THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT IN VILLAGE TNDIA «A CASE STUDY Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D‘ MTCHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY KONDAPALLI RANGA RAO 1959 ‘1 5.“;sz This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in Village India-A Case Study presented by Kondapalli Ranga Rao has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for —EhrD_ degree iDJOG-lo-logy 2; Major profess? MW 0-169 l. A. ., .st. . TFHP. l . 1. _ . , _ ....... Q... . 7 , _ . m _ . u r. .{ t...s “fink-Wet 4 3339; .e I l\; I 'rfinxln . 0"‘. “a: 1n ~. ..‘I' ”.0 3p“: '.‘ who Musk «.3? y g :' Own T‘ 51.2 in: 'me‘ - ICC-tat!” 81".»11: tam; t: L- *~.r rue pdf‘ff‘ We: in the coconut; sync-r.» aao erntoqucntl} W“ a. will. it tho scent.) coca... 1“ ‘ 1'. l ABSTRACT THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT IN VILLAGE INDIA—A CASE STUDY by Kondapalli Ranga Rao This is a study of the dynamics of political power and conflict in a village community in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. Specifically the study focuses on the impact of ggnchayati £51, i.e., democratic decentralization on the interrelationships.between caste, class, power and conflict. With the village community as the frame of reference the prob- lem at hand was analyzed from a structural-historical per- Spective. 'Reputational' and 'event analysis' methods were adopted for ascertaining the nature of leadership and the pattern of conflict in the village between the years 1945 and 1968. The researcher stayed in the village for about four months and cellected the data through interviewing and from records. No prepared questionnaire was used. The basic findings are: The power structure of a relatively isolated community tends to be monolithic, that is, that the persons who have greatest power in its socio (religious)-administrative system tend to be the same persons who have greatest power in the economic system and consequently in the political system as well. As the society becomes fluodernized and as the community becomes increasingly involved_ Kondapalli Ranga Rao in the larger societal complex, however, to start with poli— tical power would tend to become autonomous from the heredi- tary social or administrative status and would tend to depend upon economic power. Consequent upon democratic decentral- ization, however, some political power would diffuse into the local social and economic strata as well. In a relatively isolated stratified community the upper socio—economic stratum (or one individual) with adminis- trative positions would dominate the populace and political conflict, if any, would be covert (or a sort of pseudo—social domination). As the community becomes modernized, and as it becomes involved in the larger societal complex, however, overt conflict would develOp between individuals of the upper but adjacent high-ranking socio—economic strata. Consequent upon democratic decentralization economic dominants come to hold power and political conflict would continue to take the form of vertical factional conflict, with some element of horizontal (inter-strata) conflict side by side. However, if a faction maintains political affiliation with a leftist party, that faction may have more representation from the lower social and economic strata. Whether it would lead to inter-class or inter-caste conflict, ultimately depends upon the political circumstances of the region. A period of revo- lution may encourage class conflict: otherwise, it may take the form of conflict between the upper and lower social strata (castes). THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT IN VILLAGE INDIA --A CASE STUDY BY Kondapalli Ranga Rao A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1969 @7330 73-47 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many individuals and institutions have been helpful to me in the completion of this thesis. I gratefully aCknow- ledge all of them. Particular mention however needs to be made of the following. Prof. J.A. Beegle has been my most benevolent major thesis advisor and chairman of my thesis guidance committee. I place on record my deep sense of gratitude to him for all the kind advice and patient guidance he gave me throughout the preparation of the thesis. The other members of the guidance committee, Professors C.P. Loomis, J.B. Mchee, and D.E. Morrison were very helpful and gave me the benefit of their valuable advice. I am grateful to all of them. I would also like to thank Prof. w.H. Form, my academic advisor during my first year of stay on the M.S.U. campus, for his kind guidance and encouragement to my proposal to work on a research problem of the kind undertaken in this thesis. The Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, provided the necessary financial assistance for a trip to India for fieldwork. The Agricultural Development Council, Inc.. New York, supported my final year of graduate work at the Michigan state University. Preparation of the thesis is made possible due to their assistance. I gratefully thank Dr. W.T. Ross, Director of the Asian Studies Center, M.S.U.t 11 rand Dr. A. Russell Stevenson, Administrative officer of the Igricultural Development Council, New York for their kind interest. In a way Professors J.A. Beegle and D.E. Morrison were reaponsible for getting me the Council's support. My heartfelt thanks are also due to them. I would also like to thank a) the villagers of Haripur and the officials and leaders of the area for their kind cooperation in the collection of the material, and b) the Syndicate and the Vice-Chancellor of the Andhra University, waltair, India for granting study leave and thus enabling me to write this thesis. Finally, needless to say I could have not completed this work but for the c00perauon of my wife Pramila. I remain in gratitude to her forever. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page mTRowu 1w . O O O O O O O O C C O O O O C C O 1 II. m “WGANA mGIw . . . Q Q o o O Q o o g o . 28 ‘ III. m vmw “RIP UR O C O O O O O O O I C O O O 55 . IV. POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE PRE-PANCHAYNTI RAJPERIOD(1945-58).....o........80 V. POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PMCHAYATI RM (1959-1964) e o s o o o o o .113 VI. POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ (1964-68) . . . . e . e 138 VII. PATRON-CLIENT AND LEADERPFOLLOWER “MTIWWIPS C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 174 VIII. cmCIIUSION e e o e e e e s e e s e e e o e s e 185 'hli‘ ’ mmn BIBLImRAPHY e e s e e e s s e s e s s s s s 194 APPENDICES . . . . . O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O C 200 iv LIST OF TABLES Table Page L 1. Council of Village Elders: 1945-47 . . . . . . 82a 2 Members of the Village Communist Band . . . . 87a L 3 Persons Killed by Razakars . . . . . . . . . . 91a l 4 Council of Elders Nominated by Congress in l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95a 5 Nominations Received by the Village Elders During the Period 1951-55 . . . . . . . . . . 96a 6 Village Elders During 1957-58 . . . . . . . . 106a Table 1. Communist Candidates for Election for the Panchayat: 1959 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116a 2 Congress Candidates for Election for the PanChayat I 19 59 g g Q . o g o . g Q o o a Q o 11 7a 3 Caste Composition of Wards and of the Contestants: 1959 e o o s e e s o s o s o e e 1193 4 Landownership and Political Factional Affiliation‘ 1959 O O O O O O I 0 O O O O O O 1218 5 Caste and Political/Factional Affiliation; 19 59 I C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I I O O I lzlb Reputation Mentions Gained by the Leaders . . 130a Table Left Communist Candidates for 1964 Panchayat Elections 0 e s e e e e s s s o a Right Communist Candidates for 1964 Panchayat Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . Caste Composition of Wards and of the ContIBtantss 1964 s s o o e e e e e o o o Landownership and Political/Factional Affiliation, 1964 I I O O I I O O C O C O Caste and Political/Factional Affiliations 19 64 O O O O O O O O O O O O I I O O O 0 0 Reputation Mentions Received by the Village Leaders for the Period 1964-66 (Under Sri Pusala No.2 as the President) . . . . . . . Reputation Mentions Gained by the Leaders During the Period 1966-68 (After the Dismissal of Sri Pusala No.2) . . . . . . . Political Affiliation of the Creditors and Debtors (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 145a 146a 147a 150a lSOb 169a 169b .181a LIST OF FIGUES on“? Page 1 : - Location of the Village Haripur . . . . . . . 28a 2 Villagefiarlpur'..o............ 693 ; Chart 0 1 Showing Hierarchy of Castes in Haripur . . . 64a vii Appendix 1 2 3 d LIST OF APPENDICES Panchayat and General Elections and Parties. Change in Land Amount Owned by Bach Caste. . Basic Demographic Characteristics . . . . . Political Affiliation According to Caste andLand31zeI1.959000000000000 Political Affiliation According to Caste and (Class) Land Size: 1964 s 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 viii Page 200 201 202 203 206 :51 “ t! "V; s. 1 I52! I w' ‘V1 Li 5 lit" ‘ I CHAPTER ls INTRODUCTION As put by Myron Weiner, “While most other nations of Asia and Africa have generally been moving in the direc- tion of greater authoritarianism, India has moved toward a “1 The Indian Constitution greater democratization of power. abolished all distinctions based on caste and religion; popular governments based on adult suffrage were introduced in all states; many states passed land reform legislation eliminating large concentration of landed property: commun- i ity development programs were introduced in all the states: and finally, in the year 1959 a few states introduced ggnchayati raj or democratic decentralization to be followed subsequently by all other states. While all these changes had their impact on the socio—economic and political life of the villages, panchayati raj was supposed to have pro- found consequences for political power and leadership not only at the larger societal level but also at the village community level as‘well.2 ' ' luau... Myron, “India: Two Political Cultures,“ in L.w. Pye (ed) Po itical Culture and Political Devel ent, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1 , p.207. 2Government of India, Balwant rai Mehta Committee Raggrt, 1957. Also Bendix, Nation Buildin and Citizenshi , New York, New York: John WiIey 5 Sons, I964, pp. 584-550. l £5! ,:1 51 5:" 2 Statement of the Research Problem: This study is concerned with the dynamics of power relations in a village community in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. Specifically, it focuses attention on the impact of panchayati £51 on political power and conflict. Here we define power as the capacity to control or influence others. Accordingly, by political power we mean the capacity to control or influence the decisions pertain- ing to a given community, and by political conflict as the contest for political power. In viewing the impact of panchayati £21 on political power, we are concerned with the class and status backgrounds of the political leaders in the village. It is proposed to ascertain whether there is any difference in the class and caste backgrounds of the leaders before and after panchayati £21. While viewing the impact of panchayati £51 on political conflict, we are in- terested in finding the effects of political equalitarianism, consequent upon the introduction of panchayati £21, on the nature of political conflict. It is proposed to determine whether the conflict is between different strata or factions, or something else.“ Drama of Reference and Approach to the Study of the groblem: We wish to study the proposed problems in the context or frame of reference of the village community. We define the village cemmunity as a "social system encompassing a territorial unit within which members carry on most of their it'lfi' 5'] I? If .q—~.W 3 day-to-day activities necessary in meeting common needs."3 We assume that the village community ”functions as a soc1al unit‘with boundaries which result from interaction between its economic base, its social base, and the prevailing sys- tem of power relations?4 and as such the village community is a suitable place to observe power relations. This is not, however, a study of the entire community but the study of power relations in it. We take the community as a back- ground insofar as it helps us explain the dynamics of power relations.5 In this study we will try to avoid the falacy of assuming that the village community is a closed locality system “as if the larger society does not exist."6 The notion of the "self sufficient village republic“ is nothing but a myth.7 Under the panchayati'rgl three tier system each village is vertically linked with the surroundfhg region ILoomis, Charles P. and J. Allen Beegle, Rural Sociology: The Strate of Chan e, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-HaII, Inc., I553, p. 22. 4 Form, William H. and Delbert C. Miller, Industgy, Labour and Communit , New York, New York: Harper an Erothers, I930, p. §34. 5Arensberg, Conard, ”The Community-Study Method,“ American Journal of Sociolggy, Sept. 1954. p. 120. 6Steward, Julian H., Area gesearch Theory and Pgactice, Social Service Researc ounci , 0, B etin 7Srinivas, M.N.. “The Myth of self-Sufficiency of :2; Indian Village,“ Economic Weekly. Vol. 12, 1960, pp. 1375- .E’fz-i -‘. 1‘, r: -a-y I; is.” 4 and state. Hence, we assume that the village is a “part- society“ if not an exact microcosm of the larger nation- society. With community as the frame of reference, we propose to approach the problems of power and conflict from a structural-historical perspective. In this study our in- terest is in “power,“ “status," and “class" and their inter- relationships. The structural approach allows us to ex- plain “the existence of some element of social behaviour, however, “element“ may be defined, by its relations to other elements and the relations of these elements to one another in some configuration, a social structure or social .8 10 11 system. Mills,9 Lynda, Hunter and other sociologists made use of this approach. Further, since we are also in- terested in the study of change in the relations between Aclass,” “status,“ and “power", we feel, in line with Moore, that “the principal basis of organizing a discussion of I.12 social change is structural. Following Mills we also 8Romans, G.C., I'Contemporary Theory in Sociology,“ in Paris (ed) Handbook of Modern Sociolo , Chicago, Illinois: Tend McNally & Co., I963, p. 961. 9Mills, C.W. -gower Elite, Fair Lawn, New Jersey: -0xford'Univ0rsity Press,’ 9. 1oLynd. R.S. and H.M. Lynx, Middletown in Transition, New York, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 195’. 11Hunter, F., Communit P wer structure, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: North CarEIIna UnIversIty Press, 1953. 12Moore, W.E., Social Change, Bnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., , p. 25. its} 351 1&1! [as hi “I .V i‘ ., "g I :2‘:" - A _.~/_ ‘— c 5 feel that a sociological or structural study “requires an historical scope of conception and a full use of historical ,13 materials. Schulze lamented the stress on the "mere contemporary“ to the neglect of “historical depth“ in the community power structure studies.l4 Form and Miller, too, echo the same feeling.15 Finally, it is believed that to- day the develOping countries are arenas for conflict between i the old and the new, and, therefore, a theoretical approach ‘ which “regards conflict as abnormal, or that invests equi- l “16 librium with a special value is a handicap in studying communities in these countries. Review of Literature: Let us now briefly review some of the relevant theoretical literature and deduce meaningful hypotheses for the guidance of this study. Sociologists since Weber considered “class,“ “status,“ and “power“ the three main dimensions of social stratifica- tion. Marx felt that the upper economic class which owns 13Mills, E.W.. The Sociolo ical Ima ination, New York, New York; Grove Press, Inc., l§§l, p. 145. l4Schulze, R.O., "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite Society,“ in Janowitz (ed), Cbmmunit Political S¥Items, New York, New York: The Free Press 0% GIencoe, 1 1, pp. 20 to 80. 15Porn and Miller, cited. , 16Srinivas, M.N., Social Chan e in M dern India, Berkeley, California: The university of California Press, £9.93 9.; PP! ,159'160- 3‘ if [if ' I?" 6 the principal means production in a society was also the ruling class, and that it also controlled the means of 17 ‘ political domination. Michele contradicted Marx's thesis as indicated by the following: I “The Marxist's thesis of the identity between the i economic and political class does not express the whole truth of historical analysis. Our own | studies convince us that the leading economic groups maintain always a rather distant relationship to political power." 18 Bottomore says that although “economic dominance has very often been the basis for political rule,“ poli- tical power “itself may create new social classes, new 19 prOperty rights, new privileges,“ etc. Commenting upon Marx's thesis, Bottomore writes that “since political democracy is such a recent growth Marx can hardly be blamed for having failed to consider all its implications for the association between econOmic and political power."20 Marshall21 and Bendix22 with Bottomore, see the importance of adult suffrage or “citizenship“ in creating new loci of power in a society. In fact, while he gave much importance 17Bottomore, T.B., Classes in Modern Societ , London, England: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 196;, p. 61. 18 Michele, 8., First Lectures in Political Socio- lggy, Harper & Torch, 19 , pp. 08-10 . 19 Bette-ore, cited, p. 14. ZOIbid. , p. 62. 21Marshall, T.H., Class, Citizenship and Social ggvelgggent, Anchor Books, 1950. 22Bendix, cited. ’l h” I?! Ii." 7 to economic position Marx did take notice of the importance of adult suffrage. He wrote: “The carrying of universal suffrage in England would, therefore be a far more socialistic measure 1 than anything which has been honoured with that name in the continent. Its inevitable result, here, is the political supremacy of a working class." 23 Thus, even though-the above discussion is limited to the societal level, it would not be wrong to assume that at the community level while pglitical pawer normally is a function of economic or class positionI the introduction of adult suffrage would byiitself create new loci of power and conseguently leaders would emerge from among the lower classes as well. Community power structure studies by Hunter24 and Miller25 show that a very few leaders who are mainly businessmen control the decisions of the communities. The authors conclude that the communities they studied present elitist or pyramidal power structures. While these socio- logists took to positional and reputational approaches, Dahlzafound in the community a pluralistic structure, that the leaders varied from one issue-area to the other, and 23from Bottomore, cited, p. 62. 2“Hunter, cited. 25Miller, D.C., “Decision-Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City,“ American Journal of Sociolggy, November, 1958, pp. 299-310. 26 Press. Dahl, Who Governs, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 8 that the economic dominants were not the only community in- fluentials. In subsequent studies sociologists too have come out with different varieties of power structures. Hence Bonjean says that “today no one would deny the exist- ence of different patterns of leadership in different cam- | “27 . munities or in the same cammunity over time. Form and Miller suggest five models of community power structures, but conclude that "there is always a tendency for political power to become a direct handmaiden to economic power.“28 For our purposes Schulze's conclusions seem to be very pertinent. He found that; "The power structure of a relatively isolated and self-contained community tends to be mono- lithic, that is, that the persons who have greatest power in its economic system tend to be the same persons who have greatest power in its socio—political system. As the community becomes increasingly involved and interrelated in the large societal complex, however, its power structure bifurcates, resulting in two crucial and relatively discrete power sets, the economic dominants and the public leaders.”29 Of course, we have to note that even in the commun- ity studied by Schulze the “potential“ of the economic dominants was considerable and the public leaders could not effectively take community decisions independent of the former. 2‘IBonjean and Olson, “Community Leaders: Directions of Research,” Administrative Science Quarterly, December, 1964' V01. 19' No. ' p. 2 o. 28 ‘ Form and Miller, cited, p. 501. 29Schulze, cited, p. 22. '5'."— ['25 e '25 1,, .u h I i? If? 1“? .— fipfifliw-’. 9 In a village study in the state of Madras, India, Beteille found that “the processes of economic change and political modernization have led the productive system and the organ- ization of power to acquire an increasing degree of autonomy.“ But Beteille does not treat his findings to be conclusive as there are no comparable studies in other parts of the country.30 Hence, following Schulze and Beteille, we pro- pose to test the hypothesis that a traditional community will be dominated by a few economic dominants and that the ppger structure will be monolithicI As the community gets more politically modernized and gets involved more and more with the larger system, it will have a polylithic power structure and political leaders grow indeppndent of the economic dominantsa In the traditional agricultural communities land is the main source of economic power. In most of such soci- eties some individuals have been given land by the rulers and these grants usually carried with them some administra— tive responsibilities. These individuals thus became a part of the ruling elite, and thus maintained great political power. he put by Lenski, “Land ownership, when divorced from public office, was valued chiefly as a means to obtain pres- tige and economic security while public office was used 3°Beteille, 3.. CasteI glass and Power, Berkeley, California: University 0 California Press, 1966, p. 225. I”! y..- 53: .‘am [‘1 s 1“. is: I o I n I; I. i" lo primarily for political and economic advancement.“31 In Indian villages there always existed two or three officials who were appointed by the government and whose positions ’ were hereditary. Usually these officials also belonged to higher castes. Hence, we assume that in a traditional communityI given the same economic ppsitionI pegple with public office will have more political power. With pplitical p modernizationI howeverI their position will diminish. In the Indian context it is also essential to take caste status into account. In India, membership in an upper caste gave prestige and the Brahmins enjoyed ritual power. This ritual power carried with it political power too. The Indian constitution has abolished the caste system and it is gradually disappearing. However, in the rural areas prestige and deference are still largely graded along caste lines. Hence we assume that in similar economic positions these who belong to uppgr castes have more access to poli- tical power than those belonging to lower castes. Political modernization may, howeverl stimulate leadership from among the lower castes, It is believed that elections would help those with numerical strength to gain ppsitions of political 2233;. Studies of Indian villages by Srinivas,32 Mayer,33 31Lenski, 6.3.. Power and Privile s, New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 529. 32Srinivas, M.N. “The Social System of a Mysore Village,“ in Marriott (ed) Villa e India, Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. 33Mayer, A.C., ”The Dominant Caste in a Region of Central India,“ gguthwestern gournal of AnthrgpologyI Vol. 14, 1958, ”0 ‘07-2 . _. ‘2 - '_-’.v {.7 .‘- 'Iir ' —. O. _ 11 35 Beteille36 and others ShOw that the Nicholas,34 Orenstein, influence of the Brahmins has weakened considerably in the villages. Among the non-Brahmins the upper caste peasant groups with major portions of the lands in the village are reported to be holding the positions of key influentials in the village. It is also reported that the castes are more and more becoming, in Parsons term, adaptive structures with functions such as group security and solidarity. But none of the studies made a conscious effort to investigate the process of political mobility from among the lower castes consequent upon the Introduction of panchayati r 1. The Nature of Political Conflict: Sociologists differ in their views as to the import- ance of cOOperation and conflict in the Indian village com- munities. Some argue that in the villages conflict is rife and that the village community is a product of coercive in- tegration between the high and low castes. Others emphasize the harmony of caste interaction and social unity. Never— theless, the fact is that the village social system reflects both cooperation and conflict. However, one should note V that “greater political equalitarianism provides more oppor- tunities for political mobility and also stimulates 34Nicholas, R.. Structures of Politics in the Villa es of Southern Asia, in Singer and Cohen Z335: Struc- ture and Change in Indian Society, Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishers, 1968. 35Orenstein, H.. Gaona Conflict and Cohesion in an :ggian Villa e, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University as, I935. 36Beteille, cited. '0'! all (In I”) la— 12 aspirations to politically influential positions,“37 and that in any political system “where power is transferred to old bodies or new bodies of power are created, there is in- variably an increase in political conflict.”38 Hence, it ; is believed that with the introduction of panchayati raj there will be an increase in political conflict. We have been following the definition that power is the capacity to control or influence others. But we have to note that the capacity of an individual is rooted in organizations and cliques. Hunter recognized this when he wrote that "power of the individual must be structured into associational, clique or institutional patterns to be effec- tivee It 39 Following the definition of power by Weber as "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal act even against the resistance of others,"40 Dahl and other political scientists conceived power in individualistic terms.41 Presthus, a political scientist, saw this defect. He wrote: 37Seligman, L.G., “Political Mobility and Economic Development,“ in Smelser and Lipset, (eds), Social Structure and Mobilit in Economic Develo ent, Chicago, Illinois: :IaIne Publishers, I533, p. 345. 38Weiner, cited, p. 209. 39Hunter, cited, p. 6. 4oGerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Socio— lggy‘ Oxford Press, 1946, p. I85. ‘lnahl, R.A., “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,“ ”gaggican Political Science Review, June, 1958, p. 150. 13 “One shortcoming of Weber's definition is that in focussing upon the individual's aspect of power, it neglects, to some extent, its more important social dimension. This is a crucial emission, for even though the power of indivi- duals qua individuals can be empirically deter- mined, ... individual's power is always worked only within some larger framework of institu- tional power.“ 42 Vidich and Bensman show that in villages politics are focused upon personalities rather than issues. But they believe that in order to ascertain the strength of the leaders one should look for the groups from which they draw their support.43 There is a controversy among the social scientists as to the importance of caste in the field of political conflict at the village level. Some feel that with panchayati raj, caste groups come into conflict with one an- other. Srinivas observed that in the villages a caste group with high economic, political, and ritual power is the dominant caste. In case it is also numerically quite large its dominance is considered decisive. Others feel that not only the leaders of the dominant caste but also the leaders of the other castes get split into factions and, therefore, the element of caste is neutralized. Nicholas finds the elements of both horizontal and vertical cleavages in two villages of Bengal, India. After 42Presthus, R.. Men at the Top. Oxford Press, 1964, p. 50. 43Vidich, A. and J. Bensman, Small Town in Mass ggciety, New York: Anchor Books, 1960. 143 If 14 making a comparative study of various research reports on political conflict in about 20 villages in India, Nicholas concludes; 1. "The dominant mode of political conflict in Indian villages is between factions.... A faction is a non-corporate political conflict group, the members of which are recruited by a leader on the basis of diverse ties. 2. Inter-caste conflict is only important in village politics where the dominant caste is less than half of the total village popula- tion, and 3. Most of this conflict is not between castes which are in adjacent hierarchical positions, but between high ranking dominant castes and populous low-ranking castes." 44 The above conclusions are worth testing in the con- text of a village community in some other parts of the country. Nicholas' conclusions however, do not touch the composition of factions along class lines. While it is 45 and Beqira?6 argue true that sociologists such as Heberle that in peasant rural communities conflict will not take the form of class conflict, we believe that with politici- zation of the entire community and society there will be “Nicholas, cited, pp. 278-279. 45He'berle, R., Social Movements, Des Moines, Iowa: Apple Century Crofts, 19 l. 46Beqiraj, Peasant in Revolution, Ithaca, New York: Cornell university Press, I563. H7- in? 15 developing a tendency for some faction to attract relativ- ely more affluent classes while the other faction attracts relatively poorer secuons of the community. This may, of course, depend upon the nature of the leaders and the political affiliations of the leaders. A leader with leftist affiliations may have more following from among the lower classes. Our analysis has been made on the assumpdon that power is mainly potential and that it is inclusive of "in- fluence.” Danzger points out that if power is defined as potential, “the central query would be who can wield power when he so desires?“ and not “who wields power.“47 Danzger argues, if the former is the proper question, then one would be interested “with describing the resources controlled by the leadership and perhaps with spelling how these re- sources facilitate the exercise of power.“ According to him this approach not only focuses attention on the relative power of each leader but also makes understood the changing power relations in community. He writes: "A second difficulty for research on power is in- herent in the definitions used by both Hunter and Weber. Both define power in terms that tend to force the investigator to focus on the power- ful, to overlook the power of the less powerful, to fall to differentiate the areas or scopes of power, to neglect the ongoing dynamics of power relations -- the give and take involved. In- stead, the investigator is forced to focus on 47Danzer, H.M., “Community Power Structure: Problems and Continuities,“ American Sociolggical Review, Vol. 29, no. 5 ' cachet, 19 6 O p. o 9'. M: ‘1 ‘t— In? 16 who had made what successful power decisions. Power is seen as a relationship in which the actor exercising power is either able to get his way, in which case he has power, or un- able to get his way, in which case he has no power.“ 48 In another context Lenski also echoes the same belief. He writes that "it may be well to take note of Simmel's observation that where the rule of law or right prevails, there is always a two-way flow of influence between the more “49 powerful and the less powerful. Bierstedt's stress on taking into account the various sources of power of the con- tenders, illustrates the same viewpoint.50 It is here believed that by following Danzger's method of counting all the resources of each of the leaders in the conflict, it would provide us with a measure of the relative capacity of each leader to influence community decisions in a given context. We would assume that one's ability to succeed in a conflict is a function of the resources - human and non-human -- at one's dispgsal. This would be the nearest possible approach to counting “the lines of action available to each actor in the situation" as conceived by Abramson, pg. 21.51 “Ibis. , p. 714. 49Lenski, cited. p. 58. soBierstedt, R., “An Analysis of Social Power,“ aperioan Sociological Review, Vol. 15, 1950, pp. 730-738. 51Abramson, 25 a1.. “Social Power and Commitment: A.Theoretical Statement?” American Sociolpgical Review, vol. 23, February 1958, pp. 1 - . Q: Li iii" In.“ ' 17 In the foregoing discussion we concluded that factions are formed on the basis of many ties that the leader has with his followers or dependents. Srinivas suggested that other things being equal one's ability to control others is a function of patron-client relationships. He says, “the relationships of master and servant, land- owners and tenants, and creditor and debtor ... viewed collectively as the relationships of patrons and clients... are the bases of vertical relationships between individuals 52 One would expect l and, through them, between families.“ ' that with the land reform legislation the landowner-tenant relationship would not necessarily be reflected in the leader-follower relationship. Whether creditor-debtor and master-servant relationships would lead to leader-follower relationship depends upon the alternative sources of loans and income available in a community. Blau states that among others the two factors that give independence to the subordinates are the availability of alternative resources and a lack of need of the particular services.53 This is in line with Emerson's statement that ”power resides implicitly in the others dependency.“54 With the increasing 52Srinivas, cited. 53Blau, Exchan e and Power in Social Life, New York, New York: John wIIey, and Sons, T§EZ. 54Emerson, “Power Dependence Relations,“ American Sociolpgical Review, Vol. 27, February 1962, pp. - . 18 conflict between the economic dominants, consequent upon the introduction of panchayati 521, one would assume that the pressures on the low-income groups would be less, con- sequently creditor-debtor or master-servant relationship would not necessarily lead to leader-follower relationship as in the traditional community. Oscar Lewiss? Nicholas, and others reported the l importance of kinship relations in the formation of factions. j But in a recent village study Sharma56 reports that Hnship is not that important in faction formation. One would assume that with more and more pplitical modernization kinship would become less and less impprtant and instead political . pgrty affiliations may gain more and more importance. Indian village studies do not pay attention to the study of concrete disputes in the villages. Casually, many report that with the introduction of panchayati raj village ~ disputes are being more and more referred to courts of ustice and man a time the dispgpes turn ingg violent con- flicta A study of such cases would tell us more about political conflict, its sources, and also the actual ways in which the leaders try to win over the others. Hence, a study of cases of village disputes will be studied for purposes of the analysis of political power and conflict. 55Lewis, 0., Villa e Life in Northern India, Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1958. 56 Sharma, Emer in Pattern of Rural Leadershi in gpdia, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1966. ..s,~\\ .3 19 Model of Analysis: Since we are interested in the study of the impact of panchayati £21 on a village community power structure, we will use a before and after model of analysis. We use what Hyman calls a “pseudo-longitudinal design.”57 Hyman makes a distinction between genuine and pseudo longitudinal research designs. He classifies studies by Lynda and Redfield, Middletown in Transition and A Village that Chose Prggress respectively. as being genuine. These authors : compared communities at two different points in time, and . the study made at one time became a baseline study for the study made at a later time. Where there is no such base- line study, the investigator makes historical reconstruction of relevant facts in the past and then a comparison is made between this reconstructed past and the present. Since we have no baseline study, the pseudo-longitudinal model of analysis is utilized here. A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF VILLAGE AND COLLECTION OF DATA: Selection of the Village! The Telangana region of the state of Andhra Pradesh experienced a Communist led, armed peasant revolt during the years 1948 to 1950. The Nalgonda district generally and the Suryapeta taluk in particular was the central locus of the revolt. Early introduction of progressive land reform 57H Hyman, ”Research Design,“ in Ward (ed), Studying gglitics Abroad, Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., , we " e --—-q-fl 20 leslation in the region was the result of the revolt. In line with other areas of the country, general elections based on adult suffrage were introduced in the area and slowly Communist domination faded out. The introduction of panchayati 531 or democratic decentralization further re- duced the strength of Communism in the region.* But, in alyapeta taluk many villages continued under the influence of Communism. The researcher was curious in finding out the circumstances under which the Communists continued to wield influence and power in the villages which had been so democratized under the panchayati 551. Hence it was decided to choose a village the panchayat of which was controlled by Communists, and then to devote attention to the analysis of the nature of the dynamics of power and conflict, if any, between different strata or factions over the period of the period of time. The researcher had visited the suryapeta Panchayati Samiti on August 25, 1967 and began to collect basic infor- mation about the village panchayat. During the course of sitting with the panchayati extension officer of the Samiti, the researcher found that some residents of the village Haripur discussed the political situation in the village. On inquiry it was revealed that the village had been for a long time under the domination of the Communists and the president of the Samiti was never a non-Communist. In 1966 fisee Appendix No. l. 1h: ~N5N 3...!“ \J‘ ssh.- 21 the president was ousted due to some allegations against him consequent upon a violent conflict between the Con- gressites and the Communists. On obtaining further details concerning the village, the researcher felt this village would fit the research design which had been drafted earlier. Selection of this village also seemed to meet the criticisms 8 that many researchers of Indian village commun- ities selected villages which necessarily had a "dominant caste“ and consequently village conflict revolved around that caste. The village Haripur did not have any single dominant caste. Hence on this count also it was decided that Haripur village would be ideal for the present study.59 Establishment of rapport: Unlike many community studies, much of the problem of establishing rapport with the residents of the village was solved even before the researcher entered the village. Since the situation in the village was somewhat tense and a case against the ex-president of the panchayat was pending in the court, leaders of the rival factions almost daily 58“The commonest kind of village described in the recent anthropological literature in India is one...dominated by a single caste.... Whether this is the 'typical‘ village in Indian may lie open toquestion“ B.S. Conn: Anthropologi- cal Notes on Disputes and Law in India, American Anthrgpolo- gist, Vol. 67, 12/1965, p. 86. 593! no means we take this village as the 'typical‘ one. At best it presents a situation forthe study of the working of democratic decentralization in a village which was ones under feudal regime and now is under the influence of the communists. 22 approached the panchayat extension officer and the officer would introduce them to the researcher. Friendly discussions with them as well as his University affiliation (suggesting disinterest in active local politics) made the local leaders trust the researcher. The eldest Deshmukh of the village, once a dominant figure but now settled in the taluk headquarters, was also helpful in creating rapport with the local leaders. In fact the Deshmukh was by then regarded by many as one disinterested in village politics. Sympathetic understanding of the purpose of the research by the taluk Congress and Communist leaders also was instrumen- tal in encouraging cooperation from the village leaders of all factions. Thus, about 15 days stay in Suryapeta was sufficient to make the researcher acceptable to the village leaders. However, the researcher did not choose to go to reside in the village then since the leaders were at that time busy with the case in the court of law and the villagers, in their absence, would not fully cOOperate.6° The village Patwari, the keeper of land records, too was reported to have gone out of the village for some time. Even so, he visited the village along with the panchayat officer éoAccess to the lower level leaders or general masses is possible only through the important Community leaders. The latter are the Opinion leaders too. i! ll urns. d. .mfl. .WM\ 23 accompanied by a local Communist leader for two days. Sub- sequently the researcher stayed in the village for about one month during 1968, and for about two months from June through August, 1968. A short visit of two weeks was again made during December, 1968. Collection of data; Notwithstanding choice of the community case study method and appreciation of its merits,61 the researcher was also aware of its weaknesses.62 To the extent possible factual and quantitative material was gathered on various aspects, thus avoiding mere impressionistic statements. All the statements made in the Text are the outcome of the in- formation elicited from the informants and drawn from factual evidence. Basic socio-economic data as to family size, sex, age, education, occupation and caste were gathered through individual enumeration of each of the families in the vill- age. Information as to owner-tenant, master-servant, creditor-debtor, and kinship relations was elicited from the caste heads or from the creditors, landlords etc. with 61See: Vidich, Bensman, & Stein (ed): Reflections on Communit Studies, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, I933, p. x: - Preface. 62See N.J. Smelser: Sociology and the other Social Sciences in Lazarsfeld, Sewell, Wilensky (ed): The Uses of gggiology, Basic Books, Inc. New York, 1967. 24 occasional checking with their counterparts. Details regard- ing land ownership over a period of time was drawn from the official records kept with the village accountant. List of voters and wards at the time of the two panchayat elections could be had from the village panchayat office. Political affiliation of each of the families was determined with the help of two leaders from each of the two factions during each of the election periods. Selection of the informants. In the initial stages, the informants were the five village leaders -- 2 Congress party members, 2 Cemmunists and one neutral -- introduced by the panchayati extension officer. The Deshmukh living in the town was also an infor- mant. Having had from them sufficient information regard- ing some of the main events in the village between 1947 and 1968, the researcher began to contact and collect in- formation from other individuals mentioned by the six original informants. There informants aided in the recon- struction of the sequence of events in the village. Thus, about 12 persons were helpful in a major way. Gradually, after the enumeration of the households 'was completed, a list of 25 knowledgeables, including the above 12, was prepared. They included: 10 heads of the ten populous castes, 2 village officials, and 13 village leaders not included in the two previous categories. These knowledgeables were useful in providing information on various events from various points of view and also in ' 25 ’ determining the reputation of the "activists" in each of the ’ periods under study. It may be pointed out that many of activists were from the twelve informants who were helpful in the initial stages. Analysis of events: Contrary to expectation, conflict in the village did not concern any basic issues of community importance. In fact, since no community developmental activity was under- taken by the panchayat, there could be no occasion on which an issue could arise. Under the circumstances, only inter- personal disputes came to be important events around which political conflict centered during and after the panchayat elections. Hence all the important events or disputes which had village-wide ramifications had to be carefully recorded , and analyzed. Inneny cases the disputes were those which were referred to courts and they could be re-constructed with relative ease. But with regard to the others more effort was needed. Nonetheless, in order to arrive at the truth of each of the cases opinions of various peeple, leaders and non-leaders, had to be elicited. All twenty-five knowledgeables were useful in this enterprise. In view of the nature of this study, no prepared questionnaire was used during the course of the investigation. Notes on each interview were recorded and the nature of each further interview depended on the material gathered during the previous one. Only in this way was a meaningful and i E ? 26 coherent picture of the village political situation poss- 1blO. Ogganization of the Material and of the Text. The Haripur village panchayat was legally constituted in the year 1959. With a view to analyze the impact of this new legal institution on the village power structure and conflict pattern, we follow the “before and after“ model. Accordingly we organize our material into pre-panchayti £21 and panchayati £31 periods. However, since our interest is also in the analysis of the dynamics of power relations over a reasonably long period of time covering certain important events, the period between 1945 and 1968 was selected for our study. This period is divided into the following sub-periods depending upon the nature and import- ance of the events therein: 1945-1959: Pre-panchayati 521 period. 1959-1964: First phase of panchayati 521. 1964-1968: Second phase of panchayati £_j. Analysis of these periods is presented in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Further, since this is a study of a community and we expect the societal forces to have an impact on locality social structure, we undertake in chapters 2 and 3 to analyse the major changes at the regional and community levels, respectively. Hopefully, these chapters provide basic material necessary for any kind of meaningful under- standing of the problems discussed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 27 In the beginning of each of the analytical chapters (4, 5 and 6), we have stated some working hypo- theses. These hypotheses have served to guide our analysis of the material and discussion of the conclusions arrived at in each of the chapters. The last chapter, chapter 8, presents a brief sum- mary of our findings relating to the impact of panchayati 531 as well as our findings regarding the relationships be- tween caste, class, power, and conflict in a changing Indian community. I, CHAPTER II: THE TELANGANA REGION In the first chapter we assumed that a village com- munity was not a closed locality system: rather it was assumed that the village was always linked with the larger society and this linkage with the external system is be- coming broader day-by-day as the society becomes more modernized. Even if the village community is not a “micro- cosm“ of the "macro nation-society," it certainly reflects to a great extent the changes taking place at the larger societal level. In fact many political, legal and adminis- trative actions in the country in general, and in the region in particular, were intended to bring about structural and cultural changes in the villages. The village under study is located in Suryapeta, Taluk of Nalgonda district which is a part of the Telangana region of the Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh (Map 1 attached). The Telangana area consists of nine districts and until the year 1956 it was a part of the erstwhile state of Hyderabad. The Telangana area and more particular- ly the Nalgonda district was the birthplace of some very important social, econOmic and political revolutionary and reform movements. These movements gave a spurt to the enactment of progressive land reform legislation in the 28 _ 28a [ MAP 1 LOCATION OF THE VILLAGE HARIPUR (SURYAPETA TALUK NALGONDA DISTRICT) _-—__—._ -- 29 state of Hyderabad: In line with other states Community Development (C.D.) Projects were started in the year 1952. This C.D. Movement brought about many changes in the social, economic and political life of the people besides introduc- ing some important administrative changes. In the year 1956 the Hyderabad state was split into linguistic units and each such unit was merged into the adjacent area with the same language. Thus Andhra Pradish was formed with Telangana a part of it. Finally in the year 1959, the A.P. state was second in the country to introduce the scheme of Panchayatiraj. In this chapter an account of these socio— economic and political changes in the region is given under the assumption that such an account will help in analyzing and understanding the dynamics of power relations in the village under study. The Political and Economic Changes - An historical account. The state of Hyderabad, the largest of all the states in India under the British rule, was ruled by the Nizam, a muslim feudal Prince. The state was made up of three linguistic regions: The Telangana (Telugu speaking area), The Marathwada (Marathi speaking area), and the Karnataka (Hannada speaking area). While the Muslims con- stituted 11% of the population, the remainder were Hindus. As in the rest of India, the state was administratively formed into districts, each district into taluks, and each taluk into villages. The term village means a revenue 30 village or a “Mauza“ which includes the scattered hamlets known as 'Mazras“ situated within its limits.1 Each vill- age is administered by three officials: the Patwari (revenue accountant): Mali Patel (revenue collector), and the Police Patel (who maintains law and order). The Birth of State Congress Party. -- In British India (i.e. that part whiCh was not under the feudal king- doms but was directly administered by the British) the Indian National Congress, a political party, was born in the year 1885. By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century the Congress picked up momentum under the dynamic leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and began to launch mass level agitation through non-violent non-cooperative (with the government) movements for Indian independence from the British rule. The Congress, however, maintained a policy of . non-interference with the political situation in the native states. The state of Hyderabad was largely free from any ' substantial political activity or independence movement until the years 1937-38. The only organization active in the Telangana area around the thirties was the Andhra Mahasabha. This organization was principally non-political and was interested in socio-cultural and linguistic rennais- anCe. The Arya Samaj, a Hindu society, started by Swami Deyananda Saraswati, was however popular only in some towns 1Census Report: 1951 Nalgonda District, Govt. of Hyderabad, l 9 54. 31 and in the capital city, Hyderabad itself. In the year 1937 the Hyderabad State Congress, the state wing of the Indian National Congress, was formed by some leaders. The Nizam government, however, declared the formation of the political party unlawful as it felt the formation of the party detrimental to the interests of the Nizam and the state. In view of the ban of the government on the Congress party, it could not attract into its fold many leaders who could take active part in the political movement courting satyagraha (non-violent non-cooperation) and imprisonment. Swami Ramananda Tirtha, -- a bachelor Sanyasi (ascetic) from Marathwada one of the founders of the state Congress and a long time president of the party, writes as follows describing his attempts to make the Telangana leaders take part in the satyagraha movement: “To my sorrow I found that none of the senior members would come. Some ofthem were honest in that they admitted their inability to offer satyagraha and undergo suffering. After much searching Shri Rari Narayana Reddi came to me and agreed to join the movement along with his colleagues. Subsequently, however, a number of young people became active participants in the political movement against the Nizam of the state and in favor of establishing a democratic form of government. Unlike the senior leaders who hailed zTirtha, Ramanand: Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Movement, Popular Prakasan, Bom ay, , p. . 32 from urban upper classes, these youth were from the middle class as well as from among the general masses in the rural areas. The Impact of the Communist Party Sri Ravi Narayan Reddi, from the middle class in Nalganda district,was a long time active member of the Andhra Mahasabha. He joined the cengress party, as described above, in the year 1938. Radical in outlook, Sri Reddi slowly became attracted to the Communist Party of India and left the Congress Party in the year 1941. His entry into the communist party is roughly the beginning of the Party itself in the Telangana area. This change in party affili- ation of Sri Reddi created a piquant situation in the Andhra Mahasabha. Having a wide following, he was elected 'president of the Mahasabha and from that time onward the Mahasabha began to function as the Communist party in dis- guise. Consequently, the nationalist minded anti-communist senior members of the Mahasabha left the organization and formed the Andhra Conference. Over a period of time while the Andhra Mahasabha almost became converted into the Com- munist party of the state, the Andhra Conference merged in- to the Congress itself. Meanwhile the Andhra Mahasabha began to recruit members from the rural and urban masses and in line with the principles of the Communist Party, be- gan to make a plea for the freedomcf the state not only from the rule of the Nizam but also for the freedom of the r_______ 33 masses and the agricultural labour class from the clutches of the landlords. The young and progressive members from among the Congress Party and the Andhra Conference too began to raise the slogan of economic independence for the lower classes along with the political freedom of the state. The Telangana region was largely under the control of the feudal absentee landlords who owned the major chunks of the land in the villages. This structural situation campelled the political parties to think in terms of changes in the socio- economic base as well. As one could guess, by and large, the landlords, even though they had sympathies for the Con- gress as against the Communist Party, yet, were supporters of the rule of the day since their own very existence and power was a function of the continuation of the Nizam. The Muslims who were in the minority, by and large, would want the flourishing of the rule of the Nizam, the muslim ruler. The situation prevailing around the year 1965 may then be Summarized in the words of Swami Ramamandi Thirth thus: 1. “Telangana region was destined to play a prominent role in the freedom struggle. The peculiar land problem had given it a specialty and in all the movements the socio-economic aspect had to be well remembered. By and large the rural parts contained only two categories, the landed aristocracy and the landless peasantry. The landlord though few in number owned big states and the peasants had to work as wage 34 earners. This resulted in all types of in- equalities. The feudal lord was invariably aided by the autocratic regime in order to preserve his own overlordship. Naturally he was opposed to all attempts extricadng the peasant from his cruel grip. He was eager to impede the onward march of popular struggle...“ 2. The active cadre of'Telangana had been absorbed by the Andhra Mahasabha under the leadership of Shri Nargayan hddi as he was the first to take plunge into the freedom struggle. He had established a strong base in the rural part of‘Telangana area. As he joined the Com- munist party a formidable force went over the Communist ranks. The liberal section which formed the old guard had very little to do with the Satyugraha movement and they could not in- spire confidence in the new younger sections which had emerged during the last two struggles and which did not see eye-to-eye with the Com- munists. Many a budding youth with radical vision were taking shape.“3 In light of this background, the Congress and Com- munist parties intensified their agitations against the 31bid., pp. 148-166. 35 Nizam. The latter party tried more than the former to muster as much strength as possible in the rural areas. Looking at the seriousness of the situation the government in the year 1966 lifted its ban on the Congress party with a motive of starting a dialogue with its leaders and attract- ing them into the government. But the formula would not work effectively. The rulers followed a policy of con- solidating communal Muslim elements and entrenching them in power against the Hindu-dominated political parties. Con- sequently, a Muslim organization,Ittehadul-Musalmeen, was consolidated and its volunteers, the rappkars as they are called, were trained in the use of arms as a kind of second line to the regular police and army. Many a Hindu landlord too had sympathies with this organization. During the years 1946 and 1947 the entire political situation was in turmoil. At the national level it was clear that the Britishers would grant independence to India in the near future. The Muslin League, a Muslim party, was sure to be successful in being able to get Pakistan, a Muslim state, carved out of the Indian sub-continent. With the impending withdrawal of the British imperialism, the princes of the feudal states expected independence of action as to remain sovereign or join the Indian Union or Pakistan as the case may be. British India was declared independent on the 15th <1 August, 1947. In accordance with the Instrument of Accession evolved by the Indian Union government under Sri 36 Jawaharlal Nehru, one by one the princes in India announced their decision to accede tothe union. But the Nizam would not do so. Consequently political activity became more vigorous and the Rasakars supported by the Nizam government began to suppress the popular movement with an iron hand. Added to his, during the years 1946-47, the government adopted a policy of levy and compulsory procurement of grain from all types of cultivators. The manner in which the policy was implemented brought heavy suffering to the peasantry. The Communists took this opportunity and attempt- ed to put up a strong apposition to the government and its police. In the Suryapeta taluk around the village under study a number of villagers took to arms and fought the police in the fashion of a guerilla warfare. While the Congress and the Communist parties pressed the village officials, landlords, and the general public not to support the government and not to carry out any of its orders, the government through its police, military and the razakars would harass and umprison those who did disobey and/or those who were known sympathizers with the movement. The columnists, of course, took to teen and looting and even threatened to murder those who attempted to foil their tac- tics in favour of the government. Being unable to put-up with this nndwiched position, many landlords and village officials in Telangana migrated to the neighboring states in the Indian Union. Those who could not do so for various reasons or those who were loyal to the Nizam, moved into the towns and cities. 37 Looking at the deteriorating political situation in the state, the Union government of India at last took police action on 13th September, 1948 against the Nizem and the Nizam surrendered on the 17th. The state was then placed for some time under military rule followed by a civilian rule under the supervision of the Union government until a pOpular ministry was formed soon after the general elections based on adult franchise for thefirst time in the year 1951. This ushers India, after a long period of slavery, into a full-fledged democratic political system. The Armed Revolution and its Failure: Soon after the police action, the landlords returned to their villages and again began to continue their reign over the peasantry as in the old regime. Many a landlord and village officials turned to the Congress Party. The Communist party of India declared the congress controlled Union government as bourgeoisie and decided to continue their armed revolution in Telangana with a hape to over throw the government. They declared that the Nehru govern- ment was no better than the fonmer government of Nizem and once the struggle was continued the Nehru rule too could be thrown out. The Party consolidated the land-hungry rural peasant-labor force and took to killing of landlords and village officials and to distributing the lands of the rich among the tenants and the poor. This activity wasquite effective in the districts of Nalganda and Khammam. 38 Fear stricken, many landlords and rich officials again.moved out of the villages into towns. Military forces were camped in a number of strategic rural areas. Regular clashes between the military and the armed communists became the order of the day. While the military harassed the people during the day, the communists troubled them during the nights. In the process many were killed and jailed. It was rather difficult for the military to be effective against the communists as such since they were often shelter- ed by the villagers themselves. The Lambadi thandas, the habitatians of the once nomadic but now settled tribal groups who were sparsely spread out around the main villages became the targets of the military for reasons that the com- munist leaders found these places useful as their shelters and centers of activity. The Communist party however abandoned its policy of armed revolution as it found itself in a situation of con- tinuously decreasing support from the people and increasing pressure from the government. Many a leader of the movement was either unprisoned or forced out of the state and into the neighboring states. The Congress governments in the adjacent states were equally hostile to them. The Polit- bureau of the Communist Party of India realized the in- correctness of the policy based on wrong calculations of the than existing situations and decided to contest the general elections for seats in the state legislatures and the national Parliament. As one could see, this in itself 39 is a great shift in the traditional strategy of the Communist partYe The Bhoodan Movement When the Telangan region was seized through Communis- tic terrorism and consequent all-around disturbance of normal socio-economic and political life, Acharya Vinoba Bhave, an ascetic and long time associate of Mahatma Gandhi and after Gandhi's assassination the only true living expon- ent of non-violence in all its Gandhian sense, undertook Padayatra (a walking tour) of the region. He hOped this would help him meet the leaders and public of all walks of life, discuss with them and explain the necessity of voicing grievances, if any, and solving the same through peaceful non-violent means. He met the communist leaders and the government and succeeded in creating a kind of atmosphere necessary for mutual understanding and compromise for bring- ing the region back to normality. The Communists were al- ready tired of the game of warfare and therefore gave a respectful ear to the Acharya. Acharya Vinoba Bhave however, was convinced of the need of a progressive policy of land distribution in Telangana, thereby reducing the vast economic inequalities. :Being himself, a staunch Gandhian, the Acharya wanted this change to be brought about by peaceful means and by changing the hearts of the landlords by persuading them to part with some portion of their lands for the cause of eradica- tion of poverty and societal improvement. Hence, during 40 the course of his Padayatra, in April 1951 in the village Pochampalli of Nalgonda district, in his regular prayer meeting, he appealed to the Landlords to do some Bhoodan (gift of land). One landlord instantly declared a donation of some portion of his land. Encouraged by this, the Acharya spread the message wherever he went in India. The land so donated under the Bhoodan movement was handed over in each state to a committee which later dis- tributed the land, approximately five acres per family, to the landless. The government on its part used to grant loans to such people so that they may buy oxen, etc. It may be said however, that even though the movement gained momentum in Telangana, it by no means was a great success. It may be pointed out in this connection that later the Bhoodan spread into Gramdan (gift of villages) and Sunpatidan (gift of property) etc. The ultimate goal of the movement of Bhave was the attainment of sarrodaya: a social order based upon social service and non-violence and creating a caste and classless society where harmony, without conflict, would prevail. Sarrodaya was the ideal of Mahatma Gandhi. hand Reform Legislation soon after peace returned to the terror-stricken land of Telangana, the civilian government of Hyderabad, under the guidance of the Union government headed by Nehru, passed progressive legislation which is now referred to as the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural 41 Land Act, 1950. The Act was amended in the year 1954 and on various subsequent occasions. The Andhra Pradesh Ceil- ing on Agricultural Holdings Act was passed in 1961. The 1950 legislative act was mainly intended to fix the land rents, to provide security of tenure, and to bestow substantial rights on the tenants as well as to dis- courage absentee landlordism. Maximum rents were fixed in terms of multiples of land revenue varying from 3 times to five times depending upon the type of the soil. Except in certain special cases, leasing of the land three years after the commencement of the Act was prohibited. A class of tenants who were in continuous occupation of the lands of the landlords for not less than six years during or before a specified period, were declared “protected tenants“ with heritable rights and also with rights to become owners of such occupied lands. In case of non-protected tenants the period of tenure was fixed at five years and this was automatically renewed except where the landlords, following certain conditions, toOK the land back for personal culti- vation. In subsequent modifications the rights of pro- tected tenancy were also conferred on all those tenants who had leased in lands of those landlords who had.more than three family holdings. The family holding was defined as that area “which a family of five persons including the agriculturist himself, cultivates personally ... will yield annually a produce the value of which, after deducting fifty percent therefrom as cost of cultivation, is Rs. 800 ~- 42 according to the price level prevailing at the time of determination.“4 In only one district of Khamman all pro- tected tenants owning below the Basic Holding, which is equivalent of l/3rd of the Family Holding, were declared owners of the leased in land. The land area fixed as the Family Helding varied between 6 and 72 acres depending upon the type of the soil. The 1961 legislation, which was applicable to Telangana as well as to the Andhra region, prescribed the maximum size of cultivated holdings at 45 times the family holding. Accordingly the ceiling ranged between 27 and 324 acres. Thus, asone could see, the legislation was expected to transform the agrarian structure in a major way. But there were a number of legal loopholes in the legislation and these loopholes were taken advantage of by the land- lords in the form of evicting the tenants from the land and collecting rents at rates above the prescribed ones. Often, even though a family of the landlord was in actuality an individual joint family of father and son or of two brothers and so on, in official records it was shown as two separate nuclear families thereby making the two families eligible to hold enough land individually and evict the tenants. While such lOOpholes defeated the purpose of the 4Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: The Andhra Pradesh Telan ana Area Tenan and A ri tur Lan ActL. 9503 Govt. Press, Hy erabad, 58. 43 legislative reforms, it is important to note that many absentee landlords sold their lands, took other jobs in the villages, or migrated to the towns as they realized fully well that they could no longer maintain the status quo. Added to this, in many parts of Telangana the Agricultural labor force, under the leadership ofthe Communist Party, began to demand higher and higher wages and the payment of increased wages was not profitable to many small and absentee landlords. Thus, many tenants and small agriculturists and laborers could buy lands. The government also was liberal enough in granting rights of ownership to the poor, parti- cularly to the Harijans on small pieces of land that remained uncultivated and/or unowned. Thus, despite some weaknesses and difficulties the whole process resulted in a better distribution of land and manyzather than a few are now in possession of the lands in the rural areas. Community Develogment Program Independent India under the Congress party resolved to adopt parliamentary secular democracy with a federal system of government. A new Constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950. The constitution set out to clear away the differences and repression that arise out of the peculiar Indian caste system and untouchability. Any dis- crimination on the basis of sex, caste, creed and religion was prohibited. The enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability was declared as punishable under law. 44 In the year 1952, general elections were conducted on the basis of adult franchise and popular Congress ministries were fonmed both at the Center and at the state levels. The Congress government under Nehru believed in planned development and accordingly the Planning Commission was established in the year 1950 and the First Five year plan came into Operationin 1951. It was on October 2, 1952, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, that the Community development and National Ex- tension projects were initiated in different parts of the country, including the Telangana region. It was so planned that one by one all the 600,000 villages in the country, by the end of 1962, would be covered by the Projects. It was the aim of the C.D. Program to bring about developmental change in the village communities in all the fields such as agriculture and livestock, small scale industries, irriga- tion and communication, health and sanitation, education, social welfare, etc. A subject matter specialist, the ex- tension officer as he was called, was appointed for each field at the block level and all of such extension officers were put under the administrative control of the Block Development Officer, who was the leader and coordinator of the team. Each of the C.D. blocks was to cover between 60 and 100 villages and was divided into circles of five or six villages supervised by the village level worker or the Gram sevak (servant of the village community). 45 The C.D. Program in India was indigenous but it was shaped by Albert Mayer, an American architect and town planner, who was closely associated with the Etaweah Pilot Project. As put by Tinker: “Mayer tackled community develOpment as a prdb- lem in 'social engineering“, a question of bring- ing together administrative skill and technical know-how from outside, united with the local feel- ing and effort of the rustic folk, in order to achieve a physical and.mental transformation in the village milieu. Mayer placed great emphasis upon realizing the 'felt needs' of the people. He insisted that community development must be a cooperative effort between the government and the people.”5 Finances for the project came from the Ford Foundation and its representative in India, Dr. Ensminger, soon wrote “A Guide for Community Development.“ The movement proved useful in many respects. But the rate of development was not as expected by the planners. Research findings point to various cultural, social and administrative impediments to the success of the various types of prOgrams and pinpoint the hostility of the vill- agers to any programs undertaken by an outside agency, in- cluding the government. It was felt that essentially the traditional bureaucratic administrative apparatus did not transfonm itself into a real developmental administration capable of mobilizing local leadership and the masses. One of the major criticisms levelled against the C.D. program 5 Tinker, India and Egéistanc A Political Analysis, Fredrick A. Praeger, N.Y.a 9 2, p. 192. 46 was that it was more beneficial to agriculturists in general and to the upper classes and castes in particular. To quote Berreman: “... Community develOpment, as it has been de- fined in India, is fraught with potential difficulty. Briefly the problem is this: the C.D. Program aims at economic development of rural villages, with emphasis on agriculture, and at the same time it aims at fundamental changes in the social life of villages, with emphasis on democratization. In practice, the program has functioned primarily to improve agricultural productivity. As a result: its effect has been, over much of India, to bene- fit primarily the farmers -- those who own land ~- and these tend to be high caste people who are already the most economically advantaged.“6 The Indian researchers Dube, Desai and others echoed the same complaint. Dubs wrote: “...nearly 70 percent of its benefits went to the elite group and to the more affluent and influential agriculturists.“7 The split of Hyderabad State and the formation of Andhra Pgadeshg During the year 1956 a major change tOOk place in the form of reorganization of the 26 states into 14 (now 16) on the basis of linguistic division of the country. The struggle for a linguistic state was first organized by the Telugu speaking peOple of the composite Madras state. 6Berreman, “Caste and Community Development in iggéa“ Human Organization: Vol. 22, Spring, 1963, Nov. 1, 7 Dube, India's Changing Villages, Routtledge, kegan Paul, London, 1 , pp. 82-8 . 47 One Sri Potti Sriramulu went on fast unto death on December 16, 1952, and large scale riots erupted throughout the state. Consequently the Union government conceded the de- mand for an Andhra state. As the agitation for linguistic states became in- tense all over the country, it was decided to reorganize the states accordingly. The Hyderabad state was split into three of its linguistic regions and the Telugu speaking Telangana area was included with Andhra state to form the present state of Andhra Pradesh. Without going into detail, it may be necessary to point out that the “effect of re-organization was to give State politics a more intensely regional character: and to make the States a much more important level of power."8 The State politics became since then all the more caste politics. The following quote summarizes the situation in Andhra. One state where politics can be nearly equated with the rivalry of two great castes is Andhra. Before the days of universal suffrage, the Con- gress Party in Andhra was Brahmin dominated. A casts of wealthy landowners, the Kammas, began to produce Western-educated leaders in the 1930's, who in the face of the Brahmin control of Congress, joined anti-Brahmin Parties, like the Justice Party, and in due course turned to Communism ---, in its militant phase, the Communist party of India was compelled to issue a special directives to take care of its Kamma landlord supporters. The other great landowning 'middle' caste was that of the Reddis, whose emergence into political literacy came later. Their main political objective was to get even with the Kammas, and so they joined eTinker, cited. 9. 134. 48 Congress; first as Junior Partners with the Brahmins, and then as their supplanters. How- ever, in the 1955 (mid-term) election, when Congress was fighting back, after the Communist had scored on the language issue, it was decid- ed that the caste game must be played with even greater finesse. The coastal, delta region was Kamma territory: the uplands were held largely by Reddis. Congress held off until the C.P. 1. had filed its list, and then candidate for candidate, it matched the C.P.l. slate with a Congress slate of Opponents belong- ing to identical castes. That way, with superior organization and funds, Congress could success- fully trade upon caste loyalties everywhere. " 9 In Telangana too the Brahmins (not more than 4%) were the intellectual leaders but in the villages and in the region, they shared power and authority with the Reddis and, to some extent, with Velamas. The Kammas are papular in a few taluks of Khamman district. When Telangana joined Andhra State in1956, the Reddis became all the more powerful in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Panchayati Raj: The system of village panchayati or village govern- ment, in India, is, by some, traced back to antiquity. Establishment of village panchayats is included as one of the Directive Principals of State Policy of the Constitution of India. However, the roots of the present system of panchayati £21 in India lie in a report submitted in the 1957 by the team for the Study of Community Projects and 91bid., pp. 145-146. Also see: L.I. and 3.1-1. Rudolph: The Political Role of India's Caste Associations,” Pacific Affairs, March 1960. Sat Int 11 ...... ~ an... \'s 1 I .90 49 National Extension Services, set up by the Government of India to prdbe into the working of the C.D. Program and make appropriate recommendations for an efficient re- organization of the same, if necessary. The Study Team headed by Sri Balwantrai Mehta found that the C.D. Program tended to impinge on the villages from above and there was little local participation since the local leadersin all matters were looking for directives from the government officials. The Team therefore recommended that more res- ponsibility be placed in the elected councils at various levels as it felt that this method would make chaocracy function at all levels in each state and the leaders would be in a position to act in accordance with local needs and circumstances. The report therefore urged for the estab- lishment of a three-tier institutional structure of the Panchayati 521; The Panchayati, at the village level: the Panchayat Samiti, at the Block level, and the Zilla Parishad, at the District level. It is to be noted that while the C.D. program ttempted to introduce developmental administration in the place of the old revenue-dominated bureaucracy, the Panchayati raj now tried to make the official subordinates to the elected institutions and leaders. At the village level the Panchayati and its President are the real power holders and community planners. At the Block or Samiti level the President is the real authority and the Block Develogment Officer is an executive under him. At the district the Zilla Parishad and its the I: of 50 Chairman are more powerful in planning and execution than the District Collector. The Panchayati raj introduces still another element which is more relevant to us in view of the theoretical and methodological stance we took in the first chapter. These points can be made no better than in the words of Tinker: “This revolutionary proposal-aimed at liquidating the autocratic district system, which had served Mughas and British alike-~was accepted by most of the States. The new order was called Panchayati 531, no longer Panchayat 5517 instead of vi lage government, government of the villages. The distinction cannot be relegated to the realm of semantics--there is a genuine difference the 'self-sufficient villa e' conce t was finall reIin uished Henceforth the villa e mer e3 into the nei hborhood and the nei hgorhoag into the district --- The attempt to lower the level of decision making from the dis- trict to block, was reversal of the centralizing pressures of the first years of independence.“ lo The three-tar pattern was first adapted by the state of stasthan and then by the State of Andhra Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh it took legal fonm through the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959. As per this act, while all the presidents of the village panchayats are ex-officio members of the Panchayati Samiti, all the Samiti Presidents are the ex-officio members of the Zilla Parishad. Until 1963 Telangana was governed by the Hyderabad Gram Panchayats Act, 1956, -- an act which was passed just 1°Ibid.. pp. 193-194. 51 before the formation of Andhra Pradesh. Since 1964, this region, along with the Andhra region has been governed by the Law of Giram Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh, 1964. The (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) But important provisions were: (of the act of 1956) A gram panchayati could be constituted for any village or group or group of villages with a population of not less than, 1,000 and not more than 5,000: The Surpanch and Upa-sarpanch could be removed by a two-third majority vote: The gram panchayat was eligible for a grant equal to 15% of the land revenue of the village from the government. The gram panchayat's empowered to levy pilgrim tax, entertainment tax, professional tax and tax on transfers of immovable prOperty. The Panchayat could call upon the villagers to perform such labor as might be necessary for village improvement. It could constitute conciliation boards and nyaya panchayatis, if necessary. in many villages panchayats were not formed until the Panchayati raj system was adapted in the year 1959. The act of 1964 aimed at the development of village panchayats as units of local administration vested with powers relative to village life, policy, and economy. 52 The levy of house tax, vehicle tax and professional tax were made compulsory in order to ensure stable finances. The main revenue however, was derived from the share of land revenue realized in the village and duty levied on transfers of property. Other important features of the Act may be summarized as follows: (1) The Administration of each village shall be vested in the grain panchayati: (2) Each village has a Gram sabha which consists of all the adults included in the electoral roll and the sabha meets twice a year in order to suggest the improvement necessary for the village. (3) Nunbers of members of the Panchayat to be. follows: ,Village Panchayat Number of members Population in the Panchayat less than 500 5 500 -- 1,499 7 1500-- 2,999 9 3000-- 4,999 11 5000-- 9,999 13 10,000-- 14,999 15 15,000 and over 17 (4) Reservation of seats be made for women and Harijans or Tribes as follows: Ladies: One seat, if the total strength of Panchayat is seven or less; two seats if the total strength is more than seven. 53 scheduled castes or Tribes: One seat if such population is fifty or less. (5) Team of the Panchayat: 5 years. (6) Election: The electoral roll is divided into constituencies with equal members: all the members elect the Surpanch and Upa-Surpanch. The village officers can not contest the elections. (7) Duties of Panchayats; A. Obli etc but not enforceable in the court of law 1. construction and maintenance of public buildings and roads 2. Lighting of public roads 3. Construction and maintenance of drains 4. Clearing of streets . 5. Provision of public latrines and cleaning of the same 6. Maintenance of crematia and burial grounds 7. Finding out and providing means of prevent- ing and eradicating of epidemic diseases. 8. Sinking and repairing of wells for protected water supply. 9. Conservation of manurical resources 10. Registration of births and deaths 11. Establishment and maintenance of cattle pounds: etc. B. Optional: 1. Construction and maintenance of dharmasalas and choultries. 2.Promotion of pre-primary education. 3. Provision of playgrouncb and parks 4. Building libraries 5. Encouraging improved methods of cultivation 6. Encouragement of cooperatives and warehouses 7. Control of fairs 8. Implementation of land reforms 9. Development of communal harmony Since the establishment of the Panchayats, the vill- age level worker was, however, expected to carry on his community develOpment and extension work in consultation vi: 54 with the president and members of the Panchayat. The Panchayat prepares its annual budget and plan and submits to the Samiti for its approval. In effect the Panchayat President works as the representative of the village in the samiti meetings as he is the ex-officio member of the Samiti and he is one who votes for the election of the Sauiti president, who again is a village president himself. a...» nu... CHAPTER III: THE VILLAGE HARIPUR The village Haripurlwith a papulation of 2,327 persons distributed over 413 households is situated almost in the middle of the taluk, eleven miles north of Suryapeta, the taluk headquarters and marketing town. The town itself is located on the highway running between the cities Vijayawada and Hyderabad. There is no all weather road connecting Suryapeta with Haripur. A country bullock-cart, non-surfaced roadway is the only link between the two places. During rainy days the roads turn slushy at a number of points making passage of carts or cycles, and for that matter, even walking difficult. A road between Suryapeta and a village three miles from Haripur is now being surfaced and private passenger buses have already started plying over it. The Haripur villagers now travel by cart, or cycle, or on foot the three miles distance and take the bus for town. Village administration Haripur may best be described as a semi-feudal village. For about a hundred years a Niyogi Brahmin family was recognized by the Nizam of the Hyderabad state as the Deshmukh and Deshpande of the village. Deshmukh or 1'A pseudonym. 55 I 2.. A) t! 56 Deshpande are the honorary hereditary titles conferred by the Nizam on those who have been helpful to his government either in the matter of maintenance of village land records or village law and order. The general public calls the holders of these titles ”Dora," the lord. In addition to the title, the Deshmukh family was granted about fifty acres of “sari,“ partially rent-free, wetland and an honorarium of about Rs. 85/ per annum. The honorarium, or the so-called “Eppppf though paltry in amount, carried with it prestige and certain other privileges. However, as a result of the abolition of the princely and jagirdari2 system, the Deshmukhs and Deshpandes in the state have ceased to receive the “rusum” and they are now required to pay full tax on the “sari“ lands. For a long time the village was administered by the government through three village officials: patwari, Mali Patel and Police Patel. The three positions are hereditary and honorary. Patwari is the village accountant and does the jab of preparing and keeping revenue records. Transfers of land, recording of ownership, tenant rights, etc., have to be carried out through him. The Mali Patel is in charge of the collection of revenue from the Pattadars (owners) or from the tenants in accord with the demand sheet 2‘Jagir' is a free gift of villages to one. The awardee is called Jagirdar. The Jagirdari system was abolished in 1949e e. um: “ 57 prepared by the Patwari. He is also responsible for depositing the amount so collected with the treasury at the taluk headquarters. The Police Patel looks after the police functions such as maintenance of law and order, reporting to the police officials cases of theft, murder, or any sort of crime, and even a possible threat of disorder and violent conflict. Until the introduction of the panchayati raj in 1959 the police patel was also responsible for maintain- ing records of births and deaths, collecting of fines from the owners of the impounded cattle, and reporting to the higher authorities the incidence or outbreak of epidemics and asking for relief measures. All such functions are now undertaken by the village panchayat. In this village, contrary to usual patterns, all three official positions are held by the members of the Deshmukh family. About fifty years ago the three brothers of the family had their property divided among themselves and each of them inherited one of the three positions. Now their sons hold them. Payments made to these village officials in lieu of their services are in the nature of honoraria. The Patwari is paid about five percent and the police and mali patel are paid about two and a half percent each out of the land revenue collected each year from the village. For about 10 years, in recognition of the increasing load of work and the increasing cost of living, the Patwari, Mali Patel and Police Patel are also paid a monthly salary of about 30,25 and 25 rupees respectively. Notwithstanding S) (“f 3"? I" 58 the small amount of renumeration, the positions are coveted in view of the status and prestige attached to them. Of the three, the Patwari post is more sought after as it is vested with the authority to control land records and land revenue. The position of police patel requires a strong man who would have the ability to deal with the situations of conflict in a tactical way. Traditionally, these three village officials were assisted in the performance of their duties by two types of menial servants: two sethsindis and about ten 2255; madigas. Of the two sethsindis, one is a member of the Mala, an untouchable caste: and the other belongs to the Islamic religious group. As the name denotes, Yetti madigas come from the other untouchable Madiga caste. Brothers of each of these families perform their duties by turns, normally one each year. The sethsindis assist the village officials by performing duties such as calling villagers as required, carrying tapals (mail) from the village to the Eplpg headquarters, and watching the village assisted by the madigas. The duties of the madigas include: assisting the sethsindis, doing odd jobs for the officials, watching and grazing the impounded cattle and making public announce- ments in the community through the beat of the drum. As ' partial remuneration these servants were granted by the Nizam tax-free ”inam” (gift) lands, about 30 acres each for the sethsindis and about 40 acres for all the Yetti madigas. Almost ten years ago the papular Congress government 59 declared ownership rights over these ”inam“ lands by levy- ing full revenue. The Madigas are no longer required to do any service except that of making public announcements by the beat of drum as and when required by the officials. The sethsindis continue to perform the age-old duties but are paid a monthly salary of about Rs. 33/each a month. At this juncture it may be pointed out that conse- quent upon a judgment from the Supreme Court of India, all the village posts are now treated as being non-hereditary. As a reaction to this, the village officials have been demanding the government for payment of compensation for the loss of hereditary rights. The government however is still giving preferential treatment to the sons of the present incumbents of these positions. Sofar the only qualification required of any village official is imply to pass once a test given by the government each year. Besides the administrative staff mentioned above, the Nizam government of Hyderabad maintained in the village, as in other villages, various functionaries whose services were available to the officials visiting the community. These functionaries included: a potter, a carpenter, a barber, a washerman and a begari, the village sweeper. The potter would supply earthen pots and cooking utensils, and if required, would cook food. The carpenter would make necessary repairs to the wooden gates of village water tanks, and to the gates of the places where the impounded cattle are kept, and would undertake necessary repairs to the chairs Ci ...); .5‘ Us V 60 and cots used by the visiting officials. The barber would cut hair and do some massage. The washerman would wash clothes and.make beds. Finally, the sweeper would keep the choultry (public house) clean. While each of these functionaries belonged to the respective professional castes, the sweeper belonged to the male caste. In lieu of their services each was granted 3/4 tax-free inheritable ”inam“ lands ranging between 6 and 20 acres. Brothers in each of such families provide the services by turns and distribute the lands among themselves. About ten years ago these “inam” lands were declared “rytwari” or ”khalsa“ with full ownership rights over them, and the owners were no longer required to do the traditional “yetti” services. Revenue, in full, is now levied on these lands. A word of explanation might be useful at this stage. All the services as performed by the “inamu land grantees came to be referred to as “yetti” meaning literally services for no payment. The village officials and the Deshmukhs used to demand their services for no or little payment in the form of tips on almost every occasion, private or public. This amounted to slavery. There was also a time when the village businessmen and merchants were expected to supply food-stuffs to the visiting officials at no or at nominal costs. The Congress and Communist parties decried this system and accordingly this ”yetti“ practice has been abolished. Even so, the age-old practice I”) (i F‘. 1‘, ' 1’" I'm-1 61 still continues to some extent. The researcher found such functionaries doing some odd services for the visiting officials, even now. Social Stratification: The papulation of Haripur is stratified into a number of endogamous hierarchical caste groups, each of which is again divided into exogamous surname or family name groups. A prOper understanding of the functioning of the stratification system may require a brief explanation of the Hindu social system as it evolved through generations. The Hindu social system was traditionally divided into four broad strata called Varnas. This division was based upon the nature of occupation and ritual purity. These four varnas were: The Brahmins (the priests and in- tellectuals), the Kshatriyas (the warriors and kings), the vysyas (the merchants and businessmen), and the Sudras (the manual workers). The untouchables were subsequently added as the last rung to the hierarchical social ladder. The first three varnas were of “baptized“ through upansyana (the sacred thread wearing ceremony for males), prior to marriage. This ceremony was a mark of spiritual rebirth and accordingly these were called the Dvi1as, the twice- born. While the Brahmins and Vysyas remained tee-totallers, the second rank Kshatriyas did not but avoided beef eating. The Sudras were not baptized and continued to be non- vegetarians. Obviously they too accepted the Brahmanical ‘V I i 5.11.11 I." 62 social and ethical order and as such avoided beef eating. Those who continued to eat beef and to work with leather came to be treated as polluted and therefore untouchables. As one could imagine, the EEQEE 33533 was quite large and therefore it was divided into different sub-groups or castes (jatis) on the same principle of difference in occupation and ritual purity. The result was that there came to be numerous caste-groups within the Sudra varna and these varied in name from region to region. A perusal of the village and caste studies show that the Kshatriya caste as such is non-existent in a number of areas in the Southern states of India. Many local rulers belonged to the Sudra agricultural castes. Further, some of those relatively low caste groups which perceived status inconsistency, for they had political power and wealth but not correspondingly high social status, rebelled against the Brahmanical hegemony. In an attempt to sanskritize3 (or brahmanize) themselves and raise the status thereby, some have also donned the sacred thread. Those who rebelled in vain and were not reaccepted or reabsorbed into the socio- religious order, probably were treated as outcasts or outlaws. 35cc: Srinivas, M.N.: A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization, in Bendix and Lipset, (ed): Class, Status and Power, The Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 552- 63 The Visva Brahmin group of smiths and carpenters seems to be a case of such sort. As a passing reference, mention may be made of the interesting fact that at a time when the British ruled India, the Brahmins were first to become westernized (or desanstritizedi) and at that time the Sudras, though they were in competition with the Brahmins, were sanskritizing themselves, and in addition were also be- coming westernized. In our village there are 22 castes grouped into four varnas: The Brahmins, The Vysyas, the Sudras and the Harijans4 (untouchables or scheduled castes). Apparently the Kshatriya varna is not found here. The twenty-two castes are stationed in the following chart at apprOpriate levels of ranking in accord with the local behavior pat- terns of the castes toward each other. We have said earlier that the castes are generally graded on the basis of occupation and ritual purity. While this is largely true, it is difficult to say objectively which caste follows an occupation of a higher order of purity. In fact each caste, particularly in the middle range among the Sudras, claims to be equal if not superior to the other. Under the circumstances the two criteria which appeared.most useful for the purposecf rank- ing the castes in a given community, are: (l) the practice 4This is a word given to untouchables by Mahatma Gandhi. 'Harijans' means children of God. Since they are scheduled in the Constitution of India, they are called 'Scheduled Castes.” They are granted special privileges. ‘x‘ 64 relating to inter-dining and (2) the inter-personal behavior and words used at the time of addressing one another. An examination of the literature on caste studies gives the impression that researchers have rarely given the latter element due consideration. It appears pertinent to analyze the interpersonal behavior pattern as it actually takes place in the field, for such behavior would give clues to the understanding of the structural change and its direction as wells 5 (Chart I showing ranking of the castes in the village is attached). In Haripur two castes are regarded as being of equal rank when there is either the practice of inter-dining or when they do not take food at the hands of one another, and, also when interpersonal behavior is on the basis of perfect equality. The lower castes accept cooked food at the hands of the upper castes, but not vice versa. In case a.man is seated on chair or a cot, he would stand up at the sight of a member of the upper castes. In an assembly or meeting, the lower the rank, the greater the distance one would sit or stand from the upper caste. The untouchable is expected to sit or stand at a long distance from the Brahmin. There was a time when no one in the village dared to smOke in the presence of the “Dora.“ 5For a comprehensive ethological treatment of the caste structure of the area, See: Dube, S.C., Indian Village, Routledge Kegan, Paul, London, 1954. I am only pointing to those facts which are not mentioned in his treat- men . 64a CHART no.1: SHOWING HIERARCHY OB CASTBb IN HARIPUR Caste rank-level ___ I Brahmin Varna l (l)(a) Vaidiki Brahmin (b) Niyogi Brahmin (priest) (Deshmukh) (Administrator) II yysya_Va£na 2 2. Komati (Business) III Sudra Varna 3 (3)Muslim (4)Reddi or (S) Telaga (5)6anndla (7) Visva Kapu (Agri- (oil Brahmin culture) pressing) Kamsali and Kammari(Smithy) 4 (8)Golla (9)Kummari (lO)Mutrase (ll)Mere (12)Sale (Shepherd) (Potter) (Agri- (Stitch- (weaver) culture ing) and Fruit selling) 5 (l3)Gaundla (Toddy tapper) 6 (l4)Pusala (15)Chakali (l6)Mangali (Vendor) (Washerman) (Barber) 7 (l7)Vaddera (13)Yerakala (l9)Lambadi (earth- (pig-breeding, (ex-tribals work & and soothsaying) agriculture) pig raising) IV Entouchables or Harijans (including Christian converts) 8 (20)Mala (21)Madiga (Agricul- (Leather ture and work) weaving Note: Within parentheses are given the English equivalent of each caste or the ascribed occupation of each caste. 65 There is a difference in the usage of the terms of address depending upon the relative status of the addresses. If the addressee belongs to an upper caste, a suffix “garu” is added to the name as an expression of deference or regard: if the addressee is of equal or of not very low status the name of the person is uttered as it is, and, if the addressee is of a lower caste, his name will be either uttered or twisted depending upon the degree of social dis- tance as practiced at that time in the community. To illustrate the point with reference to the chart. Suppose there is a man named “Ramayya” at each of the rank levels and in each of the castes. If it is a Brahmin who is speak- ing, he would address one at the second and third levels as 'Ramayya,“ and would address others belonging to the lower ranks as "Ramaya," or “Ramiga“ or "Ramulu." If it is a Mutrasa stationed at the rank level four, he would address members of other castes of the same rank level as "RBmayya", using the name as it is, members of ranks 3, 2 and l as ”Ramayya garu,“ and members of ranks 6, 7 and 8 as "ramiga," “Ramaya,“ or “Ramulu.” Sometimes the members of the castes of adjacent rank levels do not either use words denoting deference or lack of it. Instead, they use words signify- ing equal status. For example, the Mutrasa at rank level 4 would call the one at rank level 5, as “Ramayya,” even though the latter would take food at the hands of the former and on that count the latter is of a lower caste than the former. In the same way, the Vysyas and Reddis address one 66 another with names or even sometimes with fictitious kin- ship terms signifying closeness. Of particular significance is the other practice that the Reddis and Telagas of rank level 3 eat food at the hands of all the castes of rank level 4, and the later also eat from the former. Yet the fact remains that the members of the rank level 3 are con- sidered of a higher order and accordingly they are addressed by those of rank level four with deference. As we can observe from the chart, the Kammari and Kamsali castes are Hindus, no doubt, since they believe in the basic tenets of Hinduism and the trinity of gods. But as once rebellious against Hinduism or Brahmanism, they have been outlawed, and there is no inter-dining between them and any of the other caste groups. Yet, from the point of interpersonal behavior notedabove, they are ranked at level 3. Of course, today the castes of levels 7 and 8 are reported eating at the hands of these. Kammari and Kameali (tagether with other three castes not found in Haripur), are engaged in handicrafts and are called Visva Brahmins. Separate names are given only to»mark their occupation. Otherwise they inter-dine and inter~marry. In the chart we alsonotice two other religious groups in the community. They are Muslims and Christians. Muslims as a matter of principle should eat from everyone, but in practice, under the impact of the Hindu system, they eat food only at the hands of the castes ranking five and above: and no one other than the untouchables eat at their hands. 67 Yet, from the point of interpersonal behavior they are ranked equal to the castes of the rank level three. The Christians in the village are those converted from the Malas and Madigas, and for all practical purposes they are treated as members of these caste groups. Malas and Madigas do not interdine just as is true of their Christian converts. Before concluding the explanation of the local phenomenon of caste and caste behavior, let us examine two important changes in the rural behavior patterns relevant to an understanding of the socio-political behavior in the village. As we have observed before, an individual 'Ramayya“ of the lower castes or of the untouchable caste is addressed by the individuals of the upper castes in the tone of “Ramiga,” “Ramaya” and “Ramulu.” Of these three terms, the term “Ramulu” is respectful or less inferior than the other two. Hence, those individuals from lower castes who are either politically important or who are wealthy are addressed in the third way. Consequent upon politicization and modernization, more and more individuals of lower castes with some political or economic status are being so addressed. But what is important to note is the fact that in the ultimate analysis the status of an individual of the caste system, unlike the status of one in the class system, is linked with the status of his caste group as a whale. As such, unless the status of his caste group as a whole undergoes a change, the lonely individual's status rise is always vulnerable. 68 Secondly, it has been observed that the taboo on interdining and sitting shoulder to shoulder with the un- touchable is adhered to in the village, but not in the town. As many local people have observed, in the village the realities and necessities of life, together with the control of the Gemeinschaft-like social order, compel the individuals of the higher ranks not totmix freely with the lower castes. The upper caste individuals, of course, would mould behavior to the extent essential in a particular situation. Hence somewhat liberal behavior towards the untouchable, though restrained, can be observed in the changed political context. It is a paradox that each one wants to raise his own status relative to other castes and none wants an individual from the lower caste to become one's equal, if not superior. Thirdly, in this village, as in the region, many of the Vaischnavite Niysgi Brahmin Deshmukhs have been, con- trary to Brahamanical prescription, for a long time non- vegetarians and were also used to drinking alcohol. Their ladies have been, until about the time of Police Action of the Hyderabad State in 1968 and shortly after that,in Purdah, that is wearing the veil. These two practices apparently have been adopted from the Reddi Deshmukhs of the area and the Muslim rulers of the time, probably as a matter of competition with the peers in administration, and imitation of the rulers or superiors, to the neglect of religious prescriptions: 69 Social Ecolggy: Haripur, exhibits, as do most Indian villages, peculiar ecological features. As we can see from the map 2 below, each caste group tries to reside in a particular block or locality of its own. On the main street are located, more or less in clusters, one after the other, the important upper caste groups: The Brahmins, Komatis (vysyas), Kamsalis and Reddis, followed by the Kammara, Sale, Gandla, Mutrasa, Golla, Gaondla and Vaddera. To the north, on a street Telagas and Chakalis reside. To the south are Malas and further south in isolation are the Madigas. The dispersion of the caste groups as we see from the map attached, is the outcome of population growth and consequent congestion which compelled these families toimove out of the main street and build houses at other locations. As a result we find the lower level Sudra castes and also the Vysya families building houses on the same street on which the Mala untouchable caste reside. We can however, see the tendency, even after dispersion, for a given caste, insofar as possible to build houses in a cluster. As we will see later, this sort of clustering of castes has its own impact on the nature of political'and voting behavior in that a particular caste group becomes dominant in one ward. The two»Lambadi hamlets of the vill- age at a distance of one mile are again two clusters in themselves. 69a MAP VILLAGE HARIPUR r7 wars?- \. vuaocvn ELEM .....mrom 99Pr> m. ~ :5... 2:2; 2...... 33.: u _ warm 9 _ , A . ...; Enron N r s u . m s m A M .35» .> D a A w L u m s m m nimro T D S I . U N u I n w M v ... . .9 2.1155. racism . m. u n O G PDCZDP’ 93320.1) CM ciao orator scam”. I ... H H u V A v n u u a . U V .3322.» P n Z>r> 3:» . 6.2.22.3 K‘iuuwn «.mrvu EH ‘uRYM‘I' ‘— 1‘9 FIELDS 70 Occupational Choice and gand Distribution As we have noted, the Hindu social system ascribed occupation on the basis of one's birth into a particular caste group. Presumably it worked well in a society with primitive agricultural and agricultural-based cottage in- dustrial economy. As the economy became more and more mechanized and industrialized, there was a corresponding decline in the cottage industries such as oil pressing and weaving. As population too increased by leaps and bounds, not only the traditional agricultural castes needed more of land, but the service castes also had to go in for agri- culture since making a living out cftheir traditional pro- fessions such as washing and haircutting seemed difficult. Consequently, despite the vagaries of nature and the result- ing frequent failure of crops, pressure on land increased in the villages since land was considered the source of security. Agrarian unrest is largely a by-product of this intense competition for the land which has become so scarce. In our village, except the Brahmins and three Komati (or vysya) families, all work on the farms and do manual labor such as laying roads and digging wells when necessary, irrespective of the traditional assignment of these occupations. The Brahmins related that they would not consider manual work intrinsically debasing, but have been hesitant toitake to it out of mere fear of social ostracism. No one in the community considers it a matter against the style of life of his caste to take to sheepraising 71 and business. The agricultural castes do raise sheep and some of the Harijan Malas are in business. Pig raising is still considered an activity to be undertaken by the lower castes among the Sudras and by the Harijans. Smithing and carpentry are regarded quite respectable jobs, but they are not practiced by other than the respective caste groups for the reason that the particular caste groups, namely Kamsalis and Kammaras, consider it their right. The vill- agers also do think that way. Moreover, these jdbs require specific training in the skills and such skills are not possessed by other caste groups. The case of toddy-tapping is similar. The jdbs of washing, haircutting, pot—making, and leather making are not however considered respectable by others. Hence they are strictly followed only by the respective caste groups. Bven these service castes themselves consider it defiling to follow any job other than the one traditionally asigned to each of them. The jobcf village priest is done by the Vaidiki Brahmin and noone wants really to aspire to it. As we can see from the Appendix No. 2, almost all the caste groups in the village possess lands. As on July 10, 1968 out of the total of 413 families, distributed over 22 castes in the village, 218 or 52.7 percent of the families owned land ranging between one and 350 acres. We may note that between the years 1945 and 1968 the total land possessed by the villagers of Haripur declined from 2,666 72 to 1,802 acres. Further, during the same period there was a net gain in the case of only six caste groups and there was a net loss in the rest of the 16 groups. Among those who gained are: Vaidiki Brahmin (the priest), Komati, Reddi, Gaundla, Mala, Kamsali and Vaddera. Among those who suffered greatest loss are: Deshmukh Brahmins, Muslims, Golla, Mutrasa, Madiga and Chakali. It is also significant to note the fact that of the losers those who suffered losses consistently, period after period, were the Deshmukh families, followed by Muslims, Lambadis and Madigas. The Deshmukhs lost about 75 acres to the protected tenants under the land reform legislation. Some of their properties were disposed of in order to main- tain their families, in the marriage of daughters, and in educating the children. Two families are said to have sold out their properties as the male heads of the families be- came seriously addicted to alcohol. Two families however, acquired some property in the towns. The Muslims too sold out their lands to maintain themselves and to pay for cere- ‘monies. The two groups of Deshmukhs and Muslims had their heyday under the Nizam and with his fall these groups too crumbled. These two groups are known for their inability to invest in land and to obtain greater yields. They have their lands cultivated through laborers and much of their income goes toward maintenance of the laborers. Out of a total of 8 owners in the village who leased out their lands to sharecroppers, one is Deshmukh and four are Muslims, 73 the remaining being one each from Gandla, Madiga and Telaga castes. It is interesting to note that the Lambadis had a good amount of land at their disposal in the year 1946 and in the year 1953 acquired some under protected tenancy, yet, they showed consistent losses period afterperiod. The Madigas too had substantial prOperty in the year 1946 but lost in subsequent years. In the year 1963 some of them acquired about 6 acres under the government scheme of dis- tribution of unowned cultivable land in the village to the poor and particularly to the Harijans, Mala and Madiga. Even so their position did not become better in this respect. It is said by the village Patwari and others that these low caste groups raise loans indescriminately and then sell away their lands towards repayment of loans. In fact many of them do not own more than an acre each and this small size would not help them substantially. Of those castes which gained land consistently, the Komati caste is the foremost. Of the 6 Komatis, of course, only one who possessed land in the year 1946 gained much over the period of time. He is the big money lender in the village. The Reddis and Gsaundlas, though gaining, the acreage gained is not considerable. The Vaidiki Brahmin priest again made consistent progress during the period. Malas made overall good progress and many were benefitted by land distribution. Some families progressed on account of money lending too. 74 Locking at the overall picture of land distribution in the village as it stands in the year 1968, we note that the money lenders acquired more land over the period and, despite losses, Brahmins still own a higher proportion of all land possessed by the villagers. They are followed by Gaundla, Reddi, Gsolla, Lambadi, Mala, Komati, Madiga and Telaga,in that order. The Muslims lost considerably during the period. The Golla and Gaundla are the papulous groups followed by Lambadi, Madiga, Mala, Vaddera and Mutrasa. The remainder are few in number. Employment of Agricultural Laborers: In Haripur, agriculturists who have large sized farms or whose families are small, usually employ agricul- tural laborers. These laborers are of two types: one is employed on a yearly basis and the other is employed when necessary during the intensive seasons of agricultural Operations. As of June, 1968, in the village there were about 210 families owning little or no land, and who depend upon manual labor, largely farm labor. Except the women of Brahmin, Komati, rich Reddi and some rich Telaga castes all other women do work on the farm of transplanting and cutting craps. Out of the 210 familiesmentioned above, there are about 150 laborers working on a yearly basis. Of these, 98 are employed by 46 families in our village and the rest go to work in the surrounding villages. Almost all of those who work outside belong to the Lambadi group. As we hsve 75 seen earlier, the Brahmins and some of the Komatis do not work on farms except as supervisors. Hence, four such families employ a total of 34 laborers, while the remaining 32 families employ the other 64 laborers. Of the labor pOpulation, Madigas and Lambadis are in largest proportions. Patron-Client System: As in other peasant communities of India, in Haripur many of the families of the occupational castes such as the carpenter, the leather worker, barber, washer- man and potter render their services to the other caste groups. Each family of the servicing caste is normally attached to its patrons agricultural family more or less permanently, receiving “mera”, the annual payment in kind, during the harvesting seasons. They are also attached to non-agriculturists, but in that case payments are made monthly or annually in kind or cash. The services rendered by these clients to their patrons or “Yajamanis” on payment of the “mere” are of this nature: The carpenter makes new iron and wooden agricultural implements and also makes repairs to the same. The leather worker supplies leather slippers and also leather goods essential for agricultural purposes. The barber cuts hair. The washerman washes clothes each day and also scrubs and cleans the cooking metal utensils of the Brahmins. And the potter supplies earthen cOOking utensils. Whenever special services are rendered, the clients are accordingly “tipped" or paid. 76 The special services rendered to the patrons are in this .fonm: the carpenter builds houses, carts and makes furniture; the leather worker, who is also drum beater, beats the drum on festive occasions: the barber helpd in making bathing arrangements for the relatives: the washerman goes to other villages so as to invite relatives and carries palanquin in marriages; and, then, the potter supplies earthen pots necessary during celebrations. In this village there is only one Brahmin priest and he officiates at all marriages except those of the 6th, 7th, and 8th ranks of the hierarchy chart given earlier. He is paid piecemeal even though he is presented gifts at harvest times. In Haripur all of the families in each of the ser- vice caste groups do not render the traditional services and all of the families from among the rest of the papula- tion are also not served on the basis of "mera" payments. The lower castes of fifth rank and below generally do their own washing and hire other services as and when necessary. The servicing families serve each other on the basis of service-exchange or barter system. It may be essential to point out here the fact that the service castes sometimes function in the form of labor unions. In case there is any trouble between the patron and the client, no one else from the client caste would do the service unless the original client decides it for him- self or through his caste council. Only when the caste council and the patron of his caste concerned do not agree 77 to any acceptable settlement, the matter is taken to the council of village elders which may or may not be the same as the elected village panchayat under the Panchayati Act. Further, it was observed that slowly the villagers as patrons, wish to do away with the traditional service system as they find that many of the articles necessary for agricultural Operation or for household consumption can now better be had from the town in the form of ready made goods and at a lesser cost. Consequently, the client castes, reported a gradual decline in their earnings. Basic Socio-Demggraphic Features! Now let us give brief consideration to certain demo— graphic features of the village. zypes of families: As is evident from Appendix No. 3, des- pite the idealization of the joint family in India, the village exhibits a larger prOportion of nuclear than joint families. The joint families account for only 36% of all families. Of the total 139 joint families there are 105 consisting of two generations, i.e., father and married sons living together. The rest are joint families of married brothers flying together. The upper and agricultural fami- lies however have a larger proportion of joint families than the lower, and non-agricultural castes. Probably this ex- plains the tendency on the part of the agricultural peasants to maintain joint living. Only six males in the village had two wives. 78 Households and housing: The 413 households in the village are accomodated in 380 houses. Thus while 327 families own separate houses of their own, small or big, 66 families live in 33 houses, two each. Like other villages in the region, Haripur has mainly two types of mud-wall houses, thatched and tiled. The poor build one-room thatched houses, and those who are somewhat better off build two-room thatched or tiled houses. The very poor live in circular huts although this is rare. For a long time the village had only one two-storied tiled house owned by the Deshmukh family and for the first time in 1940 that the eldest of the Deshmukhs built a terraced lime and brick house. After the Police Action, however, one terraced one and two two-storied houses of lime and brick were built by another Deshmukh, the village priest, and the village Homati money lender, respectively. As a general practice, cattle sheds are built on the farms. But those who do not own farms keep the one or two cattle they have in the living room or in a shed ad- jacent to the main house. Milk cattle in season are, how- ever, kept in the sheds close to the residences. Sex, Marital statusI and education: Out of the total pOpu- lation of 2,327 the male and female population is 51.3 and 48.7 percent respectively. Of the total, married and widowed persons account for 53%. It is significant to note that not only the entire population 20 years and above, but 79 also some below that age are married. As can be expected the married papulation below 20 years of age are more largely females than males. Again, among the widowed we find females more frequently than the males. Over 70% of the widows and widowers are over 40 and 45 years of age, respectively. _ Haripur is backward in education. Only about 15 percent are educated in the sense of reading and writing Telugu. Of the 342 educated, 200 belong to the younger generation of less than 20 years of age. The only primary school in the village reports about 250 students on its rolls, but average attendance is not more than 100 a day. The figure of 342 excludes youngsters attending school in the first two years of schooling. As is apparent from the Appendix 3, female education still is at a very low level. As we see many of the educated persons are found in the upper castes and among the Muslims. In the village there are 7 who have passed high school and one who has passed College level (B.A.) of education. Of the 7 one belongs to the Reddi caste, one is from Telaga caste, two are Brahmins and the other three are Muslims. All are employed in government service. Only the Reddi caste member is working as a teacher in the village itself. All the others are spread out in the region. CHAPTER IV: POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE PRE-PANCHAYATI RAJ PERIOD (1945-58) In this chapter we analyze the nature of political power and conflict in Haripur during the period before the introduction of panchayati £31 in 1959. Our data suggests the desirability of dividing this period into two sub- periods: 1945 to 1948 and 1949 to 1958. The year 1948 was important in that it was the year in which pOpular political movements, including the Cbmmunist revolt became intensive and the princely state of Hyderabad was terminated through police action by the central government of India. This naturally made a sharp difference in the pre- and post-police action political organization of the region, and of the community under study as well. Theoretically the pre- and post-police action periods may be properly treated as the period of pre- political democratization and the period of political democratization, respectively. Accordingly, the following working hypotheses are formulated as guidelines for the analysis of the data. A. Pre-politically democratized pgriod. Hypothesis number 1. “In a traditional, semi-isolated community of a 'pre-politically democratized (i.e. feudal) 80 81 society, individuals of the lower social and economic strata do not enter into con- flict with the traditional power holders of the upper social and economic strata.“ B. Politically democratized period. Hypothesis number 1. ”Consequent upon societal political democrati- zation, at the community level political power and hereditary social (ritual) status tend to become autonomous and economic dominants begin to assume more power than before. Hereditary public office ceases to be important.“ Hypothesis number 2. “In the initial stages of societal political democratization political conflict at the com- munity level tends to be centered around indi- viduals belonging to the upper but closely adjacent social and economic strata." Before we move on to the analysis of the material, let us be clear that the analysis itself is woven around certain significant and concrete events with the belief that this would help us group the interplay of different, yet related, forces relevant to a given situation. 1945-1947: The Pre-Communist Revolution Period. Around the years 1945 to 1947 and for a long time before, the village Haripur was more or less under the 82 domination of the eldest of the Deshmukh brothers, Sri 1 He was the biggest landlord in the village Deshmukh No. l. and was also the Police Patel. One of his cousins, Deshmukh No. 2, was the Mali Patel. The Patwari title holder among the Deshmukhs was dead, leaving behind a widow and two sons who were minors. Therefore Sri Reddi No. l was temporarily appointed Patwari. The Mala Patel and Patwari, as they themselves confessed, never dared to act against the wishes of Deshmukh No. 1. All the menial ser- vants and the service castes in the village were obedient to him. The Deshmukh No. 1 would wield his influence and authority through the council of village elders (see Table l). The members of the Council during the period, as revealed by the fifteen interviewees,2 numbered about eight excluding the Deshmukh No. 1. Caste-wise, their affilia- tions were: One Reddi, three Gaundla, one Mutrassa, one Pusala, one Vaddera, and one Madiga. All were more than 45 years of age. Of the eight members other than the Deshmukh, 1Generally pseudonyms are given to the persons after their castes. For example if one belongs to Reddi caste he is called Sri (Mr.) Reddi. In case more thancne person appears from the same caste, each of such persons is also given a number sudh as Reddi No. 1, Reddi No. 2 -- etc., in theorder they appear in the text. However, the Deshmukh Brahmins are simply called Deshmukh No. l, Deshmukh No. 2 -- etc. 2Out of the twenty-five knowledgeables selected for interview on matters of village leadership, only fifteen were of the age of about 42 years. Only people of this age could tell anything about the period 1945-47. The younger ones did not have a clear idea of that period. 82a Table 1 Council of Village Elders: 1945-47 Srl. Land Owned Positions, No. Pseudonym .Age Education in acres if any 1 1 Sri Deshmukh 45 Urdu & 236 Deshmukh No. l Telugu & police (REW) Patel 2 Sri Reddi No. 2 47 -- 32 Eldest in the Caste 3 Sri Gaundla No.1 52 -— 32 Well-to-do 4 Sri Gaundla No.2 54 -- 35 Well-to-do 5 Sri Gaundla No.3A 52 -- -- Caste head 6 Sri Mutrasa No.1 48 -- 15 Caste head 7 Sri Pusala No. l 54 -- -- Caste head 8 Sri Vaddera No. l 40 -- l Caste head 9 Sri Madiga No. 1 SO -- 4 Caste head R & W = Read and Write 83 six were the then heads of the respective caste groups and only two of the Gaundla caste were taken on the Council, purely on the basis of individual merit. Except the DesMukh, others were uneducated. The Deshmukh was well conversant with Urdu and Telugu. At that time the court and state language was Urdu, and knowledge of it was highly valued since it made possible access to officials. Of the nine members, all but three, the Deshmukh No. 1, the Reddi and the Vaddera, are now dead. 0n the testimony z z a: .4 "a a .4 «1 m e e ou-l e 1'. e 44 e H e oo-l e L10 L40 Lco Lao Loo Lao mz m2 mz mz m2 mz (c ”A CA g A A Candidates lost with “I: :3”. Es. 53“ 2‘ 'H 2‘ 2 Communists 'c u E .r: c: as O 'o 0 Group affiliation '8 5 33 3:3: 38 p.33 '33 4 Congress 05v t a: Qv z. a: <- h .-: m ~ v m A e H e 14 e «4 0 V4 0 H 0 H O H O H O H o u o H 0 via viz viz Ulz 0:2 0:2 120 and each of these wards had the same caste groups as that of the caste of the contesting candidate populous. At least, it was not smaller than any other caste group in the ward. The Congress group could not count on this advantage except ward No. 2. In accord with the final outcome, the panchayat comprised two Malas both communists, one Vaddera -- a Communist, one Gaundla -- a Congressite, one Reddi -- a Communist, and one Komati -- a Congresmember. One glaring fact however is that the numerically largest group in the village -- the Gollas, the largest group in Ward No. 4 -- the Madigas, and the single largest group in ward No. 6 ~- the Lambadis remained unrepresented in the Panchayat as none was chosen by either of the political groups. Subse- quently, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Mala No. 1 were elected President and Vice-president of the Panchayat. CasteI Class and Political behaviog: As we have noted earlier, the first two wards in Haripur elected Congress candidates. On close evaluation of Table 3, it can be observed that these two wards had more upper caste voters than others. But there were many more voters from the lower castes than from among the upper castes. This would, then, make us suspect the possibility of more upper class voters in the two wards. Hence with a view to determine whether or not caste and class factors influenced political behavior, four influentials, two Con- gress and two Communist, were asked to point out, if they 121 could, the political affiliation of all the families in the village as of the date of the panchayat election. The in- dications, made individually by each of the four were, remarkably similar. There were doubts or contradictions with regard to only 13 families. This would lead us to conclude that there is rarely any behavior in an Indian village which remains strictly personal or secret. Tables 4 and 5 would certainly suggest the impact of class and caste on political affiliation and voting be- havior. As we go from tOp to bottom on table 4, we find that as the amount of land owned increases there is a corresponding decrease in the percentage of Communist supporters. Similarly, as we move from top to bottom on Table 5 we find that large proportions of the lower castes tend to support Communist candidates rather than Congress- ites.1 Appendix 4, with cross tables, would reveal that, by and large, lower castes are more landless, suggesting a roughly monolithic political structure. We now turn to the analysis of the disputes and political cleavage among the leaders. Some Local Issues and pisputes (1959-61) Repairs to the local irrigation tank: The village Haripur has three rain-fed tanks which are used as the sources of water for irrigation. The land 1An analysis of the votes cast in the wards could not be undertaken for the reasons that no information was available as to who voted and for whom he voted. 121a TABLE 4 LANDOWNERSHIP AND POLITICAL FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1959 sri. Size 5f land N9. of families No. owned Total Communist Neutral Congress (in acres) No. % to No. % to No. % to _, Col.3 Col.3 ‘_ Col.3 l» 2___, 3 4 5 6 7 8 9__ l Landless 151 122 81.0 4 2.0 25 16.5 2 One acre and 56 34 61.0 1 1.7 21 37.3 below 3 Above one acre 125 64 51.2 5 4.0 56 44.8 5 and below 4 Above 5 to 10 41 16 40.0 3 7.5 22 52.5 and below 5 Above 10 to 15 19 4 18.8 1 7.2 14 74.0 and below 6 Above 15 to 20 9 3 33.0 - - 6 67.0 and below 7 Above 20 to 25 3 - — — - 3 100.0 and below 8 Above 25 to 30 - - — - - - - and below 9 Above 30 to 35 l - - — - 1 100.0 and below 10 Above 35 to 40 5 3 60.0 - - 2 40.0 and below 11 Above 40 to 45 - - - - - - - and below 12 Above 50 to 55 1 - - - - 1 100.0 and below 13 Above 55 to 60 - - -. - .. .. .. and below 14 Above 95 to 100 1 - - - - 1 100.0 and below 15 Above 100 l - - - - 1 100.0 Total 413 246 60.0 14 3.3 153 36.7 lZlb TABLE 5 CASTE AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1959 Srl. No._of families No. Caste Total Communist Neutral Congress__ No. % to No. % to No. % to “_ Cbl.3 Col.3 Cglpg l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 Brahmin 4 - - - - 4 100 2 Komati 6' 1 16.5 - - 5 83.5 3 Reddi 16 5 31.0 1 7.0 10 62.0 4 Teluga 10 1 10.0 2 20.0 7 70.0 5 Visva Brahmin 14 3 21.0 3 21.0 8 58.0 (Kamsali Kammari) 6 Muslim 13 3 23.0 1 8.0 9 69.0 7 Golla 70 37 55.0 2 31 8 Mutrasa 25 21 84.0 - - 4 16.0 9 Gaundla 65 27 41.5 2 3.2 36 55.3 10 Pusala ll 11 100.0 - - - - ll Chakali 13 8 61.5 - — 5 - 12 Vaddera 25 25 100.0 - - - - l3 Lambadi 46 35 76.0 - - 11 34.0 14 Mala 38 29 76.3 2 5.0 7 18.7 15 Madiga 43 30 70.0 - - 13 30.0 16 Others 14 10 71.0 1 7.0 3 22.0 Total 413 246 60.0 14 3.3 153 36.7 122 under one of the tanks was for a long time solely owned by the Deshmukh families. In fact these were the partially rent free pep; lands granted to them by the government. We have noted in the second chapter that these lands are now treated as Khalsa lands and full rent is collected on them. Traditionally, the Deshmukhs gave two acres of land under the tank to six Vaddera families in lieu of their services toward periodical repairs to the tank bund. The Vadderas are also now granted full ownership rights over these two acres. The said tank needed major repairs. Ever since the inception of the Community Development block in the area, Sri Deshmukh No. l and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 have been trying to get government sanction and money for its repair. Finally on l-l-60, the government sanctioned an amount of Rs. 7,000 toward the repair. It was also decided that the level of the slvice be raised from 5'4” to 6' so that the tank may have more storage capacity. The work contract was sanctioned in the name of Sri Deshmukh No.3. Since it was Sri Deshmukh No. 1 who managed to get the sanction and since it was he who could finance it as and when necessary, he also had a share in the work and profits. Work on the tank started in the summer of 1960. But it could not be completed the same year as one Sri Muslim No. l, a local man working as a teacher in the nearby village, petitioned against the construction work. He pleaded that about ten acres of land owned by two Muslims, 123 including himself, and two Harijans would be permanently submerged under the water provided the level of the Sluice was raised to 6 feet. As it was, the ten acres of land was cultivable only during the season of the second crop and during the time of the first crop it was always submerged under the water of the tank. The government ordered an on the spot inspection. The Harijans further represented to the visiting officials that in case the level of the sluice was kept at 6 feet, during heavy rainy seasons their houses would also be submerged under the tank water. In view of these large scale protests the government then ordered that the slvice level be retained at 5 feet 3 inches and not at 6 feet as originally sanctioned. This incident was a direct confrontation between the Deshmukhs on one hand and the Harijans and the Muslims on the other. It is rumored that Sri Muslim No. l knew about the prOposed sanction of the repair work even at the time of panchayat elections and he told it to the Harijans and that is why the Harijans were not enthusiastic to vote for Sri Deshmukh No. 3. It is also said that Sri Muslim No. l sensed the covert misunderstanding between Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. l, and with a view to ex- ploit the situation approached the latter for financial help in the event of a need to go to the court of law against the tank repair. Sri Komati No. l, on his part, took a promise from the Muslim leader that all the votes of his religious group would be cast in favor of the Congress 124 .group. This secret alliance between them was also said to be a factor in the success of the Congress candidates from wards No. l and No. 2 in which the Muslim families were located. A Dispute Between Sri Muslim No. 1 and his gigter Sri Muslim No. 1, mentioned in the above case, lhad under his care three of his deceased sister's daughters. Towards their marriage he sold away the one and a half acre prOperty of his late sister. The purchaser was none other than his other married sister living in Haripur. The land remained for a few years in her possession. Meanwhile it came to be known that Sri Pusala No.2 had illegal sex relations with her. One day her hus- band saw sri Pusala No.2 with her in the house. After a wordy duel for a while, other Muslims gathered and bet Sri Pusala. Sri Muslim No. l and his brothers admonished their sister but she Openly proclaimed her decision to live here- after with Sri Pusala No.2, and to marry him. The woman, however, wanted not to sever her relations with her kin and therefore wanted her lover to convert to Islam. Subsequent- ly, Sri Pusala No. 2 was converted to Islam, tOOk a Muslim name, and married her. Being angry with his sister, Sri Muslim No. 1 con- ceived a plan to teach her a lesson. The property he sold was not yet transferred to her legally. There was also no written document in her favor. Looking at these 1OOpholes, 125 Sri Muslim No. l denied he ever sold the land and tried forc- ibly to take control of the land and to till it himself. His sister, assisted by Sri Pusala No. 2 and his followers, successfully resisted any such seizure by him. A physical encounter also tOOk place on the farm itself. Having failed to take the land back, Sri Muslim No. l decided to go to thecourt of law. Sri Pusala No. 2 was desperate. Sri Muslim No.1 threatened to go to the police officials and report the physical assault on him by Sri Pusala No. 2.1a the village Sri Komati No. 1 and his associates were lined up against him. Under this pressure, he resigned the post of acting police patel. But Sri Pusala No. 2 could not afford to lose the land that was in possession with his new wife. So he approached Sri Deshmukh No. 3, Sri Chakali No. l and Sri Gaundla No. 5 for advice and help. These were sympathetic to him for they took up the stand that after all the woman bought the land herself and no matter whom she married, the land was hers. So they wrote a sale deed, predated to indicate land was bought by the woman from the eldest daughter of her late sister in the year 1951. We may re- call that the said three persons were village elders during the year 1951. They thought a document so written by the elders would have legal strength behind it. Reportedly the woman got her late sister's eldest daughter's signature on it. 126 Sri Muslim No. 1 was infuriated when he came to know of the above manipulation. So he pleaded in the court of law that all three elders were guilty of the grave crimi- nal activity of writing a false document. The three elders were in deep trouble, but managed to get out honorably. The court ordered that pending final decision, temporarily the land should be kept under the possession of Sri Muslim No. l.2 Cleavage in the Panchayat and in village leadership: The above disputes took in quick succession with- in months after the panchayat elections. In the two dis- putes Sri Muslim No. 1 was the main actor. While in the first he was pitted against the Deshmukh No. 3, in the second he was pitted against Sri Pusala No. 2, the ex- Communist leader and the then acting village police patel. As a consequence of the first dispute, Sri Deshmukh No. 3 joined hands with Sri Pusala No. 2, against sri Muslim No.1. We shall recall that sri Komati No.1 had, on a previous occasion, established a sort of alliance with Sri Muslim No. l and this alliance continued later during the course of the second dispute. They found in Sri Pusala No. 2 and sri Deshmukh No. 3 common enemies. It was an Opportune moment for Sri Komati No. l to act against them and alienate 2The dispute did not end there. The case is still in the court. Sri Pusala No. 2 did not allow the land to be taken in possession by Sri Muslim No. l. 127 them from the sympathies of the village panchayat and frOm the patronage of the villagers as a whole. Reportedly, Sri Komati No. 1 persuaded Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Chakali No. 1 not to stand by Sri Deshmukh No. 3 so that the later may alone be found guilty of writing the falsely predated sale deed. The two however could not do so for they were involved in it as much as the Deshmukh was. Further, they needed his influence at the official levels and his skill to tackle the problem, with necessary tact so that they come out of the troubled waters honorably, which they did ultimately. Now both Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and sri Komati No. 1 turned their attention to the arena of the panchayat board. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 had the sympathies of the two Communist members: Sri Mala No. 3 and Sri Vaddera No. l, for they were good friends of Sri Pusala No. 2. Sri Komati No. l was himself a panchayat member. Another Congress member sri Gaundla No. 3 became his close associate. We may recall that Sri Gaundla No. 3 had a quarrel with Sri Komati No. l and the Malas and was beaten by the latter. Even so, ever since he joined the Congress group and ever since a promise of the votes of the Muslim candidates in his favor was made, Sri Gaundla No. 3 became an ally of Sri Komati No. 1. Sri Mala No. 1 was elected as a Communist candidate as also was Sri Reddi No. 5. Both maintained neutrality in the dispute No. 2. But, it was felt by many at that time that the two were closer to Sri Komati No.1 128 rather than to the Communist members of the Panchayat. Sri Mala No. 1 was believed to be so acting under the guidance of Sri Mala No. 2, the Mala influential and the ex-village elder who was himself a money lender and a friend of Sri Komati No. 1. As we have noted, Sri Reddi No. 5 contested as a member of the communist group with the specific promise that he would be made the president. It was alleged by Communists that in his capacity as the President of the village panchayat he cast his vote in favor of a Congress candidate for the presidency of the Panchayat Samiti. As one remarked: “HOw could he forget the fact that his father was butchered by the Communists, even if he would not Openly say so.“ The overt neutrality on the partcf the President and the Vice President wasrpt without any advantage for sri Deshmukh No. 3. In the absence of their Opposition, the support he had from the two Communist members was enough to be invited to the informal meetings of the elders out- side the panchayat meetings. we should note that even after the panchayat was formed, the village disputes con- tinued to be settled outside the framework of the panchayat, and therefore persons outside the panchayat board continued to play leadership roles, exert influence andyield power. Pending the analysis Of the influentials during this period, it may be said at this juncture that, more often than not, in the informal court of Justice of the elders sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1 would take sides with 129 the disputants of a case and some times the deliberations would take personal overtones. It was reported that once there arose a dispute between a Lambadi creditor and a Golla debtor with regard to the repayment of a loan and calcula- tion of the interest. Sri Komati No. 1 supported the creditor and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 pleaded for the reduction 'of the rate of interest. Sri Komati No. 1 made an allega- tion that Sri Deshmukh No. 3 was instigating all the debtors against repayment of loans and that he knew one or two specific cases where he did so. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 challenged Sr1 Komati No. l to prove the allegation or else pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/. On his part, he said, he would pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/. in case the allegation was proved. In fact he went home and brought a gold necklace for deposit twith the elders in lieu of Rs. 1,000/. The men present there however tried to pacify emotions and did not take the allegation seriously. Even so, it illustrates the intensity of animosity that develOped between the two leaders. While Sri Deshmukh No. 3 was struggling hard to maintain his in- pfluehce and curb his falling prestige, Sri Komati No. l was trying to boost his prestige and influence, for in that lies his ability to practice his profession of money lending and recovering loans. Association with Sri Deshmukh No. 3 meant financial loss to Sri Komati No. l. The former either would want a share in each profit the latter would make or the former would dominate the scene. The best way therefore -was‘t6 sum saunas sum humauuoqva.oz Aumaucmamv~.oz assoc sunsets assoc sunsets Aumaucmamu Auusuumuv owoz maccsmum v.02 mans «assess sumsaum Aumsucmamv Aumsuumuvm.oz v.02 accom .um seams: «um Aumsuuouv Aumaucmfimv p.02 wmcom sum 5.0246mwm sum 0 n m i 8 a t e a t C t a a a a 3.. mm. at. .18 d.WHu .dnvt n t naii a 1 a w C W C I\ ( 148 candidate, and with Sri Reddi No. 6, the winning leftist candidate, revealed, sociologically speaking, very interest- ing and illuminating dimensions of local politics. sri Reddi No.5 and Sri Reddi No.6 were brothers. They entered into akind of secret pact that no matter what their outward political or factional affiliations were, one would support the other and therefore they would not contest from the same ward. As a result, Sri Reddi No. 6 was elected from ward No. l and Sri Reddi No.5 was elected from Ward No.2. Obviously by and large, the voters in the three wards con- tinued to be under the influence of the Congressites, parti- cularly Sri Komati No.1 -- the invisible but powerful supporter of the Rightist group. Subsequently, Sri Pusala No.2 and sri Reddi No.6 were elected president and vice- president respectively. On an examination of the Table 3 it should be clear that in wards 3 and 7 the Gaundla and Colla castes, res- pectively, commanded an absolute majority and in ward No.9 the entire population was that of Lambadis. Even so, except in ward No. 3, in the other two wards candidates belonging to castes other than the populous caste groups got elected. To that extent therefore it would not be wrong to say that caste as a factor or resource did not always determine vot- ing behavior. Obviously it was the political-factional affiliation that did matter here. In wards l, 4, 6 and 8 the contenders belonged to the same caste and therefore the caste element seems to have been neutralized. Even so, 149 it is important to note the great importance given to the caste factor at the time of selecting the candidates. As we have noted, the wards 6 and 8 were declared reserved and therefore the Mala and Madiga candidates had to be the contenders. But here also we find that in each of the two wards the castes of the contenders were the same. Further, we may note that in ward No.3, the untouchable and Leftist Mala member lost against the candidate belonging to the pOpulous Gaundla caste in the ward. By the same token in Ward 2 the Muslim. Leftist candidate, lost the election to the upper caste Reddi candidate. CasteLpC1§ss and Poligigal affiliation: This time again two rightist Communist leaders and two leftist Communists leaders were asked to identify, if they could, the political affiliation of each of the vill- age families On the eve of the 1964 elections. If we were to compare Table 5 with that of the Table 5 in Chapter V, we find that in 1964 there were more neutrals than in 1959. Further in 1964 the neutrals were also slightly more numerous than the Rightists. The cause for the increase in the size of the neutrals may reasonably be attributed to the split in the Communist group and the disintegration of the Congress group. Consequently upon the withdrawal and/or change of group affiliations on the part of the old Con- gress leaders as well as increasing cross-pressures on them by the rival communist groups, many families were puzzled 150 and assumed an attitude of non-commitment. As is evident from Table 5 the active Gaundla and Mala caste groups and the traditionally dormant, but populous Golla, Lambadi and Madiga caste groups have a larger percentage of neutrals. As we already know there was a sharp cleavage within the Gaundla caste. Since Sri Mala No. l and Sri Mala No. 3 for the first time represented rival factions, conflict within the caste became intense. Representation was given to the Golla, Madiga and Lambadi candidates for the first time in each or one of the rival Communist groups. Conse- quent pressures and counter pressures for votes pushed many families from these castes toward a neutral position. As can be seen from Table 4 majority of the landless and lower class peasant families are Leftist and the upper classes are more Rightist or neutrals. On further analysis it emerged that out of the 102 neutral families, as many as 67 were from the former Con- gressites, 32 from the former Communist supporters, two were former neutrals, and the remaining one family was that of the new patwari. Out of the former 153 Congressite families, 67 remained neutral, 15 turned to Leftist Commun- ism, and the remaining 71 became supporters Of the Rightist Cbmmunist group. By the same token, out of the 246 former Communist supporters, as many as 197 families remained with the Leftist group, 32 turned neutral, and only 17 became Rightists. Nonetheless we find that the Leftists were more numerous than the Rightists and Neutrals combined. 150a TABLE 4 LANDOWNERSHIP AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION! 1964 Srl. Size of land NO. of Families No. owned Total Left Neutral Right (in acres) Communist Communist No. % to No. % to No. % to .3 Col;3 Coll3 Cgl‘g l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l Landless 147 105 71.4 20 13.6 22 15.0 2 One acre and 65 32 50.0 23 35.4 10 14.6 below 3 Above one acre 122 54 66.3 37 30.3 31 25.4 to 5 and below 4 Above 5 to lo 38 15 40.0 13 33.3 10 26.7 and below 5 Above 10 to 15 18 7 39.0 4 22.0 7 39.0 and below 6 Above 15 to 20 12 3 25.1 1 8.3 8 66.6 and below 7 Above 20 to 25 2 1 50.0 1 50.0 - - and below 8 Above 25 to 30 l - - - - 1 100.0 and below 9 Above 30 to 35 1 - - - - 1 100.0 and below 10 Above 35 to 40 2 - - 2 100.0 - - and below and below 12 Above 45 to 50 2 - - - - 2 100.0 and below 13 Above 50 to 55 2 - - - - 2 100.0 and below 14 Above 95 to 100 l - - - - 1 100.0 andbelow 15 Above 100 l - - 1 100.0 - - Total 414 217 52.4 102 24.6 95 23.0 15Gb TABLE 5 CASTE AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1964 Srl. No, of Families Leftist Right No. Caste Total ggmmunist Neutral Communist No. % to No. 76 to NO. % to f 2 ‘ '3 4 $1.3 6 $2133 8 3911.31. 1 Brahmin 5 - - 2 40.0 3 60.0 2 Komati 6 2 33.4 - - 4 66.5 3 Reddi 16 4 25.0 2 12.5 10 62.5 4 Teluga 10 1 10.0 4 40.0 5 50.0 5 Visva Brahmin l4 3 21.3 5 35.7 6 43.0 (Kammari & Kamsali) 6 .Muslim 13 3 23.0 1 7.7 9 69.3 7 Golla 7O 29 41.4 27 38.5 14 20.1 8 (Mutrasa 25 21 84.0 1 4.0 3 12.0 9 Gaundla 65 26 40.0 24 37.0 15 23.0 10 Pusala ll 7 63.6 2 18.2 2 18.2 11 Chakali 13 10 76.8 2 15.5 1 7.7 12 Vaddera 25 25 100.0 - - - - 13 Lambadi 46 23 50.0 11 24.0 12 26.0 14 Mala 38 25 66.0 10 26.3 3 7.7 15 Madiga 43 28 65.1 8 18.6 7 16.3 16 Others 14 10 71.4 3 21.5 1 7.1 Total 414 217 52.4 103. 24.6 95 23.0 151 Post-election Conflicts It may not be presumptuous on our part to character- ize the period of 1964 to '68 as a period of political turbulance and to adopt Seals and Siegel terminology, Pervasive factionalism.5 A series of incidents of hostility and conflict took place between individuals and groups be- longing either to the same or different social or economic strata. Having come back to hold a seat of political power after a period of oblivion, Sri Pusala No.2 the president, seems to have gone all out to suppress the Opposition and to exploit every possible incident of interpersonal conflict for his own advantage. Let us examine some such incidents. gggassment of Sri Gaundla Nog3: We may recall that on the eve of the elections Sri Gaundla No.8 joined with Sri Pusala No.2 with the main pur- pose of undermining the influence of Sri Gaundla No.3. Accordingly soon after the elections were over they tOOk a series of actions against Sri Gaundla No.3. Incident No.1 In accordance with the plans drawn previously rigorous attempts were made to form the toddy tappers COOperative union. The taluka Leftist Communist leaders gave active support and the excise officials too took interest. The 5Seals and Siegel: Divisiveness and Social Conflict: An Anthr ol ical A roach. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CaIIfornia, 1967. _ 152 officials invited all the Gaundla families to become members of the Union. But as Sri Gaundla No.3 and his associates were indecisive for a long time the Union was constituted initially with twenty members, all leftist- communist supporters. It was also reported that Sri Gaundla No.3 demanded that he be made the president of the Union and that he, in his capacity as the caste head, be given one free share: but sri Graundla No.8 and his friends did not agree to this. Sri Gaundla No.3 however explained that he asked only for the presidentship and not for an extra share. He felt it essential to become president for he was afraid of being cornered and harrassed on all possible occasions. He said: "It was impossible for me to accept an insignificant position and to be at the mercy of my opponent.“ Shortly after the formation of the Union more joined as members and all together there were 44 main shares at the rate of one share to each individual. The 44 shares, however were further subdivided into 55 so as to accomo- date as many tappers as possible. sri Gaundla No.3 would not join. He and ten of his close colleagues took trees on lease from a contractor in the nearby village, but they were not allowed to sell their toddy in Haripur. This meant that these families should spend much of their time in other villages until the toddy was sold out and then return to Haripur quite late at night. It was a real bother each day. 153 incident app; We may recall that Sri Gaundla No.3 was at first a friend of sri Pusala No.2 and then became a close ally of Sri Komati No.1. Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Komati No.1 con- tinued to be Opponents. However, soon after the second panchayat elections were over Sri Komati No.1 noticed the tide Of local forces going against the Rightist Communists in general and against sri Gaundla No.3 in particular. He felt his ability to get his things done in the village was contingent upon his relations with the Leftists and accordingly turned to Sri Pusala No.2. It is rumored the newly won friendship cost him at bicycle worth of Rs. 200/ -- and 2 bags of rice-paddy. These were reportedly presented to Sri Pusala No.2 For deserting them, Sri Mala No.2, Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Gaundla No.3 all old associates, frowned upon sri Komati No.1. Sri Gaundla No.3 became particularly irritated at this change of affiliation at a time when he was under severe attack from Sri Pusala No.2. So he began to speak out against the alleged tacit support of Sri Pusala No.2 for Sri KOmati No.1 in the latter's exploitation of the poor by way of collecting compounded and exorbitant rates of interest. Any Open talk of this sort was naturally damaging to one of the stature of Sri Pusala No.2, the Panchayati President. Moreover, he was a leftist Communist leader in the village and was supposed to espouse the cause of the poor. 154 Hence upset by the accusation, Sri Pusala No.2 began to form another plot against Sri Gaundla No.3. We have noted already that during the time of the elections and for some time previous to that, sri Gaundla No.3 was the excise sub-contractor on behalf of the Haripur Gaundla toddy tappers. At that time he and some other Gaundla colleagues of his took a loan of Rs. 3,000/ -- from Sri Brahmin No. 1 and the amount was spent toward payment of the government revenue relating to the contract. Subse- quently, Sri Gaundla No.8 discovered that the entire amount so taken as loan was not spent prOperly, but a part of it was misappropriated by Sri Gaundla No.3 in contravention of thetrust placed in him. An amount of about Rs. 1,300 was still due to Sri Brahmin No.1. Under the instigation of sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Gaundla No.8, the cosignatories of the promisory note and their supporters, now refused to pay any more toward the loan and made Sri Gaundla No.3 solely res- ponsible for the required redemption. Sri Brahmin No.1 al- so pressed Sri Gaundla No.3 for immediate payment of the loan, allegedly under the influence of sri Komati No.1. Not to be content with that, Sri Gaundla No.8 prOposed to his caste members that as a punitive action for violat- ing the trust placed in him Sri Gaundla No.3 should cease to be recognized as the caste head.. The modon was carried and Sri Gaundla No.3 was replaced by another person. Thus huniliated Sri Gaundla No.3 fled the village temporarily. 155 Conflict between sri Mala No,l and sri Mala No,3: Sri Mala No.1 was the Panchayat member during the period 1959 to '64. He had lost to Sri Mala No.3 in 1964. Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.2 were supporters of sri Gaundla No.3 and therefore were now and then finding fault with the actions of Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3. The latter two did not like this and plotted to harrass Sri Mala No.1, the Rightist Communist supporter. Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.3 were paternal cousins and shared a pen for storing haystacks. Suddenly one day Sri Mala No.3 took the entire piece of land under possession and forbade Sri Mala No.1 from using it. In fear of physical blows and violence Sri Mala No.3 kept quiet for the present. Of course he appealed to the village elders suchal Sri Deshmukh No.3 and Sri Brahmin No.1 who were supposedly neutral at that time. But no settlement could be arrived at through the advice of these elders. They recommended transfer of half of the piece of land to Sri Mala No.3. But sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 would adamantly Oppose any peaceful solution and would not budge an inch from their stand. Qppgsition to Sri Pusala No.2: Due to the above incidents as well as others, slowly the villagers began to become disenchanted with Sri Pusala No.2 and disliked the manner he was conducting himself under the intoxication of unbridled power. So far the Mala leaders 156 Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 were helplessly watching the developments consequent upon the cleavage between Sri Gaundla No.3 and sri Komati No.1, two of their old associ- ates. Now that one of them was also ill treated, the two Mala leaders got ready to muster strength. They approached Sri komati No.1 and warned him of the bad consequences if he were to continue his friendship with Sri Pusala No.2. Having estimated the mounting Opposition, Sri Komati No.1 promised to go back into the fold of his previous associates, thus deserting Sri Pusala No.2. Meanwhile it so happened that some of the amounts collected from the members of the Toddy Tappers Union were not prOperly accounted for by the then president of the Union. Some members, the sympathizers of Sri Gaundla No.3, became suspicious of the President, Sri Gaundla, No.11, Sri Gaundla No.8 and their adviser sri Pusala No.2. Look- ing at this situation Sri Mala No.2 encouraged these diss- idents of the Union to contact Sri Gaundla No.3 and to bring him back to the village. Accordingly Sri Gaundla No. 3 was brought bask home and subsequently was restored to his position Of caste head. Encouraged by these sudden develOpments Sri Mala NO. 2, Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Gaundla No.3 went to the taluka Leftist leaders and complained against sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3. Pending investigation of other problems the leaders decided that half of the land of the pen be given back to Sri Mala NO. 1 immediately. Sri Mala No.3 157 complied with the decision. As we can guess, this decision lowered the prestige of Sri Mala No.3 and Sri Pusala No.2 considerably, and they were both denegrated within and out- side the village Haripur. After some time the fifteen Gaundla dissidents re- signed their membership in the Union. This made Sri Gaundla No.8 and also the Leftist Communist leaders ponder the matter and to take a fresh look at their relations with Sri Pusala No.2. However, no immediate decision was taken. Probably the leaders preferred to watch further develOpments in the village before an apprOpriate action was taken. Sri Komati No, l is beaten: As a legacy of the Nizam rule, almost every village in Telangana had about 10 percent of the land earmarked as Bancharai. the public grazing land. Many villages also had, for some reason or the other, some pprmmboke lands not be- ing cultivated. As the size of pOpulation of the country increased rapidly, pressure on land mounted considerably. The land reform acts did not greatly help to solve the prob- lem of land hunger. The political parties therefore urged the government to distribute the cultivable Bancharai and Poramboke lands among the landless poor. The Congress government accordingly decided to go ahead with the scheme of distributing the available land after retaining at least five percent of the total land in each village as Bancharai. In village Haripur about 30 poor families benefitted from 158 this scheme. Of course, as per the policy of the govern- ment, the Harijans (Mala and Madiga) beneficiaries were more numerous than others. In Haripur Sri Komati No. l and some other families including Sri Deshmukh No.3 had for a long time some Bancharai land under their plough. The government however used to levy excess taxes on these lands. sri Pusala No.2 demanded that the Bancharai land under the possession of Sri Komati No.1 be handed over to the village panchayat for distribution among the landless. Sri Romati No.1 refused to go by the wishes of sri Pusala No.2. Here we shall note that Sri Pusala No.2 became somewhat unpOpular with the Communist leaders at the taluk level and also with his colleagues in the village. The best way to restore his prestige was to indulge in such activities as were con- ceivably intended to serve the cause of the poor. Hence he declared that on an appointed day the Bancharai lands of less than an acre, under the control of Sri Komati No.1 would be parcelled out among the poor whether or not the former agreed to it. Of course, it was also declared that at the same time the two acre Bancharai land under Sri Deshmuktho.3 would also be given to the poor. ‘ On the day fixed, Sri Pusala No.2 and his party went to the designated spot. Sri Komati No.1 too went there along with a party of about 25 men and resisted the seizure of the land by the other party. In the course of physical encounter four of sri Komati No. 1's supporters received 159 injuries. Sri Komati No. l himself received a major blow on the head and was knocked down as aresult. Sri Komati No. l was taken to the taluk headquarters and was admitted to the government hospital. The police arrested the accused, numbering about twelve, including Sri Pusala No.2 and the other panchayat member Sri Mala No.3. A criminal suit was also filed against them in the court of law. The accused were freed on bail pending the final decision of the court. Bail was provided by the Leftist Communist leaders at the taluk headquarters. Terror stricken by the threats of Sri Pusala No.2 and his associates, the Congress members in the village, Sri Deshmukh No.3, Sri Brahmin No. 1, Sri Mala No.2 the parents of Sri Komati No.1, and Sri Gaundla No.3 requested police protection for some time. Police were accordingly stationed in the village for about four months. Meanwhile Sri Deshmukh No.3 petitioned the government to grant ownership rights over the Brancharai land.under his possession with the plea that the land was adjacent to his 22553 (ownership title) land. He claimed the efficiency of his agricultural Operations demanded that the bancharai land be kept under him. The Government grant- ed ownership rights as required by him on payment Of the purchase amount fixed by the revenue officials. Suspension of Sri Pusala No.2I the President: With a criminal case in the court of law against him and his men, Sri Pusala NO. 2 faced a difficult problem. There was no one to finance the huge expenditure involved 160 in fighting the case for an indefinite period. The only .alternative left was to misappropriate the panchayat funds and this he did. His well-known Opponents in the village came to know of this secret. In a way, as one revealed, they were ex- pecting sri Pusala No.2 to act the way he did. It was an Opportune time for them to act vigorously against Sri Pusala No.2. So they appealed to the officer-in-charge at the Panchayat Samiti to check on the Panchayat budget. The officer discovered that Sri Pusala No.2 had embezzled to the tune of Rs. 1,680. On the recommendation of the officer the district collector ordered the suspension of Sri Pusala No.2 effective December 20, 1966. A case against Sri Pusala No.2 is still pending with the collector's office.' Cleavagestwithinjthe.Panchayatx As per regulations, elections were soon conducted for a new president. The members elected Sri Mala No.3, the close confident of Sri Pusala No.2. The vice president sri Reddi No.6 aspired for the position but his claims were overlooked by the members led by Sri Pusala No.2 for fear that Sri Reddi No.6 might not act the way Sri Pusala No.2 might want him to. As one would expect Sri Reddi No.6 felt insulted and began to make overtures to the Rightist Communist group. According to his own version srimati Golla No.1, the Left- ist panchayat member, also became his supporter. The panchayat board as it stood on December 1, 1967 was split, 161 into two factions: One, composed of the Right Communists Sri Reddi No.5. and Srimati Guandla No.10 and the Leftist defectors Sri Reddi No.6 and srimati Golla No.1: and the other composed of Sri Mala No.3, sri Madiga No.4, sri Gaundla No. 9, Sri Vaddera No.2 and Sri Pusala No.2. Obviously the faction under Sri Pusala No.2 continued to be stronger than the other one. Despite their wishes, the Reddi brothers could not tOpple the panchayat headed by sri Mala No.3. It must be made clear however, that the above said change in affiliations was known to everyone, but no public declaration as such was made by the concerned members. Sri Reddi No.6 and srimati Golla No.1, continued to be treated as Leftist members. sri Pusala No.2 is stripped of his leftist leadership! Complaints against Sri Pusala No.2's behavior con- tinued to pour into the office of the Left Communists at the taluk headquarters. The two following incidents made a change in the local political situation in Haripur and led thetaluka leaders to take drastic action against Sri Pusala No.2. Incident 1: One Sri Chakali advanced loans both in cash and kind to srimati Gaundla. In the year 1966, just before Sri Pusala No.2's dismissal as President, he gave away l/4th acre of her irrigated land toward redemption of the loan. TO that effect a document was also written by the Patwari with signatures on it. by the two parties, sri Chakali and Srimati Gaundla. sri Pusala No.2 was one who supported the deal. Both the parties were then his supporters. 162 In the early months of the year 1967 it so happened that one Sri Gaundla No.7 had a quarrel with Sri Chakali. This was also in connection with a loan that the fonmer owed to the latter. When Sri Gaundla No.7 discovered that Sri Pusala No.2 was rather working against his in- terest, he joined the rightist Communist group. Conflict between Sri Guandla No.7 and Sri Chakali persisted and the dispute between them evaded settlement to this date (December 10, 1968). Under the circumstance, with a view .to pressure Sri Chakali, Sri Gaundla No.7 invited Srimati Guandla, who was incidentally his paternal uncle's widow, to take her land back in contravention of the written agree— ment. Her son agreed with the proposal and filed a suit in the court against sri Chakali. Strange as it may seem Sri Pusala No.2 also supported Srimati Gaundla's son and helped ;him to go to the taluk headquarters, see the lawyer and file a suit. This angered Sri Guandla No.8 who actually was instrumental in bringing Sri Pusala No.2 back from oblivion to the political scene. For a long time sri Gaundla No.8 and his father Sri Gaundla No.5 were also up against Srimati Gaundla for the alleged reason that she was in illicit sexual contact with Sri Chakali ever since her husband's death a few years ago and so long as she was “chummy” with Sri Chakali she did not care to pay heed to their advice. Hence Sri Gaundla No.8 and Sri Gaundla No.5 decided to boy- cott Sri Pusala No.2, and demanded his stepping down from the leadership of the Leftist Communist group. They also 163 pleaded with the taluk leaders to take apprOpriate punitive action against him for changing sides and for supporting Srimati Gaundla and thus breaking the unity of their group. Incident 2: We have noted that the government had been granting the poor pgggg_(ownership) rights over the Bancharai lands. Sri Gaundla No.3, almost landless, applied for the,same and worked toward that end. But suddenly he discovered that to his surprise the two acre piece of land for which he had applied was about to be granted in favor of sri Pusala No.2. Hurriedly he went to the taluk headquarters and appealed to the revenue authorities against the patwari for his fraudulent attempts in favor of Sri Pusala No.2.6 After an on-the-spot inspection the authorities decided in favor of Sri Gaundla No.3. In order to expose the unscrupulous activities of Sri Pusala No.2, Sri Gaundla No.3 also reached the Leftist leaders and reported the entire story in detail. Curiously enough we see that Sri Pusala No.2 thus be- came a target of attack both from the Left and the Right. SO far the regional leaders of the Leftist Communist did help sri Pusala No.2 in various ways. They made Sri Komati No.1 withdraw the lawsuit and did not prOpose any punitive action despite a spate of complaints against him. Of course their problem was to arrange for the substitute. But they could wait no longer. At last, the leaders arrived into the village and declared unconditional withdrawal of their support for sri Pusala No.2. 6The young patwari now stands dismissed for various acts of commission and Ommission. sri Reddi No.1 became patwari again. 164 ‘Rift between Sri Pusala NOLZ and Sri Mala No.3: Stripped of the position of panchayat president and leaders' status in the Leftist group, Sri Pusala No.2 again became helpless. Soon his old friends, including Sri Mala No.3 the new President, and Sri Gaundla No.8 the ally since 1964 elections, would desert him. Sri Gaundla No.3, Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.1 were jubilant at the changed Situation, but wanted to turn Sri Mala No.3 completely against Sri Pusala No.2 so that there may not be any immedi- ate possibility Of the two again becoming friends. The three formed a plot. For a long time sri Mala No.3 owed some money to Sri Telaga No.1, but wasevading repayment despite repeated.demands. Sri Telaga No.1 did not press much for fear of being dragged into violent factional poli- tics. With the ouster of Sri Pusala No.2 and the consequent change in the atmosphere in the village, he was strongly persuaded by Sri Mala No.1, Sri Mala No.2 and sri Gaundla No.3 to press Sri Mala No.3 for repayment. Looking at the slowly but steadily growing strength of the Congress Right- ist leaders, Sri Mala No.3 almost gave in and promised to abide by their decision. After a duration of a few days the said Rightist leaders made Sri Mala No.3 pick a quarrel with Sri Pusala No.2. Despite the fact that he was ousted from the presi- dency Sri Pusala No.2 continued to keep the Community Radio in his house andplay it as and when he deemed fit. On one evening when the radio was on Sri Mala No.3 sent a bOy to Sri Pusala No.2 with a demand to have the radio turned over 165 to him. Sri Pusala No.2, according to his own story, did not take the demand seriously and sent the boy baCk with empty hands. Reportedly sri Pusala No.2 also made a casual remark to the boy to the effect that Sri Mala No.3 was probably drunk at the time. Infuriated, Sri Mala No.3 went personally to Sri Pusala No.2 and forced his way into the house in order to seize the radio. Sri Pusala No.2 resisted with all his force and threw sri Mala No.3 out of .the house. sri Mala No.3 reported the matter to the inciters. Soon a group of people assembled, marched toward Sri Pusala No.2's residence, attacked him with severe blows and went back with the radio in their possession. Next day Sri Pusala No.2 went to the taluk headquarters for medical treatment Of the bruises he received. He took this Opportunity to call on the Leftist leaders and report to them what had happened the previous night. Having sensed the local tide of hatred against him, they advised Sri Pusala No.2 not to take any action which would further con- found the already complicated political atmosphere in the village. Unable to haveany one to stand by him, Sri Pusala No.2 dared not to report the matter even to the police and reportedly, also requested the police patel, sri Deshmukh No. 3, not to report the matter to the police. The Present Situation: “Given as I was to despair and anguish,“ remarked sri Pusala No.2, "1 used to make frequent visits to Sri Deshmukh 166 No.3." Sri Mala No.1, sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3, Sri Gaundla No.3, and also Sri Gaundla No.8 frowned upon the gesture of warmth for Sri Pusala No.2 on the part of sri Deshmukh No.3. In the words of sri Gaundla No.3, the im- placable Opponent of Sri Pusala No.2, “Ship; Doravaru“ (i.e. Sri Deshmukh No.3)-had always a liking for Sri Pusala No.2.“ Of course so was the attitude of Sri Pusala No.2 for Sri Deshmukh No.3. As per the testimony of three of these Opponents of Sri Pusala No.2 the inference could be drawn that the said five leaders have decided on a kind of moratorium according to which no»matter what happened none should approach Sri Deshmukh No.3 for any kind of favor or advice and by the same token none should engage in any kind of give-and-take affair with him. In fact, Sri Mala No.2 would pressure Sri Deshmukh No.3 to pay back the loan that was due to him. Alternatively, he asked for liberalizing the conditions of the agreement under which a piece of irrigated land was pledged to him in lieu of the loan amount. Sri Deshmukh No.3 Opted for the latter course of action as he had no cash to redeem the loan instantly. The situation did not however last long. As it should be clear by this time, in the intervening years be- tween 1966 and 1968 the Reddi brothers on the Panchayat were rather overlooked and were not consulted by the Mala brothers. Of course Sri Reddi No.5 meanwhile had a dispute, with his brother Sri Reddi No.1, the ex-patwari. The dispute related to the division and occupancy rights over a 167 piece of land. Even though this dispute did not get in- volved in factional politics, both the brothers filed law suits against the other. Unquestionably this dispute, however, gave a jolt to the long held unity between the Reddi brothers and gave an Opening to others to assaplt their stature. Even so, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Reddi No. 6 stood together and having realized the existing situation began to make friendship with Sri Komati No.1. Sri Telaga No.1, a young man, played the role of mediator between Sri Komati No.1 and sri Deshmukh No.3 and tried to heal the misunderstandings be- tween the two. sri Deshmukh No.3 thus began to regain his lost prestige. Before we move further in the analysis, we must men- tion the important develOpment that took place in the region. In keeping with the changes at the national level the Leftist Communist Paty of the region was split into Marxists and Naxalbarites. The latter name was derived from the armed revolution that was started by proeMao extremists in an area around a place called Naxalbari in the North-east 7 8 declared their state of west Bengal. The Naxalbarites disenchantment with parliamentary democracy as practiced in India and gave an Open call to the public for accepting 7This state is now ruled by the United front led by the Marxist-Leftists and the Rightists. 8sri D.V. Rao, referred to earlier, now belongs to this group. 168 revolutionary tactics and for relinquishing of seats in any of the democratic institutions. Subsequently some trouble was stirred up in the district of Nalgonda and in some villages around Haripur. Clashes also tOOk place between the rival communist leaders and a few acts of arson and murder were also reported. The Government took stern action against the trouble makers and began to round up all the suspects. In Haripur Sri Mala No.3 suspected some trouble owing to his Leftist association and extremist leanings. The Mala leaders advised sri Mala No.3 to announce publicly his com- plete disassociation with the Communists. With this act all three Mala brothers, Sri Mala No.1, sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 came to be united. Notwithstanding his differences with Sri Gaundla No.3, Sri Gaundla No.8 gave indication of his support to the Mala brothers. Whether he did so under duress of the political situation of the region or with other motives, is difficult to judge. To take a summary view of the situation as it stood on January 1, 1968. There emerged two loose groups: One made up of Sri Reddi No.5, Sri Reddi No.6, Sri Telaga No.1, Sri Deshmukh No.3 and sri Komati No.1, and the other composed of Sri Mala No.1, sri Mala No.2, Sri Mala No.3, sri Gaundla No.3 and Sri Gaundla No.8. The adjective “loose“ has been advisedly used for the reason that there has not as yet develOped strong bonds between the members of each of the groups. The "we feeling“ is yet to emerge. In the first 169 group the differences between Sri Deshmukh No.3 and sri Komati No.1 were not fully resolved. And so was the case in the difference between Sri Gaundla No.3 and sri Gaundla No.8 of the second group. The groups were also not as yet Openly pitted against each other. Leadership Reputation: To the quesdon as to "who were to your knowledge and Opinion, the important village leaders (a) immediately after the second panchayat elections in the 1966 and then, (b) after the dismissal of Sri Pusala No.2 in the village,“ the answers elicited from the 25 knowledgeables present the following reputation mentions for each of the village leaders. Since the situation differed before and after the dismissal of Sri Pusala No.2 as the president, the question was accordingly put orally. 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