


OPEN-AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS,
LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND LEVEL
OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN
COUNTERATTITUDINAL COMMUNICATION
BEHAVIOR

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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This is to certify that the
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ABSTRACT

OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS, LOCUS OF JUSTIFICATION, AND LEVEL OF COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN COUNTERATTITUDINAL COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

By

Elliot R. Siegel

Several writers have suggested that individuals differ in tolerance for inconsistency and that differential tolerance may, in turn, be related to certain personality constructs. One such personality construct, Open- and Closed-Mindedness, and its relationship to two loci of justification for the performance of belief-discrepant behavior was investigated. In addition, an attempt was made to assess the relative efficacy and limits of consistency theory and incentive theory as alternative viewpoints concerning the relationship between magnitude of justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior and degree of consequent attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction. Dissonance theory posits an inverse relationship, incentive theory a direct relationship.

The primary locus of justification for a request to engage in belief-discrepant behavior may be either authority-based (a named authority) or reasons-based (an

enumerated set of reasons). It was assumed that Open- and Closed-Minded individuals would differentially perceive the sufficiency of each locus of justification. That is, because of the Closed-Minded individual's relatively greater dependence upon authority, justification that is largely authority-based should be perceived as sufficient, while authority alone should not constitute sufficient justification for the Open-Minded individual. Conversely, for those situations in which justification is largely based on adequate reasons, the Open-Minded individual should perceive that such justification is sufficient; while valid reasons alone should not constitute sufficient justification for the Closed-Minded individual.

Thus, consistent with dissonance theory predictions, it was hypothesized that at the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior, among those individuals given authority-based justification, Open-Minded individuals would demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals; while among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals would demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals.

A second interaction hypothesis, based upon incentive theory predictions, posited that after encoding belief-discrepant arguments, among those individuals given authority-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals

would demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals; while among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Open-Minded individuals would demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

Measures of Open- and Closed-Mindedness and of attitudes toward the elimination of draft deferments for college students were obtained from a sample of undergraduate students. Approximately three weeks later, subjects were requested to write three arguments favoring the elimination of draft deferments, a position to which they were opposed. For one half of the subjects justification for the request was authority-based, and for the other half reasons-based. Half of these subjects simply committed themselves to write, while the other half completed the posttest attitude measure following belief-discrepant encoding.

Although subjects in each of the eight experimental conditions underwent significant positive attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal position, the data failed to provide support for the hypotheses. None of the hypothesized interactions were in the predicted direction, nor did any approach statistical significance. However, those subjects who actually encoded belief-discrepant arguments did undergo significantly greater attitude change than those who simply committed themselves to the task.

It was suggested that the failure to support the hypotheses may rest, at least partially, on a failure to produce conditions under which Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the authority-based and reasons-based justification manipulations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Several writers (Festinger, 1957; Cohen, 1960; Brehm and Cohen, 1962; McGuire, 1966) have suggested that individuals differ in tolerance for inconsistency and that differential tolerance may, in turn, be related to certain personality constructs. Brehm and Cohen (1962) underscore the importance of research dealing with this problem when, speaking particularly of dissonance theory, they assert that "predictions to a range of effects from dissonance theory could be sharpened by taking into account personality variables that are widely considered to be important determinants of cognition, perception, and social interaction." (p. 71)

In general, the term tolerance for inconsistency¹ is used as a shorthand label to describe the following

¹Much of the following discussion of tolerance for inconsistency is based upon an earlier paper by Gerald R. Miller and Milton Rokeach entitled "Individual Differences and Tolerance for Inconsistency," in P. H. Tannenbaum, R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, and M. J. Rosenberg (eds.), Theories of Cognitive Consistency (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 624-632.

situation: an individual, after exposure to stimulus conditions calculated to result in the arousal of inconsistency, fails to perform the predicted inconsistency reducing response(s). Given this circumstance, the individual has demonstrated high tolerance for inconsistency. However, any one, or a combination of several distinct antecedent mediating processes may have resulted in this departure from behavioral predictions. That is, the individual may have experienced a relatively low level of inconsistency; he may have experienced inconsistency, but chose an inconsistency-reducing response other than the one predicted; or he may have experienced inconsistency, but managed to retain his original behavior in the face of it.

That persons may differ in tolerance for inconsistency is of both theoretical and methodological import. In terms of the development and refinement of consistency theory, the identification of relevant personality factors influencing tolerance for inconsistency would result in more precise generalizations concerning the behavioral consequences of commitments or actions calculated to induce inconsistency. The ability to specify and control such personality variables should increase the rigor and predictive power of the typical consistency experiment. Such control procedures would offset at least one criticism of some consistency research: the charge that data for certain subjects are often excluded on post hoc grounds

(Chapanis and Chapanis, 1964). Knowledge of the personality correlates of tolerance for inconsistency would enable the researcher to identify and to measure probable response differences prior to data collection.

The present study focuses on one such personality construct: Open- and Closed-Mindedness. Specifically, the aim of this research is to investigate probable interactions between Open- and Closed-Mindedness, and two loci of justification for the performance of belief-discrepant behavior: authority-based and reasons-based justification. In addition, an attempt is made to assess the relative efficacy and limits of consistency theory (dissonance) and incentive theory concerning the relationship between magnitude of justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior and degree of consequent attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction (commonly termed self-persuasion).

Prior Research on Open- and Closed-Mindedness and Tolerance for Inconsistency

Rokeach (1960) has posed several theoretical distinctions between open and closed belief systems which suggest that Open- and Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate differential tolerance for inconsistency in certain inconsistency-arousing situations. He holds, for example, that in contrast to open belief systems, closed

belief systems are indicative of simplistic thinking. That is, closed belief systems can be characterized by a relatively high rejection of disbelief systems, by isolation of parts within and between belief and disbelief systems, and by relatively little differentiation within the disbelief system.

Thus, Miller and Rokeach (1968) suggest that high dogmatic or Closed-Minded individuals should seek to structure situations in cognitively consistent and simple ways: that inconsistent stimuli should be rejected, distorted, ignored or denied. Conversely, low dogmatic or Open-Minded individuals, because of their greater ability to think complexly and in an integrated fashion, should be able to tolerate more cognitive inconsistency.

Several studies have been conducted which test these propositions. Wrenn (1962) and Fillenbaum (1964) proposed that high dogmatic individuals are likely to experience more dissonance than low dogmatic individuals when induced to commit themselves to, or induced to engage in behavior calculated to induce dissonance. Female subjects were told that they would participate in group discussions dealing with a sexual topic. To induce dissonance, experimental subjects were asked to undergo a severe initiation to qualify as group members. The initiation consisted of reading several vivid sexual passages to the experimenter. Control group subjects either underwent a mild initiation or performed an irrelevant task.

Subjects were then asked to listen to a taped discussion which allegedly took place within the group they would be joining. What they heard was a recording of several females engaged in a dull discussion of secondary sexual characteristics. All subjects rated the content of the taped discussion for interest. In line with dissonance theory, it was expected that subjects in the severe initiation conditions would rate the discussion content as more interesting than would subjects in the control conditions. Further, it was hypothesized that this effect would be more marked for high than for low dogmatic subjects. That is, because of greater dissonance arousal, or because of less tolerance for dissonance, high dogmatic subjects exposed to the severe initiation should rate the dull discussion more favorably than low dogmatic subjects.

The results of the Wrenn and Fillenbaum studies provide only equivocal support for the hypotheses. Although the differences in the Wrenn study were in the predicted direction--i.e., high dogmatic subjects rated the dull discussion more favorably--they are not significant. Furthermore, there was no significant main effect due to the initiation variable across high and low dogmatic groups--i.e., severe initiation subjects did not rate the discussion any more attractively than control subjects.

Fillenbaum's conclusions are based on a comparison of the product-moment correlations between dogmatism scores and ratings of the discussion's interest for subjects in the severe and mild initiation conditions. Significant positive relationships between dogmatism and ratings of interest were found for both conditions. However, the correlation for subjects in the severe condition was .39, while the correlation was even larger--.56--in the mild condition. The fact that both correlations were significant (and not significantly different from one another) is not in accord with theoretical expectations: a significant correlation was expected in the severe but not in the mild condition.

Three recent studies have reported more conclusive findings. Foulkes and Foulkes (1965), investigated the relationship between dogmatism and tolerance for trait inconsistency. High and low dogmatic individuals were given a series of statements describing each of four girls. Ratings of each girl were obtained. Subjects then received additional information intended to reverse their initial impressions, and rated the girls a second time.

The results indicated that the high dogmatic subjects either changed their original ratings considerably or else showed little change. In contrast, the low dogmatic subjects generally showed moderate shifts of personality impression. The authors concluded that the

high dogmatic subjects apparently found it more difficult than low dogmatic subjects to tolerate the inconsistency created by the conflicting information; and to reduce it either changed their impressions drastically or else ignored the contradictory information.

Kleck and Wheaton (1967) examined responses of high and low dogmatic individuals to opinion consistent and opinion inconsistent information. They hypothesized that since high dogmatic individuals should be more motivated than low dogmatic individuals to avoid dissonance-producing information, that high dogmatic subjects would show: (1) a greater preference for opinion consistent information, (2) a poorer recall of the opinion inconsistent information, and (3) a less favorable evaluation of opinion inconsistent information, and a more favorable evaluation of the opinion consistent information.

Following an attitude pretest on the issue, the subjects were told they could choose to read either an article favoring a minimum age of 18 for obtaining a driver's license or one favoring the established 16 year minimum. Their choices provided a measure of preference for consistent or inconsistent information. All subjects then read both messages and evaluated them. Two weeks later they completed a test designed to assess their recall of the content of both articles.

All three hypotheses received empirical support. First, high dogmatic subjects were found to be less willing to expose themselves to inconsistent information, but the difference did not reach statistical significance. Second, high dogmatic subjects recalled significantly less dissonant information than did low dogmatic subjects. Finally, the high dogmatic subjects evaluated the opinion consistent message more favorably than did the low dogmatic subjects. Differences for the inconsistent message, although in the predicted direction, were not significant.

The results of a study by Hunt and Miller (1968) offer perhaps the best empirical evidence to date that individual differences in dogmatism are linked to differential tolerance for inconsistency. Rokeach (1960) has presented some evidence which suggests that high dogmatic individuals generally experience fewer exposures to discrepant beliefs than do low dogmatic individuals. Hunt and Miller reasoned that if high and low dogmatic individuals were asked to prepare written communications that were discrepant with their beliefs, then the high dogmatic individuals would perceive that the task would require greater effort than would the low dogmatic individuals.

Effort has been shown to be directly related to magnitude of dissonance (Cohen, 1959; and Aronson, 1961). As such, if high dogmatic individuals do experience more dissonance, then they should be more likely to engage in

dissonance-reducing activity. One means of dissonance reduction is for the individual to change his attitude so that it becomes more consistent with the position taken in the discrepant message. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Hunt and Miller hypothesized that high dogmatic subjects who are instructed to write belief-discrepant arguments will demonstrate greater attitude change than low dogmatic subjects in the direction of the advocated discrepant position.

High and low dogmatic subjects were assigned to one of three conditions: (1) a belief-discrepant condition wherein subjects were requested to write arguments opposing disarmament, a position at odds with their initial beliefs; (2) a belief-congruent condition wherein subjects were requested to write arguments consistent with their prior beliefs; and (3) an irrelevant condition wherein subjects were requested to write arguments dealing with federal aid to education.

The results supported the hypothesis. The investigators report that only the high dogmatic subjects in the belief-discrepant condition changed significantly; that is, following a commitment to write arguments opposing disarmament, they were the only group who had a less favorable posttest attitude toward disarmament. It should be noted that none of the subjects actually wrote arguments; rather, they merely committed themselves to the task.

Prior Research on Justification
for Engaging in Counterattitudinal
Behavior

A current controversial problem confronting communication researchers concerns the relationship between the magnitude of incentive or justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior and degree of consequent attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction. The proponents of two theoretical positions--dissonance theory and incentive theory--have produced conflicting empirical evidence concerning the direction of this relationship.

Dissonance theory predicts an inverse relationship between justification or incentive magnitude and degree of attitude change following belief-discrepant behavior.

Festinger (1957) states:

It also becomes apparent . . . that the magnitude of the reward or punishment, that is, the attractiveness and desirability of the offered reward or the unpleasantness and undesirability of the threatened punishment, is an important determinant of the magnitude of dissonance which exists once compliance is exhibited. Too great a reward or punishment will result in only little dissonance. (p. 91)

There is an extensive body of research in support of dissonance theory predictions. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) offered subjects either 20 dollars or one dollar to tell an incoming subject (actually a confederate) that a dull, boring task they had just completed was interesting and enjoyable. After engaging in this belief-discrepant behavior, subjects rated the task a second time. It was

found that subjects in the one dollar condition rated the task significantly more enjoyable than did subjects in the 20 dollar condition.

The authors interpret this result in support of dissonance theory. The minimal justification received by the one dollar subjects was dissonance-producing; and consequently, the subjects reduced their dissonance by modifying their attitudes toward the dull task. The 20 dollar subjects, having been given much justification, experienced little dissonance and consequently underwent little attitude change.

Similar findings are reported by Cohen (1962), who offered subjects either 10 dollars, five dollars, one dollar, or 50 cents to write belief-discrepant essays. A significant inverse relationship was found between incentive magnitude and attitude change; that is, subjects receiving small rewards underwent greater attitude change than subjects who received large rewards.

In contrast to dissonance theory, incentive theory predicts a direct relationship between justification or incentive magnitude and degree of attitude change following belief-discrepant behavior. Janis and Gilmore (1965), proponents of the incentive position, reason as follows:

. . . when a person accepts the task of improvising arguments in favor of a point of view at variance with his own personal convictions, he becomes temporarily motivated to think up all good positive arguments he can, and at the same time suppresses thoughts about

the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant to the assigned task. This "biased scanning" increases the salience of the positive arguments and therefore increases the chances of acceptance of the new attitude position. A gain in attitude change would not be expected, however, if resentment or other interfering affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives in the role-playing situation. (pp. 17-18)

The incentive position has also received much empirical support. Janis and Gilmore (1965) offered subjects 20 dollars or one dollar to write counterattitudinal essays about disliked college courses. At each of the two levels of monetary incentive, a second justification manipulation was employed. Half the subjects were told that the information would be used by leading universities in the country (favorable sponsorship), and the other half were told that a book publisher would use the information in an advertising campaign (unfavorable sponsorship). A third manipulation had to do with whether or not the subjects actually wrote the essays. Half the subjects were given a posttest attitude measure after agreeing to write the essay (simple commitment), the other half after having actually written the essay.

The authors report a significant interaction between sponsorship and the point in time at which attitude change was measured. The most attitude change occurred among subjects who actually wrote the essays under favorable sponsorship (high justification), a result consistent with incentive theory predictions. There was no significant

effect for the monetary variable. However, while not significant, those subjects who simply committed themselves to write tended to undergo greater attitude change with unfavorable (low justification) than with favorable sponsorship (high justification), a trend consistent with dissonance theory predictions.

This latter finding offers support for Rosenberg's (1965) contention that dissonance theory predictions and incentive theory predictions may both be applicable at different levels of commitment to engage in counterattitudinal behavior. Specifically, Rosenberg suggests that dissonance predictions regarding an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and degree of consequent attitude change may hold at the level of simple commitment, while incentive theory may provide a more tenable explanation of post-encoding effects.

Miller and McGraw (In Press) elaborate further on this proposition. They state:

Considering the mediating mechanisms underlying the two theories, Rosenberg's suggestion is plausible. For the dissonance theorist, self-persuasion pressures arise from public identification with a position at odds with the individual's prior beliefs. Assuming that dissonance occurs at the time when the individual perceives he is committed to the counterattitudinal position, it may well be that actual counterattitudinal encoding is largely irrelevant--that as Brehm and Cohen (1962) have asserted, mere commitment to perform a dissonant act is sufficient to trigger the dissonance dynamic. By contrast, incentive theory explanations of self-persuasion rely heavily on factors such as biased scanning and evaluation of belief-discrepant arguments--factors intimately associated with the

encoding process itself. Therefore, a period of covert and/or overt encoding is probably a necessary condition for generating incentive effects. (In Press)

To test this proposition, Miller and McGraw asked inmates of a reformatory to write an essay favoring a lottery draft system, a position to which they were opposed. Half the subjects were told that the information would be used by a committee of citizens and congressmen who were doing a study of the draft (high justification), the other half were told that the information would be used by a publishing company preparing a book on avoiding military service (low justification). Each subject was given a posttest attitude measure at two points in time: immediately after commitment to encode the counterattitudinal essay, and following actual encoding.

An interaction hypothesis was tested: following commitment to write the counterattitudinal essay, subjects given low justification would demonstrate greater attitude change than subjects given high justification (dissonance theory prediction); following actual encoding of the essay, subjects given high justification would demonstrate greater attitude change than subjects given low justification (incentive theory prediction).

Consistent with dissonance theory predictions, those subjects given low justification for engaging in counterattitudinal communication showed significantly greater attitude change immediately following commitment;

however, the post-encoding findings did not support the incentive theory prediction that subjects given high justification would undergo greater attitude change following actual encoding of the essay. It was suggested, however, that the high justification manipulation may not have been sufficient to ensure an optimal test of the incentive position.

Given these results, the authors conclude that:

. . . the present findings do suggest that dissonance and incentive theories should be treated as complementary theories dealing with different sets of antecedent variables, rather than as sharply competing positions relating to the same behavioral processes. Adequate explanation of the self-persuasion phenomenon probably requires that both dissonance and incentive notions be invoked. (In Press)

Rationale and Hypotheses

It was suggested above that individual differences in Open- and Closed-Mindedness are generally related to differential tolerance for cognitive inconsistency. That is, it appears that high dogmatic individuals are more likely to experience dissonance and to engage in dissonance-reducing behavior as a result of their relatively low tolerance for inconsistency. However, this may not be the case in all inconsistent situations.

Of central importance to this study is Rokeach's (1960) notion that Closed-Minded individuals place greater reliance on authority as a means for evaluating incoming

information and determining appropriate behavior. Speaking of this distinction, Rokeach asserts:

. . . a basic characteristic that defines the extent to which a person's system is open or closed . . . is the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside . . . By irrelevant factors we have in mind most particularly the pressures of reward and punishment arising from external authority; for example, as exerted by parents, peers, other authority figures, reference groups, social institutional norms, and cultural norms . . . the more open the belief system, the more should the person be governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing forces and the less by irrational inner forces. Consequently, the more should he be able to resist pressures exerted by external sources to evaluate and to act in accord with their wishes. (pp. 57-58)

This differing reliance upon authority on the part of Open- and Closed-Minded individuals suggests potential differences in tolerance for inconsistency in those situations in which the nature of the justification given for performance of counterattitudinal behavior is varied.

The primary locus of justification may be found either in the source of the compliant appeal--i.e., in characteristics of the person or persons who request that the individual perform belief-discrepant behaviors--or in the content of the compliant appeal--i.e., in the reasons given for performance of belief-discrepant behaviors. In the first instance, justification is largely dependent upon authority; while in the second, it derives primarily from the adequacy of the enumerated reasons.

Because of the Closed-Minded individual's greater dependence upon authority, the fact that a positive authority (highly credible source) requests belief-discrepant behavior should itself constitute sufficient justification, apart from consideration of the reasons given. On the other hand, authority per se should not constitute sufficient justification for the Open-Minded individual; in addition, he should seek valid reasons for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior.

Conversely, for those situations in which justification is largely based on adequate reasons for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior, the Open-Minded individual should perceive that such justification is sufficient. On the other hand, valid reasons alone should not constitute sufficient justification for the Closed-Minded individual.

Given these differences, we can expect Open- and Closed-Minded individuals to demonstrate differential levels of tolerance for inconsistency in situations involving authority-based and in situations involving reasons-based justification.

Moreover, it is predicted that these differences will be consistent with the proposition advanced by Rosenberg (1965) and Miller and McGraw (In Press) concerning the applicability of dissonance theory and incentive theory predictions at different levels of commitment to counter-attitudinal behavior (simple commitment and post-encoding).

The hypotheses are:

A. At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior:

Hypothesis 1A: Among those individuals given authority-based justification, Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2A: Among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals.

B. After encoding belief-discrepant arguments:

Hypothesis 1B: Among those individuals given authority-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2B: Among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

In effect, interaction hypothesis (A) posits an inverse relationship between magnitude of perceived justification and degree of attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction; a dissonance theory prediction. That is, at the level of simple commitment, those individuals perceiving sufficient justification (Closed-Minded/authority-based and Open-Minded/reasons-based) should be subject to little dissonance-arousal, and consequently, should undergo little self-persuasion. In this sense, these individuals are said to have relatively high tolerance for inconsistency. Conversely, those individuals perceiving insufficient justification (Open-Minded/authority-based and Closed-Minded/reasons-based) should be subject to greater

dissonance-arousal, and consequently, should undergo more self-persuasion. Similarly, these individuals are said to have relatively low tolerance for inconsistency.

Interaction hypothesis (B) posits a direct relationship between magnitude of perceived justification and degree of attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction; an incentive theory prediction. That is, after encoding, those individuals perceiving sufficient justification (Closed-Minded/authority-based and Open-Minded/reasons-based) should undergo a relatively greater degree of self-persuasion than those individuals perceiving insufficient justification (Open-Minded/authority-based and Closed-Minded/reasons-based).

CHAPTER II

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Overview

To test the hypotheses presented in Chapter I, this study was conducted in three phases: (1) assessment of the positiveness of a number of potential sources for the authority-based justification manipulation, and assessment of the sufficiency of a number of potential reasons for the reasons-based justification manipulation, (2) assessment of attitudes toward several controversial issues, and administration of an abridged, 20-item Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl and Powell, 1965), and (3) manipulation of the justification and commitment variables, and assessment of attitude change.

Phase 1

In the initial phase of this study, a suitable source and set of reasons which could be used as justification for a request to encode belief-discrepant arguments were selected. Subjects were 109 students enrolled in two undergraduate communication and business letter writing courses at Michigan State University. After being instructed to assume the role of a subject in an experiment

who is requested to write several arguments favoring a position to which he is opposed, each subject evaluated the source of, or the reasons given for such a request.

A total of four sources and six sets of reasons were evaluated. Each was relatively "pure"--i.e., for a given set of reasons, no particular individual or group was linked to it. To insure that all sources and reasons would be given approximately equal consideration, two different questionnaire booklets were prepared, each requiring the subject to rate only two sources and three sets of reasons (Appendix A and Appendix B). Half the subjects were given one booklet, half the other.

All subjects evaluated the positiveness of each source on a seven-point scale ranging from "Very Positively" to "Very Negatively." Similar ratings were obtained for the six sets of reasons. Each set was rated for its sufficiency on a seven-point scale ranging from "Very Sufficient" to "Very Insufficient."

The source rated most positively was "Dr. James Gruning, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan." The following set of reasons were rated most sufficient:

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding

of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of an important issue.

Mean ratings of the source and reasons were 5.08 and 5.02 respectively. Both were selected for use as justification manipulations in Phase 3.

Phase 2

A total of 381 students enrolled in five undergraduate communication courses at Michigan State University were asked to participate in an opinion survey sponsored by the Department of Communication. Each subject was given a questionnaire booklet (Appendix C) by his regular class instructor and instructed to rate six controversial issues on four evaluative seven-point polar-adjective scales: Good-Bad, Wise-Foolish, Favorable-Unfavorable, and Fair-Unfair. The range of potential scores on each issue was from four, an extremely negative evaluation, to 28, an extremely positive evaluation. Each subject also completed the abridged Dogmatism instrument. It should be noted that the scoring weights of both instruments was the reverse of the weighting sequence employed in the questionnaire booklets.

Scores on the attitude scales were used to select an issue on which most subjects' attitudes were markedly positive or negative, thus providing an opportunity to later require belief-discrepant communication behaviors of

the subjects. Attitude scores on the issue, "Elimination of draft deferments for college students" were found to be strongly skewed in a negative direction. This issue was selected for study as the experimental issue in Phase 3.

Of the 381 students in the original subject pool, two failed to complete the Dogmatism instrument and 73 were either neutral to, or in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students. This left 306 students potentially available for study. The Dogmatism scores for these subjects ranged from a high of 88 to a low of 29. A median split at 58.5 was used to assign subjects to Open- and Closed-Minded conditions. Due to scheduling difficulties, all usable subjects in one class (N = 44) were at this time directly assigned to a control condition. Thus, a total of 262 subjects were available for assignment to experimental conditions in Phase 3.

Phase 3

Subjects at each of the two levels of Dogmatism were randomly assigned to one of the following commitment and justification treatment combinations: Simple Commitment/Authority-Based, Simple Commitment/Reasons-Based, Post-Encoding/Authority-Based, and Post-Encoding/Reasons-Based.

Approximately three weeks later, under the guise of a separate experiment, several experimenters visited the subjects' classes and administered one of four pre-assigned questionnaire booklets to each subject. One half of the subjects received one of two Simple Commitment booklets, while the other half received one of two Post-Encoding booklets. Within each half, one half received an Authority-Based booklet, the other a Reasons-Based booklet. The specific format of each booklet is described later in this chapter.

More than half the experimental subjects were enrolled in a large lecture class; special procedures were required for this group. Upon entering the lecture room, each student was given a name list which was divided into four seating groups. These groups corresponded to Open- and Closed-Minded subjects' prior assignment to the four experimental treatment combinations. The instructions read as follows:

Most of the persons in your class have been randomly assigned to one of four study groups--groups A,B,C, or D. Please check the names listed below and find your group. If your name is not listed, you are assigned to group E. When you know which group you are in, please go to the front of the room where your group's booklets are located. Tell the person your name, and you will be given the booklet that has been assigned to you. After picking up your booklet, you will be directed to a section of the room where the other people in your group are seated.

Those students not present during Phase 2 data collection and those eliminated for the reasons stated

comprised the fifth group. These students participated in an unrelated study conducted by another member of the Department of Communication. When all students were correctly seated, they were instructed to begin.

Each of the four experimental booklets contained the same set of general instructions:

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of information required, each person will be asked to complete only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned . . . Do not open your booklet until you are instructed to do so. It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

So as not to confound the justification manipulations, no reference was made to the sponsors of, the reasons for, or the nature of the study. Moreover, to allay suspicion regarding their differential seating assignments, subjects were explicitly told that different booklets had been assigned. Finally, since the specific arrangement of booklet pages constituted the commitment manipulation, all subjects were instructed not to open their booklets until told to do so. Once they began, they were further cautioned against skipping ahead or returning to pages already completed. All participating experimenters reported that subjects adhered to these procedures.

In each of the three remaining classes, the experimenter was introduced (by name only) to the subjects by the regular class instructor. The experimenter explained

that he would appreciate their cooperation in a task, and then proceeded to call the names of the pre-assigned subjects and distribute the questionnaire booklets. Unassigned students were sent to an adjoining room where they were dismissed by their instructor.

Questionnaire Booklets

Justification and commitment variables were manipulated by means of booklet format. That is, each of the four experimental treatment combinations were represented by four different questionnaire booklets. Justification for the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments was manipulated by the positive source named in two of the booklets (Simple Commitment/Authority-Based and Post-Encoding/Authority-Based conditions) and by the sufficient set of reasons stated in the other two (Simple Commitment/Reasons-Based and Post-Encoding/Reasons-Based conditions). Similarly, level of commitment was manipulated by the specific sequence of pages in each of the four booklets. In the Simple Commitment/Authority-Based and Simple Commitment/Reasons-Based conditions, the posttest attitude instrument was presented prior to the request to encode arguments, while in the Post-Encoding/Authority-Based and Post-Encoding/Reasons-Based conditions, the attitude measure was obtained after encoding. The content of each of the four questionnaire booklets is described in detail below.

The two Simple Commitment condition booklets began with a statement of specific task instructions. The Authority-Based booklet (Appendix D) contained the following statement:

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students. In other words, your task is to write three good arguments which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn the page and begin.

This request was signed by "Dr. James Gruning, Project Director and Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan." No reasons for complying with the task were stated. It should be noted that the departmental affiliation of "Dr. Gruning" was changed from Psychology, as originally pretested in Phase 1, to Political Science. At the time of Phase 3 data collection, there was a great deal of unfavorable publicity in the school newspaper directed at the Psychology Department of Michigan State University. Since the study design required that the source of the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments be perceived positively, and since it was felt that such a request would appear equally authoritative from a Professor of Political Science, this change was made.

The subject then turned the page with the expectation that he would write his three arguments. Instead, the following page contained the posttest attitude instrument, which began with the following instructions:

Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated. Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate spaces below.

Six evaluative seven-point polar-adjective scales were presented. Four of the scales were identical to those used in the Phase 2 pretest. These comprised the posttest attitude instrument. Two additional scales, Valuable-Worthless and Important-Trivial, were inserted in an attempt to further disassociate the two phases. Attitude change on the four original scales served as an index of self-persuasion arising from a commitment to encode belief-discrepant arguments.

Upon completing these attitude scales, the subject turned to the following page and was instructed to complete an authority manipulation check:

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. However, before you begin, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is how our "image" will influence the results that we get. You will recall that the source of the request to write your arguments was identified as . . .

The source of the request, Dr. James Gruning, and his academic credentials were restated. Subjects rated the source's perceived positiveness on the same seven-point scale used in Phase 1. Subjects then proceeded to write their arguments favoring the elimination of deferments on the final page. Simple Commitment subjects were also

requested to encode arguments, as subjects in both commitment conditions were tested in the same room.

The second Simple Commitment questionnaire booklet --i.e., the Reasons-Based booklet (Appendix E)--was similar in format to the Authority-Based booklet described above. Rather than specifying a source for the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments, the set of reasons listed earlier was presented along with the specific task instructions to write three arguments favoring the elimination of deferments. The following page contained the same posttest attitude instrument, which was then followed by a reasons manipulation check:

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. However, before you begin, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is the "sufficiency" of the reasons that we gave you to write your arguments. You will recall that you were given the following reasons to write your arguments . . .

The reasons given for encoding the belief-discrepant arguments were restated. Subjects then rated the sufficiency of the reasons on the same seven-point scale used in Phase 1. As before, subjects then proceeded to write their arguments.

The Simple Commitment variable was operationalized as follows. It was assumed that if a subject read the specific task instructions to encode belief-discrepant arguments and then proceeded to turn the page to begin

writing, he had committed himself to engage in belief-discrepant behaviors. Further evidence of commitment is provided by the subject's completion of the posttest attitude instrument. That is, the expressed purpose of the instrument, as understood by the subject, was to provide assistance in the analyses of the arguments that the subject was later to write. The Post-Encoding commitment variable was simply operationalized in terms of the subject's actually having written belief-discrepant arguments.

The two Post-Encoding condition booklets were nearly identical to the Simple Commitment booklets, and differed only in terms of page sequencing. The specific task instructions in the Authority-Based booklet (Appendix F) and in the Reasons-Based booklet (Appendix G) were identical to those described above. Unlike the Simple Commitment booklets, however, both Post-Encoding booklets required subjects to write their arguments immediately following the task instructions.

When the belief-discrepant arguments had been written, subjects in the two Post-Encoding conditions turned the page and completed the posttest attitude instrument and the appropriate justification manipulation check. The instructions for both instruments were modified, however, in keeping with the Post-Encoding manipulation. That is, the posttest attitude instrument was prefaced by the following:

Now that you have written your arguments, it may be helpful . . .

Instructions for the authority and reasons manipulation checks were similarly modified:

Again, thank you for your cooperation. This information will be very helpful. Now, we would like some advice . . .

The appropriate authority or reasons rating scale was then presented.

Control subjects were told that they were participating in a student opinion survey. The class instructor introduced the experimenter as a member of the Department of Communication. The control questionnaire booklet (Appendix H) contained five controversial issues which were to be rated on the posttest attitude instrument employed in the experimental booklets. With the exception of the experimental issue, these issues were different from those used in Phase 2. 31 subjects completed this task. Their pretest-posttest attitude change scores on the experimental issue were used to assess baseline attitude change.

It will be recalled that a total of 262 subjects were initially assigned to the four experimental treatment combinations. 208 subjects were in attendance when the Phase 3 questionnaire booklets were administered: 106 who were assigned to Open-Minded conditions and 102 who were assigned to Closed-Minded conditions. Of this total, eight subjects refused to comply with the request to encode

belief-discrepant arguments, and nine wrote either belief-consistent arguments opposing the elimination of draft deferments for college students or unacceptable arguments favoring the elimination of draft deferments along with the entire conscription system. Of these 17 subjects, seven were in Open-Minded conditions and ten were in Closed-Minded conditions. These subjects, along with three others who failed to complete the posttest attitude instrument were eliminated from the sample. Thus, a total of 188 experimental subjects successfully completed all phases of data collection.

Because Phase 3 data collection extended over a period of two days, it was not feasible to discuss the experiment with all subjects. Rather, the researcher chose to conduct an intensive debriefing session with the last class of subjects tested. None of these subjects reported any prior knowledge of the experiment, nor were any able to accurately state its purpose. Further, none perceived a link between the pretest and posttest phases of data collection. Most subjects expressed surprise when the actual nature of the study was disclosed by the experimenter.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

For all statistical tests, the .05 level of significance was required. Analysis of the data yielded the following results.

Pretest-Posttest Mean Attitude Change

Table 1 presents the mean pretest and posttest attitude scores and mean attitude change for subjects in the eight experimental conditions and the control group. Correlated t tests revealed that subjects in each of the experimental conditions underwent significant positive attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal position. That is, both simple commitment to encode, and actual encoding of belief-discrepant arguments favoring the elimination of draft deferments resulted in more favorable attitudes toward this position. No such change was observed among control group subjects ($t < 1$).

Table 1.--Mean Pretest and Posttest Attitude Scores and Mean Attitude Change for Subjects in the Eight Experimental Conditions and the Control Group.

Condition	Pretest	Posttest	Change
Simple Commitment			
Authority-Based			
High Dogmatic	9.85	12.75	+2.90**
Low Dogmatic	8.16	10.81	+2.65*
Reasons-Based			
High Dogmatic	5.92	8.50	+2.58****
Low Dogmatic	8.48	11.12	+2.64*
Post-Encoding			
Authority-Based			
High Dogmatic	7.30	11.17	+3.87***
Low Dogmatic	7.96	13.61	+5.65****
Reasons-Based			
High Dogmatic	8.13	14.43	+6.30****
Low Dogmatic	7.35	12.96	+5.61****
Control	7.81	8.65	+0.84

*p < .05 (two-tailed)

**p < .02 (two-tailed)

***p < .01 (two-tailed)

****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Comparison of Experimental Conditions with the Control Group

The mean attitude change scores of subjects in each of the eight experimental conditions were compared with the control group mean in accordance with a modified t test developed by Dunnett (Edwards, 1966). These comparisons indicated that mean attitude change for subjects in three of the four Post-Encoding conditions was significantly

greater than the control group mean. High and Low Dogmatic subjects in the Reasons-Based justification conditions and Low Dogmatic subjects in the Authority-Based justification condition differed significantly from the control group; the remaining five conditions did not.

Test of the Hypotheses

As indicated above, the following interaction hypotheses were tested in this study.

A. At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior:

Hypothesis 1A: Among those individuals given authority-based justification, Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2A: Among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals.

B. After encoding belief-discrepant arguments:

Hypothesis 1B: Among those individuals given authority-based justification, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals.

Hypothesis 2B: Among those individuals given reasons-based justification, Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Closed-Minded individuals.

Taken together, these hypotheses posit interactions between Open- and Closed-Mindedness, locus of justification, and level of commitment to engage in counterattitudinal communication behavior. The predicted effects are schematized in Table 2.

Table 2.--Schematic of Predicted Differences in Mean Attitude Change Scores.

	Simple Authority- Based	Commitment Reasons- Based	Post-Encoding Authority- Based	Reasons- Based
High Dogmatic				
Low Dogmatic	^	v	v	^

Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of attitude change scores for subjects in the eight experimental conditions. These measures were analyzed using a three-factor analysis of variance. The results of this analysis, summarized in Table 4, indicate that none of the hypothesized interactions were in the predicted direction, nor did any approach statistical significance. Thus, the data fail to provide support for the experimental hypotheses.

There was, however, a significant main effect for Commitment. Overall, those subjects who actually encoded belief-discrepant arguments underwent greater attitude change in the counterattitudinal direction than those subjects who merely committed themselves to the task. Since this relationship was not predicted a priori, the conservative Scheffé method was used to compare each of the four Post-Encoding conditions with each of the four Simple Commitment conditions. None of the sixteen pair-wise comparisons reached statistical significance.

Table 3.--Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Change Scores for Subjects in the Eight Experimental Conditions.

	Simple Commitment		Post-Encoding	
	Authority- Based	Reasons- Based	Authority- Based	Reasons- Based
High	$\bar{X}$ = 2.90	2.58	3.87	6.30
Dogmatic	S = 4.95	2.90	5.72	6.00
	$\underline{n}$ = 20	24	23	23
Low	$\bar{X}$ = 2.63	2.64	5.65	5.61
Dogmatic	S = 5.47	5.66	6.23	5.21
	$\underline{n}$ = 27	25	23	23

Table 4.--Summary Analysis of Variance of Mean Attitude Change Scores for Subjects in the Eight Experimental Conditions.

Source of Variation	ss	df	MS	F
Dogmatism (A)	2.2257	1	2.2257	0.0742
Justification (B)	12.6884	1	12.6884	0.4233
Commitment (C)	333.0289	1	333.0289	11.1095*
A X B	13.5071	1	13.5071	0.4506
A X C	4.9376	1	4.9376	0.1647
B X C	21.2396	1	21.2396	0.7085
A X B X C	22.9694	1	22.9694	0.7662
Error		180	29.9770	

*p < .001

Perceived Sufficiency of the
Justification Manipulations

Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of subjects' ratings of the perceived positiveness of the Authority-Based justification manipulation. With the exception of the High Dogmatic subjects in the Post-Encoding condition, who perceived the named authority "slightly positively," subjects' ratings tended to fall at the neutral position.

Table 5.--Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Positiveness of the Authority-Based Justification Manipulation.

	Simple Commitment	Post-Encoding
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X} = 4.50$ $S = 1.02$ $\underline{n} = 20$	5.39 0.97 23
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X} = 4.33$ $S = 1.23$ $\underline{n} = 27$	4.48 1.14 23

It was assumed that High Dogmatic subjects would perceive the named authority as relatively more sufficient justification for compliance with the request to encode belief discrepant arguments than Low Dogmatic subjects. Multiple t tests revealed that in the two Post-Encoding conditions, High Dogmatic subjects did perceive the named authority significantly more positively than did the Low

Dogmatic subjects ($t = 2.85$; $df = 44$; $p < .01$, two-tailed). Although also in the predicted direction, the difference was nonsignificant in the Simple Commitment conditions ($t < 1$).

The means and standard deviations of subjects' ratings of the perceived sufficiency of the Reasons-Based justification manipulation are found in Table 6. Here, as well, subjects' ratings tended to fall at the neutral position.

Table 6.--Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Sufficiency of the Reasons-Based Justification Manipulation.

	Simple Commitment	Post-Encoding
High Dogmatic	$\bar{X} = 4.75$ $S = 1.36$ $n = 24$	4.74 1.51 23
Low Dogmatic	$\bar{X} = 4.96$ $S = 1.43$ $n = 25$	4.35 1.78 23

It was assumed that Low Dogmatic subjects would perceive the given reasons as relatively more sufficient justification for compliance with the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments than High Dogmatic subjects. In the two Simple Commitment conditions there was a nonsignificant trend in the predicted direction ($t < 1$);

however, this trend was not present in the two Post-Encoding conditions.

The rationale for the experimental hypotheses was based on an important underlying assumption: that Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations. That is, it was posited that High Dogmatic subjects would perceive the Authority-Based manipulation as relatively sufficient justification for compliance with the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments, and the Reasons-Based manipulation as relatively insufficient justification. Conversely, it was posited that Low Dogmatic subjects would perceive the Authority-Based manipulation as relatively insufficient justification for compliance, and the Reasons-Based manipulation as relatively sufficient justification.

Given these predicted perceptual differences, it was suggested that in the four Simple Commitment conditions those individuals perceiving relatively sufficient justification would experience little dissonance-arousal, and consequently would undergo little self-persuasion or attitude change. Conversely, those individuals perceiving relatively insufficient justification would experience greater dissonance-arousal, and consequently would undergo more self-persuasion. On the other hand, a direct relationship was posited between perceived justification and

magnitude of self-persuasion in the four Post-Encoding conditions. Thus, in effect, support for the experimental hypotheses was dependent upon the assumption that Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the two justification manipulations.

Although evidence for the proposed differences in perception of the justification manipulations was present to some degree in six of the eight experimental conditions, only one comparison reached statistical significance (i.e., ratings of the Authority-Based manipulation in the two Post-Encoding conditions). Thus, it appears that the failure to support the experimental hypotheses may rest, at least partially, on the failure to produce conditions under which Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Although subjects in each of the eight experimental conditions underwent significant positive attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal position, the data failed to provide support for the experimental hypotheses. None of the hypothesized interactions were in the predicted direction, nor did any approach statistical significance. However, those subjects who actually encoded belief-discrepant arguments did undergo greater attitude change than those subjects who simply committed themselves to the task.

It was suggested in Chapter III that the failure to support the experimental hypotheses may rest, at least partially, on the failure to produce conditions under which Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations.

Several factors may account for this finding. First, subjects' ratings of the perceived positiveness of the Authority-Based justification manipulation tended to fall at the neutral position. Only High Dogmatic subjects

in the Post-Encoding condition assigned a higher rating (i.e., "slightly positively") to the authority used to justify counterattitudinal encoding. Similar findings were obtained for ratings of the perceived sufficiency of the Reasons-Based justification manipulation. In all conditions, subjects' ratings tended to fall at the neutral position.

Given such mediocre ratings, the failure to find the predicted perceptual differences between Open- and Closed-Minded subjects may have been due to the particular authority and reasons employed in this study. That is, the named authority may have lacked the requisite degree of credibility to be perceived by the High Dogmatic subjects as sufficiently justifying compliance with the request to encode belief-discrepant arguments. Although Closed-Minded individuals may be relatively more dependent upon authority than Open-Minded individuals, a minimal level of credibility may be needed to trigger dependence upon a specific authority in situations of this type. Lacking this critical level of credibility, it seems reasonable that High Dogmatic subjects probably did not perceive the named authority as providing any more justification for compliance than did Low Dogmatic subjects.

Similarly, the given reasons may not have been of a quality necessary to elicit perceptions of sufficient justification on the part of the Low Dogmatic subjects.

While a named authority would probably not constitute sufficient justification for these subjects, neither would a set of reasons judged to be lacking in validity. Therefore, under these conditions, Low Dogmatic subjects probably did not perceive the given reasons as any more sufficient justification for compliance than did High Dogmatic subjects.

In effect, what has been suggested is that neither the named authority nor the given set of reasons may have been of sufficient credibility or quality to elicit differential perceptions on the part of Open- and Closed-Minded subjects. Minimal levels of both variables may be needed to elicit the predicted relative differences in perception.

It should be noted that both the named authority and the given set of reasons were pretested prior to their use as justification manipulations. While their pretest ratings were not very high, they were superior to the others tested. It was thought that since the pretesting session merely simulated a counterattitudinal encoding exercise, and that subjects' level of dogmatism had not been controlled, their credibility and quality would prove sufficient in the actual experimental situation. This assumption apparently was not warranted, however.

An alternative explanation is possible. The Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations may, in fact, have been of sufficient credibility

and quality. However, at least some subjects may have failed to attend to the named authority and given set of reasons in the manner anticipated.

Upon debriefing, several subjects reported that they became aware of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations only when they completed the appropriate manipulation check. Having assumed that this was "just another experiment," they paid little attention to the specific task instructions which contained the justification manipulation. They simply complied with the general request to perform a task--in this case, the encoding of belief-discrepant arguments. Only upon having completed the manipulation check, which in each case followed the posttest attitude instrument, did they become cognizant of the specific locus of justification for the request. This lack of awareness could, in part, account for both the neutral ratings assigned to the justification manipulations and the failure to obtain the predicted differential perceptions by Open- and Closed-Minded subjects.

The above observation underscores the need to deal effectively with two important problems common to behavioral research in general, and in particular, attitude research conducted within a university setting. The first problem concerns a subject's all too willing compliance with the demand characteristics of a behavioral experiment, a situation studied by Orne (1962). The second involves the

nature of subjects typically employed in attitude research. These subjects, more times than not, are students at the sophomore level who have already participated in several attitude studies involving to some degree experimenter deception. Not only are they "experiment-wise," but they often tend to display an understandable "lets get it over with" attitude when confronted with each new experimental situation. Thus, subjects' lack of awareness of the specific loci of justification in this study may have stemmed from two antecedent conditions: a general willingness to assume the role of "cooperative subject," or more likely, an eagerness to complete an unwanted task for which they perceived little freedom to avoid. In any case, future research must attempt to minimize the undesirable effects of both problems, especially the latter, which is more amenable to experimenter control.

Therefore, the failure to produce conditions under which Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations may have been due to one of two factors, or a combination of both: neither the named authority nor the given set of reasons were of sufficient credibility or quality to elicit differential perceptions and/or subjects failed to attend to the specific justification manipulations in the manner anticipated.

A third explanation is possible. The assumption that Open- and Closed-Minded subjects would differentially perceive the sufficiency of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations may, in fact, not be tenable. Although there is empirical support for Rokeach's notion that Closed-Minded individuals are relatively more dependent upon authority than Open-Minded individuals (Powell, 1962), it is possible that this difference in dependence may not necessarily result in differential perceptions of the sufficiency of authorities and reasons as loci of justification for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior. In brief, the assumption may overextend the theory of Open- and Closed-Mindedness. However, before discarding the assumption, it is the researcher's opinion that the potential gain, both theoretical and methodological, for our understanding of tolerance for inconsistency warrants replication of this study.

For this purpose, several procedural improvements are suggested by the above remarks. First, a highly credible authority and a valid set of reasons must be devised for use as justification manipulations. Both, however, must meet two constraints peculiar to this experimental paradigm: each must be relatively "pure"--i.e., for a given set of reasons, no particular individual or group should be linked to it--and each, especially the named authority, must be realistic. That is, it must appear

plausible to the subject that the named authority would request that he encode belief-discrepant arguments; and further, if subjects are to be tested in a classroom setting, the use of class time and university facilities must appear justified to the subject. It is conceivable that this desired realism may not have been attained for at least some subjects in this study.

Secondly, the experimenter must maximize the salience of the Authority-Based and Reasons-Based justification manipulations. That is, if subjects do not adequately attend to the specific justification manipulations, there is little likelihood of obtaining evidence of differential perception by Open- and Closed-Minded subjects.

Finally, effort should be made to secure a subject pool having little or no history of prior participation in attitude research. Use of experimentally-naive subjects could offset much of the difficulties discussed earlier.

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APPENDIX A

JUDGING INSTRUCTIONS

Part I

We need your assistance in pretesting some situations that will be used in future research. On the following pages you are asked to make a series of judgments, most of which are self-explanatory. Please consider each situation carefully and respond with the judgment that most accurately reflects your feelings about it. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your feelings. If you have questions about any of the judgments, raise your hand and we'll try to answer them. Now go ahead and begin.

Situation 1.

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given the following task instruction:

Dr. James Gruning, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, has asked that you write your three best arguments in favor of requiring students to spend a minimum of six out-of-class hours quarterly participating as subjects in behavioral research. Begin now. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the individual to whom the request is attributed; i.e., Dr. James Gruning, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan. How positively would you rate this individual as a source for this particular

request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring required out-of-class participation in behavioral research?

- _____ Very Positively
- _____ Quite Positively
- _____ Slightly Positively
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Negatively
- _____ Quite Negatively
- _____ Very Negatively

Situation 2

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given the following task instructions:

You are to write your three best arguments in favor of requiring students to spend a minimum of six out-of-class hours quarterly participating as subjects in behavioral research. Begin now. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the reasons given for making this request.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments favoring required out-of-class participation in behavioral research?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

Part II

Again assume that you are a subject in an experiment. You are asked to write several arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed. The specific issue that will be used may involve the question of requiring students to participate as subjects in behavioral research, or any one of a number of other issues. The kind of issue involved is not important here. Rather, we are asking you to judge either the adequacy of the reasons given to write these kinds of arguments or the source attributed to the request. Again, there are no right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your feelings. In the actual experiment, an appropriate request to write these arguments will be preceded by either one of the following sets of reasons, or a description of the source attributed to the request.

Situation 3

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of the arguments surrounding an important issue.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments

favoring a position to which you are opposed?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

Situation 4

This study is concerned with the reasons why people support or oppose certain issues of national interest. For each issue there are a number of arguments for and against the issue. You can help determine exactly what these arguments are by doing the following task.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments favoring a position to which you opposed?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

Situation 5

The students of Advertising 135 ("The Psychology of the Consumer") are asking you to do this task.

How positively would you rate this source for this kind of request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

- _____ Very Positively
- _____ Quite Positively
- _____ Slightly Positively
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Negatively
- _____ Quite Negatively
- _____ Very Negatively

APPENDIX B

JUDGING INSTRUCTIONS

Part I

We need your assistance in pretesting some situations that will be used in future research. On the following pages you are asked to make a series of judgments, most of which are self-explanatory. Please consider each situation carefully and respond with the judgment that most accurately reflects your feelings about it. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your feelings. If you have questions about any of the judgments, raise your hand and we'll try to answer them. Now go ahead and begin.

Situation 1.

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given the following task instructions:

A study group of Psychology 151 students at Michigan State has asked that you write your three best arguments in favor of requiring students to spend a minimum of six out-of-class hours quarterly participating as subjects in behavioral research. Begin now. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the individuals to whom the request is attributed; i.e., a study group of Psychology 151 students at Michigan State. How positively would you rate these

individuals as a source for this particular request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring required out-of-class participation in behavioral research?

- _____ Very Positively
- _____ Quite Positively
- _____ Slightly Positively
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Negatively
- _____ Quite Negatively
- _____ Very Negatively

Situation 2.

Assume that as a subject in an experiment, you are given the following task instructions:

You are to write your three best arguments in favor of requiring students to spend a minimum of six out-of-class hours quarterly participating as subjects in behavioral research. There are several reasons for writing these arguments. First, it is desirable to assess college students' attitudes, both pro and con, toward such a proposal. Second, it is good intellectual training to write arguments for unpopular positions. Finally, the issue is relevant and important for college students. Begin now. You have 20 minutes to write your arguments.

Now consider the reasons given for making this request. How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments favoring required out-of-class participation in behavioral research?

_____ Very Sufficiently
 _____ Quite Sufficient
 _____ Slightly Sufficient
 _____ Neutral
 _____ Slightly Insufficient
 _____ Quite Insufficient
 _____ Very Insufficient

Part II

Again assume that you are a subject in an experiment. You are asked to write several arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed. The specific issue that will be used may involve the question of requiring students to participate as subjects in behavioral research, or any one of a number of other issues. The kind of issue involved is not important here. Rather, we are asking you to judge either the adequacy of the reasons given to write these kinds of arguments or the source attributed to the request. Again, there are no right or wrong answers, only responses that reflect your feelings. In the actual experiment, an appropriate request to write these arguments will be preceded by either one of the following sets of reasons, or a description of the source attributed to the request.

Situation 3.

It has often been charged that the average person typically makes decisions on important issues without adequate knowledge of all the

relevant arguments. This study is intended to determine the extent to which college students are familiar with the arguments surrounding several important issues.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

Situation 4.

This study is concerned with the reasons why people support or oppose certain issues of national interest.

How sufficient would you perceive these reasons to be; i.e., how well do they support a request to write arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

Situation 5.

Michigan State television station WMSB, in association with the National Educational Television network (under the auspices of a grant from the Ford Foundation) are asking you to do this task.

How positively would you rate this source for this kind of request; i.e., a request to write arguments favoring a position to which you are opposed?

- _____ Very Positively
- _____ Quite Positively
- _____ Slightly Positively
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Negatively
- _____ Quite Negatively
- _____ Very Negatively

OPINION PROFILE

You are participating in an opinion survey being conducted by the Department of Communication. Because of the large size of our sample, we are asking that you record directly all your responses on the accompanying IBM Scoring Sheet with the pencil that has been provided.

Please be assured that all information will be kept strictly confidential. Only the research personnel directly involved in this survey will have access to it. All data will be analyzed in terms of group scores, and no person's responses will be singled out.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Part I

Appearing below are some issues about which people have different opinions. Each issue is followed by four items. Use these items to express your feelings about the issue. On your Scoring Sheet, please blacken the appropriate numbered space for each of the items.

There are no "correct" answers. We are interested only in your personal opinions about the issues.

Elimination of draft deferments for
college students.

1. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
2. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.
3. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.
4. Fair:UnFair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Establishment of a government bureau for the
censorship of all television programming.

5. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
6. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.
7. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.
8. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Required out-of-class student participation
in behavioral research.

9. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
10. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.
11. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable;
(4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable;
(7) Very Unfavorable.
12. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Use of armed force in controlling student
demonstrations.

13. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
14. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.
15. Favorable;Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable;
(4) Neither (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable;
(7) Very Unfavorable.
16. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Mandatory imprisonment of homosexuals

17. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
18. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither;
(5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.

19. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.
20. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Elimination of government controls on
advertising.

21. Good:Bad
(1) Very Good; (2) Good; (3) Slightly Good; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Bad; (6) Bad; (7) Very Bad.
22. Wise:Foolish
(1) Very Wise; (2) Wise; (3) Slightly Wise; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Foolish; (6) Foolish; (7) Very Foolish.
23. Favorable:Unfavorable
(1) Very Favorable; (2) Favorable; (3) Slightly Favorable; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfavorable; (6) Unfavorable; (7) Very Unfavorable.
24. Fair:Unfair
(1) Very Fair; (2) Fair; (3) Slightly Fair; (4) Neither; (5) Slightly Unfair; (6) Unfair; (7) Very Unfair.

Part II

Appearing below are some statements about which people have different opinions or beliefs. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by blackening the appropriate numbered space on your Scoring Sheet.

25. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
26. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

27. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
28. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
29. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
30. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
31. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
32. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
34. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
35. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
- (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

36. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
37. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our side.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
38. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those who one respects.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
39. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
40. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
41. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure that I am being understood.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
42. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.
43. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

44. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

(1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Mildly Agree; (4) Mildly Disagree; (5) Disagree; (6) Strongly Disagree.

APPENDIX D

NAME _____

CLASS _____

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of information required, each person will be asked to complete only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much appreciated.

Do not open your booklet until you are instructed to do so.

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

Task Instructions

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

In other words, your task is to write three good arguments which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn the page and begin.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James Gruning". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and
Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

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Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

Worth- less	<u>Very Worth- less</u>	<u>Worth- less</u>	<u>Slightly Worth- less</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Valuable</u>	<u>Val.</u>	<u>Very Val.</u>	Valuable
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad
Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favor- able	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavor- able
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Trivial	<u>Very Triv.</u>	<u>Triv.</u>	<u>Slightly Triv.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Imp.</u>	<u>Imp.</u>	<u>Very Imp.</u>	Important

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. However, before you begin, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is how our "image" will influence the results that we get.

You will recall that the source of the request to write your arguments was identified as:

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

How "positively" did you perceive this source to be?

- _____ Very Positively
- _____ Quite Positively
- _____ Slightly Positively
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Negatively
- _____ Quite Negatively
- _____ Very Negatively

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On this page, please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

1.

2.

3.

APPENDIX E

NAME _____

CLASS _____

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of information required, each person will be asked to complete only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much appreciated.

Do not open your booklet until you are instructed to do so.

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

Task Instructions

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of the arguments surrounding an important issue.

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students. In other words, your task is to write three good arguments which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn the page and begin.

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Before you write your arguments, it may be helpful in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

Worth- less	<u>Very</u> Worth- less	<u>Worth-</u> less	<u>Slightly</u> Worth- less	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Valuable	<u>Val.</u>	<u>Very</u> Val.	Valuable
Good	<u>Very</u> Good	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly</u> Good	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Bad	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very</u> Bad	Bad
Fair	<u>Very</u> Fair	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly</u> Fair	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Unfair	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very</u> Unfair	Unfair
Favor- able	<u>Very</u> Fav.	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly</u> Fav.	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Unfav.	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very</u> Unfav.	Unfavor- able
Wise	<u>Very</u> Wise	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly</u> Wise	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Foolish	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very</u> Foolish	Foolish
Trivial	<u>Very</u> Triv.	<u>Triv.</u>	<u>Slightly</u> Triv.	<u>Nei-</u> ther	<u>Slightly</u> Imp.	<u>Imp.</u>	<u>Very</u> Imp.	Important

Your arguments are to be written on the next page. However, before you begin, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is the "sufficiency" of the reasons that we gave you to write your arguments.

You will recall that you were given the following reasons to write your arguments:

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of the arguments surrounding an important issue.

How "sufficient" did you perceive these reasons to be?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

On this page, please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

1.

2.

3.

APPENDIX F

NAME _____

CLASS _____

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of information required, each person will be asked to complete only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much appreciated.

Do not open your booklet until you are instructed to do so.

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

Task Instructions

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

In other words, your task is to write three good arguments which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn the page and begin.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James Gruning", is written over a horizontal line.

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director and
Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

On this page, please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

1.

2.

3.

Now that you have written your arguments, it may be helpful in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

Worth- less	<u>Very Worth- less</u>	<u>Worth- less</u>	<u>Slightly Worth- less</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Valuable</u>	<u>Val.</u>	<u>Very Val.</u>	Valuable
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad
Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favor- able	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavor- able
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Trivial	<u>Very Triv.</u>	<u>Triv.</u>	<u>Slightly Triv.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Imp.</u>	<u>Imp.</u>	<u>Very Imp.</u>	Important

Again, thank you for your cooperation. This information will be very helpful. Now, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is how our "image" will influence the results that we get.

You will recall that at the beginning of this booklet, the source of the request to write your arguments was identified as:

Dr. James Gruning
Project Director
and Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

How "positively" did you perceive this source to be?

_____	Very Positively
_____	Quite Positively
_____	Slightly Positively
_____	Neutral
_____	Slightly Negatively
_____	Quite Negatively
_____	Very Negatively

APPENDIX G

NAME _____

CLASS _____

Your class is one of several at Michigan State University selected for study. Due to the relatively large amount of information required, each person will be asked to complete only a small part of the overall task. Therefore, different booklets have been assigned.

Thank you for your cooperation. Your help is very much appreciated.

Do not open your booklet until you are instructed to do so.

It is important that everyone begin at the same time.

Task Instructions

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of the arguments surrounding an important issue.

Please write your three best arguments in favor of the elimination of draft deferments for college students. In other words, your task is to write three good arguments which strongly support the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

You have 20 minutes to write your arguments. Please turn the page and begin.

On this page, please write your three best arguments in favor or the elimination of draft deferments for college students.

1.

2.

3.

Now that you have written your arguments, it may be helpful in the analyses of them to know how you feel about the idea that draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

Please indicate your feelings by checking the appropriate spaces below:

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

Worth- less	<u>Very Worth- less</u>	<u>Worth- less</u>	<u>Slightly Worth- less</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Valuable</u>	<u>Val.</u>	<u>Very Val.</u>	Valuable
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad
Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favor- able	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavor- able
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Trivial	<u>Very Triv.</u>	<u>Triv.</u>	<u>Slightly Triv.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Imp.</u>	<u>Imp.</u>	<u>Very Imp.</u>	Important

Again, thank you for your cooperation. This information will be very helpful. Now, we would like some advice. This study is the beginning of a much larger project that will be undertaken next month. One problem that we are concerned about is the "sufficiency" of the reasons that we gave you to write your arguments.

You will recall that at the beginning of this booklet, you were given the following reasons to write your arguments:

The complexities of today's world demand that every responsible individual be capable of intelligently assessing the conflicting arguments that surround all important issues. Perhaps the best insurance that an individual will make an intelligent assessment--and ultimately--take the best stand on a given issue, is that he first have a clear knowledge and understanding of all the relevant arguments. This exercise will enable you to demonstrate your knowledge and understanding of the arguments surrounding an important issue.

How "sufficient" did you perceive these reasons to be?

- _____ Very Sufficient
- _____ Quite Sufficient
- _____ Slightly Sufficient
- _____ Neutral
- _____ Slightly Insufficient
- _____ Quite Insufficient
- _____ Very Insufficient

APPENDIX H

Name _____

Class _____

The Department of Communication is surveying student opinion on several current issues that are receiving much attention in the news. Please express your honest, personal opinions, as that is the only way to know how students really feel about these issues.

Please print your name and class section at the top of the page. This information will be used only as an aid in data analysis. All responses will be analyzed as part of a group, and at no time will any person's responses be singled out.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Please indicate how you feel about the following issues by checking the appropriate spaces. There are no "correct" answers. We are interested only in your personal opinions.

Legalization of Marijuana

Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favorable	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavorable
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad

Elimination of Draft Deferments for College Students

Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favorable	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavorable
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad

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Federal Control of the Sale and Possession of Firearms

Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favorable	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavorable
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad

Lowering the Voting Age to 18 Years

Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favorable	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavorable
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad

Establishment of a National Popular-Vote Primary as a
Method of Choosing Presidential Candidates

Fair	<u>Very Fair</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Slightly Fair</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfair</u>	<u>Unfair</u>	<u>Very Unfair</u>	Unfair
Favor- able	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Slightly Fav.</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Unfav.</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	Unfavor- able
Wise	<u>Very Wise</u>	<u>Wise</u>	<u>Slightly Wise</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Foolish</u>	<u>Foolish</u>	<u>Very Foolish</u>	Foolish
Good	<u>Very Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Slightly Good</u>	<u>Nei- ther</u>	<u>Slightly Bad</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Very Bad</u>	Bad

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