least obviously true, even if they are not necessarily true.¹

Thus, like Russell and Descartes, Ewing claims that there is a unique sort of experience, in this case that of having ostensible intuitions. Intuition (or ostensible intuition) is, for Ewing, entirely different from "empirical observation," and is therefore a unique manner of acquiring knowledge. Thus he differs from Russell when he claims that intuition is an entirely separate kind of knowledge than sense-perception, for Russell claimed that some intuitive truths "merely state what is given in sense." Finally, Ewing admits that there is nothing about intuitional experience which makes it self-evidently intuitional; he claims only that there are ostensibly intuitional experiences (at least some of which are genuinely so).

¹A. C. Ewing, "Reason and Intuition," Annual Philosophical Lecture of the British Academy, Proceedings of the British Academy, XXI (1941), pp. 25-28.

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Ewing admits that intuition is not the only form of justification for those propositions which are ostensibly self-evident. He claims that there is an independent test of intuition, namely coherence. If a self-evident proposition fails to cohere with either other self-evident propositions or with our experience, this is grounds to reject it either as a false intuition or as a pseudo-intuition. But we cannot apply coherence, he claims, except by intuiting that there is or is not coherence.¹ For among other things, intuition in reasoning is our final test of whether a proposition follows from, or is consistent with, other propositions.²

Thus Ewing's theory resembles that of Descartes and Russell in claiming that our derivative knowledge consists of what can be inferred from intuitive knowledge by deduction; but he recognizes that just as intuitive knowledge makes other propositions evident, so also a body of knowledge derived from intuition and sense-perception in turn can lend evidence to the self-evident propositions which form a part of the body of knowledge. Like Russell's theory, Ewing's theory of intuition holds that it is by intuition that we know the inferential steps from the intuitively known premises to the evident (but not always self-evident) conclusions.

In all, Ewing recognizes four kinds of intuition: (1) those intuitions presupposed in deduction, (2) those presupposed in induction, (3) those presupposed in ethics, and (4) those consisting of "the apprehension of a whole as a whole." In each case,

¹Ibid, pp. 19-25. ²Ibid; see also: Ewing, Ethics, p. 120.

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they are "non-empirical and immediate cognitions."¹ They are non-empirical in that they are not sense-perceptual (nor, it seems among other possible types of empirical perception such as feelings, images, etc.). And they are immediate in that we do not arrive at them by inference from other cognitions: they are not evident because something else is evident, but evident by themselves. They are non-sense-perceptual evidence. Ewing, like Russell and Descartes, holds that intuitional experience provides us with at least some knowledge that is not based upon sense-perception.

In this respect, Kant's theory of intuition resembles the other three, for he holds that intuition can provide us with some knowledge (called by him a priori knowledge) that is independent of experience. Like the other theories, in Kant's theory intuition is awareness of data given in our experience. But as with Russell, and unlike Ewing and Descartes, he maintains that the data of intuition correspond to knowledge-items rather than being identical with them:

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge² may relate to objects, intuition [Anschauung] is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us.

²[eine Erkenntnis.]²

The phrase "a mode of knowledge," as a translation for "eine Erkenntnis," could be misleading. It means, roughly, what Russell calls

¹Ewing, "Reason and Intuition," pp. 11-12.

²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 65. The note is Smith's.

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knowledge by acquaintance.¹ Kant next maintains that all intuition is given by means of sense-perception (outer sensibility) and internal perceptions (inner appearances):

Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.²

And Kant claims that there are two types of intuition: empirical intuition and pure intuition. Empirical intuition gives us appearances, and pure intuition gives us the spatial and temporal forms of all appearances. These two forms of intuition, space and time, condition all appearances. Space conditions all outer appearances (which parallel Russell's particular sense-data), and time conditions all inner appearances (which parallel Russell's data of introspection).³ Our synthetic a priori knowledge of geometry is provided by (given its content by) our pure intuition of space, and our synthetic a priori knowledge of arithmetic comes from our pure intuition of time.

There is therefore a correspondence between the data of these (pure) intuitions and these a priori knowledge-items (i.e. the synthetic a priori truths of arithmetic and geometry). There is likewise a correspondence between the data of empirical intuition and the posteriori knowledge-items of the empirical sciences. (For Kant, the correspondence is apparently indirect, via the opera-

¹Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 44.

²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 65. ³Ibid., pp. 66-80.

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tions of the mind as conditioned by the categories. Kant's theory is difficult, and part of the difficulty is involved in this relation between the data of intuition, in pure and empirical perception, and the knowledge-items.) In Kant's theory, the data of intuition are unconditioned, and under Peirce's criterion would therefore qualify as intuitions, but I can find no such assumption made by the other three theories of intuition.

Like Russell, Kant is holding that intuition can give us not only empirical knowledge (a posteriori true judgments) but also a priori knowledge: knowledge of truths and principles of arithmetic and geometry. But Kant does not call it "intuitive knowledge," for he holds that all synthetic knowledge is based upon intuition. All non-analytic knowledge has to have "content" provided for it; otherwise one would not have any basis of connecting the subjects to the predicates. And only intuition, according to Kant, can provide such content: "from mere concepts only analytic knowledge, not synthetic knowledge, is to be obtained."¹

Unlike Ewing and Descartes, Kant and Russell hold that intuitional experience includes sense-perception, rather than being entirely different from it. But likewise, like the other two theories, they hold that some of the data of intuition are not data of sense-perception. To be given the spatial and temporal forms of sense-perception is not quite the same as to be given merely particular sense-data. Finally, like Ewing and Descartes, Russell and Kant both hold that intuition provides a priori (non-empiri-

¹Ibid., pp. 85-86.

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cal) knowledge--as well as empirical knowledge, rather than instead of empirical knowledge as with Ewing and Descartes.

Another intuitionist, N. O. Lossky, denies that any intuitive knowledge is a priori; rather, he holds that there is no "antithesis" between a priori and a posteriori.¹ He is apparently claiming that the so-called a priori "axioms and postulates" are different from other judgments only in (a) their extreme generality, and (b) their intuitive clarity.² He claims that all our knowledge, intuitive and otherwise, is empirical in that experience provides us with whatever knowledge we have. Some of this empirical knowledge is analytic, some of it is synthetic but necessary, and some of it is contingent, but all of it is empirical.

His theory is empirical, he claims, in that it claims that all of the evidence for what we know is given in our experience:

The intuitionist theory is an empirical theory. All empiricism is based upon the thought that objects can be known only insofar as they are experienced by the knowing subject. Only that which is actually present to consciousness is regarded by empiricists as the material for knowledge.³

But Lossky claims that his empiricism is mystical rather than individualistic, in that it claims that besides our sensuous experience of objects, we are likewise acquainted with objects in non-sensuous experience. And whereas in sensuous experience we are acquainted only with the effects of external objects upon us, in intuitionist experience we are directly aware of external objects themselves:

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¹N. O. Lossky, The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge, trans. by Natalie A. Duddington, p. 403.

²Ibid., p. 395. ³Ibid., p. 101.

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cism, maintains that the external world is apprehended in experience as it is in itself and not merely in its effects on the self.¹

This non-sensuous, direct acquaintance with external objects themselves Lossky calls "intuition." And the (non-sensuous) intuition of the most general truths and principles he calls "intellectual intuition." In intellectual intuition, one must have "complete abstraction" from sensuous experience:

The knowledge which consists in apprehension of the non-sensuous I propose to call speculative knowledge, or intellectual intuition; All knowledge and every method of thought is to a certain extent speculative. But I reserve the terms "intellectual intuition," "speculative method," "speculative knowledge," for denoting those cases in which knowledge requires complete abstraction from sensuous experience, and is positively hindered by it²

These most general truths and principles, the "axioms and postulates" of all the sciences, although they are analytic, are about external objects themselves, and they are empirical. They are not, as Mill held, inductively arrived at by generalization from experience, but they nevertheless rest on experience for their verification. They are apprehended directly by intellectual intuition:

The way to convince a person of the truth of an axiom or of a postulate is to avoid concrete examples, and to bring it before his mind in an abstract form, simply trying to make it clear and to banish all misunderstanding due to the circumstance that in concrete reality the true connection of events is concealed by a multiplicity of detail. The result of such explanation is an immediate intellectual vision, or intuition, by which the truth is apprehended with perfect clearness.³

Besides acquainting us with external particular objects and with these "axioms and postulates," intuitional experience also gives

¹Ibid., p. 102. ²Ibid., p. 364.

³Ibid., pp. 365-66.

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Thus there are in Lossky's theory four sorts of objects which are data of intuition (non-sensuous perception): particular external objects themselves (as opposed to their effects upon us, which are given in sensuous perception), relations, universals, and certain extremely general truths and principles. These truths and principles are apparently not judgments (propositional cognitions) but very general features of that reality which our judgments are about.

It seems to be the case in Lossky's theory that the data of intuition are in some cases also knowledge-items. For instance, in the case of relations it seems that it is by intuition that we know such connections immediately.² But in the case of particular external objects the knowledge-items seem to be the judgments which we make about those objects which we are acquainted with in intuitional experience. And in the case of universals and the "axioms and postulates" it seems that the data of intuition are knowledge-items, even though he says that the knowledge we have of universals and of the truths and principles is "mediated by judgments," and may have to be "limited": that is to say, revised.³ And, according to Lossky, somehow the external realities are "present in the judgment."⁴

Unlike the previous theories, Lossky's theory claims that external particulars themselves are given in our intuitional exper-

¹Ibid., p. 368. ²Ibid., pp. 103-04.

³Ibid., p. 400. ⁴Ibid., p. 388.

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2 Ibid.,

ience. In this respect, however, his theory resembles Bergson's. Bergson claims that in intuition we "enter into" that external object itself:

By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects.¹

And since what is unique to an object is how these elements are put together to form a unique whole, one's intuition of the object cannot occur "unless we have won its fellowship with its superficial manifestations." An "immense amount of facts" is "accumulated and fused together," so that preconceptions and misconceptions "cancel each other out." Only then do we enter into the object with the intellectual sympathy, and in that intuition of the object have intuitive knowledge of it.²

In Bergson's theory, as in Lossky's, intuitional experience gives us direct awareness of external particular objects. Moreover, with Bergson it is clear that these data of intuition (the external particulars) are themselves knowledge-items, apprehended as unique and inexpressible wholes. And Bergson's theory is unlike all the rest in claiming that intuitive knowledge is inexpressible (incapable of being asserted or described in true knowledge-claims). Hence, in Bergson's theory, intuitional experience cannot justify knowledge-claims, and for the simple reason that no knowledge-claims

¹Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by T. E. Hulme, p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 91.

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And this claim that in intuitional experience we are aware of data which are not sense-data seems to be the one common feature which all of these theories of intuition share, so far as the data of intuition are concerned: they all agree that intuitional experience gives us acquaintance with objects which are not data of sense-perception. That is, they all agree that in intuitional experience we have direct awareness with at least some objects which are not data of sense-perception. But they disagree about what sorts of things (other than sense-data particulars) are given in intuitional experience, and they disagree about whether or not sense-perception is a variety of intuitional experience. And this makes it quite difficult for the investigator to determine for himself what there is about these theories which makes them theories of intuition. For if they have nothing in common in regard to intuitional experience, then they will not be discernible from other theories in regard to the other criteria: that such experience provides knowledge and justifies knowledge-claims (or is inexpressible knowledge). For these theories of intuition all claim that intuition is a unique and different way of getting knowledge and verifying knowledge-claims (if knowledge-claims can be obtained from intuitive knowledge-items, i.e. if intuitive knowledge is expressible). And intuition is what supposedly distinguishes these

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theories from other epistemological theories. Unless some way can be found of distinguishing intuitional experience (according to such theories) from non-intuitional experience, one would have to admit that about all that differentiates intuitional theories from others is that they use the word "intuition" or the word "intuitive" in their theory of knowledge.

It is certainly not surprising that certain epistemological theories claim that we are directly acquainted with certain data, and that these experiences provide us with knowledge. Indeed, perhaps any theory of knowledge would have to "start somewhere," in the sense that it assumes that something is given to awareness or consciousness. They may not use the word "intuition," and prefer some other expression which has the same function of indicating "that by which" we are directly aware of something given, from which knowledge can be acquired. Many other expressions seem to have this function of directing our attention to what is "present to the understanding in some way": "it is directly evident that----," "we are aware of----," "we are aware that----," "there is an immediate consciousness of----," "it is obvious that----," "the mind understands ----," etc. And there is likely to be much more disagreement about sort of thing is given than about whether or not something is given. Thus whereas Berkeley holds that only "ideas" are given, Russell holds that sense-data particulars, universals, and complex facts are given (including complex facts consisting of universals in certain relations). Descartes holds that both mathematical truths and the self are given, whereas Bergson holds that particular external

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objects and the self are given.¹ G. E. Moore claims that non-natural properties are given, A. J. Ayer holds that sense-data are given, and so on.² It is obvious that a theory need not make use of the term "intuition" in order to maintain that some things are given in experience, and that these experiences provide us with knowledge and justify knowledge-claims.

Therefore there is something wrong with calling a theory intuitionist if it only claims that there are some things which we are directly acquainted with, from which knowledge-items are acquired and knowledge-claims justified. We would be calling "intuitionist" theories which explicitly reject all claims on behalf of intuition and intuitive knowledge, merely because they claim that some things are given which provide us with knowledge-items. The reason they reject the term "intuition" is because they take it for some peculiar, non-empirical road to knowledge.

The problem of arriving at a characterization of intuitionist experience is this: should we call any instance of acquaintance with what is given an intuition, and therefore define a theory of intuition as a theory which claims that some things are given in direct awareness, and that these experiences provide knowledge? In that case, many empirical theories which explicitly reject know-

¹Ibid., p. 24.

²G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 59; and A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 59. Moore likewise held that there are sense-data, but likewise held that we are aware of non-natural properties as well. On sense-data theories generally, see John L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, ed. from manuscript by G. J. Warnock, Galaxy Books (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

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A not very intuitively clear compromise is obtainable. Let us define intuitional experience, provisionally, as experience in which we are directly aware of certain data, at least some of which are not data of sense-perception. Any theory which claims that we have intuitional experience (i.e. experience which satisfies this criterion), and that such experience provides knowledge, would be a theory of intuition.

However, this definition of intuitional theories is still too broad. A theory could claim, for instance, that we are aware of data of imagination, or of memory, or of introspection (feelings) and still reject the term "intuition." For feeling, remembering, imagining, dreaming, etc. are presumably varieties of direct awareness, but they not sense-perceptual either. It may be held that these varieties of acquaintance derive from sense-perception, but one could likewise hold that they (some of them) derive from intuition. If a theory merely claims that we are aware of certain data usually called mental or phenomenal (memories, images, feelings, dreams, etc.), and does not claim that we are aware of facts, truths and principles, particular external objects, universals, relations of implication, organic wholes, etc., it need not make any claims about intuition or intuitive knowledge.

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Yet theories of intuition are not very clear about how intuitional experience differs from forms of experience that are not ordinarily called intuitional, and although they are clearer about what sorts of thing are given in intuitional experience, they differ widely among themselves about what the data of intuition are. The investigator of theories of intuition is therefore faced with an intuitional experience problem: where can he find agreement among theories of intuition about what intuitional experience is? It would be a lot simpler for the treatment of this problem if one could identify something more, here, than the tendency among theories of intuition to regard intuitional experience as peculiarly like visual sense-perception.

There is another common characteristic among these theories, however, that deserves mention: with the exception of Kant, they have all claimed that in intuitional experience we are acquainted with at least some data which exist independently of our awareness of them. That is, these theories suppose that at least some of the data of intuition do not (in Berkeley's phrase) exist only in being perceived--they are noumenal rather than phenomenal, to use Kant's phrase. According to these theories (with the exception of Kant's) the data of at least some intuitions are beyond (or transcend) the mental act in which we are aware of them; in some sense, they are "external" to their status as data of awareness. Or, they are independent of our awareness of them, in that they do or would exist even if unperceived.

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that they have some separate ontological status besides being perceived or perceivable: they exist other than in being the objects of direct awareness merely. And to assert that they are independent would really be saying the same thing: that they exist, and what they are, is not at all dependent upon whether or not they are or can be objects of direct awareness.

Kant, who denies that we can ever be aware of anything whose existence and nature is independent of our experience of it, would therefore be denying what all the rest of these theories have affirmed, for he claims that we can never have (of the objects of our intuition) things-in-themselves, or noumena. Even Kant, however, suggests that intuition of things-in-themselves is not impossible (to God, presumably):

But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible--given therefore coram intuitu intellectuali--such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia).¹

Human beings, however, only have sensible intuition, and therefore they have no acquaintance with things-in-themselves.²

On the other hand, Bergson holds that we can be aware of external particulars and of ourselves (as inexpressible wholes), and it is clear from his claim that we can "know reality immediately" that these data of intuition are transcendent and independent.³ Knowledge of self-evident truths and of ourselves, according to Descartes, involves direct awareness both of ourselves and of those

¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 265-66.

²Ibid., p. 268. ³Bergson, Metaphysics, p. 9.

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self-evident truths. And it is clear that the self which he claims that we have intuition of is no mere phenomenon, but a noumenon: the thinking subject whose existence is transcendent and independent of whether or not one is aware of it--i.e. self-conscious). And Russell holds that we are aware of universals and of complex facts consisting of universals in certain relations. These universals and the relations between them exist (or, to use his word, "subsist") independently of our awareness of them; they exist in a realm of universals, and will continue to exist there (or subsist there) though perceivers come and go.¹

Finally, the ethical intuitionists, Ewing included, maintain that the value properties of actions and objects exist independent of being perceived, and that self-evident propositions are given in our experience--propositions which are, and are true, independently of us.² Thus in all of these theories of intuition, with the exception of Kant's if we restrict the definition to apply only to theories of human intuition, there is a supposition that the alleged data of at least some intuitional experience exist in an ontological status of their own independently of whether or not we are aware of them.

There is still some difficulty with this common characteristic of all these theories of intuition: just exactly what is meant in saying that certain phenomena (for data of intuition are

¹Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 100.

²Ewing, Ethics, pp. 19, 121. See also W. D. Hudson, Ethical Intuitionism, New Studies in Ethics Series, p. 63. The rationalist intuitionists and the moral-sense philosophers both "reified" moral judgments.

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by definition phenomena, in the sense that they are things that are directly evident to us) are independent and transcendent of their being phenomena? What is involved, exactly, in saying that these data are things-in-themselves, which nevertheless we are acquainted with? And what does this common characteristic among theories of intuition, concerning the data of intuition, have to do with the special or unique character of (at least some) intuitional experience?

Lossky calls his intuitional theory "mystical" for the reason that it claims that we are in direct contact with some external reality when we are having intuitional experience, whereas in sensuous experience we are only aware of the effects of this reality upon ourselves as perceivers. He calls it a "mystical" theory because in this respect it is like philosophical mysticism, which claims that we are in immediate contact with (an independent and transcendent) God. In philosophical mysticism, the persistent and pious investigator is rewarded for his patience and mental efforts by an experience of direct awareness of God--he "knows Him by acquaintance," to use Russell's terminology, or "sees Him in a vision," as the visual metaphor has it:

The line of reflection I have been following may fairly enough be described as a mystical tendency of thought. Philosophical mysticism, which has hitherto generally possessed a religious tinge, has always insisted that there is no impassible gulf between God and the human soul; that there are, at any rate, moments of perfect union between the human and the divine--moments of ecstasy when man feels and experiences God no less immediately than his own self. The intuitional theory of knowledge is characterized by a kindred thought--the thought, namely, that the world of the not-self (the whole of that world, including God, if God exists) is known no less immedi-

ately than the world of the self.¹

J. G. Brennan notes the same analogy between intuition and mysticism:

Ancient Indian sages taught that a holy man, who subjected himself to long periods of self-discipline, would suddenly know the reality that lay behind the veil of Maya which is this world. In a famous passage of the *Symposium*, Plato says that a philosopher, after laboriously mounting upward by way of the disciplines of earthly love and mathematics, may achieve a vision of eternal beauty. . . . Such intuitions are characteristic of the way of knowledge of mysticism. The mystic is a saintly person who, after long exercise in prayer and ascetic self-denial, suddenly experiences a moment of luminous certitude; he "sees" beyond the world's illusion that one Divine Reality with which he feels himself united.²

Brennan distinguishes various senses of the word "intuition."³ In the mystical sense, an intuitional theory is one which claims that one can have experiences of direct awareness of Divine Reality. He has acquaintance with something that is divine and is independent (in its nature and existence) of the perceiver and his world. That is, it claims that we can be in direct contact with something which transcends us and our world.

Lossky has extended this word "mystical" to cover his theory, since it claims that we can be directly aware of external reality, or what he calls "the world of the not-self." If we adopted Lossky's locution, we could claim that one of the criteria for a theory of intuition is that it claims that we have mystical experiences, i.e. that we are directly aware of at least some data which

¹Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, p. 100.

²Joseph Gerard Brennan, *The Meaning of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., pp. 168-69.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 167-77.

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are independent and transcendent of ourselves as perceivers. Thus, in order to be a theory of intuition, a theory would have to claim that we have such experiences. However, there are three difficulties about this criterion: first, it is too broad, in that theories which claimed that we were acquainted with such data in sense-perception (i.e. naïve realisms) would qualify as theories of intuition. Second, it seems too narrow, in that theories which make the claim that intuition gives us immediate acquaintance with our real selves (as Bergson and Descartes maintain) appear to be excluded. Third, according to this criterion Kant's theory of intuition (or at least, his theory of human intuition) would be left out, for he claims that human perceivers can only have intuition of the empirical phenomena (sensations of sense-objects) and of the spatial and temporal conditions of all sense-perception, space and time. And these conditions are imposed by us upon our experience, they are not noumena or noumenal conditions.

However, so far as his description of human experience is concerned, Kant does not need the word intuition at all. He could do just as well with the word "perception": in empirical perception we are acquainted with appearances (he could say), whereas in pure perception we are acquainted with the spatial and temporal formal conditions of all perception. In neither case would he be implying that we are acquainted with things-in-themselves--external or other realities which are transcendent and independent of our perception of them. (On the other hand, he would need the word "intuition" to describe God's understanding of particulars, if that is what he is

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getting at when he talks about intellectual intuition.)

In order to avoid confusing intuitional theories with naïve realisms, let us alter the first criterion as follows: in order for a theory to be intuitional it must claim that we have mystical experiences--experiences in which we are aware of data which (a) are not sense-perceptual, and (b) are transcendent (independent, ontologically, of our awareness of them). A theory of intuition would have to maintain that at least some intuitional experiences (whether it uses the word "intuition" or not) are mystical: cases of direct awareness of data which are transcendent and which are not sense-perceptual.

There is still the problem remaining, however, of pinning down this sense in which data of intuition can be transcendent. What does it mean to say that what one is directly aware of is transcendent (independent, ontologically, of our awareness of it)? A theory is called a "naïve realism" if it claims that sense-perception gives us direct awareness of external objects. Such a theory is "realistic" in that it holds that at least some particular objects (usually "physical" or "material" objects) exist independently of whether or not they are perceived. And it is "naïve" in that it holds that we are immediately acquainted, in sense-perception, with these external (transcendent and independent) particulars, for it is argued that this claim must be false.¹

But theories of intuition are not maintaining that sense-

¹Bertrand Russell, "Physics and Perception," in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 559-565.

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perception gives us direct awareness of external particulars. Some of them hold that we are directly aware of transcendent particulars, but not by sense-perception. Others hold that we are aware of transcendent universals (conceptual realism). In both cases, the theories are claiming that we are acquainted with things which (a) are not perceived by sense-perception, and (b) exist independently of whether or not we are or can be acquainted with them. Like naïve realism, however, such theories are claiming that we can be directly aware of objects whose existence and whose nature in no way depends upon whether or not we do or can perceive them.

We do not constitute such objects by becoming aware of them, nor do we in any way alter them by doing so. Rather, we discover that they are, and discover what they are, and do not in the discovery either create them or alter them. Even if no-one ever became aware of them they would still exist and have just exactly the nature that they have when we become aware of them. They are transcendent in the sense that their nature and their existence is independent of whether or not they are data of awareness. That we are aware of them, in other words, is an intensional property of them, not an extensional property. It is in this sense that according to theories of intuition, the data of intuition are transcendent: completely independent, ontologically, of our awareness of them. That we are aware of them in our experience is an intensional property of them; their existence and their nature is entirely independent of whether or not they are data of awareness.

If we accept this criterion for identifying theories of

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intuition, then we could call a theory intuitionist which claimed that we are aware of ourselves, provided that it also would claim that the self we become aware of is completely independent, ontologically, of our awareness of it: it is in no way constituted or altered (in its extensional properties) merely because we become self-conscious. And a theory which claimed that we are acquainted with universals would claim to be intuitionist if it also claimed that the universals we become acquainted with are completely independent (in their existence and in their nature) of whether or not we are or can be aware of them.

Thus far we have identified two criteria which a theory must satisfy in order to be a theory of intuition:

(1) it must claim that we have mystical experiences: experiences in which we are aware of transcendent, non-sense-perceptual data (that is, data [a] which are not sense-perceptual, and [b] whose nature and existence are entirely independent, ontologically, of whether or not we are or can be acquainted with them), and

(2) it must claim that these mystical experiences provide us with knowledge-items, either in that the data of these experiences are themselves knowledge-items or in that there is a correspondence between the data and the knowledge-items.

These criteria for theories of intuition might be sufficient except for two interrelated problems: (1) those theories of intuition which hold that knowledge-items can be expressed (in some way) in knowledge-claims, likewise hold that intuitionist experience not only provides us with knowledge, but also justifies intuitive knowledge-claims. And (2) there seems to be less objection to the claim that intuitionist experience provides us with knowledge than there is about the claim that such experience in some way confirms, verifies, or warrants what we say (or believe) on account of our intuitionist

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experience. It is one thing to claim that my intuition leads me to discover some item of knowledge, so that I could then verify or disconfirm it by some other test or proof, and quite another thing to say that my intuitional experience has something to do with the justification of what I discover by intuition.

Mario Bunge, when he is examining the role of intuition in science, is quite willing to admit that intuition may furnish the investigator with his hypotheses. "Intuition," according to him, is a word covering various different sorts of conceptual states or events which resemble one another in their characteristics, and which are not unlike the experiences which the theories we have examined call "intuitions." These intuitional experiences provide knowledge at least in the sense that there is sudden or unexplained discovery of hypotheses which later turn out to have been fruitful and not (or not yet) disconfirmed. But Bunge claims that such mystical insight (even in the case of competent investigators, whose insights turn out to be often reliable) has nothing to do with the verification of those hypotheses.

First, having criticized a number of theories of intuition for their claims about intuition and intuitive knowledge (claims very much like the ones which would satisfy our first two criteria), he concedes that there are intuitions in science:

There is little doubt, in short, that intuitions of various sorts occur in scientific research, although they are absent from science as a body of propositions. But the scientist, though esteeming intellectual intuition because of its suggestive power, knows that it can be dangerous¹

¹Mario Bunge, Intuition and Science, Spectrum Books, p. 104.

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It is dangerous because it can be erroneous, and because it is usually vague and must be made precise by more mundane methods.

Most important, however, having an intuition has nothing to do with the justification of what we discover by it:

Scientists esteem intuition . . . but do not depend upon it. They know that psychological self-evidence is no warrant of truth, that intuition is highly personal, and that it often plays bad tricks. . . . What characterizes scientific knowledge, besides logical organization and accuracy, is testability, and not self-evidence or subjective certainty, which are sometimes associated with intuition and as often shelter prejudice and superstition.¹

Finally, hypotheses may be arrived at in various ways, not merely by intuition, and whether we discover them by intuition or by (for instance) induction, their discovery is independent of their verification:

Analogy, induction, and possibly other forms of plausible inference as well, yield hypotheses, not secure truths; and before accepting such assumptions we must subject them to certain tests, both theoretical and empirical. Even their acceptance will be provisional. If the hypotheses are adopted as postulates of some factual science, it is almost certain that in the long run they will have to be corrected or even altogether abandoned; and if the assumptions belong to formal science, the possibility should not be excluded that more comprehensive and fertile postulates may be found in the future.²

Thus, he claims, the fact that intuitions occur in science, and that they provide hypotheses which later become justified (and hence could qualify as "knowledge-items"), does not support philosophical intuitionism.³ That we have knowledge-items provided by intuitional experience is irrelevant to their being known. Theories of intuition are claiming more than that intuition provides hypotheses, or concepts, etc. They suppose that intuition is enough

¹Ibid., pp. 105-06. ²Ibid., p. 116. ³Ibid., p. 117.

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Bunge's criticism would be disputed by any theory which claimed that regardless of the utility of intuition in coming up with propositions for testing, or postulated entities, etc., intuition is also in some way a ground or foundation for our knowledge. And this is just what the theories we have examined have affirmed: knowledge-items are not only provided by intuition, they are also justified or warranted by intuitional experience. It is our intuitional experience which entitles us to say that we know them.

However, the theories we have examined are divided on an important matter. Whereas Russell, Descartes, Ewing, and Lossky all hold that our intuitional knowledge is expressible in knowledge-claims (stated or stateable propositional cognitions), Bergson holds that intuitive knowledge is inexpressible. Such theories are in a weak position relative to Bunge's criticism: they are saying that we can know something but cannot express it, and hence that there is no test for whether or not we really know it except that we feel that we know it. Since what we know cannot be asserted or described, one cannot come up with any hypotheses or assumptions for further investigation. At most what we can produce in favor of calling it knowledge is that we are firmly convinced of it because of our own private, and incommunicable, experience. We cannot even communicate our intuitive knowledge to others, let alone provide others with some judgmental grounds--some verification, other than the not very persuasive fact that we ourselves are firmly convinced that we know it.

The other theories appear to be in a somewhat better position.

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tion. They claim that intuitive knowledge-items can be expressed (asserted or described) in knowledge-claims. This at least makes it possible for intuitive knowledge to be subjected to other means of verification besides intuition, and at least when there is an appeal to intuition as justification, one can appeal to the other person's intuition. That is, one can secure agreement among people to one and the same knowledge-claim, if their separate intuitional experiences all confirm it.

According to Russell's theory, our intuitional experience provides justification for knowledge-claims (the judgments) which correspond to the knowledge-items (the intuitively known truths and principles): if a proposition is self-evident, then "the corresponding judgment must be true." In Descartes' theory, although it appears to be the case in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind that the propositional cognitions are themselves the knowledge-items, in the Meditations he says that our judgments express what we know--i.e. they are once-removed from the knowledge-items. And he does not use the word "intuition" in the Meditations, but says that our judgments (propositional cognitions) can be warranted by the "light of nature," which seems to amount to the same thing.¹

In Lossky's theory, our intuition of the "axioms and postulates" is likewise what proves to us that they are true, and similarly for the judgments we arrive at as a result of our non-sensuous perceptions. And Ewing holds that although intuition does not pro-

¹Descartes, Meditations, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, 174-79.

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vide us with certain knowledge-claims, it can at least furnish us with some evidence of the truth of our judgments.¹ And although Ewing admits that intuition is never the only justification for a proposition, he claims that it is an indispensable foundation. Ewing claims that the other test of the truth of a proposition is coherence with other well-founded propositions and with experience, by which he means roughly what Bunge says is the only kind of verification for hypotheses.² But in order to apply the test of coherence, and in order to get evidence for the whole system of coherent propositions which we accept as knowledge, Ewing argues that we must have intuition as well as coherence.³

In claiming that intuition not only provides us with knowledge-items but likewise justifies knowledge-claims, such theories are open to just the objection that Bunge raises against them: that in taking intuition as a way of justifying knowledge-claims they are resting these assertions upon an undependable, subjective, and unjustifiable foundation. Intuition is undependable, it is alleged, in that what we think we know intuitively very often turns out to be false, or probably false. It is subjective in that at least the intuitional experience is private, and not very easily (if at all) distinguishable from mere firm conviction. And it is unjustifiable, I suppose, by definition: it is supposed to be evident even though nothing makes it evident.

Intuitional theories could reply to these charges by

¹Ewing, Ethics, pp. 121-24.

²Ewing, "Reason and Intuition," pp. 19-25. ³Ibid., p. 38.

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pointing out that other sorts of verification likewise sometimes fail (inductive inference, for instance), and that (as Ewing claims) intuition need not be certain in order to yield some evidence for a proposition. They can reply that all experience is private, not just intuitional experience. And (1) in one sense, it is verifiable in other ways--namely by what Ewing calls "coherence," whereas (2) in another sense it is of course not verifiable: if it is self-evident, then by definition it is not merely evident because something else is evident.

Regardless of whether or not the characteristic charges against theories of intuition are well-founded, it is true that they are open to the objections that Bunge raises against them. For they are claiming that intuitive knowledge-claims are justified by intuitional experience, if they hold that intuitive knowledge is expressible. And if they claim that intuitive knowledge is inexpressible (incapable of being asserted in true statements or of being described in such statements), they still maintain that intuitional experience warrants our belief that we are provided with knowledge by such experience, rather than merely with possibly useful or accurate representations, or something of the sort.

This suggests that a third criterion is necessary in order to define theories of intuition, in order to show that theories of intuition take intuitional experience to provide us with more than merely hypotheses to be verified, etc. We need to recognize that such theories claim either that intuitional experience justifies knowledge-claims or that intuitional experience does provide us

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with knowledge, even though that knowledge is unassertable and indescribable. Thus the third criterion which a theory must satisfy in order to be called a theory of intuition is:

(3) it must claim that these mystical experiences are not merely psychologically convincing, but are evidence of the truth of the knowledge-items (or of the reality of the knowledge-items); either they justify the knowledge-claims which express (assert or describe) the knowledge-items, or they are evidence of knowledge-items which are inexpressible. In other words, it must claim that such experiences are justification for what we claim that we know (whether it is expressible or not).

I take each of these three criteria as a necessary condition for a theory of intuition, and all three together as a sufficient condition. A theory of intuition is defined as any theory which meets all three of these criteria. The data of intuition, for such a theory, could either be propositional or not, and so could the knowledge-items; only the knowledge-claims (if the theory makes any) would have to be propositional. The knowledge-claims would be descriptions if the knowledge-items are not propositional, and assertions if the knowledge-items are already propositional. In the latter case, it is possible that the knowledge-claims are the same as the knowledge-items--that is, that the knowledge-items are the same stated or stateable propositional cognitions as are the knowledge-claims.

Having arrived at a definition of theories of intuition which is at least adequate for the purpose of determining whether or not Plato's theory of knowledge is intuitionist, it is possible to examine that theory in order to decide if it is a theory of intuition. There are two other characteristics which many theories of intuition have: a tendency to employ visual metaphors and ana-

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logies comparing or explaining intuition in terms of visual sense-perception, and a tendency to think of knowledge as a relation between the mind and what it knows. The first is not essential to theories of intuition, certainly, since one can always avoid making ~~that~~ comparison (although such theories always seem to do so). And the second may not be essential, either: one might, for instance, admit that we are given data of intuition without making any claims whatsoever about the mind. (This gets into the problem of whether or not perception requires a perceiver.)

It was these two (possibly accidental) characteristics which first led me to regard Plato's theory of knowledge as intuition. For Plato frequently uses visual metaphors and analogies to explain what he means by knowledge, and he assumes that knowledge is such a relation: a relation between the mind and the forms. He claims that knowledge (or understanding) of the forms is like vision, or is vision. Just as we observe what is visible, so we "see" (or "know," "understand") what is knowable (or intelligible). And he claims that knowledge is a sort of relation between the mind and the forms that it knows.

II. THE FORMS

For Plato, knowledge consists of a relation between knower and known--between that which knows, the mind, and that which is known, the forms. As we will see, Plato in the Republic maintains that the objects of knowledge are the forms: these make up that reality which, according to Plato, exist absolutely and therefore can be known. The present subject of investigation is Plato's ontology in the Republic: his theory of forms.

This theory of forms has received much attention from commentators, because of Plato's persistent identification of the forms with reality. At least two fundamental problems have gained their attention: (1) the origin and development of the theory of forms, and (2) the nature of the forms. The first problem involves the second, since the nature of the forms (and of the theory of forms) does not remain unchanged throughout Plato's philosophical development.

There are two opposing schools of thought on the origin of the theory of forms. One side of the dispute holds that the theory first appears in the Phaedo as an essentially new doctrine of Plato's own invention. This school admits that there are anticipations of the theory in the earlier dialogues, and that the methods of Socrates (in particular the Socratic search for definitions) lead toward the theory of forms. But it denies that Socrates

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himself invented the theory which emerges in the Phaedo, which ascribes to the forms an existence independent of the particular instances of them. In this view, Plato was gradually led to adopt the theory of forms, which he introduces for the first time in the Phaedo. They admit that the Socrates of Plato's dialogues uses the words "form" ("εἶδος") and ("ἰδέα") in earlier dialogues, but they deny that these words mean quite the same thing in the early dialogues as they do after the Phaedo. They hold that in the earlier dialogues the forms exist in the particulars which partake of them, whereas in the later dialogues the forms exist independently of any particulars.¹

The other side of the dispute holds that the theory of forms was not invented by Plato. They believe that he learned it from the Pythagoreans at "the Pythagorean school at Athens," of which at one time Socrates was the leader. In this view, the dialogues are reports (more or less accurate) of actual conversations expressing the real views of Socrates, at least up to the Phaedo. They hold that in the Phaedo Plato has Socrates introduce the theory of forms as though it were already known to the other participants in the dialogue, the "Pythagoreans" Simmias and Cebes. And they claim that the language of the earlier dialogues presupposes the theory of forms even though it does not explain it.²

¹For arguments and evidence see: (1) G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, Appendix I, pp. 291-94; (2) W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 24-25, 34-36; and (3) J. E. Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making, pp. 79-80, 84-87.

²For arguments and evidence see: (1) Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Epistles, The Library of Liberal Arts, pp. 109-118; (2) John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato, pp. 123-29, 173;

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Regardless of which theory of the origin of the forms is correct, it is clear that the theory of forms does not remain unchanged from the time it emerges into full view in the Phaedo. For instance, in the Phaedo and the Republic Plato claims that the forms alone are completely real, but in the Sophist he admits that there are other things also which are entirely real: individual, self-moving minds and material, movable bodies.¹ Also, in the Phaedo there is no suggestion that the forms are caused by anything whatsoever, but in the Republic it is claimed that they are caused by a "divine craftsman" (the form of the good).² And then in the Timaeus Plato once again has them existing independently of any divine "craftsman"; the Δημιουργός does not create them, but only employs them to transform the receptacle into a material universe.³

These differences have led commentators to treat the subject chronologically, following out the theory of forms from its origins in the early dialogues through its changes from the Phaedo onwards. I do not have the time for this, nor do I wish to complicate this investigation with material from other dialogues which may

(3) A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, pp. 175-76. See also the Apology, 24b-c: "Socrates is unjust [reads his indictment] in that he is corrupting our young men and not recognizing (νομίζειν) the gods which our city recognizes, but new divinities (δαίμονια καὶνὰ) instead." Not only does "νομίζω" mean "recognize," it also means "acknowledge" or "honor," and the accusation is that Socrates is corrupting the young men by teaching them to honor "new divinities" instead of the gods of the state. The "new divinities" might be the forms.

¹Sophist 248c-49d. See also: (1) Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 105-11, and (2) Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, The Library of Liberal Arts, pp. 239-48.

²Republic 597c, 509b. ³Timaeus 27d-29b.

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be at variance in important respects from the Republic. I intend to examine the Republic alone; there is enough evidence there to make it possible to arrive at Plato's ontology without needing to refer very often to other dialogues.

There are three sections of the Republic in which the forms are discussed: 475a-480a, 504a-540c, and 596a-597d. Respectively, 475a-480a investigates the nature of the philosopher; 504a-540c includes the analogies of the sun and of the divided line, the allegory of the cave, and the training of the guardians in mathematics and dialectic; and 596a-597d concerns the relation between art and reality. I shall postpone 504a-540c, since it is concerned mainly with the relation between the mind and the forms and since it presupposes the forms (for the most part) rather than explaining what they are.

475a-480a

Socrates and Glaucon are attempting to reach agreement about the true nature of the philosopher, and to differentiate the genuine philosophers from the philodoxists (φιλοδόξοι), who are lovers of opinion (δόξα). They agree that the philosopher desires wisdom (475b8):

"And wouldn't we say that the philosopher is desirous (ἐπιθυμητήν) of wisdom--not desirous of some wisdom but not other wisdom, but desirous of all wisdom?"

"True."

In accordance with a previous argument,¹ it would not be correct to call someone a philosopher if he desired to be wise about

¹Republic 438d-e.

things but not about others; we would have to name him in accordance with the restriction. One who wanted only mathematical wisdom, for instance, would have to be called a lover of mathematical wisdom, rather than a lover of wisdom (φιλοσοφός).

Glaucon points out that this argument seems to result in an unfortunate consequence. Many people whom he knows Socrates would not call philosophers might be considered philosophers since they are unlimited in their desire for "wisdom." There are dilettantes and others with nothing to do who must attend every festival, see every play, and know about everything that happens to everyone. Would Socrates call such people philosophers?

"Never. But I would say that they are like philosophers."

"Then who are the genuine philosophers?"

"Those who love to look at (φιλοθεάμονας) the truth (τῆς ἀληθείας)."

"Right; but what do you mean?"

Glaucon sees that Socrates' statement is not clear. These spectators and dilettantes (who will be called philodoxists) love to look at everything whatsoever, and therefore are lovers of the truth, at least according to themselves. This definition of a philosopher as someone who loves to look at the truth supplies a visual metaphor to the knowledge relation which is retained throughout the Republic. Hereafter, knowledge (γνῶσις or ἐπιστήμη) and wisdom (σοφία) are often expressed as vision (ὄψις) or observation (θεῶν) of what is true (i.e. genuine, ἀληθής).

In order to prove to Glaucon that there is a difference between these people and philosophers, Socrates makes use of an argument which would not convince "another," i.e. a philodoxist, although it is acceptable to Glaucon:

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"It would never be easy to explain to another, but I believe that you will agree with me about this: since beautiful (καλόν) is opposite to ugly (αἰσχρῶ), they are two."

"Of course."

"And since they are two, isn't each of them one?"

"Of course."

"Similarly with just (δικαίου) and unjust (ἀδίκου), good (ἀγαθοῦ) and bad (κάκον) and all the forms (πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν), the explanation is the same (ὁ αὐτός λόγος): although each of them is itself one, each appears to be many things becoming apparent everywhere in common with one another amid bodies and activities (αὐτο μὲν ἐν ἑκάστων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστων)."

Since Glaucon accepts the theory of forms, he grants that beautiful and ugly are things, and therefore accepts the inference that since they are opposite, they are opposite things. The same explanation, says Socrates, applies to all the other forms as well. They consist of pairs of opposites, and each member of the pair is one, but seems to be many things becoming apparent (φανταζόμενα πολλὰ).

Since this passage has been variously translated and interpreted, I wish to explain my interpretation. The pair of particles "μὲν . . . δὲ" indicates the contrast between what each one (ἑκάστων) is (εἶναι) and what each one appears to be (φαίνεσθαι). Each is itself one (αὐτο . . . ἐν) and appears to be many things becoming apparent (φανταζόμενα πολλὰ). All the rest, it seems to me, modifies "φανταζόμενα πολλὰ": the forms become apparent everywhere in common with one another (τῇ . . . ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ) among bodies and activities (τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων). I think that it is the appearances of the forms, and not the forms themselves, which Plato is here saying occur in common with one another among objects and events. Hence the statement need not be understood as Ross understands it, namely as indicating that the forms partake of one

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another.¹ Ross follows Adam in taking "πάντα τα εἶδη" as the implicit subject of the sentence, with "ἕκαστον" in distributive opposition.² Even so, it does not follow that the forms have to be understood as partaking with one another. Adam translates "by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and with one another," but points out that they may only be in community with one another among actions and bodies.³

Socrates can now prove, but only to another believer in the forms, that the philosophers are different from the philodoxists: they differ in the nature of what they love.⁴ The philodoxists are lovers of sights (φιλοθεδόμενες) and lovers of sounds (φιλήκοοι). They welcome (ἀσπάζονται) beautiful colors and shapes, and beautiful tones and noises, and other appearances, but they are incapable of seeing (ἰδέναι) and welcoming the nature of the beautiful itself (αὐτοῦ . . . τοῦ καλοῦ . . . τὴν φύσιν). Whereas the philosophers are capable of reaching (ἐπ' . . . ἵέναι) and seeing (ὁρᾶν καὶ) the beautiful itself, the philodoxists can only reach and see beautiful appearances.⁵

This explanation of the difference between the philosopher and the philodoxist would only convince a believer in the forms, such as Glaucon. Socrates realizes that it would not convince the

¹Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 37.

²James Adam, ed., The Republic of Plato, I, 362-64.

³Ibid., p. 336. ⁴Republic 476a-b.

⁵Republic 476b-c. Plato does not use the word "appearances" ("φαινόμενα") until 596d. However, this word still seems to be the best way to refer to the things that appear (the "many beautifuls," etc.). Perhaps an equally non-committal term would be "sense-

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philodoxist, who has not any notion that there are any forms, and who does not know that there is a difference between appearance and reality. Therefore Socrates makes use of another argument, which is intended to convince even the philodoxist that there is a difference between himself and the philosopher.

Glaucon is willing to answer for the philodoxist, and Socrates resumes the inquiry (476e7):

"Does the knower (γινώσκων) know something (γινώσκει τι), or does he know nothing? Answer me for him."

"I would answer that he knows something."

"Something which exists, or something which does not exist (Πότερον ὃν ἢ οὐκ ὃν)?"

"Something which exists. How could he know something which does not exist?"

"Is it enough (and we should consider whether it is too much) if we hold that what is completely known exists completely and what does not exist at all is completely unknown (το μὲν παντελῶς ὃν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὃν δὲ μηδαμῇ πᾶντι ἀγνωστόν)?"

"It is enough."

The argument is from Parmenides' Way of Truth.¹ Both here and there the claim is that there can be knowledge only of what exists, and there can only be ignorance of what does not exist. Cornford translates "the perfectly real is perfectly knowable, and the utterly unreal is entirely unknowable."² The sentence will admit of either interpretation.

objects." For Plato is not, in the Republic, committed to the independent reality of particular material or perceivable objects. He nowhere says anything to suggest that the objects of sense-perception exist only in being perceived, but on the other hand nothing that he says in the Republic contradicts this, either. See Theaetetus 181d-82d.

¹Hermann Diels, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th ed., revised by Walther Kranz, 3 vols, 28B (Parmenides): 2, 7-8. Hereafter this work will be referred to as "Diels-Kranz."

²Francis M. Cornford, trans., The Republic of Plato, p. 184.

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Socrates then draws a paradoxical conclusion (477a6):

"Well then, if something is such as to both exist and not exist (τι οὕτως ἔχει ὥς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), wouldn't it lie between (μεταχῦ . . . μέστω) that which exists absolutely (ἐλλκρινῶς, literally "sun-clearly") and that which exists not at all?"

"It would."

One would think that if something both exists and does not exist, then it cannot exist: it would be impossible for it to exist. Instead of this, Plato infers that it cannot exist absolutely but can exist in a certain intermediate way. The paradoxes involved in this straightforward interpretation of him have led some commentators to deny that he is really talking about existence, but only talking about a different kind of reality.

Vlastos, for instance, argues that constructions such as "ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν," "εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι," "ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἔστι," and so on, do not allude to a domain of objects intermediate between existence and non-existence. Rather, they allude to objects which are less real in the sense that they are "less true" or "less genuine." That is, they are less clear and less reliable as objects of thought. According to this argument, there are no degrees of existence in Plato, but only kinds of existence. The forms exist absolutely (i.e. truly), and what I have called the appearances (sense-objects) equally exist, but are less genuine. They are a different kind of thing, rather than a "less existing" thing; they are a less genuine sort of thing.¹

I am not convinced by Vlastos' argument. There may not be

¹Gregory Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato," in New Essays in Plato and Aristotle, ed. by Renford Bambrough, pp. 1-20.

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degrees of existence in Plato, for that seems to imply a continuum of levels of existence. But I think that there are at least two levels of existence: the forms, which exist without qualification, and the appearances, which don't quite exist (for reasons I think I can spell out) but don't quite not exist either. After all, they do appear.

Plato will claim that each of the forms exists forever, remains exactly the same forever, and is one rather than many: one unique object which is always and forever the same.¹ Sense-objects, on the other hand, are temporary, fluctuating (κλανά), and not unique: they are many objects ressembling one another, which do not exist forever and which are constantly changing. There seems to me to be a suggestion here that permanence, uniqueness, and self-identity are "criteria" for absolute, complete existence, and that the appearances do not exist absolutely because they do not meet these conditions. Therefore they must "lie between" existence and non-existence.

But why would Plato claim that appearances don't meet these conditions? Don't sense-objects exist at a certain time, and hence exist in the "timeless" or temporally definite sense? Aren't they the same as themselves to a given observer at a given time and in a given location under such-and-such conditions of observation? Are not they unique (one rather than many) there and then to that observer under those conditions of observation? In other words, are they not eternally and uniquely self-identical in the temporally

¹Republic 478e-79a.

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Perhaps Plato would deny that appearances met these conditions if he had no temporally definite notion of the "is" of existence (and for that matter, of the "is" of predication). The typical and natural (i.e. pre-philosophic) way of understanding "is" is "is now"--i.e. "is" in the present tense, rather than "is" in some timeless sense. Hintikka claims that such temporal indefiniteness is a pervasive tendency in the Greek philosophers, and he takes Aristotle for his principal example.¹

Hintikka argues that the widespread Greek doctrine that we can know only what is eternal and changeless is the outcome of two tendencies: "(1) a tendency to think of temporally indefinite sentences as typical vehicles of communication; (2) a tendency to think of knowledge in terms of some sort of acquaintance with the objects of knowledge, e.g. in terms of seeing or of witnessing them."² I will have more to say about the second tendency later. The effect of the first tendency would have the effect of separating objects of thought into those about which temporally indefinite sentences are always true and those about which temporally indefinite sentences are sometimes true and sometimes false.

In regard to Plato's distinction between what exists completely and what is "between what is and what is not," statements about the forms would be always true or always false, whereas

¹Jaakko Hintikka, "Time, Truth, and Knowledge in Ancient Greek Philosophy," American Philosophical Quarterly, IV (Jan., 1967), 1-14.

²Ibid., p. 6.

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statements about appearances would be sometimes true and sometimes false. For instance, at one time it would be true to say that an appearance exists, and then later on this would be false, for in the meanwhile it had ceased to exist. The situation would be the same in regard to the changes in sense-objects. Although it might be true now that the appearance is red, if in future it alters its color it would not then be red. And that is how appearances are, according to Plato: they are fluctuating and temporary.

On the contrary, the forms are unique, changeless, and permanent: (1) it is always true that redness exists, and always false that it does not exist, and (2) its nature never changes, so that what is true about it (or false about it) is true forever (or false forever). Since the forms always exist and are always the same, there is no change in the truth-value of the statements (definitions) describing them, nor in the statements which affirm their existence.

Hence the forms alone exist παντελῶς and εἰλικρινῶς: they alone exist always, are the same as themselves always, and always unique. The appearances are "between existence and non-existence": they exist for a time, and then later on they do not exist. They change, and therefore do not remain the same as themselves. And they are not unique: there are "many" of them, which differ from one another, perhaps, only numerically--i.e. only in that they occur at different times and places.

However, later on Plato will argue that sense-objects are self-contradictory, in some sense, even in one and the same perception. They both "are and are not whatever you call them." They

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are ambivalent, like riddles.¹ This "ambivalence," I suppose, would likewise add a disreputable feature to sense-objects, and make for their "intermediate existence." Moreover, this feature would not involve the question of whether or not knowledge-claims must be temporally indefinite. However, Plato might have given up the position that sense-objects are ambivalent if he had recognized some concept of temporal definiteness.²

Socrates argues that if we know only what exists, and are ignorant about what does not exist, then there must be some entirely different attitude about intermediate objects (477a9):

"Then wouldn't there be knowledge (γνῶσις) about what exists (ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι), and necessarily ignorance (ἄγνοια) about what does not exist (ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι), and shouldn't we search for something between ignorance and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), if there were something of this sort, which is about what is between (ἐκ τῷ μεταξύ) what exists and what does not exist?"

"Certainly."

"But don't we say that opinion (δόξα) is something?"

"Of course."

"Is it another power than knowledge (ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης), or the same?"

"Another power."

"Then opinion has been assigned to the one (ἐπ' ἄλλῃ) and knowledge to the other (ἐπ' ἄλλῃ), each power to its own domain (κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὐτῆς)."

Plato is distributing each of the powers to its own domain of objects, although he does not mention either the objects or the domains, except by the ambiguous pronouns "ἄλλῃ" and "αὐτῆς."

Socrates has called ἐπιστήμη and δόξα powers, and hereafter these terms are ambiguous, referring either to the power of the mind relative to each domain of objects, or to the result of exer-

¹Republic 479b-c.

²Plato returns to these matters again in the Sophist, giving them a good deal more extensive treatment, 254b-59d.

cising that power. Plato explains further what he means by

"δύναμις" (477b10):

"Then isn't knowledge naturally about what exists (ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε), a power of knowing the nature of what exists (γινῶναι ὡς ἔστι το ὄν)? But first I have to give another explanation."

"What explanation?"

"We would say that powers are a certain kind of thing (γένος τι τῶν ὄντων): those with which we are able to do what we can do, and all other things able to do what they can do (αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται). For instance, I mean that vision and hearing are powers, if you now understand what form (εἶδος) I mean."

"I understand."

Three phrases in this passage call for comment: (1) "ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε," (2) "γινῶναι ὡς ἔστι το ὄν," and (3) "γένος τι τῶν ὄντων." The rest of the passage begins the explanation of what a power is, so that the power of knowing (ἐπιστήμη) can be understood.

The second of these three phrases defines "ἐπιστήμη": it is a power of "knowing what is as it is"--i.e. of knowing the nature of what exists (what exists completely). In the present context the various forms of "το ὄν" indicate what exists as distinct from what appears. The first phrase indicates the natural object of this power: knowledge is about, or "directed upon," what exists rather than what appears. That is what the power of knowing is by nature (πέφυκε) about.

One important term remains undefined: "γινῶναι." We are not told what this power of knowing accomplishes. We are only told that it is "knowing what exists as it is." The phrase "ὡς ἔστι" does not really tell us what knowing what exists consists of, although it suggests that what is known is the nature of what exists. Hence if the forms alone exist, then knowing is knowing the nature

of the forms.

Having called knowledge a power, Socrates recognizes that the term "δύναμις" needs to be defined, and he begins his explanation of what a power is by calling it γένος τι ὄντων; a certain kind (γένος) of thing. The phrase is also significant, however, because it clearly locates powers among existing things (τῶν ὄντων). A power exists completely, it doesn't merely appear. So if only the forms exist absolutely, all powers are forms. Calling the powers "a certain kind" of what exists seems to rule out the converse of this that all forms are powers.

Powers are those things "with which we are able to do what we can do," and therefore the power of knowing is "that which enables us" to know the nature of what exists. What this power is about, or directed upon, is το ὄν, and what it accomplishes, or brings about, is γινῶναι ὡς ἔστι το ὄν. And this power of knowing is among existing things (τῶν ὄντων). Hence, if all (completely) existing things are forms, then ἐπιστήμη is that form which, if we partake of it, enables us to know the forms "as they are"--i.e. to know the nature of the forms. As vision and hearing are powers with which we are able to see and hear, knowledge is the power with which we are able to know.

Socrates explains further what he understands about powers, and in the process provides a criterion of identity for powers. He does not see (ὁρᾷ) powers; he can only look at (ἐμβλέπω) their natural objects and their effects. His criterion of identity for powers is therefore based on these objects and effects (477c6):

"Listen to my opinions about these powers. I see no power's color or shape or anything of that sort, which I see of many other things which I distinguish from one another by looking at them. With a power I can only look at that thing upon which it is directed (εἰς ἐκεῖνο . . . βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ . . . ἐστὶ) and what it accomplishes (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται). And in doing this I called each of them [vision and hearing] a power. Powers which have been employed upon the same thing (ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην) and which accomplish the same thing (τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην) I call the same power (τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ). And I call powers different when they have been employed upon different things or accomplish different things. What about you? What would you do?"

"The same."

Since powers cannot be detected directly, they must be identified by means of their objects and their effects. Vision and hearing, for instance, cannot themselves be seen or heard. One can only detect the objects upon which these powers are directed, visible sights and audible sounds, and the effects of the use of these powers, seeing and hearing the objects. Since seeing is different from hearing, and sights and sounds are different, vision and hearing are different powers. Thus, if the power of knowledge is different from the power of opinion, then knowing must be different from believing (δοξάζειν), and the objects of knowledge must be different from the objects of opinion.

Having to Glaucon's satisfaction explained what a power is, Socrates returns to the powers of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα (477d7):

"Then let us go back, Glaucon. Would you say that knowledge is a certain power, or would you assign it to some other kind?"

"To this kind. Of all powers it is the most powerful (ἐπρωμενεστάτην)."

"And will we classify opinion as a power, or some other form (δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἰσόμεν)?"

"Not at all, since opinion is nothing else than that with which we are able to believe (ᾧ . . . δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα)."

"But you agreed earlier that knowledge and opinion are not the same."

"Certainly not. Would anyone in his right mind identify what is infallible with what is not?"

"Good. We are clearly in agreement that opinion is different from knowledge."

The distinction between ἐπιστήμη (or γνῶσις) and δόξα is recurrent in Plato. Here he applies it to the mental powers rather than to the effects. He gets it from Parmenides' poem, in which the "way of seeming" is contrasted with the "way of truth."¹ The way of seeming (opinion) is δόξα. The distinction is grounded, in Parmenides, on the ontological station of the objects of sense-perception (αἰσθήσις): since they cannot really exist, they cannot be objects of knowledge.² As Peters says, Plato incorporates the distinction into his own epistemology:

The distinction is incorporated, on the same grounds, into Platonic epistemology, though by now the position had been buttressed by the insistent Sophist attacks on αἰσθήσις as relative (see Plato, Theaetetus 166d-167a, citing Protagoras). In Republic 476e-480a Plato sets Parmenides' distinction as a series of epistemological and ontological correlatives: true knowledge is of true reality, i.e. the εἶδη, while ignorance is of the completely nonreal. Between the two there is an intermediate stage: a quasi-knowledge of quasi-being. This intermediate faculty (δύναμις) is δόξα and its objects are sensible things (αἰσθήματα) and the commonly held opinions of mankind.³

But although for Parmenides the distinction may be grounded in the difference between sensible objects and true reality, I think that for Plato the distinction could be the other way around. The fundamental distinction may be that between what is infallible

¹Diels-Kranz 28B (Parmenides): 7-8.

²F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon, p. 40.

³Ibid., pp. 40-41.

and what is not, and the consequent distinction between the objects of opinion and the objects of knowledge follows from it. One can always be mistaken about sense-objects, therefore there can be no knowledge of such things. If knowledge is infallible it cannot be about appearances; it must therefore be about what exists, not about what appears.

Since knowledge is infallible and opinion is not, they must be different powers. And if they are different powers, they must be about different objects and accomplish different effects (478a3):

"Then is each of them naturally capable of accomplishing something different and directed upon a different thing ('Εφ' ἑτέρῳ τι δυνάμει ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν πεφυκεν)?"

"Necessarily."

"But the power of knowledge is directed upon what exists, knowing the nature of what exists?"

"Yes."

If knowledge is directed toward what exists and is able to accomplish "knowing what is as it is" (i.e. knowing the nature of what exists), then opinion must be directed upon something else and must accomplish something else (478a8):

"And opinion, as we were saying, is the power of believing (δοξάζειν)?"

"Yes."

"Believing the very same thing which knowledge knows? And will what is believed (δοξαστόν) and what is known (γνωστόν) be the same? Or will that be impossible?"

"Impossible, given our agreements: if different powers are naturally directed upon different things, and if knowledge and opinion are different powers, as we said, then under our agreements there is no way for what is known to be the same as what is believed."

Since what is known is not the same as what is believed, and what is known is what exists, what is believed must be something else than what exists.

However, what is believed cannot be what does not exist,
either (478b3):

"Then does one believe what does not exist? Or is it impossible to believe what does not exist? Think. Doesn't the believer have his opinion about something? Or is it possible to believe, but believe nothing?"

"Impossible."

"Rather, the believer believes something or other?"

"Yes."

"But wouldn't it be right only to call what does not exist 'nothing'?"

"Yes."

"But we had to assign what does not exist to ignorance, and what does exist to knowledge."

"Right."

"Then the believer does not believe either what exists or what does not exist?"

"Yes."

"Then opinion can't be ignorance any more than knowledge?"

"It seems not."

Glaucon, still standing in for the philodoxist, is now convinced that δόξα is a power lying between (μεταξύ μετισταί) knowledge and ignorance: it does not "go beyond knowledge in clarity or go beyond ignorance in lack of clarity."¹

Socrates announces that the remaining problem is to discover what it is which neither exists nor does not exist, such that it could be called what is believed (δοξαστόν) by opinion (478e1):

"Then it remains for us to discover what partakes of both being and non-being (το ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι) and would not be called either one absolutely. If this intermediate thing were to appear, then we could rightly call it what is believed, giving back extremes for extremes and intermediate for intermediate. Don't you think so?"

"I think so."

Socrates is going to argue that since appearances "both are and

¹Republic 478c.

are not whatever you call them," and so on, they cannot exist completely. They are between existence and non-existence, and therefore must be objects of opinion. But before he can draw these conclusions, he must prove to the satisfaction of the philodoxist that appearances, the sensible objects of sense-perception which the philodoxist thinks about and talks about, are between existence and non-existence.

He begins by pointing out (for Glaucon, not for the philodoxist Glaucon is answering for) the difference between the unique, changeless, and eternal forms and the many fluctuating, temporary objects of sense-perception (478e7):

"Given these conclusions,' I would say to this person [the philodoxist] who believes in no beautiful itself (αὐτό . . . καλόν), nor any idea of beauty itself (ἰδέαν . . . αὐτοῦ κάλλους) which remains the same as itself forever (ἀεὶ . . . κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν), this person who recognizes many beautiful things (πολλὰ . . . τὰ καλά νομίζει) and loves to look (φιλοθεάμων) but would never allow anyone to say that the beautiful is one (ἐν τῷ καλόν . . . εἶναι), as well as the just and the other forms--'Given these conclusions,' we would say, 'are there any of these beautiful things which cannot appear ugly? Or any of the many just things which cannot appear unjust, or holy things which cannot appear unholy?'"

"No. The same thing could certainly appear to be in some way beautiful and in another way ugly, and the same with anything else of this sort."

Although he "loves to look," the philodoxist does not recognize the forms. He only sees and holds opinions about objects of sense-perception. He believes in many beautiful things but does not believe in the idea of beauty, which like all the other forms is unique (ἐν) and self-identical forever--i.e. eternal and always one and the same. Since he recognizes only appearances, his world is the world of Heraclitus and Protagoras: a world in which every-

thing is in constant flux and in which to seem is to be. The world of sense-objects is the domain of becoming: it is Heraclitus' world in that it is constantly changing and filled with contradiction.¹ It is Protagoras' world in that human perception is the measure of what exists in it, so that what exists is what appears to us.² Not until the Theaetetus, however, does Plato characterize it in precisely this way, where his perspective of it is derived from these two presocratic philosophers.³

This world of becoming is the only world the philodoxist is aware of, and the appearances in it (the objects of sense-perception) are the only objects his mind recognizes. What is true of beautiful and ugly things, and so on, is true of other sorts of appearances as well (478b3):

"What about the many doubles? Does it seem that they are any more double than half?"

"No."

"And likewise the many great and small things, and light and heavy things; should we say that any of them could be called these names any more than the opposite names?"

"No. Each of them will always be both."

From this Socrates and Glaucon conclude that these appearances, like riddles (αἰνίγματα) are ambivalent (ἀκαμφοτερίζουσιν). They cannot be unequivocally non-existent, because they do appear. But they cannot be unqualifiedly existent, either, for they both are and

¹Diels-Kranz 22B (Heraclitus): 49a, 88, 91.

²Ibid., 80B (Protagoras): 1.

³Theaetetus 166d-172b, 177c-180b, and 186a-186e. See also: Francis M. Cornford, ed., Plato's Theory of Knowledge, The Library of Liberal Arts, pp. 45-108.

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are not whatever you call them. Since appearances do not belong either among the things which exist absolutely or among the things which do not exist at all (since there aren't any), they must be in an intermediate domain (479c1):

"Then can you think of anywhere to put them except between existence [or substance] (οὐσίας) and what is not (τοῦ μη εἶναι)? For they do not seem to be more obscure (σκοτωδέστερα) than what does not exist, nor more clear (φανότερα) than what exists."

"True."

"Then we have discovered, it seems, that the many names, in the language of the many, 'beautiful' and the others, refer to what is between what does not exist and what exists completely."

"We have."

"And we had agreed that if something of that sort should appear, it must be called what is believed but not known: the intermediate fluctuating thing (το μεταχυ κληνητον) detected by the intermediate power (τῇ μεταχυ δυνάμει . . . ἀλίσκομεν-ον)."

"We did."

Since appearances are between existence and non-existence, they are the intermediate objects detected by the intermediate power of opinion.

The difference between the philodoxist and the philosopher is therefore: (1) a difference in the objects which each of them loves to look at (φιλοθεάσασθαι) and (2) a difference in the powers which they exercise. The philodoxist loves to look at objects of sense-perception, the intermediate objects which are detected by the power of opinion. But the philosopher loves to look at the forms, objects which exist unequivocally and are detected by the power of knowledge.

The philodoxist can only think about what he observes, and he does not observe the forms; he therefore has only opinion,

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not knowledge. The philosopher, on the other hand, possesses the power of knowing the forms, and therefore has knowledge instead of merely opinion (479el):

"So we would say that those who look at many beautiful things but do not see (ὁρῶντας) the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ το καλόν), and are unable to follow anyone else's lead toward it, only believe, and do not know anything they believe. And similarly with the just itself, and the other forms."

"Necessarily."

"And what about those who look at (θεωμένους) all of these objects themselves (αὐτὰ ἕκαστα) which are the same as themselves forever (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ὄντα)? Wouldn't we say that they know rather than believe?"

"Necessarily."

"Then wouldn't we say that they welcome (ἀσπάζεσθαι) and love (φιλεῖν) those things about which there is knowledge (ταῦτα . . . ἐφ' οἷς γνῶσις ἐστίν), whereas the others welcome and love those things of which there is opinion? Or don't we remember that we said they love and look at beautiful sounds and colors and so on, but do not admit of (ἀνέχεσθαι) the beautiful itself as something which exists (ὡς τι ὄν)?"

"We remember."

The forms are welcomed and loved by those who are able to "see" them, the philosophers. They alone have the power of knowledge: the ability to detect what exists completely--i.e. to know the forms. The forms exist completely, whereas the appearances are "between what is and what is not." The forms are unique, eternal, and changeless, and the "many beautifuls," and so on, are not "one" but many things becoming apparent again and again. They are not eternal but temporary: they come into existence and cease to exist. And they are not changeless, but fluctuation characterizes them: they "are and are not whatever you call them."

The outcome of this argument which differentiates the philosopher from the philosopher is a two-fold dichotomy, from which Plato gets his explanation of the nature of knowledge in the divided line analogy. It is (1) a classification of objects into two onto-

logical levels, complete existence and intermediate existence. What exists completely are the eternal forms, Plato's "Olympian Immortals." What exists intermediately are the objects of sense-perception, the Heraclitean appearances of which human perception is the only measure. And it is (2) a classification of mental powers into two epistemological kinds: opinion and knowledge. Opinion is the power to "have opinion of" perceivable objects. With this power, the mind is able to have belief of what it perceives, which is therefore what is believed (δοξαστόν). And knowledge is the power to "look at" and know the forms. With this power, the mind is able to know what exists, which is therefore what is known (γνωστόν).

Although from this argument we know that, according to Plato, the forms are unique, eternal, and changeless, exist completely, and are what is known by the power of knowledge, we don't know what sort of thing they are: what is unique, eternal, and so on? It may be implicit in this discussion that the forms are "universals," but Plato's clearest explanation of this occurs in his discussion of mimetic art in Book Ten.

596a-597e

Plato is arguing that since mimetic art only produces imitations of sense-objects, it only makes appearances of appearances. It is therefore even more remote from reality (what exists completely) than are sense-objects, and further from the truth. Art will be so inauthentic, and therefore misleading to the citizens of the ideal state, that it will be harmful to the state to allow

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it to exist. Plato therefore proposes to eliminate it.

But first he wishes to show how remote art is from reality. If sense-objects themselves are fluctuating and impermanent, and occupy a domain intermediate between what exists and what does not exist, and if the work of the mimetic artist is only an imitation of these sense-objects, then the work of the artist is even more remote than sense-objects from reality.

Socrates begins by asking if it would be more appropriate to start by assuming that the forms exist (596a5):

"Shall we begin our investigation with our customary method (εἰωθυίας μεθόδου)? We have customarily posited (τίθεσθαι), in each case, one particular form (εἶδος . . . τι ἓν) to every one of the many things which are called by the same name (περὶ ἕκαστα τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς τὸ αὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν). Don't you understand?"

"I understand."

The "customary method" is to explain the similarity among a number of objects of the same kind by positing a single form (εἶδος) or idea (ἰδέα) which they all have in common, and which accounts for the resemblance between them.¹ This procedure occurs in all the early dialogues. We may call many different things by the same name when we think their similarity so striking that we have one name for them all. We account for the similarity, according to Plato, by finding that form which all and only the things of that kind partake of. In other words, forms are the qualities or properties which all and only those particular sense-objects have; forms are universals.

¹Plato uses "εἶδος" when he wants a neuter noun, and "ἰδέα" when he wants a feminine one. So far as I can tell, that is the only difference between them; they have the same meaning.

Socrates applies this customary method to some examples of artificial sense-objects (596a10):

"Then we can select among these many things whatever we choose. For instance, if you like, there are many beds and tables."

"Of course."

"But there are two ideas (ἰδέαι) relative to these objects (περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη): one idea of a bed and one idea of a table."

"Yes."

"And haven't we usually said that the craftsman of each of these articles, looking toward the idea (πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων), makes in that way the beds and tables which we use, and similarly all other such articles? For no craftsman in any way (οὐ) ever produces the idea itself (τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν), does he?"

"Never."

The craftsmen Socrates is referring to here are the human craftsmen who make observable beds and tables. Later on he will claim that there is a divine "craftsman" who has not only created the world of becoming, but the forms as well.

Although there are many beds, there is only one idea of a bed. All manufactured beds partake of this bed-form, and only beds partake of it. The observable particulars are the many beds, and the universal is the one bed-form they are all instances of. When the craftsman makes a bed, he does not just put pieces of wood together at random, he "looks toward the idea." The form serves him as a pattern which he copies in his construction of the bed. But the bed itself is not produced in any way by any craftsman. It is not, like a diagram or picture, an observable archetype which someone produces and which serves as a model. Nor is it an idea in the mental sense: it is not produced in any way by any craftsman. It exists independently of the craftsman as well as

independently of the observable objects patterned after it.

There is a problem here, however. Previously, Plato has claimed that only the philosopher is able to know the forms, whereas the philodoxist cannot. Now he says that the craftsman can know them too, for it is in looking toward the forms that they can produce objects of those forms. Does this make craftsmen philosophers? Perhaps Plato would reply in the following vein: craftsmen can indeed know the forms, with enough experience and training in a particular craft, whereas philodoxists and mimetic artists cannot. But craftsmen cannot know all the forms. They can only know those forms essential to the pursuit of their technical art (τεχνη). Plato might argue that by diligent effort, a virtuous life (doing his own work), and a certain amount of experience, any man can learn one τεχνη well, and therefore learn some few forms. Thus he might learn, love, and welcome the forms of his craft (at least indirectly, through their instances), but be unable to know any others. Therefore carpenters, for instance, could not be called philosophers, since they would not love all wisdom. They could only be called "lovers of wisdom in carpentry," or something of the sort. They know only those forms which they know as carpenters, and love only the "wisdom" of the craft of carpentry. Even if they know no other form, at least they know what a bed is (for instance), and that is one more form than a philodoxist or mimetic artist knows. Since the carpenter knows what a bed is, i.e. knows the form of a bed, he can make beds and therefore perform a useful service in the state; whereas the mimetic artist knows no form at all and

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The defect in this interpretation is that Plato elsewhere leads us to believe that the *τέχνη* belong to opinion, not to knowledge.¹ Unlike the poets, perhaps, the craftsmen have advanced from *εἰκασία* to *δόξα*. But the analogy of the divided line seems to assign the mental activities and objects of the craftsmen to opinion, as it assigns their products to what is believed (*δοξαστόν*). But if the craftsmen only have opinion, how can they look toward the forms in producing their objects?

Socrates now introduces a craftsman of a different sort: a remarkable producer of everything whatsoever (596b12):

"Now, look at this next craftsman and tell me what you would call him. He makes everything whatsoever, of which each of the artisans makes only one sort."

"That is a most remarkable and skillful man."

"You will soon be even more surprised. This same craftsman not only can make every article that the other craftsmen can make, but he also makes all of the things which come out of the ground and all animals, both himself and the others. And he creates everything whatsoever which surrounds these things: earth and sky and everything in the sky and under the ground."

"He is certainly a most skillful prodigy."

"Don't you believe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that there is no craftsman of this sort at all, or that there is a producer creating all of these things in one way but not in another? Or don't you perceive that you yourself might be able to produce all these things in a certain way?"

"How?"

"No difficult way: you can do so often and quickly, and most easily, if you like, by taking a mirror and turning it around in every direction. You would quickly make the sun and everything in the sky, and the earth and yourself and all the other animals, plants, artifacts, and so on."

"yes, their appearances (*φαινόμενα*). But not at all what in truth exists (*ὄντα . . . τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*)."

This "remarkable craftsman" is not the divine *Δημιουργός* which

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not be making what exists (το ὄν), but the sort of thing which both exists and does not exist (οἷον το ὄν, ὄν δε οὐ). It would probably not be true to say that the work of the bedmaker or any other artisan, if any should appear, is what exists entirely (τελέως . . . ὄν)."

It would probably not be (κινδυνεύει οὐκ) true to say this, because no human craftsman produces "what a bed is." The divine craftsman, Plato will claim, does produce the form. Calling the bed-form "what a bed is" presumably calls attention to what a definition explains: the nature of a bed. The bed-form is what a bed is in that when you know the bed-form, you know (and perhaps can explain) what a bed is. The "ὁ ἔστιν" is what you are looking for when you ask the question "τί ἔστιν;" ("What is it?"): the nature of the form, its substance (οὐσία).¹

Socrates has now differentiated three things: the appearance of a bed, a bed, and the form of a bed (597b5):

"Well then, these beds have become three things (τρεῖς τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίνονται): the first existing in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα), which we might say a god creates (θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι), I believe. Or does something else create it?"

"Nothing else, I think."

"The second, which the carpenter creates."

"Yes."

"And the third, which the artist creates. Doesn't he?"

"He does."

All three of the phrases for which I have provided the Greek are difficult to interpret and important to the understanding of Plato's theory of forms. Cornford translates the first phrase as "we have here three sorts of beds."² But three sorts of beds is precisely

¹Gregory Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato," in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, pp. 4-5, 13.

²Cornford, The Republic of Plato, p. 326.

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what we do not have. There is one bed, one appearance of a bed, and one form of a bed. We do have three things: what a bed is, a bed, and a picture of a bed.

The second phrase might be translated either "existing in nature," "existing by nature," or "existing naturally." Cornford translates "exists in the nature of things," which loses the force which "φύσις" brings to the explanation.¹ I prefer the translation "existing in nature," since it seems to me to most clearly separate the forms from sense-objects and artistic imitations. The forms exist in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει), the domain of the forms, rather than in the fluctuating world of sense-objects and their images. I think Adam is correct in his interpretation of this phrase here, when he cites Burnet: "'in Greek philosophical language, φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative and transient.'"² The important thing about the phrase is the contrast it makes between that which "a god" creates, which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, and that which the craftsmen and mimetic artists create, which are secondary, derivative, and transient.

The third phrase can either be rendered "which God creates" or "which a god creates." Either way it is very surprising, since in the Phaedo and Timaeus we are led to suppose that the forms were never created by anyone or anything. In the Phaedo there is no

¹Ibid.

²Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, 390, and John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th ed., Meridian Books, p. 11.

Δημιουργός; the forms are simply given--presumably they always existed and always will.¹ And in the Timaeus the Δημιουργός is given the already existing forms as patterns to work with in shaping the Receptacle into a material universe.² If Plato is saying here that the forms are created in some temporal sense, then one begins to suspect the authenticity of the whole passage. If the forms are eternal, how can there be a time during which they don't exist? And if they are universals, how can a God create them?

I think that Adam is correct when he claims that Plato is now saying in theological language what he said before in philosophical language,³ namely that the existence of the other forms is dependent upon the existence of the form of the good, and that Plato is now calling the form of the good "θεός."⁴ In calling the good "a god" Plato may be merely calling attention to its immortality; in that sense, of course, all of the forms are gods. Although I agree with Adam's interpretation of "θεόν ἐργάσασθαι," this interpretation gets somewhat strained later on, for Socrates says that the god wanted (βουλόμενος) to be the maker of the forms.⁵

If my analysis is correct in regard to these disputed points, then what Plato is saying is this: there are at least three things which are created (in one sense or another). The first

¹Phaedo 78-79. ²Timaeus 29. ³Republic 509b.

⁴Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, 391.

⁵Republic 597d.

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is the form of a bed, "created by a god," i.e. dependent for its existence upon the form of the good. The second is the bed having been made by the carpenter, which is patterned after the form of a bed. And the third is the appearance of a bed which the imitative artist copies from the bed which the carpenter makes. The bed-form exists independently of both the carpenter and his bed, and the bed of the carpenter exists independently of both the mimetic artist and his picture.

Socrates' summary, however, gives rise to a problem (what seems to be a contradiction, in fact), in that he claims that there are "three forms" of beds (597b13):

"Mimetic artist, bedmaker, god: these three know how to make (ἐπισιδῆσαι) three forms (τρισὶν εἶδεσι) of beds (κλινῶν)."
 "Yes, three."

The problem is that three forms of beds is precisely, according to Plato's theory, what we cannot have. Only one of them is a form and only one of them is a bed. And the only way I can resolve the problem is to assume that Plato realizes that it is incorrect to speak this way, and has Socrates correct himself in the very next sentence. This manner of speaking, calling the three things "three forms of beds," cannot be correct because there is really one only: there can be only one form of a bed itself:

"But this god, whether it did not wish to or whether some necessity compelled it, made no more than one bed itself (αὐτόν κλινήν) in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει). It made only that one thing itself (μὲν μόνον αὐτήν ἐκείνην) to be what a bed is (ὃ ἐστὶν κλίνη). Two or more such things were not produced by the god, or generated in any other way."

"Why not?"

"Because if it had made as much as two of them, then there would have to be once again only one thing, which is the form which the other two would both have, and this form would be

again what a bed is (εἶη . . . ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη ἐκείνη), rather than the other two."

"Right."

Ignoring the god for a moment, Socrates' explanation makes use of a "third man" argument: he is trying to argue that if there were more than one form of a bed, then there would still be only one form of a bed. Suppose there were two bed-forms, each of them "what a bed is." Then there would something which is the form that they both have, namely the form of a bed. But then this third thing is the form of a bed, not the other two. Therefore there is only one bed-form. (The argument is still not very clear. It would seem simpler to argue that "what a bed is" is no different from "what a bed is," and therefore there is no more than one form of a bed (identity of indiscernibles).)

Since there cannot be more than one bed-form, the "god" cannot make more than one bed-form. Since the god "wanted" to make at least one bed-form, he did:


"And the god, I believe, knowing (εἰδώς) this, wanted (βουλόμενος) to really be for a bed the maker of a really existing thing (εἶναι ὄντως κλίνης ποιητὴς ὄντως οὐσης), rather than just another bedmaker of just another bed (κλίνης τινος . . . κλινόποιός τις), so he made one thing itself in nature (μὴν φύσει αὐτήν)."

"So it seems."

"Then shall we call him the planter (φυτουργόν, literally 'nature's maker') of it, or something of the sort?"

"That would be right, since he has made this and everything else in nature."

The adverb "ὄντως" comes from the same base as the verb "εἶναι" ("to be"), and therefore the phrases "εἶναι ὄντως" and "ὄντως οὐσης" seem redundant. But Socrates has previously described the forms as "οὐσης παντελῶς," hence "to be really" and "actually existing" may be understood as another way of saying "existing completely,"



as opposed to "existing and not existing." And both the bed-form and the *Δημιουργός κτρυππος* are so described, so if nothing exists completely except the forms, then this divine craftsman is a form. And in that case, what sense does it make to say that he knows anything or wants anything?

Socrates is here once again attributing unique existence to the bed-form, here described as the product of the divine artisan's making. He is not "just another bed-maker of just another bed," but the one really existing maker of the one really existing bed-form. Further, the god has made not only the bed-form but everything else in nature. If, following Adam's suggestion, we interpret this as meaning that the form of the good is the cause and necessary condition for the existence of everything which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, then this is another way of saying the form of the good is the cause and necessary condition of the existence of itself and all the other forms.¹

The problem remains, however, that the form of the good is here described as "knowing," "wanting," "being compelled by necessity" and so on. If we take Plato's language literally, then one of two equally unhappy consequences follow: (1) all the forms, including the form of the good, are conscious agents (immortal and changeless but still somehow purposive and rational, like the human mind), or (2) only the form of the good is a conscious agent, in which case we have the peculiar position that the forms are created

¹Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, II, 391-92. In other respects Adam's interpretation of the theological language of this portion of the *Republic* differs from my own.

by a purposive agent--as if what a bed is could be legislated into existence by a conscious act. Neither of these consequences are acceptable, and therefore the best alternative seems to be to not take Plato literally--in fact, to ignore the language which attributes divine personality to the form of the good and calls the form of the good a god.

The characterization of the forms as somehow created is the most puzzling feature of the description of the forms which emerges from Book Ten of the Republic. The remainder is consistent with the picture of the forms in the rest of the Republic. According to Book Ten, the forms are (1) neither mental nor observable. They are not produced in any way by any human craftsman. They are neither a pattern or concept existing in the mind nor an archetypal observable object or design existing among other appearances. If they are "exemplars," and they certainly seem to be such (being the originals which observable objects are copies of), then they are neither mental ones nor observable ones. They are (2) "what a thing is" ("ὁ ἔστιν")--i.e. the nature and substance (οὐσία) of observable objects. For instance, the form of a bed is what a bed is--i.e. the nature and substance of a bed. The bed-form is what gives the bed whatever intermediate existence (οὐσία) it partakes of. And (3) they exist in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι): they are primary, fundamental, and persistent, really existing in that domain which includes only that kind and level of objects. Perhaps if Plato had ever written a dialogue on the forms alone, he would have called it "Περὶ φύσεως."

There are two problems which remain untouched in this analy-

Socrates will introduce shortly, but the mimetic artist. Like the divine craftsman, the mimetic artist can produce (or more accurately, reproduce) every sense-object perceivable. Unlike him, he can only produce appearances (φαινόμενα), not "what truly exists." But the painter, who "holds a mirror up to nature," does resemble the human craftsman in one respect: he is an imitator. While the human and divine craftsmen imitate the eternal forms when they produce sense-objects, the mimetic artist imitates these same sense-objects. Therefore if it is correct to call the works of the painters and poets "phenomena," it would seem to be correct to call sense-objects "phenomena," for the same reason: they are appearances of the unobservable forms of which they are images.¹

If the mimetic artist is an imitator, then the human bed-maker is also an imitator: he does not make the form, but "just another bed" (597a1):

"But what about the bedmaker? Didn't you admit that he does not make the form, which we said is what a bed is (ὁ ἔστι κλίνη), but just another bed (ἄλλα κλίνη τινα)?"

"I did."

"Then if he does not make what a bed is (ὁ ἔστιν), he would

¹There is a difference between imitations and images, which Plato does not here recognize: an imitation need not resemble its object, even if it is intended to, and an image need not be an intended one, and hence not an imitation. But Plato is primarily concerned with these imitations as more or less accurate images, and it is as images that artistic imitations are inauthentic and deficient reproductions of their originals. And there is no question that Plato is in this section of the Republic explaining the participation relation (the relation between the universal forms and their particular instances) in terms of imitation and resemblance. See Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, pp. 118-19. We will find that, throughout 504a-540c of the Republic (particularly in the analogies of the sun and of the divided line), Plato identifies examples (paradigms, παράδειγμα) with images (εἰκόνα). Παράδειγματα are εἰκόνα. Participation is imitation (resemblance).

sis thus far, and which cannot remain unexamined in any investigation of Plato's theory of forms: the problem of participation and the problem of the "logic" of the forms (i.e. the relations of the forms to one another). I shall postpone the second of these problems to chapter six, because the evidence relevant to it occurs in the divided line analogy. I will here examine only the problem of participation.

The problem of participation, in the Republic, can either be understood as a general problem, or as a special problem. The general problem is that of the nature of participation: what is the relation between sensible objects (which I have been calling "appearances" and "sense-objects") and the forms? The special problem is that Plato treats his forms as both universals and exemplars, and they can't possibly be both.

Plato claims that a form is what the sensible objects in a given γένος have in common, which explains why they are all similar to one another and are all called by the same name. This makes the forms universals. But he also claims that the sensible objects are images (εἰκώνα), imitations (μιμήται), and appearances (φαίνόμενα) of the forms (originals) which they resemble and imitate, and imperfectly measure up to. This makes the forms exemplars. An exemplar is an object taken as a standard or paradigm case for other objects; they are judged relative to how well, or how badly, they resemble the exemplar in a certain respect. The forms are the standards which sensible objects more or less adequately live up to. They may be "perfectly existing," unobservable and non-mental exemplars, but they are exemplars nonetheless.

But if the forms are exemplars, they can't be universals: the universal would have to be what the form and its image have in common, which explains why they are similar. And if the forms are universals, they cannot be exemplars: an exemplar would have to be just another object which partakes (perfectly, rather than approximately) of the same universal as does the object which

the exemplar. More briefly, the problem is that universals cannot be copied by their instances, and exemplars cannot be properties of the objects which are measured against them.

For instance, in the Sorbonne at Paris there is a platinum bar with two marks on its surface. The distance between the two marks is (or at any rate, used to be), by definition, one meter. Any object exactly as long as the bar between those marks is, by definition, one meter long. Other objects may be approximately one meter long, in that they are not much longer or much shorter than the bar between the marks. The bar is the exemplar. Or more precisely, the bar between the marks is the exemplar; the exemplar is the part of the bar between the marks.

Suppose a meter-stick is compared with the bar. It is wood rather than platinum, so in that respect it does not resemble the bar between the marks. But it does resemble the bar between the marks in one important respect: the length of the meter-stick is the same length as the length of the bar between the marks. What the bar and the meter-stick both have in common is their length: the bar between the marks and the meter-stick partake of the same length. But the bar (or rather, the bar between the marks) is the

exemplar, whereas the length of the bar between the marks is not the exemplar, but the universal (common property) which both the bar and the meter-stick partake of. The bar and the meter-stick have in common the length of the bar between the marks; they do not have in common the bar between the marks itself.

Now suppose that we replace the bar with another "exemplar." Let the "exemplar" be the length between the marks on the bar. Then bring the same meter-stick alongside the bar. Now the bar between the marks, remember, is not the exemplar; rather, the length between the marks on the bar, supposedly, is the exemplar. But if the length of the meter-stick is the same as the length of the bar, then the length of the meter-stick is also the exemplar. In that case, the meter-stick does not imitate or resemble the "exemplar," it has the "exemplar." It resembles, not this "exemplar," but the bar between the marks. Thus this "exemplar" can't be an exemplar.

In other words, if the bar between the marks is the exemplar, then the exemplar is not a universal. And if the length between the marks on the bar is the "exemplar," then it is not really an exemplar. The meter-stick does not resemble or imitate the length between the marks on the bar, it resembles and imitates the bar between the marks and has the length between the marks on the bar. Instantiation cannot be imitation, nor can exemplification be resemblance. An instance cannot be an image; a universal cannot be an exemplar.

Therefore the two different explanations of participation are contradictory. According to the one, participation is instan-

tiation: the sensible objects are instances of the forms, which are the universals which they instantiate. According to the other the sensible objects are images of the forms, the exemplars and originals they resemble. And participation cannot be both instantiation and resemblance.¹

Attempts have been made to reconcile these two conflicting explanations of participation, by proving that Plato "really" held one of them and not the other. It is ordinarily assumed that the forms are universals, and then pointed out that they cannot therefore be exemplars and that we can avoid interpreting them so. In this view, "imitation" is a "metaphor" rather than a literal explanation of participation.² Or one can try to prove, as R. E. Allen does, that they are indeed exemplars, but not universals.³ Or one can speculate, without much evidence to go on, that there are two kinds of forms: definitionally perfect universals, and "nearest perfect instances" which are their unique exemplary instances. But it is hopeless to try to prove that universals can be exemplars.

It seems to me that we must accept that Plato held that the forms are both exemplars and universals, and that he did not (when he wrote the Republic) realize that his two explanations of partici-

¹Aristotle Metaphysics 997b. As Aristotle puts it, the ideas cannot resemble their instantiations. The result is only "eternal sensible objects."

²Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. I, Pt. I, 201-02. Copleston claims that both "participation" and "imitation" are metaphors, and indicate the relation between particulars and "patterns or essences." But that way of putting it leads one to believe that there is no inconsistency between the metaphors.

³R. E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's early dialogues," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 43-60.

pation were contradictory.¹ So the special problem of participation has no solution, as far as the Republic is concerned. And if the special problem has no solution, then neither does the general problem, because the only explanations of participation which Plato offers us in the Republic are instantiation of universals and imitation (or resemblance) of exemplars.

¹Plato attacks this very explanation of participation (resemblance) in a third-man argument in the Parmenides. See Parmenides 132d-33a. See also Francis M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, The Library of Liberal Arts, pp. 93-95.

III. THE TRIADIC MIND

For Plato, the forms exist completely, whereas sense-objects are intermediate things, "between what is and what is not." But in that case, where does the mind ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) belong? It is not a form, because it is neither unique nor changeless. There are many minds, according to the Republic, and they undergo moral generation and corruption, at least: they become better or worse, depending upon their education and environment. But it is not in the domain of the impermanent sense-objects, either. It is immortal and unobservable. Just what ontological status does the mind have, in the Republic?

There is no decisive evidence that the mind belongs in the same domain as the forms, and there is no positive evidence that it belongs to a third ontological level. One could argue that it belongs in the same domain as the forms, calling attention to its immortality and its kinship with the forms, and cite Phaedo.¹ Or one could argue that since it clearly does not belong in either of the ontological levels mentioned in the Republic, it belongs in a separate domain of its own, and cite Timaeus.² In that there is something to be said for either view, and no com-

¹Phaedo 78-80.

²Timaeus 35a. See also Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Ontology, The Library of Liberal Arts, pp. 59-66.

compelling reason for deciding the question in this investigation, I will not attempt to solve this problem of where the mind fits into Plato's ontology in the Republic. I think that when he wrote the Republic Plato was not prepared to give an opinion on it.¹

The problem I am concerned with is the nature of the mind as knower. What is there about the mind, as Plato describes it, which makes it capable of knowing the forms? Once again, it seems wise to confine the inquiry to the Republic. Like the theory of forms, Plato's theory of the mind changes from one dialogue to the next, even during the so-called middle period. In the Phaedo we are told that the mind is simple and without parts.² In the Phaedrus we are introduced to a triadic theory of the mind, with the help of the myth of the charioteer.³ In the Republic we find a similar triadic theory. He claims that there are three things (τρῖται) in the mind, and explains each of them in detail. And whereas in the earlier dialogues many (presumably autonomous) minds are assumed, we are told in the Timaeus that there is a world-mind of which individual minds are inferior versions or by-products.⁴ This investigation of Plato's theory of the mind, like the previous investigation of his theory of forms, will for the most part involve evidence in the Republic alone.

I have been using the word "mind" instead of the customary term "soul" as a translation for "ψυχή," Plato's word for this triadic companion of the body. To justify my decision I would say

¹But see Republic 611b-d, and compare with Timaeus 69b-d. See also G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, pp. 143-144.

²Phaedo 78-80. ³Phaedrus 246. ⁴Timaeus 30b.

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that this is an epistemological and metaphysical investigation of Plato's Republic, not a theological one; that "mind" has a reasonably neutral dynamic meaning rather than a positive emotive charge; and that "soul" is a word with little if any cognitive meaning, whereas "mind" at least has some cognitive meaning: it is not quite so vague. But neither "mind" nor "soul" is an adequate replacement for " $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$," and we are accustomed to hearing about immortal souls but not as accustomed to hearing minds so described.

Basically, for the Greeks, a $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is a mind which gives life to the body. That is, it is (or brings) life to the body, and it is an expanded, "Freudian" sort of a mind: that is, it is not a "Cartesian" conscious, intellectual mind, but something which also includes desires and feelings--as well as thoughts and beliefs--and it has an unconscious as well as a conscious dimension. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ gives life to the body in that it is (or is the source of) the body's motion; because the atomistic tradition thought this way, perhaps, they believed that $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ was material. It moves the body; it senses, feels, thinks, and desires; and whether it is material or not, it extends much further than the spatial and temporal limits of the living human body.¹

This description of what $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ was, in general, for the Greeks, is somewhat vague and somewhat conjectural: a collation from widely diverse ages of Greek thought before Plato, from

¹For some grasp of the meanings of " $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ " see Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed., revised and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones, pp. 2026-27.

from various schools of presocratic philosophers, and from language studies of Greek.¹ It is a difficult subject, in cases of this sort, to determine the pre-analytic meaning of a word for a whole people during half a millenium. But one must have some concept in mind, however vague and faulty, of what "φύξις" meant, pre-analytically and pre-philosophically, for Plato.

There are five portions of the Republic in which the mind is discussed at length: (1) 435a-444e, (2) 484b-495c, (3) 504a-540c, (4) 580d-587c, and (5) 608c-611d. I shall examine each of them except (3), treating them in the order (1), (4), (2), and (5). In (1) Socrates argues that the mind is triadic, like the state. In (4) he discusses the desires and happiness of each of the three things in the mind. In (2) the nature of the mind of a philosopher is examined, and it is explained why potentially philosophic minds are corrupted. And in (5) the doctrine of immortality is finally introduced. The present chapter will examine (1) and (4), and the following chapter will treat (2) and (5). Once again, I omit 504a-540c (sun, divided line, cave, and so on), which for the most part presupposes the mind rather than explaining what it is. I begin with Plato's triadic theory of the mind.

435a-444e

Having defined justice and the other virtues for the state,

¹For instance, see Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, pp. 166-76; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 93-97, pp. 345-59, and 420-22; and Martin P. Nilsson, Greek Folk Religion, Harper Torchbooks, The Cloister Library. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 42-64.

Socrates asks Glaucon if justice is the same in an individual, the "smaller thing," as it is in the state, the "greater thing" (435a5):

"Well then, if someone called a greater thing and a smaller thing the same, would they be dissimilar in this respect (ταύτη) by which (ἣ) they are called the same, or similar?"

"Similar."

"And so a just man will be no different from a just state relative to the form of justice itself (κατ' αὐτο τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος); he will be similar."

"He will."

The form of justice is the "respect in which" the just man resembles the just state. If both the just man and just state have the same form, then in that respect they will be similar: justice will be the same for the individual as for the state.

But how would we know that they can possess the same form? Socrates argues that they can possess the same form if the individual has the same three kinds of natures (τρία γένη φύσεων) as the state has, and if each of these three kinds is doing its own work, so that the individual, like the state, is wise, brave, and self-controlled:

"But it seemed to us that a state is just when the three kinds (τρία γένη) of natures (φύσεων) existing in it (ἐν αὐτῇ . . . ἐόντα) each does its own work (το αὐτὸν ἕκαστον ἐπατερεν), so that it is self-controlled (σώφρων), brave (ἀνδρεία), and wise (σοφῆ) because of certain habits (ἔξεις) and passions (πάθη) of these same kinds of natures."

"True."

"Then, my friend, we will attribute the same thing to the person who has these same forms in his mind (τα αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), if he has the same passions (τα αὐτὰ πάθη) in those kinds of the same names (ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων) which we rightly attributed to the state."

"Necessarily."

In order to simplify the interpretation, I am going to treat the

words "ἡδονή" and "ἐξέλις" as synonyms, even though perhaps they aren't--perhaps ἡδονή are passive dispositions and ἐξέλις are active dispositions. Hereafter I will treat both as merely mental dispositions, whether dispositions of the entire mind or dispositions of the things in the mind.

Socrates seems to be arguing that if the individual has the same three kinds in his mind as the state has, and if each of these kinds has the same dispositions as do the three kinds in the state, then he will have the same forms in his mind as the state has: self-control, wisdom and courage. And if he has these three virtues, he will have the fourth, because the mind will have the same three kinds of thing each doing its own work.

The state was called "just" when each of the three kinds in it has the proper dispositions.¹ The guardians are disposed to rule and be wise, the soldiers are disposed to enforce the rule of the guardians and be courageous, and the craftsmen are disposed to obey the guardians and soldiers and pursue their τέχνη. Since each of the three γένη φύσεων in it is doing its own work, the whole state is just. The lovers of wisdom rule; the lovers of honor do not rule, but enforce the rule of the philosophers; and the craftsmen neither rule nor help to rule, but merely, and literally, mind their own business. What distinguishes the soldiers from the craftsmen is that they love honor, and put honor above wealth. And what distinguishes the philosophers from the others is that they love wisdom, and put it above wealth and honor.

¹Republic 432b-34c.

The state is wise if its rulers are wise, courageous if its soldiers are spirited in carrying out the policies of wise rulers, and self-controlled if soldiers and craftsmen agree to be ruled by philosophers and philosophers agree to rule. And if the state is wise, brave, and self-controlled, the state is just.

Similarly, a person will be just if he has these same three forms in his mind. But his mind will have the same forms in it only if, like the state, it has three kinds of natures in it each doing its own work: a philosophic kind of nature ruling and being wise, a spirited kind of nature courageous in carrying out the decisions of the philosophic nature, and an appetitive kind of nature which agrees with the other two that the philosophic nature must rule.

Does the mind have these three kinds of natures in it? Socrates and Glaucon agree that the same "forms and dispositions are present in each man's mind," since they are present in the state (435e1):

"Then is it necessary for us to agree that the same forms and dispositions (τα αὐτὰ . . . εἶδη τε καὶ ἥθη) present in the state are present in each of us? For they have not come from anywhere else: it would be absurd for anyone to believe that spirit (το θυμοειδές) does not come into a state from its private citizens (τῶν ἰδιωτῶν), who already partake of this the cause [of its spirit] (οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν), which the men of Thrace and Scythia and the northern regions possess. Or the love of learning (το φιλομαθές), that cause of which the men in our own region partake. Or the love of wealth (το φιλοχρηματόν), which those in Phoenicia and Egypt seem to have not a little of."

"Very much of."

"That this is how it is, there is no difficulty about knowing."

"Not at all."

There seems to be an implication here that there are quantities of

spirit, love of learning, and love of wealth, in a state. Perhaps Plato means that Thracians are more spirited, or that more Thracians are spirited, or both. On the other hand, the Phoenicians and Egyptians "have not a little of" love of wealth. Later on he will claim that "with someone whose desires flow more strongly in one direction, they are weaker in the other directions, like a stream with many channels."¹ An individual can have more or less of each of these "forms and dispositions": his desire to learn can be great or small, and so can his spirit and love of wealth.

With two of these "forms and dispositions" there is little difficulty of interpretation. The love of learning (το φιλομαθές) is clearly both a form of desire and a mental disposition. It is the desire to learn, and it is likewise a disposition to learn in that the desire is a cause (αίτία) moving the individual to learn. And one has a desire to learn in that he has a desire to be wise: to be φιλομαθές is to be φιλοσώφους. Elsewhere he calls the rational element (το λογιστικόν) a portion (μέρος) of the mind which is φιλομαθές and φιλοσώφους.² Similarly, το φιλοχρήματον is both a desire and a disposition. It is a disposition in that it motivates the individual to seek wealth. He seeks wealth because it is the means of obtaining the goods which will obtain "bodily pleasures," and it is appetite (το ἐπιθυμητικόν) and love of profit (το φιλοκερδές); it is one's appetite that moves one to love and seek wealth.

¹Republic 485d. ²Ibid 580b.

But there is a problem with the third of these forms and dispositions, spirit (το θυμοειδές). The problem is that there are three different clusters of concepts surrounding the word. Since spirit is what makes the soldiers courageous in carrying out the policies of the philosophic rulers, the word seems to convey firmness, steadfastness, daring, intrepidity--in a word, guts. But the ordinary meaning of the word in Greek is "high-spiritedness," "passion," "hot temper," or "hot blood."¹ It comes from the same root as "θυμός" and "θυμώ," and therefore can mean, as Cornford translates it, "anger" and "indignation."² This second cluster of concepts might be summed up as one's "Irish." The two clusters are not easily merged, since one can be daring and resolute in a cold-blooded way, presumably, and hot-tempered and passionate at a safe distance.

But although guts and Irish both qualify as dispositions, they do not seem to be forms of desire. Yet a third cluster of concepts is associated with το θυμοειδές later on, which does make spirit a form of desire. When he is describing the spirited element (το θυμοειδές), Plato calls it a portion of the mind which loves honor (φιλοτιμόν), loves victory (φιλονίκον), and is "urged toward controlling and winning and being well-thought-of."³ To be spirited in this third sense is to desire honor, victory, and power. It might not be unfair to cluster these concepts under the

¹Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 810.

²Cornford, The Republic of Plato, p. 137. ³Republic 581a.

heading of love of honor (το φιλοτιμόν), since Plato seems to regard power and victory as the means of achieving honorable recognition or reputation.

It is not clear how one should fit these three different clusters of concepts together in trying to arrive at what Plato means by "spirit," and perhaps one can only understand it as some sort of unknown amalgam of them. However it is understood, it cannot be merely a cool preference of honor over wealth. Perhaps Plato means that, in spirited men such as the Thracians and Scythians are reputed to be, their passion for honor is so strong that it not only outweighs the desires for "bodily pleasures" and the wealth to purchase them, but causes such men to put honor above even life itself (the life of the body, that is). One is spirited enough to be a soldier in the ideal state if he will carry out a course of action even at the price of his human life, preferring "death rather than dishonor." This interpretation would supply precision to the otherwise vague criterion that a state is courageous when its auxiliary guardians are "spirited" in carrying out the policies of wise rulers.

Socrates has gotten Glaucon to admit the premise that the same forms and dispositions present in the state are present in each of its citizens. But the more difficult question is how they are present in the mind of each man. Does each man have all three of the forms and dispositions because of the same thing in him, or does he have each one of them because of the same things in him that the state has? He cannot be just in the same way that a state

is just unless, like the state, his mind is triadic: having not just one kind of thing which is wisdom-loving, spirited, and acquisitive, but three kinds of natures in it--one of them philosophic, one of them spirited, and one of them wealth-loving.

Thus Socrates asks Glaucon whether all three of these forms and dispositions are desires of the entire mind, so that there is only one kind of nature, or whether each of them is a disposition of a different thing in the mind (436a8):

"It will be difficult to determine whether we do each thing with this same thing (τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ), or whether we do three different things with a different thing (ἄλλῳ)--whether we learn with one of these three things in us, are courageous with another of them, and desire pleasures connected with nourishment, reproduction, and so on, with some third thing, or whether we do each of these things with the entire mind. These matters will be difficult for our argument to rightly settle."

"So it seems to me."

"Then let us go about deciding the question in the following way: it is clear that the same thing (τὸ αὐτόν) cannot be able (οὐκ ἐθέλησει) to do (ποιεῖν) or to have done to it (πάσχειν) opposite things (τάναντία) at the same time (ἅμα) throughout the same thing (κατὰ τὸ αὐτόν) and relative to the same thing (πρὸς τὸ αὐτόν). So if we find opposite things happening with them (ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα), we will know that they are not the same thing, but different things."

After meeting anticipated objections to this principle, Socrates restates it (436e8):

"Then no arguments of that sort will frighten us, nor persuade us any longer that what is the same thing (τὸ αὐτό ὃν) either can be (εἶη) or can do (ποιήσειεν) or can have happen to it (πάθοι) opposite things (τάναντία) at the same time (ἅμα) throughout the same thing (κατὰ τὸ αὐτό) and relative to the same thing (πρὸς τὸ αὐτό)."

"It won't frighten me."

What is most difficult to translate are the prepositions "κατὰ" and "πρὸς." For instance, "κατὰ" could also mean "according to" or "in reference to," and "πρὸς" could mean "opposite to"

or "in the same direction." In translating "κατα" as "throughout" and "προς" as "relative to" I am anticipating the application of the principle to the mind and its elements, understanding Socrates to mean that the same thing (the mind) cannot be or do or have done to it opposites (desire and aversion) at the same time throughout itself in reference to the same thing (the same object of desire). It cannot, at the same time, both love and hate the same thing throughout the whole of itself. Thus if we find that the same man both loves and hates the same object at the same time, then we must conclude that he does not do so throughout his mind, but loves it with something in his mind and hates it with something else in his mind.

After a long discussion about correlative forms of psychological states, Socrates applies this principle to the mind, in order to prove that it is triadic. He begins with a typical desire, thirst. Thirst is desire for a drink. But a man can be thirsty and still be unwilling to drink. Does this mean that he is both thirsty and not thirsty at the same time, relative to the same object (a drink) throughout his mind? We would have to conclude this, according to Plato, if we assumed that the whole mind includes this desire for a drink (439b3):

"Then if sometimes the mind pulls against itself (αὐτὴν ἀνθελκει) when thirsty, wouldn't there be something else in it besides that thirst which is driving him like an animal toward drinking? For we said that the same thing cannot do opposite things at the same time throughout the same thing and relative to the same thing."

"Of course."

"Just as it is not correct, I think, to say that the archer's hands both push away and draw up the bow at the same time; rather, one hand pushes it away and the other draws it

up."

"Exactly."

"But weren't we saying that sometimes a thirsty man is unwilling to drink?"

"Certainly. Very thirsty and yet frequently unwilling."

"Then what shall we say about it? That there is in the mind of those men (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν) both the urge (το κελεῖθον) to drink and the hindrance (το κωλύον) from drinking, which is another thing controlling (κρατοῦν) the urge?"

"So it seems to me."

"And so doesn't the hindrance, when it arises in such cases, arise from calculation (λογισμοῦ), whereas in other cases, under the influence of illnesses or passions (καθημέρων), it goes along with (παράγινεται) the drives and pulls (ἀγόντα καὶ ἔλκοντα)?"

There are cases of mental conflict, in which "drives and pulls" are opposed and controlled by "hindrances" to these urges, and these hindrances or controls arise out of calculation--consideration of consequences, for instance. In such a mental conflict, a man not only has in his mind the urge for an object, he also has a check or control upon the urge, which owes at least part of its origin to his reason for avoiding that object at that time. In such cases, argues Socrates, it cannot be the same thing which both does and does not desire the object. One requires an explanation of mental conflicts which does not lead to contradiction.

The solution that Socrates proposes for such mental conflicts is that there are at least two things in the mind. One of them has (or includes) such drives and pulls, which arise from the needs of the body, and the other provides the calculation which leads to opposition and control of these "animal" urges (439d4):

"Then it would not be unreasonable for us to conclude that there are two things different from one another: that with which the mind is erotic, thirsty, hungry, and agitated (ἐκτρέπεται) with all other such desires, called irrational and appetitive (ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν), associated with certain pleasures and satisfactions; and that with which the mind

reasons, which is called rational (λογιστικόν)."

"It is not merely reasonable, but likely that we would think so."

The proposed explanation is not put forward as a consequence of the fact that there are mental conflicts, but as a "not unreasonable" or "likely" explanation of them. The language of the passage does not commit Plato to the claim that the explanation he proposes is the only possible explanation of such mental conflicts, though Plato may have thought so. On the other hand, Plato may have thought that his was the simplest explanation: it would be more reasonable to believe that there are just these two rational and appetitive things in the mind, instead of as many rational and appetitive things as there are particular appetitive dispositions and particular checks and controls upon them.

Having claimed that the origin of the various checks and controls of appetites is a single rational thing (λογιστικόν), something with a different form than what is irrational and appetitive in the mind, Socrates goes on to argue that there is a third thing in the mind, of a different form than the other two (439e2):

"We have now discovered that there are two of these forms (ταῦτα . . . εἶδη) present in the mind (ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα). Is there present the third form of spirit (το . . . τοῦ θυμοῦ . . . τριτον), with which we are spirited (ὃ θυμούμεθα), or would it be one of the others?"

"Perhaps it is one of the appetites."

Appealing to mental conflicts between spirit and appetite, Socrates argues that spirit is a distinct third thing in the mind, which ordinarily takes the side of the rational thing against the appetite for the various "bodily pleasures." But it is also distinct from reason, in that some people are full of spirit from their birth, &

but become rational only much later, if at all.¹ On the basis of this combination of introspection and "likely" explanation, Plato has arrived at a theory of the mind which is triadic. It has in it three things: the rational thing (το λογιστικόν), the spirited thing (το θυμοειδές), and the third thing which includes all of the appetites (ἐπιθυμῖαι).

Thus far, Plato has described the triadic nature of the mind in four ways: (1) as "τριττῶν" ("three," or "three things" when "τριττῶν" occurs as a substantive), (2) as "τριττα γένη" ("three kinds"), (3) as "τριττα εἶδη" ("three forms"), and (4) as "τριττα γένη φύσεων" ("three kinds of natures"). And no matter which of these descriptions he uses, the relation between each of them and the mind is inclusion. The three things, or three kinds, or three forms, or three kinds of natures are in the mind (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) or present in the mind (τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνόντα). But the inclusion is not further specified. The mind is not spatial, so the relation between the mind and its three elements is not a spatial inclusion. Later on Plato will call these three things portions (μέρη). For now, I would like to get straight the sense in which the kinds, forms, and kinds of natures of the three things are in the mind.

When Socrates calls the three things "μέρη" ("portions") of the so-called "whole" ("ὅλος") which is the entire mind, the relation between the three things and the mind is that of quantitative elements to their union, which not only is triadic, but normatively has a certain order. They are μέρη not merely in a

¹Republic 431a.

descriptive sense, but in a moral sense.¹ The question now, however, is what "present in" means relative to the other three ways Plato characterizes the triadic nature of the mind.

First, I take it that Plato is claiming that each of the three things in the mind is of a different kind (γένος) than the other two. Therefore there are three different kinds present in the mind. The inclusion may be derivative: the three kinds are present in the mind by representation, in that their members are in the mind. That is, the three kinds are represented in the mind by their members. Since there are (presumably) only these three elements in the mind, each of these kinds is represented there by a single member. Hence each γένος in the mind is a unit class.

Second, however, a γένος is more than a class. It is a class including as members all and only the objects which partake of a certain form (εἶδος). Therefore there are three different εἶδη "present in" the mind. And in this case, it may mean inclusion by participation: the forms are present in the mind in that the things that partake of them are in the mind. That is, each of the forms is, by participation, "in" the element which partakes of it, which in turn is in the mind.

And third, if the nature (φύσις) of something is what is "primary, fundamental, and persistent" about it, then the nature of an element of the mind may be the form it partakes of. If so, then to say that there are three kinds of natures in the mind is to say that there are three kinds of forms in it. In that case,

¹Republic 442b-c.

the three kinds of natures are in the mind by representation: they are represented there by the forms which are in the mind by participation.

This conjecture about Plato's language in his triadic theory of the mind fits with the description Plato gives of the state, to which the mind is supposed to be analogous. The state, like the individual mind, contains three elements: the rational element (its philosophic rulers), the spirited element (the rulers' auxiliary guardians), and the appetitive element (the craftsmen). Similarly, in the state, three kinds are represented: the philosophic kind of man, whose proper function is to rule the state; the soldierly kind of man, whose duty and function is to obey and enforce the policies of wise rulers; and the appetitive kind of man, whose duty is to obey the guardians and practice his craft. In the state, as in the mind, there are three forms by participation: the philosophic rulers are rational, the philotimic auxiliaries are spirited, and the craftsmen are appetitive. Finally, there are three kinds of natures represented in the state: there are men whose nature is philosophic, men whose nature is spirited, and there are men with appetitive natures, represented by the craftsmen. Each of these three kinds of natures is a γένος of a form which some of the men in the state partake of.

There are two important differences between the state and the individual mind: (1) in the state, each kind has many individual persons as members, whereas in the mind each of the kinds is a unit class with only one mental component as a member; and (2)

in the state, each of the three elements is an organized faction made up of individual human persons. The philosophers, for example, are not merely a kind of person in the state, but (at least in a well-ordered state) constitute the ruling class. But in the individual, the three elements are not factions or combinations of other elements (so far as one can tell), but merely three (presumably homogenous) units. The rational element is simply that one thing in the mind which has (or is) the love of wisdom, the spirited thing is that with which we love honor, and the appetitive thing is whatever it is which loves pleasures or the wealth that will buy them. Just what are these three things; i.e. since they aren't further divisible wholes (so far as one can determine), what qualities or characteristics do they have?

Having argued that three things of the same three forms and kinds are present in the state and in the mind, Socrates concludes that justice must be the same for individuals as for states (441c5):

" . . . the same kinds and the same number exist in the mind of each individual as are in the state (τα αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τα αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου γῆ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν)."

"They do."

"Then doesn't it follow that the citizen is wise with this same thing in his mind with which a state is wise?"

"It does."

"And courageous with that same thing in a brave citizen by which a state is courageous, and likewise with the other things relative to virtue which both man and state possess?"

"Necessarily."

"And I believe we would say that a man is just, Glaucon, with the very same character (τὸ δίκτυ) with which a state was just."

"This too is necessary."

"But we have never forgotten that a state was just when each of the three kinds existing in it does its own work."

"It doesn't seem to me that we should forget that."

"Then we must remember that each of us, of whom each of the

things in the mind does its own work, will also be just by doing his own work."

"We must remember."

Socrates had claimed that the mind would be just in the same sense as the state is just if, like the state, the mind includes the same three forms and kinds as the state includes.¹ Having concluded that, as in the state, there is a philosophic element, a spirited element, and an appetitive element in every man's mind, he infers that justice is the same for the individual mind (the "smaller thing") as it is for the state (the "greater thing"). In the individual mind, as in the state, there is a rational and philosophic element, and it partakes of the same εἶδος and belongs to the same γένος as does the rational and philosophic element in the state. Similarly with the other two elements in the mind and the state. Therefore, the mind will be just, in the same sense as the state is just, when each of its three elements does its own work.

It is not yet clear, however, what sort of thing each of these three elements in the mind is. Thus far the only thing about them which is relatively clear is the nature of the love (φιλή) or desire (ἐπιθυμία) which is associated with each of them: one of them loves wisdom (or is the love of wisdom of that mind), one of them loves honor, and one them loves wealth. These characteristics they share with the three elements of the state. Yet the three things in the state are political units; what is the nature of these mental elements?

¹Republic 435b-c.

As Plato continues his investigation of the mind and its virtues and vices, drawing upon further analogies and metaphors, the three things in the mind begin to take on personality, as though there were three different persons in each man's mind. They battle against one another and make peace with one another. They give and obey commands, come to agreement with one another, and so on. Consequently, Plato's explanation becomes more mythical--more of a story (μῦθος) and less of an explanation (λόγος). The end-product, after his investigation of justice in the mind, seems to be a sort of trinitarian picture, a "three persons in one" image that resembles the myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus. The problem for the interpreter of Plato's descriptions of the mind is to find his way through myth and metaphor to what the explanation would be if Plato had given it straight.

This trinitarian picture begins to emerge in Plato's arguments from the conclusion that a mind is just in the same sense as a state is just. In education, for instance, we find that it is not the whole mind that is trained, but two of the three elements in the mind (441e4):

"Then isn't it proper for the rational element (τῷ λογιστικῷ) to rule, by being wise (σοφῷ ὄντι) and possessing forethought (ἔχοντι τὴν . . . προμήθειαν), over the entire mind, and for spirit to obey it and be allied with it (ὁπκηδὺ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου)?"

"Certainly."

"Then, as we said, doesn't a blend of physical training and music make them consonant (σύμφωνα), by stretching the ability to learn (μαθήμασιν) and nourishing it with stories and noble things, as well as by appeasing the spirit, taming it with harmony and rhythm?"

"Very much so."

The work of the rational element in the mind, like the work of the

philosopher in the state, is to rule over the entire mind, since it possesses wisdom and forethought if it has been properly stretched and nourished. And spirit's work is to be the obedient ally of the rational element against the appetites, enforcing reason's rule if it has been properly appeased. Although either of these elements will do its own work if it is properly trained, it can do what is not its own work--and will do what is not its own work if it is not educated from the beginning with the right blend of music and physical training. Each of them has a proper function, and is capable of exercising it, but will not do so unless certain antecedent conditions obtain.

The appetites also have a proper role in the mind, like the craftsmen in the state, and their function is to obey the alliance of reason and spirit. And, like the other two things in the mind, appetite is capable of not doing its own work, and it won't do its own work unless reason and spirit are united against it. Appetite, apparently, is not trained at all, any more than the craftsmen in the state are given an education; appetite is compelled to do its own work if reason and spirit are allied against it (442a4):

"And having been nourished in this way, and trained (κατεσκευάσμεναι) and taught (μαθόντες) what is truly their own work (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν), they will have become an obstacle to appetite, which is most of the mind in each man and is by nature (φύσει) most insatiable for wealth (χρημίδων . . . ἀκλήσιότατον). And a man must guard against it in order that he is not filled up by it with many of what are called bodily pleasures, which become so powerful that appetite no longer does its own work but attempts to rule over and enslave kinds which it is not fit to control, thereby upsetting everything throughout one's life."

"Certainly."

This triadic theory of the mind has become a normative ethic as

well. The four virtues will be assigned to the mind on the basis of the functions or roles each element is supposed to perform. The performance of its proper role is virtue, and the non-performance (or counter-performance) is vice.

The psychology claims that there are three things in the mind: reason (το λογιστικόν), spirit, and appetite. The ethic's addition is that each of these elements has a proper role or function. According to the psychology, reason is that thing in the mind which loves wisdom and reasons, and which can be wise and rule over the entire mind if spirit is its appeased ally and if it has been properly "stretched and nourished." Spirit is that thing in the mind which loves honor, and which can if properly tamed and appeased obey the rational element and enforce its commands upon the appetites. It can also, however, usurp the rule of reason and rule over the entire mind itself. And appetite is that thing in the mind (or that bundle of things) which is erotic for sexual pleasures, greedy for wealth, hungry for food, etc. It desires pleasures associated with the needs of the body and therefore loves the wealth which is necessary to satisfy such wants. Like reason and spirit, appetite can rule over and dominate the mind, and it will do so if spirit and reason are not allied against it.

According to the ethic, however, although any of these three things can control the mind, it is proper only for reason to control it. And since reason can rule only if spirit is its ally, it is proper only for spirit to enforce the commands of the rational

element against the appetites and upon itself. It is the ethic which prescribes what the proper function or role (the "work") of each of the three things is, and demands that each do its own work. The work of the rational element is to rule and be wise, the work of the spirited element is to enforce the rule of the rational element and be its ally against the appetites, and the work of the appetites is to obey spirit and reason. Finally, the education of the things in the mind is a moral nourishment: the proper blend of physical training and music (including the "music" of myths and poetry--the Greek term is wider than our own, extending over all the arts of $\kappa\omicron\lambda\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$). This education should produce an alliance or consonance ($\sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\omega\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha$) between reason and spirit against the common internal "natural enemy," the appetites.

Given the proper education, which stretches and nourishes the rational element and tames and soothes the spirit (but does not break it), this pair of things in the mind is able to take charge of the whole mind, and in that way protect mind and body from enemies (442b5):

"Well then, this pair ($\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega$) would most effectively protect all of the mind and the body from their external enemies, the one counselling ($\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$) and the other fighting alongside it, following its counsels ($\tau\alpha\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\alpha$), being ruled by it and with courage carrying out those counsels."

"They would."

Socrates now draws his ethical conclusions, specifying what justice is for the mind. In the course of doing so, he finally uses the word " $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ " for the first time. Plato has not heretofore identified the three things as portions ($\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$) of the mind. He has said that the three things are in the mind, and that appetite is the most

of each man's mind.¹ He will imply that one can have more or less of love of wisdom, love of honor, and love of wealth.² This would lead one to suppose that there can be more or less of each of the three things in the mind, and that the portions are quantities of desire. On the other hand, he has called them "portions" only after he has joined his normative ethic to his theory of the mind. This would lead one to suppose that the portions are "allotted domains" of some sort. I will return to this matter shortly.

Socrates' ethical conclusion is that the four virtues are all of them the performance by the various elements in the mind of their proper functions (442b11):

"And I believe that we call each man courageous in this portion (τοῦτῃ τῇ μέρει), when his spirit preserves the command passed down by his rational element, despite any pains or pleasures and whether he is afraid or not."

"That's right."

"And we call him wise in that small portion (ἐκείνῃ τῇ συμμέτρῃ μέρει) which rules in himself and passes down these commands, and which possess the knowledge of what is expedient for each and all in common of the three elements themselves (σφῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν ὁντιῶν)."

"Certainly."

"What about this: don't we call him self-controlled (σώφρονα) with the friendship and consonance of these same things (αὐτῶν τούτων), when what rules and its two subjects are agreed that reason must rule, and are not in conflict with reason (μη στασιάζειν αὐτῇ)?"

"Self-control is nothing else than this, both for a state and for a private citizen."

After some examples of the actions of a man who possesses such qualities, Socrates concludes that in the mind as well as in the state, justice is each thing doing its own work (443b1):

"And for all of this, the cause (αἰτία) is that each of

¹Republic 442a. ²Ibid. 485d.

the things in him does its own work, both in ruling and in being ruled?"

"This and nothing else."

Having defined justice, Socrates can now describe injustice: it is the absence of justice, a conflict (σῑδσις) in the mind (444b1):

"Doesn't it have to be some conflict among these entities: some meddling (πολυπραγμοσύνην) and doing another's work (ἄλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην) and insurrection (ἐκανάστασιν) of some portion (μέρους τινοῦς) in the whole mind, when that portion attempts to rule over the entire mind even though it is not fit to rule? Rather, it is by nature (φύσει) the sort of entity suited only to be a slave, whereas the kind of entity fit to rule is not suited to be a slave. And I believe that we would say that fluctuation (κλάνην) and disorder (καρᾶχην) among these things is injustice: ignorance, cowardice, injustice, or in a word all vice (κακίαν)."

"Yes."

The stasis in the mind is the strife which occurs when one of the things in the mind is not doing its own work: when reason is ignorant and does not rule, or when spirit is cowardly and rebellious and does not serve reason, or when spirit and appetite lack discipline and are unwilling to allow reason to rule. But when all three portions are doing their own work, performing their proper roles, there is a state of harmony in the mind: a man is at peace with himself rather than at war with himself.

This harmony in the mind is characterized by Plato as a "health" in the mind, when he has Socrates draw an analogy between justice in the mind and health in the body (444d3):

✓ "What produces health is that the things in the body are balanced (καθίσταται) in that they control and are controlled by one another according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), and what produces illness is that one thing rules or is ruled by another contrary to nature (κατὰ φύσιν)."

"That is what produces health and illness."

Health is a state of equilibrium in the body, when the organs are performing their proper functions and are not in need of nourishment. Illness is a disruption of the balance in the body's natural functioning, when from either want of nourishment or from disease the organs of the body are unable to function properly. Plato characterizes this state as an imbalance due to the failure of function of something in the body, when what is supposed to "rule" in the body is instead "ruled."

Socrates then draws the analogy between health in the body and justice in the mind (444d8):

"Then isn't what produces justice that the things in the mind are balanced to control and be controlled by one another according to nature, and what produces injustice that one thing rules or is ruled by another thing contrary to nature?"

"Yes."

"Then virtue (ἀρετή), it seems, would be a certain health and beauty (καλλος) and good state of mind (εὐεξία ψυχῆς), and vice (κακία) an illness and ugliness (αἷσχος) and weakness of mind."

"It would."

Having conceded this much, Glaucon agrees that it is ridiculous to believe that injustice is more profitable than justice. It would be like thinking that illness is more profitable than health.

We have found Plato claiming that each thing in the mind has a proper role to perform in the mind, a natural function to perform on behalf of the whole mind. We also find him waiting until after he makes this claim to start calling the three mental things portions (μέρη). I have also previously called attention to two other matters. The three elements in the mind are not organized combinations (so far as one can tell), but single units: the rational element, the spirited element, the appetite (or per-

haps, the bundle of appetites). And, these elements either have or are quantities: one can have more or less love of wisdom, love of honor, and love of wealth. (Which it is, "have" or "are," is not yet clear. In calling the three things "portions," Plato seems to imply that they are quantities of love or desire. But in saying that the three elements can be either at war with one another or at peace with one another, can give and obey commands, and so on, he seems to imply that they are entities which have quantities of those sorts, and which are in a minimal way agents: i.e. they can act and have other dispositions than those for which they are named.)

What does Plato mean by calling these three things "μέρη"? An important clue is provided by Greek religion, as found in Homer and Hesiod, and by one tradition in Greek philosophy, especially in the speculations of Anaximander. In Greek religion, the three chief gods are allotted, whether by mutual agreement or by fate, three separate sovereign dominions. Under this distribution (δασμός), Zeus rules the sky and everything above ground and sea, Poseidon is lord over the sea, and Hades is king of the underworld--everything under the surface of the earth--and hence king of the dead.

Although the gods may intervene in the affairs of men, who reside on the surface of earth and sea (on the frontiers of their sovereign dominions), the gods may not intervene in the affairs of the other two gods. Any encroachment by one god of another god's territory is injustice (ἀδικία), and there is resent-

ment (νέμεσις) of this invasion of sovereignty (γέρας). Swift retribution follows, whether at the hand of fate (Μοίρα) or at the hand of the offended god. These three different territories, each a lot (λῶξη) apportioned to a particular god, are called portions (μοίραι). And "Μοίρα" itself means "alloted portion." Justice is a state of peace between the gods, during which no god is encroaching upon the sovereign μοίρα of another god, and injustice is encroachment by one god upon the alloted portion of another.

In the philosophy of Anaximander, injustice is likewise encroachment of one thing into the domain of another. The elements are formed out of the unlimited (τὸ ἀπείρον), are distributed to their sovereign domains (earth to the earth, water to the sea, air to the sky, and fire to the ether above the sky). This initial state is justice. The world of individual objects which we see is generated by injustice: the encroachment of the elements into one another's domains. But Μοίρα will intervene to restore the moral order, making the offending elements "pay the price of their injustice"; it will bring justice, that is, restore the moral order:

Things perish into those things out of which they have their birth, according to that which is ordained; for they give reparation to one another and pay the penalty of their injustice according to the disposition of time.¹

As Cornford points out, in Anaximander as well as in the religion of Homer and Hesiod, the μοίραι are not only portions of the world, but alloted portions. The order of nature is a moral order, as well as (initially) a descriptive order, and a change of the order from

¹Diels-Kranz, 12B (Anaximander): 1. The translation of the fragment is Cornford's (see below, p. 114, n. 1).

its original form is injustice that will somehow be revenged.¹
 Injustice is the encroachment of one element into the allotted portion of another, and justice is the restoration of the natural order.

Plato's explanation of justice and injustice, relative to the three things in the mind, is similar in some respects to the foregoing description. Plato has claimed that "meddling," "doing another's work," and "insurrection"--i.e. encroachment--is injustice, and justice is each element in the mind at peace with the others and minding its own business. However, he has not claimed that this injustice in the mind is somewhere resented and that somehow justice will be restored to the mind.²

These similarities lead me to suggest that in calling the three elements in the mind portions (μέρη), Plato is not merely describing them but prescribing for them. Or, he is describing what they are by nature, rather than what they happen to be contrary to nature. Nature, for Plato as for Anaximander and the others, is a moral order as well as a descriptive order. What is fundamental, primary, and persistent is also what is best.³
 Thus, the rational element is a μέρος in that it is that element in the mind which by nature rules the mind as is "ordained," and

¹Francis M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: a Study in the Origins of Western Speculation, Harper Torchbooks, p. 12. The whole of this analysis of Greek religion and Anaximander in regard to νοέμεναι is based on this source (pp. 7-37).

²But see Republic 611b-d.

³See below, chap. xi. Both the sun and the form of the good are called "best things" (the sun, in the domain of becoming, and the good, in the domain of the forms).

which by nature is wise, whether or not it in fact rules the mind and is wise. And it is also a μέρος in the sense that it makes up a portion of the mind. To put the same thing in another way, the rational element has a natural and proper function, whether it happens to exercise it or not.

That is why Plato waits until after he gives the proper roles of the three elements before he gets to call them "μέρη." They are μέρη in both senses: descriptively, they either have or are quantities of love or desire in the mind, and normatively, they have allotted roles or functions, in that they act by nature when they mind their own business and act contrary to nature when they encroach upon one another's business. The performance according to nature is justice, and their encroachment ("meddling," etc.) upon one another is contrary to nature and unjust. Thus the rational element, for instance, is a portion (μέρος) in that, descriptively, it either is or has a love of wisdom, and normatively, is bound to act out the role which is in its nature: ruling the entire mind and being wise. If it permits itself to be ruled or to remain stupid, it fails to do its own work and does not become what its nature is.

The point of this investigation of Plato's theory of the mind is to find out what enables the mind to know the forms. Part of the answer to this question has emerged. The mind is able to know the forms because one of the three things in it, the rational element, either is or has a love for wisdom, and by nature can achieve that wisdom. The mind is triadic, having three things in

it: three μέρη, each of a different γένος and partaking of a different εἶδος. Each of them either has or is a quantity of love for a certain sort of object, and each of them has a natural function. The rational element is a μέρος of the mind in that it either has or is a quantity of love of wisdom, and it by nature (φύσει) both wise and ruler over the whole mind. If it becomes what its nature is, it will achieve both knowledge and justice--control (κράσις) of the mind and of the person who is that mind embodied.

Thus, the mind is able to know the forms if the rational element is able to know them, and the rational element will know the forms if it can become what its nature is. Not only does the rational element love wisdom, it has a power (δύναμις) to become wise: it is in its nature to be wise, as well as to rule over the rest of the mind. And it will become what its nature is if it gets the proper education (whereby its power to learn is nourished and stretched), and if spirit is also properly trained, so that it can become what its nature is, the ally of reason against the appetites. When spirit and reason together control the appetites, reason can become wise. Otherwise it will not become what its nature is: knower of the forms as well as ruler over the mind.

Two difficulties remain, however. First, does reason have the love of wisdom, or is it this (variable) quantity of desire? And second, even if the mind is otherwise courageous and self-controlled, what is there about the rational element itself which enables it to know the forms? What is its nature, and how is it

educated, such that it can acquire knowledge? The second problem will be addressed in the next chapter; but the answer to the first problem may be found in 580d-587c, where Plato describes the desires and happiness of the three things in the mind.

580d-587c

Plato has Socrates return to this triadic theory of the mind in his discussions of the pains and pleasures of each thing in the mind. Since a desire cannot very well be thought of as the sort of thing that can experience pain and pleasure, and since the pains and pleasures are likewise attributed to the three elements, it may now be clear (if it was not before) that the three things in the mind have desires rather than are desires. That is to say, it is not that one or the other of three desires rules over the mind, but that one or the other of the three things with desires rules over the mind.

Socrates' argument seems to be that since each thing in the mind loves or desires a certain sort of object, each thing in the mind must also have its own kind of satisfaction of desire (or pleasure) and its own motive (ἀρχή) as well (580d3):

"Since the state was divided into three forms (κατὰ τρία εἶδη), and thus each man's mind divided triadically (ψυχὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριῶν), our reason (τὸ λογιστικόν) will show us something else, it seems to me."

"Three pleasures (τρίτται . . . ἡδοναί) are also evident to me, with these three entities, as well as three desires and motives (ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί), one pleasure peculiar to each of these entities (ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μὲν ἰδίαν)."

"What do you mean?"

"We were saying that there are [in the mind] that with which a man learns, that with which he is spirited, and a third thing for which we did not have one name, since it is many-formed (δὲ πολλοειδὲς), but named it for the greatest and most

powerful thing in it: we called it appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) because it was most excessive in its desires (τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν) for food, drink, sexual satisfaction, and other things of the same sort, and wealth-loving (φιλοχρήματον), because such desires are satisfied mainly by means of wealth."

"That's right."

Plato is claiming that not only does each of the three things in the mind have its own kind of desire (ἐπιθυμία) and its own kind of motive (ἀρχή), but each thing in the mind has its characteristic pleasure: the satisfaction of the desire which moved the man to seek the object. As we will see, the desires are also motives (ἀρχαί) in that they can rule (ἀρχεῖν) over a man's mind, and therefore move him to seek the object--e.g. move him to pursue wealth rather than honor.

First, Socrates describes each of the three elements in the mind in accordance with its characteristic sort of desire (581a3):

"Well then, we would say that if its pleasure and love is for profit (τοῦ κέρδους) then we could reasonably classify it under one heading, as something clear to ourselves, whatever we might mean by this portion (τοῦτο . . . το μέρος) of the mind, and call it wealth-loving (φιλοχρήματον). Would we also be right to call it profit-loving (φιλοκερδές)?"

"So it seems to me."

"And what about spirit (το θυμοειδές)? Wouldn't we say that it is always wholly urged (ᾤρμησθαι) toward controlling and winning and being well-thought-of (εὐδοκιμεῖν)?"

"Of course."

"And if we called it victory-loving and honor-loving, it would be appropriate (ἐμμελές)?"

"Most appropriate."

"Well then, that with which we learn, it is entirely clear, always has been striving only to know the truth as it is (το εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅση ἔχει), and therefore among the three it cares the least for wealth and reputation (δόξης)."

"Certainly."

"And can we call it loving to learn (φιλομαθές) and wisdom-loving (φιλόσοφον) in its character (κατὰ τρόπον)?"

"Of course."

From this description of each of the three things in the mind,

Socrates draws two conclusions: (1) there are three kinds of men, and (2) there are three kinds of pleasures. The three kinds of men are those in which the philosophic element rules the mind, those in which the philotimic element rules, and those in which appetites rule. And the three kinds of pleasure are the pleasure the wealth-loving man experiences when his appetites are satiated, the pleasure the honor-loving man experiences when his desire for reputation is successful, and the pleasure of the philosopher when he learns the truth (581b12):

"Then doesn't it [the philosophic element] sometimes rule (ἄρχει) in the minds of men, and sometimes something else rules, whichever it happens to be?"

"It does."

"And because of this, we are saying, first, that there are three kinds of men, wisdom-loving, honor-loving, and wealth-loving?"

"Certainly."

"And second, that there are three forms of pleasure (ἡδονῶν . . . τρεῖς εἶδη), one of them associated with each of these kinds of men?"

"Of course."

The difference between the three kinds of men is expressed as a difference in what desire (ἐκτεθυμῆα) rules (ἄρχει) over their minds. Hence it is proper to call the desires also motives (ἀρχαί), since any of the three desires is capable of ruling over the mind. These three kinds of men, moreover, experience three kinds of pleasure, one pleasure for each of the three kinds of desire.

But just as each kind of man is ruled by a different motive (i.e. a different desire is his motive), each kind of man believes that the satisfaction of his own kind of desire is the most pleasant satisfaction. The businessman finds the appetitive life the most pleasant, and achievement of honors and understanding please him

only for their cash-value. The spirited man thinks that the life of power and glory is the most satisfying, and he is pleased by money or knowledge only to the extent to which they contribute to his success. And the philosophic man is convinced that the philosophic life is the happiest, and he values money and honors, if at all, only so much as they are necessary to the maintainance of a well-ordered state.

Since each kind of man claims that his own kind of life is the happiest, Socrates asks, how are we to decide which of them is right? (581e6):

"Well, when the pleasures of each form of life, and the life itself, are disputed (ἀμφισβητοῦνται), not in regard to the nobler or baser life (πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχρὸν ζῆν) or the better or worse life (τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἀμεινον), but relative to the more pleasant and less painful (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡδίων καὶ ἀλυσκότερον), how would we know which of them is telling the truth?"

"I'm not sure."

"Look: with what must we judge, if we are to judge rightly? Isn't it with experience (ἐμπειρία), wisdom (φρονήσις), and reason (λόγος)? Or would you have a better criterion (κρίτηριον) than these?"

"Not at all."

Plato next argues that by all three criteria, the philosopher is the best judge of which kind of pleasure gives the most satisfaction (582a8):

"Look: among the three men, who is the most experienced of them all about these pleasures? Does the profit-lover seem to you to be more experienced about the pleasure derived from knowing, from learning the truth itself as it is (μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἶδν ἔστιν), or is the philosopher more experienced about the pleasure derived from making profits?"

"There is a great difference: having been ruled by them from childhood, he was compelled to taste the other pleasures. But the profit-lover was not compelled to taste the other pleasure: this pleasure of learning what exists as it is in nature (ὅκη κέφουκε τὰ ὄντα), nor to become experienced in how pleasant it is. It would not be easy, even if he were eager

to find out."

"Then there is certainly a difference between the philosopher and the businessman in their experience of these pleasures."

"Certainly."

"And compared with the lover of honor, is the philosopher more inexperienced about the pleasure derived from being honored, or is the other man more inexperienced about the pleasure derived from being wise (φρονεῖν)?"

"But honor, if each of them accomplishes what he intends, comes to them all. The rich man is honored by many, as is a brave man and a wise one. All of them would experience the pleasure of being honored, no matter what for. But it is impossible for anyone but the philosopher to have tasted whatever pleasure comes with the vision of what exists (τῆς . . . τοῦ ὄντος θέας)."

"Then among these men, the philosopher judges best from experience?"

"Certainly."

Only the philosopher is experienced in all three pleasures, and he prefers his own.

Plato then argues that the philosopher not only is more experienced than the other two, but he also possesses the best wisdom (φρόνησις) and reasoning (λόγῳ), and therefore is the best judge. Since the philosopher's experience includes knowing the truth, he will have wisdom (φρόνησις). And since one cannot know anything without being able to reason, and reasoning (λόγῳ) is the philosopher's own instrument (ὄργανον), the philosophic kind of man will excel the other two in reasoning as well. Hence, by all three criteria, the philosopher is the best judge of the comparative happiness of the three lives and of the three pleasures (582e7):

"And since [he makes his judgments] with experience, wisdom (φρόνησις), and reason?"

"Necessarily, the judgments which the philosopher and lover of reasoning (φιλόλογος) makes must be most true (ἀληθέστατα)."

"Then of the pleasures of the three men and elements (τρεῖς . . . οὐσῶν), is the pleasure of this portion of the

mind (τοῦτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς) with which we learn the most pleasant, and the life of the man in whom this element rules the most pleasant life?"

"It must be, since the wise man (ὁ σοφὸς) is the expert (κύριος) about what is praiseworthy (ἐπαινήτης), and he praises his own life."

Thus each μέρος of the mind has its own associated pleasures as well as its own motivating desires, according to Plato. Moreover, the pleasure of the rational portion, the pleasure derived from knowing, is the most satisfying. Although this information helps to make it clear that the rational element has the desire and experiences the pleasure which comes from "learning the truth as it is," it does not further describe what the rational element is, such that it could have desires, pleasures, or knowledge. What kind of thing is it, which desires wisdom and is pleased when it learns the truth?

Socrates next argues that not only is philosophic pleasure the most pleasant of the three kinds, it is also the truest pleasure. He begins the argument by drawing an analogy between the mind and the body again. In doing so, he seems to commit an obvious and elementary mistake. He claims that just as hunger and thirst and the other appetites are states of emptiness in the body, ignorance and lack of self-control are states of emptiness in the mind. But he has previously asserted that all the appetites are in the mind. If they are in the mind, then how can they be states of depletion in the body? Eventually he clears this error by noting, implicitly at least, that certain states of emptiness in the body cause the various appetites in the mind. Under that interpretation, ignorance and lack of self-control are not themselves

desires for knowledge and for self-control, but are causes of desires. The emptiness in the mind makes the rational element love wisdom, and the lack of self-control in the mind causes a desire for self-control (on the part of reason and spirit, perhaps, for it doesn't seem to fit the nature of the appetites, no matter what the interpretation).

Socrates begins with the appetites (585a8):

"Consider this: aren't hunger, thirst, and all the appetites states of depletion (κενώσεις) in the condition of the body (τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐξέως)?"

"Yes."

"And aren't ignorance (ἄγνοια) and lack of self-control (ἀφροσύνη) states of emptiness (κενότης) in the condition of the mind?"

"Certainly."

"Then wouldn't this emptiness be filled when the understanding takes nourishment and retains it (ὅτε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἰσχων--reading "ὅτε" for "ὅ τε" in the text)?"

"Of course."

Presumably, wisdom is the nourishment for the emptiness of ignorance, and self-control is the nourishment for lack of self-control. The rational element is nourished by wisdom, and all three elements are nourished by self-control. It is not so clear which elements have the emptiness of lack of self-control.

Socrates then argues that the nourishment of the mind is more real than the nourishment of the body. He begins by claiming that nourishment which is more real is more genuine (585b9):

"And is the more real replenishment the more genuine, or the less real (Πληρώσις δε ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἥτιον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος)?"

"Clearly, the more real nourishment is more genuine."

This argument depends upon the prior distinctions between appearance and reality and between image and original. If the nourish-

ment for the mind is real nourishment rather than apparent nourishment, then it is genuine nourishment rather than spurious nourishment.

Socrates next claims that the nourishment for the mind is more real than the nourishment for the body (585b12):

"Would you think that the kinds of replenishment which partake more of pure substance (μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν) are bread, meat, and all such nourishment put together (ὅψου καὶ σωματικῆς τροφῆς), or the form of true opinion, of knowledge, of understanding, and of all virtue, taken together (το δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ συλλήβδην αὐτικῆς ἀρετῆς)? Tell me this: does it seem to you that that which clings to what is true and immortal and always alike, and which itself becomes and is in this condition, is more real than that which clings to what is mortal and never alike, and which itself becomes in this condition (το τοῦ ἀει ὁμοίου ἔχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτο τοιοῦτον ὄν καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναι . . . , ἢ το μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτο τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον)?"

"What clings to what is always alike is certainly much different."

Glaucon is unwilling to admit that what clings to (το ἔχόμενον) what is true, immortal, and always alike (ἀει ὁμοίου), becomes and is itself true, immortal and always alike. Socrates will argue later that the mind, in its truest nature, is immortal, etc., just like the forms to which it is akin (συγγένης), the forms which he here claims the mind "clings to." But Glaucon is willing to agree that what clings to the forms is "much different" than the body, which clings to what is mortal and never alike, and becomes (γιγνόμενον) rather than is.

The mind takes for its nourishment (when it is nourished, as opposed to when it is corrupted by a hostile environment) the

¹Republic 608d-12a.

eternal and unchanging ("always alike") forms. It is nourished by forms such as those of true opinion, knowledge, understanding, and every virtue. But the body is nourished by less real and less genuine substances: the things that Socrates elsewhere calls "appearances" and "imitations" of the forms, existing "between what is and what is not." The body's nourishment is less real than the mind's because the forms exist completely, whereas the appearances are "between existence and non-existence." And it is less genuine (i.e. less "true") than the mind's nourishment because these sustenances are only images of the forms.

This whole passage (585c1-585d4) is, as Adam notes, "among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic."¹ I am translating it under two hypotheses: (1) that throughout this perplexing passage, only the mind and the body are the main subjects of discussion, and (2) that Socrates is anticipating the theory that he will introduce later that the mind in its "truest nature," that of an unencrusted and unutilated rational element, is immortal and akin to the forms. Putting these assumptions together, I am risking that the "true" subjects of discussion in this disputed passage are the body and the rational element in the mind. Otherwise, in its main outlines, my translation conforms to Adam's explanation, which requires that the text be amended by reading "ἀνομοίου" for "ὁμοίου" in line 585c7.²

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, note on p. 354.

²Ibid., notes on pp. 354-55, and Appendix vi, pp. 381-83.

Socrates next claims that the body's substance, "the substance of what is always unlike," partakes no more of existence than it partakes of knowledge (585c7):

"Then does the substance of what is always unlike ('H . . . δει ἀνομοίου οὐσία) partake any more of existence than of knowledge (οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει)?"

"Not at all."

"Or of truth (Τί δ'; ἀληθείας)?"

"No."

"If it [partakes] less of truth, then it [does] not [partake] of existence (Εἰ δε ἀληθείας ἥτιον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας)?"

"Necessarily."

The body does not partake any more of existence (οὐσία) than of knowledge, in that it is not the sort of thing which knows and has the power of understanding, nor does it exist completely like the forms. Since it does not exist completely, it is less genuine. Conversely, since it partakes less of truth (i.e. is less genuine), it does not partake of existence (i.e. of complete existence). These inferences all depend, once again, upon the distinctions between appearance and reality, and between image and original. The body's substance is appearance, existing only intermediately, rather than existence (i.e. complete existence). Putting the distinction in the language of Plato in this passage, the body's substance (οὐσία) does not partake of existence (οὐσία)--i.e. complete existence. And the substance of the body is only an image of what is genuine (ἀληθής). Because it is an image, it is less genuine than the forms which it imitates.

Socrates then concludes that since the substance of the body does not exist completely and is not genuine, the kinds of substance which the treatment (θεραπείαν) of the body requires

must be themselves less genuine and less substantial (585d1):

"Then all the kinds [of substances] (ὅλως τα . . . γένη) for the treatment of the body partake of less existence and truth (ἥττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει) than the kinds of substance for the treatment of the mind."

"Much less."

Since the body's substance is less real and less genuine, the replenishment for the body's substance can only be less real and less genuine: it can be treated by only less real and less "true" kinds of substance.

And if the substance of the body is less real and less genuine than the substance of the mind, then the body itself is less real and less genuine than the mind (585d5):

"And don't you think that the body itself [partakes of less existence and truth] than the mind (Σῶμα . . . αὐτο ψυχῆς . . . οὕτως)?"

"I do."

From this, Socrates argues that since the kinds of replenishment differ in truth and reality, and since pleasure is what is provided by such nourishment, the pleasure of the body (i.e. the pleasure which is produced by meeting the needs of the body) is less real and less genuine than the pleasure of the mind (585d7):

"Then the replenishment with what is more real (τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων) for what is more real (αὐτο μᾶλλον ὄν--i.e. the mind) is more really replenishment (ὁντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται) than the replenishment with what is less real for what is less real."

"Of course."

"Therefore if replenishment with what is appropriate to its nature (τῶν φύσει προσήκοντων) is pleasant, the greater replenishment of what exists by what exists (τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων) more really and more truly (μᾶλλον ὁντως τε καὶ ἀληθεσιτέρως) leads to enjoyment of true pleasure. And that which takes less real replenishment is nourished less truly and less permanently (βεβαίως), and gains less true and more unreliable (ἀπιστοτέρας) pleasures."

"Most certainly."

In summary, Plato's argument seems to be this: first, the substances which nourish the mind (forms such as justice, understanding, and all the virtues) are more real than those substances which nourish the body, because the forms exist completely, whereas the substances which nourish the body are between existence and non-existence. Similarly, the forms are more "true" than these appearances, and the substances which nourish the body are less genuine because they are images of the forms.

Second, the mind is more real than the body, and more genuine than the body, because the mind is nourished by substances which are more genuine and more real than the substances which nourish the body. The mind is nourished by what is true and exists completely, whereas the body is nourished by images of what is true (or genuine), which are "between what is and what is not."

Third, the replenishment of what is more real (the mind) by what is more real (the forms) is real replenishment, whereas the nourishment of what is less real (the body) by what is less real (the kinds of substance which, like the body itself, are images of the forms) is only imitation replenishment--replenishment which is "between what is and what is not."

Fourth, real and genuine nourishment yields real and genuine pleasure, whereas spurious and less real replenishment yields less real and less genuine pleasure. In both cases it is the mind which is pleased, the rational element experiencing genuine and real pleasure, and the appetitive element having spurious and less real pleasure. But in the former pleasure, the cause is the re-

plenishment of the mind, and in the latter the cause is the replenishment of the body.

And fifth, the pleasure of the mind, which is provided to the mind by treating the mind with real replenishment (being "filled" by justice, understanding, etc.), is real and genuine pleasure, whereas the pleasure of the body, which is provided to the mind by treating the body with less real and less genuine replenishment (water, medicine, etc.), is less real and less genuine pleasure.

Socrates has already argued that such spurious pleasure exists. He claimed that there is an intermediate condition μετὰχύ) between true pleasure and true pain, a condition which is not really either pleasure or pain. This intermediate condition may seem painful if it is preceded by pleasure, since it is such a contrast from the previous pleasure; or it may seem pleasant if it is preceded by pain. But it is really neither pleasure nor pain. Now, when he turns from the kinds of replenishment to the kinds of men, he argues that those who have never experienced true and real pleasure (the mental pleasure which the nourishment of the mind provides) are really only in an intermediate condition when they experience bodily pleasure. Their lives seem to themselves to be pleasant, because of release from pain, but they are not really so, because their pleasure is not real and true pleasure--it is the intermediate condition (586a1):

"Then it seems that those who are inexperienced in wisdom (φρονήσεως) and virtue (ἀρετῆς), and are always engaged in dining and things of that sort, are carried down from and back to the intermediate condition (το μετὰχύ) throughout their

lives. They never rise above that level to what is truly above (το ἀληθὺς ἄνω). They neither look upon it or are carried up to it. They are neither in reality replenished by what exists (τοῦ ὄντως τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν) nor taste pure and permanent pleasure (βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρῆς ἡδονῆς). Instead, always looking downward and bending toward the ground and toward their tables, they graze and live as cattle do, fattening and copulating. And in order to get their fill of such things, they trample and butt one another in their lust, and kill one another with their horns and hooves, since neither abstinence (το στέγον) nor what exists (το ὄν) provides these substances (τοῖς οὐσίῃς)."

"Your description of the life of the many very poetic, Socrates."

Socrates is arguing that since those who are ruled by their appetitive element have not experienced the real and genuine pleasure which is provided by justice, understanding, etc., their lives exhibit only an oscillation between this intermediate condition and pain. Since they never have known real and genuine pleasure, the cessation and absence of pain seems to them to be pleasure, rather than what it is: the intermediate condition. Socrates had previously argued that there are spurious pleasures, and that an intermediate condition of this sort obtains.¹ Now he has argued that genuine pleasure is the kind that comes with the replenishment of the mind, and that the intermediate condition is the kind that comes with the replenishment of the body.

When men are ruled by their appetitive element, Socrates argues, their lives are spent in a constant struggle with other men of the same sort for the substances which will meet their bodies' needs and satisfy their appetites. The bodily pleasure which satisfies these painful appetitive desires appears to be

¹Republic 583-4.

pleasure, but it is only release from the pain which physical emptiness in the body causes in the appetitive element in the mind. (Perhaps there is also the pain--not in the appetitive element, presumably--which is the fear that ones appetites and physical needs will not be satisfied, which causes the mind to love the wealth which will satisfy such future needs.)

When the mind is ruled by its appetitive element, it seeks the "pleasure" which is release from the pains caused by physical needs (and perhaps anxiety), and therefore it pursues the material goods which lead to satisfaction of those appetites, and pursues the wealth which will purchase those goods. But such satisfaction is only release from pain: relief from the pains caused by physical needs (and perhaps from the fear of future deprivation).

Since the appetitive element compels the mind to move the body to satisfy the body's needs, the mind is not free to pursue true and real pleasure (i.e. philosophic pleasure). When the mind is dominated by the appetites, it has no time to give to the pursuit of truth and virtue. Thus, since the rational element in such men is ruled by the appetitive element, the rational element will never be nourished by its proper food (wisdom), nor will the whole mind be nourished by its proper food (justice). (It may be implied here that the pursuit of wisdom, etc., requires abstinence from the satisfaction of the appetites: doing without goods in order to pursue the good. And of course, abstinence will not furnish the body's food, either: neither abstinence nor real-

ity "furnishes such substances" to the bodies of men who lead appetitive lives.)

Therefore the lives of appetitive men, at any rate when left to themselves rather than when well-governed, are spent in conflict with one another for the appearance of pleasure. They fight over the means to it in their ignorance of true pleasure "as Stesichorus says the image of Helen was fought over by the Greeks at Troy in their ignorance of the real Helen."¹

Plato then argues that the spirited life has the same result as the appetitive life. When men are dominated by their spirited element, and are left to themselves, they spend their lives as appetitive men do, in conflict with other men of the same sort. But they do so not for wealth and goods, but for victory and honor (586c7):

"Well, what about the spirited life? Must it not be some different sort of life, which accomplishes this same result (ὅς . . . αὐτο τοῦτο διακρίνηται) either because of envy due to love of honor, or use of force due to love of conquest, or anger due to discontent, when men pursue victory and honor without reasoning and without understanding (ἀνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ)?"

"The spirited life must be of this sort."

Although spirited men are ruled by a different element in their minds, they will lead the same lives as appetitive men, struggling with one another over the appearance and image of pleasure. Without reasoning or understanding, they will neither spend their lives in any pursuit of truth nor be willing to renounce power, permitting their competitors to be honored instead of them. Like

¹Republic 586c.

appetitive men, they are in an intermediate condition even when they are pleased. They are in an intermediate condition when they win, and in pain when they lose. They never know real and genuine pleasure.

On the other hand, Socrates claims, if the philosophic element rules, or if the philosopher rules appetitive and spirited men, then spirit and the appetites are controlled by wisdom (φρονήσις). In that case, appetite and spirit achieve the most genuine pleasures of which they are capable, and the pleasures which are "most their own" (586e4):

"Well then, would we say with confidence that if all the desires which accompany the honor-loving and profit-loving elements pursue their pleasures with, and guided by, knowledge and reason (τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐκόμεναί καὶ μετὰ τούτων), and take the pleasures which the wise element prescribes (τας . . . το φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι), then they will obtain the most genuine pleasures (τας ἀληθεστάτας . . . λήφονται), taking pleasures as genuine as possible since they are guided by truth (ᾧτε ἀληθείᾳ ἐκόμενων), and obtain pleasures most their own (καὶ τας ἑαυτῶν οἰκέας), if what is best for each element is also most its own (εἴπερ το βέλτιστον ἐκαστῷ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον);"

"Most its own, indeed."

"Then if the whole mind is guided by its philosophic element (τῇ φιλοσοφῇ ὅρα ἐκόμενης ἀκῆς τῆς ψυχῆς) and is not in conflict with it (καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης), it belongs to every portion (ἐκαστῷ τῇ μέρει ὑπάχει) to do its own work with the others (εἰς . . . τὰλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) and be just (δικαίῳ εἶναι), and to be rewarded by the pleasures which are the most their own, the best, and the most genuine in their power (τας ἑαυτοῦ ἐκαστον καὶ τας βελτίστας καὶ εἰς το δυνατόν τας ἀληθεστάτας)."

"Exactly."

"But when either of the other two elements controls the mind, it belongs to each element not to discover its own pleasure (τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν), but pursue spurious pleasure (μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν) compel the other two to seek pleasure not their own (τα . . . ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἄλλοτρίαν)."

"It does."

Apparently, each of the three elements in the mind has spurious

pleasures as well as genuine pleasures, although Plato does not identify them further. He then claims that there is one genuine pleasure and two spurious ones.¹ But one can't tell from this whether he means that each element has one genuine pleasure and two spurious ones, or whether the whole mind has one genuine pleasure (learning) and two spurious ones (satisfaction of ambition and of appetite). If each element has its own genuine and spurious pleasures, then perhaps the two spurious pleasures of the rational element are "philodoxic." Since Plato has claimed that the philodoxists love to look at (φιλοθεᾶσθαι) what he has called "images" and "appearances," I am inclined to believe that Plato means that for each element in the mind there are both genuine and spurious pleasures.

In any case, the philosophic element does have its own genuine pleasure: the pleasure which it has when the mental emptiness of ignorance is "filled" by the knowledge of truth and reality ("what exists completely"). It not only has its own desire, its love of learning the truth, it also has a genuine pleasure: a pleasure which is "most its own" (i.e. natural for it), best for it, and the most genuine pleasure it is capable of having. This is the pleasure that comes with knowing the forms--its own best and most genuine nourishment.

One would think that if something gave one the best, most genuine, and happiest satisfaction, he would never seek anything else rather than that. Why, then, does the philosophic element

¹Republic 587b-c.

in men, in some cases, never seek that nourishment which will provide its own best and most genuine pleasure? Plato has previously claimed that some men are inexperienced in philosophic pleasure, and thus they may be ignorant of it. But also, Plato will claim that even a philosophic nature needs a good education in order to become what its nature is; otherwise it will never discover the happiness that accompanies the best of the three lives.

In the foregoing passages, Socrates has been investigating all three kinds of men, but previously in the Republic he gives his attention to just one of the three kinds of men: those who are by nature philosophic. And, in the foregoing, Plato has given us a triadic picture of the mind: an amalgam of three elements, each with its own desires and pleasures. Eventually he will claim that "in its truest nature" the mind is its rational element. Furthermore, the philosophic man is the man who is controlled by his philosophic element. Hence, the nature of the philosopher is very closely related to the nature of this rational (philosophic) element.

Thus it is necessary to inquire into the nature of the philosophic man, and into how the philosopher is "corrupted" and prevented from becoming what his nature is, in order to find out what sort of thing this rational element is, such that it can know the forms. For the mind "in its truest nature" is this rational element--this element which makes a man a philosopher if it rules over his entire mind.

IV. THE MIND IN ITS TRUEST NATURE

We have determined that the rational element in the mind is what has knowledge of the forms. It is a portion of the mind which has desires and pleasures, especially the desire for wisdom and the pleasure of learning. It begins in a state of emptiness which is ignorance, and has the power of knowing without having yet the knowledge it can learn. Under the appropriate conditions, ordinarily a good education, this power can be developed, and the rational element can become what its nature is: ruler over the mind and knower of the forms. But it cannot do so unless it gets the proper "nourishment." In his investigation of the nature of a philosopher, and of how a philosophic nature is corrupted, Plato supplies the conditions under which this power of the mind can be developed.

The philosophic kind of man is one whose mind is ruled by its philosophic element, and who pursues wisdom rather than honor or wealth. He is satisfied with the least quantity of material goods that will sustain him while he rules and learns. But even if a person is born philosophic in nature, he may never become so: if he is not properly trained and educated, he will never develop into a philosopher (except by an "act of God").¹ Those who have

¹Republic 493a.

the power (δύναμις) to become philosophers will do so under the right training and education. Otherwise they will become soldiers or craftsmen, poets or philodoxists--and, if they win control of the state, or a share of it, tyrants, oligarchs, demagogues, or timocrats rather than kings.

Plato does not differentiate the possible philosopher from the actual philosopher, however. What he does is differentiate the genuine philosopher from the "corrupted" philosopher. Both the true philosopher and the "corrupted" philosopher are philosophic by nature (φύσει). But one of them has been destroyed by bad training and education, and the other has managed to become what his nature is, either because he has managed to "grow wild" in spite of a hostile environment (the "act of God"), or because he has been properly cultivated.

In 484b-495c, Plato first gives his attention to the nature of a philosopher: those qualities which a man would have if he became a philosopher. Then he explains how "these very qualities" which differentiate him from men who cannot be philosophers contribute to the corruption of his nature when he grows up in a typical Greek city-state.

484b-495c

Having just finished distinguishing between philosophers and philodoxists, Socrates asks Glaucon whether the guardians of the state should be philosophers or philodoxists (484b3):

"When some men are philosophers, able to grasp (δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι) what remains the same as itself forever (τοῦ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος), and others are not philosophers

but erratic men (κλανώμενοι) who always remain entirely among the many things (ἐν πολλοῖς . . . παντοῶς ἰσχουσιν), which of them should be the leaders of the state?"

"What standard (πῶς . . . μετρώς) should we appeal to?"

"Those who show themselves able to guard the laws and business of the city should be appointed its guardians."

"That's right."

"Then is it clear whether a blind man (τυφλον) or a sharp-sighted man (ὀξύ) should be a guardian standing watch?"

"It is clear."

But in what respect are philosophers "sharp-sighted" and others "blind"? Socrates claims that they can "look upon what is most true," whereas other men cannot, and this makes them better rulers (484c6):

"How do those who are deprived of the knowledge of everything which exists in reality (τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος) differ from blind men (τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν)? They do not have in their minds any exact examples (ἐναργες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα), and they are unable to look upon what is most true (εἰς το ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες) as at a picture (ὡς περ γραφῆς). And they cannot ever see it and put it into effect in the state as nearly as possible (κάκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντες τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἶδόν τε ἀκριβέστατα). Thus they cannot furnish the state with noble, just, and good laws, and if such laws had already been laid down, be guardians preserving them."

"No, by Zeus, they aren't much different from blind men."

It is not clear why Plato thinks that philodoxic guardians could not preserve laws already laid down. It is also not clear what the exact examples (ἐναργες παράδειγμα) are. It is likely that they are the examples which Plato in the divided line analogy assigns to διανοία, or at least that they are one species of such "examples and images."

Plato then draws his conclusion, that if those who know reality do not fall short of other men in experience or in any other part of virtue besides wisdom, then they should be chosen instead of the others to be the guardians of the state. The next

question is whether philosophers do not fall short of other men in experience or virtue. But in order to decide this, Socrates claims, we must first agree on the nature of a philosopher (485a4):

"We were saying at the beginning of the argument that we must first learn their nature completely (την φύσιν αὐτῶν . . . καταμαθεῖν). And I think that if we could reach complete agreement on this (ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν), we would also agree that they have these [other] virtues as much as possible (οἷόν τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί) and that they should be the leaders of states rather than other men."

Empirically, the method for determining whether philosophers have more of the virtues (other than wisdom) than other men would be to examine cases, once one had decided upon what the virtues are. But Socrates expects to find the character of a philosopher already given in the nature of a philosopher. What a philosopher is, according to Plato, will also indicate what virtues a philosopher has. Accordingly, he has Socrates proceed to examine the form Philosopher (what a philosopher is, the nature of a philosopher), finding in it those characteristics (presumably those forms) which are "implied" by what a philosopher is. Thus, it is an example of what he will call "hypothetical reasoning": "deducing" the forms which are implied by a given form, i.e. "going from hypotheses to conclusions."¹

The first characteristic which Socrates claims is implied by this form is the love of learning the forms (485a10):

"let us agree about this form (τοῦτο) from the nature of philosophers (τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεως): they always love to learn some subject which makes clear to them (μαθήματος γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ) that substance (ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας) which always exists and never fluctuates (τῆς ἀεὶ οὐσης καὶ μὴ κλινω-

¹Republic 510c-11a.

μένης) by genesis or destruction (ὕπο γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς)."

"Let us agree on that."

"And they are unwilling to give up either a small portion (μέρους) of all existence (πᾶσης οὐσίας) or a large one, whether more honorable or less, as we had concluded about lovers and philosophers."

"That's right."

Socrates infers that if they have the desire to learn what exists and are unwilling to give up any portion of it, they must also love truthfulness and hate deception (485b10):

"Next consider whether they are necessarily sure to have (ἀνάγκη ἔχειν . . . οἱ μέλλωσιν) another form in their nature besides that one (τόδε . . . πρὸς τοῦτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει) in order to be what we are calling them (ἔσεσθαι οἷους ἐλέγομεν)."

"What form (Το ποῖον)?"

"Truthfulness (τὴν ἀψεύδειαν): never being willing to put up with what is false (το ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι το ψεῦδος), but hating it and loving truth."

"That's likely."

"It is not merely likely, my friend, but entirely necessary for that which by nature fondly possesses something (τον ἐρωτικῶς τοῦ φύσει ἔχοντα) to be fond of all its kind and their descendants (πᾶν συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν)."

"That's right."

The usual translation for "πᾶν το συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν" would be something like "all its kinsmen and close friends."¹ But I think that such a rendition would be misleading here. First, to be συγγένης with something is to be of the same tribe, family, race, species, or kind, not merely of the same family, as "kisman" would suggest. Since I have been translating "γένος" as "kind," I render "το συγγενές" as "its kind." Second, although "οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν" can mean "close friends" (or more precisely, something like "one's own from children"), it could also mean "related as children of the same house"--cousins, for instance.

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, 4.

(Perhaps it is by extension that it means persons with whom one has associated since childhood, as one has associated with his close relations. At least, this interpretation harmonizes with the "logic" of the forms, in which forms are related to one another as ancestors to descendants.) At any rate, I interpret Plato to be saying that if one loves the truth, then he loves the other forms in its γένος (whichever ones they are) and also loves all of those forms related to truth and the other forms in its kind as descendants to ancestors--i.e. all of the forms "implied" by truth and its kindred forms.

Socrates then asks whether anything is more closely related to truth than wisdom (485c10):

"Can anything be closer to truth than wisdom (Ἡ οὖν οἰκείωτερον σοφίᾳ τὴ ἀληθείας ἂν εὐροίς)?"

"How can it?"

"Then is it possible for the same nature (τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν) to be philosophic and love deception (φιλοψευδῆ)?"

"Not at all."

"Then whoever loves to learn what exists (Τὸν . . . τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ) must from his youth reach out as far as possible (μάλιστα ὀρέσθαι) for all truth (πάσης ἀληθείας)."

"Absolutely."

Having deduced these forms from the nature of a philosopher, Socrates proceeds to infer others. He next claims that a philosopher must be temperate (σώφρων), since if one's desires flow more strongly in one direction, they must flow more weakly in other directions, as though the mind were a "stream with many channels" (485d6):

"But we have seen that with someone whose desires flow more strongly in one direction, they flow more weakly in other directions, like a stream with many channels."

"What of it?"

"With anyone in whom they flow (Ἐν . . . ἐρρουήκασιν)

toward mathematics and everything of that sort, I believe that he would go after (περι . . . εἶεν) the pleasure of his mind alone (την τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ἡδουην αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν) and would entirely ignore the pleasure of the body, if he were a genuine philosopher and not a counterfeit one (εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφος τις εἴη)."

"Necessarily."

The picture of the mind as a stream with many channels is employed here to indicate how the philosophic nature differs from the others. The channels are the three elements (portions) of the mind, and the stream is the quantity of desire present in the mind, of which each element has a portion. The quantities of desire flowing through each element vary from person to person and from time to time in the same person. Apparently the amount of desire in each man's mind is the same, and remains the same, and the variation from one mind to another (and from one time to another within the same mind) is due to a difference in the amounts in each element. Accordingly, the more love of wisdom there is in the rational element, the less love of other things there is in the other elements. Therefore, at least part of the proper education of the mind will consist in whatever means will "enlarge" the "channel" of philosophic desire, so as to bring about a greater love of wisdom than of honor or wealth.

Socrates concludes that since the philosopher enjoys only mental pleasure and ignores physical pleasure (i.e. enjoys the pleasure caused by meeting the mind's needs and ignores the pleasure caused by satisfying the needs of the body), the philosopher will be temperate and not love money: he desires wisdom, not the wealth which can buy physical pleasures. For the same reason,

he will not be stingy (ἀνελευθερία) and penny-ante (σμικρολόγος); his mind always reaches for all and the whole of everything human and divine (τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός ἀεὶ ἐπορεύεσθαι θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου).¹ (Perhaps what is human and divine is knowledge, which the genuine philosopher wants "all and the whole of" in order to be called a philosopher rather than a lover only of some wisdom.) Since the philosopher's love of wisdom is great, his appetite is weak, and therefore he is not intemperate. And since he is temperate, and uninterested in making profits, he is liberal.

Since the philosopher is liberal, and likewise unconcerned about what appears, he will be unafraid and unpretentious (486a8):

"Then since liberality and vision of all time and all existence [or substance] (μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντός μεν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας) belong to his intellect (Ἡ . . . ὑπάρχει δινοῖα), do you think that his human life (τον ἀνθρώπινον βίον) can seem to him to be at all important (οἷόν τε . . . τοῦτω μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι)?"

"Impossible."

"Therefore this sort of man will not be afraid of anything, even death (καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται)."

"Death least of all."

His concern is for what is, not what appears, and therefore his human life is not important to him. He will fear nothing in human experience, even the death of this body his mind is associated with during his human life. And from the forms there is nothing to fear (there is only the nourishment of the mind). But he might still fear for the death of his mind, for if that were to die then his power to know and enjoy the forms would perish with it. However, Socrates will claim that the mind is immortal--or rather, that the

¹Republic 486a.

portion of it which has the power to know is immortal. (Note that he does not here attribute liberality and vision to the whole mind, or even to the rational element, but to "ἡ διανοία.")

It also follows, Socrates argues, that the philosopher will never become unfair or unjust, but will always be just and civilized rather than wild and uncooperative (486b6):

"Would the rational man (ὁ κόσμιος), neither wealth-loving nor stingy, pretentious, or afraid, ever become unfair and unjust?"

"No."

"If you examined this philosophic mind, wouldn't you observe (μη . . . ἐπισκέψῃ) that from its youth it was just and civilized (δικαία τε καὶ ἡμερος) rather than wild and uncooperative (δυσκοινώντητος καὶ ἀγροία)?"

"Of course."

My translation over-simplifies the text. "Δικαία" and "ἀγροία" are predicated of the feminine "ψυχὴν," and "ἡμερος" and "δυσκοινώντητος" of the masculine participle "ὄντος," representing ὁ κόσμιος. Thus "just" and "wild" are attributed to minds, and "civilized" and "uncooperative" to men.

I take it that these qualities follow from the nature of the philosopher (just, civilized, cooperative rather than wild) in that his rational element rules his mind, rather than his spirit or appetites. That is, Plato is pointing out that a philosophic man (or mind) would no more be led into injustice because the spirited element was out of control than because the appetites were unruly. Just as the strength of desire in the rational element takes strength of desire away from the appetites, it also makes the rational element stronger in desire than the apirited element. I gather, although I cannot justify it, that

the spirit is only tamed, not diminished, by the proper education and training of the mind, and therefore that the rational element gains its strength at the expense of appetite, rather than of spirit.

Socrates continues his deduction from the philosophic nature. It is quick to learn (εὐμαθής). No one would love knowledge, Socrates claims, if he experienced great difficulty and little enjoyment in learning it. Therefore a philosophic mind must be able to think quickly. Similarly, one who loves wisdom must be retentive (μνημονική). If a man could not remember what he had learned, he would end up both hating knowledge and hating himself for being unable to hold on to it. (It is not quite so obvious whether the mind is philosophic because it is quick to learn, or that it is quick to learn because it is philosophic--i.e. because it loves wisdom. Similarly, it is at least not impossible that it is retentive because it loves wisdom, and not the other way around.) In any event, Socrates is claiming that the philosopher is necessarily retentive and quick to learn.

Finally, Socrates concludes his analysis of the nature of the philosopher by inferring that the philosopher is measured (ἔμμετρον) and agreeable (εὐχάριν) in his nature (486d9):

"Then in addition to the other [forms] (προς τοὺς ἄλλους) we will look for an intellect (διάνοιαν) measured and agreeable in its nature (ἔμμετρον . . . καὶ εὐχάριν . . . φύσει), which when well-guided (εὐάγων) is naturally inclined (αὐτοφύες) to the idea of each thing which exists (ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἐκάστου)."

"We must."

This is the second occurrence of "ἡ διάνοια" as a subject of these

forms that follow from the philosophic nature. What does Plato mean by "ἡ διανοία" in these two occurrences? I doubt that it is a synonym for "ἡ ψυχὴ," although that is possible. It cannot be the power of διανοία, because a power is a form and ἡ διανοία is here a subject partaking of forms. It is probable that Plato is referring either to the rational element in the mind, which has the power of διανοία, or to some sub-element of the rational element. And since we are not told of any further sub-divisions of the three elements in the mind, I conclude that ἡ διανοία is το λογιστικόν. The rational element is the intellect--i.e. the element in the mind that has the power of διανοία (as well as the power of νοήσις).

Socrates then draws his final conclusion: the rulers of states should be philosophers, since philosophers are superior to all other men in all of the other virtues as well as in wisdom (486e1):

"Well then, doesn't it seem to you that all these [forms] we have mentioned are necessary and follow from one another in a mind which is concerned about acquiring what exists completely and independently (τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τέλειως . . . μεταλήψεσθαι)?"

"Most necessary."

"Then is it a profession for anyone with such defects to practice? Could anyone ever become adequate to it if he were not by nature retentive, quick to learn, liberal, agreeable, and lover and relation of truth, justice, self-control, and courage (φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης)?"

"Not even Momus could reproach such a man."

"Well then, if men of this sort can be brought to completion (τελειωθεῖσι) with education and maturation, wouldn't you turn your state over to them alone?"

Plato has previously claimed that knowledge is συγγένης with truth.

Now he claims that the man who loves knowledge is not only lover

(φίλος) of truth and the four virtues, but also συγγένης with them. This form (Philosopher) is in the same γένος with truth, knowledge, self-control, courage, and justice.

This rehearsal of the virtues of the philosopher would be tiresome and irrelevant if it were not for three things: (1) the qualities of the philosopher which seem to entail or be qualities of his rational element, (2) the qualities which are ascribed to "ἡ διανοία" by Plato's language of the passage, and (3) the epistemological language in parts of it (the "vision of all time and all existence [or substance]" for instance).

The qualities which Plato attributes to the philosophic nature (i.e. of the form Philosopher) are qualities which the man who is by nature a philosopher has in his nature. But he does not have them in reality unless he becomes what his nature is. Plato claims that the philosophic nature is rare.¹ But the philosopher (the genuine philosopher, who develops to become what his nature is) is rarer still. With the proper nourishment and training, men with a philosophic nature will become philosophic in fact. But this power will not be developed without the proper environment. If there is not a suitable environment, such men will not become genuine philosophers; they will instead be corrupted. In a hostile environment, the very qualities in their nature which make it philosophic will contribute to the destruction (ὀλεθρεῖα) of this nature.

Socrates, now conversing with Adeimantus, claims that

¹Republic 491b.

these qualities in the philosophic nature are themselves the causes of destruction of the philosophic nature (491b4):

"Then consider how great and many are the causes of destruction (ὄλεθροι) of these few philosophic natures or men (τούτων . . . τῶν ὀλίγων)."

"What are they?"

"Most amazing to hear, all of the [forms] (πάντων) of his nature (τῆς φύσεως), every one of them which we approved (ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὧν ἐπηνέσασμεν), destroy the mind which has them (ἀπόλυσαι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν) and turn it away from philosophy (ἀποσπᾶ φιλοσοφίας). And I mean courage, self-control, and all the other qualities we mentioned."

"That is strange to hear."

It would indeed be strange if these qualities alone caused the mind to turn from philosophy. But other factors must also be involved to prevent the philosophic mind from becoming what its nature is (491c1):

"In addition, besides these qualities, all of the so-called goods (τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα) corrupt it and turn it away (φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾶ): beauty, wealth, bodily strength, influential family connections (συγγένεια ἐκκωμμένη ἐν πόλει) and all such goods--if you have the notion of what I mean."

But how do the qualities of the philosophic nature, together with the so-called goods, corrupt the philosophic mind and turn it from philosophy? According to Plato, they do so through bad education (κακὴ παιδευσις), which stunts the growth of a philosophic mind; it has a poor opportunity to grow if it matures in a hostile environment.¹

Just as a vigorous and healthy plant or animal requires a more fruitful and richer opportunity for growth than a weak and sickly one, argues Socrates, so the best-natured minds need a better opportunity to grow than indifferent natures. And vigorous,

¹Republic 491d.

healthy organisms suffer more in a hostile environment than mediocre ones. Thus the best-natured minds become the worst, when they encounter bad education (491e1):

"Well then, Adeimantus, would we say that the best-natured minds (τας ψυχας . . . τας εὐφροσύνους) become especially bad (διαφέροντως κακας γίνεσθαι) when they encounter bad education (κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχοῦσας)? Or do you believe that the greatest injustice and highest wickedness (τα μέγιστα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἀκρατον κνηρίαν) come from an indifferent nature (ἐκ φαύλης) instead of from a vigorous nature (ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως) ruined by diet (τροφῇ διολομένης), and that a feeble nature (ἀσθενῆ . . . φύσιν) would ever be a cause of great goods or evils (μεγάλων οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίας)?"

"No."

"Then we would maintain, I believe, that the nature of the philosopher (τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν) which encounters proper education (ἥ . . . μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ) necessarily develops, in its growth, to every virtue (εἰς πᾶσαν . . . αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι). But if it is not nourished by proper seeding and cultivation, it develops to all the opposites of virtue (εἰς πάντα τὰναντία) unless something comes to its aid from the gods"

Just as a proper education stretches and nourishes the power of learning (τὸ φιλομάθης), tames and soothes the spirit, and prepares the whole mind to become what its nature is (and if its nature is philosophic, to become able to know that which exists completely), so a bad education prevents the mind from becoming what its nature is. Hence the mind which is best in its nature becomes, on account of the greatness of its abilities, the very worst when subjected to "improper seeding and cultivation," unless an "act of God" permits it to become what its nature is in spite of a hostile environment.

Socrates goes on to argue that this improper education is not that which the sophists provide, for these are merely servants of the public. It is the general public, in states in which ap-

petitive men rule, which corrupts those rare natures who could have learned wisdom in a state ruled by reason. In crowds and public meetings, in the assembly, the law-courts or the theater, they influence the minds of young men with their overt and noisy expressions of praise and blame. Since they approve and disapprove of the wrong things, being philodoxists, they praise and blame the wrong things. In that way they transmit their mistakes to their heirs. If persuasion fails, they reinforce their expressions of approval and disapproval by force, "punishing the unpersuaded with fines, dishonor, or death."¹ The "virtue" which the sophists teach, success in one's affairs, public and private, effects only a reinforcement of the persuasion and sanctions the public exerts.

A philosophic nature subjected to this pressure, therefore, becomes corrupted--bad education combining with the so-called goods and qualities of the philosophic nature itself to produce in gifted minds ignorance instead of wisdom, and injustice instead of justice. Just as men who are ruled by spirit or appetite can be directed to their proper ends, the best and most genuine in their power, if they are ruled by wise and rational rulers, so are men who could have been philosophic misdirected from their proper end by the crowd--a great beast controlled by appetite.

When the whole public combines to misdirect men with a philosophic nature, there is not much hope that they can be per-

¹Republic 492d.

suaded to take the long, hard road toward knowledge, instead of the easy way of catering to the appetites of the beast (494a11):

"Do you see any saving influence (τίνα . . . σωτηρίαν) from these [harmful conditions] (Ἐκ . . . τούτων) for a philosophic nature (φιλοσόφῳ φύσει), to preserve it in its vocation (ἐν τῇ ἐπιτηδεύματι) to reach its goal (πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν)? And keep in mind what we said; for we agreed that quickness to learn, retentiveness, courage, and liberality are among the [qualities] (ἐκ τῶν . . . εἶναι) of this nature."

"Yes."

"Then even as a child this sort of person will be first in everything, especially if his body grows like his mind."

"He will."

His family and his state will want to use him to further their own ends, so they will fill him with empty-minded arrogance and pretention (σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπικλόμενον) by honoring and flattering him and begging his favors.

Under these conditions, it is not likely that he would ever be persuaded that he is still ignorant (494d4):

"Under these conditions, if someone quietly came to him and said that there is no understanding in him (νοῦς οὐκ ἔν-εστιν αὐτῷ), and that he needs it and cannot possess it unless slaves for it (δεῖται δέ, το δε οὐ κτητον μη δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ), do you think that it would be easy for him to listen, under such bad [conditions] (δὶα τοσούτων κακῶν)?"

"Far from it."

"And if, because of his natural talent and his affinity for argument (δὶα το εὖ κεφυκέναι καὶ το συγγενες τῶν λόγων, he were enlightened (εἰσαισθῆναι) and somehow turned around and drawn toward philosophy, what do you think that those men would do when they think that his usefulness and cooperation are being destroyed? Wouldn't they say anything, and do anything, in order that he was not persuaded? To prevent him from being persuaded, wouldn't they plot against his persuader in public and private, and put him on trial?"

"Necessarily."

Subjected to such pressure, philosophic natures are not likely to become what their nature is, and the portions of the philosophic nature (τα τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη) itself are one cause of their

departure from their vocation (ἀλτὰ τρόπον τινα τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτελεστέου), along with the so-called goods.

Part of the answer has emerged to the problem of how the philosophic element can know the forms. It must belong to a mind which is by nature philosophic (lover of knowledge and capable of learning it) and which has been given a good education, or fortuitously develops in spite of a hostile environment. It is only part of the answer, however. First, we do not know, from Plato's words, whether it is greater love for knowledge which makes some men's philosophic element better able to reason, more retentive, and quicker to learn (for instance), or whether greater ability to reason, to remember, and to learn quickly make a man's rational element love wisdom more. Hence we do not know what makes the potential philosopher's rational element better able, in its nature (what it can become), to learn the forms when given a good education. Second, although Plato will later spell out what a good education consists of, for potential philosophic rulers,¹ he only tells us how a philosophic nature becomes able to acquire knowledge. He never explains what happens to the rational element in the process, while the philosopher is educated to know and understand the forms (and to rule over the state). Instead, he describes this process in terms of the relation between the mind and the forms. Perhaps that is the only way it needs to be described, since he will claim that "in its truest nature" the mind is this very rational element. And third, how would an "act of God" induce a

¹Republic 518b-35c.

philosophic nature to become what his nature is? That is, how could he be properly nourished in a hostile environment?

There are few men's minds, according to Plato, which are philosophic in nature. Fewer still are the minds which survive a hostile environment to become what their nature is, and develop into philosophic minds rather than philodoxic ones. Corrupted by bad education, they become dominated by one or the other of the two elements in the mind, and become philodoxists like those men who are not by nature capable (alone) of being ruled by their love of wisdom. The philosophic natures have greater ability, and hence they become far worse than the others.

Thus the qualification for being able to know the forms is not merely the possession of a philosophic element which is by nature capable of ruling over the mind. This element which can have greater or less ability or love of wisdom for different men must not only be strong enough in its love and its ability (by nature) to control the mind and know the forms, it must also have the opportunity to become what its nature is. Whereas men who are craftsmen or soldiers by nature can also be ruled by their rational element, this element (in them) is not by itself strong enough to rule their minds without the external reinforcement of the reason of philosophic rulers.

But in men who are naturally philosophic, this philosophic element is powerful enough in its desire and its ability to reason, etc., that if it gets the proper nourishment, whether by accident or by a good education, it will rule over the mind and be able to

know the forms even without external reinforcement. And although many men can have limited knowledge, perhaps, and know those forms which their craft or line of duty requires, only those whose love of wisdom and talent for learning it have been fostered by a good education or by good fortune can acquire knowledge--or at least, knowledge not limited to some one small job.

Plato has claimed that the philosopher is συγγένης with the four virtues, and with knowledge and truth. He next will claim that the philosophic element (in every man's mind, so far as one can tell) is not only συγγένης with these and the other forms, but like them is eternal. The triadic description of the mind is only accurate for its condition during human life. Plato claims, near the end of the Republic, that in its "truest" nature, when separated from the body, the mind is not a composition of three elements (two of them by nature inferior) but an indivisible το λογιστικόν purified of its human companions.

608c-611d

Socrates opens his argument for the immortality of the mind with the comment that an immortal thing ought not be concerned with human life, which lasts only a short time compared with eternity. Glaucon is puzzled at this opinion, and Socrates explains (608d3):

"Haven't you perceived (Οὐκ ἤσθησαι), that our minds are immortal and never are destroyed (ἀθάνατος . . . καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται)?"

"By Zeus, no!"

Socrates claims that it is not difficult to believe, and he begins his argument with a definition of good and bad (608d13):

"Do you call some things good and some things bad?"

"I do."

"Then do you conceive them as I do (ὡςπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοῶ)?"

"How do you conceive them?"

"What corrupts and destroys anything (Τὸ . . . ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθείρον πᾶν) is what is bad (τὸ κακόν), and what preserves and benefits it (τὸ . . . σφίζων καὶ ὠφελοῦν) is what is good (τὸ ἀγαθόν)."

"I conceive them as you do."

This definition construes good and bad as relative terms. (It is at least not obvious that this is a definition of "the good"--i.e. the form of the good--for Plato claims that the form of the good cannot be expressed.¹) What is good is good for something, and similarly with what is bad. Ophthalmia is bad for the eyes, illness is bad for the body, rust is bad for iron, and so on. Every object in the domain of becoming has its own natural evil and disease (σύμφυτον . . . κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα). What is good for an object preserves it from corruption and destruction, and benefits it rather than harms it. And what is bad for something is what makes it worse and threatens its existence.

Thus if the natural evil and disease of an object fails to destroy it, nothing else will. How can what is good for something destroy it, or what is neither good nor evil? (609d6):

"Then when any of these things is attacked by this [natural evil and disease] (τῷ . . . προσγένηται), doesn't it infect what is attacked (κονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ὃ προσεγένετο), and tear it all to pieces and destroy it (τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν)?"

"Of course."

"Then the sickness (ἡ κωνηρόα) and the natural evil (Τὸ σύμφυτον . . . κακόν) of each thing destroys it. Or, if this does not destroy it, then nothing can ever destroy it (αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθεῖρεται). For what is good for something can never de-

¹Republic 506c.

stroy it, and neither can what is neither good nor evil."
 "Of course."

The assumption seems to be that what is bad for something is what initiates and continues some natural process which corrupts its substance and which (if not arrested by "what is good") will end death or non-existence. For instance, hunger (the physical state as opposed to the feeling or the desire) will begin and continue the process of attrition which ends in starvation if the organism cannot obtain food. What contributes to the survival of the organism (or the continuance of the object) is what is good, and what leads to death (or non-existence) is evil.

But for what is immortal, Socrates claims, such a process can only corrupt; it cannot destroy. In this respect, according to Plato, the mind and the body are different. Since the body is mortal, its natural evil sickness (κονηρία) will if unchecked bring about its death. But although injustice is the sickness of the mind, it is not fatal. Therefore, the mind, unlike the body, cannot die (609b9):

"Then what about the mind? Isn't there something in it which makes it bad (ὁ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὴν)?"

"Very much so; everything which we have mentioned: injustice, lack of discipline, cowardice, and ignorance."

"Do any of these things tear it to pieces and destroy it (αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι)? And keep in mind that we would not be entirely mistaken if we maintained that the unjust and stupid man is destroyed by his injustice, a mental illness, when he is apprehended in being unjust (καὶ ἐννοεῖ μη ἐξαπατα-
 τηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἀδικὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπο τῆς ἀδικίας, κωνηρίας οὕσης ψυχῆς)"

It would not be entirely mistaken, because if he is caught and executed his body would be destroyed, not by his injustice alone

but by other men. Only bodily evils can destroy the body (609c5):

" The body's sickness is an illness which corrodes the body and breaks it apart, which leads to its death. Every object which we have mentioned is torn apart by its own evil and the corruption in it, which returns it to non-existence (εἰς τὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀφαινεῖται). Doesn't it?"
 "Yes."

When the body disintegrates through corruption, it ceases to be one human body and becomes many bodies. At some point in the process of corruption (Plato does not say when), the body dies and the mind and body are disjoined.

There are two alternatives, according to Plato. Either the mind is destroyed by the natural process of corruption within it, or the mind is immortal, because the natural evil of one thing cannot destroy another thing. A man's sickness or illness can only affect that portion of him which has the sickness or illness. Hence an illness which is bodily can only affect his body, immediately. It could only affect his mind if his bodily illness brought about a mental illness. His mind could not be destroyed by any bodily illness unless the bodily illness brought about a mental illness, and the mental illness in turn destroyed his mind. Similarly, an illness in the mind can only cause the death of the body by producing sickness in the body, as for instance when a man is executed for his injustice.

Thus if the natural evil of the mind cannot destroy the mind, then no evil of the body can destroy the mind: for the natural evil of the body could only destroy the mind if it could produce a mental evil to destroy the mind. But the natural evil and illness of the mind, argues Socrates, is injustice. And although

injustice can corrupt the mind, it cannot destroy it (609d4):

"Does injustice or any other evil which is present in the mind corrupt and consume the mind, tearing it apart until it is destroyed and thus causing the body to be separated from it, resulting ~~then~~ in death?"

"Not at all."

"Yet, it is irrational for something to be destroyed by another's sickness, and yet not be destroyed by its own sickness."

It would be irrational either if the illness of the mind caused the death of the body without causing any illness in the body, or if the illness in the body caused the death of the mind when even mental illness cannot cause the death of the mind.

The natural evil and illness of the mind is injustice: ignorance, cowardice, or lack of self-control. None of these can be produced by bodily illness, argues Socrates, and even if it could, injustice is not a fatal disease. Since injustice is not fatal, and since the mental illness and natural evil of the mind is injustice, the mind cannot die. Glaucon agrees that injustice is the natural evil of the mind, and that it is not fatal (610d7):

" . . . I am inclined to think that injustice appears to be just the opposite: it has killed other men, when possible, but it has kept its possessor very much alive, and vigilant about staying alive. Thus, far from being fatal, it seems, it has kept him in his tent."

"Well said. For when its own illness and its own evil is not enough to kill and destroy the mind, the evil which has ruined another thing cannot destroy the mind or anything else except what it has ruined."

"That is impossible (Σχολῆ . . . ὥς γε το εἰκός)."

"Then when it is not destroyed by any evil, either its own or another's, it is clear that it must exist forever (ἀνδύκην αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ ὄν εἶναι). And if it exists forever, it is immortal."

"It must be."

Since neither injustice nor anything else can destroy the mind, it is immortal. The entire argument depends, of course, on the

assumption that some kind of injustice is the only natural evil and illness of the mind. One would suppose that even in Plato's day senility and psychotic behavior could be distinguished from injustice, and that physical causes for such psychological states could be at least conjectured. On the other hand, it depends upon how one looks at it. It seems barbarous to say "mental illness is injustice," or to say that the cause of such behavior is injustice in the mind. It suggests that the mentally ill are entirely responsible (and blameable) for their illness. Looking at it the other way around, however, is intriguing: "injustice is only mental illness," or "injustice, a mental illness, causes people to be senile, psychotic, etc." It may be false, but it is interesting.

After an invalid argument to the effect that the number of minds in the universe is finite, Socrates calls attention to a problem. If the mind is immortal, like the forms, then it is (for him) hard to believe that it is really a synthesis of three elements (611b1):

" . . . nor would we believe that the mind in its truest nature (τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει) is such a thing [i.e. immortal], if it is full of great variation, complete unlikeness, and difference with itself (ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιοτητός τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτό)."
 "What do you mean?"

"It is not probable (οὐ ὀρθόλογον) that an immortal thing is a synthesis (αἰδίοιον εἶναι . . . συνθεῖσθαι) put together between many elements (σύνθετον . . . ἐκ πολλῶν) and not provided with what is noblest [or most beautiful] (μη τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχορηγμένον), as the mind now appeared to us (ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή)."
 "It isn't likely."

The picture of the mind which Plato has developed heretofore is

that of a synthesis of three elements which are sometimes at odds with one another, and capable of becoming and remaining unjust. The three elements can vary greatly from time to time and from person to person, they are not at all similar to one another, and they are completely different from one another in form and in kind. Moreover, two of the elements are inferior to the third, making the mind--even in the best of men--partly, at least, ignoble. The picture we now have, according to Socrates, is a strange one: an immortal thing which is plural and unbeautiful.

Socrates claims that this strange picture of the mind is incorrect. The mind is only many and ignoble during its human life (i.e. while it is embodied). A man is mortal, and his mind is triadic and unbeautiful; but the same man's mind, after his body dies, is no longer subject to the influences and "carnal accretions" upon it.¹ There is a difficulty about the translation of the passage in which Plato makes this claim, however. First, I will give the usual translation of it (611b9):

"That the mind (ψυχή) is immortal (ἀθάνατον) our recent argument and the others necessitate (ἀναγκάσειαν). But we must observe it as it truly is (οἷον ὃ ἐστὶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ . . . δεῖ αὐτο θεώσασθαι), not mutilated (οὐ λελωβημένον) by its partnership with the body (τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας) and by other evils (ἄλλων κακῶν), as we observe it now, but as it is when it becomes purified (οἷόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον); the sort of thing perfectly envisioned by reasoning (τοιοῦτον ἐκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατόν). It will find itself (αὐτο εὕρησει) very noble [or beautiful] (πολύ . . . κάλλιον) and will see more clearly (ἐναργέστερον . . . δίδωται) justice and injustice,

¹The phrase is Crombie's. See I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, I, 349. However, Crombie believes that the "carnal accretions" accompany the mind after the death of the body. On the interpretation of this passage, see also G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, pp. 138-39.

and all that we have discussed"

The difficulty with translating the passage in this usual way is that there is a difference in gender between the supposed subject "ψυχή" and all of the other words in the passage which refer or apply to it. "Ψυχή" is feminine, and all the rest are neuter: "ἀθάνατον," "λελωβημένον," "αὐτό," "γιγνομένον," "τοιοῦτον," "διαθέατον," "κάλλιον," "αὐτό," and "ἐναργέστερον."

Accordingly, I suggest that the text be amended by replacing "ψυχή" with "ψυχῇ"; the result reads as follows:

"The present argument and the others necessitate that an immortal thing is in the mind ("Ὅτι . . . ἀθάνατον ψυχῇ). And it must observe itself as it truly is, not mutilated by its partnership with the body and by other evils, as we now observe it, but as it is when it becomes purified: the sort of thing perfectly observed by reasoning. It will find itself very beautiful and will see more clearly justice and injustice, and all that we have discussed. What we were saying about it is true, as it appears at present (οἷον ἐν τῇ παρόντι φαίνεται). We have observed it conditioned (διακειμένον), as those who see the Sea-god Glaucōn cannot yet easily see his original nature (αὐτοῦ . . . τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν), because the ancient portions of his body have been broken off, crushed and mutilated by the waves. And other things have encrusted him, barnacles, seaweed, and mineral deposits, so that he seems to be anything but what he is by nature (οἷος ἦν φύσει). In this way we observe the mind (τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα) conditioned by a thousand evils (διακειμένην ὑπο μυρίων κακῶν)."

I suggest the following interpretation of this passage: we observe the mind conditioned because we observe it during our human lives, and it appears to us so conditioned by its human existence. But when the rational element (the immortal thing) is purified of the evils which now condition it, it can see itself as it is by nature: an unconditioned mind and philosophic element, unencrusted by two inferior portions and unmutilated by the corruptions of ignorance, injustice, etc.

When so unconditioned, the purified rational element can not only see itself more clearly, it can also see more clearly "justice and injustice, and all that we have discussed." In other words, when it is restored from mutilating evils and purged of encrusted portions of spirit and appetite, it can see more clearly that which it may or may not have been able to perceive during its human life: the forms. In its "truest nature" the mind is an un mutilated and unencrusted philosophic element, an immortal thing which resembles and is συγγένης with what it loves and knows: the immortal, unique, and unchanging forms.

"We must look in another direction," says Socrates, in order to find the "truest nature" of the mind (611d7):

"We must look in another direction, Glaucon."

"Where?"

"Toward its love of wisdom (Εἰς την φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς). And keep in mind the objects which it reaches for and grasps (ὣν ἄπτεται καὶ οἷον ἐφίεται ὁμιλῶν), being kin to (συγγενὴς οὕσα) what is divine and immortal and always exists (τῷ τε θεῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι). And it can become so (οἷα . . . γένοιτο) by pursuing all such things (τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐκισκομένη), and by this effort (ὕπο τα ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς) be lifted out of the sea in which it now exists, and be cleaned of the minerals and barnacles which are now with it. As it feeds upon earth, much wild rock and earth cling to it, due to its so-called happy food. And whether or not anyone can ever see its true nature (τότ' ἂν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν), many-formed or one-formed (εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδὴς), and where it lives and how (εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως), at least its forms and dispositions in its human life (τα ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πᾶσα τε καὶ εἶδη) have now been thoroughly investigated."

"Completely."

What the "true nature" of the mind is remains a mystery. The purified, disembodied rational element is unconditioned by association with the other two elements and with material objects (the body and the substances which nourish or corrupt it), and therefore

uncontaminated by the evils which human life imposes upon it (injustice, ignorance, and the others). What the rational element is, however, when it is unconditioned, is unknown. We do not know whether it is simple (one-formed) or complex (many-formed)--whereas in the Phaedo Plato maintained that the immortal mind is simple, in the Republic he admits that he does not know. I am unable to interpret the "Myth of Er," so my examination of Plato's theory of the mind must end at this mystery.

We have found Plato holding that the mind is triadic during its human life. There are three things in it: the rational (or philosophic) element, the spirited (or honor-loving) element, and the appetitive (or wealth-loving) element. The rational element loves wisdom: it desires that nourishment (reality) which will fill its emptiness (ignorance) with knowledge, and give the mind the pleasure of knowing. Spirit loves honor, and gives the mind the pleasure of "controlling and winning and being well-thought-of." And appetite loves the wealth that can purchase the substances which bring "physical" pleasures and which preserve human life.

Of these three things in the mind, the rational element is what can learn to know the forms. If it is strong enough to rule over the entire mind, and if it is not corrupted by bad education, it can achieve its power of knowing. When all three elements in the mind are doing their own work, the rational element will not only obtain control over the whole mind but achieve the wisdom

that it loves.

Plato seems to have implied (in his story of the Sea-god Glaucon) that when the mind (any man's mind) is separated from the body, it will not merely be able to know the forms, but will actually know them. Since this body is mortal, and the other two elements likewise mortal (apparently), there will be nothing to prevent the mind from having complete knowledge. There will be no inferior portions to challenge the rule of reason, and no evils (such as ignorance and injustice) accompanying the rational element, when it is purified. The unconditioned rational element will therefore be wise and just. This is an inference, however, based upon the interpretation of the passage about the Sea-god Glaucon. Plato claims also that he does not know the nature of the unencumbered rational element.

Most important for a study of Plato's epistemology, however, is (1) of the three things in the mind, only one of them is able to know the forms, and (2) for knowledge, justice matters: the mind can know the forms only if there is a harmony among the three elements and reason rules. When there is justice in the mind and the philosophic element (in certain rare individuals, properly educated) becomes what its nature is, then knowledge of the forms is possible.

The two objects in the epistemic relation, in Plato's theory of knowledge, have been identified, at least to the extent that one knows what Plato has in mind when he says that "the mind" knows the "forms." What remains unexplained is the most important question:

what relation holds between the rational element in the mind and the forms, when the mind knows the forms? And this question involves another question: how does the mind know the forms? I will argue in chapter eight that the answer to the first question is intuition (which Plato calls "νοῆσις," and which I will be translating as "understanding" until I can prove that I can call it "intuition"). First, however, I must answer the second question, which Plato addresses in 504a-540c, where the nature of the mind and of the forms is presupposed and the problem is how they come to be related as knower to known.

VI. KNOWLEDGE: THE LINE AND THE CAVE

The sun analogy introduced two "greatest things": the good, reigning over intelligible kinds and their domain (βασιλεύειν το . . . νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου), and the sun, reigning over visible kinds and their domain. The divided line introduces a further distinction relative to each of these domains--not a distinction between things in these domains, but a distinction as to how the mind is related (in knowing or believing) to the objects in each domain. In the intelligible domain, the objects of knowledge (the forms) can either be known directly, by νοήσις, or through images (εἰκόνα), by διανοία. These images of the forms are the perceivable objects of the domain of appearance. And in the visible domain, the objects of opinion (δόξα) can either be believed (δοξάζειν) directly, or believed indirectly through their images, by εἰκασία. Finally, the allegory of the cave gives (in the form of an image) the process by which the mind is led from εἰκασία to νοήσις. We begin with the divided line analogy.

509d-517e

Socrates introduces the analogy of the divided line by asking Glaucon to subdivide a line which has already been divided into unequal segments (509d6):

"Take a line-segment bisected into unequal segments, one for visible kinds and one for intelligible kinds (το τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ το τοῦ νοουμένου), and bisect each segment

again in the same proportion (ἀνα τον αὐτον λόγον). The one segment (το ἕτερον) will be to you (σοι ἔσται) images (εἰκόνες) in the visible domain (ἐν . . . τῷ ὁρωμένῳ) in clarity and unclarity relative to one another (σαφηνεία καὶ ἀσαφεία πρὸς ἀλλήλα). And I mean by images, first shadows, then reflections in water and in opaque, smooth, shining surfaces (ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανα συνέστηκεν) and so on, if you understand me."

"I do."

A line segment DL has been bisected unequally into a shorter segment DB and a longer segment BL. The shorter segment DB has again been bisected into a shorter segment DA and a longer segment AB, in the same proportion. Likewise, the longer segment BL has been bisected into a shorter segment BC and a longer segment CL, in the same proportion. The resulting linear figure has the following geometrical properties: (1) $DA:AB::DB:BL$, (2) $BC:CL::DB:BC$, (3) $DA:AB::BC:CL$, and (4) $AB=BC$.¹ The line segment DA corresponds to images in the visible world, more or less clear relative to one another. Shadows, for instance, are less clear than the mirror images in opaque, smooth, shining surfaces. Hence, the line segment DA represents a continuum of shadows and images, from the most shadowy images as we approach point D to the most exact reproductions approaching point A.

The next line segment (AB) corresponds to perceivable objects themselves, rather than images of perceivable objects (510a5):

"To the other segment assign the objects which the former are images of (ὃ τοῦτο εἰκεν): the animals around us and every kind of (πάν . . . γένος) of what grows naturally or is entirely artificial (το φευκτον καὶ το σκευαστον ὅλον)."

"I do so."

"And would you be willing to say that what is believed is

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, note and figure on pp. 64-65.

as different from what is known (διηρησθαι . . . ὡς το δοξασ-
τον προς το γνωστόν), in truth and untruth (ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μὴ),
as is an image from what it resembles (οὕτω ὁμοιωθέν προς το
ὃ ὁμοιωθή)."

"I certainly would."

Since perceivable objects are imitations of the forms, what is believed is as different from what is known as images of perceivable objects differ from those objects themselves. As shadows and mirror images differ, "in truth and untruth," from the perceivable objects they are imitations of, so those perceivable objects differ to the same degree from the real forms which they are imitations of. This relationship corresponds to geometrical property (1) of the divided line: $DA:AB::DB:BL$. Images of perceivable objects are as remote in truth (i.e. authenticity) from their originals as are perceivable objects from what is known. Since the images only resemble their originals, they are not genuine (ἀληθής) objects of belief. Similarly, since these perceivable objects are themselves only imitations of the forms, they are not genuine objects of knowledge. In authenticity and inauthenticity, what is believed is to what is known as images are to their originals.

We are next to consider how the line segment corresponding to what is known is to be divided. Socrates claims that the shorter of these segments (BC) corresponds to $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\phi\alpha$, and the longer segment (CL) corresponds to $\nu\omicron\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$. He begins by differentiating the method of $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\phi\alpha$ from the method of $\nu\omicron\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (510b4):

"[Relative to] the one segment, the mind, employing the former imitations as pictures (Ἡ το μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένῃ ψυχῇ), is compelled to inquire from hypotheses (ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων) toward a conclusion rather than toward a premise (οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν . . . ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ). And [relative to] the other segment (το δ' αὖ ἕτερον

ον)--toward an unhypothetical premise (ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον)--it goes from hypotheses (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα) without such images (ἀνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων), its method obtaining (τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη) forms themselves through forms alone (αὐτοῖς εἶδеси δι' αὐτῶν)."

"I don't quite understand what you mean."

Although this passage is somewhat difficult to put into English, it is clear that in the former process the mind uses images in order to understand the forms, these images being the perceivable objects of δόξα.¹

Just as in εἰκαστα the mind perceives objects of δόξα through (δία) their images in water and on smooth surfaces, so in διανοστα the mind knows the forms through their images, namely the perceivable objects of δόξα. And the latter process proceeds not from hypotheses toward a conclusion, but from hypotheses toward a first premise (ἀρχή), and the mind knows the forms not through images but through themselves (δι' αὐτῶν). Hence the segment of the line BL is divided into the shorter segment BC and the longer segment CL. The latter will be associated with νοήσις (understanding), and the former with διανοστα--because the mind understands (νοεῖ) the forms through (δία) perceivable objects as images.²

Thus the mind has indirect understanding (διανοστα) when it employs what Plato will call mathematical reasoning. For instance, when the mathematician is really reasoning about the form of a straight line, he draws an image and instance of this: an

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, notes on pp. 66-67.

²But see Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p. 405. There is no suggestion, in that very detailed work, of any such interpretation of διανοστα as the one I have given to it. If I am right about Plato's meaning, then it is not "ordinary."

actual perceivable straight line. He reasons from the hypothesis, the form of a straight line, to his conclusion, employing the drawn line as an image (instance) of the form.

The mind has understanding (i.e. direct understanding, νοήσις) when it engages in what Plato will call dialectical reasoning: it reasons from hypotheses toward the premises which they follow from, and it does not require images in order to understand the forms. For instance, when a mathematician inquires from hypotheses toward their premises, he can reason with forms alone and understand the forms through themselves (if he is a dialectical mathematician, of course). The objects which Plato is calling "hypotheses," "premises," and "conclusions" are the forms, as these are the objects of knowledge, regardless of whether they are understood directly or indirectly.

Glaucón has asked for a further explanation of the objects and types of inquiry which the segments of this part of the line indicate, and Socrates begins with hypothetical reasoning (510c2):

" . . . I think that you know that mathematicians in arithmetic and geometry, and so on, hypothesize (ὑποθέμενοι) the even and the odd, the figures and the three forms of angles, and other forms proper to each subject. These hypotheses have been adopted as if they were known (εἰδότες), and no one demands that an explanation (λόγον) of them be given either by himself or by anyone else, as though they were already evident (φανερῶν). And since all the rest follows step by step from these (ἐκ τούτων . . . ἀρχόμενοι . . . διεξίδυντες), they finish in complete agreement with what they anchor the investigation upon (ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐ ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁμήσωσι)."

"Yes, I certainly know that."

No explanation (λόγος) is given for the "hypotheses"; they are simply assumed. From these "hypotheses" conclusions (τελεῖται)

are drawn, consistent with the hypotheses they follow from. But although the "hypotheses" are really forms (the even, the odd, and so on), the reasoning about these forms is conducted through perceivable examples, i.e. sense-objects (510d5):

"Then don't you know that they require the visible forms (τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται) and make their arguments [or explanations] about them (τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται), and yet they are not thinking about these visible forms (οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι) but about those objects of which these are copies (ἐκείνων περὶ οἷς ταῦτα εἰσιν)? They make their arguments on behalf of (ἐνεκα) the square itself, the diagonal itself, and so on, instead of what they are drawing (ἀλλ' οὐ τούτης ἢν γράφουσιν). And these figures which they draw and construct, of which there are shadows and images in water (ὧν καὶ σκiai καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰδόμεναι εἰσιν), are needed as images (ὡς εἰκόσιν) by those who are seeking to see forms themselves (τούτοις . . . ζητοῦντες . . . αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν), which none would see except with indirect understanding (ὃ οὐκ . . . ἄλλως ἰδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ)."

"That's true."

In this final phrase, my translation differs from the customary ones, which imply that the objects known by διανοία are different from those known by νοήσις. It seems to me that "αὐτὰ" refers back to "ἐκεῖνα," which in turn refers to "those objects of which the visible forms are copies," i.e. the forms. And "αὐτὰ" is the direct object of "ἰδοι," whose subject is "τις." Therefore "τις" is either completely unrestricted, or qualified by "τούτοις." The result is that this phrase can mean either "which no one could see except by indirect understanding" or "which none of them [those who need the visible forms] could see except by indirect understanding." Thus my translation, "that none would see except by indirect understanding," leaves the English as ambiguous as the Greek. But my interpretation is that it means none of them: none of the mathematicians who employ images can see the forms except by indirect un-

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derstanding. For according to the analogy of the sun, all of the forms can be understood (νοῦν) when one sees them in the "light" of the form of the good.¹

The rest of the language in this quotation makes it clear that what is known by means of the method of reasoning from hypotheses to conclusions are (some of) the forms, and that these forms are known through their images, such as the pictures which mathematicians draw when they reason. Although their arguments are ostensibly about these pictures, they are really reasoning with the forms which the images resemble. Thus the line segment BL, divided into the shorter segment BC and the longer segment CL, has for its objects, respectively, images of the forms (i.e. objects directly perceived by δόξα) and the forms themselves. The divided line now represents (a) ways in which the mind believes or knows, and (b) objects which the mind believes or knows. In εἰκασία, represented by DA, the mind has indirect opinion of perceivable objects: it believes (δοξάζει) them through their images (shadows, reflections in water, etc.). The direct objects of εἰκασία are these images, but through these images the mind has indirect δόξα of perceivable objects themselves. In δόξα, represented by AB, the mind has direct opinion of perceivable objects themselves, rather than having belief of them through images. In διανοία, represented by BC, the mind has indirect understanding of the forms: it knows them through their images, the perceivable ob-

¹For an example of how the passage is ordinarily translated and interpreted, see Cornford, The Republic of Plato, pp. 225, 222-223.

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that the study of history is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sense of national identity. The author then discusses the various methods used by historians to study the past, including the use of primary and secondary sources, and the importance of critical thinking in the evaluation of historical evidence.

The second part of the paper discusses the role of the United States in the world. It is argued that the United States has a unique role to play in the world, and that it is essential for the United States to maintain its leadership in the world. The author then discusses the various challenges that the United States faces in the world, and the importance of the United States to the world.

The third part of the paper discusses the future of the United States. It is argued that the United States has a bright future, and that it is essential for the United States to continue to develop and grow. The author then discusses the various challenges that the United States faces in the future, and the importance of the United States to the future.

jects of direct opinion. The direct objects of $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma\alpha$ are perceivable objects, but through these imitations of the forms the mind has indirect understanding of the forms themselves. And in $\nu\omicron\theta\iota\varsigma$, represented by CL, the mind has direct understanding of the forms themselves, rather than having $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma\alpha$ of them through their examples (imitations, images).

If this interpretation is correct, then geometrical properties (2), (3), and (4) of the divided line also fit into the analogy, and Adam and others are wrong in suggesting that there is an anomaly in the equality of AB and BC.¹ First, the images of perceivable objects are imitations and images of the (relatively) authentic perceivable objects themselves. Likewise, these perceivable objects are imitations and images of the authentic forms, through which they are known; the objects represented by BC also stand, toward the forms represented by CL, in the relation of imitations and images to their originals. Thus, property (3) of the divided line holds: $DA:AB::BC:CL$; in truth and untruth, images are to perceivable objects as perceivable objects are to the forms.

Second, since the difference between the imitations employed in $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma\alpha$ and their originals directly understood by $\nu\omicron\theta\iota\varsigma$ is exactly the same as the difference between what is believed and what is known, the property (2) of the divided line holds: in truth and untruth, $BC:CL::DB:BL$. The images (examples) employed by indirect understanding are to the forms understood directly as (these same) perceivable objects of opinion are to (these same) forms

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, 64.

known. And third, property (4) holds: since the objects of direct opinion are the same as the objects employed by indirect understanding, $AB=BC$. In truth and untruth, the direct objects of opinion are the same as the objects employed in indirect understanding, and therefore there is equal authenticity.

Plato will claim that the analogy holds not only in respect of truth and untruth, but also in respect of clarity and unclarity, when he reviews the four divisions of the line. But thus far he has only said that the line represents shadows and images in clarity and unclarity relative to one another. He has not yet claimed that the major divisions of the line are clear and unclear relative to one another, and he will never claim that the objects represented within each domain are more or less true (authentic) relative to one another. We may infer that each of the other three line segments represents its objects in positions corresponding to their clarity and unclarity relative to one another. Some perceivable objects are more clear than others, and some forms are more clear than others. But we have no grounds here for assuming that some forms are more genuine than others, or that some perceivable objects are more genuine than others.

At 511e Plato will claim that (between divisions, not within divisions) each type of knowing and believing "partakes as much of clarity as its objects partake of truth." This appears to create an anomaly in the divided line analogy, since it makes direct opinion as clear as indirect understanding (and as authentic): the objects through which the latter has indirect under-

standing are the same as those which the former believes directly. But διανοία isn't any clearer or more authentic than δόξα in how it grasps those objects which correspond to it and which it uses.

But in direct understanding (νοήσις) the forms are known, not through perceivable images and examples as with διανοία, but "through themselves." Socrates begins his discussion of this part of the divided line by distinguishing between the hypothetical method and the dialectical method (511b3):

"Then you may understand what I say about what is intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ)[corresponding to] the other segment, which unaided reasoning (αὐτός ὁ λόγος) grasps by the power of dialectic (ἀπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει). It does not adopt the hypotheses as premises (τας ὑποθέσεις ποιοῦμενος . . . ἀρχας), but really as hypotheses (τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις), upward steps and anchors (ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς), in order to get all the way to the unhypothetical beginning of everything (ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἴω). And having grasped this (ᾗσάμενος αὐτῆς), it goes back down toward conclusions (ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνει) keeping hold of the consequences (ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχόμενων). It requires absolutely nothing perceivable, but descends with forms alone [or with forms themselves] through forms to forms, and concludes with forms (εἶδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη)."

The unhypothetical beginning of everything (or first premise of all, τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν) is the form of the good. Once the mind has grasped this unhypothetical beginning, it can descend to conclusions. And neither the ascent nor the descent requires images in order to aid the reasoning. Since one knows the forms directly, rather than through perceivable examples, one can ratiocinate without needing any perceivable things as images and examples. And once the form of the good is understood, all of the other forms can be understood as following from the form of the good. Whereas the hypothetical method goes from hypotheses toward their

conclusions, the dialectical method goes from the hypotheses to their premises, until it reaches the unhypothetical ἀρχή. The descent back down, likewise, can dispense with images entirely (which makes the process different from hypothetical reasoning in both directions), and one can understand all of the forms as consequences (nearer or more remote) from the form of the good. But what does this reasoning from forms to forms involve? What does this reasoning with forms themselves consist of, and what is the relation among the forms which such reasoning follows? It is no longer possible to avoid undertaking a most speculative inquiry: what is the logic of Plato's forms?

The description of Kneale and Kneale, although brief, suggests the general outline of the logic of the forms, which I am taking as a point of departure:

Both in the Republic and the Sophist there is a strong suggestion that correct thinking is following out the connections between Forms. The model is mathematical thinking, e.g. the proof given in the Meno that the square on the diagonal is double the original square in area. For Plato necessary connections hold between Forms, and inference is presumably valid when we follow in thought the connections between Forms as they are.¹

The Meno example illustrates mathematical thinking in that it is deductive: from its assumptions (which in the Republic Plato calls "hypotheses") one deduces conclusions.² If this mathematical thinking makes inferences which correspond to the "necessary connections" between the forms, then it is correct mathematical think-

¹William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 20.

²Meno 84d-85b.

ing, or as we would now call it, valid inference. In this mathematical thinking, this reasoning from hypotheses to conclusions, one does not need νοήσις of the forms about which one is thinking or reasoning. He can think and reason by means of images (i.e., for Plato, examples), and therefore in the Republic Plato claims that hypothetical reasoning (reasoning by means of images of the forms one is reasoning about) proceeds from hypotheses to conclusions, i.e. deductively.

It is important to realize, however, that whether mathematical reasoning is propositional or not, the forms themselves are not propositional. The "hypotheses" and "conclusions" are not propositions, but forms. In such reasoning these forms may be understood through "images" (actual drawn lines, etc., and perhaps even sentences), but nevertheless the hypotheses and conclusions are not these images but the forms, which are understood through the images. Since the hypotheses and conclusions are forms, the relations between them are connections between forms--"necessary connections," in some sense.

However, mathematical reasoning is only one of the two forms of reasoning described in the Republic. Plato claims that when we have direct understanding (νοήσις) of the forms, we can "go from hypotheses to an ἀρχή." The process of dialectical reasoning seems to be the reverse of the process of mathematical (or hypothetical) reasoning. Since the forms are changeless, it may be presumed that the "necessary connections" between them cannot change. Therefore in dialectical reasoning (when that reasoning

is correct) we must be following those same necessary connections from hypotheses to an ἀρχή which "implies" them. In other words, in following these "necessary connections" we are inferring the "premises" from which the "hypotheses" can be validly inferred by deduction. Hypothetical reasoning, if correct, is valid deduction of conclusions from hypotheses, whereas dialectical reasoning (at least that part of it which "goes from hypotheses to an ἀρχή") is valid induction, in Aristotle's sense, of premises from hypotheses which are implied by those premises. After the inductive reasoning, of course, they are not "hypotheses" but conclusions which follow from the unhypothetical first premise (ἀρχή) with which they are linked by the "necessary connections."

For Aristotle, induction consists in "finding the middle term."¹ For instance, Socrates dies, Plato dies, etc., and one needs an explanation why all of these individuals are mortal. Then one discovers that they are mortal because they are men. One perceives that all men are (necessarily) mortal, and therefore if Socrates is a man, then it follows (necessarily) that he is mortal. The inference from "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" to "Socrates is mortal" is a valid deductive inference. But the inference from "Socrates is a man" and "Socrates is mortal" to "all men are mortal" is inductive: we discover that he is (necessarily) mortal because he is human. If we further seek to know why all

¹Aristotle Posterior Analytics 89b10-20, 100b. See also (1) W. D. Ross, Aristotle: a Complete Exposition of His Works & Thought, Meridian Books, pp. 42-44, and (2) Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 25-26.

men are mortal, we find that they are animals, and that all animals are mortal, and so on, until we reach definitions and first principles (ἀρχαί). In other words, inductive reasoning (if correct--that is, if it discovers the necessary connections) is just the reverse of scientific demonstration; and induction as an inferential process (correct or otherwise) is the reverse of deduction.

For Plato, of course, these necessary connections hold between forms, not between kinds, propositions, or particulars. But, just as Plato's variety of "deduction" infers forms from forms which "imply" them, so Plato's variety of "induction" infers forms from forms "implied by" them. It proceeds from "hypotheses" to the ἀρχή which "implies" those "hypotheses."

Thus, both in Plato's deduction and in his induction, valid inference is correspondence with the "necessary connections" between forms. But in hypothetical reasoning, one deduces forms from forms, following these necessary connections from premises to conclusions, whereas in dialectical reasoning (or, at least, in the upward portion of dialectical reasoning) one induces forms from forms, following these same necessary connections from conclusions to their premises, until one finally reaches their unhypothetical origin (ἀρχή). Then, in turn, one can deduce the whole system of forms "implied" by this single origin (the form of the good).

This theory of a system of forms related to the form of the good by "necessary connections," in which the unhypothetical form of the good "implies" all of the forms, encounters a diffi-

culty. Since the forms are not propositional, what can these "necessary connections" be? What is this "implication" that holds between the forms? Brumbaugh thinks that this relation is a sort of "inclusion." He begins by noting two "facts":

The possibility of science and logic, and that of sound common sense as well, rest on two facts: first, that the forms are an ordered system; second, that their order sets up limits and imposes patterns on the world of space and time in which their instances appear.¹

The order of this system, according to Brumbaugh, consists of relations of "inclusion" and "exclusion" among forms.² The odd, or oddness, for instance, "includes" the one, the three, the five, etc., and it "excludes" the even. Hence, it also "excludes" whatever the even "includes": the two, the four, etc. Such opposites as the even and the odd, life and death, tallness and shortness, and the good and the bad are "mutually exclusive": each of them "excludes" the other, and therefore "excludes" whatever the other "includes."

Moreover, it is by "inclusion" and "exclusion" that the forms set limits and impose patterns upon particulars. Since the odd and the even exclude one another, any collection of things which is odd is necessarily not even, and vice versa. And since the even includes the two, any pair of objects is necessarily even. Particulars are limited and ordered in these ways because forms "include" and "exclude" forms. (Although Brumbaugh does not men-

¹Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato for the Modern Age, Collier Books, p. 110.

²Ibid., pp. 110-111.

tion them, one wonders about "mutually inclusive" forms. Anything triangular is necessarily trilateral, and vice versa. Therefore they (triangularity and trilaterality) are mutually inclusive. Are they the same, or different?)

There are two difficulties about Brumbaugh's point of view: (1) what do "inclusion" and "exclusion" mean? And (2) the forms do not, according to Plato, entirely succeed in imposing such patterns and limits upon particulars. Things in the world of becoming "are and are not whatever you call them"; they are "ambivalent," like riddles. They only have "intermediate existence," since (for instance) what is even can also be in some way odd.¹ Apparently, for Plato, only the domain of the forms is consistent and coherent. This is not a criticism of Brumbaugh, for he is platonizing rather than giving a theory of Plato's logic of the forms.

But the main problem is not with the limits and patterns imposed (or not entirely imposed) upon particulars, but with the relations among the forms. In what sense do forms "include," and "exclude," forms? If we assume that the whole system of forms is "implied" by the form of the good, which seems to be implied by saying that the form of the good is the unhypothetical origin of the forms, then all of the forms are "included by" the form of the good. But then the form of the good includes the form of the bad, even though as the opposite of the good it is "excluded by" the good. How can the good both include and exclude its opposite?

¹See above, pp. 64-65.

Inasmuch as the good is the cause of the being and substance of all of the forms, the relations between the forms will be a function of the relations between the form of the good and all of the other forms. But as Ross notes, even though it is the form of the good which gives value as well as existence to all of the other forms, the relation between the form of the good and the other forms cannot be that of final causality:

If we are to attempt even dimly to understand Plato's meaning, we must first realize that the functions assigned to the Idea of good are assigned to it in relation not to the sensible world, but to the world of Ideas; it plays the part in relation to them that the sun plays in relation to sensible things. In saying what he does of it he is not stating, directly at any rate, a teleological view of the world of nature. What he is saying is that the Ideas themselves exist and are known by virtue of their relation to the Idea of good. What can be the meaning of such a view of the world of universals? It is reasonable to offer a teleological explanation of some or all of the facts of nature, if we believe either in a benevolent Governor of the universe, or in a *nisus* in natural objects toward the good. But a teleological explanation of the world of Ideas is in a different position. Ideas are not changeable things, plastic to the will of a Governor; they are standards to which a Governor of the universe must conform. Nor on the other hand can we conceive of the Ideas as having a *nisus* towards good . . . ; things may have a *nisus*, but universals cannot.¹

The forms (including the form of the good) may be aimed at by particulars in the world of becoming, but this does not account for either the nature of the forms or the relations between them. Purpose and the teleological language of purpose are irrelevant to the "necessary connections" between the forms.

The form of the good is an object of love, and therefore a final cause, for all purposes of beings which can have purposes, and it may be the case that, for Plato, all particulars in the

¹Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 41.

world of becoming are purposive. But the relations between the form of the good and the other forms cannot be such a final causality. The forms are not purposive beings, nor are they efficient causes (means to the form of the good as an end) among themselves. The form of the good must be the cause of the forms in some other sense. All of the other forms may exist and be what they are because they are good, and therefore have those "necessary connections" between them for the same reason, but that does not tell us what the necessary connections are.

One of the criticisms frequently made of Plato is that he has failed to recognize relational universals.¹ One finds constant reference to monadic forms, but only relatively rarely does one encounter in Plato terms that might be interpreted as referring to relations. In the Timaeus, for instance, we are told about "the same" (identity) and "the other" (difference), and in the Phaedo we find a reference to "perfect equality."² And we find the "double" and "half" in the Republic, and "tallness" and "shortness" in the Phaedo, where it seems that Plato is taking these for monadic forms rather than for relational ones.³

If Plato would recognize certain relational forms, then we could interpret these "necessary connections" as some sort of relational forms which the forms in those relations partake of in pairs. An argument for doing so would be that otherwise these

¹Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, chap. vii, passim.

²Timaeus 35a, and Phaedo 75a.

³Republic 475c, and Phaedo 100c-01a.

would not be intelligible (νοητόν), since only forms are objects of understanding (νοήσις). The disadvantage of this conjecture, however, is that it would place some relational forms "higher than the good in rank and power"--or at least higher in rank. Any form which the good partakes of would seem to stand higher in the hierarchy of forms than the good, and this does not fit the picture of the good Plato describes in the analogy of the sun. Moreover, there is no evidence anywhere in Plato that pairs of particulars, rather than individual particulars, partake of universal forms. Nevertheless, this is possible; Plato may have thought that there are relational universals. The chief objection would be to the claim that the "necessary connections" are universals (i.e. relational forms), for in that case the form of the good (along with the forms it "implies") would partake of them, and thus be "lower" in the hierarchy than the "necessary connections."

There is no direct evidence in the Republic that the forms partake of one another. As we have noted, Plato does say that they are "in common with one another among bodies and activities."¹ But he nowhere in the Republic claims that they are in common with one another otherwise--in participation relations, for instance. Nevertheless, the most plausible hypothesis, in my opinion, for what the "necessary connections" are is that they are participation relations (relations, that is, of instantiation and imitation among forms).

Participation relations are not forms, and therefore are not objects of understanding. In the Parmenides, where Plato encounters

¹See above, pp. 50-51.

the suggestion that participation is a form, he rejects it by means of a third-man argument.¹ If these "necessary connections" are likewise not intelligible, then they could be participation relations. For instance, to say that the good "implies" another form is to say that the other form partakes of the form of the good. In that sense the form of the good is the cause of the other forms. This is the meaning of the word "cause" ("αἴρ(α)") which is given in the Phaedo: "it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful." They are beautiful because they are instances of the beautiful.²

I am suggesting that the form of the good is the cause of the other forms in that those other forms partake of the form of the good. The other forms are "implied by" the good in that they partake of the good. Hence when one "follows up" the order of the forms from hypotheses to their origin, he is "following up" the forms through participation relations. A possible example is with the forms of number: the two partakes of the even, the even partakes of number, number partakes of substance, and substance partakes of the good. Likewise, when one is "following them down," he is taking them in the reverse order from this: deducing those forms which partake of the forms he has taken as "hypotheses." Finally, the good is the highest subject of study in that nothing else partakes of nothing but itself: it outranks even substance, in that substance partakes of it and it does not

¹Parmenides 132a. ²Phaedo 100c-01a.

partake of substance. It is the universal of everything and the instance of nothing except (perhaps) itself.

The good causes all of the forms to exist, even substance ($\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha$), because they acquire their nature (character, substance) from it by participation. That is, it gives them their nature in that they partake of it themselves, or (possibly) in that they are ancestrally related to the good by means of participation relations.¹ In this causal sense the good is the "parent" not only of the forms but of the sun and all the other things in the world of becoming, since the sun and other things in the domain of becoming partake of the forms, which in turn are related to the good by participation relations.²

The good is "higher even than substance in power" since it is the cause of substance and substance is not the cause of it. It is an unhypothetical first premise in that it exists unconditionally, as the origin of all the other forms, which exist conditionally--i.e. they can exist because the form of the good exists. Since (in the Republic) participation is not only a relation of instance to universal, but of image to object imitated, the good is the most authentic of the forms: they are at best only imitations and images of it. Finally, since participation (imitation)

¹See W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic, revised edition. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 229. For an idea of what I mean by "ancestor" here, substitute forms for classes and participation for class-membership in the following formula: "x is an ancestor of y" means "x belongs to every class which contains y and all parents of members." The construction is due to Frege.

²The theory that the order of the forms consists of participation relations is as early as Plotinus: e.g. Ennead V ix 2.

is not a form, it is not intelligible and cannot be defined. Thus it is pointless to ask further what these "necessary connections" are among the forms: they are unintelligible and undefinable relations of participation.

If this theory of the order of the forms is correct, then there are still six problems for which I have no solution to offer. First, what about mutually inclusive forms, if there are any? Do they partake of one another? If so, then participation is not a relation between a universal and its instance, nor between an image and its original (at least, not always).

Second, what about the form of the bad? Does it partake of the good? If so, then it is and is not good: it is the opposite of the good, and therefore excluded by it, and yet it is included by it since the good implies all of the forms. Yet if it does not partake of the good, then it is not in the system of forms.

Third, if the relation of participation (imitation, implication) is unintelligible, then how can we reason correctly from forms to forms in either direction? And fourth, if the good outranks substance then it has no substance (no nature), and therefore cannot be understood--we cannot know "what it is." We not only cannot define it (describe it, i.e. say that it is such-and-such), we cannot even understand it (if that means "know what it is"--i.e. know its nature). We could at most be in some way acquainted with it, without knowing what it is, and in that sense "understand" it. Since the good partakes of nothing (or of nothing

but itself), it has no substance (nature, form) to be understood. Perhaps we could "see" it, but we could not "see" what it is.

Fifth, if the necessary connections among the forms are participation relations, then they are imitation relations. But this has the effect of dividing up the intelligible domain into a hierarchy of domains, containing more or less real and more or less authentic forms. The segment CL of the divided line would have to be further sub-divided indefinitely (depending upon the ancestral remoteness of the form of the good).

And sixth, one still cannot tell why the mind requires the images and examples in hypothetical deductive reasoning, and yet can dispense with them in dialectical deductive and inductive reasoning.

In spite of the importance of the logic of the forms, the most important distinction which has emerged from the analogies of the divided line and the sun is that between direct and indirect knowledge and belief. Plato has claimed that until the mind (or rather, the rational element of the mind) has embarked upon dialectical inquiry, it cannot have direct knowledge of the forms. It can only know them indirectly through their images, by means of the hypothetical (or mathematical) method of reasoning. Similarly, the mind can have belief of perceivable objects through their images, such as the imitations drawn by mimetic artists, the mirror-images of objects in reflective surfaces, and perhaps even the discourse about perceivable objects, if Plato would regard language as a variety of imitation, or picturing, of the

world.

On the other hand, when the mind has genuine belief (δόξα ἀληθής) of perceivable objects themselves, and perceives them directly rather than through images, it has more clear perception of objects--objects which are perceived as they are. Likewise, when the mind has understanding (νοῦς, νοήσις) of the forms, its knowledge is not indirect; it has clearer knowledge of them and understands them as they are, rather than understanding them through their images (the perceivable objects of the visible world) by διανοία.

This interpretation of the divided line analogy is very different from the usual one, which holds that (1) διανοία has its own objects, the "mathematical objects" intermediate between the forms and sensible objects, (2) the very nature of mathematical reasoning demands that one use images and examples, as the "mathematical objects" cannot be understood in any other way, and (3) four ingredients of reality are represented on the divided line: the images of εἰκασία, the objects of δόξα, the mathematical objects, and the forms. But it seems to me that, as an interpretation of Plato's ontology in the Republic at least, Ross's arguments are decisive.¹

I have claimed that for Plato knowledge is a relation between the rational portion of the mind and the forms. Inately we have the power to know them, and we can learn to know them if we have a good education. In the analogies of the sun and of the

¹Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 62-65.

divided line, I have argued that these forms have a logic and a hierarchy, and I have claimed that this logic and hierarchy consists of necessary connections which are relations of participation among the forms, the ancestor of them all being the unhy-po-thetical origin and cause of them, the form of the good.

The divided line analogy makes a further point: the rational element may either know the forms directly, through direct understanding, or it can know them indirectly, through indirect understanding. In other words, in direct understanding the mind has immediate knowledge of the forms, and in indirect understanding the mind has intermediate knowledge of them--it knows them through their examples (images). But this rational element cannot have direct understanding of the forms unless it is engaged in dialectical reasoning. In inductive dialectical reasoning, one ascends by participation relations (following them in thought) toward the form of the good. In deductive dialectical reasoning, one descends from the form of the good to all of the forms it causes and implies--that is to say, all of the forms. In neither the ascent nor the descent does one need any examples (images).

However, neither of the analogies has anything about how the mind progresses from εἰκασία to νοήσις; we are not told how one gets from the indirect perception of perceivable objects to the direct understanding of the forms. We have only a static picture of these states of mind, and of the forms of reasoning and conceiving which are represented by the four segments of the line. Nothing has yet been explained about how the mind moves from divi-

sion through division to division. How does the mind progress from εἰκασία to νοήσις? The answer to this question is provided by the program of studies which Plato provides in 518b-540c. But in one great scheme, the allegory of the cave, this static picture of the analogies is tied in with the dynamic picture of the program of studies. There are recent discussions of the pyramidal development of the Republic, and arguments about where the apex is. I suggest as a candidate the allegory of the cave.

514c-517b

Here is the allegory: imagine a society of men living in an underground cave. Since birth, these men have been prisoners, chained in positions which prevent them from seeing anything but the rear wall of the cave. Between them and the end of a tunnel connecting the cave with the world above is a bright fire, and between the fire and the prisoners is a low wall. Other men are crouched behind this wall, between it and the fire, and they hold various objects above it: dolls and statuettes of men and animals, and images of other natural or artificial objects. Some of these imitations (of the perceivable objects in the world above) are carried along the wall, and others remain in the same place. Some of them are accompanied by noises which imitate the sounds and cries of their originals, and others are represented as remaining silent. So as these objects are held above and moved along the wall, they are cast in shadow by the fire, and the prisoners see the shadows on the rear wall of the cave. The wall also reflects the noises that accompany the movements of the dolls and

statuettes. Therefore the prisoners see only the shadows of images and hear only the echoes of mimicry. But since they know nothing else, they attribute the echoes to the shadows, and they think that the shadows on the wall are the real and true things in the natural world.

Then suppose that the prisoners are released from their chains and compelled to turn around and look at the objects which the fire illuminates and casts in shadow. Finally, they look directly at the fire itself, once their eyes have become accustomed to its brightness. Now they know that they see more clearly than they did before, and that the objects which they saw before were only shadows and imitations of the objects in their cave. And the last object which they can see clearly is the fire itself, because it is so bright compared to the objects in the cave: the dolls, images, and statuettes, and the shadows of these. (For the fire is only an imitation of the sun, just as the dolls and statuettes are only imitations of animals and people in the world above ground.)

Next, suppose that a certain prisoner is dragged over the long, rough, uphill road through the tunnel of the cave, and out of the cave into the open, bright, sun-lit air above ground. The light would temporarily blind him, and he would be unable to see anything clearly, not even shadows and images in water. (Notice that these sun-lit imitations are as removed from reality and authenticity as the dolls and statuettes in the cave: they are images of real people, animals, and so on.) Once his eyes had be-

come accustomed to the light, he would be able to see shadows and images in water. Next, he would be able to see natural objects themselves, rather than only images of them. Finally, he would at last be able to see the sun itself, and he would learn that it is the cause of everything perceivable, in the cave as well as out of it.

Then, when this man returns to the cave, he will be able to see much more clearly than those who have never left it. Once he had become accustomed to the darkness, he would see the dolls and statuettes for what they are: imitations of the objects in nature above the ground. He would see the fire as only an image of the sun, and the shadows on the real wall of the cave as only imitations of the imitations in the cave.

Having told this story, Socrates interprets it in relation to the theory he has developed by means of the analogies of the divided line and of the sun (517b1):

" . . . if you compare the region of what appears through vision (την . . . δ' ὁψεως φαινομένην ἐδραν) to that of the prisoner, and the light of its fire to the power of the sun (το . . . τοῦ πυρος ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει), and if you put the upward journey (την . . . ἄνω ἀναβάσιν) and vision of things above (θεῖαν τῶν ἄνω) for the upward road of the mind (την . . . τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοδον) toward the intelligible domain (εἰς τον νοητον τόπον), then you will not, I hope, be mistaken. . . . In the intelligible domain, the idea of the good is the last and hardest thing to be seen, but it is right to infer that it is then seen to be itself entirely the cause of everything right and beautiful (πᾶσι πάντων αὐτῇ ὀρθῶν τε και καλῶν αἰτία). In the visible world it produces light and the master (κύριον) of this region, and in the intelligible domain it is mastery itself (αὐτῇ κυρία), producing truth and understanding (ἀλήθειαν και νοῦν παρασχομένη). And one must know this if one is to act wisely (ἐμφοδῶς) in affairs public and private."

The form of the good is not only the cause of all of the forms, it

is also the cause of the sun, which in turn is the cause of everything in the visible world, or at any rate, the cause of everything about the things in the visible world except what their nature is. But what their nature is, in turn, is caused by the forms, which in their turn are caused by the form of the good. Therefore the form of the good is the cause of everything whatsoever, whether it is in the world of becoming or in the world of the unchanging and eternal forms.

We are to compare the upward road through the tunnel of the cave and into the sunlight to the "upward road" of the mind from the domain of belief (δόξα) to the intelligible domain. The mind, like the prisoner, can progress from εἰκασία to genuine belief (δόξα ἀληθής), from direct belief to indirect understanding (διανοία), and from διανοία to (direct) understanding (νοήσις). For each of these three stages of the process, there is the problem of interpreting what the allegory has alleged, and what the analogies of the sun and of the divided line have not discussed, namely the problem of how the mind gets from division through division to division.

First, in what sense does the mind begin with εἰκασία (if it does so), and how does it get from there to genuine opinion of perceivable objects? Second, how does the mind advance from genuine opinion to διανοία, and what makes this such a "long, rough, uphill road"? And third, how does the mind progress from indirect understanding to direct understanding of the forms?

Curiously, Plato says nothing at all, in 518b-540c, about

the progress of the mind from εἰκασία to direct δόξα. He describes in great detail the development of the mind from δόξα to διανοία, following its progress through all the branches of actual or envisaged mathematics, and systematically. And then when it is time to discuss the progress of the mind from διανοία to νοήσις, he has Socrates say, "Glaucon, my friend, you will not be able to follow me any longer," and then only repeat previous "opinions and images" about these matters. In 518b-540c, therefore, Plato only addresses at length the second of these problems involved in the development of the mind from εἰκασία to νοήσις.

VII. KNOWLEDGE: THE LONG, ROUGH, UPHILL ROAD

The following section of the Republic, 518b-540c, is for the most part confined to the "long, rough, uphill road" from genuine (or direct) opinion into indirect understanding (διανοια), and through διανοια toward, but not into, direct understanding (νοησις). This process is the second of the three processes alluded to in the allegory of the cave.

In the allegory, the three processes in the progress of the mind from εἰκασια to νοησις are: (1) the release of the prisoners from their chains, turning them around to look at the fire and at the images its light shines on, (2) the upward journey of one of the prisoners, who is pulled up the tunnel toward the open air above, where he sees the shadows and images of the natural objects in the world above, and (3) the last redirection of the prisoner, when he is turned about and can look up at the originals of these various imitations and images, and finally at the sun itself.

In each of these processes (the first rotation, the upward journey, and the last rotation), the change in the prisoner and his circumstances is: (1) from darkness to light; (2) from unclear vision to clearer vision; (3) from more obscure objects to brighter and clearer ones (in the upward journey there is no change in the kind of direct objects, but after it there are brighter and clearer indirect ones); (4) from below and downward to above and upward;

and (5) from image to original (once again, in the upward journey, there is no change in the objects directly observed, but afterward the indirect objects are the originals observed through their images).

If the allegory can be correlated with the progress of the mind in regard to each of these aspects of the process, then each stage in the development of the mind can be described in the terms corresponding to the aspects of the transitions in the allegory. In other words, each stage in the progress of the mind can be described in the literal terms corresponding to each of the five aspects of each stage in the journey of the prisoner. We must make the following replacements: (1) truth (authenticity) for light, (2) vision for (the power of knowledge), (3) clear and evident for bright and clear, (4) the intelligible domain for the domain of sense-objects above the ground, and (5) the domain of sense-objects for the world inside the cave.

The first stage in the development of the mind, corresponding to the first rotation of the prisoners in the cave, is a redirection of the mind from: (1) the less genuine images of perceivable objects to the more genuine (but still really spurious) perceivable objects themselves, in that the mind now sees these perceivable objects themselves rather than indirectly through their images; (2) the less clear vision of shadows and images to the clearer and brighter vision of their perceivable originals; (3) the darker and more obscure (or indistinct) shadows and images to the brighter and clearer original sense-objects; (4) from literally

below and downward (reflections in water and shadows on the ground) to literally above and upward (the objects reflected in the water and casting shadows on the ground); and (5) from the images of appearances to the appearances (sense-objects) themselves.

The next transition in the life of the mind is the "long, rough, uphill road from genuine opinion to knowledge"--i.e. from direct opinion to indirect understanding. It proceeds: (1) from the inauthentic objects of opinion to the (indirectly known) authentic intelligible objects; (2) from the vision of what is visible to the indirect "vision," i.e. understanding, of what is knowable; (3) from bright and clear objects of sense-perception (which are not clear and evident) to the clear and evident objects of knowledge (indirectly known); (4) from below (the perceivable world) to above (the intelligible world), where the rational element looks "upward" toward the form (indirectly understood) by looking "downward" at their images (directly perceived); and (5) from directly perceived visible objects, which are themselves images of the forms, to the genuine forms themselves (indirectly understood through these same perceivable objects).

The last transition in the life of the mind is the development from indirect understanding of the forms to the direct understanding of them. Like the first rotation, it is a redirection of the mind from the images through which objects are seen to the objects themselves. It proceeds: (1) from the inauthentic perceivable objects through which the forms are understood to the

authentic forms themselves; (2) from the indirect understanding of the forms, which is a less clear state of knowing, to direct understanding of them, which is the clearest "vision" one can have of the forms; (3) from the less clear and evident objects through which the forms are understood to the clearest and most evident objects, the unique, changeless, and eternal forms; (4) from the perceivable examples of the forms in the world of becoming to the knowable forms themselves in the world of complete existence; and (5) from the images of the forms to the original forms themselves.

It is important to note that only the first and the third transitions are called "rotations," "being turned around," or "redirection." The transition from εἰκασία to δόξα ἀληθῆς is a development of the mind within opinion, from indirect and inauthentic opinion to direct and authentic opinion. The mind is redirected from having opinion of objects indirectly to having opinion of them directly. Similarly, the transition from διανοία to νοήσις is a progress of the mind within knowledge, where the mind is redirected from just understanding the forms indirectly to understanding them directly.

But (in the allegory of the cave) the second of these stages of development is not called a "rotation" or a "turning-around" but a "long, rough, uphill road (or journey)." Later, however, Plato will use the word "περιαγωγῆς" ("redirection") to describe the progress of the mind from opinion to knowledge (where sometimes, at least, he means only the second of these three stages

rather than the whole process).

The allegory suggests, however, that the second of these three stages is much the most laborious. In the first stage of the allegory, the prisoners need only be freed from their chains and compelled to turn around and observe the dolls and statuettes. In the second stage there is a long journey, in which the prisoner has to be dragged uphill over rough and rocky ground. And the third stage is merely another rotation, which apparently the mind can accomplish without working "like a slave" for it.¹

One has the impression that the first stage is painless, if not particularly rewarding, that the second stage is long and painful intellectual drudgery, and that the third stage (although perhaps not easy) is pleasant and interesting: having sweated through the mathematical studies that form the curriculum of the transition from opinion into indirect understanding, the student is prepared to embark upon dialectical inquiry, and enjoy the search for explanations of the hypotheses under the guidance of some Socratic friend and tutor.

There is some difficulty in deciding what Plato has in mind for the first transition. The remaining discussions that appear to be relevant to the allegory do not furnish any more evidence, and Plato may not have intended to tell us any more about it than one can gather from the divided line analogy and the cave allegory. However, certain things which Plato says elsewhere in the Republic do lead me to conclude that he had formed a position on how the

¹Republic 494d.

mind, beginning in indirect opinion, is released from this condition and "turned around" toward genuine opinion, and that he has discussed this first rotation at some length in the Republic. He claims that the first training of the guardians-to-be will be made up of (among other things) beneficial and more genuine stories, rather than the harmful and false stories which children are ordinarily first told.¹ He is led to banish mimetic poets from his state because they foster and preserve false and imitative pictures of the world.² He admits that even philodoxists love to look at and learn about whatever can be perceived, rather than remaining content with second-hand evidence.³

Thus I believe that for Plato every man's mind begins in εἰκασία (indirect and inauthentic opinion), and is redirected toward genuine and direct opinion by experience and good fortune if not by a good early education. If this is true, then the first stage of the development of the mind has been described by Plato in his initial detailed description of the early training of the guardians.⁴

The second two stages of the development of the mind are described in what immediately follows the allegory of the cave, namely 518b-540c. The "long, rough, uphill journey" through the branches of mathematics is described literally and directly, and the third stage is once again only characterized by means of images and metaphors, as in the analogy of the divided line and the cave

¹Republic 377c. ²Republic 605a-b. ³Republic 476a.

⁴Republic 376-98.

allegory.

518b-540c

Socrates begins by claiming that knowledge is not something introduced into the mind "like vision into blind eyes," but a power already present in the mind (518c5):

"our present argument refers to this power present in each man's mind (σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δυνάμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), as well as to the instrument with which each man learns (τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος). Just as an eye is unable to see except by turning with the whole body from what is obscure to what is bright (πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτιώδους), so this instrument must be turned around with the whole mind from what becomes toward what exists (ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου . . . εἰς τὸ ὄν), in order that the mind can be lifted up (ἕως . . . δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχεῖσθαι) to contemplate [or envision] the clearest object that exists (τοῦ ὄντος τοῦ φανερότατον . . . θεωμένη): the good."

"Yes."

The power of knowing is present in each man's mind because this power is possessed by the "eye" of the mind, the rational element. This portion of the mind is turned with the whole mind from perceivable objects to the forms, after which the mind becomes able to be lifted up to contemplate (θεᾶσθαι) the form of the good, the "brightest" of the forms.

Since this power is present in the rational element of the mind, Socrates argues that there should be an art (τέχνη) for the development of this power. It would be an art of redirection, or reorientation, of the mind, turning it from what becomes toward what exists (518d3):

"Then there can be an art for this instrument: an art of redirection, which would reverse someone's attitude (τίνα τροπὴν . . . μεταστραφήσεται) as quickly and efficiently as possible--not an art of putting vision into him, as he already has it, but is neither rightly oriented (ὀρθῶς τετραμμένη) nor looking at what he should (βλέποντι οἱ ἔδει)--but an art for

contriving this reorientation (τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι)."
 "So it seems."

This art of reorientation reverses the attitude of the mind, rather than putting "vision" (i.e. understanding) into it. The rational element of the mind already possesses this power of knowing. The art of redirection only reorients it, "turning" it with the whole mind so that it "looks at" what exists absolutely rather than at "what becomes." Thus the art of reorientation enables the philosophic element of the mind to become what its nature is: knower of the wisdom it loves.

Socrates does not further elaborate upon what the nature of this reorientation is, and continues to rely on metaphors of turning. However, he does explain in considerable detail how the art develops the power present in the mind: the training the mind gets which enables it to "turn" from sense-objects to the forms. According to Socrates, the problem is how men can be reoriented from the visible domain to the knowable domain (521c1):

"Then, if you wish, we will ascertain by what means men of this sort can be developed, and how one leads them up to the light (πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς), as some men are said to have been led up from Hades to the gods."

"Very well."

"It would not involve spinning the shell,¹ but redirection (περιαγωγή) of someone's mind from night-dark day (ἐκ νυκτερινῆς . . . ἡμέρας) to genuine day (εἰς ἀληθινὴν). It is a road up into what exists (τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον), which we would call genuine philosophy (ἣν . . . φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν

¹Cornford, The Republic of Plato, p. 237. In his note, Cornford describes a child's game in which players toss a shell in the air. It has light and dark sides, and if the player calls the toss correctly he wins, and if not he loses. The body, of course, is the "shell" of the mind, so that Plato means here that it is the mind which is reoriented rather than the body.

εἶναι)."

"Certainly."

This redirection of the mind (and the art which can accomplish it) are equated with (1) a road up into what exists, and (2) genuine philosophy. The second of the equations is an added feature: Plato is apparently claiming that genuine philosophy is this redirection of the mind, as well as the art of redirecting someone's mind, from εἰκαστα to νοήσις.¹

The next question is, what subjects (μαθημᾶτα) have the power of redirecting the mind (521c10):

"Then mustn't we ascertain what subjects have this power?"

"Of course."

"What subject would be the mind's towline (ψυχῆς ὄγκον) away from what becomes toward what exists (ἀπο τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν), Glaucon? What I mean is this: weren't we saying before that when young those men would be forced to be trained for war (ἀθλητας . . . πολέμου)?"

"We were."

"Then this [purpose] also needs the subject which we are seeking for the other [purpose] (Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν πρὸς ἑκείνῳ)."

"What do you mean?"

Although the subject required is for redirecting the mind from what becomes toward what exists, Socrates is claiming that it is also needed for training in warfare (i.e. for the art of war). It is clear that the subject needed is neither music nor gymnastics, since although these may be needed in the art of war, they are not required for the art of redirection: they can only produce health in the body and harmony in the mind. They don't do anything to lift up the mind toward the forms.²

¹Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, 181. ²Republic 522b.

Socrates claims that the subject he has in mind is needed by all the arts whatsoever, all διανοφαί, and all sciences (ἐπιστήμαι). This science is the "science of number and calculation," i.e. arithmetic.¹ Socrates and Glaucon agree that it is useful in the art of war; a soldier, particularly a commander of troops, must be able to count his forces and calculate their needs. The more important question, however, is whether arithmetic is likewise needed for developing the mind's power of knowing the forms (522e5):

"Do you think as I do about this subject?"

"How is that?"

"It is probably, in nature (φύσει), among those guides to understanding (τῶν πρὸς τὴν νοήσιν ἀγόντων) which we are looking for. But although it is itself just a towline toward existence [or substance] (ἐλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασιν πρὸς οὐσίαν), no one uses it correctly."

"What do you mean?"

"I will try to make my meaning clear. I am trying to determine for myself which things we regard as guides and which we do not."

The question is, what is there about arithmetic such that in its own nature it is a towline toward existence and substance, in addition to also being a useful instrument in warfare and other arts?

Socrates begins by making a distinction between perception (αἰσθήσις) which invites understanding (παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νοήσιν) and perception which does not. Some of the objects in perception summon the power of understanding into reflection (εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν), because these things in our perception are incompatible (ἐναντίον). Perception is incompatible if it shows opposites (ἐναντία) in the

¹Republic 522b-c.

same object at the same time; if it does not, then the power of understanding is not summoned to reflect upon the perception.¹

For instance, if one holds up three fingers, one does not, in his perception, see something which both is and is not a finger; therefore, his power of understanding is not called upon to reflect about what a finger is. On the other hand, the mind is invited to inquire about what largeness is when it notices that the middle finger is large compared with the first finger and small compared with the second. It sees, at the same time, that the same finger is both large and small; it therefore wonders what largeness is.² There is an incompatibility in the perception, and this provokes the power of understanding to try to define largeness and to understand what it is. (This argument seems to be one of those in which Plato is apparently confused about relations. The example does not appear to indicate any incompatibility in the perception: if you look at the three fingers you see that the middle finger is both larger than the first and smaller than the second. The perception would be incompatible only if the finger were both larger than and smaller than the same finger.)

Socrates then argues that whenever a perception invites inquiry by one's power of understanding, one of the questions which is always invited is whether we are perceiving one object or two objects. If a perception is incompatible, attributing opposites to one and the same object at the same time, then we

¹Republic 523b-c. ²Republic 523c-d.

begin to inquire whether we are perceiving one object rather than two. There seems to be only one finger, but there seems to be two opposite magnitudes, large and small. Which is it, one finger, or two things, a large thing and a small thing? In the same perception we seem to have one thing and two things.¹ Such "ambivalent" perceptions invite the mind to inquire about numbers.²


When the mind is confronted by such incompatible perceptions, and is led to investigate what the one is, it is being drawn toward what exists and being led away from what becomes (524e6):

" . . . and since it inquires what the one itself is, learning about the one (ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις) would be among the guides which convert [the mind] to the vision of what exists (ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν)."

Further, Socrates claims, what is true of the one in this respect is also true of every number. (What grounds Plato has in mind for claiming this are not clear. Perhaps he would say that if you inquired about what one is you would also inquire about what one more is, and thus be led to "the science of number and calculation.") Therefore arithmetic, Socrates argues, is one of the towlines to reality, in addition to being a science useful to warfare and the other arts which are useful to the state.

For similar reasons, argues Socrates, (plane) geometry and its as yet undeveloped successor (solid geometry) are towlines toward what exists. And Plato adds two more mathematical sciences

¹Republic 524b. ²See also Republic 479a-c.



to them: the study of solids in motion (which he calls "astronomy"), and "harmonics" (and he may have in mind here a science of proportions, or something of the sort, for he specifically rejects the suggestion by Glaucon that astronomy is a study of the stars or harmonics a study of sounds--these being as much a matter of opinion as any other sense-objects in the perceivable world).

All five of these subjects, and perhaps others (Socrates says that these may not be all), are towlines to what exists.¹ They compel the mind to be reoriented from what becomes to the forms, because in these subjects an organ of the mind is purified and given new life (ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται).² They are not merely interesting in themselves, or useful to all the other arts and sciences, but they are also needed in order to bring the mind to the direct understanding of the forms, so that it can finally inquire into the form of the good.

But direct understanding of the forms is only possible in dialectic. And although the first two stages in the development of the mind from indirect opinion to the direct understanding of the forms can be explained, the final reorientation of the mind apparently cannot be explained. Socrates claims that he cannot give the explanation of the last redirection of the mind, from διανοία to νοήσις, or describe the art which effects this transition. For the last of the arts of redirection is dialectic, and

¹Republic 530c-d. ²Republic 527c.



alone can give one direct understanding of the forms (531d5):

" . . . you describe a very difficult task, Socrates."

"This introductory investigation, Glaucon? Or don't you know that all of these subjects are introductions to the very topic which must be learned (αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν)? For these inferior men do not seem to you to be dialecticians."

"Except for a few I have met, certainly not."

In other words, men whose minds have been developed in mathematical subjects have not yet necessarily been trained in dialectical reasoning. Given hypotheses, they can draw conclusions from them. But they are unable to give or prove the reasons for what they have assumed:

"But do those who are unable to give or prove an explanation (δοῦναι τε καὶ ἀποδείξασθαι λόγον) ever know anything which we said they must know?"

"Not at all."

A dialectician presumably gives an explanation by providing a form which implies that hypothesis as a conclusion, and then proves his explanation by in turn providing the form which implies it as a conclusion, and so on. Or, perhaps, to give and to prove are the same thing: one explains his hypothesis by giving a proof of it (i.e. giving an explanation of it). This consists of pointing to the form which implies that hypothesis as a conclusion. In any case, the mathematician has not been trained to do this. Yet it is this very subject which dialectical reasoning requires:

"But isn't this the very subject (νόμος) which dialectic involves? It is oriented toward what is intelligible and is imitated by the power of vision, which we said attempts to look at animals themselves, the stars themselves, and finally the sun itself. And when someone attempts, in dialectic, reasoning without any perceptions, to move toward what each thing itself is (εἰς αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὁρᾶν), and does not stop

until he grasps what the good itself is (αὐτοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν . . . λᾶβῃ) with understanding alone (αὐτῇ νοήσει) and comes upon that last object itself which is intelligible (ἐπ' αὐτῷ . . . τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει), just as the others finally came upon the last visible thing."

"Yes, indeed."

"And don't you call this journey dialectic?"

"Yes."

To give an explanation (or reason or argument, λόγος) is to point to the form which implies the "hypothesis"; one goes from form implied to form implying it--from explanation to explanation--until he reaches the last intelligible object (ἡ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλος): the form of the good.

As we have seen, this last form to be reached and grasped by the philosophic element of the mind is also the first form in nature (φύσει), the origin (or first premise, ἀρχή) of all the forms, from which everything else follows. When the mind understands the form of the good, it can deduce all of the other forms, without needing any images of them for examples. In the return journey, the dialectician descends from explanation to what is explained, from defining forms to forms defined, through the whole system of forms.

Socrates next reviews the whole journey of the mind from εἰκασία to νοήσις, as it has thus far been explained in the Republic. He begins in the language of the allegory.¹ The prisoners have been released from their chains and turned from the shadows toward the images and the fire in the cave. They have been pulled out of the cavern toward the sun, and have reached the

¹Republic 532b-d.

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region of natural objects themselves. But they have not yet been given their final rotation, and as yet they have only seen the shadows and images of natural objects, not those objects themselves. The entire method thus far described, including the five arts which have just been discussed, have this power of drawing the best thing in the mind toward the vision of the best thing in existence.

But Glaucon admits that he finds difficult to understand this final phase of the development of the "eye" of the mind, and asks Socrates to explain this topic (νóμος) in the same way as he described the introductory investigation (532d6):

" . . . perhaps we could pursue this very topic, and we could investigate it just as we investigated the introductory one (το προσομιον). So tell men what the direction is of the power of dialectic (τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι), what routes it follows (τίνας αὖ ὁδοί), and by what forms it differs (κατὰ ποῖα . . . εἶδη διέσκηκεν). For it seems to me that these matters would lead us toward it . . ."

"Glaucon, my friend, you will not be able to follow me any longer. None of my desire has left me, but you are now asking to see the true object as it appears to me, and not merely images of what we are talking about. Whether it is as it seems to me or not, my opinion of it does not merit being asserted"

It is possible that, in refusing to explain what dialectical reasoning is, Socrates is refusing to get into difficulties of the following sort: trying to say what "what a thing itself is" is; trying to give the nature of nature, the substance of substance, the form of form; trying to define "definition," give an explanation of "giving an explanation," describe (for the benefit of Glaucon's power of understanding) what understanding is; and so on. Whether it is self-referential difficulties of that

sort which Plato is trying to avoid or not, Socrates claims to be able only to give "opinions and images" of matters involved in dialectic, and not to be able to account for them in the way he has accounted for the subjects of his introductory investigation. He is only prepared to assert that no one can acquire the ability for dialectical reasoning, and by means of it understand such matters, unless he is experienced in the subjects which have already been explained.

Men who are not prepared for dialectic will never understand what is intelligible. They will only be dreaming about what exists, as long as they cannot explain their hypotheses (533b8):

"We see that they are dreaming about what exists, and it is impossible for them to see awake, so long as they remain unchanged: employing hypotheses and being unable to give an explanation of them. For if there were a premise (ἀρχή) which you did not know, and if you inferred the intermediate steps and conclusion from what you did not know, by what device could this sort of agreement become knowledge?"

"None."

"Then only the dialectical method succeeds in this, by investigating hypotheses, in order that it can confirm the origin itself (ἐπ' αὐτήν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται). And the eye of the mind (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα), having been buried in some barbarous slime, is gently pulled out and led upward, by means of the associated arts of conversion which we have discussed (συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγαῖς χωρμένη αἰς διήλθομεν τέχναι). Conforming to custom we frequently called them sciences (ἐπιστήμας), but they need another name. They are more evident than opinion, and yet more obscure than knowledge (ἐπιστήμης)--we called it indirect understanding (διόνοισιν) earlier. But it seems to me that there is no confusion about a name for those arts which still are before us for investigation."

"Of course not."

Knowledge cannot consist of valid inference from hypotheses, even if the hypotheses happen to be true, because if you on'd't know the

premises are true then you don't know that the valid conclusions are true: no "device" can ever "make this sort of agreement knowledge." The rational element in the mind must seek explanations for its hypotheses until it finally confirms their origin.

The arts which are still to be investigated are the dialectical arts. And in the Republic they will remain uninvestigated, since Socrates will not consent to discuss them literally. He only reviews his position, as it has thus far been explained in analogies and metaphors (533e4):

"Rather, it is only clear that [knowledge], by our conventions, means clearness [or evidentness] in the mind (τὴν ἐξὶν σαφηνεῖν λέγειν ἐν ψυχῇ)?"

"Yes."

"Then it will be acceptable if we call the first part knowledge, the second part indirect understanding, the third part belief (πίστις), and the fourth part indirect opinion (εἰκασία). The last two are jointly called opinion (δόξα) and the first two understanding (νοήσιν). Opinion is about becoming (γένεσιν) and understanding is about existence [or substance] (οὐσία). And what existence [or substance] is to becoming, understanding is to opinion, knowledge is to belief, and indirect understanding is to indirect opinion. And let's refrain from drawing analogies and discriminations with these, for understanding and for what is believed, Glaucon, in order that our explanations do not grow longer than they have already."

In the divided line analogy, Socrates claimed that νοήσις and διανοία were parts of ἐπιστήμη, but in this review he has reversed them and now subsumes ἐπιστήμη and διανοία under νοήσις. He has claimed that the various branches of mathematics (as practiced by mathematicians, not as understood by dialecticians) make up διανοία, and that these arts are not as clear and evident as branches of knowledge nor as obscure and unclear as the arts of opinion (arts about what becomes).

But he could just as easily have argued that *διανοία* is not really part of *νοήσις* as he has argued that it is not really part of *ἐπιστήμη*: we are not understanding things themselves when we only understand them through images, cannot explain them, and can only assume them (without knowing what we are assuming except indirectly through examples). Nothing is quite so evident as the identity, for Plato, of knowledge and understanding: *ἐπιστήμη* is *νοήσις*. To know something is to understand "what it is": its form. And knowledge (and understanding) are clearness (evidentness) in the mind about forms.

The highest knowledge, for Plato, and the greatest understanding and clearness in the mind, is the knowledge of the good. In dialectical reasoning, one ascends inductively from forms (with forms themselves rather than through images of them) to forms--explaining his "hypotheses" and proving his explanations--until he knows (grasps, understands, envisions) this unconditional origin of all of the forms, the form of the good. Once he understands the unhypothetical and unconditional first premise, then he descends by deductive dialectical reasoning through the whole system of forms, reasoning "through forms alone from forms to forms and concluding with forms."

I have two as yet unexamined problems about this picture: the ignorance of Socrates and the nature of dialectical reasoning. First, Socrates professes to not know the good, the highest and greatest of subjects, "when he has made such matters his business all of his life," and he claims that he cannot explain dialectical

reasoning (its method, topic, and subjects), in spite of the fact that, for Plato, Socrates (the Socrates of history as well as the Socrates of this dialogue) is a master of dialectical reasoning.

There seem to be two opinions: either Socrates is lying (practicing irony) or he is telling the truth. Perhaps he is lying, being ironic in order to avoid trying to relate matters which he can understand but cannot express in language. In the seventh Letter, which may not be genuine, Plato claims that he has never tried to publish his explanations for the highest subjects of philosophy. These, he claims, can be understood in dialectical inquiry but cannot be described to others. In that case, Socrates is refusing to give more than opinions and images because such high matters can only be understood, and cannot be explained in language. And he chooses to say (or rather, Plato has him choose to say) that he is ignorant rather than admitting that he knows what they are but is unable to say what they are.¹

Or Socrates is telling the truth when he says that he has only opinions and images about these subjects. He is a master of dialectic, and has opinions and images about the form of the good, but he has not yet reached the end of his upward journey, and has

¹Letter VII 341a-344d. If genuine, however, it must have been written about the time of the Laws, which it resembles very closely in style. Morrow believes that it is genuine. See Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Epistles, The Library of Liberal Arts, (1) on the authenticity of the letter: pp. 3-16, 44-60, and (2) on the contents of the letter: pp. 60-81, 236-241. But see also M. Levinson, A. Q. Morton, and A. D. Winspear, "The Seventh Letter of Plato," in Mind, LXXVII (July, 1968), 307. They argue that this letter is spurious, on the basis of their computer analysis of its style--in particular, the frequency of the connectives "και" "δε"--in fact, the letter resembles Seussipus' letter to Philip.

not thus far understood the form of the good. And since he has not yet reached the origin of all the forms, he is not yet prepared to discuss the topic, method, and subjects of dialectical reasoning. Either of these opinions will probably seem equally plausible to the reader, and both will fit the evidence in the Republic and elsewhere. But I think that Plato, like the historical Socrates, is telling the truth (in the Republic, at least) when he claims that he does not know the greatest subjects and highest matters. The irony comes in, I submit, when he lets on that somebody else does.

The second problem involves the nature of dialectical reasoning. The reasoning described in the analogy of the divided line (which involves the progress of the mind toward the good) is inductive until the form of the good is understood, and then deductive until the whole system of forms is validly deduced. But this does not imply that dialectical reasoning involves no more than this one ascent and just this one descent. In all of Plato's dialogues one finds deductive arguments as well as inductive ones. There is no reason, I think, to suppose that masters (and students) of dialectic cannot descend from form to form whenever they wish, or ascend and descend by turns, whether they have yet reached the origin of all the forms or not. Therefore if Socrates has not yet reached the form of the good, he can still be a master of dialectic (over that portion of the system of forms through which he has ascended and descended). He can still, in dialectical argument, guide his students through ascent or descent, as he wishes.

Thus what makes such reasoning dialectical is not merely that it is inductive and then deductive. It is different from hypothetical reasoning, so far as I can determine, in three respects: (1) unlike hypothetical (or mathematical) reasoning, it can be deductive or inductive, ascending or descending at will; (2) in dialectical reasoning one is reasoning with the forms themselves, whereas in hypothetical reasoning one is only reasoning with images (i.e. examples), so that even in its deductive side there is a difference between the dialectical and the mathematical method; and (3) I gather that whereas hypothetical reasoning can be expository (stated or thought through in essay or lecture form), dialectical reasoning is conversational. Typically a dialogue is a conversation consisting of questions (by the master) and answers (by the student), but necessarily it is an exchange between participants in verbalized (or verbalizable) short answers. This is never asserted in the Republic, but since the method of the Republic itself is presumably an example (i.e. image) of dialectical reasoning, and since the Republic is conversational throughout, I conclude that dialectical argument is conversational. (I don't think that this implies that, for Plato, dialectical reasoning cannot be carried out by one person alone, in a dialogue with himself. It only implies, I think, that it must be conversational in its form. And I am not entirely clear on what it means for something to be--in this sense--conversational.)

In spite of Socrates' claim that he has only opinions and images of the form of the good and cannot say what it is, he has

nevertheless built up a more detailed picture of the form of the good than of any other form mentioned in the Republic. First, as the cause and origin of the forms, the good is the cause of the existence, nature, value, authenticity, intelligibility, and clear-and-evidentness of all the forms. Second, as the cause (parent) of the sun, the good is the indirect cause of the genesis and growth and nourishment of everything which becomes. Third, as the cause of all the forms, the good is the indirect cause of the nature (form, substance) of everything which becomes. Therefore, fourth, the good is the cause of everything which exists and everything which becomes: it is responsible for what exists completely and for what is "between what is and what is not." It is the cause of everything whatsoever, in that it is ancestrally related, by participation relations, to everything which exists and which becomes.

Fifth, as the greatest subject of learning and final cause of all purposive beings, it is the highest and most proper subject to study and object to achieve: it is the object of the mind's love, the source of all value, the goal of all learning, the best and most beautiful (noble) thing that exists, the clearest and most evident form, and the cause of the power of understanding in the mind. And sixth, it is mastery itself, the original and universal of everything and the image and instance of nothing (except possibly itself). It partakes of nothing else and nothing else partakes of it; it implies and includes all the forms, and is not implied and included by another form; it surpasses even substance

in rank and power.

But all such attributions are only "ignoble opinions," according to Socrates. Therefore they do not, for Plato, define what the good is, either separately or in combination. Moreover, if the form of the good outranks even substance, then it has no substance (form, nature): it partakes of no form (except possibly itself). Therefore it cannot be defined.

The same is true of knowledge as is true of the form of the good: in spite of Socrates' claim that he cannot explain what dialectical reasoning is (its method, topic, and subjects), Socrates has a great deal to say about that knowledge (i.e. understanding) which dialectical reasoning alone can furnish to the mind. (If knowledge is not the topic of dialectical reasoning, then it is surely one of its subjects.)

Even though Plato has claimed to have only opinions and images about these things, he has (1) specified what conditions must obtain if knowledge is to take place, and (2) identified knowledge by other (presumably extensionally synonymous) names. We have been informed that knowledge occurs only under the following conditions: first, just as seeing occurs only if there is a power of vision in the eye, visibility of certain objects, and light present in the air (or the space) between the eye and its objects (where light is a power of making objects bright and clear in sense-perception), so knowing occurs only if there is a power of understanding in the "eye" of the mind (its rational element), intelligibility of certain objects of knowledge (the forms), and

authenticity (ἀληθεῖα), "no small idea," which makes the forms clear and evident to the mind. And second, knowing occurs only if the mind has been given a good early education, trained in the mathematical διανοῖαι, and then directed upon the forms themselves while it engages in dialectical reasoning.

And Socrates has identified knowledge by other names, in the course of his analogies, the allegory of the cave, and the program of mathematical studies; knowing is: (1) direct understanding (νοῦς, νοήσις) of what is intelligible (νοητόν), (2) clear-and-evidentness (σαφηνεία) of the forms in the mind, (3) vision (or contemplation, θέα) of the forms by the "eye" of the mind, (4) confirmation (το βεβαιώσεσθαι) or proof (το ἀποδέξασθαι) when one is giving explanations (or reasons, λόγοι) for forms, (5) infallible knowing (γνῶναι) of what a thing itself is (ὁ ἔστιν αὐτό), (6) grasping (ἄπτεσθαι) of the objects which the mind "reaches for" and "is directed upon," and (7) wisdom (φρονήσις, σοφία), which the philosophic element of the mind loves and (if it can become what its nature is) acquires.

Finally, there is a lesser, indirect sort of knowledge which the mind can acquire of the forms: indirect understanding (διανοῖα). In some subjects (for instance the five branches of mathematics), when they are studied by those who are unable to engage in dialectical reasoning, one can know the forms indirectly through their images (i.e., for Plato, examples). When someone reasons hypothetically, deducing forms from forms with examples, he can learn indirectly about the forms even though he is looking

at and thinking about perceivable objects: he understands the forms through these instances. This is an intermediate relation between the mind and the forms, rather than immediate knowledge, but (1) it is nevertheless (apparently) infallible when the hypotheses are genuine, and (2) it is (indirectly) about what exists and remains the same forever. Therefore it belongs with knowledge (understanding) rather than with opinion--that is, it corresponds to the upper segment of the divided line.

Both immediate knowledge and intermediate knowledge are relations between the rational (or philosophic) element of the mind and the eternal, unique, and changeless forms. The mind comprehends them, immediately or intermediately; it grasps them, directly or indirectly; through images or without images it understands them, envisions them, and confirms them; and with or without instances, they are clear and evident to the mind, and authentic and intelligible. This, for Plato, is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσις) and wisdom (σοφία, φρονήσις), which the philosophic portion of the mind loves, and which it can have if it becomes what its nature is--if not in its human life, then perhaps after the death of the body when it is purified. These, at least, are Plato's "opinions and images."

VIII. PLATO'S THEORY OF INTUITION

I will be arguing that Plato's theory of knowledge is a theory of intuition: it satisfies the three criteria for a theory of intuition. In the course of doing this I will be showing that his theory of intuition is a theory of the following sort: (1) as in Descartes' and Lossky's theories, none of the data of intuition are data of sense-perception; (2) as in Russell's and Lossky's theories, the data of intuition are universals (unlike in those theories, universals are the only data of intuition); (3) as in Ewing's and Descartes' theories, the knowledge-items are themselves the data of intuition; and (4) although, for Plato, some of the knowledge-items are describable (in definitions), not all of them are: as with Bergson's intuitively known external particulars, some of Plato's forms (e.g. the form of the good) are inexpressible.

Knowledge, according to Plato, is a relation between the mind and the forms; it is a relation which is analogous to visual perception. Just as in vision the mind sees perceivable objects, so in knowledge the mind "sees" (understands, grasps, envisions) the forms. In direct understanding (νοήσις) the mind knows the forms directly, and does not require images (that is, for Plato, examples) through which to understand them. And in indirect understanding (διανοια) the mind has intermediate knowledge about

the forms. Although the objects of the mind's inquiry are the perceivable objects of the world of becoming, its knowledge is about the forms, which it understands through these images (instances).

These two types of knowledge are different from opinion. "Mathematical knowledge" may be an inferior, limited variety of knowledge, but it is still knowledge, not opinion. If its assumptions (the "hypotheses") are not mistaken (for otherwise it is opinion), then it is infallible and necessary (like dialectical knowledge) rather than uncertain and contingent. For according to Plato there are two different powers in the mind (i.e. in the rational element in the mind, its "eye"): ἐπιστήμη (the power of knowing) and δόξα (the power of believing). These must be different powers because they have different objects and different effects. First, the power of knowing enables us to have knowledge (γνῶσις, ἐπιστήμη), which is infallible, whereas the power of opinion only permits us to have opinion (δόξα), which is not infallible. And second, our knowledge is necessary, in that its objects exist completely and remain the same as themselves forever, whereas the objects of opinion are temporary and non-self-identical, "between what is and what is not." For the objects of opinion are sense-objects, which are many and variant, and which exist only temporarily and ambivalently; but the objects of knowledge are the forms, which are unique, changeless, and eternal. Thus the mind can know only the forms, and can only have opinion about the objects it perceives in sense-perception. The forms alone are know-

ledge-items, i.e. (for Plato) objects of the mind in the knowledge relation.

But only one of these two types of knowledge involves direct acquaintance with the knowledge-items. In νοησις the mind understands the forms themselves, reasoning dialectically "with forms themselves from forms to forms and ending with forms." But in διανοια the mind only knows the forms through their instances, reasoning mathematically with these instances. Its direct objects (the objects it uses in its deductive explanations) are perceivable objects, images of forms rather than forms themselves. Thus only in νοησις does the mind have direct awareness of the forms, its transcendent, non-sense-perceptual data of intuition and knowledge-items. As will become clear in the following, Plato's theory of knowledge meets the first two criteria for a theory of intuition, and νοησις is both intuition and intuitive knowledge.

First, in νοησις the mind has direct awareness of the forms; they are data of its experience. For, according to Plato, in dialectical inquiry the mind has direct understanding of these knowledge-items: it "detects," "grasps," "envisions," "sees," "looks at," and "reaches" them. It "loves to look at" them and "welcomes" them. It enjoys the pleasure that attends the "vision" of them. It is "fixed upon" them and they are "clear and evident" to it. And in inductive dialectical inquiry, the persistent inquirer does not stop until he "grasps what the good itself is," with his "power of understanding alone." The mind (i.e. the rational thing in the mind) is directly aware of the forms.

Second, in νοήσις the objects of this acquaintance (the forms) are not sense-perceptual. The forms are understood but not observed, whereas sense-objects are observed but not understood. The power of knowing (i.e. of understanding) has different objects than the sense-objects (appearances) of the objects of opinion. What is believed is as different from what is known, in truth and untruth, as is an image from what it resembles. The mind, in sense-perception, is aware of the instances of the forms, not the forms themselves; and in νοήσις it is aware of the forms themselves, not their images. The mind is acquainted with non-sense-perceptual data of experience, when it has νοήσις of the forms. Thus, as with Descartes and Lossky, there is a complete separation of intuition and sense-perception.

Third, in νοήσις the objects of the mind's awareness are transcendent: entirely independent, ontologically, of its acquaintance with them. The existence and substance (nature) of the forms depends entirely upon the form of the good. They are in no way produced or altered by the mind's awareness of them; they are not "in any way produced by any craftsman." They are unique and changeless forever, whether they happen to be perceived or not. Their nature and their existence are completely independent, ontologically, of whether or not the mind has the power of understand them (or develops its power of understanding them). They are genuine and intelligible (for the form of the good makes them so), but they are so independently of whether or not the rational element in the mind learns to understand them.

Therefore νοῆσις is a species of mystical experience. In νοῆσις, transcendent, non-sense-perceptual data are apprehended by the mind--or rather, by the mind "in its truest nature": its philosophic and rational element, that "eye" and instrument which loves wisdom and reasons, and which can learn to rule over the entire mind and to understand the forms. Νοῆσις is intuition, and Plato's theory of knowledge meets the first of the three criteria of a theory of intuition. Since the forms are universals, Plato is claiming (as do Russell and Lossky) that we are acquainted with universals. Unlike Russell and Lossky, Plato is holding (in the Republic) that we are acquainted, in this non-sensuous perception, with universals alone.

Plato's theory also meets the second of the three criteria for a theory of intuition. The data of νοῆσις are themselves the knowledge-items, and therefore intuitional experience provides knowledge-items. That which is given in intuitional experience is the same as that which is known: the forms. They are what is known (τὸ γνωστόν) in the knowledge-relation. They are directly understood and known in νοῆσις. Thus, in Plato's theory as in Descartes', Ewing's, and Bergson's, the data of intuition are the same as the knowledge-items: νοῆσις is both intuition of the forms and intuitive knowledge of them. Because the mind has this intuition of the forms, it can reason dialectically, reasoning "with forms alone from forms to forms and ending with forms."

The application of the third criterion to Plato's theory of knowledge is somewhat more difficult, for two reasons: (1)

Therefore veduta is a species of veduta and veduta is a species of veduta.
veduta, transcendent, non-transcendent, transcendent, transcendent, transcendent,
by the mind--or rather, by the mind "in its transcendent state,"
philosophic and rational element, that "veduta" is a transcendent element,
loves wisdom and reason, and will not be content with the
entire mind and to understand the form. "veduta" is a transcendent element,
Plato's theory of knowledge is the first of a series of theories
of a theory of intuition. Since the form is a transcendent element,
is claimed (as do Russell and Lewis) that we are acquainted with
universals. Unlike Russell and Lewis, Plato's intuition is the
veduta that we are acquainted with, in its transcendent perception,
with universal alone.

Plato's theory also about the nature of the form is the nature of the form
for a theory of intuition. The data of veduta are themselves the
knowledge-forms, and therefore intuition experience provides
knowledge-forms. That which is given in intuition experience is
the same as that which is known: the form. That is what is
known (or veduta) in the knowledge-relation. They are identical
understood and known in veduta. Thus, in Plato's theory as in
Descartes', Spinoza's, and Hegel's, the data of intuition are the
same as the knowledge-forms: veduta is born intuition of the form
and intuitive knowledge of them. Because the mind has this intuition
tion of the form, it can reason dialectically, reasoning "with
forms alone from forms to forms and ending with forms."
The application of the third criterion to Plato's theory
of knowledge is somewhat more difficult, for two reasons: (1)

whereas some of the forms are expressible (describable in definitions), others are not (the form of the good, for instance), and (2) justification, in Plato's theory of knowledge, seems to encompass three different things. First, there is the deductive reasoning from hypotheses to conclusions, which proves the conclusions only if the hypotheses are true (i.e. genuine). Second, there is the inductive reasoning from the hypotheses to their premises, which proves the hypotheses if the premises are in turn "explained"--unlike mathematicians, philosophers are able to reason inductively and therefore able "to give and prove a reason." And third, there is the νοήσις of the premises--especially in the case of the mind's understanding of the form of the good, the unhypothetical first premise and origin from which all of the forms can be proved (explained, justified, warranted), but which cannot itself be proved by giving some other form as an explanation (or reason, λόγος). Rather, once one has grasped it he sees that it is itself entirely the reason for everything else.

By the third criterion, a theory is intuitional if these mystical experiences do not merely furnish us with our hypotheses, but somehow provide justification for our knowledge-claims (if what we know is expressible). The only things in Plato's epistemology that resemble knowledge-claims are definitions: propositions of the form "x is (or means) y," in which terms that refer to forms can be substituted for the variables--for instance, as in the definition "justice is each portion doing its own work." These definitions are identity propositions ranging over forms as

values. The definiendum is a simple term referring to a form, the definiens is a complex term referring to a form, and the definition asserts the identity of the forms referred to.

For instance, the definition "justice is each portion doing its own work" says what justice is (ὁ ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνη): it describes justice by asserting that it is identical with the "doing of its own work" by each portion of the mind (or state). The definition describes the form, i.e. says what it is, by asserting its identity to the (complex) form referred to by the complex definiens. Justice, according to Plato, is a complex universal that can be defined in terms of simpler universals, and the same is true of the other expressible forms. To understand justice is to know "what it is," and for forms generally, if one is able to give a definition of what the form is (i.e. to say what its nature is), that is because he understands what it is. (It does not follow that if he understands a form he is able to define it, for according to Plato one can understand the good but cannot say what it is.)

The foregoing description of the nature of Plato's definitions is of course not Plato's, but an analysis of Plato's language of definitions. It is clear that definitions, for Plato, do not indicate the uses of words, except incidentally. They neither legislate what a word is to mean nor describe what a word already means within some language in use. They use terms rather than mentioning them, in asserting identities between forms.

Hence definitions are knowledge-claims: knowledge-claims which describe Plato's knowledge-items, the forms. They are true

if the form referred to by the definiens is identical with the form referred to by the definiendum, and false otherwise. Furthermore, one knows that the definition is true if he knows (understands) the form. For instance, if he understands justice, then he knows that justice is (or means) each portion doing its own work. In knowing that the forms are the same he also knows that the expressions are synonymous, for the expressions are synonymous if they refer to the same form--that is, if they have the same extension. And he could not know that the forms are the same unless he understood the form. Hence these definitional knowledge-claims could be verified (justified) only by νοήσις of the forms, Plato's knowledge-items. Intuition is what justifies them.

This does not imply that learning true definitions could not help one to understand the form defined, for it could "key" his understanding of it. That is, it could (if he were prepared for dialectical inquiry) cause him to understand the form. For instance, if he were informed (by some skillful Socrates, leading him toward it) that justice is each portion doing its own work, he might be taught by the definition: in the context of a dialectical argument, the definition might serve to get him to understand the form. But unless he did come to understand the form, the definition would be no more than a true opinion for him; he would not know that it was true. He would not know that it was any more probable than some other definition, such as "justice is the interest of the stronger."

But Plato does not admit of knowledge as anything but a

relation between the mind and the forms. Knowing whether or not some definition is true is not, for Plato, some distinct kind of knowledge. I presume that Plato would claim that to know whether or not a definition is true is implying that one knows the form--i.e. understands it. He would not reject the language as misleading, for he uses it himself in the first book of the Republic, where he has Socrates say, "now I know what you mean; I must consider whether or not it is true," after Thrasy-machus has explained his definition of justice.¹ Socrates then goes on to argue that the definition is false because it implies a contradiction.

The reductio method of Socrates, which overturns definitions by deducing contradictions from them, is certainly, for Plato, a method for determining when a definition is false. But such arguments cannot prove a definition true. And there is no evidence that Plato regarded such reductio arguments as explanation or justification, although it is possible that he considered them as contributing to the dialectical method in its inductive ascent. He may have regarded it as falsification but not verification.

But I am only maintaining in this investigation that (1) Plato's definitions are knowledge-claims--identity propositions which describe forms--and (2) they can be justified by νομοις of the knowledge-items, for otherwise one could not know that they

¹Republic 339b.

are true. (One could know that they are false if the definition implies a contradiction.) Likewise, perhaps, (3) they play a role in dialectical inquiry when they contribute to the discovery, but not to the verification, of the knowledge-items. But in any case, justification (explanation, verification, confirmation, proof) only incidentally, for Plato, involves these definitional knowledge-claims. Primarily it involves the forms, as will be clear in the analysis of Plato's views on justification.

According to the third criterion, a theory of knowledge is intuitional if it claims that mystical experiences constitute verification for the knowledge-items that we claim we know, even if those knowledge-items are inexpressible. I will argue that in Plato's theory, such experiences are verification, whether the form is describable (like justice) or not describable (like the good). Νοῦσις is a form of justification. But it is not the only form of justification, for Plato; it is only the one indispensable sort, as is intuition for Ewing. But this intuition and justification of the forms does not come effortlessly to the mind. We must work like a slave for it, in order to "win the fellowship" of what we seek to know.¹

The rational (or philosophic) element of the mind desires that nourishment (reality, "what exists completely") which will fill its emptiness (ignorance) with knowledge, and in doing so give the mind the best and most genuine pleasures, and the pleasures most its own: the pleasure of "knowing what exists as it is"--

¹Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 91.

are true. (One could know that they are false, if they were false.)
 implies a contradiction. (However, we can say that the
 role in dialectical inquiry when the contradiction is not
 but not to the verification of the contradiction, but to the
 case, justification (explanation, verification, confirmation, etc.)
 proof) only incidentally, as it is not a necessary condition
 knowledge-claims. Primarily it involves the knowledge-claims
 clear in the analysis of the knowledge-claims.
 According to the last criterion, the knowledge-claims

intentional if it claims that the knowledge-claims are true, even if
 justification for the knowledge-claims that we claim to know, even if
 these knowledge-claims are inconsistent. It will be that in
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The rational (or philosophic) element of the mind desires
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 the mind the best and most genuine pleasures, and the pleasures
 most like them: the pleasure of "knowing what exists as it is."

¹Platon, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 81.

i.e. of learning the nature of the forms. But it will not acquire this knowledge and enjoy this pleasure of learning unless it is developed (whether by a good education or an "act of God") to become what its nature is. If the rational element becomes ruler over the whole mind, it will be teachable: it can be turned with the whole mind away from what becomes toward what exists. In other words, it can be led by means of the art of reorientation (genuine philosophy) from εἰκασία to νοήσις.


Once the mind has genuine (i.e. direct) opinion of perceivable objects, it can be dragged over the long, rough, uphill road from ὁδῶν through διανοία, learning about the forms through their images (i.e. instances), in deductive reasoning. It accepts certain forms as "hypotheses," and deduces conclusions from them. And it reasons with examples of the forms rather than with the forms themselves. Thus, indirectly and incompletely, is capable of explaining certain forms--namely those which are implied by the hypotheses. In other words, given certain forms as unproved premises, it can prove certain forms as conclusions. Such deductive proofs, however, are indirect and incomplete. They are indirect in that instances of the forms are employed in the proof rather than the forms themselves, and they are incomplete in that the assumptions (the "hypotheses") are unproved. The mathematical knowledge acquired by διανοία, therefore, can at best be conditional: it proves the conclusions if the assumptions are true (genuine).

Having learned such mathematical knowledge, the mind can again be turned from what is dark and obscure toward what is

bright and clear. It can be reoriented from the images of the forms which it employs in its hypothetical reasoning toward the genuine forms themselves, becoming aware of them and understanding their nature. Now it can not only reason deductively, deducing forms from the forms which imply them, it can also reason from the hypotheses toward the forms which imply those hypotheses. Instead of simply assuming the forms without understanding them (at most, understanding their images as examples of them), it understands them directly. Its proofs, whether inductive or deductive, are now direct, in that the mind is reasoning with the knowledge-items themselves and not with their images.

Finally, once it has climbed upward, by its dialectical reasoning, all the way to the form of the good (the unhypothetical first premise from which the whole system of forms follows), its proofs can at last be complete: it can now descend, by deductive reasoning, to all of the forms. Once the form of the good is understood, the knowledge of all of the other forms is (1) derivative as well as intuitive, and (2) most clear and certain. All of the other forms can be drawn as conclusions from the form of the good, and therefore consist of derivative knowledge, and they are now most intelligible and most evident, since the form of the good makes them so. It is itself most clear and evident, and it implies them as consequences of itself, so that they are most clear and evident.

But the form of the good is not capable of being proved as a conclusion from some other premise. It is the highest and great-



est subject, the form and original of everything and the image and instance of nothing (except perhaps itself). Nothing is related to it as premise to conclusion; that is, nothing is connected with it as its ancestor, by participation relations. Once the mind has reached it by inductive dialectical reasoning, and has grasped it and found it the clearest and most evident of the forms, it can at last explain all the forms completely.

All of the rest of the forms are not merely evident by themselves (in that they are understood directly in dialectical reasoning), they are now most evident because the good is most evident and the good implies them. But the form of the good is not evident because some other form is evident; it is only self-evident. It cannot be explained, it cannot be described; it can only be "grasped" or "envisioned," i.e. known by acquaintance. As in Bergson's theory of intuition, the form of the good is capable of being known by intuition alone; it not merely cannot be explained by some other form, it cannot even be described.

There are three types of justification in the foregoing account. There is deduction alone, which proves (justifies, explains) the conclusion of some hypothesis on the assumption that the hypothesis is true (genuine). That is, there is mathematical deduction, in which the premises are unproved and unknown, and the conclusions are proved from the premises. There is induction, which proves the hypotheses by finding the premises which imply those hypotheses as conclusions. And there is the intuition (νοήσις) of the forms, which (1) in the case of the form of the

good is the only verification one can have, and (2) in the case of the other forms is verification for those forms with which one reasons in dialectical reasoning. Each of these types of justification (explanation, verification, proof) is, I will show, justifiably so called.

First, deductive mathematical reasoning is at least conditional proof. The "truth" (i.e. authenticity) of the conclusions is guaranteed if the premises (the "hypotheses") are true. If the reasoning is valid, the truth of the hypotheses is preserved in their conclusions. Thus, the conclusions are justified by their premises, on the condition that the hypotheses can be justified.

Second, inductive dialectical reasoning is also at least conditional proof. Since one can understand the forms directly, he can find premises which imply the former hypotheses as conclusions, and can therefore explain (prove, justify) those hypotheses. There is another form of justification involved in dialectical reasoning: the direct understanding of the forms, which makes them evident to the mind. They are not most evident until we can deduce them from the form of the good, but they are have at least some self-evidence, or we could not understand them in dialectical reasoning.

There may be still another sort of justification involved in dialectical reasoning: the explanatory power of the premises. The premises arrived at by inductive dialectical reasoning imply as conclusions those forms which were previously simply assumed as hypotheses (and held to be perfectly acceptable), and which are

now understood directly. Hence one might take the hypotheses as proof (i.e. inductive proof) for the premises which imply them. This form of justification would be the explanatory power of the premises: they imply other self-evident forms, and hence have fruitful consequences. This, too, would be a form of conditional proof, in that the self-evident conclusions are likewise made evident by the premises which imply them. As Ewing points out, this sort of confirmation not only strengthens the conclusions, it also tends to reinforce the premises which imply them.¹ (But I do not believe that Plato regarded this sort of thing as justification. There is no evidence in the Republic that he thought of explanatory power of premises, or for that matter of hypotheses, as a form of evidence for them.)

And third, the direct understanding of the forms is unconditional proof. In dialectical reasoning, the mind understands the forms directly, without needing either images or explanations in order to know them. The forms are evident by themselves, in νοήσις. It could be argued that this sort of proof is still insufficient, for Plato, because until one has grasped the form of the good, he still has not understood any of the forms completely; he knows what they are, in that he can produce a correct definition of them and can explain them by producing forms which imply them. But he does not understand them adequately until he can deduce them from the form of the good. This is exactly what Socrates claims when he says that one must take the longer road (up to the form of

¹Ewing, "Reason and Intuition," p. 20.

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