A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF G. E. MOORE'S THEORY OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

A Dissertation
for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Shukla Sinha
1975

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A Critical Evaluation of

G. E. Moore's Theory of Empirical Knowledge

presented by

Shukla Sinha

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Philosophy

Richard J. Hall
Major professor

Date 7/1/75

p—35:

ABSTRACT

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By

Shukla Sinha

Since it has been not uncommon for sense data philosophers to discredit the claims of common sense regarding knowledge of material objects, and since it has been customary among the upholders of common sense views either to exhibit unfamiliarity with the very notion of sense data or to discredit the language of sense data, Moore's views regarding empirical knowledge form somewhat of an exception, since Moore attempts to defend the claims of common sense without either avoiding or discrediting the language of sense data. Naturally, questions have been raised about the compatibility of his views and the consistency of his approach. I have considered and discussed these questions and the grounds on which their apparent plausibility is sustained. I have tried to show that these questions have been successfully answered by Moore.

The main objective of Moore's theory of empirical knowledge has been to defend the knowledge claims of common sense as expressed in everyday perceptual statements, against the views which contradict them--views which Moore calls skeptical views. I have argued that Moore has been successful and consistent in defending at least one

of the most widely accepted claims of common sense, viz., the claim regarding the knowledge of the existence of material objects, against the skeptics' claim that such knowledge is impossible. I have furthermore, tried to show that although Moore does not deny the existence of sense data and accepts it as a necessary accompaniment of our perceptual knowledge of material objects, this does not adversely affect his criticism of the skeptics, and does not lead him into inconsistency in his own positive views.

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By

Shukla Sinha

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Professors W. J. Callaghan, R. H. Kotzin, C. McCracken, R. Suter, D. F. Koch and R. J. Hall for being instrumental in my developing a more specific outlook in certain contemporary areas of philosophy at various stages of my academic tenure here.

Special thanks are due Professor Rhoda H. Kotzin for her constructive criticisms and helpful comments related to this work.

The financial support of the Fulbright Hays Binational Foundation and the Philosophy Department of the Michigan State University is also gratefully acknowledged.

Most of all, I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to my advisor, Professor Richard J. Hall, for his patience, counsel, and valuable guidance throughout this work. Without his critical but stimulating observations, this study would not have been possible.

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PREFACE

The significance and the influence of G. E. Moore's contributions in the fields of contemporary ethics and epistemology is obvious from the number of questions and the amount of discussion his writings have originated in these areas. In particular, his views regarding perceptual knowledge and the meaning of ethical statements and concepts have not only provided contemporary philosophy with many new problems, but also with new trends of thought for approaching these problems.

Despite the difference in the subject matter, his views in these two areas share in common his analytic approach towards the particular problems in question, and his steady pursuit of methodical questioning so characteristic of his writings. Furthermore, his major views in both of these areas show that his main interest has always been to investigate the epistemological aspect of the problem.

A consideration of certain aspects of Moore's views about perceptual knowledge in relation to certain issues in his ethical views led to the initial planning of the present work which was originally designed to analyze the bearings of his views regarding the direct apprehension of sense data and those regarding the intuitive knowledge of intrinsic goodness relative to his views regarding the epistemological and ontological status of sense data and the good.

However, in the process of reading Moore's views about perceptual knowledge, in preparation of this work, I have been confronted with certain questions which have seemed to me not only equally interesting and equally complicated in character, but also of a more fundamental nature. It seemed to me that a detailed discussion of these questions would be necessary not only for a proper understanding of his epistemological views but also in order to be able to appreciate any problem which would relate to both his epistemological views and ethical views. Hence, although the problems this work was intended to deal with originally relate to both epistemology and ethics, I have confined the discussions in the present work to problems related only to Moore's views regarding empirical knowledge.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is quite clear from Moore's views regarding empirical knowledge that his major objective has been to defend and justify the claims of common sense, particularly those expressed in every day perceptual statements, against any view that contradicts them. Among the different types of such views--views that Moore has called skeptical views--the one that he has been mainly concerned with is the view according to which the only objects we can <u>know</u> the existence of are sense data, where it has been held conjointly by Moore and the upholders of such a view that sense data are objects which are basically different from material objects. Naturally, it follows from any such view that, if all that we can ever know the existence of are sense data, then we cannot <u>know</u> the existence of any material objects or an external world; whereas it is one of the most widely held views of common sense that we all do know of the existence of material objects and an external world.

Since Moore has asserted that such views of common sense are known to be true beyond any question, and has claimed to be defending them as such, his acceptance of the existence of sense data at the same time leads his readers to raise certain questions which seem quite plausible at first glance. At least two such obvious questions that

may be raised in this connection are: (1) Why has Moore, after all, introduced the notion of sense data, when his main purpose has been to defend common sense? And (2) Is his sense data philosophy, once he has introduced it, compatible with his philosophy of common sense?

Both of these questions are apparently reasonable. For on the one hand, it is a fact that the very notion of sense data with all its attendant problems and the language in which these problems are expressed, is more or less unknown to the common sense parlour, whereas, on the other hand, at the philosophical parlour when a discussion is carried on through the language of sense data, it has been more or less customary (or traditional) to deny the knowledge of those facts which are accepted by common sense as well known. Hence the question arises: Can these two standpoints about perceptual knowledge (or, two levels of looking at the problem), apparently so widely apart, be reconciled with each other relative to the main objective of Moore's theory of empirical knowledge? And this question implicitly includes the question: Has Moore been successful, after all, in pursuing his objective consistently? The present work is an attempt to investigate these two questions. The main object of this work is to show (1) that the two standpoints maintained by Moore--common sense and sense data--occur as relevantly related aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge within the framework of his main objective; and (2) that Moore's approach towards his main objective, throughout his works, has been a consistent one despite the two apparently divergent standpoints. I have tried to show that when these two standpoints are considered in relation to

certain distinctions that Moore has made and maintained throughout his writings regarding empirical knowledge, the apparent incompatibility of the two disappear. Furthermore, I have tried to show that if we consider the arguments Moore has advanced against the skeptics together with the fact that he recognizes analysis as an important part of the 'proper business' of any philosophical enterprise it becomes clear that he has been successful in approaching his goal with perfect consistency.

It should, however, be mentioned here that I have chosen to limit the scope of this work mainly to the discussion of Moore's views regarding the knowledge of the existence of material objects and his views regarding visual sense data. The main reason for this has been the fact that although his views regarding perceptual knowledge include, to a certain extent, a discussion about the knowledge of the existence of other persons, and a reference to sense data given by senses other than sight, viz., tactual sense data, auditory sense data, etc., the major portion of his discussions have been devoted to the problem of knowing the existence of material objects which he seems to have taken as most fundamental in this context, and to visual sense data which he seems to have taken as representative of any kind of sense data given by any of the senses.

The discussion in the present work begins with expositions of Moore's common sense realism (Chapter II) and his philosophy of sense data (Chapter III). These expositions raise certain questions regarding the relevance and compatibility of these two philosophies relative to Moore's main goal which is to defend and justify common sense knowledge

claims against any view that contradicts it (Chapter IV). In order to determine whether these questions are justified or not, a consideration of the implications of Moore's analysis of knowledge and the various distinctions he makes there in relation to his arguments to justify his claim, has been presented in a further discussion (Chapter V). Finally, it has been shown, on the basis of the preceding considerations of Moore's epistemological views together with his views about the role of analysis in philosophy, that these questions cannot be justifiably raised against his theory of empirical knowledge. In other words, it has been shown that his two philosophies are relevantly related to his main objective which he has been able to pursue consistently and successfully (Chapter VI).

I have mainly based the discussions in this work on the original writings of Moore and only in passing have referred to the views of some of his commentators.

CHAPTER II

MOORE'S COMMON SENSE REALISM

Section I. Moore's Realism

Moore's theory of empirical knowledge consists mainly of his views regarding the nature and object(s) of perception as a cognitive process. The main objective of his theory of empirical knowledge has been to show the untenability of all those theories which imply a skepticism about our knowledge of the existence of the different things and beings which we find around us in this world, and which we all commonly believe we know about with certainty. This skeptical attitude is generally expressed by claiming that experience is the only source of our knowledge of the empirical facts, and that by means of experience, we cannot know with certainty anything beyond our own existence, feelings, perceptions, and thoughts. If this is the case, then se do not, and cannot, know of the existence of the many different things which we all ordinarily think we know of; for instance, we all believe we know that there are different kinds of material objects, and different kinds of living beings including human beings having feelings and perceptions, and that all these different things are in space and time, and so on. The common sense view of the world consists of such beliefs and knowledge claims. These beliefs are tacitly assumed in such everyday statements of ordinary language as, 'This is a table,' 'I see that a

child is standing by the side of a grown-up man,' 'That is an old building,' and so on.

These statements are perceptual statements of common sense which are commonly held by all of us as undoubtedly true. If the skeptics'claim about the extent of empirical knowledge is true, then we are not justified in holding such statements as known to be true. Moore's main objective in his theory of empirical knowledge is to refute this claim of the skeptics, and to establish the claim that we are justified in holding that such perceptual statements of common sense are known to be true. It is this enterprise that Moore's common sense realism consists of. As such, his theory of empirical knowledge deals mainly with the problem of perception and its different aspects. To be specific, it mainly consists of his views regarding the nature and object of perception as a cognitive process.

There are two aspects of his theory of perceptual (or empirical) knowledge: (1) the aspect which consists of those views that constitute his common sense realism; and (2) the aspect which consists of those views which constitute his sense data philosophy. In this chapter I shall discuss his common sense realism with special emphasis on some of the issues with which I shall be mainly concerned later in his work.

In order to discuss his common sense realism, it seems important to understand his basic epistemological position regarding the nature of cognitive process in general; the particular position that he holds in this regard is realism. Since his epistemological views mainly concern his views about perceptual knowledge, they include his views regarding

the nature of cognition or knowing as such. Moore's realism is a result of his attempt to explain and analyze the nature of any cognitive process in general.

What he has mainly intended to show is that every cognitive process is a relation between two factors, viz., the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness, and that the object of consciousness can exist, in some cases at least, quite independently of the act of consciousness. These are the two main contentions of epistemological realism as conceived by Moore. Moore's epistemological realism came into existence as a reaction against the idealist philosophy in general and the idealist epistemology in particular. He started out by reacting critically to certain specific claims made by the idealists about the nature of knowing and knowledge in general. Out of these critical reactions his own epistemological theory of realism has emerged and, in the process, has gradually taken the form of a rival theory of knowledge on positive and independent grounds.

One of the earliest and yet, perhaps, the most important critical reactions in this direction is to be found in his article "The Refutation of Idealism." In this article he critically analyzes one of the most fundamental claims of the idealists, namely, 'esse is percipi' (i.e., to exist is to be perceived), which, according to Moore, has very important bearings upon the nature and extent of knowledge. In this essay he has tried to show the untenability of this claim by

analyzing the nature of cognition in general, and of perceptual knowledge in particular. According to him any case of sense perception is a case of knowing; to be specific, it is a cognitive relation between the knower and something else which is the object of the knower's awareness. He says that any case of sense perception involves two factors: the object which is known and the awareness of the object. This distinction between the two factors of knowledge is the basis of his realism. He has wanted to emphasize the point that the Idealists have overlooked that this is the case, and as such their claim is based on a confusion: the confusion consists in their identifying the two distinct factors of knowledge. According to Moore the Idealists have analyzed knowing in terms of 'content' and 'existence.' They say that in each case of sensation, "we can distinguish two elements and two only, (1) the fact that there is feeling or experience, and (2) what is felt or experienced; the sensation or idea, it is said, forms a whole, in which we must distinguish two 'inseparable aspects,' 'content' and 'existence.'"[1] Moore holds that this analysis is false on the grounds that their use of the word 'content' in this context is inappropriate. According to Moore what is most commonly meant by saying that one thing is the 'content' of another, is the general relation that holds between a thing and its qualities; "and that this relation is such that to say that the thing exists implies that the qualities also exist." For instance, in the case of a blue flower, it may be said that blue is part of the content of the blue flower, or a blue bead. If by the relation expressed by 'one thing is the content of another,' we mean

this relation, then it follows that blue is related to the sensation of blue exactly in the same sense as blue is related to a blue bead; and just as in the case of a blue bead, which is a whole, there is, at least, another content besides blue, viz., glass, so similarly in the case of the sensation of blue, which is a whole, there is another content besides blue, viz., consciousness. If this is what we mean by the expression, "one thing is the content of another," then when we say that blue is the content of the sensation of blue, what we are saying is that blue has to the consciousness exactly the same relation which blue has to the other parts of a blue bead. And in this sense, blue exists only as an inseparable aspect of the sensation of blue, just as blue (being a quality of the blue bead) exists as an inseparable aspect of the blue bead. "The content of the thing is what we assert to exist, when we assert that the thing exists."[2]

But if this is what the Idealists have meant by saying that blue is only a content of the sensation of blue, then we should be able to speak of a 'blue sensation' without deviating from the common usage, just as we can and do speak of a blue flower or a blue bead; but the fact, according to Moore, is that although we do correctly speak of a blue bead, we do not and cannot correctly speak of a blue sensation or a blue consciousness (just as, blue glass, in the case of blue bead); hence, although we can correctly speak of blue as the content of a blue bead, we cannot correctly speak of blue as the content of the sensation of blue. This is because the relation between blue and the blue flower or its parts does not hold between blue and the

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sensation of it or its other parts, which it should if blue is to be a content of the sensation.[3] Hence, the Idealists' use of the word 'content' in this context remains inappropriate (or else unexplained).

The reason for this is that they have not been able to find the correct analysis of sensation or knowing itself. For Moore, any sensation is, in fact, a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing something'; and in every sensation we must distinguish two elements: (1) the object, or that in which one sensation differs from another, and (2) "consciousness, or that which all sensations have in common and by virtue of which they are sensations." Thus, according to Moore, in every case of knowing or experiencing something, there are two distinct factors: the mental act which is (or consists of) the awareness of something (or being aware of something) and the object (of awareness), i.e., 'the something' which the awareness is of. And if we look 'attentively enough,' we should be able to recognize further that these two elements are perfectly distinct and utterly different from each other, and the two are related by a perfectly distinct and unique relation which is what is meant by 'knowing.' The Idealists, in holding the content theory, have failed to recognize precisely this fact, viz., that there is a unique relation between two distinct elements. Moore says that though they have "recognised that something distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of what that something is. "They have not been able to hold it and blue before their minds and to compare them. . . ." The reason for this is that "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all

we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough. . . ."[4] Since the object of awareness is perfectly distinct from the awareness of it, and knowing consists in a perfectly distinct and unique relation that awareness has to the object, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that the object or knowledge can exist only as a content of knowledge or awareness, and as such, only as an inseparable aspect of experience.

What Moore has attempted to show is that the object of knowledge is not necessarily related to the awareness by a relation such that the object's nature is necessarily determined by and dependent upon the awareness of it. When we analyze a sensation, what we find is that a sensation is always a sensation or an awareness of something; i.e., the awareness cannot exist without an object. But from this it does not follow by any means that the object of awareness cannot exist without the awareness of it. According to Moore the object of consciousness is neither the same as the awareness of it, nor is it the same as an image in the mind. Hence, at least in some cases, it can exist independently of and unaffected by the awareness of it. This is, in brief, Moore's epistemological realism.

Section II. The Criteria of Common Sense

I have already stated in the beginning of this chapter that the main objective of Moore's theory of empirical knowledge has been to establish the common sense claims about the knowledge of an external world based upon sense perception. His epistemological realism as opposed to the Idealists' theory of knowledge may be said to be the first step in his pursuit of this objective. His analysis of knowing into two distinctive factors provides the basis for his common sense realism. In fact his reaction against the idealistic claims in general stems from the fact that such claims come into conflict with the claims of common sense. Although Moore has always made a distinction between the common sense view of the world--i.e., the views that all of us ordinarily accept to be undoubtedly true, and those philosophical views which are incompatible with the common sense views, he has not meant to say that the common sense views are not or cannot be philosophical, nor has he meant to say that philosophical views as such are not or cannot be part of the common sense views. All that he has meant to say is that sometimes some philosophical views are in conflict with some views which have always been held by all of us (even by those who contradict the common sense views in their theories). One of the objectives pursued by Moore in most of his works has been to examine critically and carefully such philosophical views as go against common sense views, and to determine whether these views are based on valid grounds or not.

It should not, however, give us the impression that Moore is being dogmatic in defending what is commonly held by everybody, in the sense that whatever is commonly held by everybody amounts to an authentic philosophical view, or that any philosophical view, in order to be sound, must be in total agreement with what is commonly believed. On the contrary, he has held that sometimes what is commonly believed is certainly false. He admits at many places that views commonly held to be true undergo changes with time; that many examples of such cases are to be found in the areas of ethics, theology, astronomy and geology; that many of them have been proven to be definitely mistaken. In advocating common sense he is not advocating any extreme position; all that he is advocating is that most of the time it is more reasonable than not to accept a philosophical view which is not in conflict with certain views of common sense, in the sense that its consistency with these views may be an additional ground of its acceptability. He seems to be suggesting that any philosophical theory which is in opposition to the views of common sense deserves to be treated with some additional amount of suspicion so far as its truth is concerned.

At this point it may be asked if Moore has described any definite set of criteria to determine whether a given view is or is not in accord with common sense. Moore has never given a formal specific definition of what he calls a common sense view. He has often referred to it as the belief held by all of us, or the beliefs universally agreed upon--something like a universal opinion; sometimes he refers to it as what is believed by ordinary people. However, in

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all these uses, the common sense view has been referred to as something which is taken as certainly true--something about which there cannot be any doubt. On the basis of what he has said about the common sense views in his different works, it seems that he does have certain criteria according to which we do decide whether or not a belief is a belief of common sense, although he has not given any such set of criteria at any particular place in his works. White, in his book, G. E. Moore--A Critical Exposition, enumerates five criteria which have been used by Moore at different places of his works, though not clearly specified and mentioned as such by him.

1. The criterion of universal acceptance: It seems clear from what has been discussed above, that this is perhaps the only criterion which Moore has quite often explicitly specified in characterizing a view as a view of common sense. That is, if a belief is universally accepted then it is a view of the common sense; for instance, our beliefs that there are many different kinds of material objects, that there are acts of consciousness in different living beings, that these acts of consciousness are different from material objects, that there are units of time and units of space, that material objects occupy space whereas acts of consciousness do not occupy space in the same sense as material objects do, that there are human beings having similar thoughts and feelings, and that all these things and beings share a common world which we call the external world; i.e., they do not exist inside the mind or minds of any individual being or beings, that except the acts of consciousness all other things exist outside

our minds and this locus of all these things is what we mean by an external world.

This criterion brings out clearly that what Moore has meant by 'common sense' is not something like what we ordinarily call the ability to make quick and good judgment in a given situation (as in such remarks: X is a person of sound common sense, or, It was a matter of common sense to do that in that situation, etc.).[5] Further, although Moore has often recommended universal acceptance as a reason for holding a view to be true, he has not meant, in general, that it should be regarded as a proof for the validity of the view.

2. The criterion of compulsive acceptance: This refers to such statements and beliefs "which we not only all do hold, but which we often cannot help holding, even if at the same time we hold beliefs inconsistent with them."[6] However, this fact does not prove that such a view is true, or its contradictory, false.

3. The criterion of inconsistency: This refers to beliefs which, if denied, result in various kinds of inconsistency. For instance, any view which denies the reality of time, also contains propositions that presuppose the truth of the view being denied, for such a view says that we constantly hold a belief which is not true; where by saying that 'we constantly believe in things which are not there,' it is implying that things do happen in time. That is to say, there is no way that it can avoid doing this; for it is a fact that we do constantly or always believe in time; they cannot deny this even if they want to deny the truth of such a belief. Any philosopher, no

matter however sincerely he may adopt the opinion that there is no such thing as time, will never

> be able to divest himself of particular beliefs which contradict his opinion. He will still continue to believe, with regard to particular things, just as certainly and as often as the rest of us do, that some of them do exist before others, that some of them have ceased to exist and others not yet come into existence, and that the intervals of time between particular events differ in length.[7]

Moore has talked about different variations of this type of inconsistency at different places of his works. For instance, at one place he says such a view may not presuppose the truth of the very thing that it is denying, yet may presuppose the truth of some other view which is of the same type as the one it denies. While discussing Hume's views about the matter, Moore says that Hume himself

> declares that we cannot, in ordinary life, avoid believing things which are inconsistent with them [that is, with skeptical views that we never know any external facts]; and, in so declaring, he, of course, implies incidentally that they [skeptical views] are false; since he implies that he himself has a great deal of knowledge as to what we can and cannot believe in ordinary life.[8]

4. The criterion of special kind of inconsistency: This refers to a particular kind of inconsistency that results from the very acceptance of the fact that a view is a view of common sense. This is the particular type of inconsistency that Moore has referred to in his "A Defence of Common Sense." He says that certain common sense beliefs

> have this peculiar property--namely, that if we know that they are features in the "Common Sense View of the World," it follows that they are true: it is self contradictory to maintain that we know them to be features in the Common Sense view, and yet they are not true; since to say that

> we know this, is to say that they are true. And many of them also have the further peculiar property that, if they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether "we" know this or not), it follows that they are true, since to say that there is a "Common Sense view of the world," is to say that they are true."[9]

In other words the moment a skeptic says that "we know that it is a belief of common sense, but it is not true," he is contradicting himself on two counts: first, in using the word "we," he is admitting that there are persons other than himself and that he knows it; second, even if he does not use the word "we," but accepts that certain beliefs are mere beliefs of common sense, i.e., admits of the very existence of a common sense view, whether or not he also admits that they are true, he is committing himself to the truth of at least part of this view, in the sense that he admits that it is true that there have been many people other than himself who have held such views whether such views are true or not is a different matter. (This move of Moore's will be discussed in detail later in this work.)

5. The criterion of "self evidence": This refers to the "self evident" character of at least some of the beliefs of common sense. (The expression 'self evident,' however, is used here in a modified sense; it is used to refer to the fundamental or primitive nature of certain beliefs which we never question--beliefs which we all assume to be true, and which, in a sense, form the basis of our everyday conversation in ordinary language. And as such, the use of this expression in this context is not to be confused with its use elsewhere in philosophy, where it is used to refer to propositions which are intuitively known and the opposites of which are inconceivable.) By

the self evident character of the beliefs of common sense what is meant here, is that the truth of such beliefs does not depend on any other factor than that they are just immediately known to be true; that they are known as such without any knowledge of any other belief or statement. In Moore's Principia Ethica and in Ethics, the same idea has been expressed in terms of intuition or inspection. The truth of such views is not a matter of strict demonstration; we just do know them to be certainly true, and any other proposition that can be advanced to prove or to disprove such a view is less certain than the view in question; and as such they cannot be proved or disproved formally, but they are true just the same and we all know them to be true. For Moore, statements like 'I know that this pencil exists,' are known immediately, and are much more certain than any premise which could be used to prove or disprove their truth.[10] However, he also admits that this criterion does not prove that common sense statements are true; "I can only urge that these things are self evident: I can't think of any argument to prove that they are true."[11] And hence, if anybody asserts "that the contrary is evident to him . . . I do not see how it can be proved that he is wrong."

Section III. Nature of Material Objects

In his "A Defence of Common Sense," Moore says that we all commonly believe we know different things and different facts. In the preceding sections I have presented various particular examples of such beliefs. All these particular beliefs have been broadly

classified by Moore into four groups: (1) beliefs about the existence or reality of material objects; (2) beliefs about the reality of acts of consciousness in human beings as well as in other living beings (where 'acts of consciousness' is used in a very general or wide sense); (3) beliefs about the reality of space; and (4) beliefs about the reality of time. Alternatively, it may be said that we know different kinds of facts: physical facts, mental facts, spatial facts, temporal facts. These are most fundamental beliefs of common sense and these beliefs are implicitly assumed and expressed in our everyday statements of perceptual knowledge in various forms. Moore has discussed beliefs falling under each of these classes at different places in his writings on empirical knowledge. However, in this work, I shall be concerned only with his discussion of beliefs about our knowledge of the reality of material objects as expressed in everyday perceptual statements. One of the reasons for this is that a major portion of Moore's theory of perceptual knowledge has been devoted to the discussion of this matter; it seems that he has taken the discussion of and his views about this particular issue to be the representative of his discussion and views of the common sense view of the world in general. According to Moore the belief in the existence of material objects is one of the most primitive beliefs that still continues to be held by all persistently. We believe that there are in the Universe enormous numbers of material objects; and we believe too, nowadays, "that the earth itself, and all that is in it or upon it, huge as it seems to us, is absurdly small in comparison with the whole material Universe." Although some

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of the primitive beliefs about the material Universe have undergone change, or have been proven to be false,

> yet,so far as concerns the point that there are in the Universe a great number of material objects, it has, so far as we know, remained the same. . . . Men have believed this almost as long as they have believed anything: they have always believed in the existence of great many material objects.[12]

In a sense all other beliefs either presuppose the belief in the existence of material objects (for instance, beliefs in other persons or other living beings), or, are very intimately related with the belief in the existence of material objects (for instance, beliefs in space and time). Naturally when the truth of such a deep rooted belief is questioned, its discussion deserves considerable attention and priority. Hence, in the pursuit of his main objective, which is to refute the skeptics claim that the views of common sense are not known to be true, the first thing that Moore has wanted to establish, is that we do know of the existence of material objects. The question regarding the knowledge of the existence of material objects has been given priority by Moore also for the reason that its discussion may be useful for the better understanding of the different ways of knowing and also the knowledge of things other than material objects.

> And first of all, I shall consider the question: How do we know of the existence of material objects, supposing that, as Common Sense supposes, we do know of their existence? . . . trying to answer the principal objections of those philosophers, who have maintained that we certainly do not. In the course of this discussion we shall come upon a good many conclusions as to the sorts of ways in which we know things; and shall be in a better position to consider what <u>else</u> beside material objects we can know to exist.[13]

Before discussing the main question regarding the knowledge of material objects, it seems necessary to discuss his views regarding the nature of material objects. In the rest of this chapter, then, I shall discuss what Moore has meant by a material object; so far the question of the possibility of the knowledge of material objects is concerned, I shall discuss it later in this work while discussing Moore's answer to the skeptics' challenge.

Moore has defined "material object" in two different ways: the first consists of describing the essential characteristics of a material object. He defines a material object as something which (1) does occupy space; (2) is not a sense datum of any kind whatsoever and (3) is not a mind, nor an act of consciousness.[14] Of the three, the first is a positive property, and the other two are negative properties of a material object. By the positive property of a material object, viz., occupancy of space, what is meant is that nothing can be a material object except what is situated somewhere or other in space; i.e., except what has a position in space. By saying that material objects have positions in space or are situated in space, he wants to include different possibilities as to the way of occupying space. For instance, "some material objects may, quite possibly, occupy mere points; though others, no doubt, occupy lines; others occupy areas; and others occupy volumes."[15]

By the second property, which is a negative property, viz., that a material object is not a sense datum of any kind whatsoever, what is meant is that no sense datum or part of a sense datum, or a

collection of sense data, is identical with a material object or a part of one. (However, the question as to whether a sense datum is or is not identical with a part of the surface of a material object, is an open question which will be discussed later.)

It should be mentioned at this point that although Moore has mainly and originally defined a sense datum, in a somewhat narrow sense, as the object which is actually given by the different senses in different cases of sense perception, he is using the term 'sense datum' here in a relatively wider sense. This point may be illustrated by saying that originally he has meant the sort of objects which we actually see or actually hear and so on; for instance, when we look at a coloured object, what we actually see is a coloured patch or an expanse of colour. It is objects of this sort, with necessary changes in the cases of different senses, that are called sense data in the narrow sense.

The wider sense of 'sense data' that Moore is using here, can be explained in the following way. It might be thought, on the basis of the narrow definition of 'sense data,' that an object should not be called a sense datum, unless it is actually seen or heard, etc. as the case may be; since, it is only when an object is actually seen, and so on, that it is, "strictly, given to the senses." Now he says that he is not using the term 'sense datum' in this strict sense; rather, he is so extending the term 'sense datum' to cover all those objects, actual or possible, which resemble any sense datum, which has been actually given to the senses. For instance, images of different kinds, are

never actually given to the senses, and yet they should be called sense data by virtue of the fact that they resemble the objects which have been actually experienced.

> And just as we may say that every coloured image actually is a sense datum, merely because it is a coloured patch, even though it has never been actually given to the senses; so we may say that if a coloured patch existed, which had never been directly apprehended* at all, it would be a sense datum, merely because it would be a coloured patch.[16]

What Moore wants to emphasize is that a material object is not a sense datum (or a collection of sense data), as some philosophers have held, in either of the senses of the term 'sense datum' explained above.[17]

By mentioning the third property of material objects, which also is a negative property, Moore has again tried to clarify and emphasize how he wants to use the term 'material object.' By saying that a material object is not a mind or an act of consciousness, Moore has wanted to distinguish his view from those according to which things like wheels and couplings of a train, which we ordinarily take to be material objects consist of minds.[18] But minds do not or cannot have a position in space at all, at least in the sense in which we talk of a material object's having position in space. It is true that minds or acts of consciousness are quite definitely attached, in a particular way, to some material objects, and not at all attached to some others; they are attached to some bodies in the sense that they all do occur at some place or other in our bodies. And as such, they take place wherever our bodies are. "My act of consciousness takes place in my body; and yours

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*The term 'sense data' and other related terms like 'directly apprehended,' etc., will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

takes place in yours; and our minds [generally, at least] go with us, wherever our bodies go. . . . But we believe . . . no less certainly, that to the vast majority of material objects, no acts of consciousness are attached."[19] Since there are material bodies to which no act of consciousness at all is attached, being a mind or being conscious cannot be a defining property of material objects, not to speak of its being identical with mind or act of consciousness. Secondly, even though it is a fact that minds or acts of consciousness do take place in our bodies and are wherever the bodies are, it is also a fact that minds or acts of consciousness do not occupy space in the same way in which chairs, tables, and, for that matter, even those bodies which mental acts are said to belong to, occupy space. One main difference is that we all do believe that material bodies, being situated in space, must have shape; they must have the 'shape' of the part of space which they occupy;[20] whereas we do not believe that minds or acts of consciousness have any shape at all. We further believe that material objects are external to our minds, in the sense that none of these are in any mind(s), though some of them may be said to be with (a) mind.

Moore's second way of defining 'material object' consists in giving instances of a particular type of thing which we all believe to know the existence of, and showing by that very process that there are material objects. It seems that he wants to point out that when we talk about these instances of a particular type of object we tacitly assume to know that they are all instances of material objects. This is what he calls definition by examples.

> I can give a very clear definition--a definition much clearer than philosophers generally give. . . . It's definition by examples: i.e., all I can tell you is that I use "material thing" in such a sense that if there are any chairs, or desks, or blackboards, or planets, or human bodies, etc., then there certainly <u>are</u> material things.

He thinks that there certainly is <u>one</u> proper use of the terms 'material thing,' 'physical object,' etc. which is such that a person who says, "there are human bodies, but there are no material things" is contradicting himself, just as would a person who said, "There are things which are red, but there are no things which are coloured," or who said, "There are greyhounds, but there are no dogs."[21] I shall discuss Moore's arguments for the existence of material objects and for our knowledge of their existence in a later chapter.

CHAPTER III

MOORE'S PHILOSOPHY OF SENSE DATA

Section I. Introduction of Sense Data

After asserting his claim, in his common sense realism, that the perceptual statements of common sense are known with certainty, Moore goes on to analyze the nature of a perceptual statement and the nature of sense perception as a cognitive process. His analysis in either case leads him to introduce the notion of sense data in his theory of empirical knowledge. In other words, the notion of sense data has been introduced in two different ways: by the analysis of perceptual statements and by the analysis of sense perception.

Analysis of Perceptual Statements

In his article "Some Judgments of Perception," Moore considers certain questions regarding what we are doing when we are making judgments of perception; for instance, judgments like "This is an inkstand," "This is a finger," etc. He claims that in ordinary life everybody makes many such judgments with great certainty, and that we all ordinarily accept that the truth of such judgments involves the existence of material objects. "If I am right in judging that this is an inkstand, it follows that there is at least one inkstand in the Universe;

and if there is an inkstand in the Universe, it follows that there is in it at least one material thing or physical object."[1] For we all accept that things like inkstands, chairs, tables, etc., are particular instances of material objects. At this point Moore says that a question arises as to what exactly such statements are about, i.e., what it is that is being judged in such statements. In other words, What is it that I am judging, when I judge that that is an inkstand? According to Moore, "What does . . . need to be taken seriously, and what is really dubious, is not the question, whether this is a finger, or whether I know that it is, but the question what, in certain respects, I am knowing, when I know that it is."[2]

He says that he is certain at least about one fundamental assumption about such judgments:

> it is the assumption that, in all cases in which I make a judgment of this sort, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out a thing, which is (quite plainly, in a sense in which nothing else is), the thing about which I am making my judgment; and that yet . . . I am, quite certainly, not . . . judging with regard to it, that it is a thing of that kind for which the term, which seems to express the predicate of my judgment, is a name. Thus when I judge . . . that That is an inkstand, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out, from . . . my total field of presentation at the moment, an object, which is undoubtedly . . . the object about which I am making this judgment; and yet it seems to me quite certain that of this object I am not judging that it is a whole inkstand.[3]

Rather it is always an object of the kind which has been generally called by philosophers a sense datum. "Sense data are the sort of things, about which such judgments as these always seem to be made--the sort of things which seem to be the real or ultimate subject of

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such judgments."[4] The point he wants to emphasize in this connection is that although every judgment about the inkstand is a judgment about the corresponding sense datum, in making a judgment about this sense datum, we are certainly not judging of the sense datum that it is a whole inkstand. He is not denying the fact that this judgment, viz., This is an inkstand, is, in a sense, a judgment about the inkstand itself; he is simply maintaining that this judgment is also, in another sense, a judgment about this sense datum which mediates the perception of the inkstand.

The same view has been expressed in clearer terms in his later article "A Defence of Common Sense." There, Moore says that he is quite certain about two points regarding the analysis of such statements; namely, whenever one knows or judges such a proposition to be true,

> (1) there is always some sense datum about which the proposition in question is a proposition--some sense datum which is a subject (and, in a certain sense, the principal or ultimate subject) of the proposition in question, and (2) that, nevertheless, what I am knowing or judging to be true about this sense datum is not (in general) that it is itself a hand, or a dog, or the sun, etc., etc., as the case may be.[5]

This is so because when one knows, for instance, that "This is a human hand," the sense datum which one is directly aware of is not itself a human hand, since we all know that the hand has many parts (e.g., its other side, and the bones inside it, etc.) which are quite certainly not parts of this sense datum.

The point that Moore seems to emphasize in this connection is that the common sense statements about material objects, e.g., I am

seeing a chair, or this is a penny, or these are material objects, etc., which are not (at least apparently) about any sense datum at all, when analyzed, would necessarily involve statements about sense data. To put it specifically, any attempt to analyze the perceptual statements of common sense, ultimately leads to certain questions which can be answered only in terms of statements about sense data.

How an analysis of ordinary perceptual statements leads to statements about sense data can be roughly stated as follows. According to Moore, analysis of a given proposition consists in stating it in terms of simpler propositions. For instance, the proposition "Material objects exist" can be stated in terms of simpler propositions of the form, "I am perceiving a human hand," or "I am perceiving a pencil," etc., and "Human hands, pencils are material objects."

> But even these are not simple enough. It seems to me quite evident that my knowledge [of the proposition] that I am now perceiving a human hand is a deduction from a pair of propositions simpler still--propositions which I can only express in the form "I am perceiving this" and "This is a human hand."[6]

At this point certain questions arise regarding these latter statements, e.g., what does the word 'This' stand for? Or, what exactly is it that I am perceiving, when I am perceiving this? Am I perceiving the whole human hand or just a part of it, or, perhaps, just a part of the surface of it?--and so on. And an attempt to answer such questions would, eventually, lead to statements about sense data. For instance, it may be said that in any case of sense perception, what is actually

given to the sense, i.e., what is actually perceived, is a sense datum, and the word 'this' stands for the object actually perceived--for a sense datum.

According to Moore any perceptual statement of the form, "I am seeing this," or "this is a penny" is about two objects at once--a sense datum and a physical surface, since the demonstrative 'this' (or 'that') in such a statement refers to two objects at once--'this' refers to a sense datum which is actually seen, and at the same time 'this' is a short for a definite description which identifies the physical surface, and as such 'this' refers to a physical surface answering that description. I shall discuss this issue in detail in a later chapter while discussing the relation between a sense datum and a physical surface.

Analysis of Sense Perception

In his analysis of perceptual statements, Moore has been mainly concerned with the question: What is it that such statements are about? Or, what is it that is being judged in a judgment of perception? In other words, What is the subject of such a statement? In his analysis of sense perception he is mainly concerned with the question, What is it that we are actually perceiving when we are perceiving, for instance, a physical object, by means of our senses? In other words, What is the actual object of our sense perception? In analyzing sense perception what he is analyzing is not the physiological processes involved in sense perception, but rather the mental act of perceiving. It is an analysis of sense perception as a cognitive process. He says that although the act of consciousness is a consequence of or accompaniment

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of the physiological processes of the nervous system, the mental act of consciousness can be known or observed directly (independently of the knowledge of the physiological processes) by the perceiver, whereas the complicated and minute physiological processes cannot be so known or observed. He illustrates the discussion of this subject (i.e., analysis of sense perception) with the sense of sight and the act of seeing or visual perception as a mental occurrence--an act of consciousness, which we can directly observe as happening in our minds.

> The occurrence which I mean here to analyze is merely the mental occurrence--the act of consciousness--which we call seeing. I do not mean to say anything about the bodily processes which occur in the eye and the optic nerves and the brain.[7]

The specific question to be discussed, then, is: What exactly is it that happens when we see a material object? For instance, what happens to each of us when we are looking at an envelope which occupies a definite area of space and we are all looking at it at the same time? Moore says,

> I will begin by describing part of what happened to me. I saw a patch of whitish colour, having a certain size, and a certain shape. . . . These things: this patch of whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually see. And I propose to call these things, the colour and size and shape, sense data, things given or presented by the senses--given in this case, by my sense of sight.[8]

He points out specifically what happens in such a case: (1) when we all see the same envelope at the same time, each one of us also sees certain sense data; (2) although the sense data that each one has seen may be similar to those seen by the other, no two of us, in all probability, have seen exactly the same sense data; (3) although we all see

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the same envelope, in all probability, we all see different sense data; each of us, for instance, sees a slightly different shade of colour, although all these colours may have been whitish; but each is probably slightly different from the rest, "according to the way in which the light feel upon the paper, relatively to the different positions you are sitting in; and again, according to the differences in the strength of your eye-sight, or your distance from the paper."[9] (4) Consequently, we should not say that we know that any two of us see the same sense data; whereas we should say that we know that we all see the same envelope; and (5) from all this it seems to follow that

> if we did all see the same envelope, the envelope which we saw was not identical with the sense data which we saw: the envelope cannot be exactly the same thing as each of the sets of sense data, which each of us saw; for these were in all probability each of them slightly different from the rest, and they cannot, therefore, all be exactly the same thing as the envelope.

Hence, it seems very probable that none of the colours seen is really a part of the envelope (i.e., the real colour of the envelope); and that none of the sizes and shapes seen are the size or shape of the real envelope; at least we cannot be sure that they are. However, from this fact that we cannot be sure whether these sense data are identical with the real shape, size and colour of the envelope, it does not follow that we are not sure whether there are anything like sense data.

> Some philosophers have I think doubted whether there are any such things as . . . "sense data" or "sensa." . . . But there is no doubt at all that there are sense data, in the sense in which I am now using that term. I am at present seeing a great number of them, and feeling others.[10]

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According to Moore even in our ordinary usage, when we talk of seeing an object, we generally do not mean that we are, strictly speaking, seeing the whole object; we generally only mean that we are seeing some part of it. In fact, more appropriately speaking, we should say that we see only the surface of a physical object, and more specifically, only a part of the surface, not the whole of it. There is always more in any object we see, than what we specifically see, viz., a part of it or a part of the surface of it. Similarly, there is, according to Moore, a still stricter sense of seeing in the sense of actually seeing or directly seeing. And in this sense of seeing, what we actually see or directly see, whenever we see (in the ordinary sense) the surface of a physical object or any part of it, is a sense datum (or, are sense data); that is to say, although the object of our seeing, in the ordinary sense, is a material thing, say, an envelope, (or any part of its surface), the object of our direct seeing is always a sense datum, say, a patch of certain colour or a certain shape, etc. In other words, any perceptual statement of the form, "I am seeing a physical surface" (or to that effect in any form) entails a statement of the form, "I am directly seeing a sense datum."[11]

Moore has explained this point further in the following way: In any case of seeing an object, the perceiver has a whole visual field which consists of at least two objects (although usually may be more than two); for instance, if x is seeing the envelope on the table he is also seeing, in the sense of being aware of, other things on the table or physical surfaces (including the table itself); all these

things constitute x's whole visual field, although he is really looking at only one thing, viz., the envelope. Whenever x is presented with such a visual field which he is seeing, he is also presented with a direct visual field corresponding to the visual field being seen, which is directly seen by him.

> I mean that the propositional function "x is seeing at least two objects" entails the propositional function "x has a direct visual field which contains at least two objects" or "x is seeing directly at least two objects." One can say that it is part of the very meaning of the assertion that a person is seeing his right hand as well as something else, that he has a direct visual field containing at least two objects.[12]

To use the illustration of x's seeing an envelope, just as it can be said that x can pick out the envelope from his visual field as the object he is seeing (although he is also, in a sense, seeing many other objects contained in his visual field), it can also be said that x can pick out an object from his direct visual field, viz., a whitish coloured patch of a certain shape, which he is directly seeing (although he is also, in a sense, directly seeing many other objects contained in his direct visual field). This directly seen object which has been picked out from other directly seen objects in the rest of his direct visual field, is a visual sense datum corresponding to the physical surface of the envelope which he is seeing in his visual field. Such directly seen objects are sense data.

Thus, according to Moore, there are two main senses of the word "see": the ordinary sense in which we see physical surfaces or parts of surfaces, and the special sense in which we directly see visual sense data. The important point in this connection is that

in any case of sense perception where we perceive a physical object, we also necessarily directly perceive an object which is different from the physical object perceived, and this object is a sense datum.

Section II
Moore's Characterization of Sense Data

Sense Data Are Directly Apprehended

The most characteristic feature of sense data consists in the particular way they are known. According to Moore sense data are the sort of things that are directly apprehended.

> . . . I have always both used, and intended to use, "sense datum" in such a sense that the mere fact that an object is directly apprehended is sufficient condition for saying that it is a sense datum; . . . directly apprehended smells and tastes and sounds are just as much sense data as directly seen objects.[13]

Direct apprehension, according to Moore, is a cognitive relation that holds between knower or perceiver and the object of knowledge or perception when it is actually being experienced. It is that which happens when we actually see any colour, or actually hear any sound, actually smell a smell, or actually feel the so-called sensation of hardness in pressing the palm against the table. In all these cases the act of consciousness is exactly the same in quality;

> that is to say, the actual seeing of a colour, considered as an act of consciousness, differs in no respect at all from the actual hearing of a sound, or the actual smelling of a smell. They differ only in respect of the fact, that whereas the one is the direct apprehension of one kind of sense datum, the other is the direct apprehension of another kind: the one, for instance, of a colour, the other of a sound.[14]

There are two points that need to be clarified in this connection: First, when Moore defines a sense datum in terms of direct apprehension, what he has meant is that a sense datum is an object of the sort which must be initially or originally directly apprehended; i.e., a sense datum, in order to be an object of cognition, must first be directly apprehended. The reason for this clarification is that sense data can also be indirectly apprehended. Indirect apprehension is defined by Moore as the kind of cognitive relation which one has to a thing, when one does not directly apprehend the thing itself, but does directly apprehend a proposition about it.[15] It is the kind of relation which is usually expressed by saying 'thinking of or about a thing' or 'remembering a thing' or believing something about a thing,' etc., when the thing in question is not actually experienced or directly apprehended. For instance, when one looks at the wall and actually sees its blue colour, one directly apprehends the bluish colour; but, then, if one turns one's head, or closes one's eyes, one no longer directly apprehends it; yet one may still be thinking of the colour--thinking of the bluish colour that one saw a moment ago; or one may still be remembering that it was, or that one saw it a moment ago; in this case one is, in a sense, still conscious of the colour, though one is not directly apprehending it any longer.[16] In this case the sense datum which was formerly apprehended directly, is now being apprehended indirectly. But even though a sense datum can also be apprehended indirectly, the fact remains that it must still be initially directly apprehended in order to be thought of or remembered later on. I shall

discuss the nature of indirect apprehension and direct apprehension in detail in a later chapter while discussing Moore's views about different forms of cognitive relation.

Second, although direct apprehension is something which, according to Moore, characterizes what a sense datum is, in the sense that a sense datum is initially or originally known only by way of direct apprehension, there are other things also which can be known by direct apprehension. For instance, propositions, direct apprehensions themselves, images including after images, are all known also by direct apprehension. Even though images and after images may be placed under the category of sense data, in a sense, propositions and acts of direct apprehension themselves cannot be so regarded. A question may also be raised as to whether the term 'direct apprehension' can be used in the same sense (or as the same relation) in the case of direct apprehension of propositions and in the case of direct apprehension of sense data. Moore, himself, acknowledges both of these points but has preferred to leave the issue undecided.[17]

Sense Data Are Different From Sensations

Sense data are not sensations. In accordance with his basic distinction between the object of x awareness and the act of awareness, Moore has distinguished sense data from sensation. The reason for this is that the term 'sensation' is ambiguous, since it may stand, e.g., for the bluish colour of the wall, and it may also stand for the experience or the act of consciousness which consists in seeing the colour of the wall. He says that although many philosophers have used

'sensation' without making this distinction, he prefers to use this term only in the sense of experiencing, i.e., in the sense of an act of consciousness; and not in the sense of that which is experienced, i.e., the object of experience, e.g., the colour of the wall. For the objects of the latter type he uses the term 'sense data.'

Moore offers two reasons for this distinction: (1) It is "conceivable that the patch of colour which I saw may have continued to exist after I saw it [i.e., even when I stop seeing it, e.g., when I turn my head away]; whereas, of course, when I ceased to see it my seeing of it ceased to exist." And (2) it is also conceivable

> that some sense data--this whitish colour for instance--are in the same place in which the material object--the envelope, is. It seems to me conceivable that this whitish colour is really on the surface of the material envelope. Whereas it does not seem to me that my seeing of it is in that place. My seeing of it is in another place--somewhere within my body.[18]

Sense Data Are the Kind of Objects Common To All Actual and Possible Sensory Experiences

According to Moore there are five different classes of the mental events called sensory experience: (1) images, (2) dreams, (3) hallucinations, (4) after sensations, and (5) sensations proper. The common feature in all these events is that an entity of some kind or another is experienced. This entity is not identical with the event of experiencing.

> But we can speak not only of the entities which are experienced in the experiences of this kind, but also of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of this kind; and these two classes may again be different. For a patch of colour, even if it were not actually experienced, would be an entity of the same sort as some which

> are experienced in experiences of this kind. . . . In speaking . . . of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of the five kinds . . . we do not necessarily confine ourselves to those which actually are experienced in some such experiences: we leave it an open question whether the two classes are identical or not. . . . I intend to call this class of entites the class of sensibles.[19]

The class of entities that Moore calls sensibles, consists precisely of all those entities, "whether experienced or not, which are of the same sort as those which are experienced in the experiences of these five kinds."

In this context, Moore has further said that all these sensibles have some common intrinsic property, which is recognizable, but is unanalyzable.

> When we call an experience sensory, what we mean is not only that in it some thing is experienced in a particular way, but also that this something has this unanalysable property. If this be so, the ultimate definition of "sensibles" would be merely all entities which have this unanalysable property.[20]

Secondly, he says that he prefers to use the term 'sensible' instead of the term 'sense data' for two reasons: (1) sometimes the application of 'sense datum' is limited to only that which is actually given in a sensory experience; and (2) sometimes it is used to stand for only these entities which are experienced in sensation proper, in which case, those experienced in the rest of the five classes will be excluded.

However, it should be mentioned regarding this last point (viz., the use of the term 'sensible' instead of 'sense datum') that it has not been made much use of nor has it been given much importance

in his other works; rather the term 'sense datum' has been used in the sense in which he has intended to use the term 'sensible.'

Section III. Open Questions About the Status of Sense Data

On the basis of his consideration of the various aspects of the nature of sense data, Moore thinks that the following things are true of them (as illustrated in the case of visual perception, e.g., of an envelope): that no one can be sure that the directly apprehended colour, shape, or size of the envelope, is the real colour, shape, or size of it. So far as the directly apprehended shapes and sizes are concerned, it seems quite certain that they are not the real shape and size of the envelope, since while different people see the same envelope, different people directly perceive different shapes and sizes at the same time. And "these different sizes and shapes cannot possibly all be the size and shape of the envelope." The same thing is true of the colours directly perceived by different persons. Since each of the different persons actually sees slightly different colour at the same time, "it is difficult to believe, though not absolutely impossible, that all these colours were really in the same place at the same time."

According to Moore the different areas of space (which seem to be occupied by material objects) are also objects which are directly apprehended. And in this case also, no one can be sure whether or not any part of the sense given space which any one person directly perceives, is numerically the same with parts of those sense given spaces which other persons directly perceive at the same time. It is also

doubtful whether or not any part of the sense given space is numerically the same as any part of the space occupied by the real envelope. Since, if it is so, we will have to accept either the hypothesis that all the different colours which different persons actually see as occupying the area are really in the same place as the real envelope, or else, that the colours only seem to be in this sense given area but are not really there. According to Moore, so far as the first alternative is concerned, it is difficult to believe and explain how all the different colours be at the same place at the same time; so far as the second alternative is concerned, he says that it may be said that they do really occupy the sense given area;

> . . . this area, it may be said, undoubtedly is occupied, by the colours: it is nothing but the space over which the colour is spread. So that, if the area, which I see, really is numerically the same as those which you see, then it will follow that all the different colours we see really are in the same place. This argument . . . does not seem to me absolutely conclusive. It does seem to me possible that the colour I see only seems to be in the sense given area, which I see. But it is . . . sufficient to suggest a doubt whether any part of this sense given area seen by me really is numerically the same as any part of any of those seen by you.[21]

These are some of the reasons why many philosophers have held the following views about sense data: (1) that absolutely every sense datum that any person ever directly apprehends exists only so long as he apprehends it, (2) that no sense datum which any one person directly apprehends ever is directly apprehended by any other person, and (3) that no sense datum that is directly apprehended by one person can be in the same space with any sense datum apprehended by another person.

> These three things are . . . the chief things that are meant, when it is said that all sense data exist only in the mind of the person who apprehends them; and it is certainly the common view in philosophy that all sense data do only exist in our minds.[22]

Any view holding these three things about sense data is called by Moore the accepted view.

Consequently, two questions that have been considered in detail by Moore, in this context are: (1) Are sense data totally private to the perceiver and (2) can sense data exist unperceived?

Are Sense Data Totally Private to the Perceiver?

According to the accepted view, no two persons can ever apprehend exactly the same sense datum even when they are looking at the same thing, at the same time under the same conditions; although they may perhaps apprehend exactly similar sense data; "but they would say that even though exactly alike--the same in quality--they cannot ever be numerically the same." They would further say that any sense datum apprehended by any one person cannot possibly be in the same place as any sense datum apprehended by another person even when both are apprehending the sense datum in question at the same time. That is to say, any sense datum apprehended by any one person simply doesn't have any spatial relations whatsoever with any sense datum apprehended by another person. They would allow, however, that the different sense data seen by any one person have, in a sense, spatial relations to one another. For instance, this corner of a particular colour patch apprehended by one person is really at a certain distance from the other

corner of the same patch apprehended by the same person at the same time, and the same applies to other sense data presented in the visual field of the person concerned at any one time.

> But they would say that all the different sense data within my field of vision at any one time have distance and direction from one another only within a private space of my own. That is to say, no point in this private space of mine is either identical with, nor at any distance from, any point within the field of vision of any other person. The sense given field of vision of each of us, at any moment, constitutes a private space of that person's own;--no two points in any two of these spaces, can be related to one another in any of the ways in which two points in any one of them are related.[23]

So far as Moore's view about this issue is concerned, he is of the opinion that though some of the arguments in favor of this accepted view have weight, none of them seems to be conclusive. On the other hand the objections that may be brought forward against them do not seem to be conclusive either. For instance, concerning the argument that if we don't accept the sense given space and the sense data apprehended as private, then we will have to accept that all different colours are really in the same places. He says, ". . . it seems to me possible that any one of them might be the truth."

So far as the positive aspect of his view about this matter is concerned, he appeals to the fact that we all have a strong tendency to believe certain things. For instance, in a situation like this, everyone finds it very difficult not to believe that when he looks at this envelope, for instance, and turns away his head the next moment, the colour which he has been seeing a moment ago (but not now) is not still existing; or that the space in which he has seen

it is not still existing also; or that the colour is not still in that place. Similarly, it is also very hard not to believe that the very same portion of the space that one sees is not also seen by other persons; since, one can point to the space which he sees--i.e., part of the sense given space that one sees and by doing that which one thinks one can show to the other person that portion of the space to which one is pointing. He says,

> We all constantly assume that pointing at a thing is of some use; that if I point at a thing, that serves to show you which thing I am talking about; that you will see the same thing, which I see, and will thus know what it is that I see. And it certainly seems as if the thing at which I am pointing now is part of the sense given space which I see; and that, therefore, if you see what I am pointing at, some portion of the sense given space which each of us sees must be the same.[24]

On the other hand, it is conceivable that one may be wholly mistaken in believing this, i.e., it is conceivable that the space that one points at is not a part of the sense given area that any other person sees, and what the other person sees is not a part of the sense given area which one sees; ". . . that the supposition that some portion of our sense given spaces must be identical, arises from our confusion of sense given space with the real space which we see--but see in another sense."[25]

It seems that Moore has not been able to decide for certain whether or not the sense given spaces and the colours, sizes, and other data are private, so far as they are directly apprehended or actually perceived. It seems that he has, in general, accepted that the directly apprehended sense data are (in a sense) private--that at

least some of them certainly are private, while some of them perhaps are. For instance, the data directly apprehended in dreams halucinations, or in the apprehension of images or after images, certainly are private; whereas those directly apprehended in ordinary regular and standard cases of sense perception, which he calls cases of sensation proper are perhaps not so private, i.e., not at least in the sense in which the ones mentioned above are. He says that even if the three things held by the accepted view are true of all the sense data whatsoever,

> it does not seem . . . to follow that they exist only in my mind, or indeed are in my mind in any sense at all except that they are directly apprehended by me. They are . . . not in my mind in the sense in which my apprehension of them is in my mind: for instance, this whitish colour, even if it does only exist while I see it, and cannot be seen by any one else, does not seem to me to be in my mind in the sense in which my seeing of it is in my mind. My seeing of it is . . . related to my mind in a way in which this which I see is not related to it: and I should prefer to confine the phrase "in my mind" to those things which are related to my mind, in the way in which my seeing of this colour, and my other acts of consciousness are related to it.[26]

Since Moore has not been able to be sure about this particular aspect of the status of the directly apprehended sense data, one might think that he would have to be uncertain as to whether two people could ever have knowledge of the same material object. This would have been so if he had accepted direct apprehension to be the only way of knowing. But he has explicitly said that though direct apprehension is one of the ways of knowing, it is not the only way of knowing things. According to him many philosophers have assumed more or less unconsiously that direct apprehension is the only way in which we ever have anything

before our minds, since it is much easier to observe and understand the direct apprehension of sense data and images than it is to observe ways other than direct apprehension, of having things before one's mind.

> If you try to observe what is going on in your mind at any moment, it is easier to see that you are directly apprehending certain sense data, or certain images, or both; but it is not by any means easy to see that anything else is happening in your mind at all. . . . It is, therefore, very natural to suppose that all knowledge consists merely in the direct apprehension of sense data and images; and many philosophers have . . . constantly assumed this.[27]

Since for Moore direct apprehension is not the only way of knowing things, then, even though directly perceived spaces and data are private to the perceiver, it is quite probable that different persons may perceive the same space according to other senses of perceiving or ways of knowing.

Can Sense Data Exist Unperceived?

So far as the question of whether sense data can exist unperceived is concerned, the accepted view holds that they cannot. They have held that absolutely no sense data which one ever apprehends, exists at all except at the moment when it is being apprehended by one. According to them the sense given spaces and other data like colours, sounds, aches, etc., exist only as long as they are being apprehended by someone. That is to say, that when the apprehension of them ceases to exist these sense data simply no longer are in the Universe; they just cease to exist. One may apprehend the very next moment a sense datum exactly like the one apprehended a moment ago, but the two will not be numerically the same although the two may be exactly the same in quality.

So far as Moore's views about this matter are concerned, first, he has attempted to show that there are reasons to say that such views as mentioned above are untenable, and second, he has further attempted to show that there are some good reasons to say that at least some sense data do exist unperceived.

Moore considers two a priori arguments and one empirical argument in favor of the view that absolutely no sense data can exist unless they are being perceived.

First a priori argument.--According to this argument, to suppose a sensible or sense datum to exist and yet not to be experienced is self contradictory, since the existence of any sensible consists in being perceived. Philosophers following this line of thinking hold that the contents of our sensation or experience cannot exist without being perceived, whereas our perceptions or sensations themselves may exist unperceived; that is to say, these philosophers have held that when we speak of such a content as a red patch with gold letters on it 'existing,' it (i.e., 'existing') means that the content is perceived; but when we speak of our perception of the red patch with gold letters on it existing, it (i.e., 'existing') does not mean that the content in this case, viz., our perceptions, are perceived. That is, these philosophers are using the word 'exist' in two different senses: in the case of one class of contents, viz., colours, sounds, etc., 'exists' means 'is perceived'; but in the case of the other class of contents, viz., perceptions, 'exists' does not mean 'is perceived' but means something different. According to this usage of 'exist,' if one asserts that a

sensible, e.g., a colour, a sound, etc., exists and yet is not perceived, one is contradicting oneself, since one is really asserting, in this case, that the sensible is perceived and yet is not perceived. Similarly, if one says that a sensible is perceived, yet it does not exist, what one is really asserting is that it is perceived and yet it is not perceived.[28]

Moore's argument against this view is that, in the first place, its use of the word 'exist' in two different senses is unwarranted. This is so not simply because the word 'exist' is ambiguous but because of the <u>way</u> it is used in two different cases. He says that there is nothing unusual about the fact that the same word should be used in different senses, and that many words are so used.

> But it would . . . be something very strange indeed, if in the case of a word which we constantly apply to all sorts of different objects, we should uniformly apply it to one large class of objects in the one sense and the one sense only and the other large class in the other sense and the other sense only. Usually, in the case of such ambiguous words, it happens that, in different contexts, we apply it to one and the same object in both senses. We sometimes wish to say of a given object that it has the one property, and sometimes wish to say of the same object that it has the other property.[29]

In the second place, there is a common sense usage of the word 'exist'--the sense in which we all ordinarly use it--where we do not make this distinction, at least, not in the sense in which the above mentioned view does. In fact, we don't ordinarily make <u>this</u> distinction at all, but we all do use the word 'exist' significantly in ordinary language or conversation.

> Indeed . . . it is quite plain that we constantly do ask, with regard to what is not a perception, whether it exists, in precisely the same sense, in which we ask, with regard to a perception, whether it exists. We ask in precisely the same sense: Was the Roc a real bird, or merely an imaginary one? and, did Sindbad's perception of the Roc really exist, or is it a fiction that he perceived a Roc? . . . the sense in which I am proposing to enquire whether a red patch exists, is precisely the sense in which they admit that my perception of a red patch does exist. And in this sense, it is plain that to suppose that a thing may exist, which is not perceived, or that it may not exist, although it is perceived, is at least not self contradictory.[30]

What Moore wants to emphasize is that such a claim cannot be self contradictory although in a given case it may be false; and whether it is so or not is not a matter of definition, it is a matter of empirical investigation.

The second a priori argument.--According to this argument, although it is not self contradictory to suppose that a thing is a sensible and yet is not experienced, yet we cannot justifiably make any such claim, viz., that a sensible can or does exist unperceived, since, "we can clearly see that nothing can have one property without having the other." In reply to this Moore simply expresses his opinion by saying that it is difficult to deny that one may be able to know apriori of such a connection between two properties, but since, in his own case at least, he 'cannot see' that there is any such connection, he is not convinced about this a priori argument; ". . . I cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far as a priori reasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not experienced."[31] (It seems that in this case Moore is simply expressing his critical opinion, rather than giving a

clear-cut argument, about the matter; and his main objection is against the claim that we can know of such a connection between two properties, even if there is any, a priori; hence, the emphasis on the contrast between "we can clearly see. . . ." and "I cannot see. . . .")

The empirical argument.--According to this argument there is ample empirical evidence that the existence of the sense data which we experience at any time in any case of a sensation proper, always depends on the condition of our nervous system; as such, the sense data, "which we would have experienced, if only our nervous system had been in a different condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition," even if the external physical conditions remain unchanged.

Moore says that this argument is fallacious because it assimilates two different things, viz., the existence of the sense data which we experience and the fact that we experience them. What the empirical evidence shows is that our experiencing of the sense data is always dependent upon the condition of the nervous system, even where the external physical conditions remain unchanged; but the evidence does not show that the sense data experienced also always so depends. "The fact that I am now experiencing this black mark is certainly different from the fact that this black mark now exists." Hence, this argument does not constitute a reason for holding that sensibles experienced in sensation proper cannot exist unperceived.

It may be argued, however, that if we accept that sense data can exist unperceived, then it follows that the sensibles, which a colour-blind person, if he occupied the same position as occupied by

a person who is not colour-blind, would experience, and "which would certainly be very different from those which I see, are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same place as those which I see."[32]

In response to this extension of the empirical argument, Moore says that there is no reason for the assumption that if the sensibles exist at all, they must be in the same place. He further says that the difficulties, if any, related to this assumption do not apply at least to his hypothesis

> which is only that they exist now, not that they exist in the same place in which mine do. On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at times when they are not experienced, I have only to say (1) that . . . there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that no sensibles do; and (2) that . . . perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensibles do. . . .[33]

Moore further considers, in this connection, the question as to whether there is any positive reason to suppose that sensibles ever do exist unperceived; the reason which he considers to be most important in this context,

> is simply that, in Hume's phrase, I have "a strong propensity to believe" that, e.g., the visual sensible which I directly apprehend in looking at this paper, still exists unchanged when I merely alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my eyes, provided that the physical conditions outside my body remain unchanged. In such a case it is certainly true in some sense that I should see sensibles like what I saw the moment before, if only my head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes unclosed.[34]

However, Moore has clearly said that this reason applies to only one class of sensibles, viz., those apprehended in the class of sensory experience which he calls the sensation proper. This class of sensory experience excludes these other classes of sensory experience, viz.,

images, dreams, hallucinations and illusions, and, after sensations or after images. The sensibles experienced in sensation proper are such as would be experienced (under certain conditions which actually exist), "if only a living body, having certain constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no such body does actually exist."[35]

It should be mentioned, however, that on this issue Moore has held different views at different times, and this fact makes it difficult to state clearly what exactly his views on the matter are. It seems that, so far as his earlier views on this subject are concerned, he is not sure whether the accepted view on this issue is true or not. Although he expresses his doubts about the conclusiveness of its arguments, he thinks that they could have been true. He says, "as regards the question whether this accepted view is true or not, I confess I cannot make up my mind. I think it may very likely be true."[36] But while examining the arguments of the accepted view on this matter, he seems to be 'strongly inclined' to hold the view that at least some sense data (viz., those experienced in sensations proper) may exist unperceived. It is this phase of his views that I have discussed mainly in this chapter. But, this is not his final view about this matter; in his later writings, particularly in his "Reply," he seems to have held the opinion that sense data cannot exist unperceived, just as headaches cannot exist unfelt. And again there also, at other passages he says that he is not sure about either position: that he is willing to hold both the views though they are

incompatible. I will discuss and substantiate this last claim in a later chapter when I discuss his final views about the relation between a physical surface and its corresponding sense datum.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MOORE'S THEORY OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF COMMON SENSE AND SENSE DATA

Section I. What Is Moore's Major Objective?

The main concern of Moore's epistemological writings is to defend and justify some of the most widely accepted views of common sense about perceptual knowledge of the external world. One such view that he has been mainly interested in defending and justifying is the view that we all do know that material objects exist. Although this is a view which has been most commonly and least disputedly held by all of us and has persisted for ages, the question of defending it still arises because there have been philosophical views according to which it is false to say that material objects exist or to say that we know that material objects exist.

According to Moore those views which deny such well established views of common sense, for instance views that deny our knowledge of the existence of material objects as such, or our knowledge of the existence of other persons having perceptions and thoughts, are skeptical views; such views are "those which deny something which Common Sense professes to know, without professing to know anything which Common Sense does not

profess to know. I will call these, for the sake of a name, sceptical views." All such views hold that we do not know certain things which common sense asserts that we do know. Some of these views, however, do not positively deny that there are in the Universe those things which common sense asserts to be known with certainty as existing in the Universe; these skeptical views "only say that we simply do not know at all whether these things are in it or not; whereas Common Sense asserts quite positively that we do know that they are."[1] This, however, does not mean that these skeptical views deny the possibility of any knowledge at all; nor that they deny the possibility of knowledge of certain other things which common sense also asserts to be known; what they deny is the knowledge of some of the things that common sense asserts to know of.

Some of the things that common sense asserts to know of include two broad classes of things, viz., material things existing in space and time, and acts of consciousness as found in different living bodies which also exist in space and time. Some of these skeptical views deny our knowledge only of material things or bodies but not of other minds and their acts of consciousness; while the rest deny the knowledge of both of these two classes of things. In any case all such skeptical views deny the possibility of our knowledge of the existence of material things, which according to common sense we certainly know of.

The type of skepticism that Moore is mainly concerned with in his theory of empirical knowledge is the type of skepticism just explained; on his interpretation, when the skeptics deny the possibility

of the knowledge of an external world, what they have meant is that we do not and cannot know of the existence of either one of the two above mentioned classes of things. It is the refutation of this type of skepticism that Moore has taken to be the main objective of his theory of empirical knowledge. In his various writings, although Moore has discussed considerably both skepticism about the knowledge of material things and that about the knowledge of other persons having thoughts, perceptions, etc., it seems that the major part of his views deals with the issue about the knowledge of the existence of material objects.

Section II
The Two Kinds of Objects of Knowledge for Moore

In the two preceding chapters I have discussed the two different aspects of Moore's Theory of Empirical Knowledge, viz., his philosophy of Common Sense Realism and his philosophy of Sense Data. These two aspects seem to represent two very different standpoints so far as Moore's views about empirical knowledge are concerned: viz., the common sense standpoint which is relatively less technical and less analytical; and the philosophically analytical standpoint which is technical and highly analytical. These two aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge and the two respective standpoints which Moore subsequently seems to be holding are so wide apart and different from each other that, sometimes, it seems difficult to see any relation between the two, and their relevance to his attempt to refute skepticism about the knowledge of an external world and to re-establish the common

sense view of the same. (The relevance of his common sense standpoint, however, is obvious. What is not very obvious is how this standpoint together with his sense data standpoint is relevant to his purpose.)

On the one hand, his Common Sense Realism asserts that we all do know with certainty that there are material objects and other persons; such knowledge is constantly expressed in our everyday perceptual statements like 'I see a penny,' 'I hear the clock ticking,' 'There are children playing in the playground,' 'That is a chair,' and so on. On the other hand, his philosophy of sense data asserts that when we are, for instance, seeing something, what we are actually seeing is not a penny or a chair or a book but a patch of colour of a certain shape and size; and further, these colours and sizes differ from person to person even when they are all looking at the same physical object at the same time, that these colours and shapes actually seen by different people at the same time may be very similar to one another but, in all probability, are not exactly the same. In other words, in a case of ordinary visual perception where we all ordinarily think we are seeing material objects, we are not actually seeing material objects, but are seeing sense data of different kinds. And the sense data are not material objects since, first, the seeing of sense data is different from the seeing of material objects; second, as the common sense view asserts, we all know with certainty that material objects occupy space, whereas it is at least doubtful whether sense data occupy space; third, as the common sense view claims, when two people are looking at a particular object at the same time under

the same conditions, although they are seeing the same object, in all probability, they are seeing slightly different sense data; and finally, we commonly believe we know that material objects exist even when they are not perceived, whereas it is at least doubtful, whether sense data exist unperceived at all.

The two viewpoints seem to represent two discrepant, and, in a sense, conflicting theses about the same issue, viz., our knowledge of material objects, and of an external world in general, by sense perception. It seems that Moore has given two completely different, and apparently, incompatible answers to the same question: "What do we know by sense perception?" (1) We know of the existence of various physical objects like inkstands, tables, chairs, our own bodies, etc., and other persons having thoughts and perceptions, etc., and units of space, etc., and (2) we know of the existence of sense data--objects like patches of colour, shapes of some kind, sizes of some kind, etc., which are very different from the physical objects which we ordinarily take to be the objects of our sense perception. In other words, according to the standpoint represented by his common sense realism, his answer is that the objects of our perceptual knowledge are material things, not sense data; according to the standpoint represented by his philosophy of sense data, his answer is that the objects of our perceptual knowledge are sense data, not material things. These two answers, <u>if they are really answers to one and the same question</u>, give the impression that two conflicting positions are being simultaneously held by Moore so far as views about the knowledge

of the external world by sense perception are concerned: viz., his position as upholder of a common sense philosophy and his position as an upholder of a philosophy of sense data which is almost inaccessible to the common sense viewpoint.

Section III. Questions About the Coherence of Moore's Two Standpoints

Many readers of Moore have found it difficult to see how these two extreme standpoints be combined into one coherent philosophy; for it seems that if one maintains the sense data standpoint consistently, one cannot maintain, at the same time, the common sense standpoint consistently; on the other hand, if one maintains the common sense standpoint consistently, one cannot maintain, at the same time, the sense data standpoint consistently. Since the types of things accepted as objects of knowledge in the two standpoints, respectively, are not only totally different, but also of such natures that, at least apparently, the acceptance of the one leads to the rejection of the other. Hence, in particular, some of Moore's critics have been led to suspect that the two standpoints represented by his two philosophies are incompatible with each other,[2] and others to doubt how far Moore has really been successful in his attempt to answer the skeptics' challenge about our lack of knowledge of material things, etc.,[3] and still others to doubt the extent of Moore's success in avoiding a similar skepticism in his own views concerning the same.[4] In other words, it has appeared to some of his readers that although Moore has started out with the claim to defend the common sense view of the knowledge of an external

world against the skeptics' view of the lack (or impossibility) of such knowledge, he has not remained consistent in his attempt to establish his claim. This fact has been expressed in various ways by his critics: that throughout his works on empirical knowledge, Moore has been trying to justify two conflicting viewpoints about the knowledge of material objects; that he has not consistently followed up his project to establish a defence of common sense; that he has been doing two different and unrelated things when he has originally wanted to do only one of them and not the other; or that he has wavered between two different (and perhaps incompatible) standpoints not being able to decide which one to accept finally. I will illustrate only one such criticism by quoting a passage from Murphy's paper "Moore's 'Defence of Common Sense,'" where the criticism has been stated in very clear terms. In this paper Murphy defends Moore's assertion of the validity of common sense knowledge against the charges brought about by some of his critics on the ground that they have misunderstood what Moore has been trying to say about common sense knowledge. But so far as Moore's introduction of sense data is concerned, Murphy disagrees with him.

> I find it [the introduction of sense data] difficult to accept or to reconcile with what went before. So far as I can see the proposition Moore knew and could verify did not have a sense datum for its principal and ultimate subject at all. No sense datum need be referred to and no proposition of the sort discussed about its relation to one's hand need be known in order to know with certainty that what is observed is in fact a hand. And this is

> fortunate since, on Moore's showing we do not know what this relation is. If we had to be knowing what only a correct epistemological analysis, not yet satisfactorily performed, would disclose when we know that "this is a hand," there would thus be considerable ground for scepticism about common sense knowledge after all. In fact, the assumption that something of the sort must ultimately be what we are knowing, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, is one of the most familiar sources of such scepticism. Moore rejects the sceptical conclusion, but he seems, at least at times, to have retained the assumption from which it was naturally derived. Yet his own philosophy provides the grounds for rejecting this assumption as gratuitous and misleading. Once common sense statements are interpreted in the context of their familiar use and testable validity, the claim that they are "ultimately" about the way in which sense data belong to or represent material objects becomes extremely unplausible. . . . Moore has here reverted to a theory incompatible with the philosophical commitments of his defense of common sense.[5]

Section IV
Two Underlying Reasons for These Questions

It seems that there are two underlying reasons for the questions Moore's critics have raised about the coherence of his views on empirical knowledge. One of the reasons seems to be the obvious similarity of the basic epistemological positions accepted by Moore and the skeptics regarding the source of empirical knowledge and regarding the nature of knowledge.

The skeptics' basic epistemological position is empiricism according to which all knowledge about the external world is founded upon experience, i.e., experience is the only source of our knowledge of any truths other than analytic truths. In other words, according to them, the truth of synthetic propositions can be known only by experience. They further accept in their definition of 'knowledge'

that absolute certainty is a necessary condition of knowledge; i.e., if we are said to know something, we must know it with absolute certainty. Hence, for the skeptics, 'knowledge' means absolutely certain knowledge. On the basis of these two principles, the skeptics have declared the knowledge of anything other than one's own ideas and sensations is not possible; i.e., one cannot know anything beyond one's own acts of consciousness and the data yielded by them. As such, on their view, one cannot know of the existence of an external world--i.e., of material things and other persons.

So far as Moore's position about the knowledge of an external world is concerned, it seems clear that he also is an empiricist, that he holds that all knowledge about the external world is ultimately founded upon experience. This empiricist approach has been clearly brought out by his repeated emphasis on the roles of observation and sense perception in all forms of empirical knowledge and at all stages of empirical knowledge. By the knowledge of an external world, Moore means, roughly speaking, the knowledge of the existence of various kinds of material objects which occupy space and are in time, and of acts of consciousness as found in human beings and in other living bodies which also exist in space and time; these are the two broad classes of things that the external world consists of.

According to him the most primitive objects of knowledge, so far as our knowledge of the external world is concerned, are the material objects; and the most primitive way of knowing material objects is sense perception. He is of the opinion that it is true

that we all commonly believe we know material objects by ways other than sense perception, for instance, by memory, testimony and inference, but all these other ways are based upon sense perception. He writes:

> It is, in a sense, the most primitive way of knowing material objects: it seems, in fact, to be true, that if I had not known of some material objects by means of sense perception, I could never possibly have known of any others in any of these other ways; and this seems to be true universally: no man could ever know of the existence of any material objects at all, unless he first knew of some by means of his senses. The evidence of the senses is, therefore, the evidence upon which all our other ways of knowing material objects seem to be based.[6]

It is a part of the common sense view of the world that there are material objects and we constantly know the existence of such instances of material objects as chairs and tables, etc. by means of our senses.

Moore also accepts that knowledge is always absolutely certain. To know something is to know with absolute certainty or to know for certain.[7] And yet, Moore's objective has been to come up with a thesis which is very different from, in fact the negation of, what the skeptics have thought to be the logical outcome of these two premises. From this, three possibilities follow: (1) either the skeptics are wrong or Moore is wrong about what the premises imply, i.e., either the skeptics' argument or Moore's argument is fallacious; or (2) the premises of the arguments in both cases are inconsistent so that any conclusion follows; or (3) they have been taking the basic terms in their respective premises in different senses.

In any case, the fact that these possibilities are there is sufficient to arouse some doubt about the validity of the conclusion

of Moore's argument. Even if one takes an impartial and objective stand about the whole matter, one may reasonably doubt both the conclusions until it is clarified in what sense(s) the two parties are using the basic terms in the epistemological assumptions.

The other reason for thinking that the two standpoints held by Moore (or the two aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge) might be in conflict with each other, or that Moore might not have succeeded in answering the skeptics, seems to lie in the fact that a considerable portion of Moore's epistemological views have been devoted to the discussion of the problem of sense data and various other questions generated by this general problem, the most discussed and, perhaps, the most vulnerable one being the problem of the relation between sense data and the physical objects. Such questions, especially ones regarding the relation between sense data and physical object, do not present any difficulty for the skeptics since they have claimed (to have established) that all that we can ever know the existence of are sense data (and our own acts of consciousness); and, since sense data are not material objects, it follows that on their views we cannot know of the existence of material objects.

There is, of course, little worry regarding the consistency or validity of Moore's epistemological stand insofar as his views about empirical knowledge consist only of a discussion of the various aspects of the common sense views which he has wanted to defend and justify; the problem arises as soon as he introduces the concept of sense data in his discussion of perceptual knowledge of the external world. It

begins to appear as if his common sense standpoint is somehow getting mixed up with a philosophy of sense data which is far from being a feature of common sense view. Indeed, Moore's further and deeper involvement with the problem of sense data in his various epistemological writings have even given the impression to some of his critics that his common sense standpoint has been only initial and not final.

These are the two basic reasons that seem to have led some of his critics to suspect an incoherence between his two standpoints about empirical knowledge. The first reason leads to the question: How can Moore accept the same basic principles about empirical knowledge as has been accepted by the skeptics and yet claim to reach a conclusion so different from the skeptics'? The second reason leads to the question: If Moore's major objective has been to defend the common sense view then, why has he devoted so much time to the discussion of sense data; why has he introduced the problem of sense data after all? And further, how can his philosophy of sense data be relevant to his defence and justification of the common sense?

In the succeeding two chapters, I shall try to show that Moore and the skeptics have used the key terms of their basic epistemological assumptions differently. I shall further try to show that although the specific context in which Moore has held the sense data standpoint should be distinguished from the specific context in which he has held the common sense standpoint, the two standpoints are related in the general framework of his epistemological views.

In the immediately following chapter I shall discuss Moore's views (and also those of the skeptics) about perceptual knowledge in relation to Moore's analysis of knowledge and the various ways of knowing. I shall further consider Moore's examination of and arguments against the skeptics' claims about empirical knowledge. And on the basis of these considerations I shall try to show that the two aspects of his views regarding empirical knowledge are not in conflict with each other, and that he has been consistent in his attempt to refute the skeptical views against common sense.

In the final chapter I shall consider and evaluate some further questions that may still be raised about his holding to both the standpoints. To be specific, I shall consider the question as to why Moore has introduced the problem of sense data by analyzing perceptual statements and the cognitive act of sense perception, when it appears that he could have attempted to refute the skeptics' claims without introducing and accepting the sense data standpoint at all. I shall try to answer this question by considering the role of analysis in philosophy according to Moore, and by considering whether or not his introduction of the sense datum philosophy bears against his claim to defend and justify common sense views against the skeptics' attack.

CHAPTER V

MOORE'S ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND ANSWERS TO SKEPTICISM

Section I. Why We Have to Consider Moore's Metaepistemological Views and Distinctions

In Chapters II and III I have discussed Moore's views about common sense knowledge claims and his views about sense data, respectively, which I have also referred to as two philosophies of Moore, because of their very different natures. In Chapter IV I have presented some criticisms made by some of his critics against his theory of empirical knowledge. These criticisms are mainly directed towards the relatedness of the two philosophies and their joint relevance to the pursuit of Moore's main objective.

It seems extremely important to know whether these criticisms of his views are justified or not, because, if they are justified, then they would lead to the conclusion that Moore's attempt to refute skepticism has been a futile one, and consequently, that he has not been able to pursue his objective successfully; and perhaps further, that instead of providing an answer to the skeptics, he himself has been led to skepticism--a claim, which if true, will lead one to suspect the consistency of Moore's views about empirical knowledge (since, in that case, his views would include both of these propositions:

skepticism about the knowledge of an external world can be avoided, and also, skepticism about the knowledge of an external world cannot possibly be avoided).

If these two standpoints (as represented by the two philosophies) were held in two completely different contexts, then one could perhaps say that there is no connection between the two, and their extreme nature should not bother us; but since this is not the case, it seems that the two philosophies must not only be related, but also be relevant to his main objectives, and there must have been reasons for their introduction in that context. In order to determine whether or not it is so, and if it is so, then how it is so, it seems necessary now to consider Moore's views regarding empirical knowledge in relation to his other epistemological views.

Moore's epistemological views in their entirety may be said to have two parts: the first part consists of his views about empirical knowledge in general. This part includes his views both about common sense and sense data. The other part consists of his views regarding the different sense of 'knowing' under different interpretations corresponding to the different ways of knowing, which may be called his metaepistemological views; in other words, his metaepistemological views constitute the other part of his entire epistemological views in general. Perhaps it would not be incorrect to say, in this context, that his metaepistemological views provide the form of his theory of empirical knowledge; that is, his metaepistemological views supply, so to say, the rules according to which the contents of his theory of

perceptual knowledge take shape and order, representing his two different viewpoints about empirical or perceptual knowledge. His epistemological views as a whole seem to be dealing with three very fundamental questions about knowledge: (1) "What do we know?" or "What are the objects of knowledge?" (2) "How do we know?" or "What are the ways of knowing?" and (3) "To what extent do we know what we know?" or "What are the limits of knowledge?"

If we consider the contents of the two aspects of theory of empirical knowledge only relative to questions (1) and (3), then the two viewpoints do seem to present an almost unbridgeable gap; and it seems very difficult to find any connections between the two so far as their relevance to his main objective of empirical knowledge is concerned. But this gap and the disjointedness of the two positions seem to diminish in a considerable manner if we consider them in relation to question (2). In that case these two positions seem to be two related and equally important links in his theory of perceptual knowledge, both quite relevant to the pursuit of his goal. It seems that the different moves and shifts in his philosophical views can be properly explained and appreciated by pointing out in a general but comparative way how the two aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge are related to his metaepistemological views. The apparent incompatibility of the two philosophies, and the questions it subsequently presents to his readers as to whether he has really been consistent in his attempt to refute skepticism and to avoid it so far as his own philosophical views are concerned, can be better

explained, and perhaps more plausibly, by referring and relating his subsequent views about perceptual knowledge to the basic metaepistemological views held by him. In other words, I think that the different angles from which Moore approaches the problem of perceptual knowledge are very closely tied down to his views regarding the concept of 'knowing' or 'knowledge'--i.e., different sense of 'knowledge' corresponding to the different modes of knowing; and I am further trying to suggest that the two aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge do not represent two independent or two incompatible standpoints if we take into account the proper contexts under which Moore has considered them (or has held them). Hence it seems to me that it is necessary for an appropriate evaluation and/or characterization of Moore's views regarding empirical knowledge, that they should be considered in relation to his metaepistemological views.

In what follows, I shall try to show how Moore's metaepistemological views provide the bases of the two different aspects of his theory of empirical knowledge; and, furthermore, how the two are related to each other, constituting two related and relevant lines of approaching the main problem he is concerned with. I shall divide this discussion into two sections, and the section immediately following deals with some of the main contentions of what I have so far referred to as his metaepistemological views.

Section II
Moore's Epistemological Views and Distinctions

Relation of Propositions to Knowledge and Belief

After laying the foundations of a realistic theory of knowledge by making the distinction between the two factors of knowledge--an awareness and the object of awareness, Moore goes on to consider the various ways of knowing and the different senses of knowledge corresponding to these ways. According to him, knowing is a relation between a person and an object. Any case of knowing is a case of being aware of something (i.e., some object or other). There are, however, different ways of being aware of an object, and corresponding to these different ways, there are various forms of knowledge. It should be mentioned here that in all these different forms of knowledge, the term 'knowledge' has been used in different senses. These points will be explained in detail in the following discussions under this section.

Moore's discussion of knowledge is based not only on the distinction between the two factors of knowledge mentioned above, but also on the distinction between the contents of the Universe as a whole into two exhaustive classes, viz., things that are propositions and things that are not propositions. Corresponding to the latter distinction there are two types of facts in the Universe, viz., facts about propositions and facts about things that are not propositions.[1]

According to Moore, a proposition is what is expressed by a collection of words contained in a sentence; it is the sort of thing

which is expressed by a whole sentence. He explains our knowledge of a proposition in the following way: when we hear or read or utter a sentence, something happens in our minds--"some act of consciousness--over and above the hearing [or reading or uttering] of words, some act of consciousness which may be called the understanding of their meaning." This way of being conscious of something which, in the case of reading or hearing a collection of words in a sentence, consists in understanding the meaning of certain words, may be called the apprehension of the meanings of these words along with the idea expressed by the whole sentence (in which those words occur). Thus the knowledge of a proposition consists in apprehending what is expressed by a certain combination of words in a sentence. In other words, it consists in understanding (the meaning of) a sentence. When we apprehend the meaning of a certain set of words which form a sentence, we apprehend the meaning of that sentence.

Often in the cases of two different sentences we apprehend different meanings expressed by the two different sets of words. It should be mentioned that in such cases although the meanings of the two sentences are different, they are apprehended in the same way. Moore says that a proposition is "the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases [that is, when we understand the meanings of two different sentences]. The two acts of consciousness differ in respect of the fact that what is apprehended in the one, is different from what is apprehended in the other."[2]

He further points out that when we apprehend the proposition expressed by a sentence, we often do something else also besides hearing or reading the sentence; we ordinarily either believe or disbelieve the proposition. Of course, we may simply consider or understand the meaning of a sentence without either believing or disbelieving it. In each of these cases we apprehend a proposition in exactly the same way insofar as we do understand the meaning of the sentence expressing the proposition. It is not necessary, however, that in order to think, believe or disbelieve a proposition, we have to read or hear the sentences expressing them. We often think of, believe or disbelieve a proposition at times when we are neither hearing nor reading the sentences which express them. But we apprehend the propositions in the same sense in which we apprehend them when we understand the meanings of sentences which we are reading or hearing.[3]

According to Moore, as it has been discussed before, we also apprehend things other than propositions, e.g., a sense datum--a patch of colour--which is not a proposition. Now, in the context of the apprehension of propositions, he points out that whenever we apprehend a proposition we always also apprehend things which are not propositions, viz., "things which would be expressed by some of the words," which compose the sentence expressing the proposition. He says that since every proposition is about some object or other, in apprehending the proposition we also apprehend the object(s) which the proposition is about. For instance, the proposition, 'The wall is white,' may be said to be about both the wall and also its white colour; or, the

proposition, 'Twice two are four,' may be said to be about numbers two and four. In these cases we apprehend not only the propositions themselves, but also the things which these propositions are about.[4]

There is, however, an obvious difference between the way a proposition is apprehended and the way that which the proposition is about is apprehended. In order to distinguish between these two ways of apprehending, Moore calls the former, direct apprehension and the latter, indirect apprehension. The way we are conscious of a proposition whenever we understand the meaning of a sentence, is direct apprehension; and the way we are conscious of that (whatever it may be) which the proposition is about, is indirect apprehension. In discussing the way we are conscious of a proposition in what preceded, I have already discussed the direct apprehension of a proposition. In what follows, I shall only briefly discuss what is meant by indirect apprehension, and I shall discuss this relation in detail later in this section while discussing the different ways of knowing.

According to Moore, indirect apprehension is "the kind of relation which [one has] to a thing, when [one does] directly apprehend some proposition about it, but [does] not directly apprehend the thing itself."[5] He says that it is, however, possible that sometimes some or all of these objects which the (directly apprehended) proposition is about are also directly apprehended. For instance, when I am directly apprehending a proposition that this patch of colour exists, or that it is bluish, I may also directly apprehend the patch of colour

itself, when I am actually looking at the colour patch. But sometimes we may directly apprehend a proposition and yet may not directly apprehend the thing or things that the proposition is about. For instance, if I am no longer looking at the patch that I was looking at a moment ago, I may still be apprehending it in the sense that I am thinking about it, remembering that I saw a patch of whitish colour. In this case although the proposition that I saw a patch of whitish colour is directly apprehended, the patch of colour itself is not directly apprehended. But I am still aware of the patch of colour in a sense. This way of being conscious of something is what Moore calls indirect apprehansion of that something.

Thus according to Moore, direct apprehension and indirect apprehension are two different cognitive relations that hold between a person and an object. Furthermore, whenever we are indirectly apprehending something (whatever it may be), we must also directly apprehend something else--"either some proposition about it, or perhaps, sometimes something other than a proposition."[6] But when we are directly apprehending something, we may or may not indirectly apprehend something else.

At this point a question may be raised as to why Moore has discussed the nature of propositions and the ways they are apprehended in the context of the nature of knowledge and ways of knowing. The reasons for this seem to be the following:

a. The concept of knowledge is very closely connected with the concepts of truth and falsity, on the one hand, and with that of

belief, on the other. And these concepts, viz., truth, falsity, and belief, in their turn, are essentially connected with the concept of proposition. A belief is always expressed in and through a proposition and

> a proposition is simply that in respect of which an act of belief, which is a true act, differs from another, which is a false one; or that in respect of which two qualitatively different acts of belief, which are both false or both true, differ from one another. . . . Every true act of belief partly consists in the apprehension of a proposition; and every false act of belief also partly consists in the apprehension of a proposition. . . . Propositions are, then, a sort of thing which may be properly said to be true or false. . . . A proposition is true, if and only if any act of belief which was a belief in it, would be a true act of belief; and a proposition is false, if and only if any act or belief, which was a belief in it, would be false.[7]

b. One of the necessary conditions of knowledge is true belief. In order to know something we must have, at least, some idea of or about something, and we must have a true idea of that something. In other words, we must have an idea that something is or is not the case. For instance, if I am looking at my typewriter I know that it is the case that it is of blue colour. I have some idea of or about something being the case. But can anyone have this idea without apprehending any proposition at all? One may say that one can. One may say that when one is looking at the typewriter, one is having or apprehending a visual image, and if the image that one is apprehending or having before one's mind is like the something which it is an image of, then one is having a true idea of that something. Suppose, for instance, that I am having the image of a blue square thing and if

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the thing which the image I am having is an image of is blue and square, then I may say that I do have a true idea of that thing simply because of the likeness between the image and the thing. And hence, one can have a true idea of something without apprehending any proposition at all.

Moore says that although this may seem to be a very natural view to accept, the fact is that it is never the case and such a view is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of things. The misunderstanding consists in the fact that 'having an image' has been taken to mean the same thing as having an idea of something; in other words, the phenomenon of having an image (of something) has been assimilated with the phenomenon of having an idea of something. And it has been further thought that if the image is like the thing which it is an image of, then we have a true idea of the thing, where 'true idea' is used in the same sense as 'true belief.' But the fact is that even if we apprehend an image, no matter how vivid, but do not apprehend any propositions whatsoever, we do not and cannot have any idea at all, true or false, of anything other than simply having the image. We cannot have any idea at all of the thing which the image is an image of. He writes,

> I must not only apprehend an image, which is in fact like the something else: I must also either know or think that the image is like the something else. . . . I must apprehend some proposition about the relation of the image to the object: only so I can be properly said to have an idea of the object at all.[8]

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Another important consequence of apprehending only images (or sense data) and no propositions at all would be that we would never be able to make any mistake or error; consequently, the concepts of truth or falsity as applied in the context of knowing would not have any meaning; since, truth or falsity are properties of judgments in this context which belong to not-erroneous and erroneous judgments, resepectively.

> Error always consists in believing a proposition which is false. So that if a man merely apprehended something, which was in fact unlike something else, but without believing either that it was like or unlike, or anything else at all about it, he could not possibly be said to make any mistake at all: he would never hold any mistaken or false opinions, because he would never hold any opinions at all.[9]

Hence, even in order to merely believe something or to hold an opinion about something, we must apprehend some proposition; otherwise, we would be incapable of ever holding any beliefs or opinions whatsoever. And this is a situation which is perhaps not logically impossible, but plainly is not the case (even if we agree with the skeptics for the moment that we do not and cannot know certain things).

c. The discussion of the two ways of apprehending--direct and indirect--has been necessary at this point for two important reasons: in the first place, it explains and specifies the relation that exists between us and propositions, viz., that it is a cognitive relation. Besides explaining the nature of this cognitive relation, it also

clarifies in what specific ways we are cognitively related to propositions, viz., that we either believe or disbelieve or simply understand a proposition (understanding of the proposition being common to all three cases). In the second place, these two ways of being aware of something are, according to Moore, the most basic forms of all cognitive relations. All the various ways of being aware of something, i.e., all the various ways of being in cognitive relation with something, which I shall presently discuss, can be explained only be reference to one or the other of these two ways of apprehending. There is also a third reason why Moore thinks it is important to make this distinction, namely, that these two ways of apprehending, he thinks, mark the distinction between propositions and things that are not propositions. (I do not, however, agree with this point for the obvious reason that both propositions and non-propositions can be apprehended--even according to his views--directly and/or indirectly. But the distinction between these two ways of apprehending does highlight the distinction between propositions and not-propositions in more than one way, as I have, to some extent, already discussed.) It will be made clearer in the following discussion.

Ways of Knowing

On the basis of the distinction between propositions and not-propositions and between direct and indirect apprehension, Moore divides all cognitive relations into four classes which he calls

the ways of knowing. Knowing, as has been explained, is a relation between two factors: an awareness or consciousness and an object which the consciousness is of; in other words, it is always a cognitive relation between a person and some object whatever it may be. Ways of knowing are the different ways a person may be cognitively related with something which is the object of his awareness:

1. One way of knowing consists in the relation that holds, at a given moment, between a given person and an object when the person is not apprehending the object either directly or indirectly.
2. A second way of knowing consists in the relation that holds between a person and an object, at a given moment, when the person is directly apprehending the object.
3. A third way of knowing consists in the relation that holds between a person and an object, at a given time, when the person is indirectly apprehending the object.
4. A fourth way of knowing consists in the relation that holds between a person and an object, at a given time, when the person is directly apprehending the object but is also related to the same object at the same moment by some other relation as well.

Before I explain these various cognitive relations, I would like to mention two points about them which seem to me very important. First, of these four ways of knowing, Moore regards only the fourth

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to be knowledge proper, i.e., that which deserves to be called knowledge without any qualifications whatsoever. Second, the other three ways of knowing are regarded by Moore as knowing in a sense; they are knowing insofar as they are cognitive relations between a person and an object, i.e., insofar as they are modes of being aware of something. But they should be called knowledge only in a very limited or qualified sense.

With these points in mind, I shall now present a brief discussion of how Moore has explained all these four ways of knowing.

1. According to the first way of knowing, a person may be said to know something even when he is not related, either by way of direct apprehension or by way of indirect apprehension, to this something which is the object of his knowledge. For instance, when a person knows a poem by heart, or a multiplication table, but is not at the moment conscious of them in the sense of either directly apprehending or indirectly apprehending one or the other. But what is important is the fact that although the person is not related with the multiplication table or the poem by direct or indirect apprehension at the moment, he must have had either one of the two relationships with those objects in the past. For otherwise, he cannot be said to know these objects at all. It seems that Moore is using the expression 'to know' here in the sense of 'having dispositional knowledge' although he does not use the latter expression in this context. He writes,

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> We constantly use this word "know" . . . in a dispositional sense, which is such that I can truly be said to have known that an object . . . was my hand, provided only that, if the question had been raised, I should have been able to affirm with certainty with regard to the object . . . that it was my hand. . . .[10]

2. The second way of knowing, which he calls direct apprehension, plays a very crucial role in Moore's views about perceptual knowledge both so far as his own views are concerned and so far as the views that he criticizes are concerned. As such the discussion of this way of knowing occupies a major portion of his entire epistemological corpus. I have already discussed certain aspects of his explanation of this in Chapter III, while discussing his views about sense data, and in this chapter under Section II, while discussing his distinction between propositions and non-propositions. Here I will simply mention a few points about direct apprehension on the basis of what he has said about it at different places in his works.

The term 'direct apprehension' has been used in four different senses.--(a) 'Direct apprehension' is primarily used in the sense of a relation which holds between a person and an object when the person is actually perceiving the object. In this sense it signifies the relation between a person and sense datum, since, according to Moore, what is actually given to the senses or what is actually perceived is always a sense datum. For instance, when one actually sees any colour, or actually hears any sound, or actually feels the pain of a toothache, one directly apprehends, in all these cases, the sense datum in question, i.e., the particular colour, or

sound, etc. In all these cases the act of consciousness is exactly the same in quality so far as it is an act of consciousness. They are different only in the sense that the sense datum apprehended in one case is different from the sense datum apprehended in another case, e.g., one is a sense datum of colour, the other is of a sound.[11]

(b) 'Direct apprehension' is used in the sense of an act of consciousness which consists in being aware of images. For instance, when one apprehends a visual image of a particular colour, which one has actually seen before but is not actually seeing at the moment, one is conscious of the visual image in exactly the same way as one is conscious of a particular colour when he actually sees it. When one thinks of or remembers a sense datum that one has actually seen (but is not seeing at the moment), one often apprehends some faint image of a sense datum (e.g., a patch of colour) that one has actually seen before. In this case the image--a faint copy of the sense datum of which it is an image--is directly apprehended although it is not actually given to the senses. One directly apprehends the image in exactly the same sense in which one directly apprehends the patch of colour which is actually seen.[12] According to Moore, images themselves are sense data. Although they are not strictly given by the senses, they are

> in a most important respect, of the same kind as actual sense data. When, for instance, I directly apprehend the image of a coloured patch, it is itself a coloured patch [though it is usually different both qualitatively and numerically] from any coloured patch of which it is an image . . . every coloured image actually is a sense datum merely because it is a coloured patch even though it has never been actually given to the senses.[13]

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It should be mentioned here that the same relation holds also in the cases of other kinds of images, e.g., dream images, after images, or hallucinatory images. That is, these other images also are directly apprehended, since they themselves "are instances of sense data, which have nevertheless never been actually given to the senses."

(c) 'Direct apprehension' is used in the sense of a relation which we have to direct apprehensions themselves, i.e., the way we are aware of our own direct apprehensions. For instance, when one observes one's seeing of a coloured patch, one directly apprehends one's seeing of the coloured patch. In other words, in this case the observation consists in the direct apprehension of the particular act of consciousness, viz., seeing of a coloured patch. What is directly apprehended in this case is neither a sense datum, nor an image; it is the direct apprehension (of a sense datum) itself which is directly apprehended.[14]

(d) 'Direct apprehension' is used also in the sense in which it is a relation between a person and a proposition which he either believes or disbelieves or merely considers in the sense of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Since I have discussed this relation in the first part of this section, I will not discuss it here any further.

A question may be raised at this point as to whether in all these cases, where we are cognitively related with an object by direct apprehension, the expression 'direct apprehension' denotes exactly the same relation or whether it denotes a different relation in each case. The answer is not very clear. Moore thinks that in the first three cases it is exactly the same relation but he is not sure whether or not it is so in the last case. He says,

> There are . . . reasons for supposing that what I call the direct apprehension of a proposition is something different from the direct apprehension of a sense datum: . . . in the sense, that the relation which you have to a proposition, when you directly apprehend it, is different from that which you have to a sense datum, when you directly apprehend it. . . . But I cannot tell what the difference is, if there is one; and the reasons for supposing that there is one do not seem to me to be perfectly conclusive. I must, therefore, leave undecided the question whether I am using the name direct apprehension in two different senses.[15]

3. The third way of knowing consists in being conscious of something not by way of direct apprehension of it, but by way of indirect apprehension. There are two major contexts where Moore talks about indirect apprehension--in the context of sense data and in the context of propositions. By indirect apprehension Moore means thinking of or about something. In the context of sense data, he writes:

> For instance, you look at this envelope, and you actually see a particular colour: you directly apprehend that particular colour. But, then, if you turn away your eyes, you no longer directly apprehend it: . . . but you may still be thinking of it--thinking of just that colour which you saw a moment ago: you may, therefore, in a sense still be conscious of it, though you are no longer directly apprehending it. Here, therefore, is one way of having before the mind, which is not direct apprehension: the way which we call "thinking of" or remembering.[16]

In such a case we are apprehending the sense datum--the colour, indirectly. In the context of propositions, he says that indirect apprehension is that relation "which you have to a thing when you do directly apprehend a proposition about it, [but] do not directly apprehend it. . . . That is just what we mean by thinking of a thing." It might be suggested, however, that instead of using the name 'indirect apprehension,' the name 'thinking of' should be used for this kind of relation. But Moore points out that 'thinking of' can not be an unambiguous name for this relation since it is sometimes also used for that of direct apprehension. Since the name 'thinking of' cannot serve the purpose of distinguishing the kind of relation which he wants to call 'indirect apprehension,' he prefers to use the name 'indirect apprehension' instead of the name 'thinking of.'

While discussing the ways of knowing propositions, I have explained that whenever we indirectly apprehend something, we must also directly apprehend something else--a proposition or something other than a proposition. In that context Moore has illustrated this claim mainly by cases (of indirect apprehension) such that in each case what is directly apprehended is a proposition. This gives the impression that in the case of indirect apprehension we must always directly apprehend a proposition. In other words, it seems that direct apprehension of a proposition is a necessary condition for indirectly apprehending anything whatsoever--a sense datum, a material object, or another proposition. Hence, a question naturally arises as to whether one can ever indirectly apprehend something without directly apprehending a proposition about it.

In his discussion of this question, Moore says that he is not sure "that [one] may not have this very same relation to a thing even when [one is] not directly apprehending any proposition about it." Indirect apprehension of an object consists in thinking of or about an object which is not being directly apprehended. Moore says that in order to decide whether or not we always directly apprehend a proposition about an object whenever we indirectly apprehend it (an object), we should be able to answer a different question, viz., "Is the mere thinking of [something] the same thing as directly apprehending some proposition about [it]?" In reply to this question, he says that he is inclined to think that it is, but he is not quite sure. He further says that the

> important point about indirect apprehension is that it is not direct apprehension, and yet is a way of being conscious of or thinking of a thing; and that it is a way of being conscious of a thing, which certainly does constantly occur when you are directly apprehending a proposition about a thing, though perhaps it may occur in other cases also.[17]

4. The fourth way of knowing, which Moore calls 'knowledge proper,' consists of the cognitive relation between a person and an object, only when the person directly apprehends the object and moreover, he is also related to it, at the same moment, in another way as well.

> There is one very important relation of this type . . . and which can only hold between us and a proposition--not between us and any other kind of object. It is, in fact, the relation which we commonly mean to express when we say without qualification that we know a proposition to be true--that we know that so and so is the case.[18]

This relation, which he calls knowledge proper so as to differentiate it from the rest of the ways of knowing which lead to knowledge only in a qualified sense, must satisfy four conditions: (1) one must directly apprehend some proposition; (2) one must believe the proposition to be true; (3) the proposition must be true; and (4) some fourth condition which Moore does not specify clearly. It seems, however, from his discussions about knowledge at different places in his works that this fourth condition consists in having reasons or justifications in the sense of having evidence which is definite and certain for one's belief in a proposition. According to Moore this is the most important sense of the word 'know.' In this connection it is necessary to discuss Moore's views about certainty which is regarded as a necessary condition of knowledge by most philosophers including Moore and the skeptics. Since, according to Moore, the concept of certainty is essentially related with the concept of knowledge proper, any discussion of Moore's views about knowledge proper would be incomplete without a discussion of his views about certainty and particularly in this context, without comparing his views with the skeptics' views about certainty. However, Moore's views about knowledge proper also includes his distinction between two forms of knowledge proper, which has not been discussed in this work so far. Hence in what follows I shall discuss these two subjects.

Certainty

I have already mentioned in a previous chapter that both the skeptics and Moore accept that absolute certainty is a necessary requirement for knowledge; i.e., 'to know' is 'to know with absolute certainty.' But, as I have already suggested, Moore and the skeptics have come to very different conclusions as to the extent of knowledge, although, apparently they start with very similar views about knowledge. Since certainty has been regarded by both as one of the basic concepts involved in knowledge, it becomes necessary to examine their respective views about this matter, to examine whether their views on this issue are really similar or not.

Moore's views about certainty are very closely related with his views about perceptual knowledge in general and also with his answer to the skeptics' challenge about our knowledge of an external world. It is interesting to note that Moore has mainly discussed the concept of certainty and has mainly used the word 'certain' in the context of knowledge proper, and not in the context of direct apprehension where the skeptics, in general, have looked for certainty in the sense of incorrigibility. Moor has not used the word 'certain' in the sense of 'incorrigible' or 'indubitable' where 'indubitable' means 'not able to be doubted.'[19] It seems that for him 'certain' means that which is beyond reasonable doubt and not that which is beyond logical doubt.[20] For Moore, the word 'certain' is always used in context of a proposition relative to a particular circumstance. Further, it is always used in the context of a knowledge-claim made

by somebody. Now the question arises 'Under what circumstance a proposition is beyond reasonable doubt?' Moore's answer is based upon an appeal to common usage, i.e., how the word 'certain' is used in ordinary language. By 'beyond reasonable doubt' Moore means 'it is absurd to doubt under given circumstances.' A proposition is beyond reasonable doubt when doubting the truth of the proposition involves an absurdity. By 'absurdity,' however, Moore does not mean a logical absurdity in the sense of self contradiction or logical impossibility, since the kind of absurdity that Moore is talking about is always dependent upon and relative to circumstances--to empirical facts. That is to say that the same proposition is beyond reasonable doubt under one set of circumstances may not be beyond reasonable doubt under a different set of circumstances. Moore illustrates this point by considering certain assertions made under a particular circumstance, viz., a standard classroom phenomenon where the following assertions are made by the teacher: "I am at present . . . in a room and not in the open air; I am standing up . . .; I have clothes on . . .; I am speaking in a fairly loud voice . . .; there are a good many other people in the same room in which I am; and there are windows in that wall and a door in this one." A few lines later he writes:

> . . . and I have made these assertions quite positively, as if there were no doubt whatever that they were true. . . . Not only true but also certain . . . I implied, though I did not say, that they were in fact certain. . . . On the contrary, I should have been guilty of absurdity if, under the circumstances, I had not spoken positively about these things, if I spoke of them at all. Suppose that now, instead of saying "I am inside a building," I were to say "I think I'm inside a building, but perhaps I'm

> not: it's not certain that I am," or instead of saying "I have got some clothes on," I were to say "I think I've got some clothes on, but it's just possible that I haven't." Would it not sound rather ridiculous for me now, under these circumstances, to say "I think I've got some clothes on" or even to say "I not only think I have, I know that it is very likely indeed that I have, but I can't be quite sure"? For some persons, under some circumstances, it might not be at all absurd to express themselves thus doubtfully. . . . But for me, now, in full possession of my senses, it would be quite ridiculous to express myself in this way, because the circumstances are such as to make it quite obvious that I don't merely think that I have, but I know that I have.[21]

Having illustrated what he means by 'certainty,' Moore clarifies certain ambiguities about the use of the word 'certain' in common usage. There are four main usages of the word 'certain' in ordinary language: (1) I am certain* that something is the case (p); (2) I feel certain that p; (3) I know for certain that p; (4) It is certain that p. A semantical difference between (1) and (2) on the one hand, and (3) and (4) on the other, is that whereas (3) and (4) entail the truth of p and also that p is known to be true to the speaker, (1) and (2) do not entail either. This is so because the conjunction of either (1) or (2) with the negation of p, is not self contradictory; but the conjunction of either (3) or (4) with the negation of p, is self contradictory, for at least one common use of those phrases. For, in the latter two cases, the fact that not-p proves that I did not know that p, and hence, it was not certain that p; whereas it does not prove that I did not feel certain that p. "In

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*The expression "I am certain that . . . ," however, is ambiguous since it is sometimes used to mean the same as "I feel certain that . . ." and sometimes to mean the same as "I know for certain that. . . ." Hence the implications would change accordingly depending upon the sense in which it is used.

other words, "I feel certain that p" does not entail that p is true (although by saying that I feel certain that p, I do imply that p is true), but "I know that p" and "It is certain that p" do entail that p is true; they can't be true, unless it is." The point of this clarification is that when Moore is using the word 'certain' in the context of knowledge (as in the case of the above discussed assertions), he is using it in the senses (3) or (4). Thus, it is true that Moore agrees with other philosophers in holding that certainty is a mark of knowledge, and that 'to know' is 'to know for certain' (or 'knowledge = 'certain knowledge'); but by 'certainty' he does not mean 'incorrigibility' in the sense, for instance, the direct apprehension of sense data is incorrigible, or 'indubitability' in the sense 'not able to be doubted' as opposed to 'indubitable' = 'known.' For him 'to know that p' = 'to know for certain that p' or 'it is certain that p' where p is beyond reasonable doubt, or where doubting p involves an empirical absurdity. It is true, Moore says, that in the case of a contingent proposition like "I am standing up now'--to call it p--it is possible that not p; but it should be noticed at the same time that p is not incompatible with the fact that p may be known with absolute certainty, or the fact that it is absolutely certain that p. "Because if any person whatever does at a given time know that a given proposition p is true, then it follows that that person could say with truth at that time "It is absolutely certain that p." Thus if I do know now that I am standing up, it follows that I can say with truth "It is absolutely certain that I am standing up."[22] In this case, on Moore's

view, it would be absurd (though not logically), under the circumstances, to say that 'I know that p but it is not certain that p.'

In his discussion of certainty, what Moore seems to emphasize is the fact that under certain correct usages of 'certain,' although it does not mean logically certain, it is essentially related with the concept of knowledge (i.e., knowledge proper); and similarly, that there are certain correct usages of the word 'know' where such an usage does not satisfy the condition of certainty in the sense of logical certainty, yet it satisfies the condition of certainty or absolute certainty in a different sense. One such usage of 'certain' and 'know' pointed out by Moore needs mentioning in this connection. For Moore, the proposition 'It is certain that p' entails that 'p is known to be true'; 'that p is known to be true' is a necessary condition for the truth of 'it is certain that p.' And this is a fact which also clearly shows the difference between 'It is certain that p' and 'I am (or feel) certain that p.' For instance, it is not self contradictory to say that, e.g., "I felt (or was) certain that it would rain, but in fact it didn't"; but it would be self contradictory to say that, "It was certain that it would rain, but it didn't," for at least one common use of that phrase. Since, the fact that it did not rain proves that I did not know that it would rain, and it was not certain that it would, whereas it does not prove that I didn't feel (or I was not) certain that it would. "It is, indeed, obvious . . . that a thing cannot be certain, unless it is known: this is one obvious point that distinguishes the

use of the word "certain" from that of the word "true"; a thing that nobody knows may quite well be true, but cannot possibly be certain."[23]

It seems to me that Moore is making a distinction between something like a logical certainty and empirical certainty, although he has not used these two terms; but when he talks about the skeptics' stand on certainty and contrasts that with his own, he does talk, in this context, about logical doubt, logical possibility and impossibility, on the one hand, and reasonable doubt and empirical possibility, on the other.[24] It seems that what he is trying to say is that while these philosophers have accepted logical certainty as a mark of knowledge, they have somehow either completely ignored the fact that there is an essential relation between knowledge and empirical certainty or they have not recognized this kind of certainty as certainty at all. When they say that <u>to know that p is to know for certain that p</u>, what they mean is that if one knows that p then it is logically impossible that not-p, i.e., p is logically indubitable. For instance, they would say that one can know p (i.e., with absolute certainty) where p has been formally or deductively proven, i.e., p has been shown to follow formally from a set of premises. Whereas Moore wants to say that we do not need this kind of certainty for all knowledge whatsoever (or for knowledge as such); he says that we may know that p (with certainty) where it is based on a set of premises but does not follow deductively or formally from those premises; from the fact that p does not <u>so</u> follow from the premises, it does not follow that p has not been proven by the premises on which it is based, nor does it follow that p

is not known with certainty, though it is logically possible that not-p. He writes elsewhere to the same effect:

> from the fact that two things have been conjoined, no matter how often, it does not strictly follow that they always are conjoined. But it by no means follows from this that we may not know that, as a matter of fact, when two things are conjoined sufficiently often, they are always conjoined.[25]

In all these cases when Moore talks about knowing, by 'knowing' he also means 'knowing with certainty.' What he wants to suggest is that these philosophers have used 'certainty' in a very strict or narrow sense so far as they take it as a necessary mark of knowledge.

On the other hand, sometimes these philosophers, he suggests, have used the word 'certainty' in a sense, where it seems that they think that something can be certain without its being known at all. For instance, when they characterize the common sense views about external world as mere matters of Faith--meaning not of Knowledge--what they mean to say is: "It is certain that we all do believe many such propositions, but none of us know any of them to be true." And what is meant by "it is certain that . . ." is "I and many other men know that we all do believe many such propositions, but none of us know any of them to be true." That is to say, that when they are saying 'it is certain that we all believe . . ." they are, in fact, simply saying "we all know that we all believe. . . ." But they are not realizing that in saying that something is certain, they are also acknowledging that that something is also known (for otherwise it cannot be certain). That is, in saying so they are themselves admitting that at least one common sense view is known to be true,

viz., the view that there are many human beings and we know that there are many human beings. This is so because in saying that 'it is certain that we believe . . ." they are admitting that they know that there are many human beings who have held such beliefs (which they call mere matters of faith not of knowledge). Moore says that some philosophers have overlooked this point "in the most amazing way." Since they have held that "it's quite certain that men believe these things, that they are beliefs of Common Sense; and yet that it's not certain that there are any men."[26] What Moore wants to suggest here is that to say that something is certain, is to say that something is known, i.e., there is a sense in which something cannot be certain without its being known; whereas, in the case mentioned above, what these philosophers are saying, according to Moore, that something can be certain without its having anything to do with knowledge.

> They seem to me to constantly betray the fact that they regard the proposition that those beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, . . . as not merely true, but certainly true; and certainly true it cannot be, unless one member, at least, of the human race, namely themselves, has known the very things which that member is describing that no human being has ever known.[27]

In other words, what Moore is suggesting is that, these philosophers, on the one hand, have accepted certainty to be an essential mark of knowledge in such a stringent sense that one can hardly be said to know anything with certainty, and have thus limited the scope of knowledge very considerably in the sense that we can be said to really know very few things; while on the other hand, they have sometimes used the word 'certainty' without recognizing that

under certain usages, at least, the concept of certainty essentially involves (the concept of) knowledge in the sense of knowledge proper; they have failed to recognize the fact that if we say 'that something is certain,' it implies, as has been suggested by Moore, 'that we know something to be the case.' In other words, according to Moore, the proposition 'It is certain that p' entails or implies the proposition 'Somebody knows that p.' (However, it is to be remembered that Moore uses here the word 'certainty' not in the sense of logical certainty, but in the sense of empirical certainty.) Moore has criticized both of these attitudes of the skeptics, on the grounds that, in the former case, either we do not mean by 'certainty' what they have meant, or at least, it is not necessary to mean by 'certainty' what they have meant; and, in the latter case, their use of the word 'certainty' in some cases is not proper, since it violates, at least, one correct usage of the term.

Later, in the next section, I shall discuss the application of his views about certainty to his views about perceptual knowledge, which forms a part of his justification of common sense knowledge claims.

Types of Knowledge Proper

Moore talks about two different forms of knowledge proper: immediate and mediate. They are forms of knowledge proper because they are propositional knowledge, i.e., they always consist in knowing a proposition, and secondly they meet all the conditions of knowledge proper.

Immediate knowledge consists in directly apprehending a proposition to be true, without knowing any other proposition whatever from which it follows. This form of knowledge, though immediate, is quite different from direct apprehension in more than one way. In the first place, direct apprehension can be of propositions as well as of objects that are not propositions, e.g., sense data, images, acts of consciousness. Immediate knowledge is always of some proposition or other. In the second place, it is also different from direct apprehension even when a direct apprehension is an apprehension of propositions; one may directly apprehend a proposition without believing or disbelieving it to be true (i.e., in the sense of simply understanding the meaning of a sentence), and further one may directly apprehend a true proposition or a false proposition. Whereas immediate knowledge always consists in apprehending a proposition which is believed to be true and is in fact true. However, immediate knowledge of a proposition is quite compatible with direct apprehension, in the sense that, while knowing a proposition immediately, one may also directly apprehend something else--a proposition or a sense datum, etc., and the converse is also true, i.e., while directly apprehanding a sense datum or a proposition one may also, at the same time, immediately know a proposition about the directly apprehended objects.[28]

Mediate knowledge, on the other hand, consists of knowing a proposition on the basis of knowing some other proposition from which it follows. "We give the name mediate knowledge to all cases in which you know a proposition, because you know some other from which it

follows. . . ." One of the consequences of thus distinguishing between mediate and immediate knowledge is that one may know the same proposition at the same time both immediately and mediately:

> . . . it is important to insist that even when you do know a proposition immediately, you may also at the same time know some proposition from which it follows: you may know it both immediately and also because you know some other proposition from which it follows.[29]

This consequence also marks the difference between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge on the one hand, and, direct and indirect apprehension on the other. We can never apprehend the same thing at the same time both directly and indirectly. (Mediate knowledge is different from indirect apprehension for the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, for which immediate knowledge is different from direct apprehension.)

Section III. Moore's Epistemology and His Answer to Skepticism

With this background in mind I shall attempt in the rest of this chapter to explain how the various epistemological works of Moore in their entirety form one consistent and complete attempt to answer the skeptics' challenge about the knowledge of an external world. The entire plan of the epistemological work of Moore seems to me to consist of three parts: The first part consists in stating and explaining the common sense views about knowledge. The second part consists in explaining the meaning or meanings of 'knowledge' relative to different ways of knowing. It further includes an explanation of the common sense view about the knowledge of the existence of material

objects and an explanation of the skeptics' views about perceptual knowledge, relative to these different meanings of 'knowledge.' The third part consists in justifying the common sense knowledge claims in various ways.

I will try to explain each part separately but, as I have already explained the first part in detail in an earlier chapter, and the first half of the second in an earlier section of this chapter, I will just mention them without going into the details. I shall mainly discuss in detail the second half of the second part and the third part.

The Common Sense View Reviewed

By common sense views Moore means views or beliefs held by everybody; i.e., certain definite views about the various aspects of the Universe are held by everybody nowadays and that have been held for a long time and have not undergone any substantial changes, though they may have been modified by way of improvement in certain respects. By common sense views about knowledge or common sense knowledge--claims Moore means general views about the various aspects of the Universe which are assumed to be true; which are further assumed to be known to be true with certainty. These beliefs which are accepted by everybody to be known to be true are not to be assimilated with mere prejudices; they differ from mere prejudices in the respect of the degree of their acceptance and also in the respect of the consistency and the persistence with which they are accepted. The beliefs that are accepted as known with certainty have usually been accepted universally

irrespective of temporal, geographical and cultural distinctions. Further, they have been maintained in a consistent and persistent manner through ages without ever losing their identity or basic character even if they have gone through modifications in certain respects. They are in a sense the fundamental and primitive beliefs of mankind. In various works Moore has given many illustrations of such beliefs; for instance, our beliefs about the existence of material objects which are situated in space and are different from what we call mental acts; or, our beliefs about the existence of acts of consciousness which are not situated in space in the sense in which we believe that material objects are. These acts of consciousness are believed to exist in our minds which are generally believed to belong to some particular kinds of material bodies called human beings or living beings. We further believe that the minds are somehow related to the material bodies they belong to though we may not know the exact nature of their relationship. We also believe that we know many of these objects by means of our senses--by perceiving; that sense perception does really give us knowledge about certain things--knowledge which is certain and objective or verifiable and we believe that there are also various other ways of knowing--the ways by which we know that we have dreams, or imaginations, or feelings and emotions, or the way we know that two is different from five and so on--i.e., <u>ways other than sense perception</u>. These are some examples of the various things that we all ordinarily claim to know of. For Moore, these are the kinds of beliefs that constitute the common sense view of the world.

The Metaepistemological Distinctions Appealed to

As it has been already discussed, this part of Moore's epistemological views consists of an analysis of various cognitive relations between a person and an object, explaining the different sense of knowledge corresponding to the different relations. According to Moore, any cognitive relation necessarily involves two factors, viz., consciousness and an object which the consciousness is of. Second, there are four different types of cognitive relations which he calls the ways of knowing and which he considers to be fundamental to all other ways of knowing and types of knowledge yielded by them. That is, all different ways of knowing that we ordinarily take into consideration are ultimately founded and based upon these four ways of knowing and can be explained in terms of them. For instance, we all recognize that testimony, inference, observation, memory, etc., are various means of knowledge; they are all, in the final analysis, based upon one or more of these four types of cognitive relations. Third, of these four ways of knowing only one is recognized by Moore to be knowledge proper and the other three are knowing or knowledge in a restricted and qualified sense of the term 'knowledge.' These four ways of knowing are: (1) direct apprehension, (2) indirect apprehension, (3) dispositional knowledge, and (4) knowledge proper. (It should be mentioned here that in his entire discussion about perceptual knowledge Moore has seldom talked about dispositional knowledge. As such, the different issues will be discussed here in relation to only

three ways of knowing: (1), (2), and (4). In this part of his epistemology Moore has further done the following things: First, he has explained in what sense of knowledge we ordinarily claim to know of the existence of material objects and how far this sense of knowledge corresponds to any of the three ways of knowing mentioned above. Second, he has related the skeptics' views on knowledge with the various ways of knowing in order to determine whether their views denote any one or more of these, and whether or not any (or more) of these ways may be said to be leading to the knowledge of an external world in the sense in which it has been explained.

(1) Common sense claim about knowledge of material objects and the ways of knowing.--The main issue of the common sense knowledge which Moore's entire discussion of empirical knowledge centers around is the issue regarding the knowledge of material objects by means of sense perception. So far as the question regarding the knowledge of the existence of other human beings capable of acts of consciousness is concerned, it arises, and can be settled, only when the question regarding the knowledge of the existence of material bodies can be or is settled.

Moore thinks that the existence of material objects is one of the most primitive and most persistently held beliefs of common sense; and as such when this very belief is in question, the discussion of it needs maximum priority. It is also one of the most primitive and persistently held beliefs of common sense that we know of the existence of material objects primarily and originally by sense perception; and

as such the question as to whether we do or can really have knowledge of material objects by sense perception is also of primary importance. He writes:

> This way of knowing material objects, by means of the senses, is, of course, by no means the only way in which we commonly suppose we know of their existence. For instance, each of us knows . . . material objects by means of memory; . . . by the testimony of other persons. . . . And we know also, . . . by means of inference. . . . But all these other ways do seem, in a sense, to be based upon sense perception, so that it is, in a sense the most primitive way of knowing material objects: it seems, in fact, to be true, that . . . no man could ever know of the existence of any material objects at all, unless he first knew of some by means of his senses. The evidence of the senses is, therefore, the evidence upon which all our other ways of knowing material objects seems to be based.[30]

Hence, the main question that Moore addresses himself to throughout his discussion of empirical knowledge is whether or not we do or can know of material objects by means of the sense. In this context, however, he discusses whether or not any of these three ways of knowing may be said to be the knowing of material objects by sense perception.

One of the things that Moore points out here is the distinction between 'perceiving' (and all other words to denote different forms of sense perception) as commonly used in ordinary language, and 'perceiving' as used in the context of sense data. "When applied to sense data they simply express direct apprehension; but when applied to material objects or their surfaces or any part of the space occupied by material objects they express something quite different."[31] In order to decide what sort of relation is denoted by 'perceiving' as applied to material objects when we say that we know of their existence by sense perception,

we have to discuss first in what sense we are talking about knowledge of material object.

Moore points out that when we talk about the knowledge of the existence of material objects, we talk about knowing that so and so is the case, i.e., that there are material objects, or, that material objects exist; and when we use the term 'knowledge' in this sense, i.e., in the sense of knowing that so and so is the case, use it in the sense of knowledge proper. Knowledge proper, as has been already discussed, involves four conditions: (1) that we must directly apprehend some proposition, (2) we must also believe the proposition thus apprehended, (3) that the proposition must be true, and also some fourth condition (which Moore does not specify but he seems to have meant conclusive evidence or good reason). Coming back to the question regarding the knowledge of the existence of material objects by sense perception, we have seen so far that it partly consists of direct apprehension of sense data; e.g., when we look at an envelope, we directly apprehend certain sense data. But the knowledge of the existence of a material object cannot consist merely in direct apprehension of sense data, for in that case, one is simply experiencing or having certain sense data, e.g., certain colour, shape or size, etc., and merely direct apprehension of sense data is not knowing that so and so is the case. In order to know that something exists, we must also directly apprehend a proposition, and besides these two, viz., direct apprehension of sense data and of some proposition, we must also know that something other than sense data exists which is not directly

apprehended. For instance, when we look at an envelope and directly apprehend certain sense data, we must also know, if we are to know that the envelope--a material thing--exists, that these sense data which we are directly apprehending are in fact connected with the envelope; in order to know that, we have to know something other than mere sense data, i.e., we have to know that something with which the sense data are in fact connected. Hence, in order to know of the existence of a material thing, we have to know at least this much, although we may have to know something more.

According to Moore what really happens when we know that there is an envelope which we are perceiving, is something like this: we directly apprehend certain sense data and this is accompanied by a belief, may be an obscure one, about the existence of something else with which these sense data are somehow connected. In having this belief we directly apprehend a proposition. A belief or a proposition is always about something; and this something, whatever it is, which the belief or proposition is about is, as earlier discussed, indirectly apprehended by us. In the case of our perceiving the envelope, our direct apprehension of colour, shape, etc., is accompanied by a belief or proposition about the envelope--a material thing--which is other than the sense data; and the envelope is, in this case, indirectly apprehended by us.

> So that sometimes, at all events, seeing an envelope cannot merely mean seeing certain sense data with which it is connected; it must mean also indirectly apprehending this something else--the material envelope itself, with which these sense data are connected. . . . That you do, when you

> directly apprehend certain sense data, often thus believe in the existence of something else is . . . certain. And if this something is a material object, then you really are, whenever you do it, indirectly apprehending a material object.[32]

The question that needs to be considered now is this: Can we know of the existence of material objects by indirect apprehension? Moore has discussed this question while explaining the skeptics' views about perceptual knowledge relative to the different ways of knowing.

(2) Skepticism and ways of knowing.--The skeptics Moore is considering are empiricists and accept that experience is the only source of factual knowledge. 'Sense perception' and 'observation' are two very commonly used terms to denote the forms of experience. Sense perception and the various specifications or forms of it, e.g., seeing, hearing, etc., are regarded to be the only means by which we can, if at all, know of the various facts of the external world.

A question arises at this point as to what the skeptics could have meant by the words 'perceive,' 'observe,' 'feel,' and all the other words to express sense perception if these words are to be applied to material objects at all, for instance, when one says, 'I am seeing an envelope.' In other words, what sort of way of knowing could have been denoted by 'seeing an envelope'? Clearly enough, it cannot denote direct apprehension, since in this case, by direct apprehension we would be apprehending certain sense data only. One may say that in seeing the envelope--a material object--one is directly apprehending a proposition about the envelope in the sense of having a vague belief that there is something else existing besides the sense data, which we apprehend when we see the envelope, and this something is the envelope

or a material object, and hence, we are indirectly apprehending the envelope. Hence, seeing an envelope would denote indirect apprehension.

Moore says that it is quite possible that the words 'seeing,' 'observing,' etc., as or when applied to material objects can denote indirect apprehension and the skeptics could have meant exactly this relation when they apply these words to material objects. But he points out that, even if, whenever we see an envelope which is a material object, we indirectly apprehend something, say, the envelope, it does not follow that we know that there is an envelope; nor does it follow that even if there is an envelope, we know that it is a material object. The reason for this is that, when we talk, as it has been mentioned already, of knowing the existence of material objects by sense perception, we are talking of knowledge proper; since, when we are talking of knowing that something exists, or, that something is a material object, etc., we are talking of knowing certain facts--that such and such is the case; and knowing facts denotes knowledge proper.[33] And according to Moore, in order to know whether or not something is the case, we have to apprehend a proposition directly, we must believe that proposition, the proposition must be true, and we also have to meet some fourth condition.

So far as indirect apprehension is concerned, although it forms a part of knowledge proper, it cannot be said to be a way of knowing the existence of something--knowing that something exists, or that something is a material object. It forms a part of knowledge proper in the sense that one can only know of the existence of a thing,

i.e., know that it exists, in the proper sense of the term, when one is apprehending the thing in question at least indirectly. Hence, if by seeing or perceiving a material object, we mean a process by which we do get to know of their existence, we must indirectly apprehend the material objects with which the sense data, which we directly apprehend, are, in fact, connected.

But indirect apprehension of something cannot amount to knowledge proper, or, to knowing that so and so is the case. Moore says that even if we indirectly apprehend something else when we directly apprehend a sense datum, it does not follow that we know of the existence of a material object by means of the senses, for the following reasons: first, when we indirectly apprehend something, we simply believe that there is something besides the sense data that we are directly apprehending; and from the mere fact that we believe or think that there is something, it by no means follows that there is, in fact, any such thing as we think or believe that there is. Second, even if we believe that there is something else besides the sense data, and there, in fact, is something else besides the sense data, it will only amount to true belief; but true belief constitutes only part of knowledge proper, but not the whole of it. Third, even if we not only believe that there is something but know that there is something, it does not follow that we know that this something is a material object.[34]

Hence, although the direct apprehension of certain sense data along with the indirect apprehension, in the sense of a belief about the existence of a material object, take us only half way through to

the knowledge of the existence of material objects, it still does not enable us to say that we know of the existence of material objects. Neither direct apprehension nor indirect apprehension can lead to the knowledge of the existence of something or knowledge of a fact--that something is the case. In order to be able to say that we know of the existence of the material objects, we have to know that this belief that something else than sense data exists, or the belief that there exists a material thing which is different from sense data and yet connected with them, is true and is known to be true, and also something else. In any case, we have to know at least that the proposition expressing such a belief is true. The question as to whether something exists or not is a factual question, and in order to settle it, it is necessary to show whether the proposition expressing any such claim or belief is true or not; since, the proposition expressing such a belief is not such that simply by understanding the meanings of the words in the statement one can decide whether it is true or false as one can do in the case of an analytic or inconsistent statements. The skeptics also have recognized that the issue of the knowledge of the existence of material objects is an issue regarding the validity of a proposition; they have declared that we cannot ever know for certain any statement expressing a belief in the existence of material objects to be true; whereas Moore asserts that we can and do know for certain that at least some propositions expressing belief in the existence of material objects are true.

According to Moore when the skeptics talk as to how much of our knowledge is based upon observation and try to substantiate this claim with the illustrations they give, they seem to have used the term 'observation' in the sense in which it is commonly used. Observation, in this sense, does not mean the relation of direct apprehension. Moore says that ordinarily by observation we mean "the relation which we have to material objects themselves, when we directly apprehend certain sense data: we do not mean by it the relation of direct apprehension. . . ."[35] For instance, we observe movements of material objects, or positions of material objects; and by 'observe' as applied in such cases, we do not mean that we directly apprehend movements or positions of material objects. But when we consider the conditions that have been accepted by them as necessary for knowledge, we find that by 'observation' or 'perception' they have meant direct apprehension only. The main reason for this has been the fact that they thought that absolute certainty is a necessary mark of knowledge; for them 'knowledge' means 'absolutely certain' knowledge. And by 'absolute certainty' they have meant 'indubitability' in a sense in which it is not possible to doubt. They would say: "You don't know for certain, anything which you can doubt. And you can doubt that this is a blackboard." It seems that they are using 'indubitable' to mean 'not able to be doubted' as differentiated from 'indubitable' which means known (i.e., beyond reasonable doubt). And for them as long as it is logically possible to doubt a proposition, one cannot be said to know that proposition for certain to be true.

As a result of such considerations as these, they seem to have supposed that all knowledge consists merely in the direct apprehension of sense data and images. And all those who maintain this have also commonly maintained (1) that absolutely every sense datum that any person ever directly apprehends exists only so long as he apprehends it, (2) that no sense datum which any one person directly apprehends ever is directly apprehended by any other person, and (3) that no sense datum that is directly apprehended by one person can be in the same space with any sense datum apprehended by any other person. It follows that, according to this view, all that we can ever know with certainty are sense data and images. On these hypotheses, nobody can possibly know of the existence of anything at all except his own private sense data and images.[36]

Moore's Defence of Common Sense Against Skepticism

This part of Moore's theory of empirical knowledge consists in justifying the common sense view which he wants to defend against the skeptics' attack on it, by giving various reasons to show the plausibility of the common sense view on the one hand and the implausibility of the skeptics' view on the other. His discussion of this specifically centers around the issue of knowledge of the existence of material objects through sense perception, which, according to Moore, is the most basic and fundamental view of common sense. Moore claims that we all do know for certain that there are material objects in the Universe. In other words, he claims that this belief of common

sense is known to be true belief and there are good reasons for this claim. The skeptics, in contrast, claim that no such knowledge is possible. Hence what needs to be established is that the statement expressing the belief in the existence of any material object is a true statement. Hence the question to be settled is this: Can we know for certain that any such statement is a true statement? According to the skeptics we cannot know the truth of any such statement with certainty; and as long as we do not, the statement remains at the level of mere belief, and belief is not knowledge.

In this situation, in order to appreciate either of the claims, Moore's or the skeptics', it is necessary to discuss first the conditions that the skeptics accept as necessary for knowledge. According to Moore the conditions that skeptics accept as necessary for knowledge are originally based upon the conditions laid down by Hume as necessary for knowledge. Although different skeptics differ from one another in their individual views so far as it concerns the forms in which they express these views, but they all agree on the conditions of knowledge and these are basically Hume's.

Moore's statement of Hume's rules of knowledge is as follows. Hume divides all propositions into two classes--(i) those which assert the existence of something and (ii) those which do not assert the existence of anything. Propositions belonging to class (ii) may be known to be true intuitively where their truth is self evident; or may be known to be true by demonstration by a strictly deductive method where their truth follows from the truth of some other

proposition. Propositions belonging to class (i) cannot be known by either of these ways. Propositions falling in this class can further be divided into two sub-classes: (a) propositions asserting the past, present, or future existence of something where this something can be directly apprehended; and (b) propositions asserting the past, present, or future existence of something where this something cannot be directly apprehended. Hume lays down two sets of rules for knowing the truth of either of the two sub-classes of propositions belonging to class (i).

There are two conditions for knowing the truth of any propositions belonging to (i)(a): (1) A man may really know that a thing does exist, if, at the very moment when he believes that it exists, he actually is directly apprehending the thing in question. And (2) A man may really know that a thing did exist in the past, if he did directly apprehend it in the past and now remembers it.

There are two conditions for knowing the truth of any propositions belong to class (ii)(b): (1) Nobody can ever know of the existence of anything which he has not directly apprehended, unless he knows that something which he has directly apprehended is a sign of its existence. And (2) Nobody can ever know that the existence of any one thing A is a sign of the existence of another thing B, unless he himself (or, under certain conditions, somebody else) has experienced a general conjunction between things like A and things like B; and, nobody can be said to have experienced a conjunction between any two things, unless he has directly apprehended both the things.[37]

These last two conditions of knowledge, which are called the first and the second rules by Moore, constitute the main topic of discussion, since, the issue in question is the knowledge of the existence of material objects and material objects are never directly apprehended. According to Moore, the skeptics have denied the possibility of the knowledge of the existence of material objects on the grounds of these two principles laid down by Hume. Their argument consists of two parts (1) If Hume's principles are true, then none of us ever knows of the existence of any material objects; and (2) Since Hume's principles are true, none of us ever knows of the existence of any material objects.[38] Moore agrees with the first part of this argument, i.e., <u>if</u> Hume's rules are true, then we cannot know of the existence of any material objects. For, on the basis of these two rules, one may <u>know</u>, at the most, <u>of</u> the present existence of something very much <u>like</u>, in many respects, the material object, in which one commonly believes. For instance, if I am looking at a pencil at this moment, Hume's rules "would <u>not</u> allow me to know of the existence of exactly that, in which I believe--the material object, the pencil." Since what it would allow one to know of are only patches of <u>colour</u> of a certain shape, patches of <u>hardness</u>, and <u>smoothness or roughness</u> of a certain shape. But these patches of colour, of hardness, etc., certainly do not constitute the <u>whole</u> material object which one believes one knows. Moore writes:

> The pencil, in which I believe, certainly does not consist <u>solely</u> of colours and of tactual qualities: what I believe when I believe that the pencil exists is that there exists something which really is cylindrical in shape, but which

> does not consist merely of any number of patches of colour or of smoothness or hardness, or any other sorts of sense data which I have ever directly apprehended. Even if sense data of all these kinds really are now in the same place where the pencil is . . . I certainly believe that there is in that place something else besides. This something else, even if it be not the whole material object, is certainly a part of it. And . . . if Hume's second rule were true, I could not possibly know of the existence of this something else. For I have never directly apprehended in the past anything that was like it: I have only directly apprehended sense data which had a similar shape to that which it has.[39]

According to Moore these skeptical views, which are essentially based on Hume's principles regarding the conditions of knowledge, in denying our ability to know of the existence of material objects, flatly contradict common sense according to which we all do know of the existence of material objects. Hence, in order to be able to defend and justify the view of common sense, it becomes absolutely necessary to refute the skeptics' argument first. Accordingly, Moore's first step towards a defence of common sense consists of a close examination and evaluation of the skeptical views in their different aspects. In what follows I will discuss Moore's main moves against the skeptics' views.

The statement of the skeptics' main argument.--The skeptics' argument for the denial of our knowledge of the existence of material objects is this:

If Hume's principle (regarding the conditions of knowledge) are true, then we cannot know of the existence of material objects;	1st premiss
Hume's principles are true;	2nd premiss
Therefore, we cannot know of the existence of material objects.	Conclusion

1. Moore's first move consists in showing that even if we accept the first premiss of their argument, it does not contribute to the strength of their argument at all. This is so because this premiss, if true, would also validly lead to a conclusion which is not only very different from their conclusion but also has a very significant and yet very destructive bearing on their own argument. This alternative argument which can also be validly formulated with this very premiss (and which Moore has suggested so far) is this:

If we do know of the existence of material objects, then Hume's principles are false.	1st premiss
We do know of the existence of material objects.	2nd premiss
Therefore, Hume's principles are false.	Conclusion

This argument being equally consistent destroys the strength of their argument considerably since it contradicts their basic assumption (expressed by their second premiss) which has to be true to establish the conclusion of their argument; since, the first premiss of their argument, by itself, even if true, cannot establish their claim without also establishing an alternative claim equally consistently, which falsifies their basic assumption.

> I do know that this pencil exists; but I could not know this, if Hume's principles were true; therefore, Hume's principles . . . are false. . . . In other words, . . . the fact that, if Hume's principles are true, I could not know of the existence of this pencil, is a reductio ad absurdaum of those principles.[40]

However, since both the arguments are consistent, and yet are in conflict with each other, neither of them can be said to establish

its claim conclusively, unless it can be determined which one of the two satisfies the conditions of a conclusive argument.

According to Moore, in order to decide whether or not an argument is a good or conclusive argument, one has to consider not only the fact that the conclusion follows validly from the premisses, but also whether each premiss of the argument is known to be true or not.

> The fact that one proposition coheres with or follows from another does not by itself give us the slightest presumption in favour of its truth. My conclusion coheres with my premiss, exactly as strongly as my opponent's coheres with his. . . . Both equally satisfy the condition that the conclusion must follow from the premiss. . . . And yet obviously this mere fact does not give the slightest presumption in favour of either.[41]

In order to know that the conclusion of a given argument is true, one must know the premiss or the premisses to be true. In the case of the two arguments being considered, the respective premisses other than the one already considered are, 'Hume's principle are true' (skeptics') and 'I do know of the existence of this material object' (Moore's). According to Moore the point that must be emphasized in this context is that the premiss must be absolutely known to have the equal degree of certainty or probability as the conclusion is known to have. In other words, the premiss must be at least as certain as the conclusion; the mere fact

> that the premiss is true will not, by itself, enable any one whatever to know that the conclusion is so. If anybody whatever is to be enabled by the argument absolutely to know the conclusion, that person must himself first absolutely know that the premiss is true. And the same holds good not only for absolute certainty but also for every degree of probability short of it. . . . No argument is a good one, even

> in the sense that it enables us to know its conclusion to have any probability whatever, unless its premiss is at least as certain as its conclusion: meaning by "certain," not merely true or probably true, but known to be so.[42]

Hence, it seems that the only way it can be decided between the two arguments, as to which one is better or is really conclusive, is by deciding which of the two respective premisses in question is absolutely known to be true. Moore writes,

> My opponent's premiss is that Hume's principles are true; and unless this premiss not merely is true, but is absolutely known to be so, his argument to prove that I do not know of the existence of this pencil cannot be conclusive. Mine is that I do know of the existence of this pencil; unless this premiss not only is true, my argument to prove that Hume's principles are false cannot be conclusive.[43]

So the question arises: what are the conditions under which a proposition can be known to be true?

Before giving his own view, Moore considers a view about the conditions under which one can know a proposition to be true. He says that some philosophers seem to have held that the only way in which a premiss or proposition can ever be known to be true is by having a conclusive argument in its favour; what they have meant by 'having a conclusive argument in favour of a premiss or proposition' is that the proposition in question validly follows from some other proposition (or a set of other propositions) which is already known to be true.

According to Moore this view cannot be true unless a certain qualification is added to this method; but those who have held this view have failed to notice that without this qualification this view cannot be true. In other words, he does not deny that we do sometimes know a certain proposition to be true on the basis of certain other

propositions which also we know to be true and from which the proposition in question really follows; what he denies is that this is the only way we can know the truth of a proposition. And his reason for saying this is that this method can work, i.e., we can know the truth of a proposition by this method, only if there is some other way also by which we can know a proposition to be true. So he seems to be suggesting two things here: (1) knowing a proposition to be true by having a good argument in its favor is not the only way of knowing the truth of a proposition; there is some way other than this way, of knowing a proposition; and (2) the way which is being considered cannot be a way of knowing the truth of a proposition unless there is also some other way of knowing a proposition to be true.[44]

Hence, according to Moore the qualification which must be taken into account if we are to know of the truth of a proposition by this method is the following: In the case of any proposition P, if we are to know the truth of P by knowing that P validly follows from some other proposition or a set of other propositions, i.e., by knowing that we have a conclusive argument in favor of P, then we must know some proposition S to be true by some method other than the method in question; where S is either the only other proposition from which P follows, or S is one of the propositions in the set of other propositions from which P follows; i.e., S must be a premiss of the argument that we have in favor of P.

According to Moore, if we do not add this qualification to the method of knowing the truth of a proposition by having a

conclusive argument in its favor (i.e., by knowing that the proposition in question follows from some other proposition or a set of propositions), then we would never be able to know any proposition to be true--not even to be probable. The reason for this is that

> if I cannot know any proposition whatever to be either true or probably true, unless I have first known some other proposition, from it follows, to be so; then, of course, I cannot have known this other proposition, unless I have first known some third proposition, before it; nor this third proposition, unless I have first known a fourth before it; and so on ad infinitum. . . . And it is quite certain that no man ever has thus known a really infinite series of propositions. . . . So that if . . . the view that we can never know any proposition whatever, unless we have a good argument for it were true, then it would follow that we cannot ever know any proposition whatever to be true, since we never can have a good argument for it.[45]

Hence, there must be some condition or method other than this under which a proposition can be known to be true. So far as the question of knowing the truth of the respective premisses of the two arguments--Moore's and the skeptics'--is concerned, it still remains unanswered. It remains yet to be decided whether or not either one of the premisses in question can be known to be true. So far as the premiss of Moore's argument is concerned, he says that it can be known and is known to be true by some way of knowing; although it cannot be known to be true by the deductive method discussed above, i.e., by having a good argument for it. According to Moore, this way of knowing consists in knowing the truth of a proposition without knowing the truth of any other proposition. This is what Moore calls the immediate knowledge of the truth of a proposition.

Immediate knowledge, as I have already discussed in the previous section of this chapter, is a form of knowledge proper, and it is different from direct apprehension. According to Moore, the premiss of his argument can be known with certainty to be true by immediate knowledge. In this case we directly apprehend a proposition, and at the same time we know that it is true without knowing any other proposition from which it may follow. And, further, the evidence for it is that we know it with more certainty than that with which we can know any proposition which may be advanced for or against it; or which may be used either to prove or disprove it. Thus according to him, when, for instance, we see a pencil, or touch one we know immediately that it exists; the truth of the proposition <u>that</u> it exists, is known immediately; and it is known with certainty because it is beyond reasonable doubt under the given circumstances, although it is not beyond logical doubt. He says that the proposition which forms the premiss of his argument, namely, 'I do know that this pencil exists' is known to be true immediately. And it is more certain than any other proposition which can be used to prove this proposition to be true or to be false. He writes:

> That is why I say that the strongest argument to prove that Hume's principles are false is the argument from a particular case, like this in which we do know of the existence of some material object. And similarly, if the object is to prove <u>in general</u> that we do know of the existence of material objects, no argument which is really stronger can, I think, be brought forward to prove this than particular instances in which we do in fact know of the existence of such an object. . . . However much more <u>convincing</u> it may be, it is . . . sure to depend upon some premiss which is, in fact, less certain than the premiss that I do know of the

> existence of this pencil; and so, too, in the case of any arguments which can be brought forward to prove that we do not know of the existence of any material object.[46]

Moore has considered some objections that might be brought against his claim and have given reasons why they do not affect his claim adversely: (i) it may be said that the question here is regarding whether or not the main premiss of his argument is known to be true; the main premiss of his argument is: I do know that this pencil exists; hence what he is claiming to know immediately is not the proposition, that this pencil exists; but the proposition, 'I know that this pencil exists,' and this cannot be known to be true unless the proposition, 'the pencil exists' is known to be true. Hence, it can be said that even if one can know immediately that this pencil exists, one still cannot be said to know that one knows that this pencil exists immediately, since the knowledge of this proposition depends on the knowledge of another proposition, viz., that the pencil exists. Hence, the proposition in question must have been known only mediately. In reply to this, Moore says that from "the mere fact that I should not know the first, unless I knew the second, it does not follow that I know the first merely because I know the second. And, in fact, . . . I do know both of them immediately."[47]

(ii) It may also be said that the proposition 'the pencil exists' cannot be known immediately either, since in order to know this, one has to directly apprehend certain sense data and has also to know that these sense data are signs of the pencil's existence. In reply to this objection also Moore gives more or less the same answer:

> Of course I admit, that I should not know it, unless I were directly apprehending certain sense data. But this is again a different thing from admitting that I do not know it immediately. For the mere fact that I should not know it, unless certain other things were happening, is quite a different thing from knowing only because I know some other proposition.[48]

It should be mentioned here that Moore's views about the immediate knowledge of the truth of a proposition have a significant bearing on Hume's classification of propositions and the corresponding ways of knowing them. As has been discussed already, Hume has divided all propositions into two classes: (i) propositions asserting the existence (past, present, or future) of some particular thing(s); and (ii) propositions which do not assert the existence of anything. He has further divided the propositions belonging to (i) into (a) those which assert the existence of things which are being directly observed at the moment, or things which had been directly observed in the past and now are being remembered; and (b) those which assert the existence of things which are not being directly observed at the moment nor had been directly observed in the past, or if observed in the past, are quite forgotten. So far as propositions belonging to (ii) are concerned they can be known to be true either duductively, as in the case of mathematical theorems, or intuitively, as in the case of propositions like, $2 + 2 = 4$, white is different from black, if two things are equal to a third thing, they are equal to each other; intuitively known propositions are just 'seen' to be true immediately without the help of any other propositions. In any case, according to those who accept this classification of propositions, class (ii) of

propositions do not include any proposition asserting existence of something.

It seems that Moore is suggesting that class (ii) of the above division should not be limited only to the type of propositions that the skeptics accept to be in it; it seems that he would say that it should also include at least some propositions of a particular type, viz., those which do assert the existence of something which is not being directly observed at the moment, nor have ever been so observed in the past, and yet are known to be true immediately without the help of any other proposition. He says:

> Just as we know matters of fact, which we have observed, without the need of any further evidence, and just as we know, for instance, that $2 + 2 = 4$, without the need of any proof, it is possible, that we may know, directly and immediately, some facts which we never have observed.[49]

It should be mentioned, however, that Moore has not clearly discussed this matter in his epistemological writings. In what follows I will try to mention certain points about the immediately known propositions by way of qualifying Moore's suggestion mentioned above.

The immediately known propositions are, indeed, very different in nature from those which are taken to be intuitively known, since intuitively known propositions do not assert the existence of anything whatsoever; and furthermore, they are self evident in the sense that their opposites are inconceivable. In any case, such propositions are not contingent since their denial would be self contradictory. They are like necessary or analytic or tautologous propositions. Whereas the propositions, which Moore claims to be immediately known to be

true, are such that they do assert the existence of something. Moore has never said that they are self evident, and, even if they are, they have to be so in a quite different sense. In any case, they are not self evident in the sense that their opposites are inconceivable; Moore has explicitly said that such propositions are all contingent since it is always logically possible to deny them without any self contradiction, and yet they are known with absolute certainty to be true.

Such propositions as Moore claims to be immediately known to be true are different from the intuitively known propositions also in the respect of their mode of knowing. It seems to me that Moore would not say that intuitive knowledge is a form of knowledge proper; since in knowledge proper besides knowing a proposition to be true we also have to fulfill some other condition (which Moore does not specify but seems to have meant sufficient evidence or good reasons); but in intuitive knowledge the propositions known are self evident, and as such there is no need of having any evidence or reasons for knowing them--they are self justifying. Whereas so far as immediate knowledge is concerned, Moore says that it is a form of knowledge proper, and as such in knowing them we must satisfy the other condition of knowledge proper as well.

If these propositions, which are immediately known, are to be included in the skeptics' class (ii) of propositions, then their classification would have to be modified, and consequently it would considerably bear upon one of their major claims, viz., we cannot and do not know of the existence of material objects. It would modify their

classification of propositions considerably, since, if such propositions are to be included in their class (ii) of propositions, then they would have to revise their classification of propositions of class (i); since, in this case, at least some of the propositions of their class (i)(b) would now belong to their class (ii) of propositions.

Secondly, if these propositions, which are immediately known, are included in their class (ii) of propositions, then they would have to admit of the knowledge of the existence of material objects, since their conditions of knowing the existence of material objects would not hold good at least in those cases as are expressed by immediately known propositions. At any rate, whether or not immediately known propositions are to be put together with the deductively and intuitively known propositions in the same class, Moore's arguments, showing that the propositions asserting the existence of material objects can be known immediately, do considerably diminish the force of the skeptics' claim.

2. Moore's second move against the skeptics' claim consists in showing that they could <u>not</u> have known the truth of the <u>premiss</u> of their argument; and in subsequently showing that they themselves could not have known the truth of the <u>conclusion</u> of their argument. (This move is related with the first move just considered; in the first move Moore has tried to show that his argument, viz.,

If I know that this pencil--a material object--exists, then Hume's principles are false;	1st premiss
I do know that this pencil exists;	2nd premiss
Therefore, Hume's principles are false.	Conclusion

is a conclusive argument, since, the basic premiss of his argument, I do know that this pencil exists, can be known to be true immediately. In the second move, he considers whether or not the skeptics can make a similar claim about their argument, since if they can then it would defeat Moore's first move. On the other hand, if they cannot, then it would not only establish Moore's claim, it would also defeat the purpose of their own argument.) The basic premiss of the skeptics' argument is: Hume's principles are true. The question that Moore raises here is this: Can they, according to the conditions of knowledge accepted by them, know that this proposition is true? To put it in a different way, he is asking: "By which of the ways of knowing that you have accepted, do you know that these principles are true?" It is to be noticed that in order to evaluate the proposition, viz., "Hume's principles are true," epistemologically, i.e., whether this particular proposition is or is not known to be true, one has to consider Hume's principles (i.e., propositions stating these principles) themselves. It seems that Moore's move here is rather complex, or, at least, not as straightforward as his first move, for the reason that Moore is not directly attacking their premiss in question, viz., "Hume's principles are true"; he is attacking the principles themselves (or the propositions stating these principles). He is not directly

asking, "How do you know that the proposition, 'Hume's principles are true' is true?" What he is asking, instead, is, "How do you know that the propositions stating (or expressing) these principles are true?" (These principles have been stated earlier in this section.)

The reason for this explanation of Moore's move here is that even if Moore's argument that I am going to state, does show that the skeptics do not know that their conclusion is true on the basis of the conditions of knowledge they accept, yet it may be said that Moore has not shown, after all, whether or not the basic premiss of their argument is known to them, and as such he has not shown which of the two arguments, his and the skeptics', is a better argument; so far it has been proposed to be decided on the basis of the knowledge of the respective premisses. Before I discuss his argument, I will briefly mention some of the reasons why Moore may have preferred to take this indirect and rather complex route to show that the skeptics' argument is not a good one.

a. Moore could have attacked the skeptics' argument directly by asking: "How do you know that the proposition 'Hume's principles are true' is true?" He could have further argued that since this proposition is not self evident (as its denial is conceivable without self contradiction), it could not have been known by intuition. And, since this proposition does not assert the existence of anything, it could not possibly have been known by the principles which Hume has laid down to know the propositions asserting the existence of something. But the skeptics could still have said that they know this

proposition to be true by deduction from the truth of the principles themselves. In that case, one can always reasonably question the truth of the principles themselves, unless they are already proven to be true. And if they are not proven to be true then their deduction from these principles would not be justified.

b. In order that a person may justifiably say that he knows that the proposition 'Hume's principles are true,' is true, he must know that Hume's principles are true; since the proposition 'Hume's principles are true' can be true only if Hume's principles are true. And if one does not know that Hume's principles are true, then obviously one does not know that the proposition, 'Hume's principles are true' is true. Hence, in any case, it is the knowing or not knowing of the principles themselves which is crucial. It is crucial for the skeptics to show that they do know the principles to be true; and it is crucial for Moore to show that the skeptics could not have known them to be true according to the conditions of knowledge that they accept.

The principles being considered in this context are those laid down by Hume as conditions under which certain propositions asserting the existence of external facts (in this context specifically, material objects), can be known to be true. The general form of these principles, as stated by Moore, is this: One can only know of the existence of external things (in this case, material objects) by inference; and one cannot be justified in inferring the existence of any particular thing, except by Experience--"meaning by 'experience'

what Hume meant; namely, that you have directly apprehended in the past conjunctions between things similar to something which you now directly apprehend and things similar to what you now infer."[50]

The question here is whether this proposition stating the principle can be known to the skeptics by the methods of knowing accepted by them. Moore has given two arguments to show that this proposition cannot be known to be true by the conditions of knowledge which they accept.

Moore's first criticism is based on Hume's own argument; it is, in a sense, as Moore acknowledges, a restatement of Hume's own criticism of this principle. (It must be mentioned here, by way of clarification that according to Moore's interpretation, Hume, at different places of his two works dealing with epistemology, have held three different views regarding the knowledge of the existence of 'matters of fact' [and external objects or facts which represent one kind of matters of fact], with varying degrees of skepticism. A very brief summary of these three views is as follows: According to his first view although we are incapable of knowing a good many religious and philosophical propositions asserted in books of "divinity and school metaphysics" which have been claimed to be known, we can and do know "the vast majority of facts beyond our own observation, which we all commonly suppose that we know." His second view, on the other hand,

> is that it cuts off at once all the possibility of our knowing the vast majority of these facts; since he implies that we cannot have any basis in experience for asserting any external fact whatever--any fact, that is, except facts relating to our own actual past and future observations.

> And his third view is more skeptical still, since it suggests that we cannot really know any fact whatever, beyond the reach of our present observation or memory, even where we have a basis in experience for such a fact: it suggests that experience can never let us know that any two things are causally connected, and therefore that it cannot give us knowledge of any fact based on this relation.[51])

In his first argument here, Moore is referring to Hume's argument for this third view. Moore says that after laying down his principle that we cannot know any fact, A, to be causally connected with another, B, unless we have experienced in the past a constant conjunction between facts like A and facts like B, Hume goes on to ask, "what foundation we have for the conclusion that A and B are causally connected, even when we have in the past experienced a constant conjunction between them." For instance, it is quite conceivable, that even though in the past, whenever I was close to a fire, I experienced a sensation of heat, "yet in the future this should never happen again. What is there to prove that it will happen or is likely to happen in any single instance?" It can be proven only if one already knows some such principle as mentioned above. But the question is, how can one possibly know any such principle as this?

> It is a principle which cannot be known in any of the ways which Hume allows to be possible. It is not self evident; it cannot be deduced from anything which is self evident; and it cannot be known by Experience, since on the contrary, experience can never be known to prove anything whatever, unless this principle is first known to be true.[52]

Hence, the only foundation, according to Hume, we have for this principle is custom; "It is nothing but custom which induces us to believe that, because two facts have been constantly conjoined on many occasions; therefore they will be so on all occasions."[53]

Regarding this argument of Hume's, Moore says: "I do not see how it can be answered." He thinks that this argument leads the skeptics to a dilemma which it is hard for them to escape; for if they accept that they do know that experience is a sound basis for inference, since they do know, in fact, that when two things have been conjoined in the past, they are likely to be conjoined again, then they should also admit that they do know of the existence of material objects. For if it is a question of factual certainty based on experience, then it is no less certain that we do know of the existence of material objects. If the inferential knowledge of probable conjunction is admissible then there is no reason why inferential knowledge of material objects should not be admissible, since criterion of absolute certainty in the sense of indubitability is not satisfied in either case; the proposition expressing knowledge of experience as sound basis for inference is no more certain than the propositions expressing the knowledge of material objects.

If, on the other hand, the skeptic admits that he does not know if experience is a sound basis of any inference, then he has to admit a totally solipsistic situation in which case he does not and cannot know the existence of any thing beyond his own existence and sensations (and that also in a limited sense, for he would not know of his future existence and sensations even if that be for the next moment). And, in that case, the skeptics cannot be entitled to lay down any such rule as Moore is attacking, namely, that no man knows of the existence of material objects. For, if they do not even know whether or not there

are any other human beings, they cannot have claimed as to how much other human beings do or do not know. For all that they can have claimed is that *if* there are any other human beings they *may* (or perhaps, *may not*) know of the existence of material objects.

> In other words, if you once accept this sceptical argument of Hume's as showing that Experience [in the sense in which he defines it] is *not* a sufficient basis for inference, while at the same time you hold that it is the only basis you have, all attempts to lay down *general* propositions about the limits of human knowledge become absurd. You can only at most be entitled to lay down rules as to what you yourself do know and do not know; even with regard to yourself you cannot possibly be entitled to assert that you may not, the very next moment, know of the existence of some material object: you can have no basis for the assertion that there is the very smallest probability that you will not know this.[54]

Moore's second argument to the same effect consists in considering the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to be able to lay down any general principle, and in showing that the general principle that has been accepted by the skeptics, and which is being considered, is such that it *does not fulfill those conditions*. All such propositions about the limits of human knowledge, as is expressed by the principle being considered, are, in fact, arrived at and supported by the consideration of *particular instances*, in which we do in fact seem to know or not to know something. Moore says,

> They are in fact based--and this is the best basis they can have--upon an attempt to collect all the various instances, in which we obviously do know something, and all those in which we obviously do not know something, and to discover, by comparison, what conditions are common to the cases in which we *do* know, and absent from all those in which we do not know. In fact any general principle to the effect that we can never know a particular kind of proposition, except under certain conditions, is and must be based upon an

> empirical induction: upon observation of the cases in which we obviously do know propositions of the kind in question, and of those in which we obviously do not, and of the circumstances which distinguish one class from the other.[55]

From this it follows that the particular instances always have greater (or at least equal) certainty than what any general principle may have. Once the general principles are thus established they are often thought to have greater authority, but initially by itself no general principle has any greater certainty, or even equal certainty or perhpas any certainty in comparison to what these particular instances have. It is completely on the basis of the certainty of the particular instances, and constant continuation of such a support, that any general principle is established and achieves authority. Now, it seems clear that the skeptics' principle, viz., No man can <u>know</u> of the existence of anything, unless certain conditions are fulfilled, does not meet this condition, i.e., it does not seem to be based upon, or to be established by particular instantiations. Unless it is obviously instantiated by particular cases where we do not know of existence of a material object, no principle which asserts that one cannot know of the existence of anything <u>except under conditions which are not fulfilled in the case of material objects</u>, can be regarded as established.

> The mere fact that in any particular instance I <u>did</u> know of the existence of a material object, in spite of the fact <u>that the conditions named</u> were not fulfilled, would be sufficient to upset the principle, and to prove that it was not true. . . . It must first be known, with a greater certainty, that I do not, in fact, in any particular instance, know of [the existence of any material object]. And is this, in fact known with any certainty? It seems to me it certainly is not.[56]

It seems that the skeptics committed the mistake of reckoning as instances of the cases where (according to them) we obviously do not know something, such instances in which it is by no means obvious that we do not know the thing in question, whereas the claim that we do know of the existence of material objects is one that can be shown to be based upon many such particular instances in which we obviously do know of the existence of some material object or other.

3. Moore's third move against the skeptics consists in considering some of the consequences that follow from their denial of the common sense views; and in showing that these consequences exhibit, in one form or another, inconsistency in their views. In other words, his move consists in showing different types of inconsistencies that the skeptics get involved in as a result of their denial of the common sense views.

According to the view of common sense, propositions asserting the reality of material things, time, space, and other human beings can be known to be true; for instance, we all believe we know that there are things like chairs and tables, etc., which we take to be instances of material things; similarly, we all believe we know that there are many human beings each of whom have had some experiences similar to those that each of the rest has had; we also believe we know that these material things and living bodies occupy space and exist in time. According to Moore some philosophers have held views incompatible with those of common sense, in two ways: (a) either they have held that some or all the proposition accepted by common

sense to be true, are false; (b) or, they have held that none of us knows for certain that any of the propositions accepted by common sense as known to be true, although they have not said these propositions are false.

Moore's main argument about (a) is that all those philosophers who have denied the truth of the propositions of common sense, have also held other views inconsistent with their denial of the truth of common sense propositions. One way of showing this is the following: according to common sense there have existed (or do exist) many human beings each of whom has known, for instance, that there are material objects and there are human beings other than the knower and who have similar experiences; if anybody denies that such a view is true, then, he is denying that there were or are any human beings who have known the existence of material objects and other human beings. If he is right, then it follows that he is denying that there were or are any philosophers who have held or does hold any such view, viz., the statement "there were or are many human beings who have known such and such things" is false. But the fact is that there are some philosophers who have held such views, since, at least he (i.e., one who denies) himself holds it; for in holding the view that he does, he is also admitting the existence of other human beings who have bodies and thoughts, etc., as he does, from whom he anticipates the views that he is denying; and it is also a fact that his views are known to somebody, or else, his views would not be discussed by anybody. And, if all this is true, then he cannot be right in saying that there were

or are no human beings who have known . . . etc.

> In other words, . . . if any philosopher has denied it, it follows from the fact that he has denied it, that he must have been wrong in denying it. . . . Since, if I know that they [i.e., such philosophers as one mentioned above] have held such views, I am, ipso facto, knowing that they were mistaken; . . . since I am more certain that they have existed and have held some views . . . than that they have held views incompatible with it [common sense].[57]

Another way in which, according to Moore, they have betrayed this inconsistency, is by alluding to the existence of other philosophers in particular, and of the human race in general by using the word "we" in the sense in which we all ordinarily use it. He writes,

> Any philosopher who asserts that "we" do so and so, e.g., that "we sometimes believe propositions that are not true," is asserting not only that he himself has done the thing in question, but that very many other human beings, who have had bodies and lived upon the earth, have done the same . . . they have, therefore, been holding views inconsistent with propositions which they themselves knew to be true. . . .[58]

Moore's argument for (b) is that, whenever philosophers have denied the knowability of propositions asserting the existence of material things or other persons, their denial entails two mutually incompatible propositions, viz., 'I do not know that p' and 'I know that p.' (This position is different from the preceding position in the respect that from the preceding position this consequence does not follow. Those who hold the preceding position simply hold that the statements of the common sense are not true; there is no contradiction involved in thinking that what they say is true, e.g., it might have been true that there were no material objects, or there were no human beings, etc.; their mistake consists in simply holding also other "views inconsistent with propositions which they themselves

knew to be true" and in their failure to notice this fact. But this type of view, according to Moore, is not, in itself, a self contradictory view in the sense that it entails both of two incompatible propositions (which the following view does)).

The position against which Moore's second argument is directed, can be briefly stated as follows: These philosophers admit that we all do in fact believe such propositions of common sense as asserting the existence of material objects, etc., and that such propositions may even be true; but they deny that we can ever know them, for certain, to be true; that they are just matters of Faith or mere belief, but not of Knowledge.

The point that Moore wants to emphasize in this connection is that these philosophers are making assertions about human knowledge in general. Whenever a philosopher makes any such assertion, he is making an assertion about all human beings including himself (or about himself as well as about many persons other than himself). In other words, he is not making the assertion only about himself--it is always about others too. When such a philosopher says, for instance, "No human being has ever known of the existence of other human beings or material objects,' what he is in fact saying is that 'There have been many other human beings, who have had material bodies as I have and who have been capable of having similar experiences as I am, and none of them, including myself, has ever known of the existence of other human beings and of material bodies.' In any such case, the philosopher is actually making a statement about 'us'--he says, 'None of Us knows,' or 'We do not know,'

or 'Nobody including myself knows'; he does not simply mean to say, 'I do not know.' And any such uses of words like 'us' or 'we' involves allusion to the existence of persons other than the speaker.

However, if by the expression 'Nobody knows,' one really means only 'I don't know, and if other men have existed, they don't know either,' then there is no contradiction involved. Moore says, "There is only self contradiction in holding I know there have been other men, and they have made such judgments, but they haven't known them to be true." Moore thinks that this is exactly what these philosophers are doing, when they are denying the knowability of the common sense statements about the existence of material objects, etc.; since, philosophers who deny that such propositions of common sense are ever known to be true, almost all of them "not only admit but insist that we do make such judgments as 'This is a desk' and so on." What they deny is that we do know that such judgments are true. These statements, according to them, are just part of the system of common beliefs; they are, in all cases, only believed, not ever known for certain; these are just matters of faith. "But what does 'we' mean? It means 'men with human bodies living on this earth'; and this means men related with material things related to this material thing (i.e., the earth)."[59]

Furthermore, the admittance, on their part, of the very existence of common sense beliefs is self contradictory; since if such a philosopher says: "These beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, but they are not matters of knowledge," he is saying that 'There have been many other human beings, besides myself, who have shared these

beliefs, but neither I nor any of the rest has ever known these to be true." But the fact is that if these beliefs are beliefs of common sense, then they must be true; since the proposition that they are (or there are) beliefs of common sense is such a proposition which implies (because of the very meaning of 'beliefs of common sense') the proposition that many human beings, besides the philosopher who denies the knowledge of common sense statements, have had bodies, which have lived upon the earth, and have had experiences, including beliefs of this kind. According to Moore,

> when people say: "We believe such things" they commonly mean, "It's certain that we believe them; and by this, not only, I know that we believe them. . . . This means "it's certain that other men have existed, but none of them have known." Nobody, in fact, means only: "I don't know, and, if, other men have existed similar to me, they don't know either."[60]

Proof of the Existence of Material Objects and of Knowledge of Them

Moore's final justification of the claim that the common sense propositions asserting the existence of material objects are known to be true, consists in appealing to the facts of common experience (and to the validity of the authority of the ordinary language. His appeal consists in pointing to particular facts of life which cannot be reasonably denied or even doubted, and particular usages of ordinary language which we all accept to be significant. However, in order to justify the claim that certain propositions are known to be true, it is necessary to show that the propositions in question are true; since when we are talking of the knowledge of facts, i.e., that something is

the case, we are talking of knowledge proper; and one of the conditions of knowledge proper is that the proposition believed to be known must be true. Hence, in order to show that the propositions asserting the existence of material objects are known, it is necessary to show that such propositions are true, showing that material objects exist.) Accordingly, (1) Moore first argues that there are material objects, and subsequently, that it can be known that there are material objects; and (2) then argues to the same effect that if the ways we use certain words in common usage or ordinary language are ways of using those words meaningfully, then we will have to admit also that we know of the existence of material objects; for otherwise, our ways of using those words in the ways we do use them would be reduced to absurdity.

Everyday facts appealed to.--(1) By material objects we generally and ordinarily mean objects like chairs, tables, different kinds of bodies--some animate, some inanimate, trees, mountains, stones, flowers and the like. In everyday life we do not all the time make statements like: I am sitting on a material object, I am now writing on a material object, I am seeing a material object running, or I am seeing a material object reading a material object; the statements that we do make are like these: I am sitting on a chair, I am writing on a piece of paper which is on this table, I am seeing a cat running, or I am seeing a person reading a book. But we all commonly believe that all these objects are material objects; that all these different types of objects are different examples of material objects. This is one way of defining the term 'material object,' what Moore calls definition by

examples. If we further try to determine what is the common feature that we all accept about those things which we ordinarly accept to be instances of material objects, then we find that we all accept that these are objects which exist outside of us, i.e., not inside our bodies or minds, and occupy space. In other words, we all accept that they are external objects. To say the same thing more specifically and technically, by a material object we mean something which does occupy space, is not a sense datum and is not a mind, nor an act of consciousness.

According to Moore, one way of showing the truth of propositions asserting the existence of material objects, is to show that such propositions as 'This is a chair,' or 'This is a human hand,' and so on, are true; i.e., if we can show that there are things like chairs, human hands, etc., where these things are accepted as particular instances of material objects, then it would be shown, by that very fact, that there are material objects. In other words, if it can be shown that one chair or one human hand exists, then the proposition, 'There exists a chair,' or the proposition, 'There exists a human hand,' is true. Further, Moore says that

> it is also true that from the proposition that there is at least one "thing" of that kind there follows the proposition that there is at least one thing external to our minds . . . [for instance, from "There is at least one chair," it follows "There is at least one external thing," i.e., "There is at least one material object]."[61]

Moore claims that he can prove quite rigorously that there are many such things--viz., chairs, tables, human hands, and the like. He writes:

> I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand," and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, "and here is another." . . . But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever.[62]

Moore says in order to decide whether or not it is a proof, we simply have to find out whether it fulfills all the conditions that a proof must satisfy.

According to him, any rigorous proof must satisfy three conditions: (a) the premiss which is given as a proof of a conclusion, must be different from the conclusion; (b) the premise must be known to be true; and (c) the conclusion must really follow from the premiss. Moore claims that his proof, in fact, satisfies all the three conditions:

> (a) The premiss which I adduced in proof was quite certainly different from the conclusion, for the conclusion was merely "Two human hands exist at the moment"; but the premiss was something far more specific than this--something I expressed by showing you my hands, making certain gestures, and saying the words "Here is one hand, and here is another." . . . In asserting the premiss I was asserting much more than I was asserting in asserting the conclusion. (b) I certainly did at the moment know that which I expressed by the combination of certain gestures with saying the words "There is one hand and here is another." I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated . . . and that there was another in the different place indicated. . . . And finally (c) it is quite certain that the conclusion did follow from the premiss. This is as certain as it is that if there is one hand here and another here now, then it follows that there are two hands in existence now.[63]

The point to be emphasized here is that even though this proof is different from a strictly formal proof in certain ways, we, in fact,

do constantly accept proofs of this sort as absolutely conclusive proofs of certain conclusions--as perfectly reliable for finally settling issues as to which we were previously in doubt. If this can be accepted as a proof for the existence of a material object in the present, then by a similar proof it can also be shown that material objects existed in the past and were known to be so. But this proof may not be regarded as a conclusive proof by some philosophers and this fact leads Moore to present further considerations to the same effect.

Ordinary language appealed to.--Moore has further presented consideration of a similar sort as arguments to show that propositions asserting the existence of material objects are, and can be, known to be true. He says that some philosophers, however, may refuse to accept such arguments as constituting proofs at all for any propositions whatever: whether it is a proposition asserting the existence of material objects, or, whether it is a proposition asserting the knowledge of the existence of material objects. According to Moore these philosophers seem to have accepted only two kinds of proofs as real proofs for any conclusion: deductive and inductive. Of these two, according to them, only the conclusion of deductive proof can be absolutely known or known for certain to be true; the conclusion of an inductive proof can never be known for certain, since, the conclusion of such a proof is at the most highly probable, but it can never be absolutely known or absolutely certain. Further, they have held that any argument intended to establish an existential proposition about physical objects must be inductive in nature, since no existential proposition about physical

objects is self evident and as such they cannot be intuitively known to be true. Hence any argument about the existence of physical objects must be inductive in nature and as such its conclusion can never be known to be true.

Moore's reply to this sort of argument is that such propositions as "this pencil exists now" can be known immediately to be true without knowing the truth of any other proposition from which it follows. (I have discussed this issue in detail earlier in this chapter, hence I will not discuss it here.) Moore claims that although propositions like these are not deductively arrived at, nor are they self evident in the sense that their opposites are inconceivable, yet they are known with absolute certainty to be true because it will be absurd to doubt them under certain circumstances, although it is logically possible to doubt them.

In order to prove his point Moore draws instances from every day facts where we not only use the word "certain" or "know" quite significantly, but also where, if we hesitate to use those words or doubt their appropriateness under those circumstances, it will be, in a sense, absurd, unless we absolutely change the meanings of those words in which they are used commonly. For instance, if I am looking at my right hand now while I am also seeing that I am writing with it, i.e., making certain movements with it, then I know that I am looking at a human hand. In other words, in such situations, I know that it is a human hand, and I know this with absolute certainty. However, Moore admits that it is not a matter of logic; it is always, perhaps,

logically possible that it is not a human hand. Those who doubt the truth of such statements might say: "You don't know for certain anything which you can doubt. And you can doubt that this is a human hand. But can I doubt it? or even if we can, does it prove that I don't know it?"[64] Moore writes:

> How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking--that perhaps after all I'm not, and that it's not quite certain that I am![65]

The point Moore wants to make is that if propositions of this nature are not certain, i.e., known with absolute certainty then nothing of the kind is ever certain: "if they [are] not certain, then no proposition which implies the existence of anything external to the mind of the person who makes it is ever certain." If it is true, for instance, that I do not know now (when I am standing up and I also think that I am), that I am standing up, then certainly I do not know anything of the sort at all, and never have known anything of the sort; and, not only so, but nobody else ever has. But this is not a matter of logic.[66] Since, it may be argued that, it is logically possible, e.g., that I am dreaming now and yet claiming that I am standing up. It is logically possible also that I am dreaming now and while dreaming I am thinking that I am standing up, and am actually standing up. Hence, if I am not certain that I am not dreaming now, then, even if I am thinking that I am standing up and I am, in fact, standing up, I cannot be certain that I am standing up; i.e., if I do not know for certain that I am dreaming then, I do not know for certain

that I am standing up. Moore says that he does not wish to dispute that, from the hypothesis that one is dreaming, it might follow that one does not know that one is standing up; "though I have never seen the matter argued, and though it is not at all clear to me how it is to be proved that it would follow." However, even if it is granted for the moment that if one does not know that he is not dreaming, then one does not know that one is standing up (though one actually is standing up and thinks that one is), it is doubtful how much force such an argument really has. Since, as Moore points out,

> . . . [the] first part of the argument is a consideration which cuts both ways. For, if it is true, it follows that it is also true that if I do know that I am standing up, then I do know that I am not dreaming. I can therefore just as well argue: since I do know that I'm standing up, it follows that I do know that I'm not dreaming. . . . The argument is just as good as the other, unless my opponent can give better reasons for asserting that I don't know that I am not dreaming, than I can give for asserting that I do know that I am standing up.[67]

The reason that Moore invokes is the evidence of the senses. By evidence of the senses for an assertion 'what is meant is that the assertion is, at least in part, based upon the things that I am seeing or hearing or feeling (or, in other words "having certain visual, auditory, tactile or organic sensations," or a combination of these. This evidence may not be necessarily conclusive, or the only evidence available or possible; but one can certainly claim that

> I certainly have now the evidence of my senses in favour of the proposition that I am standing up, even though this may not be all the evidence that I have, and may not be conclusive . . . if a man at a given time is only dreaming that he is standing up, then it follows that he has not

> at that time the evidence of his senses in favour of that proposition: to say "Jones last night was only dreaming that he was standing up, yet all the time he had the evidence of his senses that he was" is to say something self contradictory.[68]

Hence, the view that I do not know for certain that I am not dreaming, entails also that it is possible that I have not the evidence of my senses that I am standing up. Even if it is not certain that I have at this moment the evidence of my senses for the proposition that I am standing up, it still is quite certain that I am having some sensory experience, though it is not quite sure whether it consists of only dream images, or, sensations that really constitute the evidence of the senses in waking experience. The point that Moore wants to emphasize here is that these philosophers cannot possibly discriminate between the two (experiences), if they say, as their argument surely contends to, that it is not certain that my sensory experience now consists only of dream images. That is to say, none can be in a position to say that somebody's sensory experience now consists of only dream images, unless one knows that dreams have occurred, and that the contents or data of sensory experiences in dream are different from those in waking life, i.e., the very state of dreaming is different from the state of waking experience. Moore writes:

> . . . can he consistently combine this proposition that he knows that dreams have occurred, with his conclusion that he does not know that he is not dreaming? Can anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred, if at the same time, he does not himself know that he is not dreaming? If he is dreaming, it may be that he is only dreaming that dreams have occurred; and if he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is not only dreaming that dreams have occurred? . . . I don't think that he can.[69]

Hence, Moore concludes that anyone who says that dreams have occurred and also asserts that nobody ever knows that he is not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency. Since, by asserting the former proposition he implies that he himself knows that dreams have occurred; "while, if his conclusion is true, it follows that he himself does not know that he is not dreaming, and therefore does not know that he is not only dreaming that dreams have occurred."

Moore advances a similar argument against all those who argue that nobody can ever know for certain that propositions like 'This is a blackboard,' or 'I am seeing a blackboard,' etc., on the ground that we might be hallucinating, or under illusion, and hence, might be mistaken. Moore refers to those cases of perceptual statements of ordinary life where it would be unreasonable to say that one does not know for certain, or to say that one is hallucinating. But if one still says, even about such cases, that we might be mistaken, then such a statement will be inconsistent in the sense that it will imply one's knowledge of those cases where one might not be mistaken, whereas what they really want to say that we cannot have any such knowledge. Moore argues,

> Is it possible I am mistaken in [saying] "This is a blackboard" [when I know that I am looking at one]? Not if I know it. What does [their] argument prove? There are experiences which resemble this in a certain respect and which are false beliefs, [therefore] this one may be a false belief. I.e., some of its characters are compatible with its being a false belief. I don't see how this can give any good reason for thinking that this is not a case of knowledge. If such a view says: We know that in some cases we are mistaken, it is self inconsistent: for we can certainly only know that in a particular case "This exists" was not true, by inference from cases in which we know that it is true.[70]

The point that Moore wants to emphasize is that these philosophers think that a statement can be known for certain, only if it can be known by formal deduction; i.e., if it is not formally proven, then it is not proven at all. But Moore does not think it necessary (as it has been earlier pointed out), that in order to know a statement, we always have to have a formal proof for it; for Moore, under certain circumstances, we can know a statement to be true, even though that statement does not formally follow from a set of premisses. "From the fact that it's not known formally, it doesn't follow that is is not known. . . . Why shouldn't premisses which don't prove a conclusion formally yet prove it?"[71] He thinks that one can know a proposition in consequence of certain premisses (which constitute the evidence for that proposition), in spite of the fact that it doesn't follow formally from them.

The consideration of these arguments shows that Moore has consistently pursued his objective to refute the skeptics' challenge about our lack of knowledge of material objects. His arguments, as stated and discussed in this chapter, show that he has been able to defend and justify the common sense claims about the knowledge material objects; and that his acceptance of the existence of sense data does not affect either the consistency of his procedure or the validity of his arguments.

CHAPTER VI

COMMON SENSE, ANALYSIS, AND SENSE DATA IN MOORE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Section I
Why Does Moore Analyze Common Sense Views

From the discussion of Moore's epistemological views in the previous chapters, two points become quite clear: the first is that Moore has never cherished any doubts either about the existence of material objects or about the existence of sense data; he has explicitly admitted the existence of both sense data and material objects, and yet has come up with a theory of perceptual knowledge very different from that of the skeptics' in certain important respects. The main difference, in this context, between his views on the one hand, and those of the skeptics on the other, is that the skeptics have mainly contradicted the views of common sense on the ground of the existence of sense data; i.e., the philosophers whose views Moore has tried to refute, have all accepted certain views about sense data such that on the basis of those views they either have denied the knowability of material objects, or, have denied both the knowability and the existence of material objects; whereas these are two of the most important views accepted by common sense, viz., that there are material objects and that we all know that there are material objects. In short, all those philosophers

(i.e., philosophers that Moore is concerned with), who have accepted the existence of sense data have at least denied the knowability of material objects. Whereas Moore, while fully accepting the existence of sense data, has never denied either the existence of material objects or the knowability of material objects.

The second point is that Moore's philosophy of common sense and his philosophy of sense data are not two conflicting views as some of his critics might have thought; that despite the two philosophies Moore has been quite consistent in the pursuit of his main objective, viz., to refute skeptics' claims against the claims of common sense; and that his sense data philosophy has not invalidated his arguments against the skeptics.

In this chapter, I shall discuss some further questions that may still be raised about Moore's maintaining the two standpoints and certain consequences that follow from this. In particular, I shall be concerned with two questions: first, although the two standpoints are not in conflict with each other, it may still be asked, Why has Moore introduced the concept of sense data, after all, when what he has mainly wanted to do is to defend and justify common sense against skeptical views about external world? For it seems to be a fact that the notion of sense data does not form a part of the common sense views about perceptual knowledge. And second, since Moore accepts the existence of both sense data and material objects, how does he explain the relation between the two?

Section II. Moore's View About the Role of Analysis in Philosophical Discussion

It has been already indicated in Chapter III that the notion of sense data has been introduced mainly in two ways, viz., by way of analyzing the perceptual statements of common sense and by way of analyzing sense perception as a cognitive act. Hence the question: why has Moore brought in a philosophy of sense data in order to refute skepticism about the external world, when he already has a philosophy of common sense realism? can be replaced by the question, why, after all, does Moore analyze the perceptual statements of common sense, and sense perception as an act of consciousness, when such analyses lead to the introduction of sense data--an issue which does not seem to be required for the pursuit of his main objective?

It seems to me that this question can be answered by pointing out the fact that although it is true that the main objective of his theory of empirical knowledge has been to establish the validity of the common sense knowledge claims as expressed in everyday perceptual statements (against the skeptics' attack on them), from this it does not follow that this has been the only objective of his philosophical pursuit in this context; or that he has not or cannot have pursued any other objective simultaneously.

From the different writings of Moore it seems to be a fact that he has accepted the analysis of concepts and propositions, not only

as the most appropriate method of doing philosophy, but also as one of the objectives of philosophical pursuit. According to Moore the main task of philosophy consists in providing a general description of the Universe by classifying the different things that are or are not in the Universe, in describing how and to what extent we know these things, and in discussing what things are good and what are not. But more importantly, according to Moore, any discussion of these problems also leads to the discussion of a great number of questions or problems regarding the meanings of the different concepts and propositions involved in such discussions. And it is part of the object of philosophy to answer all these questions regarding the meanings of concepts and propositions. As such analyzing not only forms the method of philosophizing but also becomes part of the subject matter of philosophy. While discussing the subject matter of Philosophy--the sorts of questions Philosophy deals with--Moore says that the class of philosophical problems includes not only that of classifying the different things we take to be in the Universe, but also the problem of determining whether these classes of things do exist or do not, or whether we are simply ignorant as to whether they do or do not; and also of trying to define these classes and considering how they are related to one another--to define more clearly what is the difference between these various sorts of things: for instance, what is the difference between a material object and an act of consciousness, between matter and mind, etc.; what sort of a thing one's knowledge is, what the relation between knowledge and truth is, and so on. It is a function of

philosophy to answer these questions, including the questions about the meanings of concepts and propositions; and any discussion dealing with these problems involves analysis.[1] Quite in accordance with this, Moore says, while discussing the nature and kinds of philosophical questions,

> So far I've distinguished two main kinds of questions which it seems to me be the business of philosophy to discuss. (1) Questions about the meaning of particular words, phrases or forms of expression in common use (only some). (2) Questions about the nature of Reality as a whole--understood in a very wide and a very vague sense.

And he further adds two more questions to these:

> (3) A number of questions about human knowledge, (4) Still more questions about what it's reasonable for us to believe and in what degree. I don't see how it can be denied that all these sorts of questions do belong to philosophy. Of course, people may say that they ought not to: but as philosophy is now used they do.[2]

According to Moore 'analysis' or, as he alternatively called it, 'philosophic definition,' does not consist in providing the verbal definition of words or the meanings of words as dictionaries provide them--reportive definitions or how a certain word is used in a particular language. Philosophic definitions are

> all of them definitions of words or forms of expression you already understand--you already know their meaning, in the sense that you attach the common meanings to them when you use them or hear or read them, though you may not know their meanings in the sense of being able to make true propositions of the form "this means so and so" what philosophy tries to analyse is concepts which you use in ordinary life. (To use a concept for which a word stands = to use the word, and attach certain meaning to the word.)[3]

Analysis of a concept consists in describing the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word by reducing the object in question to, and enumerating, its simplest constituent concepts which cannot be

further analyzed.[4] Similarly analysis of a proposition consists in breaking the proposition into simpler and more fundamental propositions involved in it.[5]

So far as the usefulness and justification of doing analysis in philosophy is concerned, either as its method or as a part of its subject matter, it may be said, in a general way, that the usefulness of analysis consists in producing clearness of thoughts when one is thinking about the various questions concerning the various aspects of a particular problem and the solution of the problem. According to Moore, "the chief use of analysis in the way of clearness, is only clearness which it produces when you are doing philosophy itself." In this connection he distinguishes between two different ways in which analysis produces clearness: (a) the sort of clearness one attains in understanding a particular definition; "the sort of clearness you enjoy when you arrive at a good definition of this sort . . . is, it seems to me, something worth having for its own sake." And (b) the sort of clearness which understanding a given definition may bring to one in understanding other philosophical propositions--either another definition, or a philosophical proposition of the kind which is not a definition. This sort of clearness does not help very much in answering philosophical questions, or in solving philosophical problems; but it does help in having a clear understanding of the questions or problems.

> Philosophical clearness is not necessary to answer such a question as: Am I nearer to the blackboard than you are? And does it really help to answer philosophical propositions?

> I doubt if it helps you at all to say whether they are true; but only to see more clearly what the question means.[6]

But for Moore, the clear understanding of a philosophical question or problem is no less important than providing the answer or solution to it, since he is of the opinion that most of the difficulties and disagreements in philosophy are because of the fact that the questions or problems that philosophers try to provide answers or solutions to, are not clearly understood. In the preface of Principia Ethica, he writes to this effect:

> I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philosophers would try to discover what question they are asking, before they set out to answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear. . . . They are constantly endeavouring to prove that 'Yes' or 'No' will answer questions, to which neither answer is correct, owing to the fact that what they have before their minds is not one question, but several, to some of which the true answer is 'No,' to others 'Yes.'

Since Moore has always recognized that analysis is a part of the function of philosophical discussion of a problem, as has been shown above, he has, accordingly, thought it necessary to analyze the different aspects of the problem of the perceptual knowledge of the external world, the problem which has been the main concern of his epistemological views. In particular, he has thought it necessary to analyze concepts like 'material object,' 'existence,' 'knowledge,' 'perceiving,' 'seeing,' and so on; and statements like: 'This is a table,'

'I am seeing a human hand,' 'There are material objects,' and so on. The analysis of concepts and statements by way of clarifying their meanings and by raising and answering various questions about them, forms an important and major part of his entire philosophical enterprise--both from the viewpoint of method and from that of subject matter. As has been discussed in Chapter III, it is in the context of analysis that he has thought it necessary to introduce the notion of sense data. According to the skeptics we cannot know with certainty the truth of such statements as 'That is a table,' where by 'table' we mean a material object; whereas according to Moore we can and do know with certainty that that is a table and that it is a material object in the sense in which we ordinarily use the expression 'material object,' and if we are asked how we know that it is a table, surely in most cases we would say that we know that it is a table because we are perceiving it; in other words we know the table by means of sense perception and we do know with certainty that the statement 'That is a table' is true. Hence, so far as the truth of such common sense statements is concerned, we do know it. But this claim should not be confused with the claim that we know the correct analysis of such statements,[7] and furthermore, the claim that we all perceive the table, should not be taken as implying that there is only one sense of perceiving, since 'perceiving' (and words expressing different forms of it) can be analyzed into different senses.

When Moore claims that he is defending the common sense view, he is not claiming that he is defending the common sense analysis of

such views, since there aren't any common sense analyses of such views. The common sense view, as Moore takes it, consists of certain knowledge claims which are expressed in everyday perceptual statements and not the analyses of such claims, and as such the question of defending or not defending the common sense analyses or claims of analyses of statements does not arise. It is only when the common sense views or claims become the subject matter of philosophical discussion, as they do in Moore's theory of empirical knowledge, that the question as to their analyses arises.

The fact that Moore's analysis of the common sense views in certain respects leads to the introduction of the notion of sense data in his views regarding empirical knowledge, does not affect adversely either the coherence of his views or the consistency of his procedure in his theory of empirical knowledge for the following reasons:

(1) Although the analysis of the common sense views does not constitute a part of the common sense view, it provides a clarification of such views and the consequences they lead to when and if analyzed; for instance, it clarifies that though we know such views to be true, we do not know their correct analysis; it also clarifies how an attempt to analyze such views leads to the introduction of the notion of sense data. As such the analysis of the common sense views is not only indirectly related to any discussion of such views but also occurs within the general framework of Moore's views about perceptual knowledge.

(2) Although the analysis of certain aspects of the common sense views does lead to the introduction of the notion of sense data,

the latter does not generate a skepticism in Moore's views as it does in the case of the skeptics'; i.e., Moore's acceptance of the fact that there are sense data does not lead to a skepticism regarding the knowledge of material objects or an external world; he does not think, as the skeptics have thought, that it is necessary to deny the knowledge of the existence of material objects, if one has accepted the existence of sense data. His arguments for this position have been given in the preceding chapter.

Section III. The Relation Between Sense Data and Material Objects

So far as the problem of the relation between sense data and physical objects is concerned, it is closely related with the analysis of the perceptual statements of common sense (as discussed above). After asserting that we all do know with certainty that perceptual statements of common sense, like, 'I am seeing a human hand,' or 'This is a human hand,' are true, Moore raises two questions as to what could have been meant by such statements. In this connection he points out that although one may know or understand the meaning of a statement (in the sense in which we all ordinarily understand it), and yet one may not know the meaning of a statement in the sense of knowing the correct analysis of that statement;[8] his questions here refer to this last point.

The first question that he raises is: What is it that I am actually perceiving when I am perceiving that this is a human hand or that this is a part of the surface of a human hand? According to Moore,

what is actually perceived is always a sense datum such that in perceiving this sense datum one is not perceiving the whole human hand. In other words, "what I know, with regard to this sense datum, when I know 'This is a human hand,' is not that it is itself a human hand. . . ." That this is so is, according to Moore, quite certain because one knows that a hand has many parts (e.g., its other side, and its bones inside it), which are quite certainly not parts of this sense datum.

This leads to his second question which is: If this sense datum which one is actually perceiving in perceiving a human hand is not the whole of the human hand, then can it be a part of the surface of the hand? Moore says that any proposition of the form "This is a human hand" includes in its analysis a proposition of the form "This is part of the surface of a human hand" (where "This" has a different meaning from that which it has in the original proposition, viz., "This is a human hand"). But the important point is that

> this proposition also is undoubtedly a proposition about the sense datum, which I am seeing, which is a sense datum of my hand. And hence the further question arises: What, when I know "This is part of the surface of a human hand," am I knowing about the sense datum in question? Am I, in this case, really knowing about the sense datum . . . that it itself is part of the surface of a human hand? Or, . . . that even here I am not knowing, with regard to the sense datum that it is itself part of the surface of a human hand? And, if so, what is it that I am knowing about the sense datum itself?[9]

Before I discuss the various answers to this question that Moore considers, it seems important to me to make a distinction between two different aspects of the relation between sense data and physical objects. From Moore's discussion of this particular problem of the

relation of sense data to physical object, it seems clear that this problem admits of two different aspects: according to one aspect, the question is, "What is the epistemological relation between sense data and physical object?" and according to another aspect, the question is, "What is the ontological relation between sense data and physical objects?"

In what follows I shall simply briefly mention some of the main points of Moore's views regarding the epistemological relation between the two, since I have discussed the contents of these points in detail in Chapter III (although there I have not classified them as belonging to this aspect of the problem; rather I have discussed them under the more general topic, viz., Moore's views regarding sense data). The main concern of the rest of this chapter, however, is the question regarding the ontological relation between sense data and physical objects. It seems to me, nevertheless, that some of the main points regarding epistemological relation between the two should at least be mentioned here; since Moore's views regarding the ontological relation between the two are not only very closely related with his views regarding the epistemological relation between the two, but also are, sometimes, overlapping. (However, Moore has not, in his discussions, explicitly distinguished between these two aspects nor has he used these two names to classify them.)

Epistemological Relation Between Sense Data and Material Objects

So far as the epistemological relation between sense dat and material objects (or physical surfaces) is concerned, the specific question it presents is this: How is the knowing of material objects related with the knowing of sense data? Or, conversely, how is the knowing of sense data related with the knowing of material objects? In other words, in what sense is the knowledge of the one related to the knowledge of the other? Moore has given a fairly clear and definitive answer to it. His account for this relation is that the perceiving of material objects necessarily involves the direct perceiving of certain sense data; that whenever, for instance, we see a material object, we necessarily directly see certain sense data. In such cases, the direct seeing of sense data is, what he calls, a function of seeing a material object. That is, in a situation where we see a material object in the ordinary sense of 'see,' we necessarily directly see or apprehend something else as well, and that something else is (are) a sense datum (sense data).[10]

Furthermore, in a case where two or more people are looking at the same physical object under normal or ordinary conditions, although we can say that we know that these people are seeing the same physical object, we cannot or should not say that we know that they are seeing the same sense data.

Finally, although it is true without any qualifications, that the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves the direct seeing of sense data, it is not true that the direct seeing of sense data

necessarily involves the seeing of a physical object; since in many sensory experiences, for instance, in dreams, hallucinations, after sensation, etc., though we directly see sense data, we do not see any physical objects; however, as Moore would say, in the cases of sensations proper, the direct seeing of sense data do involve, as a matter of fact, the seeing of physical objects. Since, I have already discussed these issues earlier in Chapter III, I have not discussed them in detail here. What I have tried to suggest here by mentioning these points is that since Moore has talked in fairly definitive terms about the epistemological relation between sense data and physical objects, it does not seem that there is any skepticism involved in his views regarding the epistemological status of sense data, or of physical objects, or regarding the epistemological relation between the two. The reason why I have mentioned this is that it may be thought that although Moore's sense data philosophy does not lead to a skepticism regarding our knowledge of the existence of material objects, it still leads to a skepticism about our knowledge of the relation between sense data and the physical surfaces (that sense data are said to represent, or to be signs of or identical with).

Ontological Relation Between Sense Data and Material Objects

So far as the ontological relation between sense data and material objects (or physical surfaces) is concerned, the specific question it presents is this: Are sense data identical with the corresponding surfaces of physical objects. And, if they are not

identical with physical surfaces then what sort of a relation can they have to them?

Moore considers three alternative answers to this question, which, according to him, are the only answers so far offered; but he finds that each of them can be objected to.

(1) According to the first view, when one knows "This is a part of the surface of a human hand," what one knows about the sense datum in question, is that it is itself a part of the surface of a human hand. If this is so then one has to say that though one does not directly perceive one's hand, yet one does directly perceive part of its surface; "that the sense datum itself is this part of its surface and not merely something which (in a sense yet to be determined) "represents" this part of its surface"; in other words, the part of the surface of a hand is directly perceived exactly in the same sense in which a sense datum is directly perceived.[11]

But Moore finds this view untenable, because if this view is true, then either we would have to give up the view which has been held to be true by most philosophers, viz., that sense data really do have the qualities which they appear to have, or else, we would have to admit that incompatible qualities (in a particular respect) can inhere the same thing at the same time. What is meant by this is that if it is a fact, as has been so far agreed upon, that different people experience slightly different sense data, in a particular respect, e.g., in the respect of colour, while seeing the same physical surface, then, if the above mentioned view is true, all these slightly different

colours directly perceived by different people would have to belong to or inhere the same physical surface simultaneously, which seems unlikely. On the other hand, if we still believe that this view is true, and also believe that all these different colours cannot inhere the same area of the surface at the same time, then the only alternative left is that we declare the accepted view regarding the nature of sense data in this respect (viz., that different people actually perceive, for instance, different colours simultaneously), although they are all perceiving the same physical surface, as false; but this view has not been proven false; hence, the view that we are directly perceiving the part of the surface of a hand in the same sense in which we directly perceive sense data is at least questionable.

A second objection against this view is that if this view is true then in the cases of seeing double, where we certainly have two sense data each of which is of the surface seen, we would have to say that both sense data are identical with the surface seens, which again seems unlikely since the surface seen is one where as the sense data seen are two, and both cannot be identical with one and the same surface.

(2) According to Moore the second type of answer to the question of the relation of sense data to material objects has several versions. Of these different versions, the only one which Moore thinks to be plausible, is that according to which the relation R that holds between the sense datum and the surface in question is an ultimate and unanalyzable relation,

> which might be expressed by saying that "xRy" means the same as "y is an appearance or manifestation of x." I.e., the analysis which this answer would give of "This is part of the surface of a human hand" would be "There is one and only one thing which it is true both that it is part of the surface of a human hand, and that this sense datum is an appearance or manifestation of it.[12]

The main objection against this view, according to Moore, is that how we can possibly know with regard to any of our sense data that we experience in a particular case, that there is one thing and one thing only which has to them (i.e., to the sense data) such a supposed ultimate, unanalyzable relation. Those who claim that there is such a relation have not given any grounds for their claim.

(3) The third alternative answer that Moore considers is Mill's view according to which material things are "permanent possibilities of sensation." On such a view when one knows that "This is part of the surface of a human hand" what one knows with regard to the sense datum, is not that the sense datum in question is itself part of the surface of a human hand; nor does one know with regard to any relation, that the thing which has that relation to the sense datum, is part of the surface of a human hand; but

> a whole set of hypothetical facts each of which is a fact of the form. "If these conditions are fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense datum intrinsically related to this sense datum in this way," "If these (other) conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense datum intrinsically related to this sense datum in this (other) way," etc., etc.[13]

For instance, on this view, a proposition of the form, "I am seeing a disc," has to be interpreted as something like this: If I were to move my body in certain ways, I should be directly apprehending certain

sense data (other than the one(s) that I am apprehending now), e.g., tactual ones, which I should not be apprehending as result of these movements of my body, if my present visual experience were a mere hallucinatory or imaginary experience.

From Moore's reference to and discussion of this view in his different works,[14] it seems that he is inclined to prefer some such view to the rest of the views, so far as the analysis of the perceptual statements about material objects is concerned. But he has also pointed out serious difficulties with this view.

One of the main difficulties with this view is that none of the type of interpretations of perceptual statements suggested above (viz., "I am seeing a disc" is equivalent to "If I were to move my body . . ." etc.) is in its ultimate form; i.e., each of them so far is indefinite and incomplete. The reason for this is that all of these interpretations contain some physical object terms, like 'body' or 'coin' or 'disc,' etc.; in other words, these interpretations themselves involve reference to material objects, and in order to make the interpretation complete, these terms are to be interpreted in terms of hypothetical statements, and so on until all such terms are so interpreted. Secondly, it is doubtful if there is any intrinsic relation between the sense datum that one is apprehending at the moment and the sense data that one would apprehend when certain other conditions are fulfilled; and even if there is any such intrinsic relation we do not know so far how to explain either the ontological nature of that relation or our knowledge of it. Finally, if this view were true then the interpretation of such terms as 'round' or 'square,' etc., would be very

different from what they are ordinarly taken to mean. Ordinarily we take these qualities as qualities of material things; since this view conceives of matter or material things in a completely different way, the interpretation of terms like 'circular,' etc., as applied to material things have to be very different from their common usage. The same problem arises regarding the interpretation of statements asserting the past existence of material things or the existence of unperceived material things. According to Moore, they all have been interpreted, on this view, in a Pickwickian sense.[15]

The point that Moore seems to emphasize is that the question regarding the relation of sense data to material objects can be definitively answered only if a correct analysis of the perceptual statements about material objects is available. But so far we do not have any analysis of these statements which is free from obvious difficulties. Any such analysis, in its turn, depends upon definite answers to certain basic questions regarding the ontological status of sense data, for instance, questions like: Do sense data, at least some of them, exist unperceived (i.e., in the same sense in which we know that physical objects do)? And, are sense data physical in the sense that they occupy some public space in the sense in which physical objects do? I have discussed Moore's views about such problems earlier in Chapter III. To recapitulate summarily, his final answers to these questions seem to be inconclusive; in other words, it may be said that he has not given any final answers to these questions. On the one hand, he has claimed that he is strongly inclined to believe that at least

some sense data do exist unperceived[16] and do occupy the same space[17] which is occupied by the corresponding surfaces of physical objects; he has claimed that there are good reasons (though not conclusive ones) to think that at least some sense data do so exist and occupy space, and as such, there are good reasons to believe that some sense data may be identical with the surfaces of physical objects that we see. But on the other hand, he also recognizes that there are some good reasons (though not conclusive ones) to doubt that this is the case, i.e., to doubt whether they are so identical with physical surfaces. Although Moore has not given any definite answers to questions regarding whether sense data are mental, or physical, i.e., whether or not they occupy areas of space publicly observable (e.g., areas of surfaces of physical objects), it seems from his latest writings (although even here his views are not completely free from hesitations), that he is more inclined to hold that sense data do not exist unperceived and they do not occupy any public space, and they are not identical with any area of the surface of a physical object. He says at one place of his "Reply,"

> I am inclined to think that it is impossible that anything which has the sensible quality "blue" . . . more generally, anything which is ever directly apprehended, any sense datum . . . should exist unperceived, as it is that a headache should exist unfelt.[18]

In another passage of the same work, he writes"

> I know perfectly well that, if my present situation had been different from what it is only in the respect that I had been wearing blue spectacles of plain glass, then the part of the surface of my hand which I am now seeing would have looked to me of a somewhat different colour

> from that which it now looks to me. . . . But, if so, the directly seen object, which would then have "corresponded" to that piece of surface cannot possibly be identical with the piece of surface in question. And if it is not, then certainly nothing else which I am directly seeing is identical with that piece of physical surface.[19]

It is on the basis of passages like these that I have said above that he is more inclined to hold the views regarding sense data that I mentioned there; but these passages should not be taken without qualifications since there are also other passages there which exhibit the fact that these views of his are not completely free from hesitations; one such very interesting passage is the following:

> I am now seeing part of the surface of my hand; and I do now not only feel sure but know, with regard to this object I am seeing which is part of the surface of my hand, that it is part of the surface of my hand. And also I do now, at the very same time, feel some doubt as to whether a certain object, which I am directly seeing, is identical with the object which I am seeing which is part of the surface of my hand. But to say that I feel doubt as to this, is to say that it is possible that it is identical. And if it is identical, then I am both feeling sure of and doubting the very same proposition at the very same time. I do not say, of course, that I am doing this. I only say that, so far as I can see, I don't know that I'm not.[20]

And yet at another place in the same context, he says,

> And this is the truth. I am strongly inclined to take both of these incompatible views. I am completely puzzled about the matter, and only wish I could see any way of settling it.[21]

Section IV. Moore's Final Views About the Relation Between the Two

Moore has persistently continued his search to discover what the relation between the two should be until his very last work. In his last paper, "Visual Sense Data," he has explicitly said that the relation between a sense datum and the corresponding physical surface cannot possibly be one of identity.[22] His final observations as to what this relation can be if it is not one of identity, are very much based upon certain distinctions that he has made in this connection.

The first distinction is between the two referents of the demonstrative 'this' or 'that,' and the second distinction between two different senses or modes of seeing (which also holds relative to the cases of other senses with necessary changes) corresponding to the two referents of 'this' or 'that.' I have briefly mentioned the first distinction in Chapter III while discussing how the analysis of perceptual statements leads to the introduction of sense data; in this section I shall discuss this distinction in detail emphasizing the role it plays in explaining the ontological relation between a sense datum and the corresponding physical surface. I have discussed and explained the second distinction in Chapter III while discussing how the analysis of sense perception as an act of consciousness leads to the introduction of the notion of sense data, and to a certain extent while discussing the epistemological status of sense data and the epistemological relation between a sense datum and a physical surface; in this section I shall refer to this distinction only to

the extent it overlaps the discussion of the ontological relation between the two.

In the paper "Visual Sense Data," Moore says that the demonstrative 'This' or 'That' in perceptual statements like 'This is a penny,' or 'I am seeing this,' or 'That is a hand,' etc., refers to or denotes two different objects at the same time and not only one, as it is ordinarily supposed to. On the one hand, the demonstrative 'this' or 'that,' in such statements, is a short for a phrase of the kind that Russell has called a definite description; in such a usage, the word 'this' or 'that,' in Moore's view, refers to or denotes the part of the surface of a physical object that we are seeing; and yet, on the other hand, it also denotes or refers, at the same time, to another object which we are directly seeing in apprehending or recognizing how the surface of the physical object which also we are seeing at the same moment, looks to us, and in this case the object referred to is sense datum. The definite description which 'this' or 'that' is a short phrase for is, according to Moore, "the object of which this is part of the surface"; and, in this sense (i.e., in the sense of a definite description), "you could be said to 'know' the penny 'only by description,' although you can also correctly be said to be seeing the penny. . . . Perhaps we might say that the penny in such a case is only 'seen by description'!"[23] The point that Moore wants to emphasize is that if the demonstrative 'This' or 'That' in the statement 'This (or that) is a penny' is short for a definite description, and as such refers to the physical surface which satisfies that

description, and at the same time, refers to a sense datum corresponding to the physical surface, then the proposition 'This (or that) is a penny' is a proposition about two objects at once, and not about only one. At this point Moore points out that although in some of his earlier works he has maintained that the ultimate of the principal subject of any perceptual statement is always a sense datum, that does not conflict with his later claim, viz., that such a judgment is always about two objects at once. Since, he says, when he has said that a sense datum is the ultimate or real subject of a perceptual statement, he has not meant that it (the sense datum) necessarily has to be also the only subject of the statement; rather the claim "implies that it [i.e., the sense datum] is not the only subject."

In order to explain the relation between the two referents of 'This' (or 'That'), he relates this distinction with that between 'seeing' (or 'seen') and directly seeing (or directly 'seen'). When the word 'This' refers to an object which is directly seen (in an ordinary case of visual perception), the referent of 'This' is a sense datum; when the word 'This' is a short for a definite description, it refers to an object, answering the description, which is seen; in this case, the referent of 'This' is a physical surface. But the important point is that in such a situation both the referents are present at once and both the modes of seeing corresponding to the two referents occur at once or simultaneously. And this is a fact which, according to Moore, we do not usually recognize in everyday perceptual experiences; we do not recognize that whenever we are seeing a physical

object or any part of its surface, we are also directly seeing some object which is directly given to the sense, namely, a sense datum and about which we are not sure whether this directly seen object is identical with the surface of the physical object that we are seeing. Moore mentions these two points as follows:

> (1) that the function "x is seeing a physical object" entails the function "x is seeing a sense datum" (= "x is seeing some object directly"), or, in other words, that the sense in which we "see" when we say that we see a thing which is a physical object, is such that the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves the seeing of a sense datum, and also (2) that there is some reason to think that . . . no sense datum which we are seeing is ever identical with any physical surface which we are seeing; or in other words, that though the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves directly seeing some object, yet there are good reasons . . . for thinking that no physical surface is ever directly seen, and that therefore the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves the direct seeing of an object which is not a physical reality at all.[25]

He explains and illustrates this relation with a standard case of visual perception of a physical surface under ordinary and normal conditions, i.e., where one is not seeing the object double, etc., and is seeing the surface of the object in continuity (i.e., without any of its parts being hidden by some other object); for instance, when one is looking at a white wall. The white wall which one sees without any coloured glasses on, would look different if one looks at it with some coloured glasses on. If one looks at the same white wall with blue glasses on, the wall--which is white and not bluish white--looks bluish white to one. According to Moore, this is

> merely another way of saying that I am directly seeing an expanse which really is of a bluish white colour, and which at the same time has to the surface which is not bluish-white a specific relation . . . 'R'--a relation which entitles me to assert that, in directly seeing that bluish-white expanse, I am seeing the surface of the wall which is not bluish-white.[26]

(The same type of phenomenon is obtained when, for instance, the same surface of the penny looks circular and elliptical from two different angles.) It is obvious that in a situation like this although it will be correct to say that one sees a white wall, it will not be correct to say that one sees a bluish-white wall in the same sense of 'seeing.' When the white wall looks bluish white to a person, he is seeing something directly which he is not seeing when he is seeing the surface of the same wall which is white. But in any such case a person also knows that the object that he is directly seeing is definitely related with the physical surface that he is seeing. Moore writes,

> If I am not directly seeing a bluish-white expanse which has some such relation to a wall which is not bluish white, how can I possibly know that that wall is looking bluish white to me? It seems . . . quite plain that I cannot 'see' in the common sense any physical object whatever without its 'looking' somehow to me, and, therefore, without my directly seeing some entity which has R to the object I am said to see. . . . And . . . that entity is a visual sense datum.[27]

Moore's final observation on this issue is that the questions regarding the relation of a physical surface to its corresponding sense datum can be answered definitively only if we know the correct analysis of the perceptual statements, which we do not know so far (although we do know with certainty that such statements are true, and also know with certainty that the sense data which we directly see, in any

instance of ordinary cases of visual perception, are related to the corresponding physical objects, or their surfaces).

It may be said that, at least so far as the relation between a physical surface and a sense datum is concerned, there are some elements of doubt in Moore's views; but the element of doubt lies not in not being sure as to whether such statements are known to be true, but in not being sure as to whether the analyses of such statements given so far are correct. While replying to some of his critics, Moore has made some positive comments on his own on this issue:

> Mr. Bouwsma goes on to say . . . that my doubt . . . cannot be resolved; that there is no way of settling the question whether the directly seen object . . . is or is not identical with that part of the surface of my hand which I am seeing. . . . This question, of which Mr. Bouwsma asserts so dogmatically that there is no way of settling it, that "there is nothing to do but to go on doubting," is the very same one about which Mr. Marhenke asserts that he "is sure no philosopher will ever find the answer to it until we know what a correct analysis is." Mr. Marhenke, then, thinks that it is possible that it should be settled; and as to this I think he is clearly right as against Mr. Bouwsma. I, of course, do not know how this particular philosophic question is to be settled. . . . But that ways of settling this and other philosophic questions will not some day be discovered, I certainly do not know; and Mr. Bouwsma certainly does not know it either. There is certainly something else to do besides going on doubting; and that is to go on thinking about it.[28]

Later again while talking about the role of analysis relative to the two languages, viz., sense data-language and common sense-language, in the context of commenting on Ayer's criticism that the question regarding the relation of sense data to physical objects cannot be settled by the analysis of any standard language, Moore writes:

> It is in this last assertion of his, that the correct answer to my question cannot be discovered by the analysis of any standard usage, that he seems to me to have gone hopelessly wrong. His only reason for saying so seems to be that there is no standard usage either of the philosophical term "sense datum," or of the terms "directly apprehend" or "directly see"; and he is perfectly right that there is no standard usage of these terms. What he has failed to see is that my question can be put without any use of these expressions . . . and that the answer to it does depend upon the analysis of expressions which undoubtedly have a standard usage in ordinary life. The expressions I mean are those which consist in saying such words as "This is a penny" or "That is a penny" together with some standard gesture which seems to explain what object we are referring to by the words "this" or "that"; and if we could only discover the right analysis of what is meant by such expressions, my question would be answered. It is by "going on thinking" about the analysis of such expressions as these that I hope my question will some day be answered--perhaps, has already been answered in some work which I have not read.[29]

Thus, so far as our knowledge of the ontological relation between sense data and physical surfaces is concerned, and our knowledge of the ontological status of the sense data is concerned, it may perhaps be said that there is some element of skepticism, but only in a very qualified sense. That is, so far as the ontological relation between sense data and physical object is concerned, we do know that there <u>is</u> a definite relation between the two; what we <u>are not certain</u> about <u>so far</u>, is the <u>exact nature</u> of the relation between the two. If there is any element of skepticism then it is there only in the sense in which Moore has made this acknowledgment, and only to the extent to which it is implied by this acknowledgment. But if this acknowledgment of Moore's is at all indicative of an element of skepticism, it is very weakly indicative of skepticism. This is so for this reason: from

this acknowledgment it does not follow (a) that we do not know the nature of this relationship at all; (b) that we cannot ever possibly know the nature of the relationship. What follows at the most from this acknowledgment is only this: that so far we have not arrived at a complete and definite knowledge of the exact nature of this relationship (since we have not so far arrived at a complete analysis of the perceptual statements of common sense). It is quite possible that the discovery of a single intermediary step, not so far arrived at in the process of analysis, would make it complete and definite. And Moore has never claimed either that the analysis so far arrived at is final or that it is the only possible analysis. Rather, he has shown a strong optimism towards the possibility of finding out a correct analysis of the same.

Moore has always made a distinction between knowing a proposition to be true and knowing the correct analysis of a proposition; i.e., on his view it is quite possible that one knows a particular proposition to be true and yet may not know the correct analysis of the same proposition. In his entire theory of empirical knowledge Moore has repeatedly emphasized the point that we do know for certain that material objects (animate or inanimate) exist, and we also know for certain that sense data exist; and we further know that sense data are related to material objects. His position is thus clearly in opposition with that of the skeptics.

The problem in Moore's case arises only insofar as the analyses of such propositions and the terms contained in them are concerned; and

even regarding the analyses of these propositions he has never said either that they cannot be analyzed or we do not know their analyses at all; all that he has said that we do not know their complete analyses so far. But the point is that even if we cannot know the correct analysis of such statements, this fact would not, by any means, affect his views regarding the knowledge of the truth of perceptual statements asserting the existence of material objects. In other words, so far as the question as to whether or not we know such propositions to be true, Moore has given a positive answer and has justified his claim. His views about the unavailability of a correct analysis of such propositions at the moment does not undermine his claims regarding the knowability of such propositions. The point he has wanted to make throughout his theory of empirical knowledge is that such propositions are and can be known to be true, as opposed to his opponents' claim that such propositions cannot be known to be true.

The final stand of Moore's makes it quite clear that it would be incorrect to attribute to his views any of the following characterizations (as some of his critics seem to have suggested), namely, (a) that Moore's philosophy of common sense and his philosophy of sense data are in conflict with each other, or, (b) that Moore himself has not ultimately been able to avoid skepticism in his own views regarding empirical knowledge, or, (c) that his views regarding common sense and sense data constitute two completely different and unrelated philosophies running parallel as two separate alternative ways of dealing with the problem of empirical knowledge.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

[1]G. E. Moore, The Refutation of Idealism, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), p. 21.

[2]Ibid., p. 22.

[3]Ibid., p. 25.

[4]Ibid., p. 25.

[5]A. R. White, G. E. Moore, A Critical Exposition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 11.

[6]Ibid., p. 12.

[7]G. E. Moore, Is Time Real? in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Book, 1966), pp. 222-223.

[8]G. E. Moore, Hume's Philosophy, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), p. 164.

[9]G. E. Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 44.

[10]G. E. Moore, Material Things, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 142-143.

[11]Moore, Disjunctive and Other Properties, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 372.

[12]Moore, What is Philosophy? in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 15-16.

[13]Ibid., p. 41.

[14]Moore, Material Things, p. 148.

[15]Ibid., p. 145.

[16]Ibid., p. 146.

[17] Ibid., p. 147.

[18] Ibid., p. 155.

[19] Moore, What is Philosophy? p. 20

[20] Moore, Material Things, p. 147.

[21] G. E. Moore, Are Material Things Real? in Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by C. Lewy (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966), p. 14; cf. G. E. Moore, Proof of an External World, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 136.

Chapter III

[1] G. E. Moore, Some Judgments of Perception, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), p. 221.

[2] Ibid., p. 228.

[3] Ibid., p. 229.

[4] Ibid., p. 232.

[5] G. E. Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 53.

[6] Ibid., p. 53.

[7] G. E. Moore, Sense-Data, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 42.

[8] Ibid., p. 44.

[9] Ibid., p. 46.

[10] Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, pp. 53-54.

[11] G. E. Moore, A Reply to My Critics, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 644.

[12] Ibid., p. 631.

[13] Ibid., p. 639.

[14] G. E. Moore, Sense-Data, p. 62.

[15] G. E. Moore, Ways of Knowing, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 91.

[16] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 62.

[17] G. E. Moore, Propositions, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 83-84.

[18] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 45.

[19] G. E. Moore, The Status of Sense-Data, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), pp. 169-170.

[20] Ibid., p. 171.

[21] Moore, Sense-Data, pp. 53-54.

[22] Ibid., p. 57.

[23] Ibid., p. 57.

[24] Ibid., p. 60.

[25] Ibid., p. 60.

[26] Ibid., p. 58.

[27] Ibid., p. 63.

[28] G. E. Moore, The Nature and Reality of the Objects of Perception, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), p. 73.

[29] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[30] Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[31] Moore, The Status of Sense Data, p. 181.

[32] Ibid., p. 184.

[33] Ibid., pp. 184-185.

[34] Ibid., p. 181.

[35] Ibid., p. 181.

[36] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 58.

Chapter IV

[1]Moore, What Is Philosophy? p. 32.

[2]A. E. Murphy, Moore's "Defence of Common Sense," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 316.

[3]C. A. Mace, On How We Know Material Things Exist, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 295-298.

[4]R. McKeon, Propositions and Perceptions in the World of G. E. Moore, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 455, 467, 470-471, 479.

[5]Murphy, Moore's "Defence of Common Sense," pp. 316-317.

[6]Moore, Sense-Data, p. 42.

[7]G. E. Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? in Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by C. Lewy (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966), p. 49; also see G. E. Moore, Certainty, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 223-246.

Chapter V

[1] G. E. Moore, Propositions, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 71.

[2]Ibid., p. 73.

[3]Ibid., p. 76.

[4]Ibid., p. 84.

[5]Ibid., pp. 86-87.

[6]Ibid., p. 87.

[7]Ibid., p. 79.

[8]Ibid., p. 81.

[9]Ibid., p. 82.

[10] Moore, A Reply to My Critics, pp. 634-635.

[11] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 62.

[12] Ibid., p. 62.

[13] Moore, Material Things, p. 146.

[14] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 64.

[15] Moore, Propositions, pp. 83-84.

[16] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 62.

[17] G. E. Moore, Ways of Knowing, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 92.

[18] Ibid., p. 96.

[19] G. E. Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? in Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by C. Lewy (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966), p. 49.

[20] G. E. Moore, Certainty, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 239.

[21] Ibid., pp. 223-224.

[22] Ibid., p. 231.

[23] Ibid., p. 235.

[24] Ibid., p. 239ff; cf. G. E. Moore, Hume's Philosophy, in Philosophical Studies (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968), p. 161.

[25] Moore, Hume's Philosophy, p. 161.

[26] Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? p. 48.

[27] Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, p. 43.

[28] G. E. Moore, Hume's Theory Examined, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 140-141.

[29] Ibid., p. 141.

[30] Moore, Sense-Data, pp. 41-42.

[31] Moore, Ways of Knowing, p. 99.

[32] Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[33] Ibid., p. 100.

[34] Ibid., p. 102.

[35] G. E. Moore, Hume's Theory, in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 117.

[36] Moore, Sense-Data, p. 63.

[37] Moore, Hume's Theory Examined, pp. 125-126.

[38] Ibid., p. 136.

[39] Ibid., pp. 135-136.

[40] Ibid., p. 136.

[41] Ibid., p. 137.

[42] Ibid., p. 138.

[43] Ibid., p. 138.

[44] Ibid., p. 139f.

[45] Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[46] Ibid., pp. 142-143.

[47] Ibid., p. 142.

[48] Ibid., p. 142.

[49] Moore, Hume's Philosophy, p. 165.

[50] Moore, Material Things, p. 157.

[51] Moore, Hume's Philosophy, p. 156.

[52] Moore, Material Things, p. 158.

[53] Moore, Hume's Philosophy, p. 155.

[54] Moore, Material Things, p. 159.

[55] Ibid., p. 160.

[56] Ibid., p. 160.

[57]Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, p. 40.

[58]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[59]Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? p. 46.

[60]Ibid., p. 48.

[61]G. E. Moore, Proof of an External World, in Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 142.

[62]Ibid., p. 144.

[63]Ibid., p. 145.

[64]Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? p. 49.

[65]Moore, Certainty, p. 239.

[66]Ibid., p. 239.

[67]Ibid., p. 242.

[68]Ibid., p. 243.

[69]Ibid., p. 244.

[70]Moore, Do We Know That Material Things Are Real? pp. 49-50.

[71]Ibid., p. 52.

Chapter VI

[1]Moore, What Is Philosophy? p. 38.

[2]G. E. Moore, Other Philosophical Questions, in Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by C. Lewy (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966), pp. 180, 190.

[3]G. E. Moore, The Justification of Analysis, in Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by C. Lewy (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1966), p. 166.

[4]G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), p. 7.

[5]Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, p. 53.

[6]Moore, The Justification of Analysis, pp. 168-169.

[7]Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, p. 52.

[8]Ibid., p. 37.

[9]Ibid., p. 55.

[10]Moore, A Reply to My Critics, p. 629.

[11]Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, p. 55.

[12]Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[13]Ibid., p. 57.

[14]Moore, Some Judgments of Perception, p. 224; cf. The Status of Sense-Data, p. 189.

[15]Moore, The Status of Sense-Data, p. 191.

[16]Ibid., pp. 182-183.

[17]Moore, The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception, p. 93.

[18]Moore, A Reply to My Critics, p. 658.

[19]Ibid., p. 642.

[20]Ibid., pp. 636-637.

[21]Ibid., p. 659.

[22]G. E. Moore, Visual Sense Data, in British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, ed. by C. A. Mace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 210.

[23]Ibid., p. 206.

[24]Ibid., p. 210.

[25]Moore, A Reply to My Critics, pp. 644-645.

[26]Moore, Visual Sense-Data, p. 208.

[27]Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[28]Moore, A Reply to My Critics, pp. 637-638.

[29]G. E. Moore, Addendum to My Reply, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 629.

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