Tais disse 11"; resnect t0 5‘4 tiecries of 1.1.2021: izfnapter I to s} ass::;tion that 1e :areer perspective I ‘ a...“ unkn‘...’ ry vari a': l e - w Extra.- notion was '? u. ...e:r careers , t . .5513; al careers ABSTRACT CAREER PERSPECTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS B)’ James E. Piereson This dissertation focused upon the problem of institutional change and upon the question of how the decisions of political leaders with respect to such changes can be best understood. Drawing upon theories of innovation in organizations and bureaucracies, we attempted in Chapter I to sketch the outlines of an explanation based upon the assumption that leaders make decisions that are consistent with their career perspectives and goals. Three factors were suggested as ex- planatory variables: ambitions, career investments, and age. The general notion was that innovators are more likely to seek advancement in their careers, to have fewer investments staked in their pro- fessional careers, and to be younger than those who Oppose innovations. In Chapters II and III, these notions were linked to a particular case of institutional change, namely the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution. The burden of Chapter II was to show that a focus upon political careers is not inapprOpriate in this historical context, for it is consistent with a mafia! intent-f :cter of historiaf F zierszaod as im: 12:13.1" out of uh; :5 states. The 3.; ar::.i thei. 37.5; mart by their 2' Eewzlution and i. .. , ' l L‘ guinea. aff'.. :ntznental affair ierercre likely t :eriems revolve: 5'. an earlier tin: 155.25 were more In C1“, pte “re ::re erglici my? °T a mode James E. Piereson particular interpretation of the case that has been outlined by a number of historians. According to this view, Federalists should be understood as innovators who were attempting to construct a "new nation" out of what had previously been only a loose confederation of states. The division between the two groups, however, revolved around their conflicting institutional attachments which were formed in part by their political ambitions, by their experiences in the Revolution and in their previous political careers, and by their generational affiliations. Those whose careers were affiliated with continental affairs and who came of age during the revolutionary era were more likely to become Federalists in 1788, while those whose ex- periences revolved around state and local affairs and who came of age at an earlier time before local rule was challenged by continental issues were more likely to become Antifederalists. In Chapter III, these theoretical and historical approaches were more explicitly stated by placing them into the context of a theory or a model of institutional change. Here, a number of assump- tions underlying the model were made clear and from these, seven sets of propositions were derived which linked the variables of ambition, career investments, and age to the issue of innovation or institu- tional change. These prepositions were then tested by analyzing the political careers of a sample of approximately $40 Federalists and Antifederalists drawn from among those who were delegates to the various constitutional conventions in 1787 and 1788. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, the findings of the study were set forth using both bi- variate and multivariate statistical techniques. fiiticns, as ”a .u o .L —. 'h’a lee‘y 54A‘LA .vab 0 fec'eralists were 0:5. ..su anU “er “'- eA-x. :xicns (see Chat ’9 we model presented in Cray ‘I‘QOV ..... inx'estzerzt Finger the dele- ?. the average. I tic "r 5.03.95. h‘it‘: I T ‘ a ' "mm to this 3-5332: ~.e r ‘ “u“‘E‘tm ~ 0 ‘ A M ‘1 nuklon also : :."'iJ;’i . “8 line) ff. James E. Piereson The data by and large supported the model of innovation and the historical interpretation that was linked with it. Thus, Federal- ists and Antifederalists appear to have entertained divergent kinds of ambitions, as measured by their careers after 1788. Federalists were more likely than their opponents to seek advancement in their careers between 1788 and 1800 and were also more likely to locate their careers in the national arena. In contrast, the careers of Anti- federalists were more likely to reflect stationary or discrete ambi- tions and were more likely to revolve around local political insti- tutions (see Chapter IV). The model was given further support by the findings that were presented in Chapter V, which focused upon the factors of age and career investments. Hence, it was found that, as predicted, the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to become a Federalist. On the average, there was a five-year age differential between the two groups. With respect to career investments, relatively small differences were found between the groups. There was, however, an exception to this conclusion and this involved the experiences of delegates in the Revolution and their relationships to the chrono- logy of events that led up to it. Those who served militarily at the continental level during the war tended to support the Consti- tution in 1788 while those who experienced the conflict at the state and local levels tended to oppose the new system. One could thus conclude that revolutionary experiences were crucial in framing the outlooks of men toward national, state, and local institutions. The Revolution also appears to have represented an important generational dividing line, for those who launched their careers prior to the (I . t. 3:121:35 of we W.- uhen the 155‘.- . J uw‘ 333?. e‘.'en.s sighttenieney t: ‘515 it: Antifesx xzutcgained the 'r““ticnary div: These res- named in a melt .y£.;- g. :"‘ bin-lulu .L ‘ .I ~I.° "r. t}ee groh’ps . . its. r 9' ‘ nae stretit. ta (K. 'e‘ ".p'A , ".‘J‘blr ”Q \’ 6., ‘U ' 3's: . was bent H‘.‘ in N a"! of James E. Piereson beginnings of the conflict evinced a tendency to oppose the Constitu- tion when the issue arose in 1788, while those whose careers were based upon events that coincided with or followed the war showed a slight tendency to support it. Hence, the conflict between Federal- ists and Antifederalists was also an intergenerational conflict between men who gained their political educations on different sides of the revolutionary divide. These results were given additional support when the data were examined in a multivariate context through the use of multiple dis- criminant function analysis, a technique which allowed us to rank the different variables according to their capacity to discriminate be- tween the main groups in the analysis (see Chapter VI). Surprisingly, this line of analysis suggested that career investments possessed the greatest discriminant strength, and among the most prominent of these were revolutionary experiences. However, it was also found that ambi- tions and age were also important factors, since their introduction into the equation markedly increased our capacity to discriminate be- tween the groups. Moreover, the multivariate analysis allowed us to test the strength of the career model against the economic interpreta- tion that was set ferth by Charles Beard some years ago. Thus, when a set of economic variables (public security holdings, occupation, and slaveholdings) was plugged into the same equation as a number of ca- reer variables, the results revealed that the career variables consis- tently outranked the economic factors in their ability to discriminate between the groups. Hence, the career model was shown not only to be consistent with the data but also to possess greater predictive power than one of the dominant alternative approaches to the case. , ,.. Carr. .23.. CAREER PERSPECTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS By 6 ET v . James E. Piereson A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1973 '9 nvgwa‘ a“ .‘.v~ . razer cf genera .5 assist-see giver. I1 . f‘ .e :rines , Jcse .‘ . - I...'..‘V. % P“. ban-bacuuLIOots L4. the i‘Cg-k has a. I}. Calleaggeg . pt- 8 H' .' . buyeQ|atAOrkS ‘ A 21111;, {0? it: Fina: vaa .-‘6‘ a U3: ;E' n ". .‘ ‘- Tv FO-I‘u - ‘ 5"».-‘Q ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In preparing this study, I have fallen into the debt of a number of generous people. I particularly wish to acknowledge the assistance given me by the members of my dissertation committee: Alan Grimes, Joseph Schlesinger, and Charles Press. For their contributions of time, patience, and ideas, I am very grateful. In addition, thanks are also due to Paul Hain, now of the University of New Mexico, who originally suggested the idea behind this research and who likewise contributed a number of useful ideas. Similarly, the work has also benefited from the helpful suggestions of two of my colleagues, Platon Rigos and James McCormick. But though their observations improved the quality of the study, they bear no responsi- bility for its remaining shortcomings. Financial support for the study was generously provided through a Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from the National Science Foundation, and this, of course, greatly facilitated the completion of the research. ii I. IKNC‘IAT I S}. 1 PF I... SKI-t its .1 YT f..- .l H' ‘3: SC.'.. “""rrr fl‘.“- 8-“ ‘ w .“n , ... cl _ Tf‘p- 1"“ ‘~ J‘r,‘ PEP r. w- “ Ft. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . . . . Chapter I. INNOVATION IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY Footnotes--Chapter I II. THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY: THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE CONSTITUTION . . . The Setting: An Historical Background . One Analytical Perspective: "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" An Alternative Approach: The United States as a New Nation . Footnotes--Chapter II III. THE RESEARCH DESIGN: THE MODEL, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA COLLECTION . . . . . The Sources of the Data . Footnotes-~Chapter III IV. THE IMPACT OF AMBITION: THE CAREER PERSPECTIVES OF FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS Ambition, Political Organization, and the Logic of Collective Action Summary . . . . . Footnotes--Chapter IV iii Page 21 25 26 37 55 71 78 99 107 110 156 160 163 '- A... o.:- O U V. 9" b u. I If C'D'IC' «cod 0 " \‘r. AUE . ‘L! \ Age . | areer 1' mar-j: I -Q.'A.ffl I 44¥eav~~ h II (/‘I F’Vfl. ' 'I‘ VA». \ V’- ~V~4-.J' F .'\A u Eu- Footnote. .'P' VA... I I ungb.y‘- ' 3&1: LIV '4 IA. Chapter V. THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITY: THE IMPACTS OF AGE AND CAREER INVESTMENTS . Age 0 O O 0 Career Investments Summary Footnotes-~Chapter V . VI. CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE MODEL An Evaluation of the Model: A Multivariate Approach . . . . . . . . Elaborating the Model: The Economic Factor Splitting the Sample: Statesmen and Regulars The Multivariate Analysis: Conclusions The Study: A Summary Footnotes--Chapter VI BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX . iv Page 165 165 193 223 226 228 228 241 249 261 264 270 274 283 ... rs. VA .\.A .s‘ ..s .e C '7‘. ..\\ . . 5 a s a cc 0. 0s a.» \. en es fit. flrv "d ”d "d ”d .d C. .6 ... .6. a 8 ad a a5 uflu ... ... l .3; .‘a r ..a :i 0 d .Vi .~A .w. .\‘ a. 1 ‘8 l a... 1 ..a ‘A :. Pu we. ‘14 It V a ~ . & .ee .‘a .fi.‘ ‘1. ‘A hr ....A C e a “ wk .‘A VA 1 a... :a .19. c. no. .P. My. ... c. c; c. at a c a ”on no a 9e a .0; \l A... c a 96,. c a (F AA A A ..H T. A (X. :5. R. .15 Q l I :e I I I I O .... .\.J . .Q .nsnv ‘ov ... Cue aw. FLU. v. A 7.5 .. I ‘0 VI ....- .. v . . V v a e e a "I w a Vrls V n N . NJ He” H h . .A y . . . “I“ Table IV-1. IV-2. IV-3. IV-4. IV-5. IV-6. IV-7. IV-8. IV-9. IV-lO. IV-Il. IV-12. IV-13. IV-14. IV-15. LIST OF TABLES Proportions of Agreement between Career Choices and Office Rankings . Affiliation and Type of Career: First Office Affiliation and Type of Career: First Office Affiliation and Type of Career: Leadership . Affiliation and Type of Career: By Age Group Affiliation and Type of Career: After First Office Affiliation and Type of Career: After First Office By Leadership Group Type of Career, First Office: Switchers and Non-Switchers Affiliation and Mobility of Career . Affiliation and Mobility of Career . Affiliation and Mobility of Career: Leadership Affiliation and Mobility of Career, 1780- 1788: Mean Scores . . . . . Affiliation and Mobility of Career, 1780- 1788: Mean Scores for Leadership Groups . Affiliation and Mobility of Careers, 1789-1797: Mean Scores . Affiliation and Mobility of Careers, 1789- 1797: Mean Scores for Leadership Groups . Page 118 122 123 125 127 129 140 141 142 143 v" I. ‘- 1 no v.1. 1v . Wil‘a". a:::r.-o; ..AAA.G». P}::; at.» a.-éb\ P 00 (b P Y Q- I. u; Table IV-16. IV-17. IV-18. IV-19. IV-20. V-l. V-2. V-3. V-4. V-6. V-7. V-8. V-lO. V-ll. V-12. Affiliation and Target of Career, First Office . Affiliation and Target of Career, First Office . Affiliation and Target of Career, First Office: By Leadership Group Affiliation and Focus of Career, 1788-1800 . Affiliation and Focus of Career, 1788-1800: By Leadership Group . . . Age and Type of Career: By Age Groups Mean Ages by Types of Career Age and Affiliation: By Age Groups Age and Affiliation: By Affiliation Groups Age and Affiliation: By Leadership Groups Age and Affiliation: Mean Ages by Affiliation Groups . . . Age and Affiliation: Mean Ages by Leadership Groups . . Age and Focus of Career: By Age Groups . Age and Focus of Career: By Institutional Groups . Age and Focus of Career: Mean Ages of Institutional Groups Age at Entry into Politics and Number of Offices Held, 1780-1788 Age at Entry into Politics and Number of Offices Held, 1780-1788: Mean Scores by Age Groups . . . . . . . vi Page 149 150 152 154 155 169 170 173 174 175 176 177 179 179 181 184 186 Affiliat; By Ag: Affiliat: Affiliat; Mean 1 Affiliat: Mean Career 1' fly I: Table V-13. V-14. V-IS. V-16. V-17. V-18. V-19. V-20. V-21. V-22. V-23. V-24. V-25. V-26. V-27. V-28. Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics: By Age Groups . Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics: By Affiliation Groups Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics: By Leadership Groups Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics: Mean Ages by Affiliation Groups . Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics: Mean Ages by Leadership Groups Career Investments and Targets of Ambition: By Institutional Groups Rates of Consistency between Ambitions and Investments: By Size of Investment Affiliation and Focus of Investments: By Arena Affiliation and Focus of Investments: By Affiliation Groups Affiliation and Focus of Investments: By Leadership Groups Affiliation and Size of Investments, by Arena Affiliation and Revolutionary Experiences: By Arena Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience: By Affiliation Groups Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience: By Leadership Group Affiliation and Total Career Investments: By Size of Investment Affiliation and Total Career Investments: By Affiliation Groups vii Page 187 188 189 190 192 196 198 199 202 203 204 207 208 209 214 215 3,19. #311131 . .p :V' 9 \'-.)0. .«Ifula‘ Mean " .I .C " 90‘ ‘T. l';oo Aah“.rz~ 1'" [.A9 ‘n Eta.- .' ." -5 E .n ~ccs“'* I! 1.15 nt“‘ldL i i Iw.. Discriri and A ‘J-2. Discrin: and I . Discrir ADO Table V—29. V-30. V-31. V—32. V-33. VI-l. VI-2. VI-3. VI-4. VI-S. VI-6. VI-7. ‘VI-8. VI-9. VI-lO. Affiliation and Total Investments: By Leadership Groups . Affiliation and Total Career Investments: Mean Levels by Affiliation Groups Affiliation and Total Career Investments: Mean Levels by Leadership Groups Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics: By Leadership Groups . . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: 14 Variable Model Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: Stepwise Analysis Discrininant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Investment Factor Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Ambition Factor . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Age Factor Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: Stepwise Analysis for Three Factors . . . . . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Original Model and the Economic Factor . . . . . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Economic Factor . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Original Model and the Economic Factor (for delegates from slave states) . . . . . . . . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Economic Factor (for delegates from slave states) viii Page 216 217 218 220 222 235 237 239 239 240 241 244 246 247 248 V'Q e5 'a'obe “Q Q. ‘ 'a'aJ- 27:4. ‘ A u. .- I‘““De D: P,;H;" L Esau...“ States 14 \‘a: Discri ‘— -...\ _ Pebg,~ ‘ . 14 \a: Table VI-ll. VI-12. VI-13. VI-14. VI-IS. VI-16. VI-17. VI-18. Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen: 14 Variable Model . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen: Stepwise Analysis Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen: The Original Model and the Economic Factor Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars and Antifederalist Regulars: 14 Variable Model . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars and Antifederalist Regulars: Stepwise Analysis Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars and Antifederalist Regulars: The Original Model and the Economic Factor . Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars and Federalist Statesmen: The Original Model and the Economic Factor . Discriminant Function Analysis fer Antifederalist Regulars and Antifederalist Statesmen: The Original Model and the Economic Factor . ix Page 251 252 254 255 257 258 259 260 The stud; e::ed history, :clitics, the; h {it}: the 5-8015 1 (1) v. C. ""‘""Ies Q? =- - “Lattice. - ‘I 1‘ . 11":- :w ‘5, ‘Etts I ‘L ‘5 CHAPTER I INNOVATION IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY The study of political leadership possesses a long and re- spected history. Ever since men began to think systematically about politics, they have evinced a preoccupation with political leaders and with the decisions that they make. It is not too difficult to under- stand this preoccupation when we stop to consider that the meaning of the term "politics" has traditionally referred in some way to the activities of political elites. In this case at least, traditional usage has its analytical counterpart. The decisions of political leaders are at the center of any political system and their explana- tion bears closely upon the analysis of a host of other political problems, such as policy outcomes, representation, and institutional changes. It is axiomatic therefore that the development of adequate theories of leadership will yield analytical dividends fer a number of substantive areas of political science. The traditional focus of political theorists upon leadership, then, does not betray a belief in the irrelevance of non-elites, as is sometimes charged, but instead reflects upon the fact that the behavior of its leadership represents the most obvious manifestation of the Operation of the polity itself. The desrr V0... I ' 'Je" 3:.1-..a. Leau a 4.; .3.“ : “A1. uies.5.Vus 0A :J‘vl . ""‘I“V". cPav-qe oieeweld‘ Iad..5 1.3.353151035 1' ‘I' ‘ "' I an. .‘ '1 Lu .5 “CC...“ A e. a, I in 150?; 1113' 3:53.313”. as ,' caters to parser. 3:115 ion: to t'rx. :::‘.ior. of the 5:1" r, . SJams: :‘r. dark in pcligy .Ca, e1. , ' De wile leglt‘- Q A 0L .- une lrlnlti‘. The design of the present study reflects this concern with political leadership. Here my attention will be directed to the decisions of political leaders as they bear upon the problem of insti- tutional change or innovation. Our analytical goal will be to relate such decisions to the career perspectives of political elites. This will be accomplished by attempting to draw an analogy between innova- tion in organizations and change in political institutions. A number of scholars, as we shall see in a moment, have suggested that change in an organization is in part a function of the willingness of its members to pursue advancement in their careers. Put more boldly, this boils down to the proposition that innovation in an organization is a function of the ambition of its leadership. In the present study, I shall suggest that an analogous process can be understood to be at work in political institutions, that is, in organizations that exer- cise the legitimate authority of the state. Thus, instead of focusing upon the ambitions of officials in a bureau or an organization, the focus of this study will be upon the career perspectives of politi- cians as factors that can be employed to account for innovations in political institutions. In drawing upon the above analogy, this study will attempt to set forth an account of institutional change that represents a model of similar theories of change or innovation in organizations. By a model we mean a theory whose assumptions and propositions are struc- turally similar to those of another theory dealing with a different phenomenon. As Brodbeck puts it, "if the laws of one theory have the same form as the laws of another, the one may be said to be a model . . g, 01‘ ii: 136 Dune?- 4"”"7'211 coa‘ .3 .Jnaulv - it: atalogv bet-w 'i i ' a ' J 35.3.51le 1:: at there are glare." a: rules to dec. gar: situaticrs, iciies will atte- :rier to maxim: :1 or their members (v.1... F .56.], as I Have paralel betweer. viii" can be .m; Jexr Shares of . K r m 0 h *9: ,_. . n (D .7‘ for the other."1 In this sense, by way of an example, Riker's theory of political coalitions constitutes a model, since it is based upon the analogy between the behavior of players in game situations and of politicians in decision-making bodies. In both cases, he suggests, there are players, winnings to be divided, strategies for victory, and rules to decide the outcome. And, as with rational players in game situations, he hypothesizes that politicians in decision-making bodies will attempt to minimize the size of winning coalitions in order to maximize the benefits that they stand to receive as a result of their membership in such victorious coalitions.2 In the present study, as I have already indicated, we shall draw upon a similar parallel between organizations and political institutions, both of which can be understood to be staffed by officials who can increase their shares of the enterprise's outputs by changing their positions in its office hierarchy. Given this similarity, it stands to reason that the same theories that are employed to account for organizational change can be used as models to generate propositions concerning innovations in political institutions. The model that will be set forth here will, in turn, provide the framework for an examination of one conSpicuous case of institu- tional change in the United States, namely, the events which led to the ratification of the American Constitution in 1788. Hopefully, such an analysis will not only provide a useful test of our model, but will also enable us to cast some light upon the controversy over the Constitution itself, as well as upon a number of other issues, suit as federal:- It is re retresents only that cosld be e." tilitjv' of elites $32-$56 of tori: Lie. Trese ra Zeaiers as resrrr :syzhclsgical t? mierstood as a 51:5. more mil: 1:. 3f the above a: Cor; rehens i “ "U.‘4v any part "r”- to limit 53:1 § ”8 conSidEv Ha . leaCerS. r such as federalism, nationalism, and localism, that were bound up with it. It is rec0gnized, of course, that the concept of careers represents only one of a vast number of possible analytical categories that could be employed to attack this problem. Because of the visi- bility of elites, a variety of approaches have been advanced for the purpose of coming to grips with their decisions, behavior, and atti- tudes. These range from sociological theories,3 which conceive of leaders as responding to their social background experiences, to psychological theories,4 which hold that a leader's behavior can be understood as a response to the needs of his personality, to theories with more explicitly political emphases,S which stress the importance of such factors as constituency pressures and institutional roles in the deliberations of elites. It goes without saying, of course, that all of the above approaches would constitute important elements in any comprehensive theory of leadership, but for the sakes of manage- ability and parsimony, if for no other reasons, the researcher is forced to limit his focus to a relatively narrow range of variables that he considers to be important. In the present inquiry, as I said earlier, these will revolve around the career perSpectives of polit- ical leaders. The general question from which research begins is therefore the fellowing: Can distinctive outlooks toward innovation be understood as responses to the perspectives that leaders entertain toward their careers? What do we mean by the notions of institutional change or innovation? Though I shall use these terms rather loosely here, it . 'a .. A A'L'i' WH‘ ‘( .111: vertheless re shall rear. by m, as one can : :atier as "the s- teas or ends t': ;::.:‘.'atio.'. is as. the alteration o airtisn of new : is also atslica‘: t: the introduct: :rganizatio. . a: 0’. 1“ I flu ‘ ' THaeS that S'dgg -59 queS‘ GTsifdzations is '3“, ‘ ‘~."Y‘. .“ 0f baL ma- a u :2, will nevertheless prove helpful to offer a clearer indication of what we shall mean by them. Actually, the concept is not a very difficult one, as one can easily see by noting Mohr's simple definition of inno- vation as "the successful introduction into an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation."6 Often, the notion of innovation is used to refer to the latter type of change, that is, to the alteration of the ends or goals of the enterprise through the adoption of new policies or programs.7 However, as Mohr suggests, it is also applicable to alterations of the second kind as well, that is, to the introduction of new procedural rules into the operation of an organization. But used either way, innovation reflects the extent to which the members of an organization are willing to entertain pro- posals that suggest departures from its already established behavior. The question of what factors generate change or innovation in organizations is, as it turns out, a traditional one among students of administration. As a consequence, scholars have managed to set forth a variety of correlates of innovation in organizations. Cyert and March, for example, have suggested that the propensity to innovate and to adopt new programs is a function of the wealth of the organ- ization, since the more resources it possesses, the more can its leaders afford the luxury of experimentation.8 Downs has proposed, on the other hand, that the adOption of new programs is most likely to occur in newer and perhaps less financially secure organizations, since these have yet to develop firm investments in any particular pattern of behavior.9 Still others, such as Everett Rogers, have theorized that innovation depends upon the complexity of the _ ...95 v- ( 1.1.1..a..Go-5 " 15:15:.” or P“ 3: the enterpr's «r L . the 3.3. ...-. 9"” — {iaggvvsase a *- a. ., g .- O~ 5v- v.1. bull-1| whys. . ; 9‘ .rga'..:a.::.'s a: {"8 in, l u. s ...JCI‘JES : 9',“ o F . ~¢.l.e5 rrcr h'L‘I la . , ‘ 5 . .9 U u "as: of In-» 5 ‘ _ :M {5' ‘J. ' :~.“l "Ci\b ‘e r! u»- - SOCIaI . A driy a: 4:25..“ "'5 av . a N {8;} ‘*ers H". " 3‘s: a Q O“ ‘ "| A” v.3: ‘ a 'Vn a” if communications system in an organization and the extent to which it is capable of diffusing information and knowledge among the members . 10 of the enterprise. The above approaches to the problem have been complemented by a suggestive account proposed by Phillip Selznick, who has argued that innovation is a function of the kinds of leadership staffs that organizations are able to recruit. By and large, recruitment pro- cesses in organizations vary with the stage of organizational develop- ment. In his view, in the early phases of its development, an organization must come to grips with two imposing problems. The first involves the selection of a social base or, in other words, a market from which the organization receives support through exchanges of resources. The second involves the selection of a leadership staff or, in his words, an institutional core that is sufficiently unified in its outlook that it is able to impart to the organization a coherent yet distinctive identity. This, he suggests, entails a problem of recruitment. The creation of an institutional core is partly a matter of selective recruiting . . . By choosing key personnel from a key social group, the earlier conditioning of the individuals can become a valuable resource for the new organization. Con- versely, of course, just such conditioning is in question when a particular source of personnel is rejected. But core-building involves more than selective recruiting. Indoctrination and the sharing of key experiences--especially internal conflicts and other crises--will help to create a unified group and give the organization a Special identity.11 In the early and yet unstable phases of an organization's life, incentives are provided for the recruitment of an innovative corps of leaders who are attracted to the organization by its possibilities for change. This is, of course, functional for the organization's arrival, since I if a creative a: casting "the t: stages, hos-ever, retinizei, Spe; the rains, sine: :ttiniity. As :ts ;. sensity - \ . 59.3.1:- :er.t for orgasi: :2 those who ha. as: institutions 3f shared revol; :2 build nation; events, they poi his: leaders a: sizilar manner, izlitieal instit p » NET}. ‘1‘. .zentsl' of SE1‘N- 31““? c h.‘s ‘. Landmg a .. . ‘ c ’3“er ac. Swatus ,v-c T 1 .'a survival, since in such times a premium is placed upon the recruitment of a creative and innovative set of leaders that is capable of dis- covering "the true commitments of the organization."12 In later stages, however, when the organization's activities have become routinized, specialists and professionals tend to be recruited into the ranks, since they are lured by the prospects of stability and continuity. As a result, as time passes in an organization's life, its prepensity for innovative behavior diminishes.13 Selznick‘s observation concerning the importance of recruit— ment for organizational change has been mirrored by the suggestions of those who have studied its impact upon changes in political systems and institutions. Some, for example, have pointed to the importance of shared revolutionary experiences among leaders who have attempted to build national institutions in newly independent states. Such events, they point out, represent key experiences or crises around which leaders are able to build coherent national identities. In a similar manner, other scholars have noted the tendency among emerging political institutions to recruit into leadership positions large numbers of ideologues and demagogues who attempt to define the "true commitments" of these institutions.14 In addition to the above, Seligman has emphasized the importance of recruitment patterns for understanding a whole range of different kinds of political change. As a factor which affects change . . ., elite recruitment patterns determine avenues for political participation and status, influence the kind of policies that will be enacted, accelerate or retard change, effect [sic] the distribution of status and prestige, and influence the stability of the system.15 Ties: arzments 1g: and inn: 52:;5 iron the ' I a ‘ ‘P ""p F \v ' no Iuagh {Me} a :rtareo tne Tu? ' :atrgrcmcs of sccieties Such These arguments suggest that one way of approaching the problem of change and innovation among organizations and institutions is to focus upon the kinds of leaders that they recruit and upon the ways in which they are recruited. This proposition has in fact already been examined from a number of analytical perspectives, most of which however have ap- proached the notion of recruitment in terms of some aspect of the backgrounds of those who eventually become leaders. Those who have approached the problem from a sociological angle have suggested that innovative leaders are likely to be recruited from particular social classes or strata. For example, some have pointed out that in new societies such leaders are likely to be drawn from the ranks of marginal social groups, such as students, intellectuals, and soldiers, whose position in the social order has never been well established.16 Others have attempted to analyze recruitment in terms of psychological theories in order to establish links between social and political change and the personalities of leaders. Erikson, for example, has suggested an insightful link between the development of polities and the development of leader's personalities.l7 In his view, societies that are undergoing rapid social and political changes recruit into leadership positions those peculiar kinds of individuals who exper— ience analogous sorts of crises in the development of their own personalities. The fact that the leader must face an identity crisis in his own life makes it easier for him to interpret, understand, and guide the search for identity that is being experienced by his society. Erikson's argument that innovative leaders are recruited its: distinctive izrettions by a his attempt to a‘u'lg 35d P" :fs.::essf'.'l ; SIZE 3. :_,le::er.ted by well suited to ' in general, nazv regresent a“. at: '39." are relati. glue they are \ leaier. Thus, Ereat detail :35 511 kinds of e1, ’ ‘63-... .4 Hue the “Ea: from distinctive personality types has been deveIOped into different directions by a number of other scholars, among them, Wolfenstein in his attempt to outline the parameters of the "revolutionary person— ality"18 and Pye in his attempt to set forth the psychological bases of successful political development.19 Such studies of personality and social backgrounds have been complemented by those that have employed a concept that is especially well suited to the study of both recruitment and political decisions in general, namely, that of political careers. Careers, of course, represent an attractive tool of analysis since in the first place they are relatively easy to identify and to measure and in the second place they are closely associated with the activities of political leaders. Thus, there exist a host of studies which elaborate in great detail the political career backgrounds of a variety of differ- ent kinds of elites, from American presidents,20 Supreme Court 21 23 Justices, and Senators,22 to contemporary revolutionary leaders. Despite the wealth of data that such studies have brought forward, however, they have been by and large unsuccessful in relating career backgrounds in any systematic way to matters of political importance, such as, for example, institutional change. One reason for this, suggested by Browning and Jacob, is that political leaders are less likely to respond to the influences of their distant pasts than they are to the opportunities of their immediate environments.24 A second and perhaps more telling reason revolves around the paucity of useful theory that has been developed with regard to political career I‘ L , .. P ._ .M; T. _ ‘w :1'I5‘Jduv e hertert .130?" s , 'v _< puree) 1’ equal. Y“ the atser. :6 wczieriflg 3’ ' . ...a w“. " ' ' out»; bndb “'6“ U. u $.53: 9 :nts out with focus urt' ‘ “ gr:..ds of poli‘. 3321211 for the AVA :" a) ' ‘ ,..... experier._ t: has out the c ‘u .e..es, rather t fvs~:n ‘A- :' 5...S. When r. Lot: 1 .4..0na; charge; “‘51:" to deve‘. - e'. ..., but, 3'31 0f the This kit. ..l“‘h ‘ki a1 \ F \ ateer Calle‘ - . “Minor. :33. La leadErys “ ecns - 0r, If '43 th e ‘6 10 backgrounds. Thus, these studies have evoked the following criticism by Herbert Jacob: As purely information sources, these studies are without equal. Yet their information is frequently left unstructured; the absence of a theoretical framework leaves the reader wondering about the significance of it all.25 Partly as a result of this, a number of writers in recent years have begun to recast the analysis of careers and recruitment into what may be called an economic framework. Such a framework, as Olson points out, is in many ways antithetical to those approaches which focus upon the sociological, psychological, or career back- grounds of political actors.26 Where these have often attempted to account fer the complex motives of actors in terms of their back- ground experiences, theories with an economic focus attempt merely to draw out the likely consequences from some assumption concerning goals. In contrast to the above approaches, then, the latter is in many ways future oriented, since its focus is upon the goals them- selves, rather than upon their complex sociological or psychological origins. When such an approach is applied to the problem of insti- tutional changes, then, the assumption is that such innovations are likely to develop more out of leaders' assessments of their futures than out of the influences of their sometimes distant backgrounds. This kind of approach has been adapted to the analysis of political careers by Joseph Schlesinger in the form of what he has called ambition theory.27 His argument starts from the assumption that a leader's decisions are more or less rational reSponses to his ambitions or, in other words, to his office goals. He states this in the following manner: ‘ “-‘e centra Eehayiar 15 ether Na“ 3115 1rd ‘3; prone" CC' 3.3,, secer; ...... q 'I’" ' , i ...:v . ..u- ...-s. Si-‘v v‘."‘ ‘( ‘V‘V ‘ubvllU '4 ”.9. ; Lauc, Ari h"‘ § in; .‘I‘ ‘ ‘ uh, bee. x, t: .‘ ahigter or :r: '.ger aS' velikely als; "5.11.111 onal . I" ' I progressz. £28115 for ch “fiafior with : intheir career 'I r :‘F' ~m.€$l,‘,"§? we I. ' .. ‘C .. 17.8 Ian -. ~91" «with FYI xiiies in 91:, I at Stake " :_ :‘iaieis ijs :ejr F ‘ SR; 3‘38“? ar; I. I. H. “"50 a": f‘iti' 11 The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office. His problem consists, first, in defining his office goal or oals and, secondly, in relating his current activity to them. 3 According to his theory, there are three distinct classes of ambi- tions or what we have called career perspectives. First, a leader's ambitions may be discrete, in which case he has no office goals and simply intends to withdraw from political life. Second, they may be static, in which case he plans to remain in his current position. And, third, they may be progressive, in which case he aspires to hold a higher or more desirable office than the one he currently occupies.29 Schlesinger asserts that those who entertain different office goals are likely also to entertain differing outlooks toward such issues as institutional change or innovation. In particular, it is the leader with progressive aspirations who is most likely to provide the impetus for change since it is he who is forced to align his current behavior with future possibilities. Those with no desire to advance in their careers have no professional reason to become innovative. In Schlesinger's view, "if anyone is going to search for solutions it is the man whose career depends upon finding solutions . . . Only the man with progressive ambitions is driven to explore current policies in the light of future consequences, for his future career is at stake."30 Hence, much as sociologists have argued that social change is inSpired by those peeple who are socially mobile, Schlesinger argues that political innovations are inspired by those leaders who are, in a manner of Speaking, upwardly mobile in their political careers. “les ”pan t A sini'. Eras studied the .l tureaucracies. ' 11.8 typically 2*. :Lizie . The sec'xity that t right serve to the other hand. gressiyely orie 35331 01 power 95 me POS‘tio: 3138 attra o.‘ .. A r- \vkat’. ‘5‘? - u- . “sea-£11138 t} "M'- ‘ ”W orimitat; F 553€ra 10 Changel sea: to increcl .; s nth ek - ” ““813 pres Ry“!!- i-«y'JSES a 311:“; 3339645 . te..d t: VII 1‘» .. 1811- Career .4 9 :6“ ts be v0"? 1 4.. SC?- .' ..esinger D. j ’ \ he: 1 ‘30.“ - . U 9 11h raga 12 A similar thesis has been develOped by Anthony Downs, who has studied the impact of career perspectives upon innovations in bureaucracies.31 For Downs, there are two pure types of officials who typically hold positions in bureaucracies: conservers and climbers. The former are those who seek to maximize the amount of security that they enjoy and are thus hostile to any changes which might serve to undermine the stability of the bureau. Climbers, on the other hand, are analogous to Schlesinger's notion of the pro- gressively oriented politician in that they seek to increase the amount of power, income, and prestige that they command as a result of the positions that they hold.32 This they do either by gaining more attractive positions within the bureau or, alternatively, by aggrandizing the positions that they currently hold. Innovation in such organizations are usually inspired by climbers who attempt to generate changes which either facilitate their advancement or which serve to increase the power, income, or prestige that are associated 33 with their present offices. On the basis of his theory, Downs proposes a number of empirical propositions. For example, innovative bureaus tend to be dominated by climbers. Since climbers are mobile in their careers, leadership turnover is higher in innovative bureaus. Since climbers tend to be younger than conservers, innovative bureaus tend to be younger than more conservative bureaus.34 Thus, like Schlesinger, Downs argues that those who entertain different perspec- tives upon their careers are also likely to entertain different out- looks with regard to the subject of change and innovation. Unfcrt test these pr‘ - O ‘ 3*.‘9 3118:? s 5-l :tctlees as IT | | the incentives | particular kit. I party develor' to fill part, 53331" 0f coat-e nth asuirati: view than the". £14 ESiET-‘éd to 1:. 15% solution 0 jm}"v‘5111031 ea -s g, . ..al no 15 "a. SRSe he Sl'~w H55 13 Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work done to test these prepositions. We may, however, point to a few works which have attempted to link the career perspectives of leaders to such problems as institutional change and professionalization. For example, Wellhoffer and Hennessey argue that institutionalization in party organizations is consciously directed by elites who manipulate the incentives for office holding in order to lure party members with particular kinds of ambitions. Such incentives are altered as the party develops and as partisans with different aspirations are needed to fill party positions.35 On another front, Kenneth Prewitt, in a study of contemporary West Coast city councilmen, found that those with aspirations to hold higher office tended to take a more benign view than their unambitious colleagues toward innovations which were designed to increase the degree of state and federal cooperation in the solution of local problems. This, he argues, reinforces a proposition earlier suggested by Schlesinger and Downs that an offi- cial who is "ambitious for a higher position is likely to support policies which expand the prerogatives of that office."36 In a sense, he suggests that leaders are likely to support changes which aggrandize the positions to which they aSpire. In still another area, Gordon Black, again in a study of city councilmen, found that politicians with pregressive ambitions are more likely than others to adopt the values that are associated with a professional political career.37 The more one wants to advance in politics, the more likely he is to adopt favorable attitudes toward such values as bargaining and compromise. Thus, as one progresses in a political career, he J J 2:15 to adopt :areer. Curi on that Merton has Eerie adopt th serum, or .a .. W- _ "- — — etce groups. values of a gr: anentation may H34? and of e:. hearse, we ; 3:” his aspirat'. hiSl'al'Jes. HS SW10 exist his pcii1lcal 0 5;?33aching the The 8"}: it: in Scze Ca .EZlSlons th at Ifiliolfi . \Akal Caree :IJW‘S . l .. “fl .‘ ‘alh S\RIE' 14 tends to adopt values that reinforce his prOSpectS for success in that career. Curiously, both of the above findings reinforce a proposition that Merton has called anticipatory socialization, which holds that people adopt the values of a group long before they actually become members. For example, student apprentices in fields such as teaching, medicine, or law quickly adopt the values of their appropriate refer- ence groups. As Merton puts it: "For the individual who adopts the values of a group to which he aSpires but does not belong, this orientation may serve the twin functions of aiding his rise into that group and of easing his adjustment after he has become part of it."38 Of course, we can never be sure whether one adopts the values because of his aspirations, or whether he adopts his aspirations because of his values. However, the fact that such an interaction has been found to exist between a political leader's career perSpective and his political outlook suggests that this may present a useful way of approaching the problem of institutional change. The above works suggest a general hypothesis to the effect that in some caSes at least political leaders adopt values and make decisions that accord in a rough way to the perspectives of their political careers. This, in turn, leads us to suggest, following Downs and Schlesinger, that innovative leaders are likely to be recruited from the ranks of those who entertain progressive commit- ments to their careers. For such leaders, institutional changes represent one way through which their advancement is facilitated. By contrast, these who have no aspiration to advance are not expected to have as powerful reasons to become innovative. None of this ?ufiu' -'-~1:' be tale' 3“; its eitien'erer.‘ thigh we ..a.e assessments of e:.:e of their t career perSpee‘ but also by “r: ssclen of such riich politici argue that the institution, 0; fez'elcrnents ;:| i‘ill he to prtt ”imitations, S’i’EEESts that 1 is at ti=95 rel 15 should be taken to mean, however, that leaders always act out of self-interested or cynical motives but only that the achievement of their office goals usually represents a necessary preliminary step to the achievement of more grandiose and selfless designs. In addition, though we have spoken at some length on the importance of leaders' assessments of their futures, we do not mean to rule out the import- ance of their pasts. AS Eulau and others have pointed out, one's career perspective is governed not only by prospects for the future but also by "recollections of the past."39 Hirschman and Black have Spoken of such "recollections of the past" in terms of investments which politicians may parlay into future ventures.40 Thus, they argue that the more one has invested in a particular organization, institution, or career, the less likely he will be to exit when developments prove unsatisfactory and, further, the less likely he will be to propose solutions that disturb the boundaries of such organizations, institutions, or careers.41 In addition, Schlesinger suggests that the impact of such investments upon future calculations is at times reinforced by considerations of age.42 Since the young have a broader theater for the play of their ambitions, they are likely to entertain different kinds of career perspectives than the old. The proposition advanced at the beginning of this paragraph can therefore be employed as the starting point for a number of other more specific and less obvious propositions which link the variables of ambition, investments, and age to the question of innovation in political institutions. Since the present discussion III-r It is i..tenc'ed ti :rcsositioas -.. ll‘. 11.: atsreath to ir s:i:.:.'s case 1 see in the he) the sense t feature of A: i; I 0111:1318 local :‘eieral arrarg represented. a ml in goverr Cited,43 “'0‘. 23:.2‘.'ators do: \v-e a.,.EH\‘ ‘lAEIat : Cf 23:15? that 1' a‘a‘ I . “57115:”: A Se 2: is t} al: . .5186 the St war time P'Jrs :35 no, ~l SYSCe: eta. .-..se of the 16 is intended to be introductory in nature, an elaboration of these propositions will await a later chapter. In the present study, I shall attempt to employ the above approach to innovation as a means of casting light upon one con— spicuous case of political change in the United States, which in- volves, as I indicated earlier, the controversy surrounding the ratification of the Constitution in 1788. Several considerations make this case amenable to such an examination. First, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Constitution represented an innovation in the sense that it challenged the localism that was the dominant feature of American political life up to 1787 by pr0posing to sub- ordinate local institutions under national authority. Indeed, the federal arrangement that was finally written into the Constitution represented, as Huntington points out, the last significant innova- tion in governmental structure that the American system has intro- duced.43 Though this view of the proponents of the Constitution as innovators departs from a number of the more important historical interpretations of the case, we shall attempt to show in the next chapter that it is nevertheless not without considerable support among historians. A second reason why this case is amenable to this type of analysis is that the ratification of the Constitution dramatically altered the structure of opportunity within which politicians at that time pursued their careers. Not only did the ratification of the new system expand the authority of national institutions at the expense of the states and localities, but it also expanded the 1' .'. 5 n..." 7.5.? 0. ‘- ...... .. p . . ;' O‘.‘,“.VA ‘ v:u:eobflbbvn A. tea: directly ; . . .EEISIS. yielis the dat ments and or' federalists at historical rec :‘iscem the sh :rspasitions t: all of the ab: h . but “hate daci, u‘. ""‘Sine 17 number of opportunities available at the national level. Hence, the Constitution involved an innovation that could have been expected to bear directly upon the careers of a sizeable number of political leaders. Finally, this case is subject to analysis because it readily yields the data needed to test our model of innovation. The pro- ponents and opponents of the change, called Federalists and Anti- federalists at the time, are easily identifiable on the bases of historical records. Their accessibility makes it easier for us to discern the shapes of their careers and thus to relate them to the propositions that will be derived from the model of innovation. In all of the above respects, then, a focus upon this case will allow us to relate decisions concerning innovation to data dealing with the career perspectives of political leaders. In its focus upon the careers of the politicians involved in the dispute over the Constitution, this study will in a sense repre- sent a test of Marsh's dictum that "many events and developments in history were shaped . . . by whether the actors involved were im- proving, declining or remaining stationary in their social and polit- ical positions."44 But it should be pointed out that this approach deals with only one dimension of the case, that revolving around what Selznick has called the recruitment of the leadership staffs of the Opposing sides to the conflict. As a result of this rather narrow focus, it will not be possible to deal seriously with other equally important aspects of this particular case, such as the social bases for these opposing coalitions. Nevertheless, though this approach 'fi :a':.at yield a ne'er mar-gm. if this partzc; stasis to t7. 5:33: to re.at-. 23.17.; hit: r' "'- u‘ -' O 4 ‘36.)! au:.e . Ln\, fb. ,ph v ’ : m31‘!) 03.135. n‘ I A r .1‘3' RC1 0T2 e‘. . use 32‘}! alter:- ‘v '35... I: 7‘” ...-... l.“s’ I... k ’ . ‘ “5 '6 thrash 373565 of {l- g: 18 cannot yield a comprehensive account of the case, it can hopefully add, however marginally, to our understanding of it. There is, however, a caveat concerning the appropriateness of this particular case for this type of study. I have given much emphasis to the notion of ambition, a concept that is usually under- stood to relate to the complex motives of political leaders. In dealing with politicians who lived two hundred years ago, it is ob- viously quite difficult to generate reliable indicators of such a concept, since the usual technique of discerning such motivations is through obtrusive measurement or interviews, and this option is quite clearly not open to us. In this Study, therefore, I shall rely upon the only alternative course of action-—namely, unobtrusive measure- ment.45 Thus, my assumption is that the ambitions of politicians may be reliably inferred from the actual choices made during the courses of their political careers. Though such inferences are flawed in some respects, they avoid a number of difficulties, such as re- sponse sets and interviewer effects, that are the bugaboo of obtrusive techniques. Moreover, scholars have consistently found that the gap between intentions and actual behavior is rather narrow. Hain, for example, compared the expressed ambitions of a group of state legis- lators with the actual careers that they pursued in the years follow- ing their Statements and found that the correSpondence between the two measures of ambition was high at about .73.46 We assume, of course, for the purposes of this study that a similar correspondence was in play between the ambitions and the actual career choices of 2:5: Wins: szstit'fiion' I .' 5' Brae“ q ' ‘ f‘ ‘I See.“ E'a‘s' n ' . A. snvh'."..n“ h .nheUleavu _ . MW" {'9' 3 ."~.“5 AA 5‘ u ... fi; . Q ; :e.era..5~ ‘8“ :‘t t Eerie fr .... ' ' L .. Tris Hi“ be a account for 13" findings can t approaches. These general outliT- study by, firs case and, SGCO the important ,, . ..tec which. 5'»: the I. A I ..nstituti at will deal \ 19 those politicians who were involved in the deliberations over the Constitution. Briefly, then, this study will attempt to accomplish two general goals. First, it will attempt to provide a test of our model of innovation by deriving a number of propositions from the model and testing them against the actual careers of Federalist and Anti- federalist leaders. In addition, we shall employ the generalizations that emerge from the study to throw some light upon the case itself. This will be accomplished by attempting to link such generalizations with a number of broader interpretations that have been advanced to account for the division over the Constitution. Hopefully, these findings can be used to discriminate between some of these contending approaches. These tasks will be carried out according to the following general outline. The next chapter will establish the setting for the study by, first, setting forth the general historical context of the case and, second, by elaborating and offering criticisms of some of the important interpretations of it. Here, an approach will be out- lined which suggests the relevance of the model to the dispute over the Constitution. Chapter III will be largely theoretical in nature and will deal with an elaboration of the model and a specification of the propositions that are to be tested against the data. Here, also, problems of data collection and analysis will be taken up. The suc- ceeding two chapters will report the data that bear upon each one of these propositions. In Chapter IV, the three propositions dealing with ambitions will be examined and in Chapter V those dealing with 'fimn 3;: 141 career will attempt t of these prop: azr“""shed ' “mun; . . ‘ ' F 3"I'I'I. ....- v...-.u¢ath add- - mar -4..6~.es SUL_ \ .. _ . fi1:n'~-..‘.e ‘. \‘ovhtu..auds _ .emzne v.21: Ziertaxen m H ‘|l ‘ i .35 . ‘rf‘crt a"... 20 age and career investments will be analyzed. A concluding chapter will attempt to provide an evaluation of the model by examining all of these propositions in a multivariate context. This will be accomplished through the use of a technique called multiple dis- criminant function analysis which will allow us to rank all of the variables suggested by the model according to their abilities to discriminate between Federalists and Antifederalists. Thus, while the analyses undertaken in Cahpters IV and V will enable us to determine which of the propositions in the model are true, that undertaken in Chapter VI will allow us to specify which of these are most import ant . I" l V a": I . ‘ . ‘ 1“ ’Fa PFV A: i' "" “has.“ "V;‘. ‘-'.- “av-“.3?” igfl ‘35": *1 mt." arm-11...? - Y “. AT. .'!0 L‘ r . . HA 'Vidr~h’ FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I 1May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning, and Theories," in Readin s in the Philosophy_of the Social Sciences, ed. by Brodbeck (Lon on: MacMillan, 1968), p. 583. 2William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). 3An example of this approach is Donald Matthews, The Social Backgrounds of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954). 4See, for example, Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964). Much of this literature is summarized'in Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969). 5See, for example, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Con- stituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), 45-63. 6Lawrence Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review, LXIII (March, 1969), 112. 7For this interpretation, see Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations in the American States," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 880-99T’ 8Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). 9Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little-Brown, 1967), p. 264. 21 ‘ '1 _ mare: and .~ k'.'ele;tent 7 text, ed, by 1A,-\ .363“ pp. 6.; Les .‘q‘. " Trifle-n .- -..”, Uv‘A“G 7‘95. A¢.\~l\;e 1 "Fe.“ 71 t." 1.. Li H . 22 10Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 173-32. 11Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 105-106} 12Ibid., p. 62. 13Ibid., Ch. 4. 14See Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of New States," in Communications and Political Develop; ment, ed. by Lucien Pye (Princeton: Princeton university Press, I963), pp. 64-77. lsLester Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Develop- ment," Journal of Politics, XXVI (August, 1964), 612-26. 160n the United States, see Seymour Lipset, The First New Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 75—85. 17 See Erik Erikson, Ghandi's Truth (New York: Norton, 1969). 185. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 19Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). 20Paul David, Ralph Goldman, and Richard Bain, The Politics of National Partngonventions (New York: Vintage Books, 1963). 21John Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," Midwest Journal of Political Science, III (1959). 22Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960). 23Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966). if :4 Ru: Pslitical pep 73-90. ‘1 ‘SHer is. the U.S. ,' 26. St: neither 5 ed.by Sey295 log “. .Jwég r v- :‘fi‘; C 1 -C;EEE~EE 38 FT‘ée a 23 24Rufus Browning and Herbert Jacob, "Power Motivation and Political Personality," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVIII (1964), 75-90. 25Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U.S.," Journal of Politics, XXIV (November, 1962), 706. 26See Mancur Olson, "The Relationship Between Economics and the Other Social Sciences," in Politics and the Social Sciences, ed. by Seymour Lipset (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 137-62. 27Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand- McNally, 1966). 281bid., p. 6. 291bid., p. 10. 3°Ibid., p. 209. 31Anthony Downs, 22: cit. 321bid., p. 88. 33Ibid., pp. 198-200. 34These and other propositions are suggested in Downs, _23 913:, pp. 261-80. 3586a Spencer Wellhoffer and Timothy Hennessey, "Political Party Development: Institutionalization and Leadership Recruit- ment," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1971. 36See Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 190l9l: 37Gordon Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," Amgrican Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 865-78. 38Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), p. 265. Quoted in Prewitt, 22: cit., p. 190. Tfim"'""”'"""_"“"7 Iifiike, 'Car hiitical E": ' p 1". .4635, 17:.1’ ‘unn'i . 24 39Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy Ferguson, and John Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by Duane Marvick (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), p. 219. 40Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty_(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); and Gordon Black, ”A Theory of Political Ambition," American Political Science Review, LXVI (March, 1972), 144-62. 41Hirschman, op: cit., Chapter 6. 42Schlesinger, 22: cit., Chapter 9. 43Samuel Huntington, Political Order in ChangingiSocieties (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 130. 44E. Marsh, The Mandarins (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 11. Quoted in Seligman, 92: cit., p. 621. 45On the concepts of obtrusive and unobtrusive techniques, see Eugene Webb, Donald Campbell, Richard Schwartz, and Lee Sechrist, Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966). 46Paul Hain, "American State Legislators' Ambitions and Careers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971), p. 93. The r 518p in a ser 'q .“ In H “5931-51 The inte‘. amt t2“. \ r*( Exam: SIC!) co ntrO‘i'e :an at IEaSt CHAPTER II THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY: THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE CONSTITUTION The ratification of the Constitution in 1788 marked the final step in a series of institutional changes which, all told, succeeded in transforming the thirteen original colonies into what one writer has called the "first new nation."1 While the precise historical steps leading up to the events of 1788 are not matters of serious dispute, the meaning of the ratification itself continues to be a subject of intellectual controversy. As Elkins and McKitrick write: The intelligent American of today may know a great deal about his history, but the chances are that he feels none too secure about the Founding Fathers and the framing of the Federal Constitution. He is no longer certain what the "enlightened" version of the story is, or even whether there is one.2 Such controversies as this, if they cannot be definitively settled, can at least be placed upon a more solid footing by theoretical approaches of the kind that we suggested in the previous chapter. Indeed, if that theory is to make even a marginal contribution to our understanding of the ratification of the Constitution, it will have to be brought to bear upon some of the distinctive interpreta- tions that have been advanced to explain it. Accordingly, it will be 25 thepurpose 5.;‘:- ‘ " Minimal Ld Sin:« otevents t: '_ . ' .o . :r.e: c;.l.r.- - O :lreference I | t O ‘ a .ncse 17:2: 26 the purpose of the present chapter to show how a theory based upon political careers can be employed to throw light upon this controversy. Since this will involve a number of references to a sequence of events that the reader may find obscure, it will be preceded by a brief outline of the historical background of this case. This is presented for expository purposes only, so anything approaching a thorough account of this tangled problem is certainly not intended. It is merely hoped that by first establishing some historical points of reference, it will be possible to provide a clearer presentation of those interpretive approaches that I alluded to above. The Setting: An Historical Background The conflict over the Constitution in 1787 and 1788 centered, in a large part, around the question of whether political authority should be located in a national government superior to the individual states or in the reSpective states themselves. Despite the feature of federalism, its ratification effectively resolved the dispute in favor of the prOponents of nationalism. The idea of a national government did not, of course, appear full-blown over night, but instead emerged and gained support during a sequence of events which went back approximately a generation.3 Though, as Merrill Jensen points out,4 proposals for some form of inter-colony cooperation had been voiced from the beginning of the eighteenth century, its first manifestation did not occur until 1765 with the convening of the Stamp Act Congress. Called in response to a general colonial Opposi- tion to British plans to raise revenues through an imposition of a duty upon various kinds of documents (including contracts, wills, 3*.rbc‘, «vac..- A r: ,— § \ . ~33 I" 27 newspapers, and pamphlets), the Stamp Act Congress was an gd_hgg. arrangement only and therefore could not generate any persistent commitment to inter-colonial institutions. It did, however, suggest the possibility of cooperation among the colonies. As the relationship between the Crown and colonies deter- iorated over the next several years, support grew in some quarters for a national organization that could respond to inter-colonial interests on a more enduring basis. When the British responded to a number of provocations in Boston with the famous Coercive Acts, the line was passed and the first Continental Congress assembled in September 1774. As its name would suggest, the new congress began immediately to deal with questions of a continental sweep, ranging from a consideration of the limits of Parliamentary authority in the colonies to a prOposal for a general halt to all trade with England. Early linkages between continental and local institutions were forged when the Congress requested the various local Committees of Correspondence to mobilize public Opinion against the Crown, and to aid in the enforcement of Congressional prOposals. This should not, however, be taken to mean that the state and local governments were in any way subservient to the initiatives of the Continental Congress. Though the Congress endured through the Revolution and for several years thereafter as the locus for national authority, it never represented anything more than a loose federation of states; at no time between 1774 and 1788 did it possess sufficient authority to impose its will upon recalcitrant states. |1 Neve: sexed to st: deeree at 1e Fffl‘v‘.’ a“ . - EV“! 50: v“ Pv-o“ ‘ F. I cu... tug“! 28 Nevertheless, the commencement of the Revolution in 1775 served to strengthen the hand of the continental government to some degree at least, if for no other reason than military and administra- tive necessity. Finding themselves in the midst of war when they convened in May, 1775, the Congress assumed leadership in the military dimension of the conflict and voted to raise a regular army under the leadership of Washington. During the course of the Revolution, the Continental Army bore the lions-share of the military burden. There were, for one thing, considerably more tr00ps in the Continental line than in the various militias; of the approximately 250,000 men who saw military service during the Revolution, about 60 per cent had their involvement at the Continental level.S Moreover, while the Continental troops were assisted by state and local militias, the contributions of the latter, though at times extensive, were inter- mittent. Though this military division of labor served to provide the continental government with a reason for existence during the Revolution, it was also productive of a good deal of conflict between those who experienced the Revolution at different levels.6 Conti- nental soldiers, who tended to have had more extensive experience in the Revolution, were disposed to take a disdainfu1 view of their colleagues in the various militias, who they often regarded as dis- orderly irregulars and sunshine patriots. 0n the other hand, it was just this relatively professional character of the Continental troops that made those in the states suSpicious of them, for at that time many considered professional or standing armies to be politically oppressive. |t The was one of r 2:35 no legal e:.e tang, -~e.,{, N~su-., .- ‘35 15‘ 125 3‘. e-«Hest . 533?. ch... ‘1' .\ 7% T‘s, ‘“ c ‘I '4 e‘. ...e cl... ‘Vu I 29 The paramount administrative problem that faced the Congress was one of raising sufficient finances to conduct the war. Congress had no legal authority to raise funds through taxation since, for one thing, it had been commissioned by the respective states and therefore did not sit as direct representatives of the individual citizens of these states. The alternative that was adopted in 1776 was to issue bills of credit which could hOpefully be redeemed with interest by their holders at some future time. But the government soon found that its credit was shaky and farmers and merchants were soon reluctant to accept them at face value. Indeed, by 1780 continental securities were said to cost as much to print as they were worth on the market. At about this time, however, a belated, if all too unsatis— factory, solution to this problem was forthcoming with the adOption in 1781 of the Articles of Confederation. Beginning in 1776 with the formal commencement of the Revolution, attempts had been regu- larly made to give the continental government a formal grant of authority. Though a proposal for such a grant was immediately drawn up, its adoption was delayed for a number of reasons, not least among them was the resistance on the parts of some states to any greater centralization of political authority. At this particular time the states had themselves only recently gained independence and all were either in the process of adopting new state constitu- tions or had already completed the task. Hence, the states were much esteemed and were jealous of their newly acquired powers. On account of this, the final form of the Articles contained a number In" ..5..O. I v FA" ’4 ‘ bet-A59 ‘ o‘ C t... L31 . . at ICE: 9’ cf; 30 l‘.‘ 30 of extensive safeguards for state prerogatives which, by and large, narrowly delimited the areas within which the Continental government could act. Thus, considerable grants of authority were given to the Confederation in the areas of defense and foreign policy, but at the same time the states retained a more fundamental prerogative: the power of the purse. This helped to provide one solution to the 'financial problems of the Congress, for with the adoption of the Articles, it could petition the reSpective states for money as it was needed instead of relying for fUnds upon the now hopelessly in- flated bills of credit. However, the Articles containing no pro- vision whereby the Congress could enforce its requests for funding, so for all practical purposes any venture that the continental government entered into was dependent for its success upon the approval of at least nine states (the number required for passage of any proposal). With the inclusion in the Articles of such pro— tections, most states readily gave their assent to their adoption. Final passage, however, was delayed for at least three more years by the reluctance of three small states, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, to consent to ratification until some of the larger states, notably Virginia, had divested themselves of huge grants of western lands that had come into their possession. Understandably, the smaller states without such titles feared that the expansion of their neighbors into the West would be done at the expense of their own standing in the Confederation. When the Western lands were placed under the control of the Continental government, these iaHer ta: eere finall; The: ' Q I \R ac eu- v hue ,1‘t‘~‘ .v l! '- . 32.6 cams lv :.«....3. ..., i-TY set 05 Con? impress was at 18mg, and by :“a‘. A!" . ...-H. a~“l e in ‘19 v1: “\ d“: tun P 2‘ ‘I“‘ 3? c ‘s 31 smaller states voted their approval, and the Articles of Confederation were finally adopted in February, 1781. There followed a period of about seven years under the Articles that has come to be known as a "critical period" in American history. Though historians once portrayed this era as a time of chaos and plunder due to the weakness of the central government under the Articles,7 more recent scholarship has asserted some more favor- able claims on its behalf.8 A number of these have been summarized by Edmund Morgan. Any serious student must acknowledge that under the Articles of Confederation the achievements of the United States were impressive. When the Articles were adopted, the country was at war for its existence. When they were abandoned, the war had been won, peace had been concluded on favorable terms, a post-war depression had been weathered successfully, and both population and national income were increasing. Such achievements, while in some ways considerable, were insufficient in the views of many to offset a number of serious weaknesses with the system. Of these criticisms, three deserve mention here. In the first place, the Articles gave no authority to the central govern- ment to regulate interstate and international commerce. As a result, many of the states had entered into commercial conflicts which pro- duced a confusing system of tariffs, imposts, and duties which often varied as one moved from state to state. Second, it was charged that the Articles had rendered the nation vulnerable to foreign military 0 attack.1 This criticism, as Jay articulated it in the Federalist, held that a powerful and consistent foreign policy was essential both to avoid accidental or capricious wars as well as to deter other nations from initiating them. As Jay put it, "it appears evident that this u gmement three or f: deal only u 385:1". of t . . ‘ “. ‘\u,-‘ ‘HbeuAb‘. 3.: the Sta: general re: 1136 to thl callep the Hat-glad a: in: @0115 j ‘ . A. ‘ remuonsn. e 1,, «Ed'es. T a”. Wines ' h ”‘3 A: t 8:1.“ 3‘. ‘I 32 that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies."ll And third, the national government under the Articles possessed no independent authority over individual citizens of the reSpective states; instead, it could deal only with the state governments themselves.12 The most serious result of this, as I have said earlier, was that the national govern— ment could not generate financial support through the direct taxation of individuals but instead depended for its revenues upon the largess of the state governments. Frequently this was not forthcoming. These criticisms were enough to move some men to urge a general reconsideration of the Articles of Confederation. The pre- lude to this came in 1786 with the meeting of what has come to be called the Annapolis Convention. At the invitation of the states of Maryland and Virginia, delegates from the other states gathered at Annapolis in an attempt to forge some stability in the commercial relationships between the states. Since only five states responded to the invitation, the meeting clearly failed of its original pur— pose. However, at this point one of the delegates, Alexander Hamilton, moved to call another convention, this time in Phila- delphia, with the purpose not of merely resolving trade disputes but of entering into a general reconsideration of the Articles them- selves. This proposal ran directly counter to a clause in the Articles which stated clearly that any alteration in the Articles must gain the approval of both Congress and the legislatures of every state. Nevertheless, Hamilton's move was adopted, and with 'a'hlL‘ l¥-$-' "' 033 an 1" u..5 :34” at the natlcna :0 the Con); i "N- 4 Juned a S 39hr. Roch u 7 sin-2e altos 1‘" 0’ . . “that 1:: l 832:} the I“. “S 30’» are r; n‘ne 33 this maneuver the advocates of change hit upon a plan of strengthening the national government without running the gauntlet of the state legislatures. The Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in May 1787 and during its course was attended at one time or another by fifty-five delegates. Among the states, only Rhode Island re- fused to participate. Though diverse in many ways, the delegates to the Convention were nearly unanimous on one question: almost all favored a strengthening of the national government. According to John Roche, there was little ideological conflict among the delegates since almost all had come to Philadelphia with the intention of constructing a more formidable national authority.13 On his view, even the rift between advocates of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans was not premised upon a division between nationalists and states rightists but instead upon a tactical question of representation. The delegates from the smaller states were not questioning the legitimacy of national authority but wanted primarily to arrive at a solution that had a chance of being accepted back home. The litmus test of the states-rights position involved the acceptance of the proposition that "the central government had as its constituents the states, not the people, and could only reach the people through the agency of state government."14 Despite the volume of compromises in the Convention which produced a federal as opposed to a purely national system, nearly all of the delegates in attendance were nationalists in the sense that they rejected this proposition. This kind of consensus facilitated their task of grinding out a document I :nat was . authcrlty . a g u ‘ appre.a1 t ‘hu 0‘ “,l ~38 :r: e'u ‘ .. .- ~ . W act-«wt. .ns.eac’. c: “35 8:23:sz "Ventlcns 0 0f '33 CC ”he“ \were fr. . u \r‘e 0" ‘\ e' .u& aSSeP, ‘1 pix . 34 that was consistent with their desire for a strengthened central authority at the same time that it stood a fair chance of gaining approval back in the states. The likelihood of the latter was considerably increased by the provisions for ratification that the delegates appended to the document when it was finally agreed upon in September, 1787. Instead of seeking to gain the required approval of the thirteen state legislatures, as the Articles of Confederation required for any proposed alteration, the supporters of the new system pr0posed to seek the approval of the individual citizens themselves. This was accomplished by calling for special elections to choose dele— gates to constitutional conventions in each state. Thus the pro- posed Constitution directed that: "The ratification of the Con- ventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." There were two tactical reasons for this maneuver. First, by plac- ing the decision to ratify in the hands of specially elected con- ventions, they thereby steered clear of the politicians in the state legislatures who were considered to have personal interests in the old system. Second, by making ratification contingent upon the assent of only nine of the thirteen states, they removed the possibility that a few recalcitrant states, such as Rhode Island, could successfully impede the preferences of a majority of the other states. Besides these tactical dimensions to their strategy, the plan was attractive because it could be expected to contribute to the legitimacy of the new regime. If the national government l P' I - prtpased 1 ties rati; zac' deter 4 c ‘uq‘ t1“! L, U” U’ C e v P‘ 35 prOposed to deal directly with citizens in their individual capaci- ties rather than simply with state governments, its future legiti- macy depended in some measure upon gaining the consent of those over whom it would govern. Hence, the process that was chosen for ratification facilitated both the acceptance and, given this, the survival of the proposed system. Ratification proceeded swiftly, if not always smoothly. All told, the process lasted some ten months, from September, 1787 when the Constitution was first presented to the states, to July, 1788 when ratification was finally assured. However, the criti- cism that was precluded by the consensus at Philadelphia was forthcoming as soon as the contents of the proposed system became public knowledge. The old system still had its share of supporters, and they were led to oppose the ratification of the national system, which they did with vehemence and with considerably more strength than the results of the contest would at first glance indicate.15 Such critics of the Constitution were quickly called Antifederalists by its supporters--who for themselves adopted the name "Federalists." Despite this burst of criticism, however, the Federalists had by far the best of the contest from the beginning. By January, four states had given their approval to the Constitu— tion by overwhelming margins, and in three of these states (New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia) the count was unanimous among delegates to the conventions. In February, the Federalists won a close struggle in the key state of Massachusetts, and from that point their movement gained momentum. In June, the ninth state, ,‘x'eh’ Eiafps't. Virginia at 3.‘ the thi? to ratify remixing L"; luv ,1 .. u’J—u “Cu , ’ F ”as Sh‘ sec A. “ um“ " .. an a 9'. a." we. re. be ;.._,_ £0.‘drc 36 New Hampshire, voted for ratification, and the two remaining states, Virginia and New York, faced with isolation, quickly fell into line. Of the thirteen states, only Rhode Island and North Carolina refused to ratify by the middle of 1788. However, the difficulties of remaining outside the system led them to reconsider, and by 1790 both had voted their acceptances. What kinds of considerations served to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists? And what was the relationship between the ratification and the sequence of events that led up to it? As I indicated earlier, these questions continue to be matters of intel- lectual controversy, and will no doubt remain so in the future. As the symbol of American nationalism, the meaning of the Constitution has shifted with changing political tides. Accordingly, the litera- ture on the subject is graced by a variety of explanations, most of which for a number of reasons cannot be considered here. Some of these, though at different times highly influential, have proven to be incapable of serious examination. The nineteenth century notion of the Founding Fathers as acting under the guidance of divine inSpiration clearly falls into this category. Others, while essen— tially accurate as far as they go, have tended to invoke considera— tions of insufficient breadth to offer acceptable comprehensive accounts of the problem. One such interpretation that comes to mind is William Riker's argument that the supporters of the national system were driven primarily by their concern over American diplo- Inatic and military vulnerability under the Articles of Confederation. Such considerations lead us to restrict our attention to a sion “ CZSC‘ these MY ~“es rrf‘ '- 55 Pmévfl . A Y. J v. €38 8F“ . y. Au . {I- 5 avg J. "E H § u?& .e “~k” “ ‘S a ii"; \ 37 discussion of two influential interpretations of this case. Both of these may be said to offer comprehensive yet rational and empirical approaches to the problems of political change and the Constitution. These approaches will consist of, first, the argument inSpired by the work of Charles A. Beard, who focused upon the reputed economic cleavages between Federalists and Antifederalists and, second, an explanation, pieced together by a number of writers, which emphasizes the differential impact of nationalism upon these two groups.17 It will be the goal of the following discussion to show how the theo— retical approach that we outlined in the previous chapter can be reconciled with these broader interpretations of the conflict. One Analytical Perspective: "An Economic Interpretation of the Consitution" Throughout the nineteenth century, the Constitution repre- sented the central symbol around which the entire American political culture revolved. Though this was a period which witnessed, first, a divisive sectional conflict which resulted in civil war and, second, a growing class conflict brought on by the coming of indus- trialization, the Constitution remained at most times above the battle. Indeed, when conflicts did emerge, they were not fought out over the Constitution itself but over who articulated its true meaning. In a culture with its share of social and political cleavages, the myth surrounding the Constitution helped to provide the degree of consensus needed to maintain some measure of political stability. tut to 12": to be reg: C) W) 38 This outlook toward the Constitution could not have helped but to rub off on the framers of the document, who themselves came to be regarded with veneration. Washington, of course, quickly became a hero, a charismatic figure in his own lifetime. He, along with perhaps Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson, deve10ped as time passed a symbolic dimension to which partisans regularly appealed, but to which they usually attached different meanings.18 The notion of the Founding Fathers as wise and disinterested sages was not held simply by unthinking nationalists but was also reinforced by the writings of a number of historians as well. Before the Civil War, the historian George Bancroft wrote of democracy and the Con- stitution as the works of divinely inspired leaders.19 After the war in a period of increasing nationalism, John Fiske set forth the then definitive interpretation of the emergence of the Consti- tution which held that a group of high-minded and disinterested statesmen came together in Philadelphia to lead the new nation out of a period of chaos and into an era which was bound to see her destiny fulfilled.20 Despite the shifting political circumstances of the nineteenth century, the symbolism surrounding the Founding Fathers survived it intact. There are, of course, those today who still find such a view plausible. However that may be, it came under serious attack as a scholarly position around the turn of the century with the rise of what has come to be called the Progressive movement. The sources of Progressivism were varied and the movement fought for reform on a variety of political fronts, but according to some historians it was hel- that may be Pregressi'.e is: of nir.‘ of social the dOEi" ; “|I;A FOI the Pf:E SIStEd, III “015, perl desiraze . bi: ,‘ v AC... ens'. 39 it was held together by a distinctive outlook among its followers, or what may be called a Progressive "mind." For Morton White, the Progressives were united in their revolt against the excessive formal- ism of nineteenth century thinking or, in other words, against a view of social and political life which located truth in a set of abstract standards rather than in experience. Thus, according to White: They [the Progressives] are all suSpicious of approaches which are excessively formal; they all protest their anxiety to come to grips with reality, their attachment to the moving and the vital in social life.21 It was this anxiety to come to grips with "reality" that emerged as the dominant theme of the Progressive orientation. Reality, however, was not simply associated with experience but with a particular kind of experience which reflected the pervasive cynicism of social life. For the Progressive, reality was the bribe or the kickback and con- sisted, in Richard Hofstadter's words, of "a series of unspeakable plots, personal iniquities, and moral failures" which had come to dominate the whole of American life.22 The air of respectability which enshrouded social institutions was in the end only a facade which, once torn away, exposed the machinations of petty and self- interested men. The time was obviously ripe for the de-mythologizing of the Founding Fathers. Given the perspective of the Progressive mind, the older view of the Constitution as the product of disinterested statesmanship appeared not only excessively formalistic but also too naive to be accepted without serious reservation. Moreover, the traditional notion, since it viewed the framers and their works with sash. vene: that was ‘1 gr-spzng Progress; tion for ‘ , 5315's ‘2 fl 40 such veneration, tended to focus upon the Constitution as something that was essentially immutable, and therefore not subject to serious change. The Progressives, of course, were interested in reform, and their attacks on this conception reflected their impatience not only with intellectual formalism but with the status quo as well. In groping for a less formalistic view of American institutions, Progressive scholars were led to formulate on alternative explana- tion for their origins. One of the early works of the Progressive genre was J. Allen Smith's The Spirit of American Government, first published in 1907. The burden of Smith's argument rested on the claim that the Consti- tution, rather than being inSpired by a search for good government, was in fact a product of an anti-democratic reaction against the egalitarian spirit of the Revolution. His suggestion was that the framers were motivated largely by their hostility to majority rule, an hostility that was in part a reflection of their economic interests. Thus, he argued near the end of his book: It may be stated without exaggeration that the American scheme of Government was planned and set up to perpetuate the ascendency of the property holding class in a society leavened with democratic ideas. Those who feared it were fully alive to the fact that their economic advantages could be retained only by maintaining their class ascendency in the government.23 Curiously, the contention that the Constitution did not facilitate majority rule was not a proposition that was widely contested at the time of Smith's writing; indeed, the previous generation of historians accepted it both on factual and normative grounds. What was new was Smith's claim that the goal of a democratic society Iii.” iv. . .2' ‘1'“! l..- eoald not Clearly, e the Aperic .V‘.‘ .‘ “£513“ 521; "O“. EFL. 5 ... -uu‘ ‘ that tie 41 could not be attained within the strictures of present institutions. Clearly, either those institutions or the democratic aspirations of the American public would have to be seriously modified, and, like most Progressives, Smith preferred that it would be the former. Smith did not rigorously pursue his allusion to the economic motives of the framers, so his work can only be considered to be preparatory to the full-blown economic interpretation of the Consti- tution that later came to be regarded as the distinctive intellectual contribution of the Progressive movement. However, his hypothesis that the Constitution represented a reaction to the Revolution instead of an outgrowth of it became one of the principle articles of the Progressive interpretation of the American past. The fullest statement of the economic interpretation, how- ever, was put forward some years later by one of Smith's contempor- aries, Charles A. Beard in his An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). Beard's achievement was notable not only for the substantive argument that he developed but also for the kind of analysis that it represented. Since the mere suggestion of bad faith or self-interest on the parts of the framers was considered outrageous at the time, Beard felt compelled to preface his argument with a justification for an economic approach to political institutions. Earlier approaches, he argued, vacillated between two equally undesirable poles: either they located the sources of institutions in abstract notions such as divine inspira- tion or the march of history, or, on the other hand, they were content to impartially collect and set forth the relevant facts of It a partic: tion that 1:. term" EA» 3 (- AW: “ In..- \ , tve accc analysis and iii 3;: 2’: eh. of S V .e:t;al ¢ 42 a particular case. Where the first was abstract and therefore not subject to rational examination, the second was regarded as mere "story-telling." What was needed according to Beard was an orienta- tion that located the sources of political events and institutions in concrete experiences but which at the same time offered explana- tions (i.e., interpretations) for these events instead just narra- tive accounts. In other words, what was needed was a type of analysis that satisfied the requirements of scientific explanation and which could thereby appeal to a generation of scholars whose view of social and political life had been influenced by the intel- lectual claims of pragmatism and instrumentalism. In order to meet such requirements, Beard began to focus upon what he called the economic bases of politics. In employing such an approach, Beard was clearly drawing upon the writings of a number of influential predecessors, and he was quick to acknowledge the influences of Turner in history, Pound and Holmes in jurisprudence and, in addition, the writings of the European socialist, Ferdinand La Salle. Curiously, one can find no mention of the name of Marx in the original version of Beard's book. The influences of the above, however, were reinforced and, in Beard's mind, overshadowed by the political thinking of one of the framers themselves, James Madison, whose Federalist No. 10 developed an argument which related political conflict to the unequal distribution of property. For Beard, this essay represented a "masterful statement of the theory of economic determinism in 24 politics." And, just as importantly, since it came from the pen of Madisc: aeproach : Be levels of near the E O «4» Ju" ._ o .."e "'v-vv-Iw- “‘ Hula-Iv. . 35511231102 cleavages t: discove L “‘6 he v, u.e:l r 9 .. ui‘al‘d 5 air \ fluierse f it 43 of Madison, its citation served to add credibility to an economic approach to the Constitution. Beard's argument vacillated throughout between two different levels of analysis and generalization. His purpose as he stated it near the beginning of his work was not to offer a definitive account but only to lay the groundwork for future research on the problem. The purported introductory nature of his inquiry along with the assumptions of the economic approach led him to focus upon broad cleavages between social and economic groups. His aim was therefore to discover: What classes and social groups existed in the United States just previous to the adoption of the Constitution and which of them, from the nature of their property, might have been expected to benefit immediately and definitely by the overthrowing of the old system and the establishment of the new. On the other hand, it must be discovered which of them might have expected more beneficial immediate results . from the maintenance of existing legal arrangements.25 In other words, Beard was on the one hand attempting to define what in Selznick's terms we might call the social bases of these distinct sets of institutions. Such a strategy could easily have been recon- ciled with Madison's pronouncements in The Federalist, for what Beard said he was going to undertake was an examination of the diverse factions existing in American society at the time in order to discover the basis of the conflict over the Constitution. With the problem so stated there was no notion of conspiracy or petty selfishness, only an assumption to the effect that pe0ple adOpt values that are congruent with their economic positions in society. The basic economic cleavage to which Beard pointed was, in his terminology, one between owners of ”personalty," or capital of nous a] that this am a co' H t . . .p ’ , 13:15.3 ; 1.9., A; o Uvuae~aa.2 . ‘9 \ tea...»r :2: 33d iacco: Ptrted Ev EGVETnher QL ~ ‘ gels Ki‘ . C32;- fl . 44 various kinds, and owners of "realty," or land. It will be noticed that this was not so much a division between the rich and poor as it was a conflict between different types of prOperty, that is, between industry and agriculture. Among owners of personalty he included not only traders and manufacturers but also slaveowners and holders of depreciated continental securities. On the other hand, owners of realty consisted of a small group of large land owners and a large and (according to Beard) homogeneous class of small farmers and urban dwellers. A large share of this latter group were considered to be debtors. On the basis of this rough economic cleavage, Beard suggested that the movement for the Constitution was led and sup- ported by holders of personalty who were concerned to see a national government created with sufficient authority that would enable it to regulate and therefore to stabilize trade between states, to place limitations upon the ability of state legislatures to undermine legitimate debts and contracts, and to levy taxes to a degree suffi- cient to allow it to fund the public debt and to repay those who had invested in war-time securities. Opposed to this movement were those whose income was based upon the land since a political change of this kind could not be expected to influence the value of such a commodity. More importantly, however, Beard regarded landowners in general as a debt-ridden group that was heavily advantaged by the then inflated currencies and the hostility of legislatures to creditors. Hence, Beard was suggesting that the economic division between industry and agriculture was reinforced by the age-old clash between creditor and debtor. ll F he different \ amounts 3" has to at; which case accused tc tzzgulsned the most 1; ..C we A'.i‘. 383511.111“ enough 10 1 331:. “L‘Q"v-- V “it VV‘Id‘t‘v' a ‘1— 1.. C “A ‘ 'P h J.“ “flat Y d“. AVE 5‘ a" h asés 45 However, Beard went about testing these prepositions in two different ways, a strategy which as I shall point out in a moment, accounts for his vacillation between levels of analysis. One method was to argue his case from a macro or social level of analysis, in which case he would emphasize the behavior of economic groups as Opposed to Specific individuals within those groups. Here, relying 27 mainly upon such secondary sources as Libby,26 Grigsby, and Harding,28 as well as a number of lesser known state histories, he attempted to demonstrate that those geographic areas that were dis- tinguished by the greatest concentration of commercial activity were the most likely to support the proposed Constitution, while those areas dominated by small landowners and agriculture were most likely to be Antifederalist.29 Though most of the evidence that Beard marshalled here was of a secondary nature, he deemed it conclusive enough to warrant the conclusion that the support for the new system came primarily from those economic groups whose income was based upon personalty of one kind or another. The notoriety of Beard's argument, however, has stemmed more from what he had to say about specific individuals rather than about socio-economic groups. In particular, he allocated a sizeable portion of his work to demonstrating that the framers of the Consti- tution (i.e., those who were members of the Philadelphia convention) could have expected to realize immediate economic advantages as a result of their deliberations. Here, Beard's argument took a de- cidedly different direction. The argument was no longer based upon cleavages between economic groups or between their representatives nr¢'fip 1 J :::.1w.a - ‘y. at rat-5 5 . I u: S .u .m mu m , M4 .L e T. Fe m .t s S 6. Aw r m .u“ ....» e .,. ~30¢nt Cw 1 ‘3‘ . C d 46 but rather upon the immediate economic interests of Federalist leaders. To prove this dimension of his thesis, Beard relied upon his own research, drawing upon a set of old treasury records. Ac- cording to Beard, such records showed that a large proportion of the members of the Philadelphia convention held public securities which would greatly increase in value with the creation of the proposed national system. In addition, most Of the others were owners of personalty of one kind or another, the value of which was likewise expected to increase with the ratification of the new system.30 These findings were summarized by the following conclusion: The members of the Philadelphia convention which drafted the Constitution were, with few exceptions, immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from the establishment of the new system.31 His thesis thus possessed two distinct dimensions, invoking at some times the claim that the political conflict over the Constitution was based upon cleavages between broad economic groups, but suggest- ing at others that the leaders of the Federalist side were motivated by the lure of direct and immediate personal gain. Though many focused their attention on the second aspect of the argument, seeing in it either an attempt to slur the Founding Fathers or simply as an account of the Operation of another vested interest, Beard himself eventually came to repudiate it and was prepared to rest his case exclusively upon his initial proposition of group conflict.32 Despite the antipathy with which Beard's work was initially greeted, it came in time to be regarded as the definitive account of the ratification of the Constitution. In addition, it helped to set W 6 I a theme tr .c n . c. .r1ca " 'tal t 32.4 An“. uQ... I,‘= I‘- I “Av Ju. O; 0 CL V. m4 9L ’5 C N S e a 9‘ .6 . a» r \ e a .1. C a. «d 9» fllv e 5 sh we ab T» 5‘. ‘L n\ r. .5 S . . ..C M». .61 O. . 1 D. L.. . . a F.» “H e. a .‘e . O f. a t T T M S 5 ..R C 1. Mr. E I —.. S a e . r. .. a n4 5.» .. . S c. c. e 3 . .7. J 5 .... rd Q L1 0 A. e» )u ....u .pd nu . ’5 a. flu O.» IA ‘Kd Y» c. U.- :i 47 the terms for the Progressive interpretation of the entire sweep of American political history. The conflict between agriculture and capital to which Beard pointed in his study of the Constitution was a theme that ran through the works of others of the Progressive persuasion, among them, Turner, Smith, Vernon L. Parrington, and Merrill Jensen. In these cases, the favored party was invariably agrarianism, since it was associated in Jeffersonian fashion with democracy, egalitarianism, and individualism. Thus, when Beard demonstrated that small farmers were opposed to the national system, he also took pains to show that the supporters Of that system were hostile to majority rule, and were in fact attempting to restrict it. Beard's claims about the economic interests behind the Constitution therefore merged with Smith's claims about its underlying political purposes, since it was assumed that the interests Of commerce (i.e., personalty) were antithetical to the interests of democracy. Because this view of the Constitution fit so neatly with the Progressive out- look toward the whole of American society and its past, it proved to be difficult for critics to penetrate until the entire edifice of the Progressive orientation itself was challenged, and this was not forthcoming until several decades after the appearance of Beard's work. Progressive scholarship survived the demise of Progressivism itself and even gained new adherents during the 1930's when economic depression and the New Deal served to reinforce the theme of economic conflict. It was not until the post-war period that the assumptions behind the Progressive interpretation were challenged, and along with them the Beard thesis itself. under 5 ch L.partic, arguteut (. f . . ‘ uh" J4» Ins:e~4 d1: ‘4 AND J431.“. . U 6 95.4: 48 One of the first pillars of the Beard thesis to be placed under scholarly attack was his version of the economic approach and, in particular, his contention that it was derived from Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10. According to Morton White, there was a substantial gulf between Madison's and Beard's positions on this question. Specifically, White points out that each attributed the origins of economic conflict to different sources: where for Madison it was seen to be an inherent aspect Of human nature, for Beard it was understood as the product of specific economic systems.33 On this ground, White argues, Beard was closer to Marx than to Madison. Douglas Adair has concurred in this assessment, arguing that Beard invoked Madison only to make a quasi-Marxist argument appear more palatable to his American readership.34 Indeed, Beard's restatement of Madison's theory emphasized only its economic dimension, and omitted entirely any mention of Madison's catalOgue of the non- economic sources of faction, such as religion and opinions concerning government.35 Actually, however, Beard could not have been much Of a Marxist either, or he would not have felt the need to go into such meticulous detail about the economic holdings of specific individuals, but instead would have concentrated exclusively upon the interests and ideologies of economic classes. Beard's view was thus neither Madisonian nor Marxist, but rather that of the Progressive, aware that economic interests influence political decisions, but inclined to believe that such decisions reflect the personal interests of individuals rather than the loose and often subtle Operation of classes. .e Phi ent V5 gerated \1 .fi OL. \U 3‘ p b 'e -:g::ent- O \r. . 75 v. T. fl .1 § A IHH a. T HJ «J “J .5 A c IV 2. .- d ble. ors a 2 a 5-40 " | &>‘ bury. 9‘... -. ..l r- 111: u... r l. 49 Such criticisms of Beard's approach have been paralleled in recent years by a series of scholarly attacks upon Beard's substantive argument. One of the earliest of these was engineered by Robert Brown, in a work whose entire purpose was to dispute Beard's thesis.36 After retracing much of Beard's research, Brown drew the conclusion that the economic conflict that he had portrayed was simply an exag— gerated version of what actually had happened. Among the delegates to the Philadelphia convention, Brown found no consistent pattern of property-holding that accorded with Beard's conclusions; indeed, according to his tally, owners of realty greatly outnumbered holders of personalty in the convention.37 With regard to the public at large, the reputed division between capital and land was even less tenable. Contrary to Beard's claims, farmers were not a class Of debtors and they therefore had no serious economic reason for opposing the Constitution. In fact, farmers supported the new system in large numbers; if they had not, it could never have been ratified, since small farmers constituted an overwhelming prOportion Of the population at the time. Moreover, Brown rejected the view that the Constitution was put over by undemocratic means: though relatively few voted (about one in six), most adult males nevertheless had the Opportunity to do so. The degree to which they did not vote merely suggests the extent to which people were not aroused over the matter. In sum, Brown argued that Beard's argument grossly exaggerated the degree of economic conflict existing in American society in 1788. For Brown, such conflict was believed to be at a minimum. Thus, he suggested that an alternative explanation could be built around the ass; dominate were in .‘CI an a 9;, . ‘0 avSuA.S ‘ I. ‘ H4e‘.‘,4, . ‘iBA r ‘UU. 93:0 A 1:13 earlier 2' :eacemet the FL”: 3.31:!SES State to attentio Dart) bu rt : ‘He‘r CC Pclnt; Q. 50 the assumption that America in the 1780's was a consensual polity, dominated by a large number of middle-class property owners who were in basic agreement in their economic outlooks. In his criticisms of Beard, though not in his suggestions for an alternative approach, Brown's work has been reinforced by the results of a number of case studies of the ratification process in individual states. These studies Of Virginia,38 Maryland,39 North Carolina,40 and New Jersey41 represented an improvement over Beard's earlier analysis in at least two ways. First, where Beard was more concerned with discerning the economic interests of the delegates to the Philadelphia convention, these studies entered into more thorough analyses of the property holdings of the delegates to the various state conventions. Second, these studies did not restrict their attention to Federalist delegates, as Beard had done for the most part, but they also examined the holdings of Antifederalists as well. Their conclusions were in agreement with Beard's on at least one point: Federalists tended to come from the economically advantaged strata of society. However, the same was found to be true of Anti- federalists as well. Moreover, there was no significant division between the holders of personalty and realty; the leadership of both sides held similar kinds as well as amounts of property. If the results of these studies are to be believed, economic elites divided among themselves over the issue of the Constitution. In concluding his study of Virginia, Thomas summarized this theme: The leaders of both parties were recruited from the same class, and the conflict over the ratification of the Federal Constitution in Virginia was essentially a struggle between competing groups within the aristocracy.42 o S. 6! I-‘ .‘u.'~¢ a \. Ll V Alum.) - A e a a P a" ‘4.“ v». nub .. l state. "% TtO‘ ‘ o .‘u‘ .b S ..1 51 Similarly, Philip Crowl drew a parallel conclusion about Maryland: The significance Of the party Split in Maryland lies in the fact that it was an internecine war waged within a single, small, and wealthy ruling class.43 According to these studies, then, the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists, at least in those states mentioned above, was not a struggle between different types of property, nor did it in- volve a division between the supporters of democracy and its oppo- nents. Rather, it was a split among the economic leaders in each state. Though these studies did not reject the economic approach entirely, they did suggest that the Beardian version of it was not very useful. Such a conclusion was subsequently placed upon a more conclusive footing by the work of Forrest McDonald, who attempted to test Beard's thesis through a close examination Of the economic holdings of the numerous delegates to the thirteen state conven- tions.44 He likewise found that in both national and state conven- tions, the concepts of personalty and realty did not serve to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists. However, McDonald was not prepared to abandon an economic approach to the matter. Beard's problem, he pointed out, was that he attempted to account for the split over the Constitution in terms of categories that were uniform across states or, in other words, in terms of a national cleavage. McDonald suggested that the problem was clarified if it was viewed from a state-to-state perSpective. Economic issues did not have the same impact in every state; instead, they took on a I. 52 different character depending upon the economic and political condi- tions of the state. For example, agrarian concerns were important in many places, but they were overshadowed in Georgia, a farming state, by the threat of an Indian war and by the hOpe that a national government could offer military protection against such a threat. Other of the weaker states, especially New Jersey and Delaware, viewed the new system from a similar point of view. On the other hand, states that were more economically self-sufficient, such as New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, ratified only after bitter con- tests, since it was believed by many in these states that they could survive independently. Similarly, the issue of the public debt was looked at differently from state to state, depending upon the economic burden that it represented. The size of the debt varied from state to state and so did the ability to pay it. In those states in which it constituted a sizeable burden, such as in New Jersey, a national government that would fund state debts was naturally looked upon with great support. In other states, however, the burden of the debt was small, and in such states, therefore, it was not a powerful issue in the campaign. Thus, according to McDonald, the important variable in any state's decision was the degree to which it was economically self- sufficient. In short, those states that had done well on their own were inclined to desire to continue on their own, and those that found it difficult to survive independently were inclined . . 45 to desire to cast their several lots with a general government. McDonald's argument was still focused upon economic considerations, but it nevertheless tore away at the Beardian claim that the conflict 5‘ 5r __.__ was base. the econ: based up A .‘; ‘ Jew: a. -‘ a“ wLL.‘ ‘ 61. ~ FA I. "““s an, e. ‘c \5cent ‘ 53 was based upon cleavages that worked across state lines. Rather, the economic sources of the dispute were diffuse and were often based upon considerations that were endemic to particular states and localities. Beard erred, in McDonald's view, in that he did not recognize the pluralistic character Of the split between Federalists and Antifederalists. Most of the above criticisms, in one way or another, have chipped away at Beard's dualism between personalty and realty. In recent years, such criticisms have been complemented by objections to another Of the Progressive dualisms, namely, that between demo- cratic and elite rule. According to this view, put forward both by Smith and Beard, democracy found its strongest supporters on the land, among small farmers and prOperty-holders, but was frustrated by commercial interests which sought to maintain their privileged status by frustrating the power of majorities. As an extension of the personalty versus realty theme, it was argued that since the Constitution frustrated democratic rule, the objections of the Anti- federalists must have been based upon their commitment to democracy. For Beard, this was firmly demonstrated by his finding that the future leaders of the Jeffersonian party were recruited from the ranks of those who had earlier been opposed to the Constitution. On the other hand, those who had once been supporters of the new system tended to join the less democratically inclined Federalist party.47 Such a view has, however, been thrown into question by a recent study of the Antifederalists which portrayed them as being more hostile in many ways to democracy than their reputedly It 1.7.6 EOtI‘ {7.8 DEV 5 1 that 33'. ' o "' EYE“... en‘s 'P" .v “1062‘ Lt. “ere Uta IPA“ lJ‘Ql 16 54 undemocratic Opponents.48 What the Antifederalists feared most about the new system was not the threat of elite rule but the likelihood that national authority would not be responsive to purely local interests. This is to say that they were suspicious of political power that was not closely linked to the local political arena. SO long as political power was detached from local units of government, it did not matter whether it was controlled by elites or by demo- cratic majorities. The question, as Kenyon points out, was largely one of the location of political authority: The fundamental issue over which Federalists and Antifederalists split was the question whether republican government could be extended to embrace a nation, or whether it must be limited to the comparatively small political and geographic units which the separate American states then constituted. The Anti~ federalists took the latter view; and in a sense they were the conservatives of 1787, and their opponents the radicals.49 Kenyon thus suggests that the division between Federalists and Anti- federalists turned in part upon their views toward change and upon their orientations to national and local institutions. In other words, Antifederalists diverged from their opponents in that they were unable to conceive of a set of interests beyond the state or local levels that could be represented by national institutions. Kenyon's argument here represented a powerful criticism of the entire Progressive View of the Constitution, for it suggested that Beard, Smith, and their contemporaries were simply asking the wrong questions. The basic issues of the time did not revolve around the desirability of majority rule nor around the legitimacy of property rights. Rather, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, "the central issue . . . was whether the American union should become a eatial i role it. approac‘r .‘ 5:3: I: a9 lid of 1 9n being, SS become a national state."50 If this was indeed the case, the differ- ential impact of nationalism might well have played an important role in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists. When we approach the problem from this angle, other problems also take on a different color. Foremost among these is the Revolution, and its link to the deveIOpment of national institutions. Contemporary studies of revolution in a number of settings have invariably found that nationalism is a direct outgrowth of revolutionary experiences and of the demands for cooperation that revolutions bring into being.51 A similar development may have occurred in the United States and, indeed, such a case has been advanced by a number of other writers. In casting about for an alternative approach to the much criticized Beardian view, the concept of nationalism appears to be a suggestive place to begin. In the next section we shall consider some arguments that may be employed to reinforce such an approach and, after that, indicate how it bears upon the theory based upon political careers that was developed in the preceding chapter. An Alternative Approach: The United States as a New Nation The body of literature that we have just surveyed indicates that Beard's thesis, despite the extensive criticisms, has survived in at least one important sense. That is, the economic framework that he elaborated succeeded in setting the terms for the subsequent debate over the problem of the Constitution. Thus, the argument over the matter has consistently revolved around the economic 56 interests of those involved in the conflict and whether or not Beard had gotten them straight. Among the greater share of Beard's critics, much more effort has gone into repudiating his findings than into suggesting an acceptable alternative to his argument. McDonald's work represents an exception to this rule, though it will be remem- bered that, while he disputed Beard, he was nevertheless involved in locating what he considered to be the real economic origins of the Constitution. Hence, despite the criticisms, Beard's approach has still retained its paramount status, for as Louis Hartz pointed out some years ago, "you merely demonstrate your subservience to a thinker when you spend your time attempting to disprove him."52 Hartz's observation suggests that the only way to move beyond a thesis like this is to formulate an alternative approach that invokes entirely different categories of analysis. Hartz has suggested that the Progressive focus upon economic interests may be supplanted by a set of categories that relates American experiences to those of other nations. Though the Progressive outlook was worldly in the sense that it searched for the economic bases of politics, it was nevertheless parochial in the sense that it viewed America from the "inside."53 For Hartz, the American eXperience takes on an entirely different dimension when it is looked at from a European perSpective. From this view it immediately becomes apparent that the United States has lacked a feudal background and has therefore been Spared the sharp class cleavages that emerged from that system as it was found in Europe. As a result, American society has always been bourgeois and, accord- ingly, it has also been thoroughly liberal. Such a social consensus l, ...u- n' 2:- er- against .44.: vAUh, .. 94A! ’63:. in a :‘a 2&5 V d W‘— fi. - . .C e ..C I u Ya Y. A 3 a a. .d . «v. Fe . A e x g.“ p. a .p. u m m “.... ..... t. roan-ii f'ma\ V‘. a. 57 has meant that whenever conflict has appeared in the United States it has generally been between parties that were essentially agreed on fundamental values. Since the Progressives looked at American society in a vacuum, they grossly exaggerated the degree and the importance of the economic conflict that they saw. In the case of the Constitu- tion, the Progressives could view the Federalists as reactionaries against the ideas of democracy and revolution only because they could not understand what a real reactionary was; had they been able to compare Madison with Maistre they would have quickly understood the difference.54 This points to the virtue of a comparative approach which, as Hartz sees it, is that by placing American events in a cross- national perSpective, it allows us to see the distinctive character that such events assume in an American context. In recent years, however, others have adOpted the comparative approach that Hartz has suggested but, contrary to his conclusions, have proceeded to draw a wide range of parallels between the United States and other nations, especially those that have only recently gained their independence. Among them, William Nisbet Chambers has attempted to use the United States as a model of political party development, demonstrating that the emergence of a national party system in the United States had to first overcome obstacles similar to those confronted by emerging nations today.SS Included among such problems were the creation of a national identity, the building of institutions that were national in scOpe, the development of a national economy, and the recruitment of elites to staff national leadership positions. In the United States, such problems were 58 resolved in stages over time, and Chambers suggests that a clear, though at times bitterly contested, path can be traced from the Revolution, which contributed to the growth of a national identity, to the ratification of the Constitution, which established a frame- work of national institutions, to the emergence of the party system which mobilized a national electorate within more or less stable political organizations. In terms of Chambers' analysis, these stages represented distinctive chapters in the process of nation- building in the United States. Chambers' theme has recently been developed further by the work of Seymour Lipset, who has argued that since the United States was the first colonial possession to gain its independence through revolution, "it may prOperly claim the title of the first new nation."56 On his view, the struggle that the United States passed through nearly two centuries ago in achieving national independence is now being duplicated in the modern period by a host of new nations in the non-Western parts of the world. As 'new' nations, all share a similar national identity which, as Lipset says, "is linked to revolutionary, egalitarian, and anti-imperialist ideas."57 Moreover, their very newness has meant that the problem of generating legitimacy for new authorities could not be resolved on the basis of appeals to traditional values but had instead to be accomplished through the medium of charismatic leaders. For Lipset, Washington filled such a role in the United States, just as in newer states it has been filled by such nationalist leaders as Ghandi and Lenin, among others. Further, all have faced the problem of establishing 59 stable national institutions to serve as the political basis for unification. Generally, the most severe challenges to such institu- tions have come from the adherents of localism, who have little con- ception of a national identity and who therefore tend to Oppose the intrusion of new institutions into areas which have heretofore been matters of local control. Though Lipset does not mean to imply that contemporary new nations will follow paths similar to the United States,58 his argument does suggest that, in functional terms anyway, they will encounter analogous problems in the process of deveIOpment. Far from being unique, then, the early American experience is viewed by Lipset as providing a paradigm for the development of the modern national state. If Chambers and Lipset are correct in these general claims, the ratification of the Constitution in the United States can be understood as part of a process Of nationobuilding and, accordingly, can be viewed as an indicator of the growth of nationalism among the citizens of the thirteen states. Though nationalism is a slippery concept which is said to possess a host of different dimensions, Kelman has pointed out that one of its most important aspects is institutional. Thus he argues that it often involves the belief among members of relatively separate political units that they are linked by interests that can be represented by more comprehensive (i.e., national) political institutions.59 The above framework of analysis proposed by Lipset and Chambers has led a number of writers to ask whether the growth of nationalism and national institutions 60 in the United States were associated with factors similar to those that have accounted for such develOpments in other areas. To this question there have been a number of answers, most of which, however, reinforce the parallel suggested by Chambers and Lipset between the United States and the growth of new nations in general. Deutsch has argued that the growth of such nations follows a uniform pattern of development, the central feature of which is the general social mobilization of the population through the emergence of basic communications grids, urbanization, and the rise of a modern exchange economy.60 The importance of such factors is that they greatly increase the contacts between peoples with already similar outlooks, and thus reinforce the demand for political uni- fication under national institutions. Merritt has attempted to apply one of Deutsch's prOpositions--that relating communications to nationalism--to the American colonies in the eighteenth century.61 According to Merritt in his study of colonial newspapers, the rise of the independence movement in America was accompanied by a growing consciousness among colonists of a national identity that linked one colony to another. As time passed during the pre-revolutionary period, such an awareness was buttressed by the increased attention given to symbols of American unity by the colonial press, which at that time was the basic medium of communications. Thus for Merritt, as for Deutsch, the emergence of nationalism in the American colo- nies followed a pattern similar to that found in other places. In addition to the influences of communications, the development of the national idea in the United States was also 61 given momentum, as Curtis Nettels suggests, by the emergence of a national economy after the year 1775.62 This development not only had the effect of increasing contacts between the colonies but also of requiring the formulation of a common set of regulations to govern such exchanges. Indeed, for Nettels, the Constitution was a logical outgrowth of the need for national political institutions to accom- pany an emergent national economic system.63 However, Nettels argues that the prime mover fOr this entire process was the Revolu- tion, for military success against the British required a large measure of economic cooperation between the colonies, which required in turn the formulation of consistent national policies. The con- clusion of the Revolution, however, did not bring to an end the pressures for such cooperation; indeed, such pressures increased as the American economy continued to expand in the subsequent years. Nettels' suggestion of a link between the Revolution and the development of national institutions in the United States has been given additional credibility by contemporary theories of the process of nation-building. Many of these have emphasized the symbolic importance of revolution as a condition for the development of national institutions.64 Insofar as they are directed at expel- ling foreign authority, of course, revolutions achieve the minimum condition for national unification, namely, political independence. In addition to this, however, revolution helps to overcome a per- sistent tendency to localism which is often found in newer states. As Kornhauser points out, the process Of revolution itself augments It 62 the bonds of nationalism and thus helps to prepare the way for uni- fication under national institutions. Of major importance in the genesis of political independence is the emergence of a collective sense of belonging together against what comes to be perceived as alien authority [But] the very process of rebelling often contributes to the development of a new political identity. During the course of the struggle, rebels forge new bonds and symbols of unity. 65 Thus, Kornhauser observes that the common outcome of revolution, and especially of those that are directed against colonial control, is the consciousness of nationalism among those who are closely associ- ated with it. Accordingly, such revolutions also have the effect of spurring the growth of national institutions which usually succeed in centralizing political authority. Applied to the American experience, of course, this generalization clearly states what had been implicit in Lipset's parallel between the United States and 'new' nations-— namely, that the Constitution can be considered a product of the Revolution instead of a reaction against it. On this view, the telling aspect of the Revolution was not its implications for majority rule but rather that it led to a measure of political centralization under a national regime. Hence, as Hannah Arendt has argued in giving support to this view of the matter, the link between the two events consisted in the fact that "the Constitution finally consolidated the power of the Revolution and . . . was thus the true culmination of . "66 the revolutionary process. The above considerations lead us to advance the hypothesis that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was based, in part, upon their differing perceptions of nationalism and national :Ip- It '. 0...". :ALSU‘OU‘ were dis affairs appar n: propose e... i a... v‘\ A‘ulns . 63 institutions. In other words, the suggestion is that Federalists were distinctive in that they entertained a conception of American affairs that was national in scope, and that such a conception was not apparent to Antifederalists. Thus, the former were more inclined to prOpose innovations that served to expand the role of national insti- tutions. We do not mean to suggest, however, that this difference was due to the intelligence or the breadth of vision of those who sup- ported the Constitution, but rather that each side was subject to experiences that generated in them contrasting views of national, state, and local institutions. Perhaps, as Deutsch's theory would predict, Federalists supporters were recruited from more highly mobilized strata of the population or, alternatively, they may have experienced the Revolution in a manner different from their Opponents. Though such propositions lack solid empirical backing, Forrest McDonald has alluded in an indirect fashion to their plausibility. Supporters of the Federalist side, he claims, tended to be those who, "irrespective of occupation, wealth, education, or station in life, came into daily contact with persons and news and ideas from other 67 . Such experiences, as one states and, indeed, from EurOpe as well." Inight expect, were closely associated with urbanization and, hence, ‘With a highly mobilized style of life relative to other settings at time time. Curiously, Beard's claim of an urban versus rural split (Yver the Constitution is consistent with this kind of explanation. IIf'a national orientation was reflected in support for the Federalist Side and such an orientation was strongest in highly mobilized areas Such as cities, then support for Federalists would logically be 64 expected to come from more urbanized areas, while Opposition would be forthcoming from rural or less highly mobilized settings. Hence, this approach suggests that Beard may have been in part correct, though for the wrong reasons. Among political elites, however, such social and economic sources of their different outlooks, while important, may at times have been overshadowed by considerations that distinguished them as leaders. In discussing political leadership in new states, Edward Shils emphasizes the importance of professionalism and careerist orientations among elites. It is not the flash of enthusiasm but persistently sustained exertion that is the prerequisite of national development-- not just because such exertion may be a moral virtue in itself, but because it is required by the complex undertakings which are on the program of modernization. Persistently sustained exertion is a function of attachment to a task, to the norms which govern its performance, and to the role in which the norms are embedded.68 Shils' emphasis upon the "persistently sustained exertion" on the parts of leaders seems to me to be just another way of stressing the importance of commitments to political careers. Thus, his argument suggests that the eventual development of political institutions depends upon the appearance of stable political careers which can . . . . . 69 serve as bases for enduring commitments to these institutions. The more that one's career is tied to such institutions, the more likely one will be to adopt values and to make decisions which have the effects of strengthening both the institutions and therefore <:areer opportunities. According to Shils, then, national develop- Inent depends in part upon the creation of institutions that are capable of, first, recruiting a capable leadership and, second, .1; :- \4‘» 6S returning benefits sufficient to maintain it over the long haul. On the other hand, institutions not only inspire careers but at times they also frustrate them. As Wellhoffer and Hennessey have pointed out, those whose aspirations are blunted by such institutions are likely to represent sources of schisms or of Opposition to them.70 Shils' emphasis upon the importance of a professionally minded elite for the development of institutions is buttressed to some degree by the observations of those who have studied the growth of national institutions in the United States. Lamb, for example, argues that the eventual success of these institutions depended upon the creation of a national elite whose experiences and careers grew over time to be associated with national institutions. As Lamb observes: To form a new American nation—state separate from Great Britain, a new national elite had to come together, and in turn it had to organize the political, economic, and social institutions of a new nation. This process was generated by the Revolutionary War, and channeled by the Continental Congress which first brought together in Philadelphia in 1774 representatives of the elites from all thirteen of the colonies.71 Lamb's suggestion that national institutions in the United States developed around a nationally-centered elite parallels Selznick's earlier argument that change and develOpment in organizations depend upon the recruitment of a homogeneous leadership staff or, in his words, an institutional core. Selznick argues, we recall, that the cohesiveness of such leadership staffs often depends upon their recollections of shared experiences which in their minds gives their organization a special identity. For Lamb, the national t common ext tion, a k' provides political concluded national national 0f instit' their p01 careers c 0f Federa tOHard na': Orientati. (f) Mtlfeder and MCKlt~ groups Wa.| cOnth'isti:i they argg, centered z particulaj revolutiorl during ml associatef sex-V'fed a 66 national elite in the United States (i.e., Federalists) shared a common experience by virtue of their association with the Revolu- tion, a kind of experience which, as Kornhauser said earlier, often provides the occasion for the forging of new identities and new political bonds. As the Revolution developed and was eventually concluded, the careers of these leaders came to be associated with national activities and were thus staked upon the growth of national institutions. We argued in the last chapter that proponents of institutional change often entertain progressive commitments to their political careers. The focus of the above writers upon the careers of national leaders suggests that the different orientations of Federalists and Antifederalists toward the Constitution and toward nationalism were in some way related to their differing orientations to their political careers. Such an explanation for the division between Federalist and Antifederalist leaders has in fact been roughly suggested by Elkins and McKitrick.72 In their view, the cleavage between these two groups was essentially political in nature and revolved around the contrasting kinds of career paths they had followed. Federalists, they argued were distinctive in that the locus of their careers centered around continental offices of one kind or another. Of particular importance was the link between these careers and the revolutionary experience. Most literally had their careers launched during the Revolution and, more importantly, these careers were associated with the continental dimension of the War in which they served as members of Congress, as diplomats, or as officers in the ”I5 ”I Continent united in provincia outgrowth moreover, other has the most ' t0 the na‘ it represq institutiq It important authors d: tWEIVe Yep IOEY of tj ficant’ f mEntally maturing Hen w When Open that with age d that forma Rowe, 67 Continental Army. Thus, prior to 1787, most of them "had been united in an experience, and had formed commitments, which dissolved provincial boundaries."73 Hence, their nationalism was a logical outgrowth of the continental orientation of their careers and was, moreover, an extension of their revolutionary experiences. On the other hand, the careers of Antifederalist leaders were based for the most part in state and local offices and thus their antipathy to the nationalist movement was due partly to the challenge that it represented to the authority and to the legitimacy of these institutions. These differences in experience were reinforced by an important age differential between the two groups. In examining the ages of ten leaders from each side of the conflict, the authors discovered that "Federalists were on the average ten to twelve years younger than the Antifederalists."74 In the chrono- logy of the late eighteenth century, this differential was signi- ficant, for it meant that these two groups were faced with funda- mentally different kinds of political problems during their maturing years. As Richard Hofstadter has hypothesized: Men who were young enough to have come of age around 1775 when the agitations of a dozen years finally irrupted into open violence found the challenge of organization and power that came with the Revolutionary War practically coincident with their adult experiences; whereas those who came of age during or before the agitations against British tyranny that quickened after 1763 had had their minds fixed at a formative age more upon the dangers of arbitrary governmental power.7S Federalist leaders, in other words, came of age at a time when the paramount political problem concerned the exercise of power in 68 winning the Revolution, while, by contrast, Antifederalists had come to maturity several years earlier when the dominant concern was the limiting of arbitrary political power. Given such considerations, Arendt's notion that the Constitution "consolidated the power of the Revolution" takes on an added measure of credibility. At thesnme time, the impact of this chronology provides us with an explanation of why, in Kenyon's view, the Antifederalists were understood as being absorbed by the Specter of political power. This age differential also had an impact upon the outlooks that these two groups entertained toward their futures. Since Anti- federalists were believed to be somewhat older, they consequently had before them a more restricted theater for the operation of their ambitions. The relative youth of the Federalist leadership, on the other hand, encouraged the widest possible play of those national aspirations that were stirred during the Revolution and in its aftermath. With youth and ambition, we usually find energy as well, and Elkins and McKitrick suggest that this was a powerful influence upon the ability of the Federalist side to outflank their older and more inertia-ridden Opponents, and thus to secure the ratification of the national system. Implicitly, at least, Elkins and McKitrick are suggesting that Federalists and Antifederalists adOpted outlooks toward national and state and local institutions that were in accord with their per- Spectives toward their political careers. Thus, according to the authors, the nationalism of the Federalist leadership was a direct outgrowth, not of their economic holdings, but of the distinctive 69 character of the type of political career in which they were engaged. In reference to these leaders, they argue that: The logic of [their] careers was in large measure tied to a chronology which did not apply in the same way to all the men in public life during the two decades of the 1770's and 1780's. A significant prOportion of relative newcomers, with prospects initially modest, happened to have their careers Opened up at a.particular time and in such a way that their very public personalities came to be staked upon the national quality of the experience which had formed them. In a number of out- standing cases energy, initiative talent, and ambition had combined with a conception of affairs which had grown immense in scOpe and promise by the close of the Revolution.76 Though they do not explicitly state the prOposition, their allusions to ambition, careers, and political initiative imply that they view the participants in this conflict as politicians first and foremost, and thus suggest that their decisions on the Constitution were to a large degree responses to their perspectives upon their political careers. In their emphasis upon the political dimensions of these leaders, Elkins and McKitrick have been supported by the work of John Roche, who has attempted to conceive of the Federalist leader- ship as a group of "superb democratic politicians" who were for the most part "political men--not metaphysicians, disembodied conserva- tives, or Agents of History."77 For Roche, the Operations of the nationalist leaders were similar to those of a contemporary reform caucus: their minimum goal was the creation of a nationally-centered system and, in his view, they pursued it with "delicacy and skill in a political cosmos full of enemies."78 Hence, much like Elkins and McKitrick, Roche attempts to understand the success of the Federalist leadership in terms of its strategic skill in pursuing explicitly political goals. ch a ent 70 The above interpretive arguments, with their emphases upon the interaction between political outlooks and career perSpectives, strongly suggests the relevance to this case of the theoretical approach that we outlined in the preceding chapter. There we sug— gested that institutional changes and innovations are Often inspired by those who are progressively mobile in their careers and who thus support changes in institutional arrangements because they facilitate their advancement. Here we have reviewed a number of arguments which suggest that nationalism and national institutions emerged in the United States partly as a result of the career perSpectives Of a group of leaders whose pasts had been associated with continental institutions and who perceived their futures in terms of national office. In Selznick's terms, these leaders represented the insti— tutional core of a growing national organization, the fate of whose future careers was staked upon the growth of national political institutions. The argument, similar in many respects to the one advanced by Ekkins and McKitrick, that Federalists differed from Antifederalists in their ambitions or in their perceptions of their future careers parallels the one that was suggested in the previous chapter that the proponents of change are likely to entertain differ- ent orientations to their careers than those who resist it. In the next chapter, we shall attempt to bring these two complementary arguments, the one historical and the other theoretical, together in the form of a set of propositions that can be tested against the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. "‘. ’Jo ("J/ ("D "h (5 an FOOTNOTES-—CHAPTER II 1This term is suggested in Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963). 2Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Sciencengarterlx, LXXVI (June, 1961), 181. 3The following account has been gleaned from a number of historical treatments of the period. Especially helpful was Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). Also useful were;The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, ed. by WintonT561berg (New York: Bobbs- Merrill, 1958), Introduction; Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolutiop_(New York: MacMillan, I924); and Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herbert Garfinkel, ng_ Democratic Republic (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), ch. 1 and 2. For the confederation period, I consulted Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). On the Constitutional Convention, John Roche provides a good account in "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action," American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961). 4See Merrill Jensen, "The Idea of a National Government During the American Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LVIII (September, 1943), 358. 5For this infOrmation, see Historical Re ister of the Officers of the Continental Arpy, ed) by Francis Heitman (Washington, D.C.: Rare Books Publishing Company, 1914), 691. 6On this antagonism, see Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 30-31; and Richard Hofstadter, The Progpgssive Historians (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p.-235. 71 York: H Universi tree In principl CCRPORAT the INDI P- 31. arE‘u‘ment in two S were 105 and Sour the aPPr around 4 72 7John Fiske, The Critical Period in American History (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1888). 8See Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), and The New Nation, pp: cit. 9Morgan, 9p: cit., p. 113. 10William Riker, Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1964), pp. 16-25. 11John Jay, "Federalist No. 3," in The Federalist Papers, ed. by Ray Fairfield (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 11. 12This problem was also explicitly raised in the Federalist Pa ers where in No. 15 Hamilton writes: "The great and radical Vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE of COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist." See Fairfield, pp: 313:, p. 31. 13Roche, 2p: cit. 14Ibid., p. 806. 15Though the Federalists won by a clear margin, Antifederalist arguments were not without force. In 1788, they were victorious in two states, Rhode Island and North Carolina. Of the states that were lost, five (New York, Virginia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and South Carolina) were by relatively narrow margins. And of the approximately 1500 delegates elected to the various conventions, around 40 per cent were Antifederalist. 16Riker, 32, cit. 17Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Consti- Eution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1935), and Seymour Lipset, e F rst New Nation. 18On the shifting perceptions of Jefferson in American history, see Merrill Peterson, The Jefferson Ima e inpphe American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962 . \nu fit .1. 6L . de Se 73 19George Bancroft, The History of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Appleton Press, 1882). zoFiske, pp, cit. 21Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 6. 22Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 202. 23J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 298. 24Beard, pp: cit., p. 15. 251bid., p. 19. 26Oran G. Libby, Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States in the Ratificagion of theingeral Consfiiu- tion (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1894}. 27Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Federal Convention (2 vols.; Richmond, 1899, 1891). 28Samuel B. Harding, The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in thé State of MassaChusetts (New York: Longmans and Green, 1896)} 29For this argument, see Beard, 2p: cit., ch. 10. 30Board devoted an entire chapter to the holdings of the delegates to the Philadelphia convention. For his conclusions, see pp. 149-51. 311bid., p. 324. 321bid., p. xvi. 33White, pp, 535,, pp. 119-27. 34See Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," William and Magnguarterly, VIII (January, 1951). .999 . Ive 5 r . 0' GMT? Va Ty tier. ,. "J‘C‘f‘ “‘vwv X1 L11 (D p: R 74 351bid., p. 60. 36Robert Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution (New York: Norton, 1965). 371618., p. 89. 38Robert E. Thomas, "The Virginia Convention of 1788," Journal of Southern History, XIX (February, 1953). 39Phillip Crowl, "Antifederalism in Maryland," William and Mary Quarterly, IV (October, 1947). 4oWilliam Pool, "An Economic Interpretation of the Ratifica- tion of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review, XXVII (1950), 119-41, 289-313, and 437-61. 41Richard McCormick, Experiment in Independence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1950?} 42Thomas, 9p: cit., p. 72. 43Crowl, 2p: cit., p. 469. 44Forrest McDonald, We The PeOple (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 451bid., p. 416. 46For a criticism of McDonald and Brown and a defense of Board see Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American Higtorical Writing» Reconsidered (New York: Free Press, 1960), chapter 3. 47For this argument, see Charles Beard, The Economic Ori ins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: MacMillan, 1927), chapter 2. 48See Cecilia Kenyon, "The Antifederalists: Men of Little Faith," William and Mary Quarterl , XII, No. l (1955), 3-46. This argument—is also developed in The Antifederalists, ed. by Kenyon (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), Introduction. 7S 491bid., p. 240. SOHofstadter, The Progressive Historians, p. 231. 51See, for example, Robert Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964). 52Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1955), p. 28. 53Ibid., pp. 28-32. S4Ibid., pp. 78-86. 55William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), chapter 1. 56Lipset, 9p: cit., p. 17. 57Lipset, "The Newness of the New Nation," in The Comparative A roach to American Histogy, ed. by C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 67} . 58Some have been critical of the parallel suggested by Lipset. Among them, Samuel Huntington argues that his notion of the "new" nation "misses crucial differences between the American experience and those of contemporary modernizing countries." What it fails to consider according to Huntington is the difference in social characteristics between America, whish was relatively prOSperous and egalitarian, and contemporary new nations, which are generally poor and exhibit gross economic inequalities. See Huntington, Political Order in Chan in Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 134-39. 59See Herbert Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System," in International_Politics and Forei Polic , ed. by James Rosenau (New Ybrk: Free Press, 1969), p. 278. 60See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); “Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961); and "The Growth of Nafions: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics (January, 1953), 168-95. 76 Richard Merritt, Symbols of American Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962). 63Ibid., chapter 5. 64See, for example, Huntington, pp: cit., chapter 5; also, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, "National Revolutions and Political Commitment," in Internal War, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 205-32. 6SWilliam Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development," in Eckstein (ed.), pp: cit., pp. 144, 146. 66See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 140, 152. 67See Forrest McDonald, "The Anti-Federalists: 1781-1789," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XLVI (Spring, 1963), 207. 68Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of New States," in Communications and Political Develgp- ment, ed. by Lucien Pye (Princeton: Piinceton University Press, 1963), p. 65. 69For the importance of careers of different kinds for political modernization, see David Apter, The Dynamics of Moderniza- tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chapter 5. 70See Spencer Wellhoffer and Timothy Hennessey, "Political Party Development: Institutionalization and Leadership Recruitment," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 111., Sept., 1971); see also Wellhoffer, "Dimensions of Party Development," Journal of Politics, XXXIV (February, 1972). 71Quoted in Deutsch, 2p, cit., Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 32. 7zElkins and McKitrick, pp, cit. 77 731bid., p. 203. 74Ibid., p. 203. 75Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, pp. 235-36. 76Elkins and McKitrick, 22: cit., pp. 205-6. 77Roche, op: cit., p. 799 (emphasis in original). 781bid., p. 799. CHAPTER III THE RESEARCH DESIGN: THE MODEL, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA COLLECTION In the previous chapters, I have attempted to develOp two parallel arguments. In Chapter I, the attempt was made to establish a link between the career perSpectives of political leaders and their orientations toward institutional changes or innovations. Briefly, it was suggested that such changes are often inspired by those leaders who entertain pr0gressive commitments to their careers. In Chapter II, we suggested that such a link might be employed to throw light Upon the ratification of the Constitution. Thus, a number of works were brought together which suggested that the supporters of the new system could be understood as innovators whose political careers were staked upon the growth of national institutions in the United States. It will be the purpose of the present chapter, as I have said, to attempt to close the gap between the above arguments by demonstrating how the theory outlined in Chapter I is able to suggest empirical prepositions which may be tested against the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. 78 St the purpo format wi‘. ical assu:_ set of de: by such 81 assumptior Chapter I; such assu: number of tives of F a fol—mat t focuses tions and tween the parsimonic inc“Sisu £10591), TE set °f in! tends to 1 J 79 Below, I shall make use of a quasi-axiomatic format for the purpose of combining these two components of the argument.1 This fOrmat will consist, in the first place, of (a) a number of theoret- ical assumptions from which other statements may be derived and (b) a set of definitions which provide meanings for the concepts suggested by such assumptions. Some of the above, such as Schlesinger's assumptions and definitions concerning ambitions, were set forth in Chapter I; others, however, will be developed more fully below. From such assumptions and definitions, it will be possible to derive (c) a number of empirical hypotheses which relate to the career perspec- tives of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. The use of such a format brings with it a number of advantages.2 First, since it focuses upon the logical relationships between theoretical assump- tions and testable prOpositions, it allows us to close the gap be- tween the theory and the case in a relatively systematic and parsimonious manner. Second, such a focus serves as a check against inconsistencies and thus paves the way for the development of a more closely reasoned argument. Finally, since the theory consists of a set of inter-related statements, empirical support for one statement tends to lend support to others as well. In our case, for example, as we shall see in a moment, the assumptions of the theory are not of the kind that lend themselves to direct test. Thus, their plaus- ibility can only be inferred indirectly through the confirmation of the propositions that are derived from them.3 In the discussion that follows, then, the first order of business will be to employ this format to suggest a number of prepositions which relate to the political this , I ST. test these Thl that "a pc. to put it political . argument, 1 for inStrzu that Care SChleSinge Anthony DO of leaders They [ Prestj Politi Out p: reh'arc pal-81: Henge 9 b0' policies 0f thei r A th . tee d1 S static 01 Plans to 80 political careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Following this, I shall elaborate briefly upon the data that will be used to test these propositions. The point at which we begin is with Schlesinger's assumption that "a politician's behavior is a reSponse to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as officeseeker engages in political acts appr0priate to gaining office."4 According to this argument, political leaders adopt values and make decisions purely for instrumental reasons, that is, as means through which they promote their career or office goals. In employing such an assumption, Schlesinger has been joined by a number of other writers. Among them, Anthony Downs has attempted to use it in understanding the strategies of leaders of political parties. Thus, he has assumed that: They [politicians] act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office. Thus, politicians . . . never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office er 33: They treat policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends. Hence, both Downs and Schlesinger understand politicians as being analogous to economic entrepreneurs who ad0pt values and promote policies only for the purpose of exchanging them for the satisfaction of their own office goals.6 As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, Schlesinger defines three distinct types of office goals or, as he calls them, ambitions: progressive (the politician plans to advance to another office), static (he plans to remain in his current position), and discrete (he plans to withdraw from politics).7 Though he defines them in terms of politic! in a para. sive care: from offic I 'h'c’n rev; to Schles; pmgressiu that are i Static Or A Proposing used it to fesslonali Commtmem Values th: Career} tiORShips ceptions ‘ that thOs. fat-Orable Paths of heme“ ti 3f their outhOks ‘ S. “at Such 81 of political motivations, these notions may also be employed to refer in a parallel manner to different types of careers. Thus, a progres- sive career is one which exhibits some kind of successive movement from office to office, while, by contrast, a static career is one which revolves for the most part around a single office. According to Schlesinger's argument, then, leaders whose careers are, say, progressive in direction are likely to make decisions and adOpt values that are in conflict with those of leaders whose careers reflect static or discrete aspirations. A number of writers have attempted to offer tests of this proposition. Among them, Gordon Black, as we pointed out earlier, used it to establish a link between office goals and political pro- fessionalism, suggesting that leaders who entertain progressive commitments to their careers are those most likely to adopt the values that are associated with success in a professional political career.8 In a similar vein, Prewitt has pointed to empirical rela- tionships between the ambitions of city politicians and their per- ceptions of local, state, and national institutions. Thus, he found that those with progressive careers were most likely to entertain favorable views of those institutions whose offices lay in their paths of advancement.9 Still others have pointed to relationships between the office goals of political leaders and their perceptions of their constituencies, their views of democracy, and their general outlooks toward public policy.10 Schlesinger has suggested, as we pointed out in Chapter I, that such a relationship is also likely to exist between the ments in the leade fimmesi adVanCem If a care ambj Sun inn dri COR Change Schieg pure}E OEEiQ Nanci main: with On t with Enox but. Sq?“ Q33 82 direction of a leader's career and his perspective upon innovations and changes in political institutions. Politicians who wish to advance, he argues, are those most likely to inspire change and reform, for they are the ones who are led to examine current arrange- ments in terms of their bearings upon their political futures. For the leader with a progressive commitment to his career, institutional changes are often viewed as means through which his opportunities for advancement are expanded. As Schlesinger puts it: If anyone is going to search for solutions it is the man whose career depends on finding solutions. The politician with static ambitions is far more likely to be driven by immediate pres- sures, whether it be the pressure of opinion, party, or special interest group. Only the man with progressive ambitions is driven to explore current policies in the light of future consequences, for his future career is at stake.11 Downs has advanced a parallel proposition with regard to change in organizations and bureaucracies. Downs assumes, much like Schlesinger, that officials in such organizations seek to hold office purely for the income, power, and prestige that are associated with officeholding. Some of these officials are not concerned with ad- vancing up the office ladder but rather are merely concerned with maintaining their current positions and the prerogatives that go with them. Such officials Downs refers to as conservers. There are, on the other hand, those who wish to secure more attractive positions within the office structure of the organization and, appropriately enough, Downs refers to such officials as climbers.12 For our purposes, Downs' notions of conservers and climbers are analogous to Schlesinger's concepts of static and progressive ambitions and careers. For Downs, again as with Schlesinger, it is the official who wishe the orga: [Cli' powe quo. then gene: for . Conserve: initiate fixtures reason t ties £01 Present TECTui I tend tc 83 who wishes to advance who is usually responsible for changes within the organization. Hence, according to his theory: [Climbers] inherently favor change because increasing their power, income, and prestige requires altering the status quo. True, climbers support only those changes that benefit them. Nevertheless, they are favorably inclined toward the general idea of change, since it can produce new Opportunities for promotion or aggrandizement.13 Conservers, on the other hand, have considerably less reason to initiate change. Since they view themselves as nearly permanent fixtures in their current positions, they have no professional reason to support changes which, though they may open up opportuni- ties for advancement, may also have damaging implications for these present positions. TherefOre, he argues, organizations which recruit climbers are more likely to be innovative than those which tend to be staffed by conservers. In summary, the theories prOposed by Schlesinger and Downs suggest the following propositions: (l) Politicians who support institutional changes and innovations are more likely to have pro- gressive careers and ambitions than are those who oppose or who otherwise do not support such changes. Conversely, (2) political leaders who do not support such changes are more likely to have static and discrete ambitions and careers than are those who do support them. These general prOpositions may, in turn, be opera- tionalized into testable hypotheses about the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist elites. If, as we suggested in the last chapter, Federalists are understood as proponents of innova— tion, then the following set of testable hypotheses emerges: i. above hypo1 organizatic mobility a: Mich inno- the higher Support of Elite Cir: [?Ollti;a: b)’ Widen Azerican systems w to cathI which hey if iTmOV: inHOVati. Elarked b Connict gESt in 84 Hypothesis Set I: (a) Politicians with progressive ambitions were more likely to support the Federalist than the Antifederalist position on the Constitution; and, conversely, (b) those with static and discrete ambitions were more likely to support the Antifederalist view. Downs and others have suggested a useful corollary to the above hypothesis. This involves the proposition that innovation in organizations and political systems is affected by the rates of career mobility among their personnel. Thus, Downs holds that "the rate at which innovations will be suggested by bureau members will be greater the higher the rate of personnel turnover within the bureau."14 In support of this, Seligman suggests that the rate of what he calls elite circulation is a good "indicator of change and stability in a [political] system."15 This approach to the problem has been bolstered by evidence advanced by Walker who, in a study of innovation in the American states, found support for the prOposition that "political systems which allow frequent turnover and offer the most opportunities to capture high office [will] more often develop the circumstances in which new programs might be adopted."16 Accordingly, it follows that if innovative organizations are characterized by high turnover, innovative officials themselves are also likely to possess careers marked by high rates of mobility. Such a generalization may, once again, be applied to the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists. As we shall sug- gest in a moment, Federalists at that time were more likely than their opponents to be affiliated with national institutions, then in a stage 85 of rapid expansion; Antifederalists, on the other hand, were, we shall suggest, more frequently associated with the more firmly established state and local structures. Thus, since these two groups were affil- iated with institutions that were experiencing different rates of change, it is reasonable on the basis of the above discussion to suppose that their careers were also marked by differential rates of mobility. Accordingly, we may advance the following proposition: Hypothesis Set 11: The greater the mobility of a politician's career, the more likely he is to support innovative policies. Thus, (a) the greater the mobility of a delegate's career, the greater the likelihood that he supported the Federalist position on the Constitution. Thus, it follows that (b) the careers of Federalists were marked by greater mobility than those of Antifederalists. Both Schlesinger and Downs have made use of the above prOposi- tions to advance a number of parallel hypotheses concerning the link between career perspectives and political change. Downs suggests that a prominent source of innovation in bureaucracies and in other organ- izations is the desire on the parts of ambitious officials to aggran- dize their positions through the expansion of the authority and other benefits that such offices command within the organization.17 Thus, those who wish to advance (i.e., climbers) generally sponsor innova- tions which have the effect of expanding the rewards associated either with their own positions or with those which they seek to capture. Schlesinger makes the same point when he observes that "political leaders are unlikely to demean the objects of their ambi- tions."18 Hence, politicians who entertain aspirations of capturing an office rogatives 'because unlikely i the Senate of the Lot Unit h0p< “P011 Fede: argument , tion in w? exPects tc Policies T} tion 533g! Federalis. tial fear of politi Thus, the antagonis office se 01‘ whOSe tEnded tc 86 an office or sequence of offices are unlikely to threaten the pre- rogatives of those offices. For example, as Schlesinger argues, "because congressmen can realistically aspire to the Senate, it is unlikely that the House of Representatives will ever seek to reduce the Senate's powers as the British House of Commons reduced the power of the Lords in 1911. Similarly, as long as states' governors see their hopes for advancement in the Senate, it is unlikely that attacks upon Federal power will be directed at the Congress."19 From this argument, Prewitt and Nowlin have abstracted a more Specific prOposi— tion in which they suggest that the politician "who aSpires to and expects to gain a more exalted political post is likely to support policies which expand the prerogatives of that office."20 The above is essentially a formalized version of the proposi- tion suggested by Elkins and McKitrick concerning the division between Federalists and Antifederalists. They argued that one of the essen- tial features of the new system was its proposal for a redistribution of political authority from state and local to national offices. Thus, they suggested that the conflict was based partly upon an antagonism between politicians whose careers revolved around distinct office sequences. Politicians who wished to advance in their careers or whose careers were in some way associated with national office tended to support the Constitution, since it greatly expanded the opportunities fer and the benefits of a national career. By contrast, the authors suggested that politicians whose careers were wrapped up in state and local offices tended to oppose the changes that a national system implied and, hence, were among the strongest opponents ‘1‘ of the Cc a leader oppose t? 0f It'd-'pOt I a nation; McKitrici closely a SUPPOrt t 87 of the Constitution. In sum, they suggested that the more distant a leader's career from national offices, the more likely he was to oppose the Constitution. The above discussion prepares the ground for a second set of hypotheses. Since the new system expanded the opportunities for a national career, it is reasonable to suppose, as Elkins and McKitrick suggested, that those leaders whose careers were most closely aligned with national offices were those most likely to support the ratification of this system. Thus: Hypothesis Set III: (a) Those politicians who adopted national careers were more likely to support the Federalist than the Anti- federalist position on the Constitution, while (b) those who adopted state or local careers were more likely to support the Antifederalist position. Schlesinger has pointed out that while career perspectives influence the decisions and behavior of political leaders, these perspectives themselves can be understood as responses to a number of other considerations which revolve around the objective oppor- tunities that confront the politician. Concerning such perSpectives, he observes that "the most reasonable assumption is that ambition for office . . . develops with a Specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician."21 One of the most important factors which serves to define the param- eters of these opportunities is a politician's position in his life cycle or, in other words, his age. Thus, The age cycle restricts a man's political chances. A man's reasonable expectations in one period of his life are ..c unre pol; time older, t is relat plot his hand, fa align hil vancing a 30-yea 60."23 Portunit that (a) frequent the 135: ambitio. of Stat ing age bureau. members thOSe , 3150 ax this a: om te] r1, 88 unreasonable at another time. A man can fail to advance in politics as much because he is the wrong age at the wrong time as because he 15 in the wrong office. 2 The most obvious effect of age is that as a politician grows older, the range of his ambitions tends to diminish. The leader who is relatively young has in front of him an entire career in which to plot his course of advancement. The older politician, on the other hand, facing a more restricted view of his future, is forced to align his aSpirations with the limitations placed upon him by ad- vancing age. Thus, as Schlesinger states, "what is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legislator is ridiculous in his colleague of 60. "23 Since advancing age is expected to limit a politician's op— portunities fer political advancement, Schlesinger's theory suggests that (a) the younger the group of politicians in question, the more frequent will be the rate of prOgressive careers and ambitions, and the less frequent will be the rate of static or discrete careers and ambitions. Hence, (b) as politicians grow older, the frequencies of static or discrete careers and ambitions are expected to increase. As was the case earlier, Schlesinger's propositions concern- ing age have been reinforced by Anthony Downs in his theory of bureaucracy and organization. Like Schlesinger, Downs suggests that members who wish to advance in the office hierarchy of a bureau are those who, by and large, tend to be among the most innovative and also among the youngest members of the organization. Downs states this argument in the following manner: One of the effects of increasing age upon a bureau is the tendency of the average age of the bureau's members to rise. . . . Almost every bureau goes through a period of 89 rapid growth right before it reaches its initial survival threshold. During this period, it usually contains a high proportion of zealots (because they established it) and climbers (because they are attracted by fast growth). These peOple, moreover, tend to be relatively young, for youthful officials are more optimistic and full of initiative than older ones.24 One of the reasons that newer organizations tend to be innovative is simply that they tend to recruit younger leadership staffs. By con- trast, the tendency among older and more firmly established organ- izations to resist change and innovation is due in part to the relatively advanced ages of their memberships and to the limits that such aging places upon the aspirations of organizational leaders. Once again, the prOpositions suggested by the above theory can be employed to derive a number of hypotheses concerning the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Earlier we hypo- thesized that Federalists were more likely than Antifederalists to have pursued prOgressive careers. Hence, if youth is related to progressive ambitions as Downs and Schlesinger have argued, then it follows that we should suspect that Federalists would also have been on the average younger than their Opponents. This proposition corresponds with the historical thesis advanced by Elkins and McKitrick, which introduced the notion of an intergenerational conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists. They argued that the conflict over the Constitution was in part a contest between "inertia and energy." In such a contest, the Federalists held the upper hand, largely because of their relative youth and of the energy that they could summon as a result of it. Thus, because of this initiative, the Federalists had little 90 difficulty in outmaneuvering their more lethargic opponents. How- ever, due to the narrow sample from which the authors attempted to , generalize, a number of historians have diSputed their prOposition.“'S But since it is consistent with our model of innovation, we have a good reason for supposing it to be accurate. Accordingly, we shall attempt to test a number of hypotheses which relate the variable of age to the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Some of these propositions can be stated in the following manner: Hypothesis Set IV: (a) The older the politicians (whether Federalist or Anti- federalist), the more likely they were to have had static or discrete careers and the less likely they were to have had progressive careers. Conversely, the younger the politicians, the more likely they were to have had pro- gressive careers and the less likely they were to have had static or discrete careers. Thus, since politicians with progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalists (see Hypothesis Set I), it follows that (b) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to likewise throw their support to the Federalist position on the Constitution. Further, since we have already argued that Federalists were more likely than their opponents to have adopted national careers, then it follows that (c) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to locate their careers in national offices. In addition to the above, Schlesinger's theory provides us with a rationale for an additional age hypothesis. Thus, he argues that "the younger a man is when he enters politics, the greater the range of his ambitions and the likelihood of his develOping a career commitment to politics."26 The rationale for this proposition is that those who enter politics at an early age are more likely to view politics as their primary profession. Those who enter later, 91 however, often make the jump from already established positions in other careers or, in any case, from other activities that command a prior claim upon their energies. Since the latter maintain an alter- native base of Operations, they are not expected to be as heavily committed to a political career as are those for whom it represents a primary profession. In a related connection, Black suggests that the leaders who are most deeply committed to a political career are generally those who entertain progressive aspirations or who have progressive careers. Such leaders are likely to view themselves as "politicians" first and foremost and are thus usually led to adopt values which contribute to their successful advancement in their careers.27 Black suggests that such values consist in a general sense of favorable attitudes toward compromise, negotiation,aand bargaining. On the other hand, leaders who do not see themselves as career politicians are more likely to follow static or discrete careers and, further, are less inclined to adopt favorable outlooks toward the kind of professional values mentioned above. Roche's thesis concerning the organizational skill of the Federalist leadership is relevant to this discussion. He argued, we recall, that a salient feature of the Federalist leadership was its relative professionalism, which expressed itself in the willing— ness of Federalist elites to negotiate and to enter into compromises in order to achieve their minimum goal of a nationally centered system.28 If we apply the formulations of Schlesinger and Black to this problem, such a professional orientation on the parts of Federalists may have been a reflection of their commitment to a 92 political career which, in turn, may have been partly due to rela- tively early starts in politics. Such an hypothesis merits exami- nation. Accordingly, if we combine the formulations of Schlesinger, Black, and Roche, then, the following hypotheses concerning Federal- ist and Antifederalist careers may be advanced and later tested: Hypothesis Set V: (a) The younger the politicians when they entered politics, the greater the likelihood that they developed progressive careers and the less the likelihood that they followed either static or discrete careers. Thus, since we hypo- thesized earlier that delegates with progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalist position on the Constitution (see Hypothesis Set I), then it also follows that (b) the younger the delegates at their ages of entry into politics, the more likely they were to become Federalists. Gordon Black has suggested that in addition to the variable of age, political ambitions are often stirred by considerations that revolve around the structural characteristics of the political system and around the investments that the politician has placed into his career.29 In formulating his argument, he adopts the assumption that a politician's career consists of a series of deci- sions between alternative office paths or, as he calls them, career sequences. Black suggests that in charting the course of his career, a political leader is led to select those strategies of advancement which maximize the differential between the benefits gained from holding a particular office or series of offices and the costs in- curred in capturing them. Thus, as Black states the assumption: The politician, when confronted with a decision, will examine the alternatives with which he is confronted, . . . will 93 evaluate those alternatives in terms of their occurrence and the value they hold for him, and ... . will choose that alternative which holds for him the greatest expected value. 30 Since a career consists of an extended series of such decisions, the costs that a political leader incurs during the course of his career may be understood to be cumulative or, in other words, they may be viewed as investments which the politician may parlay into future political or non-political enterprises. It is axiomatic, of course, that the politician is expected to adopt those alternatives which yield for him the greatest return on the investment that he has placed into his political career. In rather rough terms, his alternatives may be said to consist of either continuing to invest in the office or career sequence in which he is currently located or, alternatively, of transferring his investment to a different kind of career. The problem, however, is that the investments that a politician has accumulated in one sequence of offices are only marginally transfer- rable to other sequences or to other types of career. Thus, a poli- tician's investment in his career may be understood to consist of such things as the contacts that he has cultivated, the goodwill that he has accumulated, or the know-how that he has developed, all of which represent resources that are not fully transferrable to alterna- tive kinds of career. Accordingly, a politician can usually expect to make the most efficient use of such resources if he remains in the career sequence in which he has already accumulated investments. The result of this kind of calculation is that as time passes the politician develops an increasing commitment to the career in which he has been engaged. Again, Black summarizes this argument: 94 In any career sequence, if this analysis is correct, as the individual increases his investment in the career sequence, the value of the next step upward or the next goal will also increase relative to alternatives outside the career sequence. In a sense, the individual's investments tend to pull him further and further into the sequence even though he may not have originally intended to follow the route on which he now finds himself. 1 On this point, Black's argument is supported by the work of A. O. Hirschman, who has developed a parallel thesis concerning loyalty to organizations.32 In Hirschman's view, as a person's in- vestment in a given organization increases, so does his commitment to that organization. Thus, in times of organizational crisis, he will be unlikely to withdraw or, in Hirschman's terms, to "exit" as a reSponse to a decline in the organization's effectiveness. Loyalty, in other words, is an increasing function of an individual's investment in the organization. This argument concerning organiza- tions can readily be superimposed upon Black's notion of career sequences. Thus, together, Hirschman's and Black's theories suggest the proposition that the more a politician has invested in a parti- cular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his career in that sequence, and the less likely he will be to "exit" or to withdraw from that sequence for reasons other than, say, age or illness. This proposition can easily be grafted on to the conflict over the Constitution and, hence, may be employed to derive hypo- theses concerning the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Once again, the argument advanced by Elkins and McKitrick is relevant to the theory. As was pointed out earlier, they suggest that the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists hinged in 95 part upon the fact that the former had located their careers in national offices and were thus hospitable to the expansion of national authority. Antifederalists, on the other hand, had been involved ' largely with state and local positions and were therefore hostile to the expansion of such authority. Employing Black's proposition, then, Elkins' and McKitrick's thesis suggests that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was due partly to the fact that they had accumulated political investments in distinct office sequences. Hence, just as Black speaks of the rational politician who as time passes becomes locked into a particular career sequence, so Elkins and McKitrick argue that Federalist leaders experienced a "profound and growing involvement" in Continental affairs, which by 1788 had grown to the extent that "their very public personalities came to be staked upon the national quality of experience that had formed them."33 Federalist attachments to national affairs, of course, were also thought to be paralleled by Antifederalist attachments to state and local office sequences. If such investments in political careers played a role in the deliberations over the Constitution and upon the views of delegates toward national, state, and local institutions, then the following hypotheses may be advanced: Hypothesis Set VI: (a) The more investments a politician has staked in a particular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his career in that sequence. Thus, it follows from the hypothesis suggested earlier (see Hypo- thesis Set III above) that (b) the more investments a politician has staked in the national sequence of offices at the expense of other office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. 96 On the other hand, (c) the more investments a politician has staked in the state or local office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Antifederalist position. Coupled with the notion of investment in Black's theory is the complementary idea of risk, for he suggests that as politicians accumulate investments in their careers, the losses that they stand to incur as the result of every succeeding venture also increase and, hence, so do the risks associated with such enterprises.34 In Black's theory, the notion of risk is used to simulate the calcula- tions of politicians who, in order to advance to a higher office, must risk the loss of their current political positions. However, calculations of risk may also be applied to a number of other political situations, such as to the problem of institutional change or innovation with which we are concerned here. As Anthony Downs has pointed out, innovations frequently involve risks for politicians, for the reason that the outcomes of such changes can never be accurately assessed in advance.35 Thus, since changes involve such uncertainties, they are likely to be supported only by those poli- ticians who are hospitable to risk-taking or who, in other words, are willing to face present uncertainties in exchange for the oppor- tunity of gaining future benefits. The reasonable inference from this is that such politicians will generally be those who have the least to lose as the result of such changes or who, again in other words, have yet to accumulate sizeable investments in their careers. By contrast, since risks increase with investments, politicians who have larger stakes in their careers are likely to adOpt a more skeptical posture toward such innovative proposals. 97 Such propositions have been employed in a wide range of settings and have been found to be consistent with both psychological and rational-choice theories of behavior. Thus, Hirschman (an economist) and Festinger (a psychologist) have made use of closely related propositions in their theories of loyalty and commitment to organizations and social movements. Accordingly they suggest that a person's satisfaction with an organization or with a social cause is directly related to the costs incurred in gaining entrance to it and to the costs involved in maintaining membership.36 The larger one's investment in an organization, therefore, the greater will be his expressed satisfaction with it and the less likely he will be to insist upon dramatic changes in it. Such a proposition may, once again, be employed to illumi- nate the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution and to derive testable hypotheses about their political careers. Since we have attempted to understand Federalists as pro- ponents of change and innovation, the above discussion suggests the following empirical hypotheses: Hypothesis Set VII: Since we have suggested that investments are inversely related to innovation, then it should follow that (a) as of 1788 the more investments a politician held in his career, the more likely he was to have supported the Antifederalist position on the Constitution. Or, in other words, as of 1788 Federalists on the average were likely to have held fewer investments in their careers than Antifederalists. From this we may deduce an additional hypothesis. If we can assume that size of investments is related to the amount of time spent in 98 politics, it may be inferred that Antifederalists began their careers at an earlier time, historically speaking, then Federalists. This hypothesis is consistent with the interpretations of the case that have been suggested by some historians, among them, Hofstadter and Elkins and McKitrick.37 Accordingly, this hypothesis can be stated as follows: Hypothesis Set VII (cont.): Since we have suggested that Antifederalists held greater investments in their careers than Federalists, then (b) Anti- federalist leaders were also likely to have begun their careers at an earlier historical time than Federalist leaders. Or, stated differently, the later (historically speaking) that a delegate began his career, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the above hypotheses have been designed to link the two arguments developed respectively in Chapters I and II. The first revolved around the general problem of change and innovation in political institutions, and in this context we drew upon the theories of Schlesinger and Downs, both of which attempted to account for such changes in terms of the career perspectives of political leaders or, in Downs' case, of organizational officials. Chapter II, on the other hand, addressed itself to the specific case and in this context a number of works were introduced which stressed the importance of political careers in the growth of national institutions in the United States and their impact upon the division between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution. The hypotheses advanced in this chapter link these two distinct approaches by employing the different assumptions, concepts, 99 and propositions of our theory to derive a number of testable hypo- theses concerning Federalist and Antifederalist careers which, in turn, have been shown to be consistent with the historical thesis advanced in Chapter II. In addition, besides providing such links, these hypotheses can be understood as Operationalizations of these general theoretical and historical approaches to the problem. Thus, one way of deter— mining the usefulness of these approaches in understanding this case is simply to examine the correspondence between the propositions which they suggest and the data concerning the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Since the theory outlined above is an abstraction or a simplified version of how politicians are expected to behave, such a correspondence cannot be expected to be exact nor anything close to it. However, if the theory represents a useful way of approaching the problem, there must be an approximate correspondence between these prOpositions and the actual career data that we shall examine in the succeeding chapters. But before pro- ceeding with this analysis, however, a discussion of the nature and the sources of these data is in order. The Sources of the Data The primary source of data for this study consisted of a sample of careers drawn from a well-defined pOpulation of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Such a population was composed of those politicians who attended either the National Constitutional Conven- tion in Philadelphia in 1787 or one of the thirteen state conventions I. 100 which followed it in 1787 and 1788. Though the size of this group tends to vary depending upon the sources that one consults, my calculations indicate that it was made up of approximately 1650 men. As a source of data, the use of this pOpulation held a number of advantages over alternative sources. For one thing, as I pointed out above, the delegates to the various conventions represented a well- defined group from which a sample could be drawn and to which findings could be generalized within fairly well-known limits of reliability. For another, this population represented an easily accessible source of data, for the delegates to the conventions were in many cases readily identifiable both in their preferences and in their careers. One general advantage of this source, then, was that it allowed for the systematic collection of the necessary career data. More im- portantly, however, since the delegates to the conventions held the authority to make binding decisions with regard to the prOposed Constitution, they appeared to me, as they have to others, to have represented the most influential and the most committed groups within either leadership staff.38 Hence, their careers represented the obvious data base against which to test the prOpositions ad- vanced in this chapter. With these considerations in mind, a sample of approximately 540 delegates was selected from the population described above. To insure an adequate representation of all important groups, the sample was stratified along two dimensions: affiliation (i.e., Federalists and Antifederalists) and the degree of influence held by delegates in the ratification process. It is important to note at this to Stat in the to he s Antifec populat mately PTOPOrt delegat1 drawn w of each 320 Fed eaSlly flCati( them 3‘ TEIati. who) b: 101 at this point that though the sample was not stratified according to state, all states, with one exception, were adequately represented in the sample.39 With regard to affiliation, the sample was designed to be self-weighting, so that the proportion of Federalists and Antifederalists in the sample approximated their proportions in the population of delegates. Thus, the sample was composed of approxi- mately 60% Federalists and about 40% Antifederalists, or roughly the proportions that these two groups were found in the population of delegates as a whole. In each of these two strata, samples were drawn which were composed of approximately one—third of the members of each group. Hence, the total sample size consisted of around 320 Federalists and 220 Antifederalists, a sample size which is easily large enough to generate reliable findings. Within each of these groups, however, an additional strati- fication was inserted. A number of students of this conflict, among them Beard, Jensen, and Elkins and McKitrick, have focused upon a relatively small number of intensely partisan nationalist leaders who, by virtue of their skills of organization and persuasion, were mainly reSponsible for the success of the Federalist cause. As these scholars reconstruct the case, such leaders were composed primarily of delegates to the Philadelphia convention, members of the Conti— nental Congress, and fOrmer leaders of the continental dimension of the Revolution. On the other hand, other historians, such as Jackson Main, have pointed out that an analogous, if less successful, leader- ship core was to be found on the Antifederalist side. This group, as we would expect, was made up largely of politicians who had been 102 influential in the states and who thus had good reason to throw their skills and energies into the defeat of the national system. In other words, within each camp were to be found men whose energetic support for or opposition to the Constitution reflected greater commitments on their parts to either innovation or to existing institutional arrangements. Hence, the career profiles of these delegates carry special importance not only for testing the above model of innovation, but also for revealing insights about the case itself. Accordingly, the sample was stratified along this leader- follower dimension. Thus, four sub-groups were generated, with the sample now consisting of what I have chosen to call Statesmen and Regulars (leaders and followers, respectively) on each side of the ratification issue. Though for some, these terms may connote ap- proval or disapproval, they are used here for descriptive purposes only and are thus not meant in any way to imply that the distinction is invidious. Statesmen on each side of the issue were identified as such by their appearances in historical accounts of the ratification con- flict or in the records of the various state and national conven- tions (see Appendix). Within each of the larger strata, Statesmen were designed to represent about one-quarter of the sample. Hence, among the 320 Federalists, about 80 were Statesmen and 240 were Regulars; among the 220 Antifederalists, the corresponding figures were 55 and 165. It is doubtful, of course, that these figures reflect the proportions in which these groups were found in the population of delegates, since leaders do not normally represent 103 one-quarter of any given population. However, the one-to-three ratio was settled upon in order to insure that the N's of each sub-group were sufficiently large to generate some confidence in the results derived from the data. Outside of the leadership strata, the effort was made to insure a representative selection of the rest of the members of the sample. There may, however, been one departure from this design. This, though, involved a prOblem that is endemic to the use of archival data, namely, the selective survival or the selective dis- appearance of data. Thus, one difficulty encountered in collecting these career data was that some members of the population of dele- gates were so obscure that no trace of their careers could be located in any historical or archival source. It is quite possible, then, that an unknown amount of bias entered into the sample which favored the selection of those delegates who in one way or another left behind a record of their careers. It is, of course, difficult to establish the effects of this kind of selective sampling since the amount of the bias is unknown. However, insofar as testing the prOpositions of the theory is concerned, I do not believe that these effects should be considered serious. This is for the simple reason that in the case that such a bias did enter the sample, it worked in the same direction for both Federalists and Antifederalists alike. In other words, if obscure delegates were systematically selected out of the sample, they were selected out for both Federalist and Anti- federalist groups. And since both samples were independently chosen in proportion to their relative numbers in the population of 104 delegates as a whole, there was no chance that more accessible Federalists were chosen at the expense of the more obscure Anti- federalists, or vice versa. This sample bias, then, if it indeed occurred, should not be expected to affect the relationships between the two groups, since similar kinds of delegates were sampled out of both. Since the propositions that were outlined above suggest that there were differences between the groups, such differences, if they truly existed, should make themselves apparent given any selective sampling of this sort. Thus, as Zetterberg has pointed out: The relationships expressed in theoretical prOpositions are presumed to be universally present. They are, accordingly, present both in representative and in non-representative samples. To diSprove or to demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any kind of sample.40 It should be noted though that this prevails only when it can be safely assumed that a sampling bias works in the same direction for all dimensions of the dependent variable and that all such dimensions are represented in the sample itself. A difficulty comes in though, as Zetterberg has suggested, when the attempt is made to generalize from a sample finding to a population value when the sample itself contains an unknown amount of bias. Since the existence of such bias in this particular sample is at best problematic, the attempt will be made to advance these kinds of generalizations where they are warranted by the data. Accordingly, the appropriate statistical tests of significance will be reproduced in the data analysis that will be undertaken in the succeeding chapters. However, since we cannot rule out the possibility of bias 105 in the sample, these tests should be interpreted with a measure of caution. The actual data on the political careers of those politicians who finally made up the sample were culled from a variety of histor- ical, biographical, and archival sources, which ranged from full- scale biographical treatments to town histories, genealogies, and election returns (see bibliography). The most reliable and effi- ciently used of these data sources generally turned out to be col- lections of brief biographical sketches, such as The National Cyclo- pedia of American BiOgrapHy, The Biographical Directory of the American Congress, or any of the various state biographical direc- tories. As one would expect, the thoroughness and the reliability of the data found on any particular career varied in a direct relation with the prominence of the politician in question. Hence, for those whose political achievements were substantial, fairly complete career profiles were obtained by consulting sources such as those mentioned immediately above. For those who were more obscure, however, information was usually sketchy, and careers often had to be pieced together from fragmentary bits of evidence taken from diverse sources such as state yearbooks, genealogical studies, and local histories. Though the use of such sources did not close all of the gaps in the data, they were sufficient to allow for a compilation of relatively complete sets of data on the careers of well over 500 men who were influential in the deliberations over the Constitution. 106 These careers, in turn, provided the base of data which was employed to test the model of innovation that was outlined earlier in this chapter. In the next two chapters, the findings that emerge from these data will be summarized and, in turn, the implica- tions of these findings for the model will be set forth. FOOTNOTES—-CHAPTER 111 1We call this a quasi-axiomatic format because we shall not formally state all of the assumptions of the theory but will instead leave many of them implicit in the body of the presentation. On axiomatic theories in general, see Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 96-100. 2For a discussion of the advantages of axiomatic formats, see Paul Reynolds, A Primer'ip_Theory Construction (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 95-96; and William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 7'5. 3The validity of this argument, however, remains a subject of controversy. For the best known defense of it, see Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Readin s in 5 k (Eondon: the Philoso h of the Social Sciences, ed. by May Brod ec MacMillan, 19655. PP. 508-28. 4Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), p. 6. SAnthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 28. 6Other writers have expanded upon this notion of political entrepreneurs. See Warren Illchman and Norman Uphoff, Ipe Political Econom of Chan e (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 3- . 7Schlesinger, 2p: cit., p. 10. 8Gordon Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 865-78. 107 108 9Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 189-937* 10See, for example, Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly, XXII (June, 1969), 298-308. 11Schlesinger, pp: cit., p. 209. 12See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 88. 13Ibid., p. 97. 14Ibid., p. 275. 15Lester Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Develop- ment," Journal of Politics, XXVI (August, 1964), 621. 16Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations in the American States,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 885. l7Downs, pp: cit., pp. 198-200. 18Schlesinger, 9p: cit., p. 201. 19Ibid., p. 174. 20Prewitt, pp: cit., pp. 190-91. 21Schlesinger, 2p: cit., p. 18. 22Ibid., p. 174. 23Ibid., p. 9. 24Downs, 2p: cit., p. 20. szee Jackson Main, The Antifederalists (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 259. 109 26Schlesinger, 2p: cit., p. 176. 27See Black, pp: cit., pp. 868-69. 28John Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action," American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 799-816. 29Gordon Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXVI (March, 1972), 144-59. 30Ibid., p. 146. 31Ibid., p. 156. 32See Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 33Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (June, 1961), 205-6. 34Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," pp: cit., pp. 148-49. 35 . Downs, pp: cit., pp. 96-97. 36See Hirschman, _p: cit., pp. 92-95; and Leon Festinger, A. Theo of Co nitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). Hirschman, however, suggests some revisions of Festinger's use of this proposition. 37Elkins and McKitrick, o . cit., and Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (New Yor : Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 235-36. 38As was pointed out in Chapter II, McDonald based his economic analysis upon the property holdings of delegates to the state conventions. 39The exception was South Carolina, where there was found to be a paucity of biographical data on the delegates to the state convention. 4oSee Zetterberg, pp: cit., p. 129. CHAPTER IV THE IMPACT OF AMBITION: THE CAREER PERSPECTIVES OF FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS The preceding chapters have attempted to outline a theory, together with a number of prOpositions derived from it, which relates the career perspectives of political leaders to the issue of innova- tion in political institutions. In the present chapter, we shall begin to test this theory. Hence, the following discussion will focus upon the first three sets of propositions that were set forth in Chapter III-~those dealing with the careers of Federalists and Antifederalists subsequent to the ratification--and will attempt to relate them to the data that have been drawn from our sample of delegates to the various constitutional conventions. Before these data are discussed, however, a preliminary question arises as to the degree to which the categories of analysis suggested by our model represent appropriate tools for examining this particular historical case. In Chapter II it was pointed out that a number of historians have used the notions of ambition and career perspectives to account for the events of 1787 and 1788. But it is important to note as well that the notion of ambition was also on 110 111 the minds of many of those who actually participated in the delibera- tions and the debates of the period. At that time, as seems to be the case today as well, ambition was widely considered to be synonymous with venality or with the un- scrupulous pursuit of political power. Thus, complaints were fre- quent among those in political life at the time of the tendency of ambition to "swallow up principle" and to reduce politics to the level of petty personal conflicts over who was going to wield power.1 For some politicians, at least, the influence of ambition, with its association with power-seeking, raised a number of questions about the value of the political vocation itself. Thus, Jefferson, for example, remarked that he was so "disgusted with the jealousies, the hatred, the rancourous and malignant passions of this [political] scene" that he regretted ever entering the political arena in the first place.2 Jefferson's complaint was not a function of his ideology, for his foremost political opponent, Hamilton, appears to have been of a like mind, at least concerning the corrosive influence of ambition. As he lamented: Public office in this country has few attractions . . . The opportunity of doing good, from the jealousy of power and the Spirit of faction, is too small in any station to warrant a long continuance of private sacrifices.3 In large part, of course, such complaints on the parts of political leaders mirrored the norms of the larger society toward ambition, power, and the political vocation. As we pointed out in an earlier chapter, a traditional theme in the American ethos has been the suspicion of political power, and at no time in the 112 American past has this amimus been more potent than in the years immediately following the Revolution when the consequences of the British system of centralized power were still fresh in memory.4 In this setting, such an orientation toward power was easily dis- placed onto those who wielded it, namely, politicians, who were in turn subjected to suspicion both by the public at large as well as by certain elites who internalized its norms toward power. Thus, since ambition was closely associated with power-seeking, it is hardly surprising that it should have been perceived as a source of corruption in political life. There were some, however, who conceived of the role of ambi- tion in politics in a decidedly different light. For example, Margaret Bayard Smith, a long-time observer of national politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was bold enough to suggest that, instead of principle, it is "the ambition of individuals [that] is the mainspring of the great political machine which we call The Government."5 Indeed, one of the most systematic expositions of this thesis was delivered at about this time by John Adams, whose writings were influential in the deliberations over the Constitution. For Adams, the rationale for the separation of powers that was written into both national and state constitutions in the 1770's and 1780's was that it allowed for the effective control of the effects of political ambition. The essence of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries. The executive and legislative powers are natural rivals; and if each has not an effectual control over the other, the weaker will ever be the lamb in the paws 113 of the wolf. The nation which will not adopt an equilibrium of power must adapt a despotism. There is no alternative.6 In Adams' view, the contention fOr power among a number of ambitious politicians made it unlikely that any Single politician could dominate. Hence, instead of attempting to exorcise ambition from the political arena, Adams attempted to justify an institutional arrangement within which it could act to reinforce the de- centralization of authority. In addition, the actual debate over the ratification of the Constitution witnessed a number of references to political ambition, most of which, however, were advanced with the intent of questioning the motives of those politicians who supported one or another side of the issue. Thus, in The Federalist, Hamilton suggested that the opponents of the new system were moved not by principle or selfless- ness but rather by ambition. Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every state to resist all changes which may hazard a dimunition of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men who . . . flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.7 It is, of course, a standard ideological ploy to accuse one's , Opponents of adopting causes that are self-serving. For the Feder- alists, however, the notion of ambition was central to their under- standing of the nature of their opposition; indeed, the ratification procedures that they adOpted were designed to minimize the influence 114 of those politicians in state offices whose ambitions would be jeopardized by the ratification of the new system. Antifederalists, of course, frequently responded with the same charge, arguing that the proponents of the Constitution were driven by their aspirations to hold Office at the national level. Among those so accused was John Adams himself, who was said to have harbored ambitions of becoming president once the new system was put into operation. There is, in addition, the frequently told story of the pOpular John Hancock, who, it was said, switched his support to the Federalists in return for a guarantee of Federalist support for his intended candidacy for vice-president or, in the event that Virginia did not ratify (thus disqualifying Washington), for presi- dent. As it turned out, Hancock's support was critical for the Federalist cause in Massachusetts, though the promise of Federalist support fer his vice-presidential ambitions was never fully redeemed.8 Considerations of career were also said to have influenced the de- cisions of a number of delegates to the New YOrk convention to switch their support to the Federalist side, thus paving the way for New York to throw its weight behind ratification. According to Forrest McDonald, those who changed their votes were, by and large, from the southern part of the state, which was strong Federalist territory. Thus, their eleventh-hour conversion to the Federalist cause had a practical basis, since, as McDonald points out, "in the event of a rising tide of Federalism in their areas their political careers would be protected by votes for the Constitution."9 115 The above discussion, while admittedly unsystematic, never- theless suggests that ambition and considerations of career played an important role in the deliberations over the Constitution and, accordingly, lends added plausibility to the propositions that were advanced in Chapter III. The decisive test of these prOpositions, however, must await an examination of the data drawn from the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders, and it is to this task that we now turn. For the remainder of this chapter, then, we shall examine the career data that bears upon the first three acts of these prOpositions, each of which deals with some aSpect of Federalist and Antifederalist careers after 1788. The first, we recall, deals with the types of these careers; the second, with their mobility; and the third, with their institutional targets. Since these prOposi- tions have been theoretically justified and have been placed into the context of historical interpretation in the preceding chapters, little needs to be said by way of elaboration upon these themes as we proceed with the examination of the data. However, once this task is completed, we shall once again have occasion to revive these questions. We begin this analysis, appropriately enough, with Hypo- thesis Set I: Hypothesis Set I: (a) Politicians with progressive ambitions were more likely to support the Federalist than the Antifederalist position on the Constitution; and, conversely, (b) those with static and discrete ambitions were more likely to support the Antifederalist position. 116 The definitions suggested by Schlesinger were employed as the starting point for testing these propositions. As he uses these notions, a progressive career refers to one in which a politician seeks to move from a lower to a higher office, a static career to one in which the politician seeks to make a long term career out of one particular office, and a discrete career or ambition to one in which a politician aims only at holding a particular office for a Specified term and then intends to withdraw from political life. Underlying this conceptualization, however, is the assumption that there exists a hierarchy of offices which may be unambiguously ranked according to their attractiveness to politicians. This assumption is, of course, necessary in order to make use of the notion of a progressive ambition. While such an assumption may be assumed to apply to stable Opportunity structures such as those found in, say, a well established organization, its applicability to the conditions in 1788 is problematic, since the ultimate shape of the structure of political Opportunity was exactly the issue over which Federalists and Antifederalists were contending. Thus, due to the fluidity of the institutional structure at that time, the question of what represented a higher and a lower office becomes difficult to answer. However, in spite of this difficulty, a large proportion of offices were nevertheless capable of being rated according to their attractiveness to politicians. Our solution proceeded from the simple assumption that in most cases such preferences would accord with the objective reward of the offices in question, such as salary, 117 term of Office, and the authority conferred by the Office. Thus, for example, it was assumed that, ceterus parebus, state senate seats were deemed more attractive to politicians on the bases of these criteria than seats in the state house, and that where movement occurred between such offices, it would be from the former to the latter. The same assumption was, of course, likewise applied to a number of other unambiguous movements, such as, say, from local office to state legislative positions. Such assumptions are, as one would expect, reinforced by behavioral data. In Table IV-l, six offices or office complexes are ranked according to their attractiveness in terms of the criteria suggested above. The lone difficulty involved the links between state executive posts and national legislative positions, which proved difficult to rank on institutional criteria. National posi— tions were, however, placed at the top because we assumed that the flow of institutional authority was in that direction. Once these rankings were established, the sample was examined for movements between the listed offices in the three—year periods before and after the ratification (i.e., 1785 to 1791). The figures that appear in the table represent the proportion of movements between the rele- vant offices that corresponded with our rankings. Since the N's are small in most cases, one should not attempt to make too much of these data. However, they do suggest that politicians in that era moved from office to office in relative accordance with our assump- tions. This is especially true with regard to movements between the various state and local offices, where the data correspond well with 118 .oumum mo meanwhoom one .Hmsocoo socsouu< .Aocpo>ou newsmusofig .mo:ho>oc mo womanoo whoa moommmo :o>wu:ooxm oumumzp .mwhfi Hovww QHNme flaw m0>fiumufimmohfimm m0 QmSOI .m.D mfiu UCQ wwhH Ohowofl mmmhwr—OU HNHCQCMHCOU mfiu MO UmmOQEOU 0H9: mmowmmo :0>..HHGHMHMOA HmGOmeZ:m ,.:Owuooswe monomeosm 0:» an ones mcofiuflmoa o>fiumfimfion Hmcoflumc one mcoHufimoa common mumum coozuon mucoEo>oE ogu mo wmm .oHomeo pom .man .eozmenmumo use: use» mmcfixcmu mommwo on» Lows acoumwmcoo one: peep mooflmwo ucm>oHos on» coozuoc mucoEo>oE mo cofiusooouu on» ucomosaos magma opp a“ Homage was» mOHSmwm och "opoz $3 3.3 3 3 3V -- as. as. oo.H oo.H oo.H moommmo Heooq £3 E 5 £8 -- mm. oo.H oo.H mm. omzo: ounum a 5 CC -- oo.H oo.H mm. ouncom oumum E E -- oo.H mu. ussou osownsm opmum 8U -- mm. no>fip=ooxm oueum -- mo>fiumfimfimoq Hacowumz moowmmo omsom oumcom ousou o>wu=ooxm o>fiumfimfimoq moowmmo Hmooa oumum Ouwum esounnm oumum ounpm Hmcoflumz mmcfixcem oowmmo one mOOflocu uooumu coozuoc nauseoum< mo m¢Owuwoaosa Hu>H mamH mamcH ecop< Sm “mucoaumo>cH mo msoom one newumflawmm< oms> mqmcH :oflumflfifimw< mmaono awgmuovmoq km ”mucosumo>cH mo maoom one cowumflawmm< mm s> H.549 204 TABLE V-23 Affiliation and Size of Investments, by Arena Size of Investments in National Arena (in years) Affiliation Total 16 or Morea 10 to 15 s to 9 2 to 4 1 Federalist -- 100% 86% 74% 44% (204) Antifederalist -- 0 14 26 S6 (55) (0) 100% 100% 100% 100% (19) (110) (114) (16) N=259 x2=21.sss DF=3 P<.001 c=.392 Size of Investments in State Arena (in years) Federalist 48% 54% 60% 61% 54% (243) Antifederalist 52 46 40 39 46 (178) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (37) (77) (115) (115) (41) N=421 x2=2.724 DF=4 P=about .7s c=.113 Size of Investments in Local Arena (in years) Federalist 37% 43% 35% 47% 53% (81) Antifederalist 53 57 65 53 47 (104) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (16) (30) (43) (64) (32) N=185 x2=3.ozs DF=4 P=about .75 c=.179 aThis column is empty because national institutions began to be forged only around 1774, or less than 15 years before the rati- fication. State and local structures, of course, were extensions of colonial institutions and thus had much longer histories as of 1788. *- 205 the Federalists. This relationship was of moderate strength (C=.392) and, in addition, the differences reported in the table were signi- ficant well beyond the .001 level. Of considerably less power in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists were the sizes of delegates' investments in state and local arenas. In both in- stances, the differences reported in the table were not statistically i significant, nor were the contingency coefficients very high. These I findings mesh with those that were reported above in that they sug- gest that national experiences were considerably more powerful than state or local experiences in discriminating between Federalist and Antifederalist delegates. Apparently, as these data suggest, those whose experiences touched national institutions in the period before 1788 invariably came to be committed to the notion that their author- ity ought to be expanded, and, of course, this commitment was re- flected in their overwhelming support for the Constitution. However, one should remember that though most of those with experiences in the national arena prior to 1788 supported the Federalists, it does not follow from this that the greater proportion of Federalists had in~ vestments in national offices. Such an interpretation would be in error, as we pointed out above and as one could quickly see by con- sulting Table V-21. The above indicators of investments may at this time be supplemented by the use of an additional one. Selznick suggests, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, that organizations often derive their coherence and their special identities by recruiting their key personnel from among those who have Shared important 206 experiences, such as internal conflicts and other crises.10 In a parallel manner, others have pointed out that political revolutions often provide the theater for such key experiences among those who join in the building of national political institutions. Accordingly, experiences in the American Revolution may have played a powerful r1 role in Shaping the outlooks of delegates toward national, state, and local institutions. Thus, such investments were separated from I other political experiences and were in turn adopted as an additional indicator of career investments in this Study. To this end, dele- h gates were classified according to whether their military experiences '3— during the Revolution took place primarily in the Continental Army or in one of the various state or local militias. A few delegates, as one would expect, had experiences at more than one level, while many others had no revolutionary experiences of any kind. Needless to say, such delegates were placed in separate categories for the purposes of this particular test. Once the delegates were so classified, their revolutionary experiences were run against their decisions on the Constitution. The hypothesis is, obviously, that experience in the Continental Army was related to support for the Federalist cause, while invest- ments in one of the various state or local militias was related to support for the opposition movement. These data are summarized in Table V-24, and they tend to bear out the hypothesis. About 84 per cent of the delegates with experience in the Continental Army during the Revolution lined up in support of the ratification of the Consti- tution. Meanwhile, about 64 per cent and 79 per cent (respectively) 207 of those who served in state and local militias during the War stood up in opposition to the new system in 1788. Delegates with dual experiences or, alternatively, without any revolutionary experience of any kind did not differ Significantly from expectation on the issue of ratification. TABLE V-24 Affiliation and Revolutionary Experiences: By Arena Revolutionary Experience: Per Cent with Revolutionary Experience Primarily in: Affilia- ? tion . . . Continental State Local Duala No M111tary Total Army Militias Militias Experience Federalist 84% 36% 21% 63% 58% (314) Anti- federalist 16 64 79 37 42 (210) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (145) (101) (19) (22) (237) N=524 x2=72.559 DF=4 p<.001 ' c=.479 aThis category consists of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution. ,- When this table is rotated, we gain a picture of the composi- tion of both groups in terms of the loci of their revolutionary exper- iences. As Table V-25 indicates, a considerable proportion of Federalists (about 39%) were recruited from the ranks of those who served in the Continental Army during the Revolution. This was much less true of Antifederalists, whose members were much more frequently drawn from the ranks of former soldiers in the state and local 208 TABLE V-ZS Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience: By Affiliation Groups Revolutionary Experience Affiliation Largely in: Federalist Antifederalist r" Continental Army 39% 11% State Militia 12 31 Local Militia l 7 Dual3 5 4 g No Military Experience 43 47 * l 6 l 6 '" (314) (210) Not Ascertained 6 10 Total 320 220 x2=72.559 DF=4 p<.001 c=.479 aThis category consists once again of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution. militias. Both Federalists and Antifederalists, meanwhile, were composed of approximately the same prOportions of delegates (about 43% and 47% respectively) who saw no military service during the revolutionary years. It may be pointed out, in addition, that these proportions maintained themselves at about the same levels after the sample was Split into sub-groups according to leadership status (see Table V-26). These findings clearly suggest that the Revolution represented one of those key experiences in the early life of the nation which served to shape the views that men adopted toward national, state, and local political institutions. The political commitments that 209 TABLE V-26 Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience: By Leadership Group Affiliation Revolutionary Exp. Largely in: Federalist Antifederalist Statesmen Regulars Statesmen Regulars Continental Army 38% 39% 11% 11% State Militia 16 10 27 32 Local Militia 4 1 8 7 Duala 1 s 8 3 No Military Exp. 41 45 46 47 100% 100% 100% 100% (80) (234) (52) (158) Not Ascertained l 5 3 7 81 239 55 165 X2=81.671 DF=12 P<.001 C=.367 aThis category consists once again of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution. 210 men forged during the years of the Revolution appear to have persisted for many years thereafter. Thus, those who experienced the Revolution in the state and local militias easily attached themselves to the view that the war was primarily geared to preserve the independence of the individual states. Since they sacrificed heavily for this notion of independence, their subsequent opposition to the Constitution is not difficult to explain, Since they apparently believed that it threat- ..-1'.‘ ' Oar-u 'SI ‘1! ‘J'l1 ened the independence of the states that was won during the Revolu— .'.'0 tion. But the war also had a continental dimension which meant that, I17 0 for some men anyway, it was primarily a war to gain continental goals, that is, national independence. Those who were most accessible to this view of affairs were primarily men who Spent their war years in the Continental Army and who were thus mobilized to defend what they perceived to be continental or national interests. Hence, as was pointed out above, delegates with these kinds of experiences in their pasts tended to give their support to the new system in 1788. The above reconstruction, of course, will be quickly recog- nized as one that parallels the revisionist view of the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists that has been set forth by Elkins and McKitrick. Their argument, we recall, challenged the Progressive interpretation that had been develOped earlier by Smith, Beard, Parrington, and Jensen (among others) which held that Fed- eralists were, by and large, reluctant revolutionaries who joined in the war only when the break with England had become inevitable. Thus, according to this view, Federalists threw their energies behind the Constitution because they saw in it a means of arresting what 211 they considered to be the alarming pro-democratic tendencies that had grown up in the aftermath of the Revolution. Hence the Constitution represented a reaction against the Revolution. In taking issue with this interpretation, Elkins and McKitrick attempted to turn the argument completely around. Thus, they suggested that "the source of Federalist, or nationalist, energy was not any distaste for the Revolution on these men's part, but rather their profound and growing . . . 11 . . . . . involvement in it." Their involvement, however, was d1st1nct1ve .13. in that it was closely associated with the continental dimension of F” the Revolution: "a remarkably large number of someday Federalists were in the Continental Army, served as diplomats or as key adminis- trative officers of the Confederation government, or, as members of Congress, played leading roles on those committees primarily responsi- ble for the conduct of the war."12 Federalists, then, did not differ from Antifederalists in their approval or disapproval of the Revolu- tion, but rather in the manner in which they experienced it and, hence, in the manner in which they interpreted it: where for a large number of Antifederalists, it seems, the war was fought to preserve the independence of the states, for an equally large number of Federalists it was fought to gain national or continental inde— pendence. As was indicated above, this thesis has the support of the data that has been reported in the present study. Accordingly, in deciding between the Elkins-McKitrick thesis and the Progressive interpretation of the conflict, these data lead me to rule in favor of the former. 212 Let me briefly summarize the results of the above test of Hypothesis Set VI. In the main, these results were disappointing insofar as the theory is concerned, for they suggest that career investments did not have much of an impact either upon the ambitions of delegates nor upon their decisions on the Constitution. There are, however, some exceptions to this generalization. First, invest- ments in the national and local arenas appeared to have had greater impacts in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists than did investments in the state arena. Delegates with investments in the national arena tended to support the Federalists while those with investments in the local arena tended to support the opposition. Those with state backgrounds, though, were found to be more evenly distributed between the two groups. In addition, the data suggested that the strength of the relationship between investments and affil- iation increased with the magnitude of investments. However, this was, as it turned out, only true with regard to investments in the national arena, which is to say that the more investments (in years) that delegates had staked in the national arena, the more likely they were to support the Federalists. No conclusion of this sort, however, could be advanced with regard to investments in state and local positions. Finally, as was pointed out immediately above, the data reported here also indicate that revolutionary experiences also played important parts in shaping the political outlooks of men during this period and, hence, in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists. Accordingly, it was found that delegates with military experiences at the Continental level during the Revolution I'L' ' ’-5HH'V ...):A ‘l i 213 tended to support the Federalists in 1788, while those with exper- iences in the various militias tended to line up with the opposition movement. This finally prepares the way for a consideration of the data bearing upon the final hypothesis, that is, Hypothesis Set VII, which also deals with the variable of career investments. In formulating this set of propositions, we drew upon a number of studies which sug- gested that innovations in organizations are a function of the will- ingness of their members to bear risks. By and large, those officials who are hospitable to risk-taking tend to be those who have yet to accumulate sizeable investments in their organizational careers. This notion was, in turn, applied to the conflict over the Constitution and, as a result, the following set of propositions were derived: Hypothesis Set VII: Since we have suggested that investments are inversely related to innovation, then it should follow that (a) as of 1788, the more investments that a delegate held in his career, the more likely he was to have supported the Anti- federalist position on the Constitution. Or, in other words, as of 1788, Federalists on the average were likely to have held fewer investments in their careers than Anti- federalists. Since we have suggested that Antifederalists held greater investments in their careers than Federalists, then (b) Antifederalist delegates were also likely to have begun their careers at an earlier historical time than Federalist delegates. Or, stated differently, the later historically speaking) that a delegate began his career, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. As it turns out, the first of these propositions is not sup- ported by our data. AS Table V-27 suggests, the number of years that delegates had spent in public office prior to 1788 had little impact 214 TABLE V-27 Affiliation and Total Career Investments: By Size of Investment fit._ “m-—s.._- h--‘—J—Lm Size of Investment (in years) Affiliation Total 30 or 10 to 19 5 to 9 2 to 4 1 None ore Federalist 55% 61% 63% 52% 50% 62% (311) Antifederalist 45 39 37 48 50 38 (214) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (61) (173) (150) (84) (12) (45) N=525 x2=3.417 DF=5 P=about .75 C=.ll3 upon the decisions that they made with respect to the Constitution. Thus, as we move from those delegates with the greatest investments in their careers to those with the least, we do not observe any large or systematic increase in the proportions of Federalist supporters. This conclusion is borne out from a different angle when the table is rotated and Federalists and Antifederalists are examined in terms of the proportions of each that fell into the different investment clas- sifications. The hypothesis had predicted, we recall, that Federal- ists would be more likely to be drawn from the ranks of those with limited political backgrounds, while their opponents were expected to be recruited from among those with more sizeable investments in their careers. This was, apparently, not the case, since, as Table V-28 indicates, Federalists and Antifederalists clustered in about equal 215 prOportionS in each of the various investment classifications. Such differences that did appear between the two groups of delegates were sufficiently small that they did not generate a statistically signi- ficant result (P= about .75). TABLE V-28 Affiliation and Total Career Investments: By Affiliation Groups Size of Investments Affiliation (in years) Federalist Antifederalist 20 or More 11% 13% 10 to 19 34 32 5 to 9 30 26 2 to 4 l4 19 1 None 9 7 100% 100% (311) (214) Not Ascertained 9 6 320 220 X2=3.4l7 DF=5 P-about .75 C=.113 The real differences appear, however, only after the sample is Split into sub-groups according to leadership status. As Table V-29 suggests, Statesmen from both sides of the ratification issue tended to have accumulated more sizeable investments in their careers than Regulars from either side. Thus, about 70 per cent of the Statesmen from each side had at least ten years of political exper- ience behind them in 1788, while this was true of only about half 216 as many of the Regulars from each Side. This finding is, however, not too difficult to explain. As Hirschman has suggested, individuals who manifest the greatest commitment or loyalty to organizations or institutions are generally those who have the most staked in them in terms of time, energy, and resources.13 Accordingly, in the present case, the above data suggest that delegates who expended the greatest energy in either supporting or opposing the new system were those who, by and large, had the most staked in their political careers. TABLE V-29 Affiliation and Total Investments: By Leadership Groups Affiliation S1ze 9f Investments Federalist Antifederalist (in years) Statesmen Regulars Statesmen Regulars 20 or More 16% 9% 27% 8% 10 to 19 53 27 43 28 5 to 9 21 34 17 29 2 to 4 5 17 ll 21 l 3 2 0 4 None 2 ll 2 10 100% 100% 100% 100% (81) (230) (53) (161) Not Ascertained 0 9 2 4 Total 81 239 55 165 2 X =57.312 DF=15 P<.001 C=.314 217 The above points are further reinforced when we examine the mean levels of investment for Federalist and Antifederalist dele- gates. As one can easily see by inspecting Table V-30, Federalists and Antifederalists differed hardly at all in the mean number of years that they had invested in their political careers prior to 1788. Thus, while the mean figure for Federalists was about 10.3 years, the corresponding figure for their opponents was 10.4 years. However, when the leadership groups are separated from the rest of the sample, significant differences emerge. Hence, as Table V-31 indicates, the mean levels of investment for leaders from both sides were significantly higher than were those of either group of follow- ers. Accordingly, while the means for Federalist and Antifederalist Statesmen were about 14 and 15 years of experience respectively, the corresponding figures for Federalist and Antifederalist Regulars TABLE V-30 Affiliation and Total Career Investments: Mean Levels by Affiliation Groups Affiliation Total Federalist Antifederalist Mean Years of Experience 10.3 10.4 10.38 Standard Deviation 9.560 9.250 9.420 Variance 91.390 85.560 88.736 N 310 209 519 F=.004 DF=518 P-about .90 R=.oosa aSimple correlation. 218 TABLE V-31 Affiliation and Total Career Investments: Mean Levels by Leadership Groups _,____._-_' Affiliation Federalist Antifederalist I Statesmen Regulars Statesmen Regulars i; Mean Years of Experience 14.1 9.0 15.2 8.9 Standard Deviation 11.490 8.410 10.780 8.130 Variance 132.020 70.730 116.210 66.100 N 81 229 52 157 Analysis of Variance Table Source of Variance Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F P Between Categories 3105.04 3 1035.0 12.419 <0.0005 Within Categories 42920.55 515 83.3 Total 46025 518 Simple Correlation: R=.260 219 were only about nine years for each. These differences were statis- tically significant at about the .0005 level. The above figures therefore suggest that while career investments may not be very use- ful in distinguishing innovators from their opponents (i.e., Fed- eralists from Antifederalists), they may nevertheless prove useful, as Hirschman suggests, in distinguishing between those who entertain differing levels of commitment to organizations and institutions. A somewhat stronger finding emerges, however, when the l careers of Federalists and Antifederalists are examined in terms of the different historical periods in which they were launched. The hypothesis derived from the model suggests that Antifederalists were likely to have embarked upon their careers earlier in historical time than Federalists. This hypothesis is in close accord with the interpretation of the case that was outlined by Elkins and McKitrick, which set forth the argument that the decisions of politicians with respect to the Constitution depended in part upon the ways in which their careers were related to the chronology of events that preceded 1788. The formative event in this chronology was the Revolution. Thus, as Elkins and McKitrick suggest, a large proportion of Fed- eralists "quite literally saw their careers launched in the Revolu- tion [while] . . . the careers of Antifederalists, on the other hand, . rested heavily upon events that preceded rather than followed 1776."14 The data that have been gathered for this study lend marginal support to this hypothesis. As the figures in Table V-32 indicate, Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ at all in 220 TABLE V-32 Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics Affiliation Year of Entry Federalist Antifederalist Before 1765 12% 12% 1765 to 1774 12 26 1775 to 1779 30 21 1780 and After 46 41 100% 100% (317) (214) Not Ascertained 3 6 Total 320 220 X2=l6.362 DF=3 P<.001 C=.244 the proportions of their delegates who started their careers prior to 1765, that is, before widespread protests against British rule were initiated. The frequency of such protests increased rapidly at the state and local levels during the next ten years (1765-1774), however, and these events apparently had a Stronger impact upon future Anti- federalists than upon future supporters of the Constitution, since about 26 per cent of the former began their careers in this period compared to only about 12 per cent of the latter. The data indicate, though, that by far the largest proportions of both groups were mobilized into politics during and in the aftermath of the Revolution. Given the fact that revolutions usually involve a rapid expansion of political participation,15 this finding was not unexpected. 221 Accordingly, about 76 per cent of the future supporters of the new system were mobilized into public life during and after the Revolu- tion (i.e., after 1775), while the corresponding figures for its opponents was somewhat smaller at about 62 per cent.16 As the figures in Table V-3l indicate, the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists on this score were statistically significant 7 (P<.001), though the relationship between the two variables was not “I'll“ very strong (C=.244). In sum, though the data lean in the predicted direction, they do not do so very decisively. -1 ll _,7_ . . These conclusions are sustained when the sample is Split once again into sub-groups according to leadership status, where it will again be observed that the overwhelming prOportion of the delegates were recruited into political life in the years following the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775 (see Table V-33). The exception to this generalization, however, consists of those delegates who were in- fluential in the Antifederalist cause (i.e., Antifederalist Statesmen), about 53 per cent of whom launched their political careers in the years prior to the Revolution. These are, I suppose, the politicians who Elkins and McKitrick had in mind when they suggested that the careers of Antifederalists "rested heavily upon events that preceded rather than followed 1776." Insofar as this generalization applies to leaders, then, it has considerable validity. In conclusion, the figures reported above yield mixed support for the propositions composing Hypothesis Set VII. On the one hand, the first of these propositions, which suggested that a delegate's decision on the Constitution was influenced by the size of his 222 TABLE V—33 Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics: By Leadership Groups m-===2m.=_rmt m “=2...“ ____‘1 -:..r.:.t7='rrt.~.. =3:— Affiliation Year Of Entry Federalist Antifederalist ,. Statesmen Regulars Statesmen Regulars ‘5 Before 1765 19% 10% 19% 9% L 1 1765 to 1774 15 12 34 23 L 1775 to 1779 37 27 23 21 L 1780 and After 29 51 24 47 100% 100% 100% 100% (81) (236) (53) (161) Not Ascertained 0 3 2 4 Total 81 239 55 165 X2=39.718 DF=9 P<.001 C=.264 investment in his career, found little support from our data, since, as was pointed out above, Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ significantly on this score. On the other hand, the second of these propositions, which suggested that Antifederalists launched their careers earlier in time than their Opponents, gained marginal support from the data, since it was found that a higher proportion of Antifederalist careers, and especially those of the leaders of the Antifederalist cause, were initiated in the years that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775; by contrast, Federalists exhibited a greater tendency to embark upon their careers in the years following 223 the start of the Revolution. Thus, the data are at least consistent with the hypothesis. However, as was mentioned above, the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists on this variable were not substantial, and for this reason it is doubtful that the historical period in which delegates started their careers could have accounted for much of the variance in their decisions on the Constitution. This question, however, will be answered with greater certainty in the next chapter. Summary In this chapter, we have attempted to test the final four sets of hypotheses that were derived from our theory of innovation and which were set forth in Chapter III. The first two sets of prOpositions (Hypothesis Sets IV and V) focused upon different aspects of politicians' ages and attempted to relate them to their decisions with respect to innovation. By and large, these sets of propositions received support from the data. Thus, it was found, much as we had predicted, that the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to support innovation, that is, to join the Federalist camp. Moreover, the data also suggested, again as was predicted in Hypothesis Set V, that the younger a delegate was when he launched his career, the more likely he was to subsequently threw his support to the Federalists. AS was made clear above, both of these sets of findings are consistent with our theory and, hence, they suggest that the variable of age is an important factor in distingUishing the supporters of innovation from its opponents. Once again, though, this will be determined in sharper detail in the next chapter. 224 The final two sets of propositions (Hypothesis Sets VI and VII) were primarily concerned to establish links between career invest- ments and a delegate's decision with respect to the Constitution, and here, for the most part, the data did not turn out according to ex- pectation. Thus, the data suggested that career investments were not particularly useful in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists. There was, however, one exception to this generalization and this involved the experiences of delegates in the Revolution and the re- lationship of their careers to the chronology of events that led up to it. Delegates who served militarily at the continental level —+ during the Revolution tended, it was argued, to develop a notion of a continental or a national interest apart from those of the separate states and thus, as the data suggest, they tended in 1788 to throw their support behind the Constitution, 3 document that proposed to strengthen the hand of national institutions. On the other hand, military experience at the state or local levels during the Revolu- tion apparently served to Strengthen the commitments of individuals to state and local institutions, for in 1788 delegates with such experiences in their pasts tended to line up in opposition to the new system. In addition, we also found some support for the hypo- thesis that was advanced by Elkins and McKitrick which suggested that the careers of a large proportion of Antifederalists revolved around events that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution and thus took shape before continental institutions began to emerge. By con- trast, Federalist careers evinced a Slightly stronger tendency to be based upon events which followed the outbreak of the war in 1775. 225 These findings therefore point to the conclusion that was advanced, once again, by Elkins and McKitrick, namely, that the Revolution represented the formative event in the political lives of those who experienced it. Individuals who, by reason of age, came to political maturity in the years following the outbreak of the Revolution or who, by reason of experience, were affiliated with r continental institutions during the war had the opportunity to develop an appreciation for what Elkins and McKitrick have called L the "national quality of experience." Hence, some years later, these L individuals were inclined to support the Federalist view on the iv Constitution. The reverse was true, of course, of those who came of age in an earlier period prior to the advent of continental organ- izations or who were associated with state or local institutions during the course of the Revolution. Accordingly, considerations of age and career experiences reinforced one another in giving shape to the outlooks of individuals toward national, state, and local institutions and, hence, toward the Constitution itself. The findings presented in this chapter, then, like those that were set forth in Chapter IV, lend general support to our theory of innovation. In the final chapter, I shall attempt to offer an overall assessment of this model by examining it in a multivariate context . FOOTNOTES-—CHAPTER V 1J. S. Slotkin, "Life Course in Midle Age," in Problems of the Middle Aged, ed. by C. B. Vedder (Springfield, 111.: Thomas Eublishers, 1965), pp. 47-58. This is quoted in Paul Hain, "American State Legislators' Ambitions and Careers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971), p. 54. 2Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 172-74. 3James Coleman, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel, Medical Innovation (New ‘York: BobbS-Merrill and Co., 1966), p. 42. 4Jackson T. Main, The Antifederalists (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 259. S . . . . A "mixed career" was one which did not possess a "dominant institutional focus" or, in other words, was one in which a politician spent at least one-third of his career in two or more distinct office arenas. 6Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, op: cit., chapter 11. 7Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), p. 176. 8Three groups of delegates were excluded from consideration here: first, those who held no offices prior to 1788; second, those who held no offices after 1788; and, third, those whose careers did not manifest a dominant fOcus prior to 1788 (i.e., those whose investments were mixed between two or more office sequences). Thus, we included only those delegates whose careers manifested identi- fiable foci both before and after the ratification. 9For the purposes of this test, all those delegates who had no careers prior to 1788 were excluded from consideration. 226 227 10Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 105-6. 11Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (June, 1961), 202. 12Ibid., p. 202. 13See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty L (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), chapter 7. 14Elkins and McKitrick, op: cit., pp. 203-4. 15This description of revolution has been suggested by ‘ Samuel P. Huntington. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing_ a- Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 266. 16It Should be pointed out that some of these consisted of delegates who held no offices prior to 1788 and whose participation in the conventions of that year therefore marked their introduction into the political arena. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE MODEL r“ Up to this point, the model has been tested by examining each set of propositions in isolation from the others. Thus, for the most part, the focus at any given time has been upon the relationship 1 between just two variables in the model. While this approach allowed for an assessment of the validity of each separate hypothesis, it did not allow us to make any inferences about the relative strengths of the different variables in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists, nor did it enable us to establish controls for Spur- ious associations. In order to accomplish these tasks, a multivariate approach is needed, and in the present chapter such an analysis will be undertaken through the use of a technique called multiple discrimi- nant function analysis. For the reasons that were outlined above, this strategy will allow for a more complete empirical evaluation of the model. Once this task is completed, the chapter will conclude with a summary of the major findings of the study. An Evaluation of the Model: A Multivariate Approach As was mentioned above, the statistical approach used to evaluate the model was multiple discriminant function analysis. 228 229 Though this technique has had its greatest application in the field of psychology, it has also had some currency among political scien- tistS.1 Its primary usefulness for my purposes is that it permits an assessment of the relative strengths of a number of independent variables in discriminating between two or more a priori or natural groups, such as Federalists and Antifederalists. Like all multi- variate approaches, however, this technique can yield results differ- ent from those found using simpler univariate comparisons. For example, a relationship that is found to be quite strong in a two variable context may turn out to be spurious or insignificant when other variables are considered simultaneously. On the other hand, variables that do not at first appear to be important using Simpler techniques may suddenly reveal themselves to be powerful predictors when controls for additional varibles are introduced. Accordingly, since the results reported in the previous two chapters of this study were based upon such simpler approaches, it is quite possible that some of these findings may require revision in the light of the following analysis. Though this is not the place for an extensive discussion of discriminant function analysis,2 a few rudiments of the technique may be briefly touched upon. Discriminant analysis is geared to answer the following research question: Given my knowledge of an individual's scores on N independent variables, how accurately can I predict his group membership? In order to answer this question, the technique allows us to combine the weighted scores of all individuals in the analysis on N different variables into a linear function. 3'.1 ‘Xnflf‘u ”W! I " Lu: .. .4;- -.- 230 The group centroids or the mean scores of all groups on the function can then be determined and, given the score of each individual on the function, we can then calculate the proportion of cases correctly categorized by the function. The most powerful functions will be those that consist of variables upon which the members of different groups in the analysis cluster at Opposing ends of their scales. Hence, the object is to find function or combination of variables that maximizes the ratio of the variance between the groups to the variance within the groups and which thus discriminates most effec- tively between the groups in the analysis. Obviously, the greater the distances between the group centroids and the larger the pro- portion of the cases correctly predicted by the function, the greater the ability of the variables composing the function to discriminate between the groups. The analysis that follows was based upon the use of 14 inde- pendent variables, all of which were encountered in one form or another in Chapters IV and V. Data on individual variables will not be reported in this chapter, and, hence, readers who are so inter- ested are directed to consult those earlier chapters. The variables that were used were broken down into three main types or factors, depending upon whether they were associated with ambitions, invest- ments, or age. The ambition factor, which focused upon different aspects of delegates' careers a££g£_l788, contributed three variables to the analysis: (a) the institutional foci of delegates' careers between 1788 and 1800; (b) the institutional targets of their careers in their first offices after 1788; and (c) the types or directions 231 of their careers between 1788 and 1800. For the purposes of measure- ment these had to be fashioned into ordinal scales. The first two, which deal with institutional attachments, were scaled according to the degree to which delegates' careers were associated with national as opposed to state and local institutions, while the latter was scaled according to the extent to which delegates followed pro- gressive, static, or discrete careers.3 The investment factor, meanwhile, which involves the dimen- Sions of delegates' careers prior to 1788, contributed six variables to the analysis. TwO of these were once again related to the insti- ”‘ tutional focus of a delegate's career: the focus of his career prior to 1788 and the focus of his revolutionary experiences. These were once again fashioned into ordinal scales according to the degree to which the careers in question were associated with national as opposed to state and local institutions (see footnote 3 for details). The other four investment variables consisted of straight-ferward interval scales, namely, the number of years that delegates had in- vested (a) in national politics, (b) in state politics, (c) in local politics, and, finally, (d) in their total careers up to 1788. The third factor consisted of age or what we might call gen- erational variables. These were three in number and consisted of (a) the ages of delegates in 1788, (b) the ages at which they entered politics, and (c) the periods or years in which they launched their careers. Since these were discussed at some length earlier (see Chapter V), they require no further elaboration here. I might 232 point out though that each of these measures was assumed to consti- tute an interval level scale. There was, in addition to the above factors, a feurth and relatively minor factor that contributed the final two variables to the analysis. These were associated with the notion of career mobility and consisted of, first, the number of offices that dele- L gates held in the period immediately prior to 1788 (i.e., from 1780 to 1788) and, second, the number held in the period just fellowing the ratification (i.e., from 1789 to 1797). Like most of those dis- Ly_m cussed above, these measures also represent interval scales. In the above discussion, I have stressed the level of measure- ment attained by each of these variables because the issue raises an important problem insofar as the use of multivariate techniques is concerned. It will be noted that five of the fourteen variables to be used here were measured through the use of ordinal as Opposed to interval scales. The use of such ordinal scales in multivariate models is often said to make the results of the analysis somewhat difficult to interpret. There is little to argue with this view- point. The problem with ordinal scales is that the distances between the points on such scales cannot be shown to be equal; thus, any given unit change may carry different meanings depending upon where it occurs on the scale. The problem is, obviously, a formid- able one. However, the researcher must still decide if the ambi- guities involved in the use of ordinal measures outweigh the useful- ness of the information to be gained from a multivariate analysis.4 In the present case, I do not believe that they do, largely because 233 nine of the fourteen variables to be used below achieve an interval level of measurement. Nevertheless, for readers who tend to be purists in these matters, a cautious interpretation of the following analysis is probably in order. There is a final problem which, however, may be more easily laid to rest. This involves the issue of multicollinearity, or high intercorrelations among independent variables. This is a frequently posed problem among students of multivariate approaches, for if independent variables are highly interrelated, it becomes quite diffi- cult to isolate their separate effects. This does not pose a serious problem for this analysis, however, since, for the most part, such intercorrelations were not high. Thus, only two sets of variables achieved simple correlations of .70 or better, while only three others achieved correlations of above .60.5 In light of the fact that 14 variables generate about 91 distinct intercorrelations with one another, the problem insofar as the present analysis is concerned can be seen to be rather slight. In the discussion below, then, discriminant analysis will be employed to predict delegates' votes on the Constitution in terms of their scores on the predictor variables discussed above. All told, 511 delegates were used in the analysis, 307 of which were Federalists and 204 Antifederalists; the remaining 29 were discarded because of incomplete data. In order to determine the best predictors of voting on the Constitution, a number of alternative models or combinations of variables were considered. Evaluations of these different models were based upon a consideration of four separate statistics for each 234 model: first, the chi-square value and the discriminant criterion for each function, both of which serve to reflect the capacity of the model to discriminate between the groups; next, the standardized function weight for each variable, a figure which reflects the dis- criminant power of each individual variable in the model;6 and, finally, the proportion of votes correctly predicted by the model, a figure which is, in a sense, the acid test of the capacity of the variables in the model to distinguish between the groups in the analysis. All of these figures will of course be reported where they are relevant to the analysis. The first step in the analysis was to combine all 14 variables into a Single model and to derive from them a single discriminant function. The results of this line of analysis are somewhat surpris- ing, for, as Table VI-l reveals, the most powerful predictors of votes on the Constitution were two variables associated with career invest- ments: the focus of a delegate's previous career and the fOcus of his revolutionary experiences. Likewise, age also appears to have had a relatively strong influence. 0n the other hand, the variables dealing with ambitions were found some distance down the list. All told, this 14-variable career model was able to correctly predict about 77 per cent of the votes of the delegates in the sample. It should be possible, however, to put together a more parsi- monious model using fewer variables but which is able to predict just as accurately. In order to locate such a model, the variables em- ployed above were entered into the analysis in a stepwise fashion beginning with the two most powerful variables. This procedure was I‘- 235 TABLE VI-l Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: 14 Variable Model Variable Standardized Function Weight 1. Investment: Focus of Previous Career .545 2. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience .445 3. Age in 1788 .378 4. Investment: Number of Years in State Office .303 5. Period when Entered Politics .287 6. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics .223 7. Ambition: Target of Career, first office after 1788 .213 8. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800 .193 Mobility of Career, 1780-1788 .137 10. Mobility of Career, 1789-1797 .123 11. Investment: Number of Years in National Office .118 12. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office .085 13. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800 .036 14. Age at Entry into Politics .008 Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted: x2=174.4o Federalists 73% DF=14 Antifederalists 84% P<.001 Total 77% Discriminant Criterion for Function: .414 236 continued until the inclusion of an additional variable into the model failed to bring with it an increase in the predictive power of the model. AS Table VI-2 shows, the initial two-variable model composed of the foci of the delegates' previous careers and their revolutionary experiences was able to correctly predict about 68 per cent of the votes on the Constitution. The inclusion of age into the model brings this figure up to about 73 per cent. From that point, suc- cessive stepwise additions do not add very much to the power of the model. The sizes of delegates' investments in state offices makes a minimal contribution, bringing the proportion of votes correctly predicted by the model up to about 74 per cent. In addition, two of the ambition variables (the institutional targets of delegates' first offices after 1788 and the types of their careers between 1788 and 1800) had small incremental impacts, and together they increased the proportion of delegates correctly grouped up to about 77 per cent. Beyond this point, additional variables carry only Slight impacts. Thus, the most parsimonious model would include only the first three variables in the stepwise analysis, from which we are able to cor- rectly predict the votes of about three-quarters of the delegates in the sample. The most powerful model, on the other hand, would be composed of the first eight variables, since they allow for the correct prediction of about 77 per cent of the cases. It is worth noting here in passing that the Antifederalists appear to have been a much more homogeneous group than their oppo- nents. 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'.. 7|: ~r\:‘ ,. frrllctubuq 95L. .TT wt.‘IL15heiiiflA ' 15:01 245 to say, however, that Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ on either of these economic variables; in fact, insofar as public securities are concerned, the mean figure for Federalists was about $2800 while the corresponding number for Antifederalists was only about $1900, a difference that is statistically Significant beyond the .05 level. This demenstrates the value of a multivariate ap- ET preach, for, by itself, such a finding would represent a confirmation L of Beard's hypothesis. However, when placed in the context of other independent variables, the economic factor is Shown to be a relatively . weak predictor of voting on the Constitution. 4; The relative weakness of these two economic variables is further borne out when they are considered in isolation, as they are in Table VI-8. As the figures indicate, these variables by themselves carried little predictive power, since they succeeded in correctly predicting only about 54 per cent of the votes on the Constitution. This is a rather poor performance in the light of the fact that we could expect to predict about 50 per cent of the cases by random drawing alone. In addition, Beard also suggested that the interests of large slaveowners were also served by the ratification of the new system. Accordingly, the delegates from the five southern states (Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland) were separated from the rest of the sample and the sizes of their slaveholdings were entered into the analysis to determine if they succeeded in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists.12 246 TABLE VI-8 Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Economic Factor - Standardized Variable Function Weight 1. Public Security Holdings .972 2. Economic Stratum .235 Percent of Votes Discriminant Criterion Correctly Predicted: for Function: X2=l.808 Federalists 41% DF=2 Antifederalists 75% .004 P: about .50 Total 54% As the figures in Table VI-9 suggest, slaveholding turned out to be a moderately powerful predictor, ranking seventh among the 17 vari- ables considered in its ability to discriminate between the two groups. Moreover, it increased the predictive power of the original model to a slight extent, increasing the prOportion of cases cor- rectly predicted to about 78 per cent.13 The relative strength of the slaveholding variable in comparison with the other two economic variables is also demonstrated when the economic factor is considered in isolation from the career variables. Thus, as Table VI-lO shows, the slaveholding variable generated a stronger standardized function weight than did either of the other two economic variables. Never- theless, the economic factor by itself proved to have little pre- dictive power once again, since it was able to correctly group only about 54 per cent of the delegates that were considered.14 unnuérirseku Ilfwsuoq x ch ‘h Id 'Oflr': ldfiiicv an '0 I: h43n172n050b o¢£lgl I 15:5:uuug sidelxnv" *‘c ed: lo oetsie '. h. :2 1mm; Of": CV3 1‘”. air“, I -"'~ou‘"‘;. ‘31,; ~d teas-3 a« . § a”ud u} bsvarq 119?:' ii #4., ‘ , .bexebicnns anew Jan: essaaeleb .48 ill~ *1! aids cow :1 99012 .6 (- vino quoig a: in i _ A “ 247 TABLE VI-9 Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Original Model and the Economic Factor (for delegates from slave states) Variable Standardized Function Weight 1. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp. .448 2. Ambition: Target of Career, first office .435 3. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800 .376 4. Investment: Focus of Previous Career .340 5. Mobility of Career, 1788-1797 .310 6. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office .301 7. Slaveholdings .247 8. Age in 1788 .198 9. Investment: Number of Years in State Office .159 10. Investment: Number of Years in National Office .134 11. Period when Entered Politics .122 12. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics .073 13. Economic Stratum .047 14. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800 .019 15. Mobility of Career, 1780-1788 .017 16. Age at Entry into Politics .012 17. Public Security Holdings .002 Percent of Votes Discriminant Criterion Correctly Predicted fer Function: X2=64.l7 Federalists 74% DF=17 Antifederalists 83% .382 P<.001 Total 78% “km-e x- 4W ‘7 w .3 a mm In", ‘ 11M - ..- .-J. r. zlrhoew v L . in Vii! 3311 at maximum. . - L . . I . - are! “N" ‘J‘. . 1' 991‘) ‘0 v ,. , ml. «Hui “I." ' 4? .... .17,)...“ ~131M_. 03 b"! Q. 8 .. .5 w 5 0A _ V. J m. .OI _ I. n. b 0 . n L .0 II. a .. .. A n. . 7 ,I d "I .. C ..l. 3 I. 1 v «a ... . .V 7 n0 . v. . . .L . ... 2.3 m§‘u_u3.¥..l..)._..nm11wci. 1.03.7)“ ...Hul. .L... 1- 101‘ . , i 248 TABLE VI-lO Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and Antifederalists: The Economic Factor (for delegates from slave states) Variable Standardized Function Weight 1. Slaveholdings .953 2. Economic Stratum .263 3. Public Security Holdings .151 Percent of Votes Discriminant Criterion Correctly Predicted: for Function: X2=3.Ol6 Federalists 41% DF=3 Antifederalists 74% .015 F: about .50 Total 54% The reader will also notice in Table VI-9 that among southern delegates, ambition played a much more significant role in discrimi- nating between Federalists and Antifederalists than it did in the earlier analyses in which delegates from all states were considered. Thus, among southern delegates, ambition variables represented two of the three most powerful predictors of voting on the Constitution. These findings, then, tend to lend additional support to the view of the ratification that has been outlined in the present work. The career variables suggested by this approach consistently outranked the economic variables suggested by Beard in their capacities to discriminate between the voting groups in the Constitution. And where an economic variable succeeded in making a measurable contribution to the predictive power of the original model, as in the case of the slaveholdings, that contribution was, at best, marginal. Hence, the n .. . . 4372-! 24:: i 1 311‘,‘."1 f 249 findings reported here further reinforce those that were set forth in Chapters IV and V. Splitting the Sample: Statesmen and Regulars The data that were reported in these earlier chapters also suggested that Statesmen and Regulars (that is, leaders and non- leaders) from both Sides differed along different dimensions than did the two main groups in the sample (see Appendix for a discussion of these terms). The objective of the present section will be to examine these differences more closely through the use of discriminant function analysis which will allow us once again to rank the various predictor variables in their ability to discriminate between the groups in ques- tion. In preparing the following discussion, the sample was split along several dimensions and, accordingly, differences between a number of sets of sub-groups in the sample were analyzed: first, differences between Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen; second, differences between Federalist Regulars and Antifederalist Regulars; and, finally, differences between Statesmen and Regulars from each side of the conflict. Each of these will be considered in turn. It was reported in Chapters IV and V that the sharpest dif- ferences between Federalists and Antifederalists were to be found in their leadership strata. This was not unexpected, since, by virtue of their intense participation in the conflict, such leaders could be assumed to have had more to gain or to lose by the ratification or the rejection of the new system. Thus, whatever factors served to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists in general were to be found to an exaggerated degree in their leadership strata. Which 250 variables, however, were most important in distinguishing between Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen? The figures re- ported in Table VI-ll suggest that of the original 14 career vari— ables, age and the period when the delegate launched his career were the two variables with the greatest discriminant power. All told, the original 14-variable career model succeeded in correctly pre- dicting the votes of about 83 per cent of the Statesmen in the sample, a figure which marks a slight improvement over its previous performance in discriminating between the two larger voting groups. When these variables are examined in a stepwise fashion, as they are in Table VI-12, we note that a high proportion of this predictive power is supplied by the two strongest variables, for age and the period of entry into politics alone successfully account for about 72 per cent of the cases in question. The successive stepwise addi- tion of one ambition variable and two investment variables brings that figure up to about 84 per cent, after which the inclusion of additional variables has little discernible impact. It will be noted that the two most powerful variables in the above analysis were, in a sense, generational variables which in- directly relate to the differential historical experiences to which the members of these groups were subject during their maturing years. Such findings thus further reinforce the Elkins-McKitrick interpreta- tion of the conflict which suggests that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was in large part an intergenera- tional conflict between politicians whose experiences had left them with conflicting views of national, state, and local political 251 TABLE VI-11 Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen: 14 Variable Model . Standardized Varlable Function Weight 1. Age in 1788 .527 2. Period when Entered Politics .500 3. Ambition: Target of Career, first office .471 4. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics .310 5. Investment: Number of Years in National Office .249 6. Mobility of Career, 1780-1788 .177 7. Investment: Focus of Previous Career .143 8. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office .098 9. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience .094 10. Investment: Number of Years in State Office .086 11. Age at Entry into Politics .034 12. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800 .072 13. Mobility of Career, 1789-1797 .026 14. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800 .016 Percent of Votes Discriminant Criterion Correctly Predicted: for Function: x2=7s.79 Federalists 80% DF=14 Antifederalists 87% .843 P<.001 Total 83% 252 -03» Henuncn one on onneonnaae one son ocouom es» en monzmnm on» .msnh .Ho>on no. one econoo oaoonenoenm. .:o On one .Hooos onnenne>-oongu one on ones» one an omen» .Hoooe onnenne> .neonae nonu gene: we venom on» we mnmnneee on» an eo>no>cn moanenne> mo cannecneeoe one on onneonnnge one oneeu one an monounm one .conuocom one open eonopco one: nocn guns: on noeno osu on mcnvneoue eoumnn one monnenne> onhe noooeem neoononee< ozv ooen-eenn .noooeo mo moooa "nononoe< .en flooooem secononeee ozv nonn-menn .nooneo mo nonnnooz .mn flooooem secononee< ozv ooen-eenn .nooneu mo oonn "eononoee .Nn nooooem necononeee ozv mononnoo open snoem ow oe< .HH muoommm HeGOnunoo< ozv ounmmo oueum an mneo> we nonesz uncoEpmo>cH .oH fluoommm He:0nunoo< ozv .nxm nne:0nusno>om mo maven uncoaumo>ca .m fluoommm He:Onpnoo< ozv oenmmo Heoog an mneo> mo nopesz upcoEumo>cH .w .mm.mn eve ene eme mom. nooneo moon>ona mo moooa "oooEuoosan .n .en.en eme eoe ewe Nan. eenn-oenn .nooneu no nonnnooz .o .me.nn eve ene ewe men. ooneoo noaonooz on mneon no nooezz ”oooaomo>en .m .ne.om enn eme emn «mm. mononnoa an mneon mo noosoz nooon "oooaooo>cn .e .ee.om een ene emn new. oonoeo umnne .nooneu mo ooenen “oononoe< .m .en.en emn emn emn men. mononnoa eonooom eon: eonnoo .N ..... --- --- --- ---- wens on owe .H oneoem Heoon .eoenoce .eoa -nnu . cennounnu . vouonoond >Huuonnou uzeannnomno engenne> mouo> mo ucoonom emnmxnec< omn3aoum "cosmoueum pennenooomec< one cosmoneum umnflenooom new mnmxnec< cenpu:5m acecnsnnemno NH-H> mamo3 no. one econoo oeeonenoenm. .neoaae non» nuns: we venom ogu we mnmxnece on» an eo>no>=n moanenne> we cennecnneou on» on onneOanme one onnen one an monounm och .conuocam one oucn vononco one: non» zonnz an noono on» on manonoooe oopmnn one moanenne> oghe floooeom neoononeee ozv mononnoo open snoom oe owe .en noooeem negononee< ozv ooen-eenn .nooneu no moooa "cononoee .mH noooeem ”econonee< ozv eenn-oenn .nooneo no nonnnooz .en floooeem Heoononee< 62V ooeomo omnne .nooneo oo ooenen ”cononne< .HH nooowmm Heconunoo< ozv ounwmo decenpez an mneo> mo nopszz "peoEpmo>cH .oH nooooem Hooononee< ozv ooen-eenn .noonoo eo oonn "oononns< .m noooeem neoononeee oze nonn-eenn .nooneo no nonnnooz .e .no.0nn emn ewe eon men. mononnoa eonooom eon: eonnoa .n .m~.noH eon eNe eno men. eenn on owe .o .en.mm emo eoe eno men. oonoeo neooe on mneon mo noneoz "ocoaomo>on .m .mm.nm emo ene eoo emu. ooneeo ooeom on oneon no nooeoz "pooaooo>=n .e .nn.om eeo eoe eoo emu. mononnoa an mnoon no nooeoz Hooon "pooaomo>on .m .mn.om eeo eoe eoo new. .axm anaconoono>oe mo moooo "econom35on .N ----- --- --- --- ---- nooneu mzen>onm mo wooed “ucosumo>:n .H Heoon .eoenoa< .eon oneocm cannounnu -nzu poneneona xenoonnou unecHEnnumno oneenne> mono> mo ucoonom emnmnnec< omnzaoum mnenswom umnnenooom new mnmnnec< canuocom pceannnumno ”mnenomom umnHenooomnuc< one mH-H> mqm?G"i”' 5J‘13U?!7éfli ed! '- " I} . ' gnu-.313; cw: 0:17 .‘IJ‘,.~'79'I." i!.:‘.'.““e'?: .' 5"‘6 1buy~wn ‘ . .I-_ x -; -' en'! sea-wed reign; 45:: ea w man: 101311: Ml!" «new!!! 1512:?) o: Issqam (H's .zquortg ow: 9d? ”3 ' 5 ow: on: m' «01112339qu 03 gnilnooas Joe m: u V 1 81211819691131”. hm: anilnohzfi .9313! but Yd .’ 7" m 267 did not appear to differ Significantly on this score. There was, however, an exception to this conclusion and this involved the ex- periences of delegates in the Revolution and their relationships to the chronology of events that led up to it. Those who served mili— tarily at the continental level during the war tended to support the Constitution in 1788 while those who experienced the conflict at the state and local levels tended to Oppose the new system. Apparently, revolutionary experiences were crucial in framing the outlooks of men toward national, state, and local political institutions. The Revolu- tion also appears to have represented a generational dividing line, for those who launched their careers prior to the revolutionary stir- rings of the 1770's evinced a tendency to oppose the Constitution when the issue arose in 1788, while those whose careers were based upon events that coincided with or followed the war Showed a slight tendency to support it. Thus, as Elkins and McKitrick suggested, the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists was also in part an intergenerational conflict between men who came of age on different sides of the revolutionary divide. These results were corroborated when the data were examined in a multivariate context through the use of multiple discriminant function analysis, a technique which allowed us to rank the different variables according to their capacity to discriminate between the main groups in the analysis. When focusing upon the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists, variables associated with career investments surprisingly turned out to possess the greatest discriminant strength. Among the most prominent of these, though, 268 were revolutionary experiences, a finding which supports these re- ported immediately above. However, it was also found that ambitions and age were also important factors, since their introduction into the equation markedly increased our capacity to discriminate between the two groups. In addition, the multivariate analysis allowed us to test the career model which has guided this inquiry against the economic interpretation that was set forth by Charles Beard. Accord- ingly, for the purpose of comparing their relative strengths, a group of economic variables (public security holdings, occupation, and slaveholdings) was plugged into the same equation as a number of the career variables that have been described above. The results gave further support to the career model, since they revealed that career variables tended to outrank economic variables in their ability to discriminate between the groups. Thus, the career model was shown not only to be consistent with the data but also to possess greater predictive power than the dominant alternative approach in the literature. What, then, do these findings tell us about the case itself? As has already been suggested, they reinforce the view of the rati— fication that was first set forth by Elkins and McKitrick and which was later placed into a more theoretical context by Lipset, who sug- gested that the acceptance of the Constitution represented one step in an extended process of nation-building in the United States (see Chapter II for details). This approach is preferable to rival inter- pretations, such as the Progressive view, largely because it makes intelligible a number of elements of the case that others overlook, 269 such as the importance of generational factors, of revolutionary experiences, of ambitions, and of the institutional foci of dele- gates' political careers. All of these were factors which, as Elkins and McKitrick argued, may have served to Shape the views that men adopted toward national, state, and local political institutions and, hence, toward the Constitution itself. As was mentioned in Chapter II, interpretations of this case tend to shift with the changing social identities of historians and social scientists. No doubt this one is congenial to those who look upon the world as one full of "new" nations, and no doubt such a preoccupation will in time change. But though this explanation is built upon such shifting sands, it is also grounded in a body of empirical findings about the case. Given this, it merits at least provisional support. FO0TNOTES--CHAPTER VI 1See, for example, Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1971). 2For more detailed discussions of discriminant analysis, see the following: William W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (New York. Wiley, Chapter 6; Dav1d Tiedeman and Joseph Bryan, "Prediction of College Field of Concentration," Harvard Educational Review, XXIV (1954), 122-39; and C. R. Rae, AdvancedTStatistical MethodS in Biometric Research (Darien, Conn.: Hafner, 1970), pp. 249—57. 3The ordinal scales used in the analysis are reproduced as follows: 1. Investment: Focus of Previous Career . National Office . Mixed: National and State or Local Offices . No Previous Career State Office . Mixed: State and Local Offices Local Office OstiuNr-o 11. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience (Index of Institutional Focus and Amount of Experience) . Continental Army--4 Years or More Continental Army--2 to 3 Years Continental Army--l Year or Less Mixed: Continental Army and State or Local Militia No Revolutionary Experience . State Militia--l Year or Less State Militia--2 to 3 Years . State Militia-—4 Years or More Local Militia--l Year or Less 10. Local Militia--2 to 3 Years 11. Local Militia--4 Years or More :OQNO‘m-thi-I 270 271 III. Ambition: Target of Career, first office after 1788 O‘U'IAOJNH IV. Am 1. 2. 3. 4. S. 6. National Office . Dual: National and State or Local Offices . No Career after 1788 . State Office . Dual: State and Local Offices . Local Office bition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800 National Office Mixed: National and State or Local Offices No Career after 1788 State Office Mixed: State and Local Offices Local Offices V. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800 (First Two Offices after 1788) 4For a . Progressive-Progressive . Sought First Office--Progressive . Progressive-Static Progressive-Discrete Sought First Office-Discrete Static-Progressive Sought First Office-Static Static Static-Discrete Discrete (1788-1792)~Progressive (after 1792) . Discrete (l788-l792)-Static (after 1792) . Discrete (No career after 1788) good discussion of this level of measurement issue, see Hubert Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University efTNOrth CarolinaFress, 1964), pp. 30-35. Blalock argues that, all things considered, the use of ordinal measures with multivariate techniques should not be expected to yield results different from those found using interval level measures. SThe pairs with correlations above .70 were the following (the correlations are in parentheses): - a. Investment: Number of Years in Politics--Investment: Number of Years in State Office (.82) b. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788 to l800--Ambition: Target of Career, first office (.82) ' 272 6A note of caution is in order about interpretations placed upon standardized function weights. It should be remembered that these are indicators of the relative strengths of only those vari- ables contained in a given model or equation. Thus, if a relatively weak variable is placed into a model containing only weaker variables still, it may receive a higher function weight that it would if it were placed into a model containing only more powerful variables. Thus, these weights are not absolute indicators of strength, but are instead relative to others that are included in a given equation. 7Three variables were chosen for each factor because the age and ambition factors were composed of only three variables each in the first place (out of the original 14). This, then, set the limit on the number of variables that could be used and, in addition, it automatically selected which variables would compose these two factors. For the investment factor, three variables had to be chosen from the original six, and these were selected so that as many dimensions of the factor as possible were touched. Thus, the institutional dimen- sion was covered by selecting the institutional foci of delegates' careers prior to 1788 as one of the variables. The amounts of dele- gates' experiences, on the other hand, were tapped by selecting the total number of years spent in politics as a second variable. Finally, affiliations with the Revolution were brought into play by the third variable, the foci of delegates' revolutionary experiences. As it turned out, these also represented three of the four most powerful of the investment variables. 8For details and references on this interpretation, see the discussion in Chapter II. 9See Forrest McDonald, We The People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 10Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitu- tion of the United States (New York} MacMillan, 1935), p. 290. 11Large slaveowners were defined as those who held more than 7 slaves. Those who held fewer were classified as small farmers and landowners. 12These data were likewise derived from McDonald, pp: cit. 13Among southern delegates, the original career model was only able to correctly predict about 73 per cent of the votes (compared to about 77 per cent among the entire sample of delegates). Thus, in increasing this figure to about 78 per cent, the slaveholdings variable possessed considerable strength. 273 14AS Beard predicted, though, Federalist Supporters tended to own more slaves than did Antifederalists. The mean fer Federalists was about 42 while the corresponding figure for their Opponents was only about 26, a difference that was statistically Significant beyond the .05 level. BI BLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Historical and Theoretical Sources Adair, Douglas. "The Tenth Federalist Revisted." William and Mary Quarterly, VIII (January, 1951). Adams, John. Works. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1851. Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sydney. "National Revolutions and Political Commitment." Internal War. Edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: The Free Press, 1964. Apter, David. The Dynamics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1963. Bancroft, George. The History of the Constitution of the United States. 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Each group was sampled independently, but the sample was designed so that the proportion of each group in the sample would correspond with its proportion in the pOpulation. Thus, the sample consisted of about 60 per cent Federalists and 40 per cent Antifederalists. Ac- cordingly, of the 540 delegates in the sample, 320 were Federalists and 220 were Antifederalists. Each group was in turn stratified according to a leader- follower dimension, that is, between Statesmen and Regulars. In each group, Statesmen represented about one-fourth of the delegates (among Federalists, the figure was 81; among Antifederalists, 55) and Regulars obviously made up the rest. As explained in the text, Regulars were selected on a random basis and their careers were culled from various biographical and historical sources, some of which are listed in the Bibliography. 283 284 Statesmen, on the other hand, did not consist of a well- defined population, and, hence, they were selected on the basis of quota sampling. These delegates were drawn from three main sources: first, from among those who attended the national convention in Philadelphia in 1787 (This source supplied 40 Federalists and 4 Anti- federalists.); second, from among those listed by Merrill Jensen (1965; pp. 424-25) as having been leaders of their respective causes (3 Federalists and 9 Antifederalists); and, third, from among those listed in other historical sources as having been influential in the conflict (38 Federalists and 42 Antifederalists). The primary sources consulted here were Main (1961) and McDonald (1958), both of which list several of the leading participants in each state. In addition, other useful sources consulted here were Harding (1896) on Massa- chusetts, Crowl (1943) on Maryland, Spaulding (1932) on New York, and Brunhouse (1942) on Pennsylvania. (See Bibliography for complete citations.) Though the sample was not stratified according to state, all thirteen states were adequately represented in the sample, though Pennsylvania and Virginia were somewhat over-represented and Massa- chusetts and South Carolina were to some degree under-represented. The following table provides a breakdown of the sample on a state-by- state basis. The states are listed in the order in which they ratified. r .. .WMJ‘. ...la. ... '1 "n4. nu.- I h .. .. . l , .1, .3 i . . . ,. . ..z .A p . r. 5. n m . . .. ..fl . a r a n .. _ _. ,, ., ll \1 . I. .1 l O .L .fl . . u m a n 2 \a an 9 I; I . J 0 ., . l. . . J «u 1. . . . . u l W I ... L a 9 .. a 0 a a , 8 u .. . 3 . x . 1: o n . T 9 .... n \J . N. u d h .0. 1. r3 I w U pl. 1 .I . fi. ..7 .. m U U» I. . .c. r... .1 , .. 1.. T i. Q d I I .. a I . n T. r. ... .- , . 4.. . . I» 0 e V I .. - . w I . ..u I 3 .. . . ..c .. 1 .r 9 8 I . r C 3 .1 a u 1 L .... t. . 9 I .J 3 ! xv v. v]. .1. p. x. C 1.. F. n: .N. v1 n m. a v I r 7 9 . .a l\ . nu I J .. n. y a . h ... 0 D 9 , .1 .. .4. y I . a. J .1 u. a .... H r x . .5 .I. l . o n t c 8 .m r v. ,. N F ..., T ... , J A I 3 . W J r . ... n 285 Approx. Approx. Total Percent Delegates in Percent of State Delegates of Pop. Sample Sample Delaware 30 2% 10 2% Pennsylvania 69 60 11 New Jersey 39 18 3 Georgia 26 2 11 Connecticut 173 10 42 8 Massachusetts 364 22 85 16 Maryland 76 4 29 South Carolina 236 14 43 New Hampshire 113 7 39 Virginia 170 10 75 14 New York 65 4 34 6 North Carolinaa 228 14 69 13 Rhode Island3 70 4 25 s 1659 99% 540 102* 3For North Carolina and Rhode Island, the figures are based on the 1788 conventions which rejected the new system and not upon subsequent ones that ratified it. *Rounding error. The figures on the conventions were drawn from Charles Warren, The Making'of the Constitution (Boston: Appen ix D. Little, Brown and Co., 19285,