A CASE STUDY OF THE SPEAKING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ’ UN - AMERICAN ACTIVITIES: THE SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS, MAY, 1960 ‘ Thesis for the Degree Of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ' ROBERT L. SMITH 1958 Iiuuul tiara. 4 1.132.412 r "" ' Lficlfigar ‘“ j ‘ Univcxsxcy This is to certify that the thesis entitled A Case Study of the Speaking of the House Committee on Un-American Activities: The San Francisco Hearings, presented by M av , 19 6 0 Robert L. Smith has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Speech 8 Theatre Date November ' 0-169 I ABS NOT A CASE STUDY OF THE SPEAKING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON {IN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES: THE SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS, MAY, 1.960 by Robert L. Smith The purpose of this study was to examine the speech practices of the House Comittee on (In-American Activities during its public hearings on comunism at San Francisco in May, 1960. It sought to analyze the speaking methods employed by the co-ittee as these methods are revealed in the official hearing transcript. The analytical focus was twofold: first, assessment of the relationship between the conittee's speech methods and its legislative purposes; and second, malysis and evaluation of the quality of the co-ittee's workmanship as a speaker. Determination of the quality of the comittee's workmanship included consideration of its methods of inquiry, choice and treatment of topics and issues. pattern of arrangement, argmentative methods, style, and its adherence to sound ethical principles. Fur- ther, each of the foregoing elements was examined in the light of its impact upon the co-nittee's source credibility. A brief history of the comittee from 1938 to 1960, with special emphasis upon its methods and procedures was Robert L. Smith developed which details the major factors which contributed to the maintenance of its public image of controversiality. Relevant legal, legislative, and procedural variables which influence the co-ittee's behaviors are also explicated, as well as the pertinent social-political factors which com- bined to create the climate of opinion in which the com- mittee did its speaking at San Francisco in May, 1960. Two major conclusions arose from the study. First, the hearings were not inquiry, and therefore had no demon- strable relevance to the co-ittee's sole legal purpose, that of obtaining factual information for the purpose of framing legislation. The study concluded that (l) the hearings were marked by extensive use of fallacious reason- in; based upon misinterpreted evidence which resulted in the developent of frequent irrational lines of argument and conclusions; (2) the hearings were not a truth-seeking instruent relative to the existing state of Conunist Party activity in the Northern'nistrict of California and the probable effects of instituting particular legislative provisions; (3) the hearings were not a rational exploration of competing ideas presented by the witnesses who appeared before the co-ittee; (It) the hearings were developed pri- marily through the use of m ineffectual interrogative method, the asking of inappropriate questions which elicited few relevant and/or rational answers from the forty-six wit- nesses; and (5) the hearings generally were an imprecise and Robert L. Smith irrelevant speculative discussion having little pertinence to the formulation of legislative solutions to any problems which may be created by any subversive activities of the Mist rarty in the United States. Second, the San Francisco hearings constituted a speech of advocacy by the thtee in which it demonstrated its unwillingness and/or inability to adapt its ideas effec- tively to those of the major segment of its i-ediate audience. The study revealed that: (l) the lines of thought developed by the co-ittee were not germane to its central idea (com- munism is a greater threat to the internal security of the United States than ever before); (2) nearly all of its arguc- ments were specious because they were undergirded by fre- quently fallacious reasoning based upon unreliable and/or inadequate evidence; (3) the pattern of arrangement was essentially deductive, and therefore contributed to the didactic tone of the speech; (it) the co-ittee's speaking style, although generally clear, forceful and vivid, pro- bably weakened the credibility of its case .ong the largely hostile audience at sen hancisco because it lacked more moderate and temperate qualities conducive to diluting negative attitudes toward itself and its ideas; and (5) the eo-ittee ' s speaking revealed an apparent disregard for a sound code of ethics for oral co-unicators in a free society. A.CASE STUDY OF THE SPEAKING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNnAMERICANIACTIVITIES: THE SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS, MAY, 1960 3! 00 Robert 1.. Smith .A THESIS Suhitted to Michigan State university in partial fulfilhment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR or PHILOSOEH! Department of Speech and Theatre 1968 Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech and Theatre, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. 0W0 62W ector of Thesis Guidance Committee: (::’oai’%%n Chairman ACKNOWIEDGMEN '1‘ With deepest appreciation to the other person who made the completion of this study possible, my wife. ii TABIEOFCCNTSNTS Page WWTOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOii Chapter I. THERMANDPWOSEOFTHESTIDY ......I Introduction Purpose of the Study Limitations of the Study Justification of the Study Methodology of the Study Resources and Materials of the Study Plan of the Study 11o CGGRESSImAI. INVESTIGATIONS AND THE HOUSE OWNER 0N UN-nAMERICAN ACTIVITIES: AN Omnwooeooeoosoooeoossssz“ De;elopent of Congressional Investigating ower The House Co-ittee on Uzi-American Activi- ties: Its Origin and Development 111. ms 1960 am morsco HEARINGS: cmsrumrs or ran cmzcsnon srmrrou . . . . . . . .31 The Climate of Opinion The Legislative Constituents The Tarticipants in the Hearings IV. THE ISSUES OF THE 1960 SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS: THEROLEOPDIAIBCTIC ...........122 The Issues Topics and the Role of Dialectic V. THBROIIOPRHBTCRIC INTI-IE 19603»! M01800 HEARINGS....o....q........l93 Standards of Critici- iii iv Chapter Page Communication.!urposes of the HCUA at San Francisco The HCUA, Its.Audiences, and Its Speaking VI. SMARYANDCCNCLUSIONS ........... 32‘; Summary Conclusions APTENDIX o o e o s . . a . s o o . . s o a o e o e o e 333 BIMWOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO339 CHAPTER I THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY Introduction The climate of controversy in which the House Committee on Uh-American Activities has operated since its inception in 1938 is characterized by one of the leading students and critics of the committee in the following terms 3 No Congressional investigating committee in history has provoked more controversy or criticism than has the Un~American.Activities Committee of the House of Representatives. No such committee has been more bitterly attacked or more vigorously defended. To some.Americans it has constituted one of the gravest threats to civil liberty our nation has ever known; in less than a.decade it has managed to create and impose a loyalty standard upon the nation that has dangerously narrowed our traditional freedoms of thought, expression, and association. To other Americans the committee has been our chief bulwark against subversion; almost singlehandedly it has saved the nation against enslavement by the Communists.1 .Although few informed persons would deny the legiti- macy of the congressional investigatory power, many students of Congress have contributed to the mountain of criticism 1Robert K.. Carr, The House Committee on Uhquerican IActivities, 19u5- 1950 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 2 which has been directed at Congressional investigations during our nation's history.2 Moreover, the chief tar- get of much of the criticism has been the House Committee on UnsAmerican.Activities. That the House Committee has attracted the greatest amount of attention and criticism 3 should come of any Congressional investigating committee as no surprise, wrote Carr, who contends that "the use of the investigating power of Congress to search for evidence of subversive activity is bound to produce an explosive result."u Attacks on Congressional investigations since l9h0, especially those which have been directed at the behaviors of the House Committee on UnaAmerican Activities, have focussed primarily on the methods and procedures used, charging that these methods and procedures constitute an invasion of individual rights.5 These attacks have come, to a large extent, "from bar associations, newspaper editors, leaders of civic groups, and members of Congress."6 Galloway 2See three general studies of the investigating power of Congress. These are E. J. Eberling, Con ressional Investi ations (New York: Columbia University Press, 19285; M. E E C . Dimoc , o ressional Investi atin Committees (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins Press, 19295; and M. . McGeary, $22. Developments g£_Congressiona1 Investigative Power (New York: Co um ia University ress, 4 . 3David Fellman, The Defendant's Rights (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., I9555, p. 539. “Carr, The House Committee 22_UnaAmerican.Activi- ties, 1945-1950, p. 5. 5George B. Galloway, "Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms,“ University g£_Chicago Law Review, XVIII (1951) , p. I+90. “'— 61bid. 3 summarizes the main points of the attacks in the following way: They Ehe investigations) can assume the aspects of a trial without the safeguards to the individual of regular court proceedings; that legislators appear in the role of judges and combine the functions of prosecuting and judging which should be separated; that as a result of the publicity of committee hearings witnesses may be exposed to such penalties as dismissal from their jobs, loss of pension pay- ments, character assassination, or injury to their reputations; that exposure through public hearings can be substituted, in certain types of cases, for regulation by law, enforced by the courts; that this process of control by exposure before an investigating committee is not subject to special rules of procedure laid down by Congress; that the legal rights of individuals, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, are in practice abridged by congressional investigations; and that conformity t9 prevailing ideas is enforced by fear of censure. Studies of Congressional investigating committee-- their methods and proceduresu-by political scientists are numerous and useful. However, except for incidental comments and descriptions about speech behaviors in political~ sociological studies of Congressional investigating committees, few studies have been undertaken which have had as their chief focus a systematic examination of the rhetorical and dialectical methods employed.8 Justice Fortes, for example, in l95h, published an essay in which many of the practices of investigating committees were treated somewhat as the speech critic might view them. He describes the "daisy- 7 . Galloway University 2; Chicago Law Review xvm (1951), p. uéo. "" " 8See discussion of related studies included under "Justification of the Study" covered later in this chapter. 4 chain technique" of guilt by mere association, "guilt by confusion" (e.g. publicly naming a person against whom there is no substantial evidence along with a list of known Communists), use of the "sliding word" (e.g. using a charge of membership in a front organization as a charge of Communism), and "the vendetta."9 A second example will suffice to illustrate that the extent to which the rhetorical and dialectical procedures of Congressional investigating committees have been studied has been both limited and superficial; and, significantly, these two examples also strongly suggest the possibilities for and the potential meaning- fulness of such a systematic study. A professor of social science played the role of rhetorical critic when he wrote: In the tense atmosphere of the legislative investigation, where accumulated passions are released' against potential or imagined enemies, each accusingly worded question or hostilely intended general statement sets the stage for more bitter accusations and more violent denun- ciation. The pattern of discourse already too prevalent in American political life--that a point cannot be made unless it is overstresaed and reiterated in the strongest possible terms-- has been further developed by congressional investigations and made into the standard currency of American legislative and political argument. Legislators who feel relatively little animosity against their opponents use this language because QAbe Fortes, "Abusive Practices of Investigating Committees," Notre Dame Lawyer XXIX (195h), pp. 192-212. 5 it has become a convention of their profession or because to be heard in the clamor of sensa- tional words, they too must speak sensationally.10 Purpose _£_the Study In view of the frequent and severe criticism which has been directed at Congressional investigations, and in particular that criticism which has been leveled at the methods and procedures used by the House Committee on Un- American.Activities, it seems worthwhile to subject the HCUAll to analysis from a rhetorical and dialectical point of view. The focus of the study will be confined to a critical examination of the public hearings on Communism which were conducted by the committee at San Francisco in May, 1960. Because the committee's membership "is rela- tively stable, its leaders men of long committee tenure, it has a continuous group life of its own."12 In spite of the pressure from the House whose creature it is, the com- mittee is worth studying as a human communications group in its own right. "The public hearing is only a part of the activity of a committee, but it is an important and often revealing part.”13 1oEdwardA. Shils, "Congressional Investigations: The Legislator and His Environment," University2£.Chicagg Law Review XVIII (1951), p. 583. 11Hereinafter abbreviation for the House Committee on Unquerican.Activiti s will be used. 12Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," American Political Science Review XXXXVIII (195“), p. 3h . 131bid. 6 The official transcript of the public hearings conducted by the HCUA at San Francisco in 1960 represents an adequate and readily accessible record,14 and appears to lend itself to such a rhetorical and dialectical study. Furthermore, in the light of the extensive criticism against the committee which alleges its failure to adhere to its legally constituted purpose-~"to diagnose diseases of the body politic, and to provide the factual basis for informed legislative policymaking"15--it is reasonable, and perhaps significant, to assume that a study of the dia- lectical and rhetorical methods employed by the HCUA in its hearings should reveal, to some extent, whether the committee does or does not violate its legislative purpose. It is fair to assume that an analysis of the communicative purposes and methods revealed by a study of the hearing transcript should result in a clearer understanding of the relationship of the HCUA's procedures and methods to its purposes. More specifically, the study will focus on: (1) an identification of the issues dealt with by the HCUA in its 1960 public hearings at San Francisco; (2) an analysis and evaluation of those issues in the light of their relevance to the legislative and communicative purposes of the HCUA; ”The public hearings of the ucus were held on May 12, 13, 11+, and June 10, 1960. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, The; Northern California District 2f_ the Communist Party: Structure- ‘Objectives-Leaaership, SKEh Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, pp. 1921- 240“. Hereinafter cited. as San Francisco Hearings. See Carr, lune House Committee gg'Un-American AcEIVIties, l9 5-1950, p- 321 CquoteT. _ 15Telford Taylor, Grand Inguest (New York: Ballan- tJLne Books, 1955), p. 279. 7 (3) an identification and analysis of the dialectical and rhetorical practices employed by the HCUA in its 1960 hearings; and (4) an interpretation and evaluation of the dialectical and rhetorical methods as they relate to the procedural and legal criteria under which the committee is supposed to operate. Limitations g£.the Study Three major limitations have been placed on the study. First, from a practicability standpoint, any attempt to study the HCUA in its entirety would be a life- time task. To illustrate the massive proportions of such a comprehensive task, one need only point to the fact that, from 1938 to 1961, the HCUA had subpenaed more than 5,000 witnesses and had published more than 50,000 pages of hearings and reports.16 Even the three major studies of the HCUA as a political organism narrowed their focus considerably.17 Second, a limitation is imposed because only certain types of materials and documents concerning the activities of the HCUA are available. These materials include the tran- scripts and records of the public hearings conducted by the 16Frank J. Donner, The Uh-Americans (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961), p. 9. 17See August Raymond Ogden, TEE-Dies Committee (washington: The Catholic University of America FFess, 19#5); and Carr's, Thg_House Committee 22_Un-Americag.Activitigg, l9#5-1950, previously cited; also see Walter Goodmanrs‘Thg Comittee: T33 Extraordinar Career 2; _t_h_e_ House Committee 22_Un-American.ActiVities (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, I968). 8 committee, as well as published reports by the HCUA which are available from the Government Printing Office. Records of the executive sessions conducted by the committee and accounts of the actual investigative research process are not available.18 The final limitation concerns the rationale for selecting the 1960 San Francisco hearings as the focal point for this study. There are at least four reasons which tend to justify the selection of these hearings as the "case" for study: (1) the high degree of controversy engendered by the hearings, both at the site of the hearings 19 (2) the fact that the San and throughout the nation; Francisco hearings may be classified as representative of the HCUA's postdworld War II investigations, in the sense that the committee was once again endeavoring to uncover information concerning Communist activity in the United States; (3) the fact that the HCUA sustained unusually adverse criticism of the methods it allegedly used in the 18U.S., Congress, House, The House Committee 25. Un-American Activities; What I; ;s_--What I; Does, 56th Czng., Tat Sess., I955, p. I8. 198cc any newspaper published during and imme- diately following the dates of the San Francisco hearings. The film entitled "Operation Abolition" which contends that demonstrations by college students and others at the 1960 San Francisco hearings of the HCUA were Communist inspired and led was commissioned by the HCUA, and it was included as part of the official record of the hearings. According to Bradley S. Greenberg's "Operation Abolition vs. Operation Correction," reported in AV Communication Review, XI (May-June, 1963), pp. #0-46,-“No other single nonentertainment film in the last decade has generated the controversy or the audience of '0peration.Abolition.'" 9 1960 San Francisco hearings;20 and (4) the fact that the 1960 hearings represented the fourth time in eight years that the committee had visited San Francisco to conduct hearings on Communism. Justification gf the Study Government in a free society is often referred to as a "government by talk." Certainly inquiry and advocacy are essential to the maintenance of a free society, and both of these tools combine to form the primary method of problem-solving in a national demo- cratic society wherein the means of deliberation is considered at least as important as the end product. It therefore seems appropriate to devote attention and study to this dimension of the legislative process: the Con- gressional investigating committee hearings. Considering that the significant decision-making in the national legislature more often than not occurs at the Congressional committee level,21 and considering the rhetorical and dialectical nature of this deliberative process, a study such as this seems justified. In addition to the relevance of this study to the field of speech, the significance of the legislative purpose 20See Donner, The Un-Americans, pp. 98-147. 21 . . See Bertram M. Cross, The Le islative Struggle: §,Study $2.80cial Combat (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com- pany, Inc., T9535, pp. 284-336. 10 and behavior of the HCUA is relevant to all Americans. In view of the sophisticated strategies and grave threats posed by those who would supplant a free society with some less desirable form of government, the need to conduct inquiries into subversive activities for legitimate legislative pur- poses is evident. Moreover, the potential threat to the basic freedoms of the members of a free society which is manifest in any legislative investigation of "uh-American activities" accentuates the importance of an understanding of the HCUA and its behavior. Thus the significance of the potential effects of the behavior of the HCUA provides a second justification for a study of this kind. .A third justification is the lack of previous research in the precise area of the study. .Although other related studies of congressional debate have been done, they have tended to focus primarily or exclusively on debating in the united States Senate, and have not had as their pur- pose an analysis of congressional hearings.22 Several examples of other types of congressional studies will clarify the point. 22Two closely related studies, one completed in 1955, and the other "in progress" in 1965, are, respectively: Hermann Stelzner, "Methods of Chairman Joseph R. McCarthy in the Voice of America Hearings, 1953“ (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Illinois, 1955); and B. Scott Bryce, "A.Rhetorical Study of the Kefauver Crime Investigations," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1965). ll Pressley McCoy studied Senate debates on diplo- matic recognition of the Soviet Union.23 His study developed the historical background of the debates, provided biogra- phical information about principal participants in the debates, and analyzed three debates with special attention to major and minor issues and classifications of affirmative and negative arguments under each issue. Naomi Wrage did a study of representative anti-war arguments in congressional debates.2u She arranged arguments as material ggpgi_in catalogue form, and compared the similarities and differ- ences in the lines of argument advanced in different his- torical periods. Giraud Chester's study of Senate debate on the selective service bill of 194025 was intended to describe the functions of Senate debate, to examine and analyze the speaking techniques, and to evaluate the effec- tiveness of debate in the Senate. The general conclusions of Chester's study are reported in a published article, 23Pressley McCoy, "An Analysis of Debates on Recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the U.S. Senate, 1917-1934 (unpublished.Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954). 2l‘Naomi‘Wrage, "A Study of Representative Anti- War Arguments Presented in Congressional Debates During Specified Periods between 1809 and 1941" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1946). 25Giraud Chester, "The Senate Debate on the Selective Service Bill of 1940" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1943). 12 26 "Contemporary Senate Debate: A Case Study." Ralph .Mdcken's study of Senate debate on the League of Nations27 provided a summary and selected texts of speeches in the debate as well as a critical analysis of the debate. Micken discusses the use of strategy in the debate in his article, "The Triumph of Strategy in the Senate Debate on the League of Nations," in Th2.9uarterly Journal 2£_ Speech.28 Stanley Rives, in his study of the congressional hearings and debates on the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, examines the relationship which existed between the dia- lectical and rhetorical procedures which were employed during the congressional deliberations.29 He concluded that a demonstrable relationship existed between the two procedures. In addition to the theses and dissertations noted above, several articles and abstracts have been 26Giraud Chester, "Contemporary Senate Debate: A.Case Study " uarterl Journal gf'Spgech XXXI (December 1945), pp. shirt—“‘1. _._.._... ' 27Ralph Micken, "A.Rhetorical Study of Senate Debate on the League of Nations" (unpublished Ph.D. dis- sertation, Northwestern University, 1948). 28Ra1phMicken, "The Triumph of Strategy in the Senate Debate on the League of Nations," Quarterly Journal 2;,Spgech XXXVII (February, 1941), pp. 49-53. 29Stanley G. Rives, "Dialectic and Rhetoric in Congress: A Study of Congressional Consideration of the Labor-Management'Relations Act of 1947" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern university, 1963). 13 30 written on congressional debating. Robinson and Mc- Pherson31 published articles which dealt with questions concerning accuracy of the reporting of congressional speaking. Kirt Montgomery's study of Thomas B. Reed re- ported in Spgech Monographs provides additional insight into the qualities of an effective congressional debater.32 Finally, IQEDQuarterlz Journal g§_Speech symposium on the ~ ArnyéMcCarthy hearings illustrates some of the methods of congressional inquiry through hearings.33 A final justification pertains to the use of the case study approach. ,Auer3# points out that the case study is somewhat similar to, but properly distinguished from, the institutional history and the history of ideas. He describes the case study as "an intensive, even microscopic, 35 investigation . . . of an individual 'case'." He concludes that ”the case studied in our field [81% might be a speech, 3oZonRobinson, "Are Speeches in Congress Reported Accurately?" Quarterly Journal 2£.SEeech XXVIII (February, 1942), pp. 8-120 31Elizabeth McPherson, "Reporting the Debates of Congress," anrterlz Journal g£_Speech XXVIII (April, 1942), 32Kirt Montgomery, "Thomas B. Reed's Theory and Practice of Congressional Debating," Beech Monographs XVII (February, 1955), pp. 65-7“. 33Frederick Haberman and others, "Views on the Army- McCarthy Hearings," Quarterly Journal g£_Speech XLI (Feb- ruary, 1955), pp. 1-13. 3"J. Jeffery Auer, Ar; Introduction to Research ill Speech (New York: Harper & Brothers,"1959), p. 170. 35Ibid. 14 a play, or any other act (or cluster of acts) of communi- cation, about which we would gather all available information, trying to create the most complete picture possible of that act in its setting, and establishing the broadest base pos- sible for interpreting it."36 Examples of case studies in rhetorical criticism are not uncommon. The Chester and Rives' studies, referred to previously, utilized the case study method.37 Likewise, Robert Oliver's study of Roosevelt's speech.38 Gale Richard's study of John.Marshall's congressional speech on 39 Jonathan Robbins, and,more recently, Gordon Hyde's analysis of Peter Marshall's washington preaching are examples of the case study approach as applied to rhetorical criticism.“o Finally, in support of the use of the case study approach in this analysis of the hearings of the HCUA, the writer would point to Croft's soundly based recommendation "that 36Ibid. 37See footnotes 26 and 29, previously cited. 38Robert T. Oliver, "The Speech that Established Roosevelt's Reputation," Quarterly Journal p§DSppech XXXI (1945). pp. 272-282. 396ale.1u Richards, "A.Case Study in Deliberative Persuasion: John Marshall's Congressional Speech on Jona- than Robbins," Speech Monographs XXI (195“), pp. 25h-266. quordonfiMahlon Hyde, "A Case Study.Approach to the Rhetorical Analysis of the Washington Preaching of Dr. Peter Marshall," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963). 15 interpretative or evaluative studies following the line suggested in this article can be managed only on subjects of limited scope."41 Providing another kind of justification for the case study of the speech phenomena of the congressional committee hearing are a number of empirically tested assumptions and hypotheses about the nature and functions of the congres- sional standing committee and its public hearings. Two widely supported assumptions concerning the two major functions of the congressional standing committee clearly imply the essentiality of the tools of rhetoric and dialectic in the process necessary for the fulfillment of these functions. The first assumption stresses "the committee's role as a fact-findipg agency,"“2 that, not unlike the first function, the congressional and the second emphasizes standing committee, through its public hearings, provides "an ease ism-"“3 (A second set of assumptions provides a useful and compelling rationale for determining, in part, the validity of a study of the dialectical and rhetorical behaviors of a “ISee Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," Quarterly Journal prSppech XLII (October, 1956), PP. 283-2910 uzfluitt, American Political Science Review XXXXVIII (195“), p. 340. “31bid. l6 congressional standing committee at work in its hearings. .As Huitt explains it: The standing committee then is a promising group with which to begin a study of the behavior of congressmen in the legislative struggle for at least four reasons. One is the greater frequency p£_interaction of individual congressmen in com- mittees than on the floor of their house. On the floor a congressman may speak seldom, and on a particular issue may confine himself to a single prepared speech. But in a committee in which he is active he talks many times and with less for- mality. A.second reason is that in the committee hearings a group of congressmen are subject to common stimuli. They hear the same witnesses and react to the same comments. The third is that the committee is a group of manageable size for inten- sive study. It is possible to observe it closely, and its members are few enough that roles can be kept straight and relationships plotted. .A fourth is that it has, within limits, a continuous life. Its membership changes, but members are encouraged by the seniority principle to stay on a committee. And the change of membership is never complete and seldom drastic at one time; group norms can easily be transmitted to new members. Although the "group dynamics" orientation of the above ra- tionale is not entirely applicab1e to the variables which affect speech behavior in the congressional committee hearing situation, the basic concepts do lend credence to the justi- fication of a case study of the dialectical and rhetorical practices of the HCUA in its public hearings. This study is unique in: (1) focussing upon the con- gressional hearings of the HCUA as dialectical and rhetorical procedures; (2) considering the hearings as a significant part of the process of congressional deliberation; and (3) analyzing the 1960 San Francisco public hearings of the House Committee on Unqueric n Activities in particular. ““Ibid. l7 Methodology p£_the Study The basic method which will be used in this case study of the hearings of the HCUA is the historical-critical approach. The historical-critical type of research is de- fined as: "The study of a period, person, or phenomenon in human development, in order to record discovered facts in an accurate, coherent, and critical narrative that posits causa- tions and probabilities)”5 Of the four basic approaches to scholarly investigation, the historical-critical seems to be the most appropriate one for this study.“6 An attempt will be made to apply the historical- critical method rigorously "by including all elements which are in any way relevant,"l"7 and to "mold these elements into a whole-~a synthesis in which associations and causal rela- tionships are made meaningful."l"8 The elements to be con- sidered in the study will include considerations of: (l) the House Committee on Un-American.Activities as the "speaking institution" under study; (2) the climate of opinion or milieu in which the HCUA has operated, particularly the climate of opinion in which the 1960 San Francisco hearings were conducted; “SAuer, Ap_lntroduction pp.Research ip_Spgech, p. 28. “slpig, See Chapter V for a more complete treatment of "The Historical Method-" “7Kenneth G. Hance, "The Historical-Critical Type of Research: A Re-examination," Central States Spgech Journal XIII (1962). p. 169. “81bid. 18 (3) the topics and issues which were the principal concerns of the HCUA in its 1960 hearings at San Francisco; (4) the significant factors or variables which distinguished the 1960 San Francisco hearings as a communication situation; (5) the message or messages communicated by the HCUA; (6) the workmanship of the dialectical and rhetorical methods employed by the HCUA in the 1960 hearings; and (7) the re- sponse or effect or influence of the HCUA as a result of its dialectical and rhetorical practices during the 1960 San Francisco hearings.l+9 In order to achieve a meaningful synthesis of the elements described above, the writer will rely upon the four research processes known as (1) description, (2) analysis, (3) interpretation, and (4) evaluation.50 Moreover, in order "to show how propositions and audiences §£p_connected: how a speaker uses techniques to adapt his ideas to the ideas of his audience,"51 the type of criticism described by Thonssen and Baird as "judicial" will be applied in the study: It combines the aims of analytic and synthetic inquiry with the all important element of evalua- tion and interpretation of results. Thus it ugIbid. See pp. 165-170 for a useful discussion of the elements of the historical-critical method. 50For a brief but useful discussion of these four research processes see Robert S. Cathcart, Post Communication: Critical Analysis ppg_Evaluation (Indianapolis: e Bo s- Merrill Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 26-31. SlCroft, Quarterly Journal 9; Speech XLII (1956). p. 290. “""'"" l9 reconstructs a speech situation with fidelity to fact; it examines this situation carefully in the light of the interaction of speaker, audience, subject, and occasion; it interprets the data with an eye to determining the effect of the speech; it formulates a judgment in the light of the philosophical-historical-logical constituents of the inquiry; and it appraises the entire event by assigning it comparatgye rank in the total enterprise of speaking. Since the rendering of critical judgments requires standards which must serve as the basis for any judgments which may be made, a description of the standards for appraisal to be used in the study is in order. Of the four general standards which have been used to judge speeches in the past-~(1) the results tandard, (2) the truth standard, (3) the ethical standard, and (4) the artistic or methods standard53--the latter most comprehensively and effectively "considers the forms and methods by which a speaker demon- strates these things [elements of the other three standard; to an audience, and measures a speech by how well or artis- tically the speaker employed the available means of persuasion on a given speech occasion."5u According to Hance, the his- torical-critical researcher ought to base his value judgments mainly upon the artistic or methods standard in rhetorical- critical studies, “for therein do we find the primary 52Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, S ech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. E8. 53Hance, Central States Speech Journal XIII (1962), pp. 169-170. 5“Cathcart, Ppst Communication: Criticism and Evaluation, p. 25. 20 justification for our work and therein lies the opportunity for us in Speech to make our peculiar contribution."55 Inasmuch as congressional hearings appear to embody the use of dialectical, as well as rhetorical principles, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the salient characteristics of dialectic. In his intensive study of some factors relating to the dialectic of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Vardaman de- rived the following definition of dialectic: a method of logical inquiry in pursuit of truth involving the principle of opposition and relying upon the technique of question and answer in speculative discussion.56 An analysis of this definition reveals that there are five essential elements of dialectic: (l) a logical or reasoned inquiry; (2) a pursuit of truth, knowledge, understanding; (3) a principle of opposi- tion; (4) a technique of question and answer; and (5) a specu- lative discussion. For the purposes of this study, Rives' description of the role of dialectic in the congressional committee hearings which he studied appears to be similar to the dialectical process which operated in the HCUA's 1960 hearings at San Francisco, based upon a reading of the tran- scripts of the 1960 hearings. According to Rives: h- 4 SSHance, Central States Sppech Journal XIII (1962), p. 170. 56George Vardaman, "An Analysis of Some Factors Relating to the Dialectic of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1952). 21 The essential elements of dialectic are present in the committee hearings. Eiearings on the proposed, Taft-Hartley Act conducted by the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and. Public WelfareJ Dialectical procedure is, in fact, well suited to the committee hearings, the purpose for which is to gather information as a basis for making reliable judgments. The hearings are a logical or reasoned inquiry; ideas are stated, developed, and tested through the use of opening statements and an interrogation period in what amounts to a rational rather than an empirical testing of thought. The hearings are held for the purpose of gathering infor- mation; knowledge, truth; witnesses attempt to state and defend their understanding of the truth while the committee attempts, by asking questions and listening, to evaluate the testimony in order to gather the in- formation and knowledge necessary upon which to base its collective judgment of probable truth. The hear- ings involve the principle of opposition in thought; men with differing interests and backgrounds testify so that the committee is confronted with competing points of view, and it attempts to explore these com- peting ideas to determine their probable validity. The hearings rely predominantly upon the technique of question and answer as a method of exploring and evalu- ating ideas presented by witnesses. Finally, the hearings are a process of speculative discussion for the purpose of determining what legislative action, if any, should be taken. Thus, the hearings are inquiry, and one cannot read them without the impres- sion of intellectual conflict in process. These five elements of dialectic, then, viewed as a process, will provide the conceptual framework within which critical judgments can be made concerning the quality of the workman- ship of the HCUA in its employment of dialectical methods. Resources and Materials p£.the Study Three classifications of resources will be used in the study. First, the official records and reports of the HCUA 57Rives, "Dialectic and Rhetoric in Congress: A Study of Congressional Consideration of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947," pp. 6-7. 22 will constitute the basic materials for analysis. Second, both primary and secondary source materials will provide the basis for the historical-biographical-critical accounts of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and for the development and descriptions of the congressional investi- gatory power and process. Newspapers, documents, books, and periodicals comprise this second category. The third category of resources includes books and articles which treat standards and methods of criticism. Foremost among these are: Hance, Ralph and Wiksell's Principles p£_Spgakipg, Thonssen and Baird's Speech Criticism, Croft's "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," Black's Rhetorical Criticism, Cathcart's Pppp.Communication: Criticism‘ppg.Evaluation, Hillbruner's Critical Qiggnsions: .919. Ag; 9_f_ Public Address Criticist Hance's "The Historical- Critical Type of Research: A Re-examination," Brockriede's "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric,“ Gross"Ipp_Legisla- tive Struggle: A Study 313 Social Combat. Plan p£_the Study Relying largely upon primary sources, this study will describe and analyze the hearings before the House of Repre- sentatives' Committee on Un-American,Activities entitled Tpp_ Northern California District p§_ppp.Communist £2551; §tructure- Objectives - Leadership. Exclusive of Chapter I, which out- lines the nature and purpose of the study, the study may be viewed as having two major sections. The first section con- sists of Chapters II and III, and, essentially, it considers 23 the extrinsic factors58 of the communication situation provided by the HCUA public hearings at San Francisco in 1960, including pertinent historical-biographical-political data concerning the behavior and image of the HCUA as these were manifested between 1938 and 1960. Chapters IV, V, and Vi comprise the second major section of the study. These chapters encompass those considerations of the study which may be termed the intrinsic factors.59 In Chapters IV and V, analysis of the dialectical and rhetorical procedures employed by the HCUA in its 1960 hearings is explicated. Chapter VI concerns itself with a summary of the findings of the study, and discusses the conclusions of the study in the light of the analysis of the rhetorical and dialectical practices of the HCUA and the relationship of these practices to the communicative and legislative purposes of the committee. 58Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art of Public Address Criticism (New York: Random House, Inc., 63); see pages 9-73 for a thorough discussion of the extrinsic factors in the criticism of public address. 59See Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art p£_ Public Address Criticism, pp. 79-158 for a thorough discussion of the intrinsic factors in the criticism of public address. "'i CHAPTER II CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON [IN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES: AN OVERVIEW A study of the dialectical and rhetorical methods and procedures of the House Committee on Un-American Activities requires consideration of a complex of factors pertaining to the congressional investigating power and process. Certain of these factors will be discussed in this chapter in order to provide a perspective on congress- ional investigations. Such a perspective is necessary if one is to understand the legal, legislative, and political factors which can influence the behavior of congressional investigating committees and, in particular, the behavior of the HCUA in its 1960 public hearings at San Francisco. Three areas will be dealt with in this chapter in order to establish a simplified yet meaningful background perspective. First, a description of the development of the congressional investigating power in the United States will be presented, primarily by reference to the significant court decisions which have shaped the course of congressional investigations up until 1960. Second, a description of the origin and development of the immediate forerunner of the 24 25 present House Committee on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the Dies Committee, will be outlined. Third, the chapter will conclude with an historical sketch of the HCUA as a permanent standing committee of Congress during the period from 1945 to 1960. Development p£_Congressional Investigatipg_Power Early development.--"The history of congressional investigations in the United States is a record of a slowly but steadily broadening implied power of the national legis- lature."1 Like so many other American political practices, the roots of congressional investigative power extend far back into British common law.2 .Although the power of Con- gress to conduct investigations and to punish for contempt is not expressly granted in the Constitution, the courts have had little difficulty in concluding that the power to investigate is a necessary corollary of its other powers, particularly in view of the grant to Congress of the power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carsying into execution the various powers vested in it.’ The power of Congress to conduct investigations would be meaningless indeed without the corollary power to punish for contempt.“ Although the first congressional investigation 1M. Nelson MbGeary, "Congressional Investigations: Historical Development," University p£_Chicago Law Review XVIII (1951), p. 425. 21bid. 3 Fellman, The Defendant's Rights, p. 236. “McGeary, University p£.Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 427. 26 investigation in the United States was initiated in 1792, just three years after Congress was established, the first contempt citation dates from 1795. It arose from an investigation into the ill-fated St. Clair expedition.5 From 1795 to 1857 "all persons charged with contempt, whether it was for a violation of a privilege of Congress, were brought before the bar of the affected house where they were convicted or acquitted by summary process."6 Prior to 1857 only two contempt cases reached the courts, and both of these resulted in convictions.7 The judiciary exercised little control or super- vision over congressional investigations during the cen- tury following the St. Clair investigation in 1792. Both Houses of Congress used the investigatory power frequently "not only to inquire into the honesty and efficiency of the executive branch of the government, but also to obtain information to assist Congress in its task of legislating wisely and intelligently."8 A number of inquiries, more- over, assisted the House and the Senate in the performance of duties relating to their own members.9 5Dimock, Congressional Investigatipg Committees, pp. 87-89. 6Carl Beck, Contempt p_f_ Congress: _A_ Study 9_f_ the Prosecutions Initiated py the Committee pp_Un-American .ACthltles, 1943-1957 (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1959), p. is. 7 . Iblds’ pp. “-50 8MicGeary, University p£.Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 426. 91bid. 27 Until 1827 Congress had little difficulty in assessing its right to authorize inquiries into internal congressional matters and investigations into the administration of the law. "But there were differences of opinion concerning the legality of inquiries directed at obtaining information to help in the enactment of 1aws."10 In 1827, however, following a lengthy debate characterized by considerable opposition to the resolution under deliberation, "the victory went to those representatives who argued that only through compulsion of testimony could the necessary facts be 1earned."11 Enforce- ment of this authority was by means of Congress's common-law power to punish for contempt, a punishment which could result in imprisonment as well as a fine. ng_8tatute p£_1§§Z,--All contempts of Congress prior to 1857 were punished without reference to statute. This procedure was amended by Congress in 1857, when a statute governing prosecution for congressional contempt was enacted. Section 1 of this act provides: That any person summoned as a witness by the authority of either House to give testimony, or to produce papers, Upon any matter before either House of Congress, who shall willingly make default, or who appearing shall refuse to answer any question pertinent to the matter of inquiry in consideration before the House or committee by which he shall be examined, shall, in addition to the pains and penalities now existing, be 10McGeary, University p£_Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 426. 11Ibid. 28 liable to indictment as and for a misdemeanor in any court of the United States having juris- diction thereof, and on conviction, shall pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and not less than one hundred dollars, and be subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one month and not more than twelve months.12 As a result of the passage of the 1857 statute, the major responsibility for determining contempt was shifted from Congress to the courts.]'3 However, "until the twentieth century Congress was reluctant to use the statutory pro- visions of 1857 and continued to punish persons summarily." The act of 1857 effected changes in the procedures for prosecuting an individual for contempt. A somewhat complicated system, it operates in this manner: If a committee determines that an act of contempt has been committed before it or one of its subcommittees, that fact is first reported to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House. Following action by the affected chamber, the contempt is then certified by one of the above officers to the United States .Attorney,for the district in which the contempt was committed. The United States Attorney, in turn, is required to prepare a bill of indict- ment. The individual cited for contempt is then brought before a grand jury for possible 15 indictment. He is then tried by a federal court. A second change wrought by the staute of 1857 concerned the manner by which guilt or innocence is 12U.S., Statutes pp.Large, XI, 155. 13McGeary, University pf Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 427. 14 15Ibid., p. 6. Beck, Contempt pg'Congress, p. 7. H- H- 29 determined. Whereas, Congress established this fact prior to 1857, the courts inherited the responsibility for deter- mining guilt or innocence as a result of the act of 1857. Relatively little use of the act was made by Congress until the United States Supreme Court in 188116 "decreed that the courts could review the congressional power to punish for contempt.“17 Ihp_courts 22g congressional investigations, Léélf ,1222,--Commencing withKilbourn v. Thompson in 1881,18 the first of a series of court decisions was handed down which was to reinforce, with few restrictions, the power of Con- gress to conduct investigations and to compel testimony. In the Kilbourn decision the Supreme Court held that no recalcitrant witness could be convicted unless the matter under investigation had a direct relation to the legislative 19 functions of Congress. Justice Miller, writing for the court majority, seemed to express the view that a broad area of the private affairs of citizens is immune from 20 congressional investigation. In spite of the fact that A—. 16Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 17McGeary, University_p£_Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 428. 18This controversy resulted from an investigation of the collapse of the real estate pool established by Jay Cooke & Company, in which the United States was one of the creditors. 198ee Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 20McGeary, University p£.Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 429. 3O the.Kilbourn decision cast doubt for almost half a century as to the existence of a congressional power to compel testimony as a means of aiding Congress in drafting legis- lation, "both houses of Congress zealously continued to investigate."21 In I}; £e_ Chaaan (1897) which confirmed the contempt conviction of a Senate witness, the Supreme Court declared that a legislative intent must be presumed in a congressional investigation: we cannot assume on this record that the action of the Senate was without a legitimate object, and so encroach upon the province of that body. . . . It was certainly not necessary that the resolution should declare in advance what the Senate migiated doing when the investigation was concluded. [Any doubts which existed as a result of the Kilbourn case, as to the right of the legislature to conduct inquiries for the purposes of framing legislation were dispelled by 23 McGrain v. Daugherty, a case decided in 1927. Justice Van Devanter, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, declared that the power of inquiry-dwith process to enforce it-- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. . . . A.1e islative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information--which 4 2l'McGeary, University 9!; Chicago Law Review XVIII, p. 30. 225;: £9. Cha n, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). 23McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 31 not infrequently is true-~recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. 4 McGrain v. Daugherty did not, however, grant an unlimited power of investigation to Congress. In the process of affirming Kilbourn v. Thompson Justice Van.Devanter care- fully pointed out, for example, that "neither house is invested with general power to inquire into private affairs and sic compel disclosures,” and that “a.witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds of the power are exceeded or the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry."25 In 1951 McGeary summarized the status of congressional investigative power by saying "that the courts are now holding only loose rein on congressional investigators."26 He supported this conclusion by pointing out that the courts "have been liberal in allowing committees to proceed unmo- lested; and, ahaost without exception, they have supported the committees in their contests with witnesses."27 The most graphic illustration of the extent to which the courts 2"MeCrainv. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). zslbid. 2 GMCGeary, University p£_Chicago Law RevievaVIII, p. 434. 27Ibid. 32 have confirmed the power of Congress to gather information for legislative purposes is contained in the opinion by Justice Holtzoff in United States v. Bryan:28 If the subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy and materiality, no matter how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the power of Congress to investigate the matter. More- over, the relevancy and the materiality of the sub- ject matter must be presumed. The burden is on one who maintains the contrary to establish his conten- tion. It would be intolerable if the judiciary were to intrude into the activities of the legisla- tive branch of the Government, and virtually stop the progress of an investigation, which is intended to secure information that Congress deems necessary and desirable in the proper exercise of its functions, unless the lack of materiality and relevancy of the subject is clear and manifest. It is clear that, at mid-century, if the ppypp_decision reflected the range of subject matter into which Congress could make inquiries, then the restrictions on the permissible fields of investigation were extremely loose. The reluctance of the courts to hold that a particular investigation has exceeded proper bounds was again demon- 29 In the strated in a 1948 case, Barsky v. United States. Barsky decision, which held that a congressional committee could require an individual to answer whether he was a believer in communism.or a member of the Communist Party, a majority of the court again reiterated the doctrine of Mpggpip v. Daugherty that the legislative power to investigate 28miited States v. Bryan, F. Supp. 58 (D.C., 1947). The case resulted w en Helen R. Bryan and three other persons refused to produce papers subpoenaed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. See also 339 U.S. 323 (1950). 29 Barsk v. United States 167 F.2d 241 (App. D.C. 1948), ce_—-31rt. eniedW'd. . (1948). ' 33 is a "limited" one. But in so doing, it made clear its unwillingness to violate the separation of powers doctrine: The remedy for unseemly conduct, if any, by Committees is for Congress, or for the people. . . . The courts have no authority to speak or act upon the conduct by the legislative branch of its own business, so long as the bounds of power and pertinency are not exceeded. Tpp_courts ppg,congressional investigations, ngp- 12§2,--In 1953, with the death of Vinson and the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, an era of marked judicial concern for the protection of libertarian values began which was, for a time, to have sharp effects upon some aspects of congressional investigations. The first two decisions of significance were Emsppk v. United States and uinn v. United States,30 which were decided on the same day in 1955. Both cases involved witnesses before the House Com- mittee on Uh-American.Activities who had refused to answer questions, basing their claims upon their rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The court majority, in supporting the right of Emspak and Quinn to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, held that they had given adequate notice to the HCUA of their in- tention to invoke the privilege. Moreover, as Chief Justice Warren stated in the Emppak decision: If it is true that in these times a stigma may somehow result from a witness' reliance on the Self-Incrimination Clause, a committee should 302mg; v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); and Quinn v. ted States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). 34 be all the more ready to recognize a veiled claim of the privilege. Otherwise, the great right which the Clause was intended to secure might be effectively frustrated by private pressures. .As important as they are, however, the Emspak and Quinn decisions merely served as a prelude to the seemingly significant and highly controversial'Watkins31 decision which the Warren Court handed down in June, 1957. In the Watkins case the Court dared to criti- cize the operations of the House Committee on Un-mmerican Activities, and to indicate an in- tention to assume some responsibility for deter- mining whether congressional committees were operating within their constitutional authority. 32 Not since the 1881 decision of Kilbourn v. Thomppon had the Court undertaken to restrict a congressional investi- gating committee. Although a large body of opinion had developed in support of the thesis that Congress was the final judge of its powers of investigation, the substance of judicial opinions refuted such an idea. .According to Pritchett: The Supreme Court had been clear from the be- ginning that if Congress turned over to the courts the responsibility for punishing as criminal alleged contempts of congressional authority, it would have to permit the courts to determine to their own sat- isfaction that contempt had occurred, and that Con- gress had been defied while exercising its legiti- mate authority. 3¥yggggpp v. united States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 32 C. Herman Pritchett Co ress Versus the Su reme Court (Minneapolis: university oi Minnesota Press, 1561). Pa Ere 33Ibid. 35 In the Watkins case a labor union official appeared as a witness before the HCUA. Watkins indicated that he was willing to answer questions about his relations with the Communist Party as well as questions concerning his acquaintances who were currently members of the Communist Party. Watkins, however, refused to answer those questions involving persons who he believed had separated from the Party on the ground that these were not relevant to the work of the HCUA and were beyond the authority of the Committee to demand.3u Wetkins was cited for contempt, and was subse- quently convicted. The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, ruled that Watkins was within his rights in refusing to answer because the authorizing resolution of the HCUA, the remarks of the chairman of the hearings, and the remarks of the mem- bers of the committee during the hearings were inadequate to convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions. "The basic proposition in the opinion was a rei- teration of the well-established doctrine that the power of Congress to investigate, while broad, is not unlimited."35 Warren, in the majority opinion, explained that "there is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress." In short, the court ruled that the House or Senate must give 3“See Watkins v. United States, 3511 U.S. 178 (1957). 35Pritchett, Copgress Versus the Supreme Court, p. 42. 36 instructions to its committees which "spell out that group's jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity. . . so that a witness and a reviewing court may have some basis for judging as to whether the questions asked are pertinent to the committee's legislative purpose."36 .Although "the Watkins decision was an exceptionally controversial one, and provoked sharp criticism of the Court from defenders. . . of the House Committee on Un-American .Activities,"37 Pritchett contends that, in the light of the Barenblatt38 and Uphaus39 rulings in 1959, "Watkins was not much of a.decision."“o In Barenblatt the Court retreated from its holding in Watkins: (l) by noting that because of factual differences in the two cases, the issue of "perti- nency," which was the narrow grounds for decision in Watkins, was not applicable in Barenblatt; and (2) by avoiding the issue of vagueness of a committee's mandate as it relates to the ability of the House or Senate to exercise supervision over its committees.“1 36Pritchett, Congresp Versus the Supreme Court, p. 43. 37GlendonA. Schubert, Constitutional Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and.Winston, Inc., I935). p. 335. 38M v- 92.1.2.9. image. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 3922114939. V- 8229.13,: 360 U.S. 72 (1959). uQPritchett, Copgress Versus the Supreme Court, p. 57. “ISee Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 37 Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for the five-man majority in the Barenblatt case, and for the first time in a case dealing with congressional investigatory power, discussed the applicability of the first amendment. His opinion expressed "a strong affirmation of the superiority of congressional power over the protection of the first amendment."u2 Harlan.wrote that the power of Congress to legislate in the field of communist activities was undoubted because "In the last analysis this power rests on the right of self-preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society.'" It is significant to note that the five-to-four majorities in the Barenblatt and Uphaus decisions reflected the customary controversy which has surrounded the exercise of the congressional investigatory power. Justice Black, in writing the principal dissenting opinion in Barenblatt, cited the twenty-year history of the HCUA's practice, and concluded: . . . the Court today fails to see what is here for all to see--that exposure and punishment is the aim of this Cbmmittee and the reason for its existence. To deny this aim is to ignore the Committee's own claims and the reports it has issued ever since it was established. I cannot believe that the nature of the judicial office requires us to be so blind, and must conclude that the Uh-American.Activities Committee's 'identification' and 'exposure' of Communists and suspected Communists, like the activities of the Committee in Kilbourn v. Thom son amount to an encroachment on the judiciary which bodes ill for the liberties of the people of this land. “zPritchett, Copgress Versus the Supreme Court, p. 50. 38 Status p§.congressional investigating power pp_p£, l960.--As the preceding overview of the development of con- gressional investigating power indicates, the issues are so complex and controversial that it is extremely difficult to describe the status of the power with any degree of specifi- city and certainty. Furthermore, the Warren Court, as many of the decisions in the area of congressional investigations reveal, still seems to be closely divided, and for the future much is bound to depend upon the behaviors of newly-appointed justices, and the legal and political setting of those cases ‘which may come before it. Nevertheless, some general and speculative state- ‘ments can be made concerning the status of the investigatory power of Congress as of 1960. Telford Taylor's estimate, written in 1961, still seems to be relevant: The court Supreme Court of the United states as presently constituted is committed to the propo- sition that Congress has a far broader power of in- vestigative identification of individuals in the field of Communism than in other contexts. Neverthe- less, it will scrutinize the authorization and execution of the inquiry with some care, and defend- ants who can point to substantial flaws are not likely to go to jail. The particular point of 'pertinency' involved in the watkins case, however has had little permanent effect except to 'educate' the investigating committees in making a plausible record, and the enduring importance of that case lies morfi in its general aura than its precise holding. 3 h3Taylor, Grand Inguest, pp. 327-328. 39 £133 £1293; Committee pp Un-American Activities: I£p_0rigin pr|Development .An examination of the House Committee on Un-American Activities from an historical point of view no doubt can provide a more meaningful perspective against which to view its 1960 public hearings at San Francisco. Three dimensions relating to the committee's impact constitute the framework for such an examination: (1) it has initiated more contempt proceedings than any other committee of either house of Congress; (2) it has been the source of the contempt cita- tions which have provided the grist for the leading court decisions concerning congressional investigatory power; and (3) it has been the subject of severe and continuous criti- cism, particularly in relation to the scope and procedure of investigations. This section of the study, therefore, will concern itself with a review of those aspects of the com- mittee's history which are germane; namely: (1) its public hearings, especially those which resulted in contempt citations; (2) the criticism.directed at the committee; and (3) the relationship between the committee's behavior and the salient legal and legislative factors which affected its behavior. In addition, because of the uniqueness of the present HCUA as a permanent standing committee of Congress, it is important to recount the contextual factors which originally caused the creation of the committee. Depression: incubator‘gpp subversive investigations.-- Although the starting point of the first congressional 40 investigation of Communism, or Bolshevism as it was called, dates to a meeting of "sympathizers" in Washington on Feb- ruary 2, 1919,““ the period of special relevance to a study of the activity of the House of Representatives in the area of investigation of Communist subversives begins in 1930.45 Up until 1927, the Senate was the foremost investigating agency of subversive activities; however, "1930 saw a revi- val of interest in the subject of Communism among some mem- bers of the House;"‘*6 thereafter the House was to become the chief investigator into subversion. Ogden suggests that perhaps it was the depression which caused this revival of interest in the subject of Cbmmunism,“7 and which prompted the House to create its first Special Committee to Investi- gate Communist Activities on June 9, 1930.“8 At least to a few members of the House of Represen- tatives, the approach by Roosevelt in his New Deal program provided a more effective means of combatting Communist subversives than did congressional investigations. The men of this persuasion "saw in true democracy and the reform of “uOgden, The Dies Committee, p. 14. This book is gen- erally regarded as the definitive study of the original temporary standing committee from 1938 to 1944; it will be relied upon extensively in this section of the study. “51618., p. 20. “51bid. “71bid. “8U.S.,Congress, House, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. NO. 118' pp. 3-“. 41 economic conditions, rather than in investigation, the real remedy for the Communist situation."l"’9 The probability that the action of the House in its establishment of committees to investigate UhnAmerican activities was connected with the economic conditions of the depression-stricken thirties can be gleaned from the following excerpt contained in a report submitted in 193“ by Representative Nelson of Maine: The solution of this problem lies in the wisdom of our legislators and the unselfishness of our in- dustrialists. In proportion as we work out economic justice here in America and so order our social system that labor shall share in the economic life of the Nation, as fully and fairly as it now shares in its social and political life, in just that pro- portion will radicalism fall of its own inanitigB and the threat of Communismcmase to disturb us. As one can infer from'Nelson's report, if the social and economic problems had been less severe during the thirties, then Communism would have been less of a problem, if any at all. Therefore, the establishment of the forerunner of the HCUA appears to have been directly linked to the economic and social problems of the thirties, at least as perceived by some of the representatives who endorsed its creation. In the light of the social-economic Upheaval caused by the depression, the high degree of political finesse of F.D.R., the majority of F.D.R. supporters in Congress, and the number of conservative voters who were reluctant to vote against ugOgden, The Dies Committee, p. 20. soU.S., Congress, House, Spgcial Committee on Com- munist Activities in the United States, 71st Cong., —3d Sess., I§3Ev P0 99- 42 the man who had given them renewed confidence, it is not surprising that "the temper of the New Deal was favorable to the untrammeled use of Congressional inquiries to attain social ends thought desirable."51 From 1933 to 1938 Congress, working in close collaboration with the White House and the execu- tive departments, continued to pour out regulatory statutes and to authorize investigations which were the arsenal of the New Deal program. By no means was this social revolution accomplished without bitter opposition and recrimination, but the critics were overborne by the unusual conjunction of a strong and vigorous Congressional majority and an aggressive and politically expert Pgssident working in harmony for positive objectives. "By the end of 1938, it was evident that the New Deal had lost its forward thrust,"53 and parallelling the gradual demise of the New Deal was the shift in the focus of con- gressional investigations from problems of domestic economy to matters associated with loyalty and subversion. With Hit- ler and Mussolini marching closer, and with communism gener- ally regarded as a.menace by many Americans, the political circumstances were ripe for the House to establish its Special Committee for the Investigation of Uhquerican.Acti- vities in May, 1938. The Dies Committee ig_born.--0ut of the welter of bills proposed in the House during the thirties to combat all kinds 5l-Taylor, Grand Inguest, p. 87. 521b1d., p. 86. 53Ernest J. “rage and Barnet Baskerville (ed.), Con- tem.orar Forum: American 8 eches on Twentieth-Centur Issues (New YorE: Harper and Brothers, 19617} p. . Q3 of subversive activities, House Resolution 282 emerged as the one that established "the most important committee ever created to investigate"5u subversive activities. Proposed by Representative Martin Dies of Texas, who was to become the committee's chairman, the resolution set forth the pur- pose of the proposed investigation in its opening section: Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Rep- resentatives be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint a special committee to be composed of seven membenfor the purpose of conducting an investigation of (l) the extent, character, and objects of un- American propaganda activities in the united States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of sub- versive and unquerican propaganda that is insti- gated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by the Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that wougd aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. 5 Following limited discussion on the floor of the House on May 26, 1938, the resolution was passed by a vote of 191 ayes to #1 noes.56 Immediately following passage of H.R. 282, Dies introduced a resolution appropriating $100,000 for the proposed investigation which was scheduled to last for only seven months.57 The Committee on.Accounts, however, reduced the amount to $25,000. 5“U.S. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1938, 6562. Herein ter Congressional Record will be abbreviated Cong. Rec. 551b1d., 7679. 551bid.. 8392. 57Jerry Voorhis, "Congressional Investigations: Inner Workings," University 2§_Chicago Law Review XVIII (1951). p. 456. 44 Representative Jerry Voorhis, Democrat, of California, who was to become a member of the Dies Committee, describes the creation of the committee in this way: The origin of the House Committee on Un~American Activities will illustrate a first point, which is that congressional investigations are frequently started because some member of the House or Senate who believes he has hit upon a field of inquiry which can catch the public's attention. Two mem- bers of the House decided at almost the same time-- in the year l937--that such a field was to be found in "unnAmerican activities.’ Both introduced reso- 1utions for the setting up of special committees. One such resolution was not passed because many mem- bers of the House did not like its author personally, and their votes, added to those of members who thought at the time that such an investigation was unnecessary, were enough to defeat the resolution. The other resolution was passed, however, agg the Committee began its well-publicized career. With the account of the historical context completed in which subversive activities emerged as a major concern of the House, and with the basic details outlined concerning the creation of the Dies Committee, it may be useful to describe selected dimensions of the activities of the com- mittee during the period from 1938 to 1960. .Although the scope of the study necessitates treatment of only certain relevant factorsn-the hearings, particularly those which resulted in congressional contempt citations; the criticism directed at the committee; and the relationship between the committee‘s behavior and the legal and legislative factors which affected that behavior-~it is important that one view 581bid. -.._.__ 45 the 1960 hearings at San Francisco in the light of the HCUA's behavior and image as an historical institution. From its beginning in 1938, the behavior and image of the committee may accurately be described as "contro- versial."59 This controversy, in large part, has been motivated by the committee's conduct in its public hearings. To demonstrate that controversiality has been the "norm" of its pattern of behavior, one could cite virtually any set of hearings during the committee's existence. In the main, any differences in the year to year behavior of the HCUA have been differences of degree rather than kind. The writer, therefore, somewhat arbitrarily has chosen to begin this part of the study by treating the HCUA's first hearings in 1938 in more detail than that which will be given the succeeding years of the committee’s acti- vities. By so doing, it is intended that the following points will be established: (1) that the HCUA has operated in a climate of controversy since its inception; (2) that the hearings motivate much of the controversy about the committee; and (3) that the nature of the criticism of the committee has remained about the same throughout its history. 1938-1944.--"The formation of the Committee received little more attention than that usually accorded Congres- sional investigating committees."6o Gradually, however, 59Walter Goodman, The Committee, passim. GoOgden, The Dies Committee, p. M. 46 Dies began to obtain some publicity by announcing that representatives of public organizations were to be asked to give pertinent information.61 The volume of the publicity increased as a result of the attacks by J. Parnell Thomas, a member of the committee, on the Federal Theatre and Writers' Project, demanding that it be investigated.62 Then, on .August 4, 1938, Dies became front-page news, and "from that time on his name was to become a familiar one to millions of newspaper readers throughout the Uhited States."63 On August 12, 1938, the Dies Committee opened its first set of formal hearings in Washington, D. C. The hearings were intended to delve into the Nazi propaganda activities of the German-American Bund. Dies' opening statement at the hearings is worth quoting in its entirety because it repre- sented the ideal standard of behavior for an investigating committee to follow: The Chair wishes to reiterate what he has stated many times--namely, that this committee is deter- mined to conduct its investigation upon a dignified plane and to adopt and maintain throughout the course of the hearings a judicial attitude. The committee has no preconceived views of what the truth is re- specting the subject matter of this inquiry. Its sole purpose is to discover the truth and to report it as it is, with such recommendations, if any, as to legislation on these subjects as the situation may require and as the duty of Congress to the Am- erican people may demand. Gluew York Times, July 13, 1938. 621bid., July 27, 1938. 630gdan, The Dies Committee, p. 48. 47 We shall be fair and impartial at all times and treat every witness with fairness and courtesy. We shall expect every witness to treat us in the same way. The committee will not permit any 'character assassination' or any 'smearing' of innocent people. We wish to caution witnesses that reckless charges must not be made against any individual or organi- zationo s s s The Chair wishes to emphasize that the committee is more concerned with facts than with opinions, and with specific proof than with generalities. Opinions, conclusions, and generalities have no probative force in any court of justice and they cannot be made the basis of any findings on the part of this committee. It's the Chair's opinion that the usefulness or value of any investigation is measured by the fairness and impartiality of the committee conducting the investi- gation. Neither the public nor Congress will have any confidence in the findings of a committee which adopts a partisan or preconceived attitude. Statements and charges unsupported by facts have no evidentiary value and only tend to confuse the issue. It is easy to 'smear' someone's name or reputation by unsupported charges or an unjustified attack, but it is difficult to repair the d e that has been done. ‘As I pre- viously stated, th a committee is determined to be fair and just to everyone, and when an individual or organization is involved in any charge or attack made in the course of the hearings, that individual or or- ganization will be accorded an opportunity to refute such charge or attack. In investigating unnAmerican activities it must be borne in mind that because we do not agree with opin- ions or philosophies of others does not necessarily make such opinions or philosophies unquerican. The most common practice en aged in by some people is to brand their opponents with names when they are unable to refute their arguments with facts and logic. There- fore, we find a few people of conservative thought who are inclined to brand every liberal viewpoint as com- munistic. Likewise, we find some so-called liberals who stigmatize every conservative idea fascistic. The utmost care, therefore, must be observed to distinguish clearly between what is obviously Uhquerican and what is no more or less than an honest difference of opinion with respect to some economic, political, or social question. _ 6“U.S. Congress, House, Special Committee to Investi- gate unqmmerican.Activities and Propaganda in the United States, Hearings, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1938. 48 As Ogden remarks, any committee that could adhere to Dies' sensible statement "could only deserve the highest praise."65 Testimony during the first day of the hearings dealt mainly with the subversive activities of the Germanquerican Bund and its connection with the Nazi Government of Germany.66 "But with the testimony of August 13, 1938, the headlines began to scream."67 Dies repeated his statement of the first day and reiterated that he had no intention of "attacking any labor organization and that all such organizations mentioned would be given a chance to refute the charges or attacks.“68 Unfortunately, Dies and his colleagues on the committee did not live up to the high standards so frequently uttered by Dies. John P. Frey, President of the Metal Trades Depart- ment of the American Federation of Labor, was on the witness stand for three days beginning on August 13, and his testi- mony consisted of a sweeping indictment of the 010's leader- ship, with the exception of John L. Lewis, as being Commun- istic.69 In regard to the three days' of testimony, Ogden points out that 650gden, mpg; Committee, p. 50. 6% MLimg, August 13, 1938. 67Ogden, Eggs; Comittee, p. 52. 68Ibid. 69U.S.,Congress, House, Special Committee to Investi- gate Uhquerican.Activities and Propaganda in the United States, Hearin s, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1938. 49 . . . a careful perusal of the testimony brings one to the conclusion that, regardless of the reputation of the witness or the good intention of the members of the Committee, there was no cross-examination, no attempt to ferret out the truth, and that the Committee resembled an en- thusiastic audience cheering on its champion more than anything else.70 Ogden further describes the types of testimony presented during the hearings: In the very first days of the hearings three types of testimony had been given before the Com- mittee and had been treated in different manners. The first was the report of tcalfe [an official investigator for the committZ? , destined to remain unique in the history of the irst phase of the Com- mittee. His was a skeleton form.which needed to be filled in by subsequent testimony of the principals involved The second was the cros oexamination of Gissibl his brother, Fritz Gissibgl had been in- vestigate by the McCormack Commit ee , which, while not perfect, was as good or better than the average of such examinations. Communists and left-wing liberals who criticize the procedure of the Committee on the grounds that it does not jibe with the rules of evidence as used in courts overlook the fact that, while the spirit of such rules of evidence is ex- pected to prevail at hearings, it is asking too much to demand absolute compliance with all of these rules. The third type of testimony was that of Prey, which regardless of its truth or falsity, was not subject to searching cross-examination and consisted princi- pally of accusations which the Committee accepted on their face value. It was this £222.Lf testimony which, unfortunatel_ was destined to constitute the greater art L t e earings during_ the first yea L t e Committee. It was not long before the hearings began to produce a decided division of opinion among the nation's press. A 700893“: 222,2323_Committee, p. 53. 7112;29: Pu 55. Emphasis added. 50 few examples from several newspapers and periodicals will indicate the nature and scope of the criticism. Strong support for the committee was constantly voiced by the Chicago Tribune in 1938. Likewise, the columns of the ultra- conservative Social Justice declared its endorsement of the committee's investigations, and by September, 1938, it had praised Dies as the "Man of the Week," worthy of the applause of every "honest, American-loving, red-baiting, United States citizen."72 On the other hand, the committee was severely attacked by the §5, L22$§_gg§t-Dispatch,73 the Washington 2253,74 $35 the Christian Century,76 and the N31 Republic." As one might expect, "leftdwing liberal publications like the Ngg_Republic took up the cudgels and in article after article attacked the Committee, its methods, its procedure and the veracity of its witnesses."78 In addition to attacks by the press, members of the New Deal Administration carried on run- ning battles with Dies. Chief among these were the conflicts 72See Social Justice, August 15, 1938; August 29, 1938; and September 5, 1933. 73§£, Legig'Post-Dis atch, August 17, 1938. 7W2221. August 2a, 1938. 7§Li£g, September 5, 1938. 76m Centur , August 31, 1933. 77See Ngg_Republic during this period. 7808d8n. Ihg.Qig§_Committee, p. 68. 51 with Cabinet members, Ickes and Perkins.79 From Washington, the Dies Committee moved its hear- ings to New York in September, 1938. "In general," according to Ogden, "this section of the hearings. . . was marked by a greater attempt to get at facts, but, as before, the hearings were representative of only one side of the question and, as such, were not completely fair."80 In October, 1938, the site of the hearings was shifted to Detroit. Little of consequence was developed in these hearings; however, a series of accusations alleging that Michigan's Governor Frank Murphy was working closely with the Communistic element in the unions engendered more sensational headlines, as did a scathing denunciation of the work of the Dies Committee by President Roosevelt.81 Dies replied to F.D.R.'s written statement with what amounted to a personal attack on the President rather than an answer to the Chief Executive's charges.82 Thus began Dies' warfare with F.D.R. over the committee which was to continue almost until the Texas Democrat retired from the House at the end of 1944. 79Robert 8. Stripling, The Red Plot A ainst America (Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania: Bell Publishing éo., I9495, p. 30. 80Ogden,‘The Dies Committee, p. 71. 81New York Times, October 26, 1938. 82U.S., Congress, House, Special Committee to In- vestigate UnquericanmActivities and Propaganda in the United States, Hearings 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1938. 52 A survey in late October, 1938, of the eighteen reporters who regularly covered the HCUA's hearings revealed that eleven of them supported F.D.R.'s charges that the com- mittee was unfair.83 Furthermore, opinion about the Dies Committee now began to assume a fixed status. While the Egg. Republic and similar publications continued their attacks, a large part of the Catholic press came out in support of the committee.8u By way of contrast, the Roman Catholic Common- ggg;.called the President's attack both cogent and stimu- latingsBS Social Justice continued to support the committee on all occasions;86 whereas, the liberal Protestant weekly, Christian Centur , while sympathetic to the committee's objective, disagreed with the methods used to achieve it.87 In fairness to the Dies Committee, it should be added that there were a few instances in which it demonstrated that it could be rigorous in its use of cross-examination during the hearings.88 As one reason for the committee's inability to handle its investigations properly, Dies, during the final 83New Y‘orkTimesI October 26, 1938. 8“Ogden, The Dies Committee, p. 85. 85Commonweal, 29 (1938), p. 30. 86Social Justice, October 10. 1933; November 19: 1933. 87m Centur , 55 (1938), p. 1355. 883cc U.S., Congress, House, Special Committee to Investigate anAmerican Activities and Propaganda in the United States, Hearings, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1938, pp. 2729-2822. I - .—...—...-—-——- 53 day of hearings on December 15, 1938, claimed that the com- mittee had been handicapped by lack of funds.89 Although there seemed to be little doubt that the committee would be continued in 1939, Dies added "that unless Congress sees fit to provide us with that assistance it would be futile to under- take to go through the tremendous difficulties again that we have encountered in the last six months."90 Reaction to the work of the HCUA during its first year was mixed and severe. The Chicago Tribune reaffirmed its support of the Dies Committee and attributed many of its dif- ficulties to the revolutionaries in the New Deal who opposed 91 On the other side of the the committee and its activities. ledger, the Egg 2.9.2.15. TM,” the §_t_. £39}; Post-Dispatch,93 and the Christian Centurzgl4 stigmatized the methods of the Dies Committee as being unfair and expressed doubt about the validity of the committee's findings. As a conclusion to this extended discussion of the work of the HCUA in its initial year of operation, the fol- lowing evaluation by Ogden of the committee's 1938 annual 99.22% 2.13.1. December 17, 1933. 90%- 91MB 112-2938.. January 5, 1939. 92.1123. 3211s 11.2%, January 4, 1939. 93.53;. MPost-Dispatch, January 4, 1939. 9“Christian Centu , 55 (1938). 54 report represents a fair appraisal: It is obvious that the report has value only to the extent that the hearings have value. But they, despite real intrinsic worth, must remain suspect because of the methods and procedures used. The Committee was not created to prove that an investi- gation was needed. It was set up to investigate un-American activities and the impartial observer must admit that it failed to do so, while it was guilty of using unfair and inefficient methods. The lack of funds may partially explain, but it does not justify, the methods used. g; ends justify ggz,means, then Ehg'methods of Ehg_Dies Committee 255 Just1fied, because it undoubtedly Egi a good 1 ' 0 means e BroEEr end nten ed $5 essen- t1a y un-Kfierican as we 25 un-Cfir1st1an an orms the bas1s of many of_the most flagrantly unjust actions of Hitler and Stalin. Hence the end of the Dies Committee, or its lack of funds, does not justify the means that were employed in the first phase of its existence.95 end, t e nvestiEat1on g_ unnAmerican actiVities. But t e philosog z the Just1f1cation 2f impropgr cause L th With the overwhelming support of the House, including an increased appropriation of $100,000 the Dies Committee began its second year of operation with renewed vigor.96 Again, Dies repeated his promises that the HCUA would learn from its mistakes and in the future would hold hearings that would be dignified and judicial.97 Judging by the responses of a number of reliable sources, the 1939 hearings revealed improvements in the procedures employed by the committee.98 The‘gg. Louis Post-Dis atcb, for example, a consistent critic 9 5Ogden, The Dies Committee, pp. 107-108. Emphasis added. """ 96 002g. Rec.,February 3, 1939, p. 1128. 97New York Times, May 16, 1939. 98Ogden, The Dies Committee, p. 117. 55 of the committee, praised it for properly documenting its charges and for adhering to the rules of evidence.99 Ogden credits the committee's improved method and technique to Rhea Whitley, the new counsel for the Dies Committee.100 The focus of the first hearings in 1939 related to evidence that showed that a well-organized, anti-Semitic plot had developed in the United States. Commenting on these harings, Ogden writes: Probably few more thoroughly documented cases were ever studied by the Committee. Yet its action in going into a public discussion of the dissemination of reports that were never themselves made public and only vaguely identified as relating to a Jewish Communist plot to overthrow America might well be questioned. 01 Further hearings on the Nazi Bund did not resume until August, 1939, by which time the war clouds were gathering over Europe. The latter months of 1939 saw other public hearings on the GermannAmerican Bund, but "they were spas- modic and not very connected."102 Speaking of this segment of the HCUA's investigations in 1939, Ogden says: The evidence before the Committee would seem to have justified a more detailed study of the native groups and it is not clear why this was not done. The procedure used in the hearings themselves can not be seriously criticized and was far superior to that of the preceding year. 03 99§_t_. LLis Pgst-Djspatch, May 25, 1939. 100Ogden, Igg_gigg_Committee, p. 117. 101%., p. 121. lozlbid., p. 129. 103 ‘ 0 bid . 133. i e th h in . See also Good- man, The ébmmittge, pp. 58-58. B ear gs 56 The signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939, gave Dies an obvious reason to shift the focus of the public hearings to Communism. Thus, the greater part of the subsequent hearings in 1939 dealt with this problem. Ogden's evaluation of the committee's behavior in 1939 gen- erally reflected the press reaction which the HCUA had elicited during its second year of existence: In all fairness it must be recognized that the hearings of 1939 were a tremendous improvement over those of the year before. Method and proce- dure were, save in a few exceptional cases, main- tained on a uniformly high plane. Rhea Whitley, more than any other single factor, seems responsi- ble for this improvement. There was, it is true, evidence of a partial reversion to the lower stand- ards of 1938 in the last two volumes of the hear- ings. . . . Despite this, however, the hearings compare favorably with the average run of investi- gations and exhibit only the faults common to this method of legislative procedure. The same can not be said of other actions of the Committee, such as the publication of the membership list of the.Amer- ican League for Peace and Democracy and the report on the consumers' organizations. ‘As denunciation was to play an increasingly important part in the future history of the Committee and public hearings a decreasingly important rois the former cannot be neglected nor glossed over. 4 For the purposes of this study, two points emerge as significant in connection.with the life of the HCUA in l9h0. First, the number of public hearings held by the Dies Com- mittee began to decrease sharply in 1990, and second, for the first time in its history, the committee exercised its power to cite for contempt on five occasions in 19h0. In regard to the first point, increasing concern over the war in 10“Ogden, The Dies Committee, pp. 17#-175. 57 Europe diminished the spotlight on the committee, and Dies was obliged to modify "the work of his Comittee to meet the changed situation."105 His change in approach consisted of (l) a concerted effort to denounce publicly the Trojan Horse, "the enemy from'within,"1°6 and (2) a shift away from the use of public hearings (primarily for security reasons) to exten- sive use of executive or closed hearings.107 Although, fre- quently, enough information was released about the executive sessions to sustain public interest,108 the information made available was insufficient to allow for much in the way of reliable description of the procedures employed by the com- mittee in the hearings. The second point-~that the HOUR exercised its contempt power for the first timeo-is significant for two reasons: (1) it indicated that witnesses had begun to refuse to comply with questions raised by the committee, or to refuse to produce papers that had been requested, a pattern.which was to become more and more prevalent during the HCUA's next twenty years of operation; and (2) these contempt citations were the beginnings 1osOgden. ghg.Dies Cbmmittee, p. 207. 106 Beeilartin Dies, The Trojan Horse in.America (New York, l9“0).'which appeared on t e eve of the—1955 elections. 107Ogden, The Dies Committee, p. 209. 103nm. , p. 211. .. . ——-‘ —— o s —— o — - --.—~-——- 58 of what was to become an unparalleled exercise of this congressional power by the HCUA.109 With the fall of France weighing heavily on most Americats' minds. the Dies Co-ittee began the year l9hl at what Ogden called "the height of its popularity."]'10 Although Dies had introduced a resolution calling for the continuation of the co-ittee, it was not until February that it was given authorization by the House to operate until August 1, 19152.111 Very few public hearings were held in 19h1, and according to Ogden, Dies had functioned, for the most part, as a "one-man" conittee: Somewhere beWeen the fall of France and 7 Dec- ember 19151 the Co-ittee, as far as the public record indicates, had disappeared. Its place had been taken by a one-man agency which could not properly be called administrative and yet could not be called legislative. The informa- tion gathered by the investigators was utilized by the Chairman who, to all intents and purposes 1'09The five witnesses cited for contempt, and the dis- position of their cases were: James H. Dolsen, acquitted by the District Court; George Powers, pleaded nolo contenders in District Court; was sentenced to six months, suspended, and fined $150; Philip Frankfeld, dismissed in 191-i7 upon the motion of the Government; Albert Blumberg, found guilty of contempt in 19156, sentenced to thirty days, suspended, and fined $150. Each of these men was cited by the sum for contempt of Congress because of his refusal to answer ques- tions directed to him by the co-ittee during hearings in 19.0. See William Hits, "Criminal Prosecution for Contempt of ggyess,” 192:. Federal 9;; Journal XIV (April-June, 1954‘). Pa e 1J-OOgden The Dies %ttee p. 231. See 3130 Goodman, The Wee, pp. - I 1410.8. Cogg. Rec., 77th Cong., lst Sess., February 8, 19‘1' P. 817. 59 had become, more than anything else, a denunciatory agency. Dies seemed to be attempting to inaugurate a system whereby a Federal employee could be dismis- sed without the least opportunity to defend himself. In the process of denunciation it seemed. that no account was to be taken of the person's actual senti- ments or actual record. The least connection with front organizations, even years ago, was considered to have waffgd permanent corruption for such Federal employees. Within four days after Pearl Harbor, Dies announced that the HCUA had subpoenaed fifty-two witnesses on Japanese activities prior to that "day of infamy."u'3 The public hearings, however, failed to materialize as the Attorney General, after consultation with the President and the State Department, declined to give approval.u“ In the early months of l9h2 notice was given of other scheduled hearings, hearings that would deal with topics ranging from Bundist and anti-Semitic activities to the Ku Klux Klan and the Union for Democratic Action.u'5 Home of these projected hearings, however, was realized. The bulk of the cousittee's work in 191-#2 consisted of investigations which resulted in written reports, without benefit of public hearings.“6 lJ-ZOgden, IE. 93; Co-ittee, p. 2G9. “352; 1955 $1.59. and mg m, December 11, 194.1. 1115M. 1150.3" Congress, House, mag; $132535, 29, Subversive Activities Aimed at Destro in our Re resentative Form 0 Uggernment, 77th Eng" 2% Sess., eport 0. H77, 1952'.- 1158ee U.S.. Congress, House, Special Conittee on [In-American Activities, Report 95 Jamnese Activities, 77th Cong., 2d 83..., 1.9“2. 60 Despite the lack of public hearings during 1942, serious reservations about the methods used by the HCUA were voiced repeatedly by Representative Jerry voorhis, a member of the committee. Anyone studying the record of the Dies Committee cannot help but be impressed by the consist- ently reasonable and objective behavior of Voorhis. His minority report, which was submitted along with the committee's majority report on the union for Democratic.Action in June, l9h2, not only criticized the methods of the Dies Committee but also spelled out a policy that the committee would have done well to have followed: The position of the minority is, however, that when the majority accuses people of being unnAmerican because their political or economic views are at variance with those of the majority it is committing an error which is not only contrary to every tradi- tion of democratic government but is of a sort that no committee of this character can commit and con- tinue to do effective work against subversive ele- ments. To include the long list of people in the chart presented by the committee and put into it the names of people who by no stretch of the imagin- ation can be considered Communists is to strike a blow at liberty of the most serious kind. . . . .All the minority is contending for is the right of loyal‘American citizens to disagree politically with a majority of the Dies Committee'without being branded as subversive and unquerican.117 The tenure of the Dies Committee was extended into 18 19h3 by another overwhelming majority,1 and the committee was voted an appropriation of $150,000.119 Few meetings 9“ 117Ue8ss conga ‘32.! 77th Gong" 2d 33..., June 25’ 1 2. 191.2 ”80.3.. mo . ne___c.. 77th Conan 2‘1 8'3“" “m“ 11' ‘ 119 Ibid.,.April 25, l9h2. 61 120 and the only were held by the Dies Committee in 19h3, public hearings dealt with problems related to the Japanese relocation centers. Prior to the opening of the hearings in June, l9k3, Jerry Voorhis had left the committee, announcing that it had become "more and more a political instrument of definite conservative bias, and less and less a dignified, important, and effective congressional committee.“121 With the war absorbing national and world attention in l9h3, it is understandable that the Dies Committee had difficulty in generating front-page news. Thus its limited activities wrought limited publicity in 19h3. What little comment there was concerning the l9h3 public hearings was generally moderate and balanced}-22 With its annual appropriation cut in half,123 the ‘work of the Dies Committee in l9hh, its final year, proved to be an.anti-climsx.12u Only one day of hearings was held,125 and in their place Dies devoted most of his energies to uttering denunciations, and making declarations that various attacks on the HCUA were part of a plot to destroy 12°suck1ey‘2susl. The Committee and Its Critics, p. 103. 1210. 10' 1%3. 1220gden, The Dies Committee, p. 286. 123 U.S. . 78th Co . 2d Sass. January 26, 19”. 9 m has“ “3 s 9 lauOgden, m Dies Couittee, pp. 29n-29s. 2 1 5Beck, Conte_m_2t g; Cameos, p. 18. 8., Cogg. Rec., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., February 62 congressional government.126 Ogden, in concluding his study of the Dies Committee, remarks . . . that the said Committee was neither an ideal nor a desired means of exposi subversive activi- ties. It did not wholly fail n its endeavors, but with different methods and better procedure, it could have performed far more efficient service. Hence, without disparaging the accomplishments of the Committee or impugning the motives of any per- son connected with it, it must be admitted that the history of the Committee reveals it to have failed in its essential purpose. It stands in the history of the House of Representatives as an example of what an investigating committee should not be. The recital of that failure may well serve to point the way that should be followed in the future. 27 The HCUA becomes rmanent, l9h5-l960.--The present House Committee on UhnAmerican.Activities is the direct descendant of the seven-year-old Dies Committee which ter- minated its "temporary" status in l94h.128 In January, 1945, at a time when it was thought that the Dies Cbmmittee at long last was to be- come a thing of the past, the House of Represent- atives suddenly approved a proposal that the in- vestigation of unquerican activities be made a permanent one, and the present standing cosmittee was created.129 Almost before the House realized what was happening, Mississippi's JohnfiRankin relied upon his keen knowledge of parliamentary procedure to get the resolution to establish the HCUA before the chamber. 126 12 Ogden, The Dies Committee, p. 290. 7Ibid., p. 296. 128Buckley gangl, The Committee and Its Critics, p. 98. 1290.11,, The House Co-ittee an. tin-American Activi- Eéfiln l22§=l2§23 P. I}. 63 Before the House could act upon the routine resolution establishing the rules of the 78th Congress as the rules of the 79th Congress, Representative Rankin proposed an amendment to these rules, establishing the Unquerican Acti- vities Committee. By making the proposal before the rules were adopted he avoided having his amendment sent to the Rules Committee. .At first it looked as though Rankin's procedural coup would be unsuccessful, for the amendment was defeated upon division 13k to 146. Rankin then called for a record vote and the unnAmerican 130 Activities Committee was established 207 to 186. The 19h5 resolution provided for the establishment of a permanent standing committee of nine members with powers and duties quite similar to those granted the Dies Committee in 1938.131 The record compiled by the Unquerican.Activities Committee for 19us and 19u6 was unflmpressive.132 In 19u5 the HCUA conducted two brief sets of hearings. One set dealt with radio publicity sponsored by the Office of Price Administration, and the other with the Communist Party of 133 the United States. Ho witnesses were cited for contempt as a result of the committee's hearings in 1945.13“ 130Beck, Contempt p§_Copg£ess, pp. 18-19. 1”Carr, T e House Committee on unnamericanxActi- vitie , p. 23. resolution will 5; quota .E. discussed in Chapter III. 1321b1d. 133See U.S., Co ess, House, Investi ations of Oh- American Pro anda.Act vities in the Ufiited States Tfiffice ice Hmifistrations, June 20,71 27, 1957; and Investi- o ations of Uhquerican Pro anda.Activities ip|the te tates (Can-unist Party}, September 26, 27. OctobEF’79-l9, l9h5. 13hbeck, Contempt p§.Copgress, p. 19. ”w .. 6a In 19h6 only three days of hearings were conducted, and nothing of consequence to the legislative purpose of the HCUA resulted from them. In terms of the rights of witnesses, however, it must be observed that the committee began to utilize its power to cite recalcitrant witnesses for congres- sional contempt with a flurry: During 1946 the committee subpoenaed twenty persons who testified in sessions, the records of which were ultimately released to the public. Eighteen of these were cited for contempt. In additional testimony taken in executive session never made public, four more persons were cited. These twenty-two persons were subpoenaed to pro- duce the records of organizations which the comp 135 mittee felt were engaged in subversive activities. Among those cited for contempt in l9h6 were Dr. Edward .K. Barsky and Miss Helen.R. Bryan, chairman and executive secretary, respectively, of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. Both were cited for contempt because of their refusal to comply with the HCUA's subpoena requesting that they produce the agency's files and records. Both Barsky and Bryan, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, were eventually convicted of contempt of Congress by the Federal Court of Appeals.136 Thus the Brzan and Derek: decisions decisions were to be but the first of a series of judicial rulings stemming from.investigstions by the HCDA which were to influence the course of congressional inquiries over the 135Beck, Contempt‘pg_Copgpess, p. 19. 136See united States v. Brpan, F. Supp. 58 (D.C.. 1987); and Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 281 (App. D.C., 19h8), cert. denied 335 U.S. ens (l9u8). 65 next fifteen years. In regard to the l9h6 hearings and the resulting contempt citations, it should be pointed out that the House resolution embodying the citations was vigorously debated, not only with respect to its substance but also in connection.with the role and procedure of the HCIIA.137 Pinally, to demonstrate that the court decisions arising out of the contempt citations initiated by the HCUA in 1996 strengthened the constitutional position of the committee, Beck summarizes: Important points of law were developed as a result of these cases. It was held that the exist- ence of a quorum of the committee could only be challenged during the hearing, not upon trial; it was held that testimony taken during investigations was admissible in the trial even though it was to be used to incriminate the witness; it was held that a trial jury may be composed of government employees even though their freedom of dec sion may be restricted by government loyalty oaths and security programs; it was held that the committee could subpoena docu- ments particularly where there existed some evidence of subversive activities; it was held that a member of a board of directors of an organization.was respon- sible for corporate decisions; it was held that the witness cannot decide what is pertinent and not perti- nent because he might well challenge all questions; it was held that freedom of speech was not unduly impinged by an investigation into political associ- ations; and finally it was held that the resolution establishing the Couittee on Ila-American Activities and the subpoenas issued by the committee did not suffer from.the vice of vsgueness.13 As a result of the Republican victory in the 19h6 Congressional election, personnel changes took place on the 137U.s. 60%., we, 79th Cong., 2d- se..m’ 19‘66. ”snack. ____p__Conte- t 2!; 29.112.112.11. pp- 35-35- 66 HCUA which were to pave the way for increased activity by the committee during the 80th Congress.139 ‘With Representa- tive J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey chairing the Republican dominated committee, changes in organization and policies were set in motion in early 1947 which included the following eight-point program: (1) to expose and ferret out the communists and Com- munist sympathizers in the Federal Government; (2) to spotlight the spectacle of having outright Communists controlling and dominating some of the most vital unions in American labor; (3) to institute a counter educa- tional program against the subversive propaganda which has been hurled at the American people; (4) investi- gation of those groups and movements which are trying to dissipate our atomic knowledge for the benefit of a foreign power; (5) investigation of Communist in- fluences in Hollywood; (6) investigation of Communist influences in education; (7) organization of the research staff so as to furnish reference service to Members of Congress and to keep them currently in- formed on all subjects relating to subversive and un- American activities in the United States; and (8) continued accumulation of files and records to be placed at the disposal of the investigaiage units of the Gwernment and the armed forces. “By 1947 postwar relations between the Uhited States and the Soviet union had deteriorated to a point where the 139Four Democrats were placed on the committee: Rankin fromfiMississippi, Wood from Georgia, Peterson from Florida, and Bonner from North Carolina. Bonner resigned from the committee at the end of 1947 and was replaced by Hebert of Louisiana. The four Republicans, in addition to chairman Thomas, were McDowell from Pennsylvania, Nixon from California, Vail from Illinois, and Mandt from South Dakota. 1“00.8., Congress, House, Re ort 2g the Committee pp_ UnnAmerican.Activities to the united tates-House p§.Re re- sentatives, 85th Cong.,-2d Sess., Committee Print, Decefiber 31, 19:3, P- 67 danger from communism became the all-consuming interest of the House committee."1u1 The HCUA held seven sets of hearings which occupied twenty-seven days during 1947.1!"2 Four of the hearings concerned prominent members of the Communist movement: Gerhart Dialer, Leon Josephson, Eugene Dennis, and Hans Eisler. The other three focussed on legislative pro- posals to curb the Communist Party, communism in labor unions, and communism in the motion picture industry. Of the ninety-seven persons who were subpoenaed to appear before the committee in 1947, thirteen were cited for contempt.:l'b'3 All thirteen "challenged the power of the committee to in- quire into political beliefs."1uu Although the HCUA conducted only three sets of public hearings in 1948, the hearings covered a span of thirty-five days and were to prove "more consequential than any others conducted by the committee since Representative Dies started his investigations in l938."]'uS In 1948 the committee conducted hearings on pro- posed legislation to outlaw the Communist Party, investigated the Alger Hiss-Wbittaker Chambers 1“ICarr, The use Committee pp.Unquerican.Activi- SieoW:_-Po %“. ""'"""" """'"'"'""‘" 1“21b1d. 1‘3Beck, Contempt p§_Copgress, p. 41. 1"“Ibid. 1M"Carr, The House Comittee pp Un-American Acti- 68 controversy and began an investigation into the charge that atom bomb secrets were being passed on to Soviet agents. The first is significant because it is one of the few times that the com- mittee has taken testimony from experts, including law professors, opposed to the proposed legisla- tion. The second is important because the subse- quent conviction of.Alger Hiss for perjury con- vinced many private citizens of the necessity and worth of this investigatory committee. The third set of hearings ultimately led to a contempt cita- tion when a :itness pleaded the Fifth Amend- lent. e s e1 Again, in 1947 and 1948, as had been true in the previous years of the committee's existence, criticismnwas leveled at the HCUA's procedure and its failure to pursue in its hearings lines of inquiry which‘would lead to results which might prove to be more germane to its legislative purpose. For example, Carr's appraisal of the Hollywood hearings was characteristic of much of the criticism: By and large, the Hollywood hearings reveal the committee at its worst. In no other committee undertaking were the motivating forces of politics and the personal prejudices of the committee meme bers more apparent; in no other hearing were the over-all strategy and specific procedures more subject to criticiom; no other major investigation of the committee ever ended so anticlimatically or produced so little tangible evidence in suppori 9f a thesis which the committee set out to prove. 4 On the basis of decisions handed-down in the thirteen 148 contempt cases, the courts clearly indicated that the lusbeck, Contempt p£_Copgresp, pp. 41-42. l"‘7Carr, no; Houpe Committee 2:; tin-American Activi- tiep, 1945-1950, p. 55; see also Myron.8. Rudd, “CEngres- sional Power of Investigation and Freedom of Speech, with Reference to the Unquerican.Activities Committee," Uni- verpitz p§_Cincipppti Llw'Review’XVII (1948), pp. 264:276. 1&9All were convicted. 69 judiciary "favors a presumption of legislative good faith and legislative purpose in matters of national security over the individual interest in freedom of political opinion and affiliation."1'"9 Coupled.with the presumption n150 stated in United tates v. Brza that"the relevancy and the materiality of the subject matter must be presumed," the majority of the courts in the thirteen contempt cases supported the position taken by Justice Jackson in Ejsler v. United States:151 I should not want to be understood as approving the use the Committee on UheAmerican.Activities has frequently made of its power. But I think it would be an unwarranted act of judicial usurpation to strip Congress of its investigatory power, or to assume for the courts the function of super- vising congressional committees. I should affirm the judgment below and leave the responsibility for the behavior of its committees squarely on the shoulders of Congress. That Congress was satisfied.with the work of the HCUA in 1947 and 1948 is evident. The contempt citations were given little deliberation by the House, in spite of the fact that the citations usually eliminated the possibility of eliciting further information from the‘witnesses, information which might result in preventative legislation.152 lhgneck, Contempt p§_§ppg£gpp, pp. 58-60. ISOSee United States v. Bgzan, 72 F. SUPP- 58 (19“7)° 15121.1” v. United States, 338 0.3. 189 (1949). 152Beck, Contempt p§,Copgress, pp. 57-62. 70 During the Slst Congress the HCUA had a large turn- over in.membership and continued to conduct its business on a larger scale than ever before. Of its nine members, only John‘wood, who resumed the chairmanship, and Richard Nixon carried over from the 80th Congress.153 Representa- tive Francis E. Halter of Pennsylvania, one of the four new Democrats to take seats on the committee, was to serve as the HCUA's chairman during the 1960 hearings at San Fran- cisco. ‘ The increased activity of the committee is reflected in the increased number of hearings which it conducted in l9u9 and 1950. Thirty-four days of hearings were held in l9h9 and BeventY-four days in 1950.15“ The subject matter of the hearings ranged widely, and seemed to reflect the committee's desire to "subject subversive activity in the United States to broad, systematic investigation."155 Carr observes that "with few exceptions, the hearings of this period are marked by futility. They attracted little 153Four new Democrats took seats on the committee: in addition to Halter, they were: Burr Harrison of Virginia, John McSweeney of Ohio, and Morgan Moulder of Missouri. In addition to Nixon, the other Republicans were: Francis Case of South Dakota, Harold Velde of Illinois, and Barnard Kearney of New York. Nixon resigned from the committee late in 1950, and his place was tken by Donald Jackson of Calif- ornia. IsuCarr,.2§g,House Committee on UnnAmericanHActivi- tie , l9h5-l950, p. £33. The totaI'Ef'TEU days of hearings ur ng the 81st Congress compares with sixty-two days during the 80th Congress, and only twelve days during the 79th Congress. 1551b1d., p. 167. 7l attention when held; . . . and they have seemingly had little influence."156 Concerning the conduct of the hearings in “#9 and 1950, it appears that the co-ittee's preliminary prepara- tion was more carefully executed than in previous years , and that it adhered to more fair and Just procedures in the hearings.157 The major procedural improvements included the permitting of witnesses to consult with counsel, to make brief oral statements, and to file longer written statements.”8 Fifty-six of the more than 250 persons who testified at hearings conducted by the HCUA during the 81st Congress were cited for contempt.“9 All fifty-six hd refused to answer questions on claims based upon the fifth .endment. Once again Congress failed to demonstrate much concern over the behavior of its co-ittee, at least on the basis of the cursory consideration it gave all but one of the fifty-six" citations. mly the resolution citing Julius lmspak was given careful scrutiny by the House.160 The position of the acne in 1%9-1950 regarding the applicability of the fifth amendment to questions asked 155mg. 157 ids. PP. 159-170; also see Back, Contempt 9; m0... P- . 1581! NO 159%. £2a__.2.t¢- t 2!. 92522:.» p. 65- 1”0.3., $95. 2.9., 81st Cong., 24 s“... 1950. ”-5- 72 by a congressional committee may be sunarized as follows: . . . the connittee recognized that the witness had the right to refuse to answer questions that might be incriminatory; the comittee denied that the ques- tions that it asked were of that nature; further, the conittee maintained that in all cases the Fifth Amendment plea must be clearly and precisely stated; lastly, the comittee held that if a witness answered that he was a member of the Communist Party, he waiied all future recourse to the self-incrimination plea. 51 All fifty-six defendants eventually were acquitted by the courts, most of them at the level of the District Court}62 Although not decided until 1955, the significant cases were the 1.032163 and 921M164 decisions which were discussed earlier in this chapter. In em, The Courts had established a preemption in favor of the witness by ruling that questions which might furnish a link in the chain of evidence for possible prosecution were incriminatory, and that even oblique reference to the Fifth Amendment was adequate to invoke that privilege.)-65 Continuing its investigations on an increasingly active scale, the anus spent ll“ days in public hearings during the 82nd Congress, at which more than 300 persons testified.“66 A majority of the witnesses refused to 16J'Beck, Contempt 9_f_ Cogress, p. 81. 162 Ibid. 16§§pppp§,v.‘Q§§322_States, 3u9 U.S. 190 (1955). 15“m v. 2.4.224. m, 3u9 U.S. 155 (1955). 1653mk, Contempt 9; Copgress, p. 91. 1551b14., p. 92. 73 answer questions posed by the committee, but only three were charged with contempt.167 In general, a number of signs of improvement were evident in the hearings conducted in 1951 and. 1952.168 The methods and procedures of the canittec seemed to be more fair than had usually been the case. Witnesses were per- mitted to consult with their attorneys and almost all of them were allowed to voice protests against the actions of the committee.169 Similarly, the House of Representatives used improved procedures in dealing with the contempt cita- tions presented to it by the HCUA. Unlike the cursory treat- ment given similar citations during the 81st Congress, the three citations initiated by the HCUA during the 82nd Con- gress received consideration by the House. "Although much of the discussion was superficial and oversimplified, the major constitutional issues were at least present for explicit reference.17o Finally, it should be noted that the court cases arising from the three contempt citations proved to be relatively unimportant.171 With the Republican Party's recovery of control in the House in 1953, Representative Harold Velde of Illinois 167%. 1’681_[_l_>_i_._<1., p. 99. 1'593eck, Contempt 9; Copgpess, p. 99. 170%. 17122.... 74 succeeded‘wood as chairman of the HCUA; and he led the com- mittee to a new record for any congressional investigating 172 committee in the nation's history. During the 83rd Con- gress the HCUA . . . spent 178 days gathering testimony from.over 650 witnesses, 350 of whom plead the Fifth.Amend- ment. The committee initiated contempt proceedings ainst twenty-six persons, retracted one, and sub- tted three reports to the Speaker of the House for his certification at a time when Congress was not in session. Of these twenty-six citations, eighteen ‘ware ipgcerned with improper use of the Fifth Amend- ment o The 178 days of hearings were held in.Washington, Los Angeles, New York,.Albany, Columbus (Ohio), Lansing, (Michigan), San.Diego, Seattle, Portland (Oregon), and Miami. The general areas of education and entertainment were the chief investigative targets during the 83rd Congress. For the purposes of this study, it is pertinent to report that the record of convictions for contempt as a result of the hearings of the HCUA indicates that witnesses 1721n l953-l95h, congressional investigations into Communist activities reached a new peak. Three major comp mittees were investigating subversion: the Permanent Sub- committee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senator McCarthy, Chairman; the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Jenner, Chairman; and the HCUA. In addition, Senator Butler from Maryland of the Subcommittee on Internal Security was placed in charge of a task force to investigate Communist influence in labor unions, and a select committee was established by the House for investigation of research foundations, Representative Reece, chairman. 1733eck, Contempt p§.Copgress, p. 101. 75 can rely upon the fifth amendment to protect themselves from successful prosecution.173 Furthermore, in connection with the hearings of the HOUR during the 83rd Congress, it should be recalled that the contempt charges against Watkins and Barenblatt were brought as a result of their behavior before the committee in hearings conducted in 195“. It should also be noted here that the HCUA adopted a set of formalised rules of procedure at the outset of the 83rd Congress . 17“ These rules of procedure will be dis- cussed in Chapter III of this study. At this point it is only necessary to stress that the rules of procedure are not actually very meaningful because all of those rules which contain restraints upon the committee "can be overridden by the co—ittec itself ."17'5 I Hearings during the 84th Congress were conducted by the HCUA in Washington, D. C., New York, New Jersey, Illin- ois, Wisconsin, California, Washington State, San Ftancisco, Youngstown (Ohio), New Haven (Connecticut), Los Angeles, St. Louis, Seattle, Chicago, and Denver}76 A total of 529 wit- nesses were subpoenaed to testify before the HCUAJ"77 1-738ae Beck, Contempt 2; Comcgg. PP- 2254270 l'7“See list of HCUA publications available from the U.S. Government Printing Office. l'758eck, Contempt ngon ess, p. 99. l'768ee list of HCUA publications available from the U.S. Government Printing Office. 1'77!)onner, The tin-Americans, p. 117. 76 Although #64 of these witnesses could be classified. as "unfriendly," only nine citations for contempt reached the courts.178 None of the contempt cases decided prior to May, 1960 effected any significant changes in the position of the judiciary with regard to the congressional investiga- tory power. As in the previous years of its history, the connittec was no less controversial.179 During the 85th Congress the HCUA questioned #20 persons, of whom twelve were cited for contempt of Con- gress.]'80 Chief among those cited for contempt were Ftank Wilkinson and Carl Braden, both of whom eventually had their convictions confirmed by the United States Supreme Court.181 Wilkinson refused to testify on the grounds that the questions were not "pertinent“ and that the conittee's probe violated. rights guaranteed him under the first amendment. Unlike Wilkinson, Braden relied. only upon the ruling in Watkins as his rationale for refusing to answer questions put to him by the HCUA. In deciding both cases, the Supreme Court held that the ruling in Barenblatt was controlling.)-82 1'7sBeck, Contempt 9_f_ Copgrelsms, PPo 227"228° 1'798ee New York Times, August 3a 19550 18”Beck, Contempt g; Copgre__ss, Po 223; 233-239- 1818ee Wilkinson v. United. States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); “d- Braaen 7o United gtate', 333 UoSo “31 (1961’s 1828ee Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 1431 (1961). 77 Hearings again were held in San Francisco in 1957, as well as in New Orleans, Baltimore, Newark, New York, 183 In Chicago, Buffalo, New Haven, and washington, D.C. 1958 the committee journeyed to Gary (Indiana), Buffalo, .Atlanta, New York, and Los.Angeles to augment the hearings which it conducted in Washington, D.C.lsu The committee's hearings included inquiries into Communist infiltration in industry, the arts, and the communications systems of several government agencies, as well as investigations into Communist propaganda from abroad, Soviet espionage, Comp munist treason, and.World Communism.185 None of the con- tempt citations which reached the courts affected the legal status of the congressional investigatory power to any significant degree.186 The pattern of behavior of the HCUA during the 86th Congress showed little evidence of any marked deviations from.that of previous years. In 1959, for example, . . . the Committee took extended testimony on Soviet espionage, terror, and internal security operations from.a former officer in the Soviet state security system. In two separate hearings 183See list of HCUA publications available from.the U.S. Government Printing Office. “Hind. 1351b1d. 186For an interesting account of the 1958 hearings by a defender of the HCUA see Buckley et al, The Committee 95g Its Critics, Chapter 5, pp. 118-147.- The-I957 IEunity .Act‘5111 be discussed, in relation to investigations, in Chapter III of this study. 78 it continued its investigation of the Communist Party in California. In Pittsburgh the Committee studied the current strategy and tactics of the Communist Party, the problems of industrial se- curity, and problems arising from denaturaliza- tion and deportation proceedings. In Chicago the Committee held hearings in its continuing investigation of Communist penetration of basic industries. In Washington the Committee held the first of a series of hearings on the Com- munist training operations.137 ”The 1960 activities of the House group are fairly representative of what it has been doing since world war II.”188 Without doubt, the most extensively publicised and criticized hearings conducted by the HCUA during the 86th Congress were those which serve as the focal point of this study-athe hearings at San Francisco in Buy, 1960.189 The demonstrations which accompanied and disrupted the San Francisco hearings did much to blur the substance and methods of the actual interaction between the committee and the witnesses. Release of the disputed fibm, "Operation ,Abolition," by the HCUA following the hearings, only served to increase the confusion and to accelerate the controversy. .As a.writer in the New York Times expressed it, the faults and virtues of the HCUA "are argued in editorial columns, 187Buckley g£_£p, The Committee and Its Critics, p. 115. 188 New York Times, Mmrch 5, 1961, p. 27. 189See Chapter III for discussion of factors sur- rounding the 1960 San Francisco hearings. 79 in the country's pulpits and-~not least-~on the bench of the Supreme Court."190 §ggpp£z,--In spite of the necessary oversimplifi- cation of the preceding historical account of the HCUA from.1938 to 1960, it is sufficient to enable one to con- clude that the nature of the committee's behavior and image has varied little during its twenty-three year history. Ivan a somewhat limited examination, such as that just described, reveals that the three basic assumptions posited at the outset of this section are valid ones. First, the Dies Committee and the present HCUA have operated largely in a climate of controversy varying only in intensity.191 Second, the public hearings conducted by the committee do provide motivation for much of the controversy in which the HCUA is bathed. .And, third, the vast majority of the criticism of the HCUA up until 1960 has been directed at the methods and procedures of its investigations. Finally, it should be pointed out that two other assumptions stated at the beginning of this section have been supported as well. First, on the basis of available data which indicate that of the 245 persons cited for contempt by all congressional committees between 19h5 and 190New York‘Times, March 5, 1961, p. 27. 191Material relevant to the critical points of view toward the HCUA‘will be elaborated upon in Chapter III. 80 1958, 14A of these citations were initiated by the HCUA,192 it is apparent that the committee has brought more contempt proceedings against witnesses than any committee of either house of Congress. Second, as the discussion of the Br an, Barskz, Emspak, QpippJ‘Watkins, and Barenblatt cases indi- cates, the HCUA.has been the source of those contempt cita- tions which have provided the bases for the leading court decisions concerning congressional investigatory power. With the description of the broad perspective accounting for the status of congressional investigatory power and the salient behavior pattern of the HCUA com- pleted, the study will now concern itself with the specific extrinsic factors which comprised the context in which the 1960 San Francisco hearings were conducted. 192See Back, Contempt pg_Copgresg, pp. 238-2h9. CHAPTER III THE 1960 SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS: CONSTITUENTS OF THE MWICATION SITUATION In this chapter the broad perspective which was developed in the preceding chapter will be narrowed down to focus upon the more specific factors which are germane to a consideration of the HCUA's rhetorical and dialecti- cal behavior during the public hearings at San Francisco in.May, 1960. These factors will be discussed under three general headings: (1) the climate of opinion in which the HCUA operated at San Francisco in 1960; (2) the specific legislation which affects the powers and duties of the HCUA; and (3) the participants in the hearings at San hancisco in May, 1960. 1h; Climate 9; Opinion Any attempt to determine cause and effect relation- ships, with any degree of reliability, concerning the events leading up to, during, and after the HCUA hearings at San Francisco infiMay, 1960, is extremely difficult. The wealth of data available which purports to assess causation is unusually contradictory and generally reflects strong 81 82 biases consistent with the political attitudes of the reporting source.1 In short, the only generalization one can make with certainty-«one that the conflicting reports agree upon-«is that the San Francisco hearings were con- ducted in an atmosphere of i-aediate hostility and anta- gonism.2 This climate of controversy in which the HCUA conducted its hearings in May, 1960, was consistent with the atmosphere which pervaded most of the investigations throughout its history. The situation at San Francisco, however, was perhaps even more volatile than that in which the couittee had found itself in any of its previous investigations.3 In the words of the HCUA, it ”completed its 3-day hearing in San Francisco under the most trying 1-See the following sources for the views of the HCUA's supporters: Buckley at; 51, Lb; Connittee and 1;; Critics, Chapter 7; U.S., Congress, House, Educate-an mat-fies Comittee, J. Edgar Hoover, Comunist Target-- Youth, 1961. For views of the HCUA's critics see, or exmnple: National Council of The Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Opiration Abolition: Some Facts and Some Consents, New York, ; Americans for Democratic Action, §_a_n_ fian- cisco and the tin-American Activities Comittee, San Fran- cisco,-I9'6r;'-afid issues of New YorE Tfies, Washipgton Po t t e at Nation The New Republic duFi- W follow es s the Retiring-s7- ng ing 28cc any of the sources listed in the previous footnote. 3U.S., Congress, House, Co-ittee on Un-nAmerican Activities, The Comunist-Ied Riots ainst Ih__e_ House Comittee ppm-Erica Activities in an Francisco ., May 151:. ,"TW‘, r—port No. 33287-8???" ong'.', 23 Sess., 1960, p. 2. Hereinafter cited as House Heart 5;. 2228, """"" 83 conditions possible."“ Recognizing the highly emotional and partisan na~ ture of nearly all of the relevant sources, the study will now concern itself with some of the factors which may have contributed to the hostile ammosphere in which the HCUA found itself at San Francisco in May, 1960. grip; 3:3 £135 heaangsuu-There are at least six major reasons which seem to account for the antagonism which was evident at San Francisco at least several months prior to the May, 1960, public hearings. First, the cumulative impact of the HCUA's previous appearances at San Francisco in 1953, 1956, and 1957, had aroused the ire of a large number of influential citizens and organizations.5 Cer- tainly the repercussions in the press concerning the death of scientist William Sherwood, who reputedly had committed suicide rather than appear before the HCUA during its 1957 hearings at San Francisco, provoked a sharp antagonistic response toward the committee.6 Second, the controversial events connected with the issuance of subpoenas by the HCUA to 110 California public “U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un~American Activities Annup; Re rt for the Year 1960 86th Cong. 2d Sess., l9 , p. 2 Hereinaftzr cited as,Annua1 Repprt for 1960. 5Donner, The UhaAmericans, p. 2. 51bid. 84 school teachers in June, 1959,7 apparently gave increased impetus to the hostile attitude toward the committee which existed in the Bay Area. Although the details relating to the timing and intent of the HCUA in issuing the subpoenas are hotly disputed, even FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who the HCUA calls its finest unimpeachable source,"8 admits that this episode fostered opposition to the 1960 hearings: An HCUA inquiry into Communist activities of educators in northern California originally had been scheduled to be held in June, 1959. At that time, widespread opposition to these pro- posed hearings developed among teachers' groups, church organizations, civil liberties groups, and a few newspapers in the San Francisco area. Stu- dent groups to protest the hearings were organized at most of the colleges and universities in the area, including the University of California, Stanford, and City College. The subsequent can- cellation of the proposed 1959 hearings left many of these groups and organizations inactive but intact. .As a result, when the May 1960 hearings were announced, it required little effogt to re~ activate these opposition groups. . . . Third, it is clear that Representative James Roosevelt's speech advocating the abolishment of the HCUA, delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives on April 25, 1960,10 just two-and-one-half weeks prior to the 7Buckley ppupl, The Committee and Its Critics, p. 182. BSee Goodman, The Committee, p. #00 ff. 9Hoover, Communist Target-~Youth, p. h. 10U.S., Copgrepsional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. 85 San Francisco hearings, added fuel to the fire of hostility. Mr. Roosevelt's speech was widely reported in the nation's press, and it was reprinted and given broad distribution by various liberal and leftdwing political organizations.11 Fourth, the intensity of the hostility expressed by college students and faculty members in the Bay Area and, in particular, those at the university of California, further reinforced the strength of the opposition to the HCUA and its proposed 1960 hearings at San Francisco. One liberal publication attributed this reaction to a general concern on the part of the students for civil liberties causes: Political and sociological activity at the University of California, the nation's largest university, reached new heights this year among the students. There was intense activity over the Chessman case, Negro sit-ins down South and suppression of academic freedom as exhibited in the firing of a professor who preached free love to his students. The University's daily student newspaper, with a circulation of about 15,000, editorialized vigorously on all of these and other matters, students participated freely in protests and demonstrations, and a majority of the faculty backed them despite the utter disapproval of President Clark Kerr and other top-ranking officials.12 Fifth, the publicly declared opposition to the HCUA by a number of respected citizens and organizations in the 11Buckley et al, The Committee and Its Critics p. 183. ”The. W. July-August. 1960. p. 6. 86 Bay Area deepened the climate of controversy in which the HCUAuwas to hold its hearings: Sentiment was building in the community in opposition to the proposed hearings. . . the Episcopal Diocese of California, the California State Labor Federation, the San Francisco Labor Council, the California State Federation of Teachers, the Friends Committee on Legislation, San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco News-Call Bulletin ssemEIymen Phillip Burton an o M'C; ell-~all raised their voices in protest. SAFE (San Franciscans for Academic Freedom and Education) was formed by a group of respected citizens who offered support to those who 'refuse to be used as agencies of punishment for the committee.’13 Sixth, and finally, the opposition to the HCUA and its scheduled San Francisco hearings by various Com- munist-dominated organizations probably was a contributing factor to the hostile attitudes and actions directed against the acne.“ During the hearipgs.--The causes and effects of the events which were precipitated during the three days of hearings at San Francisco are even.more conjectural than were those which preceded the hearing dates. An editorial in the San Francipco News-Call Bulletin which commented on the outcome of the jury trial of one of the students who had been arrested for alleged participation in the riot outside the hearing room on May 13, 1960, epitomizes the confusion of those three days in.May: 13ADA, San Francisco and the UhnAmerican Activities _;_Coll__i_._____,ttee p. 1. Infloover, Communist Target-~Youth, assim. 87 The acquittal of Robert Meisenback on charges of clubbing a policeman during the student riots at City Hall was predictable even before the trial ended. The testimon was igywild gggfligg, One some- times Ead the feeling that he was listening to two different sets of people describe two different events remote from each other in time and place.15 In the light of the wild conflict in the various reports of what happened during the May lZ-lk, 1960, HCUA hearings at San Francisco, some attempt should be made to reconcile the conflicting data. Even so, generalizations must be made with care. In spite of the conjecture as to causes, it is clear that the hostile climate of opinion which had been fomented prior to the hearings was sustained throughout the period in which the hearings were conducted. This hostility has been characterized, in part, by the HCUA in the following terms: On the second day of the hearings the party agitated hundreds of their sympathizers into mob v1olence. An extraordinary and shocking situation was created. An air of lawlessness prevailed. With virtual impunity the Communists and their dupes persisted in open and evident defiance of committee processes, which was hailed by the Com- munist Party as a signal accomplishment in their campaign to break down respect for the American system of government. 6 FBI Director Hoover describes the aura of hostility in similarly graphic language: 158an Francisco News-Call Bulletin, May 5 1961. Emphasis aHdE'. ’ lGHouae Remrt lg. 2228, p. 2. 88 With the tension growing, the inevitable happened. Violence flared that afternoon. One of the judges in a.municipal courtroom in City Hall ordered the mob dispersed because the noise made it impossible for him to hold court. When an attempt was made to carry out the order, the crowd responded by throwing shoes and jostling the officers. An officer warned that fire hoses would have to be used if the crowd did not disperse, but the crowd, instigated by Communists who had maneuvered themselves into strategic positions, became more unruly. One of the demonstrators provided the spark that touched off the flame of violence. Leaping a barricade that had been erected, he grabbed an officer's nightstick and began beating the officer over the head. The mob surged forward as if to storm the doors, and a.Police Inspector ordered the fire hose turned on. The water forced the crowd to the head of the balustrade, and the cold water had a sobering effect on the emotions of the demonstrators. For a few minutes, relative quiet ensued. Taking advantage of the lull, police officers began to lead some of the demonstrators sway, advising them that they must obey the order to disperse. Suddenly, realizing what was happening, militant individuals in the group set the pattern for renewed violence by kicking and striking the officers. In all, 68 individuals most of whom were students, were airested for inciting a riot and resisting arrest. As both of the above quotations indicate, the HCUA and Mr. Hoover cast the total blame for the hostile be- havior in and around the San Francisco City Hall during the three days of hearings on the "Cosnunist agitators.“-8 Their assumption as ts the cause of the hostility seems to be 17Hoover, Cmmmmnist TargetudYouth, p. 8. 188cc Annual.Repgrt for the Year 1960, p. 82. 89 that none of the unruly behavior would have occurred bad the Columnists not organized, directed, and agitated the crowds.19 Such a simple assessment of the causes of a situa- tion as complex as the one which existed at San Francisco leaves considerable room for doubt, in the light of the conflicting evidence. For example, the following three pieces of conflicting evidence illustrate the tenuousness of the HCUA and Hoover thesis: first, the fact that organi- zed opposition to the proposed HCUA hearings at San Fran- cisco had originated months previous to the hearings along non-Columnist college students, faculty members, and various respected organizations in the Bay Area;20 second, the fact that a umber of reliable eye-witness accounts reported that no Co-unists had provided leadership for the demonstrations during the three days of hearings;21 and, third, the fact that no Conunists were among the sixty-eight persons who were arrested (all but Meisenbach were later released from police custody)” on charges of incitement to riot and assault.23 19s.. gguae heart g3. 2228, mg. 20See Hoover, Conunigt Target-n-Youth, p. h. 21See, for exaple, National Council of Churches, Ogrgtign nglition: Some Fact; and Some Comments, m. 22Kalamazoo Gazette, May a, 1961, p. 1h. 23See, for example, Martin Mayer, ”The Found Gen- eration,“ The Progressive (March, 1961), p. 10. 90 By the same token, the students' claim that the demonstrations were "spontaneous"2u and devoid of Communist agitation.does not hold up in the light of same of the 25 Even the evidence provided by the reports of the HCUA. National Council of Churches, a severe critic of the HCUA, suggested the possibility that Communists did exert some influence during the three days of hearings: Several admitted Communists were present at City Hall, having been subpoenaed by the Cbmmittee to testify about the activities of the Cbmmunist Party in.California. They tried repeatedly to disrupt the hearings, several were ejected, and a few carried signs for a while in the picket line outside, handed out leaflets on the steps of City Hall, or joined in the shouting and chanting inside.2 Other factors further complicate the problem of determining the causes of the unruly behavior during the 1960 hearings of the HCUA at San Francisco. For instance, in addition to the denial by the students that the protests and demonstrations were Communist inspired and led, a number of first-hand reports of the fire-hosing riot on Friday,.May l3, attribute any violence which took place to the police.27 One ardent critic of the HCUA, The Washington Post, 2“Kalamazoo Gazette, May 4, 1961, p. 1%. 25See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Unquerican Activities, Th5.Truth About The Film "0 ration Abolition," Part 1, House Report No. [2737-87t5 Cong., [st Sess., I931, passim. Hereinafter cited as House Report fig, 1278, Part 1. 26National Council of Churches, Opgration.Abolition: Some Facts and Some Comments, p. 5. 27Ibid. , passim. 91 editorialized: "In point of fact, San Francisco police acted with altogether needless brutality, turning fire hoses on students whose protests were not flagrantly un- ruly."28 The HCUA, Mr. Hoover, and the police attempted to show that this charge was false.29 The preceding excerpts are representative of the serious conflicts in the mass of evidence which purport to explain the causes of the protests and demonstrations against the HCUA.during its hearings at San Francisco in May, 1960. For the purposes of this study, the brief account which has been presented concerning the social setting during the hearings is sufficient to warrant the making of two significant and reliable inferences: (1) that the climate of opinion in which the May, 1960, hearings of the HCUA were conducted was one characterized by a high degree of demonstrated hostility toward the committee; and (2) that it is highly probable that the disputed causes underlying the antagonistic behavior toward the HCUA were multiple and, consequently, included pppp_Communist and non- Commmnist inspiration and leadership. égpgphppg.hearipgs.--The events at San Francisco on Mhy lZ-lfl, 1960, were destined to perpetuate widespread “Lb; W Post, November 26, 1960. 29See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Thg.Truth About the Film “Operation Abolition," Part 2, House Report No. T27§:—87tfi Cong., lst Sess., I531, pp. l9-21. Hereinafter cited as House Report E2, 1278, Part 2 e 92 and vociferous controversy for many months after the close of the hearings. Much of the controversy was generated by the nation's mass media and by widely disseminated publica- tions distributed by various civil liberties groups, both partisans and opponents of the HCUA.3o The real "block- buster," which accelerated and dominated the controversy over the HCUA and the 1960 hearings at San Francisco came in the form of the release of a forty-five minute film entitled "Operation Abolition."31 "Operation.Abolition," so named because the HCUA alleges that the Communist.Party endeavored to use the 1960 San Francisco hearings as another step in its drive to 32 abolish the committee, purports to show that the demon- strations at San Francisco were Communist led and inspired.33 In an unprecedented move by a committee of congress, the HCUA subpoenaed film footage from San Francisco television stations KBON and KPIX, turned it over to a commercial firm inflwashington OHashington‘Video Productions, Incorporated), 30See pamphlet published by the American Civil Liberties Union entitled "Why Should Congress‘Abolish the House uneAmerican Activities Committee?," January, 1961. 31See House Report‘gp, 2223. 321913‘s};Report lg. 1278, Part 1, pp. 5-6. 33Ibid., pp. 2-5. 93 which processed it into the forty-five minute "documentary"3“ which was released to the public. Moreover, the committee broke tradition by submitting the film to the House of 35 Representatives as a part of House Report No. 2228. In- clusion of the film as a part of the report was justified by the HCUA on the ground that the content of the film pro- vided supporting evidence for the legislation introduced by Representative‘Walter which was designed to deal with "the misbehavior of witnesses and spectators before congressional committees."36 In addition to this legislative purpose, the committee offered the following rationale for its authori- zation of "0peration.Abolition:" When the committee learned that extensive cover- age of the rioting and generally disruptive and un- ruly behavior of witnesses and spectators at its San Francisco hearings had been filmed by local tele- vision cameramen, it decided that this film should be subpoenaed. . . . It felt certain that the San Francisco police would be charged with brutality and decided that copies of the film should be made available to them as conclusive photographic evidence of the manner in which they handled the rioters in the San Francisco City Hall.37 3uHouse Repprt HQ, 1278, Part 1, pp. 2-3. 35See House Report fig, 2228 which includes a transcript of the narrat on of the film "Operation "Abolition" on ppm 7‘16. SGIbidg, pp. 2-7. 37House Report E2, 1278, Part 1, p. 2. 94 The film generated prolonged, and frequently vicious, controversy throughout the nation. Charges and counter— charges emanated from the nation's press, civil liberties groups, and conservative political organizations.38 That the criticism of "Operation.Abolition" was regarded as significant by the HCUA is indicated by the fact that the committee, in addition to its other publications concerning the San Francisco hearings, was prompted to publish a lengthy rebuttal of the critics' arguments against the Criticism of the film ranged widely, as did the criticism of the critics by the defenders of the HCUA. Typical of the more severe criticism of the film, and thereby of the committee, was the following castigation by The washington Post: A prOpaganda movie called Opgration Abolition, confected n large part by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, is now being given wide commercial distribution. The movie presents a mendaciously distorted view of the demonstrations staged by a group of college students when the Committee held hearings in San Francisco last May. This is a flagrant case of forgery by film. The film warps the truth in two important respects. First, it suggests as its main thesis that the demonstrations were Communist-inspired and Communist-led. Diligent inquiry has led us to a conviction that this charge is wholly un- justified. . . . In every respect--in its distribution for private 38See previous footnotes in this chapter for ex- amples of the range of critical sources. 39See House Repprt Ep, 1278, Parts 1 and 2. 95 profit, in its falsification of facts, in its whitewashing of the UnnAmerican Activities Committee-~this film.makes a dirty goke of the congressional investigating power.“ On the other end of the critical spectrum, the editors of the Washington Post were no doubt chief targets of the invective of Mr. Buckley and his fellow editors of The National Review: Such is the pattern of innuendo, phrases torn from context, and outright misstatement, which has been used to discredit Opgration Abolition, in the course of the campaign against the House Committee on [In-American Activities. ‘We may well speculate on the condition of minds which resort to such techniques to prove their allegations. 1 Finally, in connection with the climate of opinion which existed at San Francisco in May, 1960, and its sub- sequent impact, it is apparent that it gave additional impetus and momentum to the nationwide campaign against the HCUA. According to the soundtrack of ”Operation Abolition," the movement to abolish the HCUA was begun by the Communist Party on September 20, 1957.“2 In its Annual Repprt for the Year 1960 the HCUA states that: .At the time of the San Francisco hearings, this campaign to abolish the HCUA was spear- headed by two Communist-front organization, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC). “Lie. W ems. November 26. 1960. 1 ulBuckley'p£.gg, The Committee and Its Critics, Po 2 1. """""""' quouse Report pp. 2228, p. 8. 96 with headquarters in New York, and the Citizens Committee to Preseave American Freedom (CCFAF) on the West Coast. 3 The 1960 annual report also contends that following the San Francisco hearings a new national organization was formed which was called the National Committee to Abolish the UnnAmerican.Activities Committee.uu Moreover, according to the report, the NCAUAC was founded and led by eight persons who "have been identified as members of the Comp munist Party."“5 In addition to motivating increased opposition toward the HCUA among these Communist-front organizations, the 1960 committee hearings at San Francisco kindled more concerted attempts among civil liberties groups to bring about the dissolution of the HCUA. For example, both the American Civil Liberties union and the Americans for Democratic Action instigated drives designed to persuade Congress to discontinue the HCIJA.“6 In like manner, uiAnnual Repprt for 1960I p. 62. ““Ibid. “51bid. “6See, for example, the ACLU publications: "Why should Congress.Abolish the House Unquerican.Activities Committee?," January, 1961; and The Case A ainst the House Uh-American.Activities Committee, December, ;.3Iso see the ADAis San Egancisco pp§.ppg,UnnAmerican Activities Committee, 6 . 97 defenders of the committee renewed their attacks upon the critics.“7 Summary.--At least three salient conclusions emerge from the hodge-podge of conflicting data about the events prior to, during, and following the May, 1960, hearings of the HCUA at San Francisco. First, consistent with the pattern of the HCUA's behavior and image during its twenty- two year history, the 1960 San Francisco hearings were con- ducted in a controversial atmosphere. In fact, the immediate social setting, and the subsequent repercussions caused by it, can be fairly characterized as extremely hostile. Second, the controversy engendered by the San Francisco hearings and the accompanying events again demonstrated the ability of the HCUA to obtain extensive coverage of its activities in the nation's mass media.“8 Briefly, to recapitulate, at least seven factors contributed to the resentment toward the HCUA and the resultant nation- wide press coverage: the committee's fourth appearance at San Francisco in eight years; (2) the questionable circum- stances surrounding the committee's issuance of subpoenas to 110 California public school teachers in June, 1959; (3) the speech delivered on the floor of the House of Representa- tives on April 25, 1960, by Representative James Roosevelt “7See, for example, Buckley et al, The Committee and Its Critics 1962; also see numerous *issues of The :KEerican HEFcurz :53 United States News and World Repprt-d-ring the year allowing fie uings. usSee Chapter II of this study. 98 calling for the abolishment of the HCUA; (4) the opposition to the committee and its hearings by various respected organizations in the Bay Area, including college students and faculty members; (5) the opposition to the HCUA hear- ings voiced by Communist and Communist-front organizations; (6) the actual protests, demonstrations, and riots during the hearings at the San Francisco City Hall; and (7) the subsequent release of the film "Operation Abolition" by the HCUA. The third salient conclusion which can be drawn concerning the climate of opinion at San Francisco is more subtle than its two counterparts. It tends to enhance the rationale which underlies this study. In short, the focus upon the methods and procedures actually employed by the HCUA in the San Francisco hearings was virtually obscured by the publicity clamor over the events which took place outside the hearing room. Therefore, unlike so much of the criticism of the HCUA throughout its history, which had been directed at its methods and procedures, the criticism of the San Francisco hearings centered upon events attendant to the hearings. In a sense, then, the climate of opinion was such that it obscured the function and methods of the HCUA at San Francisco.“9 ugNewsweek, May 23, 1960, p. #7. 99 The Legislative Constituents As a second dynamic constituent of the communication situation at San Francisco in May, 1960, the "rules" or "norms" under which the HCUA was supposed to operate need to be considered. Of the many laws which might affect the behavior of the HCUA in the performance of its functions as a congressional investigating committee, only five seem to act as the dominant conditioners of the committee's behavior during its hearings. Four of these "rules" are the direct result of various pieces of Congressional legislation, and the fifth stems from that "legislation" which is embodied in court decisions. 9 The HCUA's enabling act.--It is evident from the . discussion of the 1959 Barenblatt case in the preceding chapter that the mandate under which Congress established the HCUA has been held to be legally valid.so That mandate has remained unchanged since its original adoption during the 79th Congress: The Committee on Un-American.Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (l) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un- American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. soSee Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 100 The Committee on Uh-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recom- mendations as it deems advisable. For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Unquerican Activities, or any sub- committee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member. 1 Under the Rules of the House of Representatives the HCUA, like all standing committees of the House, also is empowered to function as a "watchdog" of the executive branch of the Federal government. As House Rule XII stipulates, To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws the subject matter of which is within the juris- diction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data sub- mitted to the Congress by the agencgss in the executive branch of the Government. At least two observations need to be made concerning the enabling resolution of the HCUA. First, the phrase s10.8., Congress, House, Committee on unquerican Activities, Le islative Recommendations B House Committee pp_Un~American Act1v1t1es, 86th Cong., 2. Sess., 1965, p. iv. szIbid. lOl "unquerican propaganda" is extremely vague, and there- fore, has permitted the committee to claim jurisdiction over virtually any "questions in relation thereto." And, second, unlike most standing committees of Congress whose programs are "determined for them.by the number, kind, and importance 53 of bills referred to them for consideration," the HCUA "has had to devise an investigating program of its own in order to keep busy."5u The HCUA has had very few bills referred to it, and, therefore, has never functioned pri~ marily as a legislative committee, in the usual sense of the term.55 The purppse p£,the San Francisco hearipgs.--On April 5, 1960, the HCUA met and adopted the following resolution: gp.it resolved That hearings by the committee or a suEEomm.ttee thereof, to be held in San Fran- cisco, California, or at such other place or places as the chairman may designate, on such date or dates as the chairman may determine, be authorized and approved, including the conduct of investigations deemed reasonably necessary by the staff in prepara- tion therefor, relating to the following subjects and having the legislative purposes indicated: 1. The extent, character, and objects of Comp munist infiltration and Communist Party activities in.Northern California, for the legislative pur- pose of obtaining additional information for use by the committee in maintaining surveillance over the administration and operation of the Internal 53Carr The Hpuse Cpppéttee on unquerican.Acti- vities, 191‘5-1556. p. o - “this. 55The New Yprk Times, Mbrch 5, 1961. .c—‘e-- —— 102 Security Act, the Communist Control Act, and other security legislation. 2. The past form, structure, organization and activities of the Communist Party and members of the Communist Party, whether in California or else- where, for the purpose of enabling the committee to interpret the significance of the present form, structure, organization, and activities of the Com- munist Party, for the legislative purpose of ob- taining information for use by the Committee in consideration of proposed amendments to the security laws relating to the term 'member of the Communist Party,"possib1e use in legislation of the term 'under Communist Party discipline,‘ and for use by the committee in consideration of a proposed amendment to Section 4 of the Communist Control Act of 1954, prescribing penalties for knowingly and willfully becoming or remaining a member of the Communist Party with knowledge of the purposes or objectives thereof. 3. The entry into and dissemination within the United States of foreign Communist Party propaganda, the legislative purpose being to determine the advisability of amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, designed to counteract Communist devices now used in avoiding the prohibitions of that act. 4. Techniques, strategies, tactics, and devices used by members of the Communist Party for the purpose of evading the impact of present security laws, the legislative purpose being to reveal factual situations to the committee which may require remedial legislation in the interest of national defense and internal security. 5. Any other matter within the jurisdiction of the committee which it, or any subcommittee there- of, appoinggd to conduct these hearings, may designate. As a follow-up to the adoption of the above reso- lution, Representative Francis E. welter, Chairman of the HCUA, sent the order of appointment of the subcommittee which was to conduct the San Francisco hearings to Mr. “masseuse Hearings. Part I. p. 1932. 103 Richard Arens, Staff Director for the committee, on April 6, 1960. It read: Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the rules of this Committee, I hereby appointed a sub» committee of the Committee on unnAmerican Activi- ties, consisting of Representative Edwin E. Willis, as Chairman, and Representatives Morgan M. Moulder and August E. Johansen as associate members, to conduct hearings in San Francisco, California, Monday through Thursday, May 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1960, at 10:00 a.m., on subjects under investi- gation by the Committee and take such testimony on said days or succeeding days, as it may deem necessary. Please make this action a matter of Committee record. If any Member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me. Given under my hand this 6th day of April, 1960.57 BE'M 9_f_ Procedure" <_)_f_ Egg M.--Of the seventeen "Rules of Procedure“58 under which the HCUA operated during its 1960 hearings, only ten have relevance to this study. These ten "Rules of Procedure" are as follows: I--No major investigation shall be initiated without approval of a majority of the Committee. Preliminary inquiries, however, may be initiated by the Committee's staff with the approval of the Chairman of the Committee. II--The subject of any investigation in con- nection with which witnesses are summoned or shall otherwise appear shall be announced in an opening statement to the Committee before the commencement of any hearings; and the information sought to be 57Ibid. 580.8., Congress, House, Committee on Uhquerican Activities, Rules of Procedure, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, passim. Hereinafter cited as Rules p£_Procedure, 1953. The complete text of the Rules p§_Procedure may be consulted in the Appendix of this study. 104 elicited at the hearings shall be relevant and germane to the subject as so stated. III-nAll witnesses at public or executive hearings who testify as to matters of fact shall give all testimony under oath or affirmation. Only the Chairman or a member of the Committee shall be empowered to administer said oath or affirmation. IV. A.complete and accurate record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings at hearings, both in public and in Executive Session. V-nAt every hearing, public or executive, every witness shall be accorded the privilege of having counsel of his own choosing. The parti- cipation of counsel during the course of any hear- ing and while the witness is testifying shall be limited to advising said witness as to his legal rights. Counsel shall not be permitted to engage in oral argument with the Committee, but shall confine his activity to the area of legal advice to his client. VI--Counsel for a witness shall conduct himself in a professional, ethical, and proper manner. His failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the Committee or Sub- committee before which the witness is appearing, subject such counsel to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, removing from the hearing room of counsel, or a recommendation of contempt proceedings. In case of such removal of counsel, the wit- ness shall have a reasonable time to obtain other counsel, said time to be determined by the Com- mittee. Should the witness deliberately or capri- ciously fail or refuse to obtain the services of other counsel within such reasonable time, the hearing shall continue and the testimony of such witness shall be heard without benefit of counsel. VII-«Any witness desiring to make a prepared or written statement for the record of the proceedings in executive or public sessions shall file a copy of such statement with the counsel of the Committee within a reasonable period of time in advance of the hearing at which the statement is to be pre- sented. All such statements so received which are relevant and germane to the subject of the investi- gation may, upon approval, at the conclusion of the testimony of the witness, by a majority vote of the Committee or Subcommittee members present, be inserted in the official transcript of the proceedings. 105 VIII-qA witness shall be limited to giving in~ formation relevant and germance to the subject under investigation. The Committee shall rule upon the admissibility of all testimony or infor- mation presented by the witness. Xlu-The confidential relationship between hus- band and wife shall be respected, and for reasons of public policy, one spouse shall not be questioned concerning tie activities of the other, exce t when a major tz of the Committee or Subc ttee EEEII-determ1ne BEhZEfiiee. '_- «No recomefidati on that a witness be cited for contempt of Congress shall be forwarded to the House of Representatives unless and until the Colmittee has, upon notice to all its members, met and considered the alleged contempt, and by a major- ity of those present voted that such recouendation be made.59 As the statement of the committee's "Rules of Pro- cedure" indicates, the HCUA or a subconsittee thereof holds the final authority to judge as to when its rules have been violated during its hearings. The stringent limitations placed upon witnesses' counsel during the hearings are justified in a footnote in the HCUA's "Rules of Procedure": The House Co-ittee on Un-American Activities is a Congressional Co-Iittee, not a court. . . . Moreover, the Conittee has neither the authority nor the vast powers of a court of law. A Congressional Committee conducts a search for information, not a trial. The requirements of time, the nature of the fact- findi hearing, the complications of travel, the realit es of expense, and the volminous duties of Members of Congress all add together to make it impredactical for courtroom procedures to be fol- W o The Committee has given frequent and dil ent consideration to this subject, and has det ned that in order to carry out its responsibilities 59Rules 2; Procedure, 1953, pp. 1-9. hphasis added. 106 imposed by law, the rules of evidence, including cross-examination, are not applicable.6 Ihg.§i£pp_Amendment.-~The fourth "rule" which gov- erned the behavior of the HCUA and the witnesses who appeared before it during the 1960 San Francisco hearings is the much misunderstood self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. Emanating from opinions in several Supreme Court decisions,61 the clause is properly known as the pri- vilege against self-accusation.62 The privilege against self-accusation "may be invoked by parties and witnesses in any proceeding in which there is power to compel the giving of testimony or the production of documents."63 Taylor cautions that the meaning the courts have given it must be construed to read "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself zipp.respgct pp_§pz_criminal charges."6a Complicating the application of the fifth amendment by a witness in a congressional investigative proceeding is a technical feature of the privilege known as the "waiver" 60Rules p£.Procedure, 1953, p. 7. 61See pages 25 to 38 of Chapter II of this study. 62For lucid discussions of the fifth amendment, see Fellman's The Defendant's Ri hts,Chapter 9; Taylor's Grand Inguest, Chapter 7; and Goadman's The Committee, Chapter 1 . 63Taylor, Grand Inguest, p. 216. Gulbid. 107 doctrine.65 This doctrine means that if a witness answers a question which may be construed as being criminating against him, he thereby waives the privilege and must answer any further questions which are related to the same subject.66 The problem which confronts the witness then is one of whether to answer or not to answer; and, moreover, if he chooses to answer some questions while refusing to answer others he runs the risk of waiving the privilege. Should the witness misjudge which questions to answer and. not to answer he may inadvertently waive the privilege, and may thereby leave himself open to a charge of contempt of Congress. Justice Black has described the dilemma which the witness faces in the following way: 0 . . 0n the one hand, they Evitnesses risk im- prisonment for contempt by asserting he privilege prematurely; on the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer a single question. The Court's view makes the protect on depend on timing so refined that lawyers, let alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim it. Furthermore, it is important to note that the pri- vilege against self-accusation must be specifically claimed by the witness; it does not come into play automatically.68 65Taylor, Grand Inguegt, p. 22“. 551bid. 67110 ers v. United State 31-50 U.S. 367 (1951)° this case dealt with testmfore a grand jury, but the’prin- ciples are equally applicable to legislative committees. 68Fellman, The Defendant's fights, pp. 158-159. 1.08 However, as was made clear in the discussion of the Emspak69 and Quinn70 cases in the preceding chapter, the witness may invoke the privilege "in any language that a committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to in- voke"71 it. i In sum, the problems confronting a witness before a congressional committee, in terms of his decision regarding claims against self-accusation, are complex indeed. Taylor describes the major problems and exigencies as follows: . . . generally speaking, a witness before a Con- gressional committee has the same duty to answer questions about other persons as about himself. But if the committee has no legal authority to ask the questions, then the witness may be under a moral if not a legal duty to protect others from injurious and unauthorized exposure. So far as concerns the privilege against self-accusation, the desire to protect others affords no basis for its invocation. If, however, the basis for claims i the privilege is already present, the motives wh ch influence the witness to lake the claim-- 'whether to protect ,Ehers, or whatever else-~are legally irrelevant. _T_t_:_e_ Emit: 595, 2; firm” the fifth and final "rule" or "norm? which.may affect the behavior of the HCUA and the witnesses it questions during its hearings, the Immunity Act of l95h represents a law rarely applied by 59% v. @355; mg, 394 0.3. 190 (1955). 70219.2 v. m m 3u9 0.3. 155 (1955). 711b1d., p. 162. 72Taylor, Grand In uest, p. 23a. 109 witnesses who appear before Congressional committees]:3 Congress adopted the statute late in 195“ in order to increase the probability that recalcitrant witnesses before Congressional conittees would, under the pro- tection of i-unity from subsequent criminal prosecution, agree to give the co-ittees valuable information.“ The i-unity statute was held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1956.75 The act provides that i-unity may be granted to witnesses called by Congress or any of its co-ittees in any investigations e o . relating to any interference with or endan- gering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espion- :§:a.':%‘§§:“a::fi‘£:§‘»§°¥:§§i‘§¥ 3:32;: ' In view of the large umber of recalcitrant witnesses who appear before the 1mm, and given the nature of the purposes of the co-ittee, it is apparent that the Inunity Act of 195“- does have potential applicability to witnesses called before the acne." Li“ - 7snack, Qntemgt g; m p. 121. 7"Taylor, M In uest, p. 2410. 75w v. 2.32:; m 350 11.3. ~22 (1956). “0.3.. §tatuteg g M, 68 us. 18 u.s.c. sues. "Tenor. m Inguest, p. 2%. 110 Egg Particiunts 3; the; Hearings The third and final constituent of the communica- tion situation.which warrants consideration is the parti- cipants. Not including the attorneys representing several of the witnesses, there were fifty persons who officially participated in the three days of public hearings at San 78 Francisco on May 12, 13, and 1a, 1960. Forty-six of these were witnesses who either had been subpoenaed or had appeared voluntarily;79 one was a member of the pro- fessional staff of the HCUA; and three were members of the subcommittee of the HCUA.which conducted the San Francisco hearings. 3133 5999; Lag Lg; ww-Before describing the sub- committee and staff of the HCUA.which conducted the May, 1960, San Francisco hearings, it is perhaps appropriate to reinforce an assumption which underlies this study. That assumption is that the HCUA is capable of being examined as a unique entity, in and of itself. This assumption implies (1) that the HCUA possesses certain characteristics 783ee San Francisco Heariggs, passim. 79William‘Wheeler, investigator for the HCUA, par- ticipated as a witness; therefore, he is counted as a wit- ness, not as a staff member. 80See San Francisco Hearings, passim. 111 and performs certain behaviors that are particularly unique to it, and (2) that the behavior of the HCUA is something more than the sum of the behaviors of the individual Con- gressmen and staff members who comprise it. Precedent for studying Congressional committees as discrete units has been well-established: ' Studies of Congress by political scientists have produced a time-tested consensus on the very considerable power and autonomy of Congressional committees. Because of these two related char- acteristics, it makes empirical and analytical 3232352 fiiittffifi‘fiififii'ifm “mm” “ . . The focus of the study, therefore, is upon the rhetorical and dialectical methods employed by the committee as a ggig.rather than upon the methods employed by individual members of the HCUA. Granting that the HCUA ”has inevitably been affected by the men who have served uponvit,"82 it is clear that the committee,‘gg£_g5, has acquired a "personality" of its own during the course of its history. The historical evidence presented earlier in this study reveals that the HCUA possesses a.distinctive image in the public mind as an entity with which certain kinds of behaviors are associated, without reference to the individual members of the comp 8l-lRichard P. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a.Political System: The Problem of Integration," The American Political Science Review LVI (June, 1962), Po3 o 82Carr, The House Committee 2;; Un-«Americg Acti- vities, 19h5-1955, p. 212. 112 mittee. Even the fact that certain chairmen of the HCUA in the past have demonstrated their penchant for provoking publicity about the committee and its activities83 has failed to blur the image of the HCUA as an institutional entity rather than as a collection of distinguishable individuals. Recognizing the principle state above, then, fol- lowing are brief profiles of the members of the subcom- mittee and staff who conducted the Mmy, 1960, hearings at San Francisco.8“ In addition, in line with the principle of treating the HCUA as a behavioral unit, several behav- ioral characteristics of the comittee will be suggested. ‘As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the subcom- mittee of the HCUA which conducted the 1960 San Francisco hearings was composed of three members. Representative Edwin E. Willis, Democrat, of Louisiana, served as Chair- man of the subcomittee, and two Republicans, Representa- tives August E. Johansen of Michigan and Gordon H. Scherer 83The chainmen who became most synonymous with the HCUA and its public image were: ZMsrtin Dies, J. Parnell Thomas, Harold H. Velde, and Francis E. Walter. 8“The remaining six members of the HCUA in the 86th Congress were: Representative Francis 8. Walter, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, who had served as Chairman of the committee since 1955; Representative William‘M. Tuck, Democrat, of Virginia; Representative Clyde Doyle, Democrat, of Califor- nia; Representative Morgan M. Moulder, Democrat, of Mis- souri; Representative Donald L. Jackson, Republican, of California; and Representative William E. Miller, Repub- lican, of New York. 113 of Ohio served as associate members of the subco-ittee. Scherer was appointed to the subcc-ittee by Chairman Halter after Representative Moulder apparently had indi- cated that he would be unable to serve on the subco-ittee at San hancisco.” hearing room only for the third day of testimony on Sat- urday. m 14.“ Willie, a southern Democrat, and Johansen and Gordon Scherer was present in the Scherer, midwestern Republicans reflected the conserva- tive political orientation which had characterised the behavior of the nova throughout its history.87 Both Willis and Scherer hold law degrees, and both had developed successful private law practices prior to their entrance into politics.88 Willis was elected to the Louisiana State Senate in 19‘“, and moved to the United States House of Representatives in 19139. Born in Cincinnati, Scherer chose the municipal and county office route as his stepping- stones to the House of Representatives. Scherer served 85mg lame: Ee- _..._.2228 p. 2. “Buck. Wat same. 222.1!» "8» mwm Part m. p. wear. “The biographical data concerning Representat ivee willis, Scherer, and Johansen, is found in the following sources: U.S., Co e sional 0%ctorz, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960; and Bi Fidel D ectog g; the Americ Coggreggi gin-1931', fits? States WWW CC, 9 Q 114 as a member of the Cincinnati City Council from 1945 to l9h9, and was elected to the 83rd Congress in 1953. In addition to their membership on the HCUA, Willis was a member of the House Judiciary Committee and Scherer was a.member of the House Public'Wbrks Committee. August E. Johansen, the third member of the HCUA subcommittee at San Francisco in 1960, often described as an arch conservative, was a Republican representing the lMichigan Third Congressional District. Educated at Olivet College, Western Michigan College of Education, and the university of Chicago, Johansen's careers encompassed the Baptist ministry, industrial relations work with the Kellogg Company, and editorial journalism.for a Battle Creek, Michigan, newspaper and radio station. From 1951 to l95h Johansen was administrative assistant to Repre- sentative Paul W. Shafer, Republican Congressman from IMichigan's Third District. First elected to the 8Ath Congress in 1954, Johansen also served on the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. .Although there were three staff members of the HCUA present at the San Francisco hearings, only two of them actually participated in the hearings. One of the trio, Mr. Richard Arens, was a key participant in that, as the Staff Director for the HCUA, he functioned as the chief interrogator of all the witnesses who appeared before 115 the subcommittee during the three days of hearings.89 The other staff member who participated in the hearings did so as a witness. He was Mr. William Am Wheeler, investigator for the HCUA who had worked for the committee in the same capacity since August, 1948.90 The third staff member of the HCUh.who was present but did not participate was Mr. Fulton Lewis III, research analyst.91 Richard Arena had served the HCUA as its Staff Director since 1956.92 An attorney, Arena earned his L.L.B. degree at'Washington University in St. Louis in 1937, and had begun his governmental service as a member of the Missouri Public Service Comission in 19k5.93 Arens began working for the United States Government as Staff Director for the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration in 19u7, a post which he held until 1952.9“ From 1952 to 1956 Arena worked as Staff Director for the Senate Internal 89San Francisco Heari s, passim. 9°Ibid., Part 1, p. 1952. 911bid., p. 1931. 92Who's Who In America, v. 3a (Chicago: Ann. Marquis and Company,-l9665, p. 68. 93Ibid. 9uIbid. 116 Security Subcommittee.95 Arens' tenure with the HCUA came to an abrupt conclusion in the fall of 1960 when he was forced to resign from his position as Staff Director,96 because he had been performing professional services for an organization whose purpose was to conduct research in genetics in order to discover evidence which would prove that the Negro is genetically inferior to the Caucasian.97 However questionable the activities may have been which brought about his dismissal from the staff of the HCUA, Arena appears to have possessed stronger qualifications for the position of Staff Director than those which have been attributed to many of his predecessors.98 The role of the HCUA's professional staff in its investigations is a crucial one. Loosely organized into three divisions-«investigations, research, and files,99 the staff of the HCUA "has been responsible not only for the extensive field work which has had to be performed before public hearings could be held, but also for the actual conduct of the hearings."100 A cursory examination 95Who's Who £2.America, 1966, p. 68. 96Science (July 1, 1960), p. 24. 97Ronald W. Way, "Genetics and Subversion," Nation 98 8See Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1995-195 5,p .251-5 99Ibid., p. 252. 100See Carr, The House Committee on UneAmerican Activities, 1995-1955, p. 333. 117 of the transcripts of the San Francisco hearings in 1960 reveals that Carr's assessment of the HCUA's reliance upon its staff is still valid: The staff of the Uh-American.Activities Com- mittee has been at the same time an asset and a liability to the investigation of subversive acti- vity. This particular Congressional investigating committee has depended heavily upon a professional staff for assistance. . . they the HCUA have worked closely with the staff, utilizing in sub- stantial degree the data supplied it and following closely the directions recommended by it. Perusal of almost any valume of the published hearings of the committee since 1945 reveals the extent to which the task of questioning witnesses and devel- oping the main lines of a particular inquiry has been turned over to staff members. At no time has any committee member or group of members been pre- pared to assume chief responsibility for the planning and execution of a program. Without the contribution made by the committee's staff, the investigation of unquericap activities would most likely have died a-borning. 01 Viewing the subcommittee and its staff as an entity, several statements can be made which are descriptive of the behavioral tendencies which one could have expected it to exhibit in its conduct of the 1960 San Francisco hearings. 0n the basis of those habit patterns which the HCUA had demonstrated with unusual consistency during its history, the following behavioral characteristics would seem to have had a high degree of probability of occurring during the 1960 San Francisco hearings: (1) a tendency to be cautious in its handling of witnesses, in the light of the hostile 1°11bid., pp. 2u8-249. I 5‘ 118 climate of opinion which faced it at San Francisco; (2) a tendency to be less rigid in the enforcement of its "Rules of Procedure," also as a means of diluting the hostile atmosphere; (3) a tendency to utilize "friendly"102 wit- nesses to the fullest extent possible in order to be able to convince the public that it had sufficient justification for holding the hearings; (h) a tendency to praise itself for being unusually fair in its conduct of the hearings; (5) a tendency to pgrsonalize its approach to the witnesses-- to seem to be "more interested in exposing allegedly sub- versive pgrsons than in exposing subversive activity;"103 and (6) a tendency to espouse a politically conservative point-of-view. ‘Thgywitnesses.--Of the forty-six witnesses who .appeared before the HCUA on May 12, 13, and 1h, 1960, ten may be classified as "friendly,” and thirty~six as "un- friendly." These two classifications of witnesses are commonly employed and represent a distinction which Carr explains in the following way: The Uhquerican Activities Committee's treat- ment of its witnesses has ranged widely. To begin with, it has often observed a distinction between 'friendly' and 'hostile' witnesses. Friendly wit- nesses have been allowed to ramble at length and 102See the definition of "friendly" and "unfriendly" witnesses in the final section of this chapter. 103Carr, The House Committee 25.Unquerican Acti- vities, 19h5-1955, p. 55:. 119 to tell their stories in their own words. They have seldom been asked embarrassing questions and often have been asked few questions of any type. On the other hand, hostile witnesses have often been denied the right to make prepared statements or to testify informally at any length, and the committee has frequently subjected them 18 vigorous, penetrating cross-examination. 4 Following is a list of the witnesses who appeared before the HCUA subcommittee at San Francisco in 1960 classified according to the categories of "friendly" and "hostile." It is safe to assume that those listed as "hostile" are so categorized because they either were suspected of being active members of the Communist Party or of having knowingly contributed to the Communist cause.105 Following the name of each witness is the occu- pation or vocation given by the witness during his or her testimony before the HCUA.106 Witnesses in the "friendly" category were: Mr. Irving Fishman, Deputy Collector of Customs assigned to the Port of New York Mr. Stephen K. Louie, Office of the Collector of Customs at San Francisco Mr. Harlin Wong, Office of the Collector of Customs at San Francisco Mr. William‘A. Wheeler, investigator for the HCUA 10“Car, The House Committee 2§_Un-American Acti- vities, 19h5-1955, p. :95. 105See San Francisco Hearings, Part 1, pp. 1921-1929- 106The names and occupations of the witnesses are found in the transcripts of the hearings. See San Francisco Heari 3, Parts I, II, and III, passim. The arrangement of the names of the witnesses and the p acement of the witnesses into categories represents the judgment of the writer. 120 Mrs. Barbara Hartle, poultry raiser Mr. Mr. Hr. Mr. Karl Prussion, metallurgical engineer and. builder Thomas Cahill, Chief of Police, San Francisco Police Department Michael J. Maguire, Police Inspector, City and County of San Francisco Matthew C. Carberry, Sheriff, City and County of San Francisco Thomas Grabor, salesman Witnesses in the "hostile" or "unfriendly" category Douglas Vachter, student at the University of California, Berkeley Merle Brodsky, tile mason Martin Irving Marcus, teacher Leibel Bergman, forger helper Vernon Bown, warehouseman Joseph Figueiredo, refused to state his occupation Noel Barr s, woodworker . Ann Deirup, draftsman . Elizabeth M. Nicholas, assistant cook Donald H. Clark, civil engineer Morris Graham, welder Martin Ludwig, clerk William Mandel, author, lecturer and radio-television conentator Jack Weintraub, truck driver John Andrew Negro, house painter Mrs. Bally Attarian Swaet, legal secretary Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Tyler Brooke, refused to state his occupation Elmer E. Johnson, machinist Tillman Erb, teacher Archie Brown, longshoreman Louis Zeitz, graduate student at Stanford university Hrs. layme Ellis, secretary Hrs. Lottie L. Rosen, teacher Hrs. Lillian Bansome, agricultural worker Mr. Mr. Mr. Hr. Mr. Edward Ross, salesman Ruben Venger, tailor Ralph Izard, writer and student William keich, journalist Ralph Kenneth Johnsen, machinist Mrs. Doris Dawson, housewife Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. 111‘. Travis Lafferty,‘ teacher Saul Wachter, factory worker John Allen Johnson, teacher Laurent B. Frants, legal writer and researcher Bertram Edises, attorney 121 Summary.--The significant factors have been described which combined to constitute and/or affect the immediate setting in which the HCUA conducted its hearings at San Francisco in May, 1960. These factors have been discussed under three general headings: (l) the climate of opinion in which the public hearings were con- ducted; (2) the laws which provided the "rules" which regulated the behavior of the participants in the hearings; and (3) an identification of the participants in the hearings. With the description of the extrinsic constituents of the communication situation at San Francisco completed, the study will now concern itself with a consideration of the intrinsic factors of the rhetorical-dialectical phenomenon at San Francisco. In so doing, the relationship between the extrinsic and intrinsic factors of the communi- cation situation will be explored. CHAPTER IV THE ISSUES OF THE 1960 SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS: THE ROLE OF DIALECTIC In this chapter consideration will be given to what went on in the hearing room.of the San Francisco City Hall on May 12, 13, and 14, 1960, with a.view toward deter- mining the maJor issues which emerged from the public hearings conducted by a subcomittee of the House Comittee on Un- American.Activities. Specifically, this chapter will focus upon the speaking that occurred by examining it in the light of the principles of dialectic, or ". . . the art or practice of logical discussion as employed in investigating truth."1 Since "the dialectical mode can be described as a.method of seeking a proposition to solve a problem,"2 it is logical to assume that, if the HCUA's oral inquiries were designed to acquire factual data on which to base informed legisla- tive policy recommendations, then the application of the principles of dialectic ought to reveal to what extent, if 1Clarence Barnhart, ed., American Colle e c clo~ 25d dic Dictionggz (Chicago: The Spencer Press, 1559En , p. 2Gerald M. Phillips, Communication and the Small Group (Indianapolis: The BobbséMerriII Company, In nc., I566), 122 123 any, the issues discussed show probable pertinence to the committee's legislative purposes. By viewing the transcript of the hearings in the light of the Vardaman definition of dialectic, an assess— ment can be made concerning the functional relationship between the committee's methods of inquiry and its declared purposes. Furthermore, such an examination of its methods of inquiry should reveal what, if any, were the committee's actual communication purposes with the witnesses who appeared before it at San Francisco. Finally, in this chapter, relevant factors will be incorporated concerning the historical-political-social dimensions discussed in the previous two chapters. _T_h;e_ Issues .As indicated by the House Committee's enabling act,3 the range of subjects which it may investigate is broad, indeed. The meaning of the term "unnAmerican" has not been made any more specific by the Supreme Court's positve ruling on the validity of the Congressional mandate which established the HCUA.4 ,As Pritchett observed, regarding the Court's position in Watkins, “the basic proposition in the opinion was a reiteration of the well-established 3See pp. 99 and 100 of this study. “Pritchett, Congress Versus the Supreme Court, p. #2. 124 doctrine that the power of Congress to investigate, while broad, is not unlimited."5 The scope of the committee's activities seemed all the more nebulous following the statement in Barenblatt that the authorizing resolution had been defined by the "persuasive gloss of legislative history."6 Although still quite broad, the resolution which empowered the HCUA to conduct the public hearings at San Francisco in 1960 did reflect the impact of the decision in'Watkins. The language of the resolution included carefully worded clauses which purported to describe, under four of the five subjects to be investigated, the legislative purpose which pertained to each subject: . . . hearings. . . relatin to the following subjects and having the legislative purposes indicated: 1. The extent, character, and objects of Communist infiltration and Communist Party acti- vities in Northern California, for the 1e isla- tive purpose of obtaining additional—information for use by the committee in maintaining surveil- lance over the administration and operation of the Internal Security.Act, the Communist Control Act, and other security legislation. 2. The past form, structure, organization and activities of the Communist Party and members of the Communist Party, whether in California or elsewhere, Egg-the ur ose of enabling the com- mittee in consideration of proposed amendments to the security laws relating to the term 'member of the Communist Party discipline,’ and for use by the committee in consideration of a proposed amendment to Section 4 of the Communist Control 5Pritchett, Congress Versus the Supreme Court, p. #2. 6 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (I959). 125 Act of 1954, prescribing penalties for knowingly and wilfully becoming or remaining a member of the Communist Party with knowledge of the pur- poses or objectives thereof. 3. The entry into and dissemination within the United States of foreign Communist Party propaganda, Epg_le islative purpose being to determine the adVisabi ity of amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, designed to counteract Communist devices now used in avoiding the prohibitions of that act. #. Techniques, strategies, tactics, and devices used by members of the Communist Party for the purpose of evading the impact of present security laws, the legislative purppse being to reveal factual.§ituations to t e committee which may require remedial legislation in the interest of national defense and internal security. 5. Any other matter within the jurisdiction of the committee which it, or any subcommittee thereof, appointed to conduct these hearings, may designate.7 In spite of the committee's efforts to treat the subject matter of its questions as issues, few of its questions pertained to issues, in the classical sense. Anather, the great majority of its questions sought after ‘matters of fact or personal value judgments. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe the subjects which the HCUA concerned itself with at San Francisco as topics rather than issues. For purposes of clarity, the topics which were treated during the 1960 San Francisco hearings will be discussed under two headings: (l) the topics which emerged during the questioning of the ten ”friendly" witnesses, and (2) the topics which were dealt with during the inter- rogation of the thirty-six "hostile" or "unfriendly" witnesses. 7 . San Francisco Hearings, p. 1932. Emphasis added. 126 The classifications "friendly" and "hostile" refer to those discussed in Chapter III of this study. Because of the substantial differences between the topics explored with the two categories of witnesses, a.more meaningful analysis can be accomplished by dealing with the two groups separately. 322. Issues M _1_:_h_g._ "Friendly" Witnesses A careful examination of the testimony of the ten witnesses in the "friendly" category reveals that a total of fifteen separate basic topics emerged during their appearances before the HCUA subcommittee at San Francisco. Seven of the ten witnesses had been requested to appear in advance of the hearing dates, while the other three-- Carberry, Cahill, and Maguire-awere law enforcement officers whose invitations to speak were tendered by the committee after the hearings were in progress, as a result of the disturbances which took place at City Hall. Initially, the topics discussed by each of the ten witnesses will be described. Analysis of these topics will be taken up in a later section on dialectic. Mr. Irving Fishman, accompanied by Stephen K. Louie and Harlin'Wong, was the first witness to appear before the subcommittee on the opening day of the San Francisco hearings.8 The HCUA explored three major topics with Fish- man, Louie, and Wong: (1) Is there a significant volume of 8See San Francisco Hearings, pp. 1934-1951. 127 "Political Propaganda" mailed from foreign nations to persons living in the—United States, particularly to per- sons living in California? (2) Is there a need for more stringent laws in order to restrict and control the flow of "Political Propaganda” mailed to the United States? and (3) What is the impact of foreign (Communist) "Poli- tical Propaganda? on Americans who receive it? The second ”friendly" witness to appear before the conittee was Willi- Wheeler, investigator for the sum. Wheeler was questioned both on the first and second days of the session.9 Both topics on which Wheeler was interrogated were questions of fact which pertained to documents which he had procured: (1) Will you verify the list of delegates representing the Commist Forty, Northern District of California, who attended the Com- munist Party's 17th letional Convention at New York City on December 10 to 13, 1959?, and (2) Will you verify that you are suhitting to the HCUA copies of thirty-one docu- ments which were distributed to the delegates to the Com- munist Party's 17th National Convention at New York City on December 10 to 13, 1959? Mrs. Barbara a.m., ”a redeemed Columnist who had made her peace with the eo-ittee in l956,"10 appeared third 93.. m Francigco Heeriggg, pp. 1952-1955, and pp. 2000-2002. “Good-mo flew p. “28- 128 on the San Francisco program during the first two days of the hearings. Three basic questions were raised with Mrs. Hartle: (1) What is Your judgment of the current strength, status, objectives, tactics, and strategy of the Communist Party in the United States? (2) Do you believe that the Communist Party poses a significant threat to the security of the united States, on the basis of your personal analysis and evaluation of the various Communist Party documents introduced as exhibits by Mr. Wheeler?, and (3)"Have you broken irrevocably from this conspiratorial force and found your way back to God and patriotism?"11 Mr. Karl Prussion, the featured "friendly" witness, presented extensive testimony on the second and third days of the hearings.12 The essential topics about which Mr. Prussian was questioned are reducible to five: (1) What is your assessment of the objectives, strength, tactics, and strategies of the Communist Party in the United States? (2) What was your personal background of training and experience in the Communist Party in Detroit and Flint, Michigan, between 1933 and 1940? (3) What persons can you identify, from your firsthand knowledge, who were active in the Communist Party of the Northern District of California between 1949 and 1959? (4) Why do you believe that American 11San Francisco Hearin 8. PP. 2031~20559 and PP- 2083-2096,'§Ihfi, 2145. 121mm. l29 citizens who have "brilliant" minds are motivated to become Conunists?, and (5) How would you describe the Columnist Party "cell meetings" in which you participated in various Northern California comunities? Three law enforcement officials testified during the third day of the hearings: Mr. Thomas Cahill, Chief of Police, San Francisco Police Department; Mr. Michael J. Mcguire, Police Inspector, City and County of San Francisco; and Mr. Matthew C. Carberry, Sheriff, City and County of San hancisco.” Each of them was asked about the distur~ bances and demonstrations which had taken place during the hearings: (I) What instructions did you give your subor- dinates regarding how they should treat the persons in- volved in the demonstrations outside the hearing room? (Cahill) (2) What is your description of the demonstra- tions of the past two days? (Carberry) and (3) Which of the following known Co-unists did you observe agitating the crowds outside the City Hall hearing room? (Moguire) Mr. Thomas Grabor appeared before the subco-ittee on the third day.“’ He was queried regarding his views on a single topic: Describe what it was like when you lived in Hungaryunder the suppression of the Conunists? 131mm” pp. 2083.2092 and 2101-2107. "hm" pp. 2107-2109. l30 _T_h_e_ Topics 1113 £113; "Unfriendly" Witnesses Approximately two-thirds of the time taken to conduct the three day hearings was devoted to questioning the thirty-six witnesses of the "unfriendly" or "hostile" category. In spite of efforts by the subcommittee, and particularly those of its staff counsel Richard Arena, to persuade the thirty-six witnesses to answer the questions directed to them, none of them would cooperate. For the most part, the only questions that the "unfriendly" group would respond to were those preliminary and harmless ones-- their names, addresses, occupations, education, and whether or not they were "appearing in response to" subpenas (and all thirty-six of them were) which had been served by the HCUA. Rather than discussing any substantive issues which the HCUA may have desired to pursue, the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses responded in one or several of the following ways: by evading the questions, by stalling, by attempting to read prepared statements which attacked the committee, by questioning the HCUA's procedures and methods of investigation, by directing personal insults toward mem- bers of the committee and its staff, and by refusing to answer questions put to them by the HCUA on the grounds that such inquiries were in violation of their rights under the Constitution. Thus, in one sense, the major question which dominated the testimony of the thirty-six "unfriendly" 131 witnesses became: How can I avoid answering the questions directed to me by the HCUA? Perhaps it would be fair to say that, if there was one significant substantive issue which prevailed through- out the confrontations of the committee with the "hostile" witnesses, it was-nAre you now or have you ever been actively engaged in activities of the Communist conspiracy, or been a member of the Communist Party? In the main, it was the raising of this question with the witnesses that provoked them to counter with the issue, Doesn't the HCUA threaten the Constitutional rights of individuals? The fact that thirty-four of the thirty-six "unfriendly" wit~ nesses invoked a variety of Constitutional amendments as grounds for declining to answer the committee's queries would seem to support the inference that both of the afore- mentioned issues were basic to the communication, or lack of it, which transpired during the hearings.15 Constitutional Rights is 5 32pm}; As the historical description of the HCUA presented in Chapter II of this study reveals, questions regarding the delicate balance between Congressional investigative powers and individual rights had become more critical to the Ameri- can public because of the numerous and noisy Congressional investigations, and the subsequent Supreme Court decisions 15Ibid., p. 1966 passim. 132 which arose from them, during the 1950's. It, therefore, seems appropriate to examine some of the ramifications of the behaviors of the "hostile" witnesses who appeared before the HCUA at San Francisco, particularly in connection with their reliance upon the Constitution as the basis for refusing to answer the committee's questions. On the face of it, the question, Are you now or have you ever been actively engaged in activities of the Communist conspiracy, or been a member of the Communist Party?, appears to be potentially relevant to the third subject-legislative purpose statement contained in the April 5, 1960, HCUA resolution authorizing the investiga- tion at San Francisco}6 Historically, it is this parti- cular topic and variations of it, that has provided grist for much of the controversy concerning the methods, objectives, and motives of the HCUA. As the previous dis— cussions in this study indicate, the test of the pertinency of questions directed to a witness by a Congressional in- vestigating committee (granting a wide range of possible interpretations of questions like the one above) must be based upon the standards which are clearly explained in the following excerpt from an opinion authored by Justice Frankfurter: 16See pages 124-125 of this study for resolution. 133 Prosecuring for contempt of Congress pre- supposes an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have awareness of the pertinency of the information that he has denied to Con- gress. . . . Accordingly the actual scope of the inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness. Perhaps it should be pointed-out here that the writer is fully cognizant of the fact that any attempt to assess "pertinency," in a legal sense, is purely academic. Members of Congress possess immunity for any actions they may perform in the line of duty, and therefore, are not liable to prosecution under the law for said behaviors. Therefore, unless Congress votes to bring contempt pro- ceedings against a witness who refuses to answer questions put to him by a Congressional committee, thus resulting in a court decision, any analysis of the "pertinency" of a given topic or issue has meaning only in terms of the cogency and clarity of the reasoner. Inasmuch as none of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee at San Francisco was cited for contempt, the question of the "pertinency" of any of the committee's questions must remain open to speculation. 17See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 17a (1957). ' ' " "" " ' ' 134 While only two of the "unfriendly" witnesses, Archie Brown and Bertram Edises,18 made no appeals to the Constitution, the remaining thirty-four ran the gamut of Constitutional provisions for the protection of individual rights. The reiteration of the phrase, "I refuse to answer that question on the constitutional grounds that" preceded statements by the thirty-four witnesses which encompassed everything from a single Constitutional amendment to the claim ". . . and under the whole Consti- tution."19 Significantly, none of the thirty-four chose not to include the fifth amendment as one of his or her 18For example, Mr. Edises, after stalling and hedging about stating his grounds for refusing to answer the question: ”Are you now, or have you ever been, a mem- ber of the Communist Party?," finally responded with: "I decline to answer that question on the grounds that it is unmistakably clearu-unmistakably clear--Mr. Scherer, will you please pay attention?“ That was as far as he went until he finally offered the following gambit, after which the committee excused hhnsz ME: Willis: You still have a half-minute left. I said two, so you have a half-minute to answer it on constitutional grounds. Mr. Edises: All right. The question, as to membership'in the Communist Party, is a question-nlet me put it this way-- Mp, Willis: You said you would not answer it. M_r_. Ewes: I am stating my grounds. I am trying to state my grounds. One ground is that it is a question that it is impossible, really, to answer with any degree of accuracy. And the reason, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Willis, is that in the Communist Control Act of 1954 there is a definition of Communist. Mr. Willis, will you please listen?" (See Sgp Francisco Hearings, pp. 2161-2165.) 19Ibid., pp. zoos-2011. 135 Constitutional grounds for refusing to answer questions. As ”hostile“ witness William Mandel implied in his testi- mony, to stand only on first amendment claims would be to risk being cited for contempt by running counter to the current position of the Supreme Court: To rest my case solely on the first .endment would, so 36 cases now in the courts show, con- demn me to years of court action at enormous costs. It would cost me my home and impoverish my family for a very 12:: time to come, which, of course, is what this c ttee desires. Therefore, I also refuse to testify under my right not to be a wit- ness against myself, a “right originated to protect the innocents. uilty can be convicted by the testimony of others thereis any real evidence to present. 0 Although, like Mendel, thirty others also denied the HCUA's right to question them on the grounds that the co-ittee was acting in violation of their rights under the first amendment, they, too, made certain that their refusals also were grounded in fifth amendment claims. As was disclosed in Chapter II of this study, the Court had expressed “a strong affirmation of the superiority of congressional power over the protection of the Firot Amendment,“21 in Bgonblptt less than a year previous to the'May, 1960, hearings. 2°13id., p. 2066. 21Pritchett, Copgpesp Vggsup the finpgema Court, p. 50. 136 It seems apparent, then, that at least thirty-one of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses intended to make their assertions that the HCUA was threatening the loss of civil rights as guaranteed by the first amendment-«freedom of speech and thought, in particular-ma major issue of the San Francisco hearings. They were, however, reluctant to run the risks of incurring citations for Congressional contempt by basing their claims only on the first amend- ment. Their appeals to the protection afforded them by also basing their claims on the fifth amendment revealed an acute awareness on their part of the implications of a series of recent Supreme Court decisions: In the twelve years, from 1945 to 1957, 135 other witnesses were cited for contempt. The protests of these witnesses followed an observable pattern. Through 1947 they all argued against the power of the co-ittee to question them about their beliefs; and they claimed the protection of the Constitu- tion's First Amendment-«which protects freedom of speech--as their defense against answering the com- mittee's questions. Almost without exception, the thirty-five persons who made this claim were con- victed of contempt. In later years, since 1957 hostile witnesses claimed the protection of the Constitution's Fifth Amendment-"which protects the individual from being forced to testify against himself-osnd the federal courts then began to acquit those charged by the co-ittee with contempt. The federal courts, in short, credited the right of the conittee to conduct the investigations, but excused those witnesses who stated that Sheir answers might tend to incriminate them.2 22Neil Maclileil F r e of Democrac (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 637, pp. 135-196. 137 Topics and thg_Role p: Dialectic With the topics and issues delineated which domin- ated the HCUA's 1960 public hearings at San Francisco, it now seems appropriate to examine the methods of inquiry used by the committee which evoked these topics and issues. Analysis of the committee's methods of inquiry will be accomplished by seeking answers to three questions: (1) were the methods of inquiry dialecticflz3 (2) do the methods of inquiry appear to have been designed to achieve the stated legislative purposes of the HCUA?; and (3) what were the committee's actual communication purposes with the witnesses who appeared before it at San Francisco? In the process of exploring these three questions, evaluation of the quality of the workmanship of the methods of inquiry used by the HCUA at San Francisco in 1960 will be made. As in the foregoing consideration of the topics and issues upon which the 1960 hearings focussed, examina- tion of the methods of inquiry, to a large extent, also can best be discussed by treating the testimony of the "friendly" and "unfriendly" witnesses separately. Except for a few of 23The Vardaman definition of dialectic is: Dialectic is a method of logical inquiry for the pursuit of truth, involving the principle of opposition and relying upon the technique of question and answer in speculative discussion. The definition includes five essential elements: (1) a logi- cal or reasoned inquiry; (2) a pursuit of truth, knowledge, understanding; (3) a principle of opposition; (4) a technique of question and answer; and (5) a speculative discussion. A more thorough discussion of the definition is contained in Chapter I of this study. 138 the "hostile" witnesses who were permitted to read prepared statements, the committee's treatment of the two types of witnesses differed considerably. Inguirz p£.the "Friendly" Witnesses. Of the ten "friendly" witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee at San Francisco, Mr. Karl Prussian, "a former dedicated Communist who later became an informant within the party for the Federal Bureau of Investigation,"24 was, by the committee's treatment of him, the star witness of the threeuday hearings.25 Other than the statement by Prussian that "I joined the Communist Party in 1933, and I irrevocably disassaciated myself from the Communist Party on August 12, 1959,"26 no valid questions were directed to him by the HCUA, and no evidence was presented, regarding Prussion's competence or credibility as an expert witness on communism. Thus, Prussian was another example of . . . the FBI informant who had become a major actor in the committee ceremonies. These men and women were not proper FBI agents, but Com- munist Party members, nominal or disillusioned, who for reasons of patriotism or more obscure motives reported regularly on their activities and the people they met. . . it was the infor- mants who supplied most of the matter required for the hearings. As the Communist Party fell apart, they were permitted to break cover and 2“See San Francisco Hearin 3, pp. 1921-1927. 251bid., passim. 25Ibid., p. 2031. 139 testify. By and large, they had little news to impart once they had delivered up their lists of names, but they could be counted on to reply affirmatively when Arena or one of the Congress- :en asked whether in their opinion the Communist27 arty was more of a menace now than ever before. Prussion's status as the key witness at San Francisco is further corroborated by the fact that he occupied the wit- ness chair nearly one—eighth of the time during the three days, significantly longer than any of the other forty-five witnesses.28 Two other persons, Mrs. Barbara Hartle and Mr. Irving Fishman, played major supporting roles in the cast of "friendly" witnesses. Unlike Mr. Prussian, who had only recently "surfaced" from the Communist Party, Mrs. Hartle, also a former Communist Party member who had turned FBI informant, was making at least her fourth appearance before the committee.29 Like Prussian, Mrs. Hartle's credentials as an "eXpert" witness, in the language of the committee,30 were based solely upon her "background and experience as a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1953 in the high echelons of the party."31 27Goodman, ThE_Committee, pp. 415-416. See also Carr, The House Committee pp.Un-American ActivitiegJ 1945-1950, pp. zyI-zgzo _ V 28See San Francisco Hearings, passim. 29Ibid., see Appendix, p. 2307. 3°Ibid., p. 1956. BlIbid, 140 The other major supporting player was Mr. Fishman, a New York-based Customs official, whose appearances before the HCUA seemingly had become part of the hearing ritual: Straining to provide the exhibitions in various cities with some legislative aura, Walter pressed into service one Irving Fishman, a New York Customs official. Jurisdiction over '. . . the diffusion within the united States of subversive and unnAmerican propaganda. . .' was explicit in the committee's mandate, and Fishman leavened the parades of local left- wingers with data on the number of pieces of Soviet propaganda entering the country through New York or New Orleans or Boston. What Mr. Fishman had to say could have made a thin pamphlet, but between June 1956 and May 1960 he was called on to perform a dozen times~~in washington, Philadelphia, San Francisco, New Orleans, Buffalo, Boston, Atlanta, and Newark. The highlight of his appearance usually came when he reached into the mail sack he carried with him and produced a genuine piece of Com- munist propaganda. By examining portions of the testimony of these three key witnesses-uPrussion, Hartle, and Fishman-~plus that of Maguire and Grabor, on the basis of the standards provided by the Vardaman definition of dialectic, a mean- ingful assessment of the methods of inquiry employed by the HCUA with the "friendly" witnesses could be possible. The patterns of questioning adopted with these five were typical of the committee's approaches with all of its "friendly" witnesses. 32 . Goodman, The Committee, p. 412, ._-~,_.. 141 §_Logical Inguirz ip_Pursuit p§.Knowledge. Because of the functional relationship between the first two essentials of the dialectical process, as stated in the definition, analysis of the committee's methods of inquiry which it employed with the "friendly" witnesses at the 1960 hearings first will entail a consideration of the validity of the reasoning processes of the HCUA as these pertain to the information sought; and second, the reli- ability and the validity of the knowledge which the com- mittee's questions sought to obtain from the "friendly" wit- nesses. It is apparent that the meaning of the term, "know- 1edge," in the context of the hearings, can be arrived at by determining (l) the reliability of the information given by the witnesses; (2) the probability that the HCUA's questions sought knowledge that the committee did not already possess, or sought new insights into information which it already had in its possession; and (3) the proba- bility that the questions directed to the witnesses were designed to acquire factual information which would be pertinent to the legislative purposes of the HCUA. To begin with, in connection.with the validity of the logical processes displayed by the committee in the transcript of the 1960 hearings, the validity of the funda- mental assumption upon which the HCUA based its justifi- cation for conducting the San Francisco investigation is highly suspect. That assumption--that the Communist Party 142 was a greater threat to the internal security of the United States in 1960 than ever before-~not only under- girded the inference drawn from it, that the 1960 San Francisco hearings were warranted, but more importantly, it provided the justification for the very existence of 33 the committee. In 1958 Chairman Walter, speaking for the HCUA, wrote: "Notwithstanding the eruptions which have occurred in the Communist Party in the United States and the resignation of several key officials of the party, the Communist operation today presents a menace more serious than ever before."3“ Less than two years later staff counsel Richard Arena, also speaking for the HCUA, questioned Mrs. Hartle during the San Francisco hearings: Can you tell us, first of all, what is meant by 'semantics'? Secondly, how this is used in the propagation of the conspiratorial force on American soil, that everp expgrt says is weakening our society with greater speed every day, causing‘ this society to have the impact of the world conspiracy with no less than our freedom and our lives at stake? Perhaps Mr. Arens' unidentified "experts" were Mrs. Hartle and Mr. Prussian: g5, Arena: How does the menace, the strength and the force of the Communist conspiracy on American soil, compare now, say, with the past 10 or 15 years? Egg. Hartle: It is a greater penace now than at any time in that last period. 6 33See Sgp.Francisco Hearings, pp. 2084-2085. 3“House. 229. M: me. It. sums. is. 222.8... p- 19- 35San Francisco Hearings, p. 1959, Emphasis added. 355239,. p. 1957. 143 And: fig, Arena: Tell this Committee on Unquerican ActiVities how serious is the Communist operation now on American soil? fig, Prussian: It is my sincere and honest opinion that neveffibefore in the history of the Communist Party of the United States has the situation been more Spitical for our democratic form of govern- ment. Such conclusions as those expressed by Walter, Arena, Hartle, and Prussian hardly stand up in light of the facts: It is also difficult for me Dames Roosevelg to find any rational correlation between the fact the committee received $50,000 in 1945, when there were 64,600 known Communists, and $327,000 for this year [1960] when there are fewer than 10,000 in this country of 180 million.38 The hearing transcript reveals that the HCUA also knew that there were only 10,000 known Communists in the United States in 1960, and yet, from this insufficient evidence, it drew the conclusion that the Communist operation in the United States was a greater menace than ever before: Mg. Arena: In the first place, based upon your information as a recent member of the Communist Party, how many members are there of this formal entity who now maintain a technical relationship with the entity known as the Communist Party, roughly speaking? 'What is your best estimate? E5. Prussian: My best testimony would be that the national membership of the Communist Partg at this moment would be approximately 10,000. 9 37Ibid., p. 2032. 3scan . Rec., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, p. 865. See also David Shzfihon, Tpg_Decline pvamerican Communism: A HjstorE 91 £132. Communist Part 9_f_ 1:319 U.S. Since 1945 New or : Harcourt, Brace, , passim. 39§§gFrancisco Hearings, p. 2084, 144 As the previously quoted testimony and statements indicate, "Walter and Arena showed more respect for the cause of Marxism-Leninism than the globe's bewildered Com— munists, as powerful nationalist impulses broke out in Eastern Europe, as the dispute between Russia and China flared, as Communist unity strained and shattered with the shattering of Stalinism."l"o In the words of Representative Roosevelt regarding the HCUA's logic concerning the threat of Communism to.Americans in 1960: "I am frank to say I am puzzled how to argue against this line of reasoning because I find such an argument absurd on its face."“1 Finally, by way of summarizing this critique of the committee's reasoning on such a critical question, the following apt and incisive analysis is offered: When the minuscule C.P. U.S.A. fragmented it~ self to near invisibility after the Soviets crushed the Hungarian rebellion in 1956, the committee warned that numbers did not count, the Party was a greater menace than ever since it had now gone underground. Like so many Romeos coming upon the corpse of their beloved, the Congressmen the mem- bers of the HCUA cried to the heavens, 'The Com- munist Party of the United States is not out of business; it is not dead; it is not even dormant.‘ Once the committee had worried that the Party was attracting more and more adherents. Now it worried over the decline in membership. Representative Tuck warned,'A conspiratorial force may actually weaken itself when it increases in size.' quoodman, The Committee, p. 400. “Cong. Rec., April 25, 1960, p. 865. 2 . 4 Goodman, The Committee, p. 400. 145 A study of the transcript reveals numerous other examples of the committee's disregard for reliable infor- mation upon which to base valid inferences. In this con- nection, the committee's propensity to treat the "friendly" witnesses as qualified experts on virtually any subject is antithetical to the principles of dialectic. Note, for example, the committee's query of Mr. Prussian: "Why do some people, some of whom are brilliant, why do they become Communists?"43 Such a question as this, one of the five areas covered with Mr. Prussian, properly belongs in the province of a competent psychologist or psychiatrist. Yet, Mr. Prussian, a self-described "metallurgical engineer and builder,"u“ proffered the following "expert" opinion: Usually a person of that type will join a Com- munist Party, and this is rather rare, when they don't really realize what the objectives of the Communist Party are, how they operate, what the inner workings of the party are, the ruthlessness of the party, and so forth. A person many times, of that type, might find that he is not socially located properly. A.person of that type many times will look for recognition. He will get recognition by working with the Commun- ists. He looks for response and he will get that by working with the Communists. He will get respect and he will be a leader. I honestly believe that many people of the type that you describe will join the Communist Party to gain the respect, the leadership within the Com- munist conspiracy, since they cannot get it within our free enterpgise system. This is my answer to your question. “3San Franciscg Hearings, p. 2042. ““Ibid., p. 2031. “51hid., pp. 2042-20u3. 146 In addition to the fact that Mr. Prussian is not competent to answer such a complex question, he seems to have less than adequate reasoning powers. It is difficult to accept the validity of Prussion's logic that a "brilliant" person will join the Communist Party because he does not understand what he is getting into. To assert that a "brilliant" person will exhibit such behavior, even rarely, appears to be a contradiction in terms. Similar subjectively oriented questions, like the one discussed above, were posed by the committee to others of the "friendly" witnesses at San Francisco, in spite of the failure by the committee ever to establish competency of the witnesses to provide reliable responses to said questions. For example, in its attempts to acquire highly subjective opinions from Mrs. Hartle, "a poultry raiser,"46 the HCUA directed questions to her which would have required that she be a trained psychiatrist and a scholar in the areas of language and political philosophy: fig, Arena: I would like to interrupt you here. Based upon your extensive experience in the opera- tion itself, why or how is it that the Communists are so successful in their conditioning, brain- washing of the non-Communists? Mrs. Hartle: well, they are so successful in the main in the use of non-Communists because the non-Communists don't have any idea of what they are being used for. Whey they are working for peace and a minister of a church believes in peace or a member of a congregation believes in peace, there is nothing very strange for him to do something for peace if he believes in it. He u6Ibidg, p. 1956. 147 doesn't think he is betraying his country, changing his politics or anything else. Somebody that is interested in gaining minority rights of any kind, interested in racial relations of any kind, are not, unless they suspect but usually they don't know that the Communists are building the whole thing. Most 8f the people in the united front don't know. 7 O O O O O O O O O O O ’ O I O O O O O O O O 0 Mg, Arena: . . . Would you kindly give us your observation on Communist semantics? Mag, Hartle: Well, the most ordinary word that I can think of for semantics is just weasel- wording of just playin around with words that apparently mean one thing when they mean another, or mean one thing to ope person and something else to somebody else. 8 Mrs. Hartle's responses above clearly demonstrate her unreliability as a source of useful information with regard to semantics and brainwashing. Her naive description of semantics not only reveals her lack of sophistication as a language specialist and user, it also suggests that she probably was a rather ineffectual Communist. Similarly, Mrs. Hartle's definition of brainwashing confirms her lack of competence on the subjectdmatter as well as her tendency to reason illogically. To wit, her imprecise explanation of brainwashing suggests a pattern of reasoning commonly attributed to the HCUA, namely, that if one is for "peace" or is interested in "race relations" he may find himself open to charges by the committee that he is a "dupe"of the Communists because they are also interested in these values “Sihid., p. 1959. 148 as a means of achieving world domination. The kind of ambiguity and faulty thinking reflected in Mrs. Hartle's testimony frequently have become the seeds which have been nurtured by the HCUA into allegations against liberal groups as being so~called "Communist-front organizations." The committee's charges of "subversion" which it hurled at the National Council of Churches of Christ early in 1960 emanated from similar imprecise and unreasonable testimony taken at hearings.“9 Three final examples from the hearing transcript will suffice to illustrate that the HCUA devoted a signi- ficant proportion of its time to asking "friendly" wit- nesses about subject matter which was outside the range of the witnesses' education and experience. Mr. Fishman's qualifications hardly seem adequate to the task of pro- viding reliable information in the following exchange: Mg, Arena: I have one area that I forgot to ask you about; namely, the extent to which the Com- munists are intensifying their drive to condition the minds of the youth of this country. pg, Fishman: That program has become an intense one, and absolutely no effort or eXpense has been spared in covering every college, universigg, and secondary school in the United States. Supporting the assumption that Mr. Fishman lacked the necessary competence to deal with such a psychologically- sociologically-oriented query as the one cited above, is ”See Goodman, The Committee, pp. 405-407. some 212221929. W. p. 1948. 149 the fact that he substantiated his generalization with insufficient evidence: "The volume of student material continues to increase and from what started out to be a mere handful of material now occupies a very significant Part of all of the overall picture."51 In another exchange with the HCUA, Mr. Fishman's recognition of his own incompetency regarding the question at issue evidently went unheard by the members of the sub- committee: Mr. Arens: Does this Communist propaganda in flood .__._. proportions, as you characterized it, go through the United States mails? Mr. Fishman: A lot of it does. Mr. Arena: Does the postage which is paid for this propaganda by the Communist countries pay for the shipment in total of the propaganda from the point of origin to the point of ultimate destination? Mr. Fishman: I have no ex ert information on that score; but since the’ Post Office Department is sub- aidized, it would follow that the carrying of this mail and the payments provided for this service would hardly pay for its cost. Mr. Arens: Then is it a fair interpretation that parto of the cost of shipping this Communist propa- ganda in flood proportions into the United States at these various parts of entry is paid for by the United. States taxpayers who subsidize the mails? Féshman: I think that would be a fair state- ment. That Arens inferred an unwarranted conclusion in order to support the committee's thesis in the segment of the transcript quoted above not only underlines the faulty 511hid. 5222;292 P- 1939. Emphasis Added, 150 logic of both the committee and Mr. Fishman, but it also raises serious questions about the HCUA's conception of truthfulness. The tendency of the committee to utilize "friendly" witnesses, without regard for their particular areas of competency, in order to attempt to convince the public and the Congress that sufficient justification existed to war- rant conducting investigations was consistent with the pattern of behavior exhibited by the HCUA throughout its twenty-two year tenure.53 One final illustration will serve to round-out the development of the point that the HCUA demonstrated a strong inclination in the San Francisco hearings to weaken its method of inquiry by eliciting unreliable information from.witnesses of questionable competence. Given the credentials attributed to Mr. Fishman and his two subordinates, Mr.'Wong and Mr. Louie, one's defini- tion of competency is severely tested by the committee's assumption that any of the three men was qualified to pro- vide reliable information related to the question: What is the impact of Communist "Political Propaganda" on Americans who receive it? But, like Mr. Fishman, Mr. Wong tried to answer it: 53 See Carr's The House Committee 92_Un-American Activities, 1945-1950, p. Hanff. 151 £23 Arena: What is the effect, if you are able to tell us, of the propaganda which is emanating from.aed China, let us say on the first generat on Americans of Chinese ancestry? %. Wo : Well, the effect has been considerable. at nese, prior to 1954, did not like the Government of China because of the fact that they were blackmailed and the members of their families tortured. But since they feel by reading this propaganda that the present regime is interested in their welfare, that they don't have unemploy- ment in China-~they feel that China is very good. I hear some Chinese remark.'g:e says the Government of China is no good?‘ Apparently, on the basis of Arens' earlier question of Mr. ang: "For purposes of identification, you are of Chinese extraction?”55 the committee intended to justifyiMr.‘Uong's credibility ’ by reasoning thusly: since Mr. Wong is of Chinese ancestry he therefore is competent to analyze the behaviors of persons of Chinese extraction. The fallacy of this mode of reasoning is evident: one'a ethnic or racial ancestry has no relevance, 2; a, to his knowledge of the psychological impact of political propaganda. Evidence contained in the 1969 hearing transcript also reveals that if a ”friendly" witness did not give the co-ittee the answers it wanted, it was capable of making attempts to persuade the witness to Iodify his information so as to make it fit the thesis espoused by the HCUA. Probably one of the most striking illustrations of the “m meal-ac. am pp. ism-ms. ”an... 9. 1947. 152 HCUA's endeavors to distort the truth occurred in connection with an issue which arose after the San Francisco hearings had begun. That issue, of course, pertained to the causes of the demonstrations which took place both inside and out- side the City Hall during the hearings. As was explained in Chapter III of this study, the causes of the disturbances at San Francisco are most difficult to pinpoint; however, Arena, in his interrogation of Inspector Maguire, revealed both the fallacy of M 2M of which the co-ittee was guilty and a disregard for truth in the following excerpt from the hearing record: Mr. %: Inspector Maguire. were you in charge 3? a t of the police force which has been operating here in the City Hall in the last two or three days, during the hearings of this com- mittee? , . e: At the time I was in charge. Yes- terday was in c e. Mr. ns: Did you, the course of the disch e 3? your duties in City Hall, observe the activit es .ong the young people who had been assembled here in the hall, by certain people who were known by you fra confidential sources to be members of the Co-unist Party? (At this point Mr. Johansen left the hearing room.) Mr. ire: Yes, air. 5. : id you see agitational activities .ong the young people by Merle Brodsky, who was ejected twice from this co-ittee hearing? Mr. %guire: Yes, sir. - ¥° eng: id you see itational activities .ong t e young people by Arc e Brown, who likewise has been identified as a member of the Co-unist Party and who likewise has been twice ejected from this hearing room because of his disturbances of the proceedings? . :1 Yes, sir. i en ; id you see .ong the young people, Frank on 153 . “uire: No sir; I can't truthfully answer t t one. an. Aren : Did you know that bank Wilkinson has en n town in the course of the last several days? Mr. figuire: Yes, sir; we did. . _A_r_e_n§_: id you know that Frank Wilkinson has en repeatedly identified under oath before this co-ittee as a member of the hard-core of the Com- munist Party, and that the Co-ittee on thquerican Activities has issued a report entitled 'Operation Abolition, ' in which it is revealed that Frank Wilkinson has responsibility of the conspiracy to direct the activities of the hergency Civil Liber-o ties Co-ittee and of an organization known as the Citizens Co-ittee to Preserve American Freedoms. with the avowed ob active of the party of dis- crediting the ttee on Unnamerican Activities and attempting to discredit the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its great director, J. Edgar Hoover? if: you awgrre of that? . gggu Yes, a I am. - %. Arena: Are you aware of the fact that Harry Fidges of the International Longshoremen's Union has arrived in this cosmmnity and was yesterday participating in the affairs in this hall? L‘E- M uire: I did not observe him participating, but rved shortly after he was creating a ICGIGo‘r §.£§i_: Did you observe Sally Sweet participating tational force among the young people? Mr. muire: No, sir; I did not. . id you observe Ralph Isard participating ag tational activities .sng the young people? Mr. W3 No, sir. E. 9333;: Are there any others whose n-es come to your mind at the moment whom you know from your security intonation to be members of the Mist Party who were participating in agitational acti- vities among the young6 people? at- was: NO: ir- Had the co-ittee been interested in procuring reliable information regarding who had precipitated the demonstrations it would have couched its questions in a more open-ended manner. Instead, as the above sequence indicates, its questions were derived from the unproved assumption that 551b1d., pp. 2091-2092. 154 the alleged Communists had been the guilty culprits. Mbreover, in spite of Maguire's lack of information re- garding the behavior of Prank‘Wilkinson,.Arens made certain that Wilkinson shared the blame for inciting the demonstra- tions, and this he asserted without offering any proof. Much of the i-ediately preceding analysis of the logical validity of the committee's methods of inquiry and the reliability of the information sought after reveals the HCUA's disregard for truth. in addition to the committee's predilection to exaggerate and to distort information, the 1960 hearing transcript provides substantial evidence that the HCUA was less interested in acquiring 331 information than it was in publicly displaying information*which it already had in its possession. Nowhere was this more evident than in the lengthy, and often rambling, discourses uttered by the "friendly" witnesses in response to committee questions. N Customs official Irving rial-an, for instance, had told his story to the committee many times prior to his sojourn to 8am.!rancisco in 1960. ‘Representative Jimes Roosevelt's verbal attack.on the HCUI.which‘was presented on the floor of the House less than three weeks prior to the hearings at San.Francisco accurately characterized a committee habit that was to be unrated at San Francisco: It is little better than insulting to the inn telligence of this House and this country to 155 maintain a co-ittee for the purpose of in- vestigating sag reporting what everyone already knows. 7 That much of the testimony by the "friendly" wit- nesses contained little, if anything, not already known to the co-ittee, if not to the general American public, is demonstrated by the redundancy of the following testi- mony which consists of intonation released in 1956:58 g. Johan en: Mr. Chairman, before the counsel proce a, should like to go back to the first statement the witness made regarding the organi- sational setup. . Prussion: The very top level organisation of t e Wt Party of the United States is the Conunist International which at many times, under certain circustances, changes its nmse to deceit- fully hide its intent. . Are : What is the constituent makeup of that? t s t e relationship between that and any for- eign power or government? Mr. Prussion: The Conunist International consists a a delegated body of representatives of the Co-unist Parties of the various countries through- out the world. It is the Conunist Party of the Soviet Union which always, with no exception, sets down the strategy to be used the Conunist Parties throughout the world. Similarly, the fact that the following information was well-known to the HCUA is also verifiable: E0 Arena: Are there Co-unists who are not techni- cal Em—Ers of the Conunist Party?. . . . gig. Prussian: The Co-unist Party has a varied type 57%. Rec., April 25, 1960, p. 866. 58U.S.. Congress, Senate, Subco-ittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Leila of the Co-ittee on the Judiciary, e Co-unigt Parti 3f; the Uni ed Stgtes 2; America, Bhth %809 9”” : PP. 1" o 5922 _£__& cim deem. P- 20% 156 of membership. They have one type of member who attends cell meetings, pays his dues. They have another type of Comunist, because he doesn't want to identify himself with the cell for fear of exposure by an informant such as myself, who has a courier pay his dues. Then there are many, many Co-unists who have dropped out of the Conunist Party, conveniently, so that they can hide their identity and in that way are better able to carry out the revolution- ary work. There is a fourth type of Co-mist who is never associated with a cell, but he is a Lenin- ist, and so imbued with the forthcoming revolu- tion that he works diligently wherever possible and keeps contact with Co-unist leaders on the higher level. This type of a Conunist is usually a doctor, a lawyer, a political official and in the pro- fessional field of life. All of the above information is contained, in more detail, in the Senate docI-ent cited previously, and was published four years prior to the 1960 hearings.“ luerous exnples which reinforce the fact that the HCUA, under the guise of the seemingly legitimate topics discussed earlier in this chapter, merely pretended to be gathering new information are sprinkled throughout the record of the hearings. The following list of questions posed by the co-ittee reveals the extent to which unneces- sary data were sought after from the “friendly” witnesses: &. Arena: Describe s cm, Mr. Wong? ‘ Mr. Arena: The Co-unist propaganda, the Com- munist technique, and the Conunist line are 501.2%" p. 2033. 616.3., Congress, Senate, Subco-ittee to Investi- gate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, e__t_ _a_1_., 117,1956. PP. 30-33. 157 to masquerade behind a facade of ht-anitar- ianism, is it not? oo oooooo'o oooO fi. Arena: J. Edgar Hoover, in his book 'Maaters Decet t'--I believe he quite pointedly used that title-«aid that the Cossaunists use propa- ganda to condition the minds of people, masquer- ading behind a facade of that which would be appealing. oooooooooo ooooo oeooo o0 Mr. Arena: How does the menace, the strength and We fore eof the Col-unist conspiracy on American soil, compare now, say, with the past 10 or 15 years? ......... ................ lg. Arena: Is the formal entity known as the Com- munist Party, all of the Mist operations on American soil, or is it only a part of the total Conunist operation on American soil? ooooaoo ooooooooo see. Mr. Arena: Are there any Co-unists under Com- munist discipline doing the work of the Co-unist conspiracy, consciously doing it, who do not have formal membership in the sense that you and I might have a membership in a church or in a club? .......................... Mr. Arena: Can you give us from your own experience the conspiracy the techniques which are used by the few Conunists, to condition non-Co-umists to do their dirty work? ..........‘... ............ Mr. Arena: Does the party instruct its comrades to mom to the non-Co-unists, whom they expect to condition and to use, that they are Co-unists? ....... .... ........... &.Ar eng: Mrs. Hartle, may I ask you to proceed at your own pace to tell us the processes by which the Co-unists use and enlist non-Conunists for their aficific objectives in procuring petitions, in partc ipating inCo-unist fronts, in partici- pating in demonstrations , in creating youth groups, masquerading behind an appealing facade and the like? . . . . Mr. I: : Is the Co-unist forty a political party or is t a tentacle of the world conspiracy? ........... . ...'.... fg. Aren _: Is there a technique by the conspirators to res technical membership even in the formal entity known as the Commist Party in order to avoid the impact of the work of this congressional co-ittee? 158 g. 9393;: Is the objective of the Comunist oper- ation on American soil now to convert you, me and everybody here, ideologically, to Comunism as an treatments shattered" °f a That questions such as the dozen included above exemplified the co-ittee's well-established habit, developed over its twenty-two years of investigating subversion, is readily demonstrable by scanning a few of the nearly 50,000 pages it had had published prior to 1960.63 Clearly, with the possible exception of the acquisition of new ones of alleged Conunists, the bulk of the questions posed to the "friendly" witnesses at San Francisco simply were the same "old warnings in old packages.”6“ Most of the information secured, there- fore, probably was redundant and out-dated. Coupled with the co-ittee's inclination to rehash failiar knowledge was its tendency to invite the "friendly" witnesses to verbalise on matters which showed litt le pro- bable relevance to the expedition of its legislative pur- poses. Several of the lines of inquiry discussed previously 62See Fr%ilco Heariggg, pp. Dita-191:9: 1957- 1958; 1960-196, pas . ’ 63See, for example, 0.8. Congress, House, Conittee on Unqherican Activities, Organized Communism in the United States, 85th Cong., 2d 33'... ° Bee-:1. one my Engress, House, Co-ittee on th-Amer can Activities, Len u e g a Co-unist Wea 86th Co ., lat Sess., 1959, sifi ngress, use, C ttee on tin-American EctIvIties, _11_:g___mm: h_'_h__at It Lam-What £___, Does 118, pp. 19-21. “Good-an. mm P- “00- 159 are indicative of the tangents which the HCUA frequently pursued with the "friendly" witnesses. For exnple, the questions concerning the psychology of brainwashing, the motivation which causes a brilliant mind to be drawn to conunism, and the definition of a conune, seem to have doubtful pertinence to the legislative goals espoused by the co-ittee. Illustrations such as those just referred to are typical of the co-ittee's irrelevant excursions with the ”friendly" witnesses. These, however, appear almost legi- timate when compared with the not. imaginative flights of fancy taken by the co-ittee. For example, given the legal meaning of freedom of religion in the United States, it defies one's powers of reasoning to perceive that any legislative purpose could have been served by the committee's line of inquiry in the following excerpt: Mr. Arena: . . . Within the framework of the Com- unist operation, is there room for concepts of God and spiritual values as we are taught them at our mother's knee? Mr. Prussian: The Mist Party lowers man to Hist of a East in the field. As far as the Cos-unist is concerned, man is material and not spiritual; he has no soul, no spirit, and there is no God. This is elementary and fundamental to every Co-unist. One cannot live a peaceable life under com- munism and believe in God at the sac time. Belief is God tears to shreds the entire Co-unist con- spiracy. Mr. Arena: would you tell us whether or not, in tTe process by which you disassociated yourself from the conspiracy. you were able to find any 160 strength and any spiritual faith and a reemphaség in your own life in concepts of a divine being. Perhaps the most apparent irrelevant line of inquiry was prOpounded by the committee on the morning of the third day of the hearings. By that time, on the basis of Prussion's speculations regarding the inediate threat of the Co-unist menace to the United States, the co-ittee had inflated the factual estimate of 10,000 U.S. Conunists to ”approximately 20,000 to 25,000.”65 Using these unsubstantiated figures as his foundation, Arena proceeded to build an irrelevant line of inquiry which evoked responses which are already well- known to nearly every adult American: Mr. : Where did you come from just i-edi- ately pr or to your arrival here in California? Mr. G_r____abor: Pram Hungary? Mr. Arena: From Hungary? E. Grabor: Yes, sir. Mr. Fens: Mr. Chairman, it is our intention to permit Mr. Grabor to testify briefly respecting columnists in action, as distinct from co-unism as it portrays itself behind the facade of humani- tarianism. ... .... . ..... ..... Mr. Grabor: . . .After they the Communists five trken over in 191:7, they started to destroy opposition deliberately. They destroyed and abolished every opposition party by force, by arresting and convicting the leaders of these opposition parties. Opposition papers were not permitted. At a later date there were no Western newspapers and magazines that were allowed in the state of Hungary. Mr. Aren : Is there freedom in the schools? E. Cragr: There is no freedom, sir. 65San Pranciscg m, p. 2037. 561mm , p. 2107. O t V ' v t ._ - 161 Egg Arena: Is there freedom anywhere in Hungary? Mr. Erasar: No, sir. EE} Arena: Now, sir, we don't want to prolong your testimony. we would like just to ask you if you, as a young man, hay lived under com- munism having seen communism n action, as dis- tinct from communism as it portrays itself as the pie in the sky, what word would you have as a young man to the young people of your adopted land of freedom respecting the significance of communism in the world and the status of commun- ism in America? ......................... Mr. Arens: Is your native country-~and I say this w th great reluctance, but I must ask it--is your native country, Hungary, now in a state of 'peace- ful coexistence' with the Soviet Union? Mg. Grabor: I didn't exactly understand the queen tion. Ton have to forgive me, but my language-- Mr. Arena: You witnessed the Soviet tanks rolling i. into apest, did you not? Mi. Grabor: Yes, sir. I was fighting sginst them. Mr. ens: And you saw your own people massacred, did you not? Mg. Grabor: Yes, sir. I saw thousands and thou- sands of people dying on the streets just because they wanted their rights, their freedom. They wanted the Russian army to leave Hungary. They wanted the Hungarian goods to belong to the Hun- garian people. They wanted to be patriots, and patriotism is a crime under a Communist re ime. g5, Arena: Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, t is not our Intention to prolong the interrogation of Mr. Grabor. We just thou ht it would be well to have in this record some ndication of what it is to live under communism and what is in the mind of a young man who was in the school, under a Communist regime, communism in action. It is significant to note that Arens' final state- ment in the segment of testimony quoted above contains no language which even attempts to connect the line of inquiry to the legitimate purposes of the HCUA. Rather, this fail- ure to demonstrate the relevancy of the relationship be- tween legislative purpose and the line of inquiry pursued 57Ih1d.. pp. 2107-2109. —- I. h “9’. U ' O -_ c . - .. a-h . ~ . - H——.—- 162 with Mr. Grabor perhaps reveals the conittee's cognizance of its attempts to develop a faulty analogy. The line of inquiry with Grabor is invalid because of the significant differences between the two nations being compared, Hungary and the United States. It is safe to infer that Mr. Grabor's testimony was solicited by the HCUA purely for its emotional values, a strategy liberally employed by the committee during the 1960 hearings. Other examples which further illustrate the HCUA's attachment to irrelevant, emotional-laden questions are readily discernible in the hearing transcript: Mr. Arena: Just in passing, before we proceed firther, as soon as you broke from the Co-unist Party did you, like many others, receive the smears and innuendoes and character assassina- tions from members of this conspiratorial force and from suckers and dupes whom they are able to enlist in front of them? ................... ..... .Arens: You have found your way back to God and patriotism: have you not? ......... ...... .... .Aren : Is your family presently fearful-ml you —'ltold me last evening of certain inci- dents I will not ask you to repeat-~in general, is your fnily, your wife and children, are they presently fearful of recriminations by the party against you because got: served your Government in this consliiirnny?6 Other than the potential persuasive impact upon the listeners of reinforcing their hatred toward co-unism, it is diffi- cult to justify the kinds of questions cited above on grounds of legislative pertinence. Galbidoo PP. 1956-1957; 203“. 163 inciple of Wfiasition an n a Technigue of Aest on_ Lower n cu 1atv Discuss on. As one can infer from many of the foregoing excerpts from the 1960 San Francisco hearings, the third essential element of the process of dialectic-ma principle of opposi- tion-n-is noticeably non-existent. The transcript of the testimony during the HCUA hearings gives no indication that any of the ten ”friendly” witnesses possessed vievm of the world that were fundamentally different from those of the co-ittee. As the quoted testimony cited thus far reveals, the "friendly” witnesses gave the HCUA the answers to its questions that it wanted to hear. Hone of the witnesses in the "friendly" category reflected attitudes that were not in harmony with the politically conservative biases associated with the HCUA since its establishment in 1938.69 Implicit in the mthod of dialectic, properly con- ceived and employed, is the notion of seeking probable truth. It is fundamental then that to be able to arrive at any kind of reliable policy decisions on a subject as broad and complex as ”um-American activities,” the HCUA ought to make every effort to interrogate persons with differing, but qualified, interests, backgrounds and points of view so that the co-ittee may be confronted with com- peting ideas. Tet, among the I'friendly" witnesses, none ) -_‘ 69See Goodman, The Co-ittee p. #29; see also Ogden's The D es Co-ittee ass and Carr's The Hon e ttee §E__g_n can t__L___vities, 1945-1950, aim. 164 offered the HCUA any ideas or thoughts that were incom- patible withthose of the conittee. Thus, in its studied avoidance of exposing itself to competing points of view, the HCUA provided further support for the oft-repeated allegation that [the HCUA] is unable to see any of the complexi- ties of ordinary human activity. People are either American, Un-nAmerican, or dupes, and the worth of everything they do is tested by that simple- minded standfid: 'lither you're with us or against us.’ That the co-ittee's penchant for one-sidedness was not confined to the 1960 sessions is verified in the fol- lowing evaluation of its methods of inquiry in a set of hearings held in 1959: At most, as in the passport-security hearings of 1959, which were aimed at discrediting the Supreme Court's 1958 passport ruling, an official in favor of security legislation would be invited to testify; the only opponents of such legisltion called as witnesses were persons like Harry Bridges [an alleged Co-unisg or the general manager of the Dail Worker who were asked not about their opia'dié o t e bills but about their Cosmunist assocations, and were held up as frightful examples when they took the Fifth Amendment. There was never much pretense of considering more than 92¢ side of the case regarding a proposed 1.1. The following lengthy quotations from the transcript of the 1960 hearings not only exemplify the likemindedness of the HCUA and the "friendly” witness, but, moreover, they 7°Cogg. 11..., April 25, 1960, p. 866. "'Goodman, 2g. Co-ittee, pp. 1:10-1:11. -vh- 165 further reinforce the dubious value of the cosmittee's lines of inquiry, in terms of the relationship of the topics explored to any legislative purpose: Mr. Arena: Mrs. Hartle, I wonder if I could Eject still another question in the course of the presentation you are making-wan anlysis of these Cos-uni docuents. What caused you to disassociate yourself from this conspiratorial force? We know from our own records that you were a hard-core, dedi- cated Conunist? What actually caused you to see the light and break away from the influence of this devilish force to which you had dedicated your life with a zeal and a determination that far excelled that of any Conunist whom we had to have expelled from the hearing room? Can you tell us about that? 99.3. Hartle: The most important thing that began to tea me out of the Conunist Party was the con- stant factionalism, the constant stru 1e for leadership in the Co-unist Party. Th s I ran into when I first came to Seattle. I was brought in the district office to be in the district leadership. There were always a couple or three factions and each one wanted to be the district or anizer and the top dog, and they were just fight ng about that all the time. I just didn't take too much interest in that. I thought we should get on with our work, being it was such good work and important work. Then they began to have more difficulties on the national scale. with Earl Browder and Willi- 2. Foster and some more like that. Then I heard of a few district squabbles down here in California too. That kind of factional fighting and knifingneach other was going on, a struggle for power the Cosmunist Party in the Ihited States. Besides that, I was sent underground by the Communist Party in the su-er of 1950, ad, per- force, I waun't able to associate as closely with Communists. I wasn't in just daily, morning, noon and night contact with other Co-unists. Thousands of meetings and many, many, books to read and reports to make, and people to teach, and demon- strations to hold, and picket lines and signs to make, and all these millions of things that just practically swallow up an individual in the Com- munist movement. 166 I did have a chance to read, again, some literature which I had been much interested in in the past, before I joined the Communist Party, and some histories that were not on the good list of the Conunist Party. I think I loosened the bonds a little bit, the discipline a little bit, at that time, because it was then that I decided that I was just-awell, I was disgusted with the Columnist Party. Mr. Arens: Did you have a recognition of the basic E's-ceit of the Columnist Party? Did you cone to recognize that fact? . Hartle: Yes, I did. I came to a reco tion 0 that. Strangely enough, I saw the dece t on all fronts and the very last place where I could see the deceit was in the Soviet Union, and the adherence and love and loyalty of Co-unists to the Soviet Union is unimaginable, I do believe, to the average person. But that was almost like giving up my mother. When I finally was able to see that, then there was no more chance of the So-unist Party in- fluencing me any further.7 51;. gens: Mr. Prussion, if a person were talking to a comrade now, say a trained comrade, like Hyman Liner, educational director of the Co-unist Party-wand he has been coming through this area, as I understand it, making speeches to college groups-«and someone said, 'Mr. Issuer, explain to :s the'policies and programs of the Co-unist arty. I have seen a great abundance of his work. He would be explaining the pie in the sky idea, would. he not, that the Comist Party stands for peace, for jobs, for better housing; it stands for uplift in all types of areas. Were you taught anything‘in the training school which led you to bel ve, as a trainee of the Co-unists, one who was being disciplined in the conspiracy, that the actual objectives, the actual motivation, the actual program of the Co-unist Party, was not one of ht-anity, but was one of total enslavemant? Mr. Prussi n: That is very definitely true. The mat garty picks no bones about it. If any A ”£2 W 22mins. PP. 1976-1977. 167 member of the Mist Party were honest-- and they are not-«they would tell you that the Conunist Party believes in overthrowing the Government by force and violence, after the prerequisites of the revolution have been at- tained, and the manner in which they attain these prerequisites of the revolution is by the infiltration of social, economic and political organizations. In the infiltration of these organizations, it is their job to arous class hatred, to gain leadership within these organizations, and to accelerate the class struggle and teach the working class hatred of the people who direct our industry and our Government. Mr. Arena: These conrades who have been working Fire with these youngsters, these young people who have been pickating here and causi the conotion, did the comrades make it pl n to these youngsters that they are comrades, that they are part of a conspiratorial force and are using these youngsters for their ultimate objectives? 3;. Prussion: No, they do not. I recall, for example, when I went to Wayne University-«I . just bringing this out. I think it is a little off the question, but I think it is pertinent. I recall that a lot of my convictions in joining the Com-unist Party I received at the university. In the study, for example of psychology, we were taught human behaviorism and. the materialistic conception of psychology. In the study of sociology, similarly, we studied Darwin's theory, and the material was in the manner of an approach to these questions. Consequently, when the spirit of nan and the soul of man and the nmne of God are never mentioned, never discussed at the universities, a man is readily prepared to accept membership into the Conunist Party. This was part of the pr,gsration for my joining the Mist Party. The i-ediately preceding excerpts not only reveal the high degree of closed-mindedness reflected by its 73%” pp. 2036-2037. 168 questions, but they provide further substantiation of several of the weaknesses of the committee's methods of inquiry which were discussed previously. These weaknesses include: (1) the irrelevancy, on its face, of the line of inquiry pursued with.Mrs. Hartle regarding her reasons for leaving the Communist Party; (2) the unnecessary redundancy of the questions put to Prussion regarding tactics which he learned at Communist training schools; (3) the fallacy of the inference suggested by Arena that the disturbances during the San Francisco hearings were caused by "comrades" ‘who had duped the "youngsters" who had demonstrated; and (h) the encouragement of irrelevant testimony by permitting Prussion to describe his lack of perceptiveness when he *was a student at Wayne university more than thirty years prior to the hearings. On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the com- mittee's methods of inquiry, it should be apparent that the quality of the questioning of the "friendly” witnesses during the 1960 hearings was generally poor much of the time. Many of the questions, as the previously cited testi- mony reveals, sought after highly personalized and sub~ jective responses from the witnesses. The HCUA's queries of Hartle and Prussian regarding their feelings about God seem to be totally irrelevant to the legitimate functions of the committee. Encouraging Prussion, Hartle, and Fish- man, noreover, to "tell" their stories at their "own pace" 169 elicited large amounts of disconnected, and generally irrelevant, verbiage. Furthermore, the fact that the conittee's questionsa-those interspersed throughout the frequent monologues by Prussion and Hartle-«resembled cheer-leading or side-coaching rather than astute inter- ' rogation lends further credence to the conclusion that the HCUA disdains the use of any objective method of inquiry which could discover probable truth. One final sample from the hearing record will be quoted to substantiate the claim that the collittee's questions usually sought agreement, not probable truth: a. Arena: How is it, Mrs. Hartle-and this has puzzled me personally as I have studied this operation for 1“ years, and I have seen the degree to which they can condition non-Comunista against the fight on communism-nthat they can condition them to resist any struggle against this threat to our freedom, how is it that they are able to engender such dedication and zeal and enthusiasm, even in the non-Cpnunist for the Com- munist progrn? Mrs. Hartle: Well, of course, I think the first Wis of It is, how come the Conuniat has the zeal and enthusiasm. I think the best explanation of that is that the struggle for power has always engendered a great deal of enthusiasm in the world, whether it was good or bad. That is a very mighty, sensitive thing, the desire to be in power, the desire to will the destiny of a country or of the people in it. That is a pretty serious matter. People who go into that kind of movement are Imually pretty serious about it. Then they work hard enough and learn enough to be able to throw over to other people a good (fleal of their-what do you call itn-militancy and .rvor. Mr. Aren : We saw a little of that militancy here I: the courtroom just a few minutes ago, didn't we? 170 Egg, Hartle: Yes; that is militancy in the Com- munist Party. Mr. Arena: Based upon your background and exper- ence, do you have any suggestions which you could make, just as one person, to people who will read this public record as to how we could at least bring an approach to bring the realization of the truth as to the nature of communism, as to the nature of the Communist operation, to these suckers, these dupes who are controlled by the conspirators themselves? Do you have any suggestions along that line? flag. Hartle: well, one suggestion I have for the youth, and I think if it had been used on me it might have had an effect. If the young people would know when they start fooling with the Com- munist movement how completely they are going to lose their freedom right in these united States of America, that they will not even be able to move from one city to another. £5, Arena: Do you agree with me that the average youngster who is a sucker or a dupe, or manipu- lated, consciously or unconsciously, by the con- spiratorial force, does not realize that he is actually serving the cause of destroying freedom and liberty? Egg, Hartle: That is true. ya, Arena: He thinks he is doing something good-- many 0 t em. flag. Hartle: Yes. fl;..A:ens: How do you account for that? Mrs Hartle: Well, of course, it is through a very weIi calculated propaganda. The Communist Party says it is for freedom, and it is able to convince some people. It is not able to convince everybody, thank God, but it is able to convince some people. Then, after it has drawn the people in and indoctrinated them for a while, then along comes the discipline. By that time you are obligated and oriented to where you can't desert the move- ment because you don't want tzngo back on your obligations, you know, to hum ty, peace and all of that, so then you accept the discipline. In order to get all of these good things you can't move from Seattle or--you can't move from Spokane to Seattle, and you can't marry somebody, either, especially if they are not ust quite the right type of person. They will te 1 you what to do with your children when you finally have some. 171 Mr. Arena: Isn't that what the Columnists complain ut this comittee? Isn't that thought control? Mrs. Hartle: They have the most effective thought control that I have ever had any experience with. “’ In addition to the most important consideration, that the line of inquiry initiated by the co-nittee counsel in the above testimony had little, if any, pertinence to the legislative purposes of the mun, other considerations regarding the questioning process warrant co-ent. More meaningful results might have accrued had the questions been more evaluative, probing, and penetrating. But, such was not the case. Once again, in the San Francisco hearings in 1960, the HCUA manifested behaviors not unlike those described in Chapter II of this study. Professor Carr's assessment of the co-ittee's interrogation of some "friendly“ witnesses during hearings the l-BUA had conducted between 19’45 and 1950 seems strikingly appropos to the 1960 San Francisco sessions: The conittee has been particularly prone to let ex-Co-unists indulge in monolo ues. The possibility that intelligent, pers stent questioning of such a friendly witness might be just as effective in producing results as in the treatment of unfriendly witnesses seem, not to have been recognized by the emittea. 5 The interrelationship of the five essentials of the process of dialectic is crucial. It therefore should come as no surprise that the quality of the couittee's 75Carr. 1h; gouse W 25 {In-America Acti- vitiel, p. 291. 172 speculative discussion with the ”friendly" witnesses was generally low, as well. Although some ofdthe lines of inquiry undertaken with the "friendly” witnesses resembled a kind of speculative discussion, the'rigorous application of any reasonable standard to the significance and pertin- ence of such discussion reveals that the speculation is, as one might expect, one-sided and frequently irrelevant. The co-ittee which set at San Ftancisco rarely spelled out the relationship of its line of inquiry to the process of determining what, if any, legislative action might need to be taken. Consider, for instance, the following exercise in speculation: M_r_. Arena: Let me ask you still another question, and I hadn't thought of this except in the vein in which we are proceed today: As a former deadly enemy of this c ttee and of its work, and now one who is serving your goverment in making available your knowledge, interpretation of the operation, can you tell this collsittee how you think this co-ittee could do a better job to serve the cause of resisting this awful force which is penetrating every segment of our society? Is there anything you think we ought to do that we are not doing? Mrs. Hartle: Well, I don't know whether the con- ttee can do it or who can do it, but apparently the education about communism that has to be gotten to more people will have to be done with a little bit more effective means than expecting somebody to read a congressional record because it just isn't-u-well, I think we all understand that that is just not in the cards, to expect the average American to read something like that “d .tudy it. A student will do it and some people will do it, but a lot of people won't. I don't know, but if it were possible to have really good TV pro- grams and really good radio programs and really good books-- 173 M_1_‘_. ens: We are disposed. to think that is be~ yond t e purview of the official function of this committee. Mrs. Hartle: But if the average American would ow enough about the Conunist Party, then he would be very effective. I can remember when I was in the Comunist Party I belonged to the Central Labor Council in Spokane and that was many years ago, 1936-37, when the Conunists were riding pretty high and we had quite a few Columnists in that Central Labor Council but I can remember to this day one or two men u there who knew what the Conunist conspiracy was, and they just caused us Commists all kinds of trouble and we never did get anywhere in that Central Labor Council over those two fellows. Red-baiters we called them, but they knew. 5;. Arena: Eaacists, red-baiters, witch hunters; we are used to that. In sum, the so-called methods of inquiry utilized with the "friendly" witnesses who appeared before the HCUA at its 1960 San Francisco public hearings fall short of the standards essential to an effective dialectical process. Hts-arous violations of the requisites to a rational or logical mode of inquiry occurred with great frequency, and the co-ittee's propensity to rehash already known information reveals a disregard for the objective methods necessary for the acquisition of data which could have produced a reliable basis for ascertaining probable truth. Numerous questions were directed to the ”friendly” witnesses concerning issues about which the witnesses, in many cases, lacked expert information. In spite of the witnesses' dubious competencies, the conittee accepted 753.1: We Heariggg, p. 1979. 17!: their opinions as reliable and factual data. An objective, balanced view of the various topics raised by the connittee was sacrificed to a subjective, one-sided view because all of the “friendly" witnesses expressed only attitudes and information which were compatible with the politically con- servative points of view traditionally espoused by the HCUA. In like manner, the questions directed to the "friendly" witnesses, for the most part, were ineffectual because they either were personalized or they merely served to reinforce the responses made by the witnesses. Finally, the speculative discussions proved to be generally mean- ingless because, as with the four other essentials of dialectic, the HCUA failed to show any concrete relation- ship between the issues raised and the legislative purposes for which the hearings purportedly were being conducted. In short, the methods employed by the HCUA with the "friendly" witnesses at San Francisco, appear to have been designed to attain objectives other than those sought by true inquiry. These other objectives of the HCUA will be discussed fully in Chapter V of this study as dimensions of the comittee's rhetorical practices and purposes. Ingum 95 the "Hostile" gig. ”Unfriendly" Witmsges. Exnination of the testimony of the ”friendly” wit- nesses, when juxtaposed against that of the ”hostile“ior "unfriendly” witnesses, provides a study in contrasts. 175 Whereas the transcript of the 1960 San Francisco hearings reveals that the rapport between the HCUA and the "friendly" witnesses was amiable, patronizing, courteous, and at times, intimate, the transcript indicates that the interaction between the committee and its thirty-six "unfriendly” witnesses was cool, hostile, insulting, and at times, intimidating. Thus, as the behaviors of the HCUA described in Chapter II of this study seem to have predicted, the San Francisco hearings were characterized by uncooperative, and even sharply antagonistic, verbal exchanges between members of the committee and the "unfriendly" witnesses. A.study of the hearing transcript leads one to the conclusion that the recalcitrance of the "hostile" witnesses interacted with the antagonistic behaviors of the demonstrators gathered at City Hall, and thereby accentuated and heightened the hostile behaviors of both groups.77 According to the report of the HCUA, all of the thirty-six persons in the ”hostile" category had been sub- poenaed to appear at San Francisco "on the basis of come mittee information respecting their leading roles in Northern California.Communist echelons."78 Except for the seven persons identified by Karl Prussion and Barbara Hartle as members of the Cbmmunist Party (Nicholas, Clark, 77See Chapter II of this study. 733.. San Francigcg Hearingg, pp. 1921-1925. 176 Graham, Ross, Down, and Dawson), no information was re- vealed by the comittee as to the sources of the other thirty-one "unfriendly" witnesses' identification as mem- bers of theCoununist I’arty.79 The committee's habit of concealing its sources of information had not abated at all. Assessment of the HCUA's methods of dealing with the "hostile" witnesses by testing these methods against the standards of sound dialectical procedures reveals that the questioning techniques used were even more ineffectual and more questionable than were those utilized with the "friendly" witnesses. The methods of inquiry used with the "unfriendly" witnesses were inconsistent with the essentials of the dialectical process, as defined previously. A Logical Inquiry in Pursuit of Knowledge. m. co-ittee's insistence upon seeking information from the "hostile” witnesses which it admitted that it already had in its possession constituted the most obvious element of the dialectical process which its methodology violated. As witness Bertrn Ediaes queried during his appearance before the committee: 111;. m: You know the facts, Mr. Arena? Then, Mr. Arena, why do you ask me that question when you already claim to know the information. Why do you do it? You can have only one purpose, and that is to try to embarrass me, to husiliate 791bid., p. 1921, pgsim. 177 me, to pillorize me, to pillory me, and that is the whole function of your organization, Mr. Arena.80 Several other "unfriendly" witnesses raised the sue question and, as in the case of Attorney Edises, they, too, received no mower to their questions. Mrs. Ann Deirup also attempted, without reply, to challenge the committee's purpose in requesting information from her which it already had in its possession: 2?... Arena: You are on the County Conittee, so we understand, of the Communist Party, and we thought perhaps you might have some infor- mation that could be of service to this comittee. Mrs. Deiru : If you have all these answers rom suc reliable and unimpeachable sources . . . . As in the case of the questioning of the "friendly" witnesses, the HCIIA appeared to show little interest in the acquisition of new information from the "hostile” witnesses. For example, in the following excerpts from the transcript it would seem that the co-ittee was more in- terested in persuading the witness to expose himself as a Conunist than in procuring new information about the activities of the Conunist Party: Mr. Are : Have you in the recent past been in charge oi certain activities of the Conunist conspiracy, which the party characterizes within party ranks as colonization? 8°Ibid., p. 216s. 311bid., p. 2030. 178 Sir, I put it to you as a fact, and ask you to affirm or deny the fact, that you are presently the organizer of the Communist Party of Humboldt County, California.82 Questions similar to those cited above, the answers to which already were in the committee's files, were re- peated and repeated with the thirty-six "unfriendly" wit- nesses. As was pointed out earlier in the discussion of the questions raised with the "hostile" witnesses, the query which evoked few answers was, ”Are you now or have you ever been actively engaged in the activities of the Communist Party?" It is clear, then, that the committee's purpose was not to "sample factual information with refer- ence to types and patterns of Communist activity;”83 rather, since it already claimed to know that the thirty-six had been Co-unists, the committee seemed only to want each of the "hostile” witnesses to admit the fact in public.8“ unlike the trusting "friendly" witnesses who never asked the committee to explain the pertinency of its lines of inquiry, the 'hostile" witnesses challenged the perti- nency of the HCDA's questions a.dozen times at San Fran- cisco. Most of these explanations of pertinency, by virtue of their ambiguous language and obscure logic, failed to shed much light upon the connection between the lines of lehld. , p. 2062 . 83I§id., p. 1933. 8“:bid.. PP. 2012-2013. 179 inquiry and the legislative purposes of the committee. The implications of the language used in the following explana- tion by.Arens suggests that the committee may have been planning to introduce a legislative recommendation intended to provide penalties against members of the Communist Party found guilty of mistreating fellow Party members: our. Bown: I am afraid I don' t understand your question, nor do I see the significance of it. Mr. Arena: I will be glad to explain the signi- ficance of it. There has been identified on this record, a report to the National Committee of the Gbmmunp ist Party, made by a comrade, in.which, in that report the comrade is complaining about the expulsion of another comrade. The second comrade, who was expelled, according to the report, was denied the privi- lege of counsel, he‘was denied the opportunity to know the nature of his charges; he was denied the opportunity to offer proof of his alleged innocence. He was denied even; the company of fellow comrades. He was denied any semblance of fairplay, and this one comrade is complain- ing to the National Convention of the Communist Party about this particular procceeding. Since you apparently can't quite understand the pertinency of this line of inquiry, I will say to you that this committee is trying to develop information rQecting the techniques, mode of operations, of this conspiratorial force ‘which masquerades behind a facade of dogoodism, huanitarianiam, which is sweeping the world, which has destroyed more lives on this planet than any other force since the dawn of time. Now, air this committee expects to take back to washington.with it, by direction or indirection, considerable infbrmation which ‘will be of value in the duty which this comp mittee has to evolve legislation to attempt to cop: ggth this conspiratorial force on American so . 35Ib1d., pp. 2012-2013. 180 Given that the definition of pertinency involves demonstrating, at the time a question is asked, that any question directed to a witness is germane to some legisla- tive purpose of the HCUA, it is apparent that the speech quoted above does not fulfill that definition. Perhaps .Arens' difficulty in explaining the relevance of his line of inquiry stemmed from the fact that the question he had directed to Mr. Bown was not relevant: "Do you have recol- lection of another proceeding in.which counsel wasn't even permitted in the room.in.which you were involved?"86 In- terestingly, the irrationality implicit in the committee's question to vernon Bown also violated Rule II of its own "Rules of Procedure" which states: ”. . . and the infor- mation sought to be elicited at the hearings shall be relevant and germane to the subject as so stated."87 Two other examples from the hearing transcript will suffice to demonstrate that the lines of inquiry pursued by the committee with.msny of the "hostile" wit- nesses frequently lacked rational bases. In the first example, witness Joseph Figueiredo caused counsel Arens to engage in a verbal exchange concerning irrelevant sub- ject matter; and in the secomd1'witness Ralph Izsrd, at the behest of the HCUA, led the committee on a "wild-goose chase" 5 861bid., p. 2012. 87See Chapter III, pages 103-105, for "Rules of Procedure" of the HCUA. 181 without revealing any information of substantial relevance to the legislative purposes of the HCUA: £5, Figueiredo: I was born September 7, 1910, in the honors e Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which had the honor to be the first State which got rid of witch hunts, and I am glad to be able and proud to participate in the modern effort to eliminate witch hunting in our country. 51;. Arena: Did you participate in elimination or attempted elimination of witch hunting in Massachu- setts? (The witness conferred with counsel.) ya, Pigueiredo: I am against witch hunts no matter where it ta es place, and wherever you go or any other witch hunt committee goes I will be opposed to the witch hunts. HE: Arena: Now, please answer the question. e witness conferred with his counsel.) ya, Fi ueiredo: What is the purpose and the rele- vancy of that question? fig, Arena: You opened the line of inquiry. Mr. Chairman, this record reflects that this man here has opened the door on this line of inquiry by volunteering his opposition to what he has char- acterized as witch hunts. I then asked him if he had taken an active part in eliminating, or attempting to eliminate, what be regarded as witch hunts in the State of Massachusetts. I, therefore, now, Mr. Chairman, insist upon an answer to this question. I respectfully request that the Chair order and direct this witness to answer the question. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) ‘Mr. Willis: Mr. Arena, you are perfectly correct that He 53s opened the door and his could be pursued. But go to the next question and connect it.88 The "connection" made by Arena was done so by referring to a letter which Figueiredo allegedly had written in l95h, six years previous to the hearings.89 One is led to ponder just 88San Franciscg Hearings, p. 2018. 891bid., p. 2019. 182 how serious a threat Mr. Figueiredo's alleged activities were in 1960, in the light of the six year time lapse between evidence and allegation. No connection was stated or implied by the com- mittee concerning legislative purpose and the line of inquiry pursued in detail in the following excerpt: Mr. Arena: Have you traveled abroad in the course 3? the last 6 or 7 years? 13;. Izard: Well, I think I have been to Ensenada, Mexico, on a vacation. 12;. Areas: Have you traveled to India and the Far East 211;. Izard: Several times, sir. Mr. Arena: Over what period of time did you make these several journeys to the Far East? 3- Izard: 191+6-h7 and 1950. £0 Areng: Where did you o in 1950? Mr. zard: This will requ e some consultation, counsel will excuse me for a moment. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) £15. Izard: Yes, Mr. Arena, I think your question was where I went? M_z_'. Aren : Yes, please, sir. Mr. Izfi: My ship took me first to Yokohama and Eon there I went to Tokyo for several days while the ship was tied up, and then from Yokohama to Manila for a few hours, then direct to Hong Kong, where I stayed 15 days, after which I went to Macao. Prom Macao I went to Chung-shan. From Chung- shan I went to Yangshuo, from Yangshuo to Wuham. EE- Arens: Would you hesitate to inform one who is unenmened, are these places which you are now describing within the confines of Red China? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) 5;. Izard: Does the counsel mean the People's Republic of China? Mr. Arena: Well, it is not the same terminology. ou use one terminolo y and I use another. We will accept your te ology for the purpose of this query only. Yes. a. Izard: Well, you see, at Macao, Macao used to be an island, and in the old days when the countries of the world did what they wanted, to loot China, Macao was owned by the Portuguese, and it is still a Portuguese entry port, although 183 the harbor is silted up to above 6 feet and it has no real economic significance any more. Its only real economic significance, and the only reason it is able to sustain life, is a causeway about 6 miles in length, which connects it with the Chinese mainland and from where rice-- gr, Scherer: Mr. Chairman, this is just a smart- aleck answer by the witness. I ask that you direct the witness to answer the question. Ea, Willis: Yes. The question is: Are these places you named within the territory of the-- Mr. Andersen: (counsel for Izard) He was ex— plsining that‘Macao is Portuguese. That is what he was explaining. 315. Arena: Go ahead, please, sir. Mr. Izard: Well, if I have Mr. Scherer's per- mission I will go ahead. I don't want to go ahead Without the consent of the full committee. g2, Scherer: I ask that you direct the witness to answer the questions. .Are any of the places he mentioned in.Red China? Mr. Andersen: If there is a question before the 'witness, I want it repeated, so my client knows where he stands. Mr. Arena: The essence of the question of thought which is intended to be conveyed to any reasonably receptive mind is: Are the cities or places that you have been describing within.the mainland of China, which we characterized as 'The People's Republic of China?’ EEb Izard: Chung-shan is the birthplace of Sun Yet-sen, known as the George‘washington of China, the Father of his Country. 0 Whatever the relevance of the committee's line of inquiry may have been, with regard to the travelogue approach with Mr. Izard, it was never explicated by the committee. The lack of an explanation of pertinency notwithstanding, the verbal excursion through the Far East persisted with Mr. Izard for an additional eight pages in the hearing transcript. 91 9°1b;a., pp. 2129-2131. glIbid., pp. 2131-2133. 18# From another point of view, one cannot help but be skeptical of the veracity of the committee's frequent reiterations that its lines of questioning were genmane to its legislative objectives. Its incessant probing of personal matters with witnesses, both “friendly" and "hostile," appeared to have little probable relevance to its legitimate functions. Several of the many examples of the committee's personalized lines of inquiry which occurred during the 1960 hearings will serve to illustrate its use of this technique: Mr. Arena: Are you now, this very instant, a member of that conspiratorial force that would overthrow the Government of the united States by force and violence and that would establish an authoritarian government even worse than the Nazis, namely, the Communist dictatorship? 0...... ......CCOCOOOOO Mr. Arena: Tell us about the nature of the training you have had in engineering. was that correspondence or just by going to the library or studying at home like Abraham ‘Lincoln did, or how was that? How did.you acquire this knowledge you have in engineering? 000............OOOOOOOOOO Mr. Arena: While you were there, did you make IshuIE; respecting the emasculation, the cruci- fixion, of the Christian missionaries who had been teaching in Red.China? ......OOOOOO... 00.00.... Mr. Aren : Do you anticipate after you have ‘bzen re eased from the pains and penalties of perjury if you lie, to return to your institu- tion and return to the parents and return to these people, these students to whom.you want to give fair play, and say, ‘Of course I am not a Communist, of course I have never been a Communist; of course I know nothing about that conspiratorial organization, but I wan't going to tell that witchuhunting, Constitution- wrecking, labor-baiting Committee on Uh-American 185 Activities that I was or was not a Com» munist'792 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frequently, as the above sample questions confirm. the thrust of the committee's inquiries appeared to be more cal- culated to intimidate the witness than to interrogate him regarding factual information. Moreover, the extensive and liberal use of emotionally-charged language in phrasing the questions serves to reinforce the longstanding criticism that the committee's primary purpose is to "expose for the sake of exposure."93 . A.Principle of Opposition Relying upon a Technique of Question and.Anawer in Speculative Discussion. The preceding discussion of the committee's methods of inquiry as they were employed with the ”hostile” wit~ nesses at San Francisco illustrates (l) that the HCUA's questioning technique is highly unreliable and ineffective because it does not serve the legitimate ends of the com» mittee; (2) that a principle of opposition-~seeking perti- nent data and ideas from persons of varying persuasion ~- rarely materialized because the co-ittee chose to question the witnesses regarding issues and topics which were un- related to legislative purposes; and (3) that all of the dialogue with the "unfriendly" witnesses that could be 92M" pp. 2101; 2121; 2131+; and 2155. 93Feliman, The Defendant's Rights, p. 238. 186 classified as speculative discussion pertained, for the most part, to arguments related to the constitutionality of the HCUA and its methods rather than to the issues of the San Francisco investigations. Therefore, in the light of the extensive testimony already cited and evaluated, a few more samplings of typical testimony from the hearings will be adequate to substantiate the aforementioned three points. To illustrate that the technique of question and answer revealed in the transcript of the 1960 hearings is consistent with the HCUA’s mode of inquiry throughout its history is not difficult, as the discussion in Chapter II of this study clearly shows.9u In fact, the following evaluation of the committee's questioning practices at hearings during the 1950‘s appropriately characterizes much of the treatment of the "unfriendly" witnesses at San Francisco: The self-righteousness of the committee's members and staff obstructed it in the perfor- mance of its avowed informational function. Faced with an ex-Communist, Arena required re- pentance, absement, and conversion. His ques- tions were designed to be asked, not answered. He demanded of auwitness in Buffalo: iAre you now thoroughly disgusted with the fact that you have been associated with the Communist ideolo y, which is atheistic, which is the very antithesis of Christian.morality as we know it in this country?'95 9“See Carr's The use Committee gg'UnnAmerican .Activitieg, 1945-1950, pp. f . gsGoodman, The Committee, p. tau. 187 In fairness, it should be pointed out that many of the thirty-six "unfriendly" witnesses made every effort to resist the committee at San Francisco, even in those rare instances in which the HCUA phrased pertinent, intelligent questions. Such resistance was not uncommon, as a knowledge of the committee's history reveals. .As Goodmmn.writes, regarding the late fifties: Anti-Co-ittee [the HCUA] protests there had always been, outside the hearing roomband inside, from.Communists, friends of Communists, and authentic civil libertarians, but now there were more protests and.more vigorous ones. Some wit- nesses, particularly the hard-line C.P. members, raised cain as a matter of tactics. Some were incited by the snidenesa of Arena or the bully- ing of Scherer. Since no court ever heLd a witness in contempt of committee because he had behaved contemptuously, the only option avail- able to the Congressmen when their patience was tried was to order troublesome persons from their sight, a Renalty that was generally accepted like aLmedal.9 .All of the ingredients characterized by Goodman were once again in evidence at San Francisco, including the ouster from the hearing room of several ”hostile" witnesses.97 No doubt the fact that all of the "hostile" wit- nesses had been subpoenaed to testify on the basis of the committee's allegations that they had been engaged in Communist Party activity, and the strong public animosity in the Bay.Area toward the HCUA.and its hearings combined 96mm. , p. 1.22. 97See‘§2§,Francisco Heari s, passim. 188 to heighten the degree of hostility expressed by them toward the committee. Since communication is a reciprocal process, none can occur unless those being questioned are willing to provide answers. By the same token, if the com- mittee really desired useful answers to its questions, why did it not subpoena a few "unfriendly" witnesses who might have been predisposed to respond to its queries? Among the "unfriendly" witnesses who appeared at San Francisco, the committee's questions elicited a barrage of challenges and attacks upon the Committee, its members, its purposes, methods and procedures. Objections to the committee's questions on the grounds of pertinency pro- voked frequent and extended explanations of pertinency which had become ”part of the ceremony after the Watkins decision."98 Tirades by a number of the ”hostile" wit- nesses who accused the committee of acting unconstitu- tionally represented the nearest thing to speculative discussion that occurred during the committee's dialogues with the recalcitrant witnesses. The following speech, one of the milder indictments, was part of the ritual at San Francisco: Mr. Ber an: Well, after that remark I am enlig tene to the fact that the business of the committee is to collect tidbits of infor- nation. In answer-~I understand that when you tell me to answer a question, I have got to answer gsGoodman, The Committee, p. 410. 189 it, so I am now declining to answer that ques- tion. I have a number of reasons for which I so decline. In the first instance, I decline be- cause I don't recognize the competency of this committee, not only because of the brief which says the committee chairman, his actual presence in Congress, is a violation of the fourteenth amendment, but also because every member of the committee, it seems to me, serves improperly. When they were elected to Congress, they took an oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Instead, they subvert the Constitution of the united States, sneer at its agendments, and attempt to pillory people who face t em. ' And for that reason, I say that the first amendment of the Constitution of the Uhited States, which states very clearly that I and any citizen of the united States has a.complete right to think as we please, to associate with whom we please, to have the freedom of speech, and those other rights which the first amendment allows, I, therefore, have to, and consider that the first amendment of the United States Constitution pro- tects me in my refusal to answer this question from.this committee at this time.9 Seven of the recalcitrant witnesses attempted to read prepared statements which, according to Rule VII of the committee's "Rules of Procedure,"100 are to be filed with the staff counsel of the HCUA, but not uttered at the hearings. Perhaps some degree of credence is lent to the charges leveled by the witnesses against the committee's functions and methods by virtue of the fact that five of the seven were not prevented from reading their statements 99mmaai 3: Pa 20070 10°See Chapter III, pages 103-105, for "Rules of Procedure“ of the HCUA. 190 during the hearings. Further, as the twenty-two year record of the committee's behavior suggests, the HCUA's reluctance to enforce its own "rule" may have reflected a deliberate cautiousness designed to dilute the hostile atmosphere which permeated the hearings. Finally, it seems certain that the behaviors of both the committee and the "hostile" witnesses were influenced by the pre- sence of the television and motion picture cameras which were focussed upon themmduring the three days. Clearly, in the case of one witness, the potential impact of the hearings on the television audience was well-recognized: 211;. Mandel: By the way, if the television people want some news, they can put the lights on. They can put them on if they want something to show their audiences. Mr. Arena: Do I understand you-want the lights on? Mr. Mandel: I want the lights on, pre- cisely. I want the fullest glare of publicity on this committee's activity. 101 That the hearings involved the operation of a prin- ciple of opposition, at least insofar as the "hostile" wit- nesses were concerned, is undeniable. That this particular principle of opposition, however, had little to do with the issues pertinent to the inquiry is also abundantly clear, on the basis of a study of the transcript. The committee, therefore, instead of inviting confrontation with competing points of view regarding the relevant issues, found itself faced with a single competing point of view: down with the 101San Francisco Hearin s, p. 2065. 191 HCUA. Once again, in the case of the committee's failure to explore competing viewpoints on the pertinent issues, its methods of inquiry have proved to be wanting. The fifth and final criterion essential to the effective communicative use of the dialectical process-- relevant and meaningful speculative discussion-~18 notice- ably abaent from.the transcript of the exchanges between the committee and the "unfriendly" witnesses. Inasmuch as the interrogation of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses rarely went beyond the "name, rank, and serial number” stage, exploration of what suitable legislative action, if any, should be taken regarding any pertinent issues never materialized. Summary. were the 1960 HCUA public hearings at San Francisco dialectic? The definition of dialectic set forth in Chapter I is: Dialectic is a method of logical inquiry for the pursuit of truth, involving the principle of opposition and relying upon the technique of question and answer in speculative discussion. Analysis of the San Francisco hearings reveals that they do not adhere to the five essential elements of dialectic: (l) the hearings were marred by extensive use of logical fallacies and distortions of evidence which resulted in numerous irrational lines of argument and conclusions; (2) the hearings were not, in 192 spite of frequent statements to the contrary, a truth- seeking instrument relative to the existing state of Com- munist Party activity in the Northern District of California and the probable effects of instituting particular legis- lative provisions; (3) the hearings were not a rational exploration of competing ideas presented by witnesses who appeared before the committee; (h) the hearings were developed primarily through the use of an ineffectual interrogative method, the asking of inappropriate questions by the committee and the providing of irrelevant and/or irrational answers by the witnesses; and (5) the hearings generally were an imprecise and irrelevant speculative discussion having little meaningful bearing upon the reeks of ideas and their probable consequences in terms of legis- lative solutions to the problems created by subversive activities of the Cbmmunist Party in the united States. The HCUA hearings at San Francisco, in sum, were not dialectic. Rather, analysis of the 1960 hearings reveals that the purposes of the HCUA'were altogether unrelated to inquiry; what these other purposes were will now be ex- plored in Chapter V as the 1960 committee public hearings at San Francisco are evaluated in the light of standards of rhetorical criticiam. CHAPTER V THE ROLE OF RHETCRIC IN ME 1960 SAN FRANCISCO HEARINGS It is the objective of this chapter to examine the verbal behaviors of the House Committee on [In-American Activities as they were exhibited during the May, 1960, public hearings, in the light of acceptable standards of speech criticism. In so doing, the writer will analyze the committee's ideas, its arguments, its choice of lan- guage, its strategies; in short, he will examine the rhetorical devices which the conittee employed} This chapter, then, will focus upon "the rhetorical impulse within the communication event"2 at San Francisco in May, 1960. Standard! 9; Criticism Rhetgric Defined. Rhetoric, in this study, shall be defined as the l'Cathcart, Post Connunication: Criticism and Evaluation, pp. 6-7. 2Wayne E. Brockriede, "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric,” The anrterlz Journal 9_f_ Sgech LVI (Feb- ruary, 1968), p. l. 193 19A art of purposive persuasive communication, involving the discovery of relevant materials, the adaptation of materials to an audience, and the composition and delivery of speech.3 This definition is widely-accepted among scholars in the field of speech communication. In addition to its inclusion of the long-established concepts regarding the discovery of the available means of persuasion and proper adaptation to an audience, the definition also encompasses the generally accepted premise that rhetoric involves purposive attempts to persuade. For example,.as Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell declare: "We are interested in talking £23; §_ purpgseflfl Cathcart, in addition to agreeing with Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell's definition, adds that ”it is better if the critic assumes that the end of every speech is persuasion."5 Finally, in support of the validity and usefulness of the above definition of rhetoric, Miller contends: "Communi- cation has as its central interest those behavioral situ- ations in which a source transmits a.mesaage to a receiver(s) 3Because the hearing transcript serves as the bases for this study, no attempt will be made to subject delivery to analysis. “Kenneth,G. Hance, David C. Ralph, and Milton J. Wiksell, Princi lea of S aki (Belmont California: Wadsworth-KEHEHEgTompmy, nc., 19625, p. 4:. 5Cathcart, Post Communication: Criticism and Evaluation, p. #1. 195 with conscious intent Eg.affect the latter's behavior."6 Inasmuch as the preceding chapter of this study clearly demonstrates that the HCUA's 1960 hearings at San Francisco were not inquiry, let alone dialectic, it is perhaps necessary to validate the examination of them as rhetoric. A study of the hearing transcript reveals the operation of a distinctively rhetorical impulse-- "discourse that aims to influence."7 The hearings, in spite of the committee's frequent assertions that they were for the purpose of inquiry, fulfill the requirements of the definition of rhetoric just described. Black's explanation, which follows, provides a rationale for treating the 1960 HCUA hearings as rhetoric: While the discourse itself is the most usual source for evidence of intent, it is not the only possible source. We may encounter a.dis- course in which we find no evidence of persua- sive intent, but we discover that the author of the discourse intended to persuade nonetheless. The evidence may be the author's own testimony, or the testimony of someone who knew his mind, or some aspect of the situation in which the discourse appeared that made persuasive intent mandatory. In those cases too we must regard the discourse as rhetorical because it has met the terms of the definition. We have discovered persuasive intent, and from this discovery we must regard the discourse as a fitting subject 6Gerald R. Miller, "On Defining Communication: Another Stab" The Journal g§,Communication XVI (June, 1966), p. 92. 7Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism:.A Study In Method (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 17... 196 for rhetorical criticism, regardless of what nonrhetorical characteristics it may display.8 Framewogk for Analysis. As has been indicated, "communication is a process with a purpose,"9 and this assumption will underlie the analysis of the hearings. The coaInunication event at San Francisco, as much as is possible, will be viewed as a process which is related to the larger and more complex processes attributed to the HCUA since its founding in 1938. The variables“) which will be examined in the method of analysis will be viewed in the light of their appropriateness to ”the main function of history and criticism”11 which “is to show how propositions and audiences‘are connected: how a speaker Ehe HCUA] uses techniques to adapt his Etta ideas to the ideas of his Etta audiences."12 “use. 6 9Hence, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles g_f_ Sgaking, Pe e l"o'll.'he labels and terminology which will be used in this chapter are those employed by Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell in their Princi lea 9_f_ Spgakfi. These terms will be used because 0 t eir essent a validity, clarity, and usefulness. 6 1'I'Croft, The Functions 9.; Rhetggical giticism, p. 28 . 121mm. 197 Communication Purpgses g§_the HC _£_San Francigco On the opening day of the May, 1960, hearings sub- committee chairman Edwin Willis verbalized the purported goals of the San Francisco hearings: Anyone who has had experience in dealing with Communists knows that they are constantly changing their strategy and tactics, constantly revising their forms of attack and constantly maneuvering in order to avoid the impact of those legislative ‘wespons which we have devised to protect this Nation against their machinations. (Accordingly, ours is the task to pursue the rails of the Communists wherever they may lead and in whatever form they appear, in order that we can continuously appraise our security laws in their administration and operation, and where the facts warrant to amend or revise those laws. What are the present strategies and tactics of the Communist operation in this general area? What techniques are the hard-core Communists pur- suing in order to avoid detection as they pursue their nefarious work? What are the lines of con- trol and communication between the various Com- munists' nests here and elsewhere in the Nation? What loopholes or weaknesses exist in our present security laws? How may those laws be strengthened? These questions shall be uppermost in our minds as we elicit testimony during these hearings. (May I emphasize that the purpose of the sub- committee here is to sample factual material with reference to types and patterns of activity, and not to attempt to exhaust the subject matter. We have not subpoenaed witnesses for those hearings merely to put on a.show, nor shall we attempt to interrogate in these hearings even a significant percentage of all possible witnesses on whom we have compiled information. 13 As shown by the analysis developed in the preceding chapter of this study, the committee did not adhere to the 13San Francigco Heariggs, p. 1933. 198 admirable objectives described by Congressman Willis. It has been clearly demonstrated that the HCUA's methods were not dialectic, nor were they even designed to serve the ends of inquiry. One cannot read the hearing transcript without per- ceiving that the committee's primary purpose, rather than inquiry, was persuasion. many of the excerpts from the transcript which have been cited in Chapter IV of this study indicate that the committee's object was to influence public opinion, a goal that has always been important to the HCUA.1“ In fact, Carr concluded that, historically, the committee's chief purpose, at least up until 1950, had been to persuade, to influence public opinion.15 It should be made clear that, although the author- izing resolution does not so state, the HCUA, like other Congressional investigating committees, traditionally has been regarded as having an "informing function."16 Tra- ditionally, the purposes of investigations include: (1) findi of facts on which to base legis~ lation; (2 discovering or developing of public opinion; (3) overseeing of administra- tive agencies; (h) uncovering the questionable activities of public officials and private individuals; and (5) sometimes securing 1“Carr, The House Committee‘gg,UnnAmericgg.Acti- vities, 1,, 9h5-1956",p". 775. 15mm. IGij-dO’ p. “62. 199 personal or partisan political gain.17 The point to be emphasized concerning the recognized customary functions attributed to the HCUA is not that the committee should not have been attempting to influence public opinion via its speech behaviors in May, 1960; but, rather, that it should not have wetended that its primary purpose at San Francisco was inquiry, when, in actuality, it was persuasion. Moreover, it appears highly probable that the connittee's persuasive designs in May, 1960, were calculated to secure "personal or partisan political gain" for its Congressional members in the upcoming national elections of November, 1960. In spite of the co-nittee's conclusions regarding the values of the information which it claimed had been obtained as a result of the San Rancisco hearings, the analysis of the methods of inquiry contained in Chapter IV of this study reveals that the comittee's perceptions were inaccurate. Whether intentional or accidental, the conclusions verbalized by the HCUA in its peroration to the hearings revealed its misperceptions: Willis: Well, what, then has been accomplished We- hearings which we have been conducting over the course of the last few days here in San Francisco? In the first place, we have seen confirmed here patterns of Communist activity which we are witnessing elsewhere in the Nation. These J'7Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionar (New York: Holt, Rinehart 3321' Winston, 9 P0 1 0 200 patterns include penetration of non-Communist entities by trained conspirators who masquerade behind a deceitful facade of respectability. Also, we have observed here the technique of obscuring technical membership in the Com- munist Party by official resignation from that entity, while maintaining actual status within the operation. This situation poses difficult and involved legal problems which are currently under discussion by the members of our committee. Another pattern concerning which I should like to comment is the campaign of foreign Com- ‘munist prOpaganda being sent into this country and disseminated across the land. we have wit- nessed similar situations at other ports of entry in the United States. I presided over a hearing some time ago in the port of New Orleans, and there you have tons and quantities of material, propaganda.materisl, entering our country unlabeled as required by law. It has nothing to do With prohibiting ‘material from entering the country. No member of Congress that I know of would vote for such a law. But we are entitled to have propaganda.material properly so labeled.. If you buy a can of food under the Federal law, you must, on that label,state what is in the can, or any other item that you see on a shelf. It is the same thing in that regard. And poison, for instance. Yet this material is entering in total violation of that law. That is an element we must consider, or at least submit it to the membership in Congress to see whether they want to continue that law being violated or whether they want to amend it. we are going to have some recommendations to make, and it will be up to your Congressman, the Congressmen throughout the united States, to express themselves as to whether they want some improvements. Certainly we should believe in.msjority rule; for instance, in connection with propaganda, the gentleman‘who testified here, who traveled to China Izard is one of the most suave indi- viduals I know. I know he is smart. But what do you think he is doing? He is engaging in propaganda, propaganda from the point of view or slanted from the point of view, of the Communists. In the course of the hearings which we have been conducting, much of the information which 201 we have obtained has been by indirection, although we have, I believe, obtained sub- stantial information from the direct testi- mony of those witnesses who have come forth and candidly, patriotically testified fully and freely. It may surprise you that much of the testi- mony given here negatively, by invocation of the constitutional amendments which they are entitled protection under, is valuable to us in more ways than one, by keeping abreast of the techniques here. So even an indirection or a negative reply to proper evaluation of our security posture has some value to us. There is a collateral result of hearings of this character, in that they constitute a constant reminder to the American people that the threat of communism is real. Communism involves a philosophy and an ideologyu-but it is more than a philosophy and an ideology. It is a dynamic systemuwhich is in operation now to destroy freedom and supplant it with tyranny. The committee's contentions notwithstanding, the actual major purpose of the San Francisco hearings was to persuade the.American public, its primary audience, to believe that communism is a greater threat to the internal security of the Uhited States than ever before. To support this specific purpose, the committee offered the following four major reasons: (1) the influx of Communist propaganda from abroad has reached flood proportions; (2) the Communist Party in the united States has gained strength by reducing the size of its formal membership and increasing the size of its ”underground” membership; (3) the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are active in the Communist "conspiracy" "as. ageless. Hearin 8. pp. 2167-2168. 202 and (u) the Communist Party is recruiting larger numbers of non-Communist "dupes" and "suckers" to do "its dirty work." The four propositions cited above, then, constituted the real issues with which the committee was concerned at San Francisco. Thus as has been suggested by the analysis and conclusions in Chapter IV of this study, the fifteen topics broached with the "friendly" witnesses and the single topic pursued with the "unfriendly" witnesses merely served to conceal the HCUA's real intentions: to play the role of advocate. As Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell explain it, Advocacy has as its pgime purpose per~ suading the listener to change his opinion, his attitude, and to take action in accordance with his new view. If the listener already holds the desired opinion the speaker tries to deepen and strengthen it.19 To supplement the evidence presented and discussed in Chapter IV of this study which supports the hypothesis that the HCUA's primary objective was advocacy, one can point to the following committee statements contained in the hearing transcript: (l) the influx of Comunist propaganda from abroad has reached floor proportions: Mr. Fishman: We have estimated, and we keep fairly accurate statistics at the three control units, that in 1959 approximately 6 million parcels of mail, containing over 10 million individual items of printed matter, were sub- mitted to our units for examination by the 19Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Princi les g§,§pgg§;§g, p. 234. This study will use the terms advocacy and pgru suasion interchangeably. 203 Post Office Department as having emanated in the Soviet-bloc countries.20 00.... O OOOOOOOOOCOCOO O M_r_. Arens: Is the volume of Communist propaganda emanating from abroad which is subject to your surveillance increasing or decreasing? Mr. Fishman: It has been increasing steadily. In 358m; a total of some u,897,ooo odd mail par- cels. So the figure for I959 reflected an increase of some 18 percent. To come more specifically to the Port of San Francisco, where we have just re- cently completed our study, in 1959 there were over one million mail parcels containing 2,032,000 pieces of printed matter. In 1958 there were only 9155,000 mail parcels, so here, too, we reflect an increase. None of these figures, of course, includes the return-to-the-home- land or redefection material which comes in the first-class mail.“- (2) the Mist Party of the United States has gained strength by reducing the size of its formal membership and increasing the size of its ”underground" membership: 3'.- Aren : . . . In the first place, based upon your ormation as a recent member of the Conunist Party, how many members are there of this formal entity who now maintain a technical relationship with the entity known as the Columnist Party, roughly speaking? What is your best estimate? M__r_. Pru ion: My best testimony would be that the nationfi membership of the Cos-unist Party at this moment would be approximately 10,000. Mr. Areng: How many Communists are submitting them- s—elves to Conunist discipline, who are in the opera- tion as dedicated Co-unists, but who do not have technical relationship to the Conunist Party? How many are there in the nonformal membership category?i imo aid s n: In my test ny yesterday, I s 353: tfit type of membership is equal to the actual formally enrolled membership in the Conunist Party. So you have an additional 10, 000 members who are active Co-unists. Mr. Arena: Would it be a fair approximation to say that there are, in your judgment, based upon your ”em Wagering. p. 1938. 21mg... pp. 1939-194.0. 20“ experience, approximately 20,000 Conunists under Columnist discipline at the present time on Ameri~ can soil? M4. Prussion: That would be a modest figure; yes, sir. Mr. Arena: That would be far in addition to a division of troops, that is, in nuerical strength? 3;. Prusgion: That is correct, sir. Mr. Arena: Tell us, if you please, then, why you h-a've concluded that these 20,000 Comunists consti- tute a menace, or are more threatening now than ever before in a population of 180 million people. Surely, someone would ask, Twenty thousand people of a particular political vein, a particular poli~ tical concept, a particular idea would have no appreciable impact in a society of 180 million ”Op es Mr. Prussion: My ex rience within the ranks of the conspiracy def tely indicates that indivi- dual Co-unists are capable, under certain condi- tions of leading hundreds and thousands on cer- tain issues, and that it is through their infil- tration, especially in various mass organizations, as they call them, that they are able to motivate and move people in what they call the class strug- gle. lit-bers are not too important insofar as the membership is concerned in the Conunist Party. There are many prospective little Castros in the Communist Party in the United States and many prospective little Lenins in the Communist Party in the United States."22 oo'soooooosoooooooooooooooo (3) the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are active in the Communist "conspiracy": E5. Arena: questioning "hostile" witness Leibel Bergman I announce again for this record that the pur- pose of these questions is to test the good faith of the witness. The reason why we test the good faith of the witness is that we have abundant evi- dence that persons who are Communists, who have been identified as Colmlunists, who operate in the Communist Party have no regard whatsoever for the truth and are under instructions of the conspiracy to lie to congressional co-ittees.23 221bid., pp. zoos-2085. 23Ibid., p. 2011. 205 _Mg. Scherer: . . . As I have said, the violence here in San Francisco was the next step in the Columnist assault against the cousittee. It was clearly planned at the h' hest Communist levels. The demonstrations, the rioting, and the result- ing photographs are wanted for use throughout the world by the Kremlin's propagandists in a deceit- ful attempt to show that the young people in Amer- ica are opposed to their Government when it was moving against Communist activities in the United St‘te392 (it) the Co-unist Party is recruiting larger numbers of non-Conuniat ”dupes” and ”suckers" to do their dirty work: . , . . _Mg. Arena: Do you agree with me that the average youngster who is a sucker or a dupe, or manipu- lated, consciously or unconsciously, by the con- spiratorial force, does not realize that he is actually serving the cause of destroying freedom and liberty?25 O.....‘OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO _Mg. Arena: 1 have been engaged this work with congressional cousittees, developing information on the Communist operation for 1‘: years. I - constantly amazed at the extent to which a rela- tively few trained, dedicated, hard-core con- spirators masquerading behind the facade of humanitarianism can suck in and use and condition non-nvco-unista.26 Additional evidence in support of the contention that the HCUA's essential purpose at San Francisco was advocacy was inherent in its nationwide release and distribution of the film "Operation Abolition.” The persuasive intent of the film was acknowledged by the HCUA: 2“Ibid” p, 2172. 251de., p. 197s. 25;bid., p. 1953. 206 The film.also accomplishes other things. As the narration states, it demonstrates for the Congress and the American people how a rela- tively few well-trained Communist agents can in- cite others who are neither Communists nor Com- munist sympathizers to do the work of the Com- munist Party. It also demonstrates that, as a part of its over-all campaign to subvert the united States, the Communist Party is attempting to promote contempt for law and order among the American people and to sabotage the operations of the Congress, particularly congressional inquiry into the activities of the Communist Party and its agents. ln.addition, the film portrays three of the principal weapons the Conunist Party is using in the course of actual commit- tee hearings in its efforts to destroy the Committee on Uhnmmerican.Activities: (a) mass challenges of authority and defiance of law and order inside a congressional hearing room; (b) open rioting and physical resistance to law enforcement; (c) defiance of the co-itgse by individual witnesses and their attorneys. As indicated in the discussion of the climate of opinion in Chapter III of this study, the fact that all of the persons arrested were acquitted seems to refute the above claims. The truth or falsity of the co-ittee's claims, however, does not alter the fact that its purpose at San Francisco was to persuade. That the HCUA's major objective in the San Fran- cisco hearings in 1960 was advocacy, not inquiry is clear. In fulfillment of the critical approach being used in this study, that of showing how propositions and audiences are connected, analysis of the four main propositions posited 27House Report fig, 1278, p. h. 207 by the committee will be developed next as the dimensions relevant to the rhetorical practices of the HCUA at San Francisco in 1960 are explored. The HCUA, Its Audiences, and Its Spgaking Introduction. The communication process operative at San Francisco will be examined by describing and analyzing the committee's communication methods as these pertained to the enhance- ment or diminution of the committee's source credibility. Good source credibility consists of three elements: "competence, good character, and good will."28 The rationale for focussing upon the source credibility or personal proof of the HCUA as the central rhetorical concern derives from the fact that, historically, the committee's chief identi- fying characteristic has been the image of controversiality which it has projected to the American public.29 Further- more, in view of the highly‘controversial climate which existed at San Francisco, both in the months preceding the May hearings and during the period of the hearing, it would appear that the crucial questions as to the committee's potential persuasive effectiveness are directly related to 28Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles 9; S aki , p. 38. 29See Chapter II of this study. 208 ability to enhance its source credibility among its listeners. Moreover, the fact that the committee interpreted the riots and demonstrations at San Francisco as direct attempts to bring about its dissolution revealed that it was cognizant of the need to strengthen its source credi- bility. Further credence, therefore, is given to the use of a source credibility oriented thrust in this study, Source Credibilitz p§.the HCUA Prior £p_the Hearings. Recognizing that "we can scarcely underestimate the importance of the reputation that the speaker brings "30 the initial consideration of to the speech situation, the communication process which transpired at San Fran- cisco will pertain to the image of the HCUA which probably was held by the majority of its potential listeners prior to the May, 1960, hearings. As the discussion of the climate of opinion in Chapter III indicates, the image of the HCUA prior to its May, 1960, appearance was badly tarnished. The committee's long-established repu- tation as a controversial entity, as described in Chapters II and III of this study, apparently preceded its arrival at San Francisco; thus, the advance notices which were discussed in Chapter III of this study helped to evoke among the populace in the Bay Area a set of perceptions of the HCUA as an incompetent, unfair, unconstitutional 30Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles p§_ Speaking, p. 40. 209 witch-hunting trouble-maker. Goodman's salary of the events leading up to the 1960 hearings describes the low prestige possessed by the HCUA at the time it ar- rived at San Francisco: The days leading up to the co-ittee‘s visit were full of warnings. Students from the Berkeley campus of the University of California and San Francisco State College joined in demonstrations against the long-delayed execution of Caryl Chess- man; hundreds of residents of the Bay Area attended a lively meeting of the Berkeley board of education at which two probationary teachers who had been subpoenaed the year before were given a hearing; student newspapers ran attacks on the couittee by faculty members and other groups that recalled the events of 1959 the co-ittees episode with the 110 California teach rs : the one University of Cali- fornia student Douglas Wachtefi who had been sub- poenaed-«because he was a delegate to the 1959 national C.P. convention-«did some agitating around the campus; anti-committee groups of various poli- tical shadings welcomed the investigators to San Francisco with protest meetings and statements. hotions were building up, and as the Congressmen set to work on May 12, one thousand people, mostly students, demonstrated against them in Union Square, while several hundred others marched around City Hall apd lined up before the doors of the hearing room.3 311.9. Audiencep go; the 103;: Rhetoric. Given the strong, overt antagonism which the ce-ittee faced upon its arrival at San Francisco, it is safe to asst-e that its i-ediate audience in the Bay Area could be classified as predominantly hostile. 32 This i-ediate audience--those in the hearing room at 316cm, The Cos-ittee, pp. #29430. 32See the classification of audiences in Chapter 7 of Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell's Principles 9; Spgakipg. 210 City Hall and those who listened to the hearings via loudspeakers set up outside City Hall-«represented only one audience to whom the HCUA was speaking. It is evi- dent, on the basis of the nature of its perceived role as a creature of the national legislature, that the com- mittee's primary concern was to influence the American public: Always the co-ittee has been concerned lest the American people fail to share its under- standing of the nature of subversive activity and the many forms it may take, or appreciate the seriousness of the threat offered by this activity to the 'American way of life' as seen by itself.33 Two additional factors provide compelling support for the notion that the HCUA perceived its primary audi- ence to be national, rather than local, in scope. First, the presence of television and motion picture cueras in the hearing room reveals that the co-ittee, by permitting these "eyes and ears" to record the proceedings, reflected the intention of making an impact upon more Americans than those in and around the San Francisco City Hall. Second, the processing and subsequent national distribution of the film ”Operation Abolition," which contained carefully selected and arranged scenes from the hearings, convincing- ly demonstrates that the co-ittee's persuasive designs were consciously intended for the American public. 33Carr, TheHo Hou I’e .gwittee- on Un-Ame «Americ Acpivitiep,15-50, 211 Finally, in regard to the committee's immediate audience at San Francisco, two other points need to be stressed. First, although the majority of the persons in and around City Hall during the hearings expressed hostility toward the committee, there were some persons present whose 3h attitudes toward the HCUA were favorable. JMost of these people were ministers and members of the DAR who had been provided with white admission cards by the committee.35 Second, recognizing that the concept of feedback-~"the reaction upon the source of the effect of his message upon r"36-uwas inevitable in the communication the receive situation at San Francisco, it is important not to under- estimate the impact of the overt feedback from the immediate "hostile" audience upon the speaking behaviors of the HCUA in the course of the hearings. §ource Credibilitp and the HCUA During the Hearipgs. Keeping in mind the necessity of analyzing the rhetorical techniques employed by the committee in terms of their appropriateness to the audiences which it was endeavoring to influence, the writer will now develop the major section of this chapter. In so doing, the committee's 3"‘See San Francisco Hearin 3, pp. 2175-2176. 35Donner, The UnnAmericans, pp. 198-199. 36Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles p§_ S eakin , p. 6. 212 speech behaviors will be evaluated in the light of the following critical yardstick which may be applied to the attributes of source credibility. In the context f persuasive speech it [gource credibilitif includes: (1) the reputation or prestige enjoyed by the speaker with respect to his particular audience and subject at the moment he begins to speak, and (2) the increasing or diminishing of that prestige as a resglt of what he says and does during the speech. 7 Having described the factors which contributed to the weak ethos38 possessed by the HCUA as it began the hearings, the writer will now turn to an examination of those speaking variables which operated during the hearings to reduce the committee's source credibility to an even lower ebb. Direct Statement by the HCUA to Enhance its Source Credibility. Paradoxically, it would seem, the committee's weak source credibility persisted throughout the hearings in spite of the literally hundreds of statements which it made in an effort to rejuvenate its sagging image among its listeners. More than two-hundred statements were made by the HCUA at San Francisco which were calculated to cause its 37Winston.Brembeck and William Howell, Persuasion: A Means 9_f_ Social Control (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19525, p. 2 . 38Ethos will be used interchangeably with source credibilit§_zad'pgrsonal proof. 213 audiences to perceive it as possessing the qualities of competence, good character, and good will. These direct statements which were designed to enhance the committee's prestige included (1) repeated statements characterizing itself as competent to deal with matters related to sub- version; (2) repeated assertions which purported to demon- strate that because "friendly" witnesses Hartle and Prus- sion had been "hard-core“ members of the Communist Party they therefore-were highly qualified to speak on any sub- ject related to communism and its potential threat to the internal security of the United States; (3) repeated plaudits of its own "fair, impartial, decent" behaviors in conducting its investigations; and (k) a number of phrases seemingly designed to generate good will among its listeners. All of the foregoing methods apparently were intended to strengthen the committee's case. A.wide variety of direct statements is contained in the hearing record which may be interpreted as language behaviors of the committee intended to affect its listeners' views toward its competence. The following excerpts also reflect the implication that dedicated Americans respect and admire the HCUA: Mr. Arena: Frequently we on the committee are 33ke3_b§-the patriotic people across this country who write in or attend our hearings who come up and say: 'Donft worry about those few Communists; we are behind you, and don't worry about these people who are dupes of the 214 Communists, and the youth that they are able to enlist in picket lines and the like; that the real Americans are behind you;' and then they ask this question about which we are puzzled, and perhaps you can help us or help the people who read this public record. Mr. and Mrs. America so frequently come up and say, 'What can I do as an individual to get into the fight against this awful thing which is making such tremendous inroads into our society?‘ We who are connected with the committee say: 'we are glad to make available to you the authoritative facts respecting the operation of this force, read our committee hearings and reports, and try to get the truth.’ But beyond that we are pretty well without any ideas. Do you have any ideas as to what ‘Mr. and Mrs. Honest, Freedomnloving Americans can do to lock horns with the Communists and the suckers in front of the Communists and the dupes in front of the suckers that they con- trol?3 ......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOI .Mr. Arena: Mr. Chairman, be ore calling the witness, I should like to make a.coup1e of announcements, if I may, please. I would like to call the Chair's attention to a situation which I think will be grati- fying to the committee. Last evening, at the hotel at which the committee is staying during our visit here in San Francisco, we received, at least up until about bedtime, over 1,000 telegrams from the citizenryhujust plain.Mr. and Mrs. American-- here in the San Francisco area and throughout California, strongly endorsing the work of the committee, urging the committee not to be in any sense dissuaded by the demonstrations and by the acti ties of the Communists in these proceedings. The dozen statements made to "hostile witnesses regarding the pertinency of various lines of inquiry 398nm Francippo‘gpppipgp, p. 1978. “1314. . p. 1999. 215 essentially were to demonstrate that the HCUA possessed the attributes associated with competency. The following example is more detailed and precise than any of the other co-ittee statements regarding pertinency: Mr. Arena: . . . This Committee on UnnAmerican Etiv ties is under a mandate from the United States Congress to maintain a continuing surveillance over the administration and operation of the security laws of the United States respecting the adminis~ tration and operation of such laws as the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Comunist Control Act of 19519, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Espion- age and Sabotage Act, for the purpose of advising the Congress respecting any nendments which the committee might feel the facts justify, respecting the operations of this conspiratorial force on Merican soil known as the Communist Party and activities of those conspirators popularly known as Colmnunists. In order for this comittee to make a studied. judgment, make recomendations, advise the Congress of the Uhited States respecting the operation of this conspiracy, we must interro ate the conspir- ators, we must have the facts which we get from testimony under oath. This couittee has received testimony here on this record respecting certain of the programs and activities of the Communists. This committee in the past has learned about Comunist techniques of changing nmnes; of going in what the Conun- ist conspirators call the underground; of the Comunist tie-in with the international Conun- ist apparatus; of the Communist conditioning of the minds of people to believe that they are only liberals, that they are out to do good and the like; Communists using suckers and dupes to carry the Conunist line; Columnists remaining in the background, manipulating those whom they are able to lay their hands on or to dupe. It is the information of this committee, air, that you are now a hard-core Conunist conspirator; that in the past you have obliterated all identi— fication of yourself and have used alias and have been, for some several years, in the Comunist conspiracy, in the Communist underground. If you, air, while you are under oath, will answer this first question which I have just posed 216 to you, as to whether or not you have ever used as an alias, I intend to ask you what alias you used. I intend to ask you under what circum- stances you used it. I intend to pursue with you not your beliefs, not your associations, not your political concepts as these dupes are taught to use against this committee. In sic intend to ask you about your conspiratorial activities on behalf pf this awful force which is sweeping the world. 1 That the self-aggrandizing statement of worthy objectives above is another example of the co-ittee's pretensions has been illustrated in the analysis of its methods of inquiry. A final ample from the hearing transcript will serve to confirm the co-ittee's use of language to describe its purposes at San Francisco as inquiry, a verbal gesture made to enhance its competence: as Willis: . . . At the outset of these hearings I emphasized that we were seeking here factual material which would assist the Com- mittee on UnnAmerican Activities in the dis- charge of its legislative duties. These legislative duties are not limited to the mere passage of laws of their amendment. They involve, first of all, an accumulation of factual material on which legislation in the field of internal security can be based. May I say we have heard much about this com- mittee not having a legislative purpose. If you will just analyze the laws that have been enacted as a result of our hearings, you realize how unfounded that is. The Smith Act, the Internal Security Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and many other acts, includ mg the Communist Control Act of 1951:, to nmne three offhand, with my colleague from Ohio naming another one, and many other lava which have been sponsored by, inspired by, and passed by, the Congress as a “11bid., pp. 19su-1985. 217 result of the accumulation of factual information gathered at public hearings and its considera- tion in Washington in the legislative field, and adopted invariably by the Congress of the Uhited States.'*2 The tenor of the above speech by Uillis seems more in the vein of persuasion-«an attempt to convince hiw listeners that the HCUA really is a legislative couittee-ohis obvious efforts, however, to establish the competence of the connittee in the minds of his hearers was done so at the possible expense of weakening its already insecure character image. For, as Goodman points out: "Insofar as the co-ittee deserved credit for various executive orders on security and laws such as those which broadened the scope of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Espionage Act, and the Smith Act, it was in the role of publicist, not legislator."“3 Goodman's su-ary of the HCUA's legislative accomplishments, to which the co-ittee made frequent references at San Francisco, reveals that the co-ittee had a genuine need to be concerned about its listeners' views of its competence: In its firat twenty years of life, the Un- American Activities Conittee produced one law-- the Internal Security Act of 1950. As though exhausted by that uncertain accomplishment, in the ensuing ten years it held not a s le hearing on a specific piece of legislat on. (The “21bid., pp. 2165-2166. “3Goodman, The Comittee, p. ‘:11. 218 committee's champions sometimes take credit for the Columnist Control Act of 1951+, that mysterious measure which announced that the Communist Party 'should' be outlawed, then did not quite outlaw it but in fact the major provisions of the bill or inated in the Senate and velde reported it out over the vigorous objections of Walter, Doyle and Frazier without troubling to hold any hearings.) In 195# and again in 1962, the committee reported two amendments of no great consequence to its Internal Security Act-~the first calling for the listing of all printing equipment in the posses- sion of Columnist-action and Conunist-front organi- zations, the other relieving the Defense Depart- ment of the requirement that it publish a list of strategic defense facilities from which Conunist Party members were barred. (By requiring such a listing in the first place, the Internal Security Act had inadvertently abetted enemy spies.)““ In the course of the three days of hearings the committee repeatedly attempted to convince its listeners that its sources of information.were highly competent and of the utmost integrity. By far, the least subtle of these attempts to heighten its source credibility occurred in the exchanges between.Arens and Wheeler, investigator for the HCUA, during which the phrase “confidential sources of unimpeachable integrity" was repeated six times: A Mr. Arena: Mr. Wheeler, did you, in the course '3f’t5e recent past, from confidential sources of unimpeachable integrity, procure certain documents? pg, Wheeler: Yes, sir. Mp. Arena: Do these docmsents relate to the proceedings of the 17th National Convention of that conspiratorial organization on American soil which masquerades behind the facade of the Communist ‘Purty? ““Ibid., pp. u11-u12. 219 3. Wheeler: Yes, sir. Mr. Arena: Did you, in addition, procure as an Investigator of this committee, from confidential sources of unimpeachable integrity and reliability, the list of the delegates to the 17th National Convent ion of the Comunist Party who were dele- gates from the State of California? Mr. Wheeler: Delegates from the Conunist Fa'rty, fiorthern District of California. Mr. Ar__e___ns: That is what I meant to say. I fig your “pardon. With that correction, did you likewise procure that information? l_l_r_. Wheeler: I did, sir. E. Hens: Was the source of your information an inter! ence source of unimpeachable reliability and integr ty? Hr. Wheeler: .1 consider it as such, sir; yes, sir. E. Hen : Is it a source concerning wh ich we cannot—mike a revelation on a public record be- cause of security reasons? It. Wheeler: Yes, air. The source should not be entif' Ied in public session. Mr. Aren : Are you satisfied, on the basis of your Etegrity, upon your investigative techniques, that the docuents which you have procured from this source are bona fide in every respect? E. Wheeler: Yes, sir. Mr. Are enp: Do you likewise have, Mr. Wheeler at of the delegates to the 17th Nationai Convent ion of the Comuunist Party who were dele- gates from the Northern District of the Columnist Party of California? Mr. Wheeler: I do, sir. They are not in the form '5? a Ecument- They are in the form of a report based on our intelligence courses. _M_r_. Arena: Are those intelligence sources of unimpeachable reliability and integrity? Mr. Wheeler: Yes, air. 5. Hens: Does that complete the listing of the documents? 30 Wheeler: No, air. There is one additional document. It is the members of the National Com- mittee, CPUSA, which is a list of the 25 delegates- at-large of the Cos-unist Party, USA, and the various members of the Rational Comittee from the garious Co-unist districts throughout the United tates. ”gap That has been procured by you in the course o your official duties as an investigator 220 of this comittee from sources, intelligence sources, girflpfigchable reliability and integrity; is that In view of the conittee's unwillingness to identify its so-called "unimpeachable sources,” the reiteration of its assertion probably was of questionable value in its effect upon so critical an audience as that which was assembled at San Francisco. In like manner, the conittee's thirty-seven references to the competence of the two Columnists turned FBI informants, Prussion and Hartle, consisted of repeated assertions derived from specious reasoning. The HCUA's favorite terminology which purported to substantiate the qualifications of Hartle and Prussion as ”experts" on Columnist subversion was that each had 1.... “hardQ-core" members of the conspiracy.” Several of these references by the comittee have been'cited and discussed in Chapter IV of this study; therefore, a few more exnples will suffice to illustrate the committee's use of this device: _Mp. 55.9.12: . . . Based upon your experience, Mrs. Hartle, as a hard-core conspirator yourself, at one time in the Communist Party, tell us how that process is evolved by the comrades. ......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0... M_1_.~_. Arena: . . . We know from our own recfipda that you were a hard-core, dedicated Conunist. “5’me pp. 1952-1953; 1955. “6.15.1341" Po 1959. “71bid., p. 1976. 221 Mr. Arena: Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that for a few moments, based on her background and experience in the hard-core conspiracy, Mrs. Barbara Hartle resume the stand to give us a word of interpretation of the significance of these documents.48 ......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO épgpps Now, give us just a.word of the career ‘55: you had in Detroit in the party after you completed your basic training as a hard-core Com- munist before we get into your activities in this area, in sumary form, please.“9 OCOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOO .0. Mr. Arena: . . . Based upon your background and extensive experience in the Communist Party, first as a dedicated Communist and thereafter as a person in the conspiratorial activities of the party at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation serving your Government, tell this Committee on un- American Activities how serious s the Comunist operation now on.American soil? To assume that a person who had originally joined the Conunist Party of his own volition, and who then at some later time became an FBI informant, is necessarily a reliable source of information regarding the Party and its activities is highly questionable. By the committee's own standards, Chmmunists are liars and can- not be trusted. Yet, other than its proclamations that Hartle and Prussion had "found their way back to God and patriotism," the HCUA offered no evidence during the hearings to support its claim that either witness was competent or possessed of good character. “31bid.. pp. 2002-2003. "91bid., p. 2038. 5°1b1d., p. 2032. 222 Seventeen times the committee praised itself for its fair and impartial conduct of the hearings. .A number of these selfacongratulatory statements were motivated by the HCUA's efforts to regain order in the hearing room following rather noisy and vociferous feedback from.members of the audience: 5;, Arena: Barbara Hartle, please resume the wit- ness stand. (A disturbance and demonstration in the hear- ing room.) 213;. Willis: We are now having our hearing broken up--EI;EEEbod. I ask the marshal to eject from the room those people who are leading the crowd right in the midst of our hearing. The hearing will resume in an orderly fashion. I repeat, we are here under the power of the United States Congress and ordered to be here. We want to conduct these hearings in an orderly fashion. I think everyone with a sense of fairness and decency will say that these hearings have been conducted in a.di nified fashion. (Disturbancej51 .As the above statements reveal, Mr. Willis' language is generally reasonable and conciliatory. For the most part, the committee's statements in praise of itself lacked the quality of moderation, as did most of its statements on any matter. Although the committee deserves commendation for its occasional moments of moderation, particularly in the context of such a hostile audience situation, it war- rants severe criticimm for its all too frequent indiscrimi- nate and injudicious language behavior. 511bid., pp. 1969-1970. 223 Other statements intended to impress its audiences with its good character and good will emanated from the HCUA throughout the hearings. At least twenty of these statements stated or implied that the committee had been unjustly accused of violating individual rights, some of which are guaranteed by the Constitution. The following sample excerpts are typical of the cosmittee's efforts to persuade its hearers of its lack of culpability as a violator of the United States Constitution: Mr. Arena: The Conunists or the Communist Eonts profess to be those who are strong adherents to constitutional safeguards and the like, and they have been successful, I regret to say from my study of the operation, in convincing vast number sic of Americans, many of whom are sincere, that this emittee is out to destroy the Constitution.52 00...... .0. 0000.... Mr. Arena: Mr. Fishman, this conittee has had under consideration and has made recouenda- tions, from time to time, to the House of Rep- resentatives and to the administrative agencies respecting proposals which the committee had in mind for attempting to label-mas the law re- quired-n-the Conunist propaganda which is sent in here. Of course, we know the Columnists and the Conunist dupes and the aucggrs say we are trying to engage in censorship. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Mr. Aren : Mr. Prussion, in the course of the at day or so here we have had a number of people who have been identified to us by responsible people as members of the conspir- acy, who have sat in that very chair in which you are now sitting and castigated this com- mittee, saying, in effect, that our objectives are to deprive people of employment, smear 521b1d., p. 1960. 53Ibid., p. 19u5. 22h people, and the like, although this committee tries as sincerely as we possibly can to pro- 5“ ceed on the basis of fairness and impartiality. It is fair to say that all of the attempts by the committee to represent itself as fair, impartial, and decent were calculated to elicit some degree of good will from its hearers. In addition to its frequent use of statements aimed at improving its reputation, similar to those which have been cited, the HCUh.endeavored to dilute the hostility evident among its audience (and among its "unfriendly" witnesses) by employing three other techniques. The first technique was utilized by the committee on the third day of the hearings when it expressed concern for the right of a "hostile" witness to have counsel. Con- trary to its behavior during the first two days of the hearings when, at times, it expressed annoyance at some of the "hostile" witnesses who had been accompanied by counsel, the HCUA.made every effort to treat Mrs. Rayme Ellis, a "hostile” witness, with scrupulous fairness: Mr. Arena: We observe that you are not represented by'counsel. Do you know that you have the privilege, under the rules of this committee, to be represented by counsel? Mrs. Ellis: Yes. . Arena: I beg your pardon? Egg, Ellis: Yes, I know that. £5, Arena: Is it agreeable with you to proceed with- out counsel? Mrs. Ellis: Yes. “lipid. , p. 2033. 225 Mr. Arena: As we proceed, if there is any area in which, on the basis of our experience, you might desire legal advice, we will try, so far as we can, to give you that advice objectively and fairly. I, myself, am a lawyer and I believe all of the members of the subcommittee are law- yers. We, of course, prefer that you do have counsel. Mrs. Ellis, if I ask you a question and you honestly believe that the answer to that ques- tion would be supplying information which could be used against you in a criminal proceeding, you are not obliged to answer, but you have the privilege of declining to answer that question by announcing to the committee that you invoke the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amendment. Do you understand? m. Elli-E: I d0. ......COOOOOOCOOOOOOOO... 211;. Arena: Let me ask you this question-wand I will not, under the circumstances, attempt to proceed further, because this committee is exceedingly sensitive, although the Communists and the pro-Communists don't give us that credit, we are exceedingly sensitive to the fact that we are constantly criticized for being unfair and we try to be fair-uhave you been a.member of the Communist Party any time since you were served with your subpena.to appear before this committee?55 Perhaps the committee's patronizing treatment of Mrs. Ellis reflected (1) its adjustment of its speaking behaviors in order to counteract the more than twenty disturbances which had occurred at the hearings prior to the appearance.of Hrs. Ellis, and (2) its cognizance of the favorable impression it might make via the film and television media which were recording the proceedings. Regardless of the basis for the motivation of the committee, 551b1d.. pp. 2109-2110. 226 it is evident that in its apparent kindness to Mrs. Ellis it was endeavoring to demonstrate that it possessed the attributes of good character and good will. Interestingly, Mrs. Ellis was the only one of the "hostile" witnesses who answered the HCUA's questions regarding past or present membership in the Communist Party. She told the committee, in response to seven con- secutive queries, that she was not now nor had she ever been a member of the Communist Party.56 A.second technique, seemingly designed to benefit the committee's waning image, was used only once during the hearings. Late on the second day of the hearings the committee tried to verify its claim of fair-mindedness by offering one of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses, Martin Ludwig, the option of a possible grant of immunity from criminal prosecution if he would agree to answer questions put to him. ‘As the following exchange reveals, Mr. Ludwig was unimpressed by the HCUA's bargaining: Mr. Arena: Mr. Ludwig, let me make a statement -- --—-I- . to you, if you please, sir. Uhder the law, there is what is called an immunity statute, pursuant to which this com- mittee can set in motion le al proceedings which, if consummated, have an ult mate result of granting immunity to a witness, immunity from any criminal prosecution for certain factual material which he might reveal in testimony. It is the judgment of this committee that you, sir, having been a leader, so we are advised by unimpeachable sources, having been a leader of a dissident group within the Com- munist Party, have information.which would be 551bid., p. 2110. 227 of extreme value to your Government, via this comittee, in its attempts to legislate on Com- munist activities, attempting to protect this country under whose flag you and I both have protection against the onrush of the Communist conspiracy. It is our information, air, that at one time you were, until 1957, at least, very active as a regional representative in the Communist Party itself, and that under leadership of your- self and others a.dissident group has been developed within the Communist operation. We say quite frankly we know very little about it, except we think there isvery signi- ficant infonmation there which ought to be available to this committee. With that explanation, I ask you this question in all sincerity: If this Committee on UnnAmerican Activities should initiate the proceedings to grant you a complete immunity from criminal prosecution based on any infor- mation, direct or collateral, which you could give this committee in the course of testimony to serve your Government, and if those pro- ceedings are consummated so that you are granted such immunity, would you accept that immunity and would you then testify fully and freely respecting all items of information on which we might interrogate you within the purview of th s committee's jurisdiction? ......O.........OOOOOOOOI fig, Willis: You understand, of course, that the interrogation could not be done today or any~ thing of that sort. The proceedings would have to be initiated, if that relieves you any, or if you want to think about it. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) g5. Ludwig:'Mr. Staff Director, I am here under subpena. I would never voluntarily appear before such a committee~~ Mr. Arena: Could you speak a little more Izudfy or slowly? Mr. Ludwig: I said I am here before this com» mittee under subpena. I would never have appeared here or anywhere else unless I were under subpena. I think that answers your question. 228 yr, ens: It does answer our question. I respectfu ly suggest, Mr. Chairman, that will conclude the staff interrogation of this witn ness. The possible ramifications for a witness who agrees to talk in exchange for immunity, if understood by the audience, may have ameliorated the effect of the committee's inculcation of The Com1>ulsory Testimony Act58 as a means of enhancing its good character. As Goodman states, "Critics of the immunity law pointed out that it might not protect auwitness against prosecution in a state court and would certainly not protect him from such side effects as losing his job."59 On the other hand, it may be significant that the committee, as exemplified by the 1960 San Francisco hearings, had rarely used the immunity grant to compel witnesses to testify. Perhaps its failure to utilize this weapon as a means of acquiring factual.material on which to base legis- lation was motivated by its fear that rigorous application of this law‘would result in a further deterioration of its prestige, as implied in the following explanation by Carl Beck: The fact that the committee has not exercised this power would seem to indicate either that it realized that its investigations are not of enough importance to warrant granting immuni~ ty or that full testimony by recalcitrant wit- nesses would point up the weaknesses of the 57Ibid., pp. 206u—2065. 588ee U.S., Statutes‘§£_Large, 68 7u5. 13 0.3.0. sass. 59Goodman, The Committee, p. 357. -fi—‘mflfl “...—“HF- ! - . 229 comittee, and perhaps raise the legal question of the pertinency of certain information to the legislative pur se and function of a Congressional investigation.68° Whereas the first two techniques described above were derived from the comittee's efforts to apply a law and a procedural rule, the third device resulted from the HCUA's reluctance to enforce one of its ”Rules of Pro- cedure." As indicated in an earlier discussion in Chapter IV of this study, the most pronounced attempt to soften its treatment of the "hostile" witnesses was caused by the comittee's failure to prevent five of seven "unfriendly" witnesses from reading prepared statements. The reading of these five irrelevant statements was in violation of Rule VII of the committee's "Rules of Procedure." That the HCUA was perhaps adjusting its speech behaviors to the feedback from its hearing room audience, as well as to the presence of the television and film cameras, is suggested. in the following sequence: Mr. ens: Now Mr. Wachter, do you think there Eight ave been some other reason why you are under subpena to appear before this committee other than the reasons which you gave in this press statement: namely, that we are exploring into your liberal ideas and your political beliefs? Is there something else you have been doing that you think might be of interest to this committee? (The witness conferred with counsel.) 13;. Wachter: I respectfully object to the question on the same grounds. Any question 4 60Beck, Contempt 9_f_ Congress, p. 121. 230 as to my political beliefs, associations, statements deprives me of the right of free speech, press, assembly and petition. The House unnamerican Activities Committee serves no real legislative or constitutional purpose. It punishes individuals and groups-- yr, Arena: You are reading from a prepared statement? (Applause.) Mr. Wachter: Yes, I am. Mr. Willis: That's all right. Let him answer the —r-—-— question. Mr. Arena: Continue reading, please? Mr. Wachter: It punishes individuals and groups for their political ideas and associa- 51 tions through public exposure and condemnation. The committee’s relaxation of its ruleprohibiting the reading of prepared statements, as illustrated by the above-quoted testimony, appears to have emanated from a conciliatory attitude. Closer examination of the total circumstances at San Francisco, however, suggests that the committee's motives may not have been entirely wholesome. For example, a viewing of the fihm "Operation.Abolition" reveals that, by careful editing, the committee is made to appear as the "white knight" being salaciously maligned by the capricious Communists led by Douglas Wachter and his comrades. 62 Thus, the committee's apparent generosity and spirit of good will in allowing "hostile" witnesses to violate its "rules," on the basis of the distortions con- tained in the film."Operation.Abolition," represented forms of "entrapment" or “table-turning." 61mm series. p. 1967. 62See House Repert'gg, 1278, pp. l7-35. 231 In the light of the accelerated animosity which pervaded the San Francisco hearings on the third day, perhaps the most blatantly inappropriate language behavior employed by the committee manifested itself during the testimony of Sheriff Carberry. Near the conclusion of Carberr's description of the riots which had occurred the day before the committee performed what amounted to a verbal genuflection in response to Carberry's support of the rightness of the committee's position. Given the hostile disposition of the majority of the audience at San Francisco, it is difficult to imagine that the fol- lowing intimate dialogue did not further alienate them: 3;. Willis: Sheriff, I expressed myself a while ago about the fine work that you and your deputies and others did. I want to now repeat them in your presence. I might say, when you say you were at lunch and did not witness the demonstration here, you happened to have been eating lunch with me and we were talking about the plan of having an exchange of seats, if the crowd wanted that to try to be as reasonable as possible. Lug. Carberr : For the record as well, sir, I would like to state that my particular reason, aside from the pleasant company involved,*was to see you for the purpose of continuing to provide order in here. Mr. Willis: That is right. That is why we had luhch together, to discuss it. Let me say just this, as we must proceed: One of the great living Americans in.my book is Sam.Rayburn. He told me once that the best quality, the one word that describes the best quality of a man is a man of judgment, and I regard you as a.man of maturity and good judg~ ment. You handled yourself admirably well. flip Carberrz: Thank you. 232 fig, Johansen: Mr. Chairman, before the sheriff leaves, I want again, in his presence, to associate myself with the statements which the chairman made and to express my appreciation in gihaéf ggrgh: ggzzittzz ggd the Congress. ...-.JEL___JL Y' . .As Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell aptly state, "But there is more to being a speaker with a good ethos than 'striving' to possess these qualities."6“ On the basis of the committee's bombardment of its audiences with state- ments which directly or indirectly depicted its self- assessed qualities of goodness, it appears that it acted defensively, if not desperately at times, by indiscrimin- ately hammering away at its supposedly flawless source credibility. The tendency of the HCUA to overplay its positive regard for its personal proof, except for a few moderate statements concerning its sense of fairness, suggests that the conittee was acutely attuned to the need to placate the audience antagonism which existed at San Francisco, and thereby, to overcome the witch-hunting image which had been created during its stormy twenty-two year history. That the committee was overly-sensitive to its low prestige is evident in the following utterances voiced during the hearings: Mr..Arens: [referr to labels applied to the ‘fifihA—5§_Its critic Fascists6 red-baiters, witch- hunters; we are use to that. O000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 53§_a_p_ Francisco Heari s, p. 2106. 39 Gunance’ Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles g£.§222§;§g, P. o “éae Wee segues. p. 1979. 233 Mr. Arena: Is it your design and your intention, 'ther you are relieved from the pains and pen- alties of perjury, released by this committee from your subpena, to return to the 8th Congres- sional District Democratic Council and say to those good people of that legitimate political organization, 'Of course I am.not a member of the Communist Party, but I wasn't going to tell that witch-hunting, Fascist, Red-baiting, Con- stitution-destroying Committee on UnnAmerican Activities that I was or was not a member of the Communist Party'?66 O. 0.. 0.00.0000. 0.0... Mr. Scherer: [evaluating the cause of the riots and demonstrations at San Franciscé] Among the rioters were members of Harry Bridges' Longshore- men's Union. In the forefront were a large seg- ment of the 'beatnik' crowd. Of course, a con- siderable number of students from universities in the Bay.Area were here. Mostly they were the victims of this despicable propaganda plot. Chiefly they had come here only to picket and protest, urged on by the leftwing, pro-Communist, and Communist teachers in the Bay Area who hate the Committee on UnnAmerican Activities with an unbelievable venom. However, these brave teachers stayed in the cloisters of the class- room while the students, whose minds had been poisoned with hatred and illdwill against the committee, became involved in this well- 67 conceived and well-organized demonstration. In sum, in view of the fact that the antagonism toward the HCUA at San Francisco seems to have been increased rather than diminished during the hearings, it is probable that a factor which may have contributed to making the committee's faulty image even.mrre faulty resulted from.ita habit of talking too much about itself and by extolling its virtues beyond reason.68 Such A_._.__ A A 551bid., p. 21u0. 67Ibid., pp. 2172-2173. 68Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principles p§,8peakipg, Po M. 234 excessive self-praise, although consistently attributed to the committee's behavior throughout its history, probably served to reinforce the attitudes and feelings of the hostile audience. By the same token, this same verbal behavior probably reinforced the favorable attitudes of the partisan, but less vocal members of the hearing room audience. Had the committee truly desired to dilute the hostility of the speaking situation, or had.its members been more proprietous and moderate, perhaps it could have _ persuaded its hostile listeners to attend to it more closely. But, as the committee's truculent behavior patterns indicate, it was most improbable that it would have employed the method of conciliation at San Francisco in 1960.69 It should be noted that the attempts by the HCUA to strengthen its source credibility were closely related to the major issues of its case. These relationships, however, were less apparent in those statements designed to support the committee's source credibility than they were in those which were intended to undermine the personal proof of the Communists and the critics of the HCUA. Similar techniques were used by the HCUA to heighten its own prestige by castigating its opponents and their supporters. The numerous excerpts from the transcript 691bid., p. 124. 235 which have been cited in this and the preceding chapter of this study illustrate the verbal attacks leveled by the committee at the Communist Party, its members, comrades, fellow-travelers, and the "dupes" and "suckers" who, in any way, had acted in behalf of the Communists (or who had opposed the committee). Even a cursory reading of the transcript leaves one with the impression that the word "conspiracy" is synonymous only with the term "communism." ‘ Several typical examples from the hundreds con- tained in the zus page hearing transcript will be cited as evidence of the HCUA's excessive verbal efforts to make itself respected by its listeners: !§,.Arens: I have been engaged in this work with .congresslonal committee; developing information 'on the Comunist operation, for 11: years. I am constantly amazed, at the extent to which a rela- tively few trained, dedicated, hard-core conspira- tors, masquerading behind the facade of humani- tarianism, pan suck in and use and condition non- Cbmmunists. ° oooooooooooooooooooooooooo gs, Arena: When this committee pursues a Communist, say, a schoolteacher, the comrades and those suckers in front of the comrades and those who they have duped say we are investigating education. When this committee pursues a hard-core Communist in a labor organization, the comrades and the suckers and those they can condition in front of the suckers, put up the cry that we are investi- gating labor. When this committee pursues a.Communist con- spirator in any area of our society, the comrades those in front of the comrades and the suckers in front of those, start the same cry, and they 70mm. , p. 1953. 236 are successful in ionditioning the minds of a great number of people.7 ......OOOCOOOOOO0.000.000... 3gp Arena: Based upon your background and experi- ence, do you have any suggestions which you could make, just as one person, to people who will read this public record as to how we could at least begin an approach to bring the realization of the truth as to the nature of communism, as to the nature of the Communist operation to these suckers, these dupes who are controlled by the conspirators themselves?. . . . .Do you agree with me that the average youn star who is a sucker or a dupe, or manipulated, consciously or unconsciously, by the conspiratorial force, does not realize that he is actually Serving the cause of destroying freedom and liberty?7 ....‘OOOOOOOCO......OOOOOOOCO Mr. Arena: Since you apparently can't quite understand EH. pertinency of this line of inquiry, I will say to you that this committee is trying to develop informa~ tion respecting the techniques, mode of operations, of this conspiratorial force which masquerades behind a facade of do-goodiam, humanitarianism, which is sweep- ing the world, which has destroyed more lives on this planet than any other force since the dawn of time. 0.0.......OOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOO Mr. Arena: . . . The reason why we test the good faith Ef'the witness is that we have abundant evidence that persons who are Communists, who have been identified as Communists, who operate in the Communist Party have no regard whatsoever for the truth and are under in- structions 9E the conspiracy to lie to congressional committees. O....OOOCOOOOOO......OOOOOOO Mp, Johansen: . . . ith the indulgence of the chair- man, I sEould like to observe that if there is one single college student in this room or who has been listening to these hearings who, as a result of these 711b1d., pp. 1958-1959. 721bid., p. 197a. 73Ibid., p. 2013. 7“Ibid., p. 2011. 237 hearings, has some growing awareness that in playing with communism they are flirting and con- sorting with treason, I believe that the hearing will have been amply justified.75 It required little insight to be able to perceive that the committee was cognizant of the persuasive princi- ple that if something is repeated and repeated in highly charged language, whether proof is offered in support of it or not, people are likely to believe it. In one sense, however, because Americans have been and are exposed to much anti-Communist stimuli via the mass media, the committee perhaps caused many of its listeners to "tune-out", psycho- logically, much as listeners "tune-out" overly redundant television commercials. Again, as with the probable impact of its excessive praise of its own attributes of source credibility, the HCUA probably weakened its position by ignoring the principles of decorum and propriety via its incessant and unvarying verbal castigation of the Communist Party and its so-called "suckers” and "dupes." In spite of their probable ineffectuality, these direct attacks against Communists, pro-Communists, and committee critics appear to have been designed to support, directly or indirectly, the specific purpose and the four supporting propositions posited by the HCUA at San Fran- cisco. The specific purpose was to persuade the American 751bid., p. zouz. 238 public that communism is a greater threat to the internal security of the United States than ever before; and the supporting reasons: (1) the influx of Communist pro- paganda from abroad has reached flood proportions; (2) the Communist Party of the United States has gained strength by reducing the size of its formal membership and increasing the size of its "underground" membership; (3) the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are active in the Communist "conspiracy"; and (4) the Communist Party is recruiting and manipulating larger numbers of non- Communist ”dupes" and "suckers" to do "its dirty work." Implications and Inferences.Affecting the HCUA's Source Credibility. Choice p§.subject.--Since the choice of subject with which the HCUA concerns itself is dictated by its Congressional mandate, the committee's range of topic selection must fall within the broad category of "un- American activity." The problem with the subject of "subversive activity", as Professor Carr explains, lies in "the essential meaninglessness of the concept."76 Thus, as Carr reasons: "The use of the investigating po- wer of Congress to search for evidence of subversive acti- vity is bound to produce an explosive result."77 The sub- 76Carr, The House Committee pp,Un—American Acti- vities, p. #61. 77Ibid., p. 3. 239 ject of the San Francisco hearings in 1960, then, pro- duced "an explosive result", and thereby placed the HCUA in its usual unpopular position. Thus, because of the longstanding and widely publicized image of the HCUA as a controversial entity, it is highly unlikely that its choice of subject could have enhanced its ethos at San Francisco. Probably the only way the committee could have improved its source credibility, at least with the audiences at San Francisco in May, 1960, would have been for it to have stayed away from the Bay Area in the first place. It should be pointed out that the audience for the committee's San Francisco speech probably consisted of at least three groups: (1) those present at the hearings, both inside and outside the hearing room; (2) the live television audience; and (3) the members of the American public at-large who would read the hearing transcript or report of it in the nation's press. .Although the available evidence supports the inference that the audience at the hearings was predominantly hostile, no evidence is available to indicate the probable attitudes of those in the television audience and those throughout the nation. ‘A reasonable case could be made for the view that both of the audiences who were receiving the speaking second-hand were composed of partisan as well as non- partisan listeners. 240 Choice 2§_;i§£§_2£_thought.--As the history of the House Committee on Un-American.Activities consistently reveals, its investigations into "the extent, character, and objects of unnAmerican propaganda activities in the United States" and "the diffusion within the united States of subversive and unnAmerican propaganda" invariably have engendered readily discernible antagonisms and animosity toward itself. These hostile attitudes have been reaped by the committee regardless of the nature of the lines of thought developed; thus, the inherent volatility of the idea that unnAmerican activities can be investigated, particularly in the context of the blossoming civil rights movement of the late 1950's, would seem to vitiate any lines of thought which the HCUA might have selected at San Francisco. The lines of thought p§£_§3, therefore, that the committee chose to develop in the course of the 1960 San Francisco hearings appear to have reinforced its ever faltering image. Whether, had the committee elected to pursue a different set of arguments at San Francisco, it might have succeeded in evoking some degree of favorable response from its predominantly hostile audience to its source credibility seems highly doubtful. On the whole, then, because of the combination of ambiguous but highly charged subject matter and the historically evolved image of controversiality with which it had been tagged, the 241 HCUA began its speech at San Francisco with "two strikes against it," in terms of its personal proof. In short, choice of subject and lines of thought had become communi- cation factors over which the committee had little, if any, control because, during its turbulent history, these variables virtually had been solidified into negative stereotypes by the influential liberal segment of the nation's population and the mass media.78 Pattern g§_arrg§gement.--Given the perspective implied thus far in this study that the hearings consti- tuted a three day long speech, the pattern of arrangement used by the committee must be considered as it applies to that speech as a single entity. Whether viewed as a single speech or as several connected speeches, the basic speaking plan would reflect similar approaches to the organization of materials. That the three consecutive days of speaking were intended to achieve one set of objectives in a specific communication situation at a specific location at a single point in time essentially to the same audience justifies the assumption that the San Francisco hearings may be studied as a unit. The question and answer technique used to conduct the hearings might lead the reader of the transcript to conclude that the pattern of arrangement was inductive in 78See Chapter 10 of Professor Carr's The House Com- mittee QEDUn-Amfirican Activities. Also see Goodman's The Committee, pass . 242 method-~proceeding from the particular to the general. However, as the analysis of the committee's methods of inquiry reveals in Chapter IV, most of the committee's questions were ones to which it already had formulated answers. These answers, moreover, had been converted prior to the hearings into generalizations and conclusionswhich the committee then posited as the propositions and argu- ments of its three day speech of advocacy. Although the interrogative method employed by the committee seems to create the impression that its pattern of arrangement was inductive, closer examination reveals that, in actuality, the speech was developed primarily deductively. For example, in the following exchanges, the committee's questions seek generalizations from.the "friendly" wit- 1128888: yr, Arena: Before we get into the specifics of your statistics, would you care to give us an overall appraisal as to the quantity or volume of the Communist prop anda which is imported, and has been imported in the course of the last year, via this port of entry? Mr. Fishman: Actually, this propaganda floods Efié country. It emanates in the Soviet-bloc countries and in Communist China. I have pre- pared a statement for submission to the committee which presents to some degree the background and basis for our operation. 0 I O O C O O O C O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O 351;. Arena: Do you agree with me that the average youngster who is a sucker or a dupe, or mani- pulated, consciously or unconsciously, by the conspiratorial force, does not realize that he is actually serving the cause of destroying freedom and liberty? Egg, Hartle: Yes, that is true. 243 Mr. Arena: Can you tell us, first of all, what is meant *by 'semantics'? Secondly, how this is used in the propagation of the conspiratorial force on American soil, that every expert says is weakening our society with greater speed every day, causing this society to have the impact of the world conspiracy with no less than our freedom and our lives at stake?79 The above three quotations illustrate, at least by implication, the technique employed by the HCUA through- out its interrogations of the "friendly" witnesses. In the great majority of its sessions with members of this amenable group the committee either stated, implied or asked for a conclusion or generalization from the witness. The HCUA, therefore, in its use of the "friendly" witnesses as virtual materials of development sought after generali- zations, and these generalizations provided the framework for the essentially deductive pattern which evolved, In fact, the conclusions contained in the quoted material above served as subpoints under main points argued for by the committee: (1) the threat of the Communist conspiracy to the internal security of the United States is greater than ever because Communist propaganda is flooding the country; (2) those young people who Oppose the HCUA are serving the cause of destroying freedom and liberty because they are acting, consciously or unconsciously, as dUpes of the Communists; and (3) the threat of the Communist con~ spiracy to the internal security of the United States is greater than ever because Communist "semantics" are being 244 used to increase the speed with which the conspiratorial force is moving toward the destruction of American freedom and American lives. As many of the quoted excerpts reveal, the committee, for purposes of developing its argumentative position, tried to capitalize upon the willing "friendly" witnesses by leading them to verbalize the answers which the committee sought rather than by asking thoughtful, well-framed questions. This practice of leading the witness usually consisted of the committee's making a statement and then asking the witness to agree with the statement; moreover, the HCUA normally espoused a generalization in its question to the "friendly" witness before it requested that the ‘witness present any evidence on which to base the generali- zation. Although the more significant aspects of the HCUA's speech were developed via a deductive pattern in its sessions with the "friendly“ witnesses, some less signi~ ficant matters were treated by the application of an inductive pattern of arrangement in the generally futile exchanges between the committee and the "hostile" witnesses. Given the negative attitudes toward the HCUA.which were displayed by the "unfriendly" witnesses, it is not sur- prising that the committee found the less didactic induc- tive pattern more expedient when questioning them. The following excerpts typify the committee's use of the 245 inductive pattern, a pattern used sparingly and one which frequently resulted in too few answers on which to base any useful conclusions: ‘flg, Arena: What was your first principal occupa- tion after completing your formal education? ya, Brodsky: I was a tile helper. E53 Agens: How long did you pursue that occupa- tion (The witness conferred.with his counsel.) yr, Brodsky: I guess it must have been about a coup e of years. Mr. Arena: Where did you complete your formal Education, please, air? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) 213;. Brodsky: I never did complete it. £5, Arena: Where did you complete that part of your education which you did complete. 'Where were you given higher education, if any? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) H29 Brodskz: It was in Los Angeles. _M_r_. Arens: What was your occupation in 1951? (The witness conferred.with his counsel.) 5;, Brodsky: I just don’t remember that date. _Mg. Arena: Do you know a person by the name of Moiselle Clinger? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) g5, Brodsk : I cannot answer that question. I thi that the purpose now is you are going to begin to name all kinds of names and then ask me do I know this and that. I think my conviction is that you are pro- ceeding on the grounds that this committee has no right to get into my privacy of association, of political beliefs. I think this is very clear to you. I think it has been made clear. I see no reason to answer this question. I C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O C O O O O 5!, Arena: Have you received any specialized training since you completed your fonmal edu- cation? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) Mr. Harris: I would like to have the question clarified. To me it is ambiguous. ya, Arena: Do you have in mind any specialized training which you have received since you - completed your formal education. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) 2h6 fig, Harris: Do you mean in a formal educational sense 2g; Arena: No; not necessarily. Any specialized training you have received since you completed your formal education? (The witness conferred with his counsel.) LIE- Harris: None to my mind at the moment. gr, Arena: Have you received any special training by any organization after you completed your for- mal education? ‘yg, Harris: I don't quite understand the question. yg, Arena: I will drop the line of inquiry. . O O O C C C C O 0 C O O C C . C O O O C C O C O 0 Mr. Arena: I just want to be sure the record is clear on one question. Are you now, at this instant, a.member of the Communist Party? . (The witness conferred with his counsel.) fig, Izard: The answer is the same, air. ‘yg, Arena: I respectfully suggest that this will conclude the staff interrogation of this witness. fig, Scherer: Let us not leave that 'the same." Does he decline to answer for the same reasons? Mr. Willis: You are directed to answer the last ... ...... question. Mr. Izard: I will accept Mr. Scherer's kindly offered amendment. fig, Willis: It must come from your lips. fig, Izard: It must come from.my lips, did you say? Yes, the fifth amendment. yg, Willis: Do you mean you decline to answer? ya, 12333: I decline to answer on the rounds that I am not compelled to bear witness against myself. Mr. Arena: Have you been a participant in the in- citement of the riotous conduct which has been wit- nessed here in the course of the last 2 or 3 days of our committee session? Mr. Izard: I charge this committee with inciting EBA: what happened yesterday. Mr. Arena: I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, EBA: the witness be ordered and directed to answer the question. Mr. Willis: You are directed to anwwer the ... ._,___. question. ES: Izard: I stand on the first amendment, and I stand on my rights not to be a witness against myself. I charge this committee with guilty respon- sibility in yesterday's events. Mr. Arena: Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that will conclude the staff interrogation of this wit- ness. 2&7 Mr. Willis: Mr. Scherer. Mr. Izard: Oh, a fellow Ohioan. Mr. Scherer: Have you ever received anything of value, either directly or indirectly, from the Communist apparatus in the United. States. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) Mr. Izard: The answer remains the same, air. Mr. Willis: The witness is excused. 80 Mr. Scherer: Now we know how the riots started. On the whole, it seems fair to characterize the pattern of arrangement employed by the HCUA as a combined deductive-inductive speaking plan, with primary emphasis upon the deductive. The deductive portion of the speaking plan takes on the greater significance because it pro- vided the major framework for the progression of the committee's major lines of argument. .At this point it is well to set forth an outline of the deductive plan revealed in the hearing transcript. Given the argumen- tative nature of the committee's speaking, it seems appropriate to couch the outline in terms of reasons or proofs because "the development of the subject consists of setting out arguments in support of the subject or proposition."81 Central idea: Communism is a greater threat to the internal security of the United States than ever before. I. The influx of Communist propaganda from abroad has reached flood proportions. 80m” pp. 1987-1988; 2025-2026; 2133. 81See d.iscussion of outlining in Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell's, Princigles of Spgaking, Chapter 10; in parti- cular, see pp. 6. II. III. IV. 248 The Communist Party, although smaller in techni- cal membership, is a greater threat to the security of the United States because it has increased its non-technical membership by going "underground." The "hostile" witnesses and their supporters are active in the Communist conspiracy. A. B. C. D. The "hostile" witnesses are or have been members of the Communist Party. The "hostile" witnesses and their "comrades" caused the riots and disturbances which occurred during the hearings. The "hostile" witnesses are deceitful and disloyal Americans because they refuse to tell the committee the truth. The "hostile" witnesses make a mockery of the United States Constitution. The Communist Party is recruiting larger numbers of non-Communist "dupes" and "suckers“ to do "its dirty work." A. B. The Communist Party recruited and manipu- lated those who participated in the San Francisco riots. The Communist cause is being served, consciously or unconsciously, by those who encourage co- operation with the Soviet Union. 249 It should, of course, be noted that the erratic nature of the pattern of development inherent in the hearings is not conducive to the application of a rigorous, sequential speaking plan. Rather, the outline set forth above reflects a kind of mobile or flexible deductive pat- tern, parts of which were superimposed upon the proceedings in a variety of ways during the course of the three days. The outline, however, is accurate and comprehensive in that it includes all of the major propositions and supporting reasons which the HCUA sought to develop. The committee's choice of a predominantly deductive speaking plan is commensurate with its predilections for overstating its source credibility. .As Hance, Ralph and Wiksell urge, the deductive pattern "is hardly effective with listeners who are opposed to the speaker's ideas."83 Furthermore, as they point out, “the straight-forward presentation often may antagonize, not conciliate and persuade, a hostile group of listeners."8u In the writer's judgment, the committee's lack of sensitivity to the feed- back of the hostile audience at San Francisco was again verified by its failure to select a speaking plan which would have provided a more temperate, implicative arrange- ment of its materials. That the committee's reliance upon 83 Hance, Ralph and Wiksell, Principles g£_Spgaking, p. 237. 8“mm. 250 the explicative, deductive pattern of arrangement served to reinforce the hostile attitudes among its unfriendly listeners appears highly probable. Before proceeding to an analysis of the materials of development employed by the HCUA in its San Francisco speech, an assumption regarding the role of the ”friendly" witnesses should be clarified. The writer assumes that the ten "friendly" witnesses, because of their commitment to the cause and the position advocated by the HCUA, should be viewed as elements of the committee's methods of in— vention. Carr's interpretation of the committee's use of "friendly" witnesses suggests that such an assumption is a valid one. In his study of the HCUA he indicates that the "friendly" witnesses frequently were depended upon by the committee "for the development of its hearings."85 As materials of development, the "friendly" wit- nesses exist apart from those materials created by the HCUA. They are, however, used by the committee in a.way that might appropriately be labeled "audio-visual testi- monials."86 In other words, the ten "friendly" witnesses who testified at the 1960 San Francisco hearings were as much materials of development (primarily as opinion testi- mony) as were the examples, statistics, narratives and 85See Carr's The House Committee on Un-émerican w— Activities, 1945-1950, pp. 551- . 86The‘writer's terminology. 251 visual aids which were presented by them. Thus, the ensuing analysis presupposes that the ten "friendly" wit- nesses were subpoenaed by the committee to serve as kinds of evidence, in and of themselves, from.which it could draw inferences favorable to its case. Choice 9; evidence 92.19.19. reasoning processu-m Analysis of the committee's reasoning process, choice of evidence, structure of reasoning, and.methods of refutation will be developed in this section. As with the preceding sections in this chapter, the framework for analysis will continue to be directed toward questions pertaining to how well the committee adapted its ideas to the ideas of its audience. Furthermore, consideration of the ideational relationships will be related to their probable impact upon the source credibility of the committee. Although some degree of repetition of some of the points discussed in Chapter IV of this study is unavoidable, the writer will attempt to avoid needless redundance. .As illustrated in Chapter IV of this study, the quality of the evidence and the reasoning employed to substantiate the first major contention of the HCUA at San Francisco-~that the threat of the Communist conspiracy to the internal security of the United States is greater than ever-“was highly questionable. .A close examination of the reasoning and proof used by the committee to support the two subpoints or reasons offered as development 252 of this major point will further demonstrate the specious- ness of this line of argument. The first reason presented in support of the pro- position that the threat of the Communist conspiracy to the internal security of the United States is greater than ever was: "The influx of Communist propaganda has reached flood proportions." The first witness to appear before the committee at San Francisco, Irving Fishman, was asked to provide the data to support this assertion. In so doing, Fishman and his two colleagues, Wong and Louie, offered the following evidence: statistics, fifteen times; examples, ten times; and narratives, five times. The significant set of statistics offered as evidence to support the Com- mmnist propaganda flood argument is contained in the following sequence: Mr. Arena: Is the volume of Communist propaganda emanating from abroad which is subject to your surveillance increasing or decreasing? Mr. Fishman: It has been increasing steadily. In 1958 we had a total of some 4, 897,000 od.d mail parcels. So the figure for 1959 reflected an increase of some 18 percent. To come more specifically to the Port of San Francisco, where we have just recently completed our study, in 1959 there were over one million mail parcels containing some 2,032,000 pieces of printed matter. In 1958 there were only 945,000 mail par- cels, so here, too, we reflect an increase. None of these figures, of course, includes the return-to-the-homeland or redefection material which comes in the first-class mail.87 87.3.29. 1123.23.12.99. Feelings. Pp. 1939-1940. 253 The basis for concern, on the part of the committee, stemmed from the fact that, contrary to the law, none of the "flood" of mail was labeled "Political Propaganda." .As Fishman and Arena explain it, Mr. Fishman: we‘would like to make it clear that our agencies, in the treatment of this material, are fully aware of our responsibility. It is our 'feeling that the Foreign Agents Registration Act is primarily a disclosure statute and that it makes it necessary for a foreign government which, through any of its agents, sends political propaganda into ' the United States, to disclose the source of the information. That is to make the information readily avail- able to the reader-~who should know, when he reads material, or has access to itu-just where it emanates from and just who is responsible for it. Mr. Arena: May I interrupt to rephrase-~as I understand. your statement of the law, is in a rather summary vein. See if this is substantially correct, namely, that the Foreign Agents Registra- tion.Act requires that Communist propagand.a which is being sent into the United States be labeled 'Poli- tical Propaganda' and that those persons in the United States who are disseminating this Communist propaganda.must, themagfives, register with the Department of Justice. The use of examples in support of the "flood of propaganda" argument is exemplified in the following sequence: ‘ Mr. Arena: But in the course of your experience in the United States Customs Service, including your most recent examination of this quantity of Com- munist propaganda being brought into the United States which is labeled as Communist propaganda in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration.Act; is that correct? Mg, Fishman: That is correct. 881bid., p. 1937. 254 Mr. Arens: Are you in a position to give us, f1rst of all, the range of the recipients of this Communist propaganda? Is it directed to schools and colleges in the United States? Mr. Fishman: Yes. We have some general idea of how the material is directed. It is directed, of course, primarily and principally to people who have their heritage in the countries now under Communist domination and control. It is directed to colleges, universities, and secondary schools, to every grganization associated with these schools. The following example, one which Mr. Fishman had reiterated many times previously during his frequent appearances before the HCUA, was calculated to evince a more dramatic reaction because of its visual reinforce- ment I Mr. Fishman: As the committee has an gested, we have here a number of mail sacks submitted to our unit in the past 2 days by the Post Office Depart- ment and which we have not yet reached for exami- nation. Any of them.are available for examination by the committee, but we do have a restriction against exhibiting the name and address of the re- Cipient 0 .Mr. Arens: Is it permissible and can you open a mail sack.now before the committee in order to give us an indication of the percentage, we will say first of all, the percentage of the mail coming into San Francisco from Red China which is outright Communist propaganda and the percentage which has redefection material and the percentage which has other material? Mr. Fishman: 'We will be glad to open a sack. Mr. Arens: I would suggest, if you please, that you just take a fair sampling so we do not consume any more time than ought to be used. ‘Will you just proceed at your own pace to give us a word description of what you find in that mail sack? Mr. Fishman: This particular sack comes directly from the mainland of China. ‘We have several that 89Ibid., pp. 1940-1941. 255 come by way of Hong Kong. I will have to depend on Mr. Louie for translation of the contents of these packages. M5, Arens: May I suggest you just do a sampling of two or three of them? .yg, Fishman: This is a copy of "China Reconstructs." Mm. Arens: Is that being sent to an individual _o""§——- s s s recipient or an institution? Mr. Fishman: This is addressed to an individual 52}. in California.9 Other examples and narratives pertained to speculation regarding the transshipment of Communist political propaganda via nonFCbmmunist nations, the im- pact of the propaganda upon its recipients, the question of the source of subsidy for the printing and postal ex- penses of said propaganda mail, and an irrelevant discus- sion of Chinese communes. In spite of the amount of evidence offered in support of the Communist propaganda flood argument (the testimony of Fishman, Louie and Wong covers eighteen pages in the transcript), none of it was germane to the crucial point at issue: Are the contents of the mail received in the united States from Communist nations classifiable as subversive? In other words, not once was there any evidence presented which would have indi- cated that the "political propaganda" being mailed to persons in the United States was designed to incite the recipient to engage in subversive or espionage activities 9°Ibid., p. 1942. 256 against the United States. The reasoning of the com- mittee, therefore, that the flood of Communist propa- ganda,'pgg_§g, provided a rationale for its major point that the Communist threat is greater than ever repre- sented fallacious argument $393 $3. Faulty reasoning based upon the improper use of argument £593; Ell-fl ran throughout the fabric of the Fishman testimony. For example, since the HCUA did not know the specific contents of the mail received by the estimated #0,000 American Chinese who live in the Bay Area, it had no basis for concluding that these American citizens were being bombarded by Communist "political propaganda." Such reasoning as this ignores the possi- bility that some of this mail from the Chinese mainland was non-propagandistic correspondence which emanated from friends and relatives of the Chinese American recipients. Similarly, the following sequence again illustrates the misuse of argument £1311; _slgg: £5, Arens: Does the Customs Service, which main- tains at least a watchfulness over this flood of Communist propaganda, have access to what we call first-class mail? Mr. Fishman: No. Under the Constitution, first- 'Elass mail is not subject to examination. Mr. Arens: Does the Customs Service have access, n a surveillance pattern, to Communist propaganda channeled by diplomatic routes? ‘yg, Fishman: By reciprocal agreements, we do not have access to diplomatic mail. gg, Arens: yDoes the Customs Service have access to Communist propaganda.which comes in bulk ship- ment for redistribution to dissemination points which, in turn, distribute the material outside the United States? 257 fig} Fishman: No; we have no control over that either. Mg, Arens: Then there are vast areas in which Communist propaganda is coming into the United States which are not subject to official scrutiny, let alone official censor or official labeling; is that correct? Mg, Fishman: That is correct.91 In addition to the committee's faulty reasoning processes, as illustrated by the foregoing examples, its reliance upon Fishman and wong as experts on matters out- side their range of competence further weakened the com- mittee's argument. The apparent incompetence of Fishman and wong to answer questions requiring expertise in psychology and sociology was discussed in Chapter IV of this study in the analysis of the committee's methods of inquiry. Finally, in treating the committee's methods of supporting its point that the flood of propaganda.emana- ting from Communist nations indicates that the threat of Communism.is greater than ever, it should be pointed out that the first of its hundreds of appeals to preservation was employed during the lengthy exchange with Fishman. That statements such as the following were calculated to arouse a sense of fearful concern among the listeners seems clear: Mr. Fishman: The committee may be interested in owing that many of the answers we have received 911bid., p. 1940. 258 are to the effect that we should keep the mail from the addressees. They want no part of any of this mail. Most of the recipients seem to be afraid that this is an effort to contact them for one purpose or another. They have, to a great extent, indicated to us that in leaving their homes and countries they had escaped control. But now here they are being followed. I have one or two of these letters to which I would like to make reference. Here is a letter from one individual in which he says: 'Please do not allow anything from Communist countries to be sent on to me. . . . .' we have dozens of other letters. One reads: 'If this package contains any Communist papers or other matters, just dump it in the trash or transmit it to the FBI. Don't send me anything.‘ In other words, many of these people are just scared to death every time they hear from these areas. Again, as the above testimony reveals, the committee suggested that the recipients of mail from Iron Curtain countries ought to be fearful for their safety in spite of the fact that no revelation was made regarding the contents of the mail: Mg, Johansen: You spoke of what seemed to me to indicate a fear of this mail on the part of the recipients. Could you elaborate a little on the nature of it? Is it fear of continued involvement with Communists abroad? Is it fear of efforts to control or utilize these persons now in the United States? Is it fear of blackmail, extortion? Is it fear of what might happen to their relatives in The Iron Curtain countries? Mr. Fishman: .All of those are no doubt true. The ressees are obtained by the propaganda.machine through the medium of organization listings. For example, there is one organization, the Polish- American Congress, which has some 50,000 members. By obtaining the roster you have 50,000 people that can be written to from Poland, or from any other Soviet country. The people who receive this 921bid., p. 19u5. 259 material, or who are advised of its presence here, have probably reached a point in their lives in the United States where they feel no attachment to any organization or any government other than the United States. All of a sudden they receive a letter which asks them to do a number of things, to give information, for example, or comment on life in the United States, and so on, and each one of these people, without knowledge of the other having been contacted, feels that he has been singled out as a contact point. ya, Johansen: In other words, it is a genuine fear of dangers they envision from these Communist countries? ‘Eg, Fishman: That is right. ya, jofiansen: It is not a fear that the FBI or the Un-American Activities Committee will hound them because they received this mail, is it? Mr. Fishman: No. On the contrary, I think publicity — o-—-""—"". o as is given to this redefection program.by a hearing such as this and by observations made by the House Committee on Unquerican.Activities in the past, has allayed many of these fears. People realize this is part of one great Communist program.and it is not just something directed to the individual. . Mr. Johansen: In view of some of the allegations of ‘the terror tactics of this committee, I wanted the record to be very clear as to what quarter they directed their fears.93 Implicit in the appeals to the motive of preservation contained in the above exchange are appeals to the motive of pride by virtue of the negative suggestion that the recipients of the foreign mail had demonstrated their patriotism by expressing their fears of communism. Fur- ther, Representative Johansen's final statement above represents another of the committee's attempts to boost its source credibility. The materials of development and the reasoning process used by the HCUA to establish the second reason 931bid.. pp. 1950-1951. 260 undergirding its main proposition were also tenuous. The subpoint--that the Communist Party, although smaller in technical membership, is a greater threat to the se- curity of the united States because it has increased its non-technical membership by going "underground"--appears specious on its face. Careful analysis of this line of thought and its supporting evidence was made in Chapter IV of this study. To summarize that discussion, it was shown that the HCUA conceded the fact that technical or formal membership in the Communist Party of the United States had diminished to approximately 10,000 following the Hungarian uprising in 1955. Having made this concession, the committee then relied upon the opinion testimony of Prussion and Hartle, both of whom possessed questionable competence and used insufficient evidence, to reason that (1) there are 20,000 to 25,000 active Communists in the United States, including 10,000 to 15,000 in the "under- ground," and (2) the threat of Communism to the internal security of the United States, therefore, had increased because the Party had gone "underground." Neither of these arguments was based upon adequate evidence; rather, they were the results of the speculation of Prussian, a "committee witness" whose qualifications, for reasons discussed previously, were never verified, in terms of suitable standards for testing evidence. The following excerpt reveals the speculative nature of the committee's reasoning on this point: 261 Mr. Arens: With respect to the number and effec- tiveness of the Communists in the United States, you stated yesterday that there are people who are Communists under Communist discipline, but that they do not have technical affiliation with the Communist Party as such. I would like to ask you a few general questions. In the first place, based upon your information as a recent member of the Communist Party, how many members are there of this formal entity known as the Communist Party, roughly speaking? ‘What is your best estimate? ‘yg, Prussian: My best testimony would be that the national membership of the Communist Party at this moment would be approximately 10,000. up, Arens: How many Communists are submitting them- selves to Communist discipline, who are in the opera- tion as dedicated Communists, but who do not have technical relationship to the Communist Party? How many are there in the nonformal membership category? Mr. Prussian: In my testimony yesterday, I said that that type of membership is equal to the actual formally enrolled membership in the Communist Party. So you have an additional 10,000 members who are active Communists. Mr..Arens: Would it be a fair approximation to say that there are, in your judgment, based upon your experience, approximately 20,000 Comunists under Communist discipline at the present time on American soil? %§; Prugsion: That would be a modest figure; yes, Mr. Arens: That would be far in addition to a division of troops, that is, in numerical strength? ME, Prussion: That is correct, sir. !§,.Arens: Tell us, if you please, then, why you have concluded that these 20,000 Communists consti- tute a menace, or are more threatening now than ever before in a population of 180 million people. Surely, someone would ask, 'Twenty thousand people of a par- ticular political vein, a particular political concept, a particular idea would have no appreciable impact in a society of 180 million people?’ What is your response to that inquiry based upon your intimate experience in the hard core of this operation? ya, Prussion: My experience within the ranks of the conspiracy definitely indicates that individual Com- munists are capable, under certain conditions, of leading hundreds and thousands on certain issues, 262 and that it is through their infiltration, es~ pecially in various mass organizations, as they call them, that they are able to motivate and move people in what they call the class struggle. Numbers are not too important insofar as member- ship is concerned in the Communist Party. There are many prospective little Castros in the Communist Party in the united States and many prospective little Lenins in the Communist Party in the United States.9"+ In addition to Prussion's failure to disclose just how he arrived at his estimates as to the number of Communists in the United States, he also failed to sub- stantiate his and the committee's claim that the Party posed an imminent threat to the united States. It should be re-emphasized that the HCUA's mandate, in regard to framing potential legislation, is to investigate sub- version which embodies a "clear and present danger." And yet, Mr. Prussion's comments, as the quoted state- ments above so indicate, do not relate to what i§_hap- pening; rather, they are couched in conditional language which says that the Communists are capable 2;.doing cer- tain things, not that they are doigg them. Thus, as was true with the first argument posited by the committee, that the influx of propaganda had reached "flood pro- portions", the committee failed to demonstrate that the Communist Party was actually engaged in subversive acti- vities. This second reason, then, fails to substantiate 9“Ibid.. pp. zosu-zoss. 263 the committee's central idea because it argues that the Communist Party in the United States i§.capable‘2£ threatening the internal security of the nation rather than proving that the CPUSA.i§.Egg_threatening America's security. To further illustrate the kind of specious, and frequently obsolete, evidence and reasoning utilized by the committee to support its argument that the Communist Party is a greater threat now than ever before, the fol- lowing narrative example is cited which describes an occurrence which took place twenty-six years prior to the San Francisco hearings: Mr. Arens: Mr. Prussian, give us a word, please, about your experience in the Communist Party in provocations to violence and assessment of the ensuing violence by the comrades in their conduits of public expression, and what they call police brutality. Mg, Prussian: Do you want me to give you a specific example of what I experienced? _M_r_. Arens: I wish you would; yes, sir. Mg, Prussian: Forty members of the Communist Party had infiltrated the Packard Motor Car Company in 1934. The Communist Party at that time decided to see how effective those forty members could be in influencing the workers in the plant. .A strike was provoked by these forty members; the plant was shut down; picket lines were thrown around the plant, with no obvious reason for a strike whatsoever. The strike continued for about four days, and it was obvious that the strike was to be lost. I attended a meeting of the Industrial Commission of the Communist Party, and at this meeting one Nat Ganley stated--- _Mg. Arens: Was he a comrade? M5, Prussion: He‘was a member of the National Com- mittee of the Communist Party at that time. as, Arens: All right, sir. 26# Mr. Prussion: He stated, in essence, as follows: 'Tft is obv1ous that we are going to lose the strike, but we have shown the effectiveness of the Communist Party in being able to call out all the workers. But in order to bring this strike to a proper conclusion there will have to be violence and bloodshed on the picket line tomorrow morning. Without that, we cannot hope to embarrass the local government through bitter complaints-~police brutality, and so on.’ Bloodshed and violence did take place that next mom ing 0 Mr. Arens: Was he alluding to bloodshed and violence Bf'the comrades? ya, Prussion: The bloodshed and the violence, of course, included some Communists, but in the main it was quite a bloody battle in which innocent victims suffered as a.result of this violence.95 At least three-fourths of the combined testimony of Prussian, Hartle and Fishman, rather than having rele- vance to the immediate, dynamic threat posed by communism, pertained to speculative and theoretical statements. In other words, these three "friendly" witnesses were ques- tioned about what the Communists had said they were going to do. The committee, therefore, abdicted its responsi- bility by devoting its energies to seeking information which was not germane to its legislative purpose nor even to its persuasive objectives. The crucial question that it should have been.dealing with is: What subversive activities are the Communists engaged in now? Given the speculative nature of most of the testimony uttered by the "friendly" witnesses, one is made to wonder whether or not these witnesses possessed 951bid., p. 2087. 265 any significant new evidence relevant to the proper function of the HCUA. For example, Mrs. Hartle's apparent interpretation of some documents, most of which had al- ready been made public, which had been distributed to the delegates to the 17th National Communist Party Convention illustrate the speculative nature of much of this type of testimony: Lr. Arens: Is the objective of the Communist .__,_. operation on American soil now to convert you, me, and everybody here, ideologically, to communism as an ideology and philosophy, or is the objective of the Communist operation, conquest? Mrs. Hartle: The objective is the conquest of power. Thz'Communist Party says that we wouldn't have so- cialism in 10,000 years if you pursued the educational method, that force is absolutely necessary---and it is right in these documents, again---the conquest of power. 0 O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O C O O O Lr. Arens: Knowing Communist semantics, Communist techniques, and Communist objectives, give us your interpretation of the significance of that keynote speech by Gus Hall? Mrs. Hartle: Gus Hall, in this keynote speech given to *the national convention, the 17th National Conven- tion of the Communist Party, projects the idea that the Communist Party can be very enthusiastic about its prospects for the future; that the international situation is such that very reat strides can be made by the Communist Party in this country, and that the national situation is also such as to really make it possible for the Cbmmunist Party to go ahead by leaps and bounds s O C O Q I O O O O O O O O O O O O O C C O O O O O O O Lr. Arens: I should like to ask you now to direct your attention to the material before you, developed in the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party, held last December in New York City, respecting youth activities. Would you kindly ferret out that document in the resolutions passed there, and give this committee the benefit of your background and experience in interpreting the significance of that resolution? (See Committee Exhibit No. 18, App. p. 2272.) 266 Mrs. Hartle: The resolution on the youth question, first of all, points out the great importance that the Communist Party attaches to winning the youth to the party, and says that this is an extremely important question, that a great deal of attention and work must be put to it. It says on the second page of the resolution, 'Youth work shall be placed next to labor and the Negro people's movement as our major areas of mass work.’ The document further sets forth a program for youth, and parts of the program are: l. ‘Abolition of the draft--of compulsory military training and service, and of the ROTC. 2. Ending of all atomic testing. 3. Complete disarmament. All funds needed for the implementation of this whole program could easily come from.a part of the present armaments expenditures. 4. Development of youth exchanges--students, workers, athletes, musicians, teachers, etc.-- between the United States and the socialist countries. 0 O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O 0 Mr. Arens: The Communists themselves foster the concept that we have only competing economic systems? Mrs. Hartle: Yes. ‘55, Arens: And they try to obliterate from the mind of the free world the concept that they are a con- spiratorial force out to destroy all free societies, irrespective of the economic system; isn't that cor- rect? Mrs. Hartle: Yes; that is what they do. They talk about the conquest of power, the political conquest of political power, and then establishing what they call socialism or the economic system. Mr. Arens: Is there any significant difference in the objectives, in the discipline, in the operation of Communists on American soil and Communists who sent the tanks into Budapest to mow down freedom fighters? Mrs. Hartle: No; the same general principles of Marxism-Leninism.guide those activities. Mr. Arens: Is there any significant difference between the objectives, the techniques, the operation of the Communists on American soil and the Communists who now hold in bondage the millions of people in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe? Mrs. Hartle: No. Mr. Arens: Is there any significant difference between the objectives, of the Communist program on American soil and the operation of the Communist 267 program in Red China where they have destroyed millions upon millions of people in the ascendency of this force? Egg, Hartle: No; there is no difference. §£_, Hartle: They have a document on the question of the Problem of Class Collaboration. It explains that in the labor movement in.America there is a strong tendency for collaboration between labor and capital, and that the labor leaders in the United States have always supported the foreign policy of the United States, and have never come to logger- heads with our system as a system. The fighting they have done and the strikes they have led have always been just for wages and hours, but not to overthrow the system; and the Communists have to get in there and have to sell communism and show them how to work in the labor movement to lead the labor forces so they will feel like over- throwing the whole sgstem and not just getting a few wage increases.9 It is apparent that the above statements do not support the committee's contention that the Communist Party in the United States is an active threat to the nation's security. Rather, the statements are specula- tive; they represent Mrs. Hartle's (and the committee's) interpretation of what the American Communist Party leader- ship contends ought to be done. The above statements do not even suggest that the Communist Party in the United States ig_carrying-out any of its proposals, nor is any evidence cited which would corroborate the committee's claim that the Communist Party in the United States is a greater threat than ever before. In addition to the fact that the committee's 961bid., pp. 1962, 1965, 1963, 1930. 268 reasoning is irrelevent to the conclusions which it draws, its methods of making inferences are specious. For in- stance, the analogies used by Arens above in which he equates the power and activities of the Communist Party in the United States with that of the Communist Party in Russia, Red China and the European satellite nations fails to take into account the substantial differences which exist among these societies. In particular, the fact that the nations being compared with the united States are to- talitarian governments which support the Communist Party line by coercion nullifies the validity of the analogy. The fourth and final excerpt cited in the quo- tation above is typical of the speculative nature of much of the testimony offered by the "friendly" witnesses. To theorize that the "Communists have to get in there and sell communism and show them.bow to work in the labor move- ment" has no logical relevance as supporting material for an argument that purports to show what fig, The lack of empirical data to support such a claim.further illustrates the unreasonableness of the committee's contention. Significantly, in those few cases in which the committee attempted to cite or to suggest that evidence existed which supported its reasoning that the Communist Party is a real threat to the security of the United States it employed evidence in an imprecise manner. Twice during 269 the San Francisco hearings, for instance, the HCUA suggested that the CPUSA could inundate government officials with 50,000 letters in a seventy-two hour period. However, other than asserting that the Communist Party was capable of carrying-out such a letter-writing campaign in what the committee labeled as an action of "political subversion," it failed to clinch the argument by presenting specific cases in which the Party had executed such a campaign on specific issues of national importance: ya, Arens: On that point, to what extent do the Communists, from your experience, engage in what we call political subversion, namely, pressure public officials to take a position which is fa- vorable to the immediate objective of the Communists? £33, Hartle: That is a very, very important activity in the Communist Party. In fact, I don't know which activity is more important or comes in for more time and effort than writing letters, sending petitions and delegations, and such and such, to Congressmen and Senators, and Governors, Mayors, and what have you. That is a very important part of Communist activity. Mr. Arens: They tell us, sneeringly, they can have ,000 pieces of mail on Capitol Hill on any subject under the sun in 72 hours. Do you think that is an exaggeration, or, based upon your background and experience, do you think they are able, by enlisting the dupes and the suckers on any particular issue in which they are interested, to press the button and get the letters in washington? Egg, Hartle: That is no exaggeration, I assure you. M5, Arens: But they don't reveal it in their letters, letters, in their correspondence, and in their peti- tions to the public officials that they are Communists or that it is a Communist operation, do they? Egg, Hartle: And many of the people that write the letters don't know that it has anything to do with communism at that moment. But I would like to clarify that, because they will say: 'Well, then, if nobody knows, what difference does it make?’ It makes this difference: The Communists work with these people, they get them to write these 270 letters, they go to their homes, they get their names on the list. They recruit into the Communist Party the best prospects out of them, and they, in turn, then lead the rest of them. A small force leads a large group of people, because if the Communists were just out here talking about Negro rights or labor rights, and that is all they were doing, surely they have as much right to do that as anybody else. But what they do is build the conspiracy, and organize a lot of other activi- ties that you don't know about, and they don't come out in the open about such things as hiding mimeo- graph machines, having undercover people here and there, and all kinds of ways of contact that nobody knows about, and a system whereby everybody will leave home overnight and not be available in case of an arrest or something like that. y;, Arens: Do you have information respecting the creation or attempted creation by the Communists on great political issues, of pressure groups at the grassroots for the purpose of trying to get letters sent to Washington or to State capitals for the at- tainment of Communist objectives? Mr. Prussion: That is day-to-day routing activity of’the Communist Party, such as sending telegrams, writing letters, principally trying to get resolu- tions passed in the different organizations of which they are members, in an effort to put forth the program that they would like to see legislated in the united States. This is ordinary and very usual, and part of the routine.97 Granting that Congressional hearings are not governed by "rules of evidence," the fact remains that the assertions made in the above quotations lack proof, and therefore probably would have been regarded as spurious by the many critical listeners at San Francisco. As the quotations above reveal, the committee appeared to be more concerned with psychological appeals than with logical proof. Hundreds of times during the 97Ibid., p. 1981 and 2051. 271 hearings the committee chose examples and language which were designed to reinforce its listeners' fears of com- munism. By and large, these appeals were directed to- ward the motives of preservation and pride (patriotism). Typical of these frequently uttered appeals are the fol- lowing: Mr. Arens: The Chinese propaganda coming into the country, and I say this facetiously, of course, does not reveal the commune system which is in existence there, in which families are split up; it doesn't reveal the millions which have been destroyed, body and soul, by this awful regime in Red China, does it? Mr. Arens: It is a little more acceptable to the ear because there have been so many revelations of the deceit and the murder connected.with com- munism; is that correct? Mr..Arens: I would like to interrupt you here. Based upon your extensive experience in the opera- tion itself, why or how is it that the Communists are so successful in their conditioning, brainwashing, of the non-Communists? Mr. Arens: The pertinency of your work is that I expect to pursue this line of questioning to d.etermine how long you have been engaged in the profession or occupation which you announced as your present pro- fession or occupation, with the end in view of at- tempting to trace, if we possibly can, for the purpose of the security of this Nation, your activities, if any, which you will reveal in this conspiratorial force known as the Communist Party, when you went into the underground, when you came out of the under- ground, certain of your activities on behalf of this force, which is the same force that sent the tanks into Budapest. Mr. Arens: Since you apparently can 't quite under- stand the pertinency of this line of inquiry, I will say to you that this committee is trying to develop information respecting the techniques, mode of opera- tions, of this conspiratorial force which masquerades behind a facade of do-goodism, humanitarianism, which 272 is sweeping the world, which has destroyed more lives on this planet than any other force since the dawn of time. ,gg, Prussion: Within the Communist Party there is total disregard for law. Within the Communist Party there are rigged trials, forced confessions, provo- cations of suicides of Communists who have deviated, reprisals against Communists who might deviate on party strategy. 213;. Arens: This Committee on Un-American Activities has had an investigation going in the Greater San Francisco area for several months, in which we have, we believe, developed widespread ramifications of this cancerous growth here. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O ,y;, Arens: Are you now, this very instant, a member of that conspiratorial force that would overthrow the Government of the united States by force and violence and that would establish an authoritarian government even worse than the Nazis, namely, the Communist dic- tatorship798 Several times during the hearings the committee endeavored to play upon the emotions of its listeners, particularly the ministers and the members of the DAR who were present in the hearing room, by framing appeals to the drives and motives of preservation, pride and con- formity. These appeals, for the most part, pertained to the alleged potential threat of communism to religious freedom in America. In its questioning of Prussian, for instance, the committee not only attempted to show the Godlessness of communism but also the Godlessness of some of the protesting members of its San Francisco area audience: 982231." pp. 19%, 1962, 1973, 1985, 2013, 2030, 2006, and 2101. 273 My, Arens: Mr. Prussian, earlier in these hearings I was interrogating a lady, Mrs. Barbara Hartle, who had been in the conspiracy, but who broke with the conspiracy, and in the course of the interroga- tion I observed that in finding her way out of the conspiracy back as an anti-Communist, she had found her way back to God, and I heard snickering and loud laughter here by these young people. Within the framework of the Communist operation, is there room for concepts of God and spiritual values as we are taught them at our mother's knee? Mg, Prussion: The Communist Party lowers man to that of a beast in the field. As far as the Com- munist is concerned, man is material and not spi- ritual; be has no soul, no spirit, and there is no God. This is elementary and fundamental to every Communist. One cannot live a peaceable life under communism and believe in God at the same time. Belief in God tears to shreds the entire Communist conspiracy.99 Perhaps the lengths to which the HCUA was willing to go to arouse the fears of its listeners during the hearings is best illustrated by its use of “friendly" witness Thomas Grabor as a testimonial to the horror tactics practiced by the Communists. As was indicated in Chapter IV of the study, Grabor's emotion-filled description of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 had no apparent relevance to any legislative purpose of the committee. Clearly, his appearance at San Francisco was designed to add support to the committee's central contention: that communism is a greater threat than ever to the security of the United States. Appeals to the preservation motive of Americans seems to have been the committee's sole justification for Mr. Grabor's replies: 99Ibid., p. 2037. 274 Mr. Arens: You witnessed the Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest, did you not? Mr. Grabor: Yes, sir. I was fighting against them. Mr. lArens: And you saw your own people massacred, d1d you not? Mr. Grabor: Yes, sir. I saw thousands and thousands of people dying on the streets just because they wanted their ri.ghts, their freedom. They wanted the Russian army to leave Hungary. They wanted the Hun- garian goods to belong to the Hungarian people. They wanted to be patriots, and patriotism is a crime under a Communist regime. Mr. Arens: Thank you, sir. Mr. CEa1rman, it is not our intention to prolong the interrogation of Mr. Grabor. ‘We just thought it would be well to have in this record some indication of what it is to live under communism and what is in the mind of a young man who was in the schools under a Communist regime, communism in action.100 Although it seems probable that such straight-forward emotionalism as that utilized by the committee elicited positive responses from its supporters, particularly the ministers and DAR members in attendance, it is likewise probable that the "snickering" and "laughter" alluded to by Counsel Arens reflected the disdain of the hostile members of the audience toward the cammittee's over- dramatized approach. Again, however, the committee's use of immmderate motive appeals was consistent with its long established habits of extremism. It apparently failed to recognize that indirection and suggestion might better have persuaded the hostile segments of its audience.101 1001bid., pp. 2108-2109. 101See Hance, Ralph and Wiksell, Principles of S akin , p. 124, for discussion of persuasion and the host1le audience. 275 Four reasons were presented by the committee as arguments in support of its third main point--that the "hostile" witnesses and their supporters are active in the Communist conspiracy. These reasons include (1) the "hostile" witnesses are or have been members of the Communist Party; (2) the "hostile" witnesses and their "comrades" caused the riots and disturbances which oc- curred during the hearings; (3) the "hostile" witnesses are deceitful and disloyal Americans because they refuse to tell the committee the truth; and (h) the "hostile" witnesses make a mockery of the United States Constitu- tion. Each of these four supporting reasons will now be examined. Except for the twelve "unfriendly" witnesses who were identified during the hearings as having been members of the Communist Party, the HCUA concealed its sources of identification of the remaining twenty-four "hostile" witnesses behind the phrase "confidential sources of unimpeachable integrity." Prussion provided the committee with the ammunition to label five of the witnesses as Communists: Mr. Arens: Then in 1956 were you attached to another 3211 Mr. Prussion: In 1956 I was attached to the Palo atom the Communist Party. Mr. Arens: First of all, tell us where the Palo Alto EEIlffEfiEtioned; tell us what it did, and who, to your certain knowledge, were members of the Communist Party attached to the Palo.Alto cell. 276 Mg, Prussion: The Palo Alto cell met in the homes of different members of the cell. At times it was held at the home of Mary Field, other times at the home of Gertrude Adler, Doris Dawson, Mary Wilson, Michael Shapavalov. M5, Arens: Were all these persons to your certain knowledge members of the Communist Party? Mg, Prussian: I might at this time name the people who were members of this cell so that we can--- ME, Arens: Is each and every one of these persons, to your certain knowledge, a member of the Communist Party? [M5, Prussion: That is correct. Mg, Arens: All right, sir. Now proceed with your names, if you please, Mr. Prussion, and give us, if you will do so, the spelling of those that are dif- ficult names, and a word of description. 0 O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O 0 ME, Prussion: Yes. §g_Ross, Belle Ross, Sara Alchermes, Ed Schneider, Elizabeth Nicholas, Isobel Cerney, and her husband, Mr. Cerney--I don't recall his first name; Gelsomine Becks, Ed Becks, Myra White, Alvin White, Mary Field, Holland Roberts, and Harvey Richards. M5, Arens: Did you, during the course of your ex- perience in the Communist Party as an undercover agent for the FBI, know as a Communist a person by the name of Morris Graham? ‘Mg, Prussion: Yes. Morris Graham, during the latter part of my membership, was section organizer. Mg. Arens: During the course of your experience as an undercover agent in the party, did you know as a Communist a person by the name of D_qp_ Clark? Mr. Prussion: Yes. Don Clark worked as a distri- Efitor and promoter for the People's world and other so-called educational material that the Communist Party put out. ME,.Arens: Have you served in closed party sessions with him? _Mg. Prussian: Yes. .EE: Arens: Did you know as a.Communist in like manner a person by the name of Elizabeth Nicholas? ‘ME, Prussion: Yes. Elizabeth Nicholas is an active Communist who does a considerable amount of courier work, inner party courier work, and I believe that during the latter part of the Smith Act trials Elizabeth Nicholas went underground and she wasn't seen for two or three years. She later showed up at cell meetings. 277 ‘ME, Arens: Did you, in the course of your ex- perience in the Communist Party, at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, know as a member of the Communist Party a person by the name of Ed Ross? ME, Pruss1on: Yes. Ed Ross was a member of the Communist Party cell ifi'Palo Alto, a ball-bearing salesman. He is very active and had been active in the California Democratic Clubs in the Peninsula area. He is the gentleman that I referred to when I was talking about knowledge on missiles and that sort of information. Archie Brown, known for many years to be a mem- ber of the Communist Party, was re-identified by Mrs. Hartle following Brown's attempt to harass the committee on the first day of the hearings: M5, Arens: Did you, in the course of your member- ship in the conspiratorial apparatus known as the Communist Party, know as a Communist the man who was causing such disruption here a little while ago, shouting for peace and democracy, and the like, in the Communist jargon, a man by the name of Archie Brown? Mrs. Hartle: Yes; I did know Archie Brown. I knew -r- -—-— . him to be a Communist. (A disturbance in the hearing room.) M5, Arens: Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the Chair issue an admonition to those who are disorderly in this hearing room, that this congres~ sional committee will not be taken over by the Com- munists or those under Communist discipline, and that anyone who is engaged in disorderly conduct in this hearing room will be ejected from the hearing room. fl. Willis: I have so ordered. Proceed. Mg. Arens: Under what circumstances did you know Archie Brown? gig, Hartle:, I met with Archie Brown in a Communist meeting Here in San Francisco in the early part of 1950. 102San Francisco Hearin s, pp. 20h8 and 205#. Those names-which are under ine are of those persons who had been subpoenaed by the committee to testify at San Francisco. 278 ME, Arens: Do you here and now, while you are under oath, testify that you knew Archie Brown to a certainty to be a member of the Communist Party? Mag, Hartle: Yes; I knew him to a certainty to be a member. In fact, I knew him to be a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party. ya, Arens: What activities was he engaged in as a member of this conspiratorial force known as the Communist Party? Mrs. Hartle: He was engaged in waterfront acti- —l_o_—_ o o o o o v1t1es, waterfront union act1v1ties to quite a large extent in California, at that time.103 Finally, a seventh witness, Vern Bown, was identified as a Communist by investigator Wheeler: yg, Wheeler: This particular document relates to an interfight in the Communist Party of San Fran- cisco. It refers particularly to the section known as the AFL'Section, American Federation of'Labor. This section was composed of members of the Communist Party who were also members of the AFL; the AFL Section of the Communist Party here evi- dently thought they were entitled to a little free expression, to formulate their own policy. This idea they had didn't set well with their leadership of the party in this area, that is, the country committee of the Communist Party of the Northern District of California, in San Francisco. Their position for free expression led to the expulsion of the organizer of the AFL Section, a man by the name of Vern Bown. The committee's standard procedure for identi- fying twenty-four of the "hostile" witnesses as present or former Communists rarely deviated from the following pattern: Mr. Arens: Mr. Ludwig, let me make a statement — fl . . to you, if you please, sir. . . . . It is the 1°3Ibid., p. 1971 1°4Ibid., pp. 2064 and 1968. 279 judgment of this committee that you, sir, having been a leader, so we are advised by unimpeachable sources, having been a leader of a dissident group within the Communist Party, have information which would be of extreme value to your Government, via this committee, in its attempts to legislate on Communist activities, attempting to protect this country under whose flag you and I both have protection against the onrush of the Communist conspiracy. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O C O O O O 0 Mg, Arens: Now, Mr. wachter, it is the information of this committee from unimpeachable intelligence sources that you were a delegate to the National Convention of the Communist Party from the Northern District of California, the Communist Party conven- tion held in New York City in December of 1959.105 It is to the committee's credit that its identi- fication of five of the "unfriendly" witnesses as Com- munists or former Communists was made by citing what appeared to be reliable sources. These sources usually consisted of some document which either mentioned the name of the person or which the person apparently had signed or authored. The following excerpt typifies the committee's use of this method of identification: Mr. Arens: [interrogation of Mr. Leibel Bergman] ‘Tfié first document has been identified as a document which is in the nature of a complaint to the National Committee of the Communist Party, in which the author is complaining about the expulsion procedures of a leader of the AFL Section of the conspiracy here in California, in which the author is complaining that the procedures were completely without any degree of fairplay, in which the author is complaining that no one from the section was allowed to observe the trial; in which the author is comparing the procedures by which this section organizer was expelled to the worst 1051bid., pp. 2064 and 1968. 280 type of procedures one could imagine in Fascist states and the like. I lay this document before you and ask you now, sir, while you are under oath, if you will tell this committee whether or not you are the author of that document? This Committee on Un-American.Activities has had an investigation going on in the Greater San Francisco area for several months, in which we have, we believe, developed widespread ramifications of this cancerous growth here. This Committee on Un-American Activities in the Course of the investigative processes has developed factual information to the effect that you did make a report to the National Convention of the Communist Party, a significant report, a copy of which we have a copy of which has been identified on this record.166 In total, then, the identification of the thirty- six "hostile" witnesses as present or past members of the Communist Party was accomplished by the committee via one of three methods: (1) the seven who were identified by three of the "friendly" witnesses on the basis of first- hand knowledge; (2) the five who were identified on the basis of documents which the committee had acquired through its investigations; and (3) the twenty-four who were identi- fied on the basis of information allegedly obtained from unspecified sources. It is difficult to assess the reliability of most of the identifications made at the San Francisco hearings. Given that witnesses Prussion, Hartle and Wheeler had told the truth, then it appears highly probable that the seven persons identified by them had been active in the Communist 1°5Ibid., pp. 2005-2006. 281 Party. A similar assumption may be made regarding the five persons whose identification as Communists was based upon the contents of various documents. The committee's method of identifying the largest group, twenty-four witnesses, as Communists, although con- sistent with its twenty-two years of practice, fails to meet even minimal tests of evidence. Recognizing that congressional committees are not bound by rules of evi- dence, still it seems essential that its methods meet at least minimal standards of fairness and logical adequacy. It seems incumbent upon the committee, as a representative of the national legislature of a.democratic society, to adhere to standards necessary for the maintenance of a free society. By failing to document the sources of its information, the committee not only performs a disservice to those accused, as well as to the system of government which it represents, it also weakens its own source credi- bility. Since no sources were cited by the HCUA for its allegations against two-thirds of the "hostile" witnesses, there is no way to evaluate the competency, reliability or freedom from prejudice of the sources of evidence. The committee's reasoning, therefore, that all of the "hostile" witnesses were or had been members of the Communist Party must be regarded as highly questionable. Because of the impact of the demonstrations and disturbances among the crowds at the San Francisco City 282 Hall, the second subpoint under the third major pra- position emerged as the most discussed and controversial issue of the hearings. This subpoint-~that the Communists caused the demonstrations and riots at San Francisco-- was introduced as an argument by the committee early on the morning of the third day, apparently because of the fact that the peak of the rioting had occurred on the afternoon of the second day. The committee began to lay the groundwork for the argument by opening up a line of inquiry with Prussian regarding the Communist Party's training of its members in the use of violence: Mr. Arens: Mr. Prussian, give us a word, please, about your experience in the Communist Party in provacatians to violence and assessment of the ensuing violence by the comrades in their conduits of public expression, and what they call police brutality. Mg, Prussian: I attended a meeting of the Industrial Commission of the Communist Party, and at this meet- ing one Nat Ganley stated-- Egg Arens: Was he a comrade? Mr. Prussian: He was a member of the National Com- mittee of the Communist Party at that time. Mg, Arens: .All right, sir. Mg, Prussian: He stated, in essence, as follows: Ganley's speech concerned Packard Motor strike in 193k. 'It is obvious that we are going to lose the strike, but we have shown the effectiveness of the Communist Party in being able to call out all the workers. But in order to bring this strike to a proper conclusion there will have to be violence and bloodshed on the picket line tomorrow morning. Without that, we cannot hope to arouse public interest and support, we cannot hope to embarrass the local government through bitter complaints-- police brutality, and so an.‘ Bloodshed and violence did take place that next morning. 283 1M5, Arens: Was he alluding to bloodshed and violence for the sake of bloodshed and violence, or to obtain an objective, or for propaganda purposes? Mg, Prussian: He called for bloodshed and violence in this instance because he felt that this was an opportunity to arouse the indignation of the citi- zenry against the management and against the govern- ment of the city, and what they later called police brutality, sadism, et cetera, very similar to the provocation that we had here in San Francisco yes- terday 0 Mg, Arens: Based upon your background and experience in the Communist operation, what can be expected in the Communist press and through the Communist channels, and in the form of Communist expressions with respect to the violence which took place here yesterday? .gg, Prussian: The Communist press will carry out a campaign of vilificatian of the Committee an Un- American Activities. They will hurl invectives; they will accuse the city of San Francisco of police brutality, sadism, denial of democratic rights, and a whole series of false accusations will flow from the Communist press and all their agencies, through infiltrated organi- zations, in the interest of the Communist Party. They will get well-known people, professors, mini- sters, and others to sign petitions and protests-- all to embarrass American processes. In spite of Prussian's use of a twenty-six year old personal experience as a means of verifying the Communist Party's methods of training to incite violence, it is clear that he and the HCUA had reasoned fallaciously by using argument from sign: violence is a special tech- nique of the Communists; violence was incited at San Fran- cisco; therefore, the Communists had caused the violence. It is somewhat ironic that such an expert on communism as Prussian was apparently unable to offer any recent examples of the Communist Party's use of violence. 1°7Ibid., pp. 2087-2088. 284 Nevertheless, the committee's assumption that violence is the special peragative of the Communist Party violates the tests of sound cause to effect reasoning, and is therefore unfounded in its application to the San Francisco demonstrations. Prussion's final speech in the quoted testimony above seems calculated to support the committee's usual defensive plea: those who would criticize the committee are un-American because they oppose the HCUA. .As has been indicated in Chapters III and IV of this study, particularly in the discussion of the film "Operation Abolition", the committee, as it had done so often, was again engaging in special pleading. Relying upon Prussion's illogical use of ppgpr ,mppphfpgm,si n, in the testimony quoted above, the committee attempted to prejudice the three law enforce- ment officials--Cahill, Maquire and Carberry--by asking them to provide answers which would support the theory which it was positing. The following examples from the transcript illustrate the HCUA's efforts to acquire evi- dence which would have reinforced its argument that the San Francisco demonstrations had been Communist insti- gated: ,M§, Aggpp: Chief, the gentleman who just preceded you to the stand, Mr. Prussian, served for a number of years as a dedicated Communist and, thereafter, for a number of years as an undercover agent of the 285 Federal Bureau of Investigation, after he had broken from the Communist Party, severed his ideological affinity to the party. He testified, which I can say is just confir- mation of testimony we have received elsewhere, that part of the Communist strategy and technique is to incite violence, part of the Communist tactic is to incite the use of force so that the Communists can, in turn, attempt to turn the tables on the enforce- ment agencies, complain of police brutality, and complain of arbitrary action by the committees such as the Committee on Un-American Activities and the like. I think that is a fair summary of the testimony he just gave. I don't believe you were present in the hearing room at that time. In view of the fact that he said he can now anticipate a turn of tables on the incident of the last day or so, we should like to ask you, sir, as the chief law enforcement officer of the city, to give us a brief account of the orders and directives which you gave to your officers respecting the main- tenance of peace and order here in anticipation of these hearings, and based upon the information which has been reported to you by your subordinates in the course of the last 2# hours, the essence of the posi- tian of the police department here, under your juris- diction, in respect to the incidents in which force was employed in the course of the last several hours. Mr. Cahill: . . . Yesterday morning, the situation — _"'"—"l"- o o o o a was graw1ng in intensity, tension and emotions were running high. There seemed to be no leadership whatever to the group who gathered outside the hear- ing room here in contrast to the student group which was under the control of some leaders who were able to reason with those young people. The group here were infiltrated.with individuals who, in some instances, were older than the average, and who agitated in--- fig, Arens: Were you advised by your subordinates in the security unit that these persons who were older and who were the agitators were persons whom your security officers knew to be members of the Com- munist Party? Mg, Cahill: They told me that a number of those who seemed to whip those people in the grOUp into a mob frenzy, were individuals who had been hostile and who had testified at the hearing. 286 Mg, ens: As hostile witnesses? Mg, ESEIii: Yes. Some of them. Not all of them.108 As Chief Cahill's final statement above reveals, the committee's claim was only partly supportable. Fur- ther doubts about the validity of the committee's argu- ment were raised when Chairman Willis revealed that Cahill's testimony concerning the City Hall demonstra- tions was hearsay: Mg. Willis: . . . Frankly, I only met Chief Cahill yesterday, after the incident he referred to. From information that comes to me and to us, his recita- tion of the incident and the events leading up to the triggering of the unfortunate affair is accurate. That is my understanding; it is our understanding of what occurred. Neither Chief Cahill nor I was around when the actual physical demonstration took place.109 It is significant that the committee did not pursue Cahill's statement, quoted above, that "not all of" the persons who had been observed inciting the crowd were "hostile" witnesses. Perhaps the committee avoided asking the question, "Who were the others who were observed encouraging the crowds to demonstrate?" because the answers which Cahill might have given may have cast further doubt upon the validity of the HCUA's reasoning. Similar question-begging approaches were employed by the committee in its interrogation of Inspector Maguire and Sheriff Carberry. As was illustrated in Chapter IV 108Ibid., pp. 2089-2090. 109Ibid., p. 2090. 287 of this study, the committee learned from Maguire that some of the hostile witnesses had been observed agitating the crowds at City Hall. But, as in the case of Cahill, the committee never asked the Inspector the open-ended question of gpp.he had seen agitating the demonstrators; rather, he was asked only who were the Communists he had observed: Mr. Arens: Did you, in the course of the discharge of'your duties in City Hall, observe the activities among the young people who had been assembled here in the hall, by certain people who were known by you from confidential sources to be members of the Communist Party? (At this point Mr. Johansen left the hearing roam.) Mg, Maguire: Yes, sir. Mg, Arens: Did you see agitational activities among the younger people by Merle Brodsky, who was ejected twice from this committee hearing? _Mg. Maguire: Yes, sir. [M5, Arens: Did you see agitatianal activities among the younger people by Archie Brown, who likewise has been twice ejected from this hearing room because of his disturbances of the proceedings? Mg, Maguire: Yes, sir. M£,.Arens: Did you see among the young people, Frank Wilkinson? _M_r_. Maguire: No, sir; I can't truthfully answer that one. .yg, Arens: Did you know that Frank Wilkinson has been in town in the course of the last several days? M5, Maguire: Yes, sir; we did. up, Arens: Do you know that Frank Wilkinson has been repeatedly identified under oath before this committee as a member of the hardcore of the Communist Party, and that the Committee on Un-American Activities has issued a report entitled 'Operation Abolition' in which it is revealed that Frank Wilkinson has re- sponsibility of the conspiracy to direct the activities of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and of an organization known as the Citizens Committee To Pre- serve American Freedoms, with the avowed objective of the party of discrediting the Committee an Un-American Activities and attempting to discredit the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its great director, J. Edgar Hoover? 288 Mg, Maguire: Yes sir; I do. ‘Mg, Arens: Are you aware of the fact that Harry Bridges, of the International Longsharemen's Union, has arrived in this community and was yesterday participating in the affairs in the hall? Egg uire: I did not observe him participating, but I arrived shortly after he was creating a scene. Mr. Arens: Did you observe Sally Sweet participating ‘— -W'-"—o o o . in agitatianal activ1ties among the young people? Mg, Maguire:\ No, sir; I did not. Mr. Arens: Did you observe Ralph Izard participating W'- -‘1—'—-o a o o in agitatianal activ1ties among the young people? _M_r_. Maguire: No, sir. ‘Mg, Arens: Are there any others whose names come to your mind at the moment whom you know from your security information to be members of the Communist Party who were participating in agitatianal activities among the young people? (At this point Mr. Johansen returned to the hearing room.) £0 agilire: NO, Birollo Likewise, in its session with Sheriff Carberry, the committee continued to indulge in question-begging queries, further illustrating its reliance upon sppcial pleading: Mg, Arens: Sheriff Carberry, this morning while you absent from the hearing room, a former undercover agent of the FBI, serving in the Communist Party, was elucidating an Communist Party techniques and activities. We asked him to speculate what the Communist Party would be doing about the events that occurred, the incidents that occurred, in the last day or so. He said that they would, of course, try to portray police brutality and arbitrary action and the like. Well, that happened here just 30 seconds or so before you took the witness stand. One who has been identified to us--and who would not answer questions, of course--as a Communist, started the technique here of assessing the events of the last day or so against the committee, against the police, against the law enforcement officers, so that they, the Communists, 1101bid., pp. 2091-2092. 289 can portray themselves as martyrs when, in fact, they are conspirators. we would like, therefore, to have on this record, in addition to the sworn testimony of some several moments ago of the chief of police and one of the inspectors, a word from yourself as the sheriff of this country with respect to the incidents of the last 2 days so that those who care to know the facts may, when this record is printed, read the facts.111 as was pointed out in the analysis of the testimony of Maguire and Cahill, the evidence presented by them did not warrant the conclusion which the com- mittee had inferred. Moreover, in spite of the cam- mittee's attempts to lead the three police officials to verbalize the replies that it wanted to hear; namely, that the demonstrations and riots had been Communist inspired, none of the three provided the answers sought by the committee. Rather, the only reliable inference one could make an the basis of the Cahill, Maguire and Carberry testimony is that a few known Communists had been observed agitating the crowds; the evidence which they presented, however, fails to support the conclusion that Communists were solely, or even primarily, respon- sible for the outbursts at City Hall. It is evident that the committee, by dwelling upon the Communist Party as advocates and practitioners of violence, intended to arouse fear among its listeners. Certainly its use of witness Grabor to describe the 1111bid., p. 2101. 290 Hungarian atrocities and its references to the murders committed by the Red Chinese were designed to reinforce the committee's argument that the San Francisco riots had been Communist-led. Although it seems reasonable that the committee's use of emotion probably reinforced the positive responses of its supporters, it seems equally likely that these motive appeals would have evoked a greater degree of hostility and antagonism toward the committee among its unfriendly auditors. Two final illustrations will be discussed in concluding the analysis of the evidence and reasoning employed by the HCUA in its development of the subpoint, that the Communist Party caused the riots during the hearings at San Francisco. Both of the illustrations derive from remarks made by Congressman Scherer; both reveal the committee's habit of reasoning to suit its own ends regardless of the nature and relevance of the evidence. In the first instance, Mr. Scherer assessed the cause of the riots without reference to any evidence during a heated exchange with "hostile" witness Ralph Izard: M5,ié£gp§: Have you been a participant in the inc1tement of the riotous conduct which has been witnessed here in the course of the last 2 or 3 days of our committee sessions? Mr. Izard: I charge this committee with inciting fiat—$7525? happened yesterday. Mr. Arens: I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, E33; the witness now be ordered and directed to answer the question. 291 Mg, Willis: You are directed to answer the question. Mg. Izard: I stand on the first amendment, and I stand on my rights not to be a witness against myself. I charge this committee with guilty responsibility in yesterday's events. M3, Arens: My. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that Will conclude the staff interrogation of this witness. M5. Willis: Mr. Scherer. Mg, Izard: 0h, a fellow Ohioan. ,Mg, Scherer: Have you ever received anything of value, either directly or indirectly, from the Communist apparatus for your known service to the Communist cause? ‘Mg, Izard: The same answer, sir. Mg, Scherer: The fact is, Witness, and I ask you to affirm or deny it, that you are a paid agent of the Communist apparatus in the united States. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) Mg, Izard: The answer remains the same, sir. Mg. Effis: The witness is excused. Mg, Scherer: Now we know how the riots started.112 Finally, in a six page peroration on the final day of the hearings the committee categorically concluded that the rioting at San Francisco had "clearly been planned at the highest Communist levels."113 In develop- ing this argument, the committee ignored the insufficient and conflicting evidence which had been presented during the hearings. Instead, it described the history of the movement to abolish the HCUA without showing any logical relationship between the riots and the movement. Thus, the committee again engaged in special pleading by 112161d., p. 2138. 1131618., p. 2172. 292 utilizing argument m 33112 and argument £1.29. gig}; in a fallacious manner. In spite of evidence to the contrary, particularly that voiced by Cahill, Maguire and Carberry, the following unsupported assertions were proclaimed by Mr. Scherer as spokesman for the committee: Mg, Scherer: As I have said, the violence here in San Francisco was the next step in the Com- munist assault against the committee. It was clearly planned at the highest Communist levels. The demonstrations, the rioting, and the result- ing photographs are wanted for use throughout the world by the Kremlin's propagandists in a deceitful attempt to show that the young people in America are opposed to their Government when it was moving against Communist activities in the United States. Harry Bridges, the notorious head of the Langshormen's Union, was also outside the hear- ing room inciting the mob to move in. It was Harry Bridges who just last year testified before our committee. He had just completed a trip around the world during which be consulted with all top Communist labor leaders in the transpor- tatian field. The hearings clearly established that the purpose of his trip was to bring about an agreement with these Communists in the trans- portation field to act in concert in typing up shipping throughout the world when the word.was given. It was Harry Bridges who called Chiang Kai-shek a "bum" and testified that he would re- fuse to send.war materials to Chiang Kai-shek even though the President of the United States felt that shipment of such material was necessary for the safety and security of this country. In the mob here in San Francisco were five or six other well—known, identified Communists. Among them was Archie Brown, who started the demonstra- tions in the hearing room the day before. Archie Brown, in his own words, is a "top-ranking Communist" and has been "for 20 years." In truth, he is the second-tap Communist in California-~secand only to Mickey Lima. .Also there were Douglas Wachter and Ralph Izard. I am going to tell you about these two in a few minutes. Among the rioters were members of Harry Bridges' Longsharmen's Union. In the forefront were a large 293 segment of the "beatnik" crowd. Of course, a considerable number of students from universities in the Bay Area were here. Mostly they were the victims of this despicable propaganda plat. Chief- ly they had come here only to picket and protest, urged an by the leftwing, pro-Communist, and Com- munist teachers in the Bay Area who hate the Com- mittee on Un-American Activities with an unbelie- vable venom. However, these brave teachers stayed in the cloisters of the classroom while the students, whose minds had been poisoned with hatred and ill- will against the committee, became involved in this well-conceived and well-organized demonstration. Before the Committee on Un-American Activities arrived in San Francisco, meetings had been held to arrange for picketing and demonstrations. Meet- ings were called during the hearings to urge at- tendance and further demonstrations against the committee. Here is a typical excerpt from the Daily Californian, the student publication of the University of California: The Student Committee for Civil Liberties plans to picket the hearings today. It has issued a call for students to attend the rally, and hearings, and suggests that people "laugh out loud" in the hearings when things get ridiculous. Rides for students who want to attend the hearings will leave at 8:15 to 10 a.m. this morning from Stiles Hall. Among the Communist agents who were the principal agitators, and in some cases actual participants in these demonstrations were: Archie Brown, Ralph Izard, Frank Wilkinson, Harry Bridges, Merle Brodsky, Douglas Wachter, and Vernon Bown. It is interesting to note that the hierarchy of the Communist Party-- Archie Brown, Ralph Izard, Frank Wilkinson, Harry Bridges, and Merle Brodsky--was careful to avoid actual violation cf the law. They left that up to the underlings in party ranks. I would like to point out that Vernon Bown, among those arrested, is the same Vernon Bown who was in 195a among the notorious Louisville Seven-- charged at that time with sedition, destruction of property, conspiring to destroy property to achieve a political end, and contempt of court. I say for some of the students involved, that they may not have fully realized that their protests had been organized and directed by a handful of expertly trained Communist agents-~persons who have 294 attended training schools for the specific purpose of learning how to create insurrection, how to incite a riot, how to organize peaceful and nonpeaceful protest, and how to lead and direct sincere innocents to the service of Communist aims. Some developments, as a result of the riots, are shocking. I mention a few of these only to point out the underlying Communist tactic and plan which, when the time comes, could well be used for a major scale riot, insurrection, or open revolution against duly constituted authority.11 The foregoing lengthy quotation also reveals the committee's attempts to develop its third reason under its third main point--that the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are active in the Communist “conspiracy." This subpoint, that the Communist Party has accelerated its drive to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities, closely parallels the previously discussed argument, that the Communist Party caused the riots at the San Francisco hearings. The argument was introduced briefly on the first day of the hearings in the course of the opinion testimony presented by Mrs. Hartle: Mg, Arens: Do they [the Communist Parti] leadership explain in any of the sessions of the comrades, and I say this facetiously, that this committee is after Communists, after conspirators, and that is our sole and exclusive function? Do they make that clear? M55, Hartle: No, they don't make that clear even in the Communist Party, because even there they continue to carry on the line that the efforts of this com- mittee will hurt the other fields more than the Com- munist Party, although I must say that in the higher echelons of the Communist Party the masks are taken off and assignments are made and forces are assigned, and finances are turned over, and a program is laid 11“:bid.. pp. 2172-2173. 295 out, to stop such a committee as this; whereas, across the street, maybe another committee is doing a lot of harm to some other field of some- thing, or apparently doing a lot of harm, and they don't even know about it, much less do any- thing. . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 MM, Ar a: What is t e training and teac ing of the comrades as to how they were to react, what they were to do, in the face of attempts by congressional committees to ferret out Communists and to get the facts? How were they to react toward congressional committees? What were they to do to attempt to enlist people to do their work against congressional committees? Mpg, Hartle: well, the congressional committees such as tElS, the Communist Party has always opposed, no matter what the name was or whether it was in Congress or in a State legislature or whether it was someplace else, in the school system or other places. The Communist Party has always very, very strong- ly campaigned, mobilized, and organized against any attempts to curb the rights of Communists or their activities, or to look into their doings.11 It was not until the third day of the hearings, after the serious provocations had occurred, that the HCUA began to explicate the argument suggested in the above testimony of Mrs. Hartle: Mr. Arens: Can you give us, please, sir a word 'Zbout the techniques of the Communists, in what those of us in this work call provocation to violence? Did you have a training and did you have experience in that type of activity? Mg, Prussian: I had considerable training in provocation to violence. The Communist Party, being, of course, a party of Lenin, believes that it should use legal methods and illegal methods to conclude a certain situation. It uses violence and it uses peaceful methods, either one. The purpose of the Communist Party is to raise what it calls the class-conscious level of the llslbido, PP. 1958-1590 296 working class, and it is its purpose to educate the working class through incidents such as we had here yesterday, in methods and techniques of class struggle. I believe that all of those present here yesterday witnessed a technique commonly used by the Communist Party. Mg, Arens: Do the Communists in the attainment of goals actually desire to see strife, actually desire to see bloodshed? MM, Prussian: In this particular situation, as we are experiencing it in the last few days, the Com- munist Party has tried every possible peaceful me- thod, through petition, organization meetings, and so forth, to stop the hearings of the Committee on Un-American Activities. In this they have failed and, as a result, they resorted to this spectacle that many witnessed here, of trying to close the hearings of a legally can- stituted body of our Government through force and violence, such as demonstrated by their leader yesterday, Archie Brown. [M5, Arens: Now, sir, during the course of your training and your experience in the Communist Party, did you receive any instructions, any pattern of activity, which the comrades were to use with re- ference to the Committee on Unquerican Activities, and what, in general, was and is the objective of the conspiracy toward this committee? ME, Prussian: Well, at all times one of the major targets, and at this time, of course, the major target of the Communist Party, is the Committee on Uh-American Activities, because the committee, they feel, is the biggest stumbling block that they have at this time in their effort to break out in a full- fledged Communist operation of peaceful methods and violent methods in their efforts to overthrow our Government by force and vialence.11 As was true in its development of the argument that the riots had been communist-instigated, the com- mittee did not offer sufficient evidence to show that the demonstrations at the City Hall had been executed by Communists and pro-Communists as a carefully calculated 115Ibid., pp. 2085-2086. 297 part of the movement to abolish the committee. Logically, since the evidence provided by the Cahill, Maguire and Carberry testimony was inadequate to warrant the conclusion that the riots had been caused by the Communist Party, then the committee also lacked necessary evidence on which to base the inference that the demonstrations reflected an accelerated drive by the Communists to abolish it. Recognizing the fact that the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee had, as has been discussed in Chapter III of this study, endeavored to have the HCUA abolished in the years prior to the May, 1960, hearings, it is rea~ sonable to assume that because the ECLC made such attempts prior to 1960 does not therefore prove that it was the cause of the provocations at San Francisco. Such argument from sign as that regarding the alleged role of the ECLC in the San Francisco riots was posited by the committee without any citation of viable evidence: M5, Scherer: Now, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee has a high-sounding name. Unfortunately the great majority of Americans and some Members of Congress are not aware of the nature of this organi- zation. So that we may better evaluate and under- stand what it says and does, let me tell you about the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. Both the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the House Committee on Un-American Activities, as well as J. Edgar Hoover in his book, 'Masters of Deceit,‘ have found this outfit to be Communist- cantralled and Communist-dominated. Its present chairman, Harvey O'Connor, is an identified Com- munist, presently underindictment for contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions concern- ing his Communist activities. One of the moving forces of the committee is Frank Wilkinson, also an identified Communist, who 298 has been convicted and sentenced and whose case is now on appeal for contempt in refusing to answer questions about his connections with the Communist conspiratorial apparatus. Wilkinson has a long record of service to the Communist cause and is the coordinator of the effort to bring about the aboli- tion of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Frank Wilkinson has been here at City Hall partici- pating in these demonstrations. The majority of the members of the national coun- cil of this organization have long records of service to Communist and Communist-front causes. These re- cords of service are set forth in detail in the House Committee on Un-American Activities report entitled 'Operation Abolition.‘ Now let's take a look at what the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, with the help of others, has done in these two and a half years which finally resulted in this 'ugly American' insurrection in San Francisco. At first the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee sent its paid hirelings, Clark Foreman and the no- torious Frank Wilkinson, into the cities where the committee held its hearings. Clark Foreman, in particular, met in advance of the hearings with iden- tified Communists who had been subpoenaed to testify before the committee. Witnesses were instructed how to avoid answering questions of the committee by making long, Communist propaganda speeches. They were told how to bait, vilify, and harass members and counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities. Subsequently, the Emergency Civil Liberties Com- mittee grew bolder in its attempt to disrupt the hear- ings of the Committee on UnaAmerican Activities. ECLC sent its people into the cities where hearings were to be held a week or more in advance of the hearings. They drafted petitions against the committee in which the work and objectives of the committee were com- pletely misrepresented. Signatures to these petitions were obtained from well-meaning and some not so well- meaning citizens of the community. ECLC saw that advertisements bitterly attacking the committee were placed in local newspapers. Of course, these 'disci- ples of discard' did not disclose to the people of the community the fact that the Emergency Civil Li- berties Committee was a Communist-dominated and con- trolled organization. 299 In February of this year, the Committee on Un- American Activities was holding hearings in Washington. During these hearings it was shown how the distur- bances and riots that took place at the Seventy World Youth Festival in Vienna last year resulted largely from the fact that the heads of many of the delega- tions to that festival were not youths but hardcore 40-to-60 year old members of the Communist apparatus. For the Washington hearings the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee developed still another technique. Supposedly spontaneously, there sprang up an organi- zation called Youth Against the House Uh-American Activities Committee to protest our hearings on the Vienna Youth Festival. We were charged with investi- gating youth and interfering with the free expression of youth, when all we were trying to show was that some of the delegations had no free expression be- cause of their being Communist-dominated and controlled by agents of the Kremlin. Some of the leftwing press cried crocodile tears for the young people who des- cended on Washington. This youth organization against the Committee on Un-American Activities was represented in the hearing room in Washington by some 200 young people who were supposedly representative of American youth generally. I wish you could have seen the dis- reputable array of characters who were supposed to be a cross section of American youth. The February hearings in Washington were a dis- graceful, deceitful exploitation of youth by the Com- munist apparatus in an attempt to further discredit and destroy the Committee on Unquerican Activities and to furnish grist for thi Soviet propaganda ma- chine throughout the world. 1 The speech of advocacy quoted above represents distorted logic because it does not show necessary cause- to-effect relationships. First, the causal linkage between the happenings at San Francisco in May, 1960, and the his- tory of the ECLC movement to abolish the HCUA is unsub- stantiated; second, Inspector Maguire's testimony during the hearings does not provide support for the assertion 117Ibid., pp. 2169-2172. 300 that Frank Wilkinson participated in the riots; third, the committee's description of the various hearings which it had conducted prior to the San Francisco sessions does not,,pgpdgg, prove that the same causitive factors were at work at San Francisco in May, 1960; and, fourth, the wealth of conflicting data which indicated that the causes of the riots at San Francisco had been multiple in origin were ignored by the committee.1-18 Once again, the com- mittee's tendency to perceive only those reasons which support its position illustrates its reliance Upon special pleading. The fourth and final subpoint which the committee utilized as a means of showing that the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are "nu-American" consisted of a mixture of assertion, example, narrative and suggestion. Probably the most pronounced method of support which the committee used in support of its subpoint that the Communists are making a mockery of the United States Constitution resulted from its treatment of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses as examples. Thirty-four of the thirty-six "hostile" witnesses, as indicated previously, refused to answer questions put to them by relying upon their Constitutional safeguards, particularly by citing claims under the self- incriminatian clause Of the fifth amendment. 118See pp. 83 to 99 in Chapter III of this study for a discussion of the causative factors which contributed to the San Francisco riots. 301 One cannot study the hearing transcript without arriving at the conclusion that the HCUA was well aware of the stigma usually attributed to congressional com- mittee witnesses who "take the fifth." A witness has the legal right to decline to answer questions asked of him by a congressional committee by seeking the protec- tion afforded him by the fifth amendment; this he may do if, by testifying, he may "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution"119 against himself. The types of questions which a witness may refuse to ans- wer on the basis of his claims of protection under the fifth amendment may include such seemingly innocuous questions as "Where do you live?"120 Thus, although the legal questions have been settled regarding the appli- cation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the repercussions caused by the witness who "takes the fifth" continue to provoke controversy. Inasmuch as many of the "hostile" witnesses at San Francisco declined to answer even innocuous questions like "Where are you living?", the HCUA probably aroused serious doubts in the minds of many of its listeners (both 1'19For a lucid discussion of the fifth amendment and its implications for witnesses at congressional hearings see Chapter 5 of Fellman's The Defendant's Rights, pp. 154- 185. 120$ee Chapter 12 of Goodman's The Committee, pp. 351-366. 302 among those at the hearings and those who were viewing the proceedings on television) as to the innocence of the "unfriendly" witnesses. The impact of the committee's repeatedly used technique of asking the "hostile" witnesses questions to which it seemingly expected no answer other than "I decline to answer on the grounds that I might incriminate myself," was heightened by the committee's strong suggestion that those who plead the fifth amendment do so at the behest of the Communist Party: Mg, Arens: We occasionally have this experience, Mrs. Hartle. We will subpoena a person who has been identified to us by competent intelligence sources as a member of the conspiracy, engaged in conspira- torial operations on American soil. In the course of the interrogation, we will say, 'Are you now a member of the Communist Party?‘ and with great indig- nation he says, 'No.’ Then we say, 'Were you a mem- ber of the Communist Party any time since the sub- poena was served upon you?‘ and he invokes constitu- tional guarantees. Is there a technique by the conspirators to resign technical membership even in the formal entity known as the Communist Party in order to avoid the impact of the work of this congressional committee? 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C C C O 0 Mr. Arens: I announce again for this record that the purpose of these questions is to test the good faith of the witness. The reason why we test the good faith of the witness is that we have abundant evidence that persons who are Communists, who have been identified as Communists, who operate in the Communist Party have no regard whatsoever for the truth and are under in- structions of the conspiracy to lie to congressional committees.12 The foregoing kinds of statements laid the ground- work far the committee to pursue another verbal route as 121San Francisco Hearings, pp. 1961 and 2011. 303 a means of making its point: that the Communists (in the personages of the recalcitrant witnesses) are making a mockery of the Constitution of the United States. This technique consisted of explicating the legal consequences and meanings of the Fifth Amendment, and thereby strongly implying that if the witness were not guilty and therefore liable to criminal prosecution he would have answered the committee's question. The following exchange illustrates the committee's use of this method: Mr. Arens: With that explanation, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest the witness now be ordered and directed to answer the principal outstanding ques- tion, namely: Are you now a member of the Communist Party? Mr. Willis: Yes; I order you to answer the ques- tion, sir, because you have not invoked-~you have only invoked the first amendment of the Constitu- tion. You have a lawyer, and a.right to act on his advice, if you want to. But as chairman, I will tell you that in our opinion your position at this time is not justified and I order you to answer the question. (The witness conferred with his counsel.) Mr. Wachter: I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated, and I also respect- fully refuse to answer that question on the consti- tutional grounds that I cannot be forced to bear witness against myself. Mr. Arens: Do you honestly apprehend, young man, that if you told this committee whether or not you are presently a.member of the Communist Party, you would be giving information that might be used against you in a criminal proceeding? I advise you that if you honestly apprehend that you would be giving information that could be used against you in a criminal proceeding, you have a right, under the Constitution, to invoke the provision $3 the fifth amendment against self- incrimination. 1221bid., pp. 1968-1969. 3OA Variations of the above technique were used by the HCUA in its interrogation of the "hostile" witnesses at San Francisco a total of nineteen times. None of the "hostile" witnesses modified his or her initial refusal to answer the committee's question, in spite of the additional verbal lever provided by the committee. Thus, in one sense, by negative evidence-~those who took the Fifth implied that they were guilty of being members of the Communist Party-- the committee was able to make a fairly convincing case for its subpoint. It seems probable that the hostile members of the committee's audience were given cause for deeper resentment toward the HCUA because of the method of development of this argument-~that the "hostile" witnesses and their com- rades are "unnAmerican, but that the politically conserva- tive element were provided with motivation to cheer the HCUA for the soundness of its argument. The appeals to patriotism and preservation implied by such an argument as this doubtless evoked similarly corresponding responses from the two audiences, the hostile and the friendly. Consideration of the fourth and final proposition offered by the HCUA as part of the rationale undergirding its central idea will conclude the analysis of the com- mittee's choice of evidence and its use of the reasoning process. The final main point posited by the committee in its San Francisco speech was: the Communist Party is 305 recruiting larger numbers of non-Communist "dupes" and "suckers" to do "its dirty work." Two subpoints were developed by the committee as the means by which to sub~ stantiate the argument: (1) the Communist Party recruited and manipulated those who participated in the San Francisco riots; and (2) the Communist cause is being served, con- sciously or unconsciously, by those who encourage coopera- tion with the Soviet Union. A.number of the materials of development employed by the committee to corroborate its contention that the San Francisco riots had been Communist-instigated over- lapped with those applied as support for the argument that the Communist Party had recruited and manipulated those who had participated in the provocations at City Hall. Inasmuch as the committee was logically unsuccessful in its efforts to develop its argument that the riots had been Communist inspired, it follows then that its logically related point that the Communist Party had recruited and manipulated those who participated in the riots also was lacking in adequate substantiation. The fact that the courts acquitted all sixty-eight persons who had been arrested for their alleged roles in fomenting the riots served to refute the committee's claim. Moreover, the committee again weakened its own argument because it again based its reasoning upon invalid argument from cause and 306 §_g2, Two illustrations from the hearing transcript will suffice to show the committee's apparent disregard for reliable evidence, properly documented, on which to base valid inferences: ME, Arens: I have just been advised by one of our staff members that there is a demonstration going on right around this building against this committee by people-- Mp, Willis: That will not be tolerated, that applause from the audience. Mg, Arens: --by people who have been enlisted by the Communists in response to the propaganda which they have received respecting this committee. Is that the technique which you see revealed in the propa- ganda.which you have displayed to this committee today? 0 O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O 0 ME, Arens: These comrades who have been working here With these youngsters, these young people who have been picketing here and causing the commotion, did the comrades make it plain to these youngsters that they are comrades, that they are part of a conspiratorial force and are using these youngsters for their ultimate ob- jectives? 23 Many other examples from the hearing transcript have been cited throughout this chapter which corroborate the committee's habit of asserting without offering proof to back up the assertions. The two examples quoted above are representative of the twenty-three separate sets of assertions which the committee offered as support for its argument that the Communist Party had recruited and manipulated those who had participated in the riots which broke out at the site of the hearings. No changes in the committee's argumentative 1231618.. pp. 19u9 and 2037. I C -..—...” 307 behavior can be discerned in its treatment of the fore- going argument. As with its development of other arguments which have already been discussed, the HCUA continued to overlook the complex of causative factors which ignited the San Francisco situation. Instead, it persisted in its adherence to the fallacy of spgcial pleading by pointing its finger at the Communists as the single cause of the riots. In its efforts to establish the second point under its fourth major contention, the committee moved even fur- ther into the realm of speculation and conjecture, and by so doing, it made even fewer attempts to incorporate empirical data as a means of giving greater credence to its argument. By implication, the committee's argument that the Communist cause is being served by those Americans who encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union indicated a large number of patriotic citizens including a large group of the HCUA subcommittee members' colleagues. For, as the committee theorized, any.American who would support a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union is, consciously or unconsciously, contributing to the Communist cause.lzu In a similar vein, the committee's assertions make it difficult not to include most Americans who believe in any form of social justice in the category of Communist 124Ibid.’ see pp. 1959-1960. -__- _- ...—._—— _—-— 308 "dupes" or "suckers," if one agrees with those assertions. The committee suggests, for instance, that organizations which actively agitate for nuclear disarmament or equality for the Negro are suspect because these are goals sought by the Communist Party.125 None of the foregoing asser- tions, however, are supported by reliable evidence.126 The following excerpt from the hearing transcript is typical of the committee's speculative arguments which (I) do not logically support its central idea, (2) do not contain adequate and reliable proof, and (3) imply that persons of a liberal political persuasion are "dupes" of the Com- munists: Mpg, Hartle: The way the Communist Party oper- ates the united front is to have Communists lead and influence non-Communists. A very simple example is to have a Communist Party member have a petition which says, 'I would like to see that there will be no more atomic bomb explosions,’ such as the Stockholm Peace Appeal was at one time. That member takes it out to his church, his PTA, or his neighborhood, or to friends and relatives, and says 'Don't you think this is a splendid idea, that there will be no more atomic explosions? We will call upon our government not to have any more atomic explosions of any kind.’ The person will probably say 'Yes.‘ They know them and halfway trust them and don't pay much attention to it, so they sign it. Some- times they don't even look at it. Sometimes they get the same persons two or three times. I think the committee might look those petitions 125Ibid., pp. 1958 and 1960. 126Ibid., for other examples see pp. 1973-1975; 2036-2037; “—9200 and 2053. 309 over sometimes. The same person will sign them more than once, if you happen to check into them. Then that petition is sent in. Then later on an organization is formed and these people are contacted to be in the organization. It goes on that it is a peace organization. Then all of a sudden along comes the House Un- American Activities Col-ittee and says, 'Well, there is a Co-unist in this organization,‘ and the Co—unists say, 'Look, they are trying to wreck- our peace organization.‘ So these people get mad because they are try to wreak the peace organisation, and that s the way they get {27 dupes inn-in just the simplest way or form. From the standpoint of persuasiveness, the com- mittee's primary objective at the San Francisco hearings, its fourth major proposition seemed the most ill-conceived of all of its arguents. It is reasonable to seems that the fourth point-«the "hostile" witnesses and their comrades are ”unnAmsrican“-probably was perceived by the hostile segment of the ce-ittee's audience at San Francisco as a direct attack on them. If this were the case, then the co-ittee's image among its large group of unfriendly listeners probably diminished to an all-time low level. By the same token, the ministers and DAR members who were present in the hearing room responded to the fourth major proposition with praise and admiration. The following excerpts from a letter which was drafted by several ministers who had attended the hearings as invited guests of the HCUA reveal the heights to which the 127Ibid., p. 1960. 310 committee's source credibility rose among some of its more enthusiastic supporters: What we witnessed was utterly fantastic. The shameful demonstration against law and order and against this duly constituted committee of the Congress defies description. We sat in the rear of the room on a raised platform where we could easily observe the proceedings, right in the midst of the student demonstrators. We studied the crowd carefully for hours and could easily discern which were the masterminds of the mob riots. It is our certain conviction that this indefensible demonstration against law and order was conceived, planned, and directed by a few hard-core Communist agitators who were carrying out their textbook orders on insurrection with classic success. Leaders of the mob included faculty members and well-known leftist lawyers for the fifth-amendment Communists. O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The height of their devilish hypocrisy was reached when they had the consummate nerve to profane the national anthem by singing it at the peak of their demonstration, and giving expres- sion to their treasonable delight by singing 'Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory of the Coming of the Lord.‘ The depth of their deceit was reached when this mob element put their hand over their heart and pledged allegiance to the flag. We shall never forget the hisses and boos that greeted Mr. Arens when he first mentioned the name of God in connection with one who broke from the party. we are at a loss to understand how clergyman, such as Bishop James Pike, could give any aid and comfort to this lawless kind of activity by state- ments deriding the committee, and by allowing his assistanfzpastor to address one of their despicable rallies. .As the foregoing excerpt indicates, the committee's speaking at San Francisco was appreciated by the conservative element among the committee's audiences. 128Ibid., pp. 2175-2176; the letter was included in the hearing record as "additional remarks" by Congressman Scherer. 311 Viewed in total, the argumentative methods employed by the HCUA to develop its four point speech of advocacy at San Francisco in May, 1960, violate many of the princi- ples of sound speech communication. The committee, first of all, failed to develop lines of thought which logically supported its central idea-~that the threat of the Communist conspiracy to the internal security of the United States is greater than ever before. Its arguments, rather than demonstrating that dangerous Communist conspiracies existed which threatened the security of the nation, were essen- tially speculative and theoretical. Except for its ques- tionable attempts to blame the Communist Party for causing the San Francisco riots, the committee failed to focus upon the existence of subversive activities in the United States. Second, the committee exercised a kind of logical analysis that can best be described as "simplistic": the application of simple solutions to complex problems. In fact, it tended to ignore the important assumption that the problems posed by communism and subversion are complex. Third, the committee committed hundreds of fallacies of logical construction, including special pleading, use of inadequate and irrelevant evidence, and reasoning based upon improper use of argument _f_r_o.pl pigp Mpg argument £122 EEEEE: §£1Lg,-~In their discussion of style, Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell wisely caution that "to speak effectively, we 312 must choose our words according to all the nuances of meaning they convey, the subtle shades of feeling they carry to the listener."129 Moreover. they further clarify the functional meaning-of style by pointing out that style is more than a matter of choosing the best words to convey our meanings. We must con- sider not only the words themselves but the way we put them to ether in sentences and paragraphs. It is the comb tion of choosing single words, constructing sentences of these words, and build- ing paragraphs of these sentences that makes the style of one parson different from that of an- other. o o o1 Given that the written transcript of the San Fran- cisco hearings provides the basis for the writer's per- ceptions , it should be acknowledged that this analysis of the co-ittee's style must necessarily be conjectural. Perceptions of the £22. qualities of the co-ittee's speaking as received through the eyes cannot evoke as accurate judgments as would he the case if the speech had been received aurally. Recognising the aforementioned limitations, as well as the principle that “it is impos- sible to lay down strict rules to govern style for all occasions and all circnstances,”ul the oo-ittee's speaking style will now be examined in the light of acceptable criteria. These criteria involve the rendering A_‘ 1 l’2gllance, Ralph, and Wiksell, gincgpgep 9; M- g. 9. 1‘2. mime- 131 LEI-.9." p. 137- “0-“- 313 of judgments regarding the quality of four rather impre- cise characteristics: clarity, forcefulness, vividness, and adaptability.132 Analysis of the speaking style utilised by the HCUA at San Francisco presupposes that style is inextri- cably interrelated with other rhetorical elements: 3529;, thought, evidence, arrangement, and reasoning. In fact, style-«which is the language or symbol system-"is the vehicle by which all the other speech variables are made manifest. In a similar sense, the four characteristics or qualities of style-«clarity, forcefulness, vividness. and adaptability-«re functionally interrelated. Therefore, they must be considered as variables which interact to- gether as ”one of the vital parts of the entire process of co.unicating."1'33 Ernination of the hearing transcript, as the amorous quotations included in this study , suggest. reveals that probably ninety per cent of the lnguage consists of relatively simple, direct, colloquial words. Moreover, closer study of the hearing record reveals that the pre- dominantly simple language is arranged to form sentences and paragraphs which divide almost equally into simple and — A. AALA ..A.._ 132 ., For a concise and useful discussion of style in are co-unication see Chapter II. 13313;. . p. 192. u“..- -'*. H m ”d 31h complex combinations. For example. the interrogative method inherent in the conduct of the hearings results in constructions which are both simple and complex, as the quoted segments cited in this study so indicate. The range of language and sentence complexity varied from the direct , "Where were you born?” to involved combinations like the following: %. Are : The thing I want to be certain of is t at t record reflects facts which make it clear to anyone of honest intentions that our objective here is to get the cold, hard facts from one who is under oath and who can describe procedures which cause you, as an honest indivi- dual, to know that the identifications which you will be shortly revealing are of persons who, to your certain knowledge, are not suspected because of political belief or political associa- tion or any other association, but known to a certainty by you to be hardcore conspirators. . Chairman, I respectfully suggest *at-ifihis witness is in truth and in fact attempting to answer on constitutional grounds, she should be permitted to do so. but if.on the other hand, she is going to ive another Co-unist Party speech I think t is quite proper that she be denied the opportunity to use this co-ittee as a for. for that purpose. 134 be two statements above, although complex in structure. seem to be reasonably clear. Although the com- mittee frequently employed lengthy, complex sentences, only a modest number of them appear to be lacking in clarity because of poor word choice and/or awkward syntax. In “Hug" pp. 201.0 and 2113. 315 and of themselves, without regard to any of the other rhetorical factors, then one could fairly describe the com- mittee's style as generally clear. Such an assessment seems valid even in spite of the eo-ittee' a frequent use of com- plex and complex-compound sentences, if it can be assumed that the co-ittee possessed adequate oral co-unication skills. In addition, the fact that the transcript reveals that the co-ittee was exceptionally redundant during the hearings increases the probability that its clarity was enhanced during the course of its presentation. When, however, the other three variables-«forcefulness. vividness. and adaptability-«are brought into play the question as to the degree of clarity of the co-ittee's style takes on different dimensions. For ex-ple, granting the desirability of a speaking style which, to be effective, reflects appropriate qualities of forcefulness and vividness. it must also be granted that the nature of the audience and the occasion must largely determine what constitutes appro- priate forcefulness and vividness. It seems highly probable that the co-ittee's extensive use of forceful, vivid language served to reinforce the attitudes already held by the various segments of the audience, including those present at the hearings and those who received the hearings via television or the written word. For exnple, the following excerpts probably evoked favorable 316 responses from the partisan hearers and negative responses from those who opposed the co-ittee and its ideas: Mr. Area: Is it your design and your intention, Eter you are relieved from the pains and pen- alties of perjury, released by this collsittee frm your subpena, to return to the 8th Congres- sional District Democratic Council and say to those good people of that legitimate political organization, 'Of course I am not a member of the Co-unist Party, but I wasn't going to tell that witch-hunt , Fascist, Red-baiting, Con- stitution-destroy Co-ittee on Unquerican Activities that I was or was not a member of the Columnist Party'? OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO... l_l_r_. Arenp: When this co-ittee pursues a Com- munist, say, a schoolteacher, the comrades and those suckers in front of the comrades and those who they have duped say we are investiga- ting education. When this cos-ittee pursues a hardcore Co-unist in a labor organization, the comrades and the suckers and those they can condition in front of the suckers, put up the cry that we are investigating labor. When this cmittee pursues a Con-unist conspirator in any area of our society, the comrades, those in front of the comrades and the suckers in front of those, start the one cry, and they are successful in conditfsging the minds of a great masher of people. Given that the HCUA intended to change the attitudes or beliefs of those who opposed its position, then it should have exercised more discriminating judgment by moderating its choice and treatment of language. However, if the co-ittee merely wanted to further antagonize the large tit-bers of already hostile listeners among its mixed audience. than it probably succeeded in doing so. At the same time, its strongly biased or one-sided argmentative 13515Ld,, pp. 21u0; 1958-1959. '- 317 treatments probably evoked positive reactions from the partisan auditors both at San Francisco and throughout the country. It therefore appears likely that the com- mittee's clarity at least .ong its hostile listeners was largely nullified because of its failure to tone down its use of language, and thereby adopt a conciliatory approach which may'have induced its hostile audience to become some- what receptive to its ideas. If “persuasion and style . . . are inseparably re- lated,“37 then the House Co-ittee on Ua-American Activities exercised poor judgment in its failure to recognise that highly charged, emotional language usually ‘ serves to rein- force the negative attitudes and feelings among hostile listeners .138 The high degree of frequency with which the co-ittee forcefully and vividly employed highly charged language suggests that either it had ignored or had badly misjudged the temper of its i-ediate audience and occasion at 8n Francisco in 1960. As the extensively quoted material from the hearing transcript reveals . the co-ittee repeatedly utilised language which seemed calculated to antagonize those hearers who were opposed to it. Labels such as "dupes,” ad "suckers.” since they were directed toward non-Co-mist 193 l-37Bance, Ralph, and Wiksell, Principle! 2; W Po o 1381bid,. p. 119. 'u— a—~ -——-— . ..__. 318 opponents of the co-ittee who were present at the bear-- ings, could hardly be expected to engender any degree of receptivity among the hostile listeners, let alone any measure of good will. Style. as with other rhetorical elements, finally must be appraised in terms of its contribution to the com- mittee's efforts to adapt its ideas to the ideas of its audience. ‘- The foregoing malysis points up the consistency of the co-ittee's speech practices at San Francisco. .In so doing, ‘ it reveals that style, like its rhetorical counter- parts of thought , evidence , arrangement and reasoning, was inappropriate in the light of the large group of hostile listeners contained in the co-ittee's total audience. The co-ittee’s style, although seemingly clear on its face, was ill-adapted to the hostile segment of both the present and absent audience. H In an, the HCUA's speaking style. while it probably reinforced the already favorable attitudes and opinions of those who supported the co-ittee, was inappropriate to the substantial group of hostile listeners. It seems reasonable to conclude. therefore. that although the co-ittee's infl-atory speaking style at San Francisco in May, 1960, probably was effective for its partisan auditors, it con-i- tributed little, if anything, to the enhancement of its source credibility .ong its hostile listeners, and thereby 319 seriously hampered its persuasive efforts with that group. mega-uh the final section in this chapter. the speaking of the House Co-ittee on lie-American Activities at San Francisco in May, 1960, will be appraised in the light of a sound code of ethics for oral co-unicators in a free society. The ethical standards against which the speech behaviors of the co-ittee will be evaluated are those endorsed by Hance, Ralph, ad Wiksell, and which are drawn from the analysis by Professor Karl Wallace whose stndards are derived from ”the public character of public uttermce in a free society”;39 The rhetorical practices of the co-ittee, as manifested in its speech of advocacy at San Francisco will be assessed by determining to what extent, if any, they measure up to the four standards out- mud 1:: seem; as. maps 1. The speaker must be worthy of the respect that he wants from his listeners as he speaks. He must be well prepared. The theses and judgments he believes to be valid must be products of careful preparation and of thought based upon the highest principles of logic. He must be worth listening to. 2. He must present facts and opinions accura- ately, with care and respect for the raw materials of his discourse and for the foundations under- lying his reaso 3. He must reveal the sources of his infor- mation. He must tell his listeners what person. institutions, and motivations provide the back- ground for his message whether the sources be sources of fact and o n or sources of inspira- tion (purposes, goals, values). 1398» Wallace' a "An Ethical Basis of Conunication," Th_e_ Saech Teachep, IV (January, 1955). PP. 6-8. 320 11. He just welcome dissent. He must recog- nize not only the existence of other opinions, but their value fo-“r tutfifi' his own judgments, even to the extent of taking the steps necessary to assure this testing.“‘0 Based upon the findings contained in this study of the co-ittee's speaking at San Francisco. it is fair to conclude that the co-ittee failed to adhere to the above code of ethics. In the first place, the co-ittee violated the first of the four ethical standards because it did not make itself worthy of the respect it sought from its lis- teners. As has been shown in the analysis both of the dialectical ad rhetorical methods employed by the HCUA at San Francisco, the co-ittee's major thesis (that the Co-unist Party is a greater threat to the internal security of the United States than ever before) was not valid. Moreover, the fact that the co-ittee's claim that it was conducting an investigation for the purpose of obtaining factual data in order to assist Congress in frning needed legislation was a cover-up for its persua- sive designs is contrary to those standards of huan behavior which warrant respect. Finally, in regard to the co-ittee's inability to abide by this first ethical cri- terion, the analysis undertaken in this study clearly demonstrates that it did not develop lines of thought which were based upon the highest principles of logic. 1h 1-“°Hance, Ralph, and Wiksell. W 2.3. m Po 0 321 Considering the co-ittec's lack of care and pro- cision in its choice and treatment of its materials of epeaking, it must also be judged as having failed to live up to the second of the ethical standards cited previously. The failure of the mm to present facts and opinions accurately, its failure to substantiate arguents with sufficient and reliable proof, and its failure to ground its arguentstive discourse in sound principles of cause- to-effect reasoning represents practices which fall short of any sound code of ethics for speaking. It is in the application of standards three and four of the ethical code that the co-ittee's most glaring violations of sound principles of responsible co-unication in a free society are revealed. The co-ittea, for example, by its deliberate concealment of most of its sources of information and by its specious methods of establishing the source credibility of its ”friendly” witnesses, demonstrated little regard for the values essential to the maintenance of the democratic society which it represents. In like manner, the man's persistent use of spec ial pleading as an argumentative technique during the 1960 hearings clearly reflects its unwillingness even to recognize the existence of evidence and opinions which tend to refute those which it espouses. Analysis of the com- mittee's speaking, moreover, lends further credence to the 322 frequently uttered criticism that the co-ittee's objective has always been to squelch dissent. The co-ittee's habit of implying or stating that those who oppose it or its ideas or methods in any way are Co-unists, Go-unist sympathizers, or dupes and suckers of the Comist Party, convincingly illustrates that it ignores and resents dissent rather than welcomes it. In sway, the evidence provided by the analysis of the speaking of the acne at San Prmcisco in May, 1960, compellingly reveals that the co-ittee seemingly did not adhere to a sound code of ethics for oral conunication. Ironically, the verbal behaviors of the co-ittee at San Francisco reflect the co-unication practices of those totalitarian societies from which it purports to be attempting to save the people of the United States. The threats which such irresponsible behaviors pose to a free society can be countered only by strict adherence to a code of ethics which is ”grounded in the public character of public utterance in a free society.”u‘1 For, as Professor Wallace stresses: 51‘3:‘éh2t°173§i°:§3nfi :32: 532331.35 {2°32 sole source of argunent and information. His hear- ers know this fact, and they defer to him. He in turn must defer to them. Second, the co-unicator who respects the democratic way of life must select and present fact and opinion 6 1‘1Wallsce, "An lthi: al Basis of Conunication,” Po 0 323 fairly. . . . He must, therefore, be accurate in reporting fact and opinion; he must respect accurac . . . . Third, the communicator who eves in the ultinate values of democracy will invariably reveal the sources of his information and opinion. o o o 0.. 00...... O .... A cos-unicator, moreover, will help his hearers to weigh any special bias, prejudice, and pri- vate activations which are inherent in source materials. . . . Fourth, a co—unicator in a democratic society will acknowledge and “it respect diversity of argument and opinion. 2 lhglhigpo PF. 5'3. WV]: SWY AND MCI-WINS 922:: The purpose of this case study has been to analyze the public hearings on conunisn conducted by the House Co-ittee on Unquerican Activities at San hancisco in May, 1960, in the light of acceptable standards of dia- lectical and rhetorical criticisn. a large part of the motivation for undertaking this study of the highly con- troversial House Genittee on Ihnhmerican Activities derived from the writer's desire to determine the degree of validity of the frequently voiced critici- which has been directed fundnentally at the co-ittee's investiga- tory and hearing methods and techniques. An objective exninati‘on of the official hearing transcript utilizing the historical-critical method of research seemed the most appropriate way to approach the 1960 San Francisco hearings as an oral conunication situation. were the co-ittee hearings at San hanc‘isco in 1960 dialectic? The definition of dialectic stated in Chapter 1 1.: Dialectic 1. . method of logical inquiry for the pursuit of truth, involving the principle of 324 325 opposition and relying upon the technique of question and answer in speculative discussion. Analysis of these hear- ings reveals that they do not contain the five essential elements of dialectic in that: (l) the hearings were narked by extensive use of fallacious reasoning based upon misinterpreted evidence which resulted in the develcpent of frequent irrational lines of arguent and cone lusions: (2) the hearings were not, in spite of frequent statements to the contrary, a truth-seeking instruent relative to the existing state of Win Party activity in the Northern District of California and the probable effects of instituting particular legislative provisions; (3) the hearings were not a rational exploration of competing ideas presented by the witnesses who appeared before the com- mittee; (h) the hearings were developed primarily through the use of an ineffectual interrogative method, the asking of inappropriate questions by the co-ittee which elicited few relevant and/or rational answers from the forty-six witnesses; and (5) the hearings generally were an imprecise and irrelevant speculative discussion having little per- tinence to the formulation of legislative solutions to any probleas which may be created by any subversive acti- vities of the Mist Party in the Mited States. Were the congressional hearings at San Francisco rhetoric? Rhetoric, as defined in Chapter V, is: the art 326 of purposive persuasive communication, involving the discovery of relevant materials, the adaptation of materials to an audience, and the composition and delivery of speech. The hearings were a process of advocacy through persuasive co-unication, in that the hearings represent a conscious attempt by the co-ittee to persuade its inediate audience and the American public that commisn is a greater threat to the internal security of the United States than ever before. Analysis of these hearings reveals that the House Co-ittee on tin-American Activities demonstrated poor judg- ment «and craftsmanship in the development of its persuasive speech. Because of the controversial image which preceded its arrival in San Francisco in Kay, 1960, the cosmittee's speakinghas been examined in terms of its probable impact upon the co-ittee's source credibility. Thus, the various rhetorical elements have been analysed 'with a view to deter- mining to what extent, if any, they contributed to the enhancement or diminution of the co-ittee ' s 2532;. Analysis of the hearings reveals that, given the co-ittee's decision to play advocate (a decision which went undeclared) it probably_made a najor error in judgnent by not adapting its choice and treatment of naterials to what was a predominantly hostile audience situation at San Francisco. The co-ittee's highly arguentative, and gener- ally didactic, approach apparently served to reinforce the 327 existing antagonistic attitudes nong the large nunber of hostile listeners present at San fiancisco, a significant segment of its i-ediate audience which might have been induced to listen had the conittee adopted a more concilia- tory approach. Application of sound criteria to other significant dimensions of the rhetorical act at San Francisco reveals the following: (1) the lines of thought developed by the co-ittee were not germane to its central idea; (2) nearly all of its argt-ents were specious because they were under-.- girded by frequently fallacious reasoning based upon un- reliable and/or inadequate evidence; (3) the pattern of arrangenent was prinarily deductive, and therefore con- tributed to the didactic tone of the speech; (h) the com- mittee's speaking style, although generally clear, forceful and vivid, probably weakened the credibility of its case because it lacked more moderate and temperate qualities conducive to diluting the negative attitudes of the largely hostile audience at San Francisco; and (5) the co-ittee's speaking revealed an apparent disregard for a sound code of ethics for oral co-Iunicators. Encluliogg (n the whole, then, this dialectical and rhetorical analysis of the co-ittee's speech behaviors at San Fran- cisco in may, 1960, provides specific evidence which 328 corroborates, rather than refutes, much of the criticism which has perennially been directed at the HCUA. Fran the viewpoints of dialectical and rhetorical criticise, two significant conclusions emerge from this study: (1) the San hancisco hearings were not inquiry, and therefore had no demonstrable relevance to the co-ittee's sole legal purpose, that of obtaining factual information for the purpose of framing legislation; and (2) the San Fran- cisco hearings constituted a speech of advocacy by the co-ittee in which the co-ittee demonstrated its unwil- lingness and/or inability to adapt its ideas effectively to those of the major segment of its i-ediate audience. The i-ediate implications of the foregoing con- clusions are readily discernible. With regard to the first, that the San Francisco hearings were not inquiry, it is clear that the co-ittee acted in violation of its Congressional mandate. However, if the appraisals of researchers from other disciplines who had studied the co-nittee's behaviors at various points during its twenty- two year history are reasonably accurate, then the con- nittee's non-inquiring approach at San hancisco was hardly unique. For example , the following statement by Shapiro reveals that he does not even 9.29.9. the HCUA to use its hearings for fact-finding purposes: In fact, we know that in invest ations like those of the House Dana-erican Activ ties Com- nittee all the facts necessary to sustain 329 legislative recouendations are developed by the confidential investigations of the conittee's zealous staff and the testimony of voluntary and highly cooperative witnesses. These facts, aft___e__r the: have been develo d, are used to stage manage the public showings of reluctant witnesses who, at best, do little more than confirm what the co-ittee already knows. . . . Indeed, viewing co-uittee hearings in general as part of the legislative process, there is almost no information developed in public hearings that was not available to Congress in written, confidential reports, from pub- lished sources, or through law enforcement ency or cos-ittee staff files. Public com- mittee hearings, including investigations, are basically designed for dramatic and cathartic purposes, not to obtain needed information for Congress. Perhaps it is too idealistic for the writer to suggest that the co-ittee ought to develop an effective nethod of inquiry which would enable it to pursue its legitimate legislative purpose. This study tends to support conclusions arrived at by scholars from disciplines other than speech conuni-v cation. rrofessor Carr's well-doomented study of the House Co-ittee on UnnAmerican Activities as a political entity, for example, contains several conclusions which are verified by this study of the 1960 San Frmcisco hearings.2 Carr's statement, for instance, that “all too fre- quently the connittee has been content to put the finger lnartin Shapiro, Freedom of S ech: The Su Court and Jud ial Review-meood s , New Jar ersey: Prentice- nc.,—m), pp. 167-168. 2 Carr, The House §%ttee g; mmican Activi- t_i_.__,es Laws-1950. ppm . 330 on Communists or fellow travelers while muking little or no attempt to demonstrate that they have engaged in any ..3 acts of a subversive character, accurately describes the behavior of the committee at San Francisco. Other*major conclusions posited by Professor Carr in his study of the committee's activities during the period from lQhS through 1950, are the same ones which the present analysis either supports directly or by flnplication. Briefly, these con- clusions, in Carr's words, are as follows: By constantly exaggerati the subversive threat the conittee has in the good judgment of many intelligent citizens. . . . The committee has succeeded in discrediting the Congress of the united States in the eyes of many Americans. . . e The committee has adversely affected the moral and intellectual atmosphere of the nation. This has been done by constantly reiterating the idea that our social structure is honeycombed 'with.disloya1 persons. . . . The committee has made us distrustful of each other; it has made us suspicious of organizations'xhich are the very fabric of our democratic order. Analysis of the San Francisco hearings also reveals that the committee's behavioral patterns were consistent with the six predictive statements set forth in Chapter III of this study. These six statements which describe be- havioral characteristics exhibited by the HCUA throughout its history were corroborated in this study: (1) a tendency 31b1do’ pm “5“. “M" pp. 4:57.459. .III! I. v 331 to be cautious in its handling of witnesses, in the light of the hostile climate of opinion which faced it at San Francisco; (2) a tendency to be less rigid in the enforce- ment of its "Rules of Procedure," also as a response to the hostile atmosphere in which the hearings were conducted; (3) a tendency to utilize "friendly" witnesses to the fullest extent possible in order to be able to convince the American public that it had sufficient justification for holding the hearings; (h) a tendency to praise itself for being unusually fair in its conduct of the hearings; (5) a tendency to peg- scnalize its approach to the witnesses-«to seem to be ”more interested in exposing allegedly subversive msgns than in exposing subversive activity;"5 and (6) a tendency to espouse a politically conservative point-of-view. No doubt other pertinent conclusions and implica- tions thereof could be included here. Those conclusions which have been cited, however, appear to be the more signi- ficant ones, in that they seem most relevant to the principles and problems of speech co-unication. If, in the final analysis, the conclusions of this study are at all indicative of the methods, purposes, and consequences of the speech habits of the House Co-ittee on [In-American Activities, then the co-ittee represents the very antithesis of the ideals of a free society. Fro- tected by congressional i-unity, the favor of the great 5.1.1.139." P0 “5". 332 majority of its colleagues in the House of Representa- tives, an ambiguous mandate, and a set of "Rules of Pro- cedure" which ensures its ultimate control of its hearings, the co-ittee is responsible only to its own sense of self- restraint. By its inflanatory, illogical and unethical speech practices at San Francisco in 1960, the coo-ittee not only violated sound speech conunication principles but infringed upon the first amendment freedoms as well. Furthermore, it did all of these things with the apparent assurance that its behaviors would not result in legal or legislative restrictions being placed upon them. The com- mittee simply avoided a potential encounter with the Supreme Court of the United States, the only real potential threat to its unrestrained speech habits. To prevent a possible clash with the Court, it refrained from citing any of the thirty-six ”hostile" witnesses for congressional contempt. By so doing, the cc—ittee virtually nullified the possibility of meeting the Court head-on, and thereby running the risk of having its powers curtailed. Therefore, given the co-ittee's lack of areas of significant vulnerability, and given that its members traditionally represent “safe" conservative congressional districts, then it seems‘reasonable to asst-e that it will continue to practice its brand of absolute freedom of speech as if it owned the first amendment. APPENDIX Rules of Procedure I--INITIATICII OF INVESTIGATIONS: No major investigation shall be initiated without approval of a majority of the Cousittee. heliminary in- quiries, however, may be initiated by the Committee's staff with the approval of the Chairman of the Co-ittee. II--SUBJECTS 0F INVISTIGATICN: The subject of any investigation in connection with which witnesses are sumoned or shall otherwise appear shall be announced in an opening statement to the Cc-ittee before the commencement of any hearings; and the information sought to be elicited at the hearings shall be relevant and germane to the subject as so stated. Ills-8W6 OF WITNESSES: A-u-Subpenas shall be signed ad issued by the Chairman of the Comittee, or any member of the Co-nittee designated by said Chairman. B--Witnesses shall be subpenaed at a reasonably sufficient time in advance of any hearing, said time to be determined by the Comittee, in order to ive the witness an oppor- tunity to prepare for the hear and to employ counsel, should he so desire. IV-u-EXECUTIVB AND PUBLIC HEARINGS: A-u-Execut ive : (1) If a majority of the Cosmittee or Subcclmittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national se- curity or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputa- tion of other individuals, the Conittee shall interro- gate such witness in an Executive Sgssion for the purpose of determining the necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing. 333 33“ (2) Attendance at necutive Sessions shall be limited to Members of the Co-ittee, its staff, and other persons whose presence is requested, or consented to by the Connittee. (3) All testimony taken in Executive Sessions shall be kept secret ad shall not be released or used in public sessions without the approval of a majority of the Co-ittee. B-u-Fublic Hearings: (1) All other hearings shall be public. Vu-TISTMY RIDE GAE: All witnesses at public or executive hearings who testify as to matters of fact shall give all testimony under oath or affirmation. mly the Chairman or a member of the Cos-ittee shall be empowered to administer said oath or affirmation. VImMSQm OF mm: A complete and accurate record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings at hearings, both in public and in Executive Sessimns. A Any witness or his counsel at the expense of the witness, may obtain a transcript of any public testi- mony of the witness from the Clerk of the Cc-ittee. Any witness or his counsel may also obtain a tran- script of any executive testimony of the witness: (1) When a special release of said testimony prior to public release is authorized by the Chair- man of the Co-ittee or the Chairman of any Sub- co-ittee; or (2) After said testimony has been made public by the Cc-ittee. VII-«ADVICE 0F comm: A-nAt every hearing, public or executive every wit- ness shall be accorded the privilege of h counsel of his own choosing. B--The participation of counsel during the course of any hearing and while the witness is testifying shall be limited to advising said witness as to his legal rights. Counsel shall not be permitted to engage in oral argument with the Co-ittee, but shall confine his act vity to the area of legal advice to his client. 335 VIII-m0?! OF COUNSEL: Consel for a witness shall conduct himself in a professional, ethical, and proper manner. His failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the Ccnnittee or Subcouittee before which the witness is appearing, subject such counsel to disci- plinary action which may include warning, censure, removing from the hearing room of counsel, or a recom- mendation of contempt proceedings .1 In case of such removal of counsel, the witness shall have a reasonable time to obtain other counsel, said time to be determined by the Cc-ittee. Should the witness deliberately or capriciously fail or refuse to obtain the services of other counsel within such reasonable time, the hearing shall continue and the testimony of such witness shall be heard without bene- fit of counsel. Ila-WT BY WITNESS: A-oany witness gesiriu to make a prepared or written statement for the' record of the proceedings in executive or public sessions shall file a copy of such statement with the counsel of the Ccuittee within a reasonable period of time in advance of the hearing at which the statement is to-be pre- sented. .B--All such statements so received which are relevant ad germane to the subject of the investi- gation may, upon approval, at the conclusion of the testimony of the witness, by a majority vote , of the, Committee or Subco—ittee members. present, be inserted in the official transcript of the pro- cZ‘Qd-inglo . “new or was mac-ran BY A manic: A-c-Uhere practicable, any person naed in a public hearing before the Cc-ittee _or any Subco-ittee as 1"The Cosmittee seeks factual testimony within the personal knofdedge of the withess‘ and such testimony and answers must be given by the witness himself and not sug- ' gested to witness by counsel. ' 2Statements which take the form of personal attacks by the witness"? upon the motives of the Cc-ittee, the ‘ personal characters of any hembers of the Congress or of the Co-ittee staff , and statements clearly in the nature of accusation are A not deemed to be either relevant or germane. WT 336 subversive, Fascist Co-unist, or affiliated with one or more subversive-front organization, who has not been previously so named, shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, be notified mistered letter, to the address last known to the ttee, of such fact, including: (1) A statement that he has been so naed, (2) The date and place of said hearing, (3) The name of the person who so testified, (k) The name of the subversive, Fascist, Com- " munist, or front organization with which he has been identified , and t ‘ (5) A copy of the printed Rules of Procedure 'of the Conittee. B-«Auy person, so notified, who believes that his character or reputation has been adversely affected or to whom has been imputed subversive activity, may within 15 days after receipt of said notice: (1) Col-unicate with the counsel of the Com- mittee,3 and/or (2) Request to appear at his own expense in person before the Ccaittee or any Subco-ittee thereof in public session and give testimony, in denial or affirmation, relevant and germane to the subject of the invest ation. C- such person testif ng under the provisions of B (2 above shall be accorded the same privileges as any other witness appeari before the Cc-ittee, ad may be questioned concer any matter relevant and germae to the subject of the investigation. n-mnmn 0? mm: A witness shall be limited to giving information relevant and germane to the subject under investigation. The Co-ittee shall rule upon the admissibilifiy of all testi-n mony or information presented by the witness. ; k 3All witnesses are invited at any time to confer with Co-ittee counsel or investigators for the Co-ittee prior t0 hearings. “The House Co-ittee on tin-American Activities is a Congressional Ccamittee, not a court (see pp. IV ad V). horeover, the Co-ittee has neither the authority nor the vast powers of acourt of la. A Congressional Cc-ittee conducts a search for information, not a trial. The requirements of time, the nature of the fact- finding hearing, the complications of travel, the realities 337 XII-malLATICNSHIP OF HUSBAND AND WIPE: The confidential relationship between husbad ad wife shall be respected, and for reasons of public policy, one spouse shall not be questioned concerning the activities of the other, except when a majority of the Co-ittee or Subco-ittee shall determine otherwise. XIII-u-TIIZVISRD HEARINGS: . .A-u-If a hearing be televised: . ' (1) Television facilities in the bear room shall be restricted to two ensures, the lighting facilities practicable, and the tele- vision producticn shall be available on a 1 basis to all established television com es desiring participation. (2) Telecasts of Cc-ittee heari a shall be on the basis of a public service on y, and this ‘ fact shall be publicly announced on television in the beginning and at the close of each telecast. Bo cc-ercial announcements shall be permitted from the hearing room or in connection therewith, and no actual or intimated sponsorship of the hearings shall be permitted in any instance. B-c-Bpon the request of a witness that no telecast be made of him during the course of his testimony, the Chairman shall direct that television cameras refrain from photo aphing the witness during the taking of his testfiony. : .XIV--CCHIITTIBJRIPCIIB: ' A-nllo Cc-ittee reports or publications shall be made or released to the public without the approval of the majority of the Co-ittee. B-c-llo su-ary of any Colmittee report or publication and no statement of the contents of such‘report or publication shall be released by ay Member of the Co-ittee or its staff, prior to the official issuance of the report. _kyg A—A of expense, and the voluminous duties of Members'of Congress all add together to make it impractical for courtroom pro- cedure to be followed. The Co-ittee has given frequent and diligent con- sideration to this subject, and has determined that in order to carry out its responsibilities imposed by law, the rules of evidence, including cross-exaination, are not applicable. fi .- h,— 338 xv--w1mss FEES AND mm W03: Each witness who has been subpenaed, upon the com- pletion of his testimony before the Co-ittee, may report to the office of the Clerk of the Co-ittee, room 227, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C.. and there sign appropriate vouchers for travel allow- ances and attendance fees upon the Conittee. If hearings are held in cities other than Washington, D.C., the witness may contact the Clerk of the Com- mittee, or his representative prior to leaving the 113.11.“ 1'an XVI-WT 0? “633888 No reco-endation that a witness be cited for contempt of Congress shall be forwarded to the House of Representativew unless and until the Cc-ittee has, upon notice to all its members, met and considered the alleged contempt, and by a majority of those present voted that such reco-nendation be made. MI-JBMBUTICN CF RULES: All witnesses appearing before the House Ccaittee on tin-American Activities shall be furnished a printed copy of the Rules of Procedure of the Co-ittee. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Auer, J. Jeffery. An Introgyction to Research in Speech. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939. Barnhart, Clarence (ed.) American Colle e Enc clo edic Dictionary. Chicago: The Spencer Press, 1959. Beck, Carl. 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Mpopgp v, Dppgheyty. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). gig v, United States. 349 U.S. 155 (1955). Rpgers v, United States. 340 U.S. 367 (1951). M v. Unite; States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Uniyed §tates v, Bryan. F. Supp. 58 (D.C., 1947). W. 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Wilkigon v. United Stptes. 365 U.S. 399 (1961). - - - I O D A ~ ...--- . . v -. .- D 0 A f l _-,--- _ ‘ Q 0 O - --..--o -. - - -. .. __ ..-... --...- - -1 ._ - _- ... .....- .... .‘.__.__ ‘._- ._ .- a- IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII rllllWlallllUlfllflllslHrlyiflrljtljlljlNflLlejlfilel'l . 1