

ABSTRACT

THE CASTILLIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE REIGN OF PEDRO I, 1350-1369

By

Benjamin Fredrick Taggie

The main purpose of this thesis is an attempt to explore the significance of the foreign policy of Pedro I of Castille, 1350-1369. In compiling my evidence, I have attempted whenever possible to utilize primary sources. In this case, the archives of Aragon and France as well as numerous published documents of Rymer have been most helpful. In addition to these primary sources, I have found several excellent secondary sources which approached the subject from a non-Castillian point of view. Examples of these are Roland Delachenal's and Peter Edward Russell's versions of the period.

The major findings of the thesis indicate that during the nineteen years of Pedro's reign, two major themes developed in Castillian political life. By no means are they unrelated to each other. The first was the attempt of Pedro of Castille to establish absolutism in his kingdom. In doing so, he alienated the Castillian nobility who eventually found a leader in Enrique of Trastamara, Pedro's bastard brother, who would support their feudal independence. A second theme was the dramatic diplomatic battle between France and England for close diplomatic ties with the Middle

Kingdom. The great prize at stake was Castillian maritime assistance in the Hundred Years' War, which both France and England realized would soon be resumed. A most important consideration was the Castillian fleet, which by the middle of the fourteenth century, had already earned the reputation of being one of the finest in Europe.

Pedro, following the example of his father, Alfonso XI, broke the traditional ties which Castille had had with France and entered into an alliance with the English. For this reason, the French took up the cause of Enrique of Trastamara. The results were a long and drawn-out civil war in which the French remained consistent in their support of Enrique. The English, on the other hand, wavered for various reasons in their support of Pedro. The result was a French and Trastamaran victory, the overthrow and murder of Pedro and a great diplomatic victory for France. The Trastamaran success also represented a victory for feudalism, and consequently a setback for strong central government--the direction in which Castille had been moving for most of the fourteenth century. As a result, the strong government would not reappear in Castille until the middle of the fifteenth century.

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INTRODUCTION

In the year 1372 Enrique of Trastamara, king of Castille since 1369, was able, finally, to honor one of the major stipulations of his alliance with France: the provision of Castillian ships to the French navy in its struggle against the English. In June of 1372, a fleet of twelve Castillian galleys encountered a much larger English fleet off the French coast of La Rochelle. The engagement was a dramatic demonstration of the incapacity of armed merchant ships against the superior Castillian galleys and their professional crews. The Castillian attack was completely successful; the entire English fleet was destroyed.

In the process the new governor of Aquitaine, John Hastings, Earl of Pembroke, was taken prisoner and 20,000 pounds intended for the salary of the garrisons in Gascony were seized. In the following days, the town of La Rochelle itself fell into the hands of the Franco-Castillian army. By September, it became apparent that the English fleet was incapable of relieving La Rochelle. The Castillian fleet returned triumphantly to Castille; there, Pembroke and some seventy other English and Gascon knights were paraded through Burgos, much to the pleasure of the new king of Castille.

In the following years, Castillian fleets would

return time and again to ravage the coast of England. Parliamentary records clearly demonstrate the great devastation brought to Cornwall and the Cornish coasts in 1377.¹ This was the price that the English paid for drastic diplomatic failure which had accompanied their foreign policy in the Iberian Peninsula during the 1360's. At the same time, it was a clear vindication of the policy of the French king, Charles V, who had sternly supported Enrique of Trastamara through the bitter years of his struggle to obtain the throne of Castille from his half brother.

This French victory and English defeat clearly turned the tide of the Hundred Years War in the 1370's. It was not an inevitable conclusion of the political developments of the 1360's but rather it represented a brilliant diplomatic victory for the French and a tragic diplomatic failure for the English. On the part of the French, it can be said they pursued a policy of consistency, constantly keeping their goals clearly in perspective, never waivering from their objective. They sought the attainment of political influence in Castillian politics, and, most importantly, the support of the Castillian fleet. For the English, their failure was the result of diplomatic blunders precipitated for the most part by the inadequate foreign policy of the Black Prince. That inadequacy was also intensified

¹Thomas Rymer, ed. Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Acta Publica (London: 1825), Vol. III (i), p.965.

by the narrow-mindedness of the English Parliament and the lack of foresight of the English king, Edward III.

The key to understanding the total significance of these political developments must be a comprehensive study of the foreign policy of Castille during the reign of King Pedro I, king of Castille from 1350 until his murder in 1369. Consequently, the purpose of this thesis is not to explore the personality of this extremely controversial, colorful, and turbulent king. It is not an attempt to vindicate him, as many like the French historian Merimee have attempted--but with only limited success. It is, however, an attempt to show what a pivotal period in Western European history the reign of Pedro was. In the case of Castille, it was of great significance. The usurpation of the crown by Enrique of Trastamara over Pedro I was a victory for the feudal nobility over the forces of strong, centralized monarchy. For the tyrant he may or may not have been, Pedro was certainly a strong king; a man who was leading Castille in the direction of strong central government. Enrique of Trastamara was, in contrast, a feudal king in every sense of the word. He generously bestowed royal lands and royal prerogatives on the great nobility of Castille. In return he obtained their support against the legitimate king; and thus, governmental centralization in Castille was to be set back for at least a century and a half.

The effects that this struggle had upon Western Europe can most clearly be seen in the development of the Hundred Years' War. Most certainly, the war went very badly for the English during the last years of the reign of Edward III. And though all the English setbacks cannot be attributed simply to the Franco-Castillian alliance, unquestionably, the Castillian aid of France, particularly her naval support, was a significant factor. The fact that the English clearly recognized this can be seen by the constant, but futile, endeavors of the English government for the next two decades to separate Castille from France. During this diplomatic struggle two themes emerge clearly; first, a French consistency, in contrast to a definite English inconsistency in their political relations with Castille; and secondly, within Castille the struggle of a strong monarchy against feudal nobility. These two paramount themes will be further elaborated upon.²

²Ramon Menendez Pidal, Historia de Espana (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1966), Vol. xiv. pp. 56-144.

CHAPTER I

EARLY CONTACT BETWEEN CASTILLE AND ENGLAND

The place to begin this study is before the ascension of Pedro, during the last years of the reign of King Alfonso XI. It is during the 1340's that the English, with substantial success, made their first diplomatic venture into Castillian politics, and came very close to winning a brilliant victory. They were thwarted not only by the French but also by their economic shortcomings and a series of grave misfortunes, such as the untimely death of Joanna Plantagenet. It is necessary then to examine in more detail this early English diplomatic intervention, but more importantly, to examine in detail the diplomatic orientation of Castille during the reign of Alfonso XI.

For a long period following the Moorish invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 and their consequent victory over the Visigoths, the primary concern of the remaining Christian states was initially sheer survival, followed by an eventual attempt to reconquer the Peninsula from their Moorish enemies. Certainly the fervor of the Reconquista was the primary motivating factor in Peninsular politics until the thirteenth century. By that time the Moorish territorial holdings had been reduced to the kingdom of

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Granada in the extreme southern portion of the Peninsula. Because of this the only direct contact which then existed between Christians and Moslems in the Peninsula was along the southern frontier of Castille. Even in Castille by the reign of Alfonso X, the Wise (1252-1284), the conflict between Christians and Moors had been surpassed as the critical issue in Spanish political life by a struggle between the monarchy and the nobility. This was to remain the predominant theme of Castillian history for the next two centuries.

It was during the reign of Alfonso X, an exceptional scholar and skillful soldier, that Roman law with all its ramifications for a strong, centralized government was introduced into Castillian political life. Since these monarchical doctrines were at variance with the ancient traditions of the nobles, the inevitable result of their introduction was the outbreak of civil war between king and nobility. The ambitions of the Castillian aristocracy were clearly seen in instances in which they tried to preserve their rights by fighting against their sovereign on the side of the infidel Moors of Granada and Morocco.

The most significant development in the last years of the reign of Alfonso X was a Moslem invasion, which though successfully beaten off, saw the death of the heir to the Castillian throne, the son of Alfonso the Wise, Fernando de la Cerda. According to the laws of succession

[illegible]

enacted by Alfonso, the crown was then to pass to the eldest son of the dead Fernando. However, this did not suit Alfonso's second son, Sancho, who alleged the superiority of his own claim. He did not fail to support his pretensions by promising favors to the dissatisfied nobles, and consequently, procured for himself a strong backing. Thus the last six years of the reign of Alfonso the Wise saw Castille plunged into bloody civil war with the king in support of his grandson Alfonso on one side, and opposed by Sancho and the Castillian nobility on the other.

Those elements which supported Sancho were really fighting for their own independence and feudal authority. This was very clear by the concessions which they forced from Sancho as early as 1282. In that year, Sancho issued a decree which justified insurrection against the illegal acts of the king; it allowed nobles to bring judges and royal officials to trial for maladministration, even allowing the death penalty to be inflicted upon such officers. With the aid of this rebellious nobility, then, Sancho was able to set aside his father's will and become king Sancho IV (1284-1295). Once in possession of the throne, Sancho showed a disposition to check the turbulence of the nobles and tried to recover some of the political authority he had bestowed on them during the years of his insurrection against his father. He was an energetic ruler and was able to put down his enemies with a stern hand. On one occasion,

bathing his hands in blood, he ordered the execution of 4,000 supporters of his nephew, Alfonso, the son of Fernando de la Cerda, his greatest challenger for the throne. Those hostile to Sancho once again went as far as enlisting the aid of the Moslems against him, but without success.

Sancho IV was succeeded by his nine-year-old son, Ferdinand IV, who reigned from 1295 to 1312. The greatest adversary of Ferdinand was his uncle, Juan, who renewed his pretension for the throne of Castille. This act once again furnished the rebellious nobility with an opportunity to rebel against legitimate government. It was only through the skillful regency and granting of concession by Maria de Molina, wife of Sancho and mother of Ferdinand IV, that the Castillian throne was preserved for her son. When Ferdinand came of age, he proved himself an ineffectual ruler, and although he made several successful campaigns against the Moslems in the south, he died having failed to solve the problems of internal disturbance. As his heir, he left a one-year-old son, Alfonso XI, who was to reign from 1312 to 1350, and who, according to one historian, rated as one of the greatest kings in the history of Castille.³ He unquestionably would prove himself to be the most capable Castillian king of the fourteenth century.

Again, it was Maria de Molina, acting as regent,

³Charles E. Chapman, History of Spain, (New York: The Free Press, 1918), p. 116.

[illegible]

who preserved the throne for Alfonso XI until he attained his fourteenth birthday in 1322. From the time Alfonso began to rule in his own name, he displayed the combined characteristics of tyranny, benevolence, skill, cunning and prudence. One of his very first political moves was to call one of his uncles, who at that time was his greatest challenge to the throne, to a meeting. It was called under the pretense of working out agreements between the two parties, but no sooner had his uncle fallen into his hands than the young monarch ordered his arrest and execution. Through this act, and others similar to it, Alfonso intimidated his enemies.

He was first obliged to join one faction of the nobility against another. Using this force to destroy one, he would then utilize his strength against those who had been his supporters. To some he dealt out harshness, to others, mercy. Soon the nobility had been once again returned to a state of obedience which it had not known for many generations. Realizing that the inactive nobles were only temporarily subdued and that they would once more prove to be a great danger to his royal and absolutist ambitions, he turned to a program used effectively by many monarchs before and after him: a war of conquest. He directed the energies of the Castillian nobility into a war against the Moors of Granada, which could not only be utilized as an outlet for the energies of these restless

men, but also for the enhancement of his own glory and the expansion of his kingdom as well. Thus arms which for a long time had not been exercised for anything except civil disorder were turned with great success against the Moorish neighbors to the south.

As a general, Alfonso XI proved himself to be one of the most capable in the history of Castille; he did not hesitate to demand from the clergy sacrifices which at other times would have compromised the tranquility of his kingdom.⁴ His war against the Moors, which took on the characteristics of a crusade, justified his actions and no protests were raised against the acts of Alfonso. The first great danger which confronted the king was a large invading army from the Moors of North Africa, sent to help their brothers in southern Spain. On October 29, 1340, near Taribu on the shores of the River Salado, Alfonso destroyed this invading army and won one of the most brilliant victories in the then 500 year old war between Moors and Christians. Following his great victory, Alfonso pursued his success by attacking the city of Algeciras. After a long siege, the city fell to him on the 26th of March, 1344. From there, he pressed against the Moorish stronghold of Gibraltar. Then, at a moment when success was about to be his, the black plague, which had diminished the ranks of his army, attacked the king himself.

⁴Prosper Merimee, Histoire de Don Pedro 1^{er}, Roi de Castille (9th ed; Paris: Charpentier, Libraire-Editeur, 1865), p. 38.

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It had run rampant throughout Europe since 1347 and did not distinguish aristocrat or commoner. The king succumbed at his camp on Good Friday, March 27, 1350, his death plunging all Spain into mourning. Even the Moslems paid homage to their great fallen enemy.

The following day Alfonso's fifteen-year-old son, Pedro, the first of Castille to bear that name, was proclaimed king, and for the next nineteen years a significant story in the diplomatic history of Western Europe can be observed. However, before we proceed on to the reign of Pedro, it is necessary to have a look at some diplomatic developments that had transpired during the reign of Alfonso XI.

The main energies of Alfonso were directed initially toward subduing the Castillian nobility, and then expanding his kingdom at the expense of the Moors of Granada. His foreign relations with Portugal, with whom he was bound by a marriage alliance through his wife, Maria, were for the most part cordial. His relations with Aragon did not yet show the great hostility which would characterize the following reign.

The really significant diplomatic activities of Alfonso, however, were directed towards his relationships with the two great adversaries of the Hundred Years' War--France and England. It is to his relationship with these two nations that we will direct our attention. The cultural influence of France upon Castillian life can be traced back to the

11th century. But it was the introduction of the Cluniac order into Castille that intensified the relationship between the two kingdoms. The Cluniacs were attracted to Castille by the growing importance of Santiago de Compostela. In return the reputation of the Cluniacs attracted the interest and attention of the Iberian monarchs. "In the 11th century the Cluniac monks were imported from France because the kings deemed them better fitted to deal with divine duties."⁵ It was Alfonso VI who chartered the great Cluniac monasteries of Sahagun (1079) and San Juan de la Pena (1090). "By the end of his reign the entire Church hierarchy was French, and most of the bishops were products of Cluniac training."⁶ At the same time large numbers of French merchants entered Castille to capitalize on the trade opportunities to be derived from the thousands of pilgrims making the journey to Santiago. "We know for example, that Jaca, founded in 1077, had a population of about two thousand in the year 1137, 78 per cent of whom were listed as being of French origin."⁷ A further testimony to the great

⁵Americo Castro, The Spaniards (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 165.

⁶Gabriel Jackson, The Making of Medieval Spain (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 57.

⁷Ibid., p. 57.

influence of France in medieval Spain is the fact that the word "Spanish" or espanol is of Provencal origin.⁸

With these factors in mind it is not surprising that close political ties between the two kingdoms would soon follow. There existed an informal alliance between France and Castille in the thirteenth century in the form of marriages and treaties.⁹ But it was not until the fourteenth century that a true alliance was established between the two kingdoms. The French were able to persuade the Castillian regency to agree to a treaty of friendship between the House of Valois and the Castillian dynasty. This act was agreed to by both houses on the 8th of November, 1317.¹⁰ It was also agreed as part of this act that the king of Castille would marry Isabel, third daughter of King Philip V of France. This project, however, was forgotten and the king eventually married Maria of Portugal, the daughter of King Alfonso XI.¹¹ Subsequently began the diplomatic combat between England and France which characterized Castillian politics for half a century. Both sides sought to enlist the aid of the powerful Iberian kingdom on

⁸"El etnico espanol: un provenzalismo en castellano," Estudios de toponimia y lexicografia (Barcelona, 1948), pp. 13-48, as cited by Castro, The Spaniards, p. 159.

⁹Georges Daumet, Etude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castille au XIV^e et au XV^e Siècles (Paris: Librairie Emile Bouillon, Editeur, 1898), p. iii.

¹⁰French National Archives, V. 601, n. 29.

¹¹Georges Daumet, Etude sur l'Alliance, p. 2.

their side. Of course, the greatest prize sought by both the English and the French was the Castillian fleet of superb galleys manned by expert seamen. Its presence on either side would unquestionably tip the maritime balance in the ensuing war for supremacy of Western Europe.

Edward III took the initiative. On the 14th of June, 1335, he dispatched emissaries to the court of Alfonso XI to propose a marriage between his daughter Elizabeth, and the new heir to Castille, the future Pedro I.¹² At that time, Alfonso said that his son was too young to even think of marriage, and though he received the English emissaries cordially and granted them a warm reception, it was the French who eventually drew first blood in this diplomatic combat in the Central Kingdom.

In 1336, a treaty was signed between France and Castille in which the Castillian king promised military aid to Philip VI of France.¹³ Quite possibly, it resulted from the fact that during that year Alfonso XI was faced by a major insurrection of his nobility. The revolt was led by one of the most powerful nobles of Castille, Juan Nunez de Lara, son of Don Fernando de la Cerda, and a grandson of Alfonso the Wise as well as a member of the royal house of

¹²Thomas Rymer, ed., Foedera, conventiones, litterae et acta publica (London: 1825), II (iii), p. 128.

¹³French National Archives, Paris, J 601, nos. 33 and 34.

Castille. It can be assumed that Alfonso believed that France might render aid to the rebel nobles, and consequently chose to foster at that time an alliance with the French.

In the following years, Castillian ships rendered valuable assistance to the French in their struggle with the English. Nevertheless, Alfonso was able to maintain cordial relations with the court of Edward III. In 1343, the English government once more undertook seriously a diplomatic campaign which was directed at the prospect of undermining French influence in Castille. Toward the end of the summer of that year, two English noblemen, Henry of Lancaster and William Montague, presented themselves to the Castillian court in Algeciras. They came under the pretense of joining the siege of that city, but in reality, they were distinguished diplomats in the service of Edward III. They had been instructed to initiate negotiations that would lead to an Anglo-Castillian alliance.¹⁴ It was not long before these activities of the English became known at the French court. Subsequently, the French monarch once more took vigorous action to strengthen his alliance with Castille, paying particular attention to the formation of a marriage alliance between a French princess and the heir to the Castillian throne. In their endeavor the French enlisted

¹⁴Peter Edward Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada. Las Bodas de Pedro I de Castilla y Juana Plantagenet," Anuario de Estudios Medievales (Barcelona: 1965), Vol. II, pp. 301-332.

the aid of the Avignon pope, Clement VI. In a letter dated March 14, 1343,¹⁵ the pope wrote to Gils de Albornaz, archbishop of Toledo, one of the most powerful figures in the government of Castille. In his letter, Clement clearly stated how pleasing such an alliance would be to the holy pontiff. Letters written in almost the same terms were sent to Queen Maria and to Pedro.¹⁶ A letter was written a month later by the pope to Gil de Albornaz in which he again begged the archbishop of Toledo to use all of his influence to make these negotiations successful.¹⁷ With the strong support of the pope and numerous Francophiles within Castille, the stage was set for a renewal and extension of the Franco-Castillian alliance.

On the 1st of July, 1345 an agreement was reached which contained three separate acts. The first act dealt with a renewal of the mutual defense pact between the two princes in which each promised to provide help for the other against their mutual enemies. At the same time the two parties agreed not to furnish aid to their mutual adversaries either directly or indirectly. For example, Alfonso would not allow Castillian knights to fight in the employment of the English king.¹⁸

¹⁵Vatican Reg., 138, n. mxxxviii, mxxxix, piece just., No. 7.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Vatican Reg., n. mxl, piece just., No. 9.

¹⁸French National Archives, J.602, no. 41.

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It is the second clause in the treaty which is most interesting. It specified that the donations made by King Alphonso XI to Dona Leonor de Guzman and to her sons were to maintain their perpetual value.¹⁹ The purpose of this clause was that Alfonso wished to protect the generous donations he had made to his mistress, Dona Leonor de Guzman, and to their numerous illegitimate children. It was clear that Alfonso was deeply concerned with safeguarding the generosity he had bestowed upon them and he wished to assure the validity of his gifts by support through an international act. This item was so important to Alfonso, that he stated clearly if this part of the agreement was not agreeable to the king of France, the entire treaty would be null and void.

Finally, the third act provided for the marriage of Pedro, the heir of Castille, to a French princess, Blanche of Navarre, thus binding together even more firmly the two houses. The dowry of the French princess was set at 300,000 florins. With the negotiations completed, the bishop of Sigunenza, who was one of the main promoters of the French alliance, informed the pope of the proposed marriage of the heir of Castille with Blanche of Navarre. Clement VI quickly communicated the news to the king and queen of France on the 27th of July, 1345.²⁰ Satisfied with the success of his

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Vatican Reg., 139, n. clxiv, clxv, piece just., No. 11.

influence, the sovereign pontiff, on the 12th of August, wrote to Alfonso to tell him how pleased he was and wished for lasting friendship between the kings of France and Castille.²¹ He also wrote letters of congratulations to Queen Maria and to the Prince Don Pedro, thanking them for having followed his advice.²² Other church dignitaries of France and Castille were sent similar letters of thanks from the pontiff.

The three acts, issued in Leon with the approval of Alfonso on the first of July, were sent to France and submitted to the king for approval. On the 11th of September he gave his ambassadors, who were still in Castille, full rights to swear to the alliance in his name.²³ On the 23rd of December, the delegates of the two kings met and swore to the alliance.²⁴ On the second of January, 1346, Alfonso, in the city of Madrid, confirmed the three documents in person.²⁵ It appeared that once more the French had won a major round in the diplomatic struggle for control of the Central Kingdom.

At the same time, however, that Alfonso was concluding an alliance with France, directed particularly

²¹Vatican Reg., 139, n. cclxxv, piece just., No. 14.

²²Ibid., n. cclxxvi, cclxxvii, piece just., No. 15.

²³French National Archives, J. 602, no. 455.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

against England, he was committing himself to marry his son Pedro to an English princess. To some historians this bit of diplomatic duplicity on the part of Alfonso is totally bewildering.²⁶ Their only explanation for this sudden change in the thinking of Alfonso XI is that the English had bought him off by offering him a greater sum of money. Unfortunately, they had not taken the time to examine thoroughly the sources in the English Chancellery, and particularly the documents published by Thomas Rymer. In reality, Alfonso's drastic change in policy was the result of years of arduous diplomatic efforts by the English, which had begun seriously in 1343. It becomes necessary, then, to examine in full detail the events which transpired since that English offensive of 1343, and how it resulted within the next three years in Alfonso being swayed from his French allies into an alliance with the English.

As was mentioned earlier, it was in 1343 that the English government undertook a serious diplomatic effort to influence the Castillian court. In that year, two distinguished English nobles, Henry of Lancaster, count of Derby, and William Montague, count of Salisbury, appeared before the walls of Algeciras. According to the chronicle of Alfonso XI²⁷ these two Englishmen played a very important part in the campaign. Upon arriving at the Castillian camp, they

²⁶Daumet, p. 16.

²⁷Francisco Cerda y Rico, ed., Cronica del Rey Don Alfonso XI (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles, 1875). Vol. 67, p. 54.

secretly presented to the monarch letters from Edward III in which he named them special emissaries to discuss with Alfonso XI the possibility of a marriage of Pedro to one of the daughters of the English king. The king of Castille answered that he was ready to begin negotiations concerning this matter.²⁸ This reply of Alfonso was very significant because of the drastic change it represented in Castillian foreign policy. Since the year 1336 he had been a military ally of Philip of France, as has already been mentioned. He had during those years between 1336 and 1343 rendered substantial military assistance to his ally. Upon receiving an affirmative answer from Alfonso, Derby and Salisbury quickly abandoned their military activities in Andalucia, and returned to England to give the results of their mission to their monarch.

The English government did not waste any time in following through on this diplomatic possibility. On March 27, 1344, new and additional powers were given to Henry of Lancaster to return to Castille to continue further negotiations. Again, the main topic to be discussed with the Castillians was the marriage plans to ally Castille to England. To keep this matter still a secret from France, Lancaster returned with a new diplomatic partner, Richard of Arundel. To keep the real meaning of the mission a secret, the pre-

²⁸Thomas Rymer, ed., *Foedera, conventiones, litterae et acta publica* (London, 1825), Vol. III (i), p. 22.

tense was used that Derby was bringing Arundel with him so that the latter would have an opportunity to participate in the siege of Algeciras. This plan became useless, however, when the English emissaries learned upon arrival in Gascony on the 26th of March, 1344, that the Moorish city had surrendered to Alfonso XI. It then became necessary to resort to conventional procedures of diplomacy and it was shortly after this date that the French court learned of the nature of the Anglo-Castillian negotiations. A short time later, as we have already seen, the French, with the support of the papacy, renewed with vigor their attempts to bind Alfonso XI more closely to their cause than the treaty of 1366 had. Nevertheless, the negotiations between Alfonso and the English continued to progress openly through the year 1344 and into 1345. This can be attested to by the frequent visits of the English diplomats, William Trussell and John Sheppey, to the Castillian court.²⁹ In August, 1344, the talks had progressed to the point that the English court was convinced that Alfonso was ready to negotiate the royal marriage between the two countries. Alfonso had also extended the invitation to Edward for the two monarchs to meet personally at Santiago de Campostello.³⁰ Edward reacted quickly to this promising news.

²⁹Peter Edward Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada. Las Bodas de Pedro I de Castilla y Juana Plantagenet." Anuario de Estudios Medievales (1965), Vol. II, pp. 301-332.

³⁰Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 19.

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On September 1, Edward announced to Alfonso XI the appointment of Sir William Trussell with full power to continue the negotiations concerning the marriage of Pedro, as well as the attainment of the military alliance between the two countries. Trussell was a man who had already played a role in many diplomatic missions for the English government and had been in Castille in 1330. To make the job of Trussell easier in the Castillian court, Edward wrote a series of letters to the high officials of that country in which he thanked them for their kindness and friendship towards England.³¹

Soon after the arrival of William Trussell at the Castillian court, the main problem which would plague the consummation of this alliance became apparent: the question of the dowry which Edward was prepared to pay. The instructions which he had sent with Trussell in 1344 authorized him to make an initial offer of 10,000 pounds, a quantity which Trussell could increase gradually to 20,000 pounds if it seemed necessary, without returning to consult the king.³² This amount of 20,000 pounds was equivalent to about 125,000 gold florins; we have already seen in 1345 that Philip of Valois offered Alfonso a dowry of 300,000 florins for a French princess. Consequently, the amount which Edward was

³¹Chronica del rey Don Alfonso, XI, p. 370.

³²Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 23.

prepared to offer in 1344 would eventually have to be tripled. This amount would place a severe burden on the resources of Edward III. It made difficult all the diplomatic activities of the English in Castille. The English king, at this time, found himself in a financial situation so distressing that it was impossible to back up the activities of his diplomats with a generous offer of a dowry for his daughter.³³ At the same time, Alfonso was seriously worried about the expenses of his war with the Moors. Consequently, he desired to gain the most possible financial advantages from the marriage of his heir. Nevertheless, it appears that Alfonso favored the English alliance at this time.

Trussell, and his fellow diplomat Surry, began their trip to Castille in late August.³⁴ The initial stages of their trip to Castille were made by land. As a result of the truces that then existed between France and England, they were able to pass through French territory. Unfortunately, they were not able to carry with them their credential letters or instructions, for it was feared that they might fall into the hands of the French, who were still not fully aware of the nature of the Anglo-Castillian negotiations. The secret documents were given to a secretary to

³³Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," pp. 307-308.

³⁴Leon Mirot and Eugene Deprez, Les Ambassades Anglaises pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans (Paris: Bibliothèque de L'Ecole des Chartes, 1898), Vol. LIX, p. 566, n. xcvi.

carry by sea to Gascony. In Bayona, the English emissaries received the unfavorable news that because of a shipwreck, the secretary had drowned and all the documents had been lost.³⁵ It was useless to present themselves to the Castilian court without these documents; consequently, Trussell returned to England to receive duplicates of the lost papers.³⁶ This was not the first nor the last occasion that English diplomacy with the Iberian Peninsula would be jeopardized by such communication and transportation difficulties.

At the beginning of January, 1345, Edward III named a new group of ambassadors, entirely Gascons, to carry on the negotiations with Alfonso XI.³⁷ But, unfortunately, the English had already lost three months of precious time without accomplishing anything tangible. At the time the new English diplomats arrived in February, 1345, they found that a French diplomatic expedition was already in Castille, having obviously learned of the English intentions. Philip of Valois had apparently found out what had happened at the end of 1344. As a result he sent an important diplomatic mission to Castille, ordering it to obtain from the Castilian king not only the confirmation of the alliance of 1336, but also a new and tighter alliance with the French. As we

³⁵Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 25.

³⁶Mirot and Deprez, xcvi, p. 566.

³⁷Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 26.

have already seen, this time Philip insisted upon a marriage between the Castillian heir and a French princess. As a result, this new effort by the French appeared to have been successful resulting in a new alliance concluded between France and Castille on July 1, 1345. Alfonso promised to aid the French against England and to marry his son to the French princess, Blanche of Navarre. In return, France agreed to pay a dowry of 300,000 florins, approximately 45,000 English pounds. The documents were ratified in the most solemn manner by both kings, by the Castillian heir, Don Pedro, and by the major officials and lords of Castille.³⁸

It appeared that the English had once more been thwarted in their attempts to gain Alfonso XI as an ally, that he was now bound more closely than ever to the French. The truth, however, was something else. In spite of the solemn promises which had been given to Philip of Valois, the Castillian king did not stop the negotiations with the English. In fact, by the middle of June, the English ambassadors were back in England informing Edward that Alfonso intended to send a Castillian ambassador to England for the purpose of examining the potential bride for his son. The ambassador was Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, who had already been to England in 1341 as an emissary of Alfonso XI. The details

³⁸Daumet, pp. 10-16.

of Mendoza's stay in the summer of 1345 are known to us by the accounts of the ex-ambassador Sir John Brogus, who accompanied Hurtado Mendoza during his stay.³⁹ Negotiations began in September and lasted twelve days. Apparently the only concern at this time was the Anglo-Castillian marriage and not the planned political-military alliance. Everything was quickly settled. At the end of the month, Mendoza and his companions were already at Southampton, ready to start for Castille. During the negotiations, Alfonso had not hidden from Edward III his dealings with France. In fact, it seems that he used these negotiations as a bargaining point to receive a larger dowry from the English. He mentioned to Edward, not without a certain degree of exaggeration, that the French king had offered a dowry of 400,000 florins.⁴⁰ He added, however, that he still preferred an English marriage, and to gain it he was ready to receive a lesser dowry than that from the French.

Even before the arrival of Hurtado de Mendoza in September of 1345, Edward had written to Alfonso XI accepting his terms. The English king was now prepared to offer a dowry of up to 350,000 florins or 53,500 pounds, though he did not hesitate to stress to Alfonso in his correspondence the great expenses he had been encountering in his war with France, and argued that this dowry would represent

³⁹Public Record Office, various accounts, 314, n. 12.

⁴⁰Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 46.

a tremendous economic burden upon the English crown.⁴¹ At the same time, Edward, in appointing his chief diplomats, the bishop of Bayona and Gerald de Puy, to carry on the negotiations, stressed that these men should do everything possible to try to persuade the Castillian to reduce the total amount of the dowry, and if they could not, to make the terms of delivery as easy as possible on the English king.⁴²

After the negotiations had been completed in September with the Castillian ambassador, Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, Edward appointed a new ambassador to the Castillian court, Andrew Afford, a member of the chancellery and an expert in secret negotiations with foreigners. By the end of the month, Andrew Afford and Juan Hurtado de Mendoza left England for Castille. Joanna had apparently met with the approval of the Spanish emissaries sent to examine her suitability, the dowry had been agreed upon, and thus by September of 1345 it appeared that all were ready to conclude the Anglo-Castillian marriage alliance. In reality, however, the negotiations were continued for an additional two years. The great problem that plagued Edward was his inability to collect the 350,000 florin dowry which he had promised to Alfonso. Before the end of 1345, at the instigation of

⁴¹Ibid., p. 47.

⁴²Ibid.,

Queen Maria of Castille, the English sovereign had begun to seek the solution to his economic embarrassment through a marriage alliance with Portugal.⁴³

Meanwhile, Andrew Afford and Juan Hurtado de Mendoza were already in the Castillian court at the beginning of January of 1346. On the second of that month in Madrid, Alfonso XI confirmed the previously mentioned alliance with the French.⁴⁴ Four days later, with the greatest cynicism, he concluded with the English ambassador a treaty by which he promised to marry the child Pedro to Edward III's daughter, Joanna.⁴⁵ This document was endorsed by Gils de Albornaz, Archbishop of Toledo, and Alfonso Fernandez Coronel, both of whom had just completed participation in the ratification of the alliance with France.⁴⁶ As Russell points out, it would be interesting to find out how Alphonso and his advisors justified participating in two evidently incompatible acts.⁴⁷ The answer might indicate that this was nothing more than another act of political Machiavellianism, typical of fourteenth century diplomacy. It should

⁴³Rymer, p. 46, and J. B. Sitges, Las Mujeres del rey Don Pedro I de Castilla (Madrid: 1910), p. 54.

⁴⁴Daumet, pp. 15, 16.

⁴⁵Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 73.

⁴⁶Ibid., Vol. II (i), pp. 180-181.

⁴⁷Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," p. 315.

be noted that the treaty still needed ratification by the two participating monarchs. By March 4, Afford was back in London with the documents. Edward did not waste time; he quickly named new ambassadors and granted them full power to ratify the agreement in his name. But once again in his correspondence to Alfonso XI, Edward made mention of his great difficulty in obtaining the 350,000 florins for the dowry.⁴⁸

It might be useful at this time to examine briefly some of the motives that directed Alfonso XI in these political maneuvers. Daumet found this act of bad faith on the part of Alfonso XI incomprehensible. Possibly he should have looked further into the acts of duplicity, broken promises, and acts of bad faith which permeate the entire fourteenth century. This characterized the dealings of Alfonso XI and his son Pedro, as well as those other monarchs in the Iberian Peninsula. Possibly the most outstanding examples were Pedro IV of Aragon and Charles the Bad of Navarre. At any rate, though the matter most certainly needs further study, I believe that Peter Edward Russell had offered a possible solution to the behavior of the Castillian monarch. Russell suggests that to understand the behavior of Alfonso XI we must examine the economic realities of Castille. Being a perceptive and skillful king Alfonso soon recognized

⁴⁸Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," p. 315.

that the French alliance no longer served the vital interest of Castille. The destruction of the French fleet at Sluys in 1340 had won the English uncontested control of the Channel. Consequently, the exportation of Castillian wool to Flanders was now much more dependent upon the Middle Kingdom maintaining a good relationship with the English. Though more extensive research into the economic life of fourteenth century Castille is necessary to confirm this hypothesis, some ideas can be drawn from the available evidence. It can be concluded that by the middle of the fourteenth century, the exportation of Castillian wool, particularly to Flanders, was one of the main sources of that nation's economy. Furthermore, the deterioration of Anglo-Fleming relationships in the late 1330's resulted in an embargo which Edward III placed upon English wool destined for Flanders. Consequently, the market for Castillian wool had greatly increased. With this consideration in mind we can easily understand the eager desire on the part of Alfonso to clear the way for the Castillian wool to reach those markets under the most favorable conditions. By this time, not only the revenue of the Castillian king, but that of the nobility, greatly depended on the income which the exportation of this wool furnished.⁴⁹

It is not surprising that the lords were agreeable

⁴⁹Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," p. 316, and Jackson, Medieval Spain, p. 127.

to this alliance with England. Their economic necessities far outweighed any historical-cultural connection between France and Castille as well as the probable sympathy held by these noblemen to the French king in his struggle with England. Certainly the events between 1343 and 1350 must have made this even more evident. Following the English victory at Sluys in 1340 was the impressive English victory at Crecy in 1346 and the fall of Calais in 1347. In addition to these successes we know that Edward III made use of economic weapons to support English diplomacy in Castille. Apparently in the mid 1340's, despite the great productivity of Castillian wheat, there was a food shortage. In 1346 Edward granted licenses for the exportation of wheat to Castille, but he was careful to associate such concessions to the royal marriage plans.⁵⁰ Edward then went on to inform Alfonso XI that the said licenses had been approved by the request of his daughter, Princess Joanna. During the previous year a letter of safe conduct had been granted to Castillian traders who wished to go to Flanders,⁵¹ a conciliatory gesture which served to remind merchants that Castillian commerce still needed an English safe-conduct pass to arrive safely in Flanders.

⁵⁰Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," p. 316.

⁵¹Calendars of Patent Rolls, Edward III. (London: 1908), Vol. IX, 1345-1348, pp. 55, 201.

It seems apparent that the reason for Alfonso's preparation for breaking the traditional friendship with France and moving Castille and her navy into an alliance with Edward III can be best understood by examining, at least on the surface, the economic conditions that existed. I believe that Russell in his brief analysis of the economic conditions in the mid 1340's has in all probability hit the real cause of this drastic change in Castillian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the problem remained for Edward III to fulfill his part of the agreement, the most important part being the dowry. As patient and eager as Alfonso was for the English alliance, he had also to consider his own economic necessity and the dowry was of significant importance.⁵² This was particularly true because of the large expense he had incurred in his campaign against the Moors. We have seen that by late 1345, Edward had already begun to seek that dowry in a different direction.

It appears that from the middle of 1345 through 1346 Alfonso XI, being more preoccupied than ever with his struggle against the Moors and with matters of legislative reform, left to his wife the details of foreign policy.⁵³ Maria had consequently used this power to try to increase

⁵²Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," pp. 307-308.

⁵³J. B. Sitges, Las Mujeres del Rey Don Pedro I de Castille (Madrid: Impresores de la Real Casa, 1910), p. 54.

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her own position at court, which of course was greatly threatened and in many cases overshadowed by the king's mistress, Dona Leonor de Guzman. Apparently before the end of 1345, Edward III had asked the queen of Castille to do everything possible to influence her husband to consent to a reduction in the amount of the dowry. While the ambassadors were discussing this matter with Queen Maria, she made them an unexpected proposal; she suggested that it might be worth the effort of the king of England to offer one of his sons as a husband to her unmarried sister Leonor.⁵⁴ This marriage would not only further strengthen English ties in the Iberian Peninsula but would also serve as a means to secure the dowry which Alfonso was asking from Joanna. In this way there was a possibility that Edward could obtain a royal alliance with Castille without having to send a single English gold coin to the Castillian king. The Portuguese treasury could pay the dowry for the English princess. It appears that this strategy was devised by Maria and that she proposed it to the English ambassadors without the knowledge of her husband in an attempt to strengthen her own position in the Castillian court.⁵⁵ Her exact motives are difficult to determine except for the fact that she wished to promote the program of alignment with England, which she apparently favored. In addition to this, the

⁵⁴Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 46.

⁵⁵Sitges, p. 54.

marriage between her sister and a prince of the English house would give added prestige to Portugal and her family. It could also serve to strengthen her and her son's position in Castille. The initial reaction of Edward III, though enthusiastic, was cautious. He wrote to Maria in June of 1345 telling her that if her father was really interested in such an alliance, it should be he who should take the initial step in contacting the English government.⁵⁶

The initial reaction of Alfonso IV of Portugal appears to have been not very enthusiastic regarding this projected marriage. Nevertheless, negotiations did begin. The first problem complicating them was that John of Gaunt was not acceptable to Alfonso IV, who preferred the heir to the English throne, Edward, Prince of Wales, surnamed the Black Prince. Since the Portuguese displayed considerable apathy to the project, it was the English who provided the main impetus.⁵⁷ It was English diplomats who continually visited the court at Lisbon, and not vice-versa. Until the summer of 1347, the Portuguese would give no definite answer, and for this reason Edward was forced to prolong his negotiations with Castille because he had now committed the almost incredible blunder of trusting everything to the success of the Portuguese marriage. Consequently, he had taken

⁵⁶Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 46.

⁵⁷Russell, "Una Alianza Frustrada," p. 320.

no additional steps to secure the dowry for Joanna. Finally, in the summer of 1347, the ambassadors of the Portuguese king presented themselves to the English court at Calais. Their story was somewhat encouraging; on July 7, Edward III appointed ambassadors with full powers to conclude a marriage contract between the Black Prince and Leonor of Portugal.⁵⁸ By late 1347, the English ambassadors were in Lisbon, where they received most distressing news: Leonor was about to be married to Pedro IV of Aragon.

On the death of his wife in the spring of 1347, Pedro IV had asked for the hand of the Portuguese princess. When Alfonso IV sent his emissaries to Calais in the summer, nothing was said of the proposal from Aragon, nor was the English king notified of the confirmation of the wedding of the Aragonese king and Leonor. Towards the end of October, the princess left Lisbon for Barcelona. When the English ambassador arrived in Lisbon, they found the princess had already departed; there was nothing they could do but communicate the bad news to their king.⁵⁹ We have no concrete evidence of Alfonso XI's reaction to this marriage alliance between England and Portugal, but it appears that he did not have any strong protest concerning it.

⁵⁸Rymer, Vol. III (i), pp. 128, 154, and P. R. O. Various Accounts, 312. N. 27.

⁵⁹Rafael Tasis, La Vida del Rei En Pere III (Barcelona: 1954), pp. 109-125.

The failure of the Anglo Portuguese marriage alliance at the end of 1347 appeared to be a death-blow to the English-Castillian alliance. Edward had foolishly taken no other measures to obtain the dowry of Joanna. In the meantime, the ambassadors of Alfonso XI had been demanding that King Edward fulfill his part of the agreements and send Joanna and her dowry to Castille without any further delay.⁶⁰

One of the most incredible features of these entire negotiations was the stoic patience demonstrated by King Alfonso XI during these endless delays of Edward III. Possibly even more surprising was the determination of Edward to continue the negotiations with Castille in spite of his most recent diplomatic failure in Portugal. The determination of Edward can be seen clearly since he continued to list Castille among the allies of England.⁶¹

When he received the distressing news from Portugal, Edward, rather than abandoning the plan of Joanna's marriage to Pedro, instead dispatched a letter to Alfonso telling him that his daughter would leave as soon as possible for Castille. He knew he would have to send Joanna at least as far as Gascony, and hoped that some special subsidy of Parliament would grant him the necessary dowry. The arrival

⁶⁰Rymer, Vol. III (i), pp. 153-154.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 137.

of the princess at Bordeaux would put an end to the Castilian speculation about the failure of the marriage as a result of the loss of the Portuguese dowry.⁶² In the letter Edward sent to Alfonso at the beginning of 1348, he announced that his daughter was soon to depart for Gascony.⁶³ Finally on the 21st of March, 1348, almost five years after the initial talk between Henry of Lancaster and Alfonso XI, the fleet which carried Joanna left for Gascony, carrying the princess to her future husband, the heir to the crown of Castille. Ahead of her went the two diplomats who were to continue negotiations in Castille, Gerald de Puy, and Andrew Afford. With them, the English ambassadors carried new letters addressed by Edward III to various Castilians of note. To the future bride-groom, Pedro, Edward wrote of the virtues of his future wife; to Leonor de Guzman, he wrote thanking her for her support of the projected English marriage; to various lords, including Juan Nunez de Lara and others, Edward wrote, also thanking them for their support and expressing his hope for close relations between them and the English royal house.⁶⁴ But most interesting are the instructions written on the 15th of February that Edward gave to his chief ambassadors.⁶⁵ Of special interest

⁶²Ibid., pp. 143-146.

⁶³Ibid., p. 147.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 153.

were his instructions regarding the problem of the dowry. The main objective was simply to try to delay things, thus giving Edward as much time as possible to acquire the needed funds. If these delaying tactics were not possible, then the ambassadors were instructed to throw the full blame on Queen Maria and to indicate that it was her fault that the English wasted valuable time in trying to secure the alliance with Portugal. Had she not suggested such an abortive program, the English would have, by this time, raised the necessary dowry by their own means.⁶⁶ They were to say that the English were only interested in the Castillian marriage and that Edward III had let himself be enticed by the Queen's offer only because he believed that the Portuguese marriage would be as pleasing to Alfonso as to Maria. Finally, the ambassadors were to admit that in trusting the Castillian queen and her father, Edward had spent all of the money which he had prepared for the dowry of his daughter on the successful French campaign. In spite of this, he was doing everything possible to fulfill his monetary obligations in as short a time as possible. The emissaries could then say that the English king hoped to hand over the dowry within two or three months; for the time being they should indicate no specific date to Alfonso XI. What Edward III wanted most was a new postponement; meanwhile, Princess Joanna would stay in Gascony.

⁶⁶Ibid.

No documents have survived to tell us exactly what happened in the negotiations that took place in the Castillian court, nor whether the English ambassadors had to go to the extreme of exposing Queen Maria. What we do know is that Alfonso accepted the explanations of the English monarch and that he accepted a new agreement. The only explanation we can offer for the continued patience of the Castillian king is that he believed the financial advantages of the English alliance outweighed the irritation caused by the procrastination of Edward III. Edward promised to deliver the first payment of the dowry, perhaps a reduced amount, in October of that year at the latest; at the same time, Joanna would be delivered at Bayona to a Castillian party who would escort her into her new kingdom.⁶⁷ Once more it appeared that Edward had been successful in resurrecting the Anglo-Castillian marriage alliance when it seemed to have been doomed. However, this time the good faith of Edward III did not have an opportunity to be tested. In July, the black plague appeared in Bourdeaux. To insure the safety of the English princess, Joanna was moved to a village in the country, but this precaution was useless. There, on the second of September, having contracted the dreaded disease, she died.

By the 15th of September, Edward III had been informed of this tragedy, and he officially announced the death of the

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 171.

princess to Alfonso and his heir. He took advantage of the opportunity to stress once more that he hoped that friendship would continue to exist between England and Castille in spite of this disaster. It must be noted that despite the concern of Edward, nothing had been signed between the Castillians and the English; there was no agreement of a political or military alliance between the two countries.

Thus ended the first serious attempt of the English court to formulate an alliance with Castille, but to a certain degree, in spite of the death of Joanna, the English did accomplish some positive results. The project of marrying Pedro to a French princess was abandoned. Philip of Valois received no military aid from the Castillians as a result of his alliance of 1345. Furthermore, there is no doubt that during the final years of his reign Alfonso XI was a supporter of friendship with England. Most important were the valuable contacts that England had made with Castille during the years 1343-1348. As a result the English government was in a much more advantageous position for future negotiations. When in 1358 they were presented with a new chance to formulate an alliance with Castille they had obtained from earlier contacts useful first-hand information about the political problems of Castille, insight into the personalities in Pedro's court, and knowledge of the military situation in the Peninsula. For these reasons Pedro's alliance with England can not be considered a radi-

cal change in Castillian foreign policy. In reality, Pedro was only following a course his father had chosen for him many years earlier.

Thus, I think it can clearly be seen from this discussion of Castillian foreign policy that the ten years preceding the reign of Pedro I were among the most crucial in the history of the Iberian Peninsula. Most certainly the entire nineteen year reign of Pedro was to be greatly affected by these political antecedents. Up until the time of Alfonso, Castille had been politically tied to France, but with that influence diminished in Castille, Alfonso had opened up a new option for his son. When Pedro came to the throne, he was completely free to choose for himself an alliance with the English or the French. His decision was of monumental importance, not only for the history of Castille, but for the history of France and England as well.

We now direct our course to the early reign of Pedro, the circumstances under which he became king in 1350, his initial alliance with the French under the urging of his main advisors, particularly Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, and his marriage with Blanche of Bourbon.

CHAPTER II

PEDRO'S EARLY YEARS, 1350-1352

It is impossible to understand Pedro's foreign policy without an examination of the internal history of Castille during his reign, particularly during the early years. During these years Pedro made a vigorous attempt to strengthen monarchical authority in his realm. In fact, it would not be too absurd to suggest that his real goal was true absolutism. The chief consequence of his internal policy was the alienation of the greater part of the Castillian nobility. It was as a champion of this element that Enrique of Trastamara emerged in the 1360's as a major factor in Castillian political life. His emergence as a champion of the nobility and eventually as a claimant to the throne created an entirely new situation which provided the French a fresh opportunity to seek an alliance with Castille. Enrique's ability to muster the support of the Castillian nobility and to capitalize on French aid completely changed Castille's position in international affairs. The sequence of events that led to Enrique's emergence is thus of prime importance in understanding the foreign policy of Pedro and deserves careful analysis.

On the 27th day of March, 1350, Pedro I began his

reign as the king of Castille. His reign would end nineteen years later at Montiel with his violent murder at the hands of his bastard brother, Enrique of Trastamara. It was to be one of the most interesting and most significant reigns in the history of Castille. Who was this interesting figure who now sat on the Castillian throne? He was a man known to many historians as Pedro the Cruel and, paradoxically, to others as Pedro the Just.

Pedro was born on the 30th of August, 1344, the only legitimate offspring of the unhappy union of Alfonso XI and his queen, Maria, daughter of the king of Portugal. At the time of Pedro's birth, Alfonso had already left his wife in favor of the charms of his mistress, Leonor de Guzman. It is possible that the queen hoped that producing an heir for the Castillian throne would soon return her husband to her, but these hopes were quickly shattered.¹

The fifteen years of Pedro's life preceding his succession to the Castillian throne are obscure to historians. There seems to be no question that Pedro was looked upon by his father as legitimate heir and successor to the crown of Castille. However, the boy was apparently much neglected by his father except in the years between 1343 and 1348, when he was being used as a political pawn in the negotiations between Castille and France on the one hand, and

¹Juan Catalina Garcia, Castille y Leon durante los reinados de Pedro I, Enrique II, Juan I y Enrique III, 2 vols. (Madrid: El Progreso Editorial, 1891), Vol. I, p. I.

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Castille and England on the other. While Leonor de Guzman and her illegitimate sons were accompanying Alfonso on his campaign against the Moors in southern Castille, Pedro and the queen were neglected.² Possibly these years nourished Pedro's feelings of hatred and jealousy and also his desire for revenge that so marked his future career.³ It was during these years of paternal neglect that Alfonso's generosity to his illegitimate sons became so apparent. Fadrique, less than a year older than Pedro, was appointed Master of the Order of Santiago before he reached the age of ten. Enrique of Trastamara received even more generous gifts.⁴ As has already been indicated, the concern of Alfonso for his mistress and his illegitimate children can most clearly be seen in the Franco-Castillian treaty of 1345. In that document, Alfonso XI based his entire acceptance of the treaty upon the willingness of the king of France to guarantee and safeguard those generosityies. Obviously jealous and envious of the attentions which Alfonso bestowed upon his illegitimate brothers and outraged by the treatment of his mother, Pedro nurtured resentments. These were unquestionably known to Leonor de Guzman and her sons, and became

²Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 15 and footnote 1.

³Prosper Merimee, Historie de Don Pedre I Roi de Castille (Paris: Charpentier, Libraire-Editeur, 1865), p. 54.


⁴Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 21 and footnote 1.

paramount factors in the political scene with the sudden and unexpected death of Alfonso.

The fall of Leonor de Guzman was sudden. Until the death of Alfonso, she had reigned, in many respects, as the queen of Castille. Edward III certainly recognized her power during the Anglo-Castillian marriage negotiations. In 1346, Edward wrote Leonor one of many letters thanking her for her kindness and consideration in supporting the English alliance. The English monarch even suggested that one of her sons be sent to England to be raised with the Black Prince, heir to the English throne.⁵ Leonor had substantial military power at her disposal and for several years she held the seal of the very powerful order of Santiago, which was eventually controlled by her son, Fadrique. One of her very close relatives, Perez Ponce, was Master of the Order of Alcantara, the other powerful military order in Castille. As Merimee pointed out, she consequently always had two small armies between her hands.⁶ But this ended with Alfonso's death and the great concern of Leonor was now to preserve herself and her family. The rapid change in the situation can be seen in an interesting situation that took place immediately following the death of Alfonso.

⁵Rymer, Vol. III (i), pp. 59, 74.

⁶Merimee, p. 40.



The body of the dead king was being transported from Gibraltar to Seville. Leonor, who had accompanied the king on his campaign to Gibraltar,⁷ followed the body back as far as Medina Sidonia. This town had been a gift by Alfonso to Leonor. When she reached the town, Leonor was confronted by one of the distinguished noblemen, Don Alfonso Ferrandez Coronel, who held the town as a fief from Leonor. In their interview, Alfonso Ferrandez Coronel renounced his homage to Leonor, announced that her cause was desperate and that he no longer wished to hold the town on her behalf.⁸ Not only was Leonor unsuccessful in trying to convince Coronel to change his mind, but she could not find another among the nobles of Castille who would accept the holding of the town for her.⁹

As a result, Dona Leonor entered the town to take possession of it in her own name. In doing so she committed a blunder, for it appeared to many that she was making preparations to offer resistance to the new king. With Dona Leonor at this time were her sons, Don Enrique and Don Fadrique, as well as many other relatives. Included among these numbers were Don Ponce de Leon and Don Perez Ponce, the Master of the Order of Alcantara.

⁷Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 7 and footnote 1.

⁸Pero Lopez de Ayala, Cronica del rey Don Pedro, ed. E Llaguno y Amirola, Vol. I (Madrid: Real Academia Espanola, 1779), p. 15.

⁹Ibid.

Meanwhile in Seville, the succession of Pedro to the crown of Castille had met with no protest or opposition since his claim to the throne was legal and conformed with the Castillian law of succession. The main question, however, was who would be the real political power in Castille. Though Pedro was fifteen, and consequently of a legal age to rule Castille, a youth of that age and inexperience could not be expected suddenly to gather into his hands the full power of government. All attention centered on this encompassing question: Who was to be the favorite who would rule as the power behind the throne? The choice was not long in coming, for very soon the reins of government fell into the hands of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque. Alburquerque for the next three years was to be the most powerful figure in Castille, and consequently it is deserving of our time to examine briefly some of the history relating to the career of this distinguished politician.

Possibly the most interesting characteristic of Juan Alfonso was that he was not a Castillian, but Portuguese. He was related to the royal house and thus tied, in some respects, to Queen Maria. Very early in life he had abandoned his native country and entered the service of young Alfonso XI. At the time Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque linked his future to that of the Castillian king, the nobility had not yet been subdued. By aiding the king Alburquerque earned the gratitude of the Castillian king, and in future years,

he was overwhelmed with gifts from Alfonso XI. The education of the Castillian heir, Pedro, was placed in the hands of Juan Alfonso, who was made majordomo for the boy.

The Portuguese politician clearly recognized the power of the king's mistress and, though always playing the role of the defender of the neglected queen, Juan Alfonso never went out of his way to offend the powerful Leonor. In spite of his caution, however, he was obviously considered by Leonor to be a dangerous adversary.¹⁰ At the death of Alfonso XI, Alburquerque, already closely attached to the cause of Queen Maria and in an important position with the young heir, seemed certain to play a major role in Castillian politics.

Unscrupulous, intelligent, powerful, ambitious, Alburquerque was equipped with all the necessary tools to play the dangerous game of Castillian politics.¹¹ Perhaps the greatest hindrance to his desires was the fact that he was a foreigner, and this made his political preeminence all the more distasteful to the powerful Castillian nobility. Alburquerque was wise enough to proceed slowly. There were initially few changes in the governmental circle which surrounded the new king since it was still dangerous to upset

¹⁰Merimee, p. 43.

¹¹There is at this time no biography of Juan Alfonso Alburquerque. The information on this interesting person is almost entirely limited to the writings of Ayala.

the nobility, so recently pacified by Alfonso XI. Alburquerque did not yet feel strong enough to try to destroy the faction of Leonor de Guzman. But he did take steps to win over some of the most powerful figures in the Castillian political arena. Among those was Alfonso Ferrandez Coronel, already a figure of considerable importance in Castillian politics. The same man, in January of 1346, had affixed his name first to the Castillian-Franco alliance, and then several days later to the Castillian-Anglo alliance.¹² Ayala suggests in his chronicle that Coronel had already been approached by Alburquerque and had gone over to his side before Leonor de Guzman reached the fortress of Medina Sidonia, which he held for her.¹³ There is considerable evidence to support this suggestion. Alfonso Coronel had been closely identified with the fallen mistress and her family for many years. He had also served as the majordomo of the young Enrique of Trastamara, and as we have already seen, had been entrusted with the governorship of Medina Sidonia. However, shortly after surrendering the governorship of Medina Sidonia to Leonor, he was rewarded with the lordship of Aguilar, including extensive titles and privileges which raised him to the ranks of the greatest nobles of Castille.¹⁴

Perhaps even more important, Alburquerque was able

¹²Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 74.

¹³Ayala, p. 15.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 67.

to win Juan Nunez de Lara, possibly the most powerful noble in Castille at that time, to his side. Lara was so powerful that even Edward III wrote on several occasions to him expressing his thanks and gratitude for his support of the English alliance.¹⁵ Though Lara cannot be considered a friend of Alfonso de Alburquerque, he concurred that the downfall of Leonor's party was essential. Thus at the very time that Leonor was taking possession of Medina Sidonia, a powerful party was being formed with the intent of destroying her political faction. It is reasonable to assume that the acts of the Guzman party can be attributed more to fear than to rebellion. This was certainly true of Leonor as she took possession of Medina Sidonia, unable to find a replacement for Coronel. There she fortified herself against the coming storm. Her sons and relatives had already deserted her, fleeing for their safety. They first stopped at the castle of Moron, a strong fortress belonging to the master of Alcantara, Perez Ponce. Then after a short stay, Enrique and Pero Ponce de Leon, brother of the Master of Alcantara and governor of the fortress of Algeciras, left for that city. They hoped to rally some support in defense of their cause against the king and his new ministers.

In spite of these efforts, the city fell quickly to a force sent by Pedro under the command of Gutier Fernandez

¹⁵Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 147.

de Toledo. Enrique of Trastamara and his friends were barely able to flee with their lives.¹⁶ At the same time, this and other alarming news reached Leonor at Medina Sidonia. Rumors reached her that Alburquerque intended to destroy her eldest sons, perhaps as a sacrifice to the hatred of Queen Maria. Others charged Leonor with conspiracy against the new king in trying to claim the crown for her eldest son, Enrique, by virtue of a pretended marriage with Alfonso.¹⁷ Frightened by her sudden isolation and fearing for the safety of her children, Leonor offered to capitulate to Alburquerque in return for a safe-conduct to Seville. Once there she hoped to throw herself upon the mercy of her enemies. Her safety was further assured by Juan Nunez de Lara, who personally guaranteed her safe-conduct.¹⁸ However, upon her arrival at Seville she was openly declared a prisoner and was put in the king's prison in the palace under heavy guard. The fallen mistress would never again know a day of freedom.

With Leonor in prison and her sons and relatives defeated in their efforts to hold Algeciras, the next logical step would be to destroy Pedro's bastard brothers. Alburquerque and Pedro would have followed this course, but Alburquerque was not yet strong enough to punish the sons

¹⁶Ayala, p. 20.

¹⁷Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 14 and footnote 1.

¹⁸Ayala, p. 23.

of Alfonso XI. It was also possible that he might not have believed them dangerous enough at this time to take the chance of enraging the aristocracy. At any rate, both Pedro and Juan Alfonso listened to the elements of the Castillian court who encouraged Pedro to seek a reconciliation with his brothers. Thus the party favoring reconciliation won the day. Soon Enrique of Trastamara, his brothers and other relatives came to Seville submitting to the king and swearing their homage and fidelity.¹⁹ Again, the chronicles leave us many questions regarding the chronology of these events. It does seem very apparent that this reconciliation had taken place at the very latest by the 22nd of July, 1350.²⁰

Even the imprisonment of their mother, Dona Leonor, did not seem to hinder the new friendship between the brothers. Her imprisonment seemed not a harsh one, and Enrique was able to see her every day. What quickly brought an end to these cordial relations was an act of duplicity on the part of Dona Leonor, who still schemed for the power and benefit of her family even while a prisoner in the royal palace. Among those who attended Leonor de Guzman in her captivity was a young woman by the name of Dona Juana, the daughter of Don Juan Manuel, one of the most powerful lords in Castille. This family was also related to the powerful

¹⁹Ibid., .

²⁰Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 18, note 3.

Lara faction. For many years Dona Juana had been betrothed to Enrique of Trastamara, a marriage which members of Juana's family now hoped to break, since Juana was now looked upon as a possible mate for the Castillian king.²¹ Leonor de Guzman learned of these plots to break the betrothal, and was determined to have the marriage between Enrique and Juana take place as soon as possible. The young girl, obviously under the influence of Leonor, followed her advice, and in quarters of the palace which served as Leonor's place of captivity, the marriage between Enrique and Juana was celebrated and consummated.²²

Queen Maria, Alburquerque, and the king were enraged over this matter, but had no choice except to recognize the legality of the marriage. However, Dona Leonor was not spared the wrath of her enemies; the terms of her imprisonment were greatly intensified. She was no longer allowed to see her sons, the guards were tightened around her cell, and she was taken to the castle of Carmona where she was left in isolation. It may have been at this time that her death was decided upon by her enemies.²³ It is also possible that at this time Alburquerque, Queen Maria, and the king decided to take measures against Enrique of Trastamara. Learning of the king's intentions, Enrique had time to flee

²¹Ayala, p. 25.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

from Seville and take refuge in Asturias, where he held extensive estates and where he could count on the support of his numerous vassals. The peace had scarcely begun when it was broken, and once more the Central Kingdom appeared on the verge of civil war.

To complicate further an already serious situation, Pedro, within a matter of weeks, fell victim to a very serious illness which nearly caused his death.²⁴ Although the exact nature of his illness is unknown, it may be that Pedro was one of the more fortunate victims of the black plague.²⁵ For a period of time it looked as if the king's death was inevitable. The greatest concern in the Castilian court was who would succeed him. The young king, of course, was without an heir or a legitimate brother to succeed him. Consequently, with the general belief that the throne would soon be vacant, two candidates quickly came forth. First, appeared Prince Fernando of Aragon, son of Leonor, the sister of Alfonso XI and second wife of the deceased king of Aragon. His claim to the throne was through his mother, Queen Leonor, the eldest daughter of the Castilian king, Ferdinand, who had died in the year 1312. Furthermore, there were those who contended that king Alfonso XI had designated Fernando as successor if Pedro died without heirs.²⁶

²⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁵ Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 22, note 2.

²⁶ Ayala, p. 20.

Juan Alfonso Alburquerque favored Fernando and began to work on his behalf, trying to formulate a marriage between the Aragonese prince and Queen Maria. Many other lords, however, thought that Juan Nunez de Lara would be a better choice. He was the son of Don Fernando de la Cerda, the brother of Alfonso de la Cerda, who had been cheated out of the throne by his uncle, Sancho IV. Thus, de Lara was a member of the royal family. He found a strong support from members of the nobility which included Don Alfonso Fernandez Coronel, Garci Laso, and many other Castillian knights.²⁷ Like his rival, Fernando of Aragon, de Lara sought the hand of the widowed Queen Maria to strengthen his claim to the Castillian throne. All the plots were to no avail, however, for the king recovered and destroyed the hopes of the pretenders. During the king's illness, lawlessness in Castille had become the order of the day as the processes of government came to a standstill. When it became certain that the king might die, Alburquerque and de Lara had neglected their governmental responsibilities in favor of fortifying their own political ambitions.

Towards the end of the summer it became apparent that Pedro would live. de Lara soon left Seville and returned to northern Castille to his extensive holdings in Biscaye, apparently disgruntled over the course of events.

²⁷Ibid.

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His real disgust, however, was not due to the king's recovery but rather to the fact that he was no longer in a position to challenge Alburquerque or even to share with him the running of the Castillian government. With the recovery of Pedro, the powers of government were implanted more firmly in the hands of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque than ever before. The hostility of de Lara toward Alburquerque was shared by a great majority of the Castillian nobility who resented the power of the influential foreigner in Pedro's court. The chronicles indicate that de Lara was in the process of making preparations for a revolt, not against the king, but against the government of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque. In all probability an uprising would have transpired had de Lara not died suddenly on the 28th of November, 1350, in Burgos, shortly after his return to the northern provinces.²⁸

With the death of his greatest rival, Alburquerque now ruled supreme in Castille. The king remained in Seville for the rest of the year, recuperating from his near fatal illness. Pedro's health was very fragile and he took no part in the government, abandoning himself to the pleasures of the hunt. He was satisfied to leave the power of the government entirely in the hands of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.²⁹

According to Castillian law, a general Cortes of the

²⁸Ibid., p. 29.

²⁹Ibid., p. 30.

kingdom was to meet at the beginning of each new reign. The three estates in Castillian society were allowed to present their petitions and complaints to the king. Consequently, Alburquerque took the appropriate measures for the calling of the Cortes which was to convene in the city of Valladolid. Merimee suggests that the selection of this city was intentional on the part of Alburquerque. Being located in the northern province of Castille, it would be necessary for the king and his retinue to pass through the territories which had most strongly supported Juan Nunez de Lara, and therefore were most hostile to the government of Alburquerque. The appearance of the king and his minister in the north was then intended to strengthen the power of the king in that territory.³⁰

Pedro, in all probability, left Seville near the end of February in 1351. An extant document issued by the king from Seville on the 16th of February proves he was still in that city at least until that date. The route which he took to Valladolid was not a direct one. His first destination was the town of Extremadura. It was there that Pedro met with his brother, Fadrique, to receive his homage. The two brothers met at the fortress of Llerena, which was a possession of the powerful military order of Santiago, of which Fadrique was the Grand Master. Greeting his half-brother with magnificent hospitality, Fadrique then swore the oath of fidelity and homage to Pedro, since this had been the real

³⁰Merimee, p. 58.

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purpose of his visit. This act not only symbolized the submission of Fadrique, a powerful adversary, but further enhanced the power of the king over the military order of Santiago. Previous to the reign of Alfonso XI, the numerous military orders of Castille, Santiago and Alcantara being most powerful, had been almost totally independent from the power of the king; the Master of the Order was an independent ruler. But Alfonso XI, in his endeavor to bring the Castillian nobility under the power of the monarchy, had not neglected the military orders. Alfonso had obtained for the first time the full homage of the military orders, consequently placing the king, and not the grand masters, at the head of these powerful military institutions. But Pedro was prepared to go even farther. Fadrique agreed to surrender, as Don Perez Ponce the grand Master of Alcantara had six months earlier, the right of the Order to elect their own Master, as well as surrendering extensive power to the king which they had held in the past.³¹ It might be said that during these first two years of the reign of Pedro, the grand Masters of the military orders became nothing more than lieutenants of the Castillian king. Pedro had made himself master of the military orders of Castille by imposing such regulations as only allowing the Master of the Order to be received in fortresses with permission of the king, and their surrendering of electoral privileges.

³¹Francisco de Rades y Andrada, Chronicas de las tres ordenes y cauallerias de Santiago, Calatraua y Alcantara, (Toledo: 1572), p. 45, and Ayala, p. 35.

The unfortunate Leonor de Guzman was accompanying the king and his party on this journey. At Llerena, after his submission to the king, Fadrique was allowed a last hour with his mother before she was transferred to the castle of Talavera. This town was owned by Queen Maria, and was governed for her by Gutier Fernandez de Toledo, the leader of the expedition that seized Algeciras from the Guzman faction. Leonor did not linger long at Talavera. Several days after her arrival, the order for her execution arrived. Thus perished the same woman who had sat one year earlier at the side of the king of Castille. This was but the first of a number of bloody atrocities which was to characterize the reign of Pedro. Merimee, always coming to the defense of Pedro, contends he was totally unaware of this crime.³² Juan Catalina Garcia also placed the blame on the desire of revenge by Queen Maria and the acquiescence of Alburquerque. At the same time he also placed some of the blame on Pedro for having tolerated the act of which he was probably aware.³³ Ayala himself credits the murder of Dona Leonor to the desire for revenge of Queen Maria.³⁴ Regardless of where the blame must lie in this matter, it was nevertheless a senseless murder. Dona Leonor had been totally humbled by her misfortune; her faction, with the exception

³²Merimee, p. 60.

³³Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 31.

³⁴Ayala, p. 37.

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of her powerful sons, had been destroyed. Ayala, Froissart, and the other chronicles are in agreement: the death of Leonor de Guzman was a cause of much bloodshed in the future. Possibly the most interesting point about the murder was the reaction of her sons, Fadrique, Enrique and Tello. The desire for revenge must have kindled in their hearts, but for the time being they seemed to accept the fact and in their own ways made peace with the king. Fadrique was perhaps happy that he had escaped with his own life and maintained the Mastership of the Order of Santiago.

From Llerena, the royal host began moving slowly in the direction of Valladolid, sidetracking first to visit the castle of Palencia. Here Don Tello, Leonor's third son, had remained keeping his distance from the new king. The royal messenger arrived and instructed Tello that the king wished to see him. When he went before the king, the first thing Pedro said to him was: "Don Tello, do you know your mother, Dona Leonor, is dead?" Tello replied, "I have no other father nor mother than you."³⁵ Pedro was apparently well pleased with this answer and was reconciled with his brother.

Having received the submission of Don Tello, Pedro continued his journey north toward Burgos. This was the city in which Juan Nunez de Lara had died and which had shown the greatest hostility to the government of the royal favorite,

³⁵Ibid., p. 38.

Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque. The suggested motive for Pedro's visit to Burgos at this time was that the king and his minister wished to subdue the city and bring it under the yoke of the government. The bourgeoisie of Burgos were the richest and most powerful in Castille and had also been the most outspoken in their opposition to Alburquerque and firm in their support of Juan Nunez de Lara. One of the main adherents of the dead pretender to the throne was the Adelantado of Castille, Garci de Laso, a very powerful man who had found great favor with Alfonso XI. For a number of years he had been the majordomo to the children of Leonor de Guzman. He was proud in his feudal power, totally lacking any humility. Garci de Laso was at that time in Burgos with a large number of armed men. Upon hearing of the approach of Pedro, he and his following marched out to meet the king at a place called Celada. This meeting took place early in May. Almost immediately the hostilities existing between Laso and Alburquerque began to express themselves. Haughty words were exchanged between the Adelantado and his followers and some of the adherents of Alburquerque. Particularly harsh words were spoken between Laso and Don Juan Garcia Manrique, a protege of Alburquerque, who was soon to be rewarded for his loyalty by becoming Adelantado of Castille. Merimee, in fact, suggests that the entire episode was prepared by Alburquerque beforehand so that he might have the opportunity to destroy another of his rivals.³⁶

³⁶Merimee, p. 62.

The parties, however, were prevented from open conflict by the king himself who demanded that both parties be silent.³⁷ The following day, a similar episode broke out, and again it took the king to prevent armed conflict. Pedro now ordered the two groups to march separately as they continued in the direction of Burgos.

To complicate the situation further, the bourgeoisie governors of Burgos, learning of these quarrels, sent a petition to the king asking that the two enemy factions not be allowed to enter the city at the same time. They added that the inhabitants of the city looked upon the appearance of Alburquerque as a grave problem and asked the king not to allow his minister to enter the city. Despite the courtesy in which these requests were made, Alburquerque took advantage of the situation to stress to his king that it was necessary to make an impression upon the arrogant bourgeoisie and to make an example of that city to the rest of his kingdom. The king, his minister, and his entire army marched into the city, and there was no attempt at resistance. Some who greatly feared the king fled for their lives. For example, of those who fled, one of the most important was Juan Estabanez de Castellanos. In a letter dated in Burgos on the 6th of June, the following charges were made against Juan Estabanez: he had confiscated royal property and revenue for his own purposes; he had taken revenues in the amount

³⁷ Ayala, p. 37.

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of 50,000 marevedis belonging to the monastery of Ona; in his capacity as a tax collector he had levied illegal taxes. For those offenses Pedro ordered all the personal property of Juan Estabanez confiscated and turned over to the monastery of Ona.³⁸ At a later date this same individual was declared a traitor by the king. But others like Garci de Laso, confident of his immense popularity and his own political strength, remained.³⁹

During the first night that the king spent in Burgos, Queen Maria sent a squire to Garci de Laso warning him that under no circumstances should he go the following day to the palace. She apparently had learned of the intentions of the king and Alburquerque to dispose of this powerful noble, and for some unknown personal reason, she chose to warn him.⁴⁰ For whatever reason, whether out of pride or ignorance, Garci de Laso did not choose to follow the prudent advice he had received. The following day he made an appearance before the king. Immediately upon entering the king's presence, his companions were seized and upon the order of Pedro himself, Laso was murdered. The king then ordered that the body be thrown into the main square of the city. Since it was Sunday, a bull fight was to be held in that square and

³⁸Unpublished Document, Archivo Nacional, Madrid.
Burgos, Ona, C^o, N^o 8.

³⁹Ayala, p. 38.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 40.

[illegible]

the body of Garci de Laso was terribly mutilated from those activities.⁴¹

With the murder of Garci de Laso and others that followed, Burgos was plunged into a state of terror in which no one dared to raise his voice against the king or his chief ministers. Enrique of Trastamara, not far away in his duchy of Asturias, fearing the king's wrath would seek to encompass him, fled, seeking refuge on the friendly soils of Portugal.

Albuquerque now directed Pedro toward the liquidation of the remainder of the family of Juan Nunez de Lara and of his main supporters. Though this involved Pedro in some difficulties in the fiercely independent province of Biscaye, he was nevertheless successful. The great land holdings which had once belonged to the Lara family were confiscated and brought under the direct control of the crown. Pedro was then ready to move on to Valladolid for the meeting of the Cortes. The only other significant happening which took place in Burgos before the king's departure for Valladolid was a meeting between Pedro and the new king of Navarre, Charles. This will be discussed in the following chapter when we summarize major developments in the foreign policy of Castille during the first two years of Pedro's reign.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid... pp. 42-43.

⁴²Ibid... p. 49.

As the summer of 1351 wore on, the need for Pedro to meet with the Cortes in Valladolid became increasingly necessary. Though the problem of removing the last resistance of the Lara faction in Castille had not yet been terminated, Pedro made his way to Valladolid accompanied by his ever-present minister, his mother Maria, and Fernando of Aragon. The Cortes was finally convoked during the first days of July, 1351.

This Cortes, which lasted until March of the following year, was one of the most unique and interesting in Castillian history. Fortunately a large number of documents have been preserved from these proceedings. From documents in the Biblioteca Nacional and the National Archives in Madrid, one is able to put together a somewhat substantial story of the happenings that transpired in that significant Cortes. Though it was Pedro who called the Cortes and convoked it in person, unquestionably the guiding spirit and the real power that moved legislation through it was Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.⁴³

One of the first acts of the Cortes was the reconfirmation of a series of laws which had been passed by Alfonso XI during the early years of his reign at a similar Cortes at Acala. In a letter dated September 20th, 1351,⁴⁴

⁴³Ibid., p. 51.

⁴⁴Unpublished document, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Manuscript 5784, W172v.

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Pedro stated that important laws had been passed, but in their haste to copy these laws, clerks had made numerous mistakes, and it was his desire in this Cortes to rectify those errors and to improve upon the laws of his father. Then follows a group of laws under thirty-one titles; some titles contain only one law, others have as many as six.⁴⁵

When one examines these laws, he cannot help but be impressed by the curious combination that made up Castillian society in the fourteenth century. It was still very much a feudal society, yet at the same time, he can clearly see the growing influence of Roman law. As a result, the growth in the arbitrary powers of the king in the determination of the law was becoming increasingly apparent. The majority of these laws concern legal jurisdiction, the powers of the royal judges, their area of jurisdiction, the right of a defendant to appeal, the extent of the punishment. Among the interesting laws passed by the Cortes, one concerned a guard or judge who allowed a prisoner to escape. In such a case, the person guilty for the criminal's escape would suffer the penalty himself, usually death. At the same time laws were extended to encompass adultery, the inheritance of property, and of course numerous feudal privileges and responsibilities. In all, they clearly demonstrate Alfonso XI's attempt to bring legal harmony out of the political and

⁴⁵Ibid., document N173^v-190^v.

legal chaos in Castille at the time of his ascension in 1312. Later Pedro, with the guidance of Alburquerque, tried to improve upon this beginning of his father.⁴⁶

In addition to the reassertion of his father's law code, Pedro was confronted by a number of petitions submitted to him by nobles, churchmen, and the representatives of the city bourgeoisie. One of the most interesting features of the measures is that they excluded any criticisms of the violent behavior of Pedro's government, especially concerning the execution of Garcí Laso and the remainder of the Lara faction. This could simply be a tacit acceptance of the violent measures taken by Alburquerque or a recognition of the fact that the nobility was thoroughly intimidated by the new minister and king.⁴⁷

First to come forth with its petitions was the Church, presenting in all only twenty-nine articles. For the most part, they contained complaints about the usurpation of Church land either by the rich, the king, or his officials. Most important, the Church was attempting to regain lands which had been taken from it in the early years of the reign of Alfonso XI, who had been forced to resort to such measures because of the pressing invasion of the Moorish forces threatening his kingdom. After his brilliant

⁴⁶Ibid., nos. 172^v-190^v.

⁴⁷Merimee, p. 70.

victory at the Rio Salado, however, no restitution had taken place. Now, with the beginning of a new reign, the Church was once again attempting to recover these lost lands. In all instances, Pedro did not acquiesce, but in many he did. For example, the monasteries of Sahagun,⁴⁸ of Arlanza,⁴⁹ St. Mary de la Viel,⁵⁰ and of Saint Mary of Rio Seco,⁵¹ all recovered their lands. The Archives bear note to at least thirty or forty similar examples which can be found among the surviving documents of the courts at Valladolid.

In addition to the generosity to these monasteries, other examples of Pedro's kindness to the Church can be found. One document dated January 5, 1352, shows that Pedro ordered his tax collectors to return an annual sum of taxes to the abbot of the monastery of Sahagun.⁵² With the exception of the occasional refusal on the part of Pedro to answer the petitions of the churchmen favorably, they must have, in all, been satisfied by their success in achieving much that they requested of the king at the Cortes of Valladolid.

The nobility also came forth with their demands. In

⁴⁸Unpublished documents, Archivo Nacional, Madrid, Leon y Sahagun, co934, n. 16.

⁴⁹Ibid., San Pedro de Arlanza, co. 371, no. 18.

⁵⁰Ibid., Burgos de la Viel, co. 383, n. 15.

⁵¹Ibid., co. 357, n. 2.

⁵²Archivo Nacional, Madrid, co. 934, n. 16.

many respects they were quite similar to those of the Church because they sought the confirmation, extension, and reassertion of their extensive privileges. Among their major concerns were the economic conditions which then plagued Castille. The black death had taken its toll on the population, and as in other parts of Europe, Castille was suffering from a labor shortage. The prices of the laborers had quickly become quite high by standards of the fourteenth century. The nobles asked the king to place a limit on the wages a free-laborer could demand and Pedro complied.⁵³

Another problem of great concern to the nobles was that of the free towns called behetrias. These were communities which, due to ancient privileges, were able to select their own lords. Consequently, they were a constant source of concern for the nobility. Only when they could find a new lord who was willing to go to war with the old one could a change in government take place. Now, the king was asked to divide these communities equally among all the nobles.⁵⁴ There are indications that Pedro had good intentions in regard to solving this serious problem in Castillian political life. However, if we are to believe Ayala, it was the fault of the greed of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque which prevented this situation from ever occurring since he held an extensive number of these communities.⁵⁵

⁵³Merimee, p. 72.

⁵⁴Ayala, p. 50.

⁵⁵Ibid.

The nobles further asked for a complete amnesty for their behavior during the months of Pedro's illness. The government had broken down and the nobles had placed their hands upon royal possessions, seizing royal funds for their own use. In granting these amnesties, the king reserved the right to examine each case individually and allowed himself some latitude in recovering the amount which had been usurped.⁵⁶

Certainly the most significant and most far-reaching petitions were those led by the third class, the city bourgeoisie. In examining their petitions to the king, we find their greatest concern was in the field of taxation. Though this is a gross generality, it appears that when the interest of the bourgeoisie class came into conflict with that of the nobility, Pedro ruled in favor of the bourgeoisie in a majority of occasions. This may explain why in the last years of his tottering reign, he found his greatest opposition from the great nobility and his warmest support from the bourgeoisie of the Castillian cities. Many of the claims presented by the urban communities were accusations against the royal tax collectors or against the nobles, charged with abusing their privileges to collect taxes and over-assessing the various communities. In a number of acts, still preserved in the unpublished document collections of the Biblioteca Nacional, Pedro's replies were usually quite sharp in

⁵⁶Unpublished Document, Biblioteca Nacional, M. S. 5784 Artical 5.

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seeking out justice for those who had offended their privileges as tax collectors.⁵⁷

Other legislation concerned the idea of the "just price," a factor still important in Castillian economic thinking of the 14th century.⁵⁸ Trade relations with both Navarre and Aragon concerning restriction of transporting foods across the borders was also of interest. The horse-trade with Navarre and the wine-trade with Aragon were subjects of concern to the legislators.

In summary, the Cortes of Valladolid, which met from July, 1351 until early 1352, was an extremely interesting gathering in the history of Castille. It saw Pedro and Alburquerque laboring to increase the power of the central government in Castille by clarifying and strengthening the law code of Alfonso XI. It revealed a favoritism which Pedro and his minister showed to the bourgeoisie, and it showed that Pedro, contrary to the charges made by many of his enemies, was not hostile to the Castillian church. Certainly his generous gifts and his reconfirmation of privileges bear witness to this.

The first two years of the reign of Pedro I of Castille present some interesting developments. His ascension after his father's death and the conflict which he faced with

⁵⁷Ibid., M. S. 5784, Fol. 180, Law 1 & 2; and Ayala, p. 78.

⁵⁸Unpublished document Biblioteca Nacional, n. 1254.

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his brothers played a paramount role in the future history of his kingdom. Other influential factors were the opposition from his nobility, particularly that which was directed towards his minister, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, as well as the significant legislation of the Cortes of Valladolid.

Since we have, in this chapter, directed the major attention to the domestic developments in Castille, we must now turn to the main purpose of this work: the examination of Pedro's foreign policy. During the first two years there were developments which significantly influenced the course of Castillian history for the remaining seventeen years of Pedro I's reign.

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CHAPTER III

CASTILLIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1350-1352

With the termination of the Cortes, Pedro left Valladolid at the end of March, being faced with a number of other matters that required his immediate attention. Among his most serious problems was that Alfonso Fernandez Coronel was once more beginning to incite the nobility to rebel. This was not the only problem, however, which the young king faced, for political developments in the kingdom also required his attention. During the first two years of Pedro's reign, there were six governments with which the Castillian government had significant political contact. Those six were Granada, Navarre, Portugal, Aragon, England, and France. Let us examine in detail the diplomatic developments in each of these six relationships.

The death of Alfonso XI in 1350 had virtually brought an end to the conflict with the Moors of Granada. In the turmoil that followed Alfonso's death, there was little incentive on the part of Pedro or Alburquerque to renew the struggle. Consequently, with the exception of occasional conflicts, the relationship of Granada and the Castillian king during those early years of Pedro's reign were cordial.

Garcia contends that it was on the basis of the Moors'

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respect for the reputation of the deceased Alfonso XI that the Moors accepted the conquests Alfonso had made, making no attempt to recover their lost territories.¹ The only exception to these tranquil relations was during the insurrection of Alfonso Fernandez Coronel. From his fortress of Aguilar on the border of the Moorish kingdom, he was in an excellent position to carry on negotiations with the Moors to gain comrades in his sedition. His son-in-law, Juan de la Cerda, even attempted to enlist the Moors of North Africa. There is limited evidence that the Granadian kingdom gave consideration to aiding Coronel. The sudden reappearance of Pedro in Andalucia in late 1352, discouraged any such action by the Moors and they continued their policy of neutrality.²

The warm relationship which had existed between Portugal and Castille during the reign of Alfonso XI continued into the early years of Pedro's reign. No doubt this relationship was to be expected since the king of Portugal was Pedro's grandfather. Though no formal treaties were signed between Portugal and Castille during these years, Alfonso IV asked the young king for a personal meeting during the spring of 1352. Pedro had just concluded the Cortes of Valladolid and left that city, going directly to the border of Portugal. Meeting at Ciudad Rodrigo, the two monarchs confirmed their friendship and that of their respective countries. The

¹Juan Catalina Garcia, pp. 26-27.

²Merimee, p. 93.

Portuguese king then asked his grandson to pardon the Count of Trastamara, who had sought refuge in the Portuguese kingdom during the past year. Pedro, whatever his motive, granted this request, and allowed Enrique to return to his estates in Asturia which had been confiscated during his absence and which were now returned. It should be added, however, that Enrique did not consider it appropriate to appear before his brother, and upon his pardon immediately returned to his northern estates.

The motives of Alfonso IV in this matter are impossible to determine since no documentation has survived and since little is recorded of these matters in the chronicles. It might be assumed that Alfonso acted simply out of kindness, or to prevent the outbreak of civil war in his grandson's kingdom. There is no indication that Enrique learned any lessons from this short exile. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why upon returning to Asturia, he once more engaged in seditious activities. Merimee suggests that Enrique had not yet considered usurping the throne, but that he might have had in mind establishing an independent state in northern Castille.³

Before we proceed to the more significant relations of Castille with Aragon, England, and France, we must briefly examine the contact between Navarre and Castille during these

³Merimee, p. 82.

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years. The relationship between these two countries was most significant, particularly during the 1360's. As we have seen, shortly after the death of Garci de Laso in the summer of 1351, Charles, king of Navarre, arrived in the city of Burgos, accompanied by his brother. Charles, a young man of the same age as Pedro, had become king of Navarre in 1349. In the course of his reign, which lasted until 1381, he earned for himself the infamous title of Charles the Bad. Possibly Charles was no more deserving of this description than Pedro was of his title "The Cruel." He was, however, a man noted for his political duplicity. His activities certainly added a great deal of color and confusion to a complicated story of Iberian politics in the 1360's. It appears that when Pedro and Charles met in Burgos in the summer of 1351, they warmly welcomed each other and established a close rapport. In the process they exchanged generous gifts.⁴ The real purpose of the visit of Charles was to demonstrate that he was not ready to enter an alliance with Aragon against Castille.⁵ By this time, Pedro IV had developed a hostile attitude towards Castille for reasons which we will discuss. We know that the Aragonese king had made strong gestures to the young king of Navarre and had urged Charles to marry one of his daughters. This act

⁴ Ayala, p. 49.

⁵ Geronimo Zurita, Anales de la corona de Aragon (Zaragoza: 1610), Vol. II, p. 59.

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was intended to bind the two nations closely together. However, Charles, not yet prepared to commit himself, went to Burgos to assure Pedro and Alburquerque that he was not yet prepared to take sides.⁶ Though the friendship of the two young kings was to be neither firm nor lasting, for that moment, at least, relations with Navarre seemed to be secure.

Let us now examine in more detail the exact nature of the Castillian-Aragonese relations which came very close to developing into a foreign war. Castillian-Aragonese relations during those years were closely identified with internal developments in both kingdoms. From the Aragonese point of view, the greatest concern was the presence of the Aragonese prince, Don Fernando, in Castille.

During the reign of Alfonso IV (1327-1335) the history of Aragon was uneventful except for the wars with Pisa and Genoa over the possession of Sardinia. The most significant development of this reign was a dynastic problem which plagued Alfonso's successor, Pedro IV, until the death of his rival, Fernando, in 1363. When Alfonso IV's first wife died, he married the sister of the Castillian king, Alfonso XI, in 1329. Leonor of Castille was a strong and energetic woman who soon began to exercise an increasingly powerful influence over her husband. She produced two sons for Alfonso: Fernando, born 1331, and Juan, born two years later. The major goal of her ambition was to acquire

⁶Ibid.

the throne for her eldest son, Fernando, at the expense of Alfonso's eldest son, Pedro IV. Fortunately for Pedro, he was able to thwart these plans with the support of popular sentiments. With their ambitions defeated, Leonor and her two sons withdrew from Aragon in 1345. This did not represent an end to her or her son's ambitions in Aragon, however. They never neglected an opportunity to involve themselves in the internal problems of Aragon. Any faction that was hostile to Pedro IV automatically became an ally of the exiled princes.⁷ In 1348, for example, a league of lords and communes in the southern part of Pedro IV's kingdom, centered around Valencia, revolted and took the name of a "union." Immediately the league recognized Fernando as its leader. It was not until the victory of Pedro IV at the battle of Epila in late 1348 that the pretender once more was driven from Aragon. Thus, Pedro IV could certainly lodge many grievances against the nephews of Alfonso XI, who despite their hostility to him were accepted in Castille with honor and held positions of great importance. It will be recalled, for example, that in 1350 Prince Fernando was given the post of Adelantado of the Fronterizo, a position of great significance. He was a constant companion of the new king from 1350 on. When Pedro fell seriously ill in the summer of 1350, Fernando was considered one of the potential successors to the heirless king. He received the

⁷Ibid., pp. 33-35.

strong endorsement of Queen Maria, his aunt, and Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque. It might be added at this time that despite his support for the young man, Alburquerque felt no particular affection for Fernando. It was obviously the choice of the lesser of two evils. Certainly Alburquerque could not support the pretensions of Juan Nunez de Lara, who had only temporarily alligned himself with Alburquerque because of their mutual goal of destroying the faction of Leonor de Guzman. A government headed by Juan Nunez de Lara would have no room for Alburquerque.

On the other hand, with the ambitious but ineffectual Fernando as king of Aragon and Castille, there was no reason why Alburquerque could not continue to be the real power in the kingdom, as he had been during the early months of the reign of Pedro I, particularly if Alburquerque had been instrumental in helping him obtain the throne.

The victory of Pedro IV at Epila in 1348 had been an important one for the Aragonese king. It allowed him to drive his hated enemies from the kingdom and to confiscate their territories. But the asylum which Fernando found in Castille, the elevated rank he occupied there, and his apparent alliance with the all-powerful minister of Pedro were elements of constant anxiety and irritation for Pedro IV. For this reason, the relationship between Aragon and Castille deteriorated during the first years of Pedro's reign. As was already mentioned, Pedro IV made overtures

to Charles of Navarre to align the two kingdoms by a marriage alliance. This proposal the latter declined and publicly repudiated by going to Burgos to meet with the Castilian king. These activities of Pedro IV can be understood in light of the threat which he felt the presence of Fernando of Aragon in the Castilian court represented to his security as king of Aragon.⁸

To place the Aragonese problem in its proper context it is necessary to examine some of the internal developments in Castille following the conclusion of the Cortes of Valladolid. As usual, the chronicles do not leave a chronology which is easy to follow. A document dated March 20th makes it certain that Pedro had not left Valladolid before that date.⁹ From there the Castilian king moved at the request of his grandfather, the king of Portugal, to a meeting at Ciudad Rodrigo. This probably took place in late April or early May. We know he passed through the city of Toro in April; how long it took him to reach Ciudad Rodrigo cannot be definitely determined. A very short time after meeting with his grandfather, Pedro received distressing news from Andalucia. Alfonso Fernandez Coronel was stirring up a great disturbance in the kingdom.

⁸Zurita, Vol. II, p. 59.

⁹Garcia, p. 47, N. 1.

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Since the death of Garci de Laso, Coronel had become the leader of the Juan Nunez de Lara faction which had not yet been entirely annihilated by Pedro and Alburquerque. Coronel was the same nobleman who had quickly abandoned Leonor de Guzman after the death of King Alfonso. In doing so he had obtained the good graces of Alburquerque who rewarded him by making him one of the wealthiest lords in Castille, Lord of Aguilar. The attachment to Alburquerque had been one of pragmatism. When the king fell ill in 1350, Coronel was extremely vocal in support of Juan Nunez de Lara as the potential successor to the king. When Pedro recovered and de Lara returned to his own lands in Biscaye, Coronel moved to his new holdings in the south. By the time the Cortes met in Valladolid in 1351, the relations between the king and Coronel were so bad that the latter did not dare to put in an appearance at the Cortes. Instead he remained behind his powerful walls at Aguilar. Soon he began seeking allies from among those who could be counted as enemies of the powerful Portuguese minister, naturally turning to the bastard brothers of the king. The most receptive to his overtures was Enrique of Trastamara, who had just recently returned from his exile, and his younger brother, Tello. Both shared the ambitions of Alfonso Fernandez Coronel and his dislike of Alburquerque. The treachery of Coronel extended further than this. He opened negotiations with the

Moorish king of Granada and the Arabs of North Africa to assist him in the upcoming rebellion against his legitimate king.¹⁰

It appears that Alburquerque convinced the king that the destruction of Alfonso Coronel was necessary and that immediate and vigorous action had to be taken. Leaving Ciudad Rodrigo, where the meeting with the Portuguese king had just been concluded, Pedro and Alburquerque marched in the direction of Aguilar with a small royal army. It was led by the very capable general, Gutier Fernandez de Toledo, who had saved the city of Algeciras for the king in the early months of his reign.¹¹

The speed with which the royal army reached Aguilar surprised Coronel, who had not anticipated an attack so soon. Taken totally by surprise, a great number of Coronel's comrades encouraged him to give himself up to the king, to receive the most lenient terms Pedro had to offer, which would probably have been a short exile, and to wait for a better opportunity. Coronel, however, did not follow this prudent advice.¹² Instead, when the royal messengers arrived at Aguilar with orders to receive the king, Coronel refused. His avowed reason was that he would never deliver himself to

¹⁰Merimee, p. 84.

¹¹Ayala, p. 66.

¹²Ibid., p. 65.

Albuquerque as his close friend, Garci de Laso, had. He was determined to withstand the king with force.¹³ It was then decided by the king and Albuquerque that they would take the city by siege. A short encounter followed in which the royal banner was pierced by arrows shot from the walls of the besieged city. The result was great indignation of the king and the nobles who accompanied him and who had earlier attempted to intercede with Pedro on behalf of Coronel. On that day, Coronel was declared a rebel and traitor and his property was declared confiscated and returned to the crown. In reality, however, the defenses of the city of Aguilar were strong, it was well-provisioned, and the numbers of the royal army were few. It was therefore decided that the city could not be taken.

This decision was further affected by news which had just reached the king of events in the north which required immediate attention.¹⁴ The news that had reached Pedro concerning the activities of his brothers involve, first of all, Enrique of Trastamara, who had just taken the city of Gijon by surprise attack. Meanwhile, his younger brother, Tello, only sixteen years of age, had adopted the profession of robber baron. He had attacked and robbed a large caravan going from Burgos to the great fair held at

¹³Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 68.

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Alcala Henares. The fair of Alcala was one of the largest in Castille and was under the protection of the Archbishop of Toledo. The merchants traveled with letters of protection granted to them by the king but the documents were frequently ignored. Tello was not the first nobleman to view these caravans as a source of legitimate plunder.¹⁵

Frightened by the news of the king's approach, both Enrique and Tello sought a safer environment. Their fear was intensified by the news that Pedro was moving northward with his army. During their march they successfully subdued several fortresses of Coronel. Few castles showed any resistance. In only one instance did a castle resist, only to fall eventually to Pedro. One Castella that tried to withstand the king had his hands chopped off as an example to others who might attempt resistance.¹⁶ As the king neared Gijon, Enrique fled to the mountains of Asturia with a handful of followers. He left his wife, Joanna Manuel, hoping she could negotiate his pardon with the king. Tello headed for his border fortress of Monteagudo and eventually fled to Aragon.¹⁷

Alburquerque and the king did not wish to involve themselves in a war in the north. They considered the threat

¹⁵Ibid... p. 73.

¹⁶Ibid... p. 72.

¹⁷Ibid... p. 74.

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of Alfonso Fernandez Coronel in the south a much greater menace. For that reason they were prepared to offer lenient terms to the eldest of Alfonso XI's bastard sons. In return for his oath of loyalty to the king, Enrique was to receive a pardon and return of all his lands. These terms were very quickly accepted by Joanna and Enrique. In June of 1352, Pedro and his brother met in the city of Gijon and once again reached an understanding which was to bring a temporary peace to northern Castille.¹⁸

Pedro then turned his attention to those castles held by Tello which, with the exception of Monteagudo, were quickly taken without opposition. As the royal army conquered Tello's fortresses and approached closer to the borders of Aragon, the attitude of Pedro IV caused considerable anxiety in the Castillian court. Alburquerque wished to explore further the intentions of Aragon before returning to Andalucia to crush Coronel. Aragon and Castille had been at peace for several years but their relations, as we have already seen, were very strained by 1352.¹⁹

When Tello sought refuge in the Aragonese court, he quickly received it. With eagerness Pedro IV received his homage.²⁰ This could be considered an act of reprisal against

¹⁸Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 49 and p. 49, note 2.

¹⁹See pp. 77-79 above.

²⁰Diplomatic Documents, General Archives of the Crown of Aragon, N. 1676. Dated June 14, 1352.

the Castillian government for its sheltering and encouragement of the sons of Queen Leonor.²¹ The Aragonese king was now in a position to set himself up as a protector of all those elements in Castille who were hostile to the king and his Portuguese minister. Pedro IV was now in a position to cause as much damage and harm to the Castillian monarchy as it had caused him in its support of Fernando. Both kings were now in a position to promote a civil war in their neighbor's kingdom. The growing animosity between the two courts had been intensified by the growing ambition of Fernando. When his hopes for the throne of Castille were shattered by the recovery of his cousin, he had once more turned his views toward Aragon.

It was with an awareness of these strained relations between the two kingdoms that Alburquerque reached the fortress of Monteagudo, which had served as the final shelter of Tello before his departure into Aragon. At that time there can be little question that Alburquerque desired peace with Aragon. His interest at this time was in securing the power of the central government in Castille and in enhancing his own political position within that kingdom. Neither cause would have been served at that time by a foreign war. Thus at the first opportunity he opened negotiations with the Aragonese which also showed an equal interest in preventing war.²²

²¹Merimee, p. 90.

²²Zurita, Anales, Vol. II, p. 248, and Ayala, p. 78.

Discussion began in the Castillian city of Agreda in early October of 1352. Both sides quickly came to terms. The treaty was signed at the castle of Atienza on October 29, 1352.²³ One of the main conditions was that both monarchs agreed to receive back and pardon their wayward relatives. At the same time, both kings vouched for the future behavior of these parties. This amnesty not only included Tello and Fernando of Aragon, but also inferior persons who had followed these parties in their opposition to their respective kings. In order to prevent such behavior in the future, both monarchs agreed to a clause in which they would extradict political refugees in future instances. Although all the terms of this interesting treaty were obviously not kept, it did, for the time, end the potential hostilities which could have broken out between the two kingdoms. Alburquerque and Pedro, having momentarily solved the threat of Enrique and Tello and having come to terms with the Aragonese monarch, were now free to deal with Alfonso Coronel, whom they had cleverly isolated.

With the treaty of Atienza signed, Pedro and his army returned to Andalucia. There they brought the fortress of Aguilar under siege without delay. The siege lasted for four months, before the digging of trenches forced the walls to collapse and fall to the royal forces.²⁴ There was no

²³Diplomatic Documents, General Archives of the Crown of Aragon, N. 1736 and 1737.

²⁴Ayala, p. 79.

question of mercy for Coronel. The king ordered his execution as well as the execution of a number of his followers.²⁵ Once more, the Castillian nobility had a grim reminder of the fate that awaited those who did not acquiesce to the wills of the king and Juan Alfonso Alburquerque. Following his father's example, Pedro was determined to force the Castillian nobility to obedience.

While these important developments were taking place in the political relations between Aragon and Castille, there was a renewal of political negotiations with England. As we have seen, extensive negotiations had been conducted between the courts of Alfonso XI and Edward III during the years from 1345 to 1348,²⁶ aiming toward the marriage of the Castillian heir to the daughter of Edward III. Second only to Edward's economic embarrassment, the greatest hindrance to the successful consummation of those diplomatic activities was the intensive animosity which existed between English and Castillian seamen. This hatred was deeply rooted and very old. Accounts which have survived bear witness to this point.²⁷ The exact causes of this intense animosity are difficult to determine. One cause may have

²⁵Ibid., p. 80.

²⁶See pp. 14-32.

²⁷Rymer, Vol. III, Part I, p. 9, and Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Leon y de Castilla (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1861-63), Vol. I, pp. 488, 610, 611, and 629.

been the aid which the Castillian sailors gave to the king of France at times in his wars with the English. Possibly, the most serious cause was the economic competition between Castillian and English merchants who vied for the wool trade with Flanders. Whatever the causes, the hatred was pronounced. It was obvious that both monarchs realized that a drastic improvement in the maritime relations of the two countries was essential to bring a successful culmination to their diplomatic talks of the 1340's.

The success of these talks remained threatened by the frequent attacks of the English and especially by the Bayonese against the maritime commerce of Castille. In a vigorous attempt to rectify the situation, Edward III established a new commission located in the province of Gascony and empowered it to listen to complaints arising from these maritime disputes. Later he invited Alfonso XI to send Castillian representatives to participate in the commission's activities.²⁸ It appears, however, that these and similar acts did little to improve the situation.

An event that transpired late in 1347 clearly demonstrated the problems still existing. In the summer of 1347, two English diplomats, Richard Saham and Robert Stratton, were charged with the responsibility of negotiating the hoped for marriage between the Black Prince and Leonor, daughter of the king of Portugal. They chartered a Castil-

²⁸Rymer, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 109, 140.

lian ship to return to England after they had received the unfortunate news that Leonor had already been betrothed to Pedro IV of Aragon. Upon the arrival of the ship at Plymouth, it was assaulted by an angry crowd. In the action which followed, the cargo of the ship as well as the personal property of the two diplomats was seized. This event is very significant for it shows that after four years of intense diplomatic activities to establish an alliance with Castille, Edward had not been able to appease the anti-Castillian feelings of the English maritime population.²⁹

Both rulers understood the economic and strategic advantages which would follow an Anglo-Castillian alliance. However, they were not able to convince the maritime and mercantile interests of their countries of the advantages of such a policy.³⁰ There is no question that the House of Commons greatly hindered Edward's endeavors to consummate the alliance by refusing to grant the necessary funds for the dowry. Obviously, the animosity on the Castillian side was equally as great.

As the tension between the two mercantile classes overflowed into the reign of Pedro I, it resulted in the outbreak of open hostilities during the first years of his reign.

²⁹Calendars of Patent Rolls, Edward III, 1348-50, as cited in Russell, "Allianza Frustrada," P. 322 N. 48.

³⁰Rymer, Vol. III (i), pp. 109, 140.

In the summer of 1350, the most frequent conflict between the English and Castillian seamen shifted from the coast of Biscaye into the Channel. There where the ships of both kingdoms carried on extensive trade with Flanders, they came into most frequent contact. In the summer months of 1350, the Castillians became the aggressors, on numerous occasions attacking English ships and causing considerable damage. So disturbed was the English monarch that on August 10th, 1350, he wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury accusing the Castillians of wanting to dominate the sea and bring about the total destruction of the English fleet. He asked the Archbishop to offer his prayers for the English in the struggle which was about to begin.³¹ On the 29th of August, a major sea battle was fought off the coast of Windchelsea in which the English were victorious. The Castillians had been so soundly defeated that the Basque population, which composed the majority of the seamen involved, were ready to negotiate. In the fall of 1350 a truce was signed between the English and the representatives of the Biscaye maritime population which temporarily ended the hostilities.³² Possibly the most interesting aspect of these activities is that little interest in the matter was expressed by the royal court. This could be because during these months

³¹Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 28, note 2.

³²Garcia, p. 29, note 1, and Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 380.

Pedro was recovering from his near fatal illness. All the attention of those close to the king was concentrated on the question of his successor. Nevertheless, the treaty eventually negotiated was between the English and the Biscayan maritime population; it was a treaty in which the king took no part.³³

As was observed previously, the question of who was to be the wife of Pedro was a serious concern even before he assumed the throne in 1350. It may be recalled that Alfonso XI had, on different occasions, negotiated marriage treaties with both France and England; the French treaty was totally ignored and the English treaty was never consummated because of the untimely death of Princess Joanna. As a result, when Pedro succeeded to the throne in 1350, his choice for a marriage partner was one he could make free of previous commitments. The question, however, of whom he would marry was of great importance, for the orientation of the foreign policy of Castille seemed to depend upon it.³⁴

From the French point of view, the Castillian alliance was more essential than ever and overtures from that direction were very soon in coming. Immediately after the ascension of Pedro, the French undertook another diplomatic offensive to obtain the fulfillment of this diplomatic hope.

³³Garcia, p. 29.

³⁴Daumet, p. 19.

The French king was again able to count on the strong support of the Avignon papacy. Only three months after the death of Alfonso XI, Clement VII wrote a letter to Pedro on the 13th of June, 1350, in which he reminded him of the alliance made by his father with Philip of Valois.³⁵ In this same letter, Clement advised Pedro to bring about a close reunion between his own house and that of Valois by marrying a French princess. He added that the Holy See was partial to such a marriage and would grant any necessary dispensations. Clement requested in a letter sent to Queen Maria that she urge her son to follow his advice.³⁶ In addition to this letter Clement wrote letters to the chief counselors of Pedro, to Gils Albornoz, archbishop of Toledo, to Juan Alfonso Alburquerque, and also to Fernando of Aragon.³⁷ There seems to be little doubt that the pope took such vigorous action because of the encouragement of the king of France. It was obvious that John II attached a great importance to the maintenance and strengthening of his earlier agreement with Castille.³⁸ There can be little doubt that the near fatal illness of Pedro in the summer of 1350 and the near civil war which followed brought into

³⁵Vatican Register, 144, folio XXIX, vo, piece just. no. 25.

³⁶Ibid., folio XXIX, vo. piece just, no. 26.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Daumet, p. 20.

clear focus the necessity of Pedro taking a wife and producing for Castille a legitimate heir. Although no documentation has survived, this question was undoubtedly discussed at the Cortes of Valladolid, for it was from there that definite action was taken to procure a bride for the young king. Since Alburquerque and Queen Maria favored the French alliance, it was in that direction that the new queen of Castille was sought.³⁹

The Castillian ambassadors sent to France were Don Juan Sanchez de las Roelas and Don Alvar Garcia de Albornoz, a relative of the famous archbishop of Toledo.⁴⁰ The first question was which French princess would be an acceptable bride for Pedro. After some consideration of Blanche of Navarre,⁴¹ the choice finally settled on the daughter of the Duke of Bourbon, Blanche, niece of the king of France. She was fifteen years old, a highly cultured young woman of exceptional beauty.⁴² These serious negotiations were conducted through the summer of 1352. Two simultaneous sets of negotiations were going on: one for the marriage alliance between the king of Castille and Blanche of Bourbon, the other for the renewal of the offensive and defensive alliance

³⁹Ayala, p. 69.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Daumet, p. 22.

⁴²Merimee, p. 98.

of 1345. On the 13th of June, in Conflans, the marriage of Pedro and Blanche of Bourbon was agreed upon.⁴³ In Paris, on the 2nd of July, 1352, the treaty was signed by the king of France and sent to Castille for the approval of Pedro.⁴⁴ In most respects the treaty and marriage alliance now being sent to Pedro was almost an exact replica of the one to which Alfonso XI had put his signature in 1345. There was one noticeable difference, however: the treaty of 1345 had a major clause which guaranteed the generous property grants made to Alfonso's mistress and illegitimate children. This was struck from the treaty of 1352. Pedro was now free from any commitments which his father had made.

On the 4th of November, 1352, the king of Castille confirmed the treaties in his own name.⁴⁵ It appeared that the negotiators for Pedro had done very well. They not only had managed to acquire a young and beautiful wife for Pedro, but also, in his eagerness to obtain the Castillian alliance, the king of France had consented to pay a large dowry of 300,000 gold florins. Blanche was to bring 25,000 florins with her at the time of her exit from France, and the balance was to be paid in annual installments. Pedro, for his part, ceded various territories, towns, and fortresses

⁴³French National Archives, J. 603, N. 51.

⁴⁴Ibid., N. 52.

⁴⁵Ibid., N. 54 and N. 56.

to Blanche, which would be under her total jurisdiction, but which, upon her death, would be returned to the Castillian crown. Furthermore, Pedro consented to the return of the full dowry to France if Blanche should die without an heir.⁴⁶ Negotiations having been completed in November of 1352, Pedro instructed his ambassadors to bring Blanche of Bourbon to Castille.⁴⁷ It appeared then, that the long sought alliance by the king of France was about to become a reality. Soon the Castillian fleet would come to the aid of France in her struggle with the English, and a French princess would reign as the queen of Castille. It seemed that in the future, the posterity of the fleur-de-lis would rule the Central Kingdom.

King John II of France must have dreamed of all of this with the culmination of the treaty of 1352. In reality, however, it would never come about. Paradoxically, the marriage, instead of bringing the two kingdoms closer together, would be the greatest single factor in driving Pedro from the French alliance and into one with England in 1362. It was not, I believe, because Pedro had any particular abhorrence to the French alliance, but rather because of circumstances which had developed in his personal life during the months of the negotiations with France. It was then that

⁴⁶French National Archives, J. 915, N. 5.

⁴⁷Ayala, p. 71.

Pedro fell under the charms of Maria de Padilla. Consequently, when the French princess arrived in Castille, Pedro was unable to break the bonds of this love affair.⁴⁸ Because of this, the treatment which he afforded to Blanche during the years she dwelled in Castille as his wife was appalling and caused a drastic deterioration in the relationship between the Castillian and French courts. As time passed, it became increasingly apparent to the French king that if France was to gain any kind of influence in Castille, it would not be through influencing the reigning king but by supporting the pretender, Enrique of Trastamara. And I believe this, more than anything else, led to the polarization of the French support of Enrique of Trastamara and Pedro's support of the English alliance. But before examining more fully the results of these developments it is necessary to look at the internal developments in Castille during the years immediately following the marriage of Pedro and Blanche.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 77.

CHAPTER IV

CASTILLIAN POLITICS TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR WITH ARAGON 1353-1356

The year 1352 opened with very promising prospects for the monarchy. The king had been restored to good health, peaceful relations had been re-established with other monarchs of the Iberian Peninsula, the revolt of Coronel had been suppressed, and the Castillian magnates appeared, for the present, to have been coerced by a demonstration of strength by the monarchy. Pedro was giving every indication of being a capable student in the art of ruling. This ability was imparted to him by Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque. Finally, a very promising marriage alliance had been negotiated with France which was to bring Pedro a beautiful bride and a large dowry. The prospects, then, appeared very optimistic. However the situation would drastically change in the near future.

During the next three years of Castillian history, there were three events of paramount importance. First was the marriage of Pedro to Blanche of Bourbon; second was the fall of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque as the main power in Castillian political life; and third was the outbreak of civil war. These three developments were by no means unrelated to each other.

To understand better the developments which surrounded the first of these, Pedro's repudiation of his French bride, it is necessary to examine in more detail the events which transpired during the months which the Castillian ambassadors spent at the French court negotiating this fateful alliance. At the very time that negotiations in Paris were going on to obtain a French bride for Pedro, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque was plotting to strengthen his control over the young king. Pedro had at times apparently displayed a degree of independence, and Alburquerque believed a new diversion should be found for him. Consequently he determined to place a mistress before the king, one who would not rival her sponsor, but who would serve as an agent for his political ambitions. As it turned out, Alburquerque's choice was a bad one. It was a young noblewoman who had been raised in his own household. She had been orphaned early in life and her family had been attached to the Lara faction. She was Maria de Padilla, small, but very beautiful and intelligent.¹ Once she had been installed at court, relatives of Maria de Padilla lost their obscurity and suddenly appeared at court, mixing with the most important of the king's advisors.² The exact date when Pedro took Maria

¹Ayala, p. 77.

²Merimee, p. 99.

as his mistress is a matter open to discussion. Ayala maintains that it took place sometime in the summer of 1352 in the city of Sahagun.³ Although the date itself cannot be determined exactly, it is clear that the young king took Maria as his mistress during the campaign against his brothers, Tello and Enrique, which took place in the northern part of his kingdom during the summer and autumn of 1352.⁴ The relationship matured rapidly into a serious love affair. While Pedro was besieging the fortress of Aguilar (November, 1352 - February, 1353) trying to subdue the rebellious vassal, Alonso Coronel, Maria de Padilla was in Cordova giving birth to his first child. Immediately after the fall of Aguilar on February 1, 1353, Pedro hurried to Cordova to be re-united with his mistress and to celebrate with a magnificent feast the birth of his daughter, Beatrice.⁵ Pedro bestowed upon his daughter most of the territory which he had just confiscated from the defeated Coronel.⁶ Shortly after this grand celebration, the king and his court left for Seville. After a stay of several days, they left for the city of Torrijos, located some fifteen miles from Toledo.⁷ There the young king and his youthful companions

³Ayala, p. 77.

⁴Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 55, note 1.

⁵Ayala, p. 86.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 88.

enjoyed themselves celebrating the arrival of Pedro's new daughter with feasts, banquets, and tournaments. Pedro himself took part in one of these tournaments and received a serious wound in his hand which put his life in great danger.⁸

Throughout the months between June of 1352 and February of 1353, Pedro and Maria de Padilla formulated and matured their relationship. Pedro had made no attempt to hide from the public this moral outrage; Maria lived openly as the king's wife.⁹ Pedro, of course, was simply following the example set by his father, Alfonso, who had lived openly with his mistress, Leonor de Guzman.

These were the conditions, then, that existed when on the 25th of February, 1353, Blanche of Bourbon arrived in Valladolid, the city designated for the celebration of her marriage to the king of Castille. Though Pedro was informed of the arrival of his betrothed, he did not appear ready to abandon the charms of Maria de Padilla and the pleasures of the court at Torrijos. It was not until the arrival of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, just recently returned from Portugal, that Pedro was forced to realize the necessity of fulfilling his obligations in the French alliance.¹⁰ No doubt the strongest point of Alburquerque's

⁸Ibid., p. 90.

⁹Garcia, p. 56, and Ayala, p. 79.

¹⁰Ayala, p. 91.

argument concerned the great danger which plagued the kingdom during Pedro's illness of 1350 and the necessity of providing a legitimate heir.¹¹ Alburquerque's arguments were sufficient to convince the king to fulfill his duty. However, Pedro apparently never fully forgave Alburquerque for this opposition to his relationship with Maria de Padilla. By late April, 1353, Alburquerque must have fully realized his mistake in throwing Maria into the arms of Pedro. Skillful politician that he was, however, he made every possible attempt to avoid antagonizing further the family of Maria de Padilla which was now coming to the forefront of Castillian politics and was already plotting the minister's downfall.¹²

Reluctantly, Pedro took Maria and the court and moved toward Valladolid. On the way he left his mistress at the castle of Montaban under the protection of her bastard brother, Juan Garcia de Villagera, who in the future would replace Don Padrique as the Master of Santiago. When Pedro reached Valladolid in May he found an impressive gathering prepared to celebrate the wedding. There was his mother, Queen Maria, his aunt, Queen Leonor of Portugal, his two cousins, the princes of Aragon, Fernando and Juan, many of the great nobles of Castille, and his bride-to-be Blanche,

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

now sixteen years of age and a beautiful and charming woman.¹³

Upon reaching Valladolid, the king learned that his bastard brothers, Count Enrique and Don Tello, were coming to the wedding, accompanied by numerous armed companions. At that time they were camped in the city of Cigales, about six miles from Valladolid. They insisted that they would not enter the city unless they were accompanied by their forces since they feared for their lives because of Pedro's minister, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.¹⁴ It is very possible that Enrique and Tello had with them several thousand soldiers; Ayala gives a figure of over 8,000, but his figures must be suspect.¹⁵ Alburquerque advised that the time had come for a showdown between the king and his rebellious half-brothers. He obviously believed that now was the time to eliminate this menace from Castillian politics. Pedro mobilized his forces and began to march in the direction of Cigales. When the two forces met, instead of coming to blows, they began negotiations despite the appeals of Alburquerque to take immediate punitive action. It appears that the entire incident was in many respects a charade. The Padilla faction had already been in contact with Enrique and Tello

¹³Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

purposing to undermine the power of the Portuguese minister.¹⁶ It is also apparent that the king himself was aware of the negotiations which had transpired before the meeting at Cigales.¹⁷ Merimee, in fact, suggests that the entire episode had its birth many months before the actual meeting. The dispatching of Albuquerque to Portugal on a diplomatic mission had all been part of this plan.¹⁸ It is difficult to substantiate this fact, but it nevertheless remains a distinct possibility. Pedro in all probability now desired to establish his political independence which it was impossible to do in the presence of Albuquerque. Don Tello and the Count of Trastamara, despite their political opposition to the Padilla party which was now a significant power in Pedro's government, preferred a bond of unity against the aspirations of Albuquerque who represented an obstacle to both factions. Thus when the parties met at Cigales on that summer day in 1353, any possibility of warlike action was remote. The result of the meeting was a total (though temporary) reconciliation between Pedro and his brothers.¹⁹ This event represented a political humiliation and defeat for Albuquerque. Completing his business,

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Merimee, p.101.

¹⁹Ayala, p. 93.

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Pedro returned to Valladolid to celebrate his marriage with Blanche of Bourbon.

Pedro's marriage took place on June 3rd in the church of Santa Maria Nueva de Valladolid. The ceremony was ostentatious as was befitting the occasion. The repugnance which the king felt for his new bride, however, was unknown to very few in Valladolid. Very soon the rumor spread that he was about to leave his new bride and return to his mistress. On the third day after the wedding, his mother, Queen Maria, and his aunt, Queen Leonor, came to the king and beseeched him to consider the drastic results such behavior could have on his kingdom. They asked him to consider the displeasure of the king of France and the repercussions such acts would have upon that kingdom.²⁰ They attempted to impress upon him the effects this action would have upon the nobility and the great scandal it would raise in his kingdom. To all these pleas Pedro answered that he had no intention of deserting his bride and that no such idea had entered his mind. Though not believing the king, there was little the two women could do but to accept his answer.²¹ Only hours after this meeting Pedro did in fact leave Valladolid to be reunited with Maria.²² His flight

²⁰Ibid., p. 94.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

had been planned beforehand. The preparations for his departure were being made at the very time he was engaged in the interview with his mother and aunt. In his flight he was accompanied by only a handful of friends, among whom was the brother of his mistress, Diego de Padilla. Historians have dwelt considerably on this significant historical event. One interesting account, though without any apparent historical basis, states Blanche and Fadrique had an illicit relationship as the former journeyed to Valladolid. Thus Pedro would have nothing to do with his adulterous bride. This same story could be related to the violent death of Fadrique in 1358. It is difficult to determine why Pedro found this young, beautiful and intelligent princess so repugnant and why so soon after their marriage he deserted her, aware of the grave political consequences which would follow.²³ It appears that the best explanation is that Pedro, being the impetuous and frequently irrational person that he was, simply acted on the basis of his emotions. He was deeply in love with Maria de Padilla, and this was the motivating factor of his behavior.

The following day, after abandoning Blanche, Pedro was reunited with his lover at the castle of Montaban.²⁴ We shall soon see that the political consequences of his impetuous acts were very grave for his kingdom.

²³Juan Catalina Garcia, p. 60, note 2.

²⁴Ayala, p. 95.

Shortly after Pedro's departure from Valladolid, the great assembly which had gathered for the king's wedding began to depart in different directions. Some, such as the powerful lord of Galicia, Fernando de Castro, returned to their native lands in disgust over the king's behavior. Many, on the other hand, followed the king, paying homage and solicitous of his favor. It was obvious that Alburquerque's power was diminishing. Among those who followed the king were his bastard brothers, Enrique and Tello.²⁵ It is difficult to determine their motives. They may simply have courted the favor of the king; on the other hand, they may have acted on the fact that Alburquerque was opposed to Pedro's behavior on this occasion and they wished to align themselves in the opposition camp.

The behavior of the bastards was well rewarded. Shortly after their arrival at Montaban, the hostages they had given Pedro as assurance for their good conduct during the Cigales negotiations were set free. The domination of Alburquerque had definitely come to an end.

After recovering from the initial shock of what had transpired, Alburquerque regained his self-confidence and met with the three queens to determine the best course of action to follow. The consensus was that Alburquerque and his partisans should go to Toledo where Pedro had gone with

²⁵Ibid., p. 96.

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Maria²⁶ and bring the young king back to Valladolid and his bride.²⁷ Alburquerque left Valladolid with a following of more than 1,500 knights; most were his personal retainers. In addition he was accompanied by a number of nobles²⁸ who had not yet committed themselves to either side in the dispute. Among the companions of Alburquerque on this journey was the future historian, Pedro Lopez de Ayala.

Late on the Sunday following the wedding of Pedro, Juan Alfonso reached the village of Albornoz, a short distance from Toledo. There he was visited by Pedro's emissary, Don Samuel Levi, at this time the king's chief treasurer and a close partisan of the Padilla family.²⁹ Levi brought instructions from Pedro that he wished to consult with his minister but that the king did not understand why Juan Alfonso would bring such a powerful host with him. He ordered that they should be dismissed by Alburquerque and that he should come to Toledo alone or with only a handful of followers to meet the king. Pedro assured him that he had nothing to fear for his personal safety. Don Samuel added that members of the Padilla faction wished to meet with the

²⁶Ibid., p. 97.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 98.

Portuguese and that he also had nothing to fear from them.³⁰ Samuel Levi, though an old friend of Alburquerque, did not dare tell the minister anything in addition to this. Levi, however, had not come alone, and his followers were more vocal in expressing to their friends in Alburquerque's party the dangers which awaited the minister in Toledo.³¹ When these stories reached him, they reinforced and intensified the fears which the minister already felt. When Alburquerque conferred with his followers, they advised him that it would be foolhardy to give himself up to the mercy of Pedro. They stressed the influence of the Padillas on the young king who were determined on the minister's destruction.

Making one last attempt to save his position, Alburquerque sent his majordomo, Cabeza de Vaca, to the king.³² After having listened to the messenger's lengthy discourse in which the great services and virtues of Alburquerque were elaborated, Pedro replied that Juan Alfonso should not believe the rumors that had been circulating. The king reiterated that Alburquerque should come at once and pay his respects to him. These words failed to reassure Juan Alfonso, who was convinced more than ever that the king was intent upon his destruction.³³

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid... p. 99.

³²Ibid... p. 100.

³³Ibid... p. 101.

Deciding upon retreat, Juan Alfonso, with a considerably reduced following, left Albornoz, and returned in the direction of Valladolid. Stopping at the fortress of Ferradon, he met and conferred with his closest political ally, the Master of Calatrava, Juan Nunez de Prado.³⁴ They were both in agreement that for the present any form of open resistance was impossible. The most prudent course of action was to wait patiently for the opportunity to return to power. Both believed that Pedro would soon tire of his charming mistress and her fall would carry the Padilla faction with it. Alburquerque was to withdraw to his extensive domain on the Portuguese frontier and Juan Nunez de Prado to one of the many fortresses of his Order. After visiting Valladolid and paying his respects to the three queens, Alburquerque went to the fortress of Carvajales on the Portuguese frontier. When Pedro learned of the actions of Juan Alfonso and the Master of Calatrava, he began a drastic reshuffling of his government, purging most of those who had received their commissions through the powers of the now fallen minister.³⁵

Soon after his minister's departure from Albornoz, Pedro, influenced by his most influential advisors, including the Padillas, was reminded that he still had a commitment to

³⁴Ibid., p. 102.

³⁵Ayala, p. 114, and Rades, Chronicle, p. 27.

his French bride and the French alliance. Pedro's return to his bride at Valladolid was presented as a political necessity. The young king, despite his affections for Maria, soon acquiesced to these arguments and returned to Blanche. Once reunited with his wife he lived as her husband for only two days. For the second time in a single month, he deserted her to return to Maria. Pedro would never again see his legitimate wife. After this second desertion, the French embassaries who had accompanied Blanche to Castille, including the viscount of Narbonne, left Castille and returned to their homeland. They carried with them the scandalous stories of Pedro's treatment of the French heiress. A dozen years later, when Enrique of Trastamara crossed the Castillian frontier supported by a French army, the strongest position upon which the French could base their political interference in Castille was the treatment Blanche had received from the Castillian king. Pedro had committed a political and diplomatic blunder of the first magnitude, and he would pay for it in the future with the ultimate price, his throne and his life.³⁶

The general reaction in Castille to the fall of the powerful Portuguese minister was minimal. Alburquerque had overestimated the extent of his support and, recalling the seditious acts of his following, he began to be concerned

³⁶Garcia, p. 73.

for his own safety. As a result, he quickly entered into negotiations with his liege. It was not long before an agreement was reached between Alburquerque at his fortress at Carvajales and the king's emissaries. Pedro apparently wished to humble, but not destroy, his minister at this time. He respected the long and loyal service Alburquerque had rendered to himself and to his family. Though he no longer desired to be under the tutelage of Juan Alfonso, he still had respect for the man. In return for Alburquerque's surrender of his eldest son, Martin Giles, as a hostage and guarantee that he would cause no further trouble in the kingdom, Pedro was prepared to assure Alburquerque that he need have no fear for his vast territorial holdings.³⁷ He furthermore stipulated that Alburquerque, if he wished, could return to his native kingdom of Portugal.³⁸ Pedro was less generous to those who had followed Alburquerque in opposition to their king. Alburquerque himself had taught Pedro that a vassal's greatest crime was disobedience to his king. Pedro was thus determined to punish with severity all those who had defied him. Among those who incurred the king's wrath was Alvar Perez de Castro, a member of the famous Castro family of Galicia. It was only through the intervention of the king's mother that his life was saved.

³⁷Ayala, p. 110.

³⁸Ibid.

Many others, however, were captured and brought back to Olmedo in chains, many to suffer execution or imprisonment. Pedro was determined to be master of his kingdom and ruled over the nobility with a harsh hand. This tendency toward absolutism was becoming increasingly apparent in Pedro's personality as the years of the young king's reign progressed. The nobility, upon whose shoulders the hand of the king rested so heavily, were the first to join Enrique of Trastamara when he made his attempts to usurp the throne of Castille.

From Olmeda the king moved to Cuellar, where several important events occurred. During Pedro's brief visit there he received an emissary and gifts from the king of Aragon, who apparently wished to show Pedro his desire to continue the friendship between the two countries, established by the treaty of Atienza in October, 1352.³⁹ It was also during his stay in Cuellar that Pedro completed the arrangements for the marriage of his cousin, Fernando of Aragon, to Maria, granddaughter of the king of Portugal. This marriage was to be celebrated in February of the following year. In addition to these happenings during Pedro's stay in Cuellar, Fadrique came to the king for the first time since their meeting at Llerena, an event which was quickly followed by the murder of Leonor de Guzman. Following the example of his brothers,

³⁹Garcia, p. 65, note 2.

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Tello and Enrique, the Master of Santiago had obviously decided upon a course of reconciliation with Pedro. At the same time, he also sought the friendship of the now all-powerful Padilla faction. With these goals in mind, he agreed to surrender the powerful fortress of Ruy Chacon to the bastard brother of Maria, Juan Garcia de Villagera. For the price of this concession, the king restored to the Order of Santiago many of the privileges he had taken away during the meetings of Llerena.⁴⁰

With these matters completed, Pedro then moved his court to Segovia, where he personally presided over the wedding of his brother, Tello, to the heiress of Biscaye, Joanna de Lara. During the reign of his father, Alfonso XI, Tello had been engaged as a child to Joanna de Lara, the oldest daughter of Juan Nunez, Lord of Biscaye. Alburquerque, however, had opposed this union since his rise to power in 1350. After the death of Juan Nunez de Lara, the extensive holdings of Biscaye had been confiscated and added to the royal domain. Now Pedro, contrary to the policy of his fallen minister, consented to his marriage and restored the provinces of Biscaye to Joanna de Lara. Immediately following the marriage in July, 1353, Tello left Segovia for Biscaye to take possession of his wife's rich dowry.⁴¹ It was in reality a small kingdom.

⁴⁰Ayala, p. 116.

⁴¹Garcia, p. 66, note 2.

Pedro now made plans to return to Andalucia and his favorite city of Seville, where he planned to spend the remainder of 1353. Before he did so, however, he had one more matter of business to complete: to separate his wife, Blanche of Bourbon, from Queen Maria. This was perhaps a punishment for the role his mother had played in the escape of Alvar de Castro.⁴² Queen Blanche was removed from Medina de Campo to the fortress of Arevalo where she went more as a prisoner than as a queen.⁴³ Queen Maria, under pressure from her son, left the kingdom to take up residence in her father's court. During these months, Pedro also completed the purge of the partisans of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque in his government. Anyone who had received his office during the tenure of that fallen minister was expelled.⁴⁴ The most significant change at this time was the removal of Gutier Fernandez de Toledo, one of the most competent and loyal of Pedro's officials, from the office of Chamberlain. Upon his removal, the office was given to Diego de Padilla. Pedro then returned to Seville where he passed several quiet months enjoying the city and his love for Maria de Padilla.

Pedro was in Seville by August, 1353, and remained

⁴²Ayala, p. 112.

⁴³Ibid., p. 114.

⁴⁴Ibid.

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there for the winter.⁴⁵ Very little of political importance took place during these winter months. One event, however, does stand out. This was the murder of the Master of Calatrava, Juan Nunez de Prado. He was the main confidant of the fallen minister; at the fall of Alburquerque he left Castille to seek asylum in Aragon. When Pedro learned that Juan Nunez was in the border fortress of Almargo, he sent the grand master letters of security guaranteeing his safety. At the same time, Pedro dispatched Juan de la Cerdá with a militia unit to arrest the grand master. Juan Nunez de Prado surrendered without a fight, not wishing to further anger the king. Several days later, Pedro arrived at Almargo. He immediately stripped Juan Nunez of his jurisdiction as Master of the Order and bestowed it on Diego Garcia de Padilla. Juan Nunez was imprisoned and several days later, murdered. Pedro later alleged that this outrage was committed without his consent, although it seems incredible that the king was not an accomplice to this act.⁴⁶ This event did little to enhance Pedro's reputation among the Castillian nobility.

Through the last months of 1353 Alburquerque, now having returned to Portugal, appears to have taken no part whatsoever in Castillian affairs, though obviously he

⁴⁵Garcia, p. 67, note 2.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 69, note 2.

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hungered for revenge against his enemies. His prudence and his aloofness in regard to Castillian politics was not shared, however, by all of Alburquerque's friends and followers who occasionally defied royal authority. The Padilla faction cleverly used imprudent acts as excuses to stamp out the last remnants of the Alburquerque faction, as Alburquerque had first destroyed the faction of Leonor de Guzman, and then that of Juan Nunez de Lara in the early years of Pedro's reign. Pedro, at this time, was beginning possibly to feel that the territories he had left in the hands of the minister were too extensive to be in the possession of a potential enemy. Thus Pedro, either on his own initiative or on the advice of the Padillas, determined to crush the power of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque.⁴⁷

Suddenly, in the spring of 1354, Pedro appeared before the fortress of Medellin.⁴⁸ The inhabitants of the town, not wishing to defy their king, surrendered the city. But the defenders of the citadel chose to remain loyal to their master. Not wishing to oppose actively the king, they negotiated a formal agreement. They were permitted to send a message to Alburquerque to summon help. After an agreed upon time had expired and if Alburquerque had not come to aid the fortress, they could then surrender it to the king

⁴⁷Ayala, p. 118, and Garcia, p. 89, N. 1.

⁴⁸Ayala, p. 118.

without jeopardizing their honor or safety. Albuquerque received the messenger from Medellin while he was residing in Portugal. When he replied that he could not come to their relief, the castle was handed over to Pedro who had it dismantled.⁴⁹ Following the capitulation and dismantling of the fortress at Medellin, Pedro immediately marched against the town of Albuquerque, the principal lordship of Juan Alfonso which bore his surname. It was well provisioned and guarded by men more determined to defend the rights of their lord than those at Medellin. Among the numerous defenders of Albuquerque was the commander of Calatrava, Pero Estabanez Calpentaro, nephew of the late grand master of the Order, Juan Nunez de Prado. Pedro was irritated by the resistance of the garrison. Realizing that his army was too small to take the fortress by assault, he issued a sentence of high treason against the governor of the fortress and against Pero Estabanez.⁵⁰

The siege gave every indication of developing into a long affair. Consequently, Pedro left the siege in the hands of his two brothers, Enrique and Fadrique. He also left Juan Garcia de Villagera as an overseer over his two brothers. In the late months of 1353, Villagera had just been rewarded with the position of commander in the Order of

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 119.

Santiago. Pedro then returned to Castille after having sent some ambassadors to the king of Portugal, his grandfather, Alfonso IV, to demand the extradition of Albuquerque. The Castillian emissaries arrived at the Portuguese court in Elora during the celebrations which followed the wedding of Fernando of Aragon and Maria, daughter of the king of Portugal. Juan Alfonso de Albuquerque was present at Elora, a distinguished guest of the Portuguese king. When the Castillian envoys obtained their audience with Alfonso IV, Albuquerque was present.⁵¹ Being aware of the purpose of the Castillian mission, Albuquerque asked to speak before they could present their case. During his discourse, Albuquerque presented his arguments with eloquence to the Portuguese king. He emphasized the great affronts he had received from Pedro of Castille, the unjust rewards for his services and loyalty to the Castillian throne. In his discourse, threats and accusations against both the Count of Trastamara and the grand master of Santiago were not lacking, indicating that the soon-to-be established alliance among these three men had not yet been born. In conclusion, he was prepared to defend his honor in mortal combat.⁵² To this, the Castillian messengers answered that Albuquerque should return to Castille to offer his excuses

⁵¹Ibid... p. 121.

⁵²Ibid.

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before the king. Juan Alfonso refused, saying the death of the Master of Calatrava, Juan Nunez, was too recent and that he could not trust the king's guarantee of safe-conduct. In answer to the Castillians' request that Alburquerque be extradited back to Castille, the Portuguese king refused. Coming to the aid of Alburquerque, who was his guest and relative,⁵³ Alfonso IV did concede that he would send ambassadors to the Castillian court in hope that an agreement could be reached between the two parties.

After the marriage of the heir of Aragon and his departure to Castille, the Portuguese court moved to Estremoz, accompanied by Alburquerque. While at Estremoz, Alburquerque received a secret message from the bastards who had soon forgotten their obligations to the Castillian king. They proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with the ultimate purpose being the destruction of Pedro I.⁵⁴ Alburquerque must have been surprised and suspicious of this offer made by his old enemies. However, the plan so well fitted his desire for vengeance that he met with the two bastards to continue the negotiations. The parties involved very quickly reached an agreement. To prove their sincerity, the Castillian bastards began by arresting the brother of

⁵³Garcia, p. 73, note 2.

⁵⁴Ayala, p. 125.

Maria de Padilla, Juan de Villagera, who, with them, commanded the troops then besieging Alburquerque. For his part, Alburquerque produced the sum of 200,000 maravedis to subsidize the necessary armed forces and also turned over to the bastards several of his castles as securities. The purpose of this coalition was to complete the destruction of Pedro and the substitution of a new king. The Count of Trastamara had apparently not yet given any serious thought of assuming the throne himself. He did, however, propose Pedro of Portugal, heir of the Portuguese throne and son of Alfonso IV, as a candidate. Pedro of Portugal could legitimize his claim because of the fact that he was a grandson of Sancho through his mother, Beatrice. He was closer than Pedro of Castille, who was a great-grandson of Sancho.⁵⁵ Though the Portuguese heir was willing, this part of the plan never materialized. As soon as Alfonso IV learned of it, he removed his son from the frontier and forbade him to correspond with the conspirators. In addition he threatened further sanctions against his son if he intervened in the Castillian Revolt.⁵⁶ Queen Maria, who was also in Portugal at this time and not yet a party to the plot, immediately left the Portuguese court when she learned of it, obviously wishing to leave no doubt in her son's mind that she was in

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

any way associated with the rebels. Fortunately for Pedro, Juan Garcia de Villagera was able to escape soon after his imprisonment. He took sad news of the plot to Pedro, who at that time was in Seville enjoying himself in another love affair.⁵⁷

While his bastard brothers and Alburquerque were planning his destruction, Pedro had embarked upon a new romantic episode. Temporarily losing his affections for Maria de Padilla, he had become infatuated with the charms of the beautiful Joanna de Castro. In his vigorous pursuit of her, he promised to marry her despite his earlier marriage to Blanche of Bourbon. To overcome Joanna's scruples, Pedro, using persuasion and coercion, was successful in convincing the bishops of Salamanca and Avila to attest to the fact that the marriage between Blanche and Pedro had not been legal. Consequently, Pedro was free to marry whom he pleased. Early in April, 1354, Pedro and Joanna were married by the Bishop of Salamanca in the city of Cuellar.⁵⁸ This entire episode may be interpreted as but another of his impetuous acts. The day following his marriage, he abandoned Joanna, never again to set eyes on her. Though Joanna assumed the title of queen and maintained it for the rest of her life, much to the irritation of Pedro, he never took action against

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 139.

⁵⁸Garcia, p. 77, note 2.

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her and granted economic provisions which made her comfortable for her remaining years.

The real motive for Pedro's hasty abandonment of Joanna de Castro was the message brought to him by Juan de Villagera of the treason in the western portion of his kingdom. Pedro immediately left for Castrojerez, which he designated as a meeting place for his loyal followers. A document dated from this city on April 21 indicates that Pedro was in Castrojerez by that date.⁵⁹ Thus the lines for civil war were being hardened. The kingdom of Castille was about to be plunged into a bloody conflict.

Meanwhile, in the northern part of Castille, Tello, so recently a recipient of the generosity of the king, had learned of his brothers' rebellion. He quickly joined with them and raised the banner of rebellion in his domain of Biscaye. When Pedro learned of this, he immediately attempted to make a powerful diversion in Biscaye. He arranged the marriage of the second daughter of Juan Nunez, Isabel of Lara, to the heir of Aragon, Juan. In doing so, he disinherited Joanna, the wife of Tello, and gave the Aragonese prince the title, Lord of Biscaye.⁶⁰ In the midst of these preparations for war, Pedro learned that Maria de Padilla had made him a

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ayala, p. 131.

father for the second time, bearing another daughter, Constance. This led to a reconciliation between Pedro and his mistress. It is interesting to note that during Pedro's infatuation with Joanna de Castro, Maria had given serious consideration to founding a convent in which she hoped to seclude herself. The pope, Innocent VI, possibly with the intention of removing Maria from the scene so Pedro would return to his legitimate wife, Blanche, granted this request in a letter from Avignon dated April 5, 1354.⁶¹ The convent was eventually constructed, but Maria had long before that date reached a complete reconciliation with Pedro.

By July, Pedro had left Castrojerez, moving to the town of Toro. By this time the Count of Trastamara, having raised large forces in Asturia, united with those of Juan Alfonso at Ciudad Rodrigo. Meanwhile, Padrique, mustering his forces of Santiago, already opened hostilities thus plunging the Castillian kingdom into war. Others soon began to join the banner of the rebels, particularly Fernando de Castro, the greatest lord in the northern kingdom. He was the brother of Joanna de Castro, and it is very possible that his real motive for joining those forces was to revenge his sister's humiliation.

Faced with this growing menace throughout his kingdom, Pedro's troubles were increased by an interesting episode

⁶¹Garcia, p. 79, note 1.

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which transpired in Toledo during the summer of 1354. As the above mentioned events developed, Pedro had not forgotten his deserted queen, Blanche. Since the city of Arevalo was situated close to rebel territory, and either through fear that she might fall into the hands of the rebels, or worse yet, might become a party to this uprising, Pedro ordered her to move to Toledo which he considered to be a far safer place. Juan Fernandez de Hinestrosa, uncle of Maria de Padilla, was entrusted with this delicate mission. Ayala reports that during her transit from Arevalo to Toledo, Blanche was successful in impressing upon her guards the plight in which she found herself. Upon her arrival in the city, the desperate situation of the young queen was quickly communicated to a sympathetic population, resulting in a large uprising in Toledo in support of the unfortunate young queen. This was one of those extraordinary events in history in which almost the entire population of a city were prepared to risk their future and lives on behalf of a desperate woman. In contrast to most movements against Pedro, this one had general and almost unanimous support. Those nobles who refused to participate were imprisoned by the new rulers of the city.⁶² It is interesting to note that all of the chronicles, including Ayala, place the blame for the uprising not upon the king, but rather upon the Padilla family, which had

⁶²Ayala, p. 140.

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caused the king to desert Blanche through their evil advice.⁶³

Blanche was escorted to the Alcazar of Toledo as the queen of Castille and not as a prisoner of the king. The uprising of Toledo had officially been initiated. This took place on the 14th of August, 1354.⁶⁴ After having time to consider their rash actions and in fear of the king's wrath, the Toledoans immediately began to seek aid. The most obvious source was the rebel force which had already taken up arms against the king. The nearest of the rebels was Padrique, Master of Santiago, who quickly responded and entered the city with 700 knights within a few days. Toledo also sought the aid of other rebels.

The uprising in Toledo had a contagious effect upon other followers of Pedro. One by one many men of significance in the kingdom began to desert the king. One of them was Alvaro Garcia de Albornoz, one of the chief negotiators of the marriage alliance between France and Castille in 1352. Possibly the most damaging of all was the desertion of Pedro's two cousins, the heirs of Aragon--Fernando and Juan. Like the bastards, they had quickly forgotten the king's generosity.

In the fall of 1354, there was a meeting in Cuenta de Tamariz, where assembled the most important of the rebels:

⁶³Garcia, p. 83, note 1.

⁶⁴Ayala, p. 139.

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the heirs of Aragon, their mother Leonor, Enrique, Tello, the Lord of Alburquerque, and Fernando de Castro. At that time the conspirators signed an agreement in which they decided to pursue a common cause. The terms of this agreement were sent to the king: it ordered Pedro to change his way of life, to dispose of his advisors, to put aside Maria de Padilla, and to join his wife.⁶⁵ These were the alternatives to civil war. In the figure of Blanche of Bourbon, the rebels had found a symbol and a justification of their rebellion. They declared that they were fighting on behalf of the mistreated queen. In reality, as the future clearly demonstrated, they were fighting for their own self-interest, each seeking his own rewards. In particular, the cause of this rebellion was not the treatment which Pedro had dealt out to his wife, but the favor he had shown to the Padilla family. By granting them the most powerful positions of government Pedro was denying these offices to the great nobles who considered them their prerogatives and inheritances.

The destruction of the kingdom seemed near at hand. The insurrection in Toledo and the consequent loss of that city to the royal cause was a crucial blow to the king. As the news of these events spread throughout the kingdom, it encouraged many who were undecided to join the rebel cause, whose ranks increased to 6,000 or 7,000 armed men, a number far superior to forces loyal to the king. Among the

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 157-164.

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new rebels was Juan de la Cerda, forgetting his difference with Alburquerque over the murder of his father-in-law. The circle of the loyal followers of the king continued to grow smaller. Despite their superior forces, the rebels did not wish to attack the king openly, since they were not yet truly certain of the sympathies of the kingdom's population. Thus they attempted a war of attrition, so to speak, by a constant effort to separate Pedro from his followers, at the same time hoping through negotiations to bring the king to a position of subservience to their wishes. For this reason the king's aunt, Leonor, went to him in the city of Toro, bringing with her the conditions under which the confederation would allow Pedro to keep his crown. For ten days these negotiations went on. Despite his bad fortune, Pedro remained inflexible and replied he would not negotiate with the confederation. Leonor consequently left Toro and returned to her confederates.⁶⁶

At the same time, Pedro, seeking allies against his enemies, wrote to the heir of Aragon, En Joan. In a letter dated October 28, 1354,⁶⁷ Pedro actively attempted to enlist the aid of the Aragonese prince who ruled Aragon during the absence of Pedro IV in Sardinia. What Pedro was attempting

⁶⁶Merimee, p. 156, and Garcia, p. 87.

⁶⁷Geronimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Aragon (Zaragoza: 1610), Vol. II, p. 259.

to do was invoke the treaty of Atienza which had been concluded between the two kingdoms in October, 1352. Pedro, in all probability, believed that the Aragonese would come to his aid against the two Aragonese princes, Fernando and Juan, who had caused so many problems for their kingdom and were now doing the same to Castille. In reality, however, the Aragonese court was secretly pleased with the disorder which plagued Castille. Obviously the Aragonese court believed that a weakening of the Castillian monarchy could only benefit the Aragonese kingdom. Their reply was evasive, and for the time being Pedro was abandoned by his ally to seek his own solution to his problems.

Meanwhile, all was not going well in the rebel camp. Many of the nobility, though not coming to the support of the king remained neutral. The confederates still did not dare to engage the king in open combat. At the same time, the cities of Valladolid and Salamanca closed their gates to the rebels and remained loyal to Pedro. Medina del Campo also resisted the rebels but was taken by force. It is shortly after this success that, as Garcia writes, "there died the soul of the rebellion, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque."⁶⁸ Alburquerque was the only true statesman among the rebels. He might have been surpassed in courage by the Count of Trastamara, in treachery by Don Tello, and in dignity by Fernando de Castro, but through his long experience

⁶⁸Garcia, pp. 88-89.

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in government he had proven beyond question his ability and skills in statesmanship and diplomacy. His death was sudden and rather mysterious. Ayala, writing years after the event, accredits his death to Pedro, who enticed a Roman physician by the name of Maestre Pablo to poison the minister.⁶⁹

Weight was given to these accusations by the future generosity Pedro showed to the Italian physician in the form of extensive monetary and land grants.⁷⁰ The actual guilt of Pedro, though highly likely, cannot be proven and the truth will never be known. It is interesting to point out that the stories of Pedro's implication, like so many others, circulated during the time of an extensive Trastamaran propaganda campaign against Pedro in the 1360's. The fact that many of these stories have survived indicates the success of Enrique's attempt to discredit Pedro.

After the death of Alburquerque the rebel camp was strengthened when Fadrique rejoined the main army, bringing from Toledo a force of 500 to 600 horsemen. He also brought a considerable sum of money he had seized from the royal treasury at Toledo which had been under the control of Samuel Levi. These funds were of enormous importance to the rebel cause for with them they were able to maintain a large number of mercenaries that made up a major portion of the

⁶⁹Ayala, p. 152.


⁷⁰Garcia, p. 89, note 1.



confederation's army. Both sides gave every indication that they were resolved to continue the struggle, the bastards and their allies because they saw the king's distress growing daily, Pedro because he hoped time would draw his adversaries, at least separately, back to his side. At the same time, however, negotiations were being continued. It was agreed that a meeting would take place near Toro in the small village of Tejadillo. Each side would be represented by an equal number of followers. In both instances, the adversaries chose the most distinguished numbers of their following.⁷¹

Pedro, refusing to converse with the rebels personally, chose as his spokesman Gutierre Fernandez de Toledo. Taking the nobles completely by surprise (having anticipated the king would speak for himself) Gutierre Fernandez presented his arguments before the nobles could make a statement. Consequently, before responding to the king's arguments, they conferred and chose Ferdinand Perez de Ayala for their spokesman. Ferdinand was the father of the chronicler and historian. The contents of both arguments are interesting. They show that the king understood clearly that the source of the discontent was not Queen Blanche and the treatment she had received. Rather it was the intensive jealousy the nobility harbored against the Padillas because of the favor they had

⁷¹Garcia, p. 91, note 2.



received from the king. Pedro insisted that as king it was his privilege to choose his own advisors. However, he was prepared to offer generous privileges and concessions to the nobles if they would lay down their arms and become obedient subjects. He also offered to make concessions concerning his relation with his wife, Blanche. Thus the encounter at Tejadillo, once again, clearly brought into focus the basic conflict which existed between Pedro and the Castillian nobility.

Pedro was simply trying to further the attempts of his father, Alfonso XI, to establish an authoritarian monarchy in Castille. The nobility was not prepared to accept this without a struggle. Consequently, Enrique took advantage of this situation, and presented himself as leader and champion of the magnates' cause. It was in this capacity that he would finally succeed in capturing the Castillian throne in 1369. This supposition can be further confirmed by the writings of Ayala. The historian's most vigorous complaint against Pedro I was that he failed to treat the magnates with a proper degree of respect and denied them the positions in government that they deserved by their birth. Pedro, in the eyes of Ayala, committed the unpardonable sin, bestowing these positions of power upon men of lowly birth. Here, then, lies the real clue to the political background of the Castillian civil war which, in many respects, endured for the entire nineteen years of Pedro's reign.


For the time being, however, it appeared that the conference at Tejadillo would bring some change to the situation. On the surface both sides seemed to have reached a tentative agreement, and were prepared to submit their grievances to a board of arbiters, four of whom would be selected from each side. These discussions having been completed, the two parties returned to their respective camps.⁷²

The coming of the winter of 1354, bad weather, and a lack of provisions forced the confederates to leave their position at Morales and return to their well provisioned base at Zamora. On their march from Morales, the large army of the confederation passed before the walls of Toro, displaying in defiance their vast numbers to the king. They carried before their army the dead body of Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, still in many respects the spiritual leader of the movement.⁷³

With the League's forces returning to Zamora, Pedro believed he had seen the last of the enemy for some time and so thought the situation was safe enough to be once more reunited with his mistress, whom he had left safely in the castle of Uruena. This rash act by Pedro clearly indicates that the promises he had made at Tejadillo to accept a reconciliation with Blanche were not made with good faith. At Toro, Pedro left his depleted treasury and a small army under the

⁷²Ayala, pp. 157-164.

⁷³Ibid., pp. 166-167.




command of his mother, Queen Maria. Since her recent return from Portugal she had remained with Pedro. However, the king's mother was about to deliver a disastrous blow to this unfortunate monarch.⁷⁴

Possibly angered by this last impetuous act on the part of her son, Maria communicated the news of Pedro's departure to the rebels. Her motives are difficult to determine. Her action may be looked upon as an act of treason, or as a wish to break the hold Maria de Padilla had upon the king and to force him to yield to the demands of the rebels. With great risk to herself, she informed the rebels of Pedro's departure to Uruena. It must be realized that the loss of Toro to the rebels would end any hopes Pedro had of continuing the struggle since all his remaining resources were in that city. The members of the league did not lose a moment. An all-night march brought them to Toro, where they found the gates of the city open and the city theirs. The confederates, now full of confidence, discontinued their respectful overtures and the protocol which they had maintained in their negotiations with the king. No more were there proposals of agreements. Now they sent to Uruena for Pedro to come immediately to Toro to straighten out the affairs of his kingdom.⁷⁵

⁷⁴Ibid., p..170.

⁷⁵Ibid., p..166.



When the news of this last treason reached Pedro, he immediately took counsel with his most trusted followers. Among these were Juan de Hinestrosa, Maria's uncle, Gutier Fernandez de Toledo, and Diego de Padilla. Fernandez de Toledo and Diego both advised the king that under no circumstances should he submit to the will of his enemies. Juan de Hinestrosa, however, advised the king that he had no other alternative. It was the latter course that the king chose to follow. After taking leave of his mistress, Pedro returned to Toro with only a handful of his followers, among whom were Juan de Hinestrosa and Samuel Levi, to a temporary captivity.⁷⁶

Upon his arrival at Toro, Pedro was immediately made a prisoner of the confederate forces. It is interesting to note, however, that once more the blame for the acts of the young king, who was not yet twenty-one, was placed on his evil advisors.⁷⁷ Upon Pedro's arrival and following his capture, the words spoken at Tejadillo by Gutier Fernandez de Toledo were proven to be true. The cause of Blanche of Bourbon, who until this time had been the justification used by the rebels to support their rebellion, was quickly forgotten. The rebels got down to their real business, the division of the royal powers among themselves.⁷⁸ Pedro

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Garcia, p. 96, note 1.

himself was placed under the watchful eye of his brother, Fadrique. The king's personal freedom was limited to such a degree that he was not even allowed to confer with anyone without the consent of his jailor. Even when he was permitted to enjoy his favorite pastime of hunting, he was accompanied by numerous guards. Pedro's biographers agree that it was during these humiliating months of imprisonment that he plotted a revenge that would be satisfied only by the blood of his enemies.⁷⁹ Seen in this context, the atrocities following his escape from Toro, though not justified, can in part be explained by these months in which Pedro found himself deceived on all sides and even by his own mother.

The triumph of the nobility had been complete. All was not lost for Pedro, however. There were still those in the kingdom who remained loyal to the royal cause and others, disappointed in their expectations, who soon began to regret the part they had played in the rebellion against royal authority. It was also not long before the agreement which the various members of the confederacy had made began to dissolve. As Merimee writes, the leaders at the end of the civil war saw that it was easier and surer to obtain a second place with their king than to obtain a first place among their equals.⁸⁰ Many of the communities, who during

⁷⁹Merimee, p. 173, and Garcia, p. 97.

⁸⁰Merimee, p. 166.

the course of the civil war had gone over to the side of the rebels in their desire to overthrow the hated favorites of the king, now saw political power in the more greedy hands of the political magnates. In declaring themselves against the king, each community had believed that it was freeing itself from an oppressive master. Now they found themselves exposed to a more serious menace, the Castillian nobility, but now they were without the king as a protector to stand between them and the ambitions of the feudal lords.⁸¹

Queen Blanche was soon forgotten by the rebels and remained in Toledo, taking no part in the great victory over the king. Popular opinion began to turn more and more in favor of the monarch. The most significant development during these weeks was a division of leadership of the noble faction into two distinctive parties. In one there were the three bastards and their brother-in-law, Fernando de Castro. The other was led by the Aragonese princes and their mother. The causes of this separation are not difficult to find. Fernando of Aragon, during the early months of the revolt, held a paramount position among the rebels. Had Pedro been completely overthrown as king, Fernando would have been the logical successor since he was the nephew of the dead Alfonso XI. Now with the revolt at a conclusion, the pre-eminence of Fernando was soon disregarded. He was now merely one among equals. His younger brother, Juan, also had motives for

⁸¹Ibid.

separating himself from the rebels. Having married the second daughter of Juan Nunez de Lara, he hoped for the destruction of Tello which would bring the vast domain of Biscaye to him. It was by coming to terms with the heirs of Aragon that Pedro found the greatest opportunity to break the chains of his bondage.

He found the heirs were receptive to his proposals which would return political power to the monarchy. It soon became a question not of whether the heirs would support Pedro but what their price would be. Thus the intrigue grew which would ultimately result in the flight of the king from Toro and his recapture of royal power.⁸² It was, in all probability, Pedro's loyal servant and treasurer, Samuel Levi, who negotiated the agreement between the cousins and the king. Levi had been taken prisoner with Pedro at Toro but had since been ransomed from Tello. Gaining his freedom, he continued to work on behalf of his king. The opportunity for Pedro's escape came on one of his numerous hunting expeditions in which he was accompanied by an escort of the usual 200 guards.⁸³ Taking advantage of a heavy fog and the obvious fact that the commander of the guard had been bribed, Pedro managed to escape, seeking safety miles away behind the walls of Segovia where he had some loyal servants awaiting his pre-planned arrival.

⁸²Garcia, p. 98, note 2.

⁸³Ayala, p. 174.

The agreements between Pedro and the heirs of Aragon had been a well-kept secret. Consequently, when the news of his escape reached the conspirators, those who had not been in on the plans were struck with terror. Each suspected the others, not really knowing who had been responsible for the king's escape. Thus almost as rapidly as they had formed the conspiracy, the rebels disbanded, seeking their safety in different directions. Only Enrique of Trastamara, whose courage and audacity would eventually make him king of Castille, had the strength of spirit to offer continued resistance to the king. But even Enrique hoped that his brother would once more forgive him. It was for that reason that he released from captivity the uncle of Maria de Padilla, Juan Fernandez de Hinestrosa. The latter had offered to go to the king and use his influence in an effort to win amnesty for Enrique.

But Enrique had rebelled too often; there was no appeasing Pedro after the indignity he had suffered in Toro. His heart had hardened, and he was unquestionably bent on the revenge that only the blood of his major enemies could satisfy. Many of the Rico hombres who had played a minor role in the rebellion, including Juan de la Cerda, found the king was prepared to forgive them. Not only did he forgive a great number of these rebels, but also he granted generous gifts to many, hoping to bind them more firmly to him. In doing so Pedro was also attempting to obtain their aid in

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destroying once and for all many of his enemies, including and particularly the Count of Trastamara.

A few days after his escape to Segovia, Pedro moved to Burgos where he called an assembly of the Castillian Cortes. The purpose of the meeting was to give Pedro an opportunity to state his grievances against the rebels, particularly the abuses he had been subjected to, and to ask for their money and arms to help him restore royal power throughout the kingdom. Though the records of this meeting have been lost, it is quite possible that because of its limited membership it does not deserve the distinction of being called a true Cortes;⁸⁴ nevertheless, it served its purpose.

The king was reconciled with his people and was once more presented with the means to restore his authority within the Middle Kingdom. This meeting must have taken place early in January of 1355. The exact date of the escape of Pedro from Toro cannot be known with any certainty. The chronicles say only that it happened in late 1354, possibly in late December.⁸⁵ The king had once more won the firm support of the Castillian population. This can be clearly seen by an event which transpired in the middle of January, 1355. A papal legate arrived in Spain bringing an interdict against the kingdom and the excommunication of Pedro, Maria

⁸⁴Garcia, p. 100, note 1.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 99, note 1.

de Padilla, and Joanna de Castro for their adulterous relationships. The bishops of Salamanca and Avila were also sanctioned for their part in this sacrilegious marriage. The excommunication was set forth in Toledo on the 19th of January, 1355. It seems to have in no way altered the disposition of the people with regard to the king.⁸⁶ If anything, the interference of the papacy in Castillian politics seemed to arouse further indignation in Castille and more firmly solidified support for Pedro. The only positive effect which the excommunication seemed to have was that it prevented most of the Castillian churchmen from taking part in the Cortes then convening in Burgos. Pedro replied to the excommunication by seizing the property of Cardinal Gils Albornoz and other prelates. He further threatened to confiscate the domains of all the bishops who chose to take the side of the papacy in this conflict.⁸⁷

Within three months after Pedro's escape from Toro he found himself at the head of a large army marching toward the rebel stronghold with the intention of liquidating those who remained obstinate to the royal will. Pedro went first to Medina del Campo where he stayed during Palm Sunday week.⁸⁸ This city offered Pedro his first opportunity to fulfill his

⁸⁶Merimee, p. 171.

⁸⁷Ayala, p. 209, and Odoricus Raynaldus, Annales Ecclesiastici (Rome: 1677), Vol. 26, p. 22.

⁸⁸Garcia, p. 100, note 2.

lust for revenge. There he found a great number of enemies who were responsible for his humiliation and imprisonment. Some, such as Pero Ruiz de Villagas and Sancho de Rogas, were arrested and instantly executed. Others who had played a lesser role in the rebellion were imprisoned and deprived of their property.⁸⁹

These tasks having been completed, Pedro proceeded towards Toro where he intended to deal with the Count of Trastamara. Arriving at Toro, he immediately placed this fortress under siege, but the city was too well fortified to succumb to attack. Only a prolonged siege would subdue it. After several days of indecisive fighting, Pedro learned that there were elements in Toledo who favored his cause and were willing to surrender the city to royal authority. He consequently gave up the siege of Toro and advanced southward toward the ancient Visigothic capital. His movement, however, had not remained secret to the Count of Trastamara. Enrique believed that through friends he still had in Toledo he could gain possession of that impregnable stronghold and be in a position to prolong his defiance of the king. As a result, both armies began marching toward Toledo along separate routes, both hoping to receive the city under their control. At Talavera the Count of Trastamara was joined by his brother Padrique, who was occupying that fortress.⁹⁰

⁸⁹Ayala, p. 191.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 178.

Meanwhile in Toledo the populace was divided. There were those who favored the king and others who supported the Count. However, it appears that the great majority of the population hoped to remain neutral. The city itself was invulnerable, surrounded on three sides by water and protected by great walls. The possibility of taking the city by sudden attack was literally impossible. Only a long, drawn-out siege or treachery would force the city to fall to either side, without the consent of those within.

The Count of Trastamara and his brother, Fadrique, with their forces were the first to arrive before the walls of Toledo. The inhabitants of the city, however, were not prepared to allow them to enter, preferring to await the arrival of the king before deciding which side they would choose. On the following day, May 17th,⁹¹ the Count and his forces, with the aid of treachery, were able to take the city by surprise during the siesta hour and suddenly burst across the bridge of Alcantara and took possession of the city. The nobles in the city who supported the king found refuge in the Alcazar which remained in their possession. Other parts of the city, especially the Jewish quarter, fell to the wrath of Enrique and his men. The result was a slaughter of the Jewish population who had remained loyal to the king. On Monday, May 18th, Pedro and his army appeared before the city walls. They were received across the bridge

⁹¹Garcia, p. 102, note 1 and p. 103, note 1.

of St. Martin by their loyal followers. The result was a panic which spread among the ranks of the rebel army who soon left the city in the possession of the king, but not before they had completed the slaughter of the Jewish population. Merimee suggests that as many as 1200 Jews died as a result of the episode on Saturday the 16th.⁹²

By May 18th of 1355, the rebellion which had nearly cost Pedro his throne was crushed, although fighting would continue through the remainder of 1355. His enemies were either dead or scattered, though others were yet to receive the punishment of the king. Pedro had survived the first true crisis of his reign. Unfortunately there would be others in the future. The years 1352 to 1355, then, are significant because they represent a turning point in the reign of Pedro I. For it is during these three years that Pedro was able to emancipate himself from the control of his powerful minister, Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, and to seize the reins of government for himself. In so doing, he found his quest for absolutism challenged by a restless Castillian aristocracy, who found a leader during these years in the person of Pedro's bastard brother, Enrique of Trastamara. Finally, the political rupture between Pedro and the French government, because of his disastrous marriage to Blanche of Bourbon, jeopardized any future friend-

⁹²Merimee, p. 179.

ship between the respective countries. The next significant episode in this turbulent reign was the outbreak of the life and death struggle with Aragon which began in the following year.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR WITH ARAGON

1356-1361

The years 1356-1361 are among the most important of the entire reign of Pedro I of Castille. 1356 began on a very favorable note for the Castillian king. During the final months of 1355 Pedro had successfully uprooted the last elements of the revolt that had nearly cost him his throne and had once more restored tranquility to his kingdom. By the end of 1356, however, Castille was to be involved in one of the most prolonged and bloody wars in her history, one which broke out late in 1356 and did not end until the victory of the Black Prince at Najera in 1366. It was also during these years that Enrique of Trastamara changed his role from rebel to claimant to the throne of Castille as a protege of the king of France.

Following the triumphant entry of Pedro into Toledo on May 18, 1355, a series of important events rapidly developed. After becoming master of Toledo when the Alcazar declared its support for him, Pedro showed himself to be as merciless with his enemies at Toledo as he had been several days earlier at Medina del Campo. Among those who suffered the wrath of the king were Ferdinand Sanchez de Rojas, who

had represented the league at the meeting of Tejillo, and Alfonso Gomez, commander of Calatrava. These two men were immediately put to death following their capture. In addition, all the Trastamaran wounded who had been left behind in the city were slaughtered on the king's order. There were other executions, imprisonments, and confiscations of property which followed quickly. Twenty commoners from the city of Toledo were put to death for their part in the insurrection.¹ A short time later Pedro granted a general amnesty to the inhabitants of Toledo for their part in the drama which had nearly cost him his throne.² He carefully excluded those who had followed Fadrique and Enrique to Toro as well as several others who had committed excessive crimes against the Jews in Toledo but had escaped before the king's arrival.³

Not wishing to see his neglected queen, Blanche of Bourbon, Pedro ordered her to be moved immediately to the castle of Sigunza, under the protection of Juan de Hinestrosa. At the very time Blanche was changing her prison, Pedro displayed his maturing sense of deception by writing the pope that he had not only been successful in destroying the rebellion against him, but that he was once more united with

¹Ayala, p. 189.

²Unpublished document, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, M513106, dated Oct. 12, 1355.

³Ibid.

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his legal wife. This letter apparently deceived the pope who replied with an affectionate letter encouraging him to continue in these good ways.⁴ Giving more evidence of his deceit, Pedro now took more caution in not allowing himself to be seen in public with Maria de Padilla. She no longer followed him in his expeditions and lived apart from the king.⁵

Meanwhile the rebel forces, having been dislodged from Toledo by the king, sought the walls of Toro as a last hope of refuge. It was toward Toro that Pedro directed his army during the late summer months of 1355. It appeared that before the massive walls of that fortress the showdown between Pedro and his bastard brothers would take place. But Pedro, having secured his throne once more, did not show the same incentive in the siege of Toro that he had shown in the preceding months. The inability of Pedro to press the siege with more vigor can be partially explained by his lack of financial resources.⁶ Pedro's unsuccessful attempt to destroy his enemies and take Toro immediately allowed Enrique and many of his followers to escape and find sanctuary beyond the borders of Castille.⁷

⁴Letter of Innocent VI of July 8, 1355, as cited in Merimee, p. 182.

⁵Merimee, p. 182.

⁶Ayala, p. 195.

⁷Ibid.

Meanwhile the condition of those that remained within Toro became increasingly intolerable. Numerous partisans of the league were daily deserting the cause, seeking the king's mercy and thus weakening the will and ability of those within the city to continue resistance.

Toward the end of November, there arrived in the camp of Pedro the papal legate, Cardinal Guillaume. He had come to Castille for the purpose of putting an end to the civil war in that country and of improving the marriage relations between Pedro and Blanche. He had also been entrusted with the responsibility of obtaining the release of the bishop of Siguenza, whom Pedro had imprisoned for his part in the civil war. Pedro received the papal legate with courtesy and pomp, but he was prepared to make few concessions. He did agree to release the bishop of Siguenza upon the condition that he leave Castille. In return for this concession the legate lifted the ban of excommunication and interdict which had been issued against Pedro earlier in the year.⁸ It appears that the presence of the papal legate did not hinder the siege operations then being conducted against Toro. By December 4, a major portion of the city walls had come under the control of the royal forces.⁹ All of this intensified the anxiety of those inside the city, and the number of deserters continued to increase. Of those who came to seek

⁸Ibid., p. 201.

⁹Ibid., p. 202.

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the clemency of the king, the most prominent was his brother, Padrique, the Master of Santiago.¹⁰

The attack on the 24th of January, 1356, gave Pedro possession of the city. Only the fortress armed by the hard-core of the conspiracy which had remained in Toro held out against him. The following day, seeing their situation desperate, even the defenders of the citadel surrendered to the king. Among those who became Pedro's prisoners that day was his mother, Queen Maria. Again, as in the case of Toledo, the revenge of Pedro was both swift and violent. Among those executed were Martin Telho, lover of Queen Maria, Estebanex Carpintero, false Master of Calatrava, and Gonzalea de Castaneda, all of whom had played a major role in the attempted overthrow of Pedro. Among the female prisoners was the countess of Trastamara, who was immediately incarcerated as one of Pedro's most important prisoners. The queen mother was eventually sent to Portugal as an exile. The town of Toro itself was not pillaged and did not lose any of its royal privileges.¹¹ With swiftness and violence, then, Pedro uprooted the last elements of the rebellion which had nearly cost him his throne.

By early 1356, it appeared that tranquility was once again about to descend on Castille. In reality, before the year was out, Castille would be plunged into one of the

¹⁰Ibid., p. 203ff.

¹¹Ibid., p. 207.

bloodiest and most prolonged wars in its history. For the time being, however, Pedro must have been satisfied with his accomplishment and the degree of his revenge. He had managed to extract himself from a very desperate situation and Castille was once again pacified. Most of Pedro's enemies were either dead or lingered in exile with the Count of Trastamara. The remainder of the nobility were prepared to obey the king, either because of their loyalty or because of their fear. Pedro had, in all probability, strengthened his position in the kingdom by his example of power and determination in destroying the forces that had attempted to deprive him of his throne. Having satisfied his revenge, Pedro and his court returned to Seville, which through his favoritism, had become the most important city in his kingdom. Maria de Padilla followed him there and occupied an apartment in the Alcazar. Since the end of the civil war, Pedro had thrown away any pretense of living with Blanche, his legitimate wife. The Castillian people had become accustomed to treating Maria as a queen of Castille.¹²

It was not long after the return of Pedro to Seville that the struggle with Aragon began. The origin of this war appears on the surface to have been the result of very trivial motives. But when examined in more detail it can be easily seen that the causes of the Aragonese-Castillian

¹²Merimee, p. 186.

conflict were both complicated and numerous. The events that led to the outbreak of the war were as follows. On January 8, 1356 the chief advisor of Pedro IV of Aragon, Bernal de Cabrera, concluded a treaty with France which committed Aragon to send a force of fifteen galleys to the English Channel for service against the English.¹³ Thus in the summer of 1356 a fleet under the command of Francesca de Perellos left Aragon for its destination in the English Channel. This Franco-Aragonese treaty had not been achieved without considerable protest from the Catalanian Cortes.¹⁴

After passing through the straits of Gibraltar, Perellos took his galleys into the Castillian port of Sanlucar de Barrameda at the mouth of the Guadalquivir. There, Perellos learned that a short distance up the river there were a number of ships belonging to Genoa, which for many years had been at war with Aragon. Acting on this information the Aragonese captain attacked the Genoans without delay. Unfortunately for all parties involved, this event took place in the presence of the king of Castille. Pedro, having recently returned to Seville at the conclusion of the civil war, had decided to take an excursion to the extreme southern portion of his kingdom. As circumstances

¹³Antonio de Capmani y de Montpalav, Memorias Historicas Sobre La Marina Comerico y Artes de la Antigua Ciudad de Barcelona (Madrid: 1779-92), Vol. IV, pp. 117-20.

¹⁴Coleccion de Documentos ineditos del Archivo de la Crona de Aragon, XXXII, pp. 95-96.

would have it, he had gone down the Guadalquiver as far as Sanlucar de Barrameda to observe the tuna fishing, one of the area's major sources of income. Due to these circumstances it happened that the Aragonese attack on the Genoan vessels occurred within view of the Castillian king.¹⁵


Pedro immediately sent representatives to the Aragonese admiral warning him that he was violating Castillian waters and that he lacked the respect due to the Castillian king. Perellos replied insolently that he owed an account of his conduct only to his master, the king of Aragon. Perellos then continued up the Guadalquiver, committing several acts of pillage along the way.¹⁶ This event initiated hostilities between Aragon and Castille which brought excessive bloodshed and devastation to both kingdoms through the following decade.

On August 8, 1356, Pedro dispatched a letter of protest to the king of Aragon.¹⁷ By the time En Pere received that letter, hostilities between the two kingdoms had already been initiated. Thus one could, as Garcia does, easily attribute the outbreak of this war to this one trivial event: the rash pillaging and violation of Castillian waters by Francesco Perellos. But in reality the causes of the war

¹⁵Zurita, Vol. II, p. 269.

¹⁶Ayala, p. 215.

¹⁷Coleccion de Documentos ineditos del Archivo de la Crona de Aragon, XXXII, p. 83, and Garcia, p. 132, note 6.



were much more far-reaching and complex.¹⁸ Merimee, in fact, suggests that if it had not been for the internal situations in both kingdoms in the years preceding 1356, that is the civil war Pedro faced in Castille and the uprising in Sardinia which plagued En Pere, the war in all probability would have begun much sooner.¹⁹

What then were these numerous causes which made the acts of Perellos nothing more than a catalyst of the event which some historians believe was an inevitable conflict? When we begin to examine the surviving evidence, we can see that on both sides grievances were both numerous and serious. We can begin by saying that the treaty of Atienza had been as badly kept by the Castillians as by the Aragonese. This treaty, which Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque had hoped would establish friendship between the two kingdoms, did nothing of the sort. With the disappearance of Alburquerque from the political scene in Castille, feelings between these two monarchs rapidly deteriorated. The character of both monarchs helped to contribute to this situation. Both men were extremely suspicious by nature and saw the acts of the other, though not always intended as such, to be a direct threat to their kingdom.²⁰ Conflicts concerning territorial holdings

¹⁸Garcia, p. 130.

¹⁹Merimee, p. 204.

²⁰Garcia, p. 129.

of the Order of Santiago in Aragon entangled the two men. The activities of the Aragonese privateers preying upon Castillian shipping was another grievance on the Castillian side.²¹ Possibly the most substantial cause of the war was the role played by relatives of both monarchs who had sought refuge in the neighboring countries. Pedro had granted asylum to the princes of Aragon, Fernando and Juan; En Pere had done likewise for Enrique of Trastamara, Tello, and many other Castillian nobles who had fled Castille following the civil war. In the case of the two Aragonese princes, they had not only received great favor from the Castillian king but Fernando had turned over the lordship of extensive territorial holdings which he possessed in Aragon, namely, that of Alicante and Oriheula, in return for territorial concessions in Castille. The significance of this agreement was that now the king of Castille held direct control over numerous fortresses, towns and castles in the very heart of Aragon. The seriousness by which this matter was viewed by the Aragonese king can be seen in his numerous attempts to win back his half-brother from the side of Pedro of Castille.²² These attempts were accompanied by numerous promises,²³ despite the intensive dislike of En Pere for his half-brother.

²¹Zurita, Anal., Vol. II, p. 268, and Ayala, p. 217.

²²General Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Register 1293, p. 2.

²³Ibid.

On the Castillian side, the grievance was greatest with regard to the numerous Castillian nobles who had sought refuge in Aragon after having fled the wrath of Pedro at the close of the civil war in January of 1356. It was also known in Castille that En Pere was in communication with both Tello and Enrique of Trastamara, who had at this time taken service with the king of France. Finally, there is some ground for believing that hostilities between Aragon and Castille were intentionally precipitated as a result of a French intrigue at the Aragonese court. The French, believing that an alliance with Pedro of Castille was impossible, had already begun to conceive the plan of destroying the Castillian monarch in their bid to gain a foothold in the Iberian Peninsula.²⁴ This growing French influence can be seen clearly at the beginning of 1355 in the already mentioned treaty.²⁵ It was, in fact, carrying out Aragonese obligations to France that precipitated the incident in Castillian waters which we have already described. Whether or not Perellos' activities were intentional is impossible to determine. Cabrera, when he was tried for treason eight years later, denied that Perellos had carried any instructions to provoke an incident with the Castillians. It is possible that he was simply

²⁴Peter Edward Russell, English Intervention in Portugal and Castille in the 14th and 15th Century (Oxford: 1956), p. 13.

²⁵Coleccion de Documentos ineditos del Archivo de la Crona de Aragon, XXXII, pp. 152-153.

²⁶Ibid., p. 83.

acting upon his own whim. At any rate, it was Perellos who provided the incident which provoked the Aragonese-Castilian war.

A final piece of evidence which can be used to demonstrate that the causes of the war were far more profound than the activities of Perellos is the letter we have already cited, dated August 8, 1356, sent by Pedro to En Pere. This letter clearly demonstrates that the activities of Perellos had simply added new stimulus to old resentments.²⁷ This document, published by Juan Catalina Garcia, shows very clearly that Pedro calls to the attention of the king of Aragon numerous incidents of protest of which the Perellos incident was only the latest. In this letter Pedro accused the Aragonese of badly repaying the obligations they owed because of the favors bestowed upon them by Alfonso XI and of having ignored the jurisdictional rights of the Orders of Santiago and Calatrava in Aragonese territory. He also contended that the ships of Aragon and Catalonia had done damage to the ports of Castille and to the commerce of his kingdom. Only in conclusion does he refer to the transgressions of Perellos.²⁸

I think then that we can safely conclude that the outbreak of war between Aragon and Castille in August, 1356, was indeed the result of numerous causes. The most

²⁷Garcia, p. 132.

²⁸Ibid.

important of these causes were the activities of the Aragonese princes, Fernando and Juan, in Castille and of the Castillian exiles who sought refuge in the Aragonese kingdom.

Following the attack of Perellos, events moved very swiftly. We have already referred to the long letter of protest which Pedro sent to the Aragonese king on August 8, a letter which En Pere did not answer until the following month. In the meantime, the Aragonese king had entered into a series of negotiations with Enrique of Trastamara.²⁹ In these negotiations, En Pere solicited the help of the Trastamaran, promising him in return for his military support extensive territorial holdings in Aragon as well as a generous financial subsidy. Nothing could have possibly more suited the ambitions of Enrique than the offer that En Pere was now placing before him. In a matter of months the Count of Trastamara was in Aragon, actively involving himself in the war with Castille. In the meantime, upon receiving Pedro's letter while in Perpignan, En Pere gave every indication of being eager for war.³⁰ He nevertheless desired time to develop fully his plans which included the alliance with Enrique. He thus sent a reply of moderation to the Castillian king. This letter reveals the cleverness of the Aragonese king. One of the paramount demands Pedro put forth in

²⁹Sitges, Las Mujeres, pp. 157-158.

³⁰Ibid., p. 156.

his letter was that numerous Castillian exiles be driven from the Aragonese kingdom. En Pere complied, ordering from his kingdom several Castillians, most notably Gonzalo Mexia and Gomez Carillo. These two men, among the most influential friends of the Count of Trastamara, in reality were being sent to France as envoys to negotiate an alliance between the king of Aragon and Enrique of Trastamara.³¹ They found Enrique in the service of the king of France, who was just preparing to leave Paris and join the large French army which was preparing to engage the English at the Battle of Poitiers. The offer of the king of Aragon immediately changed the plans of the Count. Enrique at once renounced his role as mercenary captain to become the chief of the discontented nobles of Castille in the service of the king of Aragon. Without hesitation he left France and soon appeared in Aragon with a numerous following of banished Castillians to join their cause to that of En Pere's. On the 8th of November at the Aragonese town of Pina, Enrique took an oath of vassalage to the Aragonese king in which he bound himself to serve En Pere as his loyal and natural lord.³² In return for placing his military resources at the disposal of the king of Aragon, Enrique was to receive

³¹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1293, p. 38, dated August, 1356.

³²Zurita, *Annals of Aragon*, Vol. II, pp. 273ff, and Sitges, pp. 74-75.

all the possessions of the two Aragonese heirs, Juan and Fernando, who were at that time in the service of the king of Castille. The sole exception was the lordship of Albaracin, which En Pere preserved for himself. In addition to these immense possessions, Enrique immediately was granted possession of several castles which belonged to the Aragonese king and were located along the Castillian frontier.³³ There was also added to these magnificent gifts an annual salary of 130,000 Barcelonan sous.³⁴ En Pere further bound himself never to conclude a treaty of peace with the king of Castille without the consent of the Count of Trastamara.³⁵ "Enrique had taken a new step; previously he had only used disaffected Castillians to support his rebellion against his half-brother. Now he was prepared to fight for the Aragonese against his fellow-countrymen."³⁶

While these events were going on in Aragon, Pedro I of Castille was engaged in punitive and diplomatic activities to bring a quick solution to the Perellos incident and, in fact, to the entire Castillian-Aragonese conflict. It is interesting to note that Ayala attributes one additional cause to Pedro's violent reaction to the Perellos affair.

³³Archives of the Crown of Aragón, Reg. 1543, p. 46.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Sitges, pp. 74-75, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 273.

³⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 24.

Finding himself unable to attack the fleet of Perellos at this time, Pedro hurried to Seville where he ordered the city's numerous Catalanian subjects to be put in irons and their property confiscated.³⁷ Then quickly assembling a fleet of ships, Pedro gave chase to Perellos for several days but without success. Returning to Seville, he dispatched a Castillian fleet to the Balearic Islands to capture any Catalanian ships they found in the vicinity.³⁸ Ayala implies that Pedro received the strong encouragement for these acts from the Padillian faction. The chronicler suggests the Padillas feared their influence was declining and believed the outbreak of a serious war would restore the king's dependence to them. Thus Ayala, substantially credits the outbreak of the war with Aragon to the urgings of the Padilla faction.³⁹

At any rate, hostilities had already broken out by fall of 1356. This, however, did not prevent Pedro from continuing a flow of diplomatic correspondence with Aragon, such as the letter sent to the Aragonese king on August 8,⁴⁰ and the reply of En Pere from Perpignan on September 4.

³⁷Ayala, p. 215.

³⁸Ayala, p. 220, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 271.

³⁹Ayala, p. 217.

⁴⁰Sitges, Las Mujeres, p. 216.

already referred to. It will be recalled that En Pere's reply of September 4 showed a degree of moderation in which he promised to negotiate a number of grievances Pedro had put forth in his August letter.⁴¹ The only real concession En Pere had made, however, was to expel some of the Castillian nobles from his kingdom. We have already seen the manner in which En Pere exploited that opportunity.

On October 18, Pedro once again wrote to the king of Aragon, replying to the Aragonese letter of September 4.⁴² This letter and others sent by the Castillian king strongly indicate that despite his wrath at the Perellos incident, Pedro was not as eager for war as his initial acts lead one to believe. In his letter of October 18, Pedro strongly urged that a diplomatic settlement be reached. He claimed that the Castillian military operations up to that point were purely punitive reprisals carried out without his authority for the most part. It appears, however, that the Aragonese king was eager for war, and as a result, on December 6, 1356, he sent a very strong and uncompromising letter to Pedro I.⁴³ It is possible that En Pere had been misled by the amount of strength which his alliance

⁴¹Ibid... p. 219.

⁴²Ibid... p. 222.

⁴³Ibid... p. 223.

with Enrique of Trastamara would bring to his cause. It is also possible that he exaggerated the amount of resistance within Castille itself to Pedro I. In addition, the strong possibility exists that En Pere was being strongly urged on by the French to undertake hostile action against the Castillian kingdom. En Pere apparently believed the time was right to satisfy his territorial ambitions at the expense of Castille.⁴⁴ "The haughty Aragonese king accordingly committed his people to war with a levity which is in striking contrast to the paralyzing caution in military matters which was to characterize the later years of his reign."⁴⁵ He was soon to repent the decision that he had made.

Both kings used the winter months for military preparations for a spring campaign. It was the Castillians who struck first. The Castillian army had already been mobilized to deal with the revolt which Pedro had successfully crushed in 1355-1356. Pedro now turned this force with devastating effect upon Aragon. En Pere was confronted with an attack sooner than he had anticipated. He had just, in the last days of 1356, concluded an alliance with two of the most powerful nobles in Castille: Juan de la Cerda, and Alvaro de Guzman. The two Castillian nobles had ratified the document on December 31, 1356, and it was ratified by the

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁵Russell, English Intervention, p. 16.

Aragonese king in Zaragossa on January 6.⁴⁶ With this alliance, the Aragonese king hoped to make a powerful diversion, or even to initiate civil war in the midst of Andalusia.⁴⁷ Pedro had already reached the Aragonese frontier when he learned of the insurrection in Andalusia. For a moment he hesitated, but then decided to plunge forward with the Aragonese invasion and to deal with the rebels at a later date.

In February, 1356 two events of note took place. First, Pope Innocent VI, hoping to bring an end to the war between Aragon and Castille, dispatched Cardinal Guillermo to the Peninsula to work for a settlement between the two warring princes. The cardinal, who was to play a more significant role in the future, had little initial success.⁴⁸ It was also in February that Pedro learned that his mother, Maria, had died in her native land of Portugal on February 18. It was rumored that her death had been the result of poison.⁴⁹ The news of his mother's death seems to have had little effect upon Pedro, who was at that time busily engaged in his military preparations. On March 9, the Castillian army appeared before the walls of Tarazona, and the following day the city fell to the Castillian army. The

⁴⁶Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 115.1.

⁴⁷Ayala, pp. 224, 234.

⁴⁸Garcia, p. 143.

⁴⁹Ayala, p. 234.

Aragonese population was driven from the town and their property was confiscated. Pedro gave every indication of totally assimilating Tarazona into the Castillian domain.⁵⁰ This Castillian possession was a major obstacle to the establishment of peace between the two kingdoms as Pedro I refused to relinquish the city. Shortly after that date, the papal legate once more made an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement between the two kingdoms. With his anger having somewhat subsided, the Castillian king, on this occasion, was more acquiescent to the papal arbitration.⁵¹ En Pere, beginning to fear for his kingdom, was also more prepared to enter into negotiations. A neutral site, the town of Tudela in Navarre, was designated for holding the conference between the Aragonese and Castillian envoys. The conference was to be presided over by the cardinal legate. Pedro was represented by Juan de Hínestrosa, Jual de Benavides, and Inigo Lopez de Orozco; Aragon by Bernal de Cabrera, Pedro de Exerica, and Alvar Garcia de Albornoz.⁵² The latter, a Castillian subject, was chosen no doubt to support the interests of the Count of Trastámara and the other banished Castillians.⁵³ After considerable

⁵⁰Ayala, p. 237, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 279.

⁵¹Garcia, p. 147.

⁵²Zurita, Vol. II, p. 28.

⁵³Merimee, p. 221.

negotiations,⁵⁴ the parties agreed to a truce on May 15, 1357, which was to last for one year. According to the agreement, both monarchs placed disputed territories into the possession of the cardinal legate, but most importantly Pedro agreed to surrender Tarazona and the castle of Ali-cante. The Castillian king was also to pardon his brother, the Count of Trastamara, and numerous other Castillian nobles who had served the king of Aragon. En Pere, by the same token, would grant equal pardons to his step-mother, brothers, and the other lords who had sought refuge in Castille. It should be noted that these special stipulations were necessary since both monarchs were compromising previous agreements they had made with their adversary step-brothers. En Pere, for example, had promised Enrique by the agreement of Pina that he would make no agreements with the king of Castille without Enrique's consent. Pedro of Castille had made similar agreements with the Aragonese heirs. A final stipulation of the treaty was that if either party failed to live up to their obligations he would suffer excommunication, his kingdom would be placed under interdict and a considerable fine would be levied against that kingdom.⁵⁵

Generally speaking, this treaty contained more

⁵⁴Collection of Salazar, as cited in Garcia, p. 149, note 3.

⁵⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1394.

advantages for the king of Aragon than for the king of Castille. The reasons why Pedro accepted the agreement can only be guessed at. Possibly his action was the result of a real or imaginary danger he believed existed of an uprising in Castille against his rule. At the time of the initiation of negotiations, the Castillian king was in the process of a successful campaign in Aragon. In addition to this, Pedro had little inclination to reach a reconciliation with the Count of Trastamara, whom he had obviously recognized by this time as his most serious rival. It is not hard to understand then, why he lived up so poorly to the terms of the peace. It is not surprising that he refused to surrender control of Tarazona, claiming it belonged to him by right of conquest. To prove his irrevocable intentions on this matter, he named Juan de Hínestrosa as governor of the town and established in Tarazona a type of military colony. He further made extensive territorial grants from the property of Tarazona to numerous Castillian nobles.⁵⁶ The cardinal objected bitterly to this poor faith on the part of the Castillian king and after three months of useless negotiation, he levied against Pedro and his kingdom both excommunication and interdict.⁵⁷ This move seemed to have little effect upon Pedro or the Castillian kingdom. Pedro obviously felt himself strong at that time because of

⁵⁶ Ayala, p. 232.

⁵⁷ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1394.

his military successes in Aragon and "his subjects had learned to fear his anger more than the apostolic censure."⁵⁸ On neither side, then, was there demonstrated a willingness to live up to the terms of the truce. Only on one point did it remain in effect: the hostilities between the two antagonists remained suspended. It appears that neither of the kings had any confidence in the temporary truce. Both men, believing the war was soon to be renewed, lent their efforts to the procurement of new allies for when the struggle was resumed. It was particularly necessary for the king of Aragon to do so, since until that time he had derived little benefit from his major Castillian allies; neither the Count of Trastamara nor his alliance with Juan de la Cerda proved to be very effective. Neither had achieved for him the goals he desired.

Juan de la Cerda had, in fact, lived up to his obligations to the Aragonese king. He had raised the banner of revolution in Andalucia, but after having ravaged the countryside to a considerable degree, he finally gave battle to a loyalist force sent from Seville to oppose him. The loyalists were led by Juan Ponce de Leon, lord of Marchena, and the admiral of Castille, Gils Bocanegra. In the ensuing battle, the rebels were cut to pieces and Juan de la Cerda was taken as a prisoner to Seville. Word was immediately sent

⁵⁸Merimee, p. 223.

to Pedro of the rebel leader's capture. Without hesitation, the Castillian king replied that Juan de la Cerda was to be put to death. The order was carried out in the summer of 1357.⁵⁹

The assistance of the Trastamaran had likewise been of little help to En Pere in the war which was now temporarily suspended. Enrique's supporters in Castille had showed themselves too weak to be capable of exercising the slightest effect on the contest. One explanation for the limited success of Pedro's enemies was that the opposition to Pedro in Castille was divided. Many opposed the leadership of Enrique and preferred the claims of the Aragonese prince, Fernando, En Pere's half-brother and a nephew of Alfonso XI of Castille. En Pere was consequently advised that many advantages could be derived from a rapprochement with his half-brother. Fernando could be used as a focal point about which those Castillian nobles who were hostile to Pedro I and not prepared to accept Enrique as their leader, could rally. Furthermore, the desertion of Fernando could cause the Castillian king, always suspicious, to lose confidence in those who remained with him. And finally there was a strategic consideration. The Aragonese prince held territories within Aragon along the border of the kingdom from which the Castillians had operated and done considerable damage to the Aragonese

⁵⁹Ayala, p. 230.

kingdom. Thus, secret negotiations were conducted between the king of Aragon and his half-brother in the second half of 1357 and continued throughout the remainder of that year.⁶⁰

In December of 1357, Fernando appeared suddenly in the kingdom of Valencia, and there he gave Orihuela and other castles and fortresses which he possessed in Aragon to the Aragonese crown. Declaring himself to be no longer a vassal to the king of Castille, he took an oath of homage to the Aragonese king.⁶¹ These agreements were solidified by a treaty of peace and reconciliation which was signed at Canada del Pozuely on December 7, 1357. In this treaty it was agreed that Fernando would receive additional and generous donations from his half-brother for surrendering the already mentioned territories. En Pere further promised military support if Fernando wished to pursue his claims to the Castillian throne.⁶² At the same time En Pere had no desire to break off his alliance with the Count of Trastamara. As a result, there was a reconfirmation of the agreement of Pina, and additional lands and monetary compensations were given to Enrique. The latter was now in an even more advantageous position since his wife, Joanna Manuel, who had been held a prisoner in Castille since the

⁶⁰Zurita, Vol. II, p. 283.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 284.

⁶²Ibid.

fall of Toro in 1356, had managed to escape and was once again united with her husband in Aragon.⁶³ Thus the last restricting influence which Pedro held over Enrique had been removed and the latter could now play an even more decisive role in the coming struggle for the throne of Castille. There are also strong indications that during these months Enrique entered into negotiation with his brothers Fadrique and Tello, who had until that time remained in the service of Pedro. These negotiations, as we shall see, were costly to the Master of Santiago.

And finally, in the hope of again threatening the southern frontier of the Castillian kingdom, En Pere signed a treaty of peace with the Moorish king of Fez and Marruecos.⁶⁴ This was but a prelude to negotiations which would commence in the near future between En Pere and the king of Granada and which were to have very serious consequences for Castille.

These then represent the major diplomatic moves of Aragon during the period of peace which had begun in May of 1357. In the meantime, the Castillian king was equally active in his preparations for the renewal of the conflict. Immediately after the conclusion of the truce with Aragon, Pedro had left the Aragonese frontier to return to Seville.

⁶³Ayala, p. 230.

⁶⁴Garcia, p. 159, note 1.

On May 25, he was in Agreda.⁶⁵ By the end of the month he was in Toledo where he remained at least a month, and by mid-summer he was in Seville. The exact date of his return to Seville cannot be determined, but by the latest, it was August 19, for on that day he affixed his signature to an alliance between himself and the Count of Armagnac. By the time Pedro had returned to Seville, serious negotiations had already been begun between himself and the new king of Portugal, Pedro I, who began his reign on May 28, 1357. The initial purpose of these negotiations was to work out the arrangements for the return of the body of Pedro's mother, Maria, to her final burial place. An additional purpose was to establish a marriage alliance between Pedro's heir and daughter by Maria de Padilla and the heir to the Portuguese throne, Fernando. These negotiations, however, were soon to develop along a more serious line in order to maintain the close personal and diplomatic relationship between the two kingdoms which had existed during the reign of Alfonso IV. The Portuguese were to lend conspicuous military assistance to Castille when the struggle with Aragon was resumed.⁶⁶

It was also during the summer of 1357 that Pedro completed his negotiations with the Count of Armagnac. Of the history of these negotiations we know nothing, but

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 152, note 1.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 179, note 2.

fortunately a copy of this treaty which survived in the departmental archives of Tarnet-Garonne was discovered and published in the year 1878.⁶⁷ This alliance, signed on August 19 between the two parties involved, called for the Count of Armagnac to provide Don Pedro with up to 550 men at arms in return for an annual payment by the Castillian king of 10,000 gold florins. If additional troops were sent by Armagnac the count was to receive further subsidies. Though we know little of the role these Armagnac troops played in the future conflict between Castille and Aragon, for the present the treaty with its promise of military aid must have been very gratifying to the Castillian king.

It is also possible that Pedro, remembering the example of his father, made diplomatic overtures to the king of England at this time. If this is true they proved premature but would nevertheless bear great importance in the near future. An indication that such diplomatic contact was established is that on August 8, 1357, Edward III issued a document in which considerable privileges were granted to the seamen of the kingdom of Castille and Biscaye.⁶⁸ It cannot be determined if this was a direct result of active negotiations on the part of Pedro, as no documents from the

⁶⁷M. Bourbon, "Traite d'Alliance Offensive et Defensive entre le Roi de Castille, Pierre le Cruel, et le Comte D'Armagnac, Jean 1^{ct}." Revue de la Societe des Salvants (1878), Vol. VII, pp. 54-61.

⁶⁸Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 380.

Castillian archives of that period have survived. It remains, nevertheless, a distinct possibility. It may, on the other hand, have been nothing more than a reprisal of the English king who was prepared to show partiality for the Castillian seamen in contrast to the Aragonese who had openly sided with the French by the terms of the Franco-Aragonese alliance.

It also appears that both the kings of Aragon and of Castille made serious attempts to involve Navarre in this conflict. Charles, king of Navarre, was at that time being held a prisoner in France.⁶⁹ His brother Louis was ruling the kingdom as regent. The indications are that Louis, like his brother, was quite capable of playing the game of political duplicity. Not wishing to involve his kingdom in a war between his two more powerful neighbors he made contradictory promises to both sides. Most likely he offered neutrality and even hinted of military assistance. These were promises which he apparently had no intention of keeping.⁷⁰

All this attention to foreign negotiations, however, did not prevent Pedro from devoting considerable energy to the domestic situation in Castille. While deeply involved in these negotiations, he also continued to assemble a huge fleet. He planned to throw this armada against the Aragonese

⁶⁹Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 282-284.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 282, 284.

capital, Barcelona, as soon as hostilities were resumed.⁷¹ Pedro further utilized this time to purge Castille of those he believed to be traitors who were seeking his overthrow. Unquestionably, the desertion of the Aragonese prince Fernando in December, 1357, had influenced him in this direction.

Even all of this, however, could not prevent Pedro from indulging his appetite for beautiful women once more. Early in the year of 1358 he appears to have fallen under the charms of Aldonza Coronel, who came to Seville seeking the pardon for her husband, Alvar de Guzman. This nobleman had openly taken part with Juan de la Cerda in the Andalusian rebellion while Pedro was engaged in the Aragonese campaign. With the king's return, however, Alvar de Guzman had managed to escape to Aragon and thus avoid the fate suffered by Juan de la Cerda. The beautiful Aldonza, who apparently came to plead on behalf of her husband, ended up becoming the mistress of the king of Castille. This was neither the first nor the last time that Pedro would temporarily abandon Maria de Padilla; it proved to be nothing more on this occasion. Aldonza Coronel was soon sent away to a convent to spend the rest of her life and Pedro once more returned to Maria.⁷²

The single outstanding incident in the year 1358,

⁷¹Ayala, pp. 249-251.

⁷²Ibid., p. 232.

however, was the murder of Pedro's brother, Fadrique, Master of Santiago. When Pedro reached the decision to murder Fadrique cannot be determined with any certainty. Ayala writes that during the early months of the Aragonese campaign that Pedro had determined to destroy Fadrique, Tello, and the Aragonese heirs at his earliest opportunity.⁷³ His reasons for killing Fadrique are not difficult to determine. We can discover one cause for this action on the part of the Castillian king in the treaty of Pina, concluded on November 8, 1356, between the Trastamaran and the king of Aragon.⁷⁴ In that treaty, there was a stipulation that if Fadrique were to leave the service of the king of Castille for that of the king of Aragon, Fadrique would be invested with all the lands and fortresses belonging to the Order of Santiago dependent upon the crown of Aragon.⁷⁵ It is impossible, of course, to determine if Fadrique was a party to this stipulation in the treaty of Pina or if the Count of Trastamara had inserted that at his own instigation. What is certain is that such a clause could not for long be kept a secret from the king of Castille, who needed little encouragement to believe that Fadrique was once more plotting against him. That Fadrique had already, on several occasions in the past, taken up arms

⁷³Ibid., p. 249.

⁷⁴Zurita, Vol. II, p. 273.

⁷⁵Ibid.

against Pedro was not forgotten by the Castillian king. That it had been Fadrique who had served as Pedro's jailor during his humiliating captivity in Toro in 1356 must also have been vividly remembered by Pedro. This latest suspicion would have been more than sufficient to influence him to destroy once and for all one of his greatest adversaries. Despite the fact that Fadrique had distinguished himself at the Battle of Tarazona, Pedro saw him as a traitor. Nevertheless, he left Fadrique the significant power of controlling the situation on the Aragonese-Castillian border during the period of truce, though he already had decided on the Master's death. Even Fadrique's seizure of the castle of Jumilla in early May⁷⁶ did not prolong his life. Possibly most damaging to Fadrique was the fact that he had negotiated with the rebel commander of Santiago, Gonzalo Mexia, early in 1358. Though these negotiations were supposed to have concerned the holdings of the Order in Aragon, the Castillian king, always suspicious, obviously thought the worst of this meeting.⁷⁷ Pedro, now preparing to resume the war with Aragon, wanted to eradicate the most dangerous threats to himself in Castille before he did so. Fadrique and Tello must have stood at the top of his list. With his brother's destruction in mind, Pedro summoned the Master of Santiago to Seville, immediately following his successful conquest of

⁷⁶Ayala, p. 232.

⁷⁷Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1543, p. 5.

the castle of Jumilla. Seeking an accomplice to this bloody plot, Pedro revealed his intentions to the Aragonese prince, Juan, who despite his brother's defection to En Pere, had remained in Castille. Juan not only possessed a true hatred for Fadrique but Pedro probably held out a further enticement, a second murder, that of Tello, which could be most beneficial to Juan. Juan had married the second daughter of Juan Nunez de Lara, and the death of Tello could make him lord of the vast domain of Biscaye. If we are to believe Ayala, Juan was so enticed by the plot that he offered to dispatch Fadrique with his own hand.⁷⁸

Unaware of the fate that awaited him, Fadrique reached Seville on the 29th of May and immediately went to the Alcazar to present himself to Pedro. There in the presence of the king of Castille, Fadrique met an instant and violent death.⁷⁹ By murdering Fadrique, Pedro had removed from the political scene a potential political menace, a man who had already rebelled against him on several occasions in the past. In all probability Fadrique would have once more joined forces with the Count of Trastamara had he entered Castille at the head of an invading army. But on that particular occasion there was little evidence to support the fact that Fadrique was once more plotting against his king. We must believe, then, that the cause of Fadrique's death

⁷⁸Ayala, p. 233.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 243.

was his past sins, particularly those events related to Pedro's captivity at Toro. It should also be added that few acts of bloodshed, with the possible exception of Blanche of Bourbon's death, would do so much damage to Pedro's reputation.

In the 1360's the Trastamaran propaganda campaign to undermine the position of Pedro was in full movement. The image of Pedro which has survived as Pedro the Cruel, bloody tyrant of Castille, can in many respects be related to the incident which we have just described.⁸⁰ The death of Fadrique, however, was the beginning of a blood-bath which the Castillian monarch had planned for his rivals. Pedro made immediate plans to depart for Biscaye to deal with Tello before he had an opportunity to learn of Fadrique's death.⁸¹ Before departing from Seville he gave orders which sent royal executioners throughout his kingdom bringing death to those proscribed by the king. Among these were Pedro Cabrena, Fernando de Gahetc, Lopez Sanchez de Bendena, a commander of the Order of Santiago, Alfonso Penorio, who during the king's captivity in Toro threatened him with a sword, Perez Fermosisno, and Gonzalo Melendez de Toledo, all who had played a part in the events of Toro in 1355-56. We are inclined to believe that, like Fadrique, their deaths were

⁸⁰W. J. Entwistle, European Balladry (Oxford: 1939), pp. 156-160.

⁸¹Ayala, p. 240.

the result of their activities surrounding Pedro's humiliation in Toro and not of any recent faults.⁸²

In his anxiety to destroy Tello, Pedro covered the distance from Seville to Leon in only seven days.⁸³ It was fortunate for Tello that a squire warned him of the king's approach. Immediately perceiving what the king's mission concerned, Tello fled, not even hesitating to recover his wife or valuables. On June 7, reaching the coastal city of Bermeo, he boarded a ship which took him safely to the English port of Bayona.⁸⁴ Less fortunate than her husband, Tello's wife, Juana de Lara, was taken prisoner by the king and spent the remainder of her days in a royal prison. Pedro's cousin, Juan of Aragon, who had been an accomplice to all these plots, now pressed the king to fulfill his agreement by giving him the lordship of Biscaye. On June 12, Juan was murdered in the presence of the king as Fadrique had been a week earlier.⁸⁵ Once more it would appear that the motive for the death of Juan was the role he had played in bringing about Pedro's captivity in Toro. Immediately following Juan's death, his wife, Isabella de Lara, and his mother Leonor, queen of Aragon, joined Juana de Lara in prison where all were to spend their remaining days.

⁸²Garcia, p. 203.

⁸³Ayala, p. 243.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 244.

In the last days of June, the heads of those proscribed by Pedro were brought to him by his executioners.⁸⁶ Of all those whose death had been decided upon by the king, only Tello had managed to escape Pedro's vengeance. While these events were going on in Castille the truce between Castille and Aragon remained intact, despite the failure of Pedro to carry out the articles signed at Tudela. Even after the seizure of Jumilla by Fadrique shortly before his death in early May, the truce remained intact. The only military operations that took place in 1358 were minor scale invasions of the Castillian kingdom by the Count of Trastamara and Fernando of Aragon in late June and early July. Enrique devastated the territory around Soria while Fernando concentrated his activities in the kingdom of Murcia.⁸⁷ Pedro was still in Bilboa when he received news of these hostile activities. Quickly assembling his forces, he marched to the frontier to deal with the invaders. Both the Count and the Aragonese heir quickly retreated across the frontier when they received word of the Castillian king's approach.⁸⁸ Both of these instances appear to have been precipitated by the individuals involved. The Count of Trastamara and Fernando of Aragon seemed to have acted

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 247.

⁸⁷Ayala, p. 249, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 251.

⁸⁸Ibid.

without the consent of the king of Aragon. In both cases, the motivation can be found in a desire for revenge for the death of their respective brothers.

Pedro sent an official protest, dated July 10, to the king of Aragon regarding his breaking of the truce.⁸⁹ It appears, nevertheless, that the Castillian king accepted these acts of hostility as not part of the official policy of the king of Aragon since Pedro made no attempt to reciprocate. After taking the proper measures to reinforce his frontier and to assure himself that Enrique and Fernando would not recross the frontier, Pedro returned to Seville. There, he devoted his energies to the preparation of a maritime expedition that he planned to throw against Aragon in the late summer of 1358. In doing so he had determined to give a new direction to the struggle with Aragon: the utilization of the Castillian fleet to attack the coastal cities of the Aragonese kingdom. Pedro had already had ample opportunity to observe the slowness and expense involved in conventional means of medieval warfare. Besieging fortified places took time which he could ill afford. It is thus praiseworthy for Pedro as a military strategist that he recognized that the most important cities in Aragon, particularly Barcelona and Valencia, were exposed to a maritime attack. Furthermore, the naval might of the Aragonese

⁸⁹Merimee, p. 246, note 1.

kingdom in 1358 had been drastically reduced by the long struggle of that kingdom with Sardinia. Pedro's program, then, was quite sound, and if it had been adequately carried out, could have brought an early end to the Castillian-Aragonese war.

Quickly assembling a small fleet, Pedro personally led an attack on the coast of Murcia. He brought the town of Guardamar, which belonged to Fernando of Aragon, under siege. The city itself quickly fell to him but the citadel held out. Pedro was prepared to take the citadel by siege when a sudden storm destroyed all of his fleet except two ships. Due to this misfortune the operations against the citadel could not continue, but Pedro burned the town on the 17th of August, 1358, and then departed from the Murcian coast, returning to Castille.⁹⁰

This misfortune, far from dimming Pedro's hopes of using Castillian naval might to deliver the fatal blow to the Aragonese kingdom, appeared to stimulate his desire for a greater effort. Immediately upon his return to Seville in late August, he began assembling a great fleet with which he planned to attack the Aragonese coast in the following summer.⁹¹

It is curious to note that this action which Pedro had taken against Guardamar did not represent an official

⁹⁰Ayala, p. 249.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 250, 251.

breaking of the truce then existing between Castille and Aragon. Just as the punitive raids of the heir Fernando and Enrique of Trastamara into Castille have been accounted for as personal acts of revenge, this act of Pedro was similarly viewed as retaliation against Fernando since Guardamar was one of his possession. Consequently, because of this curious rationale of medieval treaties and diplomacy, the truce remained in effect through the remainder of 1358. The last months of 1358 saw Pedro continuing his diplomatic offensive, attempting to enlist as many allies as possible. Among his activities was a letter written to the king of Granada in the late summer, 1358, seeking additional naval assistance.⁹² It was also during the summer of 1358 that the initial contact between the Castillian and English court began which was to mature into the Anglo-Castillian alliance of 1362.⁹³

With the exception of regaining control of several fortresses along the Aragonese border which had previously belonged to his brother Tello,⁹⁴ Pedro occupied himself in the winter months of 1358-59 in preparing his fleet. Each day he personally oversaw the construction of the armada with which he planned to destroy Aragon. Though the truce

⁹²Garcia, p. 192, note 1.

⁹³Rymer, Vol. III, p. 247, and Russell, English Intervention, p. 2.

⁹⁴Ayala, p. 252.

of Tudela remained in effect, En Pere wished to revenge the burning of Guardamar. As a result, in the early months of 1359, he entered Castille, taking advantage of Pedro's pre-occupation in Seville, to lay siege to several Castillian cities along the frontier, most notably the town of Hara which was taken and burned by the Aragonese army.⁹⁵ A similar attack on the Castillian fortress of Medinaceli proved more difficult because of the city's strong fortifications. Not wishing to prolong his stay in Castille because of the imminent attack upon the Aragonese coast by the Castillian fleet, En Pere returned to Barcelona as quickly as possible. There the Aragonese king busied himself in putting the fortifications of the coast of Catalonia and Valencia in a state of defense.⁹⁶

Just as the preparations of the Castillian king had not escaped En Pere, they had also been called to the attention of the papacy and the papal legate, both of whom were still determined to bring about peace between the Catholic princes of the Iberian Peninsula. Pope Innocent VI, hoping that a change in papal legates would bring about a new sentiment from the respective kings, replaced Cardinal Guillermo, a man apparently viewed with great suspicion by the Castillian king, with Cardinal Guido de Boulgone.⁹⁷ Pedro met

⁹⁵Zurita, Vol. II, p. 291.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Garcia, p. 196, note 1.

the cardinal legate in the border town of Almazan. The Castillian king received the legate with dignity and respect. Immediately, Pedro and the legate began serious negotiations in an effort to reach peace between the two kingdoms. Pedro, however, was not prepared to modify his previous demands in order to reach a permanent peace. He had, in fact, intensified them. Included among Pedro's demands was that Francisco de Perellos be turned over to him for punishment, that En Pere expel Enrique and Tello from Aragon, as well as Fernando and other Castillian nobles who had deserted Castille and were in the service of the king of Aragon. Pedro also demanded that Orihuela, Alicante, Guardamar, and Elche be returned to Castille. Finally, he demanded that the king of Aragon pay him a war indemnity of 500,000 Aragonese florins. Despite the harshness of the terms, the legate took them to the Aragonese king, hoping to find some basis for negotiation. En Pere had reached Zaragoza on the 28th of March to await the cardinal's arrival.⁹⁸

Predictably, En Pere was unwilling to accept these terms that the Castillian king was attempting to impose upon him. With regard to Perellos, he refused under any conditions to turn him over to the Castillian king. En Pere further refused to expel his brother Fernando, an Aragonese subject, or turn over the territories which Pedro demanded.

⁹⁸Ibid., note 3.

Only on the point of the Castillian immigrants did he show himself agreeable. If peace was established between Castille and Aragon he would expel from his kingdom Enrique, Tello, Sancho, and the Castillians who made up their following.⁹⁹

With these divergent positions, any hope for a truce between the two belligerents appeared impossible. Despite this, the cardinal returned to Pedro, who had remained in Almazan to await the Aragonese reply. The cardinal proposed a truce to be established immediately for one year between the two kingdoms, in which time he hoped to work out a permanent settlement. Pedro answered that he would be mad to accept such a proposal with his fleet assembled at great expense and effort and now prepared to deliver what he believed would be the fatal blow to Aragon. The refusal of En Pere to accept Pedro's terms enraged the Castillian king who began to escalate with greater vigor his preparations for the invasion of Aragon. His anger was so great that he apparently wished to close any possibility of peace between Castille and Aragon.¹⁰⁰ Pedro attributed the rejection of his terms by the Aragonese to the intrigues and influence of the Castillian immigrants at En Pere's court. This only increased Pedro's desire for vengeance. While still in Almazan he hurled a sentence of high treason against Fernando.

⁹⁹Ayala, pp. 258-266, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 292.

¹⁰⁰Garcia, p. 199.

Enrique, Pedro Gomez Carrillo, and several other refugees of distinction. As Garcia writes, it was an act motivated more by passion than prudence.¹⁰¹ According to Ayala, this was a great political error on the part of Pedro. The chronicler contends that at that time a significant number of the banished Castillians were secretly soliciting a pardon. They were prepared to abandon the cause of Enrique, which they now believed to be a lost one. However, now proscribed by their king, they had no other hope than to bring about his destruction.¹⁰² This alone, however, was not sufficient to satisfy Pedro's anger. "He needed blood, and unfortunately he had between his hands some hostages dear to his enemies."¹⁰³ They were Queen Leonor, mother of Fernando and Juan, Isabella de Lara, wife of Juan of Aragon, and Joanna de Lara, Tello's wife. Queen Leonor was the first of his victims, killed in the fortress of Castrojerez. "This ferocious act of the king, a slave, more than an actor, of tragic revenge, is one which history can least pardon."¹⁰⁴ The murder of his aunt, Alfonso XI's sister, was, with the murder of Fadrique, among the events most instrumental in blemishing Pedro's reputation for posterity. One can find justification for

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ayala, p. 471.

¹⁰³Merimee, p. 255.

¹⁰⁴Garcia, p. 203.

the murder of Fadrique, but not in the case of Leonor. Leonor, by the time of her death, helpless and imprisoned, was simply sacrificed to Pedro's lust for revenge. Shortly after, Joanna de Lara, Tello's wife, ended her days in a dungeon in Seville. Isabella de Lara, who had been held a prisoner for some time in Castrojerez, was transferred to the castle of Jerez where she soon had Queen Blanche for a companion. Neither of these two unfortunate women were to leave the prison alive.¹⁰⁵ After the execution of these orders, Pedro left Almazan to take command of his fleet in Seville.

The expedition Pedro had long awaited was about to take place. The Castillian fleet, consisting of over 100 ships, only awaited the arrival of the king. Among those who accompanied this expedition against Aragon was the historian Pedro Lopez de Ayala. At the end of April, 1359, the fleet entered the Mediterranean; its destination was Barcelona, the commercial and naval center of the Aragonese monarchy. By destroying Barcelona, Pedro believed that he could bring the war to a rapid end. The plan was well-conceived, and had it been properly executed, it could have brought about the desired results. However, Pedro made the fatal mistake of not pursuing his goal with the speed that was necessary. Consequently, he gave En Pere sufficient

¹⁰⁵Ayala, p. 226.

time to make the necessary preparation for the defense of Barcelona. Part of the reason for the delay was that Pedro awaited the arrival of a Portuguese squadron which was to join his fleet in the assault against Aragon. It was not until he arrived off the Valencian coast at the opening of the Ebre River that the Portuguese squadron joined him.¹⁰⁶

On June 10, 1359, the battle for Barcelona began. After several days of failure to break through the enemy lines, the Castillian fleet retreated, moving in the direction of the Balearic Isles. Arriving at the island of Ivica, Pedro put under siege the capital of that island. "Thus, instead of profitting from the great superiority of his naval forces to destroy the dispersed Aragonese squadrons, he used his immense armament against a mediocre place."¹⁰⁷ This error on the part of the Castillian king did not escape En Pere. He prudently utilized the time granted to him to reorganize his squadrons, badly scattered in the battle of Barcelona, in order to once more give battle to the Castillians. As soon as Pedro learned that the Aragonese had left Barcelona and were preparing to give him battle, he immediately abandoned the siege of Ivica and set sail for the coast of Valencia. The Aragonese fleet, under the command of Bernal de Cabrera, was only slightly inferior

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 227.

¹⁰⁷Merimee, p. 263.

in the number of galleys, but the Castellians held an infinite superiority in the eighty sail-ships that were a part of their fleet. Cabrera, recognizing the Castellian superiority, assembled his fleet in the mouth of the Denia River. The Castellians were consequently faced with the dilemma of either blockading the Aragonese fleet or taking the hazardous risk of entering the narrow river for a decisive battle. They chose the former course, and after several days of vainly blockading the Aragonese fleet without having enticed them to battle, the Castellian fleet retreated from Aragonese waters. At Cartegena the Portuguese galleys, which according to their treaty were only to remain three months under the orders of the king of Castille, returned to their own ports. This was the signal for a general dispersion of the Castellian fleet. The merchant ships returned to the ocean, the Castellian galleys were to be disarmed at Seville, the Moorish vessels returned to Malaga.¹⁰⁸ Such, then, was the end of an expedition on which Pedro had based such hopes. After such elaborate preparations and expenses, this fleet, failing to conquer Catalonia, returned without its desired victory to Seville.

Shortly after the retreat of the Castellian fleet, the Aragonese ships returned to Barcelona where they were also disarmed; only a few vessels returned to the sea to assault the coast of Andalusia.

¹⁰⁸ Ayala, pp. 280, 287.

While the Castillian fleet had failed to accomplish the goals their king had hoped for, Pedro's armies suffered a serious reversal along the Aragonese frontier. Shortly after the Castillian fleet returned to Seville, the Count of Trastamara and Tello crossed the Aragonese frontier from Agreda with about 800 men-at-arms. Suddenly they found themselves facing a considerably larger Castillian army, led by Fernando de Castro and Juan de Hinestrosa. In the ensuing battle, fought in the valley of Araviana, the Castillian army was surprised and badly defeated by the Trastamaran. Though casualties were low on both sides, Pedro lost some of his most loyal servants, the chief casualty being Juan de Hinestrosa.¹⁰⁹ Always suspicious, Pedro attributed this defeat to treasonable behavior of several prominent Castillian nobles. The inevitable result followed: bloodshed, which further diminished the following of Pedro among the Castillian aristocracy. As during past purges, there were numerous desertions to Enrique which increased the size of his following.¹¹⁰ As a further act of revenge, the Castillian king murdered the remaining two sons of Leonor de Guzman and Alfonso XI, Juan, now nineteen, and Pedro, fourteen, whom for years he had held prisoner in his dungeons.¹¹¹ These acts of violence by Pedro served the Count

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 290.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 291.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 292.

of Trastamara as well as the fortunes of war. He already had numerous partisans in all parts of Castille, and more nobles everyday found in him a champion for their cause of feudal independence which was being destroyed by the Castillian king in his attempt to establish absolutism in his state.

Hoping the time had come to strike a fatal blow to Pedro, Enrique petitioned the Aragonese king for an army with which to invade Castille. Although En Pere was quite partial to the Trastamaran, he was confronted with the problem of his half-brother, Fernando, who looked upon himself as the legitimate claimant to the throne of Castille. As nephew of Alfonso XI he obviously possessed a stronger claim to the throne than the Trastamaran bastard. To strengthen his position, Fernando not only had a significant following within Castille itself, but many friends at the Aragonese court. En Pere thus found himself in somewhat of a dilemma. Nevertheless, when he had to choose between the requests of a brother that he detested and those of an adventurer whose services had already been useful to him, the king of Aragon did not hesitate for long in making his selection. However great his hatred for Pedro, he would never have wished the ruin of this prince if it would serve to raise Fernando to being a greater rival than he already was.¹¹² En Pere had

¹¹²Merimee, p. 271.

never forgotten the fact that Fernando had once attempted to dethrone him as king of Aragon. To give him a kingdom was to arm against himself a more dangerous rival, perhaps, than Pedro of Castille. On the contrary, he saw in the Count of Trastamara a soldier of fortune, an instrument for his own ambitions to expand the boundaries of Aragon. It was thus to Enrique that he gave the command of an expedition against Castille.¹¹³

The fact that Enrique was engaged in preparations for an invasion of Castille did not long remain a secret to Pedro, who quickly made preparations to intercept the Trastamaran invasion. In typical fashion, however, Pedro wished to destroy all his suspected enemies in Castille before he marched to the borders of Castille to take on the onslaught of Enrique. Consequently, in late 1359 and early 1360 he was occupied in this manner.¹¹⁴ This tyranny, however, which Pedro displayed against the Castillian nobility, failed to accomplish the desired results. Instead of increasing the loyalty of the Castillians to his cause, it simply intensified the number of those who were prepared to act in opposition to him. For example, in 1360 the governor of Tarazona, Gonzalo Gonzalez Lucio, turned the city over to the king of Aragon in return for a generous bribe.¹¹⁵

¹¹³Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1170, p. 29, dated Tarazona, March 1, 1360.

¹¹⁴Ayala, p. 298.

¹¹⁵Ayala, p. 299, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 298.

Pedro had not yet arrived in Burgos when he learned that Enrique, Tello, and Sancho had entered Castille at the head of an army of approximately 2,500 men, many of them Castillian immigrants who had sought refuge in Aragon. Merimee suggests that the intention of the Trastamaran was to stir up the north of Castille, particularly to rally the partisans of Tello in the Basque provinces.¹¹⁶ This plan, however, proved unsuccessful. His men, poorly paid and ill-disciplined, committed numerous atrocities against the Castillian population.¹¹⁷ In several instances, noblemen opened their castles to him while others surrendered cities under their charge to the Trastamaran, but in general, the mass of the population remained loyal to their king. This scene was to be repeated on numerous occasions in the future.

By the time Pedro arrived in Burgos, he had contracted a severe illness which hampered his military operations against the invaders. When he recovered, he immediately set out in a campaign with an army in excess of 10,000 men. Near the end of April, 1360, Pedro encountered the army of Enrique near the town of Najera. A quick attack by the royalist forces nearly destroyed the entire invading army. Only nightfall prevented Pedro from exterminating the remainder of the rebels.¹¹⁸ Pedro was now presented with the opportunity

¹¹⁶Merimee, p. 277.

¹¹⁷Ayala, p. 301.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 306.

once and for all to destroy Enrique, who had been Pedro's greatest rival since the day he became king of Castille. The fact that Pedro did not take advantage of this opportunity presents one of the most bizarre stories in the history of that unusual man.

To account fully what happened on the day following the battle, we must briefly describe an event which preceded it. As Pedro marched toward Najera preparing to engage Enrique, a priest came to him from Santa Domingo de la Calzaba, and asked to speak directly to the king. In essence, the priest told Pedro that St. Dominic had appeared to him in a dream and ordered him to warn the king to mend his evil ways or Enrique would kill Pedro with his own hands. Pedro believed the priest to be an agent of Enrique, but under interrogation the priest contended that he got his commission directly from St. Dominic. Greatly irritated by the priest's obstinacy, Pedro had him burned alive at his camp near Najera.¹¹⁹ On the morning following the battle of Najera, as he advanced to deal the final blow to the Trastamaran, Pedro came upon several of his own men who had been badly wounded. Suddenly his firmness abandoned him; possibly his most recent illness at Burgos, which had left him weak, affected him due to the great exertion he had put out in the campaign. For whatever reason, despite the pleas of his followers, Pedro,

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 305.

would under no circumstances attack Enrique and his followers who had taken refuge in the poorly defended town of Najera. Instead of attacking Najera or even laying siege to it, he turned to Santa Domingo with the intention of trying to appease St. Dominic in atonement for his murder of the priest. Enrique obviously believed that he had received a form of divine protection as he unbelievably saw the royal army withdraw from Najera. Taking advantage of the opportunity Enrique with the remnants of his army, many of whom had lost their horses and equipment, began his retreat from Castille. It is possible that if his forces had been pursued with vigor by the king, not a single member of Enrique's army would have made it safely to Aragon. By the time Pedro had recovered his senses it was too late. His opportunity to destroy Enrique had escaped him.¹²⁰

The defeat of Enrique at Najera in April of 1360 does not appear to have disturbed the confidence which En Pere placed in this adventurer. It did, however, make the Aragonese king realize that he must now establish a more balanced policy of supporting both claimants to the throne, Enrique as well as Fernando. As a result, a few days after the battle of Najera, En Pere brought together the Aragonese heir and the Count of Trastamara and obliged them to swear a formal friendship according to the custom of that time. In this document, dated May 11, 1360, Fernando and Enrique

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 307.

promised to give up their mutual hostilities toward each other and to devote themselves to the service of the king of Aragon. They promised by the same treaty to reveal to him all proposals they received from the king of Castille and remain loyal vassals of the king of Aragon.¹²¹

In return, En Pere renewed his guarantee of protection to Enrique and Fernando, promising never to deal with Pedro of Castille without taking their interests into consideration.¹²² Due to a series of extraordinary circumstances, the good faith of En Pere was soon put to a test. The day following the conclusion of this agreement on May 11, Bernal de Cabrera returned from a mission to the king of Castille with proposals for a new peace settlement. These new proposals were acceptable to Cabrera, but there was one major obstacle. Pedro refused to remove the sentence of high treason against his brother Enrique or the heir Fernando. Cabrera apparently concurred with the Castillian king on this point. However, we can see by the terms of the treaty just concluded between En Pere and his allies that the Aragonese king had assured them of his protection. En Pere insisted that he could not deal with the Castillian without receiving honorable condition for his allies. Cabrera, always an advocate of peace, was forced to submit to En Pere's will. He did, however, request that

¹²¹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 2230.

¹²²Ibid.

his proposal be formally registered and stated that he had stood in favor of accepting the agreement with Castille. Because of this, a copy of these negotiations have survived in the Aragonese archives.¹²³ Possibly the intensity of En Pere's loyalty to Enrique and Fernando can be found less in his affection towards these two individuals than the fact that he was at this time actually engaged in negotiations with the king of Granada. He may well have been placing hopes in the belief that soon the king of Castille would be occupied with a war against the Moors in Andalucia that would force him to abandon Aragon. We will soon see that these hopes were not groundless.

While the Aragonese was thus firming up his alliance, Pedro of Castille was also busily engaged in diplomatic activities with both the Portuguese and the English. As was mentioned earlier, the Portuguese and Castillians continued their historical alliance by the betrothal of the Castillian heiress, Beatriz, to the Portuguese heir, Fernando. Now the two monarchs bound their two kingdoms together even more tightly. In the coming expedition which Pedro I of Castille planned to lead against Aragon, the Portuguese king pledged support of six-hundred Portuguese knights.¹²⁴ In addition, both kings agreed upon an unheard of proposition in which

¹²³ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1170, p. 165.

¹²⁴ Ayala, p. 310.

they agreed to extradite rebels which had sought refuge in their respective kingdoms. This intensified the hatred which the Castillian nobility possessed for their king.

"The nobility which had imagined itself to have the right of changing country according to their own interest, could not see without indignation such a blow against its old privileges."¹²⁵

More importantly, the Castillian negotiations with England continued through the year 1360. The negotiations had already reached an advanced stage by June, 1359,¹²⁶ when Edward III instructed the seneschal of Gascony to open formal negotiations with Castille for the formation of a binding alliance between the two kingdoms.¹²⁷ These negotiations continued through the year 1360. Near the end of 1360 the Aragonese king learned of the negotiations then progressing between England and Castille. It appears that the Castillian king had not entered into the English negotiations simply to gain an additional ally and military assistance against Aragon. He had already proved on numerous occasions in the past that the military facilities of his kingdom were more than a match for the Aragonese state. It is more likely he intended to insure himself of a strong ally in case the French decided to throw in on the side of the Aragonese or

¹²⁵Merimee, p. 286.

¹²⁶See above, pp. 173-174.

¹²⁷Rymer, Vol. III (i), p. 427.

the Count of Trastamara. This fact, of course, was not known to En Pere, and when he became aware of the negotiations he must have been alarmed considerably. He decided to attempt to put a stop to these negotiations by making a personal overture to the Black Prince. On the 22nd of December, he wrote to one of his papal agents in Avignon that he was seriously considering offering the hand of his eldest daughter, Joanna, to the prince of Wales. He instructed his agent to determine if these negotiations could in any way have been conducted secretly at Avignon.¹²⁸ En Pere realized the danger of such a proposal, as the French influence at his own court at this time was extremely strong. A rapprochement with the English would be met with obvious hostility. Even after the second battle of Najera, in 1366, when the survival of Aragon was in jeopardy, his attempted rapprochement with the English met with considerable opposition within Aragon. At any rate, no evidence remains of the fate of this Aragonese overture, and it was to be seven years before the king again attempted to negotiate with the son of Edward III. It may very possibly have been En Pere's anxiety over his international position which led him in May of 1361 to agree to the conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Castille.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, between the end of 1360, when he first learned

¹²⁸ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1174, Folio 9v.

¹²⁹ Russell, English Intervention, p. 25.

of the Anglo-Castillian negotiations, and the initiation of the treaty in May of 1361, he continued making hostile overtures toward Castille. The Aragonese king must have been satisfied in the early months of 1361 with the progress of his negotiations in Granada. There had been one of those typical coup d'etats in the Granadan state which resulted in the seizure of the throne by the Vizir Abou-Said. In doing so he had driven Mohammed, ally and vassal of Pedro of Castille and legitimate king of Granada, from the throne.¹³⁰ Abou-Said, realizing the Castillian king would support Mohammed, was most eager to enter into an alliance with the king of Aragon. Pedro IV was too clever to turn down such an advantageous opportunity. It was in the hope that the Granadan alliance would cause a diversion in Southern Castille that En Pere began to formulate plans for another invasion of Castille. Enrique's failure had not totally discouraged him, but now he decided to shift to a different agent, his half-brother, the heir Fernando. This attempt was to be more than a punitive expedition; its purpose was to be the conquest of Castille. Aragonese support of Fernando was to be extensive; in return the Aragonese king expected to be handsomely repaid. In an agreement between the two allies, signed on January 31, 1361,¹³¹ the king of

¹³⁰Russell, English Intervention, p. 25.

¹³¹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1393, pp. 77ff.

Aragon promised to provide Fernando with 2,000 armed men and a substantial financial subsidy. In return, the heir, upon his conquest of Castille, would cede to his brother the kingdom of Murcia, the province of Soria, and several notable towns.¹³² It was finally agreed that if the heir Fernando had a daughter in the future, she would marry the eldest son of En Pere, heir to the Aragonese throne.

It appears that Pedro I had remained ignorant of these negotiations. In early 1361 we find him at the head of a large Castillian army entering Aragon, where he received news that the Granadan army was preparing to invade Andalucia.¹³³ The Moorish attack would have been very dangerous since most of the Andalucian knights were then taking part in the invasion of Aragon. This serious danger to Andalucia forced Pedro to give up his invasion when it appeared the Aragonese kingdom might fall to him.

The papal legate, Cardinal Guy de Boulogne, did not lose this opportunity to act as intermediary between the two warring parties. The time was well chosen for he found both sides agreeable to a peace. Pedro of Castille, because of the impending Moorish invasion of Andalucia, was prepared to modify his demands. En Pere, despite the elaborate preparations with Fernando for the invasion of Castille,

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Ayala, p. 348.

obviously preferred peace at that time to a hazardous invasion. As we have already mentioned, his knowledge of the Anglo-Castillian negotiations must have profoundly disturbed him. For these reasons, within a few days, the cardinal legate had managed to establish a peace between Castille and Aragon.¹³⁴ The Castillian king, never one to exercise moderation, had now directed his anger against the king of Granada; he thought only of taking revenge upon Abou-Said. Pedro most likely looked upon the most recent treaty with Aragon as a necessary evil, one which he would deal with as soon as he destroyed the usurper.

It was agreed that the Aragonese king would withdraw his protection from Fernando and the Count of Trastamara, and that Pedro of Castille would return all the towns in Aragon that he had seized. With regard to Alicante and Orihuela, the cardinal recommended that discussion on the subject be suspended until the pope had the opportunity to study the matter and pronounce his judgment upon it. Another condition of the treaty was that the king of Aragon would guarantee the conduct of any Castillian refugees that remained in Aragon. In addition, there was to be a general amnesty to all rebels from both the kings of Aragon and Castille. Here again is another example of the bias in the treaty which favored Aragon over the interests of Castille.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 350.

The king of Castille had only a few Aragonese in his service while Pedro IV maintained an entire army of banished Castilians. Both kings were entitled to exclude from the general amnesty several exiles. The Castillian king, for example, was allowed eleven. Among those who headed the list were his brother Enrique and the Aragonese heir Fernando. It is interesting to notice that his other half-brothers, Tello and Sancho, were permitted to enjoy the benefits of the amnesty, though Tello was denied his right to reacquire his control of Biscaye. A final clause provided that both kings promised in the future not to receive rebel vassals in their state. This was an attempt to renew an agreement reached years earlier at Atienza and which had been so badly observed by both sides. With these conditions accepted with haste on both sides, the peace was thus concluded and signed by both kings; by Pedro of Castille on May 13, 1361, and by En Pere the following day.¹³⁵

It is interesting to note that in this long document, not one word is devoted to the Perellos incident which had begun this conflict in 1356. This demonstrates that this event had not been the true cause of the war, but rather the catalyst which sparked the beginning of the conflict. It can be compared to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and the beginning of World War I. The treaty between the

¹³⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1394, pp. 39ff.

two monarchs was soon followed by an offensive and defensive alliance between the two kings who had recently been enemies. In the future, both promised to aid each other against any foreign attacks; both, however, made reservations. For example, the king of Castille would not aid the king of Aragon in case of war between Aragon and Portugal.¹³⁶ The Aragonese king further promised to aid Pedro of Castille in his war against the king of Granada. The Aragonese king apparently felt no scruples in suddenly deserting his ally who had made peace between Aragon and Castille possible.¹³⁷

Thus, another chapter in the bloody Castillian-Aragonese war was brought to an end, though it was soon to be renewed. For the present, Pedro I devoted his attention to the destruction of Abou Said, who had forced him to accept a disadvantageous truce. En Pere was very happy to have gained a very necessary breathing period for his kingdom. Enrique of Trastamara left Aragon for France, where he soon took an oath of vassalage to the French king, and began making preparations for a return to Castille,¹³⁸ this time with French assistance and with the intention of establishing himself as the king of Castille.

¹³⁶ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1394, pp. 60ff., dated June 16, 1361.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ayala, p. 359, and Garcia, p. 133, N. 1.

We might ask why such an extensive discussion of the Aragonese-Castillian war is included in a work which is primarily concerned with the foreign policy of Castille during Pedro's reign. It must be realized that the manifestations of this war most certainly established precedents of the most profound significance. In the case of Aragon, En Pere entered the war with a light heartedness which stood in great contrast to his cautiousness and hesitation to commit his army to war, which he would display in the future. Because the war went so disastrously for his kingdom, it was necessary to call not only the Trastamaran to his aid, but also the king of France. As we will see, Charles V responded by sending great companies to the Iberian Peninsula, the very force which would cost Pedro his throne.

From the Castillian king's point of view, the war was pursued successfully for the most part, but on several occasions Pedro appeared to let the conquest of Aragon slip through his fingers for reasons which we cannot always understand. It may well have been that on such occasions, Pedro's motives were dictated more by his psychological state than by any political factors, either within or without Castille. Pedro's entire career was evidence of paranoia. If this personality flaw has been correctly interpreted, it would help to explain the frequent acts of violence for which other motivation was lacking. Since the man remained such a mystery

and enigma to us, we can only guess what his motivations might have been.

The war itself, of course, provided the restless Castillian nobility with an outlet. While pursuing a successful war with Aragon, the nobles were less inclined to question the authority of their totalitarian-minded king. Pedro must have recognized this and showed little inclination to conclude a permanent and lasting peace with Aragon. But at the very time the Aragonese war was providing Pedro with the means of controlling his nobility, as long as the war continued, he was forced to depend on the military support of the very men he mistrusted. Thus by devoting so much of the energies of his kingdom to the conquest of Aragon, Pedro did not allow himself the time to consolidate his authority within Castille itself. It was in all probability because of his fear that the Aragonese king would call upon the help of the king of France that Pedro was encouraged to renew the negotiations with England which had been begun by his father when he was a boy. This would eventually result in the English-Castillian treaty of 1362.

It was also during these early years of the war that Enrique of Trastamara changed his role from rebel to claimant to the throne of Castille as a protege of the king of France. It is unlikely that the Trastamaran could have been successful without taking advantage of the war-time situation. It was his alliance with En Pere that allowed

Enrique to remain active on the political front until a time when the interest of the French monarchy and Enrique coincided. It is clear, then, that the Castillian-Aragonese war has very direct and significant bearings on diplomacy in the years between 1356 and 1362.

CHAPTER VI

THE FRANCO-TRASTAMARAN ALLIANCE

1361-1366

The years 1361-1366 are among the most important of Pedro's reign. During this period Pedro experienced a great personal loss in the death of his mistress, Maria de Padilla; to this were added significant political setbacks. Such outstanding events as the successful completion of the war with Granada, the completion of an English-Castillian alliance, and most important, the appearance of Enrique of Trastamara as contender for the throne, marked these fateful years.

To review the situation at hand it will be remembered that a major stipulation of the treaty of May, 1361, between Castille and Aragon, required the king of Aragon to withdraw his protection from the Count of Trastamara. Enrique, finding himself deserted by his protector, soon left Aragon for France to resume his career as a mercenary adventurer. On August 13, 1361, he paid homage to King John II of France.¹ Immediately the two men began to lay plans for a program calling for Enrique to lead the Great Companies from France to Castille. At the same time, events were developing in

¹Unpublished documents, French National Archives, Paris, J329.

Castille that strengthened the excuse for Enrique and John II to interfere in the domestic politics of that kingdom.

John II could base French interference in Castillian politics on the Franco-Castillian treaty, signed in July of 1345.² In that treaty Alfonso XI attempted to protect the generous gifts which he had made to his mistress, Leonor de Guzman, and his numerous bastards. In the treaty the king of France had been required to serve as preserver of these generosities. When the treaty was renewed in 1352, after Pedro ascended the throne,³ the Castillian king took the precaution of having that stipulation eliminated from the treaty. The French government nevertheless could contend that it was committed by the 1345 treaty to intervene in Castillian politics on behalf of Alfonso XI's children, who had been deprived of their inheritance by Pedro I. Now in 1361, Pedro I gave the French an additional excuse. In July of that year, Blanche of Bourbon, after a wretched nine-year existence in Castille, died under mysterious circumstances.⁴ Ayala attributes the death of Blanche to Pedro's desire to rid himself of his unwanted wife.⁵ This

²Ibid., J602, N42.

³Ibid., J603, N51.

⁴Ayala, p. 328.

⁵Ibid.

account of Blanche's death has been copied by most other chroniclers who have dealt with the subject. More recent historians, such as Merimee, Garcia, Delachenal and Russell, are much more sceptical about the direct involvement of Pedro in Blanche's death.⁶ Though all the above-mentioned historians would agree that he was capable of committing such an atrocity, they also agree that the motive was lacking. She had long ago been forgotten as a serious influence in Castille; even the papacy had given up its attempt to reunite Pedro and his bride. All of Castille for years had learned to look upon Maria de Padilla as the real queen of the kingdom. We may safely conjecture, then, that Pedro was not directly instrumental in Blanche's death and she expired from natural causes. Her long and wretched imprisonment may well have been a contributing factor in her death. She may also have been a victim of the Black Death, which made a reappearance in the Iberian Peninsula in the early 1360's.

However, many believed that Pedro was involved in the death of his wife. Ayala, in all probability, was simply recounting a story which was in common usage when he wrote his chronicle a dozen years after Pedro's death. Certainly the French court would have been susceptible to such rumors, since it was already aware of the gross insults Blanche had received from the day of her wedding. The

⁶Merimee, p. 325; Russell, English Intervention, pp. 1-2; Delachenal, p. 252; and Garcia, p. 237.

important thing was that now the French had two excuses for the intervention in Castillian politics: first, the Franco-Castillian alliance of 1345 in which the French were to be the protectors of Alfonso XI's illegitimate children; and second, revenge for the death of Blanche of Bourbon. As these plans for French intervention in Castille matured, Pedro turned to the political front as the war with Granada began.

The usurper, Abou-Said, had not exercised any acts of hostility against the Castillians with the exception of negotiating with the court of Aragon. In all probability the Aragonese negotiations were motivated by fear rather than the wish to do any harm to the Castillian kingdom. As soon as Abou-Said learned of the new peace between Aragon and Castille in May, 1361, he wrote to Pedro, protesting his peaceful intentions and offering to continue paying tribute to the Castillian king as his predecessor had done.⁷ But as we have seen, Pedro was already determined upon the destruction of the usurper. Soon an agreement was worked out between the deposed Mohammed and Pedro for a redistribution of Granadan territory at the end of the war. Castille would benefit by the acquisition of additional Moorish land.⁸

In the early stages of the war the Castillian army

⁷ Ayala, pp. 324, 331.

⁸ Ibid., p. 332.

attained several initial successes. While these victories were being won an interesting exchange of correspondence occurred between the courts of Castille and Aragon. The recently concluded treaty between Aragon and Castille had required Aragon to assist Pedro in his war against the Moors. En Pere was reluctant to aid his bitter rival, so he procrastinated while there was the slightest chance that the Granadans might be successful. En Pere wrote Pedro on September 8,⁹ and again on October 25,¹⁰ offering excuses to the Castillian king. First, he pleaded illness, which prevented him from taking part in these matters; and second, he excused himself because of the threat which the Great Companies were at that time offering along the borders of Aragon. Apparently the Castillian king accepted these excuses, for in a letter of his own from Seville dated September 24, 1361, Pedro offered condolences to the Aragonese king for having to face such a menace, and apologized that he was unable to aid him in these problems because of the war with Granada.¹¹

Early in 1362, when it appeared inevitable that the Granadan usurper was about to be destroyed, En Pere quickly dispatched a detachment of Aragonese troops to fulfill his obligation to Pedro I. He apparently had no scruples about

⁹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1391, p. 74.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., Reg. 1394, p. 75.

deserting an ally whom he had used so successfully only months earlier.

Though we must certainly question the sincerity of the relationship between the kings of Aragon and Castille and the desires of both men for peace, there can be no question that the chief minister of the Aragonese state, Bernal de Cabrera, most certainly wanted peace. An event occurring in 1361 gave the Aragonese chief of state an opportunity to strengthen the bonds of peace between his own kingdom and Castille. Shortly after the death of the unfortunate Blanche of Bourbon in July of 1361, Maria de Padilla also died. Cabrera attempted to exploit this opportunity by proposing a marriage alliance between the Castillian king and Juanna, the daughter of En Pere.¹² The proposal, however, was quickly rejected by the Castillian king. It might have been because Pedro was not yet prepared to consider another marriage, still grieving the loss of his beautiful mistress, or, even more probably, because he intended in the near future to renew the war with Aragon and wished no binding commitments to En Pere.

Meanwhile, in early 1362, the Moors gained an unexpected victory over the Castillian forces. A Castillian army of several thousand men, under the command of Diego de

¹²Ibid., p. 87, dated December 19, 1361.

Padilla, was surprised and defeated near the town of Guadix.¹³ This unexpected victory, however, apparently frightened Abou-Said rather than renewing his hopes. As it appeared to him, Pedro, irritated by this reverse, would now only double his efforts to seek revenge.¹⁴ In addition to this, the usurper was receiving word daily that additional warriors from western Europe, encouraged by the papacy, were joining the war against Granada in a crusade against him. The Count of Armagnac was sending soldiers to Castille, honoring his agreement of the previous year with the Castillian king. By early 1362 the king of Aragon had to sacrifice his former ally by aiding Pedro of Castille in the final destruction of Abou-Said. Under these circumstances, the usurper determined to treat Diego de Padilla more as an honored guest than as a prisoner, hoping that he would intercede in his behalf with Pedro. The advice which Diego de Padilla gave to the usurper was to throw himself upon the king's mercy and hope for the best. Abou-Said accepted this advice and sometime in 1362, possibly in March, he went to Seville, where Pedro was then residing and threw himself upon the king's clemency. After listening to Abou-Said's explanation for his usurpation, Pedro promised to hand down a decision in a few days. In the meantime, Abou-Said and a number of

¹³Ayala, pp. 337ff.

¹⁴Merimee, p. 317.

his emirs were invited to a ceremonial meal where they were suddenly seized by Martin Lopez de Cordoba and imprisoned. Their execution followed several days later. According to Ayala, Abou-Said perished by Pedro's own hand.¹⁵

Two factors had sealed the death of the usurper. Under no conditions could Pedro pardon him for the treaty Abou-Said had forced Pedro to accept with Aragon in May. This treaty, which we have already described, was most advantageous to Aragon and it came at a time when Pedro was leading a successful invasion of the Aragonese kingdom. A second factor was a shrewd political calculation by Pedro that the deposed Mohammed, re-established on the throne of Granada, would be more indebted to the Castillian king than ever. Owing his crown to Pedro, he would be nothing more than a docile servant of the Castillian's will. As future events were to prove, this political calculation of Pedro was not unrewarded.¹⁶ During the final years of the Castillian's reign, it was the Granadan forces which stood by him when the Castillian nobility deserted for the Trastamaran.

The war against Granada had attracted most of the great nobles of Castille to Andalucia. With the death of Abou-Said, the re-establishment of peace, and the restoration

¹⁵Ayala, pp. 339ff.

¹⁶Merimee, p. 323.

of Mohammed, the time had come for Pedro to disband his army. Before he did so, however, he took the opportunity to call a general Cortes in the spring of 1362. Before the Cortes assembled in Seville, Pedro took the opportunity to declare solemnly that he and Blanche of Bourbon had never legally been married and that even before she had arrived in Castille he had already contracted a secret marriage with Maria de Padilla. Because of internal problems within his kingdom it had been necessary for him to maintain this marriage as a secret. To support his claim, he named several witnesses: they were Juan de Hinestrosa, Diego de Padilla, Alonso de Mayorga, and Juan Perez de Orduna. Juan de Hinestrosa was dead; the others, however, still lived and they testified before the Cortes that what the king said was true. The natural result of this act was to legalize Pedro's marriage to Maria de Padilla. Even more important, it resulted in the legitimization of the children of that marriage and the acceptance of Pedro's two-year-old son, Alfonso, as the heir to the throne of Castille.¹⁷ Pedro further took advantage of the Cortes to inform those attending that it would soon be necessary for him to again call upon his vassals to defend the frontiers of Castille. The truce then in existence between France and England had left numerous

¹⁷Ayala, p. 349.

mercenaries unemployed. For months they had busied themselves ravaging the French kingdom and were now beginning to direct their attention to the Iberian Peninsula. Already in the fall of 1361, they had ravaged the frontier of Aragon.¹⁸ Pedro impressed upon the Cortes that Castille would be the next target for these mercenaries, and thus, to protect Castille it would be necessary to deploy considerable forces along the Aragonese-Navarran frontier to protect it from such a possible invasion. It is possible that few of Pedro's nobles suspected the true reason for the concentration of an army in the northeast of Castille. The intent of Pedro, of course, was to take the Aragonese kingdom by surprise and resume the war which he had been forced to terminate because of the Granadan threat to his southern border in May of 1361. These matter accomplished, Pedro left Seville at the head of a considerable following to move to the northeast of his kingdom.

Soon after he entered into negotiations with Charles, king of Navarre, for an offensive and defensive alliance. The Navarran negotiations began in May. The Navarran king showed himself willing to enter into negotiations with Pedro of Castille. His relationship with France at that time was very bad. Of all the Iberian kingdoms, his was the most

¹⁸ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1394, p. 75.

susceptible to invasion by the Companies. It is also possible that the English influences, very important at the Navarran court in 1362, urged Charles to enter into these Castillian negotiations.¹⁹ At any rate, the Navarran king entered Castillian territory, where he began negotiations with Pedro in the border fortress of Soria. Several days later, Charles ratified the treaty which had been prepared by the Castillian and Navarran representatives. The two kings made an alliance of friendship towards each other, promising to aid each other in all their wars and to deliver mutually all immigrant exiles.²⁰ The above-mentioned treaty was ratified by Charles of Navarre on May 22 at Soria and by Pedro at Caracosa on the following June 2.²¹ On the surface, the treaty appeared to possess many advantages for the Navarran kingdom. A poor and small state surrounded by many enemies had now acquired the protection of their powerful neighbor to the south.

It did not take long for Charles to realize, however, that the alliance he had just concluded was bought at a high price. Pedro soon informed him that he was prepared to renew

¹⁹Russell, English Intervention, p. 26, note 1.

²⁰Don Jose Yanguas y Miranda, Diccionario de Antiquedades de Navarra (Madrid: 1840-1843), Vol. III, p. 99.

²¹Burtails, Archives de la Chambre de Comptes de Navarre, p. 86.

the war with Aragon; he indicated that only the threat of the Moors had earlier prevented him from annihilating the Aragonese kingdom. Now the time was right to renew the war and by the terms of the treaty just concluded, Pedro would expect Navarran troops to fight alongside his own in the campaign which was to begin in a matter of days.²²

Charles the Bad had fallen into the trap prepared for him by Pedro. As reluctant as he was to enter into the war with Aragon, he had no choice. After a brief delay he officially declared war on the Aragonese kingdom towards the middle of June and sent his troops to the aid of the Castellians.²³ The excuse given by the Navarran king was that En Pere had not honored his alliance and come to his aid when he was a prisoner of the king of France.²⁴ Pedro did not trouble himself with such formalities. Almost immediately after his meeting with the king of Navarre, he invaded western Aragon on June 11, utilizing speed and surprise to the greatest advantage.

En Pere had been taken totally by surprise. He was, at that time, on the other side of his kingdom at Peprina, with all his available forces to repulse any possible invasion by the free Companies and also to be in a strategic

²²Ayala, pp. 353ff.

²³Don Jose Yanguas, Antiquedades de Navarra, Vol. III, p. 100.

²⁴Zurita, Vol. II, p. 312.

position to conduct negotiations with Enrique of Trastamara to which we shall refer later in this chapter. The Castilian king might well have believed that Aragon was finally his. Not only did he have the military support of Navarre and Portugal, but at that moment he was concluding a significant alliance with the English.

Shortly after Pedro's invasion of Aragon had begun, his emissaries, who had been working on establishing a treaty with the English since 1359, were reaching a final agreement.²⁵ On the 22nd of June, 1362, in London, there was a public ceremony to mark the formal conclusion of a political and military alliance between the kings of England and Castille.²⁶ The main terms of the treaty are as follows: The English government would make troops available to the Castilian king upon request, providing that (1) Pedro was prepared to pay the cost of such military aid and (2) England was not involved in a war of its own. The alliance also contained a direct warning to France not to press her interference in Castille too far. An additional clause implied that in spite of the existing peace between France and England, Edward III would allow his subjects to make war in Castille against any French troops sent there to support the enemy of Pedro. Important also was the stipulation that the

²⁵Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 671-674.

²⁶Ibid.

English government would forbid any subjects of the English crown to take part in hostile action against Pedro. This was particularly significant because of the great number of Gascon and English mercenaries then being recruited in France by the Trastamaran. The provisions of the alliance of 1362 were drawn up with special reference to the political situation of Castille at that time. The increasing knowledge that Enrique of Trastamara had designs upon the throne of Castille and that the French were prepared to aid him in this endeavor must have profoundly influenced Pedro to enter into the treaty.

The explanation for the English readiness in 1362 to make such a commitment to Pedro I can easily be found. "It was the Castillian fleet which kept both French and English eyes so firmly turned towards the Peninsula during the greater part of the fourteenth century."²⁷ It was the same motivation which had drawn Edward III into negotiations with Alfonso XI in the 1340's. These efforts on Edward's part had failed because of his economic embarrassment and the untimely death of Joanna. Pedro's position in 1362, however, was considerably different from that of Alfonso XI in the 1340's. Faced with the drawn-out Aragonese war, Enrique's claim to the Castillian throne, and French hostility, Pedro must have clearly seen the military advantages the English alliance

²⁷Russell, English Intervention, p. 5.

had to offer. This agreement must have been eminently satisfactory to the Castillian king. It appeared to offer him all the assurance he needed against French intervention in his kingdom. Pedro must further have recognized the economic advantages the English alliance would offer.²⁸

The treaty was ratified by Edward III on February 1, 1363.²⁹ Pedro's ratification was considerably delayed. The cause for this is impossible to determine. It may possibly have been related to new overtures made to him by the king of France, or simply due to strong opposition within Castille against the English alliance.³⁰ At any rate, it was not until September 29, 1364, that Pedro finally committed himself to an act of open defiance to France.³¹ Despite the Castillian king's delay in ratifying the treaty, it must nevertheless have been reassuring to him to know that the English were prepared to commit themselves to the Castillian kingdom during the early months of the Aragonese invasion in 1362.

In a matter of days, a large number of Aragonese towns and castles surrendered to Pedro without offering opposition. Calatayud was one of the exceptions which offered

²⁸Ibid., pp. 20-21.

²⁹Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 66-67, 69.

³⁰Russell, English Intervention, p. 4.

³¹Public Record Office, London, Diplomatic Documents, N207.

serious resistance to the invaders. It immediately became evident that Pedro of Castille was pushing the war with more vigor and ferocity than ever.³² The situation of the Aragonese king was critical. He had not only been taken completely by surprise but the Castillian king now was throwing against him a coalition of all the Iberian princes. Not only would En Pere have to face the Castillian army, but Pedro's allies, the kings of Portugal, Granada, and Navarre, as well.³³ The king of Navarre, despite his reluctance to join the campaign, had rendered particularly effective assistance; his attacks on Sos and Salvatierre were most beneficial to Pedro.³⁴ This renewal of the war by the Castillian king earned for him the denunciation of Pope Innocent VI, and was proclaimed by En Pere to be an act of unparalleled treachery. These verbal attacks, however, did not in any manner slow the Castillian offensive.

Faced with this potential disaster, the Aragonese king at once entered into negotiations with the Great Companies to come to his assistance. Negotiations had already begun in the summer of 1361 between the Count of Trastamara and John II of France to have Enrique lead the Companies to

³²Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 311-312.

³³Garcia, Vol. I, pp. 263-264.

³⁴Don Juan Yunguas, Antiquedades de Navarra, Vol. III, p. 100.

Castille.³⁵ It is possible that En Pere was in Peprina not only to safeguard the borders of Aragon from these mercenaries, but also to be able to take part in these negotiations.³⁶ Directly involved or not, the Aragonese king must have been aware of these negotiations between the French king and Enrique of Trastamara. At any rate, after he received word of the Castillian invasion in June, he sent an appeal to Enrique to once more come to his aid.³⁷ In the meantime, John II and the Count had completed their plans on the 13th of August, 1362.³⁸ The terms of the agreement were that Enrique would, within a period of six weeks, lead the Companies out of France. For this service, he was to receive 53,000 gold florins for himself and his Castillian followers. An additional 100,000 florins were to be paid to the mercenaries for their wages before they left France. At the same time, Enrique and his brother Sancho became vassals of the French king, and in doing so received fiefs from the French king. It was also agreed that only under two conditions would the Castillian venture be cancelled and the Companies return to France: first, if the war was resumed between France and England; and second, if hostilities were to break

³⁵Ayala, pp. 326-327.

³⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 26.

³⁷Ayala, pp. 357, 361.

³⁸French National Archives, Paris, J603, N58, dated August 13, 1362.

out between the counts of Foix and Armagnac.³⁹ This treaty was ratified by both parties in Paris shortly thereafter.

Enrique began slowly leading the mercenaries in the direction of the Pyrenees. By the middle of November they were at Pamiers where they received the payment of 100,000 florins promised them by the French king.⁴⁰ Once the mercenaries received their pay, however, they declined to move into the Iberian Peninsula to take part in a winter campaign. Conveniently, a war broke out between the counts of Foix and Armagnac, which gave them a pretext for backing out of the agreement they had reached the preceding August. Thus, the army which had been intended to destroy Pedro of Castille disbanded without crossing the frontier. Only Enrique, with a small following of Castillians, entered Aragon in March of 1363.⁴¹

In the meantime, the Castillian-Aragonese war was continuing with disastrous results for Aragon. On August 29, after a valiant defense, the city of Calatayud surrendered to the Castillians.⁴² Fortunately for Aragon, shortly after the capitulation of Calatayud, the Castillian army returned to winter quarters to await the spring campaign of

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 261.

⁴¹Zurita, Vol. II, p. 316.

⁴²Ayala, pp. 356-362.

1363. Pedro returned to Seville to spend the winter. There he experienced a great personal tragedy when his son and heir, Alfonso, was carried off by the black plague.⁴³ With the coming of the spring campaign of 1363, En Pere faced disaster. He hoped for aid from Enrique and the Companies had failed to materialize the previous winter. The only assistance that he had received was from the Trastamaran and a handful of his Castillian supporters. Enrique had returned to Aragon with some apprehension. It had been less than a year since the Aragonese king had sacrificed him to the cause of peace with Castille.⁴⁴ He was aware of the fact that a considerable number of En Pere's advisors, notably Bernal de Cabrera, opposed him, and in many respects he was entering a hostile environment.⁴⁵ Despite this, he counted upon the great influence he enjoyed with the Aragonese king, and when the two men met late in March, 1363, at Monzon, they quickly came to an agreement.

By making such an agreement Enrique, for the first time, publically affirmed his intention of overthrowing Pedro. On March 31, Enrique and the Aragonese king signed a treaty which provided for the following conditions.⁴⁶

⁴³Ibid., p. 363.

⁴⁴Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 311-315.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 325.

⁴⁶Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Legajo de Autografos, as published by Merimee, pp. 545-546.

En Pere promised to aid Enrique in his conquest of Castille on the condition that the usurper would then turn over to En Pere one-sixth of the kingdom of Castille, including the kingdom of Murcia. This pact remained, however, a well kept secret. Both Enrique and En Pere wished to conceal it from public knowledge: Enrique because he did not want to diminish his image in Castille by revealing he was prepared to cede to Aragon a great part of his kingdom; En Pere because he did not yet wish to make a complete break with his brother Fernando, whom he had also promised to support in his conquest of Castille.⁴⁷ The treaty was to be reconfirmed on October 10, 1363, by the treaty of Benifar.⁴⁸

Despite the grandiose plans of the treaties of Monzon and Benifar, such a program of conquest never seemed further from being realized. The Castillian king had not only recently completed his alliance with the English, but he had directed the spring campaign of 1363 to Valencia. On the 21st of May, the capital came under siege. The numerical superiority of the Castillians had broken down all the resistance the Aragonese could offer.⁴⁹ Pedro, in an attempt to break the spirit of the Aragonese, was waging the war with an exceptional degree of terrorism.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁷Merimee, p. 346.

⁴⁸Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1543, folio 66.

⁴⁹Zurita, Vol. II, p. 317.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 318.

Castillian king had given orders that no Aragonese prisoners were to be taken alive.⁵¹ Though En Pere succeeded in relieving Valencia sometime in June, Castillian headquarters remained in the ancient fortress of Murvedre within sight of Valencia and dominating the highway which connected Valencia with the north of Aragon.

Very soon talks initiated by the Aragonese minister, Bernal de Cabrera, began working in the direction of still another truce. By summer the Castillian king was prepared once more to negotiate with Aragon because the terms now being offered by Cabrera promised the opportunity to expand the eastern frontier of Castille at the expense of Aragon. By July, a new accord had been reached to end the war.⁵² The new agreement called for Pedro I to marry the princess Joanna of Aragon, while his youngest daughter by Maria de Padilla, princess Isabelle, was to be betrothed to Alfonso, the youngest son of En Pere. In general, this total agreement was as disadvantageous to the Aragonese as the one of May, 1361, had been to the Castillian king. Aragon was forced to accept the permanent loss of western Aragon, as Pedro of Castille would be allowed to maintain all the extensive advantages which his army had won in the last two campaigns. This included such significant centers as Tarazona, Alicante, Orihuela and numerous other important towns.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 320-321.

In an attempt to lessen the Aragonese humiliation, En Pere's representatives proposed that the towns of Tarazona and Calatayud, already under the control of the Castillians, be considered as part of the dowry of princess Joanna, who was now to marry the Castillian king.⁵³ There is also considerable basis for believing that a secret clause of the agreement reached between Cabrera and Pedro called for the removal by assassination of both Enrique and Fernando of Aragon, the heirs apparent to the Castillian throne.⁵⁴ This issue is somewhat confusing. Delachenal suggests that in March of 1363 one of the terms of the agreement of Monzon between the Trastamaran and En Pere called for the removal of Fernando on that occasion.⁵⁵ It is nevertheless significant that a few days after the settlement had been agreed upon at Murvedre, the Aragonese heir was murdered at the command of En Pere. This occurred on the 10th of July. It unquestionably strengthened the position of the Count of Trastamara, who now had successfully seen his main rival, after Pedro, removed from the competition for the throne of Castille. Many of the Castillian immigrants had been repelled by the idea of supporting the bastard for the throne of Castille; when now faced with the choice between Pedro and

⁵³Zurita, Vol. II, p. 320, and Ayala, p. 372.

⁵⁴Ayala, pp. 372-373, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 321.

⁵⁵Delachenal, p. 264, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 322.

Enrique, many who would have not done so had Fernando lived chose the latter.

It now only remained for Enrique to destroy the shaky peace which Cabrera had just established. It proved not to be difficult; the humiliating provisions of the new peace treaty with Castille aroused opposition even from the pacifist Catalonian Cortes which had opposed the war with Castille from its origin. Opposition led by the Trastamaran and Francesch de Perellos, urged En Pere not to ratify the new treaty. Soon the loyalty of Bernal de Cabrera began to be questioned openly; the downfall of this powerful figure became essential to the plans of Enrique.⁵⁶

While the Castillian and Aragonese envoys attempted to work out a final draft of the treaty at Tudela, Pedro returned to Seville and Enrique labored to convince En Pere not to ratify the agreement. The kings had agreed to meet at Egea on August 20th to exchange their ratifications. Accompanied by both Cabrera and Perellos, En Pere, despite the opposition to the treaty in Aragon, had nevertheless decided to ratify it. However, finally succumbing to the influence of Perellos, En Pere became convinced that Pedro of Castille had set a trap for him, and without awaiting the arrival of the Castillian king, hastily retreated to

⁵⁶ Zurita, pp. 323, 345.

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the safety of his own kingdom.⁵⁷ This was the last attempt to make peace between Castille and Aragon.

After this En Pere, joined by the Trastamaran, began secret negotiations with Charles of Navarre for a new alliance against Pedro I. The meeting was held on the 25th of August on the Aragonese border in the castle Uncastille. It was not difficult to remove the Navarran from the Castillian alliance. Charles of Navarre, who had been tricked into the military assistance which he was forced to render to Pedro, had apparently come to regret his alliance. He had remained loyal to the treaty only because he feared the Castillian king. Throughout his entire reign, Charles proved to be a hard bargainer. The terms he extracted from En Pere and Enrique were in many respects unrealistic. Fearful of an attack from France, he received the promise of Aragonese military support against France when the campaign of Castille had been brought to a successful conclusion.⁵⁸ In the following March of 1364, Charles began to show his typical oscillation. In order to further entice him, Enrique made generous concessions of an extraordinary nature. Having already promised to cede to En Pere a sixth of Castille, he now promised the Navarran king extensive portions of northern Castille, including all the territories

⁵⁷Sitges, p. 269.

⁵⁸Archives of Chamber of Counts of Navarre, Caja 41, N47.

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which had formed part of Navarre in the days of Sancho the Great.⁵⁹ This policy of lavishness would of course bring great embarrassment to Enrique in the future, but for the present he had little to lose in giving away territory which did not belong to him.

Even after all this, the position of Enrique in Aragon was not yet completely secure. Cabrera, despite the fact that his policy had been rejected by En Pere, was still a power to be reckoned with, and he remained hostile to the plans of the Trastamaran. Charles of Navarre also distrusted the powerful Aragonese minister, and possibly during the discussion at Almudevar, in March of 1364, it was agreed that Cabrera was to be removed from the scene. This was not difficult. Cabrera had accumulated over the years a number of powerful enemies, among whom was the queen of Aragon and numerous members of the Catalonian Cortes. The Catalonians, who had been particularly annoyed by the long and harsh reign of Cabrera, refused to grant En Pere subsidies if he did not punish the hated minister.⁶⁰ The rest was easy. Cabrera fled to Navarre where he was detained by the king and returned to Aragon for trial. The results were a foregone conclusion. He was made a scapegoat for all the disasters which the Castillian war had brought to Aragon. At

⁵⁹Document of General Archives of Valencia, Vol. I, p. 101, as cited by Delachenal, p. 266, note 1.

⁶⁰Zurita, Vol. II, p. 335.

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his trial, he was made responsible for starting the war with Castille. Perellos contended that he had been instructed by Cabrera to insult the king of Castille by his intrusion of the Guadalquiver. He was blamed for the failure of the Companies to follow Enrique into the Peninsula at the end of 1362 and finally for having plotted to betray the king of Aragon to Pedro I at Egea the preceding year. He was sentenced to death on July 22, 1364 and on the 26th of the same month he was beheaded in the marketplace of Zaragoza. Hence, the last obstacle in Aragon for the plans of Enrique of Trastamara was removed.

While all these political intrigues were going on in Aragon, the war with Castille which had been resumed in December of 1363, was going worse for the Aragonese than ever. With impunity, Pedro ravaged the kingdom of Valencia and lay siege to its capital. The early months of 1364 saw Valencia in danger of falling into the hands of the Castillians. On February 24, 1364, En Pere appealed to the Catalanian Cortes for emergency funds to continue the war. Left to his own resources, it appeared that his kingdom would soon be at the mercy of Pedro. None of the support which En Pere had counted upon from the Trastamaran, from Navarre, or from the Count of Foix, had materialized.⁶¹ Thus it was left to En Pere himself to make an attempt to relieve the situation in Valencia. In March, he led an army of some 10,000 men to the

⁶¹ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1209, folio 112^{vo}, dated May 22, 1365.

defense of that city.⁶² En Pere's plan to take Pedro by surprise failed, but surprisingly, instead of offering battle to En Pere, the Castillian king withdrew at the approach of the Aragonese army. On May 28, En Pere entered the city amidst a great celebration. Pedro, however, had only retreated as far as Murvedre, and was in a position to continue threatening Valencia. After these events, Pedro returned for a brief stay in Seville, but was soon back in Aragon again, rejoining his army, as En Pere was making an attempt to retake Murvedre. Once more, Pedro refused to give battle to the Aragonese army.⁶³

In seeking an explanation for this behavior of the Castillian king, we can draw two possible conclusions. First, he had, to a considerable degree, depleted his forces in a process of occupying such an extensive amount of Aragonese territory. Thus in the process he had lost his great numerical superiority in manpower. But still, the size of his army both in July and in December of 1364 must have been equal to that of the Aragonese. We can seek a further explanation in the fact that the Castillian king lacked confidence in the Castillian nobility which made up the core of the army. He was not prepared to commit them to a battle in which their desertion could cost him his throne.⁶⁴

⁶²Ayala, p. 382.

⁶³Ayala, p. 380, and Zurita, Vol. II, p. 326.

⁶⁴Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 332-334.

Despite the partial successes of En Pere in 1364, his situation was still precarious. But in 1365 changes occurred in France which would give the Aragonese king new hope for the future. In 1364 the French king, John the Good, died, and was succeeded by his son, Charles V. Charles was a man of extraordinary ability whose talents far exceeded the mediocrity of his father. He had already served an apprenticeship in leading France during the dreadful days following the defeat of his father at Poitiers and John's subsequent captivity in England. Charles, more clearly than any of his predecessors, understood the significance of the Iberian Peninsula in the hopes of France to gain the ultimate victory over England. The Anglo-Castillian treaty was obviously as ill received in France as it had been in Aragon. Charles clearly understood the significance if the Castillian fleet were to be added to that of the English in the renewal of the Hundred Years' War, which he obviously believed to be imminent. Even if Aragon's support could be counted upon, this would not be sufficient to counterbalance the English gains in Castille. With the desperate situation then existing in Aragon, Charles V could not even be certain that the Aragonese fleet would not side with Castille and England when the war was renewed. This was an obvious possibility if Aragon fell to the Castillian onslaught, which by no means seemed uncertain in early 1365. These concerns dominated Charles' policy in regard to the Iberian Peninsula.

On February 16, 1365, Charles made his first overtures to the Aragonese government, proposing a military alliance.⁶⁵ En Pere was most receptive to such a proposal. His situation, as we have already described, was desperate and a French alliance could only help to serve his ends. These negotiations were conducted in the utmost secrecy, particularly because Charles V, as part of his conditions for his treaty with Aragon, was seeking military assistance against Navarre.⁶⁶

It will be recalled that just months earlier, the Navarrans and Aragonese had signed the treaty of Uncastillo. Charles of Navarre, however, had failed to render any military assistance to Aragon as promised. Thus, En Pere, in his typical fashion, showed no reluctance to sacrifice his ally, particularly one toward whom he possessed a personal animosity.⁶⁷

It was necessary that these negotiations be conducted in the utmost secrecy. En Pere did not want Charles of Navarre to learn of his intent to sacrifice his allies for the sake of insuring the French alliance. Despite En Pere's enthusiasm for the proposed French alliance, he nevertheless

⁶⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1293, folio 89-89^{vo}.

⁶⁶Ibid., folio 111^{vo}.

⁶⁷Joaquin Miret y Sans, "Negociations de Pierre IV D'Aragon avec la cour de France (1366-67)," Revue Hispanique (1905), Vol. xiii, pp. 19-20.

exercised great caution. He agreed to aid the French in their war against Navarre or England. However, he stipulated that such help would be withheld until his war with Castille had been terminated. This stipulation was accepted by Charles V. The French king, of course, was most eager for the Aragonese alliance because of the military and naval aid it could give him against the English, but even more important because it would allow him to accomplish his more significant goal of establishing a pro-French dynasty in Castille.

This goal coincided perfectly with his desire to rid France of the mercenaries which had ravaged his kingdom since the treaty of Bretigny in 1360 had left them unemployed. Thus, in the case of Charles V, two policies of paramount importance coincided: the attainment of a successful solution to the Iberian problem and ridding his kingdom of the Free Companies. Both of these goals could be accomplished through executing the same program: sending the mercenaries to Castille to overthrow Pedro and to establish the Trastamaran usurper. Charles, for his part, worked diligently to make this hope come about. He began by recruiting the most famous soldier-of-fortune in France to lead the expedition to Castille, Bertrand du Guesclin. The first step in obtaining du Guesclin as leader of the expedition was to have him released from captivity. At that time, the famous military captain was a prisoner of John Chandos.

Du Guesclin was ransomed for the sum of 40,000 florins of gold.⁶⁸ Charles further offered to pay 100,000 florins, which amounted to one-third of the amount promised to the mercenaries in their expedition against Pedro of Castille. In addition, Charles also promised du Guesclin additional subsidies.⁶⁹ On August 22, du Guesclin had agreed to undertake the commission.⁷⁰ It can be clearly seen that the French king was prepared to spare no expense to bring about a realization of his desires to win Castille to the side of France. This French policy we shall soon see stood in stark contrast to that of the English.

Charles V's enthusiasm to rid France of the mercenaries was shared by the Avignon pope, Urban V, who desired to rid France of these highwaymen who threatened Avignon and had on occasion extracted ransoms from the papacy. The pope not only approved of the proposed program to send the mercenaries to Castille, but even helped subsidize it to the amount of one-third of the 300,000 florins subsidy to be paid to the mercenaries.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the pope could not finance a campaign for the purpose of overthrowing a Christian monarch. Thus, the pretext of a crusade against the

⁶⁸French National Archives, Paris, J381, N4, dated August 15, 1365.

⁶⁹Ibid., J381, N5, dated August 22, 1365.

⁷⁰Ibid., J381, N4.

⁷¹Vatican Archives, Reg. 247, folio 55, dated March 1, 1365.

Moorish kingdom of Granada was established. Delachenal suggests that the pope was simply an innocent dupe in this program, seriously believing that the crusade was the primary goal of the mercenaries in the Iberian Peninsula.⁷²

I prefer to concur with Russell, however, who believes that it would have been impossible for the pope to be so ignorant of internal affairs in Castille. His favorable inclination towards the French monarchy and his past conflicts with Pedro of Castille would not have prevented him from sending the mercenaries against Pedro.⁷³

While these negotiations were going on in France, it was all-important for En Pere to keep his exhausted country fighting until the French aid could become effective. This was no easy task. Only the fact that Pedro of Castille increasingly showed a lack of confidence in the loyalty of his forces spared Aragon. On several occasions, En Pere took the step, uncharacteristic for him, of offering to risk the fate of his kingdom on a decisive battle. On each occasion, Pedro I refused, again obviously because he lacked trust in the Castillian nobility, whose desertions from his cause had increased with every passing year of his reign. This, however, did not prevent the Castillian forces from continuing their devastation of the kingdom of Valencia.

⁷²Delachenal, Vol. II, p. 281.

⁷³Russell, English Intervention, p. 34.

In June of 1365, the Castellians captured the important fortress of Oriola.⁷⁴ This was counter-balanced shortly after when the Aragonese managed to recapture Murvedre from the Castellians. Nevertheless, at the end of the campaigning season of 1365, the balance still rested with the Castellians. In his own chronicle, the Aragonese king admitted at that time that the Castellian army occupied more of Valencia and Aragon than he.⁷⁵

As the year 1365 progressed, once more the Catalonians were showing their discontent with the never-ending war. At the Cortes held in late July or early August, 1365, and presided over by the queen, it was necessary for her to rebuke the Catalonians for their reluctance to grant the necessary subsidies to keep the war going. It was also at this Cortes that the Catalonians received their first communication of the nature of the negotiations then being conducted between the Aragonese king, Charles V, Urban V, and the Companies. They were sworn to secrecy and forced to promise that they would divulge nothing of what they heard.⁷⁶ It was approximately the same time that the

⁷⁴ Ayala, p. 387.

⁷⁵ Chronique Catalane de Pierre IV d'Aragon, Amedee Pages, ed. (Paris: 1941), p. 389.

⁷⁶ Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Aragon y de Valencia y Principado de Cataluna (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1899), Vol. II, p. 360.

negotiations between Aragon, the papacy, and France were coming to a successful culmination.⁷⁷

In September of 1365, the Catalonian Cortes assembled once again in Barcelona. En Pere, still absent from his capital because of the siege of Murviedro, communicated through his queen the full extent of the Franco-Aragonese negotiations.⁷⁸ This news was not received with enthusiasm by the Catalonian Cortes. They not only rejected the king's requests for new sums of money but they vigorously opposed bringing to Aragon a large number of mercenaries whose evil reputation had preceded them. The Aragonese queen pointed out that the mercenaries were coming to Aragon even if the Cortes did not grant the subsidy. If the money was not there waiting for them as En Pere had promised, they would find other means to pay themselves.⁷⁹ This would be the final ruin of the kingdom. The queen pointed out an even more serious danger--that Pedro of Castille, once informed of what was being plotted against him and learning of the financial distresses of his enemies, would deal himself with the mercenaries and take them into his service.⁸⁰ Since the Aragonese kingdom had found itself incapable of dealing with the Castillian army alone, the addition of the mercenaries

⁷⁷Delachenal, Vol. III, pp. 270-271.

⁷⁸Cortes de Aragon....., Vol. III, pp. 369-371.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid... p. 372.

to the Castillian force would mean the end of the independence of Aragon in a matter of weeks and its absorption into the Castillian state. In a letter that the Aragonese king wrote the Cortes from Murviedro, he stressed the absolute necessity of his plan to bring the mercenaries to Aragon as a last chance for Aragon to save itself from the Castillian onslaught.⁸¹ Reluctantly, the coerced Cortes granted the 100,000 florins which En Pere required. This was not to be the last subsidy they would be asked to grant in the near future.

In late October of 1365, Murviedro was retaken by En Pere.⁸² By November 1, he had returned to Barcelona and began making preparation to receive the great Companies. Meanwhile, the Companies were slowly making their way towards Aragon. Coming from various parts of France, they did not all get under way at the same time. Their army was composed of two main groups. The first group, referred to in the Aragonese records as the "Grands Companyes," consisted of a mixture of soldiers of various nationalities who had disrupted Southern France since the Peace of Brittany.⁸³ The second group was referred to as the "French

⁸¹ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1206, folio 159, dated October 15, 1365.

⁸² Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 340-341.

⁸³ Russell, English Intervention, p. 37.

Companies" and was composed of Frenchmen recruited by the French marshall, d'Audrehem. It was at Peprina that the different Companies were to enter into Spain and assemble. The concentration of the mercenaries took place slowly. The first detachments arrived at Peprina on the 24th of November.⁸⁴ The final assembling of the army was not completed until the end of December.

Though En Pere looked with enthusiasm to the arrival of the Companies and viewed them as his source of salvation in the Castillian war, he nevertheless realized the great risk to which he was exposing himself and Aragon in calling such men to his aid. Though realizing a certain amount of damage to his kingdom was inevitable, and to a certain point he was prepared to authorize it,⁸⁵ he nevertheless enacted a number of wise measures intended to prevent the total destruction of his kingdom by the Companies. It was suggested, for example, that the mercenaries not enter Aragon in mass but in small groups of not more than two hundred.⁸⁶ Each group would be commanded by a responsible captain and accompanied by an Aragonese guide who would exercise command over the group he guided.⁸⁷ By admitting the Companies in

⁸⁴ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1076, folio 192.

⁸⁵ Chronicle de Pierre IV d' Aragon, p. 379.

⁸⁶ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1194, folio 206-296^{vo}, dated December 6, 1365.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Reg. 1386, folio 169-170.

smaller groups, they would not only be easier to handle, but it would also be a much easier task to supply them, a matter of the utmost importance. To further facilitate the supplying of the mercenaries, they were to come by different routes, distributing themselves through northern Aragon and not placing too great a burden on any single part of the kingdom.⁸⁸ At the same time, En Pere instructed his commanders of fortresses along the paths that the mercenaries would travel to put their defenses in the best possible condition.⁸⁹ The inhabitants of these districts were ordered to take their women, children and livestock into the closed cities, and to make provisions for protecting their other valuable possessions.⁹⁰ Above all, it was important not to antagonize these men of war. At each city they passed, markets were to be set up under the auspices of the local commander, where the Companies could purchase their necessities at a fair and reasonable price.⁹¹ To make certain that goods were sold at a moderate price, they were to be regulated by royal officials.⁹² It was important that the soldiers of the Companies have no excuse to complain.⁹³

⁸⁸Ibid., Reg. 1194, folio 204^{vo}-205.

⁸⁹Ibid., Reg. 1386, folio 163^{vo}-165^{vo}.

⁹⁰Ibid., Reg. 1212, folio 4-5.

⁹¹Ibid., Reg. 1386, folio 163^{vo}-165.

⁹²Ibid., Reg. 1394, folio 205.

⁹³Ibid.

With these measures, En Pere hoped to protect his kingdom as much as possible from the ravages of the mercenaries. Though they were coming to his aid it was possible for them to deal a more fatal blow to his kingdom than the Castillian had done in the preceding nine years. There was one point upon which En Pere insisted: the march of the Companies across Aragon was to be carried out as rapidly as possible. Many problems could be easily avoided if the mercenaries did not have time to engage in their ordinary pastimes of brigandage and vandalism.⁹⁴ For the same reasons, En Pere demanded that as soon as the concentration of the mercenaries was completed, that without a day's delay the Companies should begin moving towards the Castillian border.⁹⁵ Once they had crossed the frontier, all the damage caused by them would be done to the enemy.

Thanks to the cooperation of the expedition's commander, Bertrand du Guesclin, the damage caused by the Company during their march into Aragon was held to a minimum. The great French captain arrived in Barcelona shortly after Christmas, 1365. Though the Aragonese king had not viewed the coming of the Companies without considerable apprehension, he must have been pleased with their arrival. It

⁹⁴Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 313.

⁹⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1076, folio 183^{vo}, dated November 5, 1365.

appeared to him that he was receiving providential assistance.⁹⁶ Thanks to the Companies, the long and disasterous war with Castille which he had maintained for nine years was going to be brought to a victorious end in his favor.⁹⁷ Not only would the extensive Aragonese territory which had fallen to Pedro I once more be his, but he would enjoy the destruction of this hated enemy and, by the terms of the treaty of Benifar, his kingdom would be greatly enlarged at the expense of Castille. In the future he would boast that through this move he had disinherited his abhorred enemy and deprived him of his crown.⁹⁸

On New Year's Day, 1366, En Pere held a banquet in honor of the mercenary captains in his palace at Barcelona.⁹⁹ The preparations for this magnificent feast had been underway for nearly a month.¹⁰⁰ At the table of honor, there sat Bertrand du Guesclin as well as the other main leaders of the expedition, the Marshal d'Audrehem and Hugh de Calveley, whose role in the scene which was about to unfold became increasingly significant as the years passed. Shortly after

⁹⁶Ibid., Reg. 1213, folio 41^{vo}, Saragossa, dated March 12, 1366.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid., Reg. 1249, folio 80, dated August 8, 1365.

⁹⁹Chronicle de Pierre IV d'Aragon, p. 150.

¹⁰⁰Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1078, folio 7, dated December 2, 1365.

this event, on January 5, du Guesclin left for Saragossa to continue the preparations for the entrance into Castille.

Wishing to further reward du Guesclin, En Pere bestowed on the great captain the towns and estates of Borja and Magallon on January 9. These territories, situated on the extreme border of Aragon, were at this time still in the hands of the Castillians.¹⁰¹ Accepting these gifts, du Guesclin took an oath of homage to the Aragonese king but reserved the right to protect his superior relations to the king of France.¹⁰²

These ceremonies having been completed, the Companies began to move west from Saragossa, possibly on the 9th or 10th of January. On January 21st En Pere left Barcelona for Taragonna, to be better able to take part in the operations which were underway.¹⁰³ Shortly after his arrival in Taragona he received an unpleasant surprise. Du Guesclin met him with the main captains of the expedition and demanded an additional payment of 20,000 florins for unforeseen expenses. En Pere, though already in a desperate financial situation, realized that such a demand could not be refused. It was necessary for him to sell some of the royal

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Reg. 913, folio 56-60, Barcelona, dated January 9, 1366.

¹⁰² Ibid., folio 59^{vo}.

¹⁰³ Chronicle de Pierre IV d'Aragon, p. 380.

domains in order to meet these financial demands. At the same time, the Count of Trastamara was placing excessive demands on En Pere. The Count was then in upper Aragon in Tamarite with his Castillian force, and refused to advance into Castille until he was paid for the months of November, December, and January, and the month of February in advance. This came to an additional 70,000 florins.¹⁰⁴ Being totally unable to raise this amount of money, the Aragonese king authorized Enrique to sell his Aragonese possessions which had been granted to him in the past.¹⁰⁵ En Pere, however, was consoled by du Guesclin and the other captains who promised that they had come to serve him and that they were prepared to advance into Castille with or without the Count of Trastamara.¹⁰⁶ The expedition against Castille could not be delayed much longer as Aragon was suffering greatly because of the presence of the Companies.¹⁰⁷

It was during his stay in Taragona that En Pere learned of one of the most dreadful events of the campaign. It was reported to him that the little city of Tarhastro had been destroyed and 200 of its inhabitants had perished in the process during one of the most serious outrages committed by the mercenaries. By the middle of February, the

¹⁰⁴Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1212, folio 7, Taragona, dated February 4, 1366.

¹⁰⁵Zurita, Vol. II, p. 342.

¹⁰⁶Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1212, folio 7, dated February 4, 1366.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

entire army, having concentrated near Saragossa, was prepared for the invasion of Castille. Finally the assault could begin on either the 5th or 6th of March, to be led by the Englishman, Hugh de Calveley.¹⁰⁸ He would direct his attack against Borja and Magallon, the two border estates recently given to du Guesclin and still occupied by the Castillians. The struggle for Castille was about to begin.

In concluding this chapter, it might be appropriate to comment on the nature of this army about to be flung against Castille. Its size is difficult to determine. Ayala gives a figure of 10,000 to 12,000 men, which in all probability is close to its true size.¹⁰⁹ It is certain that this force was large enough to create the belief in Aragon that Pedro of Castille would not dare to face such an adversary.¹¹⁰ These men, now about to enter Castille to depose Pedro were not necessarily braver or more skillful than the Castillian they would face. They did, however, possess superior equipment, such as plate metal, and superior technique of warfare, which had been learned by the French and English during the Hundred Years' War. For example, they knew the significance of the longbow and the advantages of the knight fighting on foot. These and other

¹⁰⁸Ibid., Reg. 1214, folio 37, Saragosa, dated March 10, 1366.

¹⁰⁹Ayala, p. 394.

¹¹⁰Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1212, folio 46^{vo}, dated March 16, 1366.

advantages gave the mercenaries an almost invincible appearance. It is not hard to understand, then, that Pedro I, suspicious of the loyalty of his nobles, outnumbered by his adversaries, intimidated by the reputation of the Companies, outflanked, as we shall see, by the Navarran maneuver of his enemies, made no serious attempt to fight the Companies in the early months of 1366.

CHAPTER VII

THE OVERTHROW OF PEDRO

1366-1367

By February of 1366, the necessary military and diplomatic preparations for the invasion of Castille had been completed. With the single exception of the military support of the Companies, the most essential element in the plans of Pedro IV of Aragon had been his ability to convince Charles of Navarre to switch sides in the coming conflict. The deceitful Navarran king had weighed the pros and cons of the Aragonese proposal and shifted into their camp in December, 1366, in an alliance that was kept a secret from the Castillian and English courts. The secrecy of this alliance was most essential, as the future would show.

Pedro I of Castille, being a capable and successful military leader, assumed that the spearhead of the Aragonese forces would attack from western Aragon. He thus took the necessary military precautions of reinforcing the numerous fortresses that the Castillians held along the Aragonese frontier. Pedro, however, imprudently trusted the alliance which at that time existed between his kingdom and Navarre. As a result, he foolishly took no military precautions to protect his northeastern frontier. This obviously is what

En Pere had anticipated the Castillian king would do. As a result, it was the Aragonese king who took full credit for the success of his strategy in the early weeks of the Castillian campaign.¹ The attack on Castille was opened shortly after the 5th of March by a substantial force of English and Gascon mercenaries under the command of Hugh de Calveley. Leaving Saragossa, they struck directly westward, taking the Aragonese fortresses of Borja and Magallon, which the Castillians surrendered without a fight. From there, Calveley continued west where, after a bloody encounter, the city of Tarazona fell to the mercenary forces. These events had apparently been completed by the 10th of March; a letter dated that day from the Aragonese king to his son related these successful events.²

Until this time, it appeared that the mercenary forces were following the plan of invasion that the Castillian king had anticipated, that is, acting as the western spearhead into Castille. The next logical objective would have been the powerful fortress of Soria, which Pedro had strongly reinforced and which he intended to utilize in a first serious attempt to thwart the invasion. But from Tarazona, Calveley suddenly turned his forces northward and

¹Miret y Sans, Negociations de Pierre IV de Aragon, 1366-67, pp. 81-82.

²Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1214, folio 37. Saragossa, dated March 10, 1366.

entered into Navarran territory through the Merindad of Tudela, a move which took the Castellians totally by surprise and against which Pedro was defenseless. As Russell points out, the Castellian defenders had been outwitted.³

While Calveley had been making his diversion against Tarazona, the main body of the invading army under du Guesclin and the Count of Trastamara had already set out from Saragossa, heading directly for Tudela. They were there by the 8th of March, as a document which has survived in the Navarran archives testifies.⁴ Though the city refused to open its gates, the Navarran king, Charles the Bad, had kept his word and did not delay the invading army. It continued quickly across Navarran territory to its real objective, the kingdom of Castille. After a quick crossing of Navarran territory and re-entry into Castille, the invading army confronted the fortress of Alfaro. The commander refused to surrender the city and made preparations to resist the invaders. The Companies, however, had no intention of wasting precious time in besieging a well-fortified town. This was contrary to the entire strategy of the campaign which had attempted to utilize the elements of speed and surprise and which up to that time had been successful. Pedro I could

³Russell, English Intervention, p. 46.

⁴Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Reg. 21, no. 91. Tudela, dated March 8, 1366.

have argued that his enemies were not playing the games by the rules of medieval warfare. He fully anticipated the attack would come directly across his eastern frontier, and he had made preparations to resist it there. Now, by not engaging in the customary practice of laying siege to towns which resisted their advance, the invading army was not allowing Pedro time to readjust his strategy or to summon English aid provided for in the Anglo-Castillian alliance of 1362.

The attacking army left Alfaro behind without trying to capture it by force and without losing the time which would be involved in besieging the town. The following day it arrived in Calahorra. It is important to note the story which Ayala tells about the capitulation of Calahorra to the invading army, as it typifies the political conditions which then existed in Castille.⁵ The situation that Ayala describes in Calahorra is that the majority of the citizens were prepared to offer resistance to the invaders, but the noblemen in the town, including Ferdinand Sanchez de Tovar, adelantado mayor of Castille, had no intention of offering resistance to the Count of Trastamara and the Companies. This picture of the nobles, who held high offices from the king and who commanded forces that could adequately defend a well-fortified town such as Calahorra, capitulating to

⁵Ayala, p. 399. and Russell, English Intervention, p. 47.

the enemy while the citizen body in general was prepared to offer resistance in support of their king, was repeated on numerous occasions during the entire campaign of 1366.⁶

The capitulation of Calahorra to Enrique of Trastamara represented the first victory of the bastard in Castilian territory proper. As a result, his companions took the opportunity to encourage him to accept the crown of Castille. During the first days of the Castillian campaign, when the primary objective had been the recapture of Aragonese territory which had fallen to Pedro, En Pere had been the head and main beneficiary of the expedition. It was he who summoned the troops and paid the enormous financial exactions which the army demanded. But now, since he had entered Castillian territory and experienced his first military success with the capitulation of Calahorra, it was fitting that the leadership of the expedition would return to Enrique of Trastamara. It was to establish himself as head of the expedition that the Count of Trastamara was prepared to accept the title of king of Castille. After a brief hesitation, Enrique was declared king, "a typical piece of hypocrisy since his intentions had been committed to paper for the last three years."⁷

The coronation of Enrique was celebrated in Calahorra

⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 47.

⁷Ibid.

on the 16th of March, 1366.⁸ When the ceremony declaring Enrique king of Castille had been completed, the interest of du Guesclin, Calveley and other leaders of the Company in an early announcement of Enrique's accession was quickly made plain. Enrique was now not only the proclaimed king of Castille, but he was also solicited for favors and gifts which he bestowed with great generosity. With regard to these demands, Ayala defends Enrique by stating that he granted them with great generosity, for it was to his advantage to give gifts yet to be gained through conquest. This trait of Enrique characterized his entire reign, showing him to be both generous and wasteful. From the first day of his accession on the 16th of March, 1366, his followers exploited his well-known generosity.⁹

After a delay, in order to complete the events just described, the army began once more to push deeper into Castillian territory. The well-fortified city of Logorno refused to surrender to the invaders and the newly declared king of Castille. Remaining consistent to their plan of speed and surprise, the invading force, as in the case of Alfaro, had no intention of being slowed down by a drawn-out engagement. Consequently, they by-passed Logorno and moved westward, taking without conflict the small castle of

⁸ Ayala, pp. 400-401, and Garcia, Vol. I, p. 328.

⁹ Ayala, p. 401.

Navarrete. They then subdued the city of Briviesca, which offered resistance though it was powerless to withstand the invaders. Thus three weeks after the onset of the invasion of Castille, the army of the bastard was no more than twenty-four miles from Burgos.¹⁰

While the above events were taking place, Pedro remained in Burgos where each report of the progress of the usurper intensified his fears. When he learned the usurper's army was approaching Burgos, Pedro made preparations to depart for Seville. His motive was to secure the possession of his daughters and his treasury before they fell into the hands of the enemy.¹¹ For deserting the citizens of Burgos who, until that time, had remained faithful to him and for not making a vigorous attempt to withstand the invaders, Pedro has been censured by historians, particularly by the chronicler, Ayala.¹² In reality, Pedro had little choice in the matter. He had been totally outmaneuvered by the usurper. The bulk of his forces were strung out in the fortresses along the frontier and it had been impossible to recall these forces in time to make a serious effort to stop the invaders. The betrayal of Charles of Navarre had left the Castillian king at the mercy of his enemies. Furthermore, it seems likely that the reputation of the Companies'

¹⁰Ibid., p. 403.

¹¹Ibid., p. 402.

¹²Ibid., p. 404.

military prowess and their superior weaponry must have by now begun to intimidate Pedro. In addition he must have been suspicious of the nobles who remained with him, a fear intensified by the treachery of the adelantado mayor of Castille, Ferdinand Sanchez de Tovar. All of these factors considered, the behavior of Pedro becomes entirely understandable. His only hope was to reach Seville, secure his resources and daughters, and make every attempt possible to motivate the English to fulfill their treaty obligations to him. Consequently on the 28th of March, Pedro, with a handful of followers, withdrew from Burgos, leaving the city at the mercy of Enrique.¹³

On the day he departed from Burgos, Pedro sent word to all his commanders who still held strongholds in Aragonese territory. They were to join him as soon as possible after destroying by any means possible the fortifications of these places.¹⁴ The citizens of Burgos, having been left to their fate by the departure of the king, who had released them from their oaths of loyalty to him, sent a body of deputies to the usurper asking him to take possession of the city.¹⁵ So on the 29th of March, the bastard entered the city and in the royal monastery of Los Huelgas was finally crowned king of Castille.

¹³Ibid... p. 402.

¹⁴Ibid... p. 405.

¹⁵Ibid... pp. 406-407.

Most of Castille yet remained to be conquered by the usurper, but he continued to display the same generosity which he had shown at Calahorra, lavishing his foreign supporters with land and titles. Du Guesclin, himself, was granted Enrique's county of Trastamara with the title of duke; Calveley received the town of Carrion which was made into a county. These were but two of the numerous examples of Enrique's generosity.¹⁶ The ranks of the ancient Castillian nobility were swollen suddenly by these numerous newcomers, primarily Frenchmen. But to appease the pride of these magnates, Enrique also bestowed prodigious gifts upon his Castillian supporters, to the point of almost exhausting the royal patrimony. Thus, for the future, these vast donations of land were to weaken seriously the central government of Castille. For the time being, however, it was a prudent move since most of these lands granted by Enrique were yet to be conquered. This situation assured him of the necessary support to complete the conquest of Castille.

These early acts of the new king made it abundantly clear that if he succeeded in consolidating his position in Castille, the pendulum of power, which for the past several reigns had been swinging in the direction of absolutism, would now return in the direction of feudalism. The nobility

¹⁶Ibid., p. 401.

were most receptive to the new king,¹⁷ who in his generosity and apparent willingness to surrender the royal resources, was looked upon as the source of their political resurrection.

There can be no question that such generosity bound Enrique's followers more closely to him at his time of need. Nevertheless, the usurper was violating one of the most essential tenets of medieval kingship: that the real basis for political power rested upon the king's resources. The limited evidence available indicates that the Castillian kings in the fourteenth century were able to derive a substantial source of revenue by taxing the growing mercantile centers of their kingdom.¹⁸ It appears, nevertheless, that most of their resources continued to come from the royal domain, just as had been the case in the rest of Europe throughout the Middle Ages. The history of western Europe during the Middle Ages demonstrates many examples when kings, anxious to gain followers, did so by alienation of their royal domain. This action frequently led to the end of their dynasty or, worse, royal impotence in matters of political influence.

Alfonso XI and Pedro I had, upon every opportunity, increased the royal domain at the expense of the magnates.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 408.

¹⁸Wladimiro Piskorski, Las Cortes de Castilla (1188-1520), Translated by C. Sanchez-Albornoz (Barcelona: 1930), p. 152.

Alfonso further enlarged it by conquests of Moslem territory in the southern Iberian Peninsula. Thus, as the resources of the Castillian kings grew, so increased their influence and the establishment of absolute government in Castille. Enrique, almost overnight, was now about to reverse this process which had been going on for the greater part of the fourteenth century. Even Ayala, always an apologist for the usurper, apparently recognized this.¹⁹

Not only did Enrique alienate large elements of the royal domain to satisfy his loyal Castillian supporters, but worse, he was placing large areas of his kingdom in the hands of foreigners. These men, having taken oaths of loyalty to him and being technically his vassals, had prior loyalties elsewhere. When the occasion called, those priorities would take precedence over those given to the usurper. Enrique could not have deceived himself into believing that any amount of generosity shown to Bertrand du Guesclin would influence that soldier of fortune not to beckon to the call of the king of France, even if it meant waging war against Enrique. Thus, even if Enrique had desired to rule with the same iron hand as his predecessors, which he apparently did not, his task was that much more difficult because he was now forced to labor under the handicap of substantially reduced resources. Consequently, while France and England at

¹⁹Ayala, p. 408.

this time were moving firmly in the direction of political absolutism, based on the increasing resources of the monarchs of those kingdoms, Enrique, through his excessive generosities, was moving that state back in the direction of feudalism. The new policy was a strong contrast to the ruthless suppression they had suffered under Pedro in his attempts to establish political absolutism in Castille. Few of the nobles remained loyal to their former king.

The usurper stayed in Burgos for the remainder of April and possibly during the early days of May. He finally left Burgos, setting out in the direction of Toledo.²⁰ As the bastard marched from Burgos, his following increased daily.²¹ As Enrique approached Toledo, there was a powerful party in the city that favored turning the impregnable fortress over to the usurper. The Master of Santiago, whom Pedro had left in charge of the city, could not resist the movement. After having taken precautions to provide for his own safety, the Master turned the city over to the usurper.²² As in the case with Burgos, Enrique rewarded his followers primarily at the expense of the wealthy Jewish population who had remained for the most part loyal to Pedro. It appears that Enrique remained in Toledo for approximately fifteen days.²³

²⁰Garcia, Vol. I, p. 339, and note 1.

²¹Ayala, p. 410.

²²Ibid., p. 411.

²³Ibid., pp. 411-412.

The behavior of Don Pedro after the 28th of March, when he fled from Burgos, is to some historians very puzzling. Ayala simply accredits his behavior to what he believed was the king's cowardice. However, if we examine Pedro's behavior more closely, we see it is that of a desperate man, a man who found himself outmaneuvered by his adversary. At the same time there were few of his followers he could trust. This left him without the means to offer any effective opposition to the invading army. Thus he simply sought time and the preservation of himself and his family, hoping that the English would eventually honor their military obligations to him.

As was mentioned earlier, Pedro had sent orders to his commanders along the eastern frontier to destroy their fortifications and to gather at Toledo. There he hoped to muster some semblance of an army to resist the victorious armies. Toledo may have offered the best opportunity that Pedro had at that time to resist the invaders. But he simply was not prepared to risk his crown on the durable walls of Toledo. As a result, he remained in that city for only a few days and then moved south to Seville. This act had an important effect on those who had remained with the king, for it further undermined their spirit of resistance. It was at this time that Ayala abandoned Pedro, and we may be certain that he was only one of many. Ayala appears not to have recognized the magnitude of the problem then facing

Pedro. With the benefit of hindsight, Russell states, "The real dilemma of the Castillian king was that he could not now hope to place a force in the field capable of putting up any effective resistance to the companies and any attempt to risk a battle was therefore certain to prove an irretrievable disaster."²⁴

It was in a very desperate state that Pedro arrived at Seville early in April. The capitulation of Toledo to Enrique on the 25th of May was a terrible blow to Don Pedro, who hoped that a long siege of the fortress would give him additional time to formulate a successful plan of resistance. His position was made even more desperate because the population of Seville was becoming badly disposed towards him, largely because of rumors circulating that he was seeking the help of the king of Granada.²⁵ In his distress, Pedro turned to his uncle, the king of Portugal. He sent two of his most loyal servants to ask the king to give asylum to himself and his daughters. He also informed the Portuguese king that he was now prepared to consummate the marriage alliance between his daughter and heir, Beatrice, and Ferdinand, the heir of the throne of Portugal.²⁶ Without waiting for a reply, he sent Beatrice and her large dowry off to Portugal. At the same time, he ordered his treasurer, Martin

²⁴Russell, English Intervention, p. 53.

²⁵Ayala, p. 413.

²⁶Ibid.

Yanez, to make preparations to move the great treasure of Castille. It was to be placed on a galley, and taken to the Portuguese city of Tavira. There, Yanez was to await the arrival of the king.

Events moved quickly. The popular discontent in Seville heightened with news of the fall of Toledo and rumors that Pedro was about to abandon the city. Consequently, Pedro was forced to leave sooner than he had anticipated with his two daughters, Isabel and Constance.

He now planned to reach Portugal by land, going through the valley of the Tage.²⁷ As the Castillian king made his humiliating retreat from Seville, heading for exile in Portugal, he had not yet seen the end of his miseries. It was not long after his departure from Seville, which took place near the end of May, that Don Pedro learned of another act of treachery which cost him dearly. The almirante mayor of Castille, Edegidio Boccanegra, following the example of so many other nobles, made his decision to desert Pedro in favor of the usurper. He was not prepared, however, to go to the new king with empty hands. Knowing that the king was moving the royal treasury by sea, Boccanegra seized the royal treasure ship as it was being brought down the Guadalquivir.²⁸ Pedro's resources were now limited to those personal items he had taken with him.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 414.

He was to receive another serious blow within a matter of days. Before he had left his kingdom of Castille, he received a reply from the Portuguese king that the marriage with his heiress Beatrice was no longer desired, and that Pedro was persona non grata in Portugal.²⁹ The arrival of Beatrice and her dowry in Portugal and the request to grant sanctuary to Pedro had obviously created an embarrassment for the Portuguese king. As an ally and uncle of the Castillian king, there was a political and moral obligation to grant him asylum; at the same time, it was quite obvious that to do so could very well invite an invasion of Portugal by the Companies. Thus, pragmatism dictated the Portuguese decision. The marriage they claimed was no longer desired. Pedro's daughters would be granted sanctuary there, but Pedro, though permitted to cross the Portuguese kingdom in his quest for safety, would not be allowed to remain there. This blow would have destroyed the spirit of a weaker man. But Pedro was not yet prepared to give up the struggle. His remaining hopes now rested on the powerful province of Galicia which remained loyal to him and the hope that the English would honor their treaty commitments to Castille. Consequently, sometime early in June, Pedro crossed the Portuguese frontier after a trip of humiliation and great danger, and set up his headquarters in Monterrey. Here he began to re-assemble the remnants of royal power he

²⁹Ibid.

still possessed and to intensify his negotiations with the English.

Up to this point, the alliance had proved of little value to the Castillian king. Having reached Galicia and feeling secure for the time, Pedro continued his negotiations with the English. He had attempted, in fact, to invoke the English treaty even before the entrance of the Companies into Castille in March of 1366. He had sent one of his most loyal servants, Martin Lopez de Cordoba, Master of the Orders of Alcantara and Calatrava, to England to petition the aid of Edward III. Fortunately, a copy of the instructions carried by Martin Lopez has survived in the work of Rades y Andrada.³⁰ This document is most interesting, since it shows Pedro's endeavor to protect his reputation before the English king. Martin Lopez was instructed to defend the murder of Pedro's brother, Fadrique, and to present his case against Enrique.³¹ Pedro obviously feared that Trastamaran propaganda already circulating in France might have prejudiced his case in Gascony. Martin Lopez was to explain to the English how Enrique had attempted to deprive Pedro of his legal inheritance since the ascension of the latter in 1350. The acts of cruelty Pedro had been accused of were punishments he had been forced to administer to those guilty of great crimes.³²

³⁰Rades y Andrada, Chronique de las Tres Ordenas, p. 29.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

Martin Lopez was also instructed to raise the question of a marriage alliance between the royal houses of England and Castille. This was exercising the precedent which had been set during the negotiations of the 1340's, when Edward III worked for a marriage alliance between his daughter, Joanna, and Pedro, who at that time was the heir of Castille. It also appears that Martin Lopez was entrusted with the responsibility of mentioning the violation of the Anglo-Castillian treaty of 1362 that English contingents had committed in the invasion about to begin. This last request of Martin Lopez had positive results.

From Westminster on the 6th of December, 1365, Edward III issued a strong reprisal to English mercenaries who were making preparations to join the coming invasion of Castille. He threatened these men with harsh punishments and reprisals if they disobeyed this royal decree.³³

No evidence exists, however, of the English government's reply to the other points raised by the Castillian envoy. It appears that Pedro was advised to send envoys to Bordeaux to negotiate directly with the Black Prince, who up until that time had been very lax in his enforcement of the Anglo-Castillian treaty. Russell suggests that the main reason for the Prince's laxity was Trastamaran propaganda which was already influencing the court in Bordeaux.³⁴

³³Rymer, Vol. III (ii), p. 779.

³⁴Russell, English Intervention, p. 39.

Nevertheless, it appears that by the early part of June, shortly after Pedro had fled Seville, it became common knowledge in the Peninsula that the English were prepared to honor their alliance with the Castillian king. Perhaps the most outstanding piece of evidence to support this fact is a letter written by the king of Aragon at Saragossa on the 26th of June, 1366.³⁵ In this letter, En Pere wrote to the municipal magistrates of Valencia, attacking them for the lack of interest they had shown in paying additional subsidies to continue the war in Castille.³⁶ "We do not see that there can be here as great a peace as you say, while Pedro, the former king of Castille, is living."³⁷ En Pere informed them of the imminent danger of an English invasion and that, in many respects, the war in Castille was just beginning.³⁸ En Pere had been kept well informed of activities in Gascony.³⁹

As soon as Pedro had reached Galicia safely in June, he immediately wrote to the Black Prince informing him that he had arrived and that he was giving serious consideration to continuing the war in the northern portion of his kingdom.⁴⁰

³⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1078, folio 82^{vo}-83.

³⁶Miret y Sans, p. 83.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1077, folio 41-41^{vo}.

⁴⁰Ayala, p. 416.

The advice which Pedro received from his followers, however, was contradictory. The military men, namely Fernando de Castro and Juan Martin de Cordoba, attempted to discourage the king from withdrawing to Gascony, suggesting that he select possibly Logorno as his center of resistance and that he rely upon the loyal forces in Galicia to hold the usurper until English assistance arrived. Others in his party suggested that he leave Castille immediately to go to Gascony where he could negotiate directly with the Black Prince. It appears that Pedro himself favored this plan of action and preparations were made for the royal departure.

From Monterrey, where preliminary negotiations with the English took place, Pedro moved to Santiago. On the 27th of June, he bestowed additional lands and powers upon his loyal follower, Fernando de Castro, who appears to have been the only great magnate in Castille who had remained loyal to him. A document preserved by Sitges⁴¹ confirms that Fernando de Castro was granted extensive territories in the northern kingdom, among which was the land of Trastamara. He was also given the office of Alferez del Rey, which made Castro the commander in chief of all the loyalist forces in Castille. After completing this business, Pedro made his final preparations to depart for Gascony. Following a short stay at San Sebastian he departed for Bayonne, where he arrived on the first of August. After being

⁴¹Sitges, p. 133.

received in Bayonne by the governor, Sir Thomas Felton, he made his way to Bordeaux, where he was personally received by the Black Prince. This impressive greeting which Pedro received must have greatly pleased the Castillian king and reassured him of English assistance.⁴²

While Pedro was wandering as a fugitive and while Enrique was making his triumphant march through Castille, very significant diplomatic developments were taking place in Aragon.⁴³

The most serious concern of Pedro IV was the king of Navarre, who was once more oscillating in his diplomatic policy between a Castillian and Aragonese alliance. Charles the Bad was experiencing political pressures from the English government in Gascony to abandon his alliance with Aragon. En Pere feared Charles would acquiesce to the English demands. This intensified his great concern that his kingdom could easily be invaded by English troops coming across Navarran territory. In a letter written on March 25 to his cousin, the marquis of Villena, the Aragonese king

⁴²Jean Froissart, Chroniques, ed. J. A. Buckow (Paris: 1824-26), Vol. VI, pp. 211-213, and Ayala, pp. 430-431.

⁴³Due to the fact that so few of the diplomatic documents of this period have survived, the source material from Aragon is all the more significant to the historian trying to understand the political developments of the years 1366-1369. By following the diplomatic moves of Pedro IV of Aragon, the historian can come to a better understanding of the diplomatic questions that then concerned the Middle Kingdom.

ordered him to inform him of any changes in the plans of the Navarran king which might jeopardize the safety of Aragon.⁴⁴

Pedro IV must also have begun to have questions concerning the sincerity of his ally, the new Castillian king, in holding to the terms of the treaty of Binefar, which had been agreed upon by the two men on October 10, 1363. By the terms of this treaty, Enrique had agreed to hand over to Aragon the area of Murcia and extensive portions of Castille's eastern frontier, an area of land which amounted to approximately one-sixth of the territory of the Castillian kingdom. This was done in return for Aragonese support. It should be noted that Pedro IV had known of the coronation of Enrique since April 6th, but the new Castillian king had not bothered to inform his ally of this momentous event. In a letter of congratulations which Pedro wrote to Enrique on the 7th of April, he took the opportunity to express his concern. After offering his congratulations, Pedro wrote "we marvel very much how you have thus forgotten that you have not written us since you wrote us how you were sworn at Calahorra. And if you knew how much we desired to know of your good deed which you do by the grace of God, you would let us know them."⁴⁵

Nevertheless, En Pere did fulfill the request of the

⁴⁴Miret y Sans, p. 84.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 85.

new Castillian king to send his wife and family to him in Castille. In doing so, the Aragonese king showed the new queen of Castille the most extensive honors that were possible. By the end of April, however, the differences between the two men began to widen. The request of Enrique to allow additional mercenaries to cross Aragonese territory to help in the pacification of Castille was flatly refused by Pedro IV, who replied in a letter dated April 30, 1366 from Calatayud.⁴⁶ In this letter, En Pere emphasized the extensive damage his kingdom had suffered when the first wave of mercenaries had crossed in preparation for the invasion of Castille. He wrote that what little was left in Aragon would be destroyed by the passage of the mercenaries and asked the indulgence of Enrique to accept this humble excuse.⁴⁷

Despite the apprehensions which En Pere must have possessed at this time, he found it difficult to constrain the joy he felt at the destruction of his hated enemy, Pedro I of Castille. As a result, in early May, Pedro IV thought the time had come to announce the news of the defeat of Pedro of Castille and the proclamation of Enrique as king. On May 1, he sent a letter to the pope, then residing at Avignon; on May 6, he wrote to the kings of France and England, to the duke of Burgundy, and to the counts of Aubergne and

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 84-85.

⁴⁷Ibid.

Poix. To Charles V of France he wrote that with the assistance of the French troops sent to his aid and to Enrique of Trastamara, Castille now had a new king. His letter included details of the coronation of Enrique at Burgos on the 29th of March.⁴⁸

A month after En Pere had written his letters of May 6th, the satisfaction and confidence had already disappeared from the Catalanian court.⁴⁹ The main cause for this renewed pessimism was a growth of English activity on behalf of Pedro of Castille. En Pere had obviously been drawn to the false conclusion that the Anglo-Castillian alliance of 1362 was dead; this was a logical inference to draw because of the slowness in the English response to their Castillian ally. However, by middle or late June, it became apparent that the English did intend to aid Pedro.⁵⁰ The Aragonese king now realized that the initial successes of Enrique were not the culmination of the conflict, but simply the first stage in the struggle that would make the Peninsula an international battleground. These discouraging reports motivated En Pere to send his letter to the Valencian Cortes, discussed earlier in this chapter,⁵¹ rebuking them for their reluctance to continue their financial support of the war in Castille.

⁴⁸Registers of the Chancellery of Barcelona, Reg. 1214, folio 78, as cited by Miret y Sans.

⁴⁹Miret y Sans, p. 86.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 87.

⁵¹Ibid.

These growing complications, along with rumors that Charles of Navarre was about to change sides and unite himself with his Castillian and English allies, caused En Pere to modify his decision concerning giving passage to the new Companies which sought permission to cross Aragon. On July 29 at Barcelona, he signed a letter granting his permission.⁵² This letter makes very interesting reading because it throws considerable light on the personality of the Aragonese king and his meticulous attention to details. He had taken the most elaborate pains to try and prevent a duplication of the disastrous events that had been inflicted upon his kingdom in the early months of 1366. Among the precautions he outlined was that the Companies were to travel in small columns, each escorted by an Aragonese advisor.⁵³ The uneasiness of the Aragonese court increased daily, particularly when word reached Barcelona that the king of Navarre was at Bayonne negotiating with the Prince of Wales and Pedro of Castille. On the 7th of August, he wrote to a number of his leading magnates, informing them of his fears and of his knowledge of the negotiations going on in Bayonne, the purpose of which he believed to be the preparation for an invasion of Aragon.⁵⁴

⁵²Ibid., pp. 88-89.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

About this time serious negotiations were renewed between France and Aragon. The purpose was to determine the proper measures to take as a result of the hostile English attitude toward the new Trastamaran dynasty in Castille. The primary concern of En Pere was to bring about the destruction of Navarre as soon as possible. To this end, he directed his negotiations to both Enrique of Castille and Charles of France.⁵⁵ He proposed a triple alliance of France, Aragon and Castille, a union so powerful it would have nothing to fear from the alliance then being formed in Gascony.⁵⁶ The real motive of the war that En Pere projected against Navarre was less a desire to conquer and annex new territories for Aragon than to destroy Charles of Navarre before he could be instrumental in bringing about the return of Pedro of Castille.⁵⁷ For the return of Pedro with the Black Prince and a large English army would make Pedro an even more formidable opponent and Aragon would suffer accordingly. The most difficult problem in creating such an alliance was the unwillingness of the French to enter openly into an alliance against the English. Though Charles V was greatly interested in Iberian affairs, he was at that time at peace

⁵⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1215, folio 125, Barcelona, dated August 16, 1366.

⁵⁶Ibid., Reg. 1213, folio 125, Barcelona, dated August 16, 1366.

⁵⁷Miret y Sans, p. 91.

with the kings of England and Navarre and was not yet prepared to renew the war which until that time brought great disaster to France. Consequently the negotiations which continued through the closing months of 1366 were between the king's brother, the Duke of Anjou, and En Pere.⁵⁸ All this feverish diplomatic activity on the part of the courts of Aragon and France was directly related to the negotiations then being conducted in Bayonne, with the intent of restoring Pedro to the throne of Castille.

We must now return our attention to Bayonne to examine in more detail the nature of those extremely important negotiations. The exceptionally warm reception that Pedro had received upon his arrival had been shrewdly calculated to intensify the alarm of his enemies and encourage his supporters in Castille.⁵⁹ Once the public ceremonies had been completed, the allies got down to the serious business of working out the details for the proposed invasion of Castille.

The Prince had already given his promise to help Pedro and now all that needed to be worked out were the implicit details. It was also hoped that the support of the Navarran king could be obtained in this endeavor. The participation and cooperation of Charles the Bad was most essential. "This prince--'the door-keeper of the Pyrenees'

⁵⁸Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1293, folio 134.

⁵⁹Russell, English Intervention, p. 59.

as the count of Savoy was the 'doorkeeper of the Alps,'-- was master of the only used and practical passage to enter Castille from Guyenne."⁶⁰ Charles had already made his appearance at Bayonne by August, 1366, to take part personally in these negotiations. Of all the parties involved in this struggle, the role of the Navarran king was the most difficult. He was still a formal ally of the Black Prince and of Pedro I. On the other hand, he had a secret agreement with Enrique of Trastamara, who was now entrenched along his southern frontiers, in a position to take immediate military action against Navarre. In addition to this consideration, there was the generous promise of Enrique to cede considerable territory to Navarre upon the completion of his conquest of the Middle Kingdom. By the end of June, negotiations were going on between the courts of Pamplona and Bordeaux.⁶¹ From these conferences, the Navarran king learned that the Prince of Wales intended to use force to restore his ally to the Castillian throne. By the middle of July, it appears that Charles the Bad had decided that his best interests would be served if he cooperated with the English and allowed them to cross his territory in their invasions of Castille. It was with this in mind, that he left for Gascony in the middle of July to enter into direct negotiations.⁶²

⁶⁰Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 368.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 267, note 3.

⁶²Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Reg. 121, folio 90.

The problem of convincing the Navarran king to change his alliance from the ephemeral agreement he had made with the Trastamaran usurper was not difficult. He had a personal dislike for Enrique and the usurper's ally, the king of Aragon. In addition to this, forbidding access of his kingdom to the army that Pedro had gone to look for beyond the mountains was to expose himself to certain danger.⁶³ The Anglo-Gascon Companies were capable of opening the passage by force. It was also possible for them to circumvent the obstacle by moving their forces to the Peninsula by sea. This was a considerably more difficult, but not impossible, task. In both cases, the bad will which his hostile acts could create would bring terrible reprisals on himself and his subjects.⁶⁴ The Navarran king was thus prepared to once more shift sides, but he put a high price on his new alliance.⁶⁵

In addition to obtaining the active support of the king of Navarre, the other leading question was that of economic responsibility for the expedition. By the terms of the treaty of 1362, Pedro was to accept full financial responsibility for the expedition. The parties involved very quickly came to a verbal agreement and then set out

⁶³Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 369.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Public Records Office, Diplomatic Documents, Box VIII, n. 230.

for Libourne to commit these agreements into a formal document. "The various documents to which these allies committed themselves at Libourne on 23 September, 1366, are chiefly remarkable, perhaps, for the exceptional burden they lay upon the Castillian king. They also held an ill-concealed distrust of him which can be detected behind the numerous cautionary clauses inserted at the behest of Carlos II of Navarre."⁶⁶ The king of Navarre hoped that by taking advantage of the difficulty Don Pedro found himself in he could receive land concessions which would return to Navarre the extensive land which in ancient times had belonged to the Navarran kingdom. These towns made up the entire province of Guipuzcoa. Along with Victoria and Alava and a number of cities located on the right bank of the Ebre, they were among the richest in the kingdom. In addition to these territorial cessions, Pedro agreed to pay the Navarran king 200,000 gold florins for transit rights to cross his kingdom and for the actual military participation of Navarran forces in the coming campaign.⁶⁷ Navarre would provide 1,000 mounted men and 1,000 foot soldiers, whose expenses would be paid by Pedro at the rate of 36,000 florins a month. The details were spelled out implicitly with the Black Prince acting as guaranter of the agreement. Pedro furthermore

⁶⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 63.

⁶⁷Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 800-802.

signed an agreement in which he agreed to pay the entire cost of the English participation in the expedition, an amount approximating 550,000 gold florins.⁶⁸ In addition to this, Pedro was also forced to make territorial concessions to the Prince which included large portions of Biscaye. Possibly the most devastating clause of all was the one in which Pedro was forced to relinquish any claims to prisoners taken during the campaign, with the exception of his brothers, Don Tello and Don Sancho. Any other prisoners would not be handed over to the Castillian king but would be held by their captors for ransom. This provision would ultimately defeat the purpose of the entire expedition.

These, then, were the various agreements that were incorporated in the treaty of Libourne in 1366. I must completely concur with Russell, who writes, "they certainly do little credit for the Prince's capacity for realistic diplomacy."⁶⁹ On the surface, all appeared well. Chandos and Felton were busily preparing the army for the invasion of Castille in 1367. It seemed a certainty that Pedro would regain the throne of Castille. But due to the exorbitant financial burden which the Black Prince had placed on Pedro, a financial burden which was impossible for the Castillian king to meet, an inevitable friction between the two princes was created. The territorial concessions forced from Pedro,

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 805-806.

⁶⁹Russell, English Intervention, p. 67.

though not great in extent, had the effect of separating from Castille some of the kingdom's most valuable possessions. And finally, the foolish clause which did not allow Pedro to deal with the hard core of his enemies in Castille would make the entire expedition a dismal failure. For no sooner had these individuals been ransomed than they again raised a rebellion against the king. What a sharp contrast this foolish diplomacy of the Black Prince presents when compared with the calculated and consistent policy pursued by the French king, Charles V, in his attempt to establish Enrique of Trastamara as king of Castille. These foolhardy efforts to extort the greatest number of concessions from Pedro I at Libourne in 1366 were to reap a very bitter harvest for the English in the early 1370's. But for the time being, all appeared well, and the expedition to restore Pedro as king of Castille was about to begin.

CHAPTER VIII

NAJERA

1367

While the feverish diplomatic activities mentioned in the previous chapter were being conducted in Gascony and in the courts of Aragon and France, Enrique of Trastamara found himself confronted with numerous domestic problems. They were serious enough to prevent him from allocating sufficient attention to matters outside of Castille itself, although he was obviously not indifferent to the possible return of his brother supported by the English army.

We last saw Don Enrique when he successfully seized Toledo on the 25th of May, 1366. After remaining in Toledo for two weeks, Enrique began his journey south with the obvious intention of capturing Seville, the capital of Andalusia, and hopefully Pedro in the process. It was while going from Toledo to Seville that the usurper learned of Don Pedro's flight and the seizure of the royal treasury by Admiral Boccanegra.¹ For the moment all the obstacles were removed for the new king. At Cordova he was received with the greatest honors. The enthusiasm of his reception in Seville was so great that it took him the greater part

¹Ayala, p. 412.

of the day to journey from the city gates to the royal palace.² Most of Andalucia quickly submitted to the new king without offering any form of resistance. The old ally of Don Pedro, the king of Granada, fearing an attack from the new king, quickly asked for and obtained a truce.³ Even the king of Portugal, uncle of the deposed king, quickly offered his congratulations and recognition of the usurper.⁴ Enrique remained in Seville for the remainder of the summer of 1366. It was at the end of the summer of 1366, while still in Seville, that he disbanded a large portion of the Companies which, by following him into Castille, had made his conquest possible. The majority of these troops were English and Gascon mercenaries. Since their withdrawal took place in the latter part of August, well before the final agreements at Libourne had been completed, it is difficult to determine the role played by the Aquitaine government in this matter. It is entirely possible that Enrique himself was quite prepared to dispose of these forces. From the military point of view, he would have preferred to maintain as much military strength as possible. By late August he was aware that Pedro had made contact with the Black Prince and knew the possibility of an English invasion of Castille

²Ibid... p. 421.

³Ibid... p. 422.

⁴Ibid.

was great.⁵ Yet the presence of the mercenaries in Castille represented a serious problem to the usurper. A large number of his mercenaries were English and Gascon troops. Consequently, the question of their loyalty to his cause would be doubtful if the English definitely decided to intercede on behalf of Pedro. To maintain an army that numerous was also an economic impossibility. The resources of Castille simply were not extensive enough to cover the cost.⁶ Finally, the foreign mercenaries had committed such abuses at the beginning of the campaign that their continued presence in Castille was making the problems of solidifying his position more difficult than he had anticipated.⁷ Nevertheless, the generosity of the usurper remained consistent and upon disbanding the troops he rewarded them generously. The royal Castillian treasury brought to Enrique by Admiral Boccanegra provided the funds for these rich gifts. Of the approximate 7,000 mercenaries which accompanied Enrique to Castille, he now retained only 1,000 or 1,500 and their two primary leaders, Bertrand du Guesclin and Hugh de Calveley.⁹

The continued presence of Calveley at the usurper's court is particularly interesting. It could indicate that

⁵Ibid.

⁶Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 355.

⁷Garcia, p. 351, note 1.

⁸Ayala, p. 420.

⁹Ibid., pp. 422-423.

the government in Aquitaine had not yet taken any positive measures to withdraw the English from the service of the usurper, an obligation which had been stipulated in the treaty of 1362. On the other hand, it may simply have reflected Calveley's unwillingness to leave a generous master. For reasons unknown, Calveley remained in the service of Enrique at least until the early days of January, 1367.¹⁰

At the same time that the English and Gascon troops left Castille, numerous Frenchmen accompanying the expedition departed as well. It is interesting to note that a major pretense for French interference in the domestic policies of Castille was to revenge the death of Blanche of Bourbon, who they believed had been murdered by Pedro. The French mercenaries, having contributed to the overthrow of Pedro and not being able to lay their hands on the deposed king, had to be satisfied with an obscure accomplice.¹¹ They found the man who, rather than being the murderer of Blanche, was probably nothing more than her jailor. Ayala notes with a degree of sarcasm that this wretched man, handed over to the French and executed without a trial, was poor satisfaction to those involved.¹²

After the departure of the Companies, Enrique left

¹⁰Russell, English Intervention, p. 70, note 1.

¹¹Ayala, p. 423.

¹²Ibid.

Seville sometime in September for the north of the Peninsula, going to Galicia where opposition to the usurper was strongest and most organized.¹³ It appears that the intent of Enrique was to crush all resistance before Pedro could return with an English army. In these endeavors he met with some initial successes.

In the second half of September the king brought the city of Lugo, the strongest town in Galicia, under siege. It was there that Juan Fernando de Castro, the alfarez of Don Pedro, had been forced to take refuge.¹⁴ Due to the fact that Lugo was well provisioned and fortified, Enrique was not able to subdue it either by force or famine. After having lost two months in the siege, he determined that he could not afford any additional time for the endeavor.¹⁵ As a result he was forced to work out a compromise with the defenders of the town. It was agreed that there would be a truce between the belligerents until Easter of the following year, April 15, 1367. If after that period of five months Pedro was not able to return to help the city, it would be given over to Don Enrique.¹⁶

No sooner had Don Enrique departed from Galicia than Fernando de Castro once more took the offensive and was successful in bringing back to the royalist cause most of the

¹³Ibid., p. 424.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 424-425.

towns that had been captured by Enrique's Trastamaran forces during the Galician campaign. Meanwhile, Don Enrique was quite pleased in obtaining the agreement he had negotiated with the royalists at Lugo. He was now free to turn to more pressing items which demanded his immediate attention. Primary among these considerations was attending the Cortes at Burgos, which was to meet in the middle of November. There, the usurper was prepared to make an attempt to solve his most pressing need: financial assistance. The extensive treasury which the treacherous Boccanegra had brought the usurper only several months earlier had already been exhausted by the excessive spending and generosity of Don Enrique. It was now necessary to find new resources to maintain an imminent war, a war which would put into question all the results that had been obtained in the campaign of 1366.

As a result of the use of intimidation and persuasion, the Cortes in November approved a sales tax which, up until that time, had never been used in Castille. Its success, however, was instantaneous. It produced in the remaining months before the return of Don Pedro 29,000,000 maravedis.¹⁷ Ayala reports that the usurper while at Burgos received a letter from the king of Aragon, reminding him of the terms of the treaty of Benifar. The latter now called upon Enrique to keep his promises.¹⁸ The usurper replied that he had not

¹⁷Ibid., p. 426.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 428.

forgotten the services rendered and the agreement which existed between the two kings, but that the time had been badly chosen to undertake the division of his kingdom. He did not wish, at that time, to alienate any of his subjects on the eve of the war with Don Pedro and his English allies. He advised En Pere to have patience.¹⁹

While these events were transpiring in Castille, the English Gascon Companies released by Enrique during the previous August and September were involved in significant activities in France. Since many of these men would return to Castille under English leadership to restore Pedro, their activities upon departing from Castille are of importance to us. In many respects their activities can be considered a part of the campaign of 1367. The Companies departed from Seville in August and September of 1366. In returning to their homeland the French were able to cross Aragon without incident. The Anglo-Gascon contingent, however, represents another matter. In August they began to cross Navarran territory, ascending the Pyrenees to the pass of Roncevalles.²⁰ Despite the elaborate preparations which the Navarrans had made to insure the mercenaries would do the least amount of damage in crossing their territory, the damage they inflicted

¹⁹Ibid., p. 429.

²⁰Archives of the Chamber of Counts of Navarre, Reg. 118, dated 1366.

on the land was extensive.²¹ Finally, the Navarrans were able to convince the mercenaries that a better route was through Aragonese territory. The Navarran king even provided guides for the Companies, showing them the way to the Aragonese passes. During the crossing they attempted to take the town of Jaca by assault. Failing, they devastated the countryside about Jaca and decided once more to cross through the Navarran passes. Again, the unfortunate Navarrans paid the price for being situated at the crossroads of the Pyrenees. The devastation to Navarran territory was extensive. Charles of Navarre, who was already in Bayonne in August, received a number of reports from Pamplona describing the ruin and havoc to his kingdom because of the mercenaries. Therefore, he brought pressure to bear on the Prince to try to obtain a guarantee that the English army, now preparing for the Castillian invasion, would refrain from causing further damage to Navarre.²² Though the Prince complied with the wishes of Charles, he was helpless to prevent similar damage when the actual invasion started.²³

Meanwhile the mercenaries, finally having crossed Navarre, entered the French provinces of Languedoc and Toulouse.²⁴ In August a major engagement was fought between

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., Cajon, 25.71.

²³Ibid., Cajon, 22.2.

²⁴Rymer, Vol. III (ii), p. 808.

the French and the mercenaries, which had disastrous results for the former. In the course of the battle, a large number of Anglo-Gascon mercenaries, fighting for the French, deserted to the side of their comrades. The result was a crushing defeat for the French. Consequently, numerous prisoners fell into the hands of the conquerors.²⁵ Ten years later, Louis of Anjou declared that this battle fought at Billedieu in August of 1366 had cost him nearly 3,000,000 francs. No doubt this was because of the ransom he had to pay for his numerous vassals that had been taken prisoner there.²⁶ In this same document the duke states that the motivating factor in attempting to eliminate the mercenaries in Toulouse was to thwart the plans of the Prince of Wales. The Prince, in making his preparations for the invasion of Castille, wanted to enlist the mercenaries in his army.

In the days immediately following the conflict at Billedieu, the French king, Charles V, sent a letter of protest to Edward III. He contended that the activities of the Anglo-Gascon mercenaries had been a direct violation of the treaty of Brittany and that the Black Prince was derelict in not attempting to prevent these hostilities against French territory. Apparently, Edward recognized the grounds for this grievance and sent a rather stern reprimand to his son.²⁷

²⁵Froissart, Chronicles, VI, pp. 223-226.

²⁶French National Library, 3884, folio 14-14^{vo}.

²⁷Rymer, Vol. III.(ii), p. 808.

Despite this, a great deal of damage had been done, and Charles V was not soon to forget the bitter memory of Billedieu. Nevertheless, the Black Prince was soon able to incorporate a large number of these mercenaries into his own army for the invasion of Castille which was about to begin.

In Aragon the negotiations which had been initiated in August between En Pere and the duke of Anjou continued into the last months of 1366. The reluctance of the French king to enter openly into this alliance was of great concern to En Pere. It was not difficult for a skilled diplomat such as Pedro IV of Aragon to understand that an alliance between himself, Enrique of Trastamara, and the Duke of Anjou would have little value if the king of France did not openly enter into it.²⁸ Not satisfied with the negotiations going on at Toulouse, he wrote to his ambassador and main diplomatic advisor, Francesch de Perellos. In a letter dated September 18, 1366, En Pere informed his ambassador that it was necessary for the Aragonese court to receive greater guarantees and safeguards from the French before Aragon would openly enter into hostilities against the English. He reiterated his desire for Charles V to enter these negotiations personally and specified the exact number of men the French must guarantee in order to make the agreement

²⁸Miret y Sans, p. 93.

valid.²⁹ En Pere wished to receive the immediate aid of French soldiers in order to begin hostilities simultaneously in Gascony and Navarre. It is not difficult to understand the great need he felt for French assistance. His treasury was exhausted and his people had been ruined by long wars.³⁰ En Pere now saw his problems intensified by uprisings which were occurring on the island of Sardinia. His increasing degree of hesitation, then, is understandable.

It appears, however, that Perellos ignored the instructions and continued to negotiate with the Duke of Anjou. These negotiations culminated in an alliance signed on the 29th of September.³¹ The purpose of this treaty was to bring about the total destruction of Navarre, followed by the distribution of Navarran territory between Aragon and France, with the larger portion going to the French kingdom. The military contribution of the French would be very limited--400 horsemen who were to be paid at the expense of the French treasury. The Duke of Anjou had carefully placed in this treaty the provision that he personally would not have to take part in the coming campaign. This provision could not have enhanced the confidence which En Pere had in this new agreement.³² No specific mention was made in the treaty

²⁹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1293.

³⁰Miret y Sans, p. 103.

³¹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1293, folio 140.

³²Ibid.

of the English or the Prince of Wales. It inferred, however, that the main intention of the treaty was to deny Roncevalles to the Black Prince by conquering it before he and his army were prepared to march.

The attack on Navarre never came about because En Pere refused to ratify this document. The main reason for this refusal was that by the final months of 1366, En Pere had serious misgivings about actively engaging in hostilities with the English. The activities of the Anglo-Gascon mercenaries in September had obviously added to his fears. These mercenaries, in their attempt to cross Aragonese territory, had unsuccessfully brought the city of Jaca under siege. Though this attack was thwarted by the garrison, the mercenaries did ravage and devastate the countryside. The Aragonese king most certainly pondered this fearful experience and realized what was in store for his kingdom if the English army did invade Aragon. It was because of his increasing caution and growing inclination toward neutrality that the treaty signed with the Duke of Anjou on September 29th became less appealing. Most of the benefits would be derived on the French side. With a handful of French soldiers, En Pere was to make an attempt to destroy Navarre and confront the English troops face to face. Thus, with a minimum of French involvement and without the direct involvement of the French king, En Pere would have irretrievably committed his kingdom to a war with England. "En Pere was

not the man to fall into a trap of this sort."³³ He declined to ratify the agreement made by Perellos in defiance of his implicit instructions and recalled his envoy to Barcelona.

It became more apparent to En Pere that the French had no interest in Aragon except to employ that nation as a tool in achieving control of Castille for Enrique and thus to allow France to derive the benefits Charles V believed that event would bring. As word began to reach Aragon that the English army had assembled in Gascony and was moving toward Navarran territory, the fear of En Pere intensified greatly and added to his desire to remain neutral. In a letter to the count of Urgell dated January 29, he expressed clearly the position he intended to take--that of neutrality and defense of his borders at any cost, but at no time to attack the English forces in Navarre.³⁴ It appears that even the willingness of King Charles V to enter into open negotiations with Aragon was not enough to persuade En Pere to move from his now determined policy of neutrality. Though the French letter has not survived, a letter written by the Aragonese king on February 6 from Bendrell to the king of France makes it clear that Charles V had now proposed an open alliance between the two monarchs. En Pere excused

³³Russell, English Intervention, p. 72.

³⁴Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1214, folio 143.

himself to the king of France, but stated the time was not opportune for Aragon to enter into an open alliance against the English.³⁵ Thus it appears that Charles had offered En Pere in February what the latter sought so desperately in the late months of 1366. However, the conditions had drastically changed, as had the attitude of the Aragonese king. All the French appeals were now in vain. "En Pere saw well enough now that French policy wished to use Aragon as a tool, whose function was to help France obtain the advantages for which Charles V looked from his alliance with the usurper."³⁶

It is true that the English invasion represented a serious threat to Aragon, but the terms of the treaty of Libourne had made no reference whatsoever to the Aragonese king or his territory. En Pere now felt that if he stood aside and watched the invaders dispose of Enrique, the Prince might be prepared to allow the previous interference of Aragon in Castillian politics to be forgotten. If, on the other hand, he followed the advice of the French, he would unquestionably be involved in a war with the English against a man who had the most illustrious military reputation of the fourteenth century. "En Pere, therefore, ignored the appeals of Louis of Anjou and of the considerable body of pro-French advisors in the Aragonese government and not without some

³⁵Ibid., folio 148.

³⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 73.

trepidation, committed himself to a policy of armed neutrality in the face of English invasion."³⁷

While these events were taking place in Aragon, Enrique of Trastamara was making an eleventh hour attempt to separate Charles of Navarre from the Anglo-Castillian alliance. In this endeavor, Enrique did experience some temporary success. In the middle of October, 1366, Pedro had attempted to send some Castillian troops from Gascony to Castille to strengthen the garrisons at Logorno and other royalist fortresses. When these troops attempted to cross Navarran territory, however, they were turned back at the frontier without explanation.³⁸ News of this event encouraged Enrique to undertake some diplomatic action in that direction. Russell suggests that the possible motivation for the behavior of the Navarran king was that he had learned of the Aragonese-French intentions for the total destruction of Navarre and was thus beginning to have doubts about his alliance with the English.³⁹ The Castillian usurper, however, probably interpreted these actions as a sign that the vacillating Navarran king could once more be won over to his side. He hoped to convince Charles to close the Navarran passes to the English army. As a result, in January of 1367 Enrique

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Coleccion de Documentos Ineditos del Archivo de la Crona de Aragon, Vol. XXXIII, p. 12.

³⁹Russell, English Intervention, p. 75.

and Charles of Navarre were engaged in negotiations at Santa Cruz de Campezo.⁴⁰

By the time that the negotiations had been concluded several days later, the Navarran king had made promises to the usurper which were in stark contradiction to the obligations he had contracted several months earlier at Libourne. He had promised to close the pass of Roncesvalles and to side once more with Enrique.⁴¹ The diplomatic victory on the part of the usurper seemed to terminate any possibility of an English invasion for the present, as another route into Castille during the winter months was almost a total impossibility. As he had done at Libourne, Charles the Bad negotiated a hard bargain with the usurper, using as a bargaining point the patent letters which Pedro had given him at Libourne in September of 1366. He was, as a result, able to obtain almost the same concessions from Enrique in 1367 that he had obtained from Pedro four months earlier.⁴² One of the most incredible features of these entire negotiations was the confidence that Enrique and his allies placed in the word of Charles of Navarre despite the man's total inconsistency and duplicity in past diplomatic dealings. The Navarran king was able to play this game because of the strategic location of his kingdom. The precarious placement of Navarre,

⁴⁰ Ayala, p. 434.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 434-435.

⁴² Ibid., p. 435.

huddled in the Pyrenees between Aragon, France, and Castille, frequently drew that kingdom into war in which it had no interest. Nevertheless, its geography at the same time placed the king of Navarre in a strong bargaining position with the monarchs of western Europe when their political moves required the crossing of the Pyrenees. It was Navarre's possession of the pass of Roncesvalle which made it the gatekeeper of the Pyrenees. The control of this strategic pass often brought outside pressures to bear on the Navarran kingdom. Nevertheless, this strategic location exploited by cunning political manuevering allowed the kings of Navarre to play a role in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries far out of proportion to the size and resources of their kingdom. There never sat on the throne of Navarre a more skillful diplomat than Charles the Bad.

In a letter to the governor of Roussilon, dated from Barcelona on the 25th of January, En Pere wrote that because of the new agreement between the Castillian usurper and the Navarran king, the Prince of Wales had definitely called off his plans for the invasion of Castille.⁴³ But when the news arrived in Aragon several weeks later that the Navarran king had once more gone to Gascony to negotiate with the Prince and Don Pedro, fear of impending destruction again came to En Pere. In a letter written to the French king on February

⁴³Miret y Sans, p. 106.

6. he once more indicated that he was making preparations for an English invasion of his kingdom.⁴⁴

While En Pere and Enrique were attempting to gain the support of the Navarran king, events of importance were going on in Gascony. It is thus necessary to examine in detail the preparations for the English invasion of Castille, the actual invasion itself, and the political, military, and diplomatic activities which surrounded that important undertaking. The recruitment of the army which was to restore Pedro to the throne of Castille had already begun in August. By December the preparations were completed, with the exception of the arrival of reinforcements from England which were coming under the command of the Duke of Lancaster. In the middle of December, the army was being mustered at Dax.⁴⁵ The exact size of this military undertaking is difficult to determine. Russell suggests that the total size of the army could not have exceeded 10,000.⁴⁶ The evidence which Russell uses to support this supposition seems quite acceptable.⁴⁷ The army remained at Dax for approximately two months.⁴⁸ This extensive delay was due to several factors. First of all, the duke of Lancaster, who was bringing 1200 archers

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 108.

⁴⁵Proissart, Chronicles, VII, p. 20.

⁴⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 80.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 80, note 4.

⁴⁸Jean Chandos, Life of the Black Prince, ed. by M. K. Pope (Oxford: 1910), verses 2030-2047.

under his personal command,⁴⁹ did not arrive until late January or early February. The second factor, and possibly the most important, was the recent act of treachery on the part of the king of Navarre, who once more had changed sides in the Iberian conflict.

When the Prince learned of the new alliance between Charles of Navarre and Enrique of Trastamara, he acted swiftly and with force. By this time Hugh de Calveley had finally separated himself from the Castillian usurper and with a large company of Gascon mercenaries took a position along the southern frontier of Navarre. Stationed in this position, Calveley had remained in close contact with the Prince in Gascony. When the Prince received word of Charles' treachery, he instantly sent instructions to Calveley to invade Navarre. Without difficulty, Calveley occupied the Navarran towns of Miranda de Arga and Puente la Reina. He virtually isolated the capital of Pamplona from contact with Castille.⁵⁰

These punitive measures on the part of the Prince were quite sufficient. They sent Charles scurrying once more into Gascony. A new conference was then held at Peyrehorade, just south of Dax. Basically, the results were that the agreements of Libourne which had been committed to

⁴⁹Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 791-792, 797-799.

⁵⁰Chandos, verses 2195-2206.

paper four months earlier were renewed. "If Carlos, as is likely, claimed that he had merely indulged in a subtle maneuver to throw their enemies off guard, his allies at least had to admit that this result had been achieved. The invasion, though widely publicized since the previous June, contrived to achieve tactical surprise when it began, a fortnight after the meeting at Peyrehorade."⁵¹ The long awaited expedition began to make its move toward Castille. On Monday, the 5th of February, the army began to make its way across the Pyrenees.⁵²

In keeping with his most recent agreement with the Black Prince and Pedro, Charles the Bad in no way interfered with the English army as it crossed the Navarran passes. The only obstacle the army faced, and it was sufficient in itself, was the bad weather that characterized that time of year.⁵³ The Navarran king, in fact, even provided the supplies he had promised in the earlier agreements.

By February 23, most of the invading forces had managed the crossing and were camped in the vicinity of Pamplona, where they had received abundant supplies from the Navarran king. News of the invasion traveled quickly. En Pere knew of it by the 20th of February, as is evidenced by

⁵¹Russell, English Intervention, p. 79.

⁵²Froissart, Chronicles, VII, p. 7.

⁵³Chandos, verses 2296ff., and Froissart, Chronicles, VII, p. 7.

two letters he wrote on that day from the Aragonese city of Lerida. One was addressed to his military commander, Nicolau de Proxdia, ordering him to put the Aragonese defenses in the best possible conditions.⁵⁴ The same day he wrote a letter to his eldest son, who was then presiding over the Cortes at Valencia, advising him of the imminent dangers he believed his kingdom was facing from an English invasion.⁵⁵ Extraordinarily, the English invasion of February, 1367, closely resembled that of Enrique of Trastamara a year earlier, in that in both cases the defenders of Castille were taken completely by surprise. In both instances, it was the result of a sudden change in alliance on the part of the Navarran king. Given the nature of Charles the Bad and his difficult situation, his actions are not difficult to understand. What is incredible, however, is that his allies placed confidence in his reliability.

On the 26th of January, Enrique opened the Cortes at Burgos in an attempt to solve the kingdom's pressing economic conditions. These conditions were the result of the war and his excessive spending. It was during the session of the Cortes that Enrique received news that the English army had passed unmolested through the passes of Navarre and that Charles the Bad had once more gone over to their side. He at once dismissed the Cortes and left to take up a

⁵⁴Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1214, folio 150.

⁵⁵Ibid., Reg. 1217, folio 88-90.

strategic military position in the north of Castille.⁵⁶ The position of the usurper was further complicated by reports of rebellions taking place in various parts of his kingdom.⁵⁷ According to Ayala, these facts did not disturb him and he continued to make preparations for the coming conflict.⁵⁸

Moving westward from Burgos, Enrique set up his headquarters at Santo Domingo de la Calada, where he began mustering his army. He also sent urgent messages to du Guesclin and his band of French mercenaries who were then retiring through Aragon, requesting them to return at once to his assistance. Du Guesclin and his followers had been present at the negotiations in January between Enrique and Charles of Navarre.⁵⁹ Apparently, it was at the completion of those negotiations that Enrique thought he was secure enough to release du Guesclin and his mercenaries to return to France. Taking leave of the usurper, du Guesclin crossed into Aragonese territory where he began to push En Pere vigorously to fulfill financial and territorial promises made to him at the onset of the Castillian campaign in 1366. This was a point of conflict between the French captain and the Aragonese king. In addition there was the question of

⁵⁶Ayala, p. 451.

⁵⁷ibid.

⁵⁸ibid.

⁵⁹Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Reg. 118.

allowing the French mercenaries to cross Aragonese soil once again, a request which En Pere flatly refused. Despite this, however, it appears that En Pere was giving serious consideration to hiring du Guesclin and his French mercenaries to help defend Aragon against what he believed was an imminent English attack on his country.⁶⁰

These negotiations continued into late February. En Pere, wishing to keep on good terms with the French captain, made him numerous gifts. One was made in late February when En Pere bestowed on du Guesclin a gift of 5,000 gold florins.⁶¹ In addition to du Guesclin, En Pere also was generous to the French marshal, Arnal d'audrehem, who was granted an annual pension from the Aragonese crown.⁶² These negotiations and activities kept the French captains in Aragon where they received the urgent message from Enrique to return at once to his assistance in late February. In early March, du Guesclin and the French Companies rejoined Enrique in the ancient forest of Banares. Enrique had adopted Banares as his headquarters in northeastern Castille in his attempt to protect Burgos, which he believed to be the initial object of the English attack.

After a brief rest and the regrouping of his forces,

⁶⁰ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1214, folio 139-141, Barcelona, dated January 30, 1367.

⁶¹ Ibid., Reg. 1217, folio 114.

⁶² Miret y Sans, p. 111.

the Black Prince wasted no time in continuing his invasion of Castille. A reconnaissance force of some 200 men under the command of William Felton, brother of the governor of Aquitaine, had already been sent south from the Navarran capital to inspect the usurper's movements. Felton advanced rapidly across the Ebro River and into the Castillian city of Logor-no, which was still in the hands of Pedro's supporters. There he collected latest news about the Trastamaran activities at Banares, some thirty-five miles to the west, and relayed that information to the Black Prince. Knowing the whereabouts of the usurper's army, the Black Prince had before him two alternatives in planning his approach to Burgos. The first alternative was to remain longer in Navarran territory, marching south, and then swinging west in the direction of Logorno and Rioja. This was the most direct route and the one which Enrique probably thought the Prince would use. The second was to move directly west from Pamplona, taking the mountain route through Alava, Victoria and Miranda del Ebro. It was this second route that the Prince chose. Delachenal suggests that the main motive of the Prince in choosing this route was to spare Navarre as much as possible.⁶³ Though no records survive, it is possible that this was one of the stipulations of the agreement which had been worked out between the two parties either at Peyrehorade or at the original negotiations held in September of 1366 in Libourne.

⁶³Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 391.

A second motive, and possibly more important, was that he hoped by taking this route he would achieve an element of surprise. It might have appeared to the Prince that Enrique, having established his forces at Banares so as to block a direct assault on Burgos from the east, would be taken totally by surprise to find the English army descending upon him from the northwest. The choice, however, proved to be a bad one. "In consequence he took a decision which constituted, given the season, a first-class strategical error. Loyalist control of Logorno guaranteed at least a safe crossing of the Ebro and, once over the river, relatively easy country lay in front of any army advancing on the Castillian capital."⁶⁴

While Enrique was assembling his forces in the oak grove at Banarres, awaiting the attack of the English army, he received a letter of instruction from Charles V of France and the count of Anjou begging him not to engage the Black Prince in open combat. Instead, they encouraged Enrique to engage in a type of guerilla warfare which Charles said would soon wear out the army of the Black Prince and force it to retreat once again beyond the Pyrenees.⁶⁵ "It was sound advice. Unfortunately such an admission of military inferiority was entirely contrary to the instincts and

⁶⁴Russell, English Intervention, p. 87.

⁶⁵Ayala, pp. 443-444.

traditions of the magnates of Castille."⁶⁶ Enrique's counselor declared that he must fight; with the kingdom already wavering in political allegiance it was fatal to give the supporters of his enemies the impression he was frightened of the consequences of a battle with the Prince and Don Pedro. From his own personal experience, Don Enrique obviously could see the wisdom of the advice the French king had sent to him. The existing circumstances, however, were not adaptable to fighting that kind of war. The pressure of the magnates was a factor that Enrique could not ignore. Many had threatened to abandon him if he did not fight.⁶⁷ His resources were limited and consequently he could not sustain a war of any duration. It was better to fight the battle now and to stake all on the success of his forces. Furthermore, there was growing disaffection within his kingdom. Pedro's return to Castille had unsettled the loyalty of many of Enrique's subjects.⁶⁸ "The bastard thus awaited the event without illusion and without discouragement, with firmness and his usual calmness."⁶⁹

Though Enrique realized the issue would soon need to be decided, he nevertheless adopted, in the early stages of the war, the tactics urged upon him by Charles V and du

⁶⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 89.

⁶⁷Ayala, p. 444.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 393.

Guesclin. Meanwhile, the English army, having penetrated the mountains of Alava, arrived at Victoria, from where they evidently planned to move on to Miranda de Ebro, and from there to cross the river and move directly on Burgos. The Prince having thus committed himself, Enrique's army crossed the Ebro and advanced toward Victoria from the south. Enrique established himself in a strong position at the fortress of Zaleiaran, a stronghold which dominated the entrance to the mountains at a point where the road south of Victoria plunges into the narrow gorge of the River Zacorra. This position permitted him to follow the movements of his adversary and to repel any attempts the opposing forces made to cross the mountain passes and descend on Burgos.⁷⁰ At the same time, Enrique sent out large detachments in order to harass the English detachments attempting to provision the army already beginning to suffer severely from a lack of food. These activities led to numerous engagements between the Castellians and the English which eventually culminated in a serious encounter whose outcome was disastrous for the English cause. A force of several hundred Englishmen under the command of Sir William Felton was totally annihilated by a larger Castellian force near Arienz, not far from Victoria.⁷¹ The Castellian force of several thousand men under

⁷⁰Ayala, p. 445.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 445-446.

the command of Enrique's brother, Don Tello, then attacked the English camp itself at Victoria, inflicting serious damage and contributing to the growing demoralization among the English troops. By early spring it was apparent to the English forces that they had made the wrong choice in the route they had selected. Four weeks had now passed since the Prince's army had entered Castille and nothing significant had been achieved. A good deal of damage had been done, however, to the Prince's reputation as a war leader.⁷² It can be said, then, that these first operations of the campaign were most encouraging to the usurper. During the earlier weeks of the fighting he had not strayed far from the prudent advice of Charles V.⁷³

With the passing of every day, the position of the English army outside the walls of Victoria was becoming more hazardous. Not only were the problems of provisioning the army mounting, but also the Castillian winter with its torrential rains was taking its toll upon the English army. It was becoming increasingly clear that the army could not remain longer in Alava nor force its way southward through the enemy-held passes. As a result, the Black Prince was forced to recognize his error and make preparations for the withdrawal. "Mountain warfare on a large scale was a new

⁷²Russell, English Intervention, p. 91.

⁷³Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 395.

experience for him and one which he evidently did not well understand. Angered by his reverses he now sought to transfer the scene of the campaign to the Castillian plain."⁷⁴ Thus his army began its retreat, returning to Navarre.

The usurper, not believing the opportunity was yet right for a full-scale battle, withdrew his army to Rioja to cover Burgos. That city was now threatened by the Prince who could utilize the more direct route from the east.⁷⁵ By April 1 at the latest, Pedro and the Prince of Wales had crossed the Ebro River at Logorno without having their passage disputed and quickly took command of the city which had remained loyal to Pedro throughout the course of the war.⁷⁶

When Enrique became certain that Logorno was the new objective of the Prince, he took his army once again south of the Ebro and took up a strategic position near Najera, approximately eighteen miles to the southeast of Logorno. Enrique, had again chosen his position well. Between him and the English army was the Najerilla River, an important tributary of the Ebro. The river at that point was some two hundred yards in width and was already swollen by the spring rains. The only bridge that crossed the river in this vicinity was at Najera and Enrique had already taken possession

⁷⁴Russell, English Intervention, p. 92.

⁷⁵Ayala, pp. 447-449.

⁷⁶ibid., p. 447. The date of April 1 can be firmly established by the fact that on that day Pedro issued a letter from Logorno. See Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 396. note 2.

of it. To get to the Castillian army, it would be necessary for the Black Prince to fight his way across the bridge, a very difficult task. Up to this point in the war, the generalship of the usurper had unquestionably surpassed that of the Black Prince.⁷⁷ The scene was thus set for the significant battle of Najera.

Prior to the battle of Najera some rather interesting correspondence was exchanged between the Black Prince and the usurper. Enrique of Trastamara had initiated the correspondence on the 28th of February, 1367, when he wrote from Santo Domingo to the Prince. He indicated his astonishment that the Prince came to Castille to restore a tyrant to the throne. To his knowledge, he had no dispute with the Black Prince; however, if it was the Prince's intention to carry forth his policy he was prepared to meet him in combat as quickly as possible--he had every intention of defending his kingdom and his subjects. It appears that the Prince did not answer this letter until April 1, when he wrote from his camp in Navarrete, located several miles from the battlefield of Najera. The Black Prince put forth a strong argument in favor of legitimacy stating that, due to the treaty obligations, he and his father had no alternative but to come to the aid of the legitimate sovereign of Castille.⁷⁸ The

⁷⁷Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Manuscript 13023, folio 54.

⁷⁸British Museum, Cotton Caligula, Vol. III, no. 141, as cited by Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 398, N. 1.

Black Prince went on to state that if the usurper was willing to come to terms with his brother and relinquish his claims to the throne, the Prince was prepared to listen to his grievances against his sovereign. If not, the grievances would have to be settled on the field of battle. This reply of the Prince, according to Ayala, greatly offended the usurper since in the letter he was referred to as the Count of Trastamara and not as the king of Castille.⁷⁹

In his final reply, Enrique began by enumerating all his own titles of royalty. He addressed the Prince simply as the Prince of Wales in these terms: "To you, Edward, Prince of Wales, you who are called the oldest son of the king of England and Prince of Aquitaine. It seems to some, to many even, that you attribute much to vain glory. You know, that with the aid of God and our loyal subjects, we are ready to fight to defend our kingdom and to prevent anyone from doing damage to our inhabitants."⁸⁰

⁷⁹Ayala, p. 451.

⁸⁰Various texts of these letters are found in Ayala, p. 451. Froissart, Chronicles, VII, p. 29, Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 832-836, and Walter of Peterborough, pp. 110-113. I myself have found copies of the two letters written by Enrique of Trastamara in the Real academia de la historia, Madrid, Collection of Salazar, no. 7165-7169.

The entire authenticity of these letters is disputed.⁸¹ There appears to me to be nothing in the context of the letters that is not consistent with the sentiments of either party involved. If such a correspondence did exist, (which is very likely) Ayala would have known of it. Even writing twenty-five years later the historian could be expected to recall the basic content of the letters. They thus have the merit of exposing to us five hundred years later a degree of insight into two of the personalities involved. Enrique's letter is particularly important because it represents the grounds upon which he and the Castillian magnates justified their rebellion against their legitimate king. Ayala would have been eager to vindicate Enrique as in doing so he was vindicating the role he played in the rebellion. The letters are thus important because they represent the Trastamaran justification for the rebellion.

The Black Prince, who on the first of April had moved on to Navarette, remained there for two days, resting his troops and preparing his battle strategy. Very early on the morning of April 3, the Black Prince broke his camp at Navarette and began marching toward Najera, some seven and a half miles to the southeast. As the English army marched

⁸¹Delachenal suggests that there is every reason to suppose that Ayala, according to procedures familiar to Greek and Roman historians, simply made up the last two letters. Edward Russell, on the other hand, in his examination of this matter, gives more credence to this authenticity. (See Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 398, note 1, and Russell, English Intervention, p. 94.)

toward Najera, the Black Prince received an astonishing piece of information. Enrique and his army had abandoned their strong position on the left bank of the Najerilla River and had crossed over to the right bank, thus removing the great obstacle which separated them from the English forces.⁸² This behavior on the part of the usurper is hard to understand. It is possible that he was a man so endowed with chivalry that he was keeping his word and did not wish to have an advantage in the battle, thus giving the Black Prince the opportunity to fight on equal terms. It is also possible, as Russell suggests, that he had become overconfident by his early successes and now thought he was capable of destroying the English army once and for all.⁸³ A third possibility for his behavior was the decreasing morale of his army. Daily he was faced with desertions.⁸⁴ Consequently, by holding his strong position on the left bank, he could have held off the battle indefinitely. But with the spreading rebellion in his kingdom and the growing desertions among his army, he might have felt that the time

⁸² Ayala, pp. 453-454.

⁸³ Russell, English Intervention, p. 96.

⁸⁴ Just prior to the battle of Najera Enrique had sent 600 Castillian and Andalucian knights to occupy the town of Agreda, which was at the time loyal to Pedro. Instead of following their orders, the above mentioned force deserted to the side of Pedro. During the battle itself the usurper's brother, Don Tello, deserted and carried the left wing of Enrique's army with him. Ayala, p. 439.

had come to fight for his kingdom. For one or all of the above reasons he chose to cross the river and engage the Prince in battle. I prefer to believe that it was the third alternative that motivated the usurper. As flamboyant and chivalrous as he was, I do not believe he was a fool. To attribute such action simply to a sense of honor would most certainly make him appear in that light.

It is not necessary to go into a description of the battle of Najera.⁸⁵ In its broad details, the two forces were not of unequal size. The English force was possibly 9,000 men; Enrique's force, 7,000-8,000 men. The English had the advantage of possessing a more homogeneous force with a unity of command. They also possessed superior weaponry as well as, for the most part, being professional soldiers. The Castillian forces, on the other hand, were extremely heterogeneous. The French element under du Guesclin was the only troops capable of standing up to the English. The Castillian magnates, remaining true to their conservatism, had refused to accept the new military measures recommended by their French allies. The result was disastrous for Enrique's army.

The battle of Najera was a resounding victory for

⁸⁵Excellent descriptions and accounts can be found in the secondary sources of Peter Edward Russell, English Intervention, pp. 96-105, Roland Delachenal, Vol. III, pp. 401-408, and others. In primary sources, Ayala gives an excellent description from the Castillian side, pp. 454-478; Chandos an adequate one for the English, verses 3220-3235.

the English. Enrique's army suffered a great number of casualties, and a number of distinguished men fell into the hands of the English as prisoners. Among them were du Guesclin and Arnoul d'Audrehem, Sancho, the bastard brother of Pedro, Pero Lopez de Ayala, the chronicler, the adelantado mayor of Castille, Pedro Manrique, and hundreds of leading Castillian magnates.

The battle of Najera was, however, one of the most impressive and fruitless victories in English military history. This was because of the ill-advised clause in the treaty of Libourne denying Pedro the liberty of dealing with any Castillian prisoners taken in the campaign. . The Castillian king was thus denied the opportunity to destroy at one time the hard core opposition to his reign. The Black Prince held firmly to the terms of the treaty and obstinately refused to turn any of the prisoners over to Pedro. These men were to be ransomed and in a matter of months would once again rise in rebellion against the king, this time with complete success. The second and most important reason for the futility of this victory was the fact that Enrique of Trastamara had managed to escape. After having distinguished himself in battle, Enrique, realizing the day was lost and the impossibility of rallying his forces, had fled, making it safely to the Aragonese border.⁸⁶ The remainder of the day of April 3 and into the night, Pedro had

⁸⁶Ayala, pp. 461-462.

searched the battlefield for the remains of his brother's body, but without success. The Black Prince himself, though not tormented with the same desire of revenge as Pedro, also sought the body of Enrique, questioning those who returned from the search whether they had found anything. But all the answers were in the negative and the Prince appropriately replied as a prophet when he said, "then, there is certainly nothing."⁸⁷ Indeed, there was nothing, for in less than two years, Pedro of Castille would be dead and Enrique would once more occupy the Castillian throne. The Anglo-Castillian alliance would likewise be dead, and France would begin to enjoy the great fruits of Enrique's victory in the form of naval aid when the Hundred Year War was resumed. This did not have to be. The reason for Enrique's victory was the imprudent course followed by the Prince in the months following the English victory at Najera. It is to this point that we shall now direct our attention.

⁸⁷Ibid... p. 478.

CHAPTER IX

FAILURE OF THE ANGLO-CASTILLIAN ALLIANCE

1367-1368

Although the events leading up to the battle of Najera and the months immediately following that significant battle constitute one of the most significant periods of the reign of Pedro I of Castille, it must nevertheless be concluded that the role of the Castillian king during those months was a comparatively insignificant one. It is true that Pedro set in motion the chain of events when he appealed to his English allies for the military assistance they promised in the treaty of 1362. But once he had performed that significant role, Pedro appears to have been relegated to the position of a supporting actor in the great drama that was unfolding in the Iberian Peninsula. The impression one receives from a comprehensive study of those months is that Pedro, rather than being a man that made history during that time, was swept along by the events that were engulfing him and his kingdom. It is possible that the extreme limitation of documentation for this period veils us from grasping clearly and completely the role of Pedro in these events. Nevertheless, it does appear from the available evidence that Pedro, and indeed the usurper, were both

relegated to a subordinate position and that the chain of events which would develop in Castille during the next two years was determined more by the Prince of Wales and Charles V of France than by the actual contenders for the throne of Castille. Enrique's and Pedro's energy had to be directed to domestic matters. For Enrique, the task was to maintain the throne he had successfully usurped the previous year; for Pedro, the issue was one of survival, a survival which was contingent upon continuing support of the English. Because of this lack of diplomatic activity on the part of the Castillian king, Pedro will be conspicuously absent from the pages of this chapter despite the fact that this looms as one of the most significant periods in the diplomatic history of Castille. Therefore, it might be said with justification that it was not at Montiel in 1369 that Pedro lost his kingdom but at the negotiating tables during these crucial months when the English determined to abandon him.

By night fall of April 3, 1367, it appeared that all the goals of the English invasion of Castille had been accomplished. The usurper was fleeing for his life across Castille seeking refuge in Aragon; his army had been destroyed or captured; the hard core of the resistance to Pedro which had survived the battle were now prisoners of the Prince of Wales. The English alliance of 1362 had produced the result that Pedro and Edward III had intended it to. It

appeared, then, that in the hostilities between England and France which would commence soon, the Castillian fleet would fight along side the English. In reality, however, within six months Enrique of Trastamara would once more return to Castille in a second and final attempt to replace his brother as king. This attempt was successful and all the gains of Najera were quickly lost. Possibly the primary reason for this was the deterioration in the relationship between Pedro and the Prince of Wales which began almost as soon as the final blow had been struck on the field of Najera. The relationship between the two men had never been based on anything stronger than political necessity. Now, with the immediate danger past, both men showed themselves to be less flexible and the animosity between them began to surface.

The first grounds for conflict was a matter of the prisoners taken at Najera. Again it will be recalled that the most ill-advised clause of the treaty of Libourne was the one which forced Pedro to relinquish the right to deal out justice to any prisoners that might be taken during the campaign. The day after the battle, Pedro saw paraded before him his greatest rivals in Castille, those who had been determined to resist authority. Before him was the opportunity to destroy once and for all the greatest enemies which had opposed him. According to Ayala, the conflict began when Pedro came upon the famous Castillian engineer, Don Inigo Lopez de Orozco, and in a fit of anger killed the man.¹

¹Ayala, p. 471.

The Gascon knight who had captured Inigo Lopez immediately took the grievance to the Prince of Wales, claiming that he had not only lost considerable financial gain, but also a loss of honor by having a prisoner under his protection murdered.² According to Ayala, the Prince agreed with the knight and instantly confronted Pedro with the matter, contending that such action was in direct violation of the treaty of Libourne.³ Pedro responded by demanding that all the knights who were natives of Castille be turned over to him. He promised to pay off their ransoms, once the prices were reasonably fixed by the Prince. In the meantime, the Prince would guarantee the ransoms to those who had taken the prisoners, and then Pedro would pay off, in due time, the total sum to the Prince of Wales.⁴ Pedro believed the Prince would accept this offer, recognizing as he did, that the release of these men would have made the battle of Najera fruitless. Yet the Prince refused to yield, to the great frustration of the Castillian king. The Prince of Wales replied in a pretentious manner that English knights worked for honor and that there was not one among them who would give up his prisoner if he supposed he was being bought to be killed.⁵ Pedro retorted that if this were the case,

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 472.

⁵Ibid.

his kingdom was in a worse state than at the start, since these were the very men who had caused him to lose his kingdom in the first place. Once they were set free they would once more try to take his kingdom from him. Thus he regretted having uselessly spent his treasury.⁶

According to Ayala, the reply of the Prince was a violent condemnation of the measures Pedro had used in ruling his kingdom. He accused him of acts of tyranny and senseless executions. Pedro was instructed that he must soon change his method of government or he would again place his kingdom in jeopardy to the point that neither himself nor the king of England could help him save his throne.⁷ To what degree we can trust Ayala on this matter is not certain. There is obviously, however, a degree of truth in this interchange between the two allies. To Pedro, what the Prince was proposing must have appeared as sheer madness, an idiotic adherence to a code of chivalry for which Pedro had no use. In defense of the Prince of Wales, however, it must be said that there was some reason for his side of the argument. It was he whom Pedro was asking to underwrite the Castillian king's new obligations. The cash value of some of the prisoners was extremely high and the ability of Pedro to repay his already large debts was doubtful. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand the reluctance of the Prince

⁶Ibid., pp. 473-474.

⁷Ibid.

to enter into a deeper financial commitment with Pedro. Nevertheless, the words of Pedro proved to be true; because of the Prince's decision, the English victory at Najera became useless. In a matter of months, most of the prisoners had been ransomed, and they were again in rebellion against Pedro and working for the establishment of the Trastamaran dynasty in Castille.

On Monday the 5th, the day after the battle of Najera, the entire army moved to Burgos with Pedro moving ahead and arriving two days before the Prince. Upon his arrival in the capital of Castille Viajo, Pedro received a warm welcome from the citizens.⁸ In Burgos and throughout the kingdom, upon the news that the usurper was defeated, there was an immediate and total collapse of the usurper's government. Everywhere Trastamaran officials were arrested, and Pedro devoted himself to restoring his administration.⁹ When the Prince arrived in Burgos, possibly on the 9th, the celebrations abruptly came to an end and the ticklish and irritating negotiations began between the two allies.¹⁰ The most pressing matters were financial, and the first demand made upon Pedro was to execute the financial clauses of the Libourne agreement without delay. Pedro, of course, was unable to

⁸Ibid., p. 475.

⁹Russell, English Intervention, p. 108, note 1, A. A. Murcia, Cartas Reales, Reg. 3.

¹⁰Ayala, pp. 474-481.

meet his obligations because of the breakdown of the kingdom's financial machinery during the Civil War which Najera had temporarily suspended. He imprudently attempted to cover his position by making counter claims.¹¹ He contended he had not received full value for the royal jewels he had taken to Bayonne with him, the only remnants of the royal Castillian treasury with which he had managed to escape.¹² Thus, without absolutely denying his obligations, he attempted to renegotiate the figures. The Prince, however, faced with personal bankruptcy and an unassailable legal position, insisted that the commitment should be honored without further delay. Pedro knew this was impossible, at least until his tax collectors could get to work, which would not be for several months. It is not difficult, then, to understand the entanglement which developed between these two men in the latter part of April.

Along with the growing hostility between the two allies, there developed a resentment among the Anglo-Gascon men at arms who had accompanied the Prince on this expedition. They had not been paid by Pedro and soon developed an equally hostile attitude against him. Many of these men, especially those who had accompanied Enrique on his successful campaign a year earlier, must have contrasted the extensive generosity of Enrique with the penury of Pedro. By the

¹¹Russell, English Intervention, p. 109.

¹²Rymer, Vol. III (ii), p. 835, May 2, 1367.

end of April the Prince and Pedro had worked out the exact amount of the debt owed. It came to the enormous sum of 2,720,000 gold florins, a figure nearly five times the total assessment accepted by Pedro the previous September.¹³ This amount far exceeded the financial resources of the Middle Kingdom. As an example, this sum can be compared with the amount received by the Companies in 1366 for the invasion which was intended to place Enrique of Trastamara on the Castillian throne. The figure agreed upon then was 300,000 florins, and it will be recalled what an enormous financial strain this placed upon the Aragonese king. The Anglo-Gascon army which had restored the Castillian throne to Pedro did not exceed greatly in number the army which had placed Enrique of Trastamara on the throne a year earlier. Such a financial demand upon the Middle Kingdom was certainly beyond its financial resources. The Prince must certainly have realized this. It was only with reluctance, however, that he even ceded the point that it would take several months before the Castillian king could begin to discharge his financial obligations. Finally, the following agreement was reached: the debt of the Anglo-Gascon Companies was indisputable and Pedro would begin to discharge these obligations immediately. He would send tax-collectors throughout his kingdom to begin the process of collecting taxes, and within

¹³Ibid., p. 825.

four months he would discharge one-half of his debts to the Prince. He would then have one additional year in which to fulfill the other half of his financial obligations.¹⁴ In the meantime the three daughters of Pedro were to remain as hostages in Bayonne as guarantees that Pedro would keep his word.¹⁵

But the Prince was not satisfied with any of these promises. He demanded in addition that Pedro make a public confirmation of the terms which had been agreed upon at Libourne in September of 1366, as well as the more recent ones at Burgos. Consequently, on May 2 in Santa Maria Cathedral in Burgos, in a most solemn manner, Pedro swore to uphold the terms agreed upon between himself and the Prince.¹⁶ Four days later, on May 6, these agreements were committed to writing.¹⁷

One of the interesting sidelights of these negotiations was the increasing distrust of the Prince of Wales for the Castillian king. This, to a substantial degree, can be explained by the extensive amount of Trastamaran propaganda portraying Pedro as a cruel, deceitful and unjust

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ayala, p. 479.

¹⁶Rymer, Vol. III (ii), p. 825.

¹⁷Public Record Office, Exchequer, Diplomatic Documents, no. 1085.

king.¹⁸ It will be recalled that this propaganda had already permeated his court while still in Aquitaine. The influence of 2,000 Trastamaran prisoners in his camp and their stories of Pedro's atrocities would have further promoted such suspicions. The longer it took Pedro to consummate the terms of the Libourne agreement, the more it might have appeared to the Prince that the stories he had heard about Pedro were quite true. Possibly the clearest indication of this extensive mistrust was the precaution taken by the Prince when he arrived in Burgos on May 2 to take part in the ceremony at the cathedral of Santa Maria. The Prince had not been in the city itself, but rather had been housed in the royal monastery of Las Huelgas a mile outside the city. When the time came for the Prince to enter the city, he was accompanied by 500 armed men; he demanded that the gate of the town through which he passed as well as the road that he traveled to the cathedral be garrisoned by English troops.¹⁹ The Prince obviously, by this time, had developed an extensive mistrust for his Castillian ally, something which was unfortunate for both men, as future events were to show.

Shortly after these events in early May, Pedro made

¹⁸ When on May 2nd the Prince entered Burgos he insisted that a large force of English men-at-arms occupy the gate through which he would enter the city. He was in addition accompanied by a bodyguard of some 500 men. Ayala, pp. 479-481. Such precautions I believe could only be explained by the increasing mistrust the Prince held for Pedro.

¹⁹ Ayala, pp. 479-481.

preparations to leave Burgos. He explained to the Prince that it was necessary for him to move about the kingdom to arrange for the collection of the money which was due the following September.²⁰ The English were not to see Pedro again. By the 20th of May, Pedro was in Toledo. By then the Castillian king was devoting himself to the problems of reorganizing his kingdom. The Prince and his army remained in Burgos until the following August. By that time the English army had been ravaged by the Castillian summer, and the troops were suffering from disease and sickness. Increasing rumors from Gascony of growing hostile actions on the part of the French also made it imperative that the Prince begin withdrawing once more to the north of the Pyrenees.²¹

Until December of 1367, Pedro did make a determined effort to meet the commitments which he had accepted from the Prince. Possibly the clearest indication of his concern came in the summer of 1367 when he imposed the alcabala, a sales tax which was traditionally the most unpopular fiscal act which a king could levy. Considering the political conditions which existed in Castille, one must infer that Pedro imposed this tax only as a last resort. We can assume, then, that this did represent a serious effort to acquire

²⁰Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Reg. 121.

²¹Ayala, p. 439.

the necessary funds to repay the Prince. A letter written by Pedro on June 9 is further evidence of his endeavors.²² In this letter to his close personal friend, Garcia Fernandez de Villodre, Pedro stressed his dire financial needs and the necessity of fulfilling his financial obligations to the Prince of Wales. In the same letter, Pedro made it quite clear that he needed these sums in order to pay the Companies so that they would leave his land. "It is thus incorrect to blame the Castillian king for a willful default on the debt he owed the Prince. Possibly the latter, in fact, did get something on account. Unfortunately for all concerned the task which faced the people of Castille was quite beyond their financial capacity."²³

There can be no doubt, however, that Pedro had no intentions of living up to the territorial concessions that he had agreed upon at Libourne. Just like Enrique of Trastamara, Pedro found that it was easier to make generous land donations while in exile than to fulfill them while in power.²⁴

²²Russell, English Intervention, p. 113, note 1.

²³Ibid., p. 113.

²⁴As an example of Pedro's behavior in these matters the following examples should suffice. Biscay and Castro-Urdiales were ceded to the Prince of Wales and Soria to the constable of Aquitaine, Jean Chandos. These concessions were made by Pedro though he knew that they would never become effective. Secretly he warned his subjects that the concessions had only been made in the face of force and that they were not to allow the English to take control of their new possessions. Ayala, p. 481.

While through the summer of 1367 Pedro struggled with his financial problems and the army of the Prince suffered outside the walls of Burgos, waiting the payments due them, there were diplomatic developments going on in the courts of Aragon and France to which we must now direct our attention.

Having successfully made his escape from the battlefield of Najera, thanks to the self-sacrifice of an obscure servant, Enrique had gone toward the Aragonese frontier where he hoped to regroup his forces.²⁵ His flight, however, was not without danger. On one occasion, he was recognized by several knights who rightly believed that making him their prisoner or victim would earn the gratitude of Pedro. It was only with great difficulty that Enrique managed to escape from that dangerous situation.²⁶ Apparently without any further difficulty he reached the Aragonese town of Illueca, where two replies to his earlier letter to the king of Aragon awaited him. The first was a letter which En Pere had sent to Enrique upon learning of his defeat at Najera, a letter of condolence and sympathy.²⁷ The second was a letter in direct response to the one Enrique had sent requesting military assistance from his old ally. This letter,

²⁵Ayala, pp. 461-462.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Miret y Sans, p. 113.

dated April 7, 1367,²⁸ informed the usurper that En Pere had received his messengers who had requested a certain number of knights commanded by Pedro de Luna be sent to Soria, a fortress along the Castillian border which had remained loyal to the usurper. This letter reveals three important facts: first, that Enrique of Trastamara, three days after his defeat, judged it possible to continue his resistance against Pedro and his English allies; second, that the king of Aragon did not disapprove of the intentions of his old ally; and finally, that the dramatic flight of Enrique across the Pyrenees to reach France was neither as sudden nor as secretive as has been frequently believed.²⁹ It is clear then that the disastrous loss of the battle of Najera had not depressed the courage of the usurper and that he had, at least for the moment, every intention of making an immediate return. Pedro IV's letter shows clearly that what Enrique intended to do was to maintain the struggle from the border fortress of Soria and in the southern part of the Peninsula where he believed his support to be strongest.

Clearly the Aragonese king was sympathetic with these plans of the usurper. But at the same time, in line with his new position of neutrality, he did not wish to do anything to displease Pedro I.. Consequently, though offering support to Enrique and promising to find him a galley to

²⁸Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 145.

²⁹Miret y Sans, p. 114.

take him to Seville, he was not prepared to commit Aragonese troops to a project which he believed to be hopeless.³⁰ The Aragonese king, in fact, had no intention of involving himself further in the affairs of Enrique of Trastamara. Pedro de Luna, the commander of the escort sent to Enrique to lead him across the kingdom, was entrusted with the task of convincing the bastard that momentarily his cause was lost and his best course would be to seek asylum in France. En Pere had no intentions of intensifying the danger which threatened his state by granting sanctuary to Enrique.³¹ That same feeling motivated him, several days later, to refuse asylum to Enrique's wife when she brought her children and En Pere's daughter, betrothed to the oldest son of Enrique, to Aragon. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Aragonese king took back his daughter and declared void all agreements related to this marriage.³² Though he treated the bastard's wife with courtesy and tact, he did not allow her to remain near the border and maintain relations with the partisans of her husband. It was clear to him that it was only his policy of neutrality that, until that time, had preserved his kingdom from an armed conflict with the victors of Najera. After several days had passed it became apparent to the bastard that there was no hope of support from En Pere and that the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 115.

³² Cronica de Pedro IV, ed. Bofarull, p. 384.

wisest thing was to seek refuge beyond the Pyrenees. He thus set out, and reached in a short time the land of the count of Foix. He was received there courteously but with obvious apprehension, since the count was one of the most powerful vassals of the Prince of Wales. As a result, the stay of Enrique in the country of Foix was very short. He then set out for Languedoc and a meeting with the duke of Anjou.³³

Though the itinerary followed by Enrique is not known with any certainty, it appears that he and the duke met in Avignon sometime at the end of April, 1367.³⁴ From the duke of Anjou's point of view, the presence of the bastard was obviously a temporary embarrassment. The French court had not yet had the opportunity to establish a formal position in regard to the now deposed usurper.³⁵ The duke, however, was generous from a financial point of view to his former ally and encouraged him without delay to write to his brother the king to determine what his intentions were. The king's reply was entirely favorable. The duke of Anjou was ordered to put Enrique in possession of the fortress of Pierrepertuse. In addition to this, Charles ordered his brother to advance to the bastard the sum of 50,000 francs

³³Ayala, p. 462.

³⁴Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 423.

³⁵Ayala, pp. 462-463.

in gold.³⁶ It is possible that these gifts were not totally free from obligation on the part of the usurper. It is, in fact, even possible, although it was overlooked by Ayala, that these gifts were made in return for Enrique's surrender of titles to lands which had been granted to him when he had been in the service of the French king earlier.³⁷ Nevertheless, the usurper was now situated in a fortress which not only provided protection for himself and his family, but which also placed him in a position where he could easily follow the events in Castille while awaiting his opportunity to return. The welcome which the usurper found in France must have given back to him his confidence which would serve him so well in the future.³⁸

On the 24th of May the bastard wrote to the king of Aragon, hoping once more to make him a part of his plans for the future.³⁹ In this letter he solicited the help of his old ally, but not as a humble suppliant. He once more was assured of the support of his French allies and was further encouraged by reports from Castille of the growing discontent with Pedro's government. Though Enrique obviously wanted the support of the Aragonese king, he made it clear in his letter that he, in many respects, was only asking a return for the

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Unpublished documents, French National Archives, J 300, no. 109-109^{vo}.

³⁸Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 425.

³⁹Real Academia de la historia Madrid, Salazar Collection, A. 4, folio 127.

great services he had rendered Aragon. With or without the aid of En Pere, he was prepared to return to Castille.⁴⁰ In a later letter to En Pere he listed in more detail the specific services he had rendered to Aragon. Most importantly he named 120 cities and castles in Aragon which had been occupied by Pedro of Castille but had been returned to the Aragonese crown because of his successful invasion of Castille in 1366.⁴¹

The fact that the Aragonese king was unreceptive, almost hostile, to these overtures of Enrique is indicative of the drastic diplomatic developments which had taken place by the summer of 1367.⁴² To understand more fully this drastic transition in the orientation of Aragonese diplomacy from an anti-Anglo policy to neutrality to eventually a pro-Anglo policy, we must review the events immediately following the English victory at Najera.

As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the critical moment arrived on the 3rd of April when Enrique was defeated at Najera. The tension which instantly developed between the Castillian king and the Black Prince did not prevent some attention being directed to the Aragonese problem. As we have seen, in the days immediately following Najera, En Pere believed that despite his neutrality an attack on

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ayala, p. 510.

⁴²Miret y Sans, pp. 114-116.

Aragon by the Anglo-Castillian forces was inevitable. Still he hoped that his eleventh hour policy of neutrality would save his kingdom from devastation, and this explains his cautious policy regarding the usurper and his family. He took every precaution to protect his kingdom from the invasion he anticipated.⁴³ At the same time he was cautious in doing nothing to offend the kings of Navarre and Castille or the Prince of Wales.

It must have been with a great sigh of relief that En Pere learned that the Prince of Wales was prepared to enter into negotiations with Aragon. Which side initiated these negotiations is difficult to determine. Ayala and Zurita affirm that the initiative came from the English Prince, since he sent Hugh de Calveley as ambassador to Aragon.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Miret y Sans believes the initiative came from Pedro IV.⁴⁵ Regardless of who the initiator really was, two factors stand out very clearly. First, both the Prince and the Aragonese king were desirous of peace; the Prince because of the enormous debt he had incurred in the Castillian campaign and En Pere because he feared once more the loss of Aragonese territory recently recovered for him by the Great Companies. Second, the most important individual in these negotiations was the soldier of fortune,

⁴³Ibid., pp. 116-117.

⁴⁴Ayala, p. 518, and Zurita, p. 346.

⁴⁵Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 193, as cited by Miret y Sans, p. 117.

Hugh de Calveley. "Calveley, vassal and pensioner of the Aragonese king, was well placed to undertake the task in which his own personal interest was closely involved."⁴⁶

Calveley, and his diplomatic partner Sir William Elmham, were already at the Aragonese court by the last week in April.⁴⁷ Calveley's mission was to inquire whether the Aragonese king was prepared to make peace with Pedro I and to deny further help to the Castillian usurper. If this was the case, the Prince was prepared to enter into a truce with the Aragonese court. Obviously, En Pere was delighted at the prospect of saving his kingdom from invasion and he replied in the affirmative.⁴⁸ In a matter of weeks Aragonese envoys were on their way to Burgos to enter into direct negotiations with the English.⁴⁹ They carried with them an offer to submit all matters in dispute between the Aragonese and Castillian kings to the arbitration of the Prince of Wales.⁵⁰ The influence of Calveley in bringing about this rapprochement between England and Castille cannot be overlooked. Calveley had already played a prominent role in the overthrow of Pedro I in 1366. As one of the leading mercenary

⁴⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 116.

⁴⁷Guiterrez de Valasco, "Ingleses en Espana (Siglo xiv)," Estudios de Edad media de la Corona de Aragon: seccion de Saragoza, Vol. IV, (1950), pp. 241-242.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 242.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 243.

⁵⁰Zurita, Vol. II, p. 348.

captains he had led the vanguard of the invasion. He had also been the recipient of generous gifts from En Pere and Enrique of Trastamara before answering the call of his liege lord, the Black Prince. Thus Calveley, a vassal and pensioner of the Aragonese (having received the County of Carrion), was well disposed towards En Pere. Calveley was thus in a position to play an important role in the negotiations that followed.

An even more important aspect was the emergence in Aragon itself of a powerful party which urged an end to the support of Enrique of Trastamara. This policy had caused nothing but trouble since its adoption.⁵¹ Recalling the disasters in the war with Castille and the usurper's complete failure to implement any of his promises to En Pere, the anti-Trastamaran party was on strong grounds when it protested against the country becoming once again a battleground either for the benefit of the Castillian usurper's ambition or to further the pro-French policies advocated by Francesch de Perellos.⁵² For the moment this party was powerful and in ascendancy in the Aragonese court. The increasing mistrust that En Pere had for his minister, Francesch de Perellos, can be seen by a letter which he wrote in June of 1367. He did not even notify his minister that the negotiations with the English had begun until a month

⁵¹Russell, English Intervention, p. 117.

⁵²Ibid.

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after he dispatched his envoys to Burgos. Furthermore, the letter simply stated that the English had approached him on discussing terms of peace and that he was "interested."⁵³ This document has further interest in that it shows the nature of fourteenth century diplomacy, of which we have had numerous examples. Pedro IV entered into negotiations with the English and Pedro of Castille without informing his ally, the king of France.⁵⁴ At the same time, he did not wish to offend his French allies. En Pere, by this time was losing trust in Perellos, yet he believed that due to the latter's excessive influence in the French court, Perellos could keep him well acquainted with the reaction the French government had to these negotiations.⁵⁵

To placate his allies further, En Pere assured them that he would sign no agreement with the English that would be detrimental to his friendship with France.⁵⁶ Despite this assurance from the Aragonese monarch, the French court was greatly disturbed at the possibility of Aragon moving into the English camp. It was for this reason that in the middle of June a French knight, Tauvain de Vailleul, was authorized by Charles V to represent him in Aragon and make every attempt to divert En Pere from formulating any kind

⁵³Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 198, Zaragoza, dated June 15, 1367.

⁵⁴Miret y Sans, p. 118.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 230, and Miret y Sans, p. 126.

of alliance with the English. The French envoy, however, had not been empowered to make any kind of firm commitment to En Pere, and the proposals were in the realm of generalities which were neither precise nor specific enough to appease the Aragonese king. The irritation of En Pere can clearly be seen in a letter which he sent to Perellos on June 15, 1367.⁵⁷

In this letter he informed Perellos that the French must cease dealing in generalities and make a firm and solid commitment if they had any hope of engaging Aragonese support in the coming struggle with England.⁵⁸ In another letter written on June 29th, he again informed Perellos of his exasperation and the vagueness of the propositions put forward by the French government.⁵⁹ Though he made no attempt to conceal his aversion to Pedro of Castille the Aragonese king made it clear that without a definite commitment of French military assistance he would accept the peace overtures of the Black Prince. Thus the Aragonese king indicated in his correspondence with the French court that under the proper circumstances he was prepared to take up the sword against the English. I believe, in reality, however, that under no circumstances could he have been encouraged by the French to endure a second war. Only by his decision

⁵⁷Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 199.

⁵⁸ibid.

⁵⁹Miret y Sans, p. 121.

to adopt a position of neutrality had he been successful in extracting his kingdom from the fires of warfare. There is little likelihood that he was at that time prepared to place his kingdom in such jeopardy. I believe his policy was most clearly stated in a letter he wrote the French in the summer of 1367 in which he said his only policy was to have peace with all those who offered it.⁶⁰

In early July in the small town of Ariza on the Aragonese border the negotiations between the English, Castilians and Aragonese got under way. The atmosphere of the meetings was cordial and trustful. En Pere had already done the best he could to control the trouble-making activities of the pro-French and pro-Trastamaran elements in his kingdom from disturbing the political balance within Castille.⁶¹ "Behind the English negotiators, however, loomed an immediate threat of force which could still promptly be used if the Aragonese king showed undue dilatoriness or unwillingness to come to a genuine agreement."⁶² The Prince had already taken military measures to place his troops in such positions that they could easily begin an attack of Aragon if the conditions warranted.⁶³ As a result, the

⁶⁰ Ibid., n. 133.

⁶¹ Gutierrez de Valasco, p. 247.

⁶² Russell, English Intervention, p. 120.

⁶³ Gutierrez de Valasco, p. 245.

Aragonese king did not resort to a policy of procrastination which was characteristic of his diplomacy.

These activities were not kept a secret from the French court which developed a deepening concern over the future political position of En Pere. Consequently, Perellos wrote En Pere in early July asking him to keep him informed of the Anglo-Aragonese negotiations. The king replied in a very significant letter written on the 30th of July at Zaragoza.⁶⁴ En Pere noted his dislike for Pedro and for Enrique, "the one I wish the greatest misfortune, the other little good."⁶⁵ In this letter, En Pere was more sincere than he had been in previous ones. He acknowledged the reasons which had determined the new direction of his policy; he did not feel attached to either of the two brothers who disputed the crown of Castille because Pedro had made war with Aragon for a long time and Enrique had not kept his promises during the time he had occupied the throne. In this letter, the Aragonese king states that he would continue in the negotiations with the Prince of Wales though hoping to maintain his friendship with France, and that he was still open to an alliance with the French, provided they could once more supply a military commitment to the protection of his kingdom.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 210.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Already by this time the negotiations between England, Castille, and Aragon were beginning to take an incredible direction. The main priority for the English negotiators was to secure a lasting truce between the kings of Aragon and Castille and at the same time solve diplomatic problems which existed between England and Aragon. But something very surprising happened at Ariza. Instead of supporting the territorial demands put forth by Pedro of Castille, the English negotiators, namely Hugh de Calveley, advised the ambassadors of En Pere to stand firm and not modify the propositions they had presented.⁶⁷ It is impossible to determine whether Calveley was acting on his own initiative or upon the instructions of the Black Prince. What is important here is that the English delegation was already making preparations to negotiate secretly with the Aragonese in a way which would be detrimental to England's ally, Pedro I. The diplomacy between England and Castille during this latter part of Pedro's reign was characterized by a division of interests by both parties.

By the end of July, negotiations had progressed to the point that the English withdrew some forces from the Aragonese frontier, thus relieving some of the anxiety of En Pere. The result of these negotiations was a temporary

⁶⁷Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, letter of June 21, and Miret y Sans, p. 118.

truce between Castille and Aragon which would last until April 9, 1368. Further negotiations had been arranged to begin on the 15th of October when it was assumed that the terms for a permanent settlement could quickly be agreed upon. On August 22nd En Pere wrote to Charles V to inform him that a truce had been concluded with the king of Castille until Easter of the following year,⁶⁸ and that additional talks were to begin on October 15th. But in no case would he enter into an agreement which would be contrary to the friendship of France and Aragon. In spite of this courteous letter, the news of the treaty and future negotiations must have been strongly disagreeable to Charles and to the duke of Anjou.⁶⁹ "It would, however, be a grave mistake to presume that nothing more came out of these negotiations except the truce. Unknown to their Castillian colleagues, English and Aragonese envoys had, in fact, hammered out a secret draft of the agreement whose contents would have caused the greatest alarm and indignation to Pedro I and Enrique of Trastamara had they known of it."⁷⁰

The English historian, Peter Edward Russell, the only historian to examine in close detail the Anglo-Castillian relations in the fourteenth century, has been able to

⁶⁸Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 230.

⁶⁹Miret y Sans, p. 126.

⁷⁰Russell, English Intervention, p. 124.

expose as false the traditional belief that the Black Prince wanted nothing more than to wash his hands of Castillian affairs. The basis of these conclusions was his discovery of a significant document in the Archives of Navarre,⁷¹ a document about which we will have much more to say. This document proves beyond question that the Black Prince had no plans to separate his interests from those of Castille. The Black Prince was now proposing an alliance among the kings of Navarre, Aragon, Portugal, and himself with the aim of a total partition of Castille and the elimination of both Pedro and Enrique.⁷² The Aragonese diplomats must have been astounded when they learned from the English representatives at Ariza that the Prince was giving Pedro until April of 1368 to pay his debts and surrender Biscaye or face the consequences of war with England. With even greater astonishment they learned that the Black Prince was now more inclined to accept the view that Pedro was at fault for the Aragonese-Castillian war which had broken out in 1362.

The motive of the Black Prince in offering such a proposal is lost in history. It is also impossible to determine if he had the consent of his father in this undertaking, though it appears unlikely. A major influence on his decision

⁷¹Archives of the Chamber of the Counts of Navarre, Cajon 22:70.

⁷²Ibid., and Zurita, Vol. II, pp. 348-351.

was the impending financial disaster he faced as well as the increasing Trastamaran propaganda to which he may have been exposed from such close associates as Hugh de Calveley. But these factors alone seem insufficient to justify such a drastic move by the Prince. The real answer may have been that the Prince had discovered in Castille the opportunity to satisfy his political ambitions. A story told by Ayala is most illuminating in this respect.⁷³

According to this account, Martin Lopez de Cordoba, intimate advisor of Pedro and Master of the Order of Alcantara, revealed to some friends in Cordoba the intentions proposed by the Black Prince. The Prince proposed that Pedro take up permanent residence in Toledo, marry a woman of legitimate birth, and produce an heir to the throne of Castille. In the meantime, the Prince would act as regent for the kingdom of Castille and various individuals of note, such as Martin Lopez de Cordoba and Juan Fernandez de Castro, would act as governors in specified regions of the kingdom. Even Ayala admits that he cannot verify this story,⁷⁴ but the future behavior of the Prince lends a certain degree of authenticity to it and to the possibility that such a plan had been proposed.

At the conclusion of the peace treaty in August, the Black Prince began his departure from Castille for the reasons already mentioned; political problems in Gascony.

⁷³Ayala, pp. 497-498.

⁷⁴Ibid.

financial necessity, and the severe effect the Castillian summer had had upon his army motivated the Prince to return to Gascony. Provisions had been made, nevertheless, for the Prince to continue negotiations with Navarre and Aragon later in the year. Thus we must conclude that in spite of his brilliant victory at Najera, his political conduct during his six months in the Iberian Peninsula are subject to criticism. His inability to separate the essential strategic needs of England from his own personal ambitions undermined the entire value of the English invasion and the restoration of Pedro. Only a year earlier the Prince had strongly put forth arguments supporting legitimate kingship. Now he was in the midst of preparations to remove Pedro from the throne of Castille, totally ignoring his legitimacy, the wishes of the Castillian people, and the Anglo-Castillian treaty of 1362. It must never have occurred to the Prince that the Castillian people, faced with a choice between four foreign rulers or the usurper, would inevitably have chosen the usurper.⁷⁵

While the Prince of Wales was involved in these unorthodox diplomatic negotiations and Pedro of Castille was making a serious attempt to gather the necessary funds in order to liquidate his debts to the Prince, Enrique of Trastamara was continuing his plans for his return to Castille. The last mention of Enrique was after he had written to the

⁷⁵Russell, English Intervention, p. 126.

king of Aragon on May 24th, attempting to detach him from making any commitment to the English or his rival for the throne of Castille.⁷⁶ His letter was full of arrogance and confidence and clearly showed that Enrique believed he would once again occupy the throne of Castille. Although favorable to the usurper's plan to return to Castille, Charles V was not prepared to turn his protege loose until sufficient preparations had been made and the time was right. Actually, Enrique himself was not yet prepared in May to re-enter Castille; rather he intended to threaten the borders of the duchy of Gascony and thus oblige the Prince of Wales to cross again the Pyrenees, stripping Pedro of his military support. It is entirely possible that the fear of leaving his principality open to the assault of an audacious enemy such as Enrique was very instrumental in bringing about the withdrawal of the Prince from Castille even before Pedro had made the initial payment promised in April of 1367. The thought of supporting a war on both sides of the Pyrenees was enough in itself to encourage the Prince to depart quickly from Castille.⁷⁷

We have already seen that the retreat of the Prince began in August,⁷⁸ well before Enrique had been able to

⁷⁶Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1079, folio 71.

⁷⁷Sitges, Las Mujeres del Rey Don Pedro Primero de Castille, p. 299.

⁷⁸French National Archives, Paris, J. 1036, no. 26, dated August 13, 1367.

take any kind of punitive measures against Gascony. The essential point is that Pedro, now stripped of his English support, would receive no more aid from the English. At the same time, Enrique continued to receive the strong and consistent aid of the French which had been at his disposal since 1366. On the 13th of August, Enrique met with the duke of Anjou at Aigues-Mortes. He concluded a treaty of alliance, both offensive and defensive, against the king of England, his children, and the kingdom of Navarre.⁷⁹ The war against England was to be resumed as soon as Enrique was once more in possession of the kingdom of Castille.⁸⁰ This treaty was confirmed by the usurper on September 8th in his castle at Pierrepertuse. At this time the bastard was so encouraged by the reports from Castille of widespread dissatisfaction with the rule of Don Pedro that he believed his conquest would be even easier than the one in 1366.⁸¹ As a result, he boasted that he would be prepared to open military operations against the English by March of the following year. In reality, it would take Enrique a year and a half of bitter and bloody fighting before Castille was once more his. Not only would he find the conquest of Castille more difficult on his second attempt, but the project of

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ayala, pp. 500-501, 507-508.

getting to Castille was considerably more complicated on this second occasion. This was primarily because the king of Aragon was no longer an ally of the usurper. This new attitude was not only due to the fact that En Pere did not wish to bring the wrath of the Prince of Wales upon his kingdom, but also because of the possibility that a portion of Castille could fall to him as a result of the negotiations between the English and Aragonese.

It nevertheless appears that the Aragonese king had not yet placed full confidence in the fact that the English would not invade his kingdom. On August 8th he wrote a letter to the captain of Tauste and the municipal magistrate of Sos, instructing them to keep their defenses in prime condition in case of an English attack.⁸² On September 4th the Aragonese king replied to a letter from the duke of Anjou, who had requested that En Pere allow Enrique and his soldiers to cross the Aragonese kingdom. In uncompromising terms, En Pere stated that under no conditions would Enrique and his troops be allowed to cross Aragonese territory.⁸³ The same day En Pere wrote to Enrique of Trastamara.⁸⁴ This letter, in less uncompromising terms, implied that the refusal to allow Enrique to cross Aragonese territory was the

⁸² Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1217, folio 215.

⁸³ Ibid., Reg. 1218, folio 3, Zaragoza.

⁸⁴ Ibid., folio 5-5^{vo}, Zaragoza, dated September 8, 1367.

result of a treaty between Aragon and Castille which would expire on the 15th of October. Though not stating it frankly, the Aragonese king inferred that Enrique's request could be approved with the expiration of that treaty. This was obviously just a dilatory response and a means of gaining time. Enrique, however, did not have the patience or the time to wait until the indicated date. His partisans in Castille were pressing him to put himself at the head of the rebellion which was already beginning. Enrique himself, mistrusting the intentions of the Aragonese king, went ahead and entered the country in the valley of the Ebre in the early part of September. Although Enrique counted many enemies at the court of Aragon, he also found many supporters.⁸⁵ His most influential and ardent supporter was the uncle of the Aragonese king, the count of Ribagorza. It was agreed, unknown to En Pere that Enrique would enter upper Aragon from the county of Ribagorza and from there he would reach the Castillian border as rapidly as possible.

En Pere, on the basis of false information, had concentrated most of his troops on the Aragonese frontier to resist a crossing by Enrique and his mercenaries. This decision was the result of false and conflicting news which the Trastamaran had spread throughout the Aragonese court, stories that Enrique would enter by the pass of Panissars and that he would go by sea to the Guadalquivir, that he

⁸⁵Zurita, Vol. II, p. 349.

would come alone dressed as a monk in order not to be recognized. There were even letters sent disclosing his route which were intended to be intercepted by the Aragonese in efforts to deceive them.⁸⁶ All these details are found in the instructions sent with En Pere's ambassador to the Prince of Wales in October of 1367. This document constitutes a type of memoir which was intended to exonerate En Pere in the eyes of the Prince of Wales, who suspected his complicity in allowing the Trastamaran forces to cross Aragon.⁸⁷

Enrique entered Aragon through the county of Foix and had managed to make his way despite extraordinary fatigue through passes which were impractical for horsemen. Eventually he emerged in the valley of Andorra in the kingdom of Aragon.⁸⁸ After two days of rest in Eran, he reached the county of Ribogorza where he was well received and his forces were provisioned. From there the usurper continued his route to Estadilla and Barbastro, and by the 28th he arrived in Calahorra, where a few years earlier he had been proclaimed king of Castille.

When he learned that Enrique had in fact entered his kingdom, En Pere took steps to hinder his passage.⁸⁹ And if

⁸⁶ Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1218, folio 24, as cited by Miret y Sans, p. 131.

⁸⁷ Ibid., folio 26, as cited by Miret y Sans, pp. 131-132.

⁸⁸ Ayala, p. 511.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Enrique had been successful in outwitting the Aragonese king, not all of the army had been able to do the same. Some of his Castillian followers were captured on the march and imprisoned at Cerdanya.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, En Pere did not wish to use extreme severity and thus reach a complete break with Enrique and his protectors.⁹¹ His attempt to prevent Enrique from crossing Aragon, though unsuccessful, appeared to satisfy Pedro of Castille. It was for this reason that En Pere wrote to the military governor of Cerdanya that the prisoners taken were to be treated well.⁹²

It had been only a half year after his total defeat at Najera that the usurper had returned to Castillian territory. Having taken Calahorra without a blow and having been warmly received by the population, Enrique was ready once more to begin his attempt for the crown of Castille. The results of Najera were indeed ephemeral. It is very pertinent, then, to ask why. How did this incredible chain of events come about? The answer is a simple one. There are a number of factors which contributed to the fall of Pedro and the ascension of Enrique as king of Castille, but there are two factors which stand out above all the others. First was the dismal political showing of the Black Prince, who showed himself incapable of separating his own ambitions and personal prejudices from the strategic necessities of

⁹⁰Miret y Sans, p. 131.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

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England. Second was the consistent determination of Charles V to support his protege, Enrique of Trastamara, in order to achieve the political and military advantages in the Middle Kingdom which he deemed of utmost necessity in the coming conflict with England.

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CHAPTER X

TRASTAMARAN VICTORY

1368-1369

The success the bastard experienced in his reception at Calahorra must have encouraged him in his new attempt to conquer the crown of Castille. But as the next year would show, the speedy success he had achieved eighteen months earlier was not to be repeated on this second occasion. This time, the usurper had brought with him only 500-600 French mercenaries,¹ a force joined by approximately 2,000 Trastamaran supporters within Castille, now gathering with the usurper at Calahorra.²

It was not until the middle of October that Enrique began his march toward Burgos, on the way making an unsuccessful attempt to gain entrance to the royalist city of Logorno. He made no attempt to subdue the city, however, as its fortifications were very strong.³ As Enrique approached Burgos, he was greeted by a delegation of citizens who informed him that they were prepared to accept him into the city as their sovereign. But he was informed that he

¹Ayala, pp. 513-514.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 515.

must be prepared to encounter resistance from both the garrison in the castle and from the Jewish quarter. After several days of hard fighting, both of these parties capitulated and came to terms with their new master.

With his success there, Enrique remained in Burgos until at least the 6th of November, when he departed for Leon. By the end of 1368, it also had fallen under the sway of Enrique. The year ended, however, without the usurper being able to leave the northern part of Castille. His boast that he would be able to aid the French against the English by March of the following year was clearly an overstatement of his influence in Castille. It had become clear that Enrique of Trastamara would have to conquer Castille piecemeal since he did not possess sufficient forces to do so rapidly. The unfortunate kingdom of Castille, then, faced several years of civil war which would extend beyond the death of Pedro I in 1369.

In another respect, the position of Enrique was more precarious in 1368 than it had been during his attempt in 1366. Now, instead of being able to count on the strong support of the king of Aragon, Enrique had to count En Pere among his enemies. This was due first to the humiliation the Aragonese king had suffered because Enrique had violated his territory by crossing without his permission. Secondly, Enrique now also represented an obstacle to the territorial ambitions of En Pere which had developed in his negotiations

with the English. Enrique, established as king of Castille with strong French support, would represent a considerably more formidable obstacle to the partition of Castille than would Pedro, who by now had been deserted by the Black Prince. Charles V, having endeavored so long to gain the support of Castille, could not be expected to remain idle while the Prince and En Pere satisfied their territorial ambitions at the expense of Castille. It may have been with this in mind that En Pere renewed the truce between himself and Pedro in March of 1368.⁴

Meanwhile, it was necessary for the usurper to decide where to direct his next course of action. Though he knew that the city of Cordoba had declared in his behalf,⁵ there was a division of opinion on the matter of Enrique's moving into the southern part of Castille. The majority opinion in the Trastamaran camp was that he should devote his attention to the northern part of the kingdom because of his limited financial support and the inadequacy of his army to undertake a major campaign in Andalucia. As a result in the early months of 1368, Enrique concentrated his efforts on the major towns in northern Castille; among those which fell to him was Madrid.⁶ Finally, on the 13th of April,

⁴Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1216, folio 96-96vo.

⁵Ayala, p. 517.

⁶Ibid., p. 528.

Enrique began his siege of the impregnable fortress of Toledo, a siege which would last for nearly a year.

During this time, for unaccountable reasons, Pedro remained inactive, remaining for the most part in his Andalusian capital of Seville. Obviously, he lacked confidence in the forces at his disposal and possibly hoped that the English would return to honor their agreement of 1362. Although no documentary evidence has survived, it can be inferred from future events that Pedro must also have devoted a considerable amount of his attention to negotiation with the Moors in Granada during the early months of 1368. By that summer, a firm alliance had been established between the Moors and Pedro, an alliance, which we will see, was a mixed blessing for the Castillian king.⁷

While these events were going on in Castille, other diplomatic forces were at work outside the Iberian Peninsula that would drastically alter the future course of Castillian history. The Prince of Wales, having departed from Castille in August of 1367, crossing Navarran territory, was back in his own duchy by late August. By early September, he was in the city of Bourdeaux.⁸ During his absence in Castille, the Prince had known of the intrigues and plots of Charles V and the duke of Anjou. The time had now come for the Prince to

⁷Garcia, pp. 416 and 417, N. 1.

⁸Froissart, Chronicles, VII, p. 64, n. 1.

take his revenge.⁹ The means he would use were close at hand. The Companies he had brought back with him from Castille were once again unemployed, and he now turned them loose on France to ravage the countryside, with what appeared to be his sanction. If the Companies did not operate under the explicit orders of the Prince, they must have at least had his approval for their actions. By December most of these Companies had crossed the French frontier and were once more bringing fire and plunder to that war-torn nation, extending their activities through 1368. Though the details of their activities need not concern us here,¹⁰ it can simply be said that their activities brought havoc to various parts of France all the way from Burgundy to Normandy and Anjou. Even Paris, for a period of time, was threatened. The inaction of the English king in preventing these outrages on French territory and the apparent encouragement of the Prince of Wales heightened an already hostile feeling which existed between France and England. The duke of Anjou believed, particularly, that his territory had been singled out for specific destruction for the part he played in thwarting the expedition of the Prince to Castille.¹¹

⁹Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁰An excellent account can be found in Roland Delachenal's History of Charles V, Vol. III, Chapter 11, Part IV.

¹¹French National Archives, Reg. 3884, folio 15.

It was not long after his return to Bordeaux in September that much to his chagrin the Prince learned that Enrique was once again in Castille. His frustration must have been as great as was his anger against the Aragonese king, whom he believed to be an accomplice in this latest Trastamaran move. As a result, the Prince decided not to send representatives to the conference scheduled in October between the Aragonese and English representatives. Instead, he sent a letter to the Aragonese king demanding an explanation of how the Trastamaran forces had crossed Aragon.¹² En Pere quickly responded with a detailed explanation to the Prince which we cited above.¹³ The Prince seemed to be persuaded by this correspondence that En Pere had tried to live up to his obligations, and consequently he agreed to resume the negotiations at Tarbes early in November.

The Prince was to be represented by two of his most distinguished followers, the duke of Armagnac and John Chandos. Both the Prince of Wales and En Pere were represented at Tarbes by the same delegates who had begun the negotiations at Tarazona earlier in the year. The significantly new feature at Tarbes was the presence of the delegation from Navarre. The presence of the Navarran delegates, first of all, represented the expanding scope and complexity of the negotiations

¹²Gutierrez de Velasco, pp. 260-261.

¹³Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1218, folio 24, as cited in Miret y Sans, p. 131.

now underway; and second and most important, it is through the survival of Navarran documents that we are made aware of the actual nature of these negotiations.¹⁴ The purpose of these meetings was to bring to a culmination the secret Anglo-Aragonese negotiations which had been underway since November of 1367. It is also clear from these documents that a Castillian delegation was also present at Tarbes. It appears that Pedro I had sent a delegation to confer with the Prince after the latter had left Castille. When the Castillian delegates arrived at Bordeaux, they were informed by the English that significant negotiations were already underway in Tarbes which the Castillian delegates should join. Thus in November the four delegations--Aragonese, English, Castillian, and Navarran--plunged into a series of elaborate negotiations. The complexity of these negotiations were intensified because a great deal said had to be kept a secret from the Castillian delegation.

A considerable amount of time was allocated to a discussion on the possibility of establishing a permanent peace between Aragon and Castille.¹⁵ Most of these plans centered around the possibility of a marriage alliance. One plan called for a marriage between the heir of Aragon and Dona Constance, the second daughter of Pedro. Castillian

¹⁴Archives of the Chamber of the Counts of Navarre, Cajon, 22:70.

¹⁵Gutierrez de Valasco, pp. 262-263.

territory then claimed by Aragon could be granted to the Aragonese king in the form of a dowry. A second proposal was that Pedro himself might marry the second daughter of En Pere, Joanna. It was the first of these two plans, however, which seemed to have the greatest possibility of acceptance.

These negotiations were only for appearance. The real interest was the secret negotiations and the partition of the Middle Kingdom.¹⁶ By the middle of November, the English, Aragonese and Navarran representatives had progressed far enough to commit certain plans to writing and submit them to the three principals involved: En Pere, Charles, and the Prince of Wales.¹⁷ "Read after 600 years, the results of their deliberations placed on record startling proof of the utter lack of understanding of the Castilian problem which animated the Prince and his advisors."¹⁸ The drafted agreement at Tarbes proposed that a joint mission be sent to Pedro I with an ultimatum.¹⁹ It was to inform him that he would be given substantial military support from the three parties involved, providing he was willing to

¹⁶Archives of the Chamber of the Counts of Navarre, Cajon 22:70.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Russell, English Intervention, p. 135.

¹⁹Archives of the Chamber of the Counts of Navarre, Cajon 22:70.

subsidize it and give a satisfactory settlement of the existing financial and territorial claims of the Prince,²⁰ and similar claims En Pere and Charles II might put forth for their part in the undertaking.²¹

Without waiting for a reply from the Castillian king, En Pere and Charles II, with the Prince's approval, made a similar offer to Enrique of Trastamara. He was informed that if he was prepared to make similar concessions, the English would withdraw their support from Pedro and the Prince would not prevent his subjects from making their own private arrangements to join the Trastamaran army.²² The agreement also demanded that if the usurper accepted the terms put forth, he would surrender as hostages²³ his heir Don Juan, his daughter Leonor, his brother Don Tello, as well as a number of his most influential supporters in Castille.²⁴

In both cases, Enrique and Pedro had only forty

²⁰Neither the Prince, En Pere, nor Charles II were prepared to formulate at this time any final declaration of their financial and territorial claims against Castille. Archives of the Chamber of Counts of Navarre, Cajon 22:70.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³En Pere had obviously not forgotten that Enrique had defaulted on earlier promises given him. We may then conjecture that the hostages were demanded at the Aragonese king's request.

²⁴Archives of the Chamber of the Counts of Navarre, Cajon 22:70.

days to reply to this proposal put forth at Tarbes. The final decision on which party to support was to be made by the joint Anglo-Aragonese and Navarran delegation no later than April 2, 1368, at a place to be selected in the near future.²⁵ If it turned out that both had rejected the offer, then discussion would turn to the possibility of how to bring about the conquest of the kingdom of Castille and its partition among the three interested parties.²⁶ It is apparent, then, that the three princes involved in the Tarbes negotiations believed it was within their power to determine the fate of Castille and that of the two men competing for the throne. They further believed they could do this without resorting to standard diplomacy with the parties involved, that an ultimatum would suffice. In doing this, they failed to take under consideration the personalities of the two men involved, Enrique and Pedro, but possibly even more important, the French government, which had already invested so much time and money in an attempt to win Castille as an ally. Charles V in 1368 was as determined as ever that Castille would enter the soon to be resumed conflict with England as an ally of France, not England.²⁷

Peter Edward Russell, in his discussion of the Tarbes

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Russell, English Intervention, p. 136.

meeting, asked a very pertinent question: "What results were these proposals really intended to achieve?" Incredibly, there is an indication that even though the Prince might still have preferred to come to terms with Pedro, under the proper conditions he was prepared to accept an agreement with the Trastamaran usurper. This action would have been incredible under the existing circumstances. It will be recalled that the English alliance of 1362 had been instigated with the sole intent of gaining the support of the Castillian fleet. It now appeared that the Prince of Wales was willing to negotiate with, and in fact accept, Enrique of Trastamara as king of Castille at a time when the war between France and England was about to be renewed. The Black Prince's support of a man who had been little more than a puppet of the French government for the past ten years would make him appear to be a complete fool. Russell offers a possible answer to this confusing action by the Prince. "The manner of the approach to be made to Pedro and Enrique and the harsh terms offered to them both make it necessary to ask the question if the negotiators at Tarbes seriously expected either to accept."²⁸ The Tarbes agreement had clearly stipulated that if either Pedro or Enrique failed to accept the terms offered them, the three allies involved would take military action to obtain their goal.²⁹ Russell

²⁸Ibid., p. 137.

²⁹Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Cajon 22:77.

suggests that military action may have been the intention of the allies from the beginning and consequently the Black Prince changed sides for his own benefit. The terms offered Pedro and Enrique were only a formality and there was never a serious belief they would be accepted. Consequently, discussion had already begun on the method of carving up the Castillian state.³⁰

The tentative division that had been agreed upon provided that the central portion of the kingdom and the title of king would be allocated to the Prince of Wales.³¹ "We cannot therefore exclude the possibility that it was his ambition rather than the financial worry which led Edward III's son to lend himself to a scheme so absurd as that drawn up at Tarbes."³² One additional rider, however, had been attached to this agreement providing that no steps could be taken to implement the agreement until the approval of Edward III had been obtained. It is possible that by this time the Prince had received some kind of communication from England that his independence in diplomatic matters had definite limitations.³³ As a result, in early 1368 En Pere dispatched a diplomatic mission to England with the responsibility of securing an alliance between Aragon and England

³⁰Zurita, Vol. II, p. 353.

³¹Ibid.

³²Russell, English Intervention, p. 137.

³³Ibid.

and obtaining the approval of Edward III to the Tarbes agreement.³⁴ Thus, when the Prince should have been devoting his resources and energy to preserving England's ally and assuring his nation the support of the Castillian fleet, he was busily pursuing his own interest in a scheme which was totally detrimental to both Pedro and England.

Meanwhile in 1368 the military operations between Pedro and Enrique dragged on. Enrique continued the siege of Toledo but the defenders of the city, supported by the impregnable walls, could not be overcome. Enrique did experience some successes in subduing several royal strongholds in the vicinity of Toledo. Pedro was even more inactive, for reasons that cannot be completely explained.³⁵ It is entirely probable, though, that his inactivity can be attributed to his lack of forces and his mistrust for those that were at his disposal. Pedro did, however, make one significant move during the year 1368 in that he enlisted the aid of the king of Granada.³⁶ In return for the surrender of various territories to the Granadan kingdom, Pedro received the support of several thousand Moorish horsemen. These forces he instantly turned loose on the city of Cordoba which had already declared itself for the usurper.

³⁴Gutierrez de Velasco, pp. 264-265.

³⁵Sitges, p. 301.

³⁶Ayala, p. 525.

Cordoba at that time was not only one of the most important cities in Andalucia, but it also harbored some of the most important men opposed to Pedro. Among them were Don Gonzalo Mexia, Master of Santiago, Don Pedro Moniz, Master of Calatrava, and Don Juan Alfonso de Guzman. Had Pedro been successful in taking Cordoba with Granadan help, it most certainly would have been a serious blow to the Trastamaran cause. The attack, in fact, carried right into the streets of the city, but a forceful defense by the Cordobans finally turned the invaders back. However, it was not before they had brought a great deal of bloodshed and destruction to the city.

Next, Moorish forces were directed against the Trastamaran cities of Jaen and Eubeda. In both cases the cities were totally sacked and destroyed. According to Ayala, the Moors carried off into captivity 11,000 Christian prisoners.³⁷ It is very possible that the act of Pedro in engaging the Moors on his side harmed his position in Castille. As Garcia points out, the enlistment of the Moslem forces changed the nature of the war from a political to a religious struggle.³⁸

One other event in 1368 deserves mention. In the summer of that year, Charles II of Navarre, taking advantage

³⁷Ibid., p. 529.

³⁸Garcia, pp. 416-417.

of the civil strife in the Castillian kingdom and without waiting for news from London for the acceptance of the Tarbes agreement, seized the opportunity to make himself master of the territory which Pedro had granted to him at Libourne in September of 1366.³⁹ In May and early June, the Navarran army occupied Victoria, Logorno, Salvatierra, Laguardia and other towns in Alava.⁴⁰ The result of this Navarran move was more damaging to Pedro than to Enrique since most of the towns now occupied by the Navarrans had remained loyal to Pedro and were now lost to the royalist cause. But the summer of 1368 was to have far more drastic results for Pedro than this.

The year 1368 brought a stalemate to the civil war. It is entirely possible that the status quo could have been maintained for several years longer had the French not tipped the balance in favor of Enrique of Trastamara. The failure of Enrique to make good his earlier claims of an easy victory in Castille caused great concern in the French court. Charles V, realizing that the war with England was soon to be resumed, had no desire to engage himself in an extended campaign in the Iberian Peninsula. At the same time, he recognized more clearly than his enemies the need to have the Castillian fleet on his side when the war was resumed.

³⁹Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 405, n. 2, and Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Reg. 125.

⁴⁰Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 405.

As a result, in spite of the grave dangers to which he exposed his kingdom, Charles made preparations to assist Enrique in his final victory in Castille. Consequently, on July 18, 1368, the French king sent to Spain a mission, composed of Francois de Perellos, his new admiral Jean de Ruy, and Thibaud Hochi, one of his notaries and secretaries.⁴¹ Charles gave his representatives a double mission. First, they were instructed to smooth out the differences between the king of Aragon and Enrique of Trastamara. This explains the presence of Perellos in the French delegation. The French king, of course, was obviously desirous of breaking any agreement which might mature from the Anglo-Aragonese relations and would obviously lead to a lessening of French influence in the Iberian Peninsula.⁴² For this reason, Charles V offered himself as arbitrator over the differences between the Aragonese king and Enrique. The delegation had very little success in these negotiations because of the territorial ambitions of En Pere which had been stimulated by the Anglo-Aragonese talks of the summer of 1367 and furthered by the agreements reached at Tarbes in September of 1367.

The position of Pedro of Castille was becoming increasingly perilous every day, but the Aragonese king was

⁴¹French National Archives, J 603, no. 59.

⁴²Ibid.

not yet prepared to change sides. The mission of the French ambassadors had a second, and more important purpose which was to establish a new alliance with the Castillian usurper. In expectation of the coming war with England, Charles V needed a strong ally in the Iberian Peninsula. It was above all necessary that his allies support him at sea. Consequently, the prime instruction given to the envoys was to complete an alliance with Enrique which assured them of the cooperation of the Castillian fleet. As a result, the French delegation went from Aragon to Castille. Sometime in late October or early November they arrived at the usurper's camp before the walls of Toledo and there the serious negotiations began.⁴³

The terms put forth by the French delegation were harsh ones. The French were prepared to send enough reinforcements to Castille to insure the victory of Enrique, but the latter had first to pledge himself to pay the price. When the hostilities broke out between England and France, the Castillian fleet was to be at the disposal of the French government and was thereafter to be permanently mobilized on behalf of France as long as the war should last. Even if the war in Castille was still underway, Enrique would nevertheless be obliged to mobilize all the naval strength in Castille that he was capable of mustering and send these

⁴³Ibid., no. 60.

forces to French waters in time for the campaigning season of 1369. The costs of maintaining the fleet on active service against England was the responsibility of the Castilian treasury.⁴⁴ We can understand, then, why Enrique hesitated at committing himself to such stringent terms, but his position was too much in jeopardy to refuse. As a result, on the 20th of November, he signed a treaty which committed him to the French terms.⁴⁵ Some ill-defined points of this document were cleared up in an additional act signed and dated June 8, 1369.⁴⁶

When Charles V had received word that Enrique had submitted to his demands, he immediately dispatched du Guesclin to Castille to finish that struggle as quickly as possible in favor of Enrique.⁴⁷ In April, 1368, du Guesclin

⁴⁴French National Archives, J 603, no. 59, and Rymer, Vol. III (ii), pp. 850-852.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶French National Archives, J 603, no. 61.

⁴⁷We have had nothing to say about that gallant soldier of fortune, Bertrand du Guesclin, since his defeat and capture at the battle of Najera in April, 1367. Du Guesclin became constable of the French army in October, 1370 and held that post until his death in July, 1380. He had been taken back to Aquitaine with the Prince, the most prized possession of all the prisoners taken at Najera. There is no doubt that despite his great ransom value, the Prince was not eager to set the prisoner free. According to both Ayala and Froissart, du Guesclin was able to bring about his release through the employment of cleverness and finesse which played upon the Prince's vanity and sense of chivalry. The chroniclers record that du Guesclin told the Prince that it was being said in France and elsewhere that the Prince feared him so much that he dared not set him free. Upon hearing this, the Prince stated that he could have his freedom upon payment of a ransom

was in command of the French forces in southern France, having been given the responsibility of ridding Languedoc of the mercenaries that had been ravaging that territory since their return from the Castillian campaign in August, 1367. The presence of du Guesclin in Languedoc also served a second function. Since the diplomatic efforts to dissuade En Pere from the English alliance had failed, this action by the French government was an attempt to bring further pressure upon him with the closeness of French forces. Once again, however, the Aragonese king remained adamant and continued his negotiations with the English. In November, the order had come to du Guesclin to make preparation to cross once more into the Iberian Peninsula to aid Enrique in his final victory over Pedro of Castille. Du Guesclin easily found soldiers for this Castillian expedition. Languedoc was full of mercenaries who were eager to serve under a successful leader such as he.⁴⁸

This attack on Castille was to be a more difficult matter than it had been in 1367 for this time du Guesclin

of 100,000 francs. This was an enormous sum of money but du Guesclin did not find it difficult to find those who were prepared to put up the money for his ransom, among whom was the king himself. As a result, negotiations for du Guesclin's freedom went on from the end of November through the beginning of December. On January 13, 1368 he was finally free to leave Bordeaux. It may be added, though, that his enormous ransom was eventually paid by du Guesclin alone and the numerous advances made to him were nothing more than advances, even by the king of France. French National Archives, J 381, nos. 7 and 8.

⁴⁸Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 461.

could not cross Catalonia as he had done four years earlier to answer the call of En Pere. No attempt seems to have been made by the French king even to request the Aragonese king's formal permission for du Guesclin's journey. This was perhaps because Charles was certain that such a request would be refused. En Pere was well aware of the French plans by the end of November, and, in accordance with the terms of his agreement with Pedro I and the Black Prince, had made preparations to resist the infringement of his territorial sovereignty.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the Aragonese king did not wish to offend the great French captain for whom he still had a great deal of respect. Furthermore En Pere must have remembered the great services of du Guesclin to Aragon. Thus En Pere informed du Guesclin that he would permit him to cross his kingdom with a small following but not with the entire army.⁵⁰ An interesting document which has survived in the Aragonese archives indicates that En Pere still had hopes of employing the French captain to his own ends.⁵¹ Aragonese domination in Sardinia at this time was still seriously threatened by a widespread uprising. In the above mentioned document En Pere proposed to du Guesclin that he take a force of mercenaries

⁴⁹Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1080, folio 118^{vo}-119^{vo}.

⁵⁰Ibid., Reg. 1079, folio 158^{vo}.

⁵¹Miret y Sans, p. 132.

to Sardinia in the pay of the Aragonese king to pacify that land and return it to the control of the Aragonese monarchy.⁵² The services of du Guesclin, however, were too dearly needed by the French king at this time to release him into the services of a man who was already making hostile gestures to the French kingdom.

Attempts by En Pere to prevent du Guesclin and the Companies from crossing Aragonese territories were completely unsuccessful. Between the 15th and 20th of December, the French troops under du Guesclin entered upper Aragon as Enrique of Trastamara had done fifteen months earlier, and made their way south crossing the Aragonese kingdom. It is not known through which pass Bertrand crossed the Pyrenees but it is certain that, like the bastard, he passed through the county of Foix to upper Aragon. His itinerary then led him to the border of Navarre, where he threatened Navarran territory. Always taking advantage of every situation, du Guesclin profited from his nearness to Navarran territory by forcing Charles of Navarre to keep some earlier promises of territorial and monetary gifts which had been avoided when Pedro I returned to power in Castille. Because the Navarran king was at this time occupied with taking the Castillian territory that bordered his kingdom, du Guesclin was able to intimidate the queen of Navarre into paying a large

⁵²Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Reg. 1082, folio 43^{vo}-45.

sum of 26,000 gold florins to keep the mercenaries from entering Navarre.⁵³ In addition, territorial concessions were made to du Guesclin which had been promised to him in the invasion of 1366. In turn, he gave complete homage to the king of Navarre under the legitimate and necessary reservation that he would never serve against the king of France or Enrique of Trastamara.

From there, du Guesclin moved into Castille and in early February he joined his forces with those of Enrique, who was still involved in besieging Toledo. Pedro of Castille had, by this time, known for many months of the negotiations which had taken place with the intention of engulfing him and his kingdom. In early 1369 he began to take the necessary steps to try to counteract the diplomatic moves of his enemies. Under the circumstances, he decided to take the serious step of protesting directly to Edward III the manner in which the Black Prince was handling Castillian affairs. Consequently, sometime late in December of 1368, Juan Gutierrez, who had been present at the Libourne discussion, was dispatched from Seville to London with the rank of ambassador, to carry on these very difficult negotiations.

By the end of January, 1369, the ambassador was already in London and was presenting his grievances to the royal council.⁵⁴ On February 24th, the council replied to

⁵³Archives of the Chamber of the Count of Navarre, Cajon 172.

⁵⁴Public Record Office, Exchequer, file 59.

all the matters which the ambassador had raised on behalf of his master.⁵⁵ Pedro, first of all, requested from the English government a formal renewal of the alliance of 1362. It was once more proposed, as Martin Lopez de Cordoba had proposed in 1366, that the royal houses of England and Castille should be more closely associated by a marriage alliance. Juan Gutierrez then put forth several grievances of Pedro against the behavior of the Prince. First, he claimed that a main reason for Pedro's failure to settle his war debts with the Prince was the latter's refusal to render a complete account for the money he claimed. Secondly, the Castillian ambassador requested Edward III to intervene directly with his son to persuade him to cease showing such signs of hostility against the king of Castille, which had caused such a deterioration of Anglo-Castillian relations. And finally, the Castillian king complained of the hostile nature of the Prince's secret negotiations with Aragon and Navarre which had been going on since the summer of 1367.

The reply that the Council gave to these requests and complaints would have brought little satisfaction to the Castillian king had he lived to learn of them. Its members first rejected the proposal to renew the existing alliance of 1362 on the grounds that such a step was totally unnecessary since nothing had been done to alter the already

⁵⁵Ibid., diplomatic document no. 1553.

existing alliance. As long as Pedro continued to honor the terms of that alliance, Edward would do the same.⁵⁶ The question of the marriage alliance produced a very evasive answer. The Council put the matter off for the time being⁵⁷ but promised to give it serious consideration and provide an answer to the Castillian king regarding this matter as soon as possible. There was a slight concession on the point concerning Pedro's indebtedness to the Prince. The Council concurred with the Castillian ambassador's demand that the Prince at once give Pedro a full and final statement of his claims. The Council agreed that it was reasonable that such a statement should be provided and that Edward should write to his son and instruct him to present a final and correct statement of Pedro's indebtedness without delay.⁵⁸ "Edward III and his councillors were by no means disposed to accept the other criticisms of the Prince's behavior which the Castillian king had ventured to make."⁵⁹ The Castillian advisor was to inform his master that in the eyes of the English king and the Royal Council, the anger of the Black Prince against Pedro was totally justified.⁶⁰ In this

⁵⁶Russell, English Intervention, p. 145.

⁵⁷Public Record Office, Exchequer, diplomatic document no. 1553.

⁵⁸Russell, English Intervention, pp. 145-146.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 146.

⁶⁰Ibid.

respect, the English Council was acting on strong grounds, for it contended that if Pedro would dismiss his financial and territorial obligations to the Prince that cordial relations between the two men could be quickly restored. The complaint over the Anglo-Aragonese relations simply met with a firm denial.⁶¹ It was made quite clear that no future military help for Pedro would be forthcoming. It was called to the attention of the Castillian ambassador that one of the major clauses of the alliance of 1362 provided that neither kingdom was bound to help the other if it needed its forces for its own war.⁶² Again, the English government was acting on a firm and legal basis. The same conditions, however, had not prevented Charles V from sending military forces to Castille to bring about the military victory which he sought so eagerly. It can only be concluded that the French king recognized more clearly than the English government the valuable role that Castille, specifically its fleet, was to play in the next round of the Hundred Years War. "The whole tone of the answer given to Gutierrez by the Council makes it plain that it was believed in London the radical settlement of the Castillian problem which Aragonese envoys had recently been discussing there would soon be ended. There was, therefore, no point in discussing the future of Castille with one who, it was thought, would soon find

⁶¹Public Record Office, Exchequer, diplomatic document no. 1553.

⁶²Ibid.

himself without a kingdom."⁶³ This explanation appears to be the only logical one for the English behavior. Why else would Edward III be prepared to so easily discard an alliance he had labored so diligently for since the 1340's?

Pedro I never learned that the English government had abandoned him to his fate. At the beginning of 1369, Pedro received the alarming news from Toledo that the inhabitants and garrison in the town who were still loyal to his cause were in such extremities⁶⁴ that it was important Pedro come to their aid. The inhabitants could not much longer endure the Trastamaran siege.⁶⁵ As a result, Pedro decided that he must at last make an effort to relieve the city. After having placed in security his most valuable possessions at Carmona,⁶⁶ he left Seville with a force that could not have numbered more than 4,000 horsemen, including the contingent of Moors sent by the king of Granada.⁶⁷ Pedro seemed to have no concrete plan or itinerary. The only guide we have of the details available is from Ayala. It appears that he may have first moved in a westward direction toward the Portuguese border, then slowly north in order to come around upon his enemy and surprise them from

⁶³Russell, English Intervention, pp. 146-147.

⁶⁴Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, M13023.

⁶⁵Ayala, p. 536.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 547.

the rear. This move may also have been an attempt to prevent the arrival of reinforcements which Enrique was anticipating from the north of Castille.⁶⁸ For some unknown reason, Pedro continued his march east beyond Toledo, possibly once more changing his mind, believing it was still too risky to engage the Trastamaran army.⁶⁹

At the same time, a council of war was being held in the Trastamaran camp. The unanimous opinion was that it was necessary to pursue Pedro, to find him as soon as possible, and to destroy his army before he received the rest of the partisans which he had kept in Castille.⁷⁰ The fact that reinforcements had recently reached the Trastamaran camp from Cordoba made it possible for the Trastamarans to continue the siege of Toledo and at the same time pursue the royalist army.⁷¹ The plan was made even more plausible by the recent arrival of Bertrand du Guesclin and his French mercenaries. Enrique set out on March 10th with the force of 3,000 soldiers, intent upon destroying the royalist forces. Enrique had been kept informed of Pedro's activities since the latter had left Seville. Included was the information that Pedro had taken refuge in the castle of Montiel which

⁶⁸Ayala, p. 536, and Garcia, Vol. I, pp. 421-422.

⁶⁹Ayala, p. 547.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 546.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 546-547.

belonged to the Order of Santiago. Thanks to the presence of du Guesclin, the Trastamaran forces carried out its march with great speed and determination.⁷²

It was not yet daybreak when in the early hours of Wednesday, March 14, 1369, the Trastamaran army arrived within sight of Montiel. The position of the royalist forces was greatly aggravated by the fact that they had been taken by surprise. Their position was poorly guarded and Pedro had been ill-informed of the movements of his adversary. As Pedro was at that time expecting reinforcements from Andalusia, he believed, as did those all about him, that the torches they saw in the distance belonged to an approaching body of reinforcements.⁷³ The battle itself began in full daylight. It was short and not very bloody.⁷⁴ Because of the nature of the terrain, Pedro's troops were dispersed throughout the village, far from the scene of the activities. In the few instances in which they actually tried to oppose the Trastamaran forces, they were quickly overcome. Pedro lost few of his followers in the battle, but he suddenly found himself without an army any longer.⁷⁵ With a few of his servants he saved himself by taking refuge in the castle of Montiel. It was a well-constructed fortress and in the

⁷²Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 474.

⁷³Ayala, p. 548.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 549.

⁷⁵Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 475.

fourteenth century was capable of defying a prolonged and extensive attack. However, when Pedro came to seek refuge in it, he found it had not been supplied to sustain a siege of even short duration. The water most notably was of insufficient quantity.⁷⁶ Utilizing the opportunity which had presented itself, Enrique took no chances and immediately built an earthwork wall around the fortress to prevent the escape of Pedro. Thus, any hope of escape on the part of the Castillian king was impossible. At the same time, the lack of the necessary provisions made it impossible to seek shelter behind the walls of Montiel for more than a few days. Taking a last desperate step, Pedro entered into negotiations with du Guesclin, hoping to buy his safety. The Frenchman was untempted, however, by the generous offers made to him by the king, and immediately conveyed the information to Enrique.⁷⁷ Du Guesclin pretended to accept Pedro's offer and the Castillian king left Montiel and went to the lodging of du Guesclin where he believed his escape would be made possible. Instead, he found himself confronted by his brother Enrique, who, in the midst of a struggle, murdered Pedro and thus removed the last obstacle to his possession of the throne of Castille.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ayala, p. 554.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 551.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 556.

The death of Pedro sealed the English hope of gaining a foothold in the Middle Kingdom. Charles V would take everything from the Castillian alliance that he had hoped and worked for. Montiel was a culmination of an English diplomatic failure which had begun in the 1340's when Edward III had attempted to marry his daughter to the heir of Castille. A very significant chapter in Castillian history had come to an end, as well as one of the most interesting and intriguing periods in its diplomatic history.

CONCLUSION

It should be apparent that the reign of Pedro I of Castille represented one of the most significant periods in the diplomatic history of Castille. The main problem is how one should interpret these events in regard to Castille. The position and interest of the French and English kingdoms have already been stated on numerous occasions throughout this work. In both cases, the paramount interest was to obtain the military support of the Castillian fleet. But what of the interest of Pedro himself? Does his foreign policy represent an interest in political matters north of the Pyrenees? After carefully scrutinizing the man, I believe not.

Throughout the reign of Pedro there were numerous examples of political relations with nations outside of the Iberian Peninsula. It appears that the interest of the monarch was nevertheless entirely limited to the peninsula. His policy was twofold. First, he desired to become total and complete master of his own kingdom; and second, he wished to achieve an unchallenged hegemony in the Iberian Peninsula. In an attempt to achieve his first goal he created a large and threatening force in his own kingdom which opposed him. This force rallied behind the ambitions of Pedro's illegitimate brother, Enrique of Trastamara. That the great majority of the Castillian nobility opposed Pedro is not

surprising. In his quest to achieve absolute rule in his kingdom he did not fail to resort to the most tyrannical and harsh measures. It is not true, however, that this made him a unique figure in fourteenth century Iberian politics. Beyond question, his contemporary rulers in Aragon and Portugal could equal, and in some cases surpass, the harshness and cruelty of Pedro. We must not be easily led astray by his historical title of "the Cruel." We also must not fail to recognize that most of the history of this king which has survived had been written by his enemies and for this reason we must be suspicious of the great number of atrocities ascribed to him. However, this is not an attempt to vindicate Pedro. Many of his atrocities were inexcusable, but they simply did not distinguish him at that time in history.

However, that Pedro displayed extreme suspicion of those about him to the point of paranoia cannot be denied. Sitges¹ attributes this paranoia to the intrigues which surrounded Pedro during his boyhood and the constant betrayals he suffered during the early years of his kingship. Possibly Delachenal has been most successful in capturing the personality of this extraordinary man. "If we wish to better understand this ignominious figure, we must place him in his natural surroundings in Seville. Pedro will then appear to us as a kind of Arab monarch, not without nobility, full of

¹Sitges, pp. 173-175.

ardent and jealous passion, brightened by the climate of Andalusia and by the nearby influence of Moslem customs."²

Possibly, then, it is as an absolute Oriental despot rather than as a figure of Western nobility that Pedro must be viewed. This could very well explain the reason for the total animosity and misunderstanding which existed between the Castillian king and the Prince of Wales. The latter was imbued with a code of chivalry which appeared as nothing more than foolhardy nonsense to the former. Enrique of Trastamara, on the other hand, many years in exile in France, was much more palatable to the Westerners. He found himself fully imbued with western chivalry, a figure much more to the liking of the Prince of Wales. We can only guess at the answer to the question of how Charles V would have reacted to the unpopular Castillian king had the roles been reversed and he had been the supporter of Pedro and the Prince of Wales the supporter of Enrique. I would hazard a guess that Charles V would not have allowed his personal likings to interfere with his own political interest of which the Black Prince was guilty. Throughout the political struggle in Castille, Charles V continually demonstrated the consistency necessary to obtain that essential political goal.

Let us now return to the point of the opposition to Pedro's political aims in Castille. Those elements that opposed Pedro might not have ever had their opportunity to

²Delachenal, Vol. III, p. 253.

succeed had it not been for the significant incident of the marriage of Pedro to Blanche of Bourbon. It was the repudiation of Blanche by Pedro which gave the French the opportunity to intervene in Castillian politics. In fact, one might say that there well might have been no need for the French to intervene at all had it not been for this marriage. For it was Pedro's repudiation of Blanche, an act for which I can find no political motivation, but rather a personal and emotional preference for Maria de Padilla, that made the French-Castillian alliance of 1352 no longer tenable. Though it is true that Alfonso XI had taken the monumental step of establishing the preliminaries for an alliance between England and Castille, this alliance, as we have already seen, was never consummated. As a result, Pedro, under the guidance of his chief advisors, continued to pursue the traditional political pattern of friendship with France which had characterized Castillian foreign policy before the reign of Alfonso XI.

There is little reason to believe that Pedro would have changed his position had it not been for the unfortunate marriage to Blanche of Bourbon. Enrique of Trastamara was quick to seize upon this opportunity for not only did he have domestic allies, the discontented nobility, but now he had a foreign advocate that supported his cause under the justification of revenging the national honor of France. This, of course, is nothing more than pure conjecture.

Nevertheless, it appears to me at this time that if we were to select the single factor leading to the English and French rivalry in Castille and the resulting overthrow of Pedro, it would have been Pedro's repudiation of Blanche of Bourbon. However, Pedro did not immediately fall into the arms of the English. He continued to steer a course which, for the most part, limited the scope of his political activities to the Iberian Peninsula. It was only as a result of the long and bitter war with Aragon that he feared that the French and Trastamaran forces, joined to those of Aragon, might tip the balance against him that in 1362 he finally concluded the alliance with England. The results of this move have already been discussed in this work.

The murder of Pedro at Montiel on March 14, 1369, did not bring an end to the civil war in Castille. It would, in fact, rage on intermittently until 1394 when the treaty of Leulingham was signed. During these twenty-five years, the English poured armies, resources, and energy in a vigorous attempt to separate the Trastamaran dynasty from its French alliance, to no avail. The great irony in this was the immense energy expended by the English in those years to try to achieve what was already theirs in 1362 with the Anglo-Castillian alliance signed between Edward III and Pedro I. They had squandered this opportunity and would pay dearly for it in the future.

The humiliating naval defeat of the English at La Rochelle in 1377 was but the most painful memory the English had of their wasted opportunity. Not until 1394 did England reach any kind of accomodation with the Trastamaran dynasty, and that was when the daughter of Pedro's heir, Constance, and the duke of Lancaster, Catalina, married the Castillian king, Enrique III, grandson of the usurper. Then the English only achieved a neutralization of Castille and had not gained her as a firm ally. From the French point of view, the energies and expenses which Charles V had poured into the attempt to gain Castille as an ally and particularly the support of their fleet, was thoroughly justified in the 1370's and 1380's when the Castillian fleet inflicted numerous defeats upon the English as well as terrorized the English coast. Within Castille itself, the predominant theme must be the weakening of the central government. A point which was stressed earlier in this paper must be re-emphasized. The greatest discontent for the reign of Pedro had been because of his firm absolutism. That he was unquestionably moving Castille in the direction of an absolute monarchy, a form of government which was incompatible with the desires and traditions of the Castillian nobility, cannot be denied. Enrique had served as a champion of the nobility in their opposition to the totalitarian rule of his half-brother. As a result, the story of the Trastamaran dynasty in general is one in which the nobility held the upper hand

throughout most of this dynasty's history. In this respect, then, the Trastamaran period represents a serious setback to the emergence of a strong, central government in Castille which was delayed until the time of the Catholic monarchs in the late fifteenth century.

Finally, it must be said that the historians have done a great injustice to Iberian politics, to have for so long neglected this very significant aspect of the Hundred Years' War. For to focus upon the extensive activities of both the English and the French in their attempt to obtain Castille as an ally must manifest itself in magnifying one's concept of the war as not just a struggle between two kingdoms, but in many respects, a prelude to the world wars of the twentieth century, in which almost all of western Europe was involved.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

A study of the fourteenth century Spain offers the reader considerable opportunity to acquaint himself with the major aspects of that turbulent century in Iberian history. In general, however, Spanish and non-Spanish authors alike have neglected the significance of the reign of Pedro I of Castille and have committed themselves to, in their opinion, more significant themes such as the struggle between nobility and monarchy for political supremacy in the Peninsula. I have also tried to present this political conflict as the dominant theme in the reign of Pedro. One of the exceptions to this neglect of the Castillian monarch's reign is the comparatively recent work of Ramon Menendez Pidal. In the fourteenth volume of his Historia de Espana, he devotes a considerable portion to the importance of Pedro's reign. Not only does he seem to be one of the few historians of the past century who has recognized the importance of Pedro's reign, but also he displays an amazing amount of objectivity in his analysis of Pedro's career and personality. Pidal's objectivity stands in great contrast to the position taken by most of Pedro's biographers such as Sitges, Catalina Garcia, or Merimee. These historians either appeared as apologist or were eager to condemn Pedro. Unfortunately, in the treatment of Pedro in this period, too many historians

have examined information little beyond the interpretation of Ayala's Chronicle. This work characterized Pedro as a tyrant, overthrown by the Trastamarans with the assistance of France and the Castillian nobility. Let us hope that the work of Pidal will be given more attention by historians in the future as an analysis of this significant reign.

In attempting to write this study of the foreign policy of Pedro the Cruel, one of the first problems I encountered was a considerable lack of documentation within Spain itself. The explanation of this is that Enrique of Trastamara, after his victory in 1369, systematically destroyed all the documentation related to the reign of his deposed half-brother. Nevertheless, several items did survive. Among those were the documents found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid. These documents can be divided into two basic sections. First of all, they contain the proceedings of the Cortes held at Valladolid in 1351, the most important Cortes of Pedro's nineteen year reign. Since many of the proceedings of the Cortes simply represented a reconfirmation of acts passed during the reign of Alfonso XI, the Trastamaran did not believe it wise to dispose of them. Their main value in regard to Pedro's reign is that they clearly demonstrate an early attempt by Pedro to establish a strong central government in Castille.

Also found among the documents of the Biblioteca Nacional is an account of Pedro's life written by Diego de

Castilla. This somewhat brief biography of the Castillian king is a rather unsuccessful attempt to vindicate his character. The author's main concern is a refutation of the description of Pedro as found in Ayala's Chronicle. Because of its obvious bias this biography was of little value.

A significant number of documents have also survived in the Archivo Nacional Madrid. But almost without exception these documents are of an ecclesiastical nature and for the most part represent either the confirmation of old privileges or the granting of new ones to the monasteries throughout Castille. With few exceptions they shed little light upon Pedro's government.

In Madrid, several documents are located in the Real Academia de Historia. Found there are a number of documents related to laws passed by Pedro during his reign, as well as copies of the two letters which Enrique of Trastamara supposedly sent to the Black Prince in 1368 just prior to the Battle of Najera. Most of these documents are listed under the collection of Salazar.

It can readily be seen, then, that a diplomatic study of Pedro's history could not possibly be written from Castillian documents alone. For this reason the material found in foreign archives are of considerable importance. Among those are the rich resources of the Archives of the Crown of Aragon in Barcelona. Most important of the sources found in the Aragonese archives are the numerous letters of Pedro IV. This

extensive collection of letters which have survived treat in great detail the political relations of Aragon and Castille; it also touches upon English, French, and Navarran relations with the Iberian kingdoms. Pedro's contemporary, Pedro IV of Aragon, was possibly the first monarch of western Europe to begin collecting what would truly be called an archive. Though the Archives of the Crown of Aragon are not as well organized as the historian would desire, there is much material there related to the reign of Pedro of Castille. Numerous documentation regarding the Castillian-Aragonese war, negotiations between France and Aragon for a war against Castille, and even negotiations between England and Aragon have survived. This proved to be one of the most valuable sources I was able to utilize.

Of nearly equal importance was the significant work of Thomas Rymer. In his Foedera Conventiones Litterae et Acta Publica, Rymer has compiled a great number of English documents relevant to the Castillian politics during the reign of Pedro I. In Volume III, part i there are numerous letters relevant to the attempted marriage alliance between Castille and England during the reigns of Alfonso XI and Edward III. The bulk of these documents consist for the most part of copies of Edward III's letters addressed to Alfonso XI and other Castillian personalities. There is also found in this collection official documents such as the instructions Edward addressed to his ambassadors in Castille. In

part ii of Volume III, Rymer published many documents concerning English-Castillian relations during the years of Pedro's reign. For the most part, these are letters exchanged between the English and Castillian courts. Particularly important are those documents concerning the period after Pedro had been driven from his throne in 1366. Also in England there are documents of importance in the Public Records Office which I was able to obtain and utilize. These include Pedro's ratification of the Anglo-Castillian treaty of 1362 and a number of important documents related to the negotiations between Pedro and the Black Prince during the former's exile in Gascony in 1366. Equally important are the documents found in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. In both cases, there are documents which related to marriage negotiations between France and Castille. The negotiations of 1345 to 1349, when Alfonso XI was still king, and the negotiations of 1351-1352 concerning the fateful marriage of Pedro to Blanche of Bourbon are found there.

Finally, several very important documents can be found in the Archives of the Chamber of Counts of Navarre in Pamplona. These documents throw considerable light upon the English-Navarran-Aragonese negotiations for the partition of Castille in 1368-1369. These documents disclose the true nature of the Tarbes negotiations of 1368 by revealing how the Black Prince was prepared to sacrifice Pedro for his own political ambition.

Among the chronicles the most important, of course, is that of Pedro Lopez de Ayala. Ayala was a contemporary of the entire reign of Pedro and lived into the Trastamaran period as an eye-witness of many of the events which transpired in Castille. Thus he was in a good position to write a history of the period. Though his work is of great significance, it must be approached with a degree of caution. Ayala deserted Pedro during the Trastamaran offensive of 1366, and in many respects his work represents an attempt to justify the usurpation of the Trastamaran and the role he played in it. Ayala is not guilty of rearranging facts or of intentionally falsifying his work. However, he uses the device many historians have used in the past of simply utilizing that evidence which supports his case and disregarding the rest. Ayala, for example, labors extensively upon the acts of cruelty performed by Pedro. At the same time, he elaborates upon the virtues of the Trastamaran. In both cases he is telling the truth, but he simply has nothing good to say about Pedro and nothing bad to say about Enrique of Trastamara. In both cases, there is ample information which he has neglected to use. Despite the bias of Ayala, his chronicle is still invaluable to the historian trying to piece together a picture of the reign of Pedro I, particularly in regard to the domestic matters. In regard to foreign affairs, Ayala is most valuable in his description of Franco-Castillian wars and the English role in the restoration of Pedro in 1366.

Froissart is of little importance except for the information he sheds on the English preparation for the Castillian invasion of 1366. His comments on the campaign itself are drawn from Chandos and possibly Ayala. Froissart did not accompany the English army.

Chandos is of particular importance in his description of the military events leading to the Battle of Najera. A high ranking officer, and experienced politician, he was an active participant in the campaign. He allows us to observe the difficulties encountered by the English in the campaign.

Among the secondary sources, there are a number which are very useful. Two in particular by the English historian Peter Edward Russell proved to be so. First, an article entitled "Una Alianza Frustrada las Bodas de Pedro I de Castille y Joanna Plantagenet" is very valuable for an understanding of the extensive and involved negotiations between England and Castille in the 1340's. Russell's work is very scholarly and he has made extensive use of primary sources, particularly the documents found in Thomas Rymer. His work is most enlightening in that it indicates the strong desire that both monarchs had to establish an alliance between the two kingdoms. It is quite clear from those documents found in Rymer's work that the only thing which prevented the fulfillment of the alliance between England and Castille was Edward III's financial embarrassment.

Russell's second work, English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II, is also extremely useful. The first portion of the work is directed to the reign of Pedro I. In those pages Russell concentrated mainly upon the years 1362-1369, with particular emphasis upon the last three years. His basic interpretation is that English diplomacy was foolhardy in nature and that a great error in English calculation allowed the French to win the final victory in Castille. Though he deals mainly with the subject through the eyes of English-Castillian relations, he brings Aragon, Navarre and France into his work extensively. I have agreed completely with him in my work, that the French won a great diplomatic victory in Castille. They did so because of their political consistency in supporting their ally, Enrique of Trastamara. The English, on the other hand, handled the matter very poorly, particularly when the Black Prince allowed his personal prejudice to interfere with a successful conduct of English diplomacy.

Another valuable source is Roland Delachenal's Histoire de Charles V. His three volume work represents a definitive study of the reign of that illustrious French monarch. A large portion of Volume I deals with the French thrust into the Iberian Peninsula, particularly emphasizing the French support of Enrique of Trastamara and the role played by the Great Companies. Delachenal's work is possibly

the most scholarly of all the secondary sources consulted. In this work he has made extensive use of the French and Aragonese archives. It is well documented and is a very scholarly presentation of the subject. Delachenal has maintained a high degree of objectivity, particularly in his analysis of the character of Pedro. He appears to have a clearer insight than any of Pedro's biographers that I have consulted. It was a most significant work. It was quite apparent to me in first reading Russell and then Delachenal that Russell was deeply indebted to the research done a half-century earlier by the French historian.

Among the biographers of Pedro, three were of use: Merimee, Garcia and Sitges. Prosper Merimee, writing his work in the late nineteenth century, made a valiant, though unsuccessful, attempt to be Pedro's apologist, trying to justify Pedro's numerous atrocities. I believe Merimee was only partially successful. He is highly critical of the Trastamaran, in most cases justifiably. Merimee relied very heavily upon the works of Ayala but also used the Aragonese historian, Zurita, as well as the Aragonese archives. His main shortcoming is that he had not explored deeply enough into the French, and particularly the English, sources. This would have given him a broader concept of the events unfolding in Castille during Pedro I's reign.

Garcia, writing in 1907, is highly critical of Pedro's reign. Though I found many criticisms of Garcia's work, it is

well documented and was particularly helpful in trying to put together a chronological sequence of the reign. Garcia had obviously spent many years seeking documentation of Pedro's reign in the scattered archives of the Iberian Peninsula. Through the location and dating of various documents, Garcia helps later historians plot the movements of the Castillian king. Many of these events Merimee himself was not aware of. Sitges, in his Las Mujeres del Rey don Pedro Primero de Castille, is unquestionably an apologist for the Castillian king. Though he does not ignore Pedro's acts of atrocities, he does attempt to justify them whenever possible. Sitges' significant use is that with his work he has included over twenty documents which were most helpful in compiling a study of Pedro.

Another work of primary importance is Daumet's Etude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castille au XIV^e et au XV^e Siecles. His prime interest is the early establishment of the French alliance in the fourteenth century. The first chapters of his work are concerned with the negotiations of the French-Castillian marriage alliance during the latter years of the reign of Alfonso XI. Also included were negotiations between France and Castille which resulted in the marriage of Pedro and Blanche of Bourbon. Once more, this work is well-documented, and I found numerous references to documents in the French archives and the Vatican archives which were put to good use. Daumet's version is highly

pro-French and the author could not understand Alfonso XI's preference for the English alliance to that of the French. He was guilty of having based his study upon French and Vatican sources and not having examined the sources available in England, particularly the published documents of Thomas Rymer.

For a clear understanding of the period between the Battle of Najera and the final disposition of Pedro and the establishment of the Trastamaran dynasty, the works by Miret y Sans, Negociacions de Pierre IV d' Aragon avec le cour de France (1366-67.) is absolutely essential. Though it is primarily concerned with the diplomatic dealings of Pedro IV of Aragon, the work is extremely well-documented, and shows the feverish diplomatic activity of the Aragonese king as he first tried to steer a course between France and England while at the same time trying to come to a new understanding with the Castillian king. This work is particularly significant because it shows the willingness of the Black Prince to desert his ally, Pedro of Castille. Zurita's Annales of the Crown of Aragon is also most helpful, especially during the years 1356-1362 in that his coverage of the Aragonese-Castillian war is most thorough and for the most part unbiased.

Other secondary sources consulted and used include The Spaniards by Americo Castro and The Making of Medieval Spain by Gabriel Jackson. Both books were published in 1971. Castro's book is not directly relevant to the reign of Pedro I

but in his interpretation of the unique Castillian spirit, this book holds a significance in interpreting the mentality of fourteenth century Castille. Jackson is most significant in that his work represents the most recent publication on the subject, though his remarks about Pedro are brief.

Charles Chapman's History of Spain is mainly valuable for background information and was useful in helping me prepare my introduction. It contains a background of Castillian history prior to the reign of Pedro. The article by M. Bourbon, "Traite d'Alliance Offensive et Defensive entre le Roi de Castille Pierre le Cruel, et le Comte d'Armagnac, Jean 1st." in Revue de la Societe des Salvants, published in 1878, is interesting because of the fact that Bourbon, in his brief article, preserves a document which concerns the military alliance between Pedro I and the Count of Armagnac. This article not only shows the scope of Pedro's foreign policy but it is also proof that other information is also available which might clarify the story and interpretation of Pedro's reign. One waits curiously for another accidental discovery in some obscure archive of similar material. Even though I found no citation of this source in other historians' bibliographies, its existence proves that other valuable sources may also have been overlooked in the past.


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