THE MONGOL INVASION OF THE FERTILE CRESCENT

(1257-1260)

by

Saud Hussein Qusti

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1979

ABSTRACT

THE MONGOL INVASION OF THE FERTILE CRESCENT

1257-1260

by

Saud Hussien Qusti

The Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent 1257-1260 has never been studied as an independent subject. The subject has been treated by historians as a part of the history of the Mongols, the history of the Mongol Conquest; the history of the Crusades and the history of the Mamluks. These treatments of the subject are not satisfactory as they neglect the need for an independent approach to the subject, which in turn is necessitated by several factors. First, the invasion was the accomplishment of one Mongol Campaign, that of Hulagu. Second, the lands that the invasion occurred in, constitute a cultural and geographical unit. Third, the invasion occurred as a consecutive chain of events during a span of three years (1257-1260). The independent treatment I attempted in this study was benefitted by up-to-date publications of the primary sources that were not previously available. The study not only added a new topic, but also gave more detailed treatment to the subject and further investigation and characterization of the events.

DEDICATION

To the memory of my aunt Sa'diyah, my first history teacher:

As passionate a teller as she was,

she never concealed facts,

and never told lies!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study began as a short paper on the Battle of Ain Jalut (September 1260), for Dr. Allan Fisher. Dr. Fisher later guided the whole study through the stages of research. His patience, kindness and positive remarks made the task of researching and writing more pleasurable than they normally would have been. A part of this study on the Mongol invasion of Syria, and the Mongol-Frankish relations 1260, was submitted to Dean A. Sullivan, who enlightened this portion of study by his valuable criticism and notes. My friend Susan M. Brown, a Master's candidate at Michigan State University edited the first two chapters of the study with care; helping to make my original writing readable in English. She also criticized several points and thus turned my attention to new perspectives. Mr. Salih al-Hakami and Mr. Abd-Allah al-Meiegeel, both Ph.D candidates at the University of Michigan offered me their best help by loaning the necessary Arabic primary sources for the study from the graduate library of University of Michigan. I am deeply gratful to my wife, Salma, and my sons, Hussien, Dhia, Alla and Raid for their moral support, and for their understanding for the time I had devoted for researching and writing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

of

in

inv

ing

the

thei

sweep

the r

polit

wards

existe

unitar

eventua

extende

out of

INTRODUCTION

The Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent is - with no sense of exaggeration - an historical landmark in the history of this region in particular, and in the history of Islamdom in general. The stormy invasion (1257-1260) carried out by the Mongol and Turkic hordes driving out of their homelands in Mongolia and central Asia, had affected the political and cultural development of the region and have left their marks up today.

What the Mongols actually accomplished was the destruction and sweeping away of decaying or stagnating socio-political structures of the region, and the enhancement of and provocation to new socio-political structural forces to come out and prevail for centuries afterwards.

The Mongol storm that had destroyed the Abbassid Caliphate existed up to 1258, and by then was still functioning as a spiritual unitary leadership for Islamdom. The last Caliphs in Baghdad had eventually lost the Abbassid secular imperial sovereignty that once extended from Spain to Western India. What was left for them to govern out of this vast empire of the 8th and 9th centuries was approximately

the area that constituted most parts of the present state of Iraq. The very existance of the Caliphate had survived since the 10th century despite the rising up of several expansionist Muslim powers and only through historical compromises. The Caliphs surrendered their secular sovereignty to the rising powers and in return maintained the spiritual one, and thus the Caliphate managed to exist until the coming of the Mongols at the gates of Baghdad in 1258.

With the coming of the Mongols, such previous compromises could not work out, simply because the Mongols had no claim or desire to claim that they were a Muslim power. Consequently the Caliphate in Baghdad had no choice but to commit a suicidal struggle in defense of all its secular and spiritual possessions. With overwhelming power, the Mongols did destroy the "Papacy of Islam" in 1258, and the Abbassid Caliphate that was established in Cairo three years later, retained nothing that belonged to that of Baghdad except the name and the claimed descent of the nominal "Caliphs" to the house of Abbass.

Another historical contribution of the Mongol invasion was the destruction of the Ayyubid principalities, in inner Syria and upper Mesopotamia, that constituted the fragmental remnant of the 12th century empire of Saladin. The house of Ayyub had lost its rule over Egypt in 1250 but was still ruling over the western flank of the empire. The Mamluk regime that was established had failed so far to

extend its power from Egypt into Syria, and it was the Mongol power which carried out the task of destroying the decaying Ayyubid principalities. By this destruction, and the extension of the Mongol power to Gaza in southern Palestine, and the Mongol demand to the Mamluks in Egypt to submit, the Mongols had evoked to the Mamluks in Egypt to submit, the Mongols had evoked the only capable united Muslim power, Mamluk Egypt, to come out of the Nile Valley to the hills of Palestine for self-defense and pan-Islamic action.

The Mongol power in Palestine had reached its further extension in Asia, and the Islamic power had reached its last line of defense. When the Mamluks won the battle, they consequently inherited Syria. By unifying Muslim Egypt and Syria in the Mamluk state, the crusader states in the Syrian Coast were sandwiched again at a period of declining European supplies and commitment to the crusade, and the revival of vigorous pan-Islamic tide resulted from the defeat of the Mongols and the inheritance of inner Syria by the Mamluks.

The destruction of the crusader states in the Syrian Coast by the end of the 13th century should be considered as an indirect contribution of the Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent. It was a paradoxical result. The Mongols and the Franks, more than once, had had the vision of a Mongol-Frankish alliance that would be directed against the Muslims, but here the Mongol invasion eventually had

provoked an Egyptian expansion and brought about the process that would end the Frankish existance in Syria and brought with it practically the end of that vision.

These significant events of the Mongol invasion and its impact have been treated, so far, by historians either as a part of Mongol history or the history of the Mongol conquest as a whole. Such treatment has its defects. First it neglects the political and cultural characteristics that a certain region - in this case the Fertile crescent - has in common. It was a politically and culturally unified region which historically experienced one particular military campaign - which in this case is the Hulagu campaign - during a particular period, 1257-1260. The geographical continuance of the region, its unified culture and political interrelations made the invasion of one of its parts felt in and had its immediate consequences on the other parts.

The other defect of this treatment is its neglect of the unitary characteristics of the Mongol campaign commanded by Hulagu. Although the campaign essentially is an extension of the Mongol expansion which resulted from the unification of the Mongol hordes and had its initiative in the campaign of Chingis Khan, it is distinct in more than one aspect. First, it was carried out by a new generation, namely; the third generation of the Mongol expansionists; second its aim was limited to the conquest of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt besides the

subjection of the Ismaelis in Persia; third, it marked the last phase of the Mongol expansion in west Asia and perhaps carried with it the seed of its end. For all of these reasons, there is the need for independent treatment of the subject, and a need that I attempt to fulfill in this study.

The purpose of the study thus is: first, to narrate all the most necessary details of the Mongol invasion of Fertile Crescent; second, to analyse its interrelations with the regional powers in the Fertile Crescent, and - by necessity - that of Egypt; and finally to trace the immediate impacts of the invasion.

The second chapter of the study is aimed at reviewing the sources and at shedding light on the backgrounds of the historians of the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. Most of the review concentrated on the Arabic and Persian sources which supplied most of the historical materials of the study.

The third chapter is devoted to a survey of the political situation in Egypt and Syria on the eve of the Mongol invasion. Although the invasion never reached the Nile Valley, it has been halted by the Egyptian power of the Mamluks. The political situation in the two countries had an important impact in shaping the course of the invasion itself; thus I found it necessary to examine them.

The fourth chapter which constituted the main body of the study, is divided into several sections. The first section discusses the

of

ti

of

onc

of

tre

The

tio

cou

The

Cal

whi

the

Hula

capt

popu

ical

as co

impac

Iraq.

upper

of the Mongol expansion in the 13th century where I made a clear distinction between the first wave of the Mongol hordes into the lands of Islam in the second and third decades of the century, and the second wave, which was directed against western Asia under the command of Hulagu, and thrust further west into Islamdom. The second section treats the destruction of the Ismaelis as a political entity in Persia. The period between 1255-1257 in Persia that Hulagu spent in subjugation, the Ismaeli strongholds and consolidating Mongol power in the country, I considered as the Persian entrance to the Fertile Crescent. The second section of the chapter deals with the destruction of the Caliphate and the subjugation of the whole of its domain in the area which was known as the Arab Iraq. This section deals with details of the whole process of the invasion from the correspondence between Hulagu and the Caliph al-Mustaism down to the murder of the Caliph, the capture, and looting of Baghdad, and the murder of a large part of its population. At this point of the study, I present the varied historical versions concerning the event and examine what these versions left as common historical impressions. Finally, I discuss the immediate impacts of the invasion and the elimination of the Abbassid power in Iraq.

The chapter deals next, and thirdly, with the invasion of upper Mesopotamia and then proceeds to survey the invasion of Syria

whi

Lat

The

in

and

cha

Egy

cor

act

coc

Jal

sig

cha

be

anc

one

cer

hav

13t

Engl

which included the Mongol-Armenian alliance, the subjugation of the Latin principality of Antioch, and the occupation of all Muslim Syria. The closing section of this chapter treats the Mongol administration in inner Syria and the Mongol relations with the Franks of the Lebanese and Palestinian coasts. These relations which were of an antagonistic character had a significant impact on the Frankish attitude toward the Egyptian military action in Palestine and perhaps had its own important contribution to the final outcome of the Mongol-Mamluk confrontation.

The fifth chapter treats the Egyptian preparation for military action against the Mongols, the Mamluk march and their short policy of cooperation with the Franks of Acre and the decisive battle of Ain Jalut. The closing section of the chapter discusses the historical significance of the battle and its impacts on the near East. The last chapter contains the summary, conclusions and questions which need to be answered in further studies.

This study, which hopefully will contribute new information and some new explanations of events, has its limitations. The first one is bibliographical. The study would be more comprehensive and certainly more enlightened and enriched if additional sources could have been examined, such as the Latin records of the crusades of the 13th century. The only source of this kind which was available in English is Joinville's records of the crusade of St. Louis. Other

Arabic primary sources needed, yet unobtainable are, the last volume of Ibn Wasil's history, "Mufarej al-Kuroub," Ibn-Shadad biography of Baybars, and another important book by al-Magrezi entitled, "al-Khitate." Another limitation of this study is of a structural type. Much of the writings were consumed in discussion, and comparison of the varied and in many cases, contradictory historical versions of events.

Chapter II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Primary historical materials relating to the Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent (1257-1260), are gathered from three sources: 1) Medieval Western and Eastern Christian sources, 2) Medieval Persian sources, 3) Medieval Arabic sources. The records of chroniclers like Joinville supplied valuable first-hand information concerning the Mamluk revolt in 1250, and the establishment of political contacts between the Mongols and the Franks during the crusades of St. Louis. The historically significant records of John Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck provided the study with information concerning the early contacts of Western Christiandom with the Mongol power in the first half of the 13th century. The Armenian chronicler Grigor of Akanc, in his brief chronicle, provided the study with needed information in regard to the Armenian-Mongol relations, the Mongol capture of Jerusalem, and the encouragement to the Mamluks to take military action against the Mongols in Syria, that resulted from the departure of Hulagu from the country with the majority of his troops.

Those sources mentioned above cover only certain aspects, which play a secondary role in the whole current of the study. The most

important and comprehensive sources for the history of the Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent are found in the chronicles of the Persian and Arab historians of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries. A list of these historians and of their works relating to the subject of the study is divided into the following categories:

a) the contemporary historians of the 13th century.

b) the historians of the 14th century.

c) the historians of the 15th century.

a) The Contemporary Historians of the 13th Century:

Abu-Shama, al-Shaikh Shihab al-Din Abu-al Qasim Abd al-Rahman b. Ismail (1202-1267 A.D.), a Syrian scholar, worked as a teacher in the Rukniyah College in Damascus. Abu-Shama produced significant chronicle in the history of the Ayyubid dynasty and of Damascus. The book that I depended on for this study is entitled "Trajem rejal al-Qarnain al-Sadis wa al-Sabi"--The Biographies of the Men of the 6th and 7th Centuries--. In this book Abu-Shama offered first-hand information regarding the transition of power in Egypt from the Ayyubid to the Mamluks, the political situation in Syria on the eve of the Mongol invasion, the invasion of Syria by the Mongols, the crusader-Mongol relations and finally the defeat of the Mongols at Ain Jalut and other parts of Syria. This information supplied by Abu Shama as an eye-witness in several cases, is unique and historicaly of most significance.

Abu-Shama was an independent scholar who lived on his own, and was proud of his independence of the political authority; he was capable of writing objective records. As he was cut off from the political authority, he actually was less informative than those historians who were tied to the Ayyubid and the Mamluk courts. As a devoted Sunni Muslim, Abu-Shama did not hide his religious zeal, nevertheless he is of no influence in shaping events because of his religious feelings.

Ibn Abd al-Zahir, al Qadi Muhi al-Din (1223-1292), one of Baybars' confidential secretaries, also composed a detailed biography of the sultans Baybars (1260-1277), Qalawun (1279-1290), and Khalil (1290-1293). In his capacity as secretary of the sultanate he had to read all letters coming in, and write replies. Ibn Abd al-Zahir was thus in a position which brought him into contact with the state affairs and secrets and his biography of Baybars profiting from privileged inside knowledge, ought to be most authentic. The book of his to be reviewed is entitled "al-Rawd al-Zahir Fi Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir." The researcher in the Mamluk, Mongol, and crusades history owe to Dr. Syedah Fatima Sadequ, the publication and the translation of the extant part of this biography.

This part of the book covers briefly the establishment of the Mamluk state, the Mamluk struggle for power, the fleeing of Baybars and his Bahri Mamluk group to Syria, the battle of Ain Jalut and the murder

of the Sultan Qutuz. Ibn Abd al-Zahir pictures the Sultan Baybars in a plainly flattering way. It is noticeable that he never put under question or criticism any of Baybars' doings. Aside from this one-sided view of Baybars and his doings, the author provided priceless information, and in several cases good explanations and excellent insight into events.

Ibn Shadad, Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Ali (1216-1285), was a Syrian who worked for the Ayyubid ruler al-Nassir. He was a member of al-Nassir's mission to Hulagu during the siege of Baghdad in 1258, and he carried another mission to Yashmut Haluga's son, while the Mongols were advancing into upper Mesopotamia in 1259. When the Mongols advanced into Syria, he retired in Cairo. Later he enjoyed the patronage of the Sultan Baybars. He composed a historical geography on the great Syria known in Arabic as al-Sham. This book entitled "al-A'laq-al-Khatirah", provided us with needed information on the capture of Jerusalem by the Mongols. This information is not obtainable in other Arabic and Frankish sources--a fact that led Runciman to conclude that the mongols never reached Jerusalem.

Juvaini, Ala-al-Din Ata Malik (1226 (?)-1283). The family from which he sprang was one of the most distinguished in Persia. Juvainis had held high offices under three empires, the Seljuqi, the Khorazmi and the Mongol. The author visited Mongolia twice, during his last

prolonged visit he was persuaded by friends to write the history of the Mongol invasion, which is translated into English under the title "The History of the World Conqueror." While the composition of the book began during the period 1252-1253, Juvaini was still working on the book in 1260. Juvaini was the most capable among historians under review to record the campaign of Hulagu, but unfortunately his records of the campaign were limited to its early stage. He accompanied Hulagu during the campaign against the caliphate, but he nevertheless did not care enough to record what he witnessed.

Ibn al-Ibri. Known to the west as Bar Hebracus (1226-1286), is a christian Jacobit and thus he is one of few Medieval christian historians in the Near East who wrote history in Arabic. Ibn al-Ibri, born in Lesser Armenia, studied and worked in both Frankish and Muslim Syria. During the dampaign of Hulagu in Syria he was a resident of Aleppo's region. As he experienced the invasion he supplied first-hand information but it was unfortunately brief. Along with Abu-Shama and Ibn-Shadad, Ibn al-Ibri had the capacity of an eye-witness to enrich history with more information than what we obtained from them, regarding the Mongol invasion. The chronicle of his that concerns this study is written in Arabic and entitled "Tarikh Muktasar al-Duwal"--the brief history of the states--. The author wrote his book while he was residing in Persia under the shelter of the Mongol Il-Khans. His book

su

to

be

be

Un

the

co

vol

rup

cov

pot

som

Bag

con

Mon

simi

affe

al-F

a you

supplied information in regard to the attitude of the caliph al-Musta'Sim toward the Mongol threat, also he gives the only estimation of the number of the Mongol army that invaded Syria. His estimation of this number accordingly seems of exaggeration.

al-Juzjani, Maulana Minhaj al-Din Abu-Umar-I 'usman (d. 1300). Unfortunately for this study I had no access to information regarding the personal background of the author. al-Juzjani was in India when he composed his book which is entitled "Tabakat-I-Nasira". The second volume of the book which concerns the study deals with the Mongol interruption in the Lands of Islam.

The composition of the book was ended in 1620, and the author covers the whole campaign of Hulagu up to the invasion of Upper Mesopotamia and northern Syria. The author's knowledge of this stage is somewhat inexact, but his information regarding the campaign on Baghdad is highly valuable, and of first-hand character. al-Juzjani contributed new information about the situation in Baghdad during the Mongol siege. As the author seems Sunni Muslim, he views the events similarly to the way of most Arab historians. His religious feelings affected the style of his writing.

Ibn al-Fuwati, Abd al-Razaq al-Baghdadi (d. 1325-1326). Ibn al-Fuwati is a native of Baghdad and had experienced the invasion as a young man. After the capture of Baghdad he worked for awhile with

The

He h

"al-

His

al-D

one

of I

unde

Pers

of h

tion

minis

an ur

cine

ings

with

Mongo

Il-Kha

the 13

into c

history

The Persian scholar al-Tussi who accompanied Hulagu during the campaign. He had contacted one of the caliph al-Musta'Sims's sons. His book "al-Hawadith al-Jami'ah" supplied the study with first-hand information. His dates for events differ in more than one case from those of Rashid al-Din, and his records of the campaign on Baghdad is the most detailed one of the contemporary historians. In general, the historical accounts of Ibn al-Fuwati, is unique and essential for the history of Arab Iraq under the rule of the Mongols.

Rashid al-Din, Fuddlu Alah al-Hamadani al-Tabib (1247-1318), a Persian possibly of a Jewish ancestry. Rashid al-Din spent fifty years of his lifetime in the service of the Il-Khans of Persia. The culmination of his administrational career was his work as a wazier-prime minister--for three of those Il-Khans. He was a type of historian with an unusally wide scope of knowledge. One of his occupations was medicine which gave his last name al-Tabib (physician). His academic readings encompasses religion, metaphysics and geography. He was acquainted with four languages, besides his Persian mother tongue; Arabic, Hebrew, Mongol and probably Chinese. At the order and the encouragement of the Il-Khan Ghazan (1295-1304) he wrote a history of the Mongol empire of the 13th century, and the history of all nations which the Mongol came into contacts. His book entitled "Jami al-Tavarekh"--the collection of history--. The surviving part of this history is the one that was

devoted to the Mongol history, which is anyway a most contributory one in a field that is not so rich in historical records. The sources he depended on were the imperial records, and those of the noble Mongol families. Also, it seems obvious that he depended in recording some parts of the Hulagu campaign on the history of al-Juvaini.

In the part of this study concerning the campaign on the Assassins, the caliphate, I depended heavily on his records. Rashid al-Din covers briefly the whole campaign of Hulagu in the Fertile Crescent and his record gets briefer when he covers the invasion of Syria. His information here seems less dependable. Rashid al-Din supplied by some Arab historians, regarding the capture of Baghdad,occupation of Syria and the battle of Ain Jalut. To a certain extent, Rashid al-Din wrote an official history, while he was on the top of the Mongol administration. His bias reflects itself in "explaining" events, but in few cases, there is little doubt of the authenticity of information he offered.

b) The Historians of the 14th Century

Abu-al-Fida, (1273-1331). A prince descending from Saladin's brother, was an intimate friend of the Sultan al-Nassir (1293-40). The latter restored him to his ancestral principality of Hamah in 1310, and revived the ancient titles and privileges of his family. He seems to have obtained some of his scholarly training from the Syrian

historian Ibn-Wasil, who died in 1297-1298. By scholarly training, high rank, and personal experience Abu-al-Fida was eminently qualified at an early age to record the events of his time. His historical work "Mukhtasar ta'rikn al-Bashar" is a brief universal history. In recording the events of the Mongol invasion, Abu-al-Fida drew from preceding chronicles of Ibn Wasil, Ibn Shadad, and possibly Abu Shama.

Ibn al-Dawadari, Saif al-Din Abu Bakr Ibn 'Abd Allah Ibn Aibak. Little or nothing is known of his life other than that which emerges from his work, no later historian cited his work by name; no compiler of biographers of eminent statesmen and scholars took note of him. We do not know when he was born or when he died only he lived throughout al-Malik al-Nassir's reign and that he began his chronicle in 709/1309-1310 and completed it in 736/1335-1936. Much more is known about his father, a person of high ranking official position in the reign of al-Nassir. His chronicle that this review is concerned with is entitled "Kanz al-Durar." This chronicle is regarded as al-Dawadari's chief work. The book is a universal history, the 7th volume of which is devoted to the history of the Mamluk Turkic state, of the second half of the 13th century, and is entitled "al-Durra al-Zakiya fi Tarikh al-Dawla al-Turkiya." This volume ought to be regarded as the first attempt to narrate the history of the Bahri (Turkic) Mamluk state in the 13th century in an independent work with full awareness of its

Tu

pa

th

Da

gr

13

oth

of

Nih

his

ced

con

on

of

affe

foun

scho

rich

volv

from

Turkic character. Ibn al-Dawadari was informative to this study in particular regarding the Mamluk revolt, the Mongol occupation of Syria, the Battle of Ain Jalut, and the murder of Sultan Qutuz. Ibn al-Dawadari's sources regarding these matters were his own father and grandfather as well as preceding historians, such as al-Gazri (d. 1338-1339) and al-Yunini (d. 1325-1326).

Ibn Kathir, (1301-1302/1373-1374) was like practically all other Syrian historians, a religious scholar and teacher. A disciple of Ibn Taimiya, he wrote a universal history entitled "al-Bidaya wa-al-Nihaya fi al-Tarikh"--the beginning and the end in history--. His history of the period this study is concerned with, was based on preceding historians--Alam al-Din al-Birzali, whose history in turn was a continuation of Abu-Shama's. Ibn Kathir treated the campaign of Hulagu on Baghdad with some details. Also, he shed more light on the battle of Ain Jalut. His religious zeal and his fondness for rhetoric seem to affect his style of writing.

Ibn Khaldun, Abu Abd al-Rahman (d. 1405-1406). Famous as the founder of a new school in the philosophy of history. To some modern scholars he was the founder of sciology. Ibn Khaldun acquired unusally rich social and political experiences. He travelled, settled and involved himself in politics and academic studies in the area extended from Spain to Syria, throughout the North of Africa. To some critics,

Ibr

chr

thi

and

the

ris

sti

fle

numb

fill

c)

medi

stit

lead

erti

Egyp

ical

in A

bine

Egypt

Ibn Khaldun who found a new approach in Muslim historiography, (his own chronical Kitab al-Ibar), failed to fulfill his standards. Although, this note could be accepted in general, his central theory on the rise and fall of nomadic states, had influenced his historical treatment of the phenomenon of the Turkic penetration in the Muslim lands and the rise of the Mamluk Turkic state in Egypt. After all Ibn Khaldun was still one of the most rational Muslim historians; this character reflected itself in his explanations of events and in his estimations of numbers. He contributed data to the study although not much of it fills certain vacuums.

c) The Historians of the 15th Century

al-Maqrezi (d. 1441-1442) was regarded as the most famous of medieval Egyptian historians. After long service in the religious institutions in Egypt and Syria as a scribe, qadi (judge), imam (a prayer leader); muhtasib, and administrator of waqfs (public religious properties)--, al-Maqrezi withdrew to devote himself to a history of Islamic Egypt, which was to consist of geographical, historical, and biographical sections. The grand scope of that work, its accessibility both in Arabic and translated versions; the praise it has received, have combined to secure al-Maqrezi the hackny-eyed but apt title of dean of Egyptian historians.

"ki

al-M

ced

Ibn

tim

use

eva

or t

Fati

Nass

temp

achi

al M

eral

with

mate

Mongo

who b

Mamlu

of oth

The book with which this review is concerned is entitled "kitab al-Sulouk Li-Marifat al-Mulauk". The historical materials which al-Maqrezi's book supplied this study were acquired by him from preceding historians of the 13th and 14th centuries, like Ibn Abd al-Zahir, Ibn Shadad, Ibn Wasil, Abu Shama and the historians of al-Nassir's time. It is very hard to distinquish certain materials that al-Maqrezi used and trace them to their original sources, as almost all the medieval historians were accustomed to draw freely from their contemporaries or their predecessors without footnoting or citing them. However, Dr. Fatima Sayeda cites that al-Maqrezi attached great importance to al-Nassir's historians. Those historians we learned had pictured and attempted to please al-Nassir by minimizing or distorting Baybars and his achievements. Although al-Maqrezi was a pupil of one of the most rational Muslim historian in the Middle Ages, Ibn Khaldun, he seems, in several cases, to accept the historical materials of preceding historians with no examination. al-Maqrezi supplied this study with very rich materials in regards to the establishment of the Mamluk revolt, the Mongol invasion of Syria, and the battle of Ain Jalut.

Ibn Tagri Bardi, Jamal al-din Yosup (1411-1469). An Egyptian who belonged to the Mamluk elite, and was in close contact with the Mamluk court. Iben Tagri Bardi was a pupil of al-Maqrezi in Cairo, and of other celebrated scholars at that time. His work "al-Nujum al-Zahira

fi M

down

Egypt

conte

and 1

Bardi

the h

Syria

The a

books

not I

he wa

the M

the m

Mongo

Mumlu

a)

fi Mulouk Misr wa al-Qahira", a history of Egypt from the Arab conquest down to the year 1453, consists of the biographies of the sultan of Egypt followed by a recapitulation of the principal external events contemporary with each of them. Similar to the historians of the 14th and 15th centuries historians who have already been reviewed, Iban Tagri Bardi drew this information from the period covered by this study, from the historians of the 13th century. Some of his materials on events in Syria during the Mongol invasion obviously were drawn from Abu-Shama. The author provided for this study the story of the destruction of the books of knowledge in Baghdad by the Mongols. This story possibly is not Ibn Tagri Bardi's own invention, but as far as this research goes he was the only historian to be responsible for citing the story.

Secondary historical materials in English and Arabic regarding the Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent are found as sub-subject in the modern writings in three areas; a) history of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest, b) history of the crusades, and c) history of the Mumlunks and the Ayyubids.

a) of those books in the history of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest written or translated into English, the most valuable for this study were, Henry Howorth's History of the Mongols, Part 3, The Mongols of Persia, New York, 1965. Howorth's work of the 19th century is still the most detailed of its sort that is

written in English. The author had depended on Rashid al-din, al-Maqrezi, Abu al-Fida and Bar Habrus as well as Armenian sources. He also depended heavily on d'ohsson's significant 19th century work in the Mongol history written in French and still not available for the English reader. Howorth did not have the Arabic primary sources that have been published recently, namely, Abu Shama, Trajem rejal al-Qarnian, Ibn al-Fuwati Chronicles and Ibn Abd al-Zahir biography of Baybars. One of the few Arabic books in the history of the Mongols is the work of Fou'ad al-Sayad, The Mongols in History, Vol. 1, Beirut, 1970, and the work of Jafar Hussien, Iraq During the Reign of the Il-Khanid Mongols, Baghdad, 1968. al Sayad is exploring new fields of history in Arabic, his accounts show defects of national and religious emotionalism. In many cases he treats the events of the 13th century as they are contemporary events! Kisbak's handling of the Mongol invasion of Iraq shows much care in historical investigation and examination.

b) of these modern works on the crusades that treat the subject of this study are Steven Runciman's book, A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3, The Kingdom of Acre, Cambridge, 1962. Runciman's treatment of the Mongol invasion of Syria and their relations with the Franks is very valuable. More Arabic primary sources

that Runciman needed to reach complete masterly handling of the subject.

c) of the modern Arabic works in the Mamluk history that treat the Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent is the work of Sa'id Ashur, The Mamluk Era, Cairo, 1965. Also Sir John Blugg, Soldiers of Fortune, New York, 1973. Ashur's work is helpful to understand the current events from the Mamluk side, and still as Sayad, view past events with much emotionalism.

The R

east c

1250)

power

Ayyubi

power,

former

Egypti

the Tu

course

will a

Beirut:

Chapter III

EGYPT AND SYRIA ON THE EVE OF THE MONGOL INVASION

Egypt

The Rise of the Mamluks

Before the Mongols finally drive down from the mountains to the east of Baghdad (1257-1258), the authority of the Ayyubid state (1172-1250) had already faded away in Egypt. A new military and political power emerged in the Nile Valley following the death in 1249 of its Ayyubid sultan, al-Malik al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayub. The emerging new power, the Mamluks, were freed slaves who took over the state of their former Lords, and who were responsible for building the Mamluk-Syrian-Egyptian Empire. This Empire is called Dawlat al-Turk[1]--the state of the Turks--by Medievalist Arab historians.

Who were these Mamluks? what is their origin? and what was the course of their evolution to political power in Egypt? This section will attempt to answer these questions.

---

[1]Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-Ebar, v. 3, Dar al-Kitab al-lubnani, Beirut: 1956, p. 798.

own"

barte

vinci

but n

slaves

slave)

using

reigns

But it

scale[2]

who hac

its eme

the fre

the Abb

(ed), A
vania P

Era), Ca

The word, "Mamluk," is the passive participle of the verb "to own" in Arabic, meaning a person (or chatle) owned through deed of sale, barter, capture in war or presentation as a gift or tribute from a provincial governor or subject community. All Mamluks thus were slaves, but not all slaves called Mamluks. The term was applied only to white slaves, not to Negroes.[1] The black slave was called Abd or Raqeaq (a slave), which originally did not have a color connotation.

Mamluks were of varying Turkish origins. The traditions of using them as military forces in the Arab world goes back as far as the reigns of the Abbassid Caliphs al-Hadi (775-85) and al-Rashid (786-809). But it was the Caliph al-Mu'Atasim (833-42) who used them in a wider scale[2] and preferred them over the Persian, namely Khorasanian soldiers who had comprised the backbone of the Abbassid Caliphate armies since its emergence in 1750 up to his reign.

An explanation for the preference of the Turkish slaves over the free Khorasanians has been given by some historians as the fear by the Abbassid Caliphs of the overgrowth of the Persian influence.[3] As

---

[1]Mustafa M. Ziada, "The Mamluk Sultans to 1293," in K. Setton (ed), A History of the Crusades, Vol. II, The University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 1962, pp. 735-36.

[2]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 800

[3]Sa'id Ashur, Abde al-Fittah, al Asr al-Mamluki (The Mamluk Era), Cairo, 1965, p. 1.

for

moth

sold

the

perf

thing

force

a com

founde

Ayyubi

the us

Mamluk

of war

service

be expe

6th ed.,

Putnam's

3

for Mu'atasim himself, the fact that he was the son of a Turkish mother[1] might also have been a reason for his performance for Turkish soldiers for his own private guard as well as for the state army. Also the Turks had acquired by 9th century a wide fame as people who fit perfectly for military service and such impression possibly had something to do with their preference over others.

The purchase of the Turkish slaves and their use as a military force extended into the states of the Fertile Crescent, until it became a common phenomenon in the Ayyubid Empire, following the death of its founder, Salah al-Din (1192), among several petty kings (Muluk) of the Ayyubid household.[2] It led to the dependence by these petty kings on the use of Mamluks to defend themselves and their principalities.[3] The Mamluks were bought as children or youth, raised and trained in the art of war under their lord's care, and were freed at the age of military service. The assurance of their loyalty was stronger than what could be expected from free mercenaries, as the relationship of the Mamluks

---

[1]K. Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, MacMillan and Co. ltd., 6th ed., p. 466, 1958.

[2]Carl Brockelman, History of the Islamic Peoples, G. P. Putnam's Son, New York, p. 231.

[3]Abde al-Fittah, op. cit., p. 3.

to th

the c

their

of th

them

histo

increa

Al
or
ca
di
an
st
th
pu
so

beginn

were ch

Caspian

duwal a
Kings),

to their master has always approached kinship more than servitude[4] and the devotion of these Mamluks was always concentrated in the person of their lord.

During Sultan al-Malik al-Salih's reign (1240-1249) the number of the Turkish Mamluks increased in Egypt due to his greater trust in them over any other ethnic group in his military. The 15th century historian, Taqi al-din al-Mawrezi, gives the following reason for the increase of the Mamluks during this reign in particular:

> Al Malik al-Salih-Najm al-din Ayyub was the one who originated the Bahri Mamluks in the land of Egypt, because of what happened to him in the night that his power disappeared (during his reign in Syria) when the Khurdish and other soldiers abandoned him, and only his Mamluks stayed with him. Therefore, he gave them credit for that. When he took power of Egypt, he increased the purchase of Mamluks and made up the majority of his soldiers of them . . . .[1]

The newly purchased Mamluks were called al-Bahriyah. In the beginning, they numbered eight hundred to one thousand.[2] Those Bahries were chiefly Turks from the Kipchak region north of the Black and Caspian Seas, and were not the only Mamluks in al-Salih service, but

---

[1]Al-Maqrezi, Taqi al-Din Ahmed, Kitab al-Suluk Li ma'rifat duwal al-Muluk (The Book of the Way of Knowing the States of the Kings), Vol. 1, Part I, Second Edition (Cairo: 1936), pp. 339-340.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 341.

the most favored and powerful regiment.[1] The Sultan al-Malik al Salih moved with this regiment to the island of al Rawda in the Nile. Their name al-Bahriya (the Bahriya) came from the Arabic word Bahr, which means sea, but was used also for big rivers (like the Nile, called Bahr al Neel). Their name could come either from their residence in the island of al Rawda or from the fact that they have been imported to Egypt from overseas.

Similarities can be drawn between Sultan al Malik al Salih Ayyub, the last Ayyubid ruler to use Turkish soldiers, and the Abbassid Caliph al Mu'atasim, the first to use Turkish elements for military service on a wide scale. Each chose for himself a new residence with his Turkish soldiers apart from the capital of his state. Sultan al Malik al Salih Ayyub built a fortress on the island al Rawda for himself and his Turkish soldiers. This was to prevent the soldiers from disrupting the daily life of Baghdad. Further similarities can be drawn regarding the eventual takeover of power by the Turkish soldiers following the death of these rulers.

Several significant events during 1248-1250 led to the evolution of the Mamluks as a political power in Egypt. First, the Crusade campaign launched by the Franks against the northern Egyptian port of Damietta (1249-1250). Second, the death of the Ayyubid Sultan during

---

[1] Lane-Pool, op. cit., p. 243.

the campaign, leaving a void in leadership for three months while his son and legal heir, Turanshah, was in the fortress of Kifa in Mesopotamia. Third, Turanshah's unfamiliarity with the local political situation of Egypt and his consequently misguided policies upon his return from Mesopotamia. Fourth, the appearance of the Bahriyah as the most cohesive regiment within the Egyptian military with the Stature of being the best defenders of the Egyptian state against the Franks.

The Crusade, led by Louis IX of France, which succeeded so easily in occupying Damietta on June 5, 1249, created a deep emotional shock in Egypt. Al-Maqrezi described the emotional impact of this event:

> When this news reached the people of Cairo and Egypt, they were disturbed--a great disturbance--and they were dismayed about the existence of the state of Islam in Egypt. This was because of the possession of Damietta by the Franks, their strength by what they captured of properties, supplies and weapons, and because of the illness of the sultan.[1]

The Egyptian situation worsened upon the death of the Sultan Najm al-Din Ayyub on November 23, 1249. His Turkish wife Shajar-al-Durr (Spray of Pearls) kept his death a secret, apparently to protect the spirit of the army. She administered the affairs of the state with Amir (general) Fakr al-Din, who became "Atabeg" or the commander-in-chief

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 343.

upon the death of the sultan.[1] But the news of the sultan's death could not be kept a secret from the court for long, as Fakhr al-Din began to behave like a sultan. As a result, the deputy of the Sultanate in Cairo, Hussam al-Din, sent a messenger to hasten the heir's arrival. Hussam al-Din was concerned over the growth of Fakhr al-Din's influence in the state and was desirous of Turanshah's coming before Fakhr al-Din could take over the Sultanate of Egypt.[2]

The Franks who were informed by now of the death of the Sultan, took advantage of the situation by assaulting on February 8, the town of al-Mansura around which the Egyptian army was stationed. The assault had only one political result--the death of Fakhr al-Din, who was taken in surprise attack. The assault was repulsed and the Franks were pushed out of al-Mansura, chiefly throught the efforts of the Bahriyah.

From this point on, the Bahriyah rose to real power within the Egyptian army. Al-Maqrezi says that "God's care was what sent the Bahriyah to confront the Franks."[3] Al-Mansura was saved; the Franks were halted from further advance into Egypt; and the spirit in the Egyptian camp strengthened. The Bahriyah, for their part, had lifted

---

[1] Ibid., p. 343.

[2] Ibid., p. 345.

[3] Ibid., p. 350.

their stature as they offered what the people needed in the critical moments--defense and hope.

Toranshah, the long awaited new Sultan, at last appeared at al-Mansurah on February 28. On April 5, the Crusaders, as a result of starvation and the spread of disease, started to retreat to Damietta. The Egyptians attacked them fiercely during their retreat. Though this attack did not settle the Frankish occupation of Damietta finally, it was disastrous to the Franks and shifted the military balance to favor the Egyptians. The Syrian historian Abu Shama (1202-1267) states that thirty thousand crusaders were captured.[1] According to al-Maqrezi, thirty thousand crusaders were killed and hundreds of thousands of them were taken captive, among them Louis IX.[2] Obviously this count by al-Maqrezi is one of his exaggerated estimations. According to a modern Western account, "The whole army was rounded up and led into captivity."[3] The Bahriya again played a distinguished military role in this battle where they "did well and left a beautiful impression,"[4] and their status

---

[1]Abu-Shama, Trajem rejal al Qurnain al-Sadis wa al-Sabi, Beirut (?), p. 184.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 356.

[3]Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Vol. III, The Kingdom of Acre, Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 1966, p. 270.

[4]Al-Maqrezi, Ibid, p. 356.

was again upgraded. Among their ranks, a young Mamluk named Baybars al-Bundgdari had distinguished role in this battle.

A turning point, constituting a step in the advancement of the Bahriya to political power in Egypt, was a series of politically inept moves by Turanshah. He removed some Egyptian high ranking officials who had served his father and replaced them with Mamluks he had brought with him from Mesopotamia. This untimely change[1] came at the time when the Crusaders still occupied Damietta and when Turanshah himself was not yet firmly established in the politics of Egypt. Among those dismissed was the Kurdish Hussam al-Dain, Deputy of the Sultanate in Cairo,[2] who had worked to get Turanshah installed as Sultan, and who--in my opinion--had been a potential ally for Turanshah within the high ranks of the Egyptian administration. Also, Turanshah took an insensitive, antagonistic action against his stepmother, widow of the former sultan Shajar al-Durr. He threatened her, demanding his father's money and even her own personal jewelry.[3] Shajar al-Durr felt mistreated and unrewarded for her part in raising Turanshah to the Sultanate.

---

[1]Ibn Abd al-Zahir, Al-Qadi Muhyi al-din, Al-Rawd Al-Zahir fi Sirat Al-Malik al-Zahir, (The extant part edited and trans. by Dr. Syedah Fatima Sadeque in Baybars I of Egypt), Oxford U. Press, Decca, Pakistan, 1954, p. 79.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 358.

[3]Ibid., p. 358.

Most significant was the attitude of Turanshah toward the Bahriya who by now had a good reputation among the Egyptians. Turanshah did not fulfill a promise to their leader Faris-al-Din Aq-Tai to promote him to the post of Amir,[1] and, further, made threats to kill their leaders,[2] perhaps because of suspicion over the growth of their influence, or out of jealousy over their reputation.

As a result of the threats by Turanshah against Shajar al-Durr and the Mamluks, a coordinated attitude developed. The common Mamluk Turkish background of both the Shajar and the Mamluks could have played a role in this common attitude which resulted in conspiracy that led to the assassination of Turanshah by the Bahriya in the opening days of May 1250 after a reign of seventy-one days.[3] The two among the Bahriyah who had led in this task were Baybars and Ak-Tai.[4] DeJoinville, the French crusader 1224-1317, as an eye witness, represents important accounts on the assassination of Turanshah by the Bahriyah. He says that the Sultan was struct first by a sword that clove the hand up to the arm. Then the young Sultan fled into a tower where the murderers threw Greek fire at him. The Sultan fled to the river and one of them

---

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 385.

[4] Ibid., p. 360.

gave him a spear--thrust in the ribs. And they all swam and came and killed him in the river. Ak-Tai, DeJoinville says, cut the Sultan open with his sword and took the heart out and said to St. Louis, "What wilt thou give me? for I have slain thy enemy, who, had he lived, would have slain thee!" And the king answered him never a word.[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, says that "when the king of France saw all that had happened, he feared the consequences for himself and surrendered Damietta."[2]

As a result of Turanshah's assassination and the nonexistence of an adult Ayyubid prince in Egypt, the Ayyubid State factually came to an end. The Bahriyah installed Shajar al-Durr the widow of al-Salih as a Sultana (fem. Sultan). It was for the first and last time in the Arabic-Islamic history, the sultanate was held by a woman former slave. In the contrary to the Moslem Arabs, the Turkish Mamluks with their intimate cultural connection to the nomadic heritage of the Stepp; a woman on the top of the public was not something to be ashamed of.

The Bahriyah, who staged the coup d'etat, held the military power and installed Aybeg, and old man of their ranks as Atabeg. It was, perhaps due to public opinion and animosities after the death of the Sultan, that the Bahriyah were unable to take over the Sultanate.

---

[1]Jean Sire DeJoinville, "Chronicle of the Crusade of St. Louis," in Frank Marzials (trans.), Memoirs of the Crusades, J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London: 1933, pp. 221-223. Also, Abu Shama, op. cit., p. 185.

[2]Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 80.

Shajar al-Durr, as the widow of the former Sultan and the mother of his son, Khaleal (died infant), and also a Turkish former slave (Mamluka), constituted a necessary bridge between the Ayyubid state and the pure Turkish (Mamluk) state. Al-Maqrezi considers her reign (eighty days long), as the opening of the Mamluk state.[1]

A Sultana was not acceptable to the traditional Moslem opinion. Representative of this opinion was a letter from al-Must'asim, the Caliph of Baghdad, to the al-Bahriyah; he wrote: "If you don't have a man to rule you inform us and we will send you one."[2]

The Bahriyah felt compelled to alter this situation. The solution was the marriage of Aybeg, the commander-in-chief, and the Shajar al-Durr. She consequently stepped down as Sultana allowing Aybeg to assume the Sultanate with the title al-Malik al-Mu'ez Izz-al-Din Aybeg.[3] These two events occurred in July 1250.

During the short reign of Shajar al-Durr, the Egyptians executed a withdrawal agreement with the Franks. According to this agreement the Franks would have to evacuate Damietta and would have to pay

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 368.

[2] Ibid., p. 367.

[3] Ibid., pp. 367-368.

a huge ransom (400,000 Pounds Tournois), in exchange for the release of Louis IX and thousands of other crusaders.[4]

After the withdrawal of the Franks, the new regime of Egypt faced a new threat from the Ayyubid rulers of Syria. The Mamluks, during the short reign of Shajar, attempted to inherent the Syrian possessions of al-Salih but they failed. An ethnic opposition by the Kurdish free soldiery to the taking over of power in Egypt by the Turkish Mamluks probably was behind the decision of al-Qaimariyah regiment (Free Kurds) to surrender Damascus to al-Nasser Yosuf, the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo. In southern Syria, the governor of al-Kark released an Ayyubid prince called al-Mughith from a prison and proclaimed him a Sultan. The Ayyubids, although they had prevented the extension of the Bahriya authority to Syria, never succeeded in unifying Syria under one Ayyubid Sultan. Nevertheless, the Ayyubids constituted the major external threat to the Mamluk regime in Egypt. These rulers were aligned behind Nasser al-Din Yosuf, the most powerful of them after his acquisition of Damascus. As they regarded the Mamluk Sultanate illegitimate and aimed to restore the Ayyubid regime, they began to march toward Egypt. Responding to this challenge, the Mamluks installed a six-year-old Ayyubid child, al-Ashraf Mazafar al-Din Mousa, as co-sultan. Naturally, Al-Ashraf was co-sultan in

---

[1]Runciman, op.cit., pp. 271-273.

name only. To further legitimize their regime, the Mamluks spread in Egypt a claim that the country was ruled by the Abassid Caliph in Baghdad, and that the Mamluk Sultan was merely his deputy![1] Obviously, the Mamluks were trying in every way to legitimize their power in Egypt. On the military plane, the Mamluks won a significant battle against the Ayyubid forces near al-Salihya in February 1260.

After the Mamluks turned back the military attempts to restore Egypt to Ayyubid authority, Aybeg deposed the Ayyubid child co-sultan and, more important, gained a realistic recognition of the Syrian Ayyubids to be Sultan in Egypt. This realistic recognition was a result of mediation by an ambassador of the Abassid Caliph. According to the treaty or consilation (Sulh) which concluded in April 1253, the Mamluk regime extended its power into Palestine (Gaza and the west bank of the Jordan River), while the Ayyubid, al-Nasser Yosuf, with other Ayyubid princes hold the Syrian interior east of the river. The treaty was renewed in 1256.

Although the Mamluks saved their regime from external threats by temporarily settling their problems with the Ayyubids of Syria, they had to face a serious internal rebellion within Egypt. This rebellion did not emerge from the urban communities but from the Arabian

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 370.

tribes of Egypt. It is necessary to turn to the leading historian of the Mamluk era, al-Maqrezi, for a description of this rebellion.

> The Arabs in upper and lower Egypt cut the communication by land and river. The leader of these Arabs, al-Sharif Hissen al-Din Tha'lab, declared, "We are the people of the country and we have the right to power more than the Mamluks do." The Arabs' pride prevented them from serving the Turks and they pointed out that the Mamluks were slaves of "foreigners." (The Khurdish Ayyubids).[1]

The tribal Arabs gathered from all over Egypt to fight the Mamluks. According to al-Maqrezi, their knights numbered twelve thousand and their infantry was large, though unnumbered. However, in a decisive battle in June 1253, five thousand Mamluks under the command of Ak-Tai defeated the rebellious tribal Arabs, and save the regime from its most dangerous threat within the country.

After this battle, the regime itself became rife with power struggles. Aybeg, originally of middle rank among the Bahriyah,[2] now an old man, had to face the ambition of the real leader of the Bahriyah, Faris al-Din Aq-Tai. Aybeg survived this power struggle only through a conspiracy which culminated in the assassination of Ag-Tai and the flight of the majority of the Bahriya to Syria and Asia Minor.[3]

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 386.

[2] Ibn-Taqri Bardi, Jamal al-Din, al-Nujoum al-Zahira fi Muluk Misr wa al-Qahira (The Shining Stars about the Kings of Egypt and Cairo), Part 7 (Cairo, 1963), pp. 4-5.

[3] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., pp. 81-84.

Aybeg's reign lasted for seven years. His death (April 1257) was not to come in the military field but in his wife's bath. Shajar al-Durr had him assassinated after hearing that he was contemplating marriage to a Mesopotamian princess.[1] The former Sultana was killed days later at the hands of Aybeg's Mamluks.

It was decided by the generals to install the Sultan's fifteen-year-old son, Nur al-Din Ali, as Sultan, with the Mamluk Sayf al-Din Qutuz, the deputy of the sultanate in Cairo, as regent.[2] Nur al-Din Ali was sultan for two years and eight months. His reign was marked by more than attempt by al-Mughith of al-Kark supported by the Bahriyah to invade Egypt. His regent Qutuz carried the task of defending the regime and administrating the state. When news of the Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia and Northern Syria reached Cairo, Qutuz, with the expectation of further Mongol advancement, suggested in an audience of generals and theologians that a new strong and mature sultan was needed. Qutuz himself took on the task of deposing his young protege and installing himself, with no serious opposition, as Sultan in November 1259.[3]

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 401-403.

[2] Ibid., p. 405.

[3] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 416-417.

Syria

The Fading Ayyubid Dynasty and the Disunited Latin Colonies

Prior to the Mongol invasion of Syria (1259-1260), the Syrian political situation was more complicated than that of Egypt. In Egypt, political authority was unified solidly in the Nile Valley, while in Syria the interior was ruled by several Ayyubid princes while the coast was ruled by the Latin establishments. The ethnic and religious scene in Syria was also of great variety. While Egypt consisted of a Moslem Sunni majority with Christian and Jewish minorities, Syria consisted of Moslem Sunni and Shi'ites of several sects, Druz, Christians, and Jews. The population of Egypt was composed of Arabized peasants, townspeople, and tribal Arabs ruled by a Turkish military artistocracy of the Mamluk. In Syria Arabized peasants and townspeople, tribal Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen made up most elements of society beneath the Arabized Ayyubid ruling class, which was of Kurdish origin. On the coast, European Crusaders constituted the majority of the population.

Adding to the confused situation in Syria was the arrival of militant refugees such as the Turkish Khorezmians and the Shahrazurians, Kurds fleeing the invasion of Moslem Central Asia, Persia, and

the Kurdish region in Northern Mesopotamia by the Mongols.[1] The Latin establishments on the Syrian coast were remnants of the 12th century Latin kingdom and by the 13th century were also politically divided.

To better understand this political situation in Syria, it is necessary to give a brief background of the political development of the two major powers, the Ayyubids and the Crusaders, who ruled Syria during this period.

The Ayyubid Principalities

The Ayyubid principalities of the 13th century were the remnants of a once vast Ayyubid Empire founded by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi. Salah al-Din, born on the Tigris in 1138 of Kurdish parentage, rose to become the deputy over Egypt for the Zinkid state under Nor al-Din Zinki. In Egypt, Salah al-Din consolidated his power by declaring his independence upon the death of Nur al-Din Zinki in 1174. After a few engagements, culminating in the battle of Qurun Hamah, he wrested Syria from the 11-year-old son and successor of Nur, Isma'il. During this time, Salah al Din's older brother, Turan-Shah, succeeded in taking possession of al-Yaman. Also, Salah al-Din established his power

---

[1] Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 232.

over al-Hijaz with its holy cities. In May 1175, at his own request, Salah al-Din was granted by the Abbasid caliph a diploma of investiture over Egypt, al-Maghrib, Nubia, western Arabia, Palestine and Central Syria. Henceforth, Salah al-Din considered himself the sole sultan. Ten years later, he gained control of upper Mesopotamia and made its various princes his vassals. Nur-al-Din's dreams of first enveloping the Franks and then crushing them between the two millstones of Moslem Syria-Mesopotamia and Egypt were being realized in the career of his more illustrious successor. Salah al-Din spent the rest of his career fighting the Franks. The culminating victory was the Hittin battle (July 3-4, 1187) which sealed the fate of the Frankish cause. After a week's siege, Jerusalem, which had lost its garrison at Hittin, capitulated (October 2, 1187). The capture of the capital of the Latin Kingdom gave Salah al-Din most of the towns of Frankish Syria-Palestine. It also provoked a new crusade. The third crusade (1189-1192) was led by Frederick Barbarossa, emperor of Germany, Richard I, Coeur de Lion, King of England and Phillip Augustus, king of France. The main success of this crusade was the capture of Akka, but it failed to retake Jerusalem. Akka took the place of Jerusalem as the center of the Latin Kingdom. Peace was finally concluded on November 2, 1192, on the general principle that the coast belonged to the Latins and the interior to the Moslems and that pilgrims to the Holy City should not be molested.

Following this conclusion of peace, Salah al-Din had only a few months to live. On February 19 of the following year, he was taken ill with fever in Damascus and died 12 days later at the age of 55. Before his death, Salah al-Din, himself, divided up his empire among his survivors. His eldest son, al-Malik al-Afdal, as head of the house, inherited the Sultanate along with Damascus and southern Syria. His brother, al-Malik al-Zahir got Aleppo with northern Syria; his other brother, al-Malik al-Aziz, Egypt; and their uncle, al-Malik al-Adil, Salah-al-Din's brother, was given possessions in Mesopotamia.[1] This division should be considered a a major cause of the decline of the Ayyubid empire. Only one year after Salah al-Din's death, dissension broke out among his sons, and by playing them off against each other, their uncle was able to eliminate them all one after the other. It was only in Aleppo that the descendants of Salah-al-Din survived in power until the invasion of the Mongol's in 1260.

By 1200, al-Adil had united almost the entire empire under his rule. Yet, even during his lifetime, he divided his domains among his sons. In Egypt, he installed Kamil; in Damascus, Muazzam; and Awhad, Fa'iz and Ashraf he installed as his deputies. After the death of al-Adil in 1218, his successor, al-Kamil, extended his authority to

---

[1]Hitti, op. cit., pp. 646-651.

Damascus. Almost the whole of the Syrio-Egyptian Empire was reunited during his reign.[1] However, his death in 1238 resulted in yet another split and struggle among the Ayyubid.[2]

After the rise to power of al-Kamil's son, al-Adil (the second), the Ayyubid kings of Syria and Mesopotamia moved toward independence from the former authority of the Sultan in Cairo. Al-Adil, being hated by his army generals, was overthrown and replaced by his brother, al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub. The new Sultan, the former ruler of al-Jazara (north Mesopotamia) went through a bitter struggle in Syria before and after attaining power in Egypt. Besides his own Mamluks, he obtained the assistance of the Khorezmies, a body of more than 10,000 knights. At the request of Sultan al-Salih Najm al-Din, the Khorezmies crossed the Euphrates River into Syria (Summer 1244) (This was to be their final crossing of the river) to fight the Ayyubid rivals who did not acknowledge his sultanate, and who surrendered Jerusalem, Ascalon, and Tabariyah to the Franks (1243-44) in exchange for the Frankish assistance against al-Salih in Egypt.[3] In the name of the Sultan of Egypt, the Khorezmies crushed a coalition of Ayyubid and crusading forces

---

[1]Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 231.

[2]Al-Mazrezi, op. cit., pp. 267-332.

[3]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 314-315. Also, Gibb, Hamilton, A.R., "The Ayyubids" in Setton (ed.), A History of the Crusades, Vol. II, U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, p. 709.

aimed at invading Egypt, recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders (August 23, 1244), and finally brought Damascus from the rival Ayyubid to the authority of al-Salih in Egypt.

The Khorezmies were dissatisfied with Salih's reward for their service. They revolted and were finally crushed by Salih's forces.[1] Salih had succeeded in again unifying south and central Syria with Egypt, but he had to face the sixth crusade's attack of Damietta while he was on his death bed. After his death, his son Turanshah held the sultanate for a short period, but was killed by his father's Mamluks. The murder of Turanshah ended the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt and the reign of the Mamluks began.

The Ayyubid princes of Syria opposed the political developments in Egypt and allied themselves behind the grand one among them, al-Nasser Yosuf, who possessed Aleppo and Damascus. At this point, the Ayyubid camp, besides al-Nasser, consisted of al-Manssourr, the possessor of Hamah; al-Mugeath of al-Kark and Shobek; al-Ashraf of Tadmourr and al-Rahpa; al-Kamil of Maiyafariqin and Diyar-Bakr in the region of upper Mesopotamia and al-Malik al-Sa'ied of Mardin.[2]

Caliph al-Musta'sim of Baghad began to feel the threat of the Mongols and concerned himself with endi ng the Syrio-Egyptian

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, Ibid., pp. 316-322.

[2] Ibn-Tqri Bardi, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

confrontation. Through his mediator, a peace agreement was concluded in 1253 between the Mamluk regime in Egypt and the Ayyubids.[1] This agreement was important as the two rival regimes realistically recognized each other.[2]

Before they set foot in Syria (1260), we informed that the Mongols had begun as early as 1244, to gather ransom from the people of Syria through the cooperation of the ruler of al-Mawsel in upper Mesopotamia.[3] As the Mongols consolidated their conquests in Persia and invaded Asia Minor, they turned their attention to Syria, demanding the submission of the Ayyubid Princes to Mongol political authority.[4] Early indications of Mongol determination to set up their authority came through raids in Maiyafarigin and North Mesopotamia (1252) which killed more than 10,000 people.[5] As news of the Mongols' determination to invade Baghdad spread, the historian Ibn Tqri Bardi briefly states that:

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 398

[2] Abde al-Fittah, op. cit., p. 18

[3] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 135.

[4] Ibid., p. 308.

[5] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op.cit., p. 25.

> The Syrian army (of al-Massir) and the Egyptian army had agreed to put their antagonism aside and face the Mongols![1]

The disunity of the Ayyubid camp during this period is reflected by the fact that while relations between al-Nasser and the Mamluks were much calmer, the Ayyubid ruler al-Mughith, the possessor of al-Kark in southern Syria, made the last unsuccessful attempt to invade Egypt in 1258 encouraged by the fugitive Bahris.[2] Despite the increasing pressure of the Mongols on upper Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, the raids on Syrian borders and the demands for submission to the Ayyubid Princes, there were no serious Ayyubid moves toward political unification such as installing an Ayyubid Sultan in Syria or military mobilization to face the coming storm. The responsibility of such a unification mostly would be on the shoulders of al-Nasser who, more than any of his fellow Ayyubids, could coordinate a resistance. Yet, he was hesitant, preferring alliance with the Mongols at one time against the Mamluks and at another time moving toward coordination with the Mamluks against the Tatars.[3] As following events will show, al-Nasser failed to make a decisive move until the moment he was taken captive by the Mongols.

---

[1] Ibid., pp. 37.

[2] Ibid., pp. 45-46.

[3] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 410-411.

The fragmented Ayyubid regime in Syria, failing to reconcile its antagonism with Mamluk Egypt at the proper time, and suffering from internal disunity, was virtually impotent to mount any serious resistance against the Mongol threat of invasion.

The Crusader Colonies

The Latin establishments on the Syrian coast, prior to the Mongol invasion of Syria in the first half of the 13th century, owed their very existence on Syrian soil to the political and military accomplishment of the first crusade (1096-1099). As the crusaders invaded by land from the north through Asia Minor before entering Syria, they established their first colony in al-Ruha which developed into the principality of al-Ruha in 1098. The second Latin colony was founded in Syria itself, on the north coast. This was in Antioch which became the principality of Antioch, also in 1098. The third and most important Latin establishment was founded after the capture of Jerusalem in the same year. The Latin Kingdom was instituted with Jerusalem as its capital. Godfrey was chosen as king with the title "Baron and Defender of the Holy Sepulcher."

The Latin Kingdom, with Jerusalem as its capital, extended, during the reign of its energetic leader, Baldwin (1100-1118), from

al-Aqabah at the head of the Red Sea to Beirut. Baldwin's cousin and successor, Baldwin II (1118-1138) added a few towns, chiefly on the Mediterranean. In breadth, the kingdom did not reach beyond the Jordan. The fourth Latin colony was founded after the capture of Tripoli in 1109 and became the principality of Tripoli. The principality of al-Ruha and the principality of Antioch were held as fiefs of Jerusalem. The county of Tripoli was directly under the kingdom. Al-Ruha and Jerusalem were Burgandian princedoms; Antioch was Norman, and Tripoli was provincial. These four establishments were the only Latin states ever established on Moslem soil.

The first serious Moslem reaction to the Crusaders and their establishments came under the Zingid dynasty (1127-1174) which had succeeded in extending its power from al-Mawsil in north Mesopotamia to north and central Syria and finally into Egypt. The main accomplishment of the Zingids' campaigns against the Crusaders was the conquest of the principality of al-Ruha in 1115. The culmination of the Moslem reaction, in the 12th century, to the crusading establishments came under Salah-al-Din al Ayyubi, founder of the Ayyubid Dynasty after the death of Nur al-Din Zingi in 1174. With North Mesopotamia, the interior of Syria and Egypt under his power, Salah al-Din launched a series of successful campaigns against the Latin establishments on the Syrian coast. His decisive battle against the Crusaders, which led to the

capitulation of Jerusalem (October 2, 1187), was the Battle of Hittin, July 3-4, 1187. The capture of the capital of the Latin Kingdom gave Salah al-Din most of the towns of Frankish Syria-Palestine. The Islamic victories in the Holy Land aroused Europe and led to the formation of a new crusade.

The third crusade (1189-1192) was the largest and succeeded in capturing Akka but failed to recapture Jerusalem. Peace was concluded on November 2, 1192. After Salah al-Din's campaigns, only Antioch, Tripoli, Tyre and Akka, besides smaller towns and castles, remained in Latin possession.

In the course of the first power struggle within the Ayyubid dynasty, following Salah al-Din's death (1193), the spirit of the Holy War (al-Jehadd) in the Islamic camp declined. One after another of Salah al-Din's conquests, Beirut, Safad, Tiberias Ascalon and even Jerusalem (1229), reverted to Frankish hands.[1] Many of the Frankish gains came as a result of the crusade led by Frederick II, an excommunicated crusader, whose success in entering Jerusalem brought the Holy City itself under the Papal interdict. The crusade of Frederick

---

[1]Hitti, op. cit., pp. 637-653.

was conducted by diplomatic, rather than military, means with al-Malik al-Kamil, the Ayyubid sultan (1229).[1]

But, the Latins in Syria were in no position to take full advantage of the situation. They were themselves in as bad a plight, if not worse. There were quarrels between Genoese and Venetians, jealousies between Templars and Hospitallers, personal squabbles among leaders and contests for the title of King of Jerusalem; in their disputes one side would often secure aid from Moslems against the other.[2]

The Ayyubids, for their part, aligned with the Latins against fellow Ayyubids. In their power struggle with the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, Najm al-Din Ayyub, the Ayyubid Princes of Syria aligned with the Franks. The allied forces of the Ayyubids and the Franks attacked Egypt twice. In return for their help to the Ayyubid of Syria, the Franks took several towns.[3]

Najm al-Din Ayyub used the Khorezmies, as mentioned previously, against both the Franks and his rival Ayyubids. With Khorezmi support, the Egyptian army won a great victory over the Latins near Gaza in October 1244; they occupied and fortified Jerusalem, and in 1247,

---

[1]Bernard Lewis, "Egypt and Syria," Chapter 2, Part II, in Holt, Lambton, and Lewis (eds.), The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1, Cambridge U. Press, 1970, p. 208.

[2]Hitti, op. cit., p. 653.

[3]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 303.

captured Ascalon. The Ayyubid sovereign of Egypt was on the way to establishing his rule in much of Palestine and his supremacy over his Ayyubid rivals in Syria and the surviving remnant of the Latin kingdom was in grave danger.

In response to this danger, a new sixth crusade (1248-1254) was launched, led by the sainted king of France, Louis IX. The objective was Egypt.[1] The combined forces of Louis IX and of the Latins occupied Damietta. After the failure of the crusade in Egypt, Louis IX spent four years (1250-1254) in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but his efforts did little to strengthen the Latin principalities or to end its petty struggles.[2]

On the eve of the Mongol invasion of Syria, hope was raised on the part of the Christians for a coordinated attitude between the Mongol empire and Christiandom against the Moslems. Practical steps toward such an alliance with the Mongols was taken by the Christians of Minor Armenia to the north. Hethom the Armenian king established a diplomatic relations with the Mongols since 1243, and by 1248 he accepted for himself the status of a Mongol vassal.

---

[1]Lewis, op. cit., p. 208.

[2]Robert S. Hoyt, and Stanley Chodorow, Europe in the Middle Ages, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York: 1976, p. 563.

St. Louis, during his residence (1250-1254) in the Holy Land, attempted to establish an alliance with the Mongols. This attempt was fruitless as the Supreme Khan could not admit the existence of any Sovereign prince in the world other than himself. The ambassador who carried the diplomatic mission of the French King to Karakorum (1253-1254) returned back to his Lord with nothing except "a sincere promise that the Christians should receive ample aid so long as their rulers came to pay homage to the Suzerain of the world. The King of France could not treat on such terms.[1]

Although there is no evidence that the crusading colonies had established any sort of alliance with the Mongols prior to the actual Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent there could be no doubt that the Franks of the Syrian Coast would welcome the Mongol invasion as long as it would result in the destruction of their old enemies, the Moslems. The Franks needed to actually experience the "neighborliness" of the Mongols before they would change their minds!

---

[1] Runciman, op. cit., pp. 296-297.

Chapter IV

THE MONGOL INVASION OF THE FERTILE CRESCENT 1258-1260

The Mongol invasion of the Fertile Crescent between 1257 and 1260 was to be accomplished by a second wave of the Mongol hordes directed toward Western Asia approximately a decade after the end of the first invasion. The first wave was initiated and led in part by Chingiz Khan (1167-1227), who founded the Mongol Empire in the first half of the Thirteen Century. The second wave was led by Hulagu (or Khulagu), a grandson of Chingiz Khan and a brother of Mongke--the ruling Great Khan since 1251.[1]

The term 'second wave of the Mongol hordes,'[2] is helpful in distinguishing between two Mongol military and political accomplishments on different geographical stages in Islamic lands. The stage on which the first wave occurred, beginning in 1218,[3] was Transoxiana, Northwest and East Persia under the rule of the Khorezmis, and Eastern

---

[1] Lewis, op. cit., p. 163

[2] Hitti, op. cit., p. 486.

[3] Brockleman, Carl, op. cit., p. 264.

Asia Minor under the rule of the Seljuks of Rum. The main political accomplishments of the first wave included the destruction of the Khorezmi Empire in 1231 and the reduction of the Seljuk state to a Mongol protectorate in 1243.[1]

The fall of the Khorezmi Empire affected the later development of events in the Islamic lands to the west, as this empire had blocked the Mongol Empire from the states of the Fertile Crescent. Its destruction led to direct contact between the expansionist Mongols and these smaller states. Al-Ashraf Mousa, an Ayyubid ruler in Syria foresaw the consequences of such direct contact, regretting the Khorezmis downfall in spite of previous antagonisms with it. He said to men who came to congratulate him in regard to the death of Jalal al-Din, the Khorezmi emperor, by the Mongols: "Are you joyful? You will see that this defeat will result in the entry of the Mongols to the countries of Islam."[2]

Southern Persia, the Ismaeli (Assassin) possessions in the North, and the Fertile Crescent, except for limited raids, were spared from attack during the first Mongol wave, and the political situations in these regions were not overtly affected. After 1243, a relatively quiet

---

[1] Lewis, op cit., p. 163.

[2] Al-Sayad Fou'ad, D., Mongols in History (In Arabic), Beirut, 1970, p. 178.

period, which was to last until 1253, began in Mongol military activity as a result of political rivalry for the post of Great Khan. This troubled political period among the Mongol elite and its reflection in Mongol military activity provided a period of grace for the state of Southwest Asia.[1]

The selection in 1251 of Mongke, a grandson of Chingiz Khan, stablized the situation in the Mongol government and attention was once again turned toward further conquest. Mongke considered his first political duty the execution of the will of Changis Khan which called for world domination, a task which Ogedei (1224-41), Chingis' immediate predecessor, had only been able to begin. Mongke, therefore, began preparing expeditions into China and Western Asia. These two expeditions were decided upon at the Great Kurultai in 1521. Hulagu was to lead the expedition to the Near East, and Khubilia, another brother of the Great Khan, was to command the expedition against China.[2]

A large number of select troops were placed under Hulagu's command, as all Mongol army commanders were required to assign a

---

[1]Brockelman, op. cit., p. 299.

[2]Spuler, Bertold, The Muslim World, Part II, The Mongol Period, E. J. Brill, Leider, Netherlands, 1960, p. 18.

proportion of their effective forces to him.[1] In this way, the army, mobilized for the purpose of subjugating Western Asia, reached a strength astonishing for that period. The Russian orientalist, Wilhelm Barthold, computed ti as about 129,000 men![2] A thousand 'teams' of Chinese engineers were recruited to work the siege engines and the naphtha flame-throwers; agents were dispatched along the intended route of the expedition to requisition meadows and grazing-lands, to collect adequate stores of flour and wine, to round up herds of mares for the provision of sufficient Kumis, to clear stones and thickets from the roads, to build or prepare bridges and to hold boats in readiness on the rivers.[3]

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, Faddl Allah, al-Tabib, Jami al-Tawarikh (the collective book of Annals), Vol. II, Part I, History of Hulagu, (The Arabic Translation), translated by Muh_ma Na_h'at, ..uhamau Musa, and Fou'ad al-Sayad, Cairo, 1960, p. 235.

[2]Spuler, op. cit., p. 18.

[3]Saunders, J. J. The History of the Mongol Conquests, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, p. 109, also Rashid al-Din, p. 235.

The Destruction of the Ismaelis: The Persian Entrance to the Fertile Crescent (1255-1257)

On the 24th of Shaban 651 (19th of October, 1253) according to the Persian historian Juvaini, Hulagu embarked from his camp, perhaps around Karakorum, at the head of his army,[1] thus starting the second wave of the Mongol hordes which were directed toward West Asia and North Africa. This wave was aimed at consolidating Mongol authority in Persia and at the subjugation of the lands westward as far as Egypt. Rashid al-Din writes of Hulagu's receiving certain principle directions from his brother, the Great Khan, before his departure. He instructed Hulagu to adopt and exercise the code of Chingiz Khan regarding the small and big matter, to deal kindly with those who obeyed him and to humiliate those who disobeyed. He was instructed to subjugate the Ismaelis (Assassins), if the Caliph of Baghdad submitted he was not to be touched, but if the Caliph was disinclined to cooperate, Hulagu was instructed to exterminate him.[2]

The aims of Hulagu's campaign can be understood in light of the aim of global domination which the Mongol elite theoretically set

---

[1]Juvaini, Ala-ad-Din, Ata-Malik, The History of the World-Conqueror, Vol. II, T by John A. Boyle, London Manchester, U. Press, 1958, p. 611.

[2]Rashid, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

as a mission for themselves after the unification of the Mongol tribes by Chingis Khan in 1206. The slogan of their mission was "one lord in heaven, one lord on earth."[1] This is analogous to the unification of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Arab tribes by the prophet Mohammad, six centuries before under a global mission with the slogan, "no God but God and Mohammed is his messenger," though the Mongol slogan more explicity relates politics to religion.

Motivations underlying the Mongol drive toward these regions, such as Hulagu's personal ambition to build up his own empire[2] and the necessity to put down Assassin resistance to Mongol domination in Persia can reasonably be understood in the context of the total Mongol expansionist tendency which is still in full momentum.

In 1252, an advanced guard of 12,000 men was sent to Persia under the command of a general named Kitubuqa.[3] This general, who was to initiate the first move in this Mongol wave against the Near East, was also the commander of the Mongol army in the battle which marked the end of the Mongol tide in the thirteenth century in Western Asia. The task of the guard was to launch an early attack on the Assassins' possessions in Persia and perhaps to prepare better military conditions for

---

[1]Spuler, op. cit., p. 5.

[2]Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 250.

[3]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 235-236.

the main army led by Hulagu upon its arrival. Hulagu's Army advanced slowly from Mongolia through routes that were already cleared and prepared for one of the most significant marches in the history of Medieval Asia. Hulagu and his Mongol elite enjoyed good encampments, the local festivities of the Mongol vassals in Central Asia and Transaxonia, as well as their own favorite hobby of hunting along the way.[1]

When the army arrived at Samarkand, Hulagu was visited and paid homage by the lesser kings of Persia, two sultans of Asia Minor, and the ruler of Georgia. Here, Hulagu issued an order to the various princes of Western Asia to march with him and aid him against the Assassins or to suffer the consequences.[2] The Mongol army safely crossed the Oxus River on the 2nd of January, 1256. When the army arrived at Tus of Khurasan, which was the headquarters of the civil governor of the Western Mongol possessions, Hulagu was joined by Kitubuga. From this point, the Mongol forces advanced toward Kuhistan, the location of numerous strongholds of the Ismaelis.

The fortresses of the Ismaelis numbered about one hundred[3]--the most famous being Almaut, Maimundiz, Lembeser and Gird Kuh. It was probably due to the invincibility of these fortresses that the Ismaelis

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 240.

[3]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 255.

were able to resist domination by two empires that ruled Persia, the Seljuk and the Khorezmi and 20 years of Mongol attempts to subjugate them.[1] Hulagu, in order to achieve what others had failed, maintained a long and persistent siege and employed deceptive diplomacy with the grand commander of the Ismaelis, Rokn al-Din Khurshah. Disloyal elements within the Ismaeli camp played a role in the Mongols' favor. Other disloyal elements played the same important part in the course of the Mongol conquest of the Fertile Crescent, as will be discussed below. Nasr al-din al Tussy, a scholar and famous astronomer, along with two physicians who were forced by Khurshah to reside in the fortress of Maimundiz, advised Khurshah to surrender.[2] Under pressure and with this advice, the grand commander of the Assassins finally came out of his fortress and submitted to Hulagu. The latter granted Khurshah's life and treated him kindly in order to use the grand commander's authority in bringing the resistance of the other fortresses to an end, also to use Khurshah's authority to get the Ismaelis of Syria into submission to the Mongol authority. Several fortresses ended their resistance but, according to Tabaqat Nassiry--a Persian source, some fortresses held

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, Ibid., p. 255.

[2] Ibid., pp. 249-250.

[3] Ibid., p. 258.

out until 1270.[1] The day of surrender of the grand commander was the 19th of November, 1956.[2]

The astronomer--scholar, Nasir al-din al Tussy marked the occasion with a poem:

> When the Hejri year was six-hundred
> and fifty-four,
> And on the Sunday morning of the
> first day of the month of al-quida,
> Khurshah, the King of the Assassins
> left his throne
> And stood before Hulagu.[3]

The occasion was worth marking as it represented the end of the Ismaelis as a political and military power in Persia. However, in Syria the Ismaelis were replaced as a political entity, not by the Mongols but by the Mamluks. This occurred following the Mamluks' victory over the Mongols at Ayn Jallot and the resultant extension of their power to Syria. Paradoxically, the Muslim Suni community of North Persia, which suffered for a long period from the Ismaelis, was relieved from fellow Muslims by a power unfriendly to the Muslim world in general.

In reference to Khurshah, who was kept alive by the Mongols for a period after his surrender, Rashid al-Din says that Hulagu intended

---

[1]Howorth, op. cit., p. 106.

[2]Ibid., p. 106.

[3]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 255.

[4]Lewis, op. cit., 1, p. 163.

to use Khurshah's authority to obtain the surrender of other hold-out Ismaeli fortresses and the submission of the Ismaelis of Syria, who however were of less military and political significance than their cohorts in Persia. Rashid al-Din tells of Khurshah's dispatching two or three confidential men in company of the Mongols to order the governors of the Ismaeli fortresses in Syria to surrender. This was done before the Mongols set foot in the Fertile Crescent.[1]

But, as Khurshah, at his own request, was sent to meet the Great Khan in Karakurum, he was murdered by order of the Great Khan, probably due to his intolerance of the longstanding resistance of the Ismaelis and his apparent unwillingness to forgive such an enemy. Following the death of Khurshah, two of his sons along with his daughters, brothers, and sisters, were put to death. The Mongol Governor of the Persian province of Khorasan assembled the Ismaelis of Khuistan under the pretense of taking a census for a military levy and put them to death, to the number of 12,000. Remnants of the Persian Ismaelis were similarly slaughtered elsewhere although some found refuge in Egypt.[2] Up to today, the Ismalis survice as a small sect of Islam, mainly in India.

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 257.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., p. 108.

The Destruction of the Abbassid Caliphate (1258)

Having overwhelmed the Ismaelis in Persia, Hulagu set out to Hammadan in March of 1257[1] in preparation for the next stage of the Mongol forces' westward march. Their next target for subjugation was Arab Iraq. In Baghdad, the Abbassid Caliphate had survived five centuries and remained as a theoretical religious authority in the eastern parts of the Islamic world from the sultanate of Delhi to the sultanate of Egypt, although its actual secular authority was limited to Southern Mesopotamia or what is defined as Arab Iraq.

The condition of the Caliphate in Baghdad prior to the Mongol campaign requires a brief examination. The glory that was Baghdad and the imperial power that characterized the Caliphate in the Ninth Century was by 1257 mere history. Internal and external factors had worked jointly through the centuries toward the decay of the Caliphate. What remained was prestigious names and limited local power in the southern half of Mesopotamia; the Caliphate was suffering divisions both at the top and at the base of its State.

At the top of the Abbassid Caliphate was a weak, indecisive caliph who was incapable of making the proper decision at the proper

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 260.

time and for whom saving money was more important than saving the state or even the dynasty. Occupying himself with his aristocratic hobbies and personal enjoyment, he could not precisely estimate the seriousness of events or urgency of serious action.

It is frequently the case that there are such weak leaders at the moment of fall of a state or empire. But, it is not possible to blame only the caliph for the course of events which resulted from his policy, since the Abassid administration as a whole had become a coalition of antagonistic elements.

The vizier, Ibn-al-Alqami, a zealous Shi'i Moslem and the commander-in-chief of the army, Suleman Shah, and the chancellor (the Deviator) Rukn al-Din, both Sunni Moslems, constituted the major elements of the administration. Rivalry between these two sides over power and state policies halted a united administration decision concerning the Mongol threat. When the weak Caliph finally took a decisive attitude, it was too late to accomplish anything and the measures themselves were ineffective. After the Mongol demand for submission from the Caliph to the Mongol overlords, the Caliph hesitated between taking the advise of the vizier--who suggested submission to Hulagu and consequently acceptance of the vassal status and the advice of the commander and the chancellor--who recommended fighting the Mongols. Without apparently accepting either policy, he reduced the military forces

and engaged in a policy of accommodation to the Mongols before they were ready to march on Baghdad. When the Caliph finally decided to take the advice of his commander and chancellor, only five months were left for military preparation and mobilization. On top of this, the Caliph was unwilling to use his personal wealth to cover the expenses entailed in this move.[1]

The division at the top was probably a reflection or continuation of the underlying division among the people of the state, who were divided not only ethnically between Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds, but also religiously into the Sunni who ruled the oppressed Shi'ite, Christian, and Jewish minorities. The antagonism between the Shi'ite and Sunni was the most fatal internal weakness at the base of the Abbassid State. The contemporary generation which would witness and experience the fall of the Caliphate had already witnessed and experienced the bloody dissensions between the Sunnis of Baghdad and the Shi'is of nearby al-Karkh (1256). The military of the state led by the Caliph's son, took the side of the Sunni. The military proceeded to oppress the Shi'ites by such shameful acts as dragging their women out of their harems and carrying them on their horses with bare faces and bare feet in the public streets.[2] A minority, attacked and robbed by the same state

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 272-274.

[2]Abu-al-Fida, op. cit., p. 193; also, Howorth, op. cit., p. 114.

authority which was supposed to be protecting their rights as citizens of the state, logically would not care to defend that state.

The vizier who belonged to the Shi'i sect was as outraged as other members of the sect. Some Arab historians maintain that from that time the vizier directed his policy to one end: Mongol take-over of the Abbassid state. Perhaps also, as a Shi'i Moslem, he hoped to replace the Sunni Caliphate with a Shi'i one. Several Arab historians and one Persian historian charged Vizier Ibn-al-Alqami with having secret negotions with Hulagu and working against the Caliphate interests.[1] I share the attitude held by the 19th century historian, Henry Howorth, that this charge has some truth.[2] The vizier, as a Shi'i, theologically would have viewed the Abbassid Caliphate as illegal and his position was supported by his religious cohorts who had always dreamed of and worked for a shi'i Caliphate. Also, due to the bitter experiences of his own Shi'i community in Iraq under the reign of this Sunni Caliph, there would seem to be some doubt as to the vizier's complete loyalty to such a regime. From the Caliph's side, it seems illogical that he kept the service of such a vizier with disputable loyalty during a time of war or prospective war, but probably

---

[1] Abu-al-Fida, op. cit., p. 193.

[2] Howorth, op. cit., p. 114.

due to the long-term service of the vizier, the caliph did not question his loyalty to him.

Besides these divisions within the administration and among the people of the Abbassid State, the poor agricultural economy of the Abbassid State was drained and this was an underlying weakening factor of the Abbassid regime. The prolonged imposition of excessive taxes and the government of the provinces for the benefit of the ruling class discouraged farming. As the rulers grew rich, the people grew proportionally poorer. The depletion of manpower by recurring bloody strife left many a cultivated farm desolate.[1] In addition to these old, economic debilities which were contributing to the decay of the country's economy, a natural disaster occurred two years before the Mongol invasion causing further decline in the economy. In the autumn of 1256 a terrible downfall of rain, lasting 50 days, flooded the capital and left one half of Iraq's farming lands untilled.[2]

The military front which reflected the political and economic situation of the Abbassid state, was naturally ineffective. During the reign of the energetic Calip al-Nasir (1180-1225), we told the military of the Caliphate constituted 100,000 men; but during the reign of his grandson, al-Moustasm (1242-58) these forces were reduced sharply

---

[1]Hitti, op. cit., p. 486.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 262.

to less than 20,000 men.[1] I came to the conclusion that Abu-al-Fida and others who compare the Abbassid military during the reign of al-Nassir and the military during the reign of al-Mosta'sim neglect the situation of the military during the reigns of two Caliphs prior to al-Mosta'sim, al-Zahir (1225-1226), and al-Mustansir (1226-1242). Unsatisfactory and irregular salaries compelled many military men to seek work in other states. The historian, Ibn Kathir cited that those who were deprived of their fiefs (iqta) were compelled to beg in the market and by the gates. Ibn Kathir, who is likely guilty to exaggeration, cited that the military forces of the Abbassid Caliphate comprised only 10,000 men.[2]

It has been cited by several Arab historians, namely Abu-al-Fida and Ibn-Kathir, that such a reduction in forces was due to the advice and persuasion of the vizier, as part of his destructive policy within the Caliphate. The vizier's arguments were that a large military force such as existed before would continually drain the Caliph's resources; also, with money thus saved, the Caliph might buy off the invaders. The Caliph, who would make the final decision, accepted such an argument and endorsed the policy despite the growth of the Mongol threat.

---

[1]Abu-al-Fida, op. cit., Part 3, p. 194.

[2]Bernard Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, Part 1, Politics and War, p. 82.

In sum, the political front of the Abbassid Caliphate was characterized by a division within the high ranks of the administration and by the liklihood of disloyal elements especially in the person of the vizier, Ibn al-Alqami, and culminated in an indecisive, weak head of state. The economic situation was characterized by resources drained through prolonged, oppressive feudalistic methods and by the recent onslaught of a natural disaster. The military was reduced to or kept at a level which made it unable to contend with the Mongol military superiority. The total picture of the Abbassid Caliphate was one of a declining regional power that could not resist the pressure of the Mongols. As Hitti states, the Caliphate was a sick, old man lying on his death bed,[1] and the Mongol's took the task of taking him to his grave.

Returning to the course of the Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia, Hulagu's determination to subjugate the Caliphate was not a goal that was established after the subjugation of Persia; rather it was a step that was planned in Mongolia before the Mongolian second wave began.[2] Previously, several attempts had been made by the Mongols in Persia to invade the Caliphate during the reign of the former Caliph al-Mustansir, but these attempts were repelled by the Abbassid forces.[3] If the

---

[1]Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 484.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., Part 1, p. 237.

[3]Ibn al-Fuwati, al-Hawadeth al-Jamia-Wal-Akbar al-Nafiaa Fi al-Miaa-al-Sabbiaa, pp. 27-31, and pp. 98-99 and 109-114.

target of Hulagu's campaign was from the very beginning the subjugation of the land extending from Persia to Egypt, then unquestionably the subjugation of Mesopotamia was a link in the chain of Mongol conquest. Mongol domination in Mesopotamia was necessary as it was a geographical access to Syria and Egypt.

What is worth asking is did Hulagu think of allowing the Caliphate to exist as the religious-political umbrella of the Islamic world while taking over the actual secular authority and power of the Caliphate's realm? Previous Moslem powers rising out of Persia and Central Asia such as the Buwayhid and the Seljuk, who were also ambitious enough to subjugate Mesopotamia, had reached a historical compromise by allowing the Caliphate to exist while they held the real power. This compromise which I describe as historical for its significance in reference to Islamic history, consisted of a division in authority. The Caliph remained primarily the spiritual leader of Islamdom with greatly reduced secular power while the head of the rising power held the actual secular power and acquired the title of "Amir al-Umara" (commander of commanders) in the case of the Buwayhid[1] and "Sultan" (The Man of Power) in the case of Seljuk.[2] These leaders obtained and maintained theoretical legitimacy from the Caliphate but the actual obtaining and maintaining

---

[1]Hitti, op. cit., p. 470.

[2]Ibid, p. 474.

of power had nothing to do with the Caliphate. With the Mongols who were non-Moslem, the historian should realize that such a compromise was not easy to conclude by Hulagu nor by the Abbassid Caliph.

On the one hand, Hulagu was non-Moslem and the source of legitimacy for his power was the Great Khan in Karakorum, along with the royal Mongol tradition, and probably included the law code of "Yasa" that was instituted by Chinziz Khan. The Caliph, on the other hand, was a Moslem who would not yield his secular power into the hands of a non-Moslem whose expansion of power would be at the expense of Moslem states in Western Asia. It was a historical problem. It seems likely that the Caliph and his administrators, even though aware of their military ineffectiveness against the Mongols' military might, would have preferred to yield the secular power if the Mongols were Moslems or if the conqueror was Berke Khan, the ruler of the Golden Horde who had been converted to Islam prior to the collaspe of the Caliphate in 1258. However it was very doubtful that Hulagu would accept the status of "Sultan" under the spiritual umbrella of the Caliphate. The compromise that Hulagu was willing to offer and did offer to the Caliph, as per the directions given by the Great Khan to Hulagu and letters from Hulagu to the Caliph, was composed of two elements: first was unquestionable and immediate submission of the Caliph to the Mongol power, the second was a consequence of the first--the reduction of the Caliph to vassal

level, probably undistinquishable from the Moslem vassals of Central Asia, Transoxania, Persia and Asia Minor.

Prior to the compromise he offered, Hulagu examined the Caliph's stance regarding the Mongols. This test came in the form of a demand by Hulagu to the Caliph to supply the Mongols with military assistance against the Assassins, at the time that the Mongols were aiming at their subjugation. The primary and secondary sources on hand which cited this early demand did not give a specific date for it; one may reasonably assume this command was issued by Hulagu at the same time as other demands were sent out to several princes of West Asia while he was encamped in Samarkand in 1255.[1] The Caliph responded by displaying loyalty short of sending military assistance.[2]

From Hamdan, probably after March, 1257, Hulagu began his correspondence with the Caliph.[3] In the first letter, Hulagu began by denouncing the Caliph for not having assisted the Mongol campaign against the Ismaeli strongholds. And, although he had shown theoretical loyalty, the real sign of loyalty from the Caliph would have been sending the military assistance requested. Hulagu mentioned the might of Mongol

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 240.

[2] Ibid., p. 267.

[3] This correspondence is recorded by the Persian Historian Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 267-282; in spite of Rashid al-Din's claim that he depended on official documents, I have some doubt about the complete authenticity of these letters.

power and said that the long established nobility and power of the royal Abbassid family should not mislead them to underestimate the rising and dominating power of the Mongols. He reminded the Caliph that Baghdad had opened its gates to previous powers and angrily inquired why this was not the case for the Mongols with all their capacity and power. He warned the Caliph against choosing the path of antagonism and confrontation. He expressed willingness to pass over the unsatisfactory past if the Caliph took two steps: 1) dismantle the fortifications of Baghdad and 2) come to meet Hulagu in person, leaving his son in charge of the state, or to send the three primary officials of the state--the visier, the commander-in-chief, and the chancelor. If the Caliph would meet these two conditions, he would be granted the right to maintain his state, army and people; otherwise he should prepare himself for war!

In this letter, Hulagu gave his ultimatum to the Caliph, leaving room for compromise on Mongol terms, and reasoned that the Mongols with their power deserved similar terms given to previous powers. In the letter, Hulagu displayed that he was well informed about the political centers of power in Baghdad by demanding the alternative of dispatching the three essential actors on the political stage in the Caliphate. Several Arab historians[1] pointed out that vizier Ibn-Alqami worked at

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 193; al-Magrezi, op. cit., p. 400; and Ibn Tagri Bardi, op. cit., p. 48.

both ends as an agent for the Mongols. For the Mongols, he persuaded their invasion of Baghdad and provided them with intelligence information. For the Caliph, he encouraged a policy which weakened the military and withheld necessary information which would have allowed the Caliph to make the proper decision. Al-Magrezi says that in the year 654 A.H./1256 A.D., the spies of Hulagu arrived in Baghdad and contacted the vizier and a group of officials. The Caliph, meanwhile, was involved in his enjoyments unaware of what was going on around him.[1] Howorth, without citing his source, notes that after the capture of the Alamut fortress in 1256 (654 A.H.), Hulagu received writings from the vizier which pointed to the weakness of Baghdad and invited him to march thither.[2]

The Caliph received the envoys carrying Hulagu's mission courteously and sent back his answer with his own envoys. In his responding letter, the Caliph made four points in his overconfident refusal of the Mongol demands: 1) his military capacity to confront the Mongols if confrontation was chosen, asserting that he could mobilize the Islamic world for the purpose; 2) the threat of a march to Persia and further to Turan (Central Asia) where he would put everyone in his right place; 3) his friendship with the Great Khan and Hulagu; and 4) that Hulagu

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 400.

[2] Howorth, op. cit., p. 115.

should return to Khurasan in order to establish peaceful terms with the Caliph.[1] This message disclosed either the Caliph's ignorance of the power balance between his army and that of the Mongols or, knowing this balance, he chose to turn down Hulagu's demand by relying on his theoretical power in the Islam community to mobilize forces.

All of these claims and threats were made in a form of psychological war which did not seem to affect Hulagu. Some questions arise here: Was the Caliph sincere in his claim of mobilizing Islamdon to this end? If so, he was overconfident and ignorant of the political situation existing at that time in the two major areas which could potentially offer such assistance--Syria and Egypt. Syria was at that time divided between various Ayyubid princes with antagonism between the two principle rulers, the prince of al-Kark and the Prince of Aleppo and Damascus. Moreover, both princes were antagonistic toward the newly established Mamluk regime in Egypt. Egypt, on the other hand, was ruled in 1257 by a young sultan surrounded by ambitious generals who quarreled among themselves while waiting and watching for an opportunity to seize the sultanate. The Mamluk ruling class, had set its priority on preserving its sovereignty in Egypt against the claim of the legitimist Ayybid of Syria. The political situations in Syria and Egypt, therefore, did not justify the claim of the Caliph to ability

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

to mobilize Islamdom against the Mongols. The Caliph, by making such claims, was either ignorant, or was using the bluff of a weapon which, in reality, he did not possess.

The envoys of Hulagu, as they left Baghdad bearing gifts from the Caliph, were mistreated by a large mass of people who hurled insults at them, spat in their faces and tore their clothes. My hypothesis is that such mistreatment was perhaps instigated by hardline administrators in the Caliphate. Further assaults were prevented by the vizier's sending his men to save the envoys from the masses.

Upon receiving the Caliph's sharp answer and the report of the humiliating treatment of his men, Hulagu grew angry. He described the Caliph as "crooked as a bow" and he promised to make the Caliph "as straight as an arrow." It was an excellent analogy from a Mongol so familiar with bows and arrows. Hulagu sent another letter to the Caliph which served as a declaration of war. Hulagu no longer disguished his determination to invade Baghdad. In this letter, he said:

> God who raised Chingis Khan has offered to us the whole earth from east to west. Those who submit to us will save their properties, women and children and those who would think of confrontation will not maintain anything of those.

He warned the Caliph plainly to prepare himself for war as he would march on Baghdad with forces as numerous as ants and locusts!

Upon receiving this letter, the neglectful Caliph turned to his administrators for serious consultation. Before this, the Caliph had

been so self-assured that the Mongols would never march on Baghdad, he would say "Baghdad is enough for me and they will not begrudge it to me if I renounce all the other countries to them. Nor will they attack me when I am in it, for it is my house and my residence."[1]

The vizier advised the Caliph that in order to avoid confrontation he should offer excellent gifts and an apology, but more importantly, he should order the recitation of Hulagu's name in the Khuttba (the Friday prayer) and the imprinting of Hulagu's name on coins of the Caliphate. Because these were symbols of secular power, the suggestion of reciting Hulagu's name in the Khuttba and the imprinting of it on the coins meant, in the language of the period, that the Caliph should submit secular authority to Hulagu. This advice first met with the acceptance of the Caliph, but as he turned to his chancellor and his commander-in-chief, he changed his mind. The chancellor accused the vizier of taking such a position for personal interest, implying the vizier's alliance with the Mongols. He challenged the Caliph by threatening to seize any gifts that would be sent to Hulagu. The Caliph told the vizier that his fears were unfounded, that the Mongols were merely bluffing. The general-in-chief persuaded the Caliph to strengthen the military of the state, warning that:

---

[1]Abu'l Faraj, Ibn al-Ibri Ta'rikh Mukhtasar al-Duwal, Beirut, 1958, pp. 254-255.

> If measures are not taken immediately the Mongols will overwhelm Baghdad and the Mongols then, will not have mercy on any being, as they did not in any other countries. They will not save any one of the urban populace or the nomads, neither high nor low.

He further asserted that "if fortune should fail us, we can at least die in the battle of honor." The Caliph leaned finally to the views asserted by his chancellor and general. He then ordered the vizier to mobilize the forces,which he did.

Along with taking these measures, the Caliph continued diplomatic contacts with Hulagu, warning him against attacking Baghdad; otherwise, he would meet the unfortunate fate suffered by previous invaders. The Caliph gave several examples from the history of the Caliphate. One example was of Besariri, who had marched from Egypt with a large army. Although he succeeded in capturing the Caliphate, he was finally captured by the faithful Toghril-beg, the Seljuk, and put to death. Another example was the Khorezmi Shah, Muhammed who had been determined to uproot the family, yet had been overwhelmed by a storm in which he lost most of his troops and was consequently forced to retreat. According to Rashid al-Din, Hulagu's answer was, a Persian poem that well expressed his fearlessness and fury.

> Build about yourself a town and a rampart of iron;
> Erect a bastion and a curtain-wall of steel;
> Assemble an army of Peris and of Jins:
> Then march against me, inspired by vengeance,

If you were in heaven I would bring you down,
And inspite of yourself I will reach you in the lion's den.[1]

Hulagu, determined more than ever to march on Baghdad, took account of prospective strong military resistance of the Caliphate army and fortifications. He then, as was the custom, called for divinations from the Moslem astrologer given to him by his brother, the Great Kahn, concerning days appropriate for actions of all sorts. The astrologer, who was perhaps a Sunni religious adherent of the Caliph, predicted six great calamities would befall the Mongols should they confront the Abbassid family. Nassir al-Din al-Tussy, the astrologer of Almut and a Shi'i Moslem, assured Hulagu that none of these calamities would occur; instead Hulagu would replace the Caliph. The order was given for the Mongols to converge on Baghdad. Those forces in Asia Minor (Rum) and the west were to march through Mosul in North Mesopotamia, halt somewhere west of Baghdad and camp there to form the right wing of Hulagu's army. The left wing would march through Luristan route and thus approach Baghdad from the southeast. Hulagu, himself, was to be at the head of the central force taking the famous route through Helwan which links Iran to Mesopotamia, to encamp east of the capital. The division of the Mongol forces in this way would assure a complete seige of the city and would make it difficult if not impossible for the small

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 276 (Translation by Quatremer, in Howorth, op. cit., p. 118).

army of the Caliphate to defend the city from forces marching from various directions.

Moving toward Baghdad in order to secure an essential route for the passage of their forces, the Mongols overwhelmed the fortress of Daritang. Its Lord, Ake' was leaning toward the Caliph and was willing to furnish him with 100,000 warriors--Turkmen and Kurds--if the Caliph would perhaps supply him with the necessary finances. This number could be exaggerated. The Mongol forces forming the right wing crossed the Tigris with assistance offered by Badr al-Din Lulu, the ruler of al-Mosul, early 1258. The people of Takrit offered a desperate resistance to the Mongol by burning bridges over the river and by thus killing some invaders.[1] The Mongol forces, now on the west bank of the Tigris, pushed on toward the towns of al-Kufah, al-Hillah and al-Karkh. The inhabitants of the district of the little Tigris (Dojeil) and al-Ishaki, and of the canals of Milik and Isa, fled to Baghdad.

Hulagu, with the main forces, advanced now to Asad Abad, sent a fresh demand to the Caliph to meet him in person. At Daynor, the envoy of the Caliph came to Hulagu asking that he halt further advance and offering to give whatever revenue Hulagu would demand. Hulagu's answer was that after traveling all this distance, he would not turn

---

[1]Minhaj-ud-Din, Abu-umar-I-usman Al-Juzjani, Tabakat-I-Nasiri, Vol. II. Tr. from the Persian Manuscripts by Major H. G. Raverty, Vol. II, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, 1970, p. 1237.

back until he met the Caliph! Hulagu's forces spent some time in fighting the Kurds in this mountainous region around Karamenshah. They captured two officers of the Caliph's advance guard who agreed to serve the Mongols as scouts. Through a Turkish officer in the Mongol army, efforts were made to win the loyalty of Khara-singer, a Turkish general in the Caliph's army. The latter refused the offer which granted his safety and that of his family. In his devotion to the Caliphate, he was later killed on the battlefield in December, 1257.

According to Rashid al-Din, Hulagu arrived at the bank of the Helwan River in the month of al-Hi ja 655. A.H., December 1257, and camped there for almost two weeks. The left wing of the army by this time had conquered much of Luristan. Only two serious clashes took place between the Mongols and the Caliph's army outside of Baghdad and apparently involved the right wing of the Mongols which had advanced toward the city before the central and left wings. The site of these battles is disuptable, but according to Rashid al-Din, they occurred at the boundaries of Al-Anbar, about nine parasangs (about 36 miles) from Baghdad. These two clashes occurred after the chancellor, who was a civilian leading the Caliphate's army, learned that the Mongols were approaching Baghdad from the west bank of the Tigris. The army, which was primarily infantry, was stationed between Yaquba and Besheriyeh on the east bank of the Tigris. Upon receipt of the news, they crossed

the river and the first clash between the two forces took place on 9th Muharrem 656, 16th January 1258, according to Rashid al-Din. The forces of the Caliph defeated a Mongol force, which I assume was only a garrison of troops, and killed many Mongols. The rest retreated either by real defeat or by a planned tactic to join their main army. The chancellor over-confidently reported his military triumph to the Caliph and promised, also overconfidently, to exterminate the enemy. The defeated Mongols returned to the Little Tigris, joined the main right wing troops, and turned about toward the Caliph's army. A second battle took place which was a decisive one. The Caliph's army was encamped on low ground and the Mongols we are told, during the night turned the water of a nearby canal to flood the area. The whole low ground was flooded with water and the arms and armor of the Moslem army were ruined. One Arab historian charges the vizier with sending a group of his men to do this deed for the Mongols.[1] This charge was improbable and it seems that the vizier, who possibly offered intelligence service to the Mongols, had to be responsible for all the faults and the weak points of the Caliphate! Ibn-al-Fuwati when he mentions the incident, does not refer the flooding of the canal to any human work, his explanation was that the canal was naturally flooded during

---

[1] Howorth, op. cit., p. 122.

the night.[1] The next morning, the Mongols returned to finish what the flood had started. The Caliph's army fought a hopeless battle, 12,000 of the Caliph's army were killed.[2] The chancellor reached Baghdad with few remaining. The loss of this battle, which Rashid al-Din dates as the 17th of January, 1258, did not leave any more chance for the Caliphate to engage in army-to-army confrontation. The Caliphate had lost the best of its forces to a contingent of the Mongol troops even before the whole of the Mongol forces had gathered to surround Baghdad. The walls of Baghdad were ordered to be repaired and barricades to be made.[3]

According to Rashid on the 11th of Muharrem 656, A.H. (January 18, 1258 A.D.), Hulagu and the troops of the center of the Mongol army stationed themselves to the east of Baghdad and the seige was complete from every side.[4] According to Ibn al-Fuwati Hulagu arrived on the 12th of Muharrem (January 17th).[5]

It would be useful here to examine both the composition, etnic and religious, and the numbers as related by historical sources of the

---

[1]Ibn-al-Fuwati, al-Hawadeth al-Jamiah-Wal-akbar al-Nafia Fi al-Mi'a-al-Sabbiah, p. 374.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p.

[3]Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 375.

[4]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 286.

[5]Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 325.

Mongol army which stood at the gates of Baghdad and which would change the course of events in the Near East for centuries to come. The army was not purely Mongol, but rather it consisted primarily of the people of the Steppe, in other words, of Mongols, Tatars, and Turks.[1] In addition to these troops, the army contained Georgian and Persian troops.[2] Religiously, the conquering army was composed of pagan Shamanists, Buddist, Christian, and Moslem elements. As the majority of the army were Mongols and Tatars, I assume they were primarily pagan.

Among the Mongol troops there was a portion which belonged to the Golden Horde under its newly converted Moslem leader, Berke Khan. Although Islam had been adopted by their leader, the troops probably had not adopted it. Bertold Spuler, without disclosing his source, says that Berke had disapproved of the campaign against the Caliph and attempted to mediate, but he could not prevent the contingent which he had sent from his army from participating along with those from the other armies in the capture and sack of Baghdad.[3] The Turkish elements of the army which had probably been joining Hulagu since the beginning of his march in Central Asia, were probably offered by rulers in Central

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 228; also Bertold Spuler, The Muslem World, Part II, p. 19.

[2]Ibid., pp. 282; Howorth, op. cit., p. 212.

[3]Bertold Spuler, The Muslem World, III, The Mongol Period, p. 22.

Asia or were free groups and individuals who sought to serve the victorious army lured by the promise of booty. The Persian historian, Rashid al-Din, mentions such a Moslem-Turkish element in Hulagu's army which was used or voluntarily tried to win the Turkish elements of the Caliph's army over to the Mongols on the grounds of common ethnicity.[1]

In regard to the numbers or the percentage of Turkish elements in the Mongol army, I found no way to estimate them. I found this to be the case also in regard to the Persian troops; Rashid al-Din citied that as Hulagu was heading toward Baghdad, he was joined by "all" the sultans and petty kings of the land of Iran.[2] Naturally, these sultans and petty kings were accompanied by their troops, but no numbers were given.

Rashid al-Din, the Persian historian, did not give the total number of the Mongol Army which conquered Baghdad, but Ibn Kathir, an Arabian historian, and a Persian source put the number at 200,000.[3] This number would not seem to be exaggerated if the moderate estimation of the original Mongol army leaving Mongolia was put at 129,000 men. The enlargement of Hulagu's army by the Mongol troops previously stationed in Asia Minor and Persia as well as by the troops which were

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 283.

[2]Ibid., p. 282.

[3]Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihaya, Part 13, Cairo (?), p. 200; also Al-Juzjan, op. cit., p. 1245.

offered by Mongol vassals in the near east would seem to make a figure that is close to that given by Ibn-Kathir and Minhaj-ud-Din.

On Tuesday, the 22nd Muharrem 656 A.H. (the 29th January, 1258 A.D.), the Mongols instituted their general assault on the city.[1] The bricks lying about outside the city were collected and piled into great mounds upon which were placed battering engines and machines for shooting burning naphta.[2] As the Mongol attack on the city intensified and with the bombardment having damaged a primary tower, Burj al-Ajami (the Persian Tower) on the eastern defenses, the Caliph now sent his vizier and the Nestorian patriarch with a message to Hulagu. The message contained:

> The king (Hulagu) had demanded the dispatching of the vizier and I met his demand. Thus, the king should keep his words.

Hulagu told them that the conditions which would have satisfied him at Hamadan were no longer enough and that he must insist on the surrender of the chancellor and Sulemanshah; the latter of whom, according to Howorth, had won more than one victory over the Mongols. The next day, the vizier with a deputation consisting of the principal inhabitants of the city were sent to Hulagu, but he refused to meet them.[3] The Baghdadian historian, Ibn-al-Fuwati, says that the vizier went out to

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 286.

[2] Ibid., p. 287.

[3] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 287.

Hulagu's camp on the 12th of January, and before that he advised the defenders of Baghdad not to fight and he stayed "in the service of Hulagu" for 13 days as he came back to Baghdad in the 25gh of January.[1]

The attack was closely pressed and the bombardment continued for six days. As there were no stones near Baghdad to ply the machines with, they were sent for from Jebel Hamrin and Jelula. Palm trees, also, were cut down for use as bombardment.[2] The Mongols also shot notices into the city, offering safety to the Kadis (docotors of the law) sheiks, and other noncombatants.

On Friday, the 25th of Muharrem 656 A.H. (the 1st of February 1258 A.D.), the first serious damage to the defenses of the city occurred in the collapse of the Persian Tower. This was at the eastern walls where Hulagu was stationed with the center of the Mongol army. In this spot, on Monday the 28th Muharrem (the 4th of February), Mongol soldiers climbed the walls and cleaned its roof of defenders. By the evening of the same day, the Mongols were in actual control of the whole eastern wall of Baghdad. Their offense on the other parts of the city had so far been less successful. Hulagu ordered two bridges to be built on the Tigris at the Northern and Southern parts of Baghdad

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 324.

[2] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 287; also Howorth, op. cit., p. 123.

and boats were ordered to be prepared for the final assault on the city.[1]

According to Howorth, it was the Georgian warriors who breached the walls and opened the gates through which the Mongols entered.[2] As the situation worsened and became hopeless for Baghdad, the Chancellor made an attempt to get through the river and to reach the town of Sib, but when he reached the village of Uqab, a shower of arrows, stones and stink pots drove him back to Baghdad after losing three of his boats.[3] Tabakat-I-Nasiri, a 13th century source which composed in India, tells that the Chancellor had persuaded the Caliph to embark on a boat with his treasure, to make his way down the little Tigris to Basrah and to take shelter in the islands in the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris until the danger had passed.[4] The vizier argued against this counsel and persuaded the Caliph that he himself was arranging terms with the Mongols.

It seems possible that the chancellor tried to persuade the Caliph to escape, but as the weak-minded Caliph still had delusions of conciliation with the Mongols under the influence of his vizier, the

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 288.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., p. 126.

[3]Rashid al-Din, op.cit., p. 288.

[4]Al-Juzjani, op. cit., p. 1245.

chancellor attempted to escape himself. The plan of escaping to Southern Iraq was a logical one if it had been rationally adeopted before the Mongols tightened their seige of Baghdad and its waterways.

The Caliph now had lost all hope of reaching an agreement with the Mongols and with his eastern defenses under Mongol control, he decided to surrender. According to Rashid al-Din, he announced his decision with these words: "I will surrender and obey."[1] Before the Caliph himself came out of Baghdad to meet Hulagu, he sent three missions, two of which were led by two of his sons. They were sent with presents and sought "terms" which were not specified by Rashid al-Din in his account. The missions returned, all with no success. Hulagu, for his part, sent a messenger to demand the surrender of Sulimanshah and the Chancellor. To ease the surrender, Hulagu's messengers carried with them assurance from Hulagu for the safety of these two officials. Having received safe conducts, Sulimanshah and the Chancellor went at length to the Mongol camp on the 1st of Safar (the 7th of February). They were ordered to go back into the city according to Rashid al-Din, (Ibn-al-Fuwati gives the same date for the same event[2]) and to bring their relatives and retainers in order to join the troops of Egypt and

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 286.

[2]Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 327.

Syria.[1] They went to bring them out. According to Rashid al-Din, many of the soldiers of Baghdad joined them in their return to the Mongol camp as they were obviously illusioned by the promise that the Mongol would send them to Syria and Egypt. All of those who came out of Baghdad with the two officials were divided into groups of thousands, hundreds and tens and then were put to the sword. On the 2nd of Safar (the 8th of February), Sulimanshah and the Chancellor were put to death.

As the situation was hopeless, the Caliph emerged from the city. He was accompanied by his three sons, Abu al-Fadel Abdu al-Rahman, Abu al-Abbass Ahmad and Abu al-Manaquib Mubarak and 3,000 men of the aristocratic elite of Baghdad. Ulemma, judges and people of influence in the city went out to the Mongol camp to meet Hulagu. This actual surrender occurred, according to Rashid al-Din, on the 4th of Safar A.H. (the 10th of February A.D.), a Sunday. Ibn-al-Fuwati dates the emergence of the Caliph to Hulagu on the 28th of Muharrem (the 4th of February).

Hulagu, as he met the Caliph, did not show any anger, rather he spoke nicely to the Caliph and asked him to issue an order to the people of the city to lay down their weapons and to leave the city in order for the Mongols to estimate their number. Rashid al-Din, in relating this, did not mention why Hulagu wanted to number the people of the city and

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 289.

did not cite the Caliph asking any explanation of the demand. But, Rashid al-Din goes on to say that those people who responded to the Caliph's order in group after group were received by the swords of the Mongols and were all killed before they could use their arms.[1] As for the Caliph and the Baghdad elite who accompanied him, tents were set up for them before the gate of Kulawazi in the quarters of Kitubuga where they were guarded.[2]

As later events would indicate, Hulagu perhaps had postponed the execution of his final decision on the Caliph's destiny, in order to deal with two immediate goals. First was the destruction and looting of Baghdad, the proud city which chose to resist the Mongol might. Second was the possession of the hidden treasures of the Caliph, which he had probably heard of through his agents in Baghdad. The Wednesday that was the 7th of Safar (the 13th of February 1258 A.D.) according to Rashid al-Din, or Monday the 5th of Safar (the 11th of February according to Iban-al-Fawati, certainly was one of the most remarkable days in the history of the city. It was a transformational turning point, from an imperial past and partially holy position to a future regional capital. No longer would it serve as the geographical and historical

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 326.

[2] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 290-291.

[3] Ibid., p. 291.

center of the Islamic world in general and the Arab world in particular.

This day was tragic as it was the only chosen by Hulagu to be the day of general looting of the city and slaughter of its inhabitants who remained alive. Unfortunately, Rashid al-Din (1247-1319), the Persian whose accounts regarding the Mongol invasion up to this point I have depended on, did not say much about this tragedy. All that he recorded about this day were a few sentences which I prefer to quote:

> The beginning of the common murder and looting was in the day of Wednesday, 7th of Safar, whence the conquerors thrust into Baghdad at once and burned everything, green or dry, save a few houses of the shepherds and the foreigners.[1]

Rashid al-Din did not explain how or why the houses of the foreigners and shepherds were spared. This draws a question of why the shepherds (Ru'ah) or camel herders would have their houses in Baghdad proper and not outside or in the desert. Also, the use of the word Ru'ah, shepherds, raises a question of whether the Persian word has been accurately translated to the Arabic or not. In another page, Rashid al-Din added one more sentence on the subject:

> Most of the holy places in the city were burned, for example, the Mosque of the Caliph and the tomb of Musa al-Jawa'ad 'God had mercy upon him, and the graves of the Caliphs.[2]

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 291

[2] Ibid., pp. 292-293.

The obvious briefness and the restraint in recording the destruction of Baghdad in comparison with other Moslem historians who gave much more attention to it could lead to speculation on my part that Rashid al-Din, although formally a Moslem was a Mongol official and wrote his history under the shadow of the Mongols which prevented him from recording details of this event which might revive or strengthen resentment among his readers toward the Mongol authority which he was serving. In contrast to the briefness and restraint shown in records by Rashid al-Din, those Moslem historians who were politically free to write on the subject and particularly those who wrote a century or two after the occurence of the event, dealt with the subject in more detail and, more probably, with exaggeration in some cases. Such exaggeration could perhaps result from the religious resentment of the historians over the destruction of the Caliphate and its capital at the hands of the Mongols.

Ibn-al-Fuwati Abd al-Rassaq Ibn Ahmad, a 13th century native historian of Baghdad, was 14 years old at the time of these events and was in contact with several officials and a son of the Caliph. Although there is no indication from him that he was an eye witness, the editor of his book, a contemporary Iraqian historian, Dr. Jawad Ali, says that Ibn-al-Fuwati was taken captive during the conquest of Baghdad and was released to work closely with the Persian scholar, Naser al-Din al-Tussi. This historian, who wrote his valuable book under the

Mongolian Ilkhanid state, described the destruction of Baghdad in more detail. His accounts should naturally be highly regarded along with the accounts given by Rashid al-Din. Ibn-al-Fuwati says:

> The sword was put to the people of Baghdad on Monday the 5th of Safar and the Mongols were involved in killing, looting, capturing and persecuting people of all kinds and taking over their money and belongings by painful punishment, for a term of 40 days. They killed men, women and children and of the people of Baghdad and the countryside who had found refuge in the city, none survived except a few, save the Christians whose houses were guarded and many of the Moslems had joined them in their houses and thus survived. In Baghdad, there was a group of merchants who usually traveled to Khurasan and other places and had direct and close contact with generals (Amirs) of the Mongols. Those were given safe conducts, thus when Baghdad was invaded they came out to the emirs and returned back with guards to protect their homes and those who found refuge with them, some of their neighbors had also joined their houses. The houses of the vizier, Ibn al-alqami was also saved and many people who found shelter in them were saved. The house of the Minister of the interior (Sahib al-Diwan), Ibn al-Damagani, the house of the private secretary of the Caliph (Hajib) were also saved. Save these places, no person in Baghdad was saved except those who hid themselves in wells and underground. Most parts of the city were burned, also the Mosque of the Caliph and its neighborhood. Dead people in the streets and the markets on top of each other, analogously constituted hills and because of the rains and the passage of horses on them, their real pictures were changed and they became a lesson on whom one can reflect. Then, public safety was declared by the Mongols and those who were hidden came out. Their color was changed and their minds were astonished by the terrors they witnessed which is hard for the tongue to describe. They looked like the dead when they would emerge from their graves in the last day, all of these were a result of fear, hunger and cold.[1]

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., pp. 329-330.

Abu al-Fidda (1273-1332), a Syrian Moslem historian who was related to the Ayyubid dynasty and who served the Mamluks in Syria as governor of Hammah city, cites briefly the events of Baghdad's destruction in his book, Muktassar Akhbar al-Bashar (The Epitome of the History of Mankind). From the brief account he offered on the subject, he says:

> The Mongols put the sword to Baghdad and assaulted the Caliph's palace and killed all the noble people who were there, and none of them survived except the youngest who were taken captive. Killing continued in Baghdad for 40 days and public safety was then issued.[1]

Ibn-Kathir (died 1372), one of the leading 14th century Arab historians, offers, more than Abu al-Fidda, details of dramatic character. He says:

> They (the Taters) came down upon the city and killed all they could, men, women, and children, the old, the middle-aged and the young. Many of the people went into wells, latrines and sewers and hid there for many days without emerging. Most of the people gathered in the caravan sarays and locked themselves in. The Tatars opened the gates by either breaking or burning them. When they entered, the people in them fled upstairs and the Tatars killed them on the roofs until blood poured from the gutters into the streets; 'We belong to God and to God we return' (Koran ii, 156). The same happened in the mosques and cathedral mosques and Jewish and Christian dhimmis, those who found shelter with them or in the house of the vizier, Ibn al-Alqami the Shi'i, and a group of merchants who had obtained safe conduct from the Mongols, having paid great sums

---

[1] Abu al-Fidda, op. cit., p. 194.

> of money to preserve themselves and their properties. And, Baghdad, which had been the most civilized of all cities, became a ruin with only a few inhabitants, and they were in fear and hunger and wretchedness and scarcity.[1]

Ibn-Kathir reports the way the Mongols treated Baghdad and its inhabitants with the passion of a Moslem historian who was not an eye-witness. Almost a century separated him from the course of events. When he speaks of Baghdad as the most civilized city, he probably relied on an image of Baghdad which was different from the real picture of the Baghdad which the Mongols destroyed. Passion led to some exaggeration, yet some information or generally true impression can be found about the rigidity and the paganistic nomadism with which the Mongols dealt Baghdad, the city that chose to resist the rising Mongol power.

Al-Maqrizi (died 1441), the Egyptian historian, recorded the events briefly but with more exaggeration than the previous historians cited:

> The people were murdered in Baghdad and torn to every Direction (emigrated to everywhere). The tatars destroyed the Mosques and holy places and shed the blood until it flooded the streets (?) and they continued all of these doings for forty days. Then Hulagu ordered an estimation of the dead people, and the number was about 2,000,000.[2]

---

[1] Ibn Kathir, op. cit., p. 202.

[2] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., II, Pt. 1, p. 410.

Ibn Tagri Bardi (1411-1469) another famous Egyptian historian, recorded the incident with some effect at reasoning in regard to estimating those who were killed, but also with some questionable information not mentioned by previous historians concerning the fate of the "Books of Knowledge" in Baghdad:

> They (the Mongols) used the sword in Baghdad and killing, looting and captivity had continued in Baghdad for more than thirty days. No one was saved from them (the Mongols) except who was hidden. Then Hulagu ordered an estimation of the killed and the number was 800,000. After that Baghdad suffered the great destruction, and the Books of Knowledge--containing all sorts of arts and sciences with no parallel in the world--were burned, and used to build bridges instead of mud and stones. Other things were told . . . the sword had worked in Baghdad for thirty-four days.[1]

Ibn Tagri Bardi's story about the fate of the Books of Knowledge in Baghdad at the hand of the Mongols--how the Mongols burned and used them to make bridges, the story of the Baghdadians' blood flowing on the roads, and the huge number of victims sacrificed in the conquest of Baghdad--which shifted between 2,000,000 and 800,000--those stories are examples of the stories that were told by Medievalist Arab historians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These story tellers were not eyewitnesses but described the acts with such medievalist imagination and religious passion that the stories have survived the centuries up to the recent times.

---

[1]Ibn Tagri Bardi, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

A huge army, such as that which destroyed Baghdad under the command of Hulagu, would naturally cause a lot of terror and destruction, but the question I would raise here is whether Baghdad, in 1258, had all those people and all those books of knowledge? Dr. Jafar Khisbak, an Iraqi twentieth century historian, after examining the limited accounts of Baghdad at the time of the conquest, could not even agree on the minimum number of persons killed which the historian Al-Tha'alebi gave as 800,000; Dr. Khisbak suggests that the actual figure might have been about 90,000.[1] But if I consider the account of the Baghdadian historian Ibn-al-Fuwati which tells how the streets, the markets, and the mosques of Baghdad were overcrowded by the refugees who fled the countryside prior to the capture of Baghdad, I would assume the number killed would have been over one hundred thousand people.

The fate of the books could be mere imagination. Firstly, because the story mixed images of intellectual life of Baghdad in the 9th century with that of the 13th century. Neglected were four centuries of intellectual decay, war, revolution, and natural disasters--especially the numerous floods that Baghdad experiences, particularly the one in 1256 which preceded the Mongol invasion. The books in Baghdad would be unlikely to survive four centuries of such social and natural

---

[1] Khisbak, Jafar, Dr., Irag During the Reign of the Il-Khanid Mongols 1258-1335, Baghdad, 1968, p. 56.

elements. Secondly, there were in the Mongol camp scholars so close to Hulagu, that they would have halted such destruction of books in the planning stage for their academic interest if not just for the love of books. Ibn-al-Fuwati tells us that Nassir al-Din-al-Tussi had visited Iraq six years after the Conquest to gather books.[1] Al-Maqrezi cites, that in the observatory that al-Tussi established in Persia in 1259, there were a great number of Baghdad's books.[2]

Also, the idea of making bridges in Baghdad of books appears more imaginative, while it was more practical, to make bridges out of boats as purported by other historians when they mentioned the bridges built by the Mongols in Baghdad. After all, Hulagu, the Supreme Commander of the campaign, was described as fond of all sorts of intellectual activities and he had given scholars excellent status in his court. Thus, it is doubtful that he would encourage or tolerate such treatment of the books.

Turning back of the course of Baghdad's invasion, Rashid al-Din tells that in the day of the 9th of Safar, Hulagu entered the invaded city, and spent some time in the caliph's palace.[3] There, they played the game of Hulagu being a guest and the caliph being the host; and then.

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 350.

[2] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 420-421.

[3] Rashid, al-Din, op. cit., p. 291

with the might of a victorious invader, he compelled the caliph to disclose his hidden treasury, which contained five centuries of the Abbassid wealth stored in the form of golden pieces. The gold was preserved under ground in a particular spot in the palace, and when the Mongols put them on the ground, it looked like "Hills on Hills" as Rashid al-Din expressed the amount analogously. Each of these gold pieces weighed 100 miskals. After Hulagu put his hands on the caliph's harem of seven hundred free and slave wives.[1] At the appeal of the caliph, Hulagu left with him one hundred women who were dear and relatives. The caliph, however, enjoyed this favor of Hulagu for only five days; the caliph was then put to death along with his older son and servants. Rashid al-Din did not state the mode of the execution.[2] Ibn-al-Fawati tells that the caliph was "rolled in a carpet and then trodden under by horses."[3] This mode would fit a Mongol tradition that avoids the shedding of royal blood. Another source relates that the caliph was 'honorably' killed by Hulagu's hand and sword! When the caliph heard the judgment, he said, "If I am to die it matters little whether it be a man or a dog who kills me."[4] Howorth leans to the

---

[1] Ibid., p. 292.

[2] Ibid., p. 294.

[3] Ibn-al-Fawati, op. cit., p. 327.

[4] Howorth, op. cit., p. 128.

probability that Hulagu, had it been his first personal choice, would have spared the caliph's life, but he was dissuaded from this course by Muslims in the Mongol camp who held a bitter resentment against the Abbassid Dynasty.[1] The next day the second son of the caliph, most members of the Abbassid royal family, as well as the chiefs of the people of the city which accompanied the caliph, were executed. Few Abbassids excaped the massacre; included among those, the youngest son of the caliph, who was carried to Persia and later married to a Mongolian woman.

On the day that the caliph was killed, according to Rashid al-Din,[2] Hulagu left Baghdad for the nearby villages of Waqph and Jelabieh to avoid the tainted air. On the same day also, Rashid al-Din says Hulagu appointed a new administration for the city which included the former vizier of the dead caliph, Ibn-al-Alqami. The appointment of the vizier within the new administration supports doubts of his loyalty and accusations of his having previously secretly cooperated with Hulagu. Normal life returned to Baghdad, on that day, as the markets were reopened, and people cleaned the streets and buried their dead. By the accounts given by Rashid al-Din, the general killing and looting started in Baghdad on the 7th of Safar and normal life resumed on the 14th of

---

[1]Minjaj-ud-Din, op. cit., p. 1252.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 293.

of the same month, so the massacres lasted only for one week. Ign-al-Fuwati says that Hulagu left Baghdad in the month of Jumad the first,[1] which would indicate Hulagu's stay in Baghdad lasted for almost three months.

The rest of the caliphate's state was subjugated by the Mongols either by voluntary submission or by force. The people of the cities of al-Hilla and al-Kuffa fled to the outskirts of their towns during the seige of Baghdad, and later sent their chiefs to declare their loyalty to Hulagu and welcome the arrival of the Mongol troops in their regions. The town of Wassitte was taken by force as it chose to resist, according both to Rashid al-Din and Ibn-al-Fuwati.[2] Rashid al-Din, who gave no estimate of the number of people murdered in Baghdad, says that those who were killed in Wassitte numbered about forty thousand.[3] Al-Basra city in the furthest southern part of Iraq surrendered peacefully, while Urbit city to the northeast of Baghdad resisted and was taken by a storm, after seige.[4] The region of Khuzistan to the southeast of Baghdad was invaded, and its soldiery was put to death.[5]

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 331

[2] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 295-296, Ibn-al-Fuwati, Ibid., p. 330.

[3] Rashid al-Din, Ibid., p. 296.

[4] Ibid., pp. 298-299.

[5] Howorth, op. cit., p. 132.

After he completed his task in Baghdad, Hulagu encamped near the tomb of the Sheik Makarem, and afterward marched by easy stages to the town of Khanekin, still in Iraq.[1]

The fall of the Caliphate in Baghdad, and the reduction of Iraq from an independent state under the caliph to a part of the Persian Ilkhanid state under Hulagu and his descendents had significant historical consequences--some immediate and direct touching basically the social and political situation in Iraq, others of a wider span of time and place.

The immediate consequences were of local importance. Briefly they included: 1) The disturbance of the socio-religous balance which had existed in Iraq for more than six centuries, since the Arabic-Islamic conquest in 637 A.D. This balance was characterized by an Islamic orthodox ruling class; and Islamic Shi'i portion of the population, which, in spite of its continuous strife with the orthodox Sunnis, still held the complete status of first class citizens of the state. In addition, there were minorities--primarily Christian and Jewish who would hold always the status of second class citizens (ahel-al-Thema), whose freedom and participation in socio-political affairs in the state were restricted.

---

[1] Ibid., p. 142.

The orthodox Sunnis lost their "favored" position with the fall of the Sunni caliphate; the shi'ite had wider freedom and enjoyed the protection of the scholar Nassir al-Din Tusi (d. 672/1274) who was held in the highest esteem by Hulagu; but it was the Christians who became most privileged and the real beneficiary from the establishment of the Ilkhanid state in Iraq. This, however, would not last for long, and religious balance probably was restored by conversion of the Ilkhan Ghazan to Islam in 1295. The Christians of Iraq had looked upon the Mongol Conquest as deliverance; the Mongols, on the other hand, sympathized with the Christians for two reasons. First, within the Mongol camp there were many Christians who held influential status. Of those was the favorite wife of Hulagu, Duguz Khaton, and some of the most significant generals and of those was Kitubuqa. Their sharing the same faith of the Christian minority undoubtedly affected the Mongol policy. The second factor was political in that it was in the interest of the conquering power to back the oppressed minority. Ibn-al-Fuwati told how the head of the Christian Nestorian community, Patriarch Machicha II (1257-1265) in Baghdad enjoyed privileges and the protection of the Mongols. He was given as a residence in Baghdad the Palace of the "Grand Dawtedar," a fine house that the Caliph previously tried to possess but the respectable chancellor dared to turn down the request

of the Caliph.[1] More important, the Nestorian Patriarch obtained authority over his community which allowed him to arrest an ex-Christian who became a Moslem. This action provoked Moslem upheaval in Baghdad in 1265.[2]

The fall of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Ilkhanid Dynasty in Persia had resulted in a new balance of power in the Near East, with the Ilkhanid struggle with the Mamluks to the west of Euphrates for domination of the fertile crescent. Iraq and Syria were a borderland of the two struggling powers with its base in Egypt.

The indirect and wider consequences of the fall of the Caliphate, the subjugation of Iraq by the Mongols, and the establishment of the Ilkhanid state in Persia, had lasting effects on the political and cultural characteristics of the Near East from Persia to Egypt. It is considered that the Mongol dynasty in Persia was one of the basic historical elements in creating "the pre-condition for a national state" in Iran.[3] I would consider also the Mongol conquest in the Near East as a basic historical element in developing a prenational culture and politics for the Eastern part of the Arab world as well. In the first

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., pp. 223-224.

[2] Ibid., p. 354.

[3] Boyle, J. A., "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans". In Boyle (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. V. 15, Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1968, p. 355.

place, it destroyed the caliphate which had for long claimed multi-national representation based on religious authority. Although the caliphate had lost, since the 10th century, much of its secular power, it was still, until 1257, the umbrella that constituted the upper spiritual authority in the Islamic world. The Caliph was considered the political head of the Moslem community; his political authority was nominal, while his actual secular power was limited within Iraq. After the year of 1258 the Islamic community experienced for the first time in its history a political and religious life without a caliphate. Although the Mamluk regime in 1260 embraced an Abbassid person named 'Ahmad', and gave him the post of Caliph. The Abbassid Caliphate in Egypt was completely deprived of any previous secular authority. Its nominal existence was felt mainly in the Arabized world, and India. Persia and the Central Asians to the east never felt the existence of such a Caliphate.[1] In Persia, where the Ilkhanids behaved like Persian kings and served the traditional strategic interests of Persia, Persian-Islamic culture continued to grow apart at this time from the Arabic-Islamic culture whose base and materialistic strength came into being in the Nile Valley under the Arabized Turkish Mamluk regime. In this process, the Caliphate as a political system did not die, but became

---

[1]Hitti, op. cit., p. 677; also, Bertold Spuler "The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East", In Holt, Lampton and Lewis, The Cambridge History of Islam, I, p. 165.

more nominal than ever and Arabized more than ever. The Mongol invasion helped in creating a political situation that directed the course of history in the eastern part of the Arabized world in a pre-national path. This is what I consider the process of premature nationalization and secularization of politics in the Near East in the 13th century, which is an idea that deserves to be elaborated and clarified separately.

During this time of change, Baghdad lost its position as the center of Arabic culture and politics to Cairo. It sank to the level of capital of the province called al-Iraq al-Arabi (The Arab Iraq). Though Iraq lost its leading position in the Arabized world, it nevertheless maintained its cultural characterictics as an Arabic country, and its new position was as the country that marked the eastern border of the Arabic culture or the eastern gate of the Arabized world. Egypt, in this historical process, became the geographical center of an Arabized world that extended from Iraq in the Far East to Morocco in the Far West. Now the reestablished Abbassid Caliphate in Cairo embraced the military and learned refugees who had fled before the Mongols, and took the responsibility of defending the Islamic Arabic culture now being threatened by the Mongols in the East and the remnant of the crusading establishments on the Syrian Coast, which sought an alliance with the Mongols.

The Subjugation of Upper Mesopotamia (1259)

After the sack of Baghdad and the subjugation of the whole Arab Iraq, Hulagu prepared for the next stage in the chain of his conquest in West Asia. Ibn-al-Fuwati writes that Hulagu sent a message to Al-Nassir Yosouf, the most powerful ruler in Syria and Upper Mesopotamia to come to his audience in person. The historian did not say when or where Hulagu made his demand.[1] Al-Nassir had previously sought to establish friendly relations with the Mongols. It has been written that he sent a mission led by his vizier to the court of the Great Khan Mongke (1251-1259) with previous gifts worthy of a sovereign, and as a reward he had been granted a yarlik and paizah.[2] Now, in response to Hulagu's demand, al-Nassir--instead of coming to meet Hulagu in person--sent a mission led by his son al-Malik al-Aziz and included his vizier Zain-al-Din al-Hafezi.[3] No exact date is given to the arrival of the mission, but probably it was during the seige of Baghdad. Hulagu asked the young prince why his father had not come in person and was conciliated by the reply that he feared to leave his

---

[1] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 339.

[2] Howorth, op. cit., p. 142.

[3] al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 410.

dominions lest they should be attacked by the Franks.[1] Al-Maqrezi says the prince offered Hulagu the presents which he bore, and also asked for his aid to help him drive the Mamluks out of Egypt.[2] This request, if it is historically accurate, implies that Al-Nassir thought that by displaying his friendship, Hulagu would not attack Syria. Also, at this time, he still was giving priority to his antagonism to the Mamluk regime in Egypt. But, Hulagu was obviously viewing the situation from a different point of view. His commission was that he should lay his hands upon all Asia and further west to Egypt in Africa, and the only position that Al-Nassir would hold with Hulagu would be the status of a local vassal. Moreover, this status would not be granted to al-Nassir unless he showed the complete loyalty and submission which could only be expressed by his coming to meet his Lord in person!

Hulagu gave his permission to the al-Nassir envoys to return to Syria after the capture of Baghdad. Ibn-al-Fuwati says that Hulagu told the Syrian prince, "We had asked for your father to come, but as long as he did not we will march to him."[3] More important than this oral indirect threat, Hulagu sent a letter to al-Nassir which was recorded by Rashid al-Din, and al-Maqrezi. This letter was written by

---

[1] Howorth, op. cit., p. 142.

[2] al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 410-411.

[3] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 339.

Nasir al-Din al-Tussi, the famous Persian scholar and astronomer, in elegant classic Arabic. The subject matter of this letter is almost the same in either of the two versions recorded by the two historians. Hulagu started the letter by relating the fate of the caliph in Baghdad who dared to resist the might of the Mongols, and warned al-Nassir of a similar end if he did not show obedience. In both versions, verses from the Quran were chosen carefully to be completely effective. The al-Maqrezi version contains also selective Arabic poetry for the same purpose. Hulagu displays in his letter his knowledge about things going on in Syria such as the flight of the rich to Egypt, probably to escape the coming Mongol storm. In the last and most important part of this letter, Hulagu said:

> When you have considered my letter, hasten to submit to the King of Kings, Lord of the World, and to subject to him your person, your people, your warriors and your riches. Thus, you will avoid his anger and deserve his works, will not fail to recompense him with the greatest zeal.[1]

When al-Nassir received this letter he was disillusioned and as Ibn-al-Fuwati says, "he was dazzled."[2] Obviously, there were for him two alternatives: the first was a complete and unconditional surrender to the Mongols. The consequence of such a choice would be the reduction of his status from independent sovereign to a Mongol vassal in Syria.

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 415-416.

[2] Ibn-al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 339.

The other alternative open to him was resistance--to refuse sitting on his knees before the Mongol ruler with the consequence of such choice being the necessity of a determination to fight.

Al-Nassir chose to resist and refused to surrender unconditionally. But, he did not assume the burden of such a notice. He did not determine to fight. Part of this attitude was a result of his personal psychology which was that of a poet more than of a fighting politician. Another part of this attitude resulted from the political situation in Syria; the country was divided inland between six branches of the Ayyubid Dynasty. Those six Ayyubid princes, if they had a united front and a common policy, would have offered a reasonable resistance to the Mongols. al-Nassir, by this time, possessed Damascus, Allepo, Hims, and Balbak, but he had quarreled with al-Mugeth who possessed Al-Kark and al-Shubak in the area where the Kingdom of Jordan stands presently. Al-Mugeth was strengthened in 1259 by the Bahri Mamluks who disturbed the political scene in Syria by failing to seize power from their fellow Mamluks in Egypt. Those Bahri Mamluks were searching in Syria for a local power that they could use against the regime whose establishment in Cairo they had participated in (1249-1250) and who now were striving to destroy their enemy by any means that would not hinder their evolution to power in Egypt in the end. For them, the weak personalities of the Ayyubid princes in Syria were a suitable means. The

Bahries joined al-Nassir in the beginning; when his policy did not satisfy their inspiration, they joined al-Mugheth, who marched to Damascus; but as events turned to be in al-Nassir's favor, the most significant of them--Baybars--joined al-Nassir again. Al-Mugheth handed the rest of the Bahris over to al-Nassir who arrested them. What al-Mugheth did was the price of peace with his relative, al-Nassir. These separate events all occurred in Syria during the year that separated the capture of Baghdad from the invasion of Syria by the Mongols. This year was the critical span of time that al-Nassir needed to organize and strengthen his front against the threat of the Mongols which was expressed flatly in Hulagu's letter to him. It seems to me that al-Nassir did not use this year for the necessary serious preparation to meet the Mongol threat. Another element of strength that al-Nassir did not exploit at the right time was the help of Egypt. He turned to the Mamluk regime of Egypt requesting help against the Mongols too late and after Hulagu actually had started his invasion of Al-Jazira and Dair Bakr to the east of the Euphrates. More elaboration of al-Nassir's stance and his correspondence with the Mamluks of Egypt would have been necessary in its particular place in the course of events to achieve their needed assistance.

Returning to Hulagu, it is written that he left Iraq on April 17, 1258; he once more reached Hammadan and Siah Kuh, where he rested from the fatigues of the Baghdad campaign. Later, he moved to Meragha

and then to his quarters in Munik in the district of Tebriz. During the span of time that Hulagu spent in Persia, he made arrangements for preservation of the various treasures he had obtained thus far. He send part of these treasures to the Great Khan in Mongolia along with a report of the recent conquest and his proposal to march on Syria and Egypt.[1] Regarded as a famous academic accomplishment of the Middle Ages, Hulagu at this time endorsed and supported the construction of an observatory in Persia, at the request of the Persian astronomer, Nasir al-Din al-Tussi.

In September, 1259, Hulagu was ready to initiate his campaign against North Mesopotamia and Syria. Rashid al-Din says that the beginning of his march was on Friday the 22nd of the month of Ramadan 657 A.H. According to Howorth, the day was the 12th of September 1259. Of those vassals who supported him militarily against Baghdad, only the ruler of Al-Mowsel was ordered to offer troops to the new campaign.[2] There was no mention of the size of the troops of al-Mowsel in this campaign; also there was no mention of the existence of any other Mongol vassal troops in the campaign at its starting point. Rashid al-Din and most the Arab historians did not give figures for the total troops that participated in the march. Ibn-al-Fuwati says the number

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 305.

[2] Ibid., p. 305.

of these troops was so big that "only God could estimate them." The only figure I found was given by Abu-al (known to the west as Bar Herbracus), the christian Jacobit historian, who was a resident of Aleppo and witnessed its fall to the Mongols. Abu al-Faraj estimated a figure as huge as 400,000 men.[1] This figure is exactly twice as much as the figure given by Ibn-Khather to the Mongol troops during the campaign against Baghdad. If part of the non-Mongol troops that invaded Baghdad had now returned to their homes--such as the Georgians who received Hulagu's permission to return to Tiflis--it would be impossible to see how Hulagu could double the troops which now were directed to Syria.

Hulagu organized his army in such a way that Kitubuqa commanded the advance guard, Singkur and Baichu commanded the right wing, Sunjak and other chiefs commanded the left wing--while he himself was in direct charge of the center. The direction the campaign took was from Azrabigan to the district of Akhlat or Khelate, on the northern shores of Lake Van, and the mountains of Hakkar (Akkar)--the resort of Kurdish brigands--all of whom fell into the hands of the Mongols and were duly executed.[2] From there, Hulagu and his army entered the region of Diar Bakr and al-Jaziera, mostly now in southern Turkey and bordered by Iraq

---

[1]Abu al-Faraj, Ibn-al-Ibri, Tarikh Muktasar al-duwal, Beirut, 1958, p. 279.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., p. 141.

and Syria from the south. Here, Hulagu sent al-Malik al-Salih, the prince of al-Mowsel, to attack the town of Amid; while Hulagu advanced upon Nisibin which, the people having resisted, they pillaged. The people of the town of Herran, possessed by al-Nassir of Syria, submitted; the town of al-Ruha or Edessa also submitted. The people of Saruge, however, resisted and were almost exterminated.[1]

The Invasion, Occupation of Moslem Syria and the Subjugation of the Latin Principality of Antioch (1260)

While Hulagu was at Harran, he was visited by Haithen (or Hetoum I), the king of Little Armenia. The Mongol chief's know friendliness for the christians and the bitter strife with the Muslims of Syria that christians experienced in their crusading days, had doubtless made Hulagu's arrival seem like that of a deliverer. We are told that Haithan, whose contingent was a respectable one--12,000 horses and 4,000 foot soldiers, recommended that Hulagu begin with Aleppo in attacking Syria. Howorth's analysis of available facts was that Haithan advised Hulagu in such a way to protect the crusaders and his relative the prince of Antioch.[2]

---

[1] Ibid., p. 145.

[2] Howorth, op. cit., p. 145.

Unfortunately, Rashid al-Din, Ibn-al-Fuwati, Abu-al-Faraj, and Abu al-Fida did not detail the Mongol conquest of Aljazera and Dair Bakr, and thus there are no given dates for the subjugation of the several towns of the region. The only given date was by Ibn Taqri Bardi who says that Hulagu arrived at Herran during the month of Jumadi the first of the Hejri, year 657.[1] This date does not coincide with Rashid al-Din's start of the campaign in the month of Ramadan five months later. Rashid al-Din, who was of the 13th century, is more dependable than Ibn Taqri Bardi in this matter. With such limited knowledge concerning the dates of the subjugation of the towns of the region, I am only able to date the whole campaign in the region between the month of Ramadan to the month of Tu-alheja 657--about four months. During the last days of this period, the Mongols crossed the Euphrates River for the first time to attack Aleppo.

Al-Nassir by now was alarmed more than ever by the pressure of the Mongols to the east of the Euphrates in the region of al-Jaziera and Dair Bakr. He already had lost Herran to the Mongols, and action on his part was necessary. Howorth cites that al-Nassir called for a council[2] in or near Damascus and again there is not given a date, but it is understood that this council--if ever occurred--was held while

---

[1]Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 74.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., p. 145.

Hulagu was still in al-Jaziera and prior to the Mongol crossing of the Euphrates. I would assume that this council was called during the month of Shawal or the month of al-Queda. We have no clear idea of the number of people who were consulted or how. All that is available is the views that were expressed by two persons. The first was al-Nassir's vizier Zian al-Din al-Hafizi; the second was the Bahri Mamluk general, Baybars, who had now rejoined al-Nassir and deserted al-Mugheth. The views of the two officials of al-Nassir were flatly contradictory to each other. Al-Hafizi, a civilian vizier, was a soft-liner who enlarged on the power of Hulagu and urged him to submit. Baybars, on the other hand, was a Mamluk general whose profession was fighting, and he was a hard-liner. This division of views between the policy-makers in Damascus concerning the Mongol threat, resembles the division of views between the policy-makers in Baghdad before its fall, concerning the same subject. In both cases, there was an undetermined head of the state; in Baghdad the Caliph al-Mustasim and in Damascus the king, al-Nassir. In the case of Baghdad, the soft-liner was the civilian vizier, Ibn-al-alqami and now in Damascus the vizier al-Hafezi. The hard-liners in Baghdad were the chancellor, Rukn al-Din, and the chief general Suleman Shah, both Turks. In Damascus, the hard-liner was Baybars, a Turk also. Ibn-al-alqami had been accused by Rukn al-Din as having secretly cooperated with the Mongols and as working for their ends. In Damascus now, Baybars accused al-Hafezi of working for the

destruction of the Muslims. No firm accusation was made against Ibn-al-Hafezi as having secretly cooperated with the Mongols. Although more than Ibn-al-alqami, al-Hafezi contacted the Mongols more than once as a representative of al-Nassir. The last mission he took to the Mongols was during the seige of Baghdad, and Hulagu kept him in his camp for a long time. He was given permission to leave about one month after the capture of Baghdad. During this span of time, al-Hafezi had much to witness and be impressed by as well as to enjoy the Mongol hospitality. Thinking of the good will of the vizier, he probably was impressed by the Mongol military might and gave his advice for the Syrian cities to avoid the miserable fate of Baghdad. Thinking with possible weakness and selfishness, he perhaps worked for the stronger and prepared for his survival and the continuation of his status even with the Mongols. Similar to Ibn-al-alqami, the Mongols allowed Al-Hafezi to maintain his service under their domination.

To understand the view of Baybars and his fellow Mamluk generals and their hard-line stance, three basic elements should be considered. First, these were military men whose profession was fighting and the protection of the community in their own way. Secondly, they were new coverts who had adopted Islam in their childhood or their youth and thus their religion zeal was so firm that they could not tolerate invasion by the infidels. Thirdly, they were power seekers who participated in the destruction of the Ayyubid Dynasty in Egypt, and the

establishment of the Mamuki regime. Later, they entered a period of a power struggle against Aybuk, the first Mamluki ruler. When they failed to seize power in Egypt, they fled to Syria, persuading the Ayyubid princes there to attack Egypt, most probably hoping to achieve power through them somehow in the future. Such power seekers did not logically find their bright future under a Mongol domination or dynasty, and therefore it was to their very interests to fight the Mongols, and to protect the existence of their status quo, until they could change it according to their own needs. Baybars suggested to al-Nassir that he appoint an army of 3,000 horsemen under his leadership that would attack the Mongols in the region of the Euphrates.[1] Such a plan, had it been accepted by al-Nassir, would have offered a strategic defense against any attack upon Syria from the east.

From these two contradictory views of his officials, the attitude of al-Nassir was not clear enough. Howorth perceived al-Nassir's stance as determination to confront the Mongol's militarily, but I would not perceive it the same way. Al-Nassir's life was a target for shortly after this, he avoided an attempt of assassination by his Mamluks and escaped to the citadel of Damascus. Those who planned the attack on his life proposed to replace him with his brother, al-Thahir,

---

[1] Ibn Abd al-Zahir, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

because of the latter's 'bravery.'[1] Baybars soon deserted al-Nassir and moved to Gaza; from there he wrote to Qutuz, by then the new sultan of Egypt, expressing his willingness to join his service and asking for assurance of his personal safety if he got into Egypt. Qutuz assured him welcome and safety, and Baybars moved in.[2] The Mamluki front now built again to face the common threat of the Mongols. Even those Mamluks who were jailed inside Egypt were released for this purpose. Those Mamluks who failed to kill al-Nassir fled with al-Thahir to Gaza where they declared al-Thahir as a sultan.

The attempt on his life by the Mamluks and the desertion of Baybars from his service, both indicate that al-Nassir's stance was not satisfactory to the hard-liners. As preceding events proved, and following events will display, al-Nassir did not take the logical steps of a determined leader. His whole stance fell in a point between a refusal to submit to the Mongols and a determination to fight them. Howorth says that his heterogeneous force of Arabs, Turks, and volunteers was not reliable.[3] This could be true, as the psychological impact of the Mongol victories and their destruction so far were impressive. It has been noticed that much of the Mongol's military

---

[1]Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 792.

[2]Ibn Abd al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 91

[3]Howorth, op. cit., p. 145.

achievement depended on the terror already instilled in their enemies. However, people shape their final attitude in such critical moments in accordance with the attitude of their leadership. Their enthusiasm would go high or low as their leader's spirit went. Even in Egypt when Qutuz determined to fight in 1260, there was fear and hesitation among his Mamluk generals, but as Qutuz moved before them they followed him; their hesitation subsided, and their enthusiasm reached its peak when Qutuz in the final battle risked his life to defend what he believed was the right decision and stance.

Al-Nassir, from his stance, which could be described as "a preference to fight," sent to the ruler of Egypt, by then al-Malik a-Mansur Ali, and to the ruler of al-Kark, requesting military assistance against the coming Mongol invasion. His messenger to al-Mansur Ali was in Cairo during the month of the al-Qeda 657 A.H., before the Mongols had set foot on Syria. In charge of the state's affairs in Egypt then was the Mamluk general Qutuz who acted like a guardian or regent for the 16-year-old-king, al-Mansur. Other ambitious Mamluk generals were watching the actions of Qutuz, and in such a situation the boy-king had retained the crown so far. The spreading news of the Mongol Conquest east of the Euphrates and their proposal to invade Syria, imposed a new and decisive element on the political scene in Egypt.

What happened in Baghdad was obviously upsetting, but of less concern in Egypt than were events in Syria. Al-Nassir was an old enemy

of the Mamluk Regime, but at this time the Mongols were a common enemy to both the Ayyubids and the Mamluks; thus al-Nassir's appeal provoked a significant change in the Egyptian political stage. It appears to me that a combination of the personal ambition of Qutuz and a real national-religious reaction moved events in Egypt, and a change in the Egyptian leadership evolved. From now on, the political history of Egypt and Syria, thanks to the Mongol threat, would rejoin after a period of separation that lasted from 1250 to 1259. Those years were marked (1) by the establishment of the Mamluk regime with its internal struggle for power, and (2) by the endeavors of the Ayyubid legitimists of Syria to seize power again in Egypt, and (3) by the inability of either party to achieve victory over the other. These factors together made a truce between them a valid solution.

Responding to al-Nassir's request, Qutuz called an assembly in Qalate al-Jabal (the citadel of the mountain) in Cairo. This assembly included the young king, al-Mansur, Qutuz, the messenger of al-Nassir, Ibn-al-Adeam, the Qadi--Grand Judge of Egypt, and Ibn-Abdul Salam--a religious leader of remarkable character and respectable personality. The subject to be discussed was the Mongol threat and the necessary measures to counter it. Neither al-Maqrezi nor Ibn Taqri Bardi give a date for this assembly. Ibn-Ibdul-Salam was the spokesman for the religious leaders, and he said that any enemy of the Muslim community should be confronted by all means. On the financial measures, he said

that people should not pay for the task of defense until the public treasury and the military and ruling class had paid fairly for the purpose. Qutuz also introduced to the audience what he viewed as a problem of leadership. He said, "There is a need for a powerful sultan to fight this enemy, and al-Mansur is a young man who does not know how to operate the state."[1] No response on this last subject was received from the religious leaders, and the young king did not participate at all through the whole debate. After this assembly al-Nass (the people) which usually means in these Arabic sources of the Middle Ages the significant or influential classes, started to talk about the disposition of al-Mansur and the choice of Qutuz as a sultan.[2]

Qutuz did not waste time; a few days after this assembly, he took advantage of the absence of two generals--who were obviously rivals of his--hunting outside Cairo, and deposed the young king; arrested him and his mother; and declared himself the new sultan of Egypt. According to al-Maqrezi, the day was Saturday the 24th of thu-al-Qeda month;[3] and according to Ibn-Taqri Bardi, it was Saturday the 17th of the same month which made the date earlier by one week. When the rival generals

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 417.

[2] Ibn-Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 73.

[3] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 417.

returned to Cairo and faced the new reality, they protested. Qutuz justified his move by his fears of the Mongols and also of al-Nassir. He said,

> I meant only that we gather to fight the Tatars, and this could not be achieved without a king. When we march out and defeat this enemy, then the whole matter would be up to you. Put in power the one you like.[1]

The generals accepted the reality, and Qutuz having become the sultan of Egypt, one of the first tasks he undertook was sending his own messenger, Burhan al-Din to confirm to al-Nassir that he would support him militarily.

Ibn Taqri Bardi does not give details on the message of Qutuz to al-Nassir, but al-Maqrezi records a portion of a letter that Qutuz has sent to al-Nassir. Al-Maqrezi, however, does not link this part of a letter to this particular occasion; indeed, he says that it was sent because Qutuz tried to discourage al-Nassir from entering into an alliance with the Mongols. But as the letter was accorded to Qutuz not to al-Mansur, and because of its contents, I assume it was the letter that Qutuz sent to al-Nassir after he disposed al-Mansur. In this recorded part of a letter, Qutuz told al-Nassir:

> If you choose me, I would serve you, and if you wish, I would come to you with my troops to support you against the one who would attack you (means Hulagu). If you

---

[1] Ibid., pp. 417-18.

> do not feel secure with my personal presence, I would send you the troops commanded by the one you select.[1]

Al-Maqrezi says that al-Nassir felt secure after this letter and that Qutuz, who justified to the Mamluk generals his taking over the sultanate because of the Mongol threat and also because of fear of al-Nassir, tried now to give the impression to al-Nassir that he is merely his deputy in Egypt![2] The messenger of Qutuz arrived in Damascus and stayed there until al-Nassir retreated to the South when the Mongols took over northern Syria.

By the month of thu-al-Hega 657, Hulagu probably was about to finish his task in the Diar Bakr and al-Jazera region. He sent during this month a portion of his army under the command of his son, Yashmont, into Syria. Rashid al-Din, who covered briefly the Mongol conquest of Syria, does not tell about this campaign, while we are told by Dr. Mohammad Mustafa Zeyada that Ibn-Wassil, an Arab historian of the 13th century, had distinguished it as "the first confrontation."[3] Yashmont crossed the Euphrates and reached the regions of Nahr-al-Jouz and Till Basher and later reached Salmia, Haylan and al-hari, which were villages close to Aleppo. When this news reached Aleppo, an unaccounted portion of the population fled to Damascus and al-Nassir's deputy in the city,

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, Ibid., p. 418.

[2] Ibid., pp. 417-18.

[3] Footnote by Dr. Mustafa Ze'yada, In al-Maqrexi, op. cit., p. 419.

who was an old relative named al-Mou'asam Turan Shah, strengthened the defenses of the city. Abu al-Fida, who gives some details on this campaign, says that the Mongols approached Aleppo in the last ten days of the month of thu-al-Hega.[1] Those who were in charge of defending the city gathered in a place called al-Nawasher to decide on the suitable action. Al-Malik al Mou'asam Turanshah's advice was to stay within the walls of the city and to play a defensive role, but the majority of the militants insisted on confronting the Mongols on the battlefield and thus they gathered their troops and volunteer supporters of common people outside the city on the Mountain of Banqusa. When the Mongol troops reached the mount, the troops of Aleppo came down to confront them, and the Mongols retreated to deceive them into drawing away from their defensible position. When the troops of Aleppo had followed the Mongols for some time, the Mongols turned back and defeated them. Many of them were killed at the hands of the Mongols and others were killed at the gates of the city which was overcrowded by those who had retreated to the city to escape the swords of the Mongols. The Mongols at this stage left Aleppo untouched and proceeded to the town of Izaz which submitted voluntarily. The basic assault against Aleppo was to be launched by the main army of Hulagu more than two months later.

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

Al-Nassir, on receiving the news of this first Mongol campaign against his Syrian domination, encamped to the north of Damascus on a place called Berzah. Under his command gathered a considerable number of troops which included Arabs, Turks, Kurds and volunteers. Abu al-Fida says there were with him (many peoples),[1] but al-Maqrezi estimated the number as great as 100,000.[2] This number could be another exaggeration of al-Maqrezi, but it does indicate that al-Nassir by this time had no lack of military forces; rather what he actually lacked was the spirit of a fighter. What marked al-Nassir's moves against the Mongol invasion was a policy of "wait and see," and when the Mongols thrust into Syria, he adopted a policy of gradual retreat to the south. Probably the best military action that al-Nassir could take against the Mongol threat was to station his troops on the Euphrates to prevent the Mongols from crossing the river to Syria, as general Baybars had suggested to him. Now, when the advanced Mongol guard crossed the river, al-Nassir, instead of defending his possessions in the north, decided to stay close to Damascus. Here in Berzah at a location between Aleppo on the north and Damascus on the south,[3] he was joined by his relative, al-malik al-Mansur II, the prince of Hamah.

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 200.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 423.

[3]Abu-al-Fida, op. cit., p. 200.

The major campaign against Syria, led by Hulagu in person most probably, was initiated in the month of al-Muharem 658 (January 1259), after Hulagu had completed the conquest of Northern Mesopotamia to the east of the Euphrates. The Mongols crossed the river by four bridges of boats at Malatia, Qalat Al-Rum, al-Birah and Kirkesia.[1] The first Syrian town to fall to the Mongols during this major campaign probably was the town of al-Birah, where the Mongols released an Ayyubid prince, al-Malik al-Sa'id, who had been imprisoned for nine years. After being given his freedom by the Mongols, al-Malik al-Sa'id became their sincere ally and he was offered the fiefs of al-Sabeba and Banyas towns. Hulagu, for the rest of the month of al-Muharem, beseiged and captured Menbesh to the north of Aleppo, Jabren and al-Malaha, which contained parts of the district of Aleppo.

While Hulagu was still in this region, he sent the prince of Erzerum with a message to al-Malik al-Mo'azzam Turan shah--the deputy of al-Nassir in Aleppo--offering what seemed flexible terms for surrender of the city to the Mongols. In this message, Hulage said that the Mongols did not wish to do any harm to Aleppo or its inhabitants, their quarrel being merely with al-Nassir. He requested only that two Mongol Shahnahs, one in the town, the other in the citadel might be

---

[1]Howorth, op. cit., p. 146; also, Ibn-al-Fuwati says that the Mongols had constructed three bridges at Malatia, al-Birah and Qalat al-Rum, op. cit., p. 340.

allowed to await the impending battle between al-Nassir and the Mongols which was to decide to whom the place should belong. If the Mongols won, the place was to be theirs; if the Sultan won, then he could put the Shahnahs to death or drive them out of the city. Mo'azzam replied that there was only a drawn sword between them. The Moslem envoy of Hulagu was astonished by the reply and was sad to perceive the fate of the city.[1]

Hulagu approached the city on the 2nd of Saffar, according to both Abu-al-Fida, the Syrian and the Egyptian, Ibn Taqri Bardi.[2] The Mongols laid the city under seige. Argatu Noyan was posted at the fate of the Jews, Kitubuqa Noyan at the gate of Rum (Greeks), Sunjag before the gate of Damascus, and Hulagu himself before that of Antioch.[3] The town was surrendered by battering engines, consisting of 20 catapults, and the attack was sustained for seven days, being chiefly pressed against the so-called Gate of Iraq.

The city fell according to the information compiled by Howorth on the 25th of January, 1260.[4] Abu al-Fida says the Mongols invaded the city from a public bath called "Hamam Hamadan," which was located

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 200.

[2]Ibid., p. 201.

[3]Rashid al-Din, p. 306; also, Howorth, op. cit., p. 147.

[4]Howorth, Ibid., p. 147.

at the edge of the citadel of al-Sharef.[1] Conversely, the day was Sunday, the 9th of Safar, when the Mongols started general massacres and looting in the city, which lasted, according to Abu al-Fida, until Friday the 14th of the same month of Safar.[2] Rashid al-Din says that the massacres continued for one week.[3] Those who escaped the massacres fled to the citadel of Aleppo, to the Jewish synagogue, to the monastery of the Sufis, and to several houses in the city for which their owners had "safe conducts" from the Mongols sparing them and their possessions. Abu al-Fida says that 50,000 people of Aleppo were saved in these places.[4] None of the primary sources at hand count the number of the people killed in this massacre. Abu al-Fida says "many people" were murdered,[5] while Rashid al-Din uses almost the same general expression, "great masses."[6] But, a modern historian counts them as many as 50,000--strangely enough the same number as that given by Abu al-Fida to those who were spared.[7] Al-Maqrezi describes how the streets of

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 201.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Rashid al-Din, Ibid., p. 306.

[4]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 201.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 306.

[7]Hitti, Philip K., Syria, A Short History (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1959), p. 202.

Aleppo were filled with the corpses of the dead, but he does not give a figure to the people killed. He does estimate the number of women and children taken captive by the Mongols as 100,000.[1]

The citadel of Aleppo resisted for a longer period than the city. There remained Moazzam Turanshah, the administrator of the city and some of al-Nassir's women and children. Abu al-Fida says that the citadel resistance continued for more than a month[2] while Rashid al-Din counts the days as 40.[3] The citadel surrendered on Monday, the 11th of Rabi, the first after a promise of safety was given by the Mongols to its holders. Al-Moazzam, who was so old, was not harmed but left to die days later. The citizens were allowed to return to their homes unharmed. Nine Bahri Mamluks, who had been jailed by al-Nassir, were handed over to a Kipchak in the service of the Mongols named Sultan Jack.[4] Hulagu ordered the destruction of the citadel and the city defenses afterward.[5]

The fall of Aleppo into the Mongol's hands resulted in a common fear that spread to other cities of Moslem Syria. The behavior of

---

[1]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 422.

[2]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., 202.

[3]Rashid al-Din, Ibid., p. 306.

[4]Howorth, op. cit., p. 148.

[5]Abu al-Fida, Ibid., p. 202.

the people, especially in Damascus, was affected by the attitude of al-Nassir, their ruler. When he received the news of the fall of Aleppo, al-Nassir was still camping with his considerable troops at Berzah to the north of Damascus. This news was the last test of his position from the Mongol invasion. He did not feel it worthwhile to confront the Mongols without further regard for the outcome or the necessary price. His decision was to retreat to the south. The historians who describe his situation seem to put the blame on what they conceived as "weakness" among his troops, and this weakness or fear resulted from the continuous triumphs that the Mongols had obtained over the Moslem armies and countries up-to-date. No doubt the "retreating spirit" of al-Nassir also inflamed the fear that already existed among the troops. The army, which was constituted of multi-national elements, Arabs, Turks, Kurds, and volunteers--soon disbanded. The only tie that held this army together had been the expectation of fighting, and with the fall of Aleppo and al-Nassir's decision to retreat there was no tie left to keep it together. "Alnass" which in the Arabic Medievalist historical use means "the significant people," sold their belongings at cheap prices and rushed out of Damascus. Many of them headed toward Egypt. The demand for transportation was so high that a camel hire rose during these days to seven-hundred pieces of silver. As the time was winter, those who moved in such haste suffered the cold. Also, many of them were victims of mountain highway thieves. Al-Nassir left

his camp at Berzah on Friday the 15th of Safar with the troops that remained with him. The prince of Hammah, al-Malik al-Mansour the II, who deserted his town accompanied him. Al-Nassir first retreated to Nabless on the west bank of the Jordan River, where he spent several days before leaving for Gaza. He left in Nabless a body of troops under the command of two Emirs, Mujer al-Din and Ali Ibn Shuja. Damascus was left defenseless and the majority of those who stayed in the city were al-Amma (the poor masses), who gathered behind and on the walls of the city. The vizier, Zain al-Din al-Hafezi, was one of the nobility who chose to remain behind, and it seems that he took charge of the city. He closed the city gates, gathered those who remained within, and decided with them to surrender the city to the Mongols. Three envoys of Hulagu were already in the nearby village of Haresta, and they were allowed to enter the city on Sunday evening, the 16th of safar. The next Monday morning, the 17th, after the noon prayer, a Firman or declaration of safety issued by Hulagu was read to the people. The nobility of the city continued to administer the city.[1] Those envoys reported the surrender of the city to Hulagu.

Hulagu later sent a corps of troops to the city with instructions not to harm the populace nor their properties. These troops reached Damascus on the 17th of Rabi, the 1st, which sets the arrival

---

[1]Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 203, Beirut (?), p. 203.

of the Mongol troops one month after the voluntary surrender of the city. These troops were welcomed to the city, according to Rashid al-Din,[1] but from the side of al-Goutta, they crushed a group which resisted.[2] According to Runciman, on I March, Kitubuqa entered Damascus at the head of a Mongol army. With him were the king of Armenia and the prince of Antioch, and thus the citizens of the ancient capital of the Caliphat saw for the first time in six centuries, three christian potentates ride in triumph through their streets.[3] However, none of the Arabic primary sources at hand cites the entry of three christian chiefs together.

Rashid al-Din gives a different account concerning the submission of Damascus than other historians. According to him, the chiefs of Damascus traveled to Hulagu in Aleppo to offer him presents and the keys to their city, and to declare their loyalty to him. Therefore, Hulagu sent troops under the command of Kitubuqa to Damascus. These troops were instructed not to harm people and when they arrived they were welcomed to the city. An administration was set up in the city composed of three (Arabs ?) and the Mongols. Rashid al-Din, who did not name the Mongol administrators, says that the Arabs were al-Jashi,

---

[1] Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 308.

[2] Abu-Shama, Ibid.

[3] Runciman, op. cit., p. 307.

al-Qazweeni and al-Qumi.[1] Two of those administrators, certainly Persians, as their last names al-Qumi--of Qum of Persia--and Qazweeni--of Qazqeen of Persia--Abu Shama says that the Mongol chief in the city was a person names Il-Seban.[2]

The only serious resistance that occurred in the city was that of the citadel under the command of the Emir Badr al-Din Mohamad, which according to al-Maqrezi revolted on the 5th of Rabi, the second less than two months after the voluntary submission of the city to the Mongols. The revolt of the citadel continued until the 13th of Jumadi, the first, which means that the citadel resisted for more than a month. It was besieged by the Mongols and bombarded by battering engines until its defendants surrendered and were given a promise of safety. Abu-Shama, the Damascusian historian who was an eye-witness to the events, is the only Arab historian who tells us of the Mongol usage in Syria of carts that were drawn by cows (or oxen) to carry their weapons.[3] The Mongols then destroyed its towers and defenses. Al-Maqrezi and Abu al-Fida, who also mention this event, do not detail the circumstances of the revolt.

---

[1] Rashid al-Din., op. cit., p. 308.

[2] Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 205.

[3] Ibid., p. 204.

After the subjugation of the two main Syrian cities, Aleppo and Damascus, the Mongols extended their domination over the whole of Moslem Syria from Harrim in the north to al-Kark and Gaza in the south. Balback, the main town in the al-Bega Valley--presently in the state of Lebanon--fell to the Mongols after Damascus. Zain al-Din al-Hafezi, the former vizier of al-Nassir, who worked for the voluntary submission of Damascus to the Mongols, wrote to the governor of Balback, Shuja al-Din, who was in the service of al-Nassir, asking him to surrender the town of Kitubuqa, marching with a garrison to the town. Shuja al-Din refused to surrender in the beginning, but the Moslem theologian convinced him that his resistance would shed Moslem blood to no real advantage and he submitted to Kitubuqa and moved to Damascus with his relatives. Zain al-Din al-Hafezi acted thereafter more as a Mongol than the Mongols themselves. He wrote to Hulagu complaining about Shuja al-Din, accusing him of being in rebellion. Hulagu wrote on the back of al-Hafezi's letter, ordering his general Kitubuqa, to kill Shuja al-Din. Kitubuqa, out of anger against the ex-vizier--who reached Hulagu behind his back--ordered al-Hafezi to execute Hulagu's instructions himself, and to kill Shuja al-Din, along with the Emir of the Citadel of Damascus, with his own sword. The vizier, who so far had acted to avoid the shedding of Moslem blood by confrontation with

the Mongols, killed the two men at the insistence of the Mongol general.[1]

The town of Hammah, having been deserted and left undefended by its prince, al-Mansour, who retreated to Nabless and then to Gaza with al-Nassir, now submitted voluntarily to the Mongols. The chiefs of the town approached Hulagu in Aleppo offering him the keys to the town and declaring their loyalty. Hulagu appointed as a governor for the town a Persian named Khosru Shah, who claimed to be descended from the Arab conqueror of Syria, Khalid Ibn al-Walid of the 7th Century, A.D.[2] The town of Hims, which was also left undefended by al-Nassir, was restored to its former Ayyubid prince, al-Malik al-Ashraf. This prince, who had been deprived of his possessions by his relative al-Nassir, approached Hulagu in Aleppo; and consequently returned to Hims as its governor under the Mongol overlordship. Another Ayyubid prince, al-Malik al-Sa'id, who was deprived of his possessions, Banyas and al-Sabeba in the District of al-Julan, was released from the prison of his relative in al-Berah and appointed governor of his old possessions. This prince more than any Syrian went out of his way to prove loyalty to the Mongols.

After this, the major towns of Muslim Palestine were subjugated by the Mongols. Nabless was attacked and the generals of al-Nassir's

---

[1]Ibn Shadad, Muhamed Ibn Ali, al-A'laq-al-Khatirah, Damascus 1962, pp. 51-52.

[2]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 201.

garrison there were killed. Runciman says that the Mongols never reached Jerusalem.[1] This statement is contradictory to what Syrian historians of the 13th century inform us. Ibn-Shadad says that Jerusalem was subjugated and that a small number of people in the town were killed.[2] Another 13th century historian, this time an Armenian, tells also that Jerusalem was captured by the Mongols.[3] The Ayyubid prince of the town of Al-Kark cooperated with the Mongols and the town of al-Khalel on the west bank of the Jordan was added to his possessions on the west bank of the Jordan River.

The town of (Harence) Harrim in the north and to the east of Aleppo had to pay a higher price than any other Syrian town--the price of a 'conditional' submission to the Mongols. This town first refused to submit and it was besieged by the Mongols. When its people were pressed for submission, they refused to conclude peaceful terms with Hulagu except through a Moslem negotiator whose word they would believe. This condition obviously was a blow to Hulagu's ego and inflamed his anger; nevertheless, he accepted the condition and asked them to appoint the Moslem person they would trust.

---

[1] Runciman, op. cit., p.

[2] Ibn-Shadad, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

[3] Grigor of Akanc, History of the Nation of the Archers, Howard U. Press, Cambridge, 1954, p. 81.

The people of Harrim chose Fakr al-Din al-Saqi, who was in charge of the citadel of Aleppo and in the service of Hulagu. Hulagu instructed this man to carry on the task, and he gave a promise of safety to Harrim. When the people opened the gates of their town, Hulagu ordered the whole population of the town to be exterminated in a general Massacre. Men, women and children were put to death according to Rashid al-Din. Only one person, an Armenian goldsmith, was saved by the Mongols.[1] Abu al-Fida says the men were killed, while women of the town were taken captives.[2] Fakhr al-Din, who was chosen by Harrim and ordered by Hulagu to give the "respectable" promise of safety, was killed later on Hulagu's order. Rashid al-Din says his murder was a result of complaints about his honesty in his duties in the citadel of Aleppo, but his end could possibly be linked with the case of Harrim. At Harrim, Hulagu came to the frontier of Antioch and according to Runciman, the Mongol leader, was visited and paid homage by Bohemond, VI, the prince of Antioch.[3] This meeting marked the subjection of Antioch to the Mongols.

Al-Nassir, at that time stationed in Gaza, was rejoined by his brother, al-Thahir, and by the Mamluks who had previously attempted to

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 306.

[2]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 203.

[3]Runciman, op. cit., p. 306.

take his life. When he received the news that the Mongols had arrived in Nabless, he moved with his troops to al-Arish on the northeastern border of the Sinai Desert, and from there, he wrote again to Qutuz, the sultan of Egypt, requesting his assistance. No date is given for these events nor details regarding al-Nassir's mission to Cairo. From al-Arish, al-Nassir moved to Qatya, a custom station taxing trade between Egypt and Syria, somewhere in the middle of the Sinai Desert. Crucial events in Qatya, perpetrated a decisive turning point in the career of al-Nassir. These events led to the removal of al-Nassir from the political scene in the Near East, thus opening the way for another regional power--namely the Mamluks--to take the responsibility for confronting the Mongols and pushing them out of Syria.

There were two immediate consequences of al-Nassir's arrival and stay in Qatya. First, his ultimate disillusionment regarding his hopes to personally obtain any level of military assistance from the Mamluk regime in Egypt and, second, the final disbanding of his army. Although some of his army had deserted in Berzah, the total army disbanded and deserted him in the middle of the Sinai desert. These troops continued their march to Egypt where they were wll received by Qutuz, probably due to the absence of al-Nassir.

Despite the importance and sensitivity of the events which occurred in Qatya, the information that is given by primary sources is very brief. Perhaps the fact that Abu al-Fida, al-Maqrezi, and

Ibn Taqri Bardi wrote under the shadow of the Mamluks had something to do with the lack of information about Qutuz' attitude toward al-Nassir, who was about to enter Egypt with his troops, seeking refuge and assistance. Previously, Qutuz had responded positively to the first appeal from al-Nassir for Egyptian assistance. He wrote to him in a very humble style, asserting his willingness to help, and further claimed that he himself was a mere deputy of al-Nassir in Egypt! It is probably true, as al-Maqrezi mentions, that Qutuz wrote al-Nassir humbly in order to prevent the latter from making an alliance with the Mongols against the Mamluks in Egypt. Al-Nassir, who perhaps could not make an alliance with the Mongols in an equal term, came to depend on the illusion that Qutuz was sincere in his offer of assistance.

Here in Qatya, al-Nassir was about to enter Egypt, but bad news that he received from the Egyptian side stopped him short of crossing the desert into the Nile Valley. This news was not elaborated on by Abu al-Fida, al-Maqrezi, nor Ibn Taqri Bardi, Abu al-Fida says "al-Nassir was afraid of being arrested if he went into Egypt."[1] Al-Maqrezi says that "al-Nassir arrived in Qatya, and Qutuz, out of fear of al-Nassir, marched with his troops to al-Sa'lihia."[2] Ibn Taqri Bardi cites that

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 202.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 426.

"al-Nassir returned back from Qatya (to Transjordan) because 'something' had reached him about Qutuz."[1]

How could al-Nassir, who had already sent his wife, his treasures, and part of his troops, to Egypt and who had lost his possessions to the Mongols, constitute any danger to Qutuz in Egypt? An explanation which seems tenable is that al-Nassir was to Qutuz, at this particular moment, not a refugee in need of help, but rather an old rival. He was the only significant living Ayyubid legitimist who, despite his present miserable condition in Qatya, had been responsible for more than one campaign against the Mamluks attempting to restore the Ayyubid remine in Egypt. Beyond this, he received in his court those Bahri Mamluk dissidents who fled out of Egypt, and according to the Egyptian al-Maqrezi, he attempted to make an alliance with the Mongols against the Mamluks. To further explain the fear and suspicion of Qutuz, I would speculate that the Mamluk leader expected that al-Nassir would attempt to seize power in Egypt, depending on his Ayyubid legitimacy and perhaps on encouragement and support by non-Mamluk elements in the country, especially in the military. In addition, al-Nassir would be backed in such an attempt by his own troops. Such a possibility, if it crossed Qutuz' mind, would justify his fear of al-Nassir's entry to Egypt where the Mamluk regime was not popular.

---

[1] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 77.

An additional factor which contributed to the final disbandment of al-Nassir's army, noted by Abu al-Fida,[1] was an internal clash between the Kurdish and Turkic elements within the remnants of his army. Caught between the news from Egypt and the clashes within his forces, al-Nassir decided to turn back to South Syria, while the rest of his troops and his relative, the prince of Hammah, al-Monsour, the II, continued on to Egypt. For awhile, al-Nassir, who was accompanied by a few of his Mamluks, was thinking of retreating to al-Hijaz. His route took him on to Transjordan where he first stopped at Wadi Musa then proceeded to a place used as a station for the Moslem pilgrims, called Berkat Zieza.[2] To complete al-Nassir's misfortunes, one of his Mamluks informed the Mongols of his location at Berkat Zieza, and he fell honorable captive of the Mongols.[3] Other sources say that the Mamluk, by contacting the Mongol, tried to obtain a safe-conduct for his master.[4] None of the sources on hand mention the date of his arrest. The Mongols spared al-Nassir's life for their own purposes.

Al-Nassir was taken to the Mongol general Kitubuqa, who was by then engaged in besieging Ajalon fortress. Kitubuqa bade al-Nassir

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, p. 202.

[2]Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 77.

[3]Abu al-Fida, Ibid., p. 202.

[4]Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 205.

order the governor of the fortress to surrender--which he did after some resistance. Al-Nassir's life was further spared to serve wider Mongol interests, as later events will indicate. Hulagu by then had left Syria, for Tabriz in Persia, and al-Nassir was sent to him there where he was treated well by Hulagu upon his arrival. The Mongol chief moreover promised to restore to him Syria when he had conquered Egypt.[1]

Questions could be raised here: Why did Hulagu spare the life of al-Nassir and promise him the restoration of his lost possessions in Syria? And, why should this promise to al-Nassir be postponed until Hulagu had conquered Egypt? In answering these questions, I would remove first a premature assumption that Hulagu treated al-Nassir well and promised the restoration of his lost possessions out of love or personal admiration for him; rather the answers should be in light of previous dealings of the Mongols in the Near East and of Mongol self-interests. Also, during the subjugation of the Assassins in Persia (1256), the Mongols spared the life of Khurshah, the chief of the Assassins, until he helped in the subjugation of other Assassin fortresses in Persia, and helped the Mongols to obtain the submission of the Assassins in Syria. Now, in the case of al-Nassir, Hulagu probably planned to use al-Nassir as a card in his forthcoming struggle with the Mamluks in Egypt. Al-Nassir--as an old enemy of the Mamluk regime, the

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 204; also, Howorth, op. cit., p. 164; and Ibn al-Fuwati, op. cit., p. 343.

leader of legitimate Ayyubids, and having been in the Mongol Camp--could weaken the Egyptian political and military campaign in case of confrontation with the Mongols. Thus, the struggle between the Mongols and the Mamluks would seem, on the surface, not purely a struggle between external and internal powers over the region, but as a Mongol-Ayyubid alliance against the Mamluk regime, and therefore many supporters of the Ayyubids could be drawn to this alliance or at least could be neutralized.

On his way to the Ordu of Hulagu in Persia, al-Nassir had passed by Damascus and Aleppo, and there he witnessed the destruction that the Mongols had caused in the city where he was raised and had ruled. The scene in Aleppo was so upsetting to him that he wept and his only real talent, that of being a poet, came to express:

> It is painful to see your home withering away after
> the signs of its beauty had always been cited.[1]

Hulagu left for Persia after he secured the subjugation of Aleppo and Damascus, the two main cities of Moslem Syria. However, during his stay in Syria, Hulagu's residence and movements were limited to North Syria and he himself never reached Damascus. His latest task in Syria was the subjugation of Harrim. His departure from Syria was not expected before he completed his planned conquest of Egypt; however, when he received the new in Aleppo of the death of his brother, the

---

[1] Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 204.

Great Khan Mongke, he left Syria suddenly. Sinktur Noyan arrived from the Imperial Headquarters in Mongolia with this news. Hulagu was greatly distressed and determined to return home, but when he reached Tebriz, he was told that his second brother Khubilis had been raised to the Imperial Throne and he did not go in.[1] Rashid al-Din does not give a fixed date for Hulagu's departure from Aleppo, but said that Hulagu reached the region of Akhlate on the 24th of Jumadi the second,[2] which probably makes his departure from Syria earlier in the same Arabic month (late April or early May 1260). Before he left, Hulagu put his trusted general Kitubuqa in charge of the Mongol domination and troops which numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 men. It was probably Kitubuqa who extended the Mongol conquest in Syria to the east and south of Damascus. Hulagu, also, had sent a mission to Qutuz in Egypt with a message demanding the submission of the Mamluks to the Mongols.

After relating the course of the Mongol invasion of Syria, three subjects regarding the Mongol occupation of Syria need to be discussed: 1) Mongol administration in the Syrian hinterland, 2) Mongol policy regarding the religious structure that existed in Moslem Syria prior to their invasion, and 3) Mongol-crusader relations.

---

[1]Howorth, op. cit., p. 151.

[2]Rashid al-Din, op.cit., p. 308.

The Mongols who held the upper political and military authority did not interfere in the Syrian day-to-day administration. Those Syrian princes and chiefs who cooperated with them from the beginning remained in their posts and services. Three Ayyubid princes held service under Mongol domination: al-Malik al-Ashraf of Hims, al-Malik al-Sa'id of Banyas and al-Sabeba, and al-Malik al-Mugeeth of al-Kark and al-shubik. The ex-vizier of al-Nassir, Zain al-Din al-Hafezi took charge of the Aleppo citidel after the execution of his former governor, Fakr al-Din. Besides these natives, it is noticeable that the Mongols used Arabic Persian Shi'ites to hold administrative posts in Damascus and Hammah. In Damascus, Hulagu appointed three Persians who were previously cited from Rashid al-Din in this paper. In Hammah, the governor installed by the Mongols was a Persian named Khusrushah. This points to the favored status that the Shi'ites--especially the Persian Shi'ites --enjoyed in the Mongol administration.

In the judicial system of Moslem Syria, the Mongols appointed to the office of the Syrian Judge and the Office of Grand Judge of Syria and North Mesopotamia those who were overtly favorable toward the Mongols. The Syrian Judgeship was granted to Muhyi al-Din Zaki, who had traveled, we are told, from Damascus to Aleppo, before the submission of Damascus, to pledge his allegiance to Hulagu. The new judge thereupon returned to the city and, having assembled the chief inhabitants in the Great Mosque, on Sunday, the 3rd of February, dressed in

his Khilat made of golden tissue--a royal gift from Hulagu which was a robe of honor--read out his diploma of investiture, with Hulagu's order granting a general amnesty. The office of Grand Judge for Syria and North Mesopotamia was granted by diploma from Hulagu to Omar Tiflisi Kamil al-Din. This diploma from Hulagu was publicly read in al-Maidan al-aKhdar, or the Green Square in Damascus. There is no information on the nationality of those two judges; neither is there information about the Moslem sect that each belonged to. Regarding the religious structure, the Mongols adopted in Syria the same policy they had adopted in Iraq. They delivered the native christians from the pre-Mongol restrictions and favored them over the Moslems. The christians in return used their freedom to the extent of humiliating and insulting the Moslems. The Moslem Sunni felt the pressure of the Mongols most in what could be described as "discriminatory policy." Al-Maqrezi tells that:

> The Christians at Damascus now began to be ascendent. They produced a diploma from Hulagu guaranteeing them express protection and the free exercise of their religion. They drank wine freely in the month of Ramadan, and spilt it on the clothes of the Moslems in the streets and poured it on the doors of the Mosques. They compelled the shopkeepers to rise for the cross when the christians carried it in the roads on their way to the Church of St. Mary, and they mistreated those who refused to rise (for the cross). They used to stand with a cross and speak in praising their religion, saying openly that 'the true faith, the faith of the Messiah, is triumphant.' This upset the Moslems and they complained to Kitubuqa, the deputy of Hulagu. When they did, Kitubuqa treated them with indignity and several of them were by his

> orders bastinated. He (Kitubuqa) visited the christian churches and paid deference to their clergy.[1]

Al-Maqrezi goes on to mention that al-Hafizi tried to ease the pressure of the Mongols by offering presents to their chiefs.

The mistreatment of Moslems occurred after the departure of Hulagu and was probably a result of the christian, Kitubuqa's pro-christian policy.[2] Al-Maqrezi cites that certain insults against the Moslems occurred during the month of Ramadan,[3] Ibn Taqri Bardi dates this event on the 22nd of the month of Ramadan.[4] There are also indications that Shi'ite elements had cooperated with the Mongols and probably in reward, they enjoyed a more comfortable position than the Sunni's.

Mongol-Frankish Relations

Mongol-Crusader relations during the term of the Mongol occupation of Syria (1260) were not all friendly. Prior to the Mongol invasion, the christians of West Europe and Asia, and particulary the Crusaders, had looked with hop upon the rising star of the Mongol power

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 425; also, Howorth, op. cit., p. 150.

[2] Kitubuqa was a christian of the Nestorian sect.

[3] This date should be about four months after the departure of Hulagu.

[4] Iban Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 81.

over Islamdom, by then the main political, military, and cultural counter of christiandom in the late Middle Ages.

It has been noticed that the diplomatic effect of the Mongol tolerant attitude toward christians in Asia, was widespread and was of special significance in relations with the west. At the first appearance of the Mongols, westerns had been of varying opinions. They were not unaware of the frightful ravages perpetrated by the invaders and knew that in Europe these fell on christian peoples and churches. On the other hand, they quickly saw that a Mongol defeat of nearby Moslems was almost as good as a Frankish victory; and Franks, who derived their information from the Nestorian christians of central Asia, were aware of these advantages which a Mongol occupation brought to christians. It has been noticed that the approach of the Mongols happened to coincide with the moment when, under the combined effect of the failure of the Crusades and the spirit of the growing mendicant orders, the papacy undertook a missionary policy which--if it was not at first aimed at--could not avoid establishing contact with the Mongols and the christians under their domination.

Innocent IV, in 1247 sent to Mongolia, through Russia, the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, whose accounts remain priceless sources of information. The Mongol response was somewhat disconcerting. The Great Khan demanded the submission of all-kings, emperors, and pope. The mission of John of Plano Carpini seems as it aimed to offer

information about the state of Mongols in the first place. As the Pope's envoy he was aware of the Mongol attention to extend their domination over the world, he suggested certain methods that western christiandom should adopt to encounter the expected Mongol invasion.[1]

St. Louis, the French king, had attempted during his Crusade (1249-1254) to establish a sort of political alliance with the Mongols. As a matter of historical fact, the Mongols were the ones who started the connection with the French Crusader; when he received in 1249, in Cyprus Mongol envoys. In return, St. Louis sent his own envoys to the Great Khan of the Mongols. The envoys of the French king returned to the Holy Land before the departure of the king of France in 1254. They carried with them a demand from the Great Khan to the French king to submit to the Mongol overlordship. If he refused to submit, the Great Khan warned that the Mongols will destroy him and his country. DeJoinville, who recorded the diplomatic contacts, says that the Mongol answer to his mission had repented the king sorely that he had ever sent envoys to the great king of the Tatars.[2]

The earliest and most effective alliance of christians with the Mongols was that of Hetoum I (or Haiton), King of Armenia. In 1254 he

---

[1]John of Plano Carpini, "History of the Mongols," in the Mongol Mission, ed. by Christopher Dawson, Sheed and Ward, London, 1955.

[2]DeJoinville, op. cit., pp. 168.

had himself visited the Great Khan Mongke at Karakorum. In return for calling himself the Khan's vassal, he was promised increased territory and protection against the Anatolian Turks. He persuaded his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch, who seems in some way to have regarded him as overlord, to follow his policy. Hetoum participated in the Mongol invasion of Northern Syria and he and Bohemond were both rewarded with some of the spoils taken by the Mongols at Aleppo. Hetoum was further given back territory that he had lost to the Turks in Cilicia, and Bohemond received towns and forts that Antioch had lost to the Moslems in Saladin's time, including the port of Latakia--the only sea outlet which was left for the Muslems in the Middle and Northern Syrian coast. In return, Bohemond was requested to admit the Greek patriarch Euthymius back into Antioch in place of the Latin. Though King Hethoum was not well disposed of their element at Antioch.[1] An Arabic primary source informs us that Antioch actually turned into a vassal principality of the Mongols. The Mongols installed Shahna in Antioch and gathered head taxes from its inhabitants.[2] Though the Mongols in the northern coast of Syria had established such an alliance and treated Antioch as vassal, their relations with the Franks in Acre to the South were not friendly, but somehow reached the point of military confrontation now.

---

[1]Runciman, op. cit., p. 306.

[2]Ibn al-Dawadari, Akhbar al-Dawla al-Turkiya, edited by Ulbrich Haarmann (Cairo, 1971), p. 127.

The Antagonistic Stance of the Southern Franks Toward the Mongols

To the Franks at Acre, Bohemond's subjugation to the Mongols seemed disgraceful. The recovery of Latakia was unimportant in their minds in comparison with the insult done to the Latin church by the re-introduction of the Greek patriarch. The pope hastened to excommunicate Bohemond, while the barons at Acre wrote a letter to King Louis's brother, Charles of Anjou, to describe the dangers, political and moral, of the Mongol advance and to ask for his help. Dr. Steven Runciman says it is probable that the barons were influenced by the Venetians, who saw with the growing concern how the Genoese were strengthening their hold on the Far Eastern trade through their friendship with the Mongols, and through their new monpolies in the Black Sea since the Greek re-capture of Constantinople in July 1261. Runciman justifies fairly the fear the Franks had of the Mongols who seemed to be determined to achieve world conquest, and experience showed that they could not tolerate the existence of Independent States--their allies had to be their vassals.[1] Runciman says that "the Mongols had no intention of attacking the Franks." This statement by itself is not quite reasonable and is contradictory somehow to his justification for the Frankish fear of the Mongols. The Mongols actually had not enough span of time to

---

[1]Steven Runciman, "The Crusader States 1243-1291," op. cit., p. 573.

exercise their power in the rest of the Frankish establishments on the Syrian coast. Regarding the span of time they spent in Syria (January to September 1260), their efforts were devoted to two priorities: 1) the subjugation of Muslim Syria and 2) the expectation and preparation of a decisive confrontation with Mamluk Egypt. This expected confrontation was of decisive characteristic. Thus, the Mongols for practical reasons would not provoke the antagonism of the Franks while they had not finished dealing with Egypt, neither were they in haste to impose their power on the rest of the Franks for this very pragmatic reason. Otherwise a single political power that dominated the Syrian hinterland, especially an expansionist power like the Mongols, would not hestitate to bring the Syrian coast into its political domination either peacefully--as in the case of Antioch--or by force. The Mongols had no time for any of these alternatives with the Franks in Acre.

This unfriendly or at least unwelcomed attitude of the Crusaders in the South toward the Mongols probably led to military provocation which was carried on by Lord Julian of Sidon, who is described by Runciman as "irresponsible." This Lord could not resist the temptation to conduct a raid into the Biqa. The Mongols who had taken over the district, sent a small company to drive him back, but its leader, who was Kitubuqa's nephew, was ambushed and killed by Julian. Kitubuqa angrily sent troops which penetrated to Sidon and sacked the town. A raid into Balilee led by John II of Beirut and the Templars was severely

punished by the Mongols. John was captured and had to be ransomed.[1] Abu-Shama provides us with rather significant information regarding the last event. He says that the news of the last clash between the Mongols and Franks had reached him in Damascus on the 8th of Ramadan 658 A.H. (August 1260 A.D.) and that the Mongols who sacked Sidon had taken 300 Frankish prisoners.[2]

Howorth says that this contretemps impaired the confidence which previous existed between the Mongols and christians due to Dokus Khatun's influence and to the friendship which existed between Hulagu and Haiton, the king of Little Armenia. Howorth also concludes that the successes of the Mongols in Syria were not altogether reassuring to the christians. According to information he obtained, the people of Acre cut down all the grands about the town, while urgent letters were written to the sovereigns of Western Europe to come to the rescue. A rumor spread that Antioch and Tripoli had been taken by the Tatars, and an envoy reached England where a council was held and prayers and fasting enjoined. St. Louis held a similar council at Paris where a like discipline was enjoined, and orders given that no games were to be played except archery and shooting with the crossbow.[3]

---

[1]Runciman, op. cit., p. 573.

[2]Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 207.

[3]Howorth, op. cit., pp. 124, 165.

The split in the Crusaders' attitude toward the Mongol occupation of Muslim Syria, and particularly the unfriendly attitude of the Franks in Acre toward the Mongols, would have an important effect on the events following that would lead to the end of the Mongol tide in the Near East. It is this unfriendly Frankish attitude of the Mongols that the Mamluks in Egypt had exploited to their best benefit in their forthcoming military confrontation with the Mongols.

Chapter V

THE EGYPTIAN ENGAGEMENT AND THE END OF THE MONGOL TIDE IN THE NEAR EAST (1260)

While the Mongols were extending their dominion over Syria down to Gaza in Southern Palestine, Ibn Taqri Bardi indicates that Qutuz, the Mumluk Sultan of Egypt, was preparing (himself or his country) to fight them.[1] Further elaboration on this general statement concerning the preparation of Qutuz is given in accounts by this Egyptian historian and other historians.

From his seizure of power in Egypt, in the month al-Qeda 657 A.H. (November 1259) until he marched toward Palestine in the month of Ramadan 658 A.H. (August 1260), it seems Qutuz adopted political, financial, and military measures that I perceive as preparation for an expected confrontation with the Mongols.

On the political plane, Qutuz rebuilt the internal front of the Mamluk military ruling class of Egypt for the first time since 1254 when it had broken down as the result of a power struggle. He welcomed

---

[1] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 77.

the return to Egypt of Baybars, the most significant of the Mamluk generals who had fled to Syria in 1254 and who had influenced the political situation of that country for six years. Baybars, failing to persuade al-Nassir of Syria to confront the Mongols, had fled to Gaza with the dissident Mamluks who had plotted to assassinate al-Nassir. In Gaza he and the other Mamluks installed al-Thahir, al-Nassir's brother as Sultan.[1] Apparently, Baybars grew unsatisfied with the situation in Gaza as he sent a message to Qutuz requesting to join him in Egypt and assurance of his safety upon his return. Qutuz granted his request and gave him the fiefs of Qalyyub when he returned.[2] Other Mamluks, who were prisoners, most probably for political reasons, in the citidal of the mountain in Cairo, were set free.[3] These political moves taken by Qutuz undoubtedly strengthened his regime and its capacity to confront the Mongols.

In order to cover the expenses of a planned or expected military confrontation with the Mongols in Syria, Qutuz levied, according to al-Maqrezi, a capitation tax, which produced 600,000 dinars. He confiscated the personal property of the adherents of al-Nassir who had abandoned the latter to join Qutuz. The wife of al-Nassir was obligated

---

[1] Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., p. 792.

[2] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 240.

[3] Ibn-al Dawadari, op. cit., p. 50.

to produce her jewels, of which a portion were taken. The wives of other Amirs had to make similar sacrifices.[1]

Militarily, Qutuz strengtened his army by welcoming all Moslem militants who had fled westward before the advancement of the Mongols. Khurds, Turkmen, North Mesopotamian and Syrian troops had joined his forces in Egypt. The disbanding of al-Nassir's army probably had most benefited Qutuz.

Qutuz had justified his coup d'etat in 1259 by his ability to offer Egypt better conditions to fight the Mongols. It seems clear to me that his policies from the very beginning of his reign had continously supported his claim. His aim was to confront the Mongols and his steps had taken him to this end. His mission to al-Nassir (November 1259) to prevent the latter from making an alliance with the Mongols, his restoration of the Mamluk internal front, his strengthening of the military and finally his killing of Hulagu's envoy who demanded his submission to the Mongols, all these moves prove Qutuz' determination to confront the Mongols.

Although he was determined to fight he was in no hurry to do so. Abn Abd-al-Zahir, informs us that Qutuz had sent troops to assist al-Nassir. This auxiliary did not advance further into Syria because

---

[1]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 426-427, 439-440.

the Shahrazuri Kurds in Gaza attempted to attack it.[1] This information from the Ibn Abd al-Zahir is the only indication from the Arabic sources regarding Egyptian assistance to al-Nassir. The historian did not reveal the size of these troops or the date of their dispatching. I would assume it was of small size otherwise they would not be blocked by the Shahrazuris. This was probably due either to his unfinished preparation or to be a very practical and selfish desire to let the Mongols defeat the legitimist Ayyubid ruler of Syria so that if he won Syria from the Mongols the prize would be completely his.

Thus Qutuz, either by choice or necessity, was obliged to wait until the Mongols conquered all of Syria and destroyed the politically inactive al-Nassir. This resulted in Qutuz' consequent inheritance of al-Nassir's army making him the only Moslem ruler at this stage in the Near East to shoulder the task of fighting the Mongols. If he was the victor, the fruits of the victory would be exclusively his, but if he was the loser, he and his Mamluk regime in Egypt would pay fully for the loss.

During the span of time in which Qutuz spent in observation and preparation, Ibn Taqri Bardi informs us that the spirit of the people in Egypt was low. Those of North Africa living in Egypt fled to Yemen

---

[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 91.

and to al-Hijaz. Those who could or wanted not to desert the country were full of fear and expected the worst to come upom them.[1]

When Qutuz finally decided to take military action against the Mongols in Syria, it was in July 1260, seven months from the beginning of the Mongol invasion of Syria. With this decision, Qutuz was able to chose the time and place of his confrontation with the Mongols rather than having it imposed on him by his enemy. His decision to attack the Mongols in Syria was probably a result of careful observation of the Syrian scene. It seems that Qutuz was taking advantage of two events occurring in Syria at that time. These two developments favorable to Qutuz, which have been realized by historians,[2] were firstly, Hulagu's departure from Syria to Persia with the majority of his troops because of the death of his brother Monke (August 16, 1259). He may have had hopes to become Great Khan and he had increasing discord with his relative, Berka Khan, the Moslem Khan of the Golden Horde, to the northwest of his realm. The second reason was the military clashes which had occurred between the Mongols in inner Syria and the Franks of Acre on the Lebanese coast and North Palestine.

Regarding the first situation, Hulagu had left a relatively small number of troops in Syria under the command of his trusted general

---

[1]Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 78.

[2]Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes (Trans. Naomi Walford) Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey: 1970, pp. 367-368.

Kitubuqa. The number of these troops as estimated by twentieth century historians is between 10,000 and 20,000 men.[1] Ibn Khaldun puts the number at 12,000.[2] On the other hand, Qutuz' army had enlarged since the Mongol invasion of Syria and was estimated as containing as many as 120,000 men. According to Howorth it consisted (independently of the Egyptian troops) of Syrians, Turkmen and (the remnants of Khorezmshah's troops?) who sought shelter in Syria and Egypt.[3] Although there is no doubt about the enlargement of the Egyptian army by militant refugees from Syria and north Mesopotamia, the number given above is an exaggeration. The Khorizmian troops which were mentioned as a remnant of the Khorizmshad's army were defeated in 1231, which by 1260 should make them at any age beyond useful military service! Even though the number given by Howorth is exaggerated, it must be taken as a tentative estimation which indicates that the Egyptian army outnumbered the Mongol forces in Syria. Abu-Shama says that the Egyptian army was composed of "great masses."[4]

This existing balance of manpower between the Mamluks and the Mongols in Syria probably encouraged Qutuz to attack his enemies. Also,

---

[1] Ibid., p. 363.

[2] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 819.

[3] Howorth, op. cit., p. 167.

[4] Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 207.

the absence of Hulagu personally from the region undoubtedly gave further encouragement and relieved psychological pressure from Hulagu's foes of the presence of the victorious conqueror of such horrible fame.

In regards to the second situation, the clashes between the Mongols and the Franks introduced a new condition favorable to Qutuz. We are informed of three Mongol-Frankish clashes, in the present state of Lebanon. The provocation first came from the Franks of the coast, when Julian the Lord of Sidon raided the al-Bega valley which had become Mongol dominated land. Kitubuqa responded by sending a small troop under a nephew of his to punish the Franks. Julian then summoned his neighbors to his aid and they ambushed and slew the nephew. Kitubuqa then angrily sent a larger army, which penetrated into Sidon and ravaged the town.[1] Western secondary sources do not give any fixed date for these events. Abu-Shama on the other hand is the only Arab historian who tells briefly of the Mongol sack of Sidon. We are informed by him that the news of this sack came to Damascus on the 8th of Ramadan, which makes the occurrence of the last clash in August 1260. He also tells that 300 of the Franks were taken captive by the Mongols.[2]

Frankish-Mongol tension meant, in all practicality, the destruction of a previously possible Mongol-Frankish alliance on the

---

[1]Runciman, op. cit., p. 308.

[2]Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 207.

Palestinian and Lebanese coast which would have been similar to the alliance already drawn between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of lesser Armenia and the Mongols. Geographically, the stance of the Kingdom of Acre on the southern coast of Syria was of more importance to Qutuz than the stance of the principality of Antioch further to the north. If Qutuz obtained only the neutrality of Acre, it would be beneficial to him. Qutuz was possibly aware of the first or the two earlier Mongol-Frankish clashes, and thus he took advantage of this matter for his own ends.

Al-Maqrezi, whose accounts of the Egyptian Mongol confrontation are most detailed, links Qutuz' final decision to move militarily against the Mongols in Syria to his receiving of Hulagu's demand for submission brought by Mongol envoys.[1] According to al-Maqrezi, Qutuz, upon receiving the letter (probably sometime during July 1260), gathered his Amirs for consultation. As a result of this council, Qutuz decided to execute Hulagu's envoys and to fight the Mongols.[2] Rashid al-Din also cites such a consultation between Qutuz and the Amirs. These accounts display what seems to be a variety of attitudes among the

---

[1] Ibn-Khaldun says that the letter and the envoys were sent by Kitubuqa, which is more probable, as the envoys arrived to Cairo immediately before the Egyptian march toward Palestine (late July), while Hulagu, left Syria in the last days of May or the early days of June, op. cit., p. 819.

[2] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 429.

generals. An Amir named al-Quimary leaned toward submission to Hulagu and expressed fear of meeting the same miserable fate of those who had previously resisted. Baybars, as he did previously in Syria, held the hard-line and advised Qutuz to execute the envoys and to march against the Mongols.[1] Qutuz was aligned with the hard-line view of Baybars. According to Rashid al-Din, Qutuz spelled out his final decision in these words: "I am of the opinion that we should march together to the combat. If we win, we shall gain our end; if we lose, men cannot reproach us."[2] On Qutuz' order, the Mongol envoy and three of his companions were executed; one in the horse market at the foot of the famous citadel of the mountain in Cairo, the second outside the gate of Zo-wella, the third beyond the gate of al-Nasr and the fourth in a place called Ridania. Their heads were hung at the gate of Zo-wella. One envoy, who was a young man, was spared and was enlisted among the Mamluks of Qutuz.[3]

A general proclamation of war to defend Islam was issued in Cairo and throughout Egypt. The governors of the provinces were instructed to mobilize the soldiery and those who tried to escape their military duty were beaten. For final preparation, Qutuz, also at this

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 311-313.

[2]Ibid., p. 313.

[3]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 429.

point or immediately afterwards, communicated with al-Ashraf and al-Sa'id, two Ayyubid princes in Syria who had so far cooperated with the Mongols, to obtain their aid in his enterprise. Prince al-Ashraf of Hims responded positively and promised to hold his troops from militarily assisting the Mongols. However, Prince al-Sa'id mistreated Qutuz' envoy and received him with insulting phrases.[1] On Monday, the 15th of Shaban (July 26, 1260), Qutuz, at the head of the whole Egyptian army including the Kurdish, Syrian, North Mesopotamian, and bedoin troops that had joined his forces, moved from Cairo to al-Salihia, a station which marked the eastern border of the Nile Valley on the Sinai desert.

Al-Maqrezi indicates that the Amirs, perhaps most of them, were not pleased with the march in the first place. They had no enthusiasm to fight the Tatars, the most threating barbarous enemies that the Moslem community had ever faced. When his troops arrived at al-Salihia, Qutuz held a council of his Amirs and spoke of continuing the march into Syria. According to al-Maqrezi, all the generals objected to the plan and were halting where they were. Qutuz reminded them of their duty saying:

> O chiefs of the Moslems, you lived for so long out of the public treasury, while you dislike the conquerors (meaning

---

[1] Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., p. 820.

> probably nothing beyond disliking); I mean to advance. Those who choose the holy war can accompany me, those who would not choose it, they should return to their homes, God is witness upon them!, and the dishonor of the Moslem women will rest on the necks of those who stay behind!

The Amirs who had given Qutuz an oath in advance spoke in agreement with him in the council, and the rest of the Amirs, with a show of courage to march and of loyalty to the sultan, agreed also! During that same night, the sultan mounted his horse and the drums sounded indicating the beginning of the march. Qutuz gave no time for hesitancy for those who seemed tentative in the camp. He cried, "I will meet the Tatars by myself!" The Amirs witnessing the scene had no alternative but to follow the sultan's example.[1]

The Egyptian army crossed the Sinai toward Palestine at an unspecified date during the early days of the month of Ramadan (early August 1260). By choosing to attack the Mongols in their dominion, instead of fortifying his country and playing a defensive role, Qutuz had broken, for the first time, the military tradition of the Moslem armies in their confrontation with the Mongols throughout the 13th century. The Khorizmians in Transaxonis, the Assassins in Persia, the Abassids in Iraq, and the Ayyubids in Syria had all waited for the Mongols to strike the first blow on their countries and thus had generally relied on defensive methods. But the Mamluks of Egypt under the leadership of

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

Qutuz took the offensive, going out of their own territory to confront the enemy in their dominion.

In explaining this phenomenon, the historian should note the small size of the Mongol forces in Syria as an encouraging element for the Egyptians to take the offensive. Another reason can be found in the difficulty afforded in making effective fortifications in the Nile Valley. Along with these two factors, I would also consider what could be described as the fighting mentality of the Mamluk leadership itself as contributing to the offensive response with which Egypt answered the Mongol threat.

The Amir Baybars commanded the advance guard and preceded the main army to Gaza, where according to Rashid al-Din, a Mongol force was stationed. Upon Baybars' arrival, the Mongols withdrew and the Egyptian vanguard occupied the town. The Mongol troops at Gaza were under the command of the Mongol general, Baider, who informed his chief, Kitubuqa, of the Egyptian advance. Kitubuqa, who was at this time in Baalbek, ordered the officer to "stand firm at the place and wait," but before Kitubuqa could get to Gaza, the Mongols were attacked and pursued north to the river al-Asi.[1] According to an Egyptian source, Baybars attacked in Gaza the Shahrazuri Kurds,[2] who previously blocked

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op.cit., p. 313.

[2]Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 92.

the road before an Egyptian auxiliary to al-Naser. Perhaps, those Shahrazuris became allies to the Mongols and accepted Mongol troops in Gaza. These undated events should probably have occurred during the first week of August 1260, and thus Kitubuqa would only have approximately a month or less to mobilize his forces to meet the Egyptians for the decisive battle. Meanwhile, Qutuz arrived at Gaza with the main forces where he rested for one day and then continued the march through the Palestinian coast to Acre.

According to Western accounts, an Egyptian embassy was sent from Gaza to Acre (no specific date is given) for permission to pass through Frankish territory to obtain provisions for the march and even military aid. The barons of Acre met to discuss the request. The bitterness they felt about the sack of Sidon by the Mongols and their distrust of their oriental power with its record of massacres, along with their familiarity with the Islamic civilization led the Barons to an inclination to honor the Sultan's request. But the master of the Teutonic Knights, Anno of Sangerhausen, opposed this decision, warning them that it would be foolish to trust the Moslems much, especially if they were elated by victory. His words so far moved the assembly, that the military alliance was rejected, but the Sultan was given permission to pass through Frankish lands and to buy food there.[1] Anno's alarm was prophecy that

---

[1]Runciman, Kingdom of Acre, op. cit., pp. 311-312; also The Crusader States, op. cit., pp. 573-574.

belonged to the unforeseen future, but the Barons' friendly stance toward the Egyptians was probably calculated on the basis of experiences which were related to the immediate past and present. For ten years, since the end of Saint Louis' Crusade, the Kingdom of Acre has enjoyed a truce with both the Moslems of Egypt and Syria who were during this time occupied with their own conflicts, while the recent sack of Sidon by the Mongols was still fresh in their minds. Thus, to Acre, the Mongols rather than the Egyptians, were the immediate threat. Group interests, perhaps, had an influence on the attitude of the Barons as the Venetian trade interests of the Teutonic order that had many possessions in the Armenian Kingdom.

Al-Maqrezi, who cites the friendly communications between the Egyptian leadership and the government of Acre, gives another version of the events. When the Sultan was approaching Acre, it was the Franks who came out to his camp offering presents and military alliance. Qutuz in return presented robes of honor to them and took their oath to be neutral. He made it clear that if they pursued his army he would return to fight them before he met the Tatars.[1]

In any case, for some days in August, the Egyptian army camped in the orchards outside Acre. Many of its Amirs were hospitably entertained within the city and one of them, Baybars, pointed out to Qutuz

---

[1]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 430.

how easily the city could be taken by surprise. However, the Sultan considered such treachery to be inopportune. The Franks had been slightly alarmed by the size of the Egyptian forces, but were cheered by a promise that they could buy the horses that would be captured from the Mongols at reduced prices.[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir cites that Baybars entered Acre in disguise to reconnoiter.[2]

There is an apparent lack of information about what Kitubuqa was doing while the Egyptians were marching and encamping along the Palestinian coast. Runciman says that he was held up by an uprising of the Moslems in Damascus against the native christians, which required Mongol troops to restore order. He relied on accounts given by the Syrian historian, Abu al-Fida.[3] Certainly Runciman seems in error, as the date given by Abu al-Fida for this uprising is the 27th of Ramadan (Fifth of September)[4] which makes the occurrence of the event two days after the battle of Ain Jalut on the 25th of Ramadan (the 3rd of September), in dating the rising in Damascus. Therefore, it would seem that Runciman could not rely on the Abu-al-Fida in supporting his contention of an uprising before the battle of Ain Jalut which held up Kitubuqa.

---

[1]Runciman, Kingdom on Acres, op. cit., p. 312.

[2]Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 92.

[3]Runciman, op. cit., p. 311.

[4]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 204.

In trying to figure out Kitubuqa's doings during August, it was necessary to put several pieces of information together. The Egyptian historian Ibn al-Dawadari indicates that Kitubuqa, who we remember had been in Albeqa Valley close to Baalbek at the time Baider arrived with the news of the Mamluk advance into the Sinai, was further north at the town of Hims when the Egyptians were encamped in the orchards outside Acre.[1] Ibn Taqri Bardi says that Kitubuqa had held a council which included the Ayyubid prince of Hims, al Ashraf, and the judge Mahi al-Din. Kitubuqa consulted the council on the best action he should take against the Egyptians. Some advised him to retreat until he received reinforcement from Hulagu. Others expressed various views, but Kitubuqa himself took to the decision to confront the Egyptians.[2] It was probably at Hims where Kitubuqa waited for the gathering of all the Mongol troops in Syria as well as some Armenian and Georgian forces before marching south to Palestine. Accompanying Kitubuqa were the two Ayyubid princes, al-Said and al-Ashraf. The latter, we are informed, refrained from participating in or taking an active role in the forthcoming battles.

---

[1] Ibn al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 49.

[2] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

The Battle of Ain Jalut

While he was at Acre, Qutuz, according to Runciman learned that Kitubuqa had crossed the Jordan River and had entered eastern Galilee. He at once led his army southeast through Nazareth.[1] As he was close in approaching the Tatars, Qutuz, according to al-Maqrezi gathered his Amirs and gave them a speech which roused their enthusiasm. He called upon them to deliver Syria, to make Islam and the Moslems triumph and, finally, he warned them of God's punishment. In what seems to be an apparently emotional moment, the Amirs shed tears and gave their oath to fight the Tatars and drive them out of the lands.[2] Baybars was put in charge of the corps of troops that preceded the main army and was the first to encounter the Mongols and to skirmish with them. On the 2nd of September the Egyptian army arrived at Ain Jalut (the Spring of Goliath), a spot located between Nablus and Baissan where the Christian army had defied Saladin in 1183. The next morning the Mongols came up. The cavalry was accompanied by Georgian and Armenian contingents, but Kitubuqa probably lacked scouts and the local population was unfriendly. He did not know that the whole Mamluk army was close by.[3]

---

[1]Runciman, Kingdom of Acre, op.cit., p. 312.

[2]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 430.

[3]Runciman, op. cit., p. 312.

On Friday the 25th of Ramadan (the 3rd of September) the two armies were in each other's presence. As the sun had just risen, the valley was crowded with soldiery and the air was filled with cries of the villagers and the martial sounds of the drums of the Sultan and his Amirs. The Tatars fixed their position by stationing themselves at the foot of a hill in the battlefield and from al-Maqrezi's text, we can roughly conclude that the Egyptians maintained a position in the course of the valley.[1] The Tatars initiated the battle by raining arrows upon the Egyptians.[2] As the two armies meshed it was the Egyptians who were first pressed back and part of their troops compelled to retreat. According to Rashid al-Din, the Egyptians hid their main forces waiting in ambush and faced the Mongols only with a few selected thousands under the command of Qutuz himself. Thus, when these forces were pressed by the Mongols and retreated, the Mongols fell into the trap by pursuing them. At this stage, the Egyptian ambush sprang out and the Mongols were converged upon from three directions. The Egyptians fought fiercely until mid-day when the Mongols gave up fighting and were defeated.[3]

The Arabic primary sources did not cite this very probable Egyptian ambush but one mentioned that Baybars used a tactic to draw the

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, Ibid., p. 431.

[2] Rashid al-Din., op. cit., p. 313.

[3] Ibid., pp. 313-314.

Mongols after him.[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, says that Baybars who led the vanguard ascended the hill overlooking 'Ain Jalut. He and those with him stayed on horseback throughout the night, while the Mongols encamped near them. Qutuz and the army marched on ignorant of the nearness of the enemy, till the messengers of Baybars arrived and warned them, informing them of the proximity of the enemy; and they also drew their attention to the weakness of the enemy and disparaged the latter, encouraging them to take advantage of the opportunity; and this was one of the causes of the victory. The same historian informs us that Baybars and his troops had bore the first shock of the Mongol onslaught.[2] However al-Maqrezi and other Arab historians agree with Rashid al-Din as far as the wing of the army led by the Sultan being so disrupted that part of his troops retreated.[3]

As the situation deteriorated, Qutuz, according to al-Maqrezi personally took part in the fighting, and as the struggle grew furious, he pulled off his helmet, threw it to the ground and shouted out Wa'Islamah (O my Islam), a cry that should have moved his knight to the highest pitch of their zeal. With those about him, he threw himself upon the enemy until victory was achieved. Al-Maqrezi tells also that

---

[1]Ibn-al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 49.

[2]Iban Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 93.

[3]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 431.

the young envoy of the Mongols who had been enlisted among the Mamluks of Qutuz was nearby the Sultan in the battle and attempted to assasinate him with his arrow, but before it was shot he was cut down. It had also been told that the arrow was shot and struck Qutuz' horse and he was thus dismounted for awhile.[1] Ibn-al-Dawadari, relying on accounts given him by his grandfather, who was in the battle, says that while the Sultan was dismounted a certain Fakhr al-Din Mama offered his horse to the Sultan but Qutuz refused to ride and leave Fakhr al-Din dismounted, endangering his life. Fakhr al-Din upon this refusal by the Sultan argue with him saying, "If I am killed, there are many who would replace me, but if you are killed at this time there could be no replacement for you, and the Moslems would all be killed!" The Sultan thus agreed to mount the horse. Immediately after the battle was over, Fakhr al-Din recalled the incident with the Sultan and said that if a Mongol Knight had seen Qutuz in such a position, he would have killed him and by killing the Sultan, Islam would be lost! The Sultan replied,

> If it is about my fate, I will pass to paradise, if it is about Islam, God will never allow it to be lost. The Sultan al-Salih (the Ayyubid) died, his son al-Mo'asam (Turanshah) was killed and the Amir Fakhr al-Din (the commander-in-chief during the battle of al-Mansura) was killed, in spite of all of this, God made Islam triumph without a king![2]

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, Ibid., p. 431

[2] Ibn-al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 50.

According to this account, Qutuz was supporting his argument with the case at al-Mansura when the Franks of St. Louis were halted and beaten in spite of the fact that the Egyptian troops had lost their political and military leadership.

From the other side, the personal stance of the Mongol general, Kitubuqa, during and after the battle was glorified by the Persian historian, Rashid al-Din. He pictured him in an even more colorful knightly image than the Egyptian historian did in regards to Qutuz. According to Rashid, Kitubuqa

> spurred on by his zeal and courage (he) struck to the right and to the left against his enemies. In vain his men tried to induce him to fly but he said, "Here there is no escape from death. Death with honor and dignity is better than retreat with humiliation and disgrace!" One noble or common man of this army will surely reach the presence of the Khan and tell him that Kitubuqa had refused to retreat with shame and that he sacrificed his life for his duty. The news of the loss of this Mongol army must not deeply distress his blessed thought. Let the Khan assume that for one year the wives of his soldiers have not conceived, that the horses of his stud have sired no colts. Let the fortune of the Khan be lasting as long as his noble soul is safe, this would be compensation for what is lost. The life or death of us, his slaves, is a simple matter.

Rashid continues by saying that despite Kitubuqa being deserted by his soldiers and being left alone, he continued to struggle against one thousand men! and it was not until his horse was brought down that he was taken a prisoner.[1]

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 314.

Regarding the fate of Kitubuqa, the Egyptian sources differ from Rashid al-Din. The latter tell of him taken captive to the audience of Qutuz and puts into the mouths of the two men a dialogue which credited Kitubuqa with extensive bravery and loyalty to his lord, Hulagu. Rashid says,

> Kitubuqa was led to Qutuz with his hands tied and Qutuz said to him, "perfidious man, after shedding so much innocent blood, after vanishing many heros and great men by your broken oaths and after having destroyed many old dynasties, by your false and forged sayings, you have at last fallen into a trap!"
>
> And when he listened to his sayings
> with his hands tied
> He shuddered like a raged mad elephant.
>
> And said in reply "behold you who
> are proud and vain
> Do not boast so much of this victorious
> day!"
>
> "If I perish at your hand, I know that it is of the authority of God, not of you. When the news of my death reaches the presence of Hulagu-Khan, the sea of his wrath will boil. The hooves of the Mongol horses will trodden the lands from Azerbaijan to Egypt and the Mongol soldiers will carry off the sands of Egypt in the sacks of their horses. Hulagu-Khan has 300,000 Knights equal to Kitubuqa, so assume that only one of them would be missed!" Qutuz replied, "do not boast so much of the knights of Turan, for they succeeded only by treachery and tricks not by manhood and courage like Rustum, son of Destan." Kitubuqa answered back: "I have been a slave of the Klan throughout my life. I am not like you, treacherous and disloyal.
>
> No head nor body should be left,
> of an evil man who murders his king . . .

Make haste and destroy me that I may no longer hear
your reproach!"[1]

This quotation of Rashid al-Din's which has been recited (with the delition of the poems) and accepted by some twentieth century historians, namely, Grousset and Runciman, with no critical examination, perhaps seems to serve many conscious or subconscious ends of Rashid. It praised the bravery of the defeated general who welcomed death and never abandoned his absolute loyalty to his mater Hulagu. It also accuses Qutuz, the Mamluk victor, of being treacherous and disloyal to his own master in sharp contrast to Kitubuqa. The text also involves in a contrast of the characteristics of horsemen of Turan (Turks and Mongols) with what the Persian held as the heroic characteristics of Rustam, one of the greatest traditional Persian heroes cited in Firdawsi's (920-1020) famous book, Shah- Nama (The Book of Kings). Rashid al-Din, in praising Kitubuqa and abusing Qutuz harmonizes with his status as a vizier of the Ilkans. Whether or not Qutuz knew of Rustam, which is debatable, Rashid al-Din, by downgrading the horsemen of Turan (to which the Mongols theoretically belonged) and praising the qualities of the Persian hero, Rustam, could, as a Persian ruled over by Mongols, release some of his oppressed Persianism. Smartly enough, Rashid put such objurgation of the horsemen of Turan and extolling of Rustam in the mouth of the Mamluk, Sultan, Qutuz. For Qutuz to say such a thing

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

seems somewhat unlikely as he was of Turkish origin and theoretically belonged to the horsemen of Turan!

The dialogue recorded by Rashid, with its poems, references to Rustam and the horsemen of Turan, has the characteristics of historical fiction beyond that which can be tolerated by real history! The Armenian historian, Hayton and the Arab historians up to Ibn Taqri Bardi in the 15th Century, inform us that Kitubuqa was killed in the battle and that his son was taken captive. According to Ibn Taqri Bardi, the Amir Jamal al-Din al-Shamsi was the one who killed the Mongol general.[1] Ibn Kathir says that the son of Kitubuqa qas brought before Qutuz after the battle and the latter asked him if he father had fled? The son replied that his father would not do so! Then after a search among the Mongol dead, his corpse was found.[2]

It seems likely that if Kitubuqa was captured alive, the Mamluks would have kept him in hopes of bargaining with Hulagu. Two similar cases in Mamluk history would support this assumption. In 1250, St. Louis, the King of France who had been captured at al-Mansura, was released in exchange for a huge ransom. In 1262, a Mamluk army that had sacked Lesser Armenia, captured the crown prince of the country and he was later released in an exchange for several Mamluk generals who

---

[1]Ibn Taqri Barbi, op. ci., p. 79

[2]Ibn Kathir, op. cit., p. 227.

had been captured by the Mongols at Aleppo (January 1260) but who were at the time in Persia. The Mamluks most probably would have followed the same line in the case of Kitubuqa as his capture would have been of more value than his death.

Returning again to the main course of events, Rashid informs us that the Mongols had fought until mid-day when further struggle from them was futile. Those who survived being killed, fled. One group of them took refuge in a thicket of reeds, which Qutuz ordered to be set afire, and perished.[1] Iban Taqri Bardi says that a group of the Mongols had escaped to a nearby hill and that they were surrounded and killed.[2] Al-Maqrezi tells us that the main body of the remaining Mongol army was pursued to Baisan, where they organized themselves and a second struggle ensued, during which the Sultan is said to have cried out three times, "O my Islam," and to have appealed to God to make him His slave to triumph over the Tatars. The Mongols were again defeated and Qutus dismounted, laid his face on the dust and offered a prayer of thanksgiving.[3]

According to some accounts, among those who were captured during or immediately after the battle was the Ayyubid prince al-Sa'id,

---

[1]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 314.

[2]Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 79.

[3]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 431.

who was put to death.[1] Other accounts, however, tell us that al-Sa'id came of his own accord to Qutuz and tried in vain to excuse himself of being in the Mongol camp. Qutuz said to him, "If the Mongols were not defeated, you would never have come." As witnesses affirmed that the prince was active in fighting against the Moslems, his excuse was rejected and was put to death.[2]

Baybars was put in charge of the Mamluk troops which pursued the remnant of the Mongol forces and expelled them out of Syria. According to Ibn Khaldun, he pursued them to the town of Hims where he faced fresh Mongol troops that were sent by Hulagu to reinforce Kitubuqa, but obviously their arrival came too late and they were eliminated by Baybars.[3] Abu Shama says that the Mongols at Hims, who were by then under persistent pressure of pursuit with heavily ladened horses, decided to get rid of their belongings, including their children who were left behind. In order to hasten their flight they even killed, by their own hands, their women who they could not manage to carry with them. Perhaps they preferred death for their women to their enslavement by the enemy. Some escaped westward to the coast, possibly to find refuge in

---

[1]Abu al-Fida, op. cit., p. 205, Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 820, and Ibn Kathir, op. cit., p. 221.

[2]Ibn al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 52 and Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 80.

[3]Abu Shama, op. cit., p. 209.

the pro-Mongol principality of Antioch, many of them was plundered, killed and captured.[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir states that Baybars did not cease to ride night and day, without rest, killing or taking captive those who were unwounded, while the enemy was put to flight before him. He did not draw reign until he reached Harim. When he reached Afamiyah the enemy ralled again; and he again inflicted a smashing defeat on them at Afamiyah on Friday (the 10th of September ?) and their wealth, women and children and horses were plundered. Baybars sent the Amir b. al-Mujer to Aleppo, for further pursuit after the Mongols and joined Qutuz who by then was in Damascus.[2]

The Commander Noyan Ilka, of those Mongols who fled out of Syria, with a number of his followers, found refuge in Rum (Anatolia). The fugitives went to Haiton, King of Little Armenia, who supplied them with horses, clothes, and victuals, and they returned to Hulagu.[3] In the sum of Mongols were everywhere driven out of the Syrian interior. The camp of Kitubuqa, probably located at Hims, was pillaged. His wife, children, and dependents were captured.[4] Kitubuqa's head was cut from

---

[1]Abu Shama, op. cit., p. 209.

[2]Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 94.

[3]Howorth, op. cit., p. 173.

[4]Rashid al-Din, op. cit., p. 316.

his corpse and sent to Cairo[1] along with the news of the victory. On Saturday night, the 26th of Ramadan (the 4th of September) the first news of the battle reached Damascus and upon receiving it, the Mongol governor of the city, Il-Siban, and other Mongols, Persians, and Arabs, who were part of the administration in the city, fled the very same night. Abu Shama, who was a resident of Damascus, says that he also heard the news that same night.[2]

The citizens of the city got up the next morning to find news of the defeat of the Mongols but, more importantly, they found the city without any sort of government and guards! A furious joy and excitement spread among the Moslem populus of the city. First the Moslems plundered the property of those who had fled, and second, they celebrated their sudden freedom at the expense of their fellow Christian natives of the city. The Christians were now compelled to pay a high price for the privileges which they enjoyed during the Mongol occupation of the city which had lasted for seven months and ten days. The public display that the Christians gave to their religious ceremonies (such displays had not been allowed in Syria since the Islamic conquest) and the humiliation which had been suffered by the Moslems from the Christians, as well as the insults against Islam which were common occurrences

---

[1] Al-Marqrezi, op. cit., p. 432.

[2] Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 207.

up to several days prior to this under the protection of the pro-christian Mongols, were to now be required by the Moslems. They attacked the Christians' homes and looted them. The infuriated Moslems destroyed the Nestorian church and the famous Church of Mary.[1] This church, we have been told, had been surrendered to the Christians by the tolerant Caliph, Omar II Ibn Abd al-Azia, to compensate them for the loss of the Church of St. John, which had been taken from them by the Caliph, Abdul Malik Ibn Marwan and converted into a mosque.[2] The assailants set fires in the two churches and turned them into ruins. As for the Christians themselves, a number (Jama'a) of them were killed and the rest were compelled to hide themselves. Howorth says, "The Mussulmans put to death a great many Christians and reduced the rest to slavery." His statement, as exaggerated as it seems, is groundless in the Arabic primary sources, which includes the eyewitness accounts of Abu Shama. The fury of the masses turned, the next day, Monday, the 28th of Ramadan (the 6th of September) on the Jews who were looted, slightly, as the assailants were curbed from doing further harm to them. (Because nothing came from the Jews that was equal to that which came from the Christians.)[3] As the plunder turned to the Jews it seems that it became more attached

---

[1]Abu Shama, op. cit., p. 208.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., p. 170.

[3]Abu Shama, Ibid., p. 208.

to a general trend for public looting by undisciplined masses rather than a mere explosion of suppressed national and religious feelings. Abu Shama himself an orthodox Moslem scholar, described what happened to the Christians and their properties as "a great matter by which the hearts of the Moslems had been cured."[1] To better understand his personal resentment against the Christians, I should mention that he himself was about to be put to death during the Mongol occupation and only saved his life by paying a large sum of money.[2]

The last target of the uprising in Damascus was the Moslems who allied themselves with the Mongols, among those were al-Maskini and Ibn Baghel. An Alim, named Fakhr al-Din al Kingi, was killed in the mosque because he was suspected of having close relations with the Shi'ite. (Shi'is, in general, were on good terms with the Mongols in the Fertile Crescent.) It should be noted that all of these events occurred while the city was left on its own for two days free of any authority. These two days were between the departure of the Mongols and the arrival of Qutuz' general on the 29th of Ramadan. Prior to the general's arrival, on Sunday, the 28th of Ramadan, a letter from Qutuz was read at mid-day in the city which contained news of the victory and informed them that

---

[1] Ibid

[2] Ibid., p. 209.

he was heading toward Damascus "to spread justice."[1] A Mamluk general named Jamal al-Din al-Salahi, arrived on the 29th of Ramadan and "secured the people."[2] Qutuz himself arrived to the outskirts of Damascus on Wednesday, the 30th day of Ramadan (the 8th of September) and the next day entered the city and resided in its citadel.

After the arrival of Qutuz to Damascus, we are informed by al-Maqrezi, that another attack and looting of the Christians took place. This time it was carried out by an unspecified number of the Sultan's oshaqiya (horse trainers) supported or excited by the masses of the city. The Sultan, seemingly intolerant of the disorder and as the Christians were part of his subjects, ordered thirty of the looters to be hanged. Howorth, due to mininterpretation or mistranslation of the Arabic text of al-Maqrezi, states the thirty persons hung by Qutuz were Christians (Howorth, op. cit., p. 170). When al-Maqrezi says "wa shanaqa menhum (and he hung up of them) the Arabic pronoun, hum (them), is clearly related to the Oshakiya and other looters, not to the Christian victims. During this period, as if to balance the hanging, and perhaps for the benefit of his treasury, he had his commander-in-chief

---

[1] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 80.

[2] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, says that it was Baybars, not Qutuz who sent the first messenger to Damascus to "ensure its safety and tranquillity and informed the people of the victory," op. cit., p. 94.

collect 150,000 Derham from the Christians.[1] Qutuz' stay in Damascus was less than a month, a span of time which he spent putting his Syrian domain in order. He installed in Damascus itself, as viceroy, the Amir Alam al-Din Sinjar al-Halabi. For Aleppo, the second city in importance, he appointed a North Mesopotamian prince, Ala al-Din Ibn Badr al-Din Lulu, as governor. This prince was the son of the crafty former ruler of al-Mousel (d. 1259) and his brother al-Salih by then still ruled the city as a Mongol vassal. By such an appointment, Qutuz was aiming at political interest or as Ibn Kathir points out, he did it for Maslaha (interest).[2] He probably hoped that Ala, appointed in Aleppo, would encourage his brother in al-Mousel to revolt against the Mongols and that the communications between the two brothers would provide good omtelligence service. Previously, Qutuz had promised his ambitious general, Baybars, the post of governor of Aleppo. By changing his mind, the Sultan added more resentment to the old animosity for Baybars part as happened he will pay his life as the price for his broken promise.

Al Mansour, the Ayyubid prince who took refuge in Egypt after the Mongol invasion and fought for the Mamluks at Ain Jalut, now gained his reward, retention of his rule over the town Hamah. Another Ayyubid prince, al-Ashraf, who managed to survive the Mongols, and who secretly cooperated with Qutuz, came now to meet the Sultan at Damascus. He was

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 433.

[2] Ibn Kathir, op. cit., op. 226.

granted continuation of his rule over the town of Hims. These two Ayyubid princes who retained their possessions in Syria had lost their independence and became vassals of the Mamluk Sultanate. A third Ayyubid prince, al-Mugheeth of Al Kark and al-Shubak who cooperated with the Mongols and did not offer assistance to the Egyptians was left alone for a while. The district of Salmiya was given as a fief to the Amir, Isa Ibn Muhana, a tribal Arab chief who offered quard and intelligence services to the Mamluks in the desert and semi-dessert area that bordered the west bank of the Euphrates. In Gaza and the west bank of the Jordon, the Amir, Shams al-Din al-Burley was installed as governor. Along with these appointments, Qutuz distributed several fiefs in Syria among a number of Mamluk generals.[1] These appointments not only reflect the actual authority of the Mamluk oligarcy but also served as a part in the already existing confrontation with the Ilkhanid state which, although it had shrunk to the east of the Euphrates, still extended over Upper Mesopotamia, Persia, Iraq, and the lands of Rum in Asia Minor.

On Tuesday, the 26th of Shawal (the 4th of October) Qutuz left Damascus and headed for Cairo. Nothing in Egypt that we know of hastened his return there. Qutuz' initial plan was to go to Aleppo to personally settle the affairs of the city which had suffered most from the Mongols. However, as he was informed of a conspiracy against him

---

[1]Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 433.

by Baybars and some other Bahri generals, he changed his plan and headed instead to Cairo. The old animosity between the two men, who had fought each other twice in the battlefield, had now been revived by the Sultan's broken promise to turn over the governorship of Aleppo to Baybars. The latter, a ruthless seeker of power who had vigorously participated in the campaign against the Mongols and who led the drive which forced them out of the country, probably felt he had been deprived of his regard for the significant role he had played. He and other Bahri generals also would not have forgotten the role Qutuz had in the murder of their former Bahri leader, Oqtay in 1254, a matter which led to their fleeing from Egypt for six years. As Fatima Sadeque put it: "only the Mongol threat had brought these two again together and that danger, once removed, they became rivals, the existence of one being a menace to the other."[1]

We are informed that Qutuz decided to put Barbars under arrest when a suitable opportunity presented itself. The Sultan confided to some of his aides his intentions, perhaps the Sultan thought that the proper place to take this action would be in Cairo when he was settled at his citadel of the mountain. Baybars, informed of the Sultan's plan, grew more cautious and each conspirator was watching the other carefully. If the Sultan reached Cairo, the popularity of the victorious Moslem ruler who secured Egypt and who delivered Syria from the Tatars, would

---

[1]Syedah Fatima Sadeque, Baybars I of Egypt. Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 1956, p. 41.

make action against him impossible. While on the other side, the Sultan would have a free hand to strike against the conspirators as his Lord Aybuk, the first Mamluk Sultan, did with Oqtay! Baybars and his companions had to strike on the Sultan as soon as possible. The awaited opportunity came on the way to Egypt in a desert spot one days' journey from al-Salihya. The Sultan decided to stop here for hunting with the Amirs, while the rest of the troops proceeded to al-Salihya, where his royal tent was to be set up. Apparently, the Sultan, during or immediately after hunting, was isolated from his guards and Mamluks and was in a position of facing the conspirators alone. Here in this deserted spot, Qutuz was slain by Baybars and other Bahri generals on Saturday, the 17th of Dhul Qa'da 658 A.H. (October 1260).[1]

The murderers hastened to the camp at al-Salihya and there the conspirator Amirs accepted installing Baybars as the new Sultan among them after a "long debate."[2] A more dramatic account says that upon their arrival at the camp they approached the commander-in-chief and

---

[1]Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 62 and 96; also there is more than one version of Qutuz' end. Al-Maqrezi) op. cit., p. 435) says that after he had finished hunting and was headed for camp, Baybars requested to be given a captive Mongol woman and the Sultan agreed. As if in gratitude, Baybars held the Sultan's hand as if he would kiss it. This was a signal to the other plotters, one struck the Sultan on his shoulder with his sword, another threw him off his horse and the last shot him with an arrow which killed Qutuz.

[2]Ibn-al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 62.

informed him of their deed. He asked who among you is the one who killed the Sultan? Baybars said I am! The commander's reaction was to simply ask Baybars to sit upon the Sultan's seat. The commander-in-chief immediately gave Baybars his oath of obedience and the other Amirs followed him.[1] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir says that the commander-in-chief justified giving Baybars his oath because Qutuz was not alive and had no son, otherwise, the commander-in-chief explained, he would have been the first to fight the murderers.[2] As the event was sudden and there was no delay in the installment of Baybars which probably was firmly backed by the cohesive Bahri regiment within the army, there was no time for the Mamluks of the slain Sultan to take action. Also given the powerful outstanding personality of Baybars, there was no candidate equal to him that could fill the void in the Sultanate. Baybars, at the age of thirty-two or thirty-three, had finally seized power.

In Cairo, the city was prepared to welcome the victorious Qutuz. Instead, the people heard the crier shouting, "O people pray for mercy on the soul of al-Malik al-Muzafar Qutuz and wish good for your Sultan al-Milik al-Qahir Rukn al-Din Baybars!" The people, who had been accustomed to being mere observers of the political scene Sultans had raised up the Sultans had fallen down, but at this particular time, we are told

---

[1] Al-Maqrezi, op. cit., p. 436.

[2] Ibn Abd-al-Zahir, op. cit., p. 97.

that the news made them sad. Apparently they held a certain appreciation for the Sultan who rescued Egypt and Syria and who made Islam triumph. He was one of the few of the hated Mamluks who had been put in the high esteem of praise. With the announcement that Baybars, the leader of the Bahriya regiment, was their new Sultan, people were full of fear as the terrors of the Bahris several years ago were not yet forgotten.[1]

Qutuz' body was buried at al-Qusiar by some of those who had been in his service and his grave was a destination for visitors. Baybars we are informed, grew jealous of Qutuz' grave being dealt with like that of a saint and he ordered the corpse to be moved to an unknown place.[2]

It is interesting as well as useful to see how the reverence held for Qutuz developed a legendary description of his family background. Within the socio-religious framework of the 14th and 15th centuries the former Turkish slave background of Qutuz did not fit well with the heroic status now accorded him as the defender of Egypt, the deliver of Syria, and the saver of Islam. The thirteenth century historian Ibn Shadad (1217-1285) named Qutuz as: Saif al-Din (sword of the religion) Qutuz al-Mu'Izi (who belonged to al-Mu'Iz the first

---

[1]Ibn al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 63.

[2]Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

Mamluk sultan in Egypt) al-Turki (the Turkic).[1] Here the honorable title Saif al-Din (sword of the religion) was added to the name he was known by. Abu Shama (1203-1267) called Qutuz, Qutuz Ibn Abd-Allah (son of the servant of God).[2] This name identifies Qutuz' father as Abd Allah, however, religiously, Moslems would call any, as yet, unidentified person Abd Allah. Thus, Abu Shama gave Qutuz a general name which gives the vague impression of a Moslem background. Ibn Abd-al-Zahir follows the same line when he gives Baybars, another former Turk slave with unknown non-Muslim family background--the full name: "Sultan al-Malik al-Zahir Rukn-al-Din Abu'L Fath Baybars ben Abd Allah al-Salihi al-Najmi."[3] The historians Ibn al-Dawadari (1303-1333 ?), Ibn-Kahir (1301-1302/1373-1374), and Ibn Taqri Bardi (1411-1469) relate the already existent story of a vision in which Qutuz had the privilege of seeing the prophet Mohammed and in which the prophet told him that he would rule Egypt and defeat the Tatars. Beyond this, the historians relate somewhat different historical stories on the ancestry of Qutuz. Ibn al-Dawadari tells a story of an argument which was supposed to have taken place between Qutuz and a fellow Mamluk of his. His fellow Mamluk asserted that "you are a mere Turkic Mamluk, sone of an infidel."

---

[1] Ibn al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 40.

[2] Ibn-Kathir, op. cit., p. 225.

[3] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op. cit., p. 86.

Qutuz said that he was a Moslem, son of Moslems to ten grandfathers and is quoted as saying that his real name was not Qutuz but Mahmoud Ibn Mamdoud.[1] The rhetorical sounds of the first and last names are clearly noticeable.) Ibn Kathir seems to take the same position as Abu Shama in identifying Qutuz as Ibn Abd Allah.[2] Ibn Taqri Bardi relates another story in which Qutuz is identified as the nephew of the last emperor (Mohamed Ibn Jalal al-Din) of the Khwarizmian dynasty of Transaxonia and Persia.[3]

The stories of the vision and of Qutuz' descent from the Khorizmian dynasty can be traced to two Syrian 14th century historians, Ibn al-Jazri (d. 1338-1339), who got his accounts from his father, and Ibn al-Yunini (d. 1325-1326), on whose accounts the previously mentioned historians relied. These stories served one end: to set Qutuz in a noble, Moslem family background. The "logic" behind these inventions is probably that the heroic status given Qutuz (in reality a former Turkic slave) would seem more fitting to a descendant of a noble Moslem family such as the Khorizmian dynasty than to one of an unknown infidel Turk! The "logic" would seem more clear if we note that the Khorizmians were the first in Islamdom to confront the Mongols and the first

---

[1] Ibn al-Dawadari, op. cit., p. 40

[2] Ibn-Kathir, op. cit., p. 225.

[3] Ibn Taqri Bardi, op.cit., p. 86.

to be defeated by them. "Logically" Qutuz had taken revenge for the defeat inflicted upon his uncle, the Khorizmian emperor. Some twentieth century Arab historians, notably Dr. al-Sayyid al-Baz al-Arini[1] and Dr. Fu'ad al Sa'id[2] are inclined to accept the story that Qutuz is a descendant of the Khorizmian dynasty.

In sharp contrast to the medievalist historians who even went to the extreme of relating the mythical build-up of Qutuz' background to support his role as the defender of Egypt, deliverer of Syria, and the saver of Islam, some twentieth century historians tend to down play the role of Qutuz and to give more credit to Baybars in the defeat of the Mongols.[3] The fact is that Baybars was undoubtedly a driving force in the battlefield, militarily, against the Mongols. However, Qutuz was the political leader whose policies and spirit won the battle over the Mongols.

The Historical Significance of Ain Jalut

At Ain Jalut, the Mongols had been decisively defeated and their expansion in the near east had been firmly stopped. Instead of adding

---

[1] Al-Arini, op. cit., p. 255.

[2] Al Sa'yad Fu'ad, op. cit., p. 302.

[3] Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in World Civilization, V. 2, the U. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1974, p. 292.

Egypt to their domain, they were compelled by the Mamluk victors to evacuate Syria and to retreat beyond the Euphrates River which was to be a natural border between the Ilkhanid on the east and the Mamluks on the west for more than a century to come. This decisive defeat of the Mongols was the accomplishment of the Turkic Arabized Mamluks, who were ethnically and culturally related to the Mongols. Both the victorious and the defeated powers had originated in the Euro-Asian Great Steppes. Moreover the Mamluks, like the Mongols, were experienced in cavalry warfare and had adopted many of the Mongol fighting techniques.

Abu-Shama, the 13th century Syrian historian, was among the first, if not the first historian, to notice the similarity of the victors and the defeated at Ain Jalut. He expressed it poetically:

> The Tatars had subdued the lands
> From Egypt, came upon them a Turk (Qutuz)
> Who is sacrificing his soul.
> In Syria, he vanquished them and
> scattered their gathering
> Everything has a counter of its own kind.[1]

Modern historians of the 19th and 20th centuries have evaluated the significance of the battle and its consequences in respect to history. The Cambridge History of Islam views the matter as an alternation to the course of world history and of special import for the future

---

[1]Abu-Shama, op. cit., p. 208.

of Islam.[1] Henry H. Howorth, Steven Runciman, and J. J. Saunder all agree on the decisiveness of the battle in world history, and give varied reasons for its significance. Howorth (19th century) says that the battle had stopped the tide of Mongol aggression, had probably saved Egypt and by saving it, had saved the last refuge where the arts and culture of Muslim world had taken refuge.[2] Runciman (20th century) goes further to say that the battle had saved Islam itself from the most dangerous threat that it has ever had to face. He uses the following reasoning.

> Had the Mongols penetrated into Egypt, there would have been no great Moslem state left in the world east of Morocco. The Moslems in Asia were far too numerous ever to be eliminated but they would no longer have been the ruling race. Had Kitubuqa, the Christian, triumphed, the Christian sympathies of the Mongols would have been encouraged and the Asiatic Christians would have come into power for the first time since the great heresies of the pre-Moslem era (p. 313).[3]

Runciman goes on to say that the battle of Ain Jalut made the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt the chief power in the near east for the next two centuries, until the rise of the Ottoman Empire. It completed the reign of the native Christians of Asia. By strengthening the Moslem

---

[1]Spuler, The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East, op. cit., p. 164.

[2]Howorth, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

[3]Runciman, Kingdom of Acre, op. cit., p. 313.

element and weakening the Christian element, it was to soon induce the Mongols to embrace Islam and to hasten the extinction of the Crusader states.[1]

For Saunders, the battle had saved Egypt which consequently rose to be a great Muslim power and a repository of what was left of the old Arabic civilization. Also, in wake of their victory, the Muslims opened a great counteroffensive against the Mongols and their Christian allies and the dream of a Christian restoration in the east was dispelled forever.[2]

The term used by the historians in describing the significance of the battle, that it "saved" Egypt needs further clarification. If we interpret it as "saving" Egypt from Mongol domination this is quite correct. However, if we interpret it as "saving" Egypt from the terrors and destruction which had been inflicted upon other countries of Islamdom, this is not the case. Historically the Egyptian powers in defending the Nile Valley from a threat from the east, conducted the battle with the invaders in Syria, the Siani Desert, or on the outskirts of the Nile Valley. Basically, this is due to the geographical character of the valley, which lacked any natural defense and the cities themselves were without serious fortification. Therefore, the fate of the country

---

[1] Ibid.

[2] Saunders, op. cit., p. 115.

involving any invasion from the east was always outside the populous cities. On the other hand, the terrors and destruction inflicted by the Mongols were the fate of a resistant city which was seized. Assuming that the Mongols had won the battle, their entry into Cairo and the cities of Egypt would have been similar to their entry into Damascus. Thus, it may be more correct in saying as Spuler did, that the battle of Ain Jalut preserved Egyptian independence from Mongol domination.

Runciman's view that the battle had prevented the Christians from taking power in Egypt or anywhere in Islamdom seems invalid in light of the historical realities. By the 13th century the Islamization of the whole of Near East to Transaxonia was beyond the point where the Asiatic Christians could have come to power through the encouragement of Mongol Sympathies. The Mongol favoritism could do no more than create a temporary disturbance of the socio-religious balance as happened in Iraq and Syria. Secondly, Runciman seems to neglect the fact that political power cannot be separated from economics. Economic power in the region was still held by Moslem feudalistic chiefs and the Mongols had not disturbed this. It is very doubtful that Christian power could emerge without an economic basis.

A third and most important reality is that there is not one simple example from the 20's to the 50's of the 13th century that the Mongols allowed or encouraged Christians to hold power in a country with a Moslem majority. What actually happened is that the Mongols

relied on Moslem administrators and finally themselves adopted Islam in Transaxonia and Persia. This was not due to the influence of Ain Jalut but most probably for political survival in these regions. Also their adoption of Islam could be attributed to their cultural and religious inferiority compared to the majority of their own subjects.

Runciman's view would have more validity if the Mongols themselves were a Christian power invading Islamdom for the sake of Christianity. The combination of a religious fanaticism with the familiar savageness of the Mongols possibly could have created the political-religious balance which Runciman envisions for the region. However, this is a matter of specualtion.

Runciman's argument that Ain Jalut had hastened the extinction of the Crusader states is very realistic as the unification of Syria and Egypt was a direct result of the battle. With this unification and the emergence of the Mamluk power there would be little doubt that the Crusader states, already suffering internal divisions and a decline in external Western support, could withstand the revival of the Moslem holy war (al-Jehad), by the Syro-Egyptian Mamluk state, now directed against both Christians and Mongols.

Saunders avoided the generalization made by Howorth, that the battle by saving Egypt, had saved the last refuge of Islamic art and culture. For Howorth to say that Egypt became the last refuge for Islamic art and culture is not true. This implies that Islamic culture

had fled and another culture took its place. Islamic culture and way of life continued to exist everywhere in Islamdom under the Mongol domination. Saunders, more specifically, points out that Egypt became the repository of what was left of the Old Arabic civilization. However, the term used by Saunders, old Arabic civilization needs clarification. The Arabic civilization cannot be separated from Islam; what existed was Islamic civilization with Arabic patronage and Arabic language in religious and intellectual activity. The Islamic-Arabic civilization (a more appropriate term) as it extended over Islamdom was a multinational civilization based on three major sources: first, Islam as a religion and a way of life, second, Arabic as the language of cultural productivity, and third, political domination by Arabic powers, the Umayyad and Abbassid caliphates.

After Ain Jalut and the political division of the region into the Mamluk Empire west of the Euphrates and the Mongol Empire to the east, we can cautiously speak of the process of pre-nationalization within the Islamic culture itself.

With these processes of pre-nationalization, Egypt already an Arabic speaking country, as the wealthy center and focus of the Mamluk Empire, became the center of Islamic Arabic culture. While Persia, as a center in the Ilkanid state further developed its Islamic Persian culture whose language had begun intellectual competition with the Arabic language as early as the 9th century.

CONCLUSION

In 1250, a new power took over political authority in Egypt and ended the Ayyubid Sultanate in the country. This power was that of the Arabized Turkish Mamluks, who were former slaves, imported mainly from the Kipchack region north of the Black and the Caspian Seas to serve in the military of the Ayyubid al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub (d-1249), the sultan of Egypt and most parts of Syria and some parts of North Mesopotamia.

The phenomenon of using purchased Turks in the military was by the middle of the 13th century a common one in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. Its root can be found in the 9th century when the Abassid Caliphate in Baghdad faced the first phase of prolonged disentegration. This phenomenon was necessitated by the lack of any regulated or stable military organization in the multi-National empire that was based on its own subjects' military services. In the face of internal revolts and external challenges, the caliphate gradually increased its dependence on those Turkish slaves. Also, the crusader campaigns created pressures in Syria, North Mesopotamia, and Egypt that led the Zingid state (1127-1174)--then later the Ayyubid empire to depend on the same element for defense. The phenomenon, however, represents the first

phase the military-political domination by the people of the Steppes--Turks and Mongols--over the Near East which culminated in Ottoman domination from Iraq to Algeria, and was ended--only after gradual decline--during the first World War.

While the Mamluk regime was consolidating its hold over Egypt, the Ayyubids in Syria and North Mesopotamia (1250-1259) were lacking any unitary leadership and any driving force for revival. The fragmentary remnant of the Empire of Saladin was divided between six Ayyubid princes who were mostly antagonistic toward each other, and thus the attempts of two of them--al-Nassir and al-Mugheeth--to restore the Ayyubid rule over Egypt were fruitless. Other elements of social and military disruption in Syria and North Mesopotamia on the eve of the Mongol invasion were the militant refugees, namely, the Khorezmi Transaxonians, the Shahrazori Kurds, and finally the Bahri Mamluks. The first two fled from the region as a result of the Mongol advance, and the last fled to Syria as a result of a power struggle within the Mamluk ranks in Egypt.

The Frankish colonies on the Syrian coast during the same period were undergoing similar processes of disentegration. They also lacked a unitary force and were affected by the decline of the European support and committment to the crusades. St. Louis' crusade and his residence in Palestine (1249-1254) brought a temporary relief and support but with his departure the division among the Franks continued its course.

One year after the Mamluk revolt, and the failure of the Frankish crusade in Egypt, new political development took place in Mongolia. The Mongol elite elected Mongk, a grandson of Chingiz Khan, as a Great Khan. This election in 1251 brought stability to the Mongol government and set up suitable conditions for futher Mongol conquests, ad the Mongol expansionist drive still retained its momentum. Mongk proposed two campaigns against China and the Near East. Hulagu, a brother of the Great Khan, was to lead the campaign directed against the Near East. The aim of this campaign was the consolidation of the Mongol hold in Persia and the subjugation of the lands to the west as far as Egypt. In this vast area, Hulagu would strive to establish his own realm of power within the Mongol empire.

The Mongol army that was mobilized for the Near Eastern Campaign consisted of approximately 129,000 Mongols, Tatar and Turks. In 1253, this army, which was considered one of the most significant armies in the history of Medieval Asia, marched from Mongolia and advanced with no haste throughout central Asia and Transaxonia. On the 2nd of January, 1256, the army crossed the Oxus River into Persia. The first military task that Hulagu undertook was the destruction of the Ismaelis who so far had managed to survive in their strongholds in spite of the pressures created against them by two previous imperial powers of the Seljuks and the Khorezmi; and in spite of similar efforts by the Mongols themselves since their entry into the country during the

thirties of the 13th century. In less than two years Hulagu finished the existence of the Ismaelis as a political entity in Persia.

Having overwhelmed the Ismaelis, Hulagu turned his attention to the Abassid caliphate. First, he corresponded with the caliph al-Musta' Sim demanding the latter's unconditional submission in order for him to survive as a Mongol vassal. When the caliph refused such terms, Hulagu marched against Baghdad with a huge army which was enlarged by Mongol forces previously stationed in Asia Minor and Persia, Georgians, and other forces of the Persian vassals. Two medieval historians, of the 13th and 14th centuries estimated the number of the Mongol forces involved in the campaign against the caliphate to be as much as 200,000 men.

In Baghdad, the Abassid caliphate had survived more than five centuries, and remained up to 1258 the theoretical political-religious authority in the eastern parts of the Islamic world from the sultanate of Delhi to the sultanate of Egypt; although its actual secular authority was limited to southern Mesopotamia or what used to be defined as Arab Iraq. The political situation in Baghdad was marked by division and disorder. The Abassid administration was by then headed by a weak and indecisive caliph who was influenced by antagonistic officials that never agreed on a united policy particularly in regard to the Mongol threats. This division at the top of the state was in a way a reflection of a wider division among the subjects of the state who were

composed of Muslim Sunni, Shi'ite majority, and a large minority of Christian Nestorians and Jacobites. The sharpest division among the population of the state was that involving the Sunni supported by the caliphate and its army and the Shi'ite. In 1256 the Sunnis, supported by the military, attacked and sacked the Shi'ite town of al-Karkh, a matter that inflicted deep resentments among the Shi'i elements in the administration, and possibly led to the cooperation of the Vizier--prime minister--with the Mongols, prior to and after the invasion. Along with this division in the political stage and the populous base of the state, the caliphate was suffering from a limitation of material sources and manpower, making it inadequate for any serious resistance to the Mongols.

The small army of the caliphate, which numbered about 20,000 men, lost a decisive battle against an advance party of the Mongol army on the 17th of January 1258. On the same or the next day the Mongol forces enveloped Baghdad and besieged the city. On the 13th of February or the 11th of the same month the Mongols penetrated Baghdad generally murdering and looting for one full week according to some accounts and more than thirty days according to other accounts. Hulagu forced the caliph to disclose his secret treasurers and then put him to death by rolling him in a carpet and then had him trodden over by horses.

The murder of al-Musta'ism by the Mongols left Islandom for the first time without a caliph. This event which marked the eventual

end of the "papacy of Islam" had its psychological impact on the Muslim Sunni communities, and such impact was felt the most in the Fertile Crescent.

After the sack of Baghdad, the Mongols completed the subjugation of the caliphate territories from Arbil in the northeast to Bassra in the south in a period of five months. The elimination of the caliphate and the establishment of the Il-Khanid Mongol power in Mesopotamia resulted in disruption of the socio-religious balance that had existed in the region since the Islamic-Arabic conquest in the seventh century. The Sunni Muslims lost their most favored status, the Shi'ite had wider antonomy, while the Christians acquired more freedom and privileges. This position lasted in general until the conversion of the Il-Khan to Islam in 1295.

The destruction of the Abassid caliphate had a far-reaching impact on the course of Islamic history, as the politics of Islam after 1258 would not be directed or affected at any level, by the religiously oriented political authority of the caliphate. The secular political forces that previously had to hide behind the spiritual authority of the caliphs, finally operated free of such restriction. This should be considered as the early process of political secularization in the Near East, and in Islamdom in general. Another result was that Arab Iraq lost its central cultural and political influence in the Muslim world in general and the Arabized world in particular. At that time, Egypt,

and its capital Cairo, started to play an unchallenged leading role which has continued since. The Mamluks in Egypt, in order to give their new rule further legitimacy, received Abassid persons and established them as caliphs in Cairo. In fact, those "caliphs" were mere political prisoners who were allowed to show up in public only on ceremonial occasions. Actually, the shadowy Abassid caliphate in Cairo had nothing that resembled the real one in Baghdad its name and the claimed descent of its "caliphs" from the house of Abass.

The region of North Mesopotamia, known as al-Jazira and Deiyar Bakr, and Syria, was the next target of Hulagu. The Mongol conqueror left Iraq for Persia, on April 17, 1258. His last military action in the Iraqi campaign was the seige of the town of Miyafargeen in North Mesopotamia, which lasted for about two years. Before his departure Hulagu diplomatically prepared for his next campaign by receiving a mission sent by al-Nassir Yosouf the grand Ayyubid prince and sending a message to him demanding his unconditional submission to Mongol power.

al-Nassir who so far was hoping that the Mongols would leave his lands intact, because of their long established friendly relationship, with them, was horrified by Hulagu's demand and threat.

For more than one year Hulagu rested in Persia and prepared for the North Mesopotamian and Syrian campaign. On Friday the 22nd of the month of Ramadan 657 A.H. (September 1295), he started his new march, from Azerbaijan. The only recorded non-Mongol and non-Turk forces

that participated in the campaign at its early stage belonged to the al-Mosel principality, and were involved only in North Mesopotamia. The direction the campaign took was from Azerbejan westward to the district of Akhlat or Khelate, on the northern shores of Lake Van, and the mountains of Hakkar (Akkar). From there the Mongol army entered the region of Diar Bakr and al-Jaziera. Most of the towns in this region submitted voluntarily to the Mongols, such as Amid, Nissibeen, Herran and al-Ruha or Edessa. The town of Saruge resisted and its population was almost exterminated. The Armenian King Hetum I, with Armenian forces estimated at 12,000 horses and 4,000 foot soldiers, joined the Mongol army in this region, and proceeded with them into Syria. The whole campaign in al-Jazira and Diar Bakr lasted from September to December 1259. The Mongols built four bridges on the Euphrates and started crossing the river during December-January of the same year. Ibn al-Ibri, a contemporary historian, estimated the Mongol forces that invaded Syria with an exaggerated number as huge as 400,000 man.

The Mongol advance alarmed al-Nassir who possessed part of this region. The Ayyubid ruler turned now - about September 1259- to the Mamluks in Egypt asking for assistance against the Mongols. His request and the sense of the Mongol threat resulted in a change in the political leadership in Egypt. On a personal level, the occasion was an opportunity for the Mamluk general Qutuz to take power and depose the 16-year-old sultan al-Mansur Ali. Immediately after this, Qutuz

assured al-Nassir of his determination to assist him militarily. Meanwhile, al-Nassir himself, although he refused to submit to the Mongols, had no determination to fight them. He had no shortage of manpower but he lacked was the spirit of a fighter. The Bahri general Baybars who was in his service, along with other Mamluks, failed to persuade al-Nassir to make a serious and effective military plan to defend Syria, and thus finally abandoned him.

The first significant Syrian target for the invaders was the fortified city of Aleppo, which was taken by force on the 25th of January after a week of siege. The city was looted and the Muslim population was murdered or taken captive. When al-Nassir, who was stationed with his army at Berza to the north of Damascus, received news of Aleppo's fall, he decided to retreat southward. His forces - estimated as great as 100,000 men--disbanded. Damascus left defenseless by its ruler submitted voluntarily. The towns of Hims and Hamah surrendered to the Mongols the same day. Hulagu himself never reached Damascus and his activities were limited to the northern parts of the country. His last military action was the sack of the town of Harim which dared to surrender conditionally. Here, in the middle road between Aleppo and Antioch, the Mongol leader received Bohemond VI, the prince of the Latin principality of Antioch, who came to pay his homage to Hulagu in person. This occasion marked the subjugation of the principality to the Mongols.

On an undefined day of late May or June 1260, Hulagu left Syria for Persia with the majority of his army, after receiving the news of the death of Mongk, the Great Khan, and the rift among the royal family for the succession to the imperial post. In Syria, General Kitubuga was left to govern the country with a force of 12,000 men. He was the general who extended the Mongol domain in Muslim Syria to the south of Damascus to TransJordan, and Gaza, and to the east of it, to al-Bega Valley and Jaleli. Kitubuga also sent a message, in the name of Hulagu, to Qutuz demanding the submission of Egypt to the Mongol power.

al-Nassir who retreated first to Nablis on the Muslim Palestine, proceeded further south to Gaza heading toward Egypt. He halted in the middle of the Sinai desert. Fearing a plot against him in Egypt, he turned to southern Syria with a few relatives and mamluks, while the rest of his army joined the Egyptians. In TransJordan, al-Nassir was a lost hopeless ruler, and finally a mamluk of his requested a safe conduct for him from Kitubuga, who put al-Nassir under arrest and sent him to Hulagu in Persia. Why did Qutuz not welcome al-Nassir? is a question that still has no documentary answer.

The Mongols in the Syrian interior did not attempt to expand their domain over the Frankish coast of Palestine and Lebanon. This perhaps was due to the priority they gave to an expected confrontation with Egypt. The Franks, strangely enough, dared to make a raid on al-Biga Valley, which was by now under Mongol control. The Mongols

reacted to this raid by the sack of Sidon and the capture of 300 Franks. The antagonistic stance of the Franks of Acre toward the Mongols, and the three military clashes that occurred between the two parties need more historical investigation.

With his limited manpower, Kitubugu was overconfident to demand the Egyptian submission, and thus evoked Egyptian military action against the remnants of the Mongol army in Syria. The Mamluks for their part, were encouraged by the departure of Hulagu from Syria with the large mass of his troops. Also, the Frankish-Mongol clashes gave them further encouragement.

On Monday, the 15th of Shaban (July 26, 1260), Qutuz at the head of a large army consisting of Mamluk Turks, Kurds, Bedions and estimated as large as 120,000 men, moved from Cairo to al-Salihya. A vanguard led by General Baybars proceeded into Palestine. Qutuz obtained Frankish permission to pass through the lands of Acre, and for some days in August, the Egyptian army encamped in the orchards outside Acre. This passage and the supplies that Acre offered to the Egyptian army were advantageous. Kitubuga, who had been informed of the Egyptian move only since the attack on the Mongol corps at Gaza, gathered his forces and, aided by an unknown number of Armenians, headed southward from his residence in Hims to the Jaleeli hills.

On Friday the 25th of Ramadan (the 3rd of September) the two armies were in each other's presence. The first Egyptian force that

engaged in the battle was the vanguard led by Baybars, which probably drew the Mongols into an ambush. The high spirit that the Mamluk army fought with as well as their overwhelming number, won the battle for them by the middle of the day. Kitubuga was among those Mongols killed in the battle and the rest of his men who retreated were defeated again near Baisan and pursued by the Mamluks northward to Hims and the region of Euphrates. During a span of one month the whole Syrian enterior was liberated from the Mongols.

At Ain Jalut, the Mongols had been decisively defeated and their expansion in the Near East was halted. Hulagu was in no position to attempt another invasion of Syria. He reacted to the news of his army's defeat by putting the Ayyubid al-Nassir to death, as he did with the Abassid al-Mus'Sim before. Qutuz, the victorious Mamluk sultan, was to meet the same fate at the swords of the Bahri Mamluk generals headed by Baybars. The immediate outcome of the battle was the shrinking of the Mongol domain to the Eastern shore of the Euphrates, and the extension of the Mamluk domain into Syria. The victory of the Mamluks had revived militant pan-Islam spirit in the Syrio-Egyptian State which was to renew the struggle against the Franks and to continue the strife with the Mongols to the East.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Medieval Christian (Eastern and Western)

Dawson, Christopher (ed). The Mongol Mission, narratives and letters of the Franciscan missionaries in Mongolia and China in the 13th and 14th centuries. London: Sheed and Ward, 1955.

deJoinville, Jean. "The Life of Saint Louis" in Memoirs of the Crusades, by Villehardouin and deJoinville translated and introduced by Sir Frank Marzails). London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1958.

Grigor of Akanc. History of the Nation of the Achers (the Mongols) edited with an English translation and notes by Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Fray. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954.

John of Plano Carpini. "History of the Mongols" in Dawson, (ed) The Mongol Mission. London: Sheed and Ward, 1955.

Medieval Persian

al Juzjani, Maulana Minhaj-ud-Din Abu-Umar-I-'Usman. Tabakat-I-Nasri (A General History, Vol. 2). Translated from original Persian manuscripts by Major H.G. Raverty. New Delhi, India: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1970. (originally published in 1881).

Juvaini, Ala-ad-Din Ata-Malik. The History of the World Conqueror, Vol. 2. Translated from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John Andres Boyle. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1958.

Rashid al-Din, Faddl Allah al-Tabib. Jami al-Tawarikh (The Collection Annals) translated to the Arabic by Nash'at, Hendawi and al-Sa'yad, Cairo: Ministry of Culture and National Education, 1960.

Medieval Arabic

Abu-al-Fida. Al-Muqtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar (the Brief Chronicle in the News of Peoples). Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, (d. 1321).

Abu-Shama, Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ibn Isma'il. Trajem rejal al Qurnain al Sadis wa al-Sabi (Biographies of the men of the 6th and 7th centuries/or 12th and 13th centuries A.D. Beirut: Dar al Jeel.

al-Maqrezi. Kitab al-Suluk Li Ma'rifat Duwal al-Muluk (The Book of Conduct in Knowing the States of the Kings), Vol. 2, Parts 1 and 2, edited by Mustafa M. Ziada. Cairo: 1936.

Ibn Abd al-Zahir, Al-qadi Huhyi al-din. The extant part of the manuscript of Al-Rawd al-Zahir fi-Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir or the Blossoming Garden about the Biography of the Triumphant King (The Biography of Baybars I of Egypt 1260-1277). Edited by Dr. Syedah Fatima Sadeque. Dacca, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Ibn al-Dawadari. Akhbar al-Dawla al-Turkiya (The News of the Turkic Mamluk State) edited by the German Arabist, Ulbrich Haarmann. Cairo: 1971.

Ibn al-Fuwati, Abd al-Razaq al-Baghdadi. al-Hawadith al-Jami'ah w'al akbar al-Nafi'ah Fi al-Mi'ah al-Sabbi'ah. Baghdad: al-Makraba al-Arabiya, 1932.

Ibn al-Ibri (known to the West as Bar Herbracus, 1226-1286). Tarikh mukhtasar al Duwal (The Brief History of the States). Beirut: 1958.

Ibn Kathir. al-Bidayah wa al-Nahaya part 13. Cairo.

Ibn Khaldun. Kitab al-Ebar Vol. 3 (In Arabic). Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubrani, 1956.

Ibn Taqri Bardi, Jamal al-Din Abu al-Mahsin al Atabeki. al-Nujoum al-Zahira Fi Muluk Misr wa al-Qahira (The Shining Stars About the History of the Kings of Egypt and Cairo), part 7. Cairo: (?), 1963.

Ibn Shadad, Muhamed Ibn Ali. al-A'laq al-Khatirah. Damascus: 1962.

Secondary Sources

Abde al-Fittah, Sa'id Ashur. al Asral Mamluki (The Mamluk Era). In Arabic, Cairo: 1965.

al-Sayad, Fou'ad. al-Maghoul Fi al-Tarikh (The Mongols in History) Vol. 1 (In Arabic) Beirut: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiya, 1970.

Boyle, J.A. "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans," In Boyle, J.A. (ed.). The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 303-421.

Brockelman, Carl. History of the Islamic Peoples (translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann). New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.)

Brundage, James A. The Crusades: A Documentary Survey. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, The Marquette University Press, 1962.

Cahen, Claude. "The Mongols and the Near East," In Setton, Wolff and Hazard (eds.). A History of the Crusades, Vol 2, Phil.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962.

Gibb, Hamilton A.R. "The Ayyubids." In Setton (ed.) A History of the Crusades, Vol. II. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962.

Glubb, John. Soldiers of Fortune: the Story of the Mamluks. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1973.

Grousset, Rene. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia (translated from the French by Naomi Walford). New Brunswich, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970, esp. pp. 352-367.

Hammer - Purgstall, Joseph von. The History of the Assassins. (translated from the German by Oswald Charles Wood.) New York: Burt Franklin, 1968.

Heer, Friedrich. The Medieval World: Europe 1100-1350 (translated from the German by Janet Sondheimer). New York: New American Library, 1962.

Hitti, Phillip K. History of the Arabs. London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1958.

Hodgson, Marshall, G.D. The Venture of Islam, Vol. 2: The expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Also Introduction to Islamic Civilization, Vol. II, Same pub., 1958.

Howorth, Henry H. History of the Mongols, Part 3, The Mongols of Persia. New York: Burt Franklin, 1965.

Kingsford, Charles Lethbridge. "The Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099-1291," Chapter 8 in Bury (ed.). The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. 5, Contest of Empire and Papacy. Cambridge, 1958, pp. 300-319.

Khisbak, Jafar Hussein. Iraq During the Reign of the Il-Khanid Mongols 1258-1335. (In Arabic). Baghdad: Mitba'al-Ani, 1968.

Lane-Poole, Stanley. A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages. London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1968.

Lewis, Bernard. "Egypt and Syria," in Holt, Lambton & Lewis (eds.) The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1, The Central Islamic Lands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 175-230.

Lewis, Bernard. Islam From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constaninople, Vol 1. Politics and War. New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

Little, Donald Presgrave. An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1970.

Mayer, Hans Eberhard. The Crusades (translated from the German by John Gillingham). London: Oxford University Press, 1972, esp. pp. 251-274.

Passant, E.J. "The Effects of the Crusades Upon Western Europe," in Bury (ed.). The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. 5, Contest of Empire and Papacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948, pp. 320-333.

de Rachiwelts, I. Papal Envoys to the Great Khans. London: Faber and Faber, 1971.

Runciman, Steven. A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3, The Kingdom of Acre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Runciman, Steven. "The Crusader States, 1243-1291," in Setton, Wolff and Hazard (eds.). A History of the Crusades, Vol. 2, The Later Crusades, 1189-1311. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, pp. 557-629.

Sadeque, Syedah, Fatima. Baybars I of Egypt. Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.

Southern, R.W. Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.

Spuler, Bertold. The Muslim World, Part 2, The Mongol Period (translated from the German by F.R.C. Bagley). Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leider, 1960.

_____. "The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East." In Holt, Lambton, and Lewis (ed.). The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1, The Central Islamic Lands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 143-174.

_____. The Mongols in History (translated from the German by Geoffrey Wheeler). London: Pall Mall Press, 1971.

Throop, Palmer A. Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda. Amsterdam: N.C. Swets and Zeitlinger, 1940.

Ziada, Mustafa, M. "The Mamluk Sultans to 1293" in Setton, Wolff and Hazard (ed.). A History of the Crusades, Vol. 2, The Later Crusades, 1189-1311. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, pp. 735-758.