VESTED INTEREST AND ROLE-PLAYING:

BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

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The assumption that hedonically relevant situations condition participants' behavior in role-playing studies was explored. It was found that participants' responses in a laboratory setting were not reflecting their true attitudes and behaviors toward a hedonically relevant issue (a tuition increase). Participants contradicted their previous attitudes when confronted with an actual possibility of behaving outside the laboratory. Apparently laboratory experiments, themselves, constitute a hedonically relevant situation which influences participants' responses on behavioral and attitude measures. On the other hand, hedonically relevant information made more salient through role-playing strongly influenced participants' routine behavior regardless of the attitudes they had showed in the laboratory. Practical and theoretical implications of the assumptions explored here were discussed.

To Orlando and Belisa

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This research explores the effect of vested interest, or the hedonic relevance of an action or attitude (Sivacek & Crano, 1982), on people's attitudinal changes in situations in which individuals are performing (role-playing) the role of advocates of their own positions, or advocates of positions contrary to their own (Elms & Janis, 1965; Janis & Mann, 1965; Hoyt, Henley, & Collins, 1972; Nuttin, 1975). Furthermore, the study examines the implications of vested interest and role-playing for people's subsequent behavior.

Suppose, in a discussion about theatre, your friend says: "I do not like theatre. I think it is for lazy people whose only interest is not to work but to wear strange clothes and behave weirdly." Later you convince your friend to go to a theatre practice which is open for whoever wants to participate. Both of you participate. Your friend receives good commentaries from the theatre instructor and audience. Two months later, you find out that your friend has changed majors and, to your surprise, has become a theatre student.

Even though this hypothetical example may appear exaggerated, your friend's attitudinal and behavioral changes can be explained in the light of at least five different sociopsychological theories.

Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) would argue that as your friend has expressed negative attitudes about the theatre, the fact of participating in theatre exercises produced a state of dissonance (inconsistency) because participation was contrary to prior beliefs. As dissonance is an unpleasant outcome of the condition "I did something I do not believe," your friend restores consonance by changing previous attitudes about theatre.

A later version of dissonance theory (Aronson, 1968) would add that the change occurred because the action of theatre rehearsal was inconsistent with your friend's self-concept. He would have thought, "I am doing something I said I did not believe" which is contrary to his belief that he is a truthful and decent person. To protect his self-concept, he committed himself to be a theatre student.

In contrast to Festinger's theory, incentive theory (Janis & Gilmore, 1965; Janis, 1968) holds that role-playing makes people experience the positive and negative outcomes of a particular situation. The balance of these outcomes would induce a biased scanning process which, in turn, would determine the direction of the attitude change.

Incentivists would state that your friend's balance of outcomes made him selectively perceive the positive outcomes of practicing theatre. Hence, he found favorable arguments and avoided unfavorable ones to change his position.

Self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 1972) would posit that your friend inferred his own attitudes from his behavior. He may have said to himself, "Since I am practicing theatre and there is nothing compelling me to do so, I must infer that I like theatre." From Bem's perspective, if there are no constraints to which individuals can attribute their behavior, they will attribute to themselves attitudes which are consonant with their behavior.

From a functionalistic point of view (Katz, 1960), an attitude will change according to the function it fulfills in a specific circumstance. Functionalistic-oriented work (Pepitone, 1966; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971; Schlenker, 1973, 1982) has converged to the idea that attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior represents an individual's rationalization with the function of protecting his self and his public image to relevant others.

Even though all these theoretical perspectives have stimulated considerable research, none has been convincingly supported. The literature is plagued with contradictory findings. It is important that future research

deal with the study of possible variables which may further understanding of these contradictory findings and, in turn, permit a more effective and practical use of the body of knowledge generated.

Consider a promising alternative direction. Sivacek and Crano (1982) suggested that the attitude-behavior relationship would be maximized when the behavior suggested by a specific attitude (or the outcomes of an attitude-behavior sequence) has clear and obvious vested interest (hedonic relevance) for the actor. In the first of two experiments, they examined hedonic relevance, or one's vested interest in the attitude, as a function of age. In the 1978 elections, a proposal to change Michigan's legal drinking age from 18 to 21 years was on the ballot. Sivacek and Crano found that respondents' readiness to work against the popular referendum and the amount of time they were willing to give for that cause were correlated with their age. All respondents were opposed to the proposal, but those who would be the most affected by its approval (those who were 18 to 19 years old) showed significantly more willingness to fight the proposal and offered more of their time to work against it.

In the second study, the experimenters examined the effects of vested interest in an experiment that involved participants' attitudes toward a proposal about the use of

senior comprehensive examinations at the university. Again, participants who perceived they would be greatly affected (positively or negatively) by the implementation of the senior comprehensive examination system showed significantly more attitude-behavior consistency than other participants.

Returning to your friend's performance, it can be argued that experiencing "success" in the rehearsal (the audience's and instructor's good comments) and feeling, perhaps, what an actual theatre student felt--"It was my first contact with a cheering audience. I was in a pink cloud. The first time I knew what it was like to hold a whole roomful of people in the palm of my hand" (Sanford, 1966, p. 10)--changed his perspectives about theatre and transformed it into a hedonically relevant activity.

It is possible to make an analogy between your friend's theatrical experience and the actions of participants in role-playing studies. One of the most effective techniques to produce attitude change in both laboratory and natural settings is to induce participants to role-play a situation where they advocate a proattitudinal or counterattitudinal position. The literature to be reviewed was generated to test differing theoretical explanations of the attitudinal changes people show after performing in a role-playing situation. None of these studies tested the vested interest hypothesis, but if it is correct,

participants may have experienced hedonically relevant situations which may have misled experimenters in their interpretations.

There are at least two possible hedonically relevant situations for participants: First, they may experience vested interest because of the laboratory setting; i.e., the presence of the experimenter or other laboratory factors may condition participants' behavior regardless of the experimental manipulation; second, the experimental manipulation (position advocated) may be interest-arousing. These two possible vested interest situations may act as similar or contrary forces in determining participants' responses and may have implications for their future behavior in real life roles.

The Role-playing Literature

Role-playing has been used in three broad categories: As a laboratory method to replace deception (Cooper, 1976; Forward, Canter, & Kirsch, 1976; Greenberg, 1974; Mixon, 1972); as a means of explaining the development of the self (Corsini, 1966; Goffman, 1959; Moreno, 1946, 1962; Wilshire, 1982); and as a technique to promote attitudinal and behavioral changes (Miller & Burgoon, 1973; Miller, 1981).

Focusing on the third area, Miller (1981) and Miller and Burgoon (1973) define two types of role-playing: first, generalized role-playing, which is a highly involving

persuasive technique that places individuals in hypothetical situations where they can experience certain outcomes as if they were behaving in a real life setting; second, counterattitudinal advocacy, in which individuals are placed in situations that require them to behave in ways contrary to their previous attitudes and beliefs.

Not until the 1950s did the search begin for an explanation of the effectiveness of role-playing in changing attitudes and behavior. King and Janis (1954, 1956) examined the effects of improvisation and satisfaction with the role-playing performance. In their second study, one group of active participants read a counterattitudinal speech aloud; the other group read the script silently and then gave an improvised speech. Participants in the first condition were more satisfied with their performance than those in the second condition, but the latter showed significantly more attitude change. King and Janis concluded:

> When passively exposed to a persuasive communication, many persons may fail to be convinced because, although capable of fully comprehending the meaning of the arguments, they fail to have the sort of thoughts and anticipations that would motivate them to change their mind . . . in effect, the costumer is not simply asked to examine the ready-made material in the original communication but is given scissors, needle, and thread to hand tailor the material to suit himself (p. 184).

The kinds of "thoughts and anticipations" that King and Janis predicted people would experience in improvised role-playing were extended by Scott (1957, 1959a, 1959b).

In his last study involving participants with differing degrees of radicalism in attitudes, Scott (1959b) determined to what extent attitude change would persist. Participants engaged in an elimination debate contest whose winners would share a $100 prize. Pretreatment attitudes about three issues were assessed, and one week later, participants were assigned to defend a particular side of one of the issues regardless of their previous attitudes. Thus, some defended their own side; others counterattitudinally advocated; and others, who did not have a clear position toward the issue in question, defended "off-neutral" positions. The winners of the first round were chosen randomly.

Ten days later, the winners were contacted for a second round, and after yet another 10 days, the winners of the second debate were called for the third and last round of the contest. As in the first round, participants in the second and third debates defended specific positions regardless of their previous attitudes. In the latter two debates, their performances were actually judged by two psychology professors, a graduate student, and the experimenter. Winners, regardless of other influencing factors, changed significantly more toward the defended position than did losers or controls. Furthermore, winners maintained those attitudinal changes for at least 10 days.

The "thoughts and anticipations" suggested by King and Janis may be better explained by post hoc analysis of Scott's experiment based on the fact that winners, regardless of having been randomly chosen or actually judged, and regardless of having defended their own, contrary, or off-neutral positions, all changed in the direction of the defended position. These findings cannot be explained by invoking dissonance theory, but it is possible to defend the position that winning was in their vested interest, since our society strongly emphasizes winning. Moreover, competing for a $20 prize surely was a hedonically relevant reward for the students. Both vested interest rewards could have led students to change attitudes and to maintain those changes for at least 10 days.

In 1957, Festinger published a theory which would stimulate social psychology and generate most of the research in the field for many years. Festinger posited that if one believes one thing and advocates another, she/he will experience cognitive dissonance because of the conflicting cognitions: "(1) I believe X and (2) I am advocating not-X." To resolve this dissonance, the person will either find justifications for having counteradvocated or will change attitudes toward the counteradvocated position. The classic study by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) supported this position; as did later research by Cohen (Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

Rosenberg (1956, 1960) developed a consistency theory which predicted different outcomes than dissonance theory. He argued that results of previous dissonance experiments could be explained by participants' evaluation apprehension, i.e., "an acting anxiety-toned concern that he (the participant) win a positive evaluation from the experimenter, or at least that he provided no grounds for a negative one" (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 29). Rosenberg (1965) developed a way to eliminate evaluation apprehension through "altered replications" of previous experiments in which the role-playing situation was separated from the attitude measuring phase. Thus, he replicated Cohen's earlier experiment in a way that the experiment appeared to the participant as two separate, unrelated studies. His findings disconfirmed the dissonance prediction by showing that attitudinal changes were directly related to monetary reward.

Janis and Gilmore (1965) contended that in Festinger and Carlsmith's study, the high incentive conditions could have generated a degree of suspiciousness and guilt in the students for allowing themselves to be exploited by the experimenter and having lied to another student. Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Elms and Janis (1965) conducted studies using different types of sponsorship, amounts of monetary reward, and types of message content. The results

of both experiments led the authors to support Janis and Gilmore's predictions that:

> A large monetary reward will have a positive effect on attitude change only when the role-playing task is sponsored by an acceptable group and is oriented toward a goal perceived by S as being consonant with his own; but the same large reward will tend to create suspicion, guilt, and other interfering responses that make for less attitude change when the role-playing task is sponsored by a distrusted sponsor and is perceived as having a purpose antithetical to one's own values (pp. 58-59).

About the same time, Janis and Mann (1965) reported the findings of an experiment about the effectiveness of what they called emotional role-playing--later Miller and Burgoon (1973) would categorize it as generalized role-playing--in modifying smoking attitudes and habits. In this study, heavy smokers enacted the role of a cancer patient through different scenes. Janis and Mann found that role-playing smokers were significantly more anti-smoking than control group respondents and, two weeks after the performance, their consumption of cigarettes had decreased significantly. Eighteen months later, Mann and Janis (1968) found that role players had maintained the new attitude and behavior, and vividly recalled the role-playing situation they had performed.

Perhaps of these four studies, the ones which most support the vested interest assumption are Janis and Mann (1965) and Mann and Janis (1968), where participants not only changed their attitudes and behavior toward smoking

but maintained those changes for at least 18 months. Some of the items Janis and Mann (1965) used to assess the immediate effect of the role-playing treatment were: (a) participants' expectations that "much harm can come to me from my smoking," and (b) personal beliefs that smoking leads to lung cancer. These items probably measure the hedonically negative outcomes participants could foresee when role-playing the cancer patient. Responses to these items were in the direction indicating that they believed smoking produced cancer and that they would suffer much harm because of smoking. Both items were significantly different when compared to participants' previous responses and to those of control respondents. These items clearly indicated that participants adopting the persona of the cancer patient strongly perceived the consequences of smoking as hedonically relevant. Moreover, their consonance between attitudes and behavior after 18 months suggests that Sivacek and Crano's (1982) proposition that vested interest is a strong moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship is on the right track.

A series of studies was conducted to explore the hypothesis that dissonance and attitude change occur because of participants' commitment to the advocated position (Carlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966); their perceptions of having a choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967); and their perceptions of choices and outcomes

(Hoyt, Henley, & Collins, 1972). Calder, Ross, and Insko (1973) studied the simultaneous effect of incentive, choice, and consequences (outcomes) of performing a counterattitudinal behavior. Furthermore, they tried to determine attitudinal attributions people make when observing others' counterattitudinal behavior (Bem, 1965, 1967; Kelley, 1967) and compared those attributions with the actual attitudinal changes counterbehaving participants suffered. The experimenters concluded:

> In order for dissonance or reinforcement to be obtained insincere behavior must result in aversive consequences. Given aversive consequences, dissonance occurs only when an individual is free to choose whether or not to perform the insincere behavior. In contrast, reinforcement occurs only when an individual is required to perform the insincere behavior (p. 96).

This statement rests on the fact that people in the high consequence, free choice, and small reward (high dissonance) conditions and people in the high consequence, no choice, large reward (high incentive) conditions showed more attitude change than other participants. From a vested interest point of view, high dissonance participants could have felt compelled to change in order to demonstrate that what they did was a result of their free will. On the other hand, high incentive people had a vested interest in changing their attitudes toward the counterattitudinal position and, besides, they had no choice.

The functionalistic perspective of impression management theory (Gaes, Kalle, & Tedeschi, 1978; Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1981; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971) apparently has achieved the goal of explaining most of the contradictory results. A series of studies using the "bogus pipeline" device have supported impression management theory (Gaes et al., 1978; Quigley-Fernandez & Tedeschi, 1978). The bogus pipeline is an apparatus that supposedly can detect emotional states and lies more accurately than a lie detector. Gaes et al. (1978) used the same procedure as Hoyt et al. (1972), but they used two conditions of measurement after participants counter-attitudinally advocated. Half of the participants were measured first by the bogus pipeline and subsequently by a paper and pencil scale. The other half were measured first by the pencil and paper scale and, secondly, by the bogus pipeline. Those measured by paper and pencil first showed attitude changes and maintained these changes when measured by the bogus pipeline a second time.

The above experiment strongly supported the view that individuals are affected not only by the experimental manipulation, but also by other variables, such as environmental cues about the nature of the experiment and the evaluation they suppose the experimenter is doing. In general, participants would be expected to perform so as

to make the most positive impression on others. Bogus pipeline experiments led Tedeschi and Rosenfeld (1981) to say that "Attitude change in the forced compliance situation is an uninternalized, temporary, feigned response by subjects that is used as a tactic to manage an identity as a consistent and morally good person" (p. 163).

Relevant to the previous statement is a study by Nuttin (1975), in which counteradvocating participants from a "bad pool" who were led to believe they performed very poorly in an exam were offered the choice between monetary payments or an "amoral" reward of illegal points. All participants preferred the amoral, but hedonically, relevant reward. Intriguingly enough, all participants changed their pre-role-playing positions drastically. It would be difficult to explain Nuttin's results by invoking the notion that people behave only to show identities as morally good persons. In his study it seems reasonable to argue that the vested interest involved in obtaining such a relevant reward caused participants to eliminate thoughts about the implications of accepting the amoral reward and the impressions they would produce in the experimenter.

Vested Interest and Incentive Differentiation

Because a hedonically relevant situation can be confounded with an incentive, it seems useful to differentiate both vested interest and incentive positions. Sivacek and

Crano (1982) posited "If the logical consequence of an individual's attitude actually affects that person's life (vested interest), then consistency between attitude and action should be maximized" (p. 210). From an incentive point of view, Janis (1968) stated that attitude change depends on several things:

1. The degree of "biased scanning" in which the role player engages. This would imply two different verbal responses the role player must make: (a) invention of arguments which function as incentives for accepting the new position, and (b) seeing those arguments from the psychological standpoint of their positive value rather than their negative value (value consonance).

2. The incentives produced by the biased scanning have to be powerful enough to create a challenge to the role player's present position.

3. The arguments of the role-player have to be consonant with his/her values.

From the above description, three main differences between the two positions are derived. The first concerns the degree of real situational perceptions of effect for the person advocating the attitude in question. Vested interest deals with attitudes that posit real-life consequences for the people who hold them; thus, these attitudes will have strong relationships with the behaviors they suggest. On the other hand, incentive theory deals with

incentives people find to theoretically justify a determined old or new attitude without such attitudinal justifications necessarily having any consequences for their behavior. The second difference, though it would be possible to argue that vested interest could either facilitate or inhibit biasing scanning processes, concerns the case where biased scanning would occur in a different direction. Counteradvocating persons would think up positive arguments only in situations where the position advocated would bring them hedonically relevant rewards, otherwise, they would not engage in positive biased scanning when counteradvocating. Finally, a corollary to value consonance, incentivists see ego-involvement as an influencing factor in the role-playing situation (Janis, 1968). Sivacek and Crano (1982) differentiate ego-involvement from vested interest arguing that the latter is a more significant motivating factor and that all vested interest situations can be ego-involving, but not all ego-involving situations involve vested interest; therefore, vested interest is more important for the attitude-behavior consistency. For instance, if a high tuition increase is going to be implemented, it will be ego-involving for all students, but it will differentially affect students' vested interest based upon their ability or inability to pay.

Suppose students in an experiment are induced to believe a tuition increase may be implemented. Some

believe the tuition increase will be very low, others that it will be very high. Incentive theory predicts that pro-attitudinal participants in both low and high tuition increase conditions will show unfavorable attitudes toward a tuition increase, but the high tuition increase group will have more extreme attitudes. Counterattitudinal participants will engage in positive biased scanning of arguments supporting the advocated position, but the low tuition increase group, other things being equal, will show more favorable attitudes toward the tuition increase, since for them it will be easier to produce positive and suppress negative aspects of the increase. By contrast, vested interest theorists would say that regardless of the magnitude of the tuition increase, counter- as well as pro-advocating participants will be minimally favorable toward the position advocated; since they would feel strong constraints in the laboratory condition, they will be minimally consistent with what they just advocated.

If after the experiment an unsuspected individual requests the subjects to work either against or in favor of the tuition increase, incentive theorists will expect that (1) low and high vested interest participants who had defended an against-tuition-increase position in the laboratory (proattitudinal advocacy) will work against the tuition increase, but the high vested interest group will work the most. (2) Both high and low vested interest

participants who had favored a tuition increase in the laboratory (counterattitudinal advocacy) will work in favor of a tuition increase, but the low increase condition will work the most. On the other hand, a vested interest position will expect that low tuition increase groups, regardless of type of advocacy, will be insufficiently motivated to work either for or against the increase. It will also expect high increase groups, regardless of type of advocacy, to be strongly motivated to work against the tuition increase and not to work in its favor.

Hypotheses

In an experiment similar to the one discussed above, several hypotheses can be formally stated.

Attitudes in the Laboratory

Hypothesis 1: Pro- as well as counteradvocators will be mildly consistent with the issues they advocate.

Requested Behavior in the Laboratory

Hypothesis 2: If participants are requested to support an issue which is consistent with what they advocated, they will support it more than participants whose advocacy is not consistent with the issue.

Requested Behavior Outside the Laboratory

Hypothesis 3: When compared to affected groups, participants who feel the position they advocated is not going to affect their life will be less motivated to engage in activities for or against what they advocated.

Hypothesis 4: When compared to the nonaffected group, participants who feel the position they advocated will positively affect their life will be willing to engage in activities to support the position they advocated and will not be motivated to behave against it.

Hypothesis 5: When compared to the nonaffected group, participants who feel the position they advocated will negatively affect their life will not be motivated to engage in activities to support the position they advocated, but will be willing to behave against it.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Overview

Participants

Participants were 128 volunteer freshmen communication students. When participants volunteered for the research, they were asked to put their name and phone number on a list in order to be reached for the experiment. All participants received extra credit for their participation. Two participants were lost in the laboratory condition, and 21 participants were lost in the posttest outside laboratory condition. Thus, 126 participants were analyzed in the laboratory condition and 107 in the outside laboratory condition.

Experimenters

Four senior students, two females and two males, were trained for a period of two months prior to performing as experimenters. They rehearsed the experimental situation until they mastered all the procedures. Graduate students and faculty served as training subjects in order to evaluate the experimenters' performance.

Manipulation and Measures

Favorable Sponsorship

When participants volunteered for the experiment, they read a statement on the sign-up list indicating they were to engage in intellectual exercises.

When arriving at the laboratory, participants were told:

> The Communication Department (favorable sponsor) is interested in knowing students' opinions about current issues on campus and gathering information either in favor or against those issues. In order to do that we will ask you to argue in favor or against some issues, record a brief speech, and fill out a questionnaire. However, first you have to agree to participate and sign a departmental consent form (Appendix A).

Anonimity and Free Choice

After the participants read the research consent form, the experimenter stated:

> As you read in the consent form, you are going to argue either in favor or against University policies, but your name is not going to be used under any circumstance. If you want to continue, sign the consent form. If not, you are free to stop now; we will give you credit for coming here anyway.

Vested Interest

Following the anonimity and free choice manipulation, vested interest was aroused by giving participants information which made them believe that a plan to increase their tuition was going to be implemented (Appendix B).

Role-playing

After participants read the vested interest information, the researcher went on to say:

> The Communication Department is developing a study to analyze the possible impact of a tuition raise and to assess students' reactions to such a plan. As we have already collected enough positive (or negative) information and arguments about the plan, we would like you for the next ten minutes to write down arguments about the negative (positive) consequences of this tuition increase. Later we will ask you to record a brief speech, three to five minutes, about what you have written. When recording, try to be as realistic as possible because the Communication Department will keep this record for future use. To stimulate your thinking, we will provide you with some statements from which arguments can be developed about the negative (positive) outcomes of the tuition increase plan (Appendix C).

Then, the experimenter provided the participant with the negative or positive statements about the tuition plan.

When the participant finished the essay, the experimenter took it, together with all the other information, and asked the participant to recall what she/he had just written in order to record the speech.

Attitude Measure and Manipulation Check

Following the speech, the participant was asked to give his/her opinions about the proposed plan on a 10-item scale questionnaire which contained the attitude measure (questions 1-7) and the vested interest manipulation check (questions 8-10) (Appendix D).

Laboratory Behavior Measure

Finally, when the participant was about to leave, the researcher mentioned:

> A friend of mine who knows that I am doing this study asked me to pass this petition against the tuition increase around. Read it and you can sign it if you feel like it (Appendix E).

Behavior Manipulation

Between 12 and 17 days after the laboratory situation, each participant was contacted by phone. The experimenter identified him/herself as an interviewer from a student group which was working against or in favor of the tuition plan. Care was taken to make sure participants who had a female experimenter in the laboratory were telephoned by a male and vice versa.

Outside Laboratory Behavior Measure

After the above manipulation, a questionnaire composed of three questions was applied to assess the participants' willingness to behave in favor or against the tuition increase (Appendix F).

Following the behavior questionnaire, the participant was completely debriefed and asked if she/he was suspicious that the interview was part of the study he/she had participated in two weeks ago. In addition, she/he was offered the opportunity to receive a copy of the final research paper.

Design

The design used was a 2 x 2 x 2 posttest only factorial design. The variables manipulated were vested interest (low, high), role-playing (pro- and counterattitudinal advocacy), and requested behavior (pro- and counterbehavior).

		Vested Interest	
		Low	High
Requested Behavior	Pro	1 Proadvocacy 2 Counteradvocacy	3 Proadvocacy 4 Counteradvocacy
	Counter	5 Proadvocacy 6 Counteradvocacy	7 Proadvocacy 8 Counteradvocacy

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The analysis of variance showed no differences because of sex of participants or experimenters; thus, the data were collapsed across these factors.

The reliability analysis for the attitude scale was acceptable (Cronbach's alpha = .93). Though the reliability of the affect scale (vested interest) was not as high as the attitude scale, it still was acceptable (Cronbach's alpha = .78). For the posttest behavior measure (outside laboratory) the items were standardized due to differences in their scales (standardized alpha = .77).

A series of Fmax tests performed on the different measures yielded nonsignificant results, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated.

An analysis of the row data for the outside laboratory behavior measure permitted the discovery of two outliers (Pedhazur, 1982). These two extremes residuals (z = 2.34) were removed from the data.

Manipulation Check

An analysis of variance on the manipulation check (affect scale) of the variable vested interest in the

laboratory showed no differences either for the main effects or the interaction between vested interest and advocacy. The means tended toward the neutral point (Table 1). Unfortunately, results of this analysis indicate an apparent failure of the vested interest manipulation.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Manipulation Check by Condition

		Advocacy	
		Pro	Counter
Vested Interest	Low	M = 16.23 S = 8.11 N = 32.0	15.09 7.40 33.0
	High	17.32 7.54 31.0	14.26 7.05 31.0

Attitudes in the Laboratory

Participants' attitudinal responses were conditioned by the laboratory situation. As expected from Hypothesis 1, both counteradvocating and proadvocating participants, regardless of the vested interest manipulation, were mildly consistent with the position they advocated. The difference between these two positions was significant ($F = 31.75$, $p < .01$, $n = .45$, Table 2). An analysis of the means cell-by-cell indicates that counterattitudinal participants rated on the positive side (in favor of the

Table 2. Analysis of Variance of the Attitude Measure

SOURCE	VAR	SS	df	MS	F	p	η^2	η
Vested Interest	.056	6.98	1	6.98	.05 >	.05	.000	--
Advocacy	38.166	4770.77	1	4770.77	31.75 <	.01	.206	.45
VI x ADV	.023	2.81	1	2.81	.02 >	.05	.000	--
S/VI x ADV	146.660	18332.51	122	150.27			.793	.89

tuition increase) of the scale while proattitudinal participants rated on the unfavorable side (against the tuition increase) of the scale, thus confirming Hypothesis 1 (Table 3). There was no main effect of vested interest or interaction effect of vested interest and advocacy on the attitude variable.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Attitude Measure by Condition

		Advocacy	
		Pro	Counter
Vested Interest	Low	M = 28.74	40.76
		S = 13.14	12.43
		N = 31.0	33.0
	High	27.37	40.66
		10.77	12.65
		32.0	32.0

Fmax = 1.49 (df = 4,32; $\alpha > .05$)

Fewer counteradvocating participants signed the petition than did proadvocating participants, which supported Hypothesis 2 of this study. The difference between these two groups was significant ($F = 13.07$, $p < .01$, $n = .31$, Table 4). The mean for counteradvocating participants was 1.52 and for proadvocating participants was 1.83, where a

Table 4. Analysis of Variance of the Laboratory Behavior Measure

Source	VAR	SS	df	MS	F		p	η^2	η
Vested Interest	.000	.03	1	.03	.17	>	.05	.001	.04
Advocacy	.021	2.66	1	2.66	13.02	<	.01	.097	.31
VI x ADV	.000	.00	1	.00	.00	>	.05	.000	.00
S/VI x ADV	.200	24.95	122	.21				.902	.92

larger mean indicates fewer people signing the petition (Table 5).

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Laboratory Behavioral Measure (Petition) by Condition

		Advocacy	
		Pro	Counter
Vested Interest	Low	M = 1.81	1.51
		S = .40	.51
		N = 31.0	33.0
	High	1.84	1.53
		.37	.51
		32.0	32.0

Fmax = 1.9 (df = 4,32; $\alpha > .05$)

Requested Behavior Outside the Laboratory

It was predicted that vested interest information given in the laboratory would interact with the requested behavior outside the laboratory. This interaction of vested interest and behavior yielded a significant result ($F = 4.85$, $p < .05$, $n^2 = .03$, $n = .19$, Table 6). The means entering in this interation are shown in Table 7.

When low vested interest participants were asked to work in favor or against the tuition increase, they refused to do so, which supported Hypothesis 3.

Table 6. Analysis of Variance of the Post Laboratory Behavior Measure

Source	VAR	SS	df	MS	F	p	η^2	η
Vested Interest	.122	12.65	1	12.65	3.54	> .05	.025	.16
Advocacy	.012	1.58	1	1.58	.44	> .05	.003	.06
Behavior	1.165	121.15	1	121.15	33.87	< .01	.239	.49
VI x ADV	.013	1.38	1	1.38	.39	> .05	.003	.06
VI x BEH	.167	17.35	1	17.35	4.85	< .05	.030	.19
ADV X BEH	.020	2.13	1	2.13	.60	> .05	.004	.06
VI x ADV X BEH	.088	9.20	1	9.20	2.57	> .05	.018	.13
S/VI x ADV x BEH	3.336	346.92	97	3.58	--	--	.684	.83

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for the Post-Laboratory Behavior Measure by Condition

		Probehavior		Counterbehavior	
		Proadv	Counadv	Proadv	Counadv
Vested Interest	Low	M = .51	-.08	-1.72	- .66
		S = 1.96	2.14	1.89	1.49
		N = 15.0	17.0	15.0	11.0
	High	1.22	2.26	-1.52	-1.24
		2.18	1.93	1.60	1.60
		14.0	9.0	10.0	14.0

F_{max} = 2.15 (df - 8,11 ; α > .05)

When high vested interest-proattitudinal participants were asked to work against the tuition increase they were willing to offer their free time for that cause. On the other hand, these participants were not motivated to work for the tuition increase. These results supported Hypothesis 4 (Table 7).

High vested interest-counteradvocating participants offered time to work against the tuition increase and refused to work in favor of it, supporting Hypothesis 5 (Table 7).

Examination of the means in Table 7 indicates that high vested interest participants who had counteradvocated (defended the tuition increase) and rated positively the increase in the laboratory were the ones who offered more

time to work against the tuition increase (M = 2.26). This finding suggests that participants react to constraints in the laboratory, but that this reaction can be converted to a boomerang effect when participants' vested interests are jeopardized in real life settings.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The outcomes of this study supported the theoretical implications of the vested interest position.

The apparent failure of the vested interest manipulation can be explained by the fact that participants' responses to the affect scale, as well as to the other laboratory measures, were conditioned by the hedonically relevant situation the laboratory activity posited for participants. Their moderated answers on all the laboratory measures support this possibility. The above findings, plus participants' answers to the outside laboratory behavior measure, strongly suggested that the vested interest manipulation conditioned participants' willingness and unwillingness to behave in real life settings. Even though these results are very promising, it is necessary to look for other ways of checking participants' vested interest in future research. For instance, in this research participants' annual income could have been investigated to determine whether or not the amount of tuition increase represented a serious financial difficulty for them.

Neither dissonance nor incentive theories would fully explain the outcomes of this research. As a whole, it indicates that certain activities in laboratory experiments can be hedonically relevant for the participants; thus, in the laboratory they will act conditioned by those hedonic forces. Therefore, their attitudes and opinions have to be analyzed in that context, and those attitudes and opinions will not necessarily imply that participants will be guided by them when they behave in natural settings; thus, in the present study, participants who had defended a high tuition increase and had rated it favorable in the laboratory were the ones who offered more time to work against a tuition increase in real life settings. On the other hand, hedonically relevant information for participants' daily life will condition their actual behavior regardless of what attitudes they have expressed in the laboratory.

The support this study offers for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 has implications for the assumption that attitude change occurs when people perceive aversive consequences and have freedom of choice to engage in counteradvocacy (Hoyt, Henley, & Collins, 1972; Calder, Ross, & Insko, 1973). Counteradvocacy participants were favorable toward the tuition increase. However, the confirmation of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 indicates that the attitudes that counteradvocating participants show in the laboratory

are not related to actual routine behavior and contradicts Hoyt's (Hoyt et al., 1972) claim that participants' feelings of personal responsibility for having advocated against their attitudes will produce "lasting personal changes" toward the advocated issue. Taken together, the findings of this study bolster the postulates of the vested interest position and its potential as a broader theoretical alternative that encompasses incentive, dissonance, and impression management theories.

Pragmatically, it would be useful to test the vested interest position in conditions where the advocacy brings positive hedonic consequences (as in the study by Janis & Mann, 1965). If the expected outcomes of studies of that type are confirmed, then practical applications can be offered, e.g., in the adoption of new technologies and practices in different fields such as agriculture, health, and nutrition, it would be possible to engage reluctant technology users in role-playing experiences that would arouse positive, hedonically relevant outcomes so that they persuade themselves to use the new practices and technologies.

Recently, Stults, Messe, and Kerr (1984) have reported that true attitude change occurs in the laboratory condition when participants attribute the arousal to the counter-advocacy activity instead of to a bogus pipeline device.

It would be of theoretical interest to contrast vested interest and attribution arousal positions in laboratory and outside laboratory settings.

Finally, it is necessary to reproduce studies of this type across different situations and under conditions of greater strength: more participants, more powerful behavioral measures, more apt manipulation checks, and more degrees of variability of the vested interest manipulation. However, these weaknesses in the design and conduct of this research do not limit the potential that the vested interest orientation has for the understanding and refinement of role-playing as a persuasive practice.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENTAL RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

DEPARTMENTAL RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

With regard to my participation in research:

1. I understand that when I sign up for a given study I am indicating my sincere intent to participate in that study. I agree to sign up for a study ONLY WHEN I FULLY INTEND TO PARTICIPATE.

2. I understand the procedures by which my participation will count for some form of credit in the Communication class listed below.

3. I understand that any credit I may earn via participation in research is not transferrable to another class or another term.

4. I understand that, apart from my participation in a given study, my actual performance in that study will in no way affect my evaluation in a given course or in the Department of Communication.

5. I understand that my participation in a study does not guarantee any beneficial results to me other than credit for participation.

6. I understand that I have the right to withdraw from any study at any time without penalty.

7. I understand that I have the right to have any study in which I participate explained to me to my satisfaction after I have participated.

8. I understand that the results of a given study will be treated in strict confidence with regard to the data on any given participant. Within this restriction, I understand that the results will be made available to me at my request.

9. I understand that the data I provide a researcher as a result of my participation in a given study may be used by other scientists for secondary analysis. Again data will be treated with the strictest confidence.

10. I understand that my volunteering to participate is, in and of itself, part of a larger research project concerning the effects of participation on students.

DEPARTMENTAL RESEARCH CONTENT FORM (cont.)

11. I understand that in this study I will be asked to develop and to present arguments in favor of, or opposed to, a plan under current consideration in the university.

12. I understand that should I have any questions, problems, complaints, or if I desire further information, I have the right to contact the Research Coordinator in the Department of Communication.

Given these understandings, I have freely consented to participate in scientific research being conducted during this term in the Department of Communication.

Signed_____

Date_____

Name (print)_____

Student number_____

Class_____

Section_____

APPENDIX B

VESTED INTEREST MANIPULATION

(HIGH AND LOW)

VESTED INTEREST MANIPULATION

LOW

As you may know, the economy of the State of Michigan has suffered considerably in the current recession. This situation has led Michigan State University authorities to increase tuition in the last two academic years as a way to overcome the budget cuts the state government has imposed; however, the situation remains critical and the expected deficit for this academic year is $12 million.

Unfortunately, university authorities have said that the number of high school graduates has decreased significantly to the point that next academic year the expected number of students entering the University will be 15% less than five years ago. This certainly will aggravate even more the economic situation of Michigan State University.

Both deficit budgets and decreasing numbers of students have prompted university authorities to propose a plan which includes a tuition increase of 3.5% for next year. If approved this plan will mean an increase on cost per student per year of $112.

VESTED INTEREST MANIPULATION

HIGH

As you may know, the economy of the State of Michigan has suffered considerably in the current recession. This situation has led Michigan State University authorities to increase tuition in the last two academic years as a way to overcome the budget cuts the state government has imposed; however, the situation remains critical and the expected deficit for this academic year is $12 million.

Unfortunately, university authorities have said that the number of high school graduates has decreased significantly to the point that next academic year the expected number of students entering the University will be 15% less than five years ago. This certainly will aggravate even more the economic situation of Michigan State University.

Both deficit budgets and decreasing numbers of students have prompted university authorities to propose a plan which includes a tuition increase of 17.5% for next year. If approved this plan will mean an increase on cost per student per year of $560.

APPENDIX C

REASONS (FAVORING AND CONTRARY) TO A TUITION INCREASE

REASONS FAVORING A TUITION INCREASE

-- Positive impact on maintenance of staff excellence

-- Positive impact on international prestige of the university

-- Positive impact on motivation of students for excellence

-- Positive impact on equipment supply program

-- Positive impact on university attractiveness to high quality professors

You may develop the positive aspects of the proposed tuition increase plan according to your own ideas or according to one or more of the above statements.

REASONS CONTRARY TO A TUITION INCREASE

-- Negative impact on number of new students

-- Negative impact on conditions for current students

-- Negative impact on middle-class students

-- Negative impact on students' motivation to study

-- Negative impact on attraction of international students

You may develop the negative aspects of the proposed tuition increase plan according to your own ideas or according to one or more of the above statements.

APPENDIX D

LABORATORY QUESTIONNAIRE--ATTITUDE AND AFFECT SCALES

LABORATORY QUESTIONNAIRE -- ATTITUDE AND AFFECT SCALES

Please answer the following questions:

1. Do you feel the plan is bad or good?

very bad	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very good

2. Do you feel the plan is unreasonable or reasonable?

very unreasonable	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very reasonable

3. Do you feel the plan is dumb or smart?

very dumb	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very smart

4. Do you feel the plan will be ineffective or effective?

very ineffective	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very effective

5. Do you feel the plan is unnecessary or necessary?

very unnecessary	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very necessary

6. Do you feel the plan is unfair or fair?

very unfair	___1	___2	___3	___4	___5	___6	___7	___8	___9	___10	very fair

LABORATORY QUESTIONNAIRE -- ATTITUDE AND AFFECT SCALES (cont.)

7. Do you feel the plan is negative or positive?

very negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very positive

8. If this plan were to be adopted, how much would it affect you?

nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 a lot

9. If this plan were to be adopted, how difficult would it be for you to meet the additional tuition cost?

very difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very easy

10. If this plan were to be adopted, how likely is it that you would transfer or drop-out of the University?

very likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very unlikely

APPENDIX E

PETITION

PETITION

TO THE ADMINISTRATION:

WE, the undersigned students of Michigan State University, STRONGLY OPPOSE the plan to raise the 1984-85 tuition rate. We believe that this action will pose an undue financial hardship on many of the students of this University, and we urge you to reconsider this action.

APPENDIX F

BEHAVIOR MANIPULATION AND POSTTEST

BEHAVIOR MANIPULATION AND POSTTEST

"Hello, I am working for a student group which is developing a campaign called 'STUDENT AWARENESS AGAINST TUITION INCREASE' (or 'STUDENT AWARENESS IN FAVOR OF TUITION INCREASE'). The reason behind our campaign is that we have known that there is a growing controversy between university authorities about the possible necessity of a tuition increase for next year. As we disfavor (favor) a tuition increase for next year and we think that the only way to guarantee university survival is not (is) through a tuition increase, we are selecting students from the phone book in order to create pressure in favor of our position."

"Please would you answer some questions"

Next, the following questionnaire was applied:
(Outside laboratory behavior measure)

1. Do you agree with our position? Yes ( ) No ( )

   If yes, ask question #2;
   If no, go to question 3a.

2. Would you be willing to give some of your free time for our campaign? Yes ( ) No ( )

   If yes, ask question #3;
   If no, go to question #3a.

3. How many hours would you give us next week? _____

3a. Why?

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