LlEEiARY Michigan State University I This is to certify that the dissertation entitled THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF IRANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION presented by Saeed Raj aipur has been accepted tow‘ards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degreein Higher Education y‘fléwrfl :: $3» waif: __ Date [/5 ’13 ‘7 MS U is an Afl'mmm‘w Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 )VIESI_J RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to LIBRARIES remove this checkout from AIS-{SEEIL your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. IT - TEE IHPACT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPHENT: A CASE STUDY OF IRANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION’ BY Saeed Rajaipur A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Higher Education 1987 ABSTRACT THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF IRANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION BY Saeed Rajaipur This study hypothesized that the evolution of higher education in the pre-Islamic Republic of Iran was influenCed by a series of events that took place in the country's domestic politics and external relations. The purpose of the study was to provide an analysis. of the quantitative development of higher education in Iran, and to explore the relationship between political events and higher education expansion in the country. The period of extensive study covered the period of 1934 to 1979, from the establishment of the first modern and Western-style Iranian University to the fall of the Pahlavi's monarchial regime. A historical research method was used in conducting this work. The approach of the study was largely descriptive and explanatory rather than prescriptive. Data were obtained from government documents, United Nations publications, press reports, yearbooks, encyclopedias, doctoral dissertations, journals, and books published by scholars interested in Iranian politics and government. The expansion of formal higher educational institutions, Saeed Rajaipur student enrollments, and capital investment for higher education were reviewed and analyzed within a political context. Substantial evidence exists to support the following statements: 1. 3. 5. The system of higher education was traditionally designed to provide trained personnel for the running of an expanding government bureaucracy. Iranian colleges and universities were elitist and urban centered. Socio-economic policies Of the Shah's regime which favored the rich over the poor and the urban over the rural reinforced this character of the higher education institutions, with only three percent of their enrollment coming from the working class and rural population. . Despite considerable expansion of higher education in the 19508 and 19708, a shortage of trained manpower continued to exist in the country. Political corruption, lack of adequate economic and educational planning, and the growing of the brain drain were accountable for this shortage. The higher educational system and practices of Iran were transplanted from the United States. This was due to the broad American economic, political, and academic influence in the country and the Shah's obsession with the Westernization of all aspects of Iranian life. The persistence of an oppressive and despotic political environment during the Pahlavi regime stood against the development of truly modern and progressive higher education in Iran. Dedicated to my parents, Molouk Kalbassi and Javad Rajaipur ii IKINDWLHNflflENTS The accomplishment of this work was not possible without the assistance and cooperation of many people. Above all, I would like to express my utmost gratitude and deep appreciation to the director of this dissertation, Professor Kenneth Neff, for his encouragement, constructive guidance, and dedicated assistance. A similar note of thanks is extended to Professors Howard Hickey, Eldon Nonnamaker, Louis Hekhuis, Ruth Useem, and John Hanson. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sorrow at the untimely and tragic passing away of the late professor Richard Featherstone. I am sorry that I am not able to share the results of this study with him. Words cannot fully express my loving indebtedness to my parents, Molouk Kalbassi and Javad Rajaipur, for their material and intellectual support, steady encouragement, and patience during my graduate work in the United States of America. I am also appreciative of my friends for their understanding and encouragement throughout the writing of this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank Linda Carroll for her professional typing which made the completion of this work possible. iii LIST OF Cheater I. II. IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLES. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . Significance and Purpose of the Study. Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . Theoretical Framework. . . . . . Methodology and Sources of Information REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE. . . . . The Growth of Research on Higher Education in Developing Countries. . . . . . . . . Research on Higher Education in Iran . . . HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: HIGHER EDUCATION PRIOR To 1934 O O O O O O I O O O O O O 0 Higher Education in Ancient Iran . . . . Pre-Alexandrian or Achaemenian Period. Post-Alexandrian or Sassanian Period University of Jundi Shapour. . . . Higher Education in the Medieval Period. Islam and Education. . . . . . . . . The 'Maktab-Madrassah' System. . . . The Mongol Invasion and Aftermath. . Introduction of Modern Education . . . . Early Contacts with the West and French Influence . . . . First Modern Institution of Higher Education: Darolfunun . . . . . . . Other Modern Institutions Prior to 1934 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O summary. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O HIGHER EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT, 1934-1979 . Establishment of the First University. Higher Education From 1948 to 1967 . . Reorganization of the System . . . . . iv V. V. TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONT'D Higher Education From 1967 to 1979 Institutional Expansion. Budget Allocation. . . . Student Enrollment . Faculty. . . . . . . Students Abroad. . . . Summary. . . . . . . . THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ON HIGHER EDUCATION. . . . . . . . . The Rise and Fall of Reza Khan . . Preceding Events . . . . . . . Reza Khan Becomes Shah . . . . Reza Khan's Policies . . . . . Higher Education . . . . . . . The Fall and Legacy of Reza Kh World War II and Aftermath . . . . Occupation and Turmoil . . . . Azarbayjan Uprising. . . . . . Postwar Reforms. . . . . . . . Oil Nationalization Movement and I Outcomes . . . 0 an S t Oil Crisis and Mossaddegh's Leadership The 1953 Coup d'etat, the U. S. Role, and the Shah' s New Rule. . . The U. S. Influence and Higher Education. Planning and Higher Education. Higher Education and Politics. “White Revolution": Dictatorship, Dependency, and Reform . . . . . The Shah's “Revolution" . . . . Alliance with and Dependence on the U. S. O O O I O 0 Educational Reforms and Higher Education. . . . . . . Dictatorship and Dependency: on Higher Education. . . . . The Islamic Revolution . . . . . . summary. 0 O O O O O O O O O O I 0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS Summary and Conclusions. . . . . . Suggestions for Further Research . V Impact Foreign Influence and Higher Education 170 175 175 184 190 198 207 217 229 233 233 248 TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONT'D and M.S. 5222911: I. (1978) A. s. c. Degree . II. A. Universities . Institutions Leading t of Higher Education . B. Links Between U.S. Universities and Iranian Institutions Leading t O BOA. I 8.8. I Mvo 1 Ass ociate or Art U.S.-IRANIAN ACADEMIC LINKS (1976) Links Between Iranian and U.S. Institutions IRANIAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION Government Ministries and Organizations . BIBLIOGRAPHY . vi 250 250 251 252 253 253 260 263 10 11 12 13 LIST OF TABLES Higher Education Institutions Before the Creation of Tehran University. . . . . . . . . Institutions of Higher Education Established During 1948-1967 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o Enrollment in the Institutions of Higher Education (1935-1967). 0 o o o o o o o o o o o Iranian Universities Established During '1972-1975. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 Increase in the Number of Higher Education Institutions (1967-1979) . . . . . . . . . . . Budgetary Allocation for Higher Education (1967-1978). 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 Comparison of Student Enrollment and Budget Allocation (1967-1978) 0 o o o o o o o o o o 0 Student Enrollment by Type of Institution and SEX (1966-1976). 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 Distribution of Students by Field of Study (1969'1977). o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 Number of Full-Time and Part-Time Faculty by sex (1966-1976) 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o Iranian Students Abroad (1963-1972). . . . . . Government-Sponsored Students Abroad , (1967-1976). 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o The Size and Occupation of the Iranian Professional-Bureaucratic Intelligentsia (1956-1966). 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 vii 58 64 66 75 77 80 81 83 85 87 89 91 172 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION W Institutions of higher education are among the most important institutions of any society. Nations devote major resources to their developments in hopes of gaining knowledge and skills which are needed for the social, .economic, political, and cultural development of the entire society. The development of higher educational systems and the extent to which they can contribute to the national development, however, depends largely On the political environment within which they exist and operate. Political events may influence the processes of development and outcomes of educational systems. Therefore, an objective study of relationship between political factors and education is necessary for a better understanding of the evolution of higher educational system in a country. A preliminary search of literature makes it evident that there is a lack of accumulated knowledge related to the impact of the political environment on the evolution of the 1 higher educational system in the Pre-Islamic Republic of Iran. Such a knowledge is particularly essential at a time when the academicians and policy makers of the Islamic Republic are attempting to change the system which has been inherited from the monarchial regime and to overcome the constraints of the country's higher educational system. The purpose of this study is to: (1) provide a description of the quantitative development of higher education in Iran from 1934 to 1979, and (2) explore the relationship between political events and higher education development in Iran during that period.1 The researcher hopes that his study will provide documented information for use by present and future Iranian higher education policy makers, planners, academicians, students, and scholars interested in studying Iran's higher education. It is also hoped that this study will be found useful by students interested in the relationships between education and political factors in other developing nations. W The Iranian system of higher education underwent several stages of development during the period of 1934- 1"'Higher education" refers to formal post-secondary institutions which are empowered to grant post-secondary degrees or certificates. This definition includes universities, four—year colleges, technical colleges, and junior colleges. 1979, from the creation of the first secular and Western- style university to the downfall of the monarchial regime. The system experienced periods of slow and sporadic expansion and periods of significant growth. During the same period, Iran was the seene of several political events which affected the government's internal policies and external relations. Those events also affected the government's policies and attitudes towards higher education. This study hypothesizes that, in general, the development of higher education in Iran had a close relationship with a series of changes which occurred in the country's political environment. The study will attempt to answer the following questions: 1. Were there identifiable stages of development in the Iranian higher educational system from 1934 to 1979? ZLf so, what were they? What was the quantitative expansion of the system during each period? ~ 2. What were major political events in Iran during the 1934 to 1979 period? How did they contribute to different stages of higher education develop- ment? Why did they influence the government's policies and attitudes towards education? What implications did those events have for higher education? 3. What were major events in Iran's external relations during the 1934 to 1979 period? Did foreign powers influence Iran's internal affairs? If so, why did they? What was the impact of foreign influence on the system of higher education? W Schools and universities are social institutions. They are components of a-social systemiwhich is referred to as the "educational system." This system is in constant interaction with other social systems such as political, economic, and familial systems. A change in one social system is reflected in all other social systems. Therefore, the structure, process of development, and outcomes of the educational system cannot be fully understood without reference to the political system or other systems in society. The relationship between education and the political system has been historically a subject of concern and ldiscussion among philosophers,statesmen, political scientists, and educators. Coleman noted that since Plato and Aristotle, political philosophers have affirmed principles included in the phrases, 'As is the state, so is the school,‘ and “What you want in the state, you must put into the school."2 Such contemporary philosophers as John Dewey, Bertrand Russel, and Puolo Freire have stressed the importance of education in a democratic and liberated society. 2James S. Coleman, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 6. Szyliowics described how education is affected by politics: ‘ . . . it is through political choice and political action that economic, educational, social, and, for that matter, political institutions themselves are fundamentally shaped. Educational policies are directly related to broader question of policy-making within any society, and the specific decisions taken on such issues as who shall gain access to the schools, what they will learn while enrolled, and how they will be utilized will inevitably reflect the distribution of power, the kinds of support that any particular regime possesses, its ideological orientation3 its level of political development, and the like. In order to understand the relationship between education and politics, one may consider the concept of the “political system." According to Massialas, a political system is defined as 'a system of human interactions through which valued things in a society (e.g., resources and energies are authoritatively allocated in order to accomplish certain goals."‘4 The political system consists of a political structure (governmental institutions) and a political culture (political beliefs and attitudes of the citizens as individuals and as groups). The system processes various demands from various individuals and 3Joseph 5. Szyliowicz. W . Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1973, p. 12. ‘Byron 6. Massialas. W Menlo Park, California, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969, p. 205. interest groups and maintains itself through the material and moral support it receives from the citizens. The function of a political system depends on three main factors: (1) events in the domestic society (for example, citizen's demonstrations against the government and the occurrence of economic hardship), (2) events in the international community (for example, war and foreign intervention), and (3) the character and ideological orientation of political elites within the system. The phrase "political elites," as used here, refers to those members of the political system who hold official political positions and participate in.the making of important political decisions regarding the allocation of valued things. In order for a political system to survive, it must secure support from people in society. To elaborate on this point, one may note that the main characteristic of a political system is its "ability to make authoritative decisions which are considered to be legitimate and binding."5 The legitimacy exists when people in a society support the system. This support persists as long as the system is able to meet citizen's demands. Obedience to laws and government regulations, voting, military service, and 51bid. the payment of taxes are examples of support for the system. There are several types of demands including demands for participation in decisions and demands for allocation of specific goods and services. The authorities or the political elites try constantly to accommodate demands with support. If the level of support is low and the level of unsatisfied demands is high, the citizens may demonstrate and revolt against the system and cause its collapse. one way that the political system receives support is through educational institutions. The way that educational institutions are utilized for receiving support depends on the character of government and the political elites within the system. In a dictatorial system the government usually uses educational institutions for creating obedient citizens. It, for example, controls the curriculum of institutions and forces them to use selective criteria for admission, criteria which tend to recruit those who are sympathetic to the government or are the children of political elites. A representative government, on the other hand, sees education as a means of improving the standard of living for all segments of the society and satisfying the citizen's demands. Although the major focus of the present study is on the impact of politics upon education, it should be noted that education can also affect the political system. Education may affect the political system in two significant ways. The first way is through generating support for the system. Educational institutions can teach students to accept the established political traditions, to respect political authorities, and to participate in political acts such as voting and becoming a party member. The institutions can also provide the system with the trained people which are needed for the administration of the government. The second significant way is through generating new demands. As more and more people become educated they will become increasing- ly aware of their economic and social rights and their ethnic, religious, and racial identities. This awareness can lead to new and greater demand upon the political system which may prove incapable of processing them, resulting in political unrest or revolution. The response of a political system to the new societal demands depends on the character and ideological orientation of its political elites. Based on the types of their *political elites, Szyliowicz identified four categories of political systems: “The radical, the reformist, the adaptive, and the competitive."6 The radical system is characterized by the willingness of its political elites to restructure all aspects of the society in order to satisfy 6Szyliowicz, p. 18. societal demands. Such systems are usually established after a revolution or a struggle against a foreign power. The reformist system is one that allows reform and change, but only if traditional institutions, relationships and values can be maintained. In this system, the political elites represent conservative groups, but co-optation of new elements is possible. The adaptive system is characterized with an unwillingness to change. It tends to suppress societal demands rather than processing them. The main goal of its ruler, usually a monarch, is to preserve the status quo, although he usually allows infrastructural improvements in such areas as technology and economic affairs. Power is vested in a ruling class, and political roles are filled by the members of this class. The competitive system is one that has achieved a certain level of development and in which political roles and institutions are specialized. Recruitment into the political elites is largely determined by achievement criteria. Government represents many different factions of the society, allows a considerable degree of opposition, and promotes change according to established political procedures. Each of these four categories is an ideal type and any political system may have characteristics which will not fit any one model. In one political system, for example, the political elites may devote more attention to the rhetoric 10 of reform than to the adoption of the necessary measures to accomplish reforms. In other cases a political system seeking to implement fundamental social, economic, and political. reforms may be prevented from doing so through various international pressures. The process of change and development in a society can be affected by events and conditions in the international community. The international community includes all political systems which exist in the world. The actions and behavior of a national political system may be influenced by the actions and interactions of other political systems. The term 'international politics" is used to refer to these actions and interactions. International politics is a struggle among nations for power. Power, as used here, is defined as: The ability of an actor on the international stage to use tangible and intangible resources and assets in such a way as to influence the outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction. A nation which aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, pursues a policy of expansionism through economic, military, political, and cultural means. This may lead to'a situation under which one or more nations become dependent .aonuuoscu um aMHHMMIHuddAAdduuudH ..coua ca coauaosom magma: mo nusouo one. .noumou¢ mama .hpumh .mm .amma .muamuo>ac= canssaou .xuow 3oz .aMMMNWIAdddH4dmmMflludnldddlddmuflfllduuqu .vaoom 52.x mama «moouaom coaumospm mo auumacaz mama cams: mo aoosom .ma .coua no xcmm aucoauuz mama mcaxcnm no «usuauuca .aa . oconmoaoa can cmma mcoamoaoa can .cmm~moaoa .umom mo muumaca: smmumoaoa .umom mo manuaumca .oa up: up xuumacaz cmma mooaaoo up: .a coauuosom mo auumaca: mmma manuaumca aooaczooa dogma: .m coauuosom mo auumacaz amma so; no aoozom .h coauoosom mo muumaca: mama ocaoaooz mo aoonom .o coaumosom mo auumacaz mama omoaaou mcacaous muosocoe .m coauaosom no muumacaz aama muuc scam no aoocom .q coauooaom mo anomacaz aama oocoaom can uu< mo omoaaoo .m «usuaaoaumc mo muumacaz .uoma ousuasoaumc mo omoaaoo .N muamuud :maouom uo anomaca: aoma oocoaom asOauaaom no aoosom .a IIIluqquamauuummuluaqluumza (umuaamaammammx :aawmuauuaallll mo and» aaamu«uaqalduuaualumlamauduuu uaaIuHauuulmqqaamuaumqaquaqummmuluuamau a manna 59 institutions already established by the various ministries. As a result, in its first year of operation the university had a studentbody of 1,320 including 120 women.4 The studentbody at the university grew some 15 percent per year for the first decade after its establishment. As trends towards centralization of higher education continued, a number of other institutions were joined to the University of Tehran. In 1946, the administration of the College of Agriculture was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the university. Later, the School of Fine Arts also became part of the university. On the basis of a tradition which began in the nineteenth century, the educational structure of the University of Tehran was patterned after the French system. Faculties constituted the educational constituencies of the university. Each of them was independent in matters regarding its administration, educational policies, and admission of students. .They maintained their own registration offices and libraries, and in general operated as autonomous units.5‘ Each academic degree was divided into several academic years with annual examinations, which 4Joseph S. Szliowics, , Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1973, p. 242. 5Sassani, p. 19. 60 covered the course structure. The French system of instruction, with its emphasis on the accumulation and memorization, also prevailed at the university. According to Banani: The influence of French education and French methods was so preponderant that an open discrimination was often experienced by graduates of British, and particularly American universities, ‘when they sought teaching positions at the University.6 The teaching staff of the university, with the exception of some old scholars of Arabic and Persian literature, had generally been trained in Europe, predominantly in France. A 1928 decree had obliged the Ministry of Education to send 100 students to Europe every year for a period of five years. Thirty-five percent were to assume teaching responsibilities at the university upon their graduation.7 Administrative leadership at the university was vested in the chancellor and a university senate composed of the deans of the faculties and two professors from each faculty.8 The senate nominated a chancellor who had to be approved by both the Minister of Education and the Shah. The chancellor, 6min Banani. WW Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 99. 7Cyrus Manzoor, “University Reform in Iran, Problems and Prospects,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1971, p. 21. 3Arasteh, WW, 9. 35. 61 in consultation with the senate, prepared the university budget which was to be presented to the Majlis by the Minister of Education. The university was free to use all funds in accordance with its internal policy and the regulations enacted by the university senate. Similarly, the faculties could use_appropriated funds according to the decisions reached by the faculty senate and under its administration.9 A From the date of the foundation of the University of Tehran in 1934 until 1938, three more institutions of higher learning were created: (1) Abadan Institute of Technology, (2) School of Finance established in 1937 to train personnel for the Ministry of Finance, and (3) Higher Institute of Telecommunication established in 1938. Between 1938 and 1947 no institution was founded. During this ten year period, internal unrest, WOrld War II, and foreign powers' occupation of the country prevented educational development in Iran. It was in the late 1940's that the country could again turn its attention seriously to education. WW Beginning in 1948, the Ministry of Education again actively aimed at the expansion of higher education through- out the country. The Majlis granted necessary funds for the 9Sassani, p. 20. 62 creation of provincial universities through 1948-1955.10 During the 1948-1967 period, five provincial universities and a number of other institutions of higher education were established. These institutions generally adapted the model of the University of Tehran for their educational structures. The first university outside of Tehran was founded in 1948 in Tabriz, the capital of Eastern Azarbayjan Province. University of Esfahan and University of Mashhad were established in 1949, followed by University of Shiraz in 1950. In 1962, the University of Shiraz was renamed Pahlavi University to designate its new status. Singled out as the foundation of the first "American-style" university in Iran, a contract was signed with the University of Pennsylvania for technical assistance as well as for the periodic posting of Pennsylvania faculty to Pahlavi University.1_1 Special funds ‘were allocated to the project_along with a special charter exempting the university from many of the bureaucratic regulations that applied to other institutions, as well as bringing Pahlavi University to the very direct attention of the monarch. The University of Ahvas was founded in 1955 and 1ounssco, d - Egngggign, Paris, UNESCO, 1966, p. 625. 11Carl R. Eicher and Marvin Zonis, An_Angly§1§_gfi_n‘§.; , Washington, D.C., Overseas Liaison Committee, American Council on Education, 1976. p. 15. 63 was superseded the following year by the resurrection of the long moribund Jundi Shapour University.12 In addition to the provincial universities, a number of other institutions of higher education were established during the 1948-1967 period. The first privately founded university in Iran was created in 1957. This institution was inaugurated the National University of Iran under a policy- making Board of Trustees.13 A second private institution, Iranian Girls' College was founded in 1964.14 This institution was to admit women only and consisted of three faculties: psychology, home economics, and secretarial science. In 1966 another American-style institution, Arya Mehr Technical University, was established as an American- style science and engineering center.15 For a list of major institutions which were established during the 1948:1967 period, see Table 2. In addition to those shown in the table, a number of other post-secondary institutions were also established. These included several nursing schools and lzrbid. 13Karim Fatemi and Franklin T. Burroughs, “Higher Educational Development in Iran," WW1, vol. 40, no. 2, October 1969, p. 23. 14Ibid., p. 24. 15Eicher, p. 16. 64 Table 2 WW During 1258-1251 Date 1123;133:195" PW Tabriz University 1948 Tabriz Esfahan University 1949 Esfahan Mashhad University 1949 Mashhad Shiraz University 1950 Shiraz Jundi Shapour University 1955 Ahvaz Finance and Accounting College 1956 Tehran School of Forestry 1956 Gorgan National University of Iran 1957 Tehran School of Commerce 1957 Tehran School of Social Service 1958 Tehran Civil Aviation Institute 1959 Tehran College of Mass Communication 1960 Tehran Institute of Nutrition Science and Food Technology 1961 Tehran Banking Institute of Tehran 1962 Tehran Technology and Science College of Iran 1962 Tehran Iranian Girls' College 1964 Oremiyeh College of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry 1964 Tehran Firoozgar Higher Institute of Nursing 1964 Tehran School of Cartography 1964 Tehran School of Foreign Language and Literature 1964 Tehran School of Statistics and Information 1965 Tehran water Institute of Tehran 1965 Tehran Arya Mehr Technical University 1966 Tehran Pars College 1966 Tehran W 1967 Tehran. *Most of these institutions were given new names after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Source: Abdol Hossein Samii, WW LL33, New York, International Council for Educational Development, 1978, pp. 4-5,7. 65 a number of schools of agriculture. By 1967, there was a total of 42 post-secondary institutions throughout the country which offered programs leadimg to a degree or certificate. The growth of higher education between 1948 and 1967 is also evidenced by the increase in the number of students who enrolled in the institutions (see Table 3). In 1948, a total of 6,257 students were enrolled in Iranian colleges and universities. By 1967, student enrollment reached 36,882 including 28,020 male and 8,862 female students.16 The University of Tehran continued to be the major Iranian institution of higher education with a student population of 14,471 in 1967.17 In the same year, only 6,321 students were enrolled in all of the five provincial universities. The trend in the enrollment increase is reflected in the number of students who graduated from colleges and universities. From 1949 to 1954, 9,140 students graduated from institutions. The number of graduates totalled 19,310 during the next 15 year period from 1954 to 1969.18 During the 1970-71 academic year alone, 14,993 students graduated from the country's institutions of higher education.19 16Eicher, p. 39. 17Arasteh. Edu2at12n_and_aesial_Anaksning, p. 37. 181bid., p. 33. 19unssco, Egggagign_in_5§13, vol. VII, no. 1, September 1972, p. 76. 66 Table 3 E J] l I I] I I.! l' E I l E: II 1123312611 ' 29$; Enrollmsa; 1935 1,645 1945 3.395 1948 6,257 1953 9,430 1955 10,100 1957 12,349 1959 19,800 1961 22,849 1963 ' 24,850 1965 28,900 1967 36,882 Sources: ngn_51manggL_1210, Tehran, The Echo of Iran, July 1970, pp. 513-520. UNESCO, ‘ , vol. VII, no. 1, September 1972, pp. 64-77. Reza Arasteh, W: PP- 37-39. Faculty development during the 1948-1967 period is also worthy of attention. By law, the academic staff of the institutions was divided into three categories: ‘professors, senior lecturers, and lecturers.20 In 1948, the total number of academic staff of higher education amounted to 130. The teaching staff expanded considerably and amounted to 690 by 2°Sassani, p. 20. 67 1957, 473 of whom were teaching at the University of Tehran. This number increased sharply by 1967 and reached 2,772 (including 282 women), of whom 1,153 were employed by the University of Tehran.21 The expansion of the system of higher education during the 1948-1967 period is also evidenced by the increase in the annual budget of the system. With the exception of the National University of Iran and a few other private_ institutions, Iranian higher education was financed by the government through the Ministry of Education. The first available statistics related to the financing of higher education is for the 1956-1957 academic year and indicates that the government spent 917,000,000 rials for all public institutions during that year.22 The total budget for higher education reached 1,252,667,000 rials in 1958-1959, 1,648,572,000 rials in 1961-1962, and 1,877,000,000 rials in 1965-1966.23 The public institutions of higher education were financed from two sources of public funds. One source was the central government's treasury whose regular education 21Arasteh, p. 37. 22Arasteh, “The Growth of Higher Institutions," p. 333. 23UNEsco, . d . . ' . , Paris, UNESCO, 1971, p. 614. 68 budget funds were obtained through taxes and were allocated by the Ministry of Finance.2‘1 This budget usually financed recurrent expenditures such as salaries, rent, and school supplies. The other source was the Plan Organizations, which were in charge of all capital development and capital investments throughout the country.25 Plan Organizathnn funds were procured through oil royalties and allocated through projects which were part of the five-year national development plans. Plan Organization funds subsidized non- recurrent expenditures for such projects as buildings, equipment, research, and textbook writing. The Plan Organization also made occasional contributions to private institutions which were in need of financial assistance.26 Bs2rsanizatien_2f_ths_£x§t§mA Since the creation of the country's first modern institution of higher learning (Darolfunun) in the mid- nineteenth century until the late 1960's, the Iranian system of higher education was more or less modeled after the French system. During the 1960's, the government took some major 24The_Ensxsleeedia_sf_£dusatign, vol. 5, Chief editor: Lee C. Deighton, New York, Macmillan Company, 1971, p. 213. zslbid. 26 9‘ !' 9— _ vol. 5, Chief editor: Asa S. Knowles, San Francisco, Jossey- Bass Publishers, 1977, p. 2315. 0,. , 00’s . o :09‘ o .1 A0,, 69 steps towards changing the system of higher education. These steps included: (1) establishment of two American-style universities, (2) creation of Boards of Trustees for all Iranian universities, and (3) establishment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Until 1962, all Iranian universities followed the French pattern in the administration and academic activities of their institutions. In 1962, Shiraz University (renamed Pahlavi University) was reorganized into an American-style university. Pahlavi university was designated an autonomous institution under a formal charter passed by parliament. It was governed by a Board of Trustees made up of six ex-officio members and nine to fifteen regular members legally responsible for the operation of the university. Under the Charter, Pahlavi University was independent from the Ministry of Education: it appointed, promoted and dismissed its own faculty, set its own standards for student admission and retention, and established its own curriculum}.7 Pahlavi University represented a major departure from the traditional organization of higher education in Iran.‘ Its success encouraged the establishment of a second American-style university in the country. In 1966, Aryamehr Technical 27Maryam Hakim, 'Education and Modernization in Iran: Planning and Impact of Educational Policy," Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghampton, 1979, p. 52. 70 University was established as an American-style science and engineering institution. In 1967, the Majlis passed a law allowing the government to set up a Board of Trustees for the University of Tehran, with a further provision that the government could apply this law to other institutions of higher education. The law provided that each institution must have 'A Board of Trustees acting as a legislative body ratifying the regulations concerning employment (teaching and research personnel), finance, and the budget."28 The chancellor was also to be nominated by the Board of Trustees. Thus, the pattern of autonomous control of institutions first adapted by Pahlavi University was also duplicated for other universities and colleges. ' Yet, the most important step towards reorganization of the system of higher education was the creation of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1967. Prior to the creation of this ministry, Iranian higher education was supervised by a Higher Education Department in the Ministry of Education. In 1967, responsibility for all public institutions of higher education was vested in the new Ministry of Science and Higher Education charged with the supervision of the institutions as well as preparation of 28UNESCO, Bulletin of UNESCO Regional Office for Education, p. 65. 71 long-term plans for the development of higher education and scientific research in the country. Specifically, the tasks assigned to the ministry included: 1. determining the goals and objectives of post- secondary education and research programs: 2. preparing long-range plans for the system related to national needs and objectives: 3. coordinating these plans with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture and Arts: 4. supervising all post-secondary institutions to ensure that they are fulfilling their educational responsibilities to the standards set up for them: and 5. approving the creation of all new inssgtutions and modification in existing institutions. Shortly after its establishment, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education proved to be a powerful central organization for policy-making and coordinating all higher education institutions. It introduced the following major reforms in the educational structure of colleges and universities. 1. The system of "Chair“ was abolished and replaced by the department system. Formerly, faculties each composed of several Chairs constituted the educational and research activities ggich were organized within university departments. 29Abdol Hossein Samii and Dariush Nowrasteh, syfitgmg_gfi flighg;_j§gg§;19n1__jgan, New York, International Council of Educational Development, 1978, p. 8. 3°UNESCO, Bulletin of the UNESCO Regional Office for Education, p. 68. 72 2. In regard to the academic staff of the institutions, the following system of classification was adopted: Professor (Ostad) ~ Associate Professor (Daneshyar) Assistant Professor (Ostadyar) Lecturer (Modarress) Instructor (Morabbi)31 3. The system of annual examinations was replaced by the credit system. Each academic year was divided into two semesters. Most universities began to offer a summer term as well. 4. American degrees and grade systems were used in all colleges and universities throughout the country. 5. The Iranian universities began a tendency towards greater specialization and more emphasis was attached to science and technology disciplines. Another development which contributed to the reform and organization of the system of higher education occurred in 1968. In the summer of71968,.' the first in what became an annual series of meetings on educational evaluation was held in Ramsar. The week long gathering, which brought together' those responsible for all phases of higher education and the most important government officials, resulted in very immediate instructions for higher education.33 The 31Parvin D. Khosrovani, "The Purpose and Character of Higher Education in Iran," Ph.D. Dissertation, Wayne State University, 1982, p. 38. 32UNBSC0, p. 68. 33Eicher, p. 20. 73 thirteenth principle of the Ramsar Conference resoluthm: asserted: Higher education and scientific institutes must be developed and expanded, with view to the country's rising demand for experts in all fields in the coming years. But at the same time they should avoid developing branches which wi154not serve the economic development of the country. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education was charged with establishing, equipping, and expanding the country's institutions of higher education. Moreover, mutual links between universities and industrial and agricultural enterprises were encouraged. Finally, the conference resolution emphasized that “Institutes of higher education must be ready to make the best possible use of assistance from the private sectors.”35 The reorganization of the system of higher education during the 1960's was aimed at changing the old French pattern which existed since the mid-nineteenth century. Consequently, the French system was replaced by a new nationwide American-style system. Following the reorganization of the system, the Iranian government focused on the rapid expansion of higher education throughout the country. During the 13 year period from 1967 to 1979, the Iranian system of higher education developed with 34W, 1969, P- 512. 35Tabibi-Kazerooni, p. 8. 74 unprecedented acceleration. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a review of quantitative development of the system during this period. W919. During the academic year 1967-1968, the total number of Iranian institutions of higher education was 43, including: eight universities, 29 public two-year and four-year colleges, and five private four-year colleges. Only 10 institutions (five universities and five colleges) were located outside of Tehran. Following the government's decision to expand the system of higher education in 1968, the number of colleges and universities began to increase rapidly. The government's primary attention was focused on: (1) creation of two—year colleges, and (2) expansion of higher education outside of the capital. By 1971, the number of universities remained unchanged, but 73 new colleges including 49 two-year colleges were established. Of the 73 new institutions, 52 colleges were established outside of Tehran. During the academic year 1971-1972, the country had a total of 115 institutions of higher learning.36 A rapid increase 1J1 the number of universities happened during the 36W, p. 403. 75 1972-1975 period. As Table 4 shows, 11 new universities were created during this rather short period. Table 4 1 ! I e - o 7,-- I ,0 - No. of Date Unizsrsitg a99llsses___nosatign___fgundsd Buali Sina University 4 Hamedan 1972 The Free University of Iran -- Tehran 1972 University of Baluchestan 3 Zahedan 1973 Teachers Training University 1 Tehran 1973 Revolutionary Corps University 4 varamin 1973 Reza Shah University 2 Tehran 1973 Farabi University 6 Tehran 1974 University of Gilan l Rasht 1974 University of Herman 3 Kerman . 1974 Razi University 4 Kermanshah Illam 1974 Farah Pahlavi University 5 1975 (Formerly Iranian Girls' College) - *This university was modeled on the open university concept of the United Kingdom and emphasized correspondence courses managed through teaching centers, educational television, and computer assisted education. Source: SYstsma_2f_Hishsr_£dgsatieai__lranp New York, International Council for Educational Development, 1978, PP. 6-7. The total number of institutions of higher education reached 160 by the 1974-1975 academic year37 and continued to 37Ministry of Science and Education, , Tehran, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1976, p. 4. 76 increase steadily until 1978. .By the 1978-1979 academic year, Iran had a total of 244 institutions of higher education, including: 22 universities and 222 two-year and four-year colleges (see Table 5). The growth in the number of institutions during the 1977-1979 period was unprecedented in the history of Iranian higher education. As Table 5 indicates, the number of higher education institutions increased 481 percent during this 13 year period. It is also important to note that this expansion was not limited to Tehran and other major cities. In 1967, the vast majority of the institutions were located in Tehran and a few major provincial capitals. During the 1967-1979 period a considerable number of colleges and universities were established in the parts of the country which were previously deprived of higher education. A list of Iranian higher education institutions is presented in the Appendix of this study. Winn Based on financial resources and revenues, the institutions of higher education were classified under the following categories: 1. Universities and Autonomous Public Institutions. These institutions were established by government legislation and received their revenues directly from the government budget. They had financial and administrative autonomy. .eaaa .omnoaco do moaoooaacs .ooooaco .aaaaI4uaualuaulualaaquuqumaqqoaauu . .whma .coaumosom can oocoaom ca ocaccoam can concomom mom ousuaumca .ccusoa .mqua aAIddHMmmmmflluuamdnludldmaudduuum .coauoosom cocoa: can oocoaom mo muumaca: ”moodsom hm m.~v m.ma amv m.~mm mpa «om «Na «N mnma :1: In: an: In: an: all we on m hoaa w o .o- o u. - a m o -o- o u. - — i...o P-.- o n. . . uuux Hum «.333 «3355 umumuum Iguanas—dull .0- O .l I I .9 .4 H .‘ .4 a oases 78 2. Affiliated Public Institutions. These institutions were also established by government legislation but did not have financial autonomy. They were subordinated to ministries or other government organizations and were financially dependent on those organizations. 3. Private Institutions. These institutions were established by charters issued by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. They were administered by private organizations and were not generally entitled to financial support from the government. Although they occasionally received financial aid from the government, the gggatest part of their budget came from tuition fees.. The budget preparation and resource allocation authority rested with the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO). Each public institution was required to prepare a budget and a multiyear development plan in accordance with guideline format and instructions provided by the P80.39 The budget request was pmesented by the individual boards of trustees and was allocated by the P80. Following budget allocation, the funds were disbursed via the Ministry of Finance and Economy. In addition to these funds, there was another source of revenue for the public institutions: internal funds which were derived from tuition fees, entrance examinations fees, endowment income, and gifts. 38Ministry of Science and Higher Education, - , Tehran Institute for :Research and Planning in Science and Higher Education, 1977, p. 4-50 39Sanii, p. 13. 79 Table 6 indicates budget allocation for the higher education system during the 1967-1978 period. As the table shows, the 1977-1978 budget was 35.63 times that of the 1967- 1968 academic year. That is, in 11 year's time, the budget for higher education increased 35.63 times. The table also indicates that, on the average, there was an annual increase of 45 percent in the higher education budget. In 1975, the government announced the nationalization of education at all levels from primary education to higher education. Henceforth, all higher education institutions became publicly owned, all employees became government employees, and tuition became free.“ Consequently, those institutions of higher education which previously had been financing their activities through tuition fees became completely dependent on government funds. The sudden increase in budget allocation to higher education during the 1975-76 academic year (shown in Table 6) was a result of this development. W The expansion of institutions as well as a steady increase in the funds allocated to higher education caused a considerable increase in enrollment at the colleges and universities. The enrollment leaped from 46,987 in the 1967- 68 academic year to 175,675 in the 1977-78 academic year. 4oEicher, p. 22. 80 Table 6 1967-68 1,542,314 N.A. 1,542, 314 — 1968-69 2,231,797 N.A. 2, 231 ,797 45 1969-70 3,196,161 582,760 3,778,921 69 1970-71 3,735,620 175,809 3,911,429 4 1972-73 6,289,008 335,839 6,624,847 38 1973-74 8,945,649 454,852 9,400,501 42 1974-75 13,788,618 202,728 13,991,346 49 1975-76 27,787,402 605,354 28,392,756 103 1976-77 38,175,815 512,020 38,687 .835 36 1977-78 54,345,226 609,800 54,955,026 42 Average Annual Growth Rate 45 Sources: ' ' ° , New York, International Council for Educational Development, 1978. Ministry of Science and Higher Education, WW. 1977. This increase, however, was not comparable to the increase in allocation of funds to higher education during the period. As Table 7 indicates, student enrollment increased on the average of 14.8 percent over the 1967-1978 period while allocation of funds increased an average of 45 percent for the same period. There are several factors which can explain this relatively low increase in student enrollment. According to the International Council for Educational 81 Table 7 1967-68 46,987 - 1,542,314 - 1968-69 58,194 29 2,231,797 45 1969-70 67,268 16 3,778,921 69 1970-71 74,708 11 3,911,429 4 1971-72 97,338 30 4,795,210 23 1972-73 115,311 18 6,624,847 38 1973-74 123,114 7 9,400,501 42 1974-75 135,354 10 13,991,346 49 1975-76 151,905 12 28,392,756 103 1976-77 154,215 15 38,687,835 36 1977-78 175,675 14 54,955,026 42 Average Atmal Growth Rate 14. 8 45 Sources: - , New York, International Council for Educational Development, 1978. Ministry of Science and Higher Education, W. C o ' ChicagOr University of Chicago, 1981. 82 Development, “While huge sums were funneled.into higher education facilities--buildings and laboratory equipmentw- comparable effort was not made to augment the number of qualified faculty."41 Therefore, institutions faced a shortage of trained faculty to use the equipment and machinery, and they were not able to admit a larger number of students.A further explanation is that some new institutions had to undertake long periods of planning in order to prepare for admission of students. For instance, the Free University of Iran did not have any students until 1977. Since its foundation in 1972, the Free University had been preparing for admission of students on its several regional campuses. Table 8 shows the distribution of students by sex and type of institutions from the 1966-67 academic year to the 1975-76 academic year. During the 1966-1976 period, female enrollment multiplied 4.8 times while male enrollment multiplied 3.8 times. In 1966-67, the proportions of male enrollment and female enrollment were 76 percent and 24 percent respectively. The ratio changed to 72 percent male and 28 percent female by 1976-77. The medical fields experienced the most dramatic changes in this respect:42 in 1966-67 the proportion of male to female students was 68 “WW, 9. 27. 42lbid., pp. 28,30. .ov .m cohma .cOaumosom can cocoaom ca mcaccuam can couoomom sou ousuaumca coucoa qaHHIqHIdaAAamdualuuamduludluuduudquum .coauoozom magma: oco cocoaom mo auumacaz “oousom mamehm movemn vmueom mmhevm chm ma comeua mmueoa omo.m vowem aa~.v amuse memeca amoeua «mecca mam.» mom 5 cohem chasm mooev moaen «mmea mamawm mooehm unmema «maecu «mecca hmmeaa cameo anaem maoev mmmem cmm.~ can: macauzuaumca 533:8 5:3: 350 oaoemn momeom «bacon vam.am vmmemn momeca mm~.o momeo. maven hhmew amuoa vaaema amaeaa aamcma mmaema aamcm wmcem omh.a enmea mao.a can mauewm mohchm momema coh.oa «enema mmhema mecca mwoew mmbem chm.~ mem.a can: momoaaou Oaansm cameo awheh omaoema moocua acveca mamem mmaem maveh hmmem «moan amuoa mmm mum amm.a mmhea can a amwea «amea vamea man mnv mausum ahaeh coach aqa.aa ohmeoa romeo mmw.h Neheh moaeo «haen uncem 0am: mcoausuaumca ouo>aum Nun-mo awoemm mmmcmv hhhemv mmmcvv comeav .vvvemm mam.hm aoh.um unacww adage hmmema h<5.va mam.aa cameoa ammeca ommem amneo amoem cmmeh cmh.m oamswm mm¢.mo vahemv mmmeom ammemm «vocvm ommemm mmoeam hhaemm amoemm wmceam can: moauamuo>acs momeama ammemma vaaemma oaaemma aamcmaa mohevh omueho .cmaeom homewv «omemm amuoa mmhemv vmmemm «aaewm ommevm momemm buoema memema ohcema mmaema women mamswm waaemoa omhemm necehm ambeoa movemo ammemm mamecm cmaemv mmm.¢m cmoemm can: amuoa . e .I . VII . II . | a II. o aloe. . u.- uI-Pe. I-... c: 5% «0 ucax «deuquwa a canoe 84 percent to 32 percent respectively and in 1976-77 the ratio changed to 49 percent male and 51 percent female. The male to female ratio remained stable in the social sciences, but changed markedly in the fields of humanities and education.’ In the field of humanities the ratio was 64 percent male to 36 percent female for 1966-67 and 46 to 54 for 1976-77. In the field of education the ratio changed from 56 percent male and 44 percent female to 48 percent male and 52 percent female during the 1966-1977 period.43 Table 9 illustrates the distribution of students by fields of study during the 1969-1977 period. As is evident_ from the table, in 1969-70 academic year social sciences and humanities enjoyed the highest percentage of students. The proportion of students in the fields of engineering and natural science and mathematics increased during the 1969- 1977 period, while the proportion of students in education did not change significantly. In 1976-77 the proportion of students in social sciences and humanities was still high. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show that the overall number of students increased rapidly in the late 1960's and in the 1970's. EQSQISX The rapid growth of Iranian higher education is also evidenced by a sharp increase in the number of academic staff 43Ibid., p. 30. 85 Table 9 Tbtal 67,268 lhdhfine 9AWO Law 2,289 Social Sciences 13,702 Hummdtnai 13flm5 Eflumnfion 2gum llmunfl.5chaxxs andlumhamudcs £5964 Agriculture 2,976 Engineering 11,703 Fineluts 1L809 74,708 10,000 1,637 16,562 14,704 1,951 9Jfl6 3,162 14,008 2,844 100 13.39 2.19 2L12 19.68 1L61 IEL22 4.23 18.75 3.81 15,280 4n154 17,451 1&59 100 10.16 2.03 ZLS2 Sfln55 2.59 15C“) 4L27 17393 ILZS 115,311 11,339 ZJfifl ZSJHB 25,642 2,945 18,928 MJQZ 20flfl2 3&33 Tbtal 123,114 100 135,354 100 151,905 100 154,215 100 (Medicine 13,589 11.04 14,965 11.50 17,810 12.00 19,235 12 Law ' 2,375 1.93 3,196 2.36 2,884 2.00 2,973 2 Social Selences 28,860 23.44 32,138 23.74 31,302 120.00 27,093 18 Humanities 24,160 19.62 22,298 16.47 25,920 17.00 26,348 17 Education 3,580 2.91 4,031 2.96 4,800 3.00 5,342 4 Natural Sciences _ - and Mathematics 19,734 16.03 21,996 16.25 24,507 16.00 27,317 18 Agriculture 5,389 4.38 6,466 4.77 7,134 5.00 6,837 4 Engineering 22,057 17.91 25,868 19.11 32,779 22.00 34,411 22 Fine Arts 3,370 2.74 4,414 3.26 4,769 3.00 4,659 3 Source: Budget and Planning Organization of Iran, The I Statistics Center of Iran, 1977, p. 100. Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, I Tehran, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1975, p. 29. 86 employed by the colleges and universities. lDuring the 1966- 67 academic year, the number of full-time and part-time faculty at all institutions of higher education was 2,772. As Table 10 indicates, this figure jumped to 12,310 (5,812 full-time and 6,498 part-time) during the 1975-76 academic year. However, this increase was still not sufficient to meet demand, and consequently the institutions resorted to hiring hourly paid instructors.44 Most of these instructors worked in the private sector, but taught a few hours at a college or university by a semester based contract. (The figures shown in the table do not include this group of instructors). The latest available statistics reveal that the total number of the faculty members reached 13,125 (7,030 full-time and 6,095 part-time) by the 1976-77 academic year:45 indicating a total growth of 373 percent during the 10 year period from 1966-67 to 1976-77. The latest figure also shows a considerable increase in the proportion of full- time faculty. Si!§§fl§§.hh£2§§ Overseas education has been an old tradition among Iranian students. It began in the early nineteenth century when the government sent a number of students to European 4‘Tabibi-Kazerooni, p. 108. ”WW, 9. 31. 87 Table 10 u - ' d - ' 112.65.213.25). 1966-67 1969-70 1972;13___121§;1§__ Total 2,772 6,103 9,890 12,310 Full-time N.A. 2,773 4,128 5,812 Part-time N.A. 3,330 5,762 6,498 Male 2,490 5,430 8,764 10,628 Fall-time N.A. 2,393 31495 43864 Part-time N.A. 3,037 5,269 5,764 Female 282 673 1,126 1,682 Full-time N.A. 380 633 948 Part-time N.A. 293 493 734 Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Tehrtan, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1976. International Council for Educational Development, WW Iran, 1978, p. 32. 88 universities (see Chapter II). Although the government took the initiative in sending students abroad, many Iranian families have been sending their sons and daughters on their own. In 1935, there were 1,175 Iranian students studying abroad, 770 of whom received aid from the government and the rest were supported by their families.46 "Most of these students, approximately 75 percent, were attending French universities. World war II and domestic problems caused the government in the early 1940's to gradually reduce the number of Iranians sent abroad to a point where it stopped altogether. After WOrld war II, overseas education gained momentum and the enrollment abroad rose rapidly to 10,100 by 1958.47 Table 11 shows that the number of Iranian students in foreign cOuntries reached 21,009 by the 1971-72 academic year. The table also indicates that the United States became the most popular host country among Iranian students, followed by West Germany and England. During the 1970's, student enrollment abroad increased even more sharply. Two main factors contributed to this sharp increase. First, the Iranian government became more 46Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening, p. 41. 47Ali Akbar Frahangi, 'An Investigation of the Ideological Foundation and Administrative Structure of Higher Education in Iran," Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio University, 1980, p. 205. Table 11 89 Hg§t_§ggntrv 1963—64 1968—69 1971-72 Austria 1,149 1,360 1,860 Belgium 101 141 131 Canada -- 246 350 England 2,906 2,500 1,952 France 1,153 1,155 1,222 India 35 87 242 Italy 430 512 681 Switzerland 341 423 458 Turkey 401 1,088 1,146 U.S.A. 5,716 7,236 9,768 U.S.S.R. -- 11 11 West Germany 4,829 5,027 4,278 Other Countries 860 520 812 TOTAL 171385 20.317 21.009 Source: WW2. 90 generous in providing financial aid to the students who were willing to attend colleges and universities in foreign countries. As is evident in Table 12, the number of government-sponsored students increased from 1,049 in the 1967-68 academic year to 8,175 in 1975-76--an increase of 680 percent in 8 years time. In addition to those students whose expenses were paid entirely by the government, an increasing number of students received some kind of financial aid from the government. In 1978, about 50 percent of the students who were studying abroad received monthly aid of 200 to 350 U.S. dollars. Second, the newly established Ministry of Science and Higher Education introduced some measures to facilitate the students' exit from the country. According to those measures, students who had at least a secondary school diploma and wished to study abroad were given a language examination. Those who passed the examination could enjoy the Ministry's assistance in obtaining a passport and student visa. Students who had completed their military service were exempt from taking the examination. In 1978, the government revoked the language requirement.‘8 This action led to larger numbers of Iranians studying abroad. ‘BMalcolm G. Scully, 'Iran Makes it Easier to Study Abroad," WW, October 10, 1978, p. 10. .muuna do .22 .3 Hudmflflludldaquflu .ucosmoao>oo aacoauoosom sou aaocsoo accoauncuouca ZXZ=om mha.a mao.m emm.q moo.m ama.~ voo.m mmh.a mam.a aqo.a gases «we «mm can ama ama «ma «ma am we moaaucsou Hocuo mmo.m avm.e avm.~ ~aa.~ nmo.a aoa.a woo.a woo awe .c.m.= no em on on «a om me me ca acasaoo .3 mma mm . mm oaa mm mm mm on u wanna pom oma oNa am on me an em can oocoum now can.“ -m.a ~ma.a emu «we mmm oma ava ocoamcm v n ma «a oa em a m h pageant .l . I . I . I. . .l . I. . I... I" "I.. .7. umoa O Na manna 92 By 1978, there were approximately 75,000 Iranian students abroad, more than 50 percent of them in the United States. According to the Institute of International .Education,49 in the Spring of 1978 Iranians made up the largest single group of foreign students in the United States: out of 227,000 foreign students at American colleges and universities, 37,000 were Iranians. SQEEQL! The purpose of this chapter was to review the development and expansion of higher education in Iran during the study period. Between 1934 and 1979, the Iranian system of higher education experienced several stages of development. The first stage began with the creation of the first modern university in 1934 and lasted until 1948. During this stage, the expansion of higher education was slow and sporadic. From 1948 to 1967, the development of higher education institutions continued apace. During this period five provincial universities and a considerable number of other institutions were founded. \In the 1960's the system of higher education underwent some drastic organizational reforms which transformed the traditional French system of higher education into an American-style system. This reorganization became a prelude to an unprecedented expansion ‘9Ihid. st th 00 93 of higher education which occurred during the next stage. Between 1967 and 1979, the number of institutions jumped from 42 to 244, higher education budget increased an average of 45 percent per year, student enrollment increased at a 14.8 percent annual growth rate, and the number Of academic staff grew over 37 percent per year. The number of Iranian students in foreign countries also increased sharply during the study period and rose to over 75,000 students which were mostly attending U.S. colleges and universities. CHAPTERV THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ON HIGHER EDUCATION The educational systems of countries are in part the product of their political environments. Changes in political environment causes changes in the educational policies and practices. This chapter provides the political context needed for the better understanding of the evolution of the Iranian system of higher education during the 1934- 79 period. It describes major events which occurred in Iran's political system~ and in the government's internal policies and external relations, and it explains the impact of these events on the development of higher education during the study period. 211W W The history of 2,500 years of monarchial regime in Iran shows a single theme with variations: a period of prosperity and expansion under a newly arisen ruler or dynasty, decay of the declining dynasty accompanied by chaos 94 95 and foreign intervention, and the conquest of power by a new family or by foreign invaders. During the chaotic years of the late 18th century, a military man named Agha Mohammad Khan rose to power and established the Qajar Dynasty (1797). Under the weak and irresponsible Qajar Shahs, Iran suffered several military defeats at the hand of foreign powers and the population became completely impoverished. The Qajars, however, survived until the 1920's when they surrendered to Reza Khan who established the Pahlavi Dynasty. The weakness of Qajar rulers was in part, reflected in their humiliating defeat by Russia. After wars with that country (1800-1828), Iran had to surrender its Caucasian provinces (Georgia, Armenia, and others) and its rights to the Caspian Sea.1 The Russian advances into Iran and towards the Persian Gulf was considered by Great Britain as a threat to its interests in India. This led to a rivalry between the two great powers in Iran. In 1907 the two great powers agreed to divide Iran into three zones: a Russian sphere of influence in the north, a British one in the south, and a sort of neutral buffer zone in the middle.‘ 1Hartman Nirumand, W, Translated by Robert Engler, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. 20. 96 .This agreement was not formally annulled until the end of WOrld War 1.2 The rivalry between Russia and Britain in Iran also took the form of economic penetration. The growing industrialization of Europe required both access to raw materials and new markets for manufactured products, and underdeveloped countries were marked for economic penetration. In Iran, Russia and Britain got involved in competition for obtaining concessions. In 1872 a British banker, Baron Reuter obtained an amazing concession from the Qajar regime to exploit minerals and oil and to manage Iran's custom services. Moreover, in 1890 a British company was given a 50 year tobacco monopoly. Russia, on the other hand, gained a concession covering fishing rights in the Caspian Sea. Also, the Discount Bank of Persia, a Russian Institution, was opened in Thhran in 1891.3 In return for these concessions, Iran received a number of governmental loans and credits which were mostly used by Qajar Shahs for their expensive voyages in Europe.4 21min Banani , WWW, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 8. 3Donald N. Wilber, [LanL_£§§t_agd_£;g§gnt, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 67-68. 4lbid., p. 69. 97 The British-Russian rivalry weakened the Iranian central government and resulted in economic and political corruption. The reaction of people to foreign intervention and internal corruption was expressed by a number of sporadic rebellions which occurred in the 1890's. Following these rebellions a revolution broke out in 1905, involving a_ vast majority of the population including the clergy, the merchants, and the intellectuals. The aim of this revolution was the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional one.5 The constitutionalists were victorious and a constitutional assembly was chosen in nationwide elections in 1906. This assembly drafted Iran's first constitution according to which the parliament (Majlis) rather than the Shah was to be the center of power and decision making. In the years that followed, the Majlis appeared unable to bring about any fundamental change in the life of the nation. Inl its early stages, constitutional government in Iran suffered from the absence of a sufficient administration required to carry out necessary reforms. This young system was also undermined by the intervention of Russia and Britain. The British supported the cause of the Iranian Constitutionalists because Russia had close ties 580m Katouzian, NW. London, The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, p. 56. 98 with the throne, and also because a constitutional monarchy was similar to their own political system. In the process they even succeeded in having many key administrative positions filled by British experts or by pro-British Iranian officials. The Russians, on the other hand, supported the absolute monarchy, thinking that the constitutional movement was engineered by the British in order to reduce Russian influence in Iran. As a result, the constitutional movement was diverted from its original goal which was the establishment of an independent and constitutional political system in the country. world War I brought new problems and devastation to the country. Because of its geographic location, Iran became a battle field for foreign powers during the war. The population became completely impoverished and rebellions again broke out throughout the country. When the war ended, Iran was facing national disunity, foreign occupation, economic disruption and poverty, and administrative corruption and incompetence. The time was ripe for a new dictator to rise to power. This dictator happened to be an army colonel named Reza Khan who later established the Pahlavi Dynasty which remained in power until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 99 WW Reza Khan was a British trained military man and served in the Persian Cossack Brigade6 where he became a colonel. In 1919, Colonel Reza Khan was selected as the commander of the brigade by the head of the British military in Iran:7 In February 1921, his forces staged a military coup and arrested some 60 prominent politicians. During the coup d'etat, Reza Khan obtained ammunition, supplies, and pay for his troops from Britain.8 The British policy was to end its direct involvement and to support a pro-West and strong central government in the country. For this reason, they supported Reza Khan whom they thought was able to bring stability to Iran and protect British interests. Following the 1921 coup, Reza Khan obtained the title of army commander and began to reorganize the army, which he then used to suppress political movements and revolts throughout the country. By 1923, he was acknowledged as the chief power in the government. In October of that year, the last 6Persian Cossack Brigade had been established by the Russians in 1879. After the Bolshevik Revolution and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran, the brigade was advised by and received supplies from British forces. 7Nikki R. Keddie, WW fligtgry_gfi_nggg;n_1;§n, Yale University Press, 1981, p. 87. 8For documented discussion of British involvement in the coup, see: R.H. Ullman, MW 1221, Princeton, 1972, Chapter 9, and Dennis wright, The Wins, London, 1977, pp. 180-84- 100 Shah of the Qajar Dynasty appointed him as Prime Minister and left for Europe, never to return to Iran.9 Finally, in December 1925 Reza Kahn convened a Constituent Assembly to depose the Qajar Dynasty and offer him the imperial throne. He crowned himself as Reza Shah, founding a new dynasty, the Pahlavis (named after an ancient Persian name). Although Reza Khan based his power predominantly on the military, his rise to the throne was helped by the chaotic conditions of the country. He enlisted the confidence. and hopes of many Iranians with his promises to restore national unity and independence and to improve social and economic conditions. A number of scholars have compared Reza Khan's rise to power with that of Hitler. One scholar, for example, wrote: The startling similarity between this seizure of power and Hitler's for whom Reza Shah had great sympathy is not accidental. Both takeovers were preceded by periods of political disorders, national humiliation, and economic crisis which spawned problems impossible for a young democracy to cope with without vigorous leadership. In both cases the people were offered the mythification of their homeland, its greatness, and its history as a substitute for satisfaction of their social and material needs. In Iran as in Germany, what paraded as progress and liberatfifin was soon revealed to be the blackest reaction. 9Banani, p. 42. 10Nirumand, p. 25. 101 The core of changes which took place under Reza Shah's regime (1925-41) was an intense nationalism. The regime idolized what it considered as the glories of Iranian. history'. It, however, was not the Islamic past which was idolized, but “the glories ‘of pre-Islamic Iran."11 Islam was regarded as an alien faith imposed upon Iran by an inferior civilization. Reza Khan sought to weaken the ideological and cultural influence of Islam in Iran: developing, instead, an ideology based on the worship of Shah and country. The educational system was oriented towards promoting this ideology. This assertion of nationalism did not imply a rejection of Western culture and technology. On the contrary, Reza Shah was a strong advocate of Westernization. He sought to absorb Western culture into Iranian national life as a replacement for Islamic culture. He also utilized Western technology in his military and economic reforms. A strong and modern army was built to protect the Shah's authority within the country, Reza Shah also employed Western technology in a series of spectacular industrial projects which were launched as symbols of national prestige and status. In his Westernization efforts, the Shah received 1J'Banani, p. 46. tr of mi tc pe re of SC e1 ad 19 In 102 generous support from the governments and private firms of Western Europe and the United States. W35 There were two major features in the policies of Reza Khan's regime: centralization and modernization. Centralization was sought through a strong unified military and an expanded bureaucracy. Reza Khan accorded priority to reorganizing and strengthening the military so as to make it an efficient force capable of reinforcing his authority throughout the country. During his reign, a large portion of the government budget was spent on the armed forces. The military received an average of 64 percent per year of the total government expenditures from 1925 to 1933 and 25 percent from 1934 to 1941.12 To create a strong and reliable military, the Shah faced the problem of training officers in modern methods of warfare. Hence, he developed (a network of military schools consisting of army high schools in provinces and a war college in Tehran. Reza Khan also reinforced his control with a vastly expanded bureaucracy. The number of government administrators increased from 18,500 in 1926 to 56,800 in 1941. These people were employed by the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Education, 12Kotouzian, pp. 114, 130. 103 Trade, Post and Telegraph, Agriculture, Roads, and Industry.13 The Interior Ministry, which supervised the police, internal administration, medical ,services, elections, and military conscription, was entirely reorganized.14 The old division of few large provinces was abolished and the ministry was structured into 11 provinces, 49 counties, and many municipalities and rural districts. These divisions enjoyed very. little local power and their officials were appointed by the Interior Ministry in Tehran. Thus, the regime's control was established in all cities and villages. This extended bureaucracy required a modern administrative structure staffed by trained officials. As will be discussed, the regime sought to meet this need by emphasizing higher levels of education. Reza Khan's policies of modernization were based on: (1) reform of the economic system, and (2) secularization of social and political life in the country. As the first step to modernize the country's economy, the regime launched a series of tax reform programs. In this it was helped by an American mission headed by Arthur Millspagh who stayed in Iran from 1922 to 1927.15 Also, a number of American, ¥ 13Ervand Abrahimian, Iran_Between_1w2_zaxelutiens, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 136. 14Ibid., p. 137. 15Banani, p. 115. 104 German, Belgian, and British advisers were employed to Westernize the Ministry of Finance and its method of operation.16 As a result of these reforms, the regime obtained an increasing degree of central control over the financial affairs of the country and the amount of state income and expenditures grew rapidly. The state expenditures increased from 276 million rials in 1928 to 14,174 million in 1941.17 In the field of transportation, one of the more spectacular projects was the building of the Trans-Iranian Inailway between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf.» The construction of this railroad was carried out by American, German, and Scandinavian firms.18 This project did not receive the support of many Iranians. The main reason for taxis was the regime's overemphasis on the strategic considerations at the expense of economic ones. A large POrtion of the project's cost was financed by raising taxes on ‘tea and sugar which were important parts of the Iranians' diet. Also, the railway bypassed some of the country's aetive economic centers and populous cities. It was mainly llsed for transporting Western goods from the Persian Gulf to ‘ 16Ibid., p. 117. 17Katouzian, pp. 113, 130. 18Banani, p. 134. L 105 Tehran and a few northern cities. During WOrld war II, the railroad was used by Western Allied countries to send military aid to the Soviet front. In industry, much effort went into establishing an iron foundry and a steel mill. The construction of these two plants was to be carried out by assistance from Germany. The Reza Khan's regime gave wide publicity to this rather ambitious project, and much of the machinery was imported from Germany.19 However, due to limited economic resources and skills, the project was never carried out. The countryr achieved more success in building smaller industrial plants. After WOrld war I, Iran had a few small factories including two textile mills, a sugar refinery, a match-making factory, and an arsenal. In 1941 Iran's industry included: 37 textile mills, 11 match-making factories, eight sugar refineries, eight chemical enterprises, and five tea and one tobacco processing plants.20 It is not intended here to jpresent complete data on the industrialization of Iran under IReza Khan, but to indicate the need for trained manpower as a result of this industrialization. Iran was still an overwhelmingly agricultural society. lMore than 80 percent of its population lived in rural areas 19Banani, p. 141. 2°Ibid., pp. 137-143. L 106 and was involved in farming. Yet, the agricultural sector of the Iranian economy was least affected by the modernizing efforts of Reza Khan's regime. As Banani noted: It was perhaps a characteristic aspect of modern, nascent nationalism in backward countries, particularly in the Middle East, that these- countries invariably aspired to the prestige- giving programs of industrialization without a commensura2 e modernization and reform of agriculture.2 A key to Iran's problems continued to be its feudalistic and agrarian structure which encouraged low productivity and medieval methods. In fact, some reforms strengthened agrarian structure and the position of landlords. According to the laws of 1928-1929, any village in the possession of one person for 30 years became his private property. These laws legalized expropriations by the powerful landowners that had occurred since the 19th century.22 In 1941, 37 families alone owned 19,000 villages, about 30 percent of the total (50,000) villages.23 Another group of medium ilandlords, owning one to five villages each, owned 7,000 \rillages or 14 percent of the total. Only five percent of .£>easants owned the land they worked. The royal family owned ‘ 21Banani, p. 120. 22Nikki 3. Keddi, , Yale University Press, 1981, p. 96. 23Fred Halliday, MW, lfiiew York, Penguin Books, 1979, p. 106. 107 2,100 villages and was the largest landowner in the country. Reza Khan had obtained these villages through expropriation and confiscating the property of his political opponents. The agricultural sector of the economy, however, was ' not completely unaffected by the modernizing efforts of Reza Khan's regime. As in other areas of the economy, the regime hired a number of experts for the modernization of farming methods. These experts included: an American agronomist, a German forestry expert, two Dutch tea experts, and six French veterinarians.24 Also, some efforts were made for the mechanization of production, including building of deep wells and importing agricultural machinery. These efforts were mainly concentrated in the Caspian region where most of the royal property was located. The modernizing efforts of the regime, however, were of minor importance, for the principal task-—restructuring the feudal system--was left undone. Reza Khan's policies of modernization were also aimed at the secularization of the country's political and social life. Although the constitutional provisions proclaiming Shi'ah Islam as the official state religion were never formally altered, in practice religion was circumscribed and undermined. The constitution of 1906 stated that: 24Banani, p. 125. 108 Article I. The official religion of Iran is Islam of the true sect of ' ' ' ' [Orthodox Shi'ah]. The shah must protect and profess this faith. Article II. The Majlis . . . may at no time legislate laws that are contradictory to the sacred laws of Islam . . . 7. It is the responsibility of the W25 to determine and judge such contradictions. Therefore, it is officially decreed that in each legislative session a board of no less than five men . . . be nominated by the Ma. The Majlis shall accept this board as full members. It is their duty to study all the legislative proposals, and if they find any contradictions to the sacred laws of Islam, they shall reject it. The decision 3% this board in this respect is binding and final. Reza Khan started his secular reforms by disregarding Article II of the Constitution. This provision for an Islamic supervisory board in the Majlis was completely ignored by the Shah. He_also reduced the number of clergy in the national assembly from 24 in the fifth Majlis to six in the tenth Majlis.27 Yet, the most dramatic anti-clergy action took place in 1939, when the regime ordered a state takeover of all religious lands and foundations.28 25The term 'ulama,‘ literally translated the "learned,“ is generally used by all Muslims to designate those divines who have made a study of Theology. 26 Teheran (no date), p. 27.‘ 2‘7Abrahimian, p. 140. 23lhid., p. 141. 109 Traditionally, the Shi'ah clergy had been against Western political, economic, and cultural influence in Iran. In the 19th century, the clergy was against Russian and British intervention in Iranian internal affairs and opposed the concessions given to them by the Qajar Shahs. The Shi'ah leaders played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution, and they became a major political force within and outside of the Majlis. During the 1920's and 1930's, the clergy stood against Reza Khan's Westernizing and secular reforms. It was for this reason that he took steps to reduce the clergy's influence not only in politics but also in social, economic, and legal affairs. Reza Khan continued his secular reforms by reorganizing the Ministry of Justice, replacing religious judges by Secular lawyers. Also, a new legal code modeled on the French Civil Code was introduced, even though it contradicted the Qaranic Canons. Meanwhile, he reduced the number of religious holidays, discouraged people wishing to make pilgrimage to Mecca, outlawed public demonstrations in the holy month of Muharram, forbade women to wear Islamic dress, and encouraged Western clothes for all Iranian men and women.29 29Ihid., p. 141. 110 The educational system of Iran did not escape Reza Khan's secular reforms. When he appeared on the scene, education was mainly centered in the religious schools. The traditional maktab-madrassah system which had existed since the seventh century was still prevailing throughout the country; Maktabs (elementary schools) and madrassahs (religious colleges) were under the Ulama's supervision and they were financed by religious endowments and foundations. Western-style education which had entered Iran in the mid- l9th century was available to only a small minority of the people. In 1925,‘ there were no more than 10,000 students enrolled in non-religious schools (elementary, secondary, and higher).30 Reza Khan brought the religious schools under state control and expanded Western-style education throughout the country. By 1940, Iran had a state controlled system of education with 4,237 schools and 496,960 students.31 Reza Khan's aim was to reduce the influence of religion in the country, but he could not pursue a strong anti- Islamic policy all at once; because religion was very deeply rooted in the Iranian national life. Therefore, he used the country's educational system to change the attitudes of the 30Banani, p. 91. 311hid., p. 108. 111 younger generation towards religion. By 1940, religious instruction was abolished in primary schools. The revised curriculum included more courses in music, arts, and Persian history. The regime also required students at all levels of education to memorize patriotic songs. Closely connected to the policy of secularization was the establishment of the first coeducation primary school in 1935. Moreover, female students were admitted for the first time to higher education institutions in 1936.32 In all schools, female students and teachers were required to wear Western clothes. W The policies of Reza Khan's regime in the field of education reflected the regime's ideology and its political, economic, and social aims. Nationalism based on worship of the Shah and Iran's non-Islamic history, centralized control, and Westernization of the economic system and social life shaped the regime's attitudes toward education. In the words of a former Minister of Education, the system of education under Reza Khan had the following aims: (l) to create in the minds of the people a living consciousness of the past by showing the great achievements of the race . . . (2) to train boys and girls to become good citizens of modern Persia . . . (5) in the university the gifted youth must 32Joseph Szyliowicz, Midglg_£§§t, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press LTD., 1973, p. 245. 112 be trained for leadership and service in the state. They must be given a vision of Persia's place, past and present in the world, with the ideas of leading the country in culture, science, technology! business, statesmanship, and government. Upon his ascension to the throne, Reza Khan sought to centralize the administration of all national activities. This centralization extended to the educational system. By 1941, the Ministry of Education had absolute control over (all educational establishments including higher education institutions. This control ranged from personnel recruitment to examinations. The Ministry was also responsible for the establishment and expansion of educational institutions. Among all phases cf education, higher education received more attention. Faced with lack of trained professional cadres to carry out his administrative, military, and economic reforms and policies, Reza Khan had to expand the system of higher education. Therefore, he ordered the establishment of the country's first university and authorized the Ministry of Education to send 100 students abroad every year. Moreover, various professional schools and colleges were established by a number of ministries and governmental organizations. The Ministry of 33Issa Khan Sadiq, Sygtgm, New York, Columbia University Press, 1931, p. 85. 113 War, for example, founded a war college in.1ahran. The National Bank of Iran established the Institute of Banking.34 The Ministries of Health and Agriculture founded colleges of medicine and veterinary science (these two colleges were later incorporated into the University of Tehran). The creation of the University of Tehran was a more significant event in Iranian higher education. The establishment of this university was in part a result of Reza Khan's efforts to centralize the administration of all national activities. Prior to foundation of the university, a number of higher education institutions functioned independently of one another. Some of these institutions, namely Colleges of Law, Art and Science, Teacher's Training, Medicine, Theology, and Fine Arts were put under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In 1934, these institutions were combined and expanded to form Iran's first secular and western-style university, namely'the University of Tehran. In its Westernization efforts, Reza Khan's regime sought Western assistance for the expansion of higher education. Close relations with European countries afforded 34Reza A. Arasteh, W Iran 1859-1253' Leiden, Netherlands, E.S. Brill, 1969, p. 36. 114 him means by which to obtain this assistance. From 1923 every agreement reached with foreign countries included provisions for a number of foreign advisors to help Iran in the field of education.35 The foreign educational advisors and experts who went to Iran were mostly from France, Germany, and England. French professors and advisors were employed by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture to work at colleges of Medicine and Veterinary Science. In 1925 the Ministry of Education hired a group of Germans who helped in the founding of the Higher Technical Institute of Teheran.36 Finally, a number of British oil experts were involved in the establishment of Abadan's Higher Institute of Petroleum Industry in 1938. The degree to which higher education was expanded is reflected in the number of students attending institutions of higher education: 1,645 in 1935 and 3,395 in 1944. Despite its considerable expansion, the system of higher education was not able to meet Iran's need for skilled manpower adequately. There is no detailed information available about the number of college graduates during Reza Khan's reign and the kind of jobs that they entered. However, Szyliowics and Arasteh's studies indicate that 3sBanani, p. 98. 36Arasteh, p. 59. 115 most, if not all, of the college graduates entered administrative jobs. The vastly extended state bureaucracy was badly in need of trained administrators. For this reason, even colleges of agriculture, veterinary medicine, and engineering were engaged in training desk experts for .government ministries and organizations. In order to implement his reforms, Reza Khan had to rely heavily on Western experts and technicians. In 1940, one Iranian educator observed: Our railroad operates under the direction of Swedish, Danish, Czech, Belgian, French, and other engineers. Almost all the architects who build new houses, new factories, and new schools are foreigners. In the secondary and higher schools courses are taught by French, German, and American teachers and professors. . . . These are still no competent Iranians to replace them. Further development of higher education was hampered by a combination of political and economic reasons. As a result of the agrarian nature of Iran's economic system and Reza Khan's unwillingness to alter that system, internal revenues and resources available to the government remained restricted. This reduced the government capacity to develop institutions and structures which were necessary for national development. Yet, a large amount of national income was used for maintenance and expansion of royal properties. According to one study, upon his overthrow in 37Cited in Szyliowicz, p. 24. 116 1941, Reza Khan had 3,000,000 acres of land as well as several royal hotels, palaces, casinos, and companies.38 Moreover, a large portion of the government budget was spent on the expansion and development of the armed forces. The military received an average of 64 percent per year of the government budget from 1925 to 1933, and 25 percent from 1934 to 1941. These figures are particularly distressing when compared with the small amounts spend on education. The average percentage of education in the total government budget was only 4 percent from 1925 to 1941.39 By 1941, according to one estimate, 80 percent of all Iranians still had no access to any education and the literacy rate was less than 10 percent.40 The illiteracy rate was especially high in the rural areas which comprised 80 to 90 percent of the population. In addition to economic shortcomings, rural education was neglected for another reason: any attempt to introduce educational reforms in the rural sector would have faced opposition from landowners and others who had an interest in maintaining the status quo in rural Iran. Thus education remained mainly an urban service reaching a small minority of Iranian children. 38Abrahinian, p. 137. 39Szyliowics, p. 251. 4°Ibid. 117 Higher education, despite the considerable attention it was given, also remained very restricted. It was only a small elitist system designed to provide Reza Khan with the skills that he needed in such a way as not to threaten his position. The students who were able to enter this system generally came from urban upper class families. In 1940, 35 percent of the Iranian college students studying at home or abroad were children of merchants, 30 percent were children of government officials, and 25 percent were children of landowners.‘11 These students were considered of no threat to the economic, social, and political status quo; and because they were mostly from influential families, they could easily enter government jobs upon their graduation. Thus, during Reza Khan's reign only a small and centralized modern system of higher education was developed. In many ways, this system resembled the one which had been established in the earlier decades: an elitist system geared to the training of loyal government personnel. . Ths_Eall_and_Lesasx_2f_Eeza_Khas Reza Khan's rule was terminated by outside military intervention during World war II. After the German invasion of the U.S.S.R., the Allies decided to send military supplies to the Soviet front through Iranian soil. Reza 411bid., p. 249. 118 Khan, who had followed a pro-German policy, opposed this decision. In spite of owing his initial rise to the British government, during the 1930's Reza Khan became increasingly pro-German and pro-Nazi. Katouzian describes him as 'a militarist, a racist and pan-Iranist" who enjoyed some of "the racist Nazi propaganda about the Aryan race"42 to which he thought Iranian people belonged. By 1941 he had developed close ties with German government and was relying more and more on German technical advisers in his military and civilian projects.43 In August 1941 the Allies sent a memorandum to his regime requesting the cancellation of all diplomatic relations with Germany and demanding that Iran facilitate the transport of Allied war materials.44 Reza Khan reportedly did not accept these demands. Consequently, SOviet forces from the northwest and British forces from the Persian Gulf invaded Iran. After only three days of resistance, the Imperial armed forces surrendered and the Adlied forces occupied the country. This humiliating defeat exposed the hollowness of the ”glorious“ Iranian army (the cost of whose existence had been born by the Iranian people) and led to the abdication of Reza Khan. 42Katouzian, p. 134. 431bid. 4"Donald Wilber, W, Seventh Edition, Princeton University Press, 1975, PP. 132-33. 119 RezaKhan's reign was one of stability maintained by force. He buiJJ: a strong centralized government, concentrated all decisions in his own hands, prohibited attempts to organize political parties, and used the legislature solely to approve his decrees. His reforms never penetrated Iranian society deeply and they only weakened traditional forces in many areas. Some writers have compared Reza Khan with his better known contemporary Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. Both men came to power after their- countries had experienced periods of political disintegration and chaos. Both Iran and Tmrkey had essentially feudalistic structures. Both rulers aimed at modernizing their nations. Both associated modernization with secularization and westernization. Reza Khan, however, differed from the Turkish leader in several aspects. Unlike Ataturk who attempted to make a complete break with the past, the Iranian monarch drew on the history of Iran as a source of inspiration. Ataturk created a new Thrkey with a new capital, and a new culture, a new political system, and a new ideology. Reza Khan, on the other hand, maintained the monarchy and never sought systematically to transform the way of life of his nation. The major accomplishments of Reza Khan's regime can be summarized as follows: creation of a modern army, centralization and expansion of the government 120 administration, secularization of the sooio-political system, building of the Trans-Iranian railway, and construction a few industrial enterprises. These reforms, however, were not able to bring about any major improvement for the country, for the task of restructuring the feudal society was left alone and Reza Khan refused to alter the agrarian relationship in Iran. Instead, by eliminating his political opponents and confiscating their property, the Shah made himself the biggest feudal lord in the country. Reza Khan's educational policies closely reflected the character of his regime. Only a small urban, secular educational system was established. This system was heavily centralized and elitist, and its aim was to produce graduates who were supportive of the social, political, and cultural status quo as defined by the ruler. The function of higher education, in particular, was to prepare the children of upper class families for governmental jobs. The system of higher education produced new groups of intellectuals and professionals who were initially supportive of the status quo. The opposition from these groups to Reza Khan's dictatorial rule gradually emerged during the 1930's. In 1930, dissident Iranian students in Europe, convening a congress in Cologne, demanded the release of political prisoners in Iran and called for the 121 establishment of a republic.45 In 1934, the medical students in Teheran organized a successful strike to remove the government appointed,dean of their college.46 In 1937, 20 college graduates were arrested for plotting against the Shah's life. In the same year, the police detained 53 men and accused them of forming a secret communist organization, and organizing strikes on campus and in a textile factory. These men, most of them university graduates or students, became known as the “Fifty-three“ and a few years later formed the nucleus of the Thdeh Party which played a major role in the Iranian political scene during the subsequent decades.47 The university students and graduates, however, were not yet a significant force being capable of threatening the status quo. A more significant and forceful threat to Reza Khan's regime came from religious leaders. Opposing Reza Khan's Westernization and secularization efforts, these leaders led a number of mass demonstrations against the Shah's policies. In July 1935, for instance, the clergy called on the people to denounce “The heretical innovations, the high consumer taxes, and prevalence of corruption in 45Abrahamian, p. 154. 46Ibid., p. 155. 47Ibid., p. 156. 122 high places."48 Thousands of people answered the clergy's call and joined together in a massive demonstration against the regime. This demonstration, as well as other internal threats to Reza Khan's rule, was crushed by military force. By the late 1930's, Reza Khan had lost his initial public support. Unlike Kemal Ataturk who conscientiously channelled the backing of the civilians into the Republican party, the monarch failed to institutionalize his power and ruled without the assistance of an organized political party. Yet, he banned all political organizations, limited the authority of the Majlis, ignored the provisions of the constitution, and ruled more dictatorially from one year to the next. Through using military force and suppressing internal opposition, he survived until the allied invasion of Iran in 1941. Upon Reza Khan's removal from power, a power vacuum was created and the country again faced political disintegration and chaos. H9rld_Har_Il_and_Affermdth stueatieu_and_murmeil The strategic location of Iran led once again to the foreign occupation of the country during World War II. In 1941, the allied armies marched into Iran and replaced Reza Khan with his 21 year old son Mohammad Reza Phalavi. During 48Ibid., p. 152. 123 the early years of his reign, the new Shah was not able to exert much authority over the country. The occupation of the country by foreign powers and the relaxation of tight government control created by the fall of Reza Khan's dictatorship severely limited the power of the new monarch. The Allies divided the country into two zones which they administered as they pleased. British troops gained control of the south, Soviet troops occupied the north, while only Tehran remained unoccupied.49 In 1942, the United States troops also came'to Iran and they were stationed along the supply routes from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet border. The occupation brought serious economic problems for the country. The Allies, who needed food and raw materials, effectively forced Iranian authorities to put the country's resources at their disposal.50 They also used the Trans- Iranian railroad to send supplies to the Soviet front and caused the disruption of internal trade. Moreover, they forced the departure of German industrial experts and technicians from Iran which led to a severe reduction‘in the country's industrial production. As a result, a great scarcity of goods appeared in the country and famine even ”Nikki R. Keddie, MW aigtg;y_gfi_ug§grn_1;an, Yale University Press, 1981, p. 113. soKatouzian, p. 142. 124 broke out in some areas. According to one estimate, prices increased by 1,000 percent from 1941 to 1944, both in consequence of the Allies expenditures in the country, and as a result of the rapid rise in international demand for primary goods.51 The cost of living index issued by the Iranian National Bank rose from 100 in 1940 to 757 in 1944.52 Under these circumstances, current expenditures absorbed most of the government's budget, leaving little for development activities. Meanwhile, the collapse of Reza Khan's dictatorship created an unprecedented atmosphere of political freedom and activity in the country. Many political prisoners were freed from jail, freedom of assembly was revived, and newspapers and books could be published without government censorship. This situation led to the establishment of various political parties and organizations. The most important of these were the Tudeh Party and the National Frontu The former was a pro-Soviet Union Marxist organization which advocated radical social and economic changes and which quickly gained a large following among intellectuals. The National Front was headed by Dr. Mossaddegh who was known for his early opposition to Reza 5lrbid., p. 143. 52Keddie, p. 116. 125 Khan and to foreign control. It was formed by a coalition of diverse political parties including: the Iran Party, the Toiler's Party, the Society of Muslim warriors, the National Party of Iran, and the Pan-Iranist Party.53 The program of the National Front called for '. . . the establishment of social justice and implementation of constitutional laws, free elections and free expressions of political opinion, and the improvement of economic conditions."54 The Front represented two major groups: the traditional middle class formed of the bazaar merchants and clerics, and the modern middle class formed of intellectuals, professionals, and salaried personnel. Moreover, the clergy whose political role had been largely limited by Reza Khan, became active again and called for a return to the fundamental principles of the Islamic faith. A.1eading figure of the clergy was Ayatollah Kashani who had a long history of political activity against Pahlavi Dynasty. He later joined the National Front and played a major role in mobilizing the traditional middle class against the Shah's regime. The industrial working class, though small, also became increasingly active during and after the war. The economic crisis and high unemployment forced the workers to form 53Abrahamian, p. 253. 54Ibid. 126 various unions. Most of these unions joined the Tudah Party and supported its ideas of fundamental change in the country's social and economic structure. Thus, during the war period, Iran was faced with severe economic and political problems. Nikki Keddie wrote: The war period in Iran was one of ferment. It saw a growth of economic problems: inflation, famine, deterioration of the modern sector, and disruption of government finances. . . 7. Acute economic and social problems led to a growth of political organizations. Competing groups and ideologies vied for the allegiance of Iranians as never before. And, to compound internal rivalries, foreign powers showed a strong interest in Iran, with concern to gontrol her politics and her natural resources.5 Under these circumstances, the Iranian political system was not able to function properly. The government machinery had virtually stopped, and it was not able to implement any social, economic, or educational programs. Azarbaxian_nerisius The problems of foreign intervention and internal political struggles continued after World War II; The Azarbayjan autonomous movement of 1945-46 and the Soviet Union and U.S. involvement in the crisis were the most important political events in the immediate postwar years. The Allies had promised non-intervention in Iran's internal affairs and total and immediate withdrawal at the 55xeddie, pp. 113-19. 127 end of the war. The Treaty of Alliance signed In January 1941 by Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran had provided that Allied forces would be withdrawn from Iran within six months after the end of the war with Germany. This promise was confirmed in December 1943 at the Tehran Conference, when the Allies issued a declaration pledging both to assist Iran economically and to support its independence.56 However, in March 1946, the month when all foreign troops were to leave the country, there was not any sign of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The American and British troops had gone by February, but additional strength for the Soviets entered in March. In December 1945, the Soviet Union had helped the formation of an autonomous republic in the northwestern Province of Azarbayjan. The Soviets extended their military and political support to that government and the Red Army prevented the troops sent by the central government from entering the province.57 The people of Azarbayjan had a long history of resentment against the central government for several reasons. First they had no influence in decisions “Tarts Y. Ismaeel, WW, Syracuse University Press, 1974, p. 14. 57George Lenezowski, WW ' ° - , Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 288. 128 concerning their province, for the provincial authorities were chosen by the central government and often came from other parts of the country. They paid more taxes than,any other province without receiving commensurate benefits.58 Moreover, their Turki language was not taught or permitted for official business. After the fall of' Reza Khan, the Azarbayjanis demanded greater justice. The leftist forces led by the Democratic Party which was previously the local branch of the Tudeh Party, quickly mobilized the people and established the Autonomous Republic of Azarbayjan. The new government proceeded to carry out its plans, including a land distribution program, nationalization of all banks in the province, and the replacement of the Persian language with Turki as the official language of Azarbayjan. Similar events occurred in the Iranian Kurdish territory, much of which is in Western Azarbayjan and was occupied by the Soviet Union. The Kurds are divided mainly among Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, and have strong nationalist sentiments. The Iranian Kurds resented the centralizing policies of the government and wanted provincial autonomy. In December 1945, following a popular uprising, the People's Republic of Kurdistan was established. Although the 58Keddie, p. 119. 129 leadership of this republic was non-communist, it was supported by the Soviet Union.59 The Soviet Union supported the Azarbayjan and Kurdish uprisings for a combination of political and geopolitical reasons. :First, the Soviets wanted to strengthen the leftist forces of Iran against the central government. Also, the establishment of pro-Soviet governments in Azarbayjan and Kurdistan was in line with their goal of gaining access to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, in the struggle between East and west after the war, the Soviets had an eye on such countries as Turkey, Greece, and Iran to influence them as a way of encountering the western influence in the areas close to ‘the Soviet borders. In carrying out her policies in Iran, the Soviet Union faced the other superpower, the United States. When in January 1946, Iran accused the Soviet Union in the United Nations of interfering in its internal affairs, the United States gave strong diplomatic support to the Shah's government and threatened to use American troops to force the Soviet Union's evacuation of its forces from the country. Consequently, the Soviets began to withdraw their troops from Northern Iran in March 1946.60 Simultaneously, the 591bid., p. 120. 60Lenczowski, p. 299. 130 Iranian army, led by the Shah began to move into the evacuated areas and the Autonomous Republic of Azarbayjan collapsed, as did the Kurdish People's Republic. The Azarbayjan crisis had significant impact on the foreign relations and domestic politics of Iran. The collapse of the autonomous republics marked the end of direct Soviet involvement in Iran's internal affairs._ The Soviet influence was further limited when the Shah's government banned the Tudeh Party in 1949. Meanwhile, the crisis marked the beginning of close military and economic ties between the Shah's regime and the United States Government. In June 1946, the United States granted a military credit of $25 million to Iran and agreed to send a military mission to improve the Iranian army.“- When the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 made the United States responsible for military and economic advice and assistance to Greece and Turkey, Iran was incorporated into the new Greece, Turkey, and Iran division of the State Department.62 Moreover, the reoccupation of Azarbayjan by the central government was an important psychological advantage for the Shah. For the first time since he came to the throne, now he was able to claim control over the whole country and 61Peter Avery, Mgg§;n_jrgn, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1965, p. 401. 62Ibid., p. 400. 131 began to exert more influence in the domestic politics. By the spring of 1949, the Shah was powerful enough to convene a Constitutional Assembly to enhance his position. The assembly amended the 1906 Constitution to provide for the creation of an upper house (Senate), half of whose numbers were to be nominated by the Shah. A second amendment granted the Shah the power to dissolve the two houses of Parliament at any time.63 Furthermore, he succeeded in having a bill passed through the parliament which formally transferred Reza Khan's royal properties to himself.64 Thus, the Shah's regime survived occupation and internal uprisings and began to consolidate his rule. 22§£!i£_8§£2£m§ By the late 1940's, Mohammad Reza Shah's rule seemed well-established. Even though it was too early to say that the Pahlavi Dynasty's position had been fully restored, but the new Pahlavi monarch had survived a most serious crisis and was gradually gaining more political control. It was not until after the Shah had secured his position that his regime could turn its attention to economic and social problems. 63Abrahamian, p. 250. 64Katouzian, p. 158. 132 Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah had as his first concern the consolidation of power, and he gave priority to strengthening the armed forces. With aid from the United States, he rebuilt the demoralized military establishment which had collapsed together with other institutions of Reza Khan's regime. The United States military missions went to Iran to advise the Iranian army and gendarmerie. A mission headed by General Schwarzkopt was particularly valuable in reorganizing these two branches and in establishing the regime's control in Azarbayjan and other provinces.65 The United States also helped to restore the financial stability of the regime. Arthur Millspaugh, who had been in Iran during Reza Khan's period, was once again sent to Tehran to serve as “administrator general of finances,“ and to bring ‘order into finances and the troubled economic situation.66 A relatively simple stable political and financial situation allowed the central government to undertake some social and economic reforms. In 1948 the government created a committee called the High Plan Commission to make a survey of the country's conditions and come up with a development program. In August 1948, the commission submitted its.first report to the Majlis stating that: 65Lenczowski, pp. 113-14. 66Keddie, p. 116. See also Arthur Chester Millspaugh, W, New York, Da Capo Press, 1976. 133 It is not concealed from anybody that the economy of the country is passing these days through a critical phase which has resulted in the weakening of the productive power of the country, increase of the cost of living, poverty and unemployment. The extent of this crisis is such that individual means and power, private initiative and undertakings, and even sporadic measures of the Government agencies will not be able to overcome it. The Commission blamed world war II and foreign occupation for this economic crisis. The war had “undone much of the pre-war years industrialization“ and foreign occupation “had weakened the central government's control.“ It was, therefore, necessary for the government to attempt to redress the situation by launching a reconstruction effort. This was to be done by: (1) developing a seven-year plan designed to guide the government specifically in its expenditure allocations, and (2) setting up a Plan and Budget Organization to oversee and control these expenditures according to the predefined national objectives.68 This led to the creation of Iran's first national development plan. The United States, which was very influential in stabilizing the Shah's regime, played a considerable role in 67xeddie, p. 115. 68Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil, ' ' - , Boulder Westview Press, 1983, p. 21. 134 developing the first plan. With the advice and help of the State Department, the American engineering firm Morrison- Knudson Construction Company and the United States Overseas Consultants were chosen to assist Iran in developing and administering the Plan.69 By September 1949, a Seven Year Plan (1949-1956) was drafted and the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) was set up to implement it. The Plan allocated 28- percent of its proposed expenditures to agriculture, 30 percent to transport and communication, 20 percent to industries and mines, and 22 percent to social services. 'The total expenditures were estimated to reach 26.3 billion rials, 69 percent of which was to come from oil revenues and foreign loans and 31 percent from taxes.70 However, the oil nationalization movement of 1951-53 changed ’the whole plan. Production of Iranian oil ceased for three years, the government failed to raise foreign loans, and the planning machinery was cut off. Although the First National Development Plan came to a sudden stop in 1951, it was not a complete failure. Industrial rehabilitation was one of the achievements of the Plan. By 1951, most of the industries established during the pre-war years had been renovated. Yet the setting up of 69xeddie, pp. 130-131. 7oRazavi, p. 21. 135 a planning machinery was the moSt significant result of the First Plan. The PBO was turned into a permanent and extensive body, and prepared and executed four development plans during'the subsequent decades. Although the First Plan's emphasis was on industry and agriculture, other areas of national activity also received the government's attention. The system of education was one of the areas which required much attention, since demand for education had accelerated greatly after the war. Two main factors contributed to this acceleration: (l) the expansion of urban centers in the 1930's and during the war, and (2) the expansion of intellectual activities and political freedom after the fall of Reza Khan. The growth of the army and the bureaucracy in the 1930's had increased the size of ,Iranian cities. Also, Reza Khan's Westernization policies which focused ooly on urban areas and ignored the countryside, led to further expansion of urban centers. During the war, more rural people moved into the cities to seek employment in the Allies' diverse activities. When Reza Khan's dictatorial regime collapsed, the major cities became centers of intellectual activities. The political parties and mass media encouraged people to demand more education for their children. To meet this demand, beginning in 1948, the Ministry of Education sought to expand educational institutions at all 136 levels. At the primary level student enrollments soared from 457,230 in 1941 to 331,930 in 1951.71 At the secondary level, enrollments increased at an even faster rate, rising from 28,190 in 1941 to 83,500 in 1951.( In order to accommodate the flood of students, the Ministry strained existing facilities, and introduced a half-day program in the major cities.72 (A similar expansion occurred at the higher level. Between 1948 and 1951, four new universities in four provincial centers were established. Ironically, the first institution of higher education in a decade was created in 1948, in Tabriz, the provincial center of Azarbayjan. Some primary preparations for the creation of the University of Tabriz had been undertaken by the Autonomous Republic of Azarbayjan before its collapse. In addition to this university, three more universities were established in Esfahan, Mashhad, and Shiraz. The number of higher education students rose from 3,395 in 1944 to 7,502 in 1951.73 71Reza A. Arasteh, WWW - , Leiden, Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1969, pp. 57-580 72$zy1iowicz, p. 389. 731bid. 137 Qil_Nati9nalizati9n_uexeme0t_and_lts_uut22mes 011W Oil constitutes the single mOst important economic resource of Iran. Prior to the 1951 oil nationalization, Iran's oil industry was under the control of a British owned company which paid the Iranian government a rather small share of the profits. The post-war economic crisis and increased political awareness among Iranians led to a nation-wide movement for oil nationalization. The leader of this movement was Dr. Mossaddegh, the head of the National Front. The nationalization of oil was a major event in Iran's political, economic, and social life. The history of Iran's oil industry began in the early 20th century, when the Qajar Dynasty was still in power and Britain had large influence in the south. In 1901, a British subject, William Knox D'Arcy was granted a concession for oil exploration in Iran.74 The concession was to last for 60 years and Iran was to receive only 16 percent of the net profits. In 1908 oil was discovered in the southwest. In 1909 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was established and bought D'Arcy's concession. In 1912 the British government bought a majority of shares in the AIOC 74xeddie, p. 78. 138 to ensure a continuous oil supply for its navy.75 In 1933, the British won an extension of their concessions to 1993 instead of 1961.76 The AIOC had complete control over the exploration and marketing of Iranian oil. The company owned and operated the oil fields, transportation networks, and refineries. It determined export destinations, quantities, and prices. Therefore, Iran's income from its valuable natural resource was not determined by its own policies and economic needs, but by the British managers of the AIOC. According to a document prepared for the Majlis and noted by Katouzian,77 the revenues received by the Iranian government were even less than 16 percent of the net profits which had been promised under the 1903 concession. According to the document, between 1933 and 1949 the AIOC's net profit was 895 million pound sterling. During the same period, the company paid Iran 105 million pounds which was only 11.9 percent of the profits. This was interestingly less than 19.5 percent in taxes which the AIOC paid to the British 75Robert B. Stobaugh, "The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy. 1925—1975," In Iran_nnder_the_£ahlaxia. Edited by George Lenczowski, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 202. 761bid., p. 206. 77Katouzian, p. 183. 139 government, which itself had the majority of shares in the company. . The British control over Iranian Oil had been a source of public protest since the AIOC was formed. The public opposition increased especially during the 1940's and turned into a political movement with significant implications for the country's domestic politics and foreign relations. This movement was led by the national Front's head, Dr. Mohammad Mossaddegh. He believed that as long as any foreign company had an oil concession in Iran, the country's sovereignty would be in doubt, and its domestic and foreign policies would be influenced by outside forces. Mossaddegh, therefore, argued that if Iran wanted to achieve real independence, it had to get rid of the British controlled AIOC and nationalize its oil industry. Hossaddegh's call for oil nationalization attracted public opinion throughout the country. In 1950, the parliamentary elections centered around oil, the national Front gained a big majority in the Majlis and Mossaddegh became the chairman of the Majlis Oil Committee.78 In March 1951 the parliament approved the Oil Nationalization Act and passed a bill providing for the formation of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to replace the AIOC. Meanwhile, 78Avery, p. 419. 140 public support and demonstrations for Mossaddegh and his oil policies were so strOng that the Shah was forced to appoint him as Prime Minister.79 Prime Minister Mossaddegh had three main objectives: (1) to implement the Oil Nationalization Act and to ensure necessary financial resources for Iran's economic and social- development; (2) to reduce the royal power and to establish a democratic political system; and (3) to strengthen Iran's independence and to follow a foreign policy of non- alignment. Mossaddegh failed to achieve his first goal. An international boycott of Iranian oil called by Britain was primarily responsible for this failure. The British opposed the Iranian decision of nationalization of the AIOC, and they referred the dispute to the International Court at the Hague. In July 1952, the court ruled it had no jurisdiction over the dispute, implying “that the matter came under Iranian law, and that Iran had the right to nationalize"80 the AIOC. The British, however, continued their resistance against nationalization and called for a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil. The boycott effectively stopped Iran's oil export, and cut off oil revenues from the country. 79Keddie, p. 133. 8°Ibid., p. 134. 141 In order to achieve his second goal, Mossaddegh began to limit the royal power. He believed in the constitutional monarchy and his famous slogan was, ”The Shah Must Reign, The Nation Must Rule.“ In his view, the concentration of power in the Shah could weaken the society and corrupt the government. Mossaddegh started his attack on royal power by instructing his government to tax royal properties which had been exempt from normal taxation.81 Then he assumed the post of Minister of War (this minister had always been selected by the Shah), discharged a number of older officers originally recruited by Reza Khan and loyal to his son, reduced the military budget, and replaced the Minister of the Imperial Court with a person loyal to him.82 Meanwhile, he introduced a number of political reforms which allowed open activities by all opposition groups from right to left. Consequently, the Marxist Tudeh Party, who had a long record of opposition to the Shah and to the British interests in Iran, and had close ties with the Soviet Union, became very active, and gained large popularity.83 Massaddegh's third goal was never realized, because his government was overthrown by a United States backed coup alAvery, p. 435. ”Donald N. wnber. WW. seventh Edition, Princeton University Press, 1975. PP. 144-5. 83Keddie, p. 137. 142 d'etat which led to Iran's alignment with the West. A combination of internal and external factors cOntributed to the failure of Mossaddegh's government. By 1953 the Prime Minister had lost much of his popularity, due to severe economic problems facing the country. The boycott of Iranian oil by major international oil companies and the government loss of oil revenues were largely responsible for this economic hardship. The boycott brought the First Development Plan to a sudden stop and most of the economic and social programs were suspended. Moreover, decline in ‘the government revenues lowered imports, raised inflation, and increased unemployment. Katouzian noted that: The oil revenues, both as the main.source of government finance and as the main source of foreign exchange, had vanished; the economy was in decline, and this reduced other government revenues even further; the government was so poor that it had to postpone salary payments to the state bureaucracy, borrow from the public, and print paper money; it simply lacked the finance which it needed for running the daily affairs of the country, git alone for meeting the cost of any major reform. Mossaddegh hoped to receive financial support from the United States government and he went to Washington trying to convince the Americans that a loan was urgently needed if a pro-Soviet government was not to come to power in Iran. The Truman administration and later the Eisenhower 84Katouzian, p. 180. 143 administration rejected his urgent request on the grounds that Iran should settle the oil dispute with Britain before expecting American aid.85 Meanwhile, Mossaddegh faced a split within his coalition government. The major split was between the secular parties and the religious groups which had formed the National Front. The quarrel was over Mossaddegh's permission to the Marxist Tudeh Party to expand its activities, and over his appeal to the United States for financial support.86 The quarrel ended in the defections from the coalition and weakened the Prime Minister's ability to deal with the political and economic problems. Thus, during the years of the oil nationalization movement and Massaddegh's primiership, economic crisis and political instability in Iran intensified, and the government was prevented from carrying out its declared economic, social, and political reforms. In 1953 when Mossaddegh's position had weakened due to economic hardship and political divisions among his supporters, a military coup overthrew Mossaddegh's government and brought a United States supported military regime to power. 85Keddie, p. 135. 86Hossein Bashiriyeh. The_State_and_nezglutien_in_lran. London, Croom Helm, Ltd., 1984, p. 18. 144 The_1251_C2u2_QLstatl_the_nuited_atate§_321ex and the Shah's N3! 331g To summarize the events which led to the 1953 coup d'etat it may be noted that by August 1953, the Shah had lost much of his power, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party had enhanced its position, and the United States had become increasingly hostile towards Mossaddegh's government. On August 13 the Shah issued two imperial decrees: one dismissed Mossaddegh and the other named General Zahedi as Prime Minister.87 Mossaddegh, relying on the public support, refused to be dismissed and remained in office. Consequently, the Shah left the country for Baghdad and later Rome.88 The news of the Shah's departure resulted in "uncontrolled euphoria, jubilant riotings, and public demand for the abolition of the monarchy."89 Mossaddegh's weakened government was not able to stabilize the situation and mobilize the public against a coup d'etat which was in formation. On August 19, following a number of meetings between Iranian royalists led by Zahedi and United States officials led by Allen Dulless, Chief of the United States Central Intelligence Service, a United States backed 87Wilber, p. 146. 88Ibid., p. 147. 89Katouzian, p. 178. 145 military coup ousted Mossaddegh and brought back the Shah.90 The new government headed by General Zahedi, declared martial law and arrested Mossaddegh and other leaders of the National Front. The United States' participation in the overthrow of Mossaddegh's government was due to a number of economic and political factors. Since the beginning of the oil nationalization movement, the United States worried that the oil crisis might affect the economies of the Western Alliance and endanger the Marshal Plan, and feared that the Soviet Union might expand its influence in the country. According to Ramazani, the principle consideration beyond the United States' concerns were: (1) that the Anglo-Iranian controversy might lead to the stoppage of the flow of oil to Western European Allies of the U.S.; (2) that the example of Iranian nationalization might have an adverse effect upon the U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf area: (3) that the British departure from the south of Iran would mean the diminution of western influence in the area; and (4) that a breakdown of the Iranian economy in the face of turbulent domestic policies, particularly resulting from 9°Don Peretz, Thg_nigglg_£§§;_12ggy, New York, Rinehart and Winston, 1978, p. 47. For more information on the U.S. role in the coup, see Kermit Roosevelt, - W. New York. Mccraw-Hill Book Company, 1979. See also Allen W; Dulless, Thg_g;3fi;_gfi Intelligence, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, p. 224. 146 increasing Tudeh infiience might drive Iran to a Communist revolution. - Following his restoration, the Shah became determined to prevent any challenge to his rule. .This meant emulating his father in using force to suppress his opponents. It also meant ignoring the constitutional provisions which provided for freedom of speech and the press and free elections. When the 1954 parliamentary elections approached the Shah had suppressed all parties who had participated in the 1951-53 movement, including the National Front, the Tudeh Party and the religious organizations. The parliamentary elections were firmly controlled to ensure that the Majlis was subservient to the Shah.92 The candidates were nominated by the government and were mostly landlords, retired military officers, or politicians affiliated with the Imperial Court. The elected deputies had to be approved by the Shah before assuming their duties. Furthermore, the regime established an effective internal security service known by the acronym SAVAK in 1957. The SAVAK gradually expanded its networks to check on anyone recruited into the universities, the civil services, and 91Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Iran and the United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship,“ Th§_fl1gg1g_£g§; {93:331, vol. 30, 1976. p. 326. 92Keddie, p. 140. 147 industrial plants.93 Numerous intelligence'agents and informants were hired by the SAVAK and people became increasingly hesitant to discuss politics at all. Thus the Shah rebuilt the Pahlavi's dictatorial system and, like his father, concentrated all decisions in his hands. The United States played an important role in reestablishing and stabilizing the Shah's regime. Soon after the 1953 coup on September 3 the Eisenhower administration agreed to again start technical and economic assistance to the Iranian government. Two days later the administration granted 45 nullion dollars emergency aid to Iran '. . . in order to restore a measure of stability and economic development."94 Between 1953 and 1963, the regime received a total of 200 million dollars in loans, 850 million dollars in economic and technical assistance, and 500 million dollars worth of military aid from the United States.95 Also, American financial and economic advisors became increasingly involved in directing Iran's economic development plans and American investment in the country began to increase rapidly. By 1962 American investment amounted to 230 million dollars which was 54 percent of all 93Abrahamian, p. 420. 94Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Egigign 291192. 125]- 1213, Richmond, University Press of Virginia, 1975, p. 261. 95Abrahamian, p. 420. 148 foreign investment in Iran.96 Moreover, in 1957 the United States assisted the Shah's regime in establishing the SAVAK, and in 1959 the United States concluded a bilateral military treaty with the regime which made the United States committed to the defense of Iran. Meanwhile, with United States' involvement, the dispute over Iran's oil was settled. One may recall that following the nationalization of oil by Mossaddegh's government, Western oil companies boycotted Iranian oil, and that ultimately led to the defeat of the oil nationalization movement. Following the overthrow of Mossaddegh, the United States Secretary of State John Dulless asked Herbert Hoover Jr., famous for his work in formulating the Venezuelan Petroleum Law of 1943, to try to work out a formula which would help the settlement of the Iranian oil crisis. After a series of discussions in Tehran with the Shah's government and in London with the British Government, and the AIOC (renamed British petroleum), Hoover expressed the idea of an oil consortium. Finally, in April 1954 an international oil consortium was established and began negotiations with the Shah's government. The consortium included: British petroleum, 40%: Royal Dutch Shell, 14%: Compagnie Francaise des Pettrolles, 6%: and 8% each to Standard Oil of New gsBashiriyeh, p. 28. 149 Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Texas Oil Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, and Secony-Mobil.97 The consortium signed an agreement with the Shah's regime in August 1954. The agreement was passed by the Majlis with no opposition and came to force in October 1954. According to the agreement, the consortium was to produce and market Iranian oil for 25 years, and pay 50 percent of the net profits to the Iranian government.98 This was certainly less than what Mossaddegh had aimed for, because all major decisions, such as production level and the sale price of oil remained in the hands of the international consortium. Nevertheless, looking back to the attitudes of the AIOC before 1951, it is hard to believe that the Iranian share of the profit could have increased to 50 percent without Mossaddegh and the 1951-53 popular movement. Soon Iran's oil began to regain its share in the world market and the government oil revenues increased rapidly from 7.4 million dollars in 1954 to 32 million in 1955, 102 million in 1960, and 186 million in 1965.99 97Geor9e Lenczowski. Qi1_and_Stats_in_&he_niddle_fiaat. New York, Cornell University Press, 1960, p. 10. 98$tobaugh, p. 215. 998°88ein Amirdadeghi. Tnsntieth_9enturz_lran. New York, Holms and Meier, 1977, p. 279. 150 Thus, the overthrow of the Massaddegh's nationalist government by a United States supported coup changed Iran's political and economic situation in three basic ways. First, the Shah consolidated his power and his actions became more dictatorial. Second, the United States' interests and influence in Iran expanded in all political and economic dimensions. Third, the oil dispute between Iran and Western oil companies was settled and the government's oil revenues increased sharply. The impact of these developments on Iranian education is the subject of discussion in the following sections. WWW Following the 1953 military coup, it may be recalled, the United States provided the Shah's government with a significant amount of military, economic and technical assistance, and the American influence in Iran grew rapidly. Soon there was hardly a government ministry or organization with did not enjoy American advisory and financial assistance. The Ministry of Education was no exception, as Szyliowicz described: Numerous advisors permeated the Ministry of Education and the impact of American ideas was deeply felt in all aspects of the educational process. Many American universities accepted contracts to help develop specific projects in teacher training (Brigham Young University), agricultural education (Utah State), public administration (University of Southern 151 California). Private foundations, such as the giezlrdszjfis Foundation, were also active in many Most of the United States educational assistance was under the Point Four Program. This program, inaugurated by the Truman administration in 1950, was aimed at “providing technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.I101 Point Four was based on the Truman Doctrine that unless aid was extended to poor countries, poverty and despair in these countries could provide a fertile field for the spread of socialism and Soviet influence. During the Cold War the Point Four Program became an important means of the United States foreign policy towards underdeveloped countries, and by 1960, the program was working in 35 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The first Point Four agreement , between the United States and Iran was signed in October 1950, and was the first Point Four agreement with any country. The agreement provided for American advisory for a 'rural improvement program in Iran."102 During Mossaddegh's primiership, when the United States stopped sending economic 100Szyliowicz, p. 392. 101Clarence Hendershot, 't' c d o . ' New York, Vantage Press, 1975, p. 5. 102Carl K. Eicher, - ' ‘ ' . Washington D.C., Overseas Liaison Committee, American Council on Education, 1976, p. 580 ' 152 aid to Iran, the Point Four agreement was not suspended. In 1953 the Program Agreement for Education was signed between the Ministry of Education and the United States Point Four Administration. This agreement formed the foundation for all subsequent Point Four education activities in Iran. The objectives of the agreement were: 1. To facilitate the development of education and related fields in Iran through cooperative action on the part of the Administration and the Ministry: 2. To stimulate and increase the interchange between the two countries of knowledge, skills, and techniques in the field of education: 3. To further otherr&fe the overall economic development of Iran. Following this agreement, contracts were signed with the University of Utah, 'Utah’State Agricultural College (Utah State University), and Brigham Young University, under which these institutions undertook to provide personnel in the fields of health, agriculture, and education respectively.104 From 1953 to 1960, Brigham Young University sent four groups of educators to Iran under four separate contracts. Their primary areas of concentration were primary education, secondary education, and teacher training. They established demonstration schools in cities, 103Hendershot, p. 20. 104Eicher, p. 59. 153 trained a number of teachers, and got involved in curricula development.105 Utah State University participated in the field of agriculture and agricultural training, and became involved in the developing of Karaj Agricultural College, from 1953 to 1963.106 Another program which evolved under Point Four was the establishment of a public administration institute in Tehran. According to Hendershot, Chief of the Education Division of the United States Overseas Mission, Iran, from 1961 to 1964, "the USOM decided that essential for economic development was the development of a professional civil service."107 In 1954 an agreement was signed between the USOM and the University of Tehran for the creation of the Institute of Administrative Affairs in the university. Initially, the institute was to give a one year course leading to the master's degree, and later was to have a doctoral program. The institute was to be supported by funds from the United States and by technical assistance from the University of Southern California. The USOM entered into 'a contract with the USC in an amount not to exceed $714,329 for the provision of the technical losfiendershot, pp. 21-26. 1°6Eicher, p. 60. 107Hendershot, p. 210. 154 assistance."108 The contract was to continue from 1954 to 1960, and the USC's responsibilities were to: 1. 2. Recruit and employ, bring to and maintain in Iran staff of ten professional and technical personnel qualified to teach at the undergraduate and post- graduate level, and to do research and engage in consulting and training activities in public and business administration. Provide short-term staff members and consultants in fields to be agreed upon by the contractor and the university: Provide for the procurement of such books, equipment; materials and supplies as may 33 required for support and not available in Iran.1 A committee for USC faculty began to draft plans for the institute. In developing their plans, USC established the following goals: 1. The provision of services to ndnistries and agencies in the field of education, training, research and publications, and consulting assistance in the science of organization, administration, and management: The development of a reservoir of trained personnel within the ministries and agencies, as well as within the framework of the university, which i 1 turn, will provide and expand these direct services on a continuing basis. The development of a corps of collegiate-level personnel equipped to assume the work of the institute and continue it under university sponsorship: The development of a general awareness of the need for and value of such management skills, 1°31bid., p. 210. 1°9Ibid., p. 213. 155 techniques, education, training, and service which the Institute is prepared to offer.' This means the creation of a new field of knowledge and Persian literature in administration and managemeflB, as well as a broad applied research program. ' Over the seven years of the USC-Institute relationship, the above goals were achieved. By 1960, the institute was under the control of the University of Tehran, and USC's role was advisory. Thirty Iranians had by then received training abroad, several through the Ph.D. level. Some of them returned to staff the institute, while others took up responsible positions in the government. A quarterly journal and a monthly newsletter were started, and a personnel management and research center was established as were programs of inservice training.111 The Point Four technical assistance to higher education in Iran continued until the mid-1960's, and included these additional activities: (1) advising the University of Tehran in establishing a College of Social Sciences and a College of Education: (2) the developing of a Nursing College in Mashhad: (3) the developing of a hospital in Shiraz which became a part of the University of Shiraz; and (4) the reorganization and developing of the Military 1101616., pp. 214-215. 111Eicher, p. 61. 156 University with help from the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group.112 In his evaluation of the Point Four Program in Iran, Hendershot, head of USOM in Iran, noted: Keeping in mind that the Point Four contribution was "additive" and giving full credits to the Iranian counterparts and others with whom the Americans worked, it can be noted that the joint American-Iranian efforts brought about highly significant changes in Iranian education, over the period of sixteen years. Every aspect of educatiori Selt the influence of the American educators. 1 Point Four 'was not the only program under which the United States participated in the development of higher education. The Fulbright-Hays program also provided for the United States-Iranian cooperation in this field. This American sponsored program came into existence after the United States Congress passed the Fulbright Act (1946), which provided for the exchange of students and teachers between the United States and other countries.114 The Fulbright-Hays program in Iran began with an agreement signed between the United States and the Shah's government in 1949 which continued through 1951. It was reactivated in 112This list is far from complete. For further information see Hendershot, pp. 221-273. 113Hendershot, p. 329. 114The_c2nsiae_§91umhia_flnsxslenedia. EditOIS: Judith S. Levey and Agnes Greenhall. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 312. 157 1956, and continued under a new agreement signed in 1963. The objective of the agreement was to ”promote further mutual understanding between the people of the United States of America and Iran by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talent through education contacts.'115 The budget for the program was to be paid one-third by Iranian universities, and two-thirds by the Uhited States Department of State. Over the years, the budget varied widely from a high of $500,000 to a low of $200,000. It was $270,000 in 1964-65.115 From 1949 to 1973, some 700 people including_475 Americans participated in the program. The majority of American participants were placed at the institutions located in Tehran particularly at the University of Tehran. They included: 102 post-doctoral researchers, 272 professors, 76 students, and 25 social workers, special teachers, and youth leaders.117 The Iranian participants in the program were mostly faculry members who were awarded Fulbright grants for study at the M.A. or Ph.D. level in the United States. Thus the Fulbright-Hays program expanded academic linkage between the two countries. It also provided Iranian colleges and 115Eicher, p. 67. 1151616., p. 65. 117Ibido' p. 66. 158 universities with a considerable number of American and American trained educators. .An additional program involving United States-Iranian cooperation in higher education was the creation of the first American-style University in Shiraz with the help from the University of Pennsylvania. In 1959 the Shah, on a visit to the United States, indicated his interests 'in establishing a modern American-type university in Iran."118 Following this indication, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) held some consultations with Iranian authorities and they decided that “President Harnwell of the University of Pennsylvania should be invited to Iran to survey the situation of existing universities with a view to selecting a site for the proposed American university.‘119 President Harnwell, with several of his colleagues, made a trip to Iran and completed a report, as requested, by 1960. Harnwell's team recommended that the university of Shiraz, which dated back to 1949 when a small medical school was established and which by 1959 had faculties of science, literature, and agriculture, be changed into a new institution. In 1962 the university was transformed into an 118Szyliowicz, p. 434. 119Eicher, P. 72. Also see: Gaylord Harnwell, ° ‘ ' , Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1962. 159 American-style university and was renamed Pahlavi Universityu The new university was an autonomous institution and had its Board of Trustees, a constitution, a strong central administration, a full-time faculty instead of one composed of parttimers, a central library, a semester system, a letter-grade and grade-point credit system, and a student government.120 It started with four Colleges including Engineering, Agriculture, Arts and Sciences, and Medicine. By 1974 it had a student population of 4890 and a faculty membership of 700. The university received technical assistance from the University of Pennsylvania for 16 years under two separate contracts signed in 1962 and 1965. These contracts covered all areas of academic as well as administrative activities. They also provided for fellowship support for Pahlavi faculty to study at Pennsylvania. Over the years, Pahlavi recruited some 400 Iranian and American faculty members who had graduated from Pennsylvania.121 The relationship between the University of Pennsylvania and Pahlavi University is significant for a number of reasons. First, it provided the first model for an American-type university in Iran. Adso, it served as a 120Hendershot, p. 250. 121Eicher, p. 73. 160 model of one of the first inter-university links between the two countries, and the first one which was in operatflm: after Point Four was completed. The Point Four Program, Fulbright-Hays Program, and the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania relationship affected Iranian higher education in two significant ways. First, the United States' influence on Iranian higher education grew rapidly. The impact of this increasing influence was to a degree which led to the Americanization of the university system in Iran during later years of the Shah's rule. Second, the United States financial, technical, and academic contribution helped the expansion of higher education in Iran. Beginning in the mid-1950's the government, relying on the United States assistance as well as its oil revenues, pushed hand at quantitative expansion of higher education. The following section will address this expansion during the second and third development plans. 2] . 3 H' l E! Ii Following the resumption of oil revenues in the mid- 1950's, Iran was again able to embark on the road of economic planning. In 1955 a Second Seven Year Development Plan was adapted. As noted earlier, the First Seven Year Plan failed to achieve most of its objectives because it came to an early end during the oil nationalizathm: 161 movement. The Second Plan (1955-1962) was drafted on the basis of oil revenue projections and promised loans from the United States and from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).122 The plan called for an expenditure of 70.2 billion rials ($933 million) to be allocated among the following sectors: transportation and communication, 40.48%: agriculture, 29.88%: industry, 11.19%: and social services, 18.45%.123 The Second Plan aimed at "increasing production, preparing public necessities within the country, developing agriculture and industries, improving and completing means of communication, improving public health, raising the educational and living standards of the people and improving living conditions."124 It, however, appeared that the Second Plan was not a comprehensive plan and lacked clear objectives. Razavi, a former official of the Plan and Budget Organization, noted: The Second Plan did not bear the marks of a comprehensive plan, much less the imprint of a unified approach. The plan did nothing about the private sector, nor did it even cover the total activities of the public sector. Essentially the jplan consisted of an investment program covering 122Razavi, p. 22. 123Jahangir Amuzegar and Ali Fakrat, W ' ' , Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 42. 12‘Razavi, p. 24. 162 that portion of public funds under the control of the P80. . . . The development of any plan usually implies objectives--ones that can be meaningfully quantified for purposes of action--but the Second Plan did not specify these objectives, let alone the picfisible conflicts that might exist between them. This lack of clear objectives caused serious conflicts among various ministries and government departments that wanted the PBO to give them money and let them implement projects. These conflicts often led to the Shah's interference and caused the resignation of Abulhasan Ebtehaj, the head of the P80. Ebtehaj was forced to resign in 1959 because he disagreed with "economically irrational royal interference with the plan."126 'The Shah was in favor of large and impressive projects which were highly capital intensive and had low employment generation. Most of the funds allocated to the agricultural sector were spent on three huge hydroelectric dams which were not completed during the plan period.127 Transportation and communication funds were spent on connecting Mashhad and Tabriz to the main Trans-Iranian railway system, a project which was mainly for travel services. Investment in industry included the building of a chemical-fertilizer plant in Shiraz, which 1251816. 126Keddie, p. 148. 127Katouzian, p. 204. 163 as late as 1972, was shut down because of lack of customers.128 The reason for this was the location of the plant which was far from agricultural areas of the country. Thus, the Second Plan did not provide for anything more than a series of ad hoc actions taken by the various ministries and guided by the Shah. I This lack of comprehensive planning extended to the educational system. Indeed, during the period of the Second Plan all levels of education continued to expand outside the framework of any comprehensive plan. To meet the demand for education which had been greatly increasing since World war II, the Ministry of Education established new public schools and encouraged the opening of private schools through subsidies.129 At the primary level, student enrollment increased from 831,900 in 1951 to 1,436,200 in 1961. Secondary enrollment rose even more rapidly from 83,500 to 295,900 during those years. The number of university students increased at the fastest rate of any level from 7502 to 22,849. Despite this expansion, the size of the educational system remained relatively small and the educational opportunities that existed were distributed unequally. Szyliowicz noted that: 1281bid. ' 12SSzyliowicz, p. 392. 164 Rural educational facilities were extremely sparse: only 17 percent of the villages, primarily those located near major towns and cities, possessed schools. One quarter of all schools were to be found in and around the capital. In more isolated areas such as Kurdistan and Baluchistan, only about 15 percent of the school age population was actually enrolled. Overall, in the early 1960's, 85 percent of urban children were attending 188001 as compared to 25 percent of rural children. The unequal distribution of educational opportunities ~was especially evidenced at the university level. In 1960 five existing provincial universities had a total of 4000 students, while the University of Tehran alone had a student population of 13,000.131 Moreover, the government had failed to relate the number of students in various fields with the manpower needs of the country. In 1961, 55 percent of all university students were studying social sciences and humanities and only 45 percent were enrolled in scientific fields of any kind.132 The government, like many other third world governments, had found it easier and less expensive to expand the size of the student body in the liberal arts than in the natural sciences. The flood of graduates, however, had to be absorbed and, as in the past, the size of the government bureaucracy was expanded to solve 13°Ihid., p. 393. 1316eorge 8. Baldwin. 2lannins_and_nexeleement_in_lran. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, p. 144. 132$zyliowicz, p. 405. 165 this problem. Between 1956 and 1963, the number of government employees rose from 152,200 to 231,150. During the same period the number of employees with higher education increased from 12,320 to 53,270, from 8 percent to more than 20 percent of the total.133 Not until the time of the Third Plan was any attempt made todeal with the issue of equal distribution of educational opportunities and to relate the output of educational institutions with the manpower needs of the country. The Third Development Plan (1962-1967) represented the first effort in the direction of comprehensive planning. The new plan took all sectors of the society into consideration and specified its basic objectives. The primary objective of the- plan was to raise gross national product (GNP) by a udnimum of six percent per year. Some secondary objectives were also specified, the most important being (1) to enlarge employment possibilities and (2) to achieve a more equal distribution of income.134 The Third Plan called for a development expenditure of 230 billion rials ($3.1 billion) which was to come from Oil revenues and 133James A. Bill, Thg_2211§19§_gfi_1;33, Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 64-65. 134Razavi, p. 26. 166 foreign borrowing. About 7.4 percent (18 billion rials) of this development expenditure was allocated to education.135 For the first time, the Third Plan included provisions for the system of education. These provisions were designed to improve the balance between rural and urban facilities, between vocational and academic training, and between the institutions of Tehran and provincial institutions. In terms of quantitative goals, priority was given to the expansion of primary education and 61 percent of the total funds allocated to education were devoted to this level. The plan was to provide educational facilities for 60 percent of children from seven to twelve years old by the end of the plan period. Altogether 2.25 million pupils were to be enrolled in primary schools by 1967. yThis goal, in fact, was exceeded by about 675,000 students.136 At the secondary level, the plan emphasized qualitative improvement by limiting further expansion to about 6 percent annually so that the number of secondary students would reach 400,000 by the end of the plan period. The plan was to improve secondary education so that its function no longer was solely to prepare students for entrance into a university. The authors of the Third Plan stated that: 1351h1d., p. 27. 136$zyliowicz, p. 398. 167 Secondary education will be regarded as a preparation for economic and social life as well as a preparation for university studies for the minority which can benefit from higher education. Secondary graduates will be ready to make a living at the end of their course, as well as having a general education. There is no plan, now or in the future, to allow into secondary schools all whose parents want ghem to go there no matter what their suitability.1 Thus the equality of secondary education was expected to be improved by limiting the expansion of this level. This expectation, however, proved to be unrealistic. The educational aspirations of the graduates of the expanded primary schools was greater than had been anticipated and these aspirations were translated into pressures for admission to the secondary schools. Student enrollment in secondary education expanded at a rate of growth triple that expected in the plan, as total number of students reached 658,000 by the end of the Third Man.”8 This had two consequences: First, the qualitative goals established by the plan were not achieved. The reason was that the establishment of vocational guidance programs could not be implemented because of the vast increase in the number of students. Second, the number of applicants for admission to higher education institutions increased at a faster rate 137George B. Baldwin, "Iran's Experience in Manpower Planning,“ in W, edited by F. Harbison and C. Myers, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965, pp. 161-162. 138Szyliowicz, p. 399. 168 than expected. The inability of secondary school graduates to find employment was the main cause of this fast increase. At the college level, the Third Plan aimed at the expansion of the number of students in the scientific and vocational fields. The plan did not call for the establishment of any new university, but it provided for the creation of several technical and vocational colleges, the most important being (1) Technology and Science College of Iran, (2) College of Agriculture and Husbandry, (3) School of Statistics and Information, and (4) Educational Radio and T.V. Institute. Moreover, during the plan period, efforts were made to expand student enrollment in scientific fields in the existing universities. As a result of these efforts, the balance between student enrollment in scientific fields and that of social sciences and humanities was improved. By 1966, 50 percent of the students enrolled in scientific and technical fields, an increase of 5 percent since 1961.139 The total number of students attending colleges and universities increased from 22,849 at the start of the plan period to 36,882 in 1967. This expansion, however, lagged behind the rapid increase at the secondary-level. Most of the secondary school graduates were not able to obtain employment and had one goal, admission to a university. .The 139Ibid., p. 405. 169 higher education institutions were able to absorb only a small fraction (about 11 percent in 1966) of these graduates.14o According to one study, each year two-thirds of all secondary school graduates joined the masses of unemployed and in 1966 this meant 15,000 graduates. Many of these were absorbed in the military service, but each year a large number of released soldiers faced unemployment again and joined newly high school graduates in competition for entering higher education institutions. In 1966 more than 36,000 applicants took the University of Tehran entrance examination. Only 4000 applicants (one out of nine) were accepted. 2n: the 1966 University of Shiraz entrance examination, only one out of every fourteen examinees was accepted.141 - Thus the educational goals of the Third Plan were not fully accomplished. The most important weakness of the Third Plan was its inability to limit expansion of secondary education to the planned levels. Consequently, the qualitative problem of secondary education remained unresolved and an increasing number of secondary school graduates, which were not able to find employment, hoped to enter higher education. Although higher education was 1"08111, p. 91. 14lrhid., p. 90. 170 expanded considerably, the colleges and universities were able to accommodate a small portion of the college applicants. Yet, many college graduates could not be absorbed in productive activities. The problem of absorbing school leavers and graduates was one major cause of the . alienation of educated Iranians from the Shah's regime. The disaffection of these people is evident in the size of the brain drain during the 1960's. According to one study, in 1966 about 30,000 Iranian college students and graduates lived abroad, of whom more than 60 percent had no intention of returning home.1.42 The role of disaffected students and intellectuals in the campaign against the Pahlavi regime will be discussed in the following section. W With the expansion of the higher education system, a new social group began to appear and grow on the Iranian political scene. This new group was composed of individuals whose power derived from those skills which they learned in the modern schools. They held weapons of knowledge and educational training-~weapons that are needed in all societies which seek social, economic, and political development. James Bill refers to this new group as “the 142Marvin Zonis, "Educational Ambivalence in Iran," 1;;3133_§§2§1g§, vol. 4, Fall 1968, p. 143. 171 professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia"143 and noted that they are distinguished by five major characteristics: (1) increasingly they refuse to accept the traditional socio-political patterns that°have dominated Iranian society: (2) they possess, or are acquiring a higher education: (3) their power position derives from the skills or talents they have acquired from their modern formal education: . (4) they have been exposed in varying degrees to outside philosophies, thoughts, and ideas: and (5) they are free of any gogmatism and of blind worship of past history.1 4 In 1956 one out of every 17 Iranians belonged to the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia. By 1966 the proportion became one in twelve.145 The members of the new group were engaged in professional, technical, cultural, intellectual, and administrative occupations. Table 13 indicates the size and occupations of the group in 1956 and 1966. The figures in the table include those individuals who did not have a higher education but who were employed in administrative, technical, and managerial positions. The percentage of those with higher education rose from 8 percent in 1956 to more than 23 percent in 1966. 1438111, agiitigs_ofi_1ran, pp. 53-72. Also see: James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform From Above: The Case of Iran.“ The_122rnal_2f_felitics, vol. 32, no. 1. Fall 1970. pp. 19-40. 1448111. W. p. 25. 14SIbido' p. 270 172 Table 13 1956 1955 Professional-Bureaucratic W w Professional, Technical, and Cultural Total 93,200 212,200 Government Employees 54,800 143,200 Self-Employed 22,800 18,500 MW _15...§.Q.0__5.0.-..5.9.0_ Administrative and Managerial Total 175,900 197,900 Government Employees 146,500 134,900 Self-Employed 17,000 10,700 W JAM—421.10.0— Commerce and Retail Total 62,900 103,300 A Government Employees 2,100 2,700 W W Source: James A. Bill,- W, Columbus, Charles E. Merrill Co., 1972, pp. 62, 65-67. ‘By the 1940's and early 1950's, the professional-_ bureaucratic intelligentsia had been well enough formed to become a critical force on the Iranian political scene. After the fall of Reza Khan, the members of this group stressed liberal goals and demanded reforms in the society. The most serious challenge to the status quo was represented by those members who can be termed intelligentsia. They included professors, teachers, students, lawyers, writers, and artists. The two major postwar political organizations, namely the National Front and the Tudeh Party, were 173 organizedand led mostly by these segments of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia.146 Teachers, professors, and lawyers “dominated the leadership ranks of these organizations," while students were “the catalysts and moving forces in the important mass elements vital to low- level organization and street activity.'147 When these two organizations were crushed during the 1953 military coup, the intelligentsia's opposition continued although most of it was forced to go underground. By 1960 the intel- ligentsia, whose members had increased tremendously as a result of the expansion of the educational system, began again challenging the existing political system openly. Between 1960 and 1963, eleven major incidents took place throughout the country,148 as the intellegentsia led rallies, riots, and demonstrations. Students and teachers were the major participants. In January 1960 three students were killed and 50 injured in demonstrations demanding better educational opportunities. In May 1961 teachers throughout the country went on strike and organized demonstrations for higher pay. In one demonstration, two 1‘58epehr Zabih, 2“..ng Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 187, 204, 249, 256-57. ‘ 1“13111, W. p. 74- 148$zyliowicz, p. 407. 174 teachers were killed by the police and many others were injured or arrested.149 In January 1962 picketing students demanded free elections and the resignation of Prime Minister Amini. One student was killed, 200 injured, and more than 300 people were arrested, as Iranian commandos invaded the University of Tehran. These demonstrations indicated the intelligentsia's alienation from the existing political system. The educated elements who had been exposed to various philosophies and ideas could not agree with the Shah's pattern of rule. They once again asked for radial changes in the society.150 Their demands were concentrated in four main problem areas: political, economic, social, and educational. These problems had been neglected by the Shah who had given priority to strengthening his authoritarian rule. Now he was facing a growing opposition which was demanding: genuine political participation by people, eliminating inequality and injustice in the society, expanding economic development, and raising the general level of education and increasing educational opportunities. 1"91ceddie, p. 153. 150For a documented analysis of the intelligentsia's alienation, see James A. Bill, "The Politics of Alienation, The Case of Iran,” I;3n13n_§;gfi1g§, no. 2, Winter 1969, PP. 8-260 . 175 The demonstrations and political upheavals of the early 1960's were nationwide. They constituted the most serious threat to the traditional political system since the defeat of the nationalist movement of the early 1950's. Under these circumstances, the status quo could no longer be maintained, and the Shah's regime moved to stabi1i2e the situation by launching a reform program known as the "White Revolution". 0'!! 1.”: d5: W The "White Revolution', which started in 1963, was the Shah's reform program designed to eradicate the danger of internal opposition to this regime generated by political oppression, poverty, and social unjustice. The internal situation, however, was not the only factor which prompted the Shah to launch a reform program. In the international context, one may recall the Shah's regime had become a close ally and friend of the United States since 1953, and had been receiving a substantial amount of American military and ' economic aid. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration came to office in Washington and adopted a new policy toward the United States' allies in the third world. According to this policy, the third world regimes became required to carry out some social and economic reforms, if they were to receive 176 support from the United States. Thus, the Kennedy Administration informed the Shah that it would continue to support him on the condition that he put through a program of reforms and a $35 million loan to the Shah's government was made dependent on certain policies being implemented.151 Fred Halliday explained that: The U.S. position in Iran was similar to its position in Latin America where a reform programme, under the rubric of the Alliance for Progress, was launched to preempt the impact of the Cuban Revolution. In both cases the Kennedy Administration believed that for political reasons the only way to preserve the pro-Western states in the third world was to put through a reform programgs, within which land reform held a special place. In January 1963 the Shah's regime announced the principles of a six point program. These six points were: land reform, the nationalization of forests, the sale of shares in government-owned factories to finance the land reform, profit sharing in industry, reform of electoral law, and the establishment of a Literacy Corps. Over the next 15 years a number of other points were added, including the establishment of a Health Corps, and educational and administrative reforms. The original six points plus 151Fred Halliday, Irani__Di2tafgrshie_and_nexeleement. New York, Penguin Books, 1979, p. 26. 15ZIbid., pp. 26-27. 177 subsequent points formed the heart of a reform program which was labeled by the regime as the 'White Revolution".153 This reform program was based on several objectives. First, the Shah expected to gain the political support of the Iranian peasant which constituted the majority of the country's population (about 75 percent of Iranians were working and living in over 50,000 villages). The Shah's second aim was to neutralize and coopt discontented elements especially the intelligentsia. In a sense, these two objectives of the “White Revolution“ were closely ‘ interrelated. As James Bill pointed out: Such a revolution would not only gain the support of the peasant masses for the Shah and political elites but also it would present ideological concessions to theintelligentsia whose members had for Iyse‘tars been voicing concern for the lower classes. Moreover, the Shah sought to show his American patrons that he was a reformist leader, and that he had enough political support to be able to secure the United States' interests in Iran. The bulk of the program of the “White Revolution” was directly aimed at the peasant, and the centerpiece of the 153Roger M. Savary, “Social Development in Iran During the Pahlavi Era," in We, edited by George Lenczowski, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, pp. 104-25. 1548111. rhe_2eiirirs_or_iran. p. 140. 178 program was land redistribution. According to the Land Reform Law of 1963, landlords could keep one village, and the rest of their holdings were to be redistributed. The law thus affected large holdings, covering 14,000 out of 50,000 villages.155 Travelling around the country, the monarch himself handed over land deeds to the peasants. In the beginning the distribution of land among some peasants produced some support for the Shah. In 1963 the government- controlled media carried stories about a “National Congress of Peasants" which was convened in Tehran and supported the Shah's reform program. They also released the story that 15,000 peasants had marched on Tehran to support the Shah's policies.156 However, the peasant support was not universal, for a large part of the rural population was ignored. Prior to the land reform, the peasants were divided into two groups: those who had the right to work a particular piece of land (W) and those who had no such right (W). The latter were the agricultural laborers and village proletariats and constituted the majority of the rural population.157 They had always been the poorest and most insecure peasant groups and they had 155Bashiriyeh, p. 21. 1558111, p. 145. 157Ibido' p0 1460 179 always suffered from the lack of steady unemployment. Under the land reform law, only the NEW received land. The Eggnnjghins were not affected by the reform and their situation deteriorated even further. The result was a growing tension between the two groups, as the land owning group refused to hire the laborers who were then forced to immigrate in large numbers to the cities. This led to a decline in agricultural production, rapid increase in urban population, and mass unemployment. The Shah's “revolution“ also included the creation of Literacy and Health Corps for the expansion of education and health among peasant population. These corps were formed of conscripts who were high school or college graduates. After four months of training, these young educated conscripts had to serve in the villages for 14 months. By 1969 there were 52,000 corpsmen serving in the villages throughout the country.158 There were two main political reasons for the creation of these corps. First, the regime sought to take large numbers of educated and unemployed people off the streets and scatter them throughout the country. Second, the corps could be used to increase the government's influence and control over the peasant population. The regime, however, viewed the corpsmen as the “soldiers of the 158Szyliowicz, p. 417. 180 revolution“ whose task was to restructure rural society and improve the living conditions of the peasantry. Assessing the impact of the Literacy Corps and its effectiveness, Szyliowicz observed several problems: The first concerns the adequacy of the training program. . . .. The overwhelming percentage (484 out of 708 hours) of the schedule is devoted not to courses in teacher training and rural developments, but to political and military subjects. The effectiveness of the corpsmen, is limited by factors other than poor preparation. Above all, he operates in an isolated traditional community where communications, transportations, and living conditions are primitive. Other problems include lack of physical facilities and the supervision of thousands of poorly trained instructorf so as to maximize their effectiveness. 59 In 1978 fifteen years after the creation of the Literacy Corps, the illiteracy rate among the peasant population was still very high. The official 1978 figures indicated that only 48 percent of the rural population between six and 29 years old could read and write. According to the same official figures, 80 percent of the rural population (above the age of six) was still illiterate.16o The so-called “White Revolution“ also included a number of political reforms, the most widely publicized of which was electoral reform. The country's electoral law was 159Ibid., p. 414. 160990353] 3325 Q: IIQE annual Eggggg 1211-18, noted in Katouzian, p. 288. 181 amended to include women and to give them the right to vote and to be elected. The granting of votes to women was a vital concession on paper but meant very little, because of the country's rigged elections (In fact, even men did not enjoy many political rights, let alone women!). In his attempts to coopt and neutralize discontented elements within the society, the Shah invited some members of the intelligentsia to join the government and people like Mohammed Darakhshesh, Nuroddin Alamuti, Ghulamali Farivar, and Hassan Arsanjani were recruited.161 Darakhshesh, the leader of the Teacher's Association, became the Minister of Education. Almuti, a lawyer and one of the. original founders of the Tudeh Party, was appointed as the Minister of Justice. Farivar, a fOrmer member of the National Front and an ally of Dr. Mussaddegh in the early 1950's, accepted to be the Minister of Industry. Arsanjani, a self-claimed socialist and an advocate of land reform, was appointed as the Minister of Agriculture and became in charge of carrying out the land reform program. The governmental careers of these men, however, did not last very long and the Shah removed them from office, largely because the monarch never allowed another man to become popular and to create a potential threat to his authoritarian rule. For instance, 161Katouzian, p. 215. 182 Arsanjani who became famous for his role in implementing the land reform program, was removed from the scene in March 1963. Since then, all official publications that dealt with land reform erased and omitted his name and picture.162 Meanwhile, in response to pressures for democracy, the Shah became in favor of a Western-style two-party political system. One party, Merdum (or People) Party had existed since 1960 under the leadership of Asadullah Alam--the Shah's childhood friend and the Minister of the Imperial Court" .A new official party, Iran Novin (or Modern Iran) Party suddenly appeared by the Shah's order in 1964.163 The MIP was formed of a group of 300 (mostly U.S. educated) technocrats led by Hassanali Mansur. In the 1964 elections, the MIP emerged as the majority party, obtained most of the Majlis seats and all of the cabinet posts, and Mansur was appointed prime minister. The two-party system lasted until 1975, with the MIP as the ruling party and the Mardum party playing the role of the opposition party. . In 1975 the Shah abolished all official political parties and organizations and called for the establishment of a single party system. He had once said that: If I was a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a 1628i11, p. 142. l”Katouzian, p. 236. 183 single dominant party such as Hitler organized or such as you find today in Communist countries. But as a constitutional monarch, I can afford to encourage large-scale party activity free from the straitl-bjfcket of one-party rule. or the one-party state. In March 1975, however, the king of kings discovered Western-style democracy and a two-party system were all decadent (even in western society), and that Iran would be better off under a one-party system.165 Thus, the existing official parties were suddenly disappeared and a new party Rastakhiz (or Resurgence) party was created. Then the Shah told all those who held an Iranian birth certificate to “join the all-embracing party, remain silent but expect nothing from us or get their passports and leave the country, for the country, was not in need of traitors."166 The Shah like many other third world dictators, had finally concluded that the only way to achieve political stability and to secure his authoritarian rule, was to establish a state directed one-party political system. The Resurgence Party became the Shah's political organization through which he controlled all branches of the government. Membership in the party was required for all government and university 164Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, uifis12n_figr_ny_§guntry, London, Hutchinson, 1961, p. 173. 165Katouzian, p. 236. 156Ibid., p. 242. 184 employees. The party survived as the ruling party until the Islamic Revolution of 1979 when the people finally got rid of the Shah and his “revolution“. Thus, prompted by internaland external pressures, the Shah's regime introduced a reform program which was exaggeratedly termed as a “White Revolution“. This reform program was designed to prevent a revolution and to strengthen the position of the Shah and his pmo-West government. The creation of the “revolution“ affected the Iranian economic, social, and political situation in two basic ways: First, “the Shah and his appointed officials began stressing the need for reform in various fields including the field of education. Second, American interest in Iran acquired new dimensions and the United States' ties with the Shah's regime were strengthened. The impact of the regime's reform policies on education will be examined in a latter section, but the United States-Iranian relations after the inauguration of the “White Revolution“ will be the subject of the following section. Elli H'll i E i ll H 'l 1 S! I From the beginning of his reign, the Shah had relied on Western powers, especially the United States, in the rebuilding of the Pahlavi regime. With the defeat of the oil nationalization movement in the American-backed coup 185 d‘etat of 1953, the Shah's dependence on the United States was further increased and the United States' influence in Iran was expanded. The United States provided the Shah's regime with a large amount of military and economic aid and assisted the regime in establishing the security police (SAVAK). Iran also joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which was an extension of NATO in the Middle East, and which made the united States directly committed to the defense of Iran. Furthermore, under the United States sponsored programs such as Point Four, American technical and educational assistance to Iran was expanded. At the same time the United States obtained a 40 percent stake in Iranian oil. As the American influence in Iran intensified, the United States government became concerned about the stability of the Shah's regime. During the Kennedy administration, the United States government concluded that the third world countries which undertake large scale reforms would be more stable. In the case of Iran, the administration demanded a greater emphasis on economic and social development than simply on the regime's political and military strength. Then the United States cut back military and economic aid to Iran and made its continuation conditioned on the introduction of reforms by the regime. 186 Following the inauguration of the “White Revolution“, in January 1963, President Kennedy congratulated the Shah,”7 and Vice President Johnson, during a visit to Tehran, assured the Shah about the continuation of the American aid to his regime. During the Johnson administration, relations between the two governments were further strengthened. In 1964 the united States agreed to grant the Shah's regime $200 million in military credit. In the same year the two governments signed the Status of Forces Agreement under which the United States agreed to supply Iran with the required number of military and technical advisors and the Shah's regime accepted to extend diplomatic immunity to the United States advisors and military personnel in Iran.168 Between 1964 and 1969 the United States paid the regime nearly $900 million worth of aid, about $700 million of which were nonreturnable grants.169 Considering Iran as a “developed“ country, the united States ended its economic aid program to Iran in 1967. Speaking about the termination of the aid program to Iran, President Johnson stated that: “We are celebrating an 167Qnited_atateei_Rub1i2_2a2era.2f_2re§idents_2f_nnited SLQSSE: John F. Kennedy, sthington, D.C. 1963, pp. 160-161. 1538ashiriyeh, p. 24. 169Katouzian, p. 318. 187 achievement not an ending. This is a milestone in Iran's continuing progress and in our close relations.“170 In 1969 the American military aid to Iran.was also terminated because, “Iran was now able to finance procurement of its defense needs.“171 The main reason for the termination of the United States aid program to Iran was a substantial increase in the amount of Iran's oil revenues, rising from $186 million in 1965 to $938 million in 1969.172 During the 1960's a drastic increase in the oil consumption in the world and especially in the industrialized countries led to more oil production by oil producing countries. It also increased the price of oil throughout the world. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the Arab oil embargo against the United States and other Israel supporters further increased the oil price. Iran's oil revenues rose to $5.6 billion in 1973 and $21.7 billion in 1976.173 This enabled the Shah's regime to finance its domestic programs and to purchase equipment for its army. Also, relying on the petrodollars, two new 17°United States. W. vol. 57, no. 1486, December 18, 1967, p. 826. 171 - Relesiege, “U.S. Military Sales to Iran,“ 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 5. 172Halliday, p. 143. 173Ibid. 188 national development plans were introduced. The Fourth Plan (1968-72) and the Fifth plan (1973-78) aimed at heavy industrialization and the expansion of communication networks and educational institutions. The rapid increase in oil revenues was coincided with a new change in American foreign policy. In 1969 the Nixon Doctrine provided for the shift in the United States foreign policy from a direct American involvement in areas of political interests to the United States to one of creating “regional powers“.rr‘ The Nixon Administration considered Iran to become a “regional power“ in the Persian Gulf area which would be able to defend its interests as well as those of the Western alliance. In 1972 Nixon visited the Shah in Tehran and agreed to sell Iran whatever non-nuclear arms he wished.175 The British decision to withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf in the 1970's, and the United States policy not to replace the British with a direct United States presence meant that the United States had to increase arms sales to Iran drastically. The United States' arms sales to Iran increased from $235 million in 1969 to $2,171 million 1741119119“ H- Nixon. MW 121nl§1__nuildins_f2r_2eaee. Washington, D.C., 1971. pp. 12- 14. 175xeddie, p. 176. 189 in 1973 and reached $5,713 million by_1977.176 In the 1970's the United States sold more arms to Iran than to any other country. Several other countries like France, Britain, Italy, and the Soviet Union also sold arms to Iran, but their total value was less than that of United States' sales. The United States also became deeply involved in the industrial build up of Iran. The United States government and private investment in Iran reached $5.7 billion in 1975. There were some 400 American firms with stakes in Iran's economy, and some 44,000 Americans were residents in Iran in connection with the industrial and military build up of the country.177 In 1975 the United States and the Shah's regime signed an agreement for economic cooperation between the two countries. The agreement was to cover $15 billion worth of non-oil trade including “the sale of eight nuclear power plants to Iran, the establishment of an integrated electronics industry, the building of a major port, joint ventures to produce fertilizers, farm machinery, and processed foods, superhighways, and vocational training centers.“178 1“John 0- Stempel. WWW. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981, p. 72. 177Bashiriyeh, p. 36. 1"Rania-Izaak W1. P. 329- 190 Thus, despite some changes in the United States-Iranian relations, the United States' support continued to form a major basis of the Shah's power, not only in the sense of international security but also in terms of domestic power. This dependence which had begun in the wake of World war II and had increased during the Cold War Era, was further intensified in the late 1960's and during the 1970's. The Shah himself counted on United States' support for his regime. In 1976 he acknowledged that: The United States understands us better for the simple reason that it has so many interests in Iranm. Economics and therefore direct intergsts, political and therefore indirect interests. The impact of the Shah's ties with the United States was not felt only in the political, military, and economic affairs of Iran. As it will be discussed later, another field which was also affected by this relationship was the field of education. Winn Following the inauguration of the so-called “White Revolution“, the Shah appeared to be interested in change and development in various fields. In order to appear genuinely interested in educational reforms, he periodically encouraged criticism of the state of education (as long as 179Oriana Fallaci. W. New York. Liverright, 1976, p. 279. 191 the criticism was not directly pointed at him). The Ministry of Education was allowed to hold a number of meetings and conferences for the evaluation of the government's educational policies. In 1964 the ministry convened a “Conference of Experts“ to examine the entire system of education and to make recommendations for possible reforms. The experts concluded that the Iranian system of education was mainly aimed at the training of civil servants for the government ministries and departments, and that it was not able to meet the country's needs in the era of the “White Revolution“. They formulated the following new objectives for the system: 1. Provisions of compulsory education for all children at the 6-14 age group and equal opportunities for the people in the cities as well as in rural areas. ' 2. Training of skilled manpower, including qualified technicians, engineers, and administrators, and particularly skilled workers, foremen, and personnel at middle level for whom great need is felt.‘ 3. Training of the young generation for effective participation in the social and political activities. 4. Indoctrination of the young generation with positive social philosophy biifid upon the principles of the White Revolution. 180Ministry of Education, “Educational Aims and the New System of Education in Iran,“ Tehran, Ministry of Education, 1968, (mimeographed) pp. 4-5. 192 In order to achieve these objectives, the Ministry of Education sought to reorganize the entire system of education. The former 6-3-3 year-pattern of primary and secondary education was changed into a new pattern of 5-3-4 years. The new pattern consisted of a five-year period of primary education which was declared free and compulsory, followed by a three-year guidance period and a four-year secondary education.181 The aim of the three-year guidance period was to identify the talents and aplitudes of students. Its curriculum included both theoretical and practical courses and was designed to provide practical knowledge about vocational education as well as knowledge in the fields of social sciences and humanities. After completing the three-year period, students were expected to sit for an examination to determine their future schooling.“ Those who passed could continue their education in either academic or practical fields, while the remainder were to be guided toward appropriate employment. Secondary education consisted of two branches: technical-vocational secondary education and academic secondary education. The academic secondary schools were designed to prepare students for university entrance examinations. The graduates of technical-vocational secondary schools could either seek 13lihid., pp. 9-10. 193 employment in their area of specialization, or continue their education in technical colleges and universities. Meanwhile, a course entitled “White Revolution“ was added to secondary school curricula. This course required the students to study a book with the same title that was purportedly written by the Shah. 1 In contrast to the former system of primary and secondary education which was basically theoretical and college preparatory, the new system gave more emphasis to technical and vocational education. With the new system, the Ministry of Education hoped to meet the country's need for manpower trained at lower levels. It was also hoped to reduce the excessively large number of university applicants by doing the screening process for selection of students at an earlier stage. To deal with this problem, the ministry also sought to establish more non-university institutions of higher education which offered technical and vocational programs. The number of these institutions increased more rapidly after the creation of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. This new ministry was established in 1967 as part of structural reforms which were implemented in the field of governance and administration of education. These reforms included the breaking up of the former Ministry of Education 194 which had been responsible for all phases of education.182 Now the former ministry became responsible only for primary and secondary education and two new ministries were established. The new ministries were the Ministry of Culture and Arts and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The latter obtained authority over all institutions of higher education. In the same year, the “Educational Revolution Decree“ was introduced by the Shah's regime. The “Educational Revolution“ which became the 12th point of the “White Revolution“ called for fundamental reforms in the system of higher education. It stressed that: Universities, institutions of higher education and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education must take the role of pioneers in the Educational Revolution in Iran and therefore-it will be necessary for them to bring their activities and organization in line 133 in conformity with the aims of the revolution. Immediately after the declaration of the “Educational Revolution“, all university chancellors were replaced by young, highly trained, and predominantly American educated 182Szyliowicz, p. 426. 183Cited in: Cyrus Manzoor, “University Reform in Iran, Problems and Prospects,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1971, p. 212. 195 technocrats.184 Moreover, in 1963, 150 faculty members were recruited from Western (mostly United States) univer- sities.185 In the long run, however, the “revolution“ had the following results for the system of higher education. First, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education became the dominant factor in Iran's higher education. A document published by the government pointed out that: It is the ministry's duty to supervise all universities, colleges, and other centers of higher education: to issue licenses for the establishment, development, or termination of all such institutions: to approve a general policy regarding studies abroad: and to promote scientific and technological studies. Further, the ministry is charged with establishing, equipping, reviewing, and coordinating all research projects currently conducted by ministries, government institutions, university research centers, and other institutions of higher learning, and advising the government on the continualtaiaon or termination of such research programs. Second, the ministry made some major reforms in the administrative structure and curriculum of colleges and universities. These reforms, as pointed out in Chapter Iv, transformed the predominantly French-style university system of Iran into an American-style system. Finally, from 1968 184Marvin Zonis, “Higher Education and Social Change,“ in I;en_£eeee_;he_fieyen;1ee, edited by Ehsan Yarshalter, New York, Praeger, 1971, p. 249. IBSSzyliowicz, p. 432. 186Jamaledin Tabibi-Kazerooni, “Higher Education Development in Iran, 1967-1979,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Akron, 1983, p. 144. 196 to 1978, the system of higher education experienced an unprecedented growth as the existing institutions were expanded and new colleges and universities were established. This expansion was particularly notable during the periods of the Fourth Development Plan (1968-1972) and the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978). These plans aimed at industrialization and the improvement of management techniques, and institutions of higher education were to provide manpower needs. The Fourth Plan called for: (1) heavy industrial- ization in a variety of fields including steel, petrochemicals, aluminum, copper, and engineering industries: (2) scientific water preservation and water resources development: (3) utilization of natural gas for domestic consumption as well as export: (4) rural rehabilitation and urban development: and (5) modernization of production and management techniques.187 With regard to higher education, the plan called for rapid expansion of institutions, particularly in technical and vocational fields. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education aimed at increasing the number of students from 46,000 at the start of the plan to 90,000 by 1972. Of these, 55 percent were to receive training in technical and scientific fields. 187Amuzegar and Fekrat, p. 51. 197 To achieve this aim, a total of 77 new institutions were established including institutions of agricultural technology, hotel management, fishery technology, commerce, surveying, telecommunications, and building technology.188 Indeed, higher education enrollment passed the targeted figure and increased to 115,000 by the end of the Fourth Plan. The Fifth Plan (1973-1978) was basically a continuation of the Fourth Plan and emphasized heavy industrialization. The educational target of the Fifth Plan, like the previous plan, was based on the assumption that the system of education should be capable of responding to the country's technological development. The plan called for: (1) expansion of technical, vocational, and higher education to provide all the required skills, scientific, and technological qualification: (2) training of teachers and instructors for these fields: and (3) innovations in educational management, educational technology, and curriculum. By the recommendation of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the plan targeted a student enrollment of 195,000 by 1978.189 This target, however, 188Ali Pour-Moghaddas, “Higher Education and Development in Iran,“ Higheg_fldeeeeien, vol. 4, no. 3, August 1975, p. 372. 189Tabibi-Kazerooni, p. 157. 198 appeared to be too ambitious, as higher education enrollment increased to only 175,000 by that year. c d du The educational system of Iran has been profoundly influenced by the government's foreign relations and foreign involvement in the country. The first modern institutions of higher education were established in the 19th century when Iran became a sphere of European powers' influence and rivalry. In order to combat British and Russian influence, the government invited French ndssions into Iran for technical and educational assistance. This marked the beginning of French cultural and educational influence in Iran. The first Western-type institution of higher learning to be patterned after French schools in curriculum and organization, was established in 1851 (see Chapter III). In the early decades of the 20th century, several other European powers became involved in building schools in Iran. Britain which has obtained a monopoly over the Iranian oil industry, established the Oil Institute of Abadan to train technicians for work in the oil industry. When Hitler's Germany established close-ties with the Reza Khan's regime, a technical school under the direction of German teachers 199 ”and technicians was set up in Tehran.190 The Irano-German. Industrial School remained in existence until World War II when the Allied countries invaded. Iran and expelled all German personnel. It was, however, the French pattern of education which continued to prevail in the country. The early French missions, the French teachers employed by the Ministry of Education, and the Iranians who received their education in France helped to establish an educational system similar to that of France. When the first modern Iranian university, University of Tehran, was set up in 1934, it was modeled after the French system. The university had strong autonomous faculties which were self? sufficient in terms of courses offered, and each faculty had its own library. If students failed one or two subjects they were forced to repeat the entire year. This pattern governed the system of higher education of Iran into the 19608. A new era of foreign power rivalry in Iran began in the wake of world War II. The United States which emerged as a new super power and the most powerful Western nation, committed itself to the defense of the Western interests throughout the world. Soon a conflict appeared between the United States and the USSR which had also emerged as a super 190Amin Banani, The uggegnjzggjgn 95 1:30: 1221-125] Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 97. 200 power and had assumed the leadership of the Eastern bloc countries. The strategic location of Iran as well as its vast oil resources made this country an area of special concern to both the superpowers. The United States was concerned mainly that the spread of Soviet influence and socialism in Iran be prevented, and that the interests of the West in the country be protected. Also, the traditionally pro-West Iranian regime which had been weakened during the war, counted on the Western and especially American support for the strengthening of its power against internal as well as outside threat. Thus, the United States established close ties with the Shah's regime and became actively involved in the military and economic build-up of Iran. - The impact of the Shah's ties with the United States was not restricted to Iran's military and economy. The country's educational system was also affected by this relationship, as the United States provided Iran with a considerable amount of technical and educational aid. For the United States, not only was it important to support the Shah but also, as Bill pointed out, “it was of benefit to have a hand in helping to educate coming Iranian generations.“191 As pointed out earlier, active American 1918111. MW. 9. 79. 201 participation in the expansion of Iran's educational system began in the early 19508 under the United States sponsored programs such as Point Four and Fulbright-Hayes. When the United States terminated its aid program to Iran in 1967, American technical and educational aid to Iran was also ended. Nevertheless, the United States-Iranian relations in the field of education continued as Iran, relying on its increased oil revenues, aimed at rapid expansion of its educational system. As a contribution to such expansion, the United States and the Shah's regime signed an “Agreement on Scientific Cooperation“ in May 1968. The aim of this Agreement was “to intensify cooperation between the scientists involved in government agencies and in academic or other institutions of the two countries.“192 Under the rubric of this Agreement, the United States-Iranian academic cooperation began to intensify. At the same time, some American universities were feeling the strain of decreasing enrollments and rising costs. Iran and other oil producing countries, and their expanding educational budget were increasingly in the news, and those American universities began to seek profitable 192Eicher, p. 76. 202 academic agreements with these countries.193 In April 1975, The_fleg_19;k_11mee reported that, “Academic opportunities in Iran constitutes a rapidly expanding business,“ so that one east coast university administration official said, “There are tons of dollars there - it is like a gold mine.“194 Thus, new United States-Iranian agreements in the field of higher education were signed. There were two main types of such agreements. First, agreements which were between American institutions of higher education and Iranian government ministries and organizations. Columbia University, for example, signed a $360,000 contract with Iran's Ministry of Social Welfare in January of 1974 to “provide technical assistance in basic social welfare program development and to design a School of Social Welfare.“195. George Washington University signed an agreement with'the Imperial Iranian Army to train Iranian army officers in computer science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with Iran's Atomic Energy Organization to establish a graduate degree project to train nuclear engineers in Iran.196 Second, were inter- 1931hid., p. 77. 194The_uee_xert_rimes. April 20. 1975. p. 30. 19581cher, p. 170. lgsThe.Nen.X9rk_Time§, p- 30- 203 university agreements which were signed between Iranian institutions of higher education and United States universities and colleges. Georgetown University, for instance, signed an $11 million contract with Ferdowsi University in Mashhad for “faculty recruitment and exchange, faculty development curriculum, and equipment procure- ment.“197 Moreover, Brown University signed an agreement with the Abadan Institute of Technology which provided for Abadan graduates to study at Brown and Brown faculty to teach at Abadan. A list of United States-Iranian agreements in the field of higher education is presented in Appendix II. In addition to the United States, several other countries established academic links with Iran and contributed to the expansion of higher education in the country. The number of these links began to increase as a result of the diversification of Iran's foreign relations in the 1960s. Due to the new international situation after the Cold War (the detente movement and the relaxation of tension between East and West), the Shah's regime declared a “national independent foreign policy“, meaning a realignment in Iran's foreign relations on the basis of its direct national interests and an end to Iran's complete dependence 19‘7Eicher, p. 162. 204 on the United States. It was a combination of this and Iran's increasing oil revenues which led to establishing economic and technical relations with a wide variety of Eastern as well as Western bloc countries.198 Under an agreement with the Soviet Union, for example, the Soviet government assisted Iran in constructing a steel plant in Esfahan and a machine tool plant in Arak. To provide manpower needs for these industrial projects the Soviet Union agreed to help in building a number of institutes for training technicians and engineers.199 Two Western European countries which signed academic agreements with Iran included France and West Germany. France agreed to participate in the development of Bu Ali Sina University established in 1972 in Hamedan. West Germany was to provide assistance for the development of Guilan University founded in 1974 in Rasht. In spite of the changes in the government's foreign policy in the 1966-78 period, the United States' influence 198For relation between Iran and Soviet bloc countries, see Robert 0. Freedman. WW fieee_fiinee_lfilfl, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978 and George Lenczowski, d Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. For relations between Iran and Western Europe, see Warner J. Feld, W31 in_flerld_5ffieire, Alfred Publishing Co., 1978, PP. 257- 258. 199Walter Elkan, “Employment Education, Training and Skilled Labor in Iran,“ The_nidg1e_fieee_geernel, vol. 31, no. 2, Spring 1977, p. 183. 205 in Iran's military, economic, political, and educational affairs continued to increase. In the field of higher education, the American influence was evidenced by the number of United States-Iranian academic agreements, by the number of Iranian students studying in the United States, and by the adaptation of the American-style university system for Iranian universities. As of May 1976, 19 Iranian universities and colleges had signed 42 agreements with 32 U.S. colleges and universities. Several ministries and government agencies also had links with American universities. If these links are included, there were some 72 United States-Iranian agreements in the field of higher education by the same date200 (see Appendix II). Moreover, an increasing number of Iranian students attended United States' universities and colleges through government sponsored programs. An additional number of students went to the United States through other than government channels (see Chapter IV). In 1968, approximately 7,000 Iranians were enrolled at American colleges and universities. By 1978, more than 50 percent of an estimated 75,000 Iranian students were studying in the United States. Upon their graduation, many of these students returned home to join the faculties of Iranian institutions, or to obtain government 200Eicher, p. 82. 206 positions. These United States' trained people played a major role in the Americanization of Iranian higher education. A shift from the French—style system of higher education to an American-style, it may be recalled, had been started in the early 19603 when the University of Pennsylvania became involved in the reorganization of Shiraz University. The success of Shiraz University, the expansion of the united States-Iranian academic cooperation, and the United States' trained faculty and administrators further prepared the ground for the Americanization of higher education. With the creation of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1967, the American model was gradually adopted for all universities. The governance, administra- tion, and curriculum of the institutions become similar to that in most American universities. The universiry chancellor occupied a position similar to the President in an American university. He worked with a board of trustees and had vice-chancellors with titles such as: vice- chancellor for academic affairs, vice-chancellor for research, and vice-chancellor for business affairs. Colleges were headed by deans, and department chairmen were appointed within each college. Each university had its own university council composed of chairmen of departments and representatives from the faculty in each department. The 207 council was responsible for approving curriculum and modifications and receiving recommendations for promotion within the faculty.201 0' . . ,'. .,. .-.-,.-, . “.1 ., ;'.,- . , '., The Shah had claimed that the “White Revolution“ would supplement the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and would enhance the country's political, social, and economic life within the context of Irano-Islamic culture and without foreign interference. As the reform programs went on, however, the “revolution“ proved to be a supplement to the Reza Khan's coup d'etat of 1921. The “White Revolution“ was a new attempt to strengthen the control power of the monarch, to intensify Western-style modernization of Iran's society, and to encourage Western and especially United states' interests in building a strong Iranian state. In the 1960s and 19708, the Shah's regime continuously increased its control over the activities of the population and over the government organizations. No independent political activity of any kind was allowed in Iran. Two official political parties which existed until 1975 and the official Resurgence Party from that year, were not allowed to suggest any candidate for the Majlis without these being first approved by the regime. The Prime Minister, cabinet 2°11bid., p. 44. 208 members and other top level government officials were all appointed by the Shah.2°2‘ In dealing with those who opposed this dictatorship, the regime used two methods. One was repression. The major repressive organization was the State Information and Security Organization, SAVAK, which had been organized in 1957 with assistance from the American CIA and Israeli Mossad.203 SAVAK penetrated all government institutions, universities, trade unions, the press, and factories. Its members enjoyed arbitrary powers in dealing with opposition and used extensive methods of inter- rogation, torture and physical elimination.20‘4 The second method was co-optation of oppositionists. A considerable number of dissidents, especially members of intelligentsia, were brought into the expanded network of governmental jobs on the understanding that they would not talk or act against the regime. The increase in governmental jobs, salaries, and prerequisites as oil income grew made this an effective strategy for a time, but did not bring about real loyalty to the Shah's regime. Thus, despite reformist attitudes of the 202Hallidays, p. 46. 2”Iteddie. W. P- 144- 204For SAVAK and its activities, see a report by the International Commission of Jurists, Ih§_N:!_XQLL_Iim£§: 28 May 1976. and Marvin zonis. WW. Princeton University Press, 1971, Chapters 3 and 4. 209 regime, participation in decision-making was not broadened and political freedom actually declined over time.“ The system of higher education did not escape this absolute rulership. The Shah extended his control over the system by appointing people loyal to his regime to the top administrative positions and by carefully screening applicants for entry to a university. A top official of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education told an interviewer: “Orders had come from above to restrict entrance to Iranian universities to those who had the most at stake in maintaining the present system.“205 Once they entered a university, the students were not allowed to participate in any political activity. There was no Iranian institution of higher education which had a student council or government. Students were constantly spied upon by SAVAK. The subject matter of courses that could be threatening or critical to the regime was edited, and lecturers who criticized the regime were dismissed and often imprisoned.206 Yet, in the 1970s the regime established a “University Guard“ to patrol university campuses and to check all those who entered or exited from campuses. 205Zonis, pp. 36-37. 2”Robert Graham. WW. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979, p. 212. 210 This tight control and the absence of a liberal intellectual climate became a major handicap to the qualitative development of higher education. Norman Jacobs described the kind of student that Iranian colleges and universities produced as: . . h. a good memorizer, who speaks well but not concretely, who is quick to copy and serve those in authority, who tends to talk rather than to act, who hates to make decisions, who is not utilitarian, who is not objective, who cannot operate effectively in a critical environment, . . . who basically is insecure and maladjusted to any of his occupational demands and consequently, unproductive-in brief, an individual who is the very antithesis of the kind of educated or sophisticated individual required to participate in, let alone create and deyslop a rational, self- generating economic system. The quantitative development of higher education, however, was impressive. The expansion of the system was in part, caused by rapid economic growth and industrialization during the 19603 and 19703. The regime's repressive measures created temporarily a “stable political environ- ment“ needed for economic growth.208 As a result of “political stability“ and the rising oil revenues, gross national product (GNP) rose from less than $3 billion in 1960 to over $53 billion in 1977. The per capita income jumped from less than $150 to $1,600 even though the 207Norman Jacobs, - W. New York. Praeger. 1976. p. 159- 208Halliday, p. 46. 211 population grew from 20 to 35 million.209 The number of industrial establishments increased from about 1,000 in 1957 to 6,200 in 1979.210 This economic growth and expansion in industry, together with growth in the government bureaucracy increased the size of two groups of the population: the urban working class and “the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia“. The urban working class grew from less than 300,000 in the early 19603 to 1,700,000 in 1977. They were employed in modern industry, oil, transport, mining, and urban construction. The size of professional- bureaucratic intelligentsia totalled from 410,000 in 1963 to 630,000 in 1977. This total included 7,200 professors, 20,300 engineers, 21,500 medical personnel, 208,200 teachers, and 304,400 civil servants.211 In addition, there were 250,000 college students (studying at home or abroad) who intended to join this group. Economic growth did not necessarily lead to an equitable income distribution, for it benefitted only a small minority of population. In 1974, some 150 families owned 67 percent of all industries and financial 209Ervand Abrahamian, “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution,“ 53312, no. 87, May 1980, p. 27. 210Bashiriyeh, p. 40. 211Abrahamian, MERLE, p. 22. 212 institutions.212 According to‘a report by the International Labor Office, Iran was “one of the most inegalitarian societies in the world.“213 The ILO statistics showed that in 1974 the richest 10 percent of Iranian families accounted for as much as 55.5 percent of the total expenditures, the poorest 10 percent for as little as 1.7 percent, and the middle 40 percent for no more than 26 percent. The urban working class and peasants constituted the poorest groups. It was true that for some people the standard of living improved as they gained access to better housing, health facilities, education and consumer goods. But it was also true that after 15 years of so-called White Revolution, 96 percent of the villages remained without electricity, and the percentage of urban families living in one room increased from 36 to 43. The literacy rate rose from 26 percent to 42 percent, but 68 percent of adults remained illiterate. The number of illiterates actually rose from 13 million to 15 million, less than 40 percent of children completed primary school, only 60,000 university places were available for as many as 290,000 applicants, and the percentage of population enrolled in higher education 212Bashiriyeh, p. 40. 213Quoted in Abrahamian, m, p. 23. 213 institutions was one of the lowest in the Middle East.214 In 1978, according to a study conducted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 48 percent of the students in colleges and universities came from bureaucratic families, 35 percent from industrial and commercial classes, 7 percent from the families of landlords, 2 percent from urban working class and one percent from the peasantry.215 It should be noted that the last two classes made up about 85 percent of Iran's population. Meanwhile, following the creation of the “White Revolution“,, the Shah's regime doubled its efforts to Westernize Iran's military, economy, and society. In this the regime was helped by a sharp increase in the country's annual oil revenues which reached over $20 billion by 1977. It imported huge amounts of modern and sOphisticated wea- pons from western and especially American arms manufacturers. Iran, in the words of General Williamson, Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) from 1971 to 1973, became a salesman's dream.“216 Western eagerness to sell billions of dollars of 214Abrahamian. 112312. 9. 23. 215Quoted in Katouzian, p. 289. 216Barry Rubin, t‘o ' , New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 135. we. th 59 PI 214 weapons to Iran was largely due to “the economic drain on the West caused by the OPEC price rise: arms purchases seemed a fine wayto recycle the petrodollars.“217 Western producers of high technology, agricultural. equipment, and consumer goods had also large sales in Iran. In 1978 the United States was the largest supplier of Iran's non- military imports which amounted to 12.7 billion.218 Along with western equipment, a large number of foreign advisors and instructors including 43,000 Americans went to Iran. On the eve of the 1979 Revolution, there was hardly one government or private organization which did not have its own Western adviser. With the increase in the imports of Western goods and services, Western cultural influence in Iran also increased. Western music and movies, discos, cabarets, sexual freedom, gambling, and drug addiction began to proliferate in Iranian cities. Thus western influence in Iran, and the country's dependence on Western powers increased.219. One political scientist noted that: ,217xeddie, p. 176. 218Khosrow Fatemi, “The Iranian Revolution: its impact on economic relations with the United States,“ Ineegneeienel J2urnal_ef_uiddle_Ea§tern_Studies, no. 12, 1980, P- 304- 219The term “dependence“ here is not connected with 'Dependency Theory' which understates the possibility of independent action by a developing nation. 215 The Shah showed a growing interest in modernizing Iran's economy and society and in making the country Western in character and ndlitarily strong. This was partly owing to an emphasis, common in the Third World but here carried to extremes, on big showy projects, supersophisti- cated and expensive weapons, and fancy consumer goods, all of which put Iran in a position of long-term dependence on gsgtern countries, especially the United States. The impact of Western influence was also felt by Iranian higher education, as the American model of university system was adapted for the country's colleges and universities. The Americanization of higher education, however, was superficially successful and was in essence a failure, for the political environment of Iran was different from that of the united States. In Iran, the students and faculty had little opportunity for free discussion and debate, because, for security reasons, the Shah's regime was not willing to permit academic freedom in higher education. Moreover, censorship was widespread. In 1977, Hoveyda, the Shah's Prime Minister admitted: “Yes, we do censor books and have no need to disguise the fact. The interest of the country and the monarchial system are above everything.“221 Censorship and lack of academic freedom prevented the creation of an intellectual environment where scientific 22°xeddie, pp. 143-144. 221Quoted in Nahid Rashedi, “History of Iranian Education: Influence of Islam and the west,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1984, p. 168. 216 research could be carried out. A UNESCO consultant who made a study of the organization of scientific training in Iranian universities and colleges concluded that: “Scientific research does not yet exist in Iran except for a very few, rare, instances.“222 A Board of Trustees was one of the features of the American system which was adapted for Iranian colleges and universities. The boards faced serious problems in Iran. These problems were not due to any particular deficiencies inherent in the concept, but rather were the results of the Iranian political system. In the United States, a Board of Trustees is an important tool to advance the objectives of a universityx The trustees are usually influential and respected members of the local community and can bring intellectual vitality and financial resources to their university. In Iran most board members were the members of the royal family or they were top level government officials. For instance, one of the Shah's sisters, Ashraf Pahlavi, was the chairperson of the Board of Trustees of three universities. The Minister of Imperial Court was a board member at four universities.223 Most board members did not even live in the community where their respective 222Szyliowicz, p. 428. 223Samii, p. 7. 11! 'fl 217 universities were located. These people obtained their board membership by virtue of their loyalty to the Shah's regime. Thus, Boards of Trustees were turned into yet another tool to ensure the regime's political control over the system of higher education. Th3.1§lifl1§.3§¥219§123 The “White Revolution“ was intended to eradicate the danger of internal opposition to the United States' supported Shah's regime. Through co-optation or suppression of much of the opposition, and through economic-reforms which brought temporary prosperity for some segments of the society, the regime survived until 1979. Opposition to the Shah's rule, however, never ceased to exist and political activity iJi*various forms continued through the 19603 and 19703. The most vehement opposition to the regime was expressed by religious groups. In February 1979, the Shah's monarchial regime was replaced with an Islamic republic. This event marked the beginning of a new era in Iranian higher education. The religious opposition to the Pahlavi regime had begun in the 19203 when Reza Khan, who enjoyed close economic and political ties with the west, sought to modernize Iran along western patterns. The founder of the Pahlavi dynasty viewed Islam as an obstacle against his 218 policies of Westernization. Since then, the Pahlavi rulers vigorously attempted to separate religion from politics and to secularize Iranian society.. Various regulations were devised to curtail the influence of religion in all areas of social life including politics, economy, and education. The clergy was deprived of its constitutional rights and all Islamic institutions were brought under the centralized control of the state. At the same time, education was secularized to such an extent that even madrassahs were required to teach a curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education. The Pahlavis succeeded in secularizing the Iranian political system and political elites while a great majority of the population remained faithful to Islam. Thus Iranian society was polarized into a secular minority and an Islamic majority. The secularized minority, however, remained powerful because it had control over all the structures of political and military power. The introduction and implementation of the “White Revolution“ program intensified religious opposition to the Pahlavi regime. The most outspoken leader of this opposition was Imam Khomeini. While some religious leaders opposed the program because of land reforms and women's rights, he denounced it as a program imposed upon Iran by the United States in order to intensify the American dominance as well as the Shah's absolutism. According to 219 Algar, Imam Khomeini's criticisms were especially aimed at the following targets: 4 Autocratic rule and violation of the constitution: the proposal to grant capitulatory rights to American advisors and udlitary personnel in Iran and their dependents: the contracting of 'a $200 million loan from the U.S. for the purchase of military equipment: and the maintenance of diplomatic, commercial, and other relations with Israeiz a state hostile to the Muslims and Islam. 4 These criticisms were made in a series of lectures in Fayziyah Madrassah in Qum. The Shah's regime responded by sending paratroopers to attack the Madrassah on March 22, 1963“ 7A number of students were killed and the Madrassah was ransacked.225 The confrontation reached a new peak during the month of Muharram, “the month in the Muslim- calendar when the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the prophet, is commemorated and aspirations to emulate his example, by struggling against contemporary manifestations of tyranny, are awakened.“226 On the tenth day of the . month, June 3, 1963, Imam Khomeini delivered another speech and repeated his denunciation of the Shah and his “White 224Hamid Algar, “The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran.“ in W. Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, p. 246. ‘ 225Imam Khomeini, Ielem_ene_3ezeleeien, Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar, Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1981, p. 16. 226Ibid., p. 17. 220 Revolution.“227 Two days later, he was arrested by SAVAK and was later sent to exile. His arrest produced mass demonstrations in Qum, Tehran, and many other cities. Unarmed demonstrators confronted the Shah's armed forces which slaughtered some 15,000 people in three days.228 The date on which this uprising began, June 6, 1963 (Khordad 15, 1942 according to the Iranian calendar), marked a turning point in the political history of Iran. It established Imam Khomeini as a national leader and the spokesman for the Islamic movement which toppled the monarchial regime in 1979. With the suppression of the 1963 uprising, the Shah's regime continued the implementation of the “White Revolution“ while intensifying its attacks against the religious establishment. The newly established Religious Corps, modeled on the Literacy Corps, increased its activities to teach people that “true Islam“ differed from that preached by “black reactionaries.“229 The official Resurgence Party declared the Shah to be not only the “political leader“ of the state, but also the “spiritual 227Ihid., p. 177-80. 2231bid., p. 17. Also see Keddie, BERSE.Q£.B§¥QLEELQBI p. 158-159. 229Abrahamian, MERLE, p. 25. 221 guide“ of the nation.230 Moreover, the Iranian Islamic calender was replaced by a new royalist calendar allocating 2500 years for the whole monarchy and 35 years for the present monarch. Thus Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1935 to the royalist year 2535. Meanwhile, the regime announced that only government controlled organizations could publish theology books. It also ordered universities not to register women who insisted on wearing Islamic dress. These actions combined with the regime's Westernizing policies and the increasing Western economic, political, and cultural influence in the country, further reinforced the religious opposition. Meanwhile, Iran's social and economic life was deteriorating. When oil revenues increased, one expected a more equitable distribution of national. income among the population. But the regime's economic policies, as stated earlier, led to the concentration of wealth in a small minority of the population. It also produced rapid urban migration and overcrowding, the decline of agricultural productivity, massive imports of food and consumer goods, a rapidly rising rate of inflation, and the spread of 23oThe Shah himself claimed that, “No one is closer to God or to Imams than I am“ and that, “My reign has saved the country, because God is on my side.“ See interview by Oriana Fallaci, “The Shah of Iran,“ The_Nen_Reeuhlie. December 1973, p. 17. 222 corruption. There was a shortage of food, housing, electricity, hospitals, schools and transportation facilities. Despite these problems, much of the national income was spent on royal palaces, solid gold bathtubs, major festivals, nuclear projects, and ultra-sophisticated weapons. These problems as well as the secularization policies caused a growing dissatisfaction among various groups of people. By 1977 strikes in the factories and government organizations became widespread- The people who lived in shanty towns began criticizing the regime openly and organized street protests. There were major strikes and demonstrations by teachers and students. Street protests and riots became gradually familiar scenes in Tehran and other major cities. Popular disgust with the regime increased. when SAVAK attacked and killed several theology students and their supporters in January 1978 in Qum, after they had protested against an article published by the Ministry of Information insulting Imam Khomeini.231 The use of military force, and even the declaration of martial law in September 1978, did not stop public rallies and demonstrations. On September 8, which became known as Black 231Ali-Akbar Mahdi, “The Iranian Struggle For Liberation: Socio-historical Roots to the Islamic Revolution,“ ' ' Hieeegy, Spring 1980, p. 25. 223 Friday, in Tehran's Jaleh Square, thousands of demonstrators were massacred by tanks and sub-machine guns.232 The more the regime resorted to ndlitary force, the more courageous and militant the people became. College and university students, whose numbers had considerably increased in the 19603 and 19703, actively ' participated in the movement. In contrast to other members of intelligentsia, most students were too young and idealistic to have been co-opted by the regime. Although the Shah used every possible device to silence and control the students, and although he had closed many campuses for months at a time, he was not able to stop student opposition. Students had many grievances. According to Keddie: Within their lecture halls they could sense the strain between those technical or politically harmless new ideas they were permitted access to and the many others their teachers could not voice nor their booksellers sell. Some teachers were dismissed and others were warned or suspended. This aroused opposition from the students. With rapidly expanding universities and a large influx of poorly educated secondary students, academic and economic frustrations also grew. Also, the great majority of university applicants failed to get in, and those who did were often dissatisfied with academic, housing, and eggfational conditions, as well as political ones. 232Katouzian, p. 345. 2wheelie. W. p. 235. 224 There were many major student demonstrations over the years, particularly in major cities. Although for many years student protests was concentrated in campus areas, once the anti-Shah movement broadened in 1977-78, students had “the habits, inclinations, and experiences“ that helped them become important participants in the popular movement.234 They became involved in instigating and leading strikes and demonstrations by various groups including industrial workers and government employees. Iranian students abroad also became active. In the late 19703, about 100,000 Iranian students were abroad, and many of them opposed the Shah's regime. They established various organizations such as the Confederation of Iranian Students and Muslim Students Associations. Through their propaganda, these organizations tried to inform the world public opinion about the Shah's regime and help to enlist international support and pressure against the regime. Also, many of the students abroad returned home and participated in the revolution. By the late 19703 it was obvious that the conditions were ripe for changing the political system, but who could provide the powerful and effective leadership.needed to lead the movement and to replace the monarchial system? The secular segment of the opposition, including both its- 23‘Ihid. 225 leftists and liberal elements, was unable to assume this task, for it was too weak and did not have enough support among the people. There were several reasons for this weakness and lack of popular support. The first reason was the failure of the secular leadership during the 1951-53 movement. Second, much of the secular oppositionists had been pacified and co-opted or suppressed by the regime over the years, particularly since the introduction of the “White Revolution“. Some elements of the secular opposition established underground groups during the 19603 and 19703 'and became engaged in armed struggle against the regime. Two of the most known groups were the Marxist Iranian People's Fedaiyan, and the Islamic leftist People's Mojahedin. These groups, whose members belonged mainly to intelligentsia, actively participated in the 1977-79 movement, but, because of their small membership, they were not able to mobilize the people and to assume a leadership role. Third, many secular elements, including nationalists and liberals, were only interested in reforms and did not ~ call for the overthrow of the monarchial system. Fourth, the muslim masses associated secularism with Westernism. Western values and ideas did not appeal to the masses, for the Shah's Westernization policies had benefited a small majority of people and had produced a growing gap between 226 the masses and the elites. Consequently, it was the Islamic establishment who had stood against the Shah, the West, and Western ideas, that took up the leadership in the movement. _ All opposition groups, religious and secular, gradually gathered around the banner of the Islamic leadership. From his exile in Iraq and later in France, Imam Khomeini relentlessly continued his denunciation of the Shah's regime and encouraged the people to continue their struggle. Some 50,000 mosques throughout the county, like the cells of a mass political party, became centers of political education. Clergymen, numbering over 90,000 - some 50 ayatollahs, 5,000 hojat al-Islams, 11,000 theology students, and an unknown number of low ranking preachers, religious teachers, prayer leaders, and religious procession organizers - were mobilized to organize and lead strikes and demonstrations.235 Finally, on February 11, 1979 the hated monarchial regime collapsed, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, all economic, political, and educational institutions of Iran began to undergo revolutionary changes. The process of reorganization of the educational system was one of the first priorities of the new government and higher education 235Abrahamian, M3312, p. 24. 227 received special attention. In a message delivered on the occasion of Iranian New Year, on March 21, 1980, Imam Khomeini stated: A fundamental revolution must take place in all the universities across the country, so that professors with links to the East or the West may be purged, and the university may provide a healthy atmosphere for cultivation of the Islamic sciences. The evil form of instruction imposed by the previous regime must be stopped because all of the miseries of society during the reign of that father and son were ultimately caused by such evil instructions. . .. . All of our backwardness has been due to the failure of most university educated intellectuals to acquéff’e correct knowledge of Iranian Islamic society. In another speech which was delivered in April 1980, to an audience composed of university students, the leader of the Islamic Revolution outlined a general guideline for the reorganization of higher education. He emphasized that: We demand fundamental changes in our university system so that the universities come to serve the nation and its needs instead of serving foreigners . . . We are not rejecting modern science, nor saying that each science exists in two varieties, one Islamic and the other non-Islamic. . . The place for the strictly Islamic sciences is the traditional madrassah: the other sciences are to be taught at the university. However, the universities must become Islamic in the sense that the subjects studied in them are to be pursued in accordance with the needs of the nation and for the sake of strengthening it. The curricula that have been followed up to now at the universities have resulted in the gravitation of one part of our young people toward communism and another part toward the West. . . To Islamize the universities 236Imam Khomeini, p. 291-92. 228 means to make them autonomous, independent of the West and independent of the East, so that we have an independent country with an indepen nt university system and an independent culture.2 In order to reorganize the system of higher education, the government closed all colleges and universities in the summer of 1980. In June, a seven member Cultural Revolution Staff was designated to change the entire system of education from its previous state to an Islamic one.238 The function of this body was to determine the overall educational goals and policies of the country at all levels. Within the Cultural Revolution Staff, a division called the University Crusade was created to revise the curriculum of higher education. The University Crusade sent Crusade Councils to every higher education establishment to administer the process of transition of colleges and universities. At the time of the present study, most of the previous colleges and universities have been reopened and several new institutions have been established. In the summer of 1986, a record number of approximately 45,000 applicants passed university entrance examinations. An analysis of the changes that have occurred within the system of higher 237Ibid., p. 296-98. 23exhosraw sobhe, “Education in Revolution,“ comparatize_£dnsatign. vol. 8, no. 3, 1982. p. 275. 229 education since the establishment of the Islamic Republic is beyond the limits of this study. It should be noted, however, that the system has been reshaped according to the outlook of the Islamic leadership. The students and faculty members who had close ties with the former regime, as well as foreign educational advisors and teachers, have been excluded from the system. The curriculum has been radically revised to de-emphasize western education and to include a central element of Islamic teaching. Summary. This chapter hypothesized that, in general, there was a direct relationship between the evolution of Iranian higher education and changes that occurred in the country's political system and its foreign relations. In the early 19208 the Qajar Government, which had been weakened by internal uprisings and the British-Russian rivalry of interests in Iran, collapsed and Reza Khan, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty seized the reins of government. Strictly secular-minded and inherently a Kamal Ataturk-like nationalist, he began a forceful assault on the IBlamic institutions. National unification through coercive force, an extended administrative network, Westernization of Iran's society, and the expansion of modern and secular education were in the forefront of Reza Khan's goals. Under his 230 regime, a network of secular primary and secondary schools was built, and the first Western-style university was inaugurated in 1934. During World war II, the strategic position of Iran led to the Allied occupation of the country and Reza Khan was replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. After the war, the United States helped the new Shah to stabilize his rule and became the dominant foreign power in Iran. The services of American firms were employed to prepare a national development plan, and the United States' sponsored Fulbright-Hays Program (1949) and Point Pour Program (1950) provided technical and educational assistance to the Shah's regime. From 1948 to 1967, five major provincial universities and a number of other institutions including ~two American—style universities were founded. The ties between the Shah and the United States were further strengthened when American government helped plan a military coup against the popular government of Prime Minster Hassaddegh in 1953 and assisted him in regaining his throne. From 1953, the Shah's regime enjoyed broad American military, economic, and technical assistance. The United States also became actively involved in the expansion of Iran's educational system. In the 19608, prompted by internal uprisings and by pressure from the United States Government, the Shah's 231 regime launched a socio-economic reform program known as the “White Revolution.“ This program was designed to strengthen the Shah's political base, to intensify the westernization and secularization of Iran's society, and to make the country's economy more available to foreign investment. The reform program coupled with a sharp increase in the government oil revenues produced rapid economic growth and industrialization during the 19608 and 19708. The program also affected higher education as the regime introduced some structural reforms in the field of education to meet a growing need for trained personnel. The newly established Ministry of Higher Education took major steps to expand post-secondary education. These steps involved the training and education of many Iranians by Americans in the united States or in Iran. . Although the quantitative development of higher education particulary during the 1967-79 period was impressive, many deficiencies in the system remained unresolved. These deficiencies were in part due to certain problems inherent in the Shah's monarchial regime. Despite the rhetoric of modernism and reform, the Shah continued to be an absolute monarch whose economic policies favored a small segment of the population, who relied on foreign support to stay in power, who was obsessed with Western- style modernization without considering indigenous cultural 232 values, and who tended to suppress public demands rather than adapting necessary measures to meet the demands. These problems contributed to the expansion Of a system of higher education which was tightly controlled and elitist, which was governed by an administrative structure strange to Iran's political and cultural environment, and which lacked the liberating socio-political atmosphere essential for the development of a truly modern and progressive education. Those problems also produced the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which replaced the monarchial system with an Islamic Republic. The reorganization and development of higher education was one of the first priorities of the new government. CHAPTER VI 8m , COMUSIORS , am SUGGESTIONS This study hypothesized that the evolution of higher ' education in the pre-Islamic Republic of Iran was influenced by a series of events which took place in the country's domestic politics and external relations. In the preceding chapters, the historical development of Iranian higher education and the political history of Iran was analyzed. This final chapter will: 1) summarize the various findings of the study, (2) pose answers to the questions stated in Chapter I, and (3) make suggestions for further research on Iranian higher education. W The history of formal education in Iran covers an extended period of twenty-five centuries. This long history can be divided into three major periods: (a) the ancient period, (b) the Islamic period, and (c) the modern period or the period of Western-style education. From ancient times, 'various Persian empires established schools of higher learning to train state administrators in different fields. 233 234 One of these schools, the University of Jundi Shapour, established in the third century Ann. gained international recognition and became an important center for higher learning.' Most Persian dynasties emphasized the power of state, and every aspect of people's lives including education, depended on state control and initiation. This is the main historical reason why education has always been centralized and controlled by the state. ‘ The Islamic period began with the falling of the Persian empire before the forces of Islam (652) and the Islamization of Iranians. A8 Islam spread throughout Iran, madrassahs (religious colleges) became major centers of higher learning. The Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century reduced Iran to near anarchy and most schools were destroyed. In the sixteenth century the Safavid Shahs recreated a strong and unified Persian government and declared their own interpretation of Islam as the state religibn. They also brought Islamic educational institutions under the state control and used them only for the promotion of the official religion and the maintenance of the state. This form of education remained dominant until the twentieth century, although the western pattern of education began to penetrate the Iranian educational system in the mid-nineteenth century. 235 In the Nineteenth Century, Iran became a sphere of rivalry for expansionist Western countries seeking to enhance their economic, political, and military powers. The rivalry was primarily between Russia and Great Britain, both of which had common borders with the strategically located Iran. In order to meet the challenge presented by Russia and Britain, the Iranian government of Qajar accepted the French offer for technical and educational assistance. With the French aid, the first secular and western style institution of higher education, Daralfunun (house of techniques), was created in 1851. ‘This institution and a number of other colleges founded around the turn of the century were modeled after the French pattern of higher education, were state sponsored and controlled, and were designed to train the children of economic and political elites for government bureaucracy. This form of higher education was later adopted for the first modern Iranian University founded in 1934. The major focus of this study has been on the evolution of Iranian higher education from the date of the . foundation of the first university until 1979. The study has sought to answer the following questions: 1. Were there identifiable stages of development in the Iranian higher educational system from 1934 to 1979? If so, what were they? What was the quantitative expansion of the system during each period? 236 2. What were major political events in Iran during the 1934-79 period? How did they contribute to different stages of higher education development? Why did they influence government's policies and attitudes towards education? What implications did those events have for higher education? 3. What were major events .in Iran's external relations during the 1934-1979 period? Did foreign powers influence Iran's internal affairs? If so, why did they? What was the impact of foreign influence on the system of higher education? Iran's system of higher education underwent three main stages of development during the study period. The first stage began with the creation of the first secular and Western-style university and lasted until the late 19408. During this phase the expansion of higher education was slow and sporadic: only one university, the university of Tehran, and a few small colleges were established. The second stage began in 1948 with the establishment of the first provincial universities and lasted until 1966. During this stage, the development of higher education in Iran continued apace. Five major provincial universities were founded in Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahvaz. A.number of other post-secondary institutions were also created within this period, and by 1966, Iran had 42 colleges and universities and a total of 36,800 students. The third stage began with the creation of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1967 and lasted until 1979. During this phase the system 237 experienced some drastic structural reforms and the traditional French system of higher education was trans- formed into an American-style system. It also experienced a big push pattern of development, as the number of post- secondary institutions jumped from 42 to 244, the higher education budget increased an average of 45 percent per year, student enrollment increased at a 14.8 percent annual growth rate, and the number of academic staff grew over 37 percent per year. The number of students abroad also increased sharply and rose to over 75,000 students of whom 37,000 were attending American universities and colleges. The first stage was contemporaneous with the reign of Reza Khan and World War II. Reza Khan came to power when the Qajar dynasty failed to stabilize its rule in the face of internal uprisings and BritishrRussian rivalry of interests in Iran. He was strictly secular minded and a Kamal Ataturk-like nationalist. National Unification, an extended administrative network, and secularization and Westernization of Iran's society were Reza Khan's main goals. He sought to use education as a means of achieving these goals and he built a network of modern and Western-style schools including the University of Tehran. However, Reza Khan's obsession with personal power and wealth and his neglect of the rural sector which compromised more than 80 percent of the population limited the scope and 238 intensity of changes which were inaugurated in the country. In contrast to Kamal Ataturk of Turkey, who represented a Iradical political system, Reza Khan's regime can be best classified as an adaptive system. Whereas Ataturk sought systematically to transform the way of life of his nation, the Iranian ruler allowed only some infrastructural improvements in such areas as technology and education. Under Reza Khan's regime, only a very limited number of schools were actually established, and the number of persons who were able to enter modern higher education remained very small. Reza Khan was mainly concerned with preserving and enhancing the power of his dynasty. He concentrated all decisions in his own hands, prohibited attempts to organize political parties, and filled all political roles by the members of this family or persons loyal to him. His removal from power by the Allied forces during World War II was followed by the growth of progressive ideals among Iranians. Religious and secular intellectuals began to establish various political and social organizations. Freedom of press and social, cultural, and political activities were revived. These events increased social consciousness among the urban population and produced a great demand for education. However, the occupation of the country by foreign forces, economic problems caused by the war, and 239 lack of an appropriate central government prevented any attempt to expand education until the late 19408. Throughout this study, it has been attempted to indicate that the evolution of Iranian educational system, like that of' many other countries, has been influenced by external factors. Foreign occupation of Iran during Wbrld War II was a major cause of discontinuation of education development during the 19408. After the war the United States' influence proved to be crucial in the expansion of Iran's educational system. The American influence in Iran began to increase when the United States emerged in the course of the war as a super power and it committed it8elf to prevent the spread of the Soviet influence throughout the world. Because of its-strategic location and its vast natural resources, Iran became an area of special concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers tried to enhance their influence in the country through ndiitary, economic, political, and cultural means. While the Soviets extended their support to various leftist forces in Iran, the United States provided Mohammad Reza Shah with various kinds of aids. In 1948, the services of American firms were employed to prepare a national development plan for Iran. Moreover, such united States' sponsored programs as Point Four and Fulbright-Hays provided technical and educational assistance to the Shah's regime. 240 Meanwhile the Shah gradually gained power, reorganized the army, and began to reestablish the Pahlavi political system. Despite these gains, however, his position remained relatively weak, as was demonstrated by the popular movement of the early 19508. The roots of this movement were traced to the growth of socio-political awareness among the population and to the consequences of foreign intervention. A dispute between Iranian nationalists and Britain over the exploitation of Iranian oil resources led to a nation-wide movement against foreign intervention in the country's economic and political affairs and against the Shah's authoritarian rule. It also produced a coalition of all religious and secular progressive elements within the National Front Party whose leader, Dr. Mossaddegh, seized control of the government and nationalized the oil industry. Massaddegh's government resembling that of Egypt under Naser, represented a radical political system which aimed at restructuring all aspects of the society including education to achieve political, economic, and social development. He was however, prevented from inaugurating any lasting change through certain external factors. A British led boycott of Iran's oil weakened Massaddegh's government and a United States' engineered coup d'etat brought the Shah back to power. 241 These events affected postwar Iran's situation in three basic ways, all of which had significant consequences for the system of education. First, the United States became the dominant foreign power in Iran. This was reflected in America's growing share of military supplies and advisors and in civilian and government programs, as well as in various forms of investment by the United States Government and companies that entered Iran in great numbers. Moreover, an increasing number of American universities and government agencies became involved in the expansion of education in Iran and in the advising of Iranian colleges and Universities. The United States' academic influence accelerated to a degree which led to the Americanization of the system of higher education. 'Second, as a result of the oil nationalization movement, even though the oil industry was not nationalized in the manner that the movement's leaders had wished, Iran's oil revenues began to increase sharply. Relying on the oil revenues, the Shah's regime extended its military bureaucratic network to ensure its control over the population. It also carried out several development plans in which the expansion of an infrastructure network for the Westernization of the urban sector was given first priority. The growth of state expenditures produced mass emigration from rural areas to the cities. It also contributed to the 242 expansion of an urban centered educational system.. The unplanned expansion of secondary and higher education gave rise to an army of jobless drop-outs and graduates who, because of the regime's strategy of development, could not be accommodated in productive activities. Therefore, the regime was forced to expand the bureaucratic network in order to provide them with a desk in an office. Yet an increasing number of graduates, not being able to find a meaningful job, went abroad to continue their study towards higher degrees. Third, after the Massaddegh experience, the Shah became determined to prevent any challenge to his rule and he became increasingly engaged in repressive and dictatorial acts. Oppositional students, like other opponents, were ruthlessly crushed. Freedom of press and assembly was severely limited and censorship became widespread. University applicants were screened before admission in order to ensure that only persons loyal to the regime could, enter colleges and universities. Yet, students as well as faculty members were monitored through a network of SAVAK agents on the campuses. This atmosphere of terror prevented free discussion and debate among students and faculty members. As a result of these dictatorial measures and lack of job opportunities, the number of Iranian students and scholars fleeing their homeland was further increased. 243 Meanwhile, absolute power was rapidly concentrated in the office of the Shah, and all national organs and institutions were mobilized to preserve and strengthen monarchy. The Shah succeeded in consolidating his rule, but the cost of this success was the neglect of many serious problems confronting the country. In response to the public demand for change and improvement in the country's political, social, and economic life, the regime always resorted to force and suppression. Discontent could not be eliminated in this manner, however, and frustration with the Shah's dictatorship erupted into nationwide demonstrations in the early 19608. Students and members of professional- bureaucratic intelligentsia, whose numbers had increased considerably as a result of the educational expansion of the post-war years, became actively engaged in a movement against the regime. Joined by the urban middle class whose size had also increased as a result of rapid urbanization, and the religious groups who had always been suppressed by the Pahlavi regime, the movement was turned into a serious threat to the Shah. Under these conditions, the Pahlavi political system could no longer be maintained. Meanwhile, the United States, which had become the Shah's principal foreign supporter, was increasingly concerned about the possibility of an anti-West revolution in Iran and the spread of Soviet 244 influence in the Middle East. Therefore, it began pressuring the Shah's regime to carry out some socio- economic reforms in order to eradicate the dangers of a radical revolution. It was ih response to American as well as internal pressure that the Iranian political elites led by the Shah introduced the so-called “White Revolution“. The “revolution" was indeed a reform program dictated from above» It included some measures of land redistribution; industrial growth: and political, administrative, and educational reforms. The Shah's regime following the inauguration of the "White Revolution" can be best classified as a reformist system. Since the creation of this program, the regime promoted changes in some~ areas of society particularly in the rural sector. It also doubled its effort to import Western technology and to industrialize the economy. Although power remained in the hands of the political elites who supported the Pahlavi rule, some members of the opposition were co-opted. The co-optation of members of the intelligentsia and Western-educated bureaucrats became particularly common. The regime, however, permitted change only as long as no threat was posed to the monarchial system. ' The third phase of higher education expansion (1967-79) was contemporaneous with the period of the so-called "White 24S Revolution". During this period, the administration of the entire system of education was reorganized and the curriculum of schools was revised to harmonize educational output with the new economic and political policies. Meanwhilefthe process of establishing new schools at all levels accelerated. Educational expansion, however, was organized in such a way as to maintain the status quo as defined by the Shah. The Shah appointed people loyal to his regime to the most important leadership positions in education. In many areas, these people had little or no competence and were not qualified for their jobs. Although attention was paid to bring about improvements in the quality and quantity of higher education, concern with maintaining the existing patterns of authority placed serious constraints upon the degree to which the kind of changes that were required to make educational institutions compatible with the country's national needs could be implemented. As a result of such problems and limitations, several deficiencies persisted in the Iranian system of higher education. Below, some of the shortcomings of the system are briefly presented. 1. The continuation of an oppressive and despotic atmosphere stood against the development of truly modern and progressive education in Iran. Obedience and conformity to the will of the Pahlavi regime remained a common theme in all 246 schools, and a police network was used to reinforce that on university campuses. University students and their teachers had little Opportunity for free discussion, debate, and research. This prevented the creation of an appropriate climate for intellectual and scientific advancement. In spite of considerable expansion of higher education in the 19608 and 19708, a shortage of trained manpower continued to exist in Iran. In 1978, over 100,000 Western advisers and experts and about 300,000 low level technicians and workers from a variety of Asian countries were employed by the government and private sectors. There were several reasons for this manpower shortage. First, the proportion of higher education enrollment to the total population remained relatively low, lower than that of many other developing countries. Second, due to the Shah's dictatorial attitudes and the persistence of socio-economic problems in Iran, many educated Iranians chose to live and work abroad. Third, the system of higher education was inconsistent with the regime's development strategy which relied on the importation of expensive Western technology. The choice of a capital-intensive approach and dependence upon imported technology created such a demand for skilled and high-level manpower that the system of higher education was not able to meet it. Fourth, the system had been traditionally designed to provide trained person- nel for the running of an expanding government bureaucracy, and despite the educational reforms of the 19608 and 19708, the output of universities in technological and scientific fields remained behind national needs. Iranian colleges and universities continued to be elitist and urban centered. The maldistribution of wealth and the regime's socio-economic policies which favored the rich over the poor and the urban over the rural reinforced this character of higher education institutions with only three percent of their enrollment coming from the working class and rural population. The higher educational system and practices of Iran were transplanted from the united States. This was due to the broad American economic, 247 political, and academic influence in Iran and the Shah's obsession with the Westernization of all aspects of Iranian life. Throughout the process of planning and reorganization of higher education, all policy makers were American or American educated. That is, no practitioner of indigenous cultural forms played an important role in that process. One expected the policy-makers to utilize their experiences with academic and scientific advances of the United States to bring about improvement in Iranian higher education, but they went far behind that and implanted the American model of higher education on Iranian soil. The transplantation of an alien university structure without considering the cultural and political environment of the country and its peculiar needs, proved to be impracticable. As with many other reforms in Iran, the educational reforms stemmed from the top of the political system, and were for the benefit of a small segment of the population. No fundamental change in higher education could be expected without a revolutionary change in the political system and its leadership. The Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to the collapse of the monarchial regime and the establish- ment of an Islamic Republic, prepared the ground for some radical changes in all aspects of the society including education. These changes are to be affected by two major factors: the ideology of the new government which is based upon Islamic principles and ideals, and the foreign relations of the Islamic Republic which is based on a policy of non-alignment and independence form the West or the East. Regarding higher education, the government has called for Islamization and de_We8ternization of the system. It has 248 excluded all foreign instructors and advisors.' It has also called for a commitment to improve the quality and quantity of the system in. order to provide higher education for a larger segment of the population and to make the country self-sufficient in terms of trained manpower. It requires further research to determine the degree to which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been successful in achieving these goals. W The present study was an attempt to investigate the relationship between political change and the development of formal higher education in Iran. Time limitations and the scope of the study did not allow this researcher to examine many related issues and subjects, some of which are presented in this section. 1. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian higher education has undergone some revolutionary changes. An examination of these changes with a special focus on the ideology, internal policies, and external posture of the Islamic Republic, would be a fruitful research area for those interested in higher education in Iran. 2. Higher education has played a significant role in the political and social awakening of many nations including Iran. Also, student political activism has been a familiar feature of Iran's political scene. All these considered, the role of higher education and student activism in recent political developments and in the 1979 Islamic Revolution constitute another interesting topic for research. 249 Western-style formal higher education reached Iran in the last century, but Islamic higher education institutions, namely madrassahs, have existed in the country for centuries. The history of these institutions and their contribution to the revival of Islamic ideas deserves more attention from Iranian as well as international scholars. Most studies concerning the Iranian system of higher education, including this one, have focused mainly on the quantitative development of the system. A study of the qualitative development of the system, its relations to the country's financial and human resources, and its role in the country's national development can produce useful results for Iranian educational planners and policy-makers. Iranian higher education has received little, if any, attention from students and scholars of comparative education. A comparative study of the university system in Iran and in a selective number of other developing countries, therefore, could produce valuable results. man I MRI mmam (1978) A. miversities Date mum Bearded—Emma: university of Tehran (Tehran) 1934 19,476 University of Tabriz (18er) 1948 8,015 National miversity of Iran (Tehran) 1957 9,656 University of Shiraz (Shiraz) 1956 6,280 University of Mashhad (Mashhad) 1949 6,688 Jundi Shapour University (Ahvaz) 1954 4,690 University of Esfahan (Esfahan) ' 1949 6,742 Industrial University of Tehran (Tehran) 1966 2,976 Industrial University of Esfahan (Esfahan) 1977 1,373 Teacher Training University (Tehran) 1973 4,382 The Free University of Iran (Tehran) 1972 3,329 University of Kerman (Kerman) 1971 N.A. Bu Ali Sina miversity (Hanedan) 1972 552 Wanen's University (Tehran) 1975 1,661 miversity of (Milan (Rasht) 1974 397 university of Baluchestan and Systan (Zahedan) _ 1973 157 Razi miversity (KernaIBhah-Ilam) 1974 1,287 Abou mayhan University (Tchran) 1974 4,128 Sharal University (Mazanderan) 1977 14 Police University (Tehran) N.A. 1,309 Politechnique University (Tehran) 1977 3,042 Techmlogy and Science miversity (Tehran) 1977 5,662 *Most universities were renamed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, W . Tehran: Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education. - 250 251 B. Institutions Leading to B.A., B.S., M.A., and M.S. Date We: PM. Abadan Institute of TEchnology (Abadan) 1938 Agriculture arxl Animl Husbarriry College of Urumiyeh (Uraniyeh) 1964 Arak School of Science (Arak) 1970 Barking Institute of Iran (Tehran) 1962 Cinema and T.V. School (Tehran) 1967 College of Mass Cmnunication (Tehran) 1960 Danevand College (Damavand) 1967 Finance and Accounting College (Tehran) 1956 Goverrment Managemem Studies Center (Tehran) 1964 High Institute of Accounting (Tehran) 1968 High Institute of Te1econmmication (Thhran) 1938 Industrial Managemnt Center (Tehran) 1970 Institute of Hospital Management (Tehran) 1971 Insurance Institute of Tehran (Tehran) 1969 Iran punagemem Studies Center (Tehran) 1971 Kashan School of Science (Kashan) 1973 Nafficy School of Technology (Tehran) 1970 Research Center for Iranian oilture (Tehran) 1969 School of Cartography (Tehran) 1964 School of Civil Aviation (Tehran) 1959 School of Connerce (Tehran) . 1957 School of Construction (Tehran) 1970 School of Foreign Language and Literature (Tehran) 1964 School of Forestry (Gorgan) 1956 School of Good Health Science (Tehran) 1973 School of JUridical and Administrative Affairs (Qom) 1969 School of Math and Ecamic mnagement (Karaj) 1972 School of mtrition and Chemistry of Food (hhran) 1961 School of Political Science and Party Affairs (Tehran) 1971 School of Programing and Couputer Application (Tehran) 1972 School of Rehabilitations (Tehran) 1972 School of Social Service (Tehran) 1957 School of Sports (Tehran) 1971 School of Statistics and Information (Tehran) 1965 School of Translation (Tehran) 1968 Schools of mrsing (Tehran—Abadan-EBfahan— Kernenshahj-msht-Mashhad [25 schools] 1957-1973 Technical Teachers' Training Center (Babol) 1971 water Institute of Tehran (Tehran) 1965 Zanjan School of Agriculture (Zanjan) 1972 *Most institutions were renamed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, W Wm. Tehran: Institute for research and Planning in Science and mucation. 252 C. Institutions Leading to Associate or Arts Degree Date W m Agricultural Tools Institute of Technology (Tabriz) 1967 Air Corditioning and Conputer Programing Institute (Tehran) 1967 Belbahani Vocational Teacher Training (Tehran) 1964 Coumercial Institute of Technology of Tabriz (Tabriz) 1968 Institutes of Technology (Mran-EBfahan-Atnvz-Arak-Thbriz— Rasht-Shiraz-Gmazwin—Masmiad—Kerman-yazd) [13 imtitutes] 1948-1969 Construction and Road Institute of Technology (Man) 1968 Environment Protection Junior School (Karaj) 1972 Food Sanitary Institute of Technology (Tehran) 1973 Hostess Training Junior School (mhran) . 1974 Ichthyology arri Fishery Junior School (Anzali) 1967 Junior Technical Schools (Esfahan-Babol—Tabriz- Tehran—Shiraz-Mashhad) 1964-1972 JUnior Schools of Hygiene (Tehran-Esfahan- Mashhad-Sari-Tabriz—Shiraz) 1968-1970 Midwifery Jlmior Schools (Esfahan-My-Kermnshah) 1969-1971 Mining annior School (Shahrood) 1974 Sanitary Engineering Technology Junior School (Varamin) 1950 School of Art Teacher Training (Tehran) 1968 School of Tburism and Information (Tehran) 1971 Statistics and Accounting Institute of Technology (Tehran) 1967 Tecmical Institute of Drawing and Drafting (Tehran) N.A. Technical Institute of Technology (Tehran) _ 1967 Technical School of mad (Tehran) 1967 Weather Forecasting Junior School (Tehran) N.A. *Most institutions were renamed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, W ' . Tehran: Iratitute for Research and Flaming in Science and Erlucation. 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