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ABSTRACT

CAREER PERSPECTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS

By

James E. Piereson

This dissertation focused upon the problem of institutional change and upon the question of how the decisions of political leaders with respect to such changes can be best understood. Drawing upon theories of innovation in organizations and bureaucracies, we attempted in Chapter I to sketch the outlines of an explanation based upon the assumption that leaders make decisions that are consistent with their career perspectives and goals. Three factors were suggested as explanatory variables: ambitions, career investments, and age. The general notion was that innovators are more likely to seek advancement in their careers, to have fewer investments staked in their professional careers, and to be younger than those who oppose innovations.

In Chapters II and III, these notions were linked to a particular case of institutional change, namely the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution. The burden of Chapter II was to show that a focus upon political careers is not inappropriate in this historical context, for it is consistent with a

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particular interpretation of the case that has been outlined by a number of historians. According to this view, Federalists should be understood as innovators who were attempting to construct a "new nation" out of what had previously been only a loose confederation of states. The division between the two groups, however, revolved around their conflicting institutional attachments which were formed in part by their political ambitions, by their experiences in the Revolution and in their previous political careers, and by their generational affiliations. Those whose careers were affiliated with continental affairs and who came of age during the revolutionary era were more likely to become Federalists in 1788, while those whose experiences revolved around state and local affairs and who came of age at an earlier time before local rule was challenged by continental issues were more likely to become Antifederalists.

In Chapter III, these theoretical and historical approaches were more explicitly stated by placing them into the context of a theory or a model of institutional change. Here, a number of assumptions underlying the model were made clear and from these, seven sets of propositions were derived which linked the variables of ambition, career investments, and age to the issue of innovation or institutional change. These propositions were then tested by analyzing the political careers of a sample of approximately 540 Federalists and Antifederalists drawn from among those who were delegates to the various constitutional conventions in 1787 and 1788. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, the findings of the study were set forth using both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques.

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The data by and large supported the model of innovation and the historical interpretation that was linked with it. Thus, Federalists and Antifederalists appear to have entertained divergent kinds of ambitions, as measured by their careers after 1788. Federalists were more likely than their opponents to seek advancement in their careers between 1788 and 1800 and were also more likely to locate their careers in the national arena. In contrast, the careers of Antifederalists were more likely to reflect stationary or discrete ambitions and were more likely to revolve around local political institutions (see Chapter IV).

The model was given further support by the findings that were presented in Chapter V, which focused upon the factors of age and career investments. Hence, it was found that, as predicted, the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to become a Federalist. On the average, there was a five-year age differential between the two groups. With respect to career investments, relatively small differences were found between the groups. There was, however, an exception to this conclusion and this involved the experiences of delegates in the Revolution and their relationships to the chronology of events that led up to it. Those who served militarily at the continental level during the war tended to support the Constitution in 1788 while those who experienced the conflict at the state and local levels tended to oppose the new system. One could thus conclude that revolutionary experiences were crucial in framing the outlooks of men toward national, state, and local institutions. The Revolution also appears to have represented an important generational dividing line, for those who launched their careers prior to the

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beginnings of the conflict evinced a tendency to oppose the Constitution when the issue arose in 1788, while those whose careers were based upon events that coincided with or followed the war showed a slight tendency to support it. Hence, the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists was also an intergenerational conflict between men who gained their political educations on different sides of the revolutionary divide.

These results were given additional support when the data were examined in a multivariate context through the use of multiple discriminant function analysis, a technique which allowed us to rank the different variables according to their capacity to discriminate between the main groups in the analysis (see Chapter VI). Surprisingly, this line of analysis suggested that career investments possessed the greatest discriminant strength, and among the most prominent of these were revolutionary experiences. However, it was also found that ambitions and age were also important factors, since their introduction into the equation markedly increased our capacity to discriminate between the groups. Moreover, the multivariate analysis allowed us to test the strength of the career model against the economic interpretation that was set forth by Charles Beard some years ago. Thus, when a set of economic variables (public security holdings, occupation, and slaveholdings) was plugged into the same equation as a number of career variables, the results revealed that the career variables consistently outranked the economic factors in their ability to discriminate between the groups. Hence, the career model was shown not only to be consistent with the data but also to possess greater predictive power than one of the dominant alternative approaches to the case.

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CAREER PERSPECTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF THE
FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS

By

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1973

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In preparation
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In preparing this study, I have fallen into the debt of a number of generous people. I particularly wish to acknowledge the assistance given me by the members of my dissertation committee: Alan Grimes, Joseph Schlesinger, and Charles Press. For their contributions of time, patience, and ideas, I am very grateful. In addition, thanks are also due to Paul Hain, now of the University of New Mexico, who originally suggested the idea behind this research and who likewise contributed a number of useful ideas. Similarly, the work has also benefited from the helpful suggestions of two of my colleagues, Platon Rigos and James McCormick. But though their observations improved the quality of the study, they bear no responsibility for its remaining shortcomings.

Financial support for the study was generously provided through a Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from the National Science Foundation, and this, of course, greatly facilitated the completion of the research.

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CHAPTER I

INNOVATION IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY

The study of political leadership possesses a long and respected history. Ever since men began to think systematically about politics, they have evinced a preoccupation with political leaders and with the decisions that they make. It is not too difficult to understand this preoccupation when we stop to consider that the meaning of the term "politics" has traditionally referred in some way to the activities of political elites. In this case at least, traditional usage has its analytical counterpart. The decisions of political leaders are at the center of any political system and their explanation bears closely upon the analysis of a host of other political problems, such as policy outcomes, representation, and institutional changes. It is axiomatic therefore that the development of adequate theories of leadership will yield analytical dividends for a number of substantive areas of political science. The traditional focus of political theorists upon leadership, then, does not betray a belief in the irrelevance of non-elites, as is sometimes charged, but instead reflects upon the fact that the behavior of its leadership represents the most obvious manifestation of the operation of the polity itself.

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The design of the present study reflects this concern with political leadership. Here my attention will be directed to the decisions of political leaders as they bear upon the problem of institutional change or innovation. Our analytical goal will be to relate such decisions to the career perspectives of political elites. This will be accomplished by attempting to draw an analogy between innovation in organizations and change in political institutions. A number of scholars, as we shall see in a moment, have suggested that change in an organization is in part a function of the willingness of its members to pursue advancement in their careers. Put more boldly, this boils down to the proposition that innovation in an organization is a function of the ambition of its leadership. In the present study, I shall suggest that an analogous process can be understood to be at work in political institutions, that is, in organizations that exercise the legitimate authority of the state. Thus, instead of focusing upon the ambitions of officials in a bureau or an organization, the focus of this study will be upon the career perspectives of politicians as factors that can be employed to account for innovations in political institutions.

In drawing upon the above analogy, this study will attempt to set forth an account of institutional change that represents a model of similar theories of change or innovation in organizations. By a model we mean a theory whose assumptions and propositions are structurally similar to those of another theory dealing with a different phenomenon. As Brodbeck puts it, "if the laws of one theory have the same form as the laws of another, the one may be said to be a model

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for the other."¹ In this sense, by way of an example, Riker's theory of political coalitions constitutes a model, since it is based upon the analogy between the behavior of players in game situations and of politicians in decision-making bodies. In both cases, he suggests, there are players, winnings to be divided, strategies for victory, and rules to decide the outcome. And, as with rational players in game situations, he hypothesizes that politicians in decision-making bodies will attempt to minimize the size of winning coalitions in order to maximize the benefits that they stand to receive as a result of their membership in such victorious coalitions.² In the present study, as I have already indicated, we shall draw upon a similar parallel between organizations and political institutions, both of which can be understood to be staffed by officials who can increase their shares of the enterprise's outputs by changing their positions in its office hierarchy. Given this similarity, it stands to reason that the same theories that are employed to account for organizational change can be used as models to generate propositions concerning innovations in political institutions.

The model that will be set forth here will, in turn, provide the framework for an examination of one conspicuous case of institutional change in the United States, namely, the events which led to the ratification of the American Constitution in 1788. Hopefully, such an analysis will not only provide a useful test of our model, but will also enable us to cast some light upon the controversy over the Constitution itself, as well as upon a number of other issues,

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It is recognized, of course, that the concept of careers represents only one of a vast number of possible analytical categories that could be employed to attack this problem. Because of the visibility of elites, a variety of approaches have been advanced for the purpose of coming to grips with their decisions, behavior, and attitudes. These range from sociological theories,³ which conceive of leaders as responding to their social background experiences, to psychological theories,⁴ which hold that a leader's behavior can be understood as a response to the needs of his personality, to theories with more explicitly political emphases,⁵ which stress the importance of such factors as constituency pressures and institutional roles in the deliberations of elites. It goes without saying, of course, that all of the above approaches would constitute important elements in any comprehensive theory of leadership, but for the sake of manageability and parsimony, if for no other reasons, the researcher is forced to limit his focus to a relatively narrow range of variables that he considers to be important. In the present inquiry, as I said earlier, these will revolve around the career perspectives of political leaders. The general question from which research begins is therefore the following: Can distinctive outlooks toward innovation be understood as responses to the perspectives that leaders entertain toward their careers?

What do we mean by the notions of institutional change or innovation? Though I shall use these terms rather loosely here, it

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will nevertheless prove helpful to offer a clearer indication of what we shall mean by them. Actually, the concept is not a very difficult one, as one can easily see by noting Mohr's simple definition of innovation as "the successful introduction into an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation."⁶ Often, the notion of innovation is used to refer to the latter type of change, that is, to the alteration of the ends or goals of the enterprise through the adoption of new policies or programs.⁷ However, as Mohr suggests, it is also applicable to alterations of the second kind as well, that is, to the introduction of new procedural rules into the operation of an organization. But used either way, innovation reflects the extent to which the members of an organization are willing to entertain proposals that suggest departures from its already established behavior.

The question of what factors generate change or innovation in organizations is, as it turns out, a traditional one among students of administration. As a consequence, scholars have managed to set forth a variety of correlates of innovation in organizations. Cyert and March, for example, have suggested that the propensity to innovate and to adopt new programs is a function of the wealth of the organization, since the more resources it possesses, the more can its leaders afford the luxury of experimentation.⁸ Downs has proposed, on the other hand, that the adoption of new programs is most likely to occur in newer and perhaps less financially secure organizations, since these have yet to develop firm investments in any particular pattern of behavior.⁹ Still others, such as Everett Rogers, have theorized that innovation depends upon the complexity of the

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The above approaches to the problem have been complemented by a suggestive account proposed by Phillip Selznick, who has argued that innovation is a function of the kinds of leadership staffs that organizations are able to recruit. By and large, recruitment processes in organizations vary with the stage of organizational development. In his view, in the early phases of its development, an organization must come to grips with two imposing problems. The first involves the selection of a social base or, in other words, a market from which the organization receives support through exchanges of resources. The second involves the selection of a leadership staff or, in his words, an institutional core that is sufficiently unified in its outlook that it is able to impart to the organization a coherent yet distinctive identity. This, he suggests, entails a problem of recruitment.

The creation of an institutional core is partly a matter of selective recruiting . . . By choosing key personnel from a key social group, the earlier conditioning of the individuals can become a valuable resource for the new organization. Conversely, of course, just such conditioning is in question when a particular source of personnel is rejected. But core-building involves more than selective recruiting. Indoctrination and the sharing of key experiences--especially internal conflicts and other crises--will help to create a unified group and give the organization a special identity.¹¹

In the early and yet unstable phases of an organization's life, incentives are provided for the recruitment of an innovative corps of leaders who are attracted to the organization by its possibilities for change. This is, of course, functional for the organization's

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survival, since in such times a premium is placed upon the recruitment of a creative and innovative set of leaders that is capable of discovering "the true commitments of the organization."¹² In later stages, however, when the organization's activities have become routinized, specialists and professionals tend to be recruited into the ranks, since they are lured by the prospects of stability and continuity. As a result, as time passes in an organization's life, its propensity for innovative behavior diminishes.¹³

Selznick's observation concerning the importance of recruitment for organizational change has been mirrored by the suggestions of those who have studied its impact upon changes in political systems and institutions. Some, for example, have pointed to the importance of shared revolutionary experiences among leaders who have attempted to build national institutions in newly independent states. Such events, they point out, represent key experiences or crises around which leaders are able to build coherent national identities. In a similar manner, other scholars have noted the tendency among emerging political institutions to recruit into leadership positions large numbers of ideologues and demagogues who attempt to define the "true commitments" of these institutions.¹⁴ In addition to the above, Seligman has emphasized the importance of recruitment patterns for understanding a whole range of different kinds of political change.

As a factor which affects change . . . , elite recruitment patterns determine avenues for political participation and status, influence the kind of policies that will be enacted, accelerate or retard change, effect [sic] the distribution of status and prestige, and influence the stability of the system.¹⁵

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These arguments suggest that one way of approaching the problem of change and innovation among organizations and institutions is to focus upon the kinds of leaders that they recruit and upon the ways in which they are recruited.

This proposition has in fact already been examined from a number of analytical perspectives, most of which however have approached the notion of recruitment in terms of some aspect of the backgrounds of those who eventually become leaders. Those who have approached the problem from a sociological angle have suggested that innovative leaders are likely to be recruited from particular social classes or strata. For example, some have pointed out that in new societies such leaders are likely to be drawn from the ranks of marginal social groups, such as students, intellectuals, and soldiers, whose position in the social order has never been well established.¹⁶ Others have attempted to analyze recruitment in terms of psychological theories in order to establish links between social and political change and the personalities of leaders. Erikson, for example, has suggested an insightful link between the development of politics and the development of leader's personalities.¹⁷ In his view, societies that are undergoing rapid social and political changes recruit into leadership positions those peculiar kinds of individuals who experience analogous sorts of crises in the development of their own personalities. The fact that the leader must face an identity crisis in his own life makes it easier for him to interpret, understand, and guide the search for identity that is being experienced by his society. Erikson's argument that innovative leaders are recruited

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from distinctive personality types has been developed into different directions by a number of other scholars, among them, Wolfenstein in his attempt to outline the parameters of the "revolutionary personality"¹⁸ and Pye in his attempt to set forth the psychological bases of successful political development.¹⁹

Such studies of personality and social backgrounds have been complemented by those that have employed a concept that is especially well suited to the study of both recruitment and political decisions in general, namely, that of political careers. Careers, of course, represent an attractive tool of analysis since in the first place they are relatively easy to identify and to measure and in the second place they are closely associated with the activities of political leaders. Thus, there exist a host of studies which elaborate in great detail the political career backgrounds of a variety of different kinds of elites, from American presidents,²⁰ Supreme Court Justices,²¹ and Senators,²² to contemporary revolutionary leaders.²³ Despite the wealth of data that such studies have brought forward, however, they have been by and large unsuccessful in relating career backgrounds in any systematic way to matters of political importance, such as, for example, institutional change. One reason for this, suggested by Browning and Jacob, is that political leaders are less likely to respond to the influences of their distant pasts than they are to the opportunities of their immediate environments.²⁴ A second and perhaps more telling reason revolves around the paucity of useful theory that has been developed with regard to political career

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As purely information sources, these studies are without equal. Yet their information is frequently left unstructured; the absence of a theoretical framework leaves the reader wondering about the significance of it all.²⁵

Partly as a result of this, a number of writers in recent years have begun to recast the analysis of careers and recruitment into what may be called an economic framework. Such a framework, as Olson points out, is in many ways antithetical to those approaches which focus upon the sociological, psychological, or career backgrounds of political actors.²⁶ Where these have often attempted to account for the complex motives of actors in terms of their background experiences, theories with an economic focus attempt merely to draw out the likely consequences from some assumption concerning goals. In contrast to the above approaches, then, the latter is in many ways future oriented, since its focus is upon the goals themselves, rather than upon their complex sociological or psychological origins. When such an approach is applied to the problem of institutional changes, then, the assumption is that such innovations are likely to develop more out of leaders' assessments of their futures than out of the influences of their sometimes distant backgrounds.

This kind of approach has been adapted to the analysis of political careers by Joseph Schlesinger in the form of what he has called ambition theory.²⁷ His argument starts from the assumption that a leader's decisions are more or less rational responses to his ambitions or, in other words, to his office goals. He states this in the following manner:

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The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office. His problem consists, first, in defining his office goal or goals and, secondly, in relating his current activity to them.²⁸

According to his theory, there are three distinct classes of ambitions or what we have called career perspectives. First, a leader's ambitions may be discrete, in which case he has no office goals and simply intends to withdraw from political life. Second, they may be static, in which case he plans to remain in his current position. And, third, they may be progressive, in which case he aspires to hold a higher or more desirable office than the one he currently occupies.²⁹

Schlesinger asserts that those who entertain different office goals are likely also to entertain differing outlooks toward such issues as institutional change or innovation. In particular, it is the leader with progressive aspirations who is most likely to provide the impetus for change since it is he who is forced to align his current behavior with future possibilities. Those with no desire to advance in their careers have no professional reason to become innovative.

In Schlesinger's view, "if anyone is going to search for solutions it is the man whose career depends upon finding solutions . . . Only the man with progressive ambitions is driven to explore current policies in the light of future consequences, for his future career is at stake."³⁰ Hence, much as sociologists have argued that social

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Schlesinger argues that political innovations are inspired by those leaders who are, in a manner of speaking, upwardly mobile in their political careers.

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A similar thesis has been developed by Anthony Downs, who has studied the impact of career perspectives upon innovations in bureaucracies.³¹ For Downs, there are two pure types of officials who typically hold positions in bureaucracies: conservers and climbers. The former are those who seek to maximize the amount of security that they enjoy and are thus hostile to any changes which might serve to undermine the stability of the bureau. Climbers, on the other hand, are analogous to Schlesinger's notion of the progressively oriented politician in that they seek to increase the amount of power, income, and prestige that they command as a result of the positions that they hold.³² This they do either by gaining more attractive positions within the bureau or, alternatively, by aggrandizing the positions that they currently hold. Innovation in such organizations are usually inspired by climbers who attempt to generate changes which either facilitate their advancement or which serve to increase the power, income, or prestige that are associated with their present offices.³³ On the basis of his theory, Downs proposes a number of empirical propositions. For example, innovative bureaus tend to be dominated by climbers. Since climbers are mobile in their careers, leadership turnover is higher in innovative bureaus. Since climbers tend to be younger than conservers, innovative bureaus tend to be younger than more conservative bureaus.³⁴ Thus, like Schlesinger, Downs argues that those who entertain different perspectives upon their careers are also likely to entertain different outlooks with regard to the subject of change and innovation.

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Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work done to test these propositions. We may, however, point to a few works which have attempted to link the career perspectives of leaders to such problems as institutional change and professionalization. For example, Wellhoffer and Hennessey argue that institutionalization in party organizations is consciously directed by elites who manipulate the incentives for office holding in order to lure party members with particular kinds of ambitions. Such incentives are altered as the party develops and as partisans with different aspirations are needed to fill party positions.³⁵ On another front, Kenneth Prewitt, in a study of contemporary West Coast city councilmen, found that those with aspirations to hold higher office tended to take a more benign view than their unambitious colleagues toward innovations which were designed to increase the degree of state and federal cooperation in the solution of local problems. This, he argues, reinforces a proposition earlier suggested by Schlesinger and Downs that an official who is "ambitious for a higher position is likely to support policies which expand the prerogatives of that office."³⁶ In a sense, he suggests that leaders are likely to support changes which aggrandize the positions to which they aspire. In still another area, Gordon Black, again in a study of city councilmen, found that politicians with progressive ambitions are more likely than others to adopt the values that are associated with a professional political career.³⁷ The more one wants to advance in politics, the more likely he is to adopt favorable attitudes toward such values as bargaining and compromise. Thus, as one progresses in a political career, he

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tends to adopt values that reinforce his prospects for success in that career. Curiously, both of the above findings reinforce a proposition that Merton has called anticipatory socialization, which holds that people adopt the values of a group long before they actually become members. For example, student apprentices in fields such as teaching, medicine, or law quickly adopt the values of their appropriate reference groups. As Merton puts it: "For the individual who adopts the values of a group to which he aspires but does not belong, this orientation may serve the twin functions of aiding his rise into that group and of easing his adjustment after he has become part of it."³⁸ Of course, we can never be sure whether one adopts the values because of his aspirations, or whether he adopts his aspirations because of his values. However, the fact that such an interaction has been found to exist between a political leader's career perspective and his political outlook suggests that this may present a useful way of approaching the problem of institutional change.

The above works suggest a general hypothesis to the effect that in some cases at least political leaders adopt values and make decisions that accord in a rough way to the perspectives of their political careers. This, in turn, leads us to suggest, following Downs and Schlesinger, that innovative leaders are likely to be recruited from the ranks of those who entertain progressive commitments to their careers. For such leaders, institutional changes represent one way through which their advancement is facilitated. By contrast, those who have no aspiration to advance are not expected to have as powerful reasons to become innovative. None of this

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should be taken to mean, however, that leaders always act out of self-interested or cynical motives but only that the achievement of their office goals usually represents a necessary preliminary step to the achievement of more grandiose and selfless designs. In addition, though we have spoken at some length on the importance of leaders' assessments of their futures, we do not mean to rule out the importance of their pasts. As Eulau and others have pointed out, one's career perspective is governed not only by prospects for the future but also by "recollections of the past."³⁹ Hirschman and Black have spoken of such "recollections of the past" in terms of investments which politicians may parlay into future ventures.⁴⁰ Thus, they argue that the more one has invested in a particular organization, institution, or career, the less likely he will be to exit when developments prove unsatisfactory and, further, the less likely he will be to propose solutions that disturb the boundaries of such organizations, institutions, or careers.⁴¹ In addition, Schlesinger suggests that the impact of such investments upon future calculations is at times reinforced by considerations of age.⁴² Since the young have a broader theater for the play of their ambitions, they are likely to entertain different kinds of career perspectives than the old. The proposition advanced at the beginning of this paragraph can therefore be employed as the starting point for a number of other more specific and less obvious propositions which link the variables of ambition, investments, and age to the question of innovation in political institutions. Since the present discussion

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is intended to be introductory in nature, an elaboration of these propositions will await a later chapter.

In the present study, I shall attempt to employ the above approach to innovation as a means of casting light upon one conspicuous case of political change in the United States, which involves, as I indicated earlier, the controversy surrounding the ratification of the Constitution in 1788. Several considerations make this case amenable to such an examination. First, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Constitution represented an innovation in the sense that it challenged the localism that was the dominant feature of American political life up to 1787 by proposing to subordinate local institutions under national authority. Indeed, the federal arrangement that was finally written into the Constitution represented, as Huntington points out, the last significant innovation in governmental structure that the American system has introduced.⁴³ Though this view of the proponents of the Constitution as innovators departs from a number of the more important historical interpretations of the case, we shall attempt to show in the next chapter that it is nevertheless not without considerable support among historians.

A second reason why this case is amenable to this type of analysis is that the ratification of the Constitution dramatically altered the structure of opportunity within which politicians at that time pursued their careers. Not only did the ratification of the new system expand the authority of national institutions at the expense of the states and localities, but it also expanded the

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number of opportunities available at the national level. Hence, the Constitution involved an innovation that could have been expected to bear directly upon the careers of a sizeable number of political leaders.

Finally, this case is subject to analysis because it readily yields the data needed to test our model of innovation. The proponents and opponents of the change, called Federalists and Anti-federalists at the time, are easily identifiable on the bases of historical records. Their accessibility makes it easier for us to discern the shapes of their careers and thus to relate them to the propositions that will be derived from the model of innovation. In all of the above respects, then, a focus upon this case will allow us to relate decisions concerning innovation to data dealing with the career perspectives of political leaders.

In its focus upon the careers of the politicians involved in the dispute over the Constitution, this study will in a sense represent a test of Marsh's dictum that "many events and developments in history were shaped . . . by whether the actors involved were improving, declining or remaining stationary in their social and political positions."⁴⁴ But it should be pointed out that this approach deals with only one dimension of the case, that revolving around what Selznick has called the recruitment of the leadership staffs of the opposing sides to the conflict. As a result of this rather narrow focus, it will not be possible to deal seriously with other equally important aspects of this particular case, such as the social bases for these opposing coalitions. Nevertheless, though this approach

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There is, however, a caveat concerning the appropriateness of this particular case for this type of study. I have given much emphasis to the notion of ambition, a concept that is usually understood to relate to the complex motives of political leaders. In dealing with politicians who lived two hundred years ago, it is obviously quite difficult to generate reliable indicators of such a concept, since the usual technique of discerning such motivations is through obtrusive measurement or interviews, and this option is quite clearly not open to us. In this study, therefore, I shall rely upon the only alternative course of action--namely, unobtrusive measurement.⁴⁵ Thus, my assumption is that the ambitions of politicians may be reliably inferred from the actual choices made during the courses of their political careers. Though such inferences are flawed in some respects, they avoid a number of difficulties, such as response sets and interviewer effects, that are the bugaboo of obtrusive techniques. Moreover, scholars have consistently found that the gap between intentions and actual behavior is rather narrow. Hain, for example, compared the expressed ambitions of a group of state legislators with the actual careers that they pursued in the years following their statements and found that the correspondence between the two measures of ambition was high at about .73.⁴⁶ We assume, of course, for the purposes of this study that a similar correspondence was in play between the ambitions and the actual career choices of

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Briefly, then, this study will attempt to accomplish two general goals. First, it will attempt to provide a test of our model of innovation by deriving a number of propositions from the model and testing them against the actual careers of Federalist and Anti-federalist leaders. In addition, we shall employ the generalizations that emerge from the study to throw some light upon the case itself. This will be accomplished by attempting to link such generalizations with a number of broader interpretations that have been advanced to account for the division over the Constitution. Hopefully, these findings can be used to discriminate between some of these contending approaches.

These tasks will be carried out according to the following general outline. The next chapter will establish the setting for the study by, first, setting forth the general historical context of the case and, second, by elaborating and offering criticisms of some of the important interpretations of it. Here, an approach will be outlined which suggests the relevance of the model to the dispute over the Constitution. Chapter III will be largely theoretical in nature and will deal with an elaboration of the model and a specification of the propositions that are to be tested against the data. Here, also, problems of data collection and analysis will be taken up. The succeeding two chapters will report the data that bear upon each one of these propositions. In Chapter IV, the three propositions dealing with ambitions will be examined and in Chapter V those dealing with

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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

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CHAPTER II

THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY: THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE CONSTITUTION

The ratification of the Constitution in 1788 marked the final step in a series of institutional changes which, all told, succeeded in transforming the thirteen original colonies into what one writer has called the "first new nation."¹ While the precise historical steps leading up to the events of 1788 are not matters of serious dispute, the meaning of the ratification itself continues to be a subject of intellectual controversy. As Elkins and McKittrick write:

The intelligent American of today may know a great deal about his history, but the chances are that he feels none too secure about the Founding Fathers and the framing of the Federal Constitution. He is no longer certain what the "enlightened" version of the story is, or even whether there is one.²

Such controversies as this, if they cannot be definitively settled, can at least be placed upon a more solid footing by theoretical approaches of the kind that we suggested in the previous chapter. Indeed, if that theory is to make even a marginal contribution to our understanding of the ratification of the Constitution, it will have to be brought to bear upon some of the distinctive interpretations that have been advanced to explain it. Accordingly, it will be

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the purpose of the present chapter to show how a theory based upon political careers can be employed to throw light upon this controversy.

Since this will involve a number of references to a sequence of events that the reader may find obscure, it will be preceded by a brief outline of the historical background of this case. This is presented for expository purposes only, so anything approaching a thorough account of this tangled problem is certainly not intended. It is merely hoped that by first establishing some historical points of reference, it will be possible to provide a clearer presentation of those interpretive approaches that I alluded to above.

The Setting: An Historical Background

The conflict over the Constitution in 1787 and 1788 centered, in a large part, around the question of whether political authority should be located in a national government superior to the individual states or in the respective states themselves. Despite the feature of federalism, its ratification effectively resolved the dispute in favor of the proponents of nationalism. The idea of a national government did not, of course, appear full-blown over night, but instead emerged and gained support during a sequence of events which went back approximately a generation.³ Though, as Merrill Jensen points out,⁴ proposals for some form of inter-colony cooperation had been voiced from the beginning of the eighteenth century, its first manifestation did not occur until 1765 with the convening of the Stamp Act Congress. Called in response to a general colonial opposition to British plans to raise revenues through an imposition of a duty upon various kinds of documents (including contracts, wills,

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newspapers, and pamphlets), the Stamp Act Congress was an ad hoc arrangement only and therefore could not generate any persistent commitment to inter-colonial institutions. It did, however, suggest the possibility of cooperation among the colonies.

As the relationship between the Crown and colonies deteriorated over the next several years, support grew in some quarters for a national organization that could respond to inter-colonial interests on a more enduring basis. When the British responded to a number of provocations in Boston with the famous Coercive Acts, the line was passed and the first Continental Congress assembled in September 1774. As its name would suggest, the new congress began immediately to deal with questions of a continental sweep, ranging from a consideration of the limits of Parliamentary authority in the colonies to a proposal for a general halt to all trade with England. Early linkages between continental and local institutions were forged when the Congress requested the various local Committees of Correspondence to mobilize public opinion against the Crown, and to aid in the enforcement of Congressional proposals. This should not, however, be taken to mean that the state and local governments were in any way subservient to the initiatives of the Continental Congress. Though the Congress endured through the Revolution and for several years thereafter as the locus for national authority, it never represented anything more than a loose federation of states; at no time between 1774 and 1788 did it possess sufficient authority to impose its will upon recalcitrant states.

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Nevertheless, the commencement of the Revolution in 1775 served to strengthen the hand of the continental government to some degree at least, if for no other reason than military and administrative necessity. Finding themselves in the midst of war when they convened in May, 1775, the Congress assumed leadership in the military dimension of the conflict and voted to raise a regular army under the leadership of Washington. During the course of the Revolution, the Continental Army bore the lions-share of the military burden. There were, for one thing, considerably more troops in the Continental line than in the various militias; of the approximately 250,000 men who saw military service during the Revolution, about 60 per cent had their involvement at the Continental level.⁵ Moreover, while the Continental troops were assisted by state and local militias, the contributions of the latter, though at times extensive, were intermittent. Though this military division of labor served to provide the continental government with a reason for existence during the Revolution, it was also productive of a good deal of conflict between those who experienced the Revolution at different levels.⁶ Continental soldiers, who tended to have had more extensive experience in the Revolution, were disposed to take a disdainful view of their colleagues in the various militias, who they often regarded as disorderly irregulars and sunshine patriots. On the other hand, it was just this relatively professional character of the Continental troops that made those in the states suspicious of them, for at that time many considered professional or standing armies to be politically oppressive.

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The paramount administrative problem that faced the Congress was one of raising sufficient finances to conduct the war. Congress had no legal authority to raise funds through taxation since, for one thing, it had been commissioned by the respective states and therefore did not sit as direct representatives of the individual citizens of these states. The alternative that was adopted in 1776 was to issue bills of credit which could hopefully be redeemed with interest by their holders at some future time. But the government soon found that its credit was shaky and farmers and merchants were soon reluctant to accept them at face value. Indeed, by 1780 continental securities were said to cost as much to print as they were worth on the market.

At about this time, however, a belated, if all too unsatisfactory, solution to this problem was forthcoming with the adoption in 1781 of the Articles of Confederation. Beginning in 1776 with the formal commencement of the Revolution, attempts had been regularly made to give the continental government a formal grant of authority. Though a proposal for such a grant was immediately drawn up, its adoption was delayed for a number of reasons, not least among them was the resistance on the parts of some states to any greater centralization of political authority. At this particular time the states had themselves only recently gained independence and all were either in the process of adopting new state constitutions or had already completed the task. Hence, the states were much esteemed and were jealous of their newly acquired powers. On account of this, the final form of the Articles contained a number

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of extensive safeguards for state prerogatives which, by and large, narrowly delimited the areas within which the Continental government could act. Thus, considerable grants of authority were given to the Confederation in the areas of defense and foreign policy, but at the same time the states retained a more fundamental prerogative: the power of the purse. This helped to provide one solution to the financial problems of the Congress, for with the adoption of the Articles, it could petition the respective states for money as it was needed instead of relying for funds upon the now hopelessly inflated bills of credit. However, the Articles containing no provision whereby the Congress could enforce its requests for funding, so for all practical purposes any venture that the continental government entered into was dependent for its success upon the approval of at least nine states (the number required for passage of any proposal). With the inclusion in the Articles of such protections, most states readily gave their assent to their adoption. Final passage, however, was delayed for at least three more years by the reluctance of three small states, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, to consent to ratification until some of the larger states, notably Virginia, had divested themselves of huge grants of western lands that had come into their possession. Understandably, the smaller states without such titles feared that the expansion of their neighbors into the West would be done at the expense of their own standing in the Confederation. When the Western lands were placed under the control of the Continental government, these

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smaller states voted their approval, and the Articles of Confederation were finally adopted in February, 1781.

There followed a period of about seven years under the Articles that has come to be known as a "critical period" in American history. Though historians once portrayed this era as a time of chaos and plunder due to the weakness of the central government under the Articles,⁷ more recent scholarship has asserted some more favorable claims on its behalf.⁸ A number of these have been summarized by Edmund Morgan.

Any serious student must acknowledge that under the Articles of Confederation the achievements of the United States were impressive. When the Articles were adopted, the country was at war for its existence. When they were abandoned, the war had been won, peace had been concluded on favorable terms, a post-war depression had been weathered successfully, and both population and national income were increasing.⁹

Such achievements, while in some ways considerable, were insufficient in the views of many to offset a number of serious weaknesses with the system. Of these criticisms, three deserve mention here. In the first place, the Articles gave no authority to the central government to regulate interstate and international commerce. As a result, many of the states had entered into commercial conflicts which produced a confusing system of tariffs, imposts, and duties which often varied as one moved from state to state. Second, it was charged that the Articles had rendered the nation vulnerable to foreign military attack.¹⁰ This criticism, as Jay articulated it in the Federalist, held that a powerful and consistent foreign policy was essential both to avoid accidental or capricious wars as well as to deter other nations from initiating them. As Jay put it, "it appears evident

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that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies."¹¹ And third, the national government under the Articles possessed no independent authority over individual citizens of the respective states; instead, it could deal only with the state governments themselves.¹² The most serious result of this, as I have said earlier, was that the national government could not generate financial support through the direct taxation of individuals but instead depended for its revenues upon the largess of the state governments. Frequently this was not forthcoming.

These criticisms were enough to move some men to urge a general reconsideration of the Articles of Confederation. The prelude to this came in 1786 with the meeting of what has come to be called the Annapolis Convention. At the invitation of the states of Maryland and Virginia, delegates from the other states gathered at Annapolis in an attempt to forge some stability in the commercial relationships between the states. Since only five states responded to the invitation, the meeting clearly failed of its original purpose. However, at this point one of the delegates, Alexander Hamilton, moved to call another convention, this time in Philadelphia, with the purpose not of merely resolving trade disputes but of entering into a general reconsideration of the Articles themselves. This proposal ran directly counter to a clause in the Articles which stated clearly that any alteration in the Articles must gain the approval of both Congress and the legislatures of every state. Nevertheless, Hamilton's move was adopted, and with

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this maneuver the advocates of change hit upon a plan of strengthening the national government without running the gauntlet of the state legislatures.

The Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in May 1787 and during its course was attended at one time or another by fifty-five delegates. Among the states, only Rhode Island refused to participate. Though diverse in many ways, the delegates to the Convention were nearly unanimous on one question: almost all favored a strengthening of the national government. According to John Roche, there was little ideological conflict among the delegates since almost all had come to Philadelphia with the intention of constructing a more formidable national authority.¹³ On his view, even the rift between advocates of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans was not premised upon a division between nationalists and states rightists but instead upon a tactical question of representation. The delegates from the smaller states were not questioning the legitimacy of national authority but wanted primarily to arrive at a solution that had a chance of being accepted back home. The litmus test of the states-rights position involved the acceptance of the proposition that "the central government had as its constituents the states, not the people, and could only reach the people through the agency of state government."¹⁴ Despite the volume of compromises in the Convention which produced a federal as opposed to a purely national system, nearly all of the delegates in attendance were nationalists in the sense that they rejected this proposition. This kind of consensus facilitated their task of grinding out a document

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that was consistent with their desire for a strengthened central authority at the same time that it stood a fair chance of gaining approval back in the states.

The likelihood of the latter was considerably increased by the provisions for ratification that the delegates appended to the document when it was finally agreed upon in September, 1787. Instead of seeking to gain the required approval of the thirteen state legislatures, as the Articles of Confederation required for any proposed alteration, the supporters of the new system proposed to seek the approval of the individual citizens themselves. This was accomplished by calling for special elections to choose delegates to constitutional conventions in each state. Thus the proposed Constitution directed that: "The ratification of the Conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." There were two tactical reasons for this maneuver. First, by placing the decision to ratify in the hands of specially elected conventions, they thereby steered clear of the politicians in the state legislatures who were considered to have personal interests in the old system. Second, by making ratification contingent upon the assent of only nine of the thirteen states, they removed the possibility that a few recalcitrant states, such as Rhode Island, could successfully impede the preferences of a majority of the other states. Besides these tactical dimensions to their strategy, the plan was attractive because it could be expected to contribute to the legitimacy of the new regime. If the national government

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proposed to deal directly with citizens in their individual capacities rather than simply with state governments, its future legitimacy depended in some measure upon gaining the consent of those over whom it would govern. Hence, the process that was chosen for ratification facilitated both the acceptance and, given this, the survival of the proposed system.

Ratification proceeded swiftly, if not always smoothly. All told, the process lasted some ten months, from September, 1787 when the Constitution was first presented to the states, to July, 1788 when ratification was finally assured. However, the criticism that was precluded by the consensus at Philadelphia was forthcoming as soon as the contents of the proposed system became public knowledge. The old system still had its share of supporters, and they were led to oppose the ratification of the national system, which they did with vehemence and with considerably more strength than the results of the contest would at first glance indicate.¹⁵ Such critics of the Constitution were quickly called Antifederalists by its supporters--who for themselves adopted the name "Federalists." Despite this burst of criticism, however, the Federalists had by far the best of the contest from the beginning. By January, four states had given their approval to the Constitution by overwhelming margins, and in three of these states (New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia) the count was unanimous among delegates to the conventions. In February, the Federalists won a close struggle in the key state of Massachusetts, and from that point their movement gained momentum. In June, the ninth state,

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New Hampshire, voted for ratification, and the two remaining states, Virginia and New York, faced with isolation, quickly fell into line. Of the thirteen states, only Rhode Island and North Carolina refused to ratify by the middle of 1788. However, the difficulties of remaining outside the system led them to reconsider, and by 1790 both had voted their acceptances.

What kinds of considerations served to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists? And what was the relationship between the ratification and the sequence of events that led up to it? As I indicated earlier, these questions continue to be matters of intellectual controversy, and will no doubt remain so in the future. As the symbol of American nationalism, the meaning of the Constitution has shifted with changing political tides. Accordingly, the literature on the subject is graced by a variety of explanations, most of which for a number of reasons cannot be considered here. Some of these, though at different times highly influential, have proven to be incapable of serious examination. The nineteenth century notion of the Founding Fathers as acting under the guidance of divine inspiration clearly falls into this category. Others, while essentially accurate as far as they go, have tended to invoke considerations of insufficient breadth to offer acceptable comprehensive accounts of the problem. One such interpretation that comes to mind is William Riker's argument that the supporters of the national system were driven primarily by their concern over American diplomatic and military vulnerability under the Articles of Confederation. Such considerations lead us to restrict our attention to a

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discussion of two influential interpretations of this case. Both of these may be said to offer comprehensive yet rational and empirical approaches to the problems of political change and the Constitution. These approaches will consist of, first, the argument inspired by the work of Charles A. Beard, who focused upon the reputed economic cleavages between Federalists and Antifederalists and, second, an explanation, pieced together by a number of writers, which emphasizes the differential impact of nationalism upon these two groups.¹⁷ It will be the goal of the following discussion to show how the theoretical approach that we outlined in the previous chapter can be reconciled with these broader interpretations of the conflict.

One Analytical Perspective: "An Economic
Interpretation of the Consitution"

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Constitution represented the central symbol around which the entire American political culture revolved. Though this was a period which witnessed, first, a divisive sectional conflict which resulted in civil war and, second, a growing class conflict brought on by the coming of industrialization, the Constitution remained at most times above the battle. Indeed, when conflicts did emerge, they were not fought out over the Constitution itself but over who articulated its true meaning. In a culture with its share of social and political cleavages, the myth surrounding the Constitution helped to provide the degree of consensus needed to maintain some measure of political stability.

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This outlook toward the Constitution could not have helped but to rub off on the framers of the document, who themselves came to be regarded with veneration. Washington, of course, quickly became a hero, a charismatic figure in his own lifetime. He, along with perhaps Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson, developed as time passed a symbolic dimension to which partisans regularly appealed, but to which they usually attached different meanings.¹⁸ The notion of the Founding Fathers as wise and disinterested sages was not held simply by unthinking nationalists but was also reinforced by the writings of a number of historians as well. Before the Civil War, the historian George Bancroft wrote of democracy and the Constitution as the works of divinely inspired leaders.¹⁹ After the war in a period of increasing nationalism, John Fiske set forth the then definitive interpretation of the emergence of the Constitution which held that a group of high-minded and disinterested statesmen came together in Philadelphia to lead the new nation out of a period of chaos and into an era which was bound to see her destiny fulfilled.²⁰ Despite the shifting political circumstances of the nineteenth century, the symbolism surrounding the Founding Fathers survived it intact.

There are, of course, those today who still find such a view plausible. However that may be, it came under serious attack as a scholarly position around the turn of the century with the rise of what has come to be called the Progressive movement. The sources of Progressivism were varied and the movement fought for reform on a variety of political fronts, but according to some historians

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it was held together by a distinctive outlook among its followers, or what may be called a Progressive "mind." For Morton White, the Progressives were united in their revolt against the excessive formalism of nineteenth century thinking or, in other words, against a view of social and political life which located truth in a set of abstract standards rather than in experience. Thus, according to White:

They [the Progressives] are all suspicious of approaches which are excessively formal; they all protest their anxiety to come to grips with reality, their attachment to the moving and the vital in social life.²¹

It was this anxiety to come to grips with "reality" that emerged as the dominant theme of the Progressive orientation. Reality, however, was not simply associated with experience but with a particular kind of experience which reflected the pervasive cynicism of social life. For the Progressive, reality was the bribe or the kickback and consisted, in Richard Hofstadter's words, of "a series of unspeakable plots, personal iniquities, and moral failures" which had come to dominate the whole of American life.²² The air of respectability which enshrouded social institutions was in the end only a facade which, once torn away, exposed the machinations of petty and self-interested men.

The time was obviously ripe for the de-mythologizing of the Founding Fathers. Given the perspective of the Progressive mind, the older view of the Constitution as the product of disinterested statesmanship appeared not only excessively formalistic but also too naive to be accepted without serious reservation. Moreover, the traditional notion, since it viewed the framers and their works with

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such veneration, tended to focus upon the Constitution as something that was essentially immutable, and therefore not subject to serious change. The Progressives, of course, were interested in reform, and their attacks on this conception reflected their impatience not only with intellectual formalism but with the status quo as well. In groping for a less formalistic view of American institutions, Progressive scholars were led to formulate an alternative explanation for their origins.

One of the early works of the Progressive genre was J. Allen Smith's The Spirit of American Government, first published in 1907. The burden of Smith's argument rested on the claim that the Constitution, rather than being inspired by a search for good government, was in fact a product of an anti-democratic reaction against the egalitarian spirit of the Revolution. His suggestion was that the framers were motivated largely by their hostility to majority rule, an hostility that was in part a reflection of their economic interests. Thus, he argued near the end of his book:

It may be stated without exaggeration that the American scheme of Government was planned and set up to perpetuate the ascendancy of the property holding class in a society leavened with democratic ideas. Those who feared it were fully alive to the fact that their economic advantages could be retained only by maintaining their class ascendancy in the government.²³

Curiously, the contention that the Constitution did not facilitate majority rule was not a proposition that was widely contested at the time of Smith's writing; indeed, the previous generation of historians accepted it both on factual and normative grounds. What was new was Smith's claim that the goal of a democratic society

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could not be attained within the strictures of present institutions. Clearly, either those institutions or the democratic aspirations of the American public would have to be seriously modified, and, like most Progressives, Smith preferred that it would be the former.

Smith did not rigorously pursue his allusion to the economic motives of the framers, so his work can only be considered to be preparatory to the full-blown economic interpretation of the Constitution that later came to be regarded as the distinctive intellectual contribution of the Progressive movement. However, his hypothesis that the Constitution represented a reaction to the Revolution instead of an outgrowth of it became one of the principle articles of the Progressive interpretation of the American past.

The fullest statement of the economic interpretation, however, was put forward some years later by one of Smith's contemporaries, Charles A. Beard in his An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). Beard's achievement was notable not only for the substantive argument that he developed but also for the kind of analysis that it represented. Since the mere suggestion of bad faith or self-interest on the parts of the framers was considered outrageous at the time, Beard felt compelled to preface his argument with a justification for an economic approach to political institutions. Earlier approaches, he argued, vacillated between two equally undesirable poles: either they located the sources of institutions in abstract notions such as divine inspiration or the march of history, or, on the other hand, they were content to impartially collect and set forth the relevant facts of

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a particular case. Where the first was abstract and therefore not subject to rational examination, the second was regarded as mere "story-telling." What was needed according to Beard was an orientation that located the sources of political events and institutions in concrete experiences but which at the same time offered explanations (i.e., interpretations) for these events instead just narrative accounts. In other words, what was needed was a type of analysis that satisfied the requirements of scientific explanation and which could thereby appeal to a generation of scholars whose view of social and political life had been influenced by the intellectual claims of pragmatism and instrumentalism. In order to meet such requirements, Beard began to focus upon what he called the economic bases of politics.

In employing such an approach, Beard was clearly drawing upon the writings of a number of influential predecessors, and he was quick to acknowledge the influences of Turner in history, Pound and Holmes in jurisprudence and, in addition, the writings of the European socialist, Ferdinand La Salle. Curiously, one can find no mention of the name of Marx in the original version of Beard's book. The influences of the above, however, were reinforced and, in Beard's mind, overshadowed by the political thinking of one of the framers themselves, James Madison, whose Federalist No. 10 developed an argument which related political conflict to the unequal distribution of property. For Beard, this essay represented a "masterful statement of the theory of economic determinism in politics."²⁴ And, just as importantly, since it came from the pen

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Beard's argument vacillated throughout between two different levels of analysis and generalization. His purpose as he stated it near the beginning of his work was not to offer a definitive account but only to lay the groundwork for future research on the problem. The purported introductory nature of his inquiry along with the assumptions of the economic approach led him to focus upon broad cleavages between social and economic groups. His aim was therefore to discover:

What classes and social groups existed in the United States just previous to the adoption of the Constitution and which of them, from the nature of their property, might have been expected to benefit immediately and definitely by the overthrowing of the old system and the establishment of the new. On the other hand, it must be discovered which of them might have expected more beneficial immediate results . . . from the maintenance of existing legal arrangements.²⁵

In other words, Beard was on the one hand attempting to define what in Selznick's terms we might call the social bases of these distinct sets of institutions. Such a strategy could easily have been reconciled with Madison's pronouncements in The Federalist, for what Beard said he was going to undertake was an examination of the diverse factions existing in American society at the time in order to discover the basis of the conflict over the Constitution. With the problem so stated there was no notion of conspiracy or petty selfishness, only an assumption to the effect that people adopt values that are congruent with their economic positions in society.

The basic economic cleavage to which Beard pointed was, in his terminology, one between owners of "personalty," or capital of

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various kinds, and owners of "realty," or land. It will be noticed that this was not so much a division between the rich and poor as it was a conflict between different types of property, that is, between industry and agriculture. Among owners of personalty he included not only traders and manufacturers but also slaveowners and holders of depreciated continental securities. On the other hand, owners of realty consisted of a small group of large land owners and a large and (according to Beard) homogeneous class of small farmers and urban dwellers. A large share of this latter group were considered to be debtors. On the basis of this rough economic cleavage, Beard suggested that the movement for the Constitution was led and supported by holders of personalty who were concerned to see a national government created with sufficient authority that would enable it to regulate and therefore to stabilize trade between states, to place limitations upon the ability of state legislatures to undermine legitimate debts and contracts, and to levy taxes to a degree sufficient to allow it to fund the public debt and to repay those who had invested in war-time securities. Opposed to this movement were those whose income was based upon the land since a political change of this kind could not be expected to influence the value of such a commodity. More importantly, however, Beard regarded landowners in general as a debt-ridden group that was heavily advantaged by the then inflated currencies and the hostility of legislatures to creditors. Hence, Beard was suggesting that the economic division between industry and agriculture was reinforced by the age-old clash between creditor and debtor.

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However, Beard went about testing these propositions in two different ways, a strategy which as I shall point out in a moment, accounts for his vacillation between levels of analysis. One method was to argue his case from a macro or social level of analysis, in which case he would emphasize the behavior of economic groups as opposed to specific individuals within those groups. Here, relying mainly upon such secondary sources as Libby,²⁶ Grigsby,²⁷ and Harding,²⁸ as well as a number of lesser known state histories, he attempted to demonstrate that those geographic areas that were distinguished by the greatest concentration of commercial activity were the most likely to support the proposed Constitution, while those areas dominated by small landowners and agriculture were most likely to be Antifederalist.²⁹ Though most of the evidence that Beard marshalled here was of a secondary nature, he deemed it conclusive enough to warrant the conclusion that the support for the new system came primarily from those economic groups whose income was based upon personalty of one kind or another.

The notoriety of Beard's argument, however, has stemmed more from what he had to say about specific individuals rather than about socio-economic groups. In particular, he allocated a sizeable portion of his work to demonstrating that the framers of the Constitution (i.e., those who were members of the Philadelphia convention) could have expected to realize immediate economic advantages as a result of their deliberations. Here, Beard's argument took a decidedly different direction. The argument was no longer based upon cleavages between economic groups or between their representatives

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but rather upon the immediate economic interests of Federalist leaders. To prove this dimension of his thesis, Beard relied upon his own research, drawing upon a set of old treasury records. According to Beard, such records showed that a large proportion of the members of the Philadelphia convention held public securities which would greatly increase in value with the creation of the proposed national system. In addition, most of the others were owners of personalty of one kind or another, the value of which was likewise expected to increase with the ratification of the new system.³⁰

These findings were summarized by the following conclusion:

The members of the Philadelphia convention which drafted the Constitution were, with few exceptions, immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from the establishment of the new system.³¹

His thesis thus possessed two distinct dimensions, invoking at some times the claim that the political conflict over the Constitution was based upon cleavages between broad economic groups, but suggesting at others that the leaders of the Federalist side were motivated by the lure of direct and immediate personal gain. Though many focused their attention on the second aspect of the argument, seeing in it either an attempt to slur the Founding Fathers or simply as an account of the operation of another vested interest, Beard himself eventually came to repudiate it and was prepared to rest his case exclusively upon his initial proposition of group conflict.³²

Despite the antipathy with which Beard's work was initially greeted, it came in time to be regarded as the definitive account of the ratification of the Constitution. In addition, it helped to set

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the terms for the Progressive interpretation of the entire sweep of American political history. The conflict between agriculture and capital to which Beard pointed in his study of the Constitution was a theme that ran through the works of others of the Progressive persuasion, among them, Turner, Smith, Vernon L. Parrington, and Merrill Jensen. In these cases, the favored party was invariably agrarianism, since it was associated in Jeffersonian fashion with democracy, egalitarianism, and individualism. Thus, when Beard demonstrated that small farmers were opposed to the national system, he also took pains to show that the supporters of that system were hostile to majority rule, and were in fact attempting to restrict it. Beard's claims about the economic interests behind the Constitution therefore merged with Smith's claims about its underlying political purposes, since it was assumed that the interests of commerce (i.e., personalty) were antithetical to the interests of democracy. Because this view of the Constitution fit so neatly with the Progressive outlook toward the whole of American society and its past, it proved to be difficult for critics to penetrate until the entire edifice of the Progressive orientation itself was challenged, and this was not forthcoming until several decades after the appearance of Beard's work. Progressive scholarship survived the demise of Progressivism itself and even gained new adherents during the 1930's when economic depression and the New Deal served to reinforce the theme of economic conflict. It was not until the post-war period that the assumptions behind the Progressive interpretation were challenged, and along with them the Beard thesis itself.

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One of the first pillars of the Beard thesis to be placed under scholarly attack was his version of the economic approach and, in particular, his contention that it was derived from Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10. According to Morton White, there was a substantial gulf between Madison's and Beard's positions on this question. Specifically, White points out that each attributed the origins of economic conflict to different sources: where for Madison it was seen to be an inherent aspect of human nature, for Beard it was understood as the product of specific economic systems.³³ On this ground, White argues, Beard was closer to Marx than to Madison. Douglas Adair has concurred in this assessment, arguing that Beard invoked Madison only to make a quasi-Marxist argument appear more palatable to his American readership.³⁴ Indeed, Beard's restatement of Madison's theory emphasized only its economic dimension, and omitted entirely any mention of Madison's catalogue of the non-economic sources of faction, such as religion and opinions concerning government.³⁵ Actually, however, Beard could not have been much of a Marxist either, or he would not have felt the need to go into such meticulous detail about the economic holdings of specific individuals, but instead would have concentrated exclusively upon the interests and ideologies of economic classes. Beard's view was thus neither Madisonian nor Marxist, but rather that of the Progressive, aware that economic interests influence political decisions, but inclined to believe that such decisions reflect the personal interests of individuals rather than the loose and often subtle operation of classes.

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Such criticisms of Beard's approach have been paralleled in recent years by a series of scholarly attacks upon Beard's substantive argument. One of the earliest of these was engineered by Robert Brown, in a work whose entire purpose was to dispute Beard's thesis.³⁶ After retracing much of Beard's research, Brown drew the conclusion that the economic conflict that he had portrayed was simply an exaggerated version of what actually had happened. Among the delegates to the Philadelphia convention, Brown found no consistent pattern of property-holding that accorded with Beard's conclusions; indeed, according to his tally, owners of realty greatly outnumbered holders of personalty in the convention.³⁷ With regard to the public at large, the reputed division between capital and land was even less tenable. Contrary to Beard's claims, farmers were not a class of debtors and they therefore had no serious economic reason for opposing the Constitution. In fact, farmers supported the new system in large numbers; if they had not, it could never have been ratified, since small farmers constituted an overwhelming proportion of the population at the time. Moreover, Brown rejected the view that the Constitution was put over by undemocratic means: though relatively few voted (about one in six), most adult males nevertheless had the opportunity to do so. The degree to which they did not vote merely suggests the extent to which people were not aroused over the matter. In sum, Brown argued that Beard's argument grossly exaggerated the degree of economic conflict existing in American society in 1788. For Brown, such conflict was believed to be at a minimum. Thus, he suggested that an alternative explanation could be built around

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the assumption that America in the 1780's was a consensual polity, dominated by a large number of middle-class property owners who were in basic agreement in their economic outlooks.

In his criticisms of Beard, though not in his suggestions for an alternative approach, Brown's work has been reinforced by the results of a number of case studies of the ratification process in individual states. These studies of Virginia,³⁸ Maryland,³⁹ North Carolina,⁴⁰ and New Jersey⁴¹ represented an improvement over Beard's earlier analysis in at least two ways. First, where Beard was more concerned with discerning the economic interests of the delegates to the Philadelphia convention, these studies entered into more thorough analyses of the property holdings of the delegates to the various state conventions. Second, these studies did not restrict their attention to Federalist delegates, as Beard had done for the most part, but they also examined the holdings of Antifederalists as well. Their conclusions were in agreement with Beard's on at least one point: Federalists tended to come from the economically advantaged strata of society. However, the same was found to be true of Antifederalists as well. Moreover, there was no significant division between the holders of personalty and realty; the leadership of both sides held similar kinds as well as amounts of property. If the results of these studies are to be believed, economic elites divided among themselves over the issue of the Constitution. In concluding his study of Virginia, Thomas summarized this theme:

The leaders of both parties were recruited from the same class, and the conflict over the ratification of the Federal Constitution in Virginia was essentially a struggle between competing groups within the aristocracy.⁴²

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Similarly, Philip Crowl drew a parallel conclusion about Maryland:

The significance of the party split in Maryland lies in the fact that it was an internecine war waged within a single, small, and wealthy ruling class.⁴³

According to these studies, then, the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists, at least in those states mentioned above, was not a struggle between different types of property, nor did it involve a division between the supporters of democracy and its opponents. Rather, it was a split among the economic leaders in each state.

Though these studies did not reject the economic approach entirely, they did suggest that the Beardian version of it was not very useful. Such a conclusion was subsequently placed upon a more conclusive footing by the work of Forrest McDonald, who attempted to test Beard's thesis through a close examination of the economic holdings of the numerous delegates to the thirteen state conventions.⁴⁴ He likewise found that in both national and state conventions, the concepts of personalty and realty did not serve to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists. However, McDonald was not prepared to abandon an economic approach to the matter. Beard's problem, he pointed out, was that he attempted to account for the split over the Constitution in terms of categories that were uniform across states or, in other words, in terms of a national cleavage. McDonald suggested that the problem was clarified if it was viewed from a state-to-state perspective. Economic issues did not have the same impact in every state; instead, they took on a

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different character depending upon the economic and political conditions of the state. For example, agrarian concerns were important in many places, but they were overshadowed in Georgia, a farming state, by the threat of an Indian war and by the hope that a national government could offer military protection against such a threat. Other of the weaker states, especially New Jersey and Delaware, viewed the new system from a similar point of view. On the other hand, states that were more economically self-sufficient, such as New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, ratified only after bitter contests, since it was believed by many in these states that they could survive independently. Similarly, the issue of the public debt was looked at differently from state to state, depending upon the economic burden that it represented. The size of the debt varied from state to state and so did the ability to pay it. In those states in which it constituted a sizeable burden, such as in New Jersey, a national government that would fund state debts was naturally looked upon with great support. In other states, however, the burden of the debt was small, and in such states, therefore, it was not a powerful issue in the campaign. Thus, according to McDonald, the important variable in any state's decision was the degree to which it was economically self-sufficient.

In short, those states that had done well on their own were inclined to desire to continue on their own, and those that found it difficult to survive independently were inclined to desire to cast their several lots with a general government.⁴⁵

McDonald's argument was still focused upon economic considerations, but it nevertheless tore away at the Beardian claim that the conflict

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was based upon cleavages that worked across state lines. Rather, the economic sources of the dispute were diffuse and were often based upon considerations that were endemic to particular states and localities. Beard erred, in McDonald's view, in that he did not recognize the pluralistic character of the split between Federalists and Antifederalists.

Most of the above criticisms, in one way or another, have chipped away at Beard's dualism between personalty and realty. In recent years, such criticisms have been complemented by objections to another of the Progressive dualisms, namely, that between democratic and elite rule. According to this view, put forward both by Smith and Beard, democracy found its strongest supporters on the land, among small farmers and property-holders, but was frustrated by commercial interests which sought to maintain their privileged status by frustrating the power of majorities. As an extension of the personalty versus realty theme, it was argued that since the Constitution frustrated democratic rule, the objections of the Antifederalists must have been based upon their commitment to democracy. For Beard, this was firmly demonstrated by his finding that the future leaders of the Jeffersonian party were recruited from the ranks of those who had earlier been opposed to the Constitution. On the other hand, those who had once been supporters of the new system tended to join the less democratically inclined Federalist party.⁴⁷

Such a view has, however, been thrown into question by a recent study of the Antifederalists which portrayed them as being more hostile in many ways to democracy than their reputedly

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undemocratic opponents.⁴⁸ What the Antifederalists feared most about the new system was not the threat of elite rule but the likelihood that national authority would not be responsive to purely local interests. This is to say that they were suspicious of political power that was not closely linked to the local political arena. So long as political power was detached from local units of government, it did not matter whether it was controlled by elites or by democratic majorities. The question, as Kenyon points out, was largely one of the location of political authority:

The fundamental issue over which Federalists and Antifederalists split was the question whether republican government could be extended to embrace a nation, or whether it must be limited to the comparatively small political and geographic units which the separate American states then constituted. The Antifederalists took the latter view; and in a sense they were the conservatives of 1787, and their opponents the radicals.⁴⁹

Kenyon thus suggests that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists turned in part upon their views toward change and upon their orientations to national and local institutions. In other words, Antifederalists diverged from their opponents in that they were unable to conceive of a set of interests beyond the state or local levels that could be represented by national institutions.

Kenyon's argument here represented a powerful criticism of the entire Progressive view of the Constitution, for it suggested that Beard, Smith, and their contemporaries were simply asking the wrong questions. The basic issues of the time did not revolve around the desirability of majority rule nor around the legitimacy of property rights. Rather, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, "the central issue . . . was whether the American union should

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become a national state."⁵⁰ If this was indeed the case, the differential impact of nationalism might well have played an important role in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists. When we approach the problem from this angle, other problems also take on a different color. Foremost among these is the Revolution, and its link to the development of national institutions. Contemporary studies of revolution in a number of settings have invariably found that nationalism is a direct outgrowth of revolutionary experiences and of the demands for cooperation that revolutions bring into being.⁵¹ A similar development may have occurred in the United States and, indeed, such a case has been advanced by a number of other writers. In casting about for an alternative approach to the much criticized Beardian view, the concept of nationalism appears to be a suggestive place to begin. In the next section we shall consider some arguments that may be employed to reinforce such an approach and, after that, indicate how it bears upon the theory based upon political careers that was developed in the preceding chapter.

An Alternative Approach: The United States as a New Nation

The body of literature that we have just surveyed indicates that Beard's thesis, despite the extensive criticisms, has survived in at least one important sense. That is, the economic framework that he elaborated succeeded in setting the terms for the subsequent debate over the problem of the Constitution. Thus, the argument over the matter has consistently revolved around the economic

interests of those involved in the conflict and whether or not Beard had gotten them straight. Among the greater share of Beard's critics, much more effort has gone into repudiating his findings than into suggesting an acceptable alternative to his argument. McDonald's work represents an exception to this rule, though it will be remembered that, while he disputed Beard, he was nevertheless involved in locating what he considered to be the real economic origins of the Constitution. Hence, despite the criticisms, Beard's approach has still retained its paramount status, for as Louis Hartz pointed out some years ago, "you merely demonstrate your subservience to a thinker when you spend your time attempting to disprove him."⁵²

Hartz's observation suggests that the only way to move beyond a thesis like this is to formulate an alternative approach that invokes entirely different categories of analysis. Hartz has suggested that the Progressive focus upon economic interests may be supplanted by a set of categories that relates American experiences to those of other nations. Though the Progressive outlook was worldly in the sense that it searched for the economic bases of politics, it was nevertheless parochial in the sense that it viewed America from the "inside."⁵³ For Hartz, the American experience takes on an entirely different dimension when it is looked at from a European perspective. From this view it immediately becomes apparent that the United States has lacked a feudal background and has therefore been spared the sharp class cleavages that emerged from that system as it was found in Europe. As a result, American society has always been bourgeois and, accordingly, it has also been thoroughly liberal. Such a social consensus

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has meant that whenever conflict has appeared in the United States it has generally been between parties that were essentially agreed on fundamental values. Since the Progressives looked at American society in a vacuum, they grossly exaggerated the degree and the importance of the economic conflict that they saw. In the case of the Constitution, the Progressives could view the Federalists as reactionaries against the ideas of democracy and revolution only because they could not understand what a real reactionary was; had they been able to compare Madison with Maistre they would have quickly understood the difference.⁵⁴ This points to the virtue of a comparative approach which, as Hartz sees it, is that by placing American events in a cross-national perspective, it allows us to see the distinctive character that such events assume in an American context.

In recent years, however, others have adopted the comparative approach that Hartz has suggested but, contrary to his conclusions, have proceeded to draw a wide range of parallels between the United States and other nations, especially those that have only recently gained their independence. Among them, William Nisbet Chambers has attempted to use the United States as a model of political party development, demonstrating that the emergence of a national party system in the United States had to first overcome obstacles similar to those confronted by emerging nations today.⁵⁵ Included among such problems were the creation of a national identity, the building of institutions that were national in scope, the development of a national economy, and the recruitment of elites to staff national leadership positions. In the United States, such problems were

resolved in stages over time, and Chambers suggests that a clear, though at times bitterly contested, path can be traced from the Revolution, which contributed to the growth of a national identity, to the ratification of the Constitution, which established a framework of national institutions, to the emergence of the party system which mobilized a national electorate within more or less stable political organizations. In terms of Chambers' analysis, these stages represented distinctive chapters in the process of nation-building in the United States.

Chambers' theme has recently been developed further by the work of Seymour Lipset, who has argued that since the United States was the first colonial possession to gain its independence through revolution, "it may properly claim the title of the first new nation."⁵⁶ On his view, the struggle that the United States passed through nearly two centuries ago in achieving national independence is now being duplicated in the modern period by a host of new nations in the non-Western parts of the world. As 'new' nations, all share a similar national identity which, as Lipset says, "is linked to revolutionary, egalitarian, and anti-imperialist ideas."⁵⁷ Moreover, their very newness has meant that the problem of generating legitimacy for new authorities could not be resolved on the basis of appeals to traditional values but had instead to be accomplished through the medium of charismatic leaders. For Lipset, Washington filled such a role in the United States, just as in newer states it has been filled by such nationalist leaders as Ghandi and Lenin, among others. Further, all have faced the problem of establishing

stable national institutions to serve as the political basis for unification. Generally, the most severe challenges to such institutions have come from the adherents of localism, who have little conception of a national identity and who therefore tend to oppose the intrusion of new institutions into areas which have heretofore been matters of local control. Though Lipset does not mean to imply that contemporary new nations will follow paths similar to the United States,⁵⁸ his argument does suggest that, in functional terms anyway, they will encounter analogous problems in the process of development. Far from being unique, then, the early American experience is viewed by Lipset as providing a paradigm for the development of the modern national state.

If Chambers and Lipset are correct in these general claims, the ratification of the Constitution in the United States can be understood as part of a process of nation-building and, accordingly, can be viewed as an indicator of the growth of nationalism among the citizens of the thirteen states. Though nationalism is a slippery concept which is said to possess a host of different dimensions, Kelman has pointed out that one of its most important aspects is institutional. Thus he argues that it often involves the belief among members of relatively separate political units that they are linked by interests that can be represented by more comprehensive (i.e., national) political institutions.⁵⁹ The above framework of analysis proposed by Lipset and Chambers has led a number of writers to ask whether the growth of nationalism and national institutions

in the United States were associated with factors similar to those that have accounted for such developments in other areas.

To this question there have been a number of answers, most of which, however, reinforce the parallel suggested by Chambers and Lipset between the United States and the growth of new nations in general. Deutsch has argued that the growth of such nations follows a uniform pattern of development, the central feature of which is the general social mobilization of the population through the emergence of basic communications grids, urbanization, and the rise of a modern exchange economy.⁶⁰ The importance of such factors is that they greatly increase the contacts between peoples with already similar outlooks, and thus reinforce the demand for political unification under national institutions. Merritt has attempted to apply one of Deutsch's propositions--that relating communications to nationalism--to the American colonies in the eighteenth century.⁶¹ According to Merritt in his study of colonial newspapers, the rise of the independence movement in America was accompanied by a growing consciousness among colonists of a national identity that linked one colony to another. As time passed during the pre-revolutionary period, such an awareness was buttressed by the increased attention given to symbols of American unity by the colonial press, which at that time was the basic medium of communications. Thus for Merritt, as for Deutsch, the emergence of nationalism in the American colonies followed a pattern similar to that found in other places.

In addition to the influences of communications, the development of the national idea in the United States was also

given momentum, as Curtis Nettels suggests, by the emergence of a national economy after the year 1775.⁶² This development not only had the effect of increasing contacts between the colonies but also of requiring the formulation of a common set of regulations to govern such exchanges. Indeed, for Nettels, the Constitution was a logical outgrowth of the need for national political institutions to accompany an emergent national economic system.⁶³ However, Nettels argues that the prime mover for this entire process was the Revolution, for military success against the British required a large measure of economic cooperation between the colonies, which required in turn the formulation of consistent national policies. The conclusion of the Revolution, however, did not bring to an end the pressures for such cooperation; indeed, such pressures increased as the American economy continued to expand in the subsequent years.

Nettels' suggestion of a link between the Revolution and the development of national institutions in the United States has been given additional credibility by contemporary theories of the process of nation-building. Many of these have emphasized the symbolic importance of revolution as a condition for the development of national institutions.⁶⁴ Insofar as they are directed at expelling foreign authority, of course, revolutions achieve the minimum condition for national unification, namely, political independence. In addition to this, however, revolution helps to overcome a persistent tendency to localism which is often found in newer states. As Kornhauser points out, the process of revolution itself augments

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the bonds of nationalism and thus helps to prepare the way for unification under national institutions.

Of major importance in the genesis of political independence is the emergence of a collective sense of belonging together against what comes to be perceived as alien authority . . . [But] the very process of rebelling often contributes to the development of a new political identity. During the course of the struggle, rebels forge new bonds and symbols of unity.⁶⁵

Thus, Kornhauser observes that the common outcome of revolution, and especially of those that are directed against colonial control, is the consciousness of nationalism among those who are closely associated with it. Accordingly, such revolutions also have the effect of spurring the growth of national institutions which usually succeed in centralizing political authority. Applied to the American experience, of course, this generalization clearly states what had been implicit in Lipset's parallel between the United States and 'new' nations--namely, that the Constitution can be considered a product of the Revolution instead of a reaction against it. On this view, the telling aspect of the Revolution was not its implications for majority rule but rather that it led to a measure of political centralization under a national regime. Hence, as Hannah Arendt has argued in giving support to this view of the matter, the link between the two events consisted in the fact that "the Constitution finally consolidated the power of the Revolution and . . . was thus the true culmination of the revolutionary process."⁶⁶

The above considerations lead us to advance the hypothesis that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was based, in part, upon their differing perceptions of nationalism and national

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institutions. In other words, the suggestion is that Federalists were distinctive in that they entertained a conception of American affairs that was national in scope, and that such a conception was not apparent to Antifederalists. Thus, the former were more inclined to propose innovations that served to expand the role of national institutions. We do not mean to suggest, however, that this difference was due to the intelligence or the breadth of vision of those who supported the Constitution, but rather that each side was subject to experiences that generated in them contrasting views of national, state, and local institutions. Perhaps, as Deutsch's theory would predict, Federalists supporters were recruited from more highly mobilized strata of the population or, alternatively, they may have experienced the Revolution in a manner different from their opponents. Though such propositions lack solid empirical backing, Forrest McDonald has alluded in an indirect fashion to their plausibility. Supporters of the Federalist side, he claims, tended to be those who, "irrespective of occupation, wealth, education, or station in life, came into daily contact with persons and news and ideas from other states and, indeed, from Europe as well."⁶⁷ Such experiences, as one might expect, were closely associated with urbanization and, hence, with a highly mobilized style of life relative to other settings at the time. Curiously, Beard's claim of an urban versus rural split over the Constitution is consistent with this kind of explanation. If a national orientation was reflected in support for the Federalist side and such an orientation was strongest in highly mobilized areas such as cities, then support for Federalists would logically be

expected to come from more urbanized areas, while opposition would be forthcoming from rural or less highly mobilized settings. Hence, this approach suggests that Beard may have been in part correct, though for the wrong reasons.

Among political elites, however, such social and economic sources of their different outlooks, while important, may at times have been overshadowed by considerations that distinguished them as leaders. In discussing political leadership in new states, Edward Shils emphasizes the importance of professionalism and careerist orientations among elites.

It is not the flash of enthusiasm but persistently sustained exertion that is the prerequisite of national development--not just because such exertion may be a moral virtue in itself, but because it is required by the complex undertakings which are on the program of modernization. Persistently sustained exertion is a function of attachment to a task, to the norms which govern its performance, and to the role in which the norms are embedded.⁶⁸

Shils' emphasis upon the "persistently sustained exertion" on the parts of leaders seems to me to be just another way of stressing the importance of commitments to political careers. Thus, his argument suggests that the eventual development of political institutions depends upon the appearance of stable political careers which can serve as bases for enduring commitments to these institutions.⁶⁹ The more that one's career is tied to such institutions, the more likely one will be to adopt values and to make decisions which have the effects of strengthening both the institutions and therefore career opportunities. According to Shils, then, national development depends in part upon the creation of institutions that are capable of, first, recruiting a capable leadership and, second,

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returning benefits sufficient to maintain it over the long haul. On the other hand, institutions not only inspire careers but at times they also frustrate them. As Wellhoffer and Hennessey have pointed out, those whose aspirations are blunted by such institutions are likely to represent sources of schisms or of opposition to them.⁷⁰

Shils' emphasis upon the importance of a professionally minded elite for the development of institutions is buttressed to some degree by the observations of those who have studied the growth of national institutions in the United States. Lamb, for example, argues that the eventual success of these institutions depended upon the creation of a national elite whose experiences and careers grew over time to be associated with national institutions. As Lamb observes:

To form a new American nation-state separate from Great Britain, a new national elite had to come together, and in turn it had to organize the political, economic, and social institutions of a new nation. This process was generated by the Revolutionary War, and channeled by the Continental Congress which first brought together in Philadelphia in 1774 representatives of the elites from all thirteen of the colonies.⁷¹

Lamb's suggestion that national institutions in the United States developed around a nationally-centered elite parallels Selznick's earlier argument that change and development in organizations depend upon the recruitment of a homogeneous leadership staff or, in his words, an institutional core. Selznick argues, we recall, that the cohesiveness of such leadership staffs often depends upon their recollections of shared experiences which in their minds gives their organization a special identity. For Lamb, the

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national elite in the United States (i.e., Federalists) shared a common experience by virtue of their association with the Revolution, a kind of experience which, as Kornhauser said earlier, often provides the occasion for the forging of new identities and new political bonds. As the Revolution developed and was eventually concluded, the careers of these leaders came to be associated with national activities and were thus staked upon the growth of national institutions. We argued in the last chapter that proponents of institutional change often entertain progressive commitments to their political careers. The focus of the above writers upon the careers of national leaders suggests that the different orientations of Federalists and Antifederalists toward the Constitution and toward nationalism were in some way related to their differing orientations to their political careers.

Such an explanation for the division between Federalist and Antifederalist leaders has in fact been roughly suggested by Elkins and McKittrick.⁷² In their view, the cleavage between these two groups was essentially political in nature and revolved around the contrasting kinds of career paths they had followed. Federalists, they argued were distinctive in that the locus of their careers centered around continental offices of one kind or another. Of particular importance was the link between these careers and the revolutionary experience. Most literally had their careers launched during the Revolution and, more importantly, these careers were associated with the continental dimension of the War in which they served as members of Congress, as diplomats, or as officers in the

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Continental Army. Thus, prior to 1787, most of them "had been united in an experience, and had formed commitments, which dissolved provincial boundaries."⁷³ Hence, their nationalism was a logical outgrowth of the continental orientation of their careers and was, moreover, an extension of their revolutionary experiences. On the other hand, the careers of Antifederalist leaders were based for the most part in state and local offices and thus their antipathy to the nationalist movement was due partly to the challenge that it represented to the authority and to the legitimacy of these institutions.

These differences in experience were reinforced by an important age differential between the two groups. In examining the ages of ten leaders from each side of the conflict, the authors discovered that "Federalists were on the average ten to twelve years younger than the Antifederalists."⁷⁴ In the chronology of the late eighteenth century, this differential was significant, for it meant that these two groups were faced with fundamentally different kinds of political problems during their maturing years. As Richard Hofstadter has hypothesized:

Men who were young enough to have come of age around 1775 when the agitations of a dozen years finally irrupted into open violence found the challenge of organization and power that came with the Revolutionary War practically coincident with their adult experiences; whereas those who came of age during or before the agitations against British tyranny that quickened after 1763 had had their minds fixed at a formative age more upon the dangers of arbitrary governmental power.⁷⁵

Federalist leaders, in other words, came of age at a time when the paramount political problem concerned the exercise of power in

winning the Revolution, while, by contrast, Antifederalists had come to maturity several years earlier when the dominant concern was the limiting of arbitrary political power. Given such considerations, Arendt's notion that the Constitution "consolidated the power of the Revolution" takes on an added measure of credibility. At the same time, the impact of this chronology provides us with an explanation of why, in Kenyon's view, the Antifederalists were understood as being absorbed by the specter of political power.

This age differential also had an impact upon the outlooks that these two groups entertained toward their futures. Since Antifederalists were believed to be somewhat older, they consequently had before them a more restricted theater for the operation of their ambitions. The relative youth of the Federalist leadership, on the other hand, encouraged the widest possible play of those national aspirations that were stirred during the Revolution and in its aftermath. With youth and ambition, we usually find energy as well, and Elkins and McKittrick suggest that this was a powerful influence upon the ability of the Federalist side to outflank their older and more inertia-ridden opponents, and thus to secure the ratification of the national system.

Implicitly, at least, Elkins and McKittrick are suggesting that Federalists and Antifederalists adopted outlooks toward national and state and local institutions that were in accord with their perspectives toward their political careers. Thus, according to the authors, the nationalism of the Federalist leadership was a direct outgrowth, not of their economic holdings, but of the distinctive

character of the type of political career in which they were engaged.

In reference to these leaders, they argue that:

The logic of [their] careers was in large measure tied to a chronology which did not apply in the same way to all the men in public life during the two decades of the 1770's and 1780's. A significant proportion of relative newcomers, with prospects initially modest, happened to have their careers opened up at a particular time and in such a way that their very public personalities came to be staked upon the national quality of the experience which had formed them. In a number of outstanding cases energy, initiative talent, and ambition had combined with a conception of affairs which had grown immense in scope and promise by the close of the Revolution.⁷⁶

Though they do not explicitly state the proposition, their allusions to ambition, careers, and political initiative imply that they view the participants in this conflict as politicians first and foremost, and thus suggest that their decisions on the Constitution were to a large degree responses to their perspectives upon their political careers. In their emphasis upon the political dimensions of these leaders, Elkins and McKittrick have been supported by the work of John Roche, who has attempted to conceive of the Federalist leadership as a group of "superb democratic politicians" who were for the most part "political men--not metaphysicians, disembodied conservatives, or Agents of History."⁷⁷ For Roche, the operations of the nationalist leaders were similar to those of a contemporary reform caucus: their minimum goal was the creation of a nationally-centered system and, in his view, they pursued it with "delicacy and skill in a political cosmos full of enemies."⁷⁸ Hence, much like Elkins and McKittrick, Roche attempts to understand the success of the Federalist leadership in terms of its strategic skill in pursuing explicitly political goals.

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The above interpretive arguments, with their emphases upon the interaction between political outlooks and career perspectives, strongly suggests the relevance to this case of the theoretical approach that we outlined in the preceding chapter. There we suggested that institutional changes and innovations are often inspired by those who are progressively mobile in their careers and who thus support changes in institutional arrangements because they facilitate their advancement. Here we have reviewed a number of arguments which suggest that nationalism and national institutions emerged in the United States partly as a result of the career perspectives of a group of leaders whose pasts had been associated with continental institutions and who perceived their futures in terms of national office. In Selznick's terms, these leaders represented the institutional core of a growing national organization, the fate of whose future careers was staked upon the growth of national political institutions. The argument, similar in many respects to the one advanced by Ekkins and McKittrick, that Federalists differed from Antifederalists in their ambitions or in their perceptions of their future careers parallels the one that was suggested in the previous chapter that the proponents of change are likely to entertain different orientations to their careers than those who resist it. In the next chapter, we shall attempt to bring these two complementary arguments, the one historical and the other theoretical, together in the form of a set of propositions that can be tested against the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders.

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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II

¹This term is suggested in Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963).

²Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (June, 1961), 181.

³The following account has been gleaned from a number of historical treatments of the period. Especially helpful was Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). Also useful were The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, ed. by Winton Solberg (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), Introduction; Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution (New York: MacMillan, 1924); and Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herbert Garfinkel, The Democratic Republic (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), ch. 1 and 2. For the confederation period, I consulted Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). On the Constitutional Convention, John Roche provides a good account in "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action," American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961).

⁴See Merrill Jensen, "The Idea of a National Government During the American Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LVIII (September, 1943), 358.

⁵For this information, see Historical Register of the Officers of the Continental Army, ed. by Francis Heitman (Washington, D.C.: Rare Books Publishing Company, 1914), 691.

⁶On this antagonism, see Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 30-31; and Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 235.

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⁷John Fiske, The Critical Period in American History (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1888).

⁸See Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), and The New Nation, op. cit.

⁹Morgan, op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁰William Riker, Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1964), pp. 16-25.

¹¹John Jay, "Federalist No. 3," in The Federalist Papers, ed. by Ray Fairfield (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 11.

¹²This problem was also explicitly raised in the Federalist Papers where in No. 15 Hamilton writes: "The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist." See Fairfield, op. cit., p. 31.

¹³Roche, op. cit.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 806.

¹⁵Though the Federalists won by a clear margin, Antifederalist arguments were not without force. In 1788, they were victorious in two states, Rhode Island and North Carolina. Of the states that were lost, five (New York, Virginia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and South Carolina) were by relatively narrow margins. And of the approximately 1500 delegates elected to the various conventions, around 40 per cent were Antifederalist.

¹⁶Riker, op. cit.

¹⁷Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1935), and Seymour Lipset, The First New Nation.

¹⁸On the shifting perceptions of Jefferson in American history, see Merrill Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

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¹⁹George Bancroft, The History of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Appleton Press, 1882).

²⁰Fiske, op. cit.

²¹Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 6.

²²Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 202.

²³J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 298.

²⁴Beard, op. cit., p. 15.

²⁵Ibid., p. 19.

²⁶Oran G. Libby, Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States in the Ratification of the Federal Constitution (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1894).

²⁷Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Federal Convention (2 vols.; Richmond, 1890, 1891).

²⁸Samuel B. Harding, The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (New York: Longmans and Green, 1896).

²⁹For this argument, see Beard, op. cit., ch. 10.

³⁰Beard devoted an entire chapter to the holdings of the delegates to the Philadelphia convention. For his conclusions, see pp. 149-51.

³¹Ibid., p. 324.

³²Ibid., p. xvi.

³³White, op. cit., pp. 119-27.

³⁴See Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," William and Mary Quarterly, VIII (January, 1951).

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³⁵Ibid., p. 60.

³⁶Robert Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution (New York: Norton, 1965).

³⁷Ibid., p. 89.

³⁸Robert E. Thomas, "The Virginia Convention of 1788," Journal of Southern History, XIX (February, 1953).

³⁹Phillip Crowl, "Antifederalism in Maryland," William and Mary Quarterly, IV (October, 1947).

⁴⁰William Pool, "An Economic Interpretation of the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review, XXVII (1950), 119-41, 289-313, and 437-61.

⁴¹Richard McCormick, Experiment in Independence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1950).

⁴²Thomas, op. cit., p. 72.

⁴³Crowl, op. cit., p. 469.

⁴⁴Forrest McDonald, We The People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 416.

⁴⁶For a criticism of McDonald and Brown and a defense of Beard see Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American Historical Writing Reconsidered (New York: Free Press, 1960), chapter 3.

⁴⁷For this argument, see Charles Beard, The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: MacMillan, 1927), chapter 2.

⁴⁸See Cecilia Kenyon, "The Antifederalists: Men of Little Faith," William and Mary Quarterly, XII, No. 1 (1955), 3-46. This argument is also developed in The Antifederalists, ed. by Kenyon (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), Introduction.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 240.

⁵⁰Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, p. 231.

⁵¹See, for example, Robert Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964).

⁵²Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1955), p. 28.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 28-32.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 78-86.

⁵⁵William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), chapter 1.

⁵⁶Lipset, op. cit., p. 17.

⁵⁷Lipset, "The Newness of the New Nation," in The Comparative Approach to American History, ed. by C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 67.

⁵⁸Some have been critical of the parallel suggested by Lipset. Among them, Samuel Huntington argues that his notion of the "new" nation "misses crucial differences between the American experience and those of contemporary modernizing countries." What it fails to consider according to Huntington is the difference in social characteristics between America, which was relatively prosperous and egalitarian, and contemporary new nations, which are generally poor and exhibit gross economic inequalities. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 134-39.

⁵⁹See Herbert Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 278.

⁶⁰See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961); and "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics (January, 1953), 168-95.

⁶¹Richard Merritt, Symbols of American Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁶²Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962).

⁶³Ibid., chapter 5.

⁶⁴See, for example, Huntington, op. cit., chapter 5; also, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, "National Revolutions and Political Commitment," in Internal War, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 205-32.

⁶⁵William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development," in Eckstein (ed.), op. cit., pp. 144, 146.

⁶⁶See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 140, 152.

⁶⁷See Forrest McDonald, "The Anti-Federalists: 1781-1789," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XLVI (Spring, 1963), 207.

⁶⁸Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of New States," in Communications and Political Development, ed. by Lucien Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 65.

⁶⁹For the importance of careers of different kinds for political modernization, see David Apter, The Dynamics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chapter 5.

⁷⁰See Spencer Wellhoffer and Timothy Hennessey, "Political Party Development: Institutionalization and Leadership Recruitment," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., Sept., 1971); see also Wellhoffer, "Dimensions of Party Development," Journal of Politics, XXXIV (February, 1972).

⁷¹Quoted in Deutsch, op. cit., Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 32.

⁷²Elkins and McKittrick, op. cit.

⁷³Ibid., p. 203.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 203.

⁷⁵Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, pp. 235-36.

⁷⁶Elkins and McKittrick, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

⁷⁷Roche, op. cit., p. 799 (emphasis in original).

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 799.

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CHAPTER III

THE RESEARCH DESIGN: THE MODEL, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA COLLECTION

In the previous chapters, I have attempted to develop two parallel arguments. In Chapter I, the attempt was made to establish a link between the career perspectives of political leaders and their orientations toward institutional changes or innovations. Briefly, it was suggested that such changes are often inspired by those leaders who entertain progressive commitments to their careers. In Chapter II, we suggested that such a link might be employed to throw light upon the ratification of the Constitution. Thus, a number of works were brought together which suggested that the supporters of the new system could be understood as innovators whose political careers were staked upon the growth of national institutions in the United States. It will be the purpose of the present chapter, as I have said, to attempt to close the gap between the above arguments by demonstrating how the theory outlined in Chapter I is able to suggest empirical propositions which may be tested against the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders.

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Below, I shall make use of a quasi-axiomatic format for the purpose of combining these two components of the argument.¹ This format will consist, in the first place, of (a) a number of theoretical assumptions from which other statements may be derived and (b) a set of definitions which provide meanings for the concepts suggested by such assumptions. Some of the above, such as Schlesinger's assumptions and definitions concerning ambitions, were set forth in Chapter I; others, however, will be developed more fully below. From such assumptions and definitions, it will be possible to derive (c) a number of empirical hypotheses which relate to the career perspectives of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. The use of such a format brings with it a number of advantages.² First, since it focuses upon the logical relationships between theoretical assumptions and testable propositions, it allows us to close the gap between the theory and the case in a relatively systematic and parsimonious manner. Second, such a focus serves as a check against inconsistencies and thus paves the way for the development of a more closely reasoned argument. Finally, since the theory consists of a set of inter-related statements, empirical support for one statement tends to lend support to others as well. In our case, for example, as we shall see in a moment, the assumptions of the theory are not of the kind that lend themselves to direct test. Thus, their plausibility can only be inferred indirectly through the confirmation of the propositions that are derived from them.³ In the discussion that follows, then, the first order of business will be to employ this format to suggest a number of propositions which relate to the

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political careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Following this, I shall elaborate briefly upon the data that will be used to test these propositions.

The point at which we begin is with Schlesinger's assumption that "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as officeseeker engages in political acts appropriate to gaining office."⁴ According to this argument, political leaders adopt values and make decisions purely for instrumental reasons, that is, as means through which they promote their career or office goals. In employing such an assumption, Schlesinger has been joined by a number of other writers. Among them, Anthony Downs has attempted to use it in understanding the strategies of leaders of political parties. Thus, he has assumed that:

They [politicians] act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office. Thus, politicians . . . never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se. They treat policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends.⁵

Hence, both Downs and Schlesinger understand politicians as being analogous to economic entrepreneurs who adopt values and promote policies only for the purpose of exchanging them for the satisfaction of their own office goals.⁶

As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, Schlesinger defines three distinct types of office goals or, as he calls them, ambitions: progressive (the politician plans to advance to another office), static (he plans to remain in his current position), and discrete (he plans to withdraw from politics).⁷ Though he defines them in terms

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of political motivations, these notions may also be employed to refer in a parallel manner to different types of careers. Thus, a progressive career is one which exhibits some kind of successive movement from office to office, while, by contrast, a static career is one which revolves for the most part around a single office. According to Schlesinger's argument, then, leaders whose careers are, say, progressive in direction are likely to make decisions and adopt values that are in conflict with those of leaders whose careers reflect static or discrete aspirations.

A number of writers have attempted to offer tests of this proposition. Among them, Gordon Black, as we pointed out earlier, used it to establish a link between office goals and political professionalism, suggesting that leaders who entertain progressive commitments to their careers are those most likely to adopt the values that are associated with success in a professional political career.⁸ In a similar vein, Prewitt has pointed to empirical relationships between the ambitions of city politicians and their perceptions of local, state, and national institutions. Thus, he found that those with progressive careers were most likely to entertain favorable views of those institutions whose offices lay in their paths of advancement.⁹ Still others have pointed to relationships between the office goals of political leaders and their perceptions of their constituencies, their views of democracy, and their general outlooks toward public policy.¹⁰

Schlesinger has suggested, as we pointed out in Chapter I, that such a relationship is also likely to exist between the

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direction of a leader's career and his perspective upon innovations and changes in political institutions. Politicians who wish to advance, he argues, are those most likely to inspire change and reform, for they are the ones who are led to examine current arrangements in terms of their bearings upon their political futures. For the leader with a progressive commitment to his career, institutional changes are often viewed as means through which his opportunities for advancement are expanded. As Schlesinger puts it:

If anyone is going to search for solutions it is the man whose career depends on finding solutions. The politician with static ambitions is far more likely to be driven by immediate pressures, whether it be the pressure of opinion, party, or special interest group. Only the man with progressive ambitions is driven to explore current policies in the light of future consequences, for his future career is at stake.¹¹

Downs has advanced a parallel proposition with regard to change in organizations and bureaucracies. Downs assumes, much like Schlesinger, that officials in such organizations seek to hold office purely for the income, power, and prestige that are associated with officeholding. Some of these officials are not concerned with advancing up the office ladder but rather are merely concerned with maintaining their current positions and the prerogatives that go with them. Such officials Downs refers to as conservers. There are, on the other hand, those who wish to secure more attractive positions within the office structure of the organization and, appropriately enough, Downs refers to such officials as climbers.¹² For our purposes, Downs' notions of conservers and climbers are analogous to Schlesinger's concepts of static and progressive ambitions and careers. For Downs, again as with Schlesinger, it is the official

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who wishes to advance who is usually responsible for changes within the organization. Hence, according to his theory:

[Climbers] inherently favor change because increasing their power, income, and prestige requires altering the status quo. True, climbers support only those changes that benefit them. Nevertheless, they are favorably inclined toward the general idea of change, since it can produce new opportunities for promotion or aggrandizement.¹³

Conservers, on the other hand, have considerably less reason to initiate change. Since they view themselves as nearly permanent fixtures in their current positions, they have no professional reason to support changes which, though they may open up opportunities for advancement, may also have damaging implications for these present positions. Therefore, he argues, organizations which recruit climbers are more likely to be innovative than those which tend to be staffed by conservers.

In summary, the theories proposed by Schlesinger and Downs suggest the following propositions: (1) Politicians who support institutional changes and innovations are more likely to have progressive careers and ambitions than are those who oppose or who otherwise do not support such changes. Conversely, (2) political leaders who do not support such changes are more likely to have static and discrete ambitions and careers than are those who do support them. These general propositions may, in turn, be operationalized into testable hypotheses about the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist elites. If, as we suggested in the last chapter, Federalists are understood as proponents of innovation, then the following set of testable hypotheses emerges:

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Hypothesis Set I:

(a) Politicians with progressive ambitions were more likely to support the Federalist than the Antifederalist position on the Constitution; and, conversely, (b) those with static and discrete ambitions were more likely to support the Antifederalist view.

Downs and others have suggested a useful corollary to the above hypothesis. This involves the proposition that innovation in organizations and political systems is affected by the rates of career mobility among their personnel. Thus, Downs holds that "the rate at which innovations will be suggested by bureau members will be greater the higher the rate of personnel turnover within the bureau."¹⁴ In support of this, Seligman suggests that the rate of what he calls elite circulation is a good "indicator of change and stability in a [political] system."¹⁵ This approach to the problem has been bolstered by evidence advanced by Walker who, in a study of innovation in the American states, found support for the proposition that "political systems which allow frequent turnover and offer the most opportunities to capture high office [will] more often develop the circumstances in which new programs might be adopted."¹⁶ Accordingly, it follows that if innovative organizations are characterized by high turnover, innovative officials themselves are also likely to possess careers marked by high rates of mobility.

Such a generalization may, once again, be applied to the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists. As we shall suggest in a moment, Federalists at that time were more likely than their opponents to be affiliated with national institutions, then in a stage

of rapid expansion; Antifederalists, on the other hand, were, we shall suggest, more frequently associated with the more firmly established state and local structures. Thus, since these two groups were affiliated with institutions that were experiencing different rates of change, it is reasonable on the basis of the above discussion to suppose that their careers were also marked by differential rates of mobility. Accordingly, we may advance the following proposition:

Hypothesis Set II:

The greater the mobility of a politician's career, the more likely he is to support innovative policies. Thus, (a) the greater the mobility of a delegate's career, the greater the likelihood that he supported the Federalist position on the Constitution. Thus, it follows that (b) the careers of Federalists were marked by greater mobility than those of Antifederalists.

Both Schlesinger and Downs have made use of the above propositions to advance a number of parallel hypotheses concerning the link between career perspectives and political change. Downs suggests that a prominent source of innovation in bureaucracies and in other organizations is the desire on the parts of ambitious officials to aggrandize their positions through the expansion of the authority and other benefits that such offices command within the organization.¹⁷ Thus, those who wish to advance (i.e., climbers) generally sponsor innovations which have the effect of expanding the rewards associated either with their own positions or with those which they seek to capture. Schlesinger makes the same point when he observes that "political leaders are unlikely to demean the objects of their ambitions."¹⁸ Hence, politicians who entertain aspirations of capturing

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an office or sequence of offices are unlikely to threaten the prerogatives of those offices. For example, as Schlesinger argues, "because congressmen can realistically aspire to the Senate, it is unlikely that the House of Representatives will ever seek to reduce the Senate's powers as the British House of Commons reduced the power of the Lords in 1911. Similarly, as long as states' governors see their hopes for advancement in the Senate, it is unlikely that attacks upon Federal power will be directed at the Congress."¹⁹ From this argument, Prewitt and Nowlin have abstracted a more specific proposition in which they suggest that the politician 'who aspires to and expects to gain a more exalted political post is likely to support policies which expand the prerogatives of that office."²⁰

The above is essentially a formalized version of the proposition suggested by Elkins and McKittrick concerning the division between Federalists and Antifederalists. They argued that one of the essential features of the new system was its proposal for a redistribution of political authority from state and local to national offices. Thus, they suggested that the conflict was based partly upon an antagonism between politicians whose careers revolved around distinct office sequences. Politicians who wished to advance in their careers or whose careers were in some way associated with national office tended to support the Constitution, since it greatly expanded the opportunities for and the benefits of a national career. By contrast, the authors suggested that politicians whose careers were wrapped up in state and local offices tended to oppose the changes that a national system implied and, hence, were among the strongest opponents

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of the Constitution. In sum, they suggested that the more distant a leader's career from national offices, the more likely he was to oppose the Constitution.

The above discussion prepares the ground for a second set of hypotheses. Since the new system expanded the opportunities for a national career, it is reasonable to suppose, as Elkins and McKittrick suggested, that those leaders whose careers were most closely aligned with national offices were those most likely to support the ratification of this system. Thus:

Hypothesis Set III:

(a) Those politicians who adopted national careers were more likely to support the Federalist than the Anti-federalist position on the Constitution, while (b) those who adopted state or local careers were more likely to support the Antifederalist position.

Schlesinger has pointed out that while career perspectives influence the decisions and behavior of political leaders, these perspectives themselves can be understood as responses to a number of other considerations which revolve around the objective opportunities that confront the politician. Concerning such perspectives, he observes that "the most reasonable assumption is that ambition for office . . . develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician."²¹ One of the most important factors which serves to define the parameters of these opportunities is a politician's position in his life cycle or, in other words, his age. Thus,

The age cycle restricts a man's political chances. A man's reasonable expectations in one period of his life are

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unreasonable at another time. A man can fail to advance in politics as much because he is the wrong age at the wrong time as because he is in the wrong office.²²

The most obvious effect of age is that as a politician grows older, the range of his ambitions tends to diminish. The leader who is relatively young has in front of him an entire career in which to plot his course of advancement. The older politician, on the other hand, facing a more restricted view of his future, is forced to align his aspirations with the limitations placed upon him by advancing age. Thus, as Schlesinger states, 'what is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legislator is ridiculous in his colleague of 60.'²³ Since advancing age is expected to limit a politician's opportunities for political advancement, Schlesinger's theory suggests that (a) the younger the group of politicians in question, the more frequent will be the rate of progressive careers and ambitions, and the less frequent will be the rate of static or discrete careers and ambitions. Hence, (b) as politicians grow older, the frequencies of static or discrete careers and ambitions are expected to increase.

As was the case earlier, Schlesinger's propositions concerning age have been reinforced by Anthony Downs in his theory of bureaucracy and organization. Like Schlesinger, Downs suggests that members who wish to advance in the office hierarchy of a bureau are those who, by and large, tend to be among the most innovative and also among the youngest members of the organization. Downs states this argument in the following manner:

One of the effects of increasing age upon a bureau is the tendency of the average age of the bureau's members to rise. . . . Almost every bureau goes through a period of

rapid growth right before it reaches its initial survival threshold. During this period, it usually contains a high proportion of zealots (because they established it) and climbers (because they are attracted by fast growth). These people, moreover, tend to be relatively young, for youthful officials are more optimistic and full of initiative than older ones.²⁴

One of the reasons that newer organizations tend to be innovative is simply that they tend to recruit younger leadership staffs. By contrast, the tendency among older and more firmly established organizations to resist change and innovation is due in part to the relatively advanced ages of their memberships and to the limits that such aging places upon the aspirations of organizational leaders.

Once again, the propositions suggested by the above theory can be employed to derive a number of hypotheses concerning the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Earlier we hypothesized that Federalists were more likely than Antifederalists to have pursued progressive careers. Hence, if youth is related to progressive ambitions as Downs and Schlesinger have argued, then it follows that we should suspect that Federalists would also have been on the average younger than their opponents.

This proposition corresponds with the historical thesis advanced by Elkins and McKittrick, which introduced the notion of an intergenerational conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists. They argued that the conflict over the Constitution was in part a contest between "inertia and energy." In such a contest, the Federalists held the upper hand, largely because of their relative youth and of the energy that they could summon as a result of it. Thus, because of this initiative, the Federalists had little

difficulty in outmaneuvering their more lethargic opponents. However, due to the narrow sample from which the authors attempted to generalize, a number of historians have disputed their proposition.²⁵ But since it is consistent with our model of innovation, we have a good reason for supposing it to be accurate. Accordingly, we shall attempt to test a number of hypotheses which relate the variable of age to the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Some of these propositions can be stated in the following manner:

Hypothesis Set IV:

(a) The older the politicians (whether Federalist or Antifederalist), the more likely they were to have had static or discrete careers and the less likely they were to have had progressive careers. Conversely, the younger the politicians, the more likely they were to have had progressive careers and the less likely they were to have had static or discrete careers. Thus, since politicians with progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalists (see Hypothesis Set I), it follows that (b) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to likewise throw their support to the Federalist position on the Constitution. Further, since we have already argued that Federalists were more likely than their opponents to have adopted national careers, then it follows that (c) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to locate their careers in national offices.

In addition to the above, Schlesinger's theory provides us with a rationale for an additional age hypothesis. Thus, he argues that "the younger a man is when he enters politics, the greater the range of his ambitions and the likelihood of his developing a career commitment to politics."²⁶ The rationale for this proposition is that those who enter politics at an early age are more likely to view politics as their primary profession. Those who enter later,

however, often make the jump from already established positions in other careers or, in any case, from other activities that command a prior claim upon their energies. Since the latter maintain an alternative base of operations, they are not expected to be as heavily committed to a political career as are those for whom it represents a primary profession. In a related connection, Black suggests that the leaders who are most deeply committed to a political career are generally those who entertain progressive aspirations or who have progressive careers. Such leaders are likely to view themselves as "politicians" first and foremost and are thus usually led to adopt values which contribute to their successful advancement in their careers.²⁷ Black suggests that such values consist in a general sense of favorable attitudes toward compromise, negotiation, and bargaining. On the other hand, leaders who do not see themselves as career politicians are more likely to follow static or discrete careers and, further, are less inclined to adopt favorable outlooks toward the kind of professional values mentioned above.

Roche's thesis concerning the organizational skill of the Federalist leadership is relevant to this discussion. He argued, we recall, that a salient feature of the Federalist leadership was its relative professionalism, which expressed itself in the willingness of Federalist elites to negotiate and to enter into compromises in order to achieve their minimum goal of a nationally centered system.²⁸ If we apply the formulations of Schlesinger and Black to this problem, such a professional orientation on the parts of Federalists may have been a reflection of their commitment to a

political career which, in turn, may have been partly due to relatively early starts in politics. Such an hypothesis merits examination. Accordingly, if we combine the formulations of Schlesinger, Black, and Roche, then, the following hypotheses concerning Federalist and Antifederalist careers may be advanced and later tested:

Hypothesis Set V:

(a) The younger the politicians when they entered politics, the greater the likelihood that they developed progressive careers and the less the likelihood that they followed either static or discrete careers. Thus, since we hypothesized earlier that delegates with progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalist position on the Constitution (see Hypothesis Set I), then it also follows that (b) the younger the delegates at their ages of entry into politics, the more likely they were to become Federalists.

Gordon Black has suggested that in addition to the variable of age, political ambitions are often stirred by considerations that revolve around the structural characteristics of the political system and around the investments that the politician has placed into his career.²⁹ In formulating his argument, he adopts the assumption that a politician's career consists of a series of decisions between alternative office paths or, as he calls them, career sequences. Black suggests that in charting the course of his career, a political leader is led to select those strategies of advancement which maximize the differential between the benefits gained from holding a particular office or series of offices and the costs incurred in capturing them. Thus, as Black states the assumption:

The politician, when confronted with a decision, will examine the alternatives with which he is confronted, . . . will

evaluate those alternatives in terms of their occurrence and the value they hold for him, and ... will choose that alternative which holds for him the greatest expected value.³⁰

Since a career consists of an extended series of such decisions, the costs that a political leader incurs during the course of his career may be understood to be cumulative or, in other words, they may be viewed as investments which the politician may parlay into future political or non-political enterprises. It is axiomatic, of course, that the politician is expected to adopt those alternatives which yield for him the greatest return on the investment that he has placed into his political career. In rather rough terms, his alternatives may be said to consist of either continuing to invest in the office or career sequence in which he is currently located or, alternatively, of transferring his investment to a different kind of career. The problem, however, is that the investments that a politician has accumulated in one sequence of offices are only marginally transferable to other sequences or to other types of career. Thus, a politician's investment in his career may be understood to consist of such things as the contacts that he has cultivated, the goodwill that he has accumulated, or the know-how that he has developed, all of which represent resources that are not fully transferrable to alternative kinds of career. Accordingly, a politician can usually expect to make the most efficient use of such resources if he remains in the career sequence in which he has already accumulated investments. The result of this kind of calculation is that as time passes the politician develops an increasing commitment to the career in which he has been engaged. Again, Black summarizes this argument:

In any career sequence, if this analysis is correct, as the individual increases his investment in the career sequence, the value of the next step upward or the next goal will also increase relative to alternatives outside the career sequence. In a sense, the individual's investments tend to pull him further and further into the sequence even though he may not have originally intended to follow the route on which he now finds himself.³¹

On this point, Black's argument is supported by the work of A. O. Hirschman, who has developed a parallel thesis concerning loyalty to organizations.³² In Hirschman's view, as a person's investment in a given organization increases, so does his commitment to that organization. Thus, in times of organizational crisis, he will be unlikely to withdraw or, in Hirschman's terms, to "exit" as a response to a decline in the organization's effectiveness. Loyalty, in other words, is an increasing function of an individual's investment in the organization. This argument concerning organizations can readily be superimposed upon Black's notion of career sequences. Thus, together, Hirschman's and Black's theories suggest the proposition that the more a politician has invested in a particular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his career in that sequence, and the less likely he will be to "exit" or to withdraw from that sequence for reasons other than, say, age or illness.

This proposition can easily be grafted on to the conflict over the Constitution and, hence, may be employed to derive hypotheses concerning the careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Once again, the argument advanced by Elkins and McKittrick is relevant to the theory. As was pointed out earlier, they suggest that the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists hinged in

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part upon the fact that the former had located their careers in national offices and were thus hospitable to the expansion of national authority. Antifederalists, on the other hand, had been involved largely with state and local positions and were therefore hostile to the expansion of such authority. Employing Black's proposition, then, Elkins' and McKittrick's thesis suggests that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was due partly to the fact that they had accumulated political investments in distinct office sequences. Hence, just as Black speaks of the rational politician who as time passes becomes locked into a particular career sequence, so Elkins and McKittrick argue that Federalist leaders experienced a "profound and growing involvement" in Continental affairs, which by 1788 had grown to the extent that "their very public personalities came to be staked upon the national quality of experience that had formed them."³³ Federalist attachments to national affairs, of course, were also thought to be paralleled by Antifederalist attachments to state and local office sequences. If such investments in political careers played a role in the deliberations over the Constitution and upon the views of delegates toward national, state, and local institutions, then the following hypotheses may be advanced:

Hypothesis Set VI:

(a) The more investments a politician has staked in a particular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his career in that sequence. Thus, it follows from the hypothesis suggested earlier (see Hypothesis Set III above) that (b) the more investments a politician has staked in the national sequence of offices at the expense of other office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution.

On the other hand, (c) the more investments a politician has staked in the state or local office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Antifederalist position.

Coupled with the notion of investment in Black's theory is the complementary idea of risk, for he suggests that as politicians accumulate investments in their careers, the losses that they stand to incur as the result of every succeeding venture also increase and, hence, so do the risks associated with such enterprises.³⁴ In Black's theory, the notion of risk is used to simulate the calculations of politicians who, in order to advance to a higher office, must risk the loss of their current political positions. However, calculations of risk may also be applied to a number of other political situations, such as to the problem of institutional change or innovation with which we are concerned here. As Anthony Downs has pointed out, innovations frequently involve risks for politicians, for the reason that the outcomes of such changes can never be accurately assessed in advance.³⁵ Thus, since changes involve such uncertainties, they are likely to be supported only by those politicians who are hospitable to risk-taking or who, in other words, are willing to face present uncertainties in exchange for the opportunity of gaining future benefits. The reasonable inference from this is that such politicians will generally be those who have the least to lose as the result of such changes or who, again in other words, have yet to accumulate sizeable investments in their careers. By contrast, since risks increase with investments, politicians who have larger stakes in their careers are likely to adopt a more skeptical posture toward such innovative proposals.

Such propositions have been employed in a wide range of settings and have been found to be consistent with both psychological and rational-choice theories of behavior. Thus, Hirschman (an economist) and Festinger (a psychologist) have made use of closely related propositions in their theories of loyalty and commitment to organizations and social movements. Accordingly they suggest that a person's satisfaction with an organization or with a social cause is directly related to the costs incurred in gaining entrance to it and to the costs involved in maintaining membership.³⁶ The larger one's investment in an organization, therefore, the greater will be his expressed satisfaction with it and the less likely he will be to insist upon dramatic changes in it.

Such a proposition may, once again, be employed to illuminate the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution and to derive testable hypotheses about their political careers. Since we have attempted to understand Federalists as proponents of change and innovation, the above discussion suggests the following empirical hypotheses:

Hypothesis Set VII:

Since we have suggested that investments are inversely related to innovation, then it should follow that (a) as of 1788 the more investments a politician held in his career, the more likely he was to have supported the Antifederalist position on the Constitution. Or, in other words, as of 1788 Federalists on the average were likely to have held fewer investments in their careers than Antifederalists.

From this we may deduce an additional hypothesis. If we can assume that size of investments is related to the amount of time spent in

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politics, it may be inferred that Antifederalists began their careers at an earlier time, historically speaking, than Federalists. This hypothesis is consistent with the interpretations of the case that have been suggested by some historians, among them, Hofstadter and Elkins and McKittrick.³⁷ Accordingly, this hypothesis can be stated as follows:

Hypothesis Set VII (cont.):

Since we have suggested that Antifederalists held greater investments in their careers than Federalists, then (b) Antifederalist leaders were also likely to have begun their careers at an earlier historical time than Federalist leaders. Or, stated differently, the later (historically speaking) that a delegate began his career, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution.

As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the above hypotheses have been designed to link the two arguments developed respectively in Chapters I and II. The first revolved around the general problem of change and innovation in political institutions, and in this context we drew upon the theories of Schlesinger and Downs, both of which attempted to account for such changes in terms of the career perspectives of political leaders or, in Downs' case, of organizational officials. Chapter II, on the other hand, addressed itself to the specific case and in this context a number of works were introduced which stressed the importance of political careers in the growth of national institutions in the United States and their impact upon the division between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution. The hypotheses advanced in this chapter link these two distinct approaches by employing the different assumptions, concepts,

and propositions of our theory to derive a number of testable hypotheses concerning Federalist and Antifederalist careers which, in turn, have been shown to be consistent with the historical thesis advanced in Chapter II.

In addition, besides providing such links, these hypotheses can be understood as operationalizations of these general theoretical and historical approaches to the problem. Thus, one way of determining the usefulness of these approaches in understanding this case is simply to examine the correspondence between the propositions which they suggest and the data concerning the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Since the theory outlined above is an abstraction or a simplified version of how politicians are expected to behave, such a correspondence cannot be expected to be exact nor anything close to it. However, if the theory represents a useful way of approaching the problem, there must be an approximate correspondence between these propositions and the actual career data that we shall examine in the succeeding chapters. But before proceeding with this analysis, however, a discussion of the nature and the sources of these data is in order.

The Sources of the Data

The primary source of data for this study consisted of a sample of careers drawn from a well-defined population of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders. Such a population was composed of those politicians who attended either the National Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 or one of the thirteen state conventions

which followed it in 1787 and 1788. Though the size of this group tends to vary depending upon the sources that one consults, my calculations indicate that it was made up of approximately 1650 men. As a source of data, the use of this population held a number of advantages over alternative sources. For one thing, as I pointed out above, the delegates to the various conventions represented a well-defined group from which a sample could be drawn and to which findings could be generalized within fairly well-known limits of reliability. For another, this population represented an easily accessible source of data, for the delegates to the conventions were in many cases readily identifiable both in their preferences and in their careers. One general advantage of this source, then, was that it allowed for the systematic collection of the necessary career data. More importantly, however, since the delegates to the conventions held the authority to make binding decisions with regard to the proposed Constitution, they appeared to me, as they have to others, to have represented the most influential and the most committed groups within either leadership staff.³⁸ Hence, their careers represented the obvious data base against which to test the propositions advanced in this chapter.

With these considerations in mind, a sample of approximately 540 delegates was selected from the population described above. To insure an adequate representation of all important groups, the sample was stratified along two dimensions: affiliation (i.e., Federalists and Antifederalists) and the degree of influence held by delegates in the ratification process. It is important to note

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at this point that though the sample was not stratified according to state, all states, with one exception, were adequately represented in the sample.³⁹ With regard to affiliation, the sample was designed to be self-weighting, so that the proportion of Federalists and Antifederalists in the sample approximated their proportions in the population of delegates. Thus, the sample was composed of approximately 60% Federalists and about 40% Antifederalists, or roughly the proportions that these two groups were found in the population of delegates as a whole. In each of these two strata, samples were drawn which were composed of approximately one-third of the members of each group. Hence, the total sample size consisted of around 320 Federalists and 220 Antifederalists, a sample size which is easily large enough to generate reliable findings.

Within each of these groups, however, an additional stratification was inserted. A number of students of this conflict, among them Beard, Jensen, and Elkins and McKittrick, have focused upon a relatively small number of intensely partisan nationalist leaders who, by virtue of their skills of organization and persuasion, were mainly responsible for the success of the Federalist cause. As these scholars reconstruct the case, such leaders were composed primarily of delegates to the Philadelphia convention, members of the Continental Congress, and former leaders of the continental dimension of the Revolution. On the other hand, other historians, such as Jackson Main, have pointed out that an analogous, if less successful, leadership core was to be found on the Antifederalist side. This group, as we would expect, was made up largely of politicians who had been

influential in the states and who thus had good reason to throw their skills and energies into the defeat of the national system. In other words, within each camp were to be found men whose energetic support for or opposition to the Constitution reflected greater commitments on their parts to either innovation or to existing institutional arrangements. Hence, the career profiles of these delegates carry special importance not only for testing the above model of innovation, but also for revealing insights about the case itself. Accordingly, the sample was stratified along this leader-follower dimension. Thus, four sub-groups were generated, with the sample now consisting of what I have chosen to call Statesmen and Regulars (leaders and followers, respectively) on each side of the ratification issue. Though for some, these terms may connote approval or disapproval, they are used here for descriptive purposes only and are thus not meant in any way to imply that the distinction is invidious.

Statesmen on each side of the issue were identified as such by their appearances in historical accounts of the ratification conflict or in the records of the various state and national conventions (see Appendix). Within each of the larger strata, Statesmen were designed to represent about one-quarter of the sample. Hence, among the 320 Federalists, about 80 were Statesmen and 240 were Regulars; among the 220 Antifederalists, the corresponding figures were 55 and 165. It is doubtful, of course, that these figures reflect the proportions in which these groups were found in the population of delegates, since leaders do not normally represent

one-quarter of any given population. However, the one-to-three ratio was settled upon in order to insure that the N's of each sub-group were sufficiently large to generate some confidence in the results derived from the data.

Outside of the leadership strata, the effort was made to insure a representative selection of the rest of the members of the sample. There may, however, been one departure from this design. This, though, involved a problem that is endemic to the use of archival data, namely, the selective survival or the selective disappearance of data. Thus, one difficulty encountered in collecting these career data was that some members of the population of delegates were so obscure that no trace of their careers could be located in any historical or archival source. It is quite possible, then, that an unknown amount of bias entered into the sample which favored the selection of those delegates who in one way or another left behind a record of their careers. It is, of course, difficult to establish the effects of this kind of selective sampling since the amount of the bias is unknown. However, insofar as testing the propositions of the theory is concerned, I do not believe that these effects should be considered serious. This is for the simple reason that in the case that such a bias did enter the sample, it worked in the same direction for both Federalists and Antifederalists alike. In other words, if obscure delegates were systematically selected out of the sample, they were selected out for both Federalist and Antifederalist groups. And since both samples were independently chosen in proportion to their relative numbers in the population of

delegates as a whole, there was no chance that more accessible Federalists were chosen at the expense of the more obscure Anti-federalists, or vice versa. This sample bias, then, if it indeed occurred, should not be expected to affect the relationships between the two groups, since similar kinds of delegates were sampled out of both. Since the propositions that were outlined above suggest that there were differences between the groups, such differences, if they truly existed, should make themselves apparent given any selective sampling of this sort. Thus, as Zetterberg has pointed out:

The relationships expressed in theoretical propositions are presumed to be universally present. They are, accordingly, present both in representative and in non-representative samples. To disprove or to demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any kind of sample.⁴⁰

It should be noted though that this prevails only when it can be safely assumed that a sampling bias works in the same direction for all dimensions of the dependent variable and that all such dimensions are represented in the sample itself.

A difficulty comes in though, as Zetterberg has suggested, when the attempt is made to generalize from a sample finding to a population value when the sample itself contains an unknown amount of bias. Since the existence of such bias in this particular sample is at best problematic, the attempt will be made to advance these kinds of generalizations where they are warranted by the data. Accordingly, the appropriate statistical tests of significance will be reproduced in the data analysis that will be undertaken in the succeeding chapters. However, since we cannot rule out the possibility of bias

in the sample, these tests should be interpreted with a measure of caution.

The actual data on the political careers of those politicians who finally made up the sample were culled from a variety of historical, biographical, and archival sources, which ranged from full-scale biographical treatments to town histories, genealogies, and election returns (see bibliography). The most reliable and efficiently used of these data sources generally turned out to be collections of brief biographical sketches, such as The National Encyclopedia of American Biography, The Biographical Directory of the American Congress, or any of the various state biographical directories. As one would expect, the thoroughness and the reliability of the data found on any particular career varied in a direct relation with the prominence of the politician in question. Hence, for those whose political achievements were substantial, fairly complete career profiles were obtained by consulting sources such as those mentioned immediately above. For those who were more obscure, however, information was usually sketchy, and careers often had to be pieced together from fragmentary bits of evidence taken from diverse sources such as state yearbooks, genealogical studies, and local histories. Though the use of such sources did not close all of the gaps in the data, they were sufficient to allow for a compilation of relatively complete sets of data on the careers of well over 500 men who were influential in the deliberations over the Constitution.

These careers, in turn, provided the base of data which was employed to test the model of innovation that was outlined earlier in this chapter. In the next two chapters, the findings that emerge from these data will be summarized and, in turn, the implications of these findings for the model will be set forth.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III

¹We call this a quasi-axiomatic format because we shall not formally state all of the assumptions of the theory but will instead leave many of them implicit in the body of the presentation. On axiomatic theories in general, see Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 96-100.

²For a discussion of the advantages of axiomatic formats, see Paul Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 95-96; and William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 7-8.

³The validity of this argument, however, remains a subject of controversy. For the best known defense of it, see Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. by May Brodbeck (London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 508-28.

⁴Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), p. 6.

⁵Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 28.

⁶Other writers have expanded upon this notion of political entrepreneurs. See Warren Illichman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 203-6.

⁷Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 10.

⁸Gordon Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 865-78.

⁹ Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 189-93.

¹⁰ See, for example, Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly, XXII (June, 1969), 298-308.

¹¹ Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 209.

¹² See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 88.

¹³ Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁵ Lester Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development," Journal of Politics, XXVI (August, 1964), 621.

¹⁶ Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations in the American States," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 885.

¹⁷ Downs, op. cit., pp. 198-200.

¹⁸ Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 201.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 174.

²⁰ Prewitt, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

²¹ Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 18.

²² Ibid., p. 174.

²³ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴ Downs, op. cit., p. 20.

²⁵ See Jackson Main, The Antifederalists (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 259.

²⁶Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁷See Black, op. cit., pp. 868-69.

²⁸John Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action," American Political Science Review, LV (December, 1961), 799-816.

²⁹Gordon Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXVI (March, 1972), 144-59.

³⁰Ibid., p. 146.

³¹Ibid., p. 156.

³²See Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

³³Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (June, 1961), 205-6.

³⁴Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," op. cit., pp. 148-49.

³⁵Downs, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

³⁶See Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 92-95; and Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). Hirschman, however, suggests some revisions of Festinger's use of this proposition.

³⁷Elkins and McKittrick, op. cit., and Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 235-36.

³⁸As was pointed out in Chapter II, McDonald based his economic analysis upon the property holdings of delegates to the state conventions.

³⁹The exception was South Carolina, where there was found to be a paucity of biographical data on the delegates to the state convention.

⁴⁰See Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 129.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF AMBITION: THE CAREER PERSPECTIVES OF FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS

The preceding chapters have attempted to outline a theory, together with a number of propositions derived from it, which relates the career perspectives of political leaders to the issue of innovation in political institutions. In the present chapter, we shall begin to test this theory. Hence, the following discussion will focus upon the first three sets of propositions that were set forth in Chapter III--those dealing with the careers of Federalists and Antifederalists subsequent to the ratification--and will attempt to relate them to the data that have been drawn from our sample of delegates to the various constitutional conventions.

Before these data are discussed, however, a preliminary question arises as to the degree to which the categories of analysis suggested by our model represent appropriate tools for examining this particular historical case. In Chapter II it was pointed out that a number of historians have used the notions of ambition and career perspectives to account for the events of 1787 and 1788. But it is important to note as well that the notion of ambition was also on

the minds of many of those who actually participated in the deliberations and the debates of the period.

At that time, as seems to be the case today as well, ambition was widely considered to be synonymous with venality or with the unscrupulous pursuit of political power. Thus, complaints were frequent among those in political life at the time of the tendency of ambition to "swallow up principle" and to reduce politics to the level of petty personal conflicts over who was going to wield power.¹ For some politicians, at least, the influence of ambition, with its association with power-seeking, raised a number of questions about the value of the political vocation itself. Thus, Jefferson, for example, remarked that he was so "disgusted with the jealousies, the hatred, the rancorous and malignant passions of this [political] scene" that he regretted ever entering the political arena in the first place.² Jefferson's complaint was not a function of his ideology, for his foremost political opponent, Hamilton, appears to have been of a like mind, at least concerning the corrosive influence of ambition. As he lamented:

Public office in this country has few attractions . . . The opportunity of doing good, from the jealousy of power and the spirit of faction, is too small in any station to warrant a long continuance of private sacrifices.³

In large part, of course, such complaints on the parts of political leaders mirrored the norms of the larger society toward ambition, power, and the political vocation. As we pointed out in an earlier chapter, a traditional theme in the American ethos has been the suspicion of political power, and at no time in the

American past has this animus been more potent than in the years immediately following the Revolution when the consequences of the British system of centralized power were still fresh in memory.⁴ In this setting, such an orientation toward power was easily displaced onto those who wielded it, namely, politicians, who were in turn subjected to suspicion both by the public at large as well as by certain elites who internalized its norms toward power. Thus, since ambition was closely associated with power-seeking, it is hardly surprising that it should have been perceived as a source of corruption in political life.

There were some, however, who conceived of the role of ambition in politics in a decidedly different light. For example, Margaret Bayard Smith, a long-time observer of national politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was bold enough to suggest that, instead of principle, it is "the ambition of individuals [that] is the mainspring of the great political machine which we call The Government."⁵ Indeed, one of the most systematic expositions of this thesis was delivered at about this time by John Adams, whose writings were influential in the deliberations over the Constitution. For Adams, the rationale for the separation of powers that was written into both national and state constitutions in the 1770's and 1780's was that it allowed for the effective control of the effects of political ambition.

The essence of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries. The executive and legislative powers are natural rivals; and if each has not an effectual control over the other, the weaker will ever be the lamb in the paws

of the wolf. The nation which will not adopt an equilibrium of power must adopt a despotism. There is no alternative.⁶

In Adams' view, the contention for power among a number of ambitious politicians made it unlikely that any single politician could dominate. Hence, instead of attempting to exorcise ambition from the political arena, Adams attempted to justify an institutional arrangement within which it could act to reinforce the decentralization of authority.

In addition, the actual debate over the ratification of the Constitution witnessed a number of references to political ambition, most of which, however, were advanced with the intent of questioning the motives of those politicians who supported one or another side of the issue. Thus, in The Federalist, Hamilton suggested that the opponents of the new system were moved not by principle or selflessness but rather by ambition.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every state to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men who . . . flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.⁷

It is, of course, a standard ideological ploy to accuse one's opponents of adopting causes that are self-serving. For the Federalists, however, the notion of ambition was central to their understanding of the nature of their opposition; indeed, the ratification procedures that they adopted were designed to minimize the influence

of those politicians in state offices whose ambitions would be jeopardized by the ratification of the new system.

Antifederalists, of course, frequently responded with the same charge, arguing that the proponents of the Constitution were driven by their aspirations to hold office at the national level. Among those so accused was John Adams himself, who was said to have harbored ambitions of becoming president once the new system was put into operation. There is, in addition, the frequently told story of the popular John Hancock, who, it was said, switched his support to the Federalists in return for a guarantee of Federalist support for his intended candidacy for vice-president or, in the event that Virginia did not ratify (thus disqualifying Washington), for president. As it turned out, Hancock's support was critical for the Federalist cause in Massachusetts, though the promise of Federalist support for his vice-presidential ambitions was never fully redeemed.⁸ Considerations of career were also said to have influenced the decisions of a number of delegates to the New York convention to switch their support to the Federalist side, thus paving the way for New York to throw its weight behind ratification. According to Forrest McDonald, those who changed their votes were, by and large, from the southern part of the state, which was strong Federalist territory. Thus, their eleventh-hour conversion to the Federalist cause had a practical basis, since, as McDonald points out, "in the event of a rising tide of Federalism in their areas their political careers would be protected by votes for the Constitution."⁹

The above discussion, while admittedly unsystematic, nevertheless suggests that ambition and considerations of career played an important role in the deliberations over the Constitution and, accordingly, lends added plausibility to the propositions that were advanced in Chapter III. The decisive test of these propositions, however, must await an examination of the data drawn from the actual careers of Federalist and Antifederalist leaders, and it is to this task that we now turn. For the remainder of this chapter, then, we shall examine the career data that bears upon the first three acts of these propositions, each of which deals with some aspect of Federalist and Antifederalist careers after 1788. The first, we recall, deals with the types of these careers; the second, with their mobility; and the third, with their institutional targets. Since these propositions have been theoretically justified and have been placed into the context of historical interpretation in the preceding chapters, little needs to be said by way of elaboration upon these themes as we proceed with the examination of the data. However, once this task is completed, we shall once again have occasion to revive these questions.

We begin this analysis, appropriately enough, with Hypothesis Set I:

Hypothesis Set I:

(a) Politicians with progressive ambitions were more likely to support the Federalist than the Antifederalist position on the Constitution; and, conversely, (b) those with static and discrete ambitions were more likely to support the Antifederalist position.

The definitions suggested by Schlesinger were employed as the starting point for testing these propositions. As he uses these notions, a progressive career refers to one in which a politician seeks to move from a lower to a higher office, a static career to one in which the politician seeks to make a long term career out of one particular office, and a discrete career or ambition to one in which a politician aims only at holding a particular office for a specified term and then intends to withdraw from political life.

Underlying this conceptualization, however, is the assumption that there exists a hierarchy of offices which may be unambiguously ranked according to their attractiveness to politicians. This assumption is, of course, necessary in order to make use of the notion of a progressive ambition. While such an assumption may be assumed to apply to stable opportunity structures such as those found in, say, a well established organization, its applicability to the conditions in 1788 is problematic, since the ultimate shape of the structure of political opportunity was exactly the issue over which Federalists and Antifederalists were contending. Thus, due to the fluidity of the institutional structure at that time, the question of what represented a higher and a lower office becomes difficult to answer.

However, in spite of this difficulty, a large proportion of offices were nevertheless capable of being rated according to their attractiveness to politicians. Our solution proceeded from the simple assumption that in most cases such preferences would accord with the objective reward of the offices in question, such as salary,

term of office, and the authority conferred by the office. Thus, for example, it was assumed that, ceterus parebus, state senate seats were deemed more attractive to politicians on the bases of these criteria than seats in the state house, and that where movement occurred between such offices, it would be from the former to the latter. The same assumption was, of course, likewise applied to a number of other unambiguous movements, such as, say, from local office to state legislative positions.

Such assumptions are, as one would expect, reinforced by behavioral data. In Table IV-1, six offices or office complexes are ranked according to their attractiveness in terms of the criteria suggested above. The lone difficulty involved the links between state executive posts and national legislative positions, which proved difficult to rank on institutional criteria. National positions were, however, placed at the top because we assumed that the flow of institutional authority was in that direction. Once these rankings were established, the sample was examined for movements between the listed offices in the three-year periods before and after the ratification (i.e., 1785 to 1791). The figures that appear in the table represent the proportion of movements between the relevant offices that corresponded with our rankings. Since the N's are small in most cases, one should not attempt to make too much of these data. However, they do suggest that politicians in that era moved from office to office in relative accordance with our assumptions. This is especially true with regard to movements between the various state and local offices, where the data correspond well with

TABLE IV-1
Proportions of Agreement between Career Choices and Office Rankings

Offices	National Legislative	State Executive	State Supreme Court	State Senate	State House	Local Offices
National Legislative ^a	--					
State Executive ^b	.33 (6)	--				
State Supreme Court	.75 (4)	1.00 (2)	--			
State Senate	.88 (17)	1.00 (3)	1.00 (1)	--		
State House	.83 (22)	1.00 (3)	1.00 (2)	.89 (47)	--	
Local Offices	1.00 (5)	1.00 (1)	1.00 (1)	.71 (14)	.77 (48)	--

Note: The figures that appear in the table represent the proportion of movements between the relevant offices that were consistent with the office rankings that were established. Thus, for example, 88% of the movements between state senate positions and national legislative positions were in the predicted direction.

^a"National Legislative" offices were composed of the Continental Congress before 1788 and the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate after 1788.

^b"State Executive" offices were composed of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State.

our rankings. Because these offices were well established by this time, politicians had apparently reached a consensus as to which were most attractive. The same cannot be said, however, for movements between state and national positions, where the correspondence between our rankings and the career choices of the delegates was not quite as close. The most likely reason for this seeming disparity is that since national offices were new, they were subject to differing assessments by politicians. It is to be noted in passing that the lowest correlation between our rankings and the behavioral data occurred in relation to moves between state executive posts and national legislative positions, or, in other words, between the offices that we experienced the greatest difficulty in ranking in terms of institutional criteria.

The above assumptions and data led us to adopt the following rules for distinguishing progressive from static and discrete careers. In cases in which the offices in question could easily be distinguished on the bases of the institutional criteria suggested above and where the career choices of politicians supported these rankings, office movements could be unambiguously classified. Thus, for example, movements from the state house to the senate or from local to state-wide offices were considered to be progressive and were coded accordingly. Occasionally, we encountered a case in which a politician's career choice corresponded neither with our rankings nor with the behavior of the great share of his colleagues. These shifts were accordingly considered to be non-progressive. Since these were not regarded as career advancements, they were

included in the same category as static careers. A more serious difficulty entered, however, when we encountered moves between offices that could not be readily distinguished either on the bases of the above criteria or on the bases of actual behaviors. Moves between state executive positions and the national Congress, for example, fall into this category. When faced with lateral shifts of this sort, it was decided that the safest rule to follow was to assume that the politician in question was pursuing what was considered to be a more attractive position in an ambiguously defined structure of opportunity. Under this solution, then, lateral moves of this kind were assumed to be inspired by progressive ambitions, and these were likewise coded accordingly.

These decision rules were in turn employed to classify the careers of Federalists and Antifederalists and, in turn, to test the proposition stated above. However, even with the aid of the most clearly formulated rules of classification, the use of qualitative data of this sort is always accompanied by the danger of systematic biases entering into the coding of the data. This, of course, involves the problem of reliability. In order to meet the specter of bias, a sample of the data used in this study was turned over to two independent coders who were informed of the above coding rules and instructed to classify all office movements that they found as either progressive, static, or discrete. In turn, the results that emerged were compared for the degree of inter-coder agreement, or reliability. The greater the degree of agreement, the more reliable the data, since high agreement implies that the categories

in question are formulated clearly enough so that there is interpersonal agreement as to their meaning. In the case of our test, the results turned out to be satisfactory, since the degree of agreement between the two coders was found to be .81, which, though far from perfect, is sufficiently high to insure that no systematic bias was introduced into the data through coding procedures.¹⁰

In deriving a test for the proposition stated above, we focused upon the careers of the delegates in the time period immediately surrounding the deliberations over the Constitution, under the assumption that the career choices made in this period represented reliable reflections of calculations entertained at the time of the ratification itself. Thus, in analyzing these careers, we focused in the first place upon the last office held by each delegate prior to the ratification in 1788 and, in the second place, upon the first office gained or sought after the ratification was accomplished. The time frame adopted here was the period between 1785 and 1792, or roughly the three years on either side of the ratification. These careers were then coded as either progressive, static or discrete. In the case that a delegate held no office in the years immediately preceding the ratification (i.e., from 1785 to 1788), as was the case with many of the younger delegates, his career was coded as inapplicable for the purposes of this test. If, however he held or sought no offices in the years immediately following 1788, his career was, of course, coded as discrete.

The tables that follow summarize the results of this test of Hypothesis Set I. As Table IV-2 clearly indicates, those who

pursued progressive careers in the period in question were much more likely to support the Federalist than the Antifederalist position of the Constitution. Thus, over 80 per cent of those delegates with progressive careers were Federalists while only about 16 per cent were Antifederalists. On the other hand, as the propositions had predicted, those delegates with static or discrete ambitions were found with greater frequencies in the Antifederalist camp, though the differences here were much smaller than they were with progressive careers.

TABLE IV-2

Affiliation and Type of Career: First Office

Affiliation	Type of Career				Total
	Progressive	Static	Discrete	Other ^a	
Federalist	84%	43%	45%	59%	(297)
Antifederalist	16	57	55	41	(213)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(153)	(210)	(67)	(80)	N=510
$\chi^2=63.631$					
DF=3					
P<.001					
C=.471					

^a"Other" consists of those who held no office prior to 1788.

When this table is rotated and the percentages calculated in the other direction, we can get a picture of the composition of each group in terms of the frequencies with which its members pursued progressive, static and discrete careers. This was done in

Table IV-3, and the data suggest that within each group, the proportion pursuing progressive careers was much greater among Federalists, a finding that comes as no surprise in the light of the figures presented above. Thus, while about 41 per cent of Federalist careers were found to be progressive in direction, this was true of only about 11 per cent of Antifederalist careers. Antifederalists, meanwhile, were much more content to remain in the same offices, as differences in the rates of static careers for the two groups indicate. In both groups, however, the frequencies of discrete careers were considerably lower, though again, as the hypothesis suggested, they were higher among Antifederalists.

TABLE IV-3

Affiliation and Type of Career: First Office

Type of Career	Affiliation		
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Progressive	43%	12%	
Static	31	55	
Discrete	10	18	
Other ^a	16	15	
	<hr/> 100% (297)	<hr/> 100% (213)	
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	23	7	
	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 220	
$\chi^2=63.631$	DF=3	P<.001	C= .471

^a"Other" consisted of those who held no office prior to 1788.

The proposition is reinforced further when the sample is split into sub-groups consisting of those who were more and less influential on each side during the conflict over ratification. It is, of course, possible that the differences reported above were due, as Beard suggested, to the influence of a relatively small group of intensely ambitious nationalists at the head of the Federalist ranks. We are therefore interested in finding out if the differences reported above extend to those delegates who were not at the heads of their respective causes.

Accordingly, such a test was run, and for this purpose the sample was split into four sub-groups consisting of what we earlier termed Statesmen and Regulars from each side of the issue. The results of this test are summarized in Table IV-4. The figures suggest that the proposition survives despite this control, since regardless of leadership status, Federalists were more likely than Antifederalists to pursue progressive careers. In this respect, even the Regulars among the Federalists outdistanced by considerable margins both of the Antifederalist sub-groups. However, it is also to be noted that Federalist Statesmen stood far and away above all other sub-groups in the frequency with which they sought advancement. Thus, they were about three times as likely to pursue progressive careers as Antifederalist Statesmen, and, indeed, about twice as likely as other, less influential Federalists. Though the proposition survives this line of analysis, we are left with the strong suggestion that the Federalist leadership represented an atypical sub-group within the population of delegates. Of course their

TABLE IV-4

Affiliation and Type of Career: Leadership

Type of Career	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Progressive	63%	36%	21%	9%
Static	22	34	57	55
Discrete	8	11	15	18
Other ^a	7	19	7	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(78)	(219)	(53)	(160)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	3	20	2	5
	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=89.495$	DF=9	P<.001	C= .338	

^a"Other" consists of those who held no office prior to 1788.

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comparatively close association with the nationalist cause reflected the extent to which they were committed to the principles that that movement represented; however, it also reflected, as the figures suggest, the extent to which their careers were tied to its success.

It is also possible, however, that the above differences could have been due to the impact of still another variable, namely, age. The proposition was suggested earlier, and will be discussed further in the next chapter, that Federalists were on the average younger than their opponents. If this turns out to be the case, it would be reasonable to suspect that the difference in their votes was due not so much to their career perspectives but rather to the fact that Federalists were younger and for this reason were more likely to give support to innovative policies. This possibility was investigated by breaking both Federalists and Antifederalists into sub-groups according to age and then comparing the different frequencies of progressive, static and discrete ambitions within each age group. The relevant findings are summarized in Table IV-5. As the table indicates, the impact of age does not wash out the differences in career perspectives between Federalists and Antifederalists, since Federalists were more likely to pursue progressive careers regardless of age. Indeed, the differences between the two groups were pronounced in every age category except among those 61 and over, and here it is reasonable to suppose that the impact of ambition diminishes among politicians of all persuasions. It is also to be noted that, once again in line with the hypothesis, the frequencies of static and discrete careers remained higher for

TABLE IV-5
Affiliation and Type of Career: By Age Group

[illegible]

a "Other" consists of those who held no office prior to 1788.

Antifederalists independent of the age category in question. Thus, these data suggest that career perspectives had an impact upon the deliberations of these politicians that was independent of age.

Another question worth pursuing concerns the extent to which the career choices adopted in the years immediately surrounding the ratification were translated into long-run career commitments. Though the above findings deal with a relatively narrow time frame, the differences reported between Federalists and Antifederalists maintained themselves as the participants moved further in time beyond the events of 1788. In arriving at this conclusion, I examined the office behavior of all delegates in the sample who either held or sought office between the years 1789 and 1793. The careers of these men next examined between the years 1793 and 1800 and coded as either progressive, static, or discrete, depending upon whether they sought to advance beyond the first office held in this period, whether they attempted to make a career out of that first office, or whether they withdrew from office altogether after a brief period of time. Those who pursued no office in either period (i.e., those who were coded as discrete in the above analysis), were grouped into a separate category for the purposes of this test. The results of this line of analysis are summarized in Tables IV-6 and IV-7 where it may be seen that though the differences reported above diminished as we expanded our time frame, such differences nevertheless persisted to a significant degree. As the figures indicate, half again as many Federalists and Antifederalists pursued progressive careers after their first offices, while, at the same time, Antifederalist

TABLE IV-6
Affiliation and Type of Career:
After First Office

Type of Career	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
Progressive	43%	26%
Static	34	32
Discrete	7	24
Other ^a	16	18
	100%	100%
	(297)	(213)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	23	7
	320	220
$\chi^2=37.623$	DF=3	P<.001
		C=.366

^a"Other" consists of those who had no political career after 1788.

TABLE IV-7

Affiliation and Type of Career: After
First Office By Leadership Group

Type of Career	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Progressive	52%	40%	38%	22%
Static	32	34	18	36
Discrete	5	7	29	23
Other ^a	11	19	15	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(78)	(219)	(53)	(160)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	3	20	2	5
Total	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=49.293$ DF=9 P<.01 C=.300				

^a"Other" consists of those who had no career after their first office.

delegates entertained discrete ambitions at a rate of more than three times that of Federalist delegates. During this time period, however, the rates of static ambitions as reflected in actual office behaviors were approximately the same for both groups. These differences tended to hold up across groups when the sample was split into leadership sub-groups, though, as Table IV-7 indicates, the passage of time succeeded in narrowing the gap considerably between Antifederalist Statesmen and both Federalist groups in the frequencies with which they pursued progressive careers.

Before finally having done with this set of propositions, let us for a moment pursue a brief aside. Included in our sample was a sub-group of delegates who, after having been elected to one or another of the conventions, switched their allegiances at the last moment to the Federalists. A good share of these were found in New York where there was a good deal of eleventh-hour maneuvering, though there others from Maryland, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. McDonald has suggested that many of these "switchers" acted out of the belief that continued support for the Antifederalist position would doom any future career plans that they entertained.¹¹ This corresponds with Hirschman's proposition that those who exit from an organization usually do so because it has run dry of incentives for future gain.¹² In the light of these arguments, it is reasonable to suppose that switchers were more likely to entertain progressive ambitions than those who remained loyal to the Antifederalist position. Withal, this proposition was tested, and to this end switchers were separated from the other two main groups in the sample. Due to the small N's

among the switchers, the results of this test should be interpreted with some caution. These results are in any case summarized in Table IV-8, where it may be seen that, indeed, the frequency of progressive careers was greater among switchers than it was among Antifederalists, though, to be sure, this difference was far from large. The figures also show, however, that switchers were far outdistanced by other Federalists in the rate at which they pursued advancements in their political careers.

Let us summarize what we have said so far. The findings reported in the above tables are, by and large, consistent with our predictions and, hence, they suffice to reinforce the propositions stated in Hypothesis Set I. Thus, given the data gathered for this study, it may be concluded that those who entertained different perspectives toward their careers tended to take different positions on the Constitution. In particular, those who sought advancement in their careers were more likely to opt for the Federalists, while those who did not entertain such ambitions were more likely to side with the Antifederalists. Hence, we found as a result of this that, as a group, the Federalist side was composed of a larger share of delegates who were upwardly mobile in their careers. The conclusions to be drawn from this will be discussed in a later section of this chapter when this finding can be considered together with others that will be reported below.

We turn now to consider a proposition that is closely related to the one just analyzed. This deals with the issue of

TABLE IV-8

Type of Career, First Office:
Switchers and Non-Switchers

Type of Career	Affiliation		
	Switchers	Other Federalists	Antifederalists
Progressive	24%	43%	12%
Static	64	29	55
Discrete	12	10	18
Other ^a	0	18	15
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(17)	(280)	(213)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	0	23	7
	<u>17</u>	<u>303</u>	<u>220</u>
$\chi^2=72.780$	DF=6	P<.001	C=.500

^a"Other" consists of those who held no office prior to 1788.

career mobility, which has been discussed in Chapter III and which has already been stated as follows:

Hypothesis Set II:

The greater the mobility of a politician's career, the more likely he is to support innovative policies. Hence, (a) the greater the mobility of a delegate's career, the greater the likelihood that he supported the Federalist position on the Constitution. Thus, it follows that (b) the careers of Federalists were marked by greater mobility than those of Antifederalists.

The notion of career mobility, we have suggested earlier, can be defined simply as the frequency with which politicians move from office to office during the courses of their careers. In its focus upon such movements, the concept of mobility is similar to the variable that was examined in Hypothesis Set I. Though, admittedly, these concepts tap closely related dimensions among political careers, they may be distinguished from one another in that the concept of mobility is concerned only with the frequency with which politicians change offices and is thus unconcerned with the issue raised earlier of whether such shifts actually represent career advancements.

Due to the similarity between these two notions, we decided to adapt the procedure employed in the context of examining Hypothesis Set I to the testing of the present proposition. Hence, once again, our focus was upon the last office held by each delegate in the three years just prior to the ratification and upon the first office gained or sought after the ratification was accomplished. These careers were then coded as mobile, in the case that the delegate sought a new position, static, in the case that he remained in the same office, or

withdrew, in the case that he abandoned public office immediately after the ratification. These categories are analogous to those employed in the context of the first set of propositions. All delegates, however, could not be classified in terms of this scheme. Thus, those who held no offices prior to 1788 were included in a separate category. Also, delegates who died a short time after the ratification were considered to be inapplicable for the purposes of this test (as well as for most others that appear in this chapter).

Given the similarity between the concepts and the procedures used in testing Hypothesis Sets I and II, it comes as no surprise to find that in each case the data yield parallel results. Hence, as the figures in Table IV-9 suggest, those delegates whose careers were characterized by mobility leaned heavily toward the Federalist position on the Constitution. Thus, about 80 per cent of those delegates whose careers were so classified were Federalists. On the other hand, those whose careers were not mobile were more frequently found to support the Antifederalist cause, though by somewhat smaller margins. In addition, this relationship is further reinforced by the fact that the correlation coefficient generated from this table was about .56, which suggests that there exists a fairly strong positive relationship between career mobility and the decisions of delegates on the Constitution.

When this table is rotated, we once again gain a picture of the compositions of these two groups in terms of the frequencies with which their members pursued careers marked by mobility. As

TABLE IV-9

Affiliation and Mobility of Career

Affiliation	Mobility				Total
	Mobile	Stationary	Withdrew	Other ^a	
Federalist	81%	31%	45%	59%	(297)
Antifederalist	19	69	55	41	(213)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(216)	(147)	(67)	(80)	N=510
			Not Ascertained or Not Applicable		30
			Total		540
	$\chi^2 = 95.364$	DF=3	P<.001	C=.561	

^a"Other" consists of those delegates who held no office prior to 1788.

Table IV-10 indicates, Federalists, as proponents of innovation, were decidedly more likely than Antifederalists to exhibit mobility in their political careers. Corresponding with this, of course, was the finding that Antifederalists were more likely to have been marked by stationary careers. This pattern held up once again when the sample was split into the four leader-follower sub-groups. Accordingly, as Table IV-11 suggests, even when leadership is considered, Federalists of both sub-groups continued to exhibit mobility in their careers with greater frequency than did either of the Antifederalist groups. Thus, as the table indicates, the comparatively stationary character of Antifederalist careers held up not only among Regulars but also among those in the leadership stratum as well.

TABLE IV-10
Affiliation and Mobility of Career

Mobility of Career	Affiliation		
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mobile	59%	20%	
Stationary	15	47	
Withdrew	10	17	
Other ^a	16	16	
	<hr/> 100% (297)	<hr/> 100% (213)	
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	23	7	
	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 220	
$\chi^2=95.364$	DF=3	P<.001	C=.561

^a"Other" consists of those who held no office prior to 1788.

TABLE IV-11

Affiliation and Mobility of Career: Leadership

Mobility of Career	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mobile	73%	53%	30%	16%
Stationary	12	17	47	48
Withdrew	8	11	15	18
Other ^a	7	19	8	18
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(78)	(219)	(53)	(160)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	3	20	2	5
Total	<u>81</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>165</u>
$\chi^2=106.807$ DF=9 P<.001 C=.416				

^a"Other" consists of those who held no office before 1788.

3

Since the above procedure overlaps somewhat with that employed in our test of Hypothesis Set I, we attempted to approach the notion of mobility from another angle using a different empirical indicator. In Chapter III, we cited a number of sources that suggested that newer and relatively unestablished organizations are likely to be marked by higher rates of turnover among their personnel than is the case with more firmly established enterprises. Thus, if such organizations are marked by higher turnover, then it follows that the careers of their personnel are also likely to be characterized by more frequent leaps from office to office. If we once again view the Federalists as representatives of an emergent but as yet only tenuously established national organization, then it is also likely that their careers were marked by a higher frequency of such leaps than were those of their opponents.

In pursuing this line of analysis, we focused upon two time periods, each of an eight year duration: from 1780 to 1788 and from 1789 to 1797. These periods, of course, circumscribe the year of ratification. In each period, the number of offices held by each delegate was recorded and analyzed in terms of the differences between the mean scores for each group and in terms of the extent to which such scores correlated with the decisions on the Constitution. Tables IV-12 through IV-15 summarize the results of this analysis.

In the period from 1780 to 1788, as Table IV-12 reveals, Federalists changed offices slightly more often than Antifederalists and, hence, the figures list in the predicted direction. In addition, these differences, though seemingly small, were statistically

TABLE IV-12
Affiliation and Mobility of Career, 1780-1788:
Mean Scores

	Affiliation		Total
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mean Score (number of offices held)	1.647	1.331	1.506
Standard Dev.	1.112	.818	1.811
Variance	1.263	.670	3.280
N	296	210	506
t=3.752	DF=515	P<.01 ^a	R _{pb} =.170 ^b

^aThis significance test is two-tailed, as are all others that follow that involve differences between means.

^bThis is a point bi-serial correlation. For a discussion of this statistic, see Dennis Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 163-65.

TABLE IV-13

Affiliation and Mobility of Career, 1780-1788:
Mean Scores for Leadership Groups

	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mean Score (number of offices held)	2.040	1.475	1.566	1.255
Standard Dev.	1.200	1.051	.880	.781
Variance	1.441	1.104	.774	.610
N	76	219	53	157

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	38.16	4	9.54	9.992	<0.0005
Within Categories	478.32	501	.954		
Total	517.48	505			
Simple Correlation: R=.272					

TABLE IV-14
Affiliation and Mobility of Careers,
1789-1797: Mean Scores

	Affiliation		Total
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mean Score (number of offices held)	1.761	1.230	1.502
Standard Dev.	1.107	.938	1.078
Variance	1.224	.879	1.162
N	287	207	494
$t=5.867$ $DF=515$ $P<.01$ $R_{pb}=.235^a$			

^aPoint bi-serial correlation.

TABLE IV-15
Affiliation and Mobility of Careers, 1789-1797
Mean Scores for Leadership Groups

	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mean Score (number of offices held)	2.070	1.594	1.382	1.041
Standard Dev.	1.082	1.129	1.060	.855
Variance	1.170	1.275	1.124	.731
N	75	212	55	152

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	46.64	3	15.54	14.458	<0.0005
Within Categories	526.86	490	1.08		
Total	573.50	493			
Simple Correlation: R=.285					

significant using a t-test for differences between means. This, however, may have been due as much to the size of our N's as to the size of the difference between the means. This interpretation of the data is reinforced when we consider that the correlation obtained from the test was only about .17, which, when squared, suggests that this particular indicator of mobility accounts for less than 3 per cent of the variation between the voting groups on the Constitution.

When the sample is split along the leader-follower dimension, the picture that emerges once again casts in relief the difference between Federalist Statesmen and the other three sub-groups in the sample. Accordingly, if we focus upon the mean frequencies in Table IV-13, we see clearly that Federalist Statesmen were considerably more mobile in their careers during this period than any other sub-group. On the other hand, Federalist Regulars were not sharply differentiated from either of the Antifederalist sub-groups on this variable.

A parallel but slightly stronger conclusion emerges when we examine the data for the period following the ratification. Once again, as Table IV-14 indicates, Federalists exhibited greater mobility in their careers than did Antifederalists. In this period, however, this difference was somewhat greater as the correlations and the variations in the mean scores clearly indicate. These differences were once again found to be sufficiently large to be considered statistically significant, given the large degrees of freedom. This assessment does not change after the sample is split into the four sub-groups, since, as Table IV-15 suggests, both of the Federalist

sub-groups rated higher on this indicator of mobility than did either of the Antifederalist groups. Once again, however, Federalist Statesmen are clearly set off from the other groups in the sample. The degree to which they were atypical is suggested by the fact that the difference between the mean scores for Federalist Statesmen on the one hand and Federalist Regulars on the other was itself found to be statistically significant using a t-test.¹³ Thus, the sub-group that pushed most strongly for innovation turns out also to have been the group that exhibited the greatest mobility in their careers once that innovation was accomplished.

On balance, then, the data examined here reinforce the propositions set forth in Hypothesis Set II. Thus, those delegates whose careers exhibited mobility tended to support the Federalists while those whose careers were more stationary tended to give their support to the Antifederalists. This conclusion held true for both of the above indicators that were used to tap mobility, though the relationship between mobility and the decision on the Constitution was somewhat stronger for the period following its successful ratification.

The final set of propositions to be considered in this chapter deals with the targets of the careers of the delegates to the various conventions. These propositions were discussed in Chapter III and were stated there as follows:

Hypothesis Set III:

(a) Politicians who entertained ambitions to hold national office were more likely to support the Federalist position on the Constitution while (b) those who entertained ambitions for state and local careers were more likely to support the Antifederalist position.

This proposition represents one of the weaker links in our chain of propositions since, though it has been justified above in a theoretical sense, it may also be viewed as intuitively apparent. Federalists, of course, by virtue of their votes supporting the new system, were heavily advantaged in their efforts to capture the offices that that system brought into being. On the other hand, it may also be assumed that many voters at that time considered a vote against the Constitution to be a factor that disqualified a politician from holding national office. Thus, though a delegate's position on the Constitution may have been an outgrowth of his career perspectives, that position, once taken, may have itself played a role in determining the extent to which such ambitions were fulfilled.

But if this consideration worked in favor of the above proposition, there were other factors whose effects may have served to undermine it. Of particular importance was the relative thinness of the opportunities available at the national level. Because the national government was new in this period, opportunities at that level were more restricted than in state or local structures, a restriction which limited the number of politicians who were able to make careers out of national office. James Young has estimated that, as of about 1800, there were less than 3,000 persons in the employ of the federal government, and about 95 per cent of these occupied such obscure administrative roles as revenue collectors, federal marshals, postmasters, and foreign consuls. As he has pointed out:

The early [national] government was a small institution, small almost beyond modern imagination. In 1802, the twelfth year

of its existence under the Constitution, the entire task force of the national government . . . numbered considerably fewer persons than the federal employees now engaged in Indian affairs, or in apprehending federal criminals. Less than three thousand non-uniformed personnel were affiliated with the institution: one public servant for every 1,914 citizens as against one for every sixty-two today.¹⁴

The smallness of the size of the federal government was coupled with the meagerness of its functions. As Young points out, the Supreme Court was able to finish off its business after only about two months per year spent in the Capitol. In addition, Congress was usually in session only in the winter months when political activities did not collide with the planting and harvesting seasons. Moreover, the national government had little to do with functions that are readily conceded to it today, such as with social welfare, education, and the regulation of business. Thus, about 80 per cent of all non-military federal employees were concerned with one or another aspect of revenue collection. Those involved with the disbursement of such funds in the area of social services amounted to only about 8 per cent of this total.¹⁵ Hence, in its early years anyway, the national government was more concerned with simply maintaining itself than with providing social services to its citizens.

All of this meant that in the early years of its existence the national government suffered in prestige in comparison with the various state and local governments. Though our data do not reflect this pattern (see Table IV-1), Young points out that political leaders abandoned national positions in droves for what were considered to be more prestigious positions in the states.¹⁶ On this score,

Young's views are in agreement with those expressed by Woodrow Wilson, who in his biography of George Washington remarked that:

It was hard, in filling even the greater offices, to find men of eminence who were willing to leave the services of their states or the ease and security of private life to try the untrodden paths of federal government. The states were old and secure--so men thought--the federal government was new and an experiment.¹⁷

Thus, the thinness of its opportunity structure, the meagerness of its functions, and its relative lack of prestige--all of these factors could have been expected to limit the proportion of delegates of either persuasion who were willing or able to make a career out of national office. Such considerations may therefore serve to weaken the hypothesis suggested above that Federalists and Antifederalists were distinguished by the institutional targets of their careers.

This proposition was once again tested through an examination of the first offices held by delegates in the first three years after the ratification. These offices were then coded as either national, state, or local, depending upon the arena in which they were located. Those delegates who held no office in this period or, alternatively, who held dual positions and who were thus difficult to classify were included in a separate category.

The results of this particular test are summarized in Table IV-16. As the table indicates, those delegates whose subsequent careers were located in national office, tended to support the Federalist position on the Constitution with considerably greater frequency than they did the Antifederalist position (83 per cent for

TABLE IV-16

Affiliation and Target of Career, First Office

Affiliation	Target				Total
	National	State	Local	Other ^a	
Federalist	83%	57%	44%	43%	(297)
Antifederalist	17	43	56	57	(213)
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
	(98)	(269)	(66)	(74)	N=507
				Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	33
					<u>540</u>
	$\chi^2=36.449$	DF=6	P<.01	C=.365	

^a"Other" consists of those who either held dual offices in this period or who held no office of any kind.

the Federalists to 17 per cent for the Antifederalists). Contrary to our hypothesis, however, a similar finding is applicable to state offices, though the margin of difference between the two groups is much smaller. But when local offices are considered, the data once again lend support to the proposition, since a majority of delegates whose careers were associated with such offices gave their support to the Antifederalists.

Rotating the table, a picture of the composition of the two groups in terms of this variable comes into view. As Table IV-17 suggests, Federalists pursued national offices with much greater frequency than did their opponents. However, even among Federalists,

TABLE IV-17

Affiliation and Target of Career, First Office

Target of Career	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
National	27%	8%
State	52	53
Local	9	18
Other ^a	12	21
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%
	(297)	(213)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	23	7
	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 220
$\chi^2=36.449$	DF=6	P<.01
		C=.365

^a"Other" consists of those either held dual offices in this period or who held no office of any kind.

the proportion of delegates who sought national offices were overshadowed by a considerable margin by those who attempted to capture state positions, a finding that probably reflects the difference in the number of positions available in the two office complexes. Thus, once again in opposition to our predictions, both groups pursued careers in state offices in roughly the same proportions. The differences emerge once again, however, when we consider local offices. Given the Antifederalist view that political power should be located as close as possible to the local arena, it is not surprising to find that Antifederalists attempted to capture such positions with about twice the frequency of Federalist delegates (about 18 per cent among Antifederalists to about 9 per cent among Federalists).

This pattern was maintained, as Table IV-18 suggests, when the sample was split into sub-groups according to leadership status. Here, as before, both Federalist groups pursued national offices in larger proportions than did either of the Antifederalist sub-groups. Once again, however, Federalist Statesmen were distinctive in that they pursued national offices with much greater frequency than any of the other groups of delegates. This, of course, parallels the findings that were reported earlier in the contexts of our discussions of Hypothesis Sets I and II.

Such differences persisted when we examined the office behavior of delegates over a slightly longer time span. Thus, the careers of the delegates in our sample were examined for the years between 1788 and 1800 and coded according to their dominant institutional focus. A "dominant institutional focus" was defined as one

TABLE IV-18

Affiliation and Target of Career, First
Office: By Leadership Group

Target of Career	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
National	49%	20%	9%	7%
State	42	55	64	49
Local	1	13	8	20
Other ^a	8	12	19	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(78)	(219)	(53)	(160)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	3	20	2	5
Total	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=79.842$ DF=9 P<.01 C=.368				

^a"Other" consists of those who either held dual offices in this period or who held no office of any kind.

in which at least two-thirds of a politician's office experience in the period just mentioned was located in one particular office arena. Those careers which were not marked by a dominant focus were coded as having had a dual focus. As Tables IV-19 and IV-20 indicate, the career choices reported above for the short-run tended to maintain themselves over the longer haul. Thus, Federalists continued to center their careers around national offices in larger numbers than did Antifederalists. On the other hand, Antifederalists continued to show a slightly greater preference for state and local careers. These patterns remain intact when the sample is split into leadership sub-groups, though, once again, Federalist Statesmen were set off from the other groups in that a comparatively large proportion of such delegates continued to root their careers in national as opposed to state or local offices (see Table IV-20).

The findings reported in the above tables lend support to the proposition that delegates with national careers were more likely to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. As a result of this, it was also found that Federalists as a group were more likely than their opponents to locate their careers in the national arena, though due to the thinness of the opportunities available at that level, the frequencies of national careers on both sides of the issue were considerably lower than were those of state and local careers. Contrary to our predictions, however, state positions represented the most frequently pursued offices among both Federalists and Antifederalists alike, and as the data turned out, no significant differences were found in the rates at which delegates

TABLE IV-19

Affiliation and Focus of Career, 1788-1800

Focus of Career	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
National	26%	8%
State	46	47
Local	8	16
Dual	10	11
No Career in this Period	10	18
	<u>100%</u> (297)	<u>100%</u> (213)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	23	7
	<u>320</u>	<u>220</u>
$\chi^2=34.884$	DF=4	P<.01
		C=.358

TABLE IV-20

Affiliation and Focus of Career, 1788-1800:
By Leadership Group

Target of Career	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
National	49%	18%	7%	8%
State	32	50	57	44
Local	1	11	10	19
Dual	10	10	11	11
No Career in this Period	7	11	15	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(78)	(219)	(53)	(160)
Not Ascertained or Not Applicable	3	20	2	5
	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=77.356$ DF=12 P<.001 C=.363				

from either side pursued such offices. Nevertheless, a third element of the hypothesis received support from the data, since Antifederalists were found to have outdistanced Federalists in the rates at which they pursued local careers. In addition, as has been said, these relationships held up when the sample was split into the four leader-follower sub-groups. However, the office profiles that were set forth in Hypothesis Set III were most strongly mirrored in Federalist statesmen, whose careers reflected the strongest commitments to national offices and the greatest antipathy toward pursuing careers in either state or local arenas. Among Antifederalists, however, such a divergence was not as clearly apparent, since in both sub-groups state and local careers tended to dominate. The above finding with respect to the anomalous character of Federalist Statesmen reinforces much of the data reported earlier in the chapter which suggested that the careers of such leaders were more mobile and were more likely to reflect progressive ambitions than those of any of the other sub-groups in the sample.

Ambition, Political Organization, and the
Logic of Collective Action

The seeming importance of ambition in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists suggests that it may also be employed to shed light upon another aspect of the conflict over the Constitution. In particular, it may be useful in accounting for the differential organizational strengths of the parties to the controversy.

4

A number of organizational theorists have suggested that groups can be organized around two different kinds of payoffs: selective incentives and collective or public goods. The former consist of those rewards that the individual member can consume only by joining or contributing to the organization. Thus, selective incentives operate according to the rules of the market, since only those who contribute to or pay for the organization can consume the goods that it provides. Public goods, on the other hand, are those that cannot be so restricted, since once a public good has been provided to one person in a group, it cannot feasibly be withheld from any other person in that group. In other words, a public good, once provided through the contributions of any number of individuals, cannot be withheld from other members of their group even though such members have not contributed to its provision.¹⁸ The most common examples of public goods are national defense and other forms of police protection, goods which once erected protect every member of the society independently of who has paid for them.

Olson has argued that enterprises are more durable when they are organized around selective incentives rather than around public goods. The reason is not difficult to understand. Selective incentives provide inducements for individuals to join and to support the organization, since they cannot receive the goods of the organization unless they do. Public goods on the other hand may be consumed by such individuals without contributing to the maintenance of the organization. Thus, where public goods are at issue, organization will generally suffer, since prospective clients of the

organization will reason that they can consume the organization's products without supporting the organization itself. Moreover, all individuals, excepting those who are passionately committed to the organization's cause, are likely to reason the same way, thus making it nearly impossible for the enterprise to get off the ground, much less to function as a viable organization.

Schlesinger has suggested that a parallel argument applies to the development of political organizations, such as parties. In his view, ambition for office represents the selective incentive around which political parties succeed in organizing themselves.¹⁹ In most systems, ambitious politicians cannot fulfill their office goals except under the banner of a party; hence, in order to realize their goals, politicians must join and contribute to the maintenance of the party organization. Those leaders who do not so contribute, of course, are frozen out of the benefit that the party offers, that is, the control of public office. Thus, as Schlesinger suggests, party organization draws its strength not from a collective good, such as, say, the attraction of its principles, but instead from its control of the ambitions of its members.

To return now to the controversy over the Constitution, a number of scholars have argued that the advantage held by Federalists in the final tally derived in part from their superior political organization.²⁰ A common explanation for this holds that since Federalists had continental goals, they found it easier than Anti-federalists to develop organizations that reached across state borders. Elkins and McKittrick, however, have suggested an additional

factor. Thus, they argue that, due to their ambitions, Federalists were willing to expend greater energies in achieving their goals than Antifederalists. A more systematic rationale for this is suggested by the theory of organizations that we have just summarized.

Organization, of course, requires expenditures in time, energy, and other resources and, as we shall see, Federalists had more incentive to put forth such expenditures than did their opponents. The reason for this is that a victory promised different kinds of rewards for each side of the conflict. For Federalists, and especially for its leadership stratum, who by and large saw their futures in terms of national office, the triumph of the new system promised not only an increase in the authority of national office, but also an expansion of the opportunities at that level. Such opportunities represented a selective incentive for those with national ambitions to contribute to the Federalist organization, since, first, such opportunities would be withheld in the case of a Federalist defeat and, second, those who tendered such contributions could be expected to be advantaged in capturing such positions in the event of a Federalist victory. For Antifederalists, on the other hand, who by and large saw their futures in terms of state and local offices, a victory promised to deliver a reward that resembled a public good; or, to look at it another way, a defeat threatened them with what they might have viewed as a public evil. The new system did not threaten the availability of opportunities at the state and local level, nor, of course, did it promise to expand them. In this sense, a selective incentive was lacking for Antifederalist organization in a way that it was not for their

opponents. What the new system did threaten, however, was a decrease in the prestige and power associated with state and local positions. A victory, of course, would simply preserve the current levels of such prestige and power. Such rewards (or penalties) resemble public goods in the sense that if one state or local office-holder maintained the power and prestige of his office, all such office-holders would have similarly benefited. Hence, those Antifederalists with state and local aspirations could have expected to consume the benefits of the victorious enterprise whether or not they made any serious contributions to it. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that one element behind the differential organizational strengths of these two groups was that while Federalists were attempting to organize around selective incentives, Antifederalists were forced by the nature of their situation to organize around the promise of a public good.

The discerning reader will notice, however, that this analogy breaks down at one point. This involves the observation that the Federalist organization could not withhold national office from those who did not contribute to their cause. Obviously, a number of politicians who were not even parties to the conflict succeeded in nailing down national positions soon after ratification was accomplished. However, it is enough to sustain the analogy to suggest that those who did so contribute were heavily advantaged in their attempts to secure such offices.

Summary

When considered together, the above findings yeild considerable support for the three propositions that we have attempted

to test in this chapter. Thus, the data suggest that Federalists were more likely to pursue advancements in their careers, to exhibit mobility in their careers, and to locate their careers in the national arena. Such tendencies were, as we pointed out earlier, especially marked with regard to the careers of Federalist Statesmen. The careers of Antifederalists, on the other hand, were more likely to reflect stationary or discrete ambitions and were, in addition, more likely to revolve around local and state institutions.

The main import of these findings as far as the present study is concerned is that they reinforce the theory of change or innovation that was outlined in Chapters I and II which made use of an analogy between innovation in organizations and change in political institutions. Thus, it was suggested that, much like in organizations, the proponents of political change are likely to adopt different career perspectives than are those who oppose such change. This has so far proved to be a fruitful line of inquiry, since it has been shown in this chapter that Federalists, as proponents of innovation, differed from Antifederalists in the direction, the mobility, and the targets of their political careers.

These findings, in addition, have obvious applications to the case itself, since they emphasize the importance of ambition in the successful movement for a nationally-centered system in the years after the Revolution. Such an emphasis is consistent with a number of historical interpretations of the case that were assembled in Chapter II, such as, for example, those put forward by Lamb, Roche, and Elkins and McKittrick. All of these arguments in one way or

another stressed the role of career considerations in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists and in recruiting a leadership staff for the then emerging national institutions. This is not to say, however, that the notion of ambition carries with it the secret meaning of the conflict over the Constitution. Rather, it should be interpreted as a factor that may be employed to complement other, more comprehensive explanations of the case, such as those suggested by Lipset and Chambers which attempted to view these events as parts of a general process of nation-building in the United States.

In the next chapter, the data that bear upon the final four sets of propositions will be examined. These deal with different aspects of the ages and career investments of the delegates composing the sample.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER IV

¹A good account of this tendency may be found in James S. Young, The Washington Community: 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), Chapter 3.

²Quoted in Margaret Bayard Smith, The First Forty Years of Washington Society (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1906), p. 77.

³Quoted in Leonard White, The Federalists (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 318.

⁴On American views toward power at this time, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955), pp. 43-50.

⁵Smith, op. cit., p. 349. Mrs. Smith's memoirs were, obviously, published posthumously.

⁶John Adams, Works (Boston: Little and Brown, 1857), Vol. VI, p. 288.

⁷Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 1," in The Federalist Papers, ed. by Roy Fairfield (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 2.

⁸This story is repeated in Forrest McDonald, We the People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 216-18.

⁹Ibid., p. 288.

¹⁰A detailed treatment of the problem of inter-coder reliability may be found in Robert North, Ole Holsti, M. Zaninovitch, and Dina Zinnes, Content Analysis (Evanston: University of Northwestern Press, 1963), pp. 41-51.

¹¹McDonald, op. cit., p. 288.

¹²Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Chapter 7.

¹³The figures on this t-test were: $t=3.106$, $DF=301$, $P<.01$.

¹⁴Young, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁵These figures were derived from Young's discussion of the national government in its early years. See James Young, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 57. Young points out that "From 1797 to 1829 more Senators resigned than failed to be reelected by their state legislatures. On the average, 17.9 percent of the Senate membership resigned every two years, almost six times the biennial turnover in the modern Senate due to resignation. Among Representatives, an average of 5.8 percent resigned in each Congress, about twice the percentage of resignations in the modern House. Investigation of the careers of the 229 legislators who resigned from 1797 to 1829 reveals, moreover, that more than two thirds of them subsequently held public offices elsewhere than in Washington, and almost half of them had other public jobs outside of Washington within one year following their resignations [p. 57]."

¹⁷Woodrow Wilson, George Washington (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1896), p. 280. Quoted in White, op. cit., p. 321.

¹⁸On this concept, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 14-15.

¹⁹See Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), pp. 204-5.

²⁰See, for example, Jackson Main, The Antifederalists (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 252.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITY: THE IMPACTS OF AGE AND CAREER INVESTMENTS

In the last chapter, several propositions were examined which suggested that decisions concerning change and innovation are often governed by the ambitions or the career perspectives of the politicians involved. Both Schlesinger and Downs suggest, however, that such perspectives and, hence, such decisions are themselves influenced by the positions that officials occupy in the opportunity structure of an organization or an institution. In Chapter III, four propositions were outlined that attempted to incorporate this notion by linking the variables of age and career investments to the decisions and the career perspectives of the delegates in the sample. The present chapter, then, will set forth the data that bear upon these variables and will, in addition, offer an assessment of the validity of these final four sets of propositions.

Age

The theory of innovation that was outlined above has placed considerable stress upon the variable of age, first, in affecting an official's aspirations and, second, in fixing his outlook toward

change. In deriving propositions concerning the links between age and innovation, I have relied primarily upon the theories of Downs and Schlesinger, both of which suggest that the younger the organization and its membership, the more likely it will be to support innovation.

Of the numerous interpretations of the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists, however, relatively few have focused upon the possible importance of age. An exception to this was the argument developed by Elkins and McKittrick which focused upon the interactions between age, ambition, and decisions on the Constitution. Thus, they suggested that a primary determinant of the ambitions of Federalists was their relative youth in comparison with their opponents. This suggestion, is, of course, consistent with the predictions of our own theory. These supposed relationships between age, ambition, and innovative behavior were set forth in Hypothesis Set IV, which was stated in Chapter III as follows:

Hypothesis Set IV:

(a) The older the politicians (whether Federalist or Antifederalist), the more likely they were to have had static or discrete careers and the less likely they were to have had progressive careers. Conversely, the younger the politicians, the more likely they were to have had progressive careers and the less likely they were to have had static or discrete careers. Thus, since politicians with progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalists (see Hypothesis Set I), it follows that (b) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to likewise throw their support to the Federalist position on the Constitution. Further, since we have already argued that Federalists were more likely than Antifederalists to have adopted national careers, then it follows that (c) the younger the delegates, the more likely they were to locate their careers in national offices.

Since this set of propositions was stated in a somewhat prolix fashion, it will prove easiest to test it by sections and thus to begin with part (a), that is, with the assertion that increasing age leads to a diminished frequency of progressive careers (and vice versa).

Though this type of proposition has not often been applied to politicians, it is considered by sociologists and psychologists to have considerable applicability to the behavior of persons in other professions. For example, sociologists have observed that professional men during their forties and fifties often experience a "crisis of middle age" in which they suddenly realize that the goals that they established for themselves as younger men are forever out of reach. Sometimes, this realization leads to depression or, alternatively, to a frenetic but futile pursuit of those goals that have yet to be achieved. It is, however, frequently the case that individuals will adjust to advancing age by modifying their ambitions. As J. S. Slotkin observes, a person may come to the conclusion that:

his own abilities are too limited or conditions too unfavorable for him to achieve completely his original life goals. He then lowers his level of aspirations until it becomes more commensurate with what he deems to be a possible level of achievement; for what now seems to him grandiose original life goals, he now substitutes more modest and realistic goals.¹

Thus, much as individuals in other professions modify their goals as they grow older, it is also reasonable to suppose that politicians likewise adjust their ambitions as the aging process begins inexorably to restrict their opportunities. Accordingly, as our own proposition

suggests, the frequency of progressive ambitions can be expected to diminish as the ages of politicians increase.

In testing this proposition in the context of the conflict over the Constitution, the following indicators for age and ambition were adopted: first, appropriately enough, the ages of the various delegates in 1788 and, second, the directions of their careers in the period immediately following the ratification. The latter will be remembered as the variable that was employed in testing the first set of propositions in the previous chapter and, hence, it requires no further elaboration here. Those delegates whose careers could not be classified as progressive, static, or discrete were excluded from this particular line of analysis.

In Table V-1, the data are broken down into groups and organized into a contingency table, and, as the reader will observe, these data are generally consistent with our hypothesis, though we note that the differences between most of the groups are not large. Thus, as the age of the group in question increases, their rates of progressive careers declines while, on the other hand, their rates of static careers tend to show an increase. Meanwhile, though, the links between age and discrete ambitions only partially support our proposition. Indeed, the data are inconsistent with it at the lower age levels where it will be noted that those under 30 years of age displayed greater frequencies of such careers than those between 31 and 50. However, after the latter age, the rates of discrete ambitions increase substantially, much as, after the same age, the rates of progressive ambitions drop off sharply.

TABLE V-1

Age and Type of Career: By Age Groups

Type of Career	Age in 1788				
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over
Progressive	44%	44%	38%	34%	17%
Static	40	45	51	49	45
Discrete	16	11	11	17	38
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(25)	(114)	(138)	(88)	(40)
					N = 405
					Not Ascertained = 21
					Inapplicable = 110
					<u>Total = 540</u>
$\chi^2 = 22.865$					DF=8
					P<.01
					C=.231

It is also to be noted that the data are consistent with the notion of a "crisis of middle age" among politicians. Thus, as the table indicates, the greatest increase in the frequency of discrete careers occurred in the age groups past 50, while the largest decrease in progressive ambitions occurred among those past 60. Such findings indicate that, like those in other fields, politicians are frequently led to reevaluate their career prospects once they reach their middle and later years.

The proposition is further reinforced when the data are examined in terms of the mean ages of those delegates whose careers were classified into one or another of the above three categories. Thus, as Table V-2 reveals, those delegates who pursued progressive

TABLE V-2
Mean Ages by Types of Career

	Type of Career			Total
	Progressive	Static	Discrete	
Mean Age (Years)	43.5	46.0	49.5	45.7
Standard Deviation	9.170	9.974	12.254	10.324
Variance	84.233	99.488	150.152	106.584
N	148	194	62	404

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	1625.15	2	812.57	7.88	<0.0005
Within Categories	41224.63	400	103.06		
Total	42849.78	402			

Simple Correlation: R=.195

Significance Levels for Pairs of Means			
Pair	T	DF	Significance Level
Progressive-Static	2.464	343	P<.02
Progressive-Discrete	3.405	211	P<.002
Static-Discrete	1.176	156	P<.25

careers recorded the lowest mean age (43.5 years), a finding that is, of course, consistent with our predictions. These differences, however, do not appear to be large, since the range of the means is only about six years. In order to determine if these differences were statistically significant, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance between the ages of the delegates in the different career categories. As the figures in Table V-2 suggest, these differences were found to be significant at about the .0005 level, which indicates by a safe margin that this relationship is also applicable to the wider population of delegates. Under both of the above techniques of analysis, then, the data lend support to the hypothesis that age is related to the career perspectives that are adopted by politicians.

With this out of the way, we are now in a position to turn to the second part of Hypothesis Set IV, which suggests that the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. The obvious corollary to this, of course, is the hypothesis that Federalists were on the average younger than their opponents. As was pointed out in Chapter III, both of these propositions have considerable support in the bodies of literature dealing, first, with innovation in organizations and, second, with the actual conflict over the Constitution.

Everett Rogers, for example, cites a large body of research literature which suggests that those who support innovations tend to be younger than those who oppose them.² Moreover, Coleman and his colleagues, in a study of innovation among doctors, found that the most consistent resistance to innovation in medicine came from

doctors who were furthest removed in time from their medical school experiences (i.e., from those who were oldest).³ In addition, as Downs and Schlesinger have pointed out, innovators usually turn out to be those who entertain ambitions to advance in their careers and, as we have already found in this study, such officials tend to be younger than their colleagues who entertain other career perspectives.

This proposition also accords, as has been said, with the historical interpretation of the case that was first put forward by Elkins and McKittrick and which was later bolstered by the work of Lipset and Hofstadter. Elkins and McKittrick, however, based their conclusions upon a limited sample of delegates (N=20) and, moreover, they focused only upon the leadership strata of the two contending groups. Partly as a consequence of these methodological problems, their conclusions have been contested by Jackson Main, who, after studying a somewhat larger sample of delegates (the basis of which he did not specify), concluded that no such age difference existed and that, by and large, Federalists and Antifederalists had similar age profiles.⁴ Hopefully, the data to be reported below will shed some light upon this problem.

The data summarized in Table V-3 suggest that, indeed, younger delegates tended to throw their support behind the Federalists in larger proportions than did older ones. Thus, as the age of the group in question increases, its degree of Federalist support tends to decline from a high of 78 per cent among the youngest group of delegates to a low of about 48 per cent among the oldest. Some portion of these differences are attributable to the fact that

TABLE V-3

Age and Affiliation: By Age Groups

Affiliation	Age in 1788					Total
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over	
Federalist	78%	76%	59%	50%	48%	(312)
Antifederalist	22	24	41	50	52	(194)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(40)	(141)	(161)	(110)	(50)	N= 502
$\chi^2 = 28.490$ DF=4 P<.001 C= .323						

Federalists comprised a larger proportion of our sample than Antifederalists and, as a result, they would logically be expected to constitute the larger proportion of any given group within the sample. Nevertheless, with this factor taken into consideration, the differences reported in the table were still statistically significant at about the .001 level.

In addition, when the figures in this table are rotated, they lend considerable support to the hypothesis that Federalist delegates were younger than their opponents. This is reflected in Table V-4 by the tendency of Federalists to cluster more frequently in the age groups below 40 years of age, while Antifederalists were more likely to be found among the older age categories. Thus, about 44 per cent of the Federalist delegates fell into the age groups below 40, while the comparable figure for their opponents was only

TABLE V-4

Age and Affiliation: By Affiliation Groups

Age in 1788	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
30 and Under	10%	5%
31 to 40	34	18
41 to 50	31	34
51 to 60	18	29
61 and Over	7	14
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%
	(312)	(194)
Not Ascertained	8	26
Total	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 220
$\chi^2=28.490$	DF=4	P<.001
		C=.323

about 23 per cent. On the other hand, the proportion of Antifederalists over 50 years old was considerably higher than that of Federalists, about 43 per cent to 25 per cent. A similar, if a somewhat blurred, image emerges when the sample is split into sub-groups along the lines of leadership. Thus, the data summarized in Table V-5 suggest that of the four groups, the youngest was composed of Federalist Regulars, a large proportion of whom tended to cluster in the lower age categories. In contrast, but in correspondence with our predictions, the oldest of the groups consisted of leaders on the Antifederalist side, who were more often to be found in the age groups over 50. However, the data reported in the table do not allow

us to discriminate very clearly between the ages of the other two sub-groups.

TABLE V-5
Age and Affiliation: By Leadership Groups

Age in 1788	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
30 and Under	5%	12%	2%	6%
31 to 40	31	35	8	22
41 to 50	30	31	41	32
51 to 60	23	16	30	28
61 and Over	11	6	19	12
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(81)	(231)	(53)	(141)
Not Ascertained	0	8	2	24
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=40.679$	DF=12	P<.001	C=.274	

This becomes clearer, however, when we examine the mean ages for the different groups of delegates in the sample. Once again, the data derived from this line of analysis lend support to our proposition. Thus, as Table V-6 indicates, Federalists tended to be younger on the average than their opponents with a mean age of about 43 years compared to the Antifederalist mean of about 49 years, a difference which is statistically significant at about the .01 level. In addition, the correlation reported between age and affiliation was about

TABLE V-6

Age and Affiliation: Mean Ages by Affiliation Groups

	Affiliation		Total
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mean Age (in years)	43.1	48.8	45.3
Standard Deviation	10.47	10.11	10.77
Variance	109.710	102.132	115.992
N	311	191	502
$t=5.98$ $DF=501$ $P<.01$ $R_{pb}=.270$			

.270, a figure which, though not exceptionally high, nevertheless suggests that age had an impact upon the decisions of delegates with regard to the Constitution. These differences are once again sustained after the sample is split into the four sub-groups, where it will be observed that both of the Federalist sub-groups were younger on the average than either of the Antifederalist groups (see Table V-7). Like those differences mentioned above, these are likewise statistically significant beyond the .01 level, thus suggesting that they are also applicable to the wider population of delegates. These findings, of course, not only reinforce our theory of innovation, but they also lend support to the thesis advanced by Elkins and McKittrick which focused upon the importance of youth in providing the energy behind the Federalist enterprise.

The third component of Hypothesis Set IV suggests that the more youthful politicians were also more likely to be found in national rather than in state or local offices. In chronological

TABLE V-7
Age and Affiliation: Mean Ages
by Leadership Groups

	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mean Ages	44.6	42.6	51.1	48.0
Standard Deviation	10.34	10.47	8.61	10.49
Variance	106.94	109.70	74.21	110.07
N	80	231	53	138

Analysis of Variance Table

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Squares	F	P
Between Categories	4289.83	3	1429.94	13.225	<0.0005
Within Categories	53842.81	498	108.12		
Total	58132	501			

Simple Correlation: R=.272

space, national institutions developed somewhat later than did local and state institutions. Newer institutions, as was pointed out earlier, tend to be more innovative, tend to have more turnover, and, hence, tend to lure more of the progressively ambitious than do older and more firmly established institutions. Accordingly, they may also be expected to lure more of the youthful officials. Hence, this hypothesis suggests that leaders who staffed national institutions in the era that witnessed the ratification of the Constitution tended to be younger than those who staffed either state or local political institutions.

In testing this proposition, the ages of the delegates as of 1788 were run against the foci of their careers between the years 1788 and 1800. Delegates who held no office in this period or whose careers were mixed between state, local, and national offices were excluded from this particular test.⁵ The data that were derived from this line of analysis are summarized in Table V-8, and they suggest some support for the hypothesis. Thus, as the table shows, delegates from the younger age groups tended to locate their careers in national offices in greater proportions than those from the older groups. Accordingly, as the age of the group in question increases, its proportion of delegates who moved into national offices tends to decline from about 42 per cent among those 30 and under to about 11 per cent among those 61 and older.

Additional support for this proposition is derived when the figures in the above table are rotated so that we gain a picture of the composition of each of these institutional arenas in terms of the ages of their office-holders. As Table V-9 indicates, national

TABLE V-8

Age and Focus of Career: By Age Groups

Focus of Career 1788-1800	Age in 1788				
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over
National	42%	39%	27%	23%	11%
State	55	46	53	56	54
Local	3	15	20	21	35
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(31)	(97)	(110)	(71)	(26)
N=335					
$\chi^2=18.373$ DF=8 P<.025 C=.311					

TABLE V-9

Age and Focus of Career: By Institutional Groups

Age in 1788	Focus of Career, 1788-1800		
	National	State	Local
30 and Under	13%	10%	2%
31 to 40	38	25	24
41 to 50	30	34	35
51 to 60	16	23	24
61 and Over	3	8	15
	100%	100%	100%
	(100)	(173)	(62)
N=335			
$\chi^2=18.373$ DF=8 P<.025 C=.311			

institutions recruited about half of their membership from those 40 and under, while the comparable figures for state and local institutions were only about one-fourth and one-third respectively. By contrast, the latter institutions tended to recruit more heavily from among the older age categories.

A sharper view of this can be gained by once again examining the mean ages of delegates whose careers were associated with national, state, or local institutions. As Table V-10 indicates, delegates whose careers revolved around national institutions tended to be somewhat younger than those who were associated with state institutions, and the latter in turn were younger than those who were affiliated with local institutions. The mean ages for these different groups were about 41 years for national politicians, 45 for state politicians, and about 48 for local politicians. These differences were, moreover, statistically significant by a highly comfortable margin ($P < .0005$). The correlation coefficient of about .23 between the age of the institution and the ages of its members was, however, not exceptionally strong, though it did lean in the predicted direction. When considered together, though, these data lend support to the hypothesis that there existed around 1788 an age differential between the leadership staffs of national, state, and local institutions.

Let us review for a moment what has been found thus far. Up to this point in this chapter, we have been examining data that bear upon Hypothesis Set IV, which consists of those propositions which relate the ages of politicians to the types of careers that they

TABLE V-10

Age and Focus of Career: Mean Ages
by Institutional Groups

	Focus of Career, 1788-1800			Total
	National	State	Local	
Mean Ages	41.4	45.0	48.5	44.7
Standard Deviation	9.726	10.395	9.335	10.308
Variance	94.590	108.052	87.134	107.018
N	100	173	62	335

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	1781.60	2	890.80	8.777	<0.0005
Within Categories	33286.18	328	101.48		
Total	35067.78	330			

Simple Correlation: $R = .226$

Significance Levels for Pairs of Means			
Pair	T	DF	Significance Level
National-State	2.980	312	$P < .01$
National-Local	4.640	161	$P < .002$
State-Local	2.530	274	$P < .02$

4

followed, to their decisions on the Constitution, and to the institutional targets of their careers. By and large, the data reported above have reinforced these propositions. Thus, it has been found that the younger the delegates, (a) the more likely they were to follow progressive careers, (b) the more likely they were to support the Federalist position on the Constitution, and (c) the more likely they were to focus their careers upon national institutions (and, of course, vice versa).

It is now in order to turn to a consideration of Hypothesis Set V, which deals with the relationship between the age at which a politician embarks upon a career and his subsequent commitment to that career. The assumption underlying this set of propositions has been set forth by Schlesinger, who has suggested that the younger a politician is when he launches his political career, the more likely he will be to perceive politics as his primary activity and, hence, the greater will be his commitment to his political career and, therefore, to politics itself. Along these same lines, Coleman et al., in their study of innovation among doctors, found that those with professional (as opposed to patient-centered) orientations were those most likely to adopt medical innovations.⁶ This proposition, along with its application to the controversy over the Constitution, was set forth in Chapter III as follows:

Hypothesis Set V:

(a) The younger the politicians (whether Federalists or Antifederalists), the greater the likelihood that they developed progressive careers and the less the likelihood that they followed either static or discrete careers. Thus, since we hypothesized earlier that delegates with

progressive careers were most likely to support the Federalist position on the Constitution (see Hypothesis Set I), then it follows that (b) the younger the delegates at their ages of entry into politics, the more likely they were to become Federalists.

The first part of this proposition was tested by separating from our sample all those delegates who came into politics after 1770 and relating their ages at entry into politics to the number of offices that they held or sought between the years 1780 and 1788. The assumption here is that the more offices a politician holds, the more progressive is his career. Thus, if this hypothesis is valid, the age at which a politician launched his career will be found to be inversely related to the number of offices that he held or sought during the period in question.

The data bearing upon this particular test are summarized in Table V-11. As the table indicates, the data suggest some support for the proposition. Thus, by and large, the younger the group in terms of its age at entry into politics, the smaller was its proportion of delegates who held no offices in this period, and the greater was its proportion of delegates who held two or more offices in this period. Accordingly, the youngest group possessed the smallest proportion of delegates (9%) who held no offices in this period, and the largest proportion (54%) who held two or more offices. These figures increased and decreased respectively as the age at entry of the group in question increased. Though the relationship reported in this table leans in the predicted direction, it is nevertheless somewhat weak as the correlation coefficient indicates ($\text{Gamma} = -.201$).

TABLE V-11

Age at Entry into Politics and Number of
Offices Held, 1780-1788

Number of Offices Held, 1780-1788	Age at Entry into Politics				
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over
0	9%	10%	15%	25%	23%
1	38	37	44	45	45
2	29	36	34	21	23
3	17	9	7	9	9
4	6	7	0	0	0
5	2	1	0	0	0
	<u>101%^a</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(126)	(97)	(73)	(43)	(22)
Not Ascertained or Inapplicable					N=361 =179
Total					<u>=540</u>
$\chi^2=19.903$	DF=20	P=about .50	C=.245	Gamma=-.201	

^aRounding Error.

Moreover, the relative weakness of this relationship is also suggested by the fact that the chi-square value for the table yields a significance level of only about .50, which seems to indicate that the differences found in the sample are not large enough to be safely generalized to the broader population of delegates.

A stronger relationship is derived, however, when we examine the differences between the mean number of offices held by the delegates in each age group. Here again the relationship is in the predicted direction, since, as Table V-12 indicates, the frequency of offices held was greatest among those delegates who entered politics earliest in life, and was smallest among those who entered latest. The correlation coefficient derived from these data ($R = -.272$) was, moreover, somewhat higher than that reported immediately above. In addition, the differences reported here were sufficiently large to generate a statistically significant result ($P < .0005$).

In sum, the data concerning this particular proposition yield mixed conclusions. On the one hand, the relationship between a politician's age at entry into politics and the type of his subsequent career was found to be in the predicted direction; on the other hand, this relationship was not found to be particularly strong. Hence, a conclusion regarding the validity of this proposition must be held in abeyance for the time being, or at least until the data bearing upon the second part of Hypothesis Set V are examined.

This proposition suggests, we recall, that those delegates who entered politics early in life were those most likely to subsequently throw their support behind the ratification of the Constitution. The

TABLE V-12

Age at Entry into Politics and Number of Offices Held, 1780-1788: Mean Scores by Age Groups

	Age at Entry into Politics					Total
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over	
Mean Score (No. of offices held)	2.43	1.82	1.43	1.13	1.18	1.85
Standard Deviation	2.370	1.480	1.210	.91	.90	1.80
Variance	5.620	2.190	1.450	.84	.81	3.24
N	139	99	74	43	22	377

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	92.34	6	15.39	5.033	0.0005
Within Categories	1152.78	377	3.06		
Total	1245.12	383			

Simple Correlation: $R = .272$

figures in Table V-13 lend considerable support to this hypothesis. Thus, as the table shows, the younger the group at age of entry into politics, the larger was its proportion of delegates who gave their support to the Federalists. Among those who launched their careers before the age of 31, about 70 per cent were Federalists. By contrast, those who achieved their first office after the age of 60 were unanimous in their opposition to the Constitution. This finding is, of course, consistent with most of those reported earlier. As Schlesinger suggests, politicians who launch their careers earlier in life are those most likely to develop a career commitment to politics and, hence, are most likely to seek advancement in their careers.⁷ Since we have already found that delegates with progressive careers tended to join the Federalist ranks, it stands to reason that this should also have been true of those who had an earlier start in politics.

TABLE V-13

Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics:
By Age Groups

Affiliation	Age at Entry into Politics					Total
	30 and Under	31 to 40	41 to 50	51 to 60	61 and Over	
Federalist	70%	57%	53%	42%	0%	(310)
Antifederalist	30	43	47	58	100	(208)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(187)	(224)	(75)	(26)	(6)	N=518
$\chi^2=22.383$		DF=4	P<.001	C=.288		

This can be examined from another perspective if we rotate the above table and examine the proportions of Federalist and Antifederalist delegates whose careers were launched during these different age periods. The data summarized in Tables V-14 through V-17 lend additional support to the hypothesis that Federalists began their political careers at earlier ages than their opponents. Thus, the figures in Table V-14 reflect just such a tendency, since they reveal that about 43 per cent of Federalist delegates launched their careers before the age of 31 while this was true of only about 27 per cent of Antifederalist delegates. The latter, of course, were found in slightly larger proportions in the older age at entry categories. These

TABLE V-14

Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics:
By Affiliation Groups

Age at Entry into Politics	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
30 and Under	43%	27%
31 to 40	41	46
41 to 50	13	17
51 to 60	4	7
61 and Over	0	3
	<hr/> 101% ^a	<hr/> 100%
	(310)	(208)
Not Ascertained	10	12
Total	<hr/> 320	<hr/> 220
$\chi^2=22.383$	DF=4	P<.001
		C=.288

^aRounding Error.

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differences hold up, in addition, when the sample is split into subgroups according to leadership, though, as Table V-15 indicates, Federalist Statesmen manifested a greater tendency than other subgroups to launch their careers while still in their twenties, a finding which we interpret to reflect the comparatively stronger commitments of such delegates to their political careers

TABLE V-15

Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics:
By Leadership Groups

Age at Entry into Politics	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
30 and Under	50%	40%	26%	27%
31 to 40	34	44	49	45
41 to 50	14	13	19	16
51 to 60	2	3	4	8
61 and Over	0	0	2	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(80)	(230)	(53)	(155)
Not Ascertained	1	9	2	10
Total	<u>81</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>165</u>
$\chi^2=42.262$	DF=12	P<.001	C=.280	

The same finding emerges when the mean ages at which Federalists and Antifederalists achieved their first offices are examined. Accordingly, these figures, which are to be found in Tables V-16 and V-17, also reflect the tendency of Federalist delegates to have

1

launched their careers at earlier ages than their opponents. The mean age at which Federalists achieved their first office was about 33.6 years, while the corresponding figure for Antifederalists was about 36.6 years, a difference which is statistically significant at about the .002 level. In addition, the variables considered in Table V-16 yielded a rather high correlation coefficient ($R_{pb} = .568$), which suggests that the age at which a delegate began his career was strongly related to his subsequent decision on the Constitution.

TABLE V-16

Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics:
Mean Ages by Affiliation Groups

	Affiliation		Total
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mean Age	33.6	36.6	34.8
Standard Deviation	7.214	8.987	8.115
Variance	52.037	80.757	65.848
N	310	190	500
$t=3.984$ $DF=499$ $P<.002$ $R_{pb} = .568$			

Once again, this difference between Federalist and Antifederalist delegates was maintained when the sample was split into sub-groups according to leadership status, since both Federalist sub-groups registered lower mean ages at entry into politics than did either of the Antifederalist groups (see Table V-17). Moreover, on this variable at least, Statesmen on each side were not sharply

distinguished from the Regulars from their respective camps. Thus, the difference between Federalist Statesmen and Federalist Regulars in their mean ages at entry into politics was significant at only about the .20 level, while the corresponding figure for the difference between Antifederalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Regulars was only about .40 (see the t-test results that accompany Table V-17). In addition, the correlation coefficient reported here ($R=.207$) is considerably smaller than that reported above when the sample was divided only between Federalists and Antifederalists, which suggests that the splitting of the sample between Statesmen and Regulars served mainly to weaken the impact of the age at entry variable. This indicates, in turn, that the age at which a delegate launched his career was considerably more powerful in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists than it was in discriminating between Statesmen and Regulars.

It may therefore be concluded on the basis of these data that Federalists embarked upon their careers at slightly younger ages than their opponents, a finding which is, of course, consistent with the second proposition of Hypothesis Set V. The primary importance of this finding so far as our model is concerned is that it reinforces our image of innovators as politicians who entertain career commitments to politics, commitments which are reflected, we have argued, by their comparatively early entrances into the political arena. Further support for this interpretation is suggested by our earlier finding that age at entry into politics was also related, albeit weakly, to a second indicator of career commitment, namely, the

TABLE V-17

Affiliation and Age at Entry into Politics:
Mean Ages by Leadership Groups

	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mean Age	32.3	33.7	35.8	36.9
Standard Deviation	6.920	7.298	7.645	9.198
Variance	47.911	53.265	58.452	84.617
N	80	230	53	137

Analysis of Variance Table					
Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	1338	3	446	6.191	<0.025
Within Categories	35735	496	72.04		
Total	37073	499			

Simple Correlation: $R=.207$

Significance Levels for Pairs of Means				
Pair	T	DF	P	
Fed. Statesmen-Fed. Regulars	1.536	309	<.20	
Fed. Statesmen-Antifed. Statesmen	2.684	132	<.01	
Fed. Statesmen-Antifed. Regulars	4.166	234	<.001	
Fed. Regulars-Antifed. Statesmen	1.819	282	<.10	
Fed. Regulars-Antifed. Regulars	3.470	384	<.001	
Antifed. Statesmen-Antifed. Regulars	.838	207	<.40	

frequency of progressive ambitions among the delegates in the sample. To sum up these findings, then, the earlier in life that a delegate started his political career, the greater was the likelihood that he followed a progressive career and, also, that he threw his support behind the ratification of the Constitution. The reader is reminded, however, that this first relationship was a rather weak one. I shall return to discuss some of the implications of these findings somewhat later in this chapter. For the moment, however, we now turn to a consideration of the impact of career investments upon the decisions of Federalists and Antifederalists.

Career Investments

In addition to the variable of age, the theory of innovation that has been developed here also emphasizes the role of career investments in shaping an official's ambitions and in affecting his perceptions of institutional change. Hence, in Chapter III, two sets of propositions were outlined which attempted to link the career investments of delegates to their decisions on the Constitution.

The first of these propositions was derived largely from the works of Hirschman and Black, and suggested that the greater a politician's investments in a particular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his ambitions in that sequence and the less likely he will be to "exit" or to withdraw from such offices. This proposition, as was pointed out earlier, is in turn consistent with the more historical interpretation advanced by Elkins and McKittrick, which held that the conflict between Federalists and

Antifederalists was in part an outgrowth of the different kinds of careers that they had pursued prior to 1788. Thus, they suggested that while Federalist careers had been located in continental offices, those of their opponents, on the other hand, were focused in state and local office arenas. Hence, by 1788 these politicians had developed contrasting ideas concerning the proper distribution of authority between national, state, and local institutions; and such ideas, of course, were reflected in differing votes on the Constitution.

This series of propositions was set forth in Chapter III as follows:

Hypothesis Set VI:

(a) The more investments a politician has staked in a particular career sequence, the more likely he will be to continue to locate his career in that sequence. Thus, it follows from the hypothesis suggested earlier (see Hypothesis Set III above) that (b) the more investments a politician has staked in the national sequence of offices at the expense of other office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution. On the other hand, (c) the more investments a politician has staked in the state or local office sequences, the more likely he was to support the Antifederalist position.

Before setting about to test these propositions, I first settled upon two different but closely related indicators of investment. The first consisted of a nominal classification in which the careers of delegates prior to 1788 were coded according to their "dominant institutional focus." As before, a "dominant institutional focus" was defined as one in which at least two-thirds of a delegate's career experience (in years), both political and military, was located in one particular institutional arena. Those careers with such a

focus were then coded according to the institutional arena in which they were located (i.e., national, state, or local). Careers without a dominant focus were coded as having a dual focus. Delegates who had no political experience prior to 1788 were, of course, placed into a separate category.

The second indicator of investment was, on the other hand, a continuous variable and consisted simply of the number of years that a delegate had spent prior to 1788 in one particular office sequence. Our assumption was, of course, that the greater the number of years that a politician has spent in his career or in a particular office sequence, the greater is the investment that he has staked in it. Both of the above indicators of investment were, in turn, adapted to the task of testing the propositions contained in Hypothesis Set VI.

The first of these propositions suggested, we recall, that politicians who have investments staked in a particular office sequence will continue to locate their careers in that sequence. This hypothesis was tested, first, by relating the dominant foci of delegates' careers prior to 1788 to the office arenas in which their first offices after 1788 were located.⁸ Table V-18 summarizes the results of this particular test, and they do not yield a great deal of support for the proposition. Contrary to what had been predicted, in only one of the three groups (reading down the columns) was the largest proportion of delegates composed of those whose investments were consistent with their ambitions in terms of the office arenas in which they were located. Thus, 70 per cent of the delegates with

TABLE V-18

Career Investments and Targets of Ambition:
By Institutional Groups

First Office After 1788	Past Career Largely in:		
	National Office	State Office	Local Office
National	50%	24%	10%
State	45	70	40
Local	5	6	50
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(64)	(156)	(50)
			N=270
		Not Ascertained	=270
		or Inapplicable	
		Total	<u>=540</u>
$\chi^2=85.028$	DF=4	P<.001	C=.489

investments in state offices continued to locate their careers in the same arena after 1788. However, among those with investments in national and local offices, the corresponding figure for each was only about 50 per cent. Accordingly, among these two groups anyway, we were no more likely to find consistent relations between investments and ambitions than we were to find inconsistent relationships. Thus, though the differences presented in the table are statistically significant at about the .001 level, they do not suffice to confirm the hypothesis.

A second method of testing this proposition is to determine if the rates of consistency between investments and ambitions increase

with the amounts of investments that politicians have staked in their careers. In this test, the measure of investments was the number of years that politicians had spent prior to 1788 in the office sequence that constituted the dominant focus of their careers up to that point. This measure, in turn, was related to the arena in which their first office after 1788 was located. Delegates whose careers prior to 1788 were mixed between two or more office sequences were excluded from consideration in this test, as were, of course, those who held no offices after 1788.

The data bearing upon this particular test are briefly summarized in Table V-19 and these, like those discussed above, do not lend much support to our proposition. Thus, it will be observed that as the sizes of politicians' investments increase, so also do the proportions of consistency between their investments and their ambitions in terms of the arenas in which each were located. However, this relationship is quite weak, as the contingency coefficient for the table suggests ($C=.154$). Moreover, the differences reported here were statistically significant at only about the .50 level, which means that they do not differ significantly from what we would have expected by chance if the variables were distributed randomly throughout our sample of delegates. Hence, these data, like those examined immediately above, do not yield support for our proposition that politicians will continue to locate their careers in the office arenas in which they have staked investments. Given these data, then, the hypothesis is not confirmed.

TABLE V-19

Rates of Consistency between Ambitions and Investments:
By Size of Investment

Size of Investment (in years)	Proportion of Delegates with Ambitions in Same Arena as Investments	Proportion of Delegates with Ambitions in Different Arena than Investments	N
16 or More	.74	.26	(19)
10 to 15	.66	.34	(106)
5 to 9	.58	.42	(74)
1 to 4	.56	.44	(69)
		Total	268
$\chi^2=3.186$	DF=3	P=about .50	C=.154

With this in mind, an examination of the second and third parts of Hypothesis Set VI will now be undertaken with some apprehension. These, it will be remembered, suggest, first, that delegates with investments in the national sequence of offices were most likely to support the Federalist view of the Constitution while, second, those with investments in state and local structures were most likely to support the Antifederalist view. Once again, the above mentioned indicators of investments were employed for the purpose of testing these propositions.

In constructing Table V-20, the foci of delegates' careers prior to 1788 were run against their actual decisions on the Constitution. Here, at least, the results are generally consistent with our predictions. As the table indicates, over 90 per cent of those

TABLE V-20
Affiliation and Focus of Investments: By Arena

Affiliation	Investments: Per Cent with Past Careers Largely in:				No Career Prior to 1788	Total
	National Office	State Office	Local Office	Mixed: State- Local Offices	Mixed: Nat'l and State and Local Offices	
Federalist	92%	51%	28%	44%	85%	(314)
Antifederalist	8	49	72	56	15	(217)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(80)	(205)	(67)	(55)	(79)	N=531
$\chi^2=96.549$		DF=5	P<.001		C=.556	

delegates whose careers prior to 1788 were focused upon national institutions gave their support to the Federalist position on the Constitution. By contrast, almost three-quarters of those with investments in local offices supported the opposition movement. Delegates with investments in state offices, meanwhile, were about evenly split between both sides, and in this instance it would seem that the data do not mesh very neatly with our hypothesis. However, it should be remembered that our sample consisted of about 60 per cent Federalists to about 40 per cent Antifederalists and that, accordingly, the expected frequencies in any given column in the table (assuming there is no relationship between the variables) would correspond with these proportions. Thus, though 51 per cent of the delegates with investments in state institutions supported the Federalists, this is still somewhat lower than the expected proportion of 60 per cent or the figure that we would expect given no relationship between the variables. Accordingly, this proportion differs from expectation in the predicted direction and this is partially reflected in the size of the chi-square value for the table. It should be emphasized, though, that this difference is not large.

Additional support for the proposition is forthcoming from a consideration of delegates whose careers prior to 1788 were mixed between two or more office arenas. As expected, those with both state and local experiences were most likely to line up in the Antifederalist camp. However, among those with investments in national offices on the one hand and either state or local institutions on the other, the overwhelming proportion threw in with the Federalists.

Given the fact that such delegates had one foot in the national arena and the other in either the state or local arenas, our expectation was that they would not have exhibited any particular tendency to support one side over the other on the issue of ratification. The fact that they supported the Federalists by a wide margin, however, suggests something about the power of national experiences in the shaping of political outlooks in this period. Thus, judging from the above data, it appears that such experiences, however brief and however diluted by contradictory experiences in state and local arenas, tended to make men exceedingly sensitive to the claims of nationalism and, hence, to the argument that the authority of continental institutions ought to be expanded.

When the above table is rotated, we gain a view of the composition of Federalist and Antifederalist groups in terms of the political backgrounds of their members. As Table V-21 suggests, there were considerable differences between these two groups on this score. It will be immediately seen, for example, that the overwhelming proportion of Antifederalists (about 84%) were recruited from either state or local office backgrounds or from some combination of the two. On the other hand, this was considerably less true of Federalists, of whom only about 46 per cent were recruited from such backgrounds--a significant proportion to be sure, but still much smaller than was the case with their opponents. A good deal of this difference is attributable to the fact that, as might have been predicted, a much larger proportion of Federalists (23%) than Antifederalists (3%) was recruited from among those with national backgrounds. As these figures

TABLE V-21

Affiliation and Focus of Investments:
By Affiliation Groups

Investments: Per Cent with Past Careers Largely in:	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
National Office	23%	3%
State Office	33	47
Local Office	6	22
Mixed: State and Local Off.	7	15
Mixed: Nat'l and State and Local Offices	22	5
No Career Prior to 1788	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>
	100%	100%
	(316)	(218)
Not Ascertained	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	320	220
$\chi^2=96.549$	DF=5	P<.001
		C=.556

suggest, then, the political backgrounds of Federalists were not as sharply focused around a particular office arena as were those of their opponents. This conclusion also holds up, we might add, after the sample is split into sub-groups according to leadership status (see Table V-22).

The above findings are reinforced to some degree when the sizes of delegates' investments in national, state, and local arenas are run against their decisions on the issue of ratification. The results of this line of analysis are summarized in Table V-23.⁹ As was predicted, the greater a delegate's investment (in years) in the national arena, the greater was the likelihood that he lined up with

TABLE V-22

Affiliation and Focus of Investments:
By Leadership Groups

Investments: Per Cent with Past Careers Largely in:	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
National Office	26%	23%	6%	2%
State Office	38	31	51	46
Local Office	1	8	19	23
Mixed: State and Local Office	3	9	11	15
Mixed: Nat'l and State and Local Office	30	18	11	4
No Career Prior to 1788	2	11	2	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(81)	(235)	(53)	(162)
Not Ascertained	0	4	2	3
Total	81	239	55	165
	$\chi^2=119.553$	DF=15	P<.001	C=.430

TABLE V-23

Affiliation and Size of Investments, by Arena

Affiliation	Size of Investments in National Arena (in years)					Total
	16 or More ^a	10 to 15	5 to 9	2 to 4	1	
Federalist	--	100%	86%	74%	44%	(204)
Antifederalist	--	0	14	26	56	(55)
	(0)	100%	100%	100%	100%	
		(19)	(110)	(114)	(16)	N=259
	$\chi^2=21.553$	DF=3	P<.001		C=.392	
	Size of Investments in State Arena (in years)					
Federalist	48%	54%	60%	61%	54%	(243)
Antifederalist	52	46	40	39	46	(178)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(37)	(77)	(115)	(115)	(41)	N=421
	$\chi^2=2.724$	DF=4	P=about .75		C=.113	
	Size of Investments in Local Arena (in years)					
Federalist	37%	43%	35%	47%	53%	(81)
Antifederalist	53	57	65	53	47	(104)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(16)	(30)	(43)	(64)	(32)	N=185
	$\chi^2=3.025$	DF=4	P=about .75		C=.179	

^aThis column is empty because national institutions began to be forged only around 1774, or less than 15 years before the ratification. State and local structures, of course, were extensions of colonial institutions and thus had much longer histories as of 1788.

the Federalists. This relationship was of moderate strength ($C=.392$) and, in addition, the differences reported in the table were significant well beyond the .001 level. Of considerably less power in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists were the sizes of delegates' investments in state and local arenas. In both instances, the differences reported in the table were not statistically significant, nor were the contingency coefficients very high. These findings mesh with those that were reported above in that they suggest that national experiences were considerably more powerful than state or local experiences in discriminating between Federalist and Antifederalist delegates. Apparently, as these data suggest, those whose experiences touched national institutions in the period before 1788 invariably came to be committed to the notion that their authority ought to be expanded, and, of course, this commitment was reflected in their overwhelming support for the Constitution. However, one should remember that though most of those with experiences in the national arena prior to 1788 supported the Federalists, it does not follow from this that the greater proportion of Federalists had investments in national offices. Such an interpretation would be in error, as we pointed out above and as one could quickly see by consulting Table V-21.

The above indicators of investments may at this time be supplemented by the use of an additional one. Selznick suggests, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, that organizations often derive their coherence and their special identities by recruiting their key personnel from among those who have shared important

experiences, such as internal conflicts and other crises.¹⁰ In a parallel manner, others have pointed out that political revolutions often provide the theater for such key experiences among those who join in the building of national political institutions. Accordingly, experiences in the American Revolution may have played a powerful role in shaping the outlooks of delegates toward national, state, and local institutions. Thus, such investments were separated from other political experiences and were in turn adopted as an additional indicator of career investments in this study. To this end, delegates were classified according to whether their military experiences during the Revolution took place primarily in the Continental Army or in one of the various state or local militias. A few delegates, as one would expect, had experiences at more than one level, while many others had no revolutionary experiences of any kind. Needless to say, such delegates were placed in separate categories for the purposes of this particular test.

Once the delegates were so classified, their revolutionary experiences were run against their decisions on the Constitution. The hypothesis is, obviously, that experience in the Continental Army was related to support for the Federalist cause, while investments in one of the various state or local militias was related to support for the opposition movement. These data are summarized in Table V-24, and they tend to bear out the hypothesis. About 84 per cent of the delegates with experience in the Continental Army during the Revolution lined up in support of the ratification of the Constitution. Meanwhile, about 64 per cent and 79 per cent (respectively)

of those who served in state and local militias during the War stood up in opposition to the new system in 1788. Delegates with dual experiences or, alternatively, without any revolutionary experience of any kind did not differ significantly from expectation on the issue of ratification.

TABLE V-24

Affiliation and Revolutionary Experiences: By Arena

Affilia- tion	Revolutionary Experience: Per Cent with Revolutionary Experience Primarily in:					Total
	Continental Army	State Militias	Local Militias	Dual ^a	No Military Experience	
Federalist	84%	36%	21%	63%	58%	(314)
Anti- federalist	16	64	79	37	42	(210)
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
	(145)	(101)	(19)	(22)	(237)	N=524
$\chi^2=72.559$ DF=4 P<.001 C=.479						

^aThis category consists of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution.

When this table is rotated, we gain a picture of the composition of both groups in terms of the loci of their revolutionary experiences. As Table V-25 indicates, a considerable proportion of Federalists (about 39%) were recruited from the ranks of those who served in the Continental Army during the Revolution. This was much less true of Antifederalists, whose members were much more frequently drawn from the ranks of former soldiers in the state and local

TABLE V-25

Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience:
By Affiliation Groups

Revolutionary Experience Largely in:	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
Continental Army	39%	11%
State Militia	12	31
Local Militia	1	7
Dual ^a	5	4
No Military Experience	43	47
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	(314)	(210)
Not Ascertained	6	10
Total	<u>320</u>	<u>220</u>
$\chi^2=72.559$	DF=4	P<.001
		C=.479

^aThis category consists once again of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution.

militias. Both Federalists and Antifederalists, meanwhile, were composed of approximately the same proportions of delegates (about 43% and 47% respectively) who saw no military service during the revolutionary years. It may be pointed out, in addition, that these proportions maintained themselves at about the same levels after the sample was split into sub-groups according to leadership status (see Table V-26).

These findings clearly suggest that the Revolution represented one of those key experiences in the early life of the nation which served to shape the views that men adopted toward national, state, and local political institutions. The political commitments that

TABLE V-26

Affiliation and Revolutionary Experience:
By Leadership Group

Revolutionary Exp. Largely in:	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Continental Army	38%	39%	11%	11%
State Militia	16	10	27	32
Local Militia	4	1	8	7
Dual ^a	1	5	8	3
No Military Exp.	41	45	46	47
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(80)	(234)	(52)	(158)
Not Ascertained	1	5	3	7
	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=81.671$	DF=12	P<.001	C=.367	

^aThis category consists once again of delegates who served in more than one arena during the course of the Revolution.

men forged during the years of the Revolution appear to have persisted for many years thereafter. Thus, those who experienced the Revolution in the state and local militias easily attached themselves to the view that the war was primarily geared to preserve the independence of the individual states. Since they sacrificed heavily for this notion of independence, their subsequent opposition to the Constitution is not difficult to explain, since they apparently believed that it threatened the independence of the states that was won during the Revolution. But the war also had a continental dimension which meant that, for some men anyway, it was primarily a war to gain continental goals, that is, national independence. Those who were most accessible to this view of affairs were primarily men who spent their war years in the Continental Army and who were thus mobilized to defend what they perceived to be continental or national interests. Hence, as was pointed out above, delegates with these kinds of experiences in their pasts tended to give their support to the new system in 1788.

The above reconstruction, of course, will be quickly recognized as one that parallels the revisionist view of the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists that has been set forth by Elkins and McKittrick. Their argument, we recall, challenged the Progressive interpretation that had been developed earlier by Smith, Beard, Parrington, and Jensen (among others) which held that Federalists were, by and large, reluctant revolutionaries who joined in the war only when the break with England had become inevitable. Thus, according to this view, Federalists threw their energies behind the Constitution because they saw in it a means of arresting what

they considered to be the alarming pro-democratic tendencies that had grown up in the aftermath of the Revolution. Hence the Constitution represented a reaction against the Revolution. In taking issue with this interpretation, Elkins and McKittrick attempted to turn the argument completely around. Thus, they suggested that "the source of Federalist, or nationalist, energy was not any distaste for the Revolution on these men's part, but rather their profound and growing involvement in it."¹¹ Their involvement, however, was distinctive in that it was closely associated with the continental dimension of the Revolution: "a remarkably large number of someday Federalists were in the Continental Army, served as diplomats or as key administrative officers of the Confederation government, or, as members of Congress, played leading roles on those committees primarily responsible for the conduct of the war."¹² Federalists, then, did not differ from Antifederalists in their approval or disapproval of the Revolution, but rather in the manner in which they experienced it and, hence, in the manner in which they interpreted it: where for a large number of Antifederalists, it seems, the war was fought to preserve the independence of the states, for an equally large number of Federalists it was fought to gain national or continental independence. As was indicated above, this thesis has the support of the data that has been reported in the present study. Accordingly, in deciding between the Elkins-McKittrick thesis and the Progressive interpretation of the conflict, these data lead me to rule in favor of the former.

Let me briefly summarize the results of the above test of Hypothesis Set VI. In the main, these results were disappointing insofar as the theory is concerned, for they suggest that career investments did not have much of an impact either upon the ambitions of delegates nor upon their decisions on the Constitution. There are, however, some exceptions to this generalization. First, investments in the national and local arenas appeared to have had greater impacts in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists than did investments in the state arena. Delegates with investments in the national arena tended to support the Federalists while those with investments in the local arena tended to support the opposition. Those with state backgrounds, though, were found to be more evenly distributed between the two groups. In addition, the data suggested that the strength of the relationship between investments and affiliation increased with the magnitude of investments. However, this was, as it turned out, only true with regard to investments in the national arena, which is to say that the more investments (in years) that delegates had staked in the national arena, the more likely they were to support the Federalists. No conclusion of this sort, however, could be advanced with regard to investments in state and local positions. Finally, as was pointed out immediately above, the data reported here also indicate that revolutionary experiences also played important parts in shaping the political outlooks of men during this period and, hence, in distinguishing between Federalists and Antifederalists. Accordingly, it was found that delegates with military experiences at the Continental level during the Revolution

tended to support the Federalists in 1788, while those with experiences in the various militias tended to line up with the opposition movement.

This finally prepares the way for a consideration of the data bearing upon the final hypothesis, that is, Hypothesis Set VII, which also deals with the variable of career investments. In formulating this set of propositions, we drew upon a number of studies which suggested that innovations in organizations are a function of the willingness of their members to bear risks. By and large, those officials who are hospitable to risk-taking tend to be those who have yet to accumulate sizeable investments in their organizational careers. This notion was, in turn, applied to the conflict over the Constitution and, as a result, the following set of propositions were derived:

Hypothesis Set VII:

Since we have suggested that investments are inversely related to innovation, then it should follow that (a) as of 1788, the more investments that a delegate held in his career, the more likely he was to have supported the Antifederalist position on the Constitution. Or, in other words, as of 1788, Federalists on the average were likely to have held fewer investments in their careers than Antifederalists. Since we have suggested that Antifederalists held greater investments in their careers than Federalists, then (b) Antifederalist delegates were also likely to have begun their careers at an earlier historical time than Federalist delegates. Or, stated differently, the later (historically speaking) that a delegate began his career, the more likely he was to support the Federalist position on the Constitution.

As it turns out, the first of these propositions is not supported by our data. As Table V-27 suggests, the number of years that delegates had spent in public office prior to 1788 had little impact

TABLE V-27

Affiliation and Total Career Investments:
By Size of Investment

Affiliation	Size of Investment (in years)						Total
	20 or More	10 to 19	5 to 9	2 to 4	1	None	
Federalist	55%	61%	63%	52%	50%	62%	(311)
Antifederalist	45	39	37	48	50	38	(214)
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	(61)	(173)	(150)	(84)	(12)	(45)	N= 525
$\chi^2=3.417$		DF=5	P=about .75		C=.113		

upon the decisions that they made with respect to the Constitution. Thus, as we move from those delegates with the greatest investments in their careers to those with the least, we do not observe any large or systematic increase in the proportions of Federalist supporters. This conclusion is borne out from a different angle when the table is rotated and Federalists and Antifederalists are examined in terms of the proportions of each that fell into the different investment classifications. The hypothesis had predicted, we recall, that Federalists would be more likely to be drawn from the ranks of those with limited political backgrounds, while their opponents were expected to be recruited from among those with more sizeable investments in their careers. This was, apparently, not the case, since, as Table V-28 indicates, Federalists and Antifederalists clustered in about equal

proportions in each of the various investment classifications. Such differences that did appear between the two groups of delegates were sufficiently small that they did not generate a statistically significant result ($P =$ about .75).

TABLE V-28

Affiliation and Total Career Investments:
By Affiliation Groups

Size of Investments (in years)	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
20 or More	11%	13%
10 to 19	34	32
5 to 9	30	26
2 to 4	14	19
1	2	3
None	9	7
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%
	(311)	(214)
Not Ascertained	<hr/> 9	<hr/> 6
	320	220
$\chi^2=3.417$	DF=5	P-about .75
		C=.113

The real differences appear, however, only after the sample is split into sub-groups according to leadership status. As Table V-29 suggests, Statesmen from both sides of the ratification issue tended to have accumulated more sizeable investments in their careers than Regulars from either side. Thus, about 70 per cent of the Statesmen from each side had at least ten years of political experience behind them in 1788, while this was true of only about half

as many of the Regulars from each side. This finding is, however, not too difficult to explain. As Hirschman has suggested, individuals who manifest the greatest commitment or loyalty to organizations or institutions are generally those who have the most staked in them in terms of time, energy, and resources.¹³ Accordingly, in the present case, the above data suggest that delegates who expended the greatest energy in either supporting or opposing the new system were those who, by and large, had the most staked in their political careers.

TABLE V-29

Affiliation and Total Investments:
By Leadership Groups

Size of Investments (in years)	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
20 or More	16%	9%	27%	8%
10 to 19	53	27	43	28
5 to 9	21	34	17	29
2 to 4	5	17	11	21
1	3	2	0	4
None	2	11	2	10
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%
	(81)	(230)	(53)	(161)
Not Ascertained	<hr/> 0	<hr/> 9	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 4
Total	<hr/> 81	<hr/> 239	<hr/> 55	<hr/> 165
$\chi^2=57.312$	DF=15	P<.001	C= .314	

The above points are further reinforced when we examine the mean levels of investment for Federalist and Antifederalist delegates. As one can easily see by inspecting Table V-30, Federalists and Antifederalists differed hardly at all in the mean number of years that they had invested in their political careers prior to 1788. Thus, while the mean figure for Federalists was about 10.3 years, the corresponding figure for their opponents was 10.4 years. However, when the leadership groups are separated from the rest of the sample, significant differences emerge. Hence, as Table V-31 indicates, the mean levels of investment for leaders from both sides were significantly higher than were those of either group of followers. Accordingly, while the means for Federalist and Antifederalist Statesmen were about 14 and 15 years of experience respectively, the corresponding figures for Federalist and Antifederalist Regulars

TABLE V-30

Affiliation and Total Career Investments:
Mean Levels by Affiliation Groups

	Affiliation		Total
	Federalist	Antifederalist	
Mean Years of Experience	10.3	10.4	10.38
Standard Deviation	9.560	9.250	9.420
Variance	91.390	85.560	88.736
N	310	209	519
F=.004	DF=518	P-about .90	R=.003 ^a

^aSimple correlation.

TABLE V-31

Affiliation and Total Career Investments:
Mean Levels by Leadership Groups

	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Mean Years of Experience	14.1	9.0	15.2	8.9
Standard Deviation	11.490	8.410	10.780	8.130
Variance	132.020	70.730	116.210	66.100
N	81	229	52	157

Analysis of Variance Table

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	P
Between Categories	3105.04	3	1035.0	12.419	<0.0005
Within Categories	42920.55	515	83.3		
Total	46025	518			

Simple Correlation: $R = .260$

were only about nine years for each. These differences were statistically significant at about the .0005 level. The above figures therefore suggest that while career investments may not be very useful in distinguishing innovators from their opponents (i.e., Federalists from Antifederalists), they may nevertheless prove useful, as Hirschman suggests, in distinguishing between those who entertain differing levels of commitment to organizations and institutions.

A somewhat stronger finding emerges, however, when the careers of Federalists and Antifederalists are examined in terms of the different historical periods in which they were launched. The hypothesis derived from the model suggests that Antifederalists were likely to have embarked upon their careers earlier in historical time than Federalists. This hypothesis is in close accord with the interpretation of the case that was outlined by Elkins and McKittrick, which set forth the argument that the decisions of politicians with respect to the Constitution depended in part upon the ways in which their careers were related to the chronology of events that preceded 1788. The formative event in this chronology was the Revolution. Thus, as Elkins and McKittrick suggest, a large proportion of Federalists "quite literally saw their careers launched in the Revolution [while] . . . the careers of Antifederalists, on the other hand, . . . rested heavily upon events that preceded rather than followed 1776."¹⁴

The data that have been gathered for this study lend marginal support to this hypothesis. As the figures in Table V-32 indicate, Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ at all in

TABLE V-32

Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics

Year of Entry	Affiliation	
	Federalist	Antifederalist
Before 1765	12%	12%
1765 to 1774	12	26
1775 to 1779	30	21
1780 and After	<u>46</u>	<u>41</u>
	100%	100%
	(317)	(214)
Not Ascertained	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	320	220
$\chi^2=16.362$	DF=3	P<.001
		C= .244

the proportions of their delegates who started their careers prior to 1765, that is, before widespread protests against British rule were initiated. The frequency of such protests increased rapidly at the state and local levels during the next ten years (1765-1774), however, and these events apparently had a stronger impact upon future Anti-federalists than upon future supporters of the Constitution, since about 26 per cent of the former began their careers in this period compared to only about 12 per cent of the latter. The data indicate, though, that by far the largest proportions of both groups were mobilized into politics during and in the aftermath of the Revolution. Given the fact that revolutions usually involve a rapid expansion of political participation,¹⁵ this finding was not unexpected.

Accordingly, about 76 per cent of the future supporters of the new system were mobilized into public life during and after the Revolution (i.e., after 1775), while the corresponding figures for its opponents was somewhat smaller at about 62 per cent.¹⁶ As the figures in Table V-31 indicate, the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists on this score were statistically significant ($P < .001$), though the relationship between the two variables was not very strong ($C = .244$). In sum, though the data lean in the predicted direction, they do not do so very decisively.

These conclusions are sustained when the sample is split once again into sub-groups according to leadership status, where it will again be observed that the overwhelming proportion of the delegates were recruited into political life in the years following the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775 (see Table V-33). The exception to this generalization, however, consists of those delegates who were influential in the Antifederalist cause (i.e., Antifederalist Statesmen), about 53 per cent of whom launched their political careers in the years prior to the Revolution. These are, I suppose, the politicians who Elkins and McKittrick had in mind when they suggested that the careers of Antifederalists "rested heavily upon events that preceded rather than followed 1776." Insofar as this generalization applies to leaders, then, it has considerable validity.

In conclusion, the figures reported above yield mixed support for the propositions composing Hypothesis Set VII. On the one hand, the first of these propositions, which suggested that a delegate's decision on the Constitution was influenced by the size of his

TABLE V-33

Affiliation and Year of Entry into Politics:
By Leadership Groups

Year of Entry	Affiliation			
	Federalist		Antifederalist	
	Statesmen	Regulars	Statesmen	Regulars
Before 1765	19%	10%	19%	9%
1765 to 1774	15	12	34	23
1775 to 1779	37	27	23	21
1780 and After	<u>29</u> 100%	<u>51</u> 100%	<u>24</u> 100%	<u>47</u> 100%
	(81)	(236)	(53)	(161)
Not Ascertained	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	81	239	55	165
$\chi^2=39.718$	DF=9	P<.001	C=.264	

investment in his career, found little support from our data, since, as was pointed out above, Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ significantly on this score. On the other hand, the second of these propositions, which suggested that Antifederalists launched their careers earlier in time than their opponents, gained marginal support from the data, since it was found that a higher proportion of Antifederalist careers, and especially those of the leaders of the Antifederalist cause, were initiated in the years that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775; by contrast, Federalists exhibited a greater tendency to embark upon their careers in the years following

the start of the Revolution. Thus, the data are at least consistent with the hypothesis. However, as was mentioned above, the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists on this variable were not substantial, and for this reason it is doubtful that the historical period in which delegates started their careers could have accounted for much of the variance in their decisions on the Constitution. This question, however, will be answered with greater certainty in the next chapter.

Summary

In this chapter, we have attempted to test the final four sets of hypotheses that were derived from our theory of innovation and which were set forth in Chapter III. The first two sets of propositions (Hypothesis Sets IV and V) focused upon different aspects of politicians' ages and attempted to relate them to their decisions with respect to innovation. By and large, these sets of propositions received support from the data. Thus, it was found, much as we had predicted, that the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to support innovation, that is, to join the Federalist camp. Moreover, the data also suggested, again as was predicted in Hypothesis Set V, that the younger a delegate was when he launched his career, the more likely he was to subsequently throw his support to the Federalists. As was made clear above, both of these sets of findings are consistent with our theory and, hence, they suggest that the variable of age is an important factor in distinguishing the supporters of innovation from its opponents. Once again, though, this will be determined in sharper detail in the next chapter.

The final two sets of propositions (Hypothesis Sets VI and VII) were primarily concerned to establish links between career investments and a delegate's decision with respect to the Constitution, and here, for the most part, the data did not turn out according to expectation. Thus, the data suggested that career investments were not particularly useful in distinguishing Federalists from Antifederalists. There was, however, one exception to this generalization and this involved the experiences of delegates in the Revolution and the relationship of their careers to the chronology of events that led up to it. Delegates who served militarily at the continental level during the Revolution tended, it was argued, to develop a notion of a continental or a national interest apart from those of the separate states and thus, as the data suggest, they tended in 1788 to throw their support behind the Constitution, a document that proposed to strengthen the hand of national institutions. On the other hand, military experience at the state or local levels during the Revolution apparently served to strengthen the commitments of individuals to state and local institutions, for in 1788 delegates with such experiences in their pasts tended to line up in opposition to the new system. In addition, we also found some support for the hypothesis that was advanced by Elkins and McKittrick which suggested that the careers of a large proportion of Antifederalists revolved around events that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution and thus took shape before continental institutions began to emerge. By contrast, Federalist careers evinced a slightly stronger tendency to be based upon events which followed the outbreak of the war in 1775.

These findings therefore point to the conclusion that was advanced, once again, by Elkins and McKittrick, namely, that the Revolution represented the formative event in the political lives of those who experienced it. Individuals who, by reason of age, came to political maturity in the years following the outbreak of the Revolution or who, by reason of experience, were affiliated with continental institutions during the war had the opportunity to develop an appreciation for what Elkins and McKittrick have called the "national quality of experience." Hence, some years later, these individuals were inclined to support the Federalist view on the Constitution. The reverse was true, of course, of those who came of age in an earlier period prior to the advent of continental organizations or who were associated with state or local institutions during the course of the Revolution. Accordingly, considerations of age and career experiences reinforced one another in giving shape to the outlooks of individuals toward national, state, and local institutions and, hence, toward the Constitution itself.

The findings presented in this chapter, then, like those that were set forth in Chapter IV, lend general support to our theory of innovation. In the final chapter, I shall attempt to offer an overall assessment of this model by examining it in a multivariate context.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V

¹J. S. Slotkin, "Life Course in Midle Age," in Problems of the Middle Aged, ed. by C. B. Vedder (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas Publishers, 1965), pp. 47-58. This is quoted in Paul Hain, "American State Legislators' Ambitions and Careers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971), p. 54.

²Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 172-74.

³James Coleman, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel, Medical Innovation (New York: Bobbs-Merrill and Co., 1966), p. 42.

⁴Jackson T. Main, The Antifederalists (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 259.

⁵A "mixed career" was one which did not possess a "dominant institutional focus" or, in other words, was one in which a politician spent at least one-third of his career in two or more distinct office arenas.

⁶Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, op. cit., chapter 11.

⁷Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), p. 176.

⁸Three groups of delegates were excluded from consideration here: first, those who held no offices prior to 1788; second, those who held no offices after 1788; and, third, those whose careers did not manifest a dominant focus prior to 1788 (i.e., those whose investments were mixed between two or more office sequences). Thus, we included only those delegates whose careers manifested identifiable foci both before and after the ratification.

⁹For the purposes of this test, all those delegates who had no careers prior to 1788 were excluded from consideration.

¹⁰Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 105-6.

¹¹Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (June, 1961), 202.


¹²Ibid., p. 202.

¹³See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), chapter 7.

¹⁴Elkins and McKittrick, op. cit., pp. 203-4.

¹⁵This description of revolution has been suggested by Samuel P. Huntington. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 266.

¹⁶It should be pointed out that some of these consisted of delegates who held no offices prior to 1788 and whose participation in the conventions of that year therefore marked their introduction into the political arena.



CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE MODEL

Up to this point, the model has been tested by examining each set of propositions in isolation from the others. Thus, for the most part, the focus at any given time has been upon the relationship between just two variables in the model. While this approach allowed for an assessment of the validity of each separate hypothesis, it did not allow us to make any inferences about the relative strengths of the different variables in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists, nor did it enable us to establish controls for spurious associations. In order to accomplish these tasks, a multivariate approach is needed, and in the present chapter such an analysis will be undertaken through the use of a technique called multiple discriminant function analysis. For the reasons that were outlined above, this strategy will allow for a more complete empirical evaluation of the model. Once this task is completed, the chapter will conclude with a summary of the major findings of the study.

An Evaluation of the Model: A Multivariate Approach

As was mentioned above, the statistical approach used to evaluate the model was multiple discriminant function analysis.

Though this technique has had its greatest application in the field of psychology, it has also had some currency among political scientists.¹ Its primary usefulness for my purposes is that it permits an assessment of the relative strengths of a number of independent variables in discriminating between two or more a priori or natural groups, such as Federalists and Antifederalists. Like all multivariate approaches, however, this technique can yield results different from those found using simpler univariate comparisons. For example, a relationship that is found to be quite strong in a two variable context may turn out to be spurious or insignificant when other variables are considered simultaneously. On the other hand, variables that do not at first appear to be important using simpler techniques may suddenly reveal themselves to be powerful predictors when controls for additional variables are introduced. Accordingly, since the results reported in the previous two chapters of this study were based upon such simpler approaches, it is quite possible that some of these findings may require revision in the light of the following analysis.

Though this is not the place for an extensive discussion of discriminant function analysis,² a few rudiments of the technique may be briefly touched upon. Discriminant analysis is geared to answer the following research question: Given my knowledge of an individual's scores on N independent variables, how accurately can I predict his group membership? In order to answer this question, the technique allows us to combine the weighted scores of all individuals in the analysis on N different variables into a linear function.

1

The group centroids or the mean scores of all groups on the function can then be determined and, given the score of each individual on the function, we can then calculate the proportion of cases correctly categorized by the function. The most powerful functions will be those that consist of variables upon which the members of different groups in the analysis cluster at opposing ends of their scales. Hence, the object is to find function or combination of variables that maximizes the ratio of the variance between the groups to the variance within the groups and which thus discriminates most effectively between the groups in the analysis. Obviously, the greater the distances between the group centroids and the larger the proportion of the cases correctly predicted by the function, the greater the ability of the variables composing the function to discriminate between the groups.

The analysis that follows was based upon the use of 14 independent variables, all of which were encountered in one form or another in Chapters IV and V. Data on individual variables will not be reported in this chapter, and, hence, readers who are so interested are directed to consult those earlier chapters. The variables that were used were broken down into three main types or factors, depending upon whether they were associated with ambitions, investments, or age. The ambition factor, which focused upon different aspects of delegates' careers after 1788, contributed three variables to the analysis: (a) the institutional foci of delegates' careers between 1788 and 1800; (b) the institutional targets of their careers in their first offices after 1788; and (c) the types or directions

of their careers between 1788 and 1800. For the purposes of measurement these had to be fashioned into ordinal scales. The first two, which deal with institutional attachments, were scaled according to the degree to which delegates' careers were associated with national as opposed to state and local institutions, while the latter was scaled according to the extent to which delegates followed progressive, static, or discrete careers.³

The investment factor, meanwhile, which involves the dimensions of delegates' careers prior to 1788, contributed six variables to the analysis. Two of these were once again related to the institutional focus of a delegate's career: the focus of his career prior to 1788 and the focus of his revolutionary experiences. These were once again fashioned into ordinal scales according to the degree to which the careers in question were associated with national as opposed to state and local institutions (see footnote 3 for details). The other four investment variables consisted of straight-forward interval scales, namely, the number of years that delegates had invested (a) in national politics, (b) in state politics, (c) in local politics, and, finally, (d) in their total careers up to 1788.

The third factor consisted of age or what we might call generational variables. These were three in number and consisted of (a) the ages of delegates in 1788, (b) the ages at which they entered politics, and (c) the periods or years in which they launched their careers. Since these were discussed at some length earlier (see Chapter V), they require no further elaboration here. I might

point out though that each of these measures was assumed to constitute an interval level scale.

There was, in addition to the above factors, a fourth and relatively minor factor that contributed the final two variables to the analysis. These were associated with the notion of career mobility and consisted of, first, the number of offices that delegates held in the period immediately prior to 1788 (i.e., from 1780 to 1788) and, second, the number held in the period just following the ratification (i.e., from 1789 to 1797). Like most of those discussed above, these measures also represent interval scales.

In the above discussion, I have stressed the level of measurement attained by each of these variables because the issue raises an important problem insofar as the use of multivariate techniques is concerned. It will be noted that five of the fourteen variables to be used here were measured through the use of ordinal as opposed to interval scales. The use of such ordinal scales in multivariate models is often said to make the results of the analysis somewhat difficult to interpret. There is little to argue with this viewpoint. The problem with ordinal scales is that the distances between the points on such scales cannot be shown to be equal; thus, any given unit change may carry different meanings depending upon where it occurs on the scale. The problem is, obviously, a formidable one. However, the researcher must still decide if the ambiguities involved in the use of ordinal measures outweigh the usefulness of the information to be gained from a multivariate analysis.⁴

In the present case, I do not believe that they do, largely because

nine of the fourteen variables to be used below achieve an interval level of measurement. Nevertheless, for readers who tend to be purists in these matters, a cautious interpretation of the following analysis is probably in order.

There is a final problem which, however, may be more easily laid to rest. This involves the issue of multicollinearity, or high intercorrelations among independent variables. This is a frequently posed problem among students of multivariate approaches, for if independent variables are highly interrelated, it becomes quite difficult to isolate their separate effects. This does not pose a serious problem for this analysis, however, since, for the most part, such intercorrelations were not high. Thus, only two sets of variables achieved simple correlations of .70 or better, while only three others achieved correlations of above .60.⁵ In light of the fact that 14 variables generate about 91 distinct intercorrelations with one another, the problem insofar as the present analysis is concerned can be seen to be rather slight.

In the discussion below, then, discriminant analysis will be employed to predict delegates' votes on the Constitution in terms of their scores on the predictor variables discussed above. All told, 511 delegates were used in the analysis, 307 of which were Federalists and 204 Antifederalists; the remaining 29 were discarded because of incomplete data. In order to determine the best predictors of voting on the Constitution, a number of alternative models or combinations of variables were considered. Evaluations of these different models were based upon a consideration of four separate statistics for each

model: first, the chi-square value and the discriminant criterion for each function, both of which serve to reflect the capacity of the model to discriminate between the groups; next, the standardized function weight for each variable, a figure which reflects the discriminant power of each individual variable in the model;⁶ and, finally, the proportion of votes correctly predicted by the model, a figure which is, in a sense, the acid test of the capacity of the variables in the model to distinguish between the groups in the analysis. All of these figures will of course be reported where they are relevant to the analysis.

The first step in the analysis was to combine all 14 variables into a single model and to derive from them a single discriminant function. The results of this line of analysis are somewhat surprising, for, as Table VI-1 reveals, the most powerful predictors of votes on the Constitution were two variables associated with career investments: the focus of a delegate's previous career and the focus of his revolutionary experiences. Likewise, age also appears to have had a relatively strong influence. On the other hand, the variables dealing with ambitions were found some distance down the list. All told, this 14-variable career model was able to correctly predict about 77 per cent of the votes of the delegates in the sample.

It should be possible, however, to put together a more parsimonious model using fewer variables but which is able to predict just as accurately. In order to locate such a model, the variables employed above were entered into the analysis in a stepwise fashion beginning with the two most powerful variables. This procedure was

TABLE VI-1

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: 14 Variable Model

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.545
2.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience	.445
3.	Age in 1788	.378
4.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.303
5.	Period when Entered Politics	.287
6.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.223
7.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office after 1788	.213
8.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.193
9.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.137
10.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.123
11.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.118
12.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.085
13.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.036
14.	Age at Entry into Politics	.008
$\chi^2=174.40$ DF=14 P<.001		Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted: Federalists 73% Antifederalists 84% Total 77%
		Discriminant Criterion for Function: .414

continued until the inclusion of an additional variable into the model failed to bring with it an increase in the predictive power of the model. As Table VI-2 shows, the initial two-variable model composed of the foci of the delegates' previous careers and their revolutionary experiences was able to correctly predict about 68 per cent of the votes on the Constitution. The inclusion of age into the model brings this figure up to about 73 per cent. From that point, successive stepwise additions do not add very much to the power of the model. The sizes of delegates' investments in state offices makes a minimal contribution, bringing the proportion of votes correctly predicted by the model up to about 74 per cent. In addition, two of the ambition variables (the institutional targets of delegates' first offices after 1788 and the types of their careers between 1788 and 1800) had small incremental impacts, and together they increased the proportion of delegates correctly grouped up to about 77 per cent. Beyond this point, additional variables carry only slight impacts. Thus, the most parsimonious model would include only the first three variables in the stepwise analysis, from which we are able to correctly predict the votes of about three-quarters of the delegates in the sample. The most powerful model, on the other hand, would be composed of the first eight variables, since they allow for the correct prediction of about 77 per cent of the cases.

It is worth noting here in passing that the Antifederalists appear to have been a much more homogeneous group than their opponents. This is suggested by the fact that the models discussed above were consistently more successful in predicting the votes of

TABLE VI-2

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: Stepwise Analysis^a

Variable	Discriminant Criterion for Function:	Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted		Chi- Square
		Fed.	Antifed.	Total
1. Investment: Focus of Previous Career	----	---	---	----
2. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience	.283	60%	80%	126.79*
3. Age in 1788	.308	65%	83%	136.52*
4. Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.309	67%	83%	136.75*
5. Period when Entered Politics	.334	67%	83%	146.38*
6. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.341	67%	83%	148.93*
7. Ambition: Target of Career, First Office	.366	69%	83%	158.16*
8. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.398	73%	85%	169.85*
9. Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.406	73%	85%	172.49*
10. Mobility of Career, 1789-1797		(No Additional Effect)		
11. Investment: Number of Years in National Office		(No Additional Effect)		
12. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office		(No Additional Effect)		
13. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800		(No Additional Effect)		
14. Age at Entry into Politics		(No Additional Effect)		

^aThe variables are listed according to the order in which they were entered into the function. The figures in the table are applicable to the combination of variables involved in the analysis at the point at which they appear. Thus, figures in the second row are applicable to the initial two-variable model, those in the third row to the three-variable model, and so on.

*Significant beyond the .01 level.

Antifederalists than they were in predicting those of Federalists, which implies that the discriminant function scores of the former were consistently more uniform than were those of the latter. Thus, it follows that Antifederalists were recruited from a somewhat more narrow political stratum than were Federalists.

The above findings which point to the relative importance of career investments in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists conflict to some extent with the results that were reported in earlier chapters which pointed to ambitions as the main source of difference between the two groups. Accordingly, the issue deserves to be explored in greater detail. For this purpose, nine variables were selected from the original model and divided into three distinct types or "factors" depending upon whether they were associated with ambitions, career investments, or age. Each factor was composed of three variables, and these are listed in Tables VI-3 to VI-5. Each factor was first analyzed separately to determine how well it discriminated between the two groups and then all three were examined in a stepwise fashion beginning with the two most powerful factors as revealed by the earlier analysis.

In Tables VI-3 to VI-5, the factors are examined separately. As the figures indicate, investments appear to have carried slightly greater weight, since the investment factor alone was able to correctly group about 68 per cent of the delegates as against 65 per cent for the ambition factor and 64 per cent for the age factor. When they are combined in a stepwise analysis, the figures indicate that all three factors make significant contributions to our capacity

TABLE VI-3

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Investment Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1. Investment:	Focus of Previous Career	.791
2. Investment:	Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.608
3. Investment:	Total Number of Years in Politics	.070
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=126.21$ DF=3 P<.001	Federalists	60%
	Antifederalists	80%
	Total	68%
		.282

TABLE VI-4

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Ambition Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1. Ambition:	Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.842
2. Ambition:	Type of Career, 1788-1800	.394
3. Ambition:	Target of Career, first office after 1788	.367
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=57.12$ DF=3 P<.001	Federalists	55%
	Antifederalists	79%
	Total	65%
		.119

TABLE VI-5

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Age Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Age in 1788	.965
2.	Age at Entry into Politics	.201
3.	Period when Entered Politics	.164
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=31.19$ DF=3 P<.001	Federalists	65%
	Antifederalists	63%
	Total	64%
		.063

to discriminate between the groups. Accordingly, when investments and ambitions are run together, the resulting model is able to correctly predict about 73 per cent of the votes, but when age is added to the equation this figure is increased still further to about 76 per cent (see Table VI-6). Thus, none of the factors can be regarded as superfluous, though we are still left with the conclusion that career investments was the most powerful of the three, a conclusion which jibes with the findings set forth earlier in this chapter.

All variables considered, then, the results of the discriminant analysis point to career investments as the factor that best discriminates between the two voting groups on the Constitution. In addition, however, age and ambitions also possessed considerable importance, thus bearing out the findings that were reported in the previous two chapters.

TABLE VI-6

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: Stepwise Analysis
for Three Factors^a

Factor	Discriminant Criterion	Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted			Chi- Square
		Fed.	Antifed.	Total	
1. Investments	----	---	---	---	-----
2. Ambitions	.353	67%	82%	73%	152.95*
3. Age	.390	71%	82%	76%	166.12*

^aThe factors are listed according to the order in which they were entered into the function. The figures are applicable to the combination of factors involved in the analysis at the point at which they appear.

*Significant beyond the .01 level.

It will be observed, however, that none of the models discussed in the previous section was able to correctly predict the votes of more than approximately 77 per cent of the delegates in the sample. One might legitimately ask for slightly better performances on the parts of such models. Accordingly, in the following section I shall attempt to add to the power of these models by considering an additional set of variables, one which, as will be quickly recognized, has received considerable attention from those who have studied the conflict over the Constitution.

Elaborating the Model: The Economic Factor

Beard and other writers in the Progressive tradition suggested that economic considerations were the most important factors dividing Federalists from Antifederalists.⁸ Though, as was pointed

Displacement Factor
Antifederalist
for the

Factor	Displacement Factor
1. Investments	
2. Additions	
3. Age	

The factors in the model were entered into the function combination of factors model. They appear.

*Significant results

It will be observed, however, that the results of the model in the previous section were not significantly different from the results of more than approximately 100 models. The results in the sample. One might legitimately question the results of the model. On the basis of the results of the model, I shall attempt to add to the power of these models by constructing an additional set of variables, one which, as will be quickly recognized, has received considerable attention from those who have studied the conflict over the Constitution.

Elaborating the Model: The Economic Factor

Board and other writers in the Progressive tradition suggested that economic considerations were the most important factors leading Federalists from Antifederalists.⁸ Though, as was pointed

out in Chapter II, this is an issue that has attracted considerable scholarly attention, I have yet to see the Progressive argument examined in the light of multivariate techniques. Forrest McDonald's strategy was to test the argument through the use of univariate comparisons, the results of which suggested to him that Beard's economic variables were relatively unimportant in discriminating between the two voting groups.⁹ However, as I argued earlier, the results of such comparisons often stand in need of revision once controls are introduced for other factors. Thus, once such controls are introduced, it is not unreasonable to believe that economic variables may increase our ability to distinguish between the two groups and, hence, may contribute additional information to that contained in the models discussed above. This consideration justifies their inclusion in the present analysis.

The analysis was begun by focusing upon two economic variables whose importance was originally suggested by Beard. The first of these was the amount of public securities held by each delegate, a factor which Beard considered to have been a "dynamic element . . . in bringing about the adoption of the new system."¹⁰ Since state governments at that time were threatening to cancel the public debts owed to security holders, Beard reasoned that it was in the interest of such men to support a national government which would guarantee payment of these debts. Thus, the more public securities one held, the more likely he was to support the Constitution. Fortunately, the data on the public security holdings of most of the delegates to the conventions have been gathered through the persistent work of Forrest

McDonald, and they have been put to use in the present analysis in order to weigh the impact of this economic factor. By comparison, the second economic variable was rather crude, since it consisted of an ordinal ranking of economic groups which were scaled according to the likelihood, given the accuracy of Beard's interpretation, that a given delegate supported the Constitution. The scale was composed of five economic groups or strata which were scaled in the following order: (1) manufacturers, financiers, and large slaveowners; (2) merchants; (3) professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, ministers); (4) workers and craftsmen; and (5) small farmers and landowners.¹¹ Given the accuracy of Beard's explanation, these groups are ranked according to the propensity of their members to support the Constitution. Thus, if he was correct, the scale should discriminate between Federalists and Antifederalists, with the former clustering at the top of the scale and the latter at the bottom. Again, the data relating to this second economic variable were also derived from the work of Forrest McDonald.

The results of this line of analysis are summarized in Table VI-7 where Beard's two economic variables were run in combination with the 14 variables that composed the original career model. As the figures in the table indicate, the impact of the economic variables was rather weak; of the 16 variables in the model, occupation ranked 13th in discriminant strength and public security holdings ranked 15th. In addition, the inclusion of these variables in the model did not increase its predictive power, since we are still able to correctly group only about 75 per cent of the delegates. This is not

TABLE VI-7

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Original Model
and the Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.525
2.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience	.420
3.	Age in 1788	.369
4.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.333
5.	Period when Entered Politics	.279
6.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.270
7.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.202
8.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.193
9.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.128
10.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.122
11.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.119
12.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.113
13.	Economic Stratum	.110
14.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.040
15.	Public Security Holdings	.020
16.	Age at Entry into Politics	.012
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=174.87$ DF=16 P<.001	Federalists	73%
	Antifederalists	77%
	Total	75%
		.418

Discriminant Function Analysis
Antifederalists vs. Federalists
and the Economy

Variable	Antifederalists	Federalists
1. Investment: Focus of Investment	1.00	1.00
2. Investment: Focus of Investment	1.00	1.00
3. Age in 1788	1.00	1.00
4. Investment: Number of Investments	1.00	1.00
5. Period when Interest Declined	1.00	1.00
6. Investment: Total Number of Investments	1.00	1.00
7. Ambition: Target of Career, First of	1.00	1.00
8. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1790	1.00	1.00
9. Mobility of Career, 1788-1790	1.00	1.00
10. Investment: Number of Investments	1.00	1.00
11. Mobility of Career, 1788-1790	1.00	1.00
12. Investment: Number of Investments	1.00	1.00
13. Economic Status	1.00	1.00
14. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1790	1.00	1.00
15. Public Security Holdings	1.00	1.00
16. Age at Entry into Politics	1.00	1.00
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		
Federalists	728	728
Antifederalists	728	728
Total	728	728
Discriminant Criterion for Function:		
	418	418

X² = 174.87
Df = 16
p < .001

to say, however, that Federalists and Antifederalists did not differ on either of these economic variables; in fact, insofar as public securities are concerned, the mean figure for Federalists was about \$2800 while the corresponding number for Antifederalists was only about \$1900, a difference that is statistically significant beyond the .05 level. This demonstrates the value of a multivariate approach, for, by itself, such a finding would represent a confirmation of Beard's hypothesis. However, when placed in the context of other independent variables, the economic factor is shown to be a relatively weak predictor of voting on the Constitution.

The relative weakness of these two economic variables is further borne out when they are considered in isolation, as they are in Table VI-8. As the figures indicate, these variables by themselves carried little predictive power, since they succeeded in correctly predicting only about 54 per cent of the votes on the Constitution. This is a rather poor performance in the light of the fact that we could expect to predict about 50 per cent of the cases by random drawing alone.

In addition, Beard also suggested that the interests of large slaveowners were also served by the ratification of the new system. Accordingly, the delegates from the five southern states (Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland) were separated from the rest of the sample and the sizes of their slaveholdings were entered into the analysis to determine if they succeeded in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists.¹²

TABLE VI-8

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Public Security Holdings	.972
2.	Economic Stratum	.235
$\chi^2=1.808$ DF=2 P= about .50		Discriminant Criterion for Function: Federalists 41% Antifederalists 75% Total 54% .004

As the figures in Table VI-9 suggest, slaveholding turned out to be a moderately powerful predictor, ranking seventh among the 17 variables considered in its ability to discriminate between the two groups. Moreover, it increased the predictive power of the original model to a slight extent, increasing the proportion of cases correctly predicted to about 78 per cent.¹³ The relative strength of the slaveholding variable in comparison with the other two economic variables is also demonstrated when the economic factor is considered in isolation from the career variables. Thus, as Table VI-10 shows, the slaveholding variable generated a stronger standardized function weight than did either of the other two economic variables. Nevertheless, the economic factor by itself proved to have little predictive power once again, since it was able to correctly group only about 54 per cent of the delegates that were considered.¹⁴

Table VI

Discriminant Function Analysis
Antisociality

Variable	Discriminant Function
1. Public Security Holding	
2. Economic Status	
3. Age	
4. Sex	
5. Education	
6. Religion	
7. Marital Status	
8. Family Size	
9. Income	
10. Unemployment	
11. Social Class	
12. Ethnicity	
13. Residence	
14. Employment	
15. Criminal Record	
16. Mental Health	
17. Substance Use	
18. Social Networks	
19. Life Events	
20. Personality Traits	
21. Attitudes	
22. Values	
23. Beliefs	
24. Expectations	
25. Goals	
26. Interests	
27. Hobbies	
28. Sports	
29. Music	
30. Art	
31. Reading	
32. Writing	
33. Speaking	
34. Listening	
35. Thinking	
36. Feeling	
37. Wanting	
38. Knowing	
39. Understanding	
40. Judging	
41. Acting	
42. Interacting	
43. Relating	
44. Connecting	
45. Communicating	
46. Expressing	
47. Showing	
48. Demonstrating	
49. Illustrating	
50. Explaining	
51. Describing	
52. Narrating	
53. Reporting	
54. Telling	
55. Sharing	
56. Giving	
57. Offering	
58. Providing	
59. Supplying	
60. Delivering	
61. Distributing	
62. Spreading	
63. Extending	
64. Reaching	
65. Attaining	
66. Achieving	
67. Completing	
68. Finishing	
69. Ending	
70. Closing	
71. Shutting	
72. Stopping	
73. Halting	
74. Pausing	
75. Waiting	
76. Delaying	
77. Postponing	
78. Deferring	
79. Putting off	
80. Holding back	
81. Retaining	
82. Keeping	
83. Storing	
84. Saving	
85. Preserving	
86. Protecting	
87. Defending	
88. Guarding	
89. Watching	
90. Observing	
91. Monitoring	
92. Supervising	
93. Managing	
94. Controlling	
95. Regulating	
96. Adjusting	
97. Modifying	
98. Changing	
99. Altering	
100. Transforming	

As the figures in Table VI show, the discriminant function analysis of the variables in the study revealed that the most powerful predictors of antisociality were public security holding, economic status, age, sex, education, religion, marital status, family size, income, unemployment, social class, ethnicity, residence, employment, criminal record, mental health, substance use, social networks, life events, personality traits, attitudes, values, beliefs, expectations, goals, interests, hobbies, sports, music, art, reading, writing, speaking, listening, thinking, feeling, wanting, knowing, understanding, judging, acting, interacting, relating, connecting, communicating, expressing, showing, demonstrating, illustrating, explaining, describing, narrating, reporting, telling, sharing, giving, offering, providing, supplying, delivering, distributing, spreading, extending, reaching, attaining, achieving, completing, finishing, ending, closing, shutting, stopping, halting, pausing, waiting, delaying, postponing, deferring, putting off, holding back, retaining, keeping, storing, saving, preserving, protecting, defending, guarding, watching, observing, monitoring, supervising, managing, controlling, regulating, adjusting, modifying, changing, altering, transforming, and so on. The discriminant function analysis revealed that the most powerful predictors of antisociality were public security holding, economic status, age, sex, education, religion, marital status, family size, income, unemployment, social class, ethnicity, residence, employment, criminal record, mental health, substance use, social networks, life events, personality traits, attitudes, values, beliefs, expectations, goals, interests, hobbies, sports, music, art, reading, writing, speaking, listening, thinking, feeling, wanting, knowing, understanding, judging, acting, interacting, relating, connecting, communicating, expressing, showing, demonstrating, illustrating, explaining, describing, narrating, reporting, telling, sharing, giving, offering, providing, supplying, delivering, distributing, spreading, extending, reaching, attaining, achieving, completing, finishing, ending, closing, shutting, stopping, halting, pausing, waiting, delaying, postponing, deferring, putting off, holding back, retaining, keeping, storing, saving, preserving, protecting, defending, guarding, watching, observing, monitoring, supervising, managing, controlling, regulating, adjusting, modifying, changing, altering, transforming, and so on. The discriminant function analysis revealed that the most powerful predictors of antisociality were public security holding, economic status, age, sex, education, religion, marital status, family size, income, unemployment, social class, ethnicity, residence, employment, criminal record, mental health, substance use, social networks, life events, personality traits, attitudes, values, beliefs, expectations, goals, interests, hobbies, sports, music, art, reading, writing, speaking, listening, thinking, feeling, wanting, knowing, understanding, judging, acting, interacting, relating, connecting, communicating, expressing, showing, demonstrating, illustrating, explaining, describing, narrating, reporting, telling, sharing, giving, offering, providing, supplying, delivering, distributing, spreading, extending, reaching, attaining, achieving, completing, finishing, ending, closing, shutting, stopping, halting, pausing, waiting, delaying, postponing, deferring, putting off, holding back, retaining, keeping, storing, saving, preserving, protecting, defending, guarding, watching, observing, monitoring, supervising, managing, controlling, regulating, adjusting, modifying, changing, altering, transforming, and so on.

TABLE VI-9

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Original Model and the
Economic Factor (for delegates
from slave states)

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.448
2.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.435
3.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.376
4.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.340
5.	Mobility of Career, 1788-1797	.310
6.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.301
7.	Slaveholdings	.247
8.	Age in 1788	.198
9.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.159
10.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.134
11.	Period when Entered Politics	.122
12.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.073
13.	Economic Stratum	.047
14.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.019
15.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.017
16.	Age at Entry into Politics	.012
17.	Public Security Holdings	.002
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=64.17$ DF=17 P<.001	Federalists	74%
	Antifederalists	83%
	Total	78%
		.382

$\chi^2 = 64.17$
 $df = 17$
 $p < .001$

Percentage of Votes Correctly Predicted	Predictable	Unpredictable
74%	74%	74%
78%	78%	78%
78%	78%	78%

Investment Criterion
for Prediction

1. Investment: Focus of Career
2. Ambition: Target of Career
3. Ambition: Focus of Career
4. Investment: Focus of Career
5. Mobility of Career, 1750-1780
6. Investment: Number of Years
7. Slaveholdings
8. Age in 1780
9. Investment: Number of Years
10. Investment: Number of Years
11. Period when Entered Politics
12. Investment: Total Number of Years
13. Economic Status
14. Ambition: Type of Career, 1750-1780
15. Mobility of Career, 1750-1780
16. Age at Entry into Politics
17. Public Security Holdings

Variable

Discriminant Function
 Antislavery
 Economic Status
 Mobility of Career

Table 1

TABLE VI-10

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalists and
Antifederalists: The Economic Factor
(for delegates from slave states)

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1. Slaveholdings		.953
2. Economic Stratum		.263
3. Public Security Holdings		.151
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=3.016$ DF=3 F= about .50	Federalists	41%
	Antifederalists	74%
	Total	54%
		.015

The reader will also notice in Table VI-9 that among southern delegates, ambition played a much more significant role in discriminating between Federalists and Antifederalists than it did in the earlier analyses in which delegates from all states were considered. Thus, among southern delegates, ambition variables represented two of the three most powerful predictors of voting on the Constitution.

These findings, then, tend to lend additional support to the view of the ratification that has been outlined in the present work. The career variables suggested by this approach consistently outranked the economic variables suggested by Beard in their capacities to discriminate between the voting groups in the Constitution. And where an economic variable succeeded in making a measurable contribution to the predictive power of the original model, as in the case of the slaveholdings, that contribution was, at best, marginal. Hence, the

findings reported here further reinforce those that were set forth in Chapters IV and V.

Splitting the Sample: Statesmen and Regulars

The data that were reported in those earlier chapters also suggested that Statesmen and Regulars (that is, leaders and non-leaders) from both sides differed along different dimensions than did the two main groups in the sample (see Appendix for a discussion of these terms). The objective of the present section will be to examine these differences more closely through the use of discriminant function analysis which will allow us once again to rank the various predictor variables in their ability to discriminate between the groups in question. In preparing the following discussion, the sample was split along several dimensions and, accordingly, differences between a number of sets of sub-groups in the sample were analyzed: first, differences between Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen; second, differences between Federalist Regulars and Antifederalist Regulars; and, finally, differences between Statesmen and Regulars from each side of the conflict. Each of these will be considered in turn.

It was reported in Chapters IV and V that the sharpest differences between Federalists and Antifederalists were to be found in their leadership strata. This was not unexpected, since, by virtue of their intense participation in the conflict, such leaders could be assumed to have had more to gain or to lose by the ratification or the rejection of the new system. Thus, whatever factors served to distinguish Federalists from Antifederalists in general were to be found to an exaggerated degree in their leadership strata. Which

variables, however, were most important in distinguishing between Federalist Statesmen and Antifederalist Statesmen? The figures reported in Table VI-11 suggest that of the original 14 career variables, age and the period when the delegate launched his career were the two variables with the greatest discriminant power. All told, the original 14-variable career model succeeded in correctly predicting the votes of about 83 per cent of the Statesmen in the sample, a figure which marks a slight improvement over its previous performance in discriminating between the two larger voting groups. When these variables are examined in a stepwise fashion, as they are in Table VI-12, we note that a high proportion of this predictive power is supplied by the two strongest variables, for age and the period of entry into politics alone successfully account for about 72 per cent of the cases in question. The successive stepwise addition of one ambition variable and two investment variables brings that figure up to about 84 per cent, after which the inclusion of additional variables has little discernible impact.

It will be noted that the two most powerful variables in the above analysis were, in a sense, generational variables which indirectly relate to the differential historical experiences to which the members of these groups were subject during their maturing years. Such findings thus further reinforce the Elkins-McKitrick interpretation of the conflict which suggests that the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was in large part an intergenerational conflict between politicians whose experiences had left them with conflicting views of national, state, and local political

TABLE VI-11

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen
and Antifederalist Statesmen: 14 Variable Model

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Age in 1788	.527
2.	Period when Entered Politics	.500
3.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.471
4.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.310
5.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.249
6.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.177
7.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.143
8.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.098
9.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience	.094
10.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.086
11.	Age at Entry into Politics	.084
12.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.072
13.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.026
14.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.016
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=75.79$ DF=14 P<.001	Federalists	80%
	Antifederalists	87%
	Total	83%
		.843

TABLE VI-12

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen
and Antifederalist Statesmen: Stepwise Analysis^a

Variable	Discriminant Criterion	Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted		Chi- Square
		Fed.	Antifed.	Total
1. Age in 1788	----	---	---	----
2. Period when Entered Politics	.155	72%	72%	18.74*
3. Ambition: Target of Career, First Office	.547	72%	87%	56.48*
4. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.554	73%	83%	56.87*
5. Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.749	82%	87%	71.83*
6. Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.792	82%	86%	74.74*
7. Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.809	83%	87%	75.59*
8. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office		(No Additional Effect)		
9. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.		(No Additional Effect)		
10. Investment: Number of Years in State Office		(No Additional Effect)		
11. Age at Entry into Politics		(No Additional Effect)		
12. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800		(No Additional Effect)		
13. Mobility of Career, 1789-1797		(No Additional Effect)		
14. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800		(No Additional Effect)		

^aThe variables are listed according to the order in which they were entered into the function. The figures in the table are applicable to the combination of variables involved in the analysis at the point at which they appear. Thus, the figures in the second row are applicable to the initial two-variable model, those in the third to the three-variable model, and so on.

*Significant beyond the .01 level.

institutions. Thus, one of the important cleavages was the historical one. However, it should also be pointed out that since these variables fared better as predictors among Statesmen than they did among the larger sample of delegates, this interpretation should be regarded as one that is most applicable to the leadership strata of the two sides of the conflict.

Much the same conclusion is in order with respect to Beard's thesis which suggested the importance of economic factors in discriminating between the two voting groups. As Table VI-13 suggests, one of Beard's economic variables, public security holdings, was one of the more powerful variables in distinguishing between the two groups of leaders, since it ranked behind only three other career variables in predictive power. Moreover, together the two economic variables (economic stratum and public security holdings) served to slightly increase the proportion of votes correctly predicted by the original model up to about 84 per cent. Thus, like the generational variables suggested by Elkins and McKittrick, the economic factor seems also to have been most important to the calculations of the leadership stratum of each voting group.

These conclusions are further reinforced when we examine the variables that best discriminate between Federalist and Antifederalist Regulars. Thus, while age, ambition, and period of entry into politics were the most powerful variables in discriminating between the two leadership strata, factors associated with career investments were the most powerful in discriminating between non-leaders. As the figures in Table VI-14 suggest, the five strongest variables in

institutions. Thus, one of the hypotheses was that the more institutionalized a country is, the more likely it is to have a stable government. However, it should also be noted that the more institutionalized a country is, the more likely it is to have a stable government. The larger sample of delegations was used to test the hypothesis that the more institutionalized a country is, the more likely it is to have a stable government. The results of the analysis suggest that the hypothesis is supported.

Much the same conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the variables which suggested the hypothesis. The analysis of the variables which suggested the hypothesis is presented in Table VI-14. The results of the analysis suggest that the hypothesis is supported. The variables which suggested the hypothesis are: (1) the proportion of the population which is literate, (2) the proportion of the population which is employed in agriculture, (3) the proportion of the population which is employed in industry, (4) the proportion of the population which is employed in commerce, and (5) the proportion of the population which is employed in services. The results of the analysis suggest that the hypothesis is supported.

These conclusions are further reinforced when we examine the variables that best discriminate between leaders and non-leaders. Thus, while age, ambition, and period of entry into politics were the most powerful variables in discriminating between the two leadership strata, factors associated with career investments were the most powerful in discriminating between non-leaders. As the figures in Table VI-14 suggest, the five strongest variables in

TABLE VI-13

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Statesmen
and Antifederalist Statesmen: The Original
Model and the Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.530
2.	Age in 1788	.506
3.	Period when Entered Politics	.501
4.	Public Security Holdings	.201
5.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.196
6.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.191
7.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.191
8.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.190
9.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.091
10.	Age at Entry into Politics	.070
11.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.061
12.	Economic Stratum	.048
13.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.043
14.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.035
15.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.023
16.	Mobility of Career, 1788-1797	.010
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=79.66$ DF=16 P<.001	Federalists	85%
	Antifederalists	83%
	Total	84%
		.911

TABLE VI-14

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars
and Antifederalist Regulars: 14 Variable Model

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.517
2.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.446
3.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.410
4.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.370
5.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.219
6.	Age in 1788	.218
7.	Period when Entered Politics	.206
8.	Mobility of Career, 1788-1797	.203
9.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.164
10.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.113
11.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.064
12.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.052
13.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.052
14.	Age at Entry into Politics	.035
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=123.50$ DF=14 P<.001	Federalists	70%
	Antifederalists	84%
	Total	76%
		.396

Distinctions Between the
and Antilebanese

Variable		Percent of Total Correctly Predicted		Distinctions Between for Prediction	
1.	Investment: Focus of Investment	70%	Redneals	70%	
2.	Investment: Focus of Investment	84%	Antilebanese	84%	
3.	Investment: Total Investment	74%	Total	74%	
4.	Investment: Number of Investments				
5.	Investment: Number of Investments				
6.	Age in 1968				
7.	Period when Entered				
8.	Mobility of Career				
9.	Ambition: Type of Career				
10.	Investment: Number of Years in				
11.	Ambition: Target of Career				
12.	Mobility of Career, 1968				
13.	Ambition: Focus of Career				
14.	Age at Entry into Politics				

the analysis were associated with career investments, and together these five variables were able to account for the votes of about 69 per cent of the delegates (see Table VI-15). Other variables, on the other hand, had only minimal impacts. Accordingly, when the two economic variables were plugged into the model, as they were in Table VI-16, they added nothing in the way of predictive power and, indeed, the public security holdings and the economic strata of the delegates ranked well down the list of variables in terms of discriminant strength. Thus, insofar as non-leaders are concerned, both the generational thesis suggested by Elkins and McKittrick and the economic interpretation set forth by Beard are seriously inadequate.

When the sample is split between Statesmen and Regulars on each side of the issue, the results once again reinforce those that were reported in Chapter V where it was pointed out that these delegates differed most strongly in the amounts of political experience that they had acquired as of 1788. This conclusion holds up in the multivariate context, for, as Tables VI-17 and VI-18 indicate, career investments was the most powerful factor in discriminating between Statesmen and Regulars on both sides of the ratification issue. Indeed, since in both cases the total number of years spent in politics was the most powerful of the 16 variables, the sheer amount of this experience was of considerably more importance here than was its particular institutional focus.

This provides a clue as to why the career variables suggested by our model of innovation were consistently more successful in predicting the votes of Statesmen than they were in accounting for

the analysis were associated with those five variables were noted in the percent of the delegates (see Table 1). The other hand, had only minor differences. The economic variables were found to be the most powerful. At VI-16, they added nothing to the public security index. The public security index ranged well down the list of variables. Thus, in general, the strength of the institutional thesis suggested by the interpretation set forth in the literature. When the sample is split on each side of the issue, the results were reported in Chapter V. Cases differed most strongly in the cases that they had acquired as of 1978. In addition, the institutional thesis was the most powerful. The institutional thesis was the most powerful. Statesmen and Regulate on both sides of the issue. Indeed, since the total number of votes spent in politics was the most powerful of the 16 variables, the sheer amount of this experience was of considerably more importance here than was its particular institutional focus. This provides a clue as to why the earlier variables suggested by our model of innovation were consistently more successful in predicting the votes of Statesmen than they were in accounting for

TABLE VI-15

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars
and Antifederalist Regulars: Stepwise Analysis^a

Variable	Discriminant Criterion	Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted		Chi- Square
		Fed.	Antifed. Total	
1. Investment: Focus of Previous Career	----	---	---	----
2. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.291	60%	80%	96.13*
3. Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.294	60%	80%	96.71*
4. Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.298	60%	81%	97.95*
5. Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.305	61%	80%	99.78*
6. Age in 1788	.332	61%	82%	107.25*
7. Period when Entered Politics	.343	70%	83%	110.07*
8. Mobility of Career, 1788-1797		(No Additional Effect)		
9. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800		(No Additional Effect)		
10. Investment: Number of Years in National Office		(No Additional Effect)		
11. Ambition: Target of Career, First Office		(No Additional Effect)		
12. Mobility of Career, 1780-1788		(No Additional Effect)		
13. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800		(No Additional Effect)		
14. Age at Entry into Politics		(No Additional Effect)		

^aThe variables are listed according to the order in which they were entered into the function. The figures in the table are applicable to the combination of variables involved in the analysis at the point at which they appear.

*Significant beyond the .01 level.

TABLE VI-16

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars
and Antifederalist Regulars: The Original
Model and the Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.493
2.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.432
3.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.420
4.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.368
5.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.236
6.	Age in 1788	.212
7.	Period when Entered Politics	.212
8.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.189
9.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.169
10.	Economic Stratum	.121
11.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.119
12.	Public Security Holdings	.103
13.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.053
14.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.051
15.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.048
16.	Age at Entry into Politics	.041
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=125.88$ DF=16 P<.001	Federalists	71%
	Antifederalists	77%
	Total	73%
		.406

TABLE VI-17

Discriminant Function Analysis for Federalist Regulars
and Federalist Statesmen: The Original Model
and the Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.720
2.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.401
3.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.390
4.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.286
5.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.226
6.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.132
7.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.080
8.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.060
9.	Age at Entry into Politics	.058
10.	Period when Entered Politics	.044
11.	Public Security Holdings	.037
12.	Age in 1788	.027
13.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.015
14.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.014
15.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.009
16.	Economic Stratum	.007
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$X^2=115.37$	Statesmen	78%
DF=16	Regulars	78%
P<.001	Total	78%
		.475

TABLE VI-18

Discriminant Function Analysis for Antifederalist
Regulars and Antifederalist Statesmen: The
Original Model and the Economic Factor

Variable		Standardized Function Weight
1.	Investment: Total Number of Years in Politics	.456
2.	Age in 1788	.412
3.	Investment: Number of Years in National Office	.381
4.	Investment: Number of Years in Local Office	.369
5.	Mobility of Career, 1789-1797	.281
6.	Investment: Number of Years in State Office	.252
7.	Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Exp.	.235
8.	Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800	.234
9.	Public Security Holdings	.176
10.	Ambition: Target of Career, first office	.157
11.	Mobility of Career, 1780-1788	.105
12.	Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800	.094
13.	Economic Stratum	.061
14.	Age at Entry into Politics	.060
15.	Investment: Focus of Previous Career	.056
16.	Period when Entered Politics	.018
Percent of Votes Correctly Predicted:		Discriminant Criterion for Function:
$\chi^2=41.22$ DF=16 P<.001	Statesmen	63%
	Regulars	85%
	Total	79%
		.235

TABLE VI-12

Discriminant Function Analysis of the Data on the
Regular and Antidiscriminatory Policies
Original Model and the Revised Model

Variable	Discriminant Function Coefficient
1. Investment: Total number of years	0.018
2. Age in 1988	0.000
3. Investment: Number of years	0.000
4. Investment: Number of years	0.000
5. Mobility of Career, 1988-1990	0.000
6. Investment: Number of years	0.000
7. Investment: Focus of Research	0.000
8. Ambition: Focus of Career	0.000
9. Public Security Holdings	0.000
10. Ambition: Target of Career	0.000
11. Mobility of Career, 1980-1988	0.000
12. Ambition: Type of Career, 1988-1990	0.000
13. Economic Status	0.000
14. Age at Entry into Politics	0.000
15. Investment: Focus of Previous Career	0.000
16. Period when Entered Politics	0.018
Percent of Voters Correctly Predicted:	
Discriminant Coefficient for Function:	
Regulars	82%
Total	78%
Adjusted R ²	0.41
Period	82%
Total	78%

those of Regulars. Since Statesmen and Regulars differed greatly in the amounts of political experience that they had acquired by 1788, it is reasonable to suppose that Statesmen, by virtue of their greater experience in politics, entertained stronger attachments to their political careers than did Regulars. Thus, since the model was constructed on the assumption that the decisions of delegates could be understood as responses to their office goals, it follows that the model should be most successful in predicting the decisions of those who were most likely to adopt such a calculus, namely, career officeholders. By and large, as the data suggest, these were found more often among Statesmen than among Regulars, and this was reflected in the differential strengths of the model among these two groups of delegates.

The Multivariate Analysis: Conclusions

This chapter has set forth a somewhat more refined test of our model of innovation than was attempted in Chapters IV and V. While in those chapters the object was to determine which of the propositions suggested by the model are accurate, in this chapter the object has been to determine which of these are most important. The answer to this question has been set forth above but may be briefly summarized here.

Three general empirical conclusions emerge from the multivariate analysis. The first is that in the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists, variables associated with career investments turned out to have the greatest discriminant strength. Thus, if these figures are to be believed, the greatest cleavage between

the two groups revolved around the foci of their previous careers, with Federalists more likely to have been associated with continental institutions and Antifederalists with state and local institutions. However, despite the seeming importance of career investments, one cannot ignore the factors of age and ambition. Thus, the relative youth of Federalists and their greater tendency to seek advancement in their careers were also factors which appear to have influenced the shape of the conflict, since these variables also possessed considerable discriminant strength.

There is, in addition, a second point. Though the career model that I have developed in this work has a number of shortcomings, especially in dealing with non-leaders, it nevertheless achieves a better fit with the data than does one of the dominant alternative explanations in the literature, namely, the economic interpretation that was suggested by Charles Beard. Accordingly, when economic variables of the kind suggested by Beard (such as public security holdings, occupation, and slaveholdings) were plugged into the model, they were consistently outranked in discriminant power by a number of career variables. The relative weakness of these economic variables thus suggests that the economic approach will not do as a general explanation of the conflict. However, since the strength of these variables tended to increase somewhat when the focus was placed upon Statesmen, it may be at least suggested that Beard's formulation is applicable mainly to this narrow group of influential participants.

This brings me to a third and final point. This is that the variables that emerge as important in the analysis depend to some degree upon the sub-groups in the sample that one happens to be focusing upon. Thus, the variables that divided Statesmen on either side of the conflict were not necessarily those that divided Regulars, and vice versa. Accordingly, much as Elkins and McKittrick had suggested, the generational variables of age and the historical period of entry into politics turned out to be the most important variables in discriminating between the leadership strata of the two groups. On the other hand, when attention was turned to differences between non-leaders, the impact of the above variables diminished and variables associated with career investments (such as their revolutionary experiences and the foci of their previous careers) emerged to take their places. Hence, just as there were important cleavages between Federalists and Antifederalists, so were there those within each group, a fact which makes it all the more difficult for any single theory to account for the case. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, a number of explanations for the case turn out to be applicable only to differences between the leadership stratum of each group.

With minor exceptions, then, the findings that emerge from the multivariate analysis further reinforce both the model of innovation that was set forth in Chapter III and the account of this particular case that was outlined in Chapter II. Two considerations generate this confidence. First, the variables suggested by these approaches were able to discriminate between the groups in the analysis with considerable reliability: the various models set

forth in this chapter were consistently able to group upwards of 75 per cent of the delegates in the sample. Second, this explanation of the case attained a greater consistency with the data than did the most frequently cited alternative approach, namely, the economic interpretation: when both career and economic variables were considered at the same time, the former consistently outranked the latter in discriminant strength. Given these considerations, the conclusion can be advanced without too much danger that career factors played important roles in giving shape to the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution.

The Study: A Summary

This study has finally reached the point where its main themes and findings can be summarized.

The outlines of the study revolved around the problem of institutional change and around the question of how the decisions of leaders with respect to such changes can be best understood. Drawing upon theories of innovation in organizations and bureaucracies, we sketched a model based upon the assumption that leaders make decisions that are consistent with their career perspectives. Three general factors were suggested as explanatory variables: ambitions, career investments, and age. The general notion was that innovators are more likely to seek advancement in their careers, to have fewer investments staked in their careers, and, as a consequence, to be younger than those who oppose change.

In Chapters II and III, these speculations were explicitly linked to a particular case of institutional change, namely, the

conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists over the Constitution. In Chapter II it was shown that such a focus upon career perspectives is not inappropriate in this historical context, for it is consistent with a particular interpretation of the case that has been suggested by a number of historians. The main proponents of this approach have been Lipset, Kenyon, and Elkins and McKittrick, all of whom suggest in different ways that Federalists can be understood as innovators who were attempting to construct a "new nation" out of what had previously been only a loose confederation of states. The outlooks that men at the time adopted toward national, state, and local institutions, in turn, were formed in part by their political ambitions, by their experiences in the Revolution and in their previous political careers, and by their generational affiliations. Those whose careers were affiliated with continental affairs and who came of age during the revolutionary era were more likely to become Federalists in 1788, while those whose experiences revolved around state and local affairs and who came of age at an earlier time when the colonies were the primary frameworks of government were more likely to become Antifederalists.

In Chapter III, these theoretical and historical views were more explicitly stated by placing them into the context of a theory or a model of institutional change. Here, a number of assumptions underlying the model were made clear and from these, seven sets of propositions were derived which linked the variables of ambition, career investments, and age to the issue of innovation or institutional change. These propositions were then tested by analyzing the

political careers of a sample of approximately 540 Federalists and Antifederalists drawn from among those who were delegates to the various constitutional conventions in 1787 and 1788. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, the findings of the study were set forth using both bi-variate and multivariate statistical techniques.

By and large, the data supported the model of innovation and the historical interpretation that was linked with it. Thus, Federalists and Antifederalists appear to have entertained divergent kinds of ambitions, as measured by their careers after 1788. Federalists were more likely than their opponents to seek advancement in their careers between 1788 and 1800 and were also more likely to fasten their careers upon national institutions. Such tendencies were, in addition, somewhat exaggerated among Federalist Statesmen. By contrast, the careers of Antifederalists were more likely to reflect stationary or discrete ambitions and were, in addition, more likely to revolve around local political institutions (see Chapter IV).

The model was given further support by the findings that were set forth in Chapter V, which focused upon the factors of age and career investments. Thus, it was found that, much as predicted, the younger the delegate, the more likely he was to become a Federalist, that is, to support the institutional change. On the average, there was approximately a five-year age differential between the two groups, and, in addition, such differences were even greater between the leadership strata of the two groups. With respect to career investments, the data did not turn out according to expectation in the two variable context. Thus, by and large, Federalists and Antifederalists

political careers of a sample of supervisors in the industrial and
 Antidotevalians drawn from among the various constitutional conventions in
 V, and VI, the findings of the study were as follows: (1) the
 variate and multivariate statistics showed that the data indicated
 the historical interpretation that the Antidotevalians were more
 likely and Antidotevalians were more likely to be in the
 of ambitions, as measured by the number of years in the
 were more likely than their counterparts to be in the
 careers between 1788 and 1801, and 1801 and 1820, and
 their careers upon national Antidotevalians, and Antidotevalians
 addition, somewhat exaggerated with regard to the
 first, the careers of Antidotevalians were more likely to be in
 stationary or discrete ambitions and were, in addition, more likely
 to involve strong local political Antidotevalians (the United States).
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 and, in addition, such differences were even greater between the
 leadership strata of the two groups. With respect to career invest-
 ments, the data did not turn out according to expectation in the two
 variable context. Thus, by and large, Federalists and Antidotevalians

did not appear to differ significantly on this score. There was, however, an exception to this conclusion and this involved the experiences of delegates in the Revolution and their relationships to the chronology of events that led up to it. Those who served militarily at the continental level during the war tended to support the Constitution in 1788 while those who experienced the conflict at the state and local levels tended to oppose the new system. Apparently, revolutionary experiences were crucial in framing the outlooks of men toward national, state, and local political institutions. The Revolution also appears to have represented a generational dividing line, for those who launched their careers prior to the revolutionary stirrings of the 1770's evinced a tendency to oppose the Constitution when the issue arose in 1788, while those whose careers were based upon events that coincided with or followed the war showed a slight tendency to support it. Thus, as Elkins and McKittrick suggested, the conflict between Federalists and Antifederalists was also in part an intergenerational conflict between men who came of age on different sides of the revolutionary divide.

These results were corroborated when the data were examined in a multivariate context through the use of multiple discriminant function analysis, a technique which allowed us to rank the different variables according to their capacity to discriminate between the main groups in the analysis. When focusing upon the differences between Federalists and Antifederalists, variables associated with career investments surprisingly turned out to possess the greatest discriminant strength. Among the most prominent of these, though,

were revolutionary experiences, a finding which supports those reported immediately above. However, it was also found that ambitions and age were also important factors, since their introduction into the equation markedly increased our capacity to discriminate between the two groups. In addition, the multivariate analysis allowed us to test the career model which has guided this inquiry against the economic interpretation that was set forth by Charles Beard. Accordingly, for the purpose of comparing their relative strengths, a group of economic variables (public security holdings, occupation, and slaveholdings) was plugged into the same equation as a number of the career variables that have been described above. The results gave further support to the career model, since they revealed that career variables tended to outrank economic variables in their ability to discriminate between the groups. Thus, the career model was shown not only to be consistent with the data but also to possess greater predictive power than the dominant alternative approach in the literature.

What, then, do these findings tell us about the case itself? As has already been suggested, they reinforce the view of the ratification that was first set forth by Elkins and McKittrick and which was later placed into a more theoretical context by Lipset, who suggested that the acceptance of the Constitution represented one step in an extended process of nation-building in the United States (see Chapter II for details). This approach is preferable to rival interpretations, such as the Progressive view, largely because it makes intelligible a number of elements of the case that others overlook,

such as the importance of generational factors, of revolutionary experiences, of ambitions, and of the institutional foci of delegates' political careers. All of these were factors which, as Elkins and McKittrick argued, may have served to shape the views that men adopted toward national, state, and local political institutions and, hence, toward the Constitution itself. As was mentioned in Chapter II, interpretations of this case tend to shift with the changing social identities of historians and social scientists. No doubt this one is congenial to those who look upon the world as one full of "new" nations, and no doubt such a preoccupation will in time change. But though this explanation is built upon such shifting sands, it is also grounded in a body of empirical findings about the case. Given this, it merits at least provisional support.

such as the importance of experience, of ambition, and of the...
...political careers. Mr. ...
...and ...
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...toward the Constitution ...
...II. Interpretations of this ...
...social identities of history ...
...this one is congenial to ...
...of "new" nations, and no ...
...changes. But though this ...
...sands, it is also ...
...the case. Given this, it ...

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI

¹See, for example, Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1971).

²For more detailed discussions of discriminant analysis, see the following: William W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Wiley, 1962), Chapter 6; David Tiedeman and Joseph Bryan, "Prediction of College Field of Concentration," Harvard Educational Review, XXIV (1954), 122-39; and C. R. Rao, Advanced Statistical Methods in Biometric Research (Darien, Conn.: Hafner, 1970), pp. 249-57.

³The ordinal scales used in the analysis are reproduced as follows:

- I. Investment: Focus of Previous Career
 1. National Office
 2. Mixed: National and State or Local Offices
 3. No Previous Career
 4. State Office
 5. Mixed: State and Local Offices
 6. Local Office
- II. Investment: Focus of Revolutionary Experience
(Index of Institutional Focus and Amount of Experience)
 1. Continental Army--4 Years or More
 2. Continental Army--2 to 3 Years
 3. Continental Army--1 Year or Less
 4. Mixed: Continental Army and State or Local Militia
 5. No Revolutionary Experience
 6. State Militia--1 Year or Less
 7. State Militia--2 to 3 Years
 8. State Militia--4 Years or More
 9. Local Militia--1 Year or Less
 10. Local Militia--2 to 3 Years
 11. Local Militia--4 Years or More

See, for example, Walter Dill
"Policy Differences in Behavior"
Political Science Review, Vol. 10

For more details see the following:
 the following: William A. Dill
Procedures for the Behavioral
Chapter 6: David W. Dill, "The
Field of Concentration,"
122-29; and C. R. Rao, "Advances
Research (Dillon, Conn.)

2
 follows:

- I. Investment:
 1. National City
 2. Mixed National City
 3. No Previous Investment
 4. State Office
 5. Mixed: State and Local Office
 6. Local Office
- II. Investment:
 1. Index of Investment: (See the following)
 2. Continental Investment--1 Year or more
 3. Continental Investment--2 to 3 Years
 4. Continental Investment--1 Year or more
 5. Mixed: Continental Investment and State or Local Office
 6. No Revolutionary Experience
 7. State Office--1 Year or more
 8. State Office--2 to 3 Years
 9. State Office--4 Years or more
 10. Local Office--1 Year or more
 11. Local Office--2 to 3 Years
 12. Local Office--4 Years or more

- III. Ambition: Target of Career, first office after 1788
 - 1. National Office
 - 2. Dual: National and State or Local Offices
 - 3. No Career after 1788
 - 4. State Office
 - 5. Dual: State and Local Offices
 - 6. Local Office
- IV. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788-1800
 - 1. National Office
 - 2. Mixed: National and State or Local Offices
 - 3. No Career after 1788
 - 4. State Office
 - 5. Mixed: State and Local Offices
 - 6. Local Offices
- V. Ambition: Type of Career, 1788-1800
(First Two Offices after 1788)
 - 1. Progressive-Progressive
 - 2. Sought First Office--Progressive
 - 3. Progressive-Static
 - 4. Progressive-Discrete
 - 5. Sought First Office-Discrete
 - 6. Static-Progressive
 - 7. Sought First Office-Static
 - 8. Static
 - 9. Static-Discrete
 - 10. Discrete (1788-1792)-Progressive (after 1792)
 - 11. Discrete (1788-1792)-Static (after 1792)
 - 12. Discrete (No career after 1788)

⁴For a good discussion of this level of measurement issue, see Hubert Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 30-35. Blalock argues that, all things considered, the use of ordinal measures with multivariate techniques should not be expected to yield results different from those found using interval level measures.

⁵The pairs with correlations above .70 were the following (the correlations are in parentheses):

- a. Investment: Number of Years in Politics--Investment: Number of Years in State Office (.82)
- b. Ambition: Focus of Career, 1788 to 1800--Ambition: Target of Career, first office (.82)

⁶A note of caution is in order about interpretations placed upon standardized function weights. It should be remembered that these are indicators of the relative strengths of only those variables contained in a given model or equation. Thus, if a relatively weak variable is placed into a model containing only weaker variables still, it may receive a higher function weight than it would if it were placed into a model containing only more powerful variables. Thus, these weights are not absolute indicators of strength, but are instead relative to others that are included in a given equation.

⁷Three variables were chosen for each factor because the age and ambition factors were composed of only three variables each in the first place (out of the original 14). This, then, set the limit on the number of variables that could be used and, in addition, it automatically selected which variables would compose these two factors. For the investment factor, three variables had to be chosen from the original six, and these were selected so that as many dimensions of the factor as possible were touched. Thus, the institutional dimension was covered by selecting the institutional foci of delegates' careers prior to 1788 as one of the variables. The amounts of delegates' experiences, on the other hand, were tapped by selecting the total number of years spent in politics as a second variable. Finally, affiliations with the Revolution were brought into play by the third variable, the foci of delegates' revolutionary experiences. As it turned out, these also represented three of the four most powerful of the investment variables.

⁸For details and references on this interpretation, see the discussion in Chapter II.

⁹See Forrest McDonald, We The People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

¹⁰Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1935), p. 290.

¹¹Large slaveowners were defined as those who held more than 7 slaves. Those who held fewer were classified as small farmers and landowners.

¹²These data were likewise derived from McDonald, op. cit.

¹³Among southern delegates, the original career model was only able to correctly predict about 73 per cent of the votes (compared to about 77 per cent among the entire sample of delegates). Thus, in increasing this figure to about 78 per cent, the slaveholdings variable possessed considerable strength.

¹⁴As Beard predicted, though, Federalist Supporters tended to own more slaves than did Antifederalists. The mean for Federalists was about 42 while the corresponding figure for their opponents was only about 26, a difference that was statistically significant beyond the .05 level.

As said previously, however, the
to one more since than his
was about 43 while the corresponding
only about 30, a difference that was
the US level.

and the
the US level.

and the
the US level.

the US level.

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
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
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APPENDIX



APPENDIX

THE SAMPLE

For those who are interested, the sample was drawn according to the following procedures:

The population consisted of about 1650 delegates, about 950 of which were Federalists and 700 of which were Antifederalists. Each group was sampled independently, but the sample was designed so that the proportion of each group in the sample would correspond with its proportion in the population. Thus, the sample consisted of about 60 per cent Federalists and 40 per cent Antifederalists. Accordingly, of the 540 delegates in the sample, 320 were Federalists and 220 were Antifederalists.

Each group was in turn stratified according to a leader-follower dimension, that is, between Statesmen and Regulars. In each group, Statesmen represented about one-fourth of the delegates (among Federalists, the figure was 81; among Antifederalists, 55) and Regulars obviously made up the rest. As explained in the text, Regulars were selected on a random basis and their careers were culled from various biographical and historical sources, some of which are listed in the Bibliography.

which are listed in the Bibliography.

called from various biographical and historical sources, some of Regulars were selected on a random basis and their careers were Regulars obviously made up the rest. As explained in the text,

(among Federalists, the Figure was 81; among Antifederalists, 22) and each group, Statesmen represented about one-fourth of the delegates. In lower dimension, that is, between Statesmen and Regulars. Each group was in turn stratified according to a number

and 110 were Antifederalists.

correspondingly, of the 340 delegates in the sample, 230 were Federalists about 60 per cent Federalists and 40 per cent Antifederalists. The proportion in the population. Thus, the sample is about 60 per cent Federalists and 40 per cent Antifederalists. Each group was sampled independently. The 110 statesmen were chosen of which were Federalists and 110 were Antifederalists. The population consisted of 340 statesmen and 110 Regulars. The following procedures:

APPENDIX 2

THE DATA

Statesmen, on the other hand, did not consist of a well-defined population, and, hence, they were selected on the basis of quota sampling. These delegates were drawn from three main sources: first, from among those who attended the national convention in Philadelphia in 1787 (This source supplied 40 Federalists and 4 Antifederalists.); second, from among those listed by Merrill Jensen (1965; pp. 424-25) as having been leaders of their respective causes (3 Federalists and 9 Antifederalists); and, third, from among those listed in other historical sources as having been influential in the conflict (38 Federalists and 42 Antifederalists). The primary sources consulted here were Main (1961) and McDonald (1958), both of which list several of the leading participants in each state. In addition, other useful sources consulted here were Harding (1896) on Massachusetts, Crowl (1943) on Maryland, Spaulding (1932) on New York, and Brunhouse (1942) on Pennsylvania. (See Bibliography for complete citations.)


Though the sample was not stratified according to state, all thirteen states were adequately represented in the sample, though Pennsylvania and Virginia were somewhat over-represented and Massachusetts and South Carolina were to some degree under-represented. The following table provides a breakdown of the sample on a state-by-state basis. The states are listed in the order in which they ratified.

State	Total Delegates	Approx. Percent of Pop.	Delegates in Sample	Approx. Percent of Sample
Delaware	30	2%	10	2%
Pennsylvania	69	4	60	11
New Jersey	39	2	18	3
Georgia	26	2	11	2
Connecticut	173	10	42	8
Massachusetts	364	22	85	16
Maryland	76	4	29	5
South Carolina	236	14	43	9
New Hampshire	113	7	39	8
Virginia	170	10	75	14
New York	65	4	34	6
North Carolina ^a	228	14	69	13
Rhode Island ^a	70	4	25	5
	<hr/> 1659	<hr/> 99%	<hr/> 540	<hr/> 102*

^aFor North Carolina and Rhode Island, the figures are based on the 1788 conventions which rejected the new system and not upon subsequent ones that ratified it.

*Rounding error.

The figures on the conventions were drawn from Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1928), Appendix D.





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