nggfi M [‘1 R Y hfichégan State 'nivcrsity wn OVERDUE FINES: 25¢ per day per item RETURNING LIBRARY MATERIALS: Place in book return to remove charge from circulation records ON RESOLVING THE DILEMMA OF THE NATIVE VERSUS NON-NATIVE ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL REALITY BY Michael Baba Tsado A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1980 r “Han ‘ IJ.’ ABSTRACT ON RESOLVING THE DILEMMA OF THE NATIVE VERSUS NON-NATIVE ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL REALITY BY Michael Baba Tsado I present two conflicting accounts of some social data of Nupe society. One account is a non-native's (Nadel's - a social anthropologist's). The other account is a native's (Kashi Wusa's). Nadel says the muslim Fulani rulers of Nupe manipulate Islamic religion to control and rule the Nupe. Hence, to Nadel, the religion is subgrginate to politics for the muslim Fulani rulers. Kashi Wusa, on the other hand, says the Islamic religion is the overriding purpose of the Fulani rule of the Nupe. This View of hers is consonant with the Fulani's view of their purpose in Nupe. They say their purpose was to spread Islamic religion. To Kashi Wusa, everything the Fulani do, for example, setting up some (foreign) social institutions like muslim courts of law, is subordinate to Islamic religion and it is to help the Fulani entrench Islamic religion. Each of the two accounts has some methodological and ideological presuppositions. The methodologies and ideolo- gies entail some weaknesses. And the weaknesses are reflected in the accounts. Nadel's account presupposes the doctrine of positivistic functionalism, in part, as understood and pro- pounded by Malinowski. Malinowski holds the view that a sociologist could use the methodology of a natural scien- tist to give an (adequate) account of social phenomena independent of the conceptual analyses of the aims, inten— tions, etc. that lead social actors to act. Kashi Wusa's account presupposes the doctrine of con- ceptual analysis by a sociologist. This doctrine is asso— ciated with Peter Winch. Winch says that human activity which forms the subject matter of the sociologist is gov— erned by the intentions, aims, etc., of the social actors. Therefore, for a sociologist's interpretation (or account) of human actions to be correct (or adequate), he must inquire from the actors of the intentions, desires, etc., that lead them to act. The sociologist must engage in conceptual analyses. The positivist functionalist's attempt to give an explanation of social phenomena by appeal to lawlike causal generalizations as in the natural science with no reference to the social actors' intentions, aims, etc., would, among other things, do violence to individual difference(s). The interpretivist's (of Winch's) attempt to take as a crite- rion of the adequacy of an explanation of social phenomena only the intentions, aims, etc., which the social actors say lead them to act, makes the account, among other things. to be too particularistic and not general enough to accom- modate, for example, unintended actions and intended actions that have unintended consequences. The dilemma posed by the two accounts, the non-native and the native, is that if we areixahave social knowledge then we must choose between a positivist-functionalist's (a non—native's) account and an interpretivist's (a native's) account. But positivism entails, among other weaknesses, the weakness of being too abstract and less particular, while the interpretive model, among other weak- nesses, is too particular and not general enough. There- fore, if we must have social knowledge we must accept either the weaknesses of the positivist functionalist or the weaknesses of the interpretivist. The dilemma is resolved by a proposal of a critical social science. The critical model combines the virtues of the positivist and of the interpretivist, but has none of their weaknesses. The critical model explains social phenomena by the use of general quasi—causal laws (like the positivist's general causal laws); these laws are quasi because they are rooted (as advocated by the interpretivist) in the intentions, aims, etc., of some specific human actors. CDCopyright by MICHAEL BABA TSADO 1980 ii DEDICATION to Gogo Kashi nya Kuti Wusa (1875-1969), my Grandmother iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am thankful to Dr. Albert C. Cafagna, my advisor, whose enthusiastic support kept this work focussed. His detailed constructive criticisms and suggestions are highly appreciated. I acknowledge Dr. Richard D. Peterson's willingness to discuss freely with me many points discussed in this thesis. I also thank him for giving me some suggested readings on the topic of the thesis. I am indebted to Dr. Craig Staudenbaur and Dr. Lewis Zerby for their detailed comments and suggestions on the language and stylistics of this thesis. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ... ..................... . ............ ..... 1 CHAPTER ONE Two Incompatible Accounts ....... . ............... ...... 6 Nadel's Account ............... ...... . ............ 6 Kashi Wusa's Account ...... . ........ . ............. 11 CHAPTER TWO Two Theoretical Positions .............. ..... .......... l6 MalinOWSki 0.0.0.0.... ........ .0. I ....... O O ...... 0 l7 Winch ... ......................................... 18 CHAPTER THREE ' A Critical Examination of Nadel[§,(Non-Native) Account 23 Methodological Critique .............. . ........ ... 23 l. Functionalism ........................... 26 2. Criticisms . ..... . ....... . ............... 32 1) Its claims: . ......................... 33 a) The survival needs ..... . .......... 33 b) Patterns have consequences ....... . 33 ii) Methodological critique .............. 34 a) Causal alternative ................ 34 b) Fractional study .................. 36 c) Deductive explanation ............. 37 CHAPTER FOUR Ideolggical 1. Ide 2. How Met Critique of Nadel .... ological convictiqp ....................... Nadel's Ideology Influences His hodology ......................... ........ . 3. Re-evaluations and Commentg .................. sunlmar! 00.000000000000000 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 0000000 CHAPTER FIVE A Critical Examination of Interpretive Social Science Which Is Presupposed by Kashi Wusa's (a Native's Account 40 41 45 52 56 58 Methodological Critique .......................... l. Interpretive Social Science .................. 20 critiCisms 00 ..... 000000000000000 000000 0 00000 0 a) Influence of physical factors ...... ..... .. b) Unintended consequences ........... ..... ... C) COherence 000000000000000000000000000000000 d) SOCial Change 00000 0000000 00000000000000000 CHAPTER SIX Ideological Critique of Kashi Wusa ..... ..... . ..... .... a) uncritical 000000000 0000000000000000 00000000000 b) Independence .. ................. . .............. CHAPTER SEVEN The Dilemma ...................... . .................... Premige l . .......... . ......... . ............ ...... Premise 2 ......... . .............................. Premise 3 .. ......... ........ ..... . ....... . ...... . Premise 4 00000000000000 000000000 00000000000000000 Premise 5 ........... ........ ..................... Conclusion .................................. ..... vi 59 6O 68 69 70 70 71 72 72 73 77 77 77 79 80 80 8O CHAPTER EIGHT The Resolution of the Dilemma ...... .................. 81 a) How the Dilemma Is Resolved ........... ....... 81 b) The Doctgine of the Critical Model ........... 86 i) Application of the Critical Model .... 90 ii) A Special? Contrast with the Positivist Model .............. ....... 96 iii) Objection ........ ..... ............... 99 c) The General Theoretical Stand of the Critical Model ........................................100 d) Summary and Conclusions . ..... ................103 e) Recommendations ...... ........ ....... ....... ..lll BIBLIOGRAPHY ............. ....... ............... . ..... 115 GENERAL REFERENCES ................... ....... .... ..... 118 CRITICAL REVIEW ARTICLES-REFERENCES .... .............. 118 vii INTRODUCTION In my study of philosophy, I am fascinated by the critical attitude philosophy adopts towards social scien- tific methodologies. In this work, therefore, you find a critique of the methodologies of social science. Also being a work in philosophy, it is predominantly a work in conceptual analysis. Two methodological approaches are proposed for the study of society by two different schools of thoughts. These two approaches seem incompatible with one another. The two schools of thoughts are Winch's on one hand, and positivistic Malinowski and S.F. Nadel on the other. It is Winch's view that a social actor's account of his action is incorrigible. In the absence of any specific rea- son (for thinking otherwise), an actor is the best judge of his intentions, aims, etc. That reason which an actor says leads him to act must be the reason. No one can tell a per- son's reason for an act better than the person himself. It is the conviction of this school of thought that any ade- quate scientific explanation of a social act must be rooted in the intentions, aims, etc., of the social actors. The other school, viz, the positivist school of Malinowski (and Nadel) says that often people act without 1 2 reasons, intentions, etc., so, a social scientist should more or less rely on his observation of the social actors rather than on their account of their own behavior or the reasons, intentions, etc., which they say lead them to act.1 Each of these methodological approaches both in theory and practice, as plausible and influential as they are, share some weaknesses. I state some of these weaknesses in Chapters Three through Six as a criticism of each of these methodological approaches. I present specific cases in which each of these two methodological approaches has been used to give an interpre- tation of some specific social data and the different inter- pretations of the same data are mutually incompatible. Each of the accounts entails the weaknesses of the methodological approaches. The account based on conceptual analysis is of specific social actors with specific intentions, aims, etc. It is also only of intended, purposive actions, but not of unin- tended, unpurposive actions. This account, therefore, is too particularistic and not general or comprehensive enough to cover every aspect of human experience. The other account, which is based predominantly on the empirical observation of the behavior of the social actors, is too 1More or less, what one has between Winch and Malinowski is action versus behavior. An action may be intentional while a behavior may not be. 3 general and not specific or particularistic enough to be an adequate and true interpretation of a particular social behavior. However, each account is consistent and empiri- cally possible; therefore, the problem of choosing between the two accounts. Stated briefly, the problem is that in our effort to gain knowledge (or an interpretation or a meaning or an explanation)2 of some social fact(s), if we accept either one of the above methodological approaches, we must neces- sarily suffer the weaknesses inherent in them and the weak- nesses that result from an application of them. In this thesis, I defend an alternative theory, a critical social science, that resolves the differences between the two methodological approaches and which escapes each of their weaknesses. I also intend to relate the crit- ical model to some specific social facts about Nupe people. My approach to resolving the problem stated in this thesis is historical and conceptual analyses (which is itself the method of the critical model). In my solution to the problem, I attempt to show that these views, in spite of their authors, are not incompatible and irreconcilable, and that the critical method is the way of demonstrating this. 2The conceptual analyst (and/or an interpretive social scientist) talks in terms of giving an interpretation or a meaning of a social behavior, while a positivist social scientist of Nadel's type talks in terms of giving an explanation of a social behavior. 4 I want it to be noted in this thesis that positivistic functionalism is a technical expression. A positivist func- tionalist is a social theorist who combines in his/her social theory and work both some of the qualities (or doc- trines) of positivism and some of the qualities (or doc- trines) of functionalism. So, in this thesis when I criti- cise a social theorist as being positivistic, I am only criticising those particular qualities of positivism in his/her theory and work; and when I criticise him/her for being functionalistic, I am only criticising those qualities of functionalism found in his/her theory and works. These criticisms might not apply to all functionalists or all positivists. I am tacitly aware of the fact that a person could be either a positivist or a functionalist without having the weaknesses criticised in this thesis. I am also aware of the fact that a person could be a positivist without being a functionalist and vice-versa. Positivism3 as conceived in this thesis is the doctrine that there are general social laws operative in society, inde— pendent of the social actors in it. These laws determine human behavior. These laws are comparable in their nature and status to the laws that govern the behavior of the non—human entities which are the objects of study of a natural scientist. It is part of the doctrine of this positivism that these social laws are 3This conception of positivism is similar to Brian Fay's in Chapter Two of Social Theory and Political Practice. 5 discoverable if a social scientist studies the social enti- ties with the detached, objective neutrality that a natural scientist observes and studies non-human entities. Accord- ing to the positivist social scientist of this conception, by observation of the behavior of social actors, a social scientist would be able to ascertain what intentions, desires, etc., lead the social actors to act the way they do. The social actors' intentions, desires, etc., are only instances of the general laws of human behavior and rela- tionships. This is contrary to an interpretivist social scientist who regards social actors' desires, intentions, etc., as unique. The positivist social scientist of this conception holds that human behavior should always conform to the general social laws. The positivist believes a deductive-nomelogical form of explanation of social facts is tenable in the same way that a natural scientist gives the same form of explanation of natural phenomena. The functionalist doctrine, briefly stated, as con— ceived in this thesis, is of the view that "every" (vital) social institution fulfills some (vital) function that con- tributes to the survival of the society. It is the task of a social scientist to find out the necessary condition(s) of survival of society. I state this doctrine intx>detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. CHAPTER ONE Two Incompatible Accounts When I read S.F. Nadel's account of some social facts about the Nupe people in his book, A Black Byzantium, I found that his account is in conflict with a native Nupe's (Kashi Wusa's) account of the same social facts. I do not know which of the two accounts to choose. I present the two accounts below. Egggl's Account Nadel accounts for the cohesion among the Nupe by an appeal to the principle of kingship (political) and unifica— tion by the religion of Islam (supernatural). There are other factors,1 according to Nadel himself, but these are the ones Nadel says are the most important. Nadel also says that these variables of cohesion (e.g., kingship and religion) are deliberately manipulated by the rulers, viz, the Fulani rulers of the Nupe state in 1For in A Black Byzantium, p. 145, he talks of a “multiple system of control.” Bida.2 Nadel says the Principle of Kingship which binds the Nupe together politically could be traced back to the myth- ical hero founder of the Nupe kingdom in the person of Tsoede. He says the Nupe are an historically-minded peoPle (p. 139).3 They regard Tsoede as their ancestral king before the coming of the Fulani. Songs and stories are com- posed to reflect the heroic past (p. 139). The musicians and poets are engaged to sing the praises of the king and the kingdom (p. 146). These stories, songs and praises age page to find their ways into the bigger villages of the country (p. 139). The village chiefs are appointed by the Epgu, and they are responsible to him for the maintenance of law and order in the villages (p. 67). The District Heads, who are also appointed by him and who act as overseers of the Village Heads, report periodically to the Epgu at Bida what is going on in their different districts. The people's interests were united in the person of Etsu (pp. 137-38). One proof of this was that when the then 2S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, p. 146, says that the Mallams proselytizing among the pagans are encouraged to do so. Musicians and poets are engaged to sing praises of the king and kingdom -— both represent actual propaganda. 3All page references will be to‘A Black Byzantium unless otherwise stated. 8 gpgu was installed (in about 1934)4 in preference to gpgpu at Kutigi, it provoked comments from many unexpected quarters (PP. 137-38). The second important political binding force is the supernatural. Nadel writes, "Nupe Kingship is linked in many ways with religious usages and forms of ritual symbol- ism" so that "they inevitably become instruments of politi- cal solidarity” (p. 141). The people are religiously united in their mythical culture-hero, Tsoede. "Relics of Tsoede, regalia -— magical emblems" exist in every town of the emirate. "The name and tradition of Tsoede is also associated with cults which secure childbirth, fertility,..." Prayers at libations for whatever occasion are said in the name of Tsoede (p. 141). The dynasty of Nupe Kings is seen as descendants of Tsoede. The Kings of Nupe took an active interest in the power- ful secret society of ndako gboya. This cult was organized by village people to combat and check the activities of witchcraft. But when the kings took interest in it, it became Rug; flpgu, King's Cult. Under Epgu Masaba (1838-1841)5 the head of pg; g gpgyg society was christened Maji Dodo, Master of the Monster, "and with this royal recognition the organization of the secret society was made 4 S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, p. 84 and p. 137. 5Ibid., p. 142 and p. 407. subservient to Nupe Kingship." If any village wanted the help of the ndako gboya against the witches, it had to.make the request through the gpgu who himself shared from the income of ggggg‘gggyg from this source. Converts to Islam have the privilege of belonging to an intermediary social class. This class between the rulers and the unconverted pagan class is nearer to the rulers than the pagan population (p. 142). Village heads became Mohammedans sometimes at the expense of alienating them- selves from the rest of the population of the community they headed (p. 67). Conversion to Islam gives them social security from slave raids in most cases. And attachment to the ruling group used to be fused with conversion to Islam (pp. 142-43). The identification of state and church is seen at the annual sallah festivals.6 During these festivals, gifts are sent to and received from the Epgu. The people from the country stream to the town to watch the gpgu on horse- back. Songs an praises of Epgu are sung by musicians and poets at the festival. Almost everyone attends the pkg or the reception of the Epgu at the festivals (pp. 142—44). From both the Kingship and religious factors, a common mental and moral outlook developed in the people 6Sallah festival is a Mohammedan religious festival. A Black Byzantium, p. 143. 10 (pp. 143-44). There was a systematic replacement of tradi- tional pagan religion by Islam. The insignia of Tsoede was seized from the last King of Nupe by Fulani rulers (about 1830-1836)(p. 142), (p. 407). Nadel seems to imply that among the early Fulani rulers of Nupe the Islamic religion was subopdipgpg to politics. Nadel implies this because he says that it was by design on the part of the rulers that Mohammedan Mallams (Koranic scholars and preachers) were encouraged to proselytize among pagans, and the converts were given social and political security (p. 146), in principle at least (p. 142). He says political protection was more paramount than any other rea- son for conversion (p. 142). He gave an example of the pagans who flocked to Bida, the capital, looking for a political patron rather than a religious one before they declared their change of faith to Islam (p. 143). In short, Nadel says in many of the passages to which I have referred that the process of Islamization among the Nupe is explained by the fact that the political unity or solidarity under the rulership of the Fulani needed it. In other words, the Fulani encouraged the conversion of the Nupe to Islam so that they could build a strong and united political state. For the Fulani, according to Nadel's account, political unity takes precedence over Islamic religion. Islam is only a means to achieving the end of political unity. Put in the language of function, the religion of Islam among the Nupe has the function of uniting them politically. In the 11 language of necessary condition, Islam is a necessary condi- tion of the political unity or survival of the Nupe state.7 It is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition because it is gag among other factors. Being a necessary condition of the kind Nadel says it is for the political unity of the Nupe, one could infer that without it there would be no political unity among the Nupe under Fulani rule. Kashi Wusa's Account Kashi says that Fulani came to Nupe (country) primarily to spread the Islamic religion. She used to emphasize this point by praising the genius of the people of the city of Piciko who were throughout resistant to conversion to Islam. According to Kashi, if any muslim calls people to prayer in Piciko, the muslim is killed on the spot. She says the spirits of the other religious cults in Piciko hate the muslim religion. Piciko is known in the whole of Nupe (country) to have the greatest number of religious cults. Kashi used to say that without the religious genius of Piciko, the whole of Nupe would have lost its identity as a people to the conquest and spread of the Islamic religion of 7This follows from his functionalism as I will discuss in Chapter Three. The functionalist with the desire to give causal explanation(s) is concerned about discovering neces- sary conditions for the survival of society and its human population. Note also the conception of "necessary" explicated in Chapter Five, p. 61. 12 the Fulani. She says all Nupe could now have become Fulani in outlook had there not been some resistance to their religion. I do not want to go into the details of probing the logic of her generalizations and conclusions.8 The gener- alizations are debatable. For example, there are muslim Nupe who have not turned Fulani. However, for the purpose of the discussion in this thesis, her account could be said to be (ideologically)9 contrary to Nadel's. Kashi views things from the religious point of view.10 But Nadel views things from the point of However, her generalizations are about specific social actors at a specific time, viz, the Nupe people of her time (1875-1969). So her generalizations cannot be said to be a general social theory. For example, it cannot be claimed from her account that for a society to survive it must resist external invasion by foreigners as a positiv- ist-functionalist of Nadel-type would claim. 9Ideology in this thesis means a pre-conceived idea or a prior interest which determines or influences how one interprets, sees or understands a phenomenon (natural or social). 10Her view seems to agree with Michael Crowder's in West Afriga Under Colonial Rule, p. 32: The Nineteenth century history of West Africa can be seen as the conflict of two imperialisms; Afri- can-Muslim and EurOpean-Christian. -- Both were inspired by the conviction that they had a moral right to impose their religion and civilization on the pagan African, if necessary by force. S.J. Hogban and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, TA; Emirates 9; Northern Nigeria, pp. 119-120, say Usman Dan Fodio launched jihad against Hausa rulers because he believed they were guilty of corrupt and irreligious practices, such as the use of non-muslim titles, "and various other sins against religion such as the continuance of pagan practices and neglect of the Prophet's teachings." In some other places, the Sharia law for a jihad had to be established since it is a religious sin to rebel against a ruler. Their rebellion could be justified by Sharia Law courts. Sharia law is the muslim ecclesiastical law. 13 view of political control. Given her religious point of view, she would (and in fact, she sometimes does) account for the same data that Nadel accounts for this way. Given her own point of view, the Fulani established the kind of political administration they did so as to safe- guard their religion. Kashi would reinforce this view by her sometimes less certain citations of the tenets of Islamic catechism, which she said her people were forced to learn by the muslim Fulani on their arrival in Nupe. She said some of the tenets of the catechism enjoin a muslim to fight two kinds of wars. The first and the foremost is the holy war of Jiddah. This is the war a muslim is supposed to fight so as to convert the unconverted (or a non-muslim) to Islam.(or to become a muslim). The second is the holy war of Riddah. This is also called a back-sliding war. This is the war a muslim must fight to win former believers in Islam, who have given up their faith in Islam, back to Islamic faith. The implication is that once you are a mus- lim, you are always a muslim. So, from Kashi's point of view, it could be argued that the Fulani established the kind of political administration they did establish so as to safeguard and conserve the Islamic religion, and thereby to avert any situation of Riddah war. Or if they are already fighting one,to avoid another of its type.11 11For as M. Crowder indicated in West Africa (1977), p. 72, it appears the Fulani rulers would see themselves as fight- ing a Riddah war. He says, "In 1804 a learned Fulani(cpntJ 14 From Kashi's point of view, the muslim Fulani rulers establish courts of law among the Nupe so as to get their religion well entrenched in the country of Nupe. The same explanation goes for any/all other institutions established by the muslim Fulani rulers to replace some old existing traditional ones (most especially the existing non-muslim ones). From Kashi's point of view, it is explained that the Fulani Etsu took interest in ndako gboya secret society so as to uproot its effect among the pe0ple, since it would be a rival cult (or religion) to Islam. This also explains why Tsoede insignia was seized by the Fulani in certain cases as Nadel says (p. 143 of‘A Black Byzantium). This desire to conserve their religion and entrench their Islamic religion also explains why some village chiefs were appointed by the gpgu, and why those appointed were converts to the Islamic religion at the expense of alienating them- selves from the non-muslim people they were supposed to rule. So, from Kashi's point of view, the Fulani's political administration in Nupe is subordinate to their religion of ll(cont.) scholar, Usman Dan Fodio, declared a jihad against the Habe Kings of Hausaland. He and his followers were determined to reform society in Hausaland where the prac- tice of Islam was not pure. They accused the rulers of Hausaland of being pagans, and declared that though they called themselves Muslims, they did not obey the Sharia of Muslim Law." Since they regarded themselves as religious reformists, they could be said to be fighting Riddah war, or we could say both Riddah and Jiddah. 15 Islam. This point of view is contrary to Nadel's that reli- gion is subordinate to and instrumental to political unity and political administration. This difference in their in- terpretations indicates an ideological difference between them. Deciding between these two accounts is very difficult. The two accounts of the same ethnographic data are mutually incompatible, but each is an internally consistent and empirically possible account. In Chapter Two of this thesis, I will present two points of view, in terms of which we may judge the adequacy of either a non-native's or a native's account of social data. CHAPTER TWO Two Theogetical Positions In Chapter One of this Thesis, I presented two different accounts of the same social data. One account is a non-native's (Kashi Wusa's). Kashi wusa gives an account of her and her people's experiences and their interpretations and understandings of these experiences. Nadel, on the other hand,gives an account of his interpretations of the observed (but not "experienced") social facts, viz, the behavior of the Nupe. These two accounts are contrary to each other, but each is plausible because each is consistent and empirically possible. Choosing between these two accounts presents a problem. Which one should we believe, and which one should we reject? Two contemporary social theorists have defended each of the two types of accounts. The two theorists might help us make up our minds on which of the two accounts to choose. These two theorists are B. Malinowski and P. Winch. In this chapter, I will present their theories. 16 17 Malinowski Malinowski is reported to have said:1 The native Trobriander's account of Trobri— and society must be inadequate, that the sociologists' account of institutions is a construction not available tc>the untutored awareness of the native informant -- the sociologist who relies upon that view [of the native informant's] "obtains at best that lifeless body of laws, regulations, morals and conventionalities which ought to be obeyed, but in reality are often only evaded. For in actual life, rules are never entirely conformed to, and it remains as the most difficult but indispensable part of the ethnographers' work, to ascer- tain the extent and mechanism of the deviations.” Malinowski holds that a native's account of his society is inadequate because it ignores the fact that the social actors of his society do not always behave or act according to the norms, laws, etc., of their society, and it should be part of a sociologist's account of a society that he says in his account when these norms, laws, etc., are conformed to and when not. So a sociologist should not rely on a native's account because it leaves out that element that should form a necessary part of a sociologist's account of the society. lAlasdair MacIntyre, "The Idea of a Social Science" in Rationality, ed. by Bryan Wilson, p. 113; B. Malinowski, The Sexug; Life g: Savages, pp. 425—29. 18 Flash It is Winch's conviction that one of the primary pur- poses of the study of society is epistemological. This epistemology consists in the "understanding" of a piece of social behavior or action. The understanding consists in grasping the pgigp or meaning of what is being said or done (p. 115).2 Grasping the meaning or point of a piece of behavior or act belongs more to the realm of discourse and "to the internal relations that link the parts of a realm of discourse" (p. 115). Winch believes the understanding belongs to the realm of discourse because it is his convic- tion that human action or behavior has an internal side to it. He likens the internal side of human behavior to a pause (a pregnant pause) in the middle of a conversation. It is those peeple who are participants:h1the conversation or who are internal to it that could know what the pause means or that could understand the pause. For any other person outside the conversation circle (like a sociologist), to know the meaning of the pause he must first be told what has gone before the pause (p. 130). To know what has gone before, the outsider (possibly a sociologist) must discourse with the participants in the conversation (possibly social actors). 2All page references for the remainder of this chapter will be to The Idea gfig Social Science, by Peter Winch. l9 Winch emphasizes the point that there is an internal side to human behavior by saying that there are ideas internal to human behavior and social relations between humans (p. 123). For example, the concept of war is an idea which is possessed by social actors. So when societies engage in an armed struggle, it is an idea which determines how a social actor behaves as a member of a belligerent country (pp. 127-28). Even in a purely material situation like open armed struggle between two groups, the form which the struggle takes would still involve internal relations. An internal relation would be an idea(s) which each side possesses of the other (p. 130). This idea(s) might have the effect of making the men more ferocious (p. 131). Because of the nature of the internal side to human behavior, Winch is of the conviction that any account or explanation of the behavior of some social actors by a sociologist must be rooted in what ideas they possess of themselves. For he says any reflective understanding of a sociologist must presuppose the participant's unreflective understanding (p. 89); that technical concepts of a sociolo- gist must imply a previous understanding of those concepts which belong to the activities under investigation (p. 89). For example, the concept of liquidity preference in econom- ics which is not possessed by businessmen presupposes a previous understanding of such business concepts as money, profit, cost, risk, etc., which are possessed by business- men. And it is only by reference to these concepts 20 possessed by businessmen that the technical concept of the economist makes sense (p. 89), and it is this that distin- guishes economics from other disciplines, say, theology (p. 89) . Even in the application of a social theory, Winch feels it is necessary to make a modification of the theory in the light of the ideas possessed by social actors before the theory is applied to them. For example, if a psychoanalyst wishes to give "an account of the aetiology of neuroses amongst, say, the Trobriand Islanders," he "would first have to investigate such things as the idea of fatherhood amongst the islanders and take into account any relevant aspects in which their idea differed from that current in his own society" (p. 90). As an outcome of such an investigation, it might be discovered that it is necessary to modify the psychological theory that would be appropriate "for explain- ing neurotic behavior in this new situation" (p. 90). For example, if such a psychological theory were Freud's, the concepts contained in that theory which were developed by him while he was studying his own society must not be applied to the new society without reflection, for they might have to be modified in the light of the ideas current in the new society. From Winch's point of view, a sociologist should be 21 engaged in conceptual analysis.3 Because of this, a sociol- ogist cannot ignore what account a native gives of his own society. A sociologist should view the world as much as possible from the standpoint of the natives themselves when they are the object of study. To understand a society in its own terms approximates becoming assimilated into it. Hence, he says a "sociologist of religion must himself have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying” (p. 88). Winch's position is that a sociologist studies or seeks to understand human behavior (or activity). Their behavior is governed by the idea(s) possessed by them. So for a sociologist to gain an understanding of their behavior or to grasp the meaning of their behavior, he must discourse with them or include in his account of their behavior what account they give of their own behavior. The account they give of their behavior would be a reflection of the ideas they possess of themselves and of their (social) world. So to Winch, a sociologist cannot discard a native's account of his society though a native's account is unreflective. Winch implies a native's account is reliable. 3By conceptual analysis Winch means a sociologist should be concerned only about giving an interpretation or meaning of social behavior on the basis of the conceptions and ideas possessed by the social actors the sociologist is studying. And these conceptions and ideas, which at the same time enable the social actors to communicate intelligibly with each other, do whatever they do apprOpriately according to some social rules. These conceptions and ideas must be the ones they profess lead them to act the way they do. 22 Malinowski, on the other hand, says a native's account should not be relied upon by a sociologist when giving an account of the native's society because the native's account does not include cases of deviation of behavior from the norms, regulations, etc., of the society. Both Malinowski's position and Winch's position are very plausible and influential.4 There is no A priori way of settling the issue, so one does not know which of the two positions to accept. So from a theoretical point of view,5 consulting Malinowski and Winch will not decide between Nadel's account of some Nupe social data and Kashi Wusa's account of the same social data. In the next four chapters, I will examine both Nadel's account and Kashi Wusa's account critically. 4Winch seems to be saying, as I indicated in the introduc- tion, that a native's account is ultimately decisive. A native's propositions about their act/behavior are incorri- gible. This view is similar to Wittgenstein's that no one can tell a person's action better than himself. Malinowski, on the other hand, seems to be saying that a sociologist's account is ultimately decisive; there are causal laws under- lying human action, and these causal generalizations could be used to justify a sociologist's account. In other words, we have a scientific methodology and it is more reliable than a native's account. It is more reliableiJithe sense that it includes in its account of social facts generaliza- tions (law-like) which include cases of deviations from the social norms, etc., which deviations, etc., are left out (or are not accommodated) by the native's account of the same social data. This methodology, when applied, is sup- posed to give a complete account of the social reality, especially as experienced (consciously and unconsciously) by the social actors. That is, neither Malinowski's nor Winch's social meta- theory could help us make a decision about the truth claim and the validity of the two competing accounts of the same social data. 5 CHAPTER THREE A Critical Examination of Nadel's (Non-Native) Account In this chapter, I will criticize Nadel from a methodological point of view. Methodological Critique Nadel says in his study of Nupe that he uses the 1 technique of functional anthropology. He says he has been influenced by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown.2 Functionalism as a social theory conforms to the positivist conception of social scientific methodology. And the positivist conception of social science is influenced by a certain conception of scientific method in the physical sciences. Central to the positivist conception of science is that science should provide a deductive-nomological explanation of a natural phenomenon.3 This deductive explanation is in lS.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (p. vii). Nadel never makes it clear to us whether by this he means the method of functional anthropology. or whether functional anthropology is his theoretical assumption. However, for the purpose of discussion in this thesis, I take him to mean all of the above. 2S.F. Nadel, The Foundations pg Social Anthropology, (p. vi). 3For example, see C.G. Hempel (1959), (1964); Carnap (1934); The Encyclopedia g; Philosophy, Vol. 3 (p. 159ff). 23 24 terms of the necessary and/or sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event. This form of explanation contains a . 4 . general law in the explanans. The explanandum (or what is to be explained) is deduced from the general law together with the initial and boundary conditions (or explanans). This form of deductive explanation is structurally isomor- phic with prediction. So a successful explanation of a phenomenon gives one the knowledge of the facts that could enable one to predict the occurrence of the phenomenon. Since these facts (or conditions) are the necessary and/or sufficient condition for the occurrence of the phenomenon in question, one could manipulate these facts to control the phenomenon. For example, if part of the explanation (hence one of the statements of the explanans) of why a piece of ice floating in a beaker of water does not melt (explanan- dum) is that it is because the room has a temperature level, ‘p, then an increase or a decrease of the room temperature (a manipulation of the temperature) would affect the floating ice. If the room temperature is increased to, say, t+l, the ice will start melting, and if the room temperature is 4Hempel (1959) says the method of deductive-nomological explanation accounts for a particular event by subsuming it under general laws, and it explains that a given law holds by subsuming it under more comprehensive laws of theoretical principles. For example, Newton's theory of gravitation can be subsumed, as an approximation under the general theory of relativity. Deduction could also be said to be a relation among statements or propositions. 25 decreased to, say, t-2, it will st0p melting. So any varia- tions of the temperature above or below level p will affect the floating ice differently. So a manipulation of the con- ditions stated in the explanans will enable us control the character (or the "behavior") of the phenomenon the deductive explanation (e.g. the floating ice in this case) is about. Thus the removal of the necessary condition would ensure the absence of the phenomenon, and the presence of the necessary condition will produce the phenomenon. A scientific study of phenomena (natural or social) using the conceptual categories of deductive causal explanation, causal laws, etc., or that develops a theory in this (nomo- logical-deductive) form, has internal to its framework, the possibility of technical control. In this theory/scien- tific explanation, the concepts of cause and effect imply control: a removal of the cause (e.g. decrease and increase in the temperature level in our example) will remove the effect (e.g. the ice melting or not melting). So a posi- tivist scientist who studies a phenomenon (natural or social) will see and understand the phenomenon ultimately in terms of technical control.5 Hence, a positivist's 5The notion of possible technical control is present even in the study of those systems over which we have no control, like the solar system, because we are provided with the information that is "useful in preparing for the ineVitablefl Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (p. 37, footnote #24). 26 scientific study of a phenomenon is technical control- biased. This will become very apparent when I discuss Nadel's functionalism. But first I will state the doctrine of functionalism and state a critique of it. 1. Functionalism. I will restrict myself to two general versions of positivistic functionalism, that of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, both of whom Nadel says influenced his anthropological view.6 Malinowski says;7 The functional view of culture insists --- upon the principle that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills some vital func- tion, has some task to accomplish, repre- sents an indispensable part within a work- ing whole. Malinowski also held the view that there was a correspondence between the basic social institutions and the primary biological needs of (the aggregate of) human beings. Moreover, like human beings, social institutions can survive only if certain sets of conditions (prerequi- sites) are satisfied. A functional explanation of a social practice or institution must disclose the survival value of that social fact, by exhibiting its function in satisfying the social prerequisites and thereby also the biological prerequisites. 6S.F. Nadel, The Foundations g; Social Anthropology (p. vi). This version is only one of the many versions of functional- ism given by Malinowski. He was often inconsistent. But this version ties in fairly neatly with our discussion. Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory pf Culture gpg Other Essays, chapters one and seven. 27 Radcliffe-Brown says:8 The continuity of the social structure, like that of an organic structure, is not destroyed by changes in the units. Indi- viduals may leave the society, by death or otherwise: others may enter it. The con- tinuity of the structure is maintained by the process of social life, which consists of the activities and interactions of the individual human beings and of the organ- ized groups into which they are united. The social life of the community is here defined as the functioning of the social structure. The function of any recurrent activity, such as the punishment of a crime, or a funeral ceremony, is the part it plays in the social life of the whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity. According to Radcliffe-Brown, there are pug central tasks for a science of society: (1) to ascertain how social systems perpetuate themselves by maintaining the form of their structure (it is this that bears some relevance to our discussion here), and (2) to ascertain how social systems change their type of altering their structural form. In both versions of functionalism (of Malinowski's and Radcliffe-Brown’s), a student of society should be able to specify a set of criteria for deciding whether or not a society has survived, and also the criteria for the termination of a society. Marion Levy states four terminal conditions: 8Krimerman, L.I., ed., The Nature A Scope 9; Social Science: ‘A Critical Anthology, P. 675 (2nd column). 28 (l) The society fails to provide physical protection against the nature and social obstacles of its members. (2) The society does not ensure that its membership is stable (either through biological reproduction or immigration or capture). (3) The society does not prevent anarchy (or "the war of each against all"). (4) The society does not prohibit widespread apathy. These conditions any existing society must gygpi. Marion Levy also specifies some ten pre-conditions that any ongoing society satisfies.9 They are frequently called "society maintaining" contributions (or "functional pre- requisites”).10 Of those ten pre-conditions, ilzis these four that are frequently cited: (1) Mechanisms for the regulation of permissible means for the attainment of individual, institutional or societal ends; (2) Provision for the distribution of society‘s goods and services (incentives and rewards); 9Compare also the list on p. 151 of The Structure pf Society, by Marion J. Levy, Jr. 10Marion Levy in The Structure pi Society, p. 56, defines function as a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation of a structure through time; on p. 57, he defines structure as a pattern, i.e., an observable uniform- ity, of action or operation; and on p. 72, functional pre- requisite is said to be a function that must pre-exist if a given unit in its setting is to come into being. 29 (3) Provision of effective channels of communication and sharing of common goals: (4) Provision for the development and maintenance of a sufficient division of labor. This means that an ongoing society has averted the four terminal conditions and satisfies the prerequisites. Deductively, the argument runs: (1) If a society survives it must avert the four terminal conditions. (2) If a society averts the four terminal conditions, it must meet ten prerequisites. (3) If a society meets the functional prerequisites, then its institutions must satisfy these prerequisites. (4) Society A has survived. Therefore the institutions in society X must serve functional prerequisites followed by particular institution and particular functions they serve. I now want to state Nadel's conception of functionalism. By doing so, I hope to relate his interpretations to his theoretical background and fit them into the context of his theory. I think this is necessary because I take many examples from his field work to illustrate many points I make in this thesis. Nadel is of the view that the aim of social anthropology is to explain and describe observed social 30 facts (p. 26f).ll These social facts consist of action and interaction between individuals. Activity means aim-con- trolled or goal-oriented behavior; that is, rational behav- ior. Thus, social anthropology aims at describing and explaining rational behavior (p. 30). Nadel's theory of functionalism takes root from this aim of social anthropol- ogy. His theory of functionalism is that there is some sort of ulterior purpose12 built into all social institutions, and it is the duty of the anthrOpologist to articulate the ulterior purpose, to make systematic the apparent unrelated activities of the humans in society (pp. 367-8).13 This is the basis of providing a rational explanation for some mystic explanations or taboos, and sometimes rationalizations of the native's beliefs. For example, Nadel would say witchcraft beliefs, while expressing fears and frustrations, also relieve these tensions in a cathartic manner (through witch hunts), and so satisfy a "need" (p. 367). Nadel holds the view that society is designed (by man) for human survival and it guarantees that survival (p. 374). Among the necessary attributes of society are states of 11Unless stated otherwise, the page references throughout this chapter will be to The Foundagons o_f Social Anthropology. 12Nadel does not make it clear to us whether by this he means a function which social members may be aware of or may not be aware of. 13This is an attempt to see social facts nomologically - and as causally related. 31 cohesion, continuity, solidarity, integration, etc. (p. 371). These states are necessary for groups or societal existence (p. 371), and other social facts are subservient to them (p. 375-76). Hence, his two sets of functions: (1) the fulfillment of the necessities of group existence, and, (2) the fulfillment of biological and psycho-physical necessities (possibly of individuals) (p. 373). From the above brief sketch of this version of functionalism, it will be seen that it is the contention of the functionalist social anthropologist that there are necessary conditions, which at the same time are universally present in all and any human society, which must exist to insure the survival of both biological individual and the society in which he lives.14 Social institutions are said to fulfill some of these necessary conditions for survival and continuity, etc. So social anthropology is concerned about discovering and explaining some of these necessary conditions for the survival and maintenance of social group or society. Without much elaborate argument, I hope one sees the traces or the influence of the positivist conception of science and social science in the functionalist doctrine as I attempt to state it here. One glaring influence, and which I want to emphasize, is its emphasis on discovering 14Later I explain the dangers entailed by this claim, of a social scientist claiming a discovery of some social laws. 32 some conditions (or social institutions or those social facts) that are necessary for the survival of the society and the humans that live in it. A discovery of these neces- sary facts and how they work will make control or manipula- tion (or prediction) of the human subjects possible. This is because the presence/absence of a necessary condition/ social "facts" will produce/remove the social phenomenon. Observation of observable phenomena is heavily stressed, for example, in Nadel (however, this is not unique to positiv- ism). Nadel even says "observation and description are the primary task of science."15 It is the metaphysical convic- tion of the positivist that any explanation of reality must be rooted in observable facts.16 It is also part of the positivist's conception of explanation that its form should be deductive. 2. Criticisms.l7 The positivist functionalist, as I have shown above, is concerned about discovering the neces- sary condition for the survival of society and/or social institutions. I will criticize the claims of the positivist 15His conception of explanation is positivistic. For example, on p. 367, he says, explanation is "the search for invariant relations between facts;" compare also his notion of explanation on p. l91f and footnote #1, which cite Carnap, 1934. 16 17 The Encyclopedia g; Philosophy, Vol. 8, p. 240ff. I got part of the criticisms in this section 2 from Irving M. Zeitlin, Rethinking Sociology, chapters one and seven. Those that are not from him I state. 33 functionalist, and then his/her methodology. i) Its claims: a) The survival needs. It is the claim of the positivist function- alist that every social institution or other in a society, has:the function of contributing positively to the mainten- ance of, the continuity of social structure (Radcliffe- Brown): the satisfaction of basic (biological individual) and derived (social) needs (Malinowski); and of fulfilling the conditions of cohesion, continuity, equilibrium, solidar- ity and integration which are necessary for group or societal existence (Nadel). If this is true, it could be argued that once the institutions which are said to serve these functions die out or are defunct, the society will cease to exist. For example, those societies in the past which had slavery as a major institution should have died out with the forceful abolition of slavery, because the positivist functionalist of that time could have argued that the institution of slavery served some survival value for the society. But rather than die out, such societies still exist today (but as different societies?). b) Patterns have consequences. The claim by the positivist functionalist that every cultural pattern has some good consequence(s) is naive.18 First, any irrational action could be assigned a 18My quote of Malinowski's theory of functionalism, above, implies it. 34 (good) consequence by any imaginative person who defends his claim with a powerful argument. So even the most irrational activity is transformed to a rational one. The action may, in fact, not have any consequence. Secondly, to say an action or its consequence is good is relative and subjective to a group and its interest. What may appear to be good to one subgroup may not be so to another subgroup. So when we say a consequence is good, we may only be expressing our subjective identification with a ,particular subgroup. ii) Methodological critique. a) Causal alternative. The positivist functionalist sometimes is not aware of the different senses of cause: for example, the four senses distinguished by Aristotle. Aristotle distin- guished: (1) The efficient cause (causa quog), or that by which some change is wrought, for'example, a statue is pro- duced by a sculptor by his imposing changes upon a piece of marble. (2) Material cause, is, for example, the piece of marbleewhich the sculptor uses for making the statue. (3) The formal cause is the form acquired by the statue, or the distinctive properties of a statue. (4) The final 19 cause, the purpose of possessing a beautiful statue. Generally, positivists are committed to efficient cause 19Aristotle, Metaphyoics, Bk I, Ch. 3; The Encyclopedia pf Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 56. 35 while functionalists are committed to final cause. Malinowski in particular often vacillates between efficient cause and final cause. Some others are less pre- cise about the sense in which they use the term "cause.” However, the functionalist tries to show that a given pat- tern fulfills some vital "system need" and this explains the existence of the pattern. The consequence or the effect of a given pattern or structure is cited as the ppupg of its existence or persistence.20 This notion of cause makes a thing cause itself; it is like saying X causes itself; that is, X has a certain effect on Y that in turn causes X. Social pattern X is explained by its effects and not by its causes. For example, Radcliffe-Brown argues for the inter- dependent relationship between the unity of a social system and the harmonious working together of its various parts.21 When there are structural alternatives X and Y, we should be able to explain why Y was present instead of X. To be able to do this, the functionalist must engage in a historical inquiry of this cause. But most positivist func- tionalists are ahistorical. In fact, Radcliffe-Brown says functional explanation is alternative to historical 20This notion of causation is spurious, because it does not explain the presence of cause. For example, the fact that the probability is high that human infants will not survive without care and attention in some form by human adults does not explain the presence of such care and attention. 21Krimerman, L.I., The Nature and Scope oi Social Science, p. 675. 36 explanation. The functionalist needs a theory of causation which will tell us whether X is an efficient cause or a final cause of Y, or whether it is both of these. Also, where a multitude of events precede a given event, which one we select as the cause of the given event to serve as an explanation of it is dependent on some system or theory we hold which makes some things relevant and others not. Hence, we are faced with the problem of interpretation in assigning a cause to an event. The functionalist's attempt (especially Malinowski and to some lesser measure, Nadel) to explain cultural phenomena by reference to their function, by emphasis on the satisfac- tion of biological needs, which is an individual matter, leaves us faced with what might be called "cultural monadol- ogy," and only something like "pre-established harmony" will enable us to account for the fact that individuals living contiguously "choose” the same instruments of satisfaction. b) Epgctional study. As a theory, functionalism encourages a study of culture without reference to disciplines like his- tory. Radcliffe-Brown, for instance, claims that functional- ism attempts a physiological study of society,22 and that it is an alternative to the historical study and explanation of 22Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., "The Functional Unity of Social Systems," in Leonard I. Krimerman, ed., The Nature A Scope of Social Science (p. 678). 37 cultural phenomena. It is therefore concerned only with the synchronic analysis of functional interrelationships, but not with the diachronic derivation of the latter. Because of this lack of interest in history, one common criticism against the theory is that it cannot account for development prior to the period of observation. Hence, there follows a lack of interest in the process by which culture changes over time by such occurrences as invention, acculturation or evolution, etc. It is also said to have failed to account for differences noted in, for example, marriage regulations and kinship behavior among some ethnic groups of various tribes. Because of this conspicuous and deliberate lack of interest in some other disciplines (or factors) that deal with culture, positivistic functionalism is guilty of a fractional study of culture. This gives an incomplete picture of culture. c) Deductive explanation.23 Here I want to state that positivistic functional explanation is essentially deductive ip its explanatory role. And I want to criticize it on this basis. Earlier above, I stated the deductive form which the explanation takes: 23Of the points under this heading, I got some from some of my teachers through discussions, and some from C.G. Hempel (1959). 38 (1) If a society survives it must avert the four terminal conditions. (2) If a society averts the four terminal conditions, it must meet ten prerequisites. (3) If a society meets the functional prerequisites then its institutions must satisfy these prerequi- sites. (4) Society A has survived. Therefore the institutions in society X must serve functional prerequisites followed by particular institution and particular functions they serve. To assert that a condition p constitutes a functional prerequisite for a state of some specified kind (such as survival) is parallel to the statement ofaalaw to the effect that whenever condition A fails to be satisfied, the state in question fails to occur. So explanation by func- tional analysis requires reference to laws or law-like gen- eral statements. And such laws and/or law-like statements are hypothetical statements of the form, "If X holds then Y holds," or (x) (Fx + Gx), which does not tell us anything about a specific individual (or institution). For example, a simple generalization such as, "All vertebrates have hearts," does not describe any particular individual, Fido, as being a vertebrate and having a heart; rather it asserts of Fido and of any other object, whether vertebrate or not, that i: it is a vertebrate, then it has a heart. Secondly, a law could be said to imply statements about ”potential 39 events," which never actually take place. The gas law, for example, implies that if a given body of gas were to be heated under constant pressure at time p, its volume would increase. But if, in fact, the gas is not heated at p, this statement can hardly be said to be a description of any par- ticular event. So the law-like functional statements are descriptively vacuous. As I have implied before above, no insitution is functionally indespensable to a society, for when any institution(s) (e.g., of slavery) dies out, the society still survives, for there are alternatives to (any) institution.24 It is characteristic of positivistic functionalism that it attempts to give accounts of social factsix1the most general, deductive terms. Its accounts are WA priori"25 and predictive. I will elaborate further on this when I discuss Nadel's ideology. 24Malinowski himself invokes the principle of limited possi- bilities of Goldenweiser which states that there are lim- ited number of means for satisfying any cultural need. This means there is more than one means. Merton has in- sisted that the conception of the functional indispensabil- ity of cultural items be replaced by the assumption of "functional alternatives, or functional equivalents or func- tional substitutes." This is said to be parallel to the principle of "Multiple solutions" for adaptational problems in evolution. The principle states that given any func- tional problem (e.g., of perception), there are usually a variety of possible solutions, and any of these are actually used by different organisms. It is important to bear in mind my conception of necessary as explicated in footnote 4, page 61, of this thesis. 251 puth priori in quotes because the account is less in- clined to conceptual analysis or less reliant on the native's accounts. The desire to generalize on and reify social relations are more agreeable to it. CHAPTER FOUR Ideological Critique of Nadel In Chapter Three, I located Nadel within the tradition of positivistic functionalism. I stated that this school of functionalists is preoccupied with discovering necessary con- ditions for the survival of society/institutions and indi- viduals. I leveled some criticisms against their program and claims about the needs of society. I also argued in Chapter Three that positivistic functionalism is control biased, mostly because its accounts are very general and are (in principle) predictive. I have also said in Chapter Three that Nadel's functionalism focuses on what he thinks to be the aim of anthropology. That the aim of social anthropology is to explain and describe observed social facts (e.g., purposive action). His theory of functional- ism is that there is some sort of ulterior purpose built into all social institutions, and the anthropologist is to seek and articulate this ulterior purpose. Among the neces- sary attributes of society are states of cohesion, continu— ity, etc., and these states are necessary for group or societal existence. In this Chapter, I will want to show that Nadel's functionalism is an outgrowth of his ideological convictions, 4O 41 and how these convictions influence his study of Nupe and the account of the Nupe presented in Chapter One of this thesis. 1. Ideological conviction. Nadel believes in and stresses the unity of theory and practice.1 He is of the opinion that there is a possi- ' bility of cooperation between anthropology and colonial administration.2 He even says his work was to aid colonial government in its administration. His anthropological study of the Nupe was to provide an aid suitable for Indirect Rule.3 In an effort to control African pe0p1e, Lord Lugard originated the concept of indirect rule. Lugard's concep- tion of indirect rule4 was of a system of administration which relied on the indigenous authorities for local govern- ment. Crowder reports Lugard on the British colonial policy in Nigeria (with the implicit presupposition of Indirect lHe regarded himself as a practical or applied anthropologist and his text, ABlack Byzantium (p. vi) was dedicated to this. He says a "value-free anthropology was an illusion," in The Foundations of Social Anthropology (p. 3, pp. 52-53). 2S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (p. vi). 3 . Ibid. As I note. below, Lugard wrote the forward to Nadel's, A Black Byzantium. 42 . 5 Rule) as saying: The policy of the Government was that these chiefs (like the Etsu Bida for Nupe - the traditional rulers) should govern their peo- ple pop pg independent, but pg dependent rulers. The orders 0f the Government are not conveyed to the people through them, but emanate from them in accordance, where necessary, with instructions received through the Resident (the Resident was a white British Administrative Officer - Nadel often refers to him as the District Officer). While they themselves (the chiefs) are controlled by Government in policy and matters of importance, their people are controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves. A political officer (i.e., a British white colonial officer) would consider it as irregular to issue direct orders to an individual native, or even a village head as a Gen- eral commanding a division would to a pri- vate soldier, except through his commanding officers. (Underlinings mine) The Resident acts as a sympathetic adviser to the native chief, being careful not to interfere so as to lower his prestige, or cause him to lose interest in his work. His advice op matters of general policy issues pig instructions pg pig subordinate chiefs app district heads - pop op pp; orders of the Resident but as his own. Nadel stressed "the application of anthropology to problems of colonial policy...."6 He said "modern anthro— pology would be of great assistance to colonial government in providing it with the knowledge of the social structure of native groups upon which a harmonious Native Administration 5M. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (p. 217). 65.F. Nadel, The Foundations (p. 55). 43 -- should be built -- the anthrOpology is to demonstrate the native society in all its complexity" in its "multitude of social causes and effects" since "the efforts of administra- tion represent cause and effects --."7 In the unity of theory and practice, he says, in employing the criterion of command over persons and benefits he has "introduced concepts connoting -- purpose and utility, since command always means command for some pur- ose --." (My underlining.) From Nadel's perspective the overriding purpose (of colonial rule) was control. His functionalism focused exactly where his application focused,9 on control and regulation. Nadel's theoretical model for analysis of other societies was derived from the task required by 10 imperial nations. Control was paramount in their concern 7S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (p. vi). 88.F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (pp. 158-59); see also, his symbolic calculi on p. 115ff. 9Nadel's functionalism is predicated on "certain absolute requirements - the integration of society and the survival of populations," The Foundations, p. 375. In his study of Nupe the focus was on the cohesion - why the society did not disintegrate though it had contact with European civili- zation. ‘A Black Byzantium (p. iii, pp. 141-43). 10Imperialism as used in this thesis is the physical (and/or mental) conquest (and/or domination) of one group of people by another. The purpose of the conquest is to enable the conquering group, among other things, to exploit the labor force of the conquered group, to exploit the conquered group economically, etc., to the personal benefit of the conquering group. The conquest is to enable the conquering group to dominate the conquered group culturally (or mental- ly) so as to make the task of exploitation easy. 44 with colonized peoples. Lugard, as I have emphasized, was the founder and inventor of Indirect Rule for British colonialism. He was also the writer of the foreward to A Black Byzantium by S.F. Nadel.11 As I have said above, control was the paramount concern of the British colonialist, as Lugard's words prove, control and command are important to the system and the colonial government. Nadel reconciles his intellectual con- victions with these. So his theory focuses where colonial practice focuses. Since Nadel's position as presented above is compatible with the colonial interest of the control and command of the colonial subjects, and Nadel identifies with the interest of the colonialists, it is natural and logical that his inter— pretations of the social facts about Nupe as presented in Chapter One should be the way they are. I want to note some salient points in Lugard's concep- tion of Indirect Rule, and make some remarks on their impli- cations. I think this might throw some light on my discus- sion of Nadel. Lugard says the traditional rulers should be dependent rulers not independent rulers. They act under the directives of the colonial officers. The traditional rulers' decisions are determined or controlled by the policy of the colonial government, and the people the chiefs rule are controlled by the colonial government policy, i.e., they 11The text from which majority of the ethnographical data discussed in this thesis are taken as examples. 45 act and behave in conformity with the policy. The tradi- tional rulers or chiefs should be given some incentives to make them interested in their work of passing orders to their subjects. Nothing should be done that will make the ruler lose respect in the fact of the ruled. The implication of this is a hierarchy of social classification. The chief (or the Appu in case of the Nupe) is at the top of the social ladder or hierarchy. Next to him are his subordinates who take orders from him to the masses of the Nupe people. But both the Epgu and his sub- ordinates are under the influence of the British colonial officer. The Etsu should be given some privileges which would make theepeople he rules over respect him. The sub- jects are to be made to feel that the Etsu is a wise man; this is why Lugard says the subjects must not be allowed to know that the Epgu's decisions are being dictated by the resident, and that the resident should not give directives directly to the people the Eppu rules over or to the sub- ordinates of the gppu. This way of rulership or administra- tion implies the principle of divide and rule. This princi- ple, as I conceive it, is that of satisfying some few out of many so that these few do not any more feel like teaming up with the majority to sabotage the existing system. 2. How Nadel's Ideology Influences His Methodology. With Nadel's conviction and identification with the colonial administrator's concern about the control or 46 manipulation of colonial subjects, his understanding and explanation of the social facts of Nupe were purely in terms of control. This is indicated by the fact that he sees religion in the hands of the Fulani rulers of Nupe as an instrument for welding political unity and loyalty to the person of the King. The seizure of Tsoede insignia would have the effect of shifting the pagans' political loyalty to the Fulani ruler; the conversion of the ruled to Islam would carry with it a political loyalty to the ruler who was himself a muslim; and in fact, the converted create a special privileged social class between the ruler(s) and the lower class of unconverted pagans; with the BEER taking an interest in the powerful secret society of ndako gboya, the people shift their political loyalty to him and ask for ndako gboya help only through the .Epoo. The personality of §E§E itself is seen as a focus of potential unity. The people's attendance at the Epou's receptions at Sallah festivals is a sign of their political allegiance and loyalty to him. The law courts are to serve the political function of cultural domination. So, by religion, the Fulani rulers manipulate and con- trol the Nupe. As I said in Chapter One, religion is seen as subordinate to politics. This View I argued is contrary to Kashi wusa's, who sees everything as being subordinate to religion. In what follows, I want to show how Nadel exploits his methodological techniques to fit the system of Indirect Rule used by the colonialists. 47 To make his study of Nupe fit the concept of indirect rule, Nadel portrays Nupe society as a hierarchy of social classes. His study implies the principle of divide and rule, which is implied by the theory of Indirect Rule as propounded by Lugard. That the principle of divide and rule informs Nadel's study of the Nupe is demonstrated by the fact that he sees Nupe society as a strictly class society12 where the nobility are at the top. The nobility are the ruling class. Next to this ruling class are the Fulani, urban dwellers of Bida town and their followers (slavescn:"pages"). Next to these are the rest of the residents of Bida. Nadel,13 broadly, put the whole of the urban dwellers of Bida in one group as constituting a social class higher than that of the non-urban dwellers. Nadel then exaggerates the differences between these two classes. The class of urban dwellers, which I will loosely (like him)? call the class of the nobility for the sake of the discus- sion, are accorded higher status and made to think they belong to a higher class which is more civilized than the 12 13 S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (p. 128). In fact he says there are two main classes: (1) the ruling class of the Kingdon who are rich and own lands and were slave-raiders. (2) Those lower down the social scale - commoners and peasants who are mercilessly taxed to keep up the upper class (p. 131). The ”uncouth" manners, their "primitive" customs, are part of the pagan peasant culture of the country (p. 132). Page references are to A_Black Byzantium. 48 class of the non-urban dwellers, which for the purpose of discussion, I call the class of commoners. Nadel makes the class of the nobility feel their superiority over the class of commoners by pointing to the clothes they wear, the manner of dressing, the food they eat, the beer they drink, the language they speak, and the manner of their speech. Nadel says it is a mark of a member of the nobility to wear blue glazed "rowni" or a turban, while the peasants or commoners who are of the lower class do not (p. 128);14 people of the noble class use elegant phrases borrowed from Hausa or Arabic language to talk cir- cumlocutiously about the delicate topic of sex (p. 132), but the uneducated peasants or commoners use the crude literal expression to discuss such matters, and are there— fore despised by the higher class (p. 132). The poor eat little meat, unmilled corn (of higher nutritive content), drink sorghum-beer, but the rich noble class15 in Bida eats meat every day, rice and chicken, milled corn and drink palm-wine instead of the sorghum-beer made of corn (pp. 131-32). The class system is such that a man born of commoners as a rule remains a commoner and the ranks of nobility are filled only with men of noble birth. But occasionally there 14 15Nadel sometimes equates noble class with rich class. All page references are to A Black Byzantium. 49 is inter-class mobility which goes with the assimilation of the culture of the higher class. The higher class, which is identified with the class of giipo, is said to "have set the standard of cultural desirability and superiority in general" (p. 133). This way of seeing and understanding a subcultural group (viz the Fulani subcultural group) in contrast with its other fellow subcultural groups (e.g., the Nupe Bini and Nupe Epo, etc., subcultural groups) has the effect of wooing the favored subcultural group to the side of the observer, especially since this description would influence the policy of the government in power towards the totality of the cultural group, viz the Nupe cultural group. This description and form of understanding a cultural group gives the favored subcultural group a feeling of superiority over some other, and the feeling that culturally and intellectu- ally they are leading others,16 that their ways are better l6Nadel's books, especially A Black Byzantium, influence the Fulani because it is widely read, especially by the admin- istrators in training from Nupe in many overseas and Nigerian universities. Also, S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk- Greene in The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (1966), p. 261, say their account on Nupe rests on Nadel's A Black Byzant- ium as an evidence. Since it is the case that Nadel's study influences the behavior of the peOple it is about, his study therefore serves the purpose of self-fulfilling prophecy. And this is contrary to the epistemological (and/or hypothetical) claims of the positivist scientist whose epistemological (and/or hypothetical) claims are supposed to be confirmable or falsifiable by reference to the social facts the claims are about. But the facts now do not any more confirm or falsify the hypotheses, but fulfill them. 50 than the ways of the others, even though they might not in the least fare better than the others. The favored class becomes arrogant. The unfavored class comes to despise itself and its ways. Once the formerly unfavored class begins to reflect some aspect(s) of the manners of the favored class, it is christened "civilized," "non-paganic," etc. All positive qualities are showered on it. New favors are shown to it. This newly converted or "conquered" class then begins to behave like the first favored class (viz, the Fulani). And the first favored class is favored because it agreed to be manipulated and controlled by the controlling authority of British colonialism. The new favored class by a positive response to the favors comes under the tentacles of manipulation and control. This in abstract is the principle of divide and rule, which informs indirect rule, and which in turn informs Nadel's perception of the Nupe. Nadel sees things in terms of "more" (for muslim Nupe Fulani) and "less" (for the other subcultural groups of Nupe); the "more" means superiority and "less" means infer- iority. "more" for "richness" and ”less" for "poverty. The fact that X does not dress in a kind of dress means he is not rich enough to afford it. Everyone struggles to be dressed in that manner so that he should be thought "rich,” "superior," "educated," "civilized," etc. The fact that X does not use Hausa or the Arabic language to talk about some kinds of topics is used to suggest that he and his language are not rich in vocabulary: by the fact that X does not eat 51 this or that, it is suggested that he is not rich enough to afford it, or if rich enough to afford it, not educated enough to know the nutritious value of such food. Since some peOple want to be thought noble, rich, educated and superior, what they do is to try to inculcate the habit of consumption of the class said to be superior, rich, etc., even though it might be a bad habit. The drive now is to try to reflect and copy the habit and the culture of the class said to be the highest. The so-called highest, educated, more civilized class begins to tell the aspirants what to drop and what to hold to. "To become like us, you must forget your past. Be born anew in our hands." The control now is possible. Voluntarily, the aspirants decul- turalize themselves, and are deculturalized. Equally, the originally favored class itself is gradually deculturalized by the overall controlling master, viz, the British coloni- alist. The colonialist dictates to them what to do and think. What they dictate is largely influenced by, possi- bly, Nadel's narrow-viewed social theory of functionalism, the social theory that claims to have discovered the natural laws of social relationships. The theory is constituted of a limited number of variables (which are also ideological), because the explanation is limited to the conceptual cate- gories available to Nadel. Hence, the theory fails to reflect the possibly actual social reality of Nupe society because it ignores the conceptual categories available to them and their ideas of themselves. Nadel's theory is the 52 result of the detached observer and descriptive analyst advocated by Malinowski. (See Chapter Two of this thesis.) 3. Re-evaluationgyand Comments. I have stressed above the fact that Nadel believes that social anthropology could be of help to colonial administra- tion. It could help find solutions to the administrative problems of colonial administrators. Hence, he advocated a close and cordial relationship between anthrOpologist and colonial administrator. The central problem of the colonial administrator was how to control his colonial subjects. Nadel, therefore, found that functional social theory was the most suitable social theory that could be applied to the study of society so as to provide the information necessary for the effective control of the colonial subjects by the colonial administrator.l7 With these ideological convic- tions (political control) and theoretical convictions (func- tionalism and its application to aid colonial administration to control through Indirect Rule) at the background, Nadel, in his study of Nupe society in aid to colonial administra- tion, saw and understood the social relationships between the Nupe (and their culture) purely in control terms. This l7And control for economic exploitation, see, Michael Crowder, Colonial West Africa, p. 244; and Helen Lackner, "Social Anthropology and Indirect Rule ---" in Anthropology and the Colonigi Encounter, ed. Talal Asad (pp. 124-25). 53 is illustrated in my discussions of his account of some Nupe social data in Chapter One of this thesis and in this chapter above. The social relationships among the Nupe are seen and appreciated in terms of dominant—submissive class society. That is, the interpretation of the social relationships was purely in political terms of control. He presents or describes a society of hierarchical social structure where the King is on top. All his subor- dinates and everything around him are below him and are responsible to him. The King (or the EEEB) is portrayed as 18 The having an absolute and dictatorial political power. Epoo and the members of the ruling class and all their sub- ordinates who live with them in Bida town have their cul- ture painted and described very elegantly and attractively, for example, as more highly educated, superior, rich, etc., to the envy of the non-urban dwellers who live outside of Bida town, and who are predominantly farmers. This kind of description of the culture of the urban-dwellers of Bida had the effect of making the non-urban dwellers of Bida town despise themselves and their culture. For example, Nadel, failing to draw a distinction between the custom and the 19 law of a society, made a daughter of an Ebe tell her 18All the colonial administrator had to do was to reinforce this power so that the subjects fear the King. 19The Ebe are a Nupe subcultural group. 54 father heroically in Kutigi court that if her father could have the custom of their society brought up in the court, she would obey her father and not marry her Hausa lover.20 Thus, the triumph of muslim law over the custom of a Nupe Ebe. This undoubtedly would have the effect of making the Ebe despise himself and his custom and culture. This is coercion in naked daylight. It is coercion because the Ebe father was highly resistant to the dictates of the muslim law as administered by the Fulani. Nadel reports the Ebe went to the court three times on this issue. The muslim law represents the views of the governing race (mostly the mus- lim Fulani and to a lesser degree, white British colonialist whose approval was always at hand). So these laws represent- ing the views of the governing race failix1the dual test of good legislation, (1) that it should be in the interests of the governed (this may be debatable), and (2) it should be by the consent of the governed - this is emphatically denied. . The kind of treatment that the Ebe received in the Kutigi court by muslim law given an interpretation of white British colonial logic is what I call an attempted dehumani- zation of the colonial subjects, viz, the Nupe in this case. With the elevation of the person of kingship and his cul- tural group as forming a social class higher, superior, and above that of the other subcultural group by Nadel's 29A.§iggk Byzantium, p. 173. 55 applied functionalism, the ruling class of the Eppu are given a misleading idea of what they are and represent. It is a misleading idea since it might not be the case that theeFulani ruling class is superior to other classes, nor is their culture superior, but it might be the case that they belong to a class with a different value system from those of the other subcultural groups. What the white British colonialist would have done, if they were not ruling indirectly for the exploitation of the masses of Nupe 21 would have been to help constructaisocial bridge people, linking the two main cultural groups. But rather than do this, the way they made the Nupe Fulani understand them- selves and the other subcultural groups of Nupe understand themselves only creates or constructs a barrier between the two main subcultural groups. This, as I have emphasized, only facilitates control. The other subcultural groups, as in the case of the Ebe at the Kutigi court, are made to believe that for them to survive as individuals and groups of individuals, they must "worship" the person of the King and adopt the culture of the group to which the King belongs. The colonialist emphasizes this by imposing a heavy taxation on the people through the King.22 This compels the pe0p1e into submission. The King himself and his officials are paid high salaries from the collected taxes, or as we say, 21See references to Michael Crowder and Helen Lackner above. 22A Black Byzantium (pp- 163-64). 56 are given a lion's share of the collected taxes. This has the effect of making the King and his officials have no com- plaints against their overbearing white British colonial rulers, hence, there was no need for opposition. However, there was always a constant threat at the background that anytime the King refused a manipulation or a control by them, the colonial officers, he would be dethroned.23 Summary I have attempted to show that Nadel's interpretation and understanding of Nupe society in control terms is a natural consequence of his ideological background (colonial manipulation of the colonial subjects) and his theoretical conviction (that positivistic functionalism or anthropology could be adequately applied to the problems of colonial administration). I also argued that an understanding of the Nupe in dominant-submissive terms gives the Nupe of whatever class a false idea of what the social relationships are among them, and this consequently dehumanizes some members of some "submissive" groups like the Ebe. I also tried to show that the ruling class of the Fulani, having been given a false opinion of themselves, became arrogant. They come to think they are superior whereas they are not. This false opinion they have of them- selves makes them think they are at the top of the ladder of 23S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (p. 158). 57 development. This could be one of the reasons why they did not bother to develop their talents along the lines of Western education. Since few of their number have received a Western education, they then today become jealous of the other subcultural groups, especially the Nupe Bini who have agreed earlier in the century to embrace and develop their talents along the lines of Western education. This causes or increases a lot of suspicion between the two groups. The Fulani continues to think he is superior, but he has not the accepted modern educational requirements like the other groups that are supposed to be inferior, particularly the Nupe Bini. The Nupe Bini have the highest number of people with Western educations, and are more or less dominating in every office. So this is one of the evil consequences of the colonialists, particularly Nadel's study of the Nupe, for the Fulani rulers of Bida today, particularly in the seventies when the tension between the Nupe Bini and the Fulani is high. Studies like Nadel's are of a sort that lend themselves to developing strategies of colonial rule. CHAPTER FIVE A Critical Examination of interpretive Social Science Which Is Presupposed by Kashi Wusgos (aoNative's) Account In Chapter Three, when I was criticizing Nadel's (a non-native's) account of some Nupe social data, I said that methodologically, his account is influenced by positivistic functionalism. Some of the marked features of positivistic functionalism are that it holds that generalized deductive accounts should be given of social data. It attempts to give an account that is predictive of social phenomena. Since its account is highly generalized, it seems to be very abstract with little or no emphasis on history or on the fact that there is an internal side to human action and human relationships. Because of these traits it has, it is likely to do violence to individual differences(s). Also, because of its predictive aims, it is close to and lends itself to the imperialist task of control. Since Nadel is ideologically committed to the colonialist control of the colonial subjects, he looked for the most generalized func- tional account of the relationship between the muslim Fulani rulers of Nupe and the ruled masses of Nupe people. In doing so, Nadel ignores what individual differences there might be between the different subcultural groups in Nupe. Nadel, as a result of his methodological and ideological convictions, 58 59 sees Nupe society as class society that could be divided into two; the dominant class of the rulers (muslim Fulani) and the submissive class of the ruled (the other subcultural groups of Nupe who are not Fulani). Nupe society, therefore, is portrayed as a dominant-submissive class society. In this chapter, I want to criticize Kashi Wusa's (a native's) account from a methodological point of view. Methodological Critique Strictly speaking, Kashi Wusa does not tell us as explicitly as Nadel does what methodological convictions underlie or guide her in her account of some Nupe social facts. But from her account and fromthe fact that she is a native, one could infer what methodological presuppositions inform her account. Because she is a native, her account(s) focuses on the internal side of the social facts.l She (unwittingly) gives her account in terms of the concepts (like that of Riddah and Jidgah wars) available to her and others in her society. It could be said that her account presupposes the methodology of interpretive social science.2 And I will criticize her methodology from the point of view of interpretive social science. I will first state the doctrine of interpretive 1However, one could be a native and yet follow some other approach. I borrow this term from Brian Fay, Social Theory and Poiitical Practice, Chapter 4. 2 60 social science and then state a critique of it. 1. Interpretive Social Science. There is some similarity between this conception of a social science and Winch's. It is Winch's conviction as I stated in Chapter Two that there is an internal side to human activity, the activity which is the object of study of a social scientist. A human activity is governed by the idea(s) possessed by the human being himself. Hence, a human activity is understandable or meaningful by reference to the idea possessed by the actor. 'It is Winch's contention that human behavior (or action) is rule-governed, and the knowledge of these rules is unique to the social actor(s). So a social scientist cannot by mere observation predict how the social actor will interpret what is involved in fol- lowing that rule in radically new circumstances; where deci- sions have to be made, the outcome ”cannot" be definitely predicted, for it is a major characteristic of decisions that they involve and are the outcome of calculations by a social actor.3 The interpretive social scientist draws a distinction between doings and happening_. Happenings are those events that happen to things. Such happenings are like "falling," "rusting," etc. These happenings are predominantly the object(s) studied by the natural scientist. Doings are some 3Peter Winch, The Idea of.§ Social Science (pp. 91-2). 61 form of activities performed (mostly) by human agents. It is these doings (or activities) performed by human agents that are the object(s) studied by the social scientist. Examples of such doings are such human activities as "jump- ing," "buying," "selling," "kissing," etc. Doings are what one does, but happeningg are what happens to one. In our discussion in this thesis, we are concerned mainly with doings, the object of the study of a social science. So I concentrate the rest of the discussions on doings. Doings are described by the use of action concepts. These action concepts (or concept terms) are terms like "jumping," "buying," "selling," etc. Action concepts describe doings done (or behavior performed) with a purpose (aim, intent, desire, etc.). This means doings have internal to them the agent's purpose, intention, aim, etc. And these purposes, intentions, aims, etc., are unique or subjective to social actors as persons, hence the criterion for the the application of concept terms (or action concepts) can- not be mere observations of physical movements; the physi- cal movements require an interpretation, on the part of the observer, of what the physical movements mean to the actor. This is because no specific physical movement is ever neces- sary4 for an action to occur. For example, one can vote in 4My conception of necessary in this context is of an event X which is said to be necessary for the occurrence of Y. In this case, X is known to be an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary (cont.) 62 many ways, by sitting, standing, keeping quiet, signing a piece of paper, etc. Also no physical movement can be a suf- ' ficient condition for a specific action to be said to have occurred. For example, saying "I do" in front of a priest and one's fiance, may or may not be an act of marriage, depending on the circumstances, for the participants may be pretending or acting in a movie or rehearsing the ceremony, etc. The meaning of the bodily movement reveals what action is being performed. The meaning of the bodily movement is the purpose (or intention, aim) for which the bodily move- ment is made. And the purpose of movement is in some cases known only to the social actor who makes the bodily movement. To know the meaning of the bodily movement, therefore, the observer must discourse with the social actor he is study- ing or at least be thorougly familiar with the ideas and customs of the actor and his or her society. What meaning the actor says the bodily movement has, is the action he 4(cont.) but sufficient for the occurrence of the event Y. For example, when a short circuit, X, is said to be the cause of a house catching fire, Y, it is meant that there is a set of conditions (some negative and others positive) including the presence of inflammable material, etc., the absence of a fire extinguisher, etc., which combine with a short circuit to constitute a complex condition that was sufficient for the house's catching fire - sufficient but not necessary for the fire could have started in other ways. But of this particular complex condition, the short circuit, X, was an indispensable part of the complex suffi- cient (but not necessary) condition of the fire, Y. J.L. Mackie holds a view similar to mine in "Causes and Condi- tions,” in the Nature 9: Causation, ed. Myles Brand. 63 performs.5 The importance of the authority of the actor is emphasized when we note that a particular bodily movement could be described in many ways, for example, a particular bodily movement can be described as opening6 a window, at the same time the same bodily movement may be described as cooling the room or signaling to an accomplice outside, etc. It is because a particular bodily movement can be described in many ways, that we do not find it odd to ask why did he do X even though we could infer the why. For example, we know a bodily movement opopg a window, but we do still ask, without feeling odd, why did he open the window? This kind of question could also be linkedtxathe fact that any action (and/or bodily movement) will have many consequences, both intended and unintended, hence we seek further to discover the intention of the agent beyond the one contained in the initial action description. So our criterion for the application of an action con- cept to any bodily movement should be rootedix1the aim, pur- pose, etc., it is intended to achieve. And it is usually 5However, it could be objected that it is not always true that an action has the meaning an actor says it has, other- wise it would not be possible to deceive someone else about one of our actions: people do lie about the meaning of their actions -- or they are confused, etc. A difference should be noted between Fay and me here. I make a distinction between action and bodily movements. I strictly hold that action is the meaning assigned to a bod- ily movement. But Fay uses action to mean both bodily move- ment and the meaning assigned to bodily movement. Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, Chapter 4. 6 64 only the social actor himself, that could tell us this aim, intention, etc., of the bodily movement. So far the position has been that a social scientist should be interpreting the bodily movements of the social actors (and/or observable behavior),7 because one particular bodily movement could be given many and varied action descriptions. For an adequate interpretation, the social scientist should seek to discover the intentions, etc., which the actors have in doing whatever it is they are doing (Verstehen "understanding"). The knowledge of the intentions should be the criterion for our description of a particular bodily movement as being a particular specific action. So it is a teleological explanation of social phenomena, not an efficient causal one, that is advocated by the interpretive model of social science. Humans live in the company of their fellow humans.8 They live by acting and interacting with fellow human beings. Those who live in the same company (or group or society), are able to live together harmoniously or are able to co- exist because, among other factors, their individual actions meet some standard expectations of the other members of the same social group. So to the members of this social group, 7Hence the introduction of the term interpretive social sci-. encetanay,Cf. 4,4.1 of Social Theory and Political Practice. 8In this thesis, I sometimes use "man” and "men" to cover both male and female sex; where it is otherwise, the con- text will disambiguate. Equally, the expression "his" and "he" are used for "mankind” or ”humankind." 65 there is the question of what performances are appropriate as goipg X. That is, there is a correct procedure for doing and for not doing X. This implies that behind or underlying any action there are particular rules of the society which govern it. This means a specific action concept can be used only in the context of a certain set of social rules. It is the background of the social rules9 of a particular society which provides the limits of what it is to do X or what is to count as doing X or recognized by the members of society as doing X. These rules refer to the expectations of the members of a social group, and they (the rules) logically constitute the possibility of a particular action being said to occur. These rules refer to standard identifications of situations. It is a set of such social rules that is referred to by the concept "market-place." So the action concept "buying" logically implies or presupposes the existence of the social practice or a set of social rules of the "market-place." The social practices of a society con- stitute the logical possibility of certain classes of action. Interpretive social science seeks to discover the set of rules which underlies a given class of actions to make these rules explicit, and to relate them to other rules in 9Winch says where someone is following a rule, we cannot pre- dict how he will interpret what is involved in following that rule in radically new circumstances, The Idea of‘g Social Science (p. 92). 66 the society. This should be especially true of the social anthropologist because he is immediately confronted with behavior which is unintelligible until the rules underlying this behavior are discovered and explicated. People who coexist in the same social group (or society) could be assumed to have shared assumptions, definitions, and conceptions which give definite structure to the world (or their world) in certain definite ways (hence "meanings" to their action), and these shared factors (or assumptions, etc.) constitute the logical possibility of the existence of a certain social practice (hence, they are "constitutive"). These shared basic conceptions by the social actors may be called "constitutive meanings." It is because of these con— stitutive meanings (or shared basic conceptions) that there can be certain types of social action: for example, the social practice of the market-place can only occur given the shared constitutive meanings of, say, some conception of private property, that by exchange of goods and services one maximizes one's own resources. The constitutive meanings show how a social practice fosters the aims and satisfies the needs of the social actors as they themselves define 10 them (even tacitly). 10These constitutive meanings are related and patterned to form a world view -- there are those constitutive meanings that support social practice and there are those that under- lie the social world of which it is a part. However, the constitutive meanings are less accessible to individual social actors. They need to step outside the framework of their ordinary language and experience to get at these meanings. 67 So an attempt to set a social practice within the world view (constitutive meaning) of the social order involves elucidating the basic notions which a people share about the world, society, and human nature, for example, a social conception of masculinity and femininity, etc. In revealing these shared basic notions, the social scientist is explaining a given social order by articulating the con- ceptual scheme that defines reality in certain ways, and in terms of which the actions that he views make sense. Like a philosopher, the interpretive social scientist engages in the activity of conceptual analysis; he tries, like a philo- sopher, to reveal the A priori conditions which make social experience what it 15.11 According to the interpretive model of social science, any/every adequate account of a social phenomenon should include a relating of the three basic concepts, ”action con- cept " "social practice" and "constitutive meanings." Because constitutive meanings are presupposed in every social practice, they determine what social practice there would be. A social practice determines what action concepts are possible, and an application of an action concept logically implies some social practice. 11But this does not make interpretive social science an arm chair activity. The interpretive social scientist still needs a thorough awareneSs of social experience before he can reflect on the conditions which make such experience possible. 68 According to the interpretive model, it is a necessary condition of the truth of the claim by a social scientist that he has succeeded in uncovering the tacit assumptions (or constitutive meanings) of the social actors' social practice only when the social actors agree without coercion _that his interpretation is another way of understanding the practice, because the meanings are meanings fipr,pp§p and this can 2.1111 be 29.151. 22 their» The interpretive model emphasizes the importance of the specific meaning a specific social actor gives to his specific behavior (or "act"). Hence, some importance is attached to the native's account of some/any social fact(s) of his society. The account of Kashi Wusa, who is a native of Nupe society, is automatically qualified as satisfying some conditions stipulated by the interpretive model. This is why I said earlier that Kashi Wusa's account is best understood in terms of the interpretive model. 2. Criticisms.12 It is the claim of the interpretive model that human behavior is governed by the meanings, beliefs, rules, etc., which the social actor possesses. These beliefs, etc., are said to be internally coherent with each other. To inter- pret any action or behavior of the social actor, reference 121 got all of the criticisms under this heading from Brian Fay. Social Theory and Politipal‘Practice, Chapter 4, especially section 4.3. 69 must be made to the beliefs, aims, etc., of the particular social actor. I bring four criticisms to bear upon these claims. a) Influence of physical factors. The interpretive model stresses that an explanation of social facts must be done with reference to only the aims and intentions, etc., of the social actors. Because of this, the interpretive model does not provide the means to determine how a social scientist might find out some of those factors (non-social) that are independent of social actors (like climatic conditions, level of technology, etc.) but which exercise some influence on (or are the origin of the cause of) the beliefs, desires, aims, etc., the social actors have. A social scientist might also want to explain how the human agent adapts himself to his natural environment, but the interpretive model does not provide means for doing this. In this case, a social scientist is trying to provide a 13 quasi-causal account of the ways in which certain combina- tions of conditions give rise to certain forms of action, rules, and common meaning. 13It is quasi-causal because men act in terms of their inter- pretations and intentions towards their external conditions but they are not directly or exclusively governed by these conditions and so these conditions cannot be called causes of their action. The concept of quasi-causal was first introduced to me by Brian Fay, Social Theopy and Political Practice (p. 66). 70 b) Unintended consequences. The interpretive model stresses that an explanation of social facts must be made with reference to the purpose, intention, etc., of the individual social actors. But the patterns of unintended consequences cannot be explained by reference to only the purpose, intention, etc., of individ- ual actors. Some of these unintended consequences might reinforce the actions, beliefs, and roles of the other mem- bers of the society such that it "serves the purpose" of maintaining the structure of the group as a whole. A social scientist might want to discuss the ways in which a social whole maintains itself as an ongoing system that persists over time. c) Coherence. According to the interpretive model, a social scientist should assume that the meanings, beliefs, prac— tices and actions which he encounters, if understandable to him, must be congruent with one another. So a good inter- pretation is the demonstration of the coherence which the initially unintelligible act, rule, or belief has in terms of the whole of which it is a part. But this method does not provide a social scientist with a way of understanding structural conflicts and conflicts of ideas and beliefs within a society. Some of these conflicts might play some role or function in the life of a society. Some particular constitutive meanings of a particular social practice may serve to obscure contradictions between them and other 71 aspects of social life.14 With an interpretive social scientist, these areas of social experience, of conflicts and contradictions, are left unexplained (or unverified). d) Social changg. A social scientist is not only interested in social order but also in social change. When social actors some- times become aware of the fact that some contradictions inform their ways of living and beliefs, they might come to think of themselves differently and behave differently. But since methodologically the interpretive model assumes internal coherence between self understandings of the actors, their meanings, their social practices and their actions, it provides no way to account for this form of change, and of how a specific institution may change in the future. Also, it fails to account for historical change or the origin of an institution or of a society. 14For example, the Fulani proclaimed the universal brother- hood of Islam and a just administration of Islamic law, yet they practiced slavery and enslaved fellow muslims. CHAPTER SIX Ideologicgi_Critique of Kashi Wusa Unlike Nadel, Kashi Wusa does not state explicitly what her ideological convictions are. But from her account of the Nupe social data, one could infer her ideological leanings. However, like Nadel, her account has some ideolo- gical biases. I will discuss only two ideological weaknesses (or biases) in her accout, the uncritical nature of the account and the feeling of independence in her account. a) Upcritical. Kashi Wusa gives a manifest account of the Nupe social data. It is claimed, or the Fulani rulers of Nupe claimed, that they came to Nupe only for the purpose of spreading the religion of Islam, and Kashi Wusa gives her account of why the Fulani stayed and settled in Nupe on this basis. All the changes that came to her life and the life of her society are viewed and understood from a religious point of view. She sees that the muslim Fulani rulers established new institutions and replaced the old existing ones so as to get their religion of Islam well entrenched. For example, the law courts are established by the Fulani so as to get the religion of Islam well entrenched in Nupe; some 72 73 village chiefs are appointed by the Fulani rulers for the same purpose; the Fulani rulers seize the insignia of Tsoede from some traditional chiefs and they take interest in the secret society of pgggp.gpgyg so as to uproot the effects of these among the Nupe pagans since these would constitute a rival religion (or cult) to Islam. She explains many other things along the same line. She takes and understands things at their face value. Her account is not reflective. Unwittingly, she ignores the latent (or possibly the real) reason why the Fulani are in Nupe, the why of which they and other native Nupe were not aware: and she ignores the latent function of Islam for the Fulani administration of Nupe of which she and possibly the Fulani rulers themselves were not aware. Unlike her, Nadel totally ignores the face value of things, especially of Islam among the Fulani rulers of Nupe. He concentrates on the political function of Islam, which in his thought is very important, even if this importance is not recognized by the Nupe people - particu- larly the Nupe Fulani. b) Independence. Being a native of Nupe, Kashi Wusa tends to give an account that presents her people, the Nupe (especially her subcultural group of Nupe Bini), as an independent people; as people who were [during her lifetime (1875-1969)] autonomous and independent of Fulani culture; as people who are self-sufficient (espeCially economically). She tends 74 to be over-protective of her people in her account. For example, she says the Nupe subcultural group of Bini to which she belongs are very contemptuous of the _Fulani rulers. This is shown by the fact that when combined there are more Bini who practice their traditional religion (or pagan religion) and the Christian religion than there are Bini muslims. This contempt of the Fulani and the inde- pendence of the Bini are also demonstrated by her emphasis on the fact that there is no single convert to Islam in the Bini city of Piciko, that the people there prefer and hold on to their polytheism rather than consent to the monotheism preached by Western Christianity and Eastern Islam. She describes the Nupe and especially the Bini as being the equals of the Fulani. Kashi regards the Fulani and the other Nupe subcultural groups as peoples with different value systems. She demon- strates this in her account of the food and consumption habits of the two groups. Other than the Fulani, the rest of the Nupe subcultural groups are predominantly agriculturalists whose consumption habits and value systems are dictated by their environment, which in turn determine their mode of living. These agri- culturalists are exposed to the different kinds of foods they grow, and they grade them according to their nutritive value. For example, corns are regarded as having a higher nutritive value than some other crops like rice. They are also aware of the fact that cooked unmilled corn is highly 75 nutritious. The agriculturalists grow all these crops including rice. They grow corn for the primary purpose of personal or family consumption. But rice, which is a luxury and a less nutritious food, is grown for the purpose of selling to the hungry population of the Fulani strangers (as she calls them) deposited at the urban towm of Bida. Not many farmers grow rice: that is why it is more expensive or costly than corn, which is grown by every agricultural family. Farmers keep livestock and are hunters, so they are more exposed to different kinds of meat. Chicken meat is not the most nutritious meat in their meat grading. It is the meat of the domestic pigeon that is most nutritious. But these pigeons are very costly to keep, and so only a few are kept by some farmers. Chickens are easier to keep and feed, and so almost every farmer keeps them. And they take these chickens to sell to the Fulani at Bida. From Kashi Wusa's point of view, the Fulani in the urban town of Bida are totally dependent on the farmers for their food, and what food is sold to them by the farmers is the food they, the Fulani, interpret to be good and nutritious. It is her opinion that since the Fulani are aliens in Nupe, it is no surprise that they should speak Nupe with a strange accent and make substitutions from Hausa language and Arabic language for some Nupe vocabulary they do not know. The Fulani dialect of the Nupe language is a "corrupt" 76 and "incomplete” version of the Nupe language; the Bini has the "uncorrupt," orthodox, complete, original Nupe language. The Bini dialect of the Nupe language sets the standard for what Nupe language should be. Kashi Wusa's account, besides being uncritical of her people, the Nupe, tends to the preservation of the status quo. It tends to ignore the fact that things change and people change, as well as their ideas, beliefs, etc., with time and as a result of contact with some other fellow humans. Her account idealizes her culture. Her account is too particularistic and not general enough, methodologically. CHAPTER SEVEN The Dilemma I want to pull together in a deductive form, our dis- cussions from Chapter Two through Chapter Six of this thesis. This will show us in a more concrete form the problem posed by the non-native versus the native account of the same social data. In Chapter Eight, I propose a resolu- tion of the dilemma. Premise l If we are to have social knowledge (apparently) we must choose between the outside [non-native (positivistic- functionalistic-colonialist)] account and the native's (interpretive-uncritical-status quo-preserving) account. Premise 2 If we choose the outsider's (non-native‘s) account, we must suffer these liabilities or weaknesses: Methodologically we have an account that is highly generalized (of a fractional part of human experience) abstract and less particularistic which would do violence to individual difference. It is an account that does not account for the development of culture or the social reality 77 78 in question prior to the period of observation, it ignores the historical development and origin of the social reality in question; it is an account that is deductive in form and is constituted of causal law-like statements, such state- ments that are hypothetical and so do not tell us anything about a particular individual thing or event; it is an account that is so general that it does violence to individ- ual interest and difference; it is an account that ignores the intentions, desires, purposes, aims, etc., which actors say lead them to act. The account is predominantly of unintended, unanticipated consequences by actors (for example, Nadel says a social anthropologist seeks to dis- cover the ulterior purposes that lead people to act or that underlie human action). Ideologically, the outsider's account is an account that is control-biased in favor of imperialism. Accepting that account, we accept an account that presupposes the social order to be a dominant-submissive class society before it is studied; being control-biased, it is a puiiyl account, etc. So our acceptance of the outsider's (the non-native's) account will open us to, among other things, the aforementioned liabilities. 1In fact in ”The Interview Technique ---" in The Study o; Society, ed. Bartlett, p. 323, Nadel says he bullys his informatants to give him the kind of information he wants. 79 Premigey3 If we choose the native's account we must suffer these liabilities or weaknesses: Methodologically we would be having an account that is very particularistic and not generalized enough: it is not comprehensive enough to embrace all the factors both social and non-social (like physical environment or other) that influence and shape human life and thinking; the account is exclusively that of the intentions, desires, aims, etc., of the social actors, it is an account that is mainly of the intended consequences of the actors and ignores the unin- tended consequences of the actors; the account ignores the function of the contradictions that inform people's life experience and which contradictions could also bring about change in people's lives; the account ignores social change, it also ignores the historical origin and development of the social reality it is about, etc. Ideologically we shall be having an account that is uncritical, defensive (of the autonomy of Nupe people and culture), conservative, preservative (of status quo), resistant to and unanticipatory of change: it is purely a manifest account of social reality, it takes things in their face value. 80 Premise 4 We seek social knowledge. Premise 5 We must accept either the non-native account or the native account. Conclusion Therefore, we must suffer the liabilities of either Premise 2 or Premise 3. So our dilemma as argued in this chapter very elliptically stated is that if we seek social knowledge, we must suffer some particular liabilities. The next chapter will discuss how we are going to escape this dilemma. CHAPTER EIGHT The Resolution of the Dilemma In this thesis, I presented two important current and influential conceptions of knowledge of society. One is the positivistic functionalism of Malinowski as understood and applied by Nadel in his study of Nupe. The second is Winch's notion of the incorrigibility of a native's account of what he says he is doing; this theory is exemplified in Kashi Wusa's account of some social data of her society. I have attempted to show that each of these two theories in their application attempt to generate some social knowledge. But the accounts they provide us with have some inherent methodological and ideological weaknesses. The conclusion I draw from these two accounts (in Chapter Seven) is the dilemma that if we seek social knowledge we would have to accept either the non- native account (of Nadel) or the native account (of Kashi Wusa), and the acceptance of either one of these accounts brings with it unacceptable consequences. a) How the Dilemma is Resolved: In resolving this dilemma, I deny the major premise of the argument, Premise One: It is not the case that if we seek social knowledge we must choose between the outsider's account on the same social data. Implied in my denial is a mutual 81 82 ejection of the two major social theories, positivistic functionalism and interpretive social science (which is very close to Winch's doctrine) which gave rise to the two accounts respectively. Since I have rejected the two major theories, I advocate an alternative theory. This alternative theory is the critical model (which is familiar to Fay and some other people).1 The critical model holds that neither the non- native (the outsider) nor the native's account is adequate alone, but neither are they necessarily irreconciliable. The critical model or approach embraces the virtues of both but the liabilities of neither. It is the presupposition of the functionalist positivist that there are causal laws or law-like causes which underlie human action. These laws govern and control the human behavior 2 These laws are discoverable if the social and action. scientist studies social actors with the objective neutrality3 with which Newton studied physical phenomena so that he was able to discover the natural laws (for example, the law of gravity) that govern a falling body. This being the positivist lBrian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, Chapter 5. 2Hence Radcliffe-Brown talks of the law of social physiology, "The Functional Unity of Social Systems" in The Nature goo Sco e of Social Science: A Critical Antholo , pp. 676-677, ed. Leonard I. Krimerman, and NadeI himse f talks of cultural laws in The Foundations of Social Anthropology, p. 12 and argues that social anthropology discovers ulterior purposes underlying social acts. 3Although as a positivist this is Nadel's ideal, in his poli- tical life he uses knowledge acquired for imperialist actions. Ii. 83 functionalist conviction, he gives generalized accounts of social phenomena independent of the intentions, desires, aims, etc. which the social actors might say lead them to act the way they do; or he ignores the native's account of the same phenomena or what reasons, intentions, etc. the social actors say lead them to act the way they do. Hence, the strict empiricism of the positivist model. This form of account as I have said earlier could do violence to individual interests and differences. The interpretive model of social science (of Winch and Kashi Wusa), on the other hand, bases an account of social phenomena on the desires, aims, inten- tions, etc., which social actors give as leading them to act the way they do. By this the interpretive model escapes the weakness of doing violence to individual differences, but because of its denial of the importance of general causal laws, it has the weakness of being too perticularistic and not empirical enough. It neglects the fact that sometimes peOple's avowed intentions, desires, etc. are at variance with their actual behavior. The interpretive model has the weak- ness that the positivist has not - the interpretive model is less general and less empirical. The critical model escapes the weaknesses of both the positivist model and of the interpretive model but incor— porates and inherits both of their virtues. The critical model satisfies the requirement of the interpretive model because it holds that for the social scientist to have a subject matter he must attempt to understand the intentions 84 and desires of the actors he is observing, as well as the rules and constitutive meanings of their social order. The critical model attempts to understand social actors from their own point of view (Winch's voice). This is necessarily the case since the critical model is often rooted in the felt needs and sufferings of a group of people. In this case the critical model is as particularistic as the interpretive model. The critical model satisfies the requirement of the positivist model because it recognizes that there are many actions people perform which are caused by social conditions they have no control over;4 most often pe0ple do things to one another and to themselves without conscious knowledge and choice of the consequences of what they do. It therefore seeks to discover those systems of social relationships which determine the actions of individuals and the unanticipated but not accidental consequences of these actions. It seeks to discover quasi-causal laws and functional laws of social behavior in particular contexts. It employs the quasi- causal laws and functional 'laws' it discovers to explain the contradictions in social life, which contradictions underlie the tensions and conflicts the scientist observes5 4 . . . , Unlike the interpretive model that ignores the fact that men could act independently of their desires, motives, etc. For example, people sometimes do things for the sake of doing them, and most often they are unable to give a reason for dOing them. 5 . . . So, unlike the interpretive model, it assumes there are con- tradictions in the life of a peOple and these contradictions form part of their life experience. It seeks to explain the origin and possibly the function of some of these contra- dictions in their life and social experience. 85 and which are experienced by social actors in certain speci- fic ways. So, like the positivist model, the critical model makes use of some 'causal' laws but its laws are quasi- causal6 not causal, comparable to those discovered and used by a natural scientist to explain a natural phenomenon as the positivist claims he discovers of human relationships. In this case, the critical model is quite general, because of the appeal to quasi-causal laws, as the positivist model appeals to causal laws. The critical model also claims there are causes of human behavior but they are quasi-causes.7 So it appeals to causes as the positivist does. I have indicated that both the functionalist positivist and the interpretive social scientist fail to give an account of culture and how it could change in the future. Because of this both schools of thought are guilty of defending the 6The laws are quasi because although it might be the case that the causes are beyond the actor's control, yet he is conscious of their operation and of his act that results from these 'causes'. See the next footnote for a more elaborate explanation. See also footnote No. 12 of p. 87. 7However, there are conditional relations which influence human behavior, and they operate independent of the social actor's will. These could be of interst to social scien- tific explanation. Such conditional relations are, the effect of nutrition on fertility, and the effect of chemi- cals on sexual activity. These conditional relations could be discovered by the natural scientists and applied by a social scientist. In the case of the quasi-causes, men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions, rather than being governed direct- ly by them so these conditions are not causes but as warrant- ing conditions which make a particular action or belief more reasonable, justified, given the desires, beliefs, etc. of the actors; they involve the actor's consciousness. 86 status quo.8 The critical model, as I will illustrate in an example below, escapes this weakness. The critical model in its analysis of a social phenomenon gives a historical account of the origin of a social structure. It recognizes that social relationships do change and are changeable because they are de- pendent on the intentions, desires, etc. of the social actors; and these aims, desires etc. vary with place and time of the actors. There is no necessity about the social relationships.9 Because of this it is not conservative nor is it defensive of status quo. b) The Doctrine of the Critical Model:10 I want to state briefly the doctrine of the critical model of a social science, illustrate its application, and answer an objection to it. It is an important characteristic of the critical model that it is sympathetic to certain claims of the interpretive approach of social science as presented in this thesis. And because of this bias it employs the categories of interpretive social science in its doctrine. 8For exampleéobecause the positivist claim that the existing 1 social rela ons which their science describes are natural relations, they impede any effort to change existing social relations or social structure. 9By this I mean there is no anthropological or logical or meta- physical or ontological necessity in human relationship. That is, there is no permanent feature of human relationship, there is no unhistorical basis for human relationship. 10The concept of a critical social science is not restricted to Fay and me. In fact, Fay has a long footnote of its bibliography on p. 93 of Social Theory and Political Practice. It was a concept familiar to Marx in his CapitaI and Habermas in his Knowledge and Human Interest. 87 The critical model stresses that any valid social theory must take into account the intentions, purposes, desires and aims of the humans it is about. Since these factors vary from individual to individual and group to group, I am implying that a social theory should be about a specific person(s) or group of persons to be of any value. Because of my specific group of persons orientation, I am tacitly denying that there are discoverable, universal, necessary, natural, static, unalterable laws of human rela- tionships as presupposed by the manipulative science of the positivist conception. I am rather saying that the ever- changing purposes, desires, intentions, etc. of the humans are the things that govern their actions; also that human consciousness plays a big role in human action "men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions."11 These conditions must not . 12 therefore, be understood as causes but as quaSi-causes. llB. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 85. 12They are quasi-causes, in part, because they are alterable, Note the footnote on p. 85 where I explain quasi-causal law and explanation. A policy-maker using a critical model for decision-making is using quasi-causal laws. And by acting according to these laws, the policy-maker is no longer acting with objective neutrality for he is prejudiced toward particular beliefs and self-understanding of parti- cular social actors. The conditions which lead people to act the way they do are quasi-causes because they are socially organized and historically conditioned. Their lawful wofldhgs (or their regularities) are dependent on the conditions of the intentions, aims, beliefs, etc. or the ideas social actors have (of themselves). If the ideas peOple have (of themselves) change or are changed, their behavior would change. So, the regularities displayed (cont.) 88 According to the critical model, any social laws discovered are quasi-causal laws. And these laws are alterable with the. changing intentions, aims and desires of the social actors they are about. On the basis of available evidence, my position implies that there is no logical necessity in human relations and social structures in society. Since it is the claim of the critical model that any valid theory of society must take into account the intentions, 12 (cont.) by their behavior are 'caused' (or quasi-caused) by these ideas which are changeable. Since the ideas are changeable, the causal link between the ideas and the regularity of behavior is not like that discovered and studied by a natural scientist of non-human entities. The regularities of behavior discovered of non-human entities by a natural scientist are not caused by the beliefs, desires, etc. or the ideas these entities have (of themselves) but are caused mainly by some forces external to them. The natural scien- tist discovers these forces by his observation of them and their environment. Hence it does not make sense to say the idea (or concept) of the force of gravity belongs to a falling body or that the idea (or concept) of softness belongs to a sofa as it makes sense to say the ideas (or concepts) of inferiority, marriage, slavery, belong to social actors. The difference between the nature of the objects of study of a natural scientist and a social scien- tist is also seen this way. When a natural law is said to have been violated, the fault is attributed to the inaccurate observation of the natural scientist or to his/her inaccurate calculation. Only the natural scientist is to blame. But when a social law is said to have been violated, the fault is attributable to the social scientist and the object of his study, the social actor. Either it is the case that the scientist made a faulty observation and calculation or the social actors have reconceptualized their situation and have decided to behave in a different way so as to violate the social law(s). Because of the latter, most often the operation of the social law is dependent on the ignorance of the social actors they are about. Most often when social actors reconceptualise themselves and their situations in a reflective manner they violate the laws. This is why I insist the lawful workings of the conditions of social actors has only quasi-causal status. 89 desires, hopes, etc. of the specific social actors it is about, then there should be a frequent re-evaluation of the theory by the theorist because people's intentions, beliefs, etc. do change. He is to alter his interpreta- tions of the actors he is studying as they freely express their thoughts and aspiration to him. Their expressions should be without coercion - a free response - so that a theory based on their expressions should be a true theory, and if the theory is re-evaluated and changed it is because the truth or the reality it is about is changed. It is worth noting a Slight difference between my con- ception of a critical social science and Fay's. Fay believes a critical social science should aim at solving a specific social problem(s) like the problem of dissatisfaction among women in a Western industrial society. My position is fairly neutral. I feel a social study could be undertaken for various purposes. And a social knowledge could be put to various uses. For example, a social study could be used for/ aim at providing social knowledge for control; this I have criticized in this thesis. Besides, a critical model itself provides knowledge for a kind of control quite different from that of the positivist policy maker. I will touch on this issue under Objections later in this chapter. A social study could be used for/aim at providing knowledge that will enable the people in the society to live together in harmony. A social study could be used for/aim at providing knowledge that will help solve some social problems, etc. It is an example of this last sort that I will discuss here. 90 i) Application of the'Critical Model: I want to discuss how a critical model could be used by a critical social scientist to help a group of social actors solve a social problem. In this process of problem-solving he develops a social theory whose validation is dependent on the social actors it is about. I state the problem. Let us assume there are some Nupe Ebe13 or others who feel inadequate to participate in partisan politics. They believe this vocation is naturally meant for Fulani Mohamedan rulers. They might have some complicated argument(s) based on the universal brotherhood preached by Islam. On the basis of this, no other muslim is to compete for public office with his fellow muslim. And since the Mohammedan Fulani in Bida had always been their ruler it means they are by nature meant to be rulers. One proof of this is that even when the whitermnicame, he could not dethrone them. The white man had to rule through them14 and felt they could not do it without a full backing by the Fulani rulers in Bida. They feel they lack the ability, capacity and any other necessary qualifications to be an effective ruler or an administrator of a high position of responsibility. 131 decide to cite the Ebe as an example, because they are the ones who feel exceptionally inferior to Fulani rulers in Bida. l4By white man rulership they mean the indirect rule of the colonialists. In fact, some of them found it difficult to see any difference between colonial Nigeria and Independent Nigeria. 91 When a critical social scientist wants to help this group of Ebe out of their fears, he might proceed along these lines. Being a critical model, the critical scientist sees theories as analyses of a social situation.15 The analyses are in terms of those features of those situations which can be altered in order to eliminate certain fears. The scientist starts by giving a historical account of how/why the Ebe have their present fears that they cannot be competent rulers or how/why they do not have the natural talents exhibited by the Fulani. In short, why they feel Ir- naturally handicapped to be rulers. He explains how the historical process was such that the social order in question of ruler-ruled relationship gets perpetuated and how it led to their present fears. In the case of the hypothetical Ebe group under discussion, the critical scientist would go back into the history of their sub-tribe and teach it to them all. He would tell them (or remind them) that it was the fear of the Fulani slave-raiders that drove their grandparents and great grandparents to Nupe land. Unfortunately for them, when these Fulani got to Nupe with their Islamic religion they (the Ebe) were compelled to accept their overlordship with their religion, Islam, because of the military force of the Fulani. Since the people they were running away from at last caught up with them and sub- jected them to hardships, it is natural they should continue to fear these peOple (the Fulani). This was made worse 15A critical model could also be seen more as an ideological self-conception than as a theory. 92 when the stronger white man was here, since he still insist- ed you obey these former oppressors of your grandparents and parents.16 You still had to obey their (Islamic) laws, pay heavy taxes,17 etc. The white man had only succeeded in abolishing physical slavery and slave trade, otherwise in your minds and in the minds of your forebears you were still receiving the tortures of slaves from the slave raiders. So, nominally you were free but in your mind you were not free.18 Equally, after the white man had left formally in 1960,19 the Fulani rulers simply re-asserted their authority over you; and it almost reached the point of becoming what it was before the coming of the white man. We all remember the new Islamization campaigns and forced conversions of the mid-sixties (between 1964 to 1966) before Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the premier of the Northern Nigeria, was killed by l6A practice that contradicts the claim of the universal brotherhood of Islam preached by the same muslim Fulani rulers. 175. F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, p. 169f, p. 164. 18 dictions of being told they are free from slavery but they labor like slaves to maintain their overlords possibly by paying heavy taxes; they are not free to act according to their customs, they must act according to the alien muslim laws. 19Nigeria gained her political independence from colonial Britain on October 1, 1960. It is some of these contradictions that underlie the social structure which are responsible for their fears. The contra- 93 soldiers in January 15, 1966.20 We all remember those harassing experiences. He explains to them that their fears had root in history and in the history of their lives. Their fears are the re- sult of certain structural conflicts in the social order. Having explained the source of their fear, the scientist explains to them the nature of their fear. Such an explana- tion might be that they feel that if they become rulers, their former overlords, the Fulani rulers, might not take ) orders from them. The Fulani would not want to cooperate with their (former) inferiors allowing them to be their % rulers or taking orders from them.21 To eliminate these fears, the critical scientist develops a powerful argument to convince the people that Fulani ruler- ship and colonial rulership through the Fulani were mere accidents of history. They should strain their imagination and think of a possible world in which their ancestors could have defeated the Fulani and taken the Fulani as slaves; in such a world they could have been the rulers over the Fulani. 20Sir Ahmadu Bello was the descendant of Usman Dan Fodio. Usman Dan Fodio was the first leader of Jihad (Holy war) in Nigeria. This was in 1804. He was a muslim reformist. M. Crowder, The Soory‘of Ni eria, p. 28; M. Crowder, West Africa, p. 72. Islam ifselg was introduced to Nigeria EEout 1085 A.D. M. Crowder, The Story o£_Nigeria, p. 40 21In A Black Byzantium, p. 159—60, Nadel gives an example of a n5n3Fulani district head in Kacha who had a difficulty containing Bida residents living there within the limits of law. They felt they should not be ruled by an inferior being. 94 In fact, if the rebellion of the peasants of Trans-Kaduna (1847-1850) had succeeded, Fulani hegomony could have been overthrown.22 It is part of the characteristic feature of the critical theory that it does not presuppose any particular theory of social structure.23 So, it emphasizes in this context that whatever social structure exists in terms of the social relationship of ruler-ruled social classes is arbitrary; there is no necessity about it. And it is dissolvable in the ways suggested by the theory. To insure a complete elimination of their fears, the é critical scientist would engage in the ideological critique of the social actors concerned. He would criticize their beliefs that they are inferior beings as regards rulership. And he would criticize the belief that even if they become rulers, the Fulani would not take orders from them and they would therefore fail. He argues that the effect that these ideas and beliefs they have about themselves are false. They are illusions, false conceptions of themselves. He supports this argument by citing the fact that in the newly 22Nadel in A Black Byzantium, p. 143, made reference to this rebellion? (The Battle of Bidakoko.) This rebellion as reported by Nadel was during the reign of Etsu Umaru. And Etsu Umaru reigned between 1847 and 1850 (p. 407). 23That is, it does not presuppose that for all/any society to survive some class of people must be in some specific social position in relation to the others in the society. Each society and its structure is seen as unique and must be studied as it is. 95 adopted Nigerian constitution (of 1978), Nigerian traditional rulers (like the Epgg or Fulani rulers in Bida) are barred; from taking part in politics. The office of the traditional rulers (e.g., the Etsu) is reduced to mere ceremonial office. Also, the Federal Military Government in 1976 stripped the traditional rulers of their last political powers by the ’ local government reformation. With the local government Eu reform, the traditional rulers do not have any more hand * in the collection of taxes nor in judiciary matters. They have been reduced to the level of every other ordinary citizen and everybody is equal before the law - no one is e above the law. So, if they become rulers, they would be guided by the Nigerian constitution, and develop some organs that will enforce the law so that any subversive elements will be contained within the law. The theorist will recommend some specified actions to take so that they overcome their fears.24 For example, he might recommend they form themselves into a political party or form themselves into a constituency of a political party that is likely to win an election. They should get one of their number elected to an office. And giving him all their support, they would find that he will be a success. At that point their successful candidate in office will become the ruler of the §p§o_at Bida, because the Eooo_would have to be ruled by his (their candidate's) policies. The social actors will see in their mind's eye that the social structure has 24This might sound manipulative but it is defended in the objection below. 96 been reversed or altered and their fears eliminated. This ideology-critique has under-mined the former false ideologies which the actors possess and which were an under- standable, but not necessary consequence of the former exist- ing social structure and historical processes. It is only the practical nature of the critical theory that enables it to achieve this enlightenment of the social actors it is about. Its practicality is also seen in the way "it ties its knowledge claims to the satisfaction of human purposes 25 and desires." ii) A Special Contrast with the Positivist Model: I want to give a brief evaluation of the critical theory. And I will contrast the points made in the evaluations with the positivist model of social science. The critical model presupposes that man is an acting agent whose behavior is described by means of action concepts. These human actions, interactions and systems of actions are rooted in the self-understandings, intentions, beliefs, etc. of the actors involved, and they are rooted in the actors the theory is about. The model attempts to understand the actors from inside, which means understanding the social agents from their own points of View, and giving explana- tions in terms of the actual, specific experiences of the agents a theory is about. 5Brian Fay. Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 95 97 Where the purpose of the study is to help a group of social actors (like the Ebe in our example here) solve some specific social problem, the critical scientist (in addition to his general knowledge) uses his (social) knowledge of them (the knowledge of the constitutive meaning of their actions together with the knowledge gained by their voluntary cooperation) to educate them26 so that they conceptualize and see themselves afiitheir situation differently. They would see that the world need not operate the way it does. This education would increase their autonomy for/and their desire to achieve their collective self-determined end. By thus raising their consciousness which helps change their ideas of themselves, the critical science increases their capacity to make informed and rational choices. The policy scientist of the positivist conception on the other hand is solely concerned about the alleged necessary laws of human relationships. He ignores the fact that human actions are rooted in their changeable intentions, desires, beliefs, etc. He manages the ideas of the people about how the world operates; that being a process governed by natural 26The knowledge is not used to exploit them to other deter- mined ends as the positivist-functionalist—colonialist of Nadel would do. And as Trent Schroyer says in "A Reconceptua— lization of Critical Theory" in Radical Sociology, p. 142, a critical social science seeks toflemancipate all self- conscious agents from the seemingly natural forces of nature and history". It is "linked to the dialectic of self- reflection that is present in all socialization processes.." By this education the existing quasi-causes which are depend- ent on the misleading ideas the social actors have of them- selves are under-mined. For example, the ideas that they are inferior people or that they have no some particular talents as a people. 98 laws, they cannot change it. He attempts to change the people's ideas and beliefs about themselves toward the course of action adopted by implying that it was the only rational alternative Open, given the laws of the social order. 27 its theories are The critical model is democratic; rooted in the beliefs, intentions, etc. of the people. These theories are re-evaluated as the beliefs and intentions, etc. of the peeple change. For this to be the case, there is the need to refer to the public opinion and a change of recommen- dations (where there is one) on the basis of this communica- tion. There must further be a free flow of natural and un- coerced (when they are free from domination and threat) expressions from the actors to the experts and vice versa. The critical model sees social science as a system of free and unrestricted continuous inter-communication between the social actors and the policy-expert or the scientist, rather than as a body of objective truths in terms of which society ought to be and must be run. Any decision based on the critical model theory is effective only by reference to the Opinion of the actors it is about. The Nadel-type positivistic model is anti-democratic (or pseudo-democratic where it claims to be democratic). This is because the positivist has no need for the continuous inter-communication with the actors his theory is about. He does not act on the basis of their opinion, nor does he need to listen to their needs and wants for it is operating according to the discovered necessary, unchangeable natural 27Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 107-108. 99 laws of social relationships. It is an elitist's science (possibly a ruling few with social knowledge) for the manipulation of the masses of people. This elite deter- mines what is a rational course of action for the group. iii) Objection This objection is the one raised and answered by Fay.28 It is so powerful that I feel it is worth stating here. A positivist might say that since the critical model provides some quasi-causal laws, it therefore provides the basis for manipulation on a certain set of variables to produce certain actions and beliefs, given that the inten- tions and beliefs of the actors remained relatively constant. So, the critical model is as manipulative as the positivist model. This objection fails to note the stress on the integra- tion of theory and practice on the part of the critical model. This stress emphasizes the participation and the involvement of the social actors the social theory is about. The trans- lation of theory into action is possible only through this participation and involvement. This participation and involvement is also inevitable because the critical science is composed of an interpretive element; it follows therefore that the theory is validated by the conscious response of the people, the consciousness rooted in their self-understandings. 28Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 102-110. 100 If any manipulation is suggested, it can only be effective by referring to the opinions of the ordinary actors29 in whose name these manipulations are undertaken; and this is because, where problem solving is involved, the articulation of needs and their satisfaction can only be confirmed in the consciousness of the social actors themselves. But the positivistic science conception with its instrumental manipulation attempts (without any democratic inter-communication with the social actors) to get certain set of relationships to work for him so that he achieves a certain end efficiently. So, in a problem-solving situation, like the one of the Ebe here, a critical theory is satisfied when i) the condi- tions of the people it is about get changed what conditions are the quasi-causes of their fears, etc. and ii) their understanding of themselves is changed in specific ways as required by the theory; the understanding that was quasi- causal to the misleading ideas they had of their capabilities, etc. c) The General Theoretical Stand of the Critical Model I want to pull together and state briefly some of those major salient points made in this thesis on the general theoretical stand of a critical social science. 29It is the educative role of the ideological critique that will enable the critical scientist to overcome resistance on the part of the social actors. 101 A critical social science is an alternative methodology to positivistic functionalism and interpretive social science. It reconciles positivistic functionalism with interpretive social science. It is the conviction of the positivist that an adequate scientific explanation [(and/or scientific theory) of social or natural phenomena] must satisfy the requirements of, logical consistency, compatibility with empirical data, etc.30 It is also the conviction of the positivist that an explanation of social phenomena should be in terms of the 31 32 universal generalization. That it must predict. However, it is the positivist's conviction also that empirical data 33 The critical model always underdetermine any hearing. accommodates all of these stipulations of the positivist model. Since we accept that empirical data always underdetermine any hearing, and it is the positivist conviction that explana- tion is structurally isomorphic with prediction (but not symmetrical to it), then what kind of explanation are we looking for in social science? The answer would be the one that could predict the behavior of the social actors. But there is a problem posed. All the requirements the positivist 3°Car1 G. Hempel, (1945), (1948), (1959). 31Israel Scheffler, The Anatomyog Inquiry, p. 235. 32Ibid., p. 29f. 33Quine rather talks in terms of a theory being empirically underdetermined, Word and Object, p. 26f. 102 stipulate of a theory or an explanation are true of a natural phenomenon. Prediction in particular as conceived by the positivist is true only of a natural phenomenon. When we talk of prediction in social science we are dealing with human actors, and whatever these human actors do or whatever will "happen" in their case will be influenced by what they believe - quasi-causal. This being the case, the critical model employs the stipulations or the requirements of the interpretive model. By appeal to the interpretive model, the critical model says for the prediction to work for human beings we have to take into account their specific intentions, their interpretation and their under- standing of the phenomenon (where there is one) together with their perception of their problem (where there is one) within their act. According to the critical model, the law (or rather the quasi-law) that is correct is the one which enables us to do all the things the positivist wants to do. At the same time like the interpretivist the critical theory is one which takes seriously the intentions of actors. The quasi-law of the critical theorist enables those actors to reinterpret their problems (where there is one) in such a way that they can see a way to solve (or correct) them and to act on them. This is the general theoretical stand of the critical model as discussed in this thesis. According to the critical model discussed in this thesis, in the future when we have conflict between native and non- native account of some/the same social data, we strive to 103 reconcile them by coming to and arriving at generalizations which meet all of the positivistic requirements. And then, since the logical consistency and the empirical compatibility of the data will never uniquely determine a theory; the theory to be accepted is that theOry which satisfies the interpretivist's account by meeting (or incorporating) intentions, understandings and aimS‘og‘the'actors; an accept- able theory will be predictive in the sense that human actors who act in terms of their intentions and overcoming the frustration of their intentions, do act the way in which they interpret, and act on those interpretations so as to correct the frustrations of those intentions. d) Summary and Conclusions In this thesis I presented two conflicting accounts of the same social data about Nupe society. One account is of a native (Kashi wusa) who argues that the purpose of the Fulani in Nupe is to spread Islamic religion, hence politics is subordinate to religion to the Fulani. The other account is of a non-native (Nadel — a British colonial social antro- pologist). Nadel says the purpose of the Fulani in Nupe is to rule the Nupe and the Fulani goo Islamic religion to unite the people politically. Both accounts are plausible and empirically possible, so choosing between them constitutes a problem. Each of the two accounts has some ideological and methodo- logical presuppositions. These presuppositions influence their validity and/or reliability. Kashi Wusa's account presupposes I. 104 the methodology of interpretive social science. This me— thodology is, in part, as understood by Peter Winch. Ideologically her account tends to be protective of her people, the Nupe. Nadel's account presupposes the methodo- logy of positivism, in part, as understood and propounded by Bronislaw Malinowski. Ideologically, Nadel's study of Nupe was to aid British colonialists in their indirect rule of Nupe. Nadel also preSupposes the theory of functionalism, in part, as propounded by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. The interpretive model of social science whose methodology PIT is presupposed by Kashi WuSa's account stresses that an inter- pretation on the meaning of social reality should be given in terms of only the intentions, aims, beliefs, etc. that social actors say lead them to act the way they do. But this methodology leaves uneXplained some aspects of human experience. For example, it does not include in its account of social reality the fact that some physical factors like climatic conditions, level of technology, etc. influence peOple's beliefs, aims, etc. and the way people act or behave. The interpretive model explains only intended actions and intended consequences. It fails to explain those unintended con- sequences of intended actions and unintended actions together with their unintended consequences. The interpretive model assumes a coherence in the life of society, hence it ignores the fact that there are at times contradictions in the life of a society and these contradictions serve some function (positive and/or negative) in the life of the society. The 105 interpretive model also ignores the fact that sometimes when members of society become aware of the contradictions in their beliefs, ideas, etc. and ways of life, they change their beliefs,_ideas, etc. and change their way of life. But the interpretive model by assuming coherence in people's beliefs, aims, etc. and way of life, and by assuming a coherence between pedple's beliefs, ideas, etc. and their € (actions) and way of life, fails to account for the change = that comes to the lives of the people as a result of this 5 awareness. é a Kashi Wusa gives a manifeSt account of the events of - her society. Her account is uncritical of her people. So, ideologically, her account seems to be protective of her people, her account also shows her people as independent of the Fulani rulers of Nupe. With his presupposition of positivism as a methodology, Nadel's account presupposes some general causal laws of social reality. It is a methodology that regards a native's account of social reality as unreliable, and so, unlike the interpretive model that bases its interpretation and meaning of social reality on the intentions, beliefs, aims, etc. of the social actors, the positivist-functionalist of the Nadel-type attempts to explain social reality on the basis of some general social laws. Being a positivist of the type defined in the introduction to this thesis, Nadel's account, methodologically, is of a detached observer with an intended objective neutrality. 106 Because of this, his account of Nupe society is one of a generalised type from some pre-conceived notions (say, of some social laws) for it fails to take into account the fact that peOple's actions most often proceed from their beliefs, their ideas of themselves, etc. Nadel presupposes the theory of functionalism. The functionalist views every (major) social institution as a necessary condition for the survival of the society. The functionalist of Nadel's type imply that they (the function- alist) use "necessary" in the same sense as it is used in the natural sciences. This being the case, if an institu- tion is a necessary condition for the survival of a society it means when the institution is defunct the society will cease to exist; for in natural science if we say a short circuit is a necessary condition for a house catching fire. it is implied that without the short circuit or if the short circuit had not occurred, the house could not have caught fire. But contrary to this, societies still exist today which in the past had slavery as a major social institution. So, these societies have survived independent of the major institution(s) which could have been said to be necessary for their survival. It is not true as the functionalist claims that every cultural pattern has (good) consequences. Our saying an institution has a good consequence is relative to the sub-group of the society with whose interest we identify. For example, the religion of Islam in Nupe society cannot be said to have a good consequence without some qualification. 107 For example, muslim law has a bad consequence for Nupe—Ebe sub-cultural group because the law alienates them from some of their cherished customs. But the same muslim law has a good consequence for the Fulani rulers of Nupe because it enables them to assert their spiritual hegemony over the rest of Nupe sub-cultural groups, especially the Ebe sub- cultural group. The functionalist fails to account for the history of and the causes of some structural patterns in society; for example, why the structural pattern X was present rather than Y where X and Y are structural alterna- tives. The functionalist concentrates on the synchronic study of society (and of social institutions) and they ignore the diachronic aspect of it. Because of this they study only a part of the life of a society or an institution (fractional study). The functionalist-positivist's explana- tions of social reality are methodologically deductive. This deductive form of explanation includes statements of law-like generalizations that are hypothetical. These types of hypothetical statements are not about any specific individual and so they are descriptively vacuous. Nadel claims his study of Nupe was to help British colonialists plug indirect rule in their rule (or adminis- tration) of Nupe. Because of this, Nadel attempts to give an account that will facilitate the colonialists' control of the Nupe. Nadel's account, therefore, is a distortion of the Nupe social reality. For example, he exaggerates the difference(s) between different Nupe sub-cultural groups; 108 the Nupe-Fulani sub-cultural group are said to be superior to and contemptuous of the other Nupe sub-cultural groups. This has the effect of winning for the colonialist, the support of the Nupe-Fulani against the other Nupe-sub- cultural groups. This support is strengthened by the fact that, economically, the other sub-cultural groups are exploited for the benefit only of both the Fulani rulers and the colonialists; the other sub-cultural groups, for example, are made to pay heavy taxes from which the Fulani rulers are paid high salaries. I argue that the critical model of social science combines the virtues of interpretive model and of the positivistic functionalistic model but escapes each of their weaknesses. Like the positivistic model, methodologically, the critical model assumes there are causes of human action and behavior. But these causes are quasi-causes because they are dependent on people's ideologies, and these ideologies are changeable and are historically conditioned. The critical model is as general in its methodology as the positivist model because it uses the notion of general quasi-causal laws, although the positivist uses the notion of general causal laws. At the same time it satisfied the requirement of the interpretive model because these quasi-causal laws are based on the aims, beliefs, intentions, etc. of specific social actors, for the interpretivist stresses that a social account be based on the aims, beliefs, etc. of social actors. Unlike the positivist model but like the interpretive model it does not assume any general universal social laws to which human actions must 109 conform and which must be invoked to explain human action. Because of this, its explanations of social reality are of specific human agents at a specific time and a specific place with specific aims, beliefs, etc. In this case it is in agreement with the interpretive model. Unlike both the positivistic functionalist and the interpretivist, it assumes there are contradictions in people's life. Ideologically, the critical model only seeks to help social actors solve their social problems and uses its ability to do so as a criterion of truth for its hypo- theses. The critical social scientist uses the knowledge of the social actors to educate them into a critical self-~ examination of their ideas, beliefs, etc. By this self- criticism the social actors come to conceptualise themselves and their situation(s) differently. As Trent Schroyer says.34 a critical social theory is a critique of appearances ( p. 132). It transcends the social facts it is about, it renders them meaningful "but at the same time" it places "them in the context of the tension between the given and the possible". The critical model expresses "what a social totality holds itself to be, and then confronts it with what it is..." (p. 132). In its analysis of "the supposed and actual necessity of historical modes of authority..." the critical model also "presupposes 34Trent Schroyer in "A Reconceptualization of Critical Theory" in Radical Sociology. All page references are to this text unless stated otherwise. 110 «flueinterest of the emancipation of men from lawlike patterns of nature and history" (p. 137). "...it presupposes that all self-conscious agents can become aware of the self-formative processes of society and self and with this knowledge to achieve a historically conditioned autonomy" (p. 141). It is "linked to the dialectic of self-reflection that is present in all socialization processes..." (p. 142). It is "...a speculative science in that it tries to reflect about the necessity for the conditions of lawlike patterns in society and history (p. 142). It is part of the assumption of the critical model that most often people are not aware of their ideological commit— ment. When people are not aware of their ideology, other people are able to exploit (or manipulate) the ideology successfully to control the people possessing the ideology. The critical theory seeks to bring peOple to the awareness of their ideology“ so that other peOple cannot exploit them. When people become aware of their ideological commitment, most often they refuse to behave the way they used to and they resist a manipulation of their ideology by others. I think I might fairly claim to have made a genuine contribution toward resolving the dilemma between the native versus the non-native account of social reality. Nevertheless, I have become keenly aware of the need for further research in this area. 111 e) Recommendations In this section I give a list of future topics for further investigations. These investigations will be re- levant to the issues discussed in this thesis. 1. The following concepts have been used in the thesis without a detailed analysis or sufficient distinctions between them: A further analysis and distinctions are necessary; actions versus behavior, reasons versus cause, quasi-causal law versus causal laws. 2. The critical meta-theory recognises that there are often contradictions between the life experiences and the aims, intentions, expectations of a people. This marks a distinction between the critical meta-theory and the posi- tivistic meta-theory. The positivistic meta-theory either 35 by this aspect of contradiction ignores or is embarrassed in a people's life. Because of these contradictions which form part of human experience(s), it is felt that human experience (which constitutes the totality of social reality) is not as smooth as the events in the external physical world to allow a causal account of the social phenomena as a natural scientist does of natural phenomena. So, a positivist who tries to give a causal account of social phenomena as a natural scientist does of physical phenomena is deemed to be mistaken. The critical model assuming these 351t is embarrassed because it finds that its laws are being violated by the human agents they are about. 112 contradictions in social life, streSses the need to take into account the aims, beliefs, ideas, etc. of a people when giving an account of their social reality. By the doctrine of the critical model, the social scientist could only give an account of social reality in terms of‘goooi- causes but not causes.A The difference between the positivist causal and the critical quasi-causal lead to different conditional predictions. In several places above (for example, in page 85f) these felt contradictions are presupposed as I attempt to draw a distinction between critical social science and the other models of social science. But then, if and when these contradictions do not obtain, the sharp contrast between, for example, the critical model and the positivist model would tend to disappear. So, two problems for further study are: a) does the critical model really require the presuppo— sition of such.social contradictions? b) are such social contradictions a universal social phenomenon? 3. It was noted that, just as there are possible non- colonialist functionalists, there are possible non-positivistic functionalists. An interesting question for further study is whether non-positivistic functionalists could'escapo the dilemma presented in chapter seven or would such a position remain caught on the interpretive horn of the dilemma? In other words, would non-positivistic functionalists be caught 113 up in the dilemma or would they escape it? There are many considerations which suggest that non-positivistic function- alism is really just a version of interpretive social science, in which case they would remain caught up in the interpretive dilemma. But that is a matter for further study. 4. The critical model has been presented as a resolution m~ of the dilemma, as a methOd of reconciling the interpretivist and the functionalist methods - embracing their benefits with- out their liabilities. However, it has also been stressed that there are differences, on the one hand, between function- L alism and the critical model, and between interpretivism and the critical model, on the other. Now two questions for further investigation are: a) to what extent can the critical model, with its crucial appeal to unintended consequences, be truly said to be compatible with the interpretive model? b) to what extent can the critical model, with its crucial appeal to social contradictions, be said to be reconciliable with functionalism? 5. Finally, depending in part upon the results of our investigations of the above questions, we should like to further assure ourselves of the applicability of our distinctions between the three social scientific methodologies and their applicability to non-European society, particularly African 36 societies. In particular, we are interested in the question 36They are applicable because after all I have been doing it in trying to reconcile the conflict between Nadel's aCcount and the native-interpretivist by appealing to critical method. However, we want to assure ourselves that is capable of further illumination. 114 whether the self-conscious adoption of the critical meta- theory could have a discernible effect on the ongoing process of anti-colonial revolutions (both physical - military - and non-physical - non-military) on the African continent. In other words, regardless of what has been happening, if that meta-theory were adopted would it make a difference to actual historical course of the anti-colonial revolutions that are Em taking place in the continent today? These are questions that ”fit-n1 0 could guide further investigations. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle edited by Richard McKeon: Methaphysics BK I, Ch. 3. New York: Random House, 1941. Ashby, R. W. "Verifiability Principle," The Encyolopedia of Philosophy 8 (1972):240-246. Carnap, Rudolf. "The Rejection of Metaphysics." Psyche xiv (l934):100. Crowder, Michael. Colonial West Africa. Edited by Michael Crowder: West Africa 1919-1939: The Colonial Situation (1974). London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1978. Crowder, Michael. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973. Crowder, Michael. West Africa. Frome and London: Longman Group Limited, 1977. Crowder, Michael. West Afrioa Under Colonial Rule. 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Review of Social Theory and Political Practice, by Brian Fay. Choice 13 TNovember 1976), p. 1172.