ABSTRACT

NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP
IN A NORTHERN CITY

by Lee Sloan

This study reports a case study of Negro community leadership
and racial conflict in a Northern city. "Lakeland" is a satelite, in-
dustrial city located near Detroit. Since most studies of Negro lead-
ership have been conducted in Southern or in very large Northern cities,
this study of a Midwestern, middle-sized city fills voids in the litera-
ture.

By means of the reputational technique, 20 Negro leaders were
identified. Semi-structured interviews of these 20 persons, plus
approximately 20 interviews of white leaders, constituted the major
means of data collection. Interviews were designed to facilitate issue
analysis. Data were also gathered by means of a mail-back question-
naire left with Negro leaders, by scanning neWSpaper files, by atten-
dance at organized meetings and public affairs, and by general observa-
tion of community life.

Since our understanding of Negro community leadership was

judged to be relatively slight, Specific hypotheses were not tested.

But the e);

of referer.

Ti:

 

 

 

ifected b:
munity,

0f Powerle.
Whites, an,
Relative ‘m.
it leads b0:
1eaders; an

they Can rm

 

The
V'UIUtion, th
itself. Invo

bOunda I‘le S I

internal con

But the existing literature was reviewed in order to develop a frame
of reference or a perSpective of Negro community leadership.

The literature suggests that Negro community leadership is
affected by factors both external and internal to the Negro subcom-
munity. The major external problem faced by Negro leaders is that
of powerlessness. Superordinate power rests with dominant group
whites, and Negro leaders must operate from a weak base of power.
Relative powerlessness leads to the high fluidity of Negro leadership;
it leads both whites and Negroes to challenge the legitimacy of Negro
leaders; and it encourages Negro leaders to exercise whatever power
they can muster outside institutionalized channels.

The internal problems of Negro leadership are related to in-
volution, the process by which the Negro community turns in upon
itself. Involution strengthens the ecological, social, and psychological
boundaries of the Negro community. Negroes accomodate daily to the
internal conditions of the subcommunity, and this inevitably involves
some acceptance of life "as it is. " Institutions within the Negro com-
munity come to have a viability of their own and they act as barriers
to integration. Additionally, there are Negro leaders who have a
vested interest in segregation. There are others who are "vulnerable"
in that they are more subject than others to white control. Both those
with vested interests ard the vulnerables are somewhat constrained

from offering militant leadership.

\\‘ . ”r".

SQHSUS.

Regro lea;

typology he
distmguzs:

mOdEI'ateP

 

 

 

 

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is “Corded

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lated to tha

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es by Which

selected nu]

criminaton

"45;.h

Finally, the heterogeneity of the Negro subcommunity leads
naturally to differences of interest and to difficulties in attaining con-
sensus. This problem is crucial, for the relative powerlessness of
Negro leadership makes it imperative to present a united front.

It has long been recognized that there are diverse modes of
Negro leadership. Drawing from relevant literature, a leadership
typology has been constructed for use in this study. The typology
distinguishes among three types of Negro leadership: conservative,
moderate, and militant leadership.

In the description of the community setting, Special attention
is accorded five crucial problem areas: housing, education, politics,
employment, and police and community relations. In presenting a
social profile of Lakeland's Negro leadership the new data are re-
lated to that reported in the literature.

The dynamics of Negro leadership in Lakeland was investigated
by means of issue amlysis. The attempt was to reconstruct the process-
es by which Negro leaders attempted to or succeeded in resolving a
selected number of issues, including the following: repeal of a dis-
criminatory housing ordinance; proposed redevelopment of the central
business district; a school boycott and demonstration; a charter amend-
ment which changed the electoral system for city commission mem-

bers; and a narrowly averted race riot.

The summary chapter assesses the contribution of the study
to an understanding of Negro leadership and racial conflict, calls
attention to limitations of the study, and makes suggestions for future
research. This last section includes both a propositional inventory

of literature, and a brief discussion of strategies of research design.

NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

IN A NORTHERN CITY

Bv
.If ’ -'
, .
A Q h

r‘ ‘
it 7’7 K: Lee Sloan

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Sociology

1967

1‘\...._.

 

/ 'J"
”J
/%

@7
fl,&7

(3 COpyright by
ERNEST LEROY SLOAN

1968

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

hiany persons have contributed in numerous and diverse ways \_
to this study. Although it is impossible to mention all who have con-
tributed, the contributions of some must be acknowledged.

The study was supported by a Public Health Service Fellow-
ship lFl MH-Z4, O81-01A1 (BEH-B) from the National Institute of
Mental Health. It is difficult to imagine how the study could have
been undertaken without the Institute's financial support. for which
I am deeply grateful.

A Special thanks goes to the many individuals in "Lakeland"
who took time from busy schedules to allow for lengthy interviews.
Although I would expect no one of them to agree thoroughly with my
interpretations, it is sincerely hoped that each recognizes this
work as a sincere and conscientious effort to understand and to ex-
plain a most complex, social phenomenon.

Dr. James B. McKee, as chairman of my doctoral committee,
deserves Special recognition. Throughout my graduate student years,
he has provided both guidance and inSpiration. His assistance with
the dissertation is especially appreciated. Thanks go also to the

other members of my committee: Drs. Jay W. Artis, William H.

Form, and Herbert Garfinkel. Dr. Form was eSpecially helpful in

my attempt to obtain financial support for the study.

iii

Ar.-
two who 5:
portions 0:

l n:
and my ciaz;
a clerk, a
Was a consq
the Childre;
the field.

Fine
to whom thg
lflfOrmant’ '
lems eXami:

 

Among my fellow graduate students, I must eSpecially thank
two who served as "research consultants" and as critics of several
portions of the dissertation: Marvin Leavy and Igolima Amachree.

I must also thank the girls in my life: my wife, Mary Lou:
and my daughters. Terry, Kelly, and Romi. Mary Lou assisted as
a clerk, a typist, an editor, and as a critic. More importantly, she
was a constant source of encouragement, even though neither she nor
the children ever quite accepted the necessity of my many trips to
the field.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Dave Winburn,
to whom the dissertation is dedicated. As a former student, as an
informant, and as a friend, Dave was vitally concerned with the prob-
lems examined here. His untimely death, it seems to me, is itself

a testimony to the difficulties of being black in white America.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION

The Negro Revolt
Social Science and the Study of Minority
Group Relations
The Negro Revolt and Negro Leadership
The Problem
Significance of the Study
An Overview

II. NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

Social Conflict and the Imperative of
Leadership
The General Characteristics of Negro
Community Leadership
External Constraints on Negro
Community Leadership
The Analysis of Power
The Problem of Powerlessness
The Focus of Concern of Negro Leaders
The Internal Constraints of the Negro
Community
The Consequences of Involution
Heterogeneity and the Necessity
of Solidarity

III. TYPES OEKNEGRO LEADERSHIP \
The Natur/é and Utility of Constructive f," -—
Typologies

Selected Typologies of Negro Leadership
Gunnar Myrdal
James Q. Wilson
Daniel C. Thompson
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.

Page

16
l7
19

20

22
24

26
26
29
32

33
34

39

42

43
47
48
51
54
56

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~ Cortinued
CHAPTER
III. (Continued)

A Refined Leadership Typology

Conservative Leadership
Goals
Means
Rhetoric

Militant Leadership
Goals
Means
Rhetoric

Moderate Leadership
Goals
Means
Rhetoric

IV. THE COMMUNITY SETTING

Lakeland and Its PeOple Today
Social Characteristics of the Population
Occupation
Income
Educational Attainment
Patterns of Race Relations
Housing
Education
Politics
Employment
Police and Community Relations

V. NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND

Methodology
The Identification of Leaders
The Reputational Approach
Data Collection: The Interview
Other Methods of Data Collection
A Profile of Negro Leadership in Lakeland
Occupational Distribution
Type of Leadership
Position in Race Advancement Organizations
Other Selected Characteristics

vi

Page

59
59
61
62
66
67
68
72
76
78
8O
81
81

83

86
86
86
89
91
93
93
97
103
105
112

116

116
116
118
119
122
123
125
127
128
130

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
CHAPTER Page

VI. THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP

IN LAKELAND: POLITICS AND HOUSING 137
Politics 137
Urban Government and the Politics of Race 139
Government and the Politics of Race
in Lakeland 143
Consequences of the Modified
At-Large System 148
The 1966 Election 151
Beating the Black Beater 157
Living with the Black Beater 160
Derivation of Hypotheses 163
Housing 164
Public Housing in Lakeland 164
Redevelopment of the Central Business
District 168
The Repeal of 1560 173
Negro Leaders and Housing 176
Derivation of Hypotheses 181

VII. THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP
IN LAKELAND: EDUCATION, POLICE AND

COMMUNITY RELATIONS, AND EMPLOYMENT 182
Education 182
The Lincoln Junior High Demonstration 182
The Citizens Committee on the Equality
of Educational Opportunity 188
Education and the Dilemma of Goals 190
Elective and Appointive Negro
School Officials 191
Derivation of Hypotheses 193
Police and Community Relations 193
A Threatened Riot 194
Derivation of Hypotheses 201
Employment 201
The Urban League 202
Management 204
Labor 207

Derivation of Hypotheses 208

 

TABLE OF CO?

CHAPTER

V111. 813M).

('7

 

Si

BIBL:

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
CHAPTER Page
VIII. SUIVINIARY AND CONCLUSION 210

Contributions to an Understanding of

Negro Community Leadership 210
The General Characteristics of Negro
Community Leadership: External Constraints 210
The General Characteristics of Negro
Community Leadership: Internal Constraints 214

Types of Negro Community Leadership 217
Leadership Types and Situational Factors 222
Limitations of the Study 224
Suggestions for Future Research 227
A PrOpositional Inventory 227
Power and Powerlessness 228
Legitimacy and Ideology 230
Involution 234
Goals and Strategies 236

The Composition of Negro
Community Leadership 237
Strategies of Research Design 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY 242

viii

LIST OF TAB LES

TABLE Page
1. Lakeland's Negro Population 1900 - 1966 85
2. 1959 Occupational Data for Lakeland and

the United States Whites and Nonwhites 87
3. 1959 Income Data for Lakeland and the

United States Whites and Nonwhites 90
4. 1960 Educational Data for Lakeland and the

United States Whites and Nonwhites 92
5. Racial Composition of Lakeland Public Schools:

Student Body (Fall, 1965) 98
6. Racial Composition of Lakeland Public Schools:

Faculty (Fall, 1965) 99
7. Electoral Returns for Major Political Offices

(November 8, 1966) 104
8. Average Employment TMC Locations in Lakeland 107
9. Average Hourly Earnings for TMC Employees in U. S. 109
10. Occupational Distribution of Negro Leaders

in Lakeland and other Cities 126
11. Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics

of Negro Leaders in Lakeland and other Selected

Cities 131
12. Negro Representation on City Councils in Selected

Non-Southern Large Cities 140
13. Results of the Popular Referendum to Amend the

City Charter 147
14. General Election Returns for "Negro" District

Candidates 150

15. 1966 General Election Returns for "Family Slate"
Candidates in the "Negro" Districts 156

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page
1. Types of Negro Leadership 60
2. Negro Leadership in Lakeland 124
3. Leaflet Posted at the Chamberlain Motors Plant 195

Appendix

A- QueS'

3- {afl-

 

LIST OF APPENDIC ES

Appendix Page
A. Questionnaire Guide for Negro Leaders 249
B. Mail-Back Questionnaire Provided Negro Leaders 252

xi

The inte
two has led mOS
domestic problt
Future historian
following World
of the problem 0

attempts to dis sr

 

as those of pore r

equality, and urb

sible to ignore 11]

the Cold and hot 5

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The intensification of racial conflict over the last decade or
two has led most Americans to conclude that the most demanding
domestic problem confronting our nation is that of race relations.
Future historians will surely be tempted to refer to those decades
following World War II as an Era of Racial Crisis. The enormity
of the problem of race relations is not fully appreciated until one
attempts to dissociate it from other crucial domestic problems such
as those of poverty, urban blight, unemployment, educational in-
equality, and urban government. Furthermore, it is no longer pos-
sible to ignore the relationship between domestic race relations and
the cold and hot struggles between the democratic and communist
nations of the world. Ironically, the racial problem faced in the
United States today stems from the lofty ideals upon which our nation
was founded.

It is an extraordinary fact that a world never noted
for its racial tolerance in theory or in practice has come

to look on the United States as a symbol of equality, and

that the Oppressed turn to America in the hope of finding

understanding and an untarnished record. The burden of
responsibility thus placed upon us is a heavy one. 1

1. John F. Melby, "Racial Policy and International Relations, "
be Annals,VOl. 304 (March, 1956), p. 132.

l

The American I
"Revolution in .~'

their own.

The dail:
"r I
equal rights and
tore. Racial coy
d . .
a} Indeed when

11011. Although it

 

The American Dilemma presses more heavily upon us as the

"Revolution in ASpirationS“ leads others to accept our ideals as

their own.

The Negro Revolt

 

The daily news is a constant reminder that we are currently
witnesses to a movement in which Negro Americans are demanding
equal rights and equal participation more vigorously than ever be-
fore. Racial conflict is so frequent and so intense that it is a rare
day indeed when there is no mention of it in the news. We have come
to refer to this movement as the Negro Revolt or the Negro Revolu-
tion. Although it differs from the major revolutions of history in
that it is relatively nonviolent, it has certainly led to rapid social
change.

We need not here enter into a discussion of the fascinating
questions of why the Revolt occurred at the particular time it did or
when, in fact, it began. These issues are still subject to serious
debate, and it is doubtful that we could provide satisfactory answers
without a lengthy discussion which would take us far afield. It will
be to our benefit, however, to briefly discuss two issues relating to
the Revolt. First, we will address ourselves to the question of why
social scientists failed to predict the Revolt. Secondly, we will re-
View in summary form the changing nature of the Revolt itself, focus-

ing especially on those changes relating to Negro leadership.

MI

Not cult!
of race relation
adequacy of the I
Sociologists and
still recovering
the Negro Revol
We would be in a
in the developme

In his pre

Association in A1

 

 

Social Science and the Study of Minority Group Relations

Not only has the Negro Revolt emphasized the social problem
of race relations--it has also raised serious questions regarding the
adequacy of the social scientist's understanding of race relations.
Sociologists and others of their colleagues in the social sciences are
still recovering from their embarrassment for not having predicted
the Negro Revolt. 1 If we could provide an explanation for this failure,
we would be in a better position to determine the best route to travel
in the development of more adequate sociological theories.

In his presidential address before the American Sociological
Association in August of 1963, Everett Hughes admonished his col—
leagues to break the bonds of rigid empiricism and professionalism
in order to free the sociological imagination of the student of minor-

ity group relations. 2 Although it is difficult to argue against this

 

1. It is not the case that all social scientists failed to predict the
Revolt. Gunnar Myrdal saw the Second World War as a major turning
point in American race relations. He emphasized that "America can
never more regard its Negroes as a patient, submissive minority. "
See Gunnar Myrdal (with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold
Rose), An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1944), p. 1004. Arnold M. Rose also predicted inten-
sified Negro protest in The Negro's Morale (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1949). See also Guy B. Johnson, “Patterns of
Race Conflict, ” in Edgar T. Thompson (ed. ), Race Relations and the
Race Problem (Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1939), pp.
125-151. DeSpite these and possibly other exceptions, the Negro Revolt
surprised not only laymen, but also most social scientists.

 

 

 

 

 

2. Everett C. Hughes, "Race Relations and the Sociological Irnagi-
nation, " American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December,
1963), pp. 879-890.

 

 

prescription, 11
stems from otl".
be largely ideol
has called our a
logical theory, -
the social syste:
on stability, har

equilibrium mod

 

pinges from Witt
basically similal
whole of structui
only never really

Dahrendc

of . .
analysls 1n “1'

“biqmtous.

E

NOIOlOgjcal :1

. (SeDte bc
2.

E61118 C 0 date

4
prescription, it would seem that this particular theoretical inadequacy
stems from other factors also. The root of the difficulty appears to

be largely ideological. In a polemical tour de force, Ralf Dahrendorf

 

has called our attention to the utopian nature of contemporary socio-
logical theory, especially Parsonian theory. 1 Dahrendorf notes that
the social system model of analysis places diSproportionate emphasis
on stability, harmony and consensus. The model is essentially an
equilibrium model. It assumes a closed system in which nothing im-
pinges from without. For Dahrendorf, the elements of this model are
basically similar to those of utopian communities. In his view, the
whole of structural-functionalism describes a social system which not
only never really existed, but one which is a virtual impossibility.
Dahrendorf advocates greater utilization of a conflict model
of analysis in which change, conflict, and constraint are viewed as
ubiquitous. A conflict model of society stresses the “openness" of
society and directs our attention to uncertainties and contingencies.
Although a synthesis of these two opposing models may one day
be possible, 2 Dahrendorf is of the Opinion that the current stage of

theoretical development necessitates our keeping both models.

 

1. Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of UtOpia: Toward a Reorientation of
Sociological Analysis, " American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64,
No. 2 (September, 1958), pp. 115-127.

 

2. To date, one of the best attempts at synthesis is provided by
Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1956).

 

The model to b‘
be examined.
Others 1
contemporary A
social conflict. 1
of many early E
sociologists suc
The sam
contemporary sc
ETOUp relations.
the American be
a utOpian model 1
lears that SOCiol

.ention that the in

CO $-
nt.ary to Pa rl-r

WC

1‘3 which

\
1

paSSe

 

 

 

 

The model to be utilized will be dependent upon the problem to
be examined.

Others have also directed our attention to the reluctance of
contemporary American sociologists, in particular, to examine
social conflict. 1 These critics note that conflict was a major concern
of many early European sociologists, as well as earlier American
sociologists such as Lester F. Ward and Albion W. Small.

The same theoretical shortcomings have been noted by a few
contemporary sociologists concerned directly with the study of inter-
group relations. Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg have observed that
the American belief in progress led many social scientists to rely on
a utOpian model in analyzing race relations. 2 It is only in recent
years that sociologists have seriously challenged Robert Park's con-
3

tention that the “race relations cycle“ constitutes a natural history.

Contrary to Park, assimilation is not necessarily the end product of a

 

cycle which passes through the earlier stages of contact, conflict and

 

1. See, for example: (1) Jessie Bernard, "Where is the Modern
Sociology of Conflict? " American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1
(July, 1950), pp. 11-16; and (2) Irving L. Horowitz, “Consensus, Con-
flict and C00peration, " Social Forces, Vol. 41, No. 2 (December,
1962), pp. 177-188.

 

 

2. Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America:
Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
Inc. , 1964).

 

 

3. See Amatai Etzioni, "The Ghetto--A Re-Evaluation, " Social
Forces, Vol. 37, No. 3 (March, 1959), pp. 255-262.

accomodation.
successors to 5
tion. In this SL
the ”final” resu
way to assimila

Even mo

American Dileni

 

and Grigg obser

force of both the

almost unchaller

until the 1960's

intra ersona

the

Conflict

\Which c:

accomodation. A utopian mentality apparently led Park's immediate
successors to focus eSpecially on the "ultimate" stage of assimila-
tion. In this scheme of things, undesirable conflict could never be
the "final" result: conflict was merely a transitional phase along the
way to assimilation.

Even more importantly, Gunnar Myrdal‘s writings on the
American Dilemma have finally come under serious attack. Killian
and Grigg observed that "Myrdal's assumption as to the reality and
force of both the American creed and the American dilemma went
almost unchallenged, except in the polemics of a few Marxist writers,
until the 1960's. "1 By now, it seems clear that Myrdal's stress on

the intrapersonal conflict within whites between general and Specific

 

valuations led many sociologists to underemphasize the intergroup

 

conflict which characterizes race relations. If it is the case that the
American Creed "is gradually realizing itself" as white Americans
replace Specific valuations by the "morally higher" general valuations,
it seems that the struggle within the hearts and minds of white Amer-
icans most often follows a social struggle between Negroes and whites.
Or to put it in terms of a generalization now accepted by numerous ob-
servers: "in virtually every case of desegregation in the United States,

change has come only after the development of a crisis situation which

 

l. Killian and Grigg, op. git, p. 17.

demanded rapid
Generally, it a;
in terms which
dilemma.
James B
an ideology of n;
differences in fa

approach lends i

 

when in fact it is

 

demanded rapid resolution by a community's leadership structure. "1

Generally, it appears more plausible to interpret the leaders' action
in terms which are more suggestive of group interests than of a moral
dilemma.

James B. McKee has argued that Americans are committed to
an ideology of moderation which assumes that "no compromisable
differences in fact separate men in this society. "2 This "pragmatic"
approach lends itself either to a denial of the existence of conflict
when in fact it is very real or to a reliance on the "illusory panaceas"
of communication, human relations, and education. In McKee's opin-
ion,

the conflict between white and black in American
society is not illusory, is not a failure of communication,
cannot be solved by better human relations, nor even by
education. What that conflict does do is put for once and

for all the ideology of moderation to an ultimate test. Can

it construct a viable solution, without civil war, or with-

out the severe suppression of a minority? Or is race such

an unbridgeable gulf that reasonable men cannot reach out

to one another, cannot agree to let one another live together

in the same society?

It would seem that American sociologists, just as Americans

in general, have been fascinated by the uniqueness of the American

¥

1. James H. Laue, “The Changing Character of the Negro Pro-
test,’' The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), p. 125.

 

2. James B. McKee, ”The Ideology of Moderation: Some Assump-
tions about Conflict in American Society, " an address delivered in the
Provost's Lecture Series, Michigan State University, February 26,
1964 (mimeographed), p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

experience and the resultant uniqueness of American society. Ours
was a "new" nation which had never known a feudal aristocracy.
Until the Great Depression, there were many who viewed ours as

a "classless" society. Many who were subsequently forced to reject
this image replaced it with a view which still managed to emphasize
the value of equality. Most people reasoned that given the equality
of Opportunities, there was ample opportunity for individual social
mobility which prohibited the development of class consciousness--
the major source of conflict. Social conflict may have been charac-
teristic of the rigidly stratified societies of Europe, but it was ex-
ceptional to the American experience.

Robin M. Williams, Jr. , also has called our attention to the
relationship between the social environment and the manner in which
the social scientist chooses to examine that environment.

When group relations are relatively stable, the
central problems that tend to monopolize research have

to do with conformity, social patterning, enduring pre-

judices and stereotypes, and so on. When change becomes

massive and rapid, one senses the lack of studies of
leadership, political and legal processes, the exercise

of power and authority, the sources of innovation, and

the conditions generating collective protest. 1

The detailed analysis of the ideological roots of American

sociology or of any subdisciplinary area thereof is yet to be completed. 2

 

1. Robin M. Williams, Jr. , “Social Change and Social Conflict:
Race Relations in the United States, 1944-1964, " Sociological Inquiry,
Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1965), pp. 13-14.

 

2. For an illustration of the kind of analysis which must one day
be conducted, however, see Leon Bramson, The Political Context of
Sociolqg_y (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

 

I

The reSponsibil
as sociologists.
butmerely to S‘
of the developn:
harmony, and c.
and constraint.
It is our
diSpensable if a

race relation S ir.

 

”iv

;.e Ne r0 R9,“)1

Protegt o

Ob‘t’lOUS that the 1

9

The reSponsibility for that task naust be shared by all who identify
as sociologists. This discussion was not intended to be exhaustive,
but merely to suggest that ideology is important to an understanding
of the development of a theoretical stance which stresses stability,
harmony, and consensus to the relative neglect of change, conflict,
and constraint.

It is our contention that utilization of a conflict model is in-
diSpensable if a proper understanding of the nature of contemporary

race relations in the United States is to be realized.

The Negro Revolt and Negro Leadership

 

Protest on the part of Negro Americans is not new, but it is
obvious that the nature and tempo of Negro protest has undergone
significant change in recent years. From its beginning, the Negro
Revolt has been characterized by a new and urgent militancy and by
an expanded participation on the part of both Negroes and whites.
Viewed in these terms, the Negro Revolt is a generic category having
reference to numerous and diverse forms of protest. The Revolt is
Spearheaded by a plurality of organizations which subscribe to a
plurality of means and goals--a fact which is easily lost upon those
who oppose race advancement in any form. The Revolt runs the gamut
from the Urban League which is an interracial community services
agency with heavy emphasis on self-help; to the National Association

for the Advancement of Colored People, which still adheres to

legalistic and 6'.
Leadership Cor.
and experimentt
Racial Equality.
to the Student N;
by "new anarchi.
cratic centralisr
equality and part
Mo on to the Bi

1 ' .
.eauers reject th

 

 

 

Lntheir place a 1-

acists, The goal

10
legalistic and educational approaches; to the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, whose leader has self-consciously adOpted
and experimented with nonviolent techniques; to the Congress of
Racial Equality, which can trace its history to World War II pacifists;
to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which is manned
by "new anarchists" who seek to replace the governmental and bureau-

cratic centralism of a mass society with a gemeinschaft in which

 

equality and participatory democracy are the guiding principles; and
even on to the Black Muslims and other nationalist groups whose
leaders reject the goals of integration and assimilation and advocate

in their place a racial chauvinism which matches that of white suprem-
acists. The goals pursued, then, by those who Speak for the Negro
range from integration or assimilation, to pluralism, and on to sepa-
ratism. The means advocated range from democratic politics, to
nonviolent direct action, to creative disorder and civil disobedience,
and on to violence itself. Needless to say, the rhetoric of Negro
leaders reflects this great diversity of goals and means.

If we move now from a brief consideration of the range of
alternative approaches open to Negro protest leaders to an equally
brief consideration of the direction of change within the Revolt itself,
we obtain quite a different picture. ESpecially in the last two or three
years, there is evidence that the more militant modes of participation

have gained wider acceptance among Negroes.

1n the ea
served to rally :
measure, that g
the token nature
Negro leaders ti
a realistic goal.
decision had str:
ers themselves a
The battlecry of

mall Negroes, e

South, the most 6

the

 

land by 3g ric

01 new Chemicals

1

in ~ ,
mdnl areas Ne
cal

11

In the early years of the Revolt, the Brown decision of 1954
served to rally Negro leaders to the goal of integration. In large
measure, that goal was pursued by means of nonviolence. Now,
the token nature of those gains which have been made has led many
Negro leaders to seriously question whether or not integration was
a realistic goal. Ironically, just a few short years after the Brown
decision had struck down the separate but equal doctrine, Negro lead-
ers themselves are advocating separate but equal with new vigor.
The battlecry of Black Power has struck a reSponsive chord among
many Negroes, especially those who are most deSperate. In the
South, the most deSperate are the peasants who are being driven off
the land by agricultural mechanization, crOp diversification, the use
of new chemicals, and governmental policies which favor the large
land owner. For many of these black peasants, the obvious fact that
in many areas Negroes outnumber whites gives a utopian ring to the
call of Black Power. In the North, the most deSperate are the urban
Slum dwellers. Here are the sons and daughters of early and late
migrants to the Promised Land, many of whom have Spent most of
their lives confined to black ghettos. Here are the underemployed,
the unemployed, and the unemployable--the products of a culture of
poverty which is largely self perpetuating. Here are those who have

not found a basic security in a modern, urban, industrial society.

It now an
else will be able-
come the proble:
though we will 8‘
clear that nonvic
the Montgomery

To even t
the disciplined n _
in stark contrast
transformation 0.

tance--the counti

hi marked contra
of the backlash isl
ditional Civil Rig
nol

Onger find it 1

Rights bills.

 

12

It now appears that neither Martin Luther King nor anyone
else will be able effectively to use nonviolent techniques to over-
come the problems of the Negro ghettos in the urban North. Al-
though we will surely witness Sporadic use of such techniques, it is
clear that nonviolence is being phased out of the Revolt--even though
the Montgomery bus boycott was just a decade ago.

To even the most sympathetic observers of the Negro Revolt,
the disciplined mass protests in the South during the early '60's stand
in stark contrast to the mass rioting during the middle '60's. This
transformation of protest has also influenced the nature of the resis-
tance--the counter-revolt. The Senate filibusters of past years stand
in marked contrast to the ”backlash" of recent years. The impact
of the backlash is evident in the reluctance of Congress to pass ad-
ditional Civil Rights legislation. Significantly, Southern legislators
no longer find it necessary to filibuster to delay or to defeat Civil
Rights bills.

This discussion assumes greater relevancy when it is real-
ized that leadership does not function in a vacuum. Myrdal and others
have called our attention to the relationship between the general pat-
tern of race relations and Negro leadership. This relationship is
reciprocal. Change in the general character of race relations has

giVen rise to change in Negro leadership, and the new or emergent
leadership is in turn being reflected in the character of race relations.

M. Elaine Burgess, in what surely must be an understatement, has

observed that V 1
tion depends 121:
be found in it- P

Let us e
and Negro leade
volt has led to t3
both the national
the new militant
through of Marti
breakthrough wit

ot historical char

 

James Farmer, I

93r1y1940's, the

13

observed that "the reSponse of the minority community to desegrega-
tion depends largely upon the quality of organization and leadership to
be found in it. "1

Let us explore briefly the relationship between the Negro Revolt
and Negro leadership. It has been customary to observe that the Re-
volt has led to the emergence of a more nailitant Negro leadership at
both the national and the local levels. In the early stages of the Revolt,
the new militant leadership was most evident in the charismatic break-
through of Martin Luther King. It is perfectly proper to Speak of this
breakthrough without the necessity of subscribing to a Great Man theory
of historical change. Although A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin,
James Farmer, and others had utilized nonviolent techniques in the
early 1940's, they failed to Spark a large-scale social movement, not
necessarily because they were lacking in charismatic qualities, but
rather because conditions were not then as favorable as they were in
the late 1950's and early 1960's. These leaders and others, however,
must be given major credit for paving the way for Reverend King's

breakthrough. 2

 

l. M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 16.

 

2. See Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); and James Farmer, "The New Jacobins
and Full Emancipation, ” in Robert A. Goldwin (ed. ), 100 Years of
Emancipation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), pp.

 

 

 

89-102.

 

The Chat:
Revolt are forth
breakthrough, 13
of new Negro Pr
SNCC. The Re‘v
test organizatior
the NAACP, and
struggles within
placement of lea.
in the early yea rs
l'Old“ leaders we

more radical. J;

 

 

esxcc, both Ja
St I
. olely Carmicha
uolent resistance
versial doctrine c

At the 10c;

I.
pccement 01 ac CC

1 V
*aners

14

The changes in Negro leadership brought about by the Negro
Revolt are further evident at the national level. Aside from King's
breakthrough, the decades of the 1950's and 1960's saw the emergence
of new Negro protest organizations such as King's own SCLC and
SNCC. The Revolt also contributed to the revitalization of other pro-
test organizations, such as CORE, and challenged yet others, such as
the NAACP, and the National Urban League. By the mid-1960's,
struggles within several of these organizations brought about the dis-
placement of leaders who had themselves been defined as “radicals"
in the early years of the decade. Significantly, in each instance,
"old" leaders were replaced by new leaders who were defined as even
more radical. James Farmer of CORE gave way to Floyd McKissick.
In SNCC, both James Forman and John Lewis were diSplaced by
Stokely Carmichael. In both these organizations, the doctrine of non-
violent resistance has been superseded by the ill-defined and contro-
versial doctrine of Black Power.

At the local level, the Revolt, in general, has led to the dis-
placement of accomodative Negro leaders by younger, more militant
leaders. Ladd has stated that “there has been at least one major
displacement of race leaders in virtually every Southern city in the

last decade. “1 This transformation in leadership styles is now well

 

l. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. , Negro Political Leadership in the
South (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 134.

 

documented for
such changes if
Florida; New 9
Greenville, 5014
I

Althougit

a similar leader
such change is n
Revolt led to the

Northern cities i

 

 

Search is partial
In summa
derel

opment in s

‘0 im’estigate soc

Between the Negr

 

15

documented for Southern cities. The literature provides studies of
such changes in "Cresant City',' North Carolina; Tallahassee,
Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Winston-Salem, North Carolina;
Greenville, South Carolina; and Little Rock, Arkansas. 1

Although the daily news and periodical literature suggest that
a similar leadership change has also occurred in Northern communities,
such change is not as yet well documented. 2 Whether or not the Negro
Revolt led to the emergence of more militant Negro leadership in
Northern cities is open to debate. A major task of the proposed re-
search is partially to fill this void.

In summary, an examination of the current stage of theoretical
development in sociology suggests the desirability of research designed
to investigate social conflict. And an examination of the relationship

between the Negro Revolt and Negro leadership suggests that this is

an appropriate time for further analyses of Negro leadership.

 

1. For a Study of "Cresant City", see Burgess, 22. £_i_t._; for
Tallahassee, see Killian and Grigg, 9p. ELL-i for New Orleans, see
Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1963); for both Winston—Salem and
Greenville, see Ladd, .92- g._i_t_.; and for Little Rock, see Tilman C.
Cothran and William M. Phillips, Jr. , “Negro Leadership in a Crisis
Situation," Phylon, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1961), pp. 107-118.

 

2. See, however, Henry Holstege, Jr. , Conflict and Change in
Negro-White Relations in Great Falls (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Michigan State University, 1966).

 

 

The fol:
examine the na‘
many forms of
research) it “’3
‘ -
accordingly, We

 

 

 

In brief,

terms, the stud).

d7i':

Lao Separate and
First, We

"mums Within

16

The P roblem

 

The following is a report of research which was designed to
examine the nature of racial conflict, which is of course but one of
many forms of social conflict. As a major premise underlying the
research, it was held that racial conflict could be fruitfully examined
at the level of minority group leadership within a community setting.
Accordingly, we conducted a case study of Negro community leader-
ship in a Midwestern, middle-sized city.

In brief, the study was designed to analyze both the structure
and the dynamics of Negro community leadership. In more Specific
terms, the study objectives may perhaps best be viewed in terms of
two separate and distinct, yet interrelated, subject areas.

First, we have endeavored to establish the loci of power and
influence within the Negro subcommunity and we have searched for
those factors which served either to facilitate or to inhibit effective
minority group leadership. Our investigation was guided by questions
such as the following: Who are the leaders within the Negro subcom-
munity? What are the bases of power and influence within the Negro
subcommunity? Do Negro leaders have ready access to the important
centers of decision-making within the larger community? Have there
been recent changes in the structure of subcommunity leadership?
What factors account for the changes observed? Do Negro leaders

possess legitimacy within both the subcommunity and the larger com-

munity?

 

A secor.
Negro leadersli
assume many f:
ideal or COHSIl'l
referred to in t}
ship. We have ‘

lnour considers

 

 

 

 

with The extent

among Negro 1e

Are there Opera:
able leadership t
that means are
To what degree j

r 4

.fi '

another, Or do t1

17

A second major concern is centered about types or patterns Of
Negro leadership. ReSponses to racial subordination may and do indeed
assume many forms. These responses may be examined by means Of
ideal or constructed typologies. Such ideal types have come to be
referred to in the literature on Negro leadership as styles of leader-
ship. We have generally chosen instead to speak ofpyp§_s_of leadership.
In our consideration of leadership types, we were especially concerned
with the extent and nature Of COOperation, competition, and conflict
among Negro leaders. Questions such as the following guided us here.
Are there Operative within the subcommunity distinct and distinguish-
able leadership types? What goals are preferred by Negro leaders?
What means are preferred in the struggle for minority group goals?
TO what degree is there consensus regarding goals and means? What
factors account for the differences discovered? Insofar as goal attain-
ment is concerned, do different leadership types complement one

another, or do they undermine effectiveness?

Significance of the Study

 

Through the investigation Of Negro leadership within a com-
munity setting, this study contributes in a modest way to our under-
standing Of social conflict. When related to the existing literature, the

study contributes to our growing understanding of "how different types

 

Of issues are settled by different types of decision—makers in different

 

fully aPPreCiat“
to leaders of a 1
what different f
community; (21
white leaders, (.
existing studies
marily on South:

Perhaps
cal and a practi<

ll. Pfautz is but

 

 

 

18

ml

:ypes Of communities. The significance of the study may be more

 

fully appreciated when it is realized that: (1) the issues of importance
to leaders Of a minority group subcommunity are likely to be some-
what different from the issues Of importance to leaders Of the larger
community; (2) the studies of community leadership have focused on
white leaders, or leaders of the larger community; and (3) the few
existing studies Of Negro subcommunity leadership have focused pri-
marily on Southern cities or the very largest Of Northern cities.

Perhaps most importantly, the study satisfies both a theoreti-
cal and a practical need for more studies of Negro leadership. Harold
W. Pfautz is but one of many who has noted this need.

The power structures Of Negro sub-communities
in American cities are in a process of schism and realign-
ment under the impact of desegregation movements and
activities. On the practical side, lack of knowledge of
the dramatic changes taking place with regard both to
the personnel and the tactics of the sub-community leader-
ship On the part Of the dominant group power structure
invites communication breakdowns which can lead to
mutual miscalculations and, ultimately, to civic violence.
Within the Negro community, the lack of experience and
Of a full complement Of perSpectives to bring to bear on
community problems as well as the Often wasteful compe-
tition among leaders and agencies for power and status
(all of which are the heritage Of the vicious circle of dis-
crimination and prejudice) further complicate the problem.
The challenge this Situation presents to social scientists
Of theoretical as well as Of social action persuasion is as
pressing as it is Obvious. 2

 

1. William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, Industry, Labor, and

 

_Cpmmunity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 530.

 

2. Harold W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-
Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View, " Phylon, Vol. 23,
No. 2 (Summer, 1962), p. 166.

19

An Overview

 

The remainder of the study is divided into seven chapters. In
Chapters 11 and III, we have drawn from the existing literature for a
preliminary step toward the development Of an adequate theory Of
Negro leadership. Chapter 11 deals with the general characteristics
of Negro leadership, with particular emphasis on the constraints im-
posed On Negro leaders. Chapter III is devoted to an examination of
existing typologies of Negro leadership and to the development of the
typology used in this study. Chapter IV provides a description of
“Lakeland, " the community in which the study was conducted. Chap—
ter V presents a summary of the methodological procedures used, and
a social profile of Negro leadership in Lakeland. Where possible,
this new empirical data has been compared with data from existing
literature. Chapters VI and VII turn to an analysis Of the dynamics
Of Negro leadership in Lakeland. This analysis focuses on five prob-
lem areas considered crucial to Lakeland's Negro leaders: politics,
housing, education, employment, and police and community relations.
Chapter VIII presents a summary and conclusion, including a discus-
sion Of limitations Of the study and recommendations for future re-

search.

Proper 17
expand the from.
frontiers vary»

Eation. 1“ 50ml

apparent Where

is that of develol

will allow one to

frontier is ill 'd e

have deVOted thei

rant problems-

ly emerged as ex
woul expect to h
problems were ur
biases
. trnay b

6

analysis by meanc

t

..at powerful indi\

 

CHAPTER II

NEGRO CO MMUNIT Y LEADERSHIP

PrOperly conceived, the major task of the researcher is to
expand the frontiers of existing knowledge. The nature of those
frontiers vary, depending upon the area or tOpic selected for investi-
gation. In some areas the frontier is well defined and it is rather
apparent where one ought to go next. Oftentimes the problem then
is that of developing the methodological tools and procedures which
will allow one to go that route with confidence. In other areas the
frontier is ill-defined. Invariably this is so because relatively few
have devoted their time and energies to the examination of the rele-
vant problems. It may be that particular problems have just recent-
ly emerged as existential realities. It may be that those whom we
would eXpect to have been interested in the examination of particular
problems were unaware Of the problems because Of their ideological
biases. It may be that the relevant problems were not susceptible to
analysis by means of the existing methodological tools. It may be
that powerful individuals and groups have resisted research in order
to protect their own vested interests. Increasingly so, it may be
that those who subsidize social research, for one reason or another,

gave the relevant problems a low priority. Whatever the reason, it

20

may not always
T or any of a nu

The pro
pletely ignored
it is still an unc
volume of liters
directly to Neg r
alistic.

In 1944,
classic, An Am

"This sketch of

 

partly Speculati

made. 111 Myrda

ennnar
r 05
9.5 pUbliShe) A

’ \
81-8,

21

may not always be possible to stand upon the shoulders of giants.
For any of a number of reason, gaints may not have passed this way.

The problem selected for investigation here has not been com-
pletely ignored by social scientists. Yet there can be no denying that
it is still an underdeveloped area of study. Despite the tremendous
volume of literature on race relations, relatively little of it pertains
directly to Negro leadership, and much that does is essentially journ-
alistic.

In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal concluded an important section of his

classic, An American Dilemma, with the following words of caution:

 

“This Sketch Of Negro leadership is frankly impressionistic and
partly Speculative, as no intensive research on this topic has been

made. "1

Myrdal's caution is still warranted. Although a number Of

competent scholars have examined this area Of interest, and although
we have no interest in discrediting their work, what we know of Negro
leadership is like a candle in the darkness Of ignorance. The rapid

flux that characterizes Negro leadership today even threatens to

extinguish that candle.

In Chapters 11 and III, we turn to the task of abstracting from
the existing literature that which appears most useful in the develop-

ment of a theory adequate to explain Negro leadership. We view our

 

1. Gunnar Myrdal (with the assistance Of Richard Sterner and
Arnold Rose), An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Broth-

ers Publishers, 1944), p. 779.

 

 

 

‘ ‘ ' saw;-
I‘ c.1xI—u

work as co:
ment of suc
be done, fo

judge theor

Pri.
this seems
here is 011 1
dorf has EX

Icllow Dahi

invc
in it
COnt
or c
The
any
tion
ass,
bate

22
work as constituting but one more modest step toward the develOp-
ment of such a theory. The resultant product leaves much work to
be done, for it fails to satisfy the criteria by which we must ulimately

judge theory.

Social Conflict and the Imperative of Leadership

 

Prior to our examining factors affecting Negro leadership,

this seems an appropriate point at which to reiterate that our focus

here is on both Negro leadership and racial conflict. As Ralf Dahren-

 

1
dorf has expressed it, "social conflict is ubiquitous. " We will
follow Dahrendorf in his conceptualization of social conflict:

All relations between sets of individuals that
involve an incompatible difference of objective--i. e. ,
in its most general form, a desire on the part of both
contestants to attain what is available only to one,
or only in part--are . . . relations Of social conflict.
The general concept of conflict does not as such imply
any judgment as to the intensity or violence of rela-
tions caused by differences Of objective. Conflict may
assume the form Of civil war, or of parliamentary de-
bate, Of a strike, or of a well-regulated negotiation. 2

 

l. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 162.

 

2. Ibid. , p. 135. This conceptualization differs from others
primarily in that it is broader. For other treatments, see espe-
cially: (1) Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1956); (2) Raymond W. Mack and Richard C.
Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict--Toward an Overview and
Synthesis, “ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, NO. 2 (June,
1957), pp. 212-248; and (3) Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense:
A General Theopy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

 

 

 

 

Soci
our concert
relations b1
We will als
in Negro le
bearing 011

Alt}.
Oil-e geogray
another, Ni
ential treat
criminatior
stitutes an
society, M
with domin;

23

Social conflict, of course, assumes multifarious forms, and
our concern here is limited primarily to racial conflict--conflict
relations between those socially identified as "Negroes" or "whites. "
We will also be concerned, however, with the conflict relations with-
in Negro leadership, for these ”internal" conflicts have an important
bearing on "external" conflicts.

Although there are important differences as one moves from
one geographical setting to another or from one social setting to
another, Negro Americans may be said to be singled out for differ-
ential treatment which manifests itself in the form of prejudice, dis-
crimination, and persecution.1 Race, then, socially defined, con-
stitutes an important source of conflict and cleavage within American
society. Minority group Negroes are locked in continuous conflict
with dominant group whites over the distribution of scarce values and
resources. Racial segregation is both a result of this conflict and
an important factor affecting the nature of the continuing conflict. As
a result of the realities of racial conflict and racial segregation,
there develOps among Negro Americans a conscious awareness Of

their mutual interdependence. Members Of the Negro minority are
everywhere conscious of a common fate, and this consciousness trans-

cends to some extent the heterogeneity of the group, which is Often-

times considerable.

 

1. James W. Vander Zanden, American Minority Relations
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963), p. 21.

 

 

 

Ne
are every
they are e
munities i
secuted in
tedly is m

Of a minor

24

Negro community leadership exists because Negro Americans
are everywhere locked in conflict with the dominant group and because
they are everywhere more or less segregated from the larger com-
munities in which they reside. This conflict is not effectively pro~
secuted in the absence of leadership. The waging of conflict admit-
tedly is not the only function eXpected of leaders, but for the leaders
of a minority group it is perhaps their most significant task.

The General Characteristics of Negro
Community Leadership

 

 

The nature of Negro community leadership is affected by fac-

tors both external and internal to the Negro subcommunity. This is

admittedly an analytical distinction, and it is not an easy task to sepa-
rate external and internal factors in concrete instances. The difficulty
in distinguishing between these factors is implied in our use of the term

“subcommunity". In some respects, the Negro community is suffi-

ciently independent to warrant our referring to it as a "community":

it exists as a distinguishable social system whose boundaries can be

established through empirical Observation. Yet it is a unique kind of
community. It is not entirely independent, and in many respects it
may best be seen as a "subcommunity".

Lewis Killian has provided one Of the most insightful analyses

of the nature of the Negro subcommunity. He notes that “the Negro

communit
possesses
sentiment

N

hint respe

I L
- I
Door [Ehgl
Kill
3
. I .
a

25
community is a true community in the sociological sense, " for it

possesses the minimal characteristics of locality and community

 

sentiment.l Yet it differs from most communities in three impor-

 

tant reSpects. First, it is a "subcommunity", for:

It represents a separate growth within the frame-

work of a larger community which is historically, cul-
turally and self-consciously white . . . second, the Negro
community is a natural, but not a formal, community.
As a sub-community it lacks . . . formal political organi-
zation . . . finally. . . the Negro community represents
in its institutional structure a weak and inferior imitation
of the wider, essentially white, community.2

The essential characteristics Of the Negro subcommunity, then, stem,
from "segregation, ecological, social and psychological. "3
We are left with a measure of ambiguity, for no matter how

one looks at it, the Negro subcommunity is a more or less autonomous

 

part of a larger social entity. Throughout much of this chapter, we
must attempt to resolve some Of this ambiguity. Perhaps we should
recognize at the beginning, however, that at least to some extent, the
ambiguity is irresolvable. For the present, it is perhaps sufficient

to note that (1) whether we Speak of the Negro "community" or the

 

1. Lewis M. Killian, "Community Structure and the Role of the
Negro Leader-Agent, "Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, NO. 1 (Winter,
1965), p. 70. See also Robin M. Williams, Jr. , Strangers Next
Door (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), Chap. 8.

 

 

2. Killian, pp. c_it_., p. 70.

3. Ibid.

x mm]

 

sequently

’ nal
hem

gestive o_
erai’ly co]
the differ
example,

SOCiety 11‘.
higher 30(
h‘hh it the
Being 1‘81;

grOUP is a

 

26

Negro "subcommunity“, we have in mind the same social reality;
and (2) the ambiguity is defined as "real" by Negro leaders and con-

sequently it poses "real" and difficult problems for them.

External Constraints on Negro Community Leadership

 

The very definition Of "minority" or "minority group" is sug;
gestive of the external factors influencing Negro leadership. As gen-
erally conceived, the concept of minority group calls our attention to
the differential distribution of power and status within society. For
example, Louis Wirth observed that "The existence of a minority in a
society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group with
higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status carries
with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the society. "1
Being relatively powerless and possessing low status, the minority

group is at a serious disadvantage in the competition for scarce re-

sources and values which characterizes all social life.

Without the intent Of minimizing the relevance of differential

status, we have consciously and deliberately chosen to emphasize the

consequences of the unequal distribution of power for Negro leadership.

The Analysis of Power. Power is customarily viewed as the

 

ability to influence or determine the behavior of others in accordance

 

1. As quoted in George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger,
Racial and Cultural Minorities, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), p. 16.

 

with one's I
analysis of}
Bierstedt v
of people,
to observe
nor does a]
FOWer app
nization, a
Alti
mo SOurce

ing of resc

Kinds - ‘mO

the term 1]

R01

Peter ROSI

27
with one‘s own desires. One Of the more useful approaches to an
analysis ofpower has been contributed by Robert Bierstedt.
Bierstedt views power as stemming from three sources: "(1) numbers

"1 He goes on

of people, (2) social organization, and (3) resources.
to observe that "no one of these sources in itself constitutes power,
nor does any one of them in combination with either of the others.
Power appears only in the combination of all three--numbers, orga-
nization, and resources. "2

Although it is fairly clear what Bierstedt means by the first
two sources Of power, it is perhaps necessary to elaborate the mean-
ing of resources. Bierstedt notes that "Resources may be of many
kinds--money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, deceit,
fraud, secrecy, and, Of course, all the things usually included under
the term 'natural resources. "'3

Robert Dahl's listing of the important bases Of influence and
Peter Rossi's listing of the bases Of power both bear close resem-

blance to Bierstedt's conceptualization. Both lists incorporate in

some combination or other what Bierstedt meant by numbers,

 

1. Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power, " in Lewis
A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds. ), Sociological Theory, 2nd
ed. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 152.

 

2. Ibid., p. 153.

3. Ibid.

organizatior

fohoningzl

ROSSilists

28

organization, and resources. Dahl lists as bases Of influence the

following: 1

Money and credit.

Control over jobs.

Control over the information of others.
Social standing.

Knowledge and expertness.

POpularity, esteem, charisma.
Legality, constitutionality, Officiality.
Ethnic solidarity.

The right to vote.

\oooqo‘meoomw

Rossi lists as bases of power:2

Control over wealth and other resources.
Control over mass media.

Control over solidary groups.

Control over values.

Control over prestigeful interaction.

m-fiWNv—

We are led to conclude that there is some considerable degree
of consensus regarding the sources or bases of power. It remains
only to observe that power is not a stable relationship. Indeed, one
of the most fascinating aspects of the Negro Revolt to date has been
the development Of countervailing power by means of deliberately
organized protest groups committed to a militant confrontation with
racial discrimination and segregation.

DeSpite this development, Negro subcommunities, North and

South, are still confronted with the superordinate power of the

 

1. Robert A. Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communi-
ties, " in Charles R. Adrian (ed. ), Social Science and Community
Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michi-
gan State University, 1960), p. 32.

 

2. Peter H. Rossi, ”Theory, Research, and Practice in Com-
munity Organization, " in ibid. , pp. 12-13.

community

what is the

&
0f power, '
strating th
the demanc
is a ma jor
VleWed 313C
militant 1e
Thus a We;
attainmen t
hegro leac
effectivfine
Others th

Ma

29
community at large. Thus we are returned to a central problem:

what is the nature of leadership Operating from a weak base of power?

 

The Problem of Powerlessness. Operating from a weak base

 

Of power, Negro leaders will exPerience extreme difficulties in demon-
strating their effectiveness by Obtaining goals rapidly enough to satisfy
the demands of those subject to the "revolution in aSpirations“. This
is a major reason for the transformation of leadership which was
viewed above as a major consequence of the Negro Revolt. The new
militant leaders, of course, are also subject to the same pressures.
Thus a weak power base, together with impatient demands for goal
attainment, contributes to the inherent instability or high fluidity of
Negro leadership. Those Negro leaders incapable Of demonstrating
effectiveness by securing a "pay-off" are likely to be challenged by
others who are anxious to step into leadership positions.

Many Negroes mistakenly confuse this inability to attain impor-
tant goals relative to race advancement with a lack of conscious effort
on the part Of Negro leaders. In this reSpect, it is interesting to note
that James Q. Wilson subtitled his important study of Negro leader-
ship in Chicago "The Search for Leadership. "1 Wilson noted that
many Negro "leaders" denied the existence of Negro leadership. He

concluded that what was meant was that "there are no 'good' leaders--

 

1. James O. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free Press,
1960).

 

leaders who a:
as a race and ‘

Similar“
that Negroes a
are not "Orgah'
commlmlt‘r’ or 1

Yet ano

leadership has

 

 

 

of the minority
tant centers of i
Without power. .
their leadershi;
furthermore Oh

to establish his

in a, .
'11 negotiati

30
leaders who are selflessly devoted to causes which will benefit Negroes
as a race and as a community. "1
Similarly, as Wilson Observes, there are those who suggest
that Negroes are unorganized. Again what is meant is that Negroes
are not “organized as a community to seek ends Of benefit to the
community or the race as a whole. "2
Yet another implication of the relative powerlessness of Negro
leadership has been suggested by McKee. He observes that leaders
of the minority community ”may have no ready access to the impor-
tant centers Of decision-making in the community. They are leaders
without power, and this serves to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of
their leadership in the minority community itself. "3 Killian has
furthermore observed that "it is no easy task for Ehe Negro leader}
to establish his legitimacy, since an essential source Of validation
in any negotiation is acceptance by the Opponent as a legitimate agent. "4
Relative powerlessness appears to have one other important
implication. It would seem that exclusion from the institutionalized

centers Of decision-making would lead Negro leaders to exert what-

ever power they can muster outside institutionalized channels. Denied

 

1. Ibid., p. 3.

 

2. Ibid., p. 4.

 

3. James B. McKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids (East
Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan
State University, 1962), p. 2.

 

4. Killian, pp. git, p. 78.

 

ready access t
lized"l Channe
leaders are hi"
I
for example, h
civil disobedie:
sources of pov.
coercion. ”2 Si
riots by a simi

Should 2‘

 

huencing the de

From the perSp

lems 0f SOClal (

use of sanctions

It must
NegrOes are de‘

51d 1-
e ably. 01‘.

th
6 use of C1Vil

the right of polj

31

ready access to those "formal, recognized, established, and stabi-
lized"1 channels of influencing the decision-making process, Negro
leaders are likely to favor noninstitutionalized means. Vander Zanden,
for example, has attributed the use of nonviolent resistance, including
civil disobedience, to the Negro minority's low accessibility "to major

sources of power within a society and to the instruments of violent

coercion. "2 Some Negro leaders have tried to justify recent urban

riots by a similar reasoning.

Should Negro leaders favor noninstitutionalized means of in-

fluencing the decision-making process, certain problems follow.
From the perSpective of the total community, this poses obvious prob-
lems of social control. From the perSpective of Negro leaders, the
assertion of noninstitutionalized power exposes them to the potential
use of sanctions which may be imposed by community power holders.

It must be recognized, of course, that the extent to which
Negroes are denied access to centers of decision-making varies con-
siderably. Community leaders in the North have effectively opposed
the use of civil disobedience on the grounds that Negroes are fldenied

the right of political participation.

Beyond any doubt, then, powerlessness is a crucial determi-

nant of the nature of Negro leadership. Because of the collective

 

1. For Bierstedt, this is the essence of institutionalization. See
Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1963), p. 341.

 

2. James W. Vander Zanden, "The Nonviolent Resistance Move-
ment against Segregation, " American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68,

No. 5 (March, 1963), p. 544.

experience of r

leaders are ca

|
ential distribut

to attain racial
and the right 0
Ship is questio:
problems of pci

ment with noni:

process,

0f external con;

 

 

l

S w . Ever
%h .llthaca ett
“on Similar ;ehil(
ht) 8, Sn a In
Nile." S M
l" ee S

0l. H (N t. C

32

experience of prejudice, discrimination, and persecution, Negro

leaders are called upon to surmount racial barriers. Yet the differ-

ential distribution of power itself makes it difficult for Negro leaders
to attain racially defined goals. Given this difficulty, both the ability
and the right of Negro leaders to maintain their positions of leader-
ship is questioned by both Negroes and whites. To cope with the

problems of powerlessness, Negro leaders are encouraged to experi-

ment with noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making

process.

The Focus of Concern of Negro Leaders. One other consequence

 

of external constraints on Negro leadership is of importance. The

nature of race relations is such that Negro leaders are likely to be

concerned with the overarching issue of minority group membership

and all that that entails, to the relative neglect of other issues. Everett
Ladd has expressed this well.

The most pressing needs and concerns of Negroes
are racially defined. Their lives are race-ridden. No
issue or problem can match the importance of racial
problems. Leadership must reflect this racially defined
predicament. 1

As a general rule, then, a leader who is also a Negro must serve

first of all as a Negro leader, no matter what his capabilities or his

position of leadership. This ought not to be interpreted to imply that

 

l. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. , Negro Political Leadership in the

South (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 3.
In a similar vein Drake and Cayton have observed that "the big ques-

tions, such as 'What of the Bomb? ,' are seldom asked in Bronze-
ville. " See St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metr0polis,
Vol. II (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. xxviii.

 

 

consensus in a,

g
\.

 

detail is like“
it is to be not?"
tablishrrient of
ment 0f goal p
"the goals 0f K
have become YT

bivalence on th

 

lems 0f Power1|

ers to reach CC

Th

e Internal 0

An exar
understanding

lessness of Ne,

t
ernal constrai

33
there is a virtual consensus regarding goals. Though there may be
consensus in general terms, any attempt to specify Negro goals in
detail is likely to provoke considerable disagreement. In particular,
it is to be noted that the scarcity of resources necessitates the es-
tablishment of priorities among alternative goals. But the establish-
ment of goal priorities by leaders is complicated by the fact that
"the goals of Negro public life have become less clear and the targets
have become more uncertain. "1 All this leads to considerable am-
bivalence on the part of Negro leaders. Beyond any doubt, the prob-
lems of powerlessness are compounded by the inability of Negro lead-

ers to reach consensus regarding the priority of goals.

The Internal Constraints of the Negro Community

 

An examination of external constraints is crucial to a thorough
understanding of the nature of Negro community leadership. The power-
lessness of Negro leadership, in particular, may be attributed to ex-
ternal constraints. An analysis which emphasized solely these exter-
nal constraints, however, would be incomplete and thus inadequate.
Wilson, one of the more perceptive students of Negro leadership,

recognized this well.

 

1. James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of
Negro Civic Action, “ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5 No. 3
(September, 1961), p. 295.

 

fluenc.
classc
weak e
the C Oi
interes

 

externz
ientto
pubhc I
to deal
Simply
obstac;
civic a
Negro.

to Ci‘ric

 

 

34

Powerful constraints work against Negro in-
fluence in civic and political affairs--race prejudice,
class differences, geographic concentration, and a
weak economic position--but a thorough inquiry into
the course of Specific civic issues in which Negro
interests are involved strongly suggests that these
external or environmental constraints are not suffic—
ient to eXplain the lack of Negro effectiveness in the
public life of the community. Efforts by Negroes
to deal with race relations in a northern city are not
simply blocked by hostile forces, although powerful
obstacles are undoubtedly raised. In part, Negro
civic action is hampered by constraints inside the
Negro community. Some of the important obstacles
to civic action are products of the Negro's own com-
munity and way of life. 1

The Consequences of Involution. Both Wilson and Killian,

 

as we have seen above, argue persuasively that "the ghetto has a
life and a logic of its own. "2 Its members denied or discouraged
from full participation in the larger community, the minority com—

munity turns in upon itself. This involution is an important charac-
teristic of the segregated community, wherever it exists.
The consequences of involution are many and diverse. One

generalization, however, seems warranted. If the ecological,social,
and psychological boundaries of the ghetto are established by the walls
of external constraints, those walls are strengthened by the process

of involution. It is necessary that Negroes accomodate daily to the

internal conditions of the ghetto, and that accomodation inevitably

involves some measure of acceptance of life "as it is. " Oscar Lewis

 

1. Wilson, Negro Politics, 99; cit., p. 6.

 

2. Ibid., p. 7.

has observed f

 

hibiting the rr.
cerns here, T,
reluctant to tal
there is psychi
ner--even thou
its own, 2

In an in

Negro leade r S

 

 

ance of a Segre

|
go a Step furthe

~,‘€St€d intEre St

segregation, th

 

35

has observed that the culture of poverty is in itself a factor in-
hibiting the mobility of the poor. 1 Even more relevant to our con-
cerns here, Thomas Pettigrew has noted that Negroes are often
reluctant to take advantage of new Opportunities simply because
there is psychological security in behaving in an accustomed man-
ner-~even though the traditional way may have an unpleasantness of
its own. 2

In an important sense, then, the every day affairs of both
Negro leaders and followers necessitate at least a minimal accept-
ance of a segregated social structure. There are others who would
go a step further to argue that many Negro leaders come to have a
vested interest in a segregated system. 3 As a direct result of
segregation, they enjoy advantages which would be lost with the move-
ment toward integration. Within any Negro subcommunity, there

are many individuals whose income, status, and power are in some

measure dependent upon the perpetuation of segregation. Integration

 

1. Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez (New York: Random
House, 1961).

 

2. Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964).

 

3. See eSpecially E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie
(New York: Collier Books, 1962), and Seymour Leventman, "Minority
Group Leadership: The Advantages of the Disadvantages, " in
Bernard Rosenberg, Isreal Gerver, and F. William Howton (eds. ),
Mass Society in Crisis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964),
pp. 604-613.

 

 

would throw thi
counterparts, r
and resources.
inessmen have
appears to be a
leadership has
have some imp
men, for exam
for desegregatf

In addit
a result of gm,
fied as "Vulner
white Control,
of their %
.niluerable becfi

mu ‘
nity. The V

JOY benefits in

 

 

36

would throw this group into unfair competition with their white
counterparts, many of whom possess greater reputations, skills,
and resources. For example, many Negro professionals and bus-
inessmen have captive markets in the ghetto. Although there
appears to be a distinct possibility that this constraint on Negro
leadership has been overemphasized, it must be granted that it does
have some impact. The "Buy Black" position of many Negro business-
men, for example, is often accompanied by a reluctance to push hard
for desegregation.

In addition to those Negroes who enjoy individual advantages as
a result of group disadvantages, there are others who may be classi-
fied as ”vulnerables"--those who are more subject than others to
white control. Whereas the advantaged are advantaged largely because

of their indggendence of the larger community, the vulnerables are

 

vulnerable because of their greater dependence upon the larger com-

 

munity. The vulnerables stand to suffer not solely because they en-
joy benefits from segregation which would be lost with integration
(although many clearly do), but additionally because their participation
in attempts to bring about integration may expose them to the very
real danger of sanctions. Negro professionals drawing public salaries
(e. g. , public school teachers, social workers, etc.) appear to be
eSpecially vulnerable. The literature suggests that vulnerables are

constrained from providing vigorous, militant leadership, It may be,

however, that
strained as ar
nately, most c
of Southern cci:

Involut.
mi be called
inessence, lS

infirm" imita

 

 

 

 

tastmajority 0
The relationsh
ment °r highi‘.
and South, am
are formally F
informal reCO]

SOClany r eleV,‘

37
however, that in Northern communities, vulnerables are not as con-
strained as are the vulnerables in Southern communities. Unfortu-
nately, most of what we know of the vulnerables comes from studies
of Southern communities.

Involution further manifests itself in the develOpment of what
may be called parallel institutions within the Negro community. This,
in essence, is what Killian had in mind in his reference to "weak and
inferior” imitations of the institutions of the wider community. The
vast majority ofthose Negroes who attend church attend Negro churches.
The relationships between white and Negro churches are either nonex-
istent or highly formal. The vast majority of Negro children, North
and South, attend “Negro" schools. Even though those Negro schools
are formally parts of a larger community school system, there is an
informal recognition on the part of all that Negro schools constitute a
socially relevant subsystem. Negro professionals and Negro business-
men form their own professional and business organizations. These
organizations strive to serve the same functions as their parallels in
the larger community. Negro fraternities and sororities serve impor-
tant functions for those unable or unwilling to join the white counterpart
organizations. Negro workers come together in Negro unions or Negro
locals, or they come to constitute a race-conscious segment of an
"integrated" union or local. The examples could be expanded further,

but our purpose is primarily illustrative. The point is that the as socia-

tions of the Negro community "constitute Special interest groups,

38
organized not for participation in the activities of the wider community,
but because of exclusion from these activities. "1 The weakness of
these associations results from a stratification system which ascribes
inferiority to all that is Negro, and from the exclusion tied to that
inferiority. Their weakness is furthermore attributable to the rela-
tive lack of resources available within the Negro community. These
parallel institutions in the Negro subcommunity come to have a via-
bility of their own which acts as a barrier to desegregation and inte-
gration.

Parenthetically, we might add that the consequences of invo-
lution are eSpecially evident on Saturday night in the ghetto. At the
completion of the work week, many Negroes diSplace their hostility
and aggression through victimizing their fellow Negroes. 2

Involution, of course, is never complete. The Negro subcom-
munity is, as we have observed, a part of the wider community. There
are patterned relationships between both the institutions and the indi-
vidual members of the subcommunity and the larger community of
which it is a part. There is always some measure of institutional
diSpersion which brings the members of the Negro subcommunity into
contact with the larger community. As a general rule, involution is

most complete in those relationships that imply an equality of social

 

1. Killian, EE- cit., p. 70.

Z. See Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York:
Signet Books, 1965), chap. 13, for a perceptive account by a layman.

 

39
status. Thus, racial endogamy is a major characteristic of American
marriage patterns. Involution is less complete as we move toward
more formal and impersonal relationships. In modern, industrialized
societies such as ours, for example, the movement towards a rational
utilization of manpower resources offers assurance that a proportion
of minority group members will find themselves in contact with domi-

nant group members within the realm of work.

Heterogeneity and the Necessity of Solidarity. This brings us
to a consideration of one of the most important problems faced by
Negro leadership. The boundaries of the ghetto serve to bring to-
gether in close geographical and social proximity groups and social
categories which would be more separate were it not for those boun-
daries. The result is that the Negro community is considerably more
heterogeneous than the sterotyped image of the Negro community sug-
gests. In general, homogeneity within the Negro community breaks
down as the barriers to participation in the larger community are
removed. Thus Negro communities in urban centers are generally
more heterogeneous than those in rural areas. Similarly, Negro com-
munities in the urban North are generally more heterogeneous than
those in the urban South.

This heterogeneity, as evidenced in occupational diversity,
variation in income, prestige, life-styles, etc., leads quite naturally

to differences in interests. This is to say that the stratification system

Operative with
fication syster.
urban centers,
able difficulty
might say that
community is 1
and that each f
relations in On
ness of Negro
united front, if
to SuSPeCt that
be covert. On
front to the lai-
observed that
the Stre
and wru
and Can

In Prev.

 

Beyond

lung Ultra

 

l"——

4O
operative within the wider community is paralleled by a similar strati-
fication system Operating within the subcommunity. Thus in most
urban centers, and particularly those in the North, there is consider-
able difficulty in achieving consensus regarding goals and means. One
might say that the calculus of solidarity and consensus within the Negro
community is determined by both centripetal and centrifugal forces,
and that each force constitutes a reSponse to the general pattern of race
relations in our society. The problem is that the relative powerless-
ness of Negro leadership makes it a virtual necessity to present a
united front, if anything at all is to be gained. There is good reason
to suSpect that attempts to resolve these conflicts, if they exist, will

be covert. Only in this way will it be possible to present a united
front to the larger community. In this regard, Kenneth B. Clark has

observed that

the stresses and strains within the civil rights movement
and within and among the various organizations are real
and cannot be denied; and a great deal of energy is expended
in preventing these difficulties from becoming overt and
thus destroying the public image of unity. 1

Beyond any doubt, this dilemma posed by the necessity of

resolving intragroup conflict in such a way that leaders may still

 

1. Kenneth B. Clark, "The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum
and Organization, ” in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds. ),
The Negro American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966),

p. 624.

 

effectively ini

 

problems face
We lid»
emergent thee
final product.
in particular ~

(1

responSlhllity-fi

41
effectively implement agreed upon plans is one of the most crucial
problems faced by Negro leaders.

We have attemped to provide here the skeletal outline for an
emergent theory of Negro leadership. In no way is this viewed as a
final product. The task which remains is one for which sociologists
in particular and social scientists in general must assume a collective

reSponsibility.

The ab
for, but explic
verse mOdes o
reCQta’rlized in z
COHCern Of tho:
stiles of leade
logies, the COD
theoretical pro
literature On N
in the COnstruC

live, but a brie.

warranted. 1

 

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP

The above view of Negro community leadership not only allows
for, but eXplicitly Specifies some of the factors that contribute to di-
verse modes of leadership. This diversity of leadership has been
recognized in all studies of Negro leadership. Indeed, a recurrent
concern of those who have studied Negro leadership is that of types or
styles of leadership. Despite this heavy reliance on leadership typo-
logies, the construction of typologies involves methodological and
theoretical problems which have not been adequately handled in the
literature on Negro leadership. Our discussion of general problems
in the construction of typologies is by no means intended to be exhaus-
tive, but a brief consideration of some of the problems involved seems

warranted. 1

 

1. The discussion which follows owes most to John C. McKinney.
See his Constructive Typology and Social Theory (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1966). Those readers further interested in this tOpic
are encouraged to consult McKinney’s bibliography. Much of the lit-
erature on typology revolves about Max Weber‘s use of "ideal types. "
Weber's treatment of the ideal type may be found in his The Methodo-
logy of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1949).
In addition to Weber, constructive typologies have been utilized by
the likes of Durkheim, Tonnies, Sorokin, Becker, Parsons, and Red-
field. Howard Becker eSpecially has contributed to our growing know-
ledge of the nature of constructive typologies. See especially his
Through Values to Social Interpretation (Durham, N. C. : Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1950).

 

 

 

 

42

The

Negro
is likely to be
as Negro lead.
mm the
can be discerr.
KSeiul t0 Conce

Within
ETOup Simatioij

of a continuum

 

 

43

The Nature and Utility of Constructive Typologies

 

Negro leadership--at any level, at any time, and at any place--
is likely to be characterized by diversity. No two persons functioning
as Negro leaders are likely to respond to the minority group situation
in exactly the same way. Yet patterns of adjustment and response
can be discerned, and for purposes of analysis it is both possible and

useful to conceptualize Negro leadership in terms of broad types.

Within the range of logicallypossible reSponses to the minority

 

group situation, there is a narrower range of objectively probable ‘

 

responses. We may view this narrower range of reSponses in terms

 

of a continuum consisting of two polar extremes and all imaginable
shades of gradation between. There is heuristic utility in construct-
ing a selected number of types of leadership which fall at various
points on the continuum of objectively probable reSponses. We are
proposing the exPlicit use of a constructive typology which John C.

McKinney has defined as “a purposive, planned selection, abstraction,

 

combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with

empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical

/

cases.“1

The process of develOping a constructive typology is similar

to the more general process of concept formation. The constructed

 

l. McKinney, op. c_it. , p. 3. We follow McKinney in viewing
“ideal types" as a Special case of the more generic "constructed

types. “

type, just as

and complexi
development

cess of abstr;
selects out th
to be most es
inveStigation,

structed tYpe s

throng]
PTeCisj
aCCenti
in a 501
C6ptin
tiOn tha
tuates C

Thus the Conflg
structed type, 3

perhapS

types <:alls atte

 

 

 

 

 

44
type, just as the concept, provides "a means of reducing diversities .-
and complexities of phenomena to a generally coherent level. "1 In the
development of both concepts and types, one attempts through the pro—
cess of abstraction to attain some degree of conceptual order. One
selects out those elements, properties, criteria, etc. , which appear
to be most essential or relevant for analysis of the problem under
investigation. The distinction between ordinary concepts and con-
structed types is provided by McKinney.

Ordinary concepts are given precision as constructs
through selection and limitation; constructed types are given
precision through selection, limitation, combination, and
accentuation. The constructed type organizes experience
in a somewhat different fashion than does the ordinary con-
cept in that it forms a series of attributes into a configura-
tion that is not necessarily directly eXperienced and accen-
tuates one or more of the attributes for theoretical purposes. 2

Thus the configurational patterning of elements is crucial to the con-

structed type. 3
Perhaps the most consistent criticism of the use of constructed

types calls attention to the unreality of the type-~the discrepancy be-

_-—‘—

tween the specified content of the type and the empirical cases examined.

 

1. Ibid., p. 5.

 

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Accentuation, as can be seen in McKinney's definition of the
constructed type, is not absolutely essential.

‘ Yet, as McKir
concepts . .

ly stated by B
you are in the
structed type y
is childishly r.
by the accura,C
but W
nary that expla

do that there b

 

“let-am empir
above to focus

Sponges, rathe

Constrt

1. MCKin
2. Becker
3. CKin
Web‘l. Thls Ct
0r e? and Rec
(£3,915 Clively
a E )r probabl I
CAII‘edal e

45
Yet, as McKinney has observed, "Unreality is characteristic of all

. "1 The actual heuristic value of unreality was succinct-

concepts.
ly stated by Becker: "If construct and 'reality' exactly correspond,

you are in the morass of the particular. . . . The belief that the con-
structed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found
is childishly naive. "2 The value of a type, then, "is not to be measured

by the accuracy of its correspondence to perceptual experience .

but in terms of its capacityto explain, however tentative and prelimi-

 

nary that explanation may be. "3

It seems advisable, however, to insist as Becker and McKinney

do that there be some degree of correSpondence between the type and L‘

A
V .I

relevant empirical cases. It is acceptance of this principle that led us
above to focus on the continuum of objectively probable leadership re-

Sponses, rather than the continuum of logically possible reSponses. 4

Constructed typologies appear to have several important func-

tions in the conduct of social research. Above all else, a constructed

 

1. McKinney, pp. (it. , p. 16.
2. Becker, op. c_it., p. 120.
3. McKinney, op. (i. , p. 11.

4. This constitutes perhaps the major difference in the works of
Weber and Becker. Weber developed “pure“ types which werglogically
or objectively possible. ”Becker insisted that a type ought to be objec-
tiv'ely probable. At one point he stated “I am not at liberty to construct
an Airedale with a cast-iron stomach. " (As quoted in Charles P. and
Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (Princeton, N. J. : D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 33.

 

typology is a h
esplanatory p0
tory power or
ypology to exi
constitutes but
to be noted the
leadership has
The major eff
to specific lea
icon-raging lear~

A Cons

‘I
"“9 I'ESearc:he

polog)’ S erVe S

relief the m0,

Perha

standards ag e

Shred. Emp
tent to which

t‘fpe
' S, G.
SClenCes and

so .
«Ills
eSpe .
Cr

 

46
typology is a heuristic tool, the value of which is to be judged by its
explanatory power or potential. In the final analysis, the explana-
tory power or potential of a typology is dependent upon relating the
typology to existant or emergent theory. The current investigation
constitutes but a modest step in that direction. In particular, it is
to be noted that the prevailing tendency in the literature on Negro
leadership has been to view leadership types as indepergent variables.
\"x
The major effort has been to explain the consequences of adherence

to specific leadership styles, rather than to assess those factors en-

couraging leaders to adOpt Specific leadership styles.

A constructed typology is further of value in that it sensitizes
the researcher in his initial selection of data. A well-developed ty-

pology serves to simplify the data collecting process by placing in
relief the more essential and relevant properties of the phenomena

under investigation.

Perhaps most importantly, a constructed typology provides
standards against which empirical cases may be compared and mea-
sured. Empirical cases may be compared by determining the ex-
tent to which they deviate from one another and from the constructed
types. Given the primitive methods of measurement in the social
sciences and the theoretical value of comparative analysis, this func-

tion is especially important.

In the
advanced by n
Wilson, Burg

As a g
sciously by fi
leadership Wa
be viewed as a
A CmCial dim
that Of goals c

tinuum in Whii

 

 

47

Selected Typologies of Negro Leadership

 

In the literature on Negro leadership, typologies have been
advanced by numerous authors, including Johnson, Myrdal, Cox,
Wilson, Burgess, Thompson, Leventman, and Ladd.

As a general rule, types were developed more or less con-
sciously by first selecting the dimensions in terms of which Negro
leadership was to be examined. Often a selected dimension could
be viewed as a continuum which crosscut the types to be constructed.
A crucial dimension in most typologies advanced, for example, is
that of goals or ends. Goals may be conceived in terms of a con-
tinuum in which the polar extremes are represented by complete
acceptance of a biracial system and complete rejection of a biracial

system. The second step involves dividing the leadership continuum

 

1. See (1) Guy B. Johnson, "Negro Racial Movements and Leader-
ship in the United States, " American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43,
No. 1 (July, 1937), pp. 57-71; (2) Gunnar Myrdal, An American
Dilemma (New York: Harper 8r Brothers Publishers, 1944), pp. 709-
757 and 768—780; (3) Oliver C. Cox, "Leadership Among Negroes in
the United States, " in Alvin W. Gouldner (ed. ), Studies in Leadership
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 228-271; (4) James Q.
Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 214-
254; (5) M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 176-
186; (6) Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 58-79; (7) Seymour
Leventman, "Minority Group Leadership: The Advantages of the Dis-
advantages, " in Bernard Rosenberg, Israel Gerver, and F. William
Howton (eds. ), Mass Society in Crisis (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1964), pp. 604—613; and (8) Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. ,
Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1966), pp. 145-232.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

into a SPECific
of each type V‘
whole. As “'6
used two, thrt

patterning of 1

 

typologies of l

Gunnar Mvrda

In his
between the go
Myrdal recog:
to the social e
on the South 0

Ship primarili

W

relevant empi

types Were nol

 

 

 

48
into a specific number of types and Specifying the criteria or elements
of each type which will then be viewed in terms of a configurational
whole. As we will see, students of Negro leadership have generally
used two, three, or four unit typologies, but the configurational
patterning of types has varied considerably.
We turn now to a brief review of some of the more important

typologies of Negro leadership advanced thus far.

Gunnar Myrdal

 

In his analysis, Myrdal called attention to the relationship
between the general pattern of race relations and Negro leadership.
Myrdal recognized well that Negro leadership was largely a reSponse
to the social environment in which it operated. In focusing primarily
on the South of depression years, Myrdal conceived of Negro leader-
ship primarily in terms of "two extreme policies of behavior"--

accomodation and protest. 1 Not surprisingly, given the paucity of

 

relevant empirical research at the time of his investigation, Myrdal's
types were not well developed.

Patience, self-help, appeasement, and gradualism were central
to the doctrine of accomodation. Following this doctrine, the pace of
reform and Negro improvement were largely determined by whites.

It was necessary to push reforms "quietly and in such ways that the

 

l. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 720.

whites hardly
fortably sunk
it until such t
full participat

Until r
dal’s study, a
Cially in the S.
SOuthern "Way
the necessity (
accepting the I
COncluded that
assistance of 3
liberals COuld I
Negro Protest-
ordinate ”Sufi

OPPOSec

0f protest.

De:

 

49
whites hardly notice them before they are accomplished facts com-

fortably sunk into a new status quo. "1 Negroes were to “bootstrap"

 

it until such time that improved standards of living warranted their
full participation in the larger society.

Until relatively recent years, and surely at the time of Myr-
dal's study, accomodation was much the stronger orientation. ESpe-
cially in the South, accomodation was a pragmatic reSponse to a
Southern “way of life, " and it was advocated by leaders who recognized
the necessity of working within the established biracial system, and of

accepting the Negroes' "place. "

Booker T. Washington, in particular,
concluded that accomodation provided the only means by which the
assistance of Northern humanitarians and philanthrOpists and Southern
liberals could be obtained. This assistance was gained by tempering
Negro protest--by accomodating to white power and accepting the sub-
ordinate position reserved for the Negro populace.

Opposed to this "static" approach was the "dynamic" approach
of protest. DeSpite the historical predominance of accomodative
leaders, "the protest motive is ever present. "2 Especially up until
Myrdal's Dilemma, the protest motive was more evident in the North.

Myrdal attributed this to important differences in the central pattern-

ing of race relations to be found in the North and in the South. The

 

1. Ibid., p. 736.

2. Ibid., p. 768.

Northern siti

spects:

intere
every
notcr
Souths
contrc

In actuality,

 
  
  

WhereVer the

theanonYmih

OfpractiCal ptl
l .
“qr. ,
2. .
1&1. ,

 

50
Northern situation differed from the Southern in two important re-
Spects:

(1) That the white majority is not motivated by an
interest solidarity against Negroes, reaching practically
every white individual, and (2) that the Negro minority is
not cramped by anything like the formidable, all pervasive,
Southern system of political, judicial and social caste
controls.1

In actuality, protest leadership emerged not only in the North, but
wherever the social situation allowed it. Historically, protest has
been more characteristic of the urban than of the rural South, for
the anonymity and the depersonalization of social control character-
istic of urban life made protest possible.

Protest leaders perceived their role as that of maintaining
what today might be referred to as "creative tension. " Through
whatever means possible, protest leaders were to struggle against
racial barriers. Whereas the accomodative leader Spoke in terms of
Negro duties and obligations, the protest leader Spoke in terms of
human rights. W. E. B. DuBois, probably the most important protest
leader of the first half of the 20th century, advocated nothing less
than full social and political equality. In contrast to Washington,

DuBois offered these demands “not as ultimate goals but as a matter

of practical policy of the day. "2 Until the mid-thirties, these were

 

1. Ibid., p. 723.

 

2. Ibid., p. 742.

goals that eve
subscribed to

Althou
extremes of 3
these leaders
an entire char

of a daily con

 

51
goals that even few social scientists were willing to grant; even they
subscribed to the racist myths of inherent inferiority. 1
Although Myrdal's typology draws our attention to the polar
extremes of accomodation and protest, he himself recognized that

these leadership types were not mutally exclusive. 2 Thus he wrote

an entire chapter on compromise leadership, stressing the necessity

 

of a daily compromise between accomodation and protest. 3 AS a type,
however, compromise leadership was even less well developed than

the polar types. Yet Myrdal recognized the ambilvalent orientations

of many Negro leaders. Those Negro leaders unable to secure "favors"
or to demonstrate progress found it difficult to maintain a following
within the Negro subcommunity. On the other hand, those Negro
leaders who pushed too hard lost the support of whites. ESpecially in
the South, this was often the equivalent of the complete loss of lead-

ership.

James Q. Wilson

 

Based on his 1958-59 study of Negro leadership in Chicago,
Wilson distinguished between two political styles ("artificially

polarized ideal types"): the militant and the moderate.

 

l. E. Franklin Frazier, “Sociological Theory and Race Relations,"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June, 1947), pp. 265-271.

 

Z. Ladd is mistaken in holding that Myrdal is among those who
treat categories of leadership as “self-contained units. " See Ladd,
pp. cit., p. 147.

3. Myrdal, 22. cit., chap. 37.

actel
sake
leade
coan
(2) tr.
the r
seeki
butes
nithe

Acco
vmwsissues
plexities of i
his social wo
attempts to v

AS re;
goals while it.
aimed at the i
Mew. Whil
0f the Negro t

b

ally exClusive

utility.

 

52
The modes of thinking, Speaking, and acting char-
acteristic of these two styles can be described, for the

sake of convenience, along a few simple axes: how the

leader perceives and describes (1) the nature of the issues

confronting him and the values he brings to bear on them;

(2) the ends or goals he deems it appropriate to seek in

the realm of civic action; (3) the means he employs in

seeking these ends; and (4) the motives, goals, and attri-

butes of the other actors, white and Negro, whom he sees

in the world about him. 1

According to Wilson, whereas the militant or protest leader
views issues in terms of simplicities, the moderate stresses the com-
plexities of issues. Whereas the militant is "utOpian, " interpreting
his social world in purely normative terms, the moderate deliberately
attempts to view the world "as it is. "

As regards ends, Wilson sees the militant accepting “status"
goals while the moderate favors “welfare" goals. Status goals are
aimed at the integration of Negroes into the larger community and
society, while welfare goals are aimed at the tangible improvement
of the Negro subcommunity through, for example, "the provision of
better services, living conditions, or positions. "2 Often welfare goals
serve to perpetuate segregation. These goals are by no means mutu-
ally exclusive categories, but the analytical distinction has proven its
utility.

As regards means, the militant generally seeks a legislative

solution to matters, while the moderate is more inclined to stress

 

1. Wilson, pp. cit., pp. 214-215.

2. Ibid., p. 185.

negotiations
The militant
test and mas
time while fa
‘ more, the m
sion, the thr I
e“'li-lbc‘iSizes ;

M.
alternathe s,

WilSq
to View the u,

ferentiated b,

unison towar

1

These gOals’

the NegrOes.

 

dined t0 viev
torial body.

faced by Neg]

Not 01
went studie
examination 8

1. .

Hui.

2, _
“as.

53
negotiations “at the top, " which may lead to informal agreements.
The militant's preference for rapid solutions leads him to stress pro-
test and mass tactics, while the moderate is more willing to bide his
time while facts are gathered and studies are conducted. Further-
more, the militant stresses negative inducements, such as "compul-
sion, the threat of sanctions or deprivations, " while the moderate

, emphasizes positive inducements such as “rewards, more attractive
. M_ I

.._F l

alternatives, or promises of gain. "

Wilson sees the Negro militant or protest leader as inclined
to view the “white power structure" as a monolithic body--"an undif-
ferentiated bloc of corporate and political leaders who act largely in
unison toward agreed upon goals out of essentially identical motives.
These goals, of course, are seen to be contrary to the interests of
the Negroes. "2 The moderate leader, on the other hand, is less in-
clined to view influential whites as constituting a monolithic, conSpira-
torial body. Whereas the militant is convinced that the disadvantages
faced by Negroes are attributable to prejudice and discrimination, the
moderate is likely to feel that whites are willing to provide many oppor-

tunities that Negroes simply are not yet qualified for.
Not only is Wilson's one of the most exhaustive and more com-

petent studies of Negro leadership, it is additionally one of the few

examinations focusing on a Northern city. 1 1(4

 

// j I

1. Ibid., p. 243. p; , ‘ ‘ , t

2. Ibid., p. 226. y

Daniel C. Tl:
In his

lhomp s on he

relate
and r.
race
in the
The "
accomodatior
Uncle Tom is
Whlte Supren
ing some fay

the Uncle To:

COmIrllInitv.

 

54

Daniel C. Thompson

 

In his study of New Orleans Negro leadership, Daniel C.
Thompson has contributed a three unit typology. Following Thompson:

A leader's type will be determined by three inter-
related criteria: one, his conception of the Negro race
and race relations; two, his attitudes toward race and
race relations; and three, his own behavior and actions
in the field of race relations. 1

The "Uncle Tom" type of Negro leader is Similar to Myrdal's

 

accomodationist. The Uncle Tom accepts the inferior position assigned
Negroes in the biracial South. “The most characteristic trait of the
Uncle Tom is his acceptance Of the parasitic status assigned him by
white supremacists. He never demands on the basis Of the Negro's

"2 Uncle Toms succeed in obtain-

rights, but instead begs for favors.
ing some favors because whites recognize that this is instrumental to
the Uncle Tom's prestige and continued leadership within the Negro
community.

At the Opposite pole is the race man, who bears similarities
to Myrdal's protest leader. The race man rejects the legitimacy of
the biracial system and accepts in its place the values inherent in the

American Creed. He is inclined to reject compromise, and is thus

Similar also to Wilson's militant leader who seeks status goals.

 

1. Thompson, pp. cit., p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

55

The race man . . . has been a perennial enemy of
the biracial sistem. He has insisted that racial segrega-
tion of any kind is psychologically harmful, socially un-
workable, and a legal contradiction. He has constantly
voiced his protest in literature, music, public utterances,
and organizational Objectives. At all times he eXpresses

a restlessness and declares his impatience with second-
1

 

 

class citizenship.

Between these two polar extremes is the racial diplomat.

 

According to Thompson, the racial diplomat is class-oriented. For
Thompson, this means that he is "primarily interested in raising the
cultural level of Negroes. “2 The racial diplomat is also driven by a
search for reSpectability characteristic Of leaders in the wider com-
munity, and he places general community welfare on a par or even
above the specific needs of the Negro subcommunity. 3 He does not
accept the moral justness of a biracial system, but he has learned to
work within such a system to serve "best" the cause of race advance-
ment. Thompson also points out that an important role Of the racial
diplomat is that of "advising moderates on the 'best way' Of promoting
uplift in some Specific area of life. "4

Thompson sees Specific patterns of race relations leadership

within the biracial system, and notes that "the patterns Of intergroup

 

1. Ibid. , p. 76. Ladd has observed that this represents a "highly
partisan analysis." See Ladd, pp. c_i_t_. , pp. 176-177.

2. Thompson, pp. c_il” p. 27.

3. Ibid., p. 68.

 

4. Ibid.

 

leadership ar

   
  
 

type of Negr

type of white

 

se reoationi

 

56
leadership are determined very largely by the majority group. "1 Each
type of Negro leader will be basically dependent upon a complementary
type of white leader. Thus the Uncle Tom is associated with the vflLi’pe

segregationist, the race man is associated with the white liberal, and

 

 

the racial diplomat is associated with the white moderate. The relative

 

effectiveness of the Negro leader in attaining racial goals is dependent
on both his accessibility to influential white leaders and his support
within the Negro subcommunity. Thus, in New Orleans, Thompson
sees the relative ineffectiveness of the race man tied to his access
only to the white liberal who is on the periphery of white power. The
Uncle Tom in New Orleans is ineffective because he is not reSpected in
either the white or the Negro community. Thompson sees the racial
diplomat as probably being the most effective type Of Negro leader. In
large measure, this is so because, contrary to the Uncle Tom, the
racial diplomat maintains the reSpect of both communities. He is
"reSpected by both because he fits well into the success pattern inher-

ent in our national ideology. "2

Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.

 

Everett Ladd has been more concerned than others with the
methodological and theoretical problems associated with the construc-

tion of typologies. In his study, Ladd conducted a comparative analysis

 

1. Ibid., p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 69.

 

57

of Negro leadership in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and in Green-
ville, South Carolina. Given the focus on comparative analysis, Ladd
was forced to give serious thought to the construction Of a typology
adequately suited for that task.

Following Myrdal, Ladd explicitly calls to our attention the
fact that "the limits and content of the continuum of race leadership
styles are determined by the prevailing pattern Of race relations which

nl

varies with time and geography. For example, today's militant

leader in Greenville may become tomorrow's moderate or conservative

 

leader, to use Ladd's own terminology. Furthermore, it may be dif-
ficult to find in the Greenville of tomorrow today's conservative leader.
Ladd notes that in the urban South today, Myrdal's typology is inade-
quate, for "virtually all leaders agree that the biracial system must
be removed, not merely modified. "2 Accomodationists today, then,
must be found in the rural South where the prevailing pattern Of race
relations still-encourages some Negro leaders to accept a biracial
system.

To view the content of race leadership types as relative to time
and place, however, could pose problems in the construction of a con-
tinuum to be utilized for comparative purposes. Ladd resolves this

difficulty by accepting the community definitions Of leadership styles.

 

1. Ladd, 99. c_i_§., p. 151.

2. Ibid., p. 152.

He notes tha
mines the 1c
is the deg re
persuasively
seems most
the moderat
“is a Style n
ness in NQgI
erate leader
in Greenville
Sent pattern
the rigidity

middle grour

“re “

 

58

He notes that "for both whites and Negroes, the factor which deter-
mines the location of a particular style on the leadership continuum
is the degree of acceptability of that style to whites. "1 Ladd argues
persuasively that for the urban South today, his three unit typology
seems most apprOpriate. It is of particular importance to note that
the moderate style has just recently emerged in the urban South. It
"is a style made possible by the development of greater permissive-
ness in Negro-white relations. "2 Ladd documents clearly that mod-
erate leadership is a much more viable force in Winston—Salem than
in Greenville. Negro leaders in Greenville are constrained by the pre-
sent pattern Of race relations to adopt either of the polar styles, for
the rigidity of the biracial system in Greenville does not provide a
middle ground for an effective moderate approach.

We will not review Ladd's typology in detail, for we have drawn

most heavily from him in the development of our "own" typology. 3

 

1. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
2. Ibid., p. 198.

3. We have modified Ladd's typology in a number Of important
ways. Perhaps most importantly, we have developed more fully the
moderate style Of leadership and the dimension of means as it cross-
cuts all three leadership types. It ought to be observed that Ladd him-
self borrowed heavily from Wilson's earlier work. In the description
Of the constructed typology which follows, we will not always be con-
cerned with crediting particular individuals with their Specific contri-
butions. Suffice it to say that the typology here constructed is best
seen as the product of a cumulative effort, and that we have consciously
drawn most heavily from Wilson and Ladd. Neither they nor others, Of
course, are to be held reSponsible for the final product here described.

59

A Refined Leadership Typology

 

The task now is to describe and elaborate the typology con-
structed for purposes Of this study. Illustrative material will be drawn
from our study of Lakeland's Negro leadership.

We have chosen a three unit typology, as did Ladd, and we have

maintained his labels. Thus we differentiate among conservative,

 

moderate, and militant leadershiptypes. The content of each type

 

will be conceptualized in terms of the three dimensions Of (1) race
goals; (2) the means utilized to attain those goals; and (3) rhetoric,

the language and manner used in efforts to attain race goals. By man-
ner we have in mind all that is suggested by demeanor and deportment.
Each Of these dimensions crosscuts the three leadership types. The
content of each type will be described in terms of elements relative to
each of the three dimensions. Figure l on page 60 is a diagrammatic
representation summarizing both the content of the three leadership

types and the relationships among them.

Conservative Leadership

 

Conservative leadership is of course the type most likely to
be acceptable to majority group whites. If one's knowledge is limited
to reports in the mass media, he may not even be aware that conser-
vative Negro leaders exist today. Their activity is not the stuff that

makes news headlines. The evidence suggests that the influence of

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61
conservative Negro leaders is everywhere on the decline. Yet the
fact that their style is acceptable both to whites and an important seg-
ment within the Negro community assures them some continued in-

fluence.

M. Conservative leaders have a preference for welfare
gpal_s_. They seek goals which would result in tangible gains for the
Negro community. Welfare goals are to be contrasted with w
gppl_swhich will serve to integrate Negroes into the larger community

or to remove the stigma of race. 1 These goals are not mutually ex-

 

clusive, for a particular goal may be illustrative Of both types: e. g. ,
an increase in equal employment Opportunities.

One of the more important conservative leaders in Lakeland
is currently a member of the city commission. When asked what
kinds of Negro community goals had been realized as a result of his
efforts as a commissioner, he pointed to the removal Of a junk yard
and an increase in the number Of street lights in his district.

Housing, as we will see, constitutes a crucial issue in Lake-
land. Conservative Negro leaders are more concerned with the con-

struction of new housing units and the remodeling of existing units

 

1. Our conceptualization Of status goals or ends differs from Wil-
son's. Whereas he stresses integration as the major component of
status goals, it is necessary to stress also the removal Of racial
stigma. See the section on militant leadership which follows for the
rationale and elaboration of this point.

   
  
  
  
  

outsubstan

.Lad
”Conservat;
merits of w
Perhaps We

Of course,

 

62
than with housing desegregation. Given the drastic shortage Of ade-
quate housing in Lakeland today, conservative leaders are not with-
out substantial support on this particular issue.
Ladd has suggested another goal preference of conservatives.
"Conservative leaders, " he writes, "tend to emphasize race goals the
merits of which are generally conceded by both whites and Negroes. "1

Perhaps we may refer to these as "consensus" goals. Welfare goals,

 

of course, are more likely than status goals to be Of this nature. Since
in many Northern urban centers the emphasis is primarily on status
goals, some conservative leaders appear to be grossly uninformed on

issues considered basic to other Negro leaders.

Means. The conservative Negro leader is likely to place dis—

proportionate emphasis on self—help and self-improvement as means

 

of race advancement. From the perSpective of the conservative, more
is to be gained through self-help and self-improvement than through
protest. Negro conservatives are well aware of the cultural differences
which separate not only whites from Negroes, but also lower-class
from middle- and upper-class Negroes. The conservative deplores

the high percentages Of divorce and separation among Negroes. He
regrets the sexual looseness Of many Negroes. He is appalled by the

condition of housing in certain sectors of the Negro community. He is

 

1. Ladd, 92. 931., p. 159.

63

concerned that a high percentage of Negro women work and do not
properly care for their children. He is sensitive to the high crime
rate among Negroes. He is conscious that many Negro youth lack
adequate motivation. In each of these and in other instances, the con-
servative leader is convinced that much is to be gained through self-
improvement. He admits that the stereotype Of Negroes possessed by
many whites is based in large measure on fact. Although he recognizes
that prejudice and discrimination are important factors, he does not
place as much emphasis on them as do the militants. In fact, many
conservatives go a considerable distance toward accepting the rationale
of whites that prejudice and discrimination result from racial inferior-
ity in all its cultural manifestations.

In addition to self-help and self-improvement, Negro conserva-

tive leaders also view bargaining as an important means Of attaining

 

race goals. From their perSpective, bargaining among leaders is
much preferred to those activities which entail wider community in-
volvement. In gaining concessions from whites, conservative Negro
leaders have a definite preference for persuasion as Opposed to any
Show of force. The conservative's preference for bargaining is com-
plemented by his rejection of all forms of direct action and mass par-
ticipation. One conservative leader in Lakeland, for example, stated:

I'm not in favor Of demonstrations. I think there
are better ways. It's much better to sit down at a

conf
that

Mostconse:
ofmcn run.
haders--an
conservativ<
Negroleade
leaders has
Militant aCti
insuch a po
this will be il

Borr

rat

LaREIand ’ TC|

Cltyordinanc

 

64

conference table and negotiate. More is accomplished
that way. It doesn't help just to aggravate and agitiate.

1
Most conservative leaders will argue that direct action, as a matter
of fact, runs the risk Of severing their access to influential white
leaders--and this accessibility constitutes an important source of the
conservative's influence within the Negro community. Conservative
Negro leaders in Lakeland have argued that their effectiveness as
leaders has been undermined by the activities Of militant Negro leaders.
Militant activism, according to this argument, places white leaders
in such a position that they cannot make any concessions for fear that
this will be interpeted as a victory brought about by militancy.

Borrowing from Wilson, the conservative leader uses positive

rather than negative inducements. Conservative Negro leaders in

 

Lakeland, for example, favored first amending and then repealing a
city ordinance prohibiting the construction of public housing. Their
rationale was that this would allow construction of public housing for

the elderly. It was recognized that whites also were interested in this

 

goal. Similarly, conservative Negro leaders advocate and support

 

l. A crucial decision was made not to use recording devices in
the interview process. It was felt that better rapport could be estab-
lished if the interviewer were armed with no more than pad and pencil.
The result is that the study will not present verbatim quotations of
interviewees. We have faithfully tried to recall what was said as near-
ly verbatim as possible, but we recognized this as a difficult task. Al-
though some material will be presented following a format which nor-
mally suggests verbatim quotations, the reader ought to bear in mind
that the statements only approximate what was actually said.

programs d«
for Negroes
ency of Neg

The
51" his prefe
Opinion that
through an ,
White leade.
It is especi;
Negro Cons
crates or rr
tories into
one COHSerx
of solVlng d
bmtality.

The
for ”10ca1n
zations and
militant3_ ‘

and uni"er

 

sonne1 are

sible for C
!
natives f9

 

65
programs designed to result in greater employment Opportunities
for Negroes on the basis that this would reduce the welfare depend-
ency of Negro families.
The conservatives' preference for persuasion is complemented

by his preference for educational solutions. Conservatives are of the

 

opinion that both whites and Negroes must often be prepared for change
through an educational process. They recognize that in many issues,
white leaders are just as much in need of education as their followers.
It is especially to be noted that the educational process envisioned by
Negro conservatives may be a slow process. More so than either mod-
erates or militants, conservative leaders are willing to project vic-
tories into the far distant future. During the course of his interview,
one conservative Negro leader advocated education as the major means
of solving diverse problems related to housing, employment, and police
brutality.

The conservative leader is likely also to prefer “local" solutions

 

for "local" problems. In part, this is so because the outside organi-
zations and agents normally brought in are likely to be perceived as
militants--e. g. , the NAACP, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission,
and university researchers. In Lakeland today, power structure per-
sonnel are eSpecially hostile to outside forces whom they hold reSpon-
sible for creating adverse publicity. This fact is not lost upon conser-

vatives, for they too Oppose the outsiders. Recently a research group

~ my
“M

represe.
ducted a
and stuc
interest
membe
the Citi
been ex
Plan {01
activiti
haVE be
cOmrnu
Side ”l
Creast
whitES.
Negro

sl"i‘irs.

66
representing the School of Architecture from a nearby university con-
ducted a thorough study of Lakeland's housing problems. Some faculty
and student members of this research team maintained a continuing
interest in Lakeland's community affairs. The activities of former
members of the research team led to the formation of a group known as
the Citizens for a Progressive Lakeland Committee. This group has
been extremely vocal in their opposition to the city's urban renewal
plan focused on redevelopment of the central business district. The
activitites of both the research team and the “Citizens Committee"
have been reported in the Detroit neWSpapers, much to the dismay of
community leaders. The conservative Negro leader views such out-
side “interference” as undesirable in that it has the potential of in-
creasing racial tensions and severing his accessibility to influential
whites. Along with certain influential white leaders, the conservative
Negro leader feels that racial problems can be "created" by the out-

siders.

Rhetoric. We have labeled the conservative's rhetoric as con-
ciliatory. The conservative leader is concerned with diminishing the

intensity of racial conflict. His manner is basically nonthreatening.

 

He generally refuses to embarrass or insult whites; he rarely attempts

to antagonize or anger whites. His tone is basically nonemotive. Rarely

 

will he dramatize racial conflict as militant Negro leaders are fond of

doing. This leads militants to accuse conservatives of being more

even

obse
Sees

pohti

ence
POWe.

DY p0

This

whfie.
milita
mes,
Their

Unmbe

6?

interested in harmony than in justice. Conservative leaders are es-
pecially concerned with maintaining their individual dignity and self
reSpect. They take pride in their ability to Speak and act "diplomati-
cally. " They eSpecially deplore the "racist" approach of militants and
even some moderates.

Perhaps we can summarize with a quotation from Ladd, who
observed that the conservatives' approach “is essentially one which he
sees whites using successfully. His model is white middle-class

politics. The golden words of this type Of politics are moderation,

 

consensus, respectability, persuasion, and access. "1 The only differ-

 

ence is that white leaders using this approach Operate from a base of
power, and the effectiveness of such an approach is surely enhanced

by power.

Militant Leadership

 

At the Opposite pole Of the continuum is militant leadership.
This is Of course the type of leadership that is least acceptable to
whites. Often whites express their disapproval by Speaking not Of
militants, but rather of radicals. In most (if not all) Negro commun-
ities, militant leaders constitute a minority Of all Negro leaders.
Their influence, however, is probably greater than a consideration of

numbers alone would suggest. Ladd writes Of the militants:

 

1. Ladd, 92. cit., p. 172.

over V

ti’PeS
tion‘ls
bUt th
that (
WOrk
gram

be re

68

The goals which they pursue include those around
which interracial tensions are greatest; the means which
they select to advance the race generate the greatest
anxieties among whites; and their rhetoric tends to sharpen
rather than ameliorate racial conflict. 1

Goals. Militant Negro leaders generally prefer status goals

 

over welfare goals. Wilson, as we have seen, viewed status goals as

those which seek the integration of the Negro into all

phases Of community on the principle Of equality--all
Negroes will be granted the Opportunity to Obtain the

services, positions, or material benefits of the com-
munity on the basis Of principles other than race. 2

We have chosen to conceptualize status goals so that it has

reference not only to integration, but also tO the removal of the stigma

 

of race. This reconceptualization seems necessary, for there are
Negro leaders who do not accept integration as a goal, yet who are
militants in most other reSpects.

After considering the construction Of two separate and distinct
types which might have been labeled something like ”militant integra-
tionists" and "militant separatists", it was decided instead to construct
but the one "militantH type. This decision was based on our judgment
that (l) militant integrationists and separatists can and Oftentimes do
work together, and (2) many separatists would accept the goal Of inte-
gration if they perceived it to be a realistic goal--a goal which could

be realized within their lifetime.

 

1. Ibid., p. 176.

 

2. Wilson, 22' cit., p. 185.

69
Perhaps this can be illustrated by the remarks Of one Lakeland
leader who had commented that "There ought to be someone interested
in something other than integration. " When asked if he rejected inte-
gration as a goal for purely strategic reasons, he responded:

It's an unrealistic goal. I subscribe to a new uni-
versal humanism. This country was built along racial
lines. This is a racist nation; it always has been. It's
necessary for us to adOpt a program to free us. We need
power in order to do that. Really, we're a nation within
a nation. We're like an exploited, colonial nation. Inte-
gration will work to deprive us of all we ought to be working
towards.

I believe in Black People. What we need is greater
consciousness of race. The Negro was created out Of
slavery. Now Martin Luther King is a Negro, a nice
Negro. He can talk about that brotherly love all he wants,
but I can't see that it's going to get him anywhere. I
dream of a world dominated by Black People. Not Negroes,
but Black PeOple. I don't want a world dominated by Black
People merely so that we can dominate White PeOple. but
so that we can make it a better world. This is the first
step toward the establishment Of a universal humanism.
Racial pride or even chauvinism also motivates those militants
who do accept integration as a goal. In part, this is so because the
means they prefer are dependent upon a minimal level Of racial pride
and solidarity.

Militant leaders, according to our conceptualization, may
either accept or reject goals such as housing or school desegregation.
There are those militants who view housing desegregation as the cru-

cial step towards a truly integrated community. There are other mili-

tants who stress improvements in the quality of housing and education

as o
atti
cons

ma 1‘

Inili
tant:
negl

aCtn

t0 as
21fine
acCe
rack
Itis

0r r‘

Erati
facet
Such

direc

70
as Opposed to integration per se. In a sense, we have come full circle
at this point, for some militants seem to prefer welfare goals, as do
conservatives. But there are vital differences. The differences pri-
marily relate to means and rhetoric. But even as regards goals, the
tangible improvements sought by conservative leaders would not go
far in removing the stigma Of race, whereas the goals sought by those
militants rejecting integration would better serve that purpose. Mili-
tants argue that conservatives act to enhance their own status to the
neglect Of other members Of the subcommunity, whereas the militants'
actions serve to enhance the status Of all subcommunity members.

In a fundamental sense, a militant Negro leader may subscribe
to assimilation, or to pluralism, or even to some form of racial domi-
nance--e. g. , Black Power. Regardless of which of these goals is
accepted by militant Negro leaders, a first step is that Of overcoming
racial prejudice and discrimination, in all their many manifestations.
It is this similarity that accounts for the fact that militants preferring
or rejecting integration can and do work together in many instances.

Militant leaders in Lakeland have been more concerned than
others with residential segregation. Those militants preferring inte—
gration recognize residential segregation to be basic to other problems
faced by the Negro community. In the area of housing, the efforts Of
such militants in Lakeland during the course of the study were largely

directed toward two interrelated goals.

Plan
Velo;
allOne
have

hOuSi

the C

COmr

their

“disf

deHC‘

71

First, they were concerned with the repeal or ordinance 1560
which prohibited the construction of public housing. TO these militants,
it was clear that the intent Of the ordinance was to prevent residential
desegregation. At a later point, we must trace the circumstances
which led eventually to repeal. For now, however, we may note that
militant Negro leaders, together with white liberal leaders in the com-
munity, played a major role in this.

Second, these Negro militants were opposed to the Pellegrin
Plan which allocated city tax monies for many years to come to rede-
velopment Of the central business district. Negro leaders were not
alone in believing that the city's scarce economic resources ought to
have been allocated instead to programs designed to solve the city's
housing problems.

Another crucial status goal sought by Negro militants is in the
area Of politics. We have seen above that the current system by which
the city commission is elected has made it impossible for the Negro
community to elect its preferred candidates. Negro representatives
are, in effect, elected by whites. The election of a Negro commissioner
is not at issue. But the militants are here concerned with a status goal--
their right tO choose their own representative. In their eyes, their
"disfranchisement" is symbolic Of second class citizenship.

Militant Negro leaders are further characterized by their ten-

dency to advocate goals which intensify racial conflict-~cleavagegoals.

 

the
Wit]

fer.

Pel
lam
as l

72

They are most concerned with attaining goals which whites are least
willing to grant and status goals are generally Of this kind.

This tendency to emphasize goals which intensify racial con-
flict can be illustrated by the issues just discussed above. In 1955,
the city commission passed ordinance 1560 after having been presented
with petitions signed by several thousand city voters calling for a re-
ferendum on the issue Of public housing. Racial cleavage on this issue
was deep. Similarly, the popular referendum which approved the char-
ter amendment establishing the new electoral system revealed that
racial cleavage on this issue was nearly complete. Cleavage on the
Pellegrin Plan is somewhat different. There are many whites in Lake-
land Opposed tO the Pellegrin Plan, but many Of those would be equally
as vehement in Opposing any solution Of the city's housing problems

which called for residential desegregation.

Means. The militant leader subscribes to a protest model Of

 

m. From his perSpective, the difficulties faced by Negroes are
attributable almost entirely to the prejudice and discrimination Of
whites. For the militant, nothing is to be gained short Of struggle,
as the following exchange illustrates:

Q. Are there any whites in the community who you could
go to for help if you needed it?

A. I think you'll have to be more Specific. You'll have tO
give me a concrete or hypothetical problem.

Q. Then it's all relative to the situation?

73

A. Yes. But as a general rule, there's always a confron-
tation. Cooperation evolves from conflict. Once con-
flict is evident, then whites move either to Shut you up
or they move to cooperate in order to prevent greater
problems that would result were nothing done.

The militant recognizes the utility Of direct action and mass

participation. It would seem that the willingness tO use these means

 

has come to be the major difference between conservative and militant
leaders. Although direct action in Lakeland has been nonviolent, some
militants have argued that nonviolent direct action is no longer an
effective technique. The following, for example, was printed in the
Newsletter Of a local protest organization in Lakeland known as Positive
Action for Race Advancement (PARA):

Historically in the "movement" every Civil Rights
group has been committed to non-violence as a tactic. The
problem is that non-violence has come to mean more to the
white power structure than mere tactical maneuvers. It has
become an excuse, a break, a defense for the bigots in the
nation. They are able to move as slowly as they please in
giving us our rights as long as they can stand the minor
inconvenience Of pickets or marchers or peOple praying in
the streets. It has become a game among Southern whites
tO taunt, beat, whip, curse, kick, prod, stomp and Spit
upon "non-violent protestors“ knowing that they themselves
are in no danger of being injured in any way. Small children,
women, Old-folks, degenerates and drunks all take their
turns at the game. However, the game is not SO funny when
the bigots know that there may be retaliation. . . . The L.A.
mattg riot served notice that although Dr. King is committed
to getting his head whipped some of the "brothers" are not SO
inclined. They are tired of being pushed around and caged
in like animals in inhuman ghettos. They are not SOphisti—
cated enough to know or "to care" if they "set the movement
back 30 years. " They want to hit out at their Oppressors as
they see them. They want to take from the "credit store
exploiters", burn his shOp and hit him with a brick if he dares

Her

SCI"

int

tha‘

PM
Fri
ing

to

0r

l

to

74

Show his head. Irrational? Yes. Illegal? Yes--but the
proof of a protest is in its ability to change things.

Here is eXplicit recognition that direct action, nonviolent or violent,
serves as an outlet for hostility and aggression on the part Of the
participant. Militants See value in such tension release independent
of goal attainment.

Direct action has been used in Lakeland on several occasions
in the recent past. Militants led picketing at a local bowling alley
that had denied them entry. They also led picketing in frort Of the

Lakeland News when the paper editorially supported the candidacy Of

 

Barry Goldwater in 1964. Militants also led a protest march against
the Lakeland Board of Education and the City Hall. But the most impor-
tant instance of direct action appears to have emerged Spontaneously.
Shortly following the Northern High boycott in nearby Detroit, a demon-
stration and boycott was called for in a Lakeland junior high school to
protest the alleged "manhandling" of a Negro girl student by the school
principal. Although militant rhetoric appears to have played a part in
increasing tension, it was necessary for militant and moderate leaders
tO step in after action had been initiated by the parents Of school child-
ren. These leaders succeeded in dramatizing the discontent within the

Negro community, while at the same time preventing violence.

In contrast to the conservative leader, the militant will rely

on negative inducements. Whereas conservative leaders are careful

 

to protect the image Of the city, militants will not hesitate to publicize

75
the shortcomings of the city and its leaders. The threat to use more
drastic measures is usually implicit in the actions Of the militant
leader.
The militant has little faith in informal agreements or promises

and prefers legislative solutions instead. The militant's preference

 

for legislative or political solutions is not solely attributable to the
historically demonstrated utility Of such an approach, as Wilson has
Observed.
the effort to "politicize" the race question seems
to be another attribute of style, representing the urge for the
quick, the decisive, the comprehensive, and the permanent.
A new law can cut through laborious bargaining or the need

to educate or induce; it can be sweeping in its scope, and it

will endure. For all these reason, it is attractive to the

protest leader. 1

Wilson further Observes, however, that the militant's preference
for legislative solutions is matched by his antipathy toward politicians--
eSpecially Negro politicians. Militants are easily convinced that Negro
politicians would not be politicians at all unless their actions proved
satisfactory to whites. The militant's extreme dislike Of politicians
is compatible with his conSpiratorial view Of community and societal
power. Although politicians may occupy formal positions Of authority,
militants are convinced that power lies elsewhere.

Parenthetically, this seems an appropriate point to Observe

that the bargaining approach of the conservative leader is compatible

 

1. Wilson, 22. cit., pp. 221-222.

uifiilf
Wilsor

approz

Inente
VafiVe
and is
the co'
Rights
is niil
($011ng

.
Oi

>5

D——-

cia

lati On

§2£§§I
that th
ably.”
'iVe N.
Pohte_
and {0]

the mi.
\
1.

76

with legal solutions, as Opposed to legislative solutions. Following

 

Wilson, a legal solution stresses "court action and litigation"--the
approach most effectively used by the National NAACP. l
The militant's preference for legislative solutions is comple-

mented by his willingness to seek out higher authority. The conser-

 

vative leader, as we have seen, has a preference for local solutions
and is reluctant to appeal to higher authority--except perhaps through
the courts. It is militant leaders who file protests with the Civil
Rights Commission and with agencies of the federal government. It
is militant leaders who seek the support and assistance of liberal
congressmen and senators. And militants constantly remind city
Officials that local legislation or local governmental action is in vio-

lation Of state or federal law.

Rhetoric. We have labeled the rhetoric Of the militant as gut-
Spoken. Ladd Observes that "Militants are more outspoken in the sense
that their rhetoric poses racial controversy firmly, clearly, unavoid-
ably. "2 From the perSpective both of white leaders and Of conserva-
tive Negro leaders, the militants are often viewed as rude and im-
polite. For militants, rules Of etiquette seem secondary tO the candid

and forthright eXpression of grievances. Contrary to the conservative,

the militant's rhetoric is generally threatening to whites and emotive.

 

 

1. Ibid., p. 239.

2. Ladd, (_)p_. cit., pp. 191-192.

excerpt

distribu

1 I c] I t t

ttlSnluMO

1'6

fi.

tl(

in.

77
The militant's rhetoric may be illustrated by three brief
excerpts from the PARA Newsletter, which was at one period of time
distributed throughout the Negro community in Lakeland.

. many Negroes wait on the White Power Struc-
ture to grant them this freedom which we all desire. It's
too bad. They have not learned that no one gives you any-
thing worth having, that if you're born black, you're born
into the struggle for Negro freedom and that if we struggle
hard enough and long enough, one day, truly, the walls to
the white city of Jerico will come down. And great will be
the sound Of it.

As you know the white power structure in Lakeland
took our (Negro) vote from us two years ago. They did
this so that they could get rid of some real black, militant
leadership--Charles Washburn. They--the white power
structure--wanted to pick for themselves OUR leadership.
They want to keep their Old patronizing ways Of telling us
what's best for us. They don't like the idea of us choosing
our Own representatives because we're too dumb to pick
"reSpectable" folks.

SO, in order to help us refine our tastes they took
our vote from us. They had to think Of a way to beat the
Black man's choice. The Black Beater turned out to be a
charter amendment which gave us no more voice than the
Negro in Mississippi. . . . if we want to make decisions
for ourselves as to who represents us we must figure out
a way to beat the white man's Black Beater. This would
be an easy matter if "the brothers get together. " We should
organize and make some decisions on courses of action. If
we organized, we could dare the white power structure to
throw us Enore Of their representatives] .

>5! * *

During the days of slavery there were many Negroes
revolting against the system. These were, usually, the
field hands; they hated the whip, the extreme labor condi-
tion, the Splitting up of their families, and just the general
indignities they suffered. Then, on the other hand, there

ThESe

empha;

ConSer

535333
CePtual
F0r Ou

Wpe be

thOSe W

78

were those Negroes, usually the house slaves, who informed
on their Negro brethren. They did this in the name Of peace
and a desire to "keep in good with MASSUH. " There was
usually a reward for these people, Often referred to as "Uncle
Toms. " The reward was probably in the line of a gentle pat
on the head.

Well, today in Lakeland the problem is just about the
same. There are Negroes who are tired of living with the
indignities of having the snow on our streets plowed last,
having the city change the charter SO that we can no longer
select our own commissioner, and in general "keeping us
in our place." There are many Negroes who are tired of this
second class treatment. Yet, there are those Negroes who
are SO concerned about impressing whites and putting a few
dollars in their own pockets (mostly Negro dollars) that the
cause or efforts for our first class citizenship is Often sold
225..

When will these "sell outs" learn that they are not
respected by honest, sincere whites. But these "sell outs"
are loved by the bigots! George Wallace readily admits that
there are some Negroes whom he loves! This Wallace and
bigot-type love we don't need.

* * *

These selections indicate that the militant's rhetoric places heavy
emphasis on the themes of militancy, chauvinism, and criticism of

conservative Negro leaders.

Moderate Leadership

 

Between the two polar extremes of our continuum we may con-
ceptualize as many types of Negro leadership as seems warranted.
For our purposes, we have chosen to construct but one intermediate
type because it appears that this correSpondS best with the images Of

those who reside in Lakeland.

Giv
the‘;

W8

3151
for

bot

m0
bot
alt.
m0

Prc

79

Moderate Negro leaders perform very crucial functions.

Given their position between conservative and Militant Negro leaders
they play a vital role in resolving conflict among Negro leaders. AS
we have seen above, the resolution of intragroup conflicts is Oftentimes
prerequisite to the resolution Of conflicts between races. Moderates
also play a large role in the resolution Of these intergroup conflicts,
for their approach leads them to seek a middle ground acceptable to
both parties to conflict.

The leadership Of the moderate, as regards all three dimensions,
is characterized by ambivalence, flexibility and pragmatism. The
moderate is committed not SO much to a middle ground as he is tO
both polar alternatives. His Simultaneous commitment tO both polar
alternatives means that he is ambivalent toward each alternative. The

moderate is committed to both status and welfare goals, although he

 

probably leans toward status goals. However that may be, his selec-
tion Of goals is based upon consideration Of all factors impinging at
any particular time or place. His commitment to both polar goals
lends itself readily to a flexible and pragmatic stance. AS regards

means, the moderate is committed to both bargaining and_protest,

 

although he leans toward the use of persuasion. Ladd Speaks of the
moderate's attempt "to balance COOperation and protest. "1 Just as

with goals, in the selection of means he is able to adapt to the unique

circumstances bearing upon any particular issue. The moderate is

 

1. Ibid., p. 211.

80

both willing and able to choose the means which appear to Offer the
greater probability Of success. In terms Of rhetoric, the moderate
tempers his inclination toward militant eXpression, while at the same
time he clearly communicates to whites his dissatisfaction with the
existing system. In his rhetoric he adapts to the audience and his
perception Of their values, their interests, and their willingness to
cooperate or resist. Here also his approach is determined by a ra-

tional assessment of the probability of success.

Goals. Compared to the militant, the moderate has a greater

commitment to welfare goals. But compared to the conservative, the

 

moderate has a greater commitment to status goals. The moderate

 

is eSpecially attracted to those goals which appear negotiable within
the existant context Of race relations. He will push goals the conser-
vative is willing to leave tO the future, and he will retreat in the face
Of Opposition that would not deter the militant. In general, the mod-
erate is more impatient than the conservative but more patient than
the militant.

The moderate is eSpecially likely to stress those goals which
are crucial to the interests Of the entire community. Perhaps in this

sense, we may say that the moderate is committed to transracial goals,

 

as Opposed to racial goals. In the urban North Of the 1960's the mod-
erate has much tO say Of ameliorating poverty, unemployment, educa-

tional deprivation, etc. These are problems which are crucial to the

Negro

tothei

for E
aunt:
the su
wnhn

llS re]

the m
to USE
for tr
heam

which

hive.
Ollt CC

"Sin

81
Negro subcommunity, but they are also problems which are important

to the white community.

Means. The moderate, as we noted above, has a preference

for bargaining among leaders. Yet he recognizes well the utility Of

 

protest. One Of the more influential moderate leaders in Lakeland
admitted that he and other moderates were largely responsible for

the success Of PARA, which is easily the most militant organization
within the Negro community. Given PARA'S small membership and
its relative lack of finances and resources, it is doubtful that the
organization could have attained any success in the absence Of support
from moderates. This one moderate leader noted that PARA' s activ-
ities did not always make his job easier, but nonetheless it was a
positive force in the struggle for race advancement.

Whereas the conservative prefers positive inducements and

 

the militant prefers negative inducements, the moderate is willing

 

to use either. He is likely to use positive inducements in struggling
for transracial goals. He is likely tO use negative inducements when
he anticipates white Opposition, although he is careful in all actions

which may intensify racial conflict.

Rhetoric. The rhetoric of the moderate is basically amelior-
ative. His manner and approach are designed to prompt change with-
out completely disrupting the community. He is careful tO maintain

his individual dignity, even while communicating his distaste for the

 

im I: 3.3.: ’5‘

indign
1:31 o.
versu
His a:

COUCE

erw
unde

t0 c

82
indignities heaped upon Negroes. In attempting to resolve the rhetor-
ical clashes Of Opponents, whether it be Negro versus Negro or Negro
versus white, his total deportment projects an aura Of moderation.
His approach makes it easier for all others present tO make important
concessions without losing face. One moderate leader spoke Of a
technique Oftentimes used in negotiations with whites. According to
plan, one Negro leader would be allowed to "rant and rave" for a per-
iod, during which time the essentials Of the argument were stated
clearly and unequivically. Then the moderate would take the floor to
"cool things Off" by cautioning against emotionalism. The first speak-
er would take a militant stance to express the gravity Of the problem

under discussion, while the second would assume a moderate position

to clear the air and make negotiation possible.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

At several points in the first three chapters, it has been Ob-
served that leadership is largely a reSponse tO the social environ-
ment in which it Operates. In this chapter, we turn to a description
Of the research Site, a city which will here be identified by the pseud-
onym Of Lakeland. In describing the city and its peOple, we will
focus particularly on those factors which appear relevant for an exam-
ination of race relations and Negro leadership.

The Lakeland Chamber Of Commerce has written that "Pro-
gress was slow and growth lethargic until the first World War. From
then on, the transition from placidity to thriving industry was amaz-
ing. " In the nine years ending in 1923, Lakeland's pOpulation tripled
from 15,1500 to 47, 800. The increase in factory employment was
even greater--from 2, 975 at the beginning Of the War to 9, 573 in 1923.

It was in the first quarter Of the century that the auto industry
in Lakeland was firmly establised. The largest Of the three plants,
Chamberlain Motors, originally manufactured carriages prior to the
invention Of the automobile. The transition to automobiles was made

quickly once the potential of the market was realized. Another of the

major auto plants moved to Lakeland in 1905. The third major plant

was moved to Lakeland in 1922 when the company was only 14 years OH.

83

 

 

P0]

1m

g1;

84
A history of the city in the 20th century would focus on the growth of
the auto plants and the heavy inmigration Of workers tO provide labor
for the auto plants.

Table 1 (page 85) summarizes the growth of Lakeland and its
Negro population from the beginning of this century. The city's rapid
pOpulation growth that began during World War I continued until the
depression years, but growth since 1930 has been moderate. With
the exception Of the first decade Of the century, the city's Negro pop-
ulation has gown at a more rapid rate than the city's total population.
While the city's total population nearly doubled between 1920 and 1930,
the Negro population quadrupled. Between 1930 and 1960, the city's
pOpulation as a whole increased only 27%, but the Negro population
increased by 440%. The decade of the '60's still shows diSprOportionate
gians for the city's Negro population.

The relative gians Of the Negro pOpulation are probably even
more dramatic than the absolute gains. Though constituting less than
2% of the city's population as late as 1920, it is now estimated that
Negroes constitute 22%. The gain in relative terms is due not only
to natural increase and inmigration--the outmigration Of Lakeland's
whites is also crucial. Outlying suburban areas are growing rapidly.
The county's pOpulation grew from approximately 254, 000 in 1940 to
some 691, 000 in 1960. Currently county poulation is estimated at

about 850, 000.

85

 

 

Table 1: Lakeland's Negro Population
1900 - 1966

Year Lakeland Lakeland Percentage

Total POpulation Negro Population Negro
1900 9,769 151 1. 5
1910 14,532 192 1.3
1920 34,273 619 1.8
1930 64,928 2,553 3.9
1940 66,626 2,794 4.2
1950 73,681 6,867 9.3
1960 82,233 13,774 16.7
1966 83,1003‘ 18,282a 22.03

 

SOURCE: U.S. Census Of Population.

a.

 

Estimates.

50 mil
indust
three

1966,

Sociai
\

data 1

'11 aj

86
Lakeland today is a satelite industrial city located within a
50 mile radius of Detroit. The city is largely a one industry city:
industrial diversification is practically nonexistant. The city's
three major plants produce automobiles, trucks, and buses. In

1966, the total employment in the auto plants was nearly 38, 000.

Lakeland and Its People Today

Social Characteristics Of the Population

Tables 2 - 4 present occupational, income and educational
data for whites and nonwhites in Lakeland and the United States. 1
In presenting data for the U. S. , an attempt has been made tO provide
the most appropriate bases Of comparison with Lakeland data. Thus, .
in Table 2, the occupational data for the U.S. relate in all but one
instance to the employed male labor force in urban areas. In Table
3, all income data for the U. S. relate to families in urban areas. In
Table 4, all educational data for the U. S. relate to the urban popula-

tion. The exclusion Of the nonurban population in the tables was in-

tended primarily tO eliminate the rural South from consideration. In-

clusion Of this segment of the population eSpecially would have had a

depressing effect on income data.

Occupation. The industrial character of Lakeland is evident

 

in all three tables, but eSpecially in Table 2 (page 87). Nearly half

 

 

1. According to 1960 census data, 98. 5% Of Lakeland's nonwhites
Were then Negroes.

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88

the labor force are employed in manufacturing, and the difference be-
tween whites and nonwhites is Slight. For both whites and nonwhites,
the percentage employed in manufacturing is considerably higher than
in the urban areas of the nation. The percentage of Lakeland's Neg-
roes in manufacturing is fully twice as high as in the urban U.S. The
percentage of Lakeland's white males in both white collar occupations
and managerial and professional occupations is approximately four
times that Of Lakeland's Negroes. Contrasted with national figures,
the percentages in these occupational categories for both whites and
nonwhites are much lower in Lakeland. The low percentage of profes-
sional and managerial positions among Negroes is especially crucial,
for Negro leaders are recruited from these positions in diSprOpor-
tionately large numbers. The low percentages of Negro professionals
and managers are Offset somewhat, as we shall see, by the fact that
some Negro professionals who work in Lakeland but live elsewhere
nonetheless provide leadership for Lakeland's Negro community.
Whereas the percentage Of Lakeland whites employed as laborers or
in service occupations is essentially equal to that in urban America,
a much lower percentage Of Lakeland's nonwhites than at the national
level are so employed. In Lakeland, nonetheless, nearly two and a
half times as many nonwhite males than white males hold such jobs.
Although the data are not presented in Table 2, 44. 1% of Lake-

land's nonwhite females 14 years Old and over are in the labor force.

89
This compares with a percentage of 35.1% for whites. Of the non-
white females in the labor force, 35. 7% are private household work-
ers, while an additional 23.5% are service workers. These percent-

ages are 5. 6% and 28. 6% reSpectively for white females.

Income. In terms Of median family income, it can be seen in
Table 3 (page 90) that whereas the figures for Lakeland and the nation
are relatively comparable for whites, the figure for nonwhite fam-
ilies in Lakeland is nearly a thousand dollars higher than for nonwhite
urban families in the nation as a whole. Thus, despite the fact that
the median income Of nonwhite families in Lakeland is only three-
fourths that of the median income Of Lakeland's white families, the
descrepancy between categories is much less than at the national
level.

Much the same pattern holds if we lOOk at the percentage Of
families earning less than $3, 000. This figure is frequently used as
a measure of impoverishment. As regards whites, the percentages Of
poor families in Lakeland and in the nation are equivalent. But the
percentage of poor nonwhite families is one-fourth lower in Lakeland.
The percentage Of poor nonwhite families in Lakeland is still consider-
able, however, and it is more than twice as high as the figure for white
families. In one census tract in the Negro community, 45. 4% Of the

nonwhite families earn less than $3, 000. The median family income

fOr nonwhites in this one tract is $3,559.

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91

Considering next those families earning more than $5, 000
and those earning more than $10, 000, it can be seen that, relative
tO families in the urban U. S. , both white and nonwhite families in
Lakeland are overrepresented at the lower level and underrepresented
at the higher level. An eSpecially high percentage Of Lakeland's non-
white families then, earn more than $5, 000 but less than $10, 000.

As a generalization we may say that compared to families in
urban America, Lakeland's families are clustered in a middle range
in terms Of income distribution: relatively fewer families are classi-
fied as poor, and relatively fewer families are classified as affluent.

This generalization is even stronger for nonwhites than for whites.

Educational Attainment. Data presented in Table 4 (page 92)

 

show the expected educational gap between racial categories, both in
Lakeland and in the urban U.S. In every instance, however, that gap
is narrower in Lakeland than at the national level. In contrasting
Lakeland with U.S. urban data, we see that, in general, the Lakeland
pOpulation (both white and nonwhite) is relatively undereducated. 1 The
percentages Of both whites and nonwhites in Lakeland completing high
school and going to college are especially low. In part, this is due to
the heavy inmigration Of both whites and nonwhites from Southern

states. But on an impressionistic level, it also seems that many

‘

1. Note that the data for median years Of school completed for
whites in Lakeland are not given.

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93
Lakeland youth, Negro and white, are enticed into drOpping out Of
school at a relatively early stage in order tO work at the plants. The
recent lowering of educational standards Of employment in the plants

certainly is not a factor encouraging young peOple to remain in school.

Patterns of Race Relations

 

In focusing primarily on data available in census materials, we
have thus far provided but a minimal description Of Lakeland and its
peOple. In the remainder Of this chapter, we will turn tO a description
Of community race relations in five crucial areas. These areas are
here considered crucial because Negro leaders themselves define
them as crucial. In our examination Of the dynamics Of Negro leader-
ship in Chapters VI and VII below, we will analyze the ways in which
Negro leaders have attempted to resolve the problems they perceived
in these five crucial areas. The descriptive sections which follow are

intended to "set the stage" for that analysis.

Housing. In the eyes Of Lakeland's residents, Negro and white,
housing is easily the major problem facing the community. But the
housing problem is eSpecially salient for Negroes. As in most urban
Centers, the problem is two-fold. Lakeland's Negroes are concerned
about de facto residential segregation, and they are concerned about

the quantity and quality of housing available to them.

The pattern of residential segregation is well established in

Lakeland. According to 1960 census data, nearly 94% Of the city's

94
13, 774 Negroes lived in but three of the city's 16 census tracts. The
percentage of Negroes living in these three census tracts in 1960 was
94. 4%, 87.4%, and 27.8%. As is the general rule, these tracts are
near the center Of the city. Many Negro homes are close to industrial
plants or large warehouses. At one point, the Negro ghetto is actually
Split by a rather wide industrial belt. This division probably detracts
somewhat from the solidarity of the Negro subcommunity.

In recent years, the ghetto has expanded, primarily into con-
tiguous residential areas. The major exception to this rule is a hous-
ing subdivision somewhat removed from the ghetto into which a number
of middle class Negro families have moved recently. Although it is
not yet certain that racial balance has been achieved, many who live
there are hopeful that such is the case.

In general, both the direction and the Speed Of the ghettO'S ex-
pansion is controlled by a complex web of factors including the atti-
tudes Of Lakeland's residents (Negro and white), the practices of the
construction industry, realtors, financial institutions, local govern-
mental action or inaction, and the economic condition of the Negro
pOpulation. As a result Of the inability to Obtain adequate housing,
many middle-class Negroes who work in Lakeland do not reside there.
More than half of Lakeland's Negro teachers, for example, commute
daily from Detroit or elsewhere. This factor detracts considerably

from the pool Of Negro residents possessing characteristics which

 

kmuunnnr, I...
.—

 

95
would qualify them for positions Of leadership. On the other hand,
those nonresidents who serve as Negro leaders are not fully identified
with the community.

In recent years, Lakeland has been characterized by a highly
restricted housing market. Both whites and Negroes have serious
difficulties in securing housing suitable to their tastes and economic
means. Several important consequences follow from this condition.

\;_The restricted housing market means that pressures within the ghetto
for expansion are increased, while at the same time the pressures
from without for resisting ghetto eXpansion are increased. In the pro-
cess Of ghetto expansion, it appears that racial transition proceeds
more slowly than it otherwise might because Of (1) the difficulty Of
Negro families' breaking through barriers Of resistance, and (2) the
inability of many white families to buy their way out Of the transitional
areas that eventually come to be. Additionally, there comes tO be a
discrepancy between the amount of rent demanded and the quality Of
the housing available. Furthermore, many (though not all) of the
pople who reside in the "buffer" or "grey" zones contiguous to the
ghetto are working class whites of Southern or Appalachian origin or
ancestry. All this, together with the deteriorating and dilapidated

quality of Lakeland's housing in and near the ghetto, accounts for a

V ery volatile situation.

Much Of Lakeland's housing is unsound, to use the indiscrim-

in ate vocabulary Of the Bureau Of the Census. Projecting from 1960

96
census data, it was estimated that in 1966 there were 5, 000 unsound
housing units in Lakeland. In the same study, it was also estimated
that more than 10,000 persons lived in unsound housing. 1 Again
according to 1960 census data, of those occupied housing units with
nonwhite household heads, 20. 7% were classified as "deteriorating,"
while an additional 7. 5% were classified as "dilapidated." Overcrowd-
ing is also a reality Of life in the Negro ghetto, for 23. 6% Of those
housing units were classified as overcrowded.

Some Negro families in Lakeland live today in barracks hous-
ing that was constructed as temporary units during World War II years.
These 72 units are what remains Of a larger number Of units construc-
ted tO accomodate the rapid influx of workers attracted to the auto
plants which were then busy manufacturing defense materiel. There
is a general consensus that if housing codes were rigidly enforced,
all these units could be condemned immediately. Another 400 housing
units located nearby constitute a public housing develOpment construc-
ted in 1951-52. This development proved to be a stumbling block to
the construction of more public housing in Lakeland, as we will see at

a later point.

 

1. Anonymous, The Case for Housing: Lakeland Michigan
(1966), p. 4.

 

2. Overcrowding is here determined on the basis Of 1.01 or more
persons per room.

97

One further aSpect Of housing in Lakeland ought to be mention—
ed. Contrary tO the situation in many cities, the Negro residential
areas are generally somewhat removed from the major highways
leading into and out Of the city. In an important sense, the Negro
ghetto is largely invisible to many Of Lakeland's white citizens. This
invisibility could be an important factor contributing to the general ig-
norance Of the Negro community on the part Of many white community

leaders.

Education. De facto residential segregation is reflected in the
racial composition Of the city's schools. Tables 5 and 6 (pages 98 and
99) Show the racial composition Of the Lakeland public schools at the
student body and faculty levels. In both tables, we have distinguished
between nonwhite or "Negro" and white Schools on the basis Of the
majority composition Of the student bodies. 1

Of the city's 28 elementary schools, seven had nonwhite student
majorities in the fall Of 1965. The percentages Of nonwhite students
in those seven schools were then as follows: 99. 8%, 98. 7% 97. 6%,
96.4%, 89. 3%, 82. 4%, and 51. 7%. While 86. 4% Of Lakeland's non-

white elementary students were enrolled in schools in which nonwhite

students constituted a majority, 82.6% Of the city's white elementary

1. Although the source provides data for "nonwhites," it would
appear that nearly all nonwhites were Negroes.

98

Table 5: Racial Composition
of Lakeland Public Schools:
Student Body (Fall, 1965)

 

Level
Majority Composition Nonwhite White N
Of Student Body % %

 

Elementary

Nonwhite (7 schools) 87. 7 12.3 3, 745
White (21 schools) 5.1 94. 9 10,040
Total 27.6 72.4 13,785

----—-----—-—----——---——---—-q------——--—-—-------_---------_---

Junior High

 

 

Nonwhite (2 schools) 71. 8 28.2 1, 511
White (4 schools) 6. 93.2 3, 450
Total 26.6 73.4 4,961
Secondary
Lakeland High 36. 9 63.1 2,163
Johnson High 7.0 9 . 1,863
Total 23.1 76. 9 4,026
TOTAL 26.6 73 4 22,772

 

SOURCE: Lakeland Board Of Education

99

Table 6: Racial Composition
of Lakeland Public Schools
Faculty (Fall, 1965)

 

 

Levfl
Majority Composition Nonwhite White N
Of Student Body % %

 

Elementa ry

 

Nonwhite (7 schools) 62.2 37. 8 135
White (21 schools) 7. 9 92.1 342
Total 23.3 76.7 477

Junior High

 

 

Nonwhite (2 schools) 36. 7 63. 3 79
White (4 schools) 5.5 94.5 163
Total 15. 7 84. 3 242
Secondary
Lakeland High 6. 1 93.9 99
Johnson High 2. 5 97.5 81
Total 4. 4 95. 6 180
TOTAL 17 5 82 5 899

 

SOURCE: Lakeland Boa rd of Education

100
students were enrolled in schools in which nonwhite students consti-
tuted 8. 0% or less Of the student body.

As a result Of consolidation and differential attrition rates,
racial segregation is not as marked at the junior high and secondary
levels. Still there are two Negro junior highs, schools with nonwhite
percentages Of 97.9 and 53.3. Of all the city's nonwhite junior high
students, 82. 1% attended the two Negro schools. Only 6. 8% Of the
students in the other four junior highs were nonwhite.

The city has only two high schools. One is clearly "the"
Negro school, although nonwhite students do not constitute a majority
there. Of all the city's nonwhite high School students, however, 86.0%
attended Lakeland High in 1965. (To many persons, Lakeland High is
known as "Congo High. ") It is probably best to characterize Lakeland
High as a "biracial" rather than an "integrated" school. Just as in
the larger community, race is an important determinant Of the strat-
ification system within the school. All evidence available suggests
that segregation is an important fact Of life within the school.

Much Of the folklore within the Negro community centers about
the more or less subtle patterns Of discrimination within the city's
schools. One hears reports Of a high school administrator who a1-
legedly advised a "white" girl Of "mixed" parents to discontinue dating
a "Negro" boy; a former junior high school principal who had "man-

handled" Negro girls, and who customarily advised Negro students

101

not to take scholastic matters seriously, but rather to prepare for a
life Of menial labor; the customary exclusion Of Negro students from
competition for scholastic honors; the discouragement of Negro parti-
cipation in extracurricular club activities; the inadequacy of educa-
tional and occupational counseling for Negro students; etc.

Interestingly, the visibility Of Negro students at Lakeland High
is eSpecially marked in interscholastic athletics. Negro students are
especially represented in diSprOportionately large numbers on the
school football and basketball teams, as any reader Of the Lakeland
News Sports section knows.

Turning to a consideration of racial segregation at the faculty
level, nonwhite teachers constituted a majority in all but one Of the
seven Negro elementary schools in 1965. Although relatively large
numbers of white teachers held positions at Negro schools, relatively
few nonwhite teachers taught at white Schools. Nonwhite teachers are
disproportionately represented at the elementary level; only at this
level were Negro teachers representdd in prOportion tO the nonwhite
pOpulation Of the city. The further the Negro student goes in school,
the fewer Negro teachers he encounters.

Racial segregation is also evident at the administrative level.

All six Of the Negro administrators in the fall of 1965 served in Negro

elementary and junior high schools. In the Spring Of 1966 for the first
time, one Of those Negro administrators was given a position on the

Central administrative staff of the city board of education.

102

Going beyond the concern for de facto segregation, many Negro
leaders also feel that the quality Of education provided in Negro schools
is inferior tO that provided in white schools. It is charged, for exam-
ple, that the inexperienced and inferior teachers, Negro and white, are
assigned to Negro schools. It is also charged that white teachers in
Negro schools fail to understand or appreciate Negro youth. White
teachers allegedly perpetuate the ignorance Of Negro students by as-
suming that Negro students have a low learning capacity and reacting
accordingly. Some Negro leaders also point to gross differences in
terms of physical plants, visual aids, text materials, etc. It must
be noted here that it is extremely difficult to assess the validity Of
such charges.

Many Negro leaders, however, will point tO the results Of
standardized achievement tests to support such arguments. The tests
alone, Of course, do not validate the charges made by Negro leaders,
but a full discussion of the reasons for this would take us far afield.

For our purposes at this point, perhaps it will suffice tO Ob-
serve that in evaluating educational achievement, there are some
Negro leaders who ignore completely the debilitating impact Of the
Negro family and the Negro community; others probably minimize the

importance Of those factors. However this may be, it is important

that Negro leaders are aware Of the generally inferior product of the
Negro schools, and many of them are Of the Opinion that city school

Officials are not doing all they might to narrow the educational gap.

103

Politics. As might be eXpected Of a major industrial city,
Lakeland is predominantly Democratic. Inasmuch as Lake County
is a part Of Detroit's "bedroom suburbia," however, the county is
staunchly Republican. Unoffical returns from the 1966 election dem-
onstrate that Lakeland is a Democratic island in a Republican sea.
Table 7 (page104) shows that deSpite the fact that Democratic candi—
dates in every instance carried Lakeland, Republican candidates won
every major race except one. In that one race, a Democratic candi-
date carried the one state representative district which is entirely
within the limits Of Lakeland. In every comparable instance, Repub-
lican candidates polled a higher percentage Of the county vote than Of
either the city or state vote.

The difficulty faced by the Democratic Party in Lakeland is
made more severe by the fact that many Democratic voters in Lakeland
are conservative on both economic and noneconomic issues. A large
proportion of Democratic Party voters is drawn from white, Southern
migrants who are eSpecially sensitive to civil rights issues. UAW
Officials would have difficulty convincing many Of their members to
vote for a candidate brave enough to adopt a liberal stance on civil
rights. At the local level, this difficulty is compounded by the nature

Of the city's electoral system, which will be discussed shortly. The

result is that at the local level, in particular, elected Democrats are

lifely to be as conservative as elected Republicans.

104

Table 7: Electoral Returns for Major Political Offices

(November 8, 1966)

 

Office(s) Lakeland Lake Michigan
Vote County State
Candidate(s)a Voteb VoteC
Party % ‘70 0/0

 

Governor and Lt. Governor

 

 

 

 

 

 

Romney and Milliken (R) 48. 3 69. 2 60. 5
Ferency and Bruff (D) 51. 7 30. 8 39. 5
Unites States Senate
Griffin (R) 45.1 64. 7 56.1
Williams (D) 54. 9 35.3 43. 9
United States Congress
Monroed (R) 37.8 55. 3
Gibsond (D) 62. 2 44. 7
State Senate
Clark‘r (R) 40.2 53.2
Richardsond (D) 59. 8 46. 8
State Representative
Morrisond (D) 63. 6
Wrothd (R) 36.4
State Representative
Aarond (R) 23.2 53. 5
I-Iinmand (D) 76. 8 46. 5

 

SOURCE: The Lakeland News.

 

In each instance. the winning ticket is listed first.
Includes Lakeland city vote.

Includes Lake County vote.

Psuedonym.

Geno‘s»

105

The city is governed by a commission-manager system and
Operates on the basis of a 1922 charter. Commission elections are
nonpartisan. Commisssion candidates are nominated by wards in a
primary, but are elected at-large in a subsequent general election.
Under this system, the current commission has three members
(Of seven) who were rejected in the general election by their home
ward voters. This electoral system, as we will see, Operates es-
pecially to the disadvantage of Negro and liberal segments Of the elec-
torate, deSpite the fact that the commission generally has had one
Negro member in recent years.

The Tomlinson Motors Corporation, which iS the parent com-
pany Of all three Of the city's auto plants, is clearly in a position tO
exert considerable influence in the political affairs Of Lakeland. The
evidence suggests, however, that TMC does not rule Lakeland with
an iron hand. Many Negro and liberal white leaders feel that that is
unnecessary, and argue that the indirect influence of the Corporation
is sufficient. These persons feel that those who constitute the com-

munity power structure anticipate the desires of TMC and act accord-

ingly.

Employment. Our discussion above Of the occupational and

 

income distributions in Lakeland serves as an introduction to this
section on employment. The economic well-being of Lakeland is so

Closely tied tO the automobile industry that we will here limit our

106
discussion to the auto plants and the union. Table 8 (page107) provides
employment data for the last ten years for all three TMC plants in
Lakeland combined. The general employment trend has been upward.
Lakeland's auto plants have acted as magnets drawing both Negroes
and whites from the South and elsewhere. Due tO the low supply of
manpower resources locally, TMC has not only lowered its standards
Of employment, but additionally it has on occasion found it necessary
to directly recruit workers in other parts of Michigan and in other
states. Although the historical record is not clear, reports indicate
that the heaviest outside recruiting was done in the World War II years,
in 1953, and again in 1966. In that last year Chamberlain Motors re-
cruited approximately 400 workers in the Appalachian area, approxi-
mately half Of whom were Negro. This was a very unrewarding com-
pany venture. In large measure because Of the restricted housing
market in Lakeland which prevented many workers from living with
their families and forced many to take rooms in hotels and boarding
houses as far away as Detroit, few Of the new employees became per-
manent employees.

DeSpite the general upward trend, it is clear that employment

in the plants is subject to drastic fluctuations. Average employment

was down 6, 000 in 1958 and down again by about 2, 500 in 1961. This
fluctuation in employment results from the fact that the auto industry is
among the first to respond tO important changes in the national economy.

There can be no gainsaying it: as goes the nation, so goes Lakeland.

107

Table 8: Average Employment
TMC Locations in Lakeland

 

1957 25,845
1958 19,705
1959 22,804
1960 25,399
1961 22,889
1962 26,398
1963 27,976
1964 29,991
1965 35,251
1966 37,782

 

SOURCE; Personal communication from the Director Of Personnel
Services, Tomlinson Motors Corporation.

108

A steady upward trend is also evident in the average hourly

earnings of auto industry employees, as Table 9 (page 109) reveals.

Although these data relate to all U.S. employees, it is doubtful that

Lakeland differed Significantly. The yearly payroll for all TMC man-

ufacturing Operations in Lakeland in 1966 was nearly $334 million.

Although adequate historical data are unobtainable, Negro

labor leaders noted that it was not until World War II years that

Negroes were hired in large numbers in Lakeland's auto plants. At
that time, Negroes were largely confined tO unskilled and sem-skilled

positions in general, and sanitation positions in particular. Even

though Negro workers are now diSperSed throughout the plants at all
skill levels, they appear still to be concentrated eSpecially in the

foundary, on the assembly lines, and in sanitation. In other words,

they are still concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled positions,
despite some measure Of diSpersion. Negro leaders are especially
sensitive to the general problem Of upgrading in the plants. They are
concerned that few Negro workers qualify for industry training schools
and apprenticeship programs; that there are not more Negro foremen;

and that few Negroes hold clerical or administrative positions.
In all this, it appears that the Negro worker suffers more from

past discrimination than from present discrimination. Clearly as a

result of past discrimination, many Negro workers lack the educational
qualifications and the occupational training required. Negro workers
are also disadvantaged because many are relatively low on union sen-

iority lists, and this too is related to past discrimination.

109

Table 9: Average Hourly Earnings
for TMC Employes in U.S.

 

1940 $1.00
1950 1.82
1957 2.64
1958 2.82
1959 2.93
1960 3.06
1961 3.15
1962 3.26
1963 3.41
1964 3.57
1965 3.74
1966 3.87

 

SOURCE: Personal communication from the Director of Personnel
Services, Tomlinson Motors Corporation.

110

They probably also suffer more from the informal disc rimina-
tion of co-workers than from the formal discrimination Of management
In the plants where a foreman's recommendation is crucial to promo-
tion, for example, Negro workers will experience some discriminatory
treatment. One Negro informant concerned with employment problems
reports that a Negro promoted to a foreman's position can expect to
experience social discrimination from white co—workers. This infor-
mal discrimination has apparently led some Negroes to give up foreman
positions and return to their Old jobs. Negro workers may also be
disadvantaged in the hiring of clerical and administrative personnel,
for a concern of management is the determination Of the applicant's
ability tO "relate to" the public or co-workers. This determination is
made by means of a personal interview, and given the compositon Of
the public and the plant work force, it may be that color is perceived
as a barrier to the establishment of rapport. As a generalization,
however, it appears that Negro workers are handicapped more by the
lack of proper educational background and occupational skills than by
formal discriminatory procedures. The existing discrimination is
such that it is difficult for either management or union Officials to
COpe with it. Promotional decisions, in accordance with contractual
arrangements with the union, rely heavily upon written, Objective
examinations. Even for clerical and administrative positions, the

personal interview is accompanied by an Objective examination. The

111
union has established appeal procedures for those who feel that they
have been victims of discrimination. According to reports from both
management and labor, few such charges are made, and it is rare
indeed that such charges are substantiated.

According to one source close tO employment problems, yomg
Negro workers in the plant are quickly socialized by Older workers
in such a way that they eventually become disillusioned and subse-
quently temper their original aSpirations for upward mobility. They
then settle for a passable performance of the tasks required in what-
ever job they hold.

Each of the plants has cooperated with the Urban League in a
number of programs. An example is provided by the Summer Pro-
gram established at Chamberlain Motors. Through this program,
the plant provides summer employment for Negro college youth be-
ginning the summer prior to their entering college. The program
began four years ago with 24 Negro boys and girls enrolled. Each
summer Since the plant has added newly graduated seniors on their
way to college, in addition to employing the returnees. This program
was deliberately intended to tap the more promising Negro youngsters
at an early stage in hopes of encouraging them tO accept permanent
positions after completing college. It is hoped that these college
graduates will be able to step into positions not customarily held by

Negro workers.

112

Race relations in the union bears Similarities to race relations
in the plants. Universalistic rules are in force which reduce discrimi-
nation largely tO an informal level. Yet union leadership, just as the
local Democratic Party, is somewhat constrained by the composition
of its membership. The egalitarian ethos Of industrial unionism is
tempered whenever issues bear directly on the local, nonoccupational
interests of the worker. For example, it is doubtful that union leaders
could gain solid support from rank-and-file union members if they were
tO advocate a public housing program designed to contribute to residen-
tial desegregation.

There are a number Of Negro workers who hold important union
positions despite the prejudice of a large number of white workers.
Negro workers may realistically aspire tO preSigious and reSponsible
positions within the union hierarchy. One has long held a position at
the regional administrative level. Another is the elected ShOp Commit-
tee Chairman in the Chamberlain Motors local. Another represents
his Shop in the National Bargaining Committe, also an elective posi-
tion. Numerous others hold less reSponsible positions. In terms Of
Negro leadership, the union is vitally important in that it provides
an arena in which Negroes learn important leadership skills which are

then used in protest organizations and elsewhere--eSpecially in politics.

Police and Community Relations. DisreSpect both for law and

 

of law Officers runs deep in most Negro communities. Police brutality,

113
false arrest, general harrassment, the inadequacy of police protec-
tion in the Negro community--these are basic issues for those who
would be Negro leaders. On the other hand, crime is Oftentimes a
way Of life for many in the Negro community. Wherever the proba-
bility Of being rewarded for conforming behavior is relatively low,
the probability of deviant behavior is relatively high.

Thus it is that relations between the police and the Negro com-
munity are Often strained. In talking with Negro leaders in Lakeland,
however, one is surprised to discover that they are relatively content
with the local police department and its activities. One hears a gen-
eral complaint Of the lack of police protection in the Negro community
and a more Specific complaint of the slowness with which the police
reSpond to calls from Negroes. (Lakeland's whites have the same
complaints.) But criticism normally halts at that point.

Such was not always the case in Lakeland. The present chief
of police has served in that capacity for about four years. From the
very beginning, he moved conscientiously tO improve the image Of the
police department in the Negro community. He insisted upon a prO-
fessional performance Of duty on the part of policemen, and he sought
to provide better services. He eSpecially worked tO establish good
relationships with Negro leaders. Many of Lakeland's Negro leaders
have met with selected members of the police force for lengthy discus-

sions Of community relations problems The department will soon

114

sponsor a Youth Service Corps. This is to be a demonstration pro-
gram in which fourteen and fifteen year Old boys identified as poten-
tial juvenile delinquents are actually put to work on the police force.
The youngsters will accompany police Officers on their rounds, hand-
ling routine radio calls, searching for abandoned cars, etc. Part Of
the program is also given over to class room activities. It is hoped
that this will contribute to a greater understanding and appreciation
Of police activities on the part Of the participants.

As a result Of these efforts, the charges of police brutality
have subsided. Policemen no longer harrass Negro citizens as they
once did routinely, according to the reports Of Negro leaders. And
policemen are no longer discourteous to Negro citizens, as they once
were. All this is a remarkable achievement, given the handicap under
which the police chief worked. Although the force has not been increas-
ed in Size for eleven years, the work load has increased by 700% during
that period. Additionally, Lakeland's policemen are not well paid, and
this adversely influences the quality Of personnel.

Negroes play a large role in the various forms Of vice that are
to found in Lakeland. The numbers racket, or Yellow Dog, is confined
primarily to the auto plants where the police have no jurisdiction.
Many Of the runners are Negroes. It is reported that janitorial jobs
are sought after, for the mobility required in these jobs lends itself
to maintaining numbers routes in the plant. Several thousands of dol-

lars reportedly leave the plants each day as a result Of these activities.

115

Prostitution, for the most part, is unorganized and Of the
street variety. On one occasion the police moved in to break up
prostitution which had thrived at a particular corner in the Negro com-
munity for many years. Within days, however, the street walkers had
relocated at a new corner some distance away. Organized prostitution
is to be found in two houses Of prostitution in the Negro community.

At least one Of these is run by a Negro madam and supplied with Negro
prostitutes from Detroit. This house reportedly serves regular cus-
tomers, and the customers are exclusively white.

After hours bootlegging is also fairly wide Spread. Here also
many of the leg men are Negroes. The night shifts of the auto plants
undoubtedly make this a lucrative business.

According to police reports, there is also some traffic in
"soft" narcotics. These last three mentioned forms Of vice--prostitu-
tion, bootlegging, and dOpeOften are closely associated. The new
corner of the prostitutes also serves as a business center for those
peddling dope and bootleg whiskey, just as did the Old corner closed
down by the police.

Negroes appear to have little to do with bookmaking and gamb-
ling. The biggest bookie in town works out Of one Of the city's hotels.
Presumably he will place bets for both Negroes and whites, but there
are apparently no Negro bookies in town. Other forms of gambling,

notably card playing, are centered primarily in bars near the plants

in the northern end Of town--outside the Negro community.

CHAPTER V

NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND

In this chapter, we will first provide a description of metho-
dological procedures used in the study. Then we will present a pro-
file of Negro leadership in Lakeland. These tOpics are not as unre-
lated as it may seem at first glance, for the selection of the technique
by which leaders were identified constituted one Of the more important
methodological decisions made during the course Of the study. Most
data were collected directly from the identified leaders, and the unique-
ness of the methodological techniques employed is to be found solely

in the interview procedures.

Methodology

 

The Identification Of Leaders

 

Negro leaders were identified by means of the reputational
technique. Negro "judges" or "knowledgeables" were selected repre-
senting the following institutional Spheres: business, independent pro-
fessions, education, religion, and labor. The judge representing
business was a real estate broker and one of the most successful busi-
nessmen in the Negro community; the representative for the indepen-
dent professions was a physician who had practiced for many years

116

117
in Lakeland; the representative of education held the highest adminis-
trative position among Negroes in the city; the representative Of
religion was the minister of one Of the Oldest and largest churches
within the Negro community; and the representative Of labor was the
elected president of an AFL-CIO union local who had lived all his life
in Lakeland. A sixth judge represented a local protest organization.
Judges, in addition to identifying Negro leaders, were asked to identify
the more important organizations representing and serving the Negro
subcommunity and to identify the past and current issues salient to the
Negro subcommunity.

In selecting leaders, the judges were told to consider as leaders
those who were able to make decisions and formulate general policies
affecting Lakeland's Negro community as a whole. After a judge had
named leaders, he was questioned as to whether or not there were
Negro leaders in various institutional Spheres which were not repre-
sented on his original list. It was felt that this procedure would assure
a listing Of all persons the judge identified as Negro leaders.

The six judges cast a total Of 93 votes, 64 of which were cast
for a total of 20 persons. Each of those 20 persons received two or
more votes, and were arbitrarily identified as Negro leaders on that
basis. Twelve of the 20 received three or more votes, and five of
those twelve persons were themselves judges who refused to vote for

themselves. The remaining 29 persons listed received but one vote each.

118
Subsequent research indicated clearly that there would have been no
substantial differences had leaders been identified on the basis Of

issue analysis.

The Reputational Approach

 

Since the first use Of the reputational approach by Floyd

Hunter, 1

there has been a great deal Of controversy regarding its
use. 2 A review Of this literature would take us far afield. Perhaps
it will be sufficient to note that the technique has been used by a num-
ber of persons in studies Of Negro leadership. 3 Pfautz has been per-
haps the most emphatic in proclaiming the reliability Of the approach
as an indicator of influence. He notes that "many Of the recent criti-

cisms which have been made Of the SO-called reputational approach

to the study Of community power structures have considerably less

 

1. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City, N. Y. :

 

Anchor Books, 1953).

2. See, for example: William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller,
Industry, Labor and Community (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1960), chap. 14; Charles Press (ed. ) Main Street Politics: Policy-
Making at the Local Level (East Lansing: Institute for Community
Development, Michigan State University, 1962); and William V.
D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (eds. ), Power and Democracy in
America (Notre Dame, Ind: University Of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

 

 

 

 

3. See Harold W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro
Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View, " Phylon, Vol.
23, NO. 2 (Summer, 1962), pp. 156-166; M. Elaine Burgess, Negro
Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill: The University Of North
Carolina Press, 1960); Hunter, pp. _§i_t ; and Ernest A. T. Barth and
Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Community,"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 24 (February, 1959), pp. 69-76.

 

 

119

nl

validity when applied to the Negro sub-community. He goes on to

Observe that the sub-community social structure
is likely to be monolithic in character, involving a
small, articulate leadership at the top and an undiffer-
entiated and inarticulate mass at the bottom. Further,
despite tendencies toward differentiation Of leadership
types according tO issues which have been Observed

in metropolitan centers with large Negro pOpulationS,

there is only one issue in the final analysis: the
2

ubiquitous race question.

The study reported here Offers partial support for Pfautz'
views. AS will be seen in Chapters VI and VII, a focus on issue analy~
sis clearly reveals the identified Negro leaders to have been key actors
in the attempted or actual resolution Of crucial issues. The monolithic
character of Negro community leadership, however, must not be over-
stated. Although the reputational technique provides a means Of identi-
fying influential leaders, whether or not those identified leaders con-
stitute a monolithic body devoid of serious cleavage(s) must be dis-
covered by other means. In our study of Lakeland, issue analysis
(as reported in Chapters VI and VII) clearly reveals the existence of

cleavages within the subcommunity leadership.

Data Collection: The Interview
Interviews with these identified Negro leaders provided the

most important source of data for the study. Nineteen of the twenty

 

l. Pfautz, pp. cit., p. 164.

2. Ibid., p. 165.

120
leaders were interviewed. (Actually, all twenty were interviewed,
for one had been interviewed as a judge prior to his moving to another
city during the course of the study.) These interviews varied in length
from approximately 45 minutes tO five hours and averaged approxim-
ately two hours.

After all interviews with Negro leaders had been completed,
approximately 20 white leaders were also interviewed. White leaders
were interviewed last since it was known that many were Opposed to
"outside interference. " The fact that white leaders knew that Negro
leaders had been interviewed first probably encouraged some to grant
interviews that otherwise would have been denied. Drawing from know-
ledge Of the community gained in the conduct Of research, we selected
a sample Of those whites who were known to be either the most influen-
tial leaders within the community or those who had played active roles
in the resolution of the issues examined. Interviews Of white leaders
varied in length from approximately 30 minutes to 3 1/2 hours, but
averaged only about 1 1/4 hours.

All interviews were semi-structured. The attempt was to in-
terview in considerable depth in subject areas relevant to the research
Objectives. The interviews were designed to facilitate issue analysis.
The Objective was to reconstruct, in both historically and sociologi-
cally relevantterms, the process by which decisions had been or were

currently being determined. Each identified leader was questioned

121
thoroughly regarding his perception Of and participation in the resolu-
tion of concrete issues (current and past) faced by the community.

The interviews were designed and conducted to allow probing
in depth. In the interview process, we felt completely free to adapt to
and adjust for interviewee resistance and willingness to respond, as
well as for his knowledge of relevant issues. In this regard, we are in
complete agreement with Kenneth Clark, who concluded that in his
study of Harlem, "the use Of standardized questionnaires and interview
procedures would result in stylized and superficial verbal reSponses
or evansions. "1 In his Chicago study, Wilson reached a Similar con-‘
clusion which served as a guide in this research.

NO fixed interview schedule was employed; each
interview was designed to elicit from the particular in-
dividual the activities and issues that most concerned him
and in which he played some role. Each was asked, in
various ways, to describe and explain his involvement or
lack of involvement, his attitudes toward the issue, the
goals he sought, the means he favored using, what in fact
he had done about the issues, how he saw the other actors
involved in the issue, what Opinion he had about the ultimate
resolution of the issue, what work he did in his organization,
and so on. 2

Contrary to the advise generally given interviewers, we Often asked

questions which served to embarrass or even anger the interviewee.

In a sense, some fundamental rules Of etiquette regarding formal,

 

1. Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper 8: Row,
1965), p. xix.

 

2. James O. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free
Press, 1960), p. 11.

 

122
interpersonal relationships were violated. In the process Of the inter-
view itself, we made it known to the interviewee that we had talked to
others (friends and foes) regarding his own attitudes and behavior.
Many times we took the role of the devil's advocate. Certainly in
many instances, the interviews constituted a definite threat to the inter-
viewee.

All this was done deliberately. It was felt that such a procedure
would elicit a measure Of candor that would otherwise have been miss-
ing. It was also felt that this procedure would successfully get behind
the facade of the publicly acceptable reSponse. In Short, it was felt
that these interview techniques were necessary in a study Of social

conflict.

Other Methods Of Data Collection

 

Data were also gathered by means Of a mail-back questionnaire
left with Negro leaders at the time Of interview. In addition to inter-
views and questionnaires, data were also gathered by scanning the
local neWSpaper,l by examining Official documents, by attendance at
organized meetings and public affairs, and by general Observation Of

community life. Historical and cemus records were also examined.

 

1. Local neWSpaper files did not provide a major source of data

collection. The one newspaper in the city fails to report many im-
portant events which occur in the Negro community. Much of that
which is reported is so slanted that neWSpaper reports do not pro-

vide a reliable source of information. This in itself says a great
deal about the difficulties faced by Negro leaders and is thus im-
portant data, but the neWSpaper was of little assistance in recon-

structing the actual course of events.

123

A Profile Of Negro Leadership in Lakeland

 

At the time of the interview, a mail-back questionnaire was
left with each Negro leader. 1 Most of the data to be presented in the
remainder Of this chapter were gained by means of the questionnaire.
Sixteen leaders returned their questionnaires, for a reSponse of 80%.
For those four leaders who did not return their questionnaires, it was
possible in some instances to Obtain some Of the missing data from
other sources. In other instances, it was possible to make estimates,
and that has been done wherever we had confidence in the reliability Of
those estimates. It would appear that these procedures do not seriously
bias the data presented.

Figure 2 (page 124) presents basic data for the twenty leaders.
On the basis of the leaders' selection Of the ten "most outstanding
Negro leaders" in Lakeland, we have ranked those twenty leaders. The
basic list of the twenty leaders was provided tO facilitate Selection, but
each respondent was directed to add other names to the list if he felt
there were other leaders in the subcommunity. Fifteen of the twenty
leaders reSponded to this item. The Leadership Score in Figure 2
represents the number of votes received by each leader as one Of the

ten "most outstanding Negro leaders. "2

 

1. See Appendix B.

2. Leaders were instructed to exclude themselves from consider-

ation. This means that the five leaders who did not respond to this item
had fifteen chances Of being chosen, while the fifteen who did respond

to this item had but fourteen chances Of being chosen.

124

 

 

Figure 2: Negro Leadership in Lakeland
Leader Leadership Occupation Leadership

Score Style

Robert Clark 14 Urban League Executive Moderate
Director
Reuben Morgan 13 Dentist Moderate
James Corbin 11 Real Estate Broker Militant
Merritt Reed 10 Electrical Contractor Conservative
Arthur Young 9 Physician Moderate
Cole Mathews 9 Minister Conservative
Charles Washburn 8 Lawyer Militant
Carl Dean 8 Electrical Contractor Moderate
Prentice Colby 8 District School Moderate
Administrator

Curtis Abrams 7 Public School Teacher Militant
Harold Russell 7 Lawyer Moderate
Walter Phillips 6 School Administrator Militant
William Lakey 5 Minister Moderate
Fred Brown 5 Labor Official Conservative
Franklin Weaver 5 Labor Official Moderate
Scott Gardner 5 Minister Conservative
Paul Towers 4 Physician Moderate
Joyce Simmons 3 Bondslady Militant
Florence Darwin 1 Drug Store Owner Conservative
Thomas Hull 1 Labor Official Mode rate

 

125
The eleven leaders receiving the most votes received 75% Of
all votes cast, while the remaining one-fourth of the votes were di-
vided among the other nine listed leaders plus six persons added to
the list. Each Of those Six persons added to the list Of twenty by the
fourteen respondents received but one vote and has been excluded

from consideration here.

Occupational Distribution

 

Table 10 (page 126) Shows the occupational distribution Of
Negro leaders in Lakeland and three other cities for which comparable
data are available. It ought to be pOinted out that for all but one leader
(Clark) in Lakeland, Negro leadership is an avocation--leadership is
something they do in addition to earning a living. The data reveal
basic similarities, deSpite the differences among the cities in terms
of population Size, percentage Negro, geographical location, etc.
Lakeland has the highest percentage Of Negro leaders who are pro-
fessionals. This is eSpecially noteworthy, for many of Lakeland's
Negro professionals do not reside in Lakeland proper. Five Of the
twelve professionals in Lakeland represent the independent professions
of medicine and law. All three of the Lakeland leaders classified as
managers or officials are labor union Officials. The absence of leaders
representing large financial and commercial establishments is marked
in all four cities. Pfautz has Observed that this "makes not only for a

lack of power . . . but also a Serious gap in available perspectives for

126

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127

formulating strategy and tactics in community power struggles. "1
These data suggest important differences between Negro and white
community leaders in terms Of occupational distribution. Many

studies indicate that businessmen dominate community power struc—
tures. 2 It is doubtful that any study of leadership and power in total
communities indicates a smaller percentage Of businessmen among
leaders than in the four Negro subcommunities represented in Table

10. In the larger community, businessmens' representation among

the most influential community leaders is especially marked. Further-
more, it is customary for the city's banking and financial establish-
ments to be represented among the more influential leaders. As we

have noted, Negro businessmen in Lakeland and in most other Negro

subcommunities are likely to represent small business ventures.

Type of Leadership

 

Figure 2 (page 124) also shows the classification of Negro
leaders by type of leadership. Five are classified as militants, ten
as moderates, and five as conservatives. In general, moderates are
ranked higher than militants, who are in turn ranked higher than con—
servatives. Whereas moderates received an average of 7. 4 votes as
top ten leaders, militants received 7. 0 votes, and conservatives re-

ceived 6.0 votes. There was a tendency for militants to over-select

 

1. Pfautz,pp. pi_t., p. 163.

2. See, for example, Form and Miller, pp. <:_i£., chap. 16.

128
militants and to under-select conservatives. Similarly, conservatives
over-selected conservatives and under-selected militants. The trend
was eSpecially marked for militants. Neither militants nor conserva-
tives, however, were inclined tO under-select moderates.

It is tO be noted that two Of the militants are employed in the
Lakeland school system. The administration's recognition Of tenure
rights has apparently provided these two a measure of freedom which
manifests itself in militancy. The vulnerability Of public employees
and their consequent avoidance Of militancy has Often been Observed,
eSpecially in studies of the South.

In looking at the moderates, a striking characteristic is the
association between professionals and moderates: seven Of the twelve
professionals are moderates, while seven of the ten moderates are
professionals.

Perhaps the most interesting fact regarding conservative
leaders is that two Of the three Negro ministers identified as leaders
are conservatives. Many Negro leaders in Lakeland are eSpecially
critical of the "lack" of leadership provided by Negro clergymen.
Several militants stated that they would be thankful to have a Martin

Luther King in Lakeland.

Position in Race Advancement Organizations

 

Although Figure 2 does not provide this information, it is clear

that one's identity as a Negro leader is closely tied to his position within

129
race advancement organizations and to his position in city political or
educational organizations. This is especially evident for the first
eleven ranked leaders. Robert Clark is the Executive Director of
the Lakeland Urban League. Reuben Morgan is an elective member
Of the Lakeland School Board. James Corbin is the most recent past
president Of the NAACP and an unsuccessful candidate for the city
commission in the most recent election. Merritt Reed beat Corbin
in that election and is now serving his second term on the city commis-
sion. Arthur Young is a past city commissioner and has served in
high positions in both the NAACP and the Urban League. Both Cole
Mathews and Carl Dean are presently members of the Urban League
Board of Directors. Charles Washburn is also a past city commis-
sioner. (Washburn would surely have ranked higher were it not for
the fact that he withdrew his interest from Lakeland after the city
changed its electoral system.) Prentice Colby is the first Negro ad-
ministrator to hold a position with the Lakeland Board Of Education,
serving as the Board's Community-School and Human Relations Direc-
tor. Curtis Abrams is another militant leader who undoubtedly would
have ranked higher except that he moved from the community during
the course Of the study. While living in Lakeland, Abrams was presi-
dent Of the local protest organization known as Positive Action for Race
Advancement (PARA). Harold Russell currently serves on the Urban

League Board of Directors and is an active member of the NAACP.

130

Other Selected Characteristics

 

Table 11 (pages 131-132) presents data relating to other selected
characteristics of Lakeland's Negro leaders. Comparable data for
selected cities are also provided where available. Although Lakeland's
Negro leaders are well educated, the percentages Of those having at-
tended college is higher in the three Southern cities for which we have
data. (Barth and Abu-Laban also report an average Of 16 years Of edu-
cation for Negro leaders in Pacific City.) DeSpite the low educational
attainment of the Negro pOpulace in general, their leaders are likely tO
be selected among those who have attended or completed college. The
"pool" of potential Negro leaders, then, is relatively small. Some Of
the leaders in Lakeland attended a segregated college or graduate school,
but every leader who pursued higher education attended at least one
integrated institution Of higher education.

Only two Of Lakeland's leaders were women. The literature
suggests that the great majority Of Negro leaders are men, but we
have precise data on sexual composition for only two other cities. In
one Of those (Pacific City), contrary to the generalization advanced,
44% of the leaders were women. This appears to be an exception tO
the rule.

Relative to other cities for which we have data, Lakeland's
Negro leaders are comparatively young. Only in Pacific City was the

mean age of leaders less than in Lakeland. As has been suggested by

131

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133

numerous authors, 1 the militants are the youngest leaders. In Lake-
land, the average age for militants is 39.2, while the comparable
figures for moderates and conservatives are 46. Z and 55.2 respec-
tively. Pfautz found a similar pattern in Providence, and Ladd's
data for both Winston-Salem and Greenville are remarkably close to
the Lakeland data. 2

There were also differences regarding the range of ages among
the different types of leaders in Lakeland. The range was 31-46 for
militants, 35-53 for moderates, and 50-60 for conservatives. Note
that there is no overlapping whatsoever between militants and conser-
vatives. Ladd has suggested that leaders are permanently influenced
by the pattern of race relations existing at the time they entered adult-
hood. Conservative leaders in Lakeland who came of age in the 1920's
and '30's can look back in retrospect and assess the racial progress
made since that time. Lakeland's militants who came of age during
and after World War II tend to look ahead in hopes of future racial
advances. Thompson views older leaders as “more likely to have
become attached to conservative men of power, or of conservative
institutional forms. "3 In a similar vein, Ladd has written that “there

seems to be with advancing years a greater disillusionment, or one

 

1. See Louis Lomax, The Negro Revolt (New York: The New
American Library, 1963).

 

Z. See Pfautz, 22' c_i_t., and Ladd, (3p; SL13-

3. Thompson, gp. c_i£., p. 28.

134

might say realism, concerning the possibility for change and at the
same time a greater stake in the existing system. “1 Younger leaders
appear more likely to adhere to the idealism of youth and at the same
time to reject the professed ideals of their elders as hypocritical.

Also in terms of the ages of leaders, Lakeland has the narrow-
est age Span among cities for which we have comparable data. Lake-
land appears to be exceptional in that no one older than 60 was identi-
fied as a leader.

For four cities we have data for the average length of residence
or employment of leaders in their cities. Lakeland and Pacific City,
the two cities which most recently eXperienced heavy Negro inmigra-
tion, have the lowest averages. Here also there are important differ-
ences among leadership types. Conservatives have lived in Lakeland
for an average of 30.2 years, while the comparable figures for mod-
erates and militants are 20.4 and 9. 8 respectively. In part, this is a
reflection of age. But many Negro leaders, regardless of leadership
type, moved to Lakeland while in their twenties or early thirties, near
the beginning of their work careers. These differences in length of
residence, together with the differences in age among different leader-
ship types, suggest that younger and newer Negro leaders adopt mili-
tancy not only as a means of confronting whites, but also as a means of

gaining status within the Negro subcommunity. Their claims to prestige

 

l. Ladd, 22' cit., p. 229.

135

must generally be made against their elders and community oldtimers
whose prestige has long been established.

Although no other study is known to report comparable data,
15% of Lakeland's leaders do not reside in Lakeland proper. All three
of these leaders are moderates closely associated with the Urban
League. It seems plausible to expect these leaders to be somewhat
less committed to Lakeland and its problems than are those leaders who
live in the city. On the other hand, a certain amount of detachment may
be an important element in their role as moderate leaders. It is impos-
sible to judge how many Negro professionals and businessmen would be
leaders in Lakeland were it not for the fact that they live elsewhere.

The remaining data in Table 11 demonstrate well the mobility
of Negro Americans. In Lakeland, four-fifths of the Negro leaders
were raised in places other than Lakeland, and half of them were
raised outside the state of Michigan. For the fifteen leaders for whom
we have data, none was raised in a Deep Southern state. Many, how-
ever, were raised in border and other Northern states. The data that
others have collected on place of birth also suggest a great deal of
mobility. Northern cities, in particular, have a relatively low per-
centage of “home grown" Negro leaders.

These data on mobility are furthermore suggestive of a major
cleavage in the Negro subcommunity of Lakeland. Those newcomers

who come directly from Southern states are unlikely to move into

136
positions of leadership. Furthermore, they are unlikely even to have
ready access to those who are subcommunity leaders. In an important
sense, no one Speaks for those newcomers who come culturally unpre-

pared for life in a Northern, industrial, urban setting.

CHAPTER VI
THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND:
POLITICS AND HOUSING

In Chapters VI and VII we turn to an examination of the various
ways in which Negro leaders in Lakeland have met the problems they
themselves defined as crucial. We have reconstructed the processes
by which Negro leaders have attempted to resolve or have actually
succeeded in resolving a selected number of issues. In all cases, we
have attempted to present a problem or issue analysis in both historic-
ally and sociologically relevant terms. We focused specifically on the
decade of the sixties, but occasionally it was necessary to go back

further in time to "set the stage. "
At the close of each section in these two chapters, an attempt
is made to make explicit the theoretical significance of the preceding

discussion by suggesting hypotheses which warrant testing in subsequent
research. Many of these hypotheses will appear familiar to the reader,

for they have been suggested in previous literature and they were central
to our discussion in Chapters II and 111, although they were not there

presented in propositional form. Other hypotheses, however, were

generated in the conduct of the empirical research reported here.

Politics

Our examination of politics in Lakeland is perhaps best pre-
faced by a brief, general analysis of the politics of race in the United

137

138

States. This will be beneficial, for the case of Lakeland adds to our
knowledge of formal political barriers to Negro political strength and

variability in Negroes' accessibility to political decision-makers.

The prevailing national patterns of migration during this cen-
tury have had important political consequences for Negro Americans.
The current heavy concentration of Negroes in the urban centers of
seven key, Northern, industrial states has provided an important
measure of political leverage, eSpecially in national presidential el-
ections. This leverage is largely due to the pivotal nature of those
seven states. They are pivotal in that they are characterized by a
strong two-pary competition and they possess a large block of elec-
toral votes. 1 Although Negro political gains have been most dramatic-

ally demonstrated in national presidential elections, Negroes have

actually demonstrated their ability to influence the outcome of pOpular

elections at all levels.

But the political influence of Negro Americans has not been, is
not now, and will probably not in the near future be proportional to

their numbers. DeSpite the gains which have been made, there still

exist important barriers to the development of effective Negro politi-
cal power. Although these barriers are many and diverse, some of the

more important and interesting are formal barriers to be found in urban

political systems.

 

1. See eSpecially William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Re-
volution in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963). The seven
states are New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan,
Illinois, and California.

 

 

139

Urban Government and the Politics of Race

 

If the most auspicious Negro political gains have been made
in national presidential elections, the failure to gain is most evident
on the local political scene. The ineffectiveness of Negro political
power in urban centers is reflected in their general inability to elect
Negroes to city councils in proportion to their numbers in city popula-
tions. Table 12 (page 140) provides data for some of the larger North—
ern cities.

From the perspective of the Negro community, however, under-
representation on the council is not the only current disadvantage.

Not only are few Negroes elected to office, but those
who flelected generally find it necessary to be politicians
first and Negroes second. If they are to stay in office, they
must often soft-pedal the racial issues that are of the most
concern to Negroes as Negroes.

Both the problems of underrepresentation and of the quality of
representation are largely due to nonpartisan, at-large elections.
"In a city with a nonpartisan, at-large system the nature of Negro poli -
tics is radically affected by the fact that the candidate must face the
whole (predominantly white) electorate and must do so without benefit

of a party label. "2 As Banfield and Wilson observe, neWSpaper and

civic associational support is crucial under these circumstances. In

 

1. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics
(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press and the M. I. T. Press,
1963), p. 293.

 

2. Ibid., p. 307.

140

 

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141

cities where Negroes constitute a numerical minority, the result is
that the Negro community will either be unable to elect a Negro repre-
sentative, or white leaders will see to it that Negroes have token
representation. Furthermore, those Negroes elected will probably
be either moderate or conservative on race issues, since they "must
be acceptable to middle-class whites. "1 Nearby Detroit illustrates
the manner in which this system works. Never more than one of the
nine councilmen in Detroit has been Negro, and militant Negro leaders
have little or no chance of election.

Banfield and Wilson go on to note the dilemma faced by a Negro
councilman facing re-election in the Detroit system.

Without a strong Negro vote he cannot hOpe to be

re-elected, and to get a strong Negro vote he must .

be aggressive on at least some racial issues. But he

must also have the support of the press and the civic

associations in order to be re-elected, and he will not

have this unless he is "reasonable" from the standpoint

of conservative, middle-class whites. 2

On the basis of this analysis, it would appear that minority
groups, and especially Negroes, would be best advised to favor a
partisan, ward system of election. Given residential segregation,
such a system would seem to assure some Negro representation.

Partisan ward systems, however, are not all alike. In their

analysis, Banfield and Wilson distinguish between two different systems:

 

1. Banfield and Wilson, 91’.- cit., p. 307.

2. Ibid., p. 308.

142
(l) ward-based, machine; and (2) ward-based, weak organization
systems. Partisan politics characterizes each, but the patronage
base of politics is minimized in the weak organization system. Each
apparently leads to a particular style of Negro leadership exemplified
by William L. Dawson in Chicago and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. in
Harlem.

In the Chicago ward-based, machine system, underrepresenta-
tion is minimized, for the system assures the election of Negro repre-
sentatives in those wards in which the Negro sub—machine dominates.
But Representative Dawson is dependent upon Mayor Daley for the
patronage by which he maintains his own support. The result is that
Dawson and the Negro politicians under his control do not vigorously
Sponsor or support action which would contribute to race advancement.

In the ward-based, weak organization system, "as many Negroes
will be elected to office as there are wards in which Negroes are in a
majority, and the Negro politicians will be those who can develop per-
sonal followings or take advantage of intra-party factionalism. "1 This
system paves the way for leaders such as Adam Clayton Powell.
Powell's strength is not dependent upon the patronage he dispenses (he
has little), but rather upon the ideology he articulates and the charisma

he demonstrates. Powell, as Wilson has observed, is “the vivid and

 

1. Ibid., pp. 305-306.

143

colorful manifestation of their {Negroes} collective aspirations and
expectations. "1

Whether Powell better represents his constituency than Dawson
does his is Open to serious debate. It seems, however, that the 13.5.9.2.“
M that a Negro district will be able to elect a leader who will effec-
tively represent their interests is highest in a ward-based, weak orga-
nization system, next highest in a strong machine system, and lowest
in a nonpartisan, at-large system. Thus, while the demise of urban
machines benefitted the Negro, the further movement toward the non-
partisan, at-large system was to his disadvantage. Ironically, just as
Negroes had learned to play machine and partisan politics, the rules of
the game were changed so that they were once again at a competitive
disadvantage in the perpetual struggle for political power. The full
impact of these political changes is revealed in the facts that as of 1966,
64% of the American cities with over 5, 000 population required a non-
partisan ballot for commission elections, while 62% of them required

that commission candidates face an at-large electorate. 2

Government and the Politics of Race in Lakeland

 

Lakeland has long elected its city commissioners on a nonparti-

san ballot. And in 1962, by popular referendum, the citizens of

 

1. James O. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (November, 1960), p. 350.

 

2. Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds. ), The Municipal Year
Book: 1966 (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association,

 

 

144

Lakeland overthrew the ward electoral system and substituted a com-
plex system whereby commissioners are nominated by district but
must run at-large. (Under the new system, district voters in a pri-
mary election nominate two candidates who must Oppose one another
in the general election which follows. In the general election, each
voter in the city is allowed seven votes, one for a candidate in each
of the city's seven districts. )1

Under the old system in Lakeland, the voters in district 1,
which is estimated to be 90% Negro, elected their own version of Adam
Clayton Powell. Charles Washburn was a fiery, ultramilitant Negro
leader while serving on the commission. He was highly articulate
and clever, but he was also vehement and uncompromising in his
approach. His commission seat provided a public forum in which he
was Openly critical of the community leadership and their subjection
of the Negro subcommunity. The rank-and-file Negro citizens of
Lakeland identified with Washburn in his struggles against Lakeland's
"white power structure." But in terms of race advancement, he prob-
ably accomplished very little. He was, after all, the only Negro com-
missioner on a commission of seven. Yet, as with Powell, style was

more important than goal attainment, and Washburn was most

 

1966), pp. 92-93. For those cities in the 250, 000-500, 000 population
group, 81% required a nonpartisan ballot for commission elections.

1. In 1966, 56 of the U.S. cities with a population of over 5, 000
utilized such an electoral system. (Ibid. , p. 93.)

. llllvi ’-

145
appreciated not for what he accomplished, but rather for the way he
went about it. Wilson has beautifully captured the essence of this:
In a Situation in which ends are largely unattain-

able (at least by Negro action alone), means become all-

important. On the basis of the means employed--the

political style used-~men make judgments as to the worth

of the leader and his reputation. Means, in short, tend

to become ends in themselves; what is important is not what

you do, but how you do it.

But if Washburn's style enamored himself to Lakeland's Negroes,
he was clearly anathema to the city' 3 influential whites. He had to go.
It was decided that a change in the electoral systemwould not only make
his re-election an impossibility, but it would also make it more diffi-
cult to elect others like him--Negro or white.

Petitions for a referendum on the proposed charter amendment
changing the electoral system were circulated by members of the Ju-

nior Chamber of Commerce. Their efforts were supported by editorials

in the Lakeland News. The paper supported the amendment because it

 

would make it possible for city voters to elect a “responsible" commis-
sion. "Lakeland requires qualified men who have no obligations. We
want men who will always vote for the best interests of the city--never
for the best interests of themselves and their pals. " The prOposed
system, then, was designed "to prevent the small block system from

. H

putting a weak hand-picked candidate in office for personal gain .

For those who could not read between the lines, the News went on to

 

1. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians,"gp. cit., pp. 367-368.

146

observe that under the new system, "if the City at large is sick of
Charles Washburn and the name he is giving Lakeland, the voters Of
the entire City can toss him out, although the district is absolutely
guaranteed a commissioner from its own section. " This qualifica-
tion was an important element of the M ideological stance, for
there were still those in the city who remembered that Lakeland had
moved from an at-large to a ward system in 1939 after the election of
a commission which consisted of a number of persons who lived in--
and presumably represented the interests of—-one Specific section of
the city. The Junior Chamber's petition drive was a tremendous
success. They secured 11, 500 signatures, a figure which must be
compared with the 8, 861 voters who supported the amendment in the
referendum itself. The results of the referendum are provided in
Table 13 (page 147). Forty-one percent of the city's registered voters
turned out to approve the amendment by a large majority. As can be
seen, the voting closely followed racial lines. The overwhelming
majority of Negroes in Lakeland reside in districts land 7: the propor-
tion of Negroes in other districts is negligible. The prOportion of
Negroes in the entire city is estimated to have been 19 percent at the
time of the election and only 27. 6 percent of the city's voters Opposed
the amendment.

The evidence strongly suggests that the white citizens of Lake-

land moved to adOpt the new electoral system in order to control the

147

 

 

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148

quality of Negro representation on the commission. This interpreta-

tion is strengthened further by the following excerpt from an interview

with an elected city official. Note that his defense of the new system

never really comes to grips with the questions posed.

Q.

Let me ask you if the intent of the people who pushed
for the charter amendment was to get rid of Washburn?

NO, it wasn't.

Was the intent to limit or control the representation of
Negroes on the commission?

No, there's still a Negro on the commission. But he's
one of the better types. He's not a radical.

Regardless of the intent of those who pushed for the
amendment, has not the result been to limit and control
Negro representation on the commission?

No, there's still a Negro representative.

Yes, but we've seen in the last two elections in both
districts land 7 that the voters of those districts have
been unable to have their preferred candidates elected
to the commission. Doesn't that say something about
limiting or controlling representation?

Well, the difficulty is that they nominated the wrong

candidates. They preferred the wrong candidates. They
shouldn't support radical candidates. That's why they've
been unsuccessful in electing their preferred candidates.

Consequences of the Modified At-Large System. In terms of

Negro representation on the commission, the results are similar to

those obtained in a regular nonpartisan, at-large system. Under

Lakeland's modified electoral system, it is likely that Negroes will

149

be chosen to represent only those districts in which they constitute an
over-whelming majority. Whereas district 1 customarily elects a
Negro commissioner, district 7 has never elected a Negro candidate.
Furthermore, since the Negro candidate must face a city—wide elector-
ate without benefit of a party label, he will need neWSpaper and asso-
ciational support to win the election. As with the Detroit system, this
means that the Negro candidate hopeful of winning must be acceptable
to middle-class whites (i. e. , he must be conservative on racial issues).
Unlike the Detroit system, however, the successful Negro candidate in
the Lakeland modified system need not have strong support in the Negro
district. Indeed, the evidence suggests that strong support in his home
district would be the political kiss of death. For the primary serves
to "key" the white electorate as to the "acceptable" Negro candidate--
the rule in the general election is to vote for the candidate with the
poorest primary Showing. Just as with the Detroit system, the white
citizens of Lakeland are provided a system which allows them to pre-
vent the election Of militant Negro leaders. But at the same time, the
Lakeland system offers even better assurance Of coopting a conservative
Negro leader. The Negro community will not be without representation--
but in the eyes of many Negroes, their representative will be unwilling
to protect or advance their interests.

Table 14 (page 150) presents returns for district land 7 candi-

dates for both the 1964 and 1966 general elections. The returns

150

 

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151

clearly demonstrate the inability of the two Negro districts to elect
the candidates of their choice. As can be seen, the conservative
Merritt Reed won in district 1 in both elections, despite his inability
to carry his own district. In district 7 in the 1964 election, Candidate
B, who had missed beirg nominated in the primary by one vote, was
elected on a write-in campaign. He was elected despite the fact that
he polled less than 30 percent of the votes in his home district and less
than two percent in the other "Negro" district in the general election!
One of his opponents, Candidate C, was then an incumbent commissioner
and mayor. In 1966, this former mayor improved over his 1964 per-
formance in both his home district and the other "Negro" district, but
lost when his major opponent took two-thirds of the vote in the "non-
Negro" districts. The results from district 7 suggest that Negroes
are unable to elect their preferred candidate, even though that candi-
date may be white.

For the two elections in these two predominantly Negro dis-
tricts, the city-wide electorate has rejected the district's preferred
candidate four times out of four. In the other five districts, this has

happened only once in ten elections.

The 1966 Election. We may learn still more of the consequences

 

of Lakeland's modified electoral system by taking a closer look at the
1966 election. In the district 1 primary, James Corbin and Merritt

Reed were nominated to run against one another in the general election

152
to follow. In the primary, Corbin polled 703 votes to Reed's 443.
The two other candidates received 237 and 43 votes respectively.
Reed, of course, was the incumbent commissioner. In the 1964 elec-
tion he had demonstrated his voter appeal in the white districts Of the
city. Clearly the 1966 general election matched a militant Negro
challenger against a conservative Negro incumbent. Corbin sought
out Franklin Weaver to act as his campaign manager, for Weaver had
served fifteen years as an important grass roots political leader within
the Negro community.

At a crucial meeting with other commission candidates, it was
decided that six candidates, including Corbin, would run as the "Family
Slate. " All six of these candidates were Democrats, and in all proba-
bility, each was more liberal than his Opponent. Campaign funds were
provided by labor unions.

On the Sunday before the Tuesday election, Corbin distributed
a four page neWSpaper tabloid to support his candidacy. COpies of
"The Freedom News" were distributed door to door in the Negro com-
munity and placed on the Windshields of cars parked on church lots.
Corbin's campaign literature was designed to appeal to Negro voters.
On the first page there was a large photograph of a Negro demonstra-
tor carrying a placard reading "Uncle Tom Died 200 Years Ago. "
Other pictures showed Negro demonstrators being manhandled by

policemen and attacked by police dogs. The tabloid suggested that

153
Negro voters could support "the struggle for equality, dignity and
progress" by voting for Corbin, or they could indicate their satisfac-
tion with the past--a past which "has brought us dismal deterioration,
deSpair, disunity and defeat. " Many persons in the Negro community,
eSpecially Reed's supporters, viewed the tabloid as a racist document.
Corbin's plans to restrict distribution of the tabloids to Negro resi-
dential areas were upset when some of Reed's supporters saw to it
that many were distributed in white neighborhoods.

Corbin was advised by numerous persons, including Weaver,
that he could count on the Negro vote but had to work hard for the white
vote. These persons advised against distributing the tabloid. It may
be that Corbin made a strategic error in distributing the tabloid, if his
intent were to win the election. In all probability, however, he could
not have won no matter how he handled his campaign. At the time of
the election, he was president of the NAACP, he was known as a Negro
realtor who had played a large role in integrating a residential area
within the city, and he definitely had a militant image. It would have
been difficult to overcome these handicaps.

But if all this were not sufficient to assure his defeat, other
steps were taken by his Opponents--Negro and white. Reed concen-
trated his efforts on winning the white vote. His literature was dis-
tributed in white residential areas, and just as in 1964, he had strong

neWSpaper support. Conservative white leaders were aided in their

154

campaign against Corbin by one of his former business partners.
This individual supplied what was purported to be an affidavit signed
by Corbin confessing to unethical business practices. White leaders
saw that copies Of the affidavit were widely distributed in white areas
of the city.

In the Negro community, PARA refused to endorse either Reed
or Corbin. They recommended instead a write-in protest vote. The
PARA Newsletter wrote of Corbin: he

is not really concerned with what "good" he can do for

the Negro community but more with what good he can

do for Corbin. Therefore, there is no reason why we

or you should support him. At the risk of losing some

of the unity that the Lakeland freedom struggle has had

for the past few months we take this stand.

The results of the campaign are clearly evident in Table 14
(page 150). Reed won easily, although he was beaten in both districts
1 and 7. Among the seven successful commission candidates, only
one polled more total votes than Reed.

In terms of the city wide election, all seven incumbent candi-
dates were elected over the six Family Slate candidates and an inde-
pendent. The Nfls had endorsed the re-election of the entire com-
mission. Although it is impossible to prove, it may be that Corbin's
name on the Slate led to the defeat of some candidates who otherwise
could have been elected. However that may be, it appears certain

that the five white Slate candidates were hurt because of Corbin's

name on the Slate.

155

Table 15 (page 156) presents returns for both districts 1 and 7
for all the Family Slate candidates. The data Show that in prOpor-
tional terms, Negroes Offered strong support to Slate candidates.
Although no one of them matched the percentage of votes given Corbin
in the two districts, they all came fairly close to his performance.
Furthermore, each of the five white Slate candidates, with but one
exception, polled a higher percentage of votes in each of the two Negro
districts than in his own reSpective home district.

A different picture emerges, however, if we examine the abso-
lute number of votes polled by Slate candidates in the Negro districts.
Voters in district 1 cast a total of 1, 665 votes for both district 1 can-
didates, 990 votes for the district 7 candidates, but an average of only
895 votes for candidates in the other four districts in which Slate can-
didates were entered. There was a similar pattern in district 7, al-
though the discrepancies were not so great. Voters there cast l, 097
votes for their own district candidates, 1,035 votes for district 1 can-
didates, but an average of only 862 votes for candidates in the other four
Slate districts. Clearly, Negro voters are much less motivated to vote
for candidates in white districts than for candidates in the Negro dis-
tricts. The political interest of Negro voters diminishes considerably
at the edge Of the Negro community. Had the voters in the two Negro
districts given each Slate candidate the same number of votes they gave

Corbin, each candidate would have averaged 655 votes more than they

1966 General Election Returns

for "Family Slate" Candidates in the "Negro" Districts

Table 15:

 

District 7

saieptpueg 91213
.10} 3910A1910L
JO %

anempueo 91813
.10} 1883) 8810A

saieptpueg) pinstq

District 1

.10} 1983 9310A
1910.1.

sai'eptpueg 33213
JO} saioA [8101,
Jo %

919P1Pu'ei) 91918
.10; 1912:) 3910A

saleptpueo 13111910

Candidate

.10} 1823 8310A
19301.

(District)

156

 

55.2

571

1035

69.7

1161

1665

Corbin (l)

448 51.

876

65.

602

921

Tamblyn (2)

453 51.

887

63.9

592

926

McDowell (3)

53. 5

463

865

65.1

574

882

Bollman (4)

69.0 820 402 49.0

587

851

Larkin (5)

68.5 1097 586 53.4

678

990

Hoover (7)

 

157

actually polled in the election. These additional votes would not have
given victory to any of the five candidates, but it would have meant
better showings.

The haunting question which cannot be answered, of course,
concerns the number of votes lost in white districts by white Slate
candidates because of Corbin's name on the Slate. Perhaps they
would all have lost anyway, but it would appear on the surface that

Corbin diminished their chances of victory.

Beating the Black Beater. Not surprisingly, many Negroes in

 

Lakeland consider themselves to be disfranchised under the new elec-
toral system. They are now denied the "right" to choose "their" repre-
sentatives. In effect, the white electorate of Lakeland selects repre-
sentatives for them, a pattern which characterized the accomodating
leadership of the Old South. The fact that democratic procedures were
used to take from them a "right" which was theirs under the old ward
system leads many Negroes in Lakeland to View democratic governmert
as but another form of white hypocrisy. Many Negroes refer to the
charter amendment as the "Black Beater, " and a great deal Of time is
given over to strategies to beat the Black Beater.

The strategy which appears most obvious is that of running two
moderate or militant Negro candidates in the primary. Numerous per-
sons have asked Charles Washburn to run in the primary in the hopes

that he and another militant or moderate would win and face one another

158
in the general election. The hope then would be that white voters
would vote against Washburn and _f_o_r the other "more preferable"
militant or moderate candidate. Since passage of the amendment,
however, Washburn has refused to run again. (As a matter of fact,
Washburn has almost completely withdrawn from Lakeland: he is now
a prominent nationalist leader in Detroit and on the national level.)
It is doubful that this strategy would work. Reed has proven that con-
servative Negro candidates can win support in a primary. He polled
530 votes in the 1964 primary and 443 votes in the 1966 primary. If
two militants or moderates are to win nomination in a primary, it
would be necessary to Split the vote in such a fashion that both poll
more votes than a conservative candidate. Since each voter casts but
one vote in the primary, this would be a difficult task.

Even assuming that two militants or moderates were to be nomi-
nated in the primary, there is still the possibility of a neWSpaper sup-
ported write-in campaign such as that which succeeded in district 7 in
1964. Most Negro militants are certain that this would be the result
if they were to succeed in nominating two Negro candidates, both of
whom were considered unacceptable to white voters.

Nonetheless, this has been the strategy preferred by most
militants and moderates in the Negro community. Some militant and
moderate leaders have also given thought to supporting a liberal white

candidate against a Negro candidate in expectation that white voters

159

either could not or would not turn down a white candidate running
against a Negro candidate in the general election. This, too, would
require a considerable amount of political finesse, as well as a will—
ing and acceptable white candidate. ESpecially in district 1 where
there are few white residents, such a candidate would be hard to locate.

The reSponse of the most militant Negro leaders has clearly
been defeatist. Washburn, as we have seen, has given up the fight--
in Lakeland. In 1966, Curtis Abrams and other PARA members re-
fused to support Family Slate candidates in either districts 1 or 7.
They recommended instead write-in protest votes in both districts.
One of their preferred candidates polled four votes in the general elec-
tion, while the other polled 233. The PARA defense of their write-in
campaign in district 7 illustrates clearly their protest motivation and
their reluctance to compromise.

Number one, there was only one decent candidate in
District 7, white or black . . . Joe Hall. He lost because
we let unqualified, unscrupulous Negroes enter the fiarimary]
race and split our vote.

Number two, the only time there has been a "good"
relationship with the downtown bigots is when we, the "black
community, " have been willing to take off our cap, roll our
eyes, scratch our heads and say, "yassuh boss, anything
y'all want is ok with us."

Number three, PARA is a militant organization. We
never want "half-a-loaf. " We are not a political party. We

will co-Operate with the Negro community but we will not
"make deals" with the white power structure.

Number four, even if Hall hasn't the proverbial
snowball's chance in you know where, it is, we feel,

 

160

important for the Negro community to let the downtown

bigots know how we feel. We should vote for Hall as a

protest, if nothing else!

Some moderate Negro leaders in Lakeland have also given
thought to the possibility of legal recourse. Most Of these have been
reluctant to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment fearing
either that they might lose or that they might win, thus forcing the
city toa regular at-large system such as that Operating in nearby De-
troit. These moderate leaders are convinced also that legal action
would lead to a serious racial cleavage in Lakeland, and they are anx-
ious to avoid that.

Some conservative and moderate leaders actually prefer the
present situation to the immediate past. On the one hand, there are
those who take pride in or see utility in having a Negro commissioner
representing "all the people." On the other hand, there are others who
were as unhappy with Washburn as they are currently with Reed. The
current system may not be in their eyes the lesser of two evils, but

there is so little to choose between the two that they will not expend

their energies to attempt to overthrow the current system.

Living with the Black Beater. Lakeland's Negro community

 

still lives with the Black Beater. Disunity and the general lack of
political knowledge and organization have prevented the development
of an effective strategy to cope with the new electoral system. It is

interesting to observe that Negro leaders in Lakeland who were well

161
informed regarding other issues pertaining to housing or education,
for example, knew relatively little of politics. Very few Negro leaders
were sufficiently well informed to qualify as political leaders. Beyond
the Negro labor leaders, who are expected by the union leadership to
participate politically, only one or two Negro leaders were well in-
formed on political issues. Even Democratic party leaders in Lake-
land are not certain that it pays to try to attract the Negro vote. Es-
pecially if a campaign is devoid of racial issues, the turnout in Negro
districts is very light. And if racial issues are raised, the vote goes
up in both the Negro and lower-class white areas. In Lakeland, this
would generally mean the defeat of a candidate taking a liberal stance
on race issues.

One may argue that Negroes are not the only ones disadvantaged
by the new system. Although the white citizens of Lakeland moved to
adOpt the new electoral system in order to control the quality of Negro
representation on the commission, the new system also appears to
make it easier than ever before for the economic elites to control city
politics. The new system Operates to the advantage of those candidates
who can finance a city-wide campaign, and those who can count on
neWSpaper support. On the two commissions elected in Lakeland under
the new system, there have been both Democrats and Republicans. Par-
ty identity, however, appears to be independent of the ideological pos-

ture of the commission. In both economic and non-economic terms,

162

the Democratic members of the commission appear to be as conserva-

1 The resultant conservatism of the

tive as the Republican members.
commission Often Operates to the disadvantage not only of Lakeland's
Negroes, but to the disadvantage of the entire working class. This is
perhaps most clearly evident in the area of housing, which will be
examined shortly.

This analysis suggests an alternative solution to the Black
Beater that is rarely discussed by Negro leaders. There is currently
much political discontent among the white citizens of Lakeland. It is
possible that a Negro-labor-liberal coalition could capitalize on this
by forcing a referendum to amend the charter to allow partisan elec-
tions. Partisan elections would allow the citizenry to hold the political
parties responsible for the actions of "their" commissioners. Under
the current apolitical politics, only individual commissioners can be
held responsible for their actions. The discipline that could be pro-
vided by a political party is totally lacking. If partisan elections were
allowed, it is possible that Lakeland's Negroes could "live with" the
Black Beater and still make important gains in terms of political in—
fluence.

Whether or not such a strategy could succeed is surely debatable.

But there is no question that the Negro community is disadvantaged

 

1. One Democratic member of the commission, for example,
recently recommended sterilization for all "illegitimate mothers"
with two or more children on ADC.

163
politically by the general lack of political knowledge among Negro
leaders. This lack of knowledge seriously limits the available perSpec-
tives which might lead to the resolution of serious problems. Whether
the Negro community is to beat the Black Beater or live with it, great-
er political organization and knowledge appear to be minimal prerequi-

sites for increased political influence.

Derivation Of Hypotheses

 

This rather lengthy discussion of political affairs as they relate
to Negro leadership and racial conflict in Lakeland suggests a number
of propositions suitable for testing in subsequent research.

White leaders will deliberately seek to establish
conservative (or moderate) Negro leaders as the legitimate
leaders of the Negro subcommunity, while attempting at
the same time to discredit militant (or moderate) Negro
leaders.

The rhetoric of "good government" Oftentimes con-
stitutes an ideological defense of electoral systems deliber-
ately designed to limit or control the representation of the
lower-class in general, and Negro and ethnic minorities in
particular.

The methods by which governmental representatives
of the Negro subcommunity are selected leads Negroes to
challenge the legitimacy of those representatives.

The methods by which governmental representatives
Of the Negro subcommunity are selected leads Negroes to
adOpt a position of political cynicism.

Relative to other major issues, Negro leaders are
least likely to be well informed on political issues.

164

Housing

There is a general consensus among both whites and Negroes
in Lakeland that housing is the most crucial issue facing the community.
For Negroes, the problems of housing are especially severe. In recent
years, the general issue of housing has revolved about two Specific
problems which will command our attention here. First, there is the
problem Of public housing. Secondly, there is the problem of redevelop-

ment of the central business district (CBD).1

Public Hous inan Lakeland

 

The problem of public housing in Lakeland may be traced to the
year of 1955. In the early 1950's, in reSponse to a critical housing
need, city officials moved ahead with plans to construct three low in-
come, public housing developments. In 1952, one development of 400
units was actually completed in district 1, which is predominantly
Negro. There then developed an intense controversy regarding the
location of the two other proposed developments. A site for a second
proposed development of 300 units was actually selected in a white
section of the city. White residents objected to locating the develOp-
ment at the selected site or at any other site in the white areas of the
city. It was clear to Opponents that since the developments were to be

subsidized by the federal government, apartments were to be rented

 

l. The reader must wait to discover the relationship between
housing and redevelopment of the CBD.

i. l l 1!)? ‘J

‘1 .‘ {ill
'1

165

on a nondiscriminatory basis. Whites were convinced that this would
result either in an all Negro develOpment or an integrated develop-
ment. Neither was viewed as desirable by most white residents.

Therefore, an alternative site was selected in district 1. This
brought Opposition from Arthur Young, who was then the Negro com-
missioner for district 1. Despite the fact that there was a need for
housing units for Negro families, Young was backed in his stand op-
posing the alternative Site by almost every Negro leader in the com-
munity. Had he followed his own inclination, he may have approved
the site. But it was clear that there was little or no support within
the Negro community for the proposed district 1 site, at least among
those then recognized as leaders. Negro leaders recognized that 10-
cating the development within the Negro community would merely per-
petuate residential segregation. DeSpite the need for housing, Negro
leaders were driven by the status goal Of integration. Rather than to
accept housing that would perpetuate residential segregation, they
acted in such a way that housing needs were not met.

While the controversy regarding an acceptable site continued,
white citizens began circulating petitions calling for a referendum on
the issue of public housing. Faced with this pressure, the commission
in 1955 moved to pass ordinance 1560 which prohibited the construction
of public housing in Lakeland. At a later time, the ordinance was

amended so as to prohibit even commission discussion of public

housing construction.

166

Parenthetically, it might be added that Negro leaders suspect
that the desire of real estate companies to control the housing market
was also important in the passage of 1560. However that may be,
racial sentiment in both the white and Negro communities was clearly
the major factor.

In the decade following 1955, the housing problems in Lakeland
grew progressively acute. The problems were most severe for lower-
class workers--Negroes confined to the ghetto and unable to crack
racial barriers, and whites unable to afford suburban relocation. Negro
leaders, however, did not move vigorously to resolve housing problems
until the period of 1963 to 1965. During this period, a group of Negro
militants met with the City Planning Commission to discuss 1560. The
PARA Newsletter often found occasion to criticize the ordinance, and
PARA leaders also took their complaints to the city commission. Repre-
sentatives of both the NAACP and the Urban League met with white real-
tors to discuss the general issues of housing. Urban League represen-
tatives also met with representatives of the city commission. Other
complaints were lodged on a Sporadic basis, but even during this time
period, as one moderate leader expressed it: "For the most part, we
just complained."

Finally in 1965, militant leaders in both PARA and the NAACP
filed formal complaints with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission

charging not only discrimination in housing, but also discrimination in

167
municipal elections and de facto school segregation. On the basis of
these complaints, one CRC official was quoted as referring to "the
mess in Lakeland. " This resulted in a commission meeting at which
another CRC official spoke, along with Negro leaders including Corbin,
Washburn, and Abrams. As a result of this meeting, the commission
reorganized their Human Relations Commission which had long been
inactive. The meeting also led to the scheduling of a commission-
Sponsored public hearing on public housing to be held in March of
1966. For their part, CRC officials decided to have staff personnel
visit the city on a two day a week Schedule rather than on irregular
visits as in the past.

At the early March hearing, Negro leaders stated their criti-
cisms Of 1560 and asked for its outright repeal. A PARA spokesman
called the ordinance "biased and bigoted. " Despite a long-standing
lack of concern with public housing, the commission moved the night
of the hearing to amend 1560 to allow the construction of public housing
for the elderly. Negro leaders and others quickly charged that the
commission action was prompted by the upcoming municipal elections.

Following the hearing, PARA President Curtis Abrams sent
telegrams to the Michigan CRC and to the Department of Housing and
Urban DevelOpment (HUD) in Washington requesting that federal urban
renewal aid to the city be stopped because the city had not complied

with its workable program. In the telegrams, PARA charged that the

168
city had no Operating relocation program, that it had no committee of
minority group housing, and that it had totally neglected the problem
of providing decent housing for Negro families.
Later, in an attempt to have its urban renewal workable pro-
gram recertified by HUD, the commission announced in mid-March
that a committee on minority group housing had been appointed on

February 24. The delay in the announcement was not explained.

Redevelopment of the Central Business District

 

It was only with the emergence of another issue that Lakeland's
housing problems became of vital concern. The new issue revolved
about redevelopment of the central business district. Urban renewal
land in the south end of the CBD had been cleared for a number of years,
and city commissioners were being pressed to develOp the land. The
city's economic elites were eSpecially concerned, for the construction
of nearby suburban shopping centers in recent years had resulted in a
serious loss of retail business on the part of downtown Lakeland busi-
nessmen. This trend could not be halted or reversed without redevelop-
ment of the CBD.

During 1966, the city commission was quietly completing nego-
tiations with a developer who had substantial financial resources, as
well as previous experience in developing a number of suburban shop-

ping centers. The Lakeland News began building up support for the anti-

 

cipated contract between the city and James Pellegrin and Associates.

169
At the same time, the School of Architecture of a Michigan university
was completing an extensive study of Lakeland. Although the study
was conducted as a project for graduate students, assistance was pro-
vided by faculty representing the disciplines of urban planning, law,
economics, political science, sociology, etc. On the basis of this
study Raymond Goodman, the study director, came forth with his own
University Plan for redevelopment of the city of Lakeland. The Univer-
sity Plan was much more comprehensive than the Pellegrin Plan, for
it called not only for redevelopment of the CBD, but also for solving
the city's housing problems.

Goodman and his colleagues and students took over a vacant
building in downtown Lakeland and constructed a display to illustrate
their plan. Scale models were built Showing projected plans up to the
year 2000. A formal presentation, complete with slides and taped
narration, was provided nightly. Service clubs, voluntary associations,
and interested groups of all kinds were invited to view the presenta-
tion and the display.

By the time the commission was ready to sign a formal contract
with Pellegrin, there was wideSpread community support for the Univ-
ersity Plan. Conflict between supporters of the two opposing plans was
intensified on September 27 when the commission held a public hearing
on the Pellegrin Plan prior to voting on approval of the contract with

Pellegrin. It was learned at the hearing that important sections of the

170

detailed thirteen page contract had been revised as late as that very
afternoon. Only two Lakeland citizens had been able to obtain COpies
of the prOposed contract prior to the meeting, and they had been suc-
cessful only because they remained at City Hall until the five o'clock
closing hour. Based upon the statements made that evening, one must
conclude that many Lakeland citizens felt that they had not been pro—
vided ample time to make rational decisions concerning the contract.

Yet the people who attended the hearing had strong opinions.
The more than 800 persons who attended the five hour hearing heard
some fifteen or twenty persons Speak, most of whom represented or-

ganizations within the community. Not one Speaker favored approving

 

the contract with Pellegrin. Those who Spoke requested that the com-

 

mission either: (1) reject the contract with Pellegrin; (2) delay their
decision until expert advise had been sought or until the University
Plan had been more thoroughly explored; or (3) adOpt the University
Plan and obtain financial support and a developer for the plan. Of the
many criticisms advanced by critics, the following were among the
most important: (1) the legality of the contract was questioned since
the public had not had time to examine its contents; (2) the cost to the
city would actually be more than the $9 million the commission had
estimated (some argued additionally that the University Plan would be
much less expensive); (3) the commission had acted undemocratically

throughout its negotiations with Pellegrin; (4) actual development would

171
proceed much slower than claimed (some argued additionally that the
development of the portion of the University Plan dealing with the CBD
would proceed more rapidly); (5) the plan created traffic flow problems
which were left unresolved and which were not considered in the cost
estimate; (6) the plan failed to provide sufficient parking Space for the
planned shOpping center; and (7) the commission had not sought the ad-
vise of its own city planning department in its negotiations.

Most members of the Negro community concurred in these crit-
icisms. Indeed, the six Negro Speakers at the hearing stated these
criticisms themselves. But from the perSpective of the Negro commun-
ity, perhaps the most significant thing to come from the public hearing
was realization that there was a rather widespread consensus that
housing--and not redevelopment of the central business district--was
the most crucial problem facing Lakeland. This was a recurrent theme
in the statements presented that evening. In particular, it was the cen-
tral argument advanced by the first Speaker of the night, the regional
director of the UAW. David Fuller not only was critical of 1560; he
also proposed the creation of a Citizens Development Authority to sur-
vey the city's housing problems and to propose solutions for those
problems. Additionally, he promised substantial financial support from
the union if such a committee were established. Fuller set the tone for
the night, and the completion of his presentation was greeted with bois-

terous applause. For the remainder of the night, the audience applauded

172

Pellegrin critics and University supporters, but they heckled the com-
missioners when they expressed support of the Pellegrin contract.

Commissioners nonetheless defended themselves on the grounds
that the land had been cleared years ago and it was time that something
were done. They claimed that the Pellegrin Plan had actually been
under commission study for a period of eight months. They protest-
ed that it was illegitimate to raise the "political" issue Of housing at
this time, for the hearing was for the eXpressed purpose of deciding
whether or not to approve redevelOpment of the CBD. They claimed
that the audience had been "stacked" with opponents of Pellegrin, many
of whom were clearly outsiders. Finally, they attacked the emotion-
alism and rudeness of the evening's Speakers and the audience in gen-
eral and contrasted this with the curteousy and respect they (the com-
missioners) had shown others throughout the evening. Then at 1:20
in the morning, after a majority of the audience had left the meeting,
they voted 6 to l to approve the proposed contract with Pellegrin.

District 1's Negro commissioner, Merritt Reed, voted with
the majority, despite the fact that the Pellegrin-University controversy
had induced an unusual measure of solidarity among Negro leaders.
Negro Spokesmen for the NAACP, the Urban League, PARA, the Negro
Real Estate Association, a Negro fraternity, and a veterans organiza-
tion had all stated their Opposition to the Pellegrin Plan. One moderate

leader later Observed that "The University Plan was a beautiful

173
catalytic agent. It welded community support and contributed to ex-
tensive participation. Where there is controversy, this is good."
Another Negro militant leader later commented that he was amazed
to have seen Negroes and whites taking the same position that evening.
A letter drafted by the Executive Board of the Urban League and sent
to the commission shortly after the Open hearing probably expressed
the sentiments of most members of the Negro community in referring
to the Open hearing as "stunning and appalling . . . a ritualistic farce. "
Although this letter led to intense criticism from some (mostly white)
members of the League's Board of Directors, the message had been

delivered nonetheless.

The Releal of 1560

 

The Open hearing on the Pellegrin Plan had set the stage for
the repeal of 1560. Even while the commission had been busy com-
pleting its negotiations with Pellegrin, commission members became
increasingly aware of the pressures being brought to bear on the prob-
lems Of housing. Commissioners and other city officials began to re-
ceive rumors that Negro leaders and liberal white leaders had in their
possession a ruling by the State Attorney General which declared 1560
to be contrary to both the City Charter and the State Constitution and
therefore without legal effect. These rumors were ture. As a mat-
ter of fact, there were those--Negro and white--who had known of the

ruling for three months!

174

The question that naturally arises is why action was not taken
by those individuals. The evidence strongly suggests that militant
and even moderate Negro leaders sat on the ruling in hOpes of embar-
rassing the commission. They were willing to bide their time to wait
for the prOper moment to unveil their new weapon.

White leaders who knew Of the ruling chose to delay action to
prevent "providing political ammunition" to community conservatives
in an election year. They were fearful that this might lead to the
defeat of liberal legislators at all levels.

At the first commission meeting following the public hearing
on the Pellegrin proposal, Commissioner Reed moved for the repeal

of 1560. (The Lakeland News reported that this action came as a sur-

 

prise tO most other commissioners.) On request, however, he with-
drew his motion and the commission unanimously directed the city
attorney to draft a repeal ordinance to be submitted to the commission
in two weeks, after which time there would be scheduled a public
hearing on the issue.

Around the middle of October, important organizations made
known their support of repeal. Both the Chamber of Commerce and
the Lakeland Human Relations Commission recommended repeal.

But perhaps most importantly, Tomlinson Motors Corporation officials
privately made known their desire that something be done about housing.

One influential white community leader stated that he was told by auto

175

company Officials that an additional 1, 100 workers could be hired
tomorrow if only they could find housing. 1

Now that the commission had actually called for a public
hearing, those Negro and white leaders who knew of the Attorney
General's decision began to give second thoughts to their strategy of
withholding the ruling. Coming on the heels of the Open hearing on
the Pellegrin Plan, it was felt that this would "split the town wide
Open"--this time along racial lines. Although a hearing may indeed
have embarrassed the commission, more and more of those who knew
of the ruling came to the decision that a hearing would do more harm
than good. Finally it was decided at a meeting attended by Negro and
white liberal leaders that a public hearing on the issue ought to be
avoided, if possible. Both Negro and white leaders then made it known
to certain city officials that the Attorney General's ruling did indeed
exist. They suggested that city officials confirm this themselves by
requesting an Opinion of the Attorney General. Thus, officials were
told, they could cancel the hearing and repeal the ordinance without
any embarrassment, for the ruling would have left them no other
choice. Assurances were reportedly given the officials that the public
would not discover how long ago the ruling had first been made.

The commission finally requested a ruling of the Attorney Gen-

eral. Then the week before the scheduled hearing, they announced the

 

1. The difficulties encountered by workers recruited in Appa-
lachia the preceding summer were noted in Chapter IV.

176

ruling and moved uncerimoniously to repeal the ordinance that had
been in effect for 11 years. On that night, no Negro leaders were
present in the audience. According to one white liberal, this came
as a shock to commission members, for they had wanted to make it
appear that their hand had been forced by militant Negro leaders.
SuSpecting this, liberal white leaders had advised Negro leaders not
to attend the meeting specifically to avoid the possibility of making a

political issue of the commission's action.

Negro Leaders and Housing

 

Due to the powerlessness of Negro leadership, 1560 had been
in effect for 11 years. The ordinance was passed in the first place in
part because Negro leaders were reluctant to have another public
housing development located in district 1. Then until 1963 or '64,
there was little done by Negro leaders to Oppose the ordinance. By
this time, Lakeland's housing problems were severe, especially in
the Negro community. But even then, 1560 was still low on the prior-
ity list of the Urban League, in part because it was recognized that it
would not lead naturally to new public housing, but probably also be-
cause it was recognized that racial cleavage on the issue ran deep.
Many other Negro leaders were not actively involved in fighting the
ordinance. Those Negro leaders who were concerned with the ordi-
nance were still unable to make progress against the ordinance until

others in the community became concerned with housing problems,

177

and until they Obtained the ruling from the Attorney General. In the
beginning, Negro leaders did not have ready access to the Attorney
General. Several unsuccessful requests for a ruling had been made
by both Negro and white leaders before it was discovered that the
Attorney General's office would reSpond only to the requests of state
governmental officials and prosecuting attorneys. Thus it was neces-
sary to seek a state legislator who would request a ruling of the Attor-
ney General. One Negro leader pointed out that it was necessary to
be careful to seek out a governmental official who could be trusted.
He observed that the official could easily deceive others by reporting
that an adverse Opinion had been given.

After the ruling had been obtained, Negro leaders chose not
to use their weapon immediately. This suggests that Negro leaders
wanted more than the simple repeal of 1560. Perhaps they wanted to
wait until repeal would readily lend itself to implementing a new policy
of public housing. But there existsa rather broad consensus that Negro
leaders failed touse the ruling in hopes that they could somehow embar-
rass the city government. This Opinion is shared by white conservatives
and liberals, and by Negro conservatives. City officials later viewed
the delaying tactic as "dirty politics. "

It now appears that the city is moving to ameliorate its housing
problems. Even before repealing 1560, as was seen above, the com-

mission had amended the ordinance in order to allow the construction

178
of public housing for the elderly. The city has now obtained approval
of several such projects from the federal government's Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
There are now two important forces working within the city to

COpe with housing problems. The editor of the Lakeland News chairs

 

a "Blue Ribbon" committee that resulted from the UAW's request for
a Citizens Development Authority. The committee consists primarily
of the city's economic elite--those whom Negro leaders view as the
“white power structure. " The UAW and the Negro community are also
represented, however. Clark, Corbin, and one other person repre-
sent the Negro community on the committee, which is now officially
recognized by the city commission. The committee has secured the
services of a competent urban planner to survey the city's housing
needs, but it is generally agreed that his $8, 500 fee will not provide

a survey adequate to the need.

The other force is the Citizens for a Progressive Lakeland
Committee, which consists of persons committed to the University
Plan and Opposed to the Pellegrin Plan. Professor Goodman and other
university peOple--mostly students or former students- work closely
with this committee. The Citizens Committee has vigorously protested
the city's role in the Pellegrin Plan. An elaborate, formal complaint
was filed with HUD charging the city's noncompliance with local, state,

and federal rules and regulations pertaining to urban renewal, in

179

addition to all the criticisms heard at the public hearing. Although
Corbin, Joyce Simmons, and other Negro leaders have worked with
the Citizens Committee, its major leaders are convinced that Negro
leadership is too fragmented to be effective. Then too, it is not clear
that all members of the Citizens Committee would be committed to
residential desegregation or other housing goals which might be pre-
ferred by Negro leaders. The Citizens Committee appears to be tOp
heavy with small businessmen who would not be expected to be able to
reach agreement with Negro leaders on all issues. Negro leaders, for
their part, protest that the Citizens Committee, like most other pre-
dominantly white organizations, seeks legitimation and support from
Negro leaders Effl the important decisions have been made. They are
reluctant to grant support in such instances. Even though they may be
in favor of the prOposed action, they emphatically resent being denied
active roles in the decision-making process.

Public housirg would appear to be a part of Lakeland's future.
Whether or not it will lead to substantial residential desegregation is
a difficult question to answer. It is plainly evident that most white
residents in Lakeland are firmly Opposed to desegregation, as one city
Official noted.

Now we are willing to build develOpments in dis-
tricts l and 7. But Negro leaders are opposed to that.
That would be perpetuating segregation, in their eyes.

Negroes in this community are going to have to face up
to the fact that the white community here is unwilling to

180

build developments that would lead to integration. Negroes
first are goirg to have to demonstrate to the white community
that they're worthy of living next door to whites. They're
going to have to demonstrate that they can keep up their
prOperty, that they can develop acceptable standards of living.
Until that's done, nothing can be done that will bring about
housing integration. It's possible today for acceptable Negro
families to move irto white districts. We see that in Lake-
land today. But integration is going to be a very slow pro-
cess until Negroes can demonstrate to the white community
that they're deserving of it.

If the city chooses to construct public housing, it is evident
that they will eXperience difficulty preventing some measure of housing
desegregation. In all probability, influential white leaders will try to
hold the line against desegregation. If they must give ground, they
will probably move to locate public housing projects in white working-
class areas contiguous to the present Negro residential areas. Thus
whites may be more fragmented in the housing struggles to come.
Intense controversy is likely to center about the location and the size
of proposed public housing units. Anticipating just such Opposition,
Negro leaders are exploring possibilities such as constructing two to
six family units to be scattered throughout white residential areas.
Whatever strategies are adOpted by the Opposing forces, it would
appear at this juncture that the possibilities for housing desegregation
depend upon a diligent search by Negro leaders for a greater measure

of solidarity within their own ranks and for a viable coalition with

influential white leaders concerned also with housing problems.

181

Derivation of Hypotheses

 

An examination of housing issues in Lakeland also evokes a
number of hypotheses which might well be tested in future empirical
research on Negro leadership and racial conflict.

Because they must Operate from a weak base of
power, Negro leaders will experience extreme difficul—
ties in demonstrating their effectiveness by obtaining
race goals rapidly enough to satisfy members of the
Negro subcommunity.

Negro leaders will be predominantly concerned with
issues relating to minority group membership, and will be
inclined to assess all issues on the basis of the probable
effect on minority group members and their relations with
dominant group members.

White community leaders, even those who are
liberal within the context of the political climate of the
community, are more likely to seek legitimation and
support from Negro leaders after important decisions
have been made than to encourage the active participa-
tion of Negro leaders in the decision-making process.

Negro leaders (eSpecially militants) are reluctant to
grant their support and legitimation when they have not
participated directly in the preceding process of decision-
making, even though they may approve the issue under
consideration.

CHAPTER VII
THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND:

EDUCATION, POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS,
AND EMPLOYMENT

Education

 

The fact that Negro parents are committed to education for

their children is reflected in the Spontaneous and aggressive nature

of their actions. In the area of education, particularly, action has
often been precipitated by followers rather than by leaders. Often-
times rank-and-file members of the Negro community have not waited
for Negro leaders to take the initiative; on more than one occasion,
Negro leaders have had to Sprint in order to lead their followers. This
means also that the institutionalized channels of appeal and protest

have oftentimes been rejected.

The Lincoln Junior High Demonstration

 

This is best illustrated by a student boycott and protest demon-
stration which occurred at Lincoln Junior High School near the end of
the 1965-66 school year, an episode which warrants a detailed exami-
nation. The stage was set for protest when a Negro student charged
that she had been "manhandled" by the white, male principal of the

school as he broke up a fight. Although this one incident precipitated

182

183

the demonstration, the protest is best viewed as a reaction against
many years of community discontent. The principal at Lincoln, John
Davenport, was due to retire at the end of the school year after a
career in which he had become an anathema to the Negro community.
Davenport, earlier in his career, had been transferred from his posi—
tion as principal at Wilson Junior High to Lincoln where the percentage
of Negro students was much lower, although still a majority. Because
the level of hostility against Davenport had been very high for years,
the validity of the girl's charges seemed irrelevant tO many in the
Negro community. 1 As one militant leader expressed it, "They just
had to let everyone know how they felt about that guy." From the per-
spective of Negro parents whose children attended Davenport's schools,
his retirement called for a demonstration which had long been delayed.
In all probability, however, Davenport also served as a scapegoat not
only for the Lakeland School Board, but for the entire white community
and its leaders.

Soon after the incident, many Negro students at Lincoln had
decided to boycott the school. Their judgment in this matter was
probably influenced by the Northern High School boycott in nearby
Detroit which had just recently made national headlines. Many Negro

parents supported the desires of the students, in part because it

 

l. The evidence suggests that Davenport did what was necessary
to defend himself when the girl tried to attack him with a fingernail
file or another Sharp instrument.

184

seemed certain that a student boycott was going to occur no matter
what the parents' position on the issue. When Negro leaders heard

of the difficulties, they moved to persuade the parents to call Off the
demonstration and meet instead with school board officials to discuss
matters. When it became clear that the Negro parents and students
were going to hold a demonstration with or without Negro leaders, the
leaders moved successfully to channel the discontent into a peaceful
demonstration. Negro militant leaders came to see this as an effective
means of dramatizing discontent and gaining publicity. Although the
Urban League, Negro ministers, and others were active, the core of
leadership for the demonstration was provided by James Corbin and
NAACP members.

According to one report, a student boycott was aborted the
morning following the incident when students were locked in the school;
doors were chained and students were not allowed to leave the building.
The Superintendent of Schools, George Sanburn, later met with Lincoln
teachers and ordered them not to prevent student participation in the
demonstration. The demonstration was finally held three days later on
Friday, May 27, when anywhere from 175 to 250 students were joined
by approximately 40 parents in a two hour demonstration outside the
school building. Shortly after the demonstration began, word circu-
lated that many 9th graders had not joined the picketing because they

had been told that if they did participate, they would not be allowed

185

either to graduate or to attend a year-end school trip. A number of
Negro parents then went into the school and encouraged their 9th grade
children to join the demonstration.

Corbin then requested that the Michigan CRC arrange an appoint-
ment with Superintendent Sanburn for that afternoon. Sanburn refused
to allow the CRC to act as a liaison agent and advised the NAACP to
make the appointment themselves. Finally at the insistence of Negro
leaders, the original 1:30 appointment was set back to 3:00 to allow
the mayor and the president of the school board to attend. It was felt
by Negro leaders that this would force them and other white leaders
outside the school system to accept partial reSponsibility for what had
happened.

The Negro community was represented at the meeting by officials
of the NAACP, the Urban League, the Ministerial Alliance, and parents.
Eleven demands were presented to school officials at the meeting, nine
Of which were mimeographed. By means of the minieographed handout,
Negro leaders demanded that a monitor be placed inside the school
building for the remainder of the school year; that reprisals not be
taken against student participants in the demonstration; that "in future
disciplinary cases where female students are involved, that they not
be manhandled by male personnel of the school"; that expulsion proce—
dures established by the school board be followed at Lincoln; that

school policy regarding the expulsion of students from Lincoln and

186
their reassignment to Wilson or other schools be made public; that
the contributions of Negro Americans be stressed in history courses;
that a student human relations group be established at the school; and
that extra-curricular programs in operation at other junior high schools
be adOpted at Lincoln. Demands were also made at the meeting for a
study of race relations in the city's schools and for Davenport's re-
moval from the city's Housing Commission. Official school and school
boa rd policy already covered most of the demands, but many policies
had been frequently violated at Lincoln.

Most demands were agreed to by school officials and other white
leaders present at the meeting. The president of the school board
agreed to discuss the possibility of a study of the school system with
Civil Rights Commission officials. The mayor, however, refused to
remove Davenport from the Housing Commission. As requested, San-
burn agreed to have Prentice Colby begin serving as monitor at the school
the next school day. The superintendent, however, met Colby when
he arrived at Lincoln to assume his duties and told Colby to resume his
duties as principal at Wilson instead. An NAACP member and parent
leader of the demonstration was then appointed as an official monitor
for the remainder of the School year. Both Sanburn and Colby were
faced with a difficult situation when Negro leaders requested Colby as
the monitor. Colby was then the principal at Wilson Junior High and he

was reluctant to act in any capacity at Lincoln. Furthermore, Colby

187

had already been notified of his appointment as Community-School and
Human Relations Director to begin in July. Both Colby and Sanburn
felt that Colby's effectiveness in his new position with the school board
would be threatened if he were to act as monitor at Lincoln.

Things were hardly back to normal for the rest of the school
year at Lincoln. Negro parents felt free to go to the school at any time
of the day to volunteer their services as monitor in the hallways. The
discipline of students in the classrooms deteriorated drastically.
Lincoln's teachers eventually revolted because they felt that the school
board had not issued a vigorous statement exonerating Lincoln teachers
of blame, as had been promised. Two weeks after the student boycott,
for a two day period, more than half Of Lincoln's 43 teachers failed to
report because of "illness" DeSpite the difficulties encountered, all
parties somehow struggled through to the end of the school year. In
retrOSpect, it can be seen that the situation would have been much more
difficult had it not occurred so close to the end of the school year.

The tendency for Negroes to act prior to the initiation of action
by Negro leaders was illustrated in yet another incident related to educa-
tion. The Lakeland Board of Education had publicly announced the
appointment of a new principal for a Negro elementary school. Some
60 or 70 Negro parents living in the worst slum area of the Negro com-
munity presented themselves at the school board meeting where the

appointment was to be approved. They protested the appointment of a

white female as principal and argued instead that a Negro male ought

188

to be appointed. Recognizing the extent and the impact of broken
families in the neighborhood, Negro parents argued that only a Negro
male could provide the masculine model needed for their children. On
the motion of Dr. Reuben Morgan, a Negro moderate who serves on
the board, approval of the previously announced appointment was tab-
led. At its next meeting, the board revoked its earlier appointment

and approved instead the appointment of a Negro male to the position.

The Citizens Committee on the Equalityof Educational Opportunity

 

The Lincoln Junior High Demonstration was neither the first
nor the largest protest demonstration against Lakeland's educational
system. In 1964, a reported 2,000 Negro children and adults marched
to the Board of Education Administrative Office and on to the City Hall
to protest against de facto segregation and alleged discriminatory prac-
tices of the school system. And from that point on, the Michigan CRC
has received frequent charges alleging a denial of educational equality
in the city's school system.

Following the Lincoln demonstration, Michigan CRC Officials
urged the Lakeland School Board to appoint a committee to study the
equality of educational opportunities in Lakeland's schools. Soon
after the demonstration, when Prentice Colby assumed his duties as
Community-School and Human Relations Director, he was assigned
as coordinator of the study. Colby carefully selected a committee of

approximately 50 persons from nominations submitted on request by

189
various community organizations. Negroes, eSpecially moderates,
are well represented on the committee. Harold Russell serves as
vice chairman of the committee, and Carl Dean and a former presi-
dent of the NAACP Serve as subcommittee chairmen.

The committee is expected to submit its report after a study
of twelve to eighteen months. At this time, it is impossible to anti-
cipate the nature Of the report to be submitted. Colby and others,
however, are well aware that there are certain Negro leaders who
are skeptical of the outcome. ESpecially among militants, one hears
much talk of a possible "whitewash. " These critics argue that in the
past, the formation of committees has been used as a technique to
quiet protest rather than to resolve issues. Whatever the final result
of the committee study may be, it appears certain that the committee
would never have been appointed except for the Lincoln demonstration
and the insistence of the CRC.

Both Colby and Morgan view the committee as a first step
toward legitimizing whatever significant changes, if any, are to be
made in the educational system. Both are well aware of the measure
of lay control exercised over education. They see the committee as
a means by which public support can be marshalled for action that
neither the board nor the administration can take at this time without

encountering serious Opposition.

190

Education and the Dilemma Of Goals

 

There is certainly no consensus in Lakeland that school desegre-
gation ought to be a goal claiming the energies of Negro leaders. Negro
leadership, and the entire Negro community as well, is divided as to
whether school desegregation or the improvement of educational quality
within the existing Negro schools ought to have priority. Though school

desegregation is a status goal par excellance, there are even militant

 

leaders who opt instead for the welfare goal of improving the education-
al quality of Negro schools. Even among many who argue in favor of
school desegregation, this is seen not as a goal in itself, but rather as
a means toward the goal Of improving the quality of education provided
Negro children. Many Negro leaders are convinced that "Mainstream
Education" is to be provided only where there are white students; to
obtain a superior education, one must go where the white students are.
There are others who reject school desegregation as a goal because
of the inability to determine the apprOpriate means by which that goal
could be achieved. The problem in Lakeland, as elsewhere, is that
de facto school segregation is closely tied to residential segregation,
and that both school officials and community public Opinion support
the neighborhood school ideology. Many Negro parents themselves
are so committed to the neighborhood school that they would not con-
sider busing as a means of breaking down segregation.

The dilemma faced by Negro leaders stems in part from the

fact that so little progress has been made toward school desegregation

191
since the 1954 Brown decision of the Supreme Court. Most Negro
parents, no matter if they live in the South or the North, must still
send their children to "Negro" schools which are judged by most to
be inferior. In listening to militant Negro leaders in Lakeland speak
of the need for good "Black" (not Negro) teachers, one cannot escape
the feeling that ten years ago these same leaders would have been

Spearheading the drive for school desegregation.

Elective and Appointive Negro School Officials

 

Although school board members are elected at-large, it appears
that the community at-large has come to accept as legitimate one
"Negro seat" on the board. Dr. Reuben Morgan, a moderate Negro
leader who is highly reSpected in both the white and Negro communi-
ties, is the current Negro member of the board. In 1964, Morgan
ran unsuccessfully against one other candidate for one vacant seat.

That year he ran without endorsement by the Lakeland News. The

 

next year, he led all three candidates in a race for two vacancies.
This time he was aided by newspaper support and he won by a sub-
stantial margin.

Although not an easy task, the election of a Negro to the school
board is simplified by the fact that board elections are held separate
from other municipal elections. Thus there is a very low turnout and
the result is that a high turnout in the Negro districts plus moderate

support in the remaining districts of the city can lead to victory for a

192

Negro candidate. For example, in 1965, Morgan pulled more than
half of his 2, 800 votes in the two districts that are heavily Negro.
Chances of a Negro victory appear also to be strengthened when
there are two or more vacancies to be filled; then the election of a
Negro candidate does not appear to be so threatening to whites.

It is doubtful that just apy Negro leader could be elected to
the school board. The candidacy of a militant Negro leader would most
certainly lead to a heavy vote in white districts to offset Negro votes.
Though there may be a "Negro seat" on the school board, that seat
appears to be reserved for a "reasonable" and moderate Negro leader.

Negro leaders in Lakeland had long been concerned that there
were no Negroes on the school board's central administrative staff.
As noted above, there were Negro administrators serving in Negro
schools, but none had been appointed to the central staff. Robert
Clark, James Corbin, and Reuben Morgan, in informal discussions,
requested school officials to make such an appointment. Significantly,
these requests were made at a time when the school board had just
received word that it was to receive several large grants of financial
aid. No doubt prompted because of the clear evidence of racial prob-
lems in the school system, the board moved to create the position
which was given to Prentice Colby. From the beginning, it was made
clear that race relations ("human relations") was to be one of Colby's

major concerns. Colby, just as Morgan, is highly reSpected in both

193
the Negro and white communities. He too is a moderate, although he
is strongly sympathetic toward militant Negro leadership. Shortly
following Colby's breakthrough, other Negroes were appointed to

positions with the central administration.

D erivation of Hypotheses

 

An examination and review of problems and issues relating to
education in Lakeland suggests a number of hypotheses which are in
need of empirical tests.

The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to impor-
tant centers of decision-making within the community on
the part of Negro leaders will lead them to resort to non-
institutionalized means of influencing the decision-making
process.

Due largely to the heterogeneity of the Negro sub-
community, Negro leadership will be characterized by the
lack of consensus regarding goals and means.

During the decade of the 1960's, the prOportion of
Negro leaders who reject integration as a realistic goal
has increased.

Irnportant race advancement goals are not achieved
in the absence of concerted protest on the part Of Negro
leaders.

Police and Community Relations

 

As with other summers in the recent past, the summer of 1966
was one of racial tensions and ghetto rioting. Major urban riots ex-
ploded in Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco. Michigan cities

such as Detroit, Lansing, Benton Harbor, and Jackson also experienced

194
rioting in their Negro districts. Lakeland narrowly averted a race
riot, and we will devote this section to the examination of the circum—

stances surrounding that "near miss."

A Threatened Riot

 

The first two or three weeks of August, 1966 in Lakeland were
filled with racial tensions. Tensions began to mount shortly after
plant protection personnel at Chamberlain Motors discovered a leaflet
posted in an employee washroom. The leaflet, shown in Figure 3
(page 195), is alleged to have been distributed in Watts the previous
summer. 1 According to some accounts, additional copies of the leaf-
let were left in cars parked on the employee lots at the factory. Police
and plant personnel, however, claim that only the one copy was posted
in the washroom. However that may be, rumors rapidly swept through
the entire community to the effect that a race riot was imminent. With-
in short order, most whites were convinced that hate literature was
being distributed by Negroes, while Negroes were equally convinced

that white "red necks" were reSponsible for the distribution of the

leaflets.

 

1. It is debatable whether or not it was distributed in Watts by
Black racists, as many whites in Lakeland believed. Late in 1966
J51, a magazine intended for a Negro readership, reported that sim-
ilar leaflets were discovered in the possession of a paramilitary
organization identified with the radical right in New York state.
Police arrested members of the organization shortly after learning
of their intent to violently disrupt planned political (student-leftist)
and religious (Jewish) retreats. The reader will also note that the

 

195

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In white sections of the city, it was widely rumored that a
demonstration was soon to be led by Martin Luther King, and that
local Negro leaders were to provoke a riot after the visit. White
residents were fearful that their neighborhoods would be invaded by
Negroes who would rape white women and kill white children.

Similar rumors were circulating in the Negro sections of
town. Many Negroes believed that whites were going to invade Negro
neighborhoods. According to one particularly strong rumor in the
Negro community, the local White Citizens Council was conducting a
recruiting campaign for new members and were spreading the rumors
to help the cause. Responsible Negro leaders, rightly or wrongly,
believed that the Council was eSpecially strong at Chamberlain Motors.
One reported a membership of approximately 1200 at the plant. 1 The
rumors circulating in the Negro community reportedly Spurred talk
among Negro youths of burning down the old World War II barracks
housing--that was 222 way to get rid of undesired slum housing!

In the beginning, the Lakeland Police Department was receiving
a few calls a day pertaining to a threatened riot. In a matter of a week
or so, however, they began receiving as many as several hundred

calls a day. Callers sought information concerning what could be done

 

leaflet identifies many of the traditional targets of the radical right:
World Government, the World Court, Communism, and racial violence.

1. Such evidence as could be gathered suggests that the membership
in the Council was actually very small and very inactive. The 1200
figure surely must be an overestimate.

197
to protect their families. Should they evacuate the city? Where could
they purchase firearms and ammunition? What kind of weapons ought
they to buy?

Downtown businessmen reSponded by purchasing plywood to
cover their store windows and doors in the hope of preventing looting.
Some Opportunistic insurance salesmen began going from door to door
selling riot insurance. In both the white and Negro sections of the
city, some fathers moved their children to back bedrooms and slept
with loaded weapons nearby.

In retrOSpect, it would seem that the behavior of many persons
(Negro and white) during this period served to increase the actual
probability of rioting. From this point in time, it appears that any
racial incident could have provided the Spark for a riot. Some Negro
leaders believe that one particular incident nearly provided that Spark.
It was at the height of the rumor Spreading that some Negro youths
decided to “test" their right to be Served in "hillbilly" bars where they
knew they were not welcomed. A night of barhOpping led to Several
fights, but the fighting somehow failed to Spread.

Many Negro leaders, including Clark, Corbin, Abrams, Sim-
mons, and Fred Brown, took to the streets to quiet the youngsters.
Negro clergymen met together to discuss what could be done to pre-
vent rioting, and they placed themselves on 24 hour call to meet emer-

gencies. Negro leaders began receiving calls from white leaders

198

inquiring as to the potential of rioting. Some of the more militant
leaders took advantage of the Situation to dramatize the plight of the
Negro community. Although it is difficult to determine whether or
not militant leaders deliberately exaggerated the potential of riots,
some did not go out of the way to alleviate the fears of their white
callers. l
The initial reSponse of white community leaders was largely
one of inaction. Leaders could not reach a firm decision regarding
the appropriate action to take under the circumstances, and the re-
sult was inaction and delay. State Civil Rights Commission officials
finally became concerned and they convinced community leaders of
the desirability of refuting the validity of rumors circulating in the
community. A meeting was called between t0p level white and Negro
leaders. Clark, Corbin, and Abrams represented the Urban League,
the NAACP, PARA, and the Negro community at the meeting. Most
white leaders attending the meeting represented the “white power

structure, " a clear indication of the perceived gravity of the Situation.

As a result of this meeting, the Lakeland News gave front page cover-

 

age to the meeting itself and reprinted the following statement issued

by Corbin in the hOpes of decreasing racial tension.

 

1. Some conservative Negro leaders are still convinced that
militants deliberately exaggerated the potential of rioting.

199

This acceleration has been due to the distribution
of a racially designed hate Sheet which has been circulated
in certain areas of the city.

The sheet purports and supports racial violence and
unrest

The Lake County Chapter of the NAACP unequivocally
condemns the content, authorship and distribution of such
material.

There is no evidence that this material has emitted
from any civil rights organization or any section of the
Negro community.

Due to the intensity of rumor and hearsay now ram-
pant in the community, we strongly urge any citizen having
knowledge of these matters to immediately report them to

the Lakeland Police Department.

We ask that our citizens not repeat or encourage
these attitudes and expressions.

Progress and accomplishments cannot be obtained
by hate and violence.

Negro leaders also distributed to those attending the meeting an eleven
point memo summarizing problems existing in the Negro community.
Most of the problems pertained to housing, but the statement also
drew attention to the city's electoral system, de facto school segrega-
tion, and the absence of respect in the Negro community for police
authority. The latter was attributed to the wide-Spread belief that
laws were enforced in a biased manner. The eleven point memo was
Signed by the three Negro leaders in attendance and by the (white)

president of the board of directors of the Urban League.

200

Following the newspaper report of the meeting and Corbin's
statement, tensions eased almost as quickly as they had mounted in
the beginning. Within a relatively short period of time, the city re-
turned to normal and the perceived threat of overt violence subsided.

It iS still difficult to determine objectively just how serious
was the threat of rioting. It is interesting to note that among Negro
leaders. leadership type fails to distinguish between those who felt
that there was and those who felt that there was not the potential for
rioting. One would expect militant leaders to accept and conservative
leaders to deny a riot potential, but there were militants, moderates,
and conservatives accepting each view. The views of one militant
leader who had witnessed rioting elsewhere seem especially relevant.

I don't think we came close. I went out to talk

to the guys on the corner. There wasn't the unrest

here that I saw elsewhere. I was in Cleveland and

Detroit before things happened, and I was able to pre-

dict it. There was organization there that there wasn't

in Lakeland. You could walk into the centers in Hough

and the kids were Sitting around talking about things.

But not so here. There was no organization here. The

police were not an irritant here, either. Those riots

occurred in strong ghettos. Places where they had

organization—~where the police were gestapo-like.

Those riots began because the kids wanted to give the

police some of their own. Then they became concerned

with the merchants. I only know of one businessman

here in Lakeland that they're unhappy with. That's .

But even with him, they don't stay away from his store.

Regardless of how grave the potential of rioting actually was,

it iS important that both Negroes and whites reSponded aS if the threat

201
were real. The threatened riot and the existence of a “Watts-type
environment" was cited as one reason for the formation of the ”Blue
Ribbon" committee on housing. Although militant Negro leaders at
first seemed willing to push the incident "to the brink, " they eventually
took action to prevent rioting. This action of militants is similar to

their action regarding the Attorney General's ruling on 1560.

Derivation of Hypotheses

 

This section suggests one additional hypothesis which could be
empirically tested:
In Spite of their preference to negotiate with conser-
vative Negro leaders, crisis situations will lead conservative

white leaders in Northern cities to negotiate with militant
Negro leaders.

Employment

 

Relative to the data reported in the other sections of Chapters
VI and VII, the data relating to the attempts of Negro leaders to resolve
problems of employment are quantitatively meager and qualitatively in-
adequate. Our attempts to gather relevant data in this area were gener-
ally unrewarding. The problem presented by the nature of the data
could have been resolved either by not presenting employment data,
or by doing the best we could with what little we had.

Rather than either of these approaches, however, we chose to

analyze some of the reasons why data for employment was so difficult

202

to obtain. This approach seems justified, for the analysis casts addi-
tional light on the nature and problems of Negro leadership. In the
analysis which follows, we will focus on each of the three parties
primarily concerned with employment problems: The Urban League,

management, and labor.

The Urban League

 

The Urban League is a community services agency dedicated to
eliminating discrimination and securing equal opportunity for Negro
Americans. From its beginning, the League has followed a policy
combining self-help with an attack on discriminatory practices. This
iS clearly evident in Whitney Young's summary of 1965 Urban League
action programs.

Our action programs are designed to motivate

youth to stay in school to get the best possible education;

to expand the housing supply for the Negro population; to

eliminate racial barriers in the employment and promo-

tion of qualified Negroes; to strengthen Negro family

life; and to stimulate self-help among Negro citizens in

solving their problems.

Vitally important to the analysis here iS Young's observation
that "Implicit in the League's philOSOphy is the frank recognition that

interracial co-operation is an indispensable prerequisite to the achieve-

ment of significant and lasting gains for Negro citizens. "2 Such

 

1. Whitney M. Young, Jr. , ”The Urban League and its Strategy, "
The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), p. 103.

 

2. Ibid., p. 102.

203

cooperation is sought by means of “fact-finding, research, persuasion,
negotiation, public education, and community organization. "1

AS an organization, then, the Urban League is committed to
both goals and means which force a heavy reliance upon interracial
cooperation. The Lakeland Urban League has an interracial Board
of Directors, and its Executive Director iS responsible to that Board.
The white members of the Board represent both liberal and conserva-
tive elements within the larger community, but the conservative mem-
bers possess more power than the liberal members. The Lakeland
League is dependent for financial support on the United Fund which is
controlled, as in most cities, by conservative economic elites.

The administrative officials of an organization whose success
is seen to be dependent upon their ability to negotiate and bargain may
be guarded in telling all they know. Knowledge possessed by such
organizations is used pragmatically to persuade other negotiating
parties to accept its own goals. Organizational effectiveness could
be threatened by placing the knowledge one possesses in the hands of
a social scientist clearly interested in racial conflict. While it iS
customary to publicly report the agreements reached by means of
negotiation, a blow by blow account of the heavy infighting which

occurred is rarely reported; and it was of course the infighting which

was of concern in this research.

 

1. Ibid., p. 103.

204

Another source of Urban League reluctance to provide relevant
information may stem from the fact that the Executive Director was
himself a social scientist. And as a social scientist, he may have
been more aware than others of the threats posed by social science

research

hdanagem ent

 

As a party to frequent negotiations regarding race relations
as well as other matters, management also has an interest in with-
holding certain kinds of information from others. But management
can withhold information more easily and more subtly than the Urban
League.

As with most large-scale industry, the automobile industry iS
highly bureaucratized. In the mass production of something as com-
plex as an automobile, a bureaucratic structure is probably mandatory.
Bureaucracy itself provides formidable barriers to both the social
science researcher and the race relations professional in search of
information concerning industry.

The rigid hierarchical order of authority and responsibility
which characterizes a bureaucratic structure not only orders behavior
and makes predictability possible; it also provides a means by which
the organization may protect itself from outside intruders. A bureau-
cratic official will oftentimes refuse to answer a question on the grounds

that he does not have the authority to answer that particular question.

205
As a means of passing the buck, he may refer the questioner to others
within the bureaucracy, particularly to those possessing superordinate
authority. Oftentimes the inquirer is Sent through the bureaucratic
mazeway not so that he may obtain the answer to his question, but
rather to discourage him from asking it again.

Another characteristic Of bureaucratic organization is the re-
cruitment and selection Of personnel on the basis of technical or pro-
fessional qualifications. Management has little concern with the color
of the hands that Operate its machines, but it is vitally concerned with
the skills of the man who operates the hands. Race, then, is an irre-
levant criterion of employment, so far as management is concerned.
Management, for example, claims to have no records of the racial
composition of the company work force, and this is probably so. This
makes it difficult for both the researcher and the race relations profes-
sional to validate the existence or the extent of discrimination. 1

The official color blindness of management does not necessarily
indicate a complete absence of color consciousness. One company

personnel manager, for example, informed me that there were no

records indicating the race of employees. Shortly afterwards,

 

1. Though the Operation of universalistic standards in the employ-
ment and promotion Of personnel may eliminate overt discrimination,
it will be of little benefit to the Negro worker lacking, for whatever
reason, the Skills required. Management will not easily be encouraged
to aggressively recruit and train Negro workers, for that is not done
for anyone else.

206

however, to illustrate the absence of discriminatory practices, he
listed by name those Negro workers in his plant holding clerical
positions.

Another major barrier that confronts both the researcher and
the professional race man is i_n_t_<2'organizational rather than in_t_r_a-
organizational. To an important extent, management Shares with
labor reSponsibility for both the formulation and the implementation
of employment and promotion practices. Company-union contracts
stipulate certain procedures to be followed in employee relations.
There is a complex web of management offices and union committees
directly or indirectly concerned with employment practices. This
makes it difficult for anyone to establish the locus of responsibility
for Specific practices, eSpecially when each party attempts to absolve
itself of blame by blaming the other party. Managemert iS particularly
disgruntled with the necessity of utilizing seniority as a criterion in
employment practices, and labor union Officials, in turn, are critical
of the "arbitrary" standards and procedures used by management.
Negro leaders complain that management and labor continually "pass
the buck" when confronted with charges or inquiries concerning race
relations in the plant.

A final source Of management reluctance to provide information
to researchers and others is tied to the company policy of avoiding

entanglement in local controversy. Management is drawn into local

207

controversy only when company interests are clearly and directly
involved or threatened. Given the intensity of racial conflict across
the nation at this time, management has a Special interest in avoiding

entanglement in local racial problems.

Labor

In general, Negro labor Officials either did not possess or did
not divulge much detailed information concerning race relations either
in the union or in the plant. Negro labor leaders and Negro politicians
appear to constitute the major exception to the general rule that Negro
leaders are Negroes first. We have seen above that there are forces
leading the Negro politician to soft-pedal racial issues. Similar forces
bear upon the Negro labor official; he is a labor man first, and a race
man second. In Lakeland, at least, Negro labor leaders are active
participants in politics, but this activism rarely carries over to other
Spheres. Although the union expects its Negro officials to be active
in politics, both Negro and white labor leaders are well aware that
many Negro goals serve to divide the Negro and white working-class.
This is eSpecially so when the issues are local issues.

The three Negro labor leaders in Lakeland are either moderate
or conservative in terms of leadership type, for their position in the
union discourages them from racial militancy. The goals which would
benefit labor do not coincide neatly with those which would benefit

Negroes. A Negro labor leader who adOpted a militant racial stance

208

would probably jeopardize his position Of leadership within the union
hierarchy. 1

The Negro labor leader, it would seem, iS inclined to either
overlook or underestimate racial problems either in the union or the
plant because to recognize and actively to confront those problems
would constitute a threat to his position. His task as a labor leader
is to bring Negro and white workers together so that labor may better
pursue common goals. That is to say that he looks for interracial
solidarity, and not for interracial cleavage.

Negro labor leaders in Lakeland are also restrained by the
fact that their superiors have traditionally had little concern with
local matters. Labor leaders have learned through experience that
their bread and butter issues are fought out at the state and national
levels. The rewards that come from local victories rarely compensate
for the expenditure Of time, energy, and financial resources. Thus,

for this reason also, the Negro labor leader is likely not to find mili-

tant race leadership rewarding.

Derivation of Hypotheses

 

Despite the inability to gather the data sought relative to

employment problems, this section has contributed a number of inter-

esting hypotheses which warrant the consideration of future researchers.

 

l. Parenthetically, it might be added that social scientists have
possibly overlooked the fact that the alliances made by Negroes with labor
and liberals, eSpecially in the North, serve to limit the perspectives
available to Negro leaders at this critical juncture in the Negro Revolt.

209

The concern Of leaders of Negro protest organiza-
tions with perpetuating the organization oftentimes prohibits
them from aggressively pursuing race advancement goals
which, if attained, would force the establishment of new
goals or eliminate the necessity for the organization.

In negotiations with white leaders, Negro leaders are
handicapped by the existence of a bureaucratic ”mazeway"
which facilitates white leaders' escaping reSponsibility and
makes it difficult for Negro leaders to establish the locus of
re Sponsibility.

Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized positions
Of authority within the larger community will be opposed to
noninstitutionalized means Of influencing the decision-making
process.

Vulnerable Negro leaders will be less likely than non-
vulnerable Negro leaders to advocate, support, or participate
in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-
making process.

A general policy of noninterference in local problems
provides ideological support for the avoidance of problems
white organizational leaders are anxious (for whatever reason)
to avoid, but that policy is itself avoided when local problems
touch upon vital interests Of the organization.

Past alliances made by Negroes (e. g. , with labor and
liberals) limit the perSpectives available to Negro leaders at
the present time.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONC LUSION

A three-fold task remains: (l) to assess the contribution of
the empirical study reported here to our understanding of Negro com-
munity leadership and racial conflict; (2) to call attention to the limi-
tations of the study; and (3) to make suggestions for future research.

Contributions to an Understanding
of Negro Community Leadership

 

 

The General Characteristics Of Negro Community Leadership:
External Constraints

 

 

In Chapter II, it was suggested that it is meaningful to view the
nature Of Negro community leadership as being determined by factors
both external and internal to the Negro subcommunity. That distinc-
tion will be followed here in a brief summary of the contributions this
study makes to our understanding of Negro community leadership.

The major external constraint on Negro community leadership
was Seen to be its relative powerlessness. The Negro community has
relatively less of all those things which contribute to power, or the
ability to influence or determine the behavior of others in accordance
with one's Own desires. In terms of numbers of peOple, social organi-

zation, and resources, the Negro subcommunity is clearly subordinate

210

211

to the larger community Of which it is but a part. Compared to white
leaders, Negro leaders have less control over wealth and other finan-
cial resources, less control over jobs, less control over the mass
media, less control over prestigeful interaction, less knowledge and
expertness. lower social standing, etc. A major problem faced by
Negro leaders, then, is the fact that they must Operate from a weak
base of power.

The necessity of Operating from a weak power base, together
with impatient demands for goal attainment, was seen to contribute
to a basic instability or fluidity of leadership. Although not all Negro
leaders in Lakeland would agree, the evidence available suggests the
recent emergence Of a new militancy among Negro leaders in Lakeland.
This new militancy is undoubtedly a local reSponse to the Negro Revolt.
The center for Lakeland's Negro militancy in the middle of the 1960's
was PARA, although the evidence suggests that both the NAACP and
the Urban League moved towards increased militancy. It is interesting
to note that the clarter members of PARA originally formed a Splinter
group within the NAACP which failed to elect its slate of candidates in
the chapter election of Officers held in December of 1964. PARA was
formed only after the failure to capture legitimately the administration
of the Negro community's then most militant organization. In turning
down the PARA militants, NAACP members elected instead James
Corbin, who is himself a militant leader. The choice in the NAACP,

then, was between brands or degrees of militancy.

212

PARA'S militancy is already on the decline. Curtis Abrams
has moved from Lakeland and there is little evidence that the leaders
who have replaced him in PARA are capable of sustaining the militancy
Of 1965 and '66. Yet the potential for new militancy remains. Any
future dissatisfaction with Negro leaders and their accomplishments
is likely to manifest itself in the emergence of a new militancy. AS
Ladd has Observed: "The Negro revolution iS still moving 'always to
the left'; it has yet to reach Thermidor. "1

It was also suggested in Chapter II that Negro leaders would
experience difficulty establishing and maintaining their legitimate
right to act as leaders or agents Of the Negro subcommunity. This
was seen to be attributable to Negro leaders' inaccessibility to the
important centers of decision-making and to the refusal of white
leaders to recognize them as legitimate representatives of the Negro
community. In Lakelarrl, our interviews with white leaders clearly
substantiated this. White community leaders were aware that both the
NAACP and PARA were, in one sense, paper organizations. They knew
that as a general rule, deSpite a dues paying membership of approxi-
mately 500, NAACP officers were elected by the twenty or so persons
attending the election night meeting. They knew also that PARA mem-

bership was very low. This knowledge was used by conservative white

 

l. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. , Negro Political Leadership in the
South (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 136.

 

213
leaders to deny Negro "leaders" the legitimate right to Speak for the
Negro community. A similar charge was frequently made by liberal
white leaders, such as those associated with the anti-poverty programs.
These leaders argued that both the NAACP and the Urban League repre-
sented only middle-class, professional Negroes. Our findings suggest,
then, that the legitimacy of Negro leaders is also challenged on the
basis Of the process by which they are selected as Negro leaders.
This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that Negro leaders find it
necessary to confront white leaders whose legitimate right to Speak
for the community at large iS firmly grounded in democratic proce-
dures. There is irony in the fact that most Negro leaders are con-
vinced that a "white power structure" directs the actions of the for-
mally elected and appointed Officials of the larger community, yet
Negro leaders must confront those officials and not the power structure
itself. Thus Negro leaders who possess little authority and even less
power must confront white leaders cloaked with authority and supported
by the power of other white leaders.

As a consequence of being excluded from the institutionalized
centers Of decision-making within the larger community, it was sug-
gested in Chapter II that Negro leaders would be tempted to resort to
noninstitutionalized means of protest. Although relative to other
(particularly Southern) communities, protest in Lakeland has been

rather mild, Lakeland's Negro leaders have resorted to direct action

214
on occasion. This is most clearly evident in Spontaneous attempts to
resolve problems relating to the schools. At this point in time, the
community's potential for future rancorous conflict is probably high,
especially if the Negro community's inability to elect local represen-
tatives Of its choice continues. A tyranny of the ballot box may even-
tually be viewed to be as Oppressive as the tyranny experienced by
earlier generations Of Negro Americans.

A major economic reversal such as that experienced by the
automobile industry in 1958 in Lakeland would also seem to hold the
potential of launching a new wave of noninstitutionalized protest.
Many Observers would hold that the probability of rancorous conflict
would be especially high if such an economic reversal were to occur
after a period of gradual economic progress, and the last five or Six
years in Lakeland can be SO characterized.

The General Characteristics Of Negro Community Leadership:
Internal Constraints

 

In Chapter II, the major internal constraint on Negro leader-
ship was seen to be the process of involution whereby the Negro com-
munity turns in upon itself. In large measure, involution constitutes
a reSponse to the fact that Negroes are denied or discouraged from
full participation in the larger community. In Lakeland, we have seen
that many Negro leaders are not committed to the goals of housing or

educational desegregation. Probably an even higher proportion of

215

rank-and-file Negroes reject integration goals. Among Negro leaders,
it is possible that the current tendency to reject integration as either
an attainable or a prefer rable goal represents a "backlash to the back-
lash"; the intensified resistance to the civil rights movement is count-
ered by a rejection of the very goals that originally spurred Negroes to
activism. Though we must be extremely careful in generalizing from
the data gathered in Lakeland, it may be that the Negro militancy of
the future will be characterized by a greater emphasis on racial soli-
darity and racial chauvinism. It may be that the increased racial
pride and greater cohesiveness which emerged during the early years
of the Negro Revolt will ultimately result in a diminished insistence

on integration.

It has long been recognized that certain individuals come to
have a vested interest in the perpetuation of a segregated social
structure, a system which is itself reinforced by the process of invo-
lution. These individuals, it is held, will not aggressively move
towards integration, for any such movement would diminish their
income, status, or power. On the basis of our research, it is seri-
ously doubted that very many Negro leaders are constrained for that
reason. Very few Negro leaders perceive integration occurring SO
rapidly as to seriously threaten whatever advantages they enjoy as a
result of segregation. We can anticipate that whites will continue, as

they have done in Lakeland, to bestow Special favors on some Negro

216

leaders in the lbpes that they will be able to slow any movement tO-
wards integration. But this subterfuge is doomed to failure, for such
Negro leaders will be denied legitimacy within the Negro community.
Greater barriers to integration will be erected by those Negro leaders
who deny the moral value of winning a place in an "immoral" society.

Past research has indicated that "vulnerables" (those more
subject than others to white control: e. g. , public school teachers,
social workers, etc.) also will be reluctant to provide militant leader-
ship aimed at integration. The research reported here suggests that
vulnerables may not be as constrained in the North as in the South.
In the North, there appears to be greater separation between occupa-
tional and other social roles, a separation which protects the Negro
employee. In the North, there is a greater probability that a Negro
employee will be judged by his employer on the basis Of criteria direc-
tly relevant to performance on the job. What a Negro employee does
during nonworking hours may be disapproved by his employer, but
that employer will have difficulty legitimizing on-the-job sanctions
aimed at controlling off-hour behavior. The right Of tenure, for ex-
ample, is likely to provide the Northern Negro a measure Of protec-
tion he would lack in the South.

In Chapter II, we also called attention to the heterogeneity of
the Negro subcommunity. Heterogeneity was Seen to lead to differences

in interests which would make it difficult to achieve consensus. On the

217

surface, the findings reported above suggest that the difficulties in
achieving consensus were not as great in Lakeland as expected. But
such a conclusion may be unwarranted. During the course of the study,
some of the more influential Negro leaders met together several times
in what were referred to as Negro leadership conferences. These
meetings were apparently intended to contribute to greater planning,
cooperation, and coordination among Negro organizations and Negro
leaders. Although we had been invited to attend one of the meetings,
the invitation was later revoked because one or more of the partici-
pating members felt that the meetings ought to be for Negro leaders
only. It is not clear whether the invitation was revoked because of the
race Of the researcher, or because Of the focus Of the research. How-
ever that may be, this one incident seems to suggest that Negro leaders
do indeed attempt to resolve their differences covertly. It may also be
that a focus on issue analysis camouflaged the existence of certain
disagreements among Negro leaders. Perhaps the leaders interviewed
failed to mention some existing disagreements because they were un-
related to past or current community issues; perhaps there are disagree-
ments which will come into the Open only after the emergence of new

issues.

Types Of Negro Community Leadership
AS a general rule, the conservative white leaders of Lakeland

who have held power for many years have a definite preference for

218
conservative Negro leaders, followed by the moderates, and then the
militants. It is easy to understand why these conservative white lead—
ers are prediSposed to negotiate with conservative Negro leaders and
to avoid negotiating with militant Negro leaders. First, negotiations
with conservative Negro leaders are preferred because conservative

goals do not entail basic changes in the status quo; the means preferred

 

by conservatives Offer distinct advantages to whites who operate from
a position Of strength; and the conservative rhetoric is nonthreatening.

On the other hand, militant goals Often threaten the status quo; the

 

means favored by militants serve to dramatize and to intensify racial
conflict; and the militant rhetoric is threatening and embarrassing to
whites.

In terms of popular following within the Negro community, mil-
itant Negro leaders have the greatest support, followed by moderates,
then conservatives. Thus, those Negro leaders with the greatest follow-
ing in the Negro community have the least reSpect among Lakeland's
white leaders, while those with the least following in the Negro com-
munity have the greatest reSpect among white leaders. This does not
lead to an impasse, for white leaders have come to recognize the ne-
cessity Of working with moderate and even militant Negro leaders.

This necessity stems directly from the lack of support for conservative
leaders within the Negro community (from the perspective of white

leaders, Negro conservatives cannot "deliver the goods"), and from

219
the ability of Negro militants to either create or to capitalize on crisis
situations. It was militant and moderate Negro leaders, along with
white liberals, who eventually challenged the commission to repeal
1560. During the Lincoln Junior High Demonstration, militant Negro
leaders forced the school board, as well as the mayor, tO negotiate
with them. And at the time of the threatened riot, white leaders
sought out the militant and moderate leaders of the Negro community,
not the conservatives.

This appears to be in conflict with Thompson's findings in New
Orleans. Thompson probably generalized beyond his data when he
asserted that:

in any biracial system composed of a relatively
powerless minority and a powerful majority, the patterns

of intergroup leadership are determined very largely by

the majority group. This is so because the prime role of

the leader is to get things done. Impotent leaders must

depend upon the favors or concessions voluntarily granted

by the powerful.

So it is in a biracial social system that certain com-
plementaeratterns of race relations leadership develop,
wherein each social type Of leader among white men of power

will choose a complementary type of Negro leader with whom
he is willing to negotiate. 1

 

Thus, as we noted in Chapter III, Thompson sees the Uncle Tom depen-
dent upon the white Segregationist, the race man dependent upon the

white liberal, and the racial diplomat dependent upon the white moderate.

 

1. Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 58-59.

 

220

We too have argued that Negro leaders are relatively power-
less, but the qualification deserves emphasis; Negro leaders are not
absolutely powerless. If the role of the leader is to get things done,
neither militant nor moderate Negro leaders in Lakeland are convinced
that the most important things can be done solely through favors or
concessions voluntarily granted by white men of power. The commis—
sion did not voluntarily concede in repealing 1560; it was moved by the
fact that the ordinance had been judged unconstitutional and by the fact
that Negro leaders were apparently prepared to use that judgment in
a way that would have put the commission in a difficult and embarrassing
position. The School board did not voluntarily move to establish its
committee to examine the inequality of educational Opportunities in the
city School system; it did SO because Of pressures exerted by militant
Negro leaders and by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. The
differences between New Orleans and Lakeland suggest that Negro lead-
ers in Northern cities are not nearly as impotent as are Negro leaders
in Southern cities. Significantly, in each of these issues, militant and
moderate Negro leaders appealed to authoritative sources outside the
community. In one issue, they were favored by the Michigan State
Constitution and an officer of the state government; in the other, they
were also favored by an agency established by the State Constitution.

In Northern states, Negro leaders generally have one additional level

of governmental authority to appeal to than do Negro leaders in Southern

221
states. In the South, Negro leaders must Often "leap frog" the state
government and appeal directly to the federal government to obtain
recourse.

Though types of white leaders do indeed have preferences for
the type Of Negro leader with whom they must negotiate, they do not
always act in terms of their preferences: they are "willing" to nego-
tiate with others. By creating or capitalizing on crisis Situations,
Lakeland's militant Negro leaders actually diminished the alternatives
Open to white conservative leaders. In Lakeland, conservative white
leaders do negotiate with militant Negro leaders as they did with the
issues of 1560, the Lincoln demonstration, and the threatened riot.
From the perSpective of these white leaders, they negotiated with the
"radical," "militant," or "revolutionary" types of Negro leader de-
spite the fact that they would have preferred to negotiate with the
"better, " "nonmilitant, " or "evolutionary" types.

While the activities Of militant Negro leaders are especially
marked during times of crisis, the activities Of moderates and con-
servatives are most visible in terms of the routine functioning of the
city. It is eSpecially interesting that at the present time, while only

conservative Negro leaders can be elected to the District 1 commission

 

seat, moderate Negro leaders may be elected to fill the "Negro" seat
on the school board. This seems strange, for candidates for both posi-

tions must face an at-large electorate. In the School board elections,

222

the Negro community is favored by a separate election and the gen-
erally small voter turnout. The question that remains unanswered,
however, is why the candidacy of a moderate Negro leader for the
school board does not lead to a larger turnout of voters in the white
districts who are anxious to prevent the election of Negro moderates.
It is Speculated that there iS customarily a diSproportionately low
turnout among lower-class and poorly-educated whites in school
board elections. Not only are middle-class and well-educated whites
prediSposed to noneconomic liberalism, but they probably live in
areas of the city which would be largely unaffected by race relations
changes in the school system. It may even be that from their perSpec-

tive, it is better to elect a moderate Negro over a conservative white.

Leadership Types artl Situational Factors

 

As a generalization, it must be stated that the leadership
typology failed to provide a great deal of insight into the actions Of
Negro leaders in Lakeland. Militant, moderate, and conservative
leaders did not always reSpond as we would have eXpected. Looking
back in retrOSpect, it is our judgment that Negro leaders are subject
to situational constraints which Oftentimes lead them to act counter or
contrary to their predispositions. One of the more militant Negro
leaders recognized this well when he Observed that he wasn't nearly as
militant as members Of the Negro community thought. He stated that

although he was militant in words, his position and his reSponsibilities

223
held him back and he was restrained to some extent. This leader was
reSpected for the militancy of his rhetoric, even though it didn't always
lead to militant "action" and though it rarely led to tangible gains.

In an important sense, it seems that each new phase in the
historical sequence of events limits or narrows the range of alterna-
tives Open to Negro leaders. It may well be that the alternatives
which are eliminated along the way are precisely those toward which
a particular leader is prediSposed. Few Negro leaders in Lakeland
would speak Openly in favor of anything as blatantly discriminatory
as the charter amendment which changed the city's electoral system.
In 1955, Commissioner Young Opposed the district 1 Site for a second
public housing develOpment, even though he recognized the need for
new housing units which would be available to Negro families and
though he was not strongly committed to residential desegregation.
There came a time when Negro leaders in the Urban League felt it
necessary to take a strong stand against commission action on the
Pellegrin Plan, even though their opposition was certain to cause
dissension among white members of the Board of Directors. Militant
Negro leaders led the Lincoln Junior High demonstration, though some
were originally imlined to Simply bring parents and school Officials
together to discuss matters. In August of 1966, there was a time when
the only alternatives which seemed to be Open to Negro leaders (no
matter what their leadership type) were those of acting to provoke or

to discourage a race riot.

224
All this should not be construed to mean that a leader's pre-
ferences in terms of goals, means, and rhetoric are unimportant.
But it may be that Situational constraints are equally as crucial as
those preferences in influencing the behavior of Negro leaders in their
attempts to resolve concrete issues. It iS at least a possibility that
past researchers relied so heavily on their typologies that they over-

looked the impact Of situational constraints.

Limitations of the Study

 

This study was designed primarily to evoke insights regarding
a relatively underdeveloped area of research. A deliberate decision
was made to cast a wide net in which Negro community leadership
would be examined both intensively and extensively. It was felt that
a study designed to test Specific hypotheses would force a premature
closure Of perspectives which we wanted to avoid. The reader ought
to bear in mind that no rigorous test Of Specific hypotheses has been
presented.

The empirical data presented here were obtained by means of
a case study of Negro leadership in one city, and the study reflects
the limitations of case studies. An attempt was made to overcome
these limitations by relating the findings to those reported in previous
research. This procedure, however, does not substitute for a well

designed, systematic, comparative analysis.

225

One Special problem inherent in the case study method is that
Of generalization. In a case study, one is never certain of the influence
of idiosyncratic factors. Case studies may, however, lead to the de-
velOpment of general prOpositionS. The method provides no rigorous
means of testing such prOpOSitions; that remains the task Of subsequent
research.

Another limitation of the study relates to the brief time Span Of
the conduct Of the research. The researcher began visiting Lakeland
in August of 1966 and visits continued until late in May of 1967. These
irregular visits were one, two, or three day visits. By gathering
data regarding past issues, the period of time under investigation was
lengthened. But we do not have great confidence in the validity Of the
data relating to events that occurred more than five or six years ago.
A Special problem relating to the period of time investigated in a study
such as this is that certain issues may not have been salient during
that time period. Thus one may learn little of particular issues known
to be of crucial importance. Employment may have been an issue that
had relatively low salience for Lakeland's Negro leaders during the
time of the study. We have suggested other factors, however, which
contributed to our inability to gather adequate data regarding employ-
ment. These other factors suggest that employment problems may be
considerably more salient than the apparent lack Of interest and action

would lead us to believe. However this may be, the study suffers from

226

the limited time Span investigated and the limited amount of time Spent
in the field by the investigator. This limitation holds deSpite the fact
that many social scientists would never think of Spending even this
much time in the collection of data.

One final limitation must be discussed. Many social scientists
hold that white researchers are seriously handicapped in attempting
to conduct the kind of research reported here. Such charges are not
without support. Pettigrew, for example, has shown that the race Of
the interviewer strongly influences the reSponseS given by Negro
respondents in public Opinion surveys. 1 Many argue that racial con-
flict is currently so intense that the white researcher will experience
extreme difficulty in gaining entry, establishing rapport, and Obtaining
valid data. On the basis of this research, it is our judgment that these
difficulties are not insurmountable and that they have been greatly exag-
gerated in the literature. At several points above, we have noted diffi-
culties experienced as a result of interviewee evasiveness and resis-
tance. Our impression is that the problem under investigation consti-
tutes a much greater source of resistance than the race Of the research-
er. Throughout the study, it was our impression that white leaders
were far more evasive and far less candid than were Negro leaders.

This Of course cannot be explained in terms of racial differences

 

1. Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 50-51.

 

227
between interviewer and interviewees. Evasiveness and resistance,
in short, ought to be anticipated in any study Of conflict and power,
no matter whether or not the researcher is of a different race than
many of those studied. If difficulties are anticipated in advance, then
pragmatic decisions regarding how to COpe with them can also be made

in advance.

Suggestions for Future Research

 

In this section, we will first provide an inventory of propositions
which are intended to suggest guidelines for future research on Negro
community leadership. We will then close with a brief discussion Of
strategies Of research which hold the potential of advancing our know-

ledge in this area.

A Propositional Inventory

 

The empirically testable propositions presented in this section
are grounded in the existing literature, in the empirical study reported
here, or in both. The propositions listed vary tremendously in terms
of the extent to which they are verified. Some, at this point, are hardly
more than educated guesses in need of a rigorous empirical test, while
others appear to be well confirmed by existing evidence. The proposi-
tions also vary tremendously in terms of levels Of generality. Some

appear to call attention to relationships unique to Negro leadership,

228
while others may be generalized well beyond that context. Most
(though not all) Of the propositions state determinate relationships
between variables.

NO attempt has been made to list all propositions suggested
in the literature, although the ones listed appear crucial to an adequate
understanding of Negro leadership. Finally, the propositions are not
so logically interrelated as to warrant our referring to a theory of
Negro community leadership. We claim only that modest strides have
been taken toward the development of such a theory.

Having considered a number of different classificatory schemes,
we finally attempted to introduce order to our listing by relating propo-
sitions to basic or crucial variables. We will consider "clusters" of
prOpositions which call attention to: (1) power and powerlessness; (2)
legitimacy and ideology; (3) the process of involution; (4) goals and

strategies; and (5) the composition of Negro community leadership.

Power and Powerlessness. Throughout we have suggested that

 

a basic characteristic of Negro community leadership is its relative
powerlessness. Many of the problems of Negro leadership stem direct-
ly from the fact that Negro leaders must Operate from a weak base of
power. For example, the ineffectiveness of Negro leadership is
largely attributable to this fact.

1. Because they must Operate from a weak base of
power, Negro leaders will eXperience extreme difficulties

229

in demonstrating their effectiveness by obtaining race goals
rapidly enough to satisfy members of the Negro subcommunity.

The instability Of Negro leadership, in turn, appears to be attributable
to ineffectiveness.

2. AS a result of difficulties in attaining race goals,
Negro leadership will be highly fluid or unstable.

Although there has always been talk Of the "New Negro," mili-

tancy appears to be eSpecially marked during Post World War II years.

3. Since World War II, fluidity in Negro leadership has
been characterized by the emergence of more militant Negro
leaders.

AS a generalization, it appears that the probability that an indi-
vidual or group will conform to existing and acceptable standards of »
behavior is increased to the extent that that individual or group can
expect to be rewarded for conformity. Or as the man in the street
might eXpress it: Why accept the rules of the game if one never wins?
In a similar way, it seems that Negro leaders are encouraged to violate
or to circumvent existing rules of the game, for they are denied a role
in determining those rules and the rules do not favor them.

4. The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to impor-

tant centers Of decision-making within the community on

the part of Negro leaders will lead them to resort to non-

institutionalized means Of influencing the decision-making

process.

Power Oftentimes manifests itself in superior organization. In

modern society, bureaucratic organization constitutes a vitally impor-

tant source of power. One important resource which bureaucratic

230
organizations can both develop and protect is knowledge, and knowledge
is especially vital in conflict situations. This suggests an important
barrier faced by Negro leaders in their negotiations with whites:

5. In negotiations with white leaders, Negro leaders

are handicapped by the existence of a bureaucratic "maze-

way" which facilitates white leaders' escaping reSponsi-

bility and makes it difficult for Negro leaders to establish

the locus of responsibility.

At various points above, we have suggested that powerless
leaders will experience difficulties establishing their legitimate right
to occupy leadership positions.

6. The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to impor-

tant centers Of decision-making within the community on

the part Of Negro leaders leads both Negroes and whites

to question or challenge the legitimacy of Negro leadership.
This particular prOposition serves as a bridge to the next section in

which we turn to a consideration Of prOpositionS related to the major

variables of legitimacy or ideology.

Legitimacy and Ideology

 

Those who possess power customarily take measures to legiti-
mize or to justify their right to exercise power. This is to say that
they attempt to transform their power into authority or legitimate
power. Power is most secure when legitimacy is embedded in an
ideological "world view" which justifies the existing social structure
and is accepted without question by those subject to power. Yet those

subject to power are likely to deny the legitimacy Of those presently

231
holding power and tO adopt an ideology which challenges the existing
power structure and supports social change. Thus it is that legitimacy
and ideology are intimately related.

In the process Of racial conflict, white leaders take advantage
of their superordinate power by challenging the legitimacy of Negro
leaders, eSpecially those who constitute the greatest threat. Often-
times this leads members of the subcommunity itself to question the
legitimacy of Negro leaders.

7. White leaders' refusal to accept a Negro leader as

a legitimate representative or agent of the Negro subcom-

munity leads members of the Negro subcommunity itself

to question or challenge the Negro leader's legitimacy.
Negro leaders are further handicapped by the fact that they are not
formally selected to represent the minority group subcommunity as
such. Thus:

8. The methods by which Negro leaders are chosen

leads both Negroes and whites to question or challenge the

legitimacy of Negro leadership.

For reasons Specified above, white leaders generally prefer
to negotiate with conservative Negro leaders and to avoid negotiating
with militant Negro leaders. Thus:

9. White leaders will deliberately seek to establish

conservative (or moderate) Negro leaders as the legiti—

mate leaders of the Negro subcommunity, while attempt-

ing at the same time to discredit militant (or moderate)

Negro leaders.

Whether or not white leaders are successful in this is largely dependert

upon the presence or absence of a crisis Situation.

232

10. In the absense of a crisis situation, conservative and
moderate Negro leaders will have greater accessibility than
militant Negro leaders to white community leaders.

11. But in a crisis situation, conservative white leaders
in Northern cities will reluctantly negotiate with militant
Negro leaders.

Many decisions made today, eSpecially those made by liberal
white leaders and those which relate to the urban center, appear to
demand the acceptance and support of Negro leaders, a fact which
emphasizes that Negro leaders are not entirely without power. White

leaders, however, are reluctant to allow Negro leaders to participate

in the actual decision-making process.

12. White community leaders, even those who are liberal
within the context of the political climate of the community,
are more likely to seek legitimation and Support from Negro
leaders after important decisions have been made than to
encourage the active participation of Negro leaders in the
decision-making process.

But more and more, Negro leaders (eSpecially militants) appear to be
demanding an actual role in the decision-making process.
13. Militant Negro leaders are eSpecially reluctant to
grant their support and legitimation when they have not
participated directly in the preceding process of decision-

making, even though they may approve the issue under
consideration.

Our study Of Lakeland supports the argument that certain
governmental forms (e. g. , nonpartisanship and at-large elections)
make it difficult for the Negro subcommunity to elect local legislators
(l) in prOportion to their numbers in the general population, and (2)

committed to race advancement. In an important sense, however,

233

this form Of "disfranchisement" iS supported by a "liberal" rhetoric.

14. The rhetoric of "good government" oftentimes consti-
tutes an ideological defense Of electoral systems deliberately
designed to limit or control the representation of the lower-
class in general, and Negro and ethnic minorities in particular.

Under such "good government" systems, the Negro community is

likely to reject both "their" representatives and the government in

which those representatives serve.

15. Certain "good government" methods by which govern-
mental representatives of the Negro community are selected
lead Negroes to challenge the legitimacy of those representa-

tives.

16. Certain "good government" methods by which govern-
mental represertatives of the Negro community are Selected
lead Negroes to adopt a position Of political cynicism.

All this perhaps accounts for the relative lack of political knowledge on

the part of Negro leaders.

1?. Relative to other major issues, Negro leaders are
least likely to be well informed on political issues.

The "world view" of Negro leaders appears to be seriously
restricted as a result of the fact that race plays such a crucial role

in the determination of the Negro's life chances.

l8. Negro leaders will be predominantly concerned with
issues relating to minority group membership, and will be
inclined to assess all issues on the basis of the probable
effect on minority group members and their relations with

dominant g roup members .

The "world view" of Negro leaders is also restricted by the alliances

Of the past.

234

19. Past alliances made by Negroes (e. g. , with labor
and liberals) limit the perspectives available to Negro
leaders at the present time.

Involution. There are yet other prOpositionS which cluster

 

about the variable Of involution. An overly simplistic view of race
relations stresses the Negroes' drive toward integration and the
resistance to that movement on the part of whites. Not all Negroes

are committed to integration. however, and those who are vary in the
intensity Of their commitment. (Similarly, not all whites are committed
to segregation, and those who are vary in the intensity Of their cornrnit-
ment.) Involution apt ears to go far in explaining variation among Negroes
and Negro leaders in this regard. AS the most general prOposition:

20. The process Of involution poses important barriers
to racial desegregation or integration.

In an important sense, segregation becomes a way of life; regardless
of whether or not it is imposed upon a people, to live a segregated
life is to accept it, at least in some measure.

21. Parallel institutions within the Negro subcommunity

attain a viability of their own and thus constitute important

barriers to racial desegregation and integration.

Within the Negro community, we can identify three categories
of persons whom we would eXpect to be somewhat resistant to the
goals Of desegregation or integration and to noninstitutionalized means
of protest: those who have vested interests in segregation; those who

are vulnerable; and those who hold institutionalized positions Of-authority

Within the larger community. Thus:

235

22. Negro leaders who perceive their income, status,
and/or power to be dependent upon the perpetuation of
segregation are likely to Oppose racial desegregation or
integration.

23. Vulnerable Negro leaders are likely to oppose racial
desegregation or integration.

24. Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized posi-
tions of authority within the larger community are likely to
Oppose racial desegregation or integration.

25. Negro leaders who perceive their income, status,
and/or power to be deoendent upon the perpetuation of
segregation are not likely to advocate, support, or parti-
cipate in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the
decision-making process.

26. Vulnerable Negro leaders are not likely to advo-

cate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized means

of influencing the decision-making process.

27. Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized posi-

tions Of authority within the larger community are not likely

to advocate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized

means of influencing the decision-making process.

These are prOpositionS which direct our attention to the pro-
bability of certain commitments and certain courses of action. Future

research must be designed to determine the conditions under which

these prOpositionS do not hold. One such condition was suggested in

 

our research.

28. In the North, the ability or willingness of whites to
impose sanctions against Negro vulnerables is limited by

the relatively greater separation of occupational and other
social roles and the operation of universalistic norms

(e. g. , seniority, tenure) pertaining to occupational roles.

We have stressed at various points that involution places in

Close geographical and social proximity groups and social categories

236

Of peOple who would otherwise segregate themselves from one another.
This leads to a crucial problem faced by Negro leaders.
29. Due largely to the heterogeneity Of the Negro sub-

community, Negro leadership will be characterized by
the lack of consensus regarding goals and means.

Goals and Strategies. This leads us to a consideration of

 

propositions pertaining to goals and strategies. One such proposition
is closely related to the last listed proposition. Due to its powerless-
ness, Negro leaders will attempt to achieve consensus on goals and
strategies by covert means, for only in this way can they present a
united front to dominant group leaders.
30. Negro leaders will attempt to resolve intragroup
conflict covertly in order to present a united front to leaders
of the larger community.
Increasingly, social Scientists are moving to accept as valid

a proposition which refutes many Of the arguments advanced by con-

servative Negro leaders.

31. Important race advancement goals are not achieved
in the absence Of concerted protest on the part of Negro
leaders.

Recent events seem to indicate that Negro leaders are seri-
ously reappraising the goals which prompted action in the early years -
0f the Negro Revolt.

32. During the decade of the 1960's, the prOportion Of

Negro leaders who reject integration as a realistic goal
has increased.

237
Surely there is a close relationship between goals and means.

But the adoption of militancy lends itself to more than the attainment

Of goals benefittirg the entire minority group.

33. For many younger Negro leaders, the adoption of
a militant stance constitutes an attempt to gain status
within the Negro subcommunity by challenging the long
established Negro leadership.

To close our consideration of propositions relating to goals

and strategies, we call attention to a basic dilemma faced by organi-

zations concerned with goal attainment.

34. The concern of leaders Of Negro protest organiza-
tions with perpetuating the organization oftentimes pro-

hibits them from aggressively pursuing race advancement
goals which, if attained, would force the establishment Of
new goals or eliminate the necessity for the organization.

The Composition of Negro Community Leadership. We close
our propositional inventory by simply listing two prOpositions which
call attention to the composition of Negro community leadership.

35. Negro leaders are drawn diSproportionately from
the ranks of professionals, eSpecially the independent
professions of law and medicine.

36. Negro subcommunity leadership differs from the
leadership Of the larger community in that there are pro-

portionately fewer leaders representing large financial
and commercial businesses.

Strategies Of Research Desig

Perhaps the strategy which holds the greatest promise of ad-

vancing our knowledge of Negro community leadership is that of

238
conparative analysis. Although it is still possible to make important
contributions through case studies such as the one reported here, we
are certain to reach a point of diminishing returns. At that time, the
best research strategy would be to resort to comparative studies de-
signed to facilitate the testing of general causal prOpositions. To date,
only Ladd has provided a comparative analysis of Negro community
leadership. But illustrative examples of the kind Of studies required
have now been provided by sociologists and political scientists concerned
with the study Of community power and local government.

Studies may be designed to facilitate a number of different kinds
of comparisons. Perhaps the greatest need iS for studies which would
compare Negro leadership in a number of different kinds of communities.
Here one could compare Negro leadership in Northern and in Southern
communities; or in communities with varying prOportions of Negro
population; or in urban and in rural communities; or in communities
which have Old and established or newly arrived Negro pOpulations.

In comparing Negro leadership in different communities, one
might control for issues. One could, for example, study Negro leader-

ship in communities which have held referenda on "open housing"

 

1. See, for example: (1) Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and
Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley 8:
Sons, Inc. , 1964); (2) William V. D'Antonio and William H. Form,
Influentials in Two Border Cities: A Study in Community Decision-
Making (University of Notre Dame Press, 1965); and (3) Oliver P.

"\Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Compari-
‘jiyve Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1963)

 

 

239
ordinances in order to determine correlative factors in the success or
failure of such movements. Or one might study communities in which
there have been large-scale urban renewal programs in order to ex-
amine variations in the reSponse of Negro leaders. AS a final illus-
tration, one might select communities in order to examine Negro
leadership operating within the context of partisan or nonpartisan
electoral systems.

A second general approach would be to compare Negro leader-
ship with leadership representing other minority groups. Here one
could compare the leadership provided different minority groups in
the same community at the same point in time, or one could draw from
historical data in order to compare contemporary Negro leadership
with the leadership Of different minority groups at earlier points in
time. Following the first alternative, one might compare Negro vs.
Puerto Rican leadership in New York; Negro vs. Cuban leadership in
Miami; or Negro vs. Mexican-American leadership in LOS Angeles.
Following the second alternative, one might compare contemporary
Negro leadership with the leadership provided the Jewish or Italian-
Or Irish-Americans Of an earlier period.

The development of a general theory Of minority group leader-
ship would be enhanced by studies designed to compare Negro Amer-
ican leadership with the leadership of minority groups in other coun-

tries. Such studies would be especially beneficial if one focused on

240
nations possessing similar cultural origins. One might, for example,
compare Negro American and French Canadian leadership; or Negro
American leadership with Nonwhite leadership in South Africa.

Yet a third general approach would be to compare Negro sub-
community leadership with leadership in the total community. This
approach also would lend itself to the construction of a general theory
Of minority group leadership. In the final analysis, minority group
leadership will be fully understood only when it iS systematically com-
pared with dominant group leadership.

In addition to comparative analyses such as these, it is also
felt that there is a need for longitudinal studies. Most studies avail-
able to us now lack the perSpective that can be provided only by the
examination of leadership over an extended period of time. Here
sociologists can go to the historical record as contained in neWSpaper
files, Official and unofficial records and documents, organizational
minutes, the recollections of participants or observers of past events,
etc. The attempt here would be to reconstruct the historical records
in sociologically meaningful terms; history through the eyes Of the
sociologist ought to transcend history. The fact that one can gather
sufficient data in two or three weeks or months to write a research
report of publishable quality should not discourage lengthier field

studies.

241

Longitudinal studies would be eSpecially beneficial in deter-
mining the factors which contribute tO variations in the intensity or
violence Of racial conflict. Either a single case study or a compar-
ative study of two or more cases may evoke generalizations relating
to the processes of conflict and conflict regulation. 1

This Section is not intended to provide a definitive statement
Of the future research needs in this area. Clearly our knowledge of
Negro community leadership is SO limited that the reSponsibility for
this task ought to be shared by others. The pluralism of the social
or behavioral sciences and even sociology itself provides Opportunities
to borrow from many diverse theoretical orientations and methodolog—
ical procedures in advancing our knowledge and understanding. The
nature of racial conflict today probably Offers some assurance that

we will avail ourselves of these Opportunities.

 

1. For an illustrative example of the kind of product that could
result from such studies, see James S. Coleman, Community Conflict
(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

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Problems”, Vol. 4, NO. 4 (April, 1957), 291-301.

 

---------- . "Sociological Theory and Race Relations, " American
Sociological Review, Vol. 12, NO. 3 (June, 1947), 265-271.

 

 

Garfinkel, Herbert. When Negroes March. New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1959.

 

Hamilton, Charles V. "Race, Morality, and Political Solutions,"
Phylon, Vol. 20, No. 3 (3rd Quarter, 1959). 242-247.

Holstege, Henry, Jr. Conflict and Change in Negro-White Relations
in Great Falls. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Michigan
State University, 1966.

 

Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Consensus, Conflict, and COOperation,"
Social Forces, Vol. 41, No. 2 (December, 1962), 177—188.

 

Hughes, Everett C. "Race Relations and the Sociological Imagination,"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December,

1963), 879-890.

 

245

Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor Books, 1953.

 

Johnson, Guy B. "Negro Racial Movements and Leadership in the
United States, " American Journal Of Sociology, Vol. 43
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---------- . "Patterns of Race Conflict," in Edgar T. Thompson
(ed. ), Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham, North
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Killian, Lewis M. "Community Structure and the Role of the Negro
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---------- . "Leadership in the Desegregation Crisis: An Institution-
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---------- , and Charles Grigg. Racial Crisis in America: Leader-
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Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. Negro Political Leadership in the South.
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Laue, James H. "The Changing Character Of the Negro Protest, " The
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Leventman, Seymour. "Minority Group Leadership: The Advantages
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Lewis, Hylan, and Mozell Hill. "Desegregation, Integration, and the
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Lewis, Oscar. The Children of Sanchez. New York: Random House,
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Lomax, Louis. The Negro Revolt. New York: The New American
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Loomis, Charles P. , and Zona K. Loomis. Modern Social Theories.
Princton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. , 1961.

 

246

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDE
FOR NEGRO LEADERS

Let me begin by asking you whether or not there have been any recent
changes in Negro Leadership in Lakeland? Have you been here long
enough to Observe any changes, say, in the last five or ten years?

IF YES: How would you characterize that change (those changes)?

IS it just a change in leaders, or are there now different
kinds Of leaders?

Have there been changes in the goals preferred?
What do you feel accounts for this change?

Now I'd like to turn to a discussion Of Specific issues or problems in
which you may have played a role. For purposes of our discussion,
I'd like to talk in terms of general problem areas and Specific issues
which are considered to be important to Negroes in Lakeland. On this
card (HAND CARD TO INTERVIEWEE) I've listed those problem areas
and issues. There seems to be a great deal of consensus that these
are the most important problems faced by the Negro community here.

I'd like to review with you the historical development of some Of these
issues, with particular emphasis on your participation in them. Have
you taken an active part in any of these problems or issues. ?

IF YES: Which problems or issues have you been active in?

Then let's talk about that issue. Why don't you tell me
about it in your words. I would be eSpecially interested in how the
problem or issue came about. Who initiated action? Who was or was
not consulted? What were the positions taken by various leaders, the
strategies used, the effectiveness of those strategies, and so on.

249

250

 

Problems and Issues

 

PROBLEM AREA: Housing. (Residential segregation; restricted
housing market; substandard housing, etc.)

Issues:

1. Ordinance 1560

2. The Pellegrin - University Plan proposals for redevelop-
ment Of the central business district.

3. Alleged discrimination in urban renewal.

PROBLEM AREA: Education. (De facto segregation; inferior quality
of education in Negro schools, etc.)

Issues:

1. Lincoln Junior High Demonstration.
2. The Seven Schools Plan.

PROBLEM AREA: Politics.
Issues:

1. The Charter Amendment.
2. Electing governmental officials favorable tO race advance-
ment.

PROBLEM AREA: Employment. (Tokenism in downtown white-collar
positions; discrimination in the apprenticeship programs and
schools in the auto plants; job ceilings in the auto plants; high
School drop-outs; recession year layoffs; etc.)

 

PROBLEM AREA: Police and Community Relations.

 

Issues:

1. Threatened riot of 1966.
2. Brutality charges.

 

(NOTE: For each issue in which the interviewee had participated or
for which he had knowledge, we probed in depth as described in Chap-
ter V.)

251

Thinking ahead to five years from now, do you feel Negroes in Lake-
land will be better Off, worse off, or about the same as they are
right now?

Why do you feel that way?

APPENDIX B

MAIL-BACK QUESTIONNAIRE
PROVIDED NEGRO LEADERS

Dear

 

You are requested to complete the following form at your earliest con-
venience. Return it in the attached envelope to Mr. Lee Sloan, Depart-
ment of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.
The information requested is vital to the completion of the study. The
form has been constructed for self-administration in order that we cause
you no more inconvenience than is necessary.

The form consists of several kinds Of questions. Generally, you may
simply check M the appropriate Space or fill in the appropriate blank.

The information provided will Of course be accorded confidential treat-
ment. NO one except myself has access to study files, and I will not
divulge the Specific source Of my information to anyone. General

background information is intended for use in statistical analysis.

Thank you so much for your assistance. The sacrifice of your time
and effort is greatly appreciated. I

Sincerely yours,

Lee Sloan

252

10.

11.

253

Name:

 

Age: years.

 

Sex: male female
Marital status:
___Married
_____Single
Divorced or separated
___Widowed

How many children do you have?

 

How many Of those children are of school age(5 - 17)?

Occupation:

 

 

Name of employer. (Indicate if self-employed.)

 

How many employees are under your supervision or direction?

If you are self-employed, are your customers or clients predomin-

antly Negro?

Yes NO

— ——

Please indicate the range of your expected family income for 1966.

0-999

 

1,000- 1,999

 

2, 000-2, 999

 

3) 000-3) 999

 

4. 000-4, 999

 

5, 000-5, 999

 

6. 000-6. 999

 

7, 000-7, 999

 

8. 000-7, 999

 

9) 000-9) 999

 

10, 000 or more

 

254

12. If applicable, please indicate the other members Of your family
who contribute to the family income.

Not applicable: I am the sole contributor to family income.
Relationship (wife, husband, etc.) Occupation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13. Where were you raised?

City or county

 

State

 

14. How many years of school have you completed?
1 - 8 years
9 - 11 years
High school graduate
Some college
Attended or completed graduate school

15. If you attended college or graduate school, please indicate:

Name of School Location

(Cbllege)

 

 

(Grad. School)

 

 

15A. Were these segregated or integrated schools?
College: segregated integrated
Grad. School: segregated integrated

16. What is your religious affiliation? Which church do you attend?

 

l7.

l8.

 

I I .3
L L L: L L: L l~<: l~< '~<: I~<: L: L ~<: <1 3 g
m m o m m m m m m m m m m m m m
m u: m a: cu m m m a: U) m m a: a: g 3
I I I I I I I I I I I I I :3. a
:3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 :3 5 *< 9
O o O O o O o o o O O o o o w) *‘

 

255

DO you now live in Lakeland?

________Yes _____No
17A. IF YES: How long have you lived in Lakeland?
years.
17B. IF NO: How long have you been employed in Lakeland?

years.

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS. Please indicate below the
names of organizations with which you are or have been affiliated
during the 1960‘s. Indicate also the Offices you currently hold or
have held in those organizations.

 

uouezruefilo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

P1311 59 DUJO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

bised .10
3119.1an

l9.

 

 

 

256

If you serve on any biracial or Negro committees, boards, or
projects on the local, state or national levels, please list them
below. (Exclude those listed in response to question 18.)

ioafoxd .IO ‘pxeog ‘aaiituxtuog

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.191391 IPUOIJBN

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

uomsoct IBDUJO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.10 91918 ‘Ieooq

20.

257

IDENTIFICATION OF NEGRO LEADERS

Below is a list of persons who have been identified as Negro leaders
in the preliminary stages of reasearch. Consider as leaders those
who are able to make decisions and formulate general policies affect-
ing Lakeland's Negro community as a whole.

 

 

 

Instructions:

 

(1) Please add to this list the names Of any other persons whom
you consider to be leaders in the Negro community.

(2) Please delete from this list persons whom you do not con-
sider to be leaders in the Negro community. (Draw a line through
the appropriate names.)

(3) By check marks (J) indicate the ten most outstanding Negro
leaders in Lakeland.

(4) For each Of the three items above, exclude yourself from
consideration.

(I) Names listed alphabetically

 

 

_____Curtis Abrams __Merritt Reed

__Fred Brown __Harold Russell
Robert Clark __Joyce Simmons
Prentice Colby __Paul Towers
James Corbin __Charles Washburn
Florence Darwin __Franklin Weaver

__Carl Dean __Arthur Young
Scott Gardner Names added following

Instructions

 

Thoma S Hull
(J)

William Lakey

 

Cole Mathews

 

Reuben Morgan

 

Walter Phillips

 

258

21. You are here invited to express freely your thoughts concerning
Negro leadership in Lakeland, Negro leadership at the national
level, or the study being conducted.