NEW IRELAND: LOYALISTS IN EASTERN MAINE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

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By

Robert Wesley Sloan

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ABSTRACT

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By

Robert Wesley Sloan

In an article published in the Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society in 1970 Professor Wallace Brown, one of the authoritative scholars of loyalism during the American Revolution, summarized the development of Loyalist history and in his conclusion suggested additional approaches that would be valuable.[1] Among these suggestions Brown emphasized the need for more local studies in order to build up a body of detailed information upon which general theories about the Loyalists could be more firmly based. One excellent opportunity to follow Brown's proposal is the case of New Ireland, the Loyalist colony established during the Revolution in what is today eastern Maine. New Ireland has been neglected by historians, yet a close study of its Loyalists and their relations to rebels as well as British civil and military authorities may provide some insight into the Loyalist movement in general.

The colony had a peculiar history in that it never legally existed. A proposal for its creation was made to the government of Great Britain in 1778 and for several years

certain English officials argued for its acceptance. In the meantime they sent a military force to occupy part of the coast of Maine and then welcomed migrating Loyalists there. But the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolution also ended the hopes of the officials because its terms defined the land claimed for New Ireland as American--not English--soil.

In addition to the English officials, three groups were involved in establishing the new colony, two of them made up of British and American military forces. A British expeditionary force was sent to gain control of the site for New Ireland, but it was met by a counterexpeditionary force of American rebels dispatched to dislodge the British force. The counter-offensive failed and both sides thereafter found it necessary to maintain a military presence in eastern Maine. The third and most important group was composed of Loyalists. The vast majority of Loyalist refugees sought temporary havens in British strongholds such as New York, Boston, or Philadelphia because they expected Great Britain to suppress the rebellion and allow them to return to their homes. A relatively small number preferred the promise of permanent sanctuary that New Ireland offered.

Most of the information upon which this study is based comes from contemporary British and American materials, i. e., both government records and personal accounts. Some reliance

has been placed on secondary accounts by various authorities of the period and place, including local histories.

The major conclusion of this study is that New Ireland's history was one of adversity for friend and foe alike. The British and American military forces of course suffered from their confrontation. The Loyalists who came to the new colony did so to escape persecution from rebels, but they found only new problems when they reached New Ireland. Americans who lived near the British-occupied territory suffered because they refused to be a part of the colony. The promoters of the colony were frustrated when the Treaty of Paris gave the region meant for New Ireland to the newly independent States. This meant a final forlorn result, the move by Loyalists from New Ireland to other parts of the British Empire.

This study also attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the Loyalist movement in general. In most chapters an analysis is made of the major Loyalist topics upon which modern research has focused as each of those topics relates to New Ireland. For example, the thesis describes the types and effectiveness of Loyalist leadership and finds merchants who had had previous contact with the British through the lumber trade to have been the dominant class of leaders. As for social status, the great majority of Loyalists (about whom little evidence was found) were of the small farmer-fisherman rank. On the question of Loyalists doing active war service, the examination in this thesis of the interaction

between the British, the Loyalists, and the local rebel population reveals the inability of the British to quickly and efficiently make use of their colonial supporters while confirming that Tory raids merely escalated local resistance--but shows how effective those raids were. A considerable portion of the enquiry into Loyalist topics is devoted to Loyalist motivation. While there were examples among New Ireland's populace of most of the causes for loyalty to the English side, two causes for that loyalty were especially dominant. One was the economic motive resulting from such reasons as fear of trade disruption, fear of poverty, and temptation to deal with British military forces. A more important motive, at least the most often recorded cause that drove people to New Ireland, was rebel persecution.

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[1]Wallace Brown, "The View at Two Hundred Years: The Loyalists of the American Revolution," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, LXXXII, Part 1 (1970), 25-47.

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INTRODUCTION

In an article published in the Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society in 1970 Professor Wallace Brown, one of the authoritative scholars of loyalism during the American Revolution, summarized the development of Loyalist history and in his conclusion suggested additional approaches that would be valuable.[1] Among these suggestions Brown emphasized the need for more local studies in order to build up a body of detailed information upon which general theories about the Loyalists could be more firmly based. One excellent opportunity to follow Brown's proposal is the case of New Ireland, the Loyalist colony established during the Revolution in what is today eastern Maine. New Ireland has been neglected by historians, yet a close study of its Loyalists and their relations to rebels as well as British civil and military authorities may provide some insight into the Loyalist movement in general.

Since the publication of Louis Hartz' The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955) and William H. Nelson's

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[1]Wallace Brown, "The View at Two Hundred Years: The Loyalists of the American Revolution," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, LXXXII, Part 1 (1970), 25-47. Brown's two major studies on the Loyalists are The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants (Providence, Rhode Island, 1965) and The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York, 1969). See also his "Loyalists and the American Revolution," History Today, XII, no. 3 (March 1962), 149-157.

The American Tory (London, 1961), there has been a renewed interest in Loyalist studies. While still concerned with general works on the whole Loyalist movement,[2] these two authors and others such as Wallace Brown are focusing their attention on the analysis of certain topics in Loyalist history, topics most of which might be better understood by a study of New Ireland. For example, one current topic is the problem of determining Loyalist numbers. Since the claim by John Adams that one-third of Americans were Tories, writers have attempted to estimate a more accurate figure,

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[2]Outstanding general works on the Loyalists prior to current research were written in the last half of the nineteenth century and included: Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution with an Historical Essay, 2 vols. (1864), the second edition of which (Port Washington, New York, 1966) is used extensively in this study of New Ireland and is hereafter cited as Sabine, Loyalists; Egerton Ryerson, The Loyalists of America and Their Times, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1880); Moses Coit Tyler, The Literary History of the American Revolution, 2 vols. (Ithaca, New York, 1897), a work which includes an objective look at Loyalists as well as patriots; and Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York, 1902). Two more recent Canadian studies were W. Stewart Wallace, The United Empire Loyalists (Toronto, 1922); and George M. Wrong, Canada and the American Revolution (New York, 1935). During the first half of the present century, several regional studies on Loyalists were completed such as: Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution (New York, 1901); Otis G. Hammond, Tories of New Hampshire in the War of the Revolution (Concord, 1917); E. Alfred Jones, The Loyalists of Massachusetts: Their Memorials, Petitions, and Claims (London, 1930), another work important to this study of New Ireland; Howard Swiggett, War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers (New York, 1933); and Robert O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution (Durham, North Carolina, 1940). For more detailed summaries of the trends in Loyalist historiography, see the two works edited by G. N. D. Evans, The Loyalists (Toronto, 1968) in the Problems in Canadian History series; and Allegiance in America: The Case of the Loyalists (Reading, Massachusetts, 1969) in the Themes and Social Forces in American History series.

especially of those people who actively supported the British cause.[3] One of the most recent and perhaps most accurate calculations is that of Paul H. Smith in his essay "The American Loyalists: Their Organization and Numerical Strength."[4] Smith estimates the total number of Loyalists to have been 513,000, approximately 16 per cent of the colonial population. Another topic and one directly associated with numbers is that of locations of Loyalist strength. Here Wallace Brown leads the list of researchers with his colony-by-colony investigations.[5] A study of New Ireland cannot significantly contribute to overall estimates of numbers and locations of Loyalists, but it can and does

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[3]A major problem for historians has been the want of evidence. In the introduction to Loyalist Narratives From Upper Canada (Toronto, 1946), editor James J. Talman expressed the regret that so few personal Loyalist records had been uncovered (p. ix). Many of the Loyalist histories mentioned above (footnote 2) relied heavily upon the Loyalist claims reports that were compiled by the British government after the Revolution, but one recent writer believes that too much emphasis has been placed upon those claims. See Eugene R. Fingerhut, "Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalists' Claims: A Critique of Quantitative Analysis," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXV, no. 2 (April 1968), 245-258.

[4]Smith's article is found in W. M. Q., 3rd Ser., XXV, no. 2 (April 1968), 259-277. For other estimates see Brown, King's Friends, pp. 249-253, and Brown, Good Americans, pp. 226-238.

[5]See Brown's entire work, King's Friends, for detailed studies of each colony. For less extensive summaries of places of Loyalist strength see Brown, Good Americans, pp. 229-238; Brown, "Loyalists of the American Revolution," 150-151; Nelson, American Tory, pp. 87-89; and one of the best local studies made in this or earlier times, Esther Clark Wright, The Loyalists of New Brunswick (Fredericton, New Brunswick, 1955), pp. 155-158.

more definitely pinpoint Loyalist strength in upper, coastal New England.

There is general agreement among contemporary authorities about the nature of two other topics, Loyalist leadership and the use of Loyalists as military forces. Opinions on the first concur that while numerous personalities possessed certain leadership capabilities, their mild conservatism and slowness to act against the growing danger of rebellion (Nelson calls them the "moderate men" and uses such phrases as "comparative apathy" and "ineffective advocates" in describing their leadership[6]) caused them to fail in establishing adequate direction and organization of fellow Loyalists. They did have, however, some influence in determining the side taken by other Loyalists and, not surprisingly, were influential in later political developments in Canada.[7] New Ireland furnishes specific examples in support of these claims. As for Loyalists in military capacities Paul Smith has best researched the problem in his book Loyalists and Redcoats, a concluding quotation of which summarizes the common feeling among current writers: "In dealing with the Loyalists, Britain made two palpable errors. She turned to them for assistance much too

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[6]Nelson, American Tory, pp. 18, 41, 61-63.

[7]Ibid.; also, Brown, King's Friends, p. 178; Brown, Good Americans, p. 81; and Kenneth D. MacRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," pp. 240-243, the article found in Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964), pp. 219-274.

late, and then relied on them much too completely."[8] Again, results of the study of New Ireland concur with contemporary research, but may refine one or two details concerning Loyalists in the military, especially regarding their effect upon lowering the morale of rebel citizenry and bettering British control of the Province of Maine.

Another area of current concern is the social status of Loyalists. The long-held belief that Loyalists came primarily from the aristocratic, professional, and generally better classes of American colonial society has been altered by present day scholars who are proving that they were far more a cross-section of the population and that the majority of Loyalists, especially those who migrated to Canada, were farmers and average citizens.[9] Nevertheless, there is agreement that a disproportionately large number of the elite (professionals, officials, great landowners) became Loyalists. As we shall see, New Ireland's people were indeed a cross-section of colonial society, particularly its rural and ocean-oriented portion.

Still another topic is the political effect of Loyalists on Canadian history. Contemporary interest began in 1955 when Louis Hartz studied the development of American society

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[8]Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1964), p. 173. As the title implies, the entire work is devoted to Loyalists at war. For similar attitudes see Evans' two collections, Allegiance in America, pp. 38-49; and The Loyalists, p. 26. See also Nelson, American Tory, p. 143; and Brown, Good Americans, pp. 82-125.

[9]Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, pp. 160-163; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 260-267; MacRae, "Structure of Canadian History," p. 236.

from its roots in Europe and concluded that any conservatism in America, notably that of the Loyalists, was but a pale replica of European political conservatism because political developments in colonial America had made liberalism a dominant tradition.[10] Expanding on his thesis in a later book, Hartz gathered studies of various new western societies such as the United States and Canada, approaching them as "fragments of the larger whole of Europe struck off in the course of the revolution which brought the West into the modern world."[11] Hartz concentrated on the U. S. while a contributor, Kenneth MacRae, wrote the section on Canada. One of MacRae's conclusions was that, while Loyalists were far more liberal than their European conservative counterparts, their leaders nevertheless formed "mercantile oligarchies of ability and drive" in Canada and because of economic status and leadership capabilities "formed a profitable role for themselves in saving the colonial masses [of British North America] from the spectre of republicanism and democracy."[12] While any aspect of Canada's history is only incidental to that of New Ireland, indications are that the latter colony's

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[10]Hartz, Liberal Tradition in America, pp. 58, 69-74.

[11]Hartz, Founding of New Societies, p. 3.

[12]MacRae, "Structure of Canadian History," p. 243. A political scientist, G. Horowitz, later expanded on Hartz' "fragment" approach to North American societies and concluded that Loyalists were partially responsible for the rise of socialism in Canada. See his article, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXII (February to November 1966), 143-171.

merchant leaders did play prominent roles in the organization of the oligarchic government of the province of New Brunswick, the British colony that was established after the Revolution.

The final topic of prime concern to today's historians is Loyalist motivation, and the best summary that can be made about current studies is that loyalty was (and is) a very complicated matter. That is the collected opinion of the several authorities whose comments are compiled by G. Evans in Allegiance in America[13] and that is the belief of the two recent indepth studies on Loyalists and loyalism made by William Nelson and Wallace Brown. Nelson's study places great emphasis upon the Tory or conservative views as prime motives of Loyalists;[14] Brown's is a broader look at the variety of motives evident among Loyalists.[15]

Motives appear to fall into three broad categories: ties to England; reasons of self-interest; and influence of others. The first category includes such reasons for loyalty as oaths taken to Britain by military officers and/or civilian officials, past and present service in the military, personal attachments to the mother country (educated in

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[13]pp. 157-170.

[14]See the final chapter of Nelson, American Tory, pp. 170-190.

[15]See Brown, Good Americans, pp. 44-81; King's Friends, pp. 36-40, 269-282; and "The American Farmer During the Revolution: Rebel or Loyalist?" Agricultural History, XLII (October 1968), 327-338.

England, recent immigration from the British Isles, membership in the Church of England), and of course loyalty to the crown and institutions of England. In the second category are conservatism of the well-to-do and/or dread of trade disruption, the temptation to deal with the British (especially their military forces), poverty ("Loyalists recruited heavily from the poor people."[16]), opportunism such as families splitting up that they might have a foot in each camp, misadventures such as early persecution for Tory attitudes, pacifism, and personal reasons--or simply not knowing why one was a Loyalist, perhaps from timidity. In the last category there are group as well as individual influences. For the former there were such groups as British military forces whose presence in an area or whose victories encouraged loyalism among the people, or groups such as hinterland factions that quarreled with seaboard and urban areas. Illustrations of individual influences include those of such leaders as church officials (especially Anglican ministers), prominent local personages, or friends. As for New Ireland, it will be shown that all these motives were evident among that colony's inhabitants, but that some were far more important than others.

These are examples of the detail to which today's historians are carrying Loyalist research. They are the result of the desire for greater objectivity, of the greater accessibility of source materials, and of a renewed interest

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[16]Brown, King's Friends, p. 265.

in Loyalists and loyalism. They in turn demand more local studies to complement or correct their findings. This investigation of New Ireland is one such local study. But it should be kept in mind that it is primarily a history of the people and events of that shortlived colony. It is therefore a history written in the narrative style first because its case is little known and must be followed step by step before analysis can be made and second because evidence is too slight to permit a completely analytical approach. However, since it can contribute information regarding Loyalists in general, conclusions to most chapters include an analysis of the Loyalists involved. For those chapters the current findings on Loyalist motivation will be reviewed, and in the final chapter the other major topics upon which modern research has focused will be summarized and related to New Ireland's history.

Chapter II

PLANNING A COLONY

This is a history of a little-known British colony called New Ireland. It is also a narrative of the misfortunes suffered by the people associated with that colony. Established during the American Revolution as a haven for American Loyalists, the colony was intended to be permanent, regardless of the outcome of the war, but it lasted only from 1779 to 1783.

The colony had a peculiar history in that it never legally existed. A proposal for its creation was made to the government of Great Britain in 1778 and for several years certain English officials argued for its acceptance. In the meantime they went ahead with its establishment. In 1779 they sent a military force to occupy part of the coast of Maine and then welcomed migrating Loyalists there. But the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolution also ended the hopes of the officials because its terms defined the land claimed for New Ireland as American--not English--soil. Thus the colony had a brief though unofficial existence.

In addition to the English officials, three groups were involved in establishing the new colony, two of them made up of British and American military forces. A British expeditionary force was sent to gain control of the site for New Ireland, but was met by a counterexpeditionary force of

American rebels dispatched to dislodge the British force. The counter-offensive failed and both sides thereafter found it necessary to maintain a military presence in eastern Maine. The third and most important group was composed of Loyalists. The vast majority of Loyalist refugees sought temporary havens in British strongholds such as New York, Boston, or Philadelphia because they expected Great Britain to suppress the rebellion and allow them to return to their homes. A relatively small number preferred the promise of permanent sanctuary that New Ireland offered.

Those who moved to the new colony were not to have their troubles end; nor were they the only ones associated with the colony to experience misfortune. For Loyalists, for English civil and military officials, for American antagonists--for friend and foe alike--the history of New Ireland was a history of adversity.

There were three groups of people who played principal roles in the creation of New Ireland. The first group consisted of three men who were responsible for the idea for the colony. The second group was made up of three military officers who directed the occupation and defense of the site of the proposed colony in eastern Maine. The third group included the Loyalists who had settled there prior to the British occupation.

The three people who had originated the idea for the colony included two Americans, Loyalists John Calef and John

Nutting, and one Englishman, William Knox, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies in the British cabinet headed by Lord Frederick North. Although Calef and Nutting did not knew each other prior to the establishment of New Ireland, they had much in common. Both had homes near Boston, Massachusetts, which they lost because they were Loyalists. Both had developed connections with eastern Maine before the war. And each of them, separately, contacted the British government regarding the future of that region. Nutting's communication was more direct, at least with Undersecretary Knox, the man who would be the prime mover of the scheme in England, but Calef's came first.

Calef, a doctor of medicine and former representative to the Massachusetts provincial assembly,[1] first became linked with the Penobscot Bay area in 1772 when Thomas Hutchinson, Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, sent him to England to represent settlers at Penobscot who wanted their land claims confirmed by royal grant. Calef presented their case and returned to America, but the confirmations were not yet completed when the rebellion began.

In the meantime, three months before the battles of Lexington and Concord, Dr. Calef wrote to Sir Francis Bernard,

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[1]For family background on John Calef see David Russell Jack, "The Caleff Family," Acadiensis, III, no. 3 (July 1907), 261-273. There are several spellings of the name; the most common is "Calef". For Calef's political and military background see "Calef, John, M. D.," Biographical Data Relating to New Brunswick Families, Especially of Loyalist Descent, collected by David Russell Jack, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick Museum, St. John, 1965), I, 142-155. Hereafter cited as Biographical Data.

former Governor of Massachusetts now living in London, that the Penobscot people desired the establishment of a separate government for the area. When Bernard passed the idea on to the Earl of Dartmouth, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, he urged its acceptance because it would make a "resort for the persecuted loyalists of New England."[2] There is no evidence to indicate that the proposal was ever delivered to Dartmouth's successor, Lord George Germain. Since William Knox held his position as undersecretary under both Dartmouth and Germain, he may have kept it in mind; but it did not arise again until John Nutting appeared in England.

Nutting's association in the lumber trade along the Maine coast and his purchase of timber lands on Penobscot Bay indirectly resulted in his involvement in the establishment of New Ireland. His business enterprises attracted the attention of British military authorities in Boston when barracks were needed for incoming troops in 1774. Nutting was asked to supervise their construction and he accepted.

Nutting's continued association with the British after the war began led to his meeting William Knox. His repeated work for the military, building barracks in Boston until its

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[2]Calef's prewar concerns with Penobscot settlers is found in E. Alfred Jones, The Loyalists of Massachusetts, Their Memorials, Petitions and Claims (London, 1930), pp. 70-71. Hereafter cited as Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts. Bernard's quote is included in these pages.

evacuation, then building fortifications at Halifax, Nova Scotia, earned for him a trip to England late in 1777. He went in order to report a naval failure to take the rebel outpost of Machias east of the Penobscot River (that failure will be mentioned again). The office to which he reported was the colonial office; the officer was Knox.[3] Nutting and Knox found a mutual interest in the future of Penobscot. It was not recorded who initiated discussion on the topic, but in January, 1778, Knox induced Nutting to write to Lord Germain about the possibility of establishing a post there.

Nutting responded enthusiastically. He described a peninsula whose harbor could hold the entire British Navy and was so easily defendable that a thousand men and two ships could protect it against any continental force. He noted how the people of the area were well disposed to British control and how the post would be strategically located to carry the war to New England as well as to protect Nova Scotia from attack.[4]

Nutting did not specifically mention the place as a refuge for Loyalists, but his emphasis--or that of Knox--upon its strategic value was sure to bring a receptive response

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[3]Samuel Francis Batchelder, Bits of Cambridge History (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1930), pp. 282-308. Hereafter cited as Batchelder, Bits. One chapter is devoted to "The Adventures of John Nutting, Cambridge Loyalist."

[4]Nutting to Germain, London, January 17, 1778, Public Record Office, London: Colonial Office Papers. C. O. 5, "America and West Indies, 1689-1819." Vol. 155, no. 88, pp. 35-37. Transcripts in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Hereafter cited as C. O. 5. A year later, when Admiral George Collier asked him what could possibly have induced him to recommend a settlement there, Nutting denied

from Germain. At this particular time Lord George Germain was in need of new military plans. He had become colonial secretary in 1775 because he believed that the rebellion should be suppressed. Given responsibility for planning British strategy in the war,[5] he employed tactics that had been quite successful early in the struggle; but now, in 1778, events were posing threats to his position. The prolonged fighting, the defeat of General John Burgoyne at Saratoga in October of 1777, and the possibility of a French alliance with the Americans were all contributing to the growing demand in Fngland to end the war. Parliamentary opposition would soon cause Prime Minister North to send commissioners to America to discuss peace. In the meantime Germain had to continue military operations, and it was in the midst of this two-way approach to the struggle that Knox had Nutting introduce the potential of Penobscot.[6]

Germain accepted the idea and plans for the post were completed in Fngland in September, 1779. Although Germain was primarily concerned with military considerations, he broadened the scheme to include the establishment of a new colony in the Penobscot area. Situated between New England

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that he had. See Collier to General George Clinton, Penobscot, August 24, 1779, "British Headquarters (Sir Guy Carleton) Papers, 1747 (1777)-1783," Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institute of Great Britain (London, 1904-1909), II, 18-19. Hereafter cited as "British Headquarters Papers." In light of subsequent events, Nutting's figures for defense were amazingly accurate.

[5]John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York, 1969), pp. 217-218. Hereafter cited as Alden, American Revolution.

[6]Ibid., pp. 383-387.

and Nova Scotia, it would be called New Ireland,[7] and it would be a haven for refugee Loyalists, whether or not the war was won.[8] On September 2 Germain drafted the following orders for General George Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in North America:

> The distress of the King's loyal American subjects who have been driven from their habitations and deprived of their property by the rebels has been an object of attention with His Majesty and Parliament from the first appearance of the rebellion; and very considerable sums have been expended in furnishing them with a temporary support. But, as their number is daily increasing and is much to be apprehended (if a reconciliation does not soon take place) that scarcely any who retain their principles will be suffered to remain in the revolted provinces, it is judged proper in that event that a permanent provision should be made by which they may be enabled to support themselves and their families without being a continual burden upon the revenue of Great Britain.
>
> The tract of country that lies between Penobscot River and the River St. Croix, the boundary of Nova Scotia on that side, offers itself for the reception of those meritorious but distressed people. And it is the King's intention to erect it into a province. . . .
>
> As the first step toward making this establishment it is His Majesty's pleasure, if peace has not taken place and the season of the year is not too far advanced before you receive this, that you do send such a detachment of troops at Nova Scotia, or of the provincials under your

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[7]Batchelder, Bits, p. 312. The author speculates that the name was "perhaps in delicate reference to Knox's own nationality."

[8]Former Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson met Knox on September 19 and was told of the plan. He credited the undersecretary for originating it and wrote in his diary that night: "It put me in mind of Mr. Locke's story of Ld Shaftesbury's friend, who, after he was privately married, sent for his Ldship and another friend, to ask their advice: and I observed the same rule so far as to find no fault with the preposterous measure, because already carrying into execution. . . . However, I intend to make Mr. Knox acquainted . . . with my sentiments." See The Diary and Letters of His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, Esq.

> immediate command, as you shall judge proper and sufficient to defend themselves against any attempt the rebels in those parts may be able to make during the winter to take post on Penobscot River, taking with them all necessary implements for erecting a fort, together with such ordnance and stores as may be proper for its defense, and a sufficient supply of provisions.[9]

Germain also cited other reasons for the post, repeating the claims that Nutting had listed in his January letter. But he had his own motives as well for the operation. In a November directive to Clinton that was marked "very secret," he reminded the general that keeping the coasts constantly alarmed and destroying or disrupting enemy shipping could be important enough to return the provinces to British allegiance.[10] Note should be made of the earlier suggestion by Germain that provincials be used. With the forthcoming southern campaigns that would ultimately take Lord Charles Cornwallis to Yorktown and defeat, Loyalists were to get their opportunity to support their cause more actively.

Comp. Peter Orlando Hutchinson (London, 1883), II, 217-218. Hereafter cited as Diary . . . of Thomas Hutchinson. Hutchinson may have forgotten that before the war he had seen the likelihood of the area becoming a separate province. See Hutchinson to Earl of Dartmouth, Boston, December 30, 1772, "Shelburne Papers, 1757-1787," Vol. 66, p. 196. Transcripts in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Hereafter cited as "Shelburne Papers."

[9]Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, September 2, 1778, no. 11, "American Manuscripts (Carleton Papers), 1775-1783," Vol. 7, no. 27, pp. 239-241. Transcripts in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Hereafter cited as Carleton Papers. A copy of the above letter can also be found in Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven, Connecticut, 1954), pp. 390-391. Hereafter cited as Clinton, American Rebellion.

[10]Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, November 4, 1778, Carleton Papers, Vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 249-251. Germain had long favored coastal operations. See Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, July 27, 1777, "Correspondence of William

The colonial office decided that John Nutting should deliver the orders to General Clinton. Germain and Knox felt that, since Nutting had been a "longtime resident" of the Penobscot region, the personal contact would expedite matters. They also recommended that he be the engineer for the proposed fortifications.[11]

Nutting sailed immediately for America but ran into trouble on the way. The mail packet on which he was traveling encountered an American privateer and after a brief battle in which Nutting was wounded (he sank the dispatches he was carrying), he and the packet crew found themselves captives. They were taken to Corunna, Spain, where Nutting was exchanged[12] and whence he promptly wrote to Knox of his adventures and plight.[13] Knox in turn communicated a rather forlorn note to Germain. "Poor Nutting and the Penobscot orders," he wrote, "have missed their way for this year and I fear something will happen to prevent our taking possession of the country in the spring."[14]

Knox, Chiefly in Relation to American Affairs, 1757-1808," Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections (Dublin, 1909), VI, 133-134. Hereafter cited as "Knox Correspondence." See also extract of letter, Germain to Clinton, September 27, 1779, in Clinton, American Rebellion, pp. 423-424. William Knox, at a much later date, added another reason for the post, the protection of Lower Canada as well as Nova Scotia. See Knox to E. Cooke, Ealing, January 17, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 227-228.

[11]Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, September 2, 1778, "Carleton Papers" (note 9, above).

[12]Batchelder, Bits, pp. 314-317.

[13]Nutting to Knox, Corunna, Spain, September 30, 1778, C. O. 5, Vol. 155, no. 146, pp. 92-93.

[14]Knox to Lord George Germain, Bath, October 31, 1778, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 153-154.

Knox need not have worried. Nutting's copy of the orders for General Clinton was not the only one sent. Consequently, by the time that Nutting finally got to New York the following March, many arrangements for the establishment of the post had already been made.

It is appropriate here to introduce the three men of military rank who played key parts in the establishment of New Ireland. One was an army colonel; the others were naval officers. Both Colonel Francis MacLean and Admiral Sir George Collier had seen long service for their country, but their careers had not involved overseas colonial assignments until the Revolution. The third man, Captain Henry Mowatt, also a career officer, had spent many years in American waters prior to 1775 and by 1779 had gained some notoriety for his wartime activities.

The cause of John Nutting's visit to England was an incident that involved Admiral Collier and resulted in bringing Colonel MacLean to Nova Scotia, the debarkation point for the Penobscot expeditionary force. In the fall of 1777 plans were made in Halifax for a joint army-navy operation against the small, isolated, rebel settlement of Machias situated on the coast of eastern Maine. Collier was to command the navy arm. For some unexplained reason, instead of waiting for the army transports, he had attacked the settlement with only his ships. The attack failed and he was driven off. The commanding officer in Nova Scotia, Major-General Eyre Massey, lodged several complaints against Collier for his impromptu action, and one of them was sent

via Nutting to England. The only significant outcome of the whole episode, however, was that Massey asked for and received permission to leave the Nova Scotia command.[15] No further criticisms of Collier came from official sources. The man sent to replace Massey was Colonel MacLean, who was presently elevated in rank to Brigadier-General.[16]

Shortly after MacLean assumed his new post in September, 1778, he was included in the New Ireland scheme. In December General Clinton received the orders regarding Penobscot and relayed them to General MacLean because the latter was to organize the force that was to occupy Penobscot. Clinton added that more specific orders would follow and in the meantime MacLean should consult with a Captain Henry Mowatt, whose vessel carried the orders to Halifax.[17]

Mowatt was recommended to MacLean because of his knowledge of the Maine coast. He had spent a major part of the French and Indian War in New England waters and remained there down to the outbreak of the Revolution. In 1774 his ship assisted in the blockade of Boston Harbor. In the

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[15]There are four letters that concern General Massey's trouble with Collier and his departure from the command of Nova Scotia: Massey to General William Howe, Halifax, November 26, 1777; same to same, Halifax, January 2, 1778; same to same, Halifax, March 15, 1778; and Clinton to Massey, Philadelphia, May 15, 1778--all found in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, pp. 156, 168-171, 209-210, 250-251.

[16]Germain ordered Clinton to direct MacLean's 82nd Regiment to Halifax and the colonel to assume command there. See Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, March 11, 1778, "Carleton Papers," Vol. 7, no. 5, p. 232. For MacLean's promotion see Clinton to MacLean, New York, September 24, 1778, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, p. 301.

[17]Clinton to MacLean, New York, January 19, 1779, ibid., Vol. I, p. 372.

following year, after the fighting began, it was sent north to discourage rebel sentiment in various coastal communities.

In the performance of the latter duty, Mowatt became involved in a historic event that affected the future both of New Ireland and himself. At Falmouth he chastised rioters with a cannonade that destroyed a considerable portion of the town. The incident resulted in such heightened pressures by rebel sympathizers on several Loyalist families that they had to leave Falmouth. They would later end up at Penobscot.[18] As for Mowatt, apparently his superiors felt he carried out his orders too thoroughly because the act brought such disfavor upon him that he spent the next four years on picket duty in remote waters off Nova Scotia, vainly trying to gain a more significant command. Incidently, his immediate superior there was Admiral Collier, one of those who showed official displeasure toward him.[19]

Between the Falmouth event and January, 1779, General George Clinton was made the new British commander in America and he needed reliable information about the coast of northern New England. Discarding the attitude of his predecessor toward Mowatt and recognizing the value that

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[18]The Falmouth attack will be dealt with in more detail in a later chapter.

[19]Captain Mowatt left a personal account of his experiences before and during the Revolution, a copy of which can be found in James P. Baxter, "A Lost Manuscript," Collections and Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society, 2nd Series, Vol. II (Portland, 1891), pp. 345-375; for the above mentioned events, see pp. 345-360. Hereafter cited as Baxter, "Lost Manuscript." For additional information on Mowatt, see David Russell Jack, "The Mowatt Family," Acadiensis, VIII, no. 4 (October 1908), 308-316; and Biographical Data, Vol. III, p. 111.

Mowatt's experience and knowledge would have for the Penobscot expedition, he had summoned the captain to New York. Clinton not only got the information he wanted but also was convinced by Mowatt that Falmouth--not Penobscot--should be the objective of the campaign. The new proposal was passed on to London while the captain returned to Halifax to confer with MacLean.[20]

There, Captain Mowatt ran afoul of Admiral Collier. While at New York, Mowatt had been proposed by Clinton to command the naval portion of the expedition. Now, from Halifax Mowatt complained to Clinton that Collier, instead of ordering his ship to be immediately refitted, had intended to send her and himself to Annapolis Royal on the Bay of Fundy in order to protect that eastern country.[21] To make matters worse for Mowatt, Collier was reassigned to New York where he became Senior Officer, replacing the man who had endorsed Mowatt's leading the expedition.[22]

In the meantime mere chance played its part in New Ireland's history. While Mowatt was at Annapolis Royal, he ran into John Calef, whose reappearance into this narrative along with that of John Nutting in New York determined once again that Penobscot would be the focus of attention.

Calef had moved to Penobscot in 1775 in order to get

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[20]For Mowatt's persuasion of Clinton in favor of Falmouth and his return to Nova Scotia, see two letters from Clinton to MacLean, New York, February 11, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, p. 381.

[21]Mowatt to Clinton, Halifax, March 5, 1779, ibid., Vol. I, p. 393.

[22]Baxter, "Lost Manuscript," p. 360.

away from rebel persecution in his home town near Boston. As soon as the Revolution started, his loyalties had become suspect there, and when he asked Massachusetts authorities for permission to sail to the Maine coast to deliver needed food supplies to the local inhabitants, his 300-ton ship instead was confiscated. Several times thereafter he was threatened by mobs while his house was fired into on more than one occasion. So he had moved north to an area that he found "well affected" toward British government.[23]

It was when Captain Mowatt was at Annapolis Royal that Calef tried to convey those feelings to friendly British authorities by sailing there in a small boat. He told Mowatt and the commanding officer that he had come on behalf of the people of Penobscot to request that a British post be established in their midst. Mowatt hurriedly forwarded the appeal to MacLean and then advised Calef to return and prepare the people "for whatever may be the result."[24]

Besides that information General MacLean soon received more explicit news form New York, carried to him this time by John Nutting. General Clinton had received orders from Lord Germain confirming Penobscot for the post; and the general sent Nutting, who had brought the orders from England, on to Halifax with detailed directions for the expedition.[25]

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[23]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 70.

[24]See the letter of recommendation written for Calef by John MacDonald, Captain, 2nd Batl., 84th Regt., London, February 20, 1782, "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 187-189. MacDonald was the commander at Annapolis Royal when Calef went there in 1779.

[25]Nutting to Germain, New York, April 5, 1779, C. O. 5, Vol. 156, pp. 133-134. Nutting arrived at New York on March 28.

Clinton recommended a force of 500 men and sent a captain of engineers for the fortifications (Nutting would assist in their construction). Although Clinton did not rule out advanced penetration down the coast, he ordered that Penobscot first be secured and then perhaps activities be extended toward Falmouth.[26]

As an added assurance of success, both Clinton and Germain contacted General Frederick Haldimand, Governor of Canada. Clinton apprised him of the details of the campaign and emphasized the possibilities of better communications with Quebec, Haldimand's headquarters, via the new settlement.[27] Germain did likewise and also directed Haldimand to assist the expedition by sending a detachment of men into Maine by way of the Chaudière River, adding with considerable optimism that if everything worked out well, he had "little doubt of the recovery of the King's obedience [of] the whole of the Province."[28] Unfortunately, the future would show that Haldimand was too concerned with his own theatre of war to become very active in the Maine enterprise.

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[26]Two letters, Clinton to MacLean, New York, April 13, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, pp. 416-418. The details of the Penobscot expedition fit well into overall campaign plans; Germain called for Clinton to keep the American Continental Army busy, two corps of 4000 to hit the northern and southern coasts, and Canadian parties of Indians and troops to harass the frontiers. See Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, January 23, 1779, "Haldimand Papers," British Museum Manuscripts, Vol. B43, B. M. 21,703, pp. 132-134. Transcripts in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Hereafter cited as "Haldimand Papers."

[27]Clinton to Haldimand, New York, April 13, 1779, ibid., Vol. B147, B. M. 21,807, pp. 37-38.

[28]Germain hoped that the Kennebec River might become the center of the new settlement--which leads one to believe that,

Nevertheless, all arrangements appeared completed when Captain Mowatt again became entangled in a quarrel with his superior, Admiral Collier. Now at New York Collier agreed that Mowatt's ship, the Albany, should convoy the fleet of transports going to Penobscot, but it would do so alone. For his part Mowatt feared that one ship would not be sufficient protection; and, as he wrote years later, he was apprehensive of the consequences had it been alone: It would have meant the destruction of the invading force before it ever reached its destination and its effect "would have been equivalent to a Second Burgoynade."[29]

Fortunately, nature intervened. General MacLean had organized a force of 640 troops, including 440 of the 74th Regiment and 200 of his 82nd. MacLean wrote to Clinton that he himself would go along so that he could "put the post in order and be on hand to judge the practicability of any attempt" toward Falmouth. But, he added, contrary winds had kept Mowatt from joining him at Halifax and he therefore had asked a Captain (?) Barclay, now in charge of naval forces around Nova Scotia, to assist him. Barclay not only consented but also added two other ships to his own frigate.

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since the written instructions to Clinton were rather general, the verbal ones carried by Nutting may have received a different emphasis as to target. Could Nutting or Knox have promoted Penobscot when Germain favored a more westerly post? See two letters, Germain to Haldimand, Whitehall, April 14 and 16, 1779, "Haldimand Papers," Vol. B40, B. M. 21,710, pp. 301-302. Also, the tenor of the letters from Germain and Clinton to Haldimand appear to have a patronizing air. Perhaps they felt Haldimand had to be treated gently; events would show his reluctance toward the whole project.

[29]Baxter, "Lost Manuscript," pp. 360-361.

Then, in a last-minute postscript to his letter, MacLean wrote: "Albany came in last nite [sic]. extremely happy because of Mowatt's abilities and knowledge of coast. leave tomorrow morning, if wind permits."[30] Barclay decided to proceed anyway and thus the potential threat of destruction at sea had been avoided.

The land intended to become New Ireland had had a rather bleak history prior to 1779. Controlled by France from 1604 to 1713, it saw only sporadic attempts at settlement, all of them ending in hardship or disaster. When France ceded the region to Great Britain in 1713, the area did not enjoy a tranquil season of English settlement but became a no man's land between French and English claims in the New World. For nearly forty years it was inhabited only by a few Indian tribes that occasionally warred against English settlers to the east and west. Not until the end of the struggle between France and England for North America in 1763 did New Englanders begin migrating into the region.

For the purpose of this study, it is this last group that is important. Geographical reasons, however, require that the group not be considered as a whole. The coast of Maine is most irregular, composed of numerous estuaries bounded by fingers of land that jut out to sea. For the English settlers, that meant the establishment of isolated instead of contiguous pockets of habitation. Small colonies

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[30]MacLean to Clinton, Halifax, May 28, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, p. 440.

of immigrants were either located up the navigable portions of major rivers or scattered along the coast at the heads of embayments or on islands. The settlement of greatest importance to New Ireland was centered on the Bagaduce Peninsula in Penobscot Bay.[31] It was usually referred to as the Penobscot settlement. While the British intended that the entire Penobscot-to-St. Croix region be New Ireland, they actually would control only the area in this western proximity (see maps, p. 28).

Two men were important to the settlement of eastern Maine and subsequently to the history of New Ireland. The first was Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts during the French and Indian War. In order to protect the eastern frontier in 1759, he led an expedition up the Penobscot River. After burying a lead plate on the east shore as proof of his colony's right to eastern Maine, he constructed a fort on the opposite side of the river at the head of Penobscot Bay.[32]

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[31]Also called "Majabigwaduce," this longer name had numerous spellings. The English continued to call it by the French term. After the Revolution the Americans changed its name to Castine. Two of the better known seventeenth century French commanders at Bagaduce were d'Aulnay de Charnesay and Jean Vincent, Baron de St. Castin. The French, by the way, used the Penobscot River as an avenue of communications between Acadia and Quebec.

[32]While there, Pownall paid a visit to the old French ruins at Bagaduce. Entering the crumbling fortifications, he raised the British ensign and drank to the king's health. He then looked about at the remains of the rest of the former settlement, "which from the scite [sic] and situation of the houses, and the remains of the fields and orchards, had been once a pleasant habitation: One's heart felt sorrow



A. NEW IRELAND (lined area).



B. PROVINCE OF MAINE



C. PENOBSCOT BAY

Both actions were to affect New Ireland. As will be shown later, Pownall's claim to the eastern district as a part of Massachusetts contributed to the final decision as to the legality of the colony. His second act, the erection of Fort Pownall, eventually brought to the area Colonel Thomas Goldthwaite, a man whose influence was a factor in polarizing attitudes toward rebellion held by the people of the locale.

Goldthwaite became commander of Fort Pownall in 1763 and by the beginning of the Revolution he had become perhaps the most conspicuous individual in the Penobscot Valley. A former Secretary of War for Massachusetts, he served as the fort's commander from 1763 to 1770 and again from 1771 to 1775. In addition, he was Officer of Customs at Penobscot, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and owner of several thousands of acres of land in the region.

But at a time when relations between the colonies and the mother country were growing increasingly strained, the colonel did not hesitate to show where his loyalties lay. They were to the crown, a trait that caused him temporary loss of command in 1770 (he was reinstated by Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson in the following year) and again in

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that it had ever been destroyed." The same might have been said of the remains of New Ireland in 1784. Pownall is quoted in George Augustus Wheeler, History of Castine, Penobscot, and Brooksville, Maine; Including the Ancient Settlement of Pentagoet (Bangor, Maine, 1875), pp. 34-35. Hereafter cited as Wheeler, History of Castine. See also "The Expedition to Penobscot and the Erection of Fort Pownall, 1759," Bangor Historical Magazine, VII (October, November, December 1891), 63-64. Hereafter cited as "Expedition to Penobscot."

1775, when he was dismissed for refusing to serve in the name of rebel Massachusetts authorities. Before he left his post, he allowed Captain Mowatt and the Royal Navy to remove the guns and ammunition; afterwards, the Americans burned the fort to the ground. Colonel Goldthwaite left the Penobscot and ended up in England as a displaced Loyalist. Later, he became a supporter of the New Ireland scheme.[33]

While the fort was active, several thousand people settled east of the Penobscot River. The General Assembly of Massachusetts made scattered grants for townships to proprietors who, in turn, laid out lots and placed families upon them. One such town comprised Bagaduce and a part of the mainland and may have had ninety families by 1775. Since the grants required royal confirmation, a few towns in the Penobscot region (including Bagaduce) sent a representative to England in 1772 to request it. The man chosen to present the request was Dr. John Calef.[34]

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[33]"Expedition to Penobscot," 65; and Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 147-149. Another source gives additional reasons why Goldthwaite departed, describing him as a repulsive, arrogant, and unpopular person who cheated settlers and Indians. See Joseph Williamson, "Thomas Goldthwait [sic]," Bangor Historical Magazine, II (July 1886-January 1887), 87-89.

[34]The information on the growth of the whole region is based on various writings Calef presented to the government in England. See "A List of the No. of Inhabitants . . . Eastward of Sagadahock to St. Croix taken Oct. 1772," "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, p. 214; "The Memorial and Petition of John Calef Esquire Agent for the Inhabitants of the Territory of Penobscot . . . July 12, 1780," and "The State of the Inhabitants of the District of the Penobscot, March, 1782,"--both found in Joseph Williamson, "The Proposed Province of New Ireland," Collections of the

Many of the Bagaduce settlers for whom Calef petitioned had come there because of the existence of Fort Pownall. One Aaron Banks had been with Governor Pownall in 1759 and had served at the newly-constructed fort for a time. Following his discharge from the militia, he and several relatives and friends moved to the peninsula from more populated areas of Massachusetts colony.[35] Young Thomas Goldthwaite and his brother Henry, sons of the colonel, opened a store on or near Bagaduce and probably were partners with Nathan Phillips, a native of Boston who developed a shipping trade between there and Penobscot.[36] Many of these and later settlers were the people for whom Calef went to Annapolis Royal in 1779 to ask that a British post be established among them.

When the Revolution began, the pioneers of all newly settled areas of Maine, like so many other Americans, had to decide whether or not to keep faith with Great Britain.

Maine Historical Society, 3rd Ser., Vol. I (Portland, Maine, 1904), pp. 152-154, 154-156. Hereafter cited as Williamson, "Proposed Province," and the Collections as CMHS.

[35]For the names and dates of arrival of several of the first settlers, see "British Forces on the Penobscot," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 8 (Winter 1967), 1; and Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 200-203, 206-207.

[36]For the Goldthwaites see Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 146-149. For Phillips see the claim he filed with the British government for losses from the war, Public Record Office, London: Audit Office Claims. "American Loyalists, 1785-1787, Massachusetts Bay." A. O. 12, Vol. II, pp. 5-7. Hereafter cited as A. O. 12. See also Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 201.

The eastern Penobscot Bay region remained loyal; surrounding areas did not.

Other Maine settlements had an easier time making a decision in favor of rebellion than did Penobscot. If the people in them were not already opposed to Britain's authority, many were convinced by wartime events. There were the British attacks along the coast, two of the more notable being Mowatt's cannonading of Falmouth and Collier's assault on Machias. There were renewed fears resulting from rumors of Indian forays, instigated this time by the British instead of the French.[37] And, for some men, there were economic reasons. The only major export Maine had was lumber, a product in great demand in the more populated areas of Massachusetts. It was impossible for a saw-mill owner to remain loyal to Great Britain and still sell his produce to rebellious customers to the south. And for at least one town (Machias) there was local resentment toward the British government because much of its timber land was reserved by the crown for mast timber and thus was untouchable; rebellion could change that.[38]

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[37]Complaints of British attacks were sent to the General Court of Massachusetts. See letters, Committee of Safety to . . . General Court, Penobscot River, March 26, 1779; John Allan [to General Court], Machias, May 18, 1779; and John Parker [et al to General Court], Georgetown, June 18, 1779--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 243-244, 255-257, 289-292. See also "Damages in & near Camden, in 1779," CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 408-409. For the Indian threat see two letters, John Allan [to General Court], Machias, April 30 and May 8, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 241-242, 250-252.

[38]Dr. Calef kept a journal of "The Siege of Penobscot by the Rebels," a copy of which can be found in Wheeler,

For the Penobscot people such reasons had their other side. If British attacks and British threats converted other people to insurrection, rebel attacks and rebel threats caused them to maintain their allegiance to the crown. After Captain James Cargill and his rebel militia burned Fort Pownall in July, 1775, they proceeded toward Bagaduce, where they burned the Goldthwaites' store and confiscated several locally owned vessels and cattle. They took Nathan Phillips prisoner and sent him to Watertown and the Massachusetts government where, after some difficulty, he was finally released and allowed to return to Penobscot. Cargill did all this because the people had been sending lumber to General Thomas Gage, temporary Governor of Massachusetts and commander of British troops at Boston which was then besieged by American forces.[39] Nor was it the only outright attack made on people in the vicinity of Penobscot because of Loyalist sympathies.[40]

History of Castine, pp. 290-303 (hereafter cited as Calef, "Siege"). In a "Postscript" to it, Calef stated that there were more than 200 saw-mills in eastern Maine by 1775. He also claimed that the area was loyal to Britain, except for Machias (Wheeler, p. 312). For comments on the unique attitude of Machias, see Guy Murchie, St. Croix: The Sentinel River (New York, 1947), pp. 140-141. Hereafter cited as Murchie, St. Croix.

[39]Again, for the Goldthwaites see Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 146-149. Three settlers, John and Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch, whose names will recur several times in this work, were victims of the confiscations. For their losses see "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 165-168. As for Nathan Phillips, in his Loyalist claim that he filed after the war, he stated that he was taken by Cargill while in his store at Penobscot. See A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 1-2, 5-7; also Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 235.

[40]Two other victims of attacks were James Symons and

Added to the damage of these incursions was the poverty of many Penobscot people. As pioneers in a wilderness that did not always afford them the necessities of life, they had to rely in part upon the outside world. For that they had to have a produce to trade. Again, the one most in demand was lumber. It meant building saw-mills and selling lumber to the older centers down the coast or, for most, it was chopping down trees and hauling logs to the shore to sell to ships sent out by the mill owners or timber tradesmen.[41] Any rebel threat to any part of that trade, as in the case of the lumber going to General Gage at Boston, was a serious one for saw-mill operator, ship-owner, merchant, or homesteader.

Yet poverty and problems with trade were not unique to Penobscot. Settlers to the north, east, and west wrote to the General Council of Massachusetts during the war asking for assistance not only to repel enemy attacks but also to

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Benjamin Millekin, both of Union River, a settlement near Penobscot. Aee A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 139-142, 155-156.

[41]Rufus Buck, Fsq., gave a speech in 1857 on the history of Bucksport, a settlement north of Bagaduce, excerpts of which are found in the article "Fort Pownall," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 7 (Fall 1966), 2-3. One quote exemplifies the conditions on the Penobscot in 1775: "The spring was unusually dry and the whole summer so cold that no corn and but little grain of any kind was raised . . . and there was distress that a memorial was sent to the third Provincial Congress . . . representing the distressed condition of the inhabitants, that many families were without bread and that some children had actually died of hunger." Yet that is the summer that Dr. Calef was not allowed to bring food in his ship to the Penobscot. Another example of the poor circumstances is found in "Penobscot, Castine, and Brooksville, 1767-1817," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 10 (Summer 1967), 2.

gain relief from poor circumstances. One of the most consistent communicants was John Allan, rebel leader at Machias and officially the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Eastern Department. He repeatedly requested supplies from Boston (after the British evacuation) for Indians and settlers alike. In May, 1779, he also complained about the illicit trade with the enemy that was carried on by local people and warned that it and miserable conditions existing in all of eastern Maine would cause many habitations to give up to the Britons should they come among them.[42]

But only the Penobscot community would welcome General MacLean. It is significant that while others were appealing for help from the American side, Penobscot was sending Dr. Calef to Nova Scotia for assistance from the British. If Penobscot Bay did not suffer any more from poverty than the other areas, it suffered none the less. If Penobscot Tories were treated no differently from those of other areas, they were maltreated--and perhaps they constituted a more significant proportion of the population here than elsewhere. The case of Mathew Lymburner was a typical one: Having lived at Penobscot only five years when the war started and "wishing to preserve his loyalty to the King and at the same time stay on his property, [Lymburner] affected in public to be Neuter, altho in private he gave his assistance to every Loyalist that he could. But refusing to carry arms at Machias . . . and also to join in the mobs his principles

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[42]See Allan's letters (note 37, above).

became known, and having no dependence but on the lumber trade for subsistence not a son of liberty durst openly trade with him which reduced . . .[him] . . . to such misery that his numerous family must have starved had not Nathan Phillips relieved them to the utmost of his power."[43]

It should be remembered that Phillips was a Loyalist. And the influence of other personalities cannot be discounted. Colonel Goldthwaite was also a Loyalist and his sons remained leading local figures after his departure. John Nutting owned land and traded in lumber at Penobscot which he used to build barracks for English troops in Boston. Dr. John Calef fled from persecution and abuse to come to Bagaduce and set up a medical practice, the only known one in the region.

It was for a combination of reasons that an invitation was sent to the British to occupy Penobscot.

Thus preliminary developments for the colony had favorable results. The plans were complete and, considering the circumstances of wartime, perhaps not with undue difficulty. The three originators of the idea for New Ireland, Calef, Nutting, and Knox, had gotten the scheme accepted, and MacLean, Mowatt, and Collier were ready to do their part to establish the colony. Finally, at least a

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[43]Here again is a Loyalist claim written after the war, this one by Mathew Lymburner. Most Loyalists did not make written claims to the government. If all had, one wonders how many might have been similarly worded. See A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-106.

part of the people in the region destined to become New Ireland had displayed a receptive mood for the plan.

But the colony's origins had been accompanied by problems. Nutting's misadventures in crossing the Atlantic Ocean, his and Calef's sufferings because of loyalty to Great Britain, and the trouble that Mowatt had with superiors were the obvious ones. So, too, was the harshness of frontier life and rebel persecution suffered by the Penobscot people. The less obvious threats to the occupation were Germain's writings, which showed more interest in military victory than in a colony, and a reluctance on the part of Haldimand in Canada to lend assistance. However, the birth of New Ireland was assured. Individuals had suffered misfortune, but the project had survived. That was a condition that would become a trend.

In reviewing the motives for loyalism at Penobscot, there is strong evidence to support the stress put upon the complexities of motivation by present day historians. Not only were there several related reasons why a person remained loyal to Britain but the reasons of the average settler differed somewhat with those of the more prominent individual. The common settler, the farmer-woodcutter-fisherman who was trying to eke out a living from his small holding, had at least five possible reasons for being a Loyalist. First there was his isolated situation, not only from immediate rebel contacts but his long time absence from the more populated areas where rebellious

sentiment had grown up. Next there was his depressing poverty and the very real potential of being unable to obtain the basic necessities of life with the accompanying hope of relief from that poverty by selling his logs to men who in turn sold them to the British military forces in Boston. Added to that, there were neighbors who suffered from similar problems and lent moral support to his Loyalist tendencies by themselves favoring the British side. A resulting problem, however, was the threat or reality of rebel persecution for dealing with the enemy. Finally, there was the influence of the settler's leaders, merchants like the Goldthwaite brothers and Nathan Phillips, lumber dealers like John Nutting, the possible heritage of British allegiance left by old Colonel Goldthwaite, and the immediate, personal association of such a professional person as Dr. John Calef.

As for the more prominent people, their loyalty was for similar but varying reasons. Like the settlers, several of the better known people at Penobscot had suffered persecution from the rebels, but their experiences were more often direct ones and more costly, at least in terms of financial loss. The Goldthwaites, for example, lost a store and Phillips a boat while Nutting and Calef were forced to leave other homes and friends. Like the settlers, several notable individuals were dependent upon the British for trade and economic well-being, as were the Goldthwaites, Phillips, and Nutting. Finally, like the average settler, several were landed men; but in at least two cases, those of Colonel Goldthwaite and John Nutting, their land holdings

were far greater than a single homestead. There was another reason why a few of the leading personalities of Penobscot were Loyalists. Three had backgrounds of military service, Colonel Goldthwaite, John Nutting, and Dr. John Calef each having served in the last colonial war under British commanders and the British flag.[44] No single or simple reason then appears to have been the common cause for the side taken by any of the Penobscot people in the Revolution.

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[44]Batchelder, Bits, pp. 282-283; Biographical Data, I, 147, 154.

Chapter III

1779: A PROVINCE BORN IN CRISIS

The people who lived through the first two months of New Ireland's existence had far more difficulty than those who planned the colony. The three groups involved included the British and Massachusetts military forces and the civilian population of the Penobscot region. General MacLean's occupation of Bagaduce Peninsula in June of 1779 presented problems to that part of the local populace that supported the rebel cause. When Massachusetts promptly dispatched an army and navy to reclaim the territory, that maneuver caused even more distress to the rest of the populace. Fighting, of course, was hazardous for both military forces but the Americans suffered most. Their lack of discipline and the want of a cooperative spirit between land and sea components (assets possessed by the British) caused repeated problems and ultimately led to disaster. By mid-August Britain had assured itself control of part of eastern Maine and thus the colony could begin, despite the anguish endured by those who struggled over its birthright.

The British expeditionary force enjoyed good fortune from the beginning. It left Halifax on May 30 and took two weeks to sail to Penobscot Bay. The crossing went unchallenged, although two American vessels paid a brief

visit to Penobscot shortly before the British arrived. Once in the bay MacLean and the engineer sent to him by General Clinton reconnoitered the shoreline in order to decide on the most defensible location. It took three days to carry out the task. On the second day eight enemy ships were sighted outside the bay, but they turned about and headed out to sea. On June 15 Bagaduce Peninsula was chosen as the most likely site for a fort and the force was landed.[1]

The choice was an excellent one. The peninsula was (and is) triangular in shape and connected to the main shore to the north by a neck of land that could easily be guarded. The triangle pointed into the outlet of the quiet, rather broad Bagaduce River, which turned beside the peninsula's southern edge to form, with Cape Rozier and several small islands opposite, an exceptional harbor for the eighteenth-century warships that then stood in its waters. While the troops disembarked on the south shore, MacLean and his engineer selected a site for the fort about a quarter of a mile inland and atop a heavily wooded height of land.[2]

The British anticipated a hospitable reception and were not disappointed. From previous information MacLean knew

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[1]MacLean to Clinton, Penobscot River, Camp at Magebigwaduce, June 26, 1779; and Barclay to Clinton, Blonde, Penobscot River, June 27, 1779--both in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, pp. 458-462. John Nutting piloted the fleet during the crossing. See Batchelder, Bits, p. 318. Captain Mowatt later stated that two rebel ships were sighted during the voyage--perhaps to support his claim that greater protection for the transports was necessary. See Baxter, "Lost Manuscript," p. 361.

[2]MacLean to Clinton, ibid.

from whom he could expect assistance. The people who had asked Dr. Calef to go to Annapolis Royal that spring were known to him, and Colonel Goldthwaite had furnished a list of those whom he considered loyal.[3] Dr. Calef and Nathan Phillips presented themselves to the General upon his landing and were given the responsibility for rallying local support. Phillips was made captain and given the job of organizing the male inhabitants as a militia. The doctor acted as overseer of all civilians.[4] The general did his part by issuing a proclamation which declared that since many had already indicated their loyalty to the king of England, all should come in and take an oath within eight days, adding, as further inducements, that former behavior would not matter nor would any land claims be contested.[5] Hundreds responded. Some, because of distance or the responsibility of a large family, simply came in, took the oath, and returned

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[3]One source includes John and Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch among those who invited the British. See "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 165-168. No copy of the list attributed to Colonel Goldthwaite has been found, but Mathew Lymburner's name apparently was on it. See A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-106. A Reverend Jacob Bailey, missionary for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel of the Anglican Church and former pastor of Pownalborough, a settlement west of Penobscot, was a Loyalist refugee in Halifax in 1779. He sent a list to MacLean that included 150 names of Loyalists living near the Kennebec River, most of them members of his former parish. But the letter in which he sent the names was dated July 10, 1779, so the general could not have received it until after the siege by the Americans. See The Frontier Missionary, ed. William S. Bartlett (Boston, 1853), p. 172. Hereafter cited as Frontier Missionary.

[4]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 1-2, 7-8.

[5]"Proclamation By Brigadier General Francis MacLean . . . ," copy found in Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 304-306.

home.[6] Others nearby offered their assistance on the fort.[7]

But there were those who were opposed to the British occupation. Some refused to take the oath and consequently had to flee to friendlier territory. Others remained and waited for any opportunity to help rid themselves of the British.[8] Nor did they have to wait long because their sentiments were voiced by settlements beyond Penobscot which asked the government of Massachusetts for help against the invaders.[9]

In the meantime MacLean continued to strengthen his position. It took more than a week to clear land for a

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[6]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-106, 113-114, 155-156.

[7]Calef, "Siege," p. 391. One estimate of the number that took the oath is 651. See Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 40.

[8]Charles Hutchings refused the oath and fled from Penobscot, but his son William remained. Many years later, the latter had his recollections of the British occupation written down. They will be referred to in the next chapter. For the father and others who fled see Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 199-200, 202-205, 207, 228-229.

[9]From Pownalborough Brigadier-General Charles Cushing, the commander of the Lincoln County militia who later would play a part in New Ireland's history, sent a detailed description of the British forces and suggested that a counterattack be made as soon as possible. Similar responses came from other towns and the members of the Committee of Safety for Falmouth even wrote that they had information about British intentions to invade as far as their port. John Allan, at Machias, not only gave particulars about the British and the oath-takers but asserted that, thanks to the good spirit of the people and his proclamations, the settlers between him and the British were determined to oppose enemy expansion eastward. See Cushing to the Council of the State of Massachusetts, Pownalborough, June 19, 1779; "Petition from the Assembled Towns of Lincoln County," Wiscasset, June 24, 1779; Moses Titcomb, Clerk of the Committee of Safety . . . to General Court, Falmouth, June 24, 1779; and Allan to Jeremiah Powell, President of the Council of Massachusetts, Machias, July 16, 1779--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 295-296, 304, 312-315, 362-365.

temporary camp and the proposed Fort George and to move part of the stores up the hill from the shore. On June 26 the fort was marked out and the works begun. Calef put out a call for help and got a response from about one hundred inhabitants who constructed gun platforms and abatis and cleared land. When it was learned on July 18 that a rebel force was preparing for an attack, work on the defenses was accelerated.

Fortunately, the news of rebel activities arrived before the intended departure of Captain Barclay's fleet. First the naval commander had wanted to leave Penobscot as soon as possible, fearing that the eight ships which had been sighted might be heading for an attack on Nova Scotia. But when the enemy headed the other way, Barclay stayed on a few days longer. When he did leave on June 27, he had decided that only his own ship would go, the rest to follow at a later time (except for Captain Mowatt's vessel).

Mowatt was now in command and for the emergency decided to detain all the remaining ships. What that decision meant for General MacLean and the army was that there would now be three sloops of war and four transports to protect the harbor. It was not a large force but time would demonstrate its effectiveness. Mowatt's use of it was first evident when, as soon as the crews were ready for an attack, they were sent ashore to build what came to be called the Seaman's Bastion of the fort. It was only the beginning of a spirit of cooperation between the captain and the general, and it

would prove decisive.[10]

Hence New Ireland was begun. The British force had made an uneventful voyage and landing and had been welcomed by most of the inhabitants. A few of the latter had felt some discomfort from the occupation, otherwise all seemed well. Such was not the case, however, for the American counterexpeditionary force.

Massachusetts had lost no time in responding to the invasion of its territory. When news of the British base reached Boston, the General Court (the legislature and governing body of the state) straightway made plans for a counterattack and, on paper, the force it proposed seemed a formidable one. The naval element was to consist of nineteen transports and eighteen ships of war, including three Continental Congress vessels on loan to the state for the emergency. One of the three was captained by Dudley Saltonstall, who was chosen commodore of the combined fleet. The army was to be comprised of 1500 militia mustered from three counties of the Province of Maine, then a part of Massachusetts. Its commander would be Brigadier-General Solomon Lovell seconded by Brigadier Peleg Wadsworth with a complement of 100 artillerymen under Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere. Collected, the force would be superior to that

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[10]For the defensive preparations see the series of letters between MacLean and Barclay, Penobscot, June 22 to June 26, 1779; and two letters, MacLean to General Clinton, Penobscot River, June 26, 1779--all found in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, pp. 452-460. Also, see Calef, "Siege," pp. 291-292.

of its enemy, the fleet far outgunning the three sloops and few transports of Captain Mowatt, and the army, excluding the potential use of 300 marines attached to the warships, nearly doubling in size that of General MacLean.

There was also the promise of aid from the other side of the Penobscot River. While John Allan organized defenses at Machias, he sent out Captain John Prebble to rally the settlements westwards to resist the British. Prebble was also ordered to gather as many warriors of the Penobscot Tribe as possible and attach them to the expected American expedition.[11]

But there were inherent weaknesses in the military preparations when they were finally completed. The fleet was composed mostly of privately owned vessels. In order to encourage their owners to volunteer them for the expedition, the General Court had authorized several inducements. A forty-day embargo was put on all Massachusetts shipping trade; hence ships and sailors, if they wanted to work, would have no alternative but the fleet. And what

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[11]When the Americans arrived at Penobscot, Prebble had sixty Indians ready to fight and reported that, although many settlers had taken the British oath, they too would support the rebel side. When the British landed on Bagaduce, Colonel Allan at first considered moving his headquarters eastward to Passamaquoddy Bay, but (perhaps it surprised him) when the local people showed a determination to defend the area "to the last extremity," he decided to stay at Machias. See letters, Allan to Powell, Machias, June 23, 1779; Allan to Powell, Machias, July 16, 1779; and Prebble to Powell, Camp at Clam Cove, July 24, 1779--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 298-301, 362-365, 395-396. An interesting part of the second letter is Allan's statement that the British intended to grant independence to the thirteen states but wanted to keep the territory in Maine as far west as the Kennebec River.

was more, these privateers would not have to share any prizes with the government and they could, if necessary, complete their crews with impressments. Yet a flotilla thus gathered, one made up primarily of privateers and some impressments, would not be apt to expose itself to undue risk. If impressment was not an unusual method of obtaining crews, the men so selected would at least be cautious of life and limb. And captains who were also owners of their vessels or responsible to owners of their vessels would hold similar sentiments toward their ships. Worse, probably no one expected that the commodore would support such sensitivities and be more concerned for men and ships than for military results. As for the army, when the whole force rendezvoused at Townsend, west of Penobscot, there were not the expected 1500 militia. In fact throughout the entire campaign, General Lovell never had more than 1000 effectives, many of whom were raw recruits who lacked training and were unused to discipline, especially for carrying on a siege. As if those were not problems enough, animosities would develop not only within the militia officer ranks but between army and navy commanders as well. It was a motley force that sailed into Penobscot Bay on the afternoon of July 24 and challenged the still unprepared General MacLean.[12]

The Americans did not take full advantage of the

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[12]More will be said about the commanders and other ranks of the American forces. For a general description of the expedition, see Maine, a History, ed. Louis Clinton Hatch (New York, 1919), I, 35-36. Hereafter cited as Maine, a

incomplete British defenses. They did not intend a siege but rather hoped to storm and carry the enemy's works in a short time. The British, on the other hand, had other plans and were able, thanks to the accord between their land and sea elements, to keep the rebel troops from landing on the peninsula until the early morning hours of July 28.

Despite the unfinished condition of the fort, arrangements between MacLean and Mowatt made the British position a strong one. Mowatt's crewmen worked around the clock. They spent their days on land assisting in the construction of the fort and their evenings preparing their vessels for action and performing their more accustomed duties. On the evening of the twenty-fourth, after the American fleet was sighted, the crews went through their usual drill, then dropped their ships down to the entrance of Bagaduce Harbor and aligned them across it. Upstream and out of enemy gun range were three transports ready to be run in among any attacking ships.[13] In conjunction with these naval maneuvers MacLean had set up a battery of four twelve-pounders on the point of the peninsula that made the north side of the harbor entrance, which would join the guns of the sloops against a sea attack. As a secondary precaution the general had made entrenchments along the edge of the swamp connecting

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History. Information regarding the American fleet (ship names, commanders, etc.) can be found in Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 304. For details of the preparations made by the General Court, including arrangements with ship owners, see CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 305, 307, 308-309, 317, 323-324, 353-354, 369, 372-373.

[13]Calef, "Siege," pp. 292-293.

the peninsula to the mainland, thereby detering a landing from that direction.[14]

These preparations showed their effectiveness the following day. Fog lay on the water most of the day, but it lifted about three P. M. and nine of the rebel warships attacked Captain Mowatt's line while the American transports stood off to the north-west of the peninsula and attempted to land their troops. The attacking vessels came at the British sloops in three rather confused lines that tried to break through and enter the harbor. They were able to do minor damage only to the rigging of the English ships and received such a cannonade in return from both the ships and the land battery that they had to retire into the bay. In the meantime the army found it impossible to land.[15]

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[14]MacLean to Clinton, Camp at Majebigwaduce, August 23, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 14-15.

[15]The most detailed description of the daily events of the American attack and siege is found in Dr. Calef's journal, but several of the more important occurrences need supplementary evidence, as for this day, July 25. See Calef, "Siege," p. 293; also, MacLean to Clinton (note 14, above). Calef claimed that the attempted landing of the rebel army was repulsed with some loss to the Americans; Lovell mentions no actual attempt to land blaming contrary winds. See Lovell to Jeremiah Powell, Majorbaggaduce, July 28, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, p. 403. It is an interesting commentary on American gunnery that each time the rebels attempted to break the British line their fire was directed at the moorings in order to turn the British vessels from their broadside positions, yet the only damage to the English ships that Calef described was in their rigging. The fog is mentioned in "Letter from David Perham, giving Colonel Brewer's account of the expedition against Penobscot in 1779," found in Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 329. Hereafter cited as "Colonel Brewer's Account."

July 26 was a repetition of the preceding day except that in the evening American marines succeeded in taking Nautilus Island, an island that made the south shore of the main entrance to Bagaduce Harbor, and captured several cannon. These were quickly trained on the English ships, which then had to move deeper into the harbor directly opposite the site of the fort.[16] Except for pickets set out to guard the high bank of the western edge of the peninsula, the battery on the north side of the harbor entrance now held a lonely vigil in that direction.

The next day was quiet, its most important event being an interview that Commodore Saltonstall and General Lovell had with Colonel John Brewer, a representative from the settlements that lay up the Penobscot River from Bagaduce. Brewer had been visiting Fort George the day the American fleet arrived in an attempt to gain a neutral status for himself and his neighbors who favored the rebel cause. He now told the two commanders what he had seen of the British defenses. When he told them how little had been done on the fortifications, Lovell was "much pleased." But when Brewer told Saltonstall that with a favorable wind the American ships could sail into the harbor and easily silence the enemy guns, the commodore rejected the idea as too

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[16]The move to take Nautilus Island was made in conjunction with an attempted landing on the north side of Bagaduce Peninsula. The latter was unsuccessful. See Council of War at Machebiggaduce, July 28, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, p. 398. See also Calef, "Siege," pp. 293-294.

dangerous to his vessels.[17] The result of the interview was that General Lovell decided to attempt a landing on the west bank without the supporting influence of a naval attack.[18]

Lovell's landing set the pattern for subsequent American operations. Initially successful, it did not quite reach its intended goal. In a pre-dawn maneuver more than 1000 men attacked a shoreline that, after a narrow beach, rose sharply to form a steep embankment controlled from above by the enemy picket.[19] The invaders split into three groups, one holding fast and returning British fire while the other two began flanking movements.[20] Only the British left gave

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[17]According to Brewer, Saltonstall "hove up his long chin, and said, 'You seem to be d__n knowing about the matter! I am not going to risk my shipping in that d____d hole!'" See "Colonel Brewer's Account," pp. 330-331.

[18]Several of the subordinate officers of the American ships petitioned for an attack upon the vessels in the harbor, but their captains would not sign it nor would Saltonstall agree to it. See "A Petition of the Lieutenants and Masters of the Several armed Vessels . . .," July 27, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 400-401.

[19]General Wadsworth wrote in 1828 that Lovell had selected that particular place for the landing because he knew "that his men would make the best shift in rough ground." See Letter, Wadsworth to William D. Williamson, Hiram, Maine, January 1, 1828, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. II, pp. 157-158. Hereafter cited as Letter, Wadsworth to Williamson. Lovell's estimate of the bank's height varied almost hourly. On the day of the assault, he described it as being 100 feet high. On August 1 it was more than 200 feet high. In his journal, written later, it was "at least" 300 feet high. See letters, Lovell to Jeremiah Powell, Majorbaggaduce, July 28, 1779; and Lovell to Powell, Majorbaggaduce, August 1, 1779--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 403, 415-416. Also, see "The Original Journal of General Solomon Lovell, Kept During the Penobscot Expedition, 1779," Weymouth Historical Society Collection, no. 1 (Boston, 1881), 99. Hereafter cited as "Journal of Lovell." For troop numbers used in the landing, see Council of War, on board Warren, July 27, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, p. 401.

[20]Letter, Wadsworth to Williamson, p. 158.

any resistance; and when that resistance was broken,[21] the Americans captured the high ground and hurried toward the battery guarding the harbor entrance, captured it, then rushed toward the fort.[22]

The landing was the one grand achievement in an otherwise forlorn American venture, but it was spoiled by the failure to overrun the fort. When the rebel forces reached a point some 700 yards from the west curtain, General Lovell called a halt. Why he did so is not known. Perhaps he was apprehensive of the concentration of enemy fire and the open ground in front of the fort that his men would have to cross. Perhaps it was because of the suitability of his new position; the rebels were now located on ground somewhat higher than the fort. There is, also, the possibility that Lovell was hoping for a strong effort from his naval counterpart. Commodore Saltonstall did make a move at ten A. M. when his ship and three others made for the harbor and began a cannonade of the enemy vessels. The British reply, however, was so effective that the commodore's ship almost ran aground before it and the

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[21]On the British right Lieutenant John Moore, age eighteen, was in charge of twenty men. It was his first command under fire, but neither he nor his men retreated until they were brought off by a relief force from Fort George. See Joseph Williamson, "Sir John Moore at Castine During the Revolution," CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. II, pp. 405-406, 408-409. Hereafter cited as Williamson, "Sir John Moore." General MacLean did not know of the landing until the retreating right wing of his picket straggled into the fort. A sergeant had been sent back to tell him of the enemy advance, but he became lost in the intervening woods. See MacLean to Clinton, Camp at Majebigwaduce, August 23, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 14-18.

[22]Calef, "Siege," p. 295.

others could retreat back into the bay.[23] By that time Lovell's men had made entrenchments and begun constructing gun batteries. What had been a frontal attack became a siege.

The commanding position of the Americans gave them some hope that bombardment would bring surrender, but when the British brought several cannon from their ships to counter the rebel guns, Lovell and Saltonstall had to resort to other tactics.[24] They decided to strike at the enemy's most effective weapon, the cooperation between English army and navy. If that could be disrupted they could reasonably expect surrender. Thus, in a little more than two weeks of siege operations, three major attempts were made to cut off or destroy Mowatt's ships.

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[23] Ibid. William Hutchings, the young settler who was on Bagaduce when the attack came, claimed that MacLean stood by ready to strike his colors when the rebels began their approach toward the fort. See "William Hutchings' Narrative of the Siege and other Reminiscences," found in Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 323. Hereafter cited as "Hutchings' Narrative." Lieutenant Moore remembered only that the general prepared for an assault. See Williamson, "Sir John Moore," p. 406.

[24] Captain Mowatt brought the sloops farther into the harbor and removed the guns from one side of each, placing the smaller guns in Fort George and the larger ones at a battery midway between the fort and the shore. For these and other British defensive arrangements see the letter, MacLean to Clinton (note 21, above); Calef, "Siege," p. 296; and Williamson, "Sir John Moore," pp. 408-409. Another reason why the American cannonade was not sufficient to cause surrender may have been the poor quality of rebel gunnery. Lieutenant Moore wrote that when several of the less experienced British soldiers were frightened by the American cannonade, General MacLean walked from the fort, placed himself in full view of the firing guns, examined them with his spyglass, and then walked back erect. Moore quoted the general as saying: "You see, there is no danger from the fire of those wretched artillery men." See Williamson, "Sir John Moore," pp. 406-407.

The first try was made by Commodore Saltonstall's marines on July 31. The ship captains had opposed another plan to attack the English fleet because the enemy had a strong battery of guns midway between the fort and the shore but agreed to send their marines to drive the British from that battery. Hence a two A. M. assault was made and actually succeeded in dislodging the British. But it was only temporary because a counterattack caused the Americans to withdraw.[25]

The second attempt came when General Lovell established a battery of guns on the mainland north of Bagaduce. From there the guns could reach Captain Mowatt's ships and either destroy them or neutralize them sufficiently for a thrust between the shore and the fort. The guns were set in place and at first showed some effect. But Mowatt sent workers ashore who built a redoubt east of Fort George, mounted

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[25]This attack brought a new level of cruelty to the siege. The American attackers included several Indians, probably the Penobscot warriors who had come into the rebel camp with Captain Prebble. They killed several British regulars, scalped them and stripped the bodies of their uniforms. Young Hutchings, who next day saw the bloody uniforms in the American camp, added a final tale to the morning's events: "A drummer was killed, . . . and for a good many years after, people used to say that they could hear his ghost drumming there at midnight." See "Hutchings Narrative," p. 324. For the attack see At a Council of War on board the Warren, July 30, 1779; and Lovell to Powell, Camp on the Heights of Majabagaduce, August 1, 1779--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 409-410, 415-418. Also, see Calef, "Siege," p. 297; and "Sergeant Lawrence's Journal," in Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 316. Hereafter cited as "Sergeant Lawrence's Journal." Dr. Calef ("Siege," p. 298) stated that the American attack was supposed to have been one of seamen attacking the battery while the army attacked the fort, but that quick reactions by the British caused the latter effort to go untried. If it was true, it was only one of the several failures by the Americans to coordinate their efforts.

eight cannon, and returned the American fire. It was enough to silence most of the rebel guns and relieve the dangers to the British ships.[26]

The final attempt came on August 11 and involved another attack on the British battery between the shore and the fort. This time the Americans were surprised by a detachment of light infantry whose lieutenant "ordered to give them a volley of small arms and a tap of the Grenadier's march, accompanied by Yankee Doodle, which so daunted those poor devils that they hove some of their arms and ran into the woods."[27]

On all three occasions the Americans had almost, but not quite, succeeded. Each time the rapport between the enemy's fighting contingents remained intact and the rebel forces had to return to more routine siege operations.

Life for the civilian population certainly was not routine. The inhabitants of the peninsula and surrounding

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[26]Calef, "Siege," p. 299.

[27]The lieutenant was a man named Caffrae and he and his company of soldiers were something of an inspiration to the defenders. Making frequent rounds of much of the peninsula's shoreline both night and day, they occasionally would taunt their enemy by playing the tune "Yankee Doodle" on fife and drum meanwhile daring the rebels to venture out and fight. When General MacLean wrote his first report to General Clinton after the siege, he named two men who deserved special praise for their activities during the siege. One was Mowatt, the other was Caffrae. Three sources mention Caffrae's exploits. See MacLean to Clinton, Camp at Majebigwaduce, August 23, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 14-18; "Sergeant Lawrence's Journal," p. 318; and Calef, "Siege," p. 303.

areas found themselves in an awkward predicament when General Lovell issued a proclamation meant to counter that of General MacLean. Noting that "diverse inhabitants of these parts" had encouraged the British to come to Maine, Lovell announced that he had the duty of "exulting my best endeavours to rid this much abused country, not only of its foreign, but also from its domestic enemies." He ended with a warning that anyone reading the proclamation, including those who had taken the British oath, must come into the American camp within forty-eight yours with their firearms or be considered traitors.[28]

Those who had shown Loyalist sympathies and came within the grasp of the Americans were harshly treated. Several men who had taken the British oath were caught and imprisoned on board the rebel vessels in the bay, where they found confinement to be only one of their misfortunes. Henry Goldthwaite, for example, was robbed and stripped of his clothing.[29] The Greenlaw brothers (there were four) met such severe handling that one of them thereafter was "at times bereft of his sences [sic]."[30] All the prisoners were shackled with irons and kept in the ships' holds for

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[28]A copy of Lovell's proclamation can be found in Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 307-309.

[29]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 146.

[30]See the claim of Jonathan, Ebenezer, and Alexander Greenlaw, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 113-114. The fourth brother, Charles, was the one who suffered the mental damage. Benjamin Millekin and several of his neighbors in the Union River region were caught as was Mathew Lymburner. See A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-106, 155-156.

all but one hour each day, when they were brought on deck, placed in boats alongside, and "had the filth of the ships poured on their heads."[31] Worse was the plight of their families which were left to their own resources on plundered farms.[32]

There were other settlers who answered Lovell's summons and willingly assisted the Americans in their siege. Colonel Brewer raised half a company of men from the settlements above Bagaduce and was assigned to patrol the Penobscot River.[33] Charles Hutchings joined three other men in an ambush of a British guardboat,[34] and other less militant souls performed less dramatic but equally important duties.[35]

If the local people sympathetic to the rebel cause enjoyed some security during the siege, in the end their lot was no better than that of their Loyalist neighbors.

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[31]Calef, "Siege," p. 300.

[32]Ibid., p. 303. Fortunately, the prisoners were freed when the siege was lifted. Besides the harm to individuals, there was some damage done to personal property because of the fighting. Aaron Banks' house was burned during the first rebel attack on the battery between the fort and shore. During the second attack on that place, several other homes and outbuildings were destroyed as well as piles of lumber on the beach. See Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 200-201; and Calef, "Siege," pp. 300-301.

[33]"Colonel Brewer's Account," p. 331. Brewer apparently was not optimistic about the outcome of the siege because he sent his wife to Camden and entrusted his furniture to his brother's care.

[34]Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 202-203. The other three were young relatives of John and Joseph Perkins.

[35]Ibid., pp. 202-203, 228-229.

When the American army and fleet were driven from Penobscot, they had also to flee or suffer the consequences of possible British retribution.[36] Both civilian factions suffered from the struggle.

In the meantime the rebel armed forces had problems of their own. They had to contend with an enemy that possessed two qualities that they lacked. The first was a strong and consistent discipline among the rank and file. The second was a continued cooperative spirit between army and navy units. The fact that the Americans did not have these attributes in combination decided the outcome of the siege.[37]

Lovell must have been envious of enemy discipline; orders issuing from his headquarters showed a sequence of

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[36]More will be said in Chapter IV about the settlers who fled from the Penobscot area after the American retreat.

[37]Perhaps the best evidence to support the claim that the English had these qualities was the recognition of such by Generals Lovell and Wadsworth, the American army commanders. See Lovell to Powell, Headquarters, Majabagaduce, August 13, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 2-4; and Letter, Wadsworth to Williamson, p. 153. The British commanders of course agreed on the importance of army-navy cooperation. See MacLean to Clinton (note 28, above); and Baxter, "Lost Manuscript," p. 364. Dr. Calef repeatedly lauded the common spirit among soldiers and sailors and wrote that the latter had become so adept at assisting on shore that they could be brought from the ships into land positions in fifteen minutes. See Calef, "Siege," pp. 294-295. As for English discipline, there are several pages of regimental orders written by a Lieutenant Wilson during and after the siege which are now located in the folder "1770's" office files, Wilson Museum, Castine, Maine. One order, dated August 9, 1779, not only called for the men of the Royal Artillery to prepare for inspection of arms and accouterments, but it "recommended to them if possible to be "Cleen [sic] dressed and their hair well combed"--this in the midst of a siege.

deteriorating spirit among his men. July 27: General Lovell warned the men not give rum to the Indians or to needlessly fire their small arms. July 30: The general was alarmed by the disorder among the troops. They were to stick to their posts and not wander and officers were to see to it that all orders were conveyed to their men. Guns were not to be fired without reason and had to be kept clean. Colonel Revere and his corps should encamp with the army on shore in order to manage the cannon. August 1: "Our troops (tho brave) are yet undisplined [sic]" and he asked the Massachusetts authorities for a "few regular disciplined troops" in order to storm the enemy works. August 2: Piquets were to be particular about the people they were allowing to pass toward the enemy. August 3: A reminder that unnecessary firing of guns was against military rules; no gun was to be fired without permission. August 5: A courtmartial was to sit next day. August 6: "Some of the Officers of the Navy seeing the difficulties we labour under have expressed a desire to leave us, . . ." (on the next day Commodore Saltonstall complained that desertions on his ship made continued operations improbable, and Colonel Revere favored discontinuing the siege because, in part, several navy captains feared losing many of their impressments). August 7: A courtmartial convicted two men of desertion. Their punishment was a twenty minute ride on a wooden horse with a musket tied to each foot. August 11: The militia officers were asked if the army should split and attempt an attack on both sides of the enemy's fort.

They were unanimously against it because of the size of their force and the "great want of Discipline & subordination many of the Officers being so exceeding slack in their Duty, the Soldiers so averse to the Service and the wood in which we are encamped so very thick that on an alarm or any special occasion nearly one fourth part of the Army are skulked out of the way and conceal'd." August 13: "Many of my Officers & soldiers are dissatisfied with the Service tho there are some who deserve the greatest credit for their Alacrity & Soldier like conduct."[38]

It was not only the rank and file with which General Lovell had to contend. His greatest problem was obtaining full cooperation from the naval commander and the captains of the warships. On the day following the successful landing, Lovell asked the commodore if his ships would make a full scale attack on the small British fleet. Saltonstall held a council of war with his captains, who opposed an assault because of the enemy's guns at both the fort and

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[38]All of these selections were taken from letters, councils of wars, and orders of the day and can be found in the same source. See: Headquarters, Transport Sally, July 27, 1779; Headquarters, Majabigwaduce, July 30, 1779; letter, Lovell to Powell, Camp on the Heights of Majabagaduce, August 1, 1779; second letter, Lovell to Powell, August 1, 1779; Headquarters, Majabigwaduce, August 2, 1779; Headquarters, Majabigwaduce, August 3, 1779; Headquarters, Majabigwaduce, August 5, 1779; Lovell to Powell, Headquarters, Magabagaduce, August 6, 1779; Headquarters, Magabigwaduce, August 7, 1779; Proceedings of a Council of War held on board the Brig Hazard off Magadagaduce, August 7, 1779; Proceedings of a Council of War held at Head Quarters, Magabagaduce, August 11, 1779; Lovell to Powell, Headquarters, Magabagaduce, August 13, 1779. Their source is CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 399, 410-412, 415-418, 419-420, 421, 422, 426, 427-428, 431-432, 432-434 (this one includes Saltonstall's and Revere's comments), 452-453, and Vol. XVII, pp. 2-4.

half-moon battery (the gun emplacement located between the fort and the shore).[39] It was this decision that finally led to the unsuccessful July 31 attack on that battery by the Marines. After that disaster Lovell returned to his siege operations.

By August 5 the army had pushed its entrenchments within 600 yards of Fort George and Lovell felt he could close no farther. Again he sent a request to the fleet for a naval attack into Bagaduce Harbor. Again Saltonstall held a council of war and the result was still negative. But this time the sea captains agreed that if the army would storm the fort, they would attack the harbor. When the general received their reply, he held a council of war, but his officers unanimously opposed an all-out assault by the land forces. Lovell returned their decision to the commodore and asked for a meeting of all army and navy officers.[40]

Two meetings were held, the first on August 7 and the second on the 10th, and both failed to achieve a concerted plan of action. They also clearly showed that discipline and cooperation were wanting in the American force. At the first meeting Saltonstall repeated his suggestion for a

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[39]Council of War on board the Warren, July 29, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 409-410.

[40]Lovell [to Saltonstall], August 5, 1779; Lovell [to Saltonstall], August 6, 1779; At a Council of War holden on board the Warren . . ., August 6, 1779; Proceedings of a Council of War held at Head Quarters on the Heights of Magabagaduce, August 6, 1779--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 427, 429, 430-431, 431.

land and sea attack and received the same reply. General Lovell (perhaps having in mind the problem of deteriorating army discipline) asked Saltonstall if he could retain his personnel much longer. The commodore answered that desertions on his ship made it unlikely. Five sea captains agreed with him. Lovell then asked his militia officers how they felt about splitting the army and sending the larger part to take the ground on the opposite side of the fort. Not only did they oppose the maneuver but most of the colonels said they dared not lead their men in open field attack. The commodore then asked Lovell if the siege could succeed without reinforcements and a negative response brought about a vote on whether or not to continue operations. Thirteen voted for staying, nine for withdrawal. Among the latter was Revere who gave as reasons for his vote that, since the general could not reduce the enemy without reinforcements and the navy feared loss of many impressments, it would be better to retire and take up station down the coast in order to protect against British expansion. Nothing was settled by the council.[41] The second meeting had no better results. The navy agreed that its ships would attack the British vessels if the army split its forces and occupied the ground east of the fort. At first the army officers assented, but the next day they changed their minds. They did not have a large enough force, they

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[41]Council of War on board the Brig Hazard, August 7, 1779, ibid., pp. 432-434.

said, and it was at this time that they complained of the poor discipline and cowardly act of men hiding in the woods during any alarm. The fleet captains refused to go in without the army.[42]

Finally, on August 13 General Lovell decided to attack the enemy fort with his land forces. Hampered by a decreasingly efficient militia, apprehensive of a near exhaustion of supplies, especially ammunition, and unable to get the fleet to attack the harbor alone, Lovell made a confused but stirring appeal to his men to remember their duty and the cause for which they fought and sent word to Saltonstall that he was leading a night assault on the British defenses. The commodore finally agreed to attack and ordered his warships to hoist their sails and head for the entrance to Bagaduce Harbor.[43]

The attack was never completed. As the fleet and army began to move, the ships suddenly came about and Saltonstall sent a hurried message to Lovell that seven

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[42]Council of War on board the Warren off Magabagaduce Harbor, August 10, 1779; Proceedings of a Council of War held at Head Quarters, Magabagaduce, August 11, 1779, ibid., pp. 445-446, 452-453.

[43]Head Quarters, Magabigwaduce, August 12, 1779; Proceedings of a Council of War held at Head Quarters, Magabagaduce, August 13, 1779--both in ibid., pp. 453-455, 464. See also "Journal of Lovell," p. 104-105. There is some doubt whether either commander intended a full-scale attack. One source stated that Lovell had only 200 men for his night attack of the 13th (Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 44). Dr. Calef ("Siege," p. 301) claimed that only five American vessels made for the harbor that evening.

square-rigged vessels had been sighted down the bay. They were British.[44]

Both sides had been hoping for reinforcements. When Captain Barclay left Penobscot Bay, he went to Halifax and then to New York, where he reported to General Clinton what information he had gathered regarding the rebel threat to General MacLean.[45] As for American relief, when General Lovell realized (August 1) that he would have difficulty with the fleet as well as his own men, he wrote to Jeremiah Powell, President of the Council of Massachusetts, either for additional siege weapons or regular troops to supplement his own, should a major assault on the enemy fortifications become necessary.[46]

When the Council received Lovell's report, it took immediate action.[47] It sent out calls to York, Cumberland,

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[44]Saltonstall [to Lovell], Warren, August 13, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, p. 461. The commodore added: "You'l please to make your movements. If you mean to order the Transports up the River, I think they ought to be under way--as soon as possible."

[45]It is unknown what details Barclay could relay to Clinton. He reached New York on the 23rd of July, one day before MacLean was confronted by the rebel force. Barclay may have learned something at Halifax, or he may have gotten more details while on his voyage to New York, i. e., his passage may have come near the American force heading in the opposite direction. Whatever his information, it was enough to cause General Clinton to send relief. See "Extracts form a Confidential letter from New York Dated July 29th, 1779," CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, pp. 407-408.

[46]Lovell to Powell, Magabagaduce, August 1, 1779, ibid., p. 419.

[47]The report did not arrive in Boston until August 8 and was the first news received from Penobscot in weeks.

and Lincoln Counties to complete their quotas of militia for Penobscot. A request for troops was sent to the government of New Hampshire, and General Horatio Gates, commander of American forces at Providence, Rhode Island, was contacted and asked to loan Massachusetts 400 continental soldiers. Also, in order to expedite events at Lovell's end, a committee went to the Navy Board to request new orders for the naval command at Penobscot. Although the additional county militia and New Hampshire troops could not be gotten, the Council reported by express to Lovell on August 10 that Gates had agreed to send the 400 regulars.[48]

Then news arrived at Boston that demanded quick action. General George Washington, commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, whose headquarters was at West Point on the Hudson River, relayed information to President of the Council of Massachusetts Jeremiah Powell that he had received from a secret agent in British-held New York City. It revealed the enemy plan to send seven men-of-war under Sir George Collier after the expeditionary force that had left Boston in June. Since Washington's letter was dated August 3 and was more than a week old when it reached Boston, the

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The Council of course was concerned. See letter, President to General Lovel [sic], August 6, 1779, ibid., pp. 429-430.

[48]Council to Gen. Gates [at Providence], August 8, 1779; Council to York, Cumberland, and Lincoln Counties, August 8, 1779; Council to Meshech Wear, Pres. of Council of New Hampshire, August 8, 1779; Council orders for reinforcing Expedition, August 8, 1779; Council Chamber, August 10, 1779 [three reports],--all found in ibid., pp. 436, 437, 437-438, 439-441, 443, 444, 445.

Council held a midnight meeting on the eleventh and after hurried deliberations sent strong directives to General Lovell. The Council recommended an attack with as much of the army and navy strength as would participate; and if the attack failed, Lovell was urged to retreat to a more secure location down the coast and protect the country west of the Penobscot River.[49]

The Council continued with its own preparations. It got the Navy Board to send direct orders to Commodore Saltonstall to attack the enemy shipping at once. It made arrangements for the transportation of General Gates' troops to Penobscot (they did not sail until the nineteenth). It even ordered the confiscation of sixty-six eighteen pound cannons from a ship that had just entered Boston Harbor. That action was on August 14--and it was too late.[50]

It was too late because the British had acted more quickly and more decisively. As soon as Captain Barclay had revealed the Penobscot situation, General Clinton notified Admiral Collier and the latter organized a squadron to sail to the relief of General MacLean. It included seven warships (Barclay's was one of them) totalling 204 guns and 1530 men, a formidable flotilla. It left New York August 3,

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[49]Three letters, Major General Ld. Sterling to General Washington, Newark, August 1, 1779; General Washington to the President of the Council of Massachusetts, Headquarters, West Point, August 3, 1779; and J. P., President to General Lovell, August 11, 1779--all found in ibid., pp. 420, 423-424, 447-448.

[50]Council Orders, August 12, 13, and 14, 1779, ibid., pp. 455-456, 458-460, 463-464, 467-468.

became separated by fog but managed a rendezvous off Monhegan Island, and sailed into lower Penobscot Bay on the evening of August 13, the night Commodore Saltonstall interrupted General Lovell's attack with the message of the sighting.[51]

The day following was a disasterous one for the Americans. It began well enough with their land forces making an orderly withdrawal from Bagaduce and retreating up the Penobscot River. But the protection expected from

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[51]Collier contracted a fever as he left New York and recorded later that he thought he was meant for a longer voyage than to Penobscot. The victory, he wrote, helped relieve the fever. For British relief preparations see letters, Clinton to MacLean, New York, July 28, 1779; Collier to Clinton, Raisonable in Penobscot Bay, August 19, 1779; and Collier to Clinton--Private, Raisonable, Penobscot, August 24, 1779--all found in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. I, p. 481 and Vol. II, pp. 12, 28129. For details about Collier's fleet see Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 45. British relief might have come from two other sources. The authorities at Halifax finally got off a fleet on August 22, but part way to Penobscot it ran into a storm which caused some damage to rigging and obliged the fleet to return home. Lord George Germain lauded the effort, but a Loyalist in Halifax took a much different attitude when he wrote in his diary about the "stupid piece of conduct" in the handling of the relief fleet. The damage it received from the storm, he felt, was minor and should not have caused it to turn back: "Stupid, very stupid fellows!" For the activities of the relief fleet see two letters, Governor Hughes to [General] Haldimand, Halifax, September 26, 1779, "Haldimand Papers," Vol. B149, B. M. 21,809, pp. 72-74; and Germain to Hughes, Whitehall, November 4, 1779, "Calendar of Papers Relating to Nova Scotia," Report on the Canadian Archives, 1894 (Ottawa, 1895), p. 385. Hereafter cited as RCA 1894. For the Loyalist's comments see W. O. Raymond, "Benjamin Marston of Marblehead, Loyalist, His Trials and Tribulations During the American Revolution," Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, III, no. 7 (1907), p. 93. Hereafter cited as Raymond, "Benjamin Marston . . . Loyalist." The other potential source of assistance was General Haldimand at Quebec. He wrote to MacLean after the siege that he would have sent help except for rebel

the American fleet did not materialize and as a consequence the retreat turned into a chase and then a rout. By nightfall there was no effective American force left in eastern Maine.

The rebel army's withdrawal from the peninsula during the early hours of August 14 was completed before the British realized what had happened. MacLean had learned of the rebel attack planned for the evening of the thirteenth and had brought in his pickets in preparation for it.[52] When Lovell halted his advance and returned to his entrenchments because of the appearance of a third fleet, MacLean held fast and awaited whatever events the new day would bring. Shortly before dawn he noticed an unusual calm in the direction of the enemy camp and finding it deserted, he rushed detachments to the west end of the peninsula and across to the mainland to cut off or harry the retreat. But the detachments were too late to do any harm.[53]

The Americans were as efficient leaving the peninsula as they had been entering it. Men, guns, and stores were

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threats to Canada from the west. He did, he added, send a scouting party to the Kennebec River but had not heard from it. See Haldimand to MacLean, Quebec, October 8, 1779, "Haldimand Papers," Vol. B150, B. M. 21,810, p. 37.

[52]A deserter had told MacLean about the proposed attack. The general decided as a countermeasure to send a force across the neck of the peninsula to storm the enemy battery there (again a force combining seamen and soldiers), but when General Lovell called off his advance, the foray was also cancelled. Dr. Calef tells about it in "Siege," pp. 301-302.

[53]MacLean to Clinton, Camp at Majebigwaduce, August 23, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 14-18.

quietly loaded into transports in a matter of hours and by daylight all were headed toward Old Fort Point. General Lovell had decided that the site of Fort Pownall would serve as a temporary refuge until the imminent contest between the British and American fleets was decided. If the latter won, he would try to retake lost ground. If it failed, he would continue his retreat upriver.[54]

The American fleet failed to protect the retreating army. The morning began foggy and calm and neither fleet (including transports) could move until nearly noon. Then, with an unusual show of confidence, Commodore Saltonstall's squadron formed a crescent as if to attack the enemy. Instead, however, a council of war was quickly convened and by unanimous vote the captains decided not to engage the British but to proceed up the Penobscot after the transports. When Admiral Collier saw the American vessels break formation, he quickly ordered a pursuit and the would-be sea battle became a race. Two American ships attempted to swing past the British to the open sea via West Penobscot Bay. When their captains saw the impossibility of escape, one was run ashore all sails standing (and captured by British marines as the crew fled to land); the other was blown up as the crew ran into the woods. In the meantime several of

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[54]Lovell to Powell, Headquarters, Magabagaduce, August 13, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 2-4. The postscript to this letter was written the following day while Lovell was moving up the Penobscot.

the British ships had already started upriver after the main rebel flotilla.[55]

The combined army-navy retreat then became a rout. Lovell had begun to move the transports farther upstream when he and the army were astonished to see sixteen warships come upon them and pass them, pursued now by only four enemy vessels. The commanders of the troop transports had no alternative but to try keeping ahead or run their boats ashore, set fire to them, and hurry into the forest with the troops, away from the grapeshot and small arms fire from the British men-of-war. Some of the American vessels got farther upriver than others, but in the end it did not matter. Every warship and every transport was captured or destroyed.[56]

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[55]Collier to Clinton, Raisonable in Penobscot Bay, August 19, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 12; and At a Council of War of Navy Officers on Warren, off Machebiggaduce Harbour, August 14, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVI, p. 470. The temporary show of force by the American fleet may have been due to the weather. The British squadron was split, three vessels being two or three miles down the bay from the others. One witness stated that, because of fog, Lovell saw only the three nearest the American warships. Perhaps the rebel naval captains thought they could defeat three ships but realized the nearness of the others when the fog lifted. See letter, Thos Berry to the Council, Penobscot, August ye 14, 1779, ibid., Vol. XVII, pp. 5-6.

[56]The worst hazards for the British that Collier later could remember were the burning ships along the shore and the narrow places in the river, where tree branches brushed his studding sails. See "Extract, letter from Collier dated on board Raisonable, Penobscot Bay, August 24, 1779 (enclosure in a letter, Governor Hughes to Lord George Germain, Halifax, September 2, 1779)," RCA 1894, pp. 118-122. Lovell remembers seeing " . . . four Ships pursuing seventeen Sail of Armed Vessells [sic] nine of which were stout Ships, Transports on fire, Men of War blowing up, Provision of all kinds & every kind of Stores on Shore, . . . throwing about, and as much confusion as can possibly be conceived." See "Journal of Lovell," p. 105. John Nutting must have enjoyed the scene;

Once on land the American army disintegrated. General Lovell found himself far up the river with a small group of Penobscot Indians with whom he was able to complete his escape via the Kennebec River.[57] General Wadsworth rallied a few men and got them down to Camden on the western shore of Penobscot Bay. There he hoped to organize some kind of resistance should the British move in that direction. Before leaving the upper river, Wadsworth tried to get the assistance of Colonel Revere and his men but was refused when Revere claimed that he need only follow the general's orders during the expedition and it was obvious that the expedition was over.[58] Colonel James Brewer, the militia officer and settler on the upper Penobscot, now found himself encumbered with the sick and wounded who thronged to his home. He took them farther upstream, above the rapids, before paying another visit to General MacLean in order to get a pass enabling Brewer to ship his charges back to Boston. He was allowed it on the condition that he clear all casualties with Captain Mowatt. Brewer did so, except that after seeing

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one of the ships that was destroyed was the vessel that had caught him on his voyage from England the previous fall. See Batchelder, Bits, pp. 320-321.

[57]Conference . . . Lovell & Indian Chiefs at "Penobscot Indian Settlement," August 16, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 12-14. Incidently, Lovell promised the Indians that provisions would be sent to them from Boston. They asked that they not come by way of Machias.

[58]Revere and his men walked away and to Boston. Wadsworth's part in the history of New Ireland was not finished. For his efforts during the retreat and his confrontation with Revere see two documents: "Defense of Col. Paul Revere" and "Statement of Genl Wadsworth," ibid., pp. 215-225, 272-278. For Wadsworth's description of the defeat, see ibid., pp. 28-32.

Mowatt he picked up a navy captain who had been hurt and concealed along the shore. After final clearance at the bay, Brewer sent the men on their way. Later Mowatt and MacLean found out about the navy captain and caused such difficulties that Brewer quit his home and took his family west until after the war.[59] Meanwhile, for the rest of the rebel army it was a long trek back through the wilderness to friendly settlements.[60]

Although retreat had ended in disaster, it did not conclude the American misfortunes. When the government of Massachusetts found itself liable not only for the expenses for the expedition but also for the losses of individual ships, it asked the Continental Congress if six million dollars of the state's taxes to the central government could not be retained. Congress refused but later allowed two million to be kept.[61]

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[59]"Colonel Brewer's Account," pp. 331-335. Brewer claimed that General MacLean told him he intended to strike his colors if the American attack on the day of the landing had been pressed: "I believe," MacLean is quoted as saying, "the commanders were a pack of cowards or they would have taken me."

[60]Not everyone in Massachusetts took the defeat badly. A song that was popular there for a time included this verse:

> We burned up all our shipping
> Gave o'er the jolly cruise
> And through the woods came tripping
> From captured Bagaduce.

See "1779," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 4 (Winter 1965), 3.

[61]When Massachusetts suggested a second expedition against Fort George, Congress referred it to General Washington (more will be said on that later). Congress had not been

The military officers had to answer for their defeat. The General Court approved a committee to investigate the causes for the failure of the expedition. After several hearings the committee found reason to condemn Commodore Saltonstall for lacking "proper Spirit & Energy," for not attacking the British ships, and not protecting the transports during the retreat. Saltonstall was court-martialed and lost his rank in the Continental service. He was not the only one stigmatized. A militia colonel was censured for leaving Penobscot without orders and Colonel Revere was criticized for disputing the orders of General Wadsworth during the retreat.[62]

Victory for the British, while it had its advantages, did not satisfy the pessimists who opposed the colonial

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consulted on the first expedition, Massachusetts claiming there had not been time for such. A few Congressional members felt it was a precarious undertaking, one writing that failure was expected. For Massachusetts' requests to Congress see CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 8, 49, 89-91, 129-132, 194-195. For Congressional attitudes regarding the first expedition see Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett (Washington, D. C., 1926), IV, 351-352, 379-380, 381, 393, 394-396, 427, and V, 114-115, 116, 128.

[62]For the committee's findings see "Report of Committee on Expedition," October 7, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 258-260. Colonel Revere repeatedly requested a court-martial in order to clear his name. He was allowed one in February, 1782. It cleared him of any charges, peculiarly agreeing that, in the confusion of the retreat, regular orders were not nor could not be given. See Revere to General Court, Boston, January 22, 1781; and Court-Martial results, February 19, 1782--both in ibid., Vol. XIX, pp. 97-98, 427-430. For a general summary of the investigation and court-martial see Maine, a History, I, 37-38. In 1828 Wadsworth wrote that Saltonstall "fought a very good battle afterward [after the siege] in a large Privateer which shew [sic] him to be a Man of Courage." See Letter, Wadsworth

scheme nor did it have its rewards for those most deserving them. In England, when Lord Germain received the news, he not inaccurately described the effect the disaster would have upon the New England people. He wrote that it would deprive them of their facilities for privateering and would make secure British navigation in the region.[63] In fact American activities were greatly curtailed and the rebels no longer posed any threat to Nova Scotia. Furthermore, New England would never recover sufficiently to attempt another attack on Bagaduce. As far as military decisions were concerned, New Ireland's future was secure.

But Germain spoke for only the optimists; there were other men who saw no significance in the victory. Governor Hutchinson still could find no advantage in retaining the area and Admiral Collier thought the place a wilderness fit only for beasts. He condemned the location of the fort and complained (in a private letter to General Clinton) that the inhabitants took an oath to whichever side was likely to win.[64]

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to Williamson, p. 157. An irony to cap Wadsworth's incident with Revere occurred years later when the general's grandson, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, wrote about a midnight ride of Paul Revere, which assured the latter's fame.

[63]Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, September 27, 1779, "Carleton Papers," Vol. XIV, no. 117, pp. 110-115. One historian has claimed that the defeat of the American forces saved the area later to be New Brunswick and possibly all of Canada for the British. See James Vroom, "The Siege of Penobscot," The Educational Review Supplementary Readings, Canadian History, no. 2 (July 1898), 55-58.

[64]Diary of . . . Thomas Hutchinson, II, 285-286; Collier to Clinton, Raisonable, Penobscot--private, August 24, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 18-19.

Nor had Collier forgotten his former attitude toward Captain Mowatt. Mowatt expected that his ship would be designated to convey the news of the events to England. It was, he believed, a custom of the service that he be given that honor, and Admiral Collier agreed. But claiming the need for all major ships to remain in American waters, Collier promised that a full report would be sent to New York and that the Admiralty at home would receive complete details. He then sent Mowatt upriver to examine the rebel wrecks and, when the captain had left, sailed away to New York--and sent one ship from his squadron straight to England with the news. The "full" report to the Admiralty made no mention of the part played by the three sloops of war in the defense nor did it cite any of their captains' names. When Lord Germain wrote to General Clinton, he lauded the work of Admiral Collier and General MacLean. There was no mention of Captain Mowatt. The latter spent the remainder of his life attempting to receive just recognition for this and other services in America.[65] As for Collier, he served out the war in European waters but then resigned his command and spent most of the remaining fifteen years of his life embittered toward government for failure to recognize the importance of his activities in America. He was, however,

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[65]Baxter, "Lost Manuscript," pp. 365-367; also, Germain to Clinton (note 63, above). Collier's successors did not rectify the omission and they continued to ignore Mowatt in the way of any promotions. Mowatt wrote the "Lost Manuscript" after the Revolution in an attempt to gain the overdue recognition. He died of apoplexy on board a ship off Virginia in 1798; he was still a captain.

made vice-admiral shortly before his death in April, 1795.[66]

At least as sad a case as Mowatt's was that of General MacLean. Before the Penobscot occupation and defense, MacLean had written to Lord Germain about his future: He had served thirty years but had not grown rich. If the war ended and the British no longer needed a large army, he hoped Germain might rescue "an old servant from the appearance of want, by placing him at the head of an old regiment."[67] He did not get to enjoy either semi-retirement or the accolades due a victorious officer. He returned to Halifax in November of 1779 but failed to attain his deserved honor because he died at Halifax in May, 1781, after a long illness.[68]

Collier, Mowatt, and MacLean had done their part for New Ireland. Collier's dramatic rescue saved the British establishment at Bagaduce, and Mowatt and MacLean delayed enemy operations long enough to make rescue possible. Americans could argue about the cause of their failure, but it was due to the fact that the English enjoyed a disciplined unity unseen in the American forces. And if a single person decided the struggle, it was Captain Mowatt. If Commodore Saltonstall and the captains under his command had been

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[66] J[ohn] K[nox] L[aughton], "Collier, Sir George (1738-1795," Dictionary of National Biography, IV, 795-797. The Dictionary is hereafter cited as DNB.

[67] MacLean to Germain, Halifax, February 16, 1779, RCA 1894, pp. 40-48.

[68] See two letters, Governor Hughes to Germain, Halifax, May 6, 1781; and Germain to Hughes, Whitehall, June 30, 1781--both in RCA 1894, pp. 123-124, 395.

reluctant to force their way into the harbor, at least they had tried on two occasions and it was the gunnery of Mowatt's ships that changed their minds (despite an American advantage in number of guns, three hundred and twenty-eight to forty-eight[69]). The American army could charge a steep embankment in the face of enemy fire, yet its officers feared to attempt a direct assault on the fort, part of whose ramparts had been built by seamen and defended by guns taken from the British vessels. The American battery on the north shore had posed the most serious threat to the British ships in their last station of the siege, but the Seaman's Battery neutralized its effect. Lovell once compared strengths and admitted to having more than 900 militia opposing 700 soldiers and 300 seamen and marines of the enemy which he wrote "act occasionally pro Mare et Terram"--he did not qualify his own numbers with that remark.[70]

Another contrast between the American and British forces was each one's attitude toward Loyalist inhabitants. General Lovell's proclamation to all settlers clearly stated his feelings toward Tories, and the treatment that his men afforded any who were caught was consistent with his warnings. He did take advantage, however, of potential local rebel support, as in the case of Colonel Brewer and the upriver inhabitants, who were assigned

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[69]Calef, "Siege," p. 304.

[70]"Journal of Lovell," 104.

various military duties. On the other hand, General MacLean's proclamation was a condescending one, implying the possibility that local people might like to change their allegiance in the face of the British presence. And the general's use of Loyalists as a military force was practically nil, except as a labor force on the defensive works; no historical evidence mentions the use of Loyalists inhabitants for fighting purposes at any time during the siege. More will be said about relations between the British command and the settlers, but here is confirmation of the claim by Paul Smith, today's noted authority on Loyalist-British military cooperation, that "at times they [the Loyalists] were organized for practically no other reason than to afford them protection and to provide for their useful employment."[71] Such attitudes would later prove most discouraging to several Loyalist families.

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[71] Loyalists and Redcoats, p. ix.

Chapter IV

PEOPLE FOR THE NEW PROVINCE

The smashing victory over the rebels did in fact guarantee the life of the colony for the duration of the war, but it did not induce a mass influx of Loyalists to Bagaduce. At its peak New Ireland's population probably did not exceed 200 Loyalist families, most of whom had already been residents of the Penobscot Bay region when the Revolution began.[1] Almost all of the rest came from Falmouth and Pownalborough, two other areas in the Province of Maine. Records fail to show more than a name for many of the families. Additional information about others, however, continues to illustrate how misfortune persistently dogged those who participated in the colony's history. This chapter will describe the individual plights of three groups of Loyalists: the long time residents of Penobscot during New Ireland's existence and the Falmouth and Pownalborough Loyalists before and after they came to Bagaduce.

The problems experienced prior to the British occupation by the Loyalists who had lived on the Penobscot River before

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[1]It is impossible to determine the exact population of New Ireland. 649 of the Penobscot Loyalists, including 178 adult males, resettled in New Brunswick after the war, but that was not the total number of Loyalists at Penobscot (see Chapter VII). See "Passamaquoddy Muster Roll," Seventy-fourth Regiment, Order Book 1784 (COPY), A143, Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum, pp. 2-28. Hereafter cited as "Passamaquoddy Muster Roll." See also Esther Clark Wright, The Loyalists of New Brunswick (Fredericton, New Brunswick, 1955), pp. 200-202. Hereafter cited as Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick.

the war and the troubles they had during the American attack and siege have already been described. They encountered grief afterwards as well, and it was doubly miserable because it came from two different sources. The first source was an expected one and originated among Americans who committed offenses against various individuals. (Rebel depredations aimed at the British-held territory as a whole will be discussed in the next chapter). The second was not expected and came from the British military establishment at Fort George.

American reprisals against the local Loyalists began with the rebel retreat during which at least two Penobscot residents suffered property losses when Thomas Goldthwaite, the younger son of the colonel, had his house burned[2] and Mathew Lymburner, one of the maltreated prisoners of the Americans during the siege and whose home was only a few miles from Bagaduce, had his farm so stripped by plunderers that he was unable to return to it to live for several months.[3]

James Stinson suffered a similar but greater loss. Having assisted in the construction of Fort George, he later became a crewman on a British privateer. During one of the privateer's raids along the nearby Maine coast, it captured an American patriot's vessel which was taken

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[2]MacLean to Clinton, Magabigwaduce, August 24, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 20.

[3]Claim of Mathew Lymburner, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-106.

back to the British fort as a prize and sold. As a result, not only was Stinson's farm plundered by rebel raiders, but at war's end it was confiscated by Massachusetts authorities with no compensation and awarded to the patriot who had lost the ship.[4]

Others who served the British had their misfortunes as well. William Stewart and Zebedee Linniken had much the same kind of experience as Stinson.[5] Benjamin Milliken, another Loyalist who suffered in the hold of an American warship while rebels robbed his farm, was once more captured by them the next year when he volunteered to go eastward to get masts for the British navy. He and one of the English ship's carpenters were arranging purchases with settlers on Frenchman's Bay when Colonel Allan and his Indian allies broke up the meeting. Milliken was taken to Machias and would have been shipped off to Boston imprisonment had he not had the good fortune to escape and get back to Penobscot.[6] Several other local people were part of a British expedition that was sent up the Penobscot River in

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[4]Claim of James Stinson, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 134-137.

[5]See claims of William Stewart and Zebedee Linniken, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 143-146, 149-152. Benjamin Proctor, a native of Nantucket who came to Bagaduce, lost a ship. How he did so is unknown except that it was an "incredible story." See Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 239.

[6]Milliken's claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 155-162. See also the letters, Allan to Powell, Machias, February 20, 1780 and May 15, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 101-105, 265-269. Milliken was the first permanent settler of Ellsworth, Maine. See Albert H. Davis, History of Ellsworth, Maine (Lewiston, Maine, 1927), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Davis, History of Ellsworth.

1780 to salvage armaments from the rebel wrecks. The expedition was surprised by an American force that captured all its boats and twelve of its people among whom were several Loyalists.[7]

There were inhabitants who willingly cooperated with the British despite the likelihood of American retaliation, but there were others who met with trouble from those very allies who were supposed to defend them. For various reasons General MacLean and his successor, Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell, developed antagonisms toward the civilians that led the first to resent them and the second to deal rather harshly with some of them. And under such leadership it is not surprising that the rank and file also caused hardships for Loyalists.

MacLean's attitude was evident soon after the siege was lifted. Desirous at first of keeping the surrounding settlements intact, he and Admiral Collier had issued a joint proclamation that was intended to set the people at ease lest they feel the British resented their siege-time activities.[8] Later he was disturbed by reports that the more loyal local elements were frightening the other settlers away with threats of hanging for having assisted the Americans.[9] What was worse, by October he felt he could

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[7]See Edward Kallock Gould, British and Tory Marauders on the Penobscot (Rockland, Maine, 1932), pp. 24-25. More will be said about one of the salvagers later.

[8]MacLean to Clinton, Majebigwaduce, August 23, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 18.

[9]"Hutchings' Narrative," p. 328.

not trust any of the inhabitants on the river.[10]

MacLean may have passed on his feelings to the man who replaced him as commander because it did not take Colonel Campbell long to exhibit his feelings toward the civilian population. Shortly after he assumed command, he began placing restrictions on the settlers. Only a trusted few were allowed into the fort. Persons had to have written permission to leave Bagaduce Peninsula. Any strangers had to register with the Overseer of Inhabitants. No one could receive provisions from the fort unless he worked and had a certificate from the Overseer. Settlers could not sell liquor.[11] Under the circumstances these restraints in themselves were not severe or unusual, but they were indicative of the colonel's growing suspicions. In March, 1781, he complained to General Clinton that the inhabitants had no real attachment to the king and he requested that the 74th Regiment be removed from Penobscot because many of its soldiers had become friends of the local people who "have enticed some to desert."[12]

Nor was Campbell unwilling to punish those who violated his orders. It is recorded that two outsiders,

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[10]MacLean to Clinton, Camp at Majebigwaduce, October 20, 1779, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 52.

[11]See "Extracts from Sgt. Lawrence's Orderly Book--1779--1780," in Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 320-322.

[12]Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell to Clinton, Fort George, March 15, 1781, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 258. In November, 1782, Campbell reported that seven more troops had deserted, this time Brunswickers, and only four of them had been caught. See Campbell to Brigadier General Paterson [at Halifax], Fort George, November 1, 1782, ibid., Vol. III, pp. 197-198.

George Hoch and John Welt, came to Penobscot because they had heard of English promises of land and money. Disillusioned upon their arrival, they decided to go back to their original homes but were caught before they reached rebel territory. Considered deserters, they were court-martialed and sentenced to receive a thousand lashes. One died while the punishment was being inflicted.[13] In another case seventy-year old Shubal Williams, a farmer who sold supplies to the troops at the fort, was accused of some minor wrongdoing by a drunken soldier. He was given five hundred lashes and the local residents were required to watch.[14] Cruelty of a different nature was visited upon John and Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch. They had shown as much loyalty to the British cause as anyone, having sent lumber to General Gage in Boston, been among the group that invited the British to occupy Penobscot, and assisted in the construction of the fort (especially John Perkins who led the work force). But some time after the siege, they and their families were "grossly insulted by the more unthinking part of the Army" and found it necessary to leave the peninsula. They went to York in western Maine, hoping to renew old acquaintances there, but American authorities suspected them of continued Loyalism so they returned to Penobscot. Also considered deserters, they received the

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[13]The survivor lived to an age of ninety-nine years. See Samuel L. Miller, History of the Town of Waldoboro, Maine (Wiscasset, Maine), p. 88. Hereafter cited as Miller, History of . . . Waldoboro.

[14]Williamson, "Proposed Province," p. 156.

peculiar sentence of being jailed until they would agree to forfeit all rights to their local property. They refused and may have suffered confinement of some sort for the duration of the war. Their case was not unusual since sixteen others were plead along with it before authorities in London.[15]

It should not be concluded that all British military personnel were unfriendly to the local people. Many favorable associations were developed between soldiers and civilians;[16] and misery from within the community had sources other than the army.[17] But there were numerous enough cases that friend as well as foe was the cause of unhappiness.

The Loyalists who came to Bagaduce from Falmouth did so in a roundabout way. In their activities Captain Henry

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[15]All of the cases were plead in London by Dr. Calef. See "The State of the Inhabitants of the District of the Penobscot March 1782," in Williamson, "Proposed Province," pp. 154-155.

[16]Many soldiers remained lifelong friends of the Loyalists (see Chapter VII). The army had problems other than desertion. A duel was fought between an English lieutenant and a German officer. The Englishman killed his opponent and "absconded." See two letters, Maj. Gen. Paterson to General Carleton, Halifax, June 1, 1783, and Brigadier General H. E. Fox to Carleton, Halifax, August 6, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, pp. 120-121, 265. A melancholy case was that of Lieutenant Charles Steward who killed himself because he had been arrested for having challenged another officer to a duel. See Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 180.

[17]Despite the pleas of Calef and Campbell, John Long lost a ship to a British naval captain stationed at Bagaduce. See Long's claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 125-127. Sadness of a more personal nature resulted from several family separations when men went to Penobscot but left their families in rebel homes. For examples see Petition, Boston, October 12, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 382-383; Petition of Robert

Mowatt figured prominently. His actions, besides causing the Loyalists some loss of property, made them so suspect in the eyes of more patriotic neighbors that they found it necessary to leave Falmouth. They finally reached New Ireland after rather trying experiences and, largely a migration of merchants, were soon about their business, doing quite well despite recurring wartime problems.

The turning point in relations between Loyalists and their neighbors had come in October, 1775, when Captain Mowatt bombarded Falmouth. Mowatt had had earlier trouble with the port town. His ship had been sent from Boston to protect a local shipbuilder who had violated non-importation agreements against Great Britain. While there, news was received of Lexington and Concord and as a result a group of rebels temporarily siezed control of the town. They grabbed the captain as he was strolling on shore and harried several local Tory families. Local moderates were able to restore order and gained the release of Mowatt who, satisfied that the disruptive faction had been suppressed, left quietly. Several months later he returned--this time on his errand to pacify rebel settlements along the coast. On October 17 he anchored opposite the most thickly settled part of the town and announced that in two hours he would begin its bombardment. A group of townspeople, probably including several Tories, was sent to plead for at least a little time to get people and belongings

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Calef, Boston, September 12, 1780, ibid., Vol. XVIII, p. 397 (Dr. Calef lived without his family throughout the war); and, Davis, History of Ellsworth, p. 21.

out of harm's way. Mowatt agreed to an overnight delay and declared that if all guns and ammunition were turned in to him by next morning, he would call off the attack. Since the people of Falmouth would not agree to the demand, his ships began their destruction at nine A.M. on October 18. Over one hundred homes and stores were destroyed in addition to certain public buildings and at least one church.[18]

Mowatt's attack had the opposite effect from what was intended. Rather than confirm British control, it swayed most of the region to favor the rebel cause; and for the Loyalists there, it was a setback in relations with the remainder of the populace. Records show that ten Falmouth residents (and most but not all of their families) became Loyalist refugees following the destruction of the town. Two of them went to England and are not concerned in this study.[19] The rest, six merchants, a customs officer and

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[18]For details of the destruction of Falmouth, see Maine, a History, I, 30-32; and James Vroom, "The Penobscot Loyalists," Acadiensis, III, no. 3 (July 1903), 172-182. The first source claims that three-quarters of the buildings were destroyed; Vroom's figure is one-fifth. A contemporary source (and the one cited above) states that the upper town was saved because firm resistance was shown by the inhabitants to British seamen who landed and were attempting to set buildings afire. See "A Short Acco't of the Destruction of the Town of Falmouth in October 1775," dated Falmouth, April 23, 1782, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 406-408.

[19]The losses suffered by the two men who went to England are indicative of other losses: Reverend John Wiswall lost a store and one-sixtieth of his church at Falmouth. See his Loyalist claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 39. William Tyng, a member of a well-known Massachusetts family, also lost a store--but not to Mowatt's gunnery. An enraged mob burned it and then used his home as a barrack. See A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 31-41.

his son, a tide surveyor, eventually reached New Ireland.

Besides losses at Falmouth, the eight Loyalists shared similar experiences in reaching Penobscot. Robert Pagan and his two brothers, William and Thomas, suffered property damage and losses to both Mowatt's guns and the Falmouth rebels. After the attack they refused to join the local militia, apparently a kind of confession of Tory sentiments, which required their fleeing to more friendly climes. Robert attempted to get his family to Barbadoes but lost his ship and wound up at New York where he began another merchant business in which his brothers took part.[20] Jeremiah Pote lost business property during the bombardment and when he was threatened by local patriots, fled to Nova Scotia, then moved on to New York. In order to get his wife and family out of Falmouth, Pote had to sign over his remaining properties, including a small vessel, to the townsmen.[21] Thomas Wyer, the son of customs officer David Wyer, lost part interest in a ship that was burned by Mowatt and joined Pote in his flight to Nova Scotia and New York. He also lost more property in order to get his family and father from Falmouth.[22] At New York he and Pote

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[20]For a more thorough background on the Pagans, see A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 71-81; Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 227-228; Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution with an Historical Essay, 2nd ed. (Ft. Washington, New York, 1966), II, 142-143 (Hereafter cited as Sabine, Loyalists); and David Russell Jack, "Robert and Miriam Pagan," Acadiensis, II, no. 4 (October 1902), 179-187.

[21]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 83-84; Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 238; Sabine, Loyalists, II, 198-199.

[22]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 93-95, 101 (his father's claim);

served on board British armed vessels along the coast; Pote was caught once and spent a winter in a rebel jail.[23] The eighth person to flee from Falmouth was Thomas Oxnard, another merchant, but nothing is known about his movements except that he eventually joined the others at Bagaduce.[24]

Robert Pagan and Thomas Wyer were the first Loyalists from Falmouth to come to New Ireland. Arriving in December, 1780,[25] they stayed in a home that was owned by Captain Mowatt, a two-story structure (the only two-story at Bagaduce) that included a small store run by an army captain. Apparently the store was a very limited venture because Pagan was allowed to partition off a room on the first floor for another one and when he wrote to his wife just before Christmas, he was optimistic that it would do well since there was little competition and much demand. He also sent news of friends in Falmouth (Mrs. Oxnard was mentioned) and told of prospects in lumber, furs, and shipping. He would

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Sabine, Loyalists, II, 461-463.

[23] A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 87-89, 97-99.

[24] Thomas Oxnard's brother, Edward, went to England in 1775 and remained there until after the war when he returned to Falmouth. For both Oxnards see Sabine, Loyalists, II, 139; Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 226; and Biographical Data, III, 144-145. For a rather interesting glimpse at a part-time Loyalist's attitudes about the Revolution, see Edward S. Moseley, "Edward Oxnard," The New England Historical and Genealogical Register and Antiquarian Journal, XXVI (Boston, 1872), 3-10, 115-121, 254-259.

[25] It is indicative of the questionable attraction of the proposed colony that more than a year passed after the British occupation before these people moved there.

build her a house in the spring, he wrote, so that she and her father could join him. Wyer was to handle the shipping part of the business.[26]

Pagan's brothers and the other Falmouth refugees soon followed and before long all had combined to form a thriving merchant business. Two saw-mills and a lumberyard were erected, the lumber being purchased locally or cut from several hundred acres of land that had been purchased by the Pagans on a nearby island. A fleet of ships was gathered to carry the lumber to ports as far distant as New York and Quebec where it was exchanged for merchandise to stock two stores built and run for New Ireland residents.[27]

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[26]Letter, Robert Pagan to his wife, Fort George, Penobscot, December 23, 1780, quoted in Grace A. Mowatt, The Diverting History of a Loyalist Town (Fredericton, New Brunswick, 1953), pp. 26-28. Hereafter cited as Mowatt, Diverting History.

[27]The entire enterprise--the saw-mills, lumberyard, land, ships, and stores--may all have been owned only by the Pagans. At least it was their claim for such that was submitted after the war to the British government. Since young Pote and Thomas Wyer were at Falmouth, New York, Bagaduce, and finally St. Andrews, New Brunswick, while the Pagans were in those places and since they handled the Pagan shipping at the last-named place, it is assumed that they did so at Penobscot. See the Pagan claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, p. 74. For the other men coming to Penobscot, see Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 227-228. A Jonas Farnsworth of Machias tells of meeting Robert Pagan and others at Penobscot in the spring of 1781 when he had gone there to repurchase a small schooner taken by the British. They had moved from New York, he said, because they were "tired of doing duty." See Farnsworth's deposition, Machias, April 11, 1781, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 241-243. One of the bookkeeping journals from a Pagan store at Penobscot is still in existence and gives an interesting list of customers and their purchases. It also shows that not all business was serious because one entry reads "paid John Hancock [speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives] To Bal. in a chamber Pot 1.3." See "The Penobscot Journal," shelf #32, Archives Section, New Brunswick Museum, St. John.

One or two of the merchants even had an interest in the privateering that was carried on along the coast.[28]

Moving to Penobscot and prospering in its trade, however, did not end the problems of the Falmouth people. Like the long time residents, they were confronted with trouble from both Americans and British. Rebel privateers captured or destroyed a significant number of their trading vessels[29] and, at least in the early going, English seamen gave them "a great deal of trouble."[30] General Haldimand in Quebec suspected them of illicit trade practices and/or favoring the American cause (again, Haldimand's peculiar attitude toward Penobscot)[31] and, finally, there was even some difficulty between older settlers and Robert Pagan when he was named Overseer of Inhabitants in Dr. Calef's place while the latter journeyed to England. The commanding

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See also L. K. Ingersoll, On This Rock (Fredericton, New Brunswick, 1963), pp. 18-19.

[28]Thomas Wyer and Robert Pagan owned a privateer that was commanded by John Long. See Long's claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 125-132.

[29]Pagan claimed that he lost over thirty ships in his business enterprises at New York and Penobscot. See "Memorial of Robert Pagan and Thomas Pagan to the Governor of Nova Scotia," Acadiensis, VI, no. 4 (October 1906), 262. Hereafter cited as "Memorial of Robert Pagan." See also Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 117-118.

[30]See Pagan's letter to his wife (note 26, above).

[31]See three letters: Haldimand to -----, Quebec, June 6, 1781 [duplicate of original/original in cypher], and Haldimand to Colonel Robertson, Quebec, September 29, 1781--both in "Haldimand Papers," Vol. 147, B. M. 21,807, pp. 260-261, 292-293; also, Haldimand to Captain Hartcup, Quebec, September 19, 1781, ibid., Vol. 150, B. M. 21,810, p. 131.

officer's refusal to give back the post to Calef upon his return was resented by Calef's old friends.[32]

A personal problem of another kind was that of Thomas Oxnard, a man who regretted coming to Penobscot in the first place. His wife was still living at Falmouth and in the summer of 1781 she asked the government of Massachusetts for permission to visit her husband. In her request she asserted that Thomas had been a victim of circumstances, that he had fled from Falmouth only because he feared harm from the "ill-minded," and had never taken up arms against the American cause. She hoped, she wrote, that his name would be removed from the government list of those forbidden to return to Massachusetts-held territory.[33] The authorities allowed her the visit but would not approve her husband's homecoming. The following year she again petitioned the Massachusetts authorities, this time to be allowed to move to Penobscot since Thomas could not come to her. Her

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[32]John Calef to General Carleton, Penobscot, November 2, 1782, and Calef to Maurice Morgan, same place, date, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. III, pp. 229-230. The manner in which Pagan acted while overseer may have contributed to his unpopularity. A rebel newspaper quoted a rather harsh demand by Pagan that all Penobscot people were to work at the fort. See "Extract from Conn. Gazette (New London) printing copy of notice sent to eastern parts," in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. III, p. 272.

[33]Petition of Martha Oxnard, Falmouth, Aug. 7, 1781, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 313-314. Thomas Oxnard's name was listed in the "Banishment Act of the State of Massachusetts," (typed copy) Packet #6, Loyalist Material, Shelf #22, Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum, St. John. Pote, Wyer, Nutting, and Robert Pagan are also on the list. Wyer and Pote are described as mariners, Pagan as a merchant.

petition was granted and the family, distressed by loss of home and country, were reunited.[34]

The most depressing individual cases of misfortune were those of Loyalists who came from Pownalborough. Persecuted before they got to Penobscot, several of them suffered even worse hazards after they arrived and two died as a direct result of their ties with New Ireland.

The misfortunes of John Jones were perhaps the least insufferable. A few months before the Revolution began, Jones was accosted by a group of rowdies who demanded that he sign a covenant against Great Britain. When he refused, he was first threatened, then tied and dragged across a river. Sometime later, after the war began, his Tory sympathies resulted in his being placed in a Boston jail. His escape, however, began for him a series of rather successful adventures. He reached Quebec and met Colonel Robert Rogers of Rogers' Rangers fame. The colonel was seeking recruits for another ranger corps and Jones volunteered. Commissioned a captain, Jones was sent to Bagaduce (arriving after the British occupation) to raise a company of Loyalist rangers. As we shall see in the next chapter, he was most effective in that capacity as well as in leading men on forays against rebel habitations near Penobscot.[35]

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[34]Petition of Martha Oxnard, Falmouth, September 23, 1782, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 89-90. Also see A. O. 12, Vol. 82, p. 37.

[35]As mentioned earlier, the Reverend Jacob Bailey compiled a list of people from whom General MacLean could

But Jones' good fortune at New Ireland was exceptional among Pownalborough Loyalists. Nathaniel Gardiner was less fortunate. Formerly a judge in Rhode Island he moved to Pownalborough shortly before the war and just in time to be threatened by the same mob that maltreated Jones. Nothing more is known about him until his appearance at Bagaduce in 1780 when he volunteered to take part in the salvaging of rebel guns in the upper Penobscot River. As noted earlier, the salvagers were surprised by Americans who destroyed their boats and captured a dozen British soldiers and Loyalists. Gardiner was among the latter. Taken to the jail at Falmouth, he suffered through four months of very poor treatment which included being robbed and threatened with the gallows. He was able to escape to New York and finally got back to Penobscot.[36]

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expect assistance and support should he occupy areas west of the Penobscot River. Of those listed, most were from Pownalborough. Some of their names can be found in Reverend Henry O. Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec and One of Them--John Carlton," Sprague's Journal of Maine History, V, no. 5 (February March April 1918), 244. Hereafter cited as Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec." For Jones' pre-war experiences see that source, p. 244. For his later adventures see Hunter Boyd, "Wawieg," Acadiensis, VII, no. 3 (July 1907), 276. Hereafter cited as Boyd, "Wawieg." Colonel Rogers played a shadowy part in the history of New Ireland. He was with Admiral Collier during the relief expedition and continued to make a half-hearted effort during the rest of the war to enlist forces from eastern Maine, Nova Scotia, and Quebec for ranger duty. General Haldimand greatly suspected his motives and his men. Even Jones was not trusted by the general, at least when Jones first showed up at Quebec. Later, he delivered several messages to Haldimand from Penobscot. See letters, Haldimand to Hughes, Quebec, February 28, 1780, and same to same, Quebec, November 11, 1780--both in "Haldimand Papers," Vol. 150, B. M. 21,810, pp. 69, 108. See also Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 185.

[36]He spent the remainder of the war in command of a

One Pownalborough citizen who was virtually pushed into Loyalism and who had only the briefest of associations with New Ireland was Charles Callahan. An Irishman and a mariner, Callahan had settled in that Maine community before the war and made his livelihood sailing between there and Boston. After 1775 he tried to remain "nonpolitical" but was repeatedly pressured to join the rebel forces. Finally, he was proscribed and banished in 1777, when he went to Halifax and served as a pilot for British vessels. In December of 1779 he was on his way to Bagaduce to become commander of a privateer, but the ship on which he traveled sank just outside of Halifax Harbor. Callahan was one of the 165 who perished with it.[37]

Of all the Loyalist careers that were linked to the history of New Ireland the most tragic was that of John Carlton. A long and respected resident of Woolwich and owner of a farm and several coasting vessels, Carlton had become a leading citizen of the Pownalborough region. Like Jones and Gardiner, he had been threatened by a mob, in this case demanding that he sign a covenant or be buried alive, and when he refused the first, was made to dig his own grave before he was allowed to escape. After the Revolution began, Carlton repeatedly tempted local patriots

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privateer. For Gardiner's experiences see Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec," 244; Frontier Missionary, pp. 332-335; and Sabine, Loyalists, I, 462-463.

[37]See Charles Edwin Allen, History of Dresden, Maine (Augusta, Maine, 1931), p. 394 (hereafter cited as Allen, History of Dresden); Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 74-75; and Sabine, Loyalists, I, 286-287.

to further persecute him. Rather than join the army he paid a fine. When Loyalists had to flee the area, he assisted them. On at least one occasion, when a Loyalist homestead was put up for auction after the owners had fled, Carlton bid on it in order to preserve it should they return. Once, the Committee of Safety voted his name be struck from the list of town voters, but Carlton's popularity was such that not only did the townspeople vote him back on the list, as late as 1780 they were electing him to serve in minor public offices.[38]

It was in that year or 1781 that Carlton became associated with Penobscot. The circumstances are vague, but for some reason he was taken there by the British (whether voluntarily or not is unknown) and then sent in his own vessel to Boston, perhaps to perform a prisoner exchange. Despite a flag of truce, he was overtaken by a rebel privateer and lost his ship. He was able to escape and got back to Bagaduce but was now an unquestioned fugitive from his home area. Becoming a forager along the coast, Carlton made numerous secret visits to his wife and ten children in Woolwich in order to bring them needed

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[38]For family background on Carlton see A Carlton Genealogy and History, comp. Worrall Dumont Prescott (New Rochelle, New York, 1967), pp. 17-19. Details of Carlton's Loyalist career, including the threat of burial, are found in Frontier Missionary, pp. 172, 336-337 (Reverend Bailey, the frontier missionary, was the minister of the church that Carlton attended); and Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec," 249-253. Carlton's bidding on the Tory estate is mentioned in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 9-11.

supplies.[39] On one of his visits, in September of 1782, he was discovered by rebels off Small Point not far from Woolwich. A brief chase was culminated when he was blinded by a shot fired at him. Captured, he was carried to a home on Small Point and his wife brought to him. She was at his side when he died four days later. He was buried on his farm, at night, by friends.[40]

While the miseries of Nathaniel Gardiner, Charles Callahan, and John Carlton were perhaps the more discouraging examples of Loyalist associations with Penobscot, they nevertheless were not untypical.[41] Regardless of a Loyalist's origins--whether local or from Falmouth or Pownalborough--his ties with New Ireland often were sad ones.

In sorting out the overall aspects of Loyalist motivation suggested in this chapter, one clearly dominates

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[39]He still had friendly neighbors. When his property became subject to confiscation, they seized it but only as a formality in order to keep it for the Carlton family. See Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec," 258-259. Carlton descendants owned the home at least until the 1880's. It is still standing though not now owned by a Carlton. Worrall Prescott (note 38, above) is a descendant of John Carlton and his book and correspondence with this writer have been valuable sources of information.

[40]Thayer, "Loyalists of the Kennebec," 260-262. Reverend Bailey had warned him not to visit his home. See Frontier Missionary, p. 337. The Selectmen of Harpswell, in reviewing defensive accomplishments, wrote to the Massachusetts authorities that they had "killed one man whose name was Caltron [sic]." See Petition, February 5, 1783, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 166-167.

[41]At least two other Loyalists reached Penobscot from Pownalborough. They were Edmund Doharty and Dr. Cassimire Mayer. See Sabine, Loyalists, I, 383, and II, 53.

the rest. Persecution by the rebels was the single, most common reason why Loyalists chose New Ireland as a refuge, and perhaps why they chose to remain loyal to Britain. There were other motives. The Pagans and their associates recognized the potential of trade at Penobscot and at least one person, Thomas Oxnard, claimed that he was a Loyalist by accident rather than by design. But even in these cases their decision was first made easier by rebel outrages that forced them from their homes. Hence the primary motive was rebel persecution. Motives for the original Penobscot settlers have already been discussed (see the conclusion to Chapter II), but later persecution was the result of showing support to the British at Bagaduce. For the Falmouth people, persecution resulted more from the actions of British authorities than from their own activities. For the Pownalborough residents, evidence shows that two of them, Jones and Carlton, were persecuted for refusing to take an oath that contradicted their feelings toward England. For all, persecution completed the break between rebel and Tory. If it did not make a person a Loyalist, it confirmed his loyalty.

Chapter V

1779-1783: MASSACHUSETTS VERSUS NEW IRELAND

The repulse of the American attack on Fort George in the summer of 1779 did not end hostilities between Massachusetts and New Ireland. Having failed to dislodge the British, the rebels tried to restrict them to as little territory as possible. The English, however, launched repeated, small-scale raids further and further along the coast of Massachusetts until by war's end American control of any part of Maine was only barely evident.

The American retreat after the siege did not end the harassment of settlers; it only brought grief to different groups of them. Those whose homes were in the path of the retreat were doubly beset by troubles since they had to contend with routed militia, who needed supplies and whose wounded had to be cared for,[1] as well as by their pursuers, especially Captain Mowatt, whose threats and demands caused several families to pack up what they could and follow the rebel flight.[2]

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[1] See "Colonel Brewer's account," pp. 332-334; also, Petition of Inhabitants of Lincoln, October 1, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 333-338.

[2] For examples of people leaving the Penobscot region see Petition of Andrew Patterson for the Government of Massachusetts, Fort Halifax, March 2, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 113-114; and Vital Records of Belfast, Maine, to the Year 1892, ed. Alfred Johnson (Boston, 1917), I, 3. The entire community of Belfast moved westward in order to get out of the Britishers' way. Its population in 1776 was 229.

The responsibility for containing the British in as narrow an area as possible around Bagaduce fell to two American officers, General Peleg Wadsworth and Colonel John Allan. Wadsworth was put in charge of the overall defenses of Maine while Allan was to assist him from Machias. Both knew that the enemy had intentions of expanding into the remainder of the province, so Wadsworth assumed the responsibility for holding the territory west of British control while Allan did so for the territory east of it.

In order for their arrangement to be effective, Wadsworth and Allan had to be sure who were friends and who were foes, hence their first problem was that of distinguishing rebels from Tories. Like the British, they required an oath-taking, but it was not always a satisfactory method. A few settlers for example claimed that irregularities had been allowed in the manner of giving the oath and they sought redress in Boston.[3] Others took the requirement as

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[3]Two letters discuss prisoners who became so for refusing the oath. See CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 88-89. A melancholy sidelight to the problem was the case of Nathaniel Palmer who refused to take the oath on the grounds that he was a Quaker. He was arrested and placed in the Pownalborough jail. His petition to the government of Massachusetts for release included the following: ". . . if I should affirm to be true to war: then I should make shipwrack of faith and a good conchance . . . if you suspect me to be a tory you Rong me for I abhor the name of tory or whig Ether they only Represent too Revengeful Parties distroying Eaich other I will not Joyn Ether . . . . Now friends if you are Resolved to Expel me from my Native Cuntry when I have done you no harm or Ever will: I hope I Shall enjoy that Sperite of Peace which wishes you temporal and Eternal wellfair: and am confident that if you Refuse my Pertishon in your Court here below: yet the Court above

an opportunity to accuse unwelcomed neighbors of Toryism.[4] The General Court of Massachusetts, burdened with the hard job of judging the cases, found several of the suspects innocent and allowed them to return to their homes. It further passed a resolution ordering the militia officers not to molest Penobscot area inhabitants since many of them professed loyalty to the rebel cause but preferred to stay on their land rather than flee with the retreating American army.[5] Any such leniency of course did not ease the situation for Wadsworth and Allan.

Another problem that was a partial result of the first was the willingness of some settlers near Penobscot to trade with the British. In December, 1779, several rebel town committees reported to Boston that their paper currency was being driven into hiding because of hard money used by the enemy to purchase local supplies. They also complained that whenever anyone was caught trading with the British and shipped off to Boston for trial, he was acquited and allowed to return eastward.[6]

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will hear the Cryes of my Children and wife whose Liveing you are distroying without cause." The government dismissed his petition. See CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 212, 226, 230, 233-235, 248. There is a Nathaniel Palmer listed on the "Passamaquoddy Muster Roll" of Loyalists who settled in New Brunswick after the war.

[4]Examples of depositions against neighbors are found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 153-160, 212-213, 226-228.

[5]For the resolution of October 7, 1779, see CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 364-366.

[6]Petition of the Committees of the Several Towns and Plantations of the Countey [sic] of Lincoln . . . , Warren,

Worse than illicit trade, however, was the assistance given by Tory suspects to British troops. Numerous Loyalists served as guides or pilots for marauding forces and several will be mentioned later, but two who were immediate problems for General Wadsworth were Henry Goldthwaite and Stephen Pendleton. In October of 1779 Goldthwaite directed a raiding party that destroyed homes, vessels, and businesses in two settlements situated on the bay shore opposite Bagaduce.[7] More notorious was the raid that Pendleton guided to the home of Levi Soule, an American militia officer. Intending to kidnap Soule, the attackers captured and bound him and left him in Pendleton's care while they plundered Soule's farm. When the captive asked to see his ailing wife before he was taken away, Pendleton took him to her bedside but became alarmed when Soule ordered his wife to untie him. When she began to do so, Pendleton shot and killed Soule, the bullet passing through the victim and wounding his wife as well.[8]

December 20, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 85-88. The petition also defined the British area of control as being a ten-mile encirclement of Bagaduce. It was a fairly accurate estimate.

[7]The places were Camden, the occasional headquarters of Wadsworth, and Sandy Point. It was on this raid that Goldthwaite was wounded. See Damages in & Near Camden, in 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 408-409; and letter, Wm. Lithgow, Jr., to General Cushing, Sandy Point on Penobscot, October 15, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 386-389.

[8]Two somewhat varying accounts of the attack are Miller, History of . . . Waldoboro, pp. 88-89; and Cyrus Eaton, Annals of the Town of Warren (Hallowell, Maine, 1851), pp. 183-184. Hereafter cited as Eaton, Annals of . . . Warren.

Such incidents caused the Massachusetts government, in March, 1780, to allow Wadsworth to declare martial law for the coastal areas and islands within his purview,[9] a declaration that placed severe restrictions upon the inhabitants. None were to be allowed near Penobscot without a pass, all were to try to stop any offenders of law, and anyone moving to Penobscot would be considered a deserter from the American army. As for those people under the direct control of the British, they were to remain neutral to both sides and were not to go to the British fort. Finally, the penalty for any assistance to or communication with the enemy was set at military execution.[10]

In addition to establishing martial law, Wadsworth asked Boston not to exchange or return any more captives. And by late spring his whaleboats had put such pressure on marauding British ships that their larger vessels were hauled ashore at Bagaduce.[11]

The general's belligerence was only met by increased boldness from the other side. This time it was Loyalist John Jones, now captain of a ranger detachment working out of Fort George, who led a raid into rebel territory. In the early morning hours of August 15, 1780, Jones and several of his men kidnapped Charles Cushing, Brigadier-General of Militia and High Sheriff of Lincoln County, from his home

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[9]Wadsworth to the Board of War, Boston, March 8, 1780; and Council of Massachusetts, March 18, 1780--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 128, 142-143.

[10]Proclamation of P. Wadsworth, Thomaston, April 18, 1780, ibid., pp. 222-224.

[11]Wadsworth to Council, Falmouth, April 28, 1780; and same to same, June 8 1780, ibid., pp. 239-242, 299-300.

at Pownalborough (as might be expected, there was some personal reason for choosing an official of Jones' former home town). Cushing was hustled back to the fort, held captive for several weeks, then paroled on condition that he obtain the release of several Penobscot settlers who were being detained in Boston.[12]

General Cushing's kidnapping had been effected partly as an inducement to Massachusetts authorities to show more lenience toward Loyalists still living in rebel territory. Unfortunately, it led to quite the reverse attitude when General Wadsworth decided to take even harsher steps to strengthen his control. He first sent thirty more suspects to Boston with a recommentation that they not be allowed to return to their homes.[13] He then gave encouragement to local privateers by announcing that any prizes taken by American crews would not be shared with the government.[14]

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[12]A detailed description of the kidnapping was written in a letter by Jones to Reverend Bailey at Halifax. See Frontier Missionary, pp. 335-336. Personal satisfaction was also enjoyed by Bailey, who characterized Cushing as a "Tyrant" (p. 177). Cushing's parole was effected by General Wadsworth. See CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 357-359, 365-367, 384, 388. Upon his release Cushing recommended to Boston that better treatment be given Tory prisoners because of possible reprisals to Americans held by the British.

[13]Wadsworth to Council, Falmouth, July 24, 1780, and Wadsworth order to Lt. Jos. McLellan, Hallowell Fort Weston [sic], September 25, 1780, both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 358-359, 435.

[14]Wadsworth to Council, Headquarters, Thomaston, September 14, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 414-415. Sometimes "prizes" were questionable ones. See Petition of Ephraim Sheldon [plea? Oct., 1780?], CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 449-450.

Finally, within a fortnight of Cushing's abduction, Wadsworth determined on the severest of examples for anyone who might in the future consider aiding and abetting the enemy. He had a man named Jeremiah Baum tried by court-martial for guiding a party of marauding British soldiers westward from Bagaduce. When the verdict of guilty was handed down, Wadsworth sentenced Baum to hang. The general had threatened execution before[15] and Tories had been frightened by the sight of the gallows before, so when Baum was taken to the hangman the day after his trial, few spectators expected that the sentence would be carried out. But it was.[16]

If such tactics caused a slowdown in enemy action, it was only temporary because the British again reacted with boldness in January, 1781, this time capturing Wadsworth himself. Most of the general's troops had gone home because their terms of service had expired; and, despite pleas to Boston for replacements, Maine lay exposed to British attack.[17] John Long, a Loyalist privateersman, learned of

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[15]In June two men had been sentenced to death but escaped. See Wadsworth to Council, June 8, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 299-300.

[16]Sabine, Loyalists, I, 215-216. Wadsworth's attitude: "This Act of Severity tho painful in the highest degree proved salutary, for there was not found another instance of this kind & people began to realize the sentiment that Lenity to Enemy was Cruelty to Friend." See, Letter, Wadsworth to Williamson, pp. 159-160.

[17]Among the warnings to the Massachusetts government were those of Ezra Taylor to General Court, Pownalborough, November 28, 1780, and Wadsworth to Governor Hancock, Thomaston, January 10, 1781, both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 57-59, 87-89. Massachusetts did not immediately

Wadsworth's slender defenses and conveyed the news to Fort George, where a raiding party was organized and taken by Long across the bay to Camden. There, another Loyalist, Waldo Dicke, guided it to Thomaston and Wadsworth's home. After a brief struggle the general was overwhelmed and taken back to Bagaduce.

Wadsworth was held for several months and would have been sent to England had not he and another prisoner escaped during a violent June rainstorm and made their way back to friendly territory.[18] Thereafter, however, Wadsworth's effectiveness was ended, and for the rest of the war his district barely held its own against continued and incessant enemy depredations.[19]

In the meantime Colonel Allan was facing similar problems in far eastern Maine. Not only was his case more

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send replacements because it was attempting to get troops intended for Continental Army service diverted to the eastern district's defense. General Washington refused the request. See the exchange of correspondence between him and the General Court of Massachusetts, February 9-March 6, 1781, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 129-133, 179.

[18]For these and numerous other details of Wadsworth's capture see John Long's claim, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 125-127. Also, Dispatch from Col. Mason Wheaton to Governor Hancock, Thomaston, February 23, 1781; Resolve relating to Wadsworth, Boston, March 6, 1781; Wadsworth to John Hopkins DC Gen'l Prisoners, Fort George, May 8, 1781--all in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 152, 177, 254-256, 263-264. See also two letters, Lt. Col. John Campbell to Clinton, Fort George, March 5, 1781; and same to same, Fort George, June 22, 1781--both found in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, pp. 258-292. Plus, Letter, Wadsworth to Williamson, pp. 159-161. Two accurate secondary accounts are Eaton, Annals of . . . Warren, pp. 186-190; and Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 49-52.

[19]Examples of complaints made to Boston about enemy

precarious, since he was literally surrounded by the enemy, but he also had to contend with a populace that showed even stronger tendencies to coexist with the British than did those near Wadsworth.

The British confronted Allan from all directions. To the east they completely controlled the St. John River region and competed with him for the nearer St. Croix Valley. From the north, scouting parties from Quebec were an occasional problem. And the southward direction, the sea, meant the threat of the usually dominant British naval forces. Finally, Fort George, his worst threat, was westward.

The colonel's first problems, however, were much nearer than any British post. As Wadsworth had done in the west, Allan attempted to contain the enemy and, for a time, he had the support of most of the local inhabitants.[20]

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attacks include: Wm. McCobb to Commanding Officer at Falmouth, Boothbay, February 23, 1781; Committee of Georgetown to Governor, February 23, 1781; Major Wheaton to the Massachusetts Government, April 25, 1781; Petition of Jacob Ludwig for Waldoborough, May 29, 1782; Col. Hunter to Governor, Waldoborough, August 22, 1782; Petition of Waldoborough, May 13, 1783--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 148, 148-150, 219-220, 261-262, and Vol. XX, pp. 20-21, 75-76, 227-228. A glance at these volumes will show others. Enemy attack was not the only problem. Several settlements complained of severe droughts during the later war years, and the winters must have been worse than usual because in 1779-1780 Penobscot Bay froze between Camden and Bagaduce. See Eaton, Annals of . . . Warren, pp. 180-181. The situation in Maine was aptly described by a quote in the "Shelburne Papers" of 1781 shortly after Wadsworth's capture: "the Country from Casco Bay [Falmouth] Eastward are in the King's interest, and a State of quiet." Vol. 66, pp. 163-164.

[20]Allan and one of his aides wrote to the Massachusetts authorities in the fall of 1779 that their persuasion, threats, and encouragements had kept the area east of Blue Hill Bay and the Union River (about twenty miles east of Fort George)

Then weaknesses developed. In October, 1779, he complained that the people in Machias were trading with Nova Scotia, ignoring his declarations, and refusing to serve in the militia.[21] The Machias Committee of Safety answered by arguing about the extent of his authority over the citizens, claiming that officially his duties were concerned only with Indian relations.[22] Allan, after considering the possibility of moving his headquarters to the St. Croix, turned to the outlying settlements for help,[23] but he soon was presented with another problem from that quarter.

Having learned that a group of men from several settlements east of Fort George were gathering to discuss

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under American allegiance. See, Allan to Powell, Machias, Sept. 24, 1779; and Letter of John Preble, Frenchman's Bay, October 7, 1779--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 180, 363. For a time the settlements agreed and likewise sent claims of loyalty to Boston. See two documents, To the Council from Several Citizens at Frenchman's Bay, October 11, 1779; and, From Delegates of the Townships between Machias and Frenchman's Bay in Convention assembled, Narraguagus, March 9, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 379-380 and Vol. XVIII, pp. 133-134.

[21]Allan to General Court, Machias, October 20, 1779; and Petition of Alexander Campbell, agent for Col. Allan, to the Council and House of Representatives, Boston, January 20, 1780--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 397-400, and Vol. XVIII, pp. 70-72.

[22]More will be said about Allan and the Indians later. The Committee of Safety at Machias recommended to Boston that Allan "not be burdened with any military command, but left at liberty to give his whole time and attention to the Care of Indians." See their letter of November 6, 1779, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 419-420.

[23]Allan to General Court, Machias, January 6, 1780; and Allan to Committee, Magistrates & Militia Officers of the Several Towns and Districts Westward of Camden, Machias, March 5, 1780--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 60-62, 123.

the advantages of establishing trade relations with the British at Fort George, Allan decided to disrupt the proceedings. Taking several Indians to the home of a Captain Nathan Jones, he abruptly ended the meeting and arrested two men who had come as representatives from the fort. Unfortunately, the colonel's actions were to no avail. When he accused Jones of wrongdoing, the latter received so much popular support that his case was dropped. Furthermore, when the Colonel and his Indians learned of a cache of supplies meant for Bagaduce, the Indians got drunk on the liquor they found and destroyed the rest of the supplies. Finally, he took the two British captives to Machias but lost them when unknown local people helped them to escape.[24]

Of course enemy pressure added to Allan's troubles. Repeated raids on Mount Desert Island settlements so discouraged the inhabitants there that by 1781 most of them had taken the British oath.[25] And in February of that year an even harsher blow to eastern rebel morale occurred at Frenchman's Bay when Captain Daniel Sullivan, brother to General John Sullivan of General Washington's Continental

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[24]The two captives were Loyalist Benjamin Milliken and the ship's carpenter mentioned earlier. Details of the episode are found in several letters dated February and March, 1780. See CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 101-105, 115-119, 163-164.

[25]William D. Williamson, The History of Maine; from Its First Discovery, A. D. 1602, to the Separation, A. D. 1820, Inclusive (Hallowell, Maine, 1832), II, 482. Hereafter cited as Williamson, History of Maine. See also Allan to President Powell, Machias, January 26, 1781, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 105-112.

Army, was kidnapped and taken to Fort George.[26]

But Allan persisted in his attempts to protect the region. Like General Wadsworth, he proclaimed martial law, apprehended suspects, and sent them to Boston for trial. Yet, despite his efforts, there was continued communication between settlers and British. As one Gouldsborough inhabitant put it, people there had an "undoubted right to make the best terms we cou'd to serve our families" and then asked the Massachusetts government to grant him status as a neutral.[27] Repeated pleas were vainly sent to Boston for various kinds of relief while the patriot hold on eastern Maine continued to slip as the war went on.[28]

As Maine became less secure, Massachusetts civil officials sought outside assistance. In 1780 they asked their representatives to the Continental Congress to petition that body for help on another attack upon Bagaduce.[29]

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[26]Sullivan was taken to Fort George, then to New York. He was exchanged a short time later but died while returning to eastern Maine. See William D. Williamson, "The British Occupation of Penobscot During the Revolution", CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. I, p. 393. Hereafter cited as Williamson, "British Occupation." Allan was very nearly captured in November, 1780. See his letter, Machias, November 2, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 24-32.

[27]The quotation is from a letter, Francis Shaw to the General Court, Gouldsborough, March 17, 1781. It and others pertaining to Allan's frustrating attempts to restrict relations with the British can be found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 193, 235-236, 241-243, 252-254, 283-288.

[28]Numerous petitions for assistance can be found in ibid., pp. 380-470.

[29]See Council of Massachusetts to the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, March 8, 1780, CMHS,

Congress in turn sought the opinion of General Washington, who gave several reasons why such an expedition was impractical at the time. Naval support was necessary, he wrote, and the Americans had none to compete with the British. Regular troops would be needed to complement militia forces and he could not spare them. Also, there was a lack of funds and supplies necessary for the attempt. Then he added:

> Indeed considering the position of these States a Fleet is essential to our system of defense--that we have not hitherto suffered more than we have for want of it is to be ascribed to the feeble and injudicious manner in which the enemy have applied the means in their hands during the war. The plan they are now persuing [sic] of attacking points remote from each other will make us feel the disadvantage in a striking way--and may be fatal if our allies are not able to afford us naval succour.[30]

One of those allies did give occasional hope of assistance against the enemy at Fort George. In May of 1780 the leaders of the French army stationed in Rhode Island considered a strike there and, when they temporarily dropped the idea, asked that a French vessel cruise off the Maine coast.[31] In 1782 they renewed discussion of an attack

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2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 129-132. A committee of both Massachusetts houses had earlier discussed the feasibility of another solo attempt to dislodge the British. See ibid., p. 47.

[30]Letter to the President of the Council of Massachusetts Bay from G. Washington, Headquarters "Morris Town", April 17, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 228-230.

[31]A French frigate commanded by a Captain La Touche boldly sailed into Bagaduce Harbor in May of 1780 and made detailed plans of the British fortifications. See Williamson, "British Occupation," p. 385. In that article,

but this time were discouraged when General Washington gave them many of the same reasons he had earlier given to Congress and Massachusetts.[32]

French support not forthcoming, the desperate situation in Maine by early 1783 caused the Boston authorities again to appeal to Congress for help. Once again Congress referred them to General Washington and, as before, the general refused them. He wrote that there was the possibility of a "general pacification," and, should that not occur, an attack on New York was the foremost of future operations.[33] Maine would remain endangered for the duration of the war.

An added frustration for both the Americans and British was each side's relationship with the Indians of Maine. Colonel Allan devoted much of his energy to the defense of eastern Maine, but it should be remembered that his official title was Continental Agent for Indians in the Eastern District and his primary concern was the welfare of those

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Williamson states that Count de Rochambeau, Commander of the French Army in America, was the one who considered taking Penobscot but was discouraged by Washington. For other French involvement see two letters, E. Gerry [to Council of Massachusetts], Philadelphia, May 20, 1780; and Allan to the Massachusetts government, Machias, June 16, 1781--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 275-277 and Vol. XIX, pp. 383-388.

[32]See three letters written by Washington from his headquarters at Newburgh, August 10, 1783, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 63-67. This time Washington described Fort George as the best finished fort in America.

[33]Washington to the General Court of Massachusetts, Headquarters, Newburgh, February 22, 1783, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 187-189.

people. In that capacity he was constantly vying for their allegiance with enemy agents out of Nova Scotia.[34] And here, as with his other responsibilities, Allan's problems did not rest solely with the British since there was considerable resentment from American settlers toward his charges. In fact Allan twice temporarily moved his headquarters from Machias to Passamaquoddy Bay because of troubles between Indians and white inhabitants.[35] The English, too, had their problems. Shortly after the American siege, General MacLean made a treaty with the Penobscot Indians, but it was soon dropped when the general's successors failed to honor its obligations.[36] Later, natives were used as messengers and scouts by the commanders of the English fort and Canada, but their performances became so uncertain that the officers stopped relying on them.[37] Nova Scotia continued to entice Indians away from the Americans. Yet, in the end, the competition between the two antagonists for their support was equally ineffective;

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[34]See several letters written by, or for, Allan to the Massachusetts government, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVII, pp. 182, 397-400, Vol. XVIII, pp. 70-72, 282-284, 306-307, 345-348.

[35]Allan to Powell, Machias, February 20, 1780; and Allan to Governor, Machias, March 8, 1782--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 101-105, and Vol. XIX, pp. 436-439.

[36]Lt. Col. John Campbell to General Haldimand, Fort George, April 3, 1780, "Haldimand Papers," Vol. 149, B. M. 21,809, p. 110.

[37]Ibid. See also, Haldimand to General MacLean [at Halifax], Quebec, May 28, 1780; and Haldimand to the Commanding Officer at Penobscot, Quebec, January 30, 1782--both in "Haldimand Papers," Vol. 150, B. M. 12,810, pp. 73-74, 138.

it merely resulted in making the Indians an impotent force for either side.

It should not be assumed that misfortune plagued only the rebels during their defense of Maine. On several occasions the Loyalists met with difficulties resulting from their own offensive operations against American localities. One instance concerned Loyalists who had organized a group at Penobscot called the King's Rangers, one of whose captains was James Ryder Mowatt. In 1780 he and a crew of nine men captured a sloop near Townsend, a coastal settlement west of Penobscot. They were hunted down by a rebel force, however, and caught before they could reach Bagaduce. Mowatt had earlier captured a vessel that he now offered in exchange for his and his crew's freedom. The offer was refused, so Mowatt attempted to escape. He was caught again and would have remained a prisoner for the duration of the war had not Boston shown leniency and allowed him to be exchanged for the vessel.[38]

Another misadventure was the case of Benjamin Bradford and several other Loyalists, who were sent by Captain Henry Mowatt to steal a twenty-gun sloop being refitted at Marblehead. The raiders sailed to their destination in Bradford's vessel and as soon as they had landed, Bradford set sail for home, expecting that his comrades would follow

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[38]See Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 275; also, several letters and petitions concerning Mowatt's capture and release found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 272, 279-282, 301-302, 304-305, 316-318.

in the captured sloop. But someone detected the scheme and the would-be thieves had to quit their task and make their way back to Penobscot as best they could. Bradford's fate was worse. Expecting that he might be approached by a rebel vessel, he had destroyed any papers that identified him as a Loyalist and participant in the raid. It was a British vessel that overtook him and, when he was unable to prove his allegiance, confiscated his ship. He was brought to Penobscot after his sloop had been burned.[39]

Similar abortive episodes occurred for others. Richard Pomeroy took a small schooner from Salem but was hunted and sighted by other rebel vessels and, in order to escape, sank the prize before disappearing into the woods along the nearby shore.[40] A small two-ship British force, sent to gather the rebel guns up the Penobscot River, was attacked by five enemy whaleboats and lost both vessels, the crews having to flee into the woods.[41] Benjamin Linnekin chased several rebel fishing boats into a cove just west of Penobscot Bay, but a rebel ship in turn chased

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[39]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 50; Claim of Benjamin Bradford, A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 163-168; Frontier Missionary, p. 331.

[40]Letter, George Little to the Governor of Massachusetts, Penobscot Bay, November 3, 1782, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, p. 129. Little was a rebel and an old acquaintance of Pomeroy. In 1779 he had boldly sailed into Bagaduce Harbor, cut out one of Pomeroy's vessels, and escaped with it. See Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 44, 327.

[41]Wadsworth to President of the Council, Thomaston, June 25, 1780, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 330-332. The British tried to retake their two ships at Camden but failed.

him and caught him.[42] There were other such incidents.[43] In fact the great majority of recorded adventures of Loyalist excursions against the Americans ended in some sort of misfortune.

So it was that during the life of New Ireland relations between the Americans and British remained precarious for both sides. East and west of Penobscot, rebel settlements were increasingly harassed until by war's end they were only surviving. Yet, the British--especially the Loyalists who acted as agressors--never attained complete victory since many of their attacks ended in partial or total failure. The worst failure of all for the Loyalists, however, was that which resulted in the return of eastern Maine to the Americans in 1783.

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[42]Petition of the Selectmen of Harpswell, February 5, 1783, CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XX, pp. 166-167.

[43]Ibid. See also, Wadsworth to Council, Thomaston, May 26, 1780, and June 10, 1780; and List of Prisoners Sent by Lt. Stevens, [no date. June, 1780?]--all found in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XVIII, pp. 279-280, 304-305, 329; plus, Memorial of Town of Cape Elizabeth, January -, 1781, and Resolve of Massachusetts regarding prisoners, Boston, April 26, 1781--both in CMHS, 2nd Ser., Vol. XIX, pp. 82-85, 222.

Chapter VI

NEW IRELAND AND THE PEACE

Despite misfortunes and frustrations New Ireland had been established. The British military forces had occupied and defended the land proposed for the colony and Loyalists had committed themselves to its future. The next problem was to have the colony permanently sanctioned by the British government. Then, as the war was drawing to a close, the English had to gain American acceptance of the colony's existence, which meant persuading rebel peace representatives who were bent upon retaining as much territory as possible for their newly independent States. During the first year of the British occupation of Bagaduce, Lord George Germain had not consulted other governmental authorities about the area's prospects. Instead, he treated the invasion of eastern Maine solely as a part of military strategy aimed at winning the war. By mid-1780, however, he was convinced that king, cabinet, and Parliament should give their approval; and in that endeavour, as earlier during the development of the idea for New Ireland, he was ably assisted by Undersecretary William Knox, engineer John Nutting and, especially, Dr. John Calef.

No progress toward official recognition of the colony was attempted during the winter and spring of 1779-1780. In October of the first year Germain and Knox approached former Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson

about the possibility of his becoming the first governor of the new province. Hutchinson's reluctance about the position and his apprehensions for the whole scheme, however, dampened the officials' enthusiasm and they did nothing more about New Ireland's status until the next year.[1]

Then, in June, 1780, Dr. Calef made another appearance in London. As he had twice already in the past, Calef came to England as a representative of the Penobscot inhabitants in order to petition the royal government for confirmation of prewar land grants. This time, he had other requests as well. Calef stressed the great needs of a people "destitute of Law and Gospel" and asked for two things for them. A very loyal people who lived in an area of exceptional economic potential, he wrote in his petition, desired that a government separate from Massachusetts Bay be established at Penobscot and that a minister of the Church of England be sent to them.[2] In brief, it was a fine appeal for God, king, and good government, and it gave Germain's office substantial reasons to persuade the rest

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[1]See Diary . . . of Thomas Hutchinson, pp. 290-291. In September of 1779 Hutchinson had already written in his diary that he saw little advantage to the establishment of the post at Penobscot. See pp. 285-286.

[2]Memorial & Petition of John Calef, July 12, 1780, "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 183-185. As further inducement for sending an Anglican minister, Calef added that the Indians were "fond of Ministers and forms of Divine Worship." See also, letter, Captain Henry Mowatt to Lord Germain, Albany, Majabigwaduce, May 9, 1780, ibid., Vol. 66, pp. 180-185.

of the government to establish a new royal colony.

Shortly afterwards, Germain and Knox drew up a constitution for New Ireland for presentation to the cabinet as a whole.[3] It called for a government directed by a governor and privy council supported by an upper house of legislature which would be appointed by the crown. There would be an elected assembly but its control of finances, a sore point in previous colonial governmental structures, was to be limited. The executive was to receive a fixed income plus sufficient permanent revenue to support the government. An oath of allegiance would be required of all citizens who, in turn, would be granted parcels of land--the more meritorious Loyalists receiving larger grants, thereby assuring, by their presence, an aristocratic element to the society. The Church of England would be the

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[3]See letter, Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, August 7, 1780, "Knox Correspondence," p. 169. A copy of the letter can be found in [William Knox], Extra Official State Papers (London, 1789), II, 82. For the constitution see "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 216-221. A copy of it can be found in Williamson, "Proposed Province," pp. 147-151. An interesting letter regarding a minister for Penobscot was written by Reverend Jacob Bailey to a Reverend Dr. Bancroft, Secretary of the Venerable Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, London, from Halifax, November 8, 1781. In it Reverend Bailey wrote that Messrs. Pagan, Pote, and Wyer had asked him to move among them, "but, though that settlement has greatly increased, other gentlemen, upon whose friendship and judgement I can rely, advise me not to venture while matters remain in their present precarious situation." See Frontier Missionary, p. 180. Much of the conservatism of New Ireland's constitution would, after the Revolution, find its way into the constitutions of such new or reorganized British American colonies as New Brunswick (1784) and Upper and Lower Canada (Constitution Act of 1791).

officially recognized church and its ministers' salaries would be guaranteed by the government. Any questions regarding what English laws would prevail in the colony would be decided by the Attorney General's office in London.

Germain presented the constitution to the rest of Lord North's cabinet on August 10. It was accepted immediately and the next day George III added his royal approval.[4] But shortly after that the plan received its first major blow when Attorney General Alexander Wedderburn returned an opinion regarding the government's right to establish another colony in New England. Despite the fact that Massachusetts Bay was then in open rebellion, he declared that such an establishment violated that colony's charter rights; the British government could not organize a new colony within the boundaries of an already established one.[5]

Fearing that the law office's decision would hinder any attempt to gain support for the project from the House of Commons, the cabinet turned the project back to the Colonial Office, where Germain decided on a different tack. He would maintain possession of Penobscot as a conquered territory, extend British control as far into the rest of

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[4]See letter, Germain to Knox, [Stoneland Lodge?] , August 11, 1780, in Knox, Extra Official State Papers, II, 83.

[5]Knox, Extra Official State Papers, II, 60-61. See also, Williamson, "British Occupation," pp. 395-396. More will be said about this later.

Maine as possible, and leave the whole question of charter violations for the final peace settlement.[6] With those intentions he sent off orders to the British commanders in America to make preparations for taking additional territory.[7]

In the meantime Dr. Calef and John Nutting became involved in the new arrangement. Calef attempted to gain support for the colony from William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, former Secretary of State for the Southern Department, which had been in charge of American colonial affairs. Although Shelburne had opposed the present administration's handling of the rebellion, he was a man whose influence would be invaluable to New Ireland regardless of the outcome of the war.[8] As for Nutting, he was also to take part in the new plans. Having come to London in 1780, he had accepted temporary employment as an engineer for coastal fortifications; and Germain intended that he

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[6]Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, September 18, 1780, "Knox Correspondence," p. 172.

[7]Germain to Governor Hughes [of Nova Scotia], Whitehall, September 6, 1780; and, Germain to General MacLean, Whitehall, February 28, 1781--both found in RCA 1894, pp. 143-144, 53-58.

[8]See Calef to Shelburne, Covent Garden, December 10, 1780; and, same to same, Russell Court, March 2, 1781--both in "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 169-174, 175-176. The first letter suggests the means for capturing Boston--which "would be no inconsiderable step in closing the troubles in America"--or Portsmouth, or, finally, Falmouth. Copies of both letters were delivered to Germain. For background on Shelburne see G[eorge] F. R. B[arker], "Petty, William," DNB, XV, 1005-1012.

be sent back to New York for the purpose of joining the force which would occupy Falmouth and there assist in erecting defenses as he had done at Penobscot.[9] Nutting was to have sailed for America in 1781.

The year 1781, however, was an ominous one for the colonial proposal. Nutting did not leave England at the time because there were no further regular offensive military operations in Maine. Two things prevented continued warfare. In the first place, Germain's orders to General Clinton, including the plans for taking Falmouth, fell into the hands of the Americans; and in the second, the secretary's overall strategy was dealt a fatal blow when British General Charles Cornwallis was defeated by Washington at Yorktown in October.[10] Well might Germain rationalize the loss of his orders; he could claim that, while they might incite the rebels to strengthen defenses at Falmouth, their publication would certainly induce more Loyalists to move to Penobscot.[11]

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[9]See Batchelder, Bits, pp. 331-335; also, letter, Germain to MacLean (note 7, above).

[10]See two letters, the Rhode Island Delegates to the Governor of Rhode Island, Philadelphia, July 24, 1781; and, Thomas McKean to Richard Henry Lee, Philadelphia, September 4, 1781--both in Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VI, 157, 206.

[11]Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, October 12, 1781, "Carleton Papers," Vol. 7, no. 110, pp. 259-264. Germain cautioned Clinton that, in the light of treatment of the Loyalists with Cornwallis, "no post, place or garrison is to surrender upon terms that might discriminate between loyalists and troops," a condition that General Carleton was to particularly heed during the evacuation by the British after the fighting in America. See letter dated January 2, 1782, same source, no. 119, pp. 266-269.

But the debacle at Yorktown was something else. Not only did it destroy any hope for offensives in Maine, it was the final blow to the already tottering administration of Prime Minister Frederick North.

In March, 1782, North resigned. He had long been a reluctant officeholder and stayed until then only at the behest of the king. When he left, Germain, of course, went with him, as did William Knox whose post as Undersecretary of State for Colonial Affairs was abolished.[12] Gone was the cabinet that had promoted New Ireland. Gone were the British officials who had championed its cause. The colony had received its second major blow; another would kill it.

Undaunted by the loss of so much official support, Calef persisted in his dream. Once again he turned to the Earl of Shelburne, now Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. Hardly had Shelburne been installed in office when Calef presented him with an imposing packet of information dealing with Penobscot. There were letters recommending the doctor.[13] Then there was also a document written by Calef and entitled "The State of the Inhabitants

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[12]For a general coverage of the change in government and subsequent mention of the peacemaking events see Alden, American Revolution, pp. 478-492. For Knox see W[illiam] P[rideaux] C[ourtney], "Knox, William (1732-1810)," DNB, XI, 336-337.

[13]For the letters of recommendation see, "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, p. 195; "British Headquarters Papers," II, 407; and, Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 71.

of the District of Penobscot, March, 1782."[14] There was a "Memorandum," also by Calef, which lauded the potential growth and development of Eastern Maine, included a memorial from the inhabitants of Penobscot requesting a "Royal government," and suggested several methods for bettering the military situation against Massachusetts.[15] There was a supporting document written by Colonel Goldthwaite.[16] And Calef added three more papers: A survey he had made in 1772, an account of the annual exports of the Bagaduce area for the period 1772-1775, and a copy of an opinion (dated December 18, 1717) listing the crown restrictions on the granting of lands east of the Penobscot River.[17]

Before sailing back to America in April, Calef made several last-minute efforts for support for the colony. He met numerous times with General Guy Carleton, who was to replace General Clinton as commander of British forces in America, and discussed with him the future of Maine.[18] He again got the support of Nutting, who wrote to Lord Shelburne on Calef's behalf and stressed the importance of Penobscot's retention.[19] And, finally, he had a last

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[14]"Shelburne Papers," Vol. 66, pp. 165-168.

[15]Ibid., pp. 176-179.

[16]Ibid., pp. 197-213.

[17]Ibid., pp. 214, 215, 222.

[18]See Calef to Shelburne, ibid., p. 160.

[19]Nutting to Shelburne, London, April 22, 1782, ibid., pp. 190-194.

audience with Shelburne before he and Nutting departed from England.[20]

Calef's endeavors were complicated by changes in government. The government of which Shelburne was a member was first headed by the Marquis of Rockingham and was furnished with authority by the House of Commons to treat for peace with the Americans, even at the cost of rebel independence. Rockingham died on July 1 and Shelburne took his place as Prime Minister, holding that position long enough to gain a preliminary peace treaty. During its negotiations Shelburne did not entirely give up the idea of a Loyalist refuge in Maine. In April, while colonial secretary, he had ordered reinforcements to Nova Scotia, elements of which were transferred to Penobscot.[21] And until November he had General Carleton devote some attention to the increased protection of Fort George and surrounding territory.[22]

By strengthening Great Britain's claim to the eastern

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[20]See letter (note 19, above). For Nutting's departure see Batchelder, Bits, p. 335.

[21]Shelburne to Brigadier General Campbell, Whitehall, April 15, 1782, "Haldimand Papers," Vol. 149, B. M. 21,809, p. 225; Shelburne to Carleton, Whitehall, April 19, 1782, "British Headquarters Papers," II, 460.

[22]There were numerous exchanges of letters between Shelburne and Generals Carleton, Campbell, and James Paterson (the latter assumed the position earlier held by General MacLean) regarding the protection of Penobscot during May-November, 1782. See "British Headquarters Papers," II, 504, 542, and III, 74-75, 79, 110-111, 123, 131, 133, 155, 197-198, 207-208, 217, 229, 229-230. See also, Paterson to Shelburne, Halifax, October 29, 1782, "Shelburne Papers," Vol. 69, p. 95.

territory, Shelburne hoped to have more bargaining power in the negotiations then going on in Paris. Richard Oswald was commissioned to represent the royal government there and in October Shelburne gave him his directions regarding Penobscot.[23] Oswald was to insist upon as much Maine territory as possible to provide a Loyalist sanctuary. Should, however, the Americans be willing to "make a just provision for the Refugees," Oswald could bargain away the region.[24]

At Paris Oswald was confronted by a determined John Adams of Massachusetts, one of the five joint commissioners elected by the American Congress to treat for peace with Great Britain. Adams had come to Paris in October well prepared to deal with the question of the Province of Maine. By November 10 all treaty terms satisfied him except those concerning "Tories and Penobscot." He saw no reason to compensate people in his country who were "Dishonours and Destroyers." As for Penobscot, he furnished considerable evidence in support of Massachusetts' claim to all Maine, particularly the land east of the Penobscot River. That evidence included a record of the event in which Governor Pownall buried the lead plate in 1759 on the east bank of the Penobscot River, records of prewar town plans for such

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[23]Oswald was chosen partly because he was an old friend of Benjamin Franklin, one of the five American commissioners at Paris.

[24]Minute of the Cabinet, no. 3956, October 17, 1782, The Correspondence of King George the Third, ed. Sir John Fortesque (London, 1928), VI, 143-144.

settlements as Mount Desert and Machias, copies of a grant made by James I to Sir William Alexander which described the western boundary of Nova Scotia (and therefore the eastern boundary of Massachusetts Bay) as the St. Croix River, and statements written by several previous governors of Massachusetts during their terms of office in which each of them claimed that the region was within his jurisdiction.[25]

In the end the issue was settled by a vague compromise. Adams and the Americans wanted the eastern district; Oswald wanted some recognition of the Loyalists' plight. What the Briton got was sparse indeed; he gave up Britain's claim to Maine in return for a treaty clause requiring that Congress recommend that each of the States indemnify their Loyalists for losses suffered by them in the war. The preliminary treaty was signed at the Palace of Versailles on November 30, 1782--and any hope for New Ireland was gone.

Twenty-five years after the conclusion of the American war, Knox wrote a letter in which he blamed two people for the loss of Penobscot. A new province would have been erected, he wrote, "had not Mr. Wedderburn, the attorney-general, in resentment of not being made a peer . . ., refused to give his fiat to the commission; and Lord Shelburne, for ignorance of its importance, ceded it to

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[25]See entry of November 10, 1782, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961), III, 48-49. For background on Adams see the same source, IV, 257-271.

the Americans."[26] As for Wedderburn, Knox's attitude probably had not changed over the years, although the above was a more direct accusation than any earlier ones. For example, some time during the Revolution (1779?) he wrote "Curious Political Anecdotes" about various political figures, one of whom was Wedderburn. In them he described the attorney general as having "an assuming and forward manner," being most anxious for a peerage, and having been "deeply offended" by Lord Germain, who had expressed an opinion that Wedderburn should be content with the attorney generalship rather than aspire to a seat in the House of Lords.[27] Still piqued in 1789 by the wartime reversal of his colonial scheme, Knox described Wedderburn's part as follows:

> It may however be proper to give some account of the cause of its the establishment of New Ireland not being carried into execution, especially as all the subjects of the British empire will thereby receive fresh proof, in addition to the many they are already possessed of, how great their happiness is, and how firm their security for their lives and properties, when a Magistrate [Wedderburn was now Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas] who is so scrupulously observant of the sacredness of charter rights that he would not suffer them in the least to be infringed, even in the case of the revolted subjects of the Massachusetts Bay.[28]

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[26]Knox to E. Cooke, Ealing, January 27, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 227-228.

[27]No. 5 of "Curious Political Anecdotes," ibid., pp. 267-268.

[28]Knox, Extra Official State Papers, II, 60-61. According to the DNB, Wedderburn was at least an opportunist; at the time of his decision on New Ireland he accepted the post of Chief Justice because he, having already switched from attacking the North ministry to joining it, saw that the cabinet would not last much longer. See A[lexander] H[astie] M[illar], "Wedderburn, Alexander," DNB, XX, 1043-1045.

Knox had also written about Lord Shelburne in 1789, stating that after the latter had taken over the British government, he had asked Knox for his opinion about making peace with America. Knox thereupon explained to the Prime Minister that he had presented two plans to Lord Germain, both of them retaining some British control in the colonies. The second plan, the one most liked by Germain, had called for a treaty giving each side the territory which it controlled at the moment the fighting was concluded. The possibility of such a peace based on the war map, Knox told Shelburne, was what caused the attack on Penobscot and the campaigns in the South. Adding those lands to areas already held, such as New York, Long Island, Canada, and Nova Scotia, "would, I was convinced, secure to this country all the trade of America which was worth having, at a much less charge to the Nation, which we hitherto had been at for that country. He [Shelburne] asked me if I thought America would treat with us on such grounds? I said, <u>that I had good reason to believe they would</u>, . . . His Lordship shook his head, and said, America would never agree to anything less than total independence."[29]

There is one other detail about the former undersecretary's remembrances a quarter century after the American Revolution. He did not mention that Penobscot had been taken for the purpose of becoming a Loyalist colony. Instead, he stressed its strategic value of protecting Nova Scotia and even Lower

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[29]Knox, <u>Extra Official State Papers</u>, I, 26-28.

Canada "so as to insure the future safety and prosperity of British North America."[30] He was, however, writing in 1808 in an advisory capacity with the expectation that another war might occur between Britain and the United States and therefore was proposing not only strategy--the taking of Bagaduce again--but a means of rectifying the treaty of 1783 by regaining eastern Maine for his country.[31] Nevertheless, it is interesting that he concluded his estimate of Penobscot in the same manner he started it in 1778, by promoting its strategic value in wartime.

Perhaps New Ireland had always been a vain hope. Attorney General Wedderburn's decision, which opposed the colony's establishment within the boundaries of Massachusetts, stopped the British cabinet from continuing its efforts to complete a government for it. American representative John Adams, whose inflexible attitude opposed any loss of Massachusetts territory, especially for the sake of Tories, caused the English peace commission to reconsider its desire to retain the land meant for New Ireland. Prime Minister Shelburne, displaying the attitude that any peace with the Americans was preferable to the continuation of the war, was all too

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[30]This quotation is from a second letter written in 1808, this one to the Committee of New Brunswick, Ealing, September 7, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 229-230. The other letter (note 27, above) expressed the same ideas in more detail.

[31]Knox died before the War of 1812, but eastern Maine was reoccupied and Fort George again was fortified and garrisoned by British troops.

willing to concede its territory to the rebels. The attitude of any one of these men could have been enough to kill the colonial plan; their combined actions were more than sufficient. William Knox had continued his efforts to preserve the colony for the Empire, but his effectiveness was considerably diminished when he was put out of office. John Nutting had become only an occasional contributor to the cause. The most conspicuous person, though, was Dr. John Calef. His motive was singular, his efforts consistent; he strove for the inclusion of New Ireland in the future of things British and he devoted the war years to its fulfillment. To him New Ireland was never a vain hope.

Chapter VII

1783-1784: AN END AND A BEGINNING

The Loyalists did not immediately abandon their Penobscot settlement. It took more than a year after the signing of the preliminary treaty to complete evacuation of the place, a task not accomplished without difficulties. However, as migrants, they had the assistance of the government of Nova Scotia, which coordinated its efforts with those of the English military commander in America, General Guy Carleton, to move and resettle them on British-held lands. Part of thousands of Loyalists who left rebel territory, the New Ireland people chose to go to St. Andrews, a small peninsula like Bagaduce, this one jutting into Passamaquoddy Bay from the eastern shore of the St. Croix River, again directly opposite American territory.

Although the treaty ending the American Revolution was not formally signed until September 3, 1783, previous understandings called for the prompt evacuation of all British troops from American territory and it became General Carleton's job to see that it was done. Carleton also assumed responsibility for the removal of all Loyalists desiring to leave the newly independent states, a policy objected to by the Americans but nevertheless completed before the general's departure from New York on November 25,

1783.[1] Of course the removal included the civilian and military populations of Penobscot and were begun in June when Carleton wrote letters to General Thomas Paterson, commander of the British forces in Nova Scotia, directing that he make partial withdrawal of troops from there as soon as possible,[2] and to John Parr, Governor of Nova Scotia, asking that the Penobscot evacuees be made as welcome in the governor's province as were the Loyalists coming from New York and elsewhere.[3]

General Paterson answered that most of the soldiers at Fort George would be removed by early August, but Parr had disturbing news.[4] A number of people from Machias, he wrote, had moved onto British land east of the St. Croix River intent on settling there. To discourage them, the governor recommended that a part of the disbanded provincial troops be located in the same place.[5] A month later, dismayed that all the provincials were putting down in the St. John River Valley instead,[6] Parr proposed to General Henry Fox, Paterson's

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[1]For Carleton's activities in evacuating American territory see A. G. Bradley, Lord Dorchester (New York, 1926), pp. 193-194, 212-219.

[2]Carleton to Paterson, New York, June 7, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, p. 130.

[3]Two letters, Carleton to Parr, New York, June 8 and 14, 1783, ibid., pp. 130, 151.

[4]Paterson to Carleton, Halifax, July 28, 1783, ibid., pp. 246-247. The German troops were the first removed, probably because of the trouble between them and the English soldiers. See Note 15, Chapter IV.

[5]Parr to Carleton, Halifax, July 8, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, p. 210.

[6]Parr to Carleton, August 15, 1783, found in The

replacement, that a detachment of regular troops take post on the St. Croix. "Those lands," he claimed, "are intended chiefly for the immediate settlement of part of the provincial disbanded troops and 150 refugee families from Penobscot."[7]

Fox differed with the governor on whether the intruders presented any kind of major threat. Gathering what information he needed, he first went to Parr and then reported his opinion to General Carleton. Sending troops to the area, he felt, would "not have a tendency to settle the controversy relative to the Boundaries and might in the present situation of matters be attended with very disagreeable consequences." He closed by stating that before he made any military commitments he would await further instructions from New York.[8]

Winslow Papers, ed. Rev. W. O. Raymond (St. John, New Brunswick, 1901), pp. 124-125. Hereafter cited as Winslow Papers.

[7]Parr to Fox, Halifax, August 14, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. II, p. 276. For Fox replacing Paterson, see letter (note 2, above). Parr may have originated the idea of transferring the Penobscot Loyalists to the St. Croix or it may have originated with those people. The governor, as shown above, had reason to do so. Conversely, the St. Croix was a site similar to that at Penobscot, a border location advantageous to merchants Pagan, Pote, and Wyer. Those three represented their fellow Loyalists in a petition sent to Parr expressing the desire of about 100 families to move to Nova Scotia territory and asking for assistance to do so. The petition was sent in April. See Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 227-228.

[8]See two letters, Fox to Edward Winslow [Halifax], August __, 1783; and Fox to Carleton, Halifax, August 15, 1783--both in Winslow Papers, pp. 119, 122-123. The quotation is from the second letter. Edward Winslow, Loyalist son of a very prominent and old family of Plymouth, Massachusetts, was then directing the settling of other Loyalists along the St. John River.

Carleton agreed with Fox and after writing a calming letter to Governor Parr[9] could report that the trespassers had moved back to American territory on the west side of the river. He then advised Fox to take precautions to see that the frontier was secure before the Penobscot evacuation was completed.[10] Carleton would not approve of the use of regular troops,[11] but did agree to the stationing of a British warship on the St. Croix.[12]

That settled, Parr soon had another problem with the boundary. The people at Bagaduce had organized themselves into the Penobscot Association for the purpose of transporting themselves and their belongings to new homes. In September they sent agents on ahead to make preparations for the exodus. The selected site was St. Andrews, a point of land forming

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[9]Carleton to Parr, New York, August 22, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, p. 294.

[10]Carleton to Fox, New York, September 12, 1783, ibid., p. 349.

[11]Same to same, New York, September 15, 1783, ibid., p. 356.

[12]Same to same, New York, September 22, 1783, ibid., p. 369. See also, Fox to Carleton, Halifax, October 19, 1783, Winslow Papers, p. 143. There were probably a few long-time settlers on the east bank of the St. Croix who were not considered trespassers and were allowed to remain. For mention of such people see James Vroom, "Charlotte County and the Border Towns," found in the W. F. Ganong Collection, Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum, no. 7 (1920), article no. 13, pp. 58-69; also in the Ganong Collection, "Abstract of Charlotte County Petitions, 1765-1842, Index to Land Memorials in the Crown Land Office," (copy) p. 9, 1785, no. 60 (hereafter cited as "Abstract of Charlotte County Petitions"); Rev. J. W. Milledge, "Some Notes on the History of Charlotte County, New Brunswick," Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, no. 11 (St. John, 1927), 206-213. Hereafter cited as Milledge, "Some Notes."

the eastern side of what they believed was the mouth of the St. Croix. In the process of surveying the area, the agents were confronted by an old antagonist, Colonel John Allan, who claimed that the true St. Croix River was twenty miles eastward. When Parr heard of it, he wrote to General Carleton that, despite Allan's claim, the Loyalists were expected at St. Andrews soon because transports had already arrived at Penobscot.[13]

On October 3 those transports and several smaller vessels entered Passamaquoddy Bay carrying the greater part of the Penobscot families. As they anchored off St. Andrews Point, Colonel Allan again made an appearance and this time attempted to stop the people from landing. He was unsuccessful but thereafter met twice more with them. At one of the meetings, he was shown several old charts which showed the St. Croix as the waterway the Loyalists had chosen. Still

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[13]Parr to Carleton, Halifax, September 13, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, pp. 354-355. The agents at St. Andrews may have included Robert Pagan, Jeremiah Pote, and Thomas Wyer since they had become official representatives of the Penobscot Association. See letter dated Penobscot, January 1, 1784, part of which is quoted in Biographical Data, IV, 272 (the man who compiled this work, David Russell Jack, concludes that the unnamed author was Wyer). A more complete copy can be found in Williamson, "British Occupation," p. 398.

Allan may have attempted to use force against the agents. John Jones, the ranger who had abducted General Cushing, was one of the surveyors for the Penobscot Association and claimed that he was taken prisoner by a group of Indians led by Allan. Two days later he escaped. See Frontier Missionary, pp. 325-326. Allan, in a letter to the governor of Massachusetts, stated only that he conferred with one of the surveyors, a Mr. Zebedd Terry. See quote of letter, Allan to Gov. Hancock [Machias?], December 15, 1783, in M. N. Cockburn, "The Town of St. Andrews," Acadiensis, VII, no. 3 (July 1907), 206-208--it may have been safer for Jones to give an assumed name.

unconvinced, when he reported the events to his superiors at Boston, Allan concluded that:

> A company composed of a number of wealthy persons, among the rest Pagan (formerly of Casco Bay), one of the principal managers, intend to carry on the [lumbering] business to a great amount at Passamaquoddy. Their interest with the government has given them an opportunity of procuring a number of inhabitants, a great part British soldiers. With these they mean to take possession, and once fixed, suppose they cannot be removed, whether the land fall eastward or westward of the line. So that if the ancient river St. Croix is intended as the boundary, it will be highly necessary some steps should be taken immediately to remove those settlers from St. Andrews.[14]

Allan's recommendation was not followed. Rather than face continued confrontation, both sides agreed to negotiate the matter. A representative was sent by Governor Parr to Boston, and Massachusetts responded by appointing two committees, one to meet with Parr's man and, later, another to investigate the boundary.[15] The issue was left at that, and thus it was temporarily settled.

There still was some moving to be done from Penobscot. Many of the settlers who had built homes on Bagaduce

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[14]See letter, Allan to Hancock (note 13, above). For a description of the landing at St. Andrews see Mowatt, Diverting History, pp. 33-37.

[15]General Fox wrote to General Carleton that Allan had submitted the whole matter to Governor Hancock, who in turn had turned it over to the Massachusetts Assembly. Fox hoped that a similar method be followed by the British. As noted above, it was. See letter, Fox to Carleton, Halifax, November 1, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, p. 441. For mention of the Nova Scotian representative to Boston see the Winslow Family Papers. Originals, 1695-1815, Library Archives, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, Vol. III, p. 36. For the activities by Massachusetts authorities see CMHS, 2nd Series, Vol. XX, pp. 316-317, 376-377, 390.

dismantled and transported them to St. Andrews, but not all structures had been so transferred before the move of October 3.[16] And the business enterprise headed by the Pagan brothers had last-minute interests to dispose of before it was closed and partially conveyed to the new habitation.[17] Finally, there were military personnel that had not yet been withdrawn. General Carleton had written to the commanding officer of Fort George in September notifying him that several transports were on their way to Penobscot. At the same time he wrote General Washington of the proposed removal and told him that the officer in charge of the evacuation would so notify the nearest American post.[18] The peninsula was vacated by all intending to leave

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[16]See Appendix B of W. H. Siebert, "The Exodus of the Loyalists from Penobscot and the Loyalist Settlements at Passamaquoddy," Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, III, no. 9 (1907), 527-529. Hereafter cited as Siebert, "Exodus of the Loyalists." One source states that only sixty or seventy houses had been erected at St. Andrews in the first three months of the settlement. See letter dated January 1, 1784 (note 13, above).

[17]Thomas Wyer, Jeremiah Pote, and Robert and Thomas Pagan probably all left Bagaduce together in January, 1784, on Pagan's ship that was commanded by John Long. See: letter of January 1, 1784 (note 16, above); Claim of Jeremiah Pote, A. O. 12, Vol. II, p. 89; letter, Pagan brothers to John Parr, esq., Governor, Fort George, Penobscot, October 16, 1783, quoted in "Memorial of Robert Pagan," 262; and, Claim of John Long, A. O. 12, Vol. II, pp. 129-131. Two civilians may have left Penobscot after the military withdrawal. Nathan Phillips is reported to have departed in February and William Gallop in April. See, Claim of Nathan Phillips, A. O. 12, Vol. II, pp. 5-7; and, Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 140.

[18]See three letters, Carleton to Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Forces at Penobscot, New York, September 28, 1783; Carleton to Fox, New York, September 29, 1783; and, Carleton to General Washington, New York, October 3, 1783--all in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, pp. 378-379,

by January 15, 1784, and the last coastal stronghold held by English troops during the Revolution was returned to America.

But there was no one to accept it. The British had waited several days for an American force to occupy the fort before they left. When none came, they set fire to the barracks and remaining stores and departed.[19]

The Loyalists who established themselves at St. Andrews were considerably aided by the British government. All took advantage of the allotments of land, and a few drafted additional claims for losses arising out of the Revolution. Grants of 100 acres were made to each head of household plus 50 acres for each additional member of the family, larger grants being made to persons "of Ability to improve that Quantity." The land was distributed in such a way as to give the St. Andrews settlers town lots as well as farm plots along the river and/or bay.[20] They received materials for housing, if they did not bring their own from

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379-380, 391. In his letter to Washington Carleton must have amused himself by adding that, when an American officer appeared at Fort George, he would have delivered up to him "the fortifications with such American artillery as may be found there."

[19]See Williamson, "British Occupation," pp. 399-400.

[20]The quotation and information on land grants can be found in Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, pp. 172, 190-191, 200, 201. Apparently not everyone received grants fronting on the water because four settlers appealed, claiming they had been put back one and a half miles because of a 500-acre mill privilege that may have gone to Robert Pagan. See "Abstract of Charlotte County Petitions," 9.

Bagaduce, and tools plus clothing and food where needed.[21]

To handle losses claimed by the Loyalists the British Parliament established a commission of five men that traveled to various locales in British North America and judged upon the validity and amount to be awarded each claimant.[22] Of over 5000 claims submitted, only 500 came from the Loyalist region soon to become New Brunswick,[23] and only 14 of them came from St. Andrews. Robert Pagan and his two business associates, Thomas Wyer and Jeremiah Pote, each submitted one. Pagan's was for £849, most of which was for losses at Penobscot. He was paid £110, none of which was for Penobscot properties.[24] Wyer claimed losses of £981 and received £255, nothing for claims since his experiences at Falmouth early in the war.[25] Pote had similar claims, submitting his for £874 and receiving £374 for losses while at Falmouth.[26] The Greenlaw brothers, Jonathan, Ebenezer, and Alexander, three prison-ship victims during the American

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[21]Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution (Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1902), pp. 299-300. Hereafter, Van Tyne, Loyalists in the American Revolution.

[22]Ibid., pp. 301-302.

[23]Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, pp. 164-165.

[24]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 71-81; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 71.

[25]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 93-95; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 69. These claims were not finally filed until 1787. Thomas Wyer, as administrator for his father's estate (David Wyer had died since the move to St. Andrews), submitted a claim for £501, most of which was for back salary due David Wyer as Customs House Officer at Falmouth. It was disallowed. See A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 68.

[26]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 83-90; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 70.

siege of Fort George, placed claims for losses resulting from poor sale of their real estate near Bagaduce (each amounting to more than £300) and received £50, an amount only covering improvements made on their land while it was still owned by their father.[27] Nathan Phillips, the captain in charge of civilians at Penobscot, placed a large claim of £2517, but the losses for houses and store built at Penobscot plus £1700 in debts owed to him were rejected. He received £200, for the loss of a ship and cargo taken by rebels in Penobscot Bay on "Account of his loyalty".[28] Benjamin Milliken, the fellow who was caught by Colonel Allan but escaped from Machias, asked for another large sum, this one £1709, much of which was for a trading ship that he had lost. He got back £464, which covered land losses at Union River east of Bagaduce.[29] John Long, the man who served as pilot for the kidnapping of General Wadsworth and who later lost a vessel when a British captain sold it as a prize, placed a claim for that sloop, but it was disallowed for want of proof.[30] A similar claim was

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[27]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 113-123; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 73. Sabine states that Jonathan Greenlaw had six sons, all "Whigs", and one served under Washington. They and an uncle, another brother of Jonathan named William, stayed in Maine after the war. See Sabine, Loyalists, I, 498-499.

[28]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 1-8, A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 53. The vessel that Phillips lost was the one taken by Captain Cargill in 1775.

[29]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 155-162; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 87.

[30]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 125-132; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 88. Long may have returned to Maine and stayed there despite maltreatment for his wartime exploits. See Reuel Robinson, History of Camden and Rockport, Maine (Camden, Maine, 1907), pp. 47-49.

disallowed Benjamin Bradford. His was the ship used to carry the rangers on a raid to Salem and upon return was confiscated and burned by the British because Bradford had no proof of his allegiance. He had no proof of his ship's loss either and received nothing from the commission.[31] Five others listed small claims: James Symons, William Stewart, Zebedee Linnekin, James Stinson, and James Collins all received only a portion covering losses of property they had held at the outbreak of the war.[32] The remaining settlers accepted the land grants and temporary assistance and did not submit any claims to the British government.

Not all the Penobscot Loyalists went to St. Andrews. Some chose to go elsewhere, either to another part of the empire or to former homes now within the limits of the American confederation. Three men went to the Nova Scotia peninsula. Alexander Linkletter, former Boston

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[31]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 163-168; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 91.

[32]For Symons, Stewart, and Linnekin see A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 139-142, 143-146, 149-152, and A. O. 12, Vol. 61, pp. 84, 85, 89. For Stinson, A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 86. For Collins see Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 95. Collins went to England then to St. Andrews. The claims commission had a regular procedure that it followed both for ascertaining the validity of claims and for making awards. They "first questioned the claimant, then required a written statement sworn to by knowledgeable acquaintances [an often used supporter was John Calef] . . . . They refused to consider losses for lands bought or improved during the war; for cultivated lands, property mortgaged to its full value or with defective titles; for ships captured by Americans or damage done by British troops, or for forage." For these and other conditions see Van Tyne, Loyalists of the American Revolution, pp. 301-302.

trader, settled at Halifax.[33] Nathaniel Gardiner, the mariner caught by General Wadsworth's men while dragging for American cannon in the Penobscot River, settled at Roseway, later named Shelburne, a new habitation of great though temporary promise.[34] A Dr. Cassimire Mayer, former resident of Pownalborough and once accused of aiding deserters from British men-of-war in Halifax, came to Penobscot in 1781 and later went to Nova Scotia, "where he had built him a hut . . . and lived quite in the hermit's style."[35] Only two people went to England. James Ryder Mowatt, the privateer captain who had captured an American vessel only to have himself captured, was in London in 1789.[36] Benjamin Procter was there also, although his residency may not have been wholly intentional since his address was Newgate Prison.[37]

For some New Irelanders the desire to return to American territory was irresistible. Perhaps the best known repatriate was the one-time ranger captain John Jones. He stayed in New Brunswick for a time, first attempting to gain a grant on Grand Manan Island and, failing that, acquiring 500 acres north of St. Andrews. Sometime before 1793,

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[33]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 195.

[34]Sabine, Loyalists, I, 462-463; Frontier Missionary, pp. 333-335.

[35]Sabine, II, 53.

[36]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 275.

[37]Ibid., p. 239.

however, he was back in Maine surveying on the Kennebec River for a Massachusetts land company. He died there in 1823, a respected citizen.[38] Nathaniel Palmer had been captured by General Wadsworth during the war while marauding along the coast and was sentenced to hang. He escaped, however, and after the war had the temerity to return to his home at Broad Cove despite being "thoroughly despised by the community."[39] Mathew Lymburner, victim of rebel imprisonment during the siege, moved to St. Andrews and received a grant of land several miles up the St. Croix River. In 1787 he submitted a claim to the British government for £395 for losses of a house, several buildings, and land at Penobscot, part of which he had cleared. (He was the fourteenth of the claimants mentioned above.) He received sixty pounds from the British government only for improvements on the land[40] and subsequently moved to New Hampshire or Vermont.[41]

Two widows of men associated with the Loyalist settlement at Penobscot ended their days back in Maine. Phebe Milliken, wife of one of the Loyalist prisoners during the siege who

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[38]See, Sabine, Loyalists, I, 590-591; Frontier Missionary, pp. 325-326; and Boyd, "Waweig," 276-279.

[39]Miller, History of . . . Waldoboro, pp. 89-90.

[40]A. O. 12, Vol. 11, pp. 105-111; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 72. Lymburner's claim, written in 1787, states that his home at Penobscot was still empty since the Americans had not yet taken possession of any Loyalist property. It also mentioned that he had a brother, John, who had stayed in Maine and had taken over the mill and the land.

[41]Sabine, Loyalists, II, 39.

later moved to St. Andrews, returned to Cape Elizabeth after her husband died.[42] Rebecca Callahan, widow of Charles, the mariner who drowned while on his way to Penobscot to receive command of a privateer, had not lived in Penobscot but did live for several years of the war on the family farm at Pownalborough. Harried from there after neighbors discovered her husband's activities with the British, Rebecca resided first in Halifax and then in Annapolis, Nova Scotia, until 1790, during which time she submitted a Loyalist claim for £1110. Part of it was withdrawn when for some unknown reason she recovered the family real estate in Maine. The claims commission awarded her £150 after being satisfied that she intended to remain in Nova Scotia. She did not, however, but returned to Pownalborough in 1790 and lived out the rest of her years there.[43]

There were six other men who went back to the States, one of them against his will. Thomas Oxnard, the man whose wife had unsuccessfully petitioned the Massachusetts government to allow him to return to Falmouth from Penobscot in 1782, went to Grand Manan Island after the war, but in November, 1784, was granted a license by the General Court

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[42]Davis, History of Ellsworth, p. 17. Benjamin Milliken's was another case of fraternal separation; his brother, Samuel, remaining in Maine after the war (p. 21).

[43]There are several sources of information on Mrs. Callahan. See, A. O. 12, Vol. 10, pp. 354-399; A. O. 12, Vol. 61, p. 11; Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, pp. 74-75; Sabine, Loyalists, I, 286-287; and Allen, History of Dresden, pp. 394-396.

of Massachusetts to return again to Falmouth.[44] Dr. James Tupper went back to Nantucket, Rhode Island, Nathan Jones to Gouldsborough, Maine, William Redhead to Penobscot, and John Nelson to Warren, Maine.[45] It was a different type of homecoming for Waldo Dicke, the man who had guided the group that kidnapped Wadsworth. Dicke went to St. Andrews where he became captain of a trading vessel which in 1794 was captured in the West Indies by the French. Taken a prisoner to New London, Connecticut, he drowned while trying to escape.[46]

It should be noted that any loss in the number of Loyalists was more than compensated for by military personnel who had been stationed at Fort George and who took their discharges in America in order to share in the land grants and to continue acquaintances they had developed with Penobscot's civilian population. In fact a 74th Association (for the 74th Regiment stationed at Fort George) similar to

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[44]A. O. 12, Vol. 82, p. 46; and Sabine, Loyalists, II, 139. Thomas was responsible for the formation of a Unitarian Church in Portland, Maine, in 1791. During the War of 1812 his son commanded an American privateer with the rather interesting name of True Blooded Yankee. See Maine, a History, III, 791; and, Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 226. Thomas's brother, Edward, who spent the war in London, also returned to Falmouth. See Biographical Data, III, 144-145.

[45]For each person in the order above see Sabine, Loyalists, II, 367; Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 183; "The First English Settlements in that Part of Acadia Now Eastern Maine," Bangor Historical Magazine, VIII, nos. 1, 2, 3 (January February March 1893), 12; and, Eaton, Annals of . . . Warren, p. 205.

[46]Eaton, Annals of . . . Warren, p. 205.

the Penobscot Association was formed and included 125 veterans, 30 wives, and 48 children, all of whom settled at St. Andrews.[47]

John Nutting and John Calef did not move to St. Andrews with the other Loyalists in 1783-84. When he arrived in New York from England in November, 1782, Nutting asked General Carleton that he be returned to employment at Penobscot. The request was granted but he remained there only a short time before moving on to Halifax, where he asked for and received appointment as Overseer of the King's Works in Nova Scotia.[48] After the war, he lodged a Loyalist claim that totaled £2450; from it he received £300, most of which was compensation for losses at Penobscot, the remainder for Cambridge, Massachusetts, property.[49] He was also granted 2000 acres near Minas Basin and finally settled at Newport, Nova Scotia.[50]

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[47]There were many more discharged soldiers who settled in the Passamaquoddy region. Including those of the 74th see Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, pp. 200-202. The remainder of the 74th Regiment returned to England. See Vroom, "Penobscot Loyalists," 181. One of the better known ex-servicemen to join the Loyalists at St. Andrews was General John Campbell, the regiment's commander. See Boyd, "Waweig," 277-278.

[48]See three documents: letter, General Carleton to the Duke of Richmond, New York, November 17, 1782, and, Warrant, November 22, 1782--both in "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. III, pp. 226, 234; plus, letter, John Nutting to Sir Guy Carleton, Halifax, May 10, 1783, "British Headquarters Papers," Vol. IV, p. 76.

[49]A. O. 12, Vol. 61, no. 61, p. 12.

[50]Batchelder, Bits, pp. 337, 344-345.

Dr. Calef's adventures were more varied, involving several members of his family. While in England, Calef had asked Captain Henry Mowatt to take care of his wife and children who were still living near boston. Mowatt in turn asked his cousin, Captain David Mowatt, to look after them. David went to see them, hiding in the woods by day and visiting the family by night. While in hiding, food was brought to him by twelve-year-old Mehitible Calef, a girl whom young Mowatt would marry in 1786 in St. Andrews.[51] David also helped the doctor in 1784 when the latter had again gone to England and was returning to Penobscot unaware that he was liable to be captured because of being condemned a traitor following the Loyalist removal. Mowatt kept a small vessel off the Maine coast and intercepted Calef before he was to land. The two of them then slipped ashore, disguised themselves as Indians, and made their way by land to St. Andrews.[52] Mrs. Calef, fearing for the family's safety, had made a perilous journey from her Massachusetts home to the St. John River, east of St. Andrews, where she later was joined by her husband.[53] John was appointed Surgeon of the Garrison at St. John and submitted a Loyalist claim for £9880, receiving £2400.[54] He had some difficulty over

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[51]Mowatt had "many perilous adventures" during the episode. See Mowatt, Diverting History, pp. 30-31.

[52]Ibid., p. 46; also, David Russell Jack, "The Caleff [sic] Family," Acadiensis, VII, no. 3 (July 1907), 261-273.

[53]The family landed at St. John in a snow storm. See Mowatt, Diverting History, pp. 32-33.

[54]Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 73.

religion with the Anglican bishop in St. John, a dispute that may have been the cause for his moving to St. Andrews, where he became a respected and permanent citizen.[55]

The merchants who had led the Penobscot Association soon made St. Andrews a prominent center of trade in the newly formed Province of New Brunswick, several being rewarded for their efforts by being put into political office. Thomas Wyer, for example, already an agent for lands, became the first sheriff of the county in which St. Andrews was located and later Deputy Colonial Treasurer.[56] William Gallop and David Mowatt both joined Wyer in business and both served in various public offices.[57] But the most notable figure in the business and political life of the community was Robert Pagan. Also an agent for lands, he was justice of the peace for the Passamaquoddy district when the area was still under the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia, a colonel of militia, and a member of the New Brunswick House of Assembly from its

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[55]For Calef's problems with the church official see ibid. In 1789 the doctor paid a visit to Bagaduce and requested payment from John and Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch for expenses to cover his 1780 trip to England, a trek taken in their behalf. No reply to his letter is recorded. See that letter, Calef to Messrs. John, Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch, Penobscot, September 21, 1789, F. 80, no. 4, Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum. See also Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 219.

[56]Cockburn, "Town of St. Andrews," 224; Sabine, Loyalists, II, 461-463.

[57]For Gallop, see Cockburn, 222-223; Vroom, "History of Charlotte County," 443. For Mowatt, see Jack, "Mowatt Family," 312; Vroom, "History of Charlotte County," 443. See also, Mowatt, David, "Receipt Book 1782-1844," Shelf 54, Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum.

first session until 1819.[58] Pagan also was instrumental in the final determination of the coastal boundary between New Brunswick and the United States, first furnishing evidence of British ownership of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay by exerting his authority as magistrate in that area in 1784,[59] then leading an exploration to Dochet Island the identification of which as the site of a 1604 French settlement gave proof of which river was the St. Croix,[60] and, finally, in 1789, when an international commission decided that that river was the boundary, he allowed his home to be used for the commission's deliberations.[61]

St. Andrews competed with St. John as the major settlement until well into the nineteenth century when changes in trade regulations, especially with the British West Indies, and competition from various sources ended its era of growth.[62] By the time that St. Andrews began its

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[58]Sabine, Loyalists, II, 142-143; Cockburn, "Town of St. Andrews," 222; and Biographical Data, III, 163-164.

[59]Document 440. Pagan Robert (1750-1821), ca. 1814, 1 page. "Pagan Family, Cb." Archives Division, New Brunswick Museum.

[60]Siebert, "Exodus of the Loyalists," 523.

[61]Murchie, St. Croix, pp. 167, 174; see also, Williamson, History of Maine, II, 578-579.

[62]See Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, p. 203; also, Milledge, "Some Notes," 209-210. William Knox became agent for several provinces in North America, and the DNB (XI, 336-337) credits him for the order in council that excluded American shipping from competing in the West Indies trade as well as suggesting that New Brunswick be established as a separate colony. As several letters indicate, he maintained an interest in that province for some time. See Knox to the King, Soho Square, November 28, 1799; Knox to

slow decline from prominence, however, most of the old Loyalists were gone, satisfied that they had found in New Brunswick what they had sought in New Ireland.

After the Loyalist departure, Bagaduce Peninsula had few people left on it. The burned-out fort stood empty until May of 1784, when General Samuel McCobb came over from Camden to inspect it. In his report to Boston he included an inventory of Loyalist structures still remaining outside the fort, listing thirty-five houses, two stores, and two wharves.[63] The following summer, a survey was made which found that five men owned all the peninsula and only thirty-eight people still lived there.[64] Three of the landowners were John and Joseph Perkins and Mark Hatch, all of whom had taken the British oath but had long since become disenchanted with English rule and stayed at Penobscot.

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the Clerk of the Council, Ealing, July 5, 1804; and, Knox to Lord Castleraegh, Ealing, October 15, 1807--all found in "Knox Correspondence," pp. 214-215, 220-222, 227.

[63]McCobb informed Massachusetts authorities that he had "made the strictest inquiry of the inhabitants for the names of those which still remained among them which had taken an active part with the British army and fleet, a list of which names I have sent to General James Sullivan." See Williamson, "British Occupation," pp. 399-400. It should be remembered that Sullivan's brother was captured by Mowatt at Frenchman's Bay and died on the way home following parole. Author Williamson found no list of Loyalists and concluded that James Sullivan had decided not to pursue persecutions any further. For another account of the area after the war see "Buildings at Majorbigwaduce, Now Castine, in 1784," Bangor Historical Magazine, III, no. 6 (December 1887), 120.

[64]"Peters Survey," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 9 (Spring 1967), 2-3. See also George Witherle, "Letter from Castine Relating to its History, 1814, and Prior," Bangor Historical Magazine, III, no. 11 (May 1888), 216-218.

when the others went away. People who had earlier fled from the region gradually returned to their pre-war homesteads. Among them were Aaron Banks, who had seen his yard become the site of the half-moon battery, and Will Hutchings, the lad who was eye-witness to so many siege-time events.[65] Apparently there were no hard feelings between ex-Loyalists and returnees because the Perkinses and Hatch became leading figures in the revitalized community, and at least two former members of the British occupation forces chose to settle there in preference either to continued military service or the uncertainties of other wilderness beginnings.[66]

And so it was that the former citizens of New Ireland again started life anew and all but forgot the temporary Loyalist haven in Maine. Few people had good memories of it. The originators of the plan had tried to gain official recognition of the colony but failed. The Rebels had tried to destroy it almost before it was begun but they also failed.

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[65]For Aaron, Hutchings, and others who came back, see Wheeler, History of Castine, pp. 200-201, 203-205, 206-207, 228-229; also, "Castine and Penobscot Names, etc.," Bangor Historical Magazine, I, no. 4 (October 1885), 57-59; and, Petition of Nicholas Crosby, [no date, but in 1784], CMHS, 2nd Series, Vol. XX, p. 363. Hutchings lived to become the oldest surviving Revolutionary War pensioner in New England and was honored for such by Senator Hannibal Hamlin on July 4, 1865. The widow of a Penobscot Loyalist who died before the move to St. Andrews stayed on at Penobscot after the war and was awarded £100 by the British government for damages to her husband's property. See Jones, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 8-9.

[66]See "Scots Sailor," Wilson Museum Bulletin, I, no. 6 (Summer 1966), 4; and, Wheeler, History of Castine, p. 319.

And thereafter neither side was able to maintain unchallenged control of the land until politicians far away in London and Paris decided it for them--and killed the fledgling province. When it was over, Bagaduce, focal point of all the unfortunate events that made up the nearly five-year history of the colonial venture, stood for a moment quiet and almost alone, with only a charred fort and deserted buildings left as reminders that New Ireland really had been a forlorn hope.

The findings in this study of New Ireland throw some light on the various interpretations advanced by students of loyalism. As pointed out in the first chapter, a local study such as this presents little opportunity to investigate overall numbers of Loyalists; and a lack of evidence prohibits a numerical estimation of the population of New Ireland itself. But in the case of the geographical location of Loyalists, New Ireland supports the conclusions of modern researchers who have determined that Loyalist strength in New England was along the coast rather than the interior,[67] and that Falmouth and the general region of the Kennebec were places of major concentration in Maine.[68] Research on New Ireland, however, better details Maine's Loyalist centers, first agreeing on Falmouth (though finding it perhaps a less strong locale than previously believed) and specifying the

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[67]Nelson, American Tory, pp. 67-88; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 22-24.

[68]Brown, Good Americans, p. 229.

Pownalborough district as the primary center in the Kennebec region. Its main contribution to the topic is its detailed treatment of the Penobscot area as the single most important Loyalist stronghold.

On the question of Loyalist leadership, on the basis of this narrative, one would conclude that merchants (including ship owner-traders) were the most conspicuous figures in the Loyalist movement. Merchants, especially the Pagan group of Falmouth, were the only class of people to leave that port town. Merchants such as John Nutting, Nathan Phillips, and the Goldthwaite sons were notable in the early development of loyalism at Penobscot. And merchants, again led by a Pagan, were easily the most prominent leaders in the establishment and early government of St. Andrews. Two professional people, Dr. John Calef and Reverend Jacob Bailey, had a part in the direction of events, and farmers John Perkins and his brothers remained locally important at Penobscot (although they too later turned to trade) both during and after the Revolution; but, with the possible exception of Calef, none of these men could compete with merchants for consistent leadership. As to their effectiveness as leaders, agreement must be conceded to the conclusion by contemporary historians that it was weak; New Ireland's leaders had some influence with their fellow Loyalists but had little with their British protectors. And certainly they could not compete for reknown with such rebel commanders as General Wadsworth and Colonel Allan.

Regarding Loyalists doing active war service, historians, agreeing with Paul Smith's statement that Loyalists were used too late in the war and then were relied upon too completely, go on to emphasize the impact that such tactics had upon the Tory movement. They have determined, for example, that Loyalist acts, such as the raids along the New England coast, proved in the long run to do more harm than good; they did not end the distrust of Loyalists by British commanders, they became increasingly violent and resulted in reciprocal actions by the American side, and the raids only stiffened the resolve of the rebels to fight on.[69] Comparing those conclusions with findings in New Ireland, there is much agreement. In the first case, that British commanders continued to mistrust their civilian charges, there are the examples of General Haldimand's attitude toward the corp of Roger's Rangers at Penobscot and two of the Fort George commandants' wariness of local people. Regarding increased violence and reciprocal actions, the death of rebel militiaman Levi Soule by a Tory scout and the hanging of Tory suspect Jeremiah Baum are indicative. But the last case, that Loyalist participation in the fighting only stiffened rebel resistance, needs qualifying. If New Ireland's Loyalist activities in military duties stiffened resistance it more than made up for it by being instrumental in all but conquering Maine. Unfortunately for the Loyalists at Penobscot their efforts were all the more

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[69]See Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, pp. 17-23; Nelson, American Tory, pp. 143-144; and Brown, Good Americans, pp. 124-125.

futile because discussions for peace were already in progress --which brings us back to the point that Loyalists were used much too late to be effective.

The evidence presented here reveals some points about the social status of Loyalists. If that of New Ireland's people were determined, as have others so often in the past, by relying on the Loyalist claims, the results clearly would be as misrepresentative as were those studies. For example, fourteen of one hundred and seventy-eight St. Andrews men submitted claims to the British government after the war. Half of them were merchants. It could be assumed then that Loyalists very much represented the "better," at least the wealthier, classes of society. It would be an erroneous assumption of course, partly because one hundred and sixty-four men were entirely neglected. Besides, a study already has been made about the latter, which shows them to have been a mixed group of farmers, artificers, fishermen, mariners, and shipbuilders,[70] and when one adds to the St. Andrews people those Penobscot Loyalists who went elsewhere or remained at Bagaduce, the conclusion of contemporary historians that the Loyalist movement represented far more of a cross-section of colonial society than earlier believed is well supported by this history of New Ireland.

As with total numbers of Loyalists, it has not been

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[70]Wright, Loyalists of New Brunswick, p. 162, plus appendix, pp. 253-345.

a purpose of this study to show the effect of New Ireland's exiles upon the history of Canada, but research does indicate a significant role for the merchants, who not only became the political leaders of St. Andrews but were prominent in the development of the government of New Brunswick, a colony that historians rate the most loyal in North America.[71]

The last issue of current concern to historians was motivation of Loyalists, and three rather broad categories were listed that included twelve motives basic to the Loyalist decisions to support the British side in the Revolution. There were examples among New Ireland's populace of most if not all of those motives, but only a few were particularly important to them as a group. Certainly economic reasons such as fear of trade disruption, poverty, and temptation to deal with the British military all played prominent roles.[72] The most important single reason for the loyalty of New Irelanders to the English cause probably was persecution by rebels. In every recorded case persecution influenced their choice to remain in or become a part of the Loyalist venture in eastern Maine. But if one were to select the most important unrecorded cause for loyalism, he might

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[71]See Brown, Good Americans, pp. 193-195.

[72]Wallace Brown stated that the Loyalists in the Kennebec area were "poor parishioners of Reverend Jacob Bailey." See King's Friends, p. 24. That assumption is twice misleading. First the known parishioners of Bailey who came to Penobscot were not poor and, second, the fact that they belonged to his church was not their primary reason for loyalism. Each had his own peculiar experiences that led to his becoming an enemy of the rebels.

well pick loyalism itself--it was the cause of that most chronicled reason, persecution. There are few written statements like that of Maine Loyalist David Hatfield who, when asked by an American friend why he had suffered the difficulties of taking up a new life in New Brunswick, drew himself erect and "with emotion that brought tears to his eyes, replied, 'For my loyalty, sir!'"[73] There were probably few Penobscot exiles who would not have agreed.

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[73]Sabine, Loyalists, I, 523.

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