GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
ABYSSINIAN CRISIS. 1935 - 1936

DISSERTATION FOR THE DEGREE 0F PH. D.

NORMAN STATE UNIVERSITY

LOUIS EOHN SMITH

1977

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Great Britain and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-36.

Date

presented by

Louis John Smith

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

 

 

PW Ld/wvml/V)

Major professor

 

August 27. 1976

 

0-7 639

 

--"-

.
Oct-st.

ABSTRACT

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ABYSSINIAN CRISIS,
1935-1936

By
louis John Smith

Most accounts of the Abyssinian crisis have condemned
the British government for failing to rally the league of
Nations against Italian aggression. Thus, it is usually
argued, was lost the best opportunity to establish the league
as a bulwark against the rising tide of aggression in Europe.
This study takes issue with that interpretation on several
counts.

An analysis of the cabinet and Foreign Office materials
Opened in 1967 establishes that the British government
consciously, if reluctantly, took the lead in organizing a
league front against Italian aggression. Hoare's speech to
the Assembly on September 11 rallied the league to united
action. and Eden guided the Committee of Eighteen to the point
of sanctions. Without a British lead, it is unlikely that
the league would have imposed sanctions upon Italy. The
British lead was neither bold nor, in the end, effective.
and the government drew the line at any proposal likely to

lead to conflict between British and Italian forces in the

Mediterranean. The critical test of the league's ability to

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contain aggression was, therefore, not a full test. But the
cabinet knew, from their dealings with the French, that a
limited test of the league system was all that was possible.
And they learned that the vocal support of fifty nations at
Geneva could not be translated into military support for the
British fleet in the Mediterranean.

Throughout the crisis, the British cabinet were reluc-
tant to alienate Italy beyond future cooperation. The deci-
sion to take the lead against Italy at Geneva was delayed as
long as possible. As a result, the best opportunities to
dissuade Mussolini from his African adventure were lost early
in the crisis. It was not until Hoare took over the Foreign
Office some six months after the initial incident at WalWal
that the government began to respond in more than a passive
fashion to the crisis. Even then, the British response was
hampered by Hoare's ineXperience. Baldwin's indifference, and
the general desire of the government to find a painless
solution which did not exist.

The response of the cabinet to the conflicting pressures
which built during the crisis was a dual policy meant to give
Italy some satisfaction while adhering to the Covenant of the

league. The dual policy was premised on the hope that Italy

would take a modest gain and draw back short of war. Mussolini

held to his aggressive program, however, and the dual policy
failed disastrously when an aroused British public rejected

the Hoare-Laval proposal in December 1935. The sanctions

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experiment continued for six months after the Hoare-laval
debacle, but the Italian success and the demise of the league
were apparent by the first weeks of 1936.

The remarkable thing about British policy during the
Abyssinian crisis was not the failure of the government to
support the league, but the initiative taken to blunt Italian
aggression. There were no league advocates in the cabinet,
save Eden, but when it came to the point of accepting the
failure of the League or acting to try to save it, they took
the lead at Geneva. The pressure of public opinion lent to
their decision, as did Eden's arguments and Mussolini's
disdain for Britain and the league. But an examination of
the cabinet minutes reveals that the principle concern of the
cabinet was to save the league if possible, and to determine
if the League system of collective security would function
to contain aggression without resort to military force. It
did not do so, and the post-mortem conducted by the Foreign
Office after the crisis suggested that it would not do so as
long as national interests outweighed the ideal of international

order.

o“|

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ABYSSINIAN CRISIS,
1935-1936
By

louis John Smith

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History
1977

© Copyright by
IOUIS JOHN SMITH
1977

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to my major professor,
Donald N. lammers, for his encouragement, direction and
support throughout the project. Similarly, I wish to thank
the second member of my doctoral guidance committee, Professor
Paul R. Sweet, for his continuing interest in the undertaking
and his helpful comments on the draft. I am also grateful to
Professor Warren I. Cohen for stepping in after the death of
Professor Thomas L. Bushell and reading the final draft.
Before his untimely death, Professor Bushell offered
encouragement and support which will always be gratefully

remembered.

ii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter
I. DRIFTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

II. DUAL POLICY BOX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
III. THE MOUNTING CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
IV. THE BRITISH LEAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
V. TRIAL AND ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186
VI. END OF ILLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269

EPILOGUE: ALL THE KING'S MEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . .327
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .352

iii

INTRODUCTI ON

If ever there was an Opportunity of striking a
decisive blow in a generous cause with a minimum
of risk, it was here and now.

In Winston Churchill's weighty judgment, the Abyssinian
crisis was one of those opportunities to turn back the
aggressive tide before it prOperly bagan to flow. The
implication is that Britain should have been willing to
run the risk of war with Italy in 1935 in order to prevent
a still greater war on the horizon. In the years since
Churchill penned this condemnation, the notion of making
war to prevent war has fallen on hard times. The casualty
lists of Korea and Vietnam have raised serious questions
about the 'containment' mentality. It was in part to avoid
the specter of such lists that the 'guilty men' of the 1930's
lost their reputations. As the distinction between war and
preventive war becomes increasingly blurred, the prospect
grows that perhaps some of the mud will wash off the memory

of those who refused to see war as inevitable. There is

still, however, little inclination to look with more sympathy

 

1Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. I,
The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, l9h8),

p. 177.

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upon the men who chose from among the bad choices facing
Britain in 1935. Indeed, few things in recent decades
have passed as securely into the realm of conventional
wisdom as the conviction that Britain's timid and indecisive
handling of the Abyssinian crisis led to the fall of the
league of Nations and helped pave the way for the Second
World War.2
For those who would damn British policy, the Abyssinian
crisis offers a treasure trove of possibilities. Critics
of every political stripe and ideological bent have found
cause to condemn the National government's handling of the
crisis. Clement Attlee, for example, saw in the British
handling of the crisis the ugly hand of the imperialist.3

leo Amery saw only the folly of a misguided experiment

which drove Mussolini into Hitler's arms.“ lloyd George

 

2A typical analysis is that of C. l. Mowat: "Strong
action against Italy in December, or against Germany in
March 1936, might have prevented the Second World War.
The British public did not clamour for such action: but
its temper in October showed that it would have responded
to a strong lead from the government. Instead, it got a
course of sedatives and one piece of shock treatment, and
became passive, acquiescing in failure and despair." C. l.
Mowat, Britain Between the Warngl918-19h0 (London:
Methuen, 1966, first published in 1955), p. 557.

BOctober 22, 1935. 305 H.C.Deb., 5s.. 0015. 35-36.

uIeOpold S. Amery,MyPolitical life, Vol. II, War and
Peace,g19lh-1929 (london: Hutchinson, 1953), 20h-5. There
is—In AmeryTs account, however, the suggestion that perhaps
his friends in the government were hard-headed Conservatives
after all, and staged the entire debacle in order to dispose
of the encumbering league before getting on with the
necessary business of rearmament, III, 17h.

 

 

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3
accused the government of simple cowardice.5 Outside
Parliament, league advocates turned sharply critical after
the Hoare-laval incident and condemned the government as
weak-kneed and faithless.6 Historians, by and large, have
followed the indictment drawn up by contemporary critics of
the National government and have echoed the conclusion that
Mussolini never would have come to grips with a resolute

7

Britain.

 

5June 18, 1936. 313 H.C.Deb., 5s.. col. 1223.

6Kodne Zilliacus, an official of the League Secretariat
who wrote under the pen name of 'Vigilantes,' and Robert
Dell, a journalist with experience at Geneva, wrote
particularly biting accounts of the British role in the
Abyssinian crisis. Vigilantes, Why We Are losinggthe Peace
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), pp. 67-79: Dell, The
Geneva Racket (London: Robert Hale, l9hl), pp. 106:IE3.
Viécount Cecil of Chelwood added his condemnation in A Great
EXperiment (New York: Oxford University Press, l9hl), pp.
263-79, and Frank P. Walters took the same line in A Histogy
of the league of Nations (london: Oxford University Press,
1967: first published, 1952), pp. 623-91.

 

 

 

7Among the more telling of those accounts of the
Abyssinian crisis which helped to brand the National
government as 'guilty men' were Arnold Toynbee, Abyssinia
and Italy, Vol. II of the Survey of International Affairs;
1225 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), and G. M.
Gathorne-Hardy, A Short Histogy of International Affairs;

1 20-1 8 (london: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 399-
. The line taken by Toynbee and Gathorne-Hardy was
typical of most contemporary accounts and has carried over
in good measure into such recent treatments of the crisis as

George W. Baer, The Coming of the Italiag;Ethiopiag_War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 172-210,
and James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and
Clown (New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 108-115, 123-136.
Of the historians who have been critical of the National
government, only an apologist for Italian expansion, such
as luigi Villari, Italian Foreign Poligy under Mussolini
(New York: Devin-Adair, 1956), pp. 13h-161, and Gaetano.

 

 

 

 

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It is true that at a generation's remove from the
unheroic events of the 1930's a reassessment is beginning

8 The

which promises to balance the picture somewhat.
'guilty men' of the Western democracies remain guilty, but
considerations of degree are being introduced as more
emphasis is placed upon inadequate arms, multiple threats,
uncertain allies, poor information, timid advice, a deep-
rooted popular fear of war, and an approach to spending
conditioned by concern for economic recovery. All of these
obviously were factors bearing on the Abyssinian situation
and they now color more perceptive accounts.9 Abyssinia
does not usually seem to fit, however, into a general
reassessment of appeasement. Martin Gilbert's penetrating
study of the origins and development of appeasement, for
example, pays no heed to the several efforts to appease

Mussolini.lo

 

Salvemini, who saw the British in the role of cynical
mani ulators in Prelude to World War II (New York: Doubleday,
l95h , have differed sIgnificantIy from the usual indictment.

 

8See in particular D. C. Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of
a 'Revisionist' School?," Political Quarterly, XXXVI (1965),

pp. 191-213.

9A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 191h-19h5 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press,1965), pp. 379-85: F. S. Northedge,
The Troubled Giant (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966),
pp. 507-25. A recent article also argues that the
administrative structure of the Foreign Office had the effect
of hampering prompt consideration of the crisis as it
developed. James C. Robertson, "The Origins of British
Opposition to Mussolini over Ethiopia," The Journal of
British Studies, IX, 1 (Nov. 1969), pp. 129-31.

loMartin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (london:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

 

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It is no doubt difficult to fit Mussolini and Italy
into a more balanced reassessment of appeasement. Italy
had no grievances comparable to those which the Germans
were pressing, deSpite Italian arguments about over-
population and the 'mutilated peace' of 1919. Unlike
Hitler, Mussolini was not a new and uncertain element in
the 'thirties. Italy did not manage to hide a bullying
approach under a cloak of reasonable ambitions. And,
perhaps most significantly, few can see, in the light of
the Italian military performance in World War II, why Italy
posed the kind of threat that required appeasing. At the
time, however, many in london saw several reasons for appeas-
ing Italy's demands. Italy was a key element in the Stresa
front designed to contain Germany. Italy was also a
traditional friend with a long-standing grievance against a
half-civilized, quarrelsome, slave-trading pe0p1e. Open
admiration for Mussolini and his system was hardly confined
to Sir Oswald Mosley and his blackshirts. It is not
necessary to share this sympathy to see that it necessarily
softens the image of bending to arrogant demands which had
no justification. Equally, one need not admire the British
handling of the problem to see that so long as the notion
persists that the Abyssinian crisis was a peculiarly odious
example of yielding to blatant aggression, it will remain
difficult to put aside false issues and eXplore what was the

critical test of the inter-war security structure.

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6

Like Munich, the British approach to the Abyssinian
crisis was rooted in the post-war settlement. The idea
that a new day in international relations had dawned with
the creation of the league of Nations had taken root even
before the conviction that Germany had been wronged by the

11 .
Peace was the pass1onate concern of a

Versailles Peace.
generation scarred by the trenches of France and Belgium.
Peace meant, for many Englishmen, a disinclination to fight
to maintain the strictures imposed on Germany for the sake
of France. Peace also meant adherence to the Covenant of
the league, which embodied the hOpe that war would never
again hatch out of secret diplomacy, alliance politics, or
an armaments race. The founding fathers of the league --
lord Cecil, President Wilson, General Smuts, leon Bourgeois
-- were inspired by the intense general desire for a new
diplomacy and a better world. In Britain this desire found
expression during the war in the Union of Democratic Control
and the League of Nations Society. Perhaps because the
Versailles Treaty itself gave little reason to believe that
the old diplomacy had been buried, the league of Nations
became entrenched in the popular mind in Great Britain as

the best hope that the agony of the Great War had not been

suffered in vain.

 

11H. R. Winkler, "The development of the League of
Nations idea in Great Britain, 191h-l9l9,” Journal of Modern
History, XX (June, 1998), pp. 95-112.

 

 

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7

It was to preserve the League, or at least to give it
an honest trial, that Britain ran the risks faced in taking
a ”League stand" in 1935. The hope was that this could
be managed while yet giving Mussolini some satisfaction, and
the effort ultimately fell disastrously between two stools
for want of a clear focus. The attempt to Oppose and at
the same time to placate Italy constituted a reluctant
defensive reaction rather than a well-defined policy. The
government stumbled deep into the crisis hoping, like
Mr. Micawber, that something would turn up, in this case
something which might eliminate the need to face down a
friend. The key to understanding British policy in the
Abyssinian crisis lies in recognizing that the government
took the lead in opposing Italy, despite a keen desire to
avoid a falling out. They did so fully aware that Mussolini
would focus his resentment on London as the only possible
organizer of an effective League front.

The League front actually created was not in the end
effective, nor was the stand taken by Britain conspicuously
bold. Such determination as there was in London to see the
league procedures through was carefully hedged by the
requirement that the French show a similar determination.
And the position taken at Geneva was thoroughly undermined
by continuing efforts to negotiate a compromise settlement.
The entire undertaking pointed in the direction of failure,

and the failure duly occurred.

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8

It misses the point of that failure, however, to argue
that it might have been prevented by more courage, by more
determination. The idea of going to war with Italy to
prevent, or to stOp, Italy's war with Abyssinia was
routinely written off in London, and quite rightly so, as
contrary to Britain's conception of the League, and as not

12 It is equally off the mark to contend that

very sensible.
because of a lack of British conviction the League was
fatally weakened and a key factor lost in the struggle to
restrain aggression. In terms of what was expected of it,
the League was born crippled, and the Abyssinian crisis
served merely to certify the fact.13 When he argued from
the back benches in defense of his ruined policy that only
Britain had shown any willingness to prepare for the

military implications of sanctions, the point being made by

Sir Samuel Hoare was that national interests outweighed

 

12Another of the false trails which crisscross the
Abyssinian affair is the argument that had Britain vigor-
ously pressed the sanctions experiment, Italy would have
been forced to withdraw without coming to the point of war
with the League powers. The threat of a 'mad dog' Italian
attack upon Britain alone was taken so seriously in London
as to make such a course dangerously speculative, particularly
if the sanctions had been escalated to include oil. Even if
the concern was exaggerated, the central fact is, as Baldwin
observed, that taken to their logical conclusion sanctions
must necessarily mean a willingness to face war.

13The best corrective on the unwarranted expectations
raised by the League is F. H. Hinsley, "The Failure of the
League of Nations," Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University. Press, 1963), pp. 309-22.

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international covenants, and would no doubt continue to do
50.114 The League collapsed as a result of the Abyssinian
crisis, which is to say that it lost what remained of a
credibility which it had never been structured to enjoy. It
would have suffered a similar, if less spectacular collapse,
had Britain stood to one side, rather than providing a lead.
The cost to Britain of playing a leading role in the
Abyssinian crisis was considerable. Italy was lost as a
possible check on German resurgence, relations with France
were strained, the United States withdrew into deeper
isolation, the Dominions were dismayed and inclined to
withdraw still further from European concerns, and the value
of the League as a British and French dominated forum, and
as a bridge for Britain to EurOpe was seriously compro-
mised.15 Beyond that, the blow dealt to British prestige was,
with the possible exception of the early reverses of the Boer
War, unlike anything suffered since Yorktown. The mystery
is not why Britain failed to take still further risks in
the interests of collective security and Abyssinia. The
mystery is why, in view of the fact that the cabinet

included only one genuine League enthusiast and were agreed

 

14December 19, 1935. 307 H.C.Deb., 53., col. 2009.

15The Commonwealth reaction is assessed in Nicholas
Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth AffairngProblems of
External Poligy, l93l-l939 (London: Oxford University Press,
1952), pp.h27-29 and an insight into American thinking is to
be found in Herbert Feis, Three International Episodes Seen
from E. A. (New York: Norton, 1966, first published infil9h6),

pp. 193-276.

 

 

 

 

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10

that an Italian Abyssinia posed no threat to British
interests, Britain ran the very evident risks that it ran.
The League may have collapsed in December of 1935, but
it did not disappear. The sanctions experiment limped on
until Neville Chamberlain put a merciful end to it six
months later with his 'midsummer of madness' speech. Even
before Eden conceded final failure in June of 1936, however,
the Foreign Office was taking stock of the shambles which
Abyssinia had made of the eXperiment in international
cooperation in search of peace, and was weighing the
prospects for the future. That international experiment,
in an altered form, is still continuing and seems only
marginally healthier. What the British learned from
Abyssinia, and what difference it made if they learned
anything at all, can perhaps be of some use to those who

still hOpe to create a peaceful, logically-ordered world.

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CHAPTER I

DRIFTING

From the vantage point of London, a crisis pitting
Italy against the League of Nations must have been one of
the worst of conceivable developments in 1935. However
such a crisis evolved, Britain stood to lose. Italy and
the League were tied together in the system of regional
security which had been structured at Locarno in 1925.
Neither Locarno nor the League was especially healthy as
l93h gave way to another anxious year. The collapse of
either, however, in the face of a revived German menace
was not a happy thought. Far better to think in terms of
inducing Germany to rejoin the League on equitable terms
and to participate in an eastern Locarno system which
would involve Britain only as a midwife. Unless the
tranquil Geneva system of great power cooperation, which
had been known in the late 'twenties, could be reestablished
by burying German grievances alongside of French anxieties,
the future looked grim. Even on the most hopeful outlook,
it was past time to look to the distasteful business of
rearming. Germany posed a potential threat to British

interests in Europe, and Japan was an established threat in

11

12

the Far East, an area where the league writ clearly did not
run.1 The services had deteriorated to such an extent under
the 'ten-year' rule that it posed a serious problem to
allocate limited funds between the needs of air defense in
Europe and naval defense in the Far East.2
The league of Nations was obviously a shaky reed on
which to lean in the troubles facing Britain in 1935. The
League's effectiveness had been seriously challenged by the
Manchurian crisis, its potential had been badly limited by
the withdrawal of Japan and Germany, and its entire concep-
tual foundation had been called into question by the
collapse of the Disarmament Conference. This chain of events
tended to reinforce negative Opinion in Conservative and

military circles which, generally speaking, had never

warmed to the notion of a blanket commitment to defend the

 

1The efforts made to blunt the Japanese threat stumbled
regularly over the United States. The United States would
not contemplate a program of naval cooperation designed to
give pause to the military extremists assuming control in
Tokyo. Neither did Washington smile on the notion of a
British ship-building program which would produce the number
of cruisers needed to meet more than one threat. In London,
those elements which feared the loss of American good-will
successfully combined to defeat the impulse to seek an
accommodation with Japan. D. C. Watt, ”Britain, the U.S.
and Japan in l93h,” Personalities and Policies (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1965}, pp. 83-99.

2The ten-year rule originated in 1919 when lloyd George
told the service chiefs that they need not anticipate a major
war within the next ten years. It was not until 1932
that the ten-year rule was discarded as the basis for British
planning. A. J. P. Ta lor, English History, 191h-l9h5 (Oxford
University Press, 1965 , p. 228.

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13

whole world.3 Still, 1935 was not the time to acquiesce
in the demise Of the League. Across the first months Of
the year, the "Peace Ballot" was gathering steam in a
successful effort tO demonstrate and reinforce the
pOpularity Of the League in Britain. And aside from all
other considerations, the League was vital to the British
government as a cover for their necessary program of
rearmament, which pursued more Openly, would seem to many
a repudiation Of the whole post-war approach tO foreign
policy. When Mussolini posed a challenge to the league's
continuing usefulness, he created a dilemma for British
statesmen. For if Britain resisted that challenge, there
loomed the prospect of a third major adversary, positioned
to cut across Imperial lines Of communication.

The storm which broke over the heads Of the British
government in December of 1935 grew, in a disturbingly
familiar way, out Of an incident which occurred in an
Obscure quarter Of the world which had little apparent
bearing on British interests. On December 5, 1934 a

contingent Of African troops in the employ Of Italy quarreled

 

3Conservative mistrust Of the League is explored by
Neville Thompson in The Anti-Appeasers, Conservative
Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930's (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971), pp. 36-38.

14

with others under the loose control Of the Emperor of
Abyssinia.’+ In consequence a number Of lives were lost at
a place called WalWal, near the frontier between Abyssinia
and Italian Somaliland, and the sensibilities Of two Old
adversaries were aroused. It was a regrettable thing,
involving neighbors in east Africa, but it did not seem to
merit immediate concern. It was soon hard to ignore,
however, that there was trouble in the making.

On December 11 Italy demanded compensation Of Abyssinia
in terms calculated to be rejected.5 On December In
Abyssinia reported the incident to the League Council.6
On the same day Italy rejected the Abyssinian proposal for

arbitration.7 It did not take a keen mind to see that

Mussolini meant tO use the incident to settle an Old score,

 

“The Abyssinian troops, by mischance, were escorting an
Anglo-Abyssinian Commission which was surveying the grazing
grounds in the Ogaden at the time. Arnold J. Toynbee,

Surve Of International Affairs, 1935 Vol. II, Abyssinia and
Italy (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 135T (It
was usual in British Official circles in 1935 to refer to

EthiOpia as Abyssinia. For the sake Of consistency that
usage is followed here except where otherwise quoted).

 

 

5The Italian demands included a ceremonial apology from
the Governor Of Harar Province, a 200,000 dollar indemnity,
and the dismissal, arrest and punishment Of those Italy named
as guilty in the affair. The Earl Of Avon, The Eden Memoirs.
Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), p. 19E.

 

Sleague of Nations, Official Journal. February 1935:
p. 27 -

7Ibid., p. 248.

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15
and to record a triumph for his fascist regime. Whatever
hope existed that the scope of the quarrel could be limited
disappeared on January 3, 1935, when the Abyssinian govern-
ment asked the League to take action in the matter under
Article 11 of the Covenant.8 The memory of Manchuria was
entirely too fresh for the implications of the Abyssinian
request to be lost on london. Until June, however, the
British government was reluctant to face those implications.
Rather, the matter was allowed to drift in the hope that
a little diplomatic oil might calm the water and produce
an agreed solution which would preserve the league while
satisfying Mussolini.

II

Abyssinia laid its quarrel before the League at a

moment when the British government was engaged in rethinking
certain key elements of foreign policy which were being over-
taken by events. The central fact affecting all of British
policy was the revived German threat. Military and para-
military organizations were multiplying in the German
countryside while Hitler shrilled about the abuses Germany
had suffered under a bad peace. In Asia, Japan posed an
active challenge which Britain was equally unprepared to

meet. Something positive had to be done about security.

 

8Ibid., p 252.

16

By January of l93fi, the Foreign Office had begun a
reassessment of the concept of collective security.9
Britain had always resisted the French desire to make the
league an effective and automatic instrument of coercion,
and there were serious doubts in london about the value of

10 Had disarmament been generally

the League in a tight spot.
accepted, the situation might have been different. As it was,
it was dangerous to rely upon anything beyond domestic
resources, and after years of operating on the assumption
that there would be no war for ten years into the future,
those resources were slim.

The hope underlying British policy was that the central
problem could be scaled down somewhat by taking realistic
account of Germany as it existed, and by making allowance
11

for some of the German grievances which were patently just.

That hOpe ran throughout the discussion which the cabinet

 

9% 371/18537. W260/129/98.

10The contrast between the British and the French
approach to the League is developed in Arnold Wolfers,
Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 19EO), pp. 153-57. In Britain, any serious
suggestion that the League's capabilities ought to be
brought more into line with the League's responsibilities
was certain to run into military Opposition. ‘Iain Macleod,
Neville Chamberlain (london: Frederick Muller, 1961), p. 166.

 

llMartin Gilbert offers an excellent treatment of German
grievances and British conscience in The Roots of Appeasement
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

17

had on January 9, 1935, on the subject of coaxing Germany to

12 Neville Chamberlain argued powerfully

rejoin the league.
that Germany might prove more amenable if granted equity
in armaments, and the cabinet agreed that German rearmament,
though illegal, was an established fact and ought to be
recognized. It was further agreed that British and French
interests could best be served by drawing Germany back into
the League, and by securing German adherence to an eastern
pact similar to locarno.

The Italian menace to the league thus appeared at a
time when London was still thinking in terms of appeasing
Germany in the hope of reestablishing the easy interchange
and cooperation at Geneva which had been known during the
Stresemann era. This vision did not really begin to fade
until Simon and Eden visited Berlin late in March and learned
from Hitler that the price of a German representative at
Geneva was the return of the former German colonies.13
Earlier in the month, Hitler had underlined the pressing
question of British rearmament by announcing on March 9
that Germany was engaged in creating an air force, and on
March 16 that compulsory military service was being

reestablished.l,4

 

lzJanuary 9. 1935. Cab 23/81 2(35)1-8.

13Notes of Anglo-German Conversations, March 25 and 26,
1935. Cab 2h/25u C.P.69(35).

1D’The Times, March 10 and 17, 1935.

 

 

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18

On March h the government issued a Command Paper on
defense, laying out the arguments for rearmament. Debate on
the White Paper took place in the House of Commons a week
later in an atmosphere charged by Hitler's cpen disdain for
the Versailles restrictions. The boost given by Hitler's
announcement of March 9 to the modest proposals put forward
in the White Paper was no doubt welcome. The debate was
certain to call forth an Opposition charge that the govern-
ment was putting Mars in train once again. An election was
due within the year, and Canon Sheppard, East-Fulham, and
the famous Oxford Union resolution were only the most
outstanding recent examples of pacifist feeling in the

country.15 The government could not afford the label of

 

15H. R. l. Sheppard, vicar of St. Martin-in-the—Fields,
was well known for broadcasts from his church. In 1934 he
founded the Peace Pledge Union with an appeal to all males
to send him a postcard stating that they would never support
or approve another war. By 1936 the movement had 100,000
members.

In February 1933 the Oxford Union passed by a vote of
275-153 a resolution that 'this House will not fight for
King and Country.’

Labour won the East Fulham by-election in October
1933 by a margin of h8h0. The seat had been held by the
National candidate in 1931 by 1h,500. This reversal was
universally hailed as a triumph for pacifism, and made a
deep impression on Baldwin in particular. A. J. P. Taylor
notes that it was, in fact, as Neville Chamberlain
suspected, largely an attack on the means test. Taylor,
English History, p. 367. A recent reassessment of the East
Fulham election confirms Chamberlain's impression that the
determining issues in the contest were bread and butter
issues. Richard Heller, "East Fulham Revisted,” Journal of
Contemporary History, VI, 3 (1971), pp. 172-96.

 

 

 

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19

'war-monger.‘ In this light, perhaps the most significant
aspect of the debate on the White Paper was the degree to
which it focused on the League of Nations.

The government prefaced the White Paper with a
reaffirmation of faith in the league, adding only the
qualification that once discussion breaks down the existing
international machinery could not be relied upon against
aggression.16 The qualification was necessary if rearmament
was to make any sense at all. In debate, the government
front bench chose to emphasize their faith rather than the
qualification. By doing so, they partially neutralized
the ire of the Opposition, who saw the White Paper as a
departure from League principles akin to the sell-out which
had occurred in 1931.

Clement Attlee opened the debate by moving, in effect,
that the government's policy represented a disastrous return
to the old diplomacy:

in the Opinion of this House, the policy of
His Majesty's Government with respect to
defence is completely at variance with the
spirit in which the League of Nations was

created to establish a collective world
peace, gravely jeOpardises the prospect of

 

16The White Paper was drafted with a keen appreciation
of the pOpular mood. On February 25 the cabinet authorized
a final revision, to emphasize the importance of the defense
forces from the point of view of peace, defense and deterrent.
February 25, 1935. Cab 23/81 11(35)l. The paper as finally
approved is found at Cab 2h/253 C.P.38(35).

20

any Disarmament Convention, and, so far

from ensuring national safety, will lead

to international competition and the

insecurity thereby engendered and will

ultimately lead to war.1
Attlee's conclusion was that it was the government's failure
to make the League effective which had moved the world away
from peace and disarmament to talk of war and rearmament.18
Most opposition comment was no more thoughtful, and no less
indignant.19 The one exception was the intervention by
Sir Stafford Cripps, perhaps the best mind on the Labour
benches. Cripps cut through the rhetoric to note the basic
difference between the government and the Opposition view of
the league. The government saw the League "as a body for
promoting peace by facilitating and regularising the means
of international co-operation,” while the Opposition looked
upon the League "as an incipient world confederation of
nations.” Without a willingness to subordinate national
wishes to the international good, security on a League basis
was impossible.20

Of the government supporters, only Leo Amery specifically

rejected the larger concept of the league, held by the

 

17March 11, 1935. 299 H.C.Deb., 55.. col. 35.

18Ibid.. col. 38.

19See, for example, the remarks of F. S. Cocks on "a sad
and dismal occasion." Ibid., cols. 81-86.

20lbid.. col. 1u7.

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Opposition, as chimerical. In characteristic fashion,
Amery denounced the League of the 'true believers' as "the
league of Make-believe, the Cloud Cuckoo land of the dreamers
of a millenium which we are not likely to reach for many

a long year to come....”21

Amery's description was one
which a number of Conservatives could appreciate, but which
few would like to take out onto the hustings.

The government generally kept to the safer ground of
League advocacy, cautioning only that too much could not be
expected of the League in the given circumstances. Baldwin's
commonsense observation that "it is not a question of doing
what is best -- ideally best -- but a question of doing what
is best in the circumstances in which you work" was balanced
by his assurance that British statesmen were prepared to work

through the league for the future.22

Foreign Secretary Simon
closed the debate by emphatically denying that the White Paper
represented any weakening of the government's faith in, or
determination to uphold, the League.23

Logically, the issuance of a White Paper on rearmament

should have Offered the ideal opportunity to clear away some

of the cobwebs relating to collective security. The failure

 

211bid.. col. 101.

22Ibid., col. #7.

23Ibid., cols. 157-58.

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22

of the central tenet of disarmament to win international
approval fairly invited a statement pointing up the obvious
weaknesses Of the League system of security and the
consequent need for national self-reliance. There were,
however, very few politicans willing to embark upon a
program of reeducation in March of 1935, nor is there
evidence that very many had interpreted the blows suffered
by the League since 1931 as a cause to despair of its
prospects. Thus, the government stepped around an oppor-
tunity to debate the weaknesses and the implications of the
league system despite the fact that the Abyssinian test was
clearly on the horizon. Broad support for rearmament was

2h Disabusing the League faithful

the bird to have in-hand.
would require much more than a White Paper debate. The

effect of the White Paper was to establish an approach to

 

2“The government's ability to see rearmament and the
League commitment as mutually reinforcing had little in
common with Churchill's later concept of "arms and the
Covenant." There was no thought of forging a Geneva-centered
'grand alliance' behind the government's approach to rearm-
ament. In fact, despite the amendment which Sir Austin
Chamberlain offered on the government's behalf, there was
little inclination to think in terms of using enhanced
strength in the service of the Covenant. Ibid., col. 71.
The League was an instrument for focusing Opinion, arranging
conciliation, and bringing pressure to bear. None of this
should require the force of arms. Tying rearmament to the
League was an effort to blend a pressing need with an
established political reality, and was probably not cons-
ciously disingenuous.

23

rearmament which had wide appeal. The debate on the White
Paper left the issue of collective security dangerously
cloudy, however, and the government tied still more
tangibly to a League sinking visibly into trouble.
III
By the time of the White Paper debate in March,
Mussolini had begun the military build-up in east Africa

25

which was making Italian intentions clear. In london,
the government's reaction to the problem was emerging in a
slow and uncertain fashion. The cabinet, under the less-
than dynamic leadership of MacDonald and Baldwin, resigned
the matter to Foreign Secretary Simon. Simon, in turn, did
little with the problem beyond maintaining an uneasy watch
on it.

When Abyssinia brought the dispute before the League
Council on January 3, however, Simon reacted with real
alacrity, joining Anthony Eden and Pierre laval at Geneva

26

in a successful effort to postpone a confrontation. In a
skillful piece of on-the-spot diplomacy, which demonstrated

that the Foreign Secretary was quite capable of initiative,

 

25Toynbee, Survey of International Affairg, 1935, II,

26The French Foreign Minister, Pierre Laval, fresh from
his conversations with Mussolini in Rome, functioned as the
chief mediator with the Abyssinians. George W. Baer, Egg
_goming of the Italian-EthiOpian War (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 103.

 

 

24

Simon and Eden saw the Abyssinian and Italian representatives
and helped persuade Abyssinia not to force the issue immedi-
ately. Simon also called for a letter of formal apology from
the Abyssinian Emperor, and prOposed the creation of an
Italo-Abyssinian boundary commission to fix the disputed
boundary and to apportion the 200,000 dollars demanded by
Italy to the sufferers on both sides. Unfortunately Simon
had neither the carrot nor the stick necessary to persuade
Mussolini to throw away an Opportunity. He could only warn
that the League might find it necessary to place the matter
on its agenda. Mussolini shrugged this off as representing
a threat to the League rather than to Italy.27
Simon's prOposal dealt only with the immediate issue
and suffered from the illusion that Mussolini's ambitions
were reasonable, limited and subject to British influence.28

This illusion would plague British policy throughout the

crisis. Simon's personal intervention in the first round

 

27The details of Simon's initiative are drawn from Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 195.

28On December 20, l93h Mussolini drew up and circulated
among his closest advisers a ”Directive and Plan of Action
for the Resolution of the Italian-Abyssinian Question.” In
this document Mussolini asserted flatly that the problem
could only be solved by the destruction of the Abyssinian
armed forces and the total conquest of Abyssinia. Baer.
The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 58-61. The
great gap between Mussolini's ambitions and what British
statesmen calculated he might accept narrowed only gradually
under the pressure of the building crisis.

 
 
 

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25
at Geneva helped to postpone a confrontation which could
only menace the league. It also established British concern
and give Abyssinia reason to hOpe that British concern would
produce a settlement. Buoyed by that hOpe, and aware that
success at Geneva depended upon British and French goodwill,
Abyssinia delayed making formal application for league
consideration of the dispute.

Abyssinia was fated to waste a great deal of Optimism
throughout the crisis. Italy's reaction to his personal
effort at Geneva effectively warned Simon off, and he
adopted a passive posture which he managed, in good part, to
maintain until he handed over what had become a sticky
affair to his successor at the Foreign Office in June. His
handling of the first stages of the Abyssinian problem points
up the reason why his colleagues decided in June that Sir
John's talents could be better employed in a different
capacity.

Sir John Simon is most charitably remembered as a
skillful advocate who could vie with the best of legal minds
in drafting a comprehensive brief. In his grey way, Simon
was a valuable member of the National government, and was
rewarded across the 'thirties with key portfolios as
Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary and Chancellor of the
Exchequer. A man of cabinet stature and ability, Simon
became, after the resignation of Sir Herbert Samuel in

1932, the visible Liberal in the National government.

     

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26

Although he lacked the style of Churchill and the bite of
lloyd George, Simon was the best debater in the government
ranks, and he put his logic in harness to support a wide
variety of government positions. As Foreign Secretary,
however, he suffered from a tendency to see too much of
both sides of every question.

In Abyssinia, Simon was faced with a problem with two
very distinct and unattractive sides. To his careful mind
it was evident that to come down on either side posed an
unacceptable prospect for British policy, and so the matter
drifted.29 Simon devoted a good deal of his last months at
the Foreign Office to the German question, which was also
occupying the attention of Neville Chamberlain, the motive
force in the cabinet.30 Abyssinia was abandoned largely to
Anthony Eden, the government's specialist on all things
relating to Geneva. Given a free field in which to exercise
his sense of international morality, Eden took firm hold of
the problem. The result was that as the crisis deepened

Eden became another factor complicating the dilemma.

 

29Cab 2u/255 C.P.98(35).

30Even on the German problem, which seemed to admit of
several possibilities, Simon's outlook was tinged with
deSpair. On November 28, 193a Simon noted in his diary that
the great problem lay in winning Germany back to EurOpean
OOOperation. A new approach was clearly needed, but the
French stood in the way. The Simon Papers, Diary 11. In
many respects, British statesmen in the 'thirties conceived
themselves to be the prisoners of postures established during
the previous decade.

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27

Anthony Eden in 1935 enjoyed a unique position in
British politics. At the age of thirty-seven, he held the
position of Lord Privy Seal and was regarded by many as the
elegant symbol of all that was best in the English pe0p1e.
Born well, educated well, and proven in battle, Eden entered

31

Parliament in 1923 seemingly marked for success. A member
of the sparkling '1ost' generation who had somehow been
Spared, Eden emerged from the war with his ideals shaped

32 / /
As the protege of

by a serviceman's loathing of war.
Stanley Baldwin and Austen Chamberlain, he rose to the
second position in the Foreign Office in the National
government established in 1931. On the strength of his
ability and the apprenticeship which he had served as Austen
Chamberlain's parliamentary private secretary, Eden merited

the promotion to parliamentary under—secretary, and he

earned the recognition accorded him as lord Privy Seal in

 

31Robert Anthony Eden was born on June 12, 1897, the
younger son of Sir William Eden, seventh baronet. He was
educated at Eton and Christ Church, with time out for the
war. At age 19 he became the youngest adjutant in the army.
By war's end he was a brigade major with the rank of captain
and had been decorated with the Military Cross. In 1923 he
was elected to represent Leamington by a majority of better
than 5,000 votes.

32Alan Campbell-Johnson, Sir Anthony Eden (London:
Robert Hale, 1955), p. 21. Of his impression of Eden in
1933, Harold Macmillan writes that he "seemed to embody all
the aspirations of the war generation." Harold Macmillan,
Winds of Change 1914-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 393.

 

 

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28

193b, But his image counted for more than his ability. lord
Swinton, who, as Philip Cunliffe-Lister, was Eden's colleague
in the National government, recalls

the appeal he made to the youth of the
party, the young, idealistic generation
of the inter-war years. He was elegant

in dress and manner, pleasing in his
relations with people, dedicated to causes
which appealed to a war-weary nation; a
debonair young refggmer whose heart was

in the right place

It was not only the young who admired the figure that Eden
cut. League enthusiasts of all ages applauded the work

which he had done on the Disarmament Conference, the Saar
plebiscite, and the mediation between Hungary and Yugoslavia

34

after the assassination of King Alexander. Eden shared
the conviction of men such as lord Cecil that the league
represented the best hOpe for the future, and should be

35 To

given every tonic possible. league supporters, Eden was
the one sure element in an otherwise suspect government.36
As resident league champion, Eden was one of the political
strengths of the government. He was also a measure of the

price it was necessary to pay to win domestic support for

 

33The Earl of Swinton, Sixty Years of Power (New York:
James H. Heinemann, 1967, first published in 1966), p. 163.

3L'See, for example, Viscount Cecil to Anthony Eden,
December 7, l93h, Cecil Papers, British Museum, Add. 51083:
and A. C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe
(london: Collins, 19397, pp. 280-81, 295-98.

 

3SAnthony Eden to Viscount Cecil, December 11, l93h,
Cecil Papers, Add. 51083.

36Viscount Cecil to Frank Walters, August 19, 1935,
COpy in the Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian library,
Box 16a and d.

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29

foreign policy.

Even Eden was at first reluctant to see the Abyssinian
problem become a league problem. In his memoirs, he noted
that he caught the odor of another Manchurian crisis in
the first reports of the WalWal affair.37 If so, and the
stench was such that there is no reason to doubt it, his
initial reaction was to try and help the League avoid another
major shock. Eden joined Simon and Laval after January 3
in working to convince the Abyssinians of the wisdom of
postponing a formal appeal to the league in favor of
negotiation outside of the League framework. Abyssinia had
come to the league because Italy had refused to arbitrate
the matter, and was quite willing to consider any approach
which would produce an agreed settlement. It was Italy
that refused to play along, and by the middle of January
Eden's indignation was beginning to build. On January 16,
Eden telephoned to london that the Italians ”should be told
we could do no more, and that proceedings at Geneva should
take their course."38 In Geneva, he turned the pressure
onto the Italian representative, Baron Pompeo Aloisi.39

Shortly before the Council discussion scheduled for

 

37Avon, Facing_the Dictators, p. 193.
38Ibid., p. 196.
391bid.

 

 

 

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30

January 19, Mussolini conceded another Geneva 'victory' to
Anthony Eden by agreeing to arbitrate the diSpute according
to the provisions of the treaty of 1928 between Italy and
Abyssinia/4O
Eden's victory was, of course, no victory at all. It
left the matter to be negotiated between Italy and Abyssinia
without effective mediation, while the Italian military
build-up was progressing in east Africa. At the same time,
Eden's success served to put the League more squarely into
the picture. With his note of January 19 to Secretary-
General Avenol accepting an arbitration procedure which he
had previously rejected, Mussolini, in effect, conceded the
League's competence in the matter. League supporters in
Abyssinia and elsewhere were encouraged to draw the wrong
conclusion. The best lesson that Abyssinia could have
learned from its first appeal at Geneva would have been that
the League was incapable of offering effective help. Instead,
Abyssinia was led to believe that, given the proper British

lead, the League could function was a real restraint on

Italy.

 

uoOn January 19, 1935 the Italian and Abyssinian
governments directed notes to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations indicating their willingness to attempt
to settle their differences in accordance with article 5 of
the Treaty of Amity which had been signed between the two
nations on August 2, 1928. Italy asked for, and Abyssinia
concurred in seeking, a postponement until May of the
discussion by the League Council of the dispute growing out
of the WalWal incident. League of Nations, Official Journal,
February 1935, pp. 162-63.

 

 

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31

Eden's conduct at Geneva won him no admirers in Rome.
Mussolini was left to puzzle out the British attitude,

hl On

which he had hOped would be no worse than passive.
January 29 Leonardo Vitetti, counselor of the Italian
embassy in London, visited the Foreign Office to pass the
word that Italy had reached an understanding with France on
the question of Abyssinia, and to invite an exchange of
views between Britain and Italy on respective interests in
Abyssinia.h2 This invitation drew no British response, and

one of the few genuine Opportunities of the crisis was

lost. Despite the obvious importance of the Italian demarche,

 

it was not until March 6 that the Foreign Office handed over
the question of British interests in Abyssinia for study by
an interministerial commission headed by Sir John Maffey, a
former governor of the Sudan, who was then permanent under-
secretary in the Colonial Office. The commission pursued its
leisurely course and produced a report on June 18, which was
not circulated as a cabinet paper until August 16.143 The
commission's conclusion was that Britain had no important
interests in Abyssinia save Lake Tana, the headwaters of the

blue Nile.

 

#1
#2

Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 90.
Cab 2h/256 C.P.161(35).
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32

Simon did not lose the opportunity presented on January
29 for want of a clear appreciation of Britain's interests
in Abyssinia. He declined to make Britain's position clear,
at a time when that might still have made a difference,
quite simply because no one in a position of responsibility
in London wanted to choose between Italy and the League. By
putting on a stern face, Britain might have been able to
warn Italy off in January, before Italian prestige became too
deeply committed. Equally, Britain might have adopted a
hands-off approach in January, which would have pleased Italy
and prevented false expectations. The penalty for establish-
ing a clear position along either of these lines was the
loss of Italian friendship on the one hand, or the collapse
of the League of Nations on the other. The notion which has
since been put forward, that Britain could have backed
Mussolini down and still have retained his friendship, seems
grounded only in the belief that courage will always win out
and produce the prOper ending.uu Certainly no one operated
under such a delusion at the time. An either-or situation
was clearly taking shape. Sir John and his colleagues might
have cut their losses by selecting one side or the other.
As it was, they tried to have it both ways and lost the
friendship of Italy while lengthening the fall suffered by
the League.

 

uaBaer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 93.

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33

IV

Simon's approach to the problem, after his initiative
at Geneva in January, was to wait and to hOpe for the best.
The tactic of waiting on events has something to recommend
it if there are some signs that events might be tending in a
hOpeful direction. It is hard to imagine that Simon could
have seen such signs, unless he placed a good deal more
confidence in Mussolini's acceptance of arbitration than the

/
January 29 demarche warranted. For public consumption,

 

Simon stressed the fact that the Italian minister in Addis
Ababa had been instructed to negotiate with the Abyssinian
government, and he added that the British minister in Addis
Ababa was authorized to encourage the negotiations.u5 He
was forced to concede at the same time that Italy had
recently mobilized 30,000 additional men. There was little
doubt in Simon's mind which was the more telling deve10pment.
On February 21 he wrote the king that:

Italy is at present occupied with the

Abyssinian question, as to which Sir

John greatly fears that a serious outcome

is probable. But this must be handled in

a way which will nag affect adversely Anglo-
Italian relations.

Simon's letter to the king indicates that although he

had not sufficiently sorted out his thinking to establish

 

uSFebruary 13, 1935. 297 H.C.Deb., 58., col. 190U.

uéQuoted in Harold Nicolson, King George V, His Life and
Reign (London: Constable, 1970, first published in 1952),
p. 528.

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3b

a British position on the problem, he was certainly leaning
in one direction. While Simon leaned in one direction,

Eden leaned in the other. Eden's thought was aptly summed
up in a speech which he made on February 15 to a branch of
the League of Nations Union at Rugby. He confidently
predicted to a receptive audience that "the conception of a
collective peace system has surely come to stay."u7 It

had to succeed because it was the only substitute for a
balance of power, and a balance of power could never guarantee
peace. For Eden, the correlation was clearly established:
anything which menaced the League, menaced peace. And by

the end of February, Eden was becoming increasingly convinced
that Italy menaced the League.

On February 26, Eden addressed a memorandum to Simon
eXpressing his impatience with Italian tactics which were
delaying arbitration procedures, and his anxiety over the
Open movement of Italian tr00ps to east Africa. He suggested
that, in connection with their 'duties' as members of the
League Council, Britain and France should warn Mussolini
that they would not view the dismemberment of Abyssinia with
indifference. He did not suggest how Simon should go about

securing Laval's participation in such a warning. Simon's

“7Eden is one of the few politicans whose speeches to
meetings of the League of Nations Union can be read without
concern that they mask unspoken reservations. A copy of
Eden's February 15 speech can be found at F0 371/19673.
W141} 3/19 3/98 .

 

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35

response to Eden's suggestion was to instruct Sir Eric
Drummond in Rome, and Sir Robert Vansittart in London, to
inform the Italians that Britain would appreciate more rapid
progress on the arbitration process.u8 This was not a request
made for form's sake alone: Simon would have been genuinely
grateful had the arbitration process begun to move, and to
defuse the diSpute. After a month of no movement at all,
however, Simon must have known that Italy had no intention of
submitting its grievance to effective arbitration, and that
the British appeal would be, as in fact it was, ignored.
Despite British suggestions, Mussolini made no more
movement in the direction of arbitration than seemed abso-
lutely required. By the beginning of March, the agreement
of January 19 was not providing much of a fig leaf for the
steady stream of Italian troops and supplies which was
passing through the Suez canal. Abyssinia decided that it
could withhold its appeal to the League no longer. 0n
flarch 17 at Geneva, the Abyssinian representative Tecle
Hawariate noted the lack of any progress toward arbitration
and Abyssinia's growing fear of an invasion by the Italian
forces building up in east Africa. He therefore formally
requested the Secretary-General to lay the dispute before

the League Council in accordance with Article 15, for

hBThe details of Eden's memorandum and Simon's response
are drawn from Avon, Facinggthe Dictators, pp. 198-200.

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36

"investigation and consideration." He also added an appeal
to Article 10, under which the members of the League had a
responsibility to preserve against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of
a fellow member. Hawariate very cleverly wrapped up
Abyssinia's appeal by agreeing in advance to accept any
arbitral award arrived at through the League.“9 The League
was thus put on formal notice that it might be called upon
to impose sanctions against a principal member.

The sparks which this appeal was expected to generate
failed to materialize. The appeal was made on the day
following Hitler's proclamation calling for a conscript
army of twelve corps, and Abyssinia's problem was momentarily
lost in the general concern over what was clearly a much
larger issue. Hitler's move multiplied Italy's importance
as a check on German militarism. The effect which the move-
ment of Italian divisions to the Brenner pass had on Berlin
in July of l93h made a vivid impression on London and Paris.
While Italian diplomats conferred with their French and
British counterparts on the best way to constrain Germany,
Italy replied to the Abyssinian appeal at leisure on March 22.
Italy denounced the Abyssinian move, but held out the hope
that direct negotiations might yet produce a settlement, and

offered to take "forthwith" the steps necessary to constitute

ugLeague of Nations, Official Journal, May 1935, p. 572.

 

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the still unformed arbitration commission. This was, Italy
argued, ample evidence that arbitration was proceeding, in

which case Article 15 did not apply.50

Italy's promise was
empty and Abyssinia urgently repeated its appeal on March 29,
and again on April 3.51 On April 10, on the eve of the
Stresa conference called to consider the German problem,
Mussolini moved again to offset the Abyssinian appeals by
agreeing to proceed with the nomination of arbitrators.52
Sir John Simon went to Stresa in April deeply troubled
by his recent visit to Berlin. He had come away from the
discussions which began in Berlin on March 25 with the
general impression that Hitler desired ”a good understanding"
with Britain, an impression that Hitler managed to convey to
most of his British guests. On specific issues, however,
Hitler had been most unaccommodating. Simon recorded in his
diary at the time that Hitler seemed determined to go his
own way in rearmament, eXpected to draw all Germans within
Germany's borders, wanted the return of the ex-German
colonies before rejoining the League, and, even in that

unlikely event, had no intention of joining in collective

security. The Foreign Secretary was understandably depressed:

501bid.. p. 573.
511bid.. pp. 573-77.

 

 

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All this is pretty hopeless, for if
Germany will not cooperate for confirming
the solidarity of Europe, the rest of
EurOpe will c00perate to preserve it in
spite of Germany. This may not prevent
an ultimate eXplosion, but it will delay
it. We may see the curious spectacle of
British Tories collaborating with Russian
Communists while the League of Nations
Union thunders applause. There may be no
other course, but will i§3ensure peace?

I most gravely doubt it.

There is apparent in Simon's musings the rather half-
formed notion that the League of Nations might prove useful
in organizing a united response to a German threat, should
it come to that. His journey to Italy in April, however,
offered the chance to establish a much more manageable form)
of constraint.

V

It is an historical commonplace that the British
delegation to the Stresa conference in April 1935 missed
an excellent opportunity to clear up Britain's position
on Abyssinia and the League in direct conversation with
Mussolini. The usual assumption is that some plain talk at

Stresa would have made an important difference.5u This

53March 27, 1935, Diary 11, Simon Papers. The entry is
also printed, in substantially the same form, in Viscount
Simon, Retrogpect (London: Hutchinson, 1952), p. 203.

ShArnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs,
1325, Vol II: Abyssinia and Italy (London: Oxford University
Press, 1936), lh8—h9: R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain and the
Efiptators (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 361: Viscount
Cecil, A Great Experiment (New York: Oxford University Press,
1941), p. 266: A. J. P. Taylor The Origins of the Second
fibrld War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), p. 87: Baer,

The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 124-26.

 

 

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39

assumption rests on the idea that Britain should have been
willing to threaten Italy with overwhelming force for the
sake of Abyssinia, an idea wholly foreign to British think-
ing.55 Without such a threat, it is hard to imagine that
Mussolini would have sacrificed the pride and the expense
which he had invested in east Africa by April.

Simon lost what was, in fact, a much more promising
opportunity to influence the course of the dispute during
the month prior to his visit to Stresa. Until March 17,
Abyssinia had not made a formal claim on League procedures.
Although Abyssinia certainly would have turned to the League
for some sort of help before accepting a military defeat,
there obviously was little hOpe for effective League action
without the active support of London and Paris. Had Britain
and France plainly warned Abyssinia at the beginning of 1935
not to rely on the League, Abyssinia might not have invoked
the Covenant, and might have been more receptive to Italian
demands. Such a warning, however, would have required a

willingness to accept some responsibility for the outcome of

551n his account of the Stresa conference, Lord
Vansittart wrote that ”the humiliations consequent on
unilateral disarmament were unimaginable to those who had
not to wade through them": The Mist Procession (London:
Hutchinson, 1958), p. 519. Vansittart makes a point which
could be applied to any of the crises faced across the
1930's: British statesmen felt themselves to be dealing
from weakness rather than strength. Vansittart's obser-
vation can be misleading, however, if it is taken to imply
that only military weakness prevented Britain from drawing
the line at Stresa. No one, certainly not he, journeyed
from London to Stresa with any desire to dictate to Mussolini.

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the quarrel. Simon was not the man to shoulder unnecessary
responsibilities, nor was he prodded to do so by his
colleagues.

The British delegation to the Stresa conference with
Italy and France was led by Simon and by Prime Minister

d.56

James Ramsay MacDonal The dominant figure in the
supporting staff was that of Sir Robert Vansittart, the
permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office. The common
bond uniting these three dissimilar men at Stresa was the
tacit understanding that Italian cooperation was vital to
European peace. MacDonald, whose curious mental processes
brought forth both very good and incredibly bad advice during
the crisis, was concerned more with what he saw as the

develOping Italian challenge to British imperial interests

than with the threat to the League.57 The Prime Minister's

 

56MacDonald replaced Eden, who had been temporarily
incapacitated by what was apparently a mild heart attack
suffered during a stormy flight from Prague. Eden's absence
from the Stresa conference opens the door to speculation
that all might have come right if only Eden had been able to
make the trip. Campbell-Johnson, Sir Anthony Eden, p. 103.
This is an attractive line of conjecture in that it imposes
no burden of evidence, and can be applied to any and all,
however unlikely. The authors of a recent biography of
Stanley Baldwin argue, for example, that had Baldwin led the
delegation to Stresa, he would certainly have played the
man and set the Italians straight. Keith Middlemas and
John Barnes, Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969),
p. 831.

57MacDonald laid out his concern over the growing
Italian challenge in a letter to Hoare later in the crisis.
MacDonald to Hoare, August 13, 1935, F0 800/295. Hoare found
this letter to be "curious and almost unintelligible." It
contained "the amazing suggestion that the Italians are likely
to be our great Empire rivals in the future and will almost
certainly be stronger than ourselves.” Hoare to Neville
Chamberlain, August 18, 1935, F0 800/295.

bl

socialist ideals were a dim memory at Stresa. He wanted only
a satisfactory agreement which he could take back and lay
before the Parliaments8 Simon, on the other hand, recorded
in his memoirs that his objectives at Stresa related to
deve10ping a balanced approach to the German threat:

One objective was to show the solidarity

of the three Powers in the face of Germany's

announced increase in military strength,

and the other to keep the door open for

Germany to return to Geneva and play her prOper

part in thesgreation of collective security

for Europe.
Vansittart's memoirs are more forthcoming. He admitted that
he was concerned about the growing Abyssinian problem, and
that he recognized the opportunity to confront Mussolini at
Stresa. But Vansittart took the line that it was better "to
land Mussolini first and lecture him later," lest the confer-
ence break up abortively, with no agreement on the German
problem.60 It was not hard to sell such advice to
MacDonald and Simon.

The conference at Stresa opened on April 11 and lasted

four days. Throughout the conference the subject of

Abyssinia was studiously avoided by the chiefs-of-state

58Vansittart told Randolph Churchill that MacDonald was
unconcerned that the agreed formula at Stresa embraced only
Europe. 'What we want,‘ MacDonald told Vansittart, 'is an
agreement that we can put before the House of Commons.’
Randolph Churchill, The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden
(london: Macgibbon and Kee,wl959), p. 85.

sgsimon, Retrospect, pp. 203-0h.

60Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 520.

 

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and foreign ministers assembled. The silence on Abyssinia
reflected the common desire for a unified front on the
German question. The great unknown at the conference was
the British attitude. Having been warned by his ambassador
in london that the British would broach the Abyssinian
question, Mussolini came prepared to argue the case for his

ambitions there.61

Prodded by Eden and by the Italian
ambassador, Count Dino Grandi, Simon also brought along an
Abyssinian expert, but he was not anxious to try to spell
out a position which he had not yet formulated.62
The warning issued at Stresa came from Italy rather
than Britain. 0n the afternoon of April 12, Geoffrey
Thompson, Britain's Abyssinian expert, met with Leonardo
Vitetti, counselor of the Italian embassy in London, and
Giovanni Garnaschelli, an Abyssinian specialist from the
Palazzo Chigi. Thompson had been included in the British
party at the last moment, and he had no authority to deal
with the Italians on matters of substance.63 Garnaschelli

and Vitetti were not bound by such strictures. During an

informal exchange of some three hours, Thompson was given

61Mussolini berated Grandi after the conference for
having supplied him with faulty intelligence. Ivone
Kirk atrick, Mussolini: A Study in Power (New York: Hawthorn,
196A . p. 303.

62Avon, Facing_the Dictators, p. 179: Baer, The Coming
9f the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 119.

 

63Geoffrey Thompson, Front Iine Diplomat (London:
Hutchinson, 1959). Po 97.

 

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to understand that Italy 'could not exclude the possibility
of solving the Abyssinian question by force.’ In diplomatic
usage, this was a blunt statement of intent, and Thompson
quickly drew up a memorandum for the Foreign Secretary
warning that the Italians were talking openly of war.6u
Mussolini dramatically underscored the private warning passed
by his experts when he pointedly inserted the words "of EurOpe"
into the final declaration.65 By specifying that the declar-
ation be limited to threats to European peace, Mussolini
served the British with direct notice of his African inten-
tions and invited a challenge. All eyes turned to Simon at
that point, and his silence gave mute testimony of Iondon's

o o o 66
unwillingness to antagonize Rome.

 

6“Ibid., pp. 97-98. In light of Thompson's account, it
would seem that Simon told the House of Commons a half-truth,
at best, on May 1 when he stated that conversation among the
experts at Stresa was limited to minor matters, and Hoare
passed along another half-truth on October 22, when he told
the House of Commons that the experts at Stresa had made
their respective positions clear. 301 H.C.Deb., 5s., col.
3&8; 305 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 25-26.

65The joint statement of April 1h closed with a declar-

ation of general intent: "The three powers, the object of
whose policy is the collective maintenance of peace within
the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in
complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means,
any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger
the peace of EurOpe, and will act in close and cordial
collaboration for this purpose." John Wheeler-Bennett and
Stephen Heald (eds.), Documents on International Affairs,
1935, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 82.

66Ian Colvin, None So Blind (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1965), p. 61.

 

 

an

The encounter with Mussolini at Stresa demonstrated only
that Simon saw no point in a confrontation. It would have
been completely out of character, and of questionable
diplomatic wisdom, for Simon to have improved upon the moment
of drama created by Mussolini at the closing session. The
object of the Stresa conference was to deve10p an agreed
line on Germany. Once an agreement of sorts had been safely
pocketed, Simon felt free to return what answer he had to
Mussolini's challenge.67 An extraordinary session of the
league Council had been arranged to follow the Stresa meet-
ings, to lend the League's blessing if it was required.68
Simon took advantage of the opportunity to reemphasize his
approach to the Abyssinian problem.

The specific purpose of the extraordinary session of the
league Council was to deal with the French complaint concern-
ing Germany's recent violation of the Versailles treaty.
Council President Rustu Aras of Turkey Opened the session
on April 15 by suggesting that consideration of the Abyssinian

requests of March 17 and after could well be postponed until

 

67British reluctance to assume concrete Continental
responsibilities prevented an agreement on what the Italians
still considered to be the critical issue of Austria. The
Stresa 'front' was, thus, of reduced importance in Rome.

68In view of his importance throughout the Abyssinian
crisis, it is worth noting that Sir Robert Vansittart
witnessed the League in action during this extraordinary
session for the only time during his career. His principal
impression was of the unreality of the Geneva atmOSphere.
Colvin, None So Blind, p. #6.

 

 

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45

the regular May session in view of the stated determination
of both parties to pursue the agreed arbitration process.69
Simon concurred, but with a rider which added a Spark of
excitement to the proceedings. Would it not be possible,
Simon asked, for both parties concerned to assure the Council
that the President's suggestion could be accepted with the
confidence that before the May session the arbitrators on
both sides would be appointed and the terms of reference
fixed?70 The Abyssinian representative, Tecle Hawariate,
sought to improve upon this opening by asking as well for
assurances that no military perparations would go forward in
the meantime. Britain's military adviser at Geneva, General
A. C. Temperley, recorded that Hawariate's suggestion was

"71

"received in stony silence. Simon eXplained that he did

not want to suggest too much. He was merely anxious that the
Council in May be "in a position to know whether something

«72

practical could be undertaken. Coming after his silence

at Stresa, Simon's suggestion surprised and outraged the

 

69League of Nations, Official Journal. May 1935: P-

 

5H8.
7OIbid., p. 5u9.
71Temperley, The Whispering Gallery_of EurOpe, p. 310.

72League of Nations, Official Journal, May 1935, p.

 

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Italians.73 Baron Aloisi was put in an embarrassing position
and could only try to parry Simon's suggestion by promising
vaguely that Italy would pursue the process of arbitration and

7h It is clear from the

conciliation as rapidly as possible.
Italian indignation that if it did nothing else, Simon's
unexpected suggestion on April 15 served to dispel the impres-
sion that Britain's silence at Stresa constituted a wink and
a nod to Italy's Abyssinian ambitions.

Sir John Simon returned from Geneva generally pleased
with his week's work. A united front had been established
at Stresa, and the Geneva session had been managed so as to

blunt the anti-German tone which the French would have taken,

and to put Stresa "into a framework of the League."75 The

 

73Baron Aloisi considered Simon's move to be 'under—
handed', and Mussolini later described it as indicative of
the British 'inclination to block off every just demand of
Italy's for satisfaction.‘ Baer, The Coming of the Italian-
Ethiopian War, p. 13a. Despite the Open Italian—indignation,
Simon told William Crozier, editor of the Manchester Guardian,
that he felt that he had done the right thing at Geneva.
W. P. Crozier, Off the Record, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (London:
Hutchison, 19737, p. 39.

7a

 

 

League of Nations, Official Journal, May 1935, p. 5&9.

 

75Simon to J. L. Garvin April 18, 1935, Simon Papers,
rflixed Bag 1925-1935. The extraordinary session at Geneva,
arranged to put Stresa "into a framework of the League,"
points up the occasional utility of the League, which lent to
the British unwillingness to see the structure collapse. By
arranging for the League's blessing, the government could
silence domestic criticism that Stresa smacked of a return to
alliance diplomacy. Viscount Cecil to Stanley Baldwin,
March 29, 1935, Cecil Papers, Add. 51080. More importantly,
the government hOped that by putting the Stresa agreement
into a League context they could dilute the impression that
Germany was being isolated in Europe, and leave the door open
for‘fresh negotiations. Cab 23/81 21(35)5.

 

 

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47

Stresa front was flawed, however, by Italy's African
intentions and Britain's conflicting commitment to the
League. Mussolini's dream of an enlarged east African
empire was beginning to drive a wedge between the two
traditional allies.
VI

According to Simon's account, the Abyssinian problem
was "hardly on the international horizon" in May of 1935.76
Simon would have been much more accurate if he had written
that the Abyssinian problem was hardly on the visible
horizon in London in May of 1935. By May the problem was
five months old, and Italy's intentions were abundantly
clear. The British approach continued to rest on the hope
that if undue fuss could be avoided, the problem would some-
how resolve itself. The cabinet was content to leave the
matter to Simon, and Simon was considerate enough not to
trouble either the government or Parliament with it. On
May 2 the House of Commons was still able to discuss foreign
affairs generally without considering Abyssinia.77 Even
within the Foreign Office, the problem was a current concern
only of a handful of experts in the Egyptian department,
except when Eden or Mussolini forced the issue.78

76Simon, Retrospect, p. 209.

 

77301 w” 5s., cols. 569-688. Significantly, this
debate did focus on the central place which the League of
Nations occupied in British foreign policy.

78Sir Maurice Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain
(london: Constable, 1950), p. 112.

,.

...

 

 

#8

As the May session of the league Council approached, with
the British attitude still in doubt, Mussolini found it
necessary to force the issue once again. On May 3 Grandi
gave Simon a message from Rome which depicted the situation
in Abyssinia as a cancer which had to be cut out.79 Grandi
removed any doubt which may have remained that Italy was
contemplating war, and solicited a friendly attitude on the
part of Britain. In the course of the conversation, Grandi
spoke of the Italian desire to unite Eritrea and Italian
Somaliland, and thus gave Simon the first indication of Italy's
specific ambitions. Simon returned what Eden has aptly termed
a weak reply. He spoke of the bad effect which Italian action
in Africa would have on British public opinion and on the
Stresa front, and he appealed to the traditional bonds of
Anglo-Italian friendship. Until the government was faced with
the problem and compelled to settle on a position, Simon
could do no more than speak of general dangers, in the tones
of an anxious friend. This type of warning, Simon was forced
to confess, seemed to have little calming effect on Rome.80

The league Council was scheduled to meet on May 20, and
the Abyssinian question was definitely on the agenda. In a

speech to the Italian senate on May 1h, Mussolini sought to

79Simon's May 3 conversation with Grandi is drawn from
Cab 2h/255 C.P.98(35), and Avon, Facing the Dictators,
pp. 202-03.

8OCab 2u/255 C.P.98(35).

_.

“9

deflate Abyssinian eXpectations by noting that there had

I . . .
been no Anglo-French demarche against Italy's impending

. . . 81
action in Africa.

 

The impression conveyed by Mussolini's
speech was that Britain and France would do nothing to
prevent the rape of a member of the League. At this, even

Stanley Baldwin took alarm.82

Baldwin's alarm was a signpost,
since his interest and concern usually extended no further
than Britain's shores.

Under the pressure of the impending league Council
meeting, the cabinet discussed the Abyssinian problem on
May 15. Simon outlined the problem in a memorandum which
characteristically prOposed no solution. He had to admit
that his approach of urging upon Italy and Abyssinia the
importance of arriving at a detente had been "unhappily
without good result."83 The situation had developed to the
point where there were "the clearest indications from the
Italian Government that they contemplate military operations
on an extended scale against Abyssinia as soon as climatic

conditions permit and Italian preparations are complete."8u

 

81W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy since
Versailles, 1919-1963 2d. ed. (London: Methuen and Co.,
19687 p. 143.

82Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 832.

83Cab 24/255 C.P.98(35).

BuIbid.

 

50

As a result, Simon noted, the government faced an extremely
difficult decision:

If they support against Italy a practical
application of League principles, their action
is bound greatly to compromise Anglo-Italian
relations and perhaps even to break the close
association at present existing between France,
Italy and the United Kingdom. Indeed, Italy's
reaction, in Signor Mussolini's present mood,
is incalculable: the possibility of Italy
retorting by leaving the league must not be over-
looked. In any event, the European situation
would be most seriously affected, and it would,
in fact, be hard to imagine a state of affairs
which would be more welcome to Germany.

On the other hand, if the United Kingdom
acquiesce in what would be a misuse of the
League machinery by acting in a manner accept-
able to Italy, but certainly unjust towards
EthiOpia, His Majesty's Government will
undoubtedly lay themselves Open to grave public
criticism. Apart from the possibility indicated
above, the League itself seems bound to lose,
whatever happens: if it Opposes Italian policy,
it will be flouted by Italy, which has before it
the example of Japan: if, however, the Ethiopian
appeal is once again postponed on some uncon-
vincing excuse for a period Of months, while
Italian military preparations are matured, fur-
ther proof of the League's inability to affogg
justice to a small country will be provided.

Simon's memorandum finally brought the cabinet up
against the situation which they faced. Italy seemed bent
on war in Africa at the end Of the rainy season in autumn,
and had ignored all British warnings Of the pitfa1ls
involved. Mussolini was in a dangerous mood, and would

certainly view any British Opposition as unfriendly. The

 

Bélhig. There is no indication in this memorandum that
British thinking was motivated by imperial concerns.

 

 

 

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51

French were much attached to their new Italian friends, and
to the Stresa grouping. Any approach which split Britain
and Italy was certain to impose a strain on Anglo-French
relations. The Germans would smile to see the Stresa front
dissolve, and the likelihood Of another German move to

achieve Anschluss would increase if Italy's strength were

 

tied up by a long war in Africa.

Since France was reluctant to act forthrightly, it
would fall to Britain to provide a lead in charting a League
course in the face of outright Italian aggression. To do so
was certain to cost Italian friendship and strength in
Europe. To fail to do so, with the memory of Manchuria
fresh, would raise a great outcry in Britain. By May the
much-publicized Peace Ballot was being concluded, and there
could be little doubt of the political dangers of abandoning
the League in an election year.86 Beyond that, the League
still figured as a practical matter in government thinking
as the appropriate framework for pacts of regional security,
as the forum into which to draw Germany once again in the
interest of EurOpean cooperation, as the necessary cover for

the rearmament program, and as the only cause for which the

 

86The evolution of the Peace Ballot is traced in
Dame Adelaide Livingstone, The Peace Ballot: The Official
History (London: Victor Gallancz, 1935).

 

 

 

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British peOpIe would undertake Continental reSponsibilities.87
It would not do to stand idly by while the League of Nations
collapsed.

The cabinet was no more anxious than Simon to choose
between unattractive alternatives. But the pending League
Chauncil discussion made some sort of decision imperative.

.Ari Italian Offensive in Abyssinia was evidently set for the
fkajll. If Italy was permitted to continue to prevent League
cc>risideration of the problem by transparent delaying tactics,
\VELI? would deve10p before the League could take up Abyssinia's
rncxr11ms-old request that Article 15 be invoked, and League
aadlxrocates would raise a din. In addition, the opportunity
‘tc> organize international pressure in the interest of
<2c>r1ciliation might be lost before it became necessary to
consider collective coercion. There was general agreement
3111 ‘the cabinet that British concern for the League should be
made known at Geneva. The months between the May and
September meetings of the League could not be wasted if
some solution short of war, and the prOSpect of imposing
88Lfictions On a friend, was to be found.

With only these stars to guide him, Eden was "given

\

87In a conversation at the end of April, Vansittart had
:XDlained to Grandi the attachment which the British peOple
851 for the League, and the fact that it was the only instru-
figeWTt for which they would accept military obligations on the
C>1’l‘tinent. Could Italy not see how necessary it was to
gettle the matter by arbitration without involving the League?
aer, The Coming Of the Italian-Ethigpian War, pp. 136-37.

 

.
’u. CA

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fl)

 

‘!._

"\~

 

53

wide discretion on the handling of the crisis at Geneva."88

This proved to be the least thoughtful way to put an end to
the drifting which had been taking place in London and
Geneva. Before giving Eden his head to go off to Geneva,
and to force the problem into a league timetable of his own
devising, the cabinet would have done well to consider the
young man's known enthusiasm for League procedures, and to
keep him on a tighter leash. The time to consider whether
the League could survive a direct confrontation with Italy,
and what such a confrontation would require of Britain,
should have been before Eden departed for Geneva, bound only
by his principles, to begin to furnish the British lead in
applying League pressure on Italy.

At Geneva, Eden closeted himself on the evening of May 19
with the Italian representative, Baron Aloisi, and succeeded
in convincing him of Britain's determination to see the
problem solved through the league.89 Aloisi passed along
word of Eden's stance to Mussolini, who answered through
Sir Eric Drummond, the British ambassador in Rome, with an
open threat to resort to war in Africa if necessary 'to

.90

clarify the situation and to obtain security. Mussolini

 

88Avon, Facinglthe Dictators. p. 205'

 

89Eden to Simon, May 21, 1935, copy in the Baldwin
Papers, Vol. 123, Cambridge University Library.

90Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 209-10.

 

5h

dismissed Drummond's concern over the effect on the League
by arguing that all Of this should have been pressed months
earlier. He now had too much invested to withdraw. Eden
bristled at this response, telegraphed his indignation to
London, and persuaded laval, for the moment, that his first
concerns should be for the League and for French relations
with Britain. Between them, Eden recorded, he and Laval
agreed that they could no longer wait upon events, but must
force the pace at Geneva.91
At the instigation of Eden and Laval, the French dele-
gation drew up a draft resolution bearing upon the arbitra-
tion procedure for League Council consideration. The resolu-
tion as finally hammered out reflected the Abyssinian desire
to see arbitration embrace all of the incidents which had
occurred since November 23, rather than just the WalWal
clash. The resolution also eXpressed a desire for an under-
taking by both parties not to resort to war, and, most
significantly, set a timetable for the arbitration proceed-
ings, after which the League Council would consider the
matter.92 Eden and Iaval convinced Aloisi to forward the

text to Mussolini, and Eden rejected an Italian counter-

proposal which sought to limit the arbitration to WalWal and

 

911bid., p. 211.

 

921bid.

 

55
93

which contained no assurances as to force. Mussolini
grumbled, but finally accepted the terms as the price
necessary to buy additional time.

On May 25, the League Council took formal note once
again of the agreement of Italy and Abyssinia to seek a
peaceful solution of their quarrel under Article 5 of the
Treaty of 1928. The Council observed that efforts to settle
the dispute through diplomatic channels had been exhausted,
and provided that if no agreement on the fifth arbitrator had
been reached by July 25, and if no settlement had been
reached by August 25, the Council would meet again to consider

94

the problem. Eden recorded, with real satisfaction, that

this was "as good as we had a right to ask and better than
the world had expected."95

Eden's success at Geneva was taken to mean that the old
British lion could still rouse itself in the interests of
justice. League enthusiasts applauded Eden's stand on behalf

t.96

of Abyssinia and the Covenan More significant was the

applause of Neville Chamberlain, who was beginning to take
97

offense at the arrogant Italian manner. While Eden was in

 

93Ibid , p. 212.

9”League of Nations, Official Journal, June 1935, p. 6&0.

 

95Avon, Facing_the Dictators, p. 213.
96Eden to Cecil, May 29, 1935, Cecil Papers, Add. 51083.

97Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London:
Macmillan, 1970, first published in l9hE), p. 265.

 

 

u~v‘
—«

 

56

Geneva, tying the League's fortunes to the Abyssinian problem,
Baldwin had reinforced the importance of the League in
domestic politics by speaking of rearmament as "more than a
question of national defence." It was, he said, "a question
of the ability of this country to fulfil its obligations
under the Covenant."98 By the end of Nay, the uncomfortable
likelihood was deve10ping that Britain's oft—cited obligations
under the Covenant would soon be put to the test.

Mussolini flatly told the Italian Chamber of Deputies
on May 25 that no one should harbor unnecessary illusions
about the proceedings being recorded at Geneva that day.
Abyssinia was a problem on which his mind had been working
since 1925, and with the soldiers of the motherland in a
position to take whatever military measures were necessary,

9 .
9’ Simon

the outcome was calmly and clearly foreseen.
recorded in his diary on May 27 that "we have warned Italy in
plain terms that if it comes to a choice between Italy and

100 On the evidence

the League we shall support the League."
of Simon's handling of the problem from December through May,
it is hard to see that much that merits the description

"plain terms" passed from London to Rome. Italy did not get

a clear indication of the British response to Italian

 

98May 22, 1935, 302 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 365.

99Heald (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1935,
II, 25.

100Simon Papers, Diary 11,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l

v

!"

 

57

ambitions until the middle of April, by which time
Nussolini's investment in east Africa was such that he
would give no thought to turning back.

If Britain had any genuine opportunities to influence
the course of the Abyssinian crisis, and to stave off the
final debacle, they fell to Sir John Simon during the first
three months of 1935. Even these may not have been good
Opportunities. The student of British policy during the
Abyssinian crisis must bear in mind that, as in the situation
faced by Sir Edward Grey in July of 191M, any position taken
by Britain in 1935 may have failed to prevent a confrontation.
Mussolini saw a great chance for an uplifting military
adventure. Haile Selassie seemed little inclined to deal
for a half-loaf and would have been hard pressed to sell a
major territorial concession to his semi-independent rases.
Nonetheless, Simon was at fault for failing to press the
problem on his colleagues at a time when a firm British
position might still have made a difference. And the cabinet
was at fault for complacently abandoning what was obviously
a major and growing problem to Sir John. No one who knew
him could have imagined that Simon was, or wanted to be, a
Palmerston.

For six months the matter drifted while the government
paid scant attention to the implications of a confrontation
between Italy and the League. Both Italy and the League
figured in the British program for security. The government

was loath to consider losing either. British statesmen had

In

58

never been fond of the coercive provisions of the Covenant,
but, partly because it was popular, government spokesmen
continued to speak broadly of upholding the Covenant, with-
out differentiating among the obligations assumed. Of the
leading figures of the government, only Anthony Eden was a
genuine League enthusiast. The cabinet gave him such wide
discretion, however, that by the time that Simon handed over
gratefully to Sir Samuel Hoare in June, the Abyssinian
problem had been forced squarely into a League context and
the impression had been created that with a firm hand
Mussolini could be managed in such a context. Hoare had to
deal with a pot threatening to bubble over, with few remain-

ing ways to turn down the heat.

CHAPTER II

DUAL POLICY BOX

On June 7, 1935 Stanley Baldwin shuffled the personnel
of the National government and formed his third, and final
government. An effect of the reorganization was to invig-
orate the British handling of the Abyssinian problem. Sir
Samuel Hoare became the new Foreign Secretary and took up
the burden of the Abyssinian crisis. Although he brought
little knowledge and no direct eXperience to the management
of foreign affairs, he was eXpected to protect conflicting
British interests in the matter. In spite of his inexperience,
Hoare leaned on the best advice he could muster and converted
Simon's tendency to drift with events into an active dual
policy of attempting to conciliate Italy while upholding the
authority of the league.1 There was little that was new in
Hoare's dual policy, beyond a determination to see it succeed.
But there was little that was new in the character of the
revised government, and scant inclination to scrap and start

fresh. Although the National government had been plagued

 

1Evidence of the new spirit which Hoare brought to the
Foreign Office is to be found in the note which Baldwin passed
to Ramsay MacDonald during the cabinet meeting of June 26.

Baldwin wrote: "It is very refreshing to hear 'I strongly
advise-' from the F. 0.!" MacDonald agreed. Templewood Papers,

General Political Box VIII, file 1.

59

-
.‘.-

y..-

4
..g.

 

 

60

from the first with problems of foreign policy, Baldwin
embarked upon the reconstitution of the government in
response to political pressures only generally related to
foreign affairs. Removing Sir John Simon from the Foreign
Office was considered enough of a nod to critics of British
foreign policy.

Baldwin became Prime Minister in an effort to revital-
ize the government's image in anticipation of the impending
general election. Ramsay MacDonald had been an ineffectual
leader for some time. By 1935, he was the object of ridicule
on one side of the House of Commons, and of scorn on the
other. The heavily Conservative backbenches had become
increasingly restless. To stave off the threat of a back—
bench revolt of the type he had once led, Baldwin gave up his
comfortable position as the power behind the throne and
exchanged places with MacDonald.2

Baldwin's reorganization served to put a more logical
face on the National government and to Open a number of
places to the restless young men among the government's
supporters.3 But the most important posts within the

2Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 803-05.

3Among the younger Conservatives, places in the cabinet
went to Anthony Eden as Minister without Portfolio for League
of Nations Affairs, and Lord Eustace Percy, as Minister with-
out Portfolio. Alfred Duff Cooper would join the government
as Secretary for War in November. Ramsay MacDonald's very able
son Malcolm entered the cabinet as Colonial Secretary to off-
set the loss of Viscount Sankey to the ranks of National
Labour within the government. And Ernest Brown added a new
National Liberal member to the government as Minister of Labour.

61

government remained in familiar hands. Neville Chamberlain
elected to remain at the Exchequer, and he and Baldwin
continued to provide the leadership for the Conservative
element within the coalition. The leaders of the other
political factions making up the National facade also
remained the same. Ramsay MacDonald stayed in the government
as Lord President of the Council, and Sir John Simon moved
from the Foreign Office to the more congenial position of
Home Secretary.

Baldwin had only two significant trouble spots to deal
with in forming his third government. The Air Ministry and
the Foreign Office both seemed to require more decisive
leadership.“ Baldwin handled the problem at the service
ministry by elevating Lord Londonderry to the leadership of
the House of Lords as Lord Privy Seal and moving Sir Phillip
Cunliffe-Lister in as Secretary for Air. His handling of the
problem at the Foreign Office was not so adroit.

Sir Samuel Hoare succeeded Simon as Foreign Secretary,
a dubious reward for four strenuous and successful years of
work at the India Office. Hoare's appointment disappointed
Anthony Eden, one of the bright young men whom Baldwin was
concerned to placate. Despite Eden's relative youth, his
ability and political appeal were such that Baldwin gave

serious thought to promoting him into Simon's place, until

 

“Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. Bob-05.

62

Neville Chamberlain and Geoffrey Dawson convinced Baldwin

5

that Hoare had a better claim. Ever the sensitive party
manager, Baldwin soothed Eden and his supporters by creating
for him the position of Ninister without Portfolio for
League of Nations Affairs and endowing it with cabinet
rank.6 Thus Eden entered the cabinet at the age of thirty-
seven and was given broad, undefined responsibilities drawn
from another's portfolio.

Winston Churchill condemned the awkward situation
created by Baldwin at the Foreign Office as tending further
to confuse the state of foreign affairs by creating dual

allegiances and dual responsibilities.7

Baldwin's handling
of the Foreign Office at a very difficult juncture in
British foreign affairs merited criticism, but in practice
the relationship between the two cabinet ministers in the

Foreign Office worked out better than might reasonably have

 

5The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. Facing the
Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), p. 217.

6Eden was reluctant to stay on at the Foreign Office in
any capacity other than Foreign Secretary, but was convinced
by Hoare's hint that the unsatisfactory arrangement created
by Baldwin might be only temporary. Ibid., pp. 216-18.

 

7Winston S Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. I,
The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, l9h8), p. 137.

63

been expected.8 Eden's familiarity with the Foreign Office
gave him a clear appreciation of the disruption which could
be wrought in the carefully layered structure by competition
for authority at the top. Consequently, he made no effort
to challenge Hoare's authority within the Foreign Office.
For his part, Hoare was receptive to Eden's knowledge and
his enthusiasm and allowed him considerable latitude to
manage affairs at Geneva. Throughout Hoare's brief tenure
at the Foreign Office, he and Eden enjoyed a generally good
working relationship.
II

Even though the competition between Eden and Hoare
which might have deve10ped within the Foreign Office did not
materialize, it must still be said that Sir Samuel Hoare took
up his new office in the face of conditions which could
scarcely have been less promising. He came to his post

thoroughly exhausted from his long labors on the India Bill.

 

8Baldwin's creation of a second cabinet minister charged
with responsibility for foreign affairs may have struck those
concerned with the logical management of foreign policy as
unsound, but it answered a political need by satisfying the
desire of the increasingly evident and vocal supporters of
the League of Nations to see Eden in the cabinet, connected
with the league. Viscount Cecil to Stanley Baldwin, June 6,
1935, Cecil Papers, British Museum, Add. 51080. Nothing
could have been better calculated to appeal to the thousands
of people just completing their work on the Peace Ballot than
Baldwin's upgrading of both Eden and the affairs of the league
of Nations.

6h

His absorbtion with the concerns of the sub-continent had
been such that he had lost touch with the intricacies of
foreign policy.9 He brought to his new responsibilities
nine years of cabinet-level eXperience and a reputation

10

as a skillful conciliator. But he stepped into the middle

of a mounting crisis and had little Opportunity to grow into
his position, or to build upon his experience and ability.11
The Abyssinian crisis, which would soon be identified
as Hoare's great failure, passed fully matured into his
hands. The possibility of finding a reasonable compromise,
acceptable to all of the parties involved, had virtually
disappeared by June of 1935. Mussolini had staked his
prestige on a great success in east Africa, and the league
was directly involved in what was clearly becoming the
ultimate test of whether the Geneva system of collective
security could function to protect a member from aggression.
Hoare did not bring anything new to bear on this quandry.
Even if he had come to the Foreign Office with some notion

of how to improve British policy, it would have been hard

 

9Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (london:
Collins, l95h), pp. 108-09.

10Hoare had been Secretary for Air in the first two
Baldwin governments, entering the cabinet in 1923 when the
position was upgraded. When the National Government was
formed in 1931, Hoare went to the India Office, and remained
there as Secretary until he replaced Simon in 1935.

11In Hoare's words, he entered upon "a field that had
already been trodden flat by marching and counter-marching."
Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 1&9.

65

to move away from either of the paths marked out during the
first six months of the quarrel between Italy and Abyssinia.
One Of the first things impressed upon Hoare by his
staff at the Foreign Office was that British policy in
general had to take account of the state of Britain's
armament, as well as the threat posed to British interests

12 It made little sense to invite the

by Germany and Japan.
enmity of Italy in such circumstances. Yet Britain had
already begun to live up to its oft—cited commitments to the
league of Nations, and was providing in the person of Eden
the leadership which was necessary at Geneva if the league
was to survive its confrontation with Mussolini. It would
have required considerable political courage to reverse that
beginning just as the "Peace Ballot" was recording broad,
popular support for British participation in the league.13
Public Opinion counted for much on the eve of a general
election. Hoare was expected to keep that Opinion well in
mind, while somehow preserving Italian friendship. The dual
approach which had evolved under Simon had much to recommend

it to British policy-makers, despite its inherent contradic—

tion.

 

lzlbid.. pp. 152-53.

13The National Declaration Committee recorded 11,559,165
ballots cast in the "Peace Ballot" exercise by the end of the
count in June. Dame Adelaide livingstone and Marjorie Scott
Johnston, The Peace Ballot (london: Victor Gollancz, 1935),
supplementary sheet—included to update the figures given on

p. 34.

 

 

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66

Each aspect of Simon's approach to the Abyssinian
problem came to Hoare with its respective champion within
the Foreign Office. Eden stood for the honor of the league.
Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary, was
ready at any time to sacrifice Abyssinia in the interest of

14

an independent Austria. Both men exercised a strong and
steady influence on Hoare. Each brought to bear on the new
Foreign Secretary a powerful personality, thorough knowledge,
and deep conviction.15 Between them, they gave Hoare his
initial understanding of the principal problem which he
faced. According to Hoare's memoirs, he devoted the first
few days in his new office to "long discussions with
Vansittart and Eden as to what, if anything, we could do."16
Vansittart was certain that whatever could be done with the

Abyssinian problem had to be done with the German menace in

mind. Because Eden and his new Parliamentary Private Secretary,

 

1L‘lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (london:
Hutchinson, 1958), p. 52?.

15The effort required to master a Foreign Office
containing two such powerful and independent personalities
must be counted as one of the burdens which Hoare had to
bear, despite the efforts made by both Eden and Vansittart
to support the Foreign Secretary. Eden's strength within
the Foreign Office was such that, as leo Amery has noted,
even before he was promoted into the cabinet, he had almost
displaced Simon in function and influence. leOpold S. Amery,
ray Political life, Vol. III, The Unfoggiving Years, 1929-1940
—(fondon: Hutchinson, 1955), 15h. Vansittart has been aptly
<described by Eden as "much more a Secretary of State in
rnentality than a permanent official." Avon, Facing the
IDictators, p. 2G2.

 

l6Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 152.

67

lord Cranborne, were so straightforward in their conviction
that Britain must uphold the Covenant against the Italian
threat, Vansittart found it necessary to keep before Hoare
the danger of losing Italian strength as a check on Germany.17
For Vansittart, it was a case of priorities. While his
assertion that he "had full sympathy for the league" must be
taken carefully, there is nothing to suggest that Vansittart
18

was anxious to see the league collapse. He was hard-headed

enough to realize, however, that many people in Britain

 

seriously over-valued the league as a guarantor of universal
peace, and he "could never see the league's components tack-
ling an aggressor of weight."19 Consequently, the league had
little if any place in Vansittart's program to contain
Germany, while Italy, on the other hand, bulked very large.
Italy, as Vansittart saw it, could be handled so as to keep
the Anglo-Italian friendship intact if only Britain had a

statesman who could impress Nussolini.20 If Hitler had failed

 

17As Vansittart saw it, the real crux of the difference
between himself and the "leaguers" was that they "were anti-
Italian while I was anti-German." Vansittart, The Hist
Procession, p. 522. It is much safer to say that the “leagu-
ers" were, at least initially, much more pro-league than
anti-Italian. Vansittart was solidly anti-German though,
and had been since Hitler became Chancellor. On July 7,
1933, he drew up a memorandum for Sir John Simon in which
he laid out his misgivings about Germany. Ian Colvin,
Fone So Blind (Few York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965),

p. 26.
1pliansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 522.

 

 

19Ibid.

20lbid., p. 502.

68

to impress Mussolini, it was altogether unlikely that the
rather undynamic Sir Samuel Hoare would do so. Vansittart
no doubt saw great possibilities, however, in a Foreign
Secretary who was so willing to accept his advice.21
Until the end of August Hoare had to manage his new
problems with no more than the advice he received in the

Foreign Office, or solicited from confidantes in the

cabinet. For as long as was possible, the cabinet preferred

 

to leave the Abyssinian problem to the Foreign Office. This
was particularly true during the month of August, when the
rest of the cabinet scattered during Parliament's summer
holiday, leaving Hoare behind in london.

The tendency to leave what was obviously a complex,
important, and pressing concern to a new and inexperienced
Foreign Secretary reflected Baldwin's style of leadership.
As Conservative leader, Baldwin reassumed the position of
Prime Minister with an authority which MacDonald had not
known since 1931. He made only limited use of that authority
during the Abyssinian crisis, however. It was his settled
habit to leave matters of foreign policy to his Foreign

Secretary, and he saw no reason to alter that habit in 1935.22

 

211bid., p. 522.

 

22Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 839,

69

His only significant contribution to the management of the
Abyssinian crisis was to establish the general limits within
which Hoare had to Operate.

The one requirement which Baldwin laid on Hoare's
handling of the problem with Italy was that he manage the
affair so as to keep Britain out of war.23 Baldwin's
injunction grew from his conviction that the country was not
ready for war, as well as from his personal horror of war.

He saw war as a 'most fearful terror,’ and he was convinced
that 'the bomber will always get through.'2u Baldwin's
abhorrence of war formed the basis for much of his partici—
pation in the National government but did not convince him
that Britain should qualify its commitments under the Covenant.

The Manchurian crisis gave Baldwin a grasp of the hard
fact that the British fleet would have to carry the burden of
enforcing economic sanctions against an aggressor of weight.25
From this he drew the conclusion that sanctions carried the

serious threat of war, as well as the possibility of misunder-

standing with the great and sensitive naval power across the

 

23On January 7, 1936, just after Hoare had stepped down
in disgrace, Baldwin told his close friend, Thomas Jones, that
he had repeatedly instructed Hoare to 'keep us out of war, we
are not ready for it.’ Thomas Jones, A Diary with letters,
1 1-19 0 (london: Oxford University Press, 1969, first
published in 1954), p. 159.

2“Quoted in F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant. Britain
Lfimong the Great Powererl9l6—l9 0 (New York: Frederick.A.
JPrager, 1966), p. 385.

25Where, as in the Far East, the fleet was no longer a
ciominating factor, Baldwin was convinced that all thought of
sanctions was a mistake, Jones, A Diagy with letters, p. 30.

 

70

Atlantic. He expressed his view of sanctions in Nay of 193M
when he noted that "there is no such thing as a sanction that

"26 In Fovember of the

will work that does not mean war....
same year he added that 'never so long as I have any respon-
sibility in governing this country will I sanction the British
Navy being used for an armed blockade of any country in the
world until I know what the United States of America is
going to do.‘27
In spite of his misgivings about sanctions, Baldwin gave
steady public support to the league's position throughout the
crisis and contributed much to the impression that Britain
would play a firm role at Geneva despite the risks involved.
When he was presented on July 23 with the results of the
Peace Ballot by a delegation of the rational Declaration
Committee, Baldwin responded by referring to the league as

'28 Of course, the

the 'sheet—anchor of British policy.
Peace Ballot, and the subsequent general election stimulated
statements of loyalty to the league from virtually all

political quarters. Baldwin however, as recent biographers

 

26H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 2139.

27Quoted in A. W. Baldwin, my Father: The True Story
(london: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 207.
28lest there be any question of what he meant by the
term, Baldwin also noted in his reply that 'the foreign
policy of the Government is founded upon the league of Nations,’
and he Spoke of the efforts which the government was making
'to maintain the authority of the league of Nations.‘ Arnold
J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1935, Vol. II:
Abyssinia and Italy (london: Oxford University Press, 1936),

52-53.

 

 

71

have pointed out, was "an old and genuine supporter of the

"29 He had his doubts about the league's ability to

league.
function as had been intended, but he believed that the
league served an invaluable function in encouraging statesmen
to meet and to know each others' minds.30 And beyond the
practical functions of the league, he seems to have partici-
pated to at least a modest degree in the vision of the league
of Nations as an integral part of a better world.

Baldwin's political genius lay in the extent to which he
sensed and shared the prejudices and the aspirations of the
British pe0p1e. In common with them, he would not lightly
dismiss an idea which held out the hope of controlling the
scourge of war. When he spoke with feeling of the Ieague as
a shield for his beloved English countryside, the words may
have been written by his friend, Thomas Jones, but the

31

sentiment was his. The difference between Baldwin and Eden,
in this respect, lay in the difference between the desire and
the determination to see the league succeed. Both sentiments
contributed to British pledges of support for the Covenant

which completed the box within which Hoare had to work.

 

29Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 837.

30Jones, A Diary with letters, p. 93; The Times,
hovember 10, 192?. Baldwin, however, never attended a league
session himself.

'2

”IA copy of Baldwin's speech to the Peace Society at the
Guildhall on October 31, 1935 can be found at BC 371/18851,
c7u7u/55/18.

 

 

72

III
Baldwin was scarcely alone in pressing the new Foreign
Secretary to chart a course which would stop short of war.

Vansittart steadily emphasized the uncertain character of

32

Britain's defenses. The Dominion High Commissioners gave

Hoare the impression that the Dominions would not go to war

33

And King George pleaded to be

3h

for the sake of Abyssinia.
Spared the ordeal of another war. There was a note of
pressing anxiety in these expressions of concern which Hoare
quickly absorbed. He became convinced during his first few
days at the Foreign Office that it was essential "to find a
card of re-entry at a hand that was almost lost."35 The
best hope of salvaging what was possible of Abyssinia's
independence and the league's honor seemed to be to try to
convince Mussolini to accept a reasonable return on his
investment in east Africa. Accordingly Eden set out for

Rome on June 23 to see if Italy could be coaxed into a

settlement.

 

32Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 152-53.
Vansittart kept up this refrain throughout the crisis. On
September 30, on the eve of the Italian drive into Abyssinia,
for example, he warned Hoare that 'We are in no condition
for any adventures.’ Quoted in Ian Colvin, None 80 Blind
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), p. 71.

 

 

33Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 159.

BuIbid.

35Ibid., p. 155.

 

73

Eden's visit to Rome on 24-25 June in search of a
compromise solution was the first British attempt to mediate
directly in the Abyssinian dispute since Simon's initial
effort at Geneva in January. According to Hoare's memoirs,
the notion of approaching Mussolini directly with what was
hoped would be an attractive offer originated and took shape
in the discussions which he, Vansittart and Eden had at the
home of Philip Sasson at Trent during the week-end of 15-16
June.36 On June 19 the prOposal was sprung on the cabinet,
who were "somewhat taken aback by the suddenness of the move,"
but lent their full approva1.37

The common understanding underlying Eden's mission to
Rome was that Italy had legitimate interests to protect, and
justifiable grievances to be met in the Abyssinian affair.
Indeed, Hoare eXplained the mission to the House of Commons
several days after it failed by stating categorically that
"We admit the need for Italian eXpansion. We admit again the

justice of some of the criticisms that have been made against

 

36Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 155. Eden did
:not discuss the evolution of the offer in his account, beyond
:noting that he was not enthused about it, "still, less so when
it was suggested that I should be its sponsor in Rome." Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 221. Eden's reservations may have
developed after the fact out of his difficulty in fitting the
leading role which he played in this effort to appease
[wussolini into his account of his adventures in "facing the
dictators." Nonetheless, considering his role throughout the
.Abyssinian crisis, it is not difficult to believe that he was
less-than wholehearted in his enthusiasm for a solution which
would have rewarded Mussolini.

37Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 155.

 

7a

tffie

the Abyssinian Governmen The mission also rested on the

fact that Britain's interests in the matter related much
more to Europe and to the league of rations than to Africa.39
Britain had considerable interests in east Africa and
the Indian Ocean, but it was not felt that Italian expansion
into Abyssinia would do much to prejudice those interests.
This conclusion was argued compellingly by the Maffey
Commission which finally completed its task of defining
British interests in Abyssinia on June 18.“0 An independent
Abyssinia was rated by the Commission as preferable to an
Italian Abyssinia, but so long as British interests in lake

Tana were secured, or at least recognized, there was no

reason to be particularly concerned about the prospect of an

 

38Hoare could not see, however, that the situation need
lead to war. "We have surely found in the past that it is
possible to adjust demands and differences of this kind
without recourse to war, and I am not prepared even now to
abandon any chance that may present itself for averting what
I believe will be a calamity...." July 11, 1935. 30h H.C.Deb.,
5s., col. 519.

39In order to make certain that Mussolini was not absorb-
ing his own propaganda, Eden opened his conversations in
Rome by eXplaining that "our reasons were neither egoist nor
.African, but EurOpean. His Majesty's Government were irrevoc-
ably committed to the league, upon which their foreign policy
was founded. They could not therefore remain indifferent to
events which might profoundly affect the league's future."
Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 222. In virtually the same
words, Eden eXplained his mission to the House of Commons on
July 1. 303 H.C.Deb., 53., col. 1521. Even making allowance
for Eden's personal enthusiasm for the league, there was a
large kernel of truth in this rendering of British interests
in the Abyssinian affair. Nussolini may well have made the
mistake of judging Britain's commitment to the league in the
light of his own convictions.

h

 

OCab 2u/256 C.P.161(35).

 

75

Italian flag flying over Addis Ababa. The Italians were not,
after all, a new and unknown factor in east Africa. Eritrea
and Italian Somaliland were well-established Italian colonies.
There was a certain danger that Mussolini's grandiose vision
of a revived Roman empire would be enhanced by the absorb-
tion of the makings of a large native army, and concern was
expressed by at least two members of the cabinet over what
they saw as the challenge posed by Italy to the British

Empire.“1 It is understandably tempting to ascribe the

 

ulRamsay MacDonald suggested at one point that Italy was
becoming Britain's great imperial rival and might well prove
stronger than Britain in the future. J. Ramsay NacDonald to
Sir Samuel Hoare, August 13, 1935, F0 800/295. NacDonald's
suggestion should probably be taken as a passing tribute
to Italian propaganda. William Ormsby—Gore's letter to
Baldwin of September 8 is more important in that it reflects
not only a tendency to frame the problem in terms of imperial
competition, which was unusual among cabinet members, but
also because it reflects the disinclination to let Mussolini
ignore Britain and "get away with it" which grew among members
of the government as the crisis progressed. The letter is
worth quoting in full:

"I am afraid I cannot contemplate with equanimity
letting Mussolini get away with it and conquering
and annexing Abyssinia in the teeth of our clearly
eXpressed wishes - and I believe ultimate interests
in Africa. The blow to our national prestige
throughout the coloured world will be really serious.
Mussolini Openly says we are either too weak or
too craven and cowardly to resist him, that he is
the coming Imperial power and we the declining.

Quite apart from the crash of the league of Nations
I am convinced that sooner or later we shall have

to meet the Italian challenge to our prestige, power
and interests by force or go under in Africa and

the Mediterranean." Baldwin Papers, Vol. 123.

Crmsby—Gore's reading of the situation was balanced by the
approach taken by such other accepted champions of the
empire as Winston Churchill and leo Amery, who were convinced
that the empire would be best served by staying right with

Italy.

 

76

Opposition of a largely Conservative government to Italian

. . . . . #2
aggre551on 1n Aby881nia to such concern for empire.

The
burden of evidence suggests, however, that concern for
Europe and for the league far outweighed imperial consider-
ations. Indeed, from a strictly imperial point of view,
there was much that argued against opposing Italy's
Abyssinian ambitions. An unnecessary quarrel with Italy
posed a threat to imperial lines of communication, as well
as raising the specter of complications with the Dominions
in the event of an unpopular war.u3 Perhaps the most compel-
ling evidence that the government gave only secondary consider-
ation during the crisis to British imperial interests in east
Africa and the Indian Ocean is to be found in the offer which
Eden took to Rome, involving, as it did, the sacrifice of a
piece of British Somaliland for no tangible return.

On June 2h Eden met with Mussolini at the Palazzo
Venezia in Rome to lay out the British prOposal for a
solution to the Abyssinian problem. The prOposal proved

to be a measure of the British misunderstanding of Mussolini's

 

uzThe tendency to dismiss British concern for the League
as a.cynical cover for imperial motives is best illustrated
531 Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoare-Iaval Plan: A Study in
International Politics," Review of Politics, XXIV (July, 1962),
pp, 3142-64.

u30n August 20, 1935 J. H. Thomas, the Secretary of State
for Imminion Affairs, addressed a letter to Hoare on problems
vfliich could deve10p with the Dominions should Britain be
dramwxinto a war with Italy as the Chiefs of Staff were
'walniing. Thomas' letter was considered important enough to be
cizwzulated as a Cabinet Paper. Cab 2h/256 C.P.168.

 

.;,

Is.

0-:

~~‘

 

 

 

77

ambitions. Eden proposed that Britain cede the bay of Zeila
and a connecting corridor to Abyssinia, to satisfy Heile
Selassie's long-standing desire for an outlet on the sea,
in return for which Abyssinia would make substantial conces-
sions to Italy, such as a portion of the Ogaden, certain
economic concessions, and 'other advantages to be determined.#4
He reinforced what he no doubt considered a fair and large-
minded proposal by warning that the British people were
deeply committed to the league, and that anything which Italy
did to menace the league would be certain to disturb relations
between Britain and Italy.u5
Eden had anticipated that Mussolini might press for
somewhat better terms, but he was dismayed to discover that
the Italian dictator refused to consider the British preposal

#6

as even a reasonable starting point for negotiations. The

Italians had been led by the British ambassador, Sir Eric

.Drummond, to believe that the proposed British solution

 

uuMario Toscano, "Eden's Mission to Rome on the Eve of
the Italo-EthiOpian Conflict," Studies in Diplomatic History
arui Historiography in honour of G. P. Gooch, C. H. Tedited
by A” (L Sarkissian, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962),

13- 135-

uSAvon, Facing the Dictators, n. 223.

uélbid. Eden had been warned by Geoffrey Thompson, the
Iflxreign Office's Abyssinian expert, that Mussolini would never
coruaider the offer, but Vansittert's Italian sources indicated
tfluat Italy was anxious for a deal, and Eden harbored real
horn; for the plan which Mussolini bluntly rejected. Geoffrey
ITunnpson, Front line Diplomat (london: Hutchinson, 1959),
In 103; Vansittart, The Hist Procession, p. 530.

 

78

would satisfy half of Italy's demands, and would create
conditions which would further tend in Italy's favor.u7 On
this favorable basis, Mussolini, who had been waiting since
January for the British to define their interests, authorized
Eden's visit. The suggestion that Italy should be satisfied
with a stretch of desert and some economic privileges as a
fair return on the huge investment involved in building up
and maintaining an army in Eritrea confirmed the worst Italian
suspicions created by the unauthorized publication of the
plan in a Sunday newspaper in london on June 23.“8 The
British proposal was totally unacceptable to Italy from
several points of view.

Mussolini explained to Eden that he was opposed to making

.Abyssinia a maritime power, and he could not countenance

concessions through the intermediary of a third power,

 

u7George W. Baer, The Coming‘of the Italian-Ethiopian
Ewar (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 193.
Baer*notes that Drummond committed in this instance the
cardinal sin of painting an exaggerated picture of his
gnyvernment's intentions, thereby raising false hopes in Rome.

u8Both Eden and Hoare have expressed the opinion that
this leaking of the plan to the press seriously prejudiced
their‘chance of convincing Mussolini. Avon, Facing the
IDictators, p. 221; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 155.
It is evident, however, that the plan would have failed to
apuxroach Nussolini's expectations in any case. It is not
ladown if Mussolini had seen a copy of the Maffey report,
vfltich was photographed by Italian intelligence in the British
rhubassy, by the time of Eden's visit. If he had, he must
ruive been doubly determined not to allow the British to stand
131 his way on a matter which posed no real threat to British
irrterests in east Africa. On the other hand, the Maffey
Bernart should have reinforced Eden's argument that Britain's
reeLl interest related to the league. There is a good discus-
sicnu of Sir Eric Drummond's negligence in handling sensitive
nurterials at the Embassy in Rome in Colvin, None So Blind,

pp. 58-59-

 

 

79

particularly in that the proposal would have the effect of

making Britain the protector of Abyssinia. He went on to

crush what he considered the amazing British proposal by

outlining his minimal ambitions. Italy could be satisfied

with no less than the surrender by Abyssinia of all of the
territory conquered during the past fifty years which was

not inhabited by Abyssinians, and Mussolini made a circular

 

gesture to indicate that he considered that such territory

e)cisted on all sides of the Abyssinian state. The remaining

(zerdtral plateau could continue as a nominally independent
emitfity, but it would have to come under Italian control.“9

Mussolini's rejection of the British prOposal was so
<3<3rnplete, and his alternative terms were so far divorced
$551?<mn those which Eden was authorized to discuss, that there

‘a’éaés really little to be gained in prolonging the talks beyond

‘131PIGB initial exchange on June 24. Nonetheless, Eden continued

‘t:*}3Jrough the evening discussion on June 25 to try to convince
IZ<I‘LJ§ssolini that Britain could do no less than follow a league
(:2: <3>14rse in the matter, and Mussolini just as stubbornly
:SL‘:r"1ssisted that Italy was far too deeply committed to settle for
:EE“1“1:ything less than what he had outlined, whatever the effect
(:2) 1’1 Anglo-Italian relations or the league of !\'ations.5O

x
\\‘ 9E71£ere were no angry exchanges in these discussions, as was

\

 

“9.

Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 222—23.

50Ibid.. pp. 223-28.

80
51

later imagined, but there was equally no meeting of minds.

As the established champion of all that Mussolini was
52

flouting, Eden was the worst possible choice of mediators.

Hoare later noted that, as might have been anticipated,

Mussolini and Eden "did not conceal the extent of the differ-

ences that separated them or the personal dislike that they

felt for each other."53 Each was deaf to the argument which

was pressed so earnestly by the other. Baron Aloisi whispered

 

iri entirely the wrong ear when he suggested to Eden that the

Inaxtter could be settled if Britain and France would join with
5h

I‘taly'in condemning Abyssinia as an unfit member of the league
A significant byproduct of the talks between Eden and

lkazssolini was the discovery that French Foreign Minister
433:143rre laval was adept at telling his friends in london and

43;:CDIne what they wanted to hear with scant concern for consis-

‘t::€3110y. On January 7. 1935 laval had arranged a colonial

63“lsen‘te with Italy by secretly promising French disinterest

(:3,
\\__
\

51Ibid., p. 229; Toscano, "Eden's Mission to Rome,’

b p - 1357?.- .

(:2: 52According to Vansittart, the fascists
‘}:1£ampion of Genevan Utopia, and called him Paradise. "

‘:“:~ 11~Est Procession, p. 530.
53Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 156.

"mocked the
The

5uBaer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethigpian War,

Q is - 197-98.

81

in the pursuit of Italian ambitions in Abyss1nia.55 In a

private conversation with laval, Mussolini formed the firm

him a completely free hand in the management of the
Abyssinian affair.56 The British subsequently were given

to understand, however, that laval had promised no more

than that France would smile upon the Italian pursuit of
economic advantages in Abyss1n1a.57 From Eden's account,
int is clear that Mussolini was amazed at the British under-

srtanding of French intentions, and it is equally certain

triat, although he did not fling himself back in his chair

‘vngth appropriate gestures, as Mussolini did, Fden was also

Es‘txartled to discover that laval could convey such d1vergent

.jLITrpressions on a matter as critical as French intentions in
, P.
‘tilfixe Abyssinian dispute.5”
The question of whether laval did in fact wink at

11’1‘qlssolini's Abyssinian ambitions during their conversation

\
rjr‘ 5SIn return for the relinquishment of Italian claims in
“‘ ‘~11iisia, laval agreed in an exchange of letters with Dussolini

January 7 that French interests in Abyssinia would be

-5L1nited to the Djibouti- -Addis Ababa railway, and that France

:JL‘h
‘ <Duld pose no obstacle to the settlement of outstanding
William C. Askew,

ss'zlafferences between Italy and Abyssinia.
lie Secret Agreement between France and Italy on Ethiopia
" pp. #7-

‘::;_Tl?
EEquuary 1935," Journal of Modern History, XXV (1953),

“.9

A
S‘Avon, Facing the Dictators. P- 22“.
57Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 515.

58Avon, Facing the Dictato§§. P- 22“-

 

82

on the night of January 6 is not as important as the fact
that he clearly gave Mussolini one impression and the British

another.59 It is hard to imagine that he did not realize

what he was doing. Iaval was a man placed in an unhappy
position between two necessary allies with his eye fixed on

the German menace. His concern was to offend london and

Rome as little as possible, and to avoid being caught in an _

exposed position between them. His nimbleness during the 1

 

crisis saved Paris from having to choose between Britain and
Italy, but it also prevented France from taking the stand
which might have warned either the British or the Italians

away from a collision course. The British mission left

 

59What laval and Mussolini said to each other in a quiet
corner on the evening of January 6 is the subject of one of
those minor controversies which will probably never be sett-
led. Vansittart's indictment of laval has been popular for
its nice turn of phrase: "a wink is as good as a nod, and
laval had a drooping lid." In support of his implication,
Vansittart noted that Alexis leger, his opposite number in
the Quai d’Orsay, was convinced that laval had promised
Mussolini a completely free hand. Vansittart, The Mist
Procession, p. 515. Vansittart's judgment has been supported
by William Askew”s reading of an Italian foreign office
ghocument which he found among the captured Italian documents
iri the National Archives in Washington. Askew, "The Secret
Afiareement between France and Italy on EthiOpia, January
15N35." pp. 47-48. D. C. Watt, on the other hand, examined
”Hafterials from the captured German archives and concluded
t{l£tt Askew had misinterpreted the Italian narrative account.
}{1JS conclusion is that Mussolini had not yet formulated his
{1133’sssinian.ambitions with any precision in January, and that
l't' Vvas unlikely that laval was asked to acquiesce in the
{annexation of all or most of Abyssinia at that time. Rather.
'VEi‘t*t notes, the question was probably "tacitly left in that
5§17€32V’ and cloudy limbo where one assumes one has been under-
StC><Z><i for fear that direct enquiry may show that one has not."
E3. €3.- Watt. "The Secret Laval—Kussolini Agreement of 1935 on
‘tI‘~J-<>pia," The Middle East Journal, XV (1961), pp. 69-78.

83

Rome on June 26 with a new appreciation of Nussolini's

ambitions and his determination, and with increased doubts

about Iaval's willingness to Oppose them.6O

Eden stopped in Paris on his way home, as he had on
his way out. It was not, however, the moment to upbraid
laval for his subtlety. The French were still deeply
disturbed by the recent anglo-German naval agreement, which
Eden had attempted to explain before moving on to Fomefl In
london, the German willingness voluntarily to limit naval

construction of all classes except submarines to thirty-five

per cent of the British tonnage was viewed as an important

 

60Eden and his staff "could find no comfort in the
situation" when they reviewed the conversations in the
Embassy in Rome. Avon, Facinggthe Dictators, p. 228.

61The naval agreement with Germany had been anticipated
in london well in advance of the Stresa meetings, and was
also meant, in British eyes, to restrain Germany. A report
submitted to the cabinet by the Foreign Office and the three
defense services on January 25 laid down as guidelines for
armaments agreements with Germany maximums of 178,000 tons
for German naval construction, 300,000 daily effectives for
the German army, and metropolitan equality with France, Italy
Ennd Britain, or approximatelv 1000 first-line aircraft for
the German air force. Cab 2h/253 C.P.23(35). Although the
Pimench might not have been comfortable with these British
cetlculations, they do make it clear that london was not out
‘to Inake a lone, self-serving agreement at the expense of
f37113nds. It is no doubt true, however, as Professor Watt
has noted, that uneasiness over Britain's military situation,
€35? ‘vell as the political need to record a disarmament success
IDIVDTHIited the government to make the naval agreement while it
was possible, and to leave for the future agreements relating
t<> lleand and air forces. D. C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval
A€?17€3€3nmnt of 1935: an interim judgment," The Journal of

L'Ldern History, XXVIII (1956), p. 162.

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84

first step in limiting the budding arms race.‘2 The hope was
that the Fazi government could be drawn into freely nego-
tiated agreements on the basis of an equitable recognition of
sovereign rights which Germany would exercise in any event.
In Paris, the naval agreement which Hoare and

Ribbentrop signed on June 18 was seen in a different light.63
The French could not help but feel that the British had off-
handedly discarded the Versailles safeguards, and had acted
in clear contradiction to the spirit of the Stresa meetings,
in order to secure a bilateral agreement which contributed
to the British sense of security. The effect of the naval

agreement, the French were sure, would be to encourage

Berlin to concentrate on building an army rather than a

 

62lord Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, has explained the
thinking behind the British willingness to negotiate and sign
the Anglo-German naval agreement: "When,... in May 1935,
Hitler in an oration at Nuremberg, announced that he recog-
nized England's right to superiority on the seas, and that
he had no desire for a naval armaments race, it was clear to
the First Lord and myself, that the wise, indeed the inevit-
able, course was to come to an agreement on the matter; to
try and bind Germany to this public declaration - not
"enfbrced on her," but voluntarily made - and so to try and
stuabilize naval construction in Europe and call a halt to
snecret construction and suspicion." lord Chatfield, The Fav1
.arui Defence, Vol II: It Might Happen Again (london: William
Heinemann, 191W), pp. 73—71}.

- 63Hoare inherited the Anglo—German naval agreement
‘/}Hr“tually complete and contributed little to it beyond his
Sil£?r1aimre. In effect it constituted another of the factors
CCDDTEDlicating his handling of the Abyssinia crisis.

 

...". 6'!

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(V'Pfi-

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'a.‘

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.

 

 

85

navy. Indignation in France was general and strong.6

Although the French government could ill-afford the luxury of
a falling out with the British on the matter, the naval agree-
ment served to emphasize in Paris the value of Italian friend-
ship. That friendship, by way of contrast was reinforced on
June 19 by the signing of a secret military convention by
Generals Gamelin and Badoglio, according to which Italy and
France would march together against Germany in the event of

55

an attack upon Austria.’
Eden returned to Paris after his unsatisfactory visit to

Rome faced with the unpleasant task of trying to eXplain

away another shock to Anglo-French relations. On his initial

stop in Paris, Eden had told laval no more than that he

4
intended to discuss the Abyssinian situation in Rome.6‘ The

 

6AA survey of the French reaction against the Anglo-German
naval agreement, which swept up/such stout friends of England
as Edouard Herriot and Alexis leger, can be found in Charles
Bloch, "Great Britain, German Rearmament, and the Naval Agree-
ment of 1935," European Diplomacy_petween Two Wars (ed. Hans
W Gatzke, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), ppT_1hh-h9.

65Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 187.

. 66Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 231-32. Had Eden
filsscussed the British proposal with laval, he might have been
.1ric11ined to recommend to london that the mission be cancelled.
Laval had learned from Rome on June 18 that Italy's aim in

Abyssinia was to gain direct control over the 'peripheral'
2‘31162 of the Abyssinian empire, and a protectorate over the
Central, Amharic plateau. Askew, "The Secret Agreement
betWeen France and Italy on Ethiopia, January 1935," p. 1&8.
The French also knew from their soundings in Addis Ababa
gigai‘t._Haile Selassie felt that his rases would drive him off
It h}s throne if he should succumb to the demand for an
Eill;1an.protectorate. Baer, The Coming of the Italian—

W13 War, p. 19A.

 

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86

French were amazed to learn that the British had proposed a
solution which would have countenanced the construction of
a railway in Abyssinia in direct competition with the French
Djibouti line. The profits from the Djibouti railway helped
to offset French colonial expenses, and laval was concerned
to know how the British had calculated that France need not
be consulted. Eden could make no answer beyond intimating
that if the offer had averted a serious crisis, it would
have been worthwhile.67
In many respects, Eden's mission was the pivotal point
in the British handling of the Abyssinian affair. It was the
Opening move by the new foreign affairs team in london, and
as such was an indication that they would hold to the pattern
of alternately warning and coaxing Mussolini which had evolved
under Simon. Eden's mission demonstrated, however, a new
sense of urgency in London and a willingness to seize the
initiative rather than to continue to drift with threatening
events. At one stroke, london defined its interests in the
xlbyssinian affair for Rome, drew for the first time a
ccnqcrete and depressing measure of Mussolini's ambitions,
811d gained a new appreciation of the quicksilver qualities
le' the critical man in the middle, Pierre Iaval. For all of
't11211:, the undertaking was ill-conceived and costly.
-—————____

67Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 233.

 

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87

Foreign Secretary Hoare later confessed that he was too
ready at the outset to believe that he could build upon a
minor, personal wartime association with Mussolini.68 For
his pains in putting forward his first attempt at a solution
he succeeded only in further complicating the serious
situation with which he had to deal. In making a direct,
high-level approach to Rome, Hoare played an important card
with no more effect than to goad Mussolini to set his face
still harder and to step on British pride. Relations with
France were strained by the independent British approaches
to Berlin and Rome, and Hoare had to spend a bad afternoon
in the House of Commons trying to explain how it was that
he had proposed to give away part of a British colony.69
The publicity which attended Eden's mission and Nussolini's
curt rejection of the British prOposal had the effect of
raising the Abyssinian problem to banner level in the

British press, and leading articles began to express general

disappointment and indignation over the unreasonable Italian

 

68Templewood, Nine Troubled Years. p. 15“-

69July 1' 1935, 303 H.C.Deb., 58., cols. 1522-2b.

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88

attitude.7O

If the intelligence which Eden brought back to london
was not sufficiently depressing, it was compounded by the
knowledge that the mission had been undertaken at a cost
of irretrievably involving British prestige in the matter.
The irony of the situation seems to have been lost on london.
The white knight of the forces of the league in Britain had

undertaken a mission to do an old fashioned imperial deal

 

with a potential aggressor in order to protect what remained

of the illusion that a new and better day had dawned in the

 

7OEden's mission to Rome was prominently covered in the
British press, and most of the larger papers made the failure
of the undertaking the subject of a leading article. A sense
of dismay and indignation pervaded the leaders which appeared
in london on June 26 and 27. The Times leader of June 27 was
addressed largely to the contention put forward in the
Manchester Guardian on the previous day that Eden's mission
had been an attempt to arrange any satisfaction which
Mussolini might demand short of a mandate over Abyssinia.
The Times argued that Eden's mission was "a brave attempt in
Rome to find a way of avoiding the threatened war between
Italy and Abyssinia: and, even though it has apparently failed,
the British Government were clearly right to make it." Most
other papers bypassed the motivation of the British government
to try to fathom the Italian rejection of a reasonable solu-
tion. Most telling were the leaders of papers which had
previously indicated some sympathy for the Fascist regime.
The News Chronicle of June 27 wrote "it is distressing to
find the Duce's habitual commonsense and realism giving way
so apparently completely," and the Morning Post of the same
day noted its disappointment in Mussolini despite its usual
admiration for the work which he had done for the resuscita-
tion of Italy. The Dailerelegraph on the same day bristled
that Eden's trip to Rome had proven that "Signor Mussolini
is resolved to settle his differences with Ethiopia in his
own way, without any interference from any quarter whatso-
ever...." The Daily Mail, on the other hand, passed over
Mussolini's attitude in silence, demonstrating that anyone
who kicked at the supports of the league of Nations could be
certain of at least one friend in England.

 

 

 

 

 
 

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89

71 There is little to

conduct of international affairs.
suggest that Hoare, or anyone else in a position of
responsibility in london, recognized that Eden's mission
was a risk taken on behalf of an illusion. On the contrary,
the offer which was pressed upon Nussolini in Rome made it
clear that Britain was willing to go to considerable lengths
to placate Italy in good part because Italy was threatening
what was seen as an essential nerve interwoven in the fabric
of British foreign, security and domestic affairs. If
Mussolini's intransigence did raise any doubts in london
about the stakes involved, they were quieted by the results
of the Peace Ballot, which gave some measure of the commitment
of the British people to the inflated expectations which found
expression in the Covenant.
IV

On the evening of June 27, 1935, an enthusiastic crowd
gathered in Albert Hall to hear lord Robert Cecil announce
the final results of the massive, national referendum on
disarmament and the league of Nations which had been conducted

under his leadership by the National Declaration Committee.

 

71Interestingly, Eden's part in this effort to appease
Kussolini did not damage his reputation with those proponents
of the league in Britain who would so roundly damn Hoare for
a similar undertaking at the year's end. On July 11, Lord
Cecil wrote to tell Eden that the Executive Committee of the
league of Nations Union deplored the attacks which he had
suffered because of the attempt to reach an understanding
with Italy. At the same time, however, Cecil noted that they
did not generally approve of unilateral rather than collec-
tive action in the matter. Cecil Papers, Add. 51083.

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90

lord Cecil reported that 11,527,7F5 people, more than
double the number anticipated, had taken the time and had
shown the interest to answer the questions set out in the
ballot. There was no question, he added triumphantly,
but that the results demonstrated that the people of Great
Britain stood squarely behind the Covenant.72 Some five-
hundred thousand volunteers had worked on the 'Peace Ballot,'
and lord Cecil could well congratulate them on the comple-
tion of an unprecedented venture in shaping and measuring
public opinion just at the moment when it was certain to
have the greatest impact upon government policy. By the
end of June, the National Declaration Committee had published
a full account of the deve10pment and the results of the
Peace Ballot, and the National government had to take
account of the fact that 11,090,387 of 11,559,165 people
polled by mid-June had indicated that they favored British
participation in the league of Nations.73

From the first, the Peace Ballot had been an effort
to infuse a new enthusiasm for the league into the National
government. In a letter to Baldwin in November of 193b,

lord Cecil explained that the Peace Ballot grew out of

 

72The Times, June 28, 1935.

73livingstone and Johnston, The Peace Ballot, Supple-
mentary sheet included to update the figures given on p. 3h.

 

 

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91

concern over indications of "a terrible reversion to pre-war

mentality."7u

At the conclusion of the Peace Ballot, Cecil
wrote that the Yational Declaration Committee had begun with
the conviction that "if the British Government could be
encouraged to resume its leadership at Geneva, much could
still be done to arrest the threatened relapse into inter-
national anarchy."75
lord Cecil and his friends in the league of Fations
Union acted, throughout the inter-war period, on the insular
assumption that the peace and well-being of the world hinged
largely on the attitude and the zeal of the British government.
Such an assumption would have been open to serious question
in the halcyon years before Bismarck: in 1935 it scarcely
bore on reality at all. Vonetheless, the rational Declaration
Committee began its huge work with the conviction that the
answer to the distressingly familiar problems arising in
Europe and the Far East lay in convincing a doubting govern-
ment that the people of Great Britain were determined to see

the league of Nations succeed.

The inspiration for the Peace Ballot was provided by a

 

74Viscount Cecil to Stanley Baldwin, November 26, 193h,
Cecil Papers, Add. 51080. The collapse of the Disarmament
Conference seems to have been the principle factor which
moved the leadership of the league of Nations Union to mount
a campaign to convince the government to pursue "a really
vigorous league policy.” Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment
(New York: Oxford University Press, 19h1), pp. 257-58.

 

7Slivingstone and Johnston, The Peace Ballot, p. 60.

 

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92

Canvass of opinion on the league of I‘ations, disarmament,
and the Iocarno system conducted in January l93h by the

Ilford branch of the league of “'ations Union in that section

of london. The results encouraged the national leadership

of the league of Nations Union to enlist the support of the
churches, the major political parties and various civic

organizations in conducting a national referendum on disarm-
ament and British participation in the league of Nations.

Wi ‘th the exception of the Conservative Party, which quickly
smelled the obvious challenge to the government's handling
Of‘ foreign policy, the response was general and the D'ational
De claration Committee was well and impressively fleshed out.76

The effect of broadening the sponsorship of the referen-
dUm to include many of the high-minded and moral leaders

throughout the nation was to place the undertaking very

clearly on the side of the angels. There was never any

dOI—Ibt about the sentiments of the sponsors of the Peace

Sal lot, or about the result which they were laboring to

achieve. In many cases, the ballot was distributed with

S"‘ilp.portin,.g literature, such as the pamphlet entitled

IP'G—‘abe or Wart”?7 However much lord Cecil sought to repre-

Sent the results of the referendum as the well-considered
‘3 1’ld‘g‘ment of the British people, the entire venture had much

Ore the flavor of a recruiting drive for the league of

\

 

76Ibid., pp. 7-11, Cecil, A Great Experiment, pp. 257-58.

77livingstone and Johnston, The Peace Ballot, p. 12.

93

prltiOhS Union than of an impartial survey of public opinion.

grkue ballot itself was framed, in the manner of all effective

I~€2beenda, to solicit the desired responses:

10

20

Should Great Britain remain a Member of the league
of Nations?

Are you in favor of an all-round reduction of arma—
ments by international agreement? '

Are you in favor of the all-round abolition of
national military and naval aircraft by international
agreement?

Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for
private profit be prohibited by international
agreement?

Do you consider that, if a nation insists on
attacking another, the other nations should combine
to compel it to stop by

(a) economic and non—military measureg?

(b) if necessary, military measures?

The questions virtually demanded 'yes' answers, and the

P‘El‘tuional Declaration Committee got them in impressive numbers.

VJElIL‘ter Ashly, the Assistant Secretary of the Committee, calcu—

J-Ei‘ted that 37.9 per cent of the population over 19 years of

81%?Ee responded to the ballot.

79 More than 80 per cent of

tzrl<>sse voting were persuaded that the abolition of national

rn*131¢itary and naval aircraft was a good idea, more than 90

Der

cent were in favor of prohibiting the manufacture and

53235163 of armaments for private profit, more than 90 per cent

\

78Ibid., pp. 9-10.

79Ibid.. pp. 33-58.

94

would have welcomed an all-round reduction of armaments by

international agreement, and some 95 per cent favored Britain's

Continuing: membership in the league.‘ The fifth question

offered an element of choice, which built in less impressive
results. Still, better than 90 per cent of those responding
considered that economic and non-military measures should be

used to stay the hand of an aggressor. The positive responses

dropped to 60 per cent when the question posed concerned the
use of military measures.pl r’onetheless with the memory of
the 'Great War' still fresh, the fact that six of ten British
Citizens polled were willing to apply military measures in

Support of the Covenant may well have been the most signifi-
p
cant statistic produced by the Peace Eallot.‘2

The results of the Peace Ballot obviously were colored

by its tendentious character. riuch of the contemporary news-

paper. comment fastened on the extent to which the ballot

be gged the question. A common, conclusion was that the

\‘
V0 _ 80The calculations here were made on the basis of the
toting returns given in ibid.. supplementary sheet included
LIIDdate the figures given on p. 34.
8llbid.
,Q
1.01: ‘21t is likely, however, as Professor Nedlicott has
ed , that most of those responding to the Peace Ballot

f -

“'83::le to equate either economic or military sanctions with

“ §erious possibility of a major war. W. N. Medlicott,
lsh Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1219-1963 (london:

 

*=’*5_~t
thLIen, 1969). pp. IRE-145.

95

Ireaferendum thus lost much of its significancef3 This was

However the results of the Peace Eallot

r1zardly the case.
It

vveare achieved, they were a political fact of life.

Ivlelttered little that the referendum merely restated the
ELESESUmptiOHS of the Covenant, as though they promised an

aqusswer to the threats developing in 1935. The government

rialci to deal with the enthusiasm regenerated by the Peace
I3211Llot exercise for the notion that the league system of

disarmament and sanctions could still function to protect

IDeeaacxa.

From the standpoint of the National government, the

Y‘EL‘tllre and the timing of the Peace Ballot could scarcely

rialxres been worse. The results which the Fational Declaration

C2c>rnrnittee began to release in a steady stream after November

C’i? 193h bore unfortunately on the two problems pressing most

L117‘éé’ently on the government. What was wanted during the first

\
I“ 83Purveyors of liberal or labour sentiment, such as the
TiEiIlgyhester Guardian, the Fews Chronicle, and the Daily Herald,
Garicied to accept the Peace Ballot at face value as a success-
experiment in democracy, Ianchester uardian, June 28, 1935,

,:5212§§ Chronicle, June 28,1935, Daily Herald, June 28,1935.
‘ ‘<>53‘t of the other leading london dailies greeted the results

if: ‘the ballot with either skepticism or scorn. The Times felt
:fs- El1: if fact and sentiment were separated it would be hard to
Dg‘T1Ci much value in the ballot. The Times, June 28, 1935. The

~pr§éslggy Telegraph styled the ballot "a most misleading question-
llée," and added that it had been put forward by those people

ggfilfD called loudest for war against an aggressor but fought

23fS>Eianst the necessary armaments. The Daily Telegraph, June

<)_:§.- 1935. The Morning Post dismissed the domestic significance
1the ballot, but worried that it would be received abroad

E3.
:3 Ein indication that Britain had suddenly gone 'soft.‘ The
The Daily Vail thundered against

;~: brjine Post June 29, 1935.
23.53‘a ‘t it called "the booby—trap ballot." The Dailv Nail, June
1935.

 

 

96
months of 1935, in the light of open German rearmament and

1:11e clear challenge to league procedures being posed by

11.1: ussolini in east Africa, was an effort to educate the

public to the need for rearmament and to the obvious limita-

tions of a system of sanctions which had been predicated
upon a universal league of Fations and general disarmament.

Instead, the National Declaration Committee held the field

and reinforced just the opposite point of view. Privately,

Ne ville Chamberlain wrote of the ballot as "terribly mischie-
vous," and Vansittart described it as "a free excursion into

'the inane"?5 But beyond an occasional sally in the House of

Commons, the government left the debate over the Peace Ballot

to the National Declaration Committee and its shrill opponents

 

 

BuWhat fresh thought there was at the time did not
e3’<‘t:end to the league of Nations. On July 2, lloyd George
a~1"11"10unced the establishment of the "Council of Action for
Peace and Reconstruction," on which he spent some £LLO0,000
1T1 - an effort to promote his concept of a "New Deal" for
drl‘tain. A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 19114-19LL§ (Oxford:
T‘XYXfordoUniversity Press, 1965), p. 357. On July 26, the
$23: Five Years volume appeared under the Signature of 153

ell-known political and literary figures, assembled in good
fiflrt by lord Allen of Hurtwood. Martin Gilbert (ed. ), Plough
$0M Furrow (london: lonpmans, Green and Co., 1965),'p. 305.
3:: Oyd George and the Next Five Year Group argued creatively
bob new solutions to the economic ills which beset the nation.
tut the faith eXpressed in each case in collective security
Si’vlll‘ough the league of rations was so orthodox that lord Cecil
S - ared the platform with lloyd George on July 2, and lent his

lPs‘nature to the volume which appeared on July 26.

 

85Vansittart. The Mist Procession, p. 503; Iain Kacleod,

RY
flue Chamberlain (london: Frederick Iiuller, 1961),
‘ 191.

97

p,
(3:1? the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press. 6
The effect of the Peace Ballot was to reinforce the
:1.j_mitations operating on Hoare's handling of the Abyssinian

(ZirTiSiS. However colored, the results which lord Cecil

Eiruiuounced on June 27 could not be ignored?7 The impending

a?"€211eral election magnified the weight of the Peace Pallot,

Eizéici, in the words of leo Amery, the government found it

88

<31:>IT1fortable to "swim with the tide" It is off the mark,

I1.c>~vvever, to suggest that the ballot converted the government

‘1:<:> a sudden affection for the league, or persuaded them to a

C6lord Cecil noted that Sir John Simon had some hard
.131”1.i.ngs to say in the House of Commons about the Peace Pallot's
b? aring on rearmament, but he added that Simon afterwards
‘fl’31~‘1thdrew his "intemperate words." Cecil, . Great Experiment,
p - 259. Cecil felt that what he styled the "isolationist
35>ilf‘esass" gave the ballot an excellent advertisement by sensation-
EELHL-:Iinng it as the "Elood Ballot." Ibid.

 

:3; 87On April 12, 1935 Professor Gilbert Hurray wrote with

h a‘tisfaction about the impact which the ballot seemed to be
“Jing on the government: "It is all to the good that the

£33 JET‘iime Minister at last should wish to be civil to us and

}_1 I"Itsuld recognize the force that the league of Vations Union

¢- E§?—Ss in the country. No doubt it is the effect of the Pallot."

. __V

Elfi~3L~Zlbert Murray to lord Robert Cecil, April 12, 1935, Gilbert
EE;;‘~2:ztey'Papers, Box 16a and 16d. Bodleian library. On June 26,
3 ‘t: the completion of the ballot, lord Cecil, buoyed by the
;1_1-€Eétsults, called on Foreign Secretary Hoare to eXplain how

:I: <33 felt the Abyssinian affair should be managed. FC POO/295.
't;*-:f? the ballot increased the weight of the league of rations
‘r:§.2f7 ion outside of the government, it must also have strengthened
‘*~=-<fiieen's hand within the government.

a
8"Amery, fly Political life. III. 169-

 

98

policy which they would not have otherwise followed.89 The
Peace Ballot was only one, albeit an important one, of
several factors bearing on the significance which the league
of Nations still had for the National government in 1935.
And, in spite of a general skepticism about the league's
current capabilities, the government tended to share the
half-digested conviction, implicit in the ballot, that the
Le ague of Nations was altogether too valuable to be abandoned

Wi 'thout at least an honest test.

\

"(I 89In assessing the impact of the Peace Ballot, C. L.

‘ c7“»Iat concluded that ”late in the day the government became
W convert to the league." C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the
&s, 1918-19uo (London: Methuen and Co.. 1966, first published
‘1’“ 1955). p. suz.

 

99

CHAPTER III
THE MOUNTING CRISIS

In the wake of Anthony Eden's unhappy mission to Paris
and Rome, Sir Samuel Hoare faced a disturbing prospect as he
mulled the major policy statement he would soon have to make
to the House of Commons.1 In Italy, Mussolini was talking
and acting as though Eden's visit had removed his final
do 1:..th about a military adventure in east Africa.2 In Britain,

Mussolini's open disdain for the league of Nations and for
B:C‘ILtish mediation was breeding resentment inside as well as
o12~“l:side of the government. The best solution for the National
1\R~.‘:>\Iernment remained a compromise settlement of the Abyssinian
6‘ iSpute. But as the summer wore on and the rainy season in
‘3‘ byssinia drew toward a close it became increasingly doubtful
t I‘1at such a settlement would be found before Mussolini sent
the army which he had been gathering in Eritrea and Italian
\

1No one could better appreciate the dilemma which Hoare
h ad to wrestle with than his predecessor at the Foreign Office.
Q1”: July 7, Simon noted in his diary that it had not taken the
I‘3—‘an Foreign Secretary long to discover how difficult it was
0 handle international affairs to the general satisfaction.
he Simon Papers. Diary II.

2George W. Baer concluded that Mussolini "had passed the
goint of no return" by the beginning of July, and he noted
hat Mussolini's speeches thereafter "became ever more uncom-
promising." George w. Baer, The Coming of the Italian -

M

flioflan War (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
2) 7, p. 181.

 

 

lOO

Escamaliland into Abyssinia. In July, the cabinet began to
c:c>nsider the unpleasant question of the role which Britain
*vvc3uld play in the event of a clear case of Italian aggression
11;;>on.another member of the league of Nations.

On July 3, the cabinet met in london to hear Eden's
éa.c:<:ount of his conversations with Kussolini in Rome. The
jLITlIDllCathUS of the demands which Fussolini had outlined to
Eden were depressingly clear. Abyssinia could not accept

ES‘LJ.C2h demands, Mussolini would have his war, and Britain
‘A’<:>‘L11d have to face up to its obligations under the Covenant.
crrkiLee pmsition in which the government found itself had been
't31”1»63 secret nightmare of British statesmen since the establish-

rTIEE‘I—Jt of the league of P'ations.3 Britain was being drawn

/

3From the first, British statesmen tended to view the
teace-keeping function of the league of Nations as essentially
- Trficiliatory rather than coercive in nature. In this, they
.3?) :flered consistently from their French counterparts. As
3E?‘<:erssor Medlicott has observed, the British recognized that
a:; :1-‘th the rejection of the Covenant by the United States Senate,
“I“‘:t7‘iitain clearly became a 'producer' rather than a 'consumer'
security under the league system. In addition, the nature
<:)' economic sanctions was such as to impose the heaviest burden
(2211—1 the British fleet. During the first decade of the league's
SE; 3*Ciistence, British governments of every political stripe
<2>14ght to define the coercive function of the league in
EEiSLHfious and narrow terms. In 1921, the lloyd George govern-
Ijr1"EEalot proposed amendments to the Covenant which had the effect
(:3 If?’ interpreting the imposition of economic sanctions to mean
ggradual process. The MacDonald government in l92h rejected
‘1t331“1<a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance as tending to place an
‘14‘51'lcjue burden on British naval power. And the Baldwin govern-
Ifir1~<3211t in 1925 declined to ratify the Geneva Protocol providing
3;: (3’1? compulsory arbitration of disputes. The arguments which
‘N“3=‘1flfiur Balfour put to the league Council on March 12, 1925,
1?; éat§3 that in view of the incomplete nature of the league,
{is Jr‘lttain could not afford to take the 'strong' view of the

33 Svenant. Unfortunately, Balfour failed in his effort to

WU
P00

00

53Pl that line of reasoning to a logical conclusion within

 

101

toward the imposition of sanctions upon a friendly European
power on a matter of only limited British interest. Short
of unsaying all of the things said by British governments
over the previous fifteen years about steady support of the
Covenant, there seemed no help for it. l’o one in the cabinet
suggested that Britain could, in the circumstances, begin the
3' ob of pulling the league's teeth. l’either was it argued
that the government should face facts and qualify its
0 bligations, as was done during the Manchurian crisis. But
‘th e idea of sanctions was sobering. Baldwin warned again
“that economic sanctions carried the strong possibility of
War. Since such sanctions amounted in essence to blockade,
i ‘t was only too clear that any hostile reaction would fall
m 0 st heavily upon the British fleet. l’onetheless, after a
l th discussion, the cabinet decided to explore the effect
wh :lch economic sanctions might have upon Italy, and the
q uestion was referred for study to a subcommittee of the
Q QInmittee of Imperial Defence. There was no thought of

\

{t he Baldwin government. In lord Cecil's view, one of the
e st day's work that he did as a member of the second Baldwin

Overnment was to block Balfour's prOposal that the coercive
% S pects of the Covenant should be declared inoperative. The
Sanchurian crisis pointed up the ambivalence of the official
‘9' ritish position on the league, but it did not force the
’£??Qvernment to choose between its fidelity to the Covenant and

_‘ “ts aversion to sanctions as the Abyssinian crisis would do.
:3; mold Wolfers, Britain and France between Two Wars (New York:
Is‘.~:a-‘lf‘c:ourt, Brace and Co., 191m). p. 153; w. N. Pied‘flcott,
*1 :r‘l'tish Foreign Policy since Versailles, 15319-196}, 2nd ed.

.C l-Ohdon: Methuen, 19687 pp. 157-148: Viscount Cecil of Chelwood,

:CEW (london: Hodder and Stoughton, 19h9), , 187;
H

args op er Thorne, The limits of Foreign Policy ( ondon:
mlsh Hamilton, 1972), p. 110.

 

 

 

102
entering upon a dangerous program of economic sanctions alone,
however, and Eden's accounting raised grave questions about
the vital support of France. Considering the character of
Laval, who on June 7 had become premier as well as foreign
minister of France, the cabinet judged that any action taken

by the league in response to Italian aggression would probably

hinge upon the attitude of Paris.)4

Within the cabinet, an important effect of Eden's mission
to Rome was that it roused Neville Chamberlain to begin play-
ing a leading role in the management of the Abyssinian crisis.
Chamberlain, who was the strongest figure within the National
government and often the bellwether of cabinet opinion,
be acted sharply to the rejection of the offer which Eden had
tendered to Mussolini. ‘ On July h, Chamberlain had a discus-
8 ion about Abyssinia with Baldwin and Sir Warren Fisher which
3 Q disturbed Fisher that he wrote Baldwin to ask if England

was 'really prepared not merely to threaten but also to use
force. '5 On July 5, Chamberlain wrote in his diary of closing
the Suez Canal as a reasonable response to Mussolini's
ih‘transigence.6 Even assuming French support, it was

\
“Cab 23/82. 35(35)2.

5Quoted in Ian Calvin, None So Blind (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1965), p. 67. Sir Warren Fisher was. from
1 919 to 1939, permanent secretary to the Treasury and head of
the civil service. The tenor of his advice during the
‘abyssinian crisis, like that of Vansittart, was that Britain
was in no position to take a hard line against Italian ambitions.

1‘11 6Keith Felling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (london:
aemillan. 1970. first published in 19%). p. 265.

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103

c3<3mmonly accepted within the government that to close the
czganal would be to virtually insure an Italian attack on the
I Ieaditerranean fleet.7 That Chamberlain considered such a
cigarmerbus Option, however fleetingly, is instructive in that
.klee was not by nature the man to champion the cause of either
2%.133gssinia or the league of Nations. To Chamberlain's practi-
<c:£aL1 eye, the weaknesses of the league were glaringly apparent.
Jilrl common with many Conservatives, he felt that Britain's
Esieawcurity could best be enhanced by rearmament rather than
undue reliance upon collective security. Yet he was provoked
1:>:§r' Mussolini's attitude and he felt bound by Britain's obliga-
‘13’ii.ons under the Covenant. When it came to the point, he was
151<2> more willing than Eden to see the league finally collapse.
' :Iif'in the end,‘ Chamberlain warned his colleagues, 'the league
‘“’"<Erre demonstrated to be incapable of effective intervention
‘1::<:> stOp this war, it would be practically impossible to
Ifihlistintain the fiction that its existence was justified at all.’8
‘EIETjLs skepticism about the league's ability to function as
ii~7r1tended was balanced by his feeling that it was still impor-
‘1tléant to keep a reasonably credible league in being. For one

\

7On July 30 the service chiefs lent their weight to this
‘Ei-Essumption by stating that any steps taken to interrupt Italian
<Z=$Dmmunications with Abyssinia 'would almost invaribly lead to
"filéaru' Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the EthiOpian Crisis
<:>:f 1935-36,” American Historical Review, IXXV, 5 (June, 1970),
1:>. 1327.

gag 8Quoted in Iain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (london:
:I‘ederick Muller, 1941) p. 185,

 

o

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has

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he mused in his diary, if Nussolini were allowed to

'the small States in EurOpe will just

.9

‘thing,
' torpedo' the league,

Iraace one another to Berlin.
On July 5, Baldwin followed logically upon the decision

(3.1‘ two days earlier and asked the chiefs of staff to consider

'1:11<e militarv im lications of Britain's res onsibilities under
a p p

1%.1?”ticle 16.10 This additional evidence that the government

\AIEB.S beginning, albeit reluctantly, to consider the imposition

<:>:f‘ economic sanctions failed to satisfy Anthony Eden. Eden

11-E3.d returned from Rome and Paris with his jaw set, and he

I:>::‘essed for a stiff note to be despatched to Rome endorsing

'tilfd.e warning he had given Mussolini that Britain meant to

=33 ‘tzand by its obligations under the Covenant. Hoare warned

‘13 lite Italian ambassador, Grandi, on July 5 that Mussolini's
£51—‘t:titude pointed toward a great calamity, but he held up the

I 4—<:>te which Eden wanted to see deSpatched in order to try to

‘jL-TTlprove upon a suggestion made by Grandi. Sensing that

:333.1?itish patience was wearing thin, Grandi cleverly suggested
It: Fiat a meeting of the signatories of the tripartite treaty
'<:>;1f 1906 bearing on Abyssinia might yet produce the settlement

\
9Felling, The life of Neville Chamberlain., p. 265.

IOMarder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-

36," p, 1327,

11The Earl of Avon, The Eden Nemoirs.
C london: Cassell, 1962), pp. 239-140.

Facing the Dictators

A

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105
‘vvhich Britain wanted.12 Hoare eagerly grasped at the straw.
‘Iihe decision to begin considering economic sanctions did not
drive out the hope that an eleventh-hour agreement might
prevent the need to impose them.
II
Grandi's suggestion of another possible basis for
conciliation was skillfully timed. By July 9, it was very
obvious, if it had not been before, that Mussolini had no
intention of submitting his aspirations to the arbitral
I;>J:‘ocess established to consider the WaIWal incident under
the Italo-Abyssinian treaty of 1928. On June 25, the arbi-
‘1:LJ:‘ation commission met at Schweningen in the Netherlands.
The arbitrators appointed by Mussolini, drawn respectively
3155ar~om the Italian diplomatic establishment and from the
:E;‘=3Lscist government itself, arrived at Schweningen bound by
‘53 ‘tzrict instructions from Rome.13 The commission did not
meet in formal session until July 14, and then only to establish
\
3E2) 12Ibid. In several respects, the tripartite treaty of
‘fiacember 1906 was ideally suited to form the basis for discus-
JLons relating to the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935. The
.Ireaty established that Britain, France and Italy had inter-
§§>*Ests to protect in Abyssinia, bound each of the three signator-
:le.eas to support the independence of Abyssinia, yet recognized
“:L}1e protocols signed by Britain and Italy in 1891 and 189u
‘“~rlmich had defined Abyssinia as an Italian protectorate.
I“fearold G. Marcus, "A Preliminary History of the Tripartite
.zreaty December 13, 1906," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, XI
(July, 196A). pp. 21-40.

13Baer, The Coming_of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 209.

opwfl‘V‘

65.,J. At
a l M‘
.9” Vb

 

 

106

that a complete impasse existed between the arbitrators
appointed by the opposing sides. Abyssinia was anxious to
open to arbitration the root question of the 'ownership' of
the WalWal region, while the Italian arbitrators would consi-
der nothing more than the narrow subject of responsibility

for the WalWal incident.14

The Italian arbitrators threatened
to withdraw over the issue, and the commission was forced to
adjourn on July 9 and report the impasse to the two govern-

15

ments involved and to the League of Nations. Italy clearly
had the situation well in hand. If the considerations of the
commission were limited as Italy required, Mussolini could
well afford to agree to the appointment of a fifth arbitrator.
Within the limits laid down by Italy, the only significant
effect of the proceedings would be to consume more time.

The survey of British foreign policy which Sir Samuel
Hoare undertook for the House of Commons on July 11 offered
an Opportunity to emphasize that Britain took a serious view

of Mussolini's transparently belligerent intentions. Hoare

did not warn, in the course of his survey, that the government

 

l“Pitman B Potter, The WalWal Arbitratign (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938), pp lB-lh.

 

15The award signed by Count Luigi Aldrovandi and Raffaele
Montagna put the Italian position that the commission had been
established under eXplicit terms and was not authorized to
eXpand its considerations beyond those terms. Within the
framework of what they considered to be the original terms,
Aldrovandi and Montagna declared themselves to be ready to
continue. In their turn, the arbitrators appointed by Abyssinia,
Professors Pitman B. Potter and Albert de Ia Pradelle, argued
for a wider scope for the proceedings and called for the
appointment of a fifth arbitrator. League of Nations,
Official Journal, August 1935, pp. 973-7h.

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107

was beginning to give serious thought to the imposition of
economic sanctions. That, he no doubt felt, would have been
to throw down the gauntlet to Italy. He did make it very
clear that from the vantage point of london, the central
issue in the Italo-Abyssinian quarrel was the threat which it
posed to the league of Nations. In terms which anticipated
his famous Speech at Geneva by two months, Hoare told the
House of Commons that:

we are ready and willing to take our full

share of collective responsibility. But

when I say collective responsibility, I

mean collective responsibility. Over and

over again we have stated, and no one

better than the Prime Minister, our

fidelity to the league aig its principles,

and I reaffirm it today.
In a carefully qualified way, Hoare meant to convey a clear
warning to Italy. While Britain had no intention of acting
as a universal policeman, the government was ready to shoulder
a full share of collective reSponsibility under the Covenant
in the event of Italian aggression. Hoare tempered his
warning by reiterating Britain's desire to see a peaceful
settlement of the dispute. He referred again to the sympathy
felt in london for Italy's desire to expand overseas. He also
noted that some of the complaints made by Italy against the

17

Abyssinian government were well taken. There was, however,

 

l63m; H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 518.
17Ibid., col. 519.

108

no reason for a war which would call into question the post-
war structure of collective security. It was this structure
alone which prevented a reversion to the disastrous alliance
system of the past. For his part, Hoare concluded, "I am
not prepared even now to abandon any chance that may present
itself for averting what I believe will be a calamity, whether
it be through the machinery of the 1906 Treaty, or whether it
be through the machinery of the league, or whether it be
through both."18
Virtually all of the leading figures of the House of
Commons, other than those sitting on the government front
bench, spoke in the debate which followed. The boundaries
of the debate were established, on the one hand, by Attlee's
denunciation of the government's endorsement of Italian
imperialism, and on the other, by Churchill's fear that the
government would take the lead in Opposing Italian designs.19
Within those bounds, there was almost no opposition to Hoare's
position that Britain had to support the league, but could
not be expected to do so alone.20 Austen Chamberlain
captured the mood of the House when he spoke of the Abyssinian
dispute as the ultimate test of the system of collective

security:

 

l"'Ibid.

19Ibid., cols. 537 and 5u5.

20Ibid., cols. 519-630.

109

We are coming very near to what may be a
test case for the league as to whether it
does mean collective security; whether it
does mean anything for any one or nothing
for any one. It is not to be supposed

that the league can be flouted under the
eyes of Europe, that league methods can be
repudiated, a policy of force and conflict
engaged in, and that the league can pass
all that by, because it happens to occur in
Africa and not in EurOpe without thereby
destroying the value of collective security
not for Africa only but for Europe.

No one raised the question of the price that Britain would
be willing to pay to underwrite the role of the league as
the international guarantor of peace. The widely-held
assumption was that an aggressor would be hard put to with-
stand the combined censure and the collective economic weight
of the total membership of the League.

Hoare considered it necessary to warn Mussolini of
Britain's fidelity to the league, but he had no taste for
a direct confrontation with Italy. He recognized the problem
posed by the extent to which Italian prestige had become
engaged in the Abyssinian dispute, and he was concerned not

22

to humiliate Italy However dim the prospects, Hoare con-

tinued to feel that a negotiated settlement held out the only

 

211bid., col. 566.

2ZIn the course of eXplaining the offer which Eden had
put to Mussolini in Rome, Hoare wrote the king that "Your
Majesty's Ministers have for some time past been considering
the possibility of finding some means which would enable the
Italian Government to compose their differences with Abyssinia
without any loss of prestige.” Sir Samuel Hoare to King George
v, July a, 1935 F0 800/295.

110

hope of averting an international calamity. Accordingly, he
pursued all possible avenues of conciliation. Experience had
shown that Mussolini looked with scorn on both the league of
Nations and the arbitral commission set up to consider the
WalWal incident. Hoare therefore pressed for a meeting of
representatives of Britain, Italy and France to consider the
problem within the framework of the treaty of 1906. Although
Grandi had put the suggestion of a tripartite meeting forward
in london, he apparently did so on his own authority for
Nussolini received the idea coldly in Rome. On July 10,
Mussolini replied to laval, who had been persuaded to forward
the suggestion to Rome, that he could see no reason for a
meeting of the signatories of the treaty of 1906.23
Exasperated, Hoare turned again from coaxing to warning.
He reinforced his policy statement of July 11 by instructing
Ambassador Drummond to inform Mussolini that the government
viewed with grave anxiety the effect on Anglo-Italian rela-
tions should Italy's obvious intentions be carried out.2u
To insure that his warnings were being pressed in Rome with
sufficient vigor, Hoare reminded Drummond on July 27 that
Britain could not participate in an arrangement which would

destroy the sovereignty of Abyssinia. He added his concern

that Drummond might be allowing the Italians to "get away

 

23Baer. The Coming of the Italian—Ethiopian War. p. 216.
2L‘Sir Samuel Hoare to lord Wigram, July 12, 1935,

F0 BOO/295.

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111

with their case more easily than they deserve."25 Drummond
replied by return post that the warnings which he had conveyed
to Mussolini had been forthright enough to anger the dictator.
He concluded bleakly that in view of Mussolini's response to
the British warnings. he frankly saw no chance of a peaceful
solution.26

Sir Eric's assessment of the situation in Rome was
hardly cheering, but at least Hoare could be certain that
Mussolini was being made aware of the depth of British concern.
This contributed to the cautious eXpectation that some progress
could be made toward a negotiated settlement at the extra-
ordinary session of the league Council called for July 31 to
consider the impasse in the arbitral proceedings. On July 29
Hoare told the American ambassador, Bingham, that he hoped
that Italy could be brought at Geneva to agree to the appoint-
ment of a fifth arbitrator, and to a conference of the
signatories of the treaty of 1906 under the aegis of the
League.27

III
The appointment of a fifth arbitrator to the WalWal

commission, while not completely discounted, did not hold

 

253ir Samuel Hoare to Sir Eric Drummond (Rome), July 27,
1935. F0 800/295.

26Sir Eric Drummond to Sir Samuel Hoare, July 31, 1935,
F0 800/295.

27Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935. 1,620.

 

112

out much prospect of producing a solution to the crisis. At
best, the revival of the arbitral process would delay the
outbreak of hostilities and gain additional time for direct
negotiations among the principal European powers involved.28
What hope there was for the tripartite talks which Hoare had
in mind would depend, if the Italians could be brought to the
table, on the extent to which the French could be convinced
to come down hard on the side of the Covenant. Given laval's
concern to maintain his new-found relationship with Rome, it
did not seem likely that France would take a strong stand.

Hoare could sympathize with the delicacy of the French
position, but he could not allow the matter to go by default.
The issue was considered to be too important in london.
Britain figured, even more than Italy, as a vital factor in
French considerations of national security. Hoare pressed
this advantage as hard as he thought wise in an effort to
convince laval to take a stand strong enough to persuade
Mussolini to accept a negotiated settlement.

In Hoare's View, there were logical limits to the
pressure which should be focused upon France. Despite the
urging of Eden, he could not see that Anglo-French coOperation,

or the cause of the league of Fations would be served by

putting the French into the dock.29 Pointing the finger at

 

28Ibid.

29Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 2&3—44.

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113

the French would not win their support. The government refused
to grant Eden the authority he wanted to state the British
position at Geneva in such a way as to force the French
hand.30 The result could only have been a further strain on
relations between Paris and london. Hoare pressed Iaval but
did not push him into a corner.

On July 29, Hoare addressed a carefully drafted assess-
ment of the perils involved in the Abyssinian crisis to
Sir George Clerk, the British ambassador in Paris. Clerk
was to pass it on to laval. The letter is worth considering
in some detail. It was drafted to convince laval and would
ordinarily be suspect as a piece of special pleading. The
arguments put forward in the letter are, however, so consis-
tent with Hoare's attitude throughout the crisis that the
letter represents quite possibly the clearest statement of
Hoare's View of the concerns posed by the crisis. The letter
laid out in full the dangerous potential of a war between
Italy and Abyssinia. Hoare noted that even a quick Italian
victory in such a war would have the effect of discrediting
Italy internationally, and would very likely make Italian
policy more uncertain and venturesome. A long, indefinite
war, or an Italian defeat, would have disastrous effects upon
the balance of power in Europe, and might lead to a first-

class crisis over Austria. Considering the war as a war of

 

BOIbid.

 

11h

aggression by a white imperial power upon a smaller, black,
independent nation, Hoare pointed out that Britain and France,
with smoldering nationalist sentiment within their empires to
consider, could only lose. The reaction would be bad if

Italy won, and bad if Italy lost, in that the latter eventu—
ality would tend to point up the vulnerability of the European
imperial powers. For all of that, Hoare made it clear that
his main concern was with the impact which a war would have
upon the league of Nations, and upon the appeal of collective
security in Great Britain:

..we must expect that the effect of war
upon the influence of the league of rations
will be wholly bad. The origins, character
and purpose of such a war would not, outside
Italy, be regarded as doubtful in the light of
Signor Mussolini's own statements. It would
by all ordinary persons be held to be a plain
war of aggression for the purpose of annexation
by a strong member of the league upon a weaker
member. One of three results would then be
liable to ensue. If the league acquiesced in
such a purpose, it would fall into universal
and lasting contempt. Secondly, if it were
divided against itself, it would for the future
be viewed not as an organ of peace with a will
of its own, but merely as the one theatre for
the interplay of self-regarding national
policies. Thirdly, if it were formally but
ineffectually to condemn the action of the
Italian Government—-and many members are indis-
posed to, or incapable of, effectual condemn-
ation--ltaly would join the growing number of
scoffing dissenters. In any event, another and
inglorious chapter would have been closed in
the history of attempts to substitute a regime
of law for international anarchy, and there would
have been destroyed one of those factors-~and that
a very important factor--which join the United
Kingdom with France in the political and moral
leadership of EurOpe. In such circumstances

the countries of Central and South-Eastern
Europe, filled already with apprehensions at

115

the growing might of Termany, might well

be excused for feeling that a term had been
set to whatever stability this leadership
had secured to them, and for looking else-
where than to the league and to the two
great conservative democracies for support
and guidance.

The inevitable damage to the influence
of the league of Nations is the most powerful
reason why His Kajesty's Covernment and the
French Sovernment should, in co-Operation
with each other, use all possible means to
avert a war in Abyssinia.... I would wish to
point out to N. laval certain considerations
which apply more particularly to the effect
on the foundations of British policy of a
serious impairment of the league's position.

Should Great Britain unhappily, in the
future, be called upon to go to war in defence
of international order, it would be essential
that she should do so with the unanimous assent--
or practically unanimous assent—~of the British
pe0p1e. It is unlikely that such assent would
be forthcoming unless it were clear that the
cause for which Great Britain was engaging
herself was in defence of international order
under the authority of the league of Nations,
and when I say league of Nations, I mean, not
so much the organization as set up by the
Covenant of 1919, as the spirit and principles
which inspired the Covenant and have on the whole
guided its activities since that date. If
these are compromised, that element will disappear
which, as I have just explained, is more than
anything else requisite for unanimous support
for any war in which this country might in
future tend or intend to engage. The present
crisis is widely regarded in this country as a
test not only of the ability of the members of
the league to make their own Covenant respected,
but as a test of whether the words "collective
action" which are often, and rightly, on our lips,
really mean collective action in defence of
law and order against aggression from any
quarter, or whether the security which is
being sought is security against Germany alone.
The pOpular movement in this country in support
of the principle of security by collective

action might well be arrested unless the prin-
01ples of the league were steadfastly upheld

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116

even at the cost of the a ostasy of one more
of its principal members. 1

Hoare's concern to preserve the league was quite genuine. In
his view, an Italo—Abyssinian war would be a disaster in good
part because of its effect upon the system of collective
security which formed the foundation of British policy. If
nothing else, Hoare expected that the French would recognize
the importance of the league as a bridge for British involve-
ment in Continental affairs. laval could not expect the
British people to blink at Italian aggression and later rise
up against a German violation of the Covenant. If the French
valued the league and the concept of collective security at
all, they had to recognize the grave threat posed to the
system by an Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Hoare's object
was to avert a confrontation between the league powers and
Italy. France was in a position to contribute powerfully to
the mediation process. Hoare emphasized that it would not

do to guide Italy through the "gap" in the Covenant, in an

effort to create the fiction of a legitimate war.32 The effect

 

31Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir George Clerk (Paris), July 29,
1935, Cab 2h/256 C. P.162(35) annex I.

32Ibid, Under certain circumstances, the Covenant allowed
for an act of war as a legitimate exercise of national
sovereignty. Hence, the "gap" in the Covenant to which Hoare
referred. The paragraph usually identified as 'the gap in the
Covenant' was paragraph 7 of article 15 which stated that if
the League Council failed to reach agreement on a dispute
submitted to it, "the Members of the league reserve to them—
selves the right to take such action as they shall consider
necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."

 

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117

would be to destroy the remaining credibility of the league,
and to call collective security into serious question in
Great Britain. Hoare left Iaval to decide for himself what
that would mean to French plans for containing the German
menace.
IV

On July 31, the league Council met in Geneva to consider
the Abyssinian dispute. The meeting came at the request of
the Abyssinian government in accordance with the timetable
established by the Council on May 25. The Council had agreed
on that day to meet at the end of July if the arbitral process
failed to produce agreement on a fifth arbitrator.33 The
Council session began with little apparent prospect of agree—
ment, yet it produced results sufficient to sustain hope of
a compromise settlement. Nussolini was still playing for
time. British and French concern to find a painless solution
to the Abyssinian problem left ample room for Italian maneuver-
ing.

The Council began its deliberations on July 31 in private

session. The first meeting established the gap between the
Abyssinian and Italian positions. Gaston Jeze spoke for
Abyssinia and called upon the Council to broaden its consider-
ations beyond the procedural aspects of the arbitration

process. He asked the Council to consider whether the Italian

 

33league of ”ations, Official Journal, June 1935, p. 6&0.

 

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118

government was proceeding in a dilatory fashion in order to

3b

prevent a solution. Aloisi protested for Italy that accord-
ing to the Covenant the Council could not broaden its consider-
ations since the dispute was still the subject of arbitral

35

procedure. At Iaval's suggestion, the Council decided to

postpone discussion in order to allow for efforts to find
agreement outside of the Council chamber.36
Three days of tense negotiations produced enough accord
to revive the arbitration commission. When the Council
reconvened on August 3, Abyssinia accepted the narrow Italian
interpretation of the matter under arbitration in return for
Italian agreement to proceed with the designation of a fifth

37

arbitrator. Jeze reiterated that Abyssinia would accept in
advance the decision of the arbitrators.38 To prod the Ital—
ians into serious negotiation, the Council fixed September h
as the date on which it would meet again to consider progress
in the dispute. The establishment of a definite date for

the next Council meeting also provided a time frame for the

tripartite meeting which, Eden announced, had been agreed

 

3“league of Nations, Official Journal, August 1935, p. 966

Biggig.

36221.4.

37gpgg., pp. 967-68.
38%” p. 968.

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119

upon by the representatives of Britain, Italy and France.39
Eden explained to the Council that the signatories of the
agreement of 1906 had decided upon conversations "with a view
to finding a solution acceptable to all for the difficulties
of a more general nature which have unfortunately arisen

between Italy and Ethiopia.”0

He promised to report the
outcome of the three-power meeting to the Council when it
met again on September h.

Eden again was the motive force in the negotiations at
Geneva. Between the Council meetings, Eden pressed the unfor-
tunate Aloisi until he secured Mussolini's reluctant accept-
ance of a tripartite meeting under the eXpress authority

“1 Eden later recorded that Hoare

of the League of Nations.
would have been happy to see the Three-power meeting develop
outside of the league's purview.“2 Not so Eden. He saw his
success in keeping the league firmly yoked to the Abyssinian
crisis as a personal triumph.“3 On the evening of August 3,
Eden broadcast back to Britain on the accomplishments which

he had helped to engineer during the Council meeting just past

He referred to the negotiations as the most difficult he had

 

39Ibiq., p. 969.

“01bid.
#1

#2

Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 2H7.

 

Ibid.
“3.22.1.9.

120

ever eXperienced at Geneva, but he implied that the results
were worth the effort. He placed particular emphasis upon
the agreement reached by Britain, Italy and France to begin
direct negotiations to try and arrive at a peaceful solution.
He added that nothing would be done behind Abyssinia's back.uu

Eden's August 3 broadcast held out more hope for the
upcoming tripartite meeting than circumstances warranted.
Eden may have been trying to emphasize that his government
intended to take the meeting very seriously, but he could do
nothing to guarantee the attitude of the French. Indeed,
Iaval's actions on August 3 offered further evidence that the
French would be very unlikely to exert the pressure on Italy
which might persuade Mussolini to accept a compromise settle-
ment. Before the August 3 meeting of the league Council.
Iaval and Eden had agreed upon texts for the speeches which
they would make before the Council.“5 The idea was to close
in each case with a strong statement of fidelity to the
Covenant, meant to give Italy pause. Eden played his part
and warned that Britain was mindful of its obligations as a
member of the league, and would look to see the Council "deal
with the whole question" if an agreed settlement of the

#6

Abyssinian dispute failed to eventuate. When it came his

 

uuThe listener, August 1#, 1935, p. 26h.
uSGeoffrey Thompson, Front line Qiplomat (london:
Hutchinson, 1959). p. 105.

M
p. 969.

 

League of Nations, Official Journal, August 1935.

‘kn.

AU
3.
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121

turn, Laval omitted the pungent last paragraph of his Speech.
He eXplained afterwards that he had shown his speech to Aloisi
and had dropped the final paragraph on Aloisi's advice.“7
The elusive Laval was in himself good reason to doubt
that the three-power meeting would be productive. There
were also continuing indications that positions were hardening
in Addis Ababa and Rome. On July 17, Haile Selassie told
George Steer of The Times that he would accept the proposal
which Britain had made in June. He would exchange most of the
Ogaden for a seaport, but he ruled out the cession of any
Abyssinian territory in the north.“8 On the following day,
Haile Selassie delivered a rallying Speech to an assembly of
Abyssinian notables in Parliament House. He declared that
Abyssinia would stand against any invader, he rejected the
idea of a mandate or protectorate, and he called upon his

people to unite in the country's defense.“9

In Rome,
Mussolini spoke on July 21 of Italy's colonizing mission. He
discounted the League of Nations as an organization apparently
designed to preside over the decadence of Europe. The moment
of decision had come, Mussolini said, and to meet it he had

50

mobilized two more divisions.

 

#7Thompson, Front Line Diplomat, p. 105.

uBThe Times, July 18, 1935.
hgThe Times, July 19, 1935.

SOGaetano Salvemini, Prelude to World War II (New York:
Doubleday and Co., 195“), p. 2A3.

 

 

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122

Despite the signs of impending war, the British govern-
ment saw no point in being pessimistic about the forthcoming
tripartite meeting. Eden had arranged the meeting over
Mussolini's objections. With some French support, that suc-
cess might lead to another. Mussolini's public pronouncements
set a difficult tone for the meeting, but in private conver-
sation, away from the atmosphere of Rome or Geneva, the
Italians could be eXpected to be less rigid. In any case,
the three-power talks opened up a new possibility of arranging
a compromise settlement and, for that reason alone, could not
be discounted.

Hoare haped that Mussolini would recognize that Britain
and France were anxious to help Italy climb down from a
dangerous situation without any loss of prestige. The tri-
partite talks offered an opportunity to work out a settle-
ment before the League convened in September and took up the
matter. If the talks did nothing more than establish a more
reasonable attitude on Italy's part, it was possible that
the situation could be managed at Geneva. In a statement
to the House of Commons on August 1, Hoare urged the Italians
to lay their complaints against Abyssinia before the league
"in the prOper and regular manner. They will find the League
ready to give full and impartial consideration to the case

t. "51

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Hoare reiterated his sympathy for the Italian "need for

"52 He made it clear on the other hand, that

eXpansion.
should Italy continue to ignore the voice of reason, the
British government would be "second to no one in our inten-
tion to carry out our obligations under the Treaties and
under the Covenant."53 From the context of his remarks, it
was apparent that the Foreign Secretary's warning was as
reluctant as it was unequivocal. War, he emphasized, would
be bad for Italy, bad for Abyssinia, and "harmful beyond

exaggeration to the League...."5u

Speaking for the government,
Hoare said "we are determined to take no rash steps which
would make the situation irredeemable."55 Had he been able
to offer that assurance on behalf of Mussolini, it would have
meant a good deal more. On August 2, the House of Commons
adjourned for the summer recess and left the government to
worry over the implications of their dual policy.
V
The tripartite talks were scheduled to begin in Paris

at the end of the second week in August. Eden and Vansittart

planned to go over for preliminary conversations with French

 

52Ibid.

53Ib1d., col. 2932.

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55Ibid.

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officials to try to establish an agreed position before the
Italians arrived. Somehow, the idea that the French would
join in the effort to put pressure on the Italians took root
in London in spite of the wrigglings of Laval.

On August 6, Baldwin, Hoare and Eden met in London to
consider the line that Eden should take in the three power

56

conversations. Eden was authorized to threaten Italy with
the procedures outlined in the Covenant, but the authoriza-
tion was carefully hedged. No doubt Baldwin and Hoare had
come to recognize the danger of giving Eden his head in
negotiations relating to the Abyssinian crisis. Eden was
instructed to "do his utmost to maintain the close relations
already established with the French Government on the Italo—
Abyssinian dispute."57 On that questionable premise, the
ministers agreed that Eden should seek to establish a joint
program for later discussion with the Italian representative,
Aloisi. The object was to bring home to Aloisi ”the ultimate
choice before Italy."58
Mussolini's choice, as Baldwin, Hoare and Eden defined

it, lay either in accepting certain reasonable concessions

from Abyssinia, or in facing a League of Nations left with

 

56The rest of the cabinet had scattered for their summer
holidays. Eden and Hoare thought themselves fortunate to coax
Baldwin into a meeting in London before he left for his holi-
day in France. Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 2&8.

 

57Cab 2u/256, c.P.159(35).
581bid.

125

no option but to consider the obligations imposed by the
Covenant.59 Eden was given discretion to offer British
support for the Italian position on frontier and treaty
violations, insofar as a case could be made in each instance.
He was also authorized to support Italian demands for "usual
and reasonable" facilities for trade and habitation in
Abyssinia. And Britain obviously had no objection to the
Italian insistence on the elimination of the slave trade in

Abyssinia.6O

The ministers recognized that such modest
prOposals would hardly meet Mussolini's demands. The success
of the conversations would turn on the question of territorial
concessions.

There were indications that the French intended to
approach the matter of territorial concessions by proposing
the application of joint Anglo-French pressure on Abyssinia to
extract the "maximum offer” in the interest of peace. The
ministers agreed that Abyssinia should be encouraged to be
forthcoming on the matter of territorial concessions. Eden
was also authorized to remind the French that they too could
contribute to the territorial offer. France, after all, had

never conceded anything to Italy comparable to the British

cession of Jubaland.61

If the Italians refused to accept a reasonable package

 

 

 

126

of economic and territorial concessions they were to be left
with no illusions about the decision which they would be
forcing upon the member-states of the League of Nations.
Eden was to underline the clear danger, but he was eXpressly
instructed to give the French no reason to complain to the
Italians that Britain was pressing for a French commitment
on sanctions. Any detailed discussion of sanctions was to
be avoided, "as this does not arise at present and, if it
arises at all, belongs rather to discussions at a later

62 Eden was further instructed to bear in mind that

stage."
the cabinet had decided that, in discussions with the French,
"the underlying assumption would be that both Powers realised
their obligations and were jointly interested to find a way
out of the difficulty."63

Eden's instructions represented another victory for him.
He gained the authority to imply very strongly in Paris that
Britain would press for sanctions in the event of Italian
aggression. Nonetheless, his instructions were shot through
with caution and a reluctance to believe that the matter
would come to the point of sanctions. The dread word sanction
was to be scrupulously avoided, and Eden was to keep carefully
in step with Laval. The ministers recognized, however, that

even the implied threat which they were authorizing carried

real danger. As a concomitant to the instructions given to

 

 

 

12?

Eden, the ministers directed the Chiefs of Staff to consider
the military implications ”if Italy took the bit between her
teeth” and attacked the Mediterranean fleet.6u
The advice tendered to the cabinet by the Chiefs of
Staff was hardly encouraging. By July 30, the Chiefs of
Staff had completed their consideration of the problem posed
for them by Baldwin on July 5.65 The problem was to weigh
the implications of applying the economic sanctions outlined
in Article 16 of the League Covenant. The military experts
judged that Italy was ”particularly vulnerable to economic
pressure,” but they added that the stocks of war materials
which had been accumulated in Italy made it unlikely that
economic pressure would be effective for several months.66
They concluded that in order for economic pressure to be
effective at all, Britain and France would have to give a
vigorous and sustained lead to the smaller countries at
Geneva, and the participating navies would have to exercise
belligerent rights in the blockade of Italy, at least to the
extent of examining neutral shipping for contraband.67 In the

opinion of the military chiefs, such a blockade would "almost

inevitably lead to active hostilities, most probably at sea,

 

64cm; 214/256, C.P.166(35).

65Marder, "The Royal Navy and the EthiOpian Crisis of
1935-36.” p- 1327.

66Cab zu/256. c.P.169(35).

671b1d.

128

and thus involve the Naval Powers in the first instance."68

The Chiefs of Staff were even more emphatic about the
dangers posed by a sudden Italian attack on the Mediterranean
fleet. By August 9, Vansittart had in hand a c0py of the
report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in response to the
August 6 instructions from Baldwin, Eden and Hoare.69 In
the gravest tones, the military chiefs warned against taking
any action likely to cause Italy "to take the bit between her
teeth."70 The fleet was not on a war footing. A full week
would be required to bring the fleet up to full effectiveness,
and that was assuming authority to take the politically
sensitive step of mobilizing the reserves.71 Beyond that,
the chiefs noted, it would take at least two months "before
all our forces can be considered as able effectively to

co-operate... on a war basis."72

If the government expected
the Services to meet an Italian threat in the Mediterranean,
adequate prior notice was all-important.

The Chiefs of Staff made no effort to hide their concern
over the militarily unrealistic obligations imposed by the

Covenant. "Any idea,” they warned, "that sanctions can be

 

68Ibid.

69Sir Robert Vansittart to Sir Samuel Hoare, August 9,
1935. F0 800/295.

7°Cab 2u/256 C.P.166(35).
7llbid.

721bid.

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129

enforced whenever diplomatically desirable is highly dangerous
from the point of view of the Services...."73 The chiefs made
it clear that, in their opinion, the war which Britain was
forced to contemplate because of its connection with the
League could seriously affect the government's programs to
provide for British security. They had no doubts about
Britain's ability to win a war with Italy, but they argued
that the fleet would inevitably suffer losses which it could
ill afford.7h They pointed out that plans for the reinforce-
ment of Singapore would be disrupted by such losses, and they
added that if, as expected, a British air contingent suffered
similar losses, the objective of achieving air parity with
Germany by April, 1937 would also be undercut.75 If the
government decided to run the risks involved in Opposing
Italian ambitions in east Africa, the Chiefs of Staff stressed
that the assured military support of France was essential.76

Only Hoare and Vansittart were in London to receive the
warning of the Chiefs of Staff. When Eden returned from a
brief holiday in Yorkshire, he found Hoare and Vansittart agreed
that the arguments of the military dictated additional
caution in the impending tripartite talks.77 Eden was

73Ibid.

751319.; Marder, ”The Royal Navy and the EthiOpian
Crisis of 1935-36,” pp. 1338-39.

75Cab 2h/256 C.P.l66(35).
761bid.

77Avon,_§acingthe Dictators, p. 2&9.

 

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130

thoroughly depressed. He wrote bitterly to William Ormsby-
Gore that he was faced with 'vague instructions from home

and a thieves' kitchen in Paris.‘78

In the circumstances,
Eden felt that there was little hOpe of a successful outcome
to the talks.79

In Rome, Mussolini was also in a black mood. On July 31,
Aloisi received from Laval a copy of the memorandum which
Hoare had sent to Paris on July 29. Aloisi passed it on to
Rome, where Mussolini brooded over Hoare's arguments and
became convinced, for the first time, that the British

80 A terrible

seriously intended to stand in his way.
humiliation suddenly loomed. The British navy was in a
position to control the bottlenecks of the Mediterranean and
isolate the Italian army in east Africa. Mussolini had
gambled that the British would offer nothing more than passive
resistance to his colonizing venture. Grimly he determined
that war with Britain would be preferable to disgrace. On
August 3, he told the German ambassador, Ulrich von Hassel,
that he could not accept a second Adowa.81 On August 13, he

told the French ambassador, Charles de Chambrun, that he

 

78Ibid.

 

79Ibid.
80

 

Baer, The Coming of the Italian-EthiOpian War, p. 252.

81Documents on German Foreign Poligy, ser. C,IV.533.

131

would make war on the British before he allowed them to
force a humiliating settlement upon Italy as they had done
to France at Fashoda.82 Aloisi was sent to Paris under a
strict charge to uphold the full letter of Mussolini's
demands upon Abyssinia.83

As Mussolini expected, and as Eden feared, the tri-
partite talks which began in Paris on August 16 only served
to underline the mounting crisis. The discussions were hope-
less without an agreed common ground. The British and French
delegations had in mind a settlement which would be acceptable
in Addis Ababa as well as in Rome. The Italian delegation
was authorized to accept nothing less than effective political
control of Abyssinia. On August 18, Mussolini put an end to
the talks by rejecting out of hand the settlement proposed by
the British and the French.

From the British point of view, a critical aspect of
the Paris talks took place before the Italians arrived. Eden
and Vansittart left London on August 13 to have a day alone
with Laval and his advisers. They found that Laval conceived
of the tripartite conversations as an opportunity to mediate

in a dispute between Britain and Italy.8u Eden had anticipated

 

82Foreign Relations of the United States, l935,I,630-31:
Baer, The Cominggof the Italian-Ethippian War, p. 255.

83Baer, The Cominggof the Italian-Ethippian War, p. 254.

8hForeign Relations of the United States, l935,I,628.

132

that it would prove difficult to make Laval "face realities."85
He and Vansittart devoted the rest of the day to the task.
Their key argument was that if the League of Nations was
discredited in the Abyssinian affair, public opinion in

Britain might turn against continued British participation in

86

Continental affairs. Hoare had touched on the same nerve
in his memorandum of July 29, and Laval began to take the
repeated British warning seriously.

On August 15, it was Aloisi's turn to warn about his
government's determination. The tripartite talks did not
begin formally until August 16, but Aloisi outlined Italy's
position in advance in separate conversations with Laval and
Eden. Aloisi proposed three bases for the tripartite conver-
sations:

1. French and British recognition of Italian

political and economic preponderence in
Abyssinia.

2. A declaration by both countries of their

recognition of Italian need of eXpansion.

3. In the event of agreement on the above two

points, an assurance of Italian cooperation

8?

at Geneva.

 

85Anthony Eden to Stanley Baldwin, August 13. 1935,
Baldwin Papers, Vol. 123.

86Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 250.

87Foreign Relations of the United States, l935,I,629

f5

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Aloisi eXplained that what Italy wanted was a class C mandate
over Abyssinia.88
Laval was taken aback by Aloisi's bold statement of
Italy's requirements. He could not, he told Aloisi, accept
the points prOposed as the bases for conversation, nor could
he accept the idea of a mandate. He was anxious to find a
peaceful solution to the problem, however, and he suggested
to Aloisi that cooperation among the three powers involved
might secure most of what Italy wanted without a war.89 Eden
was more direct and less encouraging. He told Aloisi that no
agreement was possible on the basis of the Italian demands.90
The talks were effectively deadlocked before they began, and
Vansittart was Openly gloomy. In a late evening conversation
with the American Charge J. T. Marriner, he spoke direly of
the situation as more dangerous than any since 1911».91

The tripartite talks began formally on August 16, with
Eden and Laval arguing against a fixed Italian position.
Aloisi made it plain that he was under instructions to be

92

uncompromising. Throughout the morning session and on into

the evening, Eden and Laval tried to convince Aloisi that a

 

 

 

9OAvon, Facing the Dictators, p. 250.
91Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, 1,626-27.

92Avon, Facinggthe Dictators, p. 250.

 

 

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13h

solution based upon Italian political control of Abyssinia

93

was an impossibility. Instead, they proposed a variety of
advantages for Italy and Italians in Abyssinia, to be peace-
fully conceded by the Abyssinian government and guaranteed

by an updated version of the tripartate treaty of 1906. As
refined for the evening session, the British and French
proposals envisioned an Abyssinian request to the League

of Nations for the foreign assistance necessary for the
economic development and administrative reform of the country.
Britain, Italy and France would provide the assistance with
the blessing of the League and the consent of Abyssinia. The
independence and sovereignty of Abyssinia would be guaranteed,
but Britain and France were prepared to recognize Italy's
"special economic interests" and to concede to Italy the major
role in shaping the economic and administrative changes pro-
posed. The proposal made specific reference to "the possi-
bility of territorial rectifications," and the British dele-
gation indicated that Britain remained willing to cede the
port of Zeila to Abyssinia in order to facilitate an agree-
ment.9u

Aloisi steadily refused to consider the suggestions put

 

93Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, 1,629-30.

9“Ibid., 631.; Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 250: Baer,
The Cominggof the Italian—Ethigpian War, pp. 264-65. The
proposals made by Eden and Laval on August 16 had been approved,
in good part, in advance by Haile Selassie, Eric Virgin, The
Abyssinia I Knew (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 159-60. _—_

 

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135

forward by Eden and Laval. But Laval pressed his arguments
with uneXpected vigor. He stated flatly that the foreign
policy of France, like that of Britain, was based upon the
League of Nations.95 Beyond that, he noted, the French
government could not countenance the possibility of a revul-
sion of British public Opinion from cooperation in EurOpean

affairs.96

To emphasize his concern, Laval went to the
telephone, called the French Charge in Rome, and told him

to warn Mussolini that if Italy rejected the prOposals sub-
mitted to Aloisi, France would have no choice but to stand
beside Britain in the matter.97 Laval's strong stand persuaded
Aloisi to send the prOposals to Mussolini for his considera-

tion.98

In Rome, Laval's arguments in Eden's presence on
August 16 were weighed against the private assurance of sup-
port which he asked the new Italian ambassador, Vittorio
Cerruti, to pass along to Mussolini on August 15.99 Mussolini
felt secure enough to leave the proposals lying on his desk

for a day while he attended a series of military reviews.100

 

95Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, 1.630.
96.1.1222.

97Avon. Facing the Dictators, p. 250.

98Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, 1.630.

99In offering the reassurance of his support, Laval asked
Mussolini not to jeOpardize the League or to speak of war.
William C. Askew, "The Secret Agreement Between France and
Italy on EthiOpia, January 1935," Journal of Modern History,
XXV (1953). P- 48-

looBaer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 266.

 

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136

All calls from Paris were refused, and Eden and Laval, in

the words of the correspondent of The Times, were left "to

 

kick their heels” until Mussolini saw fit to return a reply.101

0n the morning of August 18, Aloisi brought Laval the
Italian reply. It came as no surprise that Mussolini had
rejected the prOposals as being 'unacceptable in all

102 The discussions were broken off. and Eden

respects.’
telegraphed to Hoare: 'We are now therefore in presence of
the breakdown which we have always foreseen.'103 It was
hard to avoid the conclusion that the last Opportunity to
forge a compromise settlement before war develOped in Abys-
sinia had been lost. Vansittart pointed up the Obvious
during a post-mortem at the British embassy that night.
'Anthony,’ he told a tired and rather petulant Eden, 'you
are faced with a first-class international crisis.'lou
Before leaving Paris, Eden had a final conversation with
Laval. Laval agreed that Mussolini seemed determined to go

his own way without any regard for world opinion, and he

assumed that some form of condemnation of Italian aggression

 

 

 

101The Times, August 19. 1935.
102Avon, Facinggthe Dictators. Po 251-
103Ibid.

104

Thompson, Front Line Diplomat, p. 107. In a letter to
Hoare, Vansittart attributed the failure of the Paris talks

in good part to the deterioration of British military strength,
which led the Italians to scoff and the French to doubt. Sir
Robert Vansittart to Sir Samuel Hoare, August 19, 1935,

F0 800/295.

 

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137

by the League of Nations would be inevitable.105 Laval said
that he had no intention of turning his back upon the League,
but he begged Eden to make the French dilemma clear when he
reported to his colleagues in London. Italy was the one
secure ally that France had on the Continent, and Mussolini
had made a pointed reference to that relationship in the
course of rejecting the Anglo-French prOposals.106
In his concluding message from Paris, Eden characterized
the French attitude as indecisive and embarrassed, and he
reiterated that virtually all possibility Of negotiation
with Italy had vanished. In the circumstances, he suggested
to Hoare that it was time to call the cabinet together to
consider the military implications of the situation.107
Hoare no doubt welcomed the idea of sharing the Abyssinian
burden again, but he must have shuddered at Eden's reference
to the growing likelihood that the British fleet would have

to enforce the provisions of the Covenant upon a European

friend.

 

105Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 251-52-

106Ibid.

107Ibid., p. 253.

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CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH IEAD

There could be little remaining doubt after the tri-
partite meetings in Paris that Mussolini was beyond the appeal
of reason. Italian military preparations were virtually
complete in east Africa, and Mussolini boasted Openly of his
plans to conquer Abyssinia as soon as the climate allowed.1
The threat of Italian aggression posed a direct challenge to
the League of Nations, a challenge which would have to be
taken up when the League convened in September. In the eyes
of most observers, the League of Nations had reached the
2

point at which its success or failure would be determined.

If the League were to meet the Italian challenge, Britain

 

1On August 19, Mussolini told the American Charge’in
Rome that it was too late to avoid an armed conflict with
Abyssinia. Italy, he said, had mobilized a million men and
had spent two billion lire. Any alteration in purpose would
ruin his government. Foreign Relations of the United States.

19350 In 739'140.

2From his vantage point as Deputy Secretary-General of
the League of Nations, Frank Walters witnessed a surge of
international Opinion in support of a Covenant "about to be
either decisively reinforced or fatally discredited." F. P.
Walters, A History of the Leggue Of Nations (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967, first published in 1952), pp. 646-h7.
In Britain, the sense of crisis produced, inter alia, a
remarkable correspondence published in the columns of The Times.
A representative example was Lord Snowden's letter, printed
on August 1h, warning that unless the League took up the
Italian challenge "there is an end to the League of Nations
and the world sinks back to the rule of the beast."

138

 

 

139

and France would have to show the way. The French were clear—
ly reluctant to Offend Mussolini and would do little at Geneva
unless pushed from London. Foreign Secretary Hoare called his
colleagues back to London at the end of August to face a
decision which they had earnestly hOped to avoid. When the
cabinet gathered on August 22, they were aware that it lay in
their hands to determine whether the existing system of collec-
tive security would be put to the test or effectively aban-
doned.

One of the letters which Hoare wrote to call the cabinet
back from holiday went to Neville Chamberlain in Switzerland.3
Chamberlain was Hoare's principal confidant in the cabinet,
and the Foreign Secretary unburdened himself about the danger—
ous problem which he was trying to manage. Mussolini had
proven completely unreasonable and there looked to be a first-
class crisis when the League met in September. The military
were gravely concerned about the risks involved in the situa-
tion, and Hoare complained that he was receiving no help from
his senior colleagues."l It was vitally necessary, he felt,
for the cabinet to meet

to consider what in these circumstances our
attitude should be on two assumptions (1) that

 

3Sir Samuel Hoare to Neville Chamberlain, August 18, 1935,
F0 800/295.

“Hoare was particularly critical of Baldwin, who, he
said, "would think about nothing but his holiday and the
necessity of keeping out of the whole business almost at any
cost," ibid.

 

 

 

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19::

JJ.

190

the French are completely with us (2) that

the French have backed out. It is equally

urgent for the Cabinet to consider what

preparations should be made to meet a

possible mad dog act by the Italians.5

Hoare's tone was rather desperate. A decision on

sanctions could hardly be avoided, and Hoare was afraid that
any move to impose significant sanctions would prompt Musso-
lini to attack Britain's Mediterranean fleet. The question
was no longer one of merely authorizing Eden to threaten the
Italians with the procedures outlined in the Covenant. The
next decision, the hard decision, might well involve Britain
in a serious war. With that prospect in mind, Hoare thought
first of the escape route which had been Open throughout the
crisis. On August 20, Hoare told the American Charge, Ray
Atherton, that ”at Geneva England would go as far as France

6 The French, of course,

was willing to go, but no further.”
would do nothing unless compelled to do so.

Significantly, HOare apparently saw no way to draw away
from sanctions other than to take shelter behind the French.
On August 13, Ramsay MacDonald wrote a letter to Hoare in
which he argued that sanctions against Italy made no sense in
that there was no League machinery for meeting force with

force, and that, in any event, Britain was not prepared to

accept the possible consequences.7 Hoare dismissed these

5Ibid.

6Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, 1,633.

7J. Ramsay MacDonald to Sir Samuel Hoare, August 13,
1935. F0 800/295.

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obvious arguments as "Ramsay's alarmist and pusillanimous
surrender to the Italians.”8 Considering his own desire to
avoid a military confrontation with Italy, Hoare's judgment
of MacDonald's reasoning was harsh. He no doubt felt, however,
that it was rather late in the day to advance a general line
of argument about the League's limitations. Throughout the
crisis, the government had chosen to emphasize their fidelity
to the League and its procedures, while hoping that the
Italian-Abyssinian quarrel would be settled peacefully. As
Mussolini's determination to have his war became increasingly
apparent, public Opinion in Britain hardened against Italy.
If, at the eleventh hour, the government were to appear to
repudiate the Covenant, they would lose very heavily with

the British people.

Before putting the question of sanctions to the cabinet,
Hoare and Eden sounded some Of the more important leaders of
Parliamentary Opinion. At Hoare's invitation, Austen Chamber-
lain, Herbert Samuel, Winston Churchill, George Lansbury,
David Lloyd George, and Lord Cecil visited the Foreign Office
by turns on August 20 and 21. Hoare would have been hard
pressed to assemble a more varied group of politicans, but
with remarkable accord they offered much the same kind of
advice. To a man, they felt that the government had to stand

by its commitments under the Covenant but had no obligation

 

8Sir Samuel Hoare to Neville Chamberlain, August 18,
1935. F0 800/295.

1h2

to do so alone.9 They saw French cooperation as all important
if the League were to move against Italian aggression, and even
Cecil recognized that it was important to avoid pushing the
French so hard that they would back out altogether. As to
sanctions, Lloyd George and Lansbury felt that the League
machinery had to be tried out, while Chamberlain and Samuel
spoke of the need to work through League channels to the

point of economic sanctions. Churchill, who worried about

the vulnerability of the Mediterranean fleet and whose
sympathies lay generally with Italy also emphasized the
importance of making it clear that Britain was prepared to
honor the obligations outlined in the Covenant. Cecil, of
course, was keen to see the effectiveness of the organization
which he had helped create finally and conclusively demon—
strated. Significantly, only Churchill seemed concerned that
economic sanctions might lead tO the point of war. The net
effect of the interviews was to establish that the cabinet
would enjoy broad support in Parliament if they elected to
take the lead in proposing economic sanctions at Paris and

Geneva.

Had the question been one of simply following the
politically popular course, the cabinet would have faced no
real problem when they met on August 22. Hoare's report on
the conversations which he and Eden had just completed at

i __—

9There are identical sets of memoranda, drawn up by
Hoare and Eden, of these conversations in F0 800/295, and in
the Templewood Papers, General Political, VIII, 1.

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143

the Foreign Office confirmed that the Peace Ballot frame of
mind continued to predominate in Parliament. The issue was
one that involved the threat of war, however, and the cabinet
had to look beyond pOpular sentiment and consider the warnings
put by the Chiefs of Staff in their report earlier in the

10 Most of the cabinet ministers did not know until

month.
they returned to London that the military chiefs considered
that sanctions carried the grave threat of a war between Bri-
tain and Italy which could cripple British efforts to meet
the threats being posed by Germany and Japan. Beyond the
military aspect of the situation, the cabinet also had to
remember that their principal interest lay in promoting a
compromise solution which would give Italy some satisfaction
and, at the same time, do the least possible damage to the
League of Nations. All in all, it represented the most
difficult and dangerous decision which the cabinet had been
forced to make during the life of the National government.

The question of sanctions was apparently too important
to be left to an unstructured discussion of the full cabinet.
0n the evening of August 21, a group of the principal ministers
met at the Prime Minister's residence, thrashed out the issue
and then led the cabinet on the following day to a decision

which had already been made. The ministers involved in the

special meeting were Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Simon, Hoare,

 

10The report, Cab 2M/256 C.P.166(35), was one of the
paper? considered at the meeting on August 22, Cab 23/82
2(35 1-

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144

Chamberlain and Eden. The decision which they reached was to
participate, if necessary, in the imposition of economic
sanctions upon Italy.11

The orientation of the key meeting Of ministers was
established at the outset by Eden and Hoare. Eden began
with an account of the tripartite discussions in Paris. He
emphasized that the Italians had been thoroughly intransigent
and would be satisfied with nothing less than dominion over
nearly all of Abyssinia. He noted that the British and
French delegations had acted together to resist the Italian
demands but added that the French were privately wavering.12
Hoare followed and said that, despite the French attitude,
he and Eden "were clear in advising their colleagues that it
was nothing less than essential to follow the regular League
of Nations procedure in this crisis."13 Hoare was arguing,
in effect, for authority to make use of the Mediterranean

fleet, and his colleagues were well aware Of the dangerous

implications of his advice.

_— .—

11The minutes of the meetin~ Of ministers on August 21,
1935 are found at Cab 23/82 F.A. H/

12Earlier in the day, Eden told Harold Nicolson over lunch
that the entire Abyssinian problem ”would be simple enough if
the French were really with us.” Eden was no doubt the only
member of the group that met later that evening who thought
that there was only one important complicating consideration.
Harold Nicolson, Diaries and LettersL_l930-1939 (New York:
Atheneum, 1966), p. 212.

 

13Cab 23/82 F.A./H./7. Hoare's conversations with Eden
and with the parliamentary leaders at the Foreign Office
apparently tempered his anxiety about sanctions.

fallow
believe :‘

rather

6A

 

 

 

145

In the end, the ministers agreed that they would have to
follow the advice of Hoare and Eden. Their conclusion,
however, was forced and unhappy, their reasoning agonized
rather than decisive. It is difficult, from their discussion,
to be certain which of several considerations contributed
most prominently to their decision. They found themselves in
a corner partially of their own making, and they were partic—
ularly conscious of the aroused British public. As MacDonald
Observed, ”if Italy proceeded to extremes, it would be a
great shock to British public Opinion if no outward action
were taken by His Majesty's government.”lu But they also
worried about the undependability of the French, the uncertain
reaction of the important non-member states, and the problem
of maintaining control of British policy once the League
Council took the matter in hand. They were especially concerned
about the threat of war. Chamberlain emphasized again that
Mussolini's unpredictability would make the application of
sanctions extremely dangerous. The risks involved were very
serious and there was considerable doubt that the French would

agree to help shoulder them.
Ironically, the feeling that the French might ultimately

prevent the League from imposing sanctions made it easier for
the ministers to support the use of sanctions. Hoare also
facilitated the difficult decision by eXplaining that if

economic sanctions were called for they could be applied

 

l“Ibid.

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146

gradually and carefully in accordance with the resolutions
interpreting Article 16 which had been adopted by the League
Assembly in 1921.15 To a certain extent, then, even the
decision to support the use of sanctions was based upon the
self-delusive expectation that there might still be a
relatively painless way out of the crisis. It was impossible,
however, to ignore the risks involved in sanctions. Perhaps
the most remarkable thing about the discussion which led to
the decision was that no one suggested that Britain could or
should refuse to accept the heavy burden which economic
sanctions might place upon the British fleet.

The full cabinet met on August 22 to draft instructions
for the delegation which would attend the forthcoming meetings
at Geneva. After lengthy discussion, they agreed that Britain

should lend cautious support to a call for economic sanctions

 

15At the second Assembly of the League Of Nations in
1921, the point was made that the system of sanctions laid
down in Article 16 had been adopted before anyone knew that
the United States would not be a member. The dangers which
might be involved in interfering with a trade which the
United States saw as legitimate led the Assembly to adOpt
resolutions sti ulating that economic sanctions could be
applied gradualIy and partially rather than suddenly and
completely. Pending the ratification of these amendments
by the member states, the Assembly directed that the League
Council should be guided by their substance. The amendments
never formally came into force because the French refused to
ratify“ them. Walters, A Histogy Of thgngagge of Nations

17“

pp.

 

147

in the event of Italian aggression.16 The British delegates
were to reaffirm the statements that had been made in Parlia-
ment about British support for the Covenant, but they were
not authorized to take the lead in proposing sanctions. The
guiding principle for the delegation would be to keep in close
step with the French, and to avoid any commitment which the
French were not equally prepared to assume. If a policy of
economic sanctions was to be adopted and implemented, it
would have to be done collectively by the entire membership
of the League. And if the League did elect to impose sanc-
tions, the cabinet cautioned that the procedure laid down in
the Covenant, as interpreted by the Assembly in 1921, should
be followed closely, "not in any quixotic spirit, and with
due regard to the many difficulties."17 With the warnings of
the Chiefs of Staff on the table before them, the cabinet
members were especially conscious of ”the grave effects on

our diplomacy of our present military weakness."18

 

16Cab 23/82 42(35)1. At the same meeting, the cabinet
decided not to lift the embargo which had been in effect on
the sale of British manufactured arms to either Italy or
Abyssinia. It was Abyssinia, of course. that was anxious to
buy the arms, but, as Hoare eXplained in a letter to Lloyd
George, the information available to the cabinet suggested
that the Abyssinians were not really in the position to buy
very much, while a unilateral lifting of the embargo might
cause a rift with the French which would destroy any prospect
of joint Anglo-French pressure on the Italians. Sir Samuel
Hoare to David Lloyd George, August 28, 1935, F0 800/295.

17Cab 23/82 42(35)1.
18Ibid.

148

On August 24, Hoare wrote to Sir George Clerk in Paris
to eXplain the cabinet's decision. His letter throws add-
itional light on the cabinet's reasoning:

The general feeling of the country, fully
reflected in the Cabinet, can, I think, be
summarised as one of determination to stick
to the Covenant and of anxiety to keep out of
war. You will say that these feelings are
self-contradictory. At present at least the
country believes that they can be reconciled.
Most people are still convinced that if we
stick to the Covenant and apply collective
sanctions, Italy must give in and there will
be no war. You and I know that the position
is not as simple as this and that the presump-
tions that, firstly, there will be collective
action including full collective action by
the French, and, secondly, that economic sanc-
tions will be effective are, to say the least,
very bold and sanguine. None the less, what-
ever may deveIOp it is essential that we
should play out the League hand in September.
If it is then found that there is no collective
basis for sanctions, that is to say in part-
icular that the French are not prepared to give
their full OOOperation, or that the action Of
the non-member States, for example Germany, the
United States and Japan, is so unhelpful as to
make economic sanctions futile, the world will
have to face the fact that sanctions are imprac-
ticable. We must, however, on no account assume
the impracticability of sanctions upgil the
League has made this investigation.

Hoare speculated that the League Council would make an inquiry
into the question of sanctions and added that Britain would
participate in such an inquiry "with the bona fide intention

of seeing what can be done in face of the actual facts."20

 

l9Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir George Clerk, August 24, 1935,
F0 800/295.

20Ibid.

149

The cabinet obviously were determined not to be responsi-
ble for the decisive failure of the League. The decision to
support sanctions was not willingly taken, nor was there much
Optimism that sanctions would succeed, or, indeed, that they
would even be imposed. If it did come to sanctions, however,
the cabinet were agreed that it was important to see if the
League system would work to control aggression without
necessitating recourse to war. In the threatening circum-
stances developing in EurOpe and the Far East, it was essential
to know how to structure a program for British security. If
the League system did not work, it was necessary to recognize
that fact and to redouble the efforts being made in the direc-

21

tion of rearmament. From the cabinet's point of view, then,

 

21Hoare stopped short of eXplaining to Clerk that an
unsuccessful attempt by the League to control Italian aggres-
sion would mean an increased emphasis upon rearmament in
Britain. The conclusion was obvious, however, and Neville
Chamberlain drew it for J. L. Garvin and George Lloyd when
he discussed the Abyssinian crisis with them at about the
same time. According to Lloyd, Chamberlain suggested that the
government could afford the luxury of a strong stand in sup-
port Of the Covenant since the French were certain to make
sanctions impossible, and Britain could then embark upon a
large program of naval reconstruction.

Lloyd's account of his conversation with Chamberlain
Opens up a critical question of interpretation. If accepted
at face value, it creates the impression that Chamberlain, and
by implication his colleagues, were frankly cynical in their
support for the league and looked to turn a difficult situa-
tion to profit by sheltering behind the French. That impres-
sion is reinforced by Leo Amery's account of a similar conver-
sation with Chamberlain on September 24. Both Amery and Lloyd
had axes to grind, however, and each may have put his own read-
ing on what Chamberlain had to say. Lloyd was President of
the Navy League and a loud thumper for naval rearmament in
Conservative circles. Amery had long been an Open Opponent
of Britain's connection with the League of Nations. The con-
clusions drawn by Chamberlain's biographers have been sharply

150

the decision to support sanctions represented an experiment,
not undertaken "cleverly", as A. J. P. Taylor has suggested,

but rather with the feeling that there was little else that

22

could be done. Essentially, the decision was, as Hoare

at variance with the impression created by the accounts of
Lloyd and Amery. Keith Feiling and Iain Macleod noted that
Chamberlain was well aware of the limitations imposed by
British military weakness and by the incomplete nature Of

the League, but each emphasized a letter which Chamberlain
wrote to his wife in September in which he reasoned that
sanctions might force Mussolini to halt and Hitler to waver.
Macleod also pointed to the fact that Chamberlain became a
leading advocate Of the dangerous Oil sanction when the
question arose in November. William Rock's conclusion was

that Chamberlain had no set views on sanctions, but developed
his thinking in response to the crisis from a variety Of
general premises. Rock's interpretation seems to accord

best with a consideration of the cabinet materials. The

League was still seen as important to the British people,

and its potential for British security had yet to be disproved.
Chamberlain and his colleagues were dubious that the League
system would work as intended, but they decided to 'try it out.'
Had the government really been determined to shelter behind

the French, it is altogether unlikely that the League would
have had the leadership or the support necessary to impose
sanctions upon Italy. Colin Forbes Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd
(London: Macmillan, l9h8), pp. 267-693 L. S. Amery, My
Political Life, Vol III, The Unforgiving Years (London: Hutch-
inson, 19553, 17h: Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamber-
lain (London: Macmillan, 1970, first published in I936), p. 268;
Iain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (London: Frederick Muller,
1961), p. 187; William R. Rock, Neville Chamberlain (New York:
Twayne, 1969), pp. 99-100.

22Taylor felt that Hoare was responsible for the cabinet's
decision to support collective action by the League: "Hoare
always suffered from excessive cleverness, and never more so
than on this occasion. He seemed to be betting on a certainty
either way. If collective security worked, the prestige Of
the National government would be enhanced and the League could
then be used effectively against Germany; if it failed, others
could be blamed and the way would be Open for rearmament."
A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 191u-19u5 (Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 380. Taylor's analysis converts the cabinet's
agonized decision into one that was cynically calculated.
Hoare and his colleagues may have been guilty of a number of
sins during the Abyssinian crisis, but cleverness was not
among them.

 

 

151

noted, a reflection of the confusion which had been typical
Of the British view Of sanctions from the first. Despite
the obvious danger, it was difficult for even a largely
Conservative government to accept that the system which had
been created to guarantee peace could in itself Spawn a war.
II

On September 4 the League Council met in Geneva and began
consideration of the long-postponed Abyssinian case. The
Council had in hand, as a point of departure, the final report
and award of the arbitral commission which had been meeting
since August 26 in Paris.23

The findings of the commission pointed up the Obvious
futility Of the arbitral effort. The commission had been
compelled to limit its concern to the WalWal incident as the
price of Italian agreement to the appointment of a fifth
arbitrator.2h The end result of the commission's careful
considerations was to establish that it was impossible to be
certain who had fired the first shot at Wa1Wal. Therefore
the commission was unable to fix the blame for the incident
on either Italy or Abyssinia. The commission's findings were

predictable and of consequence only in so far as they served

 

23The ItalO-EthiOpian Commission of Conciliation and
Arbitration rendered its decision on September 3. Baron
Aloisi submitted the commission's findings to the Secretary-
General on September h, and they were printed as part of Annex
1571, League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935, pp.
1351-55.

2“League of Nations, Official Journal, August 1935,
pp. 967-68.

 

152

to place the matter back into the hands of the League Council.
Once the commission had rendered its award on September 3,
it was no longer possible for the Italian delegate to argue
that the Council could not consider the dispute while it was
the subject of an arbitral procedure.
Eden Opened the Council's deliberations by reviewing
again the failure of the tripartite meetings in Paris. As
he had done in the critical meeting of ministers, Eden took
the Opportunity to set the tone for the meeting. He detailed
the proposals put forward by the British and French, noted
ruefully that the Italian delegation had rejected them, and
then underlined what he saw as the significance of the problem:
I am sure that all of us, as Members of
the Council of the League, must be fully alive
to our responsibilities at this time. World
Opinion is watching us.... if in the judgment
of world Opinion the League fails in this dis-
pute, its authority for the future will be
grievously shaken and its influence gravely
impaired. The collapse Of the League and Of
the new conception of international order for
which it stands would be a world calamity.2
Eden had been authorized to support rather than propose
sanctions in the event of Italian aggression, and he was
determined to make the Council face its responsibilities.
Laval, in his turn, was much more restrained than Eden.
He pledged French loyalty to the Covenant, but focused his

remarks on what he still saw as the prospects for a peaceful

solution to the dispute. "I refuse to believe," Laval said,

25League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935.
p. 1134.

153

"that this supreme effort is doomed to failure and that an
equitable settlement cannot be found, one affording Italy
the satisfaction she can legitimately claim without disre-
garding the fundamental rights of Ethiopian sovereignty."26
Laval's determined Optimism must have sounded foolish.
The Italian foreign ministry had drawn up and circulated to
the Council members an elaborate indictment depicting Abyssinia
as barbarous and unfit for membership in the League.27 Aloisi
followed Laval and eXpanded on the Italian memorandum in terms
which left no question about Italy's intentions. Italy, he
said, could no longer adopt a "passive and forgiving" attitude
towards an uncivilized state which was threatening Italian
frontiers. Abyssinia had not measured up to the standards of
the League and did not merit the rights Of membership. Italy
could not continue a discussion in the League on a footing of
equality with Abyssinia, and had to reserve "full liberty to
adopt any measures that may become necessary to ensure the
safety Of its colonies and to safeguard its own interests."28

Aloisi's menacing statement lent weight to Gaston Jeze's

 

261bid., p. 1135.

27The Italian memorandum was 63 pages in length, and was
accompanied by 272 supporting documents and a collection of
photographs selected to depict Abyssinian barbarity. The
memorandum drew tellingly upon British reports Of the slave
trade in Abyssinia and quoted with relish Lady Simon's
condemnation Of the practice. Ibid., Annex 1571, pp. 1355-
1583.

281bid., p. 1137.

15h

call for the Council to "endeavor to effect a settlement of
the dispute" in accord with Article 15 Of the Covenant.29
Jeze warned that there was no longer any time for dilatory
measures. The question the Abyssinian government wanted the
Council members to keep before them was whether Italy was to
be allowed to conduct the "war of extermination" which was
imminent. On September 6, the Council responded to the
Abyssinian appeal by establishing a Committee Of Five,
composed of representatives Of Spain, Turkey, Poland, Britain
and France, "to make a general examination Of Italo-EthiOpian
relations and to seek for a pacific settlement."30 In its
ritual fashion, the League had begun the final process which
would lead to its collapse.

Frank Walters, the British Deputy Secretary-General,
later wondered why only Maxim Litvinov, Of the representatives
Of the major powers on the Council, took up the challenge
posed by the Italian memorandum.31 He felt that Litvinov's
words on Eden's lips would have aroused great enthusiasm among

supporters of the League. Walters did not know that Eden was‘

 

29Ibid., p. llhO.
3°Ibid.. p. 11u5.

31Walters, A History of the League of Nations, pp. 6H5-
h6. Litvinov, the representative of the Soviet Union, rejected
the Italian arguments on the Obvious grounds that the League
was not formulated to pass judgment on the internal regimes
of its members. A representative Of the Soviet Union could
hardly allow such arguments to go unchallenged. League of
Nations, Official Journal, November 1935, p. lth.

 

155

bound by cabinet instructions to keep closely in step with
the French. That limited Eden's Options, for Laval told
him two days before the Council meeting that the main French
concern was to gain time to postpone a confrontation between
Italy and the League.32 Eden argued that it was more impor-
tant to dispel the notion that the League was ineffective.
Laval would not consider taking such a high line unless Eden
could promise that Britain would be as enthusiastic in support
Of the League in the future. The key question for France was
whether Britain would go to the point of sanctions if a com-
parable violation Of the Covenant occurred in Europe. Eden
could only answer with generalities. Laval's remarks recon-
firmed the unwillingness Of France to provide the leadership
which might rally the League. Indeed, it seemed evident
that Laval could only be brought to support a British call
for sanctions by a commitment of the type that British govern-
ments had long avoided. Laval's attitude frustrated Eden,
but it Offered a logical retreat which the British government
could have taken at any time until Hoare dramatically took
the lead at Geneva.

The League Assembly convened on September 9, and the most
important item scheduled for the Opening sessions was, with-

out question, the speech which Foreign Secretary Hoare was

 

32Eden met with Laval in Paris on September 2 on his
way to Geneva. His account of their conversation is found
in The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. Facing_the Dictators
Gondon: Cassell, 1962), pp. 257-58:

156

due to make on September 11. Throughout the Abyssinian
crisis, Eden had furnished most Of what little effective
leadership there had been at Geneva. Eden was, however,
a young and junior minister, whose open devotion to the
League system made it evident that he was as much a repre-
sentative of the League in London as he was of Britain in
Geneva. When Hoare mounted the rostrum of the Assembly on
September 11, he did so with the full authority of his office
and his remarks were received as the considered judgment of
his government. Seldom had a Speech been anticipated at
Geneva as eagerly as Hoare's was, and he rewarded the League
supporters crowded into the Assembly hall with a statement
of Britain's position which went beyond anything they had
hoped for.33 In his flat, unemotional way, Hoare delivered
a carefully worded speech which nonetheless had the effect of
electrifying his listeners. The speech built to an unequivo-
cal pledge, and he paused to lend particular emphasis to his
words:

In conformity with its precise and explicit

Obligations, the League stands, and my country

stands with it, for the collective maintenance

of the Covenant in its entirety, and particu-

larly for steady and collective re§&stance to

all acts of unprovoked aggression.

There was a good deal in Hoare's speech which merited

 

33The Times, September 11, 1935.

3L‘League of Nations, Official Journal, 1935, Special
Supplement NO. 138, p. 46. There is also a copy of Hoare's
speech in F0 800/295.

 

 

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157

notice beyond his emphatic pledge Of support for the Covenant.
He pointed out, for example, that his government had the
vigorous support of the British people "in the full accept-
ance of the obligations of League membership, which is the
oft-proclaimed key-note Of British policy."35 The British
government, he said, felt that small nations were entitled

to a life of their own "and to such protection as can collec-
tively be afforded to them in the maintenance Of their

national life."36

But he repeatedly stressed his government's
view that the League was a collective undertaking, and added
that if any burdens were to be borne by the League, they
would have to be borne collectively. The most interesting
section of his speech related to his statement that "some-
thing must also be done to remove the causes from which war
is apt to arise."37 He hOpefully essayed the thesis that
problems such as that between Italy and Abyssinia grew out
Of economic rather than political and territorial causes.
The answer lay, he argued, in eliminating the fear of mono-
polistic control of essential raw materials, and he Offered

British participation in an investigation into the problem

Of assuring uniform access for all countries to such commodities.

 

 

 

 

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158

All of this was meant to give Italy pause and to suggest a
possible solution, but the central impression created by
Hoare's address was that Britain had decided to do what was

38

necessary to stOp Italian aggression. That impression was
apparently confirmed when units Of the British Home Fleet,
including the battle cruisers gppg and Renown, began to
appear in the Mediterranean soon after the speech.39

Hoare's speech prompted a two-minute ovation and left

the Assembly hall buzzing with comment. The diplomatic

correspondent of the Daily Telegraph reported that the speech

 

was ”universally acclaimed as the most important pronouncement
which has been made by a British Foreign Secretary to the
League since its formulation.”O Vernon Bartlett, who had

been reporting from Geneva for the News Chronicle since the

 

first sessions Of the Assembly, enthused that neither he nor
his colleagues could remember a speech which had "such a

general and vitalising effect as that made this morning by

#1

Sir Samuel Hoare." Foreign Ministers and delegates clustered

 

38The experienced diplomats with whom Eden discussed the
speech concluded that Britain had decided to stOp Mussolini,
even if it meant using force. Eden himself felt that that was
the only possible interpretation Of the speech. Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 262.

39The fleet units began to appear in the Mediterranean
on September 12. Geoffrey Thompson, who was with the British
delegation, Observed that the news of their sudden appearance
had an immense impact at Geneva. Geoffrey Thompson, Front-
Line Diplomat (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p. 109.

#0
#1

 

Daily Telggrgph, September 12, 1935.

News Chronicle, September 12, 1935.

 

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159

around Hoare after the speech to Offer their congratulations
and to promise their support.b'2
In Britain, the response generated by the speech was
almost as enthusiastic as it had been in Geneva. Professor
Gilbert Murray reflected the delight of the supporters of
the League when he described the speech as "magnificent.”3
Winston Churchill, who had Opposed taking the lead against
Italy, was "stirred" by what he saw as the enunciation Of a
44

policy combining righteousness and strength. All Of the

daily neWSpapers gave the speech banner attention. The Times

 

quoted Hoare's pledge to uphold the Covenant and congratulated
him on "expressing the views, not only of the Government, but

Of the country as a whole."u5 The Daily Telegraph took the

 

same line and the Manchester Guardian pointed out that the

 

pledge was made with the knowledge that the Committee of Five

 

421m the letter which Hoare wrote to the king on his
return, he said that "one Of my chief troubles was that the
head of almost every delegation wished to see me to take my
orders." He had neither the time nor the inclination to
relieve them of their responsibility to make their own deci-
sions, but their response to his speech showed "what a great
position we have in the world if we are ready tO make use of
it.” Sir Samuel Hoare to Lord Wigram, September 14, 1935,
F0 Boo/295.

uBGilbert Murray to Lord Robert Cecil, September 12, 1935,
Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 16 a d.

uuChurchill was actually on the Riviera rather than in
Britain at the time Of Hoare's speech, but because of his
convictions, he Offers a particularly good example of the
domestic reaction to the speech. Winston S. Churchill, Th3
Second World War, Vol. I, The GatheringgStorm (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin,‘l948), 173.

h5The Times, September 12, 1935.

 

PHI.

160

had made no progress with the Italians and was therefore

doubly significant.“6 The speech even drew applause from

the staunchly Conservative Morning_Post, which took comfort

 

in the emphasis which Hoare placed upon collective respon-

sibility, and from the Daily Herald, which spoke for Labour

 

but conceded that on this occasion Hoare had represented the
genuine ”voice Of Britain.”u7 Only the isolationist press,

such as the Dailngail, and like-minded politicans, such as

 

Leo Amery, grumbled that Hoare's speech had decreased chances
for a negotiated settlement and increased the prospect that
Britain would be drawn into a general EurOpean conflagration
because Of an African dispute.“8
According to his memoirs, Hoare was surprised by the
enthusiasm generated by his speech.“9 He admitted, however,
that he set out to produce a revival Of spirit in the League.50

The speech had been worked up in the Foreign Office along lines

which he laid down, then carefully considered and revised in

_._

46
1935.

Daily Telegraph and Manchester Guardian, September 12,

“7Mornigg Post and Daily_Herald, September 12, 1935.

uaDailngail, September 12, 1935: Amery, Mngolitical
Life, III, 171.

 

 

 

 

ugViscount Templewood, Nine_Troubled Years (London:
Collins, 1954), pp. 169-70.

50Ibid., p. 166.

 

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161
51

accordance with suggestions made by Neville Chamberlain.
Hoare cannot have been very surprised at results which he
worked so carefully to achieve. He may well have eXpected.
though, that more attention would be paid tO the reservations
and suggestions made in the speech. For as long as he had

been Foreign Secretary, he had emphasized that Britain's
adherence to the Obligations imposed by the Covenant was
contingent upon a collective acceptance of those obligations

by the other members Of the League, and he made that point

very clear again. He also put forward a possible basis for

a solution to the crisis, which he hOped would be given

greater consideration than it received. In an immediate sense,
the prOposal to investigate the problem Of access to raw
materials was another effort to bring Mussolini to the bargain-
ing table. Beyond that, the Foreign Office had been concerned
for some time about the tendency Of the League to underwrite
the status quO, and the proposal was meant to suggest a British

awareness of the need to evolve new procedures to facilitate

 

51Chamberlain's account of the part that he played in
helping Hoare to deve10p the speech Offers a valuable insight
into the influence which he exercised over foreign policy
during the critical phase of the crisis: 'We discussed at
considerable length what he should say at Geneva and as usual
found ourselves in agreement. He first asked me my Opinion
and then, when I had given it, he produced bits Of his draft
which showed that he had been on the same idea. He then
modified the emphasis or elaborated the argument in accordance
with 2y suggestions.’ Quoted in Macleod Neville Chamberlain,
p. 18 .

 

a: 0 L... k... C «(...-.1...

S C W5. 911+... .

.d as; 1.. C. 1..-. 2. .

 

 

162
52

international change. The speech was, therefore, a blend
of Hoare's dual policy of offering the carrot while threaten-
ing the stick, but it was his emphasis upon the stick which
stood out, despite the cautionary note about a necessarily
collective effort. Hoare and Chamberlain clearly expected
that the speech would cause a stir among supporters Of the
League, since only by rousing the League with a strong state-
ment of British determination could they hope to persuade
Mussolini to pause and consider the certain implications Of
aggression.

It is easier to piece together the impression which Hoare
hoped to make with his speech than to eXplain why he chose to

make it. The cabinet had agreed on August 22 to support a

call for economic sanctions in the event of Italian aggression,

 

52The raw materials prOposal was the one aspect of the
speech that Hoare made a significant effort to clear with his
colleagues. The prOposal grew out Of a similar suggestion
which had been put forward at the Economic Conference of 1931.
The idea seemed to hold the potential to meet some of Italy's
economic grievances, as well as to defuse the issue of Germany's
lost colonies. Interested ministers were asked to comment on
the prOposal, and, although Walter Runciman and the Board of
Trade objected that effective free access to raw materials
already existed, Hoare succeeded in Obtaining general approval
for the proposal. Among the experts, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin of
the Foreign Office Observed that nothing short Of actual
colonial control was likely to satisfy the Germans, but Lord
Lugard, the great colonial administrator, lent his blessing
to the raw materials prOposal. Short-term considerations
aside, Hoare was moved to include the proposal in his speech
in the expectation that it might lay the basis for what Orme
Sargent argued was a necessary effort on the part Of the League
to adjust to the building pressures for international change.
Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 165-66. The memoranda
prepared by Ashton-Gwatkin and Lugard on the subject are found
in F0 800/295. Sargent's memorandum is filed at F0 371/1968?
wa174/2304/98.

 

A.— .v
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163

but they had not been thinking in terms of a British lead.
Indeed, there was no real need to provide a strong lead at
Geneva until the aggression actually occurred.53 Even Eden
was surprised by the strength Of the Speech when Hoare Showed

54 The practical effects Of the speech

it to him at Geneva.
were to rouse League supporters everywhere, to predetermine
in large measure the League's response to Italian aggression,
and to lock Britain into a leading posture. Hoare, with
Chamberlain's support, took responsibility for the speech
himself. The cabinet was not reconvened to consider it, and
among his senior colleagues, Hoare saw fit to consult only
Chamberlain.55 Baldwin was not given the speech to review
until after it was in finished form. The Prime Minister
returned it after a cursory reading with a spare and charac-
teristic comment: 'That is all right. It must have taken you
a long time to make it up.’56
Vansittart, who had helped to draft the speech, later

recorded that Baldwin and Chamberlain endorsed it for

"electioneering" purposes.57 There can be little doubt that

 

53The Covenant made no provision for dealing with
aggression until it was an established fact.

5“Avon, Facing the Dictators. pp. 260—61.

 

55Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 165-66.

 

56Ibid., p. 167.

57Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London:
Hutchinson, 1958), p. 532.

 

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164

all of the moves made by the government during the crisis, at
least until the general election in November, were made with
a keen awareness Of the public mood. But it is not enough to
put Hoare's speech down to the impending election alone.
There were more pressing considerations at the beginning of
September, and Hoare's own explanations, which varied in
emphasis somewhat, do a good deal to round out the picture.
He wrote the king on September 14 that his principal concerns
had been to establish a solid understanding with the French,
and to secure the fullest possible measure of agreement with

58

the other members of the League. His success meant that a
"mad dog" Italian attack upon the British fleet would be met
by the combined weight of the League.59 Intelligence reports
had persuaded Hoare that such an attack was becoming increas-

60 Collective support for the Covenant also

ingly likely.
meant that the League might survive the crisis with little
damage. Hoare told the House of Commons when it reconvened

in October that part Of the surprised reaction to his speech

 

5BSir Samuel Hoare to Lord Wigram, September 14. 1935.
F0 BOO/295.

59Hoare was confident that he had been successful in
securing the support that he wanted. Ibid.

60Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 163. Hoare noted
that it was fear of an Italian attack which prompted the
reinforcement of the Mediterranean fleet, ibid. Arthur Marder's
well-grounded conclusions support Hoare's statement, "The
Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36," American
Historical Review, LXXV, 5 (June 1970), pp. 1333-34. The fleet
movements were not authorized, therefore, to support Hoare's
bluff at Geneva, but it is hard to imagine that he was unaware
Of the impact which they would have.

 

 

 

165

grew out of the fact that other members of the League:

did not realize the depth of the faith and
hope that we have in the League as an instru-
ment for bringing about a better ordered
world. They underrated our feeling for the
League as an impartial organization rather
than as an organization directed against
this or that group Of countries. They
failed also to understand that we look to
the League as an instrument not only for
preventing war but for removing the causes
Of war. And, lastly, they failed to under-
stand that most Of us regard the League as
the bridge between Great Britain and EurOpe
and that if this bridge is gravely weakened
or destroyed, cooperation between us and
the Contingnt will become difficult and
dangerous. 1

Hoare would have been a poor politican had he passed up an
Opportunity to get additional mileage out of his triumph,

but there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of his
concern to preserve the League. He seems, in particular, to
have accepted the idea that the League represented the neces-
sary bridge between Britain and the Continent.62 It was,

unfortunately, a bridge which could Open the way to otherwise

unnecessary danger, and Hoare has confessed that he also saw

 

61

62The final point made by Hoare in his speech to the
League Assembly was that the British attitude towards the
Covenant was unlikely to change "so long as the League remains
an effective body and the main bridge between the United King-
dom and the Continent remains intact.” League of Nations,
Official Journal, 1935 Special Supplement NO. 138, p. 46.

October 22, 1935. 305 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. l9.

o a

«41

.11
m

 

166

the speech at Geneva as a last Opportunity to "bluff" the
Italians into negotiating a settlement which would prevent

the need for sanctions.63 Hoare knew, as Eden quickly
recognized when he read the speech, that his strong statement
implied a more vigorous reaction to aggression than the limit-
ed, gradual and cautious approach which had been authorized

by the cabinet.6h

The risk of encouraging undue expectations
should have been Obvious. Hoare either failed to recognize
the risk or felt that the dangers involved in sanctions
warranted taking it.

In order to make his bold speech to the Assembly, Hoare
first had to agree with Laval to avoid doing anything which
might spark a European war. The contradiction between his
understanding with Laval and the deliberate implications
of his speech may well have been lost on the Foreign Secre-
tary. He knew that his speech would have a reduced effect
unless it was seconded by a similar statement from Laval,
and he was bound by repeated cabinet instructions to keep
in close step with the French. Hoare spent most Of the day

before he delivered his speech in long meetings with Laval,

 

63Hoare wrote of his speech that "if there was any
element Of bluff in it, it was a moment when bluff was not
only legitimate but inescapable." Templewood, Nine Troubled
Years, p. 166.

61+Eden concluded that after he left London for Geneva
his colleagues had been "brought up against the character
of the Obstacle which faced them and had decided to make a
clean leap over it." Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 261.

 

167

trying to develop the firm understanding on which it would be
safe to proceed.65 Laval had been reluctant to subject him-
self to additional pressure on the Abyssinian issue, but
Hoare enticed him to Geneva earlier than he had intended with
a promise to discuss the entire range of Anglo-French rela-
tions.66

The conversations which took place alternately in the
hotels occupied by the British and French delegations at
Geneva Offered the two men their first Opportunity to meet
and assess each other. Hoare's impression of Laval was
hardly flattering. "His greasy hair, dirty white tie and
shifty lOOk did not prepossess me," Hoare wrote.67 He told
the king rather disdainfully that Laval was by origin a

68 It was hard not to admire the

peasant from the Auvergne.
quickness of Laval's mind, however, and Hoare decided that

the French premier's "peasant cunning" might prove very useful.
As the personal friend of Mussolini, he was in a good position
to make use of his wits.

Hoare found that Laval's cunning made him a difficult

man to pin down. Several members Of the French delegation,

 

65Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 167.

66Sir Samuel Hoare to Lord Wigram, September 14, 1935'
F0 Boo/295.

67Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 167-68.
68

 

Hoare to Wigram, FO 800/295.

168

notably Edouard Herriot and Joseph Paul-Boncour, were eager

to see a strong French statement in support of the Covenant.69
Laval, on the other hand, refused to commit himself until the
last possible moment. "The usual course of events," Hoare
wryly Observed, "was that he agreed entirely with me in the
morning but by tea-time he would begin to wonder whether he
would not be wise in trying to get more out of me."70 It
reminded him of trying to deal with Lloyd George.

The lever that Hoare used in his conversations with
Laval was the Open French fear Of Germany. The French
emphasized their fear by making, at the outset, a formal
request for a firm British commitment in the event of a
future violation of the Covenant.71 Hoare lacked the cabinet
authority to respond categorically to the French request, but
he argued that the necessary deterrent to German aggression
was the establishment Of a united front at Geneva.72 With
that basis tO build upon, it might be possible to draw
Germany into a pact limiting air armaments, and into Eastern
and Danubian agreements along the lines of the Locarno agree-

ments. Laval pointed out that Mussolini represented an

 

 

 

71The French submitted their request in a memorandum,

24/256 c.P.177(35).
72Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 168.

169

established check on German ambitions.73 French public
Opinion was bound to react against any move which would have
the effect of driving Mussolini into Hitler's arms. The answer,
Hoare suggested, lay in his double approach.74 While working
to create a united front against aggression at Geneva, it
would be necessary to continue the patient and cautious nego-
tiation which might produce the agreement which would preserve
the Stresa front.

Laval finally agreed to COOperate with the British
approach, but only on the condition that there would be no
war. Hoare was happy to agree. ”We both,” he wrote, "excluded
the idea Of war with Italy as tOO dangerous and double-edged
for the future of EurOpe."75 They agreed to avoid provoking
Mussolini into open hostility and concluded that any economic
pressure on which the League agreed would have to be applied
cautiously and in stages, with due regard for the fact that
some of the most powerful nations in the world were not members

76

of the League. Hoare wrote later that he sensed the

 

 

 

 

76Eden, who was present, Observed that Hoare emphasized
that the League should not limit itself to face-saving,
ineffective measures. But his notion Of what might be effec-
tive was limited, at least initially, to a proposal that
League members refuse to accept Italian eXports. Laval was
loath to go even that far. Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 260.

 

170

reservations which lay behind Laval's words, but his
conclusion at the time was that "there is now no danger of
our finding ourselves in an isolated position without French
support.”77 Laval seemingly confirmed that conclusion when
he delivered to the Assembly, two days after Hoare's address,
a statement of French policy which, while not as strong as
Hoare's, nonetheless gave the impression of solid French
support for the British position.78
Hoare and Laval would have made a very different impres-
sion on the League had their cautious agreement been common
knowledge. League supporters were deliberately led to expect
that Italian aggression would be blunted by the vigorous
Opposition of a united League of Nations. Such eXpectations
were bound to be disappointed unless the pressure mounted
by the League brought Mussolini to his knees. Hoare should
have known that there was very little chance that Mussolini
could be bluffed by the threat of League action. On August
27, Sir Eric Drummond had written from Rome that Mussolini
and the Italian people were capable of committing suicide
rather than climbing down.79 If the bluff failed, Hoare and

Laval were agreed that the League's reaction to Italian

 

77Hoare to Wigram, F0 800/295.

78League of Nations, Official Journal, 1935, Special
Supplement No. 138, 65-66.

 

79Sir Eric Drummond to Sir Samuel Hoare, August 27, 1935,
F0 Boo/295.

171

aggression would have to be limited and safe. Unless Mussolini
weakened in his resolve, a safe approach was not likely to be
effective.

It is not clear that Hoare saw the contradiction between
his speech and his agreement with Laval. He and his govern-
ment never viewed the possible imposition of sanctions as
more than an Opportunity to determine whether the League
system could restrain aggression without recourse to war. It
is hard to imagine, however, that Hoare did not realize that
he was encouraging eXpectations which were hardly warranted.

He must have been aware that his speech did not accord with

his sympathy for Italian grievances, and with the British and
French determination to pursue an agreed settlement by which
Italy was bound to profit. Hoare's concern to preserve the
League and his fear of being caught out alone by a 'mad dog'
attack did provide some justification for his speech. None-
theless, his decision to rouse the League with a strong British
lead proved to be a serious mistake. It was a mistake which

ranked with Simon's failure to respond to the Italian demarche

 

in February, and with the wide discretion which the cabinet
accorded to Eden during the early stages of the crisis. Given
Mussolini's firm determination, Hoare's bold speech to the
Assembly pointed directly to the debacle which occurred in
December.
III
Hoare came away from Geneva with a clear mind. He had

no sense of having made a mistake. On the contrary, he was

172

elated by the enthusiastic reception accorded his speech. At
a minimum, he felt that he had won sufficient support to make
an Italian attack on the Mediterranean fleet unlikely. On
September 15, he wrote to Eden that it was essential for
Britain to continue to show as much strength as possible in
the Mediterranean.80 In a similarly positive vein, he asked
Eden to consider how soon he could begin discussions at Geneva

0 O 8
on economic sanctions. 1

The Italians had been predictably
cold to the conciliatory efforts of the Committee of Five,
and Hoare was finally convinced that Mussolini had "burnt
his last boat.”82 The problem, then, was to prevent the
League from wasting the time that remained before the outbreak
of war. Before aggression became an established fact, Hoare
wanted to know how many of the delegates at Geneva had the
authority to translate the enthusiasm they exhibited on
September 11 into firm support for economic sanctions. "For
what it is worth,” he wrote to Eden, "my mind is moving in
the direction of bringing things to an issue quickly."83
Having set Eden to workat Geneva, Hoare turned to the

task of consolidating his support at home. In the wake of

his success at Geneva, he found it easy to draw in most of

 

80Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, September 15, 1935,
F0 Boo/295.

8llbid.

azlbid.
Q
V3Ibid.

173

the previous critics of his policy. The League of Nations
Union was so well pleased with his efforts to shOre up the
Covenant that Cecil agreed to cancel a rally which had been

scheduled at Albert Hall.8u

Hoare also was gratified to find
that the military leaders were impressed by the support which
he had garnered at Geneva and moderated their objections to
Opposing Italy. On September 17, he put the case for a
vigorous British lead at Geneva to the Defense Requirements
Committee, and he reported to Neville Chamberlain that even
Walter Runciman and Philip Cunliffe-Lister were enthusiastic.85
"The general conclusion," he noted, "was that now that an
isolated act against us seems almost inconceivable, the more

86 In high

strength we show in the Mediterranean the better."
spirits, he wrote to Eden that "the soldiers, sailors and
airmen are gradually beginning to show signs of no longer
being the worst pacifists and defeatists in the country."87

On the strength of the support he was receiving from all sides,
Hoare called in the French ambassador, Charles Corbin, and

warned him that from the British point of view the League was

at the critical testing point. "I told him rather bluntly

 

8L‘Sir Samuel Hoare to Viscount Cecil, September 16,
1935, F0 BOO/295.

85Sir Samuel Hoare to Neville Chamberlain, September 17,
1935, Templewood Papers, General Political, VIII, 1.

86Ibid.

87Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, September 17, 1935,
F0 BOO/295.

174

that if everything now ended in delays and futilities I
should have no more use for it, nor, I felt sure, would the
British public."88
Hoare's desire to press on with the start he had made
at Geneva was tempered by his continuing concern to avoid a
military confrontation with Italy. The threat Of a sudden
attack on the Mediterranean fleet seemed much reduced, but
Mussolini was still dangerous. His response to the reinforce-
ment of Britain's Mediterranean fleet was to order Italian
troop movements in Libya to menace Egypt, where Britain was
already confronted by nationalist unrest.89 Unlike Hoare's
effort to bluff Italy, Mussolini's move was better calculated
and more successful. On September 18 Fulvio Suvich, the
Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, approached Charles
de Chambrun, the French ambassador in Rome, and asked for an
assurance that any sanctions which might be contemplated
would not represent a military or economic menace to the life
of Italy.90 If Italy received such an assurance, Mussolini

would consider a mutual reduction of force in the area. Laval

relayed the Italian prOposal to Eden on September 20.91 He

 

88Ibid.

89On September 14, the Italian Council of Ministers issued
a communique noting in part that owing to "the unrest mani-
fested by certain native exiles of Cyrenaica "Italian forces
in Libya were being reinforced. The Times, September 16, 1935.

90

 

Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 265.

 

911bid.

175

noted that Suvich had specifically pointed to the British
naval reinforcements and the Italian trOOp buildup in Libya

as Offering the basis for a military trade—off. Laval gave

his blessing to the idea and asked Eden for an assurance, for
transmission to Rome, that the League powers were not consider-
ing military sanctions, the closing Of the Suez canal, or the

use of blockade.92

Eden passed Laval's request on to London,
with his own vigorous arguments against Offering the Italians
any assurances concerning sanctions. According to his account,
he maintained an unbending stance on the matter at Geneva and
was not compelled by the Foreign Office to change it.93 Hoare
merely bypassed Eden and offered an assurance to Mussolini
through the British ambassador in Home. On September 20,
ambassador Drummond called on Suvich to explain that the
reinforcement of British forces in the Mediterranean was

simply a defensive reaction prompted by the violent campaign

against Britain conducted by the Italian press.9u Suvich in

 

92Laval added that, in his Opinion, sanctions should be
limited to the refusal to sell certain products to Italy, and
the refusal to take Italian eXports as a whole, ibid.

93Eden's first instructions from London were to allow
Laval to take the lead in answering Mussolini's request and
to adjust the British position to that of the French. He
refused those instructions with the argument that Hoare's
speech Of September 11 had placed Britain in a leading posture
which could not be relinquished. Ibid., pp. 266-67.

9“On September 22, the British government issued a
communique on the exchange between Drummond and Suvich, which
was published by The Times on September 23, 1935.

 

(_T‘ c)
‘ 9

._-‘
c

 

\[3

r‘
‘1'
/

176

turn stated that the Italian military preparations in the
Mediterranean basin were of a purely precautionary nature.95
Drummond offered the same assurance to Mussolini as a personal
message from Hoare and added that the Foreign Secretary was
anxious to eliminate all possible misunderstandings between
the two countries.96 Drummond's exchanges with Suvich and
Mussolini reduced the danger of a major EurOpean conflict.
They also had the effect of eliminating whatever restraining
influence the reinforcement of the Mediterranean fleet might
have had on Italian operations in east Africa. Again, Hoare's
action was consistent with the desire of the British and
French governments to avoid war with Italy if at all possible,
but hardly consistent with the bold impression which he had
created at Geneva on September 11.

While Hoare was in the process Of assuring Italy that
the Mediterranean fleet was intended only for defensive
‘purposes, Mussolini was laying to rest the notion that a
compromise solution might prevent the outbreak of war. The
(knmnittee of Five appointed by the league Council on September
6 held eleven meetings between September 7 and September 2h
in an effort to promote a compromise. The committee's efforts
‘werwa completely wasted on the Italian government. On September

18, ‘the committee gave up the attempt to promote an agreement

 

95Ibid.

 

96Drummond's interview with Mussolini was the subject
of'éi communique issued in London on September 23 and published

by The Times on September 26, 1935.

177

behind the scenes, and chairman Madariaga submitted the
committee's recommendations to Italy and Abyssinia in iden-

97 The plan out-

tical notes which the league made public.
lined by the committee was similar to that which had earlier
been pressed upon Aloisi by Eden and Laval in Paris. It
called for the League to provide funds and supervision for an
overall reform Of Abyssinian administration and police, for
the management of the Abyssinian economy, and for the upgrad-
ing of the services provided by Abyssinian courts, schools
and medical facilities.98 By the terms of the committee's
proposal foreign economic participation would be encouraged,
and foreign advisers would play a large part in the program,
subject to the Emperor's concurrence.99 All of this was
largely a warmed-over version of the plan which Mussolini

100

had already rejected in August. On September 19, an

official spokesman in Rome declared that the committee's

 

97League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935.
pp. 1621-2 0

98Specific reforms contemplated under the improvement of
Abyssinian administration and police included the final supres-
sion of the slave trade, the policing of frontiers, and the
protection of European settlers. Ibid.

99The only specific reference to Italian participation
in the committee's program came in the final paragraph of the
note which stated that the British and French governments
recognized a special Italian interest in the economic develop-
mentof Abyssinia and were prepared to facilitate territorial
adjustments between the contending parties. Ibid., p. l62h.

100The committee's plan actually offered Mussolini less
control than the plan which he had rejected in August in that
the League would be directing the program of reform, and Haile
Selassie would have to approve of the advisers who would be

appointed.

178

proposal was unacceptable to Italy, and on September 22,

Aloisi Officially rejected the plan at Geneva.101 From the

British point of view, the most significant upshot of the

deliberations of the Committee of Five was the recognition

and, by inference, the approval which the committee gave to

the proposal that Britain and France continue to seek a

territorial solution to the dispute.102
Two days after Aloisi rejected the prOposal of the

Committee of Five, the cabinet met in London for the first

time in a month. By September 2h, it was no longer possible

to pretend that war might be prevented in east Africa by a

last minute agreement. Despite the certainty of war, Hoare

gave his colleagues an Optimistic appreciation of the crisis.103

In his opinion, the British position had improved significantly

since the cabinet had last met in August. Mussolini, he said,

had been "clearly impressed" by the unanimity of British

public Opinion and the strengthening of the Mediterranean

fleet. The possibility of an isolated Italian action against

British interests was much less probable than it had been.

Italy was, according to Hoare's intelligence, without a

remaining friend in Europe. Mussolini seemed to recognize the

 

101Arnold J. Toynbee, Survgy of International Affairs,
1235, Vol II: Abyssinia and Italy (London: Oxford University
Press, 1936), 1963 League of Nations, Official Journal,
November 1935, pp. 1624-25.

102
p. l62h.

 

 

League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935,

103Cab 23/82 u3<35)1.

I79

bind in which he found himself and had recently told Drummond
that he appreciated the British position and did not want to
embroil himself in a conflict with Great Britain. If, as
seemed likely, the crisis matured to the point of collective
action by the League, Hoare calculated that even Austria and
Spain could be brought to cooperate, the United States might
prove helpful, and Germany would adopt a discreet attitude
and do nothing to render League action futile. The Italians,
Hoare said, were apprehensive Of sanctions, and "even modest
sanctions might be more effective than had hitherto been
thought."lou'

Hoare had good reason to put the best possible reading
on the situation. He had to explain to the cabinet how
Britain had emerged as the determined leader of the opposition
to Italy at Geneva despite the cautious conclusions which the
cabinet had reached at the end of August. The explanation
which he offered for his bold speech to the Assembly was
ingenious rather than frank. The speech, he said, was promp-
ted by the French request for an assurance that Britain would
be as vigorous in support of the Covenant in the event of a

future violation of the Covenant.105

The speech offered an
Opportunity to answer the French request in positive but

general terms. With the speech on record, it was possible to

 

loulbid.

loSIbid.

180

respond to the French by merely restating the points made in
the speech, while emphasizing that the question of aggression
would have to be carefully considered in context in any future

situation.106

Hoare prOposed that such an answer be authorized,
and, at the same time, suggested that the French be asked to
return an assurance of full support in the event that war
developed with Italy out of the present crisis.107 The cab-
inet accepted the prOposed exchanges and made no quarrel with
Hoare's eXplanation of his speech.108
The cabinet did not press Hoare about the decision to
take the lead at Geneva, but they had a number of questions

109 Britain was

concerning the implications of his decision.
now certain to be in the forefront of any effort to impose
sanctions on Italy. Hoare's assertion that even very limited
sanctions were likely to be effective was challenged by more

than one member of the cabinet. A cabinet committee had

previously studied the problem and Hoare was reminded that

 

106Hoare said that it was important to return a quick
answer to the French in order to prevent the conclusion that
Britain was interested in Abyssinia alone, and to avoid a
charge from Lloyd George that Britain was undertaking new
commitments to France. Ibid.

107The answer which Hoare proposed to send to Paris had
been drafted in the Foreign Office and carefully considered
by Baldwin, MacDonald, Simon, Chamberlain and Hoare on
September 23. Cab 2u/256 C.P.l79(35).

108Hoare gave the note which the cabinet approved to
ambassador Corbin on September 26 and then released it for
publication. The Times, September 30, 1935.

 

1090ab 23/82 u3<35)1.

181

the conclusion reached by the committee was that minor
sanctions could only reduce Italy's capacity to wage war
in Abyssinia from twenty-four to twenty-One months. The
cabinet also questioned Hoare's Optimism about the attitude
of the United States, and wanted to know if the Foreign Office
could be certain that Mussolini would content himself with a
mere protest in response to sanctions. Britain had interests
and trade in the Mediterranean which were particularly vulner-
able. The navy was as yet unsure of its ability to use
critical French ports. Monsell spoke of the Admiralty's
concern about keeping the fleet on a war footing while the
League hesitated over the issue of sanctions.110

It took a strong, positive review of the situation by
Chamberlain to bring the discussion back to something like
the level Of Optimism which Hoare had hoped to create.111
Once again it was pointed out that if it was necessary to try
out the machinery of the League, there could be no better
test case to determine whether the system could function to
control aggression. It was important, however, that the test
be carefully conducted and controlled. The cabinet were
concerned that the League Council might prove so rigid as to
destroy all possibility of a compromise settlement. Hoare
was instructed to advise Eden to take care at Geneva not to

110Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden. September Zh'
1935. F0 Boo/295.

111Ibid.

182

be stampeded in the direction of immediate strong measures
against Italy.112
Hoare wrote to Eden after the cabinet meeting and his
tone was not as confident as it had been. Some of the mini-
sters, he wrote, had been in a mood to murmur, and he had
only secured their support with "some invaluable help from
Neville.”113 The discussion, he noted, reinforced an impres-
sion which he had about Opinion in Britain. "Feeling here is
a very long way behind feeling in Geneva. Up to the present
we have the country solidly behind us but if it came to a
question of war, we should see many breaches in the united

front."lll4

The situation would improve, he felt, if he could
pin down the French. Eden's task should be to consider what
could be done to avoid delay on the part of the League, while
guarding against the emergence of an intransigent attitude at
Geneva.115
Eden returned a reassuring letter on the following day.

He reported that the Dominions were at one with Britain on

the question of sanctions. "If anything they want the League

”116

to be more vigorous than it is. Eden also noted that

 

112Cab 23/82 u3<35)1.

113Hoare to Eden, September 2“, 1935. F0 800/295-
llulbid.
llSIbid.

116Anthony Eden to Sir Samuel Hoare, September 25, 1935.
F0 Boo/295.

183

"Laval is now working very closely with us."117 He had had

a long conversation with Laval that morning and felt that "we
should now enter upon a period when, having made all allow-
ances for Laval's natural tendency to zig-zag, the French will

move in step with us."118

Eden's letter was bolstering and
Hoare recovered much of his positive outlook.

When the cabinet met again on October 2, the Italian
invasion of Abyssinia was imminent. Eden returned for the
meeting and outlined the probable procedures which the League
would adopt once aggression became an established fact.119
An investigation would be made to confirm the aggression,
and the League would then take action according to the pro-
visions of Article 16. The question no longer was whether
the League would agree to impose sanctions, but rather what
type of sanctions would be imposed. Eden noted that Laval
wanted to limit sanctions to two stages: first, a refusal by
League members to sell war material and certain "key" minerals
to Italy, and second, a refusal to take Italian goods.

By and large, the cabinet accepted the premise that
sanctions were inevitable. The discussion which followed
Eden's remarks focused on the effectiveness and implications

of the various possible sanctions.120 Hoare let the discussion

 

ll71bid.

118Ibid.

ll9Cab 23/82 uu(35)1.

lzolbid.

184

continue until a suggestion was made which, he felt, had to
be qualified. According to the cabinet minutes

It was suggested that if the ultimate object was

merely to save the face of the League of Nations

and eventually to let Italy down lightly, small

sanctions would suffice: but that if the aim

was to strengthen the League and to prove its

efficacy it would be desirable to aim at the

larger economic sanctions.12
Hoare did not quarrel with the logic of the suggestion, but
he pointed out that the French would not agree to severe
sanctions. He was convinced that Laval would refuse to carry
sanctions to the point of blockade, and he added that the
French would never consider military sanctions. Hoare sug-
gested that even minor economic sanctions, of the kind proposed
by Laval, might prove to be effective in view of Italy's weak
economic state. Once Italy felt the pinch of economic diffi-
culties, he was convinced that Mussolini would be prepared to
accept some kind of settlement. The danger was that the
members of the League might become too intransigent before
Mussolini recognized the necessity of compromise.

The cabinet agreed that military sanctions were out of
the question, and also concluded that any consideration of
economic sanctions would have to take into account the atti-
tudes of non-members of the League, as well as the members.

With those limitations, the ministers decided that the govern-

ment's policy should be "to advocate at Geneva the imposition

 

 

185

of the maximum of economic sanctions on which agreement could

be secured."122

In considering Laval's prOposals, the cabinet
felt that a refusal to sell to Italy would not mean much, but
that if such a refusal were coupled immediately with a refusal
to accept Italian goods, a considerable impact could be made
upon a "nervous" Italy.123
On the eve of the Italo—Abyssinian war, then, the cabinet
were prepared to advocate the imposition of economic sanctions,
despite the fact that their weight would fall in good measure
upon the Mediterranean fleet. And Hoare, at least, had some

confidence that even minor sanctions would produce a settle-

ment and confirm the value of the League.

 

122Ibid.

123Ibid.

CHAPTER V

TRIAL AND ERROR

Three days after crossing into Abyssinia, Italian
soldiers brushed aside light Abyssinian resistance and entered
the provincial capital of Adowa.1 Among those who watched as
the Italian flag was hoisted over Adowa on October 6 were
several veterans who had been at Adowa when the Italian army
was humiliated in 1896. It was a moment of jubilation and
vindication for the Italian peOple, a moment which Mussolini
had been dreaming of since 1925 and actively planning for
since 1933.2 To insure his moment of revenge, Mussolini had
sent an army of soldiers and another of workers through the
Suez canal. In Eritrea, Italian engineers had worked for nine
months to prepare the harbor and roads necessary for a major
campaign. Mussolini was determined to avoid the type of
mistakes which had led to the Italian humiliation of 1896.

If necessary, he told Emilio de Bono, he would commit the

 

1Emilio de Bono, Anno XIIII: the Conquest of an Empire
(London: the Cresset Press, 1937), p. 2&3.

2Ibid., p. 13.

186

187

sin of excess rather than fail for want of men or materiel.3
Before DeBono's army pushed into Abyssinia, therefore, it was
provided with every requirement other than a plausible causus
2211;. The WalWal incident had grown cold long before the
Italian preparations were completed, and Haile Selassie had
carefully removed any other pretext for war by agreeing to
the arbitration of any issue other than the existence of his
state. As a final earnest of peaceful intent, Haile Selassie
had informed the League of Nations on September 25 that he
was withdrawing his forces thirty kilometers from the Eritrean
frontier.“ Italy was left with no justification for the
invasion which was launched on October 3 beyond Aloisi's
weak reference to Haile Selassie's last minute mobilization
order.5 After months of Italian boasts and preparations, the
watching world could only conclude that, by any of the varied
definitions of the term, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia
constituted open, unvarnished aggression.

The Italian aggression was so blatant and so long

trumpeted in advance that the Council of the League reacted

 

3Ibid., p. 119. DeBono was Minister for the Colonies
when Mussolini began to plan the Operation in Abyssinia with
him in 1933. In January, 1935, Mussolini sent DeBonO to
Eritrea as High Commissioner for East Africa. On March 28,
he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Italian forces in
east Africa, and he retained command until relieved by Pietro
Badoglio on November 26, 1935.

 

“League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935,
p. 1602.

 

5Ibid., pp. 1211 and 1603.

188

within five days of the invasion. On October 5, the
Council met to consider the failure of the League to promote
a peaceful settlement of the problem. Council President Ruiz
~ I . . . .

Guinazu of Argentina took up at the same time the Abyss1n1an
complaint of an Italian invasion and appointed a committee
of six members to investigate and report on the facts.6 By
the afternoon of October 7, the committee, consisting of
representatives of Chile, Denmark, France, Portugal, Roumania
and the United Kingdom, had completed their report and sub-
mitted it for Council consideration. The findings of the
committee were unequivocal:

After an examination of the facts.... the

Committee has come to the conclusion that

the Italian Government has resorted to war

in disregard of its covenants under Article 12

of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The committee reminded the Council that Article 16 of the
Covenant was equally unequivocal:

should any Member of the League resort to

war in disregard of its covenants under

Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be

deemed to have committed an act 8f war against
all other Members of the League.

 

With the import of their decision clearly in mind, then, the
full membership of the Council, other than the parties to the

dispute, accepted the conclusions of the committee's report.9

 

6Ibid., p. 1213.

7Lbid., p. 1225.
81bid.

91bid.

 

189

The unanimous decision of the Council brought the provisions
of Article 16 into effect. It remained only to inform the
other members of the League and to invite coordinated action
under the Covenant. For the League Council, this was a
virtually unprecedented show of speed and vigor, doubly
remarkable in that the issue involved nothing less than the
continued viability of the League itself.

In Baron Aloisi's mind, there was no doubt about the
cause of the stinging rebuke which his country suffered at
Geneva on October 7. The English, he noted bitterly in his
journal, had pressed from the first for the earliest possible

application of sanctions.10

Frank Walters, who saw things
from a different perspective, drew the same conclusion. Eden,
he observed, was once again the necessary ”driving force”
behind the Council's response to the Italian challenge.11
Although Eden was not chairman of the committee appointed on
October 5 to consider the Italian invasion, he took it upon
himself tO schedule the first meeting of the committee for

12 Eden had come to Geneva under a cabinet

that evening.
injunction to avoid a "quixotic" approach, but he had a tend-

ency to interpret cautious cabinet instructions to mean full

 

10Pompeo Aloisi, Journal, 25 juillet 1932 - 1h juin 1936,
Maurice Vaussard, trans. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 19571, p. 312.

11F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967, first published in
1952). p. 65“.

12League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1935,
p. 1213.

190

speed ahead. It was only by a stroke of luck, however, that
he succeeded in Obtaining a quick condemnation of Italian
aggression. When he discussed the situation with Laval in
Paris before the Council meeting, Eden found the French
premier inclined to think in terms of another effort to
promote a compromise solution rather than League action to
contain aggression.13 Eden knew that if Laval maintained that
attitude in the Council room, it was unlikely that the League
would react with any speed. Fortunately, from Eden's point
of view, Laval appointed Alexis Leger to represent France on
the committee which drafted the condemnation, and Eden was
able to carry Leger with him in his determination to force
the issue. Laval was disturbed by Leger's independence but

he accepted the committee report as a fait accompli.1u

 

The Council's spirited reaction to Italian aggression
carried over into the League Assembly, which took up the
Council's findings on October 9. The Assembly had completed
the work of the sixteenth session on September 28, but under
the adroit hand of Assembly President Eduard Benes, the dele-
gates elected tO adjourn rather than conclude the session,

15

pending developments in Abyssinia. As a result, Beneg, who

 

13The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. Facipg the
Dictators (London: Cassell, 19627Tp. 273.

lulbid., pp. 276-77.

 

15League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
No. 138. 1935. P- 95.

 

191

maintained close contact with the members of the Council,
was able to bring the Assembly into session again within
two days of the conclusion of the Council's deliberations.
By the close of debate on October 11, fifty of the fifty-
four delegations in the Assembly had followed the lead of
the Council and committed their governments to sanctions
against one of the principal members of the League.16
In the heady atmosphere Of the Assembly debate, a number

of brave speeches were made. Among the most rousing was the
fighting speech made by the representative of Haiti, General
Nemours. It was vital, Nemours told his colleagues, that the
League establish beyond question that

There are not two truths -- one for Africa

and the other for EurOpe. On either side

of the Mediterranean aggression must be

defined in the same way. The same bombs,

the same shells produce the same effects,

and whether the dead and wounded be black

or white, the game red blood flows from

their wounds.1
General Nemour's speech was a good indication of the depth
Of feeling aroused in a small, black nation by Italian aggres-
sion, but small nations could Offer little more than brave
words to support their indignation. Any significant program
of sanctions had to rest in large measure on the strength and

determination of Great Britain and France. The essential lead

in the Assembly hall remained in the hands of Eden and Laval.

 

161bid., p. 115.

17Ibid., p 107.

192

Their statements to the Assembly reflected the differing
attitudes which each had maintained throughout the crisis.
Laval pledged that France would "meet her Obligations"
under the Covenant, but he added:

Friendship also lays a duty on me. We are
not repudiating our faith in the authority
of the highest international institution
if, simultaneously with the application of
its law, we contigue to seek a solution

by conciliation.1

There was no suggestion Of conciliation in Eden's remarks.
He reiterated that Britain's foreign policy was based upon
membership of the League Of Nations, and went on to define
the responsibilities of the League:

The league has two main tasks. First to
avert war by the just and peaceful settlement
of all disputes. Secondly, if we fail in our
first objective, to stOp war. It is with the
second of these two tasks that we, as Members
of the Assembly, are now concerned, and it is
by the League's effectiveness in realising
this aim that the League will be judged. We
cannot neglect our duties and responsibilities.
Action must now be taken. It is for the
Members of the League of Nations collectively
to determine what that action should be. On
behalf of His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom I declare our willingness to
take our full part in such action.l9

Eden stressed that the League's action would have to be prompt
to be effective. His strong call for swift action Offset
Laval's qualified commitment, and seemed to confirm the bold

British lead established by Hoare in his speech to the

 

18Ibid., p. 106.

 

lgIbid.

 

193

Assembly on September 11. With the British firmly committed
to oppose the aggressor, and the French pledging grudging
support, the only opposition to the application of sanctions
came from Italy and the Italian client states of Austria,
Hungary and Albania.20

In London, the cabinet's reaction to the Italian invasion
was much more guarded than Eden's attitude at Geneva. In one
respect, the Italian invasion and the League Council's quick
condemnation simplified matters for the cabinet. When the
Italian columns moved into Abyssinia, Britain was relieved of
the burden of trying to prevent a war. And, since the cabinet
had already decided to support a League decision to impose
sanctions, the Council's action on October 7 focused concern
in London on the way in which sanctions would be applied.

That was a serious concern, however, and Eden's eagerness
did nothing to diminish it.

The decision to support the use of sanctions was beyond
review by the time the cabinet met on October 9 to consider
the crisis. Hoare and Eden had firmly established the British
commitment at Geneva and Baldwin reinforced it in a speech at

the annual conference of the Conservative party on October 3.21

 

2oIbid.. pp. 101-05, 11a.

21The Times, October A, 1935. In the course of his speech
Baldwin Offered another explanation of the value of the League
for Britain: ”we believe that in true collective security in
the League of Nations we have to our hand the best means of
preserving or of exercising some measure of control over events."

Pres
thei
rane
the

SENS

 

 

 

194

It was politically impossible to back away from sanctions on
October 9, and the cabinet showed no inclination to do so.
Rather, there was some evidence of the determined attitude
which prevailed at Geneva. Hoare told the cabinet that the
Italian ambassador in London had been to see him on the day
after the Italian offensive had begun in Abyssinia, and had
suggested private negotiations to effect some measure of
demobilization in the Mediterranean. The cabinet instructed
Hoare to ”receive any Italian overtures for negotiations for
a settlement outside the League of Nations very coolly at the
present time, and treat them with caution."22 Considering
their desire to avoid a military confrontation in the Mediter-
ranean, the cabinet's refusal to discuss demobilization with
the Italians was an act of courage as well as political common
sense. The ministers held to their decision to uphold the
Covenant and to act through the League, but they had reserva-
tions about underwriting the kind of enthusiasm which Eden
was working to create at Geneva. Very few of the states
which supported sanctions at Geneva were in a position to
bear any part of the military burden of imposing them. The
basis for the cabinet's decision to participate in an effort
to supress Italian aggression was the understanding that
sanctions could be applied gradually. There had never been

any support in the cabinet for drastic, or precipitate

measures, such as a blockade or the closing of the Suez canal,

 

22Cab 23/82 n5<35>1.

195

which British military advisers were convinced would lead to
war between Britain and Italy. The cabinet could see little
profit in trying to stOp one war by starting another. The
problem which the cabinet faced on October 9 was to define

a reasonable program of sanctions which they would be pre-
pared to support, and to convey to Eden their concern to

see such a program adopted at Geneva.

The full range of economic and financial sanctions
possible under Article 16 of the Covenant was examined for
the cabinet by an Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in
Time of War. The committee recommended that Britain should
continue the embargo on the eXport of arms and munitions to
Italy, and should concur in any prOposal to prohibit loans
and credits to Italy. In addition, the committee suggested
that Britain should be prepared to participate in a refusal
to accept Italian imports, and an embargo on the eXport of
essential materials to Italy, with special emphasis upon coal
and oil.23 Of the committee's recommendations, the cabinet
settled upon the proposal to refuse Italian imports as the
most effective way of "applying pressure without raising the
question Of belligerent rights.”2u Beyond that, the cabinet

were no longer as ready as they had been on October 2 to

support ”the imposition of the maximum of economic sanctions

 

230ab 2h/257 C.P.186(35).

2I4Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, October 9, 1935,
F0 800/295.

0!".
me!
th:
the
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196

on which agreement could be secured."25 The fighting spirit
which had developed at Geneva made the cabinet nervous that
Eden might be able to secure agreement to much more than

they had anticipated. The committee's recommendations also
raised a domestic consideration which the cabinet had not
foreseen. The suggestion that the cabinet consider an embargo
on the eXport of coal raised the specter of further unemploy-
ment among British miners, and the cabinet calculated that
the government would have to answer at the polls. In general,
the cabinet's desire was to begin the test of the League's
machinery in the safest possible way, from the standpoint of
domestic politics as well as with an eye to diplomatic and
military repercussions. The ministers were particularly
anxious to avoid an over-commitment until it was clear in
practice that those countries which had voted to support
sanctions would in fact do so. France remained the great
question mark. The French had replied in generally satis-
factory terms on October 5 to the formal question of whether
they would lend support in the event of conflict with Italy
during the period before sanctions came into effect, but
France still was unwilling to provide the military facilities
sought by the British services, and Laval was clearly untrust-

worthy.26 There were, the cabinet felt, several reasons to

 

25cm: 23/82 uu(35)1.

26The Times, October 8, 1935.

 

197

begin cautiously at Geneva, and they accepted the Admiralty's
argument that there was too much risk in the suggestion that
League ports should be closed to Italian shipping. For the
moment, the cabinet agreed to limit their approval to a
refusal to take Italian imports, a prohibition of loans,
credits, arms and munitions to Italy, and, if general agree-
ment could be reached, a prohibition of the sale or chartering
Of ships to Italy.27 Hoare wrote to Eden after the meeting
to eXplain the cabinet's concerns and to outline the program
of sanctions which would command cabinet support. He point-
edly instructed Eden to keep in mind that ”the discussions
should start with (1) an undertaking by all members of the
Committee that we stand together in the event of an attack
upon any one of us, (2) a discussion of the League data that
is available upon the subject of sanctions. This course
would obviate the necessity Of our having to start with some
British prOposal."28
II
The instructions Hoare sent to Geneva on October 9 had

the effect of spurring Eden rather than restraining him.29

27Cab 23/82 u5(35)1.

28Hoare to Eden, October 9, 1935, F0 BOO/295.

29Eden wrote of the cautious instructions which he
received from Hoare: ”Even allowing for the novelty and the
risks entailed in trying to constrain a man like Mussolini,
I was too often first given my head and then curbed." Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 279. Eden would have been closer to
the mark had he written that the cabinet no longer had any
inclination to give him his head, but found that he was very
difficult to curb.

'1

de

CE

th

ho

a

:n4.

+v

pa<

 

198

Eden read in the instructions a growing sense of caution which
threatened to weaken the cabinet's determination to carry
through with the sanctions eXperiment. He interpreted the
cabinet's concern as additional reason to press for the
establishment of sanctions before a nervous reaction on the
part of the League membership prevented effective action.
Most of the Foreign Ministers who had participated in the
debate on Italian aggression were still in Geneva, and Eden
calculated that there was only one week in which to push
through a program of sanctions before the ministers returned
home to domestic considerations which might dampen their

30

ardor. Accordingly, he chose to ignore Hoare's suggestion
that specific prOposals for sanctions should come from the
other delegations at Geneva.

With Eden showing the way, the League maintained the
pace set by the quick condemnation of Italian aggression.
On October 10, the Assembly established a fifty-member commit-
tee to coordinate action by the participating states.31 The
first order of business for the Coordination Committee when
it met on October 11 was to create a 'little Coordination
Committee' of seventeen members to make recommendations and
to monitor the crisis. The little Coordination Committee,

which consisted of delegates from South Africa, Argentina,

Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Greece, the Netherlands,

 

30Eden to Hoare, October 11:, 1935, F0 Boo/295.

31League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
No. 138. 1935. p. 114.

 

199

Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, coopted a delegate from Mexico
on October 12 and was known thereafter as the Committee Of

Eighteen.32

The Committee of Eighteen had day-to—day respon-
sibility for managing the League's activities during the
crisis, and its recommendations were normally adOpted by the
larger Coordination Committee with little debate. In the
Opinion Of Professor Toynbee, ”the Committee of Eighteen
would have accomplished much less than it did accomplish if
Mr. Eden had not been serving on it."33 Toynbee's observation
is a model of understatement. Eden was the driving force on
the Committee of Eighteen. He put forward most of the
suggestions which were adopted by the committee. He worked
outside of the committee room to insure that his suggestions
received prompt consideration. And he helped to prevent the
committee from becoming sidetracked by unnecessary legal or
technical debate.

Eden allowed one week for the structuring of a sanctions
program if it was to succeed, and, at his prodding, the
committees completed their work in eight days. The Committee
of Eighteen met in committee and subcommittee two and three
times a day from October 11 to October 19 to produce five
proposals, which the Coordination Committee adopted as the

32League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supple-
ment No. 145, 1935, p. 35.

33Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of_Internatignal Affairsl 1935,
Vol. II: Abyssinia and Italy (London: Oxford University Press,

1936). p. 230.

 

 

 

 

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or:'

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Ar1
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adc
ing

fir

 

 

200

program to contain Italian aggression.3u

Of the five prOposals,
three were suggested by Eden. At the first meeting of the
committee on October 11, he prOposed that League members lift
the arms embargo which was still in effect against Abyssinia
and impose a comprehensive embargo on arms shipments to Italy,
based on the list which President Roosevelt had established

on August 31 to implement the American neutrality legislation.35
Eden's prOposal was a step which should have been taken months
earlier if it were to aid Abyssinia. But it was a necessary
beginning which forestalled a sterile debate over the proper
orientation of the committee's work, and established a momen-
tum which carried through the week. Eden went on to propose
that League members refuse to take Italian eXports, and
suggested a formula to give effect to the provision in

Article 16 which called for mutual support in shouldering the
risks and burdens involved in sanctions.36 The committee
adOpted Eden's suggestions and also drafted a prOposal detail-
ing the measures to be taken to limit Italian credit and

financial dealings, and another which established a prohibited

 

3“League Of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
No. IAS, 1935, pp. lh-lfil.

351bid., p. 31. At Eden's suggestion, a sub-committee
of military experts was established to study and refine the
American list. The military experts eXpanded the list to
include, among other things, "all appliances and products
for use in chemical or incendiary warfare.” The Coordination
Committee ap roved the revised list on October 16. Ibid..
PP. 19 and 1 0-41.

36Ibid., pp. 36-37.

201

list of strategic materials which participating members were
to withhold from Italy.37

When the Coordination Committee approved the last of
the prOposals on October 19, the sanctions program was com-
plete and ready to be submitted to the governments pledged
to enforce it. Members of the Coordination Committee had
only to wait for their governments to indicate when they
would be ready to apply the sanctions and the League could
begin to act to contain Italian aggression. Eden proposed
that the committee meet again on October 29 to set a date on
which sanctions would come into effect, but the committee
felt that October 31 was the earliest that replies could be
expected from the participating governments.38 Eden had hoped
that sanctions would come into effect more quickly, but he was
not disappointed with what he, more than anyone else, helped
to achieve at Geneva. In the space of two weeks, the League
had condemned Italy as an aggressor, had agreed almost unani-
mously to take action under Article 16, and had devised the
measures designed to stay the hand of the aggressor.

The action taken by the League was particularly impressive
against the backdrop of the League's failure to respond to the

37Ibid., pp. 32-83. As accepted by the Coordination
Committee on October 19, the list of strategic materials to
be withheld from Italy included rubber, bauxite, aluminum,
iron-ore, scrap iron, chromium, manganese, nickel, titanium,
tungsten, vanadium, tin, and related ores, as well as trans-
port animals Of all types. Ibid., p. 2#.

38Ibid., pp. 65 and 69.

 

 

 

 

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202

Japanese invasion Of Manchuria. The bold impression created

was misleading, however. The League had mustered the courage

\

to challenge a major aggressor, but the challenge was weak
and ineffective. The sanctions devised at Geneva did little

to hamper the Italian war effort, and were not designed to do

so until they had been in effect for several months.39 It

would have required a naval blockade or a decision to close
the Suez canal to force a quick halt to the Italian campaign,
but neither proposal was raised in the committees considering
sanctions. Some of the more fervid supporters of the League
were prepared to run the risks involved in closing the Suez

canal but they spoke without the burden of governmental

no

responsibility. "Never fire over the heads of rioters" was

39The sanctions considered and adopted were self-evident-
ly gradual in nature. Maxim Litvinoff, of the Soviet Union,
commented on the "mild" nature of the sanctions at the time
Of their adoption, and expressed the hope that the precedent
established would not apply in future cases of aggression.
Eden, who took the lead in proposing sanctions, was aware
that the British Chiefs of Staff had studied the question of
economic sanctions and had concluded that accumulated stocks
of war materials would make Italy immune to the type of
sanctions adOpted by the League for at least several months.
Ibid.. pp. 27-28: Cab 2A/256, C.P.l69(35).

uoLord Cecil felt that closing the Suez canal would be
”the most merciful as well as the most effective peace policy."
It is hard to see that closing the canal would have been
either merciful or peaceful, but it did promise to be effect-
ive and had an Obvious appeal for those willing to risk all
for the League. It also appealed, for a different reason, to
a consistent critic of British involvement in the League.
Lord Lothian had opposed the idea of sanctions, but once the
step was taken he felt that there was no Option but to go for
Italy's throat if Britain was to avoid a terrible humiliation.
He advised Hoare to close the canal, but to do so tactfully
so as to avoid a war and leave open the possibility Of a com—
promise settlement. The cabinet may have been guilty of a

203

the advice Lord Cecil gave to Eden's Parliamentary Private
Secretary, Lord Cranborne, but Cranborne knew that there was

no hOpe of securing general support for more than a modest

#1

program of economic sanctions. The program adopted by the

Coordination Committee commanded broad support at Geneva in

good part because it was gradual in effect, and unlikely to

#2

prompt a violent Italian reaction. The program reflected

a fear that the war in Abyssinia could spread to the Mediter-

ranean, and a general desire not to alienate Italy beyond

good deal of fuzzy thinking during the Abyssinian crisis,

but they did not set the standard for what Vansittart referred
to as the "muddle-headedness" which developed in Britain in
response to the crisis. Lord Cecil to Gilbert Murray,

November 1, 1935, Gilbert Murray Papers, box 16a d. Lord
Lothian to Sir Samuel Hoare, October 18, 1935, Templewood
Papers, General Political, VIII, 3. There is a OOpy of Hoare's
reply to the effect that he could not agree with Lothian's
suggestion in the Lothian Papers, GDhO/l7/30l. Vansittart
minuted Lothian's letter in the Foreign Office, F0 BOO/295.

ulLord Cecil to Lord Cranborne, October 17, 1935, F0 800/
296. Lord Cranborne to Lord Cecil, October 7, 1935, Cecil
Papers, Add. 51087.

hzThe minutes of the committee meetings are full of
observations such as that made in the Committee of Eighteen
on October 12 by Maurice Bourquin of Belgium: "every attempt
must be made to avoid measures that would be unduly irri-
tating, and hence to take, immediately, steps sufficiently
effective to put an end to the conflict...." The contra-
diction in Bourquin's argument was common and grew out of a
desire to be bold but not too bold. As Frank Walters
remembered it, "there was anxiety not to suffer, or inflict,
more loss and disturbance than were strictly necessary....
But all were confident that under the leadership of Britain
the League would achieve its purpose." League of Nations,
Official Journal, Special Supplement NO. lA5, p. #3. Walters,
A History of the League of Ngtions, p. 658.

 

 

future
adopte

League

a

must b

made i

 

 

 

 

20#

future cooperation. To some extent the type of sanctions
adOpted also grew out of the nature and the procedures of the
League itself. In a large, diverse organization such as the
League, in which individual members are under no compulsion
beyond their own bond to participate in activities which
must be collective to succeed, difficult decisions tend to be
made in terms Of the lowest common denominator.

The economic sanctions imposed by the League were such
that Mussolini could pursue his war and not have to consider
drawing rein until he ran short of a necessary commodity, or
the money or credit with which to buy it. The arms embargo
posed no problem for Italy, and Mussolini had anticipated the
danger of an embargo of such vital supplies as iron ore,
rubber and aluminum and had stockpiled most of the things
which Italy would need during the first several months of the
Abyssinian campaign. The one critical item which Italy could
not stockpile in adequate supply was Oil, but oil was not
included on the prohibited list. Italy imported oil from the
United States, and the prospect of an Oil embargo raised the
delicate issue of maritime rights. Without an embargo on oil,
a blockade of Italian ports, or a move to close the Suez canal,
the League could not prevent an extensive Italian campaign.
There was an outside chance that Mussolini would be frightened
by the combined censure and united action of most of the mem-
bers of the League, but from the tenor of his statements and
the general Italian mood that was unlikely. It was evident,

then, that unless Mussolini lost his nerve, or the League

 

 

WO

ar

te

T10

ar

205

decided to escalate the measures adopted, Abyssinian forces
would have to withstand a prolonged campaign by a modern
army if Italian ambitions in east Africa were to be frustra-
ted.“3
Mussolini might have been stOpped by more stringent
sanctions, but stronger measures meant greater risks, and
neither of the League's pivotal members was in the mood to
shoulder heavy risks. In London, cabinet members were
nervous about the danger of pushing beyond the point of agreed,

collective action.nh

The worst possible deve10pment. from
their point of view would have been an isolated conflict
between British and Italian forces in the Mediterranean.

The guiding light for the cabinet was their earlier decision
to move in tandem with the French. The French, in turn, had

no taste for sanctions. Laval only grudgingly accepted the

argument that sanctions had become unavoidable. He remained

 

“3Most observers eXpected, on the basis of the tradition-
al fighting qualities of the Abyssinian soldier, and the
steep, rugged, roadless terrain of much of Abyssinia, that it
would take the Italians a long time to Conquer Abyssinia. In
light of the Italian preparations and the superiority of
Italian weapons, few expected another Adowa, but it was
widely anticipated that it would take up to three years for
Italy to conquer Abyssinia. The tendency to overrate the
Abyssinian ability to withstand an Italian assault contri-
buted to, and Offered a rationale for the gradual approach
to sanctions adOpted at Geneva. A. J. Barker, The Civiliz-
ing_Mission (New York: Dial, 1968), p. 149.

““Cab 23/82 45(35)1.

 

 

206

convinced that the solution to the problem lay in a compromise
settlement.u5 Laval felt that his view of the crisis, which
was that France had much to lose and little to gain from a
confrontation with Italy, was shared by most Frenchmen.’+6
The French delegation at Geneva pleaded for time to educate

French public Opinion to the need for even the most modest

of sanctions.“7 Throughout the Committee Of Eighteen's

 

hsLaval made no secret of his continuing determination
to promote an agreed settlement. He explained his point of
view to Eden on October 3 as the Italian invasion was getting
under way, he told the League Assembly on October 10 that he
planned to "continue to seek a solution by conciliation,"
and he defended French participation in a limited program of
sanctions in a statement released at Clermont-Ferrand on
October 12, in which he assured the French people that he was
still anxious to find an amicable solution to the problem.
Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 273: League of Nations, Official
Journal, Special Supplement No. 138, 1935, p. 106: Le Temps,
October 14, 1935.

“6A3 Franklin Laurens pointed out, France faced a far
graver threat from across the Rhine than Britain faced in the
Mediterranean, and the German threat in part justified French
vacillation over the implementation of sanctions. But Laurens
conceded that single-minded efforts by Laval to settle the
crisis by conciliation while sanctions were being imposed were
self-defeating attempts to 'square the circle.‘ Franklin A.
Laurens, France andpthe ItalO-EthiOpian Crisis 1935-1936 (The
Hague: Mouton,l9677, pp. 172 and 205.

 

 

 

“7Eden to Hoare, October in. 1935, F0 800/295. Opinion
in France on the issue of sanctions was seriously divided,
with organizations, journalists and politicans on the left
calling for full participation in League efforts to contain
Italian aggression, while those on the right argued that it
made no sense to alienate Italy for the sake Of Abyssinia.
Feelings ran high and demonstrations occurred daily during
the first weeks Of October. On October 7, for example, the
Socialist Trade Union Of Port and Dock Workers instructed
its members not to handle cargoes bound for Italy. On October
12, a group of rightist deputies directed an Open letter to
Laval protesting the notion of sanctions against Italy when
none were imposed against Germany for reintroducing conscrip-
tion in March. On the same day, political and veterans
organizations on the right and the left demonstrated in Paris

 

PC CK 1]

1 c f‘ (K I: 1" '5‘ a.“ J 'c I ‘lc. I < 1

 

207

deliberations, the French delegate, Robert Coulondre, spoke
Of French loyalty to the Covenant, but his prOposals were
more often designed to forestall Eden than to restrain
Italian aggression.u8 Eden had to agree privately with
Coulondre to slow the pace Of the committee's deliberations
to secure French support for the limited program which the
committee adopted.u9
In his reports to Hoare from Geneva, Eden put the best
possible reading on his dealings with the French. He knew
that the cabinet's persistent fear was that France would

pull back at the critical moment and leave Britain to face

Italy in the Mediterranean. On October 1h, Eden assured

 

and Nice and the police struggled to maintain order. In
such a volatile climate Of opinion, Laval and his government
felt that they had no Option but to walk a careful middle
line on the issue Of sanctions. Ibid., pp. 172-78.

h8When Eden prOposed that participating members should
refuse to accept Italian eXports, for example, Coulondre
countered with the proposal that the most effective way to
curb Italian aggression would be to control the flow of
strategic supplies to Italy. Both proposals were sensible
and were ultimately adOpted by the Committee of Eighteen,
but Coulondre put forward his proposal as though it were an
alternative to the prOposal advanced by Eden. Coulondre
suggested that both proposals be submitted to a sub-committee
for study, with the French proposal to be given first consider-
ation. Eden argued that his prOposal needed no study, but
he accepted Coulondre's suggestion after reaching an agree-
ment with the French delegation, outside of the committee
room, on the pace of the committee's work. Ibid.; League
of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. th,

1935. PP. 37-38. 42. 55:57.
49Eden to Hoare, October 1h, 1935, F0 BOO/295.

208

Hoare that he was working with the French representative on
the Committee of Eighteen, but he had to admit that the

French were balky and inclined to slow the pace of the proceed-

ings.5O The French could be managed, Eden thought, if they

were given time to educate French Opinion, and if Laval was
compelled to understand that a failure on his part to cooper-
ate during the crisis would break the Anglo-French front.
Eden noted that he had warned Laval of the danger of a breach
in Anglo—French relations during a conversation at Geneva,
and he implied that Hoare should do the same.51

Eden thought to control Laval by frightening him, but
Laval had the same card to play, and he did so more effective-
ly. On October 1h, Ambassador Clerk conveyed to Laval a
British request for a specific assurance of French military

52

support during the crisis. Laval replied in terms which

met French requirements under the Covenant but with reser-
vations which frightened the British cabinet:

The French Government fully considers article
16 as implying complete solidarity Of each Of
the members of the League Of Nations in respect
of that one of them who may have been attacked
by the Covenant—breaking State if this attack
has been clearly brought about by the appli-
cation Of the provisions Of the said article,
the execution O; which shall have been decided
upon in common. 3

SOIbid.
SlIbid.

52Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia NO. 2(1936). p. 3-
53Ibid.

209

The language was convoluted but the meaning was clear.
France reserved the right to decide whether an Italian
attack upon Britain had been prompted by actions taken in
support Of the Covenant. Laval's reply implied that France
would support only those actions which the French government
had approved in advance. Laval eXplained that his govern-
ment's reservation stemmed from the recent reinforcement Of
the British Mediterranean fleet. He suggested that Mussolini
could justifiably represent the increase of British strength
in the Mediterranean as a provocation rather than an agreed
measure taken in support of the Covenant.5u

The cabinet's reaction to the French reply was all that
Laval might have hOped for. The mood in the cabinet room
on October 16 was grim.55 Laval, it seemed, was capable of
playing Britain false at any turning. He knew that the
additional fleet units had been despatched to the Mediterran-
ean to dissuade an Italian attack. Yet he spoke though
Britain harbored a hostile intent. It was Obvious that
Mussolini had Laval's ear. Eden's reports from Geneva made
it clear that Laval was still actively working to promote a
compromise settlement. The cabinet had decided on October 9
to respond coolly to Italian suggestions for a military trade-

Off in the Mediterranean, but Laval's reservation altered the

 

5“Ibid., Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 281.

 

5SI-Ioare to Eden, October 16, 1935, F0 BOO/295.

210

situation. The harbor at Malta was vulnerable to an Italian
air attack, and unless the fleet received permission to use
the French ports of Bizerta and Toulon, it would be difficult
to Operate against Italy in the Mediterranean. If Britain was
to press on with the sanctions experiment, it was essential,
in the cabinet's view, that the French be persuaded to sub-
stitute cooperation for minimal support.56
To meet Laval's Objections, the cabinet agreed to consi-
der withdrawing two cruisers from the Mediterranean. At the
same time, however, they decided to impress upon Laval that
a failure on the part of the French government to provide a
firm assurance of OOOperation and support would undoubtedly
become public and have the gravest effect on Anglo-French
relations.57 While the French reservation stood, the cabinet
felt that it was dangerous to push ahead on sanctions at
Geneva. Hoare wrote to Eden that there was considerable
sentiment in the cabinet that he had taken the initiative too
Often at Geneva. The cabinet's feeling was that Eden should
”go as slowly as possible and take the initiative as little
as possible until Laval has withdrawn his reservation.” From
Hoare's perspective, it was critical that ”we should not remain
in the dangerous position Of making initiatives whilst we are

still running the risk Of being stabbed in the back."58

 

56cm. 23/82 “mm.
57Ibid.
58Hoare to Eden, October 16, 1935, F0 800/295.

211

Eden, at that point, was in the midst of his strenuous
efforts to bring the Coordination Committee to the point of
recommending sanctions, and he was not to be headed by the
cabinet's last—minute qualms.59 Fortunately, Sir George
Clerk secured the assurance which the cabinet required from
Laval on October 18, after some plain talk about Anglo-French

relations.60

The cabinet did not have to pull back from the
position which Eden had taken at Geneva, nor did they have to
pillory the French for lack of support. But they were a good
deal more anxious about future developments in the Mediterran—
ean than they had been. Laval's assurance of October 18 was
satisfactory, but it did not dispel the fear that he might
yet 'stab Britain in the back.' By October 19, Eden had
succeeded in organizing remarkably broad support for sanctions
at Geneva, but Laval undermined the entire effort by unnerving
the British cabinet. The cabinet remained committed to the
sanctions experiment, but after the disturbing cabinet on
October 16, the instinct to seek a compromise solution to the
crisis came to the fore again. The effect of the exchanges
between London and Paris on military cooperation was to

transfer the initiative which Eden had seized at Geneva into

 

59Eden later justified his independence by arguing that
"if a leading power does not lead it is not likely to see its
policies to succeed.” Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 282.

60Cmd. 5072, EthiOpia NO. 2(1936), pp. B—h; Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 283.

212

Laval's hands, where it remained through the debacle which
occurred in December.

Laval viewed himself as the necessary mediator between
Britain and Italy. The cabinet's willingness to consider
withdrawing naval units from the Mediterranean gave him an
Opportunity to mediate. When the cabinet met again on
October 23, they had word that Italy was prepared to withdraw
one division from Libya in return for a corresponding with-

61 The

drawal of two British cruisers from the Mediterranean.
cabinet were sufficiently broken to the need to reduce tensions
in the Mediterranean that they did not debate the merits Of

a prOposal to reduce the pressure on Italy just as sanctions
were coming into effect. The only requirement laid down by

the cabinet was that the cruisers were not to be withdrawn
until the French agreed to allow the British fleet to use
Bizerta and Toulon. Hoare suggested that negotiations relat-
ing to a military standdown would Offer an Opportunity to seek
a basis for an end to the crisis, and the cabinet authorized
him to undertake the diplomatic effort required. The French
had received indications from Home that Mussolini was ready

to consider a reasonable solution.62

Accordingly, Maurice
Peterson, the Foreign Office specialist on Abyssinia, was sent

to Paris to consider with Ambassador Clerk and French officials

 

61
62

Cab 23/82 u8(35)2

Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 285.

 

213

the possibilities for a negotiated settlement.63 The cabinet
stipulated, however, that "nothing would be settled except
within the framework Of the League of Nations."6u Baldwin
had decided upon a general election for mid-November and
cabinet had no desire to weaken their record Of support for
the League.
III

On October 22, Parliament reconvened to discuss the
international crisis. One day into the debate, Baldwin made
the eXpected announcement that he had decided to call a
general election. The election was set for November 1# and
Parliament was scheduled to be dissolved on October 25.
Baldwin eXplained that the autumn season offered a rare
Opportunity to conduct an election without disrupting
essential parliamentary business, and added that the lull in
the international crisis, following the agreement reached on
sanctions at Geneva, might not reoccur.65 The lull which
Baldwin saw was visible only to his eyes. The actual and
obvious reason for the election was to take advantage Of the
enviable position in which the government found themselves.
The attention of the nation had been diverted from economic
issues and was riveted on the Abyssinian crisis. The govern-
ment's policy of support for the League commanded almost

63Maurice Peterson, Both Sides of th§_Curtain (London:
Constable, 1950), p. 115.

64

 

Cab 23/82 u8(35)2.
65305 H.C.Deb., 55., cols. 153-56.

214

universal approval, and the applause for Hoare's speech and
Eden's efforts at Geneva was loud and general. From a
political standpoint, there could hardly have been a better
moment for the National government to go to the polls.

The state of the British economy, coming slowly and
unevenly out Of the depths of the depression, gave Labour
and Liberal Opponents Of the government a good deal to work
with in an election campaign. But domestic considerations
paled in contrast with the drama unfolding on the interna-
tional stage. The possibilities involved in the Abyssinian
crisis included nothing less than war on the one hand, or a
convincing vindication of the League system on the other. And
the National government held the center of the stage as the
unlikely hero Of the piece. Baldwin had a unique Opportunity
to go to the polls in shining armor. The Opportunity was too
tempting to pass by.

With the government comfortably established in the fore-
front Of the defenders Of the Covenant, Opposition politicans
were left with little in the area Of foreign policy with
which to take issue. Much Of what debate there was on the
government's handling Of the Abyssinian crisis took place
in Parliament during the brief four day session called to
consider the international situation. The debate gave the
government an Opportunity to review British triumphs at
Geneva, to dismiss suggestions that the cabinet's handling

of the crisis had been slow or uncertain, and to renew

previous pledges Of fidelity to the Covenant. Hoare led for

215

the government. He surveyed the deve10pment Of the crisis,
denied that the Italians had been left guessing as to British
policy, and gave an account of his success at Geneva. He
spoke Of the government's "unchanged" policy of loyalty to
the League and added that Britain was steadily ”determined to

66

uphold the letter and the spirit of the Covenant.” The

League was involved, he said, in a ”great eXperiment."

For the first time the system Of collective
action and collective security is being

tested in the face of a great crisis...If

it succeeds, an immense gain will have been
achieved for the peace of the world. If it
fails, a heavy disappointment will have

fallen on all those who desire to eliminate
war as an instrument of national policy,

and a heavy responsibility upon those who

have wavered in the cause. Whichever of these
results ensue...I am certain we must not live
in a world of illusion. If we can depend upon
collective action, let us know it; ig we cannot
depend upon it, let us also know it. 7

Hoare's reference to the importance of discovering whether
or not the League system would work should have been high-
lighted, in that it summed up the government's approach to
the crisis. Like his emphasis at Geneva upon collective
action, however, Hoare's frank indication that the government
approached the crisis as an experiment rather than a crusade
was hidden in verbiage about the worth Of the League and
British fidelity to the Covenant, and did little to temper
the impression that Britain was determined to make the system

work.

 

66305 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 18—20.

67Ibid., col. 32.

216

Baldwin, in his turn, said that the only possible course
of action for Britain was "absolute loyalty to the Covenant.”
He added, as Hoare had on the previous day, that Britain
would be prepared "to assist...any legitimate Opportunity for
a settlement,” but he promised that any such settlement would

be developed within the framework of the League and would be

68

"fair alike” to Italy, Abyssinia and the League. Simon

took up the same issue and emphatically denied that the govern-
ment had any intention Of negotiating a settlement outside of

the League. Neither the League nor Abyssinia, he pledged,

would be asked tO accept an accomplished fact.69

Any doubts which may have been created by talk Of a
settlement were offset by Eden's declaration of faith and
determination. He and his colleagues, he said, could feel
no enthusiasm for the task of restraining Italy:

here is a duty which has to be done, which
must and will be done....There has been and
will be no change in the policy of His
Majesty's Government, in which, as a loyal
member of the League, we will persevere....

We have tried in these post-war years
to build up a new order by means Of which we
hOpe to spare mankind in the future the scourge
of war....If we fail, even though that failure
be not final, we shall have shattered for a
generation, and it may be more, the hopes which
mankind has placed in this new endeavour. Who
can tell what the consequences of such disap-
pointment may be? If, on the other hand, the
League of Nations can on this occasion prove
itself able to withstand the strain placed
upon it--and I believe it will-~then, even

681bid., col. 15o.

691bid., col. u57.

217

though many serious problems will yet

surround us, the world will face them

fortified in its faith and inspired to
fresh endeavour by the victory of its

own ideals.

For the first time, I believe, in
the history of the world, an attempt
is being made to operate an inter-
national system based not merely upon
power, but upon certain fixed principles
of equity. This is an adventure in
which we may all be proud to play our
part.70

Eden's idealism and enthusiasm were contagious. The House

rang with cheers when he sat down.71

Unlike his colleagues,
Eden was embarked upon a genuine crusade, and his zeal convin-
ced many who might otherwise have questioned the government's
commitment.

Eden was an incalculable political asset for the National
government. Isaac Foot pointed up the difficulty faced by the
Opposition when he noted that Eden enjoyed a position in the
country "beyond anything that he can himself estimate.”

PeOple of all parties, Foot conceded, looked to Eden "with
great admiration because of the courage and the devotion that
he has shown in a very difficult task."72 It was hard, in the
circumstances, to assail the work of Eden and nearly as hard

to attack Hoare, whose stock stood almost as high as Eden's

with the British public. Clement Attlee, the new leader of

 

7OIbid., cols. 22h-25.

71The Times, Oct. 2h, 1935.

 

72305 H.C.Deb., 53., cols. 169-70.

218

the Labour Party, criticized British efforts at Geneva as
slow, and bristled at the suggestion that the government
was prepared to "buy Off" the aggressor with a generous
settlement. But he was compelled to endorse the efforts
being made to strengthen the League, and he agreed that the
Labour party would support the government's program Of
rearmament, to the extent necessary to defend the League.73
Baldwin used the election to reopen the rearmament

7“ The White Paper debate in March had been a first

issue.
step in the process of educating Parliament and the public

to the need to rearm. Baldwin took the second step on
October 23 by appealing for a mandate to restore British
strength to at least the minimal level necessary for national

safety. The Abyssinian crisis Offered an Opportunity to

argue that strengthening the British defense services was

 

73Ibid., cols. 33-47.

71‘On November 12, 1936 Baldwin "confessed" to the Commons
that he had hesitated in calling for rearmament because of
pacifist sentiment in the country. His confession was taken
by ”Cato" and Churchill to mean that he had shirked the rearm-
ament issue in the 1935 election. Reginald Bassett demonstra-
ted, however, that Baldwin was referring to a hypothetical
election in 1933 or 1934 rather than the election in 1935.
Baldwin did not fight the 1935 election on the rearmament issue
alone, but he did make it an important part of the campaign.
317 H.C.Deb., 58., col. 1144: "Cato," Guilty Men (New York:
Frederick A. Stokes, 1940), p. 37: Winston S. Churchill, Th2
Second World War, Vol. I: Thg Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1948), p. 216: Reginald Bassett, "Telling the Truth
to the PeOple: the Myth of the Baldwin 'confession,'" Cambridgg
Journal, II (November 1948), 84-95: H. Montgomery Hyde, Baldwin
(LOndon: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), pp. 459-62: Keith
Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1969), pp. 864-66. 959-73.

 

 

219

essential to world peace. Baldwin maintained, with question—
able logic, that any such strengthening would take place
"within the framework Of the League." The Covenant mandated
disarmament, but Baldwin argued, in effect, that the experience
of the Abyssinian crisis had demonstrated that, in an imper-
fect world, the Covenant required military support if it was
to be enforced. The government were ready to take risks for
peace, but only on the understanding that the strength of the
nation would be brought into harmony with its responsibilities.
"I will not be responsible," Baldwin said, ”for the conduct
of any Government in this country at this present time, if
I am not given power to remedy the deficiencies which have
accrued in our defensive services since the War.”75
Baldwin repeated his appeal for a mandate to rearm in a
radio broadcast from Chequers on October 25. He did not want
"huge forces," he said, but felt that "modernization" was
necessary to meet the burdens imposed by "full—hearted" sup-

76

port Of the League. Neville Chamberlain had suggested in
August that the government fight the coming election on the
rearmament issue.77 Baldwin did not reject Chamberlain's

advice, but he tempered it to meet the mood of the country,

and wrapped his appeal securely in the mantle of the Covenant.

75305 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 152.

76The Times, Oct. 26, 1935.

 

77Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London:
Macmillan, 1970: first published in 1946), p. 266}

220

The Peace Ballot demonstrated that there was still a great
deal Of sentiment in the country in favor Of disarmament. A
straight fight on rearmament alone, without reference to the
League would have been divisive at a time when it was
important to change the mood of the country and build a
consensus in favor Of rearmament. From the standpoint Of
restoring the armed services, the Abyssinian crisis was a
godsend. Baldwin took advantage of it in good conscience,
knowing that his government were taking what they viewed as
considerable military risks in order to give the League

system a full test. Politically, it would have been worse
than foolish to raise the rearmament issue in anything other
than the context of the government's support of the Covenant.
The Opposition were waiting to pound away on economic issues,
and Baldwin had no desire to put another club into their hands.
He had reconciled his party, in good measure, to what Churchill
styled "arms and the Covenant," and, if he made no mistakes,

he could eXpect to profit from the difficulty which the Labour
78

party faced in doing the same.

 

78On October 4, Baldwin addressed the annual conference
of the Conservative party for the first time in seven years.
According to Thomas Jones, he ”spoke for an hour and had a
great ovation. Denounced the isolationists, reconciled the
Party to the League by supporting rearmament, and reconciled
the pacifists to rearmament by supporting the Covenant.”
Baldwin skillfully blended support for the League with the
rearmament issue, but his concept of "arms and the Covenant"
differed sharply from Churchill's. Churchill seized upon the
theme of ”arms and the Covenant" with characteristic enthusiasm
during the debate on international affairs in Parliament on
October 24. Churchill conceived of the League as a 'grand
alliance,' designed to blunt the Nazi threat. Baldwin and his

221

For the Labour party, the Abyssinian crisis was a crisis
Of conscience as well as international affairs. It was also
a piece of political bad luck. The League's hour of trial
brought the Labour party up against hard choices for many
of its members. Throughout the lifetime Of the League,
Labour had adhered to the theory, embodied in the Covenant,
that wars would not be possible without arms. Overlaid on
that theory was the conviction that the last war had been an
imperialist venture, fought at the eXpense of the interests
and the blood of workers Of many nationalities, who had no
logical quarrel with one another. The Labour movement was
determined to prevent another such war--by working for disarm-
ament, and, if necessary, by participating in an international
general strike. Until the collapse of the Disarmament confer-
ence and Mussolini's challenge to the League, it was possible
for Labour to hold to the Covenant and disarmament as the
inextricably entwined bases of a correct foreign policy.
The Abyssinian crisis gave the National government the Oppor-
tunity to preempt Labour's role as parliamentary champion of
the Covenant in Britain. As Professor Mowat put it, Baldwin
stole his Opponents' clothes and left them to protest that

he would never wear them.79 The crisis put Labour onto the

 

colleagues viewed the League as an agency Of conciliation
rather than an armed alliance. Thomas Jones, A Diarywith
Letters, 1931-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954),
p. 155: 305 H.C.Deb., 58., col. 361.

79C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940
(London: Methuen, 1966: first published in 1955). pp. 553-54.

 

 

222

defensive, and forced Labourites to decide whether they would
countenance the rearmament necessary to support the Covenant,
and be prepared to see the arms used if it came to the point
of military sanctions. The rearmament issue may have been
bogus, insofar as the crisis with Italy was concerned, but the
National government successfully presented it as a test of
loyalty to the League. And the question of sanctions posed
a real moral dilemma for facifist elements in the Labour party.
The Labour party held its annual conference at Brighton
on October 1 and 2, on the eve of the Italian invasion of
Abyssinia. Labour leaders thrashed out but did not bury their
differences over sanctions at the conference. The trade unions
came into the conference committed to support for sanctions,
and with the votes necessary to impose the same commitment on
the party. Trade union leaders, such as Ernest Bevin and
Walter Citrine, viewed membership and participation in the
League Of Nations in the same way that they looked upon member-
ship in their own unions.80 They had little patience with the
moral qualms Of the pacifists or with the intellectual arro-
gance of the Socialist League. Like a labor union, the League
of Nations depended upon solidarity for success, and the union
leaders were ready to stand with the government against the
challenge mounted by the hated fascists. At the T.U.C. confer-

ence held at Margate at the beginning Of September, the trade

 

80Bevin said of membership in the League: 'It is like a
man entering a Union, you cannot enter with reservations. You
have got to be straight.‘ Quoted in John F. Naylor, Labour's
International Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969):

p. 94.

 

223

unions voted overwhelmingly to support the government in any

81 The T.U.C. resolution

action taken to uphold the League.
was endorsed by the national executive Of the party, prompting
Sir Stafford Cripps to resign from the executive, and Lord
Ponsonby to resign as leader Of the Opposition in the Lords.82
The resignations of Ponsonby and Cripps set the stage
for the debate on sanctions at Brighton. On October 1, Hugh
Dalton moved a resolution supported by the national executive
proclaiming Labour's support for any measure outlined in the
Covenant necessary to restrain Italian aggression.83 Cripps
answered for the intellectual Left, denouncing the League as
an 'International Burglar's Union' which threatened to involve
Labour in another imperialist war.814 Ponsonby Opposed sanctions
on pacifist grounds, and was supported by George Lansbury, the
Christian pacifist leader Of the party, who made a moving
appeal for a policy Of moral rather than physical defiance.85
Lansbury's speech brought the delegates to their feet, cheering,
but Bevin put them back in their seats with a harsh rebuttal.
Bevin was furious that Lansbury was Opposing a proposal which

86

he had not Opposed in the executive. Lansbury's qualms,

 

811bid.. pp. 98-99.

82Daily_Herald, Sept. 20, 1935.

 

83Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years (London: Frederick Muller,
1957 ) 9 pp' 67-69 -

8“Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, p. 551.

 

85Naylor, Labour's International Policy, pp. 104-05.

86Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. I:
Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940 (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 562.

 

224

added to those of Ponsonby and Cripps, threatened to divide
the party just as it was heading into an election. Bevin
argued bluntly that the party could no longer afford the
luxury of Lansbury's conscience:

It is placing the Executive and the Movement

in an absolutely wrong position to be taking

your conscience round from body to body to be

told what you ought to do with it.87
Bevin felt betrayed and he did not shrink from what he saw as
necessary. His rough treatment Of the revered Old party
leader offended many in the hall, but it effectively closed
the debate. When the vote was taken on October 2, ninety-
five per cent of the delegates supported the resolution which

Dalton had moved.88

Labour went on record as supporting the
government's policy in the crisis, but the issue continued to
trouble the party. It was not the position from which to fight
an election.

Lansbury resigned after he was repudiated at Brighton.
He was succeeded by his deputy, Clement Attlee, and the party
went into the election with the additional handicap of a new,
untested and relatively unknown leader. The election manifesto
issued on October 25 put the best possible face on a bad situ-
ation. Labour condemned the election as an "attempt to eXplOit
for partisan ends a situation of grave international anxiety,"

and pointed up the ills of the country after four years of

rule by the National government -- two million unemployed,

 

87Quoted in ibid., p. 568.

88Naylor, Labour's International Policy, p. 109.

 

225

the "deepening tragedy" Of the depressed areas, a ”harsh and
cruel" household means test.89 The government, Labour argued,
were trying to cling to power on the strength of their eleventh-
hour conversion to faith in the League. Labour dismissed the
government's conversion as a sham designed to cover a vast
new rearmament program. In a broadcast addressed on October 31,
J. R. Clynes denounced the government's approach to peace:

We are to have peace by millions Of bayonets:

peace by a strong Navy: peace by a greater

Air Force: and having talked peace, with a

background of gunpowder, we are asked to

believe that all these armaments are assembled

to be ready not to use them.90

The government, in reply, stood on their record. The

government's manifesto, signed by Baldwin, MacDonald and Simon,
contended that the country was steadily recovering its prosper-
ity, and needed only a further measure of "stability and confi-
dence" to complete the process. But the government did not
want the election to focus on domestic issues. Pride of place
in the election manifesto was given to an unqualified pledge
of fidelity to the League:

The League of Nations will remain as heretofore,

the keystone of British foreign policy. The

prevention of war and the establishment Of

settled peace in the world must always be the

most vital interest of the British pe0p1e. and

the League is the instrument which has been
framed and to which we look for the attainment

89The Times, Oct. 26, 1935.

 

90The Times, Nov. 1, 1935.

 

of these objects. We shall therefore

continue to do all in our power to uphold

the Covenant and to maintain and increase

the efficiency of the League. In the

present unhappy dispute between Italy and

Abyssinia there will be no wavering in the

policy we have hitherto pursued.91
The manifesto set the tone for the government's campaign. On
November 9, Hoare addressed a banquet at the Guildhall and
promised that the government would carry out Britain's obli-
gations "wherever they exist" and strive for peace "wherever
peace is threatened." Hoare assured his listeners that the
government's policy had not changed since his speech at Geneva,
and would not change after the election.92 Neville Chamberlain
dismissed allegations about vast new armaments as unfounded
prOpaganda. The government, he said, was only interested in
"repairing the deficiencies in our defences."93 Baldwin told
the annual meeting of the Peace Society, "I give you my word
that there will be no great armaments."9#

Baldwin typified the government's advantages in the

election. The government was familiar, eXperienced, comfortable

 

91The Times, Oct. 28, 1935.

 

92There is a COpy of Hoare's speech in the Templewood
Papers, General Political, VIII, 2.

93The Times, Oct. 31, 1935.
9“Baldwin's speech can be found at PO 371/18851 C747h/55/18,

and is also printed in Stanley Baldwin, This Torch of Freedom
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935), pp. 319—39.

 

 

227

and moderate. The polling on November 1h returned 432 members
pledged to support Baldwin, 21 opposition Liberals and 15h
Labourites.95 Labour increased its strength by almost 100
members and became a credible opposition, but the National
government retained a sizable majority and gained a fresh
mandate for government policies. The election gave the
government a claim to pOpular support for a limited program
of rearmament, and constituted a clear endorsement of the
government's handling of the Abyssinian crisis. To insure
popular support, the government repeatedly protested their
determination to uphold the Covenant. The effect of the
election on the Abyssinian crisis was to confirm Britain's
commitment to the League, and to reinforce the impression
that the government would do what was necessary to make the
league system work.
IV

Baldwin notwithstanding, there was no lull in the
Abyssinian crisis during the British election. Rather, the
crisis develOped at an accelerating pace while the cabinet
was distracted by the election. On November 2, the Coordina-
tion Committee met in Geneva and established November 18 as
the date by which the agreed sanctions should be put into

effect.96 The deadline served to prod those governments

 

95David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political
Facts, 1900-1968 (London: Macmillan 1969), p. lh3.

96league of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
No. 1&6, p, 8.

 

 

 

228

still considering the application of sanctions, but a number

of sanctions had been put into effect by November 2. According
to information furnished to the committee by October 31, some
four-fifths of the participating governments were applying,

or were prepared to apply the measures outlined in proposals
II, III and IV.97 The League was fully embarked upon the
critical test of the sanctions machinery.

Hoare and Laval were in Geneva on November 2, and their
presence lent weight to the decision reached by the Coordina-
tion Committee. In their remarks to the committee, however,
they stressed conciliation rather than coercion. Laval reminded
the committee that the League had a duty to seek a peaceful
settlement of the dispute. For his part, he said, he would
"stubbornly pursue“ his efforts to find a basis for negotia-

98

tions. Hoare reaffirmed Britain's commitment to the Covenant,
but emphasized his interest in a "speedy and honorable settle-
ment of the controversy." He referred to the conversations
which had been taking place in Paris and promised that any
settlement of the crisis would take shape within the framework

of the League. "Nothing is farther from our minds," he said,

"than to make and conclude an agreement behind the back of the

97By October 31, thirty-nine governments had imposed the
restrictions outlined in proposal II, forty—three governments
were prepared to accept prOposal III, and forty-four were will-
ing to accept proposal IV. Virtually all of the remaining
governments represented on the Coordination Committee had
indicated that they were giving the proposals favorable consider-
ation. Ibid.

98Ibid.

229

League.”99 Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, prOposed,
in response, that the League entrust to Hoare and Laval "the
mission of seeking... the elements of a solution which the
three parties at issue... might find it possible to accept.100
The Coordination Committee enthusiastically adopted Van Zeeland's
proposal. There was an obvious contradiction involved in
authorizing negotiations for a settlement certain to reward the
aggressor at the same time that the decision was taken to imple-
ment sanctions, but the contradiction was lost on the committee.
The League, to many of its participants, was first and fore-
most an agency of conciliation, with procedures to hinder
aggression only if conciliation failed. On November 2, Laval
and conciliation held sway at Geneva.

Hoare's statement to the Coordination Committee contrasted
sharply with his earlier speech to the Assembly. The attempt
to dissuade Mussolini from war had failed, and Hoare was eager
to find a solution which would preserve the League and release
Britain from an embarrassing and dangerous situation. The
government was committed to the sanctions eXperiment, but the
French attitude made the undertaking hazardous. Laval argued
that the French people could not be brought to support sanctions
until it was demonstrated that Mussolini was deaf to all reason-

101

able offers. After the unnerving exchange between London

 

99Ibid.. p. 9.

loolbid.

101Jones, A Diarywith Letters, pp. 158-59.

230

and Paris on the question of military cooperation, Hoare and
his colleagues were easily persuaded that another effort to
placate Italy was necessary. Eden and, to a lesser extent,
Chamberlain were the only members of the cabinet group manag-
ing the crisis who had any stomach for a fight. Hoare's
temperment was much better suited to conciliation than conflict,
and Baldwin could not tolerate the idea of war. Baldwin dic-
tated that the crisis not be allowed to blossom into a EurOpean
war, and Hoare acted on the authority granted to him by the
cabinet and the Coordination Committee to try to prevent such
a war.

Hoare anticipated that the discussions in Paris would
be based upon the report of the Committee of Five, but Laval
supported the terms outlined by Mussolini on October 16 to the

102 Mussolini indicated that he

French ambassador in Rome.
would consider an agreement which granted Italy a mandate

over all of the non-Amharic areas of Abyssinia, and which
assured Italy of predominant influence over the remaining
central highlands. The effect of such an agreement would have
been to grant Italy most of the fruits of victory without the
trouble of conquest. Ambassador Clerk and Maurice Peterson
argued for more reasonable terms. In a series of drafting

sessions, Peterson and his opposite number in the Quai d’Orsay,

the Comte de St. Quentin, worked up a proposed settlement which

 

 

102Viscount TemElewood, Nine Troubled Years (London:
Collins, 195“), p. 17 : Avon, Facing the_Dictators, p. 285.
For the proposal of the Committee of Five vide supra. pp.
176-780

 

 

231

stood somewhere between the earlier proposal of the Committee
of Five and Mussolini's demands. The Peterson-St. Quentin
draft suggested that Italy be accorded a privileged position
in the Abyssinian economy and that Italian advisers be granted
an important share in the administration of the non-Amharic
provinces in the south of Abyssinia. Overall authority would
be vested, however, in advisers in Addis Ababa appointed by
the League and supported by an international rather than an
Italian military force.103
Hoare and Eden took up the Peterson-St. Quentin draft
with Laval in Geneva on November 1. The Foreign Office had
studied the draft and Hoare said that Britain would prefer
proposals based on an exchange of territory rather than an
Italian mandate over large areas of Abyssinia.104 Laval,
however, continued to argue for Mussolini's demands. In his
opinion, reinforced by his contacts with Rome, the draft did
not go far enough to meet Italy's requirements. He suggested
that the scheme of administration for the southern provinces
be extended to include Tigre: where Italian forces were solidly
entrenched. Eden responded sharply that there was a difference

between an exchange of territory promoted by Britain and France

and a proposal which asked the League to bless the aggressor's

 

103Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 174: Peterson,
Both Sides of the Curtain, pp. 115-16: Avon, Facing thg_Dictgtors,

p' 2850

10[‘The discussion among Hoare, Eden and Laval on November
1 is drawn from Avon, Facing_the Dictators, p. 286.

 

 

 

 

232

every demand. Eden and Laval yielded nothing to each other
in the certainty with which each pursued his solution as the
only solution to the crisis. Laval found that he could make
no headway with Hoare while Eden was at his side. Eden
should have drawn the same conclusion.

Eden presented an obstacle to the French effort to
promote a settlement, but events at Geneva during the first
week in November reinforced Laval's arguments. On November 2,
Hoare met with Baron Aloisi to discuss the proposed military
reduction in the Mediterranean. The terms of the understanding
had been arranged by Laval and Aloisi seemed to be prepared
to confirm them, although he later told Laval that he did not
feel that demobilization would succeed.105 Mussolini, however,
had been assured by Drummond that Britain had no intention of
going beyond economic sanctions and he had no reason to reduce
the incentive for London to agree to the kind of settlement

106 When the agreement for a Mediter-

which Laval was promoting.
ranean detente reached Mussolini's desk, he disdainfully

"brushed it aside.”107 On November 6, Laval's point of view

 

105Aloisi, Journal, p. 320.

106Ian Colvin, None So Blind (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1965), p. 72.

107Cab 2h/257 C.P.220(35). Eden felt that his role in
helping to structure the sanctions front at Geneva prompted
Mussolini's more rigid attitude, and it well may have. It is
likely, however, that the interception of a telegram from Hoare
to Clerk, outlining the prOposed military understanding between
Britain and France, contributed at least as much to Mussolini's
ire. Aloisi, Journal, pp. 317-19: Avon, Facing the Dictators,

pp. 285-87.

 

233

received another strong boost in London when the Committee of
Eighteen decided to recommend the extension of the embargo
upon goods supplied to Italy to include a variety of strategic

108 An oil embargo, if it could be

materials, including oil.
made effective, would destroy the Italian potential to continue
the war in Abyssinia as certainly as a move to close the Suez
canal. In that event, there was every indication that Mussolini
would extend the war to the Mediterranean rather than relinquish
his ambitions in east Africa.

The prOposal to embargo oil brought the Abyssinian crisis
to a head. The gradual approach to sanctions, which won general
support from League members in October, was effectively challen-
ged by the simple device of adding a single commodity to the
prOposed embargo list. The League had slightly more than a
month in which to decide whether to force the issue and run
the risk of an eXpanded war. The Committee of Eighteen was
scheduled to meet again on December 12 to establish a date

for implementation if there was agreement on the prOposed list

of commodities to be embargoed. The easy objection to an oil

 

1081n addition to petroleum and petroleum derivatives,
the Committee of Eighteen prOposed to eXpand sanctions to
include an embargo on coal, iron, cast iron and steel. The
prOposal was put forward on November 2 by the Canadian
representative, Dr. Riddell. Riddell was later censured by
the Canadian government for acting without instructions, but,
as Eden has noted, the decision to consider an oil sanction
grew logically from the mandate given the sub-committee, and
the proposal could easily have originated with any of the
representatives assigned to consider the question. League
of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 1&6,
pp. 37-38 and h6Ln7: Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 287.

 

23h

sanction was that it could not be effective while American
tankers continued to supply Italy, but on November 15 Secretary
of State Cordell Hull issued a statement on behalf of the
American government denouncing the eXpanded trade between the
United States and Italy in war supplies. Hull eXpressly inclu-
ded oil among the "essential war materials" involved, and
stated:
This class of trade is directly contrary
to the policy of this government as announced
in official statements of the President and

Secretary of State, as it is also contrary to
the general spirit of the recent Neutrality Act.

109
Hull's statement made it appear that an oil sanction could be
effective. An effective oil sanction was an unsettling prospect
in London, Paris and Rome.

In retrospect, it seems unlikely that the Roosevelt
administration could have persuaded the American oil companies
to pass up the opportunity for enhanced profits, and it is
certain that Baldwin would not have sanctioned the use of the

110 In all

British fleet to interfere with American trade.
probability, then, the imposition of an oil sanction would not

have prompted the 'mad dog' Italian attack which the British

 

109New York Times, November 16. 1935.

110For an insider's view of the dilemma created for the
United States government by sanctions in general, and by the
oil sanction in particular, see Herbert Feis, Three International
Episodes Seen from E._A. (New York: Norton, 1966: first published
in l9h6), pp. 228-“2, 25h-60.

 

 

2°5

J

cabinet feared, despite Mussolini's bluster. The cabinet,
however, took the threat very seriously. Hull's speech,
following after the Committee of Eighteen's recommendation,
prompted a number of governments to speak out in favor of an
oil sanction, and by the end of November it was clear that
the proposal would be given a strong hearing at Geneva.111
On November 25, Hoare advised Alfred Duff Cooper, the new
Secretary of State for War, to look to his guns lest an
Italian attack, prompted by the proposed oil sanction, catch

him off guard.112

The threat posed by an oil sanction was
particularly disturbing in that the French had yet to agree
to coordinate military preparations, or to make essential
military facilities available, in spite of the conversations
between British and French military experts which had taken
place since the end of October.113
On November 26, the sub—committee on Defence Policy
Requirements of the Committee of Imperial Defence, including
all of the key members of the cabinet, met to consider the

dangerous situation created by the oil sanction prOposal.llu

 

111Sir Samuel Hoare to Walter Runciman, November 22,
1935, Templewood Papers, General Political, VIII, 3.

112Sir Samuel Hoare to Alfred Duff C00per, November 25:
1935: M'

113Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia No. 2(1936). p. “-

11“Those present included Baldwin, both MacDonalds, Simon,
Chamberlain, Hoare, Eden, Runciman, Eyres Monsell, Duff COOper
and Cunliffe-Lister from the cabinet, and Vansittart, Sir Warren
Fisher, Admiral Chatfield, Air-Marshal Ellington and General
Dill as advisers. The minutes of the meeting are found at
Cab 2u/257 C.P.220(35).

236
The Italians were spreading rumors of a possible "sortie"
against British forces if an oil sanction was imposed, and
ambassador Grandi had described a recent visit to the Foreign
Office as his "last visit.” Hoare said that Italian bluster
should be recognized for what it was, but added that "in
view of the existence of the proposal for oil sanctions the
threatening attitude of Italy could not be ignored." It was
especially hard to ignore the Italian threats in light of the
attitude of the French. The French had done nothing to prepare
for a possible war. At Toulon, the French anti-aircraft
defenses were unmanned. Franch military authorities maintained
that mobilization of French forces could not begin until after
an act of aggression had occurred. Beyond that, the French
government had yet to agree to make Bizerta and Toulon available
to the Mediterranean fleet, and they were unlikely to agree to
British use of the aerodromes in the south of France which
Cunliffe-Lister felt were essential to a British air offensive
against Italy. It was clear, then, that if an oil sanction
brought Britain and Italy to blows, Britain would have to stand
alone, at least initially. Duff Cooper and Eyres Monsell
reported that the anti-aircraft ammunition available to British
forces in the Mediterranean "was not sufficient for prolonged
operations,” and production could not be quickly increased.
If the Italian air force was free to concentrate on British
forces, without worrying about the French, it would undoubt-
edly do considerable damage. The unescapable conclusion was

that an oil sanction carried with it heavy military risks,

237

which could only be reduced if the French were brought to the
point of active military c00peration.

The essential meeting with the French to discuss the
implications of an oil sanction was scheduled for November 29,
but Laval pleaded a ministerial crisis and postponed the
discussion until December 6.115 The delay gave the cabinet
additional time to mull over the problem. The Foreign Office
pointed out, in a memorandum circulated by Hoare on November
27, that Italy had storage accommodation for no more than
three or four months' supply of oil, but added that "it is
during those three or four months that our weakness is great-
est."116 On November 29, Chamberlain, Hoare, Runciman, Simon
and Eden met in the Chancellor's room in the House of Commons
to discuss the problem in advance of the full cabinet's
deliberations. The discussion brought Chamberlain to the fore.
He felt that Secretary Hull's initiative was a departure from
the usual practice of American neutrality which should not be
discouraged. There were risks involved in pressing forward
with an oil sanction, but there were equally grave risks
involved in allowing Mussolini to carry the day with his threats:

in such circumstances U.S.A. should decline
in future to help us in any way, sanctions
would crumble, the League would lose its

coherence, and our whole policy would be
destroyed.11

llSCab 24/257 c.P.212(35).

116Ibid.

117Quoted in Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 272.

 

238

If necessary, Chamberlain argued, Britain ought to give the

lead rather than allow the question to go by default.
Chamberlain's attitude reinforced Eden's arguments and

fortified Hoare in his determination to see the sanctions

experiment through. Hoare recognized the necessity to endorse

the oil sanction prOposal, but he feared the danger of war.118
When the cabinet met to decide the oil sanction issue on
December 2 Hoare was ready with a compromise proposal.119 He

reminded the cabinet that Britain was almost alone among the
concerned League powers in having expressed no Opinion on the
oil sanction, and that there was grumbling in the French press
and elsewhere that the cabinet was hesitating in order to pro-
tect the financial interests of the Anglo-Iranian oil company.
It was necessary to dispel that rumor, and to demonstrate that
the government was prepared to play a full part in the effort
to restrain Italian aggression. But the risks were daunting,
and Britain was alone in preparing to shoulder them. The only
assurance the government had of French support was Laval's
promise, which was no assurance at all. Hoare recommended
therefore that Britain support the oil sanction proposal, but

118Despite his concern about the dangerous implications
of an oil sanction, Hoare remained convinced that it was
necessary to uphold the League in the crisis. On November 25,
he told Hankey that to back away from the oil sanction would
be to ruin the government and to smash the League. If the
oil sanction was not accepted by the cabinet, he said, he
would resign. Stephen Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets Vol.
III: 1931-1963 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 197“), pp. 186—89.

119

 

 

The minutes of the meeting are at Cab 23/82 50(35).

239

delay the establishment of a date for implementation. Any
time gained would be time which could be devoted to the search
for a satisfactory solution. Hoare noted that the Paris talks
had not produced a likely solution, but "he himself had to go
away for reasons of health for a short time and he proposed

on his journey to see M. Laval and to try and press on his
talks with him."

Hoare's suggestion appealed to the cabinet as a compro-
mise between duty and prudence. The principle of collective
security had to be maintained, but Mussolini's attitude
threatened a war which Britain was ill-prepared to fight.
Secret intelligence showed that Italy had made serious prepar-
ations for war in the Mediterranean. The service ministers
laid heavy emphasis on the danger posed by the Italian air
force, which, they said, could do heavy damage and put back
the programs designed to strengthen Britain's defense posture
in EurOpe and the Far East. But it was difficult to pull back
from the oil sanction prOposal. Public opinion was aroused,
most of the oil-producing members of the League had already
indicated their support, and, as Baldwin put it in summing up
a long and tense cabinet, if aggression succeeded and the League

was discredited, who would face Hitler?120 On the other hand

120The Abyssinian crisis pointed up rather than obscured
the growing German menace. On November 25, Hoare circulated
to the cabinet three despatches from Sir Eric Phipps in Berlin
describing the rearmament of Germany and German eXpansionist
aims. In his covering note, Hoare wrote that "the present
imbroglio in Abyssinia is mere child's play compared to the
problem with which these German claims will in some not very
distant future confront His Majesty's Government." Cab zu/257

c.P.217(35).

240

if the crisis led to a war with Italy, which demonstrated and
aggravated British military weaknesses, the same question
would apply -- who would face Hitler? The answer, for the
cabinet, was to support the League but avoid war. It was
becoming increasingly difficult to do both, but the cabinet
preferred to defer, for as long as possible, a hard choice
between the League and war in the hope that Mussolini would
finally yield to reason. Again, as with the earlier decision
to support sanctions, the cabinet looked for the safest way
to run a dangerous risk and settled upon a contradictory half-
measure.

When Hoare left for Paris, then, on December 7 for the
discussions with Laval which produced the ill-famed Hoare-Laval
plan, he did so with the eXpress authority of the cabinet.
Indeed, the cabinet looked upon the Paris talks as the best
hope that the oil sanction would not have to be put into
effect. The cabinet did not, however, discuss the details of
the prOposed settlement in authorizing Hoare's trip. The Paris
talks had not reached the point of an agreed proposal, and it
was understood that any such prOposal would be developed gg

referendum to London and subject to ultimate approval by the

 

parties involved. The cabinet had no reason to fear that they
would be confronted with an accomplished fact.

Most of the preliminary work on the Anglo—French prOposal
had been completed before Hoare took the negotiations into his

own hands. Peterson and St. Quentin spent two weeks reworking

the earlier draft and by December 3 were close to agreement.

291

By the terms of their revised prOposal, the Emperor would lose
control of most of the southern provinces of Abyssinia as well
as part or all of Tigré province in the north, leaving him to
govern a truncated but ethnically consolidated state. To com-
pensate for his losses, the Emperor would receive a port in
either British or, preferably, Italian territory.121 By the
time that Peterson cabled for additional instructions on Decem—
ber 3, he and St. Quentin had reduced the remaining points of
difference to a question of whether Italy should be granted
all or only the eastern half of Tigré’province, and a question
as to what type of restrictions, if any, were to be placed upon

122 The

the Abyssinian acquisition and development of a port.
French wanted to protect the monOpoly enjoyed by their Djibuti-
Addis Ababa railway, and they were insistent that Italy would

be satisfied with nothing less than all of Tigre province. Since
Laval was in regular contact with Mussolini by telephone, his
grasp of Italian requirements could hardly be questioned, but
Peterson was limited by his instructions. Laval was anxious

to clear away the remaining questions before the oil sanction
proposal came up again at Geneva, and he suggested a meeting

with Hoare in London to settle upon an agreed prOposal. Hoare
did not want to bring the negotiations on a compromise settle-
ment to London, where they would generate controversy before

121Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain. pp. 118-19:
Templewood, Nine Troubled_Years, pp. 174-75: Avon, Fgging
the Dictators, pp. 291-92.

122

 

 

Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtgin, pp. 118-19.

 

2&2

a settlement was reached. Instead, he agreed to meet with Laval
in Paris on his way to a skating holiday in Switzerland.123
In his account of the weekend which ruined him as Foreign
Secretary, Hoare conceded that he made a number of mistakes.
He felt that he should have delayed the meeting with Laval
until he was stronger, physically and mentally, or, if the
meeting could not have been delayed, he should have agreed with
Laval's suggestion that their discussion be held in London,
where he would have had his colleagues close at hand. At the
very least, he felt, he should have taken the precaution of
requiring the cabinet to consider and define a British position
on the proposed settlement before discussing it with Laval.
He did not take the obvious precautions because he did not
expect the meeting to produce anything more than a provisional
prOposal, and he had no intention of committing the government
to a final plan. According to his account, he did not expect
to stay in Paris for more than a few hours, but was reluctantly
persuaded to remain for what became definitive talks. The
implication, in Hoare's version of the talks, is that he was
led in a weakened state to discuss and accept much more than
he had anticipated when he left London.12u
There is no reason to doubt that Hoare was sincere when
he told Eden, before leaving for Paris, "I am not going to

_

123Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 177-78.

lzuIbid., pp. 178-80.

 

21:3

commit you to anything."125 He did expect, however, that his
trip to Paris would be important. The meeting with Laval was
not something squeezed incidentally into a holiday trip, nor
was Hoare the reluctant participant portrayed in his memoirs.
Rather, the available evidence suggests that, by the beginning
of December, Hoare, with Vansittart prodding him, had become
nearly as eager as Laval to find a settlement to the crisis,
and that the express purpose of the trip to Paris was to pull
together the Anglo-French proposal. In a letter to Ramsay
MacDonald, dated November 27, Hoare wrote:

The real problem, I think, is to know how

far the other members of the League will

be prepared to go in the way of conces-

sions once they realise that we are not

prepared to do the fighting for them. We

shall then know how far we must go towards

meeting Mussolini and getting a concrete

settlement. Such a settlement, when we

arrive at it, may well be not gloriogs

but equally I hope not inglorious.12
The way to test the reaction of League members was to put a
prOposed settlement before them. Hoare and Laval had a stand-
ing invitation from the Coordination Committee to submit a
proposal, and there was a clear precedent in the work of the
Committee of Five. Without a negotiated settlement, it seemed

likely to Hoare that the oil sanction proposal would lead to

a rupture in Anglo-French relations, and to war between Britain

 

— -..—M ...»

125Avon, Facing the Dictators. P- 298'

126Sir Samuel Hoare to James Ramsay MacDonald, November
27, 1935, Templewood Papers, Gen. Political, VIII, 3.

 

249

and Italy in the Mediterranean. Baldwin's instructions to
Hoare continued to be, "avoid war." Just before Hoare left
for Paris, Baldwin told him:

Have a good leave, and get your health back.

That is the most important thing. By all

means stOp in Paris, and push Laval as far

iitgoxag?E27bUt on no account get this country

Hoare's eXpectation that the Paris talks would succeed

derived in part from the conversations which he and Vansittart
had during the last week in November with Mussolini's personal
representative, General Garibaldi. Garibaldi had called on
Vansittart at the Foreign Office on November 25 to convey an
offer and a threat. Mussolini, he said, regretted the adventure
which he had undertaken, and would not have begun it if he had
not been misled by Grandi about the state of British public
Opinion. Mussolini's concern was "to get out of the imbroglio
as well and as speedily as possible." Garibaldi handed Vansit-
tart a brief outline of Italy's terms for peace, and said that
he had been authorized to state categorically that if Italy
could be assured in advance of such an arrangement, Mussolini
was prepared to cease hostilities and send a representative to
Geneva to put Italy's case to the League again. The terms
outlined in the note were similar to those that Britain had

already rejected: Italy wanted outright control of Tigré and

the territories of Ogaden and Danakil, and a direct or indirect

 

127Quoted in Templewood. Nine Troubled Yeagg, P- 178°

 

2U5

mandate over the rest of Abyssinia. In return, Italy was
willing to see Abyssinia gain either the British port of
Zeila or the Italian port of Assab. Garibaldi conceded that
the terms were virtually identical to those communicated to
Laval some time earlier, but he added that they were not
final and were subject to any reasonable modification. With-
out an agreement, Garibaldi warned, an embargo on oil would
drive Mussolini to an act of calculated desperation, which
would widen the conflict. Vansittart responded that neither
Britain nor the League could accept such terms, but he set

128 Hoare listened

up an interview for Garibaldi with Hoare.
to Garibaldi on November 28, and his response was also that
Mussolini's terms would destroy Abyssinia and the League.
Garibaldi stressed again, however, that the Italian terms were
only a bargaining position, and Hoare noted in his memorandum
of the conversation that he had been impressed by Garibaldi's
sincere desire to find some basis for an agreement.129
If Mussolini was prepared to bargain in good faith, there
was reason to believe that the Paris talks might lead to an
end of the crisis. In a letter to Lord Wigram on December 2

for the king's information, Hoare took a very positive view of

his impending talks with Laval. 'We intend,’ he wrote 'to go

 

128Record of conversation between Sir Robert Vansittart
and General Garibaldi November 25, 1935, Cab 24/257 C.P.225(35).

129Record of conversation between the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs and General Garibaldi, November 28, 1935,
Cab 2u/257 C.P.225(35).

2M6

all out for bringing the conflict to an end.’ For that purpose,
he planned to take Vansittart, a private secretary and a cipher
with him to Paris. And he expected to succeed: 'If as I hope
M. laval and I agree upon a basis for a peace negotiation,

Vansittart will stop on in Paris for a day or two in order to

130

clinch the details.‘ On December 5, Hoare reviewed the

crisis for the House of Commons, and stressed that the League

had granted specific approval to Britain and France to seek a

131

settlement within the framework of the Covenant. Vansittart

was equally confident that the talks with laval would result
in an agreed proposal. Before he left london, Vansittart
called senior Foreign Office officials Ralph Wigram and Rex
Ieeper to his office and asked how long it would take to alter
public opinion on the Abyssinian crisis. Ieeper, the head of

the News Department, estimated that it would take three weeks,

to which Vansittart responded 'we have only three days.’132

_—_ —___‘_‘_¥

130Quoted in Keith Middlemas and John Barnes. Baldwin,
p. 881.

lBlH.C.Deb.. 53., cols. 342-#7.

132Quoted in Colvin, None So Blind, pp. 7Q-75. Vansittart
was very active in the management of Paris talks, and he shared
Laval's conviction that it was essential to resurrect the Stresa
front. Years after the crisis, Dino Grandi referred to the
Hoare-Laval plan as 'nothing more or less than the Grandi-
Vansittart plan.‘ The evidence on the role which Vansittart
played in preparing Hoare to accept Iaval's prOposals is not
conclusive, but there was clearly substance in Eden's remark
to Hoare that in Paris, Vansittart could be more French than
the French. Nonetheless, Vansittart held to the government's
position that the league had to be maintained. On December 6,
he told the French ambassador in london that it was necessary
to find a solution to the crisis which was reasonable, but that

 

2&7

Hoare arrived in Paris on the afternoon of December 7.
He was met by Vansittart, Clerk and Peterson and taken immedi-
ately to the Quai d'Orsay, where Laval was waiting with his
advisers, Leger, St. Quentin and Rene Massigli. Outside of
the door of Laval's office, Hoare found a crowd of newspaper
reporters and photographers, which should have given him some
inkling of the prospects for secrecy.133 Inside the room,
Hoare found Laval attempting to play the role of mediator

13h

again. France, Laval said, was not a supplier of oil and
could not take the lead on the oil sanction issue. He knew,
however, from his ambassador in Rome and from the Italian
ambassador in Paris, as well as through the Veteran's Leagues
of Italy and France that Mussolini viewed the oil sanction as
a military measure and was prepared to reply in kind. If
Britain pressed at Geneva for the application of an oil
sanction, there would be war in the Mediterranean. France
would not oppose the oil sanction proposal, Laval said,

but he saw no reason to fix even a remote date for entry into
force until the processes of conciliation had failed. The

British cabinet had already decided to delay the implementation

of an oil sanction, but Hoare tried to force Laval out of the

 

such a solution could not be so generous to Italy as to destroy
the league, and with it the post-war structure of Europe. Ibid.
p. 7h; Avon, Facinggthe Dictators, p. 298; Cab 2h/257 C.P.235
(35); Aaron L. Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart's Search for
Italian cooperation against Hitler, 1933-36," Journal of
Cogtemporary Histgry, IX, 3 (July l97fi), 93-130.

 

 

 

133Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 179

lBaA record of the meeting at the Quai d'Orsay on December
7 was printed for the cabinet at Cab 2h/257 C.P.233(35).

2M8

role of mediator before conceding the issue. Pointedly he
asked whether there was any reason why France would be unable
to come to Britain's aid if there was an Italian attack upon
the British fleet. Laval replied vaguely that the French
pe0p1e habitually observed their obligations, but that they
would have to be convinced that everything possible had been
done to find a way out of the crisis before they would lend
their full support. Hoare refused to leave it at that, and
pressed for a French commitment to conversations on military
coordination between the general staffs and air staffs of each
country, to supplement the conversations which had been taking
place between the naval staffs. To Hoare's surprise, Laval
agreed without reservation. Feeling somewhat more secure about
French military support, Hoare turned to the peace proposals on
which Peterson and St. Quentin had been working for several
weeks.

The discussion of the peace terms had only begun by the
time that Hoare had planned to leave for Switzerland on Satur-
day evening, December 7. "Reluctantly" Hoare agreed to remain
until the proposals had been completed.135 Hoare's position
on the peace terms was that it was essential not to create
the appearance of rewarding aggression. He felt that the
prOposals should adhere, as closely as possible, to the report
of the Committee of Five, with some allowance for Italy's gains

135Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 180.

 

2M9

in Tigré province. Laval argued that such an approach would
be wholly unacceptable to Mussolini, and he appealed to Hoare
to be more generous. To underline his arguments and heighten
the drama of the situation, Laval kept a telephone by his

hand and called Mussolini at several points during the conver-

136

sations. In spite of Hoare's best efforts to pull him off
the fence, Laval persisted in viewing himself as the necessary
mediator between Britain and Italy.

In the end, Hoare accepted what he thought of as a reason-
able balance between his position and Laval's point of view.137
In terms of territory to be exchanged, the French insisted upon
the cession of the whole of Tigré’to Italy, but Hoare managed
to reduce the area prOposed to include Adowa, Adicrat and Makale,
but to exclude the sacred city of Axum and the western portion
of the province, In addition, frontier "rectifications" to
Italy's advantage were proposed for the Ogaden and the Danakil.
In return, Abyssinia was to receive the port of Assab in
Italian Eritrea, along with a connecting corridor: or, if the
Emperor preferred, Britain would cede the port of Zeila on a

similar basis.138

To win Laval's approval for the proposals
. l .
respecting Assab and Tigre, which were more generous to Abys-

sinia than Laval felt Mussolini would like. Hoare had to agree

 

136Ibid., p. 179

137Hoare's report to the cabinet at the conclusion of his
talks with Laval can be found at Cab 2fi/257 C.P.235(35).

1381129..

250

to an eXpansion of the area to be set aside for Italian
economic deve10pment in the south and southwest of Abys-
sinia. Specifically, Hoare and Laval agreed to propose that
the area of Abyssinia south of the 8th parallel and east of
the 35th meridian be established as a zone in which Italy
would enjoy "exclusive economic rights," under the nominal
sovereignty of the Emperor, but with a predominantly Italian
administration appointed by the League. The effect of this
proposal would have been to extend virtual Italian control
over an additional third of Abyssinia. The only compensation
prOposed for the Emperor, to offset the loss, was the scheme
of League assistance which had been drawn up previously by
the Committee of Five.

The Hoare-Laval plan was a compromise between Mussolini's
earlier demands, which envisioned the Italian annexation of all
of the non-Amharic areas of Abyssinia and an Italian mandate
over the central highlands, and the terms put forward by
the Committee of Five. As such, it was viewed as realistic
by the two statesmen. In fact, the plan confronted Abyssinia
and the league with a defeat which neither could have accepted
and hOped to survive. Hoare, however, did not see the prOposals
which he initialed as a blueprint for the destruction of Abys-
sinia and the League. He saw only the immediate threat of a
wider war, and felt that the proposals represented the best
that could be done for Abyssinia in the circumstances. Beyond

that, the understanding with Laval smoothed over a threatening

rift in Anglo-French relations, and created the possibility

251

that the structure of European security would survive to blunt
the German menace. Hoare's staff assured him, at the conclu-
sion of the negotiations, that the proposals represented 'the
best thing that he had done.‘139 Peterson told Eden on the
following day that he felt he could have gotten better terms
on his own, and he wrote later that he had had an uneasy

feeling about the prOposals from the first, but no one marred

8.1140

Hoare's sense of achievement on December He left that

evening for Switzerland and a much needed rest. Hoare's
judgment during his talks with Laval may well have been
affected by the precarious state of his health, but at the
time he was untroubled by doubt. Before he left Paris, he
and Laval issued a statement to the press which indicated
that they felt they had worked out a formula to preserve
European peace:

Animated by the same spirit of concil-
iation, and inspired by close Franco-British
friendship, we have in the course of our long
conversations of to-day and yesterday sought
the formulas which might serve as a basis for
a friendly settlement of the Italo-EthiOpian
dispute.

There could be no question at present of
publishing these formulas. The British Govern-
ment has not yet been informed of them, and
once its agreement has been received it will
be necessary to submit them to the consider-
ation of the interested Governments and to
the decision of the League of Nations.

 

139Quoted in Jones, A Diary with Letters, p. 159-

lquvon, Facing_the Dictators, p. 3013 Peterson, Both
Sides of the Curtain, p. 120.

 

 

252

We have worked together with the
same anxiety to reach as rapidly as
possible a pacific and honorable
solution. We are both satisfied with
the results which we have reached.

Hoare's skating holiday began on a perfect day in the
Swiss mountains. The air was crisp, the sky was clear, and
the ice was deep and hard. Shortly after Hoare stepped onto
the ice, however, he suffered one of the fainting spells which
had been troubling him for months, fell on his face and severely
fractured his nose.1u2 In London, the cabinet was confronted
with a similar fate. The proposals which Hoare approved in
Paris struck an unexpected blow at the new government which
Baldwin had just put together after the November election, and
threatened it with a disastrous fall.

Before any of the cabinet ministers beyond Eden and
Baldwin had learned of Hoare's understanding with Laval, the
details were published in the Paris press. The Quai d'Orsay
was notorious for its inability to preserve a secret, and on
December 9 a substantially accurate version of the Hoare—Laval

plan was printed in L’Echo de Paris and L’Oeuvre.la3 On

 

 

December 10, The Timgg reprinted the details of the plan in

Iondon.1uu Whether the leak was deliberate on Iaval's part

 

lLilThe Times, December 9, 1935.

 

1L‘ZTemplewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 184.

 

1“3Ibid.. p. 183.

1“’The Timgg, December 10, 1935.

253
or not, the effect was all that the French Prime Minister could

have asked for. The cabinet was faced with a fait accompli,

 

and had to decide, under public scrutiny, whether to support
or repudiate the absent Foreign Secretary and his understanding
with France.

The cabinet had little to work with in deciding what to
do. Maurice Peterson brought a c0py of the proposals to Eden's
house on the morning of December 9, along with a covering
memorandum by Hoare urging the cabinet to approve the terms
as quickly as possible and to convey a copy to Rome for
Mussolini's consideration. Curiously, Hoare recommended the
proposals, in his memorandum, as a way of placing the matter
back in the hands of the League.l’+5 Eden read the prOposals
with disbelief and growing horror. He took them to the Foreign
Office, where he met Baldwin and eXplained, with the aid of a
map, what Abyssinia was being asked to give up in return for
a port. The only possible interpretation, he felt, was that
aggression had succeeded and was being rewarded.1u6 But the
cabinet, which met in response to Baldwin's urgent summons,
were loath to repudiate Hoare and did not want to offend the
French. The proposals, after all, were meant only as a basis
for discussion among the parties involved. Hoare had a repu—

tation for being a clever and cautious man. Perhaps he had had

a good reason for accepting the prOposals, and would eXplain

 

luSCab 24/257 C.P.235(35).

M6Avon, Facing the Dictators, pp. 300-02.

 

25#

his reasoning when he returned. Even Eden shared in the
cabinet's loyalty to an absent colleague, but he said that
there were conditions attendant to the proposals which required
immediate change. Hoare had accepted Iaval's sustestion that
Mussolini be informed of the prOposals before they were sent
to Abyssinia, in order to enhance the possibility that Italy
would accept them. Eden stressed that from every point of
view it was essential that any proposals adOpted be sent at
the same time to Addis Ababa and to Rome. Laval wanted the
proposals withheld from Abyssinia until the Committee of Five
took up the matter on December 12, by which time Italy could
have considered and accepted them. If Abyssinia refused to
accept the proposals, laval could then denounce the Emperor as
unwilling to end the war and announce that France would no
longer participate in sanctions. The cabinet saw the force
of Eden's arguments and agreed that Italy and Abyssinia would
have to be dealt with even-handedly if the proposals were to
go forward. They also agreed that an Abyssinian refusal to
accept the terms prOposed would have no effect upon British
support for sanctions. Put they did not reject the prOposals.lh7
It proved, however, to be politically impossible for the
cabinet to stand by Hoare and his proposals. Newspaper accounts

had alerted the country to the proposals, and hard questions

 

l’WThe cabinet met to consider the prOposals on Monday
evening, December 9, and reconvened on the following morning
after Eden had telephoned their objections on procedure to
Vansittart in Paris, who secured Iaval's grudging approval
of the changes suggested. Cab 23/82 52(35) and 53(35): Avon,
Facing the Dictators, p. 305.

 

255
were asked in the House of Commons as early as December 10.
Attlee, for example, pressed to know whether the proposals
published in the papers, which in his Opinion would "over-
throw the whole basis of the league system," were similar

1&8 Baldwin evaded

to those approved by the Foreign Secretary.
the question by saying that he had not read the newspaper
accounts, but he was hard pressed to evade the demand from
several sides for information. H. B. lees-Smith, an opposi-
tion member from the West Riding of York, took up the question
again later in the day during the debate on the address from

the throne. The government, he noted, had just gone to the
polls on the issue of support for the league of Nations. They
had gained a mandate to support the league, but, he said, if

the prOposals published in the newspapers were even half correct,
Hoare and his colleagues were in violation of that mandate.lu9
Eden reminded the House that Britain and France had been invited
by the league to find a solution, and he explained that the
proposals were based on three broad principles: an exchange of
territory, league assistance to Abyssinia, and special economic
facilities for Italy. He declined to be more specific for fear

150

of prejudicing the prOposals. Eden's explanation did not
satisfy league supporters in the House, nor did Baldwin's
mysterious reference to his difficulties in meeting the general

demand for information:

 

148307 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 717-18.

luglbid., cols. 817-18.

15OIbid., cols. 821-26.

256

I have seldom spoken with greater regret
for my lips are not yet unsealed. Were

these troubles over I would make a case,
and I guarantee that not a man would go

into the Lobby against us.

Baldwin's sealed lips did not meet the demands of the
situation. If anythins, the government's refusal to release
the terms of the Hoare-laval plan lent to the growing fear
that Hoare had agreed to scuttle the league. letters poured
in to Parliament from every part of the country. One member
reported receiving four hundred angry letters in a single

152

morning. On December 13, the terms of the proposals were

released in Ceneva and the fears of many in Britain were con-
firmed. The league of Nations Union sent a delegation to Baldwin
to protest against the proposals.153 The executive committee
of the Council of Action took steps to organize a nation—wide
protest against the prOposals, the National Council of Labour
denounced the proposals as a gross violation of the Covenant,

and the newspapers took up the hue and cry with almost one

lsllbig., col. 856. Thomas Jones later asked Baldwin
what he had meant by his reference to sealed lips. Baldwin
replied that he had in mind the menace of war and the unpre-
pared state of British defenses. According to his son, how-
ever, Baldwin meant that he was morally sure that laval had
been bought by Mussolini, but could not say so. Jones, A Diary
with letters, p. 160; A. W. Baldwin, MyiFather: The True Story
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 291.

152

 

The Times, December 13, 1935.

 

153Stanley Baldwin to Viscount Cecil, December 17, 1935,
Cecil Papers, Add. 51080.

257
15a

voice. In the space of a few days, a pOpular reaction
built which was virtually unprecedented. On December 17,
Simon noted with awe in his diary that "a storm has broken
over the Sovernment's head which in suddenness and intensity
must be almost without parallel."155 The only friends left
to the government in the press, he mourned, were Rothermere,

156

Beaverbrook and Garvin. Geoffrey Dawson of The Times was

 

an old, established friend of the government, but Baldwin
refused to take Dawson into his confidence on the delicate

matter of the prOposals, and on December 16 The Times blasted

 

the prOposals in a devastating leader entitled ”A Corridor for
Camels."157 The leader was based upon a report from Paris that
the French intended to invoke the provisions of an understand-
ing dating from the turn of the century to prevent Abyssinia
from building a competing railway through the corridor which

158

would connect Abyssinia with the sea. Neither Hoare nor the

 

15“Helen Hiett, "Public Opinion and the Italo-EthiOpian
Dispute: The Activity of Private Organizations in the Crisis,"
Geneva Special Studieg, VII, 1 (Geneva Research Center, 1936),
p. 21; Ernst L. Presseisen, "Foreign Policy and British Public
Opinion: The Hoare-Laval Pact of 1935," World Affairs Quarterly,
XXIX, 3 (October 1958), 268-77.

 

155Simon Papers, Diary No. 11.

lsélbid.

157Jones, A Diary with letters, p. 161; The Times,
December 16, 1935.

158

 

 

Toynbee, Abyssinia ggd Italy, p. 297.

 

258

British government was a party to the French plan to reduce
the Abyssinian corridor to a corridor for camels, but that
fact did not emerge from the leader, which, if Parliamentary
debate is any measure, had a considerable impact upon informed
Opinion.

Parliament was the focus of the storm which the govern-
ment had to face. On December 11, Vyvyan Adams tabled a
resolution, signed by a number of the more fervid supporters
of league, condemning any settlement which granted the aggres-
sor greater concessions than could have been obtained by peace-
ful negotiations.159 On December 12, Lord Davies gave notice
of his intention to move a similar resolution in the lords,
and the Liberal Opposition, headed by Archibald Sinclair,
handed in a motion of censure denouncing any settlement which
violated the integrity of Abyssinia and rewarded the aggressor
"as a betrayal of the League of Nations and as an act of

national dishonour."160

The government could not discount the
angry attitude of the Opposition or the anguish of those govern-
ment SUpporters who were devoted to the league, but the main
concern of the government whips was the growing revolt among
rank-and—file supporters of the government who were being
pressed by their constituents to remember their election pledges.

On December 12, C. M. Patrick outlined the problem in a letter

to Hoare:

 

159The Timgg, December 12. 1935-

l601bid., December 13, 1935.

 

259

Of course, one can only generalise
when it comes to a question of the Opinions
of 600 members. But I have talked to scores
of them in the past forty-eight hours, having
tried to pick them out so as to get a fair
cross-section of Opinion. I needn't bother
you with the views of Socialists, or of
people like Mander: nor with those of the
Liberal Nationals who seem profoundly dis-
turbed. The trouble lies with our own Party
and with few exceptions a state of acute
discomfort seems to prevail among them, down
from some, at least of the Under—Secretaries,
through pe0ple like Spender Clay... down to
the most obscure, and the "new boys." The
exceptions I have come across are a few back-
woodsmen who told me that they didn't know
what it was all about but they supposed it
would be all right: some weightless die-
hards like Herbert Williams} and Edward
Grigg, who almost alone of informed people
seems to be pleased. There may well be
many more of these "exceptiogi,” but I
haven't struck them so far.1

On December 17 Austen Chamberlain found the Committee of
Conservative Members in the Commons ready to disown Hoare and
the proposals.162
In the face of the mounting tide of opposition in Parlia-
ment and in the country, the cabinet backed away from the Hoare-
Iaval plan. On December 10 the Foreign Office sent the prOpo-
sals to Addis Ababa and Rome, with a note to Sir Sidney Barton

instructing him to twist the Emperor's ar‘m.l63 But on Decem-

ber 11, the cabinet weighed the public reaction and authorized

161C. M. Patrick to Sir Samuel Hoare, December 12, 1935,
Templewood Papers, General Political, VIII, 1.

162Jones, A Diary with Letters, p. 161.

 

1639gg. 5044, pp. 13-19.

260

Eden to use his discretion in deciding how far it was neces—

sary to go in championing the Hoare—laval agreement at Geneva.16u

Eden found, predictably, that the proposals had been received
with dismay in Geneva, and on December 12 he dropped a strong
hint to the Committee of Eighteen that his government was pre-
pared to abandon them:

These conversations in Paris were begun with the
approval of the members of the League, and
neither the French Government nor ourselves

have at any time had any other intention than

to bring the outcome of our work to the league
for the league's information and judgment.

The proposals now put forward are neither
definitive nor sacrosanct. They are suggestions
which it is hOped may make possible the begin-
ning of negotiations. If the League does not
agree with thege suggestions, we shall make

no complaint.1 5

When he arrived in Geneva, Eden called Hoare and advised
him to break off his convalescence and return to Iondon.l€6
Hoare was under doctor's orders to remain where he was, how-
ever, and he had received word from Baldwin that everything
was under control.l{<7 But by December 15, the sound of the
political crisis in London had become impossible to ignore,
and on the following day, in spite of his doctor's instruc—

tions, Hoare was back in his house in Chelsea. As soon as

he returned, Hoare sent a note to Baldwin explaining that he

”hoary 23/82 5u(35)1.

165gflg. 5ouu, p. 21.

166Avon, Facigg the Dictators, p. 308.

 

167Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 18h; Jones, g
Diagy with Letters, p. 151.

 

 

261

was confined to his house because of his nose and asking

168 Baldwin came and reassured Hoare

Baldwin to "look in."
that 'We all stand together.’169 He said nothing about the
footing, however.

When the cabinet met on December 17, it was clear that
it would be difficult, if not impossible to organize sufficient
support for the proposals in the Commons. A motion of censure
was pending and the cabinet had to decide how to meet it.
Chamberlain, who was inclined to stand by Hoare and see it
through, gave the cabinet a summary of the defense Hoare intended
to make when the Commons debated the issue. Essentially,
he planned to stress the threat of war and the unwillingness
of any member of the League, save Britain, to prepare for it.
His line would be that the nation and the League should face
up to the realities of the situation. Unfortunately for Hoare,
there was no indication that his view of reality would prevail.
The cabinet gave Eden the authority to bury the proposals at
Geneva, but they put off until the last moment the painful
decision of whether to feed Hoare to the angry mob, or go down

together.170

In the end, the instinct for self—preservation
prevailed. Hoare, after all, had brought his troubles on his

own head. The cabinet confronted the problem squarely on

 

168Sir Samuel Hoare to Stanley Baldwin, December 16, 1935,
Baldwin Papers, Vol. 123.

169Templewood, Nine Troubled Years. Po 185-
17OCab 23/82 55(35)3.

 

262

December 18, and the general feeling was that Hoare ought to
resign. Baldwin said that the situation in the Commons was
the worst that he had ever known, and Halifax added that the
moral authority of the government would be destroyed if Hoare

did not step down.l7l

Hoare could make his defense, but it
would have to be from the back benches.

When Hoare rose to defend his proposals on December 19,
his resignation had been tendered and his plan was dead. The
House was placated by the sacrifice, and the members gave
Hoare a sympathetic hearing as he stood in his old place in a
corner, with a bandage on his nose, and made his case. He told
them that the League system would not work if only one country
shouldered the burdens, and he tried to convince them that he

172 But

had done the best that could reasonably have been done.
he could not make them understand, and at the end, he sobbed
and sat down. His venture in foreign affairs was over, and
with it ended, for all practical purposes, the British eXperi-
ment in collective security through the League of Nations.
Eden succeeded Hoare as Foreign Secretary. league sup-
porters everywhere assumed that Eden's promotion signalled a

return of Britain to the fold after the aberration of the

Hoare-laval agreement. In fact, Eden assumed authority for

 

171Cab 23/82 56(35). The minutes of this meeting were
considered so sensitive that they were placed in a sealed
envelope which was not opened until August, 1967. The minutes
were then refiled at Cab 23/83 5(37)10B.

172307.H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 2007-17.

263

a policy which, despite his best efforts to revive it, was
effectively dead. The British government continued formal
support for a sanctions policy, and the fieneva-based effort
limped on for another six months, but for all of the cabinet,
save Eden, the conclusions to be drawn from the sanctions
experiment were clear by the end of December. Baldwin drew
his conclusion for Thomas Jones on January 7, 1936:

One thundering good thing we have got out

of it is the realisation of what sanctions

mean. They mean that we have got to be much

more self-contained. Europe has to be

rearmed and to be ready, that is the conclu-173

51on which follows upon collective security.

It was folly to expect that a heavily armed aggressor
could be drawn up short by anything other than matching arms
and determination. The combined moral authority of the learue
counted for nothing against tanks, submarines and airplanes.
Economic sanctions could force an aggressor to change course,
if the embargo affected the aggressor's ability to fight a
modern war -- as an oil embargo would -— but it required the
determination to face the aggressor's wrath to impose a
sanction which confronted the aggressor with humiliation or
defeat. If taken to their logical conclusion, sanctions
necessarily implied a willingness to contemplate war. Conven—
tional wisdom in league circles held that no aggressor would
risk a military confrontation with the combined might of the
league membership. The British cabinet learned during the
Abyssinian crisis that the might of fifty nations was not

173Jones, A Diary_with Letterg, p. 160.

 

26h

easily or readily combined, that relatively few countries had
the capacity or inclination to share in a confrontation with
a major power, and that it was easy, in the midst of a crowd
of sanctionist nations, to stumble into an isolated confronta-
tion with an aggressor. Laval's behavior during the crisis
was in part a facet of a devious character, but in a larger
sense his policy of avoiding a confrontation with Italy con-
formed to French interests as he saw them, and pointed up the
fundamental weakness of the League. No nation, in the last
analysis, would submerge national sovereignty in a collective
effort to the extent of risking serious injury unless there
was an immediate national interest involved. The overall
objective of sustaining a system to control the scourge of
war did not provide an adequate, or logical, reason for suffer-
ing the consequences of war. The British interest in the sanc-
tions experiment was to discover whether the system would work
to contain aggression without raising the specter of war. The
Italian response to the threat of an oil sanction convinced the
cabinet that the league system could indeed Spawn a war, and
the French response to British requests for military cooper-
ation demonstrated that a war fought on behalf of the league
could be a lonely war.

In terms of genuine British interest and participation,
the sanctions eXperiment endured for little more than a month.
The cabinet scarcely gave the system a fair test before con-

cluding that it would not work as intended. It did not re-

quire a lengthy test, however, to see that the burden which

265

was placed upon the British fleet was not what the cabinet

felt to be equitable, or in Britain's interest. Britain had

no desire to be the policeman for the league. Better to revert
to regional security arrangements. The Hoare-Laval debacle
cost the government heavily in national popularity and inter-
national prestige, but it had the effect of clearing away a
good many illusions concerning the bases of British foreign
policy.

It was clear when Hoare fell that the sanctions eXperi-
ment had failed, and the cabinet were prepared to learn from
that failure. But they were generally unclear as to why Hoare
had failed. It was obvious that there had been a great spon—
taneous outcry against what was seen as the desertion of Abys—
sinia and the league in order to reward the aggressor. But,
as Halifax pointed out in a letter to Chamberlain, there had
been efforts made throughout the crisis to find a compromise
settlement, and all of those efforts prOposed advantages for
Italy at Abyssinia's expense. The Hoare-laval plan, he thought,
did not differ very radically from the plan put forward earlier,
without arousing any particular outcry, by the Committee of
Five. But the parentage of the later prOposal was more respect-
able.17u Without entering into a debate about the degree to
which the Hoare-laval plan deviated from the plan adOpted by
the Committee of Five, it is easy to agree that Halifax put

his finger on one cause of Hoare's downfall. He had negotiated

 

l7“Feiling, life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 275-

 

266

what seemed like an old—fashioned deal, done secretly and
cynically to protect the interests of Britain, France and Italy,
at the expense of a small nation and the ideals of collective
security and Open diplomacy. But Hoare's failure, and that of
the government extended well beyond the immediate 'deal.'
They reaped, in the public and international reaction to the
Hoare-Laval plan, what they had sown, in the form of Hoare's
speech to the General Assembly, Eden's brave statements, the
government's election manifesto, and the steady stream of
pledges of fidelity to the Covenant. The British people and
the league delegations were led to believe what they wanted to
believe, which was that with a firm British lead the League
would face down the Italian aggressor and collective security
would prevail. But neither the British people nor the league
knew what the government knew about the qualms of the military
concerning a 'mad dog' Italian attack, and the damage which
such an attack could do to British plans to meet the greater
threats emerging in Europe and the Far East. The government
did not eXplain that they saw sanctions as an experiment in
which it was logical to draw a prudent line. When they drew
that line, by accepting Hoare's agreement with laval, the
public failed to understand, and Hoare paid the price for con-
tributing to undue eXpectations.

Hoare has received his full measure of condemnation from
those who felt that he contrived with laval to destroy the

league, but he has failed to receive much credit for helping

to organize the sanctions experiment. The sanctions organized

26.7

by the League were, in the long run, mild and ineffective, and
the league suffered a crushing defeat in the crisis, but at
least in 1935 the league made an effort to face up to the
aggressor, and to see if the system would work, which was in
sharp contrast to the league's reaction to the Manchurian crisis
in 1931. It is fair to say, from the evidence, that without

the lead which Britain gave at Geneva, it is unlikely that the
league would have reacted with any more vigor to Italian aggres—
sion than it had to Japanese aggression. The question which
arises at a remove of more than a generation, is why did

Britain take the lead at Geneva? A governmental inquiry demon-
strated that Britain had no vital interests in Abyssinia, save
possibly Lake Tana, which the Italians in all probability

would have been prepared to safeguard. Italy was an old friend,
figured importantly in plans to contain Germany, and had long-
standing grievances against Abyssinia with which many in the
British government could sympathize. To give a lead to the
league in the sanctions experiment, the Mediterranean fleet

had to assume risks which neither the military nor the cabinet
felt that it should assume. Yet the government pushed forward
and sanctions were imposed. They did so in part because of the
pressure of public Opinion, stirred up by the Peace Ballot and
roused by Mussolini's swashbuckling disdain for civilized values.
They did so in some considerable measure because of the latitude
which they granted to Anthony Eden to exercise his sense of
international morality and dedication to the league. Eden

forced the pace in london and Geneva. And the momentum of

268

events to some extent simply carried the cabinet along, hOping
that at some point short of disaster Mussolini would come to
his senses and accept a reasonable compromise which would end
the crisis. But it was primarily to preserve the league, and
to give the league system a reasonable chance of success that
the cabinet tentatively and grudgingly shouldered what they
saw as dangerous risks. They were, after all, part of the
same generation which had suffered through the horrors of

the Great War. Until the concept was conclusively disproven,
they shared, in varying degrees, with their countrymen the
hope that the League of Nations, which was so valuable in many

other ways, might also realize its basic goal.

CHAPTER VI
END OF ILIUSION

Anthony Eden became Foreign Secretary on December 22,
1935. Ironically, he took over the management of British
policy just as the cabinet lost faith in the sanctions experi-
ment. Eden's efforts to breathe new life into the league front
were fruitless in the face of the offensive which the Italians
mounted in Abyssinia and the pessimism which prevailed in Teneva
as well as in london. In terms of enthusiasm and confidence,
the shock of the Hoare-laval proposals had an effect on the
sanctions eXperiment like that of a pin on a balloon. The popu—
lar reaction in Britain to the Hoare-Laval plan left the govern-
ment with no Option but to carry through with the collective
effort to contain Italian agmression, but the cabinet became
even more chary of taking'the initiative at Teneva. Iaval's
role in the debacle reconfirmed the cabinet's conviction that
the French would not play up in the event of a military con-
frontation with Italy. laval followed Hoare into the political
wilderness on January 22 when his government was pulled down
and replaced by a government headed by Albert Sarraut. The
new French government did not mean a new French policy, however.
Sarraut and the new Foreiin Minister Pierre-Etienne Flandin

were no more willing than laval had been to alienate Mussolini.

269

270

The French attitude remained a determining factor in london.
Without firm French support, the cabinet were loath to con-
sider additional sanctions. And without effective Opposition
from the league, Mussolini and his generals had only to carry
the fighting in Abyssinia to an assured conclusion to establish
an Italian imperium in east Africa.

The sanctions established by the league in November
imposed an uncomfortable austerity upon Italy, but essential
supplies continued to flow in a steady stream through the Suez
canal to the Italian forces in east Africa. In Abyssinia, the
approach to Addis Ababa was blocked only by the hastily organ-
ized and ill-equipped levies which the Negus was able to pull
together. Unlike the encounter in Tigre'a generation earlier,
the question no longer was whether the Abyssinian armies could
defeat and drive out the Italian aggressor, but whether they
could survive until the rainy season slowed operations and
allowed the effects of economic sanctions to begin to tell. To
forestall that possibility, Mussolini replaced the plodding
DeBono, as commander of the Italian forces in east Africa, with
the best of his generals, Pietro Badoglio.

Badoglio arrived in Eritrea to relieve DeBono on November

26.1

By the beginning of 1936, Badoglio had completed his pre-
parations and was ready to move against the Abyssinian positions.
His forces enjoyed the advantages of superior command, sound.

organization, aerial support, modern transport and artillery,

 

lEmilio de Bono, Anno XIIII: the Conquest of an Empire
(London: the Cresset Press, 1937), p. 312.

271

as well as the great advantage accorded by the machine gun.
The Abyssinian armies, by contrast, suffered from poor command,
had no modern organization or training, and little in the way
of SOphisticated weaponry. But the Abyssinian soldier was a
legendary fighter, defending a rugged and largely trackless
homeland. To neutralize the fighting qualities of the Abys-
sinian soldier, and to demoralize the civilian population,
Badoglio used his command of the air to spray mustard gas on
the Abyssinian forces, and to bomb civilian as well as military
targets, with scant regard for hospitals or Red Cross emblems.2
Badoglio's tactics facilitated his battlefield successes, but
made a mockery of Italy's ”civilizing mission" in Abyssinia.3

Badoglio began his offensive on January 19 near Makale
in the Tembien. The first battle of Tembien lasted four days
and was inconclusive. On February 10, however, Badoglio
attacked the well-entrenched trOOps of War Minister Ras
Mulugeta on the mountain of Amba Aradam and, making good use
of air support and artillery, drove them in disarray from the

2A. J. Barker, The Civilizing Mission (New York: Dial,
1968), pp. 2#l-h2.

 

3Badoglio later published an account of his campaigns and
offered a soldier's justification for using the means at hand.
Pietro Badoglio, The War ig Abyssinia (London: Methuen, 1937).
The Italian government felt compelled to offer more than a prag-
matic justification for the use of tactics generally thought to
be criminal. Putting on a bold front, the fascist government
admitted the use of gas and the bombing of Red Cross hospitals.
Italian spokesmen argued that it was a case of fighting fire
with fire, and they accused the Abyssinians of mutilating the
wounded and the dead, and of sheltering anti-aircraft positions
beneath Red Cross emblems. league of Nations, Official Journal,
November 1935, pp. 1604-05; February 1936, pp. 252-h5; April
1936. Pp. #13-15: June 1936. Po 579.

 

272

strongest position on the Abyssinian front. On February 19
the twenty-third March Division was in control of the summit
of Amba Aradam. Mulugeta's defeat allowed Badoglio to turn
the Abyssinian line and drive the armies of Ras Kassa and Ras
Seyoum out of the Tembien.u According to A. J. Barker, ”all
that remained of the armies of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum by
the end of the first week in March were a few organized detach-
ments and a large disorganized rabble."5

With the Tembien in Badoglio's hands, only the army of
Ras Imru stood in the way of Italian control of the north.
On March I, the Italian Second Corps engaged Ras Imru's army
in the battle of Shire. Imru's trOOps put up a fierce fight,
highlighted by suicidal charges into Italian machine gun
positions. Abyssinian losses were heavy and within a week
Imru's army was in rout: the last Abyssinian army on the north-
ern front had been defeated. By the middle of March, the whole
of Tigré'was in Italian hands, and the only army standing bet-
ween Badoglio and Addis Ababa was that under Haile Selassie
at Dessie. In the three battles of Amba Aradam, the Tembien,
and Shire, the Abyssinians lost over 15,000 men killed and
wounded, while Italian casualties were just under 2,600.6

Badoglio's rout of the Abyssinian armies in Tigré’provided

“Barker, The Civilizing Mission, pp. 250—52.

 

élkiQ-. pp. 256—57.

6_I_b_i_<_i_.. p. 259.

273
conclusive evidence that the economic sanctions in effect
against Italy were doing little to impede Italian progress in
Abyssinia. Nor, from the pace of Badoglio's offensive, were
they likely to prove effective before Abyssinia was defeated.
In the circumstances, the oil sanction which Hoare and laval
had maneuvered to avoid emerged, in the eyes of league advo-
cates, as the one shining hope for Abyssinia and the league.
And those looking to the application of an oil sanction
eXpected that the initiative would come from london.7
II

In London, Anthony Eden, in his new role as Foreign
Secretary, was in a stronger position to press for a British
lead at Geneva. On January 9, Eden circulated a note to his
colleagues in the cabinet arguing that, since the Anglo-French
attempt to mediate in the crisis had failed, the British repre-
sentative on the Committee of Eighteen should move to support
the application of an oil sanction. British support for an
Oil sanction would have to be conditioned, he conceded, upon
a reasonable expectation that the sanction could be made
effective, and upon firm assurances of military collaboration

should the Oil sanction lead to war.8

The cabinet took up
Eden's prOposal on January 15, but the threat of war in the
Mediterranean weighed more heavily with them than Badoglio's

_!.‘ — ———— _

7F. P. Walters, A_History of the Lgagug_of Ngtions
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967: first published in
1952)o ppo 675-760

80ab 2u/259 C.P.5(36).

 

 

27h

preparations in Abyssinia. The ministers vetoed the idea of
a British initiative on the question of an oil sanction. But,
with the pOpular uproar over the Hoare-Laval incident in mind,
they agreed that, at the forthcoming meeting of the Committee
of Eighteen, Eden should not Oppose discussion of the question.
He could support, but not propose, the establishment of an
eXpert inquiry into the probable effectiveness of an oil
sanction.9

On January 20, the league committees charged with respon-
sibility for the Abyssinian crisis took up their duties for
the first time in a month. The first order of business was
to dispense formally with the Anglo—French conciliation effort
which had failed so resoundingly. The Committee of Thirteen,
which was created to promote a settlement, met on January 20
and drafted a report to the effect that there was currently
"no Opportunity of facilitating and hastening the settlement
of the dispute through an agreement between the parties with-

10 The Committee of Thir—

in the framework of the Covenant."
teen's finding paved the way for the Committee of Eighteen

to proceed with the discussions which had been postponed in
November on an oil sanction. On January 22, the Committee of
Eighteen met and created a Committee of Experts to study and

report on the feasibility of an embargo on petroleum products.11

 

9Cab 23/83 1(36)u.

10league of Nations, Official Journgi, February 1936, p. 106.

 

11league of Nations, Offggial_ggurnal, Special Supplement
No. 1&8, pp. 7-8.

275

The experts appointed by the Committee of Eighteen
gathered at Geneva on February 3. By February 12, they had
completed their report. In admirably clear, non-technical
language, the experts explained that, unless replenished,
Italian oil reserves would last no longer than three or four
months, in light of increased Italian military and industrial
activity. The largest eXporters of oil to Italy, however,
were Venezuela and the United States. The United States,
which was not a member of the League, could more than meet
Italy's entire requirements for oil products. The experts
noted that before the Abyssinian conflict relatively small
quantities of oil products had been exported from the United
States to Italy, but ”during the last few months these exports
have shown a very large increase." The effectiveness of an
oil embargo against Italy would depend, therefore, upon "the
reduction of eXports to the normal level of the United States
exports prior to l935"12

If the success of the League depended, as many thought,
upon the application of an effective oil sanction, the report
of the Committee of Experts should have been a sobering
document. Even the most effective oil embargo would work no
immediate miracle. Italian reserves were sufficient to carry
the offensive in Abyssinia for three or four months without

.— — — “#—

12"Report of the Committee of Experts for the Technical
Examination of the Conditions Governing the Trade in and
Transport of Petroleum and its Derivatives, By-Products and
Residues," ibid., pp. 6h-85.

276
additional supplies. And, unless the League chose to
interdict American shipping, Italy would continue to receive
additional supplies. The best that could be hoped was that
the American government would take the steps necessary to
limit the export of American oil to Italy to pre—l935 levels.
In that case, Italy might be limited to a campaign of five or
six months, and Abyssinia could conceivably survive if the
Negus could fight a holding action until the rainy season.
Everything depended, however, upon the supply of oil from the
United States, and, as the experts noted, the level of Amer-
ican eXports to Italy had risen sharply since the war began,
despite public pronouncements by President Roosevelt and Sec-
retary of State Hull urging the American oil companies to hold
exports down.

There did seem to be some prospect of American cooper-
ation in an oil embargo at the beginning of 1936. The Hoare-
laval plan was generally thought to have dampened American
sympathy for the sanctions program, but President Roosevelt,
in his first message to Congress of the year, spoke out
strongly against the "twin spirits of autocracy and aggres-
sion" which, he said, were jeOpardizing world peace and pro-
gress.l3 The neutrality legislation of 1935, which narrowly
defined the limits which the president could place on trade
with combatants, was due to expire on February 29, and the

administration prOposed broader legislation, to give the

13New York Times, January h, 1936.

277
president the discretion to restrict the export of any
commodity which contributed to an existing conflict. Oil
and oil products would have fallen within the compass of the
proposed legislation. But isolationists in the Senate, led
by Gerald Nye, Bennett Clark, William Borah and Hiram Johnson,
forced the administration to withdraw the discretionary pro-
posal. All prospect of American cooperation in an oil
embargo vanished on February 12 when the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, with the grudging acquiescence of the

administration, voted to extend the existing neutrality

legislation.lu On February 29, President Roosevelt signed a

neutrality act which merely extended the narrow provisions
already in effect.15 At the same time, Roosevelt released
a statement which again indicated that he sympathized with
the league effort to control aggression:

It is true that the high moral duty I have
urged on our pe0ple of restricting their
eXports of essential war materials to either
belligerent to approximately the normal peace-
time basis has not been the subject of legis-
lation. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that
greatly to exceed that basis, with the result
of earning profits not possible during peace,
and espec1ally with the result of giv1ng
actual assistance to the carrying on of war,
would serve to magnify the very evil of war
which we seek to prevent.

1“For a discussion of the deve10pment of the Neutrality
Act of 1936 see Brice Harris, Jr., The United State§_and the
Italo—EthiOpian Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
l96h), pp. 11E-28.

 

 

15New York_Times, March 1, 1936.

léDepartment of State. Press Egleaseso XIV (MaPCh 7'

1936). 198.

 

 

278

Similar statements by Roosevelt had done nothing to hinder the
flow of oil to Italy in the past, and there was no reason to
expect that presidential sentiment would be more successful

in the future, particularly in light of the refusal by Con-
gress to broaden the scope of the neutrality legislation.

It should have been apparent on February 12, when the
Committee of Experts submitted their report and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee voted to extend the American
neutrality legislation, that there was virtually no possibil-
ity that an effective oil embargo could be imposed. Nonethe-
less, supporters Of the league seized upon the report of the
experts as though it were a promise of certain success. In
london, the labour and Liberal Opposition called for an end
to the government's vacillation and demanded that Britain take
the lead in prOposing an oil sanction when the Committee of
Eighteen met on March 2. The Opposition pressed their demands
in an angry debate in the House of Commons on February 2h.17
Eden answered for the government but was constrained by the
cabinet's continuing hesitation and could only reply that the
question of an oil sanction was still under consideration. He
pledged that Britain would play a full part in any collective
measures adOpted by the Coordination Committee, but it was
common knowledge that the Coordination Committee would do
nothing unless Britain took the lead.18 Reports of Badoglio's

17H. B. Lees-Smith Opened and laid out the opposition
demands. 309 H.CLQgp., 55., cols. 67-76.

lBIbid. ' 00180 78.80.

279

campaign in Abyssinia, complete with graphic descriptions
of the Italian use of gas and the deliberate bombing of Red
Cross hospitals, dominated the news and created a climate of
anger and frustration among league supporters in Britain.
Not even Eden's well—established reputation as a champion
of the League was proof against such frustration. Arthur
Henderson eXpressed his deep disappointment with Eden's
response to the demand for a British initiative on an Oil
sanction, and Colonel Wedgwood read "treachery" into Eden's
remarks.19
Had Eden's critics been privy to the cabinet's deliber—
ations on the question of an Oil sanction, they would have
reserved their ire for the other members of the cabinet.
Within the cabinet room, Eden was still the champion of the
league and took every Opportunity to press his colleagues to
accept the necessity of an Oil embargo. On February 19, he
told the cabinet that he had received information from Italy
which made it appear that the Italian government would be
unlikely to react violently to an Oil sanction, despite
Mussolini's bluster. He added that, from all indications, an
Oil sanction would have a serious impact upon Italian morale.20

On February 21, the Foreign Office received a personal plea

for British help from Haile Selaisse, and the Emperor's plea

 

19Ibid., cols. 110 and 127.
2OCab 23/83 8(36)3.

280

spurred Eden to press the cabinet still harder to support

an Oil sanction.21

On February 22, he circulated a memoran-
dum on the subject. He pointed out that the report Of the
Committee of Experts which had studied the question for the
Committee of Eighteen had not been very encouraging. The
report made it plain that, unless the United States chose to
cooperate, an oil sanction was unlikely to be effective, and
there did not seem to be much prospect of American COOperation.
Nonetheless, Eden argued, there was still a strong case to be
made for applying even an ineffective Oil sanction. The
Emperor's plea for help, in which he went so far as to suggest
a British mandate for Abyssinia, was a measure of the desper-

22 In the

ate situation which was developing in Abyssinia.
circumstances, Eden felt that it was important that the Com-
mittee of Eighteen act as vigorously as possible in support
of Abyssinia when it met again on March 2. He argued that

the British government should "make it clear that they are

willing to participate in an embargo on the eXport of Oil to
Italy and in a prohibition of the transport of oil to Italy

in British tankers if the other members Of the Committee are

ready to do likewise." If such a sanction failed for lack

210ab 2u/260 C.P.53(36).

22The cabinet were completely cold to the idea of a
British mandate as a solution to the Abyssinian conflict.
Eden stressed that an acceptable solution would have to be
grounded upon conciliation through the agency of the league.

Cab 23/83 9(36)5.

281

of support or proved ineffective, Eden felt that the League
should push forward with other sanctions which might have the
desired effect -- such as a sanction prohibiting all shipping
by league members to Italy.23
The cabinet took up Eden's memorandum on February 26.
The Committee of Eighteen was scheduled to meet within the
week, and it was essential to define a British position on
the prOposed Oil sanction. The arguments outlined in Eden's
paper framed the problem, and Eden warned that if the League
failed to act on the oil sanction prOposal the entire idea
of collective security would be called into question. In
spite of Eden's warning, however, the cabinet were seriously
divided on the issue and inclined to be cautious. There was
little remaining fear of a 'mad dog' Italian attack upon the
Mediterranean fleet, but there were other considerations
which troubled the cabinet. The most telling Objection raised
against the oil sanction was that it would be ineffective.
Britain was bearing a heavier burden than any other League
member because of sanctions, and if this new sanction further
estranged the Italians, British trade and investment interests
might never recover. Beyond that, an oil sanction might drive
Mussolini into Hitler's arms. Viscount Eyres Monsell, the
First Lord of the Admiralty, added that the navy was seriously

overtaxed by the burden placed upon it without mobilization,

and he maintained that it made no sense to add to that burden

 

23Ibid.

282

in the interest of an ineffective sanction. Against such
Objections, it was argued that even an ineffective Oil
sanction would drain dwindling Italian gold supplies. As
for driving Mussolini into Hitler's arms, it was noted that
Hitler's contempt for Mussolini was such that he probably
would not have him. The oil sanction was thought to be of
paramount importance by significant blocs of Opinion in the
United States and in the Dominions, as well as in Britain,
where the trade union movement was devoted to collective
security. If Abyssinia were to collapse without additional
British support, the repercussions could be heavy.

The danger of re-arousing public opinion decided Baldwin,
and he framed a conclusion for the divided cabinet. He said
that his position as prime minister, and the government's
position in general, would be seriously affected by the deci—
sion to be taken, and he concluded that a refusal to impose
an Oil sanction would have a disastrous effect upon both.

The peOple, he said, had shown themselves during the recent
general election to be in favor of trying out the League
system, and, though he had made it clear that he would never
agree to anything in the nature of a blockade, he felt that

the whole of EurOpe was entitled to know whether collective
economic sanctions would work so that each country could decide
how far to cooperate in a system of collective security.
Baldwin's arguments were decisive. The cabinet agreed that

Eden should indicate to the Committee of Eighteen that Britain

favored the imposition of an Oil sanction at as early a date

283

as the other members of the committee would agree to. But,
again, Eden was instructed to avoid taking a lead on the
question at Geneva. Even with that reservation, First lord
Eyres Monsell and Walter Runciman, the President Of the Board
of Trade, dissented so strongly from the decision to support
an Oil sanction that they had formal note taken of their
dissent.2u
As it develOped, the cabinet could have spared themselves
the difficult decision which they took on February 26. The
French were adamantly Opposed to the imposition Of an Oil
sanction and, given the British determination not to move
without France, they were able to prevent any serious consider-
ation Of the measure by the Committee of Eighteen. On March 7,
the Rhineland crisis developed and it was the end of March
before the League powers were able to concentrate on Abys-
sinia again, by which time the Italian conquest had clearly
become irreversible. The cabinet meeting of February 26 was,
therefore, the last at which serious consideration was given
to the question of drawing up the aggressor. As such, it is
particularly interesting to the student of British policy. It

is instructive to compare the decision taken in February to

support but not prOpose an oil sanction with the decisions

2L‘Cab 23/83 11(36)5. The procedure adOpted by the cabinet
to smooth over the dissent Of Monsell and Runciman was unlike
the 'agreement to differ' over the question of protection adOp-
ted by the National government in January 1932 in that there
was apparently no threat Of resignation involved in the dissent
from the decision concerning an oil sanction and the dissidents
in 1936 were not authorized to make their disagreement public.

28h

taken by the cabinet during the earlier stages of the
crisis to support and, if necessary, prOpose economic sanc-
tions. The difficult decisions taken before December 1935
were also troubled half—measures, but the cabinet:s motiva-
tion was discernibly different before and after the Hoare-
laval debacle. A wide range of influences bore on cabinet
considerations throughout the crisis, but, until Hoare-laval,
the cabinet's primary concern was to preserve the League if
possible, and, at a minimum, to give the League system of
collective security a fair test. There was still evidence
of the cabinet's concern for the league in the decision taken
on February 26, but only Eden seemed to believe that the
aggressor could still be stopped and the League system pre-
served. In essence, the decision to support an oil sanction
was taken, as Baldwin made clear, because of a concern for
domestic and international Opinion. There was some possibility
that the League would impose the sanction, which might have
caused additional problems for Britain, but that danger was
minimized by prohibiting Eden from taking the lead at Geneva.
The prohibition which the cabinet laid on Eden left the
field at Geneva to French Foreign Minister Flandin. When
the Committee of Eighteen met on March 2 to consider the
report of the petroleum eXperts, Flandin intervened with a
suggestion. The Committee of Eighteen, he noted, had always
worked closely with the Committee Of Thirteen. The Committee
of Thirteen, at its last meeting, had "affirmed its resolve

not to neglect any Opportunity of facilitating and hastening

285

the settlement of the dispute by agreement between the parties
within the framework of the Covenant."25 Flandin conveniently
overlooked the committee's finding that there was no reason
to expect such a settlement. He suggested that the Committee
of Thirteen should "meet again and consider if it would not be
possible to make another urgent appeal to the belligerents to
put an end to the war." Before the Committee of Eighteen con-
tinued its discussions, he said, the Committee of Thirteen
should hold an "urgent" meeting to consider his suggestion.26
Eden spoke for Britain and supported Flandin's prOposal.

He thought that the Committee of Thirteen's deliberations need
not cause undue delay, since the Committee of Eighteen still
had work to do to improve the operation of existing sanctions.
But he added that he wanted to make it clear that:

having considered the findings of the eXperts

report, His Majesty's Government was in favour

of the imposition of an oil embargo by the

Members of the league, and was prepared to

join in the early application of such a sanc-

tion if the other principal supplying and

transporting states who were Members of the

League of Nations were prepared to do like-

wise.2

Eden's statement met the political needs of his govern-

ment, but it brought the committee no closer to recommending

 

2sleague of Nations, Official Journal, February 1936,
p. 10‘.
26League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
No. 1&9, pp. 12—13.

 

 

27Ibid., p. 13.

286

an Oil sanction. With Britain and France agreed, the Commit—
tee of Eighteen had to defer consideration of the Oil sanction
again while the Committee of Thirteen made one more effort to
promote a solution. The Committee of Experts on petroleum

was put back to work to define the methods and products which
would be involved in an Oil embargo, but their efforts were

wasted.28

The Committee Of Eighteen never reconvened after
it adjourned on March #.

On March 5, Eden eXplained to the cabinet why he had
agreed to postpone consideration Of an Oil sanction again.
It was a familiar story. Flandin told him that Mussolini had
warned that if an Oil sanction was imposed, Italy would with-
draw from the league, denounce the locarno agreements, refuse
to sign a naval treaty, and consider as void the military
agreement concluded by Marshal Badoglio and General Camelin.
Before agreeing to proceed with an Oil sanction, therefore,
Flandin argued that the Committee of Thirteen should be
given another Opportunity to promote a settlement. He added
that the French government wanted to know what Britain would
do if Italy withdrew from the locarno agreements. Would
Britain still come to the aid Of France in the event of a
German violation Of the provisions governing the demilitar—

ized zone? Eden's instructions left him no Option but to agree

with Flandin's proposal for another effort to promote a

28Ibid., pp. 16-22.

——-—-———.

287

settlement Of the Abyssinian crisis.29 He could not answer
Flandin's question concerning locarno, however, without
consulting the cabinet. As it develOped, Flandin's question
was very timely, but the cabinet did not think so on March 5.
They knew that Hitler wanted to reestablish German control
over the demilitarized zone, but they did not eXpeot a
unilateral move and they were impatient with the French
request for an assurance. If Italy denounced the Locarno
agreements, they decided, the other signatories could confer
together on a prOper course in the changed situation.30
III

Hitler did not wait for Mussolini to denounce the
locarno agreements. On March 7, he sent German troops into
the demilitarized zone Of the Rhineland and reestablished

1.31 The German action constituted a flagrant

German contro
violation of the Versailles treaty and the Locarno agreements

and Opened Hitler to a sharp rebuff.32 In spite of the

 

29Cab 23/83 15(36)l.
3°Ibid.

31The demilitarized zone consisted Of an area from
Germany's western border to a line drawn fifty kilometers
east of the right bank Of the Rhine.

32Articles #2 and #3 of the Versailles treaty stipulated
that the demilitarized zone could not be fortified or occu-
pied by military forces. The Versailles treaty was a 'dicta-
ted peace,’ but Germany freely participated in the locarno
agreements of 1925 by which Britain, France, Germany, Belgium
and Italy guaranteed the territorial status quo on Germany's
western frontier, as well as the maintenance Of articles 2
and 43 of the Versailles treaty.

 

1!

 

 

288

reintroduction of conscription the year before, the forces
which Hitler had at hand in March 1936 could not have success-
fully resisted a French counterthrust into the demilitarized
zone. Hitler's generals were certain that he was inviting
disaster, but he proved a better judge Of the situation then
his generals.33
Hitler recognized that the Abyssinian crisis had destroy-
ed the Stresa front, and had rendered the implementation Of
the Locarno agreements unlikely. The British and French had
shown themselves unwilling to Offer serious resistance to
Italy; Hitler calculated that they would not cross swords with
a revived Germany. Italy, the other guarantor Of the demili-
tarized zone, could be discounted. Italian strength was
tied up in Africa, and Mussolini would scarcely cooperate in
a French and British effort to restrain Germany while the
sanctions imposed on Italy by the league were in effect.
Hitler also knew that he could count on the broad sympathy

33A common misconception concerning the German move
into the demilitarized zone was that Hitler had agreed with
his generals in advance to withdraw from the Rhineland at
the first sign Of a strong French reaction. D. C. Watt has
demonstrated, however, that in the event Of a French attack,
German orders called for a fighting withdrawal to the Boer—
Rhine-Black Forest line, and determined resistance along
that line. D. C. Watt, "German Plans for the Reoccupation
of the Rhineland: A note," The Journal Of Contemporary History,
I, h (October 1966), l93-99.

 

289

which existed in Britain for the German desire to revise the
inequitable provisions of the Versailles treaty.3u

TO cushion the shock of his cou , and to allow sc0pe for
the British inclination to countenance 'legitimate' German
aspirations, Hitler Offered a new basis for European security
when he announced the remilitarization Of the Rhineland.
Germany, he said, was prepared to see a demilitarized zone
recreated on both sides of iermany's western frontier.
Germany was also prepared to negotiate a twenty-five year
non-aggression pact with France and Belgium, tO be guaranteed
by Britain and Italy, to replace the locarno agreements. If
desired, he said, Germany would extend the new agreement to
include the Netherlands, and would negotiate similar agree-
ments with interested states bordering Germany on the east.
Finally, with the particular interests of the British govern-
ment in mind, Hitler Offered to reenter the league Of Nations,

—_

BuThe widespread conviction that Germany was wronged by
the dictated peace of Versailles took hold in Britain
during the decade following the Great War. It was reinforced
by an efficient German propaganda program, and by a variety
Of influential British citizens who sought, for a number of
reasons, to promote better Anglo-German relations. The best
treatment Of the deve10pment of British sympathy for German
grievances is Martin Gilbert, The Roots Of Appeasement (New
York: New American Library, 1936), pp. 22-125. D. C. Watt
analyzes the success Of the German prOpaganda effort and the
impact Of the friends of Germany in Britain in "Influence
from Without: German Influence on British Opinion, 1933-38,
and the Attempts to Counter it," Personalities and Policies
(london: Longmans, Green, 1965), pp. 117-35.

 

290

and to conclude the air pact which the British so ardently
desired.35
The British reaction to Hitler's weekend surprise

demonstrated that he had calculated well. There was little
inclination in Britain to fight to maintain the restraints
imposed on Germany to protect France. The German ambassador,
leopold von Hoesch, reported to Berlin that friends such as
lord Londonderry, lord Lothian, Sir Ian Hamilton and Colonel
Thomas Moore rallied immediately to Germany's support, and

he added that the British people did not seem to "care a
36

damn" if German forces reoccupied their own territory.

35Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on March 7 is printed
in Norman H. Baynes (ed.), The Speeches Of_AdOlph Hitlgg,
AprilquZZ-August 1929 (London: Oxford University Press, l9h2),
II, l27141302. The memorandum delivered to Britain, France,
Italy and Belgium on the same day is printed in Documents on
German Foreign Policy1_l918-l9h5, C, 5, pp. 15-19. Hereafter
ciied as DGFP. The ostensible reason for ambassador von
Hoesch's interview with Eden on March 7 was to discuss the air
pact which the British had prOposed. Hoesch was instructed
in delivering the memorandum, to 'emphasize particularly that
the Reich Government's decision to declare themselves pre-
pared tO return to the league of Nations was not an easy one,
and that the desire to meet as far as possible the British
Government's policy... was a consideration Of no small weight."
DGFP, C, 5, pp. 1h, 2h-26, hl. Gerhard Weinberg concludes,
from a study Of German documentation, that Hitler was not
serious in Offering to return to the league. Gerhard L.
Weinberg, The Fogeign Policy Of Hitler's_:ermany (Chicago:
University Of Chicago, 19707, p. 251.

 

 

 

 

 

36DGFP, C, 5, pp. 92, 9h-95, 102-03. Accbrding to
Churchill, lothian's view was that the Germans were "only
going into their own back-garden," Winston S. Churchill,
The Secogd_World Wag, Vol I: The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 196197. Lothian was weekending
with like—minded people, including Thomas Jones, Norman Davis,
Vincent Massey, Lord Astor, Sir Thomas Inskip, Sir Walter
layton and Arnold Toynbee, when news Of the German coup was
received. The group viewed Hitler's move as a 'last bus'

which Britain had to catch to win German OOOperation in

 

291

Duff COOper told Hoesch that "though the British peOple were
prepared to fight for France in the event Of a German
incursion into French territory, they would not resort to
arms on account Of the recent reoccupation Of the German

Rhineland."37 On March 10, the News Chronicle published a
38

 

sampling Of Opinion and drew the same conclusion. The Times

 

counseled moderation and emphasized the possibilities Opened

39

up by the German proposals. In Parliament, Lloyd George

said that in a court Of equity, Germany "could call evidence

which any judge would say provided some mitigation of her

folly."ho Austen Chamberlain, on the other hand, insisted

that an act Of aggression had occurred, and Winston Churchill

sought to encourage a firm British reaction, but theirs were

bl

isolated voices. In Eden's judgment "there was not one man

in a thousand in the country... prepared to take physical

action with France against a German reoccupation of the

Rhineland.”2

..— “ ¥ F

EurOpe. Jones telephoned Baldwin on March 8 and advised him
that the group felt he should welcome the German declaration
and bury the corpse Of Versailles. Thomas Jones, A Diary with
Letters, 1931—1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953),

pp. 178—81.
3792.13.13. c. 5. p. 57.

 

 

38News Chrgnicle, March 10, 1936.

 

39The__T_imes, March 9, 1935.

 

“0309.5ygyggp.. 5s., col. 2035.

“323:2. C, 5: PP- 75—76: Churchill, g@e_:ath§£ingStorm,

pp. 195-97?

uZThe Earl of Avon, The Edgn Memgirs.‘ Facing the
Dictators. london: Cassell, 19023, p. 338.

 

 

 

 

292

Eden's own reaction to Hitler's memorandum was in keep-
ing with the general British attitude. He protested "the
unilateral repudiation of a treaty freely negotiated and
freely signed,” but told Hoesch that he would give Germany's
alternate prOposals careful consideration. He added that he
considered the new German attitude towards the league of
Nations to be "most important.”3 After Hoesch left, Eden
called in French ambassador Corbin and told him that Germany's
repudiation of solemn agreements was deplorable, but Hitler's
proposals merited careful consideration. Therefore, Eden
said, he was certain that France would not do anything to

hh

make the situation more difficult. In effect, Eden Warned

Corbin against a military reaction to the German fait accompli.

 

Eden took a great deal on his own shoulders in his conver-
sations with Hoesch and Corbin, but the danger of war was
obvious, and he knew that neither the cabinet nor the country
would fight to drive Germans out of Essen and Cologne.

Eden laid out the details of the crisis, along with his
recommendations, in a memorandum which the cabinet considered
on March 9.h5 He pointed out that the German action was
particularly unfortunate in that Britain had been willing

for some time to consider renegotiation of the terms of the

 

l'BDGFP, C, 5, pp. hl-hB: Avon, Facing the Dictators,
pp. 3140-51.

uhAvon. Facing_the Dictators. p. 3u1.

“5Cab 2h/261 C.P. 73(36).

293

Locarno agreements, and Flandin had indicated that France
was prepared to do the same.46 Cermany should have demanded
arbitration of the question of the compatibility of the
Locarno pact with the recently ratified Franco-Soviet agree-
ment.“7 Instead, Hitler chose to use the Franco-Soviet pact
to justify the repudiation of a freely negotiated treaty
which bore importantly upon European security. It was, Eden

felt, "the manner of their action" which Britain must deplore.

 

n6Eden noted that an unfortunate aspect of the preci-

pitate remilitarization of the Rhineland was that it removed
an important bargaining counter in the general negotiations
which the government had hoped to initiate with “ermany.
Hitler had put Britain on notice in December 1935 that he
considered it necessary to end the demilitarized status of
the Rhineland. Within the British government, discussion
during the first months of 1936 focused on the question of
which concessions should be made to satisfy German aspira-
tions, not whether such concessions should be made. Even
Vansittart was persuaded that it was necessary to return
some of Termany's former African colonies in order to coax
iermany back into the League of Nations. And, as Harold
Nicolson observed after a conversation with Eden, the Foreign
Secretary was "prepared to make great concessions to :erman
appetites provided they will sign a disarmament treaty and
join the League of Nations." Ibid.: Cmd. 51h3, FO 371/19885
C979/u/18; Cab 2u/260 C. P. u2(3€7,‘ Cab 23/83 3(36)u; Harold
Nicolson, Diaries and Lgttegs,d_%30-l93_9, ed. Ni? e1 Nicolson
(New York: Atheneum, 196?}, p.

 

u7The Franco-Soviet agreement was signed in Paris on
May 2, 1935 and ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies
on February 27, 1936. The pact called for consultation
and cooperation within the framework of the Covenant of the
League in the event of threatened agaression by a European
state against either party, and, in the case of unprovoked
attack, it provided for immediate mutual assistance regard-
less of the position taken by the League. The agreement
was directed in all but specific language against Germany,
and was regarded as such in Berlin.

29h

iermany's action meant that Hitler henceforward could be
expected to repudiate any treaty which he found inconvenient
when he considered the time ripe and Zerman strength suffic-
ient. Nonetheless, Eden argued, "owing to “ermany's material
strength and power of mischief in Europe, it is in our inter-
est to conclude with her as far-reaching and enduring a settle-
ment as possible whilst Herr Hitler is still in the mood to
do so." The cabinet agreed and concluded that it was necess—
ary to discourage military action by France against iermany,
while reassuring the French and Belgians that they would not
suffer if they agreed to tear up the Versailles and Locarno
agreements. The cabinet also approved the statement which
Eden prOposed to make in the House of Commons explaining that
Britain was prepared to honor the obligations laid down by
the Locarno agreements, but looked to a peaceful solution
based on the proposals transmitted by Ambassador Hoesch.“8
The French, on the other hand, were much more disposed
to invoke the provisions of the Locarno agreements than to
trade their security for a fresh batch of ierman promises.
On March 8, France and Belgium addressed telegrams to the

Secretary—fieneral of the league of Nations, requesting that

 

u8Cab 23/83 16(3€)l. Eden delivered the statement
approved by the cabinet later that evening. He had intended
to emphasize to the Commons that fiermany was prepared to
return to the league of Nations "now," but Hoesch was shown
a c0py of the statement before delivery and, on instructions
from Berlin, persuaded Eden to revise his statement to exclude
any reference to a time frame. The 3erman reservation should
have warned Eden that there was little reason to expect that
Hitler was sincere in offering to return to the League. 309
figggggp.. 53., cols. 1808-13:_Q§§f, C, 5, pp. 55-56.

295

a meeting of the Council be convened as soon as possible to
consider the Terman violation of the Versailles treaty and
the Locarno agreements.)49 That same evening, French Premier
Sarraut addressed the nation by radio and rejected the
Terman memorandum of March 7 as a basis for negotiations.
Before any negotiations could be considered, he said, Cerman
trOOps would have to be evacuated from the Rhineland.50 On
larch lO, Flandin convened a meeting in Paris of representa—
tives of France, Britain, Italy and Belgium to consider the
crisis.51 Eden and Halifax represented Britain and found the
French and Belgians altogether unwilling to fall in with the
British inclination to put the best possible face on things
and concentrate upon Hitler's prOposals. Rather, the French
and Belgians were united in their desire to force the issue
through the League Council to the point of economic and
financial sanctions in an effort to compel the Germans to
withdraw their military forces from the Rhineland. They were
convinced that Hitler was not in a position to fight over the
issue, and that he had acted against the advice of the Cerman
General Staff and Dr. Schact. If the crisis did lead to

ugLeague of Nations, Offigial_gournal, April 1936,
p. 312.

 

50Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docgmgnts on
International Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press,

1937). pp-h5151.

51Italy was represented by the Italian ambassador in
Paris who was instructed to limit himself to observer status
and merely note the positions taken by the other Locarno
powers. DGFP, C, 5, pp. 50—51.

 

296

hostilities, Flandin and Van Zeeland argued that it would be
better to face such a confrontation in 1936, rather than in
two or three years, when German rearmament would be complete
and Hitler could be eXpected to seek a war. Eden and Halifax
disagreed, and in two stormy sessions held to the position
that negotiation to find a reasonable middle ground was
essential.52

France was, of course, free to act alone to reverse the
German violation of the demilitarized zone, and the French
had the means and the justification to do so. But, perhaps
with the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr in mind, the Sarraut
government elected to limit their response to Hitler's
challenge to those measures which would command firm British
support, much in the same fashion as the Baldwin government
tied British policy throughout the Abyssinian crisis to French
c00peration. Thus, the French government made brave noises
during the early stages of the Rhineland crisis and later
blamed Britain for the failure to force Germany to retreat
from the demilitarized zone, just as British ministers later
blamed France for the failure to contain Italian aggression
in Abyssinia. And there was a kernel of truth in each asser-
tion. The failure of Britain and France to act together
during the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises converted gambles
taken by Mussolini and Hitler into easy successes which

52The details of the discussions in Paris are drawn
from the report made by Eden and Halifax to the cabinet on
March 11. Cab 23/83 18(36)l.

297

destroyed the established pillars of European security.

But the results would have been the same in each case

unless Anglo-French determination had been buttressed by a
willingness to fight. The Baldwin government was not

willing to fight to preserve Abyssinia and the League of
Nations, and, despite Flandin's brave talk, the Sarraut
government was not willing to fight to preserve the demili-
tarized zone. The Sarraut government was essentially a
caretaker government facing new elections at the end of
April, and the mood of the government, the military, and

the French pe0ple was largely defensive, with little inclin—
ation to initiate military Operations against Germany,
whatever the provocation.53 The attitude of the military

was particularly limiting. The threat of German action to
remilitarize the Rhineland had been evident for some time,
but French military authorities had done nothing to prepare
to meet it. Such central figures as General Maurin, the
Minister of War, and Generals Gamelin and Georges were imbued
with the 'Naginot mentality' and insisted that an order for
general mobilization would be necessary in order to intervene

! __‘__ _

53J. B. Duroselle reviewed the published documentation,
the memoirs of Flandin, Herriot, Gamelin and Francois-Poncet,
and the French press and concluded that "France almost unani-
mously refused to act." Timidity within the government was
reinforced by "the absolute inertia of the French peOple in
the face of danger.” Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "France and the
Crisis of March 1936," in E. M. Acomb and M. L. Brown, eds..
French Society and Culture Sigce_the Old Regime (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966}, pp. 2hh-68.

 

298
I
militarily in the Rhineland.5L Flandin and lager knew,

therefore, that, despite their brave front, there was little

likelihood that the French government would push for military

55

action to reverse Hitler's £929.
Eden suspected that there was more smoke than fire in
the strong stance taken by Flandin and Van Zeeland in Paris
on March 10. But neither he nor the cabinet could discount
the danger of war implicit in the French and Belgian attitude.
Flandin had chosen to act through the League, however, and
there were no reports of significant military preparations
in France when Eden and Halifax reported to the cabinet on
March 11. Eden arranged to have the League Council meeting
called to consider the crisis transferred from Geneva to
London, and he felt that if he could secure a German under—

standing to withdraw all but a token military force from the

_—.‘— _ ’ _ *—

5“Ibid., pp. 248- 5h. The military concept of "immediate
attack, " which underlay the establishment of the demilitarized
zone, had been abandoned by French military planners for a
purely defensive strategy years before the Rhineland crisis.
The demilitarization of the Rhineland therefore had lost much
of its military importance by 1936. The eastern alliances
were valued in Paris for the number of fierman troops which
they would tie down during an invasion of France -- a rever-
sal of roles which became apparent after France declined to
fight to preserve the demilitarized zone. W. F. Knapp, "The
Rhineland Crisis of March 1936," St. Anthony's Papers, V

(1959). 79.

55Alexis laser, the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay,

warned that if strong action were not taken by either the
locarno powers or the League, France would lose all confidence
in the idea of collective security. Leger was convinced that
if forced to, the British would honor their commitments. F0

371/19890 Cl7BH/u/l8; Elizabeth R. Cameron, "Alexis Saint-
leger I.eger," in ordon A. Craig and Felix .ilbert, eds.
The_Diplomats, 1919- 1939 (New York: Atheneum, l9 5, first
published in 1953), II, 390.

 

 

299

Rhineland until the non—aggression pacts mentioned in the
ierman memorandum were negotiated, he could defuse the

55

crisis. Even without the danger of war, however, the
problem posed by the French determination to press for
economic sanctions against Termany remained. Eden conceded
that he could see the force of the argument that a British
refusal to live up to the commitments outlined in the Locarno
agreements would knock the heart out of the notion of collec-
tive security. But he had no sympathy for Flandin's sugges-
tion that the sanctions in effect against Italy should be
dropped in order to fashion a solid front against fiermany.
For their part, the cabinet were irritated that the French
refused to take a constructive view of the possibilities
inherent in the crisis, and Baldwin grumbled that pe0ple
in Britain would be slow to forget the awkward position
forced upon Britain by France.57
As it developed, the cabinet need not have worried.
Flandin made a valiant effort to recover by diplomatic
maneuver the security which his country was unwilling to
restore by force, but he could not lead where Britain would

not follow. On March 12, the cabinet discussed the impending

meeting of the league Council and agreed that it was France

 

56Eden's memoirs convey the impression that he viewed the
Cerman offer of new non-aggression pacts as a poor substitute
for the Locarno pact, but the cabinet minutes do not bear out
that impression. Avon, Paging the Dictators, p. 35h; Cab
23/83 18(36)l.

5 71m .

 

300

rather than “ermany which needed restraint.58 When the
Council met in london on March 14 to consider the crisis,
Flandin tried to convince the Council members that nothing
less than the peace and security of Europe was at stake. He
demanded the withdrawal of all Cerman forces from the Rhine-
land before negotiations could be considered. And he pro-
posed a draft resolution condemning the remilitarization of
the Rhineland as a breach of the treaties of Versailles and
I.ocarno.59 The French position was supported by the Turkish
and Soviet representatives on the Council, but it was evident
that Britain, as the principal guarantor of the locarno agree-
ments in light of Italy's African distraction, held the key
to the Council's responsefO
Flandin circulated throughout the political society of
london in an effort to win British support for a strong stance
against ”ermany, but to little avail. Baldwin sympathized but
gave him no encouragement, and Neville Chamberlain's atti-
tude was that it would be dangerously speculative to assume

that Hitler would yield to pressure without resort to war.61

SBCab 23/83 19(36)l.

59League of Nations, Official Journal, April 1936,
pp. 313-1LL. 317.; Cab 23/83 20(302.

60

61Churchill and Ralph Wigram of the Foreign Office
arranged many of Flandin's contacts. Churchill, The Gathering
Storm, pp. 195-97: Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville
Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1970, first published in 19h6),
P. 279.

 

League of Nations, Official {gurnal, April 1936, p. 319.

 

 

 

 

301

Flandin's efforts did succeed in convincing the fierman
service attaches in London that the situation had become

62 But within the British government

"exceptionally grave."
there was no inclination to take up arms against fiermany for
the sake of France.

The cabinet did recognize, however, that a sense of
security would have to be restored in France and Belgium
before any progress could be made on the proposals put forward
in the lerman memorandum of March 7. The cabinet saw in the
Terman proposals the basis for the long desired general under-
standing with Nazi ?ermany. To win French support for nego-
tiations with Germany, the cabinet grudgingly agreed that
Britain would act again as guarantor of the prOposed non-
aggression pacts between lermany, France and Belgium, and
would be prepared to supplement those agreements with a pact
of mutual assistance between Britain, France and Belgium, to
be implemented by "eneral Staff talks. Such a commitment out
against the grain, and the cabinet stipulated that any British
assurance be strictly limited to instances of unprovoked
aggressionf3

Eden outlined the British position for the league Council
on March 18. He agreed that a breach of the Versailles treaty

”if; c, 5, p. 134.
63Cab 23/83 20(36)1, 20(36)2, 20(36)3, 21(36)6, 21(35)

appendex I. The position adOpted by the cabinet was initially
developed by Eden in a memorandum on March 16, Cab 2u/261

C.P,79(36).

302

had occurred and should be condemned by the Council. But,

he added, the Council's responsibilities extended beyond
such a finding. The League had a duty not only to maintain
peace but to remove the causes of war. "To that end," Eden
argued, "all lines of approach should be examined." Britain,
he said, would be prepared to play a full part in the work
of rebuilding the security of western Europe.‘u Flandin
continued to press for the implementation of economic sanc-
tions against Germany, but the offer which Eden made of an
eXpanded British commitment to French security represented a
bird-in-hand in an otherwise dubious situation, and on March
19 he agreed to support the solution worked up by the British
Foreign Office.‘5 The Council voted on March 19 to condemn
the German violation of the treaties of Versailles and locar-
no, and to inform the signatories of the locarno agreement

of that finding.66

That met French requirements to some
extent. On March 20 Eden conveyed to the Council the prOpo—
sals which Britain, France, Belgium and Italy intended to put
to Cermany. The prOposals called for the submission of all
grievances concerning the Locarno agreements to the Hague

Court, the reestablishment of a demilitarized zone twenty

kilometers wide to be patrolled by an international force while

 

6“League of Nations, foicial_Journal, April 1935.
pp. 324-27-

65Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 359: Cab 23/83 23(36)l.

 

 

66league of Nations, Official Journal. April 1935'
p, BUG.

 

 

303

the prOposed non—aggression pacts were being negotiated, and
a prohibition of all additional military activity within the
former demilitarized zone until a mutually satisfactory
solution was devised.‘7
After March 19, the Rhineland problem no longer merited
the term "crisis," and the 7erman fait acgompli gradually
became an accepted political fact of life. Flandin's accept—
ance of the prOposals drafted on March 19 meant, in effect,
that France was prepared to settle for what comfort there
was to be had from the fresh British commitment to come to
the aid of France and Belgium in the event of German aggres—
sionf8 The British government, in turn, felt that the price
paid for French cooperation was not too high if it put an
end to talk of military action and sanctions, and Opened the
way for Terman c00peration in a new system of European secur-
ity. It soon became evident, however, that Hitler had no
desire to press ahead with negotiations to limit his freedom
of action. The Terman memorandum of March 7 was a smokescreen,

67Ibid., pp. 348-50. The idea of temporarily reestablish-
ing a narrow demilitarized zone was Neville Chamberlain's
contribution to the proposals. Cab 23/83 20(3F)1.

68The text of the British assurance to France and Belgium

was submitted to the Council along with the prOposals to be
sent to "ermany. The letter of assurance promised British
support in the event of aggression and provided for military
staff talks, but it was limited by the stipulation that the
assurances would come into force only if the effort to nego-
tiate new non-aggression agreements with “ermany failed.
League of Nations, Official qurnal, April 1936, p. 351.

 

 

30h

not the foundation stone for European security, as the
British cabinet preferred to believe.

On March 20, Eden handed the prOposals accepted by the
other locarno powers to special ierman envoy Joachim von
BibbentrOp, who was in london to represent fiermany during
the final sessions of the league Council meetings.‘9 Ribben—
trOp immediately responded that Germany would not submit its
case to the Hague Court, nor would the reestablishment of a
demilitarized zone under any guise be acceptable to Berlin.70
On March 25, the Terman government rejected the proposals out
of hand, but, in response to British pleas, agreed to submit

71

counter-prOposals. Bibbentrop warned, however, that under

no circumstances would his government accept a limitation of

72

Cerman sovereignty. On April 1, RibbentrOp presented to
the Foreign Office a nineteen-point Cerman "Peace Plan,"
which essentially repeated the proposals made in the memoran-
dum of March 7 and expanded them with references to general

disarmament.73 The German "Peace Plan" made it clear, if it

 

€9pggg, C, 5. pp. 208—la.
79;p;d., p. 214.

7?;p;g., pp, 286—87.
73121g-

73:bid., pp. 355-63.

3C5

had not been before, that the object of German diplomacy was

74

delay rather than negotiations. The passage of time cooled
passions, which suited British policy as well, but the cabinet
persisted in trying to tie Termany down to the prOposed nego-
tiations. To prod iermany, Eden announced in Parliament on
April 3 that on the previous day he had handed to the Bel-
gian and French ambassadors in London letters of assurance

in regard to the action to be taken if negotiations for a
new settlement failed.75 On April 10, France, Belgium and
Italy agreed that Britain should seek amplification from
dermany of a number of points raised in the German memoran-
dum of March 31.7é Accordingly, the Foreign Office prepared
a "questionnaire," which was delivered by the British
ambassador in Berlin on May 7.77 The German government
simply chose not to respond to the British questionnaire,

and the transmission of the questionnaire became the final
response to the remilitarization of the Fhineland —- a
fitting anti—climax to a drama which saw Britain and France
waste the best Opportunity which they would have to rebuff

Hitler and restrain Nazi ambitions.

 

 

v—c

7u’Eerhard Weinberg notes that delay was "the main object
of fierman policy" throughout the later stages of the Rhine-
land crisis. Weinberg, The Foreign_£olicy of Hitler's
Ereiméfll. P- 260 °

 

75310 EJC.Deb., 5s., cols. 2309-12.

g
7 The Times, April 11, 1936.

 

77.92%. C. 5. pp. 513-17.

306

While it lasted, the Rhineland crisis was an all-
absorbing preoccupation for the governments of western
Europe. As such, it imposes a necessary digression upon
any treatment of the Abyssinian crisis. For France and
Britain, the Abyssinian crisis virtually ceased to exist
for two weeks in the middle of March. During those two
weeks, Hitler forced an answer to a question which had
worried French governments since the end of the First World
War. Would the league function to restrain Cerman efforts
to revise the structure of European security established
after the war? The answer, not unexpectedly, was no. For
France, the Rhineland crisis cleared away any remaining
doubts about the value of the League. If it would not func-
tion to restrain Germany, it made no sense to continue to use
it to alienate Italy. When the locarno powers first met in
Paris to consider the Terman remilitarization of the Rhine-
land, Flandin, to Eden's dismay, spoke out in front of the
Italian representative for an end to the sanctions against
Italy and a resurrection of the Stresa front. In a reversion
to previous form, France again took up the demand for coercion
under the banner of the league, and Eden found himself in the
uncomfortable position of arguing that negotiation rather
than sanctions was the best answer to a challenge posed to
the established order. But Eden refused to see in the Rhine-
land crisis a reason for discontinuing sanctions against

Italy, and he did not agree that the failure of the league

Council to do more than condemn iermany's action meant that

BC?

the league system would not function in Europe. It was
hard to gainsay, however, that on the one issue of major
importance to France the league had failed to act. There
was a rich irony in the situation, given the backdrOp of
Anglo-French differences over the correct response to
Italian aggression, but the result of the failure of Britain
and France to agree upon measures to preserve the security
of Europe was, in each case, the same. ”ermany took advan—
tage of the Opportunity created by the Abyssinian crisis to
remilitarize the Rhineland, and Italy all but completed the
conquest of Abyssinia while Britain and France argued over
the prOper response to Hitler's ggup. The net effect of the
Rhineland crisis was to encourage the revisionist dictators,
dismay those who looked to the western democracies for sup-
port, and force a reassessment of the basis of security in
eastern as well as in western EurOpe. It was not, therefore,
under the happiest of circumstances that the league powers
turned their attention to the Abyssinian crisis again at the
end of March.
IV

Abyssinia was in desperate straits by the end of March.
Marshal Badoglio had destroyed the bulk of the Abyssinian
armed forces during the fighting in Tigre'and was pushing
toward Addis Ababa. On March 21, the Abyssinian government

pleaded for league action to halt the damage being done by

3C8
78

Italian bombs and poison gas. The league, however, was
impotent. At French instigation the Committee of Eighteen

had handed over responsibility for the crisis on March 2 to
the Committee of Thirteen, which was charged with the task

of conciliation. The Committee of Thirteen again sought to
promote a settlement, and Italy reverted to the comfortable
diplomatic game of delay. On March 23, the Committee of
Thirteen met to consider the replies to the appeal which had
been addressed to Italy and Abyssinia on March 3.79 Italy
agreed ”in principle” to the Opening Of negotiations to

settle the conflict, but Abyssinia insisted upon an assurance
that Italy contemplated a settlement within the spirit and
framework of the Covenant. Abyssinia feared, with good
reason, that Italy intended to use the negotiations to prevent

80

the application of an Oil sanction. The committee, however,

was in no position to do other than accept the Italian

81 The Italian representative, Earon

response at face value.
Aloisi, did not arrive in Geneva until April 15. When he did
arrive, it was to state the Italian position, not to nego-
tiate. Italy insisted upon direct negotiations rather than

negotiations through the league. Aloisi said that Abyssinia

__ —. —— -—.—.— .

 

78league of Nations, Official Journal, April 1936, p. bSF.

 

79Ibid., p. 398. The Committee of Thirteen had been
scheduled to meet on March 10, but the meeting was delayed
because of the Rhineland crisis.

8OIbid.. pp. 395-97.

811big., p. #85.

_.

309

would have to recognize the situation created by Italian
victories in the field, and he intimated that the League
would be wise to do the same if it looked for a return to

Italian participation at Geneva.82

But the Abyssinian
delegation continued to insist upon the support pledged to
Abyssinia by the terms of the Covenant, and on April 18
the Committee Of Thirteen had to report another failure to
the league Council.83

In london, it was evident before the Committee of
Thirteen renewed their efforts that nothing could be expected
from another attempt to mediate. Italy had little to gain by
compromise, and the French were in a mood to talk of dropping
sanctions rather than imposing new ones. On March 19, Eden
asked the cabinet for guidance in the event of French pressure
to end sanctions when the Committee of Thirteen took up the
question of Abyssinia again. The cabinet felt that it was
premature to consider the lifting of sanctions. Chamberlain
observed that "if sanctions were taken off before peace were
in sight there would be political trouble in the country."8h
But the cabinet no longer were willing to think in terms of
additional pressure upon Italy. On April 6, Eden reported
that he had received word that the position of the Abyssinians
8?;Qi§., p. 361.
83igig.. pp. 359-6u.

8“Cab 23/83 23(36)3.

310

had become desperate, and he suggested summoning the Committee
of Eighteen to consider additional sanctions, including, if
necessary, the closing of the Suez canal. In raising the
question of the canal, Eden played his trump card, possibly
with the intent of jolting the cabinet into some sort of
action.85 As he must have eXpected, the cabinet reacted
with one voice against the idea of closing the canal, and
expressed grave doubts about additional sanctions of any
type. Eden did win approval to put the notion of additional
sanctions forward in debate, but only to avoid domestic
recriminations in the likely event of a collapse of the
sanctions experiment.86

When the League Council met in Geneva on April 20 to
consider the failure of the efforts of the Committee of
Thirteen, Eden made full use of the latitude accorded him by
the cabinet. Addressing the Council, he warned that the
future confidence and participation of member states depended
upon the success of the league in containing argression in

85Opinion in the Foreign Office was divided on the
wisdom of closing the Suez canal in order to save Abyssinia
and the league. Owen O'Malley, Maurice Peterson and William
Strang argued in a joint memorandum that it was worth the
risk involved in closing the canal in order "to deprive
Mussolini of the full fruits of aggression." Rex leeper,
Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, Ralph Wigram, Sir Lancelot Oliphant
and Orme Sargent responded that the risk of a war which
Britain was not in a position to fight was too great to
consider such a drastic alternative. Vansittart concurred
with the later Opinion in a minute which he attached to the
memoranda. FO 371/20411 R2877/226/22: FO 371/20181 J503u/
216/1 and J5035/216/l.

8F’Ceh 23/83 27(36)1.

311

Abyssinia. He urged the Council to press on with existing
sanctions and to eXpand League action against Italy:

At this solemn hour, when we must each of us
be conscious of the gravity of our decision,
Governments must be prepared to shoulder their
responsibilities and clearly to state the policy
which they are prepared to pursue. In the view
of His Majesty's Government in the United King-
dom, it is our manifest duty as Members of the
League at least to maintain those economic and
financial sanctions which have been put into
force in connection with this dispute. In
order, however, that there may be no shadow of
doubt about the position of His Majesty's
Government, I must make it clear that, in
addition to the action under Article 16 which
has already been taken, His Majesty's Govern-
ment, as has previously been stated, are ready
and willing to consider, together with their
fellow-Members of the league, the imposition
of any further economic and financial sanctions
that may be considered necessary and effective
for the fulfillment of the obligation which
we all of us bea 7 whether we like it or not,
in this dispute.

Eden's statement to the Council was a good deal stronger
than most of his colleagues in the cabinet would have been
comfortable with, but there was little prospect that addi—
tional sanctions would be adopted at the end of April. Eden
discovered, to his chagrin, that, apart from the represen-
tatives of Portugal, Denmark and Australia, no one at Geneva
was giving much thought to Abyssinia and Africa.88 Events

in Europe held the attention of most pe0p1e. and there was

a general feeling that it was time to reassess the system

 

 

87League of Nations, Official Journal, April 1936,
p. 378.

88

 

Cab 23/8“ 30(35)3-

312

of collective security. Eden was discouraged and he painted
a grim picture when he reported to the cabinet on April 22.
He felt that while Hitler and Mussolini held the initiative
in Europe every country would be inclined to structure
decisions with an eye to the desired effect on one or the
other of the dictators, and collective security would be a
forgotten ideal. Another problem to consider was the effect
of the Italian success upon British prestige. Italian
prOpagandists were crowing that Britain's sun had set in the
Mediterranean while Italy's was rising. Eden said there were
signs that public opinion in Egypt was responding to the
Italian prOpaganda, and he added that more trouble could be
expected if Italy successfully challenged the British interest
in Lake Tsana.89
Eden's gloomy prognostications gave the cabinet food for
thought. The French still had hopes that Mussolini would be
satisfied with a settlement that the League could live with,
but there was no such Optimism in London.90 When the cabinet
took up the question again on April 29, Eden continued to out—
line what he anticipated would be the impact of the impending
Italian triumph. Italy, he said, might raise a large native
army in its African empire and menace the British position
in the Sudan and Egypt. The loss of British prestige could
821219-
9OF0 371/2036? Rzu26/188u/3.

 

313

be expected to have an unsettling effect upon India and the
'black races' of Africa. In EurOpe, the Italian success
would probably have the effect of encouraging German ambi-
tions in that Mussolini would no doubt choose to develop

his new empire rather than defend Austria. And the Italians
could be eXpected to continue to challenge British supremacy
in the Mediterranean. Beyond all of that, an Italian triumph
over the League would call into question the basis of British
and European security. Could the League of Nations survive
the failure of the sanctions experiment? If so, could it
survive in its present form? Could it ever impose sanctions
again? Should it be made clear that Britain, after the
Abyssinian failure, no longer felt any obligation to apply
sanctions? If the League was to be reformed, should reform
be linked to the reentry of Cermany into the League? Should
Britain continue to try to negotiate a new locarno treaty
regardless of the future of the League? The cabinet were
agreed on the wisdom of proceeding with the effort to achieve
ggtgntg with Termany, but they had no ready answers for the
larger questions relating to the vacuum which would be
created in British policy if the League collapsed. Baldwin
appointed a cabinet committee, consisting of himself, Ramsay
MacDonald, Chamberlain, Simon, Eden, Halifax and the new
Minister for the Coordination of Defense, Sir Thomas Inskip,

to examine the questions which Eden raised.91

 

‘— ”.... ...-...-” -—AI--——»—. ...”

glcab 23/8h 31(36)h and 31(35)5-

31h

The assumption underlying the cabinet's discussion on
April 29 was that sanctions had failed. Therefore it was
necessary to begin to draw the unpleasant conclusions which
followed from that fact. To do so meant to concede defeat
at the hands of Mussolini, however, and that was a difficult
and galling concession to make. Chamberlain's attitude, as
outlined in a letter dated May 2, illustrates the difficulty
of the decision which faced the cabinet and the ambivalence
which still existed in Chamberlain's mind:

the Italian success will encourage the French

to urge that, now everything is finished, we

ought to lift the sanctions, let bygones be

bygones, and get Italy back to the Stresa

front at once. That seems to me intolerable...

I am sure the time has not yet come for the

League to owngétself beaten. All the same,

it is beaten.
On May 2 Haile Selassie fled Addis Ababa for Jibuti and
ultimate asylum in Britain, and it became even more difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the League had been beaten.93
Italian forces entered Addis Ababa on May 5, and on May 9
Mussolini proclaimed the annexation of Abyssinia and the
succession of the king of Italy, as emperor, to its vacant

9h

throne.

 

92

Failing. cwgeglgin. p. 281.

93Th§_Times”_May 3, 1936. After consolidating his
position in Tigre, Badoglio drove quickly through what remained
of the Abyssinian forces. On April 1, Haile Selaisse's army
was defeated near Kworam. Gondar fell on April 2 and Dessie.
the emperor's headquarters, was captured on April 15. The
defense of Addis Ababa was abandoned on April 30, two days
before the emperor fled the country. The Times, April 2, 3
and 16, May 1.

 

 

9“The Times, May 6 and 10.

 

315

The flight of Haile Selaisse and the fall of Addis Ababa
confirmed the outcome in Abyssinia, but the cabinet still
were not ready to consider the lifting of sanctions when
they met on May 6. Rather, they decided that Eden should
take no initiative on sanctions when the League Council
convened on May 11. The sanctions in effect were viewed as
a bargaining counter and the cabinet were prepared to wait
for Mussolini to come forward with his terms.95 On May 12
at Geneva, Eden, in his capacity as President of the Council,
put forward a resolution calling for the League to continue
to apply the sanctions which were in effect and to meet again
on June 15 to consider the situation at that time.96

The resolution proposed by Eden was adopted by the
Council, but there was considerable danger that the sanctions
front would disintegrate before the next meeting of the Coun-
cil. Except for some desultory fighting in outlying regions,
the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was complete. Ecuador and
Chili had already decided to discontinue the application of
sanctions, and there were growing indications that other

member-states might follow suit.97 Within the British

 

...—b- ...-—--

95cab 23/8u 34(36)u.
96League of Nations, Official gournal. June 1935. p- 5&0-

 

 

 

97Stephen Heald (ed.), Document§_on International Affairs,

 

1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 19377, II, h78,
#80-82.

316

cabinet, Viscount Eyres Monsell, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, led in pushing for an end to sanctions. On May
13, he complained that the Mediterranean fleet was overtaxed
and in need of relief, and he repeated the complaint on May
18 after Eden's return from Geneva. Eyres Monsell felt that
if the strain on the fleet were to be maintained, it would
be necessary to call up some 6,000 pensioners. Eden was
prepared to support such a step to maintain British strength
in the Mediterranean, but the cabinet were not.98

On May 27, there was a full cabinet discussion on the
question of raising sanctions. Eden put the case for main-
taining sanctions, arguing that the continuing application
of sanctions would buoy up the League, and would ultimately
force Italy to recognize the authority of the League and come
to Geneva to discuss a permanent settlement. He added that,
according to Foreign Office estimates, Italy would be in a
serious position if sanctions were maintained until September.
Eden conceded, however, that the maintenance of sanctions
depended upon French support, which was doubtful, despite
speculation that the newly elected Popular Front government
of Leon Blum might take a stronger stand to uphold the
Covenant. There was little support for Eden's position among
the other members of the cabinet. The Italian embassy in
London had dropped several hints that relations between

Britain and Italy could be rapidly restored if sanctions were

 

9808b 23/8# 36(36)2 and 37(36).

317

lifted and there was an increasing inclination to improve
upon those hints. Walter Runciman, the President of the
Board of Trade, called attention to the losses being suffered
by British commerce, Ramsay MacDonald and Simon questioned
whether concessions could be won through the maintenance
of sanctions, and there was a general tendency to question
the use of sanctions once the war they were designed to
control had ended. It was also pointed out that the worst
possible outcome, from the point of view of the League, would
be a piecemeal collapse of the sanctions front through the
gradual withdrawal of participating members. To avoid such
an eventuality, Chamberlain favored direct negotiations
between London and Rome. But Eden insisted that negotiations
could only take place through the League.99
While the cabinet struggled to reach a decision on
sanctions, Mussolini, in effect, took a hand in the deliber-
ations by granting an interview to a correspondent for the
Daily Telegrgph. The interview, which was published in London
on May 28, contained a wide range of assurances that Italian
good-will and cOOperation with Britain, France and the League
could be restored if sanctions were drapped. Specifically,
Mussolini promised not to raise a large native army in Africa,
nor to consider reprisals against any of the states which had
participated in the sanctions program. He also offered to

respect British interests in Lake Tsana, to negotiate an

 

99Cab 23/8!» 39(36 )8.

318

understanding with Britain and France, and to consider
participation in a reformed League.100
Eden continued his efforts to hold Britain to the
sanctions program when the cabinet resumed their deliber-
ations on May 29, but he was fighting a rearguard action.
Baldwin asked for each member's Opinion, and only Walter
Elliot and Sir Kingsley Wood, the ministers of agriculture
and health respectively, spoke out in support of Eden's
position. On the other hand, Baldwin, Halifax, Swinton,
Hailsham, Inskip, Duff Cooper, Malcolm MacDonald and Stanley

101

came out in favor of removing sanctions. Ramsay MacDonald

and Simon were already on record as favoring the same course

102 The cabinet, therefore, were overwhelmingly

of action.
disposed to put an end to the sanctions experiment, but there
remained, as Baldwin noted, the related problems of face-

saving and public Opinion.103 Chamberlain returned to the

lOODaily Telegrgph, May 28, 1936.

 

101The division Of Opinion on this question, as on
several others during the Abyssinian crisis, demonstrates
that, while there may have been a 'boys brigade' which tended
to support Eden in the cabinet formed by Chamberlain in 1937,
there is little evidence that all, or even most, Of the
younger ministers lined up behind Eden on key foreign policy
issues in 1935 and 1936.

lOZCab 23/8u 39(36)8.

103Except for the staunchly Conservative and isolationist
press, neWSpapers throughout the country focused heavy pres-
sure On the government to maintain sanctions despite the
Abyssinian defeat. Yorkshire Post, April 21, 1935: flgws
_Chronicle, April 28, 1933: Birmingham Post, May 11, 1933;
Nanchggter Guardian, May 12, 1936; Liverpool Daily_Post,
May 12, 1936; Daily Herald, May 25, 1936.

 

 

 

 

 

 

319

idea of direct negotiations between london and Rome, and a
grumbling Eden was instructed to sound Italian ambassador
Grandi on whether Mussolini would be willing to facilitate
a settlement by making a statement to the League along the

lines of the interview granted to the Daily Telegraph.lou

 

Mussolini had no intention of making a conciliatory
gesture to the League while sanctions were in effect, and
Eden reported to the cabinet on June 10 that no reply to
the suggestion which he had made to ambassador firandi had
been received. That opened the door for Eden to SUgsest
again that there was no urgency about the decision to remove
sanctions. The scheduled Council meeting had been postponed
until June 26, and Eden proposed that sanctions be allowed to
continue in effect at least until he had a chance to confer

105

with the new French delegation at Geneva. The cabinet
reluctantly agreed, but at least one member did so with
unspoken reservations. Neville Chamberlain was scheduled
to address the 1900 Club that evening, and he resolved to use
the Opportunity to give the country a clear lead on the
sanctions question and put an end to the business of drifting
without an agreed policy.106

For weeks the government had fought shy of recognizing

the Italian success in Abyssinia, although the cabinet were

10“Cab 23/8u u0(36)5.

1050ab 23/84 u1<36)1.

lo'FFeiling, Chamberlaip, p. 296.

 

320

in essential agreement that the sanctions eXperiment had
failed. The government's hesitation was meant to coax
Mussolini to deal with the League in formulating his peace,
as well as to allow time for public Opinion in Britain to
adjust to the Italian success. But the failure to act to
impede or to recognize the Italian success laid the cabinet
Open to criticism from all sides, and gave Eden sc0pe to

work for the maintenance of a policy which no longer enjoyed
majority support in the cabinet. Chamberlain put an end to
all of that with his speech to the 1900 Club. TO an approving
Conservative audience, he said that the time had come to draw
the Obvious conclusions from the Abyssinian eXperience:

There are some pe0ple who do not desire to
draw any conclusions at all. I see for
instance, the other day that the president
of the League of Nations Union issued a
circular to its members in which he said
that the issue hung in the balance and

urged them to commence a campaign of
pressure... with the idea that, if we were
to pursue the policy of sanctions, and

even to intensify it, it is still possible
to preserve the independence of Abyssinia.
That seems to me the very midsummer Of
madness.... There is no reason why, because
the policy of collective security in the
circumstances in which it was tried has
failed, we should therefore abandon the

idea of the League and give up the ideals
for which the League stands. But if we have
retained any vestige of common sense, surely
we must admit that we have tried to impose
upon the League a task which it was beyond
its powers to fulfill.... Is it not apparent
that the policy of sanctions involves, I

do not say war, but a risk of war?... Is it
not also apparent from what has happened
that in the presence of such a risk, nations
cannot be relied upon to proceed to the last
extremity unless their vital interests are

321

threatened? That being so, does it not

suggest that it might be wise to explore

the possibilities Of localising the

danger spots of the world... by means Of

regional arrangements, which could be

approved by the League, but which should

be guaranteed only by those nations whose

interests were vitall connected with

those danger zones?lo

Chamberlain's first independent venture into the realm

of foreign affairs was dramatic and effective. In a manner
which would later become familiar, Chamberlain resolved an
impasse in Britain's dealings with one of the dictators by
taking the matter out Of the hands of the diplomats and
handling it himself. He did not give Eden any warning of
what he intended to do because Eden would have disapproved.108
But the substance of Chamberlain's speech cannot have come
as a surprise to the Foreign Secretary. Chamberlain concluded
in April that the League had failed, and he began at that
time to press upon Eden the solution which he put forward in
his speech.109 The use of those arguments in a public speech
without cabinet approval was a surprise, however, and it had

the effect that Chamberlain intended. If the maintenance of

 

107Th_e__Times, June 11, 1936.

108Chamberlain noted in his diary on June 17 that he
"did not consult Anthony Eden, because he would have been
bound to beg me not to say what I prOposed.... He himself
has been as nice as possible about it, though it is Of
course true that to some extent he has had to suffer in the
public interest." Quoted in Feiling, Chamberlain, p. 296.

 

 

109Ibid-v pp. 295—96; Iain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain
London: Frederick Muller, 1961), p. 194.

 

 

322

sanctions was ”the very midsummer of madness," in the words

Of the strongest figure in the British cabinet, the conclusion
invited was that British support for sanctions was at an end,
and the sanctions front was about to collapse. Sanctions
against Italy remained nominally in effect until formally
removed by the League Assembly at the beginning Of July, but
the sanctions eXperiment was dead when Chamberlain pronounced
it so on June 10.

Supporters of the League in Britain, who, as Chamberlain
noted in his speech, had been railing at the government for
their failure to act to save Abyssinia, were outraged by
Chamberlain's dismissal Of sanctions as a failure. On June
11, Baldwin was pressed at question time in the House of
Commons by Attlee, Sinclair, Churchill and others to disavow
Chamberlain's speech of the night before. Baldwin refused
to do so, and defended Chamberlain's remarks as "provisional
reflections on the experience gained by the Italo-Abyssinian

dispute."110

On June 15 Baldwin and Eden again had to stave
Off demands by Henderson, Attlee and Dalton to explain and
repudiate Chamberlain's speech. They won a temporary reprieve
by promising a full debate on the issue on June 18.111 On
June 17, the cabinet considered the line to be taken in the

impending debate and there was complete agreement that

 

110313 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. #01-03.
111Ibid., cols. 617-21.

*-

 

323

sanctions would have tO be lifted. Baldwin indirectly
rebuked Chamberlain by saying that in future all speeches
touching on foreign affairs should be cleared with the
Foreign Office before delivery, but Chamberlain had achieved
his purpose. Even Eden, who would have to carry the burden

in debate, now agreed that, in the existing circumstances,

112

sanctions should be raised. There remained the painful

chore Of conveying that conclusion to the country and the
league.

Eden opened the debate on June 18 with a survey of the
Abyssinian crisis and a promise. Britain, he said, had taken
the lead throughout the crisis in supporting the principle
Of collective security, and the government intended to hold
to that policy. But the time had come to put an end to an
effort which had failed:

The fact has to be faced that sanctions
did not realise the purpose for which they
were imposed. The Italian military campaign
succeeded. The capital and the most impor-
tant part Of Abyssinia are in Italian military
occupation, and so far as I am aware no
Abyssinian Government survives in any part of
the Emperor's territory. That is the situation
which has got to be faced. It is a situation
which nothing but military action from without,
from outside the country, can possibly reverse.
Is there any country prepared to take such
military action? Or is there any section of
Opinion in this country prepared to take such
military action?

 

llzcab 23/8u u2(36)1 and 42(36)12.

113313 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 1200.

324

The short answer to the questions which Eden posed was nO.
That did not prevent the supporters Of the League in the
House from roundly castigating the government, however. Nor
was Eden's assurance that the government would "strive to
restore to the League its full authority" proof against the
outrage of the government's Opponents.llu
Arthur Treenwood led the attack for Labour, and his

anger was Obviously genuine. Referring to Eden's speech, he
said "I am bound to say... that no more deplorable speech
has ever fallen from the lips Of a British Minister."115
He drew quotes from Hoare's speech at Geneva and the govern-
ment's election manifesto and hurled them at the government
front bench. He catalogued the government's sins since those
lofty promises and concluded:

Gangsterdom is triumphant, and Abyssinia

stands as a ghastly monument to the treachery

of nations who were sworn to stand by her.

NO Government in this country... ever humil-

iated itself or the peOple it represented

more shamefully and more completely than the

Government has done today by the prOposal

to dispense with the one effective wegpon in

the hands of the League of Nations.11‘
fireenwood reflected the bitterness of League supporters
throughout the country, but it was Lloyd George who put the
stunning defeat which Britain had suffered into historical

perspective:

llulbid., col. 1206.

.n——-

1151bid., col. 1211.

llé;p;g.. col. 1216.

325

This is a unique occasion. I have been
in this House very nearly half—a~century...
and I cannot recall an occasion quite like
this. I have never before heard a British
Minister... come down to the House of Commons
and say that Britain was beaten, Britain and
her Empire beaten, and that we must abandon
an enterprise we had taken in hand.... It is
a unique occasion and may God never repeat
it for this Empire.117
Shouts Of "shame" and "resign" rang in the House, but,
unlike the crisis in December, the government was in no
danger. The fact Of the Italian success was irrefutable,
and the collapse of the sanctions front had been predicted
for some time. Baldwin promised that the government would

study the Abyssinian eXperience to determine what could be

118 That

salvaged of the concept of collective security.
hardly satisfied his Opponents, but there was little that
they could do to prevent the government from raising sanctions.
Nor could the League resist a British lead, since the appli-
cation Of sanctions depended upon British and French support.
The final moment for the League's great test came on July h,
when the Assembly adOpted a resolution which recalled "the

previous findings and decisions" which had denounced Italian

aggression, but called for the removal Of the measures which

had failed to contain it.119 Although it was not given a

 

117Ibid., col. 1223.

118Ibid., cols. 1232-39.

119League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supple-
ment NO. 151, pp. 66-68.

 

326

decent burial at the time, the dream Of many died on July A
and a deep gloom prevailed at feneva. NO attempt was made
to maintain a brave front, or to deny the self-evident fact
that the League had suffered a disastrous fall. The only
question that remained was whether it could be put back

together again.

EPIIOCUE: ALI THE KING'S MEN

The doubts about the League created by the Manchurian
crisis were confirmed by the Abyssinian debacle. The one
glimmer of hOpe remaining for league supporters amidst the
wreckage of the Geneva system Of collective security was that
the League would learn from adversity and become the effective
instrument originally intended. When the Assembly conceded
defeat on July h, it issued, at the same time, a call for
all members to submit "any prOposals they may wish to make
in order to improve... the application of the principles of

the Covenant."1

The League had failed to control aggression
and its raison g’gtgg was in doubt. TO preserve the concept

Of the League, a new beginning was needed -- a reestablishment
Of the League on sounder bases to restore the credibility

and enthusiasm on which it depended. But there was no firm

or agreed ground on which to rebuild. In essence, the effort
to revive the League after the Abyssinian crisis was a patently
hopeless attempt to recreate something which had never been.
But, for those who looked upon the institutionalization of

peace as the only alternative to chaos and destruction, there

seemed no choice but to make the effort.

_ —— _ -_ __
*—

1League Of Nations, Official Journal, July 1935, p, 769.

 

327

328

Revival of the League's fortunes, insofar as possible,
depended upon significant change, but change carried with it
the danger of discord. The Assembly agreed on July b that
proposals for reform Of the Covenant were in order, but it
split along predictable lines on the type of proposals to
invite. France, the Soviet Union, Poland and the Little
Entente wanted to limit consideration to prOposals to make
the Obligations laid down under articles 11 and 16 automatic
and precise. Britain, the Dominions, the European neutral
states and Hungary preferred to deemphasize the coercive
provisions of the Covenant and Open the discussion to prOpo-
sals to make the League more attractive to the revisionist
powers.2 The Assembly agreed on a vague formula to paper
over the dispute, but the differences eXpressed were long-
standing, fundamental and firm. The gloomy but realistic
assessment Of the British Foreign Office on July 13 was that
"there was no possibility Of securing general agreement at
Geneva to any substantial amendment of the Covenant."3 None-
theless, the League pursued the goal of reform and revival
throughout the remainder Of its existence. Many of the
League's staunchest supporters were convinced that the only
change required was a change in the hearts and minds of the
leaders of the western democracies, and they continued to

hOpe, against all Odds, that with a change of attitude or

 

21bid., pp. 751-56; FO 371/2ou7u W6019/79/98.

3Cab zu/263 C.P.210(36).

329
practice, the League would be restored to its prOper stature.
In Britain, Official interest in the revival Of the League
coincided with Eden's tenure as Foreign Secretary.

Reform of the League was an idea as Old as the League
itself. Repeated attempts had been made during the first
fifteen years Of the League's existence to define, enliven,
strengthen or temper the functions Of the League. With few
exceptions, the proposed amendments of the Covenant had been
rejected. The most notable attempts to revise the Covenant
were the 1921 resolutions dealing with article 16, the 1923
resolution treating article 10, the Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, the Treaty for Improving the
Means Of Preventing War, the Convention on Financial Assist-
ance to the Victim of Aggression, and the efforts to incor-
porate the Kellogg Pact into the Covenant.“ Except for the
resolutions designed to temper the functioning Of articles 10
and 16, the major efforts to revise the Covenant during the
1920s were all framed to strengthen the capacity Of the League
to resist aggression. Article 19, which provided for orderly
change, was a dead letter throughout the period.

Britain was largely interested in the League as an
instrument of conciliation rather than coercion, and British
statesmen became increasingly concerned, as practice deter-

mined the character of the League, that the Covenant was being

 

aAll Of these prOposals failed of final adOption. Frank
P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967; first published in 1952), pp. 148,
222-28, 258-59, 268-76. 377-83, BBQ-87.

 

330

used as a device to guarantee the status quo. Britain
looked with particular concern upon the transparent French
desire to use the League to contain Germany. Successive
British governments shied away from proposals to make the
coercive provisions Of the Covenant automatic.

Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933 and the revision—
ist powers began to press their own demands for League reform.
Japan was aggrieved by the League's refusal to recognize a
change in the status quo in Manchuria and gave notice on
March 27, 1933, Of intent to quit the League.5 Hitler's
Germany demanded full equality Of treatment and insisted
that the Covenant be divorced from the 'dictated' treaty of
Versailles. When the Disarmament Conference failed to accede
to Hitler's demand for equality, Germany withdrew, and on
October 21, 1933, Germany gave notice that it would also with-
draw from the League.6 Against that backdrop, Mussolini
brought the issue Of League reform to the fore. He prOposed
a four power pact among Italy, Germany, Britain and France
which would have concentrated the effective direction of the
League in the hands of the great powers, and given them
authority to carry out the revision Of the peace treaties.
Germany welcomed the idea and Britain initialled a revised

version, but the eastern European allies Of France applied

 

5Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairg, 1933
(London: Oxford University Press, 193M), p. 515.

61%;!” p. 221.

 

331

pressure on Paris and France killed the prOposal.7 In
frustration, the Fascist firand Council announced on December
6, 1933 that Italy would withdraw from the League unless it
was radically reformed.8
Italy's demand prompted a full review of the question by
the British Foreign Office. A memorandum drafted on January
h, 1939 by Herbert Malkin, Alexander Cadogan, Rex Leeper,
William Strang and Skrine Stevenson concluded that the only
prOposal for reform which would command general support at
Zeneva was the separation of the peace treaties from the
Covenant. That would meet a specific German demand, but it
would not draw Germany back into the League, nor would it
solve the League's other problems. There were a number of
other proposals advanced over the years at Geneva which were
attractive from a British point of view, such as the proposal
to reconstitute the League Council to accord the great powers
more authority, and the prOposal to limit the coercive pro-
visions of the Covenant, but such proposals were clearly
unacceptable to other members of the League. And none of the
proposed reforms seemed likely to satisfy the revisionist
powers or draw them into contented participation in the

9

League.

_

7For a full treatment of the four power pact see Konrad
H. Jaraush, The Four Power Pact, 1933 (Madison: Wisconsin
State Historical Society Press, 19657.

8Toynbee, Survgy of International Affairs, 1933, p. 223.
9F0 371/1853? W260/129/98.

332

Nothing was done by the League to facilitate change or
to strengthen the League's capacity to resist aggression
before Mussolini forced consideration of both problems by
posing a threat to Abyssinia. The Italian conquest of
Abyssinia served to magnify and underline the problems of
security and flexibility. But it left the League with little
authority with which to manage them.

The Foreign Office considered the problem of reform at
several points during the Abyssinian crisis, but the conclu-
sion drawn was that the time was not right to raise the issue.
That conclusion held until the final stages of the crisis.
The one exception was the proposal advanced in Sir Samuel
Hoare's speech at Geneva on September 11 to open access to
colonial raw materials through the agency of the League.

The raw materials prOposal reflected the British desire to
channel revision through the League and to meet the more
reasonable aspirations of Italy and Germany, but Foreign
Office officials recognized that an ambitious proposal to
breathe life into article 19, or to suggest in other ways

that the League accommodate itself to change would run afoul

10

of France and the little Entente. On February 29, 1936

Foreign Secretary Eden spoke out against League reform.

 

10A memorandum on the question of reform by Orme Sargent
on September 5, 1935, prompted extensive minuting within the
Foreign Office. A letter from Sir Eric Drummond on September
16 led to another round of minuting on the subject. And a
memorandum on November 19 by Foreign Secretary Hoare produced
a full analysis by senior officials on the implications of
the raw materials prOposal. Foreign Office Opinion on the

333
What matters, he said, "is not so much the wording of the

11 The will

Covenant as the will of the nations to work it."
shown by League members during the Abyssinian crisis was not
sufficient to make the League work, however, and the question
of reform resurfaced unavoidably during the final stages of
the Abyssinian collapse.

On April 30, the new cabinet committee formed by Baldwin
to consider the question of collective security met to weigh
the implications of the failure of the League. Eden conceded
the League's shortcomings but insisted that the government
"must attempt to build our future policy on the basis of its
continued existence." In his view, even a crippled League
was of concrete importance to Britain. It provided a measure
of security in the event of an attack on a British possession,
it was a convenient instrument through which to exert British
influence in every part of the world, it was a vital bridge
to Europe, it facilitated the conduct of foreign policy and
won support for it in Parliament, it provided a forum for
close cooperation with the Dominions and obviated the diffi—
cult constitutional question of Dominion support in the event

of war, it offered a rationale for rearmament, and, insofar

 

 

subject of League reform was ably summed up on January 18,

1936 by William Strang. Strang argued, and Carr, Sargent,
Malkin, Collier, Mounsey, Vansittart, Cranborne and Stanhope
agreed, that the Covenant could stand considerable improvement,
but no major change was practicable. FO 371/1968? W8174/
23ou/98 and W8582/2304/98, F0 371/19692 WlOO33/77ll/98,

FO 371/20472 w1u31/79/98.

11309 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 82.

33h
as it served to preserve peace, it also served British
policy. The committee, which consisted of Baldwin, Chamber-
lain, Simon, Halifax, Hailsham, Inskip and Eden, agreed that
the League was worth preserving, but they authorized an
inquiry into the coercive provisions of the Covenant.12 Eden
translated the committee's conclusions in a memorandum on
May 28 in which he instructed the Foreign Office to presume,
in assessing the question of League reform, that there would
be:
(1) No amendment of the Covenant itself.
(2) Amendment of the Assembly Resolutions of

1921 for the purpose of interpreting in a

limitative sense the universal obligations

ziigmi: Ey.T§mbers of the League under
Consideration of the question of League reform was well under
way in London, therefore, when the Assembly called for
recommendations on July 4. The principal members of the
cabinet were agreed that the League ought to be preserved,
if possible, and Eden was determined to save as much of the
original structure as he could.

The cabinet took a lively interest in the question of

League reform during the summer of 1936, at the eXpense of a

12F0 37l/20h73 W3935/75/98: Eden's analysis of the value
of the League was developed in F0 37l/20h72 W3851/79/98.

13190 371/2ou73 wu815/79/98.

335
holiday which they all sorely needed. The future of the
League was a serious and pressing question and most members
of the cabinet worked out their ideas on the subject and
submitted them to Eden. To give the cabinet a basis for
assessment, the Foreign Office prepared a memorandum which
laid out the various options open to the League. The Foreign
Office dismissed as too radical all prOposals to either
strengthen or eliminate the coercive provisions of the
Covenant. The only prOposal for reform which the Foreign
Office felt might command general support at Geneva would be
an "intermediate” prOposal to maintain the Covenant as it was
but reduce the coercive responsibilities of League members
by interpretive resolutions. Such a compromise prOposal
would not entirely eliminate the risk of being drawn into
war on an issue not vital to British interests, however, and

lb Cabinet

might irritate rather than conciliate Germany.

interest in revival of the League was based in good part upon

a desire to draw Germany back to Geneva, and the Foreign

Office warning about German sensibilities was taken seriously.15
By and large, the suggestions submitted by cabinet members

to Eden were as cautious as the Foreign Office assessment.

The ministers recognized that a proposal to alter the Covenant

radically could split the League, but they felt that some

change was necessary if the League was to survive. Only

luCab 24/263 C.P.210(36).

150.29:; 23/85 50(36)2.

336

Sir Thomas Inskip proposed the elimination of article 16,
which he felt should be replaced by "a declaration of
intention to COOperate with other nations in protecting
common interests as to which each nation will be its own

16 Several other cabinet members also felt that the

judge."
coercive provisions of the Covenant should be modified but
they did not go so far as to suggest that the Covenant
should be altered. Malcolm MacDonald, who had responsibility
for coordination with the Dominions, warned that it would be
virtually impossible to draft a proposal on which the
Dominions could agree. Canada, at one extreme, favored the
deletion of article 16 and the creation of a "consultative"
League while South African officials favored strengthening
article 16.17
It was evident, therefore, that the Covenant could not
easily be revised, but the cabinet were almost unanimous in
feeling that Britain should make it clear that the League
would have to adopt a narrow interpretation of its peace—
keeping functions. Runciman and Stanhope felt that by temper-
ing the coercive provisions of the Covenant the League might

be able to entice some of the important non-members to apply

for membership.18 Hoare, who had returned to the cabinet as

 

16Cab 2u/263 C.P.223(36).

17Cab 2u/263 C.P.222(36).

1Boat) 2h/263 C.P.22h(36); FO 371/2ou75 Wll3uO/79/98.

337

First Lord of the Admiralty, felt very strongly that the
government should issue a statement to the effect that

Britain had neither the inclination nor the means to be

the policeman for the League. Until the League became the
universal body originally intended, Hoare felt that the
government should publicly define those interests which
Britain would fight to defend.19 Chamberlain agreed with
Hoare but took his analysis a step further. Chamberlain had
long been concerned about the inability of the League to
function as intended and had previously prOposed the esta-
blishment of an international police force to enable the
League to enforce its decisions. By the end of the Abyssinian
crisis, however, he was convinced that the coercive provisions
of the Covenant could not be universally implemented by a
truncated League. Consequently, he prOposed that the obliga-
tions assumed by the League members under articles 11 and 16
be limited to areas of vital national interest as defined by
regional pacts on the order of the Locarno agreements. He
felt that Britain could thereby limit its liabilities to
western EurOpe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. He also

thought that some modification of League procedures should

be established to "allow of easier discussion of territorial

grievances," but he was not clear how that should be done.20

 

19Cab zu/263 C.P.213(36).

ZOFO 371/2ou75 W913l/79/98; Neville Chamberlain to Lord
Iothian, June 10, 1936, Lothian Papers GDhO/l7/hh5: Feiling,
Chamberlain, pp. 295-95: William R. Rock, Neville Chamberlain
(New York: Twayne, 1969), pp. 102-03.

 

 

38
J I

Chamberlain's views on reform of the League were well defined
in his speech to the 1900 Club, but he repeated them in a
memorandum to Eden. As he eXplained in a letter to Baldwin,
he wanted to stress that no prOposals for League reform
should be advanced until they had been discussed in Berlin.21
Chamberlain's opinion counted for a great deal in the cabinet,
and when Eden formulated his own prOposal on August 20, in
response to those which he had received, he noted that a
meeting of the Locarno powers had been scheduled and he sug-
gested that the British position on reform of the League
should be withheld as long as possible. He was scheduled
to deliver a speech to the Assembly at the end of September
and he could outline the government's position at that point.22
As it develOped, Eden's speech to the League Assembly on
September 25, 1936 was the only major pronouncement made by
the British government on the question of reform. Since
Britain did not submit a proposal to the Secretariat in
advance of the Assembly meeting, Eden's speech, which Opened
the discussion of the question, was awaited with particular
interest at Teneva. In essence, the speech which Eden deli-
vered was refined from the suggestions advanced by cabinet

members, overlaid by the act of faith which Eden felt was

essential to the Ieatue's survival. But the speech was

 

21Neville Chamberlain to Stanley Baldwin, August 21, 1936,
Baldwin Papers, Vol. 171.

22Cab 2u/263 C.P.219(36).

339

phrased in cautious, general terms, carefully weighed by the
cabinet to avoid the impression that Britain was eager to
take the lead in restructuring the League.23
The pledge Eden offered to the Assembly on September 25
was that Britain's policy would "continue to be based upon
its membership of the League of Nations." He added that in
his view the machinery of the League was generally sound but
could be improved without unnecessary amendment. The failure
of the League during the Abyssinian crisis was owing, he
said, to a lack of universality and to the failure of the
League to play a more energetic role during the early stages
of the crisis. To overcome the latter problem, Eden prOposed
that article 11 be interpreted so as to allow the Council to
take action without the consent of the states in question.
To make the League more attractive to non-members and to
bring it into line with what he described as "the realities
of the world situation," Eden proposed the separation of the
Covenant from the peace treaties and suggested that coercive
responsibilities under the Covenant be limited to areas out—
lined by regional pacts.2u
Eden's speech was one of several on the subject, collec—
tively remarkable more for the variety of Opinion eXpressed

than for the light which they shed on the problem. The Argen-

tine delegation favored the removal of most of the coercive

 

-..—....

23F0 371/2ou75 W99hO/79/98: Cab 24/263 c.P.219(36);
Cab 23/85 56(36)2.

zuleague Of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement

No. 155, pp. 44-47.

 

 

3&0

aspects of the Covenant and insisted that any changes pro-
posed be effected by amendment of the Covenant rather than
interpretative resolution.25 Halvdan Koht of Norway felt

that a consultative league could be created without tampering
with the Covenant if league members would concentrate upon
removal of the causes of war in a spirit of "pacifism in the
true sense of the word."26 Yvon Delbos, of France, on the
other hand, insisted that the primary duty of the League was

to "guarantee the security of its members." Consequently, he
argued, "the League's means of action -- preventive and repres-
sive -- should be strengthened."27 Maxime Litvinoff, of the
Soviet Union, pointed to the storm clouds gathering over
Europe and asked the League to "organize mutual aid" and

"draw up its plan of action." The aggressor states outside

the League were organizing for war, he said, and the League
would be wise to begin organizing collective resistance.28
Other proposals touched on disarmament, treaty revision, the
elimination of economic sanctions, and definition of an
aggressor.29 The effect of the various prOposals was to
confirm that there was little basis for agreed reform of the

league.

zélb;§., pp. 86-87.
261bid., pp. 52-5u.
27Ibid., pp. 51—52.
gggg., pp. €1-Ffi.

29For an assessment of the various prOposals see F0 371/
20u76 W11840/79/98.

 

3u1

Nonetheless, the Assembly established a committee, known
as the Committee of Twenty—eight, to consider the question of
reform and report at the next session of the Assembly.30 The

Committee of Twenty—eight appointed rgpporteurs to prepare

 

reports on the most significant prOposals for reform. Eden's

assistant Lord Cranborne acted as rapporteur on the question

 

of universality and Paul-Boncour of France served the same
function on the question of regional pacts of mutual security.
The Foreign Office remained fully engaged therefore with the
question of League reform and the preparation of Lord Cran-
borne's report throughout much of 1937. The cabinet, however,
became increasingly wary of the issue, and, with the exception
of Eden, showed less and less interest in the league.

Several factors combined to reduce cabinet interest in
revival of the League. Most significantly, it finally became
clear during the negotiations for the five-power talks that
Hitler had no intention of negotiating a new Locarno agree-
ment, nor of rejoining the League.31 Without German partici-
pation, the League lost much of its potential usefulness in
the eyes of such senior cabinet members as Chamberlain, Simon

30League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supple-
ment No. 162, pp. 28-30.

 

31Cab 23/85 58(36)3: Cab 23/86 60(36)1. This impression
was confirmed by Lord Halifax's visit to Germany in November

1937. Cab 23/90 43(37)3.

 

3L2

and Hoare. And the dogged insistence of League supporters in
Britain that the Covenant need only be applied to succeed
compounded the cabinet's difficulty in adOpting a more real-

32

istic policy with respect to the League. Organized support
for the League began to wane in Britain after the Abyssinian
crisis, but the League of Nations Union was still a political
force to be reckoned with, particularly in Parliament where
Lord Cecil and several other leading members were in a posi-
tion to remind the government that they remained committed to
the League as the basis of British policy.33 In April 1936,
leading supporters of the League in Britain and France organ-
ized the International Peace Campaign, which was an attempt

to inject new life into the League movement by appealing for
support from organizations such as trade unions, c00perative
societies, church, professional, civic and farm groups around
the world. In September 1936, the leaders of the campaign
organized a World Peace Congress in Brussels and boasted of

an affiliation of organizations representing some four million

3h

people. But the Spanish civil war polarized political

 

32Lord Cecil to Gilbert Murray, July 30, 1936, Murray
Papers, box 16a+d3 Lord Cecil to Lord Halifax, July 30, 1936,
Cecil Papers, Add. 5108a; Notes of a conversation between a
League of Nations Union delegation and Foreign Secretary
Eden, February 5, 1937, Cecil Papers, Add. 51083.

33105 H.L.Deb., 5s., cols. 8u-88; 322 H.C.Deb., 5s.,

cols. 167, §7§I'I?21; 323 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 536-37; 325
H.C.Deb., 58., cols. 38-39.

 

3L‘For a discussion of the development and significance
of the International Peace Campaign see Donald S. Birn, "The
League of Nations Union and Collective Security," Journal of
Contemporary History, IX, 3 (July l97h), 1&8-50.

 

 

 

3&3

Opinion in Britain and elsewhere, and the International

Peace Campaign and, to a lesser extent, the League of Nations
Union came increasingly to represent Opinion on the left.
Consequently, they lost what limited influence they had with
the largely Conservative government.35 The Spanish civil war,
which captured international attention just as the Abyssinian
crisis wound down, separated the government from supporters
of the League in Britain in several respects. The government
sought to confine the danger of war to Spain by sponsoring
the Non-Intervention Committee in London. The Labour party
and other supporters of the League denounced the Non-Inter-
vention Committee as a charade and demanded that the govern-
ment support action through the League to uphold the Spanish

35

Republic against outside aggression. Angry supporters of

Spain and the League came to view the government as fascist
in sympathy, and the government dismissed their critics as
communists, fellow travelers or fools who refused to see that

the League could not hope to manage the Spanish problem so

35The leaders of the League of Nations Union recognized
the problem created by the involvement of communists in the
International Peace Campaign, and some, such as Maxwell
Tarnett, wanted to separate the League of Nations Union from
the new organization. Gilbert Murray to Lord Cecil, October
12, 1936, Murray Papers, box 16a+d3 Philip Noel-Baker to
2ilbert Murray, December 13, 1937, Murray Papers, box #.

3éAnthony Eden to Lord Cecil, September 17, 1936, Cecil
Papers, Add. 51083; Gilbert Murray to Anthony Eden, March 18,
1937, F0 371/21328 W5916/7/u1; 322 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 1131-
34. 1332-83-

344

long as fiermany was not a member. The fact that Germany was
not a member of the League also created, in the eyes of the
government, the danger that the League might be converted by
the French and their allies into a grand alliance against
Termany. The Government were determined not to become part
of an anti-Nazi or anti-Fascist 'bloc,’ and by November 1936
the inclination in London was to move slowly and cautiously
on the question of reform of the League.37
With apprOpriate hints from London, consideration of
League reform went at a snail's pace. In December 1936 the
French ambassador in London approached the Foreign Office to
ask if Britain recognized the Little Entente, the Franco-
Soviet treaty and the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as regional
pacts worthy of League support. William Strang responded
that, on the contrary, Britain favored a move away from auto-

matic guarantees of support.38 On the question of facilita-

ting change, the government backed away from Hoare's raw

37Cranborne was afraid that the League was in danger of
becoming "the Front POpulaire of nations," and he felt that
the Soviet representative, Litvinoff, wanted to use the
question of reform to drive 3ermany and Italy further from
the League. He felt that, in the circumstances, the Committee
of Twenty-eight "can do no good, and may do a great deal of
harm." Strang, Cadogan and Vansittart agreed, and even Eden
was not prepared to try to strengthen the League at the
expense of universality. On December lfi, 1936, Cranborne
told the Turkish Foreign Minister, Rustu Aras that Britain
felt that the Committee of Twenty—eight "should proceed
prudently and should not take too rapid decisions." F0 371/
20477 Wlé909/79/98; FO Boo/296.

38Fo 371/2ou77 w17198/79/98.

3H5

materials prOposal, and Cranborne wrote to Eden on March 9,
1937 that "it must be fairly obvious to all concerned that
we are in fact playing for time and are largely engaged in
stonewalling."39 Cranborne's report on universality went
through several drafts in the Foreign Office, and, as sub-
mitted to the League in September, was a comprehensive survey
of the possibilities Open to the League. The report pointed
out the paradox involved in proposals to either strengthen
or eliminate the coercive provisions of the Covenant. A
"coercive" League had to be universal to be effective but
could not achieve universality because of the coercive
requirements. A "non-coercive" League could very likely
achieve near universality but could do nothing to enforce
peace. A third alternative, developed in the report, was an
"intermediate" League providing for consultation in a crisis
on whether coercive measures could be profitably applied in
the given situation.“0
Although Cranborne's report made no recommendations, it
was not difficult to discern that Britain leaned toward the
compromise proposal outlined. Eden reviewed the question
for the cabinet on December 17, 1937, and recommended such

a proposal.)41 Fivedays later, the cabinet, in their last

 

39Lord Cranborne to Anthony Eden, March 9, 1937, F0 800/
296.

uoThere is a c0py of Cranborne's report at FO 371/212h2
w15139/25o/98.

ulCab 2h/273 C.P.315(37).

3H6

full consideration of the question, decided that "membership
of the League should involve a general obligation to consult,
and an additional obligation to take coercive action when,
but only when, consultation between members of the League
indicated that coercion might profitably be employed.”2
Discussion on the tOpic was brief and desultory, despite the
fact that the Committee of Twenty—eight had scheduled a
discussion of Cranborne's report for January. It was clear
from discussions at Geneva that the League would do little

to reform itself.“3 Any prOposal by Britain to moderate the
burdens imposed by the Covenant would be offset by French

and Soviet proposals to amplify those burdens. Cranborne's
report was balanced against Paul-Boncour's report on regional
pacts, which put the French position that all regional pacts
should be supported by the establishment of automatic econ-
omic sanctions.uu The cabinet's conclusion was that "the
original conception of the League was impracticable so long
as important nations remained outside," and they did not see

any prospect of drawing those nations in.“5 Hence, they lost

“ZCab 23/90 48(37)6.

uBAfter submitting his report to the League on September
30, Cranborne recorded in his notes that there was a general
understanding at Geneva that "the time was not ripe for the
initiation of a discussion of_the problem." FO 800/296.

uuThere is a c0py of Paul-Boncour's report at PO 371/
21242 w15uu5/250/98.

“SCab 23/90 u8<37)6.

‘

 

 

Y

 

3&7

interest in the League, except to make certain that it did
not become a holy alliance to preserve the status quo. The
exception, as always, was Eden, who saw the weakness of the
crippled League but held out hope that it could be revived.
By December 1937, however, Eden's time in the cabinet was
growing short.

While Eden remained in the cabinet he continued to be
a useful foil against the ire of the opposition. League
supporters no longer trusted him as they once had, but he
was viewed as the best of a bad lot. The League of Nations
Union hailed his speech at Geneva in September 1936 on the

#6

revival of the League. When the Opposition buzzed too

loudly around the government, it was useful to have Eden on
the front bench to proclaim his devotion to the League.“7
But, as rearmament became a largely accepted preposition,
despite Labour's continuing protests, the League began to
lose its domestic worth to the government. And the righteous
attitude of League supporters grated on the nerves of the
cabinet. Neville Chamberlain, who became Prime Minister in
May 1937, became very tired of being accused of "treachery"

for failure to pay full lip-service to the League.“8

 

uéHeadway, October 1936.
“7328 E.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 59a-9e.

u80n October 27, 1937, for example, Arthur Greenwood
denounced the government for failure to make reference to the
League of Nations in the King's Speech, reading into that
omission a willingness to throw the League "to the wolves."
328 fl;C.Deb., 58., cols. 88-89.

3M8

Chamberlain supported the compromise prOposal on League
reform advanced by Eden in December 1937, but, at the same
time, began to move publicly away from what he saw as the
dangerously unrealistic policy to which the government were
still bound by membership of the League. On October 21, he
pointed out that the League had demonstrated that it was not
a guarantee against aggression. He added that "pending a
regeneration of the League or its development into an effec-
tive instrument it is no use going on repeating 'the League.‘
We have to find practical means of restoring peace to the
world."u9 He made the same point at the Lord Mayor's banquet
on November 9, but noted that the government's policy remained
to strengthen and use the League. He made it clear, however,
that in preserving the peace of Europe he planned to rely
upon "informal discussion" with Berlin and Rome rather than
the League of Nations;0

Chamberlain's inclination to manage relations with Hitler
and Mussolini by means of ”informal discussions" which circum-
vented the Foreign Office led to a falling out with Anthony
Eden. Eden resigned from the cabinet on February 19, 1938,

51

over the issue of restoring more cordial relations with Italy.

 

”9327 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 164.

50Neville Chamberlain, In Search of_Peace (New York:
I. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 28.

51Of the several accounts of Eden's resignation, the
best is Lord Halifax's detailed "Record of Events Connected
with Anthony Eden's Resignation," a c0py of which can be
found in the Templewood Papers, General Political, X, 3. For
cabinet discussion on the matter see Cab 23/92 6(38)l, 7(38)l,
8(38)1.

 

 

I
l

 

349

A number of factors figured into Eden's resignation, inclu-
ding Eden's unwillingness to recognize the Italian conquest
of Abyssinia, which Chamberlain saw as essential to the
reestablishment of normal dealings with Rome but which Eden
Opposed as another blow to the League. Abyssinia was an
aspect of the differing views of the League maintained by
Chamberlain and Eden which made it difficult for the two men
to work together on foreign policy.

Before he resigned, Eden had an Opportunity in January
to make one final profession of faith to the League Council.
He reassured the Council that the British government:

consider that the League despite its existing
limitations is the best instrument which has
yet been devised for giving effect to the
principles of international co-operation and
they are therefore determined to keep it in
existence, to give it their full support, and
to make use of its machinery and procedure
to the ggllest extent that circumstances
permit.
The League by 1938 was beyond salvation by general professions
of faith, however, and the Committee of Twenty-eight recog-

nized as much in closing off its inconclusive discussions on

February 1.53 And any eXpectation that the issue could be

 

52There is a copy of Eden's speech to the Council on
January 27, 1938 at PO 371/22508 w1266/3/98.

53Lord Cranborne's reports on the meeting of the Committee
of Twenty-eight on January 31 and February 1, 1938 are at F0
371/22508 W1376/3/98 and W152h/3/98. Eden reported to the
cabinet on February 2 that "the general sentiment at Geneva
had been that on the subject of the future of the league of
Nations the less said the better." Cab 23/92 3(38)3.

 

350

revived and the League restored as an instrument of collective
security was effectively destroyed when Chamberlain pronounced
the League dead during the debate over Eden's resignation:

At the last election it was still possible

to hOpe that the League might afford collective

security. I believed it myself. I do not

believe it now.... I say we must not try to

delude ourselves, and still more, we must not

try to delude small weak nations into think-

ing that they will be protected by the League

against aggression and acting accordingly,

when we knfiw that nothing of the kind can be

expected.5

In dismissing the league as an instrument of collective

security, Chamberlain was merely drawing a conclusion which
had been evident since the end of 1935. It was not a conclu-
sion which was palatable to faithful supporters of the League,
but even they were hard pressed to maintain that the League
could handle the grave international problems on the horizon
at the beginning of 1938. As it develOped, Chamberlain's
concept of forthright discussion and appeasement of grievances
succeeded no better than the league had in preventing aggres-
sion. But he can hardly be faulted for failing to rely upon
the League. The League was moribund after the Abyssinian
crisis and, while the cabinet took some interest in reviving
it while there seemed a chance of drawing Termany back to
ieneva, it was evident from the outset that there was no

possibility of achieving significant, agreed reform of the

League. As to the conclusions which the government drew

 

54332 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 227.

 

351

from the consideration given to reform of the League, perhaps
the most significant, from a practical standpoint, was that
it is virtually impossible to revise a multilateral inter-
national agreement unless there is a prior consensus on
objectives. The League's experience with sanctions also
suggested that universality and commitment were essential

if the League was to exercise a police function. But unre-
stricted national sovereignty precluded full realization of
the ideal developed in the Covenant. If that fact was still
not evident to men such as Lord Robert Cecil and Anthony Eden,
it was an established precept in the cabinet room in London

after the departure of Eden.

BIBLIOG RAPH ICA I_ ESSAY

Bibliographical Essay

As with most recent studies of British policy during the
inter—war period, this study was made possible by the decision
of the British government in 1967 to reduce the period of
official documentation closed to scholars from fifty to thirty
years. That decision opened up the entire inter-war period
and offered scholars a vast new field of endeavor. Twentieth-
century cabinet and Foreign Office materials are housed by
the Public Record Office at its Portugal Street Annex, where
an efficient and knowledgeable staff provides the researcher
with easy access and sound advice. A complex system of
indexing Foreign Office documentation can present a problem
but is easily mastered. The documentation maintained by the
Public Record Office on the Abyssinian crisis presents the
student of British policy with an embarrassment of riches.

This study, which is essentially an analysis of policy
formulation at the cabinet level, depends heavily upon the
minutes of cabinet meetings, contained in the Cab 23 series,
and upon the papers prepared for cabinet consideration,
contained in the Cab 2h series. The basic F0 371 series
contains all of the extensive Foreign Office files on the
crisis. The Foreign Office files offer a wealth of detail

and were essential to this study on several points. Much

 

353

of the important Foreign Office analysis and information on
the Abyssinian crisis was drawn together and presented to

the cabinet in the Cab 2h series, however. A cabinet level
study of the crisis necessarily draws more from cabinet
minutes and cabinet papers than from Foreign Office files.

An assessment of the government's handling of the question

of League reform, on the other hand, must rest directly upon
the Foreign Office files since the cabinet gave over the task
of analysis and recommendation very largely to the Foreign
Office. The most important files on the question of League
reform are FO 371/20h72-20977, 212h2 and 22508. The Public
Record Office also maintains the valuable F0 800 series of
semi-official correspondence of leading Foreign Office
officials. Of intereSt to the student of the Abyssinian
crisis in the F0 800 series are the papers of Hoare, Cranborne
and Cadozan. The correspondence of Halifax is also included
in the F0 800 series but does not begin until he becomes
Foreign Secretary. Hoare's correspondence, with Eden in
particular, is essential to any study of British policy during

the crisis.

COpies of many of the items found in the FO 800/295 file
may also be found in the Templewood papers at the Cambridge
University Library. The Templewood papers cover the full
range of Hoare's public career and are predictably rich on
the Abyssinian crisis. The Baldwin papers, also at the Cam~
bridge University Library, are less useful. The Ealdwin

papers reflect the limited role which Ealdwin played in the

354

management of the Abyssinian crisis. Time did not permit the
consultation of the Vansittart papers at Cambridge. The
papers of Sir John Simon were consulted in the library of
the Institute of Historical Pesearch at the University of
London by permission of the present Viscount Simon. The
Simon papers are thin on the Abyssinian crisis but a diary,
maintained intermittently by Simon, did provide valuable
insight into Simon's point of view. There were two other
members of the cabinet whose papers would undoubtedly be of
considerable value to a study of British policy during the
Abyssinian crisis. Lut Iord Avon is still alive and has not
yet Opened his papers to researchers, who must make do with
his memoirs. And the papers of Neville Chamberlain were
similarly closed to scholars when the author was in Britain.
lord Robert Cecil and Professor lilbert Hurray were the
leaders of the effort on the part of the League of Nations
Union to push the government down the sanctions road. Their
papers offer an insight into the league movement in Britain
and the government's reaction to it. Lord Cecil's extensive
papers are well organized and managed by the British Museum.
The Gilbert Murray papers are in the Lodleian Library at Oxford
University and are provisionally organized but readily useable.
On the other side of the aisle, the most incisive critic of
Eritain's involvement in the league was Lord Lothian. The
lothian papers, at the Scottish Record Office in Edinburgh,

are full of debate among Lothian, Cecil, Murray and others

on the proper role of the League and Eritain's place in it.

355

Documentary collections treating Britain's role during
the abyssinian crisis are still very limited. Stephen Heald
did an excellent job of editing the published sources avail—
able at the time for the Royal Institute of International

Affairs in volume II of Documents on International_§ffairs,

 

1335 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937). The Foreign
Office published a limited selection of documents bearing on
the crisis in Cmd. SOMh, EthiOpia No. l (1935); Cmd. 5071,
Ethiopia No. l (1936); and Cmd. 5072, EthiOpia No. 2 (1936).
And there is information on British policy in the American

series Forpign Relations of the Uniteg_State§, in the French

 

series poouments diplomatigyes_francais, and in Qgcuments_gn

 

 

German_Fgreien Policy, l218—19h5 which was edited jointly in

 

the United States and Great Britain. The three volumes which
will cover the Abyssinian crisis in the british series

Documents on_British Foreign Policy,_lgl2:l9§2 are still

 

forthcoming but are eXpected soon.

Until the documentation from British archives appears in
print, scholars without ready access to the Public Record
Office will have to continue to depend, in part, upon a rich

trove of memoir literature. This literature adds a dimension
to the information available on policy formulation not found
in official documentation. Of the memoirs published by
Pritish participants in the Abyssinian drama lord Avon's

The Eden Memoirs. Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell,

 

1942) offers the most information. Eden draws directly upon

cabinet and Foreign Office files in deve10ping his full account

356

of the crisis, but his use of the evidence is very subjec—
tive and his account must be used with care. The same can

be said of Viscount Templewood's Nine Troubled Years (london:

 

Collins, 195a) in which Hoare develops a defense of his role
in the crisis. Hoare does not provide the detail that Eden
does, and his account is occasionally inaccurate on matters

of detail, but he does present a much clearer picture of the
concerns which weighed upon the cabinet than is to be found

in Eden's account. In contrast to the full accounts provided
by Eden and Hoare, Simon, the other Foreign Secretary involved
in the crisis, offers almost no information of value in his

memoirs, entitled Retrospect (london: HUtchinson, 1952).

 

Iord Halifax carried considerable weight in the cabinet on
foreign policy matters, but his memoirs, entitled Fulness

of Days (London: Collins, 1957), can be similarly dismissed
as thin and uninformative. The recollections of some of the
less important members of the cabinet, such as Lord Eustace

Percy's Some Memories (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958),

 

the Earl of Swinton's Sixty Years of Power (New York: James

 

H. Heinemann, 1967) and Alfred Duff Cooper's Old Men Forget

 

(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), are of limited but definite
value._ Of Foreivn Office figures Iord Vansittart's fih§_fii§t

Procession (london: Hutchinson, 1958) provides flashes of

 

illumination overlaid by Vansittart's ornate style. Sir

Maurice Peterson discusses his direct involvement in the

 

crisis in Both Sides of_the Curtain (london: Constable, 1950),

357
as does Sir 7eoffrey Thompson in Front-line Diplomat (Iondon:
Hutchison, 1959) but both accounts are rather thin.

Outside of the government, Thomas Jones may have
enjoyed the most privileged view of the development of
cabinet policy owing to his close friendship with Baldwin.
Jones' A Diary with letters1 1931-1950 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954) provides valuable insight into the
working of Baldwin's mind. Two of the keenest observers of
the debate in Parliament over Abyssinia and the League were
Ieo Amery and Harold Nicolson. Both sat on the government
backbenches but were possessed of independent minds. Nicol—

son was a first-rate diarist whose Diaries and Letters, 1930-

 

1929, edited by his son Nigel (New York: Atheneum, 1966)
capture the flavor of the crisis. Amery was a persistent
critic of Britain's involvement in the league, and the third

volume of his memoirs, entitled My Political life: The Unfog:

 

giving Years (london: Hutchinson, 1955), treats the crisis

 

from that point of view. At the other extreme, Iord Cecil of
Chelwood offers a different indictment of the government in

A Great Experiment (london: Cape, l9hl) and in All the Way

 

 

(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 19h9). The league of Nations
Union's point of View can also be found in Lord Allen of Hurt-

wood's papers, edited by Martin Gilbert as Plough My Own

 

.EBEEQE (London: Longmans, ireen, 1965). And for an insider's

view of deve10pments at Geneva, A. C. Temperley's The Whisper-

 

inggGallery_gf_Eurooe (london: Collins, 1939) is valuable.

 

358
For the details of the Italian management of the diplo-
matic aspects of the Abyssinian crisis, iaron Pompeo Aloisi's
Journal,_25gfiuillet l932-lu juin 1936 translated by Maurice
Vaussard (Paris: Iibrairie Plon, 1957) is essential. Emilio

De Eono outlines the planning for conquest in Anno XIIII:

 

the Conqugst ofyan Empire (London: the Cresset Press, 1937),

 

 

and Pietro Badoglio's The War in Abyssinia (London: Methuen,

 

1937) takes up the story of the Italian campaign in Abyssinia
where De Eono leaves off. Count Ciano was privy to much that
went on in Rome and Abyssinia, but Ciano's Diplomatic Papers,
edited by Kalcolm Muggeridge (london: Odhams, l9h8), is of
little use on the Abyssinian crisis.

The Diary of Pierre Iaval (New York: Scribner's, l9h8)

 

does not unlock the mystery of his motives or his character.
A number of French memoirs do shed light on the quandry in
which the French government found themselves during the
Abyssinian crisis. Among the most important of the French

memoirs are Charles de Chambrun, Traditions et souveniers

 

(Paris: Flammarion, 1952), Pierre-Ettienne Flandin, Pglitique

 

Francaise, 1919—12g9 (Paris: Nouvelles, l9b7), Edouard Herriot,

 

Jadis, II: D’une_guerre a fautre, l9lhtl93§ (Paris: Flammarion,

1952) and Ieneral Maurice Yamelin, Servir: Ie Prologue du

 

grame, lao—gofitmiggg (Paris: Plon, 19%).

 

The other primary sources essential to a study of british
policy during the Abyssinian crisis and after are the Parlia:
mgntary ngates of the House of Commons and the House of Iords,

published in the fifth series of Hansard, and the records of

359
the league Council and Assembly, published in the League's

Official Journal. Public Opinion during the crisis must be

 

measured in good part by consulting the British daily press
and periodic journals. The quality London papers, such as

The Times, the Dailyygglgggaph, the Daily Herald and the

 

News Chroniclg were particularly important in that they,

 

along with the Manchester “uardian, did much to shape and

 

reflect informed Opinion. The best barometer Of the Opinions
and aspirations of league supporters in Britain was the
journal Of league Of Nations Union, Headway.

Of the extensive secondary literature which exists on
the Abyssinian crisis and the British role in it, it is
safe to say that the best books have yet to be published.
F. w. Deakin is working on a study of the Abyssinian question
in Anglo-Italian relations during the inter-war period. And
Esmonde Robertson is preparing a multi-archival study Of
Mussolini's foreign policy. Until these new studies appear,
the best overall treatment of the Abyssinian crisis will

remain Arnold Toynbee's Abyssinia 3Q§,L3%l2o published as

 

volume II Of the Royal Institute of International Affairs'

Survey Of International_Affairs, 1935 (1936). H. V. Hodson

 

contributed a useful chapter on "The economic aspects of the
Italo-Abyssinian conflict" to Professor Toynbee's study.
Toynbee did a remarkable job of pulling together the available
information at the time, but the study is necessarily provi—
sional and marred by Toynbee's emotional involvement with

the question. Seorge W. Baer has written a more Objective

360

assessment of The Coming of the Italian-EthiOpian War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), but his study,
while useful, perpetuates many of the usual misconceptions
about British policy. It is to be hOped that Professor Eaer
will take advantage of the Opening of the Eritish archives to
continue his study through the Abyssinian conflict in a more
balanced fashion.

Among the Older accounts of the crisis, perhaps the most
succinct and valuable as an introduction is in 3. M. Cathorne-
Hardy's A_Short Historyof Intggnational Affairsy_1920_jo 1938
(London: Oxford University Press, 1938). Sathorne—Hardy
condemns British policy in fairly standard terms, but his
account is more dispassionate than Toynbee's and is at a

distant remove from diatribes such as "Cato's" Guilty Men

 

(New York: Frederick A. Stokes, l9h0) and "vigilantes'"

Why We Are Iosing the Peace (london: Victor fiollancz, 1939).

 

Two recent surveys Of the Abyssinian crisis do little to shed

additional light on the subject. Frank Hardie's The Abyssinian

 

Crisis (London: E. T. Eatsford, 1974) focuses on British
policy and draws upon cabinet materials but is little more
than a chronicle. James Dugan and Taurence Lafore's_Days of

Emperor and Clown (New York: Doubleday, 1973) is a disappoin-

 

ting updating Of the standard interpretation which rests

largely upon secondary materials and focuses more on the

fighting in Abyssinia than on the diplomatic background.
The best recent study devoted solely to the war itself

is Angelo Del Boca's The Ethiopian War; 1235-l9fll translated

 

361

by P. D. Cummins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

A. J. Barker's The Civilizingmmissiog (New York: Dial, 1968)

 

is less reliable. An important assessment Of the military
view Of the crisis from London is Arthur Marder's "The Royal

Navy and the EthiOpian Crisis of 1935-36," American Historical

 

figyigw, IXXV, 5 (June 1970), pp. 1327-56.
Biographies are important for information on the role
and attitude Of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain
during the Abyssinian crisis. Neither Baldwin nor Chamberlain
wrote memoirs. There is, unfortunately, still no satisfactory

A.

biography of Baldwin. :. M. Young's Stanlgy Baldwin (London:

 

Hart-Davis, 1952) is a curiously unsympathetic authorized
biography. H. Montgomery Hyde's Baldwin (london: Hart-Davis,
Macfibbon, 1973) is a traditional life and times rather than

a political biography. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, on

the other hand, went through an enormous amount Of material

to prepare the type of study that is needed but they apparently
did so in great haste and their Balgflip (Iondon: Weidenfeld

and Nicolson, 1969) is full of errors. It is particularly
unreliable on the Abyssinian crisis. Neville Chamberlain, by
contrast, has been much better served by his biographers.

Keith Feiling's gfie life of Neville Chamberlain (Iondon: Mac-

 

millan, l9h6) is excellent, given the limited material avail-
able to the author. He did not have access to governmental
archives nor to several private collections which have Opened
since l9h6, but he made good use of the access which he was

granted to Chamberlain's papers. His is an authorized

352

biography, and hence sympathetic, but fundamentally sound.

Iain Nacleod'slfigyille Chamberggip.(London: Frederick Muller,

 

1961) is also good but adds little to Feiling's account. A
new biography Of Chamberlain incorporating the materials
recently made available, is being prepared by David Dilks

and Alan Beattie. David Carlton is doing the same thing for
Lord Avon, who sorely needs a good biographer. Alan Campbell-

Johnson's Sir Anthony Eden (Iondon: Robert Hale, 1955) and

 

Randolph Churchill's The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthgnngdgn

 

(london: Macgibbon and Kee, 1959) do not begin to take the
measure of the man and his impact on foreign policy. The
career of Iord Halifax also needs to be studied. The Earl
of Birkenhead's Halifax (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965) is
the work of a friend rather than a scholar. Ian Colvin's
biography of Vansittart, entitled in its American version

None SO Blind (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965)

 

and published in Britain as Vansittart in Offigg, is the

 

type of biography which could be usefully done on many of
the leading advisers of the National government. Stephen
Roskill's multi-volume treatment of the career of Lord

Hankey, Hankey Man of Secgets (3 vols. London: Collins,

 

1970—7u), is setting a standard for such biographies which
will be hard to match. Biographies Of Iord Cecil and fiilbert
Murray are needed and are being prepared by Professors R. N.
Swift and F. West respectively. A good biooraphy of the
principal intellectual adversary Of Cecil and Murray is

J. R. N. Butler's Iord Iothian (London: Macmillan, 1960).

 

353
Piographies are also of some use in determining what
was happening in Paris, Rome, “eneva and Addis Ababa.
leonard Mosley has written a readable biography of Haile

§§l3§§i§i_The Conquering Lion (Iondon: Weidenfeld and Nicol-

 

son, lQFh). The thesis of James Earros' study of Avenol's
role as Secretary-Ceneral of the league is evident in the

title: Betrayal From Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary—General

 

of_the league of Nations, l93jelgh0 (Iondon: Yale University

 

 

Press, 1949). Ivonne Kirkpatrick's Mussolini: A Study in
_Pgwgr (New York: Hawthorn, 196h) is one of the better treat-
ments of i1 Duce's checkered career. Alfred Mallet's ffiggge
layal (2 vols. Paris: Dumont, 1955) and Hubert Cole's Iayal
(New York: Putnam, 19(3) do not answer all of the questions
posed by Iaval's role in the Abyssinian crisis.

For an understanding of the pivotal position of France
during the Abyssinian crisis, the best studies are Franklin

D. Iaurens, France and the_Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1925-193‘

 

 

(The Hague: Mouton, 1967) and Arnold Wolfers' older but still

very useful Britain and F;ance_between Two Wars (New York:

 

 

Harcourt, Brace, l9h0). And for a general feel for French
tradition and policy, D. W. Brogan's Th§_DeveloDment of Modern

France,_lBZO-19§2 (Iondon: Hamish Hamilton, 19uo) remains a

 

standard work. Of the studies which focus on other countries,

Erice Harris Jr's Tbs United States and the Itglojgthiopian

 

Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, lQFu) is a mono—
graph which lays out American policy effectively. luigi

Villari's Italian Foreign_Policy_Unde§_Hu§solini (New York:

 

 

 

352:

Devin-Adair, 1956) is a sympathetic account of limited use.
And Nicholas Mansergh treats the impact of the Abyssinian

crisis on the British Commonwealth in an impressive fashion

 

-..-s.— .—

 

§£I§£E%1.E9liCXn.1231;1222 (Iondon: Oxford University Press,
1952).

Alfred Zimmern's The league of Nations and the Rul_ f

-..-..—

 

law, 1218—1235 (London: Macmillan, 1935) is an essential

primer on the league, and F. P. Walters' A History of thg

 

leaguefiof Nations (2 vols. london: Oxford University Press
1952) provides the best overview of the league and the impact
of the Abyssinian crisis. Walters was, however, a senior
official of the league, and his account, which is critical

of British policy, reflects his background. Walters' account
compares favorably with very partisan pieces, such as Robert
new general treatment of the league is needed. Neither George

Scott's The Rise andeall of the League of Nations (London:

 

 

Hutchinson, 1973) nor Elmer Bendiner's A Timg_For Angels

 

(New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1975) does much to fill that need.

A few of the monographs and articles which treat limited
aspects of the Abyssinian crisis are of particular use to the
student of British foreign policy. Dame Adelaide living—

stone's The Peace Ballot: The Official History (london:

 

 

Victor Collancz, 1935), Pitman B. Potter's The WalflWal

 

Arbitration (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, 1938), Helen Hiett's, "Public Opinion and the Italo-

 

365

Ethiopian Dispute: The Activity of Private Organizations in

the Crisis," ngeva Special Studies, VII, 1 (Geneva: Geneva

 

Research Center, 1934), and Mario Toscano's "Eden's Mission
to Rome on the Eve of the Italo-EthiOpian Conflict," in

Studies in Diplomatic Histo£y_and Historiography in Honour

 

 

of g, P. Gooch, C.~§. A. O. Sarkissian ed. (New York: Barnes

 

and Noble, 1962) fall into that category.

Finally, an understanding of British policy during the
Abyssinian crisis depends upon a grasp of the hold which the
league idea had on the pOpular imagination in Britain and a
comprehension of the general search for peace and security
which grew out of the experience of the First World War.

Charles Ioch Mowat's Britain Between_the Wars, l91§;l9h0

 

(Iondon: Nethuen, 1955) is a good place to start for an under-
standing of inter war Britain. A. J. P. Taylor's English

History, 191U-19h5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955)

 

is provocative, and useful as such. W. N. Nedlicott's British

Foreign Policy Since yersailles, 1Ql9—1963 (Iondon: Nethuen,

 

19F8) and F. S. Northedge's The Troubled Giant. Britain Among

 

the Great Powers, 1316-1932 (New York: Frederick A. Prager,

 

1956) are sound surveys of British foreign policy which out—
line the problems facing British policy-makers during the
inter war period and also draw the conclusions possible from
the available research. Both surveys are refreshingly free
of traditional misconceptions about British policy. John F.
Naylor does a good job of deve10ping the confusion of the

British Labour movement on foreign policy issues during the

366
1930's in Labour's International Policy: The Labour Party
in the 1930's (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969). And

 

H. R. Winkler traces "The deve10pment of the League of

Nations idea in Great Britain, 191h-1919," in the Journal of

 

Modern History, XX (June 19h8), pp. 95-112. ChristOpher
Thorns sets the immediate background for the Abyssinian crisis
with a masterly treatment of the Manchurian crisis in The
Limits of Foreign Policy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972).

F. H. Hinsley illuminates the undue eXpectations created by
the establishment of the League in Power and the Pursuit of
Iggagg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). And

Martin Gilbert's The Roots of Appeasement (London: Weiden-

 

feld and Nicolson, 1966) does an excellent job of establishing
the climate of Opinion in which the British government worked,

and of which they partook.

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