

LEVEL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND  
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS:  
A FOUR-NATION STUDY

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.  
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
MOHAMMAD M. SALEHI

1971



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Level of Industrialization and Political  
Ideology of Industrial Workers:  
A Four-Nation Study

presented by

Mohammad M. Salehi

has been accepted towards fulfillment  
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Sociology

*William H. Form*

Major professor

Date April 6, 1971

## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to increase our understanding of some of the stratification conditions which structure the political orientations of automobile workers. Data were employed from four countries (India, Argentina, Italy and the United States) which differed in socio-cultural contents and level of industrialization. The literature indicated that three types of stratification conditions influence political orientations; stratal position, mobility experience, and status inconsistency. In addition, the industrial context of the country may have an effect.

For each of these conditions certain variables were selected for their sensitivity to the political orientation of actors. For the stratal approach the variables were skill, level of education, community of socialization, and seniority; for the mobility approach, intergenerational career and occupational mobility pattern were selected, and for the status inconsistency approach a measure was constructed which included skill, education, and community of socialization. Since the data was taken from societies differing in their level and pace of industrialization, the contextual approach was simply taken to help interpret differences in the other findings.

The findings reveal that variables in the stratal approach were most sensitive to differences in political ideologies and among them, education was the strongest. For countries with high pace of industrialization, such as Italy, mobility variables proved to be very sensitive to differences in ideologies.

In general, education and skill tended to be radicalizing forces. While mobility also tended to radicalize, this situation was not a universal pattern. The measure of status inconsistency was related to political orientation only for the American workers. Contrary to our expectations, status inconsistent workers were more liberal than the consistent ones.

LEVEL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF  
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS: A FOUR-NATION STUDY

by  
MOHAMMAD M. SALEHI

A THESIS

Submitted to

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the  
degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

1971

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research is the indirect product of the sociology department at Michigan State University.

Although my debt to others is great I am most indebted to my advisor, Professor William H. Form. My works in sociology and the development of my sociological perspective is in no small measure due to Professor Form's sincere and generous efforts. In addition, Professor Form has provided for me an example of how to be a sincere teacher, who stresses intellectual honesty and a passionate insistence on sociological objectivity.

I am also indebted to the other members of my committee, Professors William A. Faunce, J. Allan Beegle, and Grafton Trout. I owe Professor Faunce a special thanks for his careful review of my early research and for his crucial criticism which improved my work considerably.

Finally, I should like to express my appreciation to two other members of the faculty for my intellectual development, Professors Bo Anderson and James McKee.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ii
TABLE OF TABLES.....	iv
Chapter 1	
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Theory.....	3
Review of Literature.....	4
Expected Findings.....	12
Methodology.....	18
Chapter 2	
THE RESEARCH SITES.....	24
The Four Cities.....	24
Technological Characteristics of the Plants.....	31
General Descriptions of the Variables.....	32
Chapter 3	
FINDINGS.....	43
Stratal Approach.....	43
Mobility Approach.....	45
Inconsistency Approach.....	46
Summary.....	46
Chapter 4	
MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS.....	50
Stratal Approach.....	50
Mobility Approach.....	61
Inconsistency Approach.....	65
Summary.....	69
Chapter 5	
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS.....	72
Conclusion.....	79
Appendix A	
Dependent variable; Political Ideology.....	80
Independent Variables.....	82
Appendix B.....	85
REFERENCES.....	98

## TABLE OF TABLES

TABLE NUMBER		PAGE
2.1	Sector Compositions of Nations, States, and Research Sites, 1960, in Percents.....	27
2.2	Social and Economic Characteristics of Four Cities.....	28
2.3	Work Operations of Samples (representative) of Automobile Workers in Four Plants, in Percents.....	33
2.4	Labor Force Characteristics of the Samples of Four Plants.....	36
2.5	Distribution of the Variables of Skill Level, Seniority, Community of Socialization and Education, in Percents.....	37
2.6	Distribution of the Mobility and Status Inconsistency Variables, in Percents.....	38
2.7	Distribution of the Political Ideology for Four Countries, in Percents.....	39
3.1	Association between Political Ideology and Selected Stratification Variables.....	47
3.2	Political Ideology of Argentine Workers According to Their Skill Level, in Percents.....	48
3.3	Political Ideology of American Workers According to Their Community of Socialization, in Percents.....	48
3.4	Political Ideology of Indian workers According to Their Intergenerational Mobility.....	49
3.5	Political Ideology of American Workers According to Their Measure of Status Inconsistency, in Percents.....	49
4.1	Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Skill and Political Ideology.....	51



# TABLE OF TABLES (CONTINUED)

TABLE NUMBER	PAGE
4.1-1 Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Seniority, in Percents.....	52
4.1-2 Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Argentine Workers Reared in Metropolitan Areas, in Percents.....	52
4.2 Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship Between Seniority and Political Ideology.....	55
4.1-3 Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Argentine Workers with High Seniority, in Percents.....	56
4.2-1 Association Between Seniority and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Level of Education, in Percents.....	56
4.3 Level of Significance for Selected Control Variable Bearing on the Relationship of Community of Socialization and Political Ideology.....	57
4.3-1 Association Between Community of Socialization and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Semi-Skill Level, in Percents.....	58
4.3-2 Association Between Community of Socialization and Political Ideology for American Semi-Skilled Workers, in Percents.....	58
4.4 Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Education and Political Ideology.....	59
4.4-1 Association Between Education and Political Ideology for Rural Reared Indian Workers, in Percents.....	60
4.5 Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables on the Relationship of Occupational Mobility and Political Ideology.....	62

# TABLE OF TABLES (CONTINUED)

TABLE NUMBER	PAGE
4.6	Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables on the Relationship of Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology....64
4.6-1	Association Between Intergenerational Mobility and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Level of Education, in Percents.....66
4.6-2	Association Between Intergenerational Mobility and Political Ideology for Italian Workers Reared in Metropolitan Area, in Percents.....66
4.7	Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology....67
4.6-3	Association Between Intergenerational Mobility and Political Ideology for Medium Educated Italian Workers, in Percents.....68
4.7-1	Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Non-Mobile (Inter-generational) Argentine Workers, in Percents....68
4.7-2	Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Non-Mobile (Inter-generational) American Workers, in Percents.....70
4.7-3	Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Upward-Mobile (Inter-generational) American Workers, in Percents.....70
4.8	Summary Table (Percent of Significant Associations).....71
Appendix B	
B.5	Indian-Skill Level vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....85
B.6	India - Seniority vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....85

# TABLE OF TABLES (CONTINUED)

TABLE NUMBER	PAGE
B.7	India - Community of Socialization vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....86
B.8	India - Education vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....86
B.9	India - Occupational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....86
B.10	India - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....87
B.11	India - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....87
B.12	India - Measure of Status Inconsistency vs. Ideology in Percentages.....88
B.13	Argentina - Seniority vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....88
B.14	Argentina - Community of Socialization vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....89
B.15	Argentina - Occupational Career Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....89
B.16	Argentina - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....90
B.17	Argentina - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....90
B.18	Argentina - Measure of Status Inconsistency vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....91
B.19	Italy - Skill Level vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....91
B.20	Italy - Seniority vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....92
B.21	Italy - Community of Socialization vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....92
B.22	Italy - Occupational Career Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....93

# TABLE OF TABLES (CONTINUED)

TABLE NUMBER	PAGE
B.23	Italy - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....93
B.24	Italy - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....94
B.25	Italy - Status Inconsistency vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....94
B.26	United States - Skill Level vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....95
B.27	United States - Seniority vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....95
B.28	United States - Education vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....95
B.29	United States - Occupational Career Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....96
B.30	United States - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....96
B.31	United States - Intergenerational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....97
B.32	United States - Status Inconsistency vs. Political Ideology in Percentages.....97

## Chapter 1

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

#### Introduction

The political consequences of the process of industrialization is a persistent concern of much sociological research (Marx and Engels, 1962: 18-37; Lipset, 1960; Germani, 1966). Although the ideological heterogeneity of the working strata has been known for a long time, concern with its internal ideological differences has not been especially great.<sup>1</sup> In many contemporary industrializing societies, the introduction of large factories results in the recruitment of the highly stratified manual working force. This segment of the population is often referred to as the "working-class." An examination of the community of socialization, skill level, education and other background characteristics of such workers reveals remarkable heterogeneity. Whether this heterogeneity results in diversified patterns of political ideologies and whether such patterns change in the process of industrialization is the main concern of this inquiry.

A review of the literature shows some attempt to deal with this issue (e.g., Lipset, 1960) but, in general,

---

<sup>1</sup>Even Marx talked about "false-consciousness" implying that not all workers have similar ideological orientations.

systematic and detailed studies of both western and non-western nations are lacking. By using data in a four-nation study (U.S.A., Italy, Argentina, and India) of industrial manual workers in a particular industry (automobile manufacturing), we intend to explore the problem of political ideologies in a relatively narrow segment of the "working-class." We hope that our multi-national sample will reduce some of the biases implicit in studies of single western industrial societies. By considering countries at different levels of industrialization and, at the same time, by controlling for type of industry, we can probe an evolutionary model of industrialization. We can first analyze the case for each country and then observe how findings differ as we move from lower to higher levels of industrialization.

Studies of political orientations usually attempt to establish relationships between the objective situation of the actor and their subjective orientations. A review of literature reveals at least three stratification approaches to the study of political ideology; stratal position, social mobility, and status inconsistency. Unfortunately the three approaches have been applied primarily to highly industrialized western societies, so there is no way to decide which approach might have greater explanatory power in non-western countries or in countries at different industrial levels. We intend to examine all three stratification approaches in all four countries, thereby possibly increasing the universality of

our findings.

As our guiding proposition, we expect more extreme and more heterogeneous political ideologies to appear in the more rapidly industrializing societies, such as Italy and Argentina, while in a more mature industrial society, ideologies will be less extreme and more homogeneous. In the case of an early industrializing society such as India, diverse political orientations should appear, but they will not be as extreme as those in rapidly industrializing societies. These expectations are derived from the following theoretical perspective.

### Theory

Dominant theories of industrialization stress the view that the process of industrialization is accompanied by a shift in social integration from a non-occupational to an occupational source (Form and Faunce, 1969). Early industrialization tends to produce great disorganization, thereby stimulating worker dissatisfaction and maladjustment. As the process of adaptation to the new mode of relationships proceeds, new mechanisms of integration develop, easing the state of unrest. This is the argument concerning the difficulties found in the first stages of industrial "uprootedness" and Lipset's finding (1960, 54-59) that rapid industrialization leads to political radicalism. Some theorists (Inkeles, 1960; Lerner, 1958; Waisanan, 1969) have stressed that

increased education, physical mobility (i.e. migration from rural to urban), mass media exposure, and urbanization facilitate modernization attitudes and that these attitudes, in turn, result in higher degrees of political-mindedness and national political involvement. Such an argument implies that populations which have large amounts of educational inequality, rates of mobility, and types of community of socialization stimulate the development of heterogeneous ideological dispositions. Therefore, we have included in this study the variables of education, mobility (rural-urban background) as conditions which influence the actor's political orientations. In short, as the homogeneity of the working force increases, the conditions for the development of political heterogeneity decreases.

### Review of Literature<sup>2</sup>

One may categorize studies according to how they specify the objective conditions affecting political orientations. Among them are; (1) consequences of specific class position in the stratification system, (2) consequences deriving from the social mobility experience of the class, (3) the type of status inconsistency processes extant in a population, and (4) the contextual conditions of the working class.

---

<sup>2</sup>In most of the cases, similar findings or theories are reported by many authors. We only report what we hope is a representative sample of the literature.



## 1 - Stratal Position

These studies are more specific than others about the objective situation of actors. These studies simply posit an unilinear relationship between stratum position and ideological orientation. Thus, Centers (1949) reports that the lower the social class, the more radical the political ideology. Parkin (1967) also considers social class as a prominent determinant of voting pattern in industrial societies. Alford (1963: 180) argues that no evidence has been found of either a decline or any substantial change in pattern of class voting among major United States regions or religious groups for decades. Deutsch (1964) found certain relationships between a worker's position in the system of occupational inequalities (skill level) and political ideology.

## 2 - Social Mobility

Several studies have treated mobility as the dominant variable influencing the political orientation of workers. These studies have focused on both group and individual mobility. Some consequences of class mobility have also been studied; for example, "embourgeoisement" (Goldthorpe, et. al., 1968) and "uprootedness" (Leggett, 1963a). Gino Germani (1966) studied the political consequences of mobility (both group and individual). He argued that a disruption of the individual's institutionalized aspirations and the fulfillment of those aspirations are keys to exploring his political

behavior. Such an analysis brings into consideration notions such as relative deprivation and reference group variables.

Leggett (1963a), in a study concerned with the phenomena of "uprootedness," observed that workers reared in agrarian regions are more working-class conscious than those reared in industrial regions. He argued that this proposition runs counter to the expectations of Marxists (Leggett, 1963a: 683).

### 3 - Status Inconsistency

In the last two decades a new and methodologically more sophisticated approach to the analysis of political behavior has been developed. This approach tends to focus on "non-vertical" dimensions of inequalities. A single numerical score is assigned to the position of an actor in several different systems of inequalities. This single score is supposed to stand for an actor's objective characteristics and helps explain his subjective orientations. The three basic assumptions underlying such studies are, (1) a number of systems of inequalities exist which provide different aspects of an actor's identity; (2) an actor's relative position in these systems of inequalities describes a pattern of status consistency or inconsistency; and (3) an actor's political orientation varies according to his pattern of status consistency.

Based upon such assumptions, a great number of studies have attempted to investigate the relation of status inconsistency to political behavior. Lenski (1954) made an attempt

to develop a model for the measurement of status inconsistency. The logic behind his model was a hypothetical level of integration (or norm of consistency) which becomes the basis for the measurement of the status of an actor. His earlier studies had convinced him that there is a tendency for actors with inconsistent status to take extremist positions on political issues. Ever since Lenski's work, there have been a great number of studies following his approach. Certain of these studies have used cross-cultural data mostly from Western and Eastern European societies.<sup>3</sup> Lenski (1967) employed the data of four English speaking nations (U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and Britain). His findings generally supported the proposition that political orientation of actors were highly influenced by their pattern of status inconsistency.

Other studies have contradicted Lenski's results, e.g., Kenkel (1956) and Rush (1967), taking income, education and occupational prestige as the major dimensions of inequality, also developed an index of status inconsistency. They concluded that a relationship exists between inconsistent status and right wing political extremism. Kelly and Chambliss (1966) did not find much relation between measures of status inconsistency and political orientations. They found that social class membership and ethnic background were far more

---

<sup>3</sup>In some Comparative studies reported in Heller (1969), there are some marginal concerns with questions of status inconsistency. Among these are; Wesolowski (1964); and Eisenstadt (1967).

important determinants of political attitudes than the degree to which persons were status inconsistent. Segal and Knoke (1968), who emphasized the categories of achieved vs. ascribed status, concluded that inconsistency between these two status systems could highly influence the actor's political orientations.

In recent years there have been efforts to introduce the factor of social mobility into the scheme of status inconsistency. Geschwender's work (1968) gives a comprehensive summary picture of such efforts. His analysis tends to explain the political consequences of the pattern of mobility of status inconsistent actors. He argued that actors with an inconsistent system of status may attempt to achieve a higher degree of consistency by upward mobility. It is the failure to achieve upward mobility which opens up other alternatives, such as negative attitudes toward the power structure.

#### 4 - Contextual Approach

By the contextual approach we mean those studies which take as a variable the social context (such as a complex of many variables) in their propositions. The level of industrialization of a society may be considered as a context for the kinds of class structure which emerges in early, middle, and mature industrial societies. Contextual modes of explaining political behavior may also be given for different levels of social systems, i.e., societal (Germani, 1966) or

community (Nicholas, 1963).

One of the major traditions of contextual analysis is the Marxian. For the Marxists, class is not a simple stratum; rather, it is a phenomenon which is understood in terms of a context of socio-economic relationships within a given historical epoch. The locus of a class is not a phenomenon which can be separated from its historical experiences (Dahrendorf, 1959: 9-18).

Besides the Marxists, there are a number of authors who study the political behavior of certain social categories in terms of the consequences of industrialization processes. For example, Lipset (1960: 54) presented data which showed a direct relationship between the high pace of industrialization and the emergence of political extremism in the working class; and Goldthorpe et. al., (1968) showed the phenomenon of "embourgeoisement" resulted in a decrease of working class vote for labor parties in some western industrial societies. According to Lipset (1960: 68-72), variations in the working class movements in Scandinavian countries are explained in terms of timing and pace of industrialization as described by Galeson (1952). The Swedish data reveal that manufacturing grew very rapidly between the years 1900 and 1940 and that this sudden increase resulted in the migration of many unskilled workers from rural areas. This in turn resulted in the expansion of industrial rather than craft unions and the appearance of strong left wing movements within the trade

unions and the Social Democratic Party. Since the Norwegian pace of industrial growth was the most rapid, Norway had a more radical working class movement than the other Scandinavian countries. Thus, the Norwegian Labor Party was the only one in Western Europe that went almost intact to the communists when the Comintern was founded.

Lipset (1960: 54), reporting on Engels' observation, noted that the completion of the transition to a large-scale industrial society resulted in conditions in which the proletariat were replaced. In 1884 Engels (Lipset, 1960: 56) noticed a parallel between rapid industrialization in Europe and the development and growth of socialist labor movements. In later periods, these movements declined. It could be argued that rapid industrialization introduces sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and the industrial situation. Therefore, in such cases, conditions promote more extremist working-class movements. Of course, extremist movements are not limited to leftist working-class ones (Kornhauser, 1959; Lipset, 1960: 127-193).

There are only a few empirical studies which use comparative data to explore the relation of contextual situations to the political orientations of actors. Most of these studies are not methodologically sophisticated. Based upon some Indian data, Nicholas (1963) investigated the roots of political orientation among some villagers in rural West Bengal. He concluded that political factions are only understandable

in relation to the context of caste, economic relationships, kinship, and local territory. Objective conditions are not reducable to a number of discrete variables, but to a complex of variables considered as a unity.

A number of studies have put the "embourgeoisement" thesis to test. Goldthorpe, David, and Lockwood (1963), in their detailed study of affluent workers, analyzed data for some manual workers in England. Their findings showed that changes in the interaction patterns and life situations of the workers from proletariat to middle-class style defined the process of embourgeoisement. Another study of affluence by Hamilton (1965) based upon West German data, argued that the assumption of decline of the gap between the middle-class and working-class is a myth.

Other studies try to examine the relation of certain features of the social context to the political orientation of actors. These conditions may not necessarily be universal; they may be characteristic either of a society itself or of a society at a certain level of industrialization. Among such variables are factors of economic insecurity in the form of unemployment, duration of unemployment and factors of stratification (race in the U.S., caste in India). Bourdieu's (1964) findings indicated that duration of unemployment contributed to left wing orientation among Algerian workers. Leggett (1964) also found that economic insecurity (duration of unemployment) influenced political extremism. Hallowell

(1964) argued that the influence of economic insecurity (temporary layoffs, unemployments) upon actors' political orientations would last for a long time.

### Expected Findings

Since we decided to approach our analysis in terms of the major stratification models presented above, the expected findings of each model will be discussed separately.

#### Stratal Approach

Although many studies focus on the relation of social class to ideological orientation, only a few deal with low-industrialized and non-western societies. Since our data represents only industrial manual workers in a specific industry, there are very few studies directly relevant to our inquiry. Moreover, most studies based on the realities of the western industrial world, focus on the "working-class" and "middle-class," while in many industrializing societies these two strata (or classes) are not yet formed as major subsystems. Dahrendorf (1959) claims the rise of the middle-class to its existing size in industrial societies is a new phenomenon. The same argument holds for the industrial working-class. In industrializing societies, the agrarian population composes the largest stratum, while the urban population contains an emerging middle- and working-class. In such societies there is a major distinction between the rural and urban populations in terms of their style of life, occupational



affiliations, and general exposure to modernism. For urban dwellers this results in a very broad stratification of the population along the dimension of rural-urban background. Studies of modernization (Lerner, 1958; Rogers, 1969) would lead us to expect that the less modernized (in this case rural socialized) population would tend to be politically conservative, while the modernity associated with urban background would make for "psychic mobility" and would decrease the actor's conservative tendencies.

Hypothesis number one;

The more the worker is exposed to rural socialization, the higher his tendency to hold a conservative political ideology.

Whether this argument can be applied to the American data is problematic. This is mainly due to the fact that rural-reared Americans are highly exposed to the mass media and have relatively high levels of education. The contrast between rural and urban population should be higher for countries at lower levels of industrialization. One could argue that when present day older workers entered manufacturing the modernity gap between rural and urban workers was wider than it is today. In order to neutralize any such indirect influence upon our findings, the variable of seniority could be introduced as a control variable.

Education is one of the strongest modernizing agents, for the level of modernity increases with level of education (Inkeles, 1960). Therefore, we expect more educated workers

to show tendencies away from conservatism.

Hypothesis number two;

The higher the level of education of the worker, the lower the possibility of his holding a conservative political orientation.

Focussing upon in-plant stratification, skill level is a strong politicizing force (Zeitlin, 1969: 9; Deutsch, 1964).

Hypothesis number three;

Skill level is inversely associated with political ideology. The higher the skill level of the workers, the greater the tendencies to hold more conservative (right of center) political orientations.

#### Social Mobility

There are two types of mobility to consider; the consequences deriving from both inter-generational and intra-generational movements. For the inter-generational measurements two indices were prepared. In one, farmers were considered as lower than unskilled workers in the city, and for the other, as equal to the unskilled workers. We argue that while in advanced industrial societies farmers could be considered as equal to unskilled workers, in the industrializing societies, factory work is more prestigious than farming. It has more secure earnings and is associated with advanced technology and modern institutions. Studies of modernization generally assume that mobility from farm to factory and participation in large industrial organizations constitute significant modernizing processes (Inkeles, 1960). In view of this argument, we shall only employ the measure of mobility in

which farmers are treated as having lower status than unskilled urban workers. We expect that the experience of upward occupational mobility will be associated with a positive evaluation of the opportunity structure, a reinforcement of modernization attitudes, and a shift toward conservative political tendencies.

Hypothesis number four;

Downwardly mobile workers will show left of center tendencies and upwardly mobile workers will assume conservative (right of center) political orientations.

In addition, the measure of mobility may prove to be a strong control variable for the findings from the other approaches. This is especially the case for the model of status inconsistency.

#### Status Inconsistency

Practically all students of status inconsistency have studied western societies. Income, ethnic background, social class, occupational status, and education are taken as the main bases for deriving status inconsistency formulae. The construction of a model of status inconsistency applicable to cross-cultural data could be a research project in itself, but this is not our goal. We intend to make a rather primitive attempt to ascertain whether any mode of status inconsistency can have any predictive power when applied to countries at different levels of industrialization having diverse socio-historical backgrounds.

In our discussions of the stratal approach, we recognized

the variables of education, skill level, and community of socialization to be the primary bases for classifying the respondents. To include more than three dimensions in the measure of status inconsistency seems impractical. The occupational status of the respondent, a major dimension of all studies of status inconsistency, in this research will be the skill level of respondent. We are somewhat uncertain of the relevance of community of socialization as a primary variable in the inconsistency index. This is especially true in the case of the United States.

The main task in constructing a measure of status inconsistency is to establish a norm of consistency as a frame of reference. A review of the literature, as reflected by Geschwender's work (1969), shows that most authors have an implicit input-output view of the actor's relation to his occupational subsystem. Waisanan's (1969) model of actor-in-system seems to explain the kind of logic for establishing a relationship between the actors and their system of statuses, via the principles of distributive justice and cognitive dissonance. Very briefly, if an actor perceives his input-output equation in the systems to be in a balanced state, he is satisfied. If he feels that the amount of input (education and community of socialization) exceed the output (skill level) he feels under-rewarded and might develop a negative evaluation of the system of justice (or the power structure). Since one way to reduce dissonance in our model could be to

strive for better rewards (upward mobility), we introduced the mobility variables as controls.

We expect to find actors with less reward (skill) than input (education and community of socialization) to manifest leftist orientations (or at least to occupy the liberal-left wing position on our measure of political orientations). The status consistent respondents would more probably be in the center. For those who are over-rewarded, it is expected that a positive evaluation of the system would result in a right of center position (which in our case is a conservative political ideology).

Hypothesis number five,

Under-rewarded status inconsistent workers will show leftist political orientations, while over-rewarded workers will tend toward to take right of center political positions.

#### Contextual Approach

While the data of every nation will be analyzed in detail, the comparisons of the findings may reveal differences due to contextual variations. Contextual conditions in this analysis is limited only to the pace of industrialization;

Hypothesis number six,

Workers in rapidly industrializing societies (Argentina and Italy) will show relatively higher tendencies toward political extremism of the right and left, while workers in less rapidly industrializing societies (U.S.A. and India) will show more tendencies toward a moderate political position.

American workers are not only more adapted to industrial life than workers in less industrialized countries, they also

belong to a more homogeneous working-class population. Therefore, we expect the American workers to manifest more homogeneous political orientations. The Indian workers who have had less experience with an industrial mode of production (especially low seniority rural workers) are expected to show a greater tendency toward political extremes.

### Methodology

Translation of our theoretical concerns into the tools of analysis for cross-cultural data runs into serious difficulties. Fortunately some of these problems have already been solved by Form (1970) and others who have worked on this project for years. Practically all the variables in this study were already operationalized, with the exception of the index of status inconsistency which was constructed for this study. (1) Our main independent variables are mobility patterns (both intra-generational and inter-generational), stratal variables (community of socialization, level of education, seniority and skill level), and status inconsistency (to be constructed). (2) Our main dependent variable, the index of conservatism-liberalism, is separately developed for each of the four countries.

### Definition of the Major Variables<sup>4</sup>

**Skill Level;** Skill level is the degree of control over the technological process. The researchers determined the skill level of the workers by direct observation. The company's skill level classification often disagreed with the researchers because certain companies (i.e., FAI,) rewarded long tenured people with wages and status that were higher than their actual functions. In general, the following categories were established by the researchers:

Unskilled = assembly line workers

Semi-skilled = operators of machines which made identical pieces, and workers in test, inspection and repair

Skilled = craftsmen in the experimental and die making departments, and skilled maintenance workers.

**Seniority;** Seniority was the number of years in the firm. Since plants varied in age, in the case of Argentina, we had to apply a lower cutting point (see Appendix A).

**Education;** By education level we mean the number of years of formal schooling.

**Community of Socialization;** This is the size of community in which the respondent lived between the age of ten to twenty. The source of information was the various censuses of various countries. Since the size of community reported in these

---

<sup>4</sup>For all of our variables, the cutting points were made to get sufficient cases in every category to merit statistical analysis. For the cutting points see Appendix A.

censuses differed, we had to choose the cutting points provided by the censuses.

Occupational Mobility Pattern; All occupations of each respondent was coded on an ascending scale from zero to seven (farmer; unskilled; semi-skilled; skilled; office and sales; proprietors, managers and officials). Each occupational move was coded as up, down, or horizontal. Then each entire career was examined for its major pattern. Four patterns were coded; downward mobility, non-mobility, one job, and upward mobility (see Appendix A).

Inter-Generational Mobility; The categories for both father and son are with ascending occupational prestige; farmers, unskilled, semi-skilled, and white collar. Two indices were prepared, one with farmers coded as unskilled workers and the other with farmers considered as less than unskilled workers. The careers were constructed as follows:

Downward mobility = son below father

No mobility = son same as father

Upward mobility = son above father

Political Ideology; Since the political systems of the various countries differed considerably, the index of political ideology had to be accommodated to local circumstances. In the case of the United States and India, indexes were made which reflected the attitudes of the workers toward government involvement in increasing concern for the welfare of the lower income groups (see Appendix A). In the case of Italy



and Argentina similar scales could not be utilized because of the resistance of labor and management to political questions. However, in the case of Italy there is a close relationship between the union identification and the political orientation of the workers. Those who were apolitical or hostile to unions were classified as conservative; those who belong to the independent automobile union (SIDA) were classified as neutral; those who belong to the Social Democratic (UIL) and Christian Democratic (CISL) unions were classed as liberal; and those who belonged to Communist Unions (CGIL) were coded as radicals (see Appendix A).

The political situation in Argentina is very confusing and it is dangerous to investigate questions dealing with political ideology. Attitudes toward unions in Argentina center around attitudes toward Peron. Those most favorable to Peronista politics are considered most radical and those most opposed most conservative. To be actively involved in unions in Argentina means being identified with radical causes. Therefore, the index of political ideology is largely an index of union involvement (see Appendix A).

In conclusion, the problem of conceptual equivalence in the area of political ideology is an extremely difficult issue. However, we feel that the indexes we constructed are roughly comparable and sensitive to differences in political ideologies.

Note: The indexes for India, Argentina, and the United

States were simple additive ones, each question contributing a unit. The response to each of the questions were run against each other and the summated score by Chi-Square test. All of the items were statistically associated with each other and total score at or below the .05 level. The range of the contingency coefficients was relatively small and similar, thus, suggesting that weighting of the individual items might well be ignored.

#### Operationalization of the Measure of Status Inconsistency

Level of education, community of socialization, and skill level are assumed to be the main dimensions of inequality in the construction of the measure of status inconsistency. As we argued before, this measure makes sense for industrializing societies, but its applicability to American data might be risky.

The following eight cases represents the maximum combinations;

	Education (In-put)	Comm. Soc. (In-put)	Skill Level (Out-put)
a)	High	High (Urban)	High
b)	H	H	L
c)	H	L	H
d)	H	L	L
e)	L	H	H
f)	L	H	L
g)	L	L	H
h)	L	L	L

If we assume that these variables could be weighed equally, the above cases can be broken down into three categories;

- A) cases a and h which are consistently high or low.
- B) cases b, d, and f, where the amount of input into the factory system is high and the reward (skill level) is low, resulting in an under-rewarded situation.
- C) cases c, e, and g, where one of the inputs is low and the output (skill) is high, resulting in an over-rewarded situation.

A technical difficulty is to make an index of status inconsistency where dimensions of inequality are not dichotomized, but are broken down into more than two levels. This was not much of a problem because we followed the procedure presented for the dichotomous case. The only modification was to label the variables as high, medium, and low. If we assume that the sum of a high (on one of the dimensions of education or community of socialization) plus a low (on the other) is equivalent to a medium or average, then the following categories are possible;

Education	Comm. of Soc.	Skill Level
high = 3	high = 3	high = 3
medium = 2	medium = 2	medium = 2
low = 1	low = 1	low = 1

If  $\frac{(\text{Education} + \text{Community of Socialization})}{2}$  equals skill level, then status is balanced or consistent; if less than skill level, then status inconsistency is "over-rewarded"; if more than skill level, then status inconsistency is "under-rewarded."

## Chapter 2

### THE RESEARCH SITES

The original research plan was to select nations for study which are at different levels of industrialization. Table 2.1 provides information on the sector compositions of the nations, the states or provinces in which the plants were located, and the cities in which the plants were located. It is clear that Italy and Argentina are in the industrialization phase because of the larger percentage of their labor forces in manufacturing. However, since the factories studied are in highly specialized regions, the characteristics of their regions should also be noted. Michigan turns out to have the most mature economy as reflected by the highest proportion of workers in the service sector, and Piedmont, Italy is the most industrial because it has the highest proportion of workers in manufacturing. Cordoba, Argentina follows closely behind. Maharashtra, India, of course, has the highest proportion of workers in agriculture.

#### The Four Cities<sup>1</sup>

The composition of the four cities merits brief attention (Table 2.2). All four cities are provincial capitals, all except Lansing are the largest cities of their states, and all

---

<sup>1</sup>Most of this section is taken from Form (unpublished manuscripts, no date).

except Lansing are the most heavily industrialized cities in their regions. But the observable differences among the cities are dramatic. Lansing is a midwestern, middle-sized city of 120,000 people, and capital of the state of Michigan. It has a balanced economy dominated by manufacturing, government, and education. Turin is a metropolis of a million inhabitants which competes with Milan as the industrial hub of a heavily industrialized region of the country.<sup>2</sup> The city still retains some of the elegant splendor of the capital city of the ancient state of Savoy. Its old families and industrialists have a cosmopolitan outlook and think of their city as being as much a part of central Europe as of Italy. Cordoba is a city of a half million inhabitants. It too has a venerable and honorable history as the educational and trade center of western Argentina. As the country's second city, it contains an exciting mixture of traditional and industrial life patterns. And Greater Bombay is a sprawling polyglot city of 4,000,000 inhabitants, the entrepot of western India. Despite their differences, Lansing, Cordoba, and Turin are probably more alike than different compared to Bombay.

While Lansing reflects the economic and industrial composition of the United States rather adequately, Turin

---

<sup>2</sup>Turin, Milan, and Genoa, all within 80 miles of one another, constitute Italy's industrial triangle, an area which is in the vanguard of Italy's economic development.

represents a state of industrial development far ahead of that of Italy as a whole. The city's labor force contains about 20 percent more industrial workers than does the nation. Cordoba seems to represent Argentina's present economic development rather well. While the city was long exposed to industrialism, large-scale industry is new and unevenly developed. Bombay, of course, is the least representative city of its nation. In a country dominated by agriculture, Bombay stands out as a modern industrial island.

Turin turns out to be the most industrialized of the four cities, and yet it may not be the most representative city of a mature industrial economy. Lansing's manufacturing plants are somewhat larger than Turin's in terms of average number of employees. Lansing's service organizations, especially those in government, trade, and transportation are relatively larger per unit than Turin's. Thus, Lansing has a more "bureaucratized labor force" than Turin. However, the two cities are not as different as they should be for an ideal research design. Cordoba is clearly a less developed industrial or manufacturing city than either Lansing or Turin. Its industries are newer, smaller, and less mechanized. And its service industries retain a traditional small entrepreneurial character. Although Bombay is the largest city and is the second most industrialized of the four, its plants are small and primitively developed. Its service sector is also comprised of small units.

Table 2.1 - Sector Compositions of Nations, States and Research Sites, 1960, in Percents

Sectors	C O U N T R I E S			
	United States <sup>a</sup>	Italy <sup>b</sup>	Argentina <sup>c</sup>	India <sup>f</sup>
Agriculture	8	29	21	72
Manufacturing	33	40	34	12
Services	59	31	45	16
Total	100	100	100	100

  

Sectors	S T A T E   O R   P R O V I N C E			
	Michigan	Piedmont	Cordoba <sup>d</sup>	Maharashtra
Agriculture	4	22	25	72
Manufacturing	44	51	31	12
Services	52	27	44	16
Total	100	100	100	100

  

Sectors	C I T I E S			
	Lansing	Turin	Cordoba <sup>e</sup>	Greater Bombay
Agriculture	1	1	1	2
Manufacturing	31	61	35	43
Services	68	38	64	54
Total	100	100	100	99

<sup>a</sup>U.S. Census, General, Social and Economic Characteristics, Bureau of the Census, 1960; Final Report P.C.(1)-24D, Detailed Character, Washington, D.C.

<sup>b</sup>Decimo Censimento della Popolazione, ISTAT, Roma, vol. II, 1964.

<sup>c</sup>Distribucion del Ingreso y Cuentas Nacional su la Argentina, Investigacion conjunta CONADE-CEPAL, TOMO V, Buenos Aires, 1965. Tonsejo Nacional de Desarrollo Presidencia de la Nacion.

<sup>d</sup>Republica Argentina, Censo Nacional de Poblacion, 1960. Tomo, IV, Dirreccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Cuadro No. 21, p 100-1

<sup>e</sup>Encuesta Sobre Empleas y Desempleo en la Cuidad de Cordoba, April, 1967. Cordoba. Direccion General de Estadistica, Censos e Investigaciones Facultad di Ciencias, Economicas Consejo Nacional de Desarsollo. Cudro 11.

<sup>f</sup>V. G. Kulkarni, Statistical Outline of Indian Economy, Bombay: Vora and Co., 1968, p. 12-3. For Bombay, Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1962. Final Population Totals, New Delhi, Gov't of India, 1962, p. 32-5.

Table 2.2 - Social and Economic Characteristics of Four Cities

Characteristic	SMSA Lansing <sup>a</sup>	Turin	Cordoba	Greater Bombay
Size, Metropol- itan area	298,959	1,045,544	600,000	4,152,000
Percent of labor force in manufact- uring	31	63 <sup>b</sup>	35 <sup>f</sup>	43 <sup>d</sup>
Mean size of manu- facturing establish- ment	108	79 <sup>c</sup>	11	20 <sup>e</sup>
Mean years of edu- cation, adult popu- lation	12.0	4.8	5.9	3.0 <sup>-</sup>
Percent of labor force in services	67	38	64	48

<sup>a</sup>U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Final Report PC(1)-24D, Detailed Characteristics. Table 121. Washington, D. C.

<sup>b</sup>Decimo Censimento della Popolazione. ISTAT, Roma, 1964, Vol. II.

<sup>c</sup>Annario Statistico 1958, Citta di Torino, 1959, p. 137. Mean number of employees for metal manufacturing was 173. These data are for the province of Turin.

<sup>d</sup>Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1962, Final Population Totals, New Delhi; Gov't of India, 1962, p. 32-5.

<sup>e</sup>In the state of Maharashtra half of the factories employed 20 workers or less. See Statistics of Factories, 1962, Simla, Labour Bureau, Gov't of India, 1965, p. 43-4. Usually only factories hiring 10 or more employees reported to the census. In all of India 79 percent of factories in 1962 hired fewer than 49 workers. Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>f</sup>Encuesta Sobre Empleo Desempleo en la Ciudad de Cordoba, April, 1967, Cordoba. Direccion General de Estadistica, Censos e Investigaciones Facultad de Ciencias, Economicas Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo. Cuadro 11. The Argentine census of 1960 reports an average 7.1 workers per manufacturing plant in Cordoba, and 9.2 for the nation as a whole.



The impression the traveler would obtain of the four cities would be that Turin is the most cosmopolitan, followed by Cordoba, Bombay, and Lansing. The primary reason for this impression is that the three cities of Turin, Cordoba, and Bombay are large cosmopolitan metropolises which support many specialized services and institutions. Yet, the proportion of the local population which uses these services is very small. In fact, the ordering of the cities may be reversed in terms of the impact of their urban facilities upon the lives of the workers. For the mass of industrial workers, the services might as well not exist, for the city has little impact on their lives.

A basic assumption of this research was that the pace of industrialization of the country affects the rates of occupational mobility which, in turn, affect the stratification pattern and the political ideology of the workers. Since the pace of industrialization of the country may not be reflected in the local regions in which the four plants are located, the rates of industrial growth in the states or even the cities would be more appropriate data for this research than the national rates.

The most rapid recent industrialization among the four research sites of this study has occurred in the Piedmont area in which Turin is located in Cordoba province. Lansing and Michigan experienced their most rapid rates of growth between 1900 and 1930. Since then the growth has been primarily in

the service sector (Clelland, 1970).

In the decade 1950-1960 there was almost no change in the proportion of workers in manufacturing in the United States, while for both Italy and Argentina there was a six percent increase. In Italy the famous "economic miracle" largely took place in Italy's iron triangle of Genoa, Turin, and Milan (Ammassari, 1964; 26-38). In Argentina, the rapid industrial growth has occurred largely in the Federal District and in the provinces of Cordoba and Sante Fe (Gale, 1968; 113-130). The case of industrial growth in Bombay and the state of Maharashtra is not as clear as the others. Yet it is obvious that the rate of industrial growth in the city and province was greatly stimulated after World War II when the British left India. Probably Maharashtra's industrial growth during the decade 1950-1960 was more rapid than Michigan but not as rapid as Piedmont and Cordoba. Yet for India, Maharashtra is an industrial region, for one-fifth of the nation's industrial labor force is found in the state. Moreover, the state of Maharashtra is the most urban in the nation (Sharma, 1967; 39-52).

In conclusion, the position taken in this study is confirmed by the data; the labor force areas most rapidly industrializing are Piedmont and Cordoba, Maharashtra is next, and Michigan is the last.

### Technological Characteristics of the plants<sup>3</sup>

The data in Table 2.3 reveals that, despite efforts to obtain identical samples, differences in the technologies of the plants led to slight differences in the skill and departmental representations of the samples. Oldsmobile was technologically the most sophisticated plant; it had the most automatic equipment, made the most complex product and had more personnel in quality control (semi-skilled workers in test, inspection and repair). FIAT, the Italian plant, resembled Oldsmobile, but since FIAT manufactured a larger proportion of automobile parts, the plant had more machine operators. IKA (Industries Kaiser Argentina), the Argentina plant, produced several models of cars and trucks and was not as automated and as rationalized as either Oldsmobile or FIAT. PAL (Premier Automobiles Limited), the Indian plant, was technologically the most primitive; more of its operations were performed by skilled workers than semi-skilled workers, and test-inspection-repair functions tended to be performed by operators and skilled workers. The experimental departments of the different plants seemed to be most alike in skill compositions, but their ecologies differed. Oldsmobile had the largest machines and was the most spacious; the departments in the other plants were less spacious and more crowded. The four parts-making departments seemed the most uniform both in

---

<sup>3</sup>This section is taken largely from Form (1969), Form (1970).

h

h

c

c

F

f

w

h

o

e

te

Th

de

we

upc

their skill composition and in the spatial distribution of machinery.

Departmental differences among the four plants were most apparent in the assembly lines. Oldsmobile's line was the longest, the most rationalized, most mechanized, and most rapid in movement. FIAT's line was quite similar to Oldsmobile's, except that the cars were smaller. The Argentine plant had several crowded assembly lines for different types of vehicles, and workers were rotated from one line to another. Although mechanized, the lines moved very slowly. PAL's crowded assembly lines were not mechanized; automobile frames were placed on dollies which were then pushed from one work station to another after a series of assembly operations had been performed by crews at designated points. Four types of operations which involved different technologies were examined in this study; skilled craft work; parts production; test, inspection and repair, and assembly (see Table 2.3). The plants also differed in technological complexity.

In summary, although the distribution of skills and departmental operations of the plants differed somewhat, they were sufficiently similar to permit pursuit of the study.

#### General Description of Variables<sup>4</sup>

Empirical support for our theoretical arguments is based upon data for the four-nations. We will avoid detailed

---

<sup>4</sup>All of the quotations in this section are from Form (1969).

Table 2.3 - Work Operations of Samples (representative) of  
Automobile Workers in Four Plants, in Percents

Operation	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
Craft operations	30	10	18	12
Test, inspection, repairs	8	26	16	34
Machining	31	31	33	27
Assembling	31	33	32	27
Totals	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	(262)	(306)	(275)	(249)

d

b

a

t

t

m

r

E

s

t

w

t

a

s

m

c

c

s

p

ne

wo

ap

in

ne

descriptions by providing summary information about this data bank and its sources.

The four-nation study was a research plan to study an advanced industry in countries at different levels of industrial development. The advanced example of manufacturing was the automobile industry. The United States represented a mature industrial society; Italy, a society with an old but rapidly expanding industrial base; Argentina, a society undergoing more recent industrialization; and last, India, a society with a small industrial base...."Extreme care was taken to select completely analagous departments in the four plants which represented both the core manufacturing processes and the full range of skills." The sample was designed in such a way as "...to obtain an approximate representation of the skill composition of all departments in the plants devoted to manufacturing units of the plants... The Interview systematically explored the worker's adaptation to several areas, including: the manufacturing sector of work, their occupation, specific job routines, social relations in the work situation, participation in the labor union, and the degree of involvement in the neighborhood, community, and the nation."

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide some background data for the workers in the four samples. 1) "Automobile workers do not appear to be recent rural migrants who have moved directly into industry, although less than one-tenth began gainful employment in the auto industry," (Form 1969, 100). 2) In all four



countries, workers have attained an educational level "...that may be described as 'literate' and only a minority have gone beyond that level or received specialized training..." 3)

"The educational attainment of the workers, compared with others in his own country, is inversely related to the country's degree of industrialization. Thus, workers in the Indian plant constitute an educational elite relatively, while the American workers have a lower than average education." 4)

Data on the structure of the work force; the distribution of skill level, seniority, and community of socialization are found in Table 2.5. The skill distributions of the labor forces were fairly similar, but IKA contained the highest ratio of unskilled workers while PAL and OLDS contained higher ratios of skilled workers. 5) Argentina had workers with the lowest seniority and Oldsmobile had workers with most seniority. These data reflect the ages of the plants themselves. This trend roughly followed the technological sophistication of the plants. 6) A majority of American and Italian workers were reared in rural areas, while smaller ratios of Indian and Argentinians were reared in rural areas.

The data on occupational mobility reflect the dynamics of industrialization and its effect upon the structure of the labor force of the plants. As the level of industrialization of a country increases, the inflow into industrial work increases. This is reflected in the rates of the inter-generational mobility ( $F_{<0}$ )<sup>5</sup> (Table 2.6). The pattern is one of a

<sup>5</sup> $F_{<0}$  means farmers were classified as lower than unskilled urban workers.

Table 2.4 - Labor Force Characteristics of Sample of Four Plants<sup>a</sup>

Characteristics	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
1 - Mean age of workers	32	30	35	42
2 - Mean years of education	6	7	5	9
3 - Number of years in labor force	15	15	22	25
4 - Years of service in present factory	8	5	9	13
5 - Occupational background (percents):				
a. Industrial manufacturing	47	62	59	82
b. Agriculture	14	2	19	6
c. Services	28	32	12	3
6 - Rural or small town birth place (percents)	40	36	66	68

<sup>a</sup>Years plants were established are: PAL (1946), IKA (1955), FIAT (1911), and OLDS (1902). The names of the plants are: Premier Automobile Limited (PAL), Industrial Kaiser Argentina (IKA), Fabrica Italiana Automobile Torino (FIAT) and Oldsmobile (OLDS).

Table 2.5 - Distribution of the Variables of Skill Level, Seniority, Community of Socialization and Education, in Percents

Variables	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
1 - Skill				
Unskilled	36	44	31	24
Semi-skilled	38	35	51	49
Skilled	26	21	18	27
2 - Seniority				
Low	18	5	40	8
Medium	46	45	25	18
High	36	50	35	74
3 - Community of Socialization				
Rural	39 <sup>a</sup>	22	60	61
Town and cities	61	26	6	4
Metropolitan	-	52	31	32
4 - Education				
Low	20	40	54	34 <sup>a</sup>
Medium	37	35	25	61
High	43	25	16	-

<sup>a</sup>Dichotomies

Table 2.6 - Distribution of the Mobility and Status Inconsistency Variables, in Percents

Variables	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
<b>Occupational Career Mobility</b>				
Downward	14	9	10	10
No mobility	26	41	37	28
One job	2	4	5	6
Upward	58	45	58	56
<b>Inter-generational Mobility<sup>a</sup></b>				
Downward	44	35	30	26
No mobility	8	25	19	20
Upward	48	40	51	53
<b>Inter-generational Mobility<sup>b</sup></b>				
Downward	37	35	30	26
No mobility	24	34	33	30
Upward	39	31	37	44
<b>Status Inconsistency</b>				
Under rewarded	35	52	26	27
Consistant	28	19	26	15
Over rewarded	37	28	48	58

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as lower than unskilled workers.

<sup>b</sup>Farmers classed as unskilled workers.

Table 2.7 - Distribution of the Political Ideology for the  
Four Countries, in Percents

Political Ideologies	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
Conservative	30	19	13	22
Neutral	25	48	20	54
Liberal	23	18	44	24
Radical	23	15	23	-
Totals	101	100	100	100

decrease in downward mobility and increase in upward mobility with increasing industrialization where the pace of industrialization is most rapid, (Italy and Argentina), the expansion of the industrial labor force seems to result in lower rates of vertical mobility. This observation is supported by the high ratios of non-mobility workers in the Italian and Argentinian cases. Another explanation of the lower mobility of these workers is that they are young and have not had the opportunity to experience much occupational mobility. In any case the high rate of non-mobility could stimulate radical movements which are often characteristics of countries which are rapidly industrializing.

The distribution of status consistency types does not seem to follow any pattern. For the Argentina case there is a large proportion of under-rewarded workers and for the American case a larger ratio of over-rewarded. These cases might influence the political ideology of the workers resulting in a conservative orientation for the over-rewarded. According to this logic, the political ideologies for the Argentinians should move toward the left and that for the Americans, should be more toward the conservative point. The presence of the workers with low education and high skill and young workers with high education and low skill in the American data provides some evidence for the existence of considerable status inconsistency. Yet there are complexities in this situation because older workers had above average education for their age.

The distributions of the political ideology scores for workers in the four countries are somewhat different. American data do not include any radicals. The cutting point of the categories was made to permit sufficient cases for the analysis of all categories. With increasing level of industrialization there is a shift in the dominant political ideology from conservative (India), to neutral (Argentina), to left of center (Italy), to conservative (United States). Therefore, industrialization seems to have a radicalizing influence until a mature industrial society has been achieved as in the case of the United States.

The consequences of such differences in the distributions of political ideologies is expected to manifest itself in higher rate of extremism for the more heterogeneous work force. To measure the degree of heterogeneity, three stratification approaches (stratal, mobility, and status inconsistency) were undertaken. While we could not anticipate which approach would be most sensitive in explaining the political orientation of workers, we expected that for the highly stratified cases (India and Italy), the stratal approach might be most sensitive. But on other grounds, e.g., high pace of industrialization, the mobility approach might fit the Italian and Argentinian cases. The status inconsistency approach might work best for the United States cases, and so on. In conclusion, the choice of approach without considering the character of the labor force and level and pace of industrialization

of the country could hardly be justified.

It is this conviction which made our theoretical perspective and decisions about analytical approaches inseparable. Our findings may shed some light upon the logic which should be employed in defining the structural variables bearing upon the political behavior of industrial workers.



## Chapter 3

### FINDINGS

The first step in our inquiry was to test the applicability of the three approaches for accounting for political ideology.<sup>1</sup> For all four countries, ideology (dichotomy and four categories) was run against variables in the stratal approach (skill level, seniority, education and community of socialization), mobility approach (occupational mobility and inter-generational mobility) and status inconsistency approach.

#### Stratal Approach

##### Skill and Political Ideology

For the variable of skill, the analysis of the comparative data showed no significant association with political ideology (Table 3.1). Only for Argentinian workers was there a significant relationship between skill and political ideology (Table 3.1). For those workers, an increase in level of skill was associated with leftist political leanings. When the categories for the political ideology index were reduced to two, the Argentine data showed an even stronger relationship to skill level (see footnote to Table 3.1). Although the value of Chi-Square similarly increased for the data of Italian

---

<sup>1</sup>Level of significance is taken at five percent probability of error. In this chapter, a ten percent probability is reported as a tendency to be checked by multi-variate analysis.

workers, it did not reach the five percent level of significance. However, there was a tendency for the skilled workers to adopt a more leftist orientation.

#### Seniority and Political Ideology

In general, political ideology was not associated with seniority level. However, the Indian data showed a slight tendency for high seniority workers to be conservative, but this did not even reach the ten percent level of significance (Table 3.1).

#### Community of Socialization and Political Ideology

In general, no clear pattern of tendencies was observed for community of socialization. For the industrializing countries (India, Argentina, and Italy) no significant association emerged, but the American data did reveal a significant relationship (Table 3.1). The trend in this table was mixed, but it did suggest that workers of rural background tended toward a conservative or neutral position.

#### Education and Political Ideology

The distribution of political ideology according to education did reveal certain trends. Italian and Argentinian workers showed a shift toward left as their level of education increased. The degree of association for Argentina reached the five percent level of significance, but for Italy it was

at the ten percent level. The Indian data revealed an association at ten percent level of significance in the form of a curvilinear pattern, while the American data showed no pattern at all.

### Mobility Approach

In general, the mobility variables did not elicit statistically significant association with political ideology. For both the Indian and Italian data there were tendencies at the ten percent level. Italian workers who had been employed only at FIAT showed weak leftist orientations. The Indian data showed a tendency for inter-generational upward mobility (from farm to factory) to be inversely associated with political radicalism, i.e., the most upwardly mobile workers were the most conservative (Table 1.3). Although Argentinian workers who had only one industrial job showed a slight tendency toward a left of center position, this association did not reach a significant level of association (see Appendix B). Both American and Italian workers exhibited a slight association between pattern of inter-generational mobility. The upwardly mobile Italians tended toward radicalism while the reverse was the case for the Americans.

### Seniority and Political Ideology

No significant relationship was found for any of the four nations.

### Status Inconsistency Approach

The measure of status inconsistency did not show any relationship with political ideology. A tendency emerged only for the American data, as predicted. The under-rewarded tended to be more neutral than the others in their political ideologies while the over-rewarded tended to be more conservative than the under-rewarded. When the inconsistent ("under-rewarded" and "over-rewarded") categories combined, a significant association emerged. The status inconsistencies tended to be more conservative and liberal than the inconsistencies, while the latter tended to be more neutral (Table 3.4).

### Summary

In general, none of the three stratification approaches seemed to be generally sensitive to the variations in the political ideologies of the workers in the four nations. The stratal approach proved to have higher explanatory potential than the other approaches, and amongst stratal variables, education appeared to be the strongest. Skill level was also operative for Italy and Argentina, the rapidly industrializing countries, and the community of socialization for the United States. The status inconsistency approach, on the other hand, was most applicable to the more industrialized countries, Italy and the United States. According to these preliminary data, stratification analysis of political ideologies is most operative for Italy and least operative for Argentina. A fuller explanation of our findings awaits the multi-variate analysis described in the next chapter.

Table 3.1 - Association Between Political Ideology and Selected Stratification Variables

	India PAL	Argentina IKA	Italy FIAT	U.S.A. OLDS
Stratal Approach				
Skill level	ns	.001 <sup>d</sup>	.10 <sup>d</sup>	ns
Seniority	ns	ns	ns	ns
Community of socialization	ns	ns	ns	.05 <sup>c</sup>
Education	.10 <sup>c</sup>	.001 <sup>d</sup>	.01 <sup>e</sup>	ns
Mobility Approach				
Occupational mo- bility pattern	ns	ns	ns	ns
Inter-generational mobility <sup>a</sup>	.10 <sup>f</sup>	ns	.10	ns
Inter-generational mobility <sup>b</sup>	ns	ns	.10 <sup>d</sup>	ns
Status Inconsistency	ns	ns	.10 <sup>d</sup>	.10 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as lower than unskilled workers.

<sup>b</sup>Farmers classed as equal to unskilled workers.

<sup>c</sup>with the ideology index in four categories

<sup>d</sup>positive relationship

<sup>e</sup>curvilinear relationship

<sup>f</sup>negative relationship

ns = not significant

Note; Sometimes the ideology variable was analyzed according to four subcategories (radical, liberal, neutral, conservative) and sometimes by a simple dichotomy (liberal, conservative). I will present the table which reveals more statistically significant results. The nature of the collapses are indicated in the footnotes. This table is for the dichotomy in the ideology index.

Table 3.2 - Political Ideology of Argentine Workers According to Their Skill Level, in Percents

Skill Level	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Totals	Frequencies
Unskilled	25	50	16	9	100	(134)
Semi-skilled	21	46	18	15	100	(111)
Skilled	4	49	23	24	100	( 70)

Chi-Square = 19.967  $\bar{C}$  = .244 Df = 6  $P < .005$

Table 3.3 - Political Ideology of American Workers According to Their Community of Socialization, in Percents

Community of Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Totals	Frequencies
Rural	22	54	24	100	(172)
Small town & cities	20	33	47	100	( 15)
Metropolitan	33	36	31	100	( 91)

Chi-Square = 10.841  $\bar{C}$  = .194 Df = 4  $P < .05$

Table 3.4 - Political Ideology of Indian Workers According to Their Inter-generational Mobility<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward	21	29	29	21	100	(114)
No mobility	33	33	33	00	100	( 21)
Upward	36	23	16	25	100	(118)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as lower than unskilled workers.

Chi-Square = 12.201  $\bar{C}$  = .291 Df = 6 P = .05 (for .05 then there should be a Chi-Square of 12.59)

Table 3.5 - Political Ideology of American Workers According to Their Measure of Status Inconsistency, in Percents

Status Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
status consistents	33	28	38	100	( 42)
status inconsistents	24	51	25	100	(239)

Chi-Square = 6.73  $\bar{C}$  = .296 Df = 3 P < .02

## Chapter 4

### MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS

Unidimensional analysis of data may hide some of the factors which relate stratification variables to political ideology. Certain relationships could be influenced by the intervention of a third variable. This could be the case especially where tendencies emerged in the original association but did not reach a significant level of statistical association. In this chapter the data in the previous chapter are further analyzed.

#### Stratal Approach

##### Skill and Political Ideology (Table 4.1)

For all four countries, the relationship of skill level to political ideology was examined for the sub-strata of seniority and community of socialization. There were no significant associations for United States and Italy, the more industrialized countries. In the Indian data a significant association was detected. In the domain of medium seniority, leftist tendencies were observed for the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. (Table 4.1-1)

In the Argentinian data, a number of tendencies as well as two significant associations were observed (Tables 4.1-2, 3). In general, for community of socializations, the highly educated and medium seniority workers tended to shift toward



**Table 4.1 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Skill and Political Ideology**

Control Variable	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Education</b>				
Low	ns <sup>a</sup>	ns	ns	ns
Middle	ns	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	-
<b>Community of Socialization</b>				
Rural	ns	ns	ns	ns
Town and cities	ns	ns	* <sup>b</sup>	*
Metropolitan	-	.05	ns	ns
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns	*	ns	*
Middle	.05	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	.05	ns	ns

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

Table 4.1-1 - Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Seniority, in Percents

Skill Level-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled combined with semi- skilled	29	27	25	19	100 (93)
Skilled	19	52	7	22	100 (27)

Chi-Square = 11.558  $\bar{C}$  = .421 Df = 3  $P < .01$

Table 4.1-2 - Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Argentine Workers Reared in Metropolitan Areas, in Percents

Skill Level-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled	27	44	21	8	100 (77)
Semi-skilled	21	46	17	15	99 (52)
Skilled	3	46	20	31	100 (35)

Chi-Square = 16.217  $\bar{C}$  = 0.300 Df = 6  $P < .05$

the left as skill level increased. Metropolitan-reared workers and high seniority workers showed a significant association between skill and political orientation (Tables 4.1-2, 3). For these workers, an increase in the skill level was associated with a shift toward left of center political ideology.

In the Italian data a number of tendencies were observed, but no significant associations emerged. For middle and highly educated levels, as well as for all degrees of seniority, tendencies for toward left of center ideologies emerged as a result of increased skill level.

For American data no patterns were observed.

#### Seniority and Political Ideology (Table 4.2)

No significant associations emerged for the United States, Italy, and Argentina.

For the medium educated Indian workers, a significant association emerged between seniority and political ideology. An increase in the level of seniority was associated with a shift toward conservative political positions (Table 4.2-1).

Tendencies for positive association between seniority and political ideologies were observed for all levels of education for Argentinian data as well as for medium educated Italian workers.

### Community of Socialization and Political Ideology

In general, no consistent patterns were observed for the data of four countries.

The data for India did not reveal any pattern except for a significantly positive association between community of socialization and political ideology; the urban-reared workers were more liberal or radical.

For all levels of education for Argentina there were tendencies toward positive association between community of socialization and political ideology, but they did not reach the level of significance.

For the Italian and American cases no pattern or tendencies were noticeable.

### Education and Political Ideology (Table 4.4)

For the United States case there was no significant finding. For the Indian data a significant association between education and political ideology of rural-reared workers emerged (Table 4.4-1); the lowly educated had the least and the highly-educated the highest proportion of politically neutral workers.

For the Argentine case, there was a tendency for a positive relation to exist between education and political ideology, but when community of socialization was controlled, the degree of association dropped below the level of significance.

There was no pattern for the Italian and Argentinian data,

Table 4.2 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Seniority and Political Ideology

Control Variable	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
Skill Level				
Unskilled	ns <sup>a</sup>	ns	ns	ns
Semi-skilled	ns	ns	ns	ns
Skilled	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	ns	ns
Community of Socialization				
Rural	ns	ns	ns	ns
Town and city	ns	ns	*	*
Metropolitan	ns	ns	ns	ns
Education				
Low	ns	ns	ns	ns
Middle	.05	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	-

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

Table 4. 1-3 - Association Between Skill Level and Political Ideology for Argentine Workers with High Seniority, in Percents

Seniority	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled	33	43	18	5	99	(51)
Semi-skilled	19	51	19	11	100	(53)
Skilled	6	46	25	23	100	(48)

Chi-Square = 15.982  $\bar{C}$  = .308 Df = 6  $P < .02$

Table 4.2-1 - Association Between Seniority and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Level of Education, in Percents

Seniority	Conservative with Neutral	Combined_Liberal with Radical	Combined_Total	Frequency
Low	14	86	100	( 7)
Medium	67	33	100	(42)
High	74	26	100	(34)

Chi-Square = 462  $\bar{C}$  = .526 Df = 2  $P < .01$

Table 4.3 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variable Bearing on the Relationship of Community of Socialization and Political Ideology

Control Variables	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Skill Level</b>				
Unskilled	ns <sup>a</sup>	ns	ns	ns
Semi-skilled	.05	ns	ns	.05
Skilled	ns	ns	ns	ns
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	*
Middle	ns	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	*
<b>Education</b>				
Low	ns	ns	ns	ns
Middle	ns	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	-

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

Table 4.3-1 - Association Between Community of Socialization  
and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with  
Semi-Skill Level, in Percents

Community of Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Rural-reared	39	31	7	22	99	(33)
Urban-reared	34	17	37	11	99	(35)

Chi-Square = 10.661  $\bar{C}$  = .504 Df = 3  $P < .05$

Table 4.3-2 - Association Between Community of Socialization  
and Political Ideology for American Semi-Skilled  
Workers, in Percents

Community of Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Rural	20	57	23	100	(84)
Towns and cities	10	30	60	100	(10)
Metropolitan	35	39	56	100	(43)

Chi-Square = 10.799  $\bar{C}$  = 0.270 Df = 4  $P < .05$



Table 4.4 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Education and Political Ideology

Control Variable	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Skill Level</b>				
Unskilled	ns <sup>a</sup>	.05	ns	ns
Semi-skilled	ns	.05	ns	ns
Skilled	ns	ns	ns	ns
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	*
Middle	ns	.05	ns	ns
High	ns	.05	ns	ns
<b>Community Socialization</b>				
Rural	.05	ns	ns	ns
Town and city	ns	ns	*	*
Metropolitan	-	ns	.05	ns

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

Table 4.4-1 - Association Between Education and Political  
Ideology for Rural Reared Indian Workers, in  
Percents

Education	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Low	38	10	27	36	100	(29)
Medium	44	19	22	15	100	(32)
High	17	44	8	31	100	(36)

Chi-Square = 21.564  $\bar{C}$  = .541 Df = 6  $P < .001$

with the exception of a significant association between education and political orientation for metropolitan-reared Italian workers. Those who had medium education showed strongest left of center orientations.

### Mobility Approach

Since mobility pattern highly reflects the opportunity for mobility which increases with job experience, the data relating mobility to political ideology were run for amount of seniority in the plant. In addition, community of socialization and amount of education especially affect occupational mobility, so both of these variables were used as controls in the multi-variate analysis.

### Occupational Mobility and Political Ideology (Table 4.5)

India and Argentina showed no significant findings. A shift toward right of center orientations appeared for the Indian workers with upward mobility, but this did not reach a five percent level of significance. For the Argentina workers of low and medium level of education and for the rural-reared and metropolitan-reared, there was a slight shift toward the left for the upwardly mobile, but this did not reach a significant level of association.

In Italian data a leftist shift due to upward mobility was observed for all categories of seniority as well as for metropolitan workers but these tendencies did not reach a

Table 4.5 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables on the Relationship of Occupational Mobility and Political Ideology

Control Variables	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns <sup>a</sup>	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	*
Middle	ns	ns	ns	*
High	ns	ns	ns	ns
<b>Community of Socialization</b>				
Rural	ns	ns	ns	ns
Town and cities	ns	ns	*	*
Metropolitan	-	ns	ns	ns
<b>Education</b>				
Low	ns	ns	ns	ns
Middle	ns	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	*	.05 <sup>c</sup>	-

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

<sup>c</sup>Means did not reach the five percent level of significance, but came very close to it.

significant level. Only for the highly educated Italian workers was there an association close to five percent; the upwardly mobile workers, showed the strongest leftward orientation.

In general no clear pattern was observed for the American data even for the medium educated workers who showed a significant association between occupational mobility pattern and political ideology.

Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology (Table 4.6)

There were no significant findings for the Argentinian and United States data. Looking through the distribution of political ideology according to patterns of inter-generational mobility, no clear or consistent trends were noticed. Although a weak positive association was noticeable between upward mobility and leftist ideology, it never reached a significant level of association.

In the Italian data a shift toward the left for the upwardly mobile was noticed for high seniority, metropolitan-reared, and highly educated workers. But with exception of the metropolitan-reared workers, none of them reached a significant level of association. For low and medium seniority workers and for medium educated workers, a curvilinear tendency was noticed which reached a significant level only for medium educated workers.

For an Indian data there was no visible pattern except

Table 4.6 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables on the Relationship of Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology<sup>c</sup>

Control Variables	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns <sup>a</sup>	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	*
Middle	ns	ns	ns	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	ns
<b>Community of Socialization</b>				
Rural	ns	ns	ns	ns
Towns and cities	ns	ns	*	*
Metropolitan	-	ns	.05	ns
<b>Education</b>				
Low	ns	ns	ns	ns
Middle	.05	ns	.05	ns
High	ns	ns	ns	-

<sup>a</sup>Not significant

<sup>b</sup>Not enough cases

<sup>c</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

for the medium educated workers. The downwardly mobile workers showed a stronger orientation toward liberal or neutral political orientations (Table 4.6-1).

#### Status Inconsistency Approach

Among the important factors which might effect the relationship between status inconsistency and political ideology are occupational mobility and seniority which were introduced as controls. Adoption of such controls is based upon the argument that occupational mobility is recognized as a major way out of an inconsistent system of status (Geschwender, 1969). Low seniority workers may not have had the chance to experience upward mobility. Therefore, these two variables were recognized as crucial controls.

#### Measure of Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology

(Table 4.7)

In general, the distributions which did not reach significant levels of association did not reveal patterns or tendencies. No significant findings emerged for India and Italy. In Argentina, the workers who had not experienced inter-generational mobility showed a significant association between status inconsistency and political ideology. Those with a consistent system of status showed stronger radical orientations, while the inconsistent ones were relatively more neutral politically. (Table 4.7-1)

Table 4.6-1 - Association Between Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology for Indian Workers with Medium Level of Education, in Percents<sup>a</sup>

Inter-generational	Conservative combined with Neutral	Liberal combined with Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	45	55	100	(38)
No mobility	88	12	100	( 9)
Upward mobility	62	38	100	(43)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

$$\text{Chi-Square} = 6.236 \quad \bar{C} = 0.252 \quad \text{Df} = 2 \quad P < .05$$

Table 4.6-2 - Association Between Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology for Italian Workers Reared in Metropolitan Area, in Percents<sup>a</sup>

Inter-generational Mobility	Conservative combined with Neutral	Liberal combined with Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward	49	51	100	(39)
No mobility	23	77	100	(30)
Upward	24	76	100	(25)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

$$\text{Chi-Square} = 6.252 \quad \bar{C} = 0.252 \quad \text{Df} = 2 \quad P < 0.5$$



Table 4.7 - Level of Significance for Selected Control Variables Bearing on the Relationship of Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology

Control Variable	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS
<b>Seniority</b>				
Low	ns <sup>a</sup>	* <sup>b</sup>	ns	*
Middle	ns	*	ns	ns
<b>Occupational Mobility</b>				
Downward	ns	ns	ns	ns
No mobility	ns	ns	ns	ns
One job	*	*	*	*
Upward mobility	ns	ns	ns	ns
<b>Inter-generational Mobility</b>				
Downward	ns	ns	ns	ns
No mobility	ns	.05	ns	.05 <sup>c</sup>
Upward	ns	ns	ns	.05 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Not significant

<sup>b</sup> Not enough cases

<sup>c</sup> Found when index of mobility with farmers equal to unskilled workers were used.

Table 4.6-3 - Association Between Inter-generational Mobility and Political Ideology for Medium Educated Italian Workers, in Percents<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational-Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward	34	9	41	17	101	(22)
No mobility	5	00	60	35	100	(20)
Upward	9	17	54	20	100	(35)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

Chi-Square = 15.381  $\bar{C}$  = .488 Df = 6  $P < .02$

Table 4.7-1 - Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Non-Mobile (Inter-generational) Argentine Workers, in Percents

Status Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Under-rewarded	32	42	18	8	100	(38)
Consistant	25	25	6	43	99	(16)
Over-rewarded	19	61	17	13	100	(23)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

Chi-Square = 16.052  $\bar{C}$  = 0.415 Df = 6  $P < .025$

In the American data no significant findings were observed when the index of mobility (farmers less than unskilled) was used. But when the index (farmers the same as the unskilled) was used, two significant associations emerged. Both the categories of non-mobility and upwardly-mobile workers showed significant association between status inconsistency and political ideology. For both, status-consistent workers were more liberal than others (Tables 4.7-2 and 4.7-3).

#### Summary

In order to obtain an overview of the results of multi-variate analysis, a summary table (Table 4.8) was prepared. The percentages represent the proportion of the associations which reached the five percent level of significance for all of the associations computed for every variable. According to this table, the stratal approach elicited more significant findings than the other approaches. Amongst the stratal variables, education proved to be the strongest, except for OLDS, and skill level was important for PAL and IKA. For the Italian data, the mobility approach proved more applicable than the others, and for the United States, the status inconsistency approach was the most sensitive.

Table 4.7-2 - Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Non-Mobile (Inter-generational) American workers, in Percents<sub>a</sub>

	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Under-rewarded	8	84	8	100	(25)
Consistant	29	29	43	101	(21)
Over-rewarded	29	55	35	99	v(35)

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as unskilled workers.

$$\text{Chi-Square} = 16.77 \quad \bar{C} = 0.412 \quad \text{Df} = 4 \quad P < .001$$

Table 4.7-3 - Association Between Status Inconsistency and Political Ideology for Upward-Mobile (Inter-generational) American Workers, in Percents<sub>b</sub>

	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Under-rewarded	46	46	9	101	( 11)
Consistant	22	11	67	100	( 9)
Over-rewarded	26	49	25	100	(103)

<sup>b</sup>Farmers classed as unskilled workers.

$$\text{Chi-Square} = 10.692 \quad \bar{C} = 0.283 \quad \text{Df} = 4 \quad P < .05$$

Table 4.8 - Summary Table (Percent of Significant Associations)

Approach	PAL	IKA	FIAT	OLDS	TOTALS <sup>a</sup>	(N)
Strata Approach:						
Skill	.12	.25	.00	.00	.37	30
Seniority	.12	.00	.00	.12	.12	32
Community of Socialization	.12	.00	.00	.12	.12	32
Education	.12	.50	.12	.00	.74	31
Mobility Approach:						
Occupational Mobility	.00	.00	.25	.12	.37	28
Inter-generational Mobility (farmers less than unskilled workers)	.12	.00	.12	.00	.24	30
Status Inconsistency	.00	.12	.00	.25	.37	33

<sup>a</sup>This is just a simple summation of percentages for the four countries.

## Chapter 5

### INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

The main object of our research was to test the applicability and universality of three models of stratification as determinants of political orientation of industrial workers. In this chapter we will discuss the importance of the variables within each model, then the generalizations of higher levels will be presented.

#### Stratal Model

##### Skill Level (hypothesis number 3)

The variable of skill level is recognized as a crucial basis for stratification of the industrial working-class (Dahrendorf, 1959; Zeitlin, 1967). While it is generally concluded that the political behavior of the workers at different skill levels is not similar, there is no consensus on how skill level effects political ideology. While certain studies view skilled workers as more class-conscious and radically oriented (Zeitlin, 1967: 91), others do not support this position (Zeitlin, 1967: 89-119). According to our findings, only one country (Argentina) showed significant associations between skill level and political ideology. Argentine workers showed a shift toward a left-of-center political orientation as their level of skill increased (Table 1.1). When multivariate analysis was undertaken, additional significant

associations emerged. The introduction of control variables showed that the relationship between skill level and political ideology was very apparent among the metropolitan-reared workers and among those with high seniority. The medium-seniority Indian workers showed a leftist orientation with an increase in skill level. All the other significant associations (India and Argentina) pointed toward the radicalizing influence of increased skill level. While there were tendencies (at ten percent level) for skill and political ideology to be related for the Italian workers, this tendency perished when multi-variate analysis were undertaken.

In general our findings did not support hypothesis number three which expected a shift toward the right ideology for skilled workers.

### Seniority

Seniority in the work situation was the second stratifying dimension we employed. An increase in seniority could be viewed as reflecting increased adaptation to the industrial role. There were some weak tendencies in support of this argument, but in general no significant relationships were observed. Looking through the tables a number of tendencies were observed which followed an upward curvilinear pattern, where for the lower levels of seniority there was a shift toward the left which declined for high seniority workers. The unskilled and skilled Argentinians, skilled Italians and

unskilled Americans showed this pattern. In addition, an inverse association (at five percent level of significance) appeared between seniority and radical political orientation for the medium educated Indian workers. Thus, in India the low seniority workers are more radical than the medium seniority workers either due to wider modernization gap, or problems of adjustment to industrial life in early levels of industrialization. Clearly, the India case did not follow the curvilinear pattern found in the other countries.

Community of Socialization (hypothesis number 1)

The community of socialization has been directly or indirectly recognized as an important influence on the political behavior of industrial workers. Studies of uprootedness (Leggett, 1963) and political extremism of industrial workers in the process of industrialization (Lipset, 1960; Zeitlin, 1967) document this relationship. Modernization theorists view urban life as an agent and consider rural-reared actors as generally conservative (Lerner, 1958).

In general, there were no significant associations between the community of socialization and political ideology in the rapidly industrializing societies (India, Argentina and Italy). Only American workers showed a significant association; rural-reared workers had stronger conservative or neutral tendencies. This is the only case where our third hypothesis was supported.

The community of socialization proved its importance not



so much as a direct factor, but rather as an indirect one. The high degree of association between skill level and political ideology held for metropolitan-reared Italians. Urban-reared semi-skilled Indian workers also showed stronger left-of-center political orientations. This could be due more to skill level than to urban socialization because, when skill was controlled, no relationship emerged between community of socialization and political ideology.

#### Education (hypothesis number 2)

Education as a modernizing agent is heavily emphasized by modernization theorists (Inkeles, 1960; Lerner, 1958; Waisanan, 1969). A higher level of education is associated with higher degrees of "empathy" and this results in a shift away from a conservative position.

In general, industrializing societies showed significant associations (Argentina) or tendencies (India and Italy) toward a unidimensional association between educational level and political ideology. Introduction of control variables made these tendencies more clear. While the data for the Indian workers (Table 5.1) did not reveal a clear pattern, the Italian and Argentinian cases showed increased left-of-center political orientations with increases in education. This supports our second hypothesis.

### Mobility Model (hypothesis number 4)

#### Occupational Mobility Pattern

No linear association was found between occupational mobility and political ideology for any country. When seniority, community of socialization, and education were introduced as controls, only one significant association appeared for the highly educated American workers, but no clear pattern was evident.

#### Inter-generational Mobility Pattern

Inter-generational mobility is emphasized as an important politicizing factor by many authors (Lipset, 1960; Germani, 1966; Zeitlin, 1967). It is generally believed that mobility from rural to industrial work results in political unrest (Lipset, 1960; Leggett, 1963a; Zeitlin, 1967: 132-133).

According to our findings, inter-generational mobility proved to be a stronger influence upon political ideology than intra-generational mobility, especially for the Indian and Italian cases. Multi-variate analysis made the sources of such tendencies more clear. The medium educated Indian workers showed left-of-center political orientations as a consequence of downward mobility. Exactly the reverse of this was observed for Italian workers. In the Italian case, downwardly mobile workers of the medium educational level showed stronger conservative or neutral tendencies. Thus, the consequences of downward mobility do not follow a universal pattern. A similar

pattern was observed for Italian metropolitan-reared workers. The downwardly mobile were mostly conservative or neutral, while the non-mobile and upwardly mobile workers were more left-of-center. This shows that at least for the Italian case, arguments made by authors such as Zeitlin (1967) and Leggett (1963a) hold true, that upward mobility leads toward left-of-center tendencies. In general these findings did not support our hypothesis.

#### Status Inconsistency Model (hypothesis number 5)

No linear association emerged between a measure of status inconsistency and political ideology in the comparative analysis. Tendencies were only observed for the Italian and American cases. Multi-variate analysis resulted in the emergence of a relationship for the Argentine data, a disappearance of the tendency for the Italian data, and the emergence of a significant findings for the American data. For Argentinian and American workers who have experienced no inter-generational mobility (for the American case, the upward mobility too), some significant associations emerged. There were associations between status inconsistency and conservative or neutral political ideologies and status consistency with left-of-center ideologies. This runs counter to our expectations and we cannot explain it.

Contextual Model (hypothesis number 6)

We hope that this study contributes both to the theory and methodology of studies of industrialization. First, in the domain of methodology, this study points to the fact that in the analysis of industrialization (at least the political behavior of the working class), the variables used are conditioned by the level of industrialization of the country. Second, our findings shed more light upon the basis of political ideology of industrial workers of different societies (especially societies with very complicated working-class political systems as in Italy). Viewing industrialization in terms of the stratification structure of society, some casual relationships between stratification variables and political ideology could be established. Such developments as the rapid flow of rural workers into the industrial sector (resulting in higher rates of inter-generational mobility), and increase in work specialization (indicated by skill level) are amongst the important factors influencing political beliefs. Findings from the Italian and Indian cases showed that inter-generational mobility has a strong influence on political orientation, but the influence is not necessarily in the same direction in both countries. In general, the findings suggest that in rapidly industrializing societies (Italy and Argentina), the high pace of change leads to political extremism of the left. In contrast, the data for the United States showed that in a mature industrial society the diversities in political

ideologies could not be explained by the approaches which proved useful for the industrializing societies.

### Conclusion

The political consequences of industrialization seem to follow no linear or evolutionary patterns. While the consequences of such modernizing forces as education and urbanization seem to follow linear patterns, other structural variables such as seniority, skill level, and mobility seem to lead to political consequences which are conditioned by the general societal context (such as level and pace of industrialization). In view of such understanding, analysis of comparative data (focussing on the political ideology of industrial workers) by numerous models of social structure, is advantageous.

## Appendix A

I do not intend to reproduce the entire interview. Only the variables used in the analysis will be reproduced below.

### Dependent Variable: Political Ideology

United States - A trichotomy was employed; conservative, neutral and liberal. The index is based upon algebraic summation of answers to the following questions.

- 1 - There should be a government health program. yes = 1. no = 0. others = 9.
- 2 - The working man today has enough influence in Congress. disagree, others, do not know = 1. agree = 0.
- 3 - There is too much government regulation of private enterprise and business generally. disagree, others, do not know = 1. agree = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 4 - The working man has enough influence in the state. disagree, others, do not know = 1. agree = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 5 - Increases in taxes should come mostly from business. agree = 1. disagree, others, do not know = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 6 - Federal Government should do more to solve the problems of unemployment. agree = 1. disagree, others, do not know = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 7 - Do you think that the Democratic party is: too conservative = 1. in between = 0. too liberal, others, do not know = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 8 - Do you classify yourself as: a liberal = 1. a conservative, in between, others, do not know = 0. not ascertained = 9.
- 9 - Do you generally vote: Democratic = 1. Republican, split ticket, others, etc. = 0. not ascertained = 9.

The index was made according to the following distribution;

- 1 - 3 = conservative
- 4 - 5 = neutral
- 6 - 8 = liberal
- others = not ascertained

Italy - The index was based upon union identification.

- 1 - Conservative = apathetic and hostile to Union
- 2 - Neutral = SIDA, (center-right Unions)
- 3 - Liberal = UIL, CISL, (center Unions)
- 4 - Radical = CGIL, (center-left Unions)

Argentina - The algebraic responses to the following questions were codified as follows;

- 1 - Here is a list of important Union functions. Which is the most important and which is next most important?  
0 = listed other Union functions; do not know; and not ascertained; 1 = to change the political and social system of the country as first or second most important.
- 2 - Would you like to become officer or have a responsibility or position of any kind in your Union? 0 = no, do not know, and not ascertained; 1 = yes.
- 3 - Do any of your friends or acquaintances ever come to you to get your opinion on Union, political, economical, or company problems? 0 = yes, sometimes, no, do not know, and not ascertained; 1 = yes, frequently.
- 4 - Are you interested more in local or national news? 0 = local only, do not read any papers, not ascertained; 1 = national, both local and national.
- 5 - Do you ever get into discussions with others on economic and political issues? 0 = no, others, do not know, and not ascertained; 1 = yes.
- 6 - How many daily newspapers do you read? 0 = one, none, do not know, and not ascertained; 1 = two or more.
- 7 - What are some of the most important national problems? 0 = mentioned one national or none, do not know, not ascertained; 1 = mentioned two national.

- 0 - 1 = Conservative
- 2 - 3 = Neutral
- 4 = Liberal
- 5 = Radical

India - The algebraic summation of responses to the following questions were codified as;

- 1 - Do you think that the government is doing all that it can about problems of workers and the lower class? 0 = yes; 1 = no; 9 = not ascertained.
- 2 - Do you think that in order to solve the problems of workers and the lower classes, the government is moving fast enough? 0 = yes; 1 = no; 9 = not ascertained.

- 3 - It is suggested by some that any increase in taxes should come mostly from the business community. Do you agree with this view? 0 = yes; 1 = no; 9 = not ascertained
- 4 - Do you think that the working class members have enough influence in the Lok Sabha and the State Assembly? 0 = yes; 1 = no; 9 = not ascertained.
- 5 - Do you think that the government is favoring higher income groups over workers and lower economic groups? 0 = yes; 1 = no; others = 9.
- 0 - 1 = Conservative  
 2 - 3 = Neutral  
 4 = Liberal  
 5 = Radical

### Independent Variables

#### Skill Level

There were three categories of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. This is the researcher's not the companies classification. In order to get a better picture of the consequences of skill level, I used both trichotomy and dichotomy (unskilled and semi-skilled combined in one category) in the analysis.

#### Seniority

The seniority index was made according to the following categories,

- India - under 4 years = low; 5-9 years = middle; 10 years and over = high.
- Argentina - under 2 years = low; 2-4 years = middle; and 5 years and over = high.
- Italy - under 4 years = low; 5-9 years = middle; 10 years and over = high.
- U.S.A. - under 4 years = low; 5-9 years = middle; 10 years and over = high.



### Community of Socialization

- India - Determined with reference to community of birth.  
 Rural = village  
 Urban = cities and metropolitan
- Argentina - Rural = rural, small town (5,000-)  
 Middle = small cities (5,000+)  
 Metropolitan = Cordoba, (100,000+)
- Italy - Rural = less than 20,000 inhabitants (and small towns)  
 Middle (towns and cities) = 20,000 - less than 500,000  
 Metropolitan = over 500,000
- U.S.A. - Based upon community of residence between ages of 10 and 20.  
 Rural = farm and rural non-farm under 5,000  
 Middle = towns (5,000-20,000) and small urban (20,000-50,000)  
 Urban = middle urban (50,000-100,000); large urban (over 100,000); metropolitan (500,000 and above)

### Education

- India - low = 0 to 4 years; middle = 5 to 7 years; high = 8 years and above.
- Argentina - low = 0 to 6 years; middle = 7 to 9 years; high = 10 years and above.
- Italy - low = 0 to 5 years; middle = 6 to 8 years; high = 9 to 13 years.
- U.S.A. - American data was broken down into a dichotomy.  
 low = 0 to 9 years; high = 10 years and above.

### Occupational Mobility Pattern

Construction of this index went into much detail and included a large amount of information. For a detailed description, see W. H. Form (1970). A comparative index is made for all four countries which includes the four categories of; 1) downward-mobility, 2) non-mobility, 3) one-job, and 4) upward-mobility.

### Inter-generational Mobility

Two indices were prepared, one with farmers equal to unskilled workers, while the other considered farmers are

less than unskilled workers. The categories for both father and son are with ascending occupational prestige as follows: farmers, unskilled, semi-skilled, white collar.

The logic of such construction is as follows;

Downward mobility = son below father  
Non-mobility = son same as father  
Upward mobility = son above father

Note: The analysis was done for two indices of political ideology, one using four categories (conservative, neutral, liberal, and radical), and the other a dichotomy (conservative or neutral, and liberal or radical).

## Appendix B

The tables on the political ideology of workers according to selected stratification variables. These tables showed Chi-Squares below the ten percent level of significance.

Table B.5 - Indian-Skill Level vs. Political Ideology, in Percentages

Skill Level-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled	30	26	22	21	99 ( 93)
Semi-skilled	32	22	25	21	100 (102)
Skilled	25	35	20	20	100 ( 65)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101

Table B.6 - India-Seniority vs. Political Ideology, in Percentages

Seniority-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Low	23	21	28	28	100 ( 47)
Medium	26	33	20	21	100 (121)
High	36	21	23	19	99 ( 92)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101

Table B.7 - India-Community of Socialization vs. Political Ideology, in Percentages

Community of Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Rural	31	25	18	25	39	(103)
Urban	29	25	27	19	100	( 93)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

Table B.8 - India-Education vs. Political Ideology, in Percentages

Education	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Low	39	14	34	33	99	( 54)
Medium	31	25	25	18	99	( 97)
High	23	34	19	24	100	(109)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

Table B.9 - India-Occupational Mobility vs. Political Ideology, in Percentages

Occupational Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	25	25	22	28	100	( 38)
No mobility	27	31	22	19	99	( 71)
One job	16	34	34	16	100	( 6)
Upward mobility	32	24	22	22	99	(147)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

Table B.10 - India-Inter-generational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	22	28	26	23	99	( 98)
No mobility	32	27	26	14	99	( 52)
Upward mobility	33	26	16	25	100	(196)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers same as unskilled workers.

Table B.11 - India-Inter-generational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Upwardly mobile	21	29	27	22	19	(117)
No mobility	34	34	28	4	100	( 21)
Downwardly mobile	38	23	16	24	101	(117)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

Table B.12 - India-Measure of Status Inconsistency vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages

Measure of Status- Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Under- rewarded	25	29	19	27	100	(75)
Consistent	20	31	22	27	100	(98)
Over- rewarded	30	19	26	25	100	(89)
Totals	30	25	23	23	101	

Table B.13 - Argentina-Seniority vs. Political Ideology in  
Percentages

Seniority-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Low	25	44	25	6	100 ( 16)
Medium	18	51	15	16	100 (146)
High	20	47	20	13	100 (152)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100

Table B.14 - Argentina-Community of Socialization vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages

Community of Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Rural	20	47	19	14	100	( 70)
Cities and towns	16	56	15	14	101	( 81)
Metropolitan	20	45	20	15	100	(164)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100	

Table B.15 - Argentina-Occupational Career Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages

Occupational Career Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	28	50	10	17	100	( 29)
No mobility	22	51	16	11	100	(130)
One job						
Upward mobility	15	47	20	18	100	(143)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100	

Table B.16 - Argentina-Inter-generational Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	17	52	19	11	99	(109)
No mobility	23	47	14	16	100	(106)
Upward mobility	18	45	21	17	101	( 95)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as unskilled workers.

Table B.17 - Argentina-Inter-generational Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	17	52	19	11	99	(109)
No mobility	23	44	16	17	100	( 77)
Upward mobility	18	48	19	16	101	(124)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.



Table B.18 - Argentina-Measure of Status Inconsistency vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages

Measure of Status-Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Under-rewarded	22	49	18	11	100	(164)
Consistant	18	41	16	25	101	( 77)
Over-rewarded	15	53	18	15	101	( 89)
Totals	19	48	18	15	100	

Table B.19 - Italy-Skill Level vs. Political Ideology in  
Percentages

Skill Level	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled	16	27	39	18	100	(94)
Semi-skilled	12	18	47	23	100	(23)
Skilled	13	14	41	32	100	(56)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100	

Table B.20 - Italy-Seniority vs. Political Ideology in Percentages

Seniority-Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Low	19	18	39	24	100 (122)
Medium	9	24	40	27	100 ( 75)
High	8	20	51	21	100 (107)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100

Table B.21 - Italy-Community of Socialization vs. Political Ideology in Percentages

Community of-Socialization	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Rural	15	18	47	20	99	(186)
Towns and cities	6	17	56	22	101	( 18)
Metropolitan	11	22	38	29	100	( 96)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100	

Table B.22 - Italy-Occupational Career Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages

Occupational Career Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	17	30	40	13	100	( 30)
No mobility	12	17	50	21	100	(114)
One job	13	27	27	33	100	( 15)
Upward mobility	11	20	41	30	101	(147)
Totals	13	20	44	23	101	

Table B.23 - Italy-Inter-generational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational- Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	19	21	34	26	100	( 84)
No mobility	12	24	44	19	99	( 97)
Upward mobility	9	16	49	25	99	(111)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as unskilled workers.

Table B.24 - Italy-Inter-generational Mobility vs. Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter- generational-Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	19	21	33	26	99	( 89)
No mobility	9	13	53	26	100	( 55)
Upward mobility	11	22	45	22	100	(153)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

Table B.25 - Italy-Status Inconsistency vs. Political Ideology in Percentages

Status-Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Under- rewarded	12	16	41	20	99	( 78)
Consistent	17	22	38	23	100	( 78)
Over- rewarded	12	15	49	25	101	(144)
Totals	13	20	44	23	100	

Table B.26 - United States-Skill Level vs. Political Ideology

Skill Level	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Radical	Total	Frequency
Unskilled	19	50	30		99	( 63)
Semi-skilled	24	50	25		99	(141)
Skilled	34	39	26		99	( 76)
Totals	22	54	24		100	

Table B.27 - United States-Seniority vs. Political Ideology  
in Percentages

Seniority	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Totals	Frequencies
Low	12	64	24	100	( 25)
Medium	18	44	37	99	( 48)
High	28	46	25	99	(213)
Totals	22	54	24	100	

Table B.28 - United States-Education vs. Political Ideology  
in Percentages

Education	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Low	28	44	28	100	(109)
High	24	50	27	101	(177)
Totals	22	54	24	100	

Table B.29 - United States-Occupational Career Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages

Occupational Career Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	21	46	32	99	(28)
No mobility	24	45	31	100	(80)
One job	11	72	17	100	(18)
Upward mobility	29	45	25	99	
Totals	22	54	24	100	

Table B.30 - United States-Inter-generational Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Intergenerational-Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Upward mobility	27	40	33	100	( 73)
No mobility	22	57	20	99	( 83)
Upward mobility	28	46	27	101	(123)
Totals	22	54	24	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed same as unskilled workers.

Table B.31 - United States-Inter-generational Mobility vs.  
Political Ideology in Percentages<sup>a</sup>

Inter-generational-Mobility	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Downward mobility	27	40	33	100	( 73)
No mobility	26	56	18	100	( 57)
Upward mobility	25	48	26	99	(149)
Totals	22	54	24	100	

<sup>a</sup>Farmers classed as less than unskilled workers.

Table B.32 - United States-Status Inconsistency vs. Political  
Ideology in Percentages

Status Inconsistency	Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	Total	Frequency
Under-rewarded	18	55	26	99	( 75)
Consistnat	33	29	38	100	( 42)
Over-rewarded	26	49	25	100	(164)
Totals	22	54	24	100	

## REFERENCES

- Alford, R.  
1963                      The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior. Western Political Quarter, 16 (March): 180-194.
- Ammasari, P.  
1964                      A Comparative Study of Automobile Workers, East Lansing; Michigan State University, Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation.
- Blalock, H. M. Jr.  
1967                      Status Inconsistency, Social Mobility, Status Integration and Structural Effect, American Sociological Review, 32 (October): 790-801.
- Blauner, R.  
1964                      Alienation and Freedom; The Factory Worker and His Industry, Chicago; University of Chicago Press.
- Bottomore, T. B.  
1966                      Classes in Modern Society, New York; Phantheton Books.
- Baurdie, P.  
1962                      La Hantise Du Chomage Ches L'ouvrier Algerien, Sociologie de Travail, 4 (October-December): 313-331.
- Centers, R.  
1949                      The Psychology of Social Classes, Princeton University Press.
- Clelland, D.  
1970                      Occupational Composition and Community Structure; A Study of the Impact of Professionalization of Community Life and Stratification Pattern, East Lansing; Michigan State University, Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation.
- Dahrendorf, R.  
1959                      Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford; Stanford University Press.
- Deutsch, S. F.  
1964                      Skill Level, Social Involvement and Ideology; A Study of Automobile Workers, East Lansing; Michigan State University, Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation.
- Eisenstadt, S. N.  
1967                      Israeli Society, New York; Basic Books, Inc.



- Faunce, W. A.  
1968                      Problems of an Industrial Society, New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Form, W. H. and  
Faunce, W. A. (ed.)  
1969                      Comparative Perspectives on Industrial Society, Boston; Little, Brown and Company.
- Form, W. H. and  
Rytina, J. H.  
1969                      Income and Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States, American Sociological Review, 34 (February); 134-142.
- Form, W. H.  
1969                      Occupational and Social Integration of Automobile Workers in Four Countries; A Comparative Study, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 10 (March and June); 95-116.
- Form, W. H.  
1970                      The Accommodation of Rural and Urban Workers to Industrial Discipline and Urban Life; A Four Nation Study, Varna, Bulgaria; The Seventh World Congress of Sociology.
- Form, W. H.  
1971                      Technology and Social Behavior; A Comparative Study of Automobile Workers in India, Argentina, Italy and the United States, in E. Ayal (ed.), Micro Aspects of Development, Champaign, Illinois University Press (1971, Forthcoming).
- Gale, R. F.  
1968                      Industrial Man in Argentina and The United States; A Comparative Study of Automobile Workers, East Lansing, Michigan State University, Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation.
- Germani, G.  
1966                      Social and Political Consequences of Mobility, in Lipset, S. M. and Smelser, N. J. (eds), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, Chicago; Aldine Publishing Co.
- Galson, W. (ed.)  
1952                      Comparative Labor Movements, New York; Princeton Hall.
- Geschwender, J. A.  
1967                      Status Consistency and Dissonance, Social Forces, 46 (December); 160-172.
- Geschwender, J. A.  
1968                      Social Movements and Revolutions, Social Forces, 47 (December); 127-136.

- Goldthorpe, J. H.  
and Lockwood, D.  
1963 Affluence and the British Class Structure, *Sociological Review*, 11 (November-July): 140-185.
- Golthorpe, J. H.  
1966 Attitudes and Behavior of Car Assembly Workers; A Deviant Case and a Theoretical Critique, *British Journal of Sociology*, 17 (September), 227-244.
- Goldthorpe, J. H.,  
Lockwood, D.,  
Bechhofer, F., and  
Platt, J.  
1968 Vol. 1:  
The Affluent Worker, Political Attitudes and Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 
- Vol. 3:  
The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haer, J. L.  
1956 Social Stratification in Relation to Attitude Toward Sources of Power in Community, *Social Forces*, 34 (December), 137-142.
- Hallowell, R.  
1964 Economic Deprivation and Social Participation in a Group of "Middle Class" Factory Workers, *Social Problems*, 11 (Winter): 290-301.
- Hamilton, R  
Affluence and the Workers: The West German Case, *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (September), 144-152.
- Harrison, T.  
1961 Rural Reared Workers and Labor Turnover; A Research Note, *Rural Sociology*, (September), 299-304.
- Heller, C. S. (ed.)  
1969 Structured Social Inequality, New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Inkeles, A.  
1960 Industrial Man; The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value, *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (July), 1-31.
- Kelly, D. and  
Chambliss, W. J.  
1966 Status Inconsistency and Political Attitudes, *American Sociological Review*, 21 (June): 365-368.
- Kenkel, W. F.  
1956 The Relationship Between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes, *American Sociological Review*, 21 (June): 365-368.

- Kerr, C. et. al.  
1960 Industrialism and Industrial Man, New York; Oxford University Press.
- Lane, R. F.  
1955 Political Personality and Electoral Choice, American Political Science Review, 49 (March), 178-184.
- Leggett, J. C.  
k963a Uprootedness and Working-Class Conservatism, American Journal of Sociology, 69 (May); 682-692.
- Leggett, J. C.  
1963b Working-Class Consciousness, Race, and Political Choice, American Journal of Sociology, 69 (September), 171-178.
- Leggett, J. C.  
1964 Economic Insecurity and Working-Class Conservatism, American Sociological Review, 29 (April), 226-234.
- Leggett, J. C.  
1961 Economic Deprivation and Extremism; A Study of Unemployed Negroes, American Journal of Sociology, 67 (July); 47-53.
- Lenski, G. F.  
1954 Status Cristalization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status, American Sociological Review, 19 (August); 405-413.
- Lenski, G. F.  
1967 Status Inconsistency and the Vote: A Four Nation Test, American Sociological Review, 32 (April); 298-301.
- Lerner, D.  
1958 The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing Middle East, New York; Free Press.
- Lipset, S. M.  
1960 Political Man; The Social Base of Politics, New Yourk; Doubleday.
- Lipsitz, L.  
1965 Working-Class Authoritarianism; A Re-Evaluation, American Sociological Review, 30 (February); 103-109.
- Lockwood, D.  
1966 Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society, Sociological Review, 14 (November); 249-268.
- Main, J. and  
Metzer, B. M.  
1954 Attitudes of Textile Workers to Class Structure, American Journal of Sociology, 60 (July); 30-35.

- Mann, M.  
1970                      The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy,  
American Sociological Review, 35 (August),  
423-439.
- Marx, K. and  
Engels, F.  
1962                      Selected Works, Moscow; Foreign Language  
Publishing House.
- Matijko, A.  
1966                      Status Incongruency in the Polish Inte-  
legensia, Social Research, 35 (Winter);  
611-638.
- Mayer, K. B.  
1963                      The Changing Shape of the American Class  
Structure, 30 (Winter); 453-468.
- McClosky, H.  
1958                      Conservatism and Personality, American  
Political Science Review, 52 (March);  
29-35.
- Nasatire, David  
1968                      A Note on Contextual Effect and the  
Political Orientation of University  
Students, American Sociological Review,  
33 (April); 210-214.
- Nicholas, R. W.  
1963                      Village Factions and Political Parties  
in Rural West Bengal, Journal of Common-  
wealth Political Studies, 2 (November);  
17-32.
- Nooiij, A. T. Jr.  
1970                      Political Radicalism Among Dutch Farmers,  
Sociological Ruralis, 9; 43-61.
- Ossowski, S.  
1963                      Class Structure in the Social Conscius-  
ness, New York; The Free Press.
- Parkin, F.  
1967                      Working-Class Conservatism; A Theory of  
Political Deviance, British Journal of  
Sociology 18 (September); 278-296.
- Rogers, E. M.  
1969                      Modernization Among Peasants, New York;  
Nart, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
- Rush, G. B.  
1967                      Status Inconsistency and Right-Wing  
Extremism, American Sociological Review,  
32 (February); 86-92.
- Segal, D. R.  
1967                      Class, Strata and Parties in West Germany  
and the United States, Comparative Studies  
in Society and History, 10 (October);  
174-185.

- Segal, D. R.  
1969                      Status Inconsistency, Cross Pressure and American Political Behavior, American Sociological Review, 34 (June); 352-359.
- Segal, D. and  
Knoke, D.  
1968                      Social Mobility, Status Inconsistency and Partisan Realignment in the United States, Social Forces, 47 (December); 154-158.
- Smelser, N. J.  
1963                      The Sociology of Economic Life, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall.
- Smith, T.  
1969                      Structural Crystalization, Status Inconsistency and Partisanship, American Sociological Review, 34 (December); 907-921.
- Stark, R.  
1964                      Class, Radicalism and Religious Involvement in Great Britain, American Sociological Review, 29 (October); 698-706.
- Van Den Berghe, P. L.  
1963                      Dialectic and Functionalism; Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, American Sociological Review, 28 (October); 695-726.
- Waisanen, F. B.  
1969                      Actors, Social System and the Modernization Process, Bloomington, Indiana University Department of Government.
- Wesolowski, W.  
1964                      Process of Disappearing of Class Differences. Studia Socjologiczne, 2.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES



3 1293 03174 7151