OPEN -AND CLOSED ~MINDEDNESS.
LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND LEVEL
OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN
COUNTERATTITUDINAI. COMMUNICATION
BEHAVIOR

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
ELLIOT R. SIEGEL
1969

 

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thesis entitled

OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS, LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND
LEVEL OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN COUNTERATTITUDINAL
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

presented by

Elliot R. Siegel

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. Communication

degree in

Date _

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ABSTRACT

OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS, LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND
LEVEL OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN COUNTERATTITUDINAL
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

BY
Elliot R. Siegel

Several writers have suggested that individuals
differ in tolerance for inconsistency and that differen-
tial tolerance may, in turn, be related to certain per-
sonality constructs. One such personality construct,
Open- and Closed-Mindedness, and its relationship to two
loci of justification for the performance of belief-
discrepant behavior was investigated. In addition, an
attempt was made to assess the relative efficacy and limits
of consistency theory and incentive theory as alternative
vieWpoints concerning the relationship between magnitude
of justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior
and degree of consequent attitude change in the counterat-
titudinal direction. Dissonance theory posits an inverse
relationship, incentive theory a direct relationship.

The primary locus of justification for a request
to engage in belief-discrepant behavior may be either

authority-based (a named authority) or reasons—based (an

Elliot R. Siegel

enumerated set of reasons). It was assumed that Open- and
Closed-Minded individuals would differentially perceive
the sufficiency of each locus of justification. That is,
because of the Closed-Minded individual's relatively
greater dependence upon authority, justification that is
largely authority-based should be perceived as sufficient,
while authority alone should not constitute sufficient
justification for the Open-Minded individual. Conversely,
for those situations in which justification is largely
based on adequate reasons, the Open-Minded individual
should perceive that such justification is sufficient;
while valid reasons alone should not constitute sufficient
justification for the Closed-Minded individual.

Thus,consistent with dissonance theory predictions,
it was hypothesized that at the level of simple commitment
to engage in belief-discrepant behavior, among those in-
dividuals given authority-based justification, Open-Minded
individuals would demonstrate greater attitude change than
Closed-Minded individuals; while among those individuals
given reasons-based justification, Closed-Minded indivi-
duals would demonstrate greater attitude change than Open—
Minded individuals.

A second interaction hypothesis, based upon in-
centive theory predictions, posited that after encoding
belief-discrepant arguments, among those individuals given

authority-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals

Elliot R. Siegel

would demonstrate greater attitude change than Open—Minded
individuals; while among those individuals given reasons-
based justification, Open-Minded individuals would demon-
strate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

Measures of Open- and Closed-Mindedness and of
attitudes toward the elimination of draft deferments for
college students were obtained from a sample of under-
graduate students. Approximately three weeks later, sub-
jects were requested to write three arguments favoring the
elimination of draft deferments, a position to which they
were opposed. For one half of the subjects justification
for the request was authority-based, and for the other
half reasons-based. Half of these subjects simply com-
mitted themselves to write, while the other half completed
the posttest attitude measure following belief-discrepant
encoding.

Although subjects in each of the eight experimental
conditions underwent significant positive attitude change
in the direction of the counterattitudinal position, the
data failed to provide support for the hypotheses. None of
the hypothesized interactions were in the predicted direc-
tion, nor did any approach statistical significance.
However, those subjectswho actually encoded belief-discrepant
arguments did undergo significantly greater attitude change

than those who simply committed themselves to the task.

Elliot R. Siegel

It was suggested that the failure to support the
hypotheses may rest, at least partially, on a failure to
produce conditions under which Open— and Closed-Minded
subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency
of the authority-based and reasons-based justification

manipulations.

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of
Communication, College of Communication Arts, Michigan
State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

'Oirector of Thesis

Guidance Committee: , Chairman

 

 

 

 

OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS, LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND
LEVEL OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN COUNTERATTITUDINAL

COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

BY

Elliot R. Siegel

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Communication

1969

:57 9-54
7+5?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his sincere apprecia—
tion to Dr. Gerald R. Miller, whose ideas and ready guidance
were instrumental in the conception and completion of this
study. Thanks also go to Dr. Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Dr.
Joseph F. Hanna, Dr. Randall P. Harrison, and Dr. Lawrence
Sarbaugh who served as members of my guidance committee.

Special thanks go to John Bowes and Karen Pawlovich;
and to Edward Bodaken, Wayland Cummings, Samuel Mehrley,
Michael Peretz, Bonita Perry, and Edward Wotring who acted
as experimenters.

To my wife Nancy, and to Dr. David K. Berlo . . .

thank you.

ii

LIST OF

LIST OF

CHAPTER

1.

REFERENC

APPENDIX

A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM . . . . . . .
METHODS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . .
RESULTS 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O .

DISCUSSION 0 O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O 0

ES 0 O O O O I O O O I O O O C O O O O O

AUTHORITIES AND REASONS PRETEST (Form 1)
AUTHORITIES AND REASONS PRETEST (Form 2)
ISSUES PRETEST AND DOGMATISM INSTRUMENT
SIMPLE COMMITMENT/AUTHORITY-BASED BOOKLET
SIMPLE COMMITMENT/REASONS-BASED BOOKLET
POST-ENCODING/AUTHORITY-BASED BOOKLET .
POST-ENCODING/REASONS-BASED BOOKLET . .

CONTROL GROUP BOOKLET . . . . . . . . .

iii

Page

iv

20
33

42

49

52
57
62
69
74
79
84

89

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page

1. Mean pretest and posttest attitude scores
and mean attitude change for subjects in
the eight experimental conditions and
the control group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2. Schematic of predicted differences in mean
attitude change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3. Means and standard deviations of attitude
change scores for subjects in the eight
experimental conditions . . . . . . . . . . 37

4. Summary analysis of variance of mean atti-
tude change scores for subjects in the
eight experimental conditions . . . . . . . 37

5. Means and standard deviations of perceived
positiveness of the authority-based
justification manipulation. . . . . . . . . 38

6. Means and standard deviations of perceived

sufficiency of the reasons-based justi-
fication manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . 39

iv

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

 

Several writers (Festinger, 1957; Cohen, 1960;
Brehm and Cohen, 1962; McGuire, 1966) have suggested that
individuals differ in tolerance for inconsistency and that
differential tolerance may, in turn, be related to certain
personality constructs. Brehm and Cohen (1962) underscore
the importance of research dealing with this problem when,
speaking particularly of dissonance theory, they assert
that "predictions to a range of effects from dissonance
theory could be sharpened by taking into account person-
ality variables that are widely considered to be important
determinants of cognition, perception, and social
interaction." (p. 71)

In general, the term tolerance for inconsistencyl

 

is used as a shorthand label to describe the following

 

1Much of the following discussion of tolerance for
inconsistency is based upon an earlier paper by Gerald R.
Miller and Milton Rokeach entitled "Individual Differences
and Tolerance for Inconsistency," in P. H. Tannenbaum,
R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb,
and M. J. Rosenberg (eds.), Theories of Co nitive Consis-
tency (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 24-632.

 

1

situation: an individual, after exposure to stimulus
conditions calculated to result in the arousal of inconsis-
tency, fails to perform the predicted inconsistency reducing
response(s). Given this circumstance, the individual has
demonstrated high tolerance for inconsistency. However,
any one, or a combination of several distinct antecedent
mediating processes may have resulted in this departure
from behavioral predictions. That is, the individual may
have experienced a relatively low level of inconsistency;
he may have experienced inconsistency, but chose an incon-
sistency-reducing response other than the one predicted;
or he may have experienced inconsistency, but managed to
retain his original behavior in the face of it.

That persons may differ in tolerance for inconsis-
tency is of both theoretical and methodological import.
In terms of the development and refinement of consistency
theory, the identification of relevant personality factors
influencing tolerance for inconsistency would result in
more precise generalizations concerning the behavioral
consequences of commitments or actions calculated to induce
inconsistency. The ability to specify and control such
personality variables should increase the rigor and predic-
tive power of the typical consistency experiment. Such
control procedures would offset at least one criticism of
some consistency research: the charge that data for cer-

tain subjects are often excluded on post hoc grounds

 

(Chapanis and Chapanis, 1964). Knowledge of the person-
ality correlates of tolerance for inconsistency would
enable the researcher to identify and to measure probable
response differences prior to data collection.

The present study focuses on one such personality
construct: Open- and Closed-Mindedness. Specifically,
the aim of this research is to investigate probable inter-
actions between Open- and Closed-Mindedness, and two loci
of justification for the performance of belief-discrepant

behavior: authority-based and reasons-based justification.

 

In addition, an attempt is made to assess the relative
efficacy and limits of consistency theory (dissonance) and
incentive theory concerning the relationship between magni-
tude of justification for engaging in belief-discrepant
behavior and degree of consequent attitude change in the
counterattitudinal direction (commonly termed

self-persuasion).

Prior Research 9n Qpen- and Closed-
Mindedness and Tolerance for
Inconsistency

 

Rokeach (1960) has posed several theoretical dis-
tinctions between open and closed belief systems which
suggest that Open- and Closed-Minded individuals will
demonstrate differential tolerance for inconsistency in
certain inconsistency-arousing situations. He holds, for

example, that in contrast to open belief systems, closed

belief systems are indicative of simplistic thinking.
That is, closed belief systems can be characterized by a
relatively high rejection of disbelief systems, by isola-
tion of parts within and between belief and disbelief
systems, and by relatively little differentiation within
the disbelief system.

Thus, Miller and Rokeach (1968) suggest that high
dogmatic or Closed-Minded individuals should seek to
structure situations in cognitively consistent and simple
ways: that inconsistent stimuli should be rejected, dis-
torted, ignored or denied. Conversely, low dogmatic or
Open-Minded individuals, because of their greater ability
to think complexly and in an integrated fashion, should be
able to tolerate more cognitive inconsistency.

Several studies have been conducted which test
these propositions. Wrenn (1962) and Fillenbaum (1964)
proposed that high dogmatic individuals are likely to
experience more dissonance than low dogmatic individuals
when induced to commit themselves to, or induced to engage
in behavior calculated to induce dissonance. Female sub-
jects were told that they would participate in group dis-
cussions dealing with a sexual t0pic. To induce dissonance,
experimental subjects were asked to undergo a severe
initiation to qualify as group members. The initiation
consisted of reading several vivid sexual passages to the
experimenter. Control group subjects either underwent a

mild initiation or performed an irrelevant task.

Subjects were then asked to listen to a taped
discussion which allegedly took place within the group
they would be joining. What they heard was a recording of
several females engaged in a dull discussion of secondary
sexual characteristics. All subjects rated the content of
the taped discussion for interest. In line with dissonance
theory, it was expected that subjects in the severe initia-
tion conditions would rate the discussion content as more
interesting than would subjects in the control conditions.
Further, it was hypothesized that this effect would be more
marked for high than for low dogmatic subjects. That is,
because of greater dissonance arousal, or because of less
tolerance for dissonance, high dogmatic subjects exposed to
the severe initiation should rate the dull discussion more
favorably than low dogmatic subjects.*

The results of the Wrenn and Fillenbaum studies
provide only equivocal support for the hypotheses. Although
the differences in the Wrenn study were in the predicted
direction--i.e., high dogmatic subjects rated the dull
discussion more favorably--they are not significant.
Furthermore, there was no significant main effect due to
the initiation variable across high and low dogmatic
groups--i.e., severe initiation subjects did not rate the

discussion any more attractively than control subjects.

Fillenbaum's conclusions are based on a comparison
of the product-moment correlations between dogmatism scores
and ratings of the discussion's interest for subjects in
the severe and mild initiation conditions. Significant
positive relationships between dogmatism and ratings of
interest were found for both conditions. However, the
correlation for subjects in the severe condition was .39,
while the correlation was even larger--.56--in the mild
condition. The fact that both correlations were significant
(and not significantly different from one another) is not
in accord with theoretical expectations: a significant
correlation was expected in the severe but not in the mild
condition.

Three recent studies have reported more conclusive
findings. Foulkes and Foulkes (1965), investigated the
relationship between dogmatism and tolerance for trait
inconsistency. High and low dogmatic individuals were
given a series of statements describing each of four girls.
Ratings of each girl were obtained. Subjects then received
additional information intended to reverse their initial
impressions, and rated the girls a second time.

The results indicated that the high dogmatic sub-
jects either changed their original ratings considerably
or else showed little change. In contrast, the low dog-
matic subjects generally showed moderate shifts of

personality impression. The authors concluded that the

high dogmatic subjects apparently found it more difficult
than low dogmatic subjects to tolerate the inconsistency
created by the conflicting information; and to reduce it
either changed their impressions drastically or else
ignored the contradictory information.

Kleck and Wheaton (1967) examined responses of high
and low dogmatic individuals to opinion consistent and
Opinion inconsistent information. They hypothesized that
since high dogmatic individuals should be more motivated
than low dogmatic individuals to avoid dissonance-producing
information, that high dogmatic subjects would show: (1)

a greater preference for opinion consistent information,

(2) a poorer recall of the opinion inconsistent information,
and (3) a less favorable evaluation of opinion inconsistent
information, and a more favorable evaluation of the opinion
consistent information.

Following an attitude pretest on the issue, the
subjects were told they could choose to read either an
article favoring a minimum age of 18 for obtaining a
driver's license or one favoring the established 16 year
minimum. Their choices provided a measure of preference
for consistent or inconsistent information. All subjects
then read both messages and evaluated them. Two weeks
later they completed a test designed to assess their recall

of the content of both articles.

All three hypotheses received empirical support.
First, high dogmatic subjects were found to be less willing
to expose themselves to inconsistent information, but the
difference did not reach statistical significance. Second,
high dogmatic subjects recalled significantly less dissonant
information than did low dogmatic subjects. Finally, the
high dogmatic subjects evaluated the opinion consistent
message more favorably than did the low dogmatic subjects.
Differences for the inconsistent message, although in the
predicted direction, were not significant.

The results of a study by Hunt and Miller (1968)
offer perhaps the best empirical evidence to date that
individual differences in dogmatism are linked to differen-
tial tolerance for inconsistency. Rokeach (1960) has
presented some evidence which suggests that high dogmatic
individuals generally experience fewer exposures to dis-
crepant beliefs than do low dogmatic individuals. Hunt
and Miller reasoned that if high and low dogmatic individ-
uals were asked to prepare written communications that were
discrepant with their beliefs, then the high dogmatic
individuals would perceive that the task would require
greater effort than would the low dogmatic individuals.

Effort has been shown to be directly related to
magnitude of dissonance (Cohen, 1959; and Aronson, 1961).
As such, if high dogmatic individuals do experience more

dissonance, then they should be more likely to engage in

dissonance-reducing activity. One means of dissonance
reduction is for the individual to change his attitude so
that it becomes more consistent with the position taken in
the discrepant message. Consistent with this line of
reasoning, Hunt and Miller hypothesized that high dogmatic
subjects who are instructed to write belief-discrepant
arguments will demonstrate greater attitude change than
low dogmatic subjects in the direction of the advocated
discrepant position.

High and low dogmatic subjects were assigned to one
of three conditions: (1) a belief-discrepant condition
wherein subjects were requested to write arguments Opposing
disarmament, a position at odds with their initial beliefs;
(2) a belief-congruent condition wherein subjects were
requested to write arguments consistent with their prior
beliefs; and (3) an irrelevant condition wherein subjects
were requested to write arguments dealing with federal aid
to education.

The results supported the hypothesis. The investi-
gators report that only the high dogmatic subjects in the
belief-discrepant condition changed significantly; that is,
following a commitment to write arguments opposing disar-
mament, they were the only group who had a less favorable
posttest attitude toward disarmament. It should be noted
that none of the subjects actually wrote arguments; rather,

they merely committed themselves to the task.

10

Prior Research on Justification

for En a in in Counterattitudinal
Behavior

A current controversial problem confronting commu-

 

 

 

nication researchers concerns the relationship between the
magnitude of incentive or justification for engaging in
belief-discrepant behavior and degree of consequent attitude
change in the counterattitudinal direction. The prOponents
of two theoretical positions--dissonance theory and incen-
tive theory--have produced conflicting empirical evidence
concerning the direction of this relationship.

Dissonance theory predicts an inverse relationship
between justification or incentive magnitude and degree of
attitude change following belief-discrepant behavior.
Festinger (1957) states:

It also becomes apparent . . . that the magnitude of
the reward or punishment, that is, the attractiveness
and desirability of the offered reward or the unpleas-
antness and undesirability of the threatened punishment,
is an important determinant of the magnitude of dis-
sonance which exists once compliance is exhibited.

Too great a reward or punishment will result in only
little dissonance. (p. 91)

There is an extensive body of research in support
of dissonance theory predictions. Festinger and Carlsmith
(1959) offered subjects either 20 dollars or one dollar to
tell an incoming subject (actually a confederate) that a
dull, boring task they had just completed was interesting

and enjoyable. After engaging in this belief-discrepant

behavior, subjects rated the task a second time. It was

11

found that subjects in the one dollar condition rated the
task significantly more enjoyable than did subjects in the
20 dollar condition.

The authors interpret this result in support of
dissonance theory. The minimal justification received by
the one dollar subjects was dissonance-producing; and con—
sequently, the subjects reduced their dissonance by modify-
ing their attitudes toward the dull task. The 20 dollar
subjects, having been given much justification, experienced
little dissonance and consequently underwent little attitude
change.

Similar findings are reported by Cohen (1962), who
offered subjects either 10 dollars, five dollars, one
dollar, or 50 cents to write belief-discrepant essays. A
significant inverse relationship was found between incen-
tive magnitude and attitude change; that is, subjects
receiving small rewards underwent greater attitude change
than subjects who received large rewards.

In contrast to dissonance theory, incentive theory
predicts a direct relationship between justification or
incentive magnitude and degree of attitude change following
belief-discrepant behavior. Janis and Gilmore (1965),
proponents of the incentive position, reason as follows:

. . . when a person accepts the task of improvising
arguments in favor of a point of view at variance with
his own personal convictions, he becomes temporarily

motivated to think up all good positive arguments he
can, and at the same time suppresses thoughts about

12

the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant
to the assigned task. This "biased scanning" increases
the salience of the positive arguments and therefore
increases the chances of acceptance of the new attitude
position. A gain in attitude change would not be
expected, however, if resentment or other interfering
affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives
in the role-playing situation. (pp. 17-18)

The incentive position has also received much
empirical support. Janis and Gilmore (1965) offered sub-
jects 20 dollars or one dollar to write counterattitudinal
essays about disliked college courses. At each of the two
levels of monetary incentive, a second justification manip-
ulation was employed. Half the subjects were told that the
information would be used by leading universities in the
country (favorable sponsorship), and the other half were
told that a book publisher would use the information in an
advertising campaign (unfavorable sponsorship). A third
manipulation had to do with whether or not the subjects
actually wrote the essays. Half the subjects were given a
posttest attitude measure after agreeing to write the essay
(simple commitment), the other half after having actually
written the essay.

The authors report a significant interaction be-
tween sponsorship and the point in time at which attitude
change was measured. The most attitude change occurred
among subjects who actually wrote the essays under favorable

sponsorship (high justification), a result consistent with

incentive theory predictions. There was no significant

13

effect for the monetary variable. However, while not
significant, those subjects who simply committed themselves
to write tended to undergo greater attitude change with
unfavorable (low justification) than with favorable spon-
sorship (high justification), a trend consistent with dis-
sonance theory predictions.
This latter finding offers support for Rosenberg's
(1965) contention that dissonance theory predictions and
incentive theory predictions may both be applicable at
different levels of commitment to engage in counterattitu-
dinal behavior. Specifically, Rosenberg suggests that
dissonance predictions regarding an inverse relationship
between incentive magnitude and degree of consequent atti-
tude change may hold at the level of simple commitment,
while incentive theory may provide a more tenable explana-
tion of post-encoding effects.
Miller and McGraw (In Press) elaborate further on
this proposition. They state:
Considering the mediating mechanisms underlying the
two theories, Rosenberg's suggestion is plausible.
For the dissonance theorist, self-persuasion pressures
arise from public identification with a position at
odds with the individual's prior beliefs. Assuming
that dissonance occurs at the time when the individual
perceives he is committed to the counterattitudinal
position, it may well be that actual counterattitudinal
encoding is largely irrelevant--that as Brehm and Cohen
(1962) have asserted, mere commitment to perform a
dissonant act is sufficient to trigger the dissonance
dynamic. By contrast, incentive theory explanations
of self-persuasion rely heavily on factors such as

biased scanning and evaluation of belief-discrepant
arguments-—factors intimately associated with the

l4

encoding process itself. Therefore, a period of covert
and/or overt encoding is probably a necessary condition
for generating incentive effects. (In Press)

To test this proposition, Miller and McGraw asked
inmates of a reformatory to write an essay favoring a
lottery draft system, a position to which they were opposed.
Half the subjects were told that the information would be
used by a committee of citizens and congressmen who were
doing a study of the draft (high justification), the other
half were told that the information would be used by a
publishing company preparing a book on avoiding military
service (low justification). Each subject was given a
posttest attitude measure at two points in time: imme-
diately after commitment to encode the counterattitudinal
essay, and following actual encoding.

An interaction hypothesis was tested: following
commitment to write the counterattitudinal essay, subjects
given low justification would demonstrate greater attitude
change than subjects given high justification (dissonance
theory prediction); following actual encoding of the essay,
subjects given high justification would demonstrate greater
attitude change than subjects given low justification
(incentive theory prediction).

Consistent with dissonance theory predictions,
those subjects given low justification for engaging in
counterattitudinal communication showed significantly

greater attitude change immediately following commitment;

15

however, the post-encoding findings did not support the
incentive theory prediction that subjects given high justi-
fication would undergo greater attitude change following
actual encoding of the essay. It was suggested, however,
that the high justification manipulation may not have been
sufficient to ensure an optimal test of the incentive
position.
Given these results, the authors conclude that:

. . . the present findings do suggest that dissonance

and incentive theories should be treated as complemen-

tary theories dealing with different sets of antecedent

variables, rather than as sharply competing positions

relating to the same behavioral processes. Adequate

explanation of the self-persuasion phenomenon probably

requires that both dissonance and incentive notions be
invoked. (In Press)

Rationale and Hypotheses

It was suggested above that individual differences
in Open- and Closed-Mindedness are generally related to
differential tolerance for cognitive inconsistency. That
is, it appears that high dogmatic individuals are more
likely to experience dissonance and to engage in dissonance-
reducing behavior as a result of their relatively low
tolerance for inconsistency. However, this may not be the
case in all inconsistent situations.

Of central importance to this study is Rokeach's
(1960) notion that Closed-Minded individuals place greater

reliance on authority as a means for evaluating incoming

16

information and determining appropriate behavior. Speaking
of this distinction, Rokeach asserts:

. . . a basic characteristic that defines the extent to
which a person's system is open or closed . . . is the
extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and
act on relevant information received from the outside
on its own merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors
in the situation arising from within the person or from
the outside . . . By irrelevant factors we have in mind
most particularly the pressures of reward and punish—
ment arising from external authority; for example, as
exerted by parents, peers, other authority figures,
reference groups, social institutional norms, and
cultural norms . . . the more open the belief system,
the more should the person be governed in his actions
by internal self-actualizing forces and the less by
irrational inner forces. Consequently, the more should
he be able to resist pressures exerted by external
sources to evaluate and to act in accord with their
wishes. (PP. 57-58)

This differing reliance upon authority on the part
of Open- and Closed-Minded individuals suggests potential
differences in tolerance for inconsistency in those situa-
tions in which the nature of the justification given for
performance of counterattitudinal behavior is varied.

The primary locus of justification may be found
either in the source of the compliant appeal--i.e., in
characteristics of the person or persons who request that
the individual perform belief-discrepant behaviors--g£ in
the content of the compliant appeal--i.e., in the reasons
given for performance of belief-discrepant behaviors. In
the first instance, justification is largely dependent upon
authority; while in the second, it derives primarily from

the adequacy of the enumerated reasons.

17

Because of the Closed-Minded individual's greater
dependence upon authority, the fact that a positive author-
ity (highly credible source) requests belief-discrepant
behavior should itself constitute sufficient justification,
apart from consideration of the reasons given. On the
other hand, authority per se should not constitute suffi-
cient justification for the Open-Minded individual; in
addition, he should seek valid reasons for engaging in
belief-discrepant behavior.

Conversely, for those situations in which justifi-
cation is largely based on adequate reasons for engaging in
belief-discrepant behavior, the Open-Minded individual
should perceive that such justification is sufficient. On
the other hand, valid reasons alone should not constitute
sufficient justification for the Closed-Minded individual.

Given these differences, we can expect Open- and
Closed-Minded individuals to demonstrate differential
levels of tolerance for inconsistency in situations involv-

ing authority-based and in situations involving reasons-

 

 

baggd justification.

Moreover, it is predicted that these differences
will be consistent with the proposition advanced by Rosen-
berg (1965) and Miller and McGraw (In Press) concerning the
applicability of dissonance theory and incentive theory
predictions at different levels of commitment to counter-

attitudinal behavior (simple commitment and post-encoding).

 

 

18

The hypotheses are:

A. At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-
discrepant behavior:

Hypothesis 1A: Among those individuals given authority-
based justification, Open-Minded individuals
will demonstrate greater attitude change
than Closed-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2A: Among those individuals given reasons-based
justification, Closed-Minded individuals
will demonstrate greater attitude change
than Open-Minded individuals.

B. After encoding belief-discrepant arguments:

Hypothesis lB: Among those individuals given authority-
based justification, Closed-Minded individ—
uals will demonstrate greater attitude
change than Open—Minded individuals.

Hypothesis ZB: Among those individuals given reasons-based
justification, Open-Minded individuals will
demonstrate greater attitude change than
Closed-Minded individuals.

In effect, interaction hypothesis (A) posits an
inverse relationship between magnitude of perceived justi-
fication and degree of attitude change in the counteratti-
tudinal direction; a dissonance theory prediction. That is,
at the level of simple commitment, those individuals per-
ceiving sufficient justification (Closed-Minded/authority-
based and Open-Minded/reasons-based) should be subject to
little dissonance-arousal, and consequently, should undergo
little self-persuasion. In this sense, these individuals
are said to have relatively high tolerance for inconsis-
tency. Conversely, those individuals perceiving insuffi-

cient justification (Open—Minded/authority-based and Closed-

Minded/reasons-based) should be subject to greater

19

dissonance-arousal, and consequently, should undergo more
self-persuasion. Similarly, these individuals are said to
have relatively low tolerance for inconsistency.
Interaction hypothesis (B) posits a direct rela-
tionship between magnitude of perceived justification and
degree of attitude change in the counterattitudinal direc-
tion; an incentive theory prediction. That is, after
encoding, those individuals perceiving sufficient justifi-
cation (Closed-Minded/authority-based and Open-Minded/
reasons-based) should undergo a relatively greater degree
of self-persuasion than those individuals perceiving
insufficient justification (Open-Minded/authority-based

and Closed-Minded/reasons-based).

CHAPTER II

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Overview

 

To test the hypotheses presented in Chapter I, this
study was conducted in three phases: (1) assessment of the
positiveness of a number of potential sources for the
authority-based justification manipulation, and assessment
of the sufficiency of a number of potential reasons for the
reasons-based justification manipulation, (2) assessment of
attitudes toward several controversial issues, and adminis-
tration of an abridged, 20-item Dogmatism Scale (Troldahl
and Powell, 1965), and (3) manipulation of the justification

and commitment variables, and assessment of attitude change.

Phase 1

In the initial phase of this study, a suitable
source and set of reasons which could be used as justifica-
tion for a request to encode belief-discrepant arguments
were selected. Subjects were 109 students enrolled in two
undergraduate communication and business letter writing
courses at Michigan State University. After being in-

structed to assume the role of a subject in an experiment
20

21

who is requested to write several arguments favoring a
position to which he is opposed, each subject evaluated
the source of, or the reasons given for such a request.

A total of four sources and six sets of reasons
were evaluated. Each was relatively "pure"--i.e., for a
given set of reasons, no particular individual or group
was linked to it. To insure that all sources and reasons
would be given approximately equal consideration, two dif-
ferent questionnaire booklets were prepared, each requiring
the subject to rate only two sources and three sets of
reasons (Appendix A and Appendix B). Half the subjects
were given one booklet, half the other.

All subjects evaluated the positiveness of each
source on a seven-point scale ranging from "Very Positively"
to "Very Negatively." Similar ratings were obtained for
the six sets of reasons. Each set was rated for its suffi-
ciency on a seven-point scale ranging from "Very Sufficient"
to "Very Insufficient."

The source rated most positively was "Dr. James
Gruning, Professor of Psychology at the University of
Michigan." The following set of reasons were rated most
sufficient:

The complexities of today's world demand that every
responsible individual be capable of intelligently
assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all
important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an
individual will make an intelligent assessment--and

ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is
that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding

22

of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will
enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and under—
standing of an important issue.

Mean ratings of the source and reasons were 5.08 and 5.02

respectively. Both were selected for use as justification

manipulations in Phase 3.

Phase 2

A total of 381 students enrolled in five undergrad-
uate communication courses at Michigan State University
were asked to participate in an opinion survey sponsored
by the Department of Communication. Each subject was given
a questionnaire booklet (Appendix C) by his regular class
instructor and instructed to rate six controversial issues
on four evaluative seven-point polar-adjective scales:
Good-Bad, Wise-Foolish, Favorable-Unfavorable, and Fair-
Unfair. The range of potential scores on each issue was
from four, an extremely negative evaluation, to 28, an
extremely positive evaluation. Each subject also completed
the abridged Dogmatism instrument. It should be noted that
the scoring weights of both instruments was the reverse of
the weighting sequence employed in the questionnaire
booklets.

Scores on the attitude scales were used to select
an issue on which most subjects' attitudes were markedly
positive or negative, thus providing an opportunity to

later require belief-discrepant communication behaviors of

23

the subjects. Attitude scores on the issue, "Elimination
of draft deferments for college students" were found to be
strongly skewed in a negative direction. This issue was
selected for study as the experimental issue in Phase 3.

Of the 381 students in the original subject pool,
two failed to complete the Dogmatism instrument and 73 were
either neutral to, or in favor of the elimination of draft
deferments for college students. This left 306 students
potentially available for study. The Dogmatism scores for
these subjects ranged from a high of 88 to a low of 29.

A median split at 58.5 was used to assign subjects to Open-
and Closed-Minded conditions. Due to scheduling difficul-
ties, all usable subjects in one class (N = 44) were at
this time directly assigned to a control condition. Thus,
a total of 262 subjects were available for assignment to

experimental conditions in Phase 3.

Phase 3

Subjects at each of the two levels of Dogmatism
were randomly assigned to one of the following commitment
and justification treatment combinations: Simple Commit-
ment/Authority-Based, Simple Commitment/Reasons-Based,
Post-Encoding/Authority—Based, and Post-Encoding/Reasons-

Based.

24

Approximately three weeks later, under the guise of
a separate experiment, several experimenters visited the
subjects' classes and administered one of four pre-assigned
questionnaire booklets to each subject. One half of the
subjects received one of two Simple Commitment booklets,
while the other half received one of two Post—Encoding
booklets. Within each half, one half received an Authority-
Based booklet, the other a Reasons-Based booklet. The
specific format of each booklet is described later in this
chapter.

More than half the experimental subjects were
enrolled in a large lecture class; special procedures were
required for this group. Upon entering the lecture room,
each student was given a name list which was divided into
four seating groups. These groups corresponded to Open-
and Closed-Minded subjects' prior assignment to the four
experimental treatment combinations. The instructions read
as follows:

Most of the persons in your class have been randomly
assigned to one of four study groups—-groups A,B,C,
or D. Please check the names listed below and find
your group. If your name is not listed, you are
assigned to group B. When you know which group you
are in, please go to the front of the room where your
group's booklets are located. Tell the person your
name, and you will be given the booklet that has been
assigned to you. After picking up your booklet, you

will be directed to a section of the room where the
other people in your group are seated.

 

Those students not present during Phase 2 data

collection and those eliminated for the reasons stated

25

comprised the fifth group. These students participated in
an unrelated study conducted by another member of the
Department of Communication. When all students were cor-
rectly seated, they were instructed to begin.

Each of the four experimental booklets contained
the same set of general instructions:

Your class is one of several at Michigan State Univer-
sity selected for study. Due to the relatively large
amount of information required, each person will be
asked to complete only a small part of the overall
task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned
. . . Do not open your booklet until you are instructed
to do so. It is important that everyone begin at the
______,_.

same time.

So as not to confound the justification manipula-
tions, no reference was made to the sponsors of, the
reasons for, or the nature of the study. Moreover, to
allay suspicion regarding their differential seating
assignments, subjects were explicitly told that different
booklets had been assigned. Finally, since the specific
arrangement of booklet pages constituted the commitment
manipulation, all subjects were instructed not to Open
their booklets until told to do so. Once they began, they
were further cautioned against skipping ahead or returning
to pages already completed. All participating experimenters
reported that subjects adhered to these procedures.

In each of the three remaining classes, the exper-

imenter was introduced (by name only) to the subjects by

the regular class instructor. The experimenter explained

26

that he would appreciate their cooperation in a task, and
then proceeded to call the names of the pre-assigned sub—
jects and distribute the questionnaire booklets. Unassigned
students were sent to an adjoining room where they were

dismissed by their instructor.

Questionnaire Booklets

Justification and commitment variables were manip-
ulated by means of booklet format. That is, each of the
four experimental treatment combinations were represented
by four different questionnaire booklets. Justification
for the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments was
manipulated by the positive source named in two of the
booklets (Simple Commitment/Authority-Based and Post-
Encoding/Authority-Based conditions) and by the sufficient
set of reasons stated in the other two (Simple Commitment/
Reasons-Based and Post-Encoding/Reasons-Based conditions).
Similarly, level of commitment was manipulated by the
specific sequence of pages in each of the four booklets.
In the Simple Commitment/Authority-Based and Simple Commit-
ment/Reasons-Based conditions, the posttest attitude in-
strument was presented prior to the request to encode
arguments, while in the Post-Encoding/Authority-Based and
Post-Encoding/Reasons-Based conditions, the attitude
measure was obtained after encoding. The content of each
of the four questionnaire booklets is described in detail

below.

27

The two Simple Commitment condition booklets began
with a statement of specific task instructions. The
Authority-Based booklet (Appendix D) contained the follow-
ing statement:

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the
elimination of draft deferments for college students.
In other words, your task is to write three good argu-
ments which strongly support the idea that draft defer-
ments for college students should be eliminated. You
have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn
the page and begin.

 

This request was signed by "Dr. James Gruning,
Project Director and Professor of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Michigan." No reasons for complying with the
task were stated. It should be noted that the departmental
affiliation of "Dr. Gruning" was changed from Psychology,
as originally pretested in Phase 1, to Political Science.
At the time of Phase 3 data collection, there was a great
deal of unfavorable publicity in the school newspaper
directed at the Psychology Department of Michigan State
University. Since the study design required that the
source of the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments
be perceived positively, and since it was felt that such a
request would appear equally authoritative from a Professor
of Political Science, this change was made.

The subject then turned the page with the expecta-
tion that he would write his three arguments. Instead, the
following page contained the posttest attitude instrument,

which began with the following instructions:

28

Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in
the analyses of them to know how you feel about the
idea that draft deferments for college students should
be eliminated. Please indicate your feelings by check-
ing the appropriate spaces below.

Six evaluative seven-point polar-adjective scales
were presented. Four of the scales were identical to those
used in the Phase 2 pretest. These comprised the posttest
attitude instrument. Two additional scales, Valuable-
Worthless and Important-Trivial, were inserted in an
attempt to further disassociate the two phases. Attitude
change on the four original scales served as an index of
self-persuasion arising from a commitment to encode belief-
discrepant arguments.

Upon completing these attitude scales, the subject
turned to the following page and was instructed to complete
an authority manipulation check:

Your arguments are to be written on the next page.
However, before you begin, we would like some advice.
This study is the beginning of a much larger project
that will be undertaken next month. One problem that
we are concerned about is how our "image" will influence
the results that we get. You will recall that the
source of the request to write your arguments was
identified as . . .

The source of the request, Dr. James Gruning, and
his academic credentials were restated. Subjects rated
the source's perceived positiveness on the same seven-point
scale used in Phase 1. Subjects then proceeded to write

their arguments favoring the elimination of deferments on

the final page. Simple Commitment subjects were also

29

requested to encode arguments, as subjects in both commit-
ment conditions were tested in the same room.
The second Simple Commitment questionnaire booklet

—-i.e., the Reasons-Based booklet (Appendix E)--was similar
in format to the Authority-Based booklet described above.
Rather than specifying a source for the request to encode
belief-discrepant arguments, the set of reasons listed
earlier was presented along with the specific task instruc-
tions to write three arguments favoring the elimination of
deferments. The following page contained the same posttest
attitude instrument, which was then followed by a reasons
manipulation check:

Your arguments are to be written on the next page.

However, before you begin, we would like some advice.

This study is the beginning of a much larger project

that will be undertaken next month. One problem that

we are concerned about is the "sufficiency" of the

reasons that we gave you to write your arguments. You

will recall that you were given the following reasons

to write your arguments . . .
The reasons given for encoding the belief-discrepant argu-
ments were restated. Subjects then rated the sufficiency
of the reasons on the same seven-point scale used in Phase
1. As before, subjects then proceeded to write their
arguments.

The Simple Commitment variable was operationalized

as follows. It was assumed that if a subject read the

specific task instructions to encode belief-discrepant

arguments and then proceeded to turn the page to begin

30

writing, he had committed himself to engage in belief-
discrepant behaviors. Further evidence of commitment is
provided by the subject's completion of the posttest atti-
tude instrument. That is, the expressed purpose of the
instrument, as understood by the subject, was to provide
assistance in the analyses of the arguments that the sub-
ject was later to write. The Post—Encoding commitment
variable was simply operationalized in terms of the sub-
ject's actually having written belief-discrepant arguments.

The two Post-Encoding condition booklets were
nearly identical to the Simple Commitment booklets, and
differed only in terms of page sequencing. The specific
task instructions in the Authority-Based booklet (Appendix
F) and in the Reasons-Based booklet (Appendix G) were
identical to those described above. Unlike the Simple
Commitment booklets, however, both Post-Encoding booklets
required subjects to write their arguments immediately
following the task instructions.

When the belief-discrepant arguments had been
written, subjects in the two Post-Encoding conditions
turned the page and completed the posttest attitude in-
strument and the appropriate justification manipulation
check. The instructions for both instruments were modified,
however, in keeping with the Post-Encoding manipulation.
That is, the posttest attitude instrument was prefaced by

the following:

31
Now that you have written your arguments, it may be
helpful . . .
Instructions for the authority and reasons manipulation
checks were similarly modified:
Again, thank you for your cooperation. This informa—
tion will be very helpful. Now, we would like some
advice . . .
The appropriate authority or reasons rating scale was then
presented.

Control subjects were told that they were partic-
ipating in a student opinion survey. The class instructor
introduced the experimenter as a member of the Department
of Communication. The control questionnaire booklet (Appen—
dix H) contained five controversial issues which were to be
rated on the posttest attitude instrument employed in the
experimental booklets. With the exception of the exper-
imental issue, these issues were different from those used
in Phase 2. 31 subjects completed this task. Their pre-
test-posttest attitude change scores on the experimental
issue were used to assess baseline attitude change.

It will be recalled that a total of 262 subjects
were initially assigned to the four experimental treatment
combinations. 208 subjects were in attendance when the
Phase 3 questionnaire booklets were administered: 106 who
were assigned to Open-Minded conditions and 102 who were
assigned to Closed-Minded conditions. Of this total, eight

subjects refused to comply with the request to encode

32

belief-discrepant arguments, and nine wrote either belief-
consistent arguments opposing the elimination of draft
deferments for college students or unacceptable arguments
favoring the elimination of draft deferments along with the
entire conscription system. Of these 17 subjects, seven
were in Open-Minded conditions and ten were in Closed-
Minded conditions. These subjects, along with three others
who failed to complete the posttest attitude instrument
were eliminated from the sample. Thus, a total of 188
experimental subjects successfully completed all phases

of data collection.

Because Phase 3 data collection extended over a
period of two days, it was not feasible to discuss the
experiment with all subjects. Rather, the researcher
chose to conduct an intensive debriefing session with the
last class of subjects tested. None of these subjects
reported any prior knowledge of the experiment, nor were
any able to accurately state its purpose. Further, none
perceived a link between the pretest and posttest phases
of data collection. Most subjects expressed surprise when
the actual nature of the study was disclosed by the

experimenter.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

For all statistical tests, the .05 level of signif-
icance was required. Analysis of the data yielded the

following results.

Pretest-Posttest Mean Attitude
Change

Table 1 presents the mean pretest and posttest
attitude scores and mean attitude change for subjects in
the eight experimental conditions and the control group.
Correlated E tests revealed that subjects in each of the
experimental conditions underwent significant positive
attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal
position. That is, both simple commitment to encode, and
actual encoding of belief-discrepant arguments favoring
the elimination of draft deferments resulted in more fav-
orable attitudes toward this position. No such change was

observed among control group subjects (3 < l).

33

o
———< ,—

 

‘ll‘fl'f' _' ' 7
‘ U

T—"u”7“_ “ “.I

34

Table 1.--Mean Pretest and Posttest Attitude Scores and
Mean Attitude Change for Subjects in the Eight
Experimental Conditions and the Control Group.

 

 

Condition Pretest Posttest Change

 

Simple Commitment
Authority-Based

High Dogmatic 9.85 12.75 +2.90**

Low Dogmatic 8.16 10.81 +2.65*
Reasons-Based

High Dogmatic 5.92 8.50 +2.58****

Low Dogmatic 8.48 11.12 +2.64*

Post-Encoding
Authority-Based

High Dogmatic 7.30 11.17 +3.87***

Low Dogmatic 7.96 13.61 +5.65****
Reasons-Based

High Dogmatic 8.13 14.43 +6.30****

Low Dogmatic 7.35 12.96 +5.61****
Control 7.81 8.65 +0.84

 

*p < .05 (two-tailed)

**p < .02 (two-tailed)
***p < .01 (two-tailed)
****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Comparison of Experimental
Conditions with the Control

-‘—

Group

 

The mean attitude change scores of subjects in each
of the eight experimental conditions were compared with the
control group mean in accordance with a modified E test
developed by Dunnett (Edwards, 1966). These comparisons
indicated that mean attitude change for subjects in three

of the four Post-Encoding conditions was significantly

 

35

greater than the control group mean. High and Low Dogmatic
subjects in the Reasons-Based justification conditions and
Low Dogmatic subjects in the Authority-Based justification
condition differed significantly from the control group;

the remaining five conditions did not.

Test of the Hypotheses

As indicated above, the following interaction hypo-
theses were tested in this study.

A. At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-
discrepant behavior:

Hypothesis 1A: Among those individuals given authority-
based justification, Open-Minded individuals
will demonstrate greater attitude change
than Closed-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2A: Among those individuals given reasons-based
justification, Closed-Minded individuals
will demonstrate greater attitude change
than Open-Minded individuals.

B. After encoding belief-discrepant arguments:

Hypothesis 13: Among those individuals given authority-
based justification, Closed-Minded individ-
uals will demonstrate greater attitude
change than Open—Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 28: Among those individuals given reasons-based
justification, Open-Minded individuals will

demonstrate greater attitude change than
Closed-Minded individuals.

Taken together, these hypotheses posit interactions
between Open- and Closed-Mindedness, locus of justification,
and level of commitment to engage in counterattitudinal
communication behavior. The predicted effects are schema-

tized in Table 2.

 

‘4 4
. .

36

Table 2.--Schematic of Predicted Differences in Mean
Attitude Change Scores.

 

 

Simple Commitment Post-Encoding
Authority- Reasons- Authority- Reasons-
Based Based Based Based

 

High Dogmatic

/\ V V /\

Low Dogmatic

 

Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations
of attitude change scores for subjects in the eight exper-
imental conditions. These measures were analyzed using a
three-factor analysis of variance. The results of this
analysis, summarized in Table 4, indicate that none of the
hypothesized interactions were in the predicted direction,

nor did any approach statistical significance. Thus, the

data fail to provide support for the experimental hypotheses.

There was, however, a significant main effect for
Commitment. Overall, those subjects who actually encoded
belief-discrepant arguments underwent greater attitude
change in the counterattitudinal direction than those sub-
jects who merely committed themselves to the task. - Since
this relationship was not predicted a priori, the conserva-
tive Scheffé method was used to compare each of the four
Post-Encoding conditions with each of the four Simple
Commitment conditions. None of the sixteen pair-wise

comparisons reached statistical significance.

 

 

.3—

T:*‘“‘"*M“‘*‘v

37

Table 3.--Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Change
Scores for Subjects in the Eight Experimental

 

 

 

 

Conditions.
Simple Commitment Post-Encoding
Authority- Reasons- Authority- Reasons-
Based Based Based Based
High §'= 2.90 2.58 3.87 6.30
Dogmatic S = 4.95 2.90 5.72 6.00
n|= 20 24 23 23
Low R’= 2.63 2.64 5.65 5.61
Dogmatic S = 5.47 5.66 6.23 5.21
£|= 27 25 23 23

 

 

Table 4.--Summary Analysis of Variance of Mean Attitude
Change Scores for Subjects in the Eight Exper-
imental Conditions.

 

 

 

Source of Variation ss df MS F

Dogmatism (A) 2.2257 1 2.2257 0.0742

Justification (B) 12.6884 1 12.6884 0.4233

Commitment (C) 333.0289 1 333.0289 11.1095*

A X B 13.5071 1 13.5071 0.4506 §
A X C 4.9376 1 4.9376 0.1647

B X C 21.2396 1 21.2396 0.7085

A x B X C 22.9694 1 22.9694 0.7662 1
Error 180 29.9770

 

*p < .001

38

Perceived Sufficiency of the
Justification Manipulations

Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations

of subjects' ratings of the perceived positiveness of the

Authority-Based justification manipulation.

With the ex-

ception of the High Dogmatic subjects in the Post-Encoding

condition, who perceived the named authority "slightly

positively," subjects' ratings tended to fall at the

neutral position.

Table 5.—-Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Pos-
itiveness of the Authority-Based Justification

Manipulation.

 

 

Simple Commitment

Post-Encoding

 

 

High R'= 4.50 5.39
Dogmatic S = 1.02 0.97
.2 = 20 23
Low 7'= 4.33 4.48
Dogmatic S = 1.23 1.14
3‘: 27 23

 

It was assumed that High Dogmatic subjects would

perceive the named authority as relatively more sufficient

justification for compliance with the request to encode

belief discrepant arguments than Low Dogmatic subjects.

Multiple E tests revealed that in the two Post-Encoding

conditions, High Dogmatic subjects did perceive the named

authority significantly more positively than did the Low

 

‘ “u““"

N: 1' -r

39

Dogmatic subjects (E_= 2.85; df = 44; E.‘ .01, two-tailed).
Although also in the predicted direction, the difference
was nonsignificant in the Simple Commitment conditions
(1:_<1).

The means and standard deviations of subjects‘
ratings of the perceived sufficiency of the Reasons-Based
justification manipulation are found in Table 6. Here, as
well, subjects' ratings tended to fall at the neutral
position.

Table 6.--Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Suffi-
ciency of the Reasons-Based Justification

 

 

 

 

 

 

Manipulation.
Simple Commitment Post-Encoding
High R'= 4.75 4.74
Dogmatic S = 1.36 1.51
n}: 24 23
Low ‘_
Dogmatic X = 4.96 4.35
S = 1.43 1.78 by
g= 25 23 s~
It was assumed that Low Dogmatic subjects would w
perceive the given reasons as relatively more sufficient L
k'

justification for compliance with the request to encode
belief-discrepant arguments than High Dogmatic subjects.
In the two Simple Commitment conditions there was a non-

significant trend in the predicted direction (E < l);

40

however, this trend was not present in the two Post-Encoding
conditions.

The rationale for the experimental hypotheses was
based on an important underlying assumption: that Open-
and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive
the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based
justification manipulations. That is, it was posited that
High Dogmatic subjects would perceive the Authority—Based
manipulation as relatively sufficient justification for
compliance with the request to encode belief-discrepant

arguments, and the Reasons-Based manipulation as relatively

 

insufficient justification. Conversely, it was posited
that Low Dogmatic subjects would perceive the Authority-
Based manipulation as relatively insufficient justification
for compliance, and the Reasons-Based manipulation as rela-
tively sufficient justification.
Given these predicted perceptual differences, it
was suggested that in the four Simple Commitment conditions k

those individuals perceiving relatively sufficient justifi-

. ._. ._ ”A n.1‘-

cation would experience little dissonance-arousal, and

consequently would undergo little self-persuasion Or atti-

w......-.....=..-.-
I!

tude change. Conversely, those individuals perceiving
relatively insufficient justification would experience
greater dissonance-arousal, and consequently would undergo
more self-persuasion. On the other hand, a direct rela-

tionship was posited between perceived justification and

41

magnitude of self-persuasion in the four Post-Encoding
conditions. Thus, in effect, support for the experimental
hypotheses was dependent upon the assumption that Open-
and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive
the sufficiency of the two justification manipulations.
Although evidence for the proposed differences in
perception of the justification manipulations was present
to some degree in six of the eight experimental conditions,
only one comparison reached statistical significance (i.e.,
ratings of the Authority-Based manipulation in the two
Post-Encoding conditions). Thus, it appears that the
failure to support the experimental hypotheses may rest, at
least partially, on the failure to produce conditions under
which Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially
perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-

Based justification manipulations.

 

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Although subjects in each of the eight experimental
conditions underwent significant positive attitude change PI
in the direction of the counterattitudinal position, the I;
data failed to provide support for the experimental hypo-

theses. None of the hypothesized interactions were in the i

 

predicted direction, nor did any approach statistical sig- ,.
nificance. However, those subjects who actually encoded
belief-discrepant arguments did undergo greater attitude
change than those subjects who simply committed themselves
to the task.

It was suggested in Chapter III that the failure

to support the experimental hypotheses may rest, at least

partially, on the failure to produce conditions under which I?
Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially per- {
ceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons- %
Based justification manipulations. I.
p’

Several factors may account for this finding.
First, subjects' ratings of the perceived positiveness of
the Authority-Based justification manipulation tended to
fall at the neutral position. Only High Dogmatic subjects

42

43

in the Post-Encoding condition assigned a higher rating
(i.e., "slightly positively") to the authority used to
justify counterattitudinal encoding. Similar findings were
obtained for ratings of the perceived sufficiency of the
Reasons-Based justification manipulation. In all condi—
tions, subjects' ratings tended to fall at the neutral
position.

Given such mediocre ratings, the failure to find
the predicted perceptual differences between Open- and
Closed-Minded subjects may have been due to the particular
authority and reasons employed in this study. That is, the
named authority may have lacked the requisite degree of
credibility to be perceived by the High Dogmatic subjects
as sufficiently justifying compliance with the request to
encode belief-discrepant arguments. Although Closed-Minded
individuals may be relatively more dependent upon authority
than Open-Minded individuals, a minimal level of credibility
may be needed to trigger dependence upon a specific author-
ity in situations of this type. Lacking this critical
level of credibility, it seems reasonable that High Dog-
matic subjects probably did not perceive the named author-
ity as providing any more justification for compliance than
did Low Dogmatic subjects.

Similarly, the given reasons may not have been of
a quality necessary to elicit perceptions of sufficient

justification on the part of the Low Dogmatic subjects.

 

————
I.

\.~? ' I

44

While a named authority would probably not constitute
sufficient justification for these subjects, neither would

a set of reasons judged to be lacking in validity. There-

fore, under these conditions, Low Dogmatic subjects probably

did not perceive the given reasons as any more sufficient
justification for compliance than did High Dogmatic
subjects.

In effect, what has been suggested is that neither
the named authority nor the given set of reasons may have
been of sufficient credibility or quality to elicit differ-
ential perceptions on the part of Open- and Closed-Minded
subjects. Minimal levels of both variables may be needed
to elicit the predicted relative differences in perception.

It should be noted that both the named authority
and the given set of reasons were pretested prior to their
use as justification manipulations. While their pretest
ratings were not very high, they were superior to the
others tested. It was thought that since the pretesting
session merely simulated a counterattitudinal encoding
exercise, and that subjects' level of dogmatism had not
been controlled, their credibility and quality would prove
sufficient in the actual experimental situation. This
assumption apparently was not warranted, however.

An alternative explanation is possible. The
Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipula-

tions may, in fact, have been of sufficient credibility

 

_.--.-...— -‘n— ;__

v

-
lr

45

and quality. However, at least some subjects may have
failed to attend to the named authority and given set of
reasons in the manner anticipated.

Upon debriefing, several subjects reported that
they became aware of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based
justification manipulations only when they completed the
appropriate manipulation check. Having assumed that this
was "just another experiment," they paid little attention
to the specific task instructions which contained the
justification manipulation. They simply complied with the
general request to perform a task--in this case, the encod-
ing of belief-discrepant arguments. Only upon having
completed the manipulation check, which in each case £21:
lgwgd_the posttest attitude instrument, did they become
cognizant of the specific locus of justification for the
request. This lack of awareness could, in part, account
for both the neutral ratings assigned to the justification
manipulations and the failure to obtain the predicted dif-
ferential perceptions by Open- and Closed-Minded subjects.

The above observation underscores the need to deal
effectively with two important problems common to behavioral
research in general, and in particular, attitude research
conducted within a university setting. The first problem
concerns a subject's all too willing compliance with the
demand characteristics of a behavioral experiment, a situa-

tion studied by Orne (1962). The second involves the

 

ET

46

nature of subjects typically employed in attitude research.
These subjects, more times than not, are students at the
SOphomore level who have already participated in several
attitude studies involving to some degree experimenter
deception. Not only are they "experiment—wise," but they
often tend to display an understandable "lets get it over
with" attitude when confronted with each new experimental
situation. Thus, subjects' lack of awareness of the
specific loci of justification in this study may have
stemmed from two antecedent conditions: a general willing-
ness to assume the role of "cooperative subject," or more
likely, an eagerness to complete an unwanted task for which
they perceived little freedom to avoid. In any case,
future research must attempt to minimize the undesirable
effects of both problems, especially the latter, which is
more amenable to experimenter control.

Therefore, the failure to produce conditions under
which Open- and Closed—Minded subjects would differentially
perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-
Based justification manipulations may have been due to one
of two factors, or a combination of both: neither the
named authority nor the given set of reasons were of suffi-
cient credibility or quality to elicit differential percep-
tions and/or subjects failed to attend to the specific

justification manipulations in the manner anticipated.

 

FM-“W‘M—‘rm

47

A third explanation is possible. The assumption
that Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially
perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-
Based justification manipulations may, in fact, not be
tenable. Although there is empirical support for Rokeach's
notion that Closed-Minded individuals are relatively more
dependent upon authority than Open-Minded individuals
(Powell, 1962), it is possible that this difference in EI
dependence may not necessarily result in differential per- I

ceptions of the sufficiency of authorities and reasons as

 

loci of justification for engaging in counterattitudinal 1

IT“ .t-‘avv

behavior. In brief, the assumption may overextend the
theory of Open- and Closed-Mindedness. However, before
discarding the assumption, it is the researcher's Opinion
that the potential gain, both theoretical and methodological,
for our understanding of tolerance for inconsistency war-
rants replication of this study.

For this purpose, several procedural improvements “I
are suggested by the above remarks. First, a highly cred— '-
ible authority and a valid set of reasons must be devised

for use as justification manipulations. Both, hoWever,

_._’_..:..___4 Alki ”I _ u.

must meet two constraints peculiar to this experimental L,
paradigm: each must be relatively "pure"-—i.e., for a
given set of reasons, no particular individual or group
should be linked to it--and each, especially the named

authority, must be realistic. That is, it must appear

48

plausible to the subject that the named authority would
request that he encode belief-discrepant arguments; and
further, if subjects are to be tested in a classroom
setting, the use of class time and university facilities
must appear justified to the subject. It is cOnceivable
that this desired realism may not have been attained for
at least some subjects in this study.

Secondly, the experimenter must maximize the FR
salience of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justifi- I
cation manipulations. That is, if subjects do not ade-

quately attend to the specific justification manipulations,

 

there is little likelihood of obtaining evidence of differ-
ential perception by Open- and Closed-Minded subjects.
Finally, effort should be made to secure a subject
pool having little or no history of prior participation in
attitude research. Use of experimentally—naive subjects

could offset much of the difficulties discussed earlier.

-~.r

_. I...I.._........._._.O_,___
n;

I» Hu‘fin—
‘

 

LI ST OF REFERENCES

1 (5..
I I:

“a...“ .._ 1..---.-

REFERENCES

Aronson, E. The effect of effort on the attractiveness of
rewarded and unrewarded stimuli. Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 375-385.

 

Brehm, J. W. and Cohen, A. R. Explorations in Cognitive
Dissonance. New York: Wiley, 1962.

 

 

Chapanis, N. P. and Chapanis, A. C. Cognitive dissonance:
Five years later. Psychological Bulletin. 1964,
61, 1-22.

 

Cohen, A. R. Communication discrepancy and attitude
change: a dissonance theory approach. Journal of
Personality, 1959, 21, 386-396.

 

 

Cohen, A. R. Attitudinal consequences of induced discre-
pancies between cognitions and behavior. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 1960, 24, 297-318.

 

Cohen, A. R. An experiment on small rewards for discrepant
compliance and attitude change. In: J. W. Brehm
and A. R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Disso-
nance. New York: Wiley, 1962, pp. 73-78.

 

Edwards, A. L. Experimental Design in Psychological Re-
search. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,

 

Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1957.

 

Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J. M. Cognitive consequences
of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 203-210.

 

 

Fillenbaum, S. Dogmatism and individual differences in
reduction of dissonance. Psychological Reports,
1964, 14, 47-50.

 

Foulkes, D. and Foulkes, S. H. Self-concept, dogmatism,
and tolerance of trait inconsistency. Journal of

 

Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 104:111.

 

49

 

a
.51..

50

Hunt, M. F. and Miller, G. R. Open- and closed-mindedness,
belief discrepant communication behavior, and
tolerance for cognitive inconsistency. Journal
of Personalityyand Social Psychology, 1968, 8,
35-371

 

Janis, I. L. and Gilmore, J. B. The influence of incen-
tive conditions on the success of role playing in
modifying attitudes. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 17-27.

 

Kleck, R. E. and Wheaton, J. Dogmatism and responses to
Opinion consistent and opinion inconsistent in-
formation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1967, 5, 249-253. Y '

 

 

McGuire, W. J. The current status of cognitive consistency
theories. In: S. Feldman (ed.), Cognitive Con-
sistency. New York: Academic Press, 1966, pp.

1- 6.

 

Miller, G. R. and Rokeach, M. Individual differences and

tolerance for inconsistency. In: P. H. Tannenbaum,

R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M.
Newcomb, and M. J. Rosenberg (eds.), Theories of

Co nitive Consistency. Chicago: Rand McNaIly,
8’ pp. 624-632 0

 

 

Miller, G. R. and McGraw, R. L. Justification and self-
persuasion following commitment to encode, and
actual encoding of counterattitudinal communica-
tion. Speech Monographs, (In Press).

 

Orne, M. T. On the social psychology of the psychological
experiment: with particular reference to demand
characteristics and their implications. American
Psychologist, 1962, 11, 776-783.

 

Powell, F. A. Open- and closed-mindedness and the ability
to differentiate source and message. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 65, 6I-64.

 

Rokeach, M. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic
Books, 1960.

 

Rosenberg, M. J. When dissonance fails: on eliminating
evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965,
1, 28-42.

 

 

51

Troldahl, V. C. and Powell, F. A. A short-form dogmatism
scale for use in field studies. Social Forces,
1965, 44, 211-214.

 

Wrenn, R. L. The resolution of cognitive dissonance in
open and closed belief systems. Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1962.

 

 

APPENDIX A

 

 

BI

Form 1.

JUDGING INSTRUCTIONS

 

Part I

We need your assistance in pretesting some situations that
will be used in future research. On the following pages
you are asked to make a series of judgments, most of which

are self-explanatory. Please consider each situation

carefully and respond with the judgment that most accurately

reflects your feelings about it. Remember, there are no

right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your

feelings. If you have questions about any of the judgments,

raise your hand and we'll try to answer them. Now go ahead

and begin.

Situation 1.

 

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given

the following task instruction:
Dr. James Gruning, Professor of Psychology at the
University of Michigan, has asked that you write
your three best arguments in favor of requiring
students to spend a minimum of six out-of—class
hours quarterly participating as subjects in be-
havioral research. Begin now. You have 20 minutes
to write your arguments.

Now consider the individual to whom the request is attri-

buted; i.e., Dr. James Gruning, Professor of Psychology

at the University of Michigan. How positively would you

rate this individual as a source for this particular

52

 

53

request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring re-

quired out-of—class participation in behavioral research?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

Situation 2

 

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given

 

the following task instructions:

You are to write your three best arguments in
favor of requiring students to spend a minimum

of six out-of—class hours quarterly participat-
ing as subjects in behavioral research. Begin
now. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the reasons given for making this request.
How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;

i.e., how well do they support a request to write argu-

 

 

 

ments favoring required out-of-class participation in VI

behavioral research? I
Very Sufficient 1
Quite Sufficient 1
Slightly Sufficient L,

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

54

Part II

Again assume that you are a subject in an experiment. You

are asked to write several arguments favoring a position

 

to which you are Opposed. The specific issue that will be

 

used may involve the question of requiring students to
participate as subjects in behavioral research, or any one
of a number of other issues. The kind of issue involved
is not important here. Rather, we are asking you to judge
either the adequacy of the reasons given to write these
kinds of arguments or the source attributed to the re-
quest. Again, there are no Eight or wgogg answers, only
responses that reflect your feelings. In the actual ex-
periment, an appropriate request to write these arguments
will be preceded by either one of the following sets of
reasons, or a description of the source attributed to the

request.

 

Situation 3

The complexities of today's world demand that
every responsible individual be capable of in-
telligently assessing the conflicting arguments
that surround all important issues. Perhaps
the best insurance that an individual will make
an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take
the best stand on a given issue, is that he .
first have a clear knowledge and understanding
of all the relevant arguments. This exercise
wilI—Enable you-to demonstrate your knowledge
and understanding of the arguments surrounding
an important issue.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;

i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments

. “.15

 

F‘A

1
14......

55

favoring a position to which you are Opposed?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

Situation 4

 

This study is concerned with the reasons why
people support or Oppose certain issues of
national interest. For each issue there are
a number of arguments for and against the
issue. You can help determine exactly what
these arguments are by doing the following
task.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;
i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments
favoring a position to which you opposed?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

Situation 5

 

The students of Advertising 135 ("The Psychology
of the Consumer") are asking you to do this task.

 

“'.‘.i

i
I

56

How positively would you rate this source for this kind of
request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring a
position to which you are opposed?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

 

‘Q'w

I‘. .‘.§.‘"’".' O$.r
‘

APPENDIX B

 

,‘I‘l'l- ”If

Form 2.

JUDGING INSTRUCTIONS

 

Part I

We need your assistance in pretesting some situations that
will be used in future research. On the following pages
you are asked to make a series of judgments, most of which
are self-explanatory. Please consider each situation care-
fully and respond with the judgment that most accurately
reflects your feelings about it. Remember, there are no

right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your

feelings. If you have questions about any of the judgments,

raise your hand and we'll try to answer them. Now go ahead

and begin.

Situation 1.

 

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given
the following task instructions:
A study group of Psychology 151 students at
Michigan State has asked that you write your
three best arguments in favor of requiring
students to spend a minimum of six out-of-
class hours quarterly participating as sub-
jects in behavioral research. Begin now. You
have 20 minutes to write your arguments.
Now consider the individuals to whom the request is attri-
buted; i.e., a study group of Psychology 151 students at

Michigan State. How positively would you rate these

57

 

58

individuals as a source for this particular request; i.e.,
a request to write arguments favoring required out-of-
class participation in behavioral research?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

Situation 2.

 

 

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given
the following task instructions:

You are to write your three best arguments in
favor of requiring students to spend a minimum
of six out-of-class hours quarterly participat-
ing as subjects in behavioral research. There
are several reasons for writing these arguments
First, it is desirable to assess college stu-
dents' attitudes, both pro and con, toward such
a proposal. Second, it is good intellectual 1::
training to write arguments for unpopular posi- 7‘ A
tions. Finally, the issue is relevant and ' d
important for college students. Begin now.
You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the reasons given for making this request.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;

F‘ffif’TI—n '— -——.T
V
-

i.e., how well do they support a request to write argu-
ments favoring required out-of—class participation in

behavioral research?

59

Very Sufficiently

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

Part II
Again assume that you are a subject in an experiment. You
are asked to write several arguments favoring a position

to which you are opposed. The specific issue that will be

 

used may involve the question of requiring students to
participate as subjects in behavioral research, or any one
of a number of other issues. The kind of issue involved
is not important here. Rather, we are asking you to judge

either the adequacy of the reasons given to write these

kinds of arguments or the source attributed to the request.

Again, there are no £4ght_or waggg answers, only responses
that reflect your feelings. In the actual experiment, an
appropriate request to write these arguments will be pre-
ceded by either one of the following sets of reasons, or

a description of the source attributed to the request.

Situation 3.

 

It has often been charged that the average per-
son typically makes decisions on important
issues without adequate knowledge of all the

 

:4

60

relevant arguments. This study is intended to
determine the extent to which college students
are familiar with the arguments surrounding
several important issues.
How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;
i.e., how well do they support a request to write argu-
ments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

Situation 4.

 

This study is concerned with the reasons why
people support or oppose certain issues of
national interest.
How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be;
i.e., how well do they support a request to write argu-

ments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

. ‘. r0.

irn.

 

A

l

I';
"th-~

-4 _W

v.4:— -. A..- ~--—. ‘ N— w-.~w
u

61

Situation 5.
Michigan State television station WMSB, in
association with the National Educational
Television network (under the auspices of a
grant from the Ford Foundation) are asking
you to do this task.
How positively would you rate this source for this kind
of request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring
a position to which you are opposed?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

 

 

OPINION PROFILE

 

You are participating in an opinion survey being conducted
by the Department of Communication. Because of the large
size of our sample, we are asking that you record directly

all your responses on the accompanying IBM Scoring Sheet

 

with the pencil that has been provided.

Please be assured that all information will be kept

strictly confidential. Only the research personnel directly
involved in this survey will have access to it. All data
will be analyzed in terms of group scores, and no person's

responses will be singled out.

Your COOperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

62

1w-

 

‘ 9‘“ .0. ‘PII
y‘i.‘

A .0“.

63

Part I

Appearing below are some issues about which people have
different opinions. Each issue is followed by four items.
Use these items to express your feelings about the issue.
On your Scoring Sheet, please blacken the appropriate
numbered space for each of the items.

 

There are no "correct" answers. We are interested only in
your personal Opinions about the issues.

Elimination of draft deferments for
college students.

 

 

Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.

Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

Favorable:Unfavorable

(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.

Fair:UnFair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Establishment of a government bureau for the
censorship of a11 television programming.

 

Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.

Wise:Foolish .
(l) Vererise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

Favorable:Unfavorable

(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.

Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

 

:1
v”.

m

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

64

Required out-of—class student participation
in behavioral research.

 

Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.

Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

Favorable:Unfavorable

(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.

Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Use of armed force in controlling student
demonstrations.

 

Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.

Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

Favorable;Unfavorable

(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.

Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Mandatory imprisonment of homosexuals

Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.

Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

 

10 A. -39.

1“‘7§_r.?71r~.f”“r.

65

19. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.

20. Fair:Unfair

(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Elimination of government controls on

 

 

 

advertising.
21. Good:Bad IF.
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither; 1 t
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad. v.3
22. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish. I .
23. Favorable:Unfavorab1e if
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favor-
able; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Un-
favorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.
24. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.
Part II
Appearing below are some statements about which people have
different Opinions or beliefs. Please indicate the extent ;.
of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by I I
blackening the appropriate numbered space on your Scoring f ,_f
Sheet. I

25. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can
know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts fl
who can be trusted. i:

 

Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

26. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to
admit he's wrong.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

66

There are two kinds of peOple in this world: those who
are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

Most peOple just don't know what's good for them.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

Of all the different philOSOphies which exist in this
world there is probably only one which is correct.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the
highest form of democracy is a government run by those
who are most intelligent.

(l) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do
something important.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me
how to solve my personal problems.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't
worth the paper they are printed on.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
(l) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal
or cause that life becomes meaningful.

(l) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

67

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

To compromise with our political Opponents is dan-
gerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of
our side.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's
going on until one has had a chance to hear the
opinions of those who one respects.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It
it only the future that counts.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing
in common.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat
myself several times to make sure that I am being
understood.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my
secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein,
or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

68

44. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

(l) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly
Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

APPENDIX D

NAME

CLASS

 

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University
selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of
information required, each person will be asked to complete
only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, dif-

ferent booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your COOperation. Your help is very much

appreciated.

 

 

22 not Open your booklet until you are instructed tg gg_§g.

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

69.

70

Task Instructions

Please write your three best arguments ig_favor of the
elimination of draft deferments for college students.
In other words, your task is to write three good agruments

which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for

 

college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn

the page and begin.

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and

Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

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a...

 

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e

il

‘5'

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Worth-
less

Good

Fair

Favor-
able

Wise

Trivial

71

Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in the
analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that

draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate

spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

 

 

 

 

 

 

Valuable
Very Worth- Slightly Nei- Slightly VaI. ‘ Very
Worth- less ‘Worth- ther Valuable Val.
less less
Bad
Very Good SIightly Nei- Slightly Bad ' Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad
Unfair
Very Fair SIightIy Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Unfavor-
able
Very Fav. SIigHtIy Nei- SIightIy Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei— Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise Foolish Foolish
Important

Very Triv. SIigHtIy Nei- SIigHtIy Imp. Very
Triv. Triv. ther Imp. Imp.

72

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. How-
ever, before you begin, we would like some advice. This
study is the beginning of a much larger project that will
be undertaken next month. One problem that we are con-
cerned about is how our "image" will influence the results

that we get.

You will recall that the source of the request to write
your arguments was identified as:
Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

How "positively" did you perceive this source to be?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

73

On this page, please write your three best arguements £3

favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college

students.

1.

APPENDIX E

74

NAME

 

CLASS

 

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University
selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of
information required, each person will be asked to complete
only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, dif—

ferent booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your COOperation. Your help is very much

appreciated.

Do not Open your booklet until you are instructed EQ.§2.§23

 

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

75

Task.Instructions

 

The complexities of today's world demand that every respon-
sible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the
conflicting arguments that surround all important issues.
Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an
intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand
on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge
and understanding of 344 the relevant arguments. This ex-
ercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and
understanding of the arguments surrounding an important

issue.

Please write your three best arguments i3 favor of the
elimination of draft deferments for college students. In
other words, your task is to write three good arguments

which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for

 

college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn

the page and begin.

I
H
& uoi

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..
I.

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.o e
n“ n
n-. -

hi

Fl‘v-
‘4‘

Worth-
less

Good

Fair

Favor-
able

Wise

Trivial

76

Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in the
analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that

draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate

spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

 

 

 

 

 

 

Valuable
Very WortE- SIigHtIy Nei- SIigHtIy VaI. ' Very
Worth- less ‘Worth- ther Valuable Val.
less less
Bad
Very Good SIightly Nei- Slightly Bad ‘ Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad
. Unfair
Very Fair SIigEtIy Nei- SIightTy Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Unfavor-
able
Very Fav. SIightIyNei- SIigHtIy Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise Foolish Foolish
Important

 

Very Triv. SIigHtIy Nei- Slightiy Imp. Very
Triv. Triv. ther Imp. Imp.

77

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. How-
ever, before you begin, we would like some advice. This
study is the beginning of a much larger project that will
be undertaken next month. One problem that we are con-
cerned about is the "sufficiency" of the reasons that we

gave you to write your arguments.

You will recall that you were given the following reasons
to write your arguments:

The complexities of today's world demand that
every responsible individual be capable of in-
telligently assessing the conflicting arguments
that surround all important issues. Perhaps
the best insurance that an individual will make
an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take
the best stand on a given issue, is that he
first have a clear knowledge and understanding
of all the relevant arguments. This exercise
wilI—Ehable you to demonstrate your knowledge
and understanding of the arguments surrounding
an important issue.

How "sufficient" did you perceive these reasons to be?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

78

On this page, please write your three best arguments i3

favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college

students.

1.

APPENDIX F

NAME

 

CLASS

 

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University
selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of
information required, each person will be asked to complete
only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, dif-

ferent booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much

appreciated.

22 not open your booklet until you are instructed £2.92.§2°

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

79

80

 

Task Instructions

Please write your three best arguments ip_£gyg£ of the
elimination of draft deferments for college students.

In other words, your task is to write three good arguments
which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for

college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn

the page and begin.

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and

Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

81

On this page, please write your three best arguments ip

favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college

students.

1.

Worth-
less

Good

Fair

Favor-
able

Wise

Trivial

82

Now that you have Written your arguments, it may be helpful
in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea
that draft deferments for college students should be

eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate

spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

 

 

 

 

 

Valuable
Very Worth- Slightly Nei- Sligfitly Val. Very
Worth— less Worth- ther Valuable Val.
less less
Bad
Very Good SligHtly Nel- SligHtly Bad Very
Good Good Ther Bad Bad
_ Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Unfavor-
able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- SligHtly Unfav. Very '
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very-
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Important

 

 

—"""Very T—rlv. Slightly N—r—el- Slightly 'T—mp. —_Very
Triv. Triv. ther Imp. Imp.

83

Again, thank you for your OOOperation. This information
will be very helpful. Now, we would like some advice.
This study is the beginning of a much larger project that
will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are
concerned about is how our "image" will influence the

results that we get.

You will recall that at the beginning of this booklet, the
source of the request to write your arguments was identi-
fied as:

Dr. James Gruning

Project Director

and Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

How "positively" did you perceive this source to be?

Very Positively

 

Quite Positively

 

Slightly Positively

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Negatively

 

Quite Negatively

 

Very Negatively

 

APPENDIX G

NAME

 

CLASS

 

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University
selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of
information required, each person will be asked to complete
only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, dif-

ferent booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much

appreciated.

go not open your booklet until you are instructed £2.92.§2°

 

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

84

85

Task Instructions

 

The complexities of today's world demand that every respon-
sible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the
conflicting arguments that surround all important issues.
Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an
intelligent assessment-—and ultimately--take the best stand
on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge
and understanding of 244 the relevant arguments. This ex-
ercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and
understanding of the arguments surrounding an important

issue.

Please write your three best arguments ip_favor of the
elimination of draft deferments for college students. In
other words, your task is to write three good arguments

which stronglysupport the idea that draft deferments for

 

college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn

the page and begin.

86

On.this page, please write your three best arguments ig

favor or the elimination of draft deferments for college

students.

1.

Worth-
less

Good

Fair

Favor-
able

Wise

Trivial

87

Now that you have written your arguments, it may be helpful
in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea
that draft deferments for college students should be

eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate

Spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

 

 

 

 

 

_ _ Valuable
Very Worth- Slightly Nei- Slightly Val. Very
Worth- less Worth- ther Valuable Val.
less less
Bad
Very Good SligHtly Nei- SligEtly Bad Very
Good Good Ther Bad Bad
_. Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Unfavor-
able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Important

Very Triv. Sligfitly Nei- SligHEly Imp. Very
Triv. Triv. ther Imp. Imp.

88

Again, thank you for your cooPeration. This information
will be very helpful. Now, we would like some advice.
This study is the beginning of a much larger project that
will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are
concerned about is the "sufficiency" of the reasons that

we gave you to write your arguments.

You will recall that at the beginning of this booklet, you
were given the following reasons to write your arguments:

The complexities of today's world demand that
every responsible individual be capable of in-
telligently assessing the conflicting arguments
that surround all important issues. Perhaps
the best insurance that an individual will make
an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take
the best stand on a given issue, is that he
first have a clear knowledge and understanding
of all the relevant arguments. This exercise
will—enable you to demonstrate your knowledge
and understanding of the arguments surrounding
an important issue.

How "sufficient" did you perceive these reasons to be?

Very Sufficient

 

Quite Sufficient

 

Slightly Sufficient

 

Neutral

 

Slightly Insufficient

 

Quite Insufficient

 

Very Insufficient

 

 

 

APPENDIX H

Name

 

Class

 

The Department of Communication is surveying student opinion
on several current issues that are receiving much attention
in the news. Please eXpress your honest, personal opinions,
as that is the only way to know how students really feel

about these issues.

Please print your name and class section at the tOp of the
page. This information will be used only as an aid in data
analysis. All responses will be analyzed as part of a group,

and at no time will any person's responses be singled out.

Thank you very much for your COOperation.

89

90

Please indicate how you feel about the following issues by
checking the apprOpriate spaces. There are no "correct"
answers. We are interested only in your personal opinions.

Legalization of Marijuana

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fair . _ Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nel- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Favor- Unfavor-
able - __ able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- Sligfitly Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Wise Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nel- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Good Bad
Very Good Slightly Nei- Slightly Bad Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fair _ _ Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Favor- Unfavor-
able ‘g, able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Wise V _ Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise ther ‘Foolish Foolish
Good Bad

 

Very Good Slightly Nei- SligHtly Bad Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad

«AU F. s E

Hula H .! NI .- "h
Eu I» G
n I a an

A...

91

Federal Control of the Sale and Posession of Firearms

 

 

 

Fair Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Favor- Unfavor-
able , able
Very Fav. SligHEly Nei- Slightly Uhfav. Very
Fav. Fav.‘ ther Unfav. Unfav.
Wise Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Good Bad
Very Good SligHtly Nei- SligHtly Bad Very
Good Good Bad Bad

Lowering the Voting Age to 18 Years

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fair Unfair
Very Fair Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Favor- Unfavor-
able __ _ able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Wise Foolish
Very Wise Slightly Nei- Slightly Foolish Very
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Good Bad

 

Very Good SligHEIy Nei- Slightly Bad Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad

92

Establishment of a National PopulareVote Primary as a
Method of Choosing Presidenfial Candidates

 

 

 

Fair Unfair
Very Fair’ SligEtly Nei- Sligfitly Unfair Very
Fair Fair ther Unfair Unfair
Favor- Unfavor-
able able
Very Fav. Slightly Nei- Slightly Unfav. Very
Fav. Fav. ther Unfav. Unfav.
Wise _ Foolish
Very WiSe Slightly Nei- Sligfitly Foolisfi Very
Wise Wise ther Foolish Foolish
Good Bad

 

Very 'Good' Slightly Nei:§lightly Bad Very
Good Good ther Bad Bad

U IIIIIIIIII BRARI

III’IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII;

III“

5