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3 BEMENSEONAL APPROACH TO
COGNITWE CGNSISTENCY

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A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF

A DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY

presented by

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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ABSTRACT

A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF
A DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY

BY

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

Statement of the Problem

 

The term "cognitive consistency" has been used to
describe a number of models and theories of interpersonal
cognition that have elaborated upon Fritz Heider's Cognitive
Balance theory. Among the most recent extensions of this
theory has been the dimensional view of consistency dis-
cussed by Scott (1969) and Phillips (1973).

This view suggests that people employ multiple
dimensions when judging the relationship between elements of
cognition. Consistency, in the traditional sense, conceives
of only one dimensional judgment. The Phillips (1973)
formulation allows for both the traditional unidimensional
as well as a complex or multidimensional version of consis-
tency. Thus, a person may be described as consistent at
different levels of dimensionality.

The present study was conducted primarily to deter-

mine whether age-related changes in dimensional consistency

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

occur. I.Q. level, sex, and situational variables were also
examined relative to this multidimensional model of consis-
tency.

Changes in dimensional development were predicted
in accordance with organismic theories of development as
represented by Werner and Piaget. Thus, increasing develop-
mental differentiation from a global unidimensional state

to multidimensional functioning was hypothesized.

Review of the Literature

 

The literature surveyed suggests that traditional
consistency formulations do account for a good deal of
interpersonal and object perception. However, the small
number of develOpmental studies of consistency have not
agreed concerning its change with age.

Dimensionality as an aspect of cognitive complexity
was also reviewed. Although little developmental data bears
directly on this topic, there is some support for both growth
in the number of dimensions and within dimension articulation.

The organismic concept of differentiation was pre-
sented as providing a framework for studying dimensional

changes in consistency.

Methodology

 

A total of 72 subjects participated in the present
study, 24 each at the third, seventh, and eleventh grade
levels. These groups contained an equal number of boys and

girls and were further subdivided on the basis of I.Q.

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

Consistency was assessed by asking S8 to Specify
the degree of relationship on an eleven point scale between
all 21 possible pairs of seven elements relating to a given
topic. Three different topics were utilized - People I
Know, School, and Occupations.

The three resulting matrices for each subject were
factored and eigenvectors and eigenvalues computed for
Rank I through Rank VII matrix models. Estimates of matrix
variance were then computed from these eigenvalues. Dimen-
sionality was determined by the rank of the first matrix

which accounted for 75 percent of the total matrix variance.

Results

Age, sex, and I.Q. were found to be nonsignificant
variables in regard to the dependent measure of dimensional-
ity. Furthermore, a Rank I (one dimensional) model was not
found to account for less matrix variance with increasing
age as hypothesized.

Significant differences occurred, however, in the
number of dimensions utilized by subjects across the three
topics. Dimensionality increased as ego—involvement de—
creased from People I Know (X=l.9l7) to School (X=2.625)
to Occupations (X=3.333). Differences between all combina-
tions of these three topics were significant at the .0001
level of probability.

These differences due to topic were explained on
the basis of stimulus dimensionality and positivity. Differ-

ential reinforcement and modeling practices provide an

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

alternative explanation of situational differences.
In addition to these findings the implications and

limitations of the study were discussed.

A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF

A DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY

BY

Richard Joseph Piotrowski

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Counseling, Personnel Services and
Educational Psychology

1973

To My Parents

Matthew and Josephine Piotrowski

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is grateful to Dr. Harvey F. Clarizio
for the advice, encouragement, and intellectual stimulation
he provided throughout my doctoral studies as an academic
advisor, dissertation committee chairman, and teacher.

Dr. James Phillips' help during all phases of the
present study was invaluable. He first stimulated my interest
in the present topic in his Advanced Social Psychology course
and gave generously of his time in helping me to reach higher
levels of dimensionality in regard to consistency theory.

Dr. William Mehrens and Dr. Bob Winborn are also
thanked for their active participation as dissertation
committee members.

The cooperation of the administration, teachers, and
students of the Hillsdale Community Schools made the collec-
tion of data an enjoyable task. Mrs. Jeanne Lamberson is
also appreciated for her careful and patient work as typist.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Barbara, for
her understanding concerning the inconveniences caused by
the demands of writing a dissertation during our first year
together. Her encouragement and support made the completion
of this work possible.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . l
Varieties of Consistency Theory . . . . . . . 2
Consistency Theory and Other Uses
of the Term Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Consistency and Complexity in
Coqnitive Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Attempts to Provide an Interface
Between Consistency and Complexity . . . . . 12
Implications of Dimensionality for
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . l9
Cognitive Consistency Research with Adults . l9
Developmental Studies of Consistency . . . . 23
Limitations of Developmental Studies
of Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The Present Response to the Limitations
of Previous Research . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Dimensionality as an Aspect of
Cognitive Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Coqnitive Differentiation:
The Organismic View . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
III. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Procedure and Test Stimuli . . . . . . . . . 43
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

iv

Chapter

IV. ANALYSES AND RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of the Results . . . . . . .
V. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS . . . . . . . .

The Unidimensional Model of Consistency
Dimensionality in Respect to

Grade, I.Q., and Sex . . . . . . . . .
Dimensionality in Respect to TOpiC . .
Summary of the Discussion . . . . . . .
VI. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

REFERENCES
Appendix A.
Appendix B.

Appendix C.

Implications of the Present Study . . .
Implications for Future Research . . .
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Relationship Rating Instructions
Rating Scale . . . . .
Variance Estimates Generated by

Bach Matrix Rank Model for Each
Subject by Topic . . . . . . . . . .

Page

49

49
55

57

57
59

61
65

67

67
68
71
72
74
78

81

82

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2 Mean I.Q. scores of the sample . . . . . . . . . . 43

3 Mean ages of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 Multivariate analysis of variance of repeated

measures for matrix variance estimates using

a Rank I model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5 Multivariate analysis of repeated measures
for dimensionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

6 Univariate analyses of variance for
comparisons between topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page

1 Average number of dimensions utilized by
subjects on each of the three topics . . . . . . SS

vii

CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The idea that people attempt to maintain consistency
in their cognitive functioning and behavior forms the basis
for a number of social psychology theories. Among the form-
ulations sharing this common framework are Cartwright and
Harary's (1956) "Structural Balance," Abelson and Rosenberg's
(1958) "Symbolic Psycho-Logic," Osgood's (1955) "Congruity
Principle," and, perhaps the best known, Festinger's (1957)
"Cognitive Dissonance" theory. These theories also all
assume that the absence of consistency produces a tension
which results in a reorganization to restore consistency.
(Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969)

The first formal statement of consistency is found
in the work of Fritz Heider (1946, 1958). All of the above
theorists invariably acknowledge some form of intellectual
debt or primacy to Heider's Cognitive Balance theory.
Heider's model is concerned with the positive and negative
relationships within a P-O-X triad where P and O are
people and X is another person or object. Balance exists

within such a triad when all of the relationships are

positive or when two relationships are negative and one is
positive. Imbalance is obtained when two of the relation—
ships are positive and one is negative. Three negative
relations constitute an ambiguous case for balance theory.
(Heider, 1958)

While a balanced state is seen by Heider as comfort-
able and not under pressure to change, the implications of
imbalance are very different. Heider (1958) assumes that
"... if a balanced state does not exist, then forces toward
this state will arise. If a change is not possible, the
state of imbalance will produce tension." (Heider, 1958,
p.201)

Other consistency formulations will now be reviewed

to survey both how they elaborated upon and departed from

Heider's basic model.

Varieties of Consistency Theory

The theories to be reviewed extend the original model
in a number of ways. The most common elaborations include
an increased quantitative specification of the degree of
imbalance and extension of the number and kinds of rela—
tionships covered by the theory.
A. Cartwright and Harary's Structural Balance

Cartwright and Harary (1956) offered their theory
of Structural Balance to clear up some of the ambiguities
contained in Heider's original formulation and to extend

balance to a wider range of situations.

The tool they used to accomplish their objectives
was the mathematical theory of linear graphs. This enabled
them to convert Heiderian concepts such as "entity,"

"relation,' and "sign of a relation" into the graphic re—
presentations of ”point," "directed line," and "sign of a
directed line." Such a visual representation has enabled
them to make a number of theoretical and quantitative
advances.

Unsymmetrical relationships, for instance, can be
accommodated by Structural Balance. An example of such a
relationship occurs when a person does not reciprocate
another's liking. Heider's system did not provide for such
a possibility. Similarly, the absence of a relationship
can be noted in addition to positive and negative bonds.

Units of greater than three entities can be studied
using this approach. Closely related to this extension was
Cartwright and Harary's desire to describe consistency in
units beyond that experienced by a single person. Thus,
they also use their approach to study sociometric structures,
communication networks, and patterns of power.

Perhaps most importantly, however, Structural Balance
represented a quantitative refinement over the original
balance model. While Heider discussed only globally
"balanced" or "unbalanced" situations, Cartwright and Harary
were able to specify both intermediate degrees of consistency

and consistency at a given point in a structure.

B. Abelson and Rosenberg's Symbolic Psycho-Logic

Like Cartwright and Harary, Abelson and Rosenberg
(1958) extended Heider's view of consistency to account for
relationships other than positive and negative. They also
were able to specify intermediate degrees of balance.

Symbolic Psycho-Logic introduced a square matrix to
represent the relationships between any number of cognitive
elements (verbal labels attached to elements of thinking)
which comprise a given topic, or "conceptual arena." The
relations between elements can be of four types: positive
(p), negative (n), null (0), or ambivalent (a).

Rosenberg and Abelson (1958) exploited the mathe-
matical advantages of the matrix in developing an index of
imbalance. They defined the degree of imbalance of a
structure as the smallest number of changes that are nec-
essary to restore balance. This is, in effect, a least
effort approach to redressing imbalance. It is much more
specific than Heider was concerning which relationships
are likely to change as a result of imbalance.

C. Newcomb's Symmetry Model

Newcomb's (1953) consistency formulation differs
from the basic model primarily in its area of emphasis and
application-communicative acts. Like Heider, Newcomb is
concerned with an interdependent three element system. This
system involves a person (A) who communicates to a person (B)

about something (X). A symmetrical relation among these

elements is tantamount to a balanced state. However, it
is in the results of imbalance that Newcomb enlarged upon
Heider's ideas. According to Newcomb (1953) the "strain"
toward a state of equilibrium results in verbal communica-
tion from A to B in regard to X. The communicative act
which is the crucial aspect of Newcomb's theory is thought
to result because of the secondary reward value attached
to previous attempts at communication.

Although Newcomb acknowledges his theorizing as
merely a "special case of balance," the theory is felt by
some (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969) to have resulted
in some of the most stringent empirical tests of consistency.
D. Osgood's Congruity Principle

Osgood and Tannebaum's (1955) Congruity Principle is
another consistency model which centers around the effects
of communications on attitudes. In this case only two
elements are considered - a source and a concept such as
a person, institution, or idea which is evaluated by the
source. Through the use of their semantic differential
technique they have been able to develop a highly quantita-
tive approach to the Specification of the effect of a
communication upon both a source and the object of the
source's communication.

Using the semantic differential technique each of
two objects of cognition can be located somewhere from +3
to -3 on the evaluative scale. The linking relationship

between these two elements takes the form of an "assertion"

which can be either associative (positive) or dissociative
(negative).

Osgood and Tannebaum (1955) describe congruity (and
consistency) when they state that "In this simplest of
states in which human thinking Operates, sources we like
should always sponsor ideas we like and denounce ideas we

are against, and vice versa.‘ (Osgood and Tannebaum, 1955,
p.44) In such a situation there is no pressure to change
the evaluation of either element. When incongruity occurs,
however, the pressure toward congruity operates to change
the initial evaluation of elements. A formula has been
developed to specify the magnitude and direction of this
change.

The congruity principle has made considerable
quantitative contributions to consistency theory. This can
be seen in both the specification of attitudinal elements
and the prediction of change resulting from inconsistency.
E. Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance

Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is
undoubtedly the best known of the consistency formulations.
Despite its popularity, its basic premises are remarkably
similar to Heider's original balance statement. Festinger,
in fact, suggests that if the words "dissonance" be sub-
stituted for "imbalance" and "consonant" be replaced for
"balanced" then he and Heider are indicating the same basic
processes.

Festinger deals primarily with a two element system.

Two elements are dissonant when the opposite of one would
follow from the other. Thus, smoking cigarettes despite
knowing about the Surgeon General's report on its effects
is an example of a commonly occurring dissonance.

The major difference (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller,
1969) between dissonance theory and the original balance
model involves Festinger's concept of implication. Fest-
inger (1957) notes that there are many pairs of elements
where neither an element nor its opposite follows from
another element. Such a relationship is seen as irrele-
vant. Thus, many Heiderian imbalanced situations which
might be construed as dissonant are merely viewed as
irrelevant by Festinger.

Festinger (1957) discusses the magnitude of disso-
nance without quantifying it precisely. The amount of
dissonance is determined by both the importance of the
elements involved and the proportion of relevant elements
dissonant with the one in question.

While Festinger's theoretical framework is not overly
complicated, his ingenious work involving the application of
his theory in areas such as decision making, forced com—
pliance, exposure to information, and social processes has

taken consistency theory into previously unexplored realms.

8

Consistency Theory and Other Uses
of the TermfiVConsistengy"

 

 

The term "consistency" as used by the theorists
just discussed refers to a group of theories which postu-
late a tendency toward perceiving the relationship between
persons and objects so that there is harmony or balance
within the cognitive system of the perceiver. Another
common use of the term "consistency" is made within the
field of child development. This other use of the term is
in reference to the continuity or stability of personality
development over time and across situations.

Kohlberg (1972) discusses three such types of con-
tinuity: (l) trait stability, (2) continuity through sequen-
tial stage development, and (3) the stability of idiographic
individuality. Trait stability is defined as "... the
correlation between an adult behavior trait (or symptom)
and a similar childhood behavior trait." (Kohlberg, 1972,
p.1221) Continuity through invariant developmental sequen-
ces can be seen in a number of "stage" theories such as
those offered by Freud, Erickson, and Piaget. In regard to
the idiographic approach to stability Kohlberg states
"This approach is concerned with the relative salience of
traits to one another in the individual, with their organ-
ization, and with the individual's style or manner of
(expressing these traits, rather than with the individual's
rank on a trait compared with the rank of others."

(Kohlberg, 1972, p.1225)

Traditionally, consistency theorists have not been
concerned with the stability of their construct. Because
of their avoidance of such considerations one can only
assume that they viewed the tendency toward consistency as
stable over time and across situations. The present study

will provide empirical evidence on these questions.

Consistency and Complexity
in Cognitive Functioning

 

 

McGuire (1966) concluded a review of the status of
consistency theories by noting that there exists a group of
psychologists who draw their inspiration from a source which,
if not contradictory to consistency theory, is at least the
"reverse" of it. This group is probably best represented
by the work of Berlyne (1960), Fiske and Maddi (1961), and
Fowler (1965). McGuire contrasts their "complexity" views
with consistency notions of man when he states that:

Here (complexity) we come upon a romantic
notion of the organism, very different from
the classic notion of consistency theories.
The latter classic organism has a penchant

for stability, redundancy, familiarity, con—
firmation of expectance, avoidance of the new,
the unpredictable. Complexity theory's
romantic organism works on a quite different
economy. It has a stimulus hunger, an
exploratory drive, a need curiosity. It takes
pleasure in the unexpected, at least in inter-
mediate levels of unpredictability. It wants
to experience everything; it shows alternative
behavior; it finds novelty rewarding. (McGuire,
1966, p.37)

Another cognitive approach which postulates move-
Inent toward a different kind of complexity can be found

in the organismic theories of development. (Werner, 1948;

lO

Piaget, 1950). For Jean Piaget (1950) the growing child's
cognitive abilities become increasingly differentiated as
he passes from the sensorimotor to the preoperational to
the concrete operational and, finally, to the formal oper-
ational stage of development. Each stage represents a
qualitatively different form of cognitive organization than
its predecessor. Furthermore, development through these
stages has been shown to be a universal phenomenon.

Similarly, Werner (1948) states that "... the
essence of organic development is the steadily increasing
differentiation and centralization, or hierarchic inte-
gration, within the genetic totality." (Werner, 1948,
p.53)

Although organic theories of development have ob-
vious implications for cognitive balance, Heider (1958)
made virtually no mention of the developmental course of
balance and research in this area has also ignored such
considerations for a long time. Perhaps the reason for
this neglect can be attributed to Heider's roots in Gestalt
psychology. Zajonc (1968) noted that Heider assumed social
perception to be determined by both Gestalt-like structural
principles and dynamics. Since the Gestalt view maintains
that psychological structures are agenetic, the question
of their development is avoided.

Piaget (1950) in the Psychology 9: Intelligence

 

(considered at some length the Gestalt view of intelligence.

11

He ended his critique of the Gestalt position by stating
that:

On the whole then, we see that Gestalt theory
although correct in its description of forms
of equilibrium or well-structured wholes,
nevertheless neglects the reality, in per-
ception as in intelligence, of genetic
development and the process of construction
that characterises it. (Piaget, 1950, p.66)

On the other hand, Flavell (1963) noted that the
usefulness of Piagetian theory has yet to be demonstrated
in the area of "warm-blooded cognition" which includes
consistency theory.

The question of development here is an especially
interesting one, because the net effect of many of
these semicognitive operations is in some sense
to distort reality, to arrive at a nonveridical
apprehension of it in the service of some need.
This is in sharp contrast to the impeccably
ligical and reality-bound operations the genesis
of which Piaget has studied. Is there really a
development towards nonverdicality contemporan-
eous with the Piagetian develOpment away from it?
Is it true that the growing child not only
develops sharper and sharper instruments for
dissecting reality but also increases his pro-
ficiency in defensive self-deceptions, in
reducing the strain of cognitive dissonance,
incongruity, etc., at the expense of realistic
accommodations, and all the rest? (Flavell,
1963, pp.44l-442)

Thus, it would appear that the question concerning whether
consistency undergoes any significant changes with age

has not yet been answered. An extension of consistency
theory which might prove amenable to a developmental

analysis will now be considered.

12

Attempts to Provide an Interface
Between Consistency and Complexity

A theory which could provide for both consistency
and complexity would undoubtedly be a very attractive and
useful formulation. The development of such a model has
not been completely ignored as is evidenced by the work
of Scott (1969) and Phillips (1973). To provide a necess-
ary background for their developments. Bieri's (1961, 1966)
work on complexity will be mentioned as it is his expli-
cation of complexity that is most closely related to the
Scott and Phillips formulations.

Bieri (1966) considers complexity to be represented
by the dimensionality of a person's judgments. Thus,
"Cognitive complexity may be defined as the tendency to
construe social behavior in a multidimensional way, such
that a more cognitively complex individual has available
a more versatile system for perceiving the behavior of
others than does a less cognitively complex person."
(Bieri, 1961, p.14) Bieri contrasts this to complexity
approaches which focus on the differentiation of concepts
and categories.

He further considers dimensions in terms of their
articulation. This may be thought of as discrimination
‘within a dimension. Much of Bieri's research has aimed
at discovering the factors which affect articulation.

Scott (1966) borrows from Bieri the concepts of

dimensionality and articulation as ways that attributes

13

(characteristics of objects) are organized. "Images"
are combinations of characteristics or attributes which
exist in a multidimensional space. Scott has identified
a number of ways in which images from common cognitive
domains are related. Two of these measures- Affective
Balance and Affective-Evaluative Consistency are derived
from the traditional consistency position. Both of these
measures were found to be negatively correlated with
dimensionality and an ambivalent View of objects. These
results were obtained by Scott (1969) using a number of
different measures for assessing dimensionality.

The model developed by Phillips (1973) also views
the attribute space of an individual's cognitive structure
as organized along a certain number of dimensions. Through
the use of a matrix approach to COgnitive structure he has
developed a measure of dimensionality which is sensitive
to both consistency and complexity.

The matrix approach was described earlier as Abel-
son and Rosenberg's (1958) contribution to consistency
theory. Basically, this approach involves determining
what set of cognitive elements are relevant for a subject
in relation to a given topic. After a set of elements is
identified, a subject is asked to make a rating of the
intensity of the relationship between each pair of elements
in the matrix.

Both Phillips (1967) and Abelson (1967) indepen-

dently proposed that when a matrix were factored, the size

14

of its largest non-zero characteristic root, or eigenvalue,
is a good measure of the degree of balance of that matrix.
A balanced matrix is, in effect, a Rank I matrix. The per-
son operating on consistency principles exclusively could
be termed one dimensional, a dimension which Phillips
(1967) showed could be labeled as ”evaluation." Mathemat-
ically, the relation between elements e; and e; for such a

person is given by the following formula:
' z
I‘LJ =°Cete3 0C3: 6L

However, if an individual is complex in terms of
using more than one dimensional mode to make relational
judgments the Rank I hypothesis is no longer tenable. When
multiple dimensions are utilized, the rank of the structure
matrix increases with the number of dimensions (eigenvectors)
needed to reproduce the matrix with a given degree of
accuracy. (Phillips, 1973) Thus, the rank of a matrix can
describe the dimensional complexity of the person who gen-
erated it. Mathematically, the complex person's rating for
the degree of relationship between two elements is given

by the following formula:

Such a dimensional approach to consistency provides
a mechanism for redressing inconsistency that is highly
compatible with organismic theories of development. A

person who is confronted by inconsistency at a given level

WW
+

ne

OI

aL

 

 

15

of dimensionality may restore consistency by adding a

new dimension upon which his cognitive elements can be
ordered. Thus, through the process of "dimensional
augumentation" consistency is restored. Furthermore, at

a higher level of dimensionality the person is better able
to cope when confronted with a new potentially inconsistent
situation.

The adaptive nature of dimensional augumentation
is particularly evident when compared to other mechanisms
of consistency restoration. Among such mechanisms mentioned
by Abelson (1968) are denial, rationalization, bolstering,
and transcendence. The effect of these operations is largely
to distort reality while restoring consistency. In addition,
they must be applied anew whenever inconsistency arises.
Compared to dimensional augumentation they provide a very
inefficient way of maintaining consistency.

To summarize, the Phillips extension of consistency
just presented enlarges the theory to accommodate the
complex person. At the same time, the traditional formu-
lation is retained in the case of the one dimensional
person. Thus, the consistency and complexity views of
man are no longer competing theoretical positions. Instead,
consistency may be defined at different levels of complex-
ity. It is this statement of consistency that will be
studied from a developmental perspective in the present

study.

16

Implications of Dimensionality for Education

 

Information concerning differences in dimensional-
ity between students at different grade levels or between
teachers and students could be useful in several ways.

With the introduction of a number of approaches
for promoting affective education such as the Human Devel-
Opment Program (Bissell and Palomares, 1973), Dimensions
of Personality (Limbacher, 1970), Developing Understanding
of Self and Others (Dinkmeyer, 1970), and Value Clarifi-
cation (Simon, 1972) the developmental course of "warm-
blooded" c0gnition assumes additional importance. The
assumption that Piagetian intellectual development applies
to these areas as well as to more cold kinds of cognition
is, as Flavell (1963) concedes, yet to be demonstrated.

The content of these approaches - interpersonal
relationships, self acceptance, fears, personal values,
feelings, etc. has not traditionally been the specialty
of the classroom teacher. Just as the teacher must
adjust traditional subject matter to the cognitive level
of his students, so must such affectively charged material
be tailored to the student's level of understanding. The
dimensional approach to consistency provides a framework
in which such adjustments could be made.

In regard to classroom communication concerning
affective material, differences in teacher—student dimen-
sionality may have interesting effects. Ideally, communi—

<:ation would appear to be maximally effective when two

17

peOple are operating at the same level of dimensional

complexity. However, the highly dimensional teacher who

does not take into account the potentially lower level of
complexity of his students is liable to be misunderstood

when affectively charged topics are discussed.

Runkel (1956) conducted an interesting study deal-
ing with the effects of teacher-student differences in
dimensionality when only one dimension is considered.

Both teachers and students rank ordered all possible
combinations of five statements presented three at a time.
Similarity between dimensions used by teachers and students
was determined by the Coombs "unfolding technique." It was
found that those students who order attributes on dimensions
similar (collinear) to their teacher receive higher grades
than those who employ different dimensions (non—collinear).
This result was found to be independent of scholastic abil-
ity and similarity between teachers and students concerning
which statements were rated most highly. Similar results
would appear likely if number of dimensions were the
independent variable rather than unidimensional differences.

Differences in the number of dimensions between
students at different grade levels would have important
implications for curriculum construction. A lesson on
"ambivalent feelings," for instance, would require at
least a two dimensional structure for students to fully
comprehend.

If increasing dimensionality with age could be

demonstrated, then dimensional augumentation could be

18

seen as a valid goal of education. Kohlberg (1973) pro—
vides a parallel situation in his arguments for moral
education from a cognitive-developmental perspective. He
argues that traits which show a universal age related
development obviously have an adaptive value and should be
fostered. Kohlberg's method of exposing students to argu-
ments and discussion at one level above their current level
of functioning may also have some applicability as a way

of enhancing dimensional augumentation.

Statement of Purpose

 

The primary purpose of the present study is to
assess how a dimensional approach to coqnitive consistency
is affected by age. Other variables to be examined will
include I.Q. level, sex, and the situation in which consis-
tency is being assessed. Hypotheses concerning dimensional
growth will be made in light of organismic theories of devel-
opment as represented by the work of Piaget (1950) and Werner

(1948).

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The present chapter will review the experimental
evidence for the key theoretical concepts discussed in
Chapter I. The first section will summarize the research
dealing with cognitive consistency in adults. A detailed
consideration of the small number of studies examining
consistency from a developmental perspective will follow.
Cognitive complexity as a dimensional phenomena will then
be considered. It is this explication of complexity that
is most pertinent to the present research. Finally, the
work of Piaget and Werner will be examined for implica—
tions for developmental processes which may affect the

tendency toward consistency.

Cognitive Consistency Research with Adults

 

Most of the research surveyed by Zajonc (1968)
dealing with a preference for balanced (consistent) states
utilized hypothetical situations rated for their
"pleasantness" or "unpleasantness." These results gen-
erally support consistency expectations with some impor-
tant qualifications. Illustrative of both the support

for and the shortcomings of consistency theory are

19

20

studies by Jordan (1953) and Price, Harburg, and New-
comb (1966).

Jordan (1953) presented subjects with 64 situations
involving two people (P and O) and an impersonal entity
(X). Half of these hypothetical situations were balanced
and half unbalanced. The basic hypothesis that balanced
situations would be perceived as more pleasant was sup—
ported. However, some exceptions to this pattern were
noted. Positive relationships were found to influence
pleasantness. Thus, a balanced all-positive situation was
seen as more pleasant than a balanced state containing two
negative and one positive relationship. In light of the
basic theory, both of these cases are equally well bal-
anced. Furthermore, the relationship between P and 0
(both people) was more important in predicting pleasantness
than the P-X (person-object) relationship which, in turn,
was more important than the O-X bond.

Cartwright and Harary (1965) reinterpreted Jordan's
data by differentiating between a negative relationship
and the absence of a relationship. Jordan (1953) did not
make this distinction as the absence of a relationship
constituted a negative bond in traditional Heiderian
terms. By considering triads as "vacuously balanced"
when a relationship was absent, Cartwright and Harary
found that such triads were perceived as more pleasant
than unbalanced states but not as pleasant as balanced

states.

21

Price, Harburg, and Newcomb (1966) constructed
balanced and unbalanced P-O-Q triads where O and Q were
peOple known to the subject (P). These triads were rated
by subjects on an uneasy—pleasant scale. Two balanced
triads with positive P to 0 relationships were rated plea-
sant by 87 percent and 89 percent of the subjects respec-
tively. Imbalanced situations with a positive P to 0
relationship were rated "uneasy" by 89 percent and 84
percent of the subjects. These results provide an encourag-
ing degree of support for the consistency position. However,
balanced triads containing negative P to 0 bonds were seen
as "pleasant" by only 35 percent and 33 percent of the
subjects. Price, Harburg, and Newcomb (1966) explain the
failure of some situations to conform to theory as due to
the effects of uncertainty, ambivalence, and lack of engage-
ment when a P—O bond is negative.

"General but not unequivocal support" for a prefer-
ence for consistent states was also found by Zajonc (1968)
in studies in which subjects were asked 1) to predict a
missing bond, 2) to learn hypothetical consistent and incon-
sistent structures, and 3) to learn social structures.
Natural interpersonal situations have also been analyzed
to a limited extent. One study involving the galvanic skin
response (Burdick and Burnes, 1958) supported consistency
theory by finding physiological correlates of inconsistency.

Brehm and Cohen (1962) surveyed a substantial

number of studies testing propositions derived from the

cognitive dissonance formulation of consistency. Much of

22

this research bears directly on the consistency postulate
that inconsistency, or dissonance, results in tension and
subsequent reorganization in the interest of increased
consistency. Support for many of the major derivations of
the theory was found. Dissonance effects were demonstrated
in a wide variety of areas including opinions on issues,
information recall, perceptual distortion, behavioral change,
and motivation. While Brehm and Cohen (1962) concluded that
the theory has proved to be a "very powerful" predictive
tool, they do concede that there is one obvious disconfirma-
tion of the theory. This exception concerns the avoidance
of dissonant information. Insko (1967) adds the research

on reward in forced compliance situations as also failing

to support dissonance predictions.

Research reviews of either consistency theory as a
whole or of one of its derivatives are in agreement that
there is support for the basic consistency hypothesis.
(Zajonc, 1968; Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Kiesler, Collins,
and Miller, 1969; Insko, 1967) However, such support is
not unqualified because of such exceptions to theory as the
positivity bias and the differential effects of various
P-O—X bonds. It is also rare when a reviewer fails to
mention the interest shown in magicians, puzzles, para-
doxes, and science fiction as everyday sources of embarass-

ment for the consistency position.

23

Develgpmental Studies of Consistency

 

Consistency as a developmental phenomena was liter-
ally ignored for a long time. Recently, however, a number
of studies exploring its developmental course have appeared.
Much of this interest has been spurred by investigators
attempting to apply the developmental theories of Piaget
(1950) and Werner (1948) to the question of consistency.
The first amastudies to be reviewed (Weir, 1960; Smith,
1965) employed relatively older groups. Studies using
younger but better controlled groups (Shaw, 1968; Atwood,
1969; Blanchard and Price, 1971) will then be reviewed.
'Finally, a nondevelopmental but direct application of con-
sistency to an actual classroom setting (Carville, 1968)
will be mentioned.

Weir (1960) provided the first developmental study
of coqnitive consistency as a secondary explanation for a
study concerning fact-value differentiation. Subjects
(Graduate students, Undergraduates, and Evening College
students) were asked to rate their attitude toward three
topics: education, college, and university teachers. State-
ments concerning these topics were rated as "true-untrue"
(fact judgments) and "favorable—unfavorable" (value judg—
Inents). Based on Werner's concept of differentiation, it
was hypothesized that fact-value differentiation would be
greater in the Graduate student than Evening College group
éand in an academically ”high" as opposed to "low" under-

gyraduate group. Greater fact-value differentiation as

24

represented by small correlation coefficients was found
in the higher developmental groups (Graduate students and
high Undergraduates) than with their lower developmental
counterparts (Evening College students and low Under-
graduates).

Weir (1960) related his finding to consistency
theory by noting that what was described in his study as a
high fact-value correlation was equivalent to Heider's pre-
ference for balanced situations. He concluded that "From a
combination of the approaches of Werner and Heider it would
seem that the ability to tolerate "unbalanced situations" is
a developmentally high—level function." (Weir, 1960, p.81)

Smith (1965) studied groups with average ages of
13.3 (Boy Scouts), 17.6 (High School students), 22.6 (Uni-
versity students), and 57.7 (Veterans Hospital patients).
Age variation within each of these groups was considerable.
Subjects were asked to finish filling out partially com—
pleted Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Scales which created hypothe-
tical people either similar or dissimilar to the subject.
Dependent measures included a score for the differential
attribution of similarity and a rating of the subject's
twillingness to have each of the hypothetical people as a
xyork and as a leisure associate. An increasing tendency
toward consistency was found with age up to the oldest
group which reversed this trend by showing significantly
less consistency than the younger groups. Neither sex nor
intelligence had any effect on consistency.

The results of the Weir (1960) and Smith (1965)

25

studies stand in direct contradiction to one another. Sur-
prisingly, each author offers his results as proof that the
Wernerian process of differentiation has occurred. Accord—
ing to Weir (1960), differentiation proceeds from a global
state of consistency where fact and value judgments in his
study were fused to a state where these judgments are in-
creasingly independent in the more mature person. Thus, an
apparent tolerance for inconsistency is concomitant with
developmental growth. For Smith (1965), however, the occur-
rence of differentiation results in being able to see people
who are both similar and dissimilar to us more clearly. Thus,
we are better able to separate our likes from our dislikes
and consistency is enhanced by development.

Methodologically, both of these studies leave some-
thing to be desired. Neither bothered to control for relevant
group differences and age varied considerably around the
group means. Furthermore, developmental differences which
occur before the teenage years could not be detected as the
youngest group in either study was 13.3 years old.

Smith (1965) in his discussion of the differences
between his and Weir's results points to the different nature
of the two tasks as contributing to the discrepant results.
Unfortunately, later developmental studies have not pursued
the question of cross-situational stability in regard to
consistency. One objective of the present study will be to
provide some information on this point.

Younger and better controlled groups were examined

in the developmental studies by Shaw (1968), Atwood (1969),

26

and Blanchard and Price (1971).

Shaw (1968) studied subjects at 11, 13k, 168, and
19 years of age. Consistency was assessed using a verbal
form of the Heider-Simmel animated cartoon characters also
used in adult studies. The actions of three story charac-
ters were described by short sentences. Subjects rated
personality characteristics and relationship patterns among
the characters to provide measures of consistency. Consis-
tency was found to be a significant organizational principle
in all groups. However, age and sex were not found to be
significant variables.

Shaw's (1968) failure to find developmental changes
in consistency may be due to his failure to extend his study
developmentally low enough. A similar limitation was noted
in the Weir (1960) and Smith (1965) studies. Shaw's four
groups ranged in age from 11 to 19. In terms of Piagetian
theory which Shaw used to predict age related differentia—
tion, all four groups have entered the stage of formal
operations. A more likely place to look for the effects of
differentiation would be between groups in adjacent Piagetian
stages. Atwood (1969) and Blanchard and Price (1971) made
such comparisons with interesting results.

Atwood (1969) found evidence for age related changes
in consistency with groups corresponding to the following
ages and Piagetian stages: intutitive or preoperational
thought (5-6 years), concrete operations (8—9 years), and
formal Operations (11—12 years). Subjects were presented

twith stories involving three children. Two relationships

27

between the members of a triad were provided and the subject
was to indicate the nature of the final missing relationship.
Preoperational subjects did not conform to consistency
theory. Instead, their responses indicated an inability to
see the implications of the two relationships given for the
final missing relationship. Concrete Operational subjects
and formal operational subjects, on the other hand, did show
a great deal of adherence to consistency in completing the
triads. However, the responses of subjects in these two
groups to a post-test interview indicate important differ-
ences between their "needs" for consistency. Atwood (1969)
reports that "Concrete Operational thought conforms to the
balance model with surprising rigor, often reacting as if
the implications of each relation within a triadic system
for the other two were purely a matter of logic." (Atwood,
1969, p.83) More flexibility was noted in the formal stage
subjects who saw external circumstances as also determining
whether or not consistency would prevail. Thus, "For the
formal Operational child, a situation of OOgnitive balance
represents only one of many relational arrangements which
are possible in a given threeeperson system." (Atwood, 1969,
p.84)

Blanchard and Price (1971), also studying changes
between Piagetian levels, failed to confirm the direction of
Atwood's finding when the affective reaction to triadic
situations was measured. They tested one group of pre—
Operational subjects (first graders), two groups of concrete

stage subjects (second and fourth graders), and two groups

28

at the formal stage (eighth graders and college freshmen).
Each subject was presented with eight triadic situations
containing all possible combinations of consistent and in-
consistent relationships. Five point scales were used for
subjects to rate how each situation felt on "good-bad" and
"happy-sad" continuums. Both the preoperational and formal
operational groups showed a preference for consistency
while the concrete stage group did not. The latter did,
however, have a preference for positivity - a phenomenon
often noted in adult studies of consistency.

The lack of agreement between the Atwood (1969) and
Blanchard and Price (1971) studies is not too surprising in
light of the differences between their dependent measures.
Furthermore, the indirect nature of both methods of measur—
ing consistency (predicting a missing relationship and
rating the affective reaction to a triad) appears question-
able as a substitute for a child's own cognitive structures.
This will be discussed at greater length in the following
section.

Carville (1968) did study consistency within an
actual classroom setting. He examined Newcomb's statement
of consistency in regard to both liking relationships be-
tween students and school-related attitudes. Sociometric
and attitude questionnaires were administered at the
beginning and end of the school year to the fourth, fifth,
and sixth graders serving as subjects. Support for the
consistency position was found in seven of eight hypotheses

dealing with classmate liking relationships. However,

29

consistency was not supported in regard to school-related
attitudes.

To summarize the present section, there are con-
flicting results regarding the developmental course of
consistency. Weir (1960) and Atwood (1969) find evidence
that consistency decreases with age. Smith's (1965) work
suggests an age related increase. Shaw (1968) found no
evidence of change with age while Blanchard and Price
(1971) found a decline then an increase in the tendency for
consistency. Some of the limitations of the research which
have prevented a clearer conception of the developmental
course of consistency from emerging will be discussed in

the next section.

Limitations of Developmental Studies of Consistency

 

While the present section will focus on the recently
discussed developmental studies, most of the resulting criti-
cisms apply in equal measure to consistency research in
general. Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming has been the
limited number of consistency studies of children. Only
within the last five years have children younger than high
school age been studied. Even the "pioneering" developmen-
tal studies by Weir (1960) and Smith (1965) came 15 to 20
years after the first formal statement of consistency. Per-
haps the lack of developmental research parallels the
research situation in the consistency field as a whole.
Kiesler, Collins, and Miller (1968) note that while Heider

stimulated a great deal of theorizing about consistency, he

3O

stimulated much less research activity aimed at testing
the basic propositions of his theory.

Of that research that has been done a large number
of studies have assessed consistency by using hypothetical
situations with the subject being asked to either supply a
missing relationship or rate the situation for pleasantness-
unpleasantness. All three developmental studies of grade
school students reviewed earlier employed hypothetical
triads. The task of filling in a missing relationship close-
1y resembles a "cold" kind of logical reasoning or problem
solving rather than the naturally occurring cognitive states
which are described by consistency models. Particularly for
the school child accustomed to taking tests is it dangerous
to assume an isomorphism between predicting a missing bond
and a subject's own interpersonal processes. Carville's
(1968) study was a welcomed exception to the use of hypo-
thetical situations. Unfortunately, his study measuring
the consistency of friendships and school—related attitudes
only covered the age span from fourth to sixth grade.

Rating situations for their affective properties as
done by the subjects in the Blanchard and Price (1971) study
is also questionable. Insko (1967) notes that affective
dimensions such as uneasy-pleasant might not be appropriate
for describing consistent states. He likens consistency to
a stable state and inconsistency to an unstable state. While
uneasiness is seen as an acceptable correlate of instability,
Insko (1967) argues that pleasantness does not adequately

describe stability.

31

Shortcomings in the way of quantification of both
the degree of relationship between elements and the degree
of inconsistency of a structure are frequently made of con-
sistency research. (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969;
McGuire, 1966) Quantitative limitations are particularly
acute in regard to developmental research where global
measures may mask subtle processes of differentiation. Un-
fortunately, developmental investigators have followed
Heider's (1946) lead by viewing a situation as either totally
balanced or unbalanced and limiting relationships to likes
and dislikes. The quantitative elaborations of consistency
theory by Cartwright and Harary (1956), Abelson and Rosen-
berg (1958) and Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) make it possible
to avoid the criticism of the lack of quantitative sophisti-
cation of Heider's original model.

Finally, all of the developmental research surveyed
ignored advanced modes of resolving inconsistency. One is
left with the impression that everything not accounted for
by the simplistic balance model is merely inconsistency
"striving" for consistency. More complex ways of resolving
inconsistency such as dimensional augumentation (Phillips,

1973) have not been studied developmentally.

The Present Response to the Limitations
of Previous Research

 

 

The present study has attempted to avoid many of the
shortcomings of developmental studies of consistency just

discussed. Many of these limitations will be circumvented

32

through the study of a consistency model (Phillips, 1973)
which is both more quantitatively and theoretically sophis-
ticated than Heider's (1946) original model. Until now,
the latter model has been the exclusive concern of develop-
mental consistency researchers.

The quantitative advantages of the Phillips (1973)
model make it possible to specify intermediate degrees of
relationship between elements as well as an intermediate
degree of consistency for a total structure. Consistency
research with both adults and children has long been criti-
cized (McGuire, 1966; Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969)
for its failure to become more precise in this way.

Even more importantly, however, the Phillips (1973)
model conceives of consistency in terms which also allow
for "complexity." This is accomplished through the notion
of dimensionality whereby consistency at different levels
of dimensionality is possible. Previous developmental
studies of consistency have ignored such advanced modes of
inconsistency resolution.

Another drawback avoided in the present study is
the use of hypothetical rating situations criticized by
Insko (1967). Subjects will report on the relationship
between elements of a given cognitive structure as they
perceive them. Thus, a more direct or naturalistic picture
of consistency is obtained.

Finally, the situation in which consistency is
being assessed will be considered in the present study.

Although Smith (1965) alluded to the possible significance

33

of this variable in regard to consistency, it has not been
pursued by later developmental investigators. Perhaps
some of the lack of agreement between recent developmental
studies of consistency can be explained by situational

factors.

Dimensionality as an Aspect
of Cognitive Complexity

 

 

Although there is a tendency to think of cognitive
complexity as a unitary trait, there is evidence to suggest
that such a conception is too simplistic. Vannoy (1965)
presented subjects with a battery of 20 instruments pur-
porting to measure complexity. Factor analysis of the
intercorrelations of these tests failed to discover a
unitary complexity factor. Several factors, all accounting
for small proportions of the total variance, were found
instead. This led Vannoy (1965) to suggest that "... cog-
nitive complexity may consist of a number of distinct,
possibly independent, tendencies not all of which are
educed by any of the present measurement instruments."
(Vannoy, 1965, p.385)

Bieri (1966) also acknowledges that complexity is
not a unitary trait by distinguishing between two main types.
The first type views complexity in terms of the number of
concepts or categories used by a person. "Such categorical
approaches emphasize the discrete, nominal, and classifi-
catory nature of perception, such that the relevant attri-

butes of a stimulus are matched against an ideal model or

34

precept.‘ (Beiri, 1966 p.28). Bruner's work on concept
formation is given as an example of this approach to com-
plexity.

The other approach conceives of complexity in
terms of the number of dimensions utilized by a person.

This is the type of complexity that was described in Chap-
ter I in relation to the Scott (1969) and Phillips (1973)
consistency models.

Research bearing on the development of dimension—
ality was conducted by Signell (1965) and Olshan (1970).
Signell (1965) analyzed the ratings of fourth, sixth, and
ninth grade subjects for dimensional complexity in regard
to person and nation perception. Dimensional complexity
was found to increase in regard to nation but not person
perception. However, within concept complexity did increase
for person perception.

Olshan (1970) did not find an increase in the number
of dimensions utilized by third, sixth, and ninth graders
who sorted the traits describing various occupational roles.
However, the psychological nature of the two to three di-
mensions utilized at each grade level did change. Olshan
aggregated data at each grade level, however, possibly
serving to mask interindividual differences in the develop-
ment of dimensionality.

The dimensional approach to cognitive Complexity
has, like consistency theory, received little developmental
attention. Differentiation has been demonstrated in a

limited way by Signell (1965) in the number of dimensions

35

and by Olshan (1970) in addition to Signell (1965) within
dimensions. Organismic developmental theory provides a
further framework for hypothesizing dimensional growth.
This view of the developmental process will be reviewed in

the following section.

Cognitive Differentiation: The Organismic View

 

As noted in Chapter I, the organismic theories of
develOpment as represented by the work of Heinz Werner (1948)
and Jean Piaget (1950) have interesting implications for
cognitive consistency as a developmental phenomena. Both
Werner and Piaget see development as proceeding from a rela-
tively undifferentiated state toward increasing differentia-
tion. At the same time there is a hierarchic integration of
former states into the more SOphisticated state which has
evolved.

Werner (1948) asserts that the process of differentia-
tion and subordination is the basis of organic development.
This is felt to be true for biological as well as cognitive
development.

The fundamental law of develOpment which, up

to this point, has been demonstrated in the

genesis of the nervous system may logically

be applied to the mental functions per se.

An increasing differentiation and refine-

ment of mental phenomena and functions and

a progressive hierarchization may be accep-

ted as a basic principle. (Werner, 1948,

p.51)

Werner (1948) advances five pairs of concepts which

help to define the course of development discussed above.

36

Thus, he sees such growth as proceeding from (1) syncretic
to discrete, (2) diffuse to articulated, (3) indefinite to
definite, (4) rigid to flexible, and (5) labile to stable.
Werner (1948) provides numerous examples of these progres—
sions in children, primitive tribes, and animals.

Piaget (1950) is more definite than Werner in the
stages which undergo differentiation and hierarchization.
He describes the process of development from the sensori-
motor stage to the stage of formal operations as follows:

The symbolic schema assimilates sensori-motor

schemata with differentiation of function;

imitative accommodation is extended into

imaginal significants and assimilation deter-

mines the significates. The intuitive schema

is both a co-ordination and a differentiation

of imaginal schemata. The concrete operational

schema is a grouping of intuitive schemata,

which are promoted, by the very fact of their

being grouped, to the rank of reversible oper-

ations. Finally, the formal schema is simply

a system of second-degree operations, and

therefore a grouping operating on concrete

groupings. (Piaget, 1950, p.151-152)

As indicated in Chapter I, the question of whether
such differentiation occurrs in regard to affect-laden cog-
nition has yet to be answered. Flavell (1963) summarized
Piaget's feelings concerning affective development by
stating that "Alongside the develOpment of intellectual
structures from birth through adolescence are found parallel
forms of affective organization, i.e., parallel structures
which bear primarily on persons rather than on objects."
(Flavell, 1963, p.81)

Some evidence to suggest that there are parallels

between intellectual and affective organization can be

37

found in studies of personality perception. Three of
these studies (Gollin, 1958; Biskin, 1971; Peevers and
Secord, 1973) are especially relevant because they used
the work of Piaget and Werner for making their develop—
mental predictions.

Gollin (1958) studied personality perception in
three groups of subjects from 11 to 16 years of age. Sub—
jects were shown a four scene movie of a boy. In two scenes,
he was shown involved in socially approved behavior while
socially disapproved behavior was depicted in the other two
scenes. Subjects were then asked to write what they thought
of the boy. ReSponses were scored for the use of both in—
ferences and concepts. Inferences were defined as state-
ments going beyond what was shown in the movie while concepts
were attempts to account for the "diversity" of the boy's
behavior.

Both inferential and conceptual statements were
found to increase with age. Consistent but smaller sex
differences favoring girls were found. Even weaker I.Q. and
S.E.S. differences were also observed in favor of the sub-
jects higher on each of those variables.

Biskin (1971) used a similar methodclogy to Gollin
but a different dependent measure as subjects at three grade
levels (fourth, eighth, and twelfth) were shown two video—
taped vignettes showing a boy or girl displaying both
socially approved and unacceptable behavior. After seeing
a vignette, subjects were asked to write their spontaneous

impressions of the central figure. The resulting descrip~

38

tions were analyzed according to the Crockett system for
scoring impressions from contradictory information. De-
pendent variables measured by this technique include
concrete differentiation, abstract differentiation, con-
nectedness, organization, and total differentiation. An
increasing differentiation with grade was found on all of
these variables. Sex and I.Q. effects favoring girls and
brighter subjects were present to a more limited extent.

Peevers and Secord (1973) used open ended descrip-
tions of peers in studying developmental changes in person
perception. Groups were examined at the following grade
levels: Kindergarten, Third Grade, Seventh Grade, Eleventh
Grade and College. They found increasing differentiation
with age on the variable of "descriptiveness." This refers
to the "relative proportion of information pertaining to a
person as a unique individual - the extent to which a person
is differentiated from his social setting or possessions."
(Peevers and Secord, 1973, p.126) While kindergartners saw
the person and his possessions as a global whole, the older
subjects differentiated people on such bases as personality
traits, unique abilities and interests.

Gollin (1958), Biskin (1971), and Peevers and Secord
(1973) provide support for the applicability of organismic
theory to "affect-laden" cognition. The present study will
attempt to determine whether such support is forthcoming in

respect to consistency theory.

39

Summagy

Four main areas were reviewed in the present section:
consistency research with adult populations, developmental
studies of consistency, dimensionality as an aspect of cog-
nitive complexity, and the organismic concept of develop—
mental differentiation. In addition, the two sections
dealing with consistency were followed by a critique of
research in that area and a statement of how the present
study will attempt to overcome the limitations of previous
research.

The summary of consistency research with adult
pOpulations supports consistency as being an important
organizational principle of adult interpersonal and object
perception. However, enough shortcomings have been found
that classically stated consistency theory is obviously not
the last word about such perception. On an intuitive level,
the notion that even the most intelligent and flexible
among us Operate on such a simplistic principle is diffi—
cult to accept without qualification.

Developmental studies, like those of adults, have
shown that the consistency principle accounts for a good
deal of person/object perception. However, developmental
trends have not yet been clearly defined. Although not
more than five developmental studies could be found by the
present investigator, there is support for an increase in
consistency with age, a decrease with age, and no develop-

mental change.

4O

Consistency research has been hampered by problems
of quantification and a lack of direct measures of cognitive
structure. Furthermore, the small number of develOpmental
studies have examined consistency only in light of Heider's
original statement of the theory. Elaborations of the con—
sistency position which allow for considerably more quanti-
tative SOphistication have been ignored. A dimensional
approach to consistency as found in the work of Scott (1968)
and Phillips (1973) is one such promising elaboration for
developmentalists to pursue.

Dimensionality as an aspect of cognitive complexity
was also reviewed in the present section. Although there
has been little develOpmental study of this type of complexs
ity, tendencies toward both growth in the number of dimen-
sions and between dimensions have been noted.

Finally, the concept of “differentiation" as advanced
by Werner and Piaget was presented. This provides a frame-
work in which to hypothesize an increase in dimensionality
with development. At the same time, the use of an unidi-
mensional or traditional consistency model would be expected
to decline. Three studies reviewed in the area of personal-
ity impression from inconsistent information have verified
the existence of differentiation in that realm. Thus,
differentiation in the area of consistency, while not yet

unequivocally demonstrated, is a distinct possibility.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Sample

The sample consisted of groups of 3rd., 7th., and
11th. grade students drawn from a school district in a mixed
farming-industrial-college town in southern Michigan. The
3rd. graders represented all three of the district's elemen-
tary schools while the 7th. and 11th. graders attended a
centralized Middle School and Senior High School respect-
ively. Each grade level group was composed of a total of'
24 students who were further subdivided on the basis of.

intelligence and sex. The experimental design is illus-

trated in Table 1.

Table 1. Experimental Design

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRADE
3 7 11
sex
M r M r M r
0': High 6 6 6 6 6
"3 Low 6 6 6 6 6 6

 

 

 

 

 

 

41

42

Sample Selection

 

Sampling at each grade level was done on a random
basis within the confines of intelligence range. The follow-
ing score ranges were selected for defining the High and
Low intelligence groups:

High 105-120

Low 80-95
I.Q. scores were obtained from school records. At each
grade level included in the present study the California
Achievement Test battery had been administered the previous
fall. The language score from the Mental Maturity section
of this instrument was used as the intelligence criterion.

In order to compensate for some of the unreliabil—
ity of group test scores, those 7th. and 11th. graders
whose present scores fell in the High range but scored
below 100 when tested two years ago were eliminated from
the sample. Similarly, those presently scoring in the Low
group who scored above 100 two years ago were also elimi-
nated. Such a comparison was not possible with the 3rd.
grade group as no comparable previous results were avail-
able for them. The intelligence test score means for each
group included in the study is contained in Table 2.

An additional restriction placed upon the sample
was that all students selected be within one year of the
expected chronological age for their grade level. This
restriction was necessary to prevent the Low I.Q. groups

from being significantly older than expected for their

43

grade level. This would have been likely because of the
frequent occurrance of school failure within those groups.

The mean age for each group is presented in Table 3.

Table 2. Mean I.Q. scores of the sample.

GRADE

 

 

3 A 7 11

 

SEX

 

F M F M F

 

M
(5. High 111.66 111.66 113.33 111.50 112-00 110-33

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F; Low 90.16 88.66 88.33 90.16 86.00 87.00

 

Table 3. Mean ages of the sample.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRADE
3 7 11
sex
M F M r M F
0': High 9-1 8-11 13-1 13-3 16—11 17—0
*4 Low 9—1 9-3 13—4 13-4 17-1 17-3

 

Procedure and Test Stimuli

 

The SS were seen individually at school by the
examiner and tested in an office or small room. Upon
meeting the S the E introduced himself as a student from
Michigan State University. The S was then told that he
or she had been chosen by chance to participate in a study

concerning how students their age feel about a number

44

of subjects. The S was then asked if he would like to

Spend about one half hour filling out some Sheets. All

Ss agreed to do so. Specific test instructions are contain-
ed in Appendix A.

The test materials consisted of three separate tOpics
which contained seven items each. Using Abelson and Rosen-
berg's (1958) terminology such a topic would be referred to
as a "conceptual arena" and its component items known as
"cognitive elements." The three conceptual arenas construct—
ed for the present study were labeled "People I Know,"
"School," and "Occupations." The elements contained in each

of these topics were the following:

PEOPLE I KNOW

 

I (subject)

Dad (or closest male relation)
Mom (or closest female relation)
First Liked Person

First Disliked Person

Second Liked Person

Second Disliked Person

SCHOOL

I (subject)
Teacher
Principal
Lunch Time
Homework
Friends
Tests

OCCUPATIONS

 

I (subject)
Farmer

Dentist
Policeman
Factory Worker
Teacher
Janitor

45

Each cognitive element was typed on a separate
3x5 card. A rating sheet (Appendix B) was placed before
the S prior to presenting the elements for each conceptual
arena. The cards for a given arena were presented two at
a time by hand by the S. The Ss were asked to rate how
well the pairs "go together" with one another. For each
topic, a total of 21 pairwise relationships was generated
by its 7 elements.

A two step rating procedure was employed. The
rating Sheet was divided into two halves for this purpose.
The first step involved the S marking whether each pair of
elements was positive (+), negative (-), or neutral (0)
with one another. While these initial ratings were made
the rating sheet was folded so that only the left half of
the paper containing spaces numbered from 1 to 21 was ex-
posed. The appropriate sign for each relationship was
marked by the S in these spaces.

After this initial rating was made for the elements
of a conceptual arena, the rating sheet was completely
opened to expose the numbers 1 through 5 for rating the
intensity of the previously identified positive and negative
relationships. All pairs of elements identified as posi-
tively related were first re-exposed and intensity ratings
made by the S who circled the number corresponding to the
degree of relationship for a given pair. Negatively rated
relationships were then similarly re-exposed and rated for
intensity.

After one topic was completely rated, the same

46

procedure was followed for rating the two succeeding
topics. The presentation of the three topics was syste—
matically varied to control for order effects.

Before ratings were given for People I Know, SS
were asked to give the first names of two people outside
of their family that they liked and two that they disliked.
These names were then printed on 3x5 cards and presented
with the other elements for that topic.

The three conceptual arenas and their cognitive
elements were constructed with two criteria in mind. The
first was that they be meaningful to all groups represented
in the present study. Secondly, the topics were constructed
to represent a continuum of ego-involving situations. Peo-
ple I Know was thought to represent a highly involving topic
while Occupations was selected for its seemingly low involve-
ment. School was felt to represent an intermediate degree

of involvement.

Hypotheses

 

Before stating the hypotheses, a bridge between the
literature reviewed in Chapter II and the present measure
of dimensionality would be useful. The literature re-
viewed suggests that there is a large but not perfect ten—
dency toward consistency in organizing interpersonal and
object perception. Furthermore, there is no unambiguous
evidence from adult or child studies to suggest differ—

ences between groups in the tendency or "need" for con—

47

sistency. Thus, consistency may be thought of as a
constant across groups.

This has important implications for the eigen-
value measure of dimensionality used in the present study.
This index is sensitive to both consistency and dimension-
ality. Assuming that the tendency toward consistency is
a constant, changes in this index would be due to dimen-
sionality which would be expected to increase on the basis
of organismic theory. Thus, while the present measure does
not enable one to label with complete certainty a given
subject's level of dimensionality, it does permit meaningful

between group comparisons.

Hypothesis I. As grade increases a Rank I matrix (one
dimensional) will account for smaller
amounts of the total matrix variance.

This hypothesis is based on the belief that consis-
tency theory in its traditional form represents a global,
undifferentiated state. Thus, the organismic process of
differentiation should result in the simplistic model

accounting for less variance with development.

Hypothesis II. As grade increases there will be an increase
in the number of dimensions used to achieve
consistency.

Although the first hypothesis suggests an age-related
decline in consistency in the traditional sense, it can be
seen from the present hypothesis that the consistency posi—

tion is not being completely abandoned. Rather, it is

48

expected that older subjects maintain consistency at a

higher level of dimensionality.

Hypothesis III. The number of dimensions utilized by sub-
jects will be greater at the higher I.Q.
levels.

Based on the .70 correlation between Piagetian and
Stanford-Binet test scores (Kohlberg, 1968) I.Q. would be
expected to be an important factor determining dimensional
development. This would be especially true at the seventh
grade level where Piaget's stage of Formal Operations has,

on the average, just evolved out of Concrete Operations.

Hypothesis IV. The number of dimensions used by subjects
will vary across the three topics presented.
This hypothesis is based on the observation that
even the acquisition of Piagetian tasks such as the conser-
vation of matter, weight, and volume are not achieved at
the same time. (Flavell, 1963) Thus, a difference in dimene
sional development in regard to different tOpics appears
plausible. Such a difference across topics may also explain
the lack of agreement between past develOpmental studies
of consistency theory.
In addition to the above hypotheses the variable
of sex will also be examined. However, since previous
consistency studies have not found sex to be a significant

variable, no specific hypothesis is made concerning it.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSES AND RESULTS

Introduction

 

The research hypotheses were tested using two
multivariate analyses of repeated measures. The first
multivariate analysis was used to test only the initial
hypothesis. The dependent measure in this case was an esti-
mate of the total variance for each matrix accounted for by
a Rank I model - the traditional unidimensional model of
consistency. Each of the 216 matrices generated by the
72 S3 was factored according to the Rank I model using a
Computer Institute for Social Science Research program on
the Michigan State University 6500 computer.‘ Eigenvectors
and eigenvalues were calculated for each matrix by this pro-
gram. The largest of the seven matrix eigenvalues was
then squared and divided by the sum of squares of all seven
eigenvalues to obtain an estimate of the total matrix vari-
ance accounted for by the Rank I model.

In order to test hypotheses two to four a second
multivariate analysis of repeated measures was used. The
dependent measure for this analysis was a number describing
subject dimensionality for each of the three topics. This

measure was obtained by factoring each matrix using Rank II

49

50

through Rank VII models in addition to the Rank I model
previously generated. Estimates of matrix variance
accounted for by each model were then calculated by adding
the sum of squares of the 3 largest eigenvalues corres-
ponding to the rank of the model being tested and dividing
by the total sum of squares of all seven eigenvalues.
Dimensionality was defined from these variance estimates
as the model of lowest rank which accounted for at least
75 percent of the total variance for a given matrix. When
the 75 percent level could not be reached by any model for
a given matrix, the rank of the model most closely approxi-
mating this criterion determined dimensionality for that
matrix.

The 75 percent criteria provides an intermediate
degree of variance accounted for which is neither unrealis-
tically high nor low. Furthermore, this criterion orders
the data in much the same way as 70 percent or 80 percent
levels.

A criterion much lower or higher than the one chosen
would have resulted in either a basal or ceiling effect.
That is, a lower criterion in the 50-60 percent range would
have made virtually all subjects appear unidimensional. By
(zontrast, a 90 percent criterion would have resulted in
Inost subjects appearing highly multidimensional. In both
cases, the between subject variance would have been greatly
restricted when compared to the 75 percent criterion.

The variance accounted for by each model and the

derived dimensionality for each matrix are presented in

51

Appendix C.

The results of the multivariate analyses of re—
peated measures are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The
absence of significant interactions for each multivariate
analysis permits a direct interpretation of hypothesized

main effects. The .05 significance level was used to

evaluate hypothesized effects.

 

 

Table 4. Multivariate analysis of variance of repeated
measures for matrix variance estimates using a
Rank I model.
Source S SS 35
Between Subjects
Grade 1.1241 “6,116 .3527
IQ .7864 3, 58 .5064
Sex .7242 3, 58 .5417
Grade x IQ .7560 6,116 .6060
Grade x Sex .6036 6,116 .7270
IQ x Sex .5578 3, 58 .6451
Grade x IQ x Sex .8383 6,116 .5428
Within Subjects
Topic 47.9322 2, 59 .0001
Grade x Topic 1.3470 4,118 .2567
IQ x Topic .6401 2, 59 .5309
Sex x Topic 1.0190 2, 59 .3673
Grade x IQ x TOpic .5269 4,118 .7162
Grade x Sex x Topic .8088 4,118 .5220
IQ x Sex x Topic .6108 2, 59 .5464
Grade x IQ x Sex x Topic .7559 4,118 .5561

g

__¥

ram-va— —

52

 

 

Table 5. Multivariate analysis of variance of repeated
measures for dimensionality.

Source S SS 35

Between Subjects
Grade 1.7694 6,116 .1114
IQ 1.5234 3, 58 .2181
Sex .9863 3, 58 .4057
Grade x IQ .4998 6,116 .8075
Grade x Sex .4899 6,116 .8149
IQ x Sex .8797 3, 58 .4571
Grade x IQ x Sex .9345 6,116 .4732

Within subjects
Topic 32.6137 2, 59 .0001
Grade x Topic 1.4728 4,118 .2149
IQ x Topic .4578 2, 59 .6350
Sex x Topic .6003 2, 59 .5520
Grade x IQ x Topic .5878 4,118 .6721
Grade x Sex x Topic .7173 4,118 .5818
IQ x Sex x Topic .9435 2, 59 .3951
Grade x IQ x Sex x Topic .7184 4,118 .5810

 

 

53

Hypothesis I. As grade increases a Rank I matrix (one
dimensional) will account for smaller
amounts of the total matrix variance.

The obtained F ratio of 1.12 (df=6,116;p(.3527) fails

to support this hypothesis. On the first topic, People I

Know, there was slightly more variance accounted for at the

seventh (74 percent) and eleventh (71 percent) grades than

at the third grade (66 percent) by the Rank I model. The
second topic, School, Showed virtually no grade-related

change as it accounted for 58 percent, 54 percent, and 57

percent of the variance across grade. The third topic,

Occupations, showed a slight increase from 46 percent to

48 percent to 49 percent as grade increased.

Hypothesis II. AS grade increases there will be an increase
in the number of dimensions used to achieve
consistency.

The nonsignificant F of 1.7694 (df=6,1l6;p<.lll4)
fails to provide support for this hypothesis. Seventh and
eleventh graders had almost identical mean dimensionalities
across all three topics of 2.52 and 2.54 while third grad—

ers had a somewhat higher mean dimensionality of 2.81.

Hypothesis III. The number of dimensions used by subjects
will be greater at the higher I.Q. levels.
The obtained F ratio of 1.5234 (df=3,58;p<.2181)
also fails to provide support for this prediction. Further-
more, low I.Q. subjects were found to have a higher mean

dimensionality (2.78) than high I.Q. subjects (2.47).

54

Hypothesis IV. The number of dimensions used by subjects
will vary across the three topics pre-
sented.

The obtained F ratio of 32.6137 (df=2,59;p<.0001)
supports the hypothesized difference in dimensionality
across topics. In order to determine whether there were
differences between all possible pairs of topics the uni-
variate analyses of differences between topics were
examined. As can be seen in Table 6 all three possible
comparisons were significant at the .0001 level.

Table 6. Univariate analyses of variance for comparisons
between topics.

 

 

 

Comparison Mean Square - S SS' 25
Topic l-Topic 2 18.0625 21.6389 1,60 .0001
Topic l-Topic 3 72.2500 65.6818 1,60 .0001
TOpic 2-Topic 3 18,0625 18.0374 1,60 .0001

 

As illustrated by Figure l the differences between
subjects on each of the three topics were in the direction

of increased dimensionality as ego-involvement decreased.

The most involving topic-PeOple I Know-had a mean dimension-

ality of 1.917 while average dimensionalities of 2.625
and 3.333 were obtained for "School" and "Occupations"

respectively.

55

 

 

5 F'
>a
+1 4 -
--l
H
g 3 , "
0 "" I/
H I
U) ’0’
C /
g 2 b I’d”
q... ./
Q

1 1

1 1 1, _
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3

Figure 1 Average number of dimensions utilized by subjects
on each of the three topics.

In addition to the preceding hypotheses sex was
examined as a variable possibly affecting dimensionality.
The nonsignificant F ratio of .9863 (df=3,58;p<.4057) fails)
to provide support for sex effects in regard to dimension—
ality. A higher overall mean dimensionality of 2.73 was
found for girls as compared to a mean dimensionality of

2.52 for boys.

Summary of the Results

 

Hypotheses concerning differences in the amount of
variance accounted for by a Rank I matrix and differences
in dimensionality across grade and I.Q. level were not sup-
ported. Sex differences were also examined and failed to
yield a significant difference in subject dimensionality.
The nonsignificant mean differences pointed toward higher

dimensionality for third grade subjects, low I.Q. subjects,

56

and girls.

A highly significant difference (p<.0001) was found,
however, across topics. All possible comparisons between
the three tOpics were found to be significantly different
in the dimensionality utilized by subjects on each. Lowest
dimensionality was found in the highly ego-involving
People I Know t0pic while the dimensionality of subjects
increased on School and, to an even greater extent, on

Occupations.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

The results presented in Chapter IV will be
discussed under three main headings. First, findings
relating to the unidimensional model of consistency will
be considered. Following that will be a discussion of
dimensionality with respect to grade, I.Q., and sex. All
three of these variables were found to be nonsignificant
in regard to dimensionality. Finally, an attempt will be
made to explain the highly significant differences due to

topic.

The Unidimensional Model of Consistency

 

The unidimensional model represents the traditional
View of consistency. This view implies that we separate
our likes and dislikes into two distinct camps. We expect
that there will be positive relationships between those
things that we like and a similar relationship between our
dislikes. Furthermore, we expect our "likes" to be opposed
to our "dislikes" and vice versa.

It was hypothesized that the organismic process
of differentiation would result in this "simplistic"

model of consistency accounting for less matrix variance as

57

58

age increased. The results did not support this predic-
tion as nonsignificant differences were found between the
three grade level groups for each of the three topics.

The present results are in agreement with Shaw
(1968) who also failed to observe developmental change in
the tendency to seek consistency. Other develOpmental
studies fail to provide consistent evidence of an age-
related differentiation of the global state of unidimen-
sional consistency. Thus, the usefulness of organismic
theory to help describe development in this area appears
limited. Perhaps as Flavell (1963) asked, there is "...a
development toward nonverdicality contemporaneous with
the Piagetian development away from it." (Flavell, 1963,
p.441)

The amount of variance accounted for by the uni-
dimensional model no doubt explains its persistence as
the most common form of consistency from Heider's (1946)
original presentation to the present day. Averaging
across all groups one dimension accounted for 70 percent
of the estimated matrix variance on the first topic,

56 percent on the second topic, and 48 percent on the
third topic. Such explanatory power is rarely equaled in
personality or social psychology research. Thus, the fact
that consistency accounts for a good deal of person and
object perception has been demonstrated once again by the

present study.

59

Dimensionality in Respect to
Grade, I.Q., and Sex

 

 

In light of the lack of an age-related decrease
in the variance accounted for by the unidimensional model,
it is not surprising that develOpmental differences in
dimensionality were not found. Again, the "semicognitive"
processes involved in consistency have apparently oper-
ated to negate whatever developmental change has occurred.

However, the mean dimensionality across all sub-
jects and topics (X=2.625) indicates that increased explana-
tory power is added by the multidimensional model. Even
the topic generating the lowest mean dimensionality-People
I Know (X=l.9l7)- is better explained by a multidimensional
than unidimensional model. These findings are consistent
with Olshan (1970) who also found that two to three dimen-
sions were utilized at all age levels sampled with no
increase in dimensionality with age. Olshan (1970) arrived
at her results with data aggregated at each grade level.
The present study supports her findings with individually
determined dimensionality.

Thus, despite the previously acknowledged power
of the unidimensional model, the multidimensional model
of Phillips (1973) accounts for even more of the present
data. Further use of the multidimensional model for
describing consistency appears warranted on the basis of
the present results.

The question concerning why dimensional growth

was not observed at the more advanced develOpmental levels

60

remains to be considered. The most obvious answer to this
question has been alluded to already. That is, dimensional
augumentation may not conform to organismic processes of
differentiation. While some types of cognitive complexity
have been shown to undergo age-related differentiation,
these studies (Gollin, 1958; Biskin, 1970) have focused on
aspects of complexity other than dimensionality. Vannoy
(1965) gives good reason to believe that complexity is

not a unitary trait. Thus, there is the possibility that
different aSpects of complexity have different developmental
courses.

Methodologically, dimensional augumentation may
have been masked for a couple of reasons. One possibility
in this regard was a failure to extend the age range sampled
low enough. At the lowest level, third grade, at least
two dimensions were already firmly established. A third
grade group was also the youngest used by Olshan (1970)
when she failed to find dimensional growth. Perhaps the
point at which a change from a one to two dimensional cog-
nitive structure occurs is several years earlier.

Another methodological consideration possibly
affecting dimensional growth concerns the use of multi-
dimensional scaling. Peevers and Secord (1973) criticized
Olshan (1970) for her use of such a technique in attempting
to study dimensionality. Instead, they suggest that open
ended techniques would be more sensitive to developmental
changes.

Finally, the failure to discover dimensional growth

61

may be due to the inadequacy of the assumption that the
"need" for consistency is constant across groups. Based
on the literature surveyed this appeared reasonable to
assume. If the tendency toward consistency does change
with age, however, its effect in the present study would
be to offset possible increases in dimensionality. This
would have occurred because the eigenvalue index employed
to define dimensionality is sensitive to consistency as
well as dimensionality.

A recent study by Peevers and Secord (1973) did
find that third and seventh graders were more consistent
than kindergarten students although this trend was reversed
by eleventh graders. Despite this reversal effect at the
eleventh grade level, this does suggest that there may be
differences between groups in the need for consistency.
Intuitively, the pressures to conform and be accepted by
the peer group at the junior high school level may well be
operating to increase seventh graders' conformity to consis-
tency. Such a development could be obscuring concurrent

dimensional augumentation in the present study.

Dimensionality_in Respect to Topic

 

Highly significant differences (p<.0001) were found
on subject dimensionality for each of the three topics. A
mean dimensionality of 1.917 was generated across all sub-
jects for People I Know, 2.625 for School, and 3.333 for
Occupations. Furthermore, the correlations between topics

were low. Correlations of -.11 were found between People

62

I Know and School, .08 between People I Know and Occupations,
and .27 between School and Occupations. This clearly sug-
gests that a person's dimensional consistency is not con-
stant across all situations.

This lack of cross-situational stability is not
surprising in light of Vannoy's (1965) similar findings for
cognitive complexity. Furthermore, personality traits are
generally found to have low cross-situational stability. As
consistency falls on the continuum between purely affective

and purely cognitive traits, it would be expected to Show

moderate stability at best.

Bieri (1966) stressed the importance of the dimen-
sionality of the stimulus as well as the response in deter-
mining the number of dimensions a person uses in making a
given judgment. This approach is in contrast to the reSponse
centered orientation of Piaget's developmental theory.

...if we wish to predict differences between
cognitively complex and simple subjects on a
given task, we think it is of value if the
task itself can be analyzed in terms equiva-
lent to those used in conceptualizing the
variable of cognitive complexity. One result
of this kind of coordinate analysis is that
we begin to think of our structural variable
as a more specific cognitive ability, rather
than as a general trait that will express
itself in any given segment of social be-
havior. Because cognitive complexity sub-
sumes the ability of a person to differenti-
ate among a number of dimensions of social
behavior, we would apply our stimulus
analysis in terms of the dimensional quali-
ties of the input with which the person is
asked to deal. (Bieri, 1966, p.17-18)

Such an approach may help to explain the differences

in dimensionality between the three topics in the present

63

study. The topic receiving the lowest mean dimensionality,
People I Know, consisted only of real people well known

to the subject. Thus, only interpersonal dimensions would
be relevant when making these ratings. The topic ranking
second in dimensionality, School, contained both people
known to the subject and activities commonly engaged in by
the subject. Thus, dimensions not relevant to the first
tOpic could be brought into play by the more diverse ele-
ments in this situation.

The topic with the highest dimensionality-Occupa-
tions-consists of hypothetical people and represents a
somewhat abstract rating situation compared to the other
two tOpics. In this situation the subject is not bound
by reality to use a limited number of dimensions. Thus,
he may make more use of all the dimensions available to
him.

The phenomenon of positivity provides another basis
for explaining the present differences between tOpics. The
literature review showed that the greater the number of
positive bonds within a series of relationships the more
that situation would conform to the traditional consistency
model.

Price, Harburg, and Newcomb (1966) enlarged upon
these findings to stress the importance of engagement in
determining degree of consistency. High engagement is
present when there is a positive P-O bond in a P-O—X triad.
This implies that there is more interaction or involve-

ment between the elements in such a situation. In a triad

64

with a negative P—O bond uncertainity and ambivalence
serve to diminish involvement.

In the present study positivity and engagement
appear greatest in the People I Know situation. Here
there are generally strong positive bonds between the sub—
ject and four (Father, Mother, Two Liked Persons) of the
six remaining elements. For School, positivity decreases
as "My Friends" is the only strongly positive element.

”Principal,‘ "Teacher," and "Lunch Time" were usually posi—
tive but not as highly polarized as the positive elements
of People I Know. In Occupations none of the hypothetical
people serving as elements were perceived as overwhelmingly
positive by the subjects. Thus, little positivity and low
engagement describes this topic.

In line with the research on positivity, People I
Know conforms most closely to the traditional consistency
model. As positivity and engagement decrease with School
and Occupations there is further departure from the one
dimensional model.

The present results bear some similarity to those
of Carville (1968) who found strong support for consistency
in upper-elementary students in regard to attraction to
classmates but not for school—related attitudes. He
theorized that his results were due to the greater import-
ance and relevance attached to friendship choices as
Opposed to school-related attitudes.

The combination and interaction of positivity/engage-

ment with stimulus dimensionality may well account for much

65

of the differences between topics on the amount of variance
accounted for by the unidimensional model as well as differ—
ences in mean dimensionaltiy. High engagement may well
imply low stimulus dimensionality and vice versa. If posi-
tivity does result in a more effective unidimensional model,
then there is less data to be accounted for by extra dimen-
sions. Similarly, low engagement and high dimensionality
appear to be compatible. In this case the lessened power
of the traditional model implies that additional dimensions
can account for more variance.

Another possible explanation for the observed diff-
erences in dimensionality across topics may be attributed
to the differential reinforcement contingencies which
Operate in regard to different situations. For instance,
parents may reinforce children for displaying low dimension-
ality in interpersonal situations such as People I Know
while reinforcing a more multidimensional outlook in regard
to an abstract tOpic like Occupations. Also, the level of
dimensionality that parents "model" in different situations
is likely to influence children to adopt similar levels of

dimensionality in analogous situations.

Summary of the Discussion

 

The strength of the unidimensional or traditional
model of consistency was not found to decline with age in
the present study. As in previous studies, such a model

was able to account for a Significant amount of data, thus,

66

explaining its popularity.

Developmental differences in dimensionality were
not found for the variables of grade, I.Q., and sex. Des-
pite this failure, the multidimensional model of consistency
was found to be more effective than the traditional model
in accounting for the present data. Confirming the results
of Olshan (1970), two to three dimensions were utilized at
all age levels. Thus, the multidimensional consistency model
of Phillips (1973) merits further attention.

The highly significant differences generated by the
three topics was explained on the basis of stimulus dimen-
sionality and positivity. Low stimulus dimensionality and
high positivity appear compatible with one another as in
the People I Know situation which generated the lowest
dimensionality in the present study. Similarly, high stimu-
lus dimensionality and little positivity lead to higher
dimensionality as demonstrated by subjects on the Occupations
topic. An alternative explanation of differences in dimen—
sionality was offered in the form of the reinforcement
contingencies and adult modeling operating in regard to

different topics.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Summary

A model of cognitive consistency which is sensitive
to both consistency and complexity was studied from a devel-
opmental perspective. This model (Phillips, 1973) is con-
cerned with the number of dimensions a person uses to
maintain consistency. Thus, the traditional (one dimensional)
as well as a complex, multidimensional view of consistency
can be accommodated.

Previous develOpmental studies of consistency have
not elucidated clear developmental trends. Furthermore,
only the basic one dimensional balance model of consistency
has been examined. The organismic concept of differentiation
was used as a basis for predicting dimensional augumentation
at higher developmental levels.

A total of 72 subjects were divided equally into
groups on the basis of grade (Third, Seventh, Eleventh),

I.Q. (High, Low), and sex. Consistency was measured in
regard to three topics: People I Know, School, and Occupa-
tions.

Each topic resulted in data in the form of a matrix

which was factored according to Rank models from I to VII.

67

68

Dimensionality was determined by the model of lowest rank
which reached the criterion of accounting for 75 percent of
the estimated matrix variance.

Age, I.Q., and sex were found to be nonsignificant
in regard to dimensionality. Also contrary to prediction,
a one dimensional model was not found to account for less
matrix variance with age. However, topic was found to be
highly significant in generating different levels of dimen-
sionality. Mean dimensionality increased from 1.92 in re-
pect to People I Know to 2.63 for School and 3.33 for
Occupations. Approximately two to three dimensions were
employed by subjects at all levels despite the failure to
detect dimensional augumentation.

These findings were discussed and the implications
as well as the limitations of the present study will now

be considered.

Implications of the Present Study

 

The present study has implications for both cognitive
consistency theory and the field of education. Implications
for consistency theory will be considered first, the most
obvious being that the present study has highlighted the
importance of situational factors in regard to consistency.
Smith (1965) recognized the importance of these factors when
discussing the discrepancy in results between his and Weir‘s
(1960) developmental studies. However, later investigatorS‘

have not closely pursued this variable. Whenever consistency

69

researchers have studied situational factors they have
generally manipulated the relationships within a constant
situation.

This is in contrast to the present study where con-
sistency was assessed in different situations. Further
attention to situational factors is indicated by the strong
effects topic had in generating different levels of dimension-
ality in the present study.

Another implication of this study is that the multi-
dimensional model (Phillips, 1973) represents a considerable
improvement over the traditional conception of consistency.
By allowing for both consistency and complexity, this model
is very attractive theoretically. The present study found
that as early as third grade two to three dimensions are
needed to account for interpersonal and object perception.
Thus, the theoretical advantages of the multidimensional
view are complemented by its increased ability to account
for the present data.

HOpefully, future studies will refine this model
further and demonstrate its ability to account for a wider
variety of consistency and complexity phenomena. On the
basis of the present study, further use of the multidimen-
sional model certainly appears justified.

Educational implications of the present study will
now be considered. It was argued in an earlier chapter that
if dimensional augumentation with age could be demonstrated,
then attempting to foster such growth would be a valid goal

of education. Since such an increase was not found and two

70

to three dimensions were present in even the youngest
group, the need to generally stimulate growth in the number
of dimensions does not appear pressing.

The present study did demonstrate, however, that in
regard to a highly ego involving situation such as People I
Know students at all levels are not as highly dimensional as
they are in less involving situations. Thus, students may
be encouraged in such situations to use more of the dimen-
sions available to them.

Teachers could stimulate the use of more dimensions
in regard to highly interpersonal situations in several ways.
Teacher modeling and exposure to people and literature dis-
playing higher degrees of dimensionality may help to stimulate
such development. Teachers could also reinforce students for
displaying higher levels of dimensionality in their inter-
personal relationships as well as making students aware of
their use of mechanisms such as rationalization and denial
which are used when judgments are made to fit on a limited
number of dimensions.

A final implication of the present study concerns
the need for more study of development in affective areas
during the school years. The present study indicates that
the organismic model does not operate as neatly in respect
to an affect-laden area such as consistency as for more
purely cognitive development. Further developmental studies
of semicognitive processes would aid in the develOpment of
approaches for fostering their positive development. The

current interest in preventive mental health is resulting

71

in a number of classroom approaches for stimulating positive
emotional development. However, unless a clearer delinea-
tion of affective development during the school years is
made, these efforts may well be misguided. In the next
section some direct implications of the present study for

future research will be mentioned.

Implications for Future Research

 

The present study suggests at least two very impor-
tant considerations for future research. While differentia-
tion was not found in regard to the number of dimensions, it
is possible that organismic theory would have fared better
in regard to within dimension development. As mentioned
earlier, Olshan (1970) discovered changes within dimensions
in the absence of dimensional augmentation. Similarly,
Signell (1966) found within dimension develOpment in regard
to person perception. Thus, the present results are some—
what incomplete in providing a test of dimensional differen—
tiation. Further studies which examine the dimensional
approach to consistency in regard to both growth in the num-
ber of dimensions and within dimensions are needed.

The other major direction for research suggested
by the present study concerns the relationship between the
overall "need" for consistency and dimensionality. In the
preceding chapter it was noted that the assumption made in
the present study of a constant need for consistency across

age groups may be inadequate. Future research with the

72

dimensional model of consistency would do well to employ
independent measures of consistency and complexity to
determine the amount of age-related change due to each of

these factors.

Limitations

 

One limitation of the present study mentioned during
the course of the discussion was the failure to extend the
age range sampled low enough. Thus, possible dimensional
augmentation occurring before the third grade could not be
detected.

To remedy this shortcoming, however, would necessi-
tate considerable changes in methodology to accommodate a
younger age group. The present rating procedure, for in-
stance, would not have been useable as even some third
graders required considerable repetition before understand-
ing its use. In addition, as age span increased, it would
have become increasingly difficult to devise a set of common
cognitive elements relevant to all groups.

The sample utilized limits the generalizations that
can be made concerning the present results. The students
studied were drawn from schools in a small, generally conser-
vative community. No blacks, Mexican—Americans, or American
Indians were included in the sample. While the present
sample is fairly representative of small towns in the Mid—
west, it cannot be assumed that identical findings would

have resulted if the sample had been drawn from an inner-

73

city black or liberal white community.

It is possible, for instance, that in different
environments there is different reinforcement from parents
and peers for displaying various levels of dimensionality.
Furthermore, the three tOpics used in the present study may
have a very different meaning for children from various back-
grounds.

The criticism of multidimensional scaling made by
Peevers and Secord (1973) in regard to Olshan's (1970) study
also applies to the present work. They feel that such a
technique may not be sensitive enough to dimensional change
since it is designed to achieve parsimony in a set of des-
criptions. Open ended techniques are seen to be preferable
by Peevers and Secord (1973).

While the method of factoring matrices according to
various ranks or dimensional models provides an easily
obtained estimate of the matrix variance accounted for by a
given model, further work is needed concerning the mathemat-
ical properties of such matrices. Measures of the necessary
amount of change in variance generated by an additional
rank to account for a psychologically meaningful dimension

would be especially helpful.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

RELATIONSHIP RATING INSTRUCTIONS

"The reason I wanted to see you today, ___g, is
because I want to find out how _____graders feel about a
number of things. I will be asking you to mark how well
certain things go together but this is not a test because
the only right answers are what you really think."

"I am going to Show you cards with the names of
either people or things on them. Each time I will show you
the cards two at a time. On your paper here (Rating Sheet
Presented) I want you to mark whether the two things either
go together, do not go together, or have no relation to one
another. I will explain this some more by giving you some
examples."

"If you think that two things go together you mark
a plus (+) on your paper. Here are some examples of things
that gotogether:

(Sample Cards Presented)
Tom—Baseball

Tom is on the baseball team and since he likes to
play the game we would mark a plus (+) on our paper between
Tom and baseball. Here's another one:

Seed-Flower
A seed and flower go together because one follows from the
other so we would put another plus (+) on our paper."

"When two things do not go tOgether you mark a

minus (-) on your paper. Here are some examples on things

78

79

that do not go together:
Mary-Sue

Mary and Sue are two girls who do not get along with one
another so we would mark a minus (-) between them on our paper.
Here's another example of two things that do not go together:

Weeds-Flowers
Since weeds often stop flowers from growing they would not
go together and we would mark a minus (-) on our paper
between weeds and flowers."

"If you cannot decide or do not think that two things
are either for or against one another then you mark a zero (0)
on your paper between them."

'The 3x5 cards containing the elements for the first
tOpic were then presented in all possible pairs and rated
by the S. After the initial ratings of positive, minus, and
neutral were made for the first topic the S was then told
the following concerning the numerical rating procedure:

"I am now going to show you all the pairs of cards
that you marked plus (+) because you thought that they go
together. I want you to tell how much you think they go
together by circling a number from one to five on your paper.
The higher the number you circle means the more you think
they go together. A low number like a 1 or 2 means two
things go together a little bit. A 3 means they go together
some more. If you think they go together quite a bit you
would mark a 4 or a 5 if they go together a lot. Do you
have any questions about how you are supposed to use these

numbers?"

80

The preceding paragraph was then repeated substitut-
ing "do not go together" rather than "go together" for
rating the intensity of the negative relationships.

After the first topic was completed, a second rating
sheet was presented and the S told:

”Now I have another set of cards to show you. Remem-
ber, if two things go together you mark a plus and if they
do not go together you mark a minus. A zero means you can't
decide or they are not for or against one another."

After the initial ratings were made, the numerical
rating instructions were repeated. Upon the completion of
the second topic, the last topic was presented in a similar

manner to the second.

APPENDIX B

RATING SCALE

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

81

APPENDIX C

VARIANCE ESTIMATES GENERATED BY EACH MATRIX RANK MODEL

FOR EACH SUBJECT BY TOPIC

* Model resulting in derived dimensionality

Topic:

1=People I Know
2=School
3=Occupations

S01-S06: Third Grade, Low I.Q., Boys
S07-S12: Third Grade, Low I.Q., Girls

 

S Topic 1 2 3 4 5
01 1 .709 .795* .841

2 .640 .792* .821 .850

3 .303 .525 .643 .701 .747*
02 l .836* .877

2 .438 .614 .721 .772*

3 .330 .601 .677 .726 .776*
03 l .708 .809* .836

2 .459 .720 .795* .830

3 .453 .678 .788* .810 .845
04 1 .687 .788* .831 .867

2 .601 .705 .754* .802

3 .790* .836 .872
05 l .654 .751* .802

2 .243 .474 .684 .739*

3 .484 .648 .733 .795*
06 l .542 .704 .758* .808

2 .659 .763* .814 .850

3 .616 .773* .825
O7 1 .581 .703 .769* .817

2 .693 .816*

3 .327 .592 .688 .763*
08 l .497 .688 .784* .827

2 .586 .741 .798*

3 .286 .539 .698 .760*
09 l .614 .735 .843* .875

2 .474 .670 .748 .790*

3 .509 .722 .846* .890 .921
10 l .662 .771* .829

2 .568 .779* .828

3 .437 .705 .791* .821
11 l .545 .696 .766* .786 .829

2 .408 .651 .757* .792 .836

3 .379 .569 .677 .740 .779*
12 .694 .808* .837 .868

.608 .753* .809 .841
.346 .450 .615 .692 .737*

(AMP

82

83

S13-S18: Third Grade, High I.Q., Boys
Sl9-S24: Third Grade, High I.Q., Girls

S Topic 1 2 3 4 5 6

 

l3 1 .624 .755* .841 .832
2 .517 .699 .821* .828 .867
3

.247 .450 .643 .649 .721*

14 1 .516 .742 .786* .827
2 .895*
3 .673 .764* .813
15 1 .709 .804* .838
2 .416 .608 .748 .785*
3 .376 .583 .661 .719 .763*
16 l .845* .881
2 .657 .762* .824
3 .714 .790* .836 .872
17 1 .438 .714 .773* .814
2 .568 .780* .826 .866
3 .527 .662 .766* .809 .856
18 1 .749 .802* .852
2 .787* .851 .887
3 .769* .849 .885 .912
19 1 .408 .703 .766* .819
2 .744 .812* .856 .883 .924
3 .373 .582 .745 .813* .843 .870
20 1 .739 .829* .867
2 .597 .713 .803* .832 .860
3 .376 .584 .678 .747*
21 l .895*
2 .712 .783* .824
3 .415 .602 .702 .759*
22 1 .692 .805* .859 .885
2 .653 .766* .844
3 .516 .678 .770* .840
23 l .751* .848 .874
2 .439 .650 .729 .773* .811
3 .423 .571 .699 .749 .787*
24 .693 .791* .829

.490 .613 .689 .743*
.514 .630 .732*

LUMP-4

84

 

S25-S30: Seventh Grade, Low I.Q., Boys
S31-S36: Seventh Grade, Low I.Q., Girls
S Topic 1 2 3 4 5 6
25 1 .769* .819 .858 .885

2 .740 .819* .861 .894

3 .793* .853 .886 .908
26 l .760* .836 .858

2 .454 .759*

3 .891* .915
27 1 .576 .727 .782* .823

2 .656 .797* .844 .907

3 .351 .606 .715 .781*
28 l .785* .848 .881

2 .579 .728 .815* .848

3 .338 .563 .726 .780*
29 1 .629 .783* .829 .849

2 .479 .661 .740 .782*

3 .410 .549 .651 .704*
30 1 .838* .881

2 .514 .747 .800* .836

3 .473 .696 .760* .804 .842
31 l .660 .808*

2 .448 .684 .727 .758*

3 .523 .741 .819* .899 .945 71
32 l .895*

2 .758* .823 .856

3 .209 .293 .381 .453 .545*
33 l .859* .891 .913

2 .503 .631 .720 .754* .800

3 .363 .511 .647 .706 .748*
34 l .603 .710 .797*

2 .362 .524 .626 .696*

3 .314 .525 .691 .765* .821
35 l .561 .734 .781* .819

2 .699 .770* .827

3 .340 .576 .649 .699 .743*
36 l .809* .861

2 .423 .661 .707 .770* .814

3 .513 .700 .794* .836

£37-§42=
S43-S48:
S
37 1
2
3
38 1
2
3
39 1
2
3
40 1
2
3
41 1
2
3
42 1
2
3
43 1
2
3
44 1
2
3
45 1
2
3
46 1
2
3
47 1
2
3
48

Topic

WNH

85

 

Seventh Grade, High I.Q., Boys
Seventh Grade, High I.Q., Girls
1 2 3 4 5 6
.722 .794* .840 .879
.555 .724 .807* ’
.707 .846* .887 .915 .929 .953
.741 .834* .870 .896
.461 .696 .764* .817
.448 .684 .806* .858
.787* .867 .904 .930 .946
.433 734 .810*
.418 .648 .769* .818 .857
.752* .852 .883 .903
.496 .713 .791* .840
.337 .527 .708 .787* .843
.697 .755* .823 .850
.488 .684 .793* .831
.456 .622 .749 .803* .846
.751* .849 884
.553 .759* .804 .835
.529 .777* .874 .925 .953
.873* .887 .900
.586 .777* .823
.895*
.887* .909 .922
.769* .840 .871
.258 .433 .559 .636 .688*
.636 .803*
.463 756* .806 .847
.782* .840 .872 .900
.856* .886
.392 581 .720 .765*
.313 .471 .593 .674 .725*
.756* .851
.560 .700 .775*
.549 .730 .799*
.599 .771* .820 .848
.682 .832* .859 .887
.290 .529 .636 .735*

86

 

S49-S54: Eleventh Grade, Low I.Q. Boys
SSS-S60: Eleventh Grade, Low I.Q. Girls
S Topic 1 2 3 4 5 6
49 1 .754* .897 .888 .939 .968 .987
2 .465 .721 .794* .868 .893
3 .328 .476 .628 .746 .794*
50 l .687 .814* .834 .855
2 .697 .877* .899 .927 .959 .994
3 .506 .756* .825 .881 .913 .945
51 l .721 .795* .850 .879
2 .536 .681 .776* .819
3 .396 .605 .741 .777* .829
52 1 .896*
2 .473 .713 .792* .832
3 .396 .682 .788* .815 .859
53 l .496 .618 .699 .758* .887
2 .545 .805* .846 .882
3 .424 .575 .684 .748 .790*
54 l .840* .870 .879
2 .512 .615 .725*
3 .529 .687 .743 .796* .837
55 1 .748 .829* .857 .887 .906
2 .566 .784* .833 .859
3 .515 .788* .835 .874
56 1 .553 .728 .779* .811
2 .715 .824* .859
3 .186 .345 .458 .517 .571 .612*
57 l .589 .723 .788* .827
2 .444 .652 .788* .840 .876
3 .390 .639 .773* .815 .857
58 1 .610 .749 .794*
2 .653 .757* .811
3 .394 .535 .665 .743 .787* .817
59 l .888* .909 .928
2 .739 .826* .858
3 .585 .677 .754* .785
60 1 .716 .799* .847
2 .608 .775* .828 .860
3 .756* .856 .889

S61-S66:
S67-S72:
S
61 l
2
3
62 1
2
3
63 l
2
3
64 1
2
3
65 1
2
3
66 1
2
3
67 l
2
3
68 l
2
3
69 1
2
3
70 l
2
3
71 1
2
3
72 1
2

Topic

87

Eleventh Grade, High I.Q. Boys

Eleventh Grade, High I.Q., Girls

 

l 2 3 4 5 6
.749 .844* .875
.602 .779* .832 .870
.443 .730 .788* .819
.804* .855 .886 .914
.441 .634 .722 .774*
.578 .787* .844 .881
.539 .757* .829 .880
.700 .823* .852 .894 .933
.504 .675 .790* 850 .891
.685 .801* .838 .871 .898
.484 .776* .847 .866 .904
.617 .795* .885 .918 .953 .972
.576 .721 .803* .847
.707 .811* .871 .904
.395 .649 .795* .850 .886 .921
.774* .877 .901
.559 .786* .839
.500 .688 .816* .867 .903
.579 .789* .837
.468 .756* .805 .842
.396 .617 .720 .776*
.572 .748 .788* .799 .842
.781* .850 .878
.779* .858 .892 .914 .936
.651 .796* .831
.585 .800*
.594 .782* .833 .893
.641 .757* .832 .869
.518 .685 .741 .785* .828
.563 .740 .810* .861
.736 .801* .848 .876
.411 .567 .692 .779* .821
.321 .614 .743 .799* .835
.699 .789* .836 .859
.569 .724 .796* .833
.593 .764* .835 .869 .902

   

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