ABSTRACT

NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP
IN A NORTHERN CITY

by Lee Sloan

This study reports a case study of Negro community leadership
and racial conflict in a Northern city. "Lakeland" is a satelite, in-
dustrial city located near Detroit. Since most studies of Negro lead-
ership have been conducted in Southern or in very large Northern cities,
this study of a Midwestern, middle-sized city fills voids in the litera-
ture.

By means of the reputational technique, 20 Negro leaders were
identified. Semi-structured interviews of these 20 persons, plus
approximately 20 interviews of white leaders, constituted the major
means of data collection. Interviews were designed to facilitate issue
analysis. Data were also gathered by means of a mail-back question-
naire left with Negro leaders, by scanning newspaper files, by atten-
dance at organized meetings and public affairs, and by general observa-
tion of community life.

Since our understanding of Negro community leadership was
judged to be relatively slight, specific hypotheses were not tested.

But the ex

of referen

Th

affected b

munity. T

of powerle

whites, an

Relative po

it leads bo

leaders: an

they can mu

The

volution, th

itself. Invo

boundaries

internal con

some accept

munity come

to integratio

vested inter

in that they

with vested

from offerin

But the existing literature was reviewed in order to develop a frame of reference or a perspective of Negro community leadership.

The literature suggests that Negro community leadership is affected by factors both external and internal to the Negro subcommunity. The major external problem faced by Negro leaders is that of powerlessness. Superordinate power rests with dominant group whites, and Negro leaders must operate from a weak base of power. Relative powerlessness leads to the high fluidity of Negro leadership; it leads both whites and Negroes to challenge the legitimacy of Negro leaders; and it encourages Negro leaders to exercise whatever power they can muster outside institutionalized channels.

The internal problems of Negro leadership are related to involution, the process by which the Negro community turns in upon itself. Involution strengthens the ecological, social, and psychological boundaries of the Negro community. Negroes accomodate daily to the internal conditions of the subcommunity, and this inevitably involves some acceptance of life "as it is." Institutions within the Negro community come to have a viability of their own and they act as barriers to integration. Additionally, there are Negro leaders who have a vested interest in segregation. There are others who are "vulnerable" in that they are more subject than others to white control. Both those with vested interests and the vulnerables are somewhat constrained from offering militant leadership.

F:

naturally

sensus.

Negro lea

It

Negro lead

typology ha

distinguish

moderate,

In t

is accorded

employmen

social prof

lated to tha

The

by means o

es by which

selected nur

criminatory

business dis

ment which

bers; and a

Finally, the heterogeneity of the Negro subcommunity leads naturally to differences of interest and to difficulties in attaining consensus. This problem is crucial, for the relative powerlessness of Negro leadership makes it imperative to present a united front.

It has long been recognized that there are diverse modes of Negro leadership. Drawing from relevant literature, a leadership typology has been constructed for use in this study. The typology distinguishes among three types of Negro leadership: conservative, moderate, and militant leadership.

In the description of the community setting, special attention is accorded five crucial problem areas: housing, education, politics, employment, and police and community relations. In presenting a social profile of Lakeland's Negro leadership the new data are related to that reported in the literature.

The dynamics of Negro leadership in Lakeland was investigated by means of issue analysis. The attempt was to reconstruct the processes by which Negro leaders attempted to or succeeded in resolving a selected number of issues, including the following: repeal of a discriminatory housing ordinance; proposed redevelopment of the central business district; a school boycott and demonstration; a charter amendment which changed the electoral system for city commission members; and a narrowly averted race riot.

The summary chapter assesses the contribution of the study

to an understanding of Negro leadership and racial conflict, calls

attention to limitations of the study, and makes suggestions for future

research. This last section includes both a propositional inventory

of literature, and a brief discussion of strategies of research design.

NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

IN A NORTHERN CITY

By

Ernest Lee Sloan

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1967

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An

two who s

portions o

I n

and my da

a clerk, a

was a cons

the childre

the field.

Fina

to whom the

informant,

lems exami

a testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF APPENDICES

The inte

two has led mos

domestic proble

Future historia

following World

of the problem o

attempts to diss

as those of pover

equality, and urb

sible to ignore th

the cold and hot s

nations of the wo

United States tod

was founded.

It

for its rac

to look on

that the op

understan

responsib

1. John F.

The Annals, Vol.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The intensification of racial conflict over the last decade or two has led most Americans to conclude that the most demanding domestic problem confronting our nation is that of race relations. Future historians will surely be tempted to refer to those decades following World War II as an Era of Racial Crisis. The enormity of the problem of race relations is not fully appreciated until one attempts to dissociate it from other crucial domestic problems such as those of poverty, urban blight, unemployment, educational inequality, and urban government. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to ignore the relationship between domestic race relations and the cold and hot struggles between the democratic and communist nations of the world. Ironically, the racial problem faced in the United States today stems from the lofty ideals upon which our nation was founded.

> It is an extraordinary fact that a world never noted for its racial tolerance in theory or in practice has come to look on the United States as a symbol of equality, and that the oppressed turn to America in the hope of finding understanding and an untarnished record. The burden of responsibility thus placed upon us is a heavy one. [1]

---

1. John F. Melby, "Racial Policy and International Relations," The Annals, Vol. 304 (March, 1956), p. 132.

The American I

"Revolution in

their own.

The dail

witnesses to a n

equal rights and

fore. Racial cor

day indeed when

to refer to this m

tion. Although it

that it is relative

change.

We need n

questions of why t

when, in fact, it b

debate, and it is c

without a lengthy c

be to our benefit,

the Revolt. First

social scientists fa

view in summary

ing especially on t

The American Dilemma presses more heavily upon us as the "Revolution in Aspirations" leads others to accept our ideals as their own.

The Negro Revolt

The daily news is a constant reminder that we are currently witnesses to a movement in which Negro Americans are demanding equal rights and equal participation more vigorously than ever before. Racial conflict is so frequent and so intense that it is a rare day indeed when there is no mention of it in the news. We have come to refer to this movement as the Negro Revolt or the Negro Revolution. Although it differs from the major revolutions of history in that it is relatively nonviolent, it has certainly led to rapid social change.

We need not here enter into a discussion of the fascinating questions of why the Revolt occurred at the particular time it did or when, in fact, it began. These issues are still subject to serious debate, and it is doubtful that we could provide satisfactory answers without a lengthy discussion which would take us far afield. It will be to our benefit, however, to briefly discuss two issues relating to the Revolt. First, we will address ourselves to the question of why social scientists failed to predict the Revolt. Secondly, we will review in summary form the changing nature of the Revolt itself, focusing especially on those changes relating to Negro leadership.

Not onl

of race relation

adequacy of the

Sociologists and

still recovering

the Negro Revol

we would be in a

in the developme

In his pre

Association in A

leagues to break

in order to free t

ity group relation

---

1. It is not t
Revolt. Gunnar N
point in American
never more regar
See Gunnar Myrda
Rose), An Americ
Publishers, 1944)
sified Negro prote
of Minnesota Pres
Race Conflict," in
Race Problem (Du
125-151. Despite
surprised not only

2. Everett C.
nation," American
1963), pp. 879-89

Social Science and the Study of Minority Group Relations

Not only has the Negro Revolt emphasized the social problem

of race relations--it has also raised serious questions regarding the

adequacy of the social scientist's understanding of race relations.

Sociologists and others of their colleagues in the social sciences are

still recovering from their embarrassment for not having predicted

the Negro Revolt.[1] If we could provide an explanation for this failure,

we would be in a better position to determine the best route to travel

in the development of more adequate sociological theories.

In his presidential address before the American Sociological

Association in August of 1963, Everett Hughes admonished his col-

leagues to break the bonds of rigid empiricism and professionalism

in order to free the sociological imagination of the student of minor-

ity group relations.[2] Although it is difficult to argue against this

---

1. It is not the case that all social scientists failed to predict the Revolt. Gunnar Myrdal saw the Second World War as a major turning point in American race relations. He emphasized that "America can never more regard its Negroes as a patient, submissive minority." See Gunnar Myrdal (with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose), An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), p. 1004. Arnold M. Rose also predicted inten- sified Negro protest in The Negro's Morale (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949). See also Guy B. Johnson, "Patterns of Race Conflict," in Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1939), pp. 125-151. Despite these and possibly other exceptions, the Negro Revolt surprised not only laymen, but also most social scientists.

2. Everett C. Hughes, "Race Relations and the Sociological Imagi- nation," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December, 1963), pp. 879-890.

prescription, i

stems from oth.

be largely ideol

has called our a

logical theory,

the social syste

on stability, ha

equilibrium mod

pinges from with

basically similar

whole of structur

only never really

Dahrendo

of analysis in wh

ubiquitous. A c

society and dire

Although

be possible,[2] Da

theoretical deve

---

1. Ralf Dal
Sociological Ana
No. 2 (Septembe

2. To date
Lewis Coser, T
Press, 1956).

prescription, it would seem that this particular theoretical inadequacy stems from other factors also. The root of the difficulty appears to be largely ideological. In a polemical tour de force, Ralf Dahrendorf has called our attention to the utopian nature of contemporary sociological theory, especially Parsonian theory. [1] Dahrendorf notes that the social system model of analysis places disproportionate emphasis on stability, harmony and consensus. The model is essentially an equilibrium model. It assumes a closed system in which nothing impinges from without. For Dahrendorf, the elements of this model are basically similar to those of utopian communities. In his view, the whole of structural-functionalism describes a social system which not only never really existed, but one which is a virtual impossibility.

Dahrendorf advocates greater utilization of a conflict model of analysis in which change, conflict, and constraint are viewed as ubiquitous. A conflict model of society stresses the "openness" of society and directs our attention to uncertainties and contingencies.

Although a synthesis of these two opposing models may one day be possible, [2] Dahrendorf is of the opinion that the current stage of theoretical development necessitates our keeping both models.

---

1. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 2 (September, 1958), pp. 115-127.

2. To date, one of the best attempts at synthesis is provided by Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

The model to b

be examined.

Others H

contemporary A

social conflict.

of many early E

sociologists suc

The sam

contemporary so

group relations.

the American be

a utopian model

years that sociol

tention that the "

Contrary to Park

cycle which pass

1. See, for
Sociology of Conf
(July, 1950), pp.
flict and Coopera
1962), pp. 177-18

2. Lewis Kil
Leadership in Co
Inc., 1964).

3. See Amata
Forces, Vol. 37,

The model to be utilized will be dependent upon the problem to be examined.

Others have also directed our attention to the reluctance of contemporary American sociologists, in particular, to examine social conflict.[1] These critics note that conflict was a major concern of many early European sociologists, as well as earlier American sociologists such as Lester F. Ward and Albion W. Small.

The same theoretical shortcomings have been noted by a few contemporary sociologists concerned directly with the study of inter-group relations. Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg have observed that the American belief in progress led many social scientists to rely on a utopian model in analyzing race relations.[2] It is only in recent years that sociologists have seriously challenged Robert Park's contention that the "race relations cycle" constitutes a natural history.[3] Contrary to Park, assimilation is not necessarily the end product of a cycle which passes through the earlier stages of contact, conflict and

---

1. See, for example: (1) Jessie Bernard, "Where is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1 (July, 1950), pp. 11-16; and (2) Irving L. Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation," Social Forces, Vol. 41, No. 2 (December, 1962), pp. 177-188.

2. Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964).

3. See Amatai Etzioni, "The Ghetto--A Re-Evaluation," Social Forces, Vol. 37, No. 3 (March, 1959), pp. 255-262.

accomodation.

successors to

tion. In this s

the "final" resu

way to assimila

Even mc

American Dilen

and Grigg obser

force of both the

almost unchaller

until the 1960's.

the intrapersona

valuations led m

conflict which c

American Creed

replace specific

it seems that th

icans most ofter

Or to put it in t

servers: "in vi

change has com

1. Killian

accomodation. A utopian mentality apparently led Park's immediate

successors to focus especially on the "ultimate" stage of assimila-

tion. In this scheme of things, undesirable conflict could never be

the "final" result: conflict was merely a transitional phase along the

way to assimilation.

Even more importantly, Gunnar Myrdal's writings on the

American Dilemma have finally come under serious attack. Killian

and Grigg observed that "Myrdal's assumption as to the reality and

force of both the American creed and the American dilemma went

almost unchallenged, except in the polemics of a few Marxist writers,

until the 1960's."[1] By now, it seems clear that Myrdal's stress on

the intrapersonal conflict within whites between general and specific

valuations led many sociologists to underemphasize the intergroup

conflict which characterizes race relations. If it is the case that the

American Creed "is gradually realizing itself" as white Americans

replace specific valuations by the "morally higher" general valuations,

it seems that the struggle within the hearts and minds of white Amer-

icans most often follows a social struggle between Negroes and whites.

Or to put it in terms of a generalization now accepted by numerous ob-

servers: "in virtually every case of desegregation in the United States,

change has come only after the development of a crisis situation which

---

1. Killian and Grigg, op. cit. , p. 17.

demanded rapid

Generally, it a

in terms which

dilemma.

James B

an ideology of n

differences in fa

approach lends

when in fact it is

of communicatio

ion,

th
society is
cannot be
education.
for all the
it constru
out the se
an unbridg
to one ano
in the sam

It would se

in general, have b

1. James H.
test," The Annals,

2. James B.
tions about Conflic
Provost's Lecture
1964 (mimeographe

3. Ibid., p. 2

demanded rapid resolution by a community's leadership structure."[1]

Generally, it appears more plausible to interpret the leaders' action in terms which are more suggestive of group interests than of a moral dilemma.

James B. McKee has argued that Americans are committed to an ideology of moderation which assumes that "no compromisable differences in fact separate men in this society."[2] This "pragmatic" approach lends itself either to a denial of the existence of conflict when in fact it is very real or to a reliance on the "illusory panaceas" of communication, human relations, and education. In McKee's opinion,

> the conflict between white and black in American society is not illusory, is not a failure of communication, cannot be solved by better human relations, nor even by education. What that conflict does do is put for once and for all the ideology of moderation to an ultimate test. Can it construct a viable solution, without civil war, or without the severe suppression of a minority? Or is race such an unbridgeable gulf that reasonable men cannot reach out to one another, cannot agree to let one another live together in the same society?[3]

It would seem that American sociologists, just as Americans in general, have been fascinated by the uniqueness of the American

---

1. James H. Laue, "The Changing Character of the Negro Protest," The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), p. 125.

2. James B. McKee, "The Ideology of Moderation: Some Assumptions about Conflict in American Society," an address delivered in the Provost's Lecture Series, Michigan State University, February 26, 1964 (mimeographed), p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

experience and the resultant uniqueness of American society. Ours

was a "new" nation which had never known a feudal aristocracy.

Until the Great Depression, there were many who viewed ours as

a "classless" society. Many who were subsequently forced to reject

this image replaced it with a view which still managed to emphasize

the value of equality. Most people reasoned that given the equality

of opportunities, there was ample opportunity for individual social

mobility which prohibited the development of class consciousness--

the major source of conflict. Social conflict may have been charac-

teristic of the rigidly stratified societies of Europe, but it was ex-

ceptional to the American experience.

Robin M. Williams, Jr., also has called our attention to the

relationship between the social environment and the manner in which

the social scientist chooses to examine that environment.

> When group relations are relatively stable, the
> central problems that tend to monopolize research have
> to do with conformity, social patterning, enduring pre-
> judices and stereotypes, and so on. When change becomes
> massive and rapid, one senses the lack of studies of
> leadership, political and legal processes, the exercise
> of power and authority, the sources of innovation, and
> the conditions generating collective protest. [1]

The detailed analysis of the ideological roots of American

sociology or of any subdisciplinary area thereof is yet to be completed. [2]

---

1. Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Social Change and Social Conflict: Race Relations in the United States, 1944-1964," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1965), pp. 13-14.

2. For an illustration of the kind of analysis which must one day be conducted, however, see Leon Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

The responsibil

as sociologists

but merely to s

of the developm

harmony, and c

and constraint.

It is our

dispensable if a

race relations in

The Negro Revol

Protest o

obvious that the

significant chang

Revolt has been

an expanded part

Viewed in these

reference to num

spearheaded by a

plurality of mean

who oppose race

from the Urban I

agency with heav

for the Advancem

The responsibility for that task must be shared by all who identify as sociologists. This discussion was not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to suggest that ideology is important to an understanding of the development of a theoretical stance which stresses stability, harmony, and consensus to the relative neglect of change, conflict, and constraint.

It is our contention that utilization of a conflict model is indispensable if a proper understanding of the nature of contemporary race relations in the United States is to be realized.

The Negro Revolt and Negro Leadership

Protest on the part of Negro Americans is not new, but it is obvious that the nature and tempo of Negro protest has undergone significant change in recent years. From its beginning, the Negro Revolt has been characterized by a new and urgent militancy and by an expanded participation on the part of both Negroes and whites. Viewed in these terms, the Negro Revolt is a generic category having reference to numerous and diverse forms of protest. The Revolt is spearheaded by a plurality of organizations which subscribe to a plurality of means and goals--a fact which is easily lost upon those who oppose race advancement in any form. The Revolt runs the gamut from the Urban League which is an interracial community services agency with heavy emphasis on self-help; to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which still adheres to

legalistic and e

Leadership Cor

and experiment

Racial Equality.

to the Student N

by "new anarchi

cratic centralism

equality and part

even on to the Bl

leaders reject th

in their place a r

acists. The goal

range from integ

ratism. The mea

nonviolent direct

and on to violence

leaders reflects t

If we mov

alternative appro

brief consideratio

we obtain quite a

years, there is e

have gained wider

legalistic and educational approaches; to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, whose leader has self-consciously adopted and experimented with nonviolent techniques; to the Congress of Racial Equality, which can trace its history to World War II pacifists; to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which is manned by "new anarchists" who seek to replace the governmental and bureaucratic centralism of a mass society with a gemeinschaft in which equality and participatory democracy are the guiding principles; and even on to the Black Muslims and other nationalist groups whose leaders reject the goals of integration and assimilation and advocate in their place a racial chauvinism which matches that of white supremacists. The goals pursued, then, by those who speak for the Negro range from integration or assimilation, to pluralism, and on to separatism. The means advocated range from democratic politics, to nonviolent direct action, to creative disorder and civil disobedience, and on to violence itself. Needless to say, the rhetoric of Negro leaders reflects this great diversity of goals and means.

If we move now from a brief consideration of the range of alternative approaches open to Negro protest leaders to an equally brief consideration of the direction of change within the Revolt itself, we obtain quite a different picture. Especially in the last two or three years, there is evidence that the more militant modes of participation have gained wider acceptance among Negroes.

In the ea

served to rally

measure, that g

the token nature

Negro leaders t

a realistic goal.

decision had str

ers themselves a

The battlecry of

many Negroes, e

South, the most d

the land by agricu

of new chemicals

land owner. For

in many areas Ne

call of Black Pow

slum dwellers. H

migrants to the P

their lives confin

the unemployed, a

poverty which is

not found a basic

In the early years of the Revolt, the Brown decision of 1954 served to rally Negro leaders to the goal of integration. In large measure, that goal was pursued by means of nonviolence. Now, the token nature of those gains which have been made has led many Negro leaders to seriously question whether or not integration was a realistic goal. Ironically, just a few short years after the Brown decision had struck down the separate but equal doctrine, Negro leaders themselves are advocating separate but equal with new vigor. The battlecry of Black Power has struck a responsive chord among many Negroes, especially those who are most desperate. In the South, the most desperate are the peasants who are being driven off the land by agricultural mechanization, crop diversification, the use of new chemicals, and governmental policies which favor the large land owner. For many of these black peasants, the obvious fact that in many areas Negroes outnumber whites gives a utopian ring to the call of Black Power. In the North, the most desperate are the urban slum dwellers. Here are the sons and daughters of early and late migrants to the Promised Land, many of whom have spent most of their lives confined to black ghettos. Here are the underemployed, the unemployed, and the unemployable--the products of a culture of poverty which is largely self perpetuating. Here are those who have not found a basic security in a modern, urban, industrial society.

It now ap

else will be abl

come the proble

though we will s

clear that nonvi

the Montgomery

To even t

the disciplined n

in stark contra s

transformation o

tance--the count

in marked contra

of the backlash is

ditional Civil Rig

no longer find it

Rights bills.

This disc

ized that leadersh

have called our a

tern of race relat

reciprocal. Char

given rise to chan

leadership is in t

M. Elaine Burges

It now appears that neither Martin Luther King nor anyone else will be able effectively to use nonviolent techniques to overcome the problems of the Negro ghettos in the urban North. Although we will surely witness sporadic use of such techniques, it is clear that nonviolence is being phased out of the Revolt--even though the Montgomery bus boycott was just a decade ago.

To even the most sympathetic observers of the Negro Revolt, the disciplined mass protests in the South during the early '60's stand in stark contrast to the mass rioting during the middle '60's. This transformation of protest has also influenced the nature of the resistance--the counter-revolt. The Senate filibusters of past years stand in marked contrast to the "backlash" of recent years. The impact of the backlash is evident in the reluctance of Congress to pass additional Civil Rights legislation. Significantly, Southern legislators no longer find it necessary to filibuster to delay or to defeat Civil Rights bills.

This discussion assumes greater relevancy when it is realized that leadership does not function in a vacuum. Myrdal and others have called our attention to the relationship between the general pattern of race relations and Negro leadership. This relationship is reciprocal. Change in the general character of race relations has given rise to change in Negro leadership, and the new or emergent leadership is in turn being reflected in the character of race relations. M. Elaine Burgess, in what surely must be an understatement, has

observed that "

tion depends la :

be found in it. "

Let us e

and Negro leade

volt has led to t

both the nationa

the new militant

through of Marti

breakthrough wit

of historical cha

James Farmer,

early 1940's, the

necessarily beca

rather because c

the late 1950's ar

must be given ma

breakthrough. 2

---

1. M. Elain
(Chapel Hill: Th

2. See Herb
Free Press of Gl
and Full Emancip
Emancipation (Ch
89-102.

observed that "the response of the minority community to desegrega-

tion depends largely upon the quality of organization and leadership to

be found in it."[1]

Let us explore briefly the relationship between the Negro Revolt

and Negro leadership. It has been customary to observe that the Re-

volt has led to the emergence of a more militant Negro leadership at

both the national and the local levels. In the early stages of the Revolt,

the new militant leadership was most evident in the charismatic break-

through of Martin Luther King. It is perfectly proper to speak of this

breakthrough without the necessity of subscribing to a Great Man theory

of historical change. Although A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin,

James Farmer, and others had utilized nonviolent techniques in the

early 1940's, they failed to spark a large-scale social movement, not

necessarily because they were lacking in charismatic qualities, but

rather because conditions were not then as favorable as they were in

the late 1950's and early 1960's. These leaders and others, however,

must be given major credit for paving the way for Reverend King's

breakthrough.[2]

---

1. M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 16.

2. See Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); and James Farmer, "The New Jacobins and Full Emancipation," in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), 100 Years of Emancipation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), pp. 89-102.

The cha

Revolt are furth

breakthrough, t

of new Negro pr

SNCC. The Rev

test organization

the NAACP, and

struggles within

placement of lea

in the early years

"old" leaders we

more radical. Ja

l: SNCC, both Ja

Stokely Carmicha

violent resistance

versial doctrine c

At the loca

placement of acco

leaders. Ladd ha

displacement of r

last decade."1 Tl

---

1. Everett C
South (Ithaca, New

The changes in Negro leadership brought about by the Negro Revolt are further evident at the national level. Aside from King's breakthrough, the decades of the 1950's and 1960's saw the emergence of new Negro protest organizations such as King's own SCLC and SNCC. The Revolt also contributed to the revitalization of other protest organizations, such as CORE, and challenged yet others, such as the NAACP, and the National Urban League. By the mid-1960's, struggles within several of these organizations brought about the displacement of leaders who had themselves been defined as "radicals" in the early years of the decade. Significantly, in each instance, "old" leaders were replaced by new leaders who were defined as even more radical. James Farmer of CORE gave way to Floyd McKissick. In SNCC, both James Forman and John Lewis were displaced by Stokely Carmichael. In both these organizations, the doctrine of non-violent resistance has been superseded by the ill-defined and controversial doctrine of Black Power.

At the local level, the Revolt, in general, has led to the displacement of accomodative Negro leaders by younger, more militant leaders. Ladd has stated that "there has been at least one major displacement of race leaders in virtually every Southern city in the last decade."[1] This transformation in leadership styles is now well

---

1. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 134.

documented for

such changes i:

Florida; New O

Greenville, Sou

    Althoug!

a similar leade:

such change is n

Revolt led to the

Northern cities i

search is partial

    In summa

development in s

to investigate soc

between the Negr

an appropriate ti

---

1. For a Stu
Tallahassee, see
Daniel C. Thomp
New Jersey: Pre
Greenville, see I
Cothran and Willi
Situation," Phylo

2. See, how
Negro-White Rela
tion, Michigan Sta

documented for Southern cities. The literature provides studies of such changes in "Cresant City," North Carolina; Tallahassee, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Greenville, South Carolina; and Little Rock, Arkansas.[1]

Although the daily news and periodical literature suggest that a similar leadership change has also occurred in Northern communities, such change is not as yet well documented.[2] Whether or not the Negro Revolt led to the emergence of more militant Negro leadership in Northern cities is open to debate. A major task of the proposed research is partially to fill this void.

In summary, an examination of the current stage of theoretical development in sociology suggests the desirability of research designed to investigate social conflict. And an examination of the relationship between the Negro Revolt and Negro leadership suggests that this is an appropriate time for further analyses of Negro leadership.

----

1. For a Study of "Cresant City", see Burgess, op. cit.; for Tallahassee, see Killian and Grigg, op. cit.; for New Orleans, see Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963); for both Winston-Salem and Greenville, see Ladd, op. cit.; and for Little Rock, see Tilman C. Cothran and William M. Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1961), pp. 107-118.

2. See, however, Henry Holstege, Jr., Conflict and Change in Negro-White Relations in Great Falls (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966).

The foll

examine the na

many forms of

research, it wa

at the level of r

Accordingly, we

ship in a Midwes

In brief,

and the dynamics

terms, the study

two separate and

First, we

influence within

those factors wh

minority group l

such as the follo

munity? What a

subcommunity?

centers of decisi

been recent chan

What factors acc

possess legitima

munity?

The Problem

The following is a report of research which was designed to examine the nature of racial conflict, which is of course but one of many forms of social conflict. As a major premise underlying the research, it was held that racial conflict could be fruitfully examined at the level of minority group leadership within a community setting. Accordingly, we conducted a case study of Negro community leadership in a Midwestern, middle-sized city.

In brief, the study was designed to analyze both the structure and the dynamics of Negro community leadership. In more specific terms, the study objectives may perhaps best be viewed in terms of two separate and distinct, yet interrelated, subject areas.

First, we have endeavored to establish the loci of power and influence within the Negro subcommunity and we have searched for those factors which served either to facilitate or to inhibit effective minority group leadership. Our investigation was guided by questions such as the following: Who are the leaders within the Negro subcommunity? What are the bases of power and influence within the Negro subcommunity? Do Negro leaders have ready access to the important centers of decision-making within the larger community? Have there been recent changes in the structure of subcommunity leadership? What factors account for the changes observed? Do Negro leaders possess legitimacy within both the subcommunity and the larger community?

A secon

Negro leadersh

assume many f

ideal or constru

referred to in t

ship. We have

In our considera

with the extent a

among Negro lea

Are there operat

able leadership t

What means are

To what degree i

factors account f

ment is concerne

another, or do th

Through t

munity setting, t

standing of socia

study contributes

of issues are set

A second major concern is centered about types or patterns of Negro leadership. Responses to racial subordination may and do indeed assume many forms. These responses may be examined by means of ideal or constructed typologies. Such ideal types have come to be referred to in the literature on Negro leadership as styles of leadership. We have generally chosen instead to speak of types of leadership. In our consideration of leadership types, we were especially concerned with the extent and nature of cooperation, competition, and conflict among Negro leaders. Questions such as the following guided us here. Are there operative within the subcommunity distinct and distinguishable leadership types? What goals are preferred by Negro leaders? What means are preferred in the struggle for minority group goals? To what degree is there consensus regarding goals and means? What factors account for the differences discovered? Insofar as goal attainment is concerned, do different leadership types complement one another, or do they undermine effectiveness?

Significance of the Study

Through the investigation of Negro leadership within a community setting, this study contributes in a modest way to our understanding of social conflict. When related to the existing literature, the study contributes to our growing understanding of "how different types of issues are settled by different types of decision-makers in different

types of commu

fully appreciat

to leaders of a

what different f

community; (2)

white leaders,

existing studies

marily on South

Perhaps

cal and a practi

W. Pfautz is but

T
in Ameri
ment und
activities
the drama
the perso
ship on th
invites co
mutual mi
Within the
of a full c
communit
tition amo
(all of whi
criminatic
The challe
of theoreti
pressing a

1. William F
Community (New

2. Harold W
Community: A Ca
No. 2 (Sum.mer,

<u>types of communities.</u>"[1] The significance of the study may be more fully appreciated when it is realized that: (1) the issues of importance to leaders of a minority group subcommunity are likely to be somewhat different from the issues of importance to leaders of the larger community; (2) the studies of community leadership have focused on white leaders, or leaders of the larger community; and (3) the few existing studies of Negro subcommunity leadership have focused primarily on Southern cities or the very largest of Northern cities.

Perhaps most importantly, the study satisfies both a theoretical and a practical need for more studies of Negro leadership. Harold W. Pfautz is but one of many who has noted this need.

> The power structures of Negro sub-communities in American cities are in a process of schism and realignment under the impact of desegregation movements and activities. On the practical side, lack of knowledge of the dramatic changes taking place with regard both to the personnel and the tactics of the sub-community leadership on the part of the dominant group power structure invites communication breakdowns which can lead to mutual miscalculations and, ultimately, to civic violence. Within the Negro community, the lack of experience and of a full complement of perspectives to bring to bear on community problems as well as the often wasteful competition among leaders and agencies for power and status (all of which are the heritage of the vicious circle of discrimination and prejudice) further complicate the problem. The challenge this situation presents to social scientists of theoretical as well as of social action persuasion is as pressing as it is obvious.[2]

---

1. William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, <u>Industry, Labor, and Community</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 530.

2. Harold W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View," <u>Phylon</u>, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer, 1962), p. 166.

An Overview

The remainder of the study is divided into seven chapters. In Chapters II and III, we have drawn from the existing literature for a preliminary step toward the development of an adequate theory of Negro leadership. Chapter II deals with the general characteristics of Negro leadership, with particular emphasis on the constraints imposed on Negro leaders. Chapter III is devoted to an examination of existing typologies of Negro leadership and to the development of the typology used in this study. Chapter IV provides a description of "Lakeland," the community in which the study was conducted. Chapter V presents a summary of the methodological procedures used, and a social profile of Negro leadership in Lakeland. Where possible, this new empirical data has been compared with data from existing literature. Chapters VI and VII turn to an analysis of the dynamics of Negro leadership in Lakeland. This analysis focuses on five problem areas considered crucial to Lakeland's Negro leaders: politics, housing, education, employment, and police and community relations. Chapter VII presents a summary and conclusion, including a discussion of limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.

Properl

expand the fron

frontiers vary,

gation. In som

apparent where

is that of develo

will allow one to

frontier is ill-de

have devoted the

vant problems.

ly emerged as ex

would expect to h

problems were ur

biases. It may be

analysis by means

that powerful indiv

to protect their ow

that those who sub

have the relevant

CHAPTER II

NEGRO COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

Properly conceived, the major task of the researcher is to expand the frontiers of existing knowledge. The nature of those frontiers vary, depending upon the area or topic selected for investigation. In some areas the frontier is well defined and it is rather apparent where one ought to go next. Oftentimes the problem then is that of developing the methodological tools and procedures which will allow one to go that route with confidence. In other areas the frontier is ill-defined. Invariably this is so because relatively few have devoted their time and energies to the examination of the relevant problems. It may be that particular problems have just recently emerged as existential realities. It may be that those whom we would expect to have been interested in the examination of particular problems were unaware of the problems because of their ideological biases. It may be that the relevant problems were not susceptible to analysis by means of the existing methodological tools. It may be that powerful individuals and groups have resisted research in order to protect their own vested interests. Increasingly so, it may be that those who subsidize social research, for one reason or another, gave the relevant problems a low priority. Whatever the reason, it

may not always

For any of a nu

The pro

pletely ignored

it is still an un

volume of litera

directly to Neg:

alistic.

In 1944,

classic, <u>An Am</u>

"This sketch of

partly speculati

made."[1] Myrda

competent schol

we have no inter

leadership is lik

flux that charact

extinguish that c

In Chapte

the existing lite:

ment of a theory

1. Gunnar
Arnold Rose), <u>A</u>
ers Publishers,

may not always be possible to stand upon the shoulders of giants.
For any of a number of reason, gaints may not have passed this way.

The problem selected for investigation here has not been completely ignored by social scientists. Yet there can be no denying that it is still an underdeveloped area of study. Despite the tremendous volume of literature on race relations, relatively little of it pertains directly to Negro leadership, and much that does is essentially journalistic.

In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal concluded an important section of his classic, An American Dilemma, with the following words of caution: "This sketch of Negro leadership is frankly impressionistic and partly speculative, as no intensive research on this topic has been made."[1] Myrdal's caution is still warranted. Although a number of competent scholars have examined this area of interest, and although we have no interest in discrediting their work, what we know of Negro leadership is like a candle in the darkness of ignorance. The rapid flux that characterizes Negro leadership today even threatens to extinguish that candle.

In Chapters II and III, we turn to the task of abstracting from the existing literature that which appears most useful in the development of a theory adequate to explain Negro leadership. We view our

---

1. Gunnar Myrdal (with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose), An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), p. 779.

work as co⟨...⟩

ment of suc⟨...⟩

be done, fo⟨...⟩

judge theor⟨...⟩

Pri⟨...⟩

this seems

here is on

dorf has ex

follow Dahr

invo⟨...⟩
in it⟨...⟩
cont⟨...⟩
or c⟨...⟩
The
any
tion
assu
bate

1. Ral⟨...⟩
Society (Sta⟨...⟩

2. Ibi⟨...⟩
primarily i⟨...⟩
cially: (1)⟨...⟩
The Free P⟨...⟩
Snyder, "T⟨...⟩
Synthesis,"⟨...⟩
1957), pp. 2⟨...⟩
A General T⟨...⟩

work as constituting but one more modest step toward the develop-
ment of such a theory. The resultant product leaves much work to
be done, for it fails to satisfy the criteria by which we must ulimately
judge theory.

Social Conflict and the Imperative of Leadership

Prior to our examining factors affecting Negro leadership,
this seems an appropriate point at which to reiterate that our focus
here is on both Negro leadership and racial conflict. As Ralf Dahren-
dorf has expressed it, "social conflict is ubiquitous."[1] We will
follow Dahrendorf in his conceptualization of social conflict:

> All relations between sets of individuals that
> involve an incompatible difference of objective--i.e.,
> in its most general form, a desire on the part of both
> contestants to attain what is available only to one,
> or only in part--are . . . relations of social conflict.
> The general concept of conflict does not as such imply
> any judgment as to the intensity or violence of rela-
> tions caused by differences of objective. Conflict may
> assume the form of civil war, or of parliamentary de-
> bate, of a strike, or of a well-regulated negotiation.[2]

---

1. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 162.

2. Ibid., p. 135. This conceptualization differs from others
primarily in that it is broader. For other treatments, see espe-
cially: (1) Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1956); (2) Raymond W. Mack and Richard C.
Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict--Toward an Overview and
Synthesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June,
1957), pp. 212-248; and (3) Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense:
A General Theory (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

Soci

our concern

relations be

We will als

in Negro le

bearing on

    Alth

one geograp

another, Ne

ential treat

crimination

stitutes an

society. M

with domina

resources.

an importan

a result of

there devel

their mutua

everywhere

cends to son

times consi

1. Jan

New York:

Social conflict, of course, assumes multifarious forms, and our concern here is limited primarily to racial conflict--conflict relations between those socially identified as "Negroes" or "whites." We will also be concerned, however, with the conflict relations within Negro leadership, for these "internal" conflicts have an important bearing on "external" conflicts.

Although there are important differences as one moves from one geographical setting to another or from one social setting to another, Negro Americans may be said to be singled out for differential treatment which manifests itself in the form of prejudice, discrimination, and persecution.[1] Race, then, socially defined, constitutes an important source of conflict and cleavage within American society. Minority group Negroes are locked in continuous conflict with dominant group whites over the distribution of scarce values and resources. Racial segregation is both a result of this conflict and an important factor affecting the nature of the continuing conflict. As a result of the realities of racial conflict and racial segregation, there develops among Negro Americans a conscious awareness of their mutual interdependence. Members of the Negro minority are everywhere conscious of a common fate, and this consciousness transcends to some extent the heterogeneity of the group, which is oftentimes considerable.

---

1. James W. Vander Zanden, American Minority Relations (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963), p. 21.

Ne

are every

they are e

munities i

secuted in

tedly is no

of a minor

Th

tors both

admittedly

rate exter

in distingu

"subcomm

ciently ind

it exists a

established

community

may best b

Lev

of the natu

Negro community leadership exists because Negro Americans are everywhere locked in conflict with the dominant group and because they are everywhere more or less segregated from the larger communities in which they reside. This conflict is not effectively prosecuted in the absence of leadership. The waging of conflict admittedly is not the only function expected of leaders, but for the leaders of a minority group it is perhaps their most significant task.

The General Characteristics of Negro Community Leadership

The nature of Negro community leadership is affected by factors both external and internal to the Negro subcommunity. This is admittedly an analytical distinction, and it is not an easy task to separate external and internal factors in concrete instances. The difficulty in distinguishing between these factors is implied in our use of the term "subcommunity". In some respects, the Negro community is sufficiently independent to warrant our referring to it as a "community": it exists as a distinguishable social system whose boundaries can be established through empirical observation. Yet it is a unique kind of community. It is not entirely independent, and in many respects it may best be seen as a "subcommunity".

Lewis Killian has provided one of the most insightful analyses of the nature of the Negro subcommunity. He notes that "the Negro

communit

possesses

<u>sentiment</u>

tant respe

    wo
    tur
    cor
    As
    zat
    in i
    of t

The essent

from "segr

    We

one looks a

part of a la

must attem

recognize a

ambiguity i

to note that

1. Lev
Negro Lead
1965), p. 7(
Door (Engle

2. Kill

3. Ibid

community is a true community in the sociological sense," for it

possesses the minimal characteristics of locality and community

sentiment.[1] Yet it differs from most communities in three impor-

tant respects. First, it is a "subcommunity", for:

> It represents a separate growth within the frame-
> work of a larger community which is historically, cul-
> turally and self-consciously white . . . second, the Negro
> community is a natural, but not a formal, community.
> As a sub-community it lacks . . . formal political organi-
> zation . . . finally . . . the Negro community represents
> in its institutional structure a weak and inferior imitation
> of the wider, essentially white, community.[2]

The essential characteristics of the Negro subcommunity, then, stem,

from "segregation, ecological, social and psychological."[3]

We are left with a measure of ambiguity, for no matter how

one looks at it, the Negro subcommunity is a more or less autonomous

part of a larger social entity. Throughout much of this chapter, we

must attempt to resolve some of this ambiguity. Perhaps we should

recognize at the beginning, however, that at least to some extent, the

ambiguity is irresolvable. For the present, it is perhaps sufficient

to note that (1) whether we speak of the Negro "community" or the

---

1. Lewis M. Killian, "Community Structure and the Role of the
Negro Leader-Agent, "Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter,
1965), p. 70. See also Robin M. Williams, Jr., Strangers Next
Door (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), Chap. 8.

2. Killian, op. cit., p. 70.

3. Ibid.

Negro "s

and (2) th

sequently

<u>External</u>

T

gestive o

erally cor

the differ

example,

society in

higher soc

with it the

Being rela

group is a

sources ar

Wi

status, we

consequenc

<u>The</u>

ability to in

1. As

<u>Racial and (</u>

1965), p. 16

Negro "subcommunity", we have in mind the same social reality;

and (2) the ambiguity is defined as "real" by Negro leaders and con-

sequently it poses "real" and difficult problems for them.

External Constraints on Negro Community Leadership

The very definition of "minority" or "minority group" is sug-

gestive of the external factors influencing Negro leadership. As gen-

erally conceived, the concept of minority group calls our attention to

the differential distribution of power and status within society. For

example, Louis Wirth observed that "The existence of a minority in a

society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group with

higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status carries

with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the society. "[1]

Being relatively powerless and possessing low status, the minority

group is at a serious disadvantage in the competition for scarce re-

sources and values which characterizes all social life.

Without the intent of minimizing the relevance of differential

status, we have consciously and deliberately chosen to emphasize the

consequences of the unequal distribution of power for Negro leadership.

The Analysis of Power. Power is customarily viewed as the

ability to influence or determine the behavior of others in accordance

---

1. As quoted in George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 16.

with one's c

analysis of

Bierstedt v

of people,

to observe

nor does an

Power app

nization, a

Alt

two source

ing of reso

kinds--mo

fraud, sec

the term '

Rol

Peter Ros

blance to E

some comb

1. Ro
A. Coser a
ed. (New

2. Ib

3. Ib

with one's own desires. One of the more useful approaches to an

analysis ofpower has been contributed by Robert Bierstedt.

Bierstedt views power as stemming from three sources: "(1) numbers

of people, (2) social organization, and (3) resources."[1] He goes on

to observe that "no one of these sources in itself constitutes power,

nor does any one of them in combination with either of the others.

Power appears only in the combination of all three--numbers, orga-

nization, and resources."[2]

Although it is fairly clear what Bierstedt means by the first

two sources of power, it is perhaps necessary to elaborate the mean-

ing of resources. Bierstedt notes that "Resources may be of many

kinds--money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, deceit,

fraud, secrecy, and, of course, all the things usually included under

the term 'natural resources.'"[3]

Robert Dahl's listing of the important bases of <u>influence</u> and

Peter Rossi's listing of the bases of <u>power</u> both bear close resem-

blance to Bierstedt's conceptualization. Both lists incorporate in

some combination or other what Bierstedt meant by numbers,

---

1. Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," in Lewis
A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds.), <u>Sociological Theory</u>, 2nd
ed. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 152.

2. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 153.

3. <u>Ibid</u>.

organization

following:[1]

Rossi lists

We a

of consensu

only to obse

of the most

the developr

organized p

racial discr

Desp

South, are s

1. Rob
ties," in Ch
Action (East
gan State Ur

2. Pete
munity Orga

organization, and resources. Dahl lists as bases of influence the following:[1]

1. Money and credit.
2. Control over jobs.
3. Control over the information of others.
4. Social standing.
5. Knowledge and expertness.
6. Popularity, esteem, charisma.
7. Legality, constitutionality, officiality.
8. Ethnic solidarity.
9. The right to vote.

Rossi lists as bases of power:[2]

1. Control over wealth and other resources.
2. Control over mass media.
3. Control over solidary groups.
4. Control over values.
5. Control over prestigeful interaction.

We are led to conclude that there is some considerable degree of consensus regarding the sources or bases of power. It remains only to observe that power is not a stable relationship. Indeed, one of the most fascinating aspects of the Negro Revolt to date has been the development of countervailing power by means of deliberately organized protest groups committed to a militant confrontation with racial discrimination and segregation.

Despite this development, Negro subcommunities, North and South, are still confronted with the superordinate power of the

---

1. Robert A. Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," in Charles R. Adrian (ed.), Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University, 1960), p. 32.

2. Peter H. Rossi, "Theory, Research, and Practice in Community Organization," in ibid., pp. 12-13.

community

<u>what is the</u>

The

of power,

strating th

the deman

is a major

viewed abo

militant le

Thus a wea

attainment

Negro lead

effectivene

others who

Ma

tant goals

on the part

that James

ship in Chi

many Negr

concluded

---

1. Jar
1960).

community at large. Thus we are returned to a central problem:

what is the nature of leadership operating from a weak base of power?

The Problem of Powerlessness. Operating from a weak base

of power, Negro leaders will experience extreme difficulties in demon-

strating their effectiveness by obtaining goals rapidly enough to satisfy

the demands of those subject to the "revolution in aspirations". This

is a major reason for the transformation of leadership which was

viewed above as a major consequence of the Negro Revolt. The new

militant leaders, of course, are also subject to the same pressures.

Thus a weak power base, together with impatient demands for goal

attainment, contributes to the inherent instability or high fluidity of

Negro leadership. Those Negro leaders incapable of demonstrating

effectiveness by securing a "pay-off" are likely to be challenged by

others who are anxious to step into leadership positions.

Many Negroes mistakenly confuse this inability to attain impor-

tant goals relative to race advancement with a lack of conscious effort

on the part of Negro leaders. In this respect, it is interesting to note

that James Q. Wilson subtitled his important study of Negro leader-

ship in Chicago "The Search for Leadership."[1] Wilson noted that

many Negro "leaders" denied the existence of Negro leadership. He

concluded that what was meant was that "there are no 'good' leaders--

---

1. James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

leaders who a

as a race and

Simila

that Negroes a

are not "organ

community or

Yet ano

leadership has

of the minority

tant centers of

without power.

their leadership

furthermore ob

to establish his

in any negotiati

Relative

implication. It

centers of deci

ever power the

---

1. Ibid.,

2. Ibid.,

3. James

Lansing: Institu

State Universit

4. Killian

leaders who are selflessly devoted to causes which will benefit Negroes as a race and as a community."[1]

Similarly, as Wilson observes, there are those who suggest that Negroes are unorganized. Again what is meant is that Negroes are not "organized as a community to seek ends of benefit to the community or the race as a whole."[2]

Yet another implication of the relative powerlessness of Negro leadership has been suggested by McKee. He observes that leaders of the minority community "may have no ready access to the important centers of decision-making in the community. They are leaders without power, and this serves to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of their leadership in the minority community itself."[3] Killian has furthermore observed that "it is no easy task for [the Negro leader] to establish his legitimacy, since an essential source of validation in any negotiation is acceptance by the opponent as a legitimate agent."[4]

Relative powerlessness appears to have one other important implication. It would seem that exclusion from the institutionalized centers of decision-making would lead Negro leaders to exert whatever power they can muster outside institutionalized channels. Denied

---

1. Ibid., p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 4.

3. James B. McKee, Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1962), p. 2.

4. Killian, op. cit., p. 78.

ready access

lized"[1] channe

leaders are lik

for example, h

civil disobedie

sources of pow

coercion."[2] S

riots by a simi

Should N

fluencing the de

From the persp

lems of social

assertion of nor

use of sanctions

It must

Negroes are de

siderably. Cor

the use of civil

the right of poli

Beyond

nant of the natu

---

1. For Bi
Robert Bierstec
Company, Inc.,

2. James
ment against Se
No. 5 (March,

ready access to those "formal, recognized, established, and stabi-lized"[1] channels of influencing the decision-making process, Negro leaders are likely to favor noninstitutionalized means. Vander Zanden, for example, has attributed the use of nonviolent resistance, including civil disobedience, to the Negro minority's low accessibility "to major sources of power within a society and to the instruments of violent coercion."[2] Some Negro leaders have tried to justify recent urban riots by a similar reasoning.

Should Negro leaders favor noninstitutionalized means of in-fluencing the decision-making process, certain problems follow. From the perspective of the total community, this poses obvious prob-lems of social control. From the perspective of Negro leaders, the assertion of noninstitutionalized power exposes them to the potential use of sanctions which may be imposed by community power holders.

It must be recognized, of course, that the extent to which Negroes are denied access to centers of decision-making varies con-siderably. Community leaders in the North have effectively opposed the use of civil disobedience on the grounds that Negroes are not denied the right of political participation.

Beyond any doubt, then, powerlessness is a crucial determi-nant of the nature of Negro leadership. Because of the collective

---

1. For Bierstedt, this is the essence of institutionalization. See Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 341.

2. James W. Vander Zanden, "The Nonviolent Resistance Move-ment against Segregation," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68, No. 5 (March, 1963), p. 544.

experience of

leaders are ca

ential distribu

to attain racia

and the right o

ship is questio

problems of po

ment with noni

process.

The Fo

of external con

nature of race

concerned with

and all that that

Ladd has expre

are raci
issue or
problem
predican

As a general ru

first of all as a

position of leade

---

1. Everett
South (Ithaca, Ne
in a similar vein
tions, such as 'W
ville." See St. C
Vol. II (New Yor

experience of prejudice, discrimination, and persecution, Negro

leaders are called upon to surmount racial barriers. Yet the differ-

ential distribution of power itself makes it difficult for Negro leaders

to attain racially defined goals. Given this difficulty, both the ability

and the right of Negro leaders to maintain their positions of leader-

ship is questioned by both Negroes and whites. To cope with the

problems of powerlessness, Negro leaders are encouraged to experi-

ment with noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making

process.

The Focus of Concern of Negro Leaders. One other consequence

of external constraints on Negro leadership is of importance. The

nature of race relations is such that Negro leaders are likely to be

concerned with the overarching issue of minority group membership

and all that that entails, to the relative neglect of other issues. Everett

Ladd has expressed this well.

> The most pressing needs and concerns of Negroes
> are racially defined. Their lives are race-ridden. No
> issue or problem can match the importance of racial
> problems. Leadership must reflect this racially defined
> predicament. [1]

As a general rule, then, a leader who is also a Negro must serve

first of all as a Negro leader, no matter what his capabilities or his

position of leadership. This ought not to be interpreted to imply that

1. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the
South (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 3.
In a similar vein Drake and Cayton have observed that "the big ques-
tions, such as 'What of the Bomb?,' are seldom asked in Bronze-
ville." See St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis,
Vol. II (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. xxviii.

there is a virt

consensus in g

detail is likely

it is to be note

tablishment of

ment of goal p

"the goals of N

have become m

bivalence on th

lems of powerl

ers to reach cc

The Internal C

An exar

understanding

lessness of Ne

ternal constrai

nal constraints

Wilson, one of

recognized this

1. James

Negro Civic Ac

(September, 19

there is a virtual consensus regarding goals. Though there may be consensus in general terms, any attempt to specify Negro goals in detail is likely to provoke considerable disagreement. In particular, it is to be noted that the scarcity of resources necessitates the establishment of priorities among alternative goals. But the establishment of goal priorities by leaders is complicated by the fact that "the goals of Negro public life have become less clear and the targets have become more uncertain."[1] All this leads to considerable ambivalence on the part of Negro leaders. Beyond any doubt, the problems of powerlessness are compounded by the inability of Negro leaders to reach consensus regarding the priority of goals.

The Internal Constraints of the Negro Community

An examination of external constraints is crucial to a thorough understanding of the nature of Negro community leadership. The powerlessness of Negro leadership, in particular, may be attributed to external constraints. An analysis which emphasized solely these external constraints, however, would be incomplete and thus inadequate. Wilson, one of the more perceptive students of Negro leadership, recognized this well.

---

1. James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5 No. 3 (September, 1961), p. 295.

fluenc

class

weak e

the cou

interes

extern

ient to

public

to deal

simply

obstac

civic a

Negro

to civi

munity

The Co

as we have see

life and a logic

from full partic

munity turns in

teristic of the s

The con

generalization,

and psychologi

of external con

of involution.   I

internal conditi

involves some

---

1. Wilson,

2. Ibid., p

Powerful constraints work against Negro in-
fluence in civic and political affairs--race prejudice,
class differences, geographic concentration, and a
weak economic position--but a thorough inquiry into
the course of specific civic issues in which Negro
interests are involved strongly suggests that these
external or environmental constraints are not suffic-
ient to explain the lack of Negro effectiveness in the
public life of the community. Efforts by Negroes
to deal with race relations in a northern city are not
simply blocked by hostile forces, although powerful
obstacles are undoubtedly raised. In part, Negro
civic action is hampered by constraints inside the
Negro community. Some of the important obstacles
to civic action are products of the Negro's own com-
munity and way of life. [1]

The Consequences of Involution. Both Wilson and Killian,

as we have seen above, argue persuasively that "the ghetto has a

life and a logic of its own."[2] Its members denied or discouraged

from full participation in the larger community, the minority com-

munity turns in upon itself. This involution is an important charac-

teristic of the segregated community, wherever it exists.

The consequences of involution are many and diverse. One

generalization, however, seems warranted. If the ecological, social,

and psychological boundaries of the ghetto are established by the walls

of external constraints, those walls are strengthened by the process

of involution. It is necessary that Negroes accomodate daily to the

internal conditions of the ghetto, and that accomodation inevitably

involves some measure of acceptance of life "as it is." Oscar Lewis

1. Wilson, Negro Politics, op. cit., p. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 7.

has observed

hibiting the m

cerns here, T

reluctant to ta

there is psych.

ner--even thou

its own. [2]

In an in

Negro leaders

ance of a segre

go a step furthe

vested interest

segregation, th

ment toward int

are many indivi

measure depend

---

1. Oscar
House, 1961).

2. Thomas
(Princeton, Nev

3. See esp
(New York: Col
Group Leadersh
Bernard Rosenb
Mass Society in
pp. 604-613.

has observed that the culture of poverty is in itself a factor inhibiting the mobility of the poor.[1] Even more relevant to our concerns here, Thomas Pettigrew has noted that Negroes are often reluctant to take advantage of new opportunities simply because there is psychological security in behaving in an accustomed manner--even though the traditional way may have an unpleasantness of its own.[2]

In an important sense, then, the every day affairs of both Negro leaders and followers necessitate at least a minimal acceptance of a segregated social structure. There are others who would go a step further to argue that many Negro leaders come to have a vested interest in a segregated system.[3] As a direct result of segregation, they enjoy advantages which would be lost with the movement toward integration. Within any Negro subcommunity, there are many individuals whose income, status, and power are in some measure dependent upon the perpetuation of segregation. Integration

1. Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez (New York: Random House, 1961).

2. Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964).

3. See especially E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York: Collier Books, 1962), and Seymour Leventman, "Minority Group Leadership: The Advantages of the Disadvantages," in Bernard Rosenberg, Isreal Gerver, and F. William Howton (eds.), Mass Society in Crisis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), pp. 604-613.

would throw thi

counterparts, r

and resources.

inessmen have

appears to be a

leadership has

have some imp

men, for exam

for desegregat

In addit

a result of grou

fied as "vulner

white control.

of their indepe

vulnerable beca

munity. The v

joy benefits fro

(although many

in attempts to i

real danger of

(e.g., public s

especially vuln

constrained fro

would throw this group into unfair competition with their white counterparts, many of whom possess greater reputations, skills, and resources. For example, many Negro professionals and businessmen have captive markets in the ghetto. Although there appears to be a distinct possibility that this constraint on Negro leadership has been overemphasized, it must be granted that it does have some impact. The "Buy Black" position of many Negro businessmen, for example, is often accompanied by a reluctance to push hard for desegregation.

In addition to those Negroes who enjoy individual advantages as a result of group disadvantages, there are others who may be classified as "vulnerables"--those who are more subject than others to white control. Whereas the advantaged are advantaged largely because of their independence of the larger community, the vulnerables are vulnerable because of their greater dependence upon the larger community. The vulnerables stand to suffer not solely because they enjoy benefits from segregation which would be lost with integration (although many clearly do), but additionally because their participation in attempts to bring about integration may expose them to the very real danger of sanctions. Negro professionals drawing public salaries (e.g., public school teachers, social workers, etc.) appear to be especially vulnerable. The literature suggests that vulnerables are constrained from providing vigorous, militant leadership. It may be,

however, that

strained as ar

nately, most c

of Southern co

Involut

may be called

in essence, is

inferior" imita

vast majority o

The relationsh

istent or highl

and South, atte

are formally p

informal recog

socially releva

men form thei

organizations

the larger cor

tant functions

organizations

locals, or the

"integrated" u

but our purpo

tions of the N

however, that in Northern communities, vulnerables are not as constrained as are the vulnerables in Southern communities. Unfortunately, most of what we know of the vulnerables comes from studies of Southern communities.

Involution further manifests itself in the development of what may be called parallel institutions within the Negro community. This, in essence, is what Killian had in mind in his reference to "weak and inferior" imitations of the institutions of the wider community. The vast majority of those Negroes who attend church attend Negro churches. The relationships between white and Negro churches are either nonexistent or highly formal. The vast majority of Negro children, North and South, attend "Negro" schools. Even though those Negro schools are formally parts of a larger community school system, there is an informal recognition on the part of all that Negro schools constitute a socially relevant subsystem. Negro professionals and Negro businessmen form their own professional and business organizations. These organizations strive to serve the same functions as their parallels in the larger community. Negro fraternities and sororities serve important functions for those unable or unwilling to join the white counterpart organizations. Negro workers come together in Negro unions or Negro locals, or they come to constitute a race-conscious segment of an "integrated" union or local. The examples could be expanded further, but our purpose is primarily illustrative. The point is that the associations of the Negro community "constitute special interest groups,

organized not for participation in the activities of the wider community, but because of exclusion from these activities."[1] The weakness of these associations results from a stratification system which ascribes inferiority to all that is Negro, and from the exclusion tied to that inferiority. Their weakness is furthermore attributable to the relative lack of resources available within the Negro community. These parallel institutions in the Negro subcommunity come to have a viability of their own which acts as a barrier to desegregation and integration.

Parenthetically, we might add that the consequences of involution are especially evident on Saturday night in the ghetto. At the completion of the work week, many Negroes displace their hostility and aggression through victimizing their fellow Negroes.[2]

Involution, of course, is never complete. The Negro subcommunity is, as we have observed, a part of the wider community. There are patterned relationships between both the institutions and the individual members of the subcommunity and the larger community of which it is a part. There is always some measure of institutional dispersion which brings the members of the Negro subcommunity into contact with the larger community. As a general rule, involution is most complete in those relationships that imply an equality of social

---

1. Killian, op. cit., p. 70.

2. See Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: Signet Books, 1965), chap. 13, for a perceptive account by a layman.

status. Thus, racial endogamy is a major characteristic of American marriage patterns. Involution is less complete as we move toward more formal and impersonal relationships. In modern, industrialized societies such as ours, for example, the movement towards a rational utilization of manpower resources offers assurance that a proportion of minority group members will find themselves in contact with dominant group members within the realm of work.

Heterogeneity and the Necessity of Solidarity. This brings us to a consideration of one of the most important problems faced by Negro leadership. The boundaries of the ghetto serve to bring together in close geographical and social proximity groups and social categories which would be more separate were it not for those boundaries. The result is that the Negro community is considerably more heterogeneous than the sterotyped image of the Negro community suggests. In general, homogeneity within the Negro community breaks down as the barriers to participation in the larger community are removed. Thus Negro communities in urban centers are generally more heterogeneous than those in rural areas. Similarly, Negro communities in the urban North are generally more heterogeneous than those in the urban South.

This heterogeneity, as evidenced in occupational diversity, variation in income, prestige, life-styles, etc., leads quite naturally to differences in interests. This is to say that the stratification system

operative with

fication system

urban centers,

able difficulty

might say that

community is

and that each f

relations in ou

ness of Negro

united front, if

to suspect that

be covert. On

front to the lar

observed that

    the str
    and wit
    and can
    in prev
    thus de

    Beyond

resolving intra

1. Kennet
and Organizatio
The Negro Am
p. 624.

operative within the wider community is paralleled by a similar strati-

fication system operating within the subcommunity. Thus in most

urban centers, and particularly those in the North, there is consider-

able difficulty in achieving consensus regarding goals and means. One

might say that the calculus of solidarity and consensus within the Negro

community is determined by both centripetal and centrifugal forces,

and that each force constitutes a response to the general pattern of race

relations in our society. The problem is that the relative powerless-

ness of Negro leadership makes it a virtual necessity to present a

united front, if anything at all is to be gained. There is good reason

to suspect that attempts to resolve these conflicts, if they exist, will

be covert. Only in this way will it be possible to present a united

front to the larger community. In this regard, Kenneth B. Clark has

observed that

> the stresses and strains within the civil rights movement
> and within and among the various organizations are real
> and cannot be denied; and a great deal of energy is expended
> in preventing these difficulties from becoming overt and
> thus destroying the public image of unity. [1]

Beyond any doubt, this dilemma posed by the necessity of

resolving intragroup conflict in such a way that leaders may still

---

1. Kenneth B. Clark, "The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum and Organization," in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), The Negro American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 624.

effectively im

problems face

We hav

emergent theo

final product.

in particular a

responsibility.

effectively implement agreed upon plans is one of the most crucial problems faced by Negro leaders.

We have attemped to provide here the skeletal outline for an emergent theory of Negro leadership. In no way is this viewed as a final product. The task which remains is one for which sociologists in particular and social scientists in general must assume a collective responsibility.

The ab

for, but explic

verse modes o

recognized in

concern of thos

styles of leade

logies, the con

theoretical pro

literature on N

in the construc

tive, but a brie

warranted. 1

---

1. The dis
See his Constru
Century-Crofts
are encouraged
erature on typo
Weber's treatm
logy of the Soci
In addition to W
the likes of Dur
field. Howard
ledge of the nat
Through Values
sity Press, 195

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP

The above view of Negro community leadership not only allows

for, but explicitly specifies some of the factors that contribute to di-

verse modes of leadership. This diversity of leadership has been

recognized in all studies of Negro leadership. Indeed, a recurrent

concern of those who have studied Negro leadership is that of types or

styles of leadership. Despite this heavy reliance on leadership typo-

logies, the construction of typologies involves methodological and

theoretical problems which have not been adequately handled in the

literature on Negro leadership. Our discussion of general problems

in the construction of typologies is by no means intended to be exhaus-

tive, but a brief consideration of some of the problems involved seems

warranted. [1]

---

1. The discussion which follows owes most to John C. McKinney. See his Constructive Typology and Social Theory (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966). Those readers further interested in this topic are encouraged to consult McKinney's bibliography. Much of the literature on typology revolves about Max Weber's use of "ideal types." Weber's treatment of the ideal type may be found in his The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949). In addition to Weber, constructive typologies have been utilized by the likes of Durkheim, Tonnies, Sorokin, Becker, Parsons, and Redfield. Howard Becker especially has contributed to our growing knowledge of the nature of constructive typologies. See especially his Through Values to Social Interpretation (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1950).

Negro

is likely to be

as Negro lead

in exactly the

can be discerr

useful to conce

Within

group situation

responses. W

of a continuum

shades of grad

ing a selected

points on the c

proposing the e

McKinney has d

combination, ar

empirical refer

cases."1

The proc

to the more gen

---

1. McKinn

"ideal types" as

types."

The Nature and Utility of Constructive Typologies

Negro leadership--at any level, at any time, and at any place--is likely to be characterized by diversity. No two persons functioning as Negro leaders are likely to respond to the minority group situation in <u>exactly</u> the same way. Yet patterns of adjustment and response can be discerned, and for purposes of analysis it is both possible and useful to conceptualize Negro leadership in terms of broad types.

Within the range of <u>logically possible responses</u> to the minority group situation, there is a narrower range of <u>objectively probable</u> responses. We may view this narrower range of responses in terms of a continuum consisting of two polar extremes and all imaginable shades of gradation between. There is heuristic utility in constructing a selected number of types of leadership which fall at various points on the continuum of objectively probable responses. We are proposing the explicit use of a constructive typology which John C. McKinney has defined as "a <u>purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases.</u>"[1]

The process of developing a constructive typology is similar to the more general process of concept formation. The constructed

---

1. McKinney, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 3. We follow McKinney in viewing "ideal types" as a special case of the more generic "constructed types."

type, just as

and complexi

development

cess of abstra

selects out th

to be most es

investigation.

structed types

through
precisi
accentu
in a sor
cept in
tion tha
tuates c

Thus the config

structed type. 3

Perhaps

types calls atte

tween the speci

---

1. <u>Ibid</u>., p

2. <u>Ibid</u>., p

3. Accentu

constructed typ

type, just as the concept, provides "a means of reducing diversities and complexities of phenomena to a generally coherent level."[1] In the development of both concepts and types, one attempts through the process of abstraction to attain some degree of conceptual order. One selects out those elements, properties, criteria, etc., which appear to be most essential or relevant for analysis of the problem under investigation. The distinction between ordinary concepts and constructed types is provided by McKinney.

> Ordinary concepts are given precision as constructs
> through selection and limitation; constructed types are given
> precision through selection, limitation, combination, and
> accentuation. The constructed type organizes experience
> in a somewhat different fashion than does the ordinary con-
> cept in that it forms a series of attributes into a configura-
> tion that is not necessarily directly experienced and accen-
> tuates one or more of the attributes for theoretical purposes.[2]

Thus the configurational patterning of elements is crucial to the constructed type.[3]

Perhaps the most consistent criticism of the use of constructed types calls attention to the unreality of the type--the discrepancy between the specified content of the type and the empirical cases examined.

---

1. Ibid., p. 5.

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Accentuation, as can be seen in McKinney's definition of the constructed type, is not absolutely essential.

Yet, as McKi

concepts . . .

ly stated by B

you are in the

structed type

is childishly r

by the accurac

but in terms o

nary that expla

It seen

do that there b

relevant empir

above to focus

sponses, rathe

Constru

tions in the cor

---

1. McKinn

2. Becker

3. McKinn

4. This co
Weber and Bec
or objectively
tively probable
an Airedale wit
Zona K. Loomi
Nostrand Comp

Yet, as McKinney has observed, "Unreality is characteristic of all concepts . . ."[1] The actual heuristic value of unreality was succinctly stated by Becker: "If construct and 'reality' exactly correspond, you are in the morass of the particular. . . . The belief that the constructed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found is childishly naive."[2] The value of a type, then, "is not to be measured by the accuracy of its correspondence to perceptual experience . . . but in terms of its capacity to explain, however tentative and preliminary that explanation may be."[3]

It seems advisable, however, to insist as Becker and McKinney do that there be some degree of correspondence between the type and relevant empirical cases. It is acceptance of this principle that led us above to focus on the continuum of objectively probable leadership responses, rather than the continuum of logically possible responses.[4]

Constructed typologies appear to have several important functions in the conduct of social research. Above all else, a constructed

---

1. McKinney, op. cit., p. 16.

2. Becker, op. cit., p. 120.

3. McKinney, op. cit., p. 11.

4. This constitutes perhaps the major difference in the works of Weber and Becker. Weber developed "pure" types which were logically or objectively possible. Becker insisted that a type ought to be objectively probable. At one point he stated "I am not at liberty to construct an Airedale with a cast-iron stomach." (As quoted in Charles P. and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 33.

typology is a h

explanatory p

tory power or

typology to ex

constitutes bu

to be noted tha

leadership ha

The major eff

to specific lea

couraging lea

A cons

the researche

pology serves

relief the mo

under investi

Perha

standards ag

sured. Emp

tent to which

types. Given

sciences and

tion is especi

typology is a heuristic tool, the value of which is to be judged by its explanatory power or potential. In the final analysis, the explanatory power or potential of a typology is dependent upon relating the typology to existant or emergent theory. The current investigation constitutes but a modest step in that direction. In particular, it is to be noted that the prevailing tendency in the literature on Negro leadership has been to view leadership types as independent variables. The major effort has been to explain the consequences of adherence to specific leadership styles, rather than to assess those factors encouraging leaders to adopt specific leadership styles.

A constructed typology is further of value in that it sensitizes the researcher in his initial selection of data. A well-developed typology serves to simplify the data collecting process by placing in relief the more essential and relevant properties of the phenomena under investigation.

Perhaps most importantly, a constructed typology provides standards against which empirical cases may be compared and measured. Empirical cases may be compared by determining the extent to which they deviate from one another and from the constructed types. Given the primitive methods of measurement in the social sciences and the theoretical value of comparative analysis, this function is especially important.

In the

advanced by n

Wilson, Burg

As a g

sciously by fi

leadership wa

be viewed as

A crucial dim

that of goals

tinuum in whi

acceptance of

system. The

1. See (1
ship in the Un
No. 1 (July, 1
Dilemma (New
757 and 768-7
the United Sta
(New York: H
Wilson, Negr
254; (5) M. E
(Chapel Hill:
186; (6) Danie
Cliffs, N.J.:
Leventman, '
advantages, "
Howton (eds.)
Company, 196
Negro Politica
sity Press, 1

Selected Typologies of Negro Leadership

In the literature on Negro leadership, typologies have been advanced by numerous authors, including Johnson, Myrdal, Cox, Wilson, Burgess, Thompson, Leventman, and Ladd.[1]

As a general rule, types were developed more or less consciously by first selecting the dimensions in terms of which Negro leadership was to be examined. Often a selected dimension could be viewed as a continuum which crosscut the types to be constructed. A crucial dimension in most typologies advanced, for example, is that of goals or ends. Goals may be conceived in terms of a continuum in which the polar extremes are represented by complete acceptance of a biracial system and complete rejection of a biracial system. The second step involves dividing the leadership continuum

---

1. See (1) Guy B. Johnson, "Negro Racial Movements and Leadership in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 1 (July, 1937), pp. 57-71; (2) Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944), pp. 709-757 and 768-780; (3) Oliver C. Cox, "Leadership Among Negroes in the United States," in Alvin W. Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 228-271; (4) James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 214-254; (5) M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 176-186; (6) Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 58-79; (7) Seymour Leventman, "Minority Group Leadership: The Advantages of the Disadvantages," in Bernard Rosenberg, Israel Gerver, and F. William Howton (eds.), Mass Society in Crisis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), pp. 604-613; and (8) Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 145-232.

into a specific

of each type w

whole. As we

used two, thre

patterning of t

We tur

typologies of

Gunnar Myrda

In his

between the g

Myrdal recog

to the social

on the South o

ship primaril

accomodation

relevant empi

types were no

Patien

to the doctrin

reform and N

It was necess

1. Myrd

into a specific number of types and specifying the criteria or elements

of each type which will then be viewed in terms of a configurational

whole. As we will see, students of Negro leadership have generally

used two, three, or four unit typologies, but the configurational

patterning of types has varied considerably.

We turn now to a brief review of some of the more important

typologies of Negro leadership advanced thus far.

Gunnar Myrdal

In his analysis, Myrdal called attention to the relationship

between the general pattern of race relations and Negro leadership.

Myrdal recognized well that Negro leadership was largely a response

to the social environment in which it operated. In focusing primarily

on the South of depression years, Myrdal conceived of Negro leader-

ship primarily in terms of "two extreme policies of behavior"--

accomodation and protest. [1] Not surprisingly, given the paucity of

relevant empirical research at the time of his investigation, Myrdal's

types were not well developed.

Patience, self-help, appeasement, and gradualism were central

to the doctrine of accomodation. Following this doctrine, the pace of

reform and Negro improvement were largely determined by whites.

It was necessary to push reforms "quietly and in such ways that the

---

1. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 720.

whites hardly

fortably sunk

it until such t

full participat

Until r

dal's study, a

cially in the S

Southern "way

the necessity

accepting the N

concluded that

assistance of N

liberals could

Negro protest-

ordinate positi

Opposed

of protest. De

leaders, "the p

Myrdal's Dilem

Myrdal attribut

ing of race rela

---

1. Ibid., p

2. Ibid., p

whites hardly notice them before they are accomplished facts com-

fortably sunk into a new status quo."[1] Negroes were to "bootstrap"

it until such time that improved standards of living warranted their

full participation in the larger society.

Until relatively recent years, and surely at the time of Myr-

dal's study, accomodation was much the stronger orientation. Espe-

cially in the South, accomodation was a pragmatic response to a

Southern "way of life," and it was advocated by leaders who recognized

the necessity of working within the established biracial system, and of

accepting the Negroes' "place." Booker T. Washington, in particular,

concluded that accomodation provided the only means by which the

assistance of Northern humanitarians and philanthropists and Southern

liberals could be obtained. This assistance was gained by tempering

Negro protest--by accomodating to white power and accepting the sub-

ordinate position reserved for the Negro populace.

Opposed to this "static" approach was the "dynamic" approach

of protest. Despite the historical predominance of accomodative

leaders, "the protest motive is ever present."[2] Especially up until

Myrdal's Dilemma, the protest motive was more evident in the North.

Myrdal attributed this to important differences in the central pattern-

ing of race relations to be found in the North and in the South. The

---

1. Ibid., p. 736.

2. Ibid., p. 768.

Northern situ

spects:

> intere
> every
> not cr
> Southe
> contro

In actuality,

wherever the

been more ch

the anonymity

istic of urban

Protes

what today mi

whatever mea

racial barrier

Negro duties

human rights.

leader of the

than full socia

DuBois offere

of practical pc

---

1. Ibid.,

2. Ibid.,

Northern situation differed from the Southern in two important re-
spects:

> (1) That the white majority is not motivated by an
> interest solidarity against Negroes, reaching practically
> every white individual, and (2) that the Negro minority is
> not cramped by anything like the formidable, all pervasive,
> Southern system of political, judicial and social caste
> controls.[1]

In actuality, protest leadership emerged not only in the North, but

wherever the social situation allowed it. Historically, protest has

been more characteristic of the urban than of the rural South, for

the anonymity and the depersonalization of social control character-

istic of urban life made protest possible.

Protest leaders perceived their role as that of maintaining

what today might be referred to as "creative tension." Through

whatever means possible, protest leaders were to struggle against

racial barriers. Whereas the accomodative leader spoke in terms of

Negro duties and obligations, the protest leader spoke in terms of

human rights. W. E. B. DuBois, probably the most important protest

leader of the first half of the 20th century, advocated nothing less

than full social and political equality. In contrast to Washington,

DuBois offered these demands "not as ultimate goals but as a matter

of practical policy of the day."[2] Until the mid-thirties, these were

---

1. Ibid., p. 723.

2. Ibid., p. 742.

goals that eve

subscribed to

Althou

extremes of a

these leaders

an entire chap

of a daily con

however, con

the polar type

of many Negr

or to demonst

within the Neg

leaders who p

the South, thi

ership.

James Q. Wi

Based

Wilson disting

polarized idea

1. E. F
American Soc

2. Ladd
treat categori
op. cit., p. 1

3. Myrd

goals that even few social scientists were willing to grant; even they

subscribed to the racist myths of inherent inferiority. [1]

Although Myrdal's typology draws our attention to the polar

extremes of accomodation and protest, he himself recognized that

these leadership types were not mutally exclusive. [2] Thus he wrote

an entire chapter on compromise leadership, stressing the necessity

of a daily compromise between accomodation and protest. [3] As a type,

however, compromise leadership was even less well developed than

the polar types. Yet Myrdal recognized the ambilvalent orientations

of many Negro leaders. Those Negro leaders unable to secure "favors"

or to demonstrate progress found it difficult to maintain a following

within the Negro subcommunity. On the other hand, those Negro

leaders who pushed too hard lost the support of whites. Especially in

the South, this was often the equivalent of the complete loss of lead-

ership.

James Q. Wilson

Based on his 1958-59 study of Negro leadership in Chicago,

Wilson distinguished between two political styles ("artificially

polarized ideal types"): the militant and the moderate.

---

1. E. Franklin Frazier, "Sociological Theory and Race Relations," American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June, 1947), pp. 265-271.

2. Ladd is mistaken in holding that Myrdal is among those who treat categories of leadership as "self-contained units." See Ladd, op. cit., p. 147.

3. Myrdal, op. cit., chap. 37.

acter

sake

leade

confr

(2) th

the r

seeki

butes

in the

Acco

views issues

plexities of i

his social wo

attempts to v

As re

goals while th

aimed at the i

society, while

of the Negro

better service

serve to perp

ally exclusive

utility.

As reg

solution to ma

---

1. Wilso

2. Ibid.,

The modes of thinking, speaking, and acting characteristic of these two styles can be described, for the sake of convenience, along a few simple axes: how the leader perceives and describes (1) the nature of the issues confronting him and the values he brings to bear on them; (2) the ends or goals he deems it appropriate to seek in the realm of civic action; (3) the means he employs in seeking these ends; and (4) the motives, goals, and attributes of the other actors, white and Negro, whom he sees in the world about him. [1]

According to Wilson, whereas the militant or protest leader views issues in terms of simplicities, the moderate stresses the complexities of issues. Whereas the militant is "utopian," interpreting his social world in purely normative terms, the moderate deliberately attempts to view the world "as it is."

As regards ends, Wilson sees the militant accepting "status" goals while the moderate favors "welfare" goals. Status goals are aimed at the integration of Negroes into the larger community and society, while welfare goals are aimed at the tangible improvement of the Negro subcommunity through, for example, "the provision of better services, living conditions, or positions."[2] Often welfare goals serve to perpetuate segregation. These goals are by no means mutually exclusive categories, but the analytical distinction has proven its utility.

As regards means, the militant generally seeks a legislative solution to matters, while the moderate is more inclined to stress

---

1. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

2. Ibid., p. 185.

negotiations

The militant

test and mas

time while fa

more, the m

sion, the thr

emphasizes

alternatives,

Wilso

to view the "

ferentiated b

unison towar

These goals,

the Negroes.

clined to view

torial body.

faced by Neg

moderate is

tunities that

Not o

petent studies

examinations

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

negotiations "at the top," which may lead to informal agreements.
The militant's preference for rapid solutions leads him to stress pro-
test and mass tactics, while the moderate is more willing to bide his
time while facts are gathered and studies are conducted. Further-
more, the militant stresses negative inducements, such as "compul-
sion, the threat of sanctions or deprivations," while the moderate
emphasizes positive inducements such as "rewards, more attractive
alternatives, or promises of gain."[1]

Wilson sees the Negro militant or protest leader as inclined
to view the "white power structure" as a monolithic body--"an undif-
ferentiated bloc of corporate and political leaders who act largely in
unison toward agreed upon goals out of essentially identical motives.
These goals, of course, are seen to be contrary to the interests of
the Negroes."[2] The moderate leader, on the other hand, is less in-
clined to view influential whites as constituting a monolithic, conspira-
torial body. Whereas the militant is convinced that the disadvantages
faced by Negroes are attributable to prejudice and discrimination, the
moderate is likely to feel that whites are willing to provide many oppor-
tunities that Negroes simply are not yet qualified for.

Not only is Wilson's one of the most exhaustive and more com-
petent studies of Negro leadership, it is additionally one of the few
examinations focusing on a Northern city.

---

1. Ibid., p. 243.

2. Ibid., p. 226.

Daniel C. Th

In his

Thompson ha

relat
and r
race
in the

The '

accomodatior

Negroes in t

Uncle Tom is

white suprem

rights, but in

ing some fav

the Uncle To

community.

At the

to Myrdal's

the biracial

American Cr

similar also

---

1. Thor

2. _Ibid_.

Daniel C. Thompson

In his study of New Orleans Negro leadership, Daniel C.

Thompson has contributed a three unit typology. Following Thompson:

> A leader's type will be determined by three inter-
> related criteria: one, his conception of the Negro race
> and race relations; two, his attitudes toward race and
> race relations; and three, his own behavior and actions
> in the field of race relations. [1]

The "Uncle Tom" type of Negro leader is similar to Myrdal's

accomodationist. The Uncle Tom accepts the inferior position assigned

Negroes in the biracial South. "The most characteristic trait of the

Uncle Tom is his acceptance of the parasitic status assigned him by

white supremacists. He never demands on the basis of the Negro's

rights, but instead begs for favors."[2] Uncle Toms succeed in obtain-

ing some favors because whites recognize that this is instrumental to

the Uncle Tom's prestige and continued leadership within the Negro

community.

At the opposite pole is the race man, who bears similarities

to Myrdal's protest leader. The race man rejects the legitimacy of

the biracial system and accepts in its place the values inherent in the

American Creed. He is inclined to reject compromise, and is thus

similar also to Wilson's militant leader who seeks status goals.

---

1. Thompson, op. cit., p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

The race man . . . has been a perennial enemy of
the biracial system. He has insisted that racial segrega-
tion of any kind is psychologically harmful, socially un-
workable, and a legal contradiction. He has constantly
voiced his protest in literature, music, public utterances,
and organizational objectives. At all times he expresses
a restlessness and declares his impatience with second-
class citizenship.[1]

Between these two polar extremes is the racial diplomat.

According to Thompson, the racial diplomat is class-oriented. For

Thompson, this means that he is "primarily interested in raising the

cultural level of Negroes."[2] The racial diplomat is also driven by a

search for respectability characteristic of leaders in the wider com-

munity, and he places general community welfare on a par or even

above the specific needs of the Negro subcommunity.[3] He does not

accept the moral justness of a biracial system, but he has learned to

work within such a system to serve "best" the cause of race advance-

ment. Thompson also points out that an important role of the racial

diplomat is that of "advising moderates on the 'best way' of promoting

uplift in some specific area of life."[4]

Thompson sees specific patterns of race relations leadership

within the biracial system, and notes that "the patterns of intergroup

---

1. Ibid., p. 76. Ladd has observed that this represents a "highly
partisan analysis." See Ladd, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

2. Thompson, op. cit., p. 27.

3. Ibid., p. 68.

4. Ibid.

leadership a

type of Negr

type of white

segregationis

the racial dip

effectiveness

on both his a

within the Ne

sees the rela

only to the w

Uncle Tom i

either the wh

diplomat as

large measu

racial diplo

"respected b

ent in our na

Everett Carl

Ever

methodologi

tion of typol

1. Ibid

2. Ibid

leadership are determined very largely by the majority group."[1] Each

type of Negro leader will be basically dependent upon a complementary

type of white leader. Thus the Uncle Tom is associated with the white

segregationist, the race man is associated with the white liberal, and

the racial diplomat is associated with the white moderate. The relative

effectiveness of the Negro leader in attaining racial goals is dependent

on both his accessibility to influential white leaders and his support

within the Negro subcommunity. Thus, in New Orleans, Thompson

sees the relative ineffectiveness of the race man tied to his access

only to the white liberal who is on the periphery of white power. The

Uncle Tom in New Orleans is ineffective because he is not respected in

either the white or the Negro community. Thompson sees the racial

diplomat as probably being the most effective type of Negro leader. In

large measure, this is so because, contrary to the Uncle Tom, the

racial diplomat maintains the respect of both communities. He is

"respected by both because he fits well into the success pattern inher-

ent in our national ideology."[2]

Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.

Everett Ladd has been more concerned than others with the

methodological and theoretical problems associated with the construc-

tion of typologies. In his study, Ladd conducted a comparative analysis

---

1. Ibid., p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 69.

of Negro leadership in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and in Green-

ville, South Carolina. Given the focus on comparative analysis, Ladd

was forced to give serious thought to the construction of a typology

adequately suited for that task.

Following Myrdal, Ladd explicitly calls to our attention the

fact that "the limits and content of the continuum of race leadership

styles are determined by the prevailing pattern of race relations which

varies with time and geography."[1] For example, today's _militant_

leader in Greenville may become tomorrow's _moderate_ or _conservative_

leader, to use Ladd's own terminology. Furthermore, it may be dif-

ficult to find in the Greenville of tomorrow today's conservative leader.

Ladd notes that in the urban South today, Myrdal's typology is inade-

quate, for "virtually all leaders agree that the biracial system must

be removed, not merely modified."[2] Accomodationists today, then,

must be found in the _rural_ South where the prevailing pattern of race

relations still encourages some Negro leaders to accept a biracial

system.

To view the content of race leadership types as relative to time

and place, however, could pose problems in the construction of a con-

tinuum to be utilized for comparative purposes. Ladd resolves this

difficulty by accepting the community definitions of leadership styles.

---

1. Ladd, _op. cit._, p. 151.

2. _Ibid._, p. 152.

He notes tha

mines the lo

is the degre

persuasively

seems most

the moderat

"is a style n

ness in Negr

erate leader

in Greenville

sent pattern

the rigidity

middle grour

We w

most heavily

---

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. We h
ways. Perha
moderate sty
cuts all thre
self borrowe
of the constr
cerned with
butions. Suf
seen as the
drawn most
course, are

He notes that "for both whites and Negroes, the factor which deter-
mines the location of a particular style on the leadership continuum
is the degree of acceptability of that style to whites."[1] Ladd argues
persuasively that for the urban South today, his three unit typology
seems most appropriate. It is of particular importance to note that
the moderate style has just recently emerged in the urban South. It
"is a style made possible by the development of greater permissive-
ness in Negro-white relations."[2] Ladd documents clearly that mod-
erate leadership is a much more viable force in Winston-Salem than
in Greenville. Negro leaders in Greenville are constrained by the pre-
sent pattern of race relations to adopt either of the polar styles, for
the rigidity of the biracial system in Greenville does not provide a
middle ground for an effective moderate approach.

We will not review Ladd's typology in detail, for we have drawn
most heavily from him in the development of our "own" typology.[3]

------

1. _Ibid._, pp. 150-151.

2. _Ibid._, p. 198.

3. We have modified Ladd's typology in a number of important
ways. Perhaps most importantly, we have developed more fully the
moderate style of leadership and the dimension of means as it cross-
cuts all three leadership types. It ought to be observed that Ladd him-
self borrowed heavily from Wilson's earlier work. In the description
of the constructed typology which follows, we will not always be con-
cerned with crediting particular individuals with their specific contri-
butions. Suffice it to say that the typology here constructed is best
seen as the product of a cumulative effort, and that we have consciously
drawn most heavily from Wilson and Ladd. Neither they nor others, of
course, are to be held responsible for the final product here described.

A Refined Leadership Typology

The task now is to describe and elaborate the typology con-

structed for purposes of this study.   Illustrative material will be drawn

from our study of Lakeland's Negro leadership.

We have chosen a three unit typology, as did Ladd, and we have

maintained his labels.   Thus we differentiate among conservative,

moderate, and militant leadership types.   The content of each type

will be conceptualized in terms of the three dimensions of (1) race

goals; (2) the means utilized to attain those goals; and (3) rhetoric,

the language and manner used in efforts to attain race goals.   By man-

ner we have in mind all that is suggested by demeanor and deportment.

Each of these dimensions crosscuts the three leadership types.   The

content of each type will be described in terms of elements relative to

each of the three dimensions.   Figure 1 on page 60 is a diagrammatic

representation summarizing both the content of the three leadership

types and the relationships among them.

Conservative Leadership

Conservative leadership is of course the type most likely to

be acceptable to majority group whites.   If one's knowledge is limited

to reports in the mass media, he may not even be aware that conser-

vative Negro leaders exist today.   Their activity is not the stuff that

makes news headlines.   The evidence suggests that the influence of

Figure 1. Types of Negro Leadership

	CONSERVATIVE	MODERATE	MILITANT
GOALS			

Figure 1. Types of Negro Leadership

CONSERVATIVE	MODERATE	MILITANT
GOALS		**GOALS**
Welfare goals	Greater commitment to welfare goals than militants. Greater commitment to status goals than conservatives. Ambivalence Flexibility Pragmatism	Status goals
Consensus goals	Transracial goals	Cleavage goals
MEANS		**MEANS**
Self-help and self-improvement	Prefers bargaining, but recognizes utility of community involvement	Protest
Bargaining among leaders		Community involvement
Rejection of direct action and mass participation	Ambivalence Flexibility Pragmatism	Acceptance of direct action and mass participation
Positive inducements	Inducements used dependent upon the situation	Negative inducements
Educational solutions		Legislative solutions
Local solutions		Appeal to higher authority
RHETORIC		**RHETORIC**
Conciliatory	Ambliorative	Outspoken
Nonthreatening to whites	Ambivalence Flexibility Pragmatism	Threatening to whites
Nonemotive		Emotive

conservativ

fact that the

ment within

fluence.

<u>Goal</u>

<u>goals</u>. The

Negro comn

<u>goals</u> which

or <u>to remov</u>

clusive, for

an increase

One

is currently

kinds of Neg

efforts as a

and an incre

Hous

land. Conse

struction of

---

1. Our

son's. Wher

status goals,

stigma. See

rationale and

conservative Negro leaders is everywhere on the decline. Yet the

fact that their style is acceptable both to whites and an important seg-

ment within the Negro community assures them some continued in-

fluence.

Goals. Conservative leaders have a preference for welfare

goals. They seek goals which would result in tangible gains for the

Negro community. Welfare goals are to be contrasted with status

goals which will serve to integrate Negroes into the larger community

or to remove the stigma of race. [1] These goals are not mutually ex-

clusive, for a particular goal may be illustrative of both types: e. g. ,

an increase in equal employment opportunities.

One of the more important conservative leaders in Lakeland

is currently a member of the city commission. When asked what

kinds of Negro community goals had been realized as a result of his

efforts as a commissioner, he pointed to the removal of a junk yard

and an increase in the number of street lights in his district.

Housing, as we will see, constitutes a crucial issue in Lake-

land. Conservative Negro leaders are more concerned with the con-

struction of new housing units and the remodeling of existing units

---

1. Our conceptualization of status goals or ends differs from Wil-
son's. Whereas he stresses integration as the major component of
status goals, it is necessary to stress also the removal of racial
stigma. See the section on militant leadership which follows for the
rationale and elaboration of this point.

than with h

quate housi

out substan

    Lad

"Conservati

merits of w

Perhaps we

of course, a

in many Nor

goals, some

issues consi

Mea

proportionat

of race adva

is to be gain

protest. Ne

which separa

from middle

the high perc

regrets the s

condition of

1. Lad

than with housing desegregation. Given the drastic shortage of adequate housing in Lakeland today, conservative leaders are not without substantial support on this particular issue.

Ladd has suggested another goal preference of conservatives. "Conservative leaders," he writes, "tend to emphasize race goals the merits of which are generally conceded by both whites and Negroes."[1] Perhaps we may refer to these as "consensus" goals. Welfare goals, of course, are more likely than status goals to be of this nature. Since in many Northern urban centers the emphasis is primarily on status goals, some conservative leaders appear to be grossly uninformed on issues considered basic to other Negro leaders.

Means. The conservative Negro leader is likely to place disproportionate emphasis on self-help and self-improvement as means of race advancement. From the perspective of the conservative, more is to be gained through self-help and self-improvement than through protest. Negro conservatives are well aware of the cultural differences which separate not only whites from Negroes, but also lower-class from middle- and upper-class Negroes. The conservative deplores the high percentages of divorce and separation among Negroes. He regrets the sexual looseness of many Negroes. He is appalled by the condition of housing in certain sectors of the Negro community. He is

---

1. Ladd, op. cit., p. 159.

concerned that a high percentage of Negro women work and do not

properly care for their children. He is sensitive to the high crime

rate among Negroes. He is conscious that many Negro youth lack

adequate motivation. In each of these and in other instances, the con-

servative leader is convinced that much is to be gained through self-

improvement. He admits that the stereotype of Negroes possessed by

many whites is based in large measure on fact. Although he recognizes

that prejudice and discrimination are important factors, he does not

place as much emphasis on them as do the militants. In fact, many

conservatives go a considerable distance toward accepting the rationale

of whites that prejudice and discrimination result from racial inferior-

ity in all its cultural manifestations.

In addition to self-help and self-improvement, Negro conserva-

tive leaders also view bargaining as an important means of attaining

race goals. From their perspective, bargaining among leaders is

much preferred to those activities which entail wider community in-

volvement. In gaining concessions from whites, conservative Negro

leaders have a definite preference for persuasion as opposed to any

show of force. The conservative's preference for bargaining is com-

plemented by his rejection of all forms of direct action and mass par-

ticipation. One conservative leader in Lakeland, for example, stated:

> I'm not in favor of demonstrations. I think there
> are better ways. It's much better to sit down at a

conf

that

Most conse

of fact, run

leaders--ar

conservativ

Negro leade

leaders has

Militant acti

in such a po

this will be

Borr

rather than

Lakeland, fc

city ordinan

rationale wa

the elderly.

goal. Simila

1. A cr
the interview
lished if the
The result is
interviewees
ly verbatim a
though some
nally sugges
that the state

conference table and negotiate. More is accomplished
that way. It doesn't help just to aggravate and agitiate. [1]

Most conservative leaders will argue that direct action, as a matter

of fact, runs the risk of severing their access to influential white

leaders--and this accessibility constitutes an important source of the

conservative's influence within the Negro community. Conservative

Negro leaders in Lakeland have argued that their effectiveness as

leaders has been undermined by the activities of militant Negro leaders.

Militant activism, according to this argument, places white leaders

in such a position that they cannot make any concessions for fear that

this will be interpeted as a victory brought about by militancy.

Borrowing from Wilson, the conservative leader uses positive

rather than negative inducements. Conservative Negro leaders in

Lakeland, for example, favored first amending and then repealing a

city ordinance prohibiting the construction of public housing. Their

rationale was that this would allow construction of public housing for

the elderly. It was recognized that whites also were interested in this

goal. Similarly, conservative Negro leaders advocate and support

---

1. A crucial decision was made not to use recording devices in
the interview process. It was felt that better rapport could be estab-
lished if the interviewer were armed with no more than pad and pencil.
The result is that the study will not present verbatim quotations of
interviewees. We have faithfully tried to recall what was said as near-
ly verbatim as possible, but we recognized this as a difficult task. Al-
though some material will be presented following a format which nor-
mally suggests verbatim quotations, the reader ought to bear in mind
that the statements only approximate what was actually said.

programs de

for Negroes

ency of Neg

    The

by his prefe

opinion that

through an

white leade

It is especi

Negro cons

erates or m

tories into

one conserv

of solving

brutality.

    The

for "local"

zations and

militants--

and univer

sonnel are

sible for c

vatives, fo

programs designed to result in greater employment opportunities

for Negroes on the basis that this would reduce the welfare depend-

ency of Negro families.

The conservatives' preference for persuasion is complemented

by his preference for educational solutions. Conservatives are of the

opinion that both whites and Negroes must often be prepared for change

through an educational process. They recognize that in many issues,

white leaders are just as much in need of education as their followers.

It is especially to be noted that the educational process envisioned by

Negro conservatives may be a slow process. More so than either mod-

erates or militants, conservative leaders are willing to project vic-

tories into the far distant future. During the course of his interview,

one conservative Negro leader advocated education as the major means

of solving diverse problems related to housing, employment, and police

brutality.

The conservative leader is likely also to prefer "local" solutions

for "local" problems. In part, this is so because the outside organi-

zations and agents normally brought in are likely to be perceived as

militants--e. g. , the NAACP, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission,

and university researchers. In Lakeland today, power structure per-

sonnel are especially hostile to outside forces whom they hold respon-

sible for creating adverse publicity. This fact is not lost upon conser-

vatives, for they too oppose the outsiders. Recently a research group

represe

ducted a

and stud

interest

membe

the Citi

been ex

plan fo

activiti

have be

commu

side "i

creasi

whites

Negro

siders

<u>ciliato</u>

intensi

He gen

to anta

will he

doing.

representing the School of Architecture from a nearby university con-
ducted a thorough study of Lakeland's housing problems. Some faculty
and student members of this research team maintained a continuing
interest in Lakeland's community affairs. The activities of former
members of the research team led to the formation of a group known as
the Citizens for a Progressive Lakeland Committee. This group has
been extremely vocal in their opposition to the city's urban renewal
plan focused on redevelopment of the central business district. The
activitites of both the research team and the "Citizens Committee"
have been reported in the Detroit newspapers, much to the dismay of
community leaders. The conservative Negro leader views such out-
side "interference" as undesirable in that it has the potential of in-
creasing racial tensions and severing his accessibility to influential
whites. Along with certain influential white leaders, the conservative
Negro leader feels that racial problems can be "created" by the out-
siders.

Rhetoric. We have labeled the conservative's rhetoric as con-
ciliatory. The conservative leader is concerned with diminishing the
intensity of racial conflict. His manner is basically nonthreatening.
He generally refuses to embarrass or insult whites; he rarely attempts
to antagonize or anger whites. His tone is basically nonemotive. Rarely
will he dramatize racial conflict as militant Negro leaders are fond of
doing. This leads militants to accuse conservatives of being more

inter

pecia

resp

cally

even

obse

sees

politi

conse

ence

powe

by po

Milit

This

white

milita

ities,

Their

numbe

1.

interested in harmony than in justice. Conservative leaders are especially concerned with maintaining their individual dignity and self respect. They take pride in their ability to speak and act "diplomatically." They especially deplore the "racist" approach of militants and even some moderates.

Perhaps we can summarize with a quotation from Ladd, who observed that the conservatives' approach "is essentially one which he sees whites using successfully. His model is white middle-class politics. The golden words of this type of politics are moderation, consensus, respectability, persuasion, and access."[1] The only difference is that white leaders using this approach operate from a base of power, and the effectiveness of such an approach is surely enhanced by power.

Militant Leadership

At the opposite pole of the continuum is militant leadership. This is of course the type of leadership that is least acceptable to whites. Often whites express their disapproval by speaking not of militants, but rather of radicals. In most (if not all) Negro communities, militant leaders constitute a minority of all Negro leaders. Their influence, however, is probably greater than a consideration of numbers alone would suggest. Ladd writes of the militants:

---

1. Ladd, op. cit., p. 172.

over v

refere

of rac

Negro

milita

types

tionis

but th

that (

work

gratic

be re

1

2

The goals which they pursue include those around which interracial tensions are greatest; the means which they select to advance the race generate the greatest anxieties among whites; and their rhetoric tends to sharpen rather than ameliorate racial conflict.[1]

Goals. Militant Negro leaders generally prefer status goals over welfare goals. Wilson, as we have seen, viewed status goals as

those which seek the integration of the Negro into all phases of community on the principle of equality--all Negroes will be granted the opportunity to obtain the services, positions, or material benefits of the community on the basis of principles other than race.[2]

We have chosen to conceptualize status goals so that it has reference not only to integration, but also to the removal of the stigma of race. This reconceptualization seems necessary, for there are Negro leaders who do not accept integration as a goal, yet who are militants in most other respects.

After considering the construction of two separate and distinct types which might have been labeled something like "militant integrationists" and "militant separatists", it was decided instead to construct but the one "militant" type. This decision was based on our judgment that (1) militant integrationists and separatists can and oftentimes do work together, and (2) many separatists would accept the goal of integration if they perceived it to be a realistic goal--a goal which could be realized within their lifetime.

---

1. Ibid., p. 176.

2. Wilson, op. cit., p. 185.

lead

in s

gra

who

mea

and

eith

The

cia

tant

Perhaps this can be illustrated by the remarks of one Lakeland

leader who had commented that "There ought to be someone interested

in something other than integration." When asked if he rejected inte-

gration as a goal for purely strategic reasons, he responded:

> It's an unrealistic goal. I subscribe to a new uni-
> versal humanism. This country was built along racial
> lines. This is a racist nation; it always has been. It's
> necessary for us to adopt a program to free us. We need
> power in order to do that. Really, we're a nation within
> a nation. We're like an exploited, colonial nation. Inte-
> gration will work to deprive us of all we ought to be working
> towards.

> I believe in Black People. What we need is greater
> consciousness of race. The Negro was created out of
> slavery. Now Martin Luther King is a Negro, a nice
> Negro. He can talk about that brotherly love all he wants,
> but I can't see that it's going to get him anywhere. I
> dream of a world dominated by Black People. Not Negroes,
> but Black People. I don't want a world dominated by Black
> People merely so that we can dominate White People, but
> so that we can make it a better world. This is the first
> step toward the establishment of a universal humanism.

Racial pride or even chauvinism also motivates those militants

who do accept integration as a goal. In part, this is so because the

means they prefer are dependent upon a minimal level of racial pride

and solidarity.

Militant leaders, according to our conceptualization, may

either accept or reject goals such as housing or school desegregation.

There are those militants who view housing desegregation as the cru-

cial step towards a truly integrated community. There are other mili-

tants who stress improvements in the quality of housing and education

as o

at th

cons

mar

tang

far

mili

tants

negl

actio

to as

nanc

acce

raci

It is

or re

other

grati

faced

such

direc

as opposed to integration per se. In a sense, we have come full circle at this point, for some militants seem to prefer welfare goals, as do conservatives. But there are vital differences. The differences primarily relate to means and rhetoric. But even as regards goals, the tangible improvements sought by conservative leaders would not go far in removing the stigma of race, whereas the goals sought by those militants rejecting integration would better serve that purpose. Militants argue that conservatives act to enhance their own status to the neglect of other members of the subcommunity, whereas the militants' actions serve to enhance the status of all subcommunity members.

In a fundamental sense, a militant Negro leader may subscribe to assimilation, or to pluralism, or even to some form of racial dominance--e.g., Black Power. Regardless of which of these goals is accepted by militant Negro leaders, a first step is that of overcoming racial prejudice and discrimination, in all their many manifestations. It is this similarity that accounts for the fact that militants preferring or rejecting integration can and do work together in many instances.

Militant leaders in Lakeland have been more concerned than others with residential segregation. Those militants preferring integration recognize residential segregation to be basic to other problems faced by the Negro community. In the area of housing, the efforts of such militants in Lakeland during the course of the study were largely directed toward two interrelated goals.

which

it wa

deseg

which

milit

muni

Plan

velop

alone

have

housi

area

the c

comm

are,

is no

their

"disf

dency

First, they were concerned with the repeal or ordinance 1560 which prohibited the construction of public housing. To these militants, it was clear that the intent of the ordinance was to prevent residential desegregation. At a later point, we must trace the circumstances which led eventually to repeal. For now, however, we may note that militant Negro leaders, together with white liberal leaders in the community, played a major role in this.

Second, these Negro militants were opposed to the Pellegrin Plan which allocated city tax monies for many years to come to redevelopment of the central business district. Negro leaders were not alone in believing that the city's scarce economic resources ought to have been allocated instead to programs designed to solve the city's housing problems.

Another crucial status goal sought by Negro militants is in the area of politics. We have seen above that the current system by which the city commission is elected has made it impossible for the Negro community to elect its preferred candidates. Negro representatives are, in effect, elected by whites. The election of a Negro commissioner is not at issue. But the militants are here concerned with a status goal-- their right to choose their own representative. In their eyes, their "disfranchisement" is symbolic of second class citizenship.

Militant Negro leaders are further characterized by their tendency to advocate goals which intensify racial conflict--cleavage goals.

The

will

flic

the

with

fer

was

ter

rac

Pel

lan

as

whi

acti

attr

whi

as t

They are most concerned with attaining goals which whites are least willing to grant and status goals are generally of this kind.

This tendency to emphasize goals which intensify racial conflict can be illustrated by the issues just discussed above. In 1955, the city commission passed ordinance 1560 after having been presented with petitions signed by several thousand city voters calling for a referendum on the issue of public housing. Racial cleavage on this issue was deep. Similarly, the popular referendum which approved the charter amendment establishing the new electoral system revealed that racial cleavage on this issue was nearly complete. Cleavage on the Pellegrin Plan is somewhat different. There are many whites in Lakeland opposed to the Pellegrin Plan, but many of those would be equally as vehement in opposing any solution of the city's housing problems which called for residential desegregation.

Means. The militant leader subscribes to a protest model of action. From his perspective, the difficulties faced by Negroes are attributable almost entirely to the prejudice and discrimination of whites. For the militant, nothing is to be gained short of struggle, as the following exchange illustrates:

> Q. Are there any whites in the community who you could go to for help if you needed it?
>
> A. I think you'll have to be more specific. You'll have to give me a concrete or hypothetical problem.
>
> Q. Then it's all relative to the situation?

pa

ha

le

m

ef

N

A

A. Yes. But as a general rule, there's always a confrontation. Cooperation evolves from conflict. Once conflict is evident, then whites move either to shut you up or they move to cooperate in order to prevent greater problems that would result were nothing done.

The militant recognizes the utility of <u>direct action and mass participation</u>. It would seem that the willingness to use these means has come to be the major difference between conservative and militant leaders. Although direct action in Lakeland has been nonviolent, some militants have argued that nonviolent direct action is no longer an effective technique. The following, for example, was printed in the Newsletter of a local protest organization in Lakeland known as Positive Action for Race Advancement (PARA):

> Historically in the "movement" every Civil Rights group has been committed to non-violence as a <u>tactic</u>. The problem is that non-violence has come to mean more to the white power structure than mere tactical maneuvers. It has become an excuse, a break, a defense for the bigots in the nation. They are able to move as slowly as they please in giving us our rights as long as they can stand the minor inconvenience of pickets or marchers or people praying in the streets. It has become a game among Southern whites to taunt, beat, whip, curse, kick, prod, stomp and spit upon "non-violent protestors" knowing that they themselves are in no danger of being injured in any way. Small children, women, old-folks, degenerates and drunks all take their turns at the <u>game</u>. However, the game is not so funny when the bigots know that there may be retaliation. . . . The L.A. [Watts] riot served notice that although Dr. King is committed to getting his head whipped some of the "brothers" are not so inclined. They are tired of being pushed around and caged in like animals in inhuman ghettos. They are not sophisticated enough to know or "to care" if they "set the movement back 30 years." They want to hit out at their oppressors as they see them. They want to take from the "credit store exploiters", burn his shop and hit him with a brick if he dares

Her

ser

par

of g

in t

tha

La:

Ba:

the

tan

Sho

str

pro

pri

inc

to

re:

Ne

on

to

show his head. Irrational? Yes. Illegal? Yes--but the
proof of a protest is in its ability to <u>change</u> things.

Here is explicit recognition that direct action, nonviolent or violent,

serves as an outlet for hostility and aggression on the part of the

participant. Militants see value in such tension release independent

of goal attainment.

Direct action has been used in Lakeland on several occasions

in the recent past. Militants led picketing at a local bowling alley

that had denied them entry. They also led picketing in front of the

<u>Lakeland News</u> when the paper editorially supported the candidacy of

Barry Goldwater in 1964. Militants also led a protest march against

the Lakeland Board of Education and the City Hall. But the most impor-

tant instance of direct action appears to have emerged spontaneously.

Shortly following the Northern High boycott in nearby Detroit, a demon-

stration and boycott was called for in a Lakeland junior high school to

protest the alleged "manhandling" of a Negro girl student by the school

principal. Although militant rhetoric appears to have played a part in

increasing tension, it was necessary for militant and moderate leaders

to step in after action had been initiated by the parents of school child-

ren. These leaders succeeded in dramatizing the discontent within the

Negro community, while at the same time preventing violence.

In contrast to the conservative leader, the militant will rely

on <u>negative inducements</u>. Whereas conservative leaders are careful

to protect the image of the city, militants will not hesitate to publicize

the shortcomings of the city and its leaders. The threat to use more

drastic measures is usually implicit in the actions of the militant

leader.

The militant has little faith in informal agreements or promises

and prefers _legislative solutions_ instead. The militant's preference

for legislative or political solutions is not solely attributable to the

historically demonstrated utility of such an approach, as Wilson has

observed.

> . . . the effort to "politicize" the race question seems
> to be another attribute of style, representing the urge for the
> quick, the decisive, the comprehensive, and the permanent.
> A new law can cut through laborious bargaining or the need
> to educate or induce; it can be sweeping in its scope, and it
> will endure. For all these reason, it is attractive to the
> protest leader. [1]

Wilson further observes, however, that the militant's preference

for legislative solutions is matched by his antipathy toward politicians--

especially Negro politicians. Militants are easily convinced that Negro

politicians would not be politicians at all unless their actions proved

satisfactory to whites. The militant's extreme dislike of politicians

is compatible with his conspiratorial view of community and societal

power. Although politicians may occupy formal positions of authority,

militants are convinced that power lies elsewhere.

Parenthetically, this seems an appropriate point to observe

that the bargaining approach of the conservative leader is compatible

---

1. Wilson, _op._ _cit._, pp. 221-222.

with <u>le</u>

Wilsor

approa

mente

vative

and is

the co

Rights

is mil

congre

officia

lation

<u>spoker</u>

that th

ably."

tive N

polite.

and for

the mi

_____

1.

2.

with _legal_ solutions, as opposed to _legislative_ solutions. Following

Wilson, a legal solution stresses "court action and litigation"--the

approach most effectively used by the National NAACP.[1]

The militant's preference for legislative solutions is comple-

mented by his _willingness to seek out higher authority_. The conser-

vative leader, as we have seen, has a preference for local solutions

and is reluctant to appeal to higher authority--except perhaps through

the courts. It is militant leaders who file protests with the Civil

Rights Commission and with agencies of the federal government. It

is militant leaders who seek the support and assistance of liberal

congressmen and senators. And militants constantly remind city

officials that local legislation or local governmental action is in vio-

lation of state or federal law.

Rhetoric. We have labeled the rhetoric of the militant as _out-_

spoken. Ladd observes that "Militants are more outspoken in the sense

that their rhetoric poses racial controversy firmly, clearly, unavoid-

ably."[2] From the perspective both of white leaders and of conserva-

tive Negro leaders, the militants are often viewed as rude and im-

polite. For militants, rules of etiquette seem secondary to the candid

and forthright expression of grievances. Contrary to the conservative,

the militant's rhetoric is generally _threatening to whites_ and _emotive_.

---

1. _Ibid._, p. 239.

2. Ladd, _op. cit._, pp. 191-192.

excerpt

distribu

t
t
i
h
t
t

t
t
l
s
T
w
o
"

o
E
c
N
fe
a
b
o
w
th

re
fi
ti
in

The militant's rhetoric may be illustrated by three brief excerpts from the PARA Newsletter, which was at one period of time distributed throughout the Negro community in Lakeland.

. . . many Negroes wait on the White Power Structure to grant them this freedom which we all desire. It's too bad. They have not learned that no one gives you anything worth having, that if you're born black, you're born into the struggle for Negro freedom and that if we struggle hard enough and long enough, one day, truly, the walls to the white city of Jerico will come down. And great will be the sound of it.

* * *

As you know the white power structure in Lakeland took our (Negro) vote from us two years ago. They did this so that they could get rid of some real black, militant leadership--Charles Washburn. They--the white power structure--wanted to pick for themselves OUR leadership. They want to keep their old patronizing ways of telling us what's best for us. They don't like the idea of us choosing our own representatives because we're too dumb to pick "respectable" folks.

So, in order to help us refine our tastes they took our vote from us. They had to think of a way to beat the Black man's choice. The Black Beater turned out to be a charter amendment which gave us no more voice than the Negro in Mississippi. . . . if we want to make decisions for ourselves as to who represents us we must figure out a way to beat the white man's Black Beater. This would be an easy matter if "the brothers get together." We should organize and make some decisions on courses of action. If we organized, we could dare the white power structure to throw us [more of their representatives] .

* * *

During the days of slavery there were many Negroes revolting against the system. These were, usually, the field hands; they hated the whip, the extreme labor condition, the splitting up of their families, and just the general indignities they suffered. Then, on the other hand, there

These

empha

conser

<u>Modera</u>

ceptual

For ou

type be

those w

were those Negroes, usually the house slaves, who informed on their Negro brethren. They did this in the name of peace and a desire to "keep in good with MASSUH." There was usually a reward for these people, often referred to as "Uncle Toms." The reward was probably in the line of a gentle pat on the head.

Well, today in Lakeland the problem is just about the same. There are Negroes who are tired of living with the indignities of having the snow on our streets plowed last, having the city change the charter so that we can no longer select our own commissioner, and in general "keeping us in our place." There are many Negroes who are tired of this second class treatment. Yet, there are those Negroes who are so concerned about impressing whites and putting a few dollars in their own pockets (mostly Negro dollars) that the cause or efforts for our first class citizenship is often sold out.

When will these "sell outs" learn that they are not respected by honest, sincere whites. But these "sell outs" are loved by the bigots! George Wallace readily admits that there are some Negroes whom he loves! This Wallace and bigot-type love we don't need. . . .

*   *   *

These selections indicate that the militant's rhetoric places heavy emphasis on the themes of militancy, chauvinism, and criticism of conservative Negro leaders.

Moderate Leadership

Between the two polar extremes of our continuum we may conceptualize as many types of Negro leadership as seems warranted. For our purposes, we have chosen to construct but one intermediate type because it appears that this corresponds best with the images of those who reside in Lakeland.

Giv

they

we

pre

als

for

bot

is

mo

bot

alt

mo

pro

tio

any

len

me

alt

mo

wit

cir

Moderate Negro leaders perform very crucial functions. Given their position between conservative and Militant Negro leaders they play a vital role in resolving conflict among Negro leaders. As we have seen above, the resolution of intragroup conflicts is oftentimes prerequisite to the resolution of conflicts between races. Moderates also play a large role in the resolution of these intergroup conflicts, for their approach leads them to seek a middle ground acceptable to both parties to conflict.

The leadership of the moderate, as regards all three dimensions, is characterized by ambivalence, flexibility and pragmatism. The moderate is committed not so much to a middle ground as he is to both polar alternatives. His simultaneous commitment to both polar alternatives means that he is ambivalent toward each alternative. The moderate is committed to both status and welfare goals, although he probably leans toward status goals. However that may be, his selection of goals is based upon consideration of all factors impinging at any particular time or place. His commitment to both polar goals lends itself readily to a flexible and pragmatic stance. As regards means, the moderate is committed to both bargaining and protest, although he leans toward the use of persuasion. Ladd speaks of the moderate's attempt "to balance cooperation and protest."[1] Just as with goals, in the selection of means he is able to adapt to the unique circumstances bearing upon any particular issue. The moderate is

---

1. Ibid., p. 211.

both willing and able to choose the means which appear to offer the

greater probability of success. In terms of rhetoric, the moderate

tempers his inclination toward militant expression, while at the same

time he clearly communicates to whites his dissatisfaction with the

existing system. In his rhetoric he adapts to the audience and his

perception of their values, their interests, and their willingness to

cooperate or resist. Here also his approach is determined by a ra-

tional assessment of the probability of success.

Goals. Compared to the militant, the moderate has a greater

commitment to welfare goals. But compared to the conservative, the

moderate has a greater commitment to status goals. The moderate

is especially attracted to those goals which appear negotiable within

the existant context of race relations. He will push goals the conser-

vative is willing to leave to the future, and he will retreat in the face

of opposition that would not deter the militant. In general, the mod-

erate is more impatient than the conservative but more patient than

the militant.

The moderate is especially likely to stress those goals which

are crucial to the interests of the entire community. Perhaps in this

sense, we may say that the moderate is committed to transracial goals,

as opposed to racial goals. In the urban North of the 1960's the mod-

erate has much to say of ameliorating poverty, unemployment, educa-

tional deprivation, etc. These are problems which are crucial to the

Negro

to the v

for ba

protes

admitt

the su

within

its rel

organi

from

ities c

positi

the m

to use

for tr

he an

which

ative.

out cc

his in

Negro subcommunity, but they are also problems which are important to the white community.

Means. The moderate, as we noted above, has a preference for bargaining among leaders. Yet he recognizes well the utility of protest. One of the more influential moderate leaders in Lakeland admitted that he and other moderates were largely responsible for the success of PARA, which is easily the most militant organization within the Negro community. Given PARA's small membership and its relative lack of finances and resources, it is doubtful that the organization could have attained any success in the absence of support from moderates. This one moderate leader noted that PARA's activities did not always make his job easier, but nonetheless it was a positive force in the struggle for race advancement.

Whereas the conservative prefers positive inducements and the militant prefers negative inducements, the moderate is willing to use either. He is likely to use positive inducements in struggling for transracial goals. He is likely to use negative inducements when he anticipates white opposition, although he is careful in all actions which may intensify racial conflict.

Rhetoric. The rhetoric of the moderate is basically ameliorative. His manner and approach are designed to prompt change without completely disrupting the community. He is careful to maintain his individual dignity, even while communicating his distaste for the

indign

ical cl

versu

His a

conce

techn

plan,

iod,

clear

"coo

er w

unde

to cl

indignities heaped upon Negroes. In attempting to resolve the rhetor-
ical clashes of opponents, whether it be Negro versus Negro or Negro
versus white, his total deportment projects an aura of moderation.
His approach makes it easier for all others present to make important
concessions without losing face. One moderate leader spoke of a
technique oftentimes used in negotiations with whites. According to
plan, one Negro leader would be allowed to "rant and rave" for a per-
iod, during which time the essentials of the argument were stated
clearly and unequivically. Then the moderate would take the floor to
"cool things off" by cautioning against emotionalism. The first speak-
er would take a militant stance to express the gravity of the problem
under discussion, while the second would assume a moderate position
to clear the air and make negotiation possible.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNITY SETTING

At several points in the first three chapters, it has been observed that leadership is largely a response to the social environment in which it operates. In this chapter, we turn to a description of the research site, a city which will here be identified by the pseudonym of Lakeland. In describing the city and its people, we will focus particularly on those factors which appear relevant for an examination of race relations and Negro leadership.

The Lakeland Chamber of Commerce has written that "Progress was slow and growth lethargic until the first World War. From then on, the transition from placidity to thriving industry was amazing." In the nine years ending in 1923, Lakeland's population tripled from 15,1500 to 47,800. The increase in factory employment was even greater--from 2,975 at the beginning of the War to 9,573 in 1923.

It was in the first quarter of the century that the auto industry in Lakeland was firmly establised. The largest of the three plants, Chamberlain Motors, originally manufactured carriages prior to the invention of the automobile. The transition to automobiles was made quickly once the potential of the market was realized. Another of the major auto plants moved to Lakeland in 1905. The third major plant was moved to Lakeland in 1922 when the company was only 14 years old.

A hi

the

for

Neg

pop

dep

the

ula

Wh

the

pop

inc

gla

m

2%

Ne

to

w

T

s

a

A history of the city in the 20th century would focus on the growth of the auto plants and the heavy inmigration of workers to provide labor for the auto plants.

Table 1 (page 85) summarizes the growth of Lakeland and its Negro population from the beginning of this century. The city's rapid population growth that began during World War I continued until the depression years, but growth since 1930 has been moderate. With the exception of the first decade of the century, the city's Negro population has gown at a more rapid rate than the city's total population. While the city's total population nearly doubled between 1920 and 1930, the Negro population quadrupled. Between 1930 and 1960, the city's population as a whole increased only 27%, but the Negro population increased by 440%. The decade of the '60's still shows disproportionate gians for the city's Negro population.

The relative gians of the Negro population are probably even more dramatic than the absolute gains. Though constituting less than 2% of the city's population as late as 1920, it is now estimated that Negroes constitute 22%. The gain in relative terms is due not only to natural increase and inmigration--the outmigration of Lakeland's whites is also crucial. Outlying suburban areas are growing rapidly. The county's population grew from approximately 254,000 in 1940 to some 691,000 in 1960. Currently county poulation is estimated at about 850,000.

Table 1: Lakeland's Negro Population
1900 - 1966

Year	Lakeland Total Population	Lakeland Negro Population	Percentage Negro
1900	9,769	151	1.5
1910	14,532	192	1.3
1920	34,273	619	1.8
1930	64,928	2,553	3.9
1940	66,626	2,794	4.2
1950	73,681	6,867	9.3
1960	82,233	13,774	16.7
1966	83,100[a]	18,282[a]	22.0[a]

SOURCE: U.S. Census of Population.

a. Estimates.

50 mil

indust

three

1966,

data f

In pr

the m

in Ta

insta

3, al

Tabl

tion.

tend

clus

depr

in a

wer

Lakeland today is a satelite industrial city located within a

50 mile radius of Detroit. The city is largely a one industry city:

industrial diversification is practically nonexistant. The city's

three major plants produce automobiles, trucks, and buses. In

1966, the total employment in the auto plants was nearly 38,000.

Lakeland and Its People Today

Social Characteristics of the Population

Tables 2 - 4 present occupational, income and educational

data for whites and nonwhites in Lakeland and the United States.[1]

In presenting data for the U.S., an attempt has been made to provide

the most appropriate bases of comparison with Lakeland data. Thus,

in Table 2, the occupational data for the U.S. relate in all but one

instance to the employed male labor force in urban areas. In Table

3, all income data for the U.S. relate to families in urban areas. In

Table 4, all educational data for the U.S. relate to the urban popula-

tion. The exclusion of the nonurban population in the tables was in-

tended primarily to eliminate the rural South from consideration. In-

clusion of this segment of the population especially would have had a

depressing effect on income data.

Occupation. The industrial character of Lakeland is evident

in all three tables, but especially in Table 2 (page 87). Nearly half

----

1. According to 1960 census data, 98. 5% of Lakeland's nonwhites
were then Negroes.

Table 2: 1950 Occupational Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Table 2: 1959 Occupational Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Whites and Nonwhites

Variable	Lakeland Whites	Lakeland Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Whites
Percent of <u>male</u> labor force Managerial and Professional	15.3	3.7	7.2	25.8
Percent of <u>male</u> labor force White collar[a]	12.7	3.4	8.1	17.2
Percent of <u>male</u> labor force Laborers and Service[b]	11.1	26.4	38.0	11.8
Percent of <u>total</u> labor force Manufacturing	45.4	42.1	19.5	29.2

SOURCE: <u>U.S. Census of Population: 1960.</u>

a. Clerical and sales major groups.

b. Includes private household workers.

the
twe
the
in
ro
pe
an
tir
th
no
si
fo
ti
a
s
r
v

the labor force are employed in manufacturing, and the difference be-
tween whites and nonwhites is slight. For both whites and nonwhites,
the percentage employed in manufacturing is considerably higher than
in the urban areas of the nation. The percentage of Lakeland's Neg-
roes in manufacturing is fully twice as high as in the urban U.S. The
percentage of Lakeland's white males in both white collar occupations
and managerial and professional occupations is approximately four
times that of Lakeland's Negroes. Contrasted with national figures,
the percentages in these occupational categories for both whites and
nonwhites are much lower in Lakeland. The low percentage of profes-
sional and managerial positions among Negroes is especially crucial,
for Negro leaders are recruited from these positions in dispropor-
tionately large numbers. The low percentages of Negro professionals
and managers are offset somewhat, as we shall see, by the fact that
some Negro professionals who work in Lakeland but live elsewhere
nonetheless provide leadership for Lakeland's Negro community.
Whereas the percentage of Lakeland whites employed as laborers or
in service occupations is essentially equal to that in urban America,
a much lower percentage of Lakeland's nonwhites than at the national
level are so employed. In Lakeland, nonetheless, nearly two and a
half times as many nonwhite males than white males hold such jobs.

Although the data are not presented in Table 2, 44.1% of Lake-
land's nonwhite females 14 years old and over are in the labor force.

This compares with a percentage of 35.1% for whites. Of the non-white females in the labor force, 35.7% are private household work-ers, while an additional 23.5% are service workers. These percent-ages are 5.6% and 28.6% respectively for white females.

Income. In terms of median family income, it can be seen in Table 3 (page 90) that whereas the figures for Lakeland and the nation are relatively comparable for whites, the figure for nonwhite fam-ilies in Lakeland is nearly a thousand dollars higher than for nonwhite urban families in the nation as a whole. Thus, despite the fact that the median income of nonwhite families in Lakeland is only three-fourths that of the median income of Lakeland's white families, the descrepancy between categories is much less than at the national level.

Much the same pattern holds if we look at the percentage of families earning less than $3,000. This figure is frequently used as a measure of impoverishment. As regards whites, the percentages of poor families in Lakeland and in the nation are equivalent. But the percentage of poor nonwhite families is one-fourth lower in Lakeland. The percentage of poor nonwhite families in Lakeland is still consider-able, however, and it is more than twice as high as the figure for white families. In one census tract in the Negro community, 45.4% of the nonwhite families earn less than $3,000. The median family income for nonwhites in this one tract is $3,559.

Table 3: 1959 Income Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Table 3: 1959 Income Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Whites and Nonwhites

Variable	Lakeland Whites	Lakeland Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Whites
Median family income	$6,297	$4,678	$3,711	$6,433
Percent of families earning under $3,000	13.5	29.6	39.6	13.8
Percent of families earning over $5,000	70.2	44.5	32.8	62.8
Percent of families earning over $10,000	15.8	4.4	5.2	19.2

SOURCE: U.S. Census of Population: 1960.

ar

to

L

af

w

u

in

f

T

s

I

i

Considering next those families earning more than $5,000 and those earning more than $10,000, it can be seen that, relative to families in the urban U.S., both white and nonwhite families in Lakeland are overrepresented at the lower level and underrepresented at the higher level. An especially high percentage of Lakeland's non-white families then, earn more than $5,000 but less than $10,000.

As a generalization we may say that compared to families in urban America, Lakeland's families are clustered in a middle range in terms of income distribution: relatively fewer families are classi-fied as poor, and relatively fewer families are classified as affluent. This generalization is even stronger for nonwhites than for whites.

Educational Attainment. Data presented in Table 4 (page 92) show the expected educational gap between racial categories, both in Lakeland and in the urban U.S. In every instance, however, that gap is narrower in Lakeland than at the national level. In contrasting Lakeland with U.S. urban data, we see that, in general, the Lakeland population (both white and nonwhite) is relatively undereducated.[1] The percentages of both whites and nonwhites in Lakeland completing high school and going to college are especially low. In part, this is due to the heavy inmigration of both whites and nonwhites from Southern states. But on an impressionistic level, it also seems that many

---

1. Note that the data for median years of school completed for whites in Lakeland are not given.

Table 4: 1960 Educational Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Table 4: 1960 Educational Data
for Lakeland and the United States

Whites and Nonwhites

Variable	Lakeland Whites	Lakeland Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Nonwhites	U.S. Urban Whites
Percent completing 8 years or less (all persons 25 years and older)	41.7	52.7	53.9	33.8
Percent completing high school (all persons 25 years and older)	33.7	21.3	25.3	46.4
Percent with some college (all persons 25 years and older)	10.7	5.8	9.3	19.6
Median years of school completed (all persons 25 years and older)	9.8[a]	8.8	8.7	11.1

SOURCE: U.S. Census of Population: 1960.

a. This figure relates to the combined white and nonwhite Lakeland population.

Lakeland youth, Negro and white, are enticed into dropping out of

school at a relatively early stage in order to work at the plants. The

recent lowering of educational standards of employment in the plants

certainly is not a factor encouraging young people to remain in school.

Patterns of Race Relations

In focusing primarily on data available in census materials, we

have thus far provided but a minimal description of Lakeland and its

people. In the remainder of this chapter, we will turn to a description

of community race relations in five crucial areas. These areas are

here considered crucial because Negro leaders themselves define

them as crucial. In our examination of the dynamics of Negro leader-

ship in Chapters VI and VII below, we will analyze the ways in which

Negro leaders have attempted to resolve the problems they perceived

in these five crucial areas. The descriptive sections which follow are

intended to "set the stage" for that analysis.

Housing. In the eyes of Lakeland's residents, Negro and white,

housing is easily the major problem facing the community. But the

housing problem is especially salient for Negroes. As in most urban

centers, the problem is two-fold. Lakeland's Negroes are concerned

about de facto residential segregation, and they are concerned about

the quantity and quality of housing available to them.

The pattern of residential segregation is well established in

Lakeland. According to 1960 census data, nearly 94% of the city's

13,774 Negroes lived in but three of the city's 16 census tracts. The percentage of Negroes living in these three census tracts in 1960 was 94.4%, 87.4%, and 27.8%. As is the general rule, these tracts are near the center of the city. Many Negro homes are close to industrial plants or large warehouses. At one point, the Negro ghetto is actually split by a rather wide industrial belt. This division probably detracts somewhat from the solidarity of the Negro subcommunity.

In recent years, the ghetto has expanded, primarily into contiguous residential areas. The major exception to this rule is a housing subdivision somewhat removed from the ghetto into which a number of middle class Negro families have moved recently. Although it is not yet certain that racial balance has been achieved, many who live there are hopeful that such is the case.

In general, both the direction and the speed of the ghetto's expansion is controlled by a complex web of factors including the attitudes of Lakeland's residents (Negro and white), the practices of the construction industry, realtors, financial institutions, local governmental action or inaction, and the economic condition of the Negro population. As a result of the inability to obtain adequate housing, many middle-class Negroes who work in Lakeland do not reside there. More than half of Lakeland's Negro teachers, for example, commute daily from Detroit or elsewhere. This factor detracts considerably from the pool of Negro residents possessing characteristics which

would qualify them for positions of leadership. On the other hand,
those nonresidents who serve as Negro leaders are not fully identified
with the community.

In recent years, Lakeland has been characterized by a highly
restricted housing market. Both whites and Negroes have serious
difficulties in securing housing suitable to their tastes and economic
means. Several important consequences follow from this condition.
The restricted housing market means that pressures within the ghetto
for expansion are increased, while at the same time the pressures
from without for resisting ghetto expansion are increased. In the pro-
cess of ghetto expansion, it appears that racial transition proceeds
more slowly than it otherwise might because of (1) the difficulty of
Negro families' breaking through barriers of resistance, and (2) the
inability of many white families to buy their way out of the transitional
areas that eventually come to be. Additionally, there comes to be a
discrepancy between the amount of rent demanded and the quality of
the housing available. Furthermore, many (though not all) of the
pople who reside in the "buffer" or "grey" zones contiguous to the
ghetto are working class whites of Southern or Appalachian origin or
ancestry. All this, together with the deteriorating and dilapidated
quality of Lakeland's housing in and near the ghetto, accounts for a
very volatile situation.

Much of Lakeland's housing is unsound, to use the indiscrim-
inate vocabulary of the Bureau of the Census. Projecting from 1960

census data, it was estimated that in 1966 there were 5,000 unsound

housing units in Lakeland. In the same study, it was also estimated

that more than 10,000 persons lived in unsound housing. [1] Again

according to 1960 census data, of those occupied housing units with

nonwhite household heads, 20.7% were classified as "deteriorating,"

while an additional 7.5% were classified as "dilapidated." Overcrowd-

ing is also a reality of life in the Negro ghetto, for 23.6% of those

housing units were classified as overcrowded. [2]

Some Negro families in Lakeland live today in barracks hous-

ing that was constructed as temporary units during World War II years.

These 72 units are what remains of a larger number of units construc-

ted to accomodate the rapid influx of workers attracted to the auto

plants which were then busy manufacturing defense materiel. There

is a general consensus that if housing codes were rigidly enforced,

all these units could be condemned immediately. Another 400 housing

units located nearby constitute a public housing development construc-

ted in 1951-52. This development proved to be a stumbling block to

the construction of more public housing in Lakeland, as we will see at

a later point.

------

1. Anonymous, The Case for Housing: Lakeland Michigan (1966), p. 4.

2. Overcrowding is here determined on the basis of 1.01 or more persons per room.

One further aspect of housing in Lakeland ought to be mention-
ed. Contrary to the situation in many cities, the Negro residential
areas are generally somewhat removed from the major highways
leading into and out of the city. In an important sense, the Negro
ghetto is largely invisible to many of Lakeland's white citizens. This
invisibility could be an important factor contributing to the general ig-
norance of the Negro community on the part of many white community
leaders.

Education. De facto residential segregation is reflected in the
racial composition of the city's schools. Tables 5 and 6 (pages 98 and
99) show the racial composition of the Lakeland public schools at the
student body and faculty levels. In both tables, we have distinguished
between nonwhite or "Negro" and white schools on the basis of the
majority composition of the student bodies. [1]

Of the city's 28 elementary schools, seven had nonwhite student
majorities in the fall of 1965. The percentages of nonwhite students
in those seven schools were then as follows: 99.8%, 98.7% 97.6%,
96.4%, 89.3%, 82.4%, and 51.7%. While 86.4% of Lakeland's non-
white elementary students were enrolled in schools in which nonwhite
students constituted a majority, 82.6% of the city's white elementary

---

1. Although the source provides data for "nonwhites," it would
appear that nearly all nonwhites were Negroes.

Table 5: Racial Composition
of Lakeland Public Schools:
Student Body (Fall, 1965)

Level

Majority Composition of Student Body	Nonwhite %	White %	N
Elementary			
Nonwhite (7 schools)	87. 7	12. 3	3, 745
White (21 schools)	5. 1	94. 9	10, 040
Total	27. 6	72. 4	13, 785
Junior High			
Nonwhite (2 schools)	71. 8	28. 2	1, 511
White (4 schools)	6. 8	93. 2	3, 450
Total	26. 6	73. 4	4, 961
Secondary			
Lakeland High	36. 9	63. 1	2, 163
Johnson High	7. 0	93. 0	1, 863
Total	23. 1	76. 9	4, 026
TOTAL	26. 6	73. 4	22, 772

SOURCE: Lakeland Board of Education

Table 6: Racial Composition
of Lakeland Public Schools
Faculty (Fall, 1965)

Level

Majority Composition of Student Body	Nonwhite %	White %	N	
Elementary				
Nonwhite (7 schools)	62. 2	37. 8	135	
White (21 schools)	7. 9	92. 1	342	
Total	23. 3	76. 7		477
Junior High				
Nonwhite (2 schools)	36. 7	63. 3	79	
White (4 schools)	5. 5	94. 5	163	
Total	15. 7	84. 3		242
Secondary				
Lakeland High	6. 1	93. 9	99	
Johnson High	2. 5	97. 5	81	
Total	4. 4	95. 6		180
TOTAL	17. 5	82. 5		899

SOURCE: Lakeland Board of Education

students were enrolled in schools in which nonwhite students constituted 8.0% or less of the student body.

As a result of consolidation and differential attrition rates, racial segregation is not as marked at the junior high and secondary levels. Still there are two Negro junior highs, schools with nonwhite percentages of 97.9 and 53.3. Of all the city's nonwhite junior high students, 82.1% attended the two Negro schools. Only 6.8% of the students in the other four junior highs were nonwhite.

The city has only two high schools. One is clearly "the" Negro school, although nonwhite students do not constitute a majority there. Of all the city's nonwhite high school students, however, 86.0% attended Lakeland High in 1965. (To many persons, Lakeland High is known as "Congo High.") It is probably best to characterize Lakeland High as a "biracial" rather than an "integrated" school. Just as in the larger community, race is an important determinant of the stratification system within the school. All evidence available suggests that segregation is an important fact of life within the school.

Much of the folklore within the Negro community centers about the more or less subtle patterns of discrimination within the city's schools. One hears reports of a high school administrator who allegedly advised a "white" girl of "mixed" parents to discontinue dating a "Negro" boy; a former junior high school principal who had "manhandled" Negro girls, and who customarily advised Negro students

not to take scholastic matters seriously, but rather to prepare for a life of menial labor; the customary exclusion of Negro students from competition for scholastic honors; the discouragement of Negro participation in extracurricular club activities; the inadequacy of educational and occupational counseling for Negro students; etc.

Interestingly, the visibility of Negro students at Lakeland High is especially marked in interscholastic athletics. Negro students are especially represented in disproportionately large numbers on the school football and basketball teams, as any reader of the Lakeland News sports section knows.

Turning to a consideration of racial segregation at the faculty level, nonwhite teachers constituted a majority in all but one of the seven Negro elementary schools in 1965. Although relatively large numbers of white teachers held positions at Negro schools, relatively few nonwhite teachers taught at white schools. Nonwhite teachers are disproportionately represented at the elementary level; only at this level were Negro teachers represented in proportion to the nonwhite population of the city. The further the Negro student goes in school, the fewer Negro teachers he encounters.

Racial segregation is also evident at the administrative level. All six of the Negro administrators in the fall of 1965 served in Negro elementary and junior high schools. In the spring of 1966 for the first time, one of those Negro administrators was given a position on the central administrative staff of the city board of education.

Going beyond the concern for de facto segregation, many Negro leaders also feel that the quality of education provided in Negro schools is inferior to that provided in white schools. It is charged, for example, that the inexperienced and inferior teachers, Negro and white, are assigned to Negro schools. It is also charged that white teachers in Negro schools fail to understand or appreciate Negro youth. White teachers allegedly perpetuate the ignorance of Negro students by assuming that Negro students have a low learning capacity and reacting accordingly. Some Negro leaders also point to gross differences in terms of physical plants, visual aids, text materials, etc. It must be noted here that it is extremely difficult to assess the validity of such charges.

Many Negro leaders, however, will point to the results of standardized achievement tests to support such arguments. The tests alone, of course, do not validate the charges made by Negro leaders, but a full discussion of the reasons for this would take us far afield.

For our purposes at this point, perhaps it will suffice to observe that in evaluating educational achievement, there are some Negro leaders who ignore completely the debilitating impact of the Negro family and the Negro community; others probably minimize the importance of those factors. However this may be, it is important that Negro leaders are aware of the generally inferior product of the Negro schools, and many of them are of the opinion that city school officials are not doing all they might to narrow the educational gap.

Politics. As might be expected of a major industrial city,
Lakeland is predominantly Democratic. Inasmuch as Lake County
is a part of Detroit's "bedroom suburbia," however, the county is
staunchly Republican. Unoffical returns from the 1966 election dem-
onstrate that Lakeland is a Democratic island in a Republican sea.
Table 7 (page 104) shows that despite the fact that Democratic candi-
dates in every instance carried Lakeland, Republican candidates won
every major race except one. In that one race, a Democratic candi-
date carried the one state representative district which is entirely
within the limits of Lakeland. In every comparable instance, Repub-
lican candidates polled a higher percentage of the county vote than of
either the city or state vote.

The difficulty faced by the Democratic Party in Lakeland is
made more severe by the fact that many Democratic voters in Lakeland
are conservative on both economic and noneconomic issues. A large
proportion of Democratic Party voters is drawn from white, Southern
migrants who are especially sensitive to civil rights issues. UAW
officials would have difficulty convincing many of their members to
vote for a candidate brave enough to adopt a liberal stance on civil
rights. At the local level, this difficulty is compounded by the nature
of the city's electoral system, which will be discussed shortly. The
result is that at the local level, in particular, elected Democrats are
lifely to be as conservative as elected Republicans.

Table 7: Electoral Returns for Major Political Offices

(November 8, 1966)

Office(s) Candidate(s)[a]	Party	Lakeland Vote %	Lake County Vote[b] %	Michigan State Vote[c] %
Governor and Lt. Governor				
Romney and Milliken	(R)	48.3	69.2	60.5
Ferency and Bruff	(D)	51.7	30.8	39.5
Unites States Senate				
Griffin	(R)	45.1	64.7	56.1
Williams	(D)	54.9	35.3	43.9
United States Congress				
Monroe[d]	(R)	37.8	55.3	
Gibson[d]	(D)	62.2	44.7	
State Senate				
Clark[d]	(R)	40.2	53.2	
Richardson[d]	(D)	59.8	46.8	
State Representative				
Morrison[d]	(D)	63.6		
Wroth[d]	(R)	36.4		
State Representative				
Aaron[d]	(R)	23.2	53.5	
Hinman[d]	(D)	76.8	46.5	

SOURCE: The Lakeland News.

a. In each instance, the winning ticket is listed first.
b. Includes Lakeland city vote.
c. Includes Lake County vote.
d. Psuedonym.

The city is governed by a commission-manager system and operates on the basis of a 1922 charter. Commission elections are nonpartisan. Commisssion candidates are nominated by wards in a primary, but are elected at-large in a subsequent general election. Under this system, the current commission has three members (of seven) who were rejected in the general election by their home ward voters. This electoral system, as we will see, operates especially to the disadvantage of Negro and liberal segments of the electorate, despite the fact that the commission generally has had one Negro member in recent years.

The Tomlinson Motors Corporation, which is the parent company of all three of the city's auto plants, is clearly in a position to exert considerable influence in the political affairs of Lakeland. The evidence suggests, however, that TMC does not rule Lakeland with an iron hand. Many Negro and liberal white leaders feel that that is unnecessary, and argue that the indirect influence of the Corporation is sufficient. These persons feel that those who constitute the community power structure anticipate the desires of TMC and act accordingly.

Employment. Our discussion above of the occupational and income distributions in Lakeland serves as an introduction to this section on employment. The economic well-being of Lakeland is so closely tied to the automobile industry that we will here limit our

discussion to the auto plants and the union. Table 8 (page107) provides employment data for the last ten years for all three TMC plants in Lakeland combined. The general employment trend has been upward. Lakeland's auto plants have acted as magnets drawing both Negroes and whites from the South and elsewhere. Due to the low supply of manpower resources locally, TMC has not only lowered its standards of employment, but additionally it has on occasion found it necessary to directly recruit workers in other parts of Michigan and in other states. Although the historical record is not clear, reports indicate that the heaviest outside recruiting was done in the World War II years, in 1953, and again in 1966. In that last year Chamberlain Motors recruited approximately 400 workers in the Appalachian area, approximately half of whom were Negro. This was a very unrewarding company venture. In large measure because of the restricted housing market in Lakeland which prevented many workers from living with their families and forced many to take rooms in hotels and boarding houses as far away as Detroit, few of the new employees became permanent employees.

Despite the general upward trend, it is clear that employment in the plants is subject to drastic fluctuations. Average employment was down 6,000 in 1958 and down again by about 2,500 in 1961. This fluctuation in employment results from the fact that the auto industry is among the first to respond to important changes in the national economy. There can be no gainsaying it: as goes the nation, so goes Lakeland.

Table 8: Average Employment
TMC Locations in Lakeland

1957	25,845
1958	19,705
1959	22,804
1960	25,399
1961	22,889
1962	26,398
1963	27,976
1964	29,991
1965	35,251
1966	37,782

SOURCE; Personal communication from the Director of Personnel
Services, Tomlinson Motors Corporation.

A steady upward trend is also evident in the average hourly earnings of auto industry employees, as Table 9 (page 109) reveals. Although these data relate to all U.S. employees, it is doubtful that Lakeland differed significantly. The yearly payroll for all TMC manufacturing operations in Lakeland in 1966 was nearly $334 million.

Although adequate historical data are unobtainable, Negro labor leaders noted that it was not until World War II years that Negroes were hired in large numbers in Lakeland's auto plants. At that time, Negroes were largely confined to unskilled and sem-skilled positions in general, and sanitation positions in particular. Even though Negro workers are now dispersed throughout the plants at all skill levels, they appear still to be concentrated especially in the foundary, on the assembly lines, and in sanitation. In other words, they are still concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled positions, despite some measure of dispersion. Negro leaders are especially sensitive to the general problem of upgrading in the plants. They are concerned that few Negro workers qualify for industry training schools and apprenticeship programs; that there are not more Negro foremen; and that few Negroes hold clerical or administrative positions.

In all this, it appears that the Negro worker suffers more from past discrimination than from present discrimination. Clearly as a result of past discrimination, many Negro workers lack the educational qualifications and the occupational training required. Negro workers are also disadvantaged because many are relatively low on union seniority lists, and this too is related to past discrimination.

Table 9: Average Hourly Earnings
for TMC Employes in U.S.

1940	$1.00
1950	1.82
1957	2.64
1958	2.82
1959	2.93
1960	3.06
1961	3.15
1962	3.26
1963	3.41
1964	3.57
1965	3.74
1966	3.87

SOURCE: Personal communication from the Director of Personnel
Services, Tomlinson Motors Corporation.

They probably also suffer more from the informal discrimination of co-workers than from the formal discrimination of management In the plants where a foreman's recommendation is crucial to promotion, for example, Negro workers will experience some discriminatory treatment. One Negro informant concerned with employment problems reports that a Negro promoted to a foreman's position can expect to experience social discrimination from white co-workers. This informal discrimination has apparently led some Negroes to give up foreman positions and return to their old jobs. Negro workers may also be disadvantaged in the hiring of clerical and administrative personnel, for a concern of management is the determination of the applicant's ability to "relate to" the public or co-workers. This determination is made by means of a personal interview, and given the compositon of the public and the plant work force, it may be that color is perceived as a barrier to the establishment of rapport. As a generalization, however, it appears that Negro workers are handicapped more by the lack of proper educational background and occupational skills than by formal discriminatory procedures. The existing discrimination is such that it is difficult for either management or union officials to cope with it. Promotional decisions, in accordance with contractual arrangements with the union, rely heavily upon written, objective examinations. Even for clerical and administrative positions, the personal interview is accompanied by an objective examination. The

union has established appeal procedures for those who feel that they have been victims of discrimination. According to reports from both management and labor, few such charges are made, and it is rare indeed that such charges are substantiated.

According to one source close to employment problems, young Negro workers in the plant are quickly socialized by older workers in such a way that they eventually become disillusioned and subsequently temper their original aspirations for upward mobility. They then settle for a passable performance of the tasks required in whatever job they hold.

Each of the plants has cooperated with the Urban League in a number of programs. An example is provided by the Summer Program established at Chamberlain Motors. Through this program, the plant provides summer employment for Negro college youth beginning the summer prior to their entering college. The program began four years ago with 24 Negro boys and girls enrolled. Each summer since the plant has added newly graduated seniors on their way to college, in addition to employing the returnees. This program was deliberately intended to tap the more promising Negro youngsters at an early stage in hopes of encouraging them to accept permanent positions after completing college. It is hoped that these college graduates will be able to step into positions not customarily held by Negro workers.

Race relations in the union bears similarities to race relations in the plants. Universalistic rules are in force which reduce discrimination largely to an informal level. Yet union leadership, just as the local Democratic Party, is somewhat constrained by the composition of its membership. The egalitarian ethos of industrial unionism is tempered whenever issues bear directly on the local, nonoccupational interests of the worker. For example, it is doubtful that union leaders could gain solid support from rank-and-file union members if they were to advocate a public housing program designed to contribute to residential desegregation.

There are a number of Negro workers who hold important union positions despite the prejudice of a large number of white workers. Negro workers may realistically aspire to prestigious and responsible positions within the union hierarchy. One has long held a position at the regional administrative level. Another is the elected Shop Committee Chairman in the Chamberlain Motors local. Another represents his shop in the National Bargaining Committe, also an elective position. Numerous others hold less responsible positions. In terms of Negro leadership, the union is vitally important in that it provides an arena in which Negroes learn important leadership skills which are then used in protest organizations and elsewhere--especially in politics.

Police and Community Relations. Disrespect both for law and of law officers runs deep in most Negro communities. Police brutality,

false arrest, general harrassment, the inadequacy of police protec-

tion in the Negro community--these are basic issues for those who

would be Negro leaders. On the other hand, crime is oftentimes a

way of life for many in the Negro community. Wherever the proba-

bility of being rewarded for conforming behavior is relatively low,

the probability of deviant behavior is relatively high.

Thus it is that relations between the police and the Negro com-

munity are often strained. In talking with Negro leaders in Lakeland,

however, one is surprised to discover that they are relatively content

with the local police department and its activities. One hears a gen-

eral complaint of the lack of police protection in the Negro community

and a more specific complaint of the slowness with which the police

respond to calls from Negroes. (Lakeland's whites have the same

complaints.) But criticism normally halts at that point.

Such was not always the case in Lakeland. The present chief

of police has served in that capacity for about four years. From the

very beginning, he moved conscientiously to improve the image of the

police department in the Negro community. He insisted upon a pro-

fessional performance of duty on the part of policemen, and he sought

to provide better services. He especially worked to establish good

relationships with Negro leaders. Many of Lakeland's Negro leaders

have met with selected members of the police force for lengthy discus-

sions of community relations problems. The department will soon

sponsor a Youth Service Corps. This is to be a demonstration program in which fourteen and fifteen year old boys identified as potential juvenile delinquents are actually put to work on the police force. The youngsters will accompany police officers on their rounds, handling routine radio calls, searching for abandoned cars, etc. Part of the program is also given over to class room activities. It is hoped that this will contribute to a greater understanding and appreciation of police activities on the part of the participants.

As a result of these efforts, the charges of police brutality have subsided. Policemen no longer harrass Negro citizens as they once did routinely, according to the reports of Negro leaders. And policemen are no longer discourteous to Negro citizens, as they once were. All this is a remarkable achievement, given the handicap under which the police chief worked. Although the force has not been increased in size for eleven years, the work load has increased by 700% during that period. Additionally, Lakeland's policemen are not well paid, and this adversely influences the quality of personnel.

Negroes play a large role in the various forms of vice that are to found in Lakeland. The numbers racket, or Yellow Dog, is confined primarily to the auto plants where the police have no jurisdiction. Many of the runners are Negroes. It is reported that janitorial jobs are sought after, for the mobility required in these jobs lends itself to maintaining numbers routes in the plant. Several thousands of dollars reportedly leave the plants each day as a result of these activities.

Prostitution, for the most part, is unorganized and of the street variety. On one occasion the police moved in to break up prostitution which had thrived at a particular corner in the Negro community for many years. Within days, however, the street walkers had relocated at a new corner some distance away. Organized prostitution is to be found in two houses of prostitution in the Negro community. At least one of these is run by a Negro madam and supplied with Negro prostitutes from Detroit. This house reportedly serves regular customers, and the customers are exclusively white.

After hours bootlegging is also fairly wide spread. Here also many of the leg men are Negroes. The night shifts of the auto plants undoubtedly make this a lucrative business.

According to police reports, there is also some traffic in "soft" narcotics. These last three mentioned forms of vice--prostitution, bootlegging, and dope-often are closely associated. The new corner of the prostitutes also serves as a business center for those peddling dope and bootleg whiskey, just as did the old corner closed down by the police.

Negroes appear to have little to do with bookmaking and gambling. The biggest bookie in town works out of one of the city's hotels. Presumably he will place bets for both Negroes and whites, but there are apparently no Negro bookies in town. Other forms of gambling, notably card playing, are centered primarily in bars near the plants in the northern end of town--outside the Negro community.

CHAPTER V

NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND

In this chapter, we will first provide a description of methodological procedures used in the study. Then we will present a profile of Negro leadership in Lakeland. These topics are not as unrelated as it may seem at first glance, for the selection of the technique by which leaders were identified constituted one of the more important methodological decisions made during the course of the study. Most data were collected directly from the identified leaders, and the uniqueness of the methodological techniques employed is to be found solely in the interview procedures.

Methodology

The Identification of Leaders

Negro leaders were identified by means of the reputational technique. Negro "judges" or "knowledgeables" were selected representing the following institutional spheres: business, independent professions, education, religion, and labor. The judge representing business was a real estate broker and one of the most successful businessmen in the Negro community; the representative for the independent professions was a physician who had practiced for many years

116

in Lakeland; the representative of education held the highest adminis-trative position among Negroes in the city; the representative of religion was the minister of one of the oldest and largest churches within the Negro community; and the representative of labor was the elected president of an AFL-CIO union local who had lived all his life in Lakeland. A sixth judge represented a local protest organization. Judges, in addition to identifying Negro leaders, were asked to identify the more important organizations representing and serving the Negro subcommunity and to identify the past and current issues salient to the Negro subcommunity.

In selecting leaders, the judges were told to consider as leaders those who were able to make decisions and formulate general policies affecting Lakeland's Negro community as a whole. After a judge had named leaders, he was questioned as to whether or not there were Negro leaders in various institutional spheres which were not repre-sented on his original list. It was felt that this procedure would assure a listing of all persons the judge identified as Negro leaders.

The six judges cast a total of 93 votes, 64 of which were cast for a total of 20 persons. Each of those 20 persons received two or more votes, and were arbitrarily identified as Negro leaders on that basis. Twelve of the 20 received three or more votes, and five of those twelve persons were themselves judges who refused to vote for themselves. The remaining 29 persons listed received but one vote each.

Subsequent research indicated clearly that there would have been no

substantial differences had leaders been identified on the basis of

issue analysis.

The Reputational Approach

Since the first use of the reputational approach by Floyd

Hunter, [1] there has been a great deal of controversy regarding its

use. [2] A review of this literature would take us far afield. Perhaps

it will be sufficient to note that the technique has been used by a num-

ber of persons in studies of Negro leadership. [3] Pfautz has been per-

haps the most emphatic in proclaiming the reliability of the approach

as an indicator of influence. He notes that "many of the recent criti-

cisms which have been made of the so-called reputational approach

to the study of community power structures have considerably less

_____

1. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1953).

2. See, for example: William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, Industry, Labor and Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), chap. 14; Charles Press (ed.) Main Street Politics: Policy-Making at the Local Level (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University, 1962); and William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (eds.), Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

3. See Harold W. Pfautz, "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View," Phylon, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer, 1962), pp. 156-166; M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Hunter, op. cit. ; and Ernest A. T. Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Community, " American Sociological Review, Vol. 24 (February, 1959), pp. 69-76.

validity when applied to the Negro sub-community."[1] He goes on to

observe that the sub-community social structure

> is likely to be monolithic in character, involving a
> small, articulate leadership at the top and an undiffer-
> entiated and inarticulate mass at the bottom. Further,
> despite tendencies toward differentiation of leadership
> types according to issues which have been observed
> in metropolitan centers with large Negro populations,
> there is only one issue in the final analysis: the
> ubiquitous race question.[2]

The study reported here offers partial support for Pfautz'

views. As will be seen in Chapters VI and VII, a focus on issue analy-

sis clearly reveals the identified Negro leaders to have been key actors

in the attempted or actual resolution of crucial issues. The monolithic

character of Negro community leadership, however, must not be over-

stated. Although the reputational technique provides a means of identi-

fying influential leaders, whether or not those identified leaders con-

stitute a monolithic body devoid of serious cleavage(s) must be dis-

covered by other means. In our study of Lakeland, issue analysis

(as reported in Chapters VI and VII) clearly reveals the existence of

cleavages within the subcommunity leadership.

Data Collection: The Interview

Interviews with these identified Negro leaders provided the

most important source of data for the study. Nineteen of the twenty

---

1. Pfautz, op. cit., p. 164.

2. Ibid., p. 165.

leaders were interviewed. (Actually, all twenty were interviewed, for one had been interviewed as a judge prior to his moving to another city during the course of the study.) These interviews varied in length from approximately 45 minutes to five hours and averaged approximately two hours.

After all interviews with Negro leaders had been completed, approximately 20 white leaders were also interviewed. White leaders were interviewed last since it was known that many were opposed to "outside interference." The fact that white leaders knew that Negro leaders had been interviewed first probably encouraged some to grant interviews that otherwise would have been denied. Drawing from knowledge of the community gained in the conduct of research, we selected a sample of those whites who were known to be either the most influential leaders within the community or those who had played active roles in the resolution of the issues examined. Interviews of white leaders varied in length from approximately 30 minutes to 3 1/2 hours, but averaged only about 1 1/4 hours.

All interviews were semi-structured. The attempt was to interview in considerable depth in subject areas relevant to the research objectives. The interviews were designed to facilitate issue analysis. The objective was to reconstruct, in both historically and sociologically relevant terms, the process by which decisions had been or were currently being determined. Each identified leader was questioned

thoroughly regarding his perception of and participation in the resolution of concrete issues (current and past) faced by the community.

The interviews were designed and conducted to allow probing in depth. In the interview process, we felt completely free to adapt to and adjust for interviewee resistance and willingness to respond, as well as for his knowledge of relevant issues. In this regard, we are in complete agreement with Kenneth Clark, who concluded that in his study of Harlem, "the use of standardized questionnaires and interview procedures would result in stylized and superficial verbal responses or evansions."[1] In his Chicago study, Wilson reached a similar conclusion which served as a guide in this research.

> No fixed interview schedule was employed; each interview was designed to elicit from the particular individual the activities and issues that most concerned him and in which he played some role. Each was asked, in various ways, to describe and explain his involvement or lack of involvement, his attitudes toward the issue, the goals he sought, the means he favored using, what in fact he had done about the issues, how he saw the other actors involved in the issue, what opinion he had about the ultimate resolution of the issue, what work he did in his organization, and so on.[2]

Contrary to the advise generally given interviewers, we often asked questions which served to embarrass or even anger the interviewee. In a sense, some fundamental rules of etiquette regarding formal,

---

1. Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. xix.

2. James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 11.

interpersonal relationships were violated. In the process of the inter-view itself, we made it known to the interviewee that we had talked to others (friends and foes) regarding his own attitudes and behavior. Many times we took the role of the devil's advocate. Certainly in many instances, the interviews constituted a definite threat to the inter-viewee.

All this was done deliberately. It was felt that such a procedure would elicit a measure of candor that would otherwise have been miss-ing. It was also felt that this procedure would successfully get behind the facade of the publicly acceptable response. In short, it was felt that these interview techniques were necessary in a study of social conflict.

Other Methods of Data Collection

Data were also gathered by means of a mail-back questionnaire left with Negro leaders at the time of interview. In addition to inter-views and questionnaires, data were also gathered by scanning the local newspaper,[1] by examining official documents, by attendance at organized meetings and public affairs, and by general observation of community life. Historical and census records were also examined.

---

1. Local newspaper files did not provide a major source of data collection. The one newspaper in the city fails to report many im-portant events which occur in the Negro community. Much of that which is reported is so slanted that newspaper reports do not pro-vide a reliable source of information. This in itself says a great deal about the difficulties faced by Negro leaders and is thus im-portant data, but the newspaper was of little assistance in recon-structing the actual course of events.

A Profile of Negro Leadership in Lakeland

At the time of the interview, a mail-back questionnaire was left with each Negro leader.[1] Most of the data to be presented in the remainder of this chapter were gained by means of the questionnaire. Sixteen leaders returned their questionnaires, for a response of 80%. For those four leaders who did not return their questionnaires, it was possible in some instances to obtain some of the missing data from other sources. In other instances, it was possible to make estimates, and that has been done wherever we had confidence in the reliability of those estimates. It would appear that these procedures do not seriously bias the data presented.

Figure 2 (page 124) presents basic data for the twenty leaders. On the basis of the leaders' selection of the ten "most outstanding Negro leaders" in Lakeland, we have ranked those twenty leaders. The basic list of the twenty leaders was provided to facilitate selection, but each respondent was directed to add other names to the list if he felt there were other leaders in the subcommunity. Fifteen of the twenty leaders responded to this item. The Leadership Score in Figure 2 represents the number of votes received by each leader as one of the ten "most outstanding Negro leaders."[2]

_____

1. See Appendix B.

2. Leaders were instructed to exclude themselves from consideration. This means that the five leaders who did not respond to this item had fifteen chances of being chosen, while the fifteen who did respond to this item had but fourteen chances of being chosen.

Figure 2: Negro Leadership in Lakeland

Leader	Leadership Score	Occupation	Leadership Style
Robert Clark	14	Urban League Executive Director	Moderate
Reuben Morgan	13	Dentist	Moderate
James Corbin	11	Real Estate Broker	Militant
Merritt Reed	10	Electrical Contractor	Conservative
Arthur Young	9	Physician	Moderate
Cole Mathews	9	Minister	Conservative
Charles Washburn	8	Lawyer	Militant
Carl Dean	8	Electrical Contractor	Moderate
Prentice Colby	8	District School Administrator	Moderate
Curtis Abrams	7	Public School Teacher	Militant
Harold Russell	7	Lawyer	Moderate
Walter Phillips	6	School Administrator	Militant
William Lakey	5	Minister	Moderate
Fred Brown	5	Labor Official	Conservative
Franklin Weaver	5	Labor Official	Moderate
Scott Gardner	5	Minister	Conservative
Paul Towers	4	Physician	Moderate
Joyce Simmons	3	Bondslady	Militant
Florence Darwin	1	Drug Store Owner	Conservative
Thomas Hull	1	Labor Official	Moderate

The eleven leaders receiving the most votes received 75% of all votes cast, while the remaining one-fourth of the votes were divided among the other nine listed leaders plus six persons added to the list. Each of those six persons added to the list of twenty by the fourteen respondents received but one vote and has been excluded from consideration here.

Occupational Distribution

Table 10 (page 126) shows the occupational distribution of Negro leaders in Lakeland and three other cities for which comparable data are available. It ought to be pointed out that for all but one leader (Clark) in Lakeland, Negro leadership is an avocation--leadership is something they do in addition to earning a living. The data reveal basic similarities, despite the differences among the cities in terms of population size, percentage Negro, geographical location, etc. Lakeland has the highest percentage of Negro leaders who are professionals. This is especially noteworthy, for many of Lakeland's Negro professionals do not reside in Lakeland proper. Five of the twelve professionals in Lakeland represent the independent professions of medicine and law. All three of the Lakeland leaders classified as managers or officials are labor union officials. The absence of leaders representing large financial and commercial establishments is marked in all four cities. Pfautz has observed that this "makes not only for a lack of power . . . but also a serious gap in available perspectives for

Table 10: Occupational Distribution of Negro Leaders
in Lakeland and other Cities[a]

Occupational Category	Lakeland %	Providence %	Regional City %	Pacific City %
Professional	60.0	37.5	55.9	50.0
Managers and Officials	15.0	31.2	5.9	- - - -
Small Business	25.0	25.0	32.3	22.2
Clerical and Sales	- - - - -	- - - -	- - -	11.1
Other	- - - - -	6.3	5.9	16.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. Data for the other three cities are found in Pfautz, op. cit., p. 162. Pfautz collected the data for Providence in 1962. The original data for Regional City are found in Floyd Hunter, op. cit. Regional City is one of the largest cities in the Deep South. The original data for Pacific City are found in Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit. Pacific City is one of the largest cities in the Pacific Northwest.

formulating strategy and tactics in community power struggles. "[1]

These data suggest important differences between Negro and white community leaders in terms of occupational distribution. Many studies indicate that businessmen dominate community power structures.[2] It is doubtful that any study of leadership and power in total communities indicates a smaller percentage of businessmen among leaders than in the four Negro subcommunities represented in Table 10. In the larger community, businessmens' representation among the most influential community leaders is especially marked. Furthermore, it is customary for the city's banking and financial establishments to be represented among the more influential leaders. As we have noted, Negro businessmen in Lakeland and in most other Negro subcommunities are likely to represent small business ventures.

Type of Leadership

Figure 2 (page 124) also shows the classification of Negro leaders by type of leadership. Five are classified as militants, ten as moderates, and five as conservatives. In general, moderates are ranked higher than militants, who are in turn ranked higher than conservatives. Whereas moderates received an average of 7.4 votes as top ten leaders, militants received 7.0 votes, and conservatives received 6.0 votes. There was a tendency for militants to over-select

---

1. Pfautz, op. cit. , p. 163.

2. See, for example, Form and Miller, op. cit. , chap. 16.

militants and to under-select conservatives. Similarly, conservatives over-selected conservatives and under-selected militants. The trend was especially marked for militants. Neither militants nor conservatives, however, were inclined to under-select moderates.

It is to be noted that two of the militants are employed in the Lakeland school system. The administration's recognition of tenure rights has apparently provided these two a measure of freedom which manifests itself in militancy. The vulnerability of public employees and their consequent avoidance of militancy has often been observed, especially in studies of the South.

In looking at the moderates, a striking characteristic is the association between professionals and moderates: seven of the twelve professionals are moderates, while seven of the ten moderates are professionals.

Perhaps the most interesting fact regarding conservative leaders is that two of the three Negro ministers identified as leaders are conservatives. Many Negro leaders in Lakeland are especially critical of the "lack" of leadership provided by Negro clergymen. Several militants stated that they would be thankful to have a Martin Luther King in Lakeland.

Position in Race Advancement Organizations

Although Figure 2 does not provide this information, it is clear that one's identity as a Negro leader is closely tied to his position within

race advancement organizations and to his position in city political or educational organizations. This is especially evident for the first eleven ranked leaders. Robert Clark is the Executive Director of the Lakeland Urban League. Reuben Morgan is an elective member of the Lakeland School Board. James Corbin is the most recent past president of the NAACP and an unsuccessful candidate for the city commission in the most recent election. Merritt Reed beat Corbin in that election and is now serving his second term on the city commission. Arthur Young is a past city commissioner and has served in high positions in both the NAACP and the Urban League. Both Cole Mathews and Carl Dean are presently members of the Urban League Board of Directors. Charles Washburn is also a past city commissioner. (Washburn would surely have ranked higher were it not for the fact that he withdrew his interest from Lakeland after the city changed its electoral system.) Prentice Colby is the first Negro administrator to hold a position with the Lakeland Board of Education, serving as the Board's Community-School and Human Relations Director. Curtis Abrams is another militant leader who undoubtedly would have ranked higher except that he moved from the community during the course of the study. While living in Lakeland, Abrams was president of the local protest organization known as Positive Action for Race Advancement (PARA). Harold Russell currently serves on the Urban League Board of Directors and is an active member of the NAACP.

Other Selected Characteristics

Table 11 (pages 131-132) presents data relating to other selected characteristics of Lakeland's Negro leaders. Comparable data for selected cities are also provided where available. Although Lakeland's Negro leaders are well educated, the percentages of those having attended college is higher in the three Southern cities for which we have data. (Barth and Abu-Laban also report an average of 16 years of education for Negro leaders in Pacific City.) Despite the low educational attainment of the Negro populace in general, their leaders are likely to be selected among those who have attended or completed college. The "pool" of potential Negro leaders, then, is relatively small. Some of the leaders in Lakeland attended a segregated college or graduate school, but every leader who pursued higher education attended at least one integrated institution of higher education.

Only two of Lakeland's leaders were women. The literature suggests that the great majority of Negro leaders are men, but we have precise data on sexual composition for only two other cities. In one of those (Pacific City), contrary to the generalization advanced, 44% of the leaders were women. This appears to be an exception to the rule.

Relative to other cities for which we have data, Lakeland's Negro leaders are comparatively young. Only in Pacific City was the mean age of leaders less than in Lakeland. As has been suggested by

Table 11: Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics of Negro Leaders in Lakeland and other Selected Cities

Characteristic	Lakeland	Comparable Data[a]	Base N for Lakeland
Percent with some college	75	93 (CC) 90 (WS) 76 (G)	20[b]
Percent men	90	93 (CC) 56 (PC)	20
Average age in years (mean)	46.7	57.5 (P) 55 (NO) (Med.) 54.3 (RC) 51.1 (CC) 44.8 (PC)	20[c]
Range in years	31-60	30-85 (P) 28-81 (CC) 40-73 (RC)	20[c]
Average length of residence or employment in years	19.3		18[d]
Average length of residence in years		45.5 (P) 24.7 (CC) 16.5 (PC)	
Percent living outside city	15		20
Percent "raised" in the city	20		20
Percent "born" in the city		22.2 (P) 15.7 (RC)	

(table continued on next page)

Table 11: Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics of Negro Leaders in Lakeland and other Selected Cities (Continued)

Characteristic	Lakeland	Comparable Data[a]	Base N for Lakeland
Percent "raised" outside of the state	53		15
Percent "born" outside of the state		88.9 (PC) 68.7 (P) 59.0 (CC) 57.9 (RC)	

a. The cities for which comparable data are presented are indicated in parentheses according to the following key:

Cresant City (CC). See Burgess, op. cit.
Greenville (G). See Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966).
New Orleans (NO). See Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).
Providence (P). See Pfautz, op. cit.
Pacific City (PC). See Barth and Abu-Laban, op. cit.
Regional City (RC). See Hunter, op. cit.
Winston-Salem (WS). See Ladd, op. cit.

b Educational attainment was estimated for two Lakeland leaders.

c Ages of three Lakeland leaders were estimated.

d Length of residence or employment was estimated for two Lakeland leaders.

numerous authors,[1] the militants are the youngest leaders. In Lake-

land, the average age for militants is 39.2, while the comparable

figures for moderates and conservatives are 46.2 and 55.2 respec-

tively. Pfautz found a similar pattern in Providence, and Ladd's

data for both Winston-Salem and Greenville are remarkably close to

the Lakeland data.[2]

There were also differences regarding the range of ages among

the different types of leaders in Lakeland. The range was 31-46 for

militants, 35-53 for moderates, and 50-60 for conservatives. Note

that there is no overlapping whatsoever between militants and conser-

vatives. Ladd has suggested that leaders are permanently influenced

by the pattern of race relations existing at the time they entered adult-

hood. Conservative leaders in Lakeland who came of age in the 1920's

and '30's can look back in retrospect and assess the racial progress

made since that time. Lakeland's militants who came of age during

and after World War II tend to look ahead in hopes of future racial

advances. Thompson views older leaders as "more likely to have

become attached to conservative men of power, or of conservative

institutional forms."[3] In a similar vein, Ladd has written that "there

seems to be with advancing years a greater disillusionment, or one

---

1. See Louis Lomax, The Negro Revolt (New York: The New American Library, 1963).

2. See Pfautz, op. cit., and Ladd, op. cit.

3. Thompson, op. cit., p. 28.

might say realism, concerning the possibility for change and at the same time a greater stake in the existing system."[1] Younger leaders appear more likely to adhere to the idealism of youth and at the same time to reject the professed ideals of their elders as hypocritical.

Also in terms of the ages of leaders, Lakeland has the narrowest age span among cities for which we have comparable data. Lakeland appears to be exceptional in that no one older than 60 was identified as a leader.

For four cities we have data for the average length of residence or employment of leaders in their cities. Lakeland and Pacific City, the two cities which most recently experienced heavy Negro inmigration, have the lowest averages. Here also there are important differences among leadership types. Conservatives have lived in Lakeland for an average of 30.2 years, while the comparable figures for moderates and militants are 20.4 and 9.8 respectively. In part, this is a reflection of age. But many Negro leaders, regardless of leadership type, moved to Lakeland while in their twenties or early thirties, near the beginning of their work careers. These differences in length of residence, together with the differences in age among different leadership types, suggest that younger and newer Negro leaders adopt militancy not only as a means of confronting whites, but also as a means of gaining status within the Negro subcommunity. Their claims to prestige

---

1. Ladd, op. cit., p. 229.

must generally be made against their elders and community oldtimers whose prestige has long been established.

Although no other study is known to report comparable data, 15% of Lakeland's leaders do not reside in Lakeland proper. All three of these leaders are moderates closely associated with the Urban League. It seems plausible to expect these leaders to be somewhat less committed to Lakeland and its problems than are those leaders who live in the city. On the other hand, a certain amount of detachment may be an important element in their role as moderate leaders. It is impossible to judge how many Negro professionals and businessmen would be leaders in Lakeland were it not for the fact that they live elsewhere.

The remaining data in Table 11 demonstrate well the mobility of Negro Americans. In Lakeland, four-fifths of the Negro leaders were raised in places other than Lakeland, and half of them were raised outside the state of Michigan. For the fifteen leaders for whom we have data, none was raised in a Deep Southern state. Many, however, were raised in border and other Northern states. The data that others have collected on place of birth also suggest a great deal of mobility. Northern cities, in particular, have a relatively low percentage of "home grown" Negro leaders.

These data on mobility are furthermore suggestive of a major cleavage in the Negro subcommunity of Lakeland. Those newcomers who come directly from Southern states are unlikely to move into

positions of leadership. Furthermore, they are unlikely even to have ready access to those who are subcommunity leaders. In an important sense, no one speaks for those newcomers who come culturally unprepared for life in a Northern, industrial, urban setting.

CHAPTER VI

THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND: POLITICS AND HOUSING

In Chapters VI and VII we turn to an examination of the various ways in which Negro leaders in Lakeland have met the problems they themselves defined as crucial. We have reconstructed the processes by which Negro leaders have attempted to resolve or have actually succeeded in resolving a selected number of issues. In all cases, we have attempted to present a problem or issue analysis in both historically and sociologically relevant terms. We focused specifically on the decade of the sixties, but occasionally it was necessary to go back further in time to "set the stage."

At the close of each section in these two chapters, an attempt is made to make explicit the theoretical significance of the preceding discussion by suggesting hypotheses which warrant testing in subsequent research. Many of these hypotheses will appear familiar to the reader, for they have been suggested in previous literature and they were central to our discussion in Chapters II and III, although they were not there presented in propositional form. Other hypotheses, however, were generated in the conduct of the empirical research reported here.

Politics

Our examination of politics in Lakeland is perhaps best prefaced by a brief, general analysis of the politics of race in the United

137

States. This will be beneficial, for the case of Lakeland adds to our knowledge of formal political barriers to Negro political strength and variability in Negroes' accessibility to political decision-makers.

The prevailing national patterns of migration during this century have had important political consequences for Negro Americans. The current heavy concentration of Negroes in the urban centers of seven key, Northern, industrial states has provided an important measure of political leverage, especially in national presidential elections. This leverage is largely due to the pivotal nature of those seven states. They are pivotal in that they are characterized by a strong two-pary competition and they possess a large block of electoral votes.[1] Although Negro political gains have been most dramatically demonstrated in national presidential elections, Negroes have actually demonstrated their ability to influence the outcome of popular elections at all levels.

But the political influence of Negro Americans has not been, is not now, and will probably not in the near future be proportional to their numbers. Despite the gains which have been made, there still exist important barriers to the development of effective Negro political power. Although these barriers are many and diverse, some of the more important and interesting are formal barriers to be found in urban political systems.

---

1. See especially William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963). The seven states are New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California.

Urban Government and the Politics of Race

If the most auspicious Negro political gains have been made

in national presidential elections, the failure to gain is most evident

on the local political scene. The ineffectiveness of Negro political

power in urban centers is reflected in their general inability to elect

Negroes to city councils in proportion to their numbers in city popula-

tions. Table 12 (page 140) provides data for some of the larger North-

ern cities.

From the perspective of the Negro community, however, under-

representation on the council is not the only current disadvantage.

> Not only are few Negroes elected to office, but those
> who are elected generally find it necessary to be politicians
> first and Negroes second. If they are to stay in office, they
> must often soft-pedal the racial issues that are of the most
> concern to Negroes as Negroes. [1]

Both the problems of underrepresentation and of the quality of

representation are largely due to nonpartisan, at-large elections.

"In a city with a nonpartisan, at-large system the nature of Negro poli-

tics is radically affected by the fact that the candidate must face the

whole (predominantly white) electorate and must do so without benefit

of a party label."[2] As Banfield and Wilson observe, newspaper and

civic associational support is crucial under these circumstances. In

---

1. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the M. I. T. Press,
1963), p. 293.

2. Ibid., p. 307.

Table 12: Negro Representation on City Council
in Selected Non-Southern Large Cities*

City	Total Council Seats	Seats Held by Negroes (March, 1965)	Percent of Seats Held by Negroes	Negroes as Percent of 1960 Population
Detroit	9	0	0	28.9
Cleveland	33	10	30.3	28.6
St. Louis	29	6	20.7	28.6
Philadelphia	17	2	11.8	26.4
Chicago	50	7	14.0	22.9
Cincinnati	9	1	11.1	21.6
New York City	35	2	5.7	14.0
Los Angeles	15	3	20.0	13.5
Boston	9	0	0	9.1

* Reproduced from James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in American Politics: The Present," in John P. Davis (ed.), The American Negro Reference Book (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 444.

cities where Negroes constitute a numerical minority, the result is
that the Negro community will either be unable to elect a Negro repre-
sentative, or white leaders will see to it that Negroes have token
representation. Furthermore, those Negroes elected will probably
be either moderate or conservative on race issues, since they "must
be acceptable to middle-class whites."[1] Nearby Detroit illustrates
the manner in which this system works. Never more than one of the
nine councilmen in Detroit has been Negro, and militant Negro leaders
have little or no chance of election.

Banfield and Wilson go on to note the dilemma faced by a Negro
councilman facing re-election in the Detroit system.

> Without a strong Negro vote he cannot hope to be
> re-elected, and to get a strong Negro vote he must . . .
> be aggressive on at least some racial issues. But he
> must also have the support of the press and the civic
> associations in order to be re-elected, and he will not
> have this unless he is "reasonable" from the standpoint
> of conservative, middle-class whites.[2]

On the basis of this analysis, it would appear that minority
groups, and especially Negroes, would be best advised to favor a
partisan, ward system of election. Given residential segregation,
such a system would seem to assure some Negro representation.

Partisan ward systems, however, are not all alike. In their
analysis, Banfield and Wilson distinguish between two different systems:

---

1. Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 307.

2. Ibid., p. 308.

(1) ward-based, machine; and (2) ward-based, weak organization

systems. Partisan politics characterizes each, but the patronage

base of politics is minimized in the weak organization system. Each

apparently leads to a particular style of Negro leadership exemplified

by William L. Dawson in Chicago and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. in

Harlem.

In the Chicago ward-based, machine system, underrepresenta-

tion is minimized, for the system assures the election of Negro repre-

sentatives in those wards in which the Negro sub-machine dominates.

But Representative Dawson is dependent upon Mayor Daley for the

patronage by which he maintains his own support. The result is that

Dawson and the Negro politicians under his control do not vigorously

sponsor or support action which would contribute to race advancement.

In the ward-based, weak organization system, "as many Negroes

will be elected to office as there are wards in which Negroes are in a

majority, and the Negro politicians will be those who can develop per-

sonal followings or take advantage of intra-party factionalism."[1] This

system paves the way for leaders such as Adam Clayton Powell.

Powell's strength is not dependent upon the patronage he dispenses (he

has little), but rather upon the ideology he articulates and the charisma

he demonstrates. Powell, as Wilson has observed, is "the vivid and

---

1. Ibid., pp. 305-306.

colorful manifestation of their [Negroes] collective aspirations and

expectations."[1]

Whether Powell better represents his constituency than Dawson

does his is open to serious debate. It seems, however, that the proba-

bility that a Negro district will be able to elect a leader who will effec-

tively represent their interests is highest in a ward-based, weak orga-

nization system, next highest in a strong machine system, and lowest

in a nonpartisan, at-large system. Thus, while the demise of urban

machines benefitted the Negro, the further movement toward the non-

partisan, at-large system was to his disadvantage. Ironically, just as

Negroes had learned to play machine and partisan politics, the rules of

the game were changed so that they were once again at a competitive

disadvantage in the perpetual struggle for political power. The full

impact of these political changes is revealed in the facts that as of 1966,

64% of the American cities with over 5,000 population required a non-

partisan ballot for commission elections, while 62% of them required

that commission candidates face an at-large electorate.[2]

Government and the Politics of Race in Lakeland

Lakeland has long elected its city commissioners on a nonparti-

san ballot. And in 1962, by popular referendum, the citizens of

---

1. James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (November, 1960), p. 350.

2. Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds.), The Municipal Year
Book: 1966 (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association,

Lakeland overthrew the ward electoral system and substituted a complex system whereby commissioners are nominated by district but must run at-large. (Under the new system, district voters in a primary election nominate two candidates who must oppose one another in the general election which follows. In the general election, each voter in the city is allowed seven votes, one for a candidate in each of the city's seven districts.)[1]

Under the old system in Lakeland, the voters in district 1, which is estimated to be 90% Negro, elected their own version of Adam Clayton Powell. Charles Washburn was a fiery, ultramilitant Negro leader while serving on the commission. He was highly articulate and clever, but he was also vehement and uncompromising in his approach. His commission seat provided a public forum in which he was openly critical of the community leadership and their subjection of the Negro subcommunity. The rank-and-file Negro citizens of Lakeland identified with Washburn in his struggles against Lakeland's "white power structure." But in terms of race advancement, he probably accomplished very little. He was, after all, the only Negro commissioner on a commission of seven. Yet, as with Powell, style was more important than goal attainment, and Washburn was most

---

1966), pp. 92-93. For those cities in the 250,000-500,000 population group, 81% required a nonpartisan ballot for commission elections.

1. In 1966, 56 of the U.S. cities with a population of over 5,000 utilized such an electoral system. (Ibid., p. 93.)

appreciated not for what he accomplished, but rather for the way he

went about it. Wilson has beautifully captured the essence of this:

> In a situation in which ends are largely unattain-
> able (at least by Negro action alone), means become all-
> important. On the basis of the means employed--the
> political style used--men make judgments as to the worth
> of the leader and his reputation. Means, in short, tend
> to become ends in themselves; what is important is not what
> you do, but how you do it.[1]

But if Washburn's style enamored himself to Lakeland's Negroes,

he was clearly anathema to the city's influential whites. He had to go.

It was decided that a change in the electoral system would not only make

his re-election an impossibility, but it would also make it more diffi-

cult to elect others like him--Negro or white.

Petitions for a referendum on the proposed charter amendment

changing the electoral system were circulated by members of the Ju-

nior Chamber of Commerce. Their efforts were supported by editorials

in the Lakeland News. The paper supported the amendment because it

would make it possible for city voters to elect a "responsible" commis-

sion. "Lakeland requires qualified men who have no obligations. We

want men who will always vote for the best interests of the city--never

for the best interests of themselves and their pals." The proposed

system, then, was designed "to prevent the small block system from

putting a weak hand-picked candidate in office for personal gain . . ."

For those who could not read between the lines, the News went on to

_____

1. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians," op. cit., pp. 367-368.

observe that under the new system, "if the City at large is sick of Charles Washburn and the name he is giving Lakeland, the voters of the entire City can toss him out, although the district is absolutely guaranteed a commissioner from its own section." This qualification was an important element of the News' ideological stance, for there were still those in the city who remembered that Lakeland had moved from an at-large to a ward system in 1939 after the election of a commission which consisted of a number of persons who lived in--and presumably represented the interests of--one specific section of the city. The Junior Chamber's petition drive was a tremendous success. They secured 11,500 signatures, a figure which must be compared with the 8,861 voters who supported the amendment in the referendum itself. The results of the referendum are provided in Table 13 (page 147). Forty-one percent of the city's registered voters turned out to approve the amendment by a large majority. As can be seen, the voting closely followed racial lines. The overwhelming majority of Negroes in Lakeland reside in districts 1 and 7: the proportion of Negroes in other districts is negligible. The proportion of Negroes in the entire city is estimated to have been 19 percent at the time of the election and only 27.6 percent of the city's voters opposed the amendment.

The evidence strongly suggests that the white citizens of Lakeland moved to adopt the new electoral system in order to control the

Table 13: Results of the Popular Referendum
to Amend the City Charter

Lakeland, Michigan
January 13, 1964

District	Yes %	No %	N
1 (approximately 90% Negro)	8.0	92.0	1,692
2	93.0	7.0	2,154
3	90.0	10.0	1,220
4	81.1	18.9	1,901
5	85.2	14.8	2,954
6	82.6	17.4	1,199
7 (approximately 60% Negro)	51.7	48.3	1,116
Total	72.4	27.6	12,236

quality of Negro representation on the commission. This interpretation is strengthened further by the following excerpt from an interview with an elected city official. Note that his defense of the new system never really comes to grips with the questions posed.

Q. Let me ask you if the intent of the people who pushed for the charter amendment was to get rid of Washburn?

A. No, it wasn't.

Q. Was the intent to limit or control the representation of Negroes on the commission?

A. No, there's still a Negro on the commission. But he's one of the better types. He's not a radical.

Q. Regardless of the intent of those who pushed for the amendment, has not the result been to limit and control Negro representation on the commission?

A. No, there's still a Negro representative.

Q. Yes, but we've seen in the last two elections in both districts 1 and 7 that the voters of those districts have been unable to have their preferred candidates elected to the commission. Doesn't that say something about limiting or controlling representation?

A. Well, the difficulty is that they nominated the wrong candidates. They preferred the wrong candidates. They shouldn't support radical candidates. That's why they've been unsuccessful in electing their preferred candidates.
. . .

Consequences of the Modified At-Large System. In terms of Negro representation on the commission, the results are similar to those obtained in a regular nonpartisan, at-large system. Under Lakeland's modified electoral system, it is likely that Negroes will

be chosen to represent only those districts in which they constitute an over-whelming majority. Whereas district 1 customarily elects a Negro commissioner, district 7 has never elected a Negro candidate. Furthermore, since the Negro candidate must face a city-wide elector- ate without benefit of a party label, he will need newspaper and asso- ciational support to win the election. As with the Detroit system, this means that the Negro candidate hopeful of winning must be acceptable to middle-class whites (i. e. , he must be conservative on racial issues). Unlike the Detroit system, however, the successful Negro candidate in the Lakeland modified system need not have strong support in the Negro district. Indeed, the evidence suggests that strong support in his home district would be the political kiss of death. For the primary serves to "key" the white electorate as to the "acceptable" Negro candidate-- the rule in the general election is to vote for the candidate with the poorest primary showing. Just as with the Detroit system, the white citizens of Lakeland are provided a system which allows them to pre- vent the election of militant Negro leaders. But at the same time, the Lakeland system offers even better assurance of coopting a conservative Negro leader. The Negro community will not be without representation-- but in the eyes of many Negroes, their representative will be unwilling to protect or advance their interests.

Table 14 (page 150) presents returns for district 1 and 7 candi- dates for both the 1964 and 1966 general elections. The returns

Table 14: General Election Returns for "Negro" District Candidates

District	Candidate	Race	Home District %	Other Negro District (1 or 7) %	Remaining Districts %	Total City Vote %
				1964 General Election		
1	Merritt Reed	N	32.5	50.5	63.9	58.0
	A	N	67.5	49.5	36.1	42.0
	B	W	29.8	1.4	40.9	35.6
7	C	W	46.3	52.6	28.2	32.7
	D	N	23.9	46.0	30.8	31.7
				1966 General Election		
1	Merritt Reed	N	30.3	44.8	69.4	60.4
	James Corbin	N	69.7	55.2	30.6	39.6
	E	W	40.7	21.5	67.4	59.5
7	C	W	52.5	69.2	31.9	38.2
	F	N	6.8	9.3	0.8	2.4

clearly demonstrate the inability of the two Negro districts to elect

the candidates of their choice. As can be seen, the conservative

Merritt Reed won in district 1 in both elections, despite his inability

to carry his own district. In district 7 in the 1964 election, Candidate

B, who had missed being nominated in the primary by one vote, was

elected on a write-in campaign. He was elected despite the fact that

he polled less than 30 percent of the votes in his home district and less

than two percent in the other "Negro" district in the general election!

One of his opponents, Candidate C, was then an incumbent commissioner

and mayor. In 1966, this former mayor improved over his 1964 per-

formance in both his home district and the other "Negro" district, but

lost when his major opponent took two-thirds of the vote in the "non-

Negro" districts. The results from district 7 suggest that Negroes

are unable to elect their preferred candidate, even though that candi-

date may be white.

For the two elections in these two predominantly Negro dis-

tricts, the city-wide electorate has rejected the district's preferred

candidate four times out of four. In the other five districts, this has

happened only once in ten elections.

The 1966 Election. We may learn still more of the consequences

of Lakeland's modified electoral system by taking a closer look at the

1966 election. In the district 1 primary, James Corbin and Merritt

Reed were nominated to run against one another in the general election

to follow.   In the primary, Corbin polled 703 votes to Reed's 443.
The two other candidates received 237 and 43 votes respectively.
Reed, of course, was the incumbent commissioner.   In the 1964 elec-
tion he had demonstrated his voter appeal in the white districts of the
city.   Clearly the 1966 general election matched a militant Negro
challenger against a conservative Negro incumbent.   Corbin sought
out Franklin Weaver to act as his campaign manager, for Weaver had
served fifteen years as an important grass roots political leader within
the Negro community.

At a crucial meeting with other commission candidates, it was
decided that six candidates, including Corbin, would run as the "Family
Slate."   All six of these candidates were Democrats, and in all proba-
bility, each was more liberal than his opponent.   Campaign funds were
provided by labor unions.

On the Sunday before the Tuesday election, Corbin distributed
a four page newspaper tabloid to support his candidacy.   Copies of
"The Freedom News" were distributed door to door in the Negro com-
munity and placed on the windshields of cars parked on church lots.
Corbin's campaign literature was designed to appeal to Negro voters.
On the first page there was a large photograph of a Negro demonstra-
tor carrying a placard reading "Uncle Tom Died 200 Years Ago."
Other pictures showed Negro demonstrators being manhandled by
policemen and attacked by police dogs.   The tabloid suggested that

Negro voters could support "the struggle for equality, dignity and progress" by voting for Corbin, or they could indicate their satisfaction with the past--a past which "has brought us dismal deterioration, despair, disunity and defeat." Many persons in the Negro community, especially Reed's supporters, viewed the tabloid as a racist document. Corbin's plans to restrict distribution of the tabloids to Negro residential areas were upset when some of Reed's supporters saw to it that many were distributed in white neighborhoods.

Corbin was advised by numerous persons, including Weaver, that he could count on the Negro vote but had to work hard for the white vote. These persons advised against distributing the tabloid. It may be that Corbin made a strategic error in distributing the tabloid, if his intent were to win the election. In all probability, however, he could not have won no matter how he handled his campaign. At the time of the election, he was president of the NAACP, he was known as a Negro realtor who had played a large role in integrating a residential area within the city, and he definitely had a militant image. It would have been difficult to overcome these handicaps.

But if all this were not sufficient to assure his defeat, other steps were taken by his opponents--Negro and white. Reed concentrated his efforts on winning the white vote. His literature was distributed in white residential areas, and just as in 1964, he had strong newspaper support. Conservative white leaders were aided in their

campaign against Corbin by one of his former business partners.

This individual supplied what was purported to be an affidavit signed

by Corbin confessing to unethical business practices. White leaders

saw that copies of the affidavit were widely distributed in white areas

of the city.

In the Negro community, PARA refused to endorse either Reed

or Corbin. They recommended instead a write-in protest vote. The

PARA Newsletter wrote of Corbin: he

> is not really concerned with what "good" he can do for
> the Negro community but more with what good he can
> do for Corbin. Therefore, there is no reason why we
> or you should support him. At the risk of losing some
> of the unity that the Lakeland freedom struggle has had
> for the past few months we take this stand.

The results of the campaign are clearly evident in Table 14

(page 150). Reed won easily, although he was beaten in both districts

1 and 7. Among the seven successful commission candidates, only

one polled more total votes than Reed.

In terms of the city wide election, all seven incumbent candi-

dates were elected over the six Family Slate candidates and an inde-

pendent. The News had endorsed the re-election of the entire com-

mission. Although it is impossible to prove, it may be that Corbin's

name on the Slate led to the defeat of some candidates who otherwise

could have been elected. However that may be, it appears certain

that the five white Slate candidates were hurt because of Corbin's

name on the Slate.

Table 15 (page 156) presents returns for both districts 1 and 7 for all the Family Slate candidates. The data show that in proportional terms, Negroes offered strong support to Slate candidates. Although no one of them matched the percentage of votes given Corbin in the two districts, they all came fairly close to his performance. Furthermore, each of the five white Slate candidates, with but one exception, polled a higher percentage of votes in each of the two Negro districts than in his own respective home district.

A different picture emerges, however, if we examine the absolute number of votes polled by Slate candidates in the Negro districts. Voters in district 1 cast a total of 1,665 votes for both district 1 candidates, 990 votes for the district 7 candidates, but an average of only 895 votes for candidates in the other four districts in which Slate candidates were entered. There was a similar pattern in district 7, although the discrepancies were not so great. Voters there cast 1,097 votes for their own district candidates, 1,035 votes for district 1 candidates, but an average of only 862 votes for candidates in the other four Slate districts. Clearly, Negro voters are much less motivated to vote for candidates in white districts than for candidates in the Negro districts. The political interest of Negro voters diminishes considerably at the edge of the Negro community. Had the voters in the two Negro districts given each Slate candidate the same number of votes they gave Corbin, each candidate would have averaged 655 votes more than they

Table 15: 1966 General Election Returns
for "Family Slate" Candidates in the "Negro" Districts

| Candidate (District) | District 1 | | | District 7 | | |
	Total Votes cast for District Candidates	Votes cast for Slate Candidate	% of Total Votes for Slate Candidates	Total Votes cast for District Candidates	Votes cast for Slate Candidate	% of Total Votes for Slate Candidates
Corbin (1)	1665	1161	69.7	1035	571	55.2
Tamblyn (2)	921	602	65.4	876	448	51.1
McDowell (3)	926	592	63.9	887	453	51.1
Bollman (4)	882	574	65.1	865	463	53.5
Larkin (5)	851	587	69.0	820	402	49.0
Hoover (7)	990	678	68.5	1097	586	53.4

actually polled in the election. These additional votes would not have

given victory to any of the five candidates, but it would have meant

better showings.

The haunting question which cannot be answered, of course,

concerns the number of votes lost in white districts by white Slate

candidates because of Corbin's name on the Slate. Perhaps they

would all have lost anyway, but it would appear on the surface that

Corbin diminished their chances of victory.

Beating the Black Beater. Not surprisingly, many Negroes in

Lakeland consider themselves to be disfranchised under the new elec-

toral system. They are now denied the "right" to choose "their" repre-

sentatives. In effect, the white electorate of Lakeland selects repre-

sentatives for them, a pattern which characterized the accomodating

leadership of the Old South. The fact that democratic procedures were

used to take from them a "right" which was theirs under the old ward

system leads many Negroes in Lakeland to view democratic government

as but another form of white hypocrisy. Many Negroes refer to the

charter amendment as the "Black Beater," and a great deal of time is

given over to strategies to beat the Black Beater.

The strategy which appears most obvious is that of running two

moderate or militant Negro candidates in the primary. Numerous per-

sons have asked Charles Washburn to run in the primary in the hopes

that he and another militant or moderate would win and face one another

in the general election. The hope then would be that white voters would vote against Washburn and for the other "more preferable" militant or moderate candidate. Since passage of the amendment, however, Washburn has refused to run again. (As a matter of fact, Washburn has almost completely withdrawn from Lakeland: he is now a prominent nationalist leader in Detroit and on the national level.) It is doubful that this strategy would work. Reed has proven that conservative Negro candidates can win support in a primary. He polled 530 votes in the 1964 primary and 443 votes in the 1966 primary. If two militants or moderates are to win nomination in a primary, it would be necessary to split the vote in such a fashion that both poll more votes than a conservative candidate. Since each voter casts but one vote in the primary, this would be a difficult task.

Even assuming that two militants or moderates were to be nominated in the primary, there is still the possibility of a newspaper supported write-in campaign such as that which succeeded in district 7 in 1964. Most Negro militants are certain that this would be the result if they were to succeed in nominating two Negro candidates, both of whom were considered unacceptable to white voters.

Nonetheless, this has been the strategy preferred by most militants and moderates in the Negro community. Some militant and moderate leaders have also given thought to supporting a liberal white candidate against a Negro candidate in expectation that white voters

either could not or would not turn down a white candidate running against a Negro candidate in the general election. This, too, would require a considerable amount of political finesse, as well as a willing and acceptable white candidate. Especially in district 1 where there are few white residents, such a candidate would be hard to locate.

The response of the most militant Negro leaders has clearly been defeatist. Washburn, as we have seen, has given up the fight-- in Lakeland. In 1966, Curtis Abrams and other PARA members refused to support Family Slate candidates in either districts 1 or 7. They recommended instead write-in protest votes in both districts. One of their preferred candidates polled four votes in the general election, while the other polled 233. The PARA defense of their write-in campaign in district 7 illustrates clearly their protest motivation and their reluctance to compromise.

> Number one, there was only one decent candidate in District 7, white or black . . . Joe Hall. He lost because we let unqualified, unscrupulous Negroes enter the [primary] race and split our vote.

> Number two, the only time there has been a "good" relationship with the downtown bigots is when we, the "black community," have been willing to take off our cap, roll our eyes, scratch our heads and say, "yassuh boss, anything y'all want is ok with us."

> Number three, PARA is a militant organization. We never want "half-a-loaf." We are not a political party. We will co-operate with the Negro community but we will not "make deals" with the white power structure.

> Number four, even if Hall hasn't the proverbial snowball's chance in you know where, it is, we feel,

important for the Negro community to let the downtown
bigots know how we feel. We should vote for Hall as a
protest, if nothing else!

Some moderate Negro leaders in Lakeland have also given
thought to the possibility of legal recourse. Most of these have been
reluctant to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment fearing
either that they might lose or that they might win, thus forcing the
city to a regular at-large system such as that operating in nearby De-
troit. These moderate leaders are convinced also that legal action
would lead to a serious racial cleavage in Lakeland, and they are anx-
ious to avoid that.

Some conservative and moderate leaders actually prefer the
present situation to the immediate past. On the one hand, there are
those who take pride in or see utility in having a Negro commissioner
representing "all the people." On the other hand, there are others who
were as unhappy with Washburn as they are currently with Reed. The
current system may not be in their eyes the lesser of two evils, but
there is so little to choose between the two that they will not expend
their energies to attempt to overthrow the current system.

Living with the Black Beater. Lakeland's Negro community
still lives with the Black Beater. Disunity and the general lack of
political knowledge and organization have prevented the development
of an effective strategy to cope with the new electoral system. It is
interesting to observe that Negro leaders in Lakeland who were well

informed regarding other issues pertaining to housing or education,
for example, knew relatively little of politics. Very few Negro leaders
were sufficiently well informed to qualify as political leaders. Beyond
the Negro labor leaders, who are expected by the union leadership to
participate politically, only one or two Negro leaders were well in-
formed on political issues. Even Democratic party leaders in Lake-
land are not certain that it pays to try to attract the Negro vote. Es-
pecially if a campaign is devoid of racial issues, the turnout in Negro
districts is very light. And if racial issues are raised, the vote goes
up in both the Negro and lower-class white areas. In Lakeland, this
would generally mean the defeat of a candidate taking a liberal stance
on race issues.

One may argue that Negroes are not the only ones disadvantaged
by the new system. Although the white citizens of Lakeland moved to
adopt the new electoral system in order to control the quality of Negro
representation on the commission, the new system also appears to
make it easier than ever before for the economic elites to control city
politics. The new system operates to the advantage of those candidates
who can finance a city-wide campaign, and those who can count on
newspaper support. On the two commissions elected in Lakeland under
the new system, there have been both Democrats and Republicans. Par-
ty identity, however, appears to be independent of the ideological pos-
ture of the commission. In both economic and non-economic terms,

the Democratic members of the commission appear to be as conserva-
tive as the Republican members. [1] The resultant conservatism of the
commission often operates to the disadvantage not only of Lakeland's
Negroes, but to the disadvantage of the entire working class. This is
perhaps most clearly evident in the area of housing, which will be
examined shortly.

This analysis suggests an alternative solution to the Black
Beater that is rarely discussed by Negro leaders. There is currently
much political discontent among the white citizens of Lakeland. It is
possible that a Negro-labor-liberal coalition could capitalize on this
by forcing a referendum to amend the charter to allow partisan elec-
tions. Partisan elections would allow the citizenry to hold the political
parties responsible for the actions of "their" commissioners. Under
the current apolitical politics, only individual commissioners can be
held responsible for their actions. The discipline that could be pro-
vided by a political party is totally lacking. If partisan elections were
allowed, it is possible that Lakeland's Negroes could "live with" the
Black Beater and still make important gains in terms of political in-
fluence.

Whether or not such a strategy could succeed is surely debatable.
But there is no question that the Negro community is disadvantaged

---

1. One Democratic member of the commission, for example,
recently recommended sterilization for all "illegitimate mothers"
with two or more children on ADC.

politically by the general lack of political knowledge among Negro leaders. This lack of knowledge seriously limits the available perspectives which might lead to the resolution of serious problems. Whether the Negro community is to beat the Black Beater or live with it, greater political organization and knowledge appear to be minimal prerequisites for increased political influence.

Derivation of Hypotheses

This rather lengthy discussion of political affairs as they relate to Negro leadership and racial conflict in Lakeland suggests a number of propositions suitable for testing in subsequent research.

> White leaders will deliberately seek to establish conservative (or moderate) Negro leaders as the legitimate leaders of the Negro subcommunity, while attempting at the same time to discredit militant (or moderate) Negro leaders.

> The rhetoric of "good government" oftentimes constitutes an ideological defense of electoral systems deliberately designed to limit or control the representation of the lower-class in general, and Negro and ethnic minorities in particular.

> The methods by which governmental representatives of the Negro subcommunity are selected leads Negroes to challenge the legitimacy of those representatives.

> The methods by which governmental representatives of the Negro subcommunity are selected leads Negroes to adopt a position of political cynicism.

> Relative to other major issues, Negro leaders are least likely to be well informed on political issues.

Housing

There is a general consensus among both whites and Negroes in Lakeland that housing is the most crucial issue facing the community. For Negroes, the problems of housing are especially severe. In recent years, the general issue of housing has revolved about two specific problems which will command our attention here. First, there is the problem of public housing. Secondly, there is the problem of redevelopment of the central business district (CBD).[1]

Public Housing in Lakeland

The problem of public housing in Lakeland may be traced to the year of 1955. In the early 1950's, in response to a critical housing need, city officials moved ahead with plans to construct three low income, public housing developments. In 1952, one development of 400 units was actually completed in district 1, which is predominantly Negro. There then developed an intense controversy regarding the location of the two other proposed developments. A site for a second proposed development of 300 units was actually selected in a white section of the city. White residents objected to locating the development at the selected site or at any other site in the white areas of the city. It was clear to opponents that since the developments were to be subsidized by the federal government, apartments were to be rented

---

1. The reader must wait to discover the relationship between housing and redevelopment of the CBD.

on a nondiscriminatory basis. Whites were convinced that this would result either in an all Negro development or an integrated development. Neither was viewed as desirable by most white residents.

Therefore, an alternative site was selected in district 1. This brought opposition from Arthur Young, who was then the Negro commissioner for district 1. Despite the fact that there was a need for housing units for Negro families, Young was backed in his stand opposing the alternative site by almost every Negro leader in the community. Had he followed his own inclination, he may have approved the site. But it was clear that there was little or no support within the Negro community for the proposed district 1 site, at least among those then recognized as leaders. Negro leaders recognized that locating the development within the Negro community would merely perpetuate residential segregation. Despite the need for housing, Negro leaders were driven by the status goal of integration. Rather than to accept housing that would perpetuate residential segregation, they acted in such a way that housing needs were not met.

While the controversy regarding an acceptable site continued, white citizens began circulating petitions calling for a referendum on the issue of public housing. Faced with this pressure, the commission in 1955 moved to pass ordinance 1560 which prohibited the construction of public housing in Lakeland. At a later time, the ordinance was amended so as to prohibit even commission discussion of public housing construction.

Parenthetically, it might be added that Negro leaders suspect

that the desire of real estate companies to control the housing market

was also important in the passage of 1560. However that may be,

racial sentiment in both the white and Negro communities was clearly

the major factor.

In the decade following 1955, the housing problems in Lakeland

grew progressively acute. The problems were most severe for lower-

class workers--Negroes confined to the ghetto and unable to crack

racial barriers, and whites unable to afford suburban relocation. Negro

leaders, however, did not move vigorously to resolve housing problems

until the period of 1963 to 1965. During this period, a group of Negro

militants met with the City Planning Commission to discuss 1560. The

PARA Newsletter often found occasion to criticize the ordinance, and

PARA leaders also took their complaints to the city commission. Repre-

sentatives of both the NAACP and the Urban League met with white real-

tors to discuss the general issues of housing. Urban League represen-

tatives also met with representatives of the city commission. Other

complaints were lodged on a sporadic basis, but even during this time

period, as one moderate leader expressed it: "For the most part, we

just complained."

Finally in 1965, militant leaders in both PARA and the NAACP

filed formal complaints with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission

charging not only discrimination in housing, but also discrimination in

municipal elections and de facto school segregation. On the basis of these complaints, one CRC official was quoted as referring to "the mess in Lakeland." This resulted in a commission meeting at which another CRC official spoke, along with Negro leaders including Corbin, Washburn, and Abrams. As a result of this meeting, the commission reorganized their Human Relations Commission which had long been inactive. The meeting also led to the scheduling of a commission-sponsored public hearing on public housing to be held in March of 1966. For their part, CRC officials decided to have staff personnel visit the city on a two day a week schedule rather than on irregular visits as in the past.

At the early March hearing, Negro leaders stated their criticisms of 1560 and asked for its outright repeal. A PARA spokesman called the ordinance "biased and bigoted." Despite a long-standing lack of concern with public housing, the commission moved the night of the hearing to amend 1560 to allow the construction of public housing for the elderly. Negro leaders and others quickly charged that the commission action was prompted by the upcoming municipal elections.

Following the hearing, PARA President Curtis Abrams sent telegrams to the Michigan CRC and to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in Washington requesting that federal urban renewal aid to the city be stopped because the city had not complied with its workable program. In the telegrams, PARA charged that the

city had no operating relocation program, that it had no committee of minority group housing, and that it had totally neglected the problem of providing decent housing for Negro families.

Later, in an attempt to have its urban renewal workable program recertified by HUD, the commission announced in mid-March that a committee on minority group housing had been appointed on February 24. The delay in the announcement was not explained.

Redevelopment of the Central Business District

It was only with the emergence of another issue that Lakeland's housing problems became of vital concern. The new issue revolved about redevelopment of the central business district. Urban renewal land in the south end of the CBD had been cleared for a number of years, and city commissioners were being pressed to develop the land. The city's economic elites were especially concerned, for the construction of nearby suburban shopping centers in recent years had resulted in a serious loss of retail business on the part of downtown Lakeland businessmen. This trend could not be halted or reversed without redevelopment of the CBD.

During 1966, the city commission was quietly completing negotiations with a developer who had substantial financial resources, as well as previous experience in developing a number of suburban shopping centers. The Lakeland News began building up support for the anticipated contract between the city and James Pellegrin and Associates.

At the same time, the School of Architecture of a Michigan university was completing an extensive study of Lakeland. Although the study was conducted as a project for graduate students, assistance was provided by faculty representing the disciplines of urban planning, law, economics, political science, sociology, etc. On the basis of this study Raymond Goodman, the study director, came forth with his own University Plan for redevelopment of the city of Lakeland. The University Plan was much more comprehensive than the Pellegrin Plan, for it called not only for redevelopment of the CBD, but also for solving the city's housing problems.

Goodman and his colleagues and students took over a vacant building in downtown Lakeland and constructed a display to illustrate their plan. Scale models were built showing projected plans up to the year 2000. A formal presentation, complete with slides and taped narration, was provided nightly. Service clubs, voluntary associations, and interested groups of all kinds were invited to view the presentation and the display.

By the time the commission was ready to sign a formal contract with Pellegrin, there was widespread community support for the University Plan. Conflict between supporters of the two opposing plans was intensified on September 27 when the commission held a public hearing on the Pellegrin Plan prior to voting on approval of the contract with Pellegrin. It was learned at the hearing that important sections of the

detailed thirteen page contract had been revised as late as that very afternoon. Only two Lakeland citizens had been able to obtain copies of the proposed contract prior to the meeting, and they had been successful only because they remained at City Hall until the five o'clock closing hour. Based upon the statements made that evening, one must conclude that many Lakeland citizens felt that they had not been provided ample time to make rational decisions concerning the contract.

Yet the people who attended the hearing had strong opinions. The more than 800 persons who attended the five hour hearing heard some fifteen or twenty persons speak, most of whom represented organizations within the community. Not one speaker favored approving the contract with Pellegrin. Those who spoke requested that the commission either: (1) reject the contract with Pellegrin; (2) delay their decision until expert advise had been sought or until the University Plan had been more thoroughly explored; or (3) adopt the University Plan and obtain financial support and a developer for the plan. Of the many criticisms advanced by critics, the following were among the most important: (1) the legality of the contract was questioned since the public had not had time to examine its contents; (2) the cost to the city would actually be more than the $9 million the commission had estimated (some argued additionally that the University Plan would be much less expensive); (3) the commission had acted undemocratically throughout its negotiations with Pellegrin; (4) actual development would

proceed much slower than claimed (some argued additionally that the development of the portion of the University Plan dealing with the CBD would proceed more rapidly); (5) the plan created traffic flow problems which were left unresolved and which were not considered in the cost estimate; (6) the plan failed to provide sufficient parking space for the planned shopping center; and (7) the commission had not sought the advise of its own city planning department in its negotiations.

Most members of the Negro community concurred in these criticisms. Indeed, the six Negro speakers at the hearing stated these criticisms themselves. But from the perspective of the Negro community, perhaps the most significant thing to come from the public hearing was realization that there was a rather widespread consensus that housing--and not redevelopment of the central business district--was the most crucial problem facing Lakeland. This was a recurrent theme in the statements presented that evening. In particular, it was the central argument advanced by the first speaker of the night, the regional director of the UAW. David Fuller not only was critical of 1560; he also proposed the creation of a Citizens Development Authority to survey the city's housing problems and to propose solutions for those problems. Additionally, he promised substantial financial support from the union if such a committee were established. Fuller set the tone for the night, and the completion of his presentation was greeted with boisterous applause. For the remainder of the night, the audience applauded

Pellegrin critics and University supporters, but they heckled the com-

missioners when they expressed support of the Pellegrin contract.

Commissioners nonetheless defended themselves on the grounds

that the land had been cleared years ago and it was time that something

were done. They claimed that the Pellegrin Plan had actually been

under commission study for a period of eight months. They protest-

ed that it was illegitimate to raise the "political" issue of housing at

this time, for the hearing was for the expressed purpose of deciding

whether or not to approve redevelopment of the CBD. They claimed

that the audience had been "stacked" with opponents of Pellegrin, many

of whom were clearly outsiders. Finally, they attacked the emotion-

alism and rudeness of the evening's speakers and the audience in gen-

eral and contrasted this with the curteousy and respect they (the com-

missioners) had shown others throughout the evening. Then at 1:20

in the morning, after a majority of the audience had left the meeting,

they voted 6 to 1 to approve the proposed contract with Pellegrin.

District 1's Negro commissioner, Merritt Reed, voted with

the majority, despite the fact that the Pellegrin-University controversy

had induced an unusual measure of solidarity among Negro leaders.

Negro spokesmen for the NAACP, the Urban League, PARA, the Negro

Real Estate Association, a Negro fraternity, and a veterans organiza-

tion had all stated their opposition to the Pellegrin Plan. One moderate

leader later observed that "The University Plan was a beautiful

catalytic agent. It welded community support and contributed to extensive participation. Where there is controversy, this is good."

Another Negro militant leader later commented that he was amazed to have seen Negroes and whites taking the same position that evening. A letter drafted by the Executive Board of the Urban League and sent to the commission shortly after the open hearing probably expressed the sentiments of most members of the Negro community in referring to the open hearing as "stunning and appalling . . . a ritualistic farce." Although this letter led to intense criticism from some (mostly white) members of the League's Board of Directors, the message had been delivered nonetheless.

The Repeal of 1560

The open hearing on the Pellegrin Plan had set the stage for the repeal of 1560. Even while the commission had been busy completing its negotiations with Pellegrin, commission members became increasingly aware of the pressures being brought to bear on the problems of housing. Commissioners and other city officials began to receive rumors that Negro leaders and liberal white leaders had in their possession a ruling by the State Attorney General which declared 1560 to be contrary to both the City Charter and the State Constitution and therefore without legal effect. These rumors were ture. As a matter of fact, there were those--Negro and white--who had known of the ruling for three months!

The question that naturally arises is why action was not taken by those individuals. The evidence strongly suggests that militant and even moderate Negro leaders sat on the ruling in hopes of embarrassing the commission. They were willing to bide their time to wait for the proper moment to unveil their new weapon.

White leaders who knew of the ruling chose to delay action to prevent "providing political ammunition" to community conservatives in an election year. They were fearful that this might lead to the defeat of liberal legislators at all levels.

At the first commission meeting following the public hearing on the Pellegrin proposal, Commissioner Reed moved for the repeal of 1560. (The Lakeland News reported that this action came as a surprise to most other commissioners.) On request, however, he withdrew his motion and the commission unanimously directed the city attorney to draft a repeal ordinance to be submitted to the commission in two weeks, after which time there would be scheduled a public hearing on the issue.

Around the middle of October, important organizations made known their support of repeal. Both the Chamber of Commerce and the Lakeland Human Relations Commission recommended repeal. But perhaps most importantly, Tomlinson Motors Corporation officials privately made known their desire that something be done about housing. One influential white community leader stated that he was told by auto

company officials that an additional 1,100 workers could be hired

tomorrow if only they could find housing. [1]

Now that the commission had actually called for a public

hearing, those Negro and white leaders who knew of the Attorney

General's decision began to give second thoughts to their strategy of

withholding the ruling. Coming on the heels of the open hearing on

the Pellegrin Plan, it was felt that this would "split the town wide

open"--this time along racial lines. Although a hearing may indeed

have embarrassed the commission, more and more of those who knew

of the ruling came to the decision that a hearing would do more harm

than good. Finally it was decided at a meeting attended by Negro and

white liberal leaders that a public hearing on the issue ought to be

avoided, if possible. Both Negro and white leaders then made it known

to certain city officials that the Attorney General's ruling did indeed

exist. They suggested that city officials confirm this themselves by

requesting an opinion of the Attorney General. Thus, officials were

told, they could cancel the hearing and repeal the ordinance without

any embarrassment, for the ruling would have left them no other

choice. Assurances were reportedly given the officials that the public

would not discover how long ago the ruling had first been made.

The commission finally requested a ruling of the Attorney Gen-

eral. Then the week before the scheduled hearing, they announced the

---

1. The difficulties encountered by workers recruited in Appa-
lachia the preceding summer were noted in Chapter IV.

ruling and moved uncerimoniously to repeal the ordinance that had

been in effect for 11 years. On that night, no Negro leaders were

present in the audience. According to one white liberal, this came

as a shock to commission members, for they had wanted to make it

appear that their hand had been forced by militant Negro leaders.

Suspecting this, liberal white leaders had advised Negro leaders not

to attend the meeting specifically to avoid the possibility of making a

political issue of the commission's action.

Negro Leaders and Housing

Due to the powerlessness of Negro leadership, 1560 had been

in effect for 11 years. The ordinance was passed in the first place in

part because Negro leaders were reluctant to have another public

housing development located in district 1. Then until 1963 or '64,

there was little done by Negro leaders to oppose the ordinance. By

this time, Lakeland's housing problems were severe, especially in

the Negro community. But even then, 1560 was still low on the prior-

ity list of the Urban League, in part because it was recognized that it

would not lead naturally to new public housing, but probably also be-

cause it was recognized that racial cleavage on the issue ran deep.

Many other Negro leaders were not actively involved in fighting the

ordinance. Those Negro leaders who were concerned with the ordi-

nance were still unable to make progress against the ordinance until

others in the community became concerned with housing problems,

and until they obtained the ruling from the Attorney General. In the beginning, Negro leaders did not have ready access to the Attorney General. Several unsuccessful requests for a ruling had been made by both Negro and white leaders before it was discovered that the Attorney General's office would respond only to the requests of state governmental officials and prosecuting attorneys. Thus it was necessary to seek a state legislator who would request a ruling of the Attorney General. One Negro leader pointed out that it was necessary to be careful to seek out a governmental official who could be trusted. He observed that the official could easily deceive others by reporting that an adverse opinion had been given.

After the ruling had been obtained, Negro leaders chose not to use their weapon immediately. This suggests that Negro leaders wanted more than the simple repeal of 1560. Perhaps they wanted to wait until repeal would readily lend itself to implementing a new policy of public housing. But there exists a rather broad consensus that Negro leaders failed to use the ruling in hopes that they could somehow embarrass the city government. This opinion is shared by white conservatives and liberals, and by Negro conservatives. City officials later viewed the delaying tactic as "dirty politics."

It now appears that the city is moving to ameliorate its housing problems. Even before repealing 1560, as was seen above, the commission had amended the ordinance in order to allow the construction

of public housing for the elderly. The city has now obtained approval of several such projects from the federal government's Department of Housing and Urban Development.

There are now two important forces working within the city to cope with housing problems. The editor of the Lakeland News chairs a "Blue Ribbon" committee that resulted from the UAW's request for a Citizens Development Authority. The committee consists primarily of the city's economic elite--those whom Negro leaders view as the "white power structure." The UAW and the Negro community are also represented, however. Clark, Corbin, and one other person represent the Negro community on the committee, which is now officially recognized by the city commission. The committee has secured the services of a competent urban planner to survey the city's housing needs, but it is generally agreed that his $8,500 fee will not provide a survey adequate to the need.

The other force is the Citizens for a Progressive Lakeland Committee, which consists of persons committed to the University Plan and opposed to the Pellegrin Plan. Professor Goodman and other university people--mostly students or former students-- work closely with this committee. The Citizens Committee has vigorously protested the city's role in the Pellegrin Plan. An elaborate, formal complaint was filed with HUD charging the city's noncompliance with local, state, and federal rules and regulations pertaining to urban renewal, in

addition to all the criticisms heard at the public hearing. Although Corbin, Joyce Simmons, and other Negro leaders have worked with the Citizens Committee, its major leaders are convinced that Negro leadership is too fragmented to be effective. Then too, it is not clear that all members of the Citizens Committee would be committed to residential desegregation or other housing goals which might be preferred by Negro leaders. The Citizens Committee appears to be top heavy with small businessmen who would not be expected to be able to reach agreement with Negro leaders on all issues. Negro leaders, for their part, protest that the Citizens Committee, like most other predominantly white organizations, seeks legitimation and support from Negro leaders _after_ the important decisions have been made. They are reluctant to grant support in such instances. Even though they may be in favor of the proposed action, they emphatically resent being denied active roles in the decision-making process.

Public housing would appear to be a part of Lakeland's future. Whether or not it will lead to substantial residential desegregation is a difficult question to answer. It is plainly evident that most white residents in Lakeland are firmly opposed to desegregation, as one city official noted.

> Now we are willing to build developments in districts 1 and 7. But Negro leaders are opposed to that. That would be perpetuating segregation, in their eyes. Negroes in this community are going to have to face up to the fact that the white community here is unwilling to

build developments that would lead to integration. Negroes
first are going to have to demonstrate to the white community
that they're worthy of living next door to whites. They're
going to have to demonstrate that they can keep up their
property, that they can develop acceptable standards of living.
Until that's done, nothing can be done that will bring about
housing integration. It's possible today for acceptable Negro
families to move into white districts. We see that in Lake-
land today. But integration is going to be a very slow pro-
cess until Negroes can demonstrate to the white community
that they're deserving of it.

If the city chooses to construct public housing, it is evident
that they will experience difficulty preventing some measure of housing
desegregation. In all probability, influential white leaders will try to
hold the line against desegregation. If they must give ground, they
will probably move to locate public housing projects in white working-
class areas contiguous to the present Negro residential areas. Thus
whites may be more fragmented in the housing struggles to come.
Intense controversy is likely to center about the location and the size
of proposed public housing units. Anticipating just such opposition,
Negro leaders are exploring possibilities such as constructing two to
six family units to be scattered throughout white residential areas.
Whatever strategies are adopted by the opposing forces, it would
appear at this juncture that the possibilities for housing desegregation
depend upon a diligent search by Negro leaders for a greater measure
of solidarity within their own ranks and for a viable coalition with
influential white leaders concerned also with housing problems.

Derivation of Hypotheses

An examination of housing issues in Lakeland also evokes a number of hypotheses which might well be tested in future empirical research on Negro leadership and racial conflict.

Because they must operate from a weak base of power, Negro leaders will experience extreme difficulties in demonstrating their effectiveness by obtaining race goals rapidly enough to satisfy members of the Negro subcommunity.

Negro leaders will be predominantly concerned with issues relating to minority group membership, and will be inclined to assess all issues on the basis of the probable effect on minority group members and their relations with dominant group members.

White community leaders, even those who are liberal within the context of the political climate of the community, are more likely to seek legitimation and support from Negro leaders after important decisions have been made than to encourage the active participation of Negro leaders in the decision-making process.

Negro leaders (especially militants) are reluctant to grant their support and legitimation when they have not participated directly in the preceding process of decision-making, even though they may approve the issue under consideration.

CHAPTER VII

THE DYNAMICS OF NEGRO LEADERSHIP IN LAKELAND: EDUCATION, POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, AND EMPLOYMENT

Education

The fact that Negro parents are committed to education for their children is reflected in the spontaneous and aggressive nature of their actions. In the area of education, particularly, action has often been precipitated by followers rather than by leaders. Oftentimes rank-and-file members of the Negro community have not waited for Negro leaders to take the initiative; on more than one occasion, Negro leaders have had to sprint in order to lead their followers. This means also that the institutionalized channels of appeal and protest have oftentimes been rejected.

The Lincoln Junior High Demonstration

This is best illustrated by a student boycott and protest demonstration which occurred at Lincoln Junior High School near the end of the 1965-66 school year, an episode which warrants a detailed examination. The stage was set for protest when a Negro student charged that she had been "manhandled" by the white, male principal of the school as he broke up a fight. Although this one incident precipitated

the demonstration, the protest is best viewed as a reaction against many years of community discontent. The principal at Lincoln, John Davenport, was due to retire at the end of the school year after a career in which he had become an anathema to the Negro community. Davenport, earlier in his career, had been transferred from his position as principal at Wilson Junior High to Lincoln where the percentage of Negro students was much lower, although still a majority. Because the level of hostility against Davenport had been very high for years, the validity of the girl's charges seemed irrelevant to many in the Negro community.[1] As one militant leader expressed it, "They just had to let everyone know how they felt about that guy." From the perspective of Negro parents whose children attended Davenport's schools, his retirement called for a demonstration which had long been delayed. In all probability, however, Davenport also served as a scapegoat not only for the Lakeland School Board, but for the entire white community and its leaders.

Soon after the incident, many Negro students at Lincoln had decided to boycott the school. Their judgment in this matter was probably influenced by the Northern High School boycott in nearby Detroit which had just recently made national headlines. Many Negro parents supported the desires of the students, in part because it

---

1. The evidence suggests that Davenport did what was necessary to defend himself when the girl tried to attack him with a fingernail file or another sharp instrument.

seemed certain that a student boycott was going to occur no matter what the parents' position on the issue. When Negro leaders heard of the difficulties, they moved to persuade the parents to call off the demonstration and meet instead with school board officials to discuss matters. When it became clear that the Negro parents and students were going to hold a demonstration with or without Negro leaders, the leaders moved successfully to channel the discontent into a peaceful demonstration. Negro militant leaders came to see this as an effective means of dramatizing discontent and gaining publicity. Although the Urban League, Negro ministers, and others were active, the core of leadership for the demonstration was provided by James Corbin and NAACP members.

According to one report, a student boycott was aborted the morning following the incident when students were locked in the school; doors were chained and students were not allowed to leave the building. The Superintendent of Schools, George Sanburn, later met with Lincoln teachers and ordered them not to prevent student participation in the demonstration. The demonstration was finally held three days later on Friday, May 27, when anywhere from 175 to 250 students were joined by approximately 40 parents in a two hour demonstration outside the school building. Shortly after the demonstration began, word circulated that many 9th graders had not joined the picketing because they had been told that if they did participate, they would not be allowed

either to graduate or to attend a year-end school trip. A number of Negro parents then went into the school and encouraged their 9th grade children to join the demonstration.

Corbin then requested that the Michigan CRC arrange an appointment with Superintendent Sanburn for that afternoon. Sanburn refused to allow the CRC to act as a liaison agent and advised the NAACP to make the appointment themselves. Finally at the insistence of Negro leaders, the original 1:30 appointment was set back to 3:00 to allow the mayor and the president of the school board to attend. It was felt by Negro leaders that this would force them and other white leaders outside the school system to accept partial responsibility for what had happened.

The Negro community was represented at the meeting by officials of the NAACP, the Urban League, the Ministerial Alliance, and parents. Eleven demands were presented to school officials at the meeting, nine of which were mimeographed. By means of the mimeographed handout, Negro leaders demanded that a monitor be placed inside the school building for the remainder of the school year; that reprisals not be taken against student participants in the demonstration; that "in future disciplinary cases where female students are involved, that they not be manhandled by male personnel of the school"; that expulsion procedures established by the school board be followed at Lincoln; that school policy regarding the expulsion of students from Lincoln and

their reassignment to Wilson or other schools be made public; that

the contributions of Negro Americans be stressed in history courses;

that a student human relations group be established at the school; and

that extra-curricular programs in operation at other junior high schools

be adopted at Lincoln. Demands were also made at the meeting for a

study of race relations in the city's schools and for Davenport's re-

moval from the city's Housing Commission. Official school and school

board policy already covered most of the demands, but many policies

had been frequently violated at Lincoln.

Most demands were agreed to by school officials and other white

leaders present at the meeting. The president of the school board

agreed to discuss the possibility of a study of the school system with

Civil Rights Commission officials. The mayor, however, refused to

remove Davenport from the Housing Commission. As requested, San-

burn agreed to have Prentice Colby begin serving as monitor at the school

the next school day. The superintendent, however, met Colby when

he arrived at Lincoln to assume his duties and told Colby to resume his

duties as principal at Wilson instead. An NAACP member and parent

leader of the demonstration was then appointed as an official monitor

for the remainder of the school year. Both Sanburn and Colby were

faced with a difficult situation when Negro leaders requested Colby as

the monitor. Colby was then the principal at Wilson Junior High and he

was reluctant to act in any capacity at Lincoln. Furthermore, Colby

had already been notified of his appointment as Community-School and Human Relations Director to begin in July. Both Colby and Sanburn felt that Colby's effectiveness in his new position with the school board would be threatened if he were to act as monitor at Lincoln.

Things were hardly back to normal for the rest of the school year at Lincoln. Negro parents felt free to go to the school at any time of the day to volunteer their services as monitor in the hallways. The discipline of students in the classrooms deteriorated drastically. Lincoln's teachers eventually revolted because they felt that the school board had not issued a vigorous statement exonerating Lincoln teachers of blame, as had been promised. Two weeks after the student boycott, for a two day period, more than half of Lincoln's 43 teachers failed to report because of "illness." Despite the difficulties encountered, all parties somehow struggled through to the end of the school year. In retrospect, it can be seen that the situation would have been much more difficult had it not occurred so close to the end of the school year.

The tendency for Negroes to act prior to the initiation of action by Negro leaders was illustrated in yet another incident related to education. The Lakeland Board of Education had publicly announced the appointment of a new principal for a Negro elementary school. Some 60 or 70 Negro parents living in the worst slum area of the Negro community presented themselves at the school board meeting where the appointment was to be approved. They protested the appointment of a white female as principal and argued instead that a Negro male ought

to be appointed. Recognizing the extent and the impact of broken

families in the neighborhood, Negro parents argued that only a Negro

male could provide the masculine model needed for their children. On

the motion of Dr. Reuben Morgan, a Negro moderate who serves on

the board, approval of the previously announced appointment was tab-

led. At its next meeting, the board revoked its earlier appointment

and approved instead the appointment of a Negro male to the position.

The Citizens Committee on the Equality of Educational Opportunity

The Lincoln Junior High Demonstration was neither the first

nor the largest protest demonstration against Lakeland's educational

system. In 1964, a reported 2,000 Negro children and adults marched

to the Board of Education Administrative Office and on to the City Hall

to protest against de facto segregation and alleged discriminatory prac-

tices of the school system. And from that point on, the Michigan CRC

has received frequent charges alleging a denial of educational equality

in the city's school system.

Following the Lincoln demonstration, Michigan CRC officials

urged the Lakeland School Board to appoint a committee to study the

equality of educational opportunities in Lakeland's schools. Soon

after the demonstration, when Prentice Colby assumed his duties as

Community-School and Human Relations Director, he was assigned

as coordinator of the study. Colby carefully selected a committee of

approximately 50 persons from nominations submitted on request by

various community organizations. Negroes, especially moderates, are well represented on the committee. Harold Russell serves as vice chairman of the committee, and Carl Dean and a former president of the NAACP serve as subcommittee chairmen.

The committee is expected to submit its report after a study of twelve to eighteen months. At this time, it is impossible to anticipate the nature of the report to be submitted. Colby and others, however, are well aware that there are certain Negro leaders who are skeptical of the outcome. Especially among militants, one hears much talk of a possible "whitewash." These critics argue that in the past, the formation of committees has been used as a technique to quiet protest rather than to resolve issues. Whatever the final result of the committee study may be, it appears certain that the committee would never have been appointed except for the Lincoln demonstration and the insistence of the CRC.

Both Colby and Morgan view the committee as a first step toward legitimizing whatever significant changes, if any, are to be made in the educational system. Both are well aware of the measure of lay control exercised over education. They see the committee as a means by which public support can be marshalled for action that neither the board nor the administration can take at this time without encountering serious opposition.

Education and the Dilemma of Goals

There is certainly no consensus in Lakeland that school desegre-
gation ought to be a goal claiming the energies of Negro leaders. Negro
leadership, and the entire Negro community as well, is divided as to
whether school desegregation or the improvement of educational quality
within the existing Negro schools ought to have priority. Though school
desegregation is a status goal par excellance, there are even militant
leaders who opt instead for the welfare goal of improving the education-
al quality of Negro schools. Even among many who argue in favor of
school desegregation, this is seen not as a goal in itself, but rather as
a means toward the goal of improving the quality of education provided
Negro children. Many Negro leaders are convinced that "Mainstream
Education" is to be provided only where there are white students; to
obtain a superior education, one must go where the white students are.
There are others who reject school desegregation as a goal because
of the inability to determine the appropriate means by which that goal
could be achieved. The problem in Lakeland, as elsewhere, is that
de facto school segregation is closely tied to residential segregation,
and that both school officials and community public opinion support
the neighborhood school ideology. Many Negro parents themselves
are so committed to the neighborhood school that they would not con-
sider busing as a means of breaking down segregation.

The dilemma faced by Negro leaders stems in part from the
fact that so little progress has been made toward school desegregation

since the 1954 Brown decision of the Supreme Court. Most Negro

parents, no matter if they live in the South or the North, must still

send their children to "Negro" schools which are judged by most to

be inferior. In listening to militant Negro leaders in Lakeland speak

of the need for good "Black" (not Negro) teachers, one cannot escape

the feeling that ten years ago these same leaders would have been

spearheading the drive for school desegregation.

Elective and Appointive Negro School Officials

Although school board members are elected at-large, it appears

that the community at-large has come to accept as legitimate one

"Negro seat" on the board. Dr. Reuben Morgan, a moderate Negro

leader who is highly respected in both the white and Negro communi-

ties, is the current Negro member of the board. In 1964, Morgan

ran unsuccessfully against one other candidate for one vacant seat.

That year he ran without endorsement by the Lakeland News. The

next year, he led all three candidates in a race for two vacancies.

This time he was aided by newspaper support and he won by a sub-

stantial margin.

Although not an easy task, the election of a Negro to the school

board is simplified by the fact that board elections are held separate

from other municipal elections. Thus there is a very low turnout and

the result is that a high turnout in the Negro districts plus moderate

support in the remaining districts of the city can lead to victory for a

Negro candidate. For example, in 1965, Morgan pulled more than

half of his 2,800 votes in the two districts that are heavily Negro.

Chances of a Negro victory appear also to be strengthened when

there are two or more vacancies to be filled; then the election of a

Negro candidate does not appear to be so threatening to whites.

It is doubtful that just any Negro leader could be elected to

the school board. The candidacy of a militant Negro leader would most

certainly lead to a heavy vote in white districts to offset Negro votes.

Though there may be a "Negro seat" on the school board, that seat

appears to be reserved for a "reasonable" and moderate Negro leader.

Negro leaders in Lakeland had long been concerned that there

were no Negroes on the school board's central administrative staff.

As noted above, there were Negro administrators serving in Negro

schools, but none had been appointed to the central staff. Robert

Clark, James Corbin, and Reuben Morgan, in informal discussions,

requested school officials to make such an appointment. Significantly,

these requests were made at a time when the school board had just

received word that it was to receive several large grants of financial

aid. No doubt prompted because of the clear evidence of racial prob-

lems in the school system, the board moved to create the position

which was given to Prentice Colby. From the beginning, it was made

clear that race relations ("human relations") was to be one of Colby's

major concerns. Colby, just as Morgan, is highly respected in both

the Negro and white communities. He too is a moderate, although he

is strongly sympathetic toward militant Negro leadership. Shortly

following Colby's breakthrough, other Negroes were appointed to

positions with the central administration.

Derivation of Hypotheses

An examination and review of problems and issues relating to

education in Lakeland suggests a number of hypotheses which are in

need of empirical tests.

> The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to impor-
> tant centers of decision-making within the community on
> the part of Negro leaders will lead them to resort to non-
> institutionalized means of influencing the decision-making
> process.

> Due largely to the heterogeneity of the Negro sub-
> community, Negro leadership will be characterized by the
> lack of consensus regarding goals and means.

> During the decade of the 1960's, the proportion of
> Negro leaders who reject integration as a realistic goal
> has increased.

> Important race advancement goals are not achieved
> in the absence of concerted protest on the part of Negro
> leaders.

Police and Community Relations

As with other summers in the recent past, the summer of 1966

was one of racial tensions and ghetto rioting. Major urban riots ex-

ploded in Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco. Michigan cities

such as Detroit, Lansing, Benton Harbor, and Jackson also experienced

rioting in their Negro districts. Lakeland narrowly averted a race riot, and we will devote this section to the examination of the circumstances surrounding that "near miss."

A Threatened Riot

The first two or three weeks of August, 1966 in Lakeland were filled with racial tensions. Tensions began to mount shortly after plant protection personnel at Chamberlain Motors discovered a leaflet posted in an employee washroom. The leaflet, shown in Figure 3 (page 195), is alleged to have been distributed in Watts the previous summer.[1] According to some accounts, additional copies of the leaflet were left in cars parked on the employee lots at the factory. Police and plant personnel, however, claim that only the one copy was posted in the washroom. However that may be, rumors rapidly swept through the entire community to the effect that a race riot was imminent. Within short order, most whites were convinced that hate literature was being distributed by Negroes, while Negroes were equally convinced that white "red necks" were responsible for the distribution of the leaflets.

---

1. It is debatable whether or not it was distributed in Watts by Black racists, as many whites in Lakeland believed. Late in 1966 *Jet,* a magazine intended for a Negro readership, reported that similar leaflets were discovered in the possession of a paramilitary organization identified with the radical right in New York state. Police arrested members of the organization shortly after learning of their intent to violently disrupt planned political (student-leftist) and religious (Jewish) retreats. The reader will also note that the

Figure 3: Leaflet Posted at the
Chamberlain Motors Plant

This is a PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUC-
TION OF LEAFLETS distributed in the
WATTS AREA during the LOS ANGELES
RIOTS, August, 1965

KILL THE WHITE DEVILS!

(picture shown not reproducible)

This African Negro is one
of twenty thousand innocent civilians
brutally murdered by the white devil
soldiers. Now the white man's day
is over.

We will kill the white men.
We will have the white women for
our pleasure. We will smash out
the brains of the white babies
against the nearest tree. The
time to begin is soon - Watch
for the sign.

Only through the World
Government can all Negroes
find Peace.

Only through the World Court
can all Negroes find Justice.

Only through World Communism
can all Negroes find Equality.

Only through Bloodshed can
all Negroes find Freedom.

START A RIVER OF BLOOD

KILL THE WHITE DEVILS!

In white sections of the city, it was widely rumored that a demonstration was soon to be led by Martin Luther King, and that local Negro leaders were to provoke a riot after the visit. White residents were fearful that their neighborhoods would be invaded by Negroes who would rape white women and kill white children.

Similar rumors were circulating in the Negro sections of town. Many Negroes believed that whites were going to invade Negro neighborhoods. According to one particularly strong rumor in the Negro community, the local White Citizens Council was conducting a recruiting campaign for new members and were spreading the rumors to help the cause. Responsible Negro leaders, rightly or wrongly, believed that the Council was especially strong at Chamberlain Motors. One reported a membership of approximately 1200 at the plant.[1] The rumors circulating in the Negro community reportedly spurred talk among Negro youths of burning down the old World War II barracks housing--that was one way to get rid of undesired slum housing!

In the beginning, the Lakeland Police Department was receiving a few calls a day pertaining to a threatened riot. In a matter of a week or so, however, they began receiving as many as several hundred calls a day. Callers sought information concerning what could be done

leaflet identifies many of the traditional targets of the radical right: World Government, the World Court, Communism, and racial violence.

1. Such evidence as could be gathered suggests that the membership in the Council was actually very small and very inactive. The 1200 figure surely must be an overestimate.

to protect their families. Should they evacuate the city? Where could they purchase firearms and ammunition? What kind of weapons ought they to buy?

Downtown businessmen responded by purchasing plywood to cover their store windows and doors in the hope of preventing looting. Some opportunistic insurance salesmen began going from door to door selling riot insurance. In both the white and Negro sections of the city, some fathers moved their children to back bedrooms and slept with loaded weapons nearby.

In retrospect, it would seem that the behavior of many persons (Negro and white) during this period served to increase the actual probability of rioting. From this point in time, it appears that any racial incident could have provided the spark for a riot. Some Negro leaders believe that one particular incident nearly provided that spark. It was at the height of the rumor spreading that some Negro youths decided to "test" their right to be served in "hillbilly" bars where they knew they were not welcomed. A night of barhopping led to several fights, but the fighting somehow failed to spread.

Many Negro leaders, including Clark, Corbin, Abrams, Simmons, and Fred Brown, took to the streets to quiet the youngsters. Negro clergymen met together to discuss what could be done to prevent rioting, and they placed themselves on 24 hour call to meet emergencies. Negro leaders began receiving calls from white leaders

inquiring as to the potential of rioting. Some of the more militant leaders took advantage of the situation to dramatize the plight of the Negro community. Although it is difficult to determine whether or not militant leaders deliberately exaggerated the potential of riots, some did not go out of the way to alleviate the fears of their white callers. [1]

The initial response of white community leaders was largely one of inaction. Leaders could not reach a firm decision regarding the appropriate action to take under the circumstances, and the result was inaction and delay. State Civil Rights Commission officials finally became concerned and they convinced community leaders of the desirability of refuting the validity of rumors circulating in the community. A meeting was called between top level white and Negro leaders. Clark, Corbin, and Abrams represented the Urban League, the NAACP, PARA, and the Negro community at the meeting. Most white leaders attending the meeting represented the "white power structure," a clear indication of the perceived gravity of the situation. As a result of this meeting, the Lakeland News gave front page coverage to the meeting itself and reprinted the following statement issued by Corbin in the hopes of decreasing racial tension.

---

1. Some conservative Negro leaders are still convinced that militants deliberately exaggerated the potential of rioting.

This acceleration has been due to the distribution of a racially designed hate sheet which has been circulated in certain areas of the city.

The sheet purports and supports racial violence and unrest.

The Lake County Chapter of the NAACP unequivocally condemns the content, authorship and distribution of such material.

There is no evidence that this material has emitted from any civil rights organization or any section of the Negro community.

Due to the intensity of rumor and hearsay now rampant in the community, we strongly urge any citizen having knowledge of these matters to immediately report them to the Lakeland Police Department.

We ask that our citizens not repeat or encourage these attitudes and expressions.

Progress and accomplishments cannot be obtained by hate and violence.

Negro leaders also distributed to those attending the meeting an eleven point memo summarizing problems existing in the Negro community. Most of the problems pertained to housing, but the statement also drew attention to the city's electoral system, de facto school segregation, and the absence of respect in the Negro community for police authority. The latter was attributed to the wide-spread belief that laws were enforced in a biased manner. The eleven point memo was signed by the three Negro leaders in attendance and by the (white) president of the board of directors of the Urban League.

Following the newspaper report of the meeting and Corbin's statement, tensions eased almost as quickly as they had mounted in the beginning. Within a relatively short period of time, the city returned to normal and the perceived threat of overt violence subsided.

It is still difficult to determine objectively just how serious was the threat of rioting. It is interesting to note that among Negro leaders. leadership type fails to distinguish between those who felt that there was and those who felt that there was not the potential for rioting. One would expect militant leaders to accept and conservative leaders to deny a riot potential, but there were militants, moderates, and conservatives accepting each view. The views of one militant leader who had witnessed rioting elsewhere seem especially relevant.

> I don't think we came close. I went out to talk to the guys on the corner. There wasn't the unrest here that I saw elsewhere. I was in Cleveland and Detroit before things happened, and I was able to predict it. There was organization there that there wasn't in Lakeland. You could walk into the centers in Hough and the kids were sitting around talking about things. But not so here. There was no organization here. The police were not an irritant here, either. Those riots occurred in strong ghettos. Places where they had organization--where the police were gestapo-like. Those riots began because the kids wanted to give the police some of their own. Then they became concerned with the merchants. I only know of one businessman here in Lakeland that they're unhappy with. That's . . . But even with him, they don't stay away from his store.

Regardless of how grave the potential of rioting actually was, it is important that both Negroes and whites responded as if the threat

were real. The threatened riot and the existence of a "Watts-type environment" was cited as one reason for the formation of the "Blue Ribbon" committee on housing. Although militant Negro leaders at first seemed willing to push the incident "to the brink," they eventually took action to prevent rioting. This action of militants is similar to their action regarding the Attorney General's ruling on 1560.

Derivation of Hypotheses

This section suggests one additional hypothesis which could be empirically tested:

> In spite of their preference to negotiate with conservative Negro leaders, crisis situations will lead conservative white leaders in Northern cities to negotiate with militant Negro leaders.

Employment

Relative to the data reported in the other sections of Chapters VI and VII, the data relating to the attempts of Negro leaders to resolve problems of employment are quantitatively meager and qualitatively inadequate. Our attempts to gather relevant data in this area were generally unrewarding. The problem presented by the nature of the data could have been resolved either by not presenting employment data, or by doing the best we could with what little we had.

Rather than either of these approaches, however, we chose to analyze some of the reasons why data for employment was so difficult

to obtain. This approach seems justified, for the analysis casts addi-

tional light on the nature and problems of Negro leadership. In the

analysis which follows, we will focus on each of the three parties

primarily concerned with employment problems: The Urban League,

management, and labor.

The Urban League

The Urban League is a community services agency dedicated to

eliminating discrimination and securing equal opportunity for Negro

Americans. From its beginning, the League has followed a policy

combining self-help with an attack on discriminatory practices. This

is clearly evident in Whitney Young's summary of 1965 Urban League

action programs.

> Our action programs are designed to motivate
> youth to stay in school to get the best possible education;
> to expand the housing supply for the Negro population; to
> eliminate racial barriers in the employment and promo-
> tion of qualified Negroes; to strengthen Negro family
> life; and to stimulate self-help among Negro citizens in
> solving their problems.[1]

Vitally important to the analysis here is Young's observation

that "Implicit in the League's philosophy is the frank recognition that

interracial co-operation is an indispensable prerequisite to the achieve-

ment of significant and lasting gains for Negro citizens."[2] Such

---

1. Whitney M. Young, Jr., "The Urban League and its Strategy,"
The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), p. 103.

2. Ibid., p. 102.

cooperation is sought by means of "fact-finding, research, persuasion, negotiation, public education, and community organization."[1]

As an organization, then, the Urban League is committed to both goals and means which force a heavy reliance upon interracial cooperation. The Lakeland Urban League has an interracial Board of Directors, and its Executive Director is responsible to that Board. The white members of the Board represent both liberal and conservative elements within the larger community, but the conservative members possess more power than the liberal members. The Lakeland League is dependent for financial support on the United Fund which is controlled, as in most cities, by conservative economic elites.

The administrative officials of an organization whose success is seen to be dependent upon their ability to negotiate and bargain may be guarded in telling all they know. Knowledge possessed by such organizations is used pragmatically to persuade other negotiating parties to accept its own goals. Organizational effectiveness could be threatened by placing the knowledge one possesses in the hands of a social scientist clearly interested in racial conflict. While it is customary to publicly report the agreements reached by means of negotiation, a blow by blow account of the heavy infighting which occurred is rarely reported; and it was of course the infighting which was of concern in this research.

---

1. Ibid., p. 103.

Another source of Urban League reluctance to provide relevant information may stem from the fact that the Executive Director was himself a social scientist. And as a social scientist, he may have been more aware than others of the threats posed by social science research

Management

As a party to frequent negotiations regarding race relations as well as other matters, management also has an interest in withholding certain kinds of information from others. But management can withhold information more easily and more subtly than the Urban League.

As with most large-scale industry, the automobile industry is highly bureaucratized. In the mass production of something as complex as an automobile, a bureaucratic structure is probably mandatory. Bureaucracy itself provides formidable barriers to both the social science researcher and the race relations professional in search of information concerning industry.

The rigid hierarchical order of authority and responsibility which characterizes a bureaucratic structure not only orders behavior and makes predictability possible; it also provides a means by which the organization may protect itself from outside intruders. A bureaucratic official will oftentimes refuse to answer a question on the grounds that he does not have the authority to answer that particular question.

As a means of passing the buck, he may refer the questioner to others within the bureaucracy, particularly to those possessing superordinate authority. Oftentimes the inquirer is sent through the bureaucratic mazeway not so that he may obtain the answer to his question, but rather to discourage him from asking it again.

Another characteristic of bureaucratic organization is the recruitment and selection of personnel on the basis of technical or professional qualifications. Management has little concern with the color of the hands that operate its machines, but it is vitally concerned with the skills of the man who operates the hands. Race, then, is an irrelevant criterion of employment, so far as management is concerned. Management, for example, claims to have no records of the racial composition of the company work force, and this is probably so. This makes it difficult for both the researcher and the race relations professional to validate the existence or the extent of discrimination. [1]

The official color blindness of management does not necessarily indicate a complete absence of color consciousness. One company personnel manager, for example, informed me that there were no records indicating the race of employees. Shortly afterwards,

---

1. Though the operation of universalistic standards in the employment and promotion of personnel may eliminate overt discrimination, it will be of little benefit to the Negro worker lacking, for whatever reason, the skills required. Management will not easily be encouraged to aggressively recruit and train Negro workers, for that is not done for anyone else.

however, to illustrate the absence of discriminatory practices, he listed by name those Negro workers in his plant holding clerical positions.

Another major barrier that confronts both the researcher and the professional race man is interorganizational rather than intra-organizational. To an important extent, management shares with labor responsibility for both the formulation and the implementation of employment and promotion practices. Company-union contracts stipulate certain procedures to be followed in employee relations. There is a complex web of management offices and union committees directly or indirectly concerned with employment practices. This makes it difficult for anyone to establish the locus of responsibility for specific practices, especially when each party attempts to absolve itself of blame by blaming the other party. Management is particularly disgruntled with the necessity of utilizing seniority as a criterion in employment practices, and labor union officials, in turn, are critical of the "arbitrary" standards and procedures used by management. Negro leaders complain that management and labor continually "pass the buck" when confronted with charges or inquiries concerning race relations in the plant.

A final source of management reluctance to provide information to researchers and others is tied to the company policy of avoiding entanglement in local controversy. Management is drawn into local

controversy only when company interests are clearly and directly
involved or threatened. Given the intensity of racial conflict across
the nation at this time, management has a special interest in avoiding
entanglement in local racial problems.

Labor

In general, Negro labor officials either did not possess or did
not divulge much detailed information concerning race relations either
in the union or in the plant. Negro labor leaders and Negro politicians
appear to constitute the major exception to the general rule that Negro
leaders are Negroes first. We have seen above that there are forces
leading the Negro politician to soft-pedal racial issues. Similar forces
bear upon the Negro labor official; he is a labor man first, and a race
man second. In Lakeland, at least, Negro labor leaders are active
participants in politics, but this activism rarely carries over to other
spheres. Although the union expects its Negro officials to be active
in politics, both Negro and white labor leaders are well aware that
many Negro goals serve to divide the Negro and white working-class.
This is especially so when the issues are local issues.

The three Negro labor leaders in Lakeland are either moderate
or conservative in terms of leadership type, for their position in the
union discourages them from racial militancy. The goals which would
benefit labor do not coincide neatly with those which would benefit
Negroes. A Negro labor leader who adopted a militant racial stance

would probably jeopardize his position of leadership within the union hierarchy. [1]

The Negro labor leader, it would seem, is inclined to either overlook or underestimate racial problems either in the union or the plant because to recognize and actively to confront those problems would constitute a threat to his position. His task as a labor leader is to bring Negro and white workers together so that labor may better pursue common goals. That is to say that he looks for interracial solidarity, and not for interracial cleavage.

Negro labor leaders in Lakeland are also restrained by the fact that their superiors have traditionally had little concern with local matters. Labor leaders have learned through experience that their bread and butter issues are fought out at the state and national levels. The rewards that come from local victories rarely compensate for the expenditure of time, energy, and financial resources. Thus, for this reason also, the Negro labor leader is likely not to find militant race leadership rewarding.

Derivation of Hypotheses

Despite the inability to gather the data sought relative to employment problems, this section has contributed a number of interesting hypotheses which warrant the consideration of future researchers.

---

1. Parenthetically, it might be added that social scientists have possibly overlooked the fact that the alliances made by Negroes with labor and liberals, especially in the North, serve to limit the perspectives available to Negro leaders at this critical juncture in the Negro Revolt.

The concern of leaders of Negro protest organizations with perpetuating the organization oftentimes prohibits them from aggressively pursuing race advancement goals which, if attained, would force the establishment of new goals or eliminate the necessity for the organization.

In negotiations with white leaders, Negro leaders are handicapped by the existence of a bureaucratic "mazeway" which facilitates white leaders' escaping responsibility and makes it difficult for Negro leaders to establish the locus of responsibility.

Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized positions of authority within the larger community will be opposed to noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

Vulnerable Negro leaders will be less likely than non-vulnerable Negro leaders to advocate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

A general policy of noninterference in local problems provides ideological support for the avoidance of problems white organizational leaders are anxious (for whatever reason) to avoid, but that policy is itself avoided when local problems touch upon vital interests of the organization.

Past alliances made by Negroes (e. g. , with labor and liberals) limit the perspectives available to Negro leaders at the present time.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A three-fold task remains: (1) to assess the contribution of the empirical study reported here to our understanding of Negro community leadership and racial conflict; (2) to call attention to the limitations of the study; and (3) to make suggestions for future research.

Contributions to an Understanding of Negro Community Leadership

The General Characteristics of Negro Community Leadership: External Constraints

In Chapter II, it was suggested that it is meaningful to view the nature of Negro community leadership as being determined by factors both external and internal to the Negro subcommunity. That distinction will be followed here in a brief summary of the contributions this study makes to our understanding of Negro community leadership.

The major external constraint on Negro community leadership was seen to be its relative powerlessness. The Negro community has relatively less of all those things which contribute to power, or the ability to influence or determine the behavior of others in accordance with one's own desires. In terms of numbers of people, social organization, and resources, the Negro subcommunity is clearly subordinate

to the larger community of which it is but a part. Compared to white

leaders, Negro leaders have less control over wealth and other finan-

cial resources, less control over jobs, less control over the mass

media, less control over prestigeful interaction, less knowledge and

expertness, lower social standing, etc. A major problem faced by

Negro leaders, then, is the fact that they must operate from a weak

base of power.

The necessity of operating from a weak power base, together

with impatient demands for goal attainment, was seen to contribute

to a basic instability or fluidity of leadership. Although not all Negro

leaders in Lakeland would agree, the evidence available suggests the

recent emergence of a new militancy among Negro leaders in Lakeland.

This new militancy is undoubtedly a local response to the Negro Revolt.

The center for Lakeland's Negro militancy in the middle of the 1960's

was PARA, although the evidence suggests that both the NAACP and

the Urban League moved towards increased militancy. It is interesting

to note that the charter members of PARA originally formed a splinter

group within the NAACP which failed to elect its slate of candidates in

the chapter election of officers held in December of 1964. PARA was

formed only after the failure to capture legitimately the administration

of the Negro community's then most militant organization. In turning

down the PARA militants, NAACP members elected instead James

Corbin, who is himself a militant leader. The choice in the NAACP,

then, was between brands or degrees of militancy.

PARA's militancy is already on the decline. Curtis Abrams has moved from Lakeland and there is little evidence that the leaders who have replaced him in PARA are capable of sustaining the militancy of 1965 and '66. Yet the potential for new militancy remains. Any future dissatisfaction with Negro leaders and their accomplishments is likely to manifest itself in the emergence of a new militancy. As Ladd has observed: "The Negro revolution is still moving 'always to the left'; it has yet to reach Thermidor."[1]

It was also suggested in Chapter II that Negro leaders would experience difficulty establishing and maintaining their legitimate right to act as leaders or agents of the Negro subcommunity. This was seen to be attributable to Negro leaders' inaccessibility to the important centers of decision-making and to the refusal of white leaders to recognize them as legitimate representatives of the Negro community. In Lakeland, our interviews with white leaders clearly substantiated this. White community leaders were aware that both the NAACP and PARA were, in one sense, paper organizations. They knew that as a general rule, despite a dues paying membership of approximately 500, NAACP officers were elected by the twenty or so persons attending the election night meeting. They knew also that PARA membership was very low. This knowledge was used by conservative white

---

1. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership in the South (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 136.

leaders to deny Negro "leaders" the legitimate right to speak for the Negro community. A similar charge was frequently made by liberal white leaders, such as those associated with the anti-poverty programs. These leaders argued that both the NAACP and the Urban League represented only middle-class, professional Negroes. Our findings suggest, then, that the legitimacy of Negro leaders is also challenged on the basis of the process by which they are selected as Negro leaders. This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that Negro leaders find it necessary to confront white leaders whose legitimate right to speak for the community at large is firmly grounded in democratic procedures. There is irony in the fact that most Negro leaders are convinced that a "white power structure" directs the actions of the formally elected and appointed officials of the larger community, yet Negro leaders must confront those officials and not the power structure itself. Thus Negro leaders who possess little authority and even less power must confront white leaders cloaked with authority and supported by the power of other white leaders.

As a consequence of being excluded from the institutionalized centers of decision-making within the larger community, it was suggested in Chapter II that Negro leaders would be tempted to resort to noninstitutionalized means of protest. Although relative to other (particularly Southern) communities, protest in Lakeland has been rather mild, Lakeland's Negro leaders have resorted to direct action

on occasion. This is most clearly evident in spontaneous attempts to resolve problems relating to the schools. At this point in time, the community's potential for future rancorous conflict is probably high, especially if the Negro community's inability to elect local representatives of its choice continues. A tyranny of the ballot box may eventually be viewed to be as oppressive as the tyranny experienced by earlier generations of Negro Americans.

A major economic reversal such as that experienced by the automobile industry in 1958 in Lakeland would also seem to hold the potential of launching a new wave of noninstitutionalized protest. Many observers would hold that the probability of rancorous conflict would be especially high if such an economic reversal were to occur after a period of gradual economic progress, and the last five or six years in Lakeland can be so characterized.

The General Characteristics of Negro Community Leadership: Internal Constraints

In Chapter II, the major internal constraint on Negro leadership was seen to be the process of involution whereby the Negro community turns in upon itself. In large measure, involution constitutes a response to the fact that Negroes are denied or discouraged from full participation in the larger community. In Lakeland, we have seen that many Negro leaders are not committed to the goals of housing or educational desegregation. Probably an even higher proportion of

rank-and-file Negroes reject integration goals. Among Negro leaders, it is possible that the current tendency to reject integration as either an attainable or a preferrable goal represents a "backlash to the backlash"; the intensified resistance to the civil rights movement is countered by a rejection of the very goals that originally spurred Negroes to activism. Though we must be extremely careful in generalizing from the data gathered in Lakeland, it may be that the Negro militancy of the future will be characterized by a greater emphasis on racial solidarity and racial chauvinism. It may be that the increased racial pride and greater cohesiveness which emerged during the early years of the Negro Revolt will ultimately result in a diminished insistence on integration.

It has long been recognized that certain individuals come to have a vested interest in the perpetuation of a segregated social structure, a system which is itself reinforced by the process of involution. These individuals, it is held, will not aggressively move towards integration, for any such movement would diminish their income, status, or power. On the basis of our research, it is seriously doubted that very many Negro leaders are constrained <u>for that</u> <u>reason</u>. Very few Negro leaders perceive integration occurring so rapidly as to seriously threaten whatever advantages they enjoy as a result of segregation. We can anticipate that whites will continue, as they have done in Lakeland, to bestow special favors on some Negro

leaders in the hopes that they will be able to slow any movement to-
wards integration. But this subterfuge is doomed to failure, for such
Negro leaders will be denied legitimacy within the Negro community.
Greater barriers to integration will be erected by those Negro leaders
who deny the moral value of winning a place in an "immoral" society.

Past research has indicated that "vulnerables" (those more
subject than others to white control: e. g., public school teachers,
social workers, etc.) also will be reluctant to provide militant leader-
ship aimed at integration. The research reported here suggests that
vulnerables may not be as constrained in the North as in the South.
In the North, there appears to be greater separation between occupa-
tional and other social roles, a separation which protects the Negro
employee. In the North, there is a greater probability that a Negro
employee will be judged by his employer on the basis of criteria direc-
tly relevant to performance on the job. What a Negro employee does
during nonworking hours may be disapproved by his employer, but
that employer will have difficulty legitimizing on-the-job sanctions
aimed at controlling off-hour behavior. The right of tenure, for ex-
ample, is likely to provide the Northern Negro a measure of protec-
tion he would lack in the South.

In Chapter II, we also called attention to the heterogeneity of
the Negro subcommunity. Heterogeneity was seen to lead to differences
in interests which would make it difficult to achieve consensus. On the

surface, the findings reported above suggest that the difficulties in

achieving consensus were not as great in Lakeland as expected. But

such a conclusion may be unwarranted. During the course of the study,

some of the more influential Negro leaders met together several times

in what were referred to as Negro leadership conferences. These

meetings were apparently intended to contribute to greater planning,

cooperation, and coordination among Negro organizations and Negro

leaders. Although we had been invited to attend one of the meetings,

the invitation was later revoked because one or more of the partici-

pating members felt that the meetings ought to be for Negro leaders

only. It is not clear whether the invitation was revoked because of the

race of the researcher, or because of the focus of the research. How-

ever that may be, this one incident seems to suggest that Negro leaders

do indeed attempt to resolve their differences covertly. It may also be

that a focus on issue analysis camouflaged the existence of certain

disagreements among Negro leaders. Perhaps the leaders interviewed

failed to mention some existing disagreements because they were un-

related to past or current community issues; perhaps there are disagree-

ments which will come into the open only after the emergence of new

issues.

Types of Negro Community Leadership

As a general rule, the conservative white leaders of Lakeland

who have held power for many years have a definite preference for

conservative Negro leaders, followed by the moderates, and then the militants. It is easy to understand why these conservative white leaders are predisposed to negotiate with conservative Negro leaders and to avoid negotiating with militant Negro leaders. First, negotiations with conservative Negro leaders are preferred because conservative goals do not entail basic changes in the status quo; the means preferred by conservatives offer distinct advantages to whites who operate from a position of strength; and the conservative rhetoric is nonthreatening. On the other hand, militant goals often threaten the status quo; the means favored by militants serve to dramatize and to intensify racial conflict; and the militant rhetoric is threatening and embarrassing to whites.

In terms of popular following within the Negro community, militant Negro leaders have the greatest support, followed by moderates, then conservatives. Thus, those Negro leaders with the greatest following in the Negro community have the least respect among Lakeland's white leaders, while those with the least following in the Negro community have the greatest respect among white leaders. This does not lead to an impasse, for white leaders have come to recognize the necessity of working with moderate and even militant Negro leaders. This necessity stems directly from the lack of support for conservative leaders within the Negro community (from the perspective of white leaders, Negro conservatives cannot "deliver the goods"), and from

the ability of Negro militants to either create or to capitalize on crisis situations. It was militant and moderate Negro leaders, along with white liberals, who eventually challenged the commission to repeal 1560. During the Lincoln Junior High Demonstration, militant Negro leaders forced the school board, as well as the mayor, to negotiate with them. And at the time of the threatened riot, white leaders sought out the militant and moderate leaders of the Negro community, not the conservatives.

This appears to be in conflict with Thompson's findings in New Orleans. Thompson probably generalized beyond his data when he asserted that:

> . . . in any biracial system composed of a relatively powerless minority and a powerful majority, the patterns of intergroup leadership are determined very largely by the majority group. This is so because the prime role of the leader is to get things done. Impotent leaders must depend upon the favors or concessions voluntarily granted by the powerful.
>
> So it is in a biracial social system that certain complementary patterns of race relations leadership develop, wherein each social type of leader among white men of power will choose a complementary type of Negro leader with whom he is willing to negotiate. [1]

Thus, as we noted in Chapter III, Thompson sees the Uncle Tom dependent upon the white segregationist, the race man dependent upon the white liberal, and the racial diplomat dependent upon the white moderate.

---

1. Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 58-59.

We too have argued that Negro leaders are relatively power-
less, but the qualification deserves emphasis; Negro leaders are not
absolutely powerless. If the role of the leader is to get things done,
neither militant nor moderate Negro leaders in Lakeland are convinced
that the most important things can be done solely through favors or
concessions voluntarily granted by white men of power. The commis-
sion did not voluntarily concede in repealing 1560; it was moved by the
fact that the ordinance had been judged unconstitutional and by the fact
that Negro leaders were apparently prepared to use that judgment in
a way that would have put the commission in a difficult and embarrassing
position. The school board did not voluntarily move to establish its
committee to examine the inequality of educational opportunities in the
city school system; it did so because of pressures exerted by militant
Negro leaders and by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. The
differences between New Orleans and Lakeland suggest that Negro lead-
ers in Northern cities are not nearly as impotent as are Negro leaders
in Southern cities. Significantly, in each of these issues, militant and
moderate Negro leaders appealed to authoritative sources outside the
community. In one issue, they were favored by the Michigan State
Constitution and an officer of the state government; in the other, they
were also favored by an agency established by the State Constitution.
In Northern states, Negro leaders generally have one additional level
of governmental authority to appeal to than do Negro leaders in Southern

states. In the South, Negro leaders must often "leap frog" the state government and appeal directly to the federal government to obtain recourse.

Though types of white leaders do indeed have preferences for the type of Negro leader with whom they must negotiate, they do not always act in terms of their preferences: they are "willing" to negotiate with others. By creating or capitalizing on crisis situations, Lakeland's militant Negro leaders actually diminished the alternatives open to white conservative leaders. In Lakeland, conservative white leaders do negotiate with militant Negro leaders as they did with the issues of 1560, the Lincoln demonstration, and the threatened riot. From the perspective of these white leaders, they negotiated with the "radical," "militant," or "revolutionary" types of Negro leader despite the fact that they would have preferred to negotiate with the "better," "nonmilitant," or "evolutionary" types.

While the activities of militant Negro leaders are especially marked during times of crisis, the activities of moderates and conservatives are most visible in terms of the routine functioning of the city. It is especially interesting that at the present time, while only conservative Negro leaders can be elected to the District 1 commission seat, moderate Negro leaders may be elected to fill the "Negro" seat on the school board. This seems strange, for candidates for both positions must face an at-large electorate. In the school board elections,

the Negro community is favored by a separate election and the generally small voter turnout. The question that remains unanswered, however, is why the candidacy of a moderate Negro leader for the school board does not lead to a larger turnout of voters in the white districts who are anxious to prevent the election of Negro moderates. It is speculated that there is customarily a disproportionately low turnout among lower-class and poorly-educated whites in school board elections. Not only are middle-class and well-educated whites predisposed to noneconomic liberalism, but they probably live in areas of the city which would be largely unaffected by race relations changes in the school system. It may even be that from their perspective, it is better to elect a moderate Negro over a conservative white.

Leadership Types and Situational Factors

As a generalization, it must be stated that the leadership typology failed to provide a great deal of insight into the actions of Negro leaders in Lakeland. Militant, moderate, and conservative leaders did not always respond as we would have expected. Looking back in retrospect, it is our judgment that Negro leaders are subject to situational constraints which oftentimes lead them to act counter or contrary to their predispositions. One of the more militant Negro leaders recognized this well when he observed that he wasn't nearly as militant as members of the Negro community thought. He stated that although he was militant in words, his position and his responsibilities

held him back and he was restrained to some extent. This leader was

respected for the militancy of his rhetoric, even though it didn't always

lead to militant "action" and though it rarely led to tangible gains.

In an important sense, it seems that each new phase in the

historical sequence of events limits or narrows the range of alterna-

tives open to Negro leaders. It may well be that the alternatives

which are eliminated along the way are precisely those toward which

a particular leader is predisposed. Few Negro leaders in Lakeland

would speak openly in favor of anything as blatantly discriminatory

as the charter amendment which changed the city's electoral system.

In 1955, Commissioner Young opposed the district 1 site for a second

public housing development, even though he recognized the need for

new housing units which would be available to Negro families and

though he was not strongly committed to residential desegregation.

There came a time when Negro leaders in the Urban League felt it

necessary to take a strong stand against commission action on the

Pellegrin Plan, even though their opposition was certain to cause

dissension among white members of the Board of Directors. Militant

Negro leaders led the Lincoln Junior High demonstration, though some

were originally inclined to simply bring parents and school officials

together to discuss matters. In August of 1966, there was a time when

the only alternatives which seemed to be open to Negro leaders (no

matter what their leadership type) were those of acting to provoke or

to discourage a race riot.

All this should not be construed to mean that a leader's pre-ferences in terms of goals, means, and rhetoric are unimportant. But it may be that situational constraints are equally as crucial as those preferences in influencing the behavior of Negro leaders in their attempts to resolve concrete issues. It is at least a possibility that past researchers relied so heavily on their typologies that they over-looked the impact of situational constraints.

Limitations of the Study

This study was designed primarily to evoke insights regarding a relatively underdeveloped area of research. A deliberate decision was made to cast a wide net in which Negro community leadership would be examined both intensively and extensively. It was felt that a study designed to test specific hypotheses would force a premature closure of perspectives which we wanted to avoid. The reader ought to bear in mind that no rigorous test of specific hypotheses has been presented.

The empirical data presented here were obtained by means of a case study of Negro leadership in one city, and the study reflects the limitations of case studies. An attempt was made to overcome these limitations by relating the findings to those reported in previous research. This procedure, however, does not substitute for a well designed, systematic, comparative analysis.

One special problem inherent in the case study method is that of generalization. In a case study, one is never certain of the influence of idiosyncratic factors. Case studies may, however, lead to the development of general propositions. The method provides no rigorous means of testing such propositions; that remains the task of subsequent research.

Another limitation of the study relates to the brief time span of the conduct of the research. The researcher began visiting Lakeland in August of 1966 and visits continued until late in May of 1967. These irregular visits were one, two, or three day visits. By gathering data regarding past issues, the period of time under investigation was lengthened. But we do not have great confidence in the validity of the data relating to events that occurred more than five or six years ago. A special problem relating to the period of time investigated in a study such as this is that certain issues may not have been salient during that time period. Thus one may learn little of particular issues known to be of crucial importance. Employment may have been an issue that had relatively low salience for Lakeland's Negro leaders during the time of the study. We have suggested other factors, however, which contributed to our inability to gather adequate data regarding employment. These other factors suggest that employment problems may be considerably more salient than the apparent lack of interest and action would lead us to believe. However this may be, the study suffers from

the limited time span investigated and the limited amount of time spent in the field by the investigator. This limitation holds despite the fact that many social scientists would never think of spending even this much time in the collection of data.

One final limitation must be discussed. Many social scientists hold that white researchers are seriously handicapped in attempting to conduct the kind of research reported here. Such charges are not without support. Pettigrew, for example, has shown that the race of the interviewer strongly influences the responses given by Negro respondents in public opinion surveys.[1] Many argue that racial conflict is currently so intense that the white researcher will experience extreme difficulty in gaining entry, establishing rapport, and obtaining valid data. On the basis of this research, it is our judgment that these difficulties are not insurmountable and that they have been greatly exaggerated in the literature. At several points above, we have noted difficulties experienced as a result of interviewee evasiveness and resistance. Our impression is that the problem under investigation constitutes a much greater source of resistance than the race of the researcher. Throughout the study, it was our impression that white leaders were far more evasive and far less candid than were Negro leaders. This of course cannot be explained in terms of racial differences

---

1. Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 50-51.

between interviewer and interviewees. Evasiveness and resistance,

in short, ought to be anticipated in any study of conflict and power,

no matter whether or not the researcher is of a different race than

many of those studied. If difficulties are anticipated in advance, then

pragmatic decisions regarding how to cope with them can also be made

in advance.

<div align="center">

Suggestions for Future Research

</div>

In this section, we will first provide an inventory of propositions

which are intended to suggest guidelines for future research on Negro

community leadership. We will then close with a brief discussion of

strategies of research which hold the potential of advancing our know-

ledge in this area.

A Propositional Inventory

The empirically testable propositions presented in this section

are grounded in the existing literature, in the empirical study reported

here, or in both. The propositions listed vary tremendously in terms

of the extent to which they are verified. Some, at this point, are hardly

more than educated guesses in need of a rigorous empirical test, while

others appear to be well confirmed by existing evidence. The proposi-

tions also vary tremendously in terms of levels of generality. Some

appear to call attention to relationships unique to Negro leadership,

while others may be generalized well beyond that context. Most (though not all) of the propositions state determinate relationships between variables.

No attempt has been made to list all propositions suggested in the literature, although the ones listed appear crucial to an adequate understanding of Negro leadership. Finally, the propositions are not so logically interrelated as to warrant our referring to a theory of Negro community leadership. We claim only that modest strides have been taken toward the development of such a theory.

Having considered a number of different classificatory schemes, we finally attempted to introduce order to our listing by relating propositions to basic or crucial variables. We will consider "clusters" of propositions which call attention to: (1) power and powerlessness; (2) legitimacy and ideology; (3) the process of involution; (4) goals and strategies; and (5) the composition of Negro community leadership.

Power and Powerlessness. Throughout we have suggested that a basic characteristic of Negro community leadership is its relative powerlessness. Many of the problems of Negro leadership stem directly from the fact that Negro leaders must operate from a weak base of power. For example, the ineffectiveness of Negro leadership is largely attributable to this fact.

    1.   Because they must operate from a weak base of power, Negro leaders will experience extreme difficulties

in demonstrating their effectiveness by obtaining race goals rapidly enough to satisfy members of the Negro subcommunity.

The instability of Negro leadership, in turn, appears to be attributable to ineffectiveness.

2.   As a result of difficulties in attaining race goals, Negro leadership will be highly fluid or unstable.

Although there has always been talk of the "New Negro," militancy appears to be especially marked during Post World War II years.

3.   Since World War II, fluidity in Negro leadership has been characterized by the emergence of more militant Negro leaders.

As a generalization, it appears that the probability that an individual or group will conform to existing and acceptable standards of behavior is increased to the extent that that individual or group can expect to be rewarded for conformity. Or as the man in the street might express it: Why accept the rules of the game if one never wins? In a similar way, it seems that Negro leaders are encouraged to violate or to circumvent existing rules of the game, for they are denied a role in determining those rules and the rules do not favor them.

4.   The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to important centers of decision-making within the community on the part of Negro leaders will lead them to resort to non-institutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

Power oftentimes manifests itself in superior organization. In modern society, bureaucratic organization constitutes a vitally important source of power. One important resource which bureaucratic

organizations can both develop and protect is knowledge, and knowledge

is especially vital in conflict situations. This suggests an important

barrier faced by Negro leaders in their negotiations with whites:

> 5.   In negotiations with white leaders, Negro leaders
> are handicapped by the existence of a bureaucratic "maze-
> way" which facilitates white leaders' escaping responsi-
> bility and makes it difficult for Negro leaders to establish
> the locus of responsibility.

At various points above, we have suggested that powerless

leaders will experience difficulties establishing their legitimate right

to occupy leadership positions.

> 6.   The actual or perceived nonaccessibility to impor-
> tant centers of decision-making within the community on
> the part of Negro leaders leads both Negroes and whites
> to question or challenge the legitimacy of Negro leadership.

This particular proposition serves as a bridge to the next section in

which we turn to a consideration of propositions related to the major

variables of legitimacy or ideology.

Legitimacy and Ideology

Those who possess power customarily take measures to legiti-

mize or to justify their right to exercise power. This is to say that

they attempt to transform their power into authority or legitimate

power. Power is most secure when legitimacy is embedded in an

ideological "world view" which justifies the existing social structure

and is accepted without question by those subject to power. Yet those

subject to power are likely to deny the legitimacy of those presently

holding power and to adopt an ideology which challenges the existing

power structure and supports social change. Thus it is that legitimacy

and ideology are intimately related.

In the process of racial conflict, white leaders take advantage

of their superordinate power by challenging the legitimacy of Negro

leaders, especially those who constitute the greatest threat. Often-

times this leads members of the subcommunity itself to question the

legitimacy of Negro leaders.

> 7. White leaders' refusal to accept a Negro leader as
> a legitimate representative or agent of the Negro subcom-
> munity leads members of the Negro subcommunity itself
> to question or challenge the Negro leader's legitimacy.

Negro leaders are further handicapped by the fact that they are not

formally selected to represent the minority group subcommunity as

such. Thus:

> 8. The methods by which Negro leaders are chosen
> leads both Negroes and whites to question or challenge the
> legitimacy of Negro leadership.

For reasons specified above, white leaders generally prefer

to negotiate with conservative Negro leaders and to avoid negotiating

with militant Negro leaders. Thus:

> 9. White leaders will deliberately seek to establish
> conservative (or moderate) Negro leaders as the legiti-
> mate leaders of the Negro subcommunity, while attempt-
> ing at the same time to discredit militant (or moderate)
> Negro leaders.

Whether or not white leaders are successful in this is largely dependent

upon the presence or absence of a crisis situation.

10.   In the absense of a crisis situation, conservative and moderate Negro leaders will have greater accessibility than militant Negro leaders to white community leaders.

11.   But in a crisis situation, conservative white leaders in Northern cities will reluctantly negotiate with militant Negro leaders.

Many decisions made today, especially those made by liberal white leaders and those which relate to the urban center, appear to demand the acceptance and support of Negro leaders, a fact which emphasizes that Negro leaders are not entirely without power. White leaders, however, are reluctant to allow Negro leaders to participate in the actual decision-making process.

12.   White community leaders, even those who are liberal within the context of the political climate of the community, are more likely to seek legitimation and support from Negro leaders after important decisions have been made than to encourage the active participation of Negro leaders in the decision-making process.

But more and more, Negro leaders (especially militants) appear to be demanding an actual role in the decision-making process.

13.   Militant Negro leaders are especially reluctant to grant their support and legitimation when they have not participated directly in the preceding process of decision-making, even though they may approve the issue under consideration.

Our study of Lakeland supports the argument that certain governmental forms (e. g. , nonpartisanship and at-large elections) make it difficult for the Negro subcommunity to elect local legislators (1) in proportion to their numbers in the general population, and (2) committed to race advancement. In an important sense, however,

this form of "disfranchisement" is supported by a "liberal" rhetoric.

    14.   The rhetoric of "good government" oftentimes consti-
tutes an ideological defense of electoral systems deliberately
designed to limit or control the representation of the lower-
class in general, and Negro and ethnic minorities in particular.

Under such "good government" systems, the Negro community is

likely to reject both "their" representatives and the government in

which those representatives serve.

    15.   Certain "good government" methods by which govern-
mental representatives of the Negro community are selected
lead Negroes to challenge the legitimacy of those representa-
tives.

    16.   Certain "good government" methods by which govern-
mental representatives of the Negro community are selected
lead Negroes to adopt a position of political cynicism.

All this perhaps accounts for the relative lack of political knowledge on

the part of Negro leaders.

    17.   Relative to other major issues, Negro leaders are
least likely to be well informed on political issues.

The "world view" of Negro leaders appears to be seriously

restricted as a result of the fact that race plays such a crucial role

in the determination of the Negro's life chances.

    18.   Negro leaders will be predominantly concerned with
issues relating to minority group membership, and will be
inclined to assess all issues on the basis of the probable
effect on minority group members and their relations with
dominant group members.

The "world view" of Negro leaders is also restricted by the alliances

of the past.

19.   Past alliances made by Negroes (e. g. , with labor and liberals) limit the perspectives available to Negro leaders at the present time.

Involution.   There are yet other propositions which cluster about the variable of involution.   An overly simplistic view of race relations stresses the Negroes' drive toward integration and the resistance to that movement on the part of whites.   Not all Negroes are committed to integration. however, and those who are vary in the intensity of their commitment.   (Similarly, not all whites are committed to segregation, and those who are vary in the intensity of their commitment.)   Involution appears to go far in explaining variation among Negroes and Negro leaders in this regard.   As the most general proposition:

20.   The process of involution poses important barriers to racial desegregation or integration.

In an important sense, segregation becomes a way of life; regardless of whether or not it is imposed upon a people, to live a segregated life is to accept it, at least in some measure.

21.   Parallel institutions within the Negro subcommunity attain a viability of their own and thus constitute important barriers to racial desegregation and integration.

Within the Negro community, we can identify three categories of persons whom we would expect to be somewhat resistant to the goals of desegregation or integration and to noninstitutionalized means of protest: those who have vested interests in segregation; those who are vulnerable; and those who hold institutionalized positions of authority within the larger community.   Thus:

22.	Negro leaders who perceive their income, status, and/or power to be dependent upon the perpetuation of segregation are likely to oppose racial desegregation or integration.

23.	Vulnerable Negro leaders are likely to oppose racial desegregation or integration.

24.	Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized positions of authority within the larger community are likely to oppose racial desegregation or integration.

25.	Negro leaders who perceive their income, status, and/or power to be dependent upon the perpetuation of segregation are not likely to advocate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

26.	Vulnerable Negro leaders are not likely to advocate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

27.	Those Negro leaders holding institutionalized positions of authority within the larger community are not likely to advocate, support, or participate in noninstitutionalized means of influencing the decision-making process.

These are propositions which direct our attention to the pro-bability of certain commitments and certain courses of action. Future research must be designed to determine the conditions under which these propositions do not hold. One such condition was suggested in our research.

28.	In the North, the ability or willingness of whites to impose sanctions against Negro vulnerables is limited by the relatively greater separation of occupational and other social roles and the operation of universalistic norms (e.g., seniority, tenure) pertaining to occupational roles.

We have stressed at various points that involution places in close geographical and social proximity groups and social categories

of people who would otherwise segregate themselves from one another.

This leads to a crucial problem faced by Negro leaders.

> 29.   Due largely to the heterogeneity of the Negro sub-
> community, Negro leadership will be characterized by
> the lack of consensus regarding goals and means.

Goals and Strategies.   This leads us to a consideration of

propositions pertaining to goals and strategies.   One such proposition

is closely related to the last listed proposition.   Due to its powerless-

ness, Negro leaders will attempt to achieve consensus on goals and

strategies by covert means, for only in this way can they present a

united front to dominant group leaders.

> 30.   Negro leaders will attempt to resolve intragroup
> conflict covertly in order to present a united front to leaders
> of the larger community.

Increasingly, social scientists are moving to accept as valid

a proposition which refutes many of the arguments advanced by con-

servative Negro leaders.

> 31.   Important race advancement goals are not achieved
> in the absence of concerted protest on the part of Negro
> leaders.

Recent events seem to indicate that Negro leaders are seri-

ously reappraising the goals which prompted action in the early years

of the Negro Revolt.

> 32.   During the decade of the 1960's, the proportion of
> Negro leaders who reject integration as a realistic goal
> has increased.

Surely there is a close relationship between goals and means.

But the adoption of militancy lends itself to more than the attainment

of goals benefitting the entire minority group.

> 33.   For many younger Negro leaders, the adoption of
> a militant stance constitutes an attempt to gain status
> within the Negro subcommunity by challenging the long
> established Negro leadership.

To close our consideration of propositions relating to goals

and strategies, we call attention to a basic dilemma faced by organi-

zations concerned with goal attainment.

> 34.   The concern of leaders of Negro protest organiza-
> tions with perpetuating the organization oftentimes pro-
> hibits them from aggressively pursuing race advancement
> goals which, if attained, would force the establishment of
> new goals or eliminate the necessity for the organization.

The Composition of Negro Community Leadership. We close

our propositional inventory by simply listing two propositions which

call attention to the composition of Negro community leadership.

> 35.   Negro leaders are drawn disproportionately from
> the ranks of professionals, especially the independent
> professions of law and medicine.

> 36.   Negro subcommunity leadership differs from the
> leadership of the larger community in that there are pro-
> portionately fewer leaders representing large financial
> and commercial businesses.

Strategies of Research Design

Perhaps the strategy which holds the greatest promise of ad-

vancing our knowledge of Negro community leadership is that of

conparative analysis. Although it is still possible to make important contributions through case studies such as the one reported here, we are certain to reach a point of diminishing returns. At that time, the best research strategy would be to resort to comparative studies designed to facilitate the testing of general causal propositions. To date, only Ladd has provided a comparative analysis of Negro community leadership. But illustrative examples of the kind of studies required have now been provided by sociologists and political scientists concerned with the study of community power and local government.[1]

Studies may be designed to facilitate a number of different kinds of comparisons. Perhaps the greatest need is for studies which would compare Negro leadership in a number of different kinds of communities. Here one could compare Negro leadership in Northern and in Southern communities; or in communities with varying proportions of Negro population; or in urban and in rural communities; or in communities which have old and established or newly arrived Negro populations.

In comparing Negro leadership in different communities, one might control for issues. One could, for example, study Negro leadership in communities which have held referenda on "open housing"

---

1. See, for example: (1) Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964); (2) William V. D'Antonio and William H. Form, Influentials in Two Border Cities: A Study in Community Decision-Making (University of Notre Dame Press, 1965); and (3) Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparitive Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963).

ordinances in order to determine correlative factors in the success or failure of such movements. Or one might study communities in which there have been large-scale urban renewal programs in order to examine variations in the response of Negro leaders. As a final illustration, one might select communities in order to examine Negro leadership operating within the context of partisan or nonpartisan electoral systems.

A second general approach would be to compare Negro leadership with leadership representing other minority groups. Here one could compare the leadership provided different minority groups in the same community at the same point in time, or one could draw from historical data in order to compare contemporary Negro leadership with the leadership of different minority groups at earlier points in time. Following the first alternative, one might compare Negro vs. Puerto Rican leadership in New York; Negro vs. Cuban leadership in Miami; or Negro vs. Mexican-American leadership in Los Angeles. Following the second alternative, one might compare contemporary Negro leadership with the leadership provided the Jewish or Italian- or Irish-Americans of an earlier period.

The development of a general theory of minority group leadership would be enhanced by studies designed to compare Negro American leadership with the leadership of minority groups in other countries. Such studies would be especially beneficial if one focused on

nations possessing similar cultural origins. One might, for example, compare Negro American and French Canadian leadership; or Negro American leadership with Nonwhite leadership in South Africa.

Yet a third general approach would be to compare Negro sub-community leadership with leadership in the total community. This approach also would lend itself to the construction of a general theory of minority group leadership. In the final analysis, minority group leadership will be fully understood only when it is systematically compared with dominant group leadership.

In addition to comparative analyses such as these, it is also felt that there is a need for longitudinal studies. Most studies available to us now lack the perspective that can be provided only by the examination of leadership over an extended period of time. Here sociologists can go to the historical record as contained in newspaper files, official and unofficial records and documents, organizational minutes, the recollections of participants or observers of past events, etc. The attempt here would be to reconstruct the historical records in sociologically meaningful terms; history through the eyes of the sociologist ought to transcend history. The fact that one can gather sufficient data in two or three weeks or months to write a research report of publishable quality should not discourage lengthier field studies.

Longitudinal studies would be especially beneficial in deter-
mining the factors which contribute to variations in the intensity or
violence of racial conflict. Either a single case study or a compar-
ative study of two or more cases may evoke generalizations relating
to the processes of conflict and conflict regulation. [1]

This section is not intended to provide a definitive statement
of the future research needs in this area. Clearly our knowledge of
Negro community leadership is so limited that the responsibility for
this task ought to be shared by others. The pluralism of the social
or behavioral sciences and even sociology itself provides opportunities
to borrow from many diverse theoretical orientations and methodolog-
ical procedures in advancing our knowledge and understanding. The
nature of racial conflict today probably offers some assurance that
we will avail ourselves of these opportunities.

---

1. For an illustrative example of the kind of product that could
result from such studies, see James S. Coleman, Community Conflict
(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agger, Robert E., Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, _The Rulers and the Ruled_. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964.

Anonymous. _The Case for Housing: Lakeland Michigan._ 1966. (mineographed)

Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. _City Politics._ Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the M. I. T. Press, 1963.

Barth, Ernest A. T., and Baha Abu-Laban. "Power Structure and the Negro Sub-Community," _American Sociological Review_, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February, 1959), 69-76.

Becker, Howard. _Through Values to Social Interpretation._ Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1950.

Bernard, Jessie. "Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?" _American Journal of Sociology_, Vol. 56, No. 1 (July, 1950), 11-16.

Bierstedt, Robert. "An Analysis of Social Power," in Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds.), _Sociological Theory_, 2nd ed. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), 143-156.

----------. _The Social Order._ New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.

----------. "The Sociology of Majorities," in Raymond Mack, _Race, Class, and Power_ (New York: American Book Company, 1963), 18-31.

Boulding, Kenneth. _Conflict and Defense: A General Theory._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.

Bramson, Leon. _The Political Context of Sociology._ Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Brink, William, and Louis Harris. _The Negro Revolution in America._ New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964.

242

Brown, Claude. Manchild in the Promised Land. New York: Signet Books, 1965.

Burgess, M. Elaine. Negro Leadership in a Southern City. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

Campbell, Ernest Q. "On Desegregation and Matters Sociological," Phylon, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1961), 135-145.

Carter, Barbara. "Integrating the Negro Teacher Out of a Job," The Reporter (August, 12, 1965), 31-33.

Clark, Kenneth B. "The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum and Organization," in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), The Negro American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), 595-625.

----------. Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Coleman, James S. Community Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957.

Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956.

Cothran, Tilman C., and William Phillips, Jr. "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1961), 107-118.

Cox, Oliver C. "Leadership Among Negroes in the United States," in Alvin W. Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 228-271.

Dahl, Robert A. "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," in Charles R. Adrian (ed.), Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1960), 25-42.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

----------. "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 2 (September, 1958), 115-127.

D'Antonio, William V., and Howard J. Ehrlich (eds.). Power and
      Democracy in America. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
      Notre Dame Press, 1961.

D'Antonio, William V., and William H. Form. Influentials in Two
      Border Cities: A Study in Community Decision-Making.
      University of Notre Dame Press, 1965.

Drake, St. Clair, and Horace R. Cayton. Black Metropolis. 2 vols.
      New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

Etzioni, Amatai. "The Ghetto--A Re-Evaluation," Social Forces,
      Vol. 37, No. 3 (March 1959), 255-262.

Farmer, James. "The New Jacobins and Full Emancipation," in
      Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), 100 Years of Emancipation (Chi-
      cago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), 89-102.

Form, William H., and Delbert C. Miller. Industry, Labor and
      Community. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.

Frazier, E. Franklin. Black Bourgeoisie. New York: Collier Books,
      1962.

----------. The Negro in the United States. Revised Ed. New York:
      The MacMillan Company, 1957.

----------. "The Negro Middle Class and Desegregation," Social
      Problems, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April, 1957), 291-301.

----------. "Sociological Theory and Race Relations," American
      Sociological Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June, 1947), 265-271.

Garfinkel, Herbert. When Negroes March. New York: The Free
      Press of Glencoe, 1959.

Hamilton, Charles V. "Race, Morality, and Political Solutions,"
      Phylon, Vol. 20, No. 3 (3rd Quarter, 1959), 242-247.

Holstege, Henry, Jr. Conflict and Change in Negro-White Relations
      in Great Falls. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan
      State University, 1966.

Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation,"
      Social Forces, Vol. 41, No. 2 (December, 1962), 177-188.

Hughes, Everett C. "Race Relations and the Sociological Imagination,"
      American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December,
      1963), 879-890.

Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1953.

Johnson, Guy B. "Negro Racial Movements and Leadership in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43 No. 1 (July, 1937), 57-71.

----------. "Patterns of Race Conflict," in Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1939), 125-151.

Killian, Lewis M. "Community Structure and the Role of the Negro Leader-Agent," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1965), 69-79.

----------. "Leadership in the Desegregation Crisis: An Institutional Analysis," in Muzafer Sherif (ed.), Intergroup Relations and Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1962).

----------, and Charles Grigg. Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1964.

Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. Negro Political Leadership in the South. Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1966.

Laue, James H. "The Changing Character of the Negro Protest," The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), 119-126.

Leventman, Seymour. "Minority Group Leadership: The Advantages of the Disadvantages," in Bernard Rosenberg, Israel Gerver, and F. William Howton (eds.), Mass Society in Crisis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), 604-613.

Lewis, Hylan, and Mozell Hill. "Desegregation, Integration, and the Negro Community," The Annals, Vol. 304 (March, 1956), 116-123.

Lewis, Oscar. The Children of Sanchez. New York: Random House, 1961.

Lomax, Louis. The Negro Revolt. New York: The New American Library, 1962.

Loomis, Charles P. , and Zona K. Loomis. Modern Social Theories. Princton, N. J. : D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. , 1961.

Mack, Raymond W., and Richard C. Snyder. "The Analysis of Social Conflict--Toward an Overview and Synthesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June, 1957), 212-248.

McKee, James B. "Community Power and Strategies in Race Relations: Some Critical Observations," Social Problems, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter, 1958-1959), 195-203.

----------. "The Ideology of Moderation: Some Assumptions About Conflict in American Society." An address delivered in the Provost's Lecture Series, Michigan State University, February 26, 1964. (mimeographed)

----------. Negro Leadership in Grand Rapids. East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1962.

McKinney, John C. Constructive Typology and Social Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.

Melby, John F. "Racial Policy and International Relations," The Annals, Vol. 304 (March, 1956), 132-136.

Monahan, Thomas P., and Elizabeth H. Monahan. "Some Characteristics of American Negro Leaders," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 5 (October, 1956), 589-596.

Myrdal, Gunnar (with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose). An American Dilemma. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944.

Nolting, Orin F., and David S. Arnold (eds.), The Municipal Year Book: 1966. Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1966.

Ottenberg, Simon. "Leadership and Change in a Coastal Georgia Community," Phylon, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1st Quarter, 1959), 7-18.

Parenton, Vernon J., and Roland J. Pellegrin. "Social Structure and the Leadership Factor in a Negro Community in South Louisiana," Phylon, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1956), 74-78.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. A Profile of the Negro American. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964.

Pfautz, Harold W. "The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View," Phylon, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer, 1962), 156-166.

Phillips, W. M., Jr. "The Boycott: A Negro Community in Conflict," Phylon, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1st Quarter, 1961), 24-30.

Press, Charles. Main Street Politics: Policy-Making at the Local Level. East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, 1962.

Record, Wilson. "Intellectuals in Social and Racial Movements," Phylon, Vol. 15, No. 3 (3rd Quarter, 1954), 231-242.

----------. "Negro Intellectual Leadership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: 1910-1940," Phylon, Vol. 17, No. 4 (4th Quarter, 1956), 375-389.

Rose, Arnold M. "The American Negro Problem in the Context of Social Change," The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), 1-17.

----------. The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.

Rosenberg, Morris. "Power and Desegregation," Social Problems, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April, 1956), 215-223.

Rossi, Peter H. "Theory, Research, and Practice in Community Organization," in Charles R. Adrian (ed.), Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1960), 9-24.

Simpson, George Eaton, and J. Milton Yinger. Racial and Cultural Minorities. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Thompson, Daniel C. The Negro Leadership Class. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

Vander Zanden, James W. American Minority Relations. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963.

----------. "The Nonviolent Resistance Movement against Segregation," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68, No. 5 (March, 1963), 544-550.

Walker, Jack L. "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1963), 99-124.

Watts, Lewis G. "Social Integration and the Use of Minority Leadership in Seattle, Washington," Phylon, Vol. 21 (1960), 136-143.

Weber, Max. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949.

Williams, Oliver P., and Charles R. Adrian. Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.

Williams, Robin M., Jr. "Social Change and Social Conflict: Race Relations in the United States, 1944-1964," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1965), 8-25.

----------. Strangers Next Door. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.

Wilson, James Q. "The Negro in American Politics: The Present," in John P. Davis (ed.), The American Negro Reference Book (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 431-457.

----------. Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership. New York: The Free Press, 1960.

----------. "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5 No. 3 (September, 1961). 291-303.

----------. "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 4 (November, 1960), 346-369.

Young, Whitney M., Jr. "The Urban League and its Strategy," The Annals, Vol. 357 (January, 1965), 102-107.

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDE
FOR NEGRO LEADERS

Let me begin by asking you whether or not there have been any recent changes in Negro Leadership in Lakeland? Have you been here long enough to observe any changes, say, in the last five or ten years?

    IF YES: How would you characterize that change (those changes)?

        Is it just a change in leaders, or are there now different kinds of leaders?

        Have there been changes in the goals preferred?

        What do you feel accounts for this change?

Now I'd like to turn to a discussion of specific issues or problems in which you may have played a role. For purposes of our discussion, I'd like to talk in terms of general problem areas and specific issues which are considered to be important to Negroes in Lakeland. On this card (HAND CARD TO INTERVIEWEE) I've listed those problem areas and issues. There seems to be a great deal of consensus that these are the most important problems faced by the Negro community here.

I'd like to review with you the historical development of some of these issues, with particular emphasis on your participation in them. Have you taken an active part in any of these problems or issues. ?

    IF YES: Which problems or issues have you been active in?

        Then let's talk about that issue. Why don't you tell me about it in your words. I would be especially interested in how the problem or issue came about. Who initiated action? Who was or was not consulted? What were the positions taken by various leaders, the strategies used, the effectiveness of those strategies, and so on.

249

Problems and Issues

PROBLEM AREA: <u>Housing</u>. (Residential segregation; restricted housing market; substandard housing, etc.)

<u>Issues</u>:

1. Ordinance 1560
2. The Pellegrin - University Plan proposals for redevelopment of the central business district.
3. Alleged discrimination in urban renewal.

PROBLEM AREA: <u>Education</u>. (De facto segregation; inferior quality of education in Negro schools, etc.)

<u>Issues</u>:

1. Lincoln Junior High Demonstration.
2. The Seven Schools Plan.

PROBLEM AREA: <u>Politics</u>.

<u>Issues</u>:

1. The Charter Amendment.
2. Electing governmental officials favorable to race advancement.

PROBLEM AREA: <u>Employment</u>. (Tokenism in downtown white-collar positions; discrimination in the apprenticeship programs and schools in the auto plants; job ceilings in the auto plants; high school drop-outs; recession year layoffs; etc.)

PROBLEM AREA: <u>Police and Community Relations</u>.

<u>Issues</u>:

1. Threatened riot of 1966.
2. Brutality charges.

(NOTE: For each issue in which the interviewee had participated or for which he had knowledge, we probed in depth as described in Chapter V.)

Thinking ahead to five years from now, do you feel Negroes in Lake-
land will be better off, worse off, or about the same as they are
right now?

Why do you feel that way?

APPENDIX B

MAIL-BACK QUESTIONNAIRE
PROVIDED NEGRO LEADERS

Dear_____:

You are requested to complete the following form at your earliest con-
venience. Return it in the attached envelope to Mr. Lee Sloan, Depart-
ment of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.
The information requested is vital to the completion of the study. The
form has been constructed for self-administration in order that we cause
you no more inconvenience than is necessary.

The form consists of several kinds of questions. Generally, you may
simply check (✓) the appropriate space or fill in the appropriate blank.

The information provided will of course be accorded confidential treat-
ment. No one except myself has access to study files, and I will not
divulge the specific source of my information to anyone. General
background information is intended for use in statistical analysis.

Thank you so much for your assistance. The sacrifice of your time
and effort is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Lee Sloan

1. Name: _____.

2. Age: _____years.

3. Sex: _____male _____ female

4. Marital status:

   ____Married

   ____Single

   ____Divorced or separated

   ____Widowed

5. How many children do you have? _____

6. How many of those children are of school age(5 - 17)? _____

7. Occupation: _____

8. Name of employer. (Indicate if self-employed.)

   _____

9. How many employees are under your supervision or direction?___

10. If you are self-employed, are your customers or clients predominantly Negro?

    _____Yes _____No

11. Please indicate the range of your expected family income for 1966.

    _____0-999   _____6,000-6,999

    _____1,000-1,999   _____7,000-7,999

    _____2,000-2,999   _____8,000-7,999

    _____3,000-3,999   _____9,000-9,999

    _____4,000-4,999   _____10,000 or more

    _____5,000-5,999

12. If applicable, please indicate the other members of your family who contribute to the family income.

_____Not applicable: I am the sole contributor to family income.
Relationship (wife, husband, etc.)   Occupation

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

13. Where were you raised?

City or county _____

State _____

14. How many years of school have you completed?

_____1 - 8 years

_____9 - 11 years

_____High school graduate

_____Some college

_____Attended or completed graduate school

15. If you attended college or graduate school, please indicate:

Name of School   Location

(College) _____   _____

(Grad. School)_____   _____

15A. Were these segregated or integrated schools?

College: _____segregated   _____integrated

Grad. School: _____segregated   _____integrated

16. What is your religious affiliation? Which church do you attend?

_____

17. Do you now live in Lakeland?

_____Yes   _____No

   17A. IF YES: How long have you lived in Lakeland?

             _____years.

   17B. IF NO: How long have you been employed in Lakeland?

             _____years.

18. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS. Please indicate below the names of organizations with which you are or have been affiliated during the 1960's. Indicate also the offices you currently hold or have held in those organizations.

Organization	Member presently?	Offices held	Current or Past?
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P
	yes _ no		C _ P

19. If you serve on any biracial or Negro committees, boards, or projects on the local, state or national levels, please list them below. (Exclude those listed in response to question 18.)

Committee, Board, or Project

Local, State or National Level?

Offical Position

20. IDENTIFICATION OF NEGRO LEADERS

Below is a list of persons who have been identified as Negro leaders in the preliminary stages of reasearch. <u>Consider as leaders those who are able to make decisions and formulate general policies affecting Lakeland's Negro community as a whole.</u>

<u>Instructions:</u>

(1) Please add to this list the names of any other persons whom you consider to be leaders in the Negro community.

(2) Please delete from this list persons whom you do not consider to be leaders in the Negro community. (Draw a line through the appropriate names.)

(3) By check marks (✓) indicate the ten most outstanding Negro leaders in Lakeland.

(4) For each of the three items above, exclude yourself from consideration.

(✓) <u>Names listed alphabetically</u>

_____Curtis Abrams

_____Fred Brown

_____Robert Clark

_____Prentice Colby

_____James Corbin

_____Florence Darwin

_____Carl Dean

_____Scott Gardner

_____Thomas Hull

_____William Lakey

_____Cole Mathews

_____Reuben Morgan

_____Walter Phillips

_____Merritt Reed

_____Harold Russell

_____Joyce Simmons

_____Paul Towers

_____Charles Washburn

_____Franklin Weaver

_____Arthur Young

<u>Names added following</u>
<u>Instructions</u>

(✓)

_____

_____

_____

_____

21. You are here invited to express freely your thoughts concerning Negro leadership in Lakeland, Negro leadership at the national level, or the study being conducted.