MORALITIES OF OWING AND LENDING: CREDIT, DEBT, AND URBAN LIVING IN KARIAKOO, DAR ES SALAAM By Benjamin Amaniiler A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree o f History -Doctor of Philosophy 2015 ABSTRACT MORALITIES OF OWING AND LENDING: CREDIT, DEBT, AND URBAN LIVING IN KARIAKOO, DAR ES SALAAM By Benjamin Amaniiler The literature on Africans and credit and debt is marked by a double binary. Scholars have tended to separate ÒtraditionalÓ or ÒinformalÓ credit and debt relations from ÒmodernÓ or ÒformalÓ financial institutions and instruments. In addition, scholars have either focused on the role credit and debt relations played in the economic realm or they have examined the social and cultural significance of debt and credit. As a result, the prevailing picture of Africans and finance in twentieth -century urban Africa is one of inadequacy, lack, and exclusion: the inadequacy of traditional form s of credit in market economies, AfricansÕ lack of access to formal financial institutions, and their exclusion from the modern world of finance. This dissertation challenges this doubly binary conceptualization and locates the myriad views and uses of cre dit and debt in one conceptual frame. It shows that credit and debt relations were constitutive of various aspects of urban life, including multi -racial neighborhood sub -communities, respectable identities, urban membership and belonging, urban livelihoods and entrepreneurship, and urban planning and governance. The Kariakoo neighborhood in Dar es Salaam serves as the locus to examine how debt and credit shaped work and business, social and communal life, and peopleÕs identities and subjectivities in urban Africa. If debt is an anthropological and historical constant, the relations of debt and credit also changed significantly over the twentieth century when economists and planners as well as urban traders and lenders debated and shaped these relations and t he multiple Ð at times competing, at times intersecting Ð moralities undergirding them. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the ways and meanings of borrowing, investing, and doing business in urban Africa. First of all, it challenges hi stories of credit and finance in colonial and postcolonial Africa, which have focused exclusively on formal financial institutions to which few had access. In fact, wholesale traders at the Kariakoo market relied on an informal and long -established credit system known as mali kauli to trade agricultural products while having little cash at disposal . Kariakoo residents also turned semi-formal pawnshop credit to th eir advantage and proved to be reliable borrowers . Second of all, it shows the significance of credit and debt well beyond the economic sphere of urban life. Credit and debt relations were central to cosmopolitan neighborhood communities Kariakoo residents formed across racial and class categories. The availability of shop credit and pawnshop credit was a constitutive element of the urban experience, urban living, and urban belonging. Third of all, I demonstrate how the morality at the center of discourses and practices of debt repeatedly acted as fulcrum for reforming urban subjects. Colonial and postcolonial governments undertook repeated efforts to make urban residents more business -minded by impelling them to work on their creditworthiness and become Òg ood debtors.Ó However, multiple moralities continued to exist in Kariakoo, which allowed urban residents to critically evaluate new forms of credit and debt and the attending moral discourses . Finally, I illustrate that the racial antagonisms between urban residents, which have dominated the literature on credit from the colonial era to the present, have obscured the intimate and long -standing relations of credit and debt between people of African, Arab, and Asian descent in various aspects of urban life. Following commodity trails and describing the workings of urban sub -communities, I show how Kariakoo residents of all hues and colors not only worked and lived together but also shared cultural notions of respectability, generosity, and shame . Copyright by BENJAMIN AMANI BRƒHWILER 2015 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It would have been impossible to write this dissertation without the help of a large number of people and institutions. At Michigan State University, my advisor Laura Fair, the dissertation committee members Walter Hawthorne, Ed Murphy, and Mara Leichtman as well as Brandt Peterson, David Wiley, Deo Ngonyani, and Peter Limb have generously provided their intellec tual and psychological support. All of my fellow graduate student s were important and helpful companions, and I would like to specifically mention Todd Ellick, Emily Riley, Mandy Lewis, Josh Grace, Caleb Owen, Matthew Park, April Greenwood, Jennifer Eaglin, Alex Galarza, Bre Grace, and Bala Saho. Outside of MSU, Jim Brennan, Lynn Thomas, Kelly Askew , and Derek Peterson have provided valuable and highly appreciated feedback on my work at some stage during the research and writing process . In Tanzan ia, my first word of gratitude goes to the hundreds of people who agreed to sit down with me and share their life stories. My research assistants , Riziki Mashalo in Dar es Salaam and Benedict John Mgubike in Ifakara accompanied me to many interviews and were incredibly good at locating potential interview partners. Kennedy Mkute and Hidaya Kassim Mpagama helped me transcribe some of the recorded interviews. The doors of the Department of History at the University of Dar es Salaam were open thanks to the hospitality of Oswald Masebo, who was always eager to discuss my research and listen to my requests. The p resence of my fellow Tanzanianist historians Marcel Dreier, Lukas Meier, Emily Callaci, Julie Weiskopf, and Stephanie L−mmert enriched my research experience in Dar es Salaam . Finally, an ever -grateful asante to Mama Naha, who made my first stay in Dar es Salaam in 2006 so enjoyable that I had to go back to Tanzania. vi Financial support for research and write -up came from various organizations. Money from the Fulbright Foreign Student Program allowed me to do pre -dissertation archival work in the United King dom and Germany in 2010. The MSU International Studies and Programs Pre -Dissertation Research Grant facilitated a pre-dissertation research trip to Dar es Salaam in 2011. Twelve months of research in Tanzania and six months of archival research in Europe f rom 2012 to 2014 were funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation through the generous Fellowshi p for Prospective Students and doc.m obility as well as by the MSU history department through the Milton E. Muelder Graduate Award . Finally, the Freiwill ige Akademische Gesellschaft made money available for the write -up phase in Basel. At the University of Basel, I would like to thank Patrick Harries, Olivia Hochstrasser, Martin Lengwiler, and Veit Arlt for helping me arrange my stay at the history department as a lecturer and visiting scholar. A word of thanks also goes to the a rchivists at the various archives I visited in Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and Germany , who kindly supported my research by making available historical documents. Finally, I would li ke to thank my friends and family on three continents, who have accompanied me on this journey. To my wife Agnes and my son Ari, thank you for having started a new chapter in my life. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... x INTRO DUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC HISTORY .................................................... 5 DEBT, MORALITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY ........................................................................ 10 DEBT AND CREDIT IN (EAST) AFRICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY .................................... 18 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 30 CHAPTER OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ 35 CHAPTER 1 ÑURBAN BELONGING: MORAL NEIGHBORHOOD COMMUNITIES IN COLONIAL KARI AKOO ............................................................................................................ 42 COSMOPOLITAN KARIAKOO: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE ........................................... 44 CREDIT AND COLONIAL ECONOMIC RATIONALITY ................................................. 51 COSMOPOLITAN KARIAKOO: THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND ............................... 64 MORALITY, DEBT, AND BELONGING ............................................................................ 85 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 103 CHAPTER 2 ÑBORROWING AND SAVING AGAINST ALL ODDS: PAWN SHOP CREDIT AND SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN COLONIAL KARIAKOO ................................... 105 DEMONIZING BORROWING AND EULOGIZING SAV ING ........................................ 107 PAWNING GOODS ............................................................................................................. 110 THE PLEDGED OBJECT .................................................................................................... 126 KUWEKA AKIBA VERSUS KUWEKA PONI ...................................................................... 133 CREDIT FOR SOCIALISM ................................................................................................. 147 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 150 CHAPTER 3 ÑINTERWEAVING THR EADS OF CREDIT: TEXTILES, TRADE, AND SHOPS IN COLONIAL DAR ES SALAAM AND SOCIALIST TANZANIA ........................ 153 TRADING (THROUGH) TEXTILES .................................................................................. 157 THE DUKA SYSTEM .......................................................................................................... 164 OPERATING SHOPS AND SHOPKEEPERS ..................................................................... 175 BEYOND OPERATION MADUKA .................................................................................... 197 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 202 CHAPTER 4 ÑIN THE UNDER BELLY OF THE MARKET: RICE, MALI KAULI , AND UAMINIFU IN COLONIAL AND SOCIALIST KARIAKOO ................................................. 204 MARKTHALLENZWANG: COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE RICE MARKET .............. 206 THE MARKET HALL IN DAR ES SALA AM ................................................................... 211 IN THE UNDERBELLY OF THE MARKET: MALI KAULI ............................................. 219 UAMINIFU ............................................................................................................................ 224 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 233 viii CHAPTER 5 ÑCOMPETING MORALITIES: MICROCREDITS, CREDITWORTHINESS, AND AIBU IN POSTSOCIALIST KARIAKOO ....................................................................... 235 A CULTURE OF (MICRO -)CREDIT .................................................................................. 236 FROM UAMINIFU TO CREDITWORTHINESS ................................................................ 243 COMPETING MORALITIES AND AIBU STORIES ......................................................... 251 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 258 CONCLUSI ON ........................................................................................................................... 261 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 267 APPENDIX 1: ARCHIVES CONSULTED ......................................................................... 268 APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS .............................................................................................. 269 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 272 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Post Office Savings Bank accounts in Dar es Salaam, 1927 -1933. 145 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 0.1 : Cartoon in Uhuru newspaper, June 27, 1979 . ÒWhy should I not sell alcohol to other people? They also have money.Ó ÑÒToday, I am full [of money]. DonÕt you know that I received that house loan today?Ó 17 Figur e 1.1 : Map of Dar es Salaam, March 1918. The ÒNative QuartersÓ are located in the western area of the Dar es Salaam . 48 Figure 1.2 : An Arab shop in a Swahili -type house i n late -colonial Dar e s Salaam . 75 Figure 1.3 : A visualization of the Òsystem of c orner ÔdukasÕ Ó in Kariakoo, 1968. The black squares indicate the location of shops . 82 Figure 2.1 : ÒDer Laden von Mr. Gangji Ó Ð D. R. GanjiÕs pawnshop in late - colonial Kariakoo. 119 Figure 2.2: Pledge agreement I, ca. 1910. 122 Figure 2.3: Pledge agreement II, ca. 1910. 122 Figure 2.4 : ÒOriginalpfandschein von Mr. Gangji Ó Ð Pawn ticket issued by pawnshop owner D. R. Ganji. 132 Figure 2.5 : Saving money with the help of moneyboxes. Caption on the back side: ÒMs Ruth Zakari, one of the customers , who uses the service of saving money by way of money boxes, counting the money that was put into this money box.Ó 149 Figure 3.1 : Cartoon in Duka la Ujamaa na Ushirika. ÒSell me a bag of maize flour on credit.Ó Ð ÒNo comrade, we donÕt sell on credit. Ó 153 Figure 4.1 : Market hall in Dar es Salaam, ca. 1906. 212 Figure 4.2 : Kariakoo Ma rket Hall, February 28, 1971 . Photograph of personal collection by author. 216 Figure 4.3 : Kariakoo Market Hall , 2012. 218 1 INTRODUCTION It was a cool, bre ezy evening in Dar es Salaam during the month of Ramadan in 2013 . The largely Muslim residents of the Gerezani section in the Kariakoo neighborh ood had already broken the fast. Some of the men had gotten together at the kijiweni , their gat hering point at a street corner in front of the house of an elderly man nicknamed ÒMzee Dubai .Ó1 Mzee Dubai , one of the better -off kijiweni members, requested an itinerant coffee vendor to offer coffee for everyone in the group. He insisted that we were all invited to drin k and share some dates and sweets. Story telling, exchange of information, and poking fun at each other kept the kijiweni going and time passing. Just like tea and coffee houses, kijiweni corner communities have formed central units of urban culture in Dar es Salaam. 2 Politics, sports, gossip, and urban rumors were the most popular topics of discussion . And then , there were lots of stories about money lending and borrowing, outrageous interest rates, interest rates and Islam, debt enforcement, unpaid credit , for eclosure auctions, and bankruptcies . At that particular evening, I was at the kijiweni with my friend and research assistant Riziki. He was on the phone with a potential customer of his unregistered business in which he sold phones on credit and used much of his time and energy following up on debt payments. I eyed an old issue of the local newspaper The Citizen , picked it up, and flicked through it. I was 1 Names changed in this prelude. 2 On the impor tance of tea and coffee houses in Dar es Salaam, see David Henry Anthony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transit ion: A PeopleÕs History of Dar e s Salaam, 1865 -1935Ó (University of Wisconsin, 1983). 3 Ludger Kasumuni, ÒGovt: Domestic Debt Swelling,Ó The Citizen , April 4, 2013. 2 On the impor tance of tea and coffee houses in Dar es Salaam, see David Henry Anthony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transit ion: A PeopleÕs History of Dar e s Salaam, 1865 -1935Ó (University of Wisconsin, 1983). 2 struck by an article on the national debt in which the Minister of Finance warned against the Òex cessive increase in domestic debtsÓ and the dangers they posed for the national economy. The author of the article counterpoised this statement with a recent IMF report, which came to the conclusion that TanzaniaÕs risk of debt distress remained low. 3 My a ttention shifted to the small shop on the other side of the street where a dispute between the shopkeeper and a customer had broken out. The shopkeeper had refused to sell the customer a coupon to top -up his cell phone account on credit before the customer cleared his debts with the shopkeeper. The customer was outraged and started to insult the shopkeeper , called him a bad person, and swore to never buy at his shop again. Meanwhile, the kijiweni members started to engage in a discussion about the role of banks in business . As we were snacking on dates, Mzee Abdul told the story of a businessman shipping large amounts of dates to Dar es Salaam ahead of Ramadan. The bureaucrats at the harbor were aware that the market for dates was limited so they took advan tage of that knowledge and extort ed enormous amounts of bribes so the dates could be cleared. Mzee Bakari jumped in to tell the story of a rich man of South Asian origin from Iringa , who exploited another businessman and caused him to go bankrupt. In the e nd, the Asian businessman went bankrupt himself because Òyou canÕt be successful when you treat o ther people unjustly.Ó Mzee Chacha then started to wonder whether businessmen such as Said Salim Bakhresa , one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Tanzania and based in Kariakoo, were able to conduct business without having to rely on interest -bearing bank loans , which were illegal or haram according to Islamic jurisprudence. Mzee Daudi called him naŁve and asserted that the big businessmen as well as the sm all and medium business in Kariakoo, who were mostly Muslim, were involved in 3 Ludger Kasumuni, ÒGovt: Domestic Debt Swelling,Ó The Citizen , April 4, 2013. 3 the haram practice of using bank loans. Thus, whatever sadaka (voluntary charity ) businessmen gave out during Ramadan were ultimately based on money gained in unlawful ways. To a few men at the kijiweni , this came as a surprise, but for most it was a fait accompli. Mzee Elyudi brought up the point that large -scale businessmen such as Bakhresa were able to get loans from international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the African Development Bank, which provided loans at very low interest rates. On the other hand, ordinary citizens only had access to loans from one of the numerous private banks, which had recently opened branches in the bustling and economically acti ve Kariakoo neighborhood . They offered loans at considerably higher rates, namely 30 per cent per annum and more. Mzee Faridi , the most outspoken man at the kijiweni when it came to loans , disliked bank loans not only because they were haram but also becau se of the dangerous trappings they entailed and the shame of losing oneÕs house and belongings when failing to repay loans. Mzee Galinoma added that debts caused sleepless nights because one was too worried about how to make repayments. He gave an example of a man who was not able to sleep for two nights because of an outstanding loan. The discussion was interrupted when my friend Hamadi passed by. I jokingly challenge d him to of fer us some sodas but he refused stating he d id not have any money. Later that evening, Hamadi wanted to talk to me in private and explained how he used most of his earnings to pay school fees for his brother because the funds from the local religious community only paid for a portion of the fees. So he asked me to lend him some mone y for that purp ose. When I offered to give him a small amount as a gift, he insisted on accepti ng it not as a gift but as loan .4 This urban scene drawn from my research journal encapsulates various forms of lending and borrowing in present -day Kariakoo and the multiple moralities undergirding them. Practices 4 Fieldnotes journal , July 12, 2013. 4 of lending and borrowing were immersed in discourses of credit and debt touching on the obligation of affluent people to share their wealth, the incompatibility of interest -bearing loans and Islam, the importance of bank loans for businesspeople in Kariakoo, the danger of debt and the shame associated with failing to repay debts and losing oneÕs possessions , trust as the basis for mutually beneficial credit and debt relations, and the social pressure on shopkeepers to sell goods on credit. The Kariakoo neighborhood in Dar es Salaam serves as a case study to examine how debt and credit shaped work and business, social and communal life, and peopleÕs identities and subjectivities in urban Africa. If debt is an anthropological and historical constant, as some scholars have argued, 5 relations of debt and credit in Kariakoo certainly changed in significant ways over the twentieth century. In fact, credit and debt relations have been hotly d ebated and discussed, created and maintained, facilitated and prevented not only by economists and urban planners but also by urban traders and various groups of lenders. What remained constant, however, was the reality for Kariakoo reside nts to be perpetually indebted while s imultaneously serve as creditors .6 Kariakoo residents actively sought to create debt and credit relations rather than to avoid them at any cost. Debt and credit relations formed the basis for the membership in urban neighborhood communities, the organizati on of trading goods and agricultural produce in and out of Kariakoo, and the creation of respectable urban identities. 5 Nathalie Sarthou -Lajus, LÕ”thique de la dette (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997); David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2011); Philip Coggan, Paper Promises: Debt, Money, and the New World Order (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012). 6 As I became a regular member of the above -mentioned kijiweni community in the course of my time spent as a researcher and resident in Kariakoo, I became wrapped up in the intricate network of debt at the kijiweni . I was repeatedly confronted with other membersÕ requests for small loans. I usually offered to help out with a small amount of money. To my surprise, people never asked me to give them money as a gift but as a loan and these loans were generally paid back but the repayment period varied from a less than an hour to several months. Eventually, I found it difficult to keep track of who owed what to whom. 5 CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC HISTORY The argument that credit and debt relations formed central aspect of urban life and livelihood s in Tanzania challenges Eurocentric histories of credit and finance in colonial and postcolonial Africa, which have focused exclusively on formal financial institutions to which few had access. The literature has remained relatively silent on AfricansÕ vi ews and uses of credit and debt and the social and cultural Ð not just the economic Ð work of those relationships. 7 In fact, residents in urban Africa made extensive use of various forms of credit to create urban communities, trade networks, and personal b usinesses. Wholesale traders at the Kariakoo market hall relied on the credit system known as mali kauli Ð verbal letters of credit based on reputations and social capital rather than bank accounts Ð to trade relatively large amounts of products such as ri ce and textiles (chapter s 3 and 4). Kariakoo residents also turned pawnshop credit to their advantage and proved to be reliable borrowers (chapter 2). The significance of credit and debt went well beyond the economic sphere of urban life in twentieth -cent ury Africa. Credit and debt relations were central to neighborhood communities Kariakoo residents formed across racial and class categories. For instance, Asian shopkeepers were often compelled to sell goods to African customers on credit (chapter 1). Cred it and debt relations were also crucial for the meaning and understanding of urbanity, urban living, and urban belonging. Kariakoo residents in colonial Dar es Salaam , for instance, viewed pawnshop credit to be a right they were entitled to as urban citize ns (chapter 2). And Kariakoo residents 7 For Tanzania, see Charles Stephen Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War PeriodÓ (Ph.D. Thesis, U ppsala University, 1987). 6 created feelings of belonging in the city by becoming members of neighborhood communities by establishing credit and relations with other community members (chapter 1). Instead of conceiving of credit and debt purely as belonging to the economic realm of the human experience, credit and debt are conceptualized as economic, social, political, and cultural formations in this dissertation .8 A focus on the cultural underpinnings of credit and debt relations allows taking into account the (etic and emic) references to the importance of ÒcultureÓ when it comes to using loans and doing business in urban Tanzania. In a speech on financial institutions, TanzaniaÕs first president Julius Kambarage Nyerere made such a reference: [T]here is no such thing as a ÔneutralÕ financial system. É [T] hings like interest rates and price structures are not neutral É in their effects. É An apparently ÔneutralÕ financial decision will lead to one result in a highly developed capitalist system, and possibly a quite different one in an undeveloped poor society Ð whether or not it has adopted a capitalist philosophy. Money in the hands of an agricultural producer in U.S.A. may Ð although I do stress the word may Ð lead him to invest in more product ive agricultural machinery; the same money in the hands of a peasant in Tanzania may Ð again notice the world [sic] Ð lead him to take another wife, or purchase more cattle. Both producers will be acting sensibly in the light of their own culture, and thei r individual economic well -being; the results for the national economy will be very different. 9 Understanding credit and debt relations broadly as cultural formations means to escape an economistic understanding of the matter. With regards to slavery, Fre derick Cooper remarked that taking the market for granted and assuming people to act as self -sufficient and self -interested economic actors does not provide Òan adequate framework to analyse the fundamental differences in the ways labour was controlled and surplus value extracted or to understand the 8 Marcel Mauss understood Òthe giftÓ as a Òtotal social factÓ with implications in the economic, political, legal, and religious spheres ( Marcel Mauss, The G ift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies , Norton Library (New York: Norton, 1967) ). For how Òthe economyÓ came to conceptualized as a sphere separate from cultural, social, and political life and following its rules, see Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno -Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 9 Julius K. Nyerere, Inaugural Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Bank of Tanzania, 1983), 2. 7 consequences that the ability of particular groups to control and use slaves had for social organization, cultural values, and ideology.Ó 10 A similar skepticism with the application of Western views of economic actors in African contexts should be displayed when investigating credit and debt. Therefore, credit is understood not merely as an economic instrument, which people used to various degrees of success depending on their economic skills, available capital, and other quantifiable variables. Rather, I investigate to what ends lenders and borrowers in the urban neighborhood of Kariakoo used credit, how urban credit contributed to the formation of specific neighborhood communities, and how it sparked debates abo ut desirable kinds of urban African subjects. The recent literature has shown that a focus on debt and credit opens up possibilities to make visible and examine the cultural underpinnings of economic relations. In an exemplary study on the history of inst allment plans in the US with the indicative subtitle A Cultural History of Consumer Credit , Lendol Calder has demonstrated the usefulness of integrating economic, social, and cultural approaches when looking at debt and credit .11 Drawing on Calder , I unders tand credit as embedded in social relations and cultural norms rather than as purely economic transactions between self -interested individuals. Creditor s engaged in complex calculations that were concerned with the potential of great gain and the risk of e qually great 10 Fred erick Cooper, ÒThe Problem of Slavery in African Studies,Ó Journal of African History 20, no. 1 (1979): 104. 11 Lendol Glen Calder, Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). David Graeber has rightly noted that the study of pawnship in African history might benefit from a more integrative approach as well. While Mary Douglas viewed pawnship as a matter of kinship, Toyin Falola and Paul Lovejoy understood it as the equivalent of an interest -bearing loan ( Graeber, Debt ; Mary Douglas, ÒBlood -Debts and Clientship among the Lele,Ó The Journal of th e Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 90, no. 1 (1960): 1 Ð28; Mary Douglas, ÒMatriliny and Pawnship in Central Africa,Ó Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 34, no. 4 (October 1, 1964): 301 Ð13; Toyin Falola and Pa ul Lovejoy, Pawnship in Africa: Debt Bondage in Historical Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994)). 8 loss. Likewise, cultural values concerning generosity and patronage as well as social bonds in the community considerably affected the ways in which credit was perceived and used. Sometimes , scholars have treated the investment in social rela tions in a rather instrumentalist manner. PeopleÕs investment in Òsocial capitalÓ rather than material assets is understood as a matter of accumulation. Shared senses of ethnicity, religion, and race are portrayed as merely building trust and thus facilita ting more efficient uses of credit. 12 Sara Berry provides a necessary critique of Ò social capitalÓ when she points out that the Òmost intimate social relationships are often the most conflict -riddenÓ and she urg es scholars Òto recognize the tension between trust and suspicion that permeates all social relationships and try to understand its dynamic power and potential.Ó 13 Likewise, John Lonsdale challenges the idea that the market serves as a morally neutral entity while community is inherently moral. 14 Unders tanding debt as a calculable, payable, and enforceable entity, which the debtor is morally obliged to repay, makes debt and credit compatible with the logic of the market . Credit and debt are then understood merely as a way to enhance circulation and make allocation of capital more efficient. 15 This economistic view of credit and debt constituted one of the discourses that guided peopleÕs behavior with regards to credit and debt , but it rarely provided the only such discourse. Debt is not always calculable a nd payable , for instance when we consider the debt we owe to our 12 Abner Cohen, Custom & Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns (London : Routledge & K. Paul, 1969). 13 Sara Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896 -1996 (Po rtsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2001), 156. See also Janet L. Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 14 John Lonsdale, ÒStates and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey,Ó African Studies Review 24, no. 3 (1981): 139. 15 Joseph Miller shares this understanding when he argues that debt fuelled the slave trade in central western Africa because debt was a way to make local producers produce more slaves and cash crops ( Joseph Mill er, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830 (Wisconsin: Currey, 1988) ). 9 parents for having given us life. 16 Debt can also be used as a political tool to exert power over subjects and cultivate loyalty amongst them. 17 Even as creditor -debtor relationships helped to form communities, these communities and the debt and credit relationships undergirding them should be considered as social processes constantly in the making, open to multiple interpretations, and potentially filled with tensions. Thus, there is a need to broaden the view on debt and credit relations . Using the history of the Kariakoo neighborhood in Dar es Salaam as a case study, I look at the various form s of debt in that neighborhood, and how forms of debt have shaped work, social life, and people themse lves in the neighborhood. A focus on debt and credit provides particular insights into forms of power, governmentality and subjectivities. It also allows for new understandings of the ways and meanings of saving, investing, and doing business in urban Afri ca. And it s hed s new light on the history of race and race relations in urban Tanzania. It is important to avoid the binary trap of dividing societies as either gift - or market -economies. 18 As will be seen below, creditors and debtors used credit as a way t o build personal relationships and conform to communal norms . This provides insights into urban subjectivities, which did not easily comply with hegemonic power structures and the notion of homo oeconomicus . Shopkeepers in colonial Dar es Salaam, for insta nce, sold goods on credit even though the chances were that customers would not pay for the goods. When considering the social and cultural aspects of this practice, it 16 Sarthou -Lajus, LÕ”thique de la dette . See also Graeber, Debt . 17 Cassandra Mark -Thiesen, ÒThe ÔbargainÕ of Collaborat ion: African Intermediaries, Indirect Recruitment, and Indigenous Institutions in the Ghanaian Gold Mining Industry, 1900 Ð1906,Ó International Review of Social History 57, no. S20 (2012): 17 Ð38. 18 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (New York: Norton, 1967). 10 may be described as a way to build social relations within the community. 19 Shopkeepers who never sold on credit might have been more successful in accumulating wealth for themselves, their families, and religious community. Their status and reputation in the neighborhood community, however, were affected negatively by their business behavior (chapter 1). DEBT, MORALITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY Framing credit and debt relations broadly as cultural formations means to take seriously the moral discourses constituting these relations. 20 It does not necessarily follow , however, that these discourses and practices need to be conceived as a Òmoral economyÓ constituting a separate sphere with its own rules. 21 Rather, it means to take into account the competing moralities of credit and debt that undergirded relations in urban collectives, between patrons and clients, and 19 See also Julia Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 20 Lendol Calder shows how the use of in stallment plans was seen as a sign of moral decline even though it actually imposed discipline on consumers ( Calder, Financing the American Dream ). 21 In its original formulation, E. P. Thompson applied the concept of the moral economy to food riots in eighteenth -century rural England. Thompson argued that these rioters England were rational actors who aimed to re -establish a moral order by drawing on centuries -old customs and patterns of behavior. The moral economy of provision establishe d informal rules, which guaranteed the rights of lower -class people to be the first to buy grain at regulated prices. As large -scale merchants increasingly challenged the ways in which actors of the economy of provision traded commodities, consumers rebell ed against high prices of grain during times of shortage. Thompson argued that rioters acted out long -established modes of behavior to force farmers, millers, and bakers to lower the price of grain and bread. Although riots were not led by institutionalize d groups, they were characterized by clear rules of order in which outright theft was largely absent. Rioters understood themselves as re -establishing a moral economy of provision in which they had the right to buy grain and bread to low prices. Thompson h imself considered the moral economy of provision to be no longer in existence as the logic of the market economy assumed hegemony at the beginning of the nineteenth century ( E. P. Thompson, ÒThe Moral E conomy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,Ó Past & Present , no. 50 (1971): 76 Ð136). For an example of the application of the concept to modern urban contexts, see Benjamin Orlove, ÒMeat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot,Ó Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 2 (1997): 234 Ð68. For a critique of the concept, see Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience . 11 among market participants. As Julia Elyachar has shown for the el -Hirafiyeen neighborhood in Cairo, workshop owners acted in market -oriented ways while at the same time engaging in the moral project of building a neighborhood community. 22 The m orality at the center of discourses and practices of debt repeatedly acted as a fulcrum for reforming urban subjects in Kariakoo . The pervasiveness of (supposedly harmful) credit and debt relations also served as the discursive moral foil against which urb an planning interventions were legitimated (chapters 3 and 4). Moral discourses around credit and debt were productive spaces because they provided a realm where local views of business practices and government visions of desirable business behavior inters ected. Colonial and postcolonial governments undertook repeated efforts to make urban residents more business -minded by impelling them to work on their creditworthiness and become Ògood debtors.Ó However, competing moralities continued to exist in Kariakoo , which allowed urban residents to critically evaluate new forms of credit and debt and their attending moral discourses (chapter 5). The importance of credit and debt for the formation of communities or collectives reverberates with Friedrich NietzscheÕ s argument in On the Genealogy of Morals that creditor -debtor relationships , which he considered to be a univer sal phenomenon in human history, formed the basis on which people came to measure themselves against others. Nietzsche contended that creditor -debtor relationships brought about morality and conscience as well as feelings of superiority, guilt, and obligation as the linguistic similarities of the German ÒSchuldenÓ (debts) and ÒSchuldÓ (guilt) indicates. While p unishing bad debtors compensated credi tors and gave them the privilege and pleasure of inflicting pain on debtors, t he punishment of debtors also gave rise to memory and morality. Nietzsche argued that as relationships of debt 22 Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession . 12 assumed an intergenerational character, the present generation came to see its wealth as a form of debt incurred to its ancestors. The wealthier and more powerful a society was, the greater became the desire to pay back the debts in the form of sacrifices. In the most extreme cases, ancestors became deified and venerated as gods. 23 Most relevant for the purposes of this dissertation is NietzscheÕs contention that creditor -debtor relationships produced particular subjectivities, i.e. they forced individuals to measure themselves against others and to adopt a sense of time in which promises for future repayment could be made and contractual agreements reached in the past could be remembered. 24 The central term at the nexus of debt, morality, and subjectivity is creditworthiness. In the Kariakoo market environment, where social relations were heavily marked by aspects of credit and debt, local notions of honesty, trustworthiness, and creditworthiness intersected with continuous efforts by c olonial and postcolonial governments and financial institutions to educate residents in fin ancial matters. Credit and the quest to form creditworthy subjects and citizens stood at the heart of policies formulated and implemented by colonial as well as the postcolonial state actors . In British colonial Tanganyika, the government passed a law proh ibiting Africans from taking out loans. In numerous debates, colonial officials legitimated the restriction of AfricansÕ access to credit by presenting the colonial state as the paternalistic protector of Africans, who were supposedly unable to handle mone y properly and for whom the availability of credit presented the danger of getting sucked into the spiral of perpetual indebtedness. At the 23 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsc he, On the Genealogy of Morals , Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 62 Ð64, 70Ð71, 88Ð91. 24 Ibid., 64. For a critique of NietzscheÕs conception, see Graeber, Debt , chapter 4. With Foucault, I consider subject formation as a continuous process taking place in an environment of power manifested in social relation. In this e nvironment of power, human beings turn themselves into subjects and create certain subjectivities ( Michel Foucault, ÒThe Subject and Power,Ó Crit ical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777 Ð95). 13 same time, officials grudgingly admitted their own dependence on Asian credit, which made it imposs ible for them to restrict Asian residents from accessing and providing credit. In the postcolonial period, the socialist state used credit as a tool to promote President Julius NyerereÕs vision of Tanzania as a modern agricultural economy. Banks were nationalized in 1967 a nd the newly founded National Bank of Commerce allocated credit to socialist ujamaa villages rather than urban -based businesspeople. Still, the socialist government and financial institutions complained about African borrowers, who often considered loans t o be gifts and did not have any intention of paying them back. In the post -socialist period since 1985, credit increasingly came to be seen by state and non -state institutions as a way to alleviate poverty, both in rural and urban areas. Former president J akaya Kikwete in 2005 ran on a platform of assisting the Tanzanian poor with the help of a fund that provided mon ey to microcredit institutions, which in turn applied their ways of gauging potential lendersÕ creditworthiness. Again, African borrowers were seen as being in need of training and education because they supposedly did not know what credit was and how to handle loans. The various ways of how different governments allocated credit and legitimized these credit allocations reveal much about state po wer and how Tanzanian state actors tapped into the powerful moral discourses surrounding credit and debt to govern citizens. These long -lasting and sustained efforts by governing and financial institutions determined how credit was allocated and they shap ed how people would use credit. In short, credit has been a primary means to shape desirable subjects and citizens. At t he same time, local actors drew on multiple available discourses to question and challenge imposed definitions of creditworthiness. To a large extent, Africa historians have reproduced a colonial view of Africans when it comes to business and creditworthiness. Africans either emerge as being 14 exploited by larger market forces or they are portrayed as acting in spheres separate from these market forces. In the former view, Africans end up being victims; in the latter view, Africans emerge as agents who heroically and self-knowingly carve out spaces for their livelihoods. Rather than simply putting the colonial view on its head and celebrate A frican ingenuity and business efforts that largely went unnoticed by both colonial and postcolonial governments or even forced governments to change their political i deologies ,25 I am interested to explore where local business practices and government visio ns of desirable business behavior intersected. The realm of intersection was often the moral discourses surrounding the use of credit. Debt and time were intricately linked to each other , as Nietzsche pointed out, and this was true also on the East African coast . In his Dictionary of the Suaheli Language from the late nineteenth century , Johann Ludwig Krapf translate d the Kiswahili word ÒKopeshaÓ with Ò to lend, to suppl y a trader with goods on credit Ó and provide d the example ÒBaniani ame -ni-kopesha mÕda mi ezi miwili, the Baniani [Hindu Asian person] gave me goods on credit for two months .Ó He translated t he Kis wahili word Òm ÕdaÓ or ÒmudaÓ with Ò a space of time agreed for Ð, a set term Ó and more specifically Ò an appointed space of time within which a debt mu st be paid or the borrowed money or property returned to its owner .Ó26 The definition of time with the help 25 See, for instance, Aili Mari Tripp, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997). 26 Johann Ludwig Krapf, A Dictionary o f the Suahili Language (London: Tr and Co., 1882). Johann Ludwig Krapf was a long -time resident of Mombasa, Kenya, and a missionary of the London Missionary Society . A few additional comments on how credit, debt, borrowing, and lending have been conc eptualized in the Kiswahili language might be useful here. To owe and to be in debt are expressed in different ways in English and in Kiswahili. The active verb ÒkudaiÓ means Òto claimÓ and it also means Òto be owed toÓ in the context of credit and debt. T he closest translation for the passive form Òkudaiwa,Ó on the other hand, is the active form Òto owe.Ó These verb constructions are indicative of the status and position of creditor and debtor. In Kiswahili, Òmtu anayedaiÓ is the active person, who makes a claim on someone else. ÒMtu anayedaiwaÓ is the passive person, who is being made claims on. Krapf used the example Ònadai kuako fethayangu, I demand my money [from you].Ó Related to this, the Kiswahili verbs ÒkukopaÓ, 15 of credit is remarkable , and the explicit connection between time and credit also illustrate that different credit relations come with dis tinct conce ptions of time. L ocal credit arrangement s such as mali kauli (chapter 4) entailed a concept ion of time that was flexible, whereas bank loans and microcredits depended on fixed time periods, which challenged more flexible understandings of time. These loans had to be paid back in regular intervals, usually weekly or monthly. Official visions and imaginations of what urban residents should do with respect to credit and debt were plentiful in Dar es Salaam. Colonial governments viewed the urban population thr ough a racial lens and formulated policies accordingly. With regards to people of Asian descent , credit was presented as beneficial for their business activities with Europeans and other Asians. When it came to people of African descent , the colonial gover nment considered credit to be dangerous because it would make Africans dependent on immoral Asian dukawallahs or shopkeepers, who exploited African customers by providing loans they could only repay by selling their houses and belongings . The racial antago nisms between Asians and Africans have dominated the literature on Dar es Salaam. James Brennan has argued that credit and debt relations between Asians and Africans contributed to the racialization of identities in colonial ÒkukopeshaÓ, and ÒkukopeshwaÓ differ from the English translations Òto borrowÓ and Òto lendÓ. In English, the verbs Òto borrowÓ and Òto lendÓ are two completely different verbs that do not share a common root. In Kiswahili, the verbs share the common root Ò -kopa.Ó The original verb is Òkukopa ,Ó which means Òto borrow,Ó is rarely used in this form. However, it does serve as the root for various derivative forms, including the noun ÒmkopoÓ for Òc reditÓ or Òloan.Ó ÒTo lendÓ in Kis wahili is a derivative form of Òkukopa,Ó namely the causative form Òkukopesha,Ó which would be best translated as Òto make [someone] borrow.Ó ÒKukopeshwa,Ó the passive form of Òkukopesha,Ó is the most commonly used expression of the English Òto borrow.Ó It would be best translated as Òto be made to borrow.Ó In short, a pe rson who lends money actually makes somebody borrow money in Kiswahili. And the person who borrows money is being made to borrow money. As in the above example of ÒkudaiÓ and ÒkudaiwaÓ, the creditor emerges as the active person, who makes the debtor borrow money. The debtor occupies the passive part, who is almost being made to borrow, almost against his or her will. 16 Dar es Salaam. 27 Looking at the printed press in the colonial period, Brennan is certainly right to detect the fostering of racial identities and the development of racial antagonisms in political discourses. However, the focus on racial antagonisms and stereotypes has obscured the intim ate and long -standing relations of credit and debt between Asians and Africans in various aspects of life. 28 Credit and debt relations sustain ed a specific economic system and intimately connected Kariakoo residents of all hues and colors, who not only work ed and lived together but also shared cultural notions of respectability, generosity, and shame. Mutual trust manifested itself in various forms. Kariakoo residents , for instance, routinely deposited their savings in the form of textiles or money with the local shopkeeper , whereas shopkeepers and itinerant traders generally sold goods on credit . When Kariakoo residents talk about the past, they often use the word uaminifu , which is Kiswahili for ÒtrustworthinessÓ and Òhonesty.Ó Notably, uaminifu was not res erve d for a particular ethnic or racial group but could be applied to any resident in the cosmopolitan Kariakoo neighborhood. Despite myriad government efforts to create particular urban subjects, market and community relations in Kariakoo were rather resi lient and continued to be based on trust and credit throughout the colonial, socialist, and postsocialist periods. Although peopleÕs actual practices did not always conform to government regulations , racial stereotypes and racialized policies did , of cours e, shape everyday life and livelihoods in 27 James R. Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), chapter 2. 28 Franck Raimbault, who mentions credit and debt relations in German colonial Dar es S alaam, writes with respect to the use of the Kiswahili language, Òil nÕest gu‘re possible dÕanalyser la situation avec les cat”gories racialo -g”ographicques en usage dans les sources. É On ne peut donc pas tenir un discours g”n”ral sur les relations entre les Africains et les marchands indiens. Les marchands install”s depuis des d”cennies dans la r”gion connaissaient cette langue [Kiswahili] et les coutumes locales. Ceux qui r”sidaient ‹ Dar [es Salaam] depuis les ann”es 1860 ou 70, avaient d”velopp” des re lations sociales ”troites avec la population, notamment les chefs locauxÓ ( Franck Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914)Ó (Ph.D. Thesis, 20 08), 140). 17 colonial Kariakoo and their legacies have shaped postcolonial contexts . First of all, being a creditor was for a long time associated with being of Asian origin because Asians were more likely to be creditors in co lonial Dar es Salaam. Second of all, Africans to a certain extent embraced the stereotype of being irresponsible debtors, as the cartoon below from 1979 expresses (figure 0.1). Figure 0.1: Cartoon in Uhuru newspaper, June 27, 1979. ÒWhy should I not sel l alcohol to other people? They also have money.Ó ÑÒToday, I am full [of money]. DonÕt you know that I received that house loan today?Ó 29 The man at the bar , who has receive d a house loan earlier that day, tells the waitress to reserve enough beers for him. Beer Ð as so many other commodities in the late 1970s Ð was scarce due to economic difficulties and the socialist policy of self -reliance, which did not allow goods to be imported to Tanzania unrestrictedly. Apparently, the man plans to spend the loan mon ey on beer rather than on the house for which the loan is intended. 29 Uhuru newspaper, June 27, 1979. 18 More important than racial aspects were communal and class aspects of credit and debt relations. Borrowing and lending among members of the same urban community was very common and an exp ression of solidarity among community members. The willingness to loan money was understood as an expression of community membership. Notably, loans from wealthier members of the community were considered to be gifts or entitlements and debtors did not nec essarily feel the need to repay these loans. Wealthy people, who were not willing to lend money, were critiqued for their lack of solidarity and not considered to be part of that particular urban community. Creditors themselves, therefore, invested in high ly valued social relations at the expense of economic profit, thus helping to build social life in colonial Kariakoo while ensuring their status of well -respected members of the local community, a particularly delicate task for members of the relatively pr ivileged minority of Asian residents. 30 The following discussion illustrates how the findings presented in this dissertation build on and challenge the existing historiography of credit and debt in (East) Africa. DEBT AND CREDIT IN (EAST) AFRICAN HISTORIO GRAPHY There has yet to be published a monograph that is mainly devoted to the subject of credit in African history. In addition to the Òdebt studiesÓ literature referred to above, 31 I draw on the literature on credit and debt in Africa. Economic and social historians as well as historical anthropologists have addressed credit as an economic and social relation since the inception of the sub -discipline of African history in the 1950s. Scholars have discussed the importance o f 30 With respect to trade arrangements based on credit, however, loans always had to be paid back. In fact, traders did not refer to these arrangements as credit transactions but simply as mali kauli transactions (see chapter 4) . 31 Mauss, The Gift , 1967; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage B ooks, 1989); Calder, Financing the American Dream ; Graeber, Debt ; Coggan, Paper Promises . 19 credit in the economic sphere, a nd they have noted that p recolonial long -distance trade, the Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade, imperial economies of the colonial period, as well as national economies of postcolonial Africa cannot be adequately understood without looking at credit tr ansactions. Scholars have also looked at how institutions of social discipline used credit to shape subjectivities by instilling certain values into African subjects. Providence, calculation, saving, and self -discipline were emphasized as core principles f or a productive use of credit. Notably, these projects of social discipline had their limits as African debtors used credit to their own ends. The following sections provide an overview of the kinds of knowledge historians and anthropologists of Africa hav e produced with regards to credit. Particular attention is paid to the scholarship of East Africa. Africa historians focusing on the precolonial period have viewed and examined credit most often as a financial instrument. Credit was widely used and played an important role in the organization of long -distance trade in precolonial Africa. Already in the 1950s, Kenneth Dike described how the palm oil trade in the Niger Delta depended on an elaborate credit system, which had its roots in the slave trade. Init ially, the use of credit was based entirely on mutual trust as exclusive groups of traders created and negotiated reputations of creditworthy merchants. Over time, however, African middlemen in the Delta failed to maintain their exclusive sense of creditwo rthiness. As they came to depend on the supply of goods and credit from Europeans, corruption and abuse of credit crept in and increasing competition made the lives of middlemen more difficult and even more dependent on European merchants. 32 Writing in t he 1980s, Joseph Miller examines the organization of the sla ve trade in West Central Africa. He draws on Karl MarxÕ works to distinguish two systems of trade based on 32 Kenneth Onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delt a, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 20 different political economies. 33 The capitalistic Atlantic system was based on exchange valu e, while the pre -capitalist African system was based on use value. Far from being incompatible, the two systems complemented each other in various ways. Miller argues that central western Africans did not simply turn into capitalists when their societies s tarted to interact with Atlantic traders. Rather, Africans continued to view the production of goods as based on use v alue rather than exchange value. For instance, Africans measured the prices for slaves in fixed sets of commodities rather than in currenc ies that could be adjusted incrementally. However persistent, African notions of Ògift -givingÓ and ÒsharingÓ were transformed into more market -based values of exchange with the help of Atlantic tradersÕ use of credit. Merchant kings liked the relationships with Luso -African merchants because Luso -Africans sold goods on credit without expecting African kings to establish relationships of dependence, as was common in the African system . Furthermore, Luso -African traders did not rely on local notions of credit worthiness and offered less powerful people the opportunity to acquire and trade goods, which could increase their status. 34 These new merchant kings used the commercial credit available in the Atlantic system and extended it to their subjects. At times, th ey compelled elders and nobles to take loans with the aim of making them more dependent. 35 European creditors, on the other hand, applied various strategies to ensure that debtors would pay back their loans. They helped to put people with good credit rating s in power and boycotted offending debtors. Direct seizure of offending debtors, however, was infrequent. 36 African traders used the high morbidity and mortality of slaves to force slave buyers to agree to more favorable credit arrangements. 37 According to 33 Miller, Way of Death . 34 Ibid., 97. 35 Ibid., 131. 36 Ibid., 124. 37 Ibid., 188. 21 Miller, the extensive use of credit was responsible for the increased production of slaves in West Central Africa. As more goods became available and African rulers faced greater levels of indebtedness, marginalized people such as pawns were transformed int o slaves. Pawnship itself had been a form of credit in precolonial Africa but the relatively mild creditor -pawn relationships were transformed into harsh slave -master relationships. 38 Roberts and Mann likewise in vestigate precolonial int ercontinental trade . They show how trade relationships between Africans and Europeans centered on credit and property. Paying particular attention to legal aspects of these rela tionships, the authors describe how in the nineteenth century, the provision of credit was increas ingly undertaken by writing contracts and pledging property rather than establishing patron -client relationships or swearing oaths. With the abolition of slave trade and slavery, slave owner -slave relationships transformed into credit -debtor relationships as former slave owners extended credit to former slaves. 39 38 Ibid., 95. While Miller gives a very logical account of how African regional trade based on use value might have looked like and how it changed with the arrival of the Atlantic slave trade, he does not provide much evidence to document these d evelopments. 39 Richard Roberts and Kr istin Mann, ÒIntroduction: Law in Colonial Africa,Ó in Law in Colonial Africa, by Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (London: James Currey, 1991), 9, 11, 29. Documents produced and assembled by German colonial state actors contain reference to slaves and sl ave owners in Dar es Salaam. This is not surprising because slaves were among the early Dar es Salaam inhabitants and the Germans never outlawed slavery in German East Africa ( Jan-Georg Deutsch, Emancipation Without Ab olition in German East Africa, c .1884-1914 (Ox ford: James Currey, 2006)). Koponen estimates the number of slaves in Dar es Salaam district in 1912 at about 4000 ( Juhani Koponen, Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884 -1914, Finnish Historical Society S tudia Historica 49 (Helsinki: Tiedekirja, 1994), 613 ). However, there are no indications that slave owner -slave relationships were transformed into credit -debtor relationships in Dar es Salaam. When slave owners died, slaves were either freed or they boug ht themselves free or other people bought them free. In one case, the death of Jumbe Kirumbi bin Bwanaumari, 15 of the 135 rupees with which KirumbiÕs four slaves had bought themselves free was used to pay KirumbiÕs outstanding debts (TNA: G35/3: Ò[Verwalt ung der] Nachl−sse [verstorbener Nichteurop−er]. 1910 -1912Ó). In interviews, (former) Kariakoo residents sometimes used the language of slavery, which is commonly used for situations of oppression and exploitation, to refer to bank loans with exorbitant in terest rates. Taxi driver Briton took out a loan of 15 million TSh to finish building his house. The loan was 22 Gareth Austin, in one of the rare pieces entirely devoted to the uses of cre dit in African societies, traces the origins of credit Africa prior to European contact. 40 Overall, Austin takes stock of t he various forms of indigenous credit institutions. He argues that human pawning was so prevalent in precolonial Africa because land was abundant and therefore had little value as security. 41 With regards to rotating credit and savings associations, he cont ends that they were more likely to be used by relatively affluent members of the community rather than by already impoverished people. Debt among kin members was rarely considered debt and death did not cancel a debt but transferred it to kin. He views tra ding diasporas as institutions, which facilitated the use of credit among an exclusive group of people with the help of a code of business ethics, sometimes underpinned by the sanctions of Islam. This echoes Abner CohenÕs study of how urban Hausa traders Ð by maintaining and strengthening their ethnic exclusiveness Ð were able to participate competitively in trade. The internal cohesion of the Hausa community formed the basis of trust, on which credit transaction could take place. 42 As a n economic historian, Austin refutes the theoretical underpinnings of dependency theory and the modes of production school of the 1970s because they overemphasized the domination of outsiders. While embracing a market -based approach to African economies, he is wary of moderniz ation theory and the substantivist school Ð two theoretical frameworks, which had been influential in the 19 50s and 1960s. Austin challenges both frameworks because they repayable within three years at the interest rate of 18 per cent. He worked as a prison guard at the time and the monthly loan payments were direc tly deducted from his salary. ÒWhen you borrow, you become a slave. Life becomes very difficultÓ ( Briton , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Ilala, Dar es Salaam, March 17, 2013 ). 40 Gareth Austin, ÒIndigenous Credit Institutions in West Africa,Ó in Local Su ppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750 -1960, by Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993). 41 See also John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400 -1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 42 Cohen, Custom & Politics in Urban Africa . 23 regarded precolonial indigenous economic institutions as either hostile to economic gr owth or as largely incompatible with market econom ics. Nevertheless, Austin wants to go back to the earlier market approach and answer the unresolved questions of market ÔimperfectionsÕ and conflicting rationalities of precolonial Africa. While Austin laud ably emphasizes the rationality of African actors and the efficiency of indigenous economic institutions, his unwillingness to abandon a Western market -based approach le ads him to describe African economies as fragmented and incomplete . For instance, Austi n describes the fact that the terms of lending were often determined at least in part by the individual relationship between the two parties rather than by conditions in a competitive market as a form of Òmarket fragmentation.Ó 43 As the lender tended to hav e much information about the debtor, the risks involved in providing credit could be reduced. Stiansen and Guyer emphasize the role of Islam with its guidelines for conducting business. Charging of interest on credit was explicitly prohibited by the QurÕa n. Aside from Islamic notions, precolonial concepts of interest were very flexible. The concept of default did not exist and credit contract were re -negotiated when the debtor failed to pay back loans in time.44 Robin Law concurs with Stiansen and Guyer tha t credit transactions tended to be negotiated individually. Although credit was important for overseas and domestic trade in precolonial Dahomey, personal and informal relationships, rather than specialized financial institutions, formed the basis of econo mic transactions. Like Miller for West Central Africa, L aw describes how European traders extended credit in the form of goods supplied in advance of the delivery of slaves and later palm oil. Most of these credit arrangements were short -term although 43 Austin, ÒIndigenous Credit Institutions in West A frica,Ó 110. 44 Endre Stiansen and Jane Guyer, ÒIntroduction,Ó in Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective , by Endre Stiansen and Jane Guyer (Uppsala Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 9 Ð10. 24 long -term credits existed as well. Debts were not always repaid and European and Brazilian creditors found themselves in too weak a position to withhold credit. Africans, on the other hand, sometimes extended credit to Europeans. Over time, European traders re placed the practice of advancing goods to African suppliers with employing Africans or Afro -Europeans as local agents of European firms. 45 In precolonial East Africa, the provision of credit had been a long -standing phenomenon with particular Asian characte ristics in towns and cities along the East African coast. Creditors in nineteenth -century Zanzibar were either India -born or of Indian descent and they brought capital accumulated in India to do business on the East African coast. 46 A considerable share of lower -class AfricansÕ income consisted of loans and credits that were never paid back. 47 Jeremy Presthol dt describes how demanding the repayment of debts in pre -Busaidi Mombasa was not only very difficult but also dangerous as creditors were Òharangued, jai led, or otherwise molested when they attempted to call in their debts.Ó 48 When the Zanzibar -based Busaidi government formally annexed Mombasa in 1837, it changed the ways in which business was conducted. It encouraged Zanzibar -based traders to do business w ith Mombasa by facilitating their access to credit. Furthermore, it enforced creditorsÕ rights, which gave lenders incentives to do business in Mombasa. Owners of local businesses, landowners, and merchants engaged in the caravan trade 45 Robin Law, ÒFinance and Credit in Pre -Colonial Dahomey,Ó in Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective , by Endre Stiansen and Jane Guyer (Uppsala Sweden: Nordisk a Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 17 Ð24. 46 Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856 -1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinem ann, 1995), 32; Jeremy Prestholdt, Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 78 Ð79. 47 J. A. K. Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 139. 48 Prestholdt, Domesticating the World , 188, footnote 6. 25 to the interior all took advantage of the availability of money capital. 49 Coastal urban patricians in Pangani, Saadani, and Bagamoyo equally borrowed money from Zanzibar -based creditors to finance the expensive caravan trade to the interior. 50 As the Sultanate of Zanzibar expa nded its influence on the coast, it actively helped to spread economic activities that involved the regulated lending and borrowing of money. Robert Gregory showed how old forms of credit -provision used in India became more common in East Africa. The most prominent feature was the use of promissory notes called hundi. 51 Overall, credit and debt relations in precolonial Africa have been described as existing outside or side by side with capitalist exchange values. With the colonial conquest and institution o f colonial rule on the African continent, European powers started to pursue their economic interests with the help of colonial states. Colonial administrations were wary of local moneylenders, and Western financial institutions operating in colonial Africa tended to display extraordinary caution with regards to provi ding credit to African subjects . One of the effects of this Òunnecessary cautionÓ was the survival and proliferation of precolonial forms of credit, such as rotating credit societies. Colonial administrators classified these practices as Òinformal.Ó 52 Colonial financial policies introduced rigid time limits to credits and the novel notion of default , which replaced more flexible negotiations and re -negotiations over the terms of credit. 53 The colo nial state Ð and later the postcolonial state Ð also used credit as a political instrument. African veterans of the colonial military, for example, were granted low -interest loans as a way 49 Ibid., 35 Ð36. 50 Glassman, Feasts and R iot , 39. 51 Robert G. Gregory, South Asians in East Africa: An Economic and Social History, 1890 -1980 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 102. 52 Austin, ÒIndigenous credit i nstitutions in West Africa,Ó 133. 53 Stiansen and Guyer, ÒIntroduction,Ó 10. 26 to ensure their loyalty to the French Empire. 54 Slavery, pawning, an d debt bondage, on the other hand, were actively suppressed. Disputes over debt became increasingly resolved in colonial courts and with the help of a fixed set of Òcustomary laws.Ó Furthermore, political actors used indebtedness as a way to accumulate pow er. In Asante, for instance, Frimpon legitimized his aspirations to become Asantehene by referring to the fact that other chiefs were indebted to him and were therefore his subordinates. 55 In colonial Egypt, the state promoted the use of credit and debt as a way to facilitate tax collection. Against the wishes of the rural population, the British first introduced the concept of privately owned land. The villager councilor, who was forced by the state to own a certain amount of land, was made responsible for the payment of taxes of all the villagers. Those who were unable or unwilling to pay taxes, were then compelled to work the land of the village councilor so as to pay off their debts. Others lost the right to work their own land as it was confiscated by t he state. These forced relations of debt were based on the idea of private property, which many villagers objected to. 56 For colonial Africa, the best study is a chapter by Mann and Guyer on the soci”t”s de pr”voyances (local credit and cooperative associat ions) in French West Africa. 57 These associations aimed at encouraging cash savings amongst African populations, offering an alternative to loans from the local informal sector, which were seen as usurious. In addition to that, the associations had the purp ose of educating farmers in credit and savings. By inculcating 54 Gregory Ma nn and Jane Guyer, Ò Imposing a Guide on the Indig‘ne: The Fifty Year Experience of the Soci”t”s de Pr”voyance in French West and Equatorial Africa,Ó in Credit, Currencies and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective , by Endre Stiansen and Jane Guyer (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 129. 55 Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries , 22. 56 Mitchell, Rule of Ex perts . 57 Mann and Guyer, ÒImposing a Guide on the Indig‘ne: The Fifty Year Experience of the Soci”t”s de Pr”voyan ce in French West and Equatorial Africa.Ó 27 pr”voyance or foresight into African subjects, they functioned as institutions of social discipline, which Òsought to remold local farmers into profitable and productive subjects.Ó 58 Ultimately, however, the soci”t”s failed to bring about the individualized sense of financial self -discipline because administratorsÕ actions did not conform to their own preaching and because the use of coercion became politically unacceptable in the late colonial p eriod. In colonial East Africa, Asian capital and moneylenders continued to play a crucial role in the economy. Gregory locates four social groups, for which Asian credit was important. European farmers borrowed money to get through periods of drought or economic decline. In German East Africa, a Punjabi Hindu became known as ÒThe BankÓ because Germans regularly relied on him for loans when they failed to get any from banks . Likewise, Africans and Arabs in Zanzibar and on the coast made regular use of Asia n credit. Unlike European settlers in the Kenya highlands, who could not legally lose their land to Asians, coastal Africans and Arabs became increasingly indebted to Asians and sometimes ended up losing their land. Africans from the interior, who were dra wn into the market economy, bought goods like seeds, fertilizer, and farm implements from the local Asian shop, often on credit. According to Gregory, their word was sufficient as collateral . Most importantly, credit and the advancement of goods on credit were used among people of Asian descent. It allowed for a rapid expansion of family businesses, especially in wholesale and retail trade. In Dar es Salaam, the Ismaili Khojas, who were followers of the Aga Khan, formed their own lending institutions, which offered loans at six per cent and matched the amount provide d by the borrower as a security .59 58 Ibid., 132. 59 Gregory, South Asians in East Africa , 98, 100, 102Ð105. Overall, Gregory paints a rather rosy picture of the effects that Asian money lending had on all sections of East African so ciety. 28 In the case of colonial East Africa, I show in chapter 2 how debtorsÕ failure to repay loans in time had devastating consequences in terms of their material weal th and social status. As pawnshop credit was regulated by the colonial state, it no longer assumed the symbolic role of gift giving in the way earlier uses of credit had done. Rather, the failure to repay debt involved tangible dangers and some landlords l ost entire houses because they continued to buy goods from their tenants -cum -shopkeepers without clearing the debt. 60 One pawnshop user complained about his inability to influence the terms of business: Òwhen one goes to pledge a shirt or a vest or a pair o f trousers, they give the smallest amount, far less than they cost to buy. One is in their hands, they make on every transaction and one loses.Ó 61 Therefore, poor urban residents, who lacked valuable securities and regular incomes and had no access to bank loans, often had little choice but to use the long -established system of pawnshop credit and obey the rules. Surprisingly, however, debtors were reluctant to report any abuses to the British officials and they did not want the colonial government to ban As ian credit. Evidently, pawnshop users had come to view the availability of urban credit as their right although many had become caught in a monthly cycle of pawning goods for credit. 62 In postcolonial Africa Ð and especially after the dem ise of socialism an d communism Ð international organizations portrayed credit as a liberating force for the common people , nota bene as long as it bypassed the state. Non -governmental organizations such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh came to serve as a model for economic development in the Global South. Julia Elyachar described for urban Egypt how international development agencies promoted peopleÕs right to get into debt by having access to micro credits. For postcolonial Africa, ElyacharÕs study 60 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 142. 61 Ibid., 105 Ð106, emphasis add ed. 62 Gregory, South Asians in East Africa , 105Ð107. 29 of microcredit programs in the el -Hirafiyeen neighborhood of Cairo in the 1990s addresses the question of subjectivities most explicitly. 63 In seminars and workshops sponsored by international organizations, the users of microcredits were instructed to make life choices based on eva luations of the finances involved. The prospective managers of local microcredit services, on the other hand, were instructed to use Òculture,Ó such as the headman, the religious leader, community pressure, or the police, as ways to ensure the repayment of loans. While ÒcultureÓ was turned into a cost -saving device, micro -credit services generated new subjects, which understood their economic failures on the market in terms of their own failures detached from the social environment of the neighborhood. Thus , the older network of mutual obligations created by workshop owners was undermined and became increasingly meaningless as residents of el -Hirafiyeen came to understand themselves as Òindividual subjects free to own and to sell.Ó 64 In postcolonial Tanzania, the socialist state as well as financial institutions in postsocialist times formulated moralities that challenged long -established moralities underlying credit relations. At the same time, long -standing moralities serve d as a way to criticize and resist new forms of credit. In socialist Tanzania the state attempted to restrict private lending of money by nationalizing bank and credit institutions and by making pawnshops and practices of moneylending illegal. At the same time, t he state started to provide credit for sta te officials and farmers. ShopkeepersÕ and pawnbrokersÕ opportunities to engage in moneylending activities were restricted as the socialist state attempted to curtail the power of ÒcapitalisticÓ businessmen. 65 63 Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession . 64 Ibid., 194, 200, 211, 214 Ð215. 65 Greg ory, South Asians in East Africa , 110. 30 Overall, the existing scholarshi p on the use of credit in African history only hints at what Nietzsche discussed in rather abstract terms. Credit was more than the availability of money or goods that could be borrowed and paid back at a later point in time. Credit was ultimately a social relationship between human beings embedded in a material world and conflicting normative and legal discourses around the rightful use of credit. Creditors were sometimes successful at instilling values into debtors and at creating new debtor subjectivitie s by providing new kinds of credit and establishing hegemonic discourses of economic behavior. However, as will be seen below, urban Tanzanians did not simply play by the rules set by creditors. Instead, they perceived and evaluated new forms of credit aga inst the backdrop of a multi -layered history of borrowing and lending, histories of dispossession and wealth -creation, and systems of trade. METHODOLOGY The Kariakoo neighborhood in colonial and postcolonial Dar es Salaam serves as a case study to examine how debt and credit shaped work and business, social and communal life, and peopleÕs identities and subjectivities in urban Africa. To get at the se various aspects of credit and debt, including the moral perceptions involved , I have combined the tools of cultural, social, and economic history approaches and I have d rawn on a variety of methods and sources. I have generated oral sources w ith the help of the methods of oral history and life history, I produced field notes by doing participant observation, and I have examined written sources at various arc hives in Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and Germany . More than one hundred and thirty oral history interviews with long -standing traders, merchants, bankers, and microcredit lenders form an important part of sources for this dissertation . I conducted these interviews during a year -long research stay in Dar es Salaam in 31 2012-13. Kariakoo market stalls and shops, bank offices, tradersÕ homes, and my apartment situated right next to the Kariakoo market hall all s erved as interview locations. Interviews varied considerably in length, ranging from a quarter of an hour to two and a half hours. Particularly relevant and co -operative traders were interviewed several times. Some interviews took the form of life history interviews. These open -ended and semi -structured interviews have provide d insights into peopleÕs personalities, identities, and subjectivities because they allow space for the expression of expectations and desires, dreams and disappointments. Ethnographi c observations and the oral history interviews with long -standing residents of the Kariakoo neighborhood have complemented and challenged much of what I found in archives and libraries. Firs t of all, the interview ees have challenged the missionariesÕ and s tate actorsÕ rhetoric that Africans were unable to save and thus needed to be trained to save. Interviewees revealed numerous forms of saving money Kariakoo residents had practiced . They put their savings with shopkeepers, who would keep the money for them . They also saved money with the he lp of rotating savings groups. In addition, r eligious communities organize d savings groups. Members of the Ismaili Khoja community formed a savings and credit group in Dar es Salaam in the 1930s. Thirty years later , the C atholic Church started to promote savings and credit co -operatives (SACCOs ), which were outlawed again in the 1970s when the socialist state abolish ed all non -state associations in the country. However, r otating credit societies continued to exist th roughout the socialist period, and i n the late 1980s, the government legally authorized SACCOs again and in the 2000s started to promote SACCOs activities as a form of poverty alleviation. Second of all, oral history interviews have allowed me to gain a better understanding of how traders and middlemen were able to do business in Kariakoo at times when it was very 32 difficult if not impossible for them to access loans from banks and other financial institutions. It emerged that the chains of credit, which were cha racteristic of the Dar es Salaa m trade in the colonial period , continued to be the dominant characteristic in the postcolonial period. Until around the year 2000, business transactions bas ed on mali kauli Ð which is Kis wahili expression for selling goods ( mali ) on cr edit through a verbal promise ( kauli ) Ð was the most prominent way of doing business. Trading farmer and upcountry traders would bring goods to the Kariakoo market, where middlemen received the goods and paid the farmers once they had sold the produce wholesale to retailers. Only with the introduction of small -scale loans to Dar es Salaam businesspeople in the late 1990 s did the system of mali kauli start to break down in f avor of cash-based trans actions. Very closely related to mali kauli is the concept of uaminifu or trustworthiness/ honesty that came up in many interviews with long -standing traders. It is usually with a sense of nostalgia that people talk about what trade was like in the past. Traders really knew each other very well in the colo nial a nd early postcolonial periods, t hey trusted each other , and they traded goods on that basis of trust. A trading farmer from upcountry usually hand ed over the produce to a particular middleman at the Kariakoo market. He then wait ed for the middleman t o sell the produce, which usually took a few days. During that time, the upcountry trader slept at the middlemanÕs house. Once the produce was sold, the upcountry trader was paid his share and he went back to his farm. Several long -standing traders describ ed this kind of honesty as a form of credit even though they did not call it credit at the time. Finally, ethnographic observations and oral history interviews have shown how prevalent small-scale lending and borrowing on a verbal basis was and still is a mong Kariakoo residents. For small -scale entrepreneurs, much of their time is devoted to claiming outstanding debts 33 because they tend to sell their goods on credit. Without this kind of verbal credit arrangement , however, they would be unable to do busines s in the first place. The interviews also show how past events and experiences have shaped how Kariakoo residents perceive present -day lending and borrowing activities. A large majority of small -scale businesspeople are skeptical of bank credits and they t end to describe bank activities by using terminology from the socialist period. For instance, people use the verb Òtaifisha ,Ó to nationalize, in order to describe the fact that banks seize a borrowerÕs house in case the borrower is unable to repay the loan in time. The banks, of course, are private companies in present -day Tanzania and the word Òto nationalizeÓ may not be complete -ly accurate in this context. But it conjures up the memories of how the socialist state nationalized all the houses of wealthy p eople in 1971. This illustrates how present -day forms of lending and borrowing are embedded in a very particular history of social and economic relations. The w ritten sources accessed in fourteen archives located in Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and German y between 2010 and 2014 provided additional insights. They have been particularly helpful in three different aspects, namely creating maps of credit and debt, understanding state policies, and examining moral discourses around debt in colonial Dar es Salaam. Firstly, archival sources have provided insight into the social and economic networks of credit in Dar es Salaam. Bankruptcy files and inheritance cases show that businesspeople located in colonial Dar es Salaam set up numerous relations of credit and d ebt with clients as well as suppliers. In fact, the wealthier a businessman was, the more outstanding loans he had and the more loans he had given to other people. This was mainly due to the fact that business was not done on a cash basis but on a credit b asis. European suppliers forwarded goods to Dar es Salaam merchants on credit and the Dar es Salaam merchants themselves forwarded the goods to 34 retailers on credit. As it turns out, these chains of credit were not only a parti cular characteristic of Dar es Salaam trade in the colonial period but they also continued to be the dominant characteristic of trade in the postcolonial period . Secondly, the documents held at government archives and university lib raries in Dar es Salaam have re vealed that credit and the quest to form creditworthy subjects and citizens stood at the heart of policies formulated and implemented by the colonial as well as the postcolonial state. The colonial state in Tanganyika restricted access to bank credit for people depending on the ir racial identity . In numerous debates, colonial officials legi timated the restriction of Afri cansÕ access to credit by presenting the colonial state as the paternalistic protector of Africans, who were supposedly unable to handle money properly and for w hom the availability of credit constituted the danger of getting sucked into the spiral of perpetual indebtedness. At the same time, officials grudgingly admitted their own dependence on Asian credit, which made it impossible for them to restrict Asians fr om accessing and providing credit. In the postcolonial period, the socialist state used credit as a tool to promote President Julius NyerereÕs vision of Tanzania as a modern agricultural economy. Banks were nationalized in 1967 and the newly founded N ation al Bank of Commerce allocated credit to socialist ujamaa villages rather than urban -based businesspeople. Meanwhile, the newly constructed market complex in Kariakoo, which was opened in 1975, housed numerous consumer cooperative shops run by state parasta tals. Similar to ujamaa village projects, they were eligible for loans from the National Bank of Commerce. In the post -socialist period since 1985, credit increasingly came to be seen by state and non -state institutions as a way to alleviate poverty, both in rural and urban areas. Former p resident Jakaya Kikwete in 2005 ran on a platform of assisting the Tanzanian poor with the help of a fund that provided money to microcredit institutions. The various ways of how 35 different governments allocated credit and legitimized these credit allocations reveal much about state power and how Tanzanian state actors tapped into the powerful moral discourses surrounding credit and debt to govern citizens. Thirdly, primary sources held at missionary archives and personal papers provide additional insights into moral discourses. Historians have traditionally viewed missionary texts as sources to write about religious, social, and political aspects of history. Here, the missionary sources I have examined account for economi c aspects of history and help to gain a better understanding of the moral discourses around the borrowing and lending of money in colonial Dar es Salaam. European missionaries portrayed credit as dangerous because it had the potential of trapping Africans in cycles of debt. They urged Africans in Kariakoo to save money during prosperous times so they would not have to borrow money from supposedly exploitative Muslim moneylenders during hard times. Mission stations provided banking services for Africans whil e missionaries taught Africans the importance of saving and the dangers of borrowing money. The call to save money was taken up not only by the colonial state but also by the postcolonial state as well as banking institutions, which used credit to promote certain agendas and to create particular kinds of subjects. CHAPTER OVERVIEW Chapter 1 focuses on the intersection of credit, morality, and community in the Kariakoo neighborhood in colonial period. Government officials planned Kariakoo as the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of the city with a grid -like structure of orthogonally intersecting streets and neatly separated from the Asian and European sections by a cordon sanitaire. Although a certain anonymity was inherent in the monotonous and repetitive street layout, the cosmopolitan 36 residents of the neighborhood , who were of African, Asian, and Arab descent, formed meaningful local communities, usually around corner shops. Members of these Òcorner communitiesÓ were held together by myriad intersecting relations of credi t and debt, which in turn were regulated by moral codes embedded in these communities. Membership was defined by a memberÕs ability to lend or borrow money or goods to another member, according to oneÕs status and wealth. The existence and effectiveness of moral corner communities also enabled members to buy goods on credit from the nearby shop. For shopkeepers, in turn, the practice of selling goods on credit was a crucial way of asserting membership in Kariakoo. Trust, shame, and respectability were share d notions among members irrespective of their racial and class backgrounds. This understanding of neighborhood sub -communities challenges colonial views of Asian-African relations in Dar es Salaam as oppositional and benefitting only Asians. It also compli cates the literature on race relations in urban Tanzania, which views credit relations as merely fostering racial tensions. Actual credit relations routinely crossed racial boundaries. Finally, it exemplifies how Africans were able to create meaningful spa ces of belonging in the city. Overall, credit and debt relations were constitutive of urban communities and the urban economy. Colonial officials held two related mythical beliefs about urban AfricansÕ financial behavior as examined in chapter 2. Firstly, debt was inherently dangerous for Africans. Since Africans were not able to pay back borrowed money in time, they would get trapped in endless cycles of debts. In 1931 the colonial government enacted the Credit to Natives Ordinance, which prohibited Afric ans from taking out bank loans. Secondly, Africans did not have the ability to save money. Explanations for this inability varied. Some argued that Africans lived in the moment, were unable to plan ahead, and spent money as soon as they had some. Others 37 contended that Africans were inherently Òunbusiness -likeÓ and did not understand one of the pillars of what Max Weber called Òthe Protestant ethic,Ó namely productively reinvesting oneÕs savings into a business. I redress these beliefs by investigating the o ne (semi -)formal channel of borrowing and saving to which Africans in colonial Dar es Salaam had unrestricted access: pawnshop credit. Urban Africans borrowed and lent money and goods from and to a whole range of people in the form of verbal credit arrange ments such as trade credit, community -based credit institutions, rotating credit and savings associations. However, the only somewhat formal kind of credit for urban Africans was pawnshop credit. The historical picture emerging reveals that urban Africans used pawnshops repeatedly and in large numbers. Africans regularly borrowed money and paid back loans in time. Having access to pawnshop credit could be an indisputable advantage when it came to investing in a side -business, buying seeds for peri -urban gar dens, helping a friend clear debts, and affording expenses for a wedding or a funeral. As many Africans in colonial Kariakoo patronized pawnshops on a regular basis, they came to view pawnshop credit as an indispensable aspect of urban life. Even though th e colonial government did consider pawnshops morally right, it did not dare ban them. Only the first independent government outlawed pawnshops shortly after independence. Shops Ð in Kis wahili maduka (sg. duka ) Ð had been at the center of economic policies since the late nineteenth century. They were the foil against which a supposedly better, more efficient, more just economic system could be created. Retail shops were the bone of contention prompting the German colonial government to set up a Òmarket hall systemÓ rivaling the Ò duka system.Ó Government campaigns to reform the retail sector run like a thread through the history of Dar es Salaam. Chapter 3 examines what these campaigns were aimed at: the modus operandi of trade at shops in Dar es Salaam. The advancement of goods on credit and the underlying credit 38 and debt relations were the defining feature of the duka system as well as the reason for its longevity and persistence. To illustrate the concrete trade and credit relationships, the chains of credi t, the various types of debt relation as well as the scales of credit and interest rates available to shopkeepers, I follow one particular commodity Ð textiles Ð and portray how it was traded in Dar es Salaam shops from the late nineteenth century onwards. I argue that the very convertibility of textiles not only contributed to their high demand and their use as the main medium of exchange; it also facilitated the creation of a system of trade based on credit and personal relations. After independence, stat e institutions started to play a considerably more important part in the textile trade and production. Newly established textile mills were a source of national pride and symbols of self -reliance. Regional and national distributors, cooperative shops, and factory shops were supposed to completely take over textile retailing from private shops. Despite the increased role of state institutions, however, long -standing trade and credit relations continued to be relevant in the textile trade. When regional distr ibutors went bankrupt, Dar es Salaam wholesale traders provided the credit to finance the textile trade from the factory to their own shops and to urban retailers in Kariakoo. The market hall formed the geographical, architectural, and symbolical heart of the Kariakoo neighborhood from the construction of first hall in 1914 onwards. It was also at the center of the Òmarket hall system,Ó an economic policy with roots in the German period, which stand at the center of chapter 4. German Ð and later British an d Tanzanian Ð authorities attempted to establish a trade system that would rival and eventually replace the duka system for the trade in agricultural products. By forcing traders to engage in instant cash transactions rather the credit relations, the Germa n government envisioned the market hall system to turn Africans into better taxpayers and more productive farmers. However, by the 1940s at the latest and probably much 39 earlier, instant cash transactions were the exception rather than the rule at the Karia koo market hall. Instead, mali kauli Ð a form of credit based on verbal promises Ð was the commonly acknowledged practice of trading agricultural goods. The mali kauli system allowed wholesale traders to trade relatively large amounts of produce without ha ving to have much cash at their disposal. Traders received upcountry goods from suppliers and they verbally agreed on a price for the goods. Suppliers were paid according to the agreed -upon price once goods were sold to retailers. Mali kauli was compatible with Muslim prescriptions concerning commercial activities, which considered charging interest on money sinful. In mali kauli credit arrangements, interest was not visible. Mali kauli remained the mode of trading agricultural products after independence a nd after the socialist state increasingly took control of trade in the country via cooperative unions. Even the construction of a new market building Ð a symbol of socialist modernity and a model for socialist wholesale and retail trade Ð in 1975 did not i nterrupt tradersÕ long -established trade and reliance on mali kauli arrangements. Uaminifu , ÒhonestyÓ or Òtrustworthiness,Ó was the central notion undergirding mali kauli . The uaminifu discourse set out business rules, formed a framework of expectations, a nd compelled Kariakoo traders to cultivate their reputation as trustworthy and honest traders in the eyes of upcountry suppliers and the people in the market and in Dar es Salaam. If traders had the reputation of being honest, they could do business even i f they did not have any cash at disposal. TradersÕ conceptions of personhood and self -worth were constituted relationally. The last chapter focuses on the time since the 1990s when the financial sector in Tanzania was deregulated and small and medium -size loans became available to Kariakoo traders. Providers of small bank loans and microcredits in Kariakoo were convinced that their potential clientele was Òfinancially illiterateÓ and first -time customers of financial institutions. 40 CreditorsÕ mission was not only to lend money to small traders but also to change borrowersÕ ways of handling money, conceiving of time, viewing themselves, and relating to other traders. Credit providers understood bank and microcredit loans as a catalyst for the emergence of a ne w culture of doing business and for the transformation of borrowing tradersÕ subjectivities towards more individualistic concepts of selfhood. Kariakoo traders Ð especially those of the younger generation Ð started to take out bank loans and pay their supp liers immediately in cash instead of having to rely on mali kauli credit arrangements. This challenged the mali kauli system and the conceptions of self -worth and personhood . For traders, who had long relied on verbal promises, the shift to bank loans and written documents constituted a qualitative change. Signed written documents meant that there was a legal obligation to make agreed -upon repayments, which brought about a new experience of time as well. Despite the multi -pronged attempts to create new borr owing and debt -responsible subjects, former conceptions of self and personhood were not entirely undermined. Most Kariakoo traders were skeptical of bank loans and their skepticism referred not only to the technical characteristics and technicalities of th ese loans such as high interest rates and short repayment periods, but also to the new business culture bank loans were supposed to bring about, which challenged older ways of doing business and their attendant value systems. Traders of the older generatio n were not willing to submit to the psychological pressure that accompanied bank and microcredit loans. They had built a lifetime of uaminifu they could draw on. In the Kariakoo market environment, where communal and trade relations were heavily marked by aspects of credit and debt and shaped by moral discourses on debt, the project of impelling borrowers to re -think themselves as independent, rational, and fiscally responsible entrepreneurs did not unfold uncontestedly. Rather, Kariakoo borrowers perceived small and microcredits against the backdrop of a multi -layered history of borrowing 41 and lending, histories of dispossession and wealth -creation, and systems of trade. The persistence of older forms of morality and relations of trust served as a way to eva luate and criticize bank loans. 42 CHAPTER 1 ÑURBAN BELONGING: MORAL NEIGHBORHOOD COMMUNITIES IN COLONIAL KARIAKOO In The Gunny Sack , Tanzanian novelist M. G. Vassanji reminisced about his childhood growing up in the Kariakoo neighborhood Ð the ÒAfrican sectionÓ Ð of Dar es Salaam in the late colonial period. His family, which had their roots in South Asia, had just lost their livelihood and savings and they started a new life in Kariakoo : We had to start from scratch, borrowing and buyi ng on credit, and we opened a duka [shop] in the African section [of Dar es Salaam], selling kerosene by jigger and packets of spice, and our fortunes never rose again, we were mukhis [chieftains] once, people called us Sharriffu [noble], Germans called us Bwana [Sir], but for forty years and more we stayed poor, changing trades, trying this and trying that, moving from here to there. Collectors would shout and wave their hands, making sure the neighbours heard, and we would pay out of shame even if we had to borrow more money to do it. 66 Credit was widely used in colonial Kariakoo. Shopkeepers often sold goods on credit in order to maintain good relations with their customers. Various pawnshops provided loans in exchange for everyday goods such as shirts an d kanga cloths . Workers relied on small credits to get through the Òhungry daysÓ before payday. The provision of credit helped street vendors and shopkeepers to start new businesses, expand existing ones, and prevent businesses from collapsing in bad times. Credit, morality, and community intersected in the cosmopolitan urban society Vassanji and his family lived and did business in. The use of credit was deeply embedded in moral discourses, so t he (in)ability to repay debts had moral implications in Kariak oo. The above extract illustrates how collectors of debt drew on moral discourses to challenge debtorsÕ reputation and sense of pride so as to urge the repayment of borrowings rather than using the legal system and state actors to enforce the repayment of loans. The practices and moralizing 66 M. G. Vassanji, The Gunny Sack (Oxford: Heinemann, 1989), 53. 43 discourses of debt and credit considerably shaped communal relations in Kariakoo and credit and debt relations encompassed urban residents across racial categories . The provision of credit in colonial Kariakoo always inv olved a considerable amount of trust. Certainly, shopkeepers and pawnshop owners made use of financial and legal measures to gauge the creditworthiness of a debtor. They required securities and used the legal system to minimize potential losses. However, t he lenders ran a risk that the borrower would not repay the money, particularly in a neighborhood like Kariakoo where the colonial state was conspicuously absent. Therefore, creditors had to use other means of ensuring the repayment of credit. In other cases, loans were not necessarily expected to be paid back, especially when customers bought goods on credit. The practice of selling goods on credit was widespread and it suggests that shopkeepers did not always give credit with the sole aim of making profit . At times, it was used to foster social ties in the community. Thus, shopkeepersÕ business conduct and debtorsÕ use of credit are examined in the larger social and cultural context rather than strictly from an economistÕs point of view. 67 67 The discussion of shopkeepersÕ lives and moral urban communitie s in colonial Kariakoo in this chapter relies heavily on M. G. VassanjiÕs novels The Gunny Sack and Uhuru Street . Both describe the authorÕs experiences growing up as a child of an Asian shopkeeper in late -colonial Kariakoo. Vassanji wrote these books abou t thirty years after he had lived in Dar es Salaam. Thus, his descriptions stem from a combination of his memory of growing up as a child in Kariakoo, his memory of what his family and friends told him about that time, and his own investigation into his fa mily history. In addition to that, VassanjiÕs conscious and unconscious forms of remembering have to be read against the events and happenings that took place during the time period between the late 1950s and the actual writing of the books in late 1980s. Therefore, his depiction of Kariakoo (as any historical text) needs to be contextualized. Wherever possible, I use other accounts, such as J. A. K. LeslieÕs social survey, colonial records, maps, and newspaper articles, to elaborate historically sound argu ments. Particularly interesting is VassanjiÕs conscious acceptance of his African ancestry, which leads him to carefully describe everyday interactions between Kariakoo residents of African and Asian descent. 44 COSMOPOLITAN K ARIAKOO: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE The thousand faces of Kariakoo ... From the quiet and cool, shady and dark inside of the shop you could see them through the rectangular doorframe as on a wide, silent cinema screen: vendors, hawkers, peddlers, askaris, thieves , beggars and other more ordinary pedestrians making their way in the dust and the blinding glare and the heat, in kanzus, msuris, cutoffs, shorts, khaki or white uniforms, khangas, frocks, buibuis, frock -pachedis ... African, Asian, Arab; Hindu, Khoja, Memon, Shamsi; Masai, Makonde, Swahili ... men and women of different shades and hues and beliefs. 68 The Kariakoo neighborhood in late -colonial Dar es Salaam was a truly cosmopolitan social space and a veritable market neighborhood. Day after day residents o f adjacent and outlying neighborhoods of the city as well as people from the countryside were willing to take the time and spend the money to go to Kariakoo. The central neighborhoodÕs attractions were both economic and social in nature. On the one hand, t he neighborhoodÕs covered and open -air markets as well as numerous shops offered a broad variety of goods at low prices. And markets and shops were more than physical sites where goods, foods, and drinks were exchanged for money. They were spaces where soc ial interactions of an urban nature took place. At the central market, buyers listened to the local radio programs and popular songs that were broadcast through loudspeakers; at open -air markets, local bands took advantage of the ready audiences and played their music; shops sold newspapers, which were read and discussed at the shops themselves or at the tea stalls right next to the central market. Shops also sold fashionable textiles such as kangas and kanzus , which residents wore to express their urban id entities. Finally, friends and strangers came together at the pombe beer market, which was the only place in town where the popular millet beer was legally sold. Before getting into the details of how credit and debt relations helped constitute moral nei ghborhood communities on the ground level of this cosmopolitan urban space, it is worth 68 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 85Ð86. 45 sketching out the perspective assumed by what Michel de Certeau called the Òvoyeurs,Ó i.e. city planners and state officials, who viewed the colonial city from a distan ce and as abstract geometric space. 69 The underlying rationale of urban planning tells us something about the imaginations colonial authorities had about urban residents and about the roles these residents were to play. Government officials in colonial Dar es Salaam planned Kariakoo as the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of the city neatly separated from the Asian and European sections by a cordon sanitaire . The neighborhood initially also housed soldiers and members of the Carrier Corps serving the colonial army. From a birdÕs eye view the neighborhood had all the appearances of a well -ordered section of the city. The structure was thought to create and maintain control and order and, thus, make Kariakoo more easily governable. In both German and British colonial imaginat ions, Dar es Salaam was to be a racially segregated town with Europeans, Asians, and African s residing in their respective racially -defined neighborhoods. During the German colonial period, which ended with the First World War, European and Asians mainly l ived in two adjacent neighborhoods near the natural port. Africans tended to reside either in unplanned settlements outside of the European and Asian sections or in the pre -existing villages such as Keko and Kigogo. The German colonial government had not e stablished a separate neighborhood for Africans although segregated living areas for Africans, Asians, and Europeans including a Òtote ZoneÓ Ð a Òdead zoneÓ Ð between the African and the Asian sections existed on paper since 1891. 70 Only shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, the Germans started to act on the plans of creating a cordon sanitaire 69 Michel de Certeau, ÒWalking in the City,Ó in The Certeau Reader , by Michel de Certea u and Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000). 70 Anthony, ÒCulture and society in a town in t ransitionÓ; Andrew Burton, African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime & Colonial Order in Dar e s Salaam (London: British Institute in Eastern Africa, 2005), 44 Ð45; Anders Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam (Lund: Royal University of Lund Department of Geography, 1985), 54. 46 between the Asian and African neighborhoods. A colonial official wrote in October 1913 that about half of the inhabitants of the Òdead zoneÓ would be wi lling to sell their houses and plots provided they receive an adequate compensation and a new plot elsewhere in town. 71 By then Dar es Salaam had a population of around 22,500 people of whom 19,000 were of African and 2,500 of Asian descent. 72 Sixteen years later Ð at the end of the 1920s Ð, the British administration of Dar es S alaam resumed the German plan and establish ed an ÒOpen Space AreaÓ between what was now called ÒZone IIÓ (the Asian section) and ÒZone IIIÓ (the African section). ÒThe policy of creat ing this broad neutral belt separating Zone III, the native area, from Zones I and II has been steadily carried out without hardship to the natives, who have received land in other parts of Zone III chiefly in the recently created extension known as Borman Õs shamba.Ó 73 Colonial attitudes towards race and urban living had left their marks on the residential pattern in Dar es Salaam. By 1932, the creation of the cordon sanitaire was complete as the area had been ÒcleanedÓ of coconut trees and human residents. 74 Cleanliness and order were the central terms around which urban policies in colonial Dar es Salaam were framed. The general colonial understanding of urban conditions was that they were unhealthy, which generated a constant discourse about public health and sanitation. Just as in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in the early 1900s, separation policies in Dar es Salaam were couched in the language of hygiene and sanitation. 75 ÒIn the interest of public health,Ó 71 October 12, 1913, TNA: G4 /49: ÒKommunal -Angelegenheiten Daressalaam. Bd. 3: 1913 -1915.Ó 72 Burton, African Underclass , 45. 73 Annual Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam for the year 1929 by Senior Commissioner, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 74 Annual Report for 1931, TNA: ÒTanganyika Territory: District OfficerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam Districts, 1931-1937.Ó 75 Maynard Swanson, ÒThe Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900 -1909,Ó Jour nal of African History 18, no. 3 (1977): 387 Ð410. 47 neighborhoods such as the Upanga Area, which had b een placed within the European residential zone, were turned into racially -exclusive residential areas in the interwar period. In the words of the Executive Officer of the Township Authority, Òthe Township Authority cannot doubt from advice given to it by the Health Authorities that the methods of life of these natives are a constant menace to the health of its [the neighborhoodÕs] non -native community.Ó 76 The ninety -nine Ònative hutsÓ obviously did not qualify as Òbuildings of European typeÓ and had to be removed. Many African residents including the Tambaza family relocated to the Kariakoo area. 77 Notions of health and sanitation also informed the lay -out of the new urban neighborhoods of Kariakoo. Straight streets were thought to both improve hygienic condi tions and government control. German plans for an African neighborhood on a grid pattern existed but they were never realized. Shortly after World War One, the Senior Commissioner in the British colonial administration noted that Ògreat efforts have been m ade towards improving the sanitation and general lay -out: a higher standard has been exacted, especially in the better quarters, and a considerable new area has been surveyed and cut up into plots for native occupants. All this has done much to straighten streets, increase the comfort of the population, and also to facilitate administration.Ó 78 This new area was the Kariakoo neighborhood and it came to be characterized by its orthogonally intersecting streets, which contrasted starkly with the convoluted and narrow streets of the Asian section to the east of the ÒNative QuartersÓ (see figure 1.1). 76 Letter by P.C., Dar es Salaam, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, December 16, 1935, TNA: 12589: ÒDar -es-Salaam Township, Lay -out of.Ó 77 Abdallah Mohamed Tambaza, interview with author, March 21, 20 13, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 78 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1923, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 48 Figure 1.1: Map of Dar es Salaam, March 1918. The ÒNative QuartersÓ are loc ated in the western area of the Dar es Salaam .79 Malaria also formed an important co ncept in the discourse on urban planning, both in the interwar and the postwar period. In the Kariakoo area, schemes for draining the swamp at Mgogoni, the Gerezani Creek, and Msimbazi Creek were planned and realized in order to control malaria. The draina ge of the Msimbazi Creek, which was only completed after WWII, opened up land for the establishment of recreational grounds just to the north of Kariakoo known as Jangwani. 80 A recurrent problem of sanitation in Kariakoo was the sewage system. In 1956, 79 Map of Dar es Salaam, March 1918, PRO: MPG 1/1086. 80 Letter by the D irector of Medical Services to the Member for Social Services, Dar es Salaam, February 18, 1954, TNA: ACC 39/SS 3/43/08: ÒMalaria in Dar -es-Salaam; Minutes, July 4, 49 Kari akoo resident Ahmed Abdalla complained that the Ò[t]he daily overlow [sic] of the dirty water from the cesspit É is not only a nuisance to the neighbouring houses but also to the public. The daily overflow of the dirty water spreads and runs to Pemba Stree t and then right to Livingstone Street, and the very bad smell emanating from this stench is more than a man can be expected to bear. This has created every fear that serious disease might result to people living nearby here.Ó 81 Garbage collection was inade quate as well, mainly because the Sanitation Department did not have the necessary machinery. In 1924, the Senior Commissioner complained that Ò[t]he Ox Carts are slow and too small. They should be scraped for obvious reasons and at least six more motor lo rries of large capacity obtained for the use of the town generally.Ó 82 Another health concern, which was directly related to urban planning, was the port in Dar es Salaam. Because of the fear of infectious diseases from outside, the Public Health Department was deeply involved in controlling ships, warehouses, etc. 83 These sanitary issues, in turn, served as the basis of legitimacy for restricting trade and business premises in Kariakoo. The racist aspects of this discourse of sanitation and urban planning were always obvious and explicit. The Asian section or ÒIndian BazaarÓ was persistently described in the least favorable light. ÒThis section [the Indian Bazaar] of the Township is very congested and the conditions under which people live, Asiatics chiefly , are often thoroughly insanitary.Ó 84 Space 1953,Ó and October 4, 1954, TNA: ACC 39/SS 3/43/014: ÒAnti -Malarial Drainage and Reclamatio n of the Msimbazi Creek Area.Ó 81 Letter by Ahmed Abdalla, resident at 29 Pemba Street, Dar es Salaam, to the Medical Officer of Health, Dar es Salaam, February 8, 1956, TNA: ACC 39/SS 3/37/03: ÒHealth & Sanitary Measures, Dar es Salaam Municipality.Ó 82 Rep ort on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1924 by Senior Commissioner, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 83 Minutes, May 5, 1954, TNA: ACC 39/SS 3/37/03: ÒHealth & Sanitary Measures, Dar es Salaam M unicipality.Ó 84 Annual Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam for the year 1929 by Senior Commissioner, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó For Zanzibar, 50 was limited in the Asian section because the neighborhood was demarcated by the European and African neighborhoods and, thus, there was no room for expansion. In 1929, John Pashen had drawn up a plan to develop th e Upanga neighborhood into a residential area for Asians, but Asian housing was not a government priority and the Pashen Plan was never fully realized. 85 At a Township Authority meeting, it was stated that ÒDar es Salaam had no real scheme for town planing [sic]. In theory there was the Pashen plan, but in practice that was quite unworkable, and there was nothing to put in its place.Ó 86 Although overcrowding was a real problem, the way colonial officials described the low sanitary standards in the Asian secti on fit too neatly into the colonial discourse of Asians in Tanganyika. They were out -of-place, bearers of disease, potentially dangerous for Africans, and a problematic part of colonial society. Sometimes, Asians were presented as the Oriental ÒotherÓ that was not compatible with western, and African, values and ways of living: [T] he large proportion of very low class types [of Asians] renders all measures connected with sanitation most difficult of application, the more so, since the rackrenting landlord i s unfortunately by no means rare. The religion and psychology of the Oriental also furnish complications; a comparatively well -to-do man, possibly in Government employment, will gravely state that he prefers miserable and insanitary surroundings, since he thereby acquires additional spiritual merit; the love of extreme privacy, particularly as regards their womenfolk , also tends to create dark, ill -ventilated, unhealthy dwellings. The result is obvious, in the terrible figures of Indian child mortality, whi ch, even allowing for all sources of inaccuracy, are some four times as great as those of the European and African communities. 87 see Garth Andrew Myers, Disposable Cities: Garbage, Governance a nd Sustainable Development in Urban Africa (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005). 85 Sarah L. Smiley, ÒThe City of Three Color s: Segregation in Colonial Dar e s Salaam, 1891 -1961,Ó Historical Geography 37 (2009): 189. 86 The Tan ganyika Standard, October 8, 1943, accessed at TNA: 13483: ÒTown Planning Schemes DÕSalaam.Ó 87 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1924 by Senior Commissioner, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 51 CREDIT AND COLONIAL ECONOMIC RATIONALITY The architectural and hygienic orderliness of colonial urban planning was complement ed by a vision of economic and commercial orderliness. The German and British colonial administrations made the distinction between two systems of trade: the problematic Ò duka systemÓ and the desirable Òmarket hall system.Ó The duka system was based on cre dit relations between Asian shopkeepers and African traders and farmers. Shopkeepers typically advanced textiles on credit to customers in exchange for agricultural products. Colonial authorities depicted the credit -based duka system as morally wrong becau se, in their view, it allowed unscrupulous Asians to exploit helpless Africans. 88 Shopkeepers were seen as problematic and in need of reform, and colonial governments periodically aimed to reform the opaque and difficult -to-control duka system by forcing sh opkeepers to use cash transactions only and to keep account books in German or English. 89 As a more radical measure, colonial authorities proposed to abolish the duka system completely and replace it with the market hall system in which products were to be traded publicly in a central market hall located at every town in the colony including, of course, in Dar es Salaam. Again, transactions were to be made on cash rather than credit basis. 90 88 ÒLa pratique du cr”dit est souvent cit”e par les sources europ”ennes comme lÕun des probl‘mes centraux dans les relations entre les marchands indiens et leur client‘le africaineÓ (Franck Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914)Ó (Ph.D. Thesis, 2008), 116 ). 89 Only in the post -World War Two period did the colonial government come to think of shops not as problems but as useful tools to shape African consumersÕ tastes and desires and to prevent Africans from hoarding money; see Fergus Chalmers Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika: An Enquiry into the Distribution and Consumption of Commodities among Africans Carried Out in 1952 -1953 (London: H. M. Stationery Off, 1955). 90 In-depth discussions of the duka system and the market hall system are to be found in chapters three and four. 52 The market hall system was at the heart of the German urban economi c policies and the German colonial administration initiated the move of the main market hall from the edge of the Asian section of town to what was to become the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of town. The completion of the market hall coincided with the outbreak of th e First World War so the market hall was immediately turned into a military barrack for porters. When the British took control of the city in 1916, they continued to use it for their Carrier Corps. 91 The presence of the Carrier Corps in the market hall insp ired the neighborhood residents to use a Kiswahili -ized version of the name carrier corps Ð ÒKariakooÓ Ð for the entire neighborhood. 92 Only when the war ende d, did it finally fulfill its intended function as a market hall. The rationale behind creating ma rket halls was to bring order in the supposed chaos of market transactions and to break up credit relations between Asian shopkeepers and African farmers and small traders. Again, discussions about urban planning were wrapped in the language of hygiene and sanitation, also with regards to economic policies. The example of the so-called Òshark marketÓ located in Kariakoo makes explicit the link between health concerns and urban planning. It also demonstrates the colonial governmentÕs preference for the marke t hall system over the duka system. And it hints at the limits of the colonial government power to control the urban economy. 93 91 James Brennan, ÒNation , Race and Urbanization in Dar e s Salaam, Ta nzania, 1916 -1976Ó (Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 2002), 46 Ð47. 92 James R. Brennan and Andrew Burton, ÒThe Emerging Metropolis: A History of Dar Es Salaam, circa 1862 -2000,Ó in Dar e s Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis , by James R. Brennan, Andrew Burton, and Yusufu Qwaray Lawi (African Books Collective, 2007), 13Ð75. 93 Urban spaces such as a Kariakoo in Dar es Salaam were different from rural areas , also in legal matters (see Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) ). In October 1934, Dar es Salaam Township was officially separated from the rest of the Dar es Salaam District (Annual Report 1935, TNA: ÒTanganyika Territory: District OfficerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam Districts, 53 For much of the early history of Dar es Salaam, shark meat was a popular food for the African population. It was relatively cheap and an important source of protein. Shark meat was both locally produced and imported on dhows from the Arabian Peninsula. Monsoon winds only allowed for the import of shark meat seasonally so imported shark meat had to be stored between dhow seasons. Ini tially, shark meat traders, who were mostly of Arab descent , stored the shark meat in their houses and sold it at their shops located at various sites in Dar es Salaam. The British colonial government considered the storage and sale of shark meat in shops problematic due to sanitary concerns and, in 1924, it decided to abolish the duka system and re -organize the shark meat trade along the lines of the market hall system noting Òthe advantages of setting the trade concentrated into one building where it can be controlled and supervised.Ó A central shark market was erected in Kariakoo Òfor the sale of the popular if unsavoury delicacy,Ó although traders did not initially appreciate the new shark market. 94 Only four years later, a new and more spacious shark mar ket was constructed housing a total of eighteen stalls instead of the previous sixteen. 95 Despite shark meat tradersÕ initial resistance, the government successfully implemented its vision of a centralized, regulated, and easy -to-control market for shark me at instead of its sale at unhygienic shops scattered throughout town. 96 1931-1937Ó). The regulation of markets was different for urban and rural markets. Rural markets were regulated by Native Administrations and fees were paid into Native Treasuries. Urban markets such as the public market hall in Kariakoo, on the other hand, were much more directly controlled by colonial authorities, who had the power to enforce regulations such as making the use of the market compuls ory. These rules were made in the Townships Ordinance, 1920, and later in the Market Ordinance, 1928. Letter by Attorney General, Dar es Salaam, February 10, 1928, TNA: AB. 1031: ÒMarket Procedure Regarding Dues etc.Ó 94 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1924, TNA: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 95 Annual Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam for the year 1928, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 96 Around the same time, beer sale in Kariakoo was re -organized along almost identical lines and based on a similar legitimation. Beer shops located in various part of town were closed down in 54 After World War Two, the British colonial government drew again on the discourse of sanitation and hygiene to effect policy changes with regards to urban trade. In 1952 the Municipal C ouncil Òwished to demolish the existing [shark] market on health groundsÓ and it was argued that the smell of shark meat was not appreciated by all sections of the community. 97 In subsequent discussions among colonial officials, the removal of the market wa s justified on the basis of Òpublic health reasonsÓ and of shark meat being Òsuch a noxious substanceÓ warning that Òthe odour of Msimbazi Street will permeate the townÓ if no solution to the shark meat trade is found. 98 ÒMunicipal Council has long been pre ssing for the demolition of the present Shark Market and, from the Public Health point of view, Municipal Council will be interested in the proper construction and management of the new Shark Store.Ó 99 The Dar es Salaam Municipality and the colonial governm ent debated over who was to finance the construction of the new shark market and whether a shark market was still needed in the first place. The Municipality argued that the provision of shark meat was of national importance and not only a Dar es Salaam af fair because shark meat was taken to upcountry areas. The Municipality turned down an offer by the colonial government to provide a loan of 2000 pounds at six per cent interest rate per annum and demanded that the funds for the 1926 and the sale of beer was centralized in one ÒGovernme nt Beer HallÓ or the pombe market, where twelve licensees were allowed to sell beer (Report on the Eastern Province of Tanganyika Territory, 1926, TNA: AB.41: ÒAnnual Report 1926, Eastern ProvinceÓ). 97 August 24, 1954; August 28, 1954, TNA: ACC 183/UW/815 10/I: ÒDÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 98 Msimbazi Street is one of the main streets in Kariakoo. R.H. Robertson, February 28, 1956; June 4, 1956; C.C. Harris, District Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, October 23, 1956, TNA: ÒACC 183/UW /81510/I: DÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 99 M.L.G., Minutes, June 21, 1956, TNA: ÒACC 183/UW/81510/I: DÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 55 construction of the new shar k market should be fully provided by the colonial government. 100 Meanwhile, the shark market traders inserted themselves into the discussion by writing letters to the Governor of the Tanganyika Territory, Edward Twining. The traders, who were all of Arab des cent, noted that it was Òin the interests of africans [sic]Ó to make the provision of shark meat available in Dar es Salaam because it was a wholesome food affordable for lower -class Africans. 101 ÒWe consider this matter so important to the stability of our economy to justify your immediate sympathetic and fatherly consideration.Ó 102 Furthermore, ÒGovernment is under moral obligation to provide us with alternative facilitiesÓ and Òwe are confident Government will have no desire to be party to the increase of th e cost of living of Africans.Ó 103 Eventually, the colonial government made the eighteen shark meat traders pay part of the funds for the construction of the new market as a way of them more ÒresponsibleÓ and more ÒproductiveÓ people. The concern with Òdevel opmentÓ and ownership was characteristic for colonial policies in the post -World War II period. A focus on urban housing illustrates the British colonial governmentÕs attitude towards loans and credit, how colonial policies changed before and after World W ar Two, and what role housing credit was imagined to play in creating new urban subjectivities. Especially at the periphery of town, i ndebted Dar es Salaam residents sometimes 100 Letter by Acting member for local government, to the P.C., Eastern, Jun e 15, 1956, TNA: ACC 183/UW/81510/I: ÒDÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 101 Letter by the Shark Market Stall Holders to His Excellency Sir Edward Twinning, Governor and Commander in Chief, T.T., Dar es Salaam, April 21, 1956, TNA: ACC 183/UW/81510/I: ÒDÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 102 Letter by the Shark Market Stall Holders to His Excellency Sir Edward Twinning, Governor and Commander in Chief, T.T., Dar es Salaam, December 22, 1955, TNA: ACC 183/UW/81510/I: ÒD ÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 103 Letter by the Shark Market Stallholders to the Officer Administering the Government, June 16, 1957, TNA: ACC 183/UW/81510/I: ÒDÕSalaam Municipality Ð Boundaries Layout and Markets.Ó 56 resorted to the option of selling land or houses when they w ere unable to clear their debts .104 In 1929, Mohamed bin Hassan, identified as ÒZaramoÓ and a ÒNative,Ó wanted to sell land in the Ukonga area just outside of Dar es Salaam in order to pay outstanding debts. 105 The only willing buyer was Alidina Datu Patel, a man of Asian descent . The current occupier of the land, Sebi bin Mbaruk, expressed his fears that his family might no longer be allowed to live on the land if it was sold to Asians. Thus, Sebi asked the district government Ònot to allow the sale on the grounds that his commun ity are poor and that if once an Indian gets a footing at Ukonga it will be the beginning of their end.Ó Colonial authorities were generally wary of Africans selling land to Asians, and the District Officer stated ÒI feel that it would be politically unsou nd to allow a Non -Native to acquire a holding in this community.Ó 106 The Land Officer, on the other hand, simply made the rather unrealistic suggestion that Sebi raise the purchase price of 500 shillings to keep the property for his family. 107 In another land case from the same year, the District Officer again expressed his discomfort with Asians acquiring Af rican land in Dar es Salaam. Ò[N] ative owned land in the township of Dar -es-salaam is rapidly passing into the possession of non-natives who are mostly of Asian nationality. This general process is causing me some uneasiness.Ó 108 104 For the Germa n colonial period, see Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 70. 105 Letter by District Officer, Dar es Salaam, to Provincial Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, January 2, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealin g in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 106 District Officer, Dar es Salaam, January 18, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 107 Land Officer, Dar es Salaam, April 17, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: Ò Dealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 108 Case of Conveyance of land between Indu and Mfiti Mwinyimkuu (Africans) and Ashabhai Kashibhai Patel (Asians) in Dar es Salaam, District Officer, Dar es Salaam, to the Land Officer, Dar es Sa laam, July 30, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 57 Indebtedness was a reason for Africans to sell land, and it was a motive for selling houses in Dar es Salaam as well. House owners in the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of Dar es Salaam sometime s became indebted to their residents, for instance when one of their residents ran a shop in the house and routinely sold the house owner goods on credit. 109 Kariakoo resident Fawzi SaidÕs father used to sell ginger at the old Kariakoo market hall. He eventu ally became a wholesale trader and was able to buy a house in the Gerezani section of Kariakoo, which is the house Fawzi lives in today. The price for the house was 2000 Shillings, which was a lot of money at the time. He was not able to pay the total sum in cash but he provided the owner of the house with small amounts of goods over an extended period of time until he had paid 1000 Shillings. Then he paid 500 Shillings in cash and moved into the house while paying the remaining 500 Shillings again in small portions .110 In cases like these , the relationship between tenant and landlord came to resemble a creditor -debtor relationship. House owners could also take out mortgages on their houses. When house owners in Kariakoo were unable to repay debts or mortgages , they sold their houses, sometimes also to families of Asian and Arab descent .111 This was much to the dislike of the colonial government, which had designated Kariakoo the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of town. The colonial governmentÕs response to Òthe steady infiltr ation of AsiansÓ into Kariakoo 112 in the interwar period was to prohibit Africans from taking out loans, which culminated in the Credit to Natives Ordinance of 1923. 113 109 Leslie described how a shopkeeper acquired a house because the landlord became increasingly indebted to the shopkeeper as the landlord was buying goods at the shop on credit (Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam , 142). 110 Fawzi Said, interview with the aut hor in Kiswahili, Gerezani, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam , December 25, 2012. 111 Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam , 142. 112 Memorandum, Housing Conditions, Dar es Salaam, Asians, n.d. [1943], TNA: 24387: ÒImprovement to Native Houses.Ó 113 Brennan, Taifa , 36. For more on the Credit to Natives Ordinance, see chapter 2. 58 Before World War Two, Kariakoo residents themselves took the initiative and used their own money and labor to build houses, while the colonial government did not play an overly active role in shaping the building of and financing of houses in Kariakoo even though colonial officers repeatedly lamented the poor quality of housing and the dangers this entailed for the health of the entire urban population .114 The kind of houses people usually built in the African section of Dar es Salaam came to be referred to as ÒSwahili houses.Ó They contained six rooms aligned in two rows separated by a hallway. T he house owner usually rented out three to five of the rooms to generate income. The courtyard in the back was shared by all parties and constituted a semi -private living space where house dwellers cooked, washed, and received visitors. Swahili houses in K ariakoo typically did not have electricity, piped waters supply, or water-borne sanitation. Swahili houses gave form to a distinct way of urban living as they provided the space in which people with various backgrounds had to figure out ways of living toge ther, interacting, co -operating, and solving conflicts. A considerable number of houses were owned by women, who had made money in the urban economy through such activities as petty trade and sex work. 115 By the late -colonial period, one tenth of the inhabit ants of Kariakoo owned one or more houses in Dar es Salaam. House owners rented out rooms for relatively little money but they were still able to generate a steady income. They usually charged people of relative wealth more rent than ordinary workers and u nderemployed people. Asian families could also rent rooms in Kariakoo but they had to seek prior approval from the government and take 114 In one case, a colonial officer argued that new and better houses would he lp mitigate the malaria threat ( Tanganyika Standard newspaper, August 7, 1943, accessed at TNA: 24387: ÒImprovement to Native HousesÓ). 115 ÒIt is often a mystery how natives manage to build their houses especially the old women who will embark on the building of a house with no sensible means at their disposal but what they can make from the sale of rice cakes and fried fishÓ ( E. C. Baker, ÒMemorandum on the Social Conditions of Dar e s Salaam,Ó 25, copy in SOAS special collections; see also Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam , 117, 178). 59 out a Right of Occupancy. This was not always done, especially when house owners could charge Asians higher rent in excha nge. 116 Asians eventually bought some houses in the African section, which prompted much debate among colonial authorities. In the postwar period, the colonial government changed its attitude towards urban housing and took on a much more interventionist stan ce. As Fred Cooper has described for postwar Mombasa, the goal was to create particular urban subjectivities or, in the language of contemporary colonial officials, a Òstable and tranquilÓ urban African population. 117 An important aspect of the ÒrespectableÓ urban living entailed accommodation, and the colonial government actively promoted the ideal of home ownership. A white paper on urban housing stated that Òmuch has been done to cope with the demand for housing in general, to provide permanent, if modest, living quarters for some of the increasing urban population, and to mitigate the problem of overcrowding. But as a major principle of policy house ownership must be encouraged in every way. A stable and contented population can only be assured if large numbers are the owners of houses.Ó 118 The ideal of home ownership itself was pervasive in different strata of society, also among African residents . To be sure, the colonial government put 116 Municipal Secretary, Dar es Salaam, September 29, 1938, TNA: ACC 61/490: ÒAfrican Welfare and Commercial Association, Dar es Salaam. Ó 117 Frederick Cooper, On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). ÒIt is o nly during the last few years that the question [of housing] has come into prominence. It is obvious that the provision of proper and adequate housing is a major factor in maintaining a stable and tranquil society, and that per contra lack of suitable home s leads to discontent and restlessness among the populationÓ (J.F.R. Hill, Member for Communication, Works and Development Planning, October 13, 1953, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to CommitteeÓ). 118 No author, n.d. [m id-1950s], TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to Committee.Ó 60 particular emphasis on the ÒpermanencyÓ of houses. 119 Colonial officials went so far as to outline the specific construction materials necessary for a house to be considered permanent and thus suitabl e for respectable urban residents .120 In a two -page document, they described 17 aspects that qualify urban houses as permanent. In addition to ÒFloor,Ó ÒWalls,Ó and ÒRoof,Ó these aspects also included a detailed description of ÒDecoration.Ó 121 The costs for a ÒpermanentÓ three -room house were estimated to be £300, about the same as a ÒtraditionalÓ six -room Swahili house. 122 Africans share d the ideal of home ownership and the number of African house owners grew in the postwar period. In 1956 the number stood at over 8000, which was equal to 19 per cent of the African population. In Kariakoo, 10 percent of the African population owned one or two houses. 123 For urban Africans, the ownership of a house was a way to invest savings, a means to generate income by renting rooms out to lodgers, and a form of insurance against indigence in old age. 124 119 The Asian population also felt strongly about home ownership in Dar es Salaam. When the Aga Khan advised his Ismaili followers in the postwar period to build h ouses wherever they were residing, it boosted the house construction industry in Dar es Salaam. In Kariakoo, however, home ownership among Asians was a contested subject. The colonial government did not like to see Asians acquiring and building houses in t he Kariakoo neighborhood because it was supposed to be reserved for Africans. For a collection of articles on the Òhousing question,Ó see Edward Murphy and Najib B. Hourani, The Housing Question from High Modernist to Neoliberal Urbanism (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 120 Construction materials are still a much -debated political issue in Dar es Salaam today but it is now discussed in the context of security and bribery. During my research stay in Dar es Salaam, a 16 -storey building, which was under construction, collapsed in the city center killing 36 people on March 29, 2013. The constructors were accused of using sub -standard construction material the government was criticized for not enforcing building standards. 121 TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒGeneral Specification for Typ ical Houses Built Under the Urban Loan Fund.Ó 122 J.F.R. Hill, Member for Communication, Works and Development Planning, October 13, 1953, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to Committee.Ó 123 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 153, 261. 124 Memorandum. Housing Conditions. Dar es Salaam [1943], TNA: 24387: ÒImprovement to Native Houses.Ó The value of a plot in Kariakoo was estimated at Shs. 3,000/ - (Letter by District 61 What is particularly interesting for the purposes of this study is how the colonial government promoted home ownership among urban Africans. Colonial officials imagined the provision of urban housing loans to be a way to create a stable and contented urban middle class.125 In 1953, it established the African Urban Housing Loan Fund to enable Africans to build their own houses. Special plots in the new Magomeni neighborhood were set aside for loan applicants, who had to deposit one -third of the estimated cost of the house. The loan had to be repaid at 4.5 per c ent in monthly instal lments over a time period of twenty years. While the colonial government considered credit dangerous and harmful for Africans in the interwar period, after WWII colonial authorities imagined specific loans to bring about desirable new urban African subjectivities. The provision of credit was a specific art of governance through which the colonial government put to use an ideal shared by both rulers and ruled to shape new urban subjectivities. Member of the Urban Housing Loans Committee argued that the Òpsychology of ownershipÓ was crucial in so far as Africans would only value their houses if they owned them ,126 echoing the governmentÕs argument with regards to the construction of the new shark market mentioned above. The problem was tha t few Africans could afford to put down the initial o ne-third of the capital cost needed to qualify for these loans. Also, according to J. F. R. Hill involved in Works and Development Planning, ÒFew Africans would, at present, be sufficiently far seeingÓ t o appreciate the generous terms of the loans. Therefore, he suggested, Òunorthodox methodsÓ were Commissioner, Kisarawe, to the P.C., Eastern, March 3, 1949, TNA: 29538: ÒNative Courts in Dar es Salaam TownshipÓ). 125 No author, n.d. [mid -1950s], TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to Committee.Ó 126 Minutes of the fiftee nth meeting of the urban housing loans committee, January 14, 1959, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/033: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Agenda and Minutes.Ó 62 required to hand out these loans and promote house ownership among Africans. 127 And indeed, as a way to popularize housing loans, the contribution to receive a l oan was reduced from one third of the capital cost to one twentieth of the capital cost or even less. With a contribution of £25, one could get a loan of £500 or more. Consequently, these loans became hugely popular and the funds of £50,000 set aside by th e Legislative Council for housing loans for the year 1957 and the £75,000 set aside for 1958 turned out to be insufficient. 128 The sudden rise in demand for these loans that set in once the loan conditions were eased also dispelled colonial officersÕ earlier doubts that Africans would react to loan conditions Òrationally.Ó 129 Overall, housing loans are an example of how creditors aimed to shape debtors through loans and conditions. Most explicitly, D. C. Hill stated that Òit was His ExcellencyÕs idea to try and encourage a stable middle class African group to emerge as a result of these loans.Ó 130 127 ÒFew Africans would, at present, be sufficiently far seeing for such a proposition. It is not at all easy th erefore to devise a system by which Africans can acquire houses of a permanent nature and it is probably impossible unless unorthodox methods are pursued. Strict adherence to the business methods of building societies, and the total elimination of risks or subsidies, would not enable many to participateÓ (J. F. R. Hill, Member for Communication, Works and Development Planning, October 13, 1953, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to CommitteeÓ). 128 Letter by D. C. Hill, Offic er in Charge, African Urban Housing Loans & Investments, October 27, 1957, and November 26, 1958, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to Committee.Ó 129 The new houses were also supposed to improve the public health situation as they helped to mitigate the malaria threat. The creation of a permanent urban middle class with the help of housing loans was not always a straightforward matter as not all receivers of housing loans in fact used them to build or improve houses. Hussei n Omari Mwagao, a resident of Mwanza on Lake Victoria, used a loan provided by the Local Development Loan Fund to invest in a timber transportation business rather than to build a house in Mwanza. The borrower was eventually imprisoned for six months becau se he sold the chattels he used as security to receive another loans from the same fund (Letter by Officer in Charge, African Housing Loans & Investments, October 25, 1957, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/036: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Memorandum to CommitteeÓ). 130 Minutes of the 13 th meeting of the Urban Housing Loan Funds Committee, May 30, 1958, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/033: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Agenda and Minutes.Ó 63 However, the creation of a stable urban middle -class of house owners ran into difficulties. Despite the eased conditions for urban housing loans, poor Africans were not able to raise enough money to make the required down payment, and they felt that the loan scheme favored wealthy Africans. And even those who received housing loans did not always make Òproper use of the loanÓ as far as the colonial government was concern ed. Instead of building ÒmodernÓ three -room houses for their nuclear families, they continued to build six -roomed Swahili -type houses, which offered the house owners the possibility of generating income by renting out room to lodgers. Furthermore, the numb er of urban housing loans offered was far too small to actually create an urban middle class worthy of its name. The number of current loans provided was a mere 98 in September 1958. 131 While Ò[t]he object of the scheme was to Ôprime the pumpÕ to encourage p rivate enterprise to loan monies to Africans for building houses,Ó the colonial governmentÕs willingness to subsidize urban housing loans was ultimately too short -termed and too small in scale. By late 1958, the demand for these loans had already outstripp ed the supply of money available. Already in October 1959, there were calls from within the colonial government to stop subsidizing urban housing loans and to provide loans on a commercial basis to much less favorable conditions instead. 132 131 Minutes of the 16 th meeting of the Urban Housing Loan Funds Committee, March 11, 1959; Quarterly Report on Loan Funds Available to Africans, September 30, 1958, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/033: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Agenda and Minutes.Ó 132 Letter by Assistant Director Administrator, Dar es Salaam, to the Ministry of Urban Local Government a nd Works, Dar es Salaam, October, 1959; Minutes of the 14 th meeting of the Urban Housing Loan Funds Committee, December 4, 1958, TNA: ACC 183/LG/139/033: ÒUrban Housing Loans Committee. Agenda and Minutes.Ó 64 COSMOPOLITAN KARIAKOO: THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND While the colonial governmentÕs vision of Dar es Salaam was quite clear and unambiguous, community life in colonial Kariakoo did not always comply with colonial ideas of urban living and livelihoods. Therefore, a switch o f perspectives back to the street level along the lines suggested by de Certeau is in order here. De Certeau argued that city planners and state officialsÕ image of the city as a connected grid and a unified field largely fails to grasp the complexity of the city, which people practice at ground level. In everyday life, ÒwalkersÓ on the ground are the writers of urb an text, which ultimately evade the totalizing eye of the voyeurs. They experience the city by making multifaceted use of streets and other urba n spaces. Comparing walkersÕ pedestrian movements t o speech acts, de Certeau argued that walking has the potential of transgressing the forms laid out by planners. By engaging in the everyday acts of walking, urban dwellers are able to turn urban space int o their own place. Adopting different styles, walkers make urban space more dense or open gaps. Appropriating and manipulating proper names such as street names also provides a means to make urban spaces meaningful for walkers. Narrating local legends gene rates memories of local places that are personal and that may contradict official narratives. For instance, the birdÕs eye view of the Kariakoo grid -system of streets had all the appearances of a well -ordered neighborh ood. It resulted in a repetitive succe ssion of rather monotonous and lo ok-alike street intersections and i nhabitants of the wealthier downtown area were often unable to distinguish one street corner from another when they visited Kariakoo. 133 Kariakoo residents, on the other hand, appropriated t his urban space and were able to distinguish different intersection according to the respective corner shop at the corner community there. 133 Vassanji, The Gunny S ack , 100. 65 Thus, lived spatial relations in the city partially escape and contest the panoptic gaze of urban planners and admini strators, to which Foucauldian approaches attribute much power. 134 First of all, insufficient investments in infrastructure and government oversight as well as rapid urban growth led to a conspicuous lack of government control despite the fact that the order ed layout of the African section was to make the neighborhood easily governable. The racially defined sections of Dar es Salaam were assigned different levels of investment in infrastructure and services, which was consistent with colonial policies. Water kiosks, for instance, were few and far between and water -borne sewage was lacking completely. 135 The levels of investment in the African section were so low they worked against the goal of making Kariakoo an easily governable and controllable urban space. Streetlights are a case in point. By 1944, there were merely twenty -four streetlights in the African section. 136 Thus, the colonial government restricted Africans to certain parts of the town at night and required them to carry a light in all areas at night, 137 a policy which was not easily enforceable and which was indicative of the lack of control the colonial government exercised in the African sections of town. Population growth in Dar es Salaam was rapid, and the colonial government proved unable to enforce restrictions. The number of Africans in Dar es Salaam grew from an estimated 20,000 in 1921 to 24,000 only three years later. It slightly decreased to 22,734 in 1931 mainly because of the global economic recession, only to increase to 33,000 before World War Two and 134 Certeau, ÒWalking in the City.Ó For an early effort to write a history of Dar es Salaam from the perspectives of Africans, see Ant hony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transition.Ó 135 J.M. Lusugga Kironde, Ò Race, Class and Housing in Dar e s Salaam: The Colonial Impact on Land Use Structure, 1891 -1961,Ó in Dar e s Salaam: Histories from a n Emerging African Metropolis , by James R. Brennan, Andrew Burton, and Yusufu Qwaray Lawi (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2007), 114; Sarah L. Smiley, ÒPatterns of Urban Lif e and Urban Segregation in Dar e s Salaam, TanzaniaÓ (University of Kansa s, 2007), 106 Ð107. 136 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 386. 137 Burton, African Underclass , 164Ð165. 66 45,000 in 1943. 138 The African population in town was extraordinarily multi -ethnic and men outnumbered women. In 1931, for instance, African s in Dar es Salaam represented 159 different tribes and two thirds were men. 139 Dar es SalaamÕs Asian popula tion also grew quickly. In 1921, there were 4005 Asian residents of whom 600 had commercial occupations, 140 and ten years later, the number stood at 9491 most of whom were male and born in India. 141 Second of all, despite the fact that Kariakoo was planned as the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of the city, almost a quarter of Kariakoo residents were of South Asian origin. Due to a lack of space in the Asian section of town and because of a lack of personal funds, Asians increasingly moved to Kariakoo where relatively cheap accommodation was available. In 1931, nine percent of the houses in Kariakoo were either rented or owned by Asians, 142 especially along the two main commercial streets Msimbazi and Kichwele as well as on the streets surrounding the market hall where Asian a nd Arab shops dominated the cityscape. In 1943, a colonial official aware of the fact that Kariakoo was not as well -ordered and clean as it was intended remarked Ò[t]he African 138 Annu al report on Dar -es-Salaam District for 1922 by F. W. Brett, Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930;Ó Tanganyika Secretariat and Philip Euen Mitchell, Census of the Native Population of Tanganyika Terr itory, 1931 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1932); Burton, African Underclass , 54; Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1924 by Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930;Ó Annual Report for 1931, TNA library: ÒTanganyika Territory: District OfficerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam Districts, 1931-1937.Ó All the statistics except the national censuses are rough estimates as the colonial officials themselves acknowledged . 139 Annu al Report for 1931, TNA library: ÒTanganyika Territory: District OfficerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam Districts, 1931 -1937.Ó 140 Tanganyika and D. C. Campbell, Report on the Native Census, 1921 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1921); Tanganyika Territory, Non-Native Census, 1921: Report (Dar es Salaam, 1921). 141 Tanganyika Territory, Non-Native and Native Census 1931 (Dar es Salaam, 1931). 142 Brennan, ÒNation , Race and Urbanization in Dar e s Salaam, Tanzania, 1916 -1976,Ó 46 Ð47. Many of those had lost most of their wealth during the war as their savings held in German currency lost all of their value ( Sporrek, Food Mar keting an d Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 54. 67 quarter of the town which is well and spaciously planned, gives a superficial i mpression of cleanliness and good order, especially in the dry season, but in fact it is badly congested, and there is É a steady infiltration of Asians.Ó 143 In 1957, KariakooÕs population stood at around 29,000 of whom 3800 were of Asian and 1820 or Arab de scent. 144 ÒThis cosmopolitanism presents a real problem,Ó stated the Senior Commiss ioner of the District of Dar es Salaam already in 1924, because Òan astonishing variety of nationalities may be envolved [sic] in any question which arises.Ó 145 What was perceiv ed as problematic from the viewpoint of colonial administrators , however, was the basis for the emergence of a vigorous urban culture, society, and economy in Kariakoo . Third of all, although the German and British colonial governments envisioned the African section to be mainly a residential neighborhood, Kariakoo developed into the most important commercial center of the city, particularly for the lower -class population. In fact, Kariakoo derived much of its vibrancy and social vitality from its dual fu nction as residential and business neighborhood. 146 Both African and Asian businesspeople were considerably involved in this development. In the colonial imagination of a racially segregated Dar es Salaam, however, the Kariakoo neighborhood was planned as a residential neighborhood for Africans. The African urban economy was to be based exclusively on the public market hall at the center of the 143 Memorandum. Housing Conditions. Dar es Salaam [1943], TNA: 24387: ÒImprovement to Native Houses.Ó 144 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 276; Burton, African Underclass , 212. 145 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1924 by Senior Comm issioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 146 Even today, Kariakoo displays a distinctly different atmosphere. Cars, motorbikes, trucks, bajajis, push -carts, bicycles, and pedestrians together created an en ormous chaotic energy that is different from the various other markets had sprung up in suburbs like Tandika and Temeke. These suburban markets are also very busy and thronged with people, street vendors, and market stalls, but they were relatively calm be cause they are clearly delineated market areas where only market business is being done. 68 neighborhood. The number of private shops or maduka (sg. duka ) was to be reduced to a minimum. In reality, municipal policies were not as clear -cut and unambiguous as the colonial imagination suggested. In fact, policies regarding the urban economy in Dar es Salaam were complicated and at times contradictory. 147 The contradictory nature of colonial policies was acknowled ged even by colonial officers , albeit not openly. With regards to a request by Salim Asmani to lease his house located in the Kariakoo neighborhood to an Asian trader, the district officer wrote ÒMr. Salim Asmani was not granted permission to rent his hous e to a non -native (65 Livingstone Street) for the purpose of opening a shop therein, as this Street is outside the trading area.Ó The two sentences following this statement were crossed out by still readable. Ò The question of the trading area in the Townsh ip was considerably complicated some years ago when owing to a misunderstanding shops were allowed in residential streets outside the Trading Area. The Township Authority would now like to eliminate these shops but is unable to do so owing to legal and oth er difficulties; it certainly does not wish to increase their numbers by allowing new shops to be opened .Ó148 Due to this Òmisunderstanding,Ó 149 which the colonial administration did not want to 147 Brennan, Taifa . 148 Letter by Ag. District Officer, March 28, 1939, TNA: ACC 61/490: ÒAfrican Welfare and Commercial Association, Dar es Salaam.Ó 149 The confusion and lack of certainty was expressed in formula tions like Ò It appears that at present trading is not allowed in IlalaÓ and ÒThe reservation of the area for native residents would not in itself presumably prevent a non -native from acquiring houses in the area, although the intention of the Committee was I think that the area should be reserved for native ownersÓ (Letter by D.C. Campbell, Acting Chief Secretary, to the Executive Officer, Township Authority, Dar es Salaam, July 4, 1934; Letter by the P.C., Eastern, to the Land Officer, Dar es Salaam, TNA: 12589: ÒDar -es-Salaam Township, Lay -out of,Ó emphases added by author). The misunderstanding was mainly based on the fact that the Township Authority adopted a resolution to regularize the policy of refusing approval of ordinary native houses for use as sh ops. It also recommended declaring the area west of Msimbazi Street to be a residential area. However, there never followed an official declaration. As a result, colonial authorities decided on a case -by-case basis whether houses could be used as shops in Kariakoo and the adjacent Ilala neighborhood. 69 openly acknowledge, colonial policies were inconsistent and open for interpretation. In the case described above, Salim Asmani was allowed to trade in his own house even though it was not located in the trading area as long as the Medical Officer of Health approved of the premises. However, he was not allowed to rent it to a Ònon -native,Ó who intended to trade in that house. 150 Generally, existing shops run by Asians, Arabs, or Africans could not be shut down. As a result, a multitude of shops existed in Kariakoo throughout the colonial period, not only in the streets and areas officially acknowledged as trading areas along the two main streets Kichwele and Msimbazi and the streets around the public market hall, but also outside these areas. Kariakoo residents formed meaningful local communities despite the social anonymity inherent in the monotonous and repetitive street layout, and particular role s were taken up by shopkeepers, whose shops were to be found at just about every i ntersection in the neighborhood. Kariakoo in postwar Dar es Salaam was a cosmopolitan and social ly, politically, and culturally most vibrant neighborhood. Various communities based on religion, place of origin, ethnicity, occupation, politics, and leisure had their localities in Kariakoo. The TANU headquarters was located in KariakooÕs east side and was a meeting place for people involved in the independence movement. 151 Various associations based on leisure activities such as dance societies, musical clubs, and football teams were located in Kariakoo. The Mnazi Mmoja park Yahya Mohamed, who was of Arab origin, was allowed to acquire a house in the Ilala neighborhood, but he was not allowed to convert it to a shop. ÒYahya Mohamed should not be allowed to trade until the general p olicy has been clearly formulated, after which a decision should be given in his case in accordance with the general policy which it is decided to adoptÓ (Letter by D.C. Campbell, Acting Chief Secretary, to the Executive Officer, Township Authority, Dar es Salaam, July 4, 1934, TNA: 12589: ÒDar -es-Salaam Township, Lay -out ofÓ). 150 Letter by T. M. Revington, Chief Secretary to the Government, July 8, 1939, TNA: ACC 61/490: ÒAfrican Welfare and Commercial Association, Dar es Salaam.Ó 151 In Gabriel RuhumbikaÕs novel Miradi Bubu ya Wazalendo , the character Saidi, who lived in Kariakoo and worked at an Asian shop in the downtown area during the late -colonial period, volunteered at the TANU headquarters and was eventually employed there ( Gabriel Ruhumbika, Miradi Bubu ya Wazalendo (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1992), 45 Ð57). 70 adjacent to Kariakoo served as a playground for children who might have acquired their sporting equipment at one of the auction markets in Kariakoo. 152 In addition to that, tea and coffee houses were important institutions in the city because they provided residents with public spaces th at were not restricted by ethnicity, education, or class. Historian David Anthony characterized the makeshift tea and coffee stands Òcentral units of mass culture.Ó 153 Probably the liveliest of these public -drinking places was the pombe beer market, which wa s the only legal place in the entire city where locally brewed pombe or grain beer was sold and consumed. 154 Vassanji repeatedly describes the sounds of drums and songs, the sight of dancers, and the smells of beer, maize, cassava, and meat stemming from the pombe beer market. 155 Furthermore, several mosques, a temple, and the Mission Quarters were located in Kariakoo. The official festivities for Eid al -Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan, were held at Mnazi Mmoja, involved food, drinks, dances, and games, an d lasted for three days. 156 This impressive set of activities contributed to the neighborhoodÕs particularly vibrant and truly urban character. 157 All these activities , however , cannot be understood in separation from KariakooÕs role as Dar es SalaamÕs commerc ial center and the various economic activities in which its residents were involved. 152 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 245; M. G. Vassanji, Uhuru Street: Short Stories (Oxford: Heinemann, 1991), 44, 69. 153 Anthony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transition,Ó 121. 154 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 250. According to Burton, the consumption of alcohol at any other place outside the pombe market was outlawed in 1926 ( Burton, African Underclass , 56. 155 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 87, 90, 95. 156 Habari za Leo newspaper , August 20, 1948 , accessed at Zentralbibliothek f Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Kiel and Hamburg. 157 Anthony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transition.Ó The authors of the Master Plan called Kariakoo a community wit h a Òclosely knit social patternÓ ( Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania (Toronto, Canada: The Associates, 1968), 47 Ð48). 71 The neighborhoodÕs attractions were both economic and social in nature. 158 Physical spaces and infrastructures as well as social actors facilitated the making of Kariakoo a s a market neighborhood. The central market building, the shark market, the mnada market, and numerous shops built into existing houses were the physical structures that made these social interactions and experiences possible. Day by day residents of adjac ent and outlying neighborhoods of the city as well as people from the countryside were willing to spend time and money to commute to Kariakoo several times a week or even daily. 159 Inner -city traders purchased their goods at Kariakoo central market and sold them at their shops or in the streets in other parts of the city. 160 Kariakoo was Dar es SalaamÕs commercial center, if not for the cityÕs European and Asian population, then certainly for its majority African population as well as for the Asian and Arab population living in Kariakoo. The daily stream of visitors and shoppers, who caused KariakooÕs daytime population to be considerably larger than its nighttime population, was one group of people that marked social life in Kariakoo. But markets and shops were more than physical sites where goods, foods, and drinks were exchanged for money. They were spaces where social interactions of an urban nature took place. The largest and most important market place was the central market hall. It was not merely a place to buy and sell commodities. It was also a place to meet friends and relatives and to engage in forms of recreation and entertainment. ÒThe central market of Kariakoo represents the 158 Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 63Ð64. 159 ÒAll of the African sections of the city, including the most distant from Kariakoo such as Temeke and Kinondoni, use this market as often as three to four times a week. Those in closer proximity, such as Magomeni, Ilala and Buruguni [sic] visit the market almost dailyÓ ( Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania , 26). Kariakoo occupied the central place in bus -usersÕ mental maps of the city as Kariakoo was the central node of the inner -city of colonial Dar es Salaam. ÒAt present Kariakoo is the terminus and origin of the transit systemÓ ( Ibid., 39). 160 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 182. 72 most active centre in the city serving as the market place as well as the place to see friends and relatives. É this traditional market place, besides being a place for shopping, is a meeting place of friends and relatives and serves as an extremely valuable form of recreation and social contact.Ó 161 Also, buyers listened to the l ocal radio programs, news programs, and popular songs that were broadcast through loudspeakers at the Kariakoo market. 162 In addition to these regulated markets, there were several open -air markets where people sold things in the streets or courtyards. Auct ions were held for goods that were otherwise only available in downtown shops, which were considered more respectable but were more expensive. Customers with personal relations to vendors at open -air markets were more likely to get the things they wanted t o buy. In the evenings, music bands sometimes took advantage of the ready audiences and played their music. 163 Market places were thus much more than sites where goods were bought and sold. They created the space for the kind of personal interactions and exp eriences that characterized Kariakoo as the social and cultural center of Dar es Salaam. This was the reason why a resident from the Buguruni neighborhood Òlikes to go to townÓ to look for work but also to Òsee his other friends É, some in Kariakoo, where he can fit in a visit with a shopping expedition to the market.Ó 164 Just like regulated market halls, open -air market places, and tea and coffee stalls, shops were integral and vital social elements of the Kariakoo market neighborhood. Shops sold newspapers , which were read and discussed at the shops themselves or at the tea and coffee stalls right next to the central market. Shops also sold fashionable kangas cloths and kanzus robes, 161 Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania , 25Ð26. 162 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 196; Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 149. 163 Vassanji, Uhuru Street , 43Ð45. 164 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 182. 73 which residents used to express their urban identities. Shops did not only provide the building blocks on which corner communities within Kariakoo were created, they were also a central aspect of the Ð visible and mental Ð image of Kariakoo. When urban residents thought of Kariakoo as a neighborhood, they not only envisioned the central market and the adjacent central bus terminal, which formed the heart of the neighborhood. They were also likely to think of the two main streets, Kichwele and Msimbazi, which were the defining streets of Kariakoo leading right into the interior of the neighborhood. Leslie described how a resident of Ilala took his brother, who had just arrived at Dar es Salaam for the first time, for a walk to show him the city. After strolling along Acacia Street and Ring Street in the downtown area, they wandered down Kichwele Street and Msimbazi Street in Kariakoo. 165 Both Kichwele Street and Msimbazi Street were lined with shops Ð an image which came to represent one of the ways in which urban residents imagined and remembered Kariakoo. 166 The social world in Karia koo was extraordinarily ÒthickÓ due to the neighborhoodÕs social, cultural, economic, and political vibrancy. Even the authors of a national capital master plan published shortly after independence noticed the Òintense social structure existing in all Afri can communities, directly related to their high densities. É The functioning of communities such as Kariakoo with its closely knit social pattern resulting from small scale and distance relationships.Ó 167 Workers and employees, who worked at the port or in t he downtown area and who often spent their leisure time in the Kariakoo area, were important group of actors to shape 165 Ibid., 102 Ð103. 166 See map 5 in Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania ; Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 85. 167 Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania , 47Ð48. 74 Kariakoo as a market neighborhood. Still more important the residents, who gained a living by engaging in market activities: shopkeepers. Most shops in colonial Kariakoo were owned by Asian inhabitants of the poorer strata of the Asian community in Dar es Salaam. The preferred kind of shop was the so -called Òcorner store,Ó which was open on the fronts to two streets and whose verandahs neede d to be cemented by law. In comparison to an ordinary shop that was open only to one street, a corner store was more visible, offered more room for displaying sales items, and allowed for attending to several customers at a time (see figure 1.2) . Between t he two doorways some shops even had display windows, which shopkeepers used to catch passing pedestriansÕ attention. Vassanji describes how ÒAfrican boys and girls would come and gaze for long mouthwatering minutesÓ at these display windows. 168 Shopkeepers h elped to create desires among inhabitants of the neighborhood. 169 168 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 106. 169 Wright pointed out the fact that colonial officers in Tanganyika and Nyasaland saw traders and shops as means to create a new kind of African consumer, who desires more and a broader variety of cons umer goods ( Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika , 6). 75 Figure 1.2: An Arab shop in a Swahili -type house in late -colonial Dar e s Salaam.170 Shops often stood at the center of the social worlds of their owners and their families. Vassanji describ es the most established shopkeeper in the immediate neighborhood, Mzee Pipa, as an old man who spent more time in his corner store than outside of it. All day long he would sit in a white singlet and a worn -out loincloth, perched on a carseat [sic] atop a wooden crate, so that surrounded by all his wares, he looked on the two streets É He looked sweaty and dirty, a part of his shop; it seemed you could rub layers and layers of turmeric or coriander, or whatever else he sold, off his skin, he breathed in an d breathed out nothing but musty air with the odour of grain and spice, gunny and cockroach egg. 171 Mzee Pipa had become one with his shop visibly resembling the goods he sold and embodying the store, which served as the basis for Mzee PipaÕs livelihood fo r decades. 170 Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam , 176-177. 171 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 100. 76 In other cases, shops were not run by individuals but by entire families including children. 172 VassanjiÕs family owned a shop on Kichwele Street, which was managed by his widowed mother who heavily relied on the help of her children, her mother, and her brothers. The central place of social interaction for children of a shopkeeperÕs family was the store itself. The shop was considered part of the familyÕs living area especially in the afternoon and in the evening. 173 The shop was not only a physica l and social space but also a room filled with scents and odors stemming from the various spices and food items as well as the kanga cloths and other clothes and textiles being sold. 174 ShopkeepersÕ families tended to rent and live in backrooms of Swahili -style houses or rooms on the second floor of multi -story houses of which there were few in colonial Kariakoo. 175 As the shops were so deeply interlinked with the house and its inhabitants, the shop came to define the social function of the house it was located in. Asian shopkeepers did not quite comply with colonial officersÕ image of them as business -like and eager to reinvest profits into their shops rather than spending it on other commodities or giving it away. 176O VassanjiÕs uncleÕs wife Zera was a Òcompuls ive giverÓ who regularly used the profits derived from their shop to supply children and neighbors with food and money. VassanjiÕs mother Kulsum, on the other hand, only became ÒefficientÓ and Òbusiness -mindedÓ when she realized that Ð as a single mother r aising five to eight children Ð she did not have any other option. 177 To be business -minded and efficient was not so much a choice but the 172 Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 92Ð93. 173 Vassanji describes how, after the afternoon nap, Òthere would be more of us than customers [in the shop], fighting over snacks of roasted cassava and corn and the occasional bottle of CokeÓ (Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 105). 174 Ibid., 86. 175 Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 92Ð93. 176 See also Gijsbert Oonk, Settled Strangers: Asian Business E lites in East Africa (1800 -2000) (New Delhi: Sage, 2013). 177 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 92Ð93. 77 outcome of circumstances and a sign of poverty. Being business -like and efficient found its expression in KulsumÕs cons tant worry about her savings and her hardened physical appearance. Wealthy shopkeepers like Zera, on the other hand, were able and willing to dispose of their wealth and use it to create and intensify social relations. Shopkeepers in Kariakoo did not live isolated lives that were guided by the sole concern of profit maximization. Rather, they were part of a broader social world that comprised their families, religious and business communities, and members of the neighborhood. Shopkeepers were exposed to va rious sets of social norms according to which shopkeepers were expected to meet certain obligations. According to Vassanji, KulsumÕs brother Bahdur successfully demanded a large amount of money from Kulsum to support a friendÕs political campaign. Kulsum w as willing to give her brother the requested amount even though she had to take the money from her emergency fund. 178 Likewise, the well -established and relatively wealthy shopkeeper Mzee Pipa was confronted with his sisterÕs continuous and publicly announce d demands for food, money, and social recognition. Unlike Kulsum, Mzee Pipa failed to appropriately support his relatives because the food he sent to her were leftovers and the money too little. Due to the insufficient support for his sister, Mzee Pipa was known in the neighborhood for his avarice. 179 Pointing out inappropriate social behavior by making it public was one way of ensuring that the wealthier members of the community met their social obligation. In addition to meeting their relativesÕ demands, M uslim shopkeepers in Kariakoo were expected to donate to their respective religious community as well as to the poor and handicapped who were often known by their name in the neighborhood and who Òparaded the 178 Ibid., 147 Ð148. 179 Ibid., 122; Vassanji, Uhuru S treet, 55. 78 streets with begging bowlsÓ on Fridays, Òthe da y of charity.Ó 180 Interestingly, while Mzee Pipa did not meet his sisterÕs demands, he was careful to send weekly offerings to his mosque every Friday to fulfill a family obligation. 181 This kind of charity by the wealthy to religious communities in the name o f a larger social group is strikingly similar to what Jeremy Prestholdt describes for nineteenth -century Mombasa where wealthy people invested in the construction and renovation of mosques. The aim was to have themselves and their social group be commemora ted as both wealthy and generous. 182 The religious community was similarly important for Muslim Asians in twentieth -century Tanganyika. When VassanjiÕs father, the community leader Dhanji Govindji, took money out of the community fund when his savings were u sed up, this was considered the greatest sin possible and he faced shame and social exclusion. 183 Thus, Muslim Asians and coastal Africans shared a sense of social responsibility to their religious community. With regards to their immediate neighborhood, sh opkeepers in Kariakoo provided certain services, ranging from the free provision of water for beggars and thirsty customers to the transportation of the neighborsÕ children to school. 184 Mzee Pipa offered a transportation service for schoolchildren in the ne ighborhood, which the city did not provide. 185 These relations point to the existence of sub -communities within the larger Kariakoo neighborhood. Everyday interactions between neighbors irrespective of socioeconomic, religious, and racial background living a t and close to an intersection led to the formation of sub -communities within the larger 180 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 86, 122. Brennan describes an incident in which an Asian resident was surrounded by a crowd of angry people after he refused to give alms to a beggar and hit him (Brennan, ÒNation, Race and Urbanization in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916 -1976,Ó 183) . 181 Vassanji, Uhuru Street , 52. 182 Prestholdt, Domesticating the World , 188Ð189, footnote 11. 183 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 54. 184 Vassanji, Uhuru Street , 29. 185 Ibid. , 53. 79 Kariakoo neighborhood. Corner shops stood at the center of corner communities because they provided certain service to their immediate neighbors. Leslie mentioned that Òthere are small groups, usually of better -dressed young men, listening to radios in shops, É and parts of Kariakoo are a forest of aerials.Ó 186 Many shopkeepers owned radios, which drew large audiences when football games were broadcast. 187 Furthermore, shop s provided a kind of street lighting, especially when shops closed late during Ramadan, which was enjoyed by both children and adults. 188 While street lighting and electricity were scarce in Kariakoo, gas lighting was more common for private houses. 189 However , the number of consumers of electricity in Dar es Salaam rose from about 5800 to almost 13,000 in the years between 1951 and 1961 and shopkeepers in Kariakoo were likely to be among the few people in the neighborhood who were able to afford electricity. 190 Corner communities were cosmopolitan in character as residents of African, Arab, and Asian descent were constitutive elements. Corner communities were facilitated by the physical proximity of neighbors , the existence of shops serv ing as semi -public meetin g places, and the almost -permanent presence of shopkeepers, who assumed the roles of communicators. Like urban associations and groups as well as hoteli and mikahawani tea and coffee stands, the social space created around corner shops acted as Òequalizers Ó of urban society. 191 Members of these 186 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 196. 187 Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania , 26. 188 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 128. 189 ÒWe strolled in the streets, Acacia Avenue, Ring Street, Kichw ele, Msimbazi Street É Every house was bright with lights, electric in the stone town, pressure in the wattle and daubÓ ( Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 102Ð103). Burton no tices that roads in the African township were poorly lit as there were only 24 street lights in 1940 ( Burton, African Underclass , 89. 190 Tanzania, Selected Statistical Series (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance,Economic Affairs, and Planning, 1987), 43. 191 Anthony, ÒCulture and Society in a Town in Transition,Ó 123. 80 neighborhood sub -communities were not organized along aspects of identity to which the colonial government paid most attention to, namely race and occupation. Rather, corner communities brought together Kariakoo reside nts regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, or occupation, and they provided opportunities for urban residents to form moral communities and meaningful urban identities within the larger framework of a European -dominated colonial society. Kiswahili as the lingua franca and Islam as the religion of the large majority of urban residents facilitated the formation of a sense of community and togetherness. Tensions between Kariakoo residents of Asian, Arab, and African descent were far less severe than has be en suggested for colonial Dar es Salaam .192 Shops were spaces where residents of the neighborhood met and interacted with each other as vendors, customers, employers, and employees on an everyday basis. People of all hues and colors met and interacted with e ach other on an everyday basis. Although economic relationships were unequal as Asians tended to be wealthier than Africans and often acted as employers and shopkeepers, both Asians and Africans profited from successful economic cooperation. Ultimately, bo th shopkeepers and other residents were part of the social world of Kariakoo where members of the neighborhood were able to sanction excessively exploitative behavior. The importance of shops for social life in Dar es Salaam was also noted by outside obse rvers such as geographer Harm de Blij and the authors of Dar es SalaamÕs first master plan. In his richly illustrated booklet, de Blij noted that Ò Everywhere, the duka stores occupy corner locationsÓ and that Òpractically every residential block in Kariako o includes one or more stores of the duka type. These stores, which usually occupy corner locations, sell everyday household requirements. Like most of the businesses in KariakooÕs commercial zone, these are operated by 192 Brennan, Taifa . 81 Asians or Arabs.Ó 193 The authors of th e Dar es Salaam master plan proposed profound changes to turn the city of Dar es Salaam into a capital city worth its title, but they argued that certain elements of the historically grown urban city needed to be retained. One of them was the Òsystem of co rner ÔdukasÕ [stores],Ó which should not only be preserved but be planned for. ÒAt almost every corner (and especially in Kariakoo) we find the traditional duka. It is usually merely a variation on the design of the Swahili house. The shops or dukas have a n extremely small service area yet amazingly enough function as everything from a drug store to groceries and hardware stores and are part of the essence of the life pattern of the African people. The owner very often has a radio and especially on the occa sions of broadcast sporting matches, the audiences are large.Ó Furthermore, Ò[t]he traditional corner duka [store] serving the houses and its particular city ÔblockÕ also provide a force to shape meaningful neighborhoods.Ó 194 The physical proximity of neighb ors, the existence of shops, which served as permanent meeting places, and the presence of shopkeepers, who assumed the roles of communicators, facilitated the emergence of what I call Òcorner communities.Ó 193 Harm J. De Blij, Dar e s Salaam: A Study in Urban Geography (Eva nston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 39 Ð40. 194 Projec t Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania , 26, 45, 49. 82 Figure 1.3: A visualization of the Òsystem of corner Ôdukas ÕÓ in Kariakoo, 1968. The black squares indicate the location of shops. 195 Shops and shopkeepers played important social roles in corner communities in colonial Kariakoo. Not only did they spend the better part of the day in their shops, they often rented or owned the rooms adjacent to the shop. They were highly visible figures as their shops were semi -public spaces that were used by customers, workers, and visitors. Long -standing shopkeepers were thus well known in the immediate neighborhood especially when they were relatively wealthy and owned houses and cars, and when they were active members in other communities or associations. Unlike visitors from other Dar es Salaam neighborhoods, Kariakoo residents were able to distinguish between inte rsections and street corners and they named street corners 195 Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master Plan, Dar e s Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania . 83 after their most visible, well known , and longest -standing residents, who were often shopkeepers. The Kichwele/Viongozi intersection where VassanjiÕs family lived was known as ÒPipa CornerÓ named a fter its most illustrious resident Mzee Pipa. 196 Residents of late -colonial Kariakoo used corner stores to appropriate the intersection they lived on and define it as their own. 197 Vassanji describes his immediate neighborhood in colonial Kariakoo with explici t reference to the buildings on the four corners and their occupants: Habib Mansion, into which we moved, was on the corner of Kichwele and Viongozi Streets ... With Habib Mansion the development of the Kichwele/Viongozi intersection became complete: ther e were on the remaining corners, Salama Building, and Anand Bhavan, and Mzee PipaÕs Amin Mansion. ... Mzee Pipa, Old Barrel, was the oldest resident on the corner. In Anand Bhavan was short, fiery Nuru Poni the pawnbroker who also wrote letters to the Edit or ... Salama Building boasted DayaÕs, the rumour -monger, and the Mawanis. 198 Shopkeepers and their shops occupied prominent places and they often formed the basis on which corner communities could be built. As almost all the shopkeepers in colonial Kariako o were of Asian or Arab descent, one might suspect that these corner identities were not relevant for and excluded the m ajority of African residents. In fact, Africans were directly involved in the creation of these communities and were an integral part of them. This becomes apparent with respect to the shopkeepersÕ nicknames. The attribution of nicknames seems to have been an inevitable act with which all new residents were blessed or cursed. According to Vassanji, ÒWhen you move into a neighbourhood, you wish in your heart of hearts, above anything else save for good business in your shop, for a nice nickname.Ó 199 Nicknames such as ÒMzee PipaÓ 196 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 100. 197 For a discussion of naming practices in urban Zanzibar, see Garth Andrew Myers, ÒNami ng and Placing the Other: Power and the Urban Landscape in Zanzibar,Ó in Critical Toponymies: The Contested Politics of Place Naming , by Lawrence D. Berg and Jani Vuolteenaho (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2009), 85 Ð100. 198 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 98Ð100. 199 Ibid., 99. , emphasis in original. 84 (Elder Barrel), ÒNuru PoniÓ (Pawn[broker ] Brightness ), and ÒMawaniÓ (Spectacles) given to Asian residents of the Pip a Corner were all based on the urban lingua franca Kiswahili rather than Hindi, Arab, or Gujarati words . Pawnshop owner Nuru Poni, whose actual name was A. A. Raghavji, was given his nickname by an African customer who made fun of RaghavjiÕs excessive reli giosity. 200 Corner communities were by no means the only meaningful communities in colonial Kariakoo. Nor did the existence of corner communities mean that all the members of a community got along well with one another. To the contrary, neighborhood gossip a nd jealousy were certainly integral aspects of these communities. 201 Nor did it mean that all the residents of a particular area were active members of the community. Some residents of the houses located at the Pipa Corner, Peter and Viviana, did not partake in the corner community while their sister Alzira found refuge from the violent and depressing life of their parents at KulsumÕs shop. Peter and Viviana, on the other hand, chose to spend much of their time at the Goan Institute, at parties, and at dances .202 Communities based on religion, place of origin, ethnicity, occupation, politics, and leisure were similarly important and were represented in some form in Kariakoo, which gave the neighborhood its social, political, and cultural vivaciousness. However, the social importance of Kariakoo cannot be understood without looking at the neighborhoodÕs economic role as the commercial center of Dar es Salaam. Systems of credit were instrumental in connecting the social and the economy because shopkeepers and othe r members of corner communities facilitated the access to credit, which allowed residents of Kariakoo to spend money more immediately and according to their wishes. Shopkeepers equally 200 Ibid., 119 Ð120. 201 Ibid. , 102. 202 Ibid., 123. 85 borrowed money either to start a business or to get through financially difficult times. To ensure the paying back of money, creditors might challenge the debtorÕs reputation in the neighborhood community. Thus, economic activities in colonial Kariakoo were not detached from the local community but operated within the social norms of this community. Credit helped to shape the market neighborhood of Kariakoo. MORALITY, DEBT, AND BELONGING Watu wengine wanapenda sana kurediti Kukopa madukani mwisho wa mwezi hawalipi Mwenyeduka akimwuliza Òwapi pesa zangu?Ó Kujibu rahisi Òmwish o wa mwezi nina tafu nyingi kakaÓ Some people like credit a lot To buy on credit at shops [but] at the end of the month they donÕt pay When the shopkeeper asks ÒWhere is my money?Ó The easy answer is ÒI have many troubles at the end of the month, brother Ó203 Within corner communities in Kariakoo, the lending of money and selling of goods on credit assumed importance for the workings of social relations and the formation of particular subjectivities. The existence of formal loans, such as pawnshop loans des cribed in chapter 2, in no way restricted more verbal credit arrangements . The practice of selling goods on credit, which constituted the social norm in the multiracial corner communities of Kariakoo, became crucial in the context of shopkeepersÕ assertion of urban citizenship and belonging. 203 Song ÒKukopa Mwisho Hawalipi .Ó The notion that customers are entitled to buy goods on credit, which may or may not be paid back i n the future, is of continuing relevance in contemporary Dar es Salaam. In his recent song Kazi ya Dukani (Òwork at the shopÓ), Tanzanian artist Dogo Mfaume sings about the difficulties in Dar es Salaam to run a profitable shop because the neighbors -cum -customers assert their right to buy goods on credit by invoking their seniority or their female attractiveness. The shopkeeper eventually goes bankrupt because his customers fail to pay for the goods bought on credit. 86 Members of corner communities were held together by a myriad of intersecti ng relations of credit and debt, which in turn were regulated by moral codes embedded in these communities. Membership was defined by the possibi lity for a member to borrow or lend money or goods to another member, according to his or her status and wealth, and usually on an oral basis. Trust, shame, and respectability were shared notions among members irrespective of their racial and class backgro unds. Drawing on the literature on credit and community in East Africa Ð particularly with regards to the cultural values of patronage and generosity Ð, I use the term Òmoral economyÓ to analyze these communities. Instead of understanding the term Òmoral economyÓ as inherently oppositional as in E. P. ThompsonÕs and James ScottÕs conceptions, 204 I use it as a way to take into account how shared moral discourses and cultural values defined communal meanings of debt and credit and how they shaped urban communit ies and the urban economy. In a study of two sections of the Keko neighborhood in Dar es Salaam in the early 1970s, Katherine Levine identified a distinctive kind of community life in the low -income section based on the geographical proximity of the house s and peopleÕs tendency to spend their work and leisure time within their section of the neighborhood. The residents of the middle -income section, on the other hand, lived further apart from each other and were more likely to interact with people living ou tside of their neighborhood section. The lack of social cohesion and community between residents of the two different sections also pertained to the possibility to borrow m oney from fellow residents. A resident of the low -income section put it: ÒI could mo re easily borrow a shilling from one of the fellow workers as poor as me than get anything out of 204 Thompson, ÒThe Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth CenturyÓ; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant Rebellion an d Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 87 those people [from the middle -income section], with their Sh[illing]s. 1000/= a month and their big cars.Ó 205 Understanding the willingness to loan money as an expression of community membership and using money to invest in social capital in the community have a longer history in societies on the East African coast. In the nineteenth century, patriarchs in Swahili towns such as Pangani, Saadani, and Bagamoyo mad e use of credit provided by Asians in ways that did not generate monetary income. They hosted huge feasts to display their power as patrons and foster bonds with clients. As a result of this competitive generosity, they became highly indebted. 206 In nineteen th-century Mombasa, the possession and display of material things likewise influenced a personÕs social status. The appropriate thing for wealthy people to do was to establish relationships with clients, who were able to make claims on their patron. Even o utside of relationships with their clients, affluent people engaged in public spending and actively distributed their wealth on an everyday basis. People, who did not distribute their wealth, were considered Òmiserly,Ó an attribute usually reserved for Hin du businesspeople, who became the stereotyped examples of what respectable people should not do. Rich Swahili people found themselves confronted with what Prestholdt called the Òparadox of socioeconomic morality.Ó 207 While giving away oneÕs wealth contribute d to a personÕs social status, the person had to make sure that enough resources would be available to generate income in the future. Wealthy people in Mombasa invested in the construction and renovation of mosques with the aim of having themselves and the ir social group commemorated as both affluent and generous. 208 205 Katherine Levine, ÒSocial Inequality and Nation al Politics in a Suburb of Dar e s SalaamÓ (University of London, 1971), 19, Archive of the SOAS library. 206 Glassman, Feasts and Riot . 207 Prestholdt, Domesticating the World , 46Ð51. 208 Ibid., 188 Ð189, footnote 11. 88 People who did not comply with these norms faced social sanctions and accusations of avarice. Expectations that a wealthy person on the Swahili coast was to distribute wealth in the form of gift s and credit even found their expression in Johann Ludwig KrapfÕs Kiswahili dictionary assembled in Mombasa in the 1880s. A Kiswahili proverb from the 1880s went mali bahili kula duda , i.e. Òworms will eat the property of a miser ,Ó and the Kiswahili word f or a greedy person, bahili , was translated as Òa man who is only bent upon gathering property without using it.Ó 209 However, the pressure to share and the desire to generate clients and power by handing out money and goods could also ruin wealthy people. Whe n explaining the word ku-komba , Òto hollow out,Ó Krapf provided the example Ò Watu wame -m-komba maliyakwe pia iote , the people got all his money,Ó and explained ÒThere are many Suahili [people on the coast] who were once wealthy people, but who lost all the ir riches by aspiring after greatness, influence, and a large retinue.Ó 210 To be wealthy in a nineteenth -century East African coastal town involved a delicate balancing act of accumulating and distributing wealth. It almost always meant to give money and goo ds to less -wealthy members of the community, either as loans to be repaid with interest at a later date or as gift -like loans to be repaid by means of political allegiance. An example from Bagamoyo in what is today Tanzania illustrates the importance of values such as generosity and charity, not only for the local Swahili population but also for people of South Asian descent. 211 Sewa Haji was a wealthy businessman, who was born in Bagamoyo on the coast and lived in the second half of the nineteenth century. He had made a lot of money equipping caravan leaders with products such as cloth and beads and he recruited 209 Krapf, A Dictionary of the Suahili Language . 210 Ibid.; see also Glassman, Feasts and Riot ; Deutsch, Emancipation Without Ab olition in German East Africa, c .1884-1914, 35, 42. 211 Robert G. Gregory, The Rise and Fall of Philanthropy in East Africa: The Asian Contribution (New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers, 1992). 89 porters, usually among his debtors. 212 Caravan leaders borrowed money from him to finance their caravans. Upon return, Sewa Haji collected the debts w ith interest, usually in the form of ivory and other goods the caravans brought to the coast from the interior. Rather than keeping his wealth to himself and his family, Sewa Haji donated some of it to the broader public shortly before his death. In Dar es Salaam, he bestowed 12,400 rupees to the German authorities for the establishment of a school and a hospital. All these institutions were to be open for everybody and services free for the poor, and the language of instruction in schools was to be Kiswahi li.213 In Bagamoyo, he gave his buildings and various luxury items to the German authorities on condition that a school and a leper station be built bearing his name. 214 One of Sewa HajiÕs goals was certainly to have his name remembered by the people in the co mmunity. The establishment of colonial states did not fundamentally change local peopleÕs views and dealings with credit and debt. Gene rally speaking, colonial state actors were not always able 212 Jan-Georg Deutsch speculated that Ò[i]t is likely that these la tter [guides and porters] were slavesÓ ( Jan-Georg Deutsch, Emancipation Without Ab olition in German East Africa, c .1884-1914, Eastern African studies (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 71). Raimbault confirms that Arabs indebted to Sewa Haji were obliged to supply him with their dependents, whether they were slaves, pawns, or otherwise dependent. Raimbault relies on a report by Lieutenant von Gıtzen: ÒDie Hauptschwierigkeit in der Organisation einer Karawane nach dem Innern ist das Anwerben von zuverl−ssigen Tr−gern. Die grosse Mehrzahl geht nur mit, um sich ein paar Tage verpflegen zu lassen und dann durchzubrennen. Der einzige, der eine Art von Garantie hiergegen leistet, ist immer noch der In der Sewah Hadjih, derall Agenten hat, dem alle Araber so verschuldet sind, dass sie ihm die nıthigen Leute stellen msenÓ (von Gıtzen, ÒReisebriefe aus Ost -AfrikaÓ in Deutsches Kolonialblatt , 1891, 411Ó in Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 95 ). 213 Letter by Freiherr von Soden, Kaiserlicher Gouverneur, April 15, 1892, TNA: G4/1: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten, Allgem. 1901 -1905.Ó 214 The Germans sold the goods and buildings received and establis hed a fund they called ÒBazarfonds.Ó Instead of building the leper station, the fund was used to offer loans to various German and Asian businessmen and entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam. While most debtors repaid the loans ranging from 1000 to 9000 rupees pl us 7 to 9 per cent annual interest rates, the German entrepreneur Burg was not able to do so because his ice -making business never took off. He owed a total of 4272.09 rupees and was unable to pay back 1691.95 rupees. As a result, BurgÕs plot was put up fo r compulsory sale. Still, the leper station in Bagamoyo was never built (TNA: G3/91: ÒVerwaltung des sogenannten Bazarfonds;Ó TNA: G3/92: ÒVerwaltung BazarfondsÓ). 90 to establish a hegemonic hold over colonized peoples and thei r economic actions. Colonial power was Òdominance without hegemonyÓ 215 and ÒarterialÓ rather than Òcapillary.Ó 216 Following the limits of colonial power, the economic impact of colonization was uneven and depended on place and time. The capitalist transformati on in the colonial context was by no means comprehensive and was accompanied by a multitude of tensions and struggles. As a result, Western notions of credit often did not become hegemonic. Local people sought credit opportunities and used loans to their o wn ends even as companies and state officials tried to deploy credit as a means to extract labor and resources from African economies. This is not to say that nothing changed with the onset of imperialism and colonialism. The ways communal ties were susta ined and power relationships maintained with the help of credit were also affected by colonial capitalism. As slavery was abolished and master -slave relationships were reworked outside of colonial courts, some master -slave relationships were redefined as c reditor -debtor relationships. 217 In colonial East Africa, credit remained closely associated with people of Asian descent like Sewa Haji, who had provided the finance for the caravan trade in the nineteenth century. Colonial authorities reinforced that assoc iation because they saw credit in a dual light. When it came to Asians, credit was seen as something beneficial, something that ensured their business activities. When it came to Africans, the colonial government considered credit something dangerous, some thing that made Africans dependent on Asians. The provision of access to credit to certain groups became a way for the colonial government to rule. 215 Frederick Cooper, ÒConflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,Ó The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994): 1531; Ranajit Guha , Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 216 Cooper, ÒConflict and Connection,Ó 1533. 217 Roberts and Mann, ÒIntroduction: Law in Colonial Africa,Ó 29 Ð30. 91 Asian credit remained important throughout the colonial period, for different social groups in East Africa. European farmers borrowed money to get through periods of drought or economic decline. In German Tanganyika, a Punjabi Hindu became known as ÒThe BankÓ because Germans in Arusha regularly relied on him for loans when they failed to get loans from banks. Likewise, Africans and Arabs in Zanzibar and on the coast made regular use of Asian credit. Unlike European settlers in the Kenya highlands, who could not legally lose their land to Asians, coastal Africans and Arabs became increasingly indebted to Asians a nd often ended up losing their land. Africans from the interior, who were drawn into the market economy, bought goods like seeds, fertilizer, and farm implements from the local Asian shop, often on credit. Asian credit was sometimes available for African r etailers as well. Africans, who had gained AsiansÕ confidence through years of association, obtained credit without having to provide any kind of collateral or security. The provision of credit was based on trust and was not limited to exclusive ethnic or racial groups. And Asian shopkeepers and merchants routinely offered to hold money in trust of employees and people in their community. 218 Most importantly, credit and the advancement of goods on credit were used among people of Asian descent in East Africa. It 218 Gregory, South Asi ans in East Africa , 97Ð98. Examples from German -colonial Dar es Salaam of how Europeans bought goods at Asian shops on credit include: John Thomas, who bought a bicycle at Bhijibhai RaibhayÕs shop and paid less than half the full price for it promising to pay the rest at a later point in time (TNA: G21/714: ÒKonkursverfahrer das Vermıgen des Unternehmers John Thomas, Daressalaam, 1905Ó); Johannes Mastrokosta, who borrowed money from Nur Muhammed and provided a golden watch, 25 square meters of gravel, and two makuti houses as security (TNA: G21/913: ÒKonkursverfahrer das Vermıgen des Kaufmannes Johannes Mastrokosta, Daressalam, 1891 -1896Ó); Steinkopf & Co., who had debts with De Silva, Souza Junior & Dias, and Mr. Manekji F. Metha (TNA: G21/699: Ò Konkursverfahrer das Vermıgen der Steinkopf & Co., OHG, Daressalaam, 1893 -1895Ó); Rigas Mutopulos, who owed money to Souza Junior & Dias, Saip Ali Ismailji and others (TNA: G21/700: ÒKonkursverfahrer das Vermıgen des Kaufmannes Rigas Mutopulos, D aressalaam, 1893 -1895Ó); and Julius Kndahl, who was in debt with Gulalm Hussein, Mrubey Jatterji and others (TNA: G21/701: ÒKonkursverfahrer das Vermıgen des Kasinowirtes und Kaufmannes Julius Kndahl, Daressalaam, 1898Ó). 92 allowed for a rapid expansion of family businesses, especially in wholesale and retail trade. In Dar es Salaam, the Ismaili Khojas, who were followers of the Aga Khan, formed their own lending institutions, which offered loans at six per cent and match ed the amount provided by the borrower as a security. The first such institution was the Tanganyika Ismailia Co -operative Society, which was formed in 1937 -38. Among other things, it allowed some Ismaili families to expand their shops, also in Kariakoo. 219 The advancement of goods on credit became a widely used practice within the Ismaili community and allowed a rapid expansion of businesses from the coast into the interior. 220 Local understandings of credit, debt, and community also remained pertinent in the colonial period. The writings of Baraka bin Shomari from Kunduchi, a coastal village just twenty kilometers north of Dar es Salaam, provide detailed insights into how the local people understood credit and debt at the very end of the nineteenth century. 221 While Asians tended to write down credit agreements, for instance when relying on hundi promissory notes long established throughout the western Indian Ocean world, Swahili debtors handed out pieces of wood or knots the creditors had to present when claiming their money. Still, the terms of repayment were flexible and creditors found it difficult to claim their money as debtors appeased them with sweet words and sweeter food when the time of repayment drew near. When creditors 219 Shirin Remtulla Walji, ÒA History of the Ismaili Community in TanzaniaÓ (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974), 169. 220 Gregory, South Asians in Eas t Africa , 97Ð105. Overall, Gregory paints a rather rosy picture of the effects that Asian money lending had on all sections of East African society. If Africans were not always able to use the borrowed money to improve their situations Ð and in fact many lost their land and chattels Ð, it was due to their inability to invest the loans properly and to gauge the risks involved in borrowing money. What Gregory and other historians have left largely unexamined is the role of more informal urban credit and the social and cultural contexts, in which the economic practices of lending and borrowing money took place. 221 Baraka bin Shomari wrote down his insights and provided them to Carl Velten in 1895 (Carl Velten, Schilderungen der Suaheli von Expeditionen v. Wissmanns, Dr. Bumillers, Graf v. Gıtzens, und Anderer. (Gıttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1901), vi). 93 insisted on repayment, neighbors , friend s, or the local Pazi chief were asked to mediate. With the establishment of the Zanzibari Sultanate in the mid -nineteenth century, new institutions were set up to help creditors enforce debt repayment, one of them being the chumba cha wadeni , the c ell for debtors, where reluctant debtors could be locked up. Generally, however, severe punishments like putting someone in chains were not applied for failing debtors, who were considered to have committed merely minor offenses. Even debtors who ended up in the chumba cha wadeni were allowed to visit friends and relatives. 222 Debt had sometimes been associated with pawnship, as Baraka bin Shomari asserted. Nephews or nieces were pawned when one had incurred financial debts or what Mary Douglas called Òblood debts,Ó 223 i.e. when someone had killed a person from another lineage. Alternatively, a person could pawn himself or herself, which happened especially in times of famine. 224 Debt could also lead to enslavement, at least before World War One because the Germa n authorities never really outlawed slavery during their rule in German East Africa. In extreme cases, when the power relationship between creditor and debtor was particularly wide and when geographical distances between creditors and debtors were long, pa wnship was equivalent to slavery, as pawns could no longer be redeemed by paying the outstanding debt. 225 On the local level, however, debt Ð or rather being indebted to another person Ð had the potential of creating friendship and a sense of community. Amon g members of the same community, borrowing and lending small amounts of money was an everyday occurrence. 222 Ibid., 234 Ð235, 360. 223 Douglas, ÒBlood -Debts and Clientship among the Lele.Ó 224 Velten, Schilderungen der Suahe li, 234Ð236. For a regional overview, see Edward Alpers, ÒDebt, Pawnship and Slavery in Nineteenth -Century East Africa,Ó in Bonded Labour and Debt in the Indian Ocean World , by Gwyn Campbell and Alessandro S tanziani (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013). 225 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition in German East Africa, c.1884 -1914, 55Ð56. 94 Baraka bin Shomari observed that Òto borrow is our habit.Ó 226 Borrowing and lending were ordinary social actions, and friendship and indebtedness went t ogether. When [s/he and] his/her friend borrow money from each other, they donÕt claim the money from each other, but the friend himself/herself makes a decision Ð I must pay. But only good people proceed that way, bad people file a suit and insult each o ther, and the friendship ends. And when s/he borrows money from a person, who is not a friend, s/he pays reluctantly. The ones who are reluctant to pay back usually say: Ôborrowing is [like] a wedding paying back is [like] mourning.Õ 227 What Baraka bin S homari described for late nineteenth -century Kunduchi was true for colonial and postcolonial Dar es Salaam, save that practices of borrowing and lending were not only common among Swahili people but among residents of all racial, class, and ethnic backgrou nds. Vassanj i describes a person in 1960s Kariakoo, who got to know another person and agreed to lend him money. When the money got paid back, the two men became friends. 228 Even in more recent decades and up to the present, the sense of community in urban E ast Africa has been understood and read through oneÕs willingness and ability to borrow and lend, as the above -mentioned example of the Keko neighborhood in Dar es Salaam and the street scene at the beginning of this dissertation illustrate. 229 J. A. K. Lesl ie observed for late -colonial Dar es 226 Carl Velten, Desturi za Wasua heli na Khabari za Desturi za SheriÕa za Wasuaheli (Gıttingen, 1903), 8. Translation from Kiswahili by the author. 227 Ibid., 60. Translation from Kiswahili by the author. 228 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack . 229 This has not been specific to East African coastal societies. Anthropologist Julia Elyachar shows that t he significance of creditor -debtor relationships for the making and unmaking of a community have also stood at the center of social life in the el -Hirafiyeen neighborhood in Cairo. Workshop owners in the neighborhood act in market -oriented ways while at the same time enga ging in the moral project of building a neighborhood community. While the sending away of a customer to another workshop might be considered a loss from a capitalist perspective, it may also constitute an investment in social relations from the craftsmanÕs perspective ( Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession ). 95 Salaam that Òborrowing between Africans É is never repaid.Ó 230 How being indebted to other people was a sign of having good relations with other people in the community also became obvious when I attended the funeral of a friendÕs relative the Kigogo Mburahati area of Dar es Salaam during my research in 2013. At the funeral, the attendees were asked whether there was anybody who had lent the deceased person money and the money had not been paid back. Quite a few people rai sed their hand, which I took as a sign of impending negotiations and potential tension s between creditors and relatives of the deceased debtor. When I communicated my thoughts to my friend, she was surprised and explained that having a lot of creditors was a good sign as it showed that the deceased person had good relations with other people. When a deceased person did not have any creditors at all, it meant that the person was isolated and not a member of the community. 231 A final example of how being indebt ed creates close social relations, is how bride wealth is paid. When getting married, it is not considered polite and respectful for the husband to pay bride wealth in full and at once. Instead the husband pays some of the bride wealth and leaves the rest to be paid at an undefined point in the future. The share of the bride wealth that is not paid is referred to in Kiswahili as kishikaundugu , roughly translated as Òwhat keeps familyhood.Ó It brings the two families together and creates undugu or familyhood .232 An indication that this practice has been common for at least a century in Dar es Salaam can be found in documents from Ger man colonial times. When married men died in German colonial Dar es Salaam, it was quite common for their wives to claim an outsta nding share of the bride wealth. One can read in bequests from 1910 to 1912 ÒHis wife claim s from him (2 rupees),Ó ÒDebt on his body: the bride wealth of his wife: 40 rupees,Ó ÒDebt on him: the 230 Leslie, A Survey of Da r e s Salaam , 6. 231 Fieldnotes journal , November 2, 2013. 232 Fieldnotes journal, October 19, 2013. 96 bride wealth of his wife: 33 rupees,Ó ÒDaughter of Selemani (h is wife) bride wealth: 20 rupees,Ó ÒBride wealth of his wife Sikuzani binti Hamisi: 70 rupees,Ó and Ò3 women received each 40 rupees bride wealth today.Ó 233 Bride wealth was a form of an ongoing debt relation as long as husband and wife or wives were alive. Only when the husband died, the outstanding debt was forgiven or paid by the husbandÕs family. The unpaid share of the bride wealth constituted husband and wife/wives as debtor and creditor s and locked them and their families into a debtor -creditor relatio nship that cemented the social ties between the families. The practices of giving and receiving credit in the absence of a due date can thus be understood as a form of fostering valuable social ties in the community. In light of the works discussed above, I understand credit as more than a simple monetary transaction between two rational and profit -maximizing subjects. The use of credit cannot only have the effect of undermining existing webs of mutual obligation, but it can also work towards building soci al relations, thus resembling MaussÕs concept of the gift, especially when the terms of repayment are not clearly set. 234 Following David GraeberÕs suggestion to conceive of society as Òan active project or set of projectsÓ and to understand value as Òthe wa y actions become meaningful to the actors by being placed in some larger social whole,Ó 235 the practices of lending and borrowing money and goods in the absence of a due date can be understood as a form of fostering valuable social ties in the community. Rel ationships of credit and debt involve larger amounts of trust than other financial dealings, a s Arjun Appadurai has argued when discussing the importance of 233 ÒMke wake anamdai (2 Rp. [rupees]),Ó ÒDeni juu yake maiti: mahari ya mke wake: 40 Rp.,Ó ÒDeni juu yake: Mahari yake mke: 33 Rp.,Ó ÒMahari ya mke wake Garza : 20 Rp.,Ó ÒMtoto binti Selemani (mke wake) mahari yake: 20 Rp.,Ó ÒMahari ya mke wake Sikuzani binti Hamisi: 70 Rp.,Ó Ò3 Weiber haben heute je 40 Rp mahari erhaltenÓ (TNA: G35/3: ÒNachl−sse. 1910 -1912Ó). Translations from Kiswahili and German by author. 234 Mauss, The Gift , 1967. 235 David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The Fals e Coin of Our Own Dreams , 1st ed (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 254. 97 trust in Òsocially mediated chains of debtÓ between friends, neighbors, and co -workers found in the urban setting of Mumbai .236 So, the widespread use of credit and debt among members of an urban neighborhood is indicative of an existing sense of community. Accordingly, credit and debt relations shaped communi ties in late -colonial Kariakoo, and to apply the above understanding of credit and debt relations to the Kariakoo neighborhood has ramifications in three different areas. First of all, it means to complicate the literature on race relations in urban Tanzania, which views credit and debt relations mainly as a source of racial tensions and contributing to the racialization of identities in colonial Dar es Salaam. 237 This may have been true when we look at credit and debt only in so far as they became political issues. But examining credit and debt relatio ns in Kariakoo means to inquire about their relevance on various other societal levels, h ow credit and debt relations help ed to susta in a specific economic system, w hat it mean t for Kariakoo residen ts to be perpetually indebted, t o what extent Kariakoo res idents were considered to be ÒcreditworthyÓ subjects, a nd how credit and debt shape d market subjectivities in Kariakoo . As far as racial identities go, actual credit relations rout inely crossed racial boundaries and concepts such as trust, reputation, stat us, and shame were crucial for and shared by Kariakoo residents of all races and classes. The existence and effectiveness of moral corner communities enabled members to buy goods on credit from the nearby shop. For shopkeepers, in turn, the practice of sel ling goods on credit was a crucial way of asserting citizenship in the urban market neighborhood of Kariakoo. Shopkeepers were constantly faced with customersÕ requests to lower prices and to sell on credit. Customers used the strategy of bargaining to de mand the distribution of the 236 Arjun Appadurai, ÒSpectral Housing and Urban Cleansing: Notes on Millennial Mumbai,Ó Cosmopolitanism (2002): 55, 61. 237 Brennan, Taifa . 98 shopkeeperÕs wealth in their favor. As Wright pointed out for rural Tanganyika, customers challenged shopkeepersÕ setting of prices. ÒIn the indigenous African system of bargaining, the seller apparently feels constrained on oc casion, lest he be regarded as a skinflint, to leave the decision [on the selling price of a commodity] in the hands of his customer.Ó 238 Bargaining also allowed shopkeepers to charge prices according to customersÕ wealth and ability to pay. Verney Cameron a nd Daniel Oliver in Zanzibar experienced an extreme case in 1877. ÒIn the first place they [Arabs, Wasuahili and Wameriam] naturally supposed that we were in the employ of the English Government, and therefore ought to pay twice or three times the ordinary price for men [porters] and stores. All who thus defrauded us considered themselves perfectly justified in cheating a Government so rich and liberal as ours has the reputation of being.Ó 239 Shopkeepers considered it legitimate to charge wealthy people more. Likewise, customersÕ requests to buy goods on credit were ever -present. Already in the mid-1890s, Baraka bin Shomari noted that shops and shopkeepers constituted important sources of credit and that people liked to buy things on credit. 240 Asian shopkeeper s in Kariakoo were confronted with these requests just as much as African shopkeepers. 241 Although demanding the repayment of debts was no longer as dangerous as in pre -Busaidi Mombasa, where creditors were Òharangued, jailed, or otherwise molested when they attempted to call in their debts,Ó 242 creditors in late -colonial Kariakoo still found it difficult to make debtors pay. When he 238 Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika , 53. 239 Verney Lovett Cameron and Daniel Oliver, Across Africa (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 9Ð10. 240 Velten, Desturi za Wasuaheli na Khabari za Desturi za SheriÕa za Wasuaheli , 8. 241 Goanese restaurant and bakery owner Pinto routinely sold food and drinks to his African customers, mainly soldiers and musicians, on credit in 1900s Dar es Salaam. Bills were to be paid at the end of the month (TNA: G21/146: ÒErmittlungssache gegen den B−cker Pinot, Daressalaam, wegen Schankkontravention. 1906 -1907Ó). 242 Prestholdt, Domesticating the World , 188, footnote 6. 99 investigated poorer urban AfricansÕ sources of income, Leslie described the phenomenon of Ònet borrowingÓ or forgiven debt, i.e. a considerable share of lower -class AfricansÕ income consisted of loans and credits that were never paid back. Employers as well as landlord s forgave debt or were forced to forgive debt when employees and renters were unable to pay. 243 Also, shopkeepers were not always able to enforce the repayment of debt, especially with their regular customers. 244 By requiring advances from their employers, delaying the payment of their rents, and buying goods on credit, urban Africans were able to draw on debt relations to make a living in the city. From the shopkeeperÕs perspective, allowing certain customers to delay the payment of goods was a way to foster social ties in the neighborhood. However, shopkeepers did not sell goods on credit undeliberately. Shopkeeper Mzee Pi pa in VassanjiÕs The Gunny Sack had two pictures in his shop hanging side by side, Òone, a man at his desk, holding his head in despair, his safe open and spilling over with useless scraps of paper and rats running amok among them, with the caption: ÔI sol d on creditÕ; the other, a smug gentleman counting money in a neat office: ÔI sold for cashÕ.Ó 245 This policy loudly echoed colonial authoritiesÕ views of the use of credit. In practice, however, shopkeepers were willing to sell goods on credit to regular cu stomers and those with steady employment. Credit at shops Òis not perhaps so common, except among the steadier workers É it is normally only the better paid, those with known jobs and a regular 243 Renters and workers chose housing and jobs according to how favorable their credit and debt relations wer e with landlords and employers. Domestic servants preferred to work for Asian rather than European employers despite the fact that salaries paid by Europeans were higher. Asian employers, however, were tended to chose to work for Asian employers, who gave advances more willingly and did not insist on repayment as much as Europeans ( Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 84). 244 Ibid., 139 Ð142. 245 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 100Ð101. 100 income, who are allowed to take their groceries on credit.Ó 246 Interestingly, shopkeepers considered exactly those people creditworthy, whom colonial authorities at the time considered to be the desirable class of permanent urban residents. Still, there were ways for other people to take advantage of shopkeepersÕ credi t as well, as a telling example in KrapfÕs Kiswahili dictionary indicates . Illustrating the use of the word ku-kopea , Òto borrow for someone,Ó Krapf gave the example Ònime -ku-kopea mali kua Baniani,Ó which he translated with the lengthy ÒI have taken goods for you from the Baniani, you would not have got the goods from him, but I got them for you.Ó 247 With the help of a guarantor, who had a personal relationship of trust with a shopkeeper, shop credit was accessible for otherwise uncreditworthy residents. A way for a resident to build up the reputation as a creditworthy customer was to deposit the savings with the shopkeeper. Shopkeepers routinely played the role of bankers for neighbors and customers in colonial Kariakoo, already before World War One. 248 How m uch people owed and borrowed each other and what securities they had accepted, became visible when people died and state officials took care of the estate of the deceased person. Mohamed bin Nasor, who died in 1911 in Dar es Salaam, was a relatively wealth y person with property worth 4281.50 rupees. He had accepted amana or ÒsecuritiesÓ from more than twenty people. Abdalla Premji, who had lived in the Gerezani section of Kariakoo, had accepted securities of 600 rupees from Wirbai binti Bhanji and 2000 rupe es for the mosque. People also put securities in the hands of 246 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 141Ð142. 247 Krapf, A Dictionary of the Suahili Language . 248 E.g. letter by Kaiserlicher Bezirksamtmann Londau, Daressalam, July 30, 1904, TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel un d Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901 -1906.Ó See also Bi Ashura, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam , April 18, 2013 ; and Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni , interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kigogo, Dar es S alaam, May 26, 2013. 101 Simba bin Halfani Tungi, who died August 6, 1911. 249 Leslie observed in late -colonial Kariakoo that Ò[i]n a number of cases, usually among the older, more permanent residents, any surplus cash Ð for instance the proceeds of the sale of a crop, or dowry received Ð is deposited with a shopkeeper, and acts as surety for the monthly credit.Ó 250 Being a shopkeeper in colonial Kariakoo involved engaging in social relations in the community, which transcend ed commercial and market relations in a narrow sense. 251 Second of all, this understanding of credit and debt challenges colonial views of Asian -African relations in Kariakoo as necessarily oppositional and benefitting only Asians. As described above, Africa ns and Asian urban residents refused to follow the colonial governmentÕs view of Dar es Salaam as a racially segregated city, in which European lived in the eastern and Asians in the western downtown area, while African resided in the surrounding areas to the north, east, and west. 252 At least in the Kariakoo neighborhood, inhabitants considered Asian shopkeepers to be rightful residents in so far as they were part of corner communities. 253 249 TNA: G35/3: ÒNachl−sse 1910 -1912.Ó 250 Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam , 142. 251 See also Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 92. 252 Other historians have been more willing to adopt the view that race was the most important social category in colonial Dar es Salaam (see Burton, African Underclass ; Brennan, Taifa ). While race certainly mattered in urban politics in colonial Dar es Salaam, class often proved to be a more important social category, for example when African landlords and landladies in Kariakoo turned out African ten ants and rented entire houses to Asians ( Brennan, ÒNation , Race and Urbanization in Dar e s Salaam, Tanzania, 1916 -1976,Ó 188 ). These Asians, in turn, were part of the poor er strata of the Asian urban population while richer Asians lived in the downtown area. 253 Franck Raimbault also hints at colonial authoritiesÕ misguided interpretation of Asian -African relations in German colonial Dar es Salaam: ÒLes abus indiens vis -‹-vis de la population constituaient au total une r”alit” faisant moins peur aux Africains que les autorit”s colonialesÓ (Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 117 ). There is a marked discrepancy of how relations between Africans and Asians are conceptualized in oral and written sources. When interviewees talked about race relations in the past, they acknowledge d that Asians had been generally better off while Africans 102 Third of all, the creation of neighborhood communities based on credit and debt relations were deeply moral affairs. These corner communities were held together by moral discourses that guided and shaped credit and debt relations. Being indebted and lending money to others was common and it was rather easy to raise money to buy a direly needed article when one was a member of a corner community. However, being indebted came with its own problems and the debtorÕs sense of honor was at stake. Creditors were entitled to brag and joke about debtors, who constantly borrowed money without repaying it. The play Hukooo Darisalama illustrates the centrality of the concepts of honor and humiliation in communal debt and credit relations. The story line revolves around relations of credit and debt in rural Tanzania, and the act of borrowi ng money is intricately related to aibu , Òhumiliation,Ó and heshima , Òhonor.Ó The main character, Baba Semeni, asks the village teacher Baba Ana for money to cover the various debts he incurred in anticipation of a money order from his son -in-law, Bandu, w ho lives in Dar es Salaam. ÒI ask you to help me. Cover up my aibu , teacher. I need it. I ask you to lend me 100 shillings, when Bandu comes back for Dar es Salaam, he will bring me money.Ó When Baba Ana hesitates to lend Baba Semeni money, Baba AnaÕs wife puts additional pressure on her husband: ÒBaba Ana, give your friend money, you are putting aibu on him [ unamwaibisha ].Ó The creditorÕs reputation is likewise at stake as Baba Ana fears that other people will consider him a fool because he keeps giving Ba ba Semeni money without ever getting repaid. Baba Semeni, on the other hand, complains about being unfairly derided by Baba Ana. 254 were poor. The relations betw een Africans and Asians, however, were usually described in a positive light. Asians were good and helpful people, who helped others (including non -Asians ) start a business etc. In written documents, on the other hand, Asians were portrayed as bad and mere ly looking after their own business and caring about their own communities. They were dangerous for Africans. 254 Mobali L. Muba, Hukooo Daris alama (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1980), 20Ð24, translation from Kiswahili by the author. 103 Both debtorsÕ and creditorsÕ senses of honor were at stake in credit relations in Tanzania, and failing to pay debts had the potential of putting aibu on them. As described in the section from VassanjiÕs The Gunny Sack quoted at the beginning of this chapter, debtors even borrowed money from other people in order to repay the first lender. After his father had used money from the communal society fund for private ends, the family experienced financial hardship. ÒWe had to start from scratch, borrowing and buying on credit, and we opened a duka [shop] in the African section [of Dar es Salaam, i.e. Kariakoo], selling kerosene by ji gger and packets of spice É Collectors would shout and wave their hands, making sure the neighbours heard, and we would pay out of shame even if we had to borrow more money to do it.Ó 255 When the family was unable to pay back the money in time, collectors ma de public the failure of paying back, thus challenging the debtorÕs reputation in the neighborhood community to ensure the repayment of money. As we will see in chapter 5, bank loans and their requirements for collateral, which in case of non -repayment cou ld be seized by the lender, exacerbated the danger of being put to shame. CONCLUSION The intersection of credit, community, and morality in the Kariakoo neighborhood in colonial Dar es Salaam has stood at the center of this chapter. Government officials planned Kariakoo as the ÒAfrican sectionÓ of the city with a grid -like structure of orthogonally intersecting streets and neatly separated from the Asian and European sections by a cordon sanitaire. Although a certain anonymity was inherent in the monotono us and repetitive street layout, African, Asian, and Arab residents of the neighborhood formed meaningful local and cosmopolitan communities, usually 255 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 53. 104 around corner shops. Members of these corner communities were held together by myriad intersecting relatio ns of credit and debt, which in turn were regulated by moral codes embedded in these communities. Membership was defined by a memberÕs ability to lend or borrow money or goods to another member, according to oneÕs status and wealth. The existence and effec tiveness of moral corner communities enabled members to buy goods on credit from the nearby shop. For shopkeepers, in turn, the practice of selling goods on credit was a crucial way of asserting membership in Kariakoo. Shopkeepers, who never sold on credit , might have been more successful in accumulating wealth for themselves, their families, and religious communities, but their status and reputation in the corner community were negatively affected by their business behavior. Thus, acknowledging that buildi ng personal relationships within the local community was something Kariakoo residents considered a project worth investing in helps to come to a better under -standing of shopkeepersÕ business behavior. Trust, shame, and respectability were shared notions a mong members irrespective of their racial and class backgrounds. Overall, economic activities in colonial Kariakoo were not detached from the local community but operated within the social norms of this community, and credit and debt relations were constit utive of urban communities and the urban economy. Although for a long time not being considered fully urbanized, both in the eyes of colonial authorities and social scientists, Africans Ð together with Asians and Arabs Ð formed moral corner communities in colonial Dar es Salaam. This suggests that Africans were able to create meaningful spaces of belonging in the city and that debt and credit relations were central for these emerging urban subjectivities. 105 CHAPTER 2 ÑBORROWING AND SAVING AGAINST ALL ODDS: PAWNSHOP CREDIT AND SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN COLONIAL KARIAKOO PawnbrokersÕ various stalls belong to the Dar es Salaam cityscape. Whoever crosses the African neighborhood on Kichwele Street, is being screamed at by numerous shop signs: ÔPawnbroker -Mshika -Reha ni!Õ É How do we protect our urban Africans from such dangers? By caring about their social welfare, by teaching them a prudent way of living, and by urging them to be thrifty É Where our children of pastoral care think of Ôkuweka akiba,Õ [i.e.] putting as ide, in time of plenty, they donÕt have to concern themselves with Ôkuweka poni,Õ [i.e.] pawning, in lean years. 256 Discourses around borrowing and lending money in colonial Dar es Salaam were marked by strong moral undertones. European missionaries like Fa ther Engelberger, a Catholic priest from Switzerland working in Kariakoo in the late 1940s quoted above, portrayed credit as dangerous because it had the potential of entrapping Africans in cycles of debt. Although Engelberger acknowledged that in rare cas es, pawning goods might help urban residents to get through periods of unemployment and other hardship, he condemned the habit of borrowing money as morally corrupting. Depicting moneylenders in Kariakoo as exploitative and dangerous for Africans, Engelber ger argued that pawnship credit did not help people overcome obstacles, but it locked them into relations of increasing dependency. Engelberger further considered pawnshops undesirable because they provided thieves with a way to turn stolen goods into mone y. Instead, Engelberger urged Africans to save money during prosperous times so they had savings to fall back on during hard times. In order to facilitate and encourage African saving s, the mission 256 ÒZum Stadtbild von Dar -es-Salaam gehıren nicht zuletzt die vielen Buden der Pfandverleiher. Wer auf der Kichwelestrasse das Negerviertel durchquert, den werden von links und rechts zahlreiche Ladenschilde anschreien: ÔPawnbroker -Mshika -Rehani!Õ É Wie sczen wir unsere Stadtneger vor solchen Gefahren? Indem wir um ihr soziales Wohl besorgt sind, sie zu einer vetigen Lebensweise erziehen und zur Sparsamkeit anhalten. É Wo unsere Seelsorgekinder in fetten Jahren an das Ôkuweka akibaÕ, ans Zklegen, denken, da msen sie in mageren Jahren sich nicht ums Ôkuweka poniÕ, ums Pfandanlegeme rnÓ ( Franz Engelberger, Der Missionsbote , Bd. 3 (Zurich: Christliche Vereinsbuchhandlung, 1949), 44, 48 , translation from German by the author ). 106 station in Kariakoo provided banking services for Africans while missionaries taught Africans the importance of saving and the dangers of borrowing money .257 The call to save money was taken up by both colonial and postcolonial state actors as well as representatives of banking institutions, who used credit to prom ote their agendas and to create particular kinds of financial subjects. Two related goals are being pursued in this chapter . The first is to challenge two related mythical beliefs about urban AfricansÕ financial behavior commonly held amongst government officials in the colonial period. Firstly, indebted Africans were in danger because they were not able to pay back borrowed money in time and get trapped in unending cycles of debts. Secondly, Africans did not have the ability to save money. Explanations for this inability varied. Some argued that Africans lived in the moment, were unable to plan ahead, and spent money as soon as they had some. Others contended that Africans were inherently Òunbusiness -likeÓ and did not understand one of the pillars of what M ax Weber called Òthe Protestant ethic,Ó namely productively reinvesting oneÕs savings into a business. 258 Up to the present, versions of these beliefs have persisted, although explanations for their validity have varied. I redress these beliefs by investigat ing the channels of (semi -)formal borrowing and saving to which Africans in colonial Dar es Salaam had unrestricted access: pawnshop credit and savings accounts at the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB). The picture that emerges is one of Africans borrowing m oney to a great extent and paying back loans in time. Likewise , urban Africans knew various forms of saving and rather than making us of bank savings accounts, they continued to rely on their own long -established forms of saving . 257 Ibid., 3:97 Ð98. 258 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Los Angeles: Roxbury Pub ., 1998). 107 The second goal of this chapter is to argue that Kariakoo residents in the colonial period came to view credit, and particularly pawnshop credit, as an urban right. Despite government efforts to curb and regularize pawnshop loans, urban Africans continued to pledge household goods and jewelry at pawnshops throughout the colonial period. This changed dramatically shortly after independence when pawnshops were banned and banks were nationalized, which made it considerably more difficult for urban Africans to take out loans. The bann ing of pawnshops was an element of NyerereÕs long -term plan to create a socialist economic and financial system in which government banks monopolized the allocation of loans for the use of productive and desirable ends. The nationalization of banks took pl ace in 1967 and loans were directed away from urban to rural borrowers. The net effect was that rural farmers in socialist ujamaa villages had increasing access to loans at the expense of lower -class urban residents. Savings institutions were less affected by the nationalization of banks since the POSB was not considered a fully -fledged bank. Nevertheless, the POSB lost its position as a trustworthy place to deposit oneÕs savings and overall savings by urban Africans decreased. DEMONIZING BORROWING AND EUL OGIZING SAVING Practices of borrowing and lending have often been undergirded by particularly strong moral discourses. Demonizing acts of borrowing while eulogizing acts of saving were not only common in the context of pawnshops in colonial Dar es Salaam, but also with regards to the installment plan in twentieth -century United States. 259 In colonial Dar es Salaam, these discourses were racially tinged, as they set up the binar y Asian creditor -African debtor and constituted Òthe borrowing AfricanÓ as a proble m, thus legitimizing repeated efforts aimed at 259 Calder, Financing the American Dream . 108 solving or mitigating this problem. One way to tackle the problem was to force African traders and farmers to engage in commercial activities on cash basis only (see chapter 4). Another was to educate Africans about the dangers of borrowing money (see chapter 5). A third option was to simply ban Africans from borrowing money, which was what the British colonial government decided to do in 1923. The Credit to Natives Ordinance prohibited Africans from taking out bank loans. Demonizing borrowing was a common practice among governing authorities in Dar es Salaam from the late nineteenth century until the end of the socialist period in the 1980s. In the colonial period, borrowing was believed to be particularly da ngerous for Africans because they supposedly did not know how to make repayments. Already in mid -nineteenth century Zanzibar, Sayyida Salme, later Emily Ruete, a member of the SultanÕs family, complained in her memoirs about her escort of armed slaves. She lamented that Ò[t]hey used to give us a lot of trouble, and to cause great expense. For all their weapons, with the exception of rifles and revolvers, were inlaid with gold or silver, and these rascals would put them in pledge for a trifle with some East Indian usurer, simply to quench their thirst in pomba [sic] (palm wine). So what could a mistress do but buy the articles back at ten times the amount, or fit the creatures out anew after having them soundly whipped?Ó 260 A British colonial officer stated in 1948 ÒI do not like Africans borrowing money as they are all too prone to acquiring debts which they find difficult to settle.Ó 261 Even the otherwise so keenly and compassionately observing J. A. K. Leslie was not always able to refrain from reproducing a we ll-established stereotype when describing AfricansÕ management of money. Newcomers in the city did not have any knowledge of how to handle 260 Emilie Ruete, Memoirs of an Arabian Princess from Zanzibar. Translated by Lionel Strachey (New York: DoubleDay, Page & Company, 1907), 134. 261 Minutes, S.A.A., March 12, 1949, TNA: 38850: ÒMoney Lenders, Regi stration of.Ó 109 money, he asserted, and Òcertainly very few indeed have used money to such an extent that they are able to calculate how long it will last and to allocate it throughout a month or a fortnight.Ó 262 The trope of the financially illiterate African also found e xpression in literature . In Shiva NaipaulÕs North of South , a magistrate says ÒAfricans, as a rule, donÕt seem to unde rstand that when banks lend you money, they expect something back in return.Ó 263 The stereotype of the financially illiterate Africa n was perpetuated over decades and it constituted of two aspects. Governing authorities not only considered Africans to be un able to handle borrowed money. They also doubted AfricansÕ ability Ð and particularly African menÕs ability Ð to save money. To demonize borrowing and eulogize saving were two sides of the same logical coin. Thrift was described as a character trait, which would help Africans lead economically successful lives. In his annual report for 1921, Senior Commissioner of the Dar es Salaam District, F. W. Brett, deliberated ÒThe struggle for existence would be less if the natives concerned could be imbued with some idea of thrift.Ó 264 And an article on the Post Office Savings Bank published in the Mambo Leo newspaper in 1927 unambiguously stated ÒThe thrifty man is the successful man.Ó 265 According to colonial authorities, the common African in Dar es Salaam was unable to engage in practices of saving and borrowing money. With regards to saving, however, colonial authorities believed that Africans would be able to change and improve their habits. Particularly African womenÕs economic practices repeatedly confused coloni al officialsÕ perceptions. E. C. Baker observed in 1931 that Ò[i]t is 262 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 116. 263 Shiva Naipaul, North of South: An African Journey (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 42%). 264 Annual report on Dar -es-Salaam District for 1921, F.W. Brett, Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaa m District, 1921 -1930.Ó 265 Mambo Leo, 1927, accessed in TNA: 20999: ÒCo -operative Society (Development Fund) Ð Proposal by Bukwimba Federation to establish.Ó 110 often a mystery how natives manage to build their houses especially the old women who will embark on the building of a house with no sensible means at their disposal but what they can make from the sale of rice cakes and fried fish. The building usually progresses at a very slow rate and it is often months before they can do more than erect the uprights. A small sum must first be saved and this is used to pay men to cut poles whilst the b uilder takes advantage of every possible me ans to add to his capital. É [T]he building of a house entails, in many instances, an amount of self denial and thrift of which one would imagine the African to be incapable.Ó 266 More than twenty -five years later, J . A. K. Leslie made colonial authorities gendered perception of African saving even more clearly. ÒMost women seem much more cautious over money in town than the men, and many have managed to save quite large amounts, enough in some cases to build a house with, from the sale of small quantities of firewood, fish or beans, a few cents at a time. Few men could resist the temptation to spend these earnings at least as fast as they came in.Ó 267 Since they believed it was possible, state officials repeatedly engag ed in efforts to teach Africans how to save money. As discussed in detail below, the inculcation of thrift into Africans assumed particular importance in the interwar period when the Post Office Savings Bank was launched in Dar es Salaam. PAWNING GOODS As far as handling borrowed money was concerned, the consensus among government officials before World War Two was that Africans could not be taught how to change their habits. Therefore, they attempted to prevent Africans from borrowing money with the help of the so -called Credit to Natives Ordinance. The argumentation in favor of the Credit to Natives 266 Baker, ÒMemorandum o n the Social Conditions of Dar e s Salaam,Ó 25. 267 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 117. 111 Ordinance was that Africans did not have a strong enough character to be able to protect themselves from the danger inherent in taking out loans. They would be in danger of getting trapped in endless cycles of debt and of being exploited by reckless Asian creditors. This form of colonial governance was undergirded by moralized views about Africans and Asians. Instead of reforming borrowing AfricansÕ character by compelling them to deal with borrowed money in ÒappropriateÓ, i.e. morally right, ways, the colonial government chose to ÒprotectÓ the supposedly vulnerable urban Africans from the dangers of debt. 268 The Credit to Natives Restriction Ordinance was implem ented in 1923 with the goal to protect African debtors from creditors in so far as creditors were unable to claim repayments of AfricansÕ debts if they had not been pre -approved. 269 And occasionally, indebted Africans indeed found protection from their non -African creditors. Abdulla bin Msopola from the town of Rudewa took a mortgage of 3000 shillings from the K. S. Patel, who was of Asian descent. Abdulla bin Msopola did not have to pay the money back because Òthe transaction, by which the native borrowed Sh .3000/-, was carried out without the approval of the District Officer. The debt is now legally irrecoverable under the Credit to Native Restriction Ordinance.Ó 270 The more important effect the ordinance had on Africans, however, was that it prevented them fr om receiving loans from non -Africans, unless they had special permission to do so. It applied to all people of African descent in Tanganyika and a few examples from both rural and urban areas of the territory illustrate how it worked in practice. Magji Vis ram of the town of Kilosa, a man of 268 In that sense, the Credit to Natives Ordinance did not represent a form of Òmoral governanceÓ (Alan Hunt, Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). This contrasts with governmenta l practices in post -socialist Dar es Salaam described in chapter 5. 269 Brennan, Taifa , 36. 270 Letter by the Acting District Officer, Kilosa, to Land Officer, Dar es Salaam, September 26, 1931, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 112 Asian descent, applied for permission from the district officer to loan the sum of 2000 shillings to Abdulamani and the sum of 500 shillings to Muhimbogoo bin Itbari, who were both of African descent. In both cases, the Credit to Natives Ordinance was invoked and permission was not granted. 271 Advances on produce also fell under the ordinance, as another case from Kilosa shows. The Ibrahim Brothers and Co. from Dar es Salaam wanted to provide a loan of 2000 shilling to Tupa bin Tupa from Kilosa so he could grow cotton. The Morogoro Provincial Commissioner did not approve of the loan because Ò[i]t is far too big a sum of money to allow the man to become indebted on the security of a cotton crop which may be destroyed.Ó 272 Usaga ra Company in Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, were allowed to give Òoffice boyÓ Omari bin Zahoro a loan amounting to 1460 shillings. Omari bin Zahoro wanted to invest the money in his house in Dar es Salaam and he offered to pay back the loan in monthly instal lments of 60 shillings. Permission for the loan was given under the condition that Omari bin ZahoroÕs house was used as collateral. 273 The racial aspects of the Credit to Natives Ordinance were explicit, which meant that Asians and Arabs were allowed t o take out bank loans. When Saleh bin Said bin Saleh living in House No. 69 on Livingstone Street in Kariakoo applied for a mortgage from Karishanker Mulji 271 Letter by the District Officer of Kilosa to Magji Visram, February 19, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 272 Letter by the Provincial Commissioner, Morogoro, to the District Officer, Kilosa, February 16, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 273 Letter by Usagara Company to District Officer, Dar es Salaam, July 9, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó Another effec t of the introduction of the Credit to Natives Ordinance was the increase of the moneylenderÕs licenses, which was recorded for Zanzibar but might have been felt in Dar es Salaam as well. In Zanzibar, since Africans were no longer able to take out mortgage s on their land, they officially sold a plot to an Asian creditor, received money, only to buy back the same plot after some time for a slightly higher price. These sales were in fact mortgages in sale guise or disguised mortgages. Needless to say, they pu t the African vendors/lenders in a difficult position and they were prone to lose their land to Asian buyers/creditors (February 24, 1930, ZNA: AB 14/68: ÒMortgages by natives to moneylendersÓ). 113 and Company in 1932, the Provincial Commissioner requested to ÒPlease report if the ÔborrowerÕ is a native and if so whether the necessary sanction to borrow under the Credits to Natives Ordinance was obtained.Ó The Land Commissioner replied ÒBorrower is an Arab,Ó which meant that he was exempted from the ordinance and allowed to apply for the mortgage. 274 Sebe bin Mbaruk, a Dar es Salaam resident, wanted to raise a loan of 2500 shillings on his house on the corner of Sewa Street and Upanga Road Òfrom a non -native firmÓ at the annual interest rate of 24 per cent. The loan was approved because ÒSebe bin Mbar uk is an Arab and É the Restriction to of [sic] Credit to Natives Ordinance does not apply to him. Permission to contract a loan is therefore not required.Ó 275 Thus, race constituted an important aspect of who was able to access bank loans in interwar Dar es Salaam, and it put people of African descent at a distinct disadvantage. 276 Despite the Credit to Natives Ordinance, urban Africans borrowed and lent money and goods from and to a whole range of people in various forms of credit arrangements. Trade credit involved suppliers advancing goods to wholesalers and retailers, who paid the supplier once they had sold the goods. When traders died in colonial Dar es Salaam, they typically left behind 274 Letter by Land Officer, Dar es Salaam, to Provincial Commi ssioner February, Dar es Salaam, February 19, 1932, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 275 Letter by the District Officer, Dar es Salaam, to the Provincial Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, July 24, 1931, TNA: ACC 61/ 324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -Natives.Ó 276 As in other historical contexts, race in Tanganyika was a social construct, and it was at times malleable and defined by culture. A case from Bagamoyo illustrates how people of Baloch descent successfully recast themselves as ÒSwahiliÓ people because Òthey are the descendants of settlers of many years ago, and the majority have intermarried with coast natives and have adopted native customs.Ó This allowed them to acquire land in the Akun a section of Bagamoyo (January 28, 1929, TNA: ACC 61/324: ÒDealing in Real Estate etc. between Natives and Non -NativesÓ). 114 several pages filled with outstanding debts and credit. 277 Shop credit was also very common as discussed in the previous chapter. Shopkeepers played the role as Òmini -bankersÓ 278 since they not only sold goods on credit, but also stored local residentsÕ deposits. To be a potential borrower and lender in the eyes of other membe rs was one of the defining characteristics of being a member of a corner community in Kariakoo, and it was particularly important for shopkeepers of Asian descent to establish their membership in a local urban community. Moneylenders also existed, but they were few in numbers and they charged extraordinarily high interest rates. Contrary to pawnbrokers, moneylenders did not ask debtors to provide property as collateral. 279 Religious -based credit institutions also existed, most prominently among the Ismaili Kh oja community, a Shia Muslim group with origins in northwestern India. The Tanganyika Ismailia Co-operative Society was formed in 1937 -38. By 1939, there were four credit societies in Dar es Salaam, whose Òsole function is to make credit available to their members on somewhat easier terms than those offered by banks and financing houses.Ó 280 Loans also went to families, who used the funds to expand their shops in Kariakoo. 281 277 For more on trade credit, see chapters 3 and 4. 278 Franck Raimbault uses the term Òmini -banquiersÓ to describe Asian shopkeepers in German colonial Dar es Salaam ( Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 116 ). 279 Dar es Salaam Municipal Secretary E. H. Helps noted in 1936 that there were two licensed moneylenders in town at t he time (letter by E. H. Helps, Municipal Secretary, Dar es Salaam, to the P.C., Eastern Province, August 14, 1936, TNA: 24324: ÒTrades Licensing and Licensing of Itinerant Traders Draft BillsÓ). 280 Report by His MajestyÕs Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the TANGANYIKA TERRITORY For the Year 1939, page 40, accessed at TNA library: ÒReport to the League of Nations on Tanganyika Territory, 1939.Ó 281 Walji, ÒA History of the Ismaili Community in Tanzania,Ó 169. 115 In addition to these various forms of credit and debt, there was one somewhat formal kind of credit urban Africans in the colonial period had access to: pawnshop credit. 282 The colonial government tolerated pawnshop credit despite the existence of the Credit to Natives Ordinance preventing Africans from taking out loans. Even though the colo nial government did not approve of pawnshops and pawnbrokersÕ practices and considered pawnshops to be morally wrong, pawnshop loans were exempted from the Credit to Natives Ordinance because so many Africans patronized pawnshops on a regular basis. Pawnbr okers specialized in providing relatively small amounts of money in exchange for personal goods. Pawnbrokers kept these valuables at their shops until the customer paid back the borrowed money plus a previously agreed -upon amount of interest. In case the b orrower failed to repay the money in time, the pawnbrokers were obliged by law to sell the pledged object at a public auction. As most Kariakoo residents did not qualify for bank loans, they made considerable use of pawnshop credit either to bridge the las t few days before payday or to get investment capital for larger projects. 283 Low -value items such as shirts and kanga cloths were pawned to bridge short -term financial needs. High -value items such as jewelry were used for longer -term investments or for the payment of taxes and licenses. Pawnshop customers were used to paying back loans in time and with interest. 284 Smaller loans were usually paid back at the beginning of the month when workers and employees received their salaries. To buy back pawned high -value items was a more costly matter. Some Kariakoo residents relied on revenues from the annual sale of the rice harvests in June and July. 282 In the postwar period, hire purchase loans and house loans also became available. Loans from colonial banks, however, were never accessible to Kariakoo residents in colonial Dar es Salaam. 283 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 142Ð143. 284 Leslie observed that ÒUnlike borrowing between Af ricans, much of which is never repaid, pledges pawned are nearly all redeemedÓ ( Ibid., 6 ). In Zanzibar town in 1939, eleven pawnbrokers stated that articles of wearing apparel were usually redeemed, and one stated that 75% were redeemed (Letter by Manning, January 3, 1939, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 116 Leslie observed that in July, Òa large proportion [of houses] even in Kariakoo, has a mat spread out and newly harves ted rice drying in the sun.Ó 285 This indicates the importance of revenue generated from agricultural activities for urban residents in colonial Dar es Salaam. 286 Unsurprisingly, then, pawnbrokers in colonial Dar es Salaam, but also in other towns in colonial East Africa, were of Asian descent. As pawnshops were mainly patronized by Africans, pawnshops were located in the Kariakoo neighborhood in colonial Dar es Salaam . At the turn of the twentieth century in German colonial Dar es Salaam, there were about seve n shopkeepers, who exclusively focused their business on pawnbroking. Various other Asian shopkeepers were involved in pawnbroking, but they were officially registered as shopkeepers. 287 In 1928 in British colonial Dar es Salaam, there were eight licensed pa wnbrokers. They were legally allowed to provide loans for three months with interest of 6 cents per shilling per month. 288 The Dar es Salaam pawnbrokers claimed in 1930 that each one of them attend ed to about 300 to 400 customers on the first day of each mon th. 289 Even if this number may be a slight exaggeration, it still indicates how popular pawnshops were. On the first day of every month, a total of well over 285 Ibid., 147. 286 See chapter 4 for an elaborate discussion of the rice trade in and out of Kariakoo. 287 Letter by Kaiserlicher Bezirksamtmann Londau, Dar es Salaam, June 30, 1904, TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2 : 1901 -1906.Ó 288 Letter by Brett, Provincial Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, to the Chief Secretary, May 5, 1928, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 289 Letter by the Pawnbrokers of Dar es Salaam, represented by W. Dharsee, Dar es Salaam, March 31, 1930, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó Pawnbrokers in Zanzibar claimed in 1941 that the eighteen existing pawnshops in Zanzibar Òcater to the immediate needs of the inhabitants of the Protectorate and every year at a conservative esti mate about a hundred thousand people are being accommodatedÓ ([Signed by 18 pawnbrokers] Zanzibar, September 20, 1941, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 117 2000 people in Dar es Salaam Ð or roughly one out of every ten African residents Ð rushed to one of the eight pawnshops to redeem pledged goods. 290 Pawnshops remained popular during World War Two and in the postwar period. There were thirteen pawnshops in Dar es Salaam in 1940 291 and eighteen pawnshops in the late 1950s, and all of the pawnbrokers were Isma ili Khojas, many of whom were related to each other and to the longer -established pawnbrokers in Zanzibar. Pawnbrokers typically specialized on certain goods because the license they were required to have in order to conduct their business defined a partic ular price range of goods that could be pawned. Leslie estimated that pawnbrokers in Dar es Salaam gave out over 300,000 small loans every year. 292 Pawnshop credit was so common that Òthe interest on pawnbrokers tickets was included as a basic item in the co st of living computations for Africans,Ó as a colonial officer observed in 1948. 293 Leslie described the network of pawnbrokers as a Òclosed circleÓ where competition was absent. Pawnbrokers were also organized in a pawnbrokers association, both in Dar es Sa laam and in Zanzibar. Despite the lack of outright competition, pawnbrokers rarely exploited their clients, as Leslie noted to his surprise. 294 Legally, pawnbrokers were not able to raise interest 290 In Zanzibar town, the estimated numbers were similar. Pawnbrokers claim ed in 1938 that each pawnbroker sold 600 pawn tickets a month (Comments by Seif bin Soleman, December 22, 1938, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 291 Minutes, January 6, 1940, TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 292 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 144. Furthermore, Leslie recounted how an African visitor to Dar es Salaam observed that Òpawn -shops thronged and packed with more khangas than the eye could countÓ ( Ibid., 103). 293 Minutes, February 25, 1948, 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 294 See also the Report of the Committee on Rising Costs: ÒÉ there is a surfeit of them [pawnbrokers] in Dar es Salaam and what evidence we have heard on this subject suggests that the pawnbroker plays a promin ent part in the economy of the average African household. It is easy to assume that the continuance in business of these myriads of petty pawnbrokers derives from the exploitation of African customers. This may well be true but it would be difficult to secure evidence to prove itÓ (Extract from the Report of the Committee on Rising Costs [1951], TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration ofÓ). 118 rates indefinitely because the pawnshop ordinance clearly def ined the maximum interest on both low -value and high -value items. When it came to determining how much money a client would receive for a particular pledged item, however, pawnbrokers did have some leverage. Here, the personal rel ations between client and owner of a pawnshop as well as the clientÕs social standing in the neighborhood became crucial. Recurrent v isits and repayments helped to build trust so clients tended to have their preferred pawnshops in Kariakoo, whose service they would regularly call o n.295 A 1939 report from Zanzibar town included the remarkable statements that ÒIn receiving goods in pawn, pawnbrokers take into consideration the social standing of the pledger . In the case of a person of good social standing wishing to pawn gold or silver articles, and who is expected to redeem the pledge, the pawnbroker will advance up to 50% [of the value] of the article pawned. To other persons, 25% or less is advanced.Ó 296 D. R. Gangji was one of these pawnbrokers in colonial Kariakoo (see picture 2.1). He had a shop in house number 46 on Kichwele Street, one of two main streets in Kariakoo (later renamed Uhuru Street). His shop was constantly busy with customers, but like other pawnshops, it was particularly busy at the end of the month. Father Engelberg er, who provided a detailed, if biased, portrayal of D. R. Gangji in 1949, described Kariakoo residents as being intimately familiar with pawning goods for credit on a regular basis. Goods commonly pawned were household items such as shirts, pants, kanga cloths, hats, shoes as well as silver and gold. Engelberger estimated that at any given time, one in four Africans walking around in Dar es Salaam had a pawn ticket in her of his pocket. 297 295 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 143. 296 Letter by Manning, January 3, 1939, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decree.Ó 297 Engelberger, Der Missionsbote , 3:44 Ð48. In a letter to the Tanganyi ka Standard, A. G. Christie disapprovingly stated that Òwhatever else the African may have in his pocket he will always have an imposing bundle of pawn tickets which are bound to represent a dead loss to 119 Figure 2.1: Ò Der Laden von Mr. Gangji Ó Ð D. R. GanjiÕs pawnshop in late-colonial Kariakoo. 298 EngelbergerÕs description of Gangji exudes the missionaryÕs visceral dislike for the pawnbroker as the missionary considered pawnbroking to be morally wrong because it put African debtors in danger of getting caught up in unendin g cycles of debt and dependence. Colonial officials to some extent shared EngelbergerÕs views. They lamented the questionable character of pawnbrokers, and they generally suspected pawnshops to be Òthe Ôclearing housesÕ of much stolen propertyÓ and pawnbro king a Òprofitable form of parasitism [on the African].Ó 299 Overall, colonial officers displayed a general unease about pawnbroking. Urban AfricansÕ extensive use of pawnbroking loans also challenged colonial officialsÕ understanding of Africans as Òunbusine ss-like.Ó In the minutes to the registration of pawnbrokers, colonial officials himÓ (Tanganyika Standard, November 15, 1944, access ed at TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration ofÓ). 298 Engelberger, Der Missionsbote , 3:46. 299 Letter by Brett, Provincial Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, to the Chief Secretary, May 5, 1928, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Regi stration of;Ó Minutes, May 15, 1951, TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 120 engaged in a debate whether this topic should be an ÒAÓ file (ÒAfrican AffairsÓ) or an ÒFÓ file (Business and Economics) because pawnbroking involved aspects of both spheres, w hich the colonial administration had tried to separate neatly. 300 In general, colonial officials took a more pragmatic approach than people like Engelberger. Although the pawnbroking business was considered to be morally wrong, pawn shops were Ð in the words of the Dar es Salaam Provincial Commissioner Ð Òa necessary evil in Dar es Salam and [they] are used by approximately 75% of the population.Ó 301 The Committee on Rising Costs confirmed this view by stating that Òrecourse to pawnbrokers is an unavoidable aspect of the present social organisation of Tanganyika,Ó mainly because wages for urban African workers were very low. 302 The Social Welfare Organizer unwillingly acknowledged that pawnshop credit had beco me an intricate part of urban life in Dar es Salaam . ÒT here is no doubt that the pawnshop has become part of the economic life of the lower paid Africans in the town. The absorption of so much money from the pockets of the Africans for an unproductive service which encourages imrpvedence [sic] is deplorable, b ut the pawnbrokers provide financial accommodation for Africans in an emergency which is provided by no other agency.Ó 303 Other observers noted that Òthe pawnbroker plays a prominent part in the economy of the average African householdÓ and that Ò[t]he addic tion to pawning is É widespread.Ó 304 300 Minutes [1948], TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 301 Letter by Commissioner, Tanganyika Police and Prisons, May 21, 1928, TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawn brokers, Registration of.Ó 302 P.A.S., Minutes, September 9, 1952, TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 303 Letter by the Social Welfare Organizer, Dar es Salaam, to the Member for Education, Labour and Welfare, November 19, 1948, TNA: 12230/Vol . II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 304 Extract from the Report of the Committee on Rising Costs [1951], TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of;Ó Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 143. Likewise in Zanzibar town, colonial officials noted ÒThe position of pawnbrokers in Zanzibar should be appreciated. They have been termed Ôthe poor manÕs bankerÕ and, in Leg[islative] Co[uncil], the Honourable Member for Pemba even went as far as t o ask that the State should undertake Pawnbroking at 121 The colonial governments did not ban pawnshops but instead they tried to regulate them. Already the German colonial government legislated a Pfandleiheverordnung (pawnbroking ordinance), which was based on the existing pa wnbrokers ordinance from Zanzibar. The most hotly discussed topic was the issue of language. It was suggested that pawnbrokers needed to keep their books in German or in Kis wahili so the government would be able to control and oversee AsiansÕ business acti vities. 305 The second major point of discussion was how to determine who a pawnbroker was. Only a handful of people had specialized in pawnbroking whereas many traders engaged in pawnbroking as a side business in order to satisfy AfricansÕ and ArabsÕ demands for financial services. 306 Most of these transactions were arranged directly between creditor and debtor but the colonial state was sometimes involved, especially when it came to larger sums of money. An example was Dar es Salaam resident Nasabu Hussein bin Muhamad, who in October 1904 borrowed 1000 rupees from Dar es Salaam trader Adamji Babuji and Sons for the duration of one year. The creditor provided his house on Marktstrasse as a collateral. 307 low rates of interest for the benefit of poor people. In the Town of Zanzibar it would appear then that they are almost a public necessityÓ (Provincial Commissioner, December 30, 1940, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒTh e pawn brokers decreeÓ). The Zanzibari pawnbrokers themselves claimed that Òthe Pawnshops are the CASH BANKS where they [the poor class Africans and Arabs] are sure to be relieved of their pressing needsÓ (Pawn -Brokers of Zanzibar, March 21, 1946, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 305 TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901 -1906.Ó Others argued that the language requirement would force Asians to employ a bilingual secretary to translate their books from Gujarati to German. This b rought up racial fears as some colonial officials were worried that a German secretary employed by an Asian pawnbroker would come from the lowest ranks of German society and would generally hurt the reputation of all Germans living in German East Africa (K aiserliche Bezirksamtmann, Pangani, May 13, 1906, TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901 -1906Ó). 306 Ò[E]n mati‘re financi‘re, Africains et Arabes pr”f”raient largement se tourner vers un marchand indien de leur connaissance plutŽt que vers un Europ”enÓ ( Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 86 ). 307 Pledge agreement, Dar es Salaam, October 10, 1904, TNA: G35/3: ÒNachl−sse, 1910 -1912.Ó 122 Figure 2.2: Pledge agreement I, ca. 1910 .308 Figure 2.3: Pledge agreement II, ca. 1910 .308 By 1904, pawnbroking had grown to such an extent as to make it the object of colonial legislation. The Pfandleiheverordnung determined the monthly interest rate to be 2 pesa per rupee for loans below 20 rupees and 1 pesa per rupee for loans above 20 rupees. As 1 rupee contained 64 pesa, the interest rate amounted to 3.125 per cent per month and 37.5 per cent per year, and 1.5625 per cent per month and 18.75 per cent per year, respectively. In cases where loans were taken out for less than one month, interest rates were doubled. Pawnbrokers were required to issue a pawn ticket for every pledged item and unredeemed items were auctioned off 308 TNA: G35/3: ÒNachl−sse, 1910 -1912.Ó 123 under the supervision of a government official. 309 At the same time, traders engaging in pawnbroking activities were required to keep a separate account book for pledged items. 310 After World War One, the British administration introduced a Pawnbrokers Ordinance that by and large resembled the German Pfandleihverordnung , although it was mainly based on the Kenya Colony Pawnbrokers Ordinance. 311 Even though the Credit to Natives Ordinance was introduced in 1923, the Pawnbrokers Ordinance was only legislated seven years later in 1930. Again, one of the requirement s was for pawnbrokers to issue a paw n ticket for each pledged item. Pawnbrokers in Dar es Salaam were quick to express their frustration with the new ordinance in 1930 . They were unhappy with the caps on interest rates to three per cent per month as specified in the ordinance, particularly for low -value items and for items pledged for shorter than a month. 312 More controversial was the issue of language, which had been a bone of contention since the German colonial period. In a petition, they took on section 8 of the ordinance, which made it c ompulsory for all the pawnbrokers to keep their books in English or Kiswahili in English characters. ÒUnfortunately, most of us, not being blessed with sufficient knowledge of English or Swahili to enable us to keep the books in the manner required, shall be compelled to engage a book -keeper competent enough to undertake this task.Ó 313 Unlike Dar es 309 Bes timmungen betreffend die Auss Pfandleihgewerbes, April 27, 1904, TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901 -1906.Ó 310 Kaiserlicher Bezirksamtmann, Dar es Salaam, April 17, 1906, TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe im Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901-1906.Ó 311 Commissioner of Police, Dar es Salaam, March 4, 1929, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 312 Letter by The Pawnbrokers of Dar es Salaam, represented by W. Dharsee, Barrister -at-Law, Dar es Salaam, March 31, 1930, TNA: 12230/Vo l. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 313 A petition by the pawnbrokers of Dar es Salaam to the Chief Secretary (undersigned Habib Kassam Keswani, A. Karim Alarakhia, H. J. Pirani, H. N. Kanji, Ismail Nanji, Mohamedali Ismail Rawji, H. P. Gulamhussein, H. R . Ibrahim, Mohamedali & Co., K. D. Gangji), January 27, 1930, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 124 Salaam shopkeepers, who went on a 54 -day strike in 1923 because of the language issue, pawnbrokers accepted the new ordinance. Meanwhile, Kariakoo residents had come to view pawnshop credit as an indispensable aspect of urban life. Pawnshops only existed in the city and having access to some sort of formal credit could be an indisputable advantage when it came to investing in a side -business, buying seeds for peri -urban gardens, helping a friend clear debts, and affording expenses for a wedding or a funeral. Kariakoo residents understood the access to credit as their right or an Òurban entitlement.Ó 314 It allowed them to spend money more flexibly and more according t o their wishes. As more cash was brought into circulation, borrowers could spend money more immediately and at higher levels. Traders used paw nshop services to raise capital, which allowed them to conduct larger commercial transactions. A small -scale fruit trader, for instance, pawned his coat to buy wholesale a large amount of fruits , which he transported and sold retail at a higher price per piece. 315 The comparatively high percentage of workers in the neighborhood used pawnshop services regularly to bridge periods of unemployment or underemployment as well as the period before paydays. Regular pawnshop users had their favorite pawnshops because Òto be well known to the pawnbroker is half the battle.Ó 316 In that sense, the ready availability of pawnshop credit shaped the market neighborhood of Kariakoo and it helped to constitute Kariakoo as the economic center of Dar es Salaam. As pawnshop credit was regulated by the colonial state, it did not assume the symbolic role of gift -giving or gift -receiving in ways selling/buying goods on credit and 314 I have borrowed the term Òurban entitlementÓ from James Brennan, whose use of the term does not include access to credit ( Brennan, Taifa ). See also Gregory, South Asians in East Africa , 105Ð107. 315 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 143. 316 Ibid., 144. 125 lending/borrowing money to and from members of the neighborhood community did. 317 A crucial aspect was that debts were written down rather than agreed on verbally. 318 Repayment periods and interest rates were clearly fixed so that the failure to repay debts involved tangible dangers for the debtor. Since the terms of borrowing and repaying could not be easily re -negotiated as in verbal debt and credit arrangements, borrowers at times expressed their frustration of being unable to influence the credit arrangement. A pawnshop client complained Òwhen one goes to pledge a shirt or a vest or a pair of trousers, they give the smallest amount, far less than they cost to buy. One is in their hands, they make on every transaction and on e 317 See chapter 1. 318 In Mobali MubaÕs play Hukooo Darissalama , the difference between borrowing money on a verbal basis displayed different characteristics from borrowing money on a written basis. Debtors perceive d borrowing money on a verbal basis as receiving a gift. Teacher Mikaeli explained why he did not want to lend Baba Semeni money again: ÒWhen you borrow money, you think you were given it as a gift. You were not around at all, but not trouble has brought y ou back. (He pauses) Also, remember the paper where you wrote it down for me. I still have it.Ó Because Mikaeli did not trust Baba Semeni, he had insisted on writing down the Baba SemeniÕs debt. Written credit agreements were mainly enforced when the two p artied did not trust each other entirely. Another scene illustrates this: Baba Semeni went to the pombe or local beer club without money and he wanted to buy pombe on credit. Dina, the pombe vendor, did not initially agree to sell on credit, but then Baba Semeni convinced her by insisted on writing the debt down on paper: ÒLetÕs write it down for each other. Mapombe [Baba SemeniÕs friendÕs name]! Bring her the debt register. (Mapombe leaves) . A lot of drunkards are liars but not me. I donÕt have financial p roblems.Ó Ð Dina: É (Mapombe gives Dina the register, Dina hands it to Baba Semeni) Write it down here. If you donÕt pay me tomorrow, I will take whatever you have written down for me. (Baba Semeni writes down) Ó In the final act, Baba Semeni is supposed to make the debt payments. He first assures his creditors: ÒA promise is like a debt [Ahadi ni deni]. Today, there will be no problem because everything will be resolved and everyone will be happy.Ó However, he is unable to pay, as Mpoka, one of his creditor s, explains to the chief [mjumbe]: ÒWe did not fight with each other but we make claims on each other. Baba Semeni borrowed my money a long time ago, I donÕt even remember the day. He promised to pay me but when I arrived at his house, he didnÕt have any m oney. He begged me to wait but I refused saying that if he wanted me to wait he had to write me a pawn ticket [hati ya rehani], which he did. After he had written the note for me I agreed to wait.Ó And the chief ruled: ÒBaba Semeni, because the creditors [ wenye mali] are tired of waiting, I cannot force them [to wait longer]. Therefore, I have decided that everyone take the things written on his or her pawn ticket.Ó And the creditors happily leave Baba SemeniÕs house with kanga cloths, bed sheets, kitchenwa re, and a chair ( Muba, Hukooo Darisalama , 31, 39, 43Ð45, translation from Kiswahili by author ). 126 loses.Ó 319 Losses experienced in pawnshop credit arrangements did not so much involve reputation as material wealth. Pawnbrokers also risked incurring losses when their debtors failed to repay the money and when they were unable to sell pawned goods. Deba ting whether or not pawnbrokers in colonial Dar es Salaam were exploitative, a pawnbrokerÕs daughter in VassanjiÕs Uhuru Street argued that pawnbrokers charged high interest rates because of the small value of the objects customers used as pledges. 320 Pawnbr okers also vehemently refuted the colonial administrationÕs recurrent insinuation that pawnbrokers enabled questionable Africans to dispose stolen objects at their pawnshops. At a meeting of eighteen Zanzibari pawnbrokers in 1951, pawnbrokers put forward t hat ÒWe help the poor by lending our sums of money to them and in fact they pawn with us unidentifiable pledges, how then could we know that such pledges were bona fide or stolen property.Ó 321 It is worth investigating these objects more closely in order to reflect on the pledged object as a material expression of credit and debt relations and to appreciate the gendered aspects of pawnshop credit. THE PLEDGED OBJECT The pledged object can be understood as a material expression of a credit and debt relation. The most common goods to be pawned were pieces of clothing such as shirts, pants, coats, and hats. In 1930, the Dar es Salaam pawnbrokers unequivocally stated that Òclothes are the articles 319 Leslie, A Sur vey of Dar e s Salaam , 105Ð106. 320 Vassanji, Uhuru Street , 85. 321 Pawn-broker meeting at Darajani in the house of Nanchand Deuchand, Hindoo, November 23, 1951, ZNA: AB 14/74: ÒThe Pawnbrokers Decree.Ó 127 mostly pledged to secure small loans.Ó 322 The pawnshop allowed urban Africans to transform a shirtÕs or a kanga clothÕs use value into exchange value when the piece of clothing was brought to the pawnshop in exchange for a small amount of money. The reverse transformation took place when the money plus interest was repaid and the shirt or kanga cloth returned to the original owner. A nice kanga cloth or a nice shirt in Kariakoo, therefore, oscillated between being a piece of clothing, collateral for a loan, and money. 323 On the one hand, a shirt allowed a man to present a res pectable public self in the city. 324 On the other hand, a pawned shirt allowed him to make investments in social and economic relations. A nice piece of kanga cloth likewise allowed a woman to dress as a respectful urban woman. But kanga cloths were also a w ay to store wealth, they served as gifts, and could easily be converted to cash at the next pawnshop. The use of clothes and textiles as pawn goods resonated with the long -standing use of textiles in East Africa not only as pieces of clothing and social ma rkers but also as a form of currency and a way to store wealth. 325 322 A petition by the pawnbrokers of Dar es Salaam to the Chief Secretary (undersigned Habib Kassam Keswani, A. Karim Alarakhia, H. J. Pirani, H. N. Kanji, Ismail Nanji, Mohamedali Ismail Rawji, H. P. Gulamhussein, H. R. Ibrahim, Mohamedali & Co., K. D. Gangji), January 27, 1930, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó The same applied to Zanzibar, where ÒThe most common articles that are being constantly pawned are coats, trousers, khanjus [kanzus], vikoi, bedsheets, primus stoves, wooden and iron bedsteads, mirrors, chairs, watches and etc.Ó ([Signed by 18 pawnbrokers] Zanzibar, September 20, 1941, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 323 Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value . A Zanzibari representative of the pawnbrokers used the term Òthe strict intrinsic value of the article to be pawnedÓ to refer to the current exchange value (Lett er by R. K. Khursedji, Secretary to the PawnbrokerÕs Association, Zanzibar, December 31, 1943, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 324 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam . 325 See also chapter 3. 128 The most regularl y pledged objects were kanga cloths, as numerous female interviewees assured me .326 Nuru Muki, a single mother of nine children, who made ends meet by selling uji porridge and beans from the verandah of her house in the Gerezani section of Kari akoo, vividly remembered how shopkeepers actively encouraged customers like her to buy kanga cloths from them, either for cash or on credit .327 Written evide nce from Zanzibar confirms these observations . ÒIf one would like to know the economic condition of the country he should visit pawnbrokers shops. There are many kinds of articles filled up in their cupboards and the most one could see in abundance are the Kangas.Ó 328 Kanga cloths were prop erties owned by women, and to assemble a collection of kanga cloths constituted a gendered form of saving. 329 Thanks to pawnshops, these savings could be turned into cash almost immediately, for instance in times of hunger. ÒOwing to the scarcity of employme nts nowadays one would find a man go out of his house early in the morning in search of a job leaving behind him a family. He will return back in the evening empty handed no job and no food for the poor family. Now then if this man is in good terms with hi s family, his wife would run to a PawnbrokerÕs shop with her own kangas for pawning. This is the only means for ready money for this class of people and she will return 326 Numerous interviewees remembered h ow Kariakoo residents brought kanga cloths to the pawnshops to get small loans (Bibi Sipo, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, June 3, 2013; Bi Ashura , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki, interview wit h the author in Kiswahili, Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, December 29, 2012 ). 327 Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 328 Zanzibari newspaper, March 1, 1949, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decree.Ó 329 The Acting Seni or Commissioner also used the example of Òa poor woman who wishes to pawn a pair of khangasÓ (Letter by Ag. Senior Commissioner, March 28, 1949, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 129 home with food without any trouble.Ó 330 A good pair of kanga cloths could be pawned for a loan of two shillings, 331 which was sufficient for a meal or other small everyday expenses. The transformation from use value to exchange value and back did not always happen without trouble. Pawnshops users sometimes complained about loans that were too s mall because pawnbrokers undervalued the pledged objects. For pawnbrokers, pieces of clothing presented a challenge in terms of storage. They were liable to decay if stored for a long time under bad conditions. ÒPledged clothing, on which from 10% -25% of i ts value is advanced, [is] stacked in open shelves, or in cupboards with badly fitting doors or broken glass panels,Ó described the Municipal Officer in Zanzibar, where a similar problem existed. ÒI have witnessed one of the quarrels [between pawner and pa wnbroker] when 8 kang[a]s, almost new, which had been in pawn for 2 months were all eaten through by rats, [a]nd when the pawner, ignorant of Section 27A. of the [pawnbrokers] decree, complained, the pawnbroker stated that rats were Ôshauri la MunguÕ [GodÕ s will]. The pawnbroker admitted there were rats in the premises but no attempt had been made to suppress them.Ó 332 Since pieces of clothing were pledges pawned for less than 15 shillings, pawners were given a period for redemption of up to twelve months. Pawnbrokers considered this period to be exceedingly long and in 1930, they suggested successfully to reduce it to six months. 333 330 Zanzibari newspaper, March 1, 1949, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn broke rs decree.Ó 331 Letter by Ag. Senior Commissioner, March 28, 1949, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decree.Ó 332 Comments on Pawnbrokers Decree by Municipal Officer, December 24, 1940, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decree.Ó 333 A petition by the pawnbrokers of Dar es Salaam to the Chief Secretary, January 27, 1930, TNA: 12230/Vol. I: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó Referring to the mainland legislation, Zanzibari pawnbrokers made a similar request ten years later. ÒWe therefore earnestly request that the peri od should be reduced to six months for which act of kindness we shall ever remain grateful to you. É We have been on several occasions put to trouble and expense by the persons who pawn their clothes with us. They purposely come after a considerable period and demand 130 The transformation from exchange value to use value did not always happen smoothly, either, for instance when the pawner was unab le to raise money to redeem the pledged objects. In that case, pawnbrokers had the right to auction off the unredeemed items. While high -value items had to be auctioned off by an official auctioneer, low -value items such as shirts and kanga cloths were auc tioned by the pawnbrokers themselves at their houses/shops. Pawners had to oblige to their loss, which at times resulted in hard feelings. Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni , who had been a long -standing wholesale rice trader at the Kariakoo market hall, remembe red how he was personally hurt when he found out that his younger brother had lost two nice shirts to a pawnbroker because he was unable to redeem the shirts in time. ÒIn Kariakoo there were a lot of pawnshops like five or six or more. Many people lost the ir belongings there. É They [the pawnshops] brought trouble. A relative of mine pawned two of his shirts for seven shillings but he was unable to redeem them. So the nice shirts were lost. He had bought them for 45 shillings. Very nice shirts. So I got ver y angry. Had he told me, I would have given him money [to redeem the shirts]. But he only told me when the time was up and they had been auctioned off.Ó 334 The pledged object could also be an expression of the pawnerÕs conviction that keeping goods at pawns hops was safer than keeping them at the house. In that case, pawners drew relatively small loans for high -value items such as gold or jewelry so that at the time of that the the [sic] shirt or some such similar article was given to us in very good condition and they could not understand the reason why the cloth was moth -eatenÓ (Letter by Kanji Shakerchand Patalia, Zanzibar, November 26, 1940, ZNA: AB 14/71 : ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 334 Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Mrisho Athman, a Zanzibari man who wrote to the newspaper Afrika Kwetu in 1949 at the occasion of a pawnbrokersÕ strike, expressed similar feelings agains t pawnbroking. ÒI am not in favour of the Pawnbrokers shops. Many people have lost and still losing their belongings on account of the habit of pawn[ing]Ó (Letter by Mrisho Athman, in Afrika Kwetu , April 28, 1949, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 131 redemption, they could easily raise the required money. 335 However, certain pledged objects were also prone to be tampered with and devalued purposefully by the pawnbroker. A Zanzibari letter writer suggested in 1933 that pawnbrokers were not to be trusted with long chains or bangles because Òwhat this cunning thieves [sic] does is, if the pladge [sic] be neck chain, specially a long chain, or, particular kinds of bracelets then they removes [sic] a link or two from bracelet or small chain and two to four from long chain. Even from bangle they removes [sic] small piece of about quarter inch. It is most difficult for the owener [sic] to detect this unless before and after the pladge [sic] links are counted which none [sic] does.Ó 336 Pawnshops also had the curious ability of stripping stolen goods off of their association with crime. Thieves could turn stolen goods into cash by taking them to a pawnshop, using them as pledges, and collecting pawn credit without having the intention of ever redeeming them again. Unaware of the pledged objects being stolen goods, pawnbrokers eventually auctioned off the o bjects, which had taken on the characteristic of Òunredeemed pledgesÓ rather than Òstolen goods.Ó In that instance, the pledged object only appeared to represent a credit and debt relations while in reality it involved the sale of stolen goods at a conside rably reduced price. The advantage for thieves was that pawnbrokers were generally willing and able to provide a small amount of money for these goods without knowing whose objects they were. The colonial governments were not happy about these circumstance s. I n Zanzibar, a Member of Council even suggested to run pawnshops under state control in order to control pawnshop dealing more tightly. 337 335 The PawnbrokerÕs Association, Zanzibar, November 22, 1950, ZNA: AB 14/72: ÒPawnbrokers, moneychangers, Gold and silver smiths licences.Ó 336 January 1933: ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decree.Ó 337 Provincial Commissioner, Zanzibar, March 31, 1947, ZNA : AB 14/72: ÒPawnbrokers, moneychangers, Gold and silver smiths licences.Ó 132 Once the pledged object Ð a material expression of a credit and debt relation Ð was stored away in the pawnshop, i t was itself substituted with another material item . For every pledged item, pawnbrokers issue d a pawn ticket, which the pawner kept until the day of redemption. Only upon presentation of the pawn ticket , a pledged object could be redeemed. An example of a pawn ticket from 1945 is displayed in figure 2.4. It was issued by the above -mentioned pawnbroker D. R. Gangji, who was a pawnbroker in postwar Kariakoo. The writing on the pawn ticket indicated that Mohammed bin Yusuf borrowed 1 shilling and 50 cents fro m pawnbroker D. R. Gangji on Kichwele Street while pledging one kanga cloth. 338 Figure 2.4: Ò Originalpfandschein von Mr. Gangji Ó Ð Pawn ticket issued by pawnshop owner D. R. Ganji. 339 338 Translation based on EngelbergerÕs transcription in German provided in Engelberger, Der Missionsbote , 3:44 Ð45. 339 Ibid., 3:47. 133 Pawn tickets had their own materiality and they could be damaged, lost, o r stolen, which either meant a dead loss to the pawner or a considerably long and bureaucratic way of recovery. Pawners, who had lost their pawn tickets, had to submit a declaration to the District Commissioner. By 1945, up to six pawners showed up at the District CommissionerÕs office per day to report the loss of a pawn ticket , prompting the Provincial Commissioner to empower the Liwali and Assistant Liwali of Dar es Salaam Township to attest pawnersÕ declarations in order to reduce the District Commissio nerÕs workload. 340 This number Ð six lost and reported pawn tickets per day, or roughly 1500 per year Ð again indicates the widespread use of pawnshop credit in postwar Dar es Salaam. KUWEKA AKIBA VERSUS KUWEKA PONI Creating a culture of fixed savings is o ne among the secrets of achieving success in the business market since savings is a foundation of wealth. Conserving money is simple only if you have financial strategies, which guide you towards your goals. Sometimes, we find it difficult, but having savi ngs makes you less stressed and paranoid about everything, as well as living within your means. 341 Dealing with money cannot be located in an economic sphere separate from culture. In colonial Kariakoo as elsewhere, acts of borrowing, lending, and saving we re cultural practices undergirded by powerful moral discourses and embodied practices. The ways money was raised for feasts or burials, for instance, were preconfigured by societal cultural understandings. Public commentators in Dar es Salaam have also dra wn on the language of ÒcultureÓ to promote desirable ways of handling money as the above extract from a recent issue of the Tanzania Business Forum suggests. 340 Letter by Provincial Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, to the Chief Secretary, May 24, 1945, TNA: 12230/Vol. II: ÒPawnbrokers, Registration of.Ó 341 Saumu Jumanne, ÒSaving Money and Building Wealth: Wealth Consciousness,Ó Tanzania Business Focus , no. 3 (May 2012): 44. 134 To present saving as morally superior to borrowing means to build on a motif that goes back to Ge rman and British colonial periods. Not only colonial officers and missionaries but also Asian pawnbrokers drew on and contributed to this discourse. As mentioned above, the most vocal critics of pawnbroking services were the missionaries, whose main concer n was the perceived effects credit and indebtedness had on the character of the debtor. Father Engelberger viewed Africans customers as victims of pawnbrokers. Although he acknowledged that in rare cases, the pawning of goods might help urban residents to get through periods of unemployment and other hardship, he condemned the habit of borrowing money as morally corrupting. Rather than helping people to overcome obstacles, the practice of pawning entrapped people in increasing amounts of debt, which could n ot be paid back, thereby creating relations of dependency. Instead of pawning goods ( kuweka poni ), Engelberger suggested urban Africans save money ( kuweka akiba ) during prosperous times so they had savings to fall back on in hard times.342 MissionariesÕ atte mpts to reform urban AfricansÕ behavior with regards to money and credit needs to be seen in the context of a larger project of creating specific cultural practices. Missionaries wanted to protect African Christians in Dar es Salaam from a host of activiti es including late -night dancing, conspicuous consumption, prostitution, alcoholic beverages, unhygienic living conditions, paganism, and Islam. 343 Borrowing money was one of many temptations urban Africans faced. Lutheran missionaries were equally concerned with impressing the virtues of saving on urban Africans. Pastors were known for their outspoken attitude against the practice of lending and borrowing money even if they were willing to make 342 Engelberger, Der Missionsbote , 3:44 Ð45. 343 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1/ -6092, bmw 1/ -6093, bmw 1/ -6083, bmw 1/832. Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin, EZA 5/2914, 5/2915 ( Bd. 1 1887.12-1931.08). 135 exceptions for well -known and self -disciplined Africans. Pastor K lamroth described borrowing money as a way of corrupting a personÕs heart. 344 Missionaries generally deplored the increasing importance of money in AfricansÕ lives in general and tried to encourage people to value work, community, and religion instead. 345 The Kiswahili -language monthly newspaper Mambo Leo echoed missionariesÕ concerns and promoted the advice ÒAlways spend money according to your meansÓ because being in debt me ant to live an unhappy life. A Kis wahili poem on debts stated that Òdebts are a bad th ingÓ and Òdebt is dangerous.Ó 346 In order to facilitate and encourage African saving, b oth Catholic and Lutheran missionaries in Dar es Salaam started to provide banking services for their African fellow believers in town. In addition to giving urban Africa ns the opportunity to deposit their money 344 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1. 345 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1/3567. 346 Mambo Leo , April 1954, 50; August 1954, 123. Christian missionariesÕ concern with inculcating the values of saving in Africans resonates with Max WeberÕs argumen t in The Protestant Ethic that the rise of modern or ÔrationalÕ capitalism was only made possible by the prior qualitative shifts in understandings of religion, work, and accumulation with the rise of Protestantism in general in Europe and America. Martin LutherÕs reformulation of the concept of the calling was a necessary first step in the development of the capitalist spirit. Where people in medieval Europe tended to see their labor occupations as largely inconsequential for their entry into heaven, Luthe rÕs Reformation attributed more importance to peopleÕs occupations. While monks and pastors were relegated to ordinary human beings, each personÕs occupation ( Beruf ) became equated with a pastorÕs or a monkÕs calling ( Berufung ). Thus, everybody was expecte d to lead a monkÕs life though not in a secluded monastery but in the ÔrealÕ world. Combined with CalvinÕs doctrine of predestination, which held that God had already chosen the ones who would enter heaven, LutherÕs concept of the calling led to the emerge nce of the Ôcapitalist spirit.Õ Although men and women could not do anything to change their destiny, many overcame the constant anxiety over their fate after death by viewing success in their economic activities as a sign of their being chosen. Thus, they worked longer and harder, saved their profits, and re -invested the savings from their hard work into their own businesses. Unlike earlier capitalists, their motivation for the accumulation of wealth was not grounded in greed but in honesty that was derive d from a new religious understanding of their lives. Their business activities were no longer speculative but predictable, reliable, and Ôrational,Õ which contributed to the rapid spread and acceptance of the new economic. Max Weber distinguished between Ô traditionalÕ capitalist practices, which had existed for millennia, and ÔrationalÕ or modern capitalism, which came into being in the eighteenth century system ( Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ). 136 safely, the bank service also gave the mission a chance to establish closer contacts with Africans. 347 The Berliner Missionswerk started their bank service as early as 1911. 348 However, their small and underfunded miss ion station found itself in severe financial trouble in the 1937. As the mission was in desperate need of money, the missionaries could no longer follow their own rhetoric and they ÒborrowedÓ almost the entire savings entrusted to them Ð notably without informing the African depositors. In a letter from March 30, 1937, the Berlin missionaries in Dar es Salaam wrote to their brethren in Berlin asking for money and expressing a feeling of embarrassment and anxiety over African saversÕ confidence. 349 Already in the early 1930s, the German missionaries were concerned about the dealings of a certain minister Schmidt, who was able to buy goods on credit with an Asian company thanks to his status as a Berlin missionary but who never paid the dues. 350 Therefore, mission aries started to worry about their credit rating in the local Asian business community, while at the same time preaching urban Africans about the evils of using credit and the virtues of saving. Despite the incongruence of missionariesÕ words and deeds, t he general thrust of the colonizing mission when i t ca me to money and finance was to create a culture of saving among Africans. Saving was to be a guiding principle in urban and rural peopleÕs lives. Colonials and colonial institutions played an active rol e as inculcators of thrift in Africans by way of encouraging them to put money aside repeatedly and in regular intervals. For that purpose, the Post Office Savings Bank provided their customers with so -called Òhome safesÓ in the form of wooden or metal box es with which bank customers were supposed save small amounts of money 347 Marita Haller -Dirr, 75 ...! : 75 Years Baldegg Sisters, Capuchin Brothers in Tanzania (Luzern, 1997), 40Ð41. 348 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1. 349 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1. 350 Berliner Missionswerk, bmw 1/ -6109. 137 on a regular basis. 351 The POSB also made use of Kiswahili proverbs in their saving campaigns such as Òakiba haiozi,Ó literally Òa reserve does not decayÓ and the Kiswahili equivalent of Òput something away for a rainy day. Ó352 According to colonial rhetoric, thrift would make urban AfricansÕ lives less miserable, also because it would free them from monthly repayments of debt incurred at the Asian shops and pawnshops . According to Senior Co mmissioner F. W. Brett, ÒThe struggle for existence would be less if the natives concerned could be imbued with some idea of thrift. É The Indian and middleman of the market purchases the bulk of the country produce which he retails at 50 to 100% profit, a nd the consumerÕs monthly pay is expended within a few hours of receipt in settlement of his past monthÕs account at the Indian shop.Ó 353 The only acceptable alternative to saving money was to invest it in ÒproductiveÓ goods. 354 One important aspect of creatin g a culture of saving money in personal bank accounts involved the building of trust in western banking institutions among the local population. When 351 Letter by the Deputy Postmaster General to the Chief Secretary , June 20, 1933, TNA: 21390/Vol. III: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Regulations.Ó In postwar Zanzibar, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies stated ÒLump sum savings are the least satisfactory form of thrift to recommend amongst people mainly dependent upon a regular salary or wage. The recurrent savings of small sums is the more valuable lesson to learn,Ó Registrar of Co -operative Societies, December 4, 1953, ZNA: AB 14/12: ÒSavings Campaign.Ó 352 The Kiswahili version of the pamphlet for a savings campaign du ring WWII stated ÒUSITUME mapesa ovyo, SAIDIA iktisadi ya Unguja, AKIBA haiozi, WEKA pesa zako usizo zihitajia katika , BENKI YA POSTA Ó and the English version stated ÒDO NOT spend money unnecessarily, HELP ZanzibarÕs Economy, SAVE your money for a rainy da y, INVEST your spare cash in the POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANK Ó (ZNA: AB 14/4: ÒZanzibar Po st Office Savings Bank Campaign Ó). 353 Annual report on Dar -es-Salaam District for 1921 by F.W. Brett, Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 354 The aspect of investing in productive things became more prominent during and after World War Two. In Kenya, for instance, savings campaigns during that time envisioned returning soldiers as potential entrepreneurs. I n a pamphlet for Afri can soldiers, they portrayed Ò the foolish soldier wasting his accumulated pay on luxury articles in shops [and] the wise soldier drawing on demobilisation a substantial sum of money sufficient to start him off as a farmer, artisan or trader Ó (The Chief Secretary, East African GovernorsÕ Conference, Rhodes House, Nairobi, January 10, 1944, ZNA: AB 14/4: ÒZanzibar Po st Office Savings Bank Campaign Ó). 138 the Post Office Savings Bank opened its doors in 1927 with the explicit goal to Òencourage thrift and to p rovide a means by which comparatively poor people may save their money with perfect safety,Ó 355 it quickly became clear that urban dwellersÕ confidence in banks was lacking. One of the reasons was the peopleÕs experiences during World War One . The Dar es Sal aam Senior Commissioner observed in 1924 that Ò[t] he Post Office have a small number of depositors on their books É but nothing like the number who should be putting a little away for the Rainy Day. No doubt the War experiences of many who trusted the Germ an Banks and Post Office have discouraged adventure in this respect.Ó 356 Dar es Salaam residents had sustained losses during the war when their money in the German Sparkasse was no longer available after GermanyÕs defeat, which naturally created a general mi strust of banking institutions in general. Vassanji poignantly sums it up in The Gunny Sack , ÒÔ[t] hey are making fires out of it. ItÕs useless, this Deutsch Ost Afrika eine -rupee. The new Government and the banks will not honour it.ÕÓ 357 The Ismaili Khoja c ommunity in Dar es Salaam had particularly bad experiences with German financial institutions d uring World War One. The German colonial government regarded the Ismaili Khojas with general suspicion because the latterÕs spiritual leader, the Aga Khan, had sided with the United Kingdom. As the Germans suspected members of the Ismaili Khoja community to raise money for the war against Germany, Ismaili Khojas were forced to deposit their savings with the local Bezirkskasse , the district bank, in order to dispro ve German allegations. In the coastal town of Kilwa, the district officer inspected the Ismaili Khoja community and had their safe opened to find 5000 rupees, which were deposited in the 355 Mambo Leo , 1927. 356 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1927 by Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó 357 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 53. 139 Bezirkskasse .358 A colonial officer in Tabora, a town in west -central T anganyika, stated that the best way for Ismaili Khojas to prove that their money would not be sent to the Aga Khan was to deposit it with the Bezirkskasse for the duration of the war. 359 Similar actions were taken in the towns of Mwanza and Morogoro. The Ger mans used the bank as a way to monitor the financial transactions of the local Asian population. After World War One, the British aimed at regaining the local populationÕs trust in financial institutions by creating the Post Office Savings Banks. They ackn owledged to a certain extent that peopleÕs trust in western financial institutions had to be regained after bad experiences in World War One. The Deputy Postmaster General in Dar es Salaam stated in 1933 that ÒTanganyika depositors are chiefly Africans who se confidence in the bank was not easy to gain after their losses in German time.Ó 360 However, British colonialists usually legitimized the establishment of banks with the help of another argument. In their eyes, Africans did not know how to handle money and , thus, needed to be educated in matter s of finance. 361 The assumption that Africans were Òfinancially illiterateÓ served as a point of departure for various interventions including the establishment of the Post Office Savings Bank. 362 Particularly with respec t to th e 358 Letter by Kaiserlicher Bezirksamtmann, Kilwa, February 19, 1915, TNA: G9/41: Ò[Angelegenhei ten der] Indischen Khodja Aga Khan Gemeinde, Bd. 2, 1907 -1915.Ó 359 ÒDen besten Beweis dafss sie keinen verbotenen Gebrauch von dem Gelde machen wollen, werden die Inder dadurch liefern kınnen, dass sie den Betrag freiwillig w−hrend des Krieges auf der Bezirkskasse deponieren Ó (July 14, 1915, TNA: G9/41: Ò[Angelegenheiten der] Indischen Khodja Aga Khan Gemeinde, Bd. 2, 1907 -1915Ó). 360 Letter by the Deputy Postmaster General, December 12, 1933, TNA: 23465/Vol. I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Ordinance Ð Amendment to.Ó 361 In Zanzibar in 1958, the manager of National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited suggested to educate the African community about deposit accounts by way of showing them films (Letter by Manager of National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited , to the Community Development Officer, Zanzibar, January 28, 1958, ZNA: AB 14/20. ÒSaving Schemes: BanksÓ). 362 Asian pawnbrokers in Zanzibar made use of this colonial discourse to achieve their own ends. The secretary of the PawnbrokerÕs Association Zanzib ar, R. K. Khursedji, wrote in December 1943, ÒThe native acts on the principle of ÒMore the merrierÓ without thinking for the morrow, 140 issue of interest rates, colonialists were convinced that Africans did not really understand it and, thus, the actual rate was much less important to Africans than access to financial institutions. In December 1933, the Treasurer suggested that, a lthough the object of the POSB was to encourage thrift, the interest rate for deposits of 3 per cent could be lowered without having any effect on African depositorsÕ behavior. ÒThe Treasury view is that a reduction in the rate of interest on Savings Bank deposits would not shake the confidence of the African depositors. The African is more concerned with the accessibility of his money that with the rate of interest.Ó 363 And indeed, the interest rate for deposits was brought down to 2.5 per cent in 1935. If s ome Dar es Salaam residents in the largely Muslim Kariakoo neighborhood were indeed not so concerned with the actual rate of interest, it was not because they did not understand the concept but because their religion did not allow them to gain interest on their money. A few Muslim bank customers in fact asked the management not be paid interest on their deposit accounts. 364 and without caring whether he would be able to redeem the same. In all such cases, it is our bitterest experience that he would not be able to redeem the same and thus he becomes poorer day by day. This is the grimmest picture of the Native Economics and I humbly believe that it is as trueÓ (R. K. Khursedji, Secretary to the PawnbrokerÕs Association, Zanzibar, December 31, 1943, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ). 363 Treasurer, Dar es Salaam, to the Chief Secretary, December 19, 1933, TNA: 23465/Vol. I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Ordinance Ð Amendment to .Ó In socialist Tanzania, this view was perpetuated. ÒBut the proble m of educating the masses in this country [Tanzania] to re -orient their saving habits towards using national saving institutions in preference to hoarding their money, whether under their pillows or in the ground is great. I feel we must soon mount a massive educational programme to that end É this is the only way of mobilising rural savingsÓ (The National Bank of Commerce, Annals (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), 13 ). 364 During a savings campaign during World War Two in Zanzibar, the Postmaster was reported to confirm that Òmany cases arise in which deposits are made but in which the depositors refuse to receive the interest due to them when they withdraw money or close their accounts: they use the savings bank as a se cure place only and do not regard it from an interest earning point of viewÓ (Minutes, Information Officer, March 25, 1943, ZNA: AB 14/4: ÒZanzibar Post Office Savings Bank CampaignÓ). The Director of Education noted that the Òadvice to Ôlay up for a rainy day, and let your money earn interestÕ is directly contrary to Islamic ideas of what is permittedÓ (Minutes, Director of Education, March 25, 1943, ZNA: AB 14/4: ÒZanzibar Post Office Savings Bank CampaignÓ). 141 Contrary to colonialistsÕ assertions, Kariakoo residents were not Òfinancially illiterateÓ at all when it came to saving. In fact, they w ere engaged in various forms of saving other than putting cash into a personal bank account. One of these alternative forms of saving was to entrust money and goods to the shopkeeper at the nearby corner store, as described in the previous chapter. Another way of saving took the form of collective saving, as it was done on a communal rather than on an individual basis. Kariakoo residents saved money with the help of rotating savings groups, which had various names in Kiswahili including upato , mchezo wa kup eana , and kibati .365 Religious communities were among the first to organize savings groups. Members of the Ismaili Khoja community Ð a Shia religious group originally from South Asia Ð formed a savings and credit group in Dar es Salaam in the 1930s. 366 A third way to save was to buy and keep goods such as kanga cloths, which could conveniently be converted into cash at a pawnshop at any time. ÒAny one who is familiar with the native way of life will agree that he is not habetuated [sic] to save in cash but when ever he can afford he buys all kinds of articles É with the one thought of having something in reserve for a rainy day,Ó Zanzibari pawnbrokers observed in 1941. 367 Finally, even some colonial employers offered ways of saving by offering voluntary savings arr angements for their employees. At the end of the month, employers retained a share of the employeesÕ salaries as their savings. The police in Dar es Salaam ran the most 365 Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki , interview with the aut hor in Kiswahili. Up to the present, a very effective way of mobilizing resources in Dar es Salaam is to raise money collectively for special occasions such as weddings rather than relying on individualsÕ saving. 366 See chapter 1. In the early 1960s, the Ca tholic Church started to promote savings and credit co-operatives ( H. H. Binhammer, The Development of a Financial Infrastructure in Tanzania (Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 80 ). In the 1970s, these cooperatives were outlawed as the socialist state aimed to abolish all non -state associations in t he country. Nevertheless, informal rotating credit societies continued to exist throughout the socialist period. In the late 1980s, the government legally authorized savings and credit co -operatives again and they became known as SACCOs. But it was only in the 2000s that the government started to promote SACCOs activities as a form of poverty alleviation. 367 Zanzibar, September 20, 1941, ZNA: AB 14/71: ÒThe pawn brokers decreeÓ. 142 successful saving scheme of this kind . Only when giving three months notice, police off icers could withdraw their savings from their employer and even apply for loans. 368 So from the perspective of Kariakoo residents, the Sparkasse in German colonial Dar es Salaam and the Post Office Savings Bank in British times merely added one more way of s aving to an already existing myriad ways of saving. The success of established forms of saving may help explain why the Sparkasse and the Post Office Savings Bank initially attracted few customers in Kariakoo. 369 Most obviously, the German Sparkasse and the British Post Office Savings Bank provided a financial service. Dar es Salaam residents could store their cash savings at a secure place while gaining interest over time. For both colonial governments, generating local savings was a way to bankroll governme ntal expenses. In addition to that, both financial institutions explicitly aimed at reforming colonial subjectivities by encouraging in Africans the spirit and practice of thrift. The Sparkasse regulations defined that the purpose of the Dar es Salaam savi ngs bank was to Òprovide the colored inhabitants in particular with the opportunity to save securely and usefully in order to awaken and foste r the nativesÕ economical sense, Ó370 and t he Post Office Savings Bank had the goal to Òencourage thrift and to provi de a means by which comparatively poor people may save their money with perfect safety. Ó An article in the newspaper Mambo Leo aimed at promoting savings accounts a t the Post Office Savings Bank 368 TNA: ACC 90: 1046/3 Vol. I: ÒSavings Bank System, Rank and File.Ó 369 Raimbault compares the success of African saving at Asian shops with the modest use of the Sparkasse in German colonial Dar es Salaam ( Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 117 ). 370 ÒZweck der Sparkass e: Die Sparkasse des Bezirks Daressalam hat den Zweck insbesondere der farbigen Bevılkerung Gelegenheit zu geben, Ersparnisse sicher und nutzbar anzulegen, um so den wirtschaftlichen Sinn des Eingeborenen zu wecken und zu fırdern,Ó Statuten fe Sparkas se des Bezirks Daressalam, TNA: G3/92: ÒVerwaltung [bzw. Kreditvergabe aus dem zur Errichtung eines Leprakranken -Asyls geschaffenen] Bazarfonds [auch Stiftung des Inders Sewa Hadji fin Lepra -Krankenhaus in Bagamoyo]. Bd. 2: 1906 -1912.Ó 143 came to the conclusion that Ò[t] he thrifty man is the success ful man.Ó 371 Similar to the soci”t”s de pr”voyances in French West Africa examined by Gregory Mann and Jane Guyer, the Sparkasse and the Post Office Savings Bank were aimed at encouraging cash savings amongst African populations. 372 Not many Dar es Salaam resi dents were convinced by the colonial financial rhetoric, which associated success with a personÕs ability to put money into a personal savings account. In fact, very few urban residents initially used savings accounts, both in case of the Sparkasse in the German period and in case of the Post Office Savings Bank in the British period. According to colonialists, there were two main reasons for urban residentsÕ slow response to the new savings institution. On the one hand, the Òfinancially illiterateÓ people had not yet realized the advantages of savings accounts so they continued to hide their savings in trees and burying them in the ground. On the other hand, colonialists resorted to the familiar bogeyman, the Asian shopkeeper, to account for the small numbe r of African account holders in the early years of the POSB. Supposedly, Asian shopkeepers charged depositors a fee for the service of keeping their money rather than paying them interest on their deposits. 373 Despite an unpromising start, people started to put their savings in Post Office Savings Bank accounts. The increase in customers was slow but steady. For the whole of Tanganyika, the number of African depositors grew from 402 to 1,400 in the first seven years after the bank was 371 Mambo Leo news paper , 1927, accessed in TNA: 20999: ÒCo -operative Society (Development Fund) Ð Proposal by Bukwimba Federation to establish. Ó 372 Mann and Guyer, ÒImposing a Guide on the Indig‘ne: The Fifty Year Experience of the Soci”t”s de Pr”voyance in French West and Equatorial Africa.Ó Contrary to the Sparkasse and the POSB, the soci”t”s de pr”voyances also offered loans that we re seen as an alternative to loans from the local informal sector, which were seen as usurious. 373 Postmaster in response to the above Mambo Leo newspaper article from August 1927, TNA: 20999: ÒCo -operative Society (Development Fund) Ð Proposal by Bukwimba Federation to establish.Ó 144 opened in January 1927. 374 Depositors were mainly urban residents employed as personal servants, clerks, government employees such as policemen and soldiers, and commercial employees. Farmers did not feature prominently among POSB account holders, although Òthe primary object of t he Savings Bank is to promote thrift among the native peasantry in the Territory,Ó as the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam wrote to the Postmaster General in 1927. 375 An unproportionally large share of Tanganyika customers resided in urban area. Between 1927 and 1932, 36 to 56 per cent of all the Tanganyika POSB accounts were held at branches in Dar es Salaam,376 and a majority of those did not belong to ÒnativesÓ but to residents of Asian origin. In 1927, the POSB in Dar es Salaam counted 145 accounts, 97 of w hich were ÒAsiaticÓ accounts, 35 ÒAfricanÓ accounts holding an average amount of 27,361, and 11 ÒEuropeanÓ accounts. On average, each ÒAsiaticÓ account held 282 shillings, each ÒAfricanÓ account only 136 shillings, and each ÒEuropeanÓ account 162 shillings . By 1932, the number of ÒAsiaticÓ accounts had risen to 380, each holding an average of 354 shillings, while each of the 245 African accounts held an average of 77 shillings (see chart 2.1). ÒEuropeanÓ accounts stood at a mere 59, holding an average of 48 9 shillings. While the number of both ÒAsiaticÓ and ÒAfricanÓ accounts rose 374 Minutes, July 27, 1934, TNA: 23465/Vol. I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Ordinance Ð Amendment to.Ó 375 Minutes, July 27, 1934, TNA: 23465/Vol. I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Ordinance Ð Amendment to;Ó Letter by the Chief Secretary, Da r es Salaam, to the Postmaster General, July 30, 1927, TNA: 10347/I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank.Ó 376 Minutes, July 27, 1934, TNA: 23465/Vol. I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Ordinance Ð Amendment to.Ó Annual report on the post office 1927; Letter by the Chief A ccountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, March 1, 1929; Letter by the Chief Accountant, A. R. James, to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, March 21, 1930; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 25, 1931; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 24, 1932; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 21, 1933, TNA: 10347/I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank.Ó 145 steadily in these years, the average amount per account remained more or less steady in the former groups, while the average decreased considerably in the latter group. Year Numbe r of ÒAsiaticÓ accounts Total amount (in Shs.) Average amount per account Number of ÒAfricanÓ accounts Total amount (in Shs.) Average amount per account 1927 97 27,361 282 35 4,749 136 1928 145 50,203 346 80 10,005 125 1929 271 78,167 288 122 17,020 140 1930 291 88,787 305 127 17,375 137 1931 339 110,916 327 182 16,504 91 1932 380 134,481 354 245 18,769 77 Table 2.1: Post Office Savings Bank accounts in Dar es Salaam, 1927 -1933.377 The actual POSB account holders in Dar es Salaam did not fully conf orm to the section of the population envisioned by the colonial government. While the bank was to provide services mainly to the rural population, urban residents were the main users of the bank. While the African population was the bankÕs main target popu lation, the POSB also attracted many clients of Asian origin. In Dar es Salaam, middle -class Asian customers formed the majority of POSB customers, at least in the early years. Overall, the POSB developed into a savings bank popular with Dar es Salaam resi dents and the number of depositors increased steadily over the years. 378 By the 1950s, the POSB had developed into an important mobilizer of deposits in Tanganyika .379 377 Annual report on the p ost office 1927; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, March 1, 1929; Letter by the Chief Accountant, A. R. James, to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, March 21, 1930; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 25, 1931; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 24, 1932; Letter by the Chief Accountant to the Postmaster General, Dar es Salaam, February 21, 1933, TNA: 10347/I: ÒPost Office S avings Bank.Ó 378 Numbers for Dar es Salaam clients are hard to come by for the period after 1933. However, the total number of depositors in Tanganyika in 1940 was 10,130 of which 5,675 were identified as ÒAfricanÓ (TNA library: ÒReport on Tanganyika Terr itory, 1940,Ó 106). 379 Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War Period,Ó 78-81. POSB deposits increased steadi ly in the first half of the 1950s and started to decline in the second half of the decade. 146 The issue of identification did not only involve bank account holder sÕ categorization into racially -defined groups as ÒAfrican,Ó ÒAsiatic,Ó or ÒEuropean.Ó In order to guarantee a safe way of depositing and withdrawing money, account holders also needed to be identified individually. In the absence of identification cards and passports, the POSB used the deposit book as a piece of identity and at times referred to it as ÒPass Book.Ó 380 According to the Savings Bank Ordinance, ÒEvery depositor, on making a first deposit on his own behalf, shall be required to specify his full name, occupation and ful l address , and in the case of natives of Africa or India his fatherÕs name with tribe or caste, and such further particulars as may be considered necessary for future identification.Ó 381 In the postwar period, the POSB started to use account holdersÕ photogr aphs but there was only one camera available for the whole of Tanganyika so pass books without photographs continued to be accepted. 382 Still, t he establishment of the POSB went hand in hand with new ways of identifying people. In addition to name, occupatio n, and address, new account holders in the 1920s and 1930s were required to indicate their ÒtribeÓ or their Òcaste.Ó Already in the interwar period, the desire to make Africans Òfinancially literateÓ and users of banking services was one of the most powerf ul drives behind identifying individual s unequivocally. 380 Provincial Commissioner, Mbeya, July 13, 1937, TNA: 21390/Vol. II: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Regulations.Ó 381 The Savings Bank Ordinance, 1936, TNA: 21390/Vol. II I: ÒPost Office Savings Bank Regulations.Ó 382 Letter by the Postmaster to the Honorary Chief Secretary, January 3, 1958, ZNA: AB 14/4: ÒZanzibar Post Office Savings Bank Campaign.Ó 147 CREDIT FOR SOCIALISM [T] here is no such thing as a ÔneutralÕ financial system. É [T] hings like interest rates and price structures are not neutral É in their effects .383 After independence of Tang anyika in 1961 and the declaration of Tanzania as a socialist state in 1967, state actors introduced radically new understandings and systems of saving and borrowing. The break became most obvious in 1967 when president Julius Nyerere outlined his socialis t vision for Tanzanian in the Arusha Declaration. 384 Immediately following the declaration, the seven privately operated commercial banks in Tanzania were nationalized and merged into the state-owned National Bank of Commerce (NBC). 385 In addition, other state -owned financial institutions such as the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) and the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) existed with the aim of creating and supporting an economic system based on socialism. ÒWe expect Socialist Bankers to adopt a different attitud e, and to tell us how these tasks can be done; to tell us how credit can be usefully and safely made available to our peasants and small scale producers throughout our large country,Ó Nyerere explained. 386 Credit planning became an annual bank exercise and c redit allocation was seen as a central aspect of the creation of a socialist economy. 387 Together with the much less publicized banning of pawnshops in 1965 , the 383 Nyerere, Inaugural Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere President of the United Republic of Tanzania , 2. 384 Tanzania Afric an National Union, The Arusha Declaration and TANUÕs Policy on Socialism and Self -Reliance (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967). 385 Ernst -Josef Pauw, Das Bankwesen in Ostafrika (Mhen: Weltforum C. Hurst, 1969), 124 Ð129. 386 Nyerere, Inaugural Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere President of the United Republic of Tanzania , 5. 387 Publicly -financed credit schemes that served the rich and the powerful were heavily criticized for not comp lying with the countryÕs socialist ideology. The most publicly discussed credit scheme was a hire purchase plan provided by Karadha Company Limited, which was commissioned by the NBC. In 1969, Karadha started to provide hire purchase plans for government e mployees, including members of parliament, to buy private cars. The Bank of Tanzania, the countryÕs central bank, criticized the NBC for providing public loans for private 148 state had almost completely monopolized the allocation of credit in Tanzania. NBC manager Nsekel a explained in 1971, ÒIn a planned socialist economy, the function of banks is to provide sufficient credit to enable a planned volume of physical activities to take place.Ó 388 The nationalization of banks brought about a shift in terms of lending policies. While at the time of nationalizati on in 1967, 64 per cent of bank credit went into the pr ivate sector, eight years later in 1975, 82 per cent of bank credit went into the public sector. 389 According to Finance Minister Jamal, one of the reasons for the nati onalization of banks was to accelerate the extension of banking services in rural Tanzania. Likewise, Nyerere noted that every Tanzania n should have a bank account, thus embracing the idea of modern banking services as something potentially beneficial as l ong as they were provided by the right people (Tanzanians rather than foreigners). 390 The NBC started its own savings campaigns by promoting the use of Òmoney boxesÓ (see figure 2.5). NBC, TRDB, and BoT loans were allocated in the context of new political an d moral discourses, which made it difficult for state actors to force borrowers such as vehicles, but was unable to stop the NBC from doing so. The only BoT achievement was to lower the interest rates to about 10 per cent and less, which was considerably lower than the interest rates offered by private hire purchase dealers at the time ( Bank of Tanzania, Central Banking in Socialist Trans formation of Tanzania: A Special Publication to Commemorate the 10th Anniversary of the Founding of the Bank of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: The Bank of Tanzania, 1976), 30 ). Vice-president Rashidi Kawawa also criticized the Karadha loan scheme by stating tha t ÒThe decision taken by the NBC to grant car loans to civil servants has no Government blessings and will not be carried out Ð but if it is done, it will be shortlivedÓ (cit. in Ngila Mwase, Decision -Making in TanzaniaÕs National Bank of Commerce (NBC): Controls and Part icipation Dichotomy (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic research Bureau, 1975), 40 ). Only in 1970, however, the Karadha scheme was scrapped after being termed ÒunsocialistÓ at a National Executive Committee meeting in Dar es Salaam ( Ngila Mwase, Decision -Making in TanzaniaÕs National Bank of Commerce (NBC): Controls and Participation Dichotomy (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Economic research Bureau, 1975), 40). 388 National Bank of Commerce, The NBC Story: What It Is, What It Does, How It Works, What It Has Achieved (Dar es Salaam: National Bank of Commerce, 1971), 17. 389 Bank of Tanzania, Central Banking in Socialist Transformation of Tanzania , 65. 390 Ibid., 3, 5. 149 ujamaa villages or parastatal organizations to make repayments. Receivers of state credit generally viewed the money as a gift. Repayment was not to be done in form of money and interest but in form of political allegiance. 391 Individuals trying to raise money for commercial or private purposes, however, found it very difficult to get loans from banks, just like in the decades prior to nationalization and independence .392 Figure 2.5: Saving money with the help of moneyboxes. Caption on the back side: ÒMs Ruth Zakari, one of the customers, who uses the service of saving money by way of money boxes, counting the money that was put into this money box.Ó 393 391 By 1982, the NBC had accumulated irrecoverable debts from parastatals of over 3 billion shillings ( Bank of Tanzania, Major Issues in Domestic Banking in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Bank of Tanzania, 1982), 5 Ð6). Clearly, parastatal such as the National Milling Corporation had not always made repayments on NBC loans. 392 Pauw, Das Bankwesen in Ostafrika , 132; Binhammer, The Development of a Financial Infrastructure in Tanzania , 39Ð41; Walter Tessier Newlyn, Money in an African Context (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 41 Ð44; Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War Period,Ó 212. 393 ÒBi Ruth Zakaria, mmojawapo wa wateja wanaotumia huduma za kuwek a fedha kwa njia ya visanduku (money boxes) akihesabu fedha zilizokuwa ndani ya kisanduku hicho.Ó Photograph provided by the Ministry of Information, Dar es Salaam. 150 While the nationaliz ation of banks in 1967 was a highly publicized political project understood to form a fundamental pillar of the socialist economy in Tanzania, the banning of pawnshops in March 1965 took place in almost complete silence. In their oral recollections of the past, however, Kariakoo resident s clearly remembered the ban of pawnshops. 394 In the eyes postcolonial state actors, pawnshops were a means of exploiting poor people and thus needed to be outlawed. The Post Office Savings Bank, on the other hand, continued t o exist after 1967 and, as a government institution, was little affected by the nationalization of commercial banks. Up until the 1970s and 1980s, many Kariakoo traders were holders of POSB accounts. Since POSB did not give out loans, traders mainly used t heir bank accounts as current and deposit accounts. However, the role of the POSB as an attractive savings bank declined somewhat after 1967. Although in 1980, there were more than twice as many POSB account holder in Tanzania than in 1966, the average amo unt of savings per account decreased. 395 This might have been due to the fact that the NBC also started to offer savings accounts, as they considered Òthe problem of educating the masses in this country to re -orient their saving habits towards using national saving institutions in preference to hoarding their money, whether under their pillows or in the ground is great.Ó 396 Similar to colonial attempts to educate people how to save, the socialist government aimed at teaching Tanzanians to take their money to th e bank. CONCLUSION Forty -two years had passed by since the enactment of the Credit to Natives Ordinance when the postcolonial government banned pawnshops in 1965. Thereby, the postcolonial government 394 Mzee Salum, interviewed by the au thor in Kiswahili, Manzese, Dar es Salaam, May 27, 2013 . 395 Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War Period,Ó 170 Ð171. 396 The National Bank of Commerce, Annals , 13. 151 carried out what the British colonial government had wa nted to do but had not dared do. However, postcolonial financial policies were more than simply a continuation of colonial policies. With the nationalization of banks in 1967, state actors gained a virtual monopoly on the allocation of credit, which they c onsidered a formidable and indispensable tool to create an economic system based on socialist principles. These developments made it even harder for ordinary Kariakoo residents to get a loan from a financial institution. They also put a stop to the late-colonial governmentÕs cautious attempts in the postwar years to make bank loans avai lable to enterprising Africans when government officials realized that the use of credit might help to create African entrepreneurs. By the mid -1960s, the conviction that ord inary urban residents could not be trusted with bank loans had won the day. Despite the hegemonic official discourse with regards to credit and saving in colonial and early postcolonial Dar es Salaam, urban residentsÕ attitudes towards credit and savings w ere not entirely guided by this official discourse. Borrowing money was a common practice among residents of Kariakoo although the vast majority did not have access to the banking institutions in Dar es Salaam. Residents used the services of pawnshops, ret ail shops, traders, and friends to save and borrow money and to buy goods on credit. These forms of creditor -debtor relations were embedded in moral discourses, as will be shown in the next two chapters with respect to trade credit in particular. Colonial and postcolonial government representatives also shared the belief that ordinary African s did not have the ability to save money and therefore needed to be taught to save money in personal bank accounts. Both European missionaries and colonial officials r egarded the use of credit as dangerous and morally corrupting and encouraged Kariakoo residents to save money so as not to become financially dependent on other people. The German Sparkasse as well as the British Post Office Savings Bank were created with the goal to encourage in Africans the spirit 152 and practice of thrift and planning ahead. After the socialist government had nationalized foreign banks, the state -owned NBC started their own savings campaigns, which resembled colonial campaigns to a consider able degree. Urban residents in colonial and postcolonial Kariakoo engaged in various ways of saving money and goods, both in collective and individualized form. Furthermore, many bank account holders lost their money in the First World War after the Germa n defeat. For these reasons, the Post Office Savings Bank only gained in attractiveness over time, especially in the late colonial period. When the POSB was opened in the early 1920s, however, urban residents did not avidly embrace the notion of putting th eir savings on personal bank accounts. 153 CHAPTER 3 ÑINTERWEAVING THREADS OF CREDIT: TEXTILES, TRADE, AND SHOPS IN COLONIAL DAR ES SALAAM AND SOCIALIST TANZANIA In a cartoon from a textbook on how to start and run a cooperative shop in socialis t Tanzania, a customer tells the salesperson ÒSell me a bag of maize flour on credit.Ó The salesperson responds ÒNo comrade, we donÕt sell on creditÓ (see figure 3.1). Figure 3.1: Cartoon in Duka la Ujamaa na Ushirika. ÒSell me a bag of maize flour on cr edit.Ó Ð ÒNo comrade, we donÕt sell on credit.Ó 397 The cartoon was accompanied by the following text: To offer customers credit to buy goods is not allowed under any circumstances in Socialist/Co -operative shops [maduka ya Ujamaa/Ushirika]. The main reason restricting us from providing credit is that, if goods leave the shop without being paid in cash, it will result in a lack of money to buy new goods at the wholesalers, who do not sell on credit. The shelves will remain empty until the money of goods, whic h were sold on credit, is returned. Furthermore, it is not good for a 397 Duka la Ujamaa na Ushirika, 1, Kuanzisha Duka . Mafunzo kwa njia ya posta (Moshi, Tanzania: Chuo Cha Uelimu ya Ushirika, n.d.), accessed at MUCCoBS library. 154 person to buy on credit the goods he or she needs. He or she can be tempted to buy more than the appropriate amount he or she needs. A lot of people, who buy everyday needs [mahitaji] on credit, increase their expenses to such an extent that they fail to pay their debts later on. Therefore, the members who contributed money to start the shop will have lost their money because credit causes the death of the shop. 398 Furthermore, the textboo k explains the sale of goods on credit increases the overall workload of the salesperson and the shop manager and it increases the expenses for books and papers. Therefore, the following rule should be observed, ÒThere is no credit for anyone.Ó 399 This adumb rates the socialist stateÕs efforts to reform retail shops i n the country, which culminated in Operation Maduka (ÒOperation ShopsÓ) in the mid -1970s. Questions of credit and debt formed a crucial aspect of these reforms and their ultimate failure. Shops, in Kis wahili maduka , had been at the center of economic policies since the late nineteenth century. They were the foil against which a supposedly better, more efficient, more just economic system could be created. Retail shops were the bone of contention t hat motivated the German colonial government to set up a Òmarket hall systemÓ rivaling the Ò duka system,Ó with limited success. In the interwar period, the British colonial government attempted to control shops in Dar es Salaam more tightly by forcing shop owners to use the Eng lish language for their ledgers, which prompted an 398 Duka la Ujamaa na Ushirika, 1, Kuanzisha Duka . Mafunzo kwa njia ya posta (Moshi, Tanzania: Chuo Cha Uelimu ya Ushirika, n.d.) , 81, accessed at MUCCoBS library. Translation from Kiswahili by the author. 399 Duka la Ujamaa na Ushirika, 1, Kuanzisha Duka . Mafunzo kwa njia ya posta (Moshi, Tanzania: Chuo Cha Uelimu ya Ushirika, n.d.), 82, accessed at MUCCoBS library. Translation from Kiswahili by the author. 155 almost two month -long strike by Dar es Salaam shopkeepers in April and May 1923. 400 The law was never enacted. After independence, the socialist government aimed to ban all the private retail shops and replace them with community -owned cooperative shops or ujamaa shops . At the height of these efforts in the mid -1970s, th e socialist government launched the above -mentioned Operation Maduka . Once again , the success was infinitesimal. For a long time and up to the late 1980s and early 1990s, colonial and postcolonial governments conceived shopkeepers as a problem or even a threat. Some colonial government official s suggested the entire duka system be eliminated because it was based on shopke epers ÒbarteringÓ textiles for agricultural produce. This resulted in African farmers having plenty of cloths but lacking cash to pay for taxes and supposedly without motivation to increase production. More optimistic government representatives in the late-colonial period asserted that the duka system and shopkeepers could be reformed. Once reformed , shopkeepers would act as a sort of catalyst and bring about desirable changes. For British government officials in the postwar period, shopkeepers had the pote ntial of transforming rural Africans into consumers of capital goods and monied taxpayers. The supply and showcasing of consumer goods in shops was to create new desires for consumer goods among the rural population, who in turn would farm more cash crops to be able to buy the desired goods. For the colonial governments, this had the doubly positive effect of enabling the population to pay taxes and increasing cash crops 400 Report on the District of Dar -es-Salaam District for the year 1923 by Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930;Ó Brennan and Burton, ÒThe Emergin g Metropolis: A History of Dar e s Salaam, circa 1862 -2000.Ó 156 for export. 401 In the eyes of socialist government representatives, on the other hand, properly educated managers of consumer cooperatives would eradicate and substitute ÒexploitativeÓ capitalist shopkeepers. Thus, g overnment campaigns to reform the retail sector run like a thread through the recent history of Dar es Salaam. The goal of this c hapter, however, is not to explain these campaigns but to investigate what they were aimed at: the modus operandi of the trade at shops in Dar es Salaam. The advancement of goods on credit and the underlying credit and debt relations, which formed veritabl e chains of credits, were the defining feature of the duka system as well as the reason for its longevity and persistence. To illustrate the concrete trade and credit relationships, the chains of credit, the various types of debt relation as well as the sc ales of credit and interest rates available to shopkeepers, I follow one particular commodity Ð textiles Ð and describe how it was traded in Dar es Salaam shops from the late nineteenth century onwards. The textile trade was done at shops and not at market s, and it was not based on cash payments but on credit and debt relations between wholesale traders, retail traders, and customers. Rather than relying on cash payments, textile traders incurred and cleared debts and they advanced and called in credit. The bigger a traderÕs business was, the larger the debts and loans were. To be indebted and to act as a creditor were constitutive elements of being a textile trader in Dar es Salaam. 401 Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika . 157 TRADING (THROUGH) TEXTILES KOPA , v. a. (ku kopa = ku vata, old languag e), (1) to take goods on credit, to be returned at a certain period, to borrow; e.g. , nimekŠpa mali kua Bani⁄ni kua mÕda wa mi”zi miwili, I have taken goods from the Banian on credit for two months. I intend to buy a piece of cloth worth 1! dollar, but I c annot pay the money immediately; thus the Baniani says, ÒI will give you the cloth for 2 dollars, but I do not want the money now, I give you mÕda ( an appointed space of time ) of four months .Ó By this means he gains ! dollar. The man who takes on credit mu st always pay more than the actual value is at present, but then he has not to pay immediately. Siku -nunœa ngœo hi, laken nime -i-kopa kua re⁄li mbili. [ I did not buy this cloth but I borrowed it for two reals .] The merchant gains on account of the mÕda. (2 ) To cheat, deceive, e.g., if the man who took money or goods on credit escapes to another country, which is frequently the case (mkŠpi). 402 Much has been written about the long history of production, trade, and consumption of textiles in East Africa and th e Indian Ocean world. On the East African coast, textiles and clothes were intricately linked to status and power and they were crucial for establishing and maintaining patron -client relations. 403 Scholars have also noted the cultural significance of textile s in East Africa, for instance with regards to kanga cloth s and their varying fashion styles and rapidly changing consumer tastes. 404 In late -colonial Dar es Salaam, Òthe donning of a kanzu is a simple but effective membership card enabling the country bumpk in to be accepted as a civilized man,Ó observed J. A. K. Leslie in the late 1950s and added, Òhere in town clothes make the man.Ó 405 I contribute to this scholarship by focusing on the rather more dull -looking single -colored kinds of textiles called kaniki and how the multiple and variable uses of these cloths as currency, means to store wealth, collateral for shop credit, and clothing was at the heart of credit based trade in 402 Krapf, A Dictionary of the Suahili Language , 171. 403 Jonathon Glassman, ÒThe BondsmanÕs New Clothes: The Contradictory Consciousness of Slave Resistance on the Swahili Coast,Ó Journal of African History 32, no. 2 (1991): 277 Ð312. 404 Laura Fair, Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post -Abolit ion Urban Zanzibar, 1890 -1945 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001). 405 Leslie, A Survey of Dar e s Salaam , 11, 110. 158 and out of Kariakoo. The very fact that cloth was used as the main medium of exchan ge shaped the entire trade or system of trade. Colonial officials occasionally misconstrued this credit -based trade as Òbarter trade.Ó They observed how Africans Òbarter cloth against wax, ghee, and native produceÓ in Kigoma and how ÒNatives selling stand ing crops to Indians almost invariably barter the crop for clothingÓ in Pangani. 406 Colonial officials also noted that African farmers accepted cloths as a form of payment for their agricultural produce when selling it to Asian shopkeepers. The value of thes e cloths would be only half of the agreed -upon price in rupees. 407 In the colonial imagination, this Òbarter tradeÓ was a highly undesirable system of trade because it enabled Asian shopkeepers to take advantage of African farmers. Furthermore, it made Afric an farmers less likely to pay taxes as farmers were not paid in an officially recognized currency but in cloth, which the colonial state could not easily expropriate. Barter trade thus constituted a nightmare for colonial officials. As shown in the next ch apter, colonial governments attempted to eradicate this Òbarter tradeÓ by forcing farmers to sell their produce for cash in officially recognized market halls. However, exchanging goods was not really barter trade when it involved textiles. On the one han d, exchanging cloth for agricultural products displayed the qualities of a medium of exchange, which was more widely accepted among Africans than official currencies like the Indian silver Rupee and the Maria Theresa Dollar. Textiles could be used to buy o ther items and they could be stored. On the other hand, textiles could be turned into clothing, be used in social functions such as funerals, and given away to clients in order to acquire or maintain the status of 406 Kigoma, January 22, 1923, and Pangani, February 1, 1923, TNA: AB.1030: ÒMarkets Ð Procedure regarding Dues etc.Ó 407 Der Kaiserliche Bezirksamtmann, Pangani, February 20, 1903, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 159 a patron. 408 Furthermore, textiles could be used as collateral in order to get credit from a shopkeeper. And they could also be given away to potential clients. The very convertibility of textiles contributed to their high demand, 409 and their use as the main medium of exchange shaped the entire syste m of trade as one being based on credit and personal relations rather than based on cash transactions betwee n anonymous market participants, as indicated in the quote at the beginning of this section. Ò[T]he Baniani says, ÔI will give you the cloth for 2 dollars, but I do not want the money now, I give you mÕdaÕ,Ó to which Krapf added Ò Siku -nunœa ngœo hi, laken nime -i-kopa kua re⁄li mbili. Ó410 The Kiswahili sentence was not translated in the original. The literal translation is ÒI did not buy this cloth but I borrowed it for two realsÓ so Òbuying on creditÓ is in Kiswahili expressed simply with ÒborrowingÓ when it involved textiles. The German and British colonial governmentsÕ insistence on cash payments needs to be examined in the context of the dominance o f credit -based trade transactions, which were highly personalized and relied on trust. Colonial efforts to monetize the economy were manifold. The supply of sufficient amounts of cash was a constant occupation of the German colonial administration. In orde r to make sure there was enough local cash in the colony, officials exchanged marks for rupees at the large trade companies such as Hansing & Co., OÕSwald & Co., and the Deutsch -Ostafrika Gesellschaft (DOAG) based in Zanzibar. When the colonial officials r ealized that the exchange rate was better in Bombay, they started to transport shiploads of copper coins from India to German East Africa through the Deutsch -Asiatische Bank . In 408 Miller describes for southwest Africa during the period of the Atlantic slave trade how Afric an rulers came to depend on foreign trade good such as cloths to sustain their clients and secure their status as patrons ( Miller, Way of Death ). 409 On the consumption of textiles in Mo mbasa, see Prestholdt, Domesticating the World . In a study from the mid -1950s on Nyasaland and T anganyika, Fergus Wright noted that Òthe only industrially manufactured commodities regularly consumed by virtually all the African households are textile productsÓ ( Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika , 57). 410 Krapf, A Di ctionary of the Suahili Language , 171. 160 regular intervals of about four months, up to 34 boxes containing up to 200,00 0 rupees were shipped from Bombay to Dar es Salaam at a time, where part of it was transferred to various regional administrative centers in the colony. 411 Despite these efforts there were times when the available cash was not sufficient to pay colonial emp loyees. During World War One, the salaries of 600 porters working on the battleship Kınigsberg could not be paid because of a lack of funds. This caused German soldier Freudenberger to act on his own initiative. He visited Asian shopkeepers in Dar es Salaa m and forced them to hand over their silver money, all while falsely presenting himself as acting on behalf of the government. The Asian shopkeepers took Freudenberger to court but they lost the case although everything spoke in their favor. They were decl ared not to be sane so their statements were deemed not valid. Still, the incident was upsetting for the colonial administration as a whole because it undermined their policy of making Asians feel save so they would take their silver money to the bank on a voluntary basis. 412 These colonial efforts to monetize the colonial economy illustrate the hard work involved in creating a money economy , which did not naturally replace a barter economy. 413 First of all, the economy on the Swahili coast in the nineteenth ce ntury was no2t exclusively based on barter trade but also involved complex debt relations . And secondly, copper coins did not naturally become the basis of an advanced economic system during the colonial period. Rather, the colonial government engaged 411 Letter by the Kaiserliche Gouverneur, Dar es Salam, May 22, 1900, TNA: G3/67: ÒBeschaffung des laufenden Bargeldbedarfes [fe Gouvernements -Hauptkasse zu Dar -es-Salaam, insbes. von Bankh−usern in Indien], Bd. 1 : 1891 -1900.Ó TNA: G3/68: ÒBeschaffung des laufenden Bargeldbedarfes [fe Gouvernements -Hauptkasse zu Dar -es-Salaam, insbes. von Bankh−usern in Indien], Bd. 2: 1900 -1903.Ó TNA: G3/69: ÒBeschaffung des laufenden Bargeldbedarfes [fe Gouvernements -Hauptkasse zu Dar -es-Salaam, insbes. von Bankh−usern in Indien], Bd. 3: 1903 -1910.Ó 412 Letter written in Dar es Salaam, August 17, 1915 and transcript of court proceedings, Dar es Salaam, September 7, 1915, TNA: G1/162: ÒJos. Freudenberger, 1915.Ó 413 Graeber debunks this myth created by Adam Smith and others ( Graeber, Debt ). 161 in t he laborious task of shipping entire bags full of coins across the Indian Ocean in order to make sure that their project of creating a cash economy would take off. In reality, the monetization remained partial and uneven. To make things more complicated, a multitude of currencies were in circulation at any given time. The Maria Theresa Dollar lost its attraction some time in the mid -nineteenth century as traders from South Asia increasingly used the Indian silver rupee. 414 When the Deutsch -Ostafrika Gesellsc haft was assigned the authority to issue copper and silver coinage in 1890, it decided to produce coins that corresponded to the Indian coins current in East Africa at the time. 415 Paper money was introduced in 1905 but the local population continued to pref er coins. During World War One, interim notes were issued to pay the salaries of soldiers and porters because the colonial government lacked silver currency. As the war wore on, the interim notes were devalued because of inflation. The Germans even suspect ed the British to have purposefully brought counterfeit paper currency into circulation in order to enhance inflation. 416 By the end of the war, the paper money had lost much of its value and peopleÕs faith in paper money had suffered a severe blow. 417 Shortly after World War One, German hellers, East African Florin cents, and the recently introduced Shilling cents were in circulation concurrently. 418 By the time of World War 414 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition in Germa n East Africa, c. 1884 -1914, 51, footnote 205. 415 Letter by R. W. Taylor, Currency Officer, Dar es Salaam, to the Secretary, East African Currency Board, London, June 2, 1922, TNA: AB.925: ÒGerman Currency.Ó 416 Report on the Origin and System of Paper Curre ncy, Its Issue, Circulation and Redemption in German East African, From 1 st January 1905 to 6 th June 1916, TNA: AB.925: ÒGerman Currency.Ó 417 M. J. Borcawen, Chairman of The Planters Association, T.T., Tanga, to the Chief Secretary, April 2, 1925, TNA: ÒAB. 203/Vol. II: Currency Board.Ó 418 Annual report on Dar -es-Salaam District for 1922 by F.W. Brett, Senior Commissioner, TNA library: ÒProvincial CommissionerÕs Reports Dar es Salaam District, 1921 -1930.Ó Letter by S. S. Davis, Currency Officer, Dar es Salaam, to the Secretary, East African Currency Board, London September 2, 1920, TNA: ÒAB.202/Vol. I: Currency Board.Ó 162 Two, the quality of some genuine coins in circulation was so low that allegations of the use of counterfeit money were difficult to evaluate, which, in turn, gave rise to rumors that many coins in circulation were not genuine. 419 All the while, the practice of melting down silver and copper coins for bracelets and other ornaments was reported t hroughout the colony. 420 By 1939, it had become so common the colonial government decided to outlaw it and imprison culprits for six months. 421 Meanwhile, local traders and farmers continued to rely on textiles as a universally acknowledged currency. What help ed to perpetuate the use of textiles as the preferred medium of exchange was the lack of access local traders had to cash credit. In 1931, one observer made the link between buying with the help of cloth or Òpiece goodsÓ and the unavailability to credit to local traders. ÒIt was considered that the growing practice of transactions in kind between buyers and native producers had many drawbacks. Central Markets, in which transactions had been normally in cash, had been abolished. On the other hand, itinerant traders, owing to the lack of credit, were unable to obtain cash and so purchase with piece goods etc. in lieu.Ó 422 The same year, a colonial official in Lindi noted ÒThe suggestion [by the Government] is that it be made illegal to deal in certain produce ex cept for cash. I do not think such legislation would have the desired effect. É Small traders are not using the cash medium because of the uncertain state of markets and the tightening up of credit. Small traders have not got cash and a simple direction to use cash which does not also ease the situation by striking at the underlying causes of the 419 Letter by E. Bellevue, Secretary, East Africa Currency Board, January 10, 1941, TNA: 25775/Vol. II: ÒImpounding of Counterfeit Currency.Ó 420 Annual Report for the Kauli Sub -District 1925, and Annual Report for the Kigoma District 1925, TNA: AB.57: ÒAnnual Report 1925, Kigoma District.Ó 421 April 11, 1939, TNA: 25775/Vol. I: ÒImpounding of Counterfeit Currency.Ó 422 Extract from a minute by H.E. th e Governor, August 18, 1931, TNA: 10138: ÒMarketing of Produce, System of.Ó 163 scarcity appears incapable of successful operation.Ó 423 A government directive on the marketing of produce stated ÒFor some time past owing to the restricted credit extended to the small Indian traders who handle the crops in the outlying districts the system of barter has once again crept in on a large scale and the number of sales of produce against cash during the past season was almost negligible with, I am given to understand, a resultant increased difficulty in the way of collection of taxes. The restriction of credit mentioned above has resulted in a decrease in the amount of money in circulation upcountry and this, to a certain extent, is proved by an increase in the number of promissory notes which have been paid by consignments of produce instead of in cash.Ó 424 So while farmers preferred to trade with the nearby shopkeeper s-cum -traders, these shopkeepers -cum -traders purchased agricultural goods in exchange for forwarding cloths to farmers before harvest because shopkeepers did not have access to cash loans. When good harvests were anticipated, e.g. the groundnuts in Tabora in 1925, shopkeepers acquired large amounts of textiles. 425 The availability of cloth was ac tually so important that it became a defining character of small traders. An example from the rice -producing Ulanga district around the town of Ifakara illustrates this point. In 1947, small traders in Ifakara protested against the Mr. Devjibhai Hindocha, whose company was afforded the monopoly in rice trading and milling. The company M/S D. K. Hindocha (Tanganyika) Ltd. was also involved in textile trade so they did not have to rely on smaller traders to trade textiles for rice. Smaller traders suggested t hey be appointed as 423 Letter by South Eastern, Lindi, December 30, 1931, to the Provincial Commissioner, TNA: 10138: ÒMarketing of Produce, System of.Ó 424 n. d. [1932?], TNA: 10138: ÒMarketing of Pro duce, System of.Ó 425 TNA: AB.46: ÒAnnual Report, Tabora District, 1925.Ó 164 buying agents but Hindocha did not agree to that, which left many small traders in despair. 426 ÒWhereas the traders are sitting melanchally [sic] in their shops watching the millers [large -scale traders] making huge profits out of the deb ris of the traders rights.Ó The way small traders expressed their grievances was to refer to the lack of access they had to textiles, the very basis of their business and livelihoods. They noted that ÒThe poor [traders] are not getting piece goods enough e ven to keep their bodies and souls to -gether.Ó 427 THE DUKA SYSTEM Like in the colonyÕs various regions, small shopkeepers -cum -traders in Dar es Salaam largely relied on cloth as a medium of exchange. In German and British colonial periods, textiles were tra ded mostly on credit basis in Dar es Salaam shops. This so -called duka system of trade was a thorn in the flesh of colonial administrations. The duka system of trade relied on personal relations between buyer and seller , respectively creditor and debtor, a nd it did not rely on cash transactions. Thus, colonial administrators found it difficult to control and proposed to replace it with what the market hall system based on what the Germans called Markthallenzwang , or Òthe obligation to sell at market halls,Ó nota bene for cash. Reading the various colonial documents on the market hall system against and along the grain makes visible the workings of the duka system and the intimate relations on which it relied. 426 The United Ulanga Produce Buyers Groups, Ifakara, to the District Commissioner, Mahenge, April 30, 1947, TNA: TNA: ACC 461/WF 12/Vol. IV: ÒControl of Rice and Paddy.Ó 427 March 27, [1 947?], Ulanga Merchant Association, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, TNA: ACC 461/WF 12/Vol. IV: ÒControl of Rice and Paddy.Ó 165 Colonial officers repeatedly, and as early as 19 02, observed and complained about the common practice of using textiles as medium of exchange. 428 The mere fact that the German market hall ordinance explicitly forbade trade deals on credit and only allowed transactions on cash basis indicates the prevalenc e of credit -based dealings in shops. As outlined above, transactions based on textiles had the characteristics of credit as well as cash dealings so the establishment of market halls was a way for the colonial administrations to fight credit -based trade re lations between traders, consumers, and producers. The government imagined the new policy to help regulate trade and tighten the stateÕs control over the economy, reduce the economic power and influence of Asian traders, protect the ÒnativesÓ from the Òexp loitiveÓ Asian traders, force local traders and producers to use cash for their market transactions and break up credit relations between farmers and shopkeepers, and incentivize people to use cash in general, which would make it easier for the government to collect taxes. This plan did not work out as intended as shown in the following chapter. One reason for the partial failure of the market hall system to replace the duka system was that traders on all levels of the chain formed constitutive parts of th e duka system. In German colonial times, for instance, German trading houses bought and sold goods on credit and with the help of textiles. Unsurprisingly, then, textiles were by far the most widely traded article, precisely because it acted as a medium of exchange as well as a basis for credit transactions. German traders carefully created and maintained relations of trust with Asian wholesalers and retailers, not always to the delight of the colonial administration. Occasionally, the large German trading houses OÕSwald & Co. and Hansing & Co. were accused of supporting Asian traders at 428 E.g. Dar es Salam, November 27, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 166 the expense of new entrants to the East African market from Germany. 429 German traders, on the other hand, perceived the market hall ordinance as a threat. 430 The Deutsch -Ostafr ikanische Gesellschaft (DOAG) lobbied against the implementation of the market hall ordinance. ÒBecause of the obligation to sell at market hall s, the farmer is driven to the cities , to the detriment of his economic situation, and in the urban market halls , there is the scrutiny and publicness of prices, credit, and clientele. Thus, with a few strokes of the pen, most massive interferences take place with existing pecuniary circumstances and with sensitive economic relations, which have been won through yea rs of diligence, and in the end, the cautious trading world will turn away from German East Africa.Ó 431 These Òsensitive economic relationsÓ between DOAG traders and local traders and producers were based on goods forwarded on credit. In Kilwa, DOAG and Hans ing & Co. were able to create a sort of monopoly on the trade of agricultural produce by regularly providing textiles to local traders on credit. 432 In Mahenge, DOAG engaged in similar practices and advanced goods to farmers and small traders on a regular ba sis and unsuccessfully asked the military station to help them collect debts. 433 429 Excerpt from Frankfurter Journal , December 2, 1891, TNA: ÒG8/75: Westdeutsche Handels - und Plantagengesellschaft. Bd. I: 1890 -1900.Ó See also Lutz J. Schwidder, Das Hamburger Kolonialhan delshaus Wm. OÕSwald & Co. und die Einfung von ÒTechnikenÓ in die Kolonien 1890 - 1914 (Hamburg: Diplomica, 2004). 430 Already during the times of the caravan trade, European traders had adopted local practices and gave porters cloths as advances of sala ries. Carl Velten wrote ÒIch É gab den Tr−gern ihren Lohn, einem jeden 6 gora [Stk Zeug von 30 engl. Ellen] Zeug und 5 farbige Ther. Sie fragten mich: ÔWohin sollen wir dafe Lasten tragen?ÕÓ ( Velten, Schilderungen der Suaheli , 1). 431 Gesch−ftsbericht der Deutsch -Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft zu Berlir das Jahr 1900, TNA: G8/69: ÒDeutsch -Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, Bd. 4: 1897 -1901.Ó Translated from German by the author. 432 Letter signed by D. K. G., Dar es Salaam, July 3, 1900, TNA: G8/69: ÒDeutsch -Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, Bd. 4: 1897 -1901.Ó 433 Lorne Erling Larson, ÒA History of the Mahenge (Ulanga) District, Ca. 1860 -1957Ó (University of Dar es Salaam, 1976), 83. 167 German traders imported various kinds of textiles to Dar es Salaam, including shawls, black and blue kaniki, ÒMascat goods,Ó kikoi, shuka, blankets, whites, and khakis. Nota b ene, they were not the first to do so. Rather, they competed with Asian traders, who had had a long history of bringing a variety of textiles to the East African coast. 434 With the onset of the colonial period, however, German businesspeople established them selves as the main importers of textiles. German traders located in Dar es Salaam regularly reported the commercial dealings of all the Dar es Salaam traders, gauged their creditworthiness, and set a maximum credit limit for each trader as the OÕSwald & Co . papers held at the Staatsarchiv in Hamburg nicely illustrate. The detailed assessments of Dar es Salaam tradersÕ creditworthiness and payment morale could take up to 13 pages in one report. While some Dar es Salaam traders were considered ÒtrustworthyÓ a nd Òcreditworthy,Ó others, like Ali Wali & Co., were Òvery easily offended and 434 Tharia Topan was the most successful of these traders in mid - to late -nineteenth century East Africa. Several European travellers including Henry Stanley reported how they bought goods to be used as gifts and trade in the interior from Tharia Topan. ÒZanzibar possesses it s ÒmillionairesÓ also, and one of the richest merchants in the town is Tarya Topan Ð a self -made man of Hindostan, singularly honest and just; a devout Muslim, yet liberal in his ideas; a sharp business man, yet charitable. I made TaryaÕs acquaintance in 1 871, and the righteous manner in which he then dealt by me caused me now to proceed to him again for the same purpose as formerly, viz. to sell me cloth, cottons, and kanikis, at reasonable prices, and accept my bills on Mr. Joseph M. Levy, of the Daily Te legraph. Honest Jetta, as formerly, was employed as my vakeel [agent] to purchase the various coloured cloths, fine and coarse, for chiefs and their wives, as well as a large assortment of beads of all sizes, forms, and colours, besides a large quantity of brass wire 1/8 inch in thicknessÓ ( Henry Morton Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Gradener, 1878), 63 Ð64); see also Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbai ne coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 38 Ð40). The nineteenth -century ivory and slave trade in East Africa were also often done through textiles and on the basis of credit, as several authors have noted ( Edward Alpers, Ivory and Slaves: Changing Pattern of International Trade in East Central Africa to the Later Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Abdul Sheriff, Slaves, Spices, and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration o f an East -African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770 -1873 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987); Deutsch, Emancipation Without Ab olition in German East Africa, c. 1884-1914, 35). Verney Cameron and Daniel Oliver noted that virtually every trade r in the interior owed money to the Asian customs official in Zanzibar, a post Tharia Topan occupied the late 1870s ( Cameron and Oliver, Across Africa , 24). 168 need[ed] to be treated accordingly.Ó 435 A typical assessment of a trustworthy trader read as follows, ÒNassur Rattonzi has been paying well, is now clear until the end of December . With rupee 60,000 his credit limit is by far not fully used. Unfortunately, he is very cautious with orders because he is ÔadamantÕ about going to Mecca again. We are trying to discourage him from going because we absolutely need him for our trade in kan ga cloths in these bad times. A credit limit should not be set for him. We can calmly risk even rupee 100,000 any time. His assets should be more than this sum.Ó 436 Poperty Pirabey was a less creditworthy trader, according to OÕswald & Co. ÒPoperty Pirabey o nce again paid dismally. He needs to remain at a credit limit of rupee 6,000 -8,000. He trades with Tabora, Dodoma, and Lindi, where he has good agents, which carries weight when it comes to the assessment of his creditworthiness. He also has a considerably higher credit limit with Mler and DOAG. His assets are supposed to stand at rupee 20,000. We have constantly been dunning him.Ó 437 OÕSwald & Co. was also in competition with other German trading houses when it came to the provision of credit. OÕSwald & Co . repeated complained about DOAG because they had a more expansive way of providing credit to customers, which made them more attractive in the eyes of local traders. 438 Some traders were clearly able to take advantage of the competitive situation in which t he German trading houses found themselves. Dar es Salaam trader Alibey Curji was estimated to owe rupee 50 -55,000 to Mler, rupee 15,000 to DOAG, and rupee 15 -20,000 to Hansing & Co. although he only had assets worth rupee 15 -20,000. Still OÕSwald & Co. w ere willing to provide him with a credit of 435 Bilanz -Brief, Dar es Salaam, December 31, 1909, Staatsarchiv Hamburg: 621 -1/147, 18 Ban d 7: ÒOÕswald & Co., Briefe von Dar es Salaam, 1910.Ó 436 January 31, 1914, Staatsarchiv Hamburg: 621 -1/147, 18 Band 8: ÒOÕswald & Co. 191 4, Briefe von Dar es Salaam,Ó 18. 437 January 31, 1914, Staatsarchiv Hamburg: 621 -1/147, 18 Band 8: ÒOÕswald & Co. 1914, Briefe von Dar es Sala am,Ó 22. 438 January 31, 1914, Staatsarchiv Hamburg: 621 -1/147, 18 Band 8: ÒOÕswald & Co. 191 4, Briefe von Dar es Salaam,Ó 4. 169 rupee 10,000. 439 So Alibey CurjiÕs volume of credit was 5 to 6 times higher than his assets. After World War One, Barclays and other banks partially took over the role as providers of credit to Dar es Salaam wholes alers and as assessors of their creditworthiness. 440 The chains of credit interconnected importers, wholesalers, small shopkeepers, itinerant traders , and end consumers. Dar es Salaam wholesalers were a crucial link in the chain as they were forwarded goods on credit from importers and they forwarded goods to retailers on credit. For them, to be a successful trader meant to set up numerous relations of credit and debt with clients as well as suppliers. As files on bankruptcy cases and inheritance cases in the Tanzania national archives reveal, the bigger the traders were, the more outstanding loans they had and the more loans they had given to other people. This was again due to the fact that business was not done on a cash basis but on a credit basis. As will be shown below, these chains of credit were not only a particular characteristic of Dar es Salaam trade in the colonial period but they also continued to be the dominant characteristic of trade in the postcolonial period. The example of the above -mentione d Ali Wali helps to illustrate the above point. Upon his death on June 28, 1910, the list of creditors was almost three pages and the list of creditors four and a half pages long. His debts amounted to a total of rupee 88,179.32. He owed money to the Germa n trading houses Hansing & Co. (rupee 13,229.14) and OÕSwald & Co. (rupee 10,949.52) but the majority of his debts were the sum of smaller amounts owed to Asian individuals. His debts also included a deposit of 600 rupee, which the local mosque had made to his store. While his debts were considerable, he was owed even more money by other people, namely a total of rupee 439 January 29, 1914, Staatsarchiv Hamburg: 621 -1/147, 18 Band 8: ÒOÕswald & Co. 1914, Briefe von Dar es Salaam. Ó 440 See half -yearly reviews on Tanganyika branches in BGA. 170 139,325.63. Among his debtors were many Asian individuals but also a lot of Europeans, 441 and the amounts owed to him ranged from 1 to 798 rup ees. The majority of the debtors were shopkeepers to whom Ali Wali forwarded goods like textiles on credit. His assets stood at rupee 86,181.88 but they were not in form of cash but in fixed assets such as houses. 442 Generally, the Dar es Salaam inheritance cases from the German colonial period indicate that traders did not run their businesses based on cash transactions but on the basis of debts and credi t. Successful tradersÕ goals were not to clear all the debts they had or to claim all the debt owed to th em. On the contrary, owing to the suppliers and being owed to by customers was a permanent aspect of being a trader in Dar es Salaam. 441 Colonial sources reveal a number of cases in which Asians acted as creditors for Europeans. Franck Raimbault notes that in the early 1890s, Khimji Jeram lent a Greek entrepreneur 5000 rupees. Th e goal was not so much to bring their European debtor in financial difficulty but to ensure access to their debtorsÕ social network, which could potentially be included in their market network ( Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine col oniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 231 (3) ). Europeans in Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, had access to a number of credit sources, some of which were highly questionable. One example was the so -called Bazar fund, which was mainly based on donations by the late Sewa Hadji, who intended the fund to be a welfare fund for the establishment of a leper station. The colonial administration turned the fund into a credit fund for businessmen such as German businessman von Burg, who borrowed mone y from the Bazar fund to invest in his ice factory. Von Burg subsequently went bankrupt and failed to repay the loans (TNA: G3/92: ÒVerwaltung [bzw. Kreditvergabe aus dem zur Errichtung eines Leprakranken -Asyls geschaffenen] Bazarfonds [auch Stiftung des I nders Sewa Hadji fin Lepra -Krankenhaus in Bagamoyo]. Bd. 2: 1906 -1912Ó). 442 TNA: G35/3: Ò[Verwaltung der] Nachl−sse [verstorbener Nichteurop−er]. 1910 -1912.Ó Some people also owned slaves who were sometimes Ð but not always Ð manumitted at the occasion of the masterÕs death. When Dar es Salaam resident Mkarafu binti Bakari died in October 1911, Amana and her child Gundumu claimed that they were promised to be manumitted when her master died (Dar es Salaam, October 26, 1911, TNA: G35/3: Ò[Verwaltung der] Nachl−sse [verstorbener Nichteurop−er]. 1910 -1912Ó). The manumission was not automatic as the German colonial administration never outlawed slavery ( Deutsch, Emancipation Without Ab olition in German East Africa, c. 1884-1914). 171 This was also true for shopkeepers in colonial Dar es Salaam, who often ran their shops as family businesses with long op ening hours. 443 In the Kariakoo neighborhood, selling goods on credit was a way for Asian shopkeepers to establish and maintain their membership in neighborhood sub -communities, as shown in chapter 1. Furthermore, knowing how to sell on credit was an importa nt skill in an environment like Kariakoo where customers generally had very little cash at their disposal. 444 In addition, shopkeepers supplied hawkers with clothes for sale in urban neighborhoods. 445 Long -standing Kariakoo residents vividly remembered these walking street traders and called them wanguonguo, Òthe clothes people.Ó They were typically of Arab origin and they walked through Kariakoo with clothes thrown over their shoulders selling them to urban households on credit. ÒBack in the days, these Arabs were called wanguonguo,Ó Mzee Salum , who had spent the majority of his long life living in Kariakoo and trading rice at the Kariakoo market hall, explained. ÒThey walked around in the streets. He puts the clothes like 443 A government committee reported in 1937 that Òa large number of businesses in Dar es Salaam are run by the owners themselves wit h the help of relatives and dependentsÓ (Report of the Committee appointed by Government to enquire whether the Interests of Shop Assistants are sufficiently and adequately protected by the Shop Assistants (Employment) Ordinance, March 2, 1937, TNA: 25080: ÒShop Assistants Employment Ordinance, Amendments toÓ). 444 For Dar es Salaam in the German colonial period, see Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 128. For East Africa in the German and th e British colonial periods, see Gregory, South Asians in East Africa , 102Ð108. Even in upcountry towns like Mahenge, Asian shopkeepers supplied goods on credit to African traders during the interwar period ( Larson, ÒA History of the Mahenge (Ulanga) District, Ca. 1860 -1957,Ó 358 Ð359). A Mahenge merchant named Abdulgan Gulamali made clear that a certain ÒYusufu Mkumba works as a shopkeeper in his own name. He buys the goods on credi t at my shop [ÒMali anakopa kwanguÓ] so he is not my clerkÓ (Letter by Abdulgan Gulamali, to the District Officer Mahenge, August 22, 1930, TNA: ACC 461/5/4: ÒMarket and Trading Correspondence,Ó translated from Kiswahili by the author). Like many other loc al traders, Yusuf Mkumba was not an employed agent selling things and goods on commission but an independent trader who bought his goods from his supplier on credit. 445 These credit arrangements between shopkeepers and hawkers also existed in upcountry Tang anyika, where ÒA small merchant carrying only a small stock in his shop may have a dozen hawkers touring the country with thousands of rupees worthÓ (Letter by the District Political Officer to the Secretary of the Administration, April 26, 1919, TNA: AB.1 21: ÒHawkersÓ). 172 this and like that [he pretends to thr ow clothes over his left and right shoulder], and heÕs ready to walk. He goes to every house. He sells on credit. Back then, Arabs were not rich, they only had a little bit of money. And they themselves took the goods from the Indians on verbal promise.Ó 446 Once the hawkers collected the money from their customers, they paid the shopkeepers the agreed -upon price. 447 These hawkers were the last chain of the textile trade, which interlinked importers, wholesalers, shopkeepers, hawkers , and customers in relations of credit. Shopkeepers in Dar es Salaam themselves had little capital but they had the advantage of having access to various forms of loans. As mentioned above, European trading houses generally provided them with textiles on credit. 448 Some Asian traders i n Dar es Salaam also had access to loans available at their respective religious community. Despite the significant class differences within the Asian community, which separated poorer shopkeepers in Kariakoo from wealthy traders in the downtown area, reli gious events regularly brought together members of the same 446 Mzee Salum, interview with the autho r in Kiswahili . See also Philemon Mbaganile, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, May 17, 2013 . 447 Wanguonguo were an early form street trading, which ha s become much more widespread nowadays. Itinerant traders in Dar es Salaam are now referred to as wamachinga , which is a Kiswahili -ized version of the English Òmarching guyÓ ( Colman Titus Msoka, ÒInformal Markets and Urban Development: A Study of Street Vending in Dar e s Salaam, TanzaniaÓ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 2005) ). In present -day Kariakoo, wamachinga occu py a very prominent but contested place. At times, they are the victims of nasty attacks by the police units FFU (Field Force Unit, locally referred to as Fanya Fujo Uone , Òcommit nuisance and you will seeÓ) attempting to Òclean upÓ the city. Nevertheless, wamachinga are omnipresent in Kariakoo and they are very audible as well. The cigarette and peanuts selling wamachinga use 5, 10, and 20 shilling coins, which have very little value, line them up in one hand, and move them back and forth in order to crea te a clinking sound. They usually come up with and repeat a particular rhythm while walking the streets of Kariakoo, which has the effect of adding the never -ending sound of clinking coins to the sounds of market pitchmen, hooting cars, and radios in Karia koo. Furthermore, customers usually call wamachinga by the things they sell. It is normal for someone trying to buy a cigarette to call the guy selling the cigarette Ò sigara !Ó The same applies to Ò chungwa !Ó (ÒorangeÓ), Ò ndizi !Ó (ÒbananaÓ), Ò kahawa !Ó (Òcoff eeÓ), etc. The most interesting product name is ÒKariakoo,Ó which refers to plastic bags with the brand name Kariakoo. 448 See also Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó 128 Ð129. 173 religious groups. The Ismaili Khojas even founded the Tanganyika Ismailia Co -operative Society in 1937/38, which acted as a sort of credit society for members of the religious community. 449 Shopkee pers often relied on rich merchants to borrow money to start their business. 450 However, they were not always able to pay back the money in time. Novelist M. G. VassanjiÕs Ismaili Khoja family, for example, would not have been able to open their first shop i n Kariakoo without the help of credit. 451 When his mother was unable to pay back the money in time, creditors made use of the social neighborhood world to challenge the familyÕs reputation in the neighborhood and to pressure shopkeepers to pay back the money owed. 452 Not all Dar es Salaam residents consider ed the relatively easy availability of credit for Asian shopkeepers desirable . Already in the 1930s, Mr. Chitale of the Tanganyika Merchants Conference, which mainly represented small traders, portrayed exis ting systems of credit as benefiting the lending institutions while impoverishing the growing number of small traders, thus exposing the rift between small shopkeepers and rich merchants. Chitale argued that rich Ismaili Khojas, by providing Òeasy creditÓ to small traders, were responsible for an unhealthy competition amongst small shopkeepers. The existing system of credit was devastating because it 449 Shirin Walji gives an example of a family that was able to expand a small shop in Kariakoo with the help of the Tanganyika Ismailia Co -operative Society ( Walji, ÒA His tory of the Ismaili Community in Tanzania,Ó 169 ). In 1951, the Ismailia credit society in Dar es Salaam had a membership of 1795 people and gave a total of pound 39,364 as loans to members, mainly for trading purposes (TNA library: ÒReport on Co -operative Development For the Year 1951Ó). In 1953, the renamed Diamond Jubilee Investment Fund was reported to have provided loans to Ismaili Khojas active in retail trade, and loans to members stood at pound 38,223 (TNA library: ÒReport on Co -operative Developmen t For the Year 1953Ó). 450 AfricansÕ lack of access to theses sources of credit is one of the reasons for the extremely low number of shopkeepers in colonial Dar es Salaam. 451 M. G. VassanjiÕs novels The Gunny Sack and Uhuru Street describe the authorÕs expe riences growing up as a child of an Ismaili Khoja shopkeeper in late -colonial Kariakoo . 452 Vassanji, The Gunny Sack , 53. 174 allowed for the number of traders and shopkeepers to grow to such an extent that the competition among trade rs became unbearable. And I must say very frankly that the real offenders in this respect were the indenting houses and the importers who in the hope of increasing their sales gave each credit to all and sundry with the result that there was too much manuf acture in the market and too many merchants competing with each other to sell it with an eye on the due date of Hundi. 453 In quite a number of cases merchants have been forced to sell their stock at below cost to keep their credit in tact by meeting the Hund i on due date. This state of things would never have happened if credit in the beginning has been given sparingly and with discrimination. But such discrimination can only be exercised by large indenting houses and wholesale businessmen. A small merchant c an not be blamed for buying goods beyond his capacity if such goods are offered to him on easy credit. Such extention [sic] of credit leads to losses beyond the strength of the small merchant to bear with the result that as soon as credit is stopped or cur tailed he is unable to survive. It is this pernicious system of extention of credit which I have to bring to your notice and I am convinced in my own mind that a great deal of our present trouble is due to this fact. If our merchants had done their busines s on strictly cash basis making credit as an exception and not a rule our merchants would have been much better off. Our credit system is the root cause of cut -throat competitions. Until we have this grave defect we shall never prosper as we should and des erve. It is my earnest request to the small traders, therefore, never to buy on credit and in any case never to sign a Hundi. 454 In addition to making visible the frictions within the Asian community, ChitaleÕs remarks point to the impact of competition on shopkeepers and the urban neighborhood community as it caused them to have an Òunreasonable jealousyÓ towards their neighbors and family members. Instead of appreciating oneÕs neighborÕs commercial success, small -scale traders started to view their neighbo rÕs success as being based on unjustified forms of doing business. He regarded jealousy, which had been exacerbated by the credit system and competition, as a danger for neighborhood communities and families. 455 ChitaleÕs allegations of economic exploitation point to the fact that 453 A hundi was a promissory note widely used among Asian traders. 454 BNA: Public Records Office, CO 691/133/9. 455 BNA: Public Records Office, CO 691/133/9. For a similar argument about the effects of microcredits in the el-Hirafiyeen neighborhood in present -day Cairo, see Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession , 217. 175 the provision and utilization of credit was embedded in moral discourses at various societal levels. Therefore, discussions about the ÒproperÓ and ÒimproperÓ use of credit expose the intricate links between shopkeepersÕ business beh avior and their claims to membership in the urban neighborhood, which was certainly more difficult for shopkeepers of Asian descent as they were entangled in long -standing discourses portraying them as bloodsuckers and exploiters .456 OPERATING SHOPS AND SHO PKEEPERS After independence and the proclamation of Tanzania as a socialist state , the role of the state in the textile trade and production increased considerably. Newly established textile mills became a source of national pride and symbols of self -reli ance. The parastatal National Textile Corporation (TEXCO) had a weekly radio program, which opened with the question ÒWho is responsible for clothing in our nation ?Ó Ð ÒTEXCO!Ó 457 A short story entitled Pamba Yamrudia Mkulima was completely devoted to teachi ng the reader the value of the Urafiki Textile Mill and how it contributed to TanzaniaÕs self -sufficiency. 458 National and regional distributors, cooperative shops, and factory shops were supposed to completely take over textile retailing from private shops. While the German and British colonial government aimed at replacing the duka system with a market hall system, the socialist government sought to nationalize and reform the duka system. The nationalized bank NBC set aside loans for cooperatives and assessed their creditworthiness. The pinnacle of the government efforts to reform the duka 456 Already at the end of the late nineteenth century, the British described Asian shopkeepers in East Africa as bloodsucking shopkeepers (Richa Nagar, ÒThe South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold,Ó Comparative Studies of South Asian, Africa and the Middle East xvi, no. 2 (1996): 65 ). Missionaries residing in colonial Dar es Salaam likewise contributed to these discourses and portrayed Asian retailers as defrauding usurers (Engelberger, Der Missionsbote ). 457 Daily News , January 5, 1984. 458 Wafanyakazi wa Kiwanda cha Nguo cha Urafiki. Pamba Yamrudia M kulima (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Pub. House, 1976). 176 system was the so-called ÒOperation Maduka.Ó Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa announced in mid-February 1976 that all private shops in ujamaa villages be closed by the end of the month. KawawaÕs launching of the operation followed his visit to the Kilombero Sugar Company estate, where he learned that two co -operative shops faced strong competition by private shops. 459 The launching of the operation came as a surprise for many o rdinary Tanzanians. However, KawawaÕs policy announcement did not completely appear out of the blue. Kawawa was frustrated with the mixed results of villagization and economic growth in Tanzania. He was also familiar with the problems of price hiking, blac k marketeering, smuggling, and hoarding. And he may have considered the establishment of co -operative shops and the scapegoating of private traders as solutions to all these problems. Therefore, depicting the launching of Operation Maduka merely as a spont aneous act of the prime minister would mean to overlook long -standing discourses and feelings antagonistic to shopkeepers. The socialist rhetoric used during the implementation of Operation Maduka intersected with longer -standing discourses of exploitativ e behavior. Executors of Operation Maduka could draw on portrayals of shopkeepers as exploiters of ordinary people to legitimize the launching of the operation. When Operation Maduka was launched in February 1976, traders in general and Asian shopkeepers i n particular had long become entangled in discourses portraying them as bloodsuckers and exploiters. Already at the end of the late nineteenth century, the British described Asian shopkeepers as bloodsucking dukawallah .460 As Asian shopkeepers Ð mainly Ismai li Khojas Ð successfully established a widespread network of shops reaching from the coast to the interior during the colonial period, these stereotypes were perpetuated by colonial state 459 Daily News , February 19, 1 976. President Nyerere and government ministers did not seem to have been directly involved in the launching of the operation. 460 Nagar, ÒThe South Asian Diaspora in Tanzan ia: A History Retold,Ó 65. Dukawallah is the Hindi word for Òshopkeeper.Ó 177 actors and were carried over into the postcolonial period, 461 for inst ance when marketing co -operatives were established in the late -colonial and early -postcolonial periods, which were mainly aimed at breaking the Asian monopoly in the wholesale trade. In 1972, the Daily News described private shopkeepers as Òcapitalists and racketeers who hoarded commoditiesÓ and as exploiting Òthe toiling masses.Ó 462 Likewise in the months immediately before the launching of Operation Maduka, the Daily News newspaper was filled with stories about dishonest shopkeepers. Some shopkeepers were f ined for over - or underweighting goods, others for hoarding goods and selling them for prices that were higher than the ones recommended by the government. Black marketeers as well as the growing number of street hawkers and owners of food kiosks were incr easingly perceived as a problem. Many newspaper articles pertaining to traders continued to make recourse to the language of exploitation, which had become so intricately linked to private traders, even as the racial identification of shopkeepers as Asians was no longer made explicit. 463 In an attempt to stop the exploitative and anti -socialist behavior of private traders, the Tanzanian state introduced price controls, nationalized the internal wholesale trade in 1971, and established the National Price Comm ission in 1973. The number of products under price control rose from three (rice, wheat flour, and bread) in 1965 to one thousand in 1973 to over three thousand in 1978. 464 Therefore, Operation Maduka was only the last of a number of government initiatives t o curtail the economic power of private entrepreneurs. In fact, even the idea of 461 Ibid. 462 Daily News April 27, 1972, cit. in Ibid., 69. 463 Daily N ews , October 3, October 10, October 14, October 17, November 11, December 12, 1975, February 2, 13, 1976. However, the language of exploitation could also be employed by people to criticize the conduct of co -operative shops (see Daily News , November 9, 197 5). 464 T. L. Maliyamkono and Mboya S. D. Bagachwa, The Second Economy in Tanzania (London: James Currey, 1990), 84 Ð86. The practice of price control dates back to the colonial period as the colonial state issued Special Price Control Ordinances in 1 920 and 1951. 178 ujamaa or co -operative shops was not new in the 1970s. KarumeÕs government in semi-autonomous Zanzibar had already nationalized the retail trade and established peopleÕs shops in 1967. On the mainland, there was a government campaign immediately after independence to replace private shops with communally -owned shops. The campaign was a failure as Nyerere himself acknowledged in 1967. 465 Given the similarities with Operation Madu ka in 1976, it is worth examining the early -1960s campaign on the mainland more closely. Like Operation Maduka fifteen years later, the government aimed at establishing communally -owned retail shops in order to make private shops redundant. Following Nyere reÕs ideology of ujamaa laid out in a speech in 1962, communally -owned shops would give people the control over the distribution of goods and get rid of the potentially exploitative middlemen. Already in November 1958, Nyerere and Kawawa in fact opened a Ò Workers Co -operative Retail ShopÓ at the intersection of Mchikichi Street and Livingstone Street in Kariakoo. 466 However, the chances for success were small right from the outset. The government was familiar with a study published in 1962, which concluded th at Òthe distribution system in Tanganyika is a low -cost distribution systemÓ and even Òone of the most competitive on price of any system in the worldÓ because wage levels were low and traders managed to keep their overheads down to the very minimum. Ò[M]o st shopkeepers are prepared to carry on a small retail business in return for a very low level of income indeed.Ó 467 Most businesses were small family businesses, which tended to have none or few employees. 465 Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1968), 154. 466 Mwafrika newspaper , November 8, 1958. 467 Econom ist Intelligence Unit (Great Britain), A Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1962), 170, 175; Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism , 154. The Economist Intelligence Unit survey did, however, poi nt to one area where shopkeepersÕ practices needed to be reformed. Instead of bargaining, they should introduce and stick to fixed prices. 179 Furthermore, family members often worked very long hours and spent little money and time on overhead costs such as paper work. 468 Thus, the costs of retail trade would be very difficult to beat and consumer goods would not become cheaper even if the new co -operative shops were successful. Nevertheless, the g overnment was not satisfied with the existence of private traders and decided to launch the campaign to establish consumer co -operative shops in towns and mainly in Dar es Salaam. 469 To be sure , the campaign had strong racial overtones as the majority of ret ail traders in Tanganyika at the time were of Asian descent. 470 Ultimately, it was a complete failure as shops were poorly managed and the salary expenses were too high. 471 Despite its failure, the campaign had situated the term ujamaa shops or co -operative s hop within the socialist vocabulary. This language was upheld throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In a presidential address in 1967, Nyerere proposed that ÒThe best way to deal with this problem [of an exploitative distribution system] is for people to e stablish their own co -operative shops, controlled by them, where they can see the real cost of obtaining something at a convenient placeÓ and that if Òa village community, or the people in a group of streets, decided to start their own shop on an ujamaa ba sis; then it would really be their ÔownÕ shop to which they had a loyalty. They could jointly decide what type of things they wanted to be available and they could arrange to share in the work, the expenses, and the profits of the shop they were using.Ó 472 Two years later, Nyerere stated that Òlocally -based co -operative retail shops will get every encouragement from the Government and after they have proved their ability to serve our people 468 Economist Intelligence Unit (Great Britain), A Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika , 171. 469 Ibid., 193; Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism , 154. 470 Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976), 73 Ð74. 471 Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism , 154. 472 Ibid., 154Ð155. 180 so co -operatives will gradually take over the larger part of retail t rading.Ó 473 Therefore, the language of ujamaa shops could be readily employed by government officials, shopkeepers, and customers in 1976. A Daily News reader writing in October 1975, for example, suggested that people could draw on their experiences from th e early 1960s to establish ujamaa shops now. 474 The government continued to encourage the formation of consumer shops throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In November 1975, four months before the start of Operation Maduka, the Regional TANU Executive Committee in Mbeya decided that Òall essential consumer commodities should be sold in all co -operative or ujamaa consumer shops in the village s. É The committee also directed that copies of price lists should be distributed to all Party and Government offices and to a ll co -operative and Ujamaa consumer shops in the region.Ó 475 Two months later, the Regional Party Executive Secretary in Rukwa called on leaders in ujamaa villages to wage war against individual businesses and support co -operative undertakings. 476 Private shop s were banned in Liwale District weeks before the launching of Operation Maduka in February 1976. 477 And just one week before the operation started, a Daily News reader from Tanga set the stage for the operation by comparing in great detail his experiences o f being a customer in a private shop and in a co -operative shop. The letter deserves a somewhat lengthy quote: If one walks into a shop nowadays he very often stands there without anybody showing concern and when somebody finally does show any concern usu ally it is in a very unbecoming manner, sometimes giving the impression that one is 473 Julius K. Nyerere, Kupanga ni Kuchagua = To Plan Is to Choose: Presidential Address to the National Conference of Tanganyika African Nation al Union Dar es Salaam - 28th May, 1969 (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1969), 31. 474 Daily News newspaper , October 28, 1975. 475 Daily News newspaper, November 27, 1975. 476 Daily News newspaper January 26, 1976. 477 Daily News newspaper February 18, 1976: ÒLiwale District banned privately owned shops several weeks ago.Ó 181 disturbing the shopkeeper. Very often, you are rudely confronted with the question ÒWhat do you wantÓ should one want to buy an article then one had to keep requesting and begging as if they are not paying for it. The answer to the begging is usually a rude one and usually contains an answer like Ð ÒItÕs so many shillings, do you have it?Ó I really get annoyed by the attitude of our shopkeepe rs. Admittedly, I get some relief when I go to co -operative shops where there are two or three workers. The case here is a bit different because at least somebody asks politely. ÒWhat can I do for youÓ Again someone is usually concerned enough to tell you the situation of whatever you wan t and this shows people are caring for whatever they are doing. É The prices in our co -operative shops are fixed although some articles are sold at prices a bit higher than in some shops. In this way the exploitation of man by man is kept at the lowest. É in the co -operative shops É people are served from a queue as they arrive. 478 The timing and content of the letter cast doubt on whether the letter was actually written by an ordinary reader of the Daily News or rather formulated by a person who was familia r with the impending launching of Operation Maduka. After all, the Daily News was a government -owned newspaper. Certainly, these letters and articles helped to discursively set the stage for the launching of Operation Maduka. 479 478 Daily News newspaper, February 12, 1976. In a study on the control of retail prices published in 1967, Helen Kimble and Ole M¿lg„rd Andersen come to the surprising conclus ion that contrary to the governmentÕs view that price control was a means to prevent the bargaining shopkeeper from exploiting customers, the practice of bargaining in Tanzania actually works in favor of poor customers because ÒIt may be that the lower of the two prices is Òtoo lowÓ (because if all items were sold at that price the trader could not cover his overheads), just as the higher price may be Òtoo highÓ. In fact, it can be argued that the discrimination practised by traders often works to be positi ve advantage of the poorer consumers, and that it can be regarded as a more effective means of equalisation than a system of fixed prices .Ó Kimble and Anderson go as far as calling bargaining shopkeepers as Òpractising a simple form of socialism in the sal e of their goodsÓ ( Helen Kimble and Ole M¿lg„rd Andersen, The Control of Retail Prices in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, University College, 1967), 23, emphasis added ). An earlier study comparing bargaining and fixed prices came to the conclusion that the system of bargaining created feelings of distrust between customers and shopkeepers, which helped to perpetuate the ster eotype of the exploitative shopkeeper ( Economist Intelligence Unit (Great Britain), A Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika , 177). 479 Political scientist Roger Yeager refutes the idea that policies initiated by Kawawa were arbitrary and spontaneous. Coining the term ÒKawawa Formu laÓ and contrasting it with the ÒNyerere Formula,Ó which lays emphasis on democracy, equality, and socialism, Yeager argues that since the time of the struggle for independence and the immediate independence period, Kawawa and other members of the TANU est ablishment applied the tactic of setting impossible 182 After KawawaÕs announcement o f Operation Maduka, numerous articles were published about the successes and failures of the operation. While the initial articles talked about the operation exclusively in terms of a rural enterprise of establishing peopleÕs shops in ujamaa villages, the language quickly changed and the operation was to be applied to both rural and urban areas. A comparison of how shops located in urban areas such as Dar es Salaam and shops in rural areas were written about in Daily News articles in the context of Operatio n Maduka, is illustrative. In June 1976 a certain Jokati from Morogoro wrote the following letter to the editor of the government -owned Daily News newspaper: Now, was the ÒOperation MadukaÓ for example, primarily meant for closing private shops and only s econdary for opening effective cooperative shops? Who said we have to set fire to the lice -infected hair in order to remove all the lice and still remain alive? What is the rationale, the logic and integrity of closing down 90 private shops and only openin g one cooperative shop instead? Such decisions, as made by our regional leaders in the areas where Operation Maduka has been a torture rather than a relief to the people, just emphasise the fact that proper practical decisions are rare if not absent. 480 Jok atiÕs scathing evaluation of Operation Maduka was published only four months after Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa had launched it. The operation was presented as an integral part of ujamaa , which aimed at turning Tanzania and Tanzanians into a socialist soc iety free of exploitation, inequality, and foreign dependency. Operation Maduka was designed to reform the goals for achievement in a very short period of time. Although the full accomplishment of the stated goals is not expected to be reached, this tactic promised to bring about more progress to -wards the sta ted goal than implementing policies in a more bureaucratic and orderly way. Yeager calls KawawaÕs tactic a rather typical expression of a new class of African elites, whose power rested on political power and an oligarchic conception of political organizat ion (Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 49 Ð50, 70). Gıran Hyd”n us es the example of Operation Maduka to show how civil servants were unable to act in a concerted manner to defend their class interests. Rather, they were Òthrown out of gearÓ and overwhelmed by the bold policy initiatives put forward by politicians such as Kawawa. However, civil servants were still able to influence the shaping of policy programs, although not as a social class ( Gıran Hyd”n, ÒAdministration and Public Policy,Ó in Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania , by Joel D. Barkan (New York: Praeger, 1984), 103 Ð24). 480 Daily News newspaper, June 21, 1976. 183 retail trade by replacing private shops with communally -owned shops. Rather than evaluating the success or failure of Operation Maduka, 481 I suggest to examine the discussions about and around Operation Maduka as part of a larger discourse of Tanzanian socialism. In order to make sense of an environment increasingly marked by economic hardship, various state and non -state actors applied discursive tools within the hegemonic discourse of socialism to subvert and criticize the state and state programs. Over time, the hegemonic discourse of socialism was itself changing. JokatiÕs markedly critical comment on the implementation of a socialist campaign, for instance, would not have been possible before May 1976, when president NyerereÕs public denounced local officers, who implemented the operation by simply closing down all private shops, as enemies of TanzaniaÕs policy o f socialism and self -reliance. NyerereÕ s intervention changed the ways in which Operation Maduka was discussed in the newspapers and opened a discursive space for non -state actors to use the rhetoric of socialism to evaluate and criti cize state actors and programs. 482 Once it was started, Operati on Maduka was to be applied to all corners of Tanzania. In reality, however, private shops continued to exist, and their existence could be more easily legitimized in some circumstances than others . There were considerable differences between the ways in w hich the operation was envisioned in the nationÕs commercial center of Dar es Salaam 481 Various scholars of Tanzania have come to the unanimous conclusion that Operation Maduka was a failure. See for instance Deborah Fahy Bryceson, Food Insecurity and the Social Division of Labour in Tanzania 1919 -85 (London: Macmillan in association with St Anto nyÕs College, Oxford, 1990), 211; Nagar, ÒThe South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold,Ó 71; Tripp, Changing the Rules , 94Ð95. The Tanzanian government did not consider Operation Maduka a failure at the time. It pointed to the fact that only six months after the start of the operation, at the end of August 1976, over 2,000 co -operative shops had been established throughout the country ( Daily News newspaper, August 30 and September 22, 1976). 482 Ivaska makes a similar argument in his analysis of Operation Vijana in the 1960s (A ndrew Ivaska, Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar e s Salaam (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011) ). 184 and smaller towns and villages in other parts of the country. In December 1975, barely two months before the start of the operation, a new market complex was opened in the Kariakoo neighborhood of Dar es Salaam. The new structure replaced the market built at the end of the German period in 1914 and was meant to serve as the primary wholesale market in the city of Dar es Salaam and the nation as a whole. In its effort to con trol and regulate the wholesale trade, the state attempted to centralize all wholesale trades in one location. The three -floor Kariakoo Market complex constructed at the height of the socialist era also provided commercial spaces for shops. At its inaugur ation in 1975, the new market complex was presented as a modern shopping center, which would make shopping easier for urban dwellers as all items necessary for everyday needs were located under one roof. Shop spaces were rented to various institutions, whi ch sold goods like textiles, stationery, pharmaceuticals, and household appliances. In president NyerereÕs view, the new market building symbolized socialist modernity and encapsulated an economic system free of exploitation and inequality. 483 The modern soc ialist marketing system was most visible on the upper floor of the building where shoppers could stroll along shop windows and glance at shoes, clothes, textiles, stationery, pharmaceuticals, and household appliances. The majority of these shops were owned and run by cooperatives and parastatals such as the Urafiki Textile Mill and Ubungo Farming Implements. Private shopkeepers, on the other hand, were largely absent as they were to be replaced by publicly owned marketing entities, according to the new soci alist economic policy. 484 Only two 483 German and British colonial discourses demonizing South Asian traders and middlemen as exploiters of helpless Afric an farmers were powerful in East Africa and considerably shaped colonial policies in Deutsch -Ostafrika and Tanganyika. In postcolonial Tanzania, the image of the Indian exploiter and petty bourgeois continued to influence policies, e.g. the acquisition of buildings in 1971 and the nationalization of companies ( Oonk, Settled Strangers ; Brennan, Taifa ; Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania ). 484 See chapter 3. 185 months after the opening of the new Kariakoo market hall, Operation Maduka was launched and underlined the socialist characteristics the new market hall in Kariakoo. A Daily News advertisement for shops in the Kariakoo mark et stated that public corporations, branches of parastatals, and co -operative societies would be given top priority. 485 However, private shops were never banned in the main building ,486 which points to the stateÕs unwillingness to strictly enforce Operation Ma duka in Dar es Salaam. 487 Generally speaking, Operation Maduka in Dar es Salaam did not take the form of the enforced closure of private shops as happened in certain rural areas described below . Rather, the government merely encouraged the establishment of c o-operative shops by providing the incentive of centrally located spaces. 488 While state violence directed against private shopkeepers was more or less absent in Dar es Salaam during Operation Maduka in 1976, it had been all the more present five years earli er when a large number of houses were nationalized. 489 The Buildings Acquisition Act of 1971 had a particular impact on shopkeepers in Dar es Salaam , who 485 Daily News newspaper, March 16, 1976. 486 Mzee Massawe, interview with the author in Kiswahili, at his shop in the Kariakoo Market hall, Aug ust 27, 2013. Mzee Mwaipungu , interview with the author in Kiswahili, at his stand in the Kariakoo market, April 24, 2013. 487 The retail market a djacent to the main building housed more than 160 concrete stalls, each of which was rented out to two people b ecause of the large number of applications. The over 320 individual traders mainly sold vegetables and fruits (Sporrek, Food Marketing and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 80; Daily News newspaper, December 8 and December 14, 1975 ). The nature of these market stalls was also not called into question by Operation Maduka. Daily News newspaper reporters mentioned unselfconsciously how market stalls were hired out to individual vendors (Daily News newspaper , June 27, 1976 ). Indicative of the lack of an absolute equation of shopkeeper and exploiter is the fact that the Daily News attributed the soc ialist label ÒnduguÓ (meaning Òc omradeÓ) to a Dar es Salaam shopkeeper in August 1976 ( Daily N ews newspaper , August 26, 1976). 488 By the early 1980s, the main building housed various shops, which were co -operatives or branches of parastatals ( Ibid. 489 In addition to the Building Acquisition Act of 1971, butcher shops were nationalized in Dar es Salaam and other main towns in 1974 ( Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 179 ). 186 were mainly of Asian descent . ÒAlthough, this was not intended to be a racial move, it strongly aff ected the Asian community,Ó writes Sporrek. Ò Several of the buildings that were taken over contained shops of different types and when the ownership of buildings changed hands the shops were closed. They later reopened under new regimes and not infrequently as a Consumer Cooperative.Ó 490 Bryceson has argued that Asian merchants were spared of the forced closure of their shops during Operation Maduka because the weaknesses of state trading firms in their handling of retail trade had become visible to both customers and politicians by 1976. 491 More controversial and more consequential was the implementation of Operation Maduka in the countryside and small towns. Regional commissioners interpreted KawawaÕs statement that all private shops should be closed within two wee ks in various ways. Many took it as a call to provide more incentives for people to open co -operative shops. Others followed KawawaÕs example and closed down private shops where co -operative shops were already present. Yet others closed down large numbers of shops in areas where no co -operative shops existed. 492 Operation Maduka had is strongest impact in the areas where private shops were closed down while co -operative shops had not been established. Both shopkeepers and consumers complained about this pract ice because everyday goods including textiles were no longer 490 Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 100. See also Tripp, Changing the Rules , 94Ð95. Nagar notes that in the wake of the 1971 exodus of Dar es SalaamÕs Asian traders, Ithna Asheri and Hindu traders from up -country towns moved to the city and filled the void left in the commercial sector ( Nagar, ÒThe South Asian Diaspora in Tanzania: A History Retold,Ó 71 ). In 1973, Asians owned 12, Arabs 59, and Africans 29 per cent of the shops in Dar es Salaam ( Sporrek, Food Mar keting and Urban Growth in Dar e s Salaam , 100). 491 Bryceson, Food Insecurity and the Social Division of Labour in Tanzania 1919 -85, 143. For consumersÕ attitudes in Dar es Salaam in 1988, see Debora h Fahy Bryceson, Liberalizing TanzaniaÕs Food Trade: Public & Private Faces of Urban Marketing Policy, 1939 -1988 (London: UNRISD, 1993), 174 : ÒThe more favourable attitude towards traders voiced by Dar es Salaam householders during the survey reflects the stark realism that they do not trust the official marketing system to supply them adequately with staple foods and their own capability to self -provision is weak.Ó 492 Hyd”n, ÒAdministration and Public Policy,Ó 111. 187 available. In the border town of Kyela in Mbeya region, for example, the regional commissioner ordered the closure of some forty shops in order to protect three or four recently opened co-operati ve shops. 493 This order came just days before president Nyerere publicly denounced regional commissioners for engaging in Òanti -socialÓ practices of haphazardly closing down shops without ensuring the establishment of an adequate number of co -operative shops .494 Crucial in the case of Kyela, and the reason why it became a publicly discussed case, was that Kyela was located right at TanzaniaÕs border with Malawi. Nyerere took an exceptional stance on shops close to the border and supported the closure of shops i n border towns because smugglers could use them to store their goods. 495 Therefore, the radical move to replace forty private shops with a handful of co -operative shops was not revoked. Kyela residents and consumers were the ones most affected by the operat ion and they started to express their opinions in newspapers towards the end of the year 1976. A Kyela resident and Sunday News reader complained that the press and the radio did not portray the establishment of co -operative shops at the expense of 43 priv ate shops in Kyela town in an objective light. While the press praised the event as a success of Operation Maduka, ordinary residents of Kyela suffered because necessary consumer items were not available any more. A Daily News reader complained that ÒBasic necessities are nowhere to be found. One has to travel to Tukuyu or Mbeya for things such as soap, sugar, bed -sheets and blankets. The four Òcooperative shopsÓ are ill -equipped and serve the people who matter rather than the common people. When people com plain about these shortages and criticize the local leadership for closing the shops without strictly following the PartyÕs directive on Operation Maduka, they are 493 Daily News newspaper , May 19, 1976. 494 See below. Daily News newspape r, May 23, 1976. 495 Sunday News newspaper , May 23, 1976. 188 intimidated and in fact locked up in police cells.Ó 496 Two weeks later, a Dar es Salaam -based reader supported the above criticism and drew attention to the language with which policies that worked against the interests of ordinary people were legitimized. ÒThese two words ÔoperationÕ and ÔcampaignÕ should from now be handled with great care É espe cially when such calls are made by our [political] heads. In most cases the words get misinterpreted and often are hurriedly handled in a competitive way.Ó 497 Another point of criticism put forward by newspaper readers was the timing of Operation Maduka. Kaw awa expected people to use their own savings to establish co -operative shops, rather than the government providing credit . A Mwanza -born man living in Tanga argued that February was a time of the year when farmers in the Lake region generally did not have any capital as the cotton harvest was in June and July. Therefore, people in Mwanza should be given time until at least the next harvest season so they would be able to start their own co -operative shops. 498 As far as the running of co -operative shops was c oncerned, many people wondered how the mismanagement of ujamaa shops, which was a major problem of co -operative shops established in the early 1960s, could be avoided. The shopkeeper mentality was generally considered the epitome of the capitalist attitude of mind, which needed to be reformed. The governmentÕs solution was an elaborate plan to train and ÒreformÓ present and future shopkeepers to become Òshop managersÓ and Òshop assistants.Ó While shopkeepers were often 496 Sunday News newspaper , October 24, 1976. 497 Sunday News newspaper , November 7, 1976. 498 Daily News newspaper , February 25, 1976. See also the letter in Daily News newspaper , March 25, 1976 in support of the former. 189 invoked in political talk to refer to a self -interested and deeply capitalist vision of politics, 499 ujamaa shopkeepers were supposed to be socialist in their attitudes of mind. Therefore, the government organized seminars to teach instructors, who subsequently organized their own regional semin ars for ujamaa shopkeepers. 500 And the Cooperative College in Moshi ran courses on how to establish and run a consumer cooperative. Villagers could take these courses on a distant learning basis and course booklets were sent to them by mail. The governmentÕ s concern with shopkeepersÕ business behavior was not new in 1976. A report by the Economist Intelligence Unit published in 1962 suggested that shopkeepers adopt a new and friendlier attitude towards customers. 501 Neither was the view of shopkeepers as impor tant agents in the production of new subjectivities a recent phenomenon. In his study of African consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika from the 1950s, Fergus Chalmers Wright 499 Two leading intellectuals of socialist Tanzania, Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu and Issa Shivji, made use of the shopkeeperÕs vision as an analogy to a capitalist outlook. Shivji states that ÒPolitically and economically dependent on the metro politan bourgeoisie, and with the political vision of a prosperous shopkeeper and a real estate speculator rather than that of an industrial captain, the Asian commercial bourgeoisie was not even capable of bourgeois liberalismÓ ( Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania , 69). Babu, on the other hand, described politicians promoting tourism in the following way: ÒTourism is the quintessence of a shopkeeperÕs economic vision and such a vision is not about serious eco nomic developmentÓ (Haroub Othman, Babu: I Saw the Future and It Works: Essays Celebrating the Life of Comrade Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, 1924 -1996 (Dar es Salaam: E & D Ltd, 2001), 30 ). 500 Mbeya residents interviewed by Bryceson in 1988 were still concerned with reforming traders. Some suggested that traders engage in farming so as to re -educate their mind s ( Bryceson, Liberalizing TanzaniaÕs Food Trade: Public & Private Faces of Urban Marketing Policy, 1939 -1988, 169). 501 The report stated ÒA new attitude is urgently needed whereby the customer is no longer considered as an oppone nt to be outwitted and, if possible, fleeced. A sound business, not only for the individual, but for the trading community as a whole, can only be built up on the basis of fair -dealing and trust between retailer and consumer. At present there are very few traders in Tanganyika who do not invariably choose the immediate quick profit in preference to a smaller profit, which, however, will build up goodwill and an expanding business in the future. É In future if a trader is to build up a sound business, he wil l have to consider the wishes of his customers, he will have to realise that he is providing a service for them, not conducting a never -ending battle of wits against themÓ ( Economist Intelligence Unit (Great Britain), A Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika , 178). 190 quoted an Overseas Economic Survey that stated that Òwithout the incentive of cons umer goods he wants the African will not exert himself unduly and remains content to do no more than is necessary to pay for his immediate needs.Ó 502 So, colonial officials acknowledged in the 1950s that rural shopkeepers had to play a role in shaping Africa nsÕ tastes and desires of consumption and thereby turning them into better consumers, on which the capitalist system ultimately depended on. Likewise in 1976, the state attributed shopkeepers a crucial role in creating new subjects. This time, however, sho pkeepers were supposed to help to create a truly socialist society. To that end, so -called ÒmanagersÓ and ÒassistantsÓ of co -operative shops needed to be properly trained. The state was especially anxious about shopkeepers who had owned private shops and n ow wanted to be involved in the management of a co -operative shop. In two -week seminars, trainers were instructed how to teach one -month seminars for shop managers and assistants. 503 Besides teaching basic commercial arithmetic, book -keeping and shop managem ent lessons, the seminars were particularly concerned with inculcating less tangible skills such as honest, good character, and conduct in participants. 504 The new shop managers were supposed to be antithetical to the prevalent image of shopkeepers as exploi ters and bloodsuckers. In ujamaa discourse, rural shopkeepers were categorized as ÒkulaksÓ or Òpetty capitalists.Ó They often farmed, traded, and owned several small enterprises at the same time. The shop was only one of several ventures a shopkeeper was engaged in. Shops were typically kept small so the owner could oversee the daily transaction personally. As a result, the costs of running the shop were low compared to running a co -operative shop. Unsurprisingly, these petty 502 Overseas Ec onomic Surveys, cit. in Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika , 6. 503 Daily News newspaper , March 4, March 25, April 13, 1976. 504 Daily News newspaper , March 10, April 3, April 4, June 2, 1976. 191 capitalist shopkeepers were no t interested in having communal shops springing up in their villages. As the pressure against private shops ro se with Operation Maduka, some shopkeepers successfully subverted the socialist policies of the state by setting up shops under a communal label w hile running them as their own. 505 The importance of rural shops and shopkeepersÕ attitude of minds in the creation of a socialist Tanzania are apparent in a study on ujamaa villages conducted by Michaela von Freyhold in the 1970s. On the one hand, villagers often expressed their complaints in shops because they did not have enough money to buy all the things necessary for everyday life. On the other hand, villagersÕ hopes and desires crystallized around consumer goods during their daily visits to the shop. T hey measured how well ujamaa worked for them in terms of whether they were able to buy the essential things for life at the shop. One villager stated that ÒThe best propaganda for Ujamaa would be if one could go to the shop, buy two or three good pieces of cloth for the wife and good material for trousers, and say that the money was earned from the Ujamaa shamba.Ó 506 When in certain areas, the majority of shops disappeared or lacked the most basic commodities such as textiles , many villagers read this as a fa ilure of ujamaa . Daily News readers rarely called into question the legitimacy of Operation Maduka as whole during the first two months after KawawaÕs announcement . This changed considerably when president Nyerere publicly spoke out against regional commis sionersÕ arbitrary closure of private shops and thus enabled non -state actors to launch more vigorous criticisms against Operation Maduka and the shortages that accompanied it. Three months after the announcement of Operation Maduka, Nyerere intervened in the discussion. Applying the anti -socialist language 505 Michaela von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 63, 78. 506 Cit. in Ibid., 140. 192 of exploitation and competition, Nyerere said that the party and the government have not announced Òa competition of closing down private shops, and any leader who is ordering the closure of the shops re sulting in the people not getting their necessary requirements is an enemy of TanzaniaÕs policy of socialism and self -reliance.Ó 507 According to Nyerere, these politicians were more concerned with publicity on the radio and in the newspaper than with the soc ialist policy of ujamaa .508 Private shops should not be forcefully closed but Ð faced with the competition of superior co -operative shops Ð die a Ònatural death.Ó 509 Thus, Nyerere cared more about the availability of necessary goods for ordinary people than wi th the rapid extinction of private shops. 510 507 Sunday News newspaper , May 23, 1976. Already in his foundational ÒUjamaa Ð The Basis of African SocialismÓ from 1962, Nyerere denounced acquisitive and competitive behavior as working socialist goals. ÒAc quisitiveness for the purpose of gaining power and prestige is unsocialist [because it] sets off the spiral of personal competition Ð which is then anti -socialÓ (Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism , 3). 508 The importance of competition among local official based on numbers reflects what James Scott describes as the Ònotional ujamaa villageÓ which could be measured quantitatively with statistical methods. Likewise in the case of Operation Maduka, administrators were able to count the number of private shops that were closed down in a certain region and compare it to other regions. At least some regional commissioners seemed to have been involved in this kind of competition with other region al commissioners ( James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale Univ ersity Press, 1998), 244 ). 509 NyerereÕs more gradual approach was in line with his ÒThe Varied Paths to SocialismÓ address in 1967, in which he stated that Òwe have seriously to consider whether, and how far, we can dispense with the incentives of private profit at that time. É public ownership may not necessarily and always be the correct answer for socialists at a particular timeÓ ( Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism , 84). In 1969, a government -issued document addressed at the public at large stated Ò It is also the objective to stimulate development of consumersÕ co -[o]peratives. When the consumers organise themselves and make their purchases in their own co -operative stores, this wi ll gradually eliminate the private retailersÓ ( Tanzania, The PeopleÕs Plan for Progress: A Popular Version of the Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1969 -1974 (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Economic Affairs and D evelopment Planning, 1969), 53 ). 510 David Leonard argues that NyerereÕs intervention might have been due to the fact that the announcement of Operation Maduka undercut the ability of Tanzanian manufacturers to sell their products as traders stopped buying stock due to the uncertainty created by the operation ( David 193 NyerereÕs intervention had a remarkable effect on the ways in which Operation Maduka was written about in the Daily and Sunday News in the following weeks and months. A notable effect was that, as the failure of Operation Maduka became more and more visible, the blame for the failure was shifted away from the central government to regional administrators. 511 Similarly striking was the immediate adoption of NyerereÕs language in almost all articles on Operation Maduk a following his intervention. The issue, which featured NyerereÕs announcement, included an opinion piece that stated ÒÔOperation MadukaÕ is a process of putting the retail trade in the hands of the people, to serve the people. It cannot succeed if right f rom the beginning it is associated with hardship for the peasants and workers of this country.Ó 512 Various other articles published in the following weeks and months expressed a sudden concern with the hasty implementation of the operation, with the lack of confidence that existing co -operative shops were capable of serving the population satisfactorily, and with the fact that regional officers turned a deaf ear to NyerereÕs call. 513 This shift in how government newspapers reported on Operation Maduka demonstra tes how powerful NyerereÕs intervention was, at least as far as the Leonard, ÒCla ss Formation and Agricultural Development,Ó in Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania , by Joel D. Barkan (New York: Praeger, 1979), 154 ). NyerereÕs attitude displayed by his intervention is also remarkably similar to Abdulrahman Mohamed BabuÕs, the former minister of trade. Retrospectively, Babu insisted that he had always resisted the nationalization of both wholesale and retail trade. Although he was aware that the private sector in Tanzania was mainly dominated by shopkeepers, he did not think it was wise to interrupt distributive trade by forcing private traders to close their businesses. He acknowledged the importance of the availability of well -stocked shops so peasants would produce cash -crops (Othman, Babu , 21, 44Ð46). In a similar way, Shivji argues that the portrayal of the dukawallah as the supreme exploiter only obscures more important as pects of exploitation linked to production rather than circulation ( Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania , 71Ð72). Both Babu and Shivji share Marx and EngelsÕs point of view laid out in th e ÒManifesto of the Communist PartyÓ that the lower strata of the middle class, to which shopkeeper s belonged, would eventually become part of the proletariat ( Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party (New York: International Publishers, 1948) ). 511 Daily News newspaper , June 21, 1976. 512 Sunday News newspaper , May 23, 1976. 513 Daily News newspaper , May 25, July 26, 1 976. 194 official political discourse was concerned. NyerereÕs intervention in the debate and his branding of certain regional commissioners as enemies of TanzaniaÕs socialism had the effect of undermining KawawaÕs legitimacy as prime minister. Kawawa was relegated from the position of prime minister and second vice -president to the position of minister of defense and national service in 1977, largely as a result of the failed Operation Maduka. 514 NyerereÕs intervention also gave rise to more outspoken criticisms by non -state actors in the newspapers. Some letters to the editor reveal that, as Operation Maduka caused or exacerbated the shortage of everyday goods, people faced material hardship as well as moral dilemmas. Examples mentioned above show how Kyela residents complained about the distances they had to travel to buy essential things for everyday use. Likewise, peasants lamented the high prices in co -operative shops. 515 One Daily News reader desc ribed how people had to revert to traditional forms of fire making because matchboxes were no longer available. 516 Other readers expressed their discomfort of having to bury the dead in undignified ways because Marekani cloth, in which the dead were supposed to be wrapped, was no longer sold. 517 Customers were also dissatisfied with the way in which co -operative shops dealt with the shortage of goods. A resident of Mwanza town described the frustrating and ÒpatheticÓ reality of having to stand in line for hour s to buy a piece of cloth at a workerÕs co -operative shop. ÒNowadays the residents of Mwanza urban in their hundreds parade in queues at Nyakato from morn to eve, but since the shop is too small to suffice many people, most of them return home 514 Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment , 75Ð76; Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1976 -1977 (London: Rex Collings, 1977), B348 ÐB350. 515 Africa Contemporary Record , B348. 516 Daily News newspaper , July 26, 1976. 517 Daily News newspaper , July 26, 1976. Shortages of goods also collided with peopleÕs tastes. As the p referred kind of rice became rare in Dar es Salaam shops, residents refused to buy rice from certain part of Tanzania. As a result, shopkeepers did not accept the lower -quality rice from national distributors ( Daily News newspaper , June 3, 1976). 195 with nothing . Priority is given to the workers.Ó 518 An obvious advantage of being a member of a co-operative shop was the privileged access to rare goods. 519 In the context of these shortages, which Operation Maduka exacerbated rather than mitigated, black market sales co ntinued unabatedly. Various newspaper readers lamented the high prices on the black market and some suggested some kind of collaboration between the Tanzania Film Company and black marketeers to the detriment of consumers. 520 A Dar es Salaam vendor of kanga cloth, who was charged with selling his goods above the fixed price, pointed to the fact that buyers themselves were Òready to be exploitedÓ and tried to persuade him to sell his goods at any price he wished. 521 Finally, n ewspaper readers noted that capitali st businessmen gave their enterprises socialist -sounding names in order to appear legitimate. In Sumbawanga, for instance, a Daily News reader described how private traders use bogus and fictitious co -operative ventures to engage in capitalist practices. Ò Having carefully chosen suitable sugar coated and patriotic names for their fake co -operative enterprises, names such as ÒMwananchiÓ [The Citizen] ÒUmojaÓ [Unity] ÒMuunganoÓ [Union] , quickly get themselves registered. After the initial registration process the issue of business licences becomes automatic. After this, these fake co -operatives have a free hand in looting uninterrupted. Their business will have Òco -operativeÓ protection Ð 518 Daily N ews newspaper , August 4, 1976. 519 Dummah, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, March 27, 2013 . Dummah was employed as a salesperson at the cooperative shoe shop Viatu Company , located on the upper floor of the Kariako o Market hall, from 1976 to 1988. The shop went bankrupt shortly thereafter and Dummah started his own business trading goods to Zambia and Botswana. 520 Daily News newspaper , May 28, June 9, 1976. 521 Daily News newspaper , July 20, 1976. 196 the helmet that will render any opposition harmless.Ó 522 In Dar es Salaam managers of co -operative shops also had privileged access to textiles and other consumer goods. 523 Various social actors in Tanzania used the rhetoric of socialism to make sense of the increasingly harsh economic realities of the 1970s. As Kawawa declared p rivate shopkeepers as exploiters and Nyerere redefined certain regional politicians as enemies of socialism, they opened up discursive spaces within the hegemonic discourse of socialism. Shopkeepers and consumers themselves noted these gaps and applied the language of socialism to subvert or criticize state policies. The ways in which Operation Maduka was implemented in specific locations varied considerably depending on how the respective regional commissioner interpreted KawawaÕs guidelines to the operat ion, whether shops were located in the capital city of Dar es Salaam, in smaller towns, or in villages, and whether the location was near an international border. While government officials in Dar es Salaam were not willing to strictly enforce Operation Ma duka, rural areas close to the border such as Kyela experienced the closing of large numbers of private shops. The continued existence of private shops could be more easily legitimized in areas, where co-operative shops already existed and where ordinary c itizens had few means to challenge the power of government officials. Operation Maduka entailed more than the closure of private shops and the provision of co-operative shops. The central government was also concerned with reforming shopkeepersÕ attitudes of mind. In seminars, co -operative shopkeepers were trained to become Òshop managersÓ and Òshop assistants,Ó who cared about the general welfare of the community rather 522 Daily News newspap er, October 10, 1976. 523 Yusuph Abubakar Kaita, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Mabibo, Dar es Salaam, January 6, 2013 . 197 than private profit. While the socialist state focused on the equal distribution of go ods, ordinary citizens read state power and the success of ujamaa socialism in terms of consumption. Where co-operative shops were unable to provide essential consumer goods such as marekani cloth and matchboxes , people understood Operation Maduka as a sig n of the failure of ujamaa . BEYOND OPERATION MADUKA Despite the increased role of state institutions and government campaigns such as Operation Maduka , long -standing trade and credit relations continued to be relevant in the textile trade. For people who had the necessary capital or business connections, doing business in the socialist period could be extremely profitable. In the textile sector, the government ran most of the industries but some private companies were also allowed. For local entrepreneurs like Sunderji Nanji, who had been involved in the textile business since colonial times, the socialist period was a great time. There was not much competition because imports were restricted and, due to the shortages, people bought whatever was available. 524 Another businessman, who was one of the biggest textile merchants in Dar es Salaam in the 1970s and preferred to remain anonymous , confirmed this. 525 The sales manager at Urafiki Textile Mill and private textile traders in Dar es Salaam knew each other wel l so when the State Trading Corporation and later the Regional Trade Corporations did not have the money to finance the textile trade, Dar es Salaam wholesale traders jumped in and provided the credit to finance the textile trade from the factory to their 524 Prem Ruparelia, son of Sunderji Nanji, interview with the author in English, Posta, Dar es Salaam, March 25 , 2013. 525 Anonymou s 1, interview s with the author in English, Dar es Salaam, August 24 and September 14, 2013. 198 own shops and urban retailers in Kariakoo and elsewhere. 526 ÒThere were lots of rules and conditions to obtain the commodity from the industries, like textile industries, nationalized by the government,Ó said another textile trader active in the late sociali st period , who wanted to remain anonymous . ÒYou bribe them; sometimes you lose the bribe, they donÕt supply you; sometimes when they supply you, they donÕt supply you the material that you want; they say when you want to buy kanga, Ôyou must buy white clot h,Õ and in my shop I donÕt sell white cloth, what shall I do with that white cloth; I want kitenge and they say Ôyou should buy khaki, Õ I donÕt sell khaki in my shop, what should I do with that khaki. So it was conditional purchases. But then, slowly slowl y we got used to it, and later on, as I told you, after liberalization, sky was the limit. But during the nationalization, we bought from the subsidiaries of the textile mills.Ó 527 Cooperative shops continued to play an important role in this trade because t hey had privileged access to textiles, and some cooperative shop managers were willing to sell this privilege at an extra cost. 528 Relatively well -off Dar es Salaam businessmen continued to be able to get loans from financial institutions to favorable condit ions throughout the socialist period as the case of Sadru Shariff illustrates. Sadru Shariff joined his fatherÕs business in 1957. His father imported goods from India, China, Hong Kong, Germany, and England wholesale and sold it to retailers in Dar es Sal aam on credit basis . ÒMy connection with Kariakoo market is that we used to open the cases here [in the Asian section of town], usually containing a hundred dozens and then we would sell five dozens, ten dozens to retailers in Kariakoo. And I would go in t he evening to 526 This dovetails with Robert GregoryÕs observation that Asians in East Africa tended to loans more money to rural debtors during the colonial period. After indepen dence, Asian lending generally diminished but was increasingly directed toward urban debtors ( Gregory , South Asians in East Africa , 110). 527 Anonymous 2 , interview with the author in English, Ifakara, Morogoro, March 11, 2013. 528 Yusuph Abubakar Kaita, intervi ew with the author in Kiswahili . 199 collect money. É we could sell for cash but that was not the way that it was done. Even today it is not done that way. Somebody used to buy ten dozens and he would come here and take ten dozens and pay the money as he sells. É those days, the system was that they buy goods from you, they sell it within a week.Ó In 1962, the year after Tanganyika became independent, Sadru Shariff started his own business called Tanganyika Enamel. He joined up with the government and borrowed money from the rece ntly -created Tanganyika Development Finance Company (TDFL). Over the years and up to 1980s, he continued to get loans from TDFL, banks, and the National Housing Corporations on several occasions. ÒBetween 1964 and 1978, I made a few small small expansions and I borrowed money for that from banks and TDFL. But if you borrow from TDFL, there are fees and you donÕt want to pay these fees for small loans so you donÕt want to borrow just 100 or 1,000.Ó Until the late 1970s, borrowing money from financial institu tions was relatively easy for Sadru Shariff. He used his own capital and added to that the capital of his Hong Kong -based partners and the capital provided by his family. Together, this was $50,000 , which was the equivalent of TSh. 1,000,000 at the time. Ò So there was 1,000,000 Shillings capital so that I could borrow up to 900[,000] from the long -term lenders, É from the TDFL. So 1.9[00,000] became my base. So with that, I could borrow from the bank as a working capital of 3.8[00,000]. É I applied to a loa n on a 7 -year basis. The first two years you donÕt pay. Interest rate was 7 per cent.Ó Finally, the confirming houses provided trade credit to large importers as well. Sadru Shariff was able to use their 90 -day -credit to his own advantage. ÒAnd you could borrow another 1 million from the confirming houses in London, which for whatever you import, you ask them to pay them and you pay them after 90 days. É if you are smart enough, then this you could do: if your turnover is that big, you buy goods at 90 days, sell it within 20 days, 200 youÕve got four times more leverage.Ó To conclude, he emphasized the credit nature of all these business transactions. ÒAll these businesses is done on financing principles, no? Nobody has money in his pocket. Everybody is just ext ending papers.Ó In the late 1970s, the inflation rate rose to very high levels, which made borrowing and repaying more difficult, especially borrowing in ÒhardÓ currencies like dollars. This proved to be near -disastrous for Sadru Shariff. ÒSo in Õ79, I bo rrow 1 million dollars. É600,000 in dollars and 400,000 dollars in Shilling. So that was the first time I borrowed from the IBRD, the International Bank for Rural Development, which is the World Bank. É when we borrowed in 1979, up to 1981 we did not pay a nything but in 1981 we had to start repaying. So the balance sheet became lop -sided. Shillings here [on the left side], and dollars there [on the right side]. The shillings went down and the dollars were there. É So in 1984, I was almost getting to be fore closed.Ó This also had effects on other aspects of his life. ÒIn 1984, I was the Aga KhanÕs chairman [in Dar es Salaam] and I resigned from the chairmanship. Obviously, because the Aga Khan doesnÕt want a bankrupt chair.Ó It also had psychological effects. ÒSo that was a mad thing. Those years for me were a totally maddening existence. The amount of pressure that I had É [Debt] can be a real burden. It can be the only burden, you know. You canÕt think of anything else.Ó 529 A new era in the textile trade star ted in the mid -1980s when trade restrictions with other countries were eased and large amounts of second -hand clothes, in Kiswahili mitumba , were imported. 530 Kariakoo became the center of this trade, which not only took place in shops but 529 Sadru Shariff, interview with the author in English, Dar es Sal aam, April 4, 2013. 530 Although the volume of trade in mitumba rose exponentially in the mid -1980s, the trade in second -hand clothes was not new in the 1980s. In colonial and socialist times, missionaries imported used clothes from Europe. Furthermore, Kar iakoo petty traders collected used clothes from wealthy Dar es Salaam residents and sold them at the Kariakoo Auction Mart, commonly 201 also in markets an d streets, most famously in Karume Market and Congo Street, allowing petty traders to assume new identities such as ÒbusinessmenÓ and to shake off derogatory attributes such as Òhooligans.Ó The mode of financing the trade, however, continued to be based on credit relations. 531 The trade in textiles in general changed dramatically with the end of NyerereÕs economic policy of self -reliance. Traders started to buy textiles in Dubai, Thailand, Hong Kong, and, more recently, China. The first private traders to mak e use of the right to import textiles from abroad made exorbitant profits. An elderly man now resident in Ifakara, who requested to remain anonymous, was among those traders. He had a wholesale shop in central Dar es Salaam just across the street from the Kariakoo neighborhood from 1984 to 1989 and made about 30 business trips abroad during these years. ÒAt the time whatever you brought to Tanganyika [sic] Ð rice, maize, textile both foreign and local one, foodstuff Ð just after one week or so you donÕt hav e that material again.Ó 532 Still, trade relations continued to be based on personalized credit relations, which always involved the risk of the debtorÕs absconding, as Ndala Kasheba reminds us in his popular song Kesi ya Khanga from 1990. Mama nipe nauli ni kamfuate Monika Amekimbilia Zambia na treni ya mizigo Kisa cha kukimbia madeni yamemzidi Doti kumi za khanga alizokopa hajalipa Anatafutwa na Polisi popote hapatikani Na mimi rafiki yake nipo nje kwa mdhamana Nililala rumande siku mbili kituoni Usumbufu n ilioupata kwa kweli sina raha Naona bora niende Zambia nikamtafute Monika Nimlete Daresalama apambane na kesi yake Monika uko wapi? Mahakamani wameshapanga siku ya kusikiliza kesi referred to as mnadani (Hamis Ka ssim Ulele, interview s with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, January 15 an d May 13, 2013). 531 See also Sayaka Ogawa, ÒÔEarning among Friends:Õ Business Practices and Creed among Petty Traders in Tanzania,Ó African Studies Quarterl y 9, no. 1/2 (Fall 2006): 23 Ð38. 532 Anonymous 2 , interview with the author in English, Ifakara, March 11, 2013. 202 Asipokuja nitapelekwa jela kutumikia kifungo Monika uko wapi? Monika! 533 Mama give me money to buy a ticket so I can follow Monika She has run off to Zambia on the cargo train The reason for running away is that she hasnÕt been able to handle the debts She hasnÕt paid ten doti 534 of kanga cloth she borrowed/bought on credit The poli ce are looking for her and she is not available anywhere And I, as her friend, am out on bail I was in custody at the police station for two nights The trouble I have been in, I am not happy at all I think it will be better for me to go to Zambia to look f or Monika So I can bring her back to Dar es Salaam and she can face her court case Monika where are you? At the court they have already set the date to hear the case If she doesnÕt show up, IÕll be brought to jail to serve the sentence Monika, where are you? Monika! In the past two decades, competition has become very stiff as todayÕs textile traders assert. Ibrahim Changula, a young textile trader working at his fatherÕs shop in Kariakoo, said that profit margins had become much smaller, mainly because Kariakoo traders rely on bank loans instead of the personalized credit arrangements with suppliers. 535 This shift in credit arrangements is the topic of the next two chapters . CONCLUSION Shops Ð in Kiswahili maduka Ð were at the center of economic policies from the late nineteenth century onwards . They were the foil against which a supposedly better, more efficient, more just 533 Ndala Kasheba, ÒKesi ya Khanga.Ó 534 One doti is four yards so ten doti is 40 yards or roughly 36.5 meters. 535 Ibrahim Changula, interview wit h the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, August 22, 2013. Ibrahim Changula explained that Kariakoo traders used loans from banks and microcredit institutions for their business, also because the bank staff roamed around in Kariakoo trying to con vince shopkeepers to take out loans. As traders take out loans when their business is in bad shape hoping to rescue their business, they sell their goods for a very cheap price and put pressure on other shopkeepers to lower their prices as well. In the end , everyone is hurt. The person who has taken out the loan eventually goes bankrupt and the bank sells his goods, while the other shopkeepers sell their goods at a very low rate. 203 economic system could be created. Government campaigns to reform the retail sector run like a thread through the history of Dar es Sa laam. In this chapter, I have investigate d what these campaigns were aimed at: the modus operandi of trade at shops in Dar es Salaam. The advancement of goods on credit and the underlying credit and debt relations were the defining feature of the duka syst em as well as the reason for its longevity and persistence. The organization of trade of one particular commodity Ð textiles Ð has helped to illustrate the concrete trade and credit relationships, the chains of credit, the various types of debt relation as well as the scales of credit and interest rates available to shopkeepers . The very convertibility of textiles not only contributed to their high demand and their use as the main medium of exchange; it also facilitated the creation of a system of trade bas ed on credit and personal relations. After independence, state institutions started to play a considerably more important part in the textile trade and production. Newly established textile mills were a source of national pride and symbols of self -reliance . Regional and national distributors, cooperative shops, and factory shops were supposed to completely take over textile retailing from private shops. Despite the increased role of state institutions, however, long -standing trade and credit relations conti nued to be relevant in the textile trade. When regional distributors went bankrupt, Dar es Salaam wholesale traders provided the credit to finance the textile trade from the factory to their own shops and to urban retailers in Kariakoo. 204 CHAPTER 4 ÑIN T HE UNDERBELLY OF THE MARKET: RICE, MALI KAULI , AND UAMINIFU IN COLONIAL AND SOCIALIST KARIAKOO Ifakara nakwenda bila hela naenda na suruali yangu na sharti langu na bado napata biashara. 536 ÒI could go to Ifakara even without any money, with nothing but m y pants and my shirt and I could still do business.Ó In present -day Kariakoo rice is everywhere, and it comes in all shapes and sizes. Vitumbua Ð fried rice cakes Ð are a popular morning snack and they are sold at make -shift breakfast stalls on residentsÕ verandahs or on the street. Zanzibari -owned restaurants prepare mkate wa kumimina and vibibi Ð rice -bread and rice -chapatis. Women food vendors popularly referred to as mama nÕtilie set up their stalls in the afternoon and evening and offer plates of wali Ð cooked rice Ð with vegetables, greens, meat, and beans to hungry customers. In Somali - and Arab -owned restaurants, patrons with a few thousand shillings to spare spoil themselves with a plate of pilau , biryani , or mandi Ð rice dishes prepared with a dis tinct mix of spices. At the Kariakoo market hall and at the numerous shops throughout Kariakoo, mchele Ð uncooked rice Ð is sold wholesale and retail, respectively. During rice harvest season in June and July, children delight in snacking on pepeta Ð pounded fresh, uncooked rice. And during Ramadan, Muslim residents break the fast with vipoopoo Ð a boiled side dish made with rice flour. Rice is imbued with cultural meanings in Kariakoo due to its long history in the region. 537 From the founding of Dar es Sal aam in the mid -nineteenth century onwards, town residents grew, traded, and consumed rice. As the levels of production, importation, and consumption 536 Mzee Peni, Kariakoo wholesale rice trader, interview with the author in Kis wahili, Manzese, Dar es Salaam, May 25, 2013. 537 According to Mtoro Mwenyi Bakari, rice was a crucial ingredient for occasions such as the birth of a child and weddings. Furthermore, rice was sacrificed to accelerate th e birth of a child when the woma n was in labor. Bakari also described kiapo cha mchele , Òthe rice oath,Ó which was used to find thieves ( Velten, Desturi za Wasuaheli na Khabari za Desturi za SheriÕa za Wasuaheli , 5, 8, 106, 274Ð275). 205 increased over the decades, rice changed its status from a Òluxury staple foodÓ 538 eaten primarily at festive occasions, to a basic staple food affordable for a vast majority of people on a weekly or even daily basis. As an edible and perishable product, rice was not only sold in retail shops but also in bulk at the Kariakoo wholesale market hall. In this chapter , I follow rice and trace the ways it was traded in and out of Kariakoo from the late nineteenth century onwards. TradersÕ long -standing strategies of organizing wholesale rice trade were as important as government efforts to control and regulate the trade . As African rice traders were legally prohibited from taking out bank loans during the colonial period, they relied on verbal credit arrangements referred to as mali kauli. Even after independence and the socialist reorganization of the national economy Ð including the construction of a massive new market hall in Kariakoo Ð, mali kauli remained the dominant characteristic of the rice trade in and out of Kariakoo. Mali kauli was so pervasive that rice farmers in the Kilombero Valley around Ifakara at 300 m iles west of Dar es Salaam, wholesale traders in the Kariakoo market, shop retailers in the neighborhood, and end consumers in Dar es Salaam were all linked up in chains of credit. Uaminifu was the central notion of a moral discourse undergirding mali kaul i credit arrangements. It set out business rules and formed a framework of expectations, which shaped peopleÕs behavior towards each other and towards themselves in significant ways. Uaminifu compelled wholesale traders in the Kariakoo market to cultivate their reputation as trustworthy and honest traders in the eyes of upcountry suppliers as well as other people in the market and in the neighborhood. Thus, tradersÕ conceptions of personhood and self -worth were constituted relationally. If a rice trader, li ke Mzee Peni quoted 538 The term is taken from Bryceson, Liberalizing TanzaniaÕs Food Trade: Public & Private Faces of Urban Marketing Policy, 1939 -1988, 135. 206 above, had the reputation of being honest and trustworthy, he could travel to Ifakara Òwith nothing but my pants and my shirtÓ and still return to Kariakoo with rice. MARKTHALLENZWANG : COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE RICE MARKET Rice was a defining feature of urban living in Dar es Salaam right from the beginning of the townÕs existence. To satisfy the urban populationÕs demand for rice, Dar es Salaam residents engaged in work in paddy fields located within walking distance from town. Until the late colonial period, freshly -harvested paddy was put out to dry in front of many Kariakoo houses. J. A. K. Leslie noted during Òa walk round the streets in July [that] almost every house in the more outlying parts, and a large proportion even in Kari akoo, has a mat spread out and newly harvested rice drying in the sun.Ó 539 From early on, however, the growing urban populationÕs rising demand for rice could not be satisfied with supplies from the townÕs immediate surroundings. Rice was brought to Dar es S alaam from rice -growing regions such as Morogoro and the Kilombero Valley. Urban residents relied on the sale of rice grown in their home districts to pay off debts so characteristic of their urban existence in Kariakoo. 540 And already in the 1890s, rice was imported to Dar es Salaam from India, thus highlighting its characteristic as a truly Indian Ocean food that had been produced, traded, and consumed throughout the Indian Ocean world for a long time. 541 For German East Africa as a whole, the year 1894 marke d the 539 Leslie, A Survey o f Dar e s Salaam , 147. 540 Ibid., 6: ÒThe agricultural seasons are important even in town, and indebtedness is relieved for many by a capit al sum accruing from the rice harvest in June/July, mainly from fields in their home districts.Ó 541 Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orien tale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó vols. 1, 397; vol. 2, 54 Ð57. See also the literature on rice in the Atlantic world, e.g. Judith Carney, Black Rice ! : The African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Walter Hawthorne, ÒFrom ÔBlack RiceÕ to 207 date when rice imports for the first time surpassed rice exports. 542 Both Asian traders and German trading houses, particularly Hansing & Co. and D.O.A.G., were involved in the rice trade. 543 Most of the rice available in Dar es Salaam, however, was from rice -growing areas in the region. For Kariakoo residents, consuming rice Ð much like wearing a kanzu Ð was an expression of belonging to an urban society, which was informed by the long -standing urban Swahili culture on the East African coast. 544 Dar es Sa laam residents irrespective of their origin viewed the consumption of rice as an Òurban entitlement.Ó When the distribution of rice was rationed according to race during the two world wars, the distribution and consumption of rice became a political issue and Dar es Salaam residents promptly voiced their discontent. Rice was allocated to Asians and not to Africans, whereupon Africans protested their complete exclusion from rice purchases while Asians considered their rations to be too small. 545 Certainly for both Africans and Asians, eating rice had become a marker of their urban existence. Food rations were only the tip of the iceberg with regards to colonial policies concerning the production, trade, and consumption of agricultural products. At a deeper lev el Ð and thus less visible, also in the historical literature Ð were policies rooted in the German period aimed at ÔBrownÕ: Rethinking the History of Risiculture in the Seventeenth -and Eighteenth -Century Atlantic,Ó American Historical Review 115, no. 1 (2010): 151 Ð63. 542 K. Braun, Der Reis in Deutsch -Ostafrika , 1908, 169. Braun relied on the statistics of the Deutsches K olonialblatt . 543 Raimbault, ÒDar -es-Salaam histoire dÕune soci”t” urbaine coloniale en Afrique orientale allemande (1891 -1914),Ó vols. 1, 397; vol. 2, 54 Ð57. 544 Ibid., vols. 2, 55. 545 Bren nan, Taifa , 94Ð103. ÒUrban entitlementÓ is BrennanÕs term. The governmentÕs concern to supply urban Tanzanians with sufficient amounts of rice has lasted into the present. During my research in Dar es Salaam in 2013, Dar es Salaam residents protested the high prices for rice. In response, the government decided to import 200 million tons of cheap rice from Vietnam to satisfy urban consumers, while blowing a resounding slap to the local rice farmers, who had to sell their rice at heavily discounted prices. 208 creating a new colonial trade system for agricultural products. The vision was to make an orderly, centralized, and easily controllable marke t, in both the concrete sense of actual marketplaces and in the abstract sense of the word ÒmarketÓ as a conceptual system of trade. The Òmarket hall systemÓ involved a central market hall in every town in the colony where ÒnativeÓ products including rice would be traded in a regulated and orderly manner. The tool to realize the vision of the Òmarket hall systemÓ was the Òmarket hall actÓ ( Markthallenverordnung ) passed by the German colonial government in the 1890s. The underlying concept was the Markthalle nzwang , literally Òcompulsory market hallsÓ but better translated as the Òobligation to trade at market halls.Ó According to the act, all agricultural products had to be sold and bought for cash in officially recognized market halls located in every town i n the territory. Commercial transactions on credit and buying and selling outside of the market halls, for instance in shops, were explicitly prohibited. The colonial government envisioned the trade system based on Markthallenzwang to have multiple desirab le effects. It would facilitate an efficient trade, as caravan leaders would be able to buy necessary food items at centrally located markets. These markets would always be supplied to a sufficient degree with agricultural products because the maakida 546 as local representatives of the colonial government were in charge of the market halls. Since maakida would receive half of the amount of market fees, they would urge farmers to bring as much produce to the market as possible. 547 Furthermore, the market hall sy stem Ð similar to the hut and 546 Maakida (singular: akida ) were administrators of district sections in the German colonial hierarchy and they were mostly of African or Arab origin. 547 Bagamoyo, January 31, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommu nalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903-1906.Ó 209 head tax Ð was to contribute to the larger goal of monetizing the colonial economy. 548 Selling their goods for cash, African traders and farmers would be able to pay taxes and spend money on everyday consumer goods from local sh ops. This, in turn, would incentivize them to produce more agricultural products to be sold at the market. 549 Finally, AfricansÕ presence at the market hall was to have an educational effect in that they would get to know orderly market transactions as well as Òthe marketÓ in the abstract sense of the word; it would help them learn how prices are determined by the laws of demand and supply. 550 The German colonial authorities were aware that their policies might run against the wishes of German trading houses su ch as DOAG, Hansing & Co., and OÕSwald & Co. In fact, these policies were intended to undercut credit relations between European trading houses and Asian customers. 551 In 1900, the DOAG lamented that the introduction of the market hall act in Lindi, a coasta l town about 300 miles south of Dar es Salaam, had considerable negative effects on the amount of produce being traded in Lindi. Many traders avoided the market hall in Lindi because of the taxes payable there. In response, a government official explained that colonial policies aimed at making German East Africa a valuable part of the empire. If the market hall act prevented the exploitation of African farmers, this was a desirable outcome even the profits of 548 Compared to the literature on the role of colonial taxes, very little has been written about the Markthallenzwang , but see Koponen, Development for Exploitation , 186. 549 TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 550 ÒDas erzieherische Moment, das bei der Einrichtu ng der Markthallen jeweils als Hauptweck [sic] derselben von Seiten des Gouv. hervorgehoben wurde É Der Markthallenzwang, und mit ihm die Angewıhnung an einen geordneten Kauf und Verkauf, die Voraugenfr Preisbildung durch Angebot uand Nachfrage un d die Wirkung einer eigenen Wertsch−tzung der Waare seitens der Verk−ufer auf die PreisbildungÓ ( Letter by das Kaiserliche Bezirksamt, Mohorro, November 14, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kom munalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906Ó). 551 See chapter 3. 210 German firms were slightly smaller. 552 In a less p atronizing tone with respect to African farmers, Governor Albert Freiherr von Rechenberg reminded government officials in 1906 that Òone of the most important purposes of colonization is to gain products from colonies and to buy them in exchange for Europe an trade commodities.Ó Constraints on European traders were only allowed when they were necessary to guarantee public peace. 553 A moral discourse undergirded the Markthallenzwang and legitimized the creation of the market hall system. It derived its moral co gency primarily from negation. The Òmarket hall systemÓ for trade in agricultural products was set against an existing system of trade, the so -called Òduka system,Ó which consisted of what the German administration conceived to be scattered, unaccountable, and unaccounted exchanges between Asian shopkeepers -cum -buyers and African farmers -cum -sellers.554 The Markthallenzwang was to prevent African farmers and traders from entering morally questionable and exploitative credit relationships with Asian shop owner s.555 The goal was Òthe elimination of Indian tradersÕ light -shunning trading practices in their shops.Ó 556 A colonial administrator praised the work of market halls in Bagamoyo where African farmers brought their produce to the market hall for public auction in order to escape the underhanded dealings of wily Asian traders. 557 A similar observation was made in Lindi where local Africans had recognized Òthe blessing of the new market [hall] actÓ and voluntarily brought their products to the market hall for sale w hile saving the obtained cash for future payments of 552 TNA: G8/ 69: ÒDeutsch -Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, Bd. 4: 1897 -1901.Ó 553 TNA: G1/29: ÒHandel und Gewerbe i m Allgemeinen, Bd. 2: 1901 -1906.Ó 554 See chapter 3. 555 Das Kaiserliche Bezirksamt, Mohorro, November 14, 1902 , TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd . 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 556 Das Kaiserliche Bezirksamt, Mohorro, November 14, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 557 Bagamoyo, Januar y 31, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903-1906.Ó 211 taxes. 558 Thus, German authorities considered the creation of the new trade system also a moral cause against AsiansÕ reprehensible use of cre dit to exploit Africans. The implementation of the Markthallenz wang in Dar es Salaam illustrates the interrelatedness of race, credit, and urban governance at the marketplace. THE MARKET HALL IN DAR ES SALAAM By the end of the 1890s, market halls had been set up in most coastal towns including Dar es Salaam. What the colonial government envisioned did not necessarily correspond to what happened on the ground. The example of the Dar es Salaam market hall illustrates how translating the market hall system into practice was marked by difficulties and unintended consequen ces. The problems started in the realm of finances. While the market hall was the sine qua non of the market hall policy, the funds for building and maintaining these halls were not available in Dar es Salaam. Thus, the imperial district office ( das Kaiser liche Bezirks -Amt) invited tenders for the construction and running of a market hall in 1898. At least two people, the Soliman bin Nasr and Amji Mousaji, responded to the invitation to tender. Soliman bin Nasr, who was also the local liwali 559 at the time, w on the bid. He received the right to build and run a market hall for the public sale of fish, meat, fruits, vegetables, and other food products. In exchange, he was able to keep a share of the fees collected from the traders . Soliman bin NasrÕs funds made the construction of the market hall possible even as the Dar es Salaam municipal funds were inadequate. When, a few years later, in 1904, the Dar es Salaam municipality [Kommunalverband ] eventually bought the market hall, Soliman bin NasrÕs role as helping to 558 Lindi, July 5, 1900, TNA: G3/55: ÒZollverwaltung, Allgem. Bd. 7: 1900 -1902.Ó 559 Wali or liwali was the administrative title for a local representative of the Sultan of Zanzibar. A wali acted as a regional gouvernor within the SultanÕs empire. 212 Òguide the market trade [ Marktverkehr ] into orderly channels that support public interestsÓ was acknowledged. 560 Figure 4.1: M arket hall in Dar es Salaam, ca. 1906.561 Shortly after Soliman bin Nasr built the market hall, the market hall act for Dar es Salaam was passed in 1901. It was modeled after acts already in use in the southern coastal towns of Kilwa and Lindi. As discussed above, the act established that all food products had to be brought to and sold at the market hall. No commercial transaction s of agricultural products were allowed to take place outside of the market hall. Urban traders were explicitly prohibited from buying up food products on the access roads to the Dar es Salaam market. Even foods produced for oneÕs 560 Der Kaiserliche Bezirksamt mann , Bagamoyo, June 27, 1904, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915;Ó G35/67: Bau -Angelegenheiten in der Stadt Daressalaam. 1892 -1906; G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 561 Winterton Collection of East African Photographs, Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston. Object 32 -3-3. Accessed August 27, 2014. 213 own household had to be b rought to the market hall and be inspected by the market master before one could take it home. Exempted from the Markthallenzwang were non -food products and cooked foods as well as the dealings of European traders. 562 Market hall fees were charged for every sale in the market hall and a share of the market fees entered the town coffers directly. The total amount of market fees in the years 1902 to 1906 ranged between 12Õ000 and 13Õ800 rupees annually, which accounted for 15 to 17.5 per cent of the total incom e of the Dar es Salaam municipality in those years. 563 In other words, tangible monetary interests were a convenient outcome of, if not an important motivation for, the establishment of a market hall in Dar es Salaam, albeit one colonial administrators, amid st their lofty rhetoric, rarely acknowledged. 564 Similar to the financial dimensions of the market hall system, its racial dimensions only became clearly defined and visible with the practical implementation of the market hall act. One of the main goals of t he new market hall was to replace an existing system of trade based on credit relations with a system of trade based on cash transactions. The principal target were credit -providing shopkeepers, who happened to be mostly of South Asian origin in Dar es Salaam. They had occupied a particular and racially tinted position in the colonial imagination of urban markets and trade. The market hall system aimed at dislodging them from the urban retail 562 TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915;Ó TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906.Ó 563 TNA: G4/51: ÒWirtschaftspl−ne des Kommunal -Verbandes Dar -es-Salam. 1899 -1906.Ó More difficult to measure were the amounts of money that entered public coffers as an indirect result of the Markthallenzwang. After all, the idea was that the farmers would receive cash when selling their produce at the market hall, which would put money in their hands and enable them to pay taxes. 564 Winterfels did, for example, acknowledge that ÒDie Markthalle ist keineswegs nur als pekuni −re Einnahmequelle fe Kommune oder deren P−chter zu betrachtenÓ ( Letter by Winterfeld, Dar -es-salam, May 6, 1901, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Da ressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915Ó) . 214 and wholesale market in agricultural products. 565 However, the succ ess of the market hall in Dar es Salaam towards that end was unclear. It turned out that forcing commercial transactions into market halls was more difficult than colonial administrators had imagined. As an agricultural product, rice was on the list of pr oducts to be traded in market halls exclusively. 566 However, African producers of rice and other agricultural products refrained from taking their produce to Dar es Salaam because they did not want to pay the market fees. Even a reduction of the fees charged in the market hall did not have the intended effect of luring more suppliers to the market hall. Instead, farmers sold their produce to smaller and not officially regulated markets, e.g. markets springing up along the railroad from Dar es Salaam to the we st. There, middlemen bought the rice and other products, transported them to Dar es Salaam , and sold them at the market hall. 567 Ultimately, the government was not able to break up the trade relations between rice producers and traders. 568 Another racial aspe ct emerged with respect to the market master, who was to oversee the commercial practices in the market hall. As the market hall act pointed out, its aim was to ensure food security for the non -European urban population. European traders were not subject t o the market hall act and they were exempted from paying market hall fees. 569 Colonial officials legitimized these measures by drawing on a racially tinged language of hygiene and sanitation, 565 See chapter 3. 566 In 1913, rice was temporarily removed from the Markthallenzwang (Angepasste Verordnung betreffed das Marktwesen fn Bezirk des Kommunalverbandes Daressalam, March 12, 1913, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Da ressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915Ó). 567 June 17, 1905, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenh eiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915.Ó 568 Similar complications arose in other towns in German East Africa. In Lindi, the colonial administration complained that the obligation to pay for agricultural products such as rice for cash excluded a large numb er of small African and Asian traders from the trade in rice and other grains (Der Kaiserliche Bezirksamtmann , Lindi, September 19, 1902, TNA: G4/7: ÒMarkthallen der Kom munalverb−nde. Bd. 1: 1903 -1906Ó). 569 TNA: G4/8: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde, 190 7-1909.Ó 215 which was particularly strong when it came to the trade in food pr oducts. 570 They argued that the sanitary conditions of market halls were not suitable for the sale of food products meant to be consumed by Europeans. 571 A European personÕs permanent presence in the market hall was thought to be harmful because of the repulsi ve odors that might endanger his or her health. 572 When Mr. Giloy and Mr. Machmuth, a German and a Turkish national, each expressed their desire to take the job as market master in Dar es Salaam in 1901, colonial officer Winterfels expressed his surprise at GiloyÕs application. The job had only been advertised in the non -European sections of town. Despite allegations of racial preference from some European residents, Machmuth was selected. 573 This set a precedent and all the subsequent market masters in Dar es Salaam were non -Europeans as Europeans were considered to be unfit to do the job as market masters. In 1913 the colonial administration deemed the existing market hall Ð located at the edge of the Asian section and a stoneÕs throw from the African section Ð to be too congested and unsanitary. Sketches for a new and much bigger market hall were drawn up. 574 Somewhat paradoxically, the location of the new market hall was to be in the heart of the Ònative quarterÓ of Dar es Salaam, which was planned as a residen tial area. With the completion of the new market hall (see figure 4.2) coinciding with the outbreak of World War I, the hall was first used not for 570 In colonial African contexts, sanitary regimes and urban planning were often intricately connected. An early influential text is Swanson, ÒThe Sanitati on Syndrome.Ó Waste and sanitation served as a powerful discourse to legitimate the racial segregation of Dar es Salaam with the help of a cordon sanitaire. 571 TNA: G4/8: ÒMarkthallen der Kommunalverb−nde, 1907 -1909.Ó 572 Letter by Winterfeld, Dar -es-salam, May 6, 1901, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915.Ó 573 Letter by Winterfeld, Dar -es-salam, May 6, 1901, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915.Ó The official reason for the selection of Mach muth was GiloyÕs aggressive and violent behavior towards the local population. 574 Skizze zu einer Markthalle in Daressalam, TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Dare ssalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915.Ó 216 commercial but for military purposes. 575 The presence of the Carrier Corps in the market hall inspired the n eighborhood residents to use a Kis wahili -ized version of the name carrier corps Ð Kariakoo Ð for the entire neighborhood. 576 Figure 4.2: Kariakoo Market Hall, February 28, 1971. Photograph of personal collection by author. As the British took over the admi nistration in former German East Africa, they left the pillars of urban trade policies planted by the Germans in place. The market hall system remained largely unchanged and the Kariakoo market hall was used as the only and central wholesale market for agr icultural products. The market masters of the Kariakoo market hall continued to be of non -European origin because the market environment was deemed unsuitable for Europeans. Therefore, the colonial administrationÕs oversight of the market was not nearly as strong as the Markthallenverordnung and subsequent regulations imagined. Traders had enough leeway to 575 Rabinow has pointed out the intimate relationship between markets and the army ( Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989) ). 576 Brennan and Burton, ÒThe Emergin g Metro polis: A History of Dar e s Salaam, circa 1862 -2000.Ó TNA: G4/50: ÒKommunalangelegenheiten Daressalam. Markthalle. 1898 -1915.Ó 217 interpret the numerous rules laid out in the market hall act according to their own needs and ideas. As a result, by the 1940s, but probably much earlier , instant cash transactions as prescribed by the market hall act were the exception rather than the rule at the Kariakoo market hall. Instead, mali kauli , a letter of credit based on verbal promises described below, was the commonly acknowledged modus oper andi of trading rice and various other goods at the Kariakoo market hall. Even after TanzaniaÕs independence in 1961 and the adoption of socialist policies in 1967, regulations concerning urban marketing of agricultural products displayed striking paralle ls to the German Markthallenverordnung. According to official rhetoric, the socialist government aimed to create a new economic system free of exploitation and inequality. The single most important building in that respect was the new market hall in Kariak oo, a massive three -floor concrete building (see figure 4.3). It was built from 1971 -1975 and replaced the German -built hall. In NyerereÕs view, the new market building symbolized socialist modernity and encapsulated an economic system free of exploitation and inequality. 577 The new Kariakoo market was not only a symbol of modern consumer culture but also a model for socialist wholesale and retail trade in urban Tanzania. At its inauguration President Nyerere personally praised the new market building as a modern shopping complex, which enabled Dar es Salaam residents to fulfill all of their everyday needs in a comfortable and modern environment under one roof. 578 The Daily News newspaper 577 German and British colonial discourses demonizing South Asian traders and middlemen as exploiters of helpless African farmers w ere powerful in East Africa and considerably shaped colonial policies in Deutsch -Ostafrika and Tanganyika. In postcolonial Tanzania, the image of the Asian exploiter and petty bourgeois continued to influence policies, e.g. the acquisition of buildings in 1971 and the nationalization of companies ( Oonk, Settled Strangers ; Brennan, Taifa ; Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania ). 578 Daily News newspaper , December 8, December 14, 1975. 218 echoed NyerereÕs description of the Kariakoo market as a modern shopping mall. ÒWith all the various items in one place one no longer needs to walk the whole city to fill his shopping list. É Instead of wandering from street to street, Dar es Salaam residents now can visit Kariakoo Market for all their shopping requirements.Ó 579 The modern socialist marketing system was most visible on the upper floor of the building where shoppers could stroll along shop windows and glance at shoes, clothes, textiles, stationery, pharmaceuticals, and household appliances. The majority of these s hops were owned and run by cooperatives and parastatals such as the Urafiki Textile Mill and Ubungo Farming Implements. Private shopkeepers, on the other hand, were largely absent as they were to be replaced by publicly -owned marketing entities, according to the new socialist economic policy. 580 Figure 4.3: Kariakoo Market Hall , 2012.581 579 Daily News newspaper , June 27, 1976. 580 See chapter 3. 581 Annika Seifert an d Gunter Klix, Hitzearchitektur Lernen von der afrikanischen Moderne (Zch: gta Verlag, 2012). 219 The wholesale market for agricultural products was located at the underground level of the market. It was the only wholesale market in town for rice and other agricultural products and, thus, it served the entire city of Dar es Salaam. All agricultural products had to be brought to the Kariakoo market hall, which amounted to a kind of modern Markthallenzwang. And also in many other respects, the trade in rice and other agric ultural products continued to be organized in similar ways as during the colonial and early postcolonial period. In the following, I focus on how rice was traded from rice farmers in rural areas to the Kariakoo market and finally to end consumers in the ci ty. IN THE UNDERBELLY OF THE MARKET: MALI KAULI Neither TanzaniaÕs independence nor the opening of the new market constituted clear breaks with a long -lasting trading system. Relations between upcountry suppliers, Kariakoo traders, and urban retailers continued to be based on trading patterns and credit relations established in the colonial period when Africans had been legally prohibited from taking out loans unless they applied for a special permission. 582 As African traders found it difficult if not im possible to access loans from banks and other financial institutions, they created verbal credit arrangements such as mali kauli , which linked up rice farmers, rural traders, Kariakoo wholesalers, urban retailers, and end consumers in chains of credit. Eve n when private banks were nationalized in the early postcolonial period, these arrangements continued to be relevant. 583 While wealthy and well-connected businessmen and businesswomen were able to get loans, Kariakoo traders usually did not qualify for those loans. Thus, from the perspective of urban African traders, the 582 TNA: 10493; 26231; ACC 26/M5/2: Credit to Native Ordinance, 1931. 583 The Tanzanian government nationalized private banks in 1967. The newly nationalized ban ks gave out a large majority of their loans to parastatals in the public sector of the economy rather than to private entities ( Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Fin ancial Ex perience in the Post -War Period Ó). 220 colonial period and the socialist period displayed more similarities than differences with regards to accessing bank loans . Even in the modern Kariakoo wholesale market opened in 1975, the mali kauli -system continued to form the basis on which business transactions were conducted, just as had been the case in the German -built market hall. Personal relations between wholesalers and suppliers outlasted the temporary move of the market to the Il ala neighborhood while the new market hall was being constructed between 1971 and 1975. As most of the Kariakoo traders moved to Ilala, which was located just to the west of Kariakoo, 584 upcountry suppliers followed their trusted Kariakoo middlemen to the in terim wholesale market. Upon completion of the new market hall in 1975, a reverse movement set in as wholesale traders went back to Kariakoo and established themselves in the underground market. Again, suppliers followed wholesale traders and started to br ing upcountry produce to Kariakoo. Close personal relations between upcountry suppliers and wholesale traders formed the basis of the mali kauli -system. All the long -standing wholesale traders I interviewed confirmed the existence of mali kauli at the time and they were able to describe it with ease and in detail. 585 584 A minority of traders preferred to go to the small retail market in the formerly Asian neighborhood or ÒUhindiniÓ to the east of Kariakoo. 585 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kar iakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, March 23, 2013 ; Dummah , interview with the author in Kiswahili ; Faraji Iddi Dibuma , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Ukonga, Dar es Salaam, March 18, 2013 ; Jabu Ramadhani , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kar iakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, May 12, 2013; Mzee Luanda , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Manzese, May 22, 2013 ; Kasoga , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Tandika, Dar es Salaam, April 16, 2013 ; Juma Saidi Lusunga , interview with the autho r in Kiswahili, Kariakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, April 1, 2013 ; Mzee Gogo , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Ifakara, Morogoro, October 12, 2013; Mzee Kagire , interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, March 20, 2013; Mzee Kobelo , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Manzese, Dar es Salaam, May 27, 2013 ; Suleiman Majata, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Manzese, Dar es Salaam, May 25, 2013; Mohammed Hussen Nyoko , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, January 15, 2013; Salum Ra madhani Kusa Elikeni, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 221 In short, the system worked as follows. A supplier/farmer from upcountry handed over the produce to a particular wholesaler/middleman at the Kariakoo market and waited for the latter to sell the produce, which usually took a few days or a couple of weeks. Once the produce was sold, the supplier was paid his share and returned home. 586 Alternatively, an upcountry supplier would hand over the produce to the wholesaler, return home, and collect the mon ey during the next visit to Dar es Salaam. Depending on the amount of goods available at the Kariakoo market, traders had two options. During harvest season when upcountry suppliers would bring large amounts of rice to Kariakoo, they would simply stay in K ariakoo, negotiate a price with the suppliers, sell the produce to local retailers, and then pay the upcountry suppliers their share. When there was not enough rice available at the Kariakoo market, Kariakoo traders would travel upcountry themselves or sen d their aids upcountry to buy produce there. 587 Whether they stayed in 586 The use of the male gender is chosen here because men formed the overwhelming majority of the upcountry suppliers and Kariakoo traders at the time. Fideris Mwamsea from Mbingu near Ifakara in Morogoro Region farmed bananas and started to transport them to Dar es Salaam in the 1980s. His contact at the Kariakoo wholesale market was Mzee Kagire, who had specialized in the trade with unripe bananas. In Kariakoo, Fideris would talk to Mze e Kagire and they would agree on a price. Usually, Fideris would wait for up to one week before Mzee Kagire sold the bananas. After Mzee Kagire sold the bananas, Fideris would get his money (Fideris Mwamsea , interview with the author in Kiswahili , Mbingu, Morogoro, March 8, 2013; Mzee Kagire, interview with the author in Kiswahili). 587 Traders in other produce also relied on the mali kauli system. Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, who traded bananas at the Kariakoo market since 1958, would send his aids to the farmer s with a letter requesting to get their bananas. They then collected the bananas and brought them to Kariakoo, where Habibu Mganda sold them and brought the money to the farmers. He knew the banana farmers very well and they considered him their agent in t own (Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili). It was also common for shopkeepers located at the upper level of the Kariakoo market to establish mali kauli -like relationships with their suppliers. Both private shops and cooperative shops did business in that way although they did not call it mali kauli but business on a commission basis. Only the shops of the Regional Trading Corporation (RTC), the local representatives of the state distribution network, were doing business with the help of formal credit. RTC shops managers could apply for loans through a loan officer at the credit department (Mzee Urio, who worked at the RTC shop in the Kariakoo 222 Kariakoo or traveled upcountry, Kariakoo traders did business within the mali kauli -system. They would only pay the suppliers once they had sold the produce. 588 Wholesale rice traders in Ka riakoo by and large operated according to the mali kauli -system. Immediate cash transactions were the exception, credit transactions the rule. Mzee Peni was one of the wholesale rice traders at the Kariakoo market. 589 He started to work at the Kariakoo marke t in the early 1960s. He first traded potatoes, tomatoes, okra, and cassava leaves. He got into the rice trade when the new Kariakoo market building opened in 1975. He either waited at his market stall in the Kariakoo market building for upcountry traders, who handed their rice over to him on mali kauli basis, or he went to one of the rice -producing areas himself and bought rice from farmers and small -scale traders there when there was not enough rice being supplied to Kariakoo. In Mzee PeniÕs case, he went to Ifakara in Morogoro region, at about 300 miles south -west of Dar es Salaam on a partially non -tarmac road. From there, he transported the rice to Dar es Salaam on one of the Asian -owned buses or lorries, and sold it at the Kariakoo market. He bought on e kilogram of hulled rice in Ifakara for 300 Shillings and sold it in Kariakoo for 500 Shillings. Transportation costs ate up most of the 200 Shilling difference in price. Furthermore, he had to pay a small government tax at the Kariakoo market. Initially, Mzee Peni only paid for part of the transportation costs and the tax, because he bought the rice in Ifakara on mali kauli basis. Once sold, he paid the rest of the transportation costs as well as the price for the rice in Ifakara. He boasted that ÒI could go to Ifakara even without any money at all, market building in the late 1980s, interview with the author , at the UFI shop in the Kari akoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, April 19, 2013 ). RTC shops were the exception to the rule of doing business based on mali kauli . 588 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 589 Mzee PeniÕs name indicates that he was a prominent and ac tive resident of the Kariakoo neighborhood. In fact, his name Mzee Peni was short for Mzee Panafrican. Mzee Peni was the leader of a football club named Panafrican, which was formed by a group of players, who used to play for the more widely -known club Yan ga, also located in the Kariakoo neighborhood. 223 with nothing but my pants and my shirt and I could still do business. This is different now. Nowadays there are only cash -based transactions [ hela kwa hela ] and you would appear a conman [if you wanted to do bu siness without money].Ó 590 Other former rice traders at the Kariakoo wholesale market confirmed Mzee PeniÕs emphasis on the continued importance of mali kauli . Jabu Ramadhani got involved in the rice trade when he moved back from the temporary market in Ila la to the newly -built Kariakoo market building in 1975. Ramadhani did, however, notice that the move into the modern Kariakoo building prompted a change in how amounts of rice were measured when rice was sold to retailers and end consumers. Before 1975, ri ce was sold with the help of so -called vibaba , containers holding about one pint of liquid or 700 grams of rice. In the new Kariakoo market, Jabu Ramadhani and his colleagues started to use scales. 591 While the move into the modern market building did bring about a change in how wholesalers sold rice to retailers and end consumers, the market relations between upcountry suppliers and wholesale traders continued to be marked by mali kauli transactions. Jabu Ramadhani explained ÒWe didnÕt buy [rice from upcount ry vendors]. They give you the load, you wait for five days or a week and then you give him the money. É He waits for his money [because] we didnÕt have cash. É We used to do business by trusting each other, [based on] uaminifu . É First, you take him so he knows your home. É He knows your family first and then you agree [on business matters] and sometimes he even sleeps at your house.Ó 592 From the perspective of Kariakoo wholesale rice traders, the mali kauli system of trade reduced the risk of trade and incr eased their working capital. 590 Mzee Peni, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 591 Jabu Ramadhani, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 592 Jabu Ramadhani, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 224 UAMINIFU The personal relations characteristic of the mali kauli -system at the Kariakoo wholesale market were undergirded by the concept of uaminifu . Uaminifu can best be translated as ÒtrustworthinessÓ or Òhonesty.Ó Semanti cally, uaminifu is related to two sets of meaning. On the one hand, the verb ku-amini means Òto trust,Ó Òto have faith in,Ó Òto believe,Ó also in a religious way. Amini is related to imani (ÒfaithÓ, Òreligious faithÓ). On the other hand, ku-amini is relate d to amana , which means ÒdepositÓ and Òpledge.Ó 593 Uaminifu was discursively closely related to mali kauli and long -standing traders always mentioned uaminifu when they talked about the mali kauli ways of doing business. Wholesale traders insisted that in or der for the mali kauli -system of trade to work, upcountry suppliers and Kariakoo traders had to be honest and trust each other, which was expressed with the help of the reciprocal verb form ku-aminiana , Òto trust each other.Ó 594 It was usually with a sense o f nostalgia that traders talked about what trade had been like in the past. But despite the nostalgia, it was striking how both Kariakoo traders and upcountry suppliers placed mali kauli and uaminifu in a common discursive space. ÒWhen a person gives you h is goods on a mali kauli basis, you meet again on the agreed -upon day and you give him his money. He comes and he goes away and already you have built uaminifu . When he comes back, he must come see you again,Ó described Mzee Kobelo, one of the long -standin g wholesale traders at the Kariakoo market. 595 593 These translations are drawn from Kr apfÕs Kiswahili dictionary from 1882. They are surprisingly similar to the translations found in the most recent version of the Kiswahili -English dictionary published by the University of Dar es Salaam ( Krapf, A Dictionary of the Suahili Language ; Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam, TUKI English -Swahili Dictionary = Kamusi Ya Kiingereza -Kiswahili , ed. J. S. Mdee and David Phineas Bhukanda Massamba, 3rd ed (Dar es Salaam: Institute of Kiswahili Research, University of Dar es Salaam, 2006) ). 594 In Kiswahili, the verb suffix -ana expresses the reciprocal form, e.g. ku-amini , Òto trust;Ó ku-aminiana , Òto trust each other .Ó 595 Mzee Kobelo, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 225 The powerful uaminifu discourse shaped peopleÕs behavior towards each other and their attitudes towards themselves in significant ways. The sense of trust on which personal long -term relations with upcountry sup pliers were built often also survived in times of crisis. 596 The uaminifu discourse compelled Kariakoo traders to cultivate their reputation as trustworthy and honest traders in the eyes of upcountry suppliers and, more generally, the people in the market and in the neighborhood. 597 A good reputation could to a certain extent be inherited from a parent, 598 but all the traders had to constantly work on maintaining and improving their reputation as waaminifu , i.e. honest and trustworthy people. Juma Lusunga, one of the wholesale traders at the Kariakoo market, described his reputation as mwaminifu , an honest trader, as being the equivalent of modern advertising. ÒOur business advertisement is to do business wellÓ because mouth -to-mouth advertisement was extremely ef fective and would convince other upcountry suppliers to bring their fish to him. 599 At times, various suppliers would insist he 596 Fideris Mwamsea took bananas to the Kariakoo market in the month following the month of Ramadan. Dar es Salaam residents Ð particularly the significant Muslim population Ð had spent much money to cover the extra expenses for festivities and food at the end of the holy month. As a result, the demand for foodstuff was low, Mzee Kagire was unable to sell the bananas, and the bananas went bad. Fideris Mwamsea experienced a heavy loss and he had to scra p his plans of buying a plot of land in Dar es Salaam. Despite this loss, his trust in Mzee Kagire was unshaken and they continued to do business with each other. In other cases, when upcountry suppliers felt like their trust in wholesale traders had been betrayed, they resorted to the Kariakoo market management. A supplier could take the wholesale trader to the managers of the Kariakoo market when the wholesaler was not able to sell the produce and pay the upcountry suppliers the agreed -upon price . However , this rarely happened (Fideris Mwamsea, interview with the author in Kiswahili ; Mzee Kagire, interview with the author in Kiswahili; s ee also Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili ). 597 Mzee Kalulu used the term jina kubwa or Ògrea t name,Ó which can be translated as Ògood reputationÓ (Mzee Kalulu, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, January 19, 2013 ). 598 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 599 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 226 receive their produce even though he was not able to pay for it immediately. So it was common for him to have up to ten people wai ting to be compensated for their supplies. 600 A more tangible way Kariakoo traders used to build trust with upcountry suppliers was to show them their house and family in Dar es Salaam. Sometimes, suppliers even stayed at the Kariakoo tradersÕ houses while waiting for the traders to sell their produce. 601 Wholesale traders would also agree to keep suppliersÕ share of profit for as long as the latter decided to stay in Dar es Salaam. Suppliers did not consider the option of putting money into a bank account bec ause banks wanted to have a form of security from their clients or a guarantor who would vouch for a client. Workers and employees were more likely to have bank accounts at that time and small -scale traders from upcountry were not considered potential bank clients. 602 By keeping suppliersÕ money at their house, Kariakoo traders partially fulfilled the role of the banks to which suppliers did not have access . The sense of trust among Kariakoo wholesale traders routinely crossed ethnic boundaries. 603 And the not ion of uaminifu and its accompanying expectations were also relevant 600 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 601 Jabu Ramadhani, interview with the author in Kiswahili. !"# Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Mabibo, Dar es Salaam, January 6, 2013; Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 603 The very fact that traders at the Kariakoo wholesale markets and upcountry suppliers represented a large number of ethnic groups was considered one of the reasons the mali kauli -system worke d so well in Kariakoo. Jabu Ramadhani, who identified himself as a Rangi from the Kondoa area in north -central Tanzania, would do business with anyone looking for a business partner. He preferred to build trust without relying on a common ethnic identity ( Jabu Ramadhani, interview with the author in Kiswahili). Mzee Mdachi, a supplier from Lukozi near Lushoto in north -east Tanzania, who had made experiences with wholesale traders in both Kariakoo and in the main market in Tanga, 200 miles north of Dar es Sa laam on the Indian Ocean coast, made a telling comparison between the markets in Dar es Salaam and in Tanga. He praised the mali kauli -system and the trustworthiness of traders in Kariakoo while lamenting the corrupt nature of the traders at the main marke t in Tanga, a coastal town in north -east Tanzania. The wholesale traders in Kariakoo were wakweli and waamanifu , i.e. honest and trustworthy people, who sold the produce and took their fair share. He blamed the corruptness of Tanga 227 to lorry and bus drivers, who were part of the network of trust and credit that facilitated the rice trade in the first place. Rather than having to travel to Dar es Salaam themselves, su ppliers could simply put their loads onto a lorry going to Kariakoo. After selling the goods, Kariakoo traders put the money in an envelope, write the name of the supplier and the their own name on it, and give the envelope to a trusted driver going to the particular areas. Drivers carried up to twenty or thirty envelopes full of money with them and distributed the envelopes to the suppliers when arriving at the destination. 604 In retrospect, several long -standing traders described the kind of honesty and tr ust uaminifu refers to as a form of credit or even a form of capital. At the time, however, they did not call it ÒcreditÓ or Òcapital.Ó If a trader had the reputation of being honest and trustworthy, he could do business even when he did not have any capit al at disposal. 605 As long as the suppliers trusted a particular trader, they would supply goods without expecting immediate cash payments. ÒHere [in Kariakoo], capital is uaminifu , and uaminifu is capital,Ó 606 Juma Lusunga stated, and uaminifu allowed traders like him to access goods without having to pay for them right away. 607 A reputation as mwaminifu could help a trader back on his feet when he was bankrupt. And a good reputation could bring a trader a lot of business. Salum Elikeni described how upcountry traders on the fact that most of the wholesale traders in Tanga as well as the upcountry suppliers such as himself were from the Sambaa ethnic group. At the Tanga market, the homoethnic environment did not have positive effect on the level of trust between upcountry suppliers and Tanga wholesalers (Mzee Mdachi, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Lukozi, Tanga, May 5, 2013). Compare this with West Africa where Cohen and Lovejoy provide examples of how Africans organized their trade on the basis of a shared ethnicity ( Cohen, Custom & Politics in Urban Africa ; Paul E . Lovejoy, Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700 -1900 (Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980) ). 604 Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili; Mohammed Hussen Nyoko, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 605 Mohammed Hussen Nyoko, intervi ew w ith the author in Kiswahili; Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 606 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 607 Mohammed Hussen Nyoko, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 228 suppliers he had never met sent him goods, simply because they had heard about his good reputation and entrusted him their produce. He would then pay them their money once he had sold the produce. 608 Neither wholesale traders nor suppliers at the time thought of these arrangements as a form of credit. ÒThe one trusting you doesnÕt have an idea that he is lending you and you, who are borrowing, donÕt have any idea that you are borrowing from another personÕs business; you donÕt know that and you donÕt use that kind of language,Ó contended Lusunga. 609 Much more important was another kind of language, the language of mutual respect. In fact, it was common for both the supplier and wholesaler to call the other tajiri , i.e. Òwealthy person,Ó even when one of them did not have any money. 610 Although they did not use the Kiswahili words for ÒcreditÓ and ÒdebtÓ when engaging in mali kauli practices, Kariakoo traders were very adept at using these arrangements to their advantage. The mali kauli arrangement with upcountry sup pliers freed up cash capital traders were able to use productively on the sale side of their business. 611 From the perspective of Kariakoo wholesale rice traders, the mali kauli system of trade reduced the risk of trade and increased their working capital. From the perspective of the upcountry traders and farmers, the mali kauli system in Kariakoo had both positive and negative aspects. Upcountry traders often had no choice but to 608 Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, int erview with the author in Kiswahili. 609 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 610 Mtunga Mbande, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Ifakara, Morogoro, March 10, 2013 . See also Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahi li. 611 An illuminating example provides Habibu Mganda, a banana trader who had been in business since the late 1950s. Even though he had a considerable amount of capital in cash at disposal, he would buy the produce on mali kauli basis. ÒThe first thing I learned with regards to bananas is that when you buy cash, you can get a very bad lossÓ because some bananas do not ripen quickly enough and cannot be sold. The chances for suppliers to reimburse him for unsold bananas were slim. On mali kauli basis, on th e other hand, he would only pay for the bananas he actually sold to retailers or end consumers. He would then use the money he had at disposal to sell his produce to large -scale buyers such as the university, the army, the hospital, or the prison on credit . These government institutions would regularly pay him at the end of the month (Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili). 229 enter into mali kauli agreements with wholesale traders in Kariakoo. Since the y did not know the potential buyers of their produce, i.e. retailers and end consumers, they had to go through wholesale traders, who would not agree to buy produce in cash. Wholesale traders at times abused the trust endowed in them by upcountry traders. Upcountry traders complained that they had to agree to prices that were merely half of what wholesalers would charge their customers. 612 When produce went bad as a result of lacking buyers, Kariakoo traders sometimes refused to cover any part of costs. 613 And there were also instances where wholesale traders disappeared before upcountry traders were given their share. 614 As the mali kauli system completely relied on uaminifu , there was always the risk of a trader abusing other peopleÕs trust. More importantly, a traderÕs dishonest practices often meant the end of his career as a trader. Mzee Peni insisted Òwe knew whether a person is honest and trustworthy [ mwaminifu ] because we do business the first day [the first time], so the second and the third day we know wh at kind of person he is and what his name and his fatherÕs name are. Also, they knew my number. At the stall in the market, we used to have numbers.Ó 615 Traders, who had not established themselves and had not acquired a reputation as mwaminifu , had to rely o n cash payments. 616 Overall, mali kauli was the system Kariakoo wholesalers relied on when they traded with rice from Ifakara. The positive aspects of the mali kauli system dominated also for the upcountry traders. In Ifakara, rice farmers -cum -traders empha sized how the importance of knowing a trustworthy wholesale trader in Kariakoo. Otherwise, one was stranded with a load of rice in Dar es Salaam 612 Yusuf Mbwilo, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Chimala, Mbeya, November 9, 2013 . 613 Mzee Gogo, inter view with the author in Kiswahili. 614 Michael Michoro Mbwana, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Chimala, Mbeya, November 9, 2013 . 615 Mzee Peni, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 616 Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, who was in the rice business in the early 1980s, was one of these traders. He made clear that nobody in Ifakara would give you rice on mali kauli basis when they did not know you (Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, interview with the author in Kiswahili). 230 without being able to sell it for a good price. 617 Upcountry rice traders insisted that Kariakoo wholesale trader s were very trustworthy. Kariakoo traders would abide to an agreed -upon price and there was no need to write things down. Verbal agreements were honored. What is more, traders stationed in Ifakara used the same discourse of uaminifu to describe themselves and their ways of doing business. Ò Uaminifu is my capital,Ó as the long -standing rice trader Sebastian Mbilingi put it pointedly. ÒThe main capital is uaminifu , especially for us poor people.Ó 618 Ifakara rice traders would draw on their reputation as waamini fu when wealthy traders from Dar es Salaam came to Ifakara to buy rice. These traders were referred to as wapemba , i.e. people from the island of Pemba (sg. mpemba ). In fact, the wapemba were Dar es Salaam residents doing business in Kariakoo and they were used to doing business on the basis of uaminifu . Unlike other traders, however, they came to Ifakara with cash and they would give trusted Ifakara traders cash so they could go to the villages with their bicycles, buy rice from farmers, and bring it to If akara. 619 Wapemba would not blindly trust Ifakara traders. The person in charge of the rice milling machine would serve as the guarantor. Wapemba would also gauge the trustworthiness of an Ifakara trader by pretending to accidentally give him too much money, waiting whether the Ifakara trader would silently accept the extra money or be honest and tell the mpemba about the mistake. Once a mpemba and an Ifakara trader had established trade relations based on uaminifu , the mpemba would rely on this specific Ifak ara trader during future visits. 620 Kariakoo tradersÕ heav y reliance on verbal credit agreements might suggest that bank loans were not available to Dar es Salaam residents at the time. This is not entirely true. Even 617 Mtunga Mbande, interview with the auth or in Kiswahili. 618 Sebastian Kilian Mbilingi, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Ifakara, Morogoro, March 10, 2013. 619 Mtunga Mbande, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 620 Mzee Mgaya , interview with the author in Kiswahili, Ifakara, Morogoro, March 10, 2013; Mtunga Mbande, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 231 before the liberalization of the financi al sector in the first half of the 1990s, it was not impossible for ordinary Dar es Salaam residents to get loans from banks. However, it was a challenge for ordinary traders to receive loans from the nationalized banking sector. After adopting a socialist policy framework laid out in the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the Nyerere government quickly moved to nationalize private banks. Barclays Bank, the South African Standard Bank, the Bank of India, and the Banque Belge du Congo were taken over by the governm ent and became the National Bank of Commerce (NBC). Unlike the private banks before nationalization, NBC gave out loans to the public sector rather than the private sector. A majority of loans went to government parastatals. Within thirteen years of the fo rmation of the National Bank of Commerce, the percentage of loans given out to the public sector rose from 13 per cent to about 90 per cent. 621 NBC remained the only bank to give out loans for commercial enterprises until 1991.622 Only two of the 48 Kariakoo t raders I talked to were able to get bank loans before the late 1990s. 623 Although they were aware of NBC giving out loans to businesspeople, most Kariakoo traders did not try to get bank loans because they were convinced the bank would not consider them cred itworthy customers. In tradersÕ own understanding, their businesses were too small, they did not have the necessary personal connections to influential people, and as Africans they did not have the right skin color to fulfill the requirement to get a loan. Several traders insisted 621 Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War Period,Ó 141. 622 Other state banks existed as well, such as the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), and the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) ( Binhammer, The Development of a Financial Infrastructure in Tanzania ; Kimei, ÒTanzaniaÕs Financial Experience in the Post -War PeriodÓ; Kami S. P . Rwegasira, Financial Analysis and Institutional Lending Operations Management in a Developing Country: A Critical Perspective of Tanzania Bank s and DFIs (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1991) ). 623 Hamis Mohamed Zowange , interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, March 25, 2013 ; Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 232 that it did not even cross their minds that they could get a loan from NBC or from any other bank. ÒWe were not creditworthy [ tulikuwa hatuaminiwi ] and we didnÕt even have thoughts of going to borrow money [from banks]Ó stated Hab ibu Mganda , a wholesale banana trader at the Kariakoo market hall .624 Jabu Ramadhani echoed this statement, ÒI have never [taken out a loan] and not even the thought of going to take out a loan existed.Ó 625 The mere idea of trying to secure a bank loan was too far -fetched for these traders to even consider. 626 It was not for a lack of experience with banking institutions that Kariakoo traders failed to consider taking out bank loans for their businesses. 627 A few traders also had NBC accounts and they used these f inancial institutions for their business dealings. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the NBC account holder Juma Lusunga found that he could make good use of the checks the bank made available to him. On the one hand, paying suppliers via check helped him safe time as he did not have to count money. On the other hand, handing out check s to suppliers made him look like an extraordinarily wealthy businessman in the eyes of other people so more and more suppliers came to trust him as their business partner in the Kariakoo market. 628 624 Habibu Ramadhani Mg anda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 625 Jabu Ramadhani, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 626 This provides insights into Kariakoo tradersÕ subjectivities. I discuss in chapter 5 how fundamentally the introduction of microcredits challenged exi sting subjectivities. 627 See chapter 2. 628 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Hamis Mohamed Zowange also had a bank account with NBC, which he only used as a deposit account. Although Kariakoo traders did not have access to formal l oans, they had the option of resorting to informal loans from local moneylenders. Informal moneylenders charged interest rates that were significantly higher than the ones charged by banks. Twenty per cent interest per month was common and interest rates c ould be considerably higher as well. Informal moneylenders were Africans, Arabs, and Asians, and they had their own means of ensuring the repayment of loans, which included the use of force. Because of their high interest rates, these loans were attractive for quick and illegal business deals. Kariakoo traders rarely if ever made use of private informal moneylenders. They preferred to rely on the mali kauli system of doing business and they were also able to borrow money from each other when their starting capital was completely used up ( Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili). 233 In order to get a bank loan from NBC, a trader needed to have at least two wadhamini , i.e. people serving as guarantors. Usually, wadhamini had to have NBC accounts with a sufficient amount of money to cover the traderÕs loan. In case of non-repayment of the loan, wadhamini were held responsible. 629 This bank policy inadvertently gave Asian businessmen and businesswomen an advantage over African traders. It was much easier for a potential Asian borrower to find two wadhamini than for a poten tial African borrower because Asian communities in Dar es Salaam were tightly -knit and Asians were much more likely to have bank accounts. 630 Although the colonial law restricting credit to Africans had long been repealed, African businesspeople still found it impossibly difficult to borrow money from banks . Furthermore, the bribes loan officers regularly demanded did not make taking out loans easier for ordinary traders. 631 The limited access to bank loans only underwrote the importance and longevity of the mali kauli system of trade in Kariakoo. CONCLUSION Focusing exclusively on bank and state policies means to overlook African tradersÕ extensive use of verbal credit agreements to create trade networks and personal businesses. Rice traders at the Kariakoo ma rket relied on and invested in mali kauli credit relations with their suppliers in order to trade relatively large amounts of produce with little cash at hand. Mali kauli remained the mode of trading rice throughout the colonial and socialist periods even after the socialist state 629 Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni was one of the few Kariakoo traders I interviewed, who was able to take out a loan from NBC in the form of an overdraft. 630 Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili. From his own experience, Mzee Urio stated that ÒIn the past, banks used to trust Asians more than AfricansÓ (Mzee Urio, intervie w with the author in Kiswahili ). 631 Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 234 increasingly took control of trade in the country via cooperative unions. Neither did the construction of a new market building at the height of the socialist period interrupt long -established trade relations and mali kauli arrang ements. Mali kauli was also compatible with Muslim prescriptions with regards to commercial activities because interest was not visible in mali kauli arrangements. Traders relied on the powerful uaminifu discourse to forge trade relations and respectable identities. The uaminifu discourse compelled Kariakoo traders to cultivate their reputation as trustworthy and honest traders in the eyes of upcountry suppliers and the people in the market and in the neighborhood. With the help of this rich and moral voca bulary, Kariakoo traders could assess other tradersÕ activities and identify them as waaminifu , thus belonging to their community, while carefully making sure that other traders would identify them as waaminifu . If a trader had the reputation of being hone st and trustworthy, he could do business even if he did not have any cash at disposal. TradersÕ conceptions of personhood and self -worth were constituted relationally. The morality underwriting these credit and debt relations became the focus of attention in the mid -1990s when microcredits and small bank loans became available for traders in Kariakoo. Microcredit proponents and state actors argued that the shift away from mali kauli and towards immediate cash payments was a step of modernizing market relati ons in Kariakoo. More importantly, loan officers deployed a different kind of morality when distinguishing between ÒgoodÓ and ÒbadÓ traders, which is the subject of the next chapter. 235 CHAPTER 5 ÑCOMPETING MORALITIES: MICROCREDITS, CREDITWORTHINESS, AND AIBU IN POSTSOCIALIST KARIAKOO In a speech broadcast on the evening news, Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner Said Meck Sadick addressed the cityÕs female residents at the occasion of International WomenÕs Day 2013. In a patronizing tone, he told them n ot to be afraid of approaching financial institutions and let cowardice and worries about high interest rates stand in their way of economic development. Instead of listening to stories about people who have failed to repay loans, they should make use of l oans and bring about development. ÒYou should dare [to take out a loan] so you can see its fruits, and donÕt listen to the words of the one who has failed,Ó he pronounced. 632 According to Said Sadick, stories circulating in the urban public had generated irr ational fears and worries, which prevented women in Dar es Salaam from taking out loans. Dar es Salaam residents Ð irrespective of their gender Ð had good reasons to be skeptical of bank loans. For the past twenty years, banks and microfinance institution s had provided loans to small - and medium -scale businesswomen and businessmen in Dar es Salaam. Yet, many long -standing urban residents remained doubtful. PeopleÕs skepticism did not only refer to the technical characteristics and technicalities of these l oans such as high interest rates and short repayment periods. 633 Bank credit was also constitutive of a new business culture, which challenged older ways of doing business and their attendant value systems. 634 Late colonial and 632 Newstar Rwechungura, ÒWanawake Dar Acheni Woga, Kopeni Mitaji,Ó Mwananchi newspaper , March 8, 2013. 633 Annual interest rates on formal loans usually ranged between 18 and 30 per cent, but could be as high as 240 per cent, while the annual inflation rate stood at about twelve per cent. Repayment periods were as short as one month and the first portion of the loan was expected to be repaid as early as one week after the loan was taken out ( Staphord Kwanama, ÒRiba Kubwa Za Mikopo Zinavyowaliza Wakopaji,Ó Mwananchi newspaper , October 26, 2012; Mwananchi, ÒMeghji Alia Riba Benki Zinaumi za Wakopaji,Ó Mwananchi newspaper , June 6, 2013. 634 For an anthropological study of how microcredits changed the ways of doing business in a neighborhood in Cairo, see Elyachar, Markets of Disp ossession . 236 postcolonial governments underto ok repeated efforts to make urban residents more business -minded by impelling them to work on their creditworthiness and become Ògood debtors.Ó The morality at the center of these discourses and practices of debt acted as a fulcrum for reforming urban subj ects. Moral discourses around credit and debt were productive spaces because they constituted a realm where local views of business practices and government visions of desirable business behavior intersected. Still, the project of impelling borrowers to re -think themselves as independent, rational, and fiscally responsible entrepreneurs accountable only to loan officers did not unfold uncontestedly. Competing moralities allowed urban residents to critically evaluate new forms of credit and debt and their at tending moral discourses. This was particularly true in the Kariakoo market environment, where communal and trade relations were heavily marked by aspects of credit and debt and shaped by moral discourses on debt. In an urban environment of competing moral ities, Kariakoo borrowers perceived small and microcredits against the backdrop of a multi -layered history of borrowing and lending, histories of dispossession and wealth -creation, and systems of trade. The persistence of older forms of morality and relati ons of trust served as a way to evaluate and criticize bank loans. A CULTURE O F (MICRO -)CREDIT Kariakoo traders had access to microcredits and small and medium -size bank loans for the first time in the mid -1990s when TanzaniaÕs financial sector was dereg ulated . The Tanzanian governmentÕs hotly debated acceptance of an IMF - and World Bank -sponsored structural adjustment program in 1986 was the formal start to deregulate the economy, including the banking sector. NBCÕs monopoly position in the commercial ba nking sector ended in 1991 and 237 the doors were opened for private financial institutions to be set up. By 1999, a total of 31 financial institutions had been established. 635 NBC itself underwent a thorough process of restructuring towards privatization. 636 Some of the newly created financial institutions took the form of microfinance institutions. Among the first were FINCA, PRIDE, and the Presidentia l Trust Fund for Self -Reliance , all of which were established in the mid -1990s. These early non -bank microfinance institutions in Tanzania drew on ideas and experiences of microfinance institutions in other parts of the world, such as Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh. Banks in Tanzania drew their inspiration from microfinance institutions in order to reach larger segments of society. The formation of the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), an offshoot of NBC, was one example. According to the rhetoric adopted by financial institutions and the Tanzanian government, microfinance was a means to enhance the desirable pro cess of making banking services available to previously excluded segments of the Tanzanian public. Providers of small bank loans and microcredit loans actively promoted loans at the Kariakoo produce wholesale market and other markets in the neighborhood. S taff members of NMB and PRIDE reached out to Kariakoo traders and encourage them to take out loans. 637 Hamis Ulele, who traded used car parts at a tiny stall in the Kariakoo Auction Mart, vividly remembered ÒThey came in here and told the traders ÔCome and b orrow money so you can do business!ÕÓ 638 In these early days of microfinance in Kariakoo, banks and microcredit NGOs accepted a traderÕs market stall as security for a small loan of 500Õ000 Tanzanian shillings. Upon repaying the initial loan, a trader 635 Tanzania Ministry of Finance, ÒNational Micro -Finance PolicyÓ (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 2000). 636 NBC was split into three different entities in 1997, including NBC (1997) Limited and the National Microfinance Bank. 637 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 638 Hamis Ka ssim Ulele, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 238 could eventually qualify for loans of up to 3 million shillings. Of the 48 Kariakoo traders I interviewed, 42 took out their first loans from banking institutions in the late -1990s and early 2000s. The provision of small loans to formerly ÒunbankableÓ people did not simply satisfy an already existing demand as the promoters of microcredits proclaimed. Initially, Kariakoo traders, who had been invested in the mali kauli system of trade , were not particularly eager to take out bank loans. Lenders undertook various activities to promote loans and ÒeducateÓ urban dwellers and traders about the meaning of loans and the formalities involved. Winnie Terry, a former officer at the microcredit organization FINCA, remembered that people in Dar es Salaam wondered why she was interested in giving them money and why she wanted to trust them. 639 A lot of effort was invested in shaping urban TanzaniansÕ desires for bank and microcredit loans and persuading people, who had been excluded from banking services, to embrace the idea of borrowing money and making repayments with interest and within clearly defined time units. Loan providersÕ mission was not only to lend money to people but also to educate Òfinancially illiterateÓ people how to use credit. Much of this work aimed at the cu ltural ways of doing business in Kariakoo. 640 Representatives of credit institutions often referred to the cultural aspect of their work when they used terms such as Òcredit mentalityÓ or Òculture of credit.Ó 641 Salie 639 Winnie Terry, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, June 11, 2013. 640 Elyacher shows for the el -Hirafiyeen neighborhood in Cairo how prospective managers of local microcredit services were instructed to use culture, such as the headman, the religious leader , community pressure, or the police, as ways to ensure the repayment of loans, and culture was turned into a cost -saving device ( Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession , 194, 200, 211, 214Ð215). 641 Winnie Terry , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Shafik Bhati a, interview with the author in English, Buguruni, Dar es Salaam, August 6, 2013 ; Salie Mlay , interview with the author in English , Posta, Dar es Salaam, November 23, 2013 ; Reginald Massawe , interview with the 239 Mlay, the NMB branch manager in Kariakoo i n the early 2000s, went to the Kariakoo market hall every evening to spend time with the traders because he wanted to get to know their way of doing business. ÒYou really need to know how these people work, from the bottom, their culture.Ó 642 Salie Mlay conv inced the market manager to organize a meeting in the market building to inform the traders about the formalities of taking out loans. 643 An explicit reference to ÒcultureÓ was also made by Miguel Llenas, the General Director of Dun&Bradstreet Bureau Tanzani a Limited, the national representative of the Ameri can company Dun&Bradstreet , when promoting the imminent creation of the first credit bureau in Tanzania in 2013. Now we help the government of Tanzania, the banks, every stakeholders of the country to cre ate a culture of repayment. If you have a loan, you will have to pay. If you have a credit card, you will have to pay. If you have a telephone line in your house, you will have to pay. If you are paying anything in any retail company, for example you go to a retailer store and you buy a fridge or a TV to be paid in one year, you will have to pay it. Because if you donÕt do that, eventually nobody will lend you money because everybody will know that you donÕt pay in time.644 Miguel Llenas made clear that the role of the credit bureau was to change borrowersÕ mentality and introduce a new culture of doing business. Dun&Bradstreet would collect information about companiesÕ and individualsÕ credit history in order to enable money -lending institutions to gauge peo pleÕs creditworthiness. The information database on potential borrowers should Òcreate an author in Kiswahili, Survey, Dar es Salaam, Ma y 23, 2013; Tirunagari Srikanth, interview with the author in English , Posta, Dar es Salaam, July 15, 2013 . 642 Salie Mlay, interview with the author in English. 643 Salie Mlay claimed that he had 250 applications after the initial meeting. The applicants incl uded wholesale traders from the underground level as well as shopkeepers from the upper level. 644 Miguel Llenas, General Director of Dun&Bradstreet Bureau Tanzania Limited, in an interview with Tanzanian media at the occasion of a workshop on the establishm ent of a credit bureau in Tanzania. The workshop took place on May 3, 2013, and representatives of 45 banks operating in Tanzania participated. Interview available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mZTQiOcJeM, transcribed by the author. 240 easily identifiable pool of credit -worthy customers,Ó Miguel Llenas was quoted in the Tanzanian daily newspaper The Citizen .645 A necessary prerequisite for the workin gs of a credit bureau was the identification of potential borrowers. Incidentally, the creation of TanzaniaÕs first credit bureau coincided with the launching of compulsory national identity cards. The first ID cards were issued just a few months after the LlenasÕ statement cited above was made. Banks in Tanzania had struggled with the challenge of unambiguously identifying clients before. In the British colonial days bank clients were identified via an akida who in turn relied on a jumbe . Both akida and jumbe were local political representatives of the British colonial government. When cashing a check at the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), for instance, an African bank client had to see an elder or jumbe , who confirmed the identity of the person. The bank client subsequently had to take the letter to the akida , present the POSB book and the tax receipt, and have it signed by the akida. Only then could the bank client finally go to the bank and cash the check. Despite this lengthy and thought -out process of identifying bank clients, there was at least one person in Tanga, who in 1939 managed to outsmart the system. He impersonated a person named Omari Sekoyo and cashed a check in the latterÕs name. 646 After independence, the Tanzanian government discu ssed the idea of introducing a national identity card several times, although it was never a pressing political issue. The idea was first introduced in 1968 at a regional meeting with government representatives from Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. It took eighteen years before a resolution regarding the registration of 645 Frank Aman, ÒDefaultersÕ Days Numbered after Credit Reference Bureau Launched,Ó The Citizen newspaper , May 6, 2013. 646 TNA 28657: ÒPayment of Savings Bank Deposit to Wrong Person: Pe tition from Omari Sekoyo. Ó Still in 2013, it was common practice to provide a letter from the ten -cell leader when a Tanzanian wanted to open a bank account. 241 citizens was formulated and implemented. 647 No action was taken, however, due to financial constraints. Finally in 2006, the government arranged for a feasibility study and, shortly thereafter, it decided to implement and finance a national ID card program, which the National Identification Authority (NIDA) was to supervise. By 2015, every adult Tanzania was to own a national identification card. 648 In 2013, the issuing of ID cards was officially launched and citizens started to apply for cards. The government attached high hopes to the introduction of national ID cards. According to TanzaniaÕs macroeconomic policy framework for the years 2013 -2017, ID cards were expected to Òenhance national peace and security Ó and NIDAÕs database information was to be used Òfor socio -economic development.Ó 649 With respect to financial matters, the policy framework stated: IDs will not be merely identity documents just like passports, business cards or identity cards issued by o neÕs employers. It will mean an increased social economic status because it may also serve as a one -stop document that will provide details of the economic status of the Tanzanian national that may be helpful for the banks to advance him/her credit in the event one is an applicant for a loan. Identifying potential borrowers will help lenders assess risks and costs on an individual basis and better determine the creditworthiness of each borrower, which will make loans more accessible to citizens. 650 Peace and development were to be achieved, among other things, by assessing every citizenÕs creditworthiness. Citizens became defined as ÒborrowersÓ or Òpotential borrowers,Ó who looked to financial institutions as potential lenders. The state came to occupy a subs idiary position as the issuer of ID cards and facilitator of information databases. In many ways, the citizen -state 647 The Registration and Identification of Persons Act, No.11/86 was enacted in 1986. 648 United Republic of Tanzania, Macroeconomic Policy Framework for the Five Year Development Plan/Budget, 2013/2014 -2016/17 (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Ministry of Finance, 2013), 42Ð44. 649 Ibid., 42. 650 Ibid., 43. 242 relationship became redefined as borrower -lender relationship. Issuing national ID cards also had the effect of fixing citizen -borrowers in specific geographical locations. 651 ÒSaidi Mohamed from Kariakoo,Ó for instance, was not a sufficient way to unambiguously identify a person because most likely, several people called Saidi Mohamed may have resided in the Kariakoo neighborhood at any given t ime. At the same time, national ID cards were considered to help realize land as collateral for loans, along the lines Hernando de Soto suggested. 652 To be sure, the provision of ID cards had the potential to quantify and fix people in a system and create ne w kinds of knowledge that could be used for various purposes, including multiparty democratic governance, policing, and US anti -terrorism efforts. With regards to finance, however, national ID cards were expected to create new kinds of knowledge about indi vidual peopleÕs creditworthiness. The creation of a credit bureau and the introduction of ID cards, both in 2013, were to support financial institutions in their efforts to gauge individualsÕ creditworthiness. The goal was to identify users of financial se rvices and to divide them into ÒgoodÓ and ÒbadÓ debtors. The statements above illustrate how collecting information about citizens, identifying people as potential borrowers, assessing individualsÕ creditworthiness, and lending money to clients were all ti ed up in one discursive field, which started to take shape in urban Tanzania in the mid -1990s. Government agencies and financial institutions advised citizens and customers how to use money properly and productively. Furthermore, they defined with renewed vehemence who was eligible to have access to money in the form of loans in the first place. Taken together, the credit 651 Ibid., 27. For more on the entanglements of the citizen and borrower discourses, see chapter 4. 652 Hernando de Soto and Francis Cheneval, Realizing Property Rights (Zch:fer&Rub, 2006). 243 bureau and the national ID amounted to a Òtechnology of neoliberalism.Ó 653 The credit bureau in combination with the national ID card const ituted Tanzanians as citizen s-borrowers. Together with credit histories collected by the credit bureau, financial institutions would be able to use national identity cards to unambiguously identify creditworthy citizens and their potential collateral. 654 Borrower s-citizens, on the other hand, were expected to take stock of themselves and work on their creditworthiness in order to become Ògood debtors.Ó FROM UAMINIFU TO CREDITWORTHINESS A focus on the notion of uaminifu illustrates to what extent the processe s described above translated to what happened on the ground in Kariakoo, i.e. how power relations and trader subjectivities in the Kariakoo market changed with the liberalization of the financial sector in the mid-1990s and the arrival of microcredit loans in the subsequent decade. The widespread availability of bank loans made it easier for Kariakoo traders to pay their suppliers immediately in cash instead of relying on mali kauli transactions. Immediate cash transactions had the advantage of shortening u pcountry suppliersÕ stay in Dar es Salaam. A Kariakoo trader with the disposable cash to pay upcountry suppliers immediately was able to lure suppliers away from other Kariakoo traders, who based their trade on the mali kauli system. To marginalize and rep lace mali kauli transactions was an explicit goal formulated by Salie Mlay, the NMB branch manager in Kariakoo from 2002 to 2008, when he started to advertise NMB loans to Kariakoo traders. ÒI told the [Kariakoo] market manager ÔIf you want to make more mo ney, we need to cooperate, me and you, and support these people [the wholesalers at the Kariakoo market] so 653 Keith Breckenridge, ÒBiometrics, Governance and PredictabilityÓ (VAD Congress: Future Afri ca, Bayreuth, Germany, 2014). 654 Ibid. 244 they can have cash and they can sell more, and collect more revenue, and you can renovate the market.Õ É We had a meeting and we agreed that we woul d give microcredit so they can support cash movements so they can pay on the spot instead of take it on credit.Ó 655 When Kariakoo traders started to take out bank loans and pay suppliers in cash, the mali kauli system and the conceptions of self -worth and personhood described in chapter 4 were challenged. Uaminifu as a central term to describe a traderÕs professional ability and personal identity was undermined while ÒcreditworthinessÓ as assessed by loan officers became increasingly relevant. The definato ry struggle over the meaning and relevance of uaminifu and creditworthiness provides an insight into processes of subject formation. 656 Whether and how people and institutions considered a person trustworthy had an effect on the personÕs understanding of him self or herself. How trustworthiness was defined and who was defined as trustworthy fundamentally shaped peopleÕs identities and subjectivities. Notions of trustworthiness and honesty were particularly relevant in the Kariakoo market environment, where cre dit and debt were constitutive of social and communal relations. Who had the power to define trustworthiness and trustworthy traders was critically important. The definatory power over who was and who was not a trustworthy trader in the Kariakoo market sh ifted from upcountry suppliers to loan officers . For loan officers, uaminifu was no longer a central term to describe a traderÕs personality and his or her ability as a professional trader. A few Kariakoo traders also referred to uaminifu as something that had 655 Salie Mlay, interview with the author in English. 656 With Fouc ault, I consider subject formation as a continuous process taking place in an environment of power manifested in social relation. In this environment of power, human beings turn themselves into subjects and create certain subjectivities, see especially Foucault, ÒThe Subject and Power.Ó 245 mattered in the past, but had become less important in the present. 657 Rather than relying on tradersÕ reputation as waaminifu , they gauged debtorsÕ creditworthiness and separated ÒgoodÓ debtors from ÒbadÓ debtors. They employed a similar but narrower c oncept of trustworthiness, i.e. creditworthiness, expressed in Kis wahili with the verb ku-kopesheka , i.e. Òto be creditworthy.Ó 658 The change from ÒtrustworthinessÓ to ÒcreditworthinessÓ was significant because creditworthiness was not synonymous with uamin ifu. Certainly for Kariakoo traders, the shift from uaminifu to creditworthiness was substantial. What fundamentally changed were the people assessing Kariakoo traders. In the mali kauli system, upcountry suppliers ultimately had the power to define which Kariakoo trader was trustworthy. Suppliers expected a trustworthy Kariakoo trader to take care of produce and sell it to the agreed -upon price before it went bad. Suppliers relied on a traderÕs reputation and on their personal relations with the trader to gauge the traderÕs uaminifu. By agreeing to hand over their goods to a particular Kariakoo trader without insisting on immediate cash payments, they granted the trader a form of short -term credit. There were always several wholesale traders present for eac h kind of produce so suppliers could choose to entrust their goods to any other wholesale trader present at the market. As they built personal long -term relations a particular Kariakoo trader, suppliers helped him to establish a reputation as a trustworthy trader .659 With the emergence of a cash -based trading system as an alternative to the mali kauli system, bank ers and microfinance officials replaced upcountry suppliers as assessors of Kariakoo 657 Suleiman Majata, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 658 From the verb ku-kopa (Òto borrowÓ) and the derivative verb form ku-kopesha (Òthe make (someone) borrowÓ, i.e. Òto lendÓ). Ku-kopesheka is the stative form of ku-kopesha , so the literal translation of ku-kopesheka is Òto be in a state of being made to borrowÓ or Òto be lendable.Ó 659 See chapter 4. 246 tradersÕ trustworthiness, or rather creditworthiness. As banke rs expected borrowing traders to be able to pay back loans with interest in regular installments, they required them to prove their creditworthiness by providing evidence that their businesses had been profitable for the duration of several months or years . Hardly any one of these traders had a credit history with financial institutions. 660 According to Habibu Mganda, ÒMany of us traders, we donÕt have business records, which could give us the memory of how last yearÕs business was compared to this yearÕs business. É ThatÕs why the banks are afraid of us and now the banks do lend us money but itÕs very little money and not a considerable amount.Ó 661 Kariakoo traders had to prove that they were capable businessmen even when they had been in business for decades a nd had a long -standing reputation as waaminifu. As the definatory power of who was a capable and trustworthy businessman shifted away from fellow traders and suppliers to loan officers, the borrowing traders came to view themselves and their activities in a new light. In their role as assessors of creditworthiness, loan officers wrote specific kinds of histories. As writers of credit histories, they did not trust oral sources and strongly believed in the value of written documents such as bank statements, business plans, title deeds, and proof of residence. With the help of these documents, they gauged tradersÕ creditworthiness and separated creditworthy traders from not creditworthy ones. ÒIn the process of giving loans, there is something called ÔWhat is your capacity to hold money? How much money can you trade with?Õ And that should not come from your mouth, it has to come from a certain record, which can prove how much you can trade with,Ó explained NMB branch manager Salie Mlay adding ÒIf I give you, le tÕs say, one million [shillings] this year, through putting the money to the account, taking out, put your sales, paying people, it will be enough to tell us how much money you have 660 Creditors and loan officers such as Salie Mlay lamented this to a great extent. 661 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with t he author in Kiswahili. 247 traded within the year and whether you deserve to be given two million. Bu t if you donÕt write your own history of how much money you can trade with, we may give you another one million or we may give you even less because we donÕt know how much you get.Ó 662 Kariakoo traders were encouraged to write their own histories as entrepre neurial and creditworthy businessmen with the help of written documents. For Kariakoo traders, who had long relied on verbal promises ( kauli ), the shift to bank loans and written documents constituted a qualitative change. 663 ÒYou have to bring an analysis [of your business, a business plan], you canÕt just talk at the table. No, you have to talk with documents, in a written manner. ÔThis is the business and this is the analysis [of my business], the business will have this many shillings and this will be th e profit,Õ and these things are in a file,Ó Yusuph Kaita described the change. 664 Others confirmed how loan officersÕ means of assessing creditworthiness were different from how uaminifu was assessed in the past. Loan officers required potential borrowers to present bank statements in order to see the history of the flow of money pertaining to a particular account. Many Kariakoo traders had not kept ledgers or entertained bank accounts. 665 Bank loans relied on a legal framework in ways mali kauli arrangements had not. ÒA loan is a contract, and you have to pay according to what you agreed on, and it is a legal contract, not 662 Salie Mlay, interview with the author in English. Mzee Urio, a shopkeeper on the first floor of the Kariakoo market and one of Salie MlayÕs clients at the time, lamented that banks asked for various documents, including two yearsÕ worth of written business records, which he was not able to produce. In the end, Mzee Urio did not think it was worth the time and money to apply for a loan of only 500,000 shillings. To express his frustration, he moved all of his money to another bank (Mzee Urio, interview with the author in Kiswahili) . 663 Roberts and Mann show how provision of credit in the nineteenth century was increasingly undertaken by writing contracts and pledging property rather than establishing patron -client relationships or sw earing oaths ( Roberts and Mann, ÒIntroduction: Law in Colonial Africa,Ó 9, 11, 29). 664 Yusuph Abubakar Kaita, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 665 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 248 a voluntary agreement [which] when you fail [to pay, you can say] Ôwell, weÕll see next year.Õ No, it is a legal contract. If you donÕt pay , this and this step will be taken, and you sign there,Ó Juma Lusunga explained. 666 Signed written documents meant that there was a legal obligation to make agreed -upon repayments, which brought about a new experience of time as well. Credit arrangements alw ays create and rely on particular conceptions of time. 667 The mali kauli system depended on flexible time promises. Whether Kariakoo traders were able to sell the produce on the spot or after two weeks did not matter. Whenever the produce was sold, Kariakoo traders reimbursed upcountry suppliers for the goods they were entrusted with. 668 Bank loans , on the other hand, entailed fixed time units for repayment, which stripped bank loans off the Maussian gift -like character mali kauli loans displayed. 669 Thus, t he di ssemination and widespread availability of bank loans challenged cultural notions of trust and honesty. Credit providers understood bank loans to be a catalyst for the emergence of a new culture of doing business, which involved a change in peopleÕs ways o f handling money, their conception of time, their relations with other people, and their understanding of themselves. Instead of investing time and money into building personal and trust -based relations with upcountry suppliers, which was crucial in the mali kauli -system of trade, K ariakoo traders were now expected to be accountable primarily to loan officers and to engage with suppliers in impersonal and cash -based market transactions. The new way of trading at the Kariakoo based 666 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the aut hor in Kiswahili. 667 Nietzsche went as far as arguing that creditor -debtor relationships were responsible for humansÕ sense of time in the first place ( Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals ). 668 Trade relations resembling mali kauli have a long history in the Indian Ocean world. As long as a supplier had a good host and was fed and accommodated properly, there was no need for immediate payment of goods (Abdul Sheriff, Dhow Culture of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) ). 669 As David Graeber has argued, fixing the time units in which loa ns can be repaid changes the quality of loans from gift -like to credit -like ( Graeber, Debt ). 249 on bank loans and immedia te cash payments de-emphasized tradersÕ acknowledgment that their fate and business success depended on other tradersÕ actions and expectations and it challenged long -standing cultural notions of trust and honesty. As loan officers measured and quantified ÒcreditworthinessÓ with specific methods, some borrowing traders indeed came to see themselves and their relations to other people in a new light. There was also a subtle difference between the ways long -standing Kariakoo traders talked about doing busines s before and after the introduction of bank loans. T raders tended to use reciprocal verb forms expressed with the suffix -ana when referring to the past, and they more often used reflexive verb forms expressed with the prefix ji- when describing business a ctivities since the mid -1990s. Traders insisted on the importance of ku-aminiana , Òto trust each other,Ó when doing business on mali kauli basis. When describing more recent business activities, traders used reflexive verb forms expressed with the prefix ji-, such as in ku-jikwamua (Òto extricate oneselfÓ), ku-jipanga (Òto put oneself in orderÓ), or ku-jipimisha (Òto evaluate oneselfÓ). Hamis Zowange, a wealthy Kariakoo trader and businessman, was conscious of how taking out bank loans changed the way he di d business, even as he struggled to find the right words. Ò[Loans] helped me get thisÉ you know, when you borrow money, there is a little thing that gives you like a certain obligation to do what? To work, diligently, so you are able to repay and to be inÉ it contributes to a certain extent to the conduct of business. You evaluate yourself [unajipimisha mwenyewe ]. Because when you take money or when you take a car [as a loan], then you have to put it to work in a way that you give back the share [of the len der] and you get your share.Ó 670 Mtunga Mbande, a rice trader from Ifakara, who had taken out loans from NMB, also acknowledged that taking out loans had an effect on how he did business. ÒIt animates your 670 Hamis Mohamed Zowange, interview wi th the author in Kiswahili. 250 mind because, you know, there is this challenge that now, I mustnÕt sleep, I need to work. É You know, when these loans came here, it was true that people thought that we would be able to do what? To extricate ourselves [ Tukajikwamua ].Ó671 The shift towards an increasing occupation with oneself instead of one Õs reliance on others also became visible when Kariakoo traders lamented the decreasing importance of uaminifu and expressed that the sense of creditworthiness granted by banks and microfinance institutions was not an equivalent substitute for uaminifu. Salum Elikeni, for instance, contended that umimi , i.e. Òselfishness,Ó had replaced uaminifu .672 The reflexive verb forms contrasted with the ways Kariakoo traders talked about the mali kauli system of trade as well as the rotating credit societies, which wer e a common form of collectively saving money among urban Tanzanians. 673 These ass ociations had various names in Kiswahili, including the name mchango wa kupeana and mchezo wa kupeana , literally Òthe contribution to give each otherÓ and Òthe game to give each other.Ó 674 These small -scale savings and credit schemes already carried the notion of doing something to each other in their names. Nuru Muki, who used to sell rice cakes and beans on her verandah in the Gerezani section of Kariakoo, described the rotating credit associations she was involved in. ÒIt was like a mchango wa kupeana and we women used to do it a lot. When you do business, you bring your money, 500 [shillings], 500 [shillings], one person receives [all the money] and we even saved gold. We really got money, this was called mchango . É We poor people did not borrow from banks, our 671 Mtunga Mbande, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Mtunga Mbande then went on to say that due to the high interest rates, the extra work one put in only benefitted the banks and not the one taking out the loan. Rather tha n helping people to free themselves, banks loans actually entrap them. 672 Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 673 Tripp uses the Kiswahili term upato (Tripp, Changing the Rules , 117Ð121). 674 Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Zena Omar i Shamti, interview wi th the author in Kiswahili , Mabibo, Dar es Salaam, January 13, 2013; Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili; Nizar Visram, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, January 22 and 30, 2013 . 251 bank was to give each other, ourselves to ourselves.Ó With a noted change in tone, Nuru Muki talked about bank loans. ÒWorkers used to get loans but in the old days, loans were not very common. It was there but not very much. Here and there, there was a person who was able to put himself/herself in order [ mwenye kujipanga ] would get a loan, my dear, but as a poor person like me, you canÕt get a loan. How do you think I woul d be able to pay [it back]? I would be put in jail, I am scared.Ó 675 Reflexive verb constructions such as ku-jipanga increasingly challenged reciprocal verb constructions such as ku-peana . To a certain extent, bank credit did indeed work as a catalyst for t he emergence of a new culture of doing business. The introduction of bank loans had the effect of prompting borrowers to take stock of themselves and work on their selves in new ways. N ew trader subjectivities marked by a sense of individualism and self -reflection took shape, especially with traders who were able to expand their businesses with the help of bank loans. COMPETING MORALITIES AND AIBU STORIES Despite the multi -pronged attempts to create new borrowing and fiscally responsible subjects, former conceptions of self and personhood were not entirely undermined. Kariakoo traders were skeptical of bank loans and the new business culture bank loans were supposed to bring about as well as the new morality undergirding loan officersÕ assessments of poten tial debtors. While users of bank loans were supposed to work on their creditworthiness by producing paper trails and making repayments on their loans in regular intervals, Kariakoo traders continued to build their reputation as waaminifu traders by buildi ng relations of trust with other traders and suppliers. Newly entitled receivers of bank and microcredit loans drew on these older forms of 675 Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 252 morality to critically engage with the emerging morality of creditworthiness, which constituted a competing morality of borrowing and lending and challenged older forms of morality and relations of trust between traders and upcountry suppliers. 676 A large majority of traders did not uncritically embrace the new financial instruments. 677 People framed their critique mainly i n three different ways. One was to criticize the technicalities of loans available in urban Tanzania. A common assessment was that interest rates were excessively high 678 and the time for repayment too short and not up for re -negotiation. Kariakoo traders of ten brought up the issue of time when describing how lenders seized borrowersÕ possessions such as houses and land due to non -repayment of loans. According to them, the fixed time units on which bank and microcredit loans relied were the reason so many peo ple lost their possessions. 679 Moreover, the conditions to even qualify for a loan were numerous and difficult to fulfill. For instance, ownership of a house was often not sufficient as a collateral, unless one also had the title deed, which was not easy to get in urban Tanzania. Various application fees further lowered the appeal of loans. Several people also articulated their annoyance with loan officers, who would not give out loans unless the clients allowed them to keep five to ten per cent of the loans for themselves as a bribe. Finally, lenders disliked the long application process and the wealth of papers and documents one had to submit and sign to get a loan. 680 Since small 676 Julia Elyachar uses the term Òentitlement debtÓ to describe a similar phenomenon in Cairo (Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession ). 677 44 of the 48 Kariakoo traders I talked to were critical of formal loans. 678 In 2013, annual interest rates were usually between 30 and 40 per cent. 679 Mzee Abdallah, interview with the author in Kiswa hili , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, March 30, 2013. 680 Jabu Ramahani , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Ramadhani Rashidi Mal ekela, interview with the author in Kiswahili ; Mzee Urio, interview with the author in Kiswahili ; Fabiola Lagali, interview with t he author in Kiswahili , Kariakoo Market hall, Dar es Salaam, March 19, 2013 ; Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. While criticizing 253 traders knew that the unpredictability of their business would make it difficult for them to effect regular repayments, they had good reasons not to take out loans. 681 Religious beliefs provided the grounds for some Kariakoo traders not to use bank loans. Taking out an interest -bearing loan was problematic for Muslims traders, who accou nted for the vast majority of traders in Kariakoo. According to the QurÕan, loans bearing interest or riba were forbidden or haramu . As long as no interest was charged, however, loans were not considered problematic 682 and Muslim traders often accepted inter est-free loans from fellow traders or from wealthy Kariakoo patrons. Advancing goods on credit was not haramu , either, which was a distinct advantage of mali kauli arrangements. Many shopkeepers were only able to establish themselves because they received goods on credit. 683 For most Muslim traders, however, religious identity did not prevent them from taking out interest -bearing loans and many were quite willing to talk about their experiences with credit. Even more orthodox Muslims acknowledged that when a person was in trouble and needed money, it was acceptable to take out interest -bearing loans. 684 A third way of conveying dislike for bank loans took a different tone, one that belonged to the realm of affect. Fear was the most common feeling long -standing b usinesspeople, who had relied on mali kauli transaction for decades, expressed when evaluating bank loans. They the technicalities of loans was common for most Kariakoo traders, traders of a younger generation ten ded to be the ones restricting themselves to this kind of critique. 681 Hamis Ka ssim Ulele, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 682 A small minority of Muslim traders such as Alif Ndige, a shopkeeper in Kariakoo, even considered financial services offered in the form of Islamic banking problematic. Islamic banking had only been available in Dar es Salaam for a few years when I conducted interviews in 2013. 683 Mzee Abdallah, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 684 Mzee Abdallah, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 254 articulated their fear of being put in jail 685 or being dispossessed of their belongings when failing to repay loans according to the rigid time f rame set by the lender. Traders used the verb ku-taifisha , Òto nationalize,Ó to describe how banks seized the houses of borrowers, who had failed to make repayments in time. 686 The use of the terminology of ku-taifisha illustrates how past events and experie nces shaped Kariakoo residentsÕ perception of the newly -introduced ways of lending and borrowing. The banks in post -1991 Tanzania were private companies and the word Òto nationalizeÓ may not have been entirely accurate to describe a private companyÕs seizi ng debtorsÕ property. But ku-taifisha conjured up the memories and the ghosts of the socialist past, most strikingly the so -called Òacquisition of buildingsÓ in 1971 when privately -owned multi -story buildings were nationalized. 687 Most of the nationalized ho uses were located in Dar es Salaam. Long -standing Kariakoo traders articulated their fear of being dispossessed of their belongings by telling stories. These stories were about people whose possessions Ð household items, furniture, cars, or even houses Ð were taken away because of an outstanding loan. What tellers of these stories conveyed went beyond the material loss debtors incurred. More important were the shame and embarrassment people experienced when they were being dispossessed. A failing debtorÕs greatest worry was to avoid being seen by neighbors and passers -by when creditors showed up to collect the possessions. Tel lers of these stories used the Kis wahili word aibu , i.e. Òembarrassment,Ó Òhumiliation,Ó or Òshame,Ó to describe these situations. 688 Zena Shamti provided a typical example of an aibu story. ÒI am scared [of taking out loans] because I 685 Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 686 Mohammed Hussen Nyoko, intervi ew with the author in Kiswahili; Mzee Mgaya, intervie w with the author in Kiswahili. 687 The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971. 688 Moral neighbo rhood communities played a crucial role in ensuring the repayment of loans in colonial Kariakoo (see chapter 1). 255 donÕt have anything and then you end up having to sell the place you expected to build a house on and then youÕll be distressed. The other day, a woman had all of her possessions taken away, all her things were taken to Magomeni [a neighborhood in Dar es Salaam] where they were sold. This is aibu for me when I think of it in my heart, you take another personÕs thing and you fail to give it back.Ó 689 People tol d me and each other similar aibu stories about unnamed neighbors and acquaintances all the time and unsolicitedly. The debtors were never explicitly identified as tellers did not consider it appropriate to publicly mention debtorsÕ names. 690 The threat of pu tting debtors publicly to shame was a powerful means for creditors to ensure the repayment of loans. 691 However, creditors and representatives of lending institutions were not always able to repel the pressures on their reputation and their social conscience , either. Winnie Terry, who used to work at FINCA, one of the most important microcredit institutions in Tanzania, routinely participated in the seizure of failing debtorsÕ possessions. She specifically remembered the expression on a womanÕs face when her belongings were collected and taken away. ÒA person, who has never taken out a loan, has a house, a bed, a mattress, sheets, couches, a fridge, a TV. She [then] takes out a loan and fails to pay, [and] all of these things go away. So, has the loan helped h er or has it pushed her back? You know, these are questions you ask yourself a lot. As for me, theyÉ sometimes, they haunt me.Ó 692 689 Zena Omari Shamti, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 690 Faraji Iddi Dibuma, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Failing to pay deb ts was often described aibu , not only in oral accounts but also in newspaper reports and other written texts. In 2011 the newspaper Mwananchi , the most widely -read Kiswahili newspaper in Tanzania at the time, ran a story on TanzaniaÕs public debt in which it contended that it was aibu for Tanzania to continue to have debts the coming generation would have to repay ( Mwananchi newspaper , May 2, 2011, ÒKwanini Nchi Imezidiwa Na Madeni Kiasi Hiki? Ó). 691 See chapter 1. 692 Winnie Terry, interview with the author in Kiswahili. She used the English word Òto haunt:Ó ÒMaswali É yananihaunt.Ó 256 The frequency with which Kariakoo traders and residents told me aibu stories and the similarity of these stories indicate how effectively they shaped peopleÕs opinions on bank and microcredit loans. 693 Wholesale rice trader Temeck Sanga remembered that in the early days of microfinance in Dar es Salaam it was big news when there was a case of a bank selling a debtorÕs assets. 694 Several microcredit officers complained that stories about failing debtors whose possessions were taken away were often blown out of proportion, a theme Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner Said Sadick alluded to in his speech recounted at the beginning of thi s chapter .695 These statements attest to the power of aibu stories in shaping potential borrowersÕ opinions and Òstructures of feelingÓ 696 about bank and microcredit loans. Similar to vampire stories in colonial East Africa, 697 aibu stories reflected peopleÕs an xieties, in this case anxieties with regards to the introduction of bank loans and new kinds of power relations they entailed. Kariakoo traders mentioned psychological pressure, stress, and anger when talking about their experiences with bank loans and mi crocredits. Salum Elikeni remembered vividly how angry he got when he took out his first loan in the form of an overdraft, only to find out the excessively high interest rates. 698 Mzee Massawe decided against taking out loans because he considered himself to o old to be troubled by the process of taking out loans and repaying 693 I have been inspired here by Ellen MoodieÕs use of peopleÕs narratives and how telling these stories has th e effect of shaping identities ( Ellen Moodie, El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peac e: Crime, Uncertainty, and the Transition to Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) ). 694 Temeck Lenard Sanga, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, August 23, 2013 . 695 ÒWanawake Dar acheni woga, kopeni mi taji,Ó Mwananchi , March 8, 2013. 696 ÒStructure of feelingÓ is a term coined by Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 697 Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 698 Unfortunately, Salum Elikeni could not specify how high the interest rate was ( Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni, interview with the author in Kiswahili ). 257 them. 699 Kariakoo traders of the older generation were often not willing to submit to the psychological pressure that accompanied bank loans and the new culture of doing business they came with. Juma Lusunga, who had extensive experiences with mali kauli forms of credit as well as with bank loans, appreciated that mali kauli arrangements did not bring with them the stress and psychological pressure, which usually accompanied bank loans. 700 Tra ders of a younger generation, on the other hand, found it somewhat easier to embrace the idea of bank loans even though they usually displayed a critical attitude as well. However, their critique often referred to the technicalities of these loans, for ins tance the high interest rates and the short repayment periods. 701 Working on their own selves and changing the ways of doing business were often experienced as painful and stressful. Habibu MgandaÕs description was representative of other tradersÕ experienc es. ÒThe person, who takes out a bank loan wants to, I mean, he doesnÕt sleep. He doesnÕt sleep. He does business in a way that does not correspond to his capability and out of fear, so he can repay the money to the bank É and when there are only three day s left to make the repayments, and he doesnÕt have the money, well he isnÕt even able to go to sleep, he only worries.Ó 702 Instead of working on how they were perceived by fellow traders, suppliers, and customers, who in times of need would serve as sponsors , borrowing traders were now urged to work on themselves and their ways of doing business. 703 699 Mzee Massawe, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 700 Juma Saidi Lusunga, interview with the author in Kiswahili. 701 See Grace Augustino , interview with the aut hor in Kiswahili , Ifakara, Morogoro, March 9, 2013; Kasoga , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Kiwango, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, April 18, 2013 . 702 Habibu Ramadhani Mganda, interview with the author in Kiswahi li. 703 Not everyone was convinced by the effectiveness of formal loans. Said Nassor, an itinerant vendor of self -made wooden articles in Kariakoo, compared bank loans with informal loans from a wealthy sponsor. ÒChange [for the better] comes when you get a sponsor who wants to lend 258 CONCLUSION The cultural and moral underpinnings of financial and trade relations at the Kariakoo market have stood at the center of this chapter. Broadly conceptua lizing market relations as cultural rather than merely economic formations 704 puts a new complexion on the advent of neoliberal capitalism in the 1990s. The deregulation of the financial sector and the provision of small and medium -size loans for larger segm ents of society including Kariakoo traders were accompanied by new discourses and changing subjectivities. The ÒliberalizationÓ of the Tanzanian economy as spelled out in structural adjustment programs went beyond introducing the rationale of the market in both economic and non -economic spheres of the Tanzanian society. It also involved the emergence of a discourse of the responsible debtor and the re -making of traders as debtor -citizens accountable to financial institutions. CreditorsÕ mission was not only to lend money to small traders but also to change how borrowers handled money, conceived of time, viewed themselves, and related to other traders. Credit providers understood bank loans as a catalyst for the emergence of a new culture of doing business an d for the transformation of borrowing you money, a trustee who comes and sponsors you, and not from these poor credits [microcredits]Ó (Said Nassor, interview with the author in Kiswahili , Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, April 10, 2013 ). While generalized stories of other p eopleÕs problems to repay loans abounded in Kariakoo and considerably shaped peopleÕs attitudes towards bank loans, a surprisingly large number of Kariakoo traders also recounted stories about their own experiences with bank loans. They very vividly rememb ered the first time they had taken out a loan. Particularly striking were the accounts of traders, who had found it difficult or impossi ble to repay bank loans in time (Hamis Mohamed Zowange, interview with the author in Kiswahili; Mohammed Hussen Nyoko , interview with the author in Kiswahili; Shuaid Aboud, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, March 13, 2013; Mzee Luanda, interview with the author in Kiswahili; James Luanda, interview with the author in Kiswahili, Temeke market, Dar es Salaam, May 24, 2013; Yusuph Abubakar Kaita, intervie ws with the author in Kiswahili ). 704 Max Weber formulated an early conceptualization of capitalism as a cultural formation in 1905. Weber asserted that the ÒProtestant ethicÓ was an important force behind the development of capitalism in Europe and the United States ( Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ). For how Òthe economyÓ came to conceptualized as a sphere separate from cultural, social, and political li fe and following its rules, see Mitchell, Rule of Experts . 259 tradersÕ subjectivities towards more individualistic concepts of selfhood. Bank credit and the discourse of the responsible debtor provided the grounds on which borrowing traders were impelled to re -think and re -make t hemselves as independent, rational, and fiscally responsible entrepreneurs. Ultimately, the advent of neoliberal capitalism envisioned the re -making of Tanzanian citizens as market subjects. The Kariakoo wholesale produce market in Dar es Salaam has served as a lens through which the processes of subject formation become visible. TradersÕ accounts of their experiences with bank loans provides insights into how the use of bank credit did and did not serve as a catalyst to transform borrowing tradersÕ subject ivities. At the Kariakoo market, the past two decades were marked by the emergence of immediate cash payments financed by bank and microcredit loans as an alternative for transactions on mali kauli basis. The shift constituted a qualitative change in trade rsÕ relations amongst each other. Discursively, the concept of uaminifu was replaced by the more narrowly defined concept of Òcreditworthiness.Ó Long -standing Kariakoo traders, who had relied on the mali kauli -system, were skeptical of bank loans. Bank loa ns were seen as constitutive of a new business culture, which challenged older ways of doing business and their attendant value systems. In other words, the provision of bank loans to people, who had previously not been considered creditworthy, did not sim ply satisfy an already existing demand as the promoters of microcredits proclaimed. Rather, much cultural work was required to shape urban TanzaniansÕ desires for bank loans. As urban Tanzanians Ð especially those of the younger generation Ð started to mak e use of bank loans, credit served as a catalyst to transform borrowing tradersÕ subjectivities. As impersonal cash transactions replaced mali kauli relations based on trust, the power to define a personÕs creditworthiness shifted from upcountry suppliers to loan officers. This definatory shift 260 was reinforced by the two -pronged policy of introducing national ID cards and establishing a credit bureau. As loan officers measured and quantified ÒcreditworthinessÓ with specific methods, borrowing traders came to see themselves and their relations to other people in a new light. The use of bank credit induced citizen s-borrowers to take stock of themselves and work on their selves. New trader subjectivities marked by a sense of individualism and self -reflection too k shape. While some traders came to define themselves as businessmen or businesswomen responsible for and in charge of their own lives even when their business careers were marked by hardship and failure, other traders were not willing to perform this wor k of self -transformation. Rather than shifting the burden of blame onto themselves, they continued to build and maintain relations of trust with producers , consumers, and other traders, and they continued to rely on their status as waaminifu . Forms of lend ing and borrowing Ð in Kariakoo as elsewhere Ð were embedded in particular histories of social and economic relations, and the introduction of bank loans was perceived and evaluated against the backdrop of a multi -layered history of borrowing and lending, histories of dispossession and wealth -creation, and systems of trade. Thus, in the Kariakoo market environment, where communal and trade relations were heavily marked by aspects of credit and debt and shaped by moral discourses on debt, the project of impe lling borrowers to re -think themselves as independent, rational, and fiscally responsible entrepreneurs did not unfold uncontestedly. 261 CONCLUSION Yusuph Kaita had spent the majority of his adulthood in Kariakoo and his life was shaped by the neighborh ood in various ways. Born near Kondoa in rural central Tanganyika in 1948, he moved to Dar es Salaam after he finished secondary school. He found work as a stock keeper for the National Textile Company (NATEX). He first lived at Gogo Street, at a stoneÕs t hrow from the Kariakoo market hall, and he then moved to Livingstone Street a bit further away. His workplace at NATEX was at Kamata, also located in the Kariakoo neighborhood. Later on, he opened a cooperative shop in Ilala, the neighborhood adjacent to K ariakoo in the west and in many ways an extension of the Kariakoo neighborhood. While residing in Kariakoo, he founded and ran a local football club, Gerezani United, and invested much of his time and money in the club. Eventually, he and his wife bought a plot in Mabibo, a neighborhood about 10 kilometers west of Kariakoo. Although they built a house and moved there, Yusuph KaitaÕs life continued to revolve around Kariakoo. Still in 2013, when I got to know him more closely, he went to Kariakoo almost ever y day to meet his frien ds and to make some money as a broker for houses and plots of land. To navigate competing moralities of borrowing and lending in search for an urban living was an important part of Yusuph KaitaÕs life . His life story exemplifies the neighborhoodÕs communal culture and it illustrates and connects the main arguments and themes put forward in the preceding pages. When Yusuph Kaita first moved to Kariakoo, he quickly became integrated in the neighborhood community. He was an adamant supp orter of the Kariakoo football club Simba and he accompanied them wherever they played. Eventually, he founded and ran his own local football club, Gerezani United, in which he invested much of his time and money. Due to his active role as a community memb er and due to his investments into the local community, he 262 was a well -known personality and many neighborhood residents were indebted to him. Still in 2013, he was a member of the corner community at the Manyema Mosque on Mafia Street just off of Livingsto ne Street. Whenever I wanted to see him, I would find him there. After moving to Kariakoo, Yusuph Kaita got married to Zaina. She viewed his investments into football clubs as a waste of money. In order to acquire an asset and to save money spent on rent, Zaina wanted them to buy a plot of land and build a house. Bank loans were not available at the time but Zaina was able to convince her husband to save some money. They eventually bought a plot of land at the city outskirts in Mabibo, built a house, and m oved there with their four young children. Yusuph Kaita worked for the parastatal company NATEX for a total of eleven years, from 1977 to 1988. During that time, he got to know the customers, who were in the textile business. Many of them were of South As ian origin and they had used to import textiles themselves and to sell it wholesale in their shops before the state nationalized much of the trade and production of textiles in the 1960s and 1970s. Now, they had to buy the goods from NATEX or from regional distributors. To get preferential treatment in times of general shortage of textiles, some of them paid bribes and provided the funds to buy the textiles from the state -owned textile mills because state distributors were short of money . While still being employed at NATEX, Yusuph Kaita and a group of friends started a cooperative shop in Ilala. Cooperative shops were the first to receive locally produced textiles from factories like Urafiki in Ubungo, Dar es Salaam, for sale at his shop to customers in the neighborhood. Yusuph Kaita used his contacts to private textile wholesalers and sold some of these textiles to them, at a premium. In 1988, he decided to quit his job at NATEX and focus entirely on business. He became a trader in the import/export busine ss, which was shortly after private persons and companies 263 were again allowed to engage in that business. With the help of a former co -worker and friend, he shipped low -quality beans from Tanzania to prisons in Zambia. He also exported prawns to Botswana by plane, where they were smuggled into South Africa. After the death of his friend, Yusuph Kaita decided to continue on his own and he started to export prawns and cardamom to Djibouti and Somalia, also by plane. The starting capital for this trade came in the form of a loan from the state -owned National Bank of Commerce. It was his first bank loan ever. With this money, he bought prawns and cardamom and shipped them to Djibouti, where he handed the goods over to his Somali partners on mali kauli basis. The first time, the Somali business partners sold the goods and gave Yusuph Kaita his share. The second time, they took the goods and disappeared without paying any money, thus leaving Yusuph Kaita in a difficult position. He had incurred a considerable loss a nd he was not able to repay the bank loan. The combination of bank loans on the Tanzanian side of his business and mali kauli on the Djibouti side turned out to be disastrous. Yusuph Kaita trusted his partners in Djibouti but they abused the trust on which the mali kauli system was based. On the Tanzanian side, the bank officers did not take any responsibility for the failed business deal even though Yusuph Kaita had informed them about all the details of the deal. The bank made sure he pay back the outstan ding loan with interest. Eventually, Yusuph Kaita was able to borrow enough money from his networks of friends and relatives to repay the loan with interest. The bank had extended the repayment period, but only after increasing interest rates considerably. On the original loan of 700Õ000 shillings, Yusuph Kaita paid back a total of two million shillings, so about 185 per cent interest. This bad business experience threw him off track as far as his career as a businessman was concerned. He was completely ban krupt. Psychologically, it was a turning point in his life. ÒMy family was very unhappy at the time. There was a danger of losing the house but God helped us. 264 É I was very confused because I didnÕt have a shilling. I was stuck, I was bankrupt, I didnÕt hav e money to do business, I was stumped.Ó Yusuph Kaita had to abandon his trading activities and he eventually started to work as a broker of houses and land. Thanks to his extensive communal network in Kariakoo, he was able to generate enough money to survi ve. As far as bank loans were concerned, however, Yusuph Kaita did not consider them anymore. ÒI have learned. I donÕt desire [loans], I donÕt want them. I donÕt want to get tension. I want to rest .Ó705 Like other Kariakoo residents, who had made negative ex periences with bank loans, Yusuph Kaita decided to make a living in the city by relying exclusively on his long -established credit and debt relations in the neighborhood. He continued to emphasize notions of uaminifu and conducted trade within the mali kau li-system even as he came to occupy an increasingly marginal space in the marketplace and in market discourses. Yusuph KaitaÕs life illustrates the need to locate the myriad views and uses of credit and debt in one conceptual frame, and it shows the futil ity and danger of separating Òtraditional Ó or Òinformal Ó credit and debt relations from ÒmodernÓ or Òformal Ó financial institutions and instruments . Yusuph KaitaÕs life and this dissertation as a whole help to complicate and correct the prevailing picture of Africans and finance in twentieth -century urban Africa , namely that traditional forms of credit became inadequate in modern market economies, that Africans lacked access to financial institutions, and that Africans were excluded from the modern world of 705 Yus uph Abubakar Kaita, interview with the author in Kiswahili. Other people may have been able to bring together various forms of credit and debt and their competing moralities with more ease. In a newspaper article on how to increase business capital, the wr iter lists various forms of credit available in Tanzania. The list includes formal credits such as bank loans, overdrafts, factoring, and hire purchase, but it also mentions mali kauli as a way for a businessperson to increase capital. The basis for mali k auli credit would be to Òbuild a good relationship with the supplier of the productsÓ ( Mwananchi newspaper , May 25, 2011 : ÒKukuza Mtaji Wa Bias hara Na Fulsa Ziliz opo Tanzania Ó). For many Kariakoo traders, however, the diverging moralities underlying debt relations were not always easy to combine. 265 finance. Instead, they show that credit and debt relations were constitutive of various aspects of urban life, including cosmopolitan neighborhood communities, respectable identities, urban membership and belonging, urban livelihoods and entrepreneurship, and urban planning and governance. In the Kariakoo neighborhood in Dar es Salaam, debt and credit have shaped work and business, social and communal life, and peopleÕs identities and subjectivities. Moral perceptions of credit and debt were central to the se negotiations and for the workings of urban life and trade. Examining the various forms of lending and borrowing and the multiple Ð at times competing, at times intersecting Ð moralities undergirding them, this dissertation has attempted to contribute to our understanding of the ways and meanings of borrowing, investing, and doing business in urban Africa in important ways. First of all, it has challenged histories of credit and finance in colonial and postcolonial Africa, which have focused exclusively on banking institutions to which few had access. Urban Africans made extensive use of informal, semi -formal, and formal credit to create urban communities, trade networks, and personal businesses. Wholesale traders at the Kariakoo market relied on the indi genous credit system known as mali kauli Ð verbal letters of credit based on reputations and social capital Ð to trade large amounts of agricultural products while having sma ll amounts of cash at disposal . Kariakoo residents also turned pawnshop credit to their advantage and proved to b e reliable borrowers . Second of all, this dissertation has shown the significance of credit and debt well beyond the economic sphere of urban life in twentieth -century Africa. Credit and debt relations were central to cosmop olitan neighborhood communities Kariakoo residents formed across racial and class categories. For instance, shopkeepers , who were mostly of Asian descent, were able to assert membership in Kariakoo by selling goods to customers on credit . The availability of 266 small-scale shop credit and pawnshop credit was a constitutive element of the urban experience, urban living, and urban belonging . Third of all, this dissertation has demonstrate d how the morality at the center of discourses and practices of debt repea tedly acted as fulcrum for reforming urban subjects. Moral discourses around credit and debt were productive spaces because they provided a realm where local views of business practices and government visions of desirable business behavior intersected. Col onial and postcolonial governments undertook repeated efforts to make urban residents more business -minded by impelling them to work on their creditworthiness and become Ògood debtors.Ó The pervasiveness of credit and debt relations served as the discursiv e moral foil against which urban planning interventions were legitimated. Government officials chastised non-state or extra -institutional lenders and accused them of creating harmful d ebt relations . However, multiple moralities continued to exist in Kariak oo, which allowed urban residents to critically evaluate new fo rms of credit and debt and the attending moral discourses. Traders and residents in K ariakoo preferred older morally -grounded systems of trade to cash -based transactions facilitated by bank loa ns. Finally, this dissertation has illustrate d that the racial antagonisms between urban residents of Asian and African descent , which have dominated the literature on credit from the colonial era to the present one, have obscured the intimate and long -standing relations of credit and debt between Asians and Africans in various aspects of life. Following commodity trails and describing the workings of urban sub -communities, I show how Asians and Africans not only worked and lived together but also shared c ultural notions of respectability, generosi ty, and shame . 267 APPENDICES 268 APPENDIX 1: ARCHIVES CONSULTED Tanzania: Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam (TNA) Zanzibar National Archives, Zanzibar (ZNA) The National Library , NBA Room, Dar es Salaam The Library at the University of Dar es Salaam, East Africana Room The Library at the University College in Moshi (MUCCoBS) Tanzania Gender Networking Programme Library San Damiano Franciscan Archive, Dar es Salaam UK: British National Archives at Kew, London ( BNA ) Barclays Group Archives, Manchester (BGA) School of Oriental and African Studies Library , London (SOAS) Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House Germany: Staatsarchiv, Hamburg (SAH) Zentralbibliothek firtschaftswissenschaften, Kiel and Hamburg Bibliothek des Berliner Missionswerks, Berlin Evangelische s Zentralarchiv, Berlin 269 APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS Abdallah Makame DASICO, Kariakoo, Dar es Sa laam Abdallah Mohamed Tambaza Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Abdulsalaam Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Adam Komba Ifakara, Morogoro Anonymous 1 Posta, Dar es Salaam Anonymous 2 Ifakara, Morogoro Ali Ngagesa DASICO, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Alif Ndige Kariakoo, Dar es S alaam Araf Sykes Posta, Dar es Salaam August Mullis Ilala, Dar es Salaam Bashiri Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Baton Nyingi Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Biharilal Tanna Upanga, Dar es Salaam Bi Ashura Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Bibi Sipo Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Briton Ilala, Dar es Salaam David Maluila Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam Donath Olomi Ilala, Dar es Salaam Dummah Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Elyudi Ngoda Chimala, Mbeya Elly Duma Mabibo, Dar es Salaam Fabiola Lagali Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Faraji Iddi Dibuma Kichangani, Dar es Salaam Fawzi Said Gerezani, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Fideris Mwamsea Mbingu, Morogoro Grace Augustino Ifakara, Morogoro Gunendu Roy Mbezi Beach, Dar es Salaam Habibu Ramadhani Mganda Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Habibu Mhezi Ushirika Building, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Halidi K. Lugome Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Hamis Ka ssim Ulele Kariakoo Auction Mart, Dar es Salaam Hamis Mohamed Zowange Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Hilda Mwe ndapole Mabibo, Dar es Salaam Ibrahim Changula Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Jabu Ramadhani Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam James Luanda Temeke, Dar es Salaam James Ngomuo Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Jayantilal Keshavji Chande London, UK Juma Mfaume DASICO, Kar iakoo, Dar es Salaam Juma Saidi Lusunga Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Kasoga Tandika, Dar es Salaam Kilipamwango Chimala, Mbeya Kiwango Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Majid Saleh Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam 270 Mama John Kitumbini, Dar es Salaam Manu Haridas Ifak ara, Morogoro Maneno Ngozi Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Michael Michoro Mbwana Chimala, Mbeya Mohammed Hussen Nyoko Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Moses Balagaju Keko, Dar es Salaam Moustafa Khataw Posta, Dar es Salaam Mr Masondole Machinga C omplex, Ilala, Dar es Salaam Mtunga Mbande Ifakara, Morogoro Mzee Gogo Ifakara, Dar es Salaam Mzee Ibrahim Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Mzee Kagire Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Mzee Kajiru Ifakara, Morogoro Mzee Kalulu Kariakoo, Dar e s Salaam Mzee Kibavu Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Mzee Kobelo Manzese, Dar es Salaam Mzee Luanda Manzese, Dar es Salaam Mzee Maliya Buguruni, Dar es Salaam Mzee Massawe Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Mzee Mdachi Lukozi, Tanga Mzee Mgaya Ifakara, Morogo ro Mzee Mustafa Sheikilango, Dar es Salaam Mzee Mwaipungu Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Mzee Ngolongolo Dodoma Mzee Nyoni Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Mzee Nyoro Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Mzee Peni Manzese, Dar es Salaam Mzee Peter Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Mzee Salum Manzese, Dar es Salaam Mzee Urio Kariakoo Market Hall, Dar es Salaam Mzee wa Redio Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Mzee wa Gongo shop Tandika, Dar es Salaam Navroz Lakhani Oyster B ay, Dar es Salaam Nizar Visram Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Ntimi Mwakinyuke Ifakara, Morogoro Nuru Uwesohogwa Muki Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Olive Luena Posta, Dar es Salaam Oswald Kinunda Upanga, Dar es Salaam P. Vic Missiaen Posta, Dar es S alaam Pedro Simon Salamba Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Peter Anase Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Philemon Mbaganile Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Prem Ruparelia Posta, Dar es Salaam Ramadhani Rashidi Malekela Mabibo, Dar es Salaam Ramadhani Migogele DASICO, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Reginald Massawe Survey, Dar es Salaam 271 S. Shamo Posta, Dar es Salaam Sadiki Mjuma Ifakara, Morogoro Sadru Shariff Posta, Dar es Salaam Said Nassor Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Salie Mlay Posta, Dar es Salaam Salum Dilunga Sheikilango, Dar es Salaam Salum Ramadhani Kusa Elikeni Kigogo, Dar es Salaam Sebastian Kilian Mbilingi Ifakara, Morogoro Shafik Bhatia Buguruni, Dar es Salaam Shiraz Bhira Posta, Dar es Salaam Shoto Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Shuaid Aboud Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Sophia Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Suleiman Majata Manzese, Dar es Salaam Teddy Ifakara, Dar es Salaam Temeck Lenard Sanga Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Tirunagari Srikanth Posta, Dar es Salaam Veronica Mgalawe Kibaha, Dar e s Salaam Viju Cherian Posta, Dar es Salaam Winnie Terry Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam Yusuf Hassam Gerezani section of Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam Yusuf Mbwilo Chimala, Mbeya Yusuph Abubakar Kaita Mabibo, Dar es Salaam Zena Omari Shamti Mabibo, Dar es Salaam 272 BIBLIOGRAPHY 273 BIBLIOGRAPHY Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1976 -1977. 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